Skip to main content

Inductive Influence

Williamson, Jon (2007) Inductive Influence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58 (4). pp. 689-708. ISSN 0007-0882. E-ISSN 1464-3537. (doi:10.1093/bjps/axm032) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

Abstract

Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief 12 to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence on the next observation. I show how this approach can be used to capture the Johnson-Carnap continuum of inductive methods, as well as the Nix-Paris continuum, and show how inductive influence can be measured.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1093/bjps/axm032
Additional information: This paper demonstrated that it is, after all, possible for the objective Bayesian to learn from experience.
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:50 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:29 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1292 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Williamson, Jon: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0514-4209
  • Depositors only (login required):

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year