Thomas, Alan P. (2003) An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2 (3). pp. 161-185. ISSN 1568-7759. (doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000004923.54269.f4) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:1288)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/b:phen.0000004923.54269.f4 |
Abstract
The importance of this paper is that it further develops a novel approach to the problem of consciousness. An account of person level and state level consciousness are developed together, where ‘consciously’ modifies exercises of the mental acts of a whole person. Consciousness is distinguished from self-knowledge and a Neo-Brentanian identity theory of their mutual relation is rejected. A theory of self-knowledge is outlined, grounded on globally based self-ascription. The bearing of this theory on the unity of consciousness is explained. This paper has been cited by leading experts in the field such as Zahavi, Rowlands and Thomasson.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1023/b:phen.0000004923.54269.f4 |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Maureen Nunn |
Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:50 UTC |
Last Modified: | 09 Mar 2023 11:29 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1288 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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