An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness

Thomas, Alan P. (2003) An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2 (3). pp. 161-185. ISSN 1568-7759. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)


The importance of this paper is that it further develops a novel approach to the problem of consciousness. An account of person level and state level consciousness are developed together, where ‘consciously’ modifies exercises of the mental acts of a whole person. Consciousness is distinguished from self-knowledge and a Neo-Brentanian identity theory of their mutual relation is rejected. A theory of self-knowledge is outlined, grounded on globally based self-ascription. The bearing of this theory on the unity of consciousness is explained. This paper has been cited by leading experts in the field such as Zahavi, Rowlands and Thomasson.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:50
Last Modified: 10 Jun 2014 08:33
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):