Thomas, Alan P. (2003) An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2 (3). pp. 161-185. ISSN 1568-7759. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)
The importance of this paper is that it further develops a novel approach to the problem of consciousness. An account of person level and state level consciousness are developed together, where ‘consciously’ modifies exercises of the mental acts of a whole person. Consciousness is distinguished from self-knowledge and a Neo-Brentanian identity theory of their mutual relation is rejected. A theory of self-knowledge is outlined, grounded on globally based self-ascription. The bearing of this theory on the unity of consciousness is explained. This paper has been cited by leading experts in the field such as Zahavi, Rowlands and Thomasson.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Maureen Nunn|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:50|
|Last Modified:||10 Jun 2014 08:33|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1288 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|