Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

Kirchin, Simon T. (2003) Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6 (3). pp. 241-264. ISSN 1386-2820. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

In this piece I try to nail a train of thought that is offered, typically by realists against anti-realists, as a reason for thinking that our raw moral phenomenology provides a reason to prefer moral realism. This idea is referred to often, but is rarely detailed. I argue that various arguments that one can devise which are in keeping with this train of thought fail. I conclude by saying, controversially, that moral phenomenology is fairly irrelevant when thinking about metaethics. This paper has been cited by a number of people in their recent work (for example, Horgan and Timmons, Loeb).

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:48
Last Modified: 28 May 2014 09:53
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1219 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):