Power

The concept of power is acknowledged as one of the few steady axes around which the social

sciences have been revolving at least since the first half of the 20th century. In fact, very few

concepts have been as pervasive and generative. Equally undisputed is the lack of a shared

understanding among social scientists of what power is. This situation has been clearly

encapsulated by the claim of power as an “essentially contested” concept (i.e., neither

empirically settled nor conceptually commonly defined). To reduce the complexity of the many

faces of power, two main limitations can be imposed. First, from a metatheoretical viewpoint,

the focus is posited on the different conceptual uses of power within the social sciences. Even

if no one feature is common among all the conceptual uses, it is still possible to realize how

they are connected by a series of overlapping “family resemblances” that simply make it

possible to talk of power as such. Second, from a theoretical viewpoint, the reference to the

concepts, practices, and institution of surveillance helps narrow down the field, guiding the

selection of the many and different conceptual uses. Therefore, emphasis is placed on what

might be called the modernist matrices of power in the social sciences—those theoretical

frameworks that keep inspiring, as reference points or critical targets, scholarly reflections on

power today—and then on disciplinary and postdisciplinary theories of power, recognizing the

seminal role of Michel Foucault’s contribution to any discussion about power and surveillance.

This entry, therefore, first undertakes an examination of the work of three philosophers whose

concepts and theories shaped the meaning of power. It then reviews in detail the concepts of

disciplinary power and postdisciplinary power.