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De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality

Tanney, Julia (1995) De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality. Philosophical Studies, 79 (3). pp. 237-258. ISSN 0031-8116. E-ISSN 1573-0883. (doi:10.1007/BF00989693) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:11283)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00989693

Abstract

It seems to be a platitude that what makes behaviour irrational is its failure to accord with some particular norm of rationality and it seems right to say that intentional action by and large conforms to these norms. These considerations might encourage one to attempt to

do this captured by construing them as psychologically internalized rules, or as causal determinants of behaviour?

causal account of intentional action, which, for the sake of making the arguments clear, I shall just accept. I shall show that it is not necessary to individualize a principle of rationality in order to characterize an individual’s actions as internally irrational. In the second half of the

explain her dispositions to act in accordance with what the norm prescribes, either directly, or via her second-order explicational abilities. I argue in the end that cognizing a norm of rationality could only be considered constitutive of an individual’s ability to obey it on a very artificial and stipulative sense of “obey”. I conclude that it is a mistake to construe the principles of rationality as norms or rules which may or may not be obeyed or followed.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/BF00989693
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Julia Tanney
Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2009 18:36 UTC
Last Modified: 28 May 2019 13:48 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11283 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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