Chadha, Jagjit S. and Nolan, Charles (2003) Monetary and Fiscal Interactions in DSGE framework. In: Chadha, Jagjit S. and Altug, Sumru and Nolan, Charles, eds. Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ISBN 978-0-521-82668-6. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:11003)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. |
Abstract
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have begun to dominate the field of macroeconomic theory and policy-making. These models describe the evolution of macroeconomic activity as a recursive sequence of outcomes based upon the optimal decision rules of rational households, firms and policy-makers. Whilst posing a micro-founded dynamic optimisation problem for agents under uncertainty, such models have been shown to be both analytically tractable and sufficiently rich for meaningful policy analysis in a wide class of macroeconomic problems, for example, monetary and fiscal policy, economic cycles and growth and capital flows. This volume collects specially commissioned papers from leading researchers, which pull together some of the key recent results in diverse areas. This book will promote research using optimising models and inform researchers, post-graduate students and economists in policy-oriented organisations of some of the key findings and policy implications.
Item Type: | Book section |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Jagjit Chadha |
Date Deposited: | 15 Sep 2008 15:00 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 09:44 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11003 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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