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Normative error theory and no self-defeat: A reply to case

Khuramy, Mustafa, Schulz, Erik (2024) Normative error theory and no self-defeat: A reply to case. Philosophia, 52 . pp. 135-140. ISSN 0048-3893. E-ISSN 1574-9274. (doi:10.1007/s11406-024-00718-4) (KAR id:105338)


Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, both on the error theorist’s side and those that claim that there is a self-defeat problem. Upon clarification, we also raise scepticism to what exactly the nature of self-defeat is meant to be.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s11406-024-00718-4
Uncontrolled keywords: self-defeat; Epistemic normativity; Nihilism; Error theory
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
SWORD Depositor: JISC Publications Router
Depositing User: JISC Publications Router
Date Deposited: 18 Mar 2024 12:36 UTC
Last Modified: 19 Mar 2024 13:46 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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