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A Model of Competing Gangs in Networks

Poindron, Alexis, Allouch, Nizar (2024) A Model of Competing Gangs in Networks. Games, 15 (2). Article Number 6. ISSN 2073-4336. (doi:10.3390/g15020006) (KAR id:105169)


Two groups produce a network good perceived by a third party, such as a police or military institution, as a ‘public bad’, referred to as ‘crime’ for simplicity. These two groups, considered mafias, are assumed to be antagonists, whether they are enemies or competitors in the same market, causing harm to each other’s activities. This paper provides guidelines for the policymaker, typically the police, seeking to minimize overall crime levels by internalizing these negative externalities. One specific question is investigated: the allocation of resources for the police. In general, we recommend a balanced crackdown on both antagonists, but an imbalance in group sizes may lead the police to focus on the more criminal group.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.3390/g15020006
Uncontrolled keywords: Applied Mathematics, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Statistics and Probability
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Funders: Agence Nationale de la Recherche (
Agence de l'innovation de défense (
SWORD Depositor: JISC Publications Router
Depositing User: JISC Publications Router
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2024 14:37 UTC
Last Modified: 04 Mar 2024 10:04 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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