Closed Loop Supply Chain under Power Configurations and Dual Competitions

This paper investigates pricing and collecting decisions in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) under different power configurations and dual competitions. If the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) could sell products directly and collect used products, OEM has to compete with both forward retailer and reverse collector, simultaneously, and OEM possesses different bargaining powers. Specifically, we examine the following models: (1) M1: OEM holds the first position in both forward and reverse channels; (2) M2: OEM holds the first (second) position in the forward (reverse) channel; (3) M3: OEM holds the second position in both channels. We conduct a systematic comparison of forward competition, reverse competition and dual competitions across the above models. From the perspective of the entire supply chain, the outcome of model selection hinges on the extent of competition. If the competition is sufficient, two forward leaders will engage in a price battle which results in great losses for both. Then M1 is preferred. Otherwise, M3 outperforms.