Tanney, J. (2004) On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIX (1). pp. 173-186. ISSN 0031-8205.
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In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are “on the inside”. My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical “intuitions”. Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and prepositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, I argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is a first-class, American philosophical journal with blind refereeing.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Maureen Nunn|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:49|
|Last Modified:||07 Feb 2012 12:54|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1239 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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