Foucault's Concepts of Critique

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Contents

Abstract

What is the relation between Foucault's work and critique? Foucault made his debt to the critical tradition clear on different occasions, either by attempting to define critique in the light of his archaeo-genealogical studies (1990: 154-155) or through explicit statements like "we are all Neo-Kantians" (2001: 546). Thus, it is not surprising that a considerable number of books and articles have been dedicated to the study of the relation between Foucault's oeuvre and the notion of critique. These studies, although varying in their scope and emphases, tend to adopt two major interpretative strategies. The first attempts to give a coherent reading of Foucault's work by making it a project that was organized around the central theme of the critique from the beginning. Beatrice Han's *Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical* (2002) is one of the best examples of such an attempt. The second strategy, instead of doing a chronological study of the development of the notion of critique in Foucault's oeuvre, takes its starting point to be one of his, more often than not, later notions in order to present a 'Foucauldian critique', in the light of which the rest of his work needs to be re-interpreted. Colin Koopman, for example, in *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity* (2013), argues that Foucault's approach to critique consists in "the historical problematization of the present", on the basis of which it is possible to distinguish between "critical methods" (e.g., genealogy and archaeology) and "critical concepts" (e.g., discipline and Biopower) in his oeuvre. This thesis presents a chronological study of Foucault's oeuvre in order to reveal the existence of the multiplicity of *concepts* of critique, in which the relation between its variables is shifting perpetually. These variables, taking inspiration from Deleuze (1991; 2006), are: Articulation, Visibility and Subject. However, instead of identifying each of them with a specific phase of Foucault's 'critical project', I will argue that all of them have always been present but the relation between them goes through significant changes and thus gives rise to those phases. This thesis is a detailed analysis of the schemata of Foucauldian critique in order to demonstrate that instead of a singular notion, his oeuvre provides us with a plural concept of critique.

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Abbreviations

(All translations from French are mine and all other translations have been checked with the original text and when it was necessary they have been modified.)

AD	*De l'archéologie a la dynastique*
AK	*Archaeology of Knowledge*
AP	*Ariane s'est pendue*
APMD	*À propos de Marguerite Duras*
AS	*L'Archéologie du savoir*
BB	*The Birth of Biopolitics*
BC	*The Birth of The Clinic*
BF	*Behind the Fable*
BP	*Body/Power*
BW	*The Birth of a World*
CAP	*Candidacy Presentation*
CF	*Confessions of The Flesh*
CFT	*The Concern for Truth*
CM	*Croître et Multiplier*
CPB	*Cuvier's Position in the History of Biology*
CT	*The Courage of Truth*
CTIH	*Critical Theory/Intellectual History*
DAO	*Distance, Aspect, Origin*
DH	*The Discourse of History*
DL	*Death and the Labyrinth*
DN	*The Debate on the Novel*
DND	*Le discours ne doit pas être pris comme...*
DS	*Different Spaces*
DSC	*Des supplices aux cellules*
DSL	*Michel Foucault : « désormais la sécurité est au-dessus des lois »*
EMS	*End of the Monarchy of Sex*
EP	*Eye of Power*
FL	*Foucault live*
FN	*The Father's "No"*
FRS	*Foucault répond à Sartre*
FS	*Fearless Speech*
GL	*On the Government of the Living*
GSO	*On the Government of Self and Others*
HB	*Herculine Barbin*
HC	*An History of Culture*
HDC	*History, Discourse, Discontinuity*
HEM	*L'homme est-il mort?*
HM	*History of Madness*

HOS	*Hermeneutics Of the Subject*
HS1	*The History of sexuality I*
HS2	*The History of sexuality II*
HS3	*The History of sexuality III*
HS-UP	*Preface to The History of Sexuality II*
IAP	*Intellectuals and Power*
IDS	*Il Faut Defendre la Societe*
IKA	*Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*
IMF	*Interview With Michel Foucault*
IP	*The Impossible Prison*
LI	*Language to Infinity*
LK	*Andre Breton: A Literature of Knowledge*
LN	*Lecture on Nietzsche: How to Think the History of Truth with Nietzsche without Relying on Truth*
LNM	*La naissance d'un monde*
LS	*Langage of Space*
LSS	*Linguistiques et sciences sociales*
LWK	*Lectures on the Will to Know*
MAO	*Madness, the Absence of Oeuvre*
MC	*Madness and Civilization*
MES	*Madness Only Exists in Society*
MP	*The Meshes of Power*
MPF	*My Body, This Paper, This Fire*
NFM	*Nietzsche, Freud, Marx*
NGH	*Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*
NGHf	*Nietzsche, la généalogie, l' histoire*
OA	*On Attica*
OD	*The Order of Discourse*
OES	*Omnes et Singulatim*
OGL	*On The Government of The Living (course summary)*
OK	*Oedipal Knowledge*
OT	*The Order of Things*
P	*Problematics*
PA	*The Prose of Acateon*
PAB	*Power Affects the Body*
PC	*Pouvoir et Corps*
PCFP	*Les problèmes de la culture: Un débat Foucault-Preti*
PLR	*Pourquoi réédite-t-on l'oeuvre de Raymond Roussel?*
PP	*Psychiatric Power*
PPP	*Politics, Polemics and Problematization*
PPS	*Psychiatric Power (course summary)*
PS	*Power and Strategies*
PSS	*The Punitive Society*
PT	*A Preface to Transgression*

PTI	*Penal Theories and Institutions (Course Summary)*
QA	*Qu'est-ce que un autor?*
QG	*Questions on Geography*
QM	*Questions of Methods*
QPF	*Qui êtes-vous, professeur Foucault?*
REC	*On The Archaeology of the Science: Response to the Epistemology Circle*
RH	*Return to History*
RM	*Remarks on Marx*
SC	*La situation de Cuvierdans l'histoire de la biologie*
SE	*Michel Foucault : la sécurité et l'Etat*
SEN	*Social Extension of the Norm*
SEP	*Surveiller et Punir*
SKP	*Space, Knowledge, Power*
SM	*Sorcery and Madness*
SMD	*Society Must be Defended*
SP	*The Subject and Power*
SPC	*La Société Punitive*
SSR	*Speaking and Seeing in Raymond Roussel*
SSS	*Sade : Sergeant of Sex*
ST	*Subjectivity and Truth*
STC	*Summoned to Court*
STP	*Security, Territory, Population*
TAK	*The Archaeology of Knowledge*
TF	*Theatrum Philosophicum*
THS	*The History of Sexuality*
TIF	*Truth is in the Future*
TIP	*Théories et institutions pénales*
TJF	*Truth and Juridical Forms*
TL	*Two Lectures*
TNP	*This is not a Pipe*
TO	*The Thought of the Outside*
TOT	*The Order of Things (interview)*
TP	*Truth and Power*
TS	*Talk Show*
VFJ	*La vérité et les formes juridiques*
VK	*Va-t-on Extrader Klaus Croissant ?*
WA	*What is an Author?*
WC	*What is Critique?*
WDTT	*Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice*
WE	*What is Enlightenment?*
WOP	*What Our Present Is*
WPF	*Who Are You Professor Foucault?*

Foucault's Concepts of Critique

Introduction

This is a dissertation on Foucault's concepts of critique. It will be argued that in Foucault's oeuvre, instead of a singular concept of critique, we are dealing with a multiplicity of concepts. This dissertation is less about critique than about the invention of the concepts of critique and their dynamic. The aim of this study is not to assess Foucault's critical endeavor but to analyze the way that this endeavor became possible. To remain faithful as much as possible to the Foucauldian mode of questioning,[1] I will try to illustrate the 'how' of his oeuvre.

Concept, an idea put forward by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosphy?*, should be distinguished from the conceptual toolkit. While the former refers to the creativity of thinking ('how'), the latter denotes the created content of thought ('what'). What a thinker says about a specific issue, for example rationality, has been made possible by a singular mode of thought, which makes them a structuralist, a Hegelian, or a post-colonialist. This is the distinction that Bruno Latour (1993) makes between the 'modality of thought' (being a modernist) and the 'process of thinking' (the modern constitution).This idea will be discussed partly in this chapter and partly in chapter 4. Concept, as it was envisaged by Deleuze and Guattari, is composed of *variables* and their relations.

The core thesis of this dissertation is that Foucault's oeuvre consists of three concepts of critique, each being composed of three variables of Articulation, Visibility, and Subject. Since these variables have different *phases,* so the relation between them is not a static structure, and the mode of being of each concept is determined by the dominant variable. The first three chapters are dedicated to the detailed study of variables and their phases.

The fact that Foucault is one of the most cited authors[2] implies two things. Firstly, it means that any new study of Foucault must begin by recognizing the need to limit the secondary literature. Foucault's oeuvre itself, including books, interviews, and lectures, is an enormous

[1] As Deleuze (2001: 106) once stated, philosophical activity is nothing but an "elaborately developed question" that "shows us what things are, or what things should be". Thus, a Foucauldian study of any subject involves not using the conceptual toolkit he developed, but to remain faithful to his mode of questioning. In that sense, it is possible to say that this dissertation is a Foucauldian study of Foucault.
[2] According to Google Scholar, the citation of Foucault's work has always had an ascending trend: [https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AKqYIxMAAAAJ]

amount of material that makes the reading and integration of all of it in a single study a daunting enough task. However, to study the diversity of secondary literature, which extends from using Foucault's conceptual toolkit in football studies[3], nursing[4], education[5] to international relations[6], is absolutely impossible. Bearing in mind this limitation from the beginning, my strategy for choosing some of the secondary literature and omitting others has been to let the course of research indicate which sources should be read and integrated. The most relevant literature for this research are those that attempt to grasp a project in Foucault's oeuvre: Beatrice Han-Pile, Johanna Oksala, and Colin Koopman. The second implication is that, as Todd May (2006) has observed, there should be a relatively good reason to commence a new study of Foucault. Considering the amount of secondary literature, why yet write another book, essay or Ph.D. thesis on Foucault?

The answer to this question is that this study is a departure from what has already been said about Foucault's critical activity towards, hopefully, a new land where concepts are created. Thus, this dissertation should be read as a line of departure that connects those analyses of Foucault's critical activity -without denying or disapproving their value- to a conceptual field that can account for their diversity. The aim is not to show that everybody is wrong, but to account for the diversity of readings that claim to be right. While a review of these different analyses will be provided in chapter 4, I have constructed my arguments through/against many of these scholarly works. The aim of this study is to see what it would be like if Foucault, in a Rousselian gesture, wanted to write a book titled *How I Wrote Certain of my Books*?

From *Dispositif* to Concept

What inspired this research? The inspiration comes from Deleuze's works on Foucault, but it should be said straightaway that this is not a sequel to Deleuz's reading of Foucault. However, Deleuze has a twofold role in this dissertation: the source of inspiration for the three main concepts (i.e. articulation, visbility, and subject) and providing a conceptual framewoek for the notion of critique that is the central theme of this study. On the basis of

[3] Pezdeka, Krzysztof and Michaluka, Tomasz, *The Functioning of the Polish Football Association from the Perspective of Michel Foucault's Conception of Exclusion*.
[4] Gastaldo D. and Holmes D., *Foucault and Nursing: A History of the Present*. Authors argue that nurses in different countries has started developing Foucauldian interpretations of nursing.
[5] Many books and essays have been published on this subject, but for a recent and influential research see: Ball J., Stephen, *Foucault, Power, and Education*.
[6] For one of the recent example see: Kierssey, Nicholas J. and Stokes, Doug, *Foucault and International Relations: New Critical Engagements*.

Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of "concept" in *What is Philosophy?*, I have tried to analyse critique as a concept. I will demonstrate that if we consider critique as a multiplicity of relations between "variables", then it is legitimate, following Deleuze, to analyze it as a concept. This methodological approach towards critique enables us to study Foucault's oeuvre in terms of its relational elements. Thus, instead of trying to explain "what" his critique has done, our focus will be on "how" he has done his critique and "how" he has shifted from one concept of critique to the other one.

Thus it is clear that the distinction between "how" and "what" plays a critical role in this analysis. Iain Mackenzie's reading of Deleuze and Guatari's *What is Philosophy?* has made such a theoretical distinction possible. In his *The Idea of Pure Critique*, MacKenzie makes a distinction between the critical activity ("what") and the idea of critique ("how") and argues that the latter should be understood as "pure critique". What is essential in pure critique is to overcome "indifference", a project that is Kantian in its nature. To develop the idea of pure critique, MacKenzie reads Deleuze and Guattari's works in the light of the critical attitude that was inaugurated by Kant, that is to say, critique as overcoming indifference. What is important for our study is that Mackenzie demonstrates that in order to understand pure critique ("how") one needs to take the idea of "concept" in *What is Philosophy?* seriously.

Here I will focous on Deleuze's reading of Foucault and the way that the three main ideas of articulation, visibility, and subject emerged. I will also argue that the way that these ideas are developed in this dissertation differs from this original reading. I will return to Mackenzie in the conclusion.

Foucault's oeuvre, for Deleuze (2007a: 241-242), is situated somewhere between Heidegger (because of its engagement with nothing but thought) and Nietzsche (because it is 'Untimely'). According to Deleuze, Foucault's work was formed by three axes which were discovered one after the other: Knowledge, Power and Subjectivation (Deleuze, 2006). Deleuze defines the first axis by the term 'strata' or 'historical formations' which has two essential aspects: articulations and visibility. From one strata to the other, it is the distribution of visibilities and the system of articulation that are changed. The knowledge that Foucault's archaeology targets "is a practical assemblage, a 'mechanism' of statements and visibilities" (ibid, 51). There is no conjunction between these two aspects of the strata; rather, the limit that separates them, at the same time, links them together; this is a "limit

with two irregular faces, a blind word and a mute vision" (ibid: 65). Behind the knowledge, one can only find the wall of "non-knowledge", as Foucault puts it, or 'strategies' or 'the non-stratified', as Deleuze calls it. This 'outside' is power which should be understood as "relations between forces". Foucault's Nietzscheanism is here more evident than anywhere else because instead of looking for the origin or the essence of power, he asks about the way that it is practiced. Power functions regardless of the forms that provide it with its means and ends or the formed substances that it functions upon: diagram is the name that is given to this pure functionality (in contrast to archive, which refers to a formalized function). Deleuze argues that Foucault's 'diagramaticism', analogous to Kant's 'schematism', is the presentation of "pure relations" between forces, which makes the link between two irreducible aspects of knowledge possible (ibid, 81-82). In this reading, while diagram is the a priori of the archive, it does "not lie outside strata but forms the outside of strata" (ibid: 84).

For Deleuze, thinking occurs in relation to this outside, it *happens* "in the interstice" between seeing and speaking. While the diagram stems from the outside, the outside is not identical with any diagram, because the diagram cannot exhaust all the relations between forces. Thinking doesn't mutate the stratified, but in relation to the outside, which continues to 'draw' new diagrams, it can bring about radical shifts. Here, Deleuze (ibid: 94-95) argues, Foucault realized an "impasse": "If power is constitutive of truth, how can we conceive of a 'power of truth' which would no longer be the truth of power, a truth that would release transversal lines of resistance and not integral lines of power?" to resolve this issue, Foucault introduced the third axis of subjectivation or the Fold. Deleuze rejects the idea that Foucault's late works should be read as an attempt to return to the subject. Although this axis emerged last, it was present from the beginning in his work in the sense that this "theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside" has haunted Foucault from his first book (ibid: 98). Foucault, for example, dealt with this issue in *The Order of Things*: why does thinking, which comes from outside, not function as a window so that the outside 'floods' into the inside? Foucault's answer is that, the unthought is not external to thought but "lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside" (ibid: 97). For Deleuze, thus, subjectivity as the relation to oneself which became central in *The Use of Pleasure* is more a matter of reorganization that now gives prominence to the 'fold' as a doubling that produces an inner and an outer surface. In Deleuze's monograph, the three axes simultaneously exist in Foucault's oeuvre but their emergence is only a matter

of 'recentring'. Subjectivation, for example, far from 'annulling' other axes "was already working at the same time as the others".

In a conference held four years after Foucault's death, Deleuze returns to these themes but with some modifications. Deleuze's argument here is that Foucault's oeuvre should be understood as "an analysis of concrete 'dispositifs'" (2007b: 338). What constitute dispositifs are no longer the three aspects of Knowledge, Power, and Subjectivity, but 'lines'.[7] Those aspects are only "three main instances" of dispositif and consist of "chains of *variables*" or lines. Dispositif is treated as a 'skein' which is "composed of lines of visibility, utterances, lines of force, lines of subjectivation, lines of cracking, breaking and ruptures that all intertwine and mix together" (ibid, 342). The important shift that occurs with the introduction of dispositif-lines is that the three axes of Power, Knowledge and Subjectivity do not have the static structural relation which was suggested in his earlier books. Each dispositif is defined by "its content of … creativity", and depending on which lines are the source of creativity, the dispositif can be identified with one of those three aspects. In each apparatus, at any specific 'age', the different lines can be divided into two groups: "lines of stratification or sedimentation and lines of actualization or creativity" (ibid: 347). However, the important point is that none of the lines are inherently lines of creation or stratification, that can only be determined by analyzing the totality of relations.

This somewhat short presentation of Deleuze's reading of Foucault's work was necessary because it was the relation between lines and dispositif that inspired the present study. The question that inaugurated this dissertation was this: is it possible to grasp Foucault's different critical activities in terms of a dispositif? If one wants to apply dispositif not to a social phenomenon but to an oeuvre, what can constitute its lines? How can one make a distinction between different dispositifs within an oeuvre and at the same time link them together? I found the answer to these questions in Deleuze and Guattari's *What is philosophy?*, where they develop the idea of the concept. Apart from the interesting fact that the title of the first draft of Deleuze's monograph was *Michel Foucault's Main Concepts*, there is also further evidence in Deleuze and Guattari's work that justifies the link between dispositif and concept. The connection between the two passes through the notion of assemblage (*agencement*). Since the notion of assemblage in this study does not play a

[7] Deleuze and Guattari have developed the idea of three different types of line (i.e. molar line, molecular line and line of flight) in *A Thousand Plateaus*, especially chapter 8.

substantial role, I will not delve into details of the notion itself. It is enough to know that as the original French term suggests, the assemblage is the 'arrangement' or 'composition' of heterogeneous elements that come together and constitute a functioning constellation. As it has been suggested by some scholars, the concept of assemblage is the development of the notion of dispositif (Patton,2000: 44; Bogue, 2007: 145; Wets-Pavlov: 2009: 150; Dovey, 2013: 133). Moreover, the different kinds of assemblages are distinguished on the basis of the lines to which they correspond (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 69). Accordingly, it is possible to say that dispositif is a type of assemblage.

Deleuze and Guattari in their work have discussed different types of assemblages, but what is important for this study is that in *What is Philosophy?* they (2013: 36) argue that "concepts are concrete assemblages". A Concept, as understood by Deleuze and Guattari, is a *combination* (*chiffre*) of different 'variables'. Deleuze (2007: 144), regarding his own concepts, writes: "What is interesting about concepts like desire, or machine, or assemblage is that they only have value in their variables and in the maximum of variables which they allow". Thus, the notion of assemblage functions as a bridge so that we can move from dispositif towards the concept, from the socio-political realm to that of thought. If the notion of dispositif enabled Deleuze to deal with the question "'what' was Foucault doing when he was critiquing?", the idea of concept can help us to answer the following question: "'how' was Foucault thinking when he was critiquing?" However, one question still remains to be answered. We know that dispositif is a constellation of lines and concept a combination of variables, now the question is how we should understand variables and their relationships.

The concept is a multiplicity composed of different variables, but it is not merely a constellation of any sort of heterogeneous elements. Variables, which we can understand as very similar to lines in the notion of dispositif, account for the dynamic of concept and thus in the analysis of each concept "it's not a matter of bringing all sorts of things under a single concept, but rather of relating each concept to the variables that explain its mutations" (Deleuze, 1997: 31). The creation of concepts consists in bringing these different variables into a novel relation which can make the mutation of the formed concept possible. Variables, as Deleuze and Guattari perceive them, have different *phases*. We will discuss these issues in more detail in chapter 4, but here let's consider the example of the Cartesian Cogito which is composed of three variables of doubting, thinking and being (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013: 24-26). The variable of being, for instance, includes three phases of "infinite

being, finite thinking being, and extended being". The Cartesian concept of the self, however, only allows for the second phase and excludes others, this is because concepts are 'closed' multiplicities. Other phases of being only appear when a new concept, i.e. God, emerges that is linked to the first concept through a 'bridge'. Moreover, bridges are the result of a *crisis*. As Deleuze (2007, 338) tells us, great thinkers "do not evolve but proceed by crises". In the case of Descartes, for example, having the idea of infinity is a crisis that cannot be explained by the concept of self and thus makes the emergence of a new concept, with its own components, possible.

Before presenting the variables that are at work in Foucault's concepts of critique, it is worth turning to Foucault himself to see if we can find confirmations for our approach towards his thought. Paul Patton (2000, 49) has observed that there are "several 'zones of indiscernibility' between the concepts of power deployed throughout the texts of Deleuze, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari".[8] Is it possible to locate another indiscernible zone, not in relation to their concepts but regarding their understanding of thought? To answer this question we need to explore Foucault's reflection upon his own career. My contention is that this reflection appears in Foucault's oeuvre in two different modalities. One is very common and it is possible to find different instances of it in Foucault's work to the extent that one might suspect that it goes beyond a mere reflection and presents the strategic aspect of Foucault's oeuvre. The other, in which Foucault explicates the 'how' of his thinking is very rare and only occurs in his lectures.[9] I will examine each respectively.

On different occasions, Foucault provides his addressees with the general outlook of his project. However, as Thomas Lemke (2007) puts it, this should be understood as a re-interpretation of previous works in the light of his current concerns. When he was preoccupied with the notion of power, for example, he (TP: 115) expressed his retrospective assessment of his earlier books as follow: "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it

[8] Alain Badiou (2012: 85) argues that the pairing Deleuze/Foucault is "philosophically empty". For him, Deleuze and Foucault are separated on the basis of their treatment of "the dead figures of opinion". While Foucault never concerned himself with "'the buried knowledge of erudition", Deleuze has always stuck to "the uncontested and canonical figures".

[9] Deleuze (1988: 94) famously made a distinction between Foucault's books and his interviews. The former deals with "the history of what we are slowly ceasing to be" (e.g. disciplinary society), and it is only in the latter that he talks about the current dispositif that is slowly emerging (e.g. control society). What have been neglected here are Foucault's lectures, to the extent that Deleuze ignores all those lectures delivered from 1977 to 1984 and talks about "the fairly long silence" that followed the publication of *The History of Sexuality.* As it will become clear in the next chapters, to follow the traces of Foucault's thought closely one needs to take his lectures seriously.

was that I was talking about, in *Madness and Civilisation* or *The Birth of the Clinic*, but power?" Or when he became interested in the notion of *subjectivation*, he argues that the general theme of his research has always been subject not power (ST: 327). These attempts should be regarded as his concern for presenting a continuous project, which can only be achieved through draping his oeuvre in a "fictive coherence". Such attempts culminate in his last lectures. In his penultimate lecture series, *The Government of Self and Others*, he states that his project is an attempt to do "a history of thought" which means:

> "an analysis of what could be called focal points of experience in which forms of a possible knowledge (*savoir*), normative frameworks of behavior for individuals, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked together" (GSO: 3; 41-42).

His claim is that while these three elements were present in his first book, *History of Madness*, in next works he only concentrated on one of these areas. This fictive coherence enables Foucault to provide a ground for his current concerns and to evolve his conceptual toolkit. Thus, this type of retrospective assessment sheds light on *what* Foucault was doing at each moment of his career. We can now get a different picture of his contemplation on the 'how' of the 'theoretical work'.

In *On the Government of the Living*, Foucault, in one of the rare occasions of his work, shares a 'secret' with his audience about the way that he carries out his studies. Thinking, Foucault argues, does not consist in establishing a fixed ensemble of positions or a static system. Theoretical work, or the 'how' of thinking, should not be seen as a "plan of a permanent structure". In contrast to planning, thinking is a matter of a "line of displacement" (*un tracé de déplacement*)[10], it is a:

> "constant need, or necessity, or desire to plot (*relever*), so to speak, the points of passage at which each displacement risks resulting in the modification, if not of the whole curve, then at least of the way in which it can be read and grasped in terms of its possible intelligibility" (GL: 76; modified translation).

[10] In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari's '*calque'* – the opposite of mapping- has been translated into 'tracing', which can be confused with Derrida's 'trace' ('*trace*'). However, Foucault's use of the term 'trace' is more compatible with Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philsophy?*, where they use '*tracer*' (to trace) with the values of '*carte*' (cartography) and none of the *calque*.

Thus, thinking is not planning but plotting (*relevé*). As the French term suggests, thinking is akin to dancing when the ballet dancer rises from their *position* to stand on the tips of the toes. Each book, interview, or course is "a new line" that can modify what has been written and said so far. Moreover, this can explain Foucault's strategic need to reinterpret his previous works in the light of the most recent one. It is the last displacement, the last line that makes the reassessment of the whole curve and its intelligibility necessary. This makes it clear that Foucault himself has made a distinction between thought ('what') and thinking ('how'), and that the former can be understood through the latter. It is the process of thinking (i.e. the curve) that determines the significance and meaning of conceptual tools. Moreover, not only his explanation of thinking but the terminology that is used for this purpose illustrate the propinquity between Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari.

The Outline

It has become a tradition to distinguish three phases of archaeology, genealogy and ethics in Foucault's oeuvre (Han, 2002; May, 2006). The three concepts of critique that are analyzed in this dissertation correspond to these phases. However, contrary to other studies, each phase is not the starting point, and it is not considered as a homogeneous bloc. Foucault (IP: 127) once said that he is a 'continuist' and discontinuity is nothing but a problem that needs to be solved. The aim of each chapter is to illustrate *how* Foucault was shifting from his previous position to a new one and that each phase contains different and sometimes contradictory claims (for example, as it will be explained in chapter 1, Foucault had contradictory understandings of the notion of discourse). We should always bear in mind that Foucault, like a crawfish, advances sideways (BB: 78).

The first chapter explores the Articulation→Visibility relation and the aim is to show that different phases of articulation (discourse, literature, discursive formation,…) were dominant in the first phase of Foucault's oeuvre. One of the important issues in this chapter, which has been neglected by many scholars, is the importance of literature as a spatial event for Foucault. Literature or writing can make things visible and provide a basis for subject-functions. As the term subject-function reveals, writer is not a concrete person but something like a "point of view" that makes critique possible. It is the internal condition of thought or ,as Deleuze and Guattari put it, a "conceptual persona". It is thinking itself that moulds the thinker in the shape of a writer. Through this chapter I will demonstrate how

Foucault provides a foundation for this persona through holding a specific relationship between the three variants.

Chapter 2 will start with the analysis of the shift in the notion of event, and I will argue that it can help us to follow the line of displacement that led Foucault to introduce genealogy. The important thesis of this chapter is that Foucault's thought shifted from the spatial to the material. It is through tracing the emergence of the materiality that one can understand *how* of critical activity in Foucault's oeuvre during this period. Here what calls for a critical activity is not articulation, but visbility or even 'banality'. The critical thinker appears as a 'Warrior' who needs to confront what has been taken for granted and most visible. To think critically the "scene" under investigation should be seen as a battlefield. Any effective critical activity consist in revealing those battlefields beneath what seems to be the most banal and visible. This provides the critical activity with a point of view to understand subject and articulation differently.

After exploring the Visbility→Articulation relation in the second chapter, in chapter 3, I will focus on the Subject. The main argument of this chapter is that the subject has always been present in Foucault's work, but it has gone through different phases in relation to the two other variables until finally it becomes the determining variable. Here subject is analyzed in terms of it self-referntiality. Subejct is bound to his/her identity through self-knowledge and power relations with the Other. For Foucault the critical intersection of these two axes of self-referentiality is where the persona of the truth-teller or Parrhesiast emerges. Thus, critical thinker should be a truth-teller.

Chapter 4 analyzes various approaches regarding Foucault's critical project. It will become clear that the concern of these studies has been Foucault's critical thought ('what'), then I will proceed by proposing a framework to comprehend Foucault's critical thinking ('how'). Making the distinction between thought ('what') and thinking ('how') is the main contribution of this dissertation to Foucault studies. This will provide a new path for reading Foucault's oeuvre, and thus will enable us to give new meaning and depth to the already familiar concepts and terms such as subject, critique and discourse. Moreover, this study seeks to provide a theoretical basis for critical activity. If we consider critique as a mental activity which addresses and reformulates the evershifting world around us, how is it possible to maintain the dynamic nature of this thinking? The argument of this thesis is that Foucault's oevre provides us with a lucid answer: by having a relational conception of critique.

Chapter 1 Articulation

It is generally accepted that there are three phases in Foucault's work: archaeology, genealogy and ethics. Although it has become a convention for any study of his oeuvre to start with the archaeological period, there is no unanimous understanding about the meaning of this term.[11] What almost all of these texts have in common is that they construe a continuity in Foucault's work on the basis of the repetition of a concept, here archaeology. It is possible, however, to make a distinction between two general strands in this understanding based on the continuity of the concept. I will contrast my analysis of Foucault's work to these two strands by providing a detailed study of Foucault's movements and displacements. Moreover, this analysis will make it clear that the plurality of understandings is due to the dynamic of Foucault's own work.

The first approach is the one that considers the first phase as a group of attempts through which Foucault pursues an archaeological *project*. Beatrice Han's book on Foucault's critical project is a very good example of such an approach. The first phase of Foucault's project, according to her, is marked with "the archaeological transposition of the critical question" (Han, 2002:15). If Foucault shifts from archaeology to genealogy, it is because, despite his attempts to provide different formulations for the historical a priori, none of them can help him to overcome the methodological failure of archaeology. Foucault, in this reading, for a while is preoccupied with the idea of archaeology and unsuccessfully tries to overcome its deficiencies. While here the continuity of Foucault's project is based on different modalities of the same methodology, the second approach overlooks all these ups and downs, arguing that in Foucault's work a repeated *pattern* is discernible. Mark E. G. Kelly (2012: 8), for example, states that *History of Madness* "clearly sets the *pattern* for many of Foucault's later books". However, while his earlier books are theoretically undeveloped, "the later repetitions … display greater theoretical depth" and thus one can start their analysis by bracketing the earlier works.

One should note that any attentive study of Foucault's oeuvre needs to have a vigilant eye on the appearance and transformation of concerns and questions; otherwise the force of

[11] Since there are enormous amount of texts on Foucault, it is not possible to give a full list of different interpretations of the term archaeology, but here are some examples: Mathieu Potte-Bonneville (2010: 29-34; my translation) defines it as "the historical exploration of the archive". David Webb (2012: 32) considers archaeology as an alternative to the analysis of actual experience. Garry Gutting (2005: 34) makes the claim that archaeology, very similar to the modernist avant-garde, is a historical study without individual subject.

retrospective contemplation (at times exercised and encouraged by Foucault himself) will demonstrate a single conceptual path where in reality there are multiplicity of routes. Not only does he give different conceptual definitions of archaeology at different stages of his *archaeological phase*, the questions that motivate his research differ from one book to the other. For example, at the time of writing *Death and Labyrinth*, his guiding question was "what does it mean to see and to speak?" -which had Raymond Roussel and Alain Robbe-Grillet as its counterpart in literature- by the time of *The Order of Things* it was transformed to "what does it mean to think and to speak?", which corresponded to the thoughts of Maurice Blanchot (DN: 73). Does this mean that there is no unity in Foucault's early works? Or rather we should look for the principle of unity somewhere else?

In the following sections I will try to give a positive answer to this question by showing that what accounts for the continuity is not concepts or theoretical tools and concerns but an ensemble of relations comprised of the three variations (i.e. articulation, visibility and subject) which I introduced in the introduction. What provides for the archaeological phase its principle of continuity is actually the specific mode of relations between these variations. Consequently, while Foucault shifts from one question to the other and thus gives his concepts a new twist, this mode of relation remains intact. In what follows a morphological study of these relations is provided in order to acknowledge both the dynamic of Foucault's work and its continuity.[12]

Madness of the Limit and the Erotics of Language

In an interview held shortly after the publication of *History of Madness*, Foucault mentions Georges Dumézil as his primary methodological inspiration, from whom he borrowed the idea of structure: "Just as Dumézil does with myths, I attempted to discover the structured forms of experience whose pattern can be found, again and again, with modifications, at different levels" (MES, 1996:8). He clarifies further that the structure he studied in his book was that of exclusion: "I wanted to describe the modification of a structure of exclusion" (MES, 1996:8). My contention, nevertheless, is that these three terms of structure, experience, and exclusion, should not be understood in their established or ordinary meanings. Thus, *History of Madness* not only provides a historical account for the objectification of madness, but here Foucault -to use Deleuze's analogy- picks up tools and

[12] In this chapter I will mainly focus on the articulation-visibility relation and will deal with articulation-subject in chapter 3.

arrows that are available to him only in order to "send them in other directions" (Deleuze, 1994: xv). In my attempt to illustrate this point, I will first focus on the notion of "structure of exclusion" to provide a reading of the book that is more philosophical than social. Then, I will elaborate the notion of experience.

Tragic Structure of Exclusion

Foucault starts his study by referring to the condition of the leper houses throughout Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. These places, once full of lepers, became abruptly empty, but only for other inhabitants to fill them again. Each society, according to Foucault, found itself obliged to draw boundaries, to exclude (MES, 1996:13). Nevertheless, the object of exclusion is not the same throughout history: while in middle ages it was the leper, during the classical era it was the mad (HM, 2009:3-6; MES, 1996:8). Thus, during the middle ages and until the appearance of 'Confinement' in the seventeenth century, the mad were present in society as aesthetic figures, and then at the outset of the classical era they were silenced and excluded. However, we should be careful not to succumb to the idea, suggested by the rhetoric, that there is an essential and constant role of exclusion that should be played by a group (May, 2006: 30). There have been various exclusions in each society at a given historical moment, but there are those which play a fundamental role in giving the "Western ratio" its present configuration. Foucault calls them *limit-experiences* and gives an inventory of them: Orient, dream, sexuality and madness. What Foucault suggests is that we are dealing with the plurality of the structures of exclusion, amongst which madness is the most obvious and for that reason the easiest one to study (MAO, 2009:544). However, how should we understand the structure of exclusion in *History of Madness*?

The book has been received along two different axes: theory-practice and social-philosophical (Scull, 1990). The first reading of *Histoire de la folie*, mainly in France, considered it as a study belonging to the tradition of the *epistemology of science*, which was developed through works of Jean Cavaillès, Gaston Bachelard and George Canguilhem. When, however, under the influence of the events of May 1968, criticism of the present system of restrictions and controls was symbolized in madness, as "a subjectivity freed from the constraints of social adaptation", Foucault's book was read as a denunciation of

repression (Castel, 1992: 66-67).[13] On the other axis, first we have the different expressions of the commonly accepted social reading of the book: how confinement, as the great event of the classical age, works as a transitory space in which the experience of madness went through a radical change and eventually madness turned into mental illness (Gordon, 1992; Gordon, 2013; Gutting, 2006; Khalfa, 2009). According to this reading, *History of Madness* narrates the process of the objectification of madness: in the dark depth of the space of confinement the discourse of psychiatry started shimmering.[14] But if the book is to be considered as an attempt to analyze historically madness as a socially constructed object, then what should we do with the claims of those historians who say that the book rests on "the shakiest of scholarly foundations" and "riddled with errors of fact and interpretations" (Scull, 1990: 57)[15]?

Garry Gutting (2006: 50), in his reply to the evaluation of the book by historians, suggests that one should make a distinction between two levels of claims. On the "meta-level", the experience of madness is significant in so far as it is "an essential part of the history of reason", but on the "object-level", interpretations and historical facts are brought into account for the social construction of madness at each historical age.[16] Drawing on this distinction, one can say that there are two interlinked but at the same time non-reducible dimensions at work in this book. One follows the horizontal movement of the history of madness, and the other is concerned with a relational, or rather vertical, structure of reason-madness. Since here I am concerned more with the philosophical aspect of Foucault's oeuvre rather than its historical narration, I will now provide a reading of the book on the basis of the latter dimension.

The study of the experience of madness, Foucault asserts, will "confront the dialectics of history with the immobile structures of the tragic" (HM, 2009: xxx). In his indubious allusion to Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, Foucault gives us a hint of his understanding of that vertical structure: "Nietzsche has shown that the tragic structure from which the history of

[13] We can say, however, that these two readings, one being academic and the other practical, are not absolutely opposite to each other; the link between the two can be found in Foucault's idea of the "specific intellectual". For more details see Simons, 1995, pp. 53-55.

[14] In Foucault's own words "It was the depths of confinement itself that generated the phenomenon; it is from confinement that we must seek an account of this new awareness of madness [i.e. madness as illness]" (MC: 213).

[15] For a summary of claims against/for Foucault's historical method see McNay, 1994, pp.24-26.

[16] John Rajchman in *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy*, makes a very similar distinction in order to differentiate between what interests philosophers and historians in Foucault's oeuvre in general.

the Western world is made is nothing other than the refusal, the forgetting and the silent collapse of tragedy" (HM, 2009: xxx). In a non-dialectical reading of Nietzsche, the Dionysian-Apollonian relation reveals a non-reducible contradiction and thus any domination of one principle over the other can only bring about a derivative unity that would be fragile for exactly the same reason (Montag, 2005). Furthermore, this domination is not the result of a negation from within (as Hegelian dialectic might suggest) but could only happen as the consequence of a real combat between *positivities* with its victor and vanquished.[17] Though Apollonian and Dionysian drives are antagonistic, Nietzsche thinks that it is possible to have a relation of non-domination between the two, and Greek tragedy was nothing but the manifestation of the balance in their relation. However, tragedy was a very short-lived moment. The historical onslaught that led to the domination of the Apollonian element over the Dionysian was waged by Socratic rationalism as it is embodied in Euripides and his dramatic works: Euripides in his "*Socratic* tendency … opposed and defeated Aeschylean tragedy" (Nietzsche, 2007:60). It is only from the standpoint of the victor that a valorisation of the vanquished is possible: Socratic rationalism, as the conqueror and in the name of science and reason, could condemn and confute myth and tragedy. In this light, one can see why Foucault rejects any resort to the "terminal truths" of psychopathology (HM, 2009: xxvii). Those truths have been imposed on the history of madness by the conqueror reason. However, what is the tragic structure of madness?

Foucault distinguishes between two visions of madness: the Tragic, in which madness was a figure of the cosmos and its truth was "the truth of the world", and the Critical which apprehended madness as "the order of the aevum" where madness becomes the truth about man himself (HM, 2009:18-26). To the former category belong artists such as Hieronymus Bosch, Jan Brueghel and Albrecht Dürer, for whom the experience of madness lies in "silent images"; Erasmus, on the other hand, is the protagonist of the latter vision for whom madness was confined to "the universe of discourse". The experience of madness in the Middle Ages, and up until the Renaissance, was constructed by a balanced relation between these two "radically different" visions, the sign of which was that literary forms (which for Foucault represent the Critical) and visual representations (which represents the

[17] Foucault's reading of Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* is analogous to that of Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in terms of its non-dialectical nature. While Deleuze published his book a year after the publication of *History of Madness,* he put out *Sens et Valeurs* in 1959, which served as the basis for the chapter of his book on tragedy. Warren Montag suggests that not only was Foucault familiar with this piece but it influenced his understanding of the tragic experience.

Tragic) "answer each other and swap roles, now as commentary, now as illustration" (HM, 2009:16). During the Renaissance, however, this gap between painting and literature, between "word and image", widened and at the beginning of the seventeenth century the Critical experience, because of the great importance that was accorded to language in the Renaissance, dominated the Tragic experience (HM, 2009:27-28). The yet undivided experience of madness which was still recognizable in *Don Quixote* and *King Lear,* during this period "little by little … invested by reason, it is as though it is welcomed and planted within it" (HM, 2009: 34-35). Nevertheless, this domination did not result in a total obliteration but only in "a mere occultation". As a result, when the oppressive power is in its heyday and oppression is at its peak, an explosion will be necessary and the tragic will appear again, e.g. in the works of Goya or Sade, but not uncompromised (HM, 2009: 530-535). Thus, the linear course of history, written by the conqueror reason, which ultimately considered madness as "mental illness" must be rewritten again, this time according to its vertical dimension (HM, 2009: xxix); that is to say, the constant clash and struggle between the Tragic and the Critical (HM, 2009: 28). What Foucault is trying to do here is to historicize Nietzsche's Apollonian-Dionysian antagonism (or, in Foucault's own terms, Reason-Unreason). From this perspective, therefore, he could be called structuralist, at least to the extent that Nietzsche was one. *History of Madness* is a book in which the social-historical and the metahistorical meet and intersect.

Thus, *History of Madness* is not about madness as a *referent* and it does not, as Shoshana Felman suggests, tell "the story of Reason's progressive conquest and consequent repression of that which it calls madness" (Felman, 1975:209). Derrida too misses the point when he accuses Foucault of a performative contradiction by interpreting the *archaeology of silence* as an attempt to give a language to madness.[18] Foucault's aim, as a matter of fact, is to show historically that:

> "Behind the critical consciousness of madness in all its philosophical, scientific, moral and medical guises lurks a second, tragic consciousness of madness, which has never really gone away (HM: 27)."

[18] Here I will not discuss the debate between Derrida and Foucault after the publication of *History of Madness*, I will return to this issue in the fourth chapter and in relation to Foucault's debate on logocentrism. However, it is worth mentioning that Nikolas Rose, in a short piece, provides a very compelling argument about how we should understand "madness itself" (Rose, 1992). For a summary of the debate between Foucault and Derrida see McNay, 1994.

More importantly, one can conclude that when Foucault contrasts reason to madness, he does not refer (as McNay (1994: 26-31) suggests) to rationality in general and pure madness but to these two modes of consciousness whose relation constructs our experience of madness. This experience, however, because based on confrontation and domination reveals the limits of the culture more than its identity.

Limit and Experience

The object of *History of Madness*, as we have already seen, is the structure of the experience of madness "which is history through and through, but whose seat is at its margins, where its decisions are made" (HM, 2009: xxxii). For Foucault, these foundational decisions at the confines of history are related to the formation of the limits of culture, to the inception of its "present".[19] Each culture, through obscure and soon to be forgotten gestures, demarcates its limits and thus designates its "Exterior", and at the same time is identified, throughout history, by that "hollowed-out void" (HM, 2009: xxix). Hence, the limit of a culture is at the same time an origin: an originary division. Foucault describes the shining moment of exclusion as *limit-experience*. To study a culture in terms of its limit-experience means to investigate "the originary thickness" in which it takes shape: the "degree zero" of its history. We should clarify that the degree zero is not, as Timothy O'Leary (2008:8) suggests, "a time before the exclusion"; it is impossible, Foucault asserts, to have access to that "primitive purity" of madness. The only accessible point retrospectively available to us is the moment of that "lightning flash decision", of the tragic tear (*déchirer*) that marks the boundaries of a culture as well as its unique historical formation (HM, 2009: xxxiii). It is worth mentioning that here Foucault understands archaeology to be an awareness of this tear, of "a fault line" in the soil of our present, and an attempt to fathom how deep it is by tracing it back to that fundamental decision (TT, 1996:15).

This tragic division or *déchirer* reveals itself socially as exclusion (confinement) and *spiritually* as inclusion (mental illness). The structures of exclusion and abandonment, Foucault maintains, through a gradual development in the classical age have transplanted from the space of society to the land of consciousness: "what was once the visible fortress of social order is now the castle of our own consciousness" (HM, 2009:11). What are considered

[19] Contrary to those scholars who see Foucault merely as a thinker of rupture, he conceives a continuity between the classical age and modernity (HM: 27). For a good summary of the interpretations regarding rupture look at Iyer, Arun, *Towards an Epistemology of Ruptures: The Case of Heidegger and Foucault*.

generally to be the emancipatory measures of Samuel Tuke (1784-1857) and Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), who unshackled the mad and released them from the Confinement, for Foucault was merely a transition from one type of fetter to another: "if it freed the madman from the inhumanity of his chains, it also chained the mad to man and his truth" (HM, 2009: 244). The classical age was dominated by a binary structure ("truth and error, world and fantasy, being and non-being, day and night") and "the circle of day and night" was its law (HM, 2009: 522). This binary structure was replaced by the tripartite relation of anthropology at the end of that age: "man, his madness and his truth" (HM, 2009: 522). What happened during the classical age was that the binary structure, symbolised by the cosmological twofold of day-night, was subjugated by man who brought it down to his own level and "made *in himself* the day and the night" (HM, 2009: xxxiv). To say that madness is spiritually included is another way of saying that the Critical dominated the Tragic, as the result of which a 'self-relation' was established between man and his truth which is called psychology. This transition was made possible by *forgetting*. It seems that Foucault believes that for the memory of modern western man to be constructed, a double forgetting has been at work. One is the forgetting of the tragic experience of madness as if the lightning flash of limit-experience dazzled the mind and led him to amnesia. The other forgetting is the condition of possibility for the process of interiorization as if the dark and dreadful dungeons of the Confinement resulted in the evanescence of the binary structure.

However, one should how understand the nature of the limit and the consequential relation of exteriority-interiority? By contrasting the notion of limit as understood by Hegel to that of Foucault, we will be in a better position to grasp the being of limit. According to Hegel "something is what it is only *within* its limit and *due to* its limit" (Hegel, 2010:147; emphasis added). The limit itself is nothing but the negation of something that we can call an "other". In this way, limit "contains in itself a contradiction", that is to say, it constitutes something through negatively constituting something else, and thus it is intrinsically dialectical (Hegel, 2010:148). The notion of limit is at the core of the concerns of a group of thinkers who have been called poststructuralists including Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and Kristeva. For James Williams (2005: 1), the notion of limit is the common thread that passes through their works and informs the identity of poststructuralism. Limit for Foucault is relational but not only do the terms of the relation (i.e. the tragic structure) not contradict each other and as such limit cannot be dialectical, but it does not give rise to the simple dichotomy of exclusion/inclusion;

Limit excludes through inclusion, it is an *inclusive exclusion*.[20] To understand this inclusive exclusion we need to pay attention to Foucault's claim that there is an isomorphism in the experience of madness and literature. This relation of madness to literature, for Foucault, far from being an abstraction, has been historically informed (FN, 1998:18)[21].

Foucault was not the first to make a link between language and madness, Lacan had done this before in his manifesto "*The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*" by stating that psychosis is a "language without discourse".[22] I will come back to the importance of literature for Foucault later, but here my focus is on the notion of limit. In his review of Jean Laplanche's *Hölderlin et la question du père*, Foucault asks how is it possible, as in the case of Hölderlin, for a language to "apply a single and identical discourse to poetry and madness"? From a psychopathological point of view, this possibility lies in the continuity between psychological structures of madness and their manifestations in a literary form. Foucault rejects this "unitary theory" and states that this possibility, on the contrary, is grounded in a *déchirer*, a schizophrenic space (FN, 1998:7-8). In the analysis of Hölderlin's oeuvre, for instance, what makes it possible to identify Diotima, a fictional character, with Susette Gontard, a real person and his lover (FN, 1998: 11)?

Foucault distinguishes between three methodological approaches to the question of sameness in Laplanche's work, amongst which one is the key to understanding the relation between madness and poetry. In elaborating on the relation between Hölderlin's life and his work, one can see that an oeuvre "seeks to anchor itself in the improbable unity of two [literary and non-literary] beings as closely aligned as a figure and its reflection in a mirror", thus in this state limit takes the form of a mirror that produces a "perfect circle" which

[20] Although I have been inspired by Agamben, and have borrowed this term from his works, my contention is that there is a sharp distinction between Agamben and Foucault in this matter; After all, Agamben is more Derridean than Foucauldian. For Agamben this inclusive exclusion has its prime site in language: "The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion" (Agamben, 1998:12). For Foucault, as I have emphasised, the "historical ensemble – notions, institutions, judicial and police measures, scientific concepts – which hold captive … madness" plays a crucial role that cannot be reduced to language (HM: xxxiii). Moreover, I hold that when Foucault uses the term *exteriority*, he actually refers to this inclusive exclusion not to something external.

[21] Commentators like McNay (1994: 45-46) who read *History of Madness* socially, as the study of "a repressed and marginal social group" overlook the relation between literature and madness.

[22] Foucault has been influenced by Lacan but he didn't endorse his ideas uncritically, even in *The Father's "NO"* he criticizes Lacan's idea of *foreclosure*. For the claim that Foucault was influenced by Lacan see Rajchman (1985) and for a summary of Foucault's criticism of Lacan see Fendler (2014) *Michel Foucault*, pp. 21-23.

contains everything without remainder (FN, 1998:13). Oeuvre through the literary language, thus, assumes the role of a measure in the sense that it traverses the "other world" of non-oeuvre and at the same time marks its limit. However, the determination of this circular space of sameness is only possible through the mediation of the literary language which at the same time "attempts to obliterate this space by covering it with lovely images of immediate presence" (FN, 1998:14). The literary language, thus, which made oeuvre possible and maintained the balance of the circular space of sameness, is not innocent. As "a supreme and empty form", it devours the reflected world of oeuvre only to wrap it up upon itself, to draw its Limit. This language, which enabled Diotima to personify Susette, brought about her death too. The perfect mirroring was based on "a radical break of transitivity" (PT: 75). Thus, we are caught between two limits: limit of life (the circle of sameness) and that of death (the Limit). However, here there is only one thing, i.e. literary language, that is responsible for the existence of this double limit (it is the same with madness). I will argue that for Foucault while historically the latter precedes the former, the relation is reversed in our present experience of the degree zero.

Limit-experience. There is confusion among scholars about the notion of limit-experience.[23] This confusion mainly has its roots in Foucault's own retrospective evaluation of this term. In an interview when Foucault is pushed by the interviewer to distinguish his notion of experience from the phenomenological one, he replies by saying that for him it is not the meaning of everyday experience but experience as desubjectivation which bears importance: "The idea of a limit-experience that wrenches the subject from itself is what was important to me in my reading of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot" (IWMF: 241). Despite this self-evaluation, limit-experience in this period refers specifically to a historico-ontological decision.[24] The limit-experience is the original division, the onset of tragic exclusion, an originary space in which the history of a culture will unfold. This Limit leaves its trace on the

[23] Joel Whitebook understands it in eschatological terms, the aim of which is to reach the "Absolute". James Miller, one of Foucault's biographers, considers Foucault's use of drug or involvement in sadomasochistic sexual rituals as practices that exemplify limit-experience. In contrast to Miller, Huffer and Wilson suggest that limit-experience can be those banal and everyday things such as driving or buying groceries, because these things "can produce a transformation in the Subject-Object relation" (Huffer and Wilson, 2010:335). However, a very common misunderstanding is the one that confuses it with transgression (Gutting, 2002; O'leary, 2010).

[24] Timothy O'leary suggests a middle ground by defining limit-experience as "an exceptional occurrence in the life of an individual (or, sometimes, a culture) which changes the way that individual (or culture) approaches a given area of human life" (O'leary: 2010: 166).

culture more by what it subtracts than by what it positively constitutes. This is the real meaning of the inclusive exclusion: what has been excluded is included as an "hollowed-out void" (HM: xxix). It is a tragic "and" which joins and unites madness and reason by turning madness into a "perpetual rupture". It is on the basis of this rupture that man, in a self-relation, can find his truth in himself.

This self-relation reveals itself clearly in psychological discourse and Foucault, in his analysis of Hölderlin's psychosis, gives an account of it by elaborating on the meaning of the absence of the Father (*le "non" du Père*). Following Lacan and his discussion of the notion of the Name-of-the-Father (*le Nom du Père*), he sees Father as the agent who, in a single stroke and by saying "No" (*le non du Père*), proclaims the Law, marks limits and establishes the relation between the signifier and the signified (FN, 1998:15-16). Now, Psychosis as Father's absence is not related to the emptiness of a place that belongs to an individual named father or to "a mythical orphanage", but "to the order of the signifier". On account of that absence, a fundamental gap appears in the place of the signifier that "transforms lyricism into delirium" and oeuvre into the absence of oeuvre. In the last chapter of *History of Madness*, Foucault explains that while madness in the classical age was "a space of indecision" where at any moment an oeuvre might come to the fore, in our age it has transformed into the decision which excludes the possibility of oeuvre (HM, 2009:535-537). Freud, standing at the climax of this shift, who by closing up madness upon itself has made it a non-language through making it a double language, that is to say a *play* of speech and language, a "lacunary reserve" (which is simply another name for "the catastrophe of the signifier"): "its language is contained inside a speech that ultimately says nothing other than this implication" (MAO, 2009:546-547).

Transgression. One of the most discussed, but not well-understood, notions in Foucault's oeuvre is that of transgression. [25] Foucault, one year after the death of George Bataille, in an introductory essay to a newly prepared collection of his works, elaborates on his concept of transgression.[26] What is at stake in Foucault's essay is

[25] Gerald L. Bruns finds in Mallarme's experience of le *N´eant* (Nothingness) the prototype of Foucault's idea of transgression (although he calls it limit-experience, the details that he provides makes it clear that he is actually talking about transgression).

[26] Foucault's reading, although being one of the most influential interpretations, has been contested by other scholars. For example, Susan Rubin Suleiman in *Subversive Intent: Gender, Politics, and the Avant-*

the relation between sexuality and language. Contrary to the dominant perception of modernity, according to which sexuality has become a natural process that can be expressed in "the clear light of language", Foucault argues that sexuality rather is a "fissure" (*scissure*). He immediately adds that this fissure is not the one that constitutes our individuality but "one that marks the limit within us and designates us as limit" (PT: 70).[27] Sexuality and the death of God, moreover, belong to the same experience. After the death of God, we are living in a *profane* world where the limit of the Limitless is annihilated and with it our experience of "exteriority of being", and thus we are left with the constant recognition of interiority (PT, 1998:71). But, Foucault continues, the chief characteristic of this "inner experience" is its "intrinsic finitude": "the limitless reign of the Limit" (PT, 1998:71). Instead of the singularity of the Limitless that constituted our Finitude externally, now we are left with the plurality of limits that internally constitutes the relationship of finitude to being. But how does the being of Limit reveals itself to us? Foucault replies: through transgression. Transgression, devoid of its ethical connotation, carries the limit (e.g. the tragic structure) "to the limit of its being" (e.g. the tragic decision) in order to "find itself in what it excludes" (PT: 75). The play of transgression and limit, whose existence depends on each other, re-enacts that ontological decision that constitutes through inclusive exclusion. Transgression, thus, does not negate the limit but affirms it;[28] and since it has no being except in the "lightning flash" that reveals the limit on the night of a historico-ontological decision, no content can bind it: it is a "nonpositive affirmation" (PT: 74).

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garde, studies the role of transgression in the Avant-Garde literature by tracing it back to the Surrealists. She argues that for Bataille, "the drama of transgression" has at its own premium site the female body with its duplicity as "asexual maternal and sexual feminine" and thus Foucault's attempt to locate transgression in language is the result of a misinterpretation of Bataille.

[27] This illustrates a very crucial point that has mainly been overlooked amongst Foucauldian scholars. Transgression in Foucault's early works is not related to the constitution of the subject but it is a critique of Man as a metaphysical entity. Those who see in Foucault's later works a return of/to transgression, generally have confused transgression with limit-experience (in actual fact Foucault never uses the term transgression in this sense again). Another source of confusion is a mistranslation. For example, Jon Simons in *Foucault and the Political* argues that Foucault returns to the concept of transgression "two decades later in his central essay 'What is Enlightenment?'"(p. 68). However, this only reveals that he has used Paul Rabinow's edited volume, *Foucault Reader*. In this edition the French phrase "*la forme du franchissement possible*" has been translated as "the form of a possible transgression" (p. 45). As you can see in the French phrase, Foucault here does not talk about transgression but "crossing-over" (*franchissement*).

[28] The idea that transgression indicates "going beyond limits" or destroying the norms and taboos completely misunderstands the Foucauldian notion of transgression. Although this is generally the attitude of some authors outside the circle of Foucauldian scholars, for a very similar expression by a Foucauldian scholar look at Barry Smart's *Michel Foucault (2): Critical Assessments*, pp. 299-301.

Let me explain this further with the example of madness. We have already seen that Western reason was formed through a historico-ontological decision (limit-experience) which by wrapping madness upon itself and turning it into a rupture, made it possible for man to construct a self-referential subjectivity. In relation to madness, one can say that transgression, like a *mnemonic event*, brings the limit-experience to our consciousness. In *the age of reason*, the existence of the mad philosopher (Nietzsche), the mad painter (Van Gogh) and the mad writer (Hölderlin and Artaud) is transgressive. They are neither "absolute Otherness" [29] nor the figures of Unreason but in and through their oeuvre, they make the tragic "and" to shine in the margins of Reason. The other relevant point here is that since transgression is determined by the limit-experience, it can function differently. The transgression of the mad-philosopher was only one of them, but there are other forms amongst which sexuality (or, in Bataille's terminology, eroticism) plays a crucial role.

What Foucault finds transgressive in Bataille's engagement with the experience of sexuality is not deviant sexual practices but eroticism, i.e. the spoken sexuality: "sexuality is only decisive for our culture as spoken, and to the degree it is spoken" (PT: 85).[30] We should immediately add that in this language "what is said … is of little importance, as are the meanings that are delivered there" (MAO: 545). Erotic articulation has an ontological importance that makes speaking at the same time liberation. What is specific about erotic language, which can be traced back to Sade, is its relation to the death of God. However, in modern philosophy since Descartes we are told that the existence of God necessarily entails the existence of Man and vice versa. Now if God (the Limitless) is dead, the consequence will be that in the place that was once occupied by the philosophical subject (the Finitude) a void has been hollowed out. Eroticism is the language that, in correspondence to that void, provides a space (a *fold*) in which the absolute subject is dispersed, and thus our language can be finally liberated from its tyranny. This dispersion is what Foucault

[29] This is the way that Dreyfus and Rabinow understand Foucault's treatment of madness. They argue that if madness is this "absolute otherness", then Foucault is the victim of the exactly what he criticizes in hermeneutics (exegesis, or a commentary addressed to the Word), because madness merely substitutes the "Word of God". Although this is not the way that Foucault understands madness, he wants to show that our modern experience of madness is actually similar to the mode of self-referentiality of hermeneutics.

[30] Roland Barthes shares Foucault's idea about the relation between sexuality and language: "the transgression of values, which is the declared principle of eroticism, has its counterpart—perhaps even its foundation—in a technical transgression of the forms of language" (Barthes, 1972).

> calls "the limitless reign of the Limit": instead of the Subject we have a transgressive language that makes the limit internal to the experience of finitude. Articulation can play a crucial role only to the extent that it transgresses the subject who speaks, in her own language.

We can conclude that the question of articulation, through madness and sexuality, is bound to the fundamental aspects of modern philosophy.[31] In relation to madness, articulation brings to the fore a historical decision by showing that the western man, "five centuries old", is the offspring of the Renaissance (MAO, 2009: 543). Erotic language, in relation to a recent limit-experience, not only makes visible the disappearance of that Man but also provides a space of visibility for the scattered subject.

The Hollow Sun of Language: Articulation as Commentary

Foucault's writings in the period between *History of Madness* and *The Order of Things* are emblematic of his preoccupation with literature (for which *The Birth of Clinic* is a major exception). However, this obsession with literature should not be considered as a personal interest, as something one does between two important and tedious occupations as a way of relief; on the contrary, in what follows the argument will be that his understanding of literature played a constituent role in the trajectory of his oeuvre. By neglecting this aspect of his work, many traits of his major books and, more essentially, the shift from one to the other in this phase would seem to be obscure and disruptive. Moreover, while it is true that Foucault shared the concerns of the "modernist sensibility" and avant-garde culture of the 1960s about *écriture* (writing), his work cannot be reduced to a merely literary criticism.[32] Alain Badiou refers to this irreducible aspect of his works when he writes: "witness his reading of Raymond Roussel, *witness the critic he could have been*" (Badiou: 2009: 123; emphasis added). Here I will argue that his engagement with Roussel was crucial and

[31] The fact that Foucault was not very enthusiastic about Marxism can also be connected to his conception of language: "the appearance of sexuality as a fundamental problem marks the slippage of a philosophy of man as a worker to a philosophy based on a being who speaks" (PT: 85).

[32] This is the argument of Rajchman (1985: 9-11) to account for Foucault's shift from literature to politics. For him, the swan song of modernism could be heard in Foucault's works of this period, but Foucault as an intellectual "in the political sense" renounced that avant-garde literary culture in the name of war and power. It seems some of the immediate audiences of Foucault's early works had the same idea; Roland Barthes in an interview published in 1964 refers to Foucault's *History of Madness* by stating that the 'vertigo' which has been expressed in "the Reason/Unreason couple" will ultimately constitute "the essential subject of all theoretical work on literature" (Barthes, 1981 in During, 1992: 68).

instrumental for his shift from *History of Madness* to *The Order of Things*. I will explicate this by examining two of Foucault's least examined books.

In an interview held in the same year (1966) as the publication of *The Order of Things*, Foucault asserts that while *History of Madness* was "the history of division … the history of difference", in his new book he wanted "to state how a society reflects upon resemblances among things and how differences between things can be mastered, … sketched out according to rational schemes", or, to put it in a nutshell, it was "the history of resemblance, sameness, identity" (TOT: 13; OT: xxvi). For instance, Foucault, preserving the periodization of his last studies, argues that in the sixteenth century the identity of animals and plants was understood on the basis of the marks that it was believed every being bore; in this case each species was identified in relation to itself. However, in the Classical age, this system of identity underwent a drastic change. Identity on the basis of marks substituted by identity according to differences that were discernable between species and as the result they could be identified only in relation to each other: the system of classification emerged. Moreover, finally in the modern age, beginning with Cuvier, identity is definable by means of difference not between species but within them as organisms (OT: 157-158). However, why did identity gain such an axial importance in Foucault's project? How has he shifted from the Other to the Same?

One can trace back the question of identity to Foucault's earlier engagement with that of seeing and saying which was elaborated in *The Birth of the Clinic*. After 16 years, today we can still repeat Chris Philo's words about this book: "This book is a remarkable work … despite remaining almost entirely unreferenced and unnoticed in the literature" (Philo, 1999: 11).[33] This book can be considered as a follow-up study of the problem that was central to *History of Madness*, i.e. the question of Man.[34] The rationale behind this continuity is that "medical thought is fully engaged in the philosophical status of man" (BC: 198).

In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault accounts for the "mutation" in medical discourse, from the classical conception of disease to the modern understanding, by investigating not the

[33] As a matter of fact according to Google Ngram Viewer, the 90s were the heyday of this book and reference to it has declined since. However, it should be mentioned that according to Garry Gutting (1989, 133) this book has been the best received of all Foucault's works amongst historians.

[34] Although Garry Gutting (1989:111) claims that while one might be tempted to consider HM as the history of mental illness and then read BC as its counterpart, i.e. the history of bodily illness, there is no direct link between the two. Against this idea, and even considering the fact that Foucault does not refer to HM, my contention is that in BC he elaborates on some themes that was already present in HM (for example look at the section "Birth of the Asylum" in HM).

"thematic contents" or "logical modalities" but by reaching to the archaeological level where "things and words" exist in a not-yet-separated form and thus "the way of seeing and the way of saying are still one" (BC: xi; translation modified). Although this can remind us of the degree-zero of madness, two major differences are discernable. Contrary to the degree-zero of madness that was the place of confrontation (between the Tragic and the Critical), what now has been set as the objective of the study is the identical correlation between words and things. On the other hand, for him the "distribution of the visible and invisible" is analogous to "the division between what is stated and what remains unsaid" (BC: xi). Foucault argues that there is a common structure that "carves up and articulates what is seen and what is said" (BC: xix). Thus the archaeological level, where things and words are not yet separated, does not have a temporal dimension like limit-experience. Instead of looking for the ontological decisions at the margins of history, here we are dealing with the historicity of a structure that constitutes two heterogeneous but homological realms of *spatialization* and *verbalization*. How can we bring this 'deep' structure to the light of day?

Theoretically it should be possible to reach the archaeological depth either through words or things. However, Foucault evades anachronism by arguing that we have only access to those things through their verbal traces. Accordingly, it is merely "the spoken structure of the perceived" that can be brought to the fore (BC: xi). On the basis of this statement, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982: 12), in their influential and now classic book *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, argue that this book is Foucault's "methodological overreaction to the search for deep truth behind experience". They see Foucault as the victim of what he himself calls *exegesis*. I will argue, against their view, that Foucault actually rejects hermeneutics in the name of archaeology.

Foucault believes that Nietzsche "the philologist" had prophesied the current situation under which what has been left to us is the "existence of language". This language, contrary to the "original language", cannot rely on the Word of God which murmurs from the profundity of history, at the Origin, with such a quivering voice that makes it eternally secret: we know that God is dead. "We are doomed", Foucault asserts, "historically to history to the patient construction of discourse about discourses, and to the task of hearing what has already been said" (BC: xvi). This task, however, is not that of commentary: "commentary questions discourse as to what it says and intended to say" (BC: xvi). This is what Foucault calls exegesis, a commentary that excavates the soil of language to reach the Words. What

Foucault wants to do is to do away thoroughly with the system of signifier/signified, thus with Commentary, and to replace it with a "structural analysis of discourse". In this way, the spoken elements of discourse – interestingly enough he calls these elements "statement" (*énoncé*)- have to be treated not as "autonomous nuclei of multiple significations" but as "event" (BC: xvii). Consequently,

> what counts in the things said by men is not so much what they may have thought or the extent to which these things represent their thoughts, as that which systemizes them from the outset, thus making them thereafter endlessly accessible to new discourses and open to the task of transforming them (BC: xix).

If it is necessary to prioritize "the things said", it is not because we are interested in the psychology of ideas or hermeneutics; the reason is that insofar as they are considered in the modality of their historical appearance, they make discourses accessible for the recessive work of archaeology.

The other relevant issue here is to assess whether or not Foucault is a nominalist. Johanna Oksala (2005: 34-36) considers Foucault to be a nominalist because his primary object of study is the order of discourse, which will ultimately reveal the ontological order of things. She defines nominalism as the idea that "discourse systematically forms the objects of which it speaks, as well as the ontological order on the basis of which they become possible" (Oksala, 2005: 35).[35] My argument is that Foucault in *The Birth of the Clinic* explicitly refers to two separate realms of words and things, which though they are independent, have been organized homologically. The objective of his archaeological endeavor is to reveal the *concrete a priori* of medicine which simultaneously conditions both "the domain of its experience and the structure of its rationality" (BC: xv). That our retrospective access to the realm of things is obstructed does not change the fact that there exist two independent domains. Textual evidence for this reading is that Foucault (BC: xi) makes a distinction

[35] Beatrice Han (1998: 52) argues that a consistent nominalism in Foucault's work does not appear before *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. According to Han, even in *The Order of Things*, Foucault studies the relation between two independent ontologies that are related to the modes of existence of words and things. However, her reading is based on the assumption that BC is "a sort of applied phenomenology of perception", which was developed earlier by Merleau-Ponty (Han, 1998:48-50). For more claims on Foucault's historical nominalism see: Flynn, 2005; Hacking, 2002; Rouse, 1994.

between the "spoken structure" and language (*langage*): the former is the space in which the latter can acquire volume and existence.

In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault goes beyond (or, one can say deeper than) the phenomenology of the encounter and the liberal idea of the contract between two individuals by considering the birth of clinic as a significant event in the self-referentiality of Man (Rajchman, 1988: 110). In classical medicine, diseases were conceived as abstract essences that are independent of the particular bodies where they might appear. The non-corporeal space in which things and words could meet each other was the table. At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, through engagement with the problem of epidemics, the clinical medicine appeared. This new medical consciousness, Foucault states, "has the paradoxical ability to hear a language as soon as it perceives a spectacle" (BC: 107-108). The assumption of clinical medicine about the reciprocal transparency of the visible and the expressible was based on certain conceptions of the nature of language. Foucault, however, argues that exactly because of that convertibility, "the status of the language that must be its foundation" is left opaque (BC: 117). Clinical medicine went through an archeological shift when Marie-François-Xavier Bichat introduced the pathological anatomy into clinical medicine. Foucault considers death to play a vital role in this shift. Through autopsies that could be performed immediately after death, the analytic knowledge of medicine now is founded upon death (the surfaces opened up by anatomical dissection). While once the truth of man was observable on the surface of the body, now death has relocated it to the depth of his body. Man has related to itself in a "structure of invisible visibility" (BC: 165). Again, as was the case in *History of Madness*, Man has been constituted as a self-referential being through a void.

My contention is that there is a fundamental link between BC and Foucault's works on Roussel.[36] BC and *Death and the Labyrinth* have many things in common. The latter, similar to the former, is one of Foucault's books that is least commented on.[37] In terms of their content, not only does death play a fundamental role in both books, but the core of his analysis is based on questioning the relation between seeing and saying. In *Speaking and*

[36] Foucault has written two texts on Roussel. First he published an essay (*Dire et Voir Chez Raymond Roussel*) in *Lettre ouvert 4* in 1962, which then became, with some modifications, the first chapter of his book *Raymond Roussel* in 1963.

[37] Foucault in an interview expresses his happiness about the fact that no one talks about this book so that it can remain his secret affair (DL: 185). He also claims that the book does not follow the sequence of his works.

Saying in Raymond Roussel, an essay which finally developed into a book, Foucault traverses Roussel's oeuvre to elaborate on the relation between the fundamental elements of his cosmos: words and things (Faubion, 2004: viii). Roussel's language, Foucault believes, contrary to the occult language is not constituted on the basis of just one secret that is kept silent, but its enchantment resides in the secret forms of language: "it is morphological not a semantic displacement" (SSR: 25). In Roussel, the relation between seeing and saying, between things and words, is not that of expression or stylistic formalism (saying the same things in different ways) but by making use of different techniques he illustrates that they are, as if caught in a labyrinth, reciprocated through "the uncontrollable polyvalence of forms" (SSR: 26). In *How I Wrote Certain of My Books*, published posthumously, Roussel explains these techniques: for example he chooses two "almost identical" words – for instance, *billard* (billiard table) and *pillard* (plunderer) - and by adding words which have two meanings, he would make two "almost identical" sentences (Foucault calls the first "sentence" and the second "antisentence") that have radically different meanings (following our example, thus we will have "*les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux billard*" [the white letters on the cushions of the old billiard table] and "*les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux pillard*" [the white man's letters on the hordes of the old plunderer]) (O'leary, 2009). His task is to start with the first sentence and navigate the narration so that the second sentence concludes it. What is important in Roussel, for Foucault, is that this narration "is not the fidelity of language to the object, but the birth of a perpetually renewed and infinite relation between words and things" (PLR: 422). It is as if narration constitutes the a priori of relation between seeing and saying: it starts with a sentence that is mainly "a concrete language referring to things" and advancing continuously it raises new objects and finally when it becomes silent, in the antisentence, "things start to flicker for themselves, forgetting that they have been previously 'spoken'" (DL: 24; PLR: 422). Narration or, in general, literature gives rise to a space, a hollow but structured one, in which words and things find their place of coexistence and mutual relation. Nevertheless, how was it possible for us to unravel the structure of this mysterious space of not-yet-separated seeing and saying? The answer is through a discourse (i.e. *How I Wrote Certain of My Books)* on other discourses (some of Roussel's Books).[38] Here lies the cornerstone of Foucault's thought that not only

[38] Simon During in *Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing*, makes connections between Foucault's book on Roussel and other post-structural literary criticisms. While he provides a very detailed analysis of the book in terms of the play of labyrinth and death or, to put it in another way, saying and

allows him to build a fortress against phenomenology but accounts for his divergence from *History of Madness*. While the experience of writing, i.e. the moment when Roussel was writing his book, belongs to the undifferentiated space of seeing and saying, what is accessible retrospectively is "the spoken structure". The experience of narrating in Roussel is the single figure of seeing-saying (their reciprocity makes it inconsistent with the tragic structure of Dionysian-Apollonian relation), but when time sets its seal on that experience what is left behind is articulation: to our ears a murmur that is already there. Hindsight by its nature renders impossible any access to that experience, "we are doomed historically to history, … to the task of hearing what has already been said" (BC: xvi).[39] One can clearly see how this prominence given to the spoken structure prefigures the pivotal role that the notion of Archive, as the homogeneous site of verbal traces, will play later (TOT: 14).

This can, moreover, shed light on Foucault's reading of the "concrete a priori". Since *The Birth of the Clinic* is research about "the conditions of possibility of medical experience", it is a transcendental project; but it is also, Foucault immediately adds, research that is "deliberately both historical and critical" (BC: xix). What is the nature of those conditions of possibility? What does "historical" add to critical? For Kant, "conditions of possibility of experience in general" are the "conditions of possibility of the objects of experience" (Kant, 2000: 194). These conditions, which are intrinsic structures of our cognition, enable Kant to anticipate all possible empirical objects. For Foucault, the condition of possibility is a "profound structure", an "and", a place of reciprocity that he roughly calls *discourse*.[40] Discourse is not a place for accumulated knowledge [connaissance] (theories, concepts, or systems) but is the home for epistemic knowledge [savoir], i.e. "the more general arrangement … that determines the reciprocal position and the connexion between the one who must know and that which is to be known" (BC: 137). In this sense, contrary to Kant, for Foucault the conditions of possibility of experience are the conditions of possibility of the objects of experience *and* the knowing subject. In other words, he distances himself from the anthropological feature of the Kantian transcendental. What about the futuristic and anticipatory claims of the Kantian transcendental? Here Foucault also reverses Kant

saying, he does not pay attention to what Foucault calls "discoursing on discourse". My argument here is that it is this relation within Roussel's oeuvre that was important for Foucault's archaeological analysis.

[39] This why Foucault tells us that Roussel's work is not merely a literary experiment, but he actually experiments with the nature of language (DL: 175).

[40] We will see later how he loads this term with still different meanings, but I have to point out here that what he calls discourse in BC, in *The Order of Things* will become episteme.

through the introduction of the historical element. If it is possible to grasp the concrete a priori, to uncover those fundamental structures, it is because they have already come to a closure (BC: xv). Articulation does not revive the experience; it can only function as a commentary on the verbal traces that are left to reveal the hollow sun of 'and' in the space of which things become expressible.

Articulation as the Visibility of the Spatial Event

By asserting, though with an indifferent tone, that he is now interested in the Same, Foucault implicitly proclaims a significant shift in his thought. In *History of Madness*, he maintained that if there exists identity, for example between man and his truth, it is because a difference has been historically established, and a dividing line has been drawn (to which the existence of the mad philosopher testifies). The Same, in the final analysis, is constructed by and rooted in difference. Thus when he declared that *The Order of Things* was "the history of resemblance, sameness, identity", in fact, he was alluding to a different logic (TOT: 13; OT: xxvi). One can say, according to this new formulation, that if different realms, that is to say, words and things, are related to each other, it is because they both are rooted in a common place, in an *intermediary* space. In the previous section, we studied this relation that was embodied in the question "how to speak and see?" in the works of Roussell. Now we can turn to Blanchot and some other authors to see how they influenced Foucault and constructed the foundations of *The Order of Things*.

Foucault's *The Order of Things* has been the target of criticism more than any other of his works.[41] There are two types of philosophical criticisms levelled at the book: the problem of the subject and the inconsistency of conceptual tools. It has been argued that Foucault considers himself to be outside of the epistemic order that he tries to analyze and that by rejecting the idea of the constitutive subject he has left no place for freedom (Oksala, 2005: 70-71). Foucault has also been criticized because the central concept of his study, that is to say, the historical a priori, is problematic because his archaeology cannot provide a theoretical ground for it (Han, 2002: 50-60).[42] My aim in this section is to show that in *The*

[41] It has been criticized both by philosophers and historians. Historians mainly consider it to be a historical book which tries to compensate for its lack of analytical depth by a reckless generalization (Gutting, 1989: 176-9). Gutting argues against these criticisms that Foucault's historical analysis merely provides some basis for his philosophical criticism. Here I will focus more on the philosophical criticisms.

[42] For Han (2002: 10-11) , historical a priori is the most fundamental and the most enduring concept for Foucault that emerges for the first time in BC but after AK, even though the term is not mentioned, it will take on new avatars such as problematization or games of truth.

Order of Things, the question of language has a primacy over the problem of the subject. Moreover, by explicating the notion of the event in OT, I will suggest a different reading of what is meant by the historical a priori. Of course here I cannot do justice to Foucault's engagement with language and literature, but I will start by giving some hints about the nature of his concern about language.[43]

The primary concern for Foucault is to provide a novel understanding of language, because he thinks, though precariously and through the hazy lens of uncertainty, that it can bring about a new response to the question of what thought is (DN: 74; MAO: 549).[44] Thus when he declares that his objective is to write for our culture "the history of its own thought" (TOT: 18), he is mainly interested in the history of the language. Moreover, when he uses the word "thought", he does not refer to the history of philosophical and theoretical thought but "of all that contains thought in a culture" and thus one cannot make any choice, they should read everything because thought exists in philosophy, jurisprudence, administrations, novels as well as prisons (TOT: 14-18). Philosophers and historians of our time, according to Foucault, have failed to think this thought, due to their "intellectual cowardice", and remain caught in the dichotomy of formalization and interpretation (TOT: 17-18). Signs and marks of language are considered either to be man-made constructions as the bearer of meaning and intentions or to be something "always there, deposited on the figure of the world", waiting for us to reach them through interpretation. To pose the problem correctly and appropriately, his solution is to approach the issue from the perspective of the *being of language*. This being, however, for him has been historically informed and has gone through different forms that have been studied in *The Order of Things*.

Foucault, as the bulk of his essays in this period indicate, was preoccupied with the question of the being of language.[45] We have already explored some of these studies in relation to madness and the ideas of Roussel. In *Language to Infinity* his objective is to articulate two

[43] Foucault's engagement with literature has been neglected by most commentators. For example, Joseph J. Tanke in his study dedicated to Foucault's philosophy of art, does not mention the importance of literature for his work. For Oksala (2005: 88), Foucault's engagement with language can be understood as an attempt to "rethink freedom without human nature". This can be achieved through language's ability to undermine the stability of the dominant historical a priori. However, as I will demonstrate, language as a domain of positivity cannot transcend the historical a priori. For more on Foucault and literature see Rajchman, 1988; During, 1992; Carrol, 1988.

[44] "literature in our day … is a phenomenon whose necessity has its roots in a vast configuration in which the whole structure of our thought and our knowledge is traced" (OT: 418).

[45] Philippe Sabot in *Lire Les mots et les choses de Michel Foucault*, argues that archaeology here is mainly the study of the ontology of language.

"ontological events of language" in the history of Western thought, one is symbolized by Homeric heroism and the other brought about by Sade (LI: 90-91). In Homeric Rhetoric, which according to Foucault lasted until the eighteenth century, language was reduplicating itself, as if through a mirror erected against and towards death, so as to speak to infinity within any oeuvre. This mirror, contrived at the outside of the oeuvre, established the sovereignty of the Word as an eternal speech within the oeuvre, from which language "made itself into its self-enclosed reflection": language (*langue*) is constructed in an eternal speech (parole) (LI: 94). At the end of the eighteenth century what has changed was precisely this relation between language and speech. The space that had been opened up by Rhetoric now was closed off and replaced by that of the Literature: the mirror has shifted from the outside of language to the inside. Language does not repeat anymore the hidden speech of the Word, but, left to its own monotonous and continuous existence, has gained the power to repeat itself (LI: 100). The space of literature is not where speech adopts a form (and thus Foucault departs from the Barth-Sartre debate), but it is "a site that is nowhere" and embraces within itself all oeuvres of past and future (LI: 100-101). While here Foucault distinguishes two events in the ontological history of language, he will later recognize other events in *The Order of Things*. Moreover, the ontological event of language will play a more fundamental role in the order of knowledge. In another attempt to contemplate the being of language, he explores Pierre Klossowski. Here the being of language assumes a "simulacral space", a hollow, where the distance and proximity of the Same find their common place. Simulacrum, according to Foucault, is "a representation of something in which this thing delegates and manifests itself but withdraws and in a sense conceals itself, a falsehood that causes one to take one sign for another" (PA: 127). Furthermore, while there are instances of superimposition, simulacrum differs from the sign since the latter belongs to the realm of meaning and the former to that of appearance (PA: 128). Simulacrum belongs to an experience, entirely foreign to dialectics, which can be formulated in the equation A=A. This equation, through its "eternal internal movement", does not produce any truth; it is a *nonpositive affirmation* that instead opens up a space for the language of non-dialectical thought (PA: 126; PT). One can observe here the spatial nature of Foucault's thought that contrary to the temporality of the negation, characteristic of dialectical thought, attempts to think the Same. While the idea of simulacrum is as old as the Greek gods, Klossowski's innovation is that he "treats his own language as a simulacrum" where language and commentary are the same (PA: 133-134). This language, Foucault concludes, is the only one

that has left for us: we are doomed to discourse about discourses, to the play of speech (parole) and language (langue) (MAO: 545). The common trait of all these essays is that an empty space, a void, has been opened up that constitutes the being of language in our age. Why is this void so essential for language? Why is Foucault tenaciously working to make it clear that literature has become a "simulacral space", a "lacunary reserve", a play?

To understand Foucault's concern about the essential void, it might be useful to place it in the wider tradition of *mise en abyme* (literally means "set into abyss"), a term introduced to art criticism by André Gide (Sheridan, 1998: 397). In studying a work of art, what Gide was interested in was "to find transposed, on the scale of the characters, the very subject of that work" (Gide, 200:29) and thus his interest in Velázquez's *Las Meninas* and *Hamlet*'s play within a play. In France, this term became the primary tool for formalist critics who thought that the essence of literature is its self-referentiality, that is to say when it cuts itself off from extra-textual relations and confines itself to its own textual boundaries: an interiorization to infinity (Carroll, 1987:53-55).[46] It seems that Foucault adopts this approach, even though with some reservations. For him literature has become a "certain self-relation which is complex, multilateral and simultaneous", a network that it is a priori is not anymore world or truth but language alone (DAO: 101-103). Nevertheless, this self-referentiality of literature, for Foucault, does not mean an extreme interiorization:

> "Literature is not language approaching itself until it reaches the point of its fiery manifestation; it is, rather, language getting as far as away from itself as possible. And if, in this setting 'outside of itself,' it unveils its own being, the sudden clarity reveals not a folding-back but a gap, not a turning back of signs upon themselves but a dispersion" (TO: 149).

Thus contrary to the interiorization of formalist *mise en abyme*, he thinks self-referentiality in terms of dispersion. This is the lesson that, Foucault asserts, Blanchot has taught us; thus, contrary to those who consider literature as a mode of language (e.g. Sartre and Barthes), it

[46] John Rajchman (1988) is among few Foucauldian scholars who has paid attention to Foucault's obsession with language in his early works. For him, Foucault's modernism, which he shared with those involved in *nouvell critique*, reveals itself very explicitly in the idea of the self-reflexivity of language. The common trait of the artistic works that Foucault has used to elaborate this theme (*Las Meninas*, *Don Quixote*, *Justine*, or even Rousseau's *Dialogues*) is that they present "the self-referring instance of that tradition". Rajchman concludes that arts are "meta-epistemic" in the sense that they can, allegorically, bring to light those deep structures that have made knowledge possible. He concludes that Foucault later rejected modernism because he realized that the idea of formalism, which was the basis of OT, is politically barren. As I will argue here, Foucault didn't use self-referentiality in its formalist sense.

is for him a hollow that constitutes the outside of any oeuvre: literature is the very specific being of language in our time (DH: 25). Moreover, it seems that any self-referentiality, according to Foucault, to gain its dispersed volume and to enter the ontological realm needs an "essential void". Foucault's celebrated analysis of Velázquez's *Las Meninas* at the beginning of *The Order of Things* sheds light on this issue.[47] For him, in this painting, representation and the space opened up by it has been offered in its pure form, and what has made it possible is a void, i.e. "the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation" (OT:18). The essential void provides an ontology not based on the chain of beings, each grounded on the other, but on the basis of an unfounded Being.[48] This fundamental void, being posited outside of the painting, is where three gazes converge: that of the painter (when he is contemplating the picture called *Las Meninas*), that of the spectator and that of the model (King Philip IV and his wife). This is not the place of a sovereign subject but a "neutral space" of multiplicity. It is crucial to emphasize that this point does not organize the painting, but it makes it possible by constructing its outside: this void is the spatial condition of possibility of dispersion of elements on the canvas. However, this void does not equal nothingness, it is not a "lacuna", it is an "absolute opening" through which representation gains volume and enters into being as the relation between elements of the painting (OT: 336). Thus we can see that the doubles of this essential void, as depicted in the painting, are at the threshold of disappearance: the painter will return to his painting and will become hidden, the royal family is flickering in the mirror and will disappear soon, the man (who personifies the spectator) is literally at the threshold. Foucault refers to this void through terms such as "transitivity", "murmur", "hollow" and "tear". For Foucault, literature has become exactly this essential void for language, that is to say, its outside that enables it to abandon its traditional communicative function and to emerge as "an unfolding of pure exteriority" (TO: 148). Literature as the being of language is only possible in the absence of the sovereign subject: the being of literature and the being of man, as history has confirmed, according to Foucault, are mutually exclusive (OT: 369; TO: 149). However,

[47] Joseph J. Tanke in *Foucault's Philosophy of Art: A Genealogy of Modernity* provides a very detailed study of the painting. His main argument is that the painting, or the way that it has been organized around the absence, can be seen as a "guiding image" for OT in general.

[48] Here Heidegger's ideas about the unfoundedness of Dasein reverberates in Foucault's work. Although I cannot explore the relation between Foucault and Heidegger, it is worth mentioning that in an interview Foucault refers to Heidegger as "the essential philosopher" and that his reading of Heidegger has determined his philosophical development (RM: 470). As far as I know, the link between Foucault and Heidegger in terms of their engagement with language has not yet been studied properly. For more on Foucault and Heidegger see: Han, 2003; Dreyfus, 1996; Lawlor, 2013.

what is this "being of language" and why it is not compatible with the constitutive subject? How is it possible for us to think this outside?

Because of the importance Foucault gives to language, it is justifiable to consider *The Order of Things* as a historical exploration of the being of language.[49] What we should look for are the ways that this being has been historicized and the essential void that, in that specific time, has made it possible. Here I will provide a reading of OT on the basis of these elements. The first period that he scrutinizes covers a large part of human history from the invention of writing to the end of the sixteenth century. Language, in this period and especially during the Renaissance, is believed to be part of the world and, far from being an arbitrary and contractual system, has been set down by God, hence the resemblance between things and words: "things themselves hide and manifest their own enigma like a language and … words offer themselves to men as things to be deciphered" (OT: 39). Language and things were transparent to each other, thanks to this lucid resemblance which was the raison d'etre of the existence of language, before Babel; however, this lucid resemblance is lost after that, as a punishment, and thus words and things lost their transparency. On the basis of written language, at the end of the Renaissance, a ternary system is constructed. In the realm of language, there is, first of all, the written text of the world, "a stigma upon the things". Above all marks, above the discourse of the world, a secondary discourse appears which is called commentary, which by interpreting those written marks, it opens up a space for the language. As a result, for the first time in western culture, commentary leads to the proliferation of the discourse to infinity because it can never reach a "definitive statement", each discourse needs, at any moment, a further discourse to reveal its own truth (OT: 45-47). Under the written texts there exists, as the motor of commentary, an "Original Text" which discloses itself in every discourse as "a murmured element" that calls for a further discourse (OT: 45). The being of language in the Renaissance is the endless attempt of commentary to gain resemblance to the Text: it is a lack that shines forth in the form of a "promise". The space in which language has gained its being as commentary is thus based on the void of complete resemblance.

This system shattered when, in the Classical age, language lost its existence "as the material writing of things" (OT: 47). While in the Renaissance we had the question of sign and its

[49] While in the classical and the modern age he studies labour, life and language, in Renaissance, as his starting point, he only considers language.

designation, now in the Classical age, since words have lost their nature as marks of things, the analysis of language is based on representation. In the age of representation the existence of language as a thing vanished and what is left of it was its function in representation: it became *discourse*. Discourse is a key term throughout Foucault's intellectual career, and at the same time it is the one that has been the source of much confusion, owing to the fact that it is loaded with several meanings (some of them being contrary to each other) and functions. It is used, sometimes, in its general sense as the verbal expression (e.g. the primal discourse (OT: 46)). However, in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, it acquired a very specific meaning as a "complex space" with its own rules and regulations (AK: 23-34). In this case, discourses are presented as those "limited practical domains which have their boundaries, their rules of formation, their condition of existence" (HDC: 41). This alteration is salient when one compares the *Foreword to the English Edition* with the rest of the book in *The Order of Things* (OT: ix-xv). Nevertheless, the most important denotation of discourse for us here is the one that Foucault introduces in contrast to literature as counter-discourse. Here discourse is a mode of being (or non-being for that matter) that determines the ontological existence of language and subjugates it to "the dynasty of representation" (TO: 148-149).

Now, before moving to the modern age, there is an important question we should ask: what is the source of historicity for the being of language? Why is the being of language in the classical age so different from that of the Renaissance? For Foucault, the being of language has been historically constructed through what he calls *épistémè*, which has taken at least three forms: in the pre-classical era it was Similitude, in the classical period it was replaced by Order and in the modern epoch we witness the reign of History (OT: 238). Different meanings have been ascribed to this term by scholars: the entirety of Western knowledge (O'Farrell, 1989:54-55), an historical condition of possibility of knowledge (Oaksala, 2005:21-22) and a list of conditions (Maniglier, 2013: 106). My contention, however, is that there has been a considerable misunderstanding among the scholars about the notion of épistémè in the sense that it has been generally confused with *historical a priori* (Oaksala, 2005; Han, 2002).[50] I will explicate the distinction as well as the relation between the two terms by claiming that Foucault in OT has developed a spatial notion of event.

[50] For example Han (2002: 60) argues that "Foucault employed them [i.e. épistémè and historical a priori] in an interchangeable manner in *The Order of Things*".

In the introduction to The Order of Things, Foucault elaborates different levels of thought. At one extreme of thought, we have "the fundamental codes of a culture" that provides for those who are living in that culture their "empirical orders" (OT: xxii). He gives us a list of these empirical orders that are exactly what he calls domains of positivity (i.e. linguistic, exchange, perceptive and practical codes and grids) and the task of his book is, in contrast to historians of ideas, to study them (OT: xiii). While it might seem surprising for many Foucauldian scholars, it is these fundamental codes that Foucault calls historical a priori. The textual evidence for this argument can be found in *The Order of Things*. For example Foucault tells us that natural history, as one of the positivities of the classical age, was made possible by a historical a priori that opened up the space for different inquiries and controversies in the field which is now called life:

> "This a priori is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man's everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to be true" (OT: 172).

It should also be mentioned that since in each age there exist different types of historical a priori, each delimiting a specific field of knowledge, we have the plurality of positivities. Positivity (or, as Foucault sometimes calls it, empirical positivity) and historical a priori are closely related concepts: one delimits the field, and the other is the field delimited.[51] On the other hand, opposite to the historical a priori, Foucault locates scientific theories and philosophical interpretations. While the historical a priori is ordered knowledge (savoir), reflective thought contemplates order to give it a philosophical foundation. Now, épistémè is an "intermediary" domain between these two regions: "*there is* the pure experience of order and its mode of being" (OT: xxiii; my italics). While *épistémè* is spatially between the two, it is *fundamentally* "anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures". This means that for Foucault *épistémè* is not grounded in empiricities, but it is the brute fact of "there is".[52]

[51] Positivity, a term that, as Agamben (2009: 4-6) has shown, can be traced back to Hegel, is an historical element loaded with rules which is "imposed on individuals by an external power" (i.e. it is not rooted in or informed by faculty of mind) but has become internalized (the "encoded eye"). Moreover, here positivity is very similar to Canguilhem's idea that forms of knowledge are informed by concepts. His notion of concept cannot be reduced to theories, but it is a grid of intelligibility that makes the formulation of theories possible (Gutting, 1989: 33-35).

[52] Here again one can see a similarity between the Heideggerian project which distinguishes between the ontic and Being and Foucault's *épistémè*/empiricities distinction. Han identifies some Heideggerian strands

However, there is an ambiguity in Foucault's use of the term *épistémè*. I will argue that Foucault has used it in two different senses: *épistémè* as an epistemic field and *épistémè* as an event.

In the first sense, *épistémè* is related, abstractly, to the historical a priori. It can be understood as an epistemic field where the mode of being of all positivities is determined. This mode of being has a paradoxical nature which orders words and things simultaneously: "order is, at one at the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law …, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language" (OT: xxi). Thus, it belongs not only to an objective realm of things but at the same time has no existence except in words. We should note, however, that this being of things is not their empirical being as objects of subjective experience, but rather it is merely their mode of being as objects defined by historical a priori. Foucault, moreover, holds that things "emancipated" from the grids of the historical a priori, i.e. the epistemic field, does not exist in our thought, because every culture can become conscious about those grids only when another grid has already been superimposed (OT: xxii; OT: 238). This reveals the rationale of Foucault's own methodology in which historical comparison prevails. One can say that épistémè, in this sense, is the space of "and", that meager synthetic space of the Same: any kind of relation between words and things has become possible on the basis of this ground.[53] Thus we are dealing with a space in which different positivities are linked to each other in the element of similarity and have formed a "fundamental network" which rules over

in OT, but then she argues that this parallel cannot be held for two reasons: firstly, order is a restricted notion that presupposes a certain understanding of Being and secondly, order for Foucault is at the same time both spatial and subjective (experience of order). In relation to the first I will solve it by making a distinction between *épistémè* as an event and the mode of being of *épistémè* which is revealed in positivities. The second criticism confuses Foucault's non-subjective notion of experience with subjective experience. Foucault, in an autocriticism, states that the notion of experience in his earlier works was too enigmatic and it could show "to what extent one was still close to admitting an anonymous and general subject of history" (AK: 14). Michael Schwartz (2003: 164) claims that "*The Order of Things* would have been impossible without the history of Being as its model". He shows how Foucault is using Heidegger and at the same time criticizes him. Despite his brilliant study, he also conflates *épistémè* with historical a priori. Moreover, Heidegger has used the term *épistémè* in *The Question Concerning Technology* to refer to a knowledge that "provides an opening up. As an opening up it is revealing" (Heidegger, 1977: 13). Thus for him there is a relation between knowing and the event of Being.

[53] This synthetic space should not be confused with Kant's synthetic a priori. For Kant the aporia was how to synthesize between Hume's empiricism and Berkeley's idealism: whether causality is a matter of mind or is in nature. His response was that both lead to the same thing, because what we consider to be nature is nothing other than the application of the categories of mind (including causality) to bring about objects of experience, the only things that we can acquire knowledge of: nature is "the sum total of objects of experience" (Kant, 2000: 111). Considering Foucault's obvious and stubborn anti-subjectivism, he is far from this Kantian problematization and solution. This synthetic, mediatory space is neither that of "a priori and necessary concatenation" nor that of "perceptible contents" (OT: xxi; Han: 41).

"methods, concepts, types of analysis, acquired experiences, minds, and finally men themselves" (OT: 83)

In the second sense, *épistémè* is related to what Foucault calls an "enigmatic event" (OT: 258). When George Canguilhem (2006: 82) describes archaeology as "the condition of an *other history*, in which the concept of event is retained, but in which events affect concepts not men", he actually refers to the crucial role that the notion of events play in Foucault's work in this period. The shift from one epistemic field to another is a "radical event"[54] and the task of archaeology is to study this transformation "in terms of its own evident arrangement" by accomplishing a fourfold examination of: (1) the configuration of positivities, (2) the empirical entities of each positivity (for example, language in the modern age substituted discourse of the classical era), (3) the newly formed relation between positivities, and (4) the epistemic field as a general grid of knowledge (OT: 236). This enables Foucault to develop a methodology in which continuity and discontinuity coexist: while the construction of the epistemic field is continuous (this is why, for example, Foucault can say that, in transition from the classical age to the modern era, language was the last positivity that changed (OT: 330)), the condition of possibility of this formation is the enigmatic event of a rupture.

Although Foucault repeatedly asserts that we do not know the nature of this event, he alludes that its function is to transform the "mode of being" of epistemic order (OT: 235). This event, which has been neglected by most Foucauldian scholars, is the spatial condition of possibility for the emergence of the epistemic field at each era. While most of the thinkers who deal with historical phenomena think in a temporal manner, the unique trait of Foucault's thought is that he thinks spatially. This space is related to self-referentiality and the essential void that we have already discussed in relation to *Las Meninas*. Foucault distinguishes four special events that have been opened up so far: Like, Representation, Man, and Literature. In the classical age, for example, Order, as the epistemic field of that age, was made possible in the space opened by Representation: "The whole Classical system

[54] Foucault here rejects the idea of progressive rationality. From one épistémè to the other, if knowledge changes, it is not because people have started to observe more delicately or to think rationally, but because their mode of thought has changed: for instance, after contrasting Aldrovandi to Buffon, Foucault concludes that: "Aldrovandi was neither a better nor a worse observer than Buffon; he was neither more credulous than he, nor less attached to the faithfulness of the observing eye or to the rationality of things. His observation was simply not linked to things in accordance with the same system or by the same arrangement of the episteme" (OT: 44).

of order … is unfolded within the space that is opened up inside representation when representation represents itself" (OT: 227). What is essential for this self-referentiality to move in the direction of dispersion and not interiorization is, as we have seen, a void. This void for Like was constituted by the nonalignment between hermeneutics and semiology (OT: 33), for Representation by the absence of the sovereign subject (OT: 73), for Man by the repetition of finitude (the identity and difference between the positive finitude and the fundamental finitude) (OT: 343). Following these events, the mode of the being of positivities start to change but not abruptly. Foucault discerns two phases for this transformation: in the first step while the "fundamental mode of being of positivities does not change", a new configuration appears and in the second phase the mode of being of positivities alters (OT: 240). It is for this reason that Foucault, who has noticed the recent event and the emergence of Literature, keeps telling us that we are still under the spell of an anthropological mode of thought: the second phase has not yet started, and we still remember the anthropological thought. The only way that this new mode of being can be understood is "obsoleteness": to embrace the new one by forgetting the older one (OT: 307).

If Foucault can say that "in any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one épistémè that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge [savoir]", it is because épistémè, as the spatial event or as the epistemic field, is unique in each age but opens up a space for the emergence of the multiplicity of positivities. However, we should add that the spatial event is not an occurrence that happens once in time, it continues to trace the space that it has opened up indefinitely, it is always contemporary and positivities are its reifications. Moreover, this is why the epistemic field can only come to light by means of comparison.

	Épistémè as the Spatial Event	Épistémè as the Epistemic Field	Mode of Being of Language
Renaissance	Like	Similitude	Commentary
Classical Age	Representation	Order	Discourse
Modernity	Man	History	Philology, Formalization, Interpretation, and Literature
Contemporary	Literature	?	Commentary

Figure 2.

Now, returning to our inquiry about discourse, when Foucault says that being of language in the classical age was that of discourse, one needs to understand it in terms of the spatial event of that epoch. As the result of that event (i.e. Representation), the sign has earned the capacity of ordering through its existence as a double representation, which distinguishes it from the ternary existence of the sign in the Renaissance (i.e. sign, signified and conjuncture): "from the Classical age, the sign is the *representativity* of the representation in so far as it is *representable*" (OT: 72). The place of conjuncture that has been left vacant is that of the "neutral space" in Velázquez's painting, it is the essential void that makes the dispersion of the epistemic field possible: the sign now is determined by its relational function. Moreover, Language (*langage*), as a particular system of signs, has no other existence than that of representation and thus Foucault was able to say that language did not exist but functioned: it functioned as a transparent medium between things and words (OT: 87). This being (or non-being) of language, where what has remained for it was only a representation, is what he calls discourse (OT: 88). However, the epistemic field of the classical age, through the "enigmatic event" at the end of the eighteenth century, has been replaced by another one: History replaced Order (OT: 258; OT: 274).

History, as the space opened up by the modern spatial event, led to the dispersion of the classical positivities only to regroup them again, but with one exception. While the living being of natural history regrouped in life and economic procedures gathered together around production, language, the being of which as discourse was the last thing to disappear

in the threshold of modernity, turned into a fragmentary being (OT: 331-332). In the classical age knowing and discoursing were the same thing because language was "the initial, inevitable way of representing representations" (OT: 322). After the spatial event, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, language "began to fold in upon itself … to deploy a history" and became "one object of knowledge among others" (OT: 322). This is why classical thought, after its most fundamental bastion has fallen, is not accessible to us: it is now our prehistory (OT: 331). The fragmentary being of language manifests itself in four distinctive forms: philology, formalization, interpretation and literature (OT: 331-332). Foucault considers this to be the reason for our obsession (Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Russell, Freud) with language. Now our central question has become this: "what is language, how can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its plenitude?" (OT: 334). Foucault, here more than anywhere else, is clear about his project; we need to overcome this fragmentation, to bring it to unity again, it is only in this way that we can "bring to completion what had occurred before us, and without us, towards the end of eighteenth century" (OT: 334). How can we do this? From Foucault's undertaking in *The Order of Things*, one can assume that he had two things in mind. Firstly, we need to think not in terms of History, the épistémè of the nineteenth century, and thus he brought to the fore heterotopia, grid, field, and other spatial concepts. The reason is that a new spatial event has happened, and Foucault wants us to embrace it by forgetting the older one. Secondly, any attempt to bring to completion this spatial event needs to address its foundational element, that is to say, Man. However, what does Foucault exactly mean by Man?[55] How can it be a spatial event?

For Foucault, Man, as the figuration of finitude, is a two hundred years old entity that had no existence in the age of representation and is going to disappear again as the result of the latest spatial event. As the result of the disappearance of representation, the fragmentation of language, and the folding back of positivities upon themselves, Man has been able to fill the place that once belonged to God: "Anthropology indicates the absence of God, and

[55] There is no consensus among commentators about Foucault's notion of Man. Maniglier (2013: 106) argues that here Foucault refers to an epistemological question rather than a particular thing or a metaphysical entity. Nancy Fraser (1994) finds three different types of anti-humanism in Foucault's work, each of which corresponds to three main stages of his oeuvre. For her the anti-humanism of archaeology is a philosophical issue that criticizes the metaphysics of subjectivity in the West. It has also been suggested that there is a parallel between Foucault's anti-humanism and that of Heidegger. Hoy (1981) relates it to Heidegger's critique of Cartesianism. For more on Foucault's anti-humanism and its relation to Heidegger see Han, 2005.

occupies the void that the infinite leaves in its wake" (IKA, 2008:120). It is true, Foucault states, that our modernity started when man became an object for positivities, but this is only the appearance; at a fundamental level (the task of archaeology is to study this level), Man is the name given to the spatial event that constitutes the threshold of our modernity when "finitude was conceived in an interminable cross-reference with itself" (OT: 346). As we have seen before, the spatial event for Foucault is a particular self-referentiality that instead of interiorization disperses to infinity because of its essential void. Here I will focus on Foucault's complementary doctoral thesis on Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.[56] Foucault not only translated this text but wrote an introduction to it, in which he explores the relation between Anthropology and Critique. Here I will argue that Foucault recognizes two different types of repetition, and while one of them can be considered as a spatial event, the other is the ground for Foucault's anti-humanism.[57]

In Kant's oeuvre, Foucault argues, a movement is discernible according to which "the problem of finitude goes from interrogating the limit and transgression to interrogating the return to the self" (IKA, 123). In the first instance, repetition repeats the play of transgression-limit in Critique: "we are at the level of the structural foundation of the *anthropologico-critical repetition*" (IKA, 83). Foucault calls this first type of repetition *The Fundamental,* which can itself take four different forms of *mirroring*, *foundation*, *complementarity and mediation* (Han, 2002: 22-25). The fundamental moves in the opposite direction to the transcendental: while the transcendental begins with the a priori forms of experience, the fundamental takes the empirical contents of the experience as its starting point only in order to show that the empirical finitude cannot be its own foundation but that it "always appears as already transcendentally founded" (Han, 2002: 27). Here we are

[56] As his complementary thesis, Foucault submitted the translation of Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* with his introduction and notes. However, while the translation was published in 1964, his introduction only saw the light of day in 2008. Arguments in the introduction are very condensed and subtle, thus it seemed necessary, not only for the jury but for Foucault himself, to elaborate on them in more detail (Nigro, 2008:127-129). A task, however, never accomplished, or at least, if we accept Daniel Defert's view that *The Order of Things* was Foucault's promised book on the relation between critique and anthropology, it did not appear in its original configuration (IKA, 2008:150). The main objective of the *Introduction* is to analyse the relation between Critique and Anthropology in terms of analytic of finitude to reveal what is for Foucault the nature of modern illusion (IKA, 2008:117-118).

[57] Foucault's *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* has been discussed very rarely. Even in the Afterword, Robert Nigro (2008) does not make any connection between this work and Foucault's criticism of empirical-transcendental double in *The Order of Things*. Beatrice Han (2002) provides a very through and detailed study of the text and my explication here is heavily influenced by her study.

dealing with a mimetic repetition which is constituted on the basis of a gap between transcendental and empirical.

In contrast to the fundamental, Foucault posits philosophical anthropology or more precisely the *Originary*. While for Foucault the fundamental was a legitimate form of repetition, the originary informs the vicious circle of finitude. Here a kind of repetition is still at work but this one, contrary to the fundamental, inverts the structure:

> "Thus, the structure of the relationship between the given and the a priori in *Anthropology* is the opposite of that revealed in the *Critique*. The a priori, in the order of knowledge, becomes, in the order of concrete existence, an *originary* which is not chronologically first, but which, having appeared in the succession of figures of the synthesis, reveals itself as already there" (IKA, 68).

The problem with the originary is that, contrary to the transcendental a priori, it cannot preexist its empirical emergence because it can take the meaning of an already-there only *retrospectively* (IKA,65). In this way, the empirical existence of man becomes the a priori of knowledge and thus it is empirical knowledge that determines the transcendental nature of man. Thus, instead of having a void that can establish self-referentiality, here we have a self-referentiality that constitutes its own void.

Foucault in OT repeats the same claim with a somewhat different terminology. He argues that the void, in the modern era, has been located at the center of the repetition of finitude, in the slim space between the positive finitude and the fundamental finitude. In all positivities, man has become an object and thus, one can say, "man is governed by labour, life and language":

> "All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature" (OT: 341-342).

This is the positive finitude. However, these empiricities are possible only because man, who through them discovers himself to be finite, can illumine them; for man, body, desire and language are given "against the background of his own finitude" (OT: 343). This is the fundamental finitude. These two types of finitude are the same and yet radically different, and thus the essential void appears in-between. The whole of modern thought pours out and returns to this slim space of repetition "of the identity and the difference between the positive and the fundamental" (OT: 343). What Foucault calls Man, or an anthropological

thinking, is this self-referentiality of the finitude, i.e. analytic of finitude. However, why does Foucault consider it an "anthropological slumber"? What is the difference between the self-referentiality of finitude and other self-referentialities? Representation, as a type of self-referentiality, has no other existence except in its function; resemblance exists insofar as it can play the role of a bridge between hermeneutics and semiology. It was for this reason that a metaphysics was necessary for the form of microcosm-macrocosm (for resemblance) or finite-infinity (for representation). This metaphysics was necessary because it made possible for empiricities "to be the manifest forms of human finitude" and also have representation (or resemblance) as their condition of possibility (OT: 345). At the beginning of the nineteenth century a very particular kind of self-referentiality appeared which, while it had its essential void in the disjointed relation between the fundamental and the positive finitude, made metaphysics redundant exactly for that reason: the negative relation between infinite and finite gave way to the duplication of finitude on the basis of itself. The self-referentiality specific to Man, that is to say the Originary, is that of Repetition, a Fold that, contrary to other types which were the principles of exteriorization and scattering, acts as a "dialectical interplay" which leads to "an ontology without metaphysics" (OT: 370). This Fold is the space of the quadrilateral of man: "the connection of the positivities with finitude, the reduplication of the empirical and the transcendental, the perpetual relation of the Cogito to the unthought, the retreat and return of the origin" (OT: 365).

To explicate this further, I argue that here the essential void assumes the form of a vortex that swallows everything, while the void of representation is a volcano conduit ("a lacunary reserve") that makes eruption and dispersion possible; to play with words, one is the "repetition of the void" and the other is "the void of repetition". Therefore, Foucault proclaims, our task is to destroy this "anthropological 'quadrilateral' in its very foundation" (OT: 372). He admits that this arrangement was essential for our thought and constitutes part of our history after Kant, but it is now has turned into an obstacle to "an immanent new form of thought", that is to say, Literature (OT: 373). This again confirms the fact that *épistémè* as the spatial event (the Fundamental) is different from *épistémè* as the epistemic field (the Fold or the Originary).

Literature is the last spatial event that Foucault, standing over the shoulders of Blanchot, in the dusk of Man, can see emerging on the horizon of our thought.[58] This event is the self-referentiality of language that opens up the space for the experiments of our thought. Language, overcoming its fragmentation, has appeared again in its unity as "the thick space within –or between- whose layers those experiments [of our thought] are conducted, it is in the element of language as in the element of water or air that all these experiments take place" (DN: 72-73). Literature is that spatial being which has made this unity and volume possible. It is in this sense that we can understand it as the outside: not as a "positive presence" but an absence, a "minuscule hiatus" (TO: 155-157). What does it mean to remain loyal to the being of literature in our thought? What is this "thought from outside"? We can reply, negatively, that this thought, contrary to reflection, should avoid two things: subject and time. Foucault argues that the being of language and the being of Man has been shown historically to be mutually exclusive (TO: 149). While the traces of this subjectless thought can be recognized in Mallarmé, Artaud, Bataille and Klossowski, it is Blanchot, who is absent from the existence of his texts and "absent by virtue of the marvelous force of their existence", that presents himself as "that thought itself" (TO: 151). The self-referentiality of Blanchot is not that of "I lie, I speak", but is the mere "I speak" (TO: 147-148). In the former, the subject addresses itself and thus we have a self-referentiality that is compatible with the idea of Man: "the speaking subject is also the subject about which it speaks". However, the latter appears, though momentarily, in the absence of any supporting discourse: before "I speak", in the silence anterior to its utterance, there is no discourse; the moment it relates to a content (I speak about …), it also disappears (Lawlor, 2012:177). What has made it possible for language to "come together in an attempt to recapture itself in the stripped-down form, "I speak", is the "desert" that surrounds it, that is to say, the essential void, "an absolute opening through which language endlessly spreads forth": it is literature, the latest spatial event (TO: 148). This self-referentiality is not that of the Fold; it is the principle of scattering. Language develops "on the basis of itself" and thus opens up a space in which language distances from itself: this is the space of the same and the other (Lawlor, 2012:178). Moreover, "I speak", contrary to the "I think" that leads to interiority, takes us to the outside where the subject disappears: now language is the closest thing to the spatial

[58] Oksala (2005: 87) argues that the importance of literature for Foucault lies in that fact that in the literary domain, "the ontological order of things, the historical a priori, can be suspended, even thrown out". However, as I have explained here, language has gained its importance not because it can undermine the ontological order, but exactly because of the latest spatial event that gives language its prominence.

event. Foucault, to escape the self-referentiality of Man, warns us that the void of "I speak" is not the foundation of positivities but "stands at the threshold of all positivity" provides them with the space to unfold (TO: 150). The relation of spatial event and positivities, in which their mode of being is informed, is not that of founding-founded; the mode of being refers to the particular space which allows them to unfold.

Foucault, although he admits that finding a language for this thought is very hard, gives us some hints about the language of reflection and fiction that are compatible with such a thought. In reflection what is needed is the application of negation in a non-dialectical manner (because it interiorizes) to negate not only what one has said but "the very ability to speak": the play of void and speech (TO: 152). The language of fiction also needs a similar strategy. Fiction doe not consist in producing images, but transforms them into "the unimaginable". Fiction, then, "consists not in showing the invisible, but in showing the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is invisible", and thus it is related to "placeless places" (the counterpart of the void), e.g. "beckoning thresholds, … corridors leading to more corridors, … a tunnel" (TO: 153). Blanchot, for Foucault, is the figure who stands at the intersection of these two languages: in Blanchot "commentary" emerges again but this time without the Word (BC: xvi-xvii; OT: xviii-xix; TO: 153-154). This commentary, as a "discourse on the nondiscourse of all language", is addressed towards the outside the language, towards the void, and thus allows it to unfold to infinity; hence the importance of *attraction*, i.e. to know that one is irremediably outside of the outside.

Literature as the latest spatial event has made the destruction of the anthropological quadrilateral possible. This destruction, however, is a completion because it brings to an end the event that has taken place at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Articulation, in its fidelity to the spatial event, not only will awaken us from the anthropological slumber but will make that event visible.

The Differential Diagnosis of the Present

From *The Order of Things* to *The Archaeology of Knowledge* a significant shift in Foucault's work occurred: the question of the being of language and the prominent status of literature disappeared. While it seemed that he was suggesting that we need to realize Literature as the latest spatial event in the western culture, now it is simply a discourse like any other discourse (AK: 137). This disappearance of literature has a vital influence on Foucault's project in a way that not only allowed for the emergence of new concepts and issues (e.g.

discursive formation, enunciative function or énoncé) but paved the way for the entrance of power. If we want to know how it was possible for the genealogical project to appear on the horizon of Foucault's thought, we need to grasp this disappearance and its consequences. Moreover, this shift can confirm one of the main aspects of our study in previous sections when we argued that literature has played a crucial role in Foucault's early writings and thought: *Archaeology of Knowledge* proves that argument, though negatively. Now, in this section we will scrutinize this alteration and its consequences. Why literature has descended from its supreme position to the realm of discourse?

The archaeology of Knowledge, has been criticized on the basis of Foucault's own criticism of the analytic of finitude. It has been suggested that Foucault himself is a victim of what he has shown to be problematic, i.e. the circularity and confusion between the conditioning and the conditioned. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 79-99) put forward an argument on the basis of Foucault's concept of regularity in order to account for the failure of AK. This argument has been widely accepted and repeated by other commentators[59], and thus I will try first to present the problem as they formulated it and then proceed by providing a reading of AK that can respond to this criticism. Foucault in AK claims that he is studying the discursive formation (or the field of statements) "in its empirical modesty", that is to say, a set of rules that govern "things actually said" (AK: 127; AK: 72).[60] The task of archaeologists is then to describe these field of regularities. However, the problem starts when one tries to understand the nature of this government. Foucault explicitly rejects the idea that these rules have anything to do with anything beyond the discursive field itself (e.g. consciousness or human mind) (AK: 121). It might mean that the primary function of these rules is to systemize the discursive field. However, Foucault gives them a prescriptive role by claiming that discursive formation is "a complex group of relations that function as a *rule*: it lays down (*prescrit*) what must be related" (AK: 74, my italics). Since Foucault wants to remain at the level of discourse, he ends up with "the strange notion of regularities that regulate themselves. Since the regularity of discursive practices seem to be the result of their being governed …, while they are assumed to be autonomous, the archaeologist must attribute causal efficacy to the very rules which describe these practices' systematicity" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 84-85). This is exactly what Foucault calls the problem of the Fold (the "self-

[59] For example look at: Han, 2002, pp. 66-67; Koopman, 2013, pp. 274-275.
[60] Han (2002: 65) argues that here one can see that contrary to Husserl, Foucault does not make any transcendentalist claims.

supporting finitude" of Man), and one can easily reiterate his criticism by substituting 'discourse' for 'finitude'.

My contention is that this approach ignores the fact that Foucault had adopted a regressive outlook that analyses the mode of existence of énoncés from the standpoint of an archaeologist who does not share the same archive with them. More importantly, what has enabled Foucault to undertake such an analysis is his spatial approach to the materiality of language. As Kelly (2009: 12) argues, the autonomous nature of discourse is anti-idealist "since what is actually said is an irruption in the material world, not something merely ideal". Moreover, as Deleuze (2006: 3-4) has shown in his monograph on Foucault, regularity accounts for the rarity of énoncés that should be understood spatially:[61] "regularity of the statement … represents not the average, but rather the whole statistical *curve*".[62] I will try to show that Foucault's shift from Literature to discourse is essential for understanding the regularity of the discursive space.

As we saw, Literature as the last spatial event was manifested in the form of "I speak". Language, thus, gained an ontological existence that was absolutely new: language was no longer part of the world (as it was the case in the pre-Classical era) or mere representation and discourse, it is now a radical and sovereign being that "faces the world, equilibrates it, compensates for it, even destroys it absolutely and scintillates outside it" (LK: 11). "I speak", as the site of language, does not refer to communication but to the dispersion of this being and "I" is not a "responsible agent of discourse" but a nonexistence through whose emptiness language pours out and scatters (TO: 148). This is why Foucault stresses that the being of language and man are mutually exclusive: the theory of signs and the empirical order of man has been historically incompatible throughout the western culture (TOT: 15-17). As a consequence, in the analysis of signs one should avoid doing it in accordance with those empirical elements that have made the human sciences possible. The problem of the

[61] Deleuze distinguishes between three spatial realms. The collateral space refers to the domain of other statements that are part of the same group. Thus, the space of statements cannot be homogenous and rules should be inherently variable and to be found at the level of statements themselves. Then there is the correlative space that links statements to subjects, objects and concepts; this space accounts for the autonomy of language. The last space is that of the complementary, which relates statement to non-discursive elements.

[62] Deleuze (2006: 4) argues that there is a similarity between statement (énoncé) and Bergson's notion of memory, because the former "preserves itself within its own space and continues to exist while this space endures". This is a very radical shift on Foucault's side, because in this way the question about the origin becomes irrelevant and with it any reference to a subject.

being of language is fundamentally tied to the question of the being of the sign. Foucault explains his concern about this issue as follows:

> "What appears to me to be deceiving and naïve in reflections on and analysis of signs is that one supposes them to be always already there, deposited on the figure of the world, or constituted by men, and that one never investigates their being. What does it mean, the fact that there are signs and marks of language?" (TOT: 17)

The sign is neither a neutral tool as if it belongs to the realm of things that everybody can pick and use nor a man-made object that one can produce at their caprice. In *Nietzsche, Freud, Marx*, Foucault takes the study of the being of the sign as his task. While it repeats some of the themes already discussed in *The Order of Things*, here Literature is not mentioned as the latest spatial event. Here he argues that in the sixteenth century, the hermeneutics system was constituted on the basis of similitude (with the five notions of convenientia, sympatheia, emulatio, signatura, analogy) and thus there was a consensus between the sign and the signified. As Foucault has already explained in *The Order of Things*, the reason was that semiology and hermeneutics were superimposed on each other at that time. In the seventeenth century, this system of resemblance was bracketed; in the age of representation hermeneutics was impossible. With Nietzsche, Freud and Marx at the beginning of our age, however, it was not the signified or meaning that changed but the being of the sign itself: they "changed the nature of the sign and modified the fashion in which the sign can, in general, be interpreted" (NFM: 272). This return of hermeneutics, though, was not without compromise; similitude was replaced by simulacra and thus what it made possible was a hermeneutics without semiology. This ontological shift has three aspects. The space in which the sign considered to be a sign is not anymore that of homogeneity, but it has given way to the depth (*profondeur*), which has to be understood not as interiority but as exteriority. The interpreter demonstrates, through "excavation", that what is considered to be deep interiority (e.g. value, capital, consciousness) is the superficiality of the platitude. While the interpreter is an excavator, interpretation itself is a projection "which always leaves depth above it to be displayed in a more and more visible fashion" and thus renders its exteriority back (NFM: 273). Secondly, interpretation has become an infinite task because there is no "original signified" and "interpretation precedes the sign" (NFM: 277). Finally, the time of hermeneutics is circular, and thus it always returns

to interpretation itself not to signs, because to become an infinite task, hermeneutics needs to do away with the fundamental existence of signs; hermeneutics is now very close to madness (NFM: 278).

This short essay on the being of the sign is a further movement in the anti-anthropological direction since it emancipates language from the burden of meaning totally.[63] A language freed from the system of meaning cannot be related to a "sovereign consciousness" but, on the contrary, it is responsible for the emergence of objects (even that of the man) (WPF: 93). This, moreover, enables Foucault to distinguish his analysis from the totalizing method of phenomenology. While it attempts to describe everything (Cogito as well as what is "already there" before Cogito), Foucault does away with Cogito so as to be able to describe "the entire systems of relations that otherwise would not be describable" (WPF: 95). The idea of the essential void is still at the core of his thought. Thus, Foucault situates himself within a group of thinkers -which has started from Marx, Nietzsche and Freud- who testify to the diminishing supremacy of the subject established by Descartes (TAK: 60). Nonetheless, it seems that Foucault has radicalized his anti-anthropological stand by reversing his former claims about the relation between Literature and the eclipse of Man. By providing a historical account of successive spatial events, his aim in *The Order of Things* was to show how Man is falling apart in front of our eyes exactly in the period that language gains a being and Literature arises. Nonetheless, now the obliteration of Man has become a methodological force (Foucault's methodological book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, is actually its product) that not only need not to be coincided with a spatial event, but provides a firm ground for the analysis of literature as a newly formed discourse. The death of man is not an exciting event like the death of God, but it means the death of Subject "as origin and foundation of knowledge (savoir)" (BW: 67).This radicalization manifests itself distinctively when Foucault claims that what made it possible for Blanchot to show

[63] Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that there is a nihilism in Foucault's archaeology that he shares with Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Kuhn, the core of which is the absence of belief in the Truth and hence the importance of the idea of discontinuity. However, they continue, there is a more extreme nihilism at work in AK, according to which not only there is no truth but meaning should be bracketed too. This is because Foucault's analysis of the discursive formation is based on the regularity of what is said and these rules are not in the mind of people, thus whatever meaning they attribute to what they say is epiphenomenal (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 86-87). They conclude that this analysis entails an "ego split" in which the archaeologist (as a detached spectator) looks at the very phenomenon in which he or she, as a historical speaker, is involved. However, this reading fails to take into account Foucault's assertion that one cannot describe "the latest discursive formation" exactly because one speaks from within the same rules (AK: 130). We can only grasp our archive in the element of the difference: our archive "establishes that we are difference, that our reason is eth difference of discourse, our history eth difference of time, ourselves the difference of masks" (AK: 131). This double bracketing, thus, is performed on the closed archive.

"literature is … what constitutes the outside of every work" is not the spatial event but the institution of a new relationship between the author (*écrivain*) and the work by eliminating and negating the former (DH: 25-26). To put it, in a nutshell, he replaces the "I speak" of Literature with the "One speaks" of discourse.[64]

The irony of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is that while it is Foucault's only theoretical book, it lacks the clarity necessary for such work more than any other of his books. Archaeology is the name that he has given to the methodology deployed in a series of his works from *History of Madness* to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. However, even though Foucault is using a single term he means different things in each case. In an interview conducted after the publication of *The Order of Things* he firmly states that archaeology is the "analysis of our own sub-soil" and without the existence of such a "fault line" in the soil of our present, archaeology could not have been possible (TOT: 14-15). This fault line, according to his diagnosis, was the existence of the two contesting positions in the human sciences since their appearance at the end of 19th century: formalization and interpretation. Although he kept the term archaeology, he radically changed its meaning only a year after that interview by saying that it is akin neither to "geology (as analysis of the sub-soil)" nor to "genealogy (as descriptions of beginnings and sequences)" (DH: 27). What has happened is that, by moving away from the spatial event that was the condition of possibility of each discontinuity, he is left with a *discursive plane* that consists of individual discourses and their relations. While it is not the aim of our project to study intentions and mentality, one cannot help but confirm the importance of a question put to Foucault by the journal *Esprit* about the dilemma of his thought. The question which, as Foucault himself admitted, touched "the very core" of his work, was that, considering his view as one which "introduces constraint of the system and discontinuity in the history of the mind", how it is possible to think about "progressive political intervention" (HDC: 33). The dilemma is, considering such a system, one can either accept the system or rather "appeal to an uncontrolled event, to the irruption of exterior violence" which is that of the spatial event. Foucault's response is that he is a "pluralist" and thus instead of system he believes in systems; therefrom he gives the title of "systems of thoughts" to his project (CP: 9). The grandeur of this question, it seems, is one of the forces that pushed Foucault to move from the singularity of the spatial event to the

[64] When Deleuze says that Foucault's different approaches to language (*langage*) can be discerned in his shift from "the being of language" in OT to "there is language" in AK, he actually refers to the same replacement.

plurality of the individual discourses. Now, the central question is how to delineate individual discourses as an ensemble that is "both stable and capable of transformation". Foucault's aim is to introduce unities, through his archaeological analysis, whose principle of stability is not anthropological (e.g. conscience, author or mentality) and their mode of transformation is not determined by "the universal relation of causality" (DH: 20). Thus to understand the Foucauldian conception of discourse at this stage of his thought, we have a twofold task in front of us, we need to grasp its continuity and discontinuity.

Each discourse has three elements or, to put it in a more accurate way, aspects: discursive formation, discursive practice and statement. The central feature of discourse is that it is a practice that makes the difference between what one could say (according to grammar and logic) at one period and what is actually said (HDD: 42). Discursive practice is the "law of this difference"[65]. Foucault has a very peculiar understanding of the term "rule". It is neither something imposed from without nor internal to a discourse but it is at its limit: Foucault attempts to "define a particular site by the exteriority of its vicinity" (AK: 34-35; AK: 15). This is another example that for him "rule" is a spatial concept through and through. As we saw, exteriority, for him, is not the antithesis of interiority but in *The Order of Things* and those essays concerning the being of language, exteriority coincided with the spatial event. Literature, for example, at the beginning of the twentieth century was the exteriority for all knowledge; it was the void for the pouring out and scattering of positivities. However, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault abandoned that absolute exteriority and adopted a pluralist notion of it. Each discourse is a field of exteriority which takes the form of a group of rules. These rules, however, do not say anything about the "internal constitution" of element in a discourse, they are not rules of formulation (AK: 35); they do not account for the historical appearance of things said (AK: 91); but they are immanent in a practice, i.e. a discursive practice, which structures the regularity of the dispersion of elements and their function. Rule, understood as a field of exteriority, is anterior to the description\prescription dichotomy because it is neutral about the content and only regulates the limits: it is "the unconscious of things said" (REC: 309). In this way we can say that for speaking grammar is its field of exteriority: when someone speaks, grammar does not impose itself from without, it is immanent in speaking. Grammar describes the spoken and at the same time prescribes

[65] In AK Foucault uses the terms 'law', 'rule' and 'system' synonymously (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 80). Barry Allen (2010: 155) makes a distinction between Foucault and structuralism on the basis of his conception of "rules" and argues that because his theory of knowledge is based on "generative rules" he is much closer to Chomsky.

how one can speak to make sense, but it does not suggest anything about the meaning that one can or wants to convey. Discursive practice is thus a group of rules for discursive formation and statements. Statement, as the atom of discourse, when considered in terms of its existence belongs to discursive formation, as the principle of dispersion of elements in discourse, in the same way as a sentence belongs to a text (AK: 91). Whereas formulation of a sentence is determined by grammar, which is not the same thing as the rule for composing texts, in the case of statement "the fact of its belonging to a discursive formation and the laws that govern it are one and the same thing" (AK: 91). It is because discursive practice not only makes possible "the four-level system of discursive formation" but "the conditions of operation of the enunciative function" (REC: 321; AK: 92). As if we can have a grammar not only applicable to sentences but to texts as well. When a particular relation is established between "institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual organizations" and other discourses that are more than mere juxtaposition, we can say that discursive practices have achieved their distinct "individuality and autonomy" (AK: 57-58; AK: 144). Discursive practice, as a definite and distinct spatial relationality, is responsible for the continuity of discourse. This continuity, however, is not that of objects, concepts or consciousness. Discursive practice, as Deleuze (2006: 14) suggested, is the topological principle of discourse, since it makes the same relation between elements that gave rise to it in the first place even when they intrinsically change. To give a concrete example, elements that brought about psychiatry (juridical system, demographic demands, prisons) at the beginning of nineteenth century kept mutating but the discursive practice made the same spatial relation between them and thus while the system of regularity remained the same new objects, concepts, modalities of enunciation, and theoretical structures emerged (AK: 58-59). Discursive practice is the condition of possibility for the continuity of discontinuity.

Discourse is discontinuous at two different, but not heterogeneous, realms. Discursive practice gives rise to the discursive formation that is constituted in four interconnected systems of formations, i.e. the formation of objects, the formation of concepts, the formation of enunciative modalities and formation of strategies. Contrary to formulation, which deals with the construction of elements, a system of formation accounts for dispersion and thus discursive formation is "a distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, divisions" (AK: 93). Understood in this way, discursive formation does not directly deal with "empirical figures" but only their (co-)existence and thus the criticism levelled at him for confusing systems and their elements can be dismissed (Han, 2002:62-63). Foucault calls the

idea, for which "the laws of construction are at the same time the condition of existence", "formalist illusion" (REC: 330). Foucault, on the contrary, is concerned with "the history of conditions that makes possible the appearance, the functioning and the transformation" of discourse (BW: 66). Dealing with a concept, for example, in a discourse, what is important for archaeology is not its construction but the spatial condition of its (co-)existence, the way that it is delineated as a distinct concept and at the same time is connected to other concepts, objects, positions of subject, strategies, other discourses and institutions. By the same token, when it comes to the statement, while it is a unique event, "it is linked both to the situations that give rise to it, and to the consequences it gives rise to, but also at the same time and in quite another modality, to the statements that precede it and follow it" (REC: 330). By introducing discursive formation and statement-event, Foucault attempts to get rid of the primacy of the rectilinear continuity on the basis of causality and substitute it, perhaps under the influence of *Annales,*[66] with multi-layered synchronic-diachronic structures (AK: 129). There is, nonetheless, another type of discontinuity, at the level of discourse itself, which, one can judge retrospectively, has been much more important for Foucault's project.

Foucault's general aim is to "substitute the analysis of *different types* of *transformation* for the abstract general and wearisome form of 'change' in which one so willingly thinks in terms of succession" (HDD: 36, my italics). Change, understood either as the result of a psychological irruption or as a continuous deviation, has often been used interchangeably with becoming where causality has a prerogative place. His aim is to do away with such a notion and substitute it with transformations at different levels and thus introduce *discontinuities*. However, discontinuity is not "a monotonous and unthinkable void" which can only be filled by casual and psychological interpretations, but is a multiplicity of transformations, the descriptive analysis of which is history (HDD: 38). In the "history of discourse", Foucault identifies four different thresholds of transformation: positivity, epistemologization, scientificity and formalization (AK: 144).[67] These thresholds, for each

[66] Peter Burk (1991: 101-102) suggests that Foucault was influenced by the *Annales* school and his archaeology and genealogy has a family resemblance to the history of mentalities. Allan Megill (1987) argues that while the Annales School welcomed Foucault's History of Madness, there is a silence about Foucault's other works in *Annales*. He concludes that while Foucault felt an affinity for them (for example he mentions the notion of longue *durée* in AK), they felt none for him.

[67] Deleuze (2006: 20-21) makes a distinction between 'limit' and 'threshold'. For him Foucault shares with historians the idea that in the analysis of limit, or 'break', one should use "a serial method" to spot the points where a spatial redistribution occurs. Threshold, however, indicates that similar statements "lack a common denominator" and thus cannot be equivalent. Hence he recognizes a two-tiered system of

discourse, have a different temporal distribution. For one discourse all thresholds might be crossed at the same time (e.g. mathematics), for the other two of them might coincide (e.g. in biology the establishment of positivity coincided with appearance of scientificity). Hence, we are not dealing with a monotonous and accumulative progress of reason, which accepts only the single division between non-(or less-) science and definitive science, but each discourse passes through different thresholds the most decisive of which is that of positivity. If Cuvier, Ricardo and Bopp are necessary for an archaeological project, it is not because their intentions and thoughts have formulated a new discourse; we have to bear in mind that discourse is not a trace of thought or anything else (HDD: 49). These proper names are *symbols* of transformations at the level of positivity. Let's have a closer look at Cuvier and the case of biology.

It is generally accepted that Darwin was the one who introduced a taxonomy on the basis of individuals that was in sharp contrast to Cuvier's species-based taxonomy. In fact, one can find more similarities between Darwin and Lamarck, who also considered species as an "abstract category". Foucault considers how we should interpret this similarity (Darwin/Lamarck) and dissimilarity (Darwin/Cuvier) and whether there is a continuous line from Lamarck to Darwin, which bypasses Cuvier; it is a problem about (dis-)continuity. His argument is that the category of species that was criticised by Lamarck has nothing to do with what Darwin meant by the very same term. The reason is that "Darwin's criticism of the species could only occur as a result of the transformation, reorganization and redistribution in biological knowledge that was achieved through the work of Cuvier" (CPB: 126). Cuvier's contribution to the discourse of biology is that he transformed the whole structure of "the epistemological field" of biology through shifting its threshold from species to the individual. The comparative anatomy of Cuvier, Foucault argues, made the anatomo-physiological functioning as the threshold of Biology (CPB: 128-130). Contrary to the continuity that was suggested by the similarity of Lamarck and Darwin, now we can discern a radical shift between them which made Darwin's work possible: the "Cuviean transformation". To analyse a scientific discourse, a discipline which Foucault calls "epistemography", four

transformation; one belongs to the mobility of statements and the other refers to the mutation of discourses. However, as we have shown earlier, Foucault rejects any type of duality on the basis of rules (the rule of the dispersion of statements (or what Deleuze calls 'family') is the same as the rule of their existence). Foucault himself never made a distinction between limit and threshold in AK, but made a distinction between different types of thresholds on the basis of the type of spatial rearrangement that they can bring in. For another analysis on the basis of a two-tiered system and its flaws look at Han, 2002, pp. 61-63.

different levels are distinguishable: epistemonomical, epistemocritical, epistemological and a fourth one that Foucault is reluctant to give a name[68] but we, following Francois François (1998), can call archaeological (SC: 61-62). While three of these analyses deal with scientific discourse when it has already emerged and became constituted as knowledge, only the fourth one takes into account "the transformation of the field of knowledge (*savoir*)" (SC: 62). At this level, where Foucault wants to situate himself, analysis is not done in terms of truth and error (as it is the case with epistemocritical) or to reveal the theoretical structure of discourse (like epistemological analysis); it is neither "the internal epistemological control that a scientific discoursed exercised upon itself" (epistemotonic) (SC: 61). All these issues, in comparison to discursive transformation, are secondary and derivative and are not reliable when it comes to the continuity of discourse. Archaeological analysis tells us whether the threshold of positivity has been passed, and a new discursive practice has gained its individuality. Archaeology's object of study, to put in another way, "is the historicity of the epistemonomic functioning of science" (Delaporte, 1998: 287).

The most salient characteristics of archaeological analysis are that it can reveal discontinuities where "a conceptual continuity or theoretical isomorphism can perfectly cover" such an "archaeological break" (SC: 83). This break, which might not be visible at the surface of discourse, is not necessarily simultaneous with conceptual or theoretical shifts. Corresponding to these levels of the shift, Foucault identifies three types of resistance, the most fundamental of which is the one that relates to change in discursive formation. This resistance at the archaeological level, for Foucault, is related to political practice. It is remarkable to see that the entrance of the political in Foucault's thought happens through resistance and not power. To those who reproach Foucault for turning his back to political engagement by occupying himself merely with "strictly and meticulously theoretical problems", his response is that "every form of political action can only be articulated in the strictest way with a rigorous theoretical reflection" (FRS: 55). By bringing to the fore the archaeological break, we will be able to determine the mode of existence of the discourse (especially the scientific discourse) at each age. Since political practice transforms "not the meaning or the form of the discourse, but the condition of its emergence, insertion and functioning", the transformation of the mode of existence of the discourse is related to "progressive politics" (HDD: 46-48). The relation between scientific discourse and political

[68] It seems that his hesitation to call it archaeological is rooted in being in a transitory stage at that period, shifting his attention from knowledge to power. We will discuss the nature of this shift later.

practice is usually viewed either in terms of modification of the "conscience of men" or in terms of the transposition of political concepts and theories to the scientific discourse. Foucault rejects both approaches because the former is unable to "account for the formation of discourse" and the latter cannot tell us what should be the mode of existence of a scientific discourse in order to make the transposition for it, and not any other discourse, possible (HDD: 45). Political practice, according to Foucault, transforms the discursive formation and thus is not reflected (or expressed) in concepts, objects or strategies. Hence, the relation between political practice and scientific discourse is direct because it does not pass through the subject; and yet it is indirect, since political practices are not immediately expressed in the elements of the discourse. Foucault's definition of *the progressive politics* actually serves to prove that what he has been done so far, under the title of archaeology, is a progressive politics through and through. According to him such a politics recognizes rules and historical conditions of a practice, possibilities for the transformation of it, levels and functions of the subject and correlations between practices at the level of their positivity (HDD: 48:49). Nevertheless, isn't it that one can offer precisely the same definition of archaeology? Hence, it doesn't seem entirely correct to say that "the task of archaeology is to describe how political practice transforms the conditions of existence and functioning of a discourse" (Simon, 2995:26-27). Since here politics and theory have been brought together, archaeology is itself a political practice.

This analysis, political in its nature, is what Foucault calls "a diagnosis of the present" (FRS: 53). Foucault is always very careful to renounce any affiliation between archaeology and *arche* (ἀρχή), on the one hand, and excavation on the other (TAK: 57; REC: 309). Archaeology is an attempt to suspend the vigorous search for "the lost origin" which can enable one to reveal the transcendental moment of knowledge; instead of absolute beginning and first origin, it searches for the "relative beginnings", transformations and institutionalizations (AK: 156; TAK: 57). This is why Foucault rigorously criticizes phenomenology as a historicotranscendental analysis. Archaeology is not a kind of excavation if it means digging deep down into the discourse to find its secret and hidden relations which are deeper that human consciousness. We should bear in mind that discourse for Foucault is not a "mode of signification" but a practice, it is "what we can do with the language" (LSS: 828). The aim of this analysis is to uncover the "unconscious of knowledge" which is not on the side of language but on the side of "the historical conditions that accounts for what one says or of what one rejects, or of what one transforms into the mass of spoken things (FRS: 54; BW:

66). If such practices are invisible and need an archaeologist to make them visible, it is because they are “too much on the surface of things” (TAK: 58). Diagnosis of the present, which according to Foucault is the primary task of philosophers after Nietzsche, has nothing to do with eternal truths but it describes what our present is by highlighting how utterly different it is from our past (WPF: 91-97). Articulation as the diagnosis of the present makes visible the invisible difference of the present: it is a philosophico-political practice.

Chapter 2 Visibility

Paul Veyne (1997: 146) once observed that in his early works, "Foucault began by paying more attention to discourse than to practice, studying practice by way of discourse", implying that in his later works the relation was reversed. His comment suggests that there was a priority of discourse over practice in his early works, which does not mean that practice was entirely absent from his analysis. We have already shown that the nature of that primacy was spatial, in the sense that discourse was considered to be a "spatial technique, not metaphor" (SKP: 254).[69] Nevertheless, how should we understand Veyne's suggested 'reversal'?[70] Here I will argue that it is a shift from the spatial to *the material* which is characterized by the emergence of body and truth in Foucault's oeuvre. To reveal the nature of this shift, I will first elaborate the notion of the spatial in the archaeological phase to provide a point of contrast against which his later works can be grasped. Then I will examine Foucault's most discussed notion of power-knowledge in order to show that while the visibility→articulation relation which emerges with this shift remains prevalent, the concepts themselves are in perpetual transformation and modification.

Metaphysics of Event: Banality of the Visibility

In *History of Madness*, what strikes the reader is the fact that the material is nothing but a 'translation', that is to say the conceptual space is transposed into the concrete institutional and architectural spaces of society. This passage can furnish us with an example of such translation:

> "Unreason is first and foremost … that deep division, typical of an age of the Understanding, which alienates the one from the other, making strangers of the madman and his madness ... Confinement perhaps was *the institutionalised version*. As an undifferentiated space of exclusion, did confinement not reign between the mad and their madness, between immediate recognition and a truth that was permanently deferred, covering the same ground in social structures as unreason in the structures of knowledge?" (HM: 206; my italics)

[69] Chris Philo (1992: 141-144) suggests that Foucault deployed "geography" as a strategic weapon to shatter the totalizing continuities of historiography. My claim, however, in the previous chapter goes beyond Philo's suggestion by emphasising the importance of the being of language and Literature as the spatial event.
[70] While Veyne himself does not elaborate on the nature of this reversal, West-Pavlov reads it causally. He argues that Foucault's shift from 'spatial discourse' to 'discursive space' can be understood in causal terms, i.e. it was "through his study of discourses that Foucault became interested in practices" (West-Pavlov, 2009: 113).

Foucault here recognizes a homogeneity between the social practices and structures and discursive paradigms.[71] It was this understanding that led him to give priority to articulation because of both its retrospective accessibility and the emancipatory role that it can play in its connection to the latest spatial event. It has been suggested, however, that Foucault's notion of *heterotopia*[72] symbolizes his shift from the "textual space" to the analysis of the material world of "particular social spaces" (Johnson, 2006: 75). By elaborating on this notion, however, I will claim that though he changes the level of his analysis, Foucault remains a spatial thinker and we should wait for *The Order of Discourse* for the emergence of the notion of the material.

In *The Order of Things*, after discussing Borges' Chinese encyclopaedia, Foucault introduces the term heterotopia in order to describe the space specific to the encyclopaedia:

> "Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things … to 'hold together'" (OT: xix).

On the basis of this definition, the general tendency among scholars is to understand heterotopias as "places of epistemological and representational disorder on the margins of a society's order of representations" (West-Pavlov: 2009: 137). Heterotopias are thus generally associated with resistance: heterotopias are "spaces of resistance and transgression" (Johnson, 2006: 81), "sites of resistance and exclusion" (Werbner, 1997: 2) or "a peculiar standpoint … derived from an immanent yet disturbing relation to the here and now" (Bosteels, 2006: 120). However, on the basis of what I have presented in the last chapter, I will endorse Topinka's argument (2010: 54) that "shifting the focus from resistance to order and knowledge production reveals how heterotopias make the spatiality of order legible". Heterotopia is the other name for the essential void which in the contemporary era by giving rise to the syntactical relation specific to Literature "sterilize[s]

[71] In the same vein, Foucault (LS: 163-164) argues that while language "over the centuries, has been coordinated with time", now "language is (or, perhaps, became) a thing of space".

[72] Foucault introduces the term in *The Order of Things* and then in the same year in a brief radio talk, which serves as the basis for his now famous lecture entitled "*Des espaces autres*" (translated as '*Of Other Spaces*' and '*Different Spaces*'). His analysis of the term is rather sketchy to the extent that one of the commentators describes it as "frustratingly incomplete, inconsistent, incoherent" (Soja, 1996: 162). Moreover, it was a very short-lived notion and did not play any substantial role in Foucault's later works.

the lyricism of our sentences". Now, is it possible to say that heterotopia undergoes a change when it is presented in *Different Spaces*?

Foucault uses his experience of giving a lecture on "other spaces" to a group of architects and the reaction of an existentialist psychologist who blamed him for neglecting history as an example of the dominance of the temporal paradigm in French academic circles of that time (QG: 69; West-Pavlov: 2009: 112). For Foucault, as I have shown, this is because the latest spatial event (i.e. Literature) has not yet swept away all the remnants of the previous spatial event (i.e. History). He reiterates this notion by saying that: "I think that today's anxiety concerns space in a fundamental way … Time probably only appears as one of the possible games of distribution between the elements that are spread out in space" (DS: 177). However, this does not mean that space is a new experience, on the contrary it has a history and Foucault distinguishes three successive experience of space in this history: the medieval space of localization, the seventeenth century notion of extension and finally the modern day experience of emplacement. Thus, when Foucault talks about "today's anxiety" he actually refers to this experience of emplacement which is defined by "the relation of proximity between points or elements" (DS: 176). Even from this very brief presentation, it is possible to discern a tension between Foucault's claim here and the definition given in *The Order of Things*. However, this tension is not, as it has been suggested, between a textual and a social conception of heterotopia.[73] The textual proof for this claim is that what Foucault calls "general archive" is nothing but Borges' Chinese encyclopaedia. Moreover, Foucault gives examples of heterotopias "without geographical coordinates" and thus it is not the materiality of the space that plays a crucial role but the relation established between elements. What accounts for the tension, I argue, is the fact that while in *The Order of Things* he was concerned with the spatial event and its specific syntactical 'and', here he adopts a more radical view by focusing his analysis on a relational space that can be described by notions like "series, tress, lattices (*des treillis*)" (DS: 176; translation modified). What has changed, to put it differently, is not Foucault's ways of thinking social spaces but the profundity of the spatial in his thought. What has been neglected by scholars is the similarity between what he says about the ship, as heterotopia par excellence, and énoncé.

[73] West-Pavlov (2009: 137), for example, suggests that the notion of heterotopia indicates a 'tectonic' shift in Foucault's understanding of the social spaces. For more similar arguments see Topinka, 2010; Chaplin, 2000.

Accordingly, here Foucault is still a spatial thinker, and he accounts for the regularity of the dispersion through an exteriority articulated in the modality of spatial terms. In what comes next, I will show that what made the emergence of the material possible is the problematization of the idea of regularity through elaboration of the notion of 'incorporeal event'- a Deleuzian term (1990) that has been borrowed from the Stoics. Furthermore, the genealogical 'turn' will be analysed in relation to this emergence instead of ascribing it to a methodological or theoretical failure/success.

In *Theatrum Philosophicum*, where Foucault applauds Deleuze and discusses two of his books, the notion of event[74] plays a crucial role.[75] Foucault recognizes in Deleuze's book, *The Logic of Sense*, an attempt to offer a notion of the event which, contrary to the failure of neopositivism, phenomenology and philosophy of history, makes thinking through the event possible (TP: 351). This notion of event, which is called "pure event" or "incorporeal event", is more like a wound or death, an effect that is "produced entirely by bodies colliding" and at the same time incorporeal: "it is the intangible, inaccessible battle that turns and repeats itself a thousand times" (TP: 349). Pure event, according to Foucault, has three requirements: a logical dimension (it is the meaning of a proposition on the surface of words and things, and is not trapped in "the circle of the self"), a grammar (while the present, for the philosophy of history, is a former future and a past to come, here it is viewed from the infinitive point), and a metaphysical surface (it is not, as neopositivits thought, merely a state of things) (PT:350). The logic of event is what Foucault has dealt with in *The Order of Things*, meaning-event is an "intangible meaning", like death, which on the one hand turns towards things (dying as an occurrence) and on the other hand towards words (dying as what is said about that occurrence). Moreover, one can assume that by the

[74] Though on most aspects of Foucault's thought we are faced with an extraordinary growing literature, his notion of event has remained under-discussed. And when attention has been paid to it, this has often been in relation to discourse, 'discursive event' (Johnston, 1990; Cooper, 1988). Nathan Widder (2008) has attempted to elaborate upon the notion of event in terms of "dispersion". Widder argues that while dispersion in everyday language means 'dispersion', in chemistry it has the specific meaning of "a mixture of heterogeneous substances". Thus event, both as 'discursive event' and 'revolutionary event', is a question of synthesis of differences without the differentiality being compromised.

[75] As David Macey (1995: 253), one of Foucault's biographers, has stated this essay is "a celebration rather than a critical review". David Wood (2007: 129) attests to the significance of this essay by saying that it has canonized the Deleuzian notion of event. Scott Lash (1984) by showing the connection between Foucault's notion of body and Deleuze and Guattari's "body without organs" in *Anti-Oedipus*, concludes that contrary to Foucault's explicit claims he has "less in common with Nietzsche than with Merleau-Ponty, whose lived body was also a body without organs" (for a similar point see Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, pp. 110-112). To read Deleuze's demure but rather diabolical comment on Foucault's review see Robert Maggiori's interview with him, *Fendre les choses, fendre les mots*.

philosophy of history Foucault mainly has in mind Hegel for whom the only acceptable way to reflect on the event is to consider it in terms of universal reason. The problem of continuity of discourse as well as a plurality of events which were the main concerns of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* are counterposed to such a "crowned and coherent cosmos". Now that we have been able to relate grammar and logic to specific instants of Foucault's oeuvre, what we can say about the metaphysics of event, is it possible to trace it back to any moment in the oeuvre? The metaphysics of event, which is based on the heterogeneity of cause and effect, refuses to reduce surfaces to depths (and thus distances itself from Marxism) and strongly rejects physicalism. The metaphysical aspect of the event will enable Foucault to transform his epistemological conception of the event into a political one and thus to make a connection between discourse and the political without any recourse to hidden meanings or a conscious subject. Archaeology, as the political diagnosis of the present, only demonstrates how different we are but does not account for the conditions of possibility of this difference. Metaphysics is precisely what was needed in his work: he has always been preoccupied with the conditions of existence of the event (its grammar and logic) but not its being, with rules not invention (*Erfindung*), with truth not the will to truth (AK: 29; TJF: 6). Genealogy, in its embryonic status, is an attempt to contrive a metaphysics for the event and an exteriority for the discourse which differs from that of regularity. This is, one can say, the Deleuzian moment of Foucault's oeuvre. But what is the nature of this event?

If one wants to pinpoint the supposed "turning point" in Foucault's oeuvre, it would be inspiring to take into consideration a very short and, to a great extent, repetitive lecture delivered in Japan, titled *Madness and Society*. The main claim here is that while generally scholars focus on positive phenomena, his approach deals with the mode of existence of a culture defined by a "checkerboard", and thus the aim is to study the "weave" of its squares (MS: 335). The gist of this text is the repetition of what has already been said in *History of Madness*: each culture is constituted through its practices of exclusion. While it is true that the manifestation of these structural forms of exclusion can differ from one era to another, their tragic structure remains unchanging: this demonstrates how primitive our societies are (MS: 342). The emergence, or resurgence, of the idea of exclusion[76] is an attempt on

[76] Han traces back the notion of exclusion to *Archaeology of Knowledge* where Foucault argues that "a discourse, at a given moment, may accept … or on the contrary exclude … this or that formal structure" (AK, 128 cited in Han, 2002: 64). However, as I have already demonstrated, exclusion plays a crucial role in the organization of the *History of Madness* as well.

Foucault's part to relate discourse to political practices. But is this a return to *History of Madness*? Once he said about his works that they are organised around two axes. *Madness and Civilization* and *The Birth of the Clinic* explore the vertical axis, that is to say, the relation between discourse and other institutions, practices and political relations (DH: 23). The horizontal dimension, which was the task of *The Order of Things*, traverses the isomorphic domain of discourse. Now, is it possible to locate the emergence of the political in his oeuvre at that point where these two axes cross each other? To put it in other words, is it just a matter of reconciliation between the discursive and the non-discursive? This idea has been put forward by those who assume that what determines Foucault's emerging devotion to the political is the introduction (or re-introduction) of the non-discursive into his thought (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983:102-103; Oksala, 2005:95). But this is a misleading characterization since he has always acknowledged the meticulous distinction between discourse as a quasi-autonomous phenomenon and "pure ideality". Although he discredits any causal or symbolic relation between discourse and socio-political practices, he does not fall into discursive idealism but instead envisages "specific forms of articulation" of discourse on political practices at the level of its positivity (AK: 125-126). Moreover, discourse is not merely related to a juxtaposed group of heterogeneous elements, such as "institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptual organizations" and other discourses, but it brings them to a well determined relation to each other (AK: 56-57). What has been problematized is not the lack of non-discursive element, but the dominance of regularity: the notion of exteriority that was conceptualized in terms of regularity needed to be revised. Foucault himself retrospectively criticizes his works for confusing the effects of power with "systemacity, the theoretical form or something like a paradigm" (TP: 105).

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, the being of énoncé is distinguished from that of sign and object (AK: 66); it has a materiality which is not added to it after the effect but constitutes it and accounts for its transformations (AK: 78-90). Materiality of discourse, in distinction to the textuality, is constituted in a specific relation to *something else*, a relation which can be either institutional (in contrast to "spatio-temporal localization") or discursive (Deleuze, 2006: 11; AK: 80). Accordingly, the materiality of the discourse is constituted by a kind of relationality that Foucault calls exteriority.[77] This exteriority, as Deleuze puts it, is in the first

[77] Some Foucauldian scholars have noted the importance of materiality for Foucault without reducing it to the textual materiality. A very good example is Mark G. E. Kelly who acknowledges Foucault's "material perspective on language" and that statement is "an irruption in material world" (Kelly, 2012: 11-13). He proceeds by arguing that this materiality in the first place is conceived as a "material medium", e.g. "sound-

place a matter of method according to which "instead of moving from an apparent exteriority to an essential 'nucleus of interiority' we must conjure up the illusory interiority in order to restore words and things to their constitutive exteriority" (Deleuze, 2006: 43). However, because of its ontological dimension, it would be very misleading to reduce exteriority to a merely methodological technique. According to archaeology, discourse is envisaged in terms of its existence, i.e. at the level of "it is said", but it is not said from anywhere: "'anyone who speaks' … is necessarily caught up in the play of an exteriority" (AK: 96). Discourse as an event is constituted in the element of exteriority, but archaeology stops exactly at this point or, to be more critical, one can say that it reduces the ontological question of exteriority to the regularity of discourse and remains at the level of knowledge: archaeology, as the exploration of the surface of discourses, has set "identification and description of type of discourse" as its task (AD: 421). To surpass the conceptualization of exteriority as regularity and provide it with a materiality, what is necessary is the introduction of metaphysics into the notion of event.

Foucault's inaugural lecture at the College de France, *The order of Discourse*, is a transitional text par excellence; he will later describe it as "a piece I wrote at a moment of transition" (THS: 183). While some have considered it to be the inception of genealogy (Han, 2002: 79) others emphasize its archaeological character (Visker, 1995: 117-118); however, in practice it is a fleeting moment in his oeuvre which is neither this nor that. The lecture focuses on the idea that discourse is controlled at three different levels of production, existence and subjection (*assujettissement*). These three levels correspond to the three variables that structure this study and by elaborating on their relation here I will be able to show the emergence of a new configuration.

Discourse is produced, in every society, through the modes of *exclusion* in order to ward off its power, to tame its "aleatory event (*événement aléatoire*)" and to evade its materiality (OD: 52; modified translation). There are three modes of exclusion to tame discourse,

waves" or "ink on paper". However, it cannot be reduced to the materiality of an artefact. The materiality of statement is analogous to that of tools, whose status as tools lies in "the practices with which they recombine". He concludes by saying that "the statement is the basic unit of language as a practice". While I agree that we need to go beyond the textual materiality, instead of linking the materiality to practice here I will argue that it should be analysed in terms of exteriority. West-Pavlov (2009: 119) recognizes a similarity between Foucault and Barthes on the basis of their emphasis on the "imperceptible ground" of literature. However, contrary to Kelly, he reduces this materiality to "the material vehicles".

operating on its exteriority: prohibition, madness and the will to truth (OD: 52-57).[78] The novelty of this lecture lies in the fact that Foucault links exclusion (in its general sense and not merely as an institutional or a social practice) to an exteriority which is not reduced to regularity but is understood in terms of power, event and materiality. Moreover, two dimensions of discourse, that is to say, event and chance ("*hasard*") have also been mastered through internal procedures exercised by discourse on itself; these procedures include commentary, author and discipline (OD: 56-61). Discourse in its application is similarly subject to control because it is not open to everyone, and it is necessary for one to meet certain requirements before becoming a speaking subject; thus we have speech rituals, societies of discourse, doctrines and social appropriations (OD: 61-64). While the control of chance and event is attributed to both exteriority and interiority of discourse, for our study it is important to see how Foucault makes a distinction between the two.

Foucault draws the distinction between these two types of control through the notion of truth. But what can be said about the emergence of truth in the horizon of Foucault's thought? Is it, as Han (2002:79) suggests, a matter of strategy that enables Foucault to bring in the analysis of power? In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* it was already stated that positivities "form the precondition of … which later functions as an item of knowledge or an illusion, an accepted truth or an exposed error" (AK: 140). Positivity of knowledge is not the system of valorisation but what makes the valorisation possible.[79] Moreover, we have already demonstrated that any transformation at the level of positivities is caught up to some extent in the power relations. What was missing, nonetheless, in this analysis has a metaphysical nature: if knowledge is defined in terms of an immaterial precondition and

[78] Foucault later will criticize this negative conception of power through exclusion. He claims that while he had a legitimate problem, that of articulation of discourse and power, he followed the dominant notion of power by conceptualizing it as "an essentially judicial mechanism" and through notions like exclusion (THS: 183-184). However, here it is exactly this somewhat negative notion of power that paves the path for his engagement with the political.

[79] In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and then in *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault famously described his methodology as "happy positivism" (*un positivisme heureux*) (AS: 164; OD: 73). This has led to the expression of different views amongst commentators. From what Foucault (OT: 320) says in *The Order of Things*, where he argues for a substantial link between eschatology and logical positivism, it is obvious that he does not use the term 'positivism' in any common sense of the world. Vincent Descombes (1980, 110) finds a similarity between Foucault and August Comte's positivism in their approach to philosophy as "a function of the history of concepts". Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 105) understand it in terms of light-hearted approach of genealogist towards meaningful and serious non-discursive practices. Kelly (2012: 26) defines Foucault's positivism by referring to his definition of positivist science as "that which 'basically had confidence in itself, even when it remained carefully critical of each of its results'", according to which Foucault gives a critical sense to positivism. However, on the basis of Foucault's own emphasis (AK: 98) in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, I am inclined to interpret positivism as the methodology of studying positivity (*positivité*).

power is a corporeal relation, then are we not trapped in a Cartesian dilemma? I will here argue that *will to know* is Foucault's way out of this situation. It not only accounts for his recourse to the notion of truth but elucidates what he means by the metaphysics of event.

The concept of truth is discussed in *The Order of Discourse* at two different levels. At the level of existence (or the regularity of discourse), truth appears in relation to 'discipline', a new term for discursive formation, and has an archaeological lineage (Han, 2002: 79).[80] What Foucault presents here is not a universal criterion which can be applied to propositions, but, on the contrary, demonstrates a deeper schism which makes such a claim irrelevant. At this level, the concept of truth is related to his discussion of thresholds in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, it is not a matter of scientificity but *acceptability*.[81] However, what is important is that a transfiguration has occurred, since discipline, defined as the "permanent re-actuation of the rules", is not any more the exteriority of discourse but its limit (OD: 61). This transformation has a fundamental consequence. Since discipline has lost its spatial character and has become "a sort of anonymous system at the disposal of anyone who wants to or is able to use it", the subject is no longer located at the exteriority but is subjected to discourse and its system of control (the level of subjection) (OD: 59). This is where articulation→subject relation gives way to visibility→subject; we will return to this issue in the next chapter. But if discipline is the limit of discourse, where the recognition of true/false propositions becomes effective, what happens to the exteriority of discourse? Foucault borrows (and at the same time distorts) a term from Canguilhem to designate this limit: "in the true" (Han, 2002: 82-83; OD: 60). For a proposition to become acceptable and speakable in the scientific discourse, it needs to be in the true; thus, in a sense, whatever crosses the threshold of discipline is true at the archaeological level. This archaeological

[80] It seems that Foucault now reserves the term discursive formation for the emergence of discursive event. Thus, while discipline is an archaeological term, discursive formation belongs to genealogy (OD: 71-72).

[81] Following Han (2002: 79-85), I use the term acceptability with the caveat that it should bear in mind that Foucault does not use it here and when it appears in his works, he had actually moved away from the concerns have been expressed in this period. In *L'a priori historique selon Michel Foucault : difficultés archéologiques*, Han (2003: 38) argues that *The Order of Discourse,* which marks the beginning of genealogy, is where archaeology's status and function were redefined and "the notion of acceptability can be spotted for the first time" (my translation). It seems that Han here refers to the emergence of a notion not to the presence of a term. According to her, Foucault here makes a distinction between "*the criteria of the active predication of truth*" and "the condition of possibility of predication", or "acceptability" (Han, 2002: 81; emphasis in the original). One should not understand acceptability as "a criterion for prediction", but it operates as a "historically variable function". Foucault, in a roundtable held in 1978, defines his study as that of condition of acceptability of practices (IP: 276-277). On a different occasion in the same year, by elaborating on power/knowledge nexus, he tells us that archaeology consists in studying positivities, that is to say, it is a movement from "the fact of acceptance" to its conditions of acceptability (WC: 60-61).

analysis, which is not intended to "isolate mechanisms of causalities", is a morphology of articulation and thus could reduce exteriority to regularity (AK: 162). The exteriority of discourse, however, is now populated with monsters, those entities beyond true and false (because this dichotomy can only be established inside a definite discourse) that science is unable to speak about: exteriority is now the teratological realm of knowledge. This fault line is neither ahistorical nor historico-transcendental, but "a historical, modifiable and institutionally constraining system" (OD: 54). What justifies the evocation of the notion of exclusion is Foucault's attempt to provide a historical account for this division: he is now interested in the morphology of exclusion.[82] Discourse, viewed not at the level of its propositions or at the level of its form of articulation, is forged by a "constitutive exclusion" (LWK: 180). Although Foucault identifies three modes of exclusion operating on the exteriority of discourse, one of them is so fundamental and powerful that it assimilates others "in order to modify them and to provide them with a *foundation*" (OD: 56; my italics). Foucault wants to see why and how our will to know is caught in truth. Why the disciplinary boundaries are drawn on the basis of truth? He refers to this constitutive exclusion by an explicitly Nietzschean term: *the will to truth*. This is the second level of the analysis of truth in *The Order of Discourse,* and my contention is that it was this level that forced Foucault to move towards a metaphysics of event.

It is unanimously accepted that Foucault has borrowed the term "will to truth" from Nietzsche (Sheridan, 1980: 117-119; Mahon: 1992). For the latter the will to truth is a passive will towards life and the dominant will in the representational model of knowledge; it is one of the negative manifestations of the will to power. Will to Truth, as it is now dominant in science, far from being a justification in itself, "needs a critique … the value of truth is tentatively to be *called into question*" (Nietzsche, 2007: 111; Deleuze, 2006: 88-89). Foucault shares with Nietzsche this critical approach towards the will to truth. The will to the truth for him is the "prodigious machinery designed to exclude" (OD: 56). Han has argued, however, that while there is a parallel between these two thinkers, it is not possible to

[82] One way to understand the Foucault/Derrida debate is through the notion of exclusion (Kelly, 2012: 25). When Foucault criticizes Derrida's "textualization", he actually refers to the lack of an exteriority that can be grasped in terms of exclusion (BPF: 416). Derrida's criticism of logocentrism is based on the "play" of the signifier: "from the moment there is meaning there are nothing but signs. *We think only in signs*" (Derrida, 1976: 50). As Richard Rorty (1991: 115) explains, this anti-Cartesian idea leads to an infinite regressive interpretation that moves from one sign to the other ad infinitum. Foucault, on the contrary, wants to account for the moment of the emergence of the system of signification by going outside the text. He is interested in the invention (*Erfindung*) of signs.

understand this term in Foucault's oeuvre from a Nietzschean perspective per se on the basis of two reasons (Han, 2002: 94-97).[83] The first reason is that the will to truth for Nietzsche is merely a derivative notion which gains its meaning in relation to the will to power. Foucault, on the contrary, gives it a self-referring status which once belonged to the will to power (Han, 2002:97). The second reason is that, while in the Nietzschean version there is a counterpoint for the nihilism of the will to truth, i.e. the Dionysian, Foucault's oeuvre lacks such a dualism. This second point, according to Foucault's commentators, makes his position unjustifiable and intrinsically nihilistic (Han, 2002: 98). If there is no counterpoint to the will to truth, how and why can one criticise or resist its growing dominance and effects? My contention is that such a reading ignores the vital importance of the will to know and its relation to the will to truth.[84] If there is a parallel between these two thinkers, it is because Foucault introduces the will to know with its two counterpoised inflections, that is to say, will to truth and tragic knowledge. The fact that the will to truth is a derivative and historical notion is graspable when he contrasts the meaning of the true discourse for "the Greek poets of the sixth century BC" to the Platonic desire for truth (OD: 54-55). "Between Hesiod and Plato a certain division was established", a division which revealed itself in the banishment of the Sophists and "probably gave our will to know its general form" (OD: 54). His series of lectures on the will to know, a detailed study of this division, seeks to establish the emergence of the will to truth as an event.

The aim of this series of lectures, Foucault clearly states, is "to put together, fragment by fragment, a 'morphology of the will to know'" (LWN: 1). Although the will to know has a history but this theme plays another crucial role for Foucault, it is the theoretical foundation of genealogical analysis: "sometimes this theme of the will to know will be taken up in specific historical research; sometimes it will be treated for itself and in its theoretical implication" (LWN: 224). The will to know has a history with its two major types, tragic

[83] Other commentators have studied Foucault's Nietzscheanism from different perspectives. Hans Sluga (2010) argues that contrary to what a cursory reading of Foucault's genealogical works might suggest, his conception of the genealogical project differs from that of Nietzsche. Sluga specifies three aspects of this departure: Nietzsche's question of origin was replaced by "descent", genealogy for Foucault is more related to history than politics, and the interpretational side of genealogy was reduced to a minimum. Michael Mahon (1992), on the other hand, shows how Foucault's work from the beginning to the end can be read as a continuation and, to some extent, refinement of Nietzsche's genealogy. For more see Sembou, 2014.

[84] Alan Sheridan (1980: 117) underlies the fact that beginning from *History of Sexuality I*, the "Nietzschean concept of a 'will to knowledge' lies at the foundation of all Foucault's subsequent thought". However, my claim is that this concept had been emerged much earlier and was present in Foucault's first series of lectures at the Collège de France. Moreover, Daniel Defert (2013: 266-267) highlights the fact that Foucault's will to know differs from Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche exactly because of his refusal to assimilate will to know (*savoir*) to will to truth.

knowledge and the will to truth, but it is at the same time a theoretical framework to study knowledge and to provide a metaphysics for the event. First let's have a look at the historical aspect. The will to truth is an episode in the will to know and has dominated our age through excluding the tragic knowledge, symbolized by Sophists and their activities. This exclusion, Foucault argues, is to some extent "analogous to the possible role played by the contrast between madness and reason" (LWN: 2). However, statements like this should be treated prudently, because otherwise it might be seen as suggesting a similarity between what has been done in *The History of Madness* on the basis of the notion of exclusion and these lectures. However, exclusion played a very different role in that case: it was grounding the constitution of the relation between madness and reason. Madness excluded insofar as it constituted the *outside of* reason, madness was chained to reason. Here, on the contrary, when Foucault speaks of exclusion it is a "question of eliminating the outside", an elimination which makes the existence of the dominated modality of the will to know possible (LWK: 38). That is why while it was possible to have mad philosophers, monster scientists are absolutely unimaginable and unspeakable. Another important implication of this displacement in the notion of exclusion is that now we are dealing with a constitutive exclusion. The way that Foucault dealt with madness/reason in *The History of Madness*, the existence of each was presupposed, and exclusion only changed their relationship. Here, on the contrary, the exclusion constitutes the elements of the division. Now, what was the nature of this excluded tragic knowledge? This knowledge, unlike the Aristotelian apophantic statements, pivots upon the agonistic statements and procedures. Truth emerges, in this "pre-law stage", through struggle, oath, challenge and test; moreover, truth itself makes the decision and is not only an element in the judge's decision (LWK: 76-78). What makes the transition from the agonistic truth to the apophantic truth possible is the modification of the whole system of power. In general, what happened was that during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., truth as challenge (a truth that is not linked to knowledge) supplanted by a juridical knowledge of order (nomos), a knowledge which immediately linked to the state apparatus and became the correlative of the justice of everyday life, i.e. truth becomes political and effective means of exclusion (*dikaion*) (LWK: 116-120; 186-187). There are institutions and procedures that make this transition possible and at the same time occult its political nature: institution of money, intuition of the nomos, and institution of a religious justice (LWK: 129-130). The consequence of this transition is that a specific type of the will to know, through the mediation of the politico-juridical system, emerged in

which truth and knowledge are bound together. From another point of view, Aristotle (and to some extent Plato) is the one who gives a philosophical formulation for this transition and thus rules out those systems of thought, e.g. Sophists, which did not correspond to truth. For Aristotle, according to Foucault, man naturally "desires to know" but this desire would have no existence if knowledge had not already preceded it and hence "knowledge is at once its object, its end, and its material" (LWK: 16-17). The will to truth, the current dominant type of the will to know, is characterized by a "mutual belonging" to desire and knowledge, a kind of co-naturalness and hence any attempt to demonstrate that will and desire are outside of knowledge is scandalous. The famous Foucauldian distinction between *savoir* and *connaissance* has been formulated in this light:

> "We will call knowledge-connaissance the system that allows desire and knowledge-savoir to be given a prior unity, reciprocal belonging, and co-naturalness. And we will call knowledge-savoir that which we have to drag from the interiority of knowledge-connaissance in order to rediscover in it the object of a wiling, the end of desire, the instrument of a domination, the stake of a struggle" (LWK: 17).

Since knowledge-connaissance is the subject-object relation, any radical question about knowing needs to go beyond it to reach knowledge-savoir. But what is knowledge-savoir if it is not the subject-object relation? The short and apparently paradoxical answer is that *savoir* is not knowledge, since it is related to domination and struggle. For Foucault, knowing is not a subjective process for obtaining knowledge or reaching the truth, but it is a "pure event at the surface of processes which do not themselves belong to the order of knowledge-connaissance" (LWK: 31). For instance, who is eligible to speak? Are ordinary people allowed to give testimony, or do they need to belong to a specific household or a caste to be able to speak (economico-political aspect)? When someone gives testimony about something, how should this utterance be considered? As a verdict, a fact or a divine sign (juridico-religious aspect)? Knowing is a historical phenomenon which cannot be reduced to a subjective process, it has been made possible through socio-political procedures and determinations. Knowledge-savoir is "the set of these events" which constitute a will outside and prior to any knowledge-connaissance. This savoir-connaissance relation is against the prevailing analyses according to which events are singular instances of actualization of knowledge. Moreover, not only knowledge-connaissance is an effect of

knowledge-savoir, but there is no inherent link between truth and knowledge. Accordingly, it is possible (and historically demonstrable) to envisage a will to know in which, contrary to the will to truth, truth-knowledge relation and will-knowledge relation are not taken for granted. This leads us to the methodological implications of the will to know and its relation to genealogy and metaphysics of event.

Before proceeding any further it is necessary to make it clear at this point that Foucault's Nietzscheanism has two interdependent aspects, both rooted in his interpretation of *Ursprung* (origin): *Herkunft* and *Erfindung*. In his debate with the Italian philosopher, Giulio Preti,[85] when the latter asked him which Nietzsche he likes, Foucault gave a revealing answer: "Obviously, it is not that of Zarathustra; it is that of *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Genealogy of Morals*" (PCFP: 372). As Preti pointed out, it seems that Foucault is interested in Nietzsche as the philosopher of genesis. However, for Foucault what makes Nietzsche's historical analysis different from those of Husserl and Heidegger is that "he does not make a reference to the originary". This historical analysis, which does not refer to origins, is "a positivist type of history" ("*une analyse historique de type positiviste"*) (PCFP: 372). This sheds light on the meaning of Foucault's assertion that he is a happy positivist. Moreover, it makes it clear why he painstakingly tries to show that *Ursprung* (literally means origin) in Nietzsche does not mean "a linear genesis" (NGHf: 136). My argument in the following paragraphs is that Foucault recognizes two sides for *Ursprung*, one of which deals with the emergence of incorporeal singularities and the other is the corporeal effects of these singularities. Thus the metaphysics of event hinges upon the notion of effect.

In his much-discussed essay, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, Foucault sets the task of genealogy to record the "singularity of events" which is diametrically opposed to "the search for the 'origin'"(NGH: 369-370; translation modified). This means when Nietzsche uses the term *Ursprung*, he does not use it in a metaphysical sense to refer to an ideal origin. Foucault distinguishes between two senses of the word *Ursprung* in Nietzsche's works. The first is Herkunft which is an equivalent for 'descent'[86]; it is situated "within the articulation of the body and history": "The body -and everything that touches it: diet, climate, and soil- is the domain of *Herkunft*" (NGH: 375-376). Thus in genealogy we are dealing with a corporeality

[85] Luca Maria Scarantino (2013) provides a historical and theoretical introduction to this debate by focusing mainly on Preti's philosophy. For more on this debate see Hacking (2009).

[86] Sluga (2010) argues that by refusing to accept a real difference between Herkunft and Ursprung, Foucault actually departs from Nietzsche significantly. He makes a distinction between Foucault's specific genealogy and Nietzsche's comprehensive genealogy.

that owes its mode of visibility to descent. The example that Foucault gives here is very interesting: fathers' belief in the reality of afterlife will cause the suffering of their children's bodies. It is this idea that will become one of the most quoted sentences of *Discipline and Punish*: "the soul is the prison of the body".[87] What is important here is that body is conceptualized in terms of effect. Body, or "a volume in perpetual disintegration", is "the surface of the inscription of events" (NGH: 375).[88] The modality of the corporeal visibility is the effect of myriad causes, and now the question is how it is possible to make a connection between those material causes and these corporal effects. Foucault answers this question through the successive notions of *Entstehung* (emergence) and *Erfindung* (invention).

Generally speaking, Foucault's commentators have overlooked the distinction between *Herkunft* and *Entstehung* (Lash, 1984; Mahon, 1992: 109-110; Butler: 1989). One can assume that the text's ambiguity has contributed to this matter, since in both cases Foucault seems to talk about the beginning. Foucault tells us that the analysis of Herkunft is a genealogical tool to study "the beginning-numberless beginnings" (NGH: 374). Here Foucault attempts to put forward an *ironic* beginning for historical analysis which "shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (NGH: 375). If the genealogist wants to avoid accepting any 'empty synthesis' (e.g. God, soul or I), they should "seek the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect … to form a network (*réseau*) that is difficult to unravel" (NGH: 373). This is very similar to the archaeological problem of constructing networks (or grids) without recourse to constituted objects or constitutive subject. While there he accomplished this through discursive elements, here he resorts to corporal networks. It is on the basis of such network that in *Discipline and Punish*, for example, he can claim that in our "hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons" a similar mode

[87] Interestingly enough, while this statement has become one of the fundamental aspects of the secondary literature in the field of Foucauldian studies, Foucault himself tried to minimize its importance in less than one year after the publication of *Discipline and Punish*: "Of Course, when I said that the soul was the prison of the body, it was a joke, of course. But the idea was that the body in this kind of discipline is defined and delimited by a kind of relation of the individual to himself" (Foucault, 2003, in Paras, 2006: 109). As a matter of fact, Foucault here reinterprets his previous statements in the light of his then dominant concern of subjectivation. I will explicate this aspect of his work in the next chapter.

[88] Foucault's conception of body has been criticized by some scholars, the strongest of which has been put forward by Judith Butler, and I will return to this in the next section. However, it worth mentioning those critics who consider Foucault's notion of body as a distorted presentation of Nietzschean genealogy. Scott Lash (1984: 1-17), for example, argues that from Foucault's notion of 'descent' one can assume that he is doing a genealogy of bodies and not that of morals. While this in itself is justifiable, he continues, Foucault relies on only a limited number of Nietzsche's works which results in a very partial treatment of the body. For Lash the significant difference is that while for Nietzsche the body is a "causal agent", Foucault's notion of body is absolutely passive.

of spatial distribution of bodies is at work (DP: 205). The idea of corporal network lies at the basis of the notion of "political anatomy". My contention is that the power-knowledge nexus, in its nebulous stage emerged as *Herkunft-Entstehung*. Thus, while the former relates to physics of power, the latter deals with knowledge or, as Foucault calls it here, interpretation. Interestingly enough, it is in relation to *Entstehung* and knowledge that notions like force, battle and domination are mentioned.[89] According to *Entstehung*, only a 'single drama' has been on the stage of history, that of subjugation (*asservissement*) or domination which "install itself in a system of rules" (NGH: 376-378).[90] *Entstehung* refers to the successive emergence of different interpretations defined as "violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game" (NGH, 378). The important point here is the heterogeneity of interpretation and adversary forces. The concept of goodness, for example, is neither "the energy of the strong" nor "the reaction of the weak" and thus none of them is responsible for its emergence: emergence always happens in the "interstice". The relation between forces and emergence, Foucault asserts, should be understood in terms of the event. Foucault will develop further this idea by replacing the term *Enstehung* (emergence) with that of *Erfindung* (invention).

In his immediately following works, Foucault is silent about *Herkunft* but develops and radicalizes the idea of successive interpretations. In 1971, at the University of McGill, he delivered a very important lecture on Nietzsche, where he revealed one aspect of his

[89] The evaluation of Foucault's interpretation and translation of the German terms are beyond this thesis, however it worth mentioning that his understanding of *Enstehung* has been criticized. John David Pizer (1992: 461-477 cited in Sembou, 2014), for example, argues that while *Ursprung* has been used in reference to battle and confrontation (as in *The Birth of Tragedy*), *Entstehung* in the German philosophical tradition usually refers to an original unity which brings about an uninterrupted continuity.

[90] As I mentioned earlier, Butler is amongst those who do not make a distinction between *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*, which leads her to consider this single drama as Foucault's 'confession' of his metaphysical commitment. Her main argument is that Foucault's genealogy "conceives the body as a surface and asset of subterranean 'forces' that are, indeed, repressed and transmuted by a mechanism of cultural construction external to that body" (Butler, 1989: 602). However, Foucault here never refers to body as force and he merely mentions subjugation (*asservissement*) in reference to substitution of one interpretation by another one. True, Foucault claims that this interpretation is inscribed on the body, but this is not, as Butler thinks, a "prediscursive and prehistorical body". For Foucault, as the notion of *Enstehung* demonstrates, a pure body outside of history does not exist, but body is the development of human history: the contemplative eye replaces the vigilant eye. Moreover, Butler finds traces of dichotomy in Foucault who, in a fashion very similar to Levi-Strauss, makes a distinction between the raw/body and the cooked/culture, the former being the material surface for the inscription of the latter. However, genealogy traces the succession of interpretations, each of which is inscribed upon the other and body is nothing other than the inscribed interpretation that determines its mode of visibility. Foucault does not do a genealogy of bodies (as Lash (1984) suggests) but a genealogy of interpretations; he is not interested in the materiality of the body but in its mode of visibility. To put it in another way, genealogy is the history of effects (this is what Foucault means by "*Wirklich Histoire*" or "*l'histoire 'effective*'"). I will return to this issue in the next section.

Nietzschean mode of thought. The lecture begins by singling out the term invention (*Erfindung*) in a passage of *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense*, where Nietzsche announces that knowledge is an invention. Invention is opposed to origin (*Ursprung*) in the sense that it does not consist in going back to find "something which was already there", but it looks for "a small beginning" where it reveals that there is "something altogether different" behind knowledge (*connaissance*) (LN: 203; TJF: 6-7; NGH: 371). This idea of "something altogether different" has some consequences:

1- If behind knowledge (*connaissance*) there is something irreducible to it (contrary to Aristotelian model of knowledge), it does not mean that we need to uphold an empiricism because there is nothing that can anticipate knowledge: there is only "the wall of non-knowledge" (LN: 203). There is neither an affinity between knowledge and human nature nor between knowledge and the world. Knowledge as an invention is the opposite of Kantian knowledge because here "the conditions of experience and the conditions of the object of experience are completely heterogeneous" (TJF: 9). Thus, while Foucault does not deny the fact that *connaissance* is an effect, he does not establish a linear and expressive causal relation. It is not possible to find behind *connaissance* anything that can predict the dominant type of knowledge, we are rather dealing with an event.
2- Knowledge is constituted by something altogether different that is historical in its nature and circumstantial in its effect: event is always singular (TJF: 14; NGH: 381).
3- Since knowledge (and truth) is the product of something other than knowledge, we should consider this something else (which, as we will see below, Foucault calls knowledge (*savoir*)) an event that belongs to the category of activity (TJF: 13).

The next step is to see what Foucault means by "something altogether different". Knowledge (*connaissance*) is not rooted in consciousness but rests on an ensemble of relations. What is unknowable is not the thing in itself but the relations in themselves (x= chaos). It is not knowable because it precedes knowledge (*connaissance*) and constitutes the wall of non-knowledge. This pool of relations, the chaos, results from the play of differences: relations are different in terms of forms or points of support (LN: 210). This ensemble of relations is not a homogenous and peaceful sphere, but there are violent dynamics and struggles for domination:

> "Among these relations, a group of them is characterized by the fact that they forcibly join together several differences, that they exert violence so as to impose on them the analogy of a resemblance, of a common utility or affiliation, which marks them with a common stamp" (LN: 211).

Knowledge (*connaissance*) is the outcome of violence done to differences in order to impose on them an analogical resemblance, and thus knowledge (*connaissance*) rather than being a result of the good will refers to the will to power. While Foucault calls the result of violence, distortion and perversion, *connaissance*, the reality of forces and relations of domination can only be understood in terms of *savoir*. Is it not here Foucault appears as a disguised Marxist thinker who only plays with words (reality vs. perversion) to hide the fact that he is criticizing the ideology? Is it not that the contrast between the difference of relations and resemblance of analogy reminds us of the contrast between the class struggle and the State (infrastructure vs. superstructure)? However, what distinguishes Foucault from the Marxist tradition is his notion of the event. While knowledge-savoir, as the exteriority of knowledge, has an ontological existence, knowledge-connaissance merely belongs to the realm of the epistemological.[91] The notion of event provides Foucault with a theoretical tool to have an epistemological effect which is not the result of accumulation and is not, like Marxist notion of Ideology, reducible to ontological elements.

Foucault's radical endeavour is to challenge self-subsistent categories of knowledge and provide a material and historical foundation for them. Pure event is the relation between knowledge and non-knowledge, i.e. connaissance-savoir; a relation between two heterogeneous domains of ideas and the material which brings to the fore the paradoxical notion of the "materialism of the incorporeal" (OD: 69). To use a metaphor, *savoir* is the colliding swords in a battleground and connaissance is the spark that emits from the event of collision. *Savoir*, to put it differently, is the interpretation that does not seek for a knowledge hidden in the origin but itself is the source of knowledge.

[91] Agamben's reading of Foucault's archaeology (2009: 66) comes very close to this conclusion when he claims that "ontology is not a determinate knowledge but the archaeology of every knowledge, which explores the signatures that pertain to being by virtue of the very fact of existing, thus predisposing them to the interpretation of specific knowledge". Even what he (2009: 84) calls "qualitatively other" is very similar to Foucauldian *savoir*. Agmaben, by giving different examples of thinkers ranging from Heidegger to Benjamin to Mauss and Overbeck, shows that "the moment of arising" (or Entstehung) is the prehistory of our history or, to put it differently, it is the threshold of indifference of memory and forgetting. However, what this reading lacks is a political ontology, and my claim is that Foucault tries to provide one through invention (*Erfindung*).

The main characteristics of this event are as follow:

1- Multiplicity. Event is always singular because the savoir-connaissance relation is an historical phenomenon with its determinate longevity (TJF: 14). However, it does not mean that event is an indivisible unity that can be located on a coordinate system of time and space. Event is "polycephalous" and is grounded on a certain number of relations scattered temporally and spatially (LWK: 194; RH: 427).

2- Discontinuity. Since event cannot be reduced to a causal relation (due to the heterogeneity of savoir and connaissance), it is the principle of the discontinuity of human history. We are dealing with a "serial history" in which "layers of events multiplying" (RH: 426-429).

3- Non-reflexive. The relation between savoir, as related to socio-political struggles, and connaissance is not that of expression or reflection. According to Marx, "conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear … as the direct efflux of their material behaviour [i.e. material relations of production]") (Marx & Engels, 1996: 47). Even the clash of ideas and thoughts merely reflects the contradiction between productive forces and the existing mode of production. For Foucault, on the contrary, the link between struggles and their effects in discourse is not an expressive/reflexive one. Struggles may call upon specific discourses, define the role each type of discourse should play, delineate the place and qualities for the person who can eligibly function as the subject of discourse and define the domain of objects that can play an instrumental role in struggles (LWK: 194-195). Thus, the relation between knowledge-connaissance and knowledge-savoir can only be analysed in terms of discursive formation and appropriation. Foucault's aim is here to link archaeology to the political in a non-discursive way.

4- Political. The event in its nature is political because it is directly linked to the relations of struggle and power, to the will to power. The event does not anymore, as was the case in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, occur within a discourse or texts but in a battleground. However, by the political Foucault does not mean those struggles between conflicting social classes for political power, but the series of "humble processes" like rites of purification, alteration of calendar, transformation of juridical systems and introduction of new currencies (LWK).

This notion of event now meets the metaphysical requirement put forward by Foucault in *Theatrum Philosophicum*.

After this explanation, we can return to the question of the will to truth. The notion of *Erfindung* demonstrates that the will to truth is a political invention which has been established through the exclusion of other form of the will to know (LWK: 2). To put it differently, the will to truth is the modern condition of intelligibility for the modes of acceptability. While the mode of acceptability refers to fact that knowledge is linked to truth, the condition of intelligibility reveals how this relation is historically contingent and politically constructed. What enables Foucault to make such a claim is a metaphysical notion of event which disrupts the Platonic idea of continuity between knowledge and object of knowledge and makes knowledge the effect of something altogether different. Does this make Foucault a metaphysician? Of course nothing is further from Foucault's thought than metaphysics as a search for the ultimate foundation or essence. However, it is possible to give the question a positive answer if metaphysics is understood in a different way. Oksala (2010: 447-449), who defines metaphysics as "ontological claims about the nature of reality", goes as far as to claim that "if Foucault's thought does not contribute anything to ontological questions, then neither does it ultimately contribute anything significant to political philosophy". According to her, Foucault, to accomplish the "politicization of ontology", firstly has denaturalized ontology by showing its contingent nature (the archaeological phase) and then has exposed the constitutive role of power relations in crafting ontologies (the genealogical phase) (Oksala, 2012: 19-27). By blurring the distinction between epistemology and ontology, Oksala (2012: 26) concludes that "power-knowledge is a mere analytical grid *and* an ontological concept because ontology consists of mere analytical grids".[92] However, my claim is that at this stage of his career Foucault has a representational conception of power (TIP: 54) and thus he is merely interested in the metaphysics of effect and the question is how it is possible to make the acceptability intelligible without either making it merely the state of things or reducing it to ideology.

Furthermore, this metaphysics of event indicates a reversal in the articulation→visibility relation which is important for this study. Writing, so far, had a revealing function which

[92] Kelly (2009) makes a similar claim by comparing Foucault and Freud in terms of their understanding of the 'analysis'. As the unconscious could not be understood before the analysis, Foucault's notion of "relational power" can be understood only after the analysis. However, he moves toward a totally different direction when provides a metaphysical understanding of power by claiming that it is "transhistorical", something that is always there, whose form does not change but its *mode*.

made visible the reality of the present by contrasting it with the past. Now, since we are dealing with truth and knowledge, which are not unknown but are obvious and evident to the point of banality, writing is necessary because they are visible. The banality of the visible makes articulation, as writing about their secrets and inventive characters, a subversive activity (IAP: 79).

Dispositif, Exclusion, and Visibility

In the last section, through the notion of event, it was demonstrated how power, in its most explicit form, found its way into Foucault's work.[93] The long-lasting outcome of Foucault's engagement with the political is the nexus of power-knowledge (*pouvoir-savoir*). Instead of portraying a dichotomous relation between power and knowledge, Foucault demonstrated that behind knowledge there is the non-knowledge of power relations, and thus power is not external to knowledge. In his first reading of Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*,[94] Foucault uses tragedy to show how one type of power-knowledge, embodied in Oedipus as the expert king (*roi savant*), was excluded by other types of power-knowledge which were articulated on the basis of *measure* (*mesure*) (OK: 229-257). The main characteristic of measure as the dominant type of power-knowledge is that it disguises the fact of being an invention of power relations, through its mode of visibility (i.e. disinterestedness, desire to know and justice). While the Oedipal knowledge is overtly linked to power (he has to solve riddles in order to be able to govern the city), the oracular knowledge and knowledge gained through regular inquiry are linked to justice and measure. This means that our mode of thought, since Greek philosophy of the fifth century, does not allow us to think knowledge in terms of power and will to know; we think of it in terms of measure and the "pure passion to know".

[93] It has become a tradition to mention the relation of May '68 to Foucault's genealogical turn (Smart, 2002: 6; Dumm, 2002: 8; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983:104). While Foucault at that time was in Tunis, as Miller (1993: 173) has emphasized, he was following the events very closely. Interestingly enough, the French journalist, Maurice Clavel, in his article for *Nouvel Observateur* on May 3rd relates the events to Foucault's idea of "Death of Man" (Falzon et al., 2013: 39). However, Foucault claims that "it wasn't May of '68 in France that changed me, it was March of '68, in a third world country" (RM, 136). Here he is referring to "student agitations of incredible violence" in Tunis. Following Deleuze (1995:106), moreover, many commentators have singled out *Discipline and Punish* as the most explicit result of Foucault's engagement with the events of May '68. However, my aim in this study is not to find traces of Foucault's biography in his oeuvre, instead I have tried to account for theoretical shifts and methodological transformations through emergence/disappearance/modification of notions and concepts.

[94] For a list of other occasions and a short analysis of their differences see Defert, 2011.

In what follows, I will argue that contrary to the prevalent reading that considers the nexus of power-knowledge as a constant notion in Foucault's oeuvre, it has gone through different changes and modifications. The main argument here is that while the nexus remained the framework of analysis the emphasis shifted from knowledge to power: while at the beginning it was a matter of revealing knowledge's invention by power, later the analysis was merely organized around power's inventive force. Hence the emergence of the terms, like "power relation", that are absent in his 1970-71 lectures.

Foucault's first three lectures at the College de France (1970-73) form a triple study of the types of power-knowledge: measure, inquiry, and examination. The aim of these studies is to "trace the formation of certain types of knowledge (*savoir*) out of the juridico-political matrices that gave birth to them and act as their support" (PTI: 17). Measure in the Greek city-state was the "effect and instrument" of a new system of justice which replaced that of challenge-truth and were mainly about distribution (LWK: 106-108). Inquiry, as the instrument and effect of a power of observation, had a double origin: the Germanic law and the emergence of the state (in the Carolingian period), and the Church of early the Middle Ages (TJF: 44-47; TIP: 210). The empirical science is the daughter of this inquisitorial origin, although it tries to forget and to cover its "pudenda origo".[95] The examination is linked to the power of "oversight and control" that imposed prison upon penal theory from outside (LPS: 30; PTI: 18). It was this form of power-knowledge that gave rise to the "human sciences" (TJF: 59).[96] At this stage, Foucault seems to be satisfied with establishing that at the origin of our knowledge lies something altogether different. For him, the unsavoury beginning of measure, inquiry and examination does not mean that they are still linked to power relations. On the contrary, now that they function inside "definite epistemological

[95] As Flynn (2005) puts it, here Foucault as a genealogist "joins Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as a 'master of suspicion', uncovering the unsavory provenance (pudenda origo) of ostensibly noble enterprises". See also *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, p. 370. However, I will show that Foucault's genealogy will move beyond merely uncovering shameful beginnings.

[96] Foucault's famous adage in *Discipline and Punish*, "another power, another knowledge", is the expression of the nexus of power-knowledge (DP: 226). On the basis of this expression, Foucault has been criticized for "dissolving all social phenomena in the acid bath of power" and thus disarming critical theory from its power of making a distinction between just/unjust or legitimate/illegitimate forms of social and political arrangements (Best and Kellner, 2003: 294; McCarthy, 1991: 54). However, as Visker (1995: 59) argues, Foucault's first aim is to derive the specificity of a particular mode of knowledge (e.g. empiricism or human sciences) not from their object of study but from a specific mode of power. Moreover, through demonstrating the circularity of power-knowledge relation (knowledge is effect and instrument of power), Foucault provides us with the radical condition of change and transformation: instead of criticizing the system on the basis of values, one should try to criticize the evaluation itself (or acceptability). I will return to this point a little further.

domains" they are "detached from their relationship with the forms of power" (PTI: 18). Power-knowledge thus provides a framework in which power is the inventive force and knowledge is invented; we have a circularity, to put it differently, in which power is exercised, and knowledge is circulated (PTI: 18).[97] However, starting from *La Société Punitive*, Foucault realized that contrary to inquiry and measure, examination has not been detached from its power relations: "The great Investigation that gave rise to the sciences of nature has become detached from its politico-juridical model; the examination, on the other hand, is still caught up in disciplinary technology" (DP: 226). This realization manifests itself in the significant change of Foucault's theoretical tools and the emergence of new concepts. I will first give three reasons for this shift and then will discuss the nature of it by focusing on the notion of *dispositif*.

The first reason can be found in a "concrete experience" that Foucault had of prison, around 1971-72 (PAB: 207). On February 8, 1971, Foucault and his friends announced the formation of the association *Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons* (GIP), the aim of which was to gather information from those who have first-hand experience of prison in order to show that what seems to be the banal and, to some extent, necessary institution of our societies is actually "one of the hidden regions of our social system" (Eribon, 1991: 204; Macey, 2004: 97-99; Schrift, 2013: 137-139). He will later say that this experience shifted his conception of power: power is not anymore considered negatively and as "an essentially legal mechanism", but in terms of "technology … tactics and strategy" (PAB: 207).[98] What 'precipitated' this shift of

[97] For Han (2002: 107) this circularity means that on the one hand power cannot be thought in an "asymmetrical perspective, as the source or the cause of truth", and on the other, knowledge is not "the prerogative" of any individual or structure. The relation between power and truth is that of "a structural enmeshing". However, my argument is that this circularity should be understood merely in relation to the dynamic of the function of power-knowledge and not its *invention*. Invention is an asymmetrical relation and Foucault will assign any radical change or resistance to practices engaged with power relations (if invention was a symmetrical relation it wouldn't matter if one starts from knowledge or power). This is why he defines genealogy as "a question of making an analysis of the dynastic, genealogical type, tracing the filiations beginning from the relations of power" (SPC: 86). For example *Discipline and Punish* is not so much a study of examination as an explication of disciplinary power that has shaped it (DP: 246).

[98] For many of Foucault's commentators this experience coincides with the introduction of Marxist terminology into his work and a shift in terms of his interlocutors. Kelly (2012: 16-18) argues that while Foucault didn't become a Marxist, the appearance of Marxist vocabulary indicates that his work has become politicized. Han (2002: 74) highlights the fact that Foucault's work now is a debate with Marxists (particularly Althusser) and "para-Marxists" (e.g. Marcuse and Reich) whose works are more "a questioning of politics rather than of the nature or the conditions of the possibility of knowledge". Balibar (1992: 39) goes as far as to claim that Foucault's continuous confrontation with 'Marxism' -which is not always the same Marxism- can give his work a unity. For more on Foucault and the Marxist terminology see Paras, 2006, pp. 60-61.

analysis is Foucault's visit to the prison facility Attica in early 1972 (OA: 113-115). It worth quoting Foucault's explanation at some length:

> "Until then I envisioned exclusion from society as a sort of general function, a bit abstract, and I tried to plot that function as in some way *constitutive of society* … the question that I ask myself now is the reverse: prison is an organization that is too complex to be reduced to purely *negative function of exclusion* … it possesses positive functions" (OA: 114-115; my italics).

Here Foucault criticizes his notion of "constitutive exclusion" on the ground of its negative implications for power relations. Through examining his treatment of truth, it is possible to shed light on this shift.

So far we have seen two different notions of exclusion in Foucault's oeuvre; one type of exclusion was the madness/reason relation in which madness was the outside of reason and thus it was possible to have mad philosophers. The other type was related to the will to truth, in which the exclusion was nothing but the elimination of the outside, interiority without any exteriority, and thus the existence of "unbearable Sophists" (LKW: 39). What these two types have in common is the negativity of exclusion, and he starts criticizing both of them. He declares now that madness is not the exteriority of our society but it is the most interior aspect of it, and in general "the margin is a myth": "madness is no less an effect of power than non-madness" (SEN: 198; SM: 201). To put it in another way, it is not the relation between pre-existing terms that are constituted but the relata themselves are constituted through the relation. However, his approach towards truth is still more revealing. As we have already seen, Foucault introduced the will to truth as a form of the will to know which has excluded the truth-event. He deals with the same subject once more in his lectures but the way that he understands the nature of this relation is very different, because it is no longer the negative relation of exclusion but a more subtle relation of "colonization", "concealing" and "normalization". In the *Psychiatric Power* lectures, Foucault makes a distinction between two series of truth: truth-event and truth-demonstration (PP: 237). Truth-event is like a thunderbolt that strikes a person, and thus the relation is not that of knowledge, and the person is not the subject of knowledge, here we are dealing with "a truth provoked by rituals, captured by ruses, seized according to occasions" (PP: 237). The other series of truth is like the sky that is always behind the clouds of ignorance ready to be discovered and thus is related to knowledge, specifically scientific knowledge. However, the relation between the two series is not that of exclusion: "truth-knowledge is basically only a region and an aspect,

albeit one that has become superabundant and assumed gigantic dimensions, but still an aspect or a modality of truth as event and of the *technology* of this truth-event" (PP: 238; my italics). Truth-knowledge "colonized and took over" the truth-event. This is why Foucault is not happy to use the term "transition" because they are not two foreign forms which oppose each other, and finally one overcomes the other (MDF: 709). One of the most important implications of this new understanding of the nature of truth is the most radical problematization of visibility. This, at the same time, means that the event will turn into the methodological concept of *eventalization*. What is visible and self-evident is not the victorious conqueror of the battle, it only feigns the victory, and the genealogist can reveal the real relation between the two sides through eventalization. Eventalization as "a breach of self-evidence" has two aspects: 1) by showing the singularity of the self-evidence of knowledge and practice, it declines any claims of necessity to status quo, and 2) rediscovers the strategies and tactics underlying this appearance, i.e. all the connections, plays of force, claims of scientificity and so on (or to put it in a nutshell, power-knowledge) (QM: 226-227; MDF: 711).[99]

The second reason can be found in the modality of the power relation itself. In *Théories et Institutions Pénales*, Foucault studies the transition of penal practices from a system of revenge to that of punishment through the notion of inquisition. The transition from the old accusatory practices to the "juridical form of inquiry" is tied to "the birth of state"; it is initiated from above (DP: 227). Through the reaction of authorities (the main actors here are Cardinal Richelieu and Chancellor Séguier) to the Nu-pieds revolt Foucault demonstrates how for the first time State arms are deployed independently of the king and merely in terms of the reason of the state (TIP: 7). It was on the basis of this new system of power (i.e. the State), which wanted to "take stricter and stricter control of the administration of penal justice", that the juridical form gained its dominance (PTI: 18-19). Prison as the general form of confinement, Foucault explains in *La Société Punitive*, is also not a development of penal theories but has imposed on it from the outside. However, here we are faced with two

[99] These aspects of eventalization are very similar to what Deleuze tells us about the dicethrow in his book on Nietzsche. The dicethrow has two moments, the combination of fallen dice which affirms the necessity and the aleatory nature of throwing dice itself. The aleatory nature of dice that are shaken and thrown is related to fragmentation, chaos and multiplicity of chance and necessity is "never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself" (Deleuze, 1983:26). Because it is not possible to have all the possible combinations at the same moment, so necessity as the singular combination is actually the affirmation of chance and its multiplicity. Eventalization in a similar manner affirms the multiplicity of infrastructure through affirming the singularity of the self-evidence.

"ensembles": "the penal ensemble" of the eighteenth century according to which the criminal is theorized in terms of "society's enemy", and "the punitive ensemble" which is a penitentiary system that responds to crime through the practice of imprisonment (SPC: 114). While the former is related to the "state institutionalization of justice", the latter is an "extra-juridical" practice which, as the case of *Lettre de cachet* indicates, "rises from the bottom to the top" and is "the instrument of a local and … capillary control" (PSS: 31; DP: 117-119). Consequently, to avoid analysing power representationally and in terms of given entities like State or law, one needs to analyse power relations themselves. This is why instead of the invention of knowledge Foucault starts talking about the invention of power (DP: 138). Foucault's 1973-1974 lecture series is a good example of this shift. Foucault starts *Psychiatric Power* by an explicit return to the questions that informed his first book, *History of Madness* and actually considers this series of lectures as the second volume to that book. The temporal distance between these two works is discursively bridged with a self-criticism. Foucault admits that at the time of writing that book he couldn't do away with representation effectively and indeed he has given a privileged role to it (i.e. his point of departure was "the perception of madness") (PP: 12). To move radically away from that analysis, he suggests starting from the *dispositif* of power as "a productive instance of discursive practice" (PP: 13). His aim is to study the very power relation that gives rise to the game of truth.

Moreover, the "capillary functioning of power" entails that one cannot change anything radically as long as the power relation remains intact. In his analysis of a series of paintings by Paul Rebeyrolle, Foucault articulates, in a dramatic way, his understanding of the omnipresence of power. The paintings depict, in ten canvases, the captivity of a dog in a prison-like space and its eventual liberation. The verticality of elements (woods, batons, and bars) in these paintings, Foucault asserts, is not merely a dimension of space, but it is "the dimension of power" (FF: 170). These elements of power constitute a space which has no exteriority; this is the space of the "in the truth"; the outside is the dark world of grotesque images and monsters. This is why the window on the wall is not able to display a real space of exteriority; in fact, the impotent window is the flip side of the dominant power: it is the source of visibility and knowledge. Thus, those who think that they can escape from power through the window forget that as long as verticality has not been abolished there can be no real emancipation. Instead of escaping from the window, we need to bring down the wall to form a new space (FF: 171). The distinction that Foucault makes between

"depsychiatrization" and "antipsychiatry" movements illustrates this point. The former is "power-conserving" because it is a question of displacing psychiatric power relation on behalf of a more exact knowledge (PPS: 45). It does not attack the power relation and its truth effect, but only displaces it to the outside of the asylum and gives it a new point of application (either in the form of pharmacological psychiatry or psychoanalysis). Antipsychiatry, on the contrary, is a "systematic destruction" of asylum itself "through an internal effort", because it knows that "power relations constitute the a priori of psychiatric practice" (PPS: 47-48). It struggles against the relations of domination in the very same place that power relations are distributed.

The last reason is the (re)introduction of the body in the analysis of power relations. I have already shown the relation between genealogy and body through the notion of *Herkunft*. However, while this relation was emphasised in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, Foucault didn't make use of it until his 1972-73 lectures.[100] Here Foucault, rejecting those analyses of penal theories that are made in terms of morality, claims that what has brought about the epochal shift in the forms of penality at the end of eighteenth century is "a problem of bodies and materiality": a new form of relation between the apparatus of production and those who make it function (PSS: 34-35). Foucault's main argument, as reformulated and repeated in *Discipline and Punish*, is that there is a fundamental relation between political power and bodies. Foucault's notions of body and materiality are amongst those aspects of his work that have attracted the attention of many scholars, especially feminist theorists. David Couzens Hoy (1999: 5-6) argues that the body for Foucault in both its materiality and its cultural representation is constructed by power relations. However, for him there is a universal invariant body that has been destroyed by history. For Étienne Balibar (1992: 54-55), Foucault's analysis is a "historical materialism" according to which, in opposition to Marx, materiality does not refer to "social relations" but to the effects of power on bodies. To avoid falling into the traps of vitalism, moreover, he suggests that one needs to take Foucault's nominalism seriously and remain at the level of "the material nature of bodies". Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983: 110-111) suggest that since the body is the target of control, it needs to be a stable core, very similar to Merleau-Ponty's *le corps proper* (lived body) which in distinction to physical body accounts for the communality of perceptions. Maybe the most

[100] This illustratyes the fact that using the term "genealogical turn" can be misleading. For many of the Foucauldian scholars, genealogy starts with the entrance of the body in the analytical scene (McNay, 1994: 90-91; Lash, 1984). However, as a close study of Foucault's lectures reveals, after *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* the body did not play a substantial role in his analysis until *La Société Punitive*.

influential reading of Foucault's notion of body belongs to Judith Butler, to the extent that in feminist literature her reading is often conflated with Foucault's (Oksala, 2005: 119). Thus, in what comes next, I will limit my discussion to her conception in order to explicate my own reading.

Butler in *Gender Trouble* reads Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* as an attempt to substitute Nietzsche's internalization with "the model of inscription". For Foucault prison's function is not so much the repression of prisoner's desire as "to compel their bodies to signify the prohibitive law as their very essence, style, and necessity" (Butler, 2010: 183). Butler appropriates Foucault's conception of the body as a "variable boundary" and " signifying practice". Thus for her, the body is through and through a discursive construction rather than a 'being'. In *The Psychic Life of Power*, she argues that when Foucault claims that soul "is produced permanently around, on, within, the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those that are punished", he actually makes an Aristotelian claim (Butler, 1997: 89-90). Soul, as an instrument of power, is the 'form' and the materiality of the body is the 'matter', and thus she concludes that "there is no body outside of power, for the materiality of the body — indeed, materiality itself—is produced by and in direct relation to the investment of power" (Butler, 1997: 91). She interprets Foucault's adage "the soul is the prison of the body" as an affirmation for this reading. However, she recognizes an inconsistency between this conception and what Foucault presents in *The History of Sexuality I*.[101] Foucault here, according to Butler, sees body as a tabula rasa ready for inscription through historical procedures, similar to Kafka's *The Penal Colony*. This not only contradicts Foucault's attempt to go beyond the culture/nature dichotomy, but reveals his hidden commitment to a "prediscursive and prehistorical 'body'" (Butler, 2010: 177; Butler, 1989: 607). I will argue that no matter how disappointing it may sound, Foucault is not problematizing the body; but rather for him, the question is how the body is invested with power relations. My contention is that Foucault uses the body in two distinct but interconnected meanings: body as the target of power relations, and body as the ontological foundation of power relations.

[101] Oksala (2003: 127-134) makes the same claim as well, but she draws a very different conclusion. For her *The History of Sexuality I*, presents a more dynamic conception of body which can account for resistance. Using Foucault's earlier essay, *A Preface to Transgression*, she argues that "the limit between discursive intelligibility and unintelligibility can be crossed in experience" (Oksala, 2003: 129). However, in the final analysis, body for her is a discursive construction. I will limit my arguments here to *Discipline and Punish* and the question of soul, but I think there is not a discontinuity between the two books in relation to the Foucault's treatment of the body: 'sex' in *The History of Sexuality I* is analogous to the 'soul'.

Power of the Sovereign	Sovereign	Mark	Ceremony	The Vanquished Enemy	Tortured Body
Punitive Power	Social Body	Sign	Representation	The juridical Subject	Soul
Disciplinary Power	Administrative Apparatus	Trace	Exercise	The Individual	Body Subjected to Training

Figure 1.

Foucault's treatment of different *mechanisms* of punishment reveal that power always, directly or indirectly, exerted on bodies (hence the terms "political anatomy"). He recognizes three different types of punishment which, in each particular period of history and in relation to the dominant *technology* of power, only one of them is predominant (DP: 130-131). While the sovereign tortured the condemned bodies in a ceremonial manner, the other two technologies of power, which emerged at the end of nineteenth century, are either exercised on the 'soul' or on the body and 'soul' together. But what does Foucault mean by soul? Is it, as Butler suggests, what brings the body of the prisoner to existence? We need to make a distinction between the emergence of the soul and its function in relation to the body and power relations. While in torture, the "point of application of power" was the body of the condemned, the humanization of penalties changed this target. Foucault tells us that penal reform gave rise to two different power relations[102] and their corresponding mechanisms of punishment, the first of which has soul as the target of power while in the second soul and body together are targets of power. Thus, the soul is the "correlative of a technique of power" (DP: 101). What these two have in common is that power relations are duplicated by an "object relation" which is not external to them (like a prohibition): "The processes of objectification originate in the very tactics of power and of the arrangement of

[102] What Foucault calls here 'power relations', in *La Société Punitive* has been called "ensemble". The difference between *Discipline and Punish* and those lectures is that while there he was studying the punitive ensemble, here he argues that the punitive system has superseded by a disciplinary power relation.

its exercise" (DP: 102).[103] Foucault's claim is that these two power relations give rise to 'soul' as an object of knowledge. The difference between the two technologies of power –which itself is rooted in different tactics of power and different materiality- is that while in the former soul is understood in terms of representations the latter considers soul as "the seat of habits" (DP: 128). Accordingly, power is always invested in the body, either directly (in the case of torture) or indirectly (through the soul). When Foucault states that "the soul is the prison of the body" he simply means that power affects the body through manipulating representations or behaviours. The soul does not bring the body to existence, but it makes possible the procedure of "the submission of bodies through the control of ideas" (DP: 102).

The production of the soul "around, on, within, the body" can be understood in relation to the body as the ontological foundation of power relations and the last dominant form of the technology of power, i.e. disciplinary power. What is at stake here is the circularity of power-knowledge: soul (as "the knowable man") is the effect and instrument of power. However, the novelty of this analysis lies in the fact that Foucault is no longer content to reveal the political dynasty of knowledge, but it becomes the network of power itself that needs to be made intelligible. Since in the next chapter I will return to the relation of objectification and assujettissement (subjectification), here I will deal with the subject very briefly. Disciplinary power, as the latest anatomical power, consists in techniques of submitting the body through "obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself - movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body" (DP: 137). This analytical investment of power in the body (as exemplified in the case of the army) has the knowable man ("soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct") as its object effect (a soldier is made out of "a formless clay, an inapt body") (DP: 135 & 305). Thus, for Foucault it is not the body itself that is problematized but its objectification and subjectification. 'Body', understood not as the biological object but as a somatic materiality, is the relay of an ensemble of relations that are responsible for the circularity of power-knowledge. Moreover, it should be noted that Foucault does not use 'body' (*corps*) merely to refer to the somatic materiality, he has utilized the word in reference to architecture, institutions, and apparatuses. Here again, by 'body' Foucault means materiality; for example when he talks about the recent revolts against prisons, Foucault argues that "in fact, they were revolts, at the level of the body, against *the very body of the prison*. What was at issue was not whether the prison

[103] In the next chapter I will return to this objectification and its relation to subjectification (*assujettissement*).

environment was too harsh or too aseptic … but its very materiality as an instrument and vector of power" (DP: 30; my italics). As he explains, the purpose of his study is to write a "'history of the bodies' and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in them has been invested" (HS1:152). It is this relation between bodies that the term *microphysics of power* refers to.[104]

Foucault now has moved away from a study aimed at the condition of acceptability of knowledge to one which is concerned with the condition of acceptability of practices (IP: 276). This means, it is not enough to reveal the political dynasty of knowledge, but one needs to account for the circularity of power-knowledge. It was regarding this demand that Foucault introduced the notion of 'dispositif'.[105] Dispositif is a network established between heterogeneous (both discursive and non-discursive) elements consisting of "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" (CF: 194).[106] For example, the Panopticon, considered as the relation between Bentham's writings, real architecture, the guards, the prisoners, the play of visibility/invisibility and many other elements, is a dispositif which makes the circularity of power-knowledge possible: "Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it gains the efficiency and the ability to penetrate into men's behavior; knowledge (*savoir*) follows the advances of power, discovering new objects

[104] The key for understanding Foucault's claim in *The History of Sexuality I* that resistance against the dispositif of sexuality "ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures", lies in this notion of microphysics (HS1: 148). He dismisses Bataille or Sade, whom he once considered to be at the front line of resistance, only because they were trapped in the dispositif of sexuality by emphasising the emancipatory value of saying yes to 'sex'. Thus it is a conspicuous error to suggest, as Deleuze does, that Foucault is Sadistic (Deleuze, 1997). For more on pleasure/body and resistance see: Oksala, 2005 pp. 124-134; Butler, 1997, pp. 94-96; Hoy, 1999; Halperin, 1995, pp. 93-94.

[105] The term 'dispositif' has been translated as 'apparatus', 'deployment', 'mechanism' or 'setup'. For a detailed study of the problem of translation of dispositif see Bussolini, 2010. Agamben (2009: 8-11) has made an etymological study of the term showing its connection to Hegelian 'positivity' and Heidegger's *Gestell*. He has also draws attention to its religious genesis by showing that in the writings of the Latin Fathers, the term *oikonomia*, in its theological meaning, translated to *Dispositio*. In terms of Foucault's own works, however, I think it is possible to trace it back to the idea of "immense machine" (OA: 113) and "ensemble" (SPC: 113-115). Later in his work, the notion of 'foyer' (WDTT: 176-178) will replace dispositif.

[106] In *What is an Appaartus?*, Agamben (2009) analyzes the Foucauldian notion of dispositif in order to construct a homogenous and useful concept for his studies. After making some etymological explanations he concludes that "I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses off living beings" (Agamben, 2009: 14). Apparatus according to this definition can refer to a wide range of things from philosophy to cigarette to pencil and to prison. To put this definition in Agamben's own terminology, apparatus is a mechanism that governs *zoe* ('the ontology of creatures', 'substance' or 'living beigns') in order to produce ('desubjectify' and 'subjectify') *bios* ('subject') (Agamben, 1998). Foucault's notion of dispositif differs from Agamben's apparatus in that this notion accounts for both subjectification and objectification; it does not refer to an entity (e.g. T.V. or language) but a relational plane (prison in itself is not a dispositif but the panopticon).

of knowledge (*objets à connaître*) over all the surfaces on which power is exercised" (DP: 204; translation modified).

Now if dispositif is a skein of heterogeneous elements, it is necessary to examine the ways that it can be entangled and conceptualized. Foucault, by turning around the Clausewitzian expression, states that politics "has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military model" (DP: 180). This conceptualization gives rise to "a risky, reversible, warlike relationship" (PP: 237). Accordingly, Foucault introduces the notions of strategy and tactic. To study dispositif, Foucault himself suggest, we need to understand it by *scene*. In the manuscript of his lectures on psychiatric power, he gives us a hint of what he meant by this term: "Understanding by scene, not a theatrical episode, but a ritual, a strategy, a battle" (PP: 33). The two contrasting images provided in *Discipline and Punish*, the case of Damiens and the rule-governed house of young prisoners, are not part of his rhetorical techniques, but they present two scenes, two strategic arenas. Tactics, as the microphysics of power, are situated between the multiplicity of bodies and strategies. However, it does not mean that we are dealing with two separate realms but there is one continuous reality which consists of intertwined heterogeneous, but mutually conditioning, strata of relations. Strategies are not tactics writ large, for example, father/family is not the projection of the sovereign/state relation (HS1: 100). Although tactic is an *intentional* arrangement of bodies ("people know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do") and strategy, in contrast, is *nonsubjective* ("but what they don't know is what what they do does"), the "rule of double conditioning" relates them to each other: "one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work" (HS1: 100; Deyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 187). Moreover, if it is possible for Foucault to call the modern societies *disciplinary societies*, it is because there is a "more-or-less coherent and unitary" global strategy which is coextensive with the social body (PS: 142). However, far from being imposed on it from above, it emerges through the contagious process of colonization, it is, in other words, "immanent cause" (Deleuze, 1988:37). This global strategy is related to the concept of the *diagram*.

In his review of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, Deleuze[107] draws attention to the notion of Panopticon (not the concrete entity but when it considered abstractly) which works as a very specific machine: it is an abstract machine, a diagram. Although De Landa argues that a proto-diagram is identifiable in *Difference and Repetition*, where Deleuze discusses the nineteenth century thermodynamics, the term itself first appeared in this review and later developed to the extent that it played a major role in Deleuze's (and Guattari's) oeuvre (De Landa, 2000). In his monograph on Foucault, Deleuze defines diagrams as "the mixing of non-formalized pure functions and unformed pure matter", it is "pure Matter-Function" (Deleuze, 2006:156). Pure matter, which Foucault calls body and informal function, as a particular direction, "line" or a global strategy, are mixed in the diagram and this is the reason why when it is actualized there exists a connection between formed matter and formed function: e.g. education is the function of school or care is the function of hospital (Deleuze, 1988: 33; Legg, 2011:130-131). Deleuze calls the integration of formalized functions and their related formed bodies (e.g. school or state), assemblages; or to put in a simpler way, assemblage is the actualized diagram (Deleuze, 1988:37; De Landa, 2000: 39-40). Thus, we can say that dispositif is the historical dynamic of diagram-assemblage relation.

In connection with the main concern of this research, it should be noted that the notion of dispositif can help us to grasp the visibility→articulation relation more clearly. Foucault no longer writes to make things visible, but it is visibility itself that needs to be problematized. Power relations are, to a great extent, mechanisms that function in relation to the dichotomy of visibility/invisibility: "Disciplinary power … is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility" (DP: 187).[108] His new approach to the idea of power relation, i.e. non-exclusionary relation and non-suppressive understanding of power, underpin this shift. 'Delinquents', for example, are not excluded or suppressed but produced and circulated (as a synthetic visbility) because of the positive and economically beneficial role that they play in the economy of power. On the other hand, writing about sex and making it more visible is no longer a subversive act, but it

[107] Deleuze (1992) commenting on dispositif has considered it to be a concept that can give Foucault's undertaking consistency and coherence. In *What is a Dispositif?*, Deleuze (1992: 159) defines it as a "tangle, a multitude ensemble" which has the dimensions of visibility, enunciation, force and subjectification. What is considered to be three phases of Foucault's thought, according to Deleuze is nothing but studies of dispositif according to its different lines.

[108] To remain consistent, I have tried to give examples from *Discipline and Punish* but it is possible to provide other cases in relation to the dispositif of sexuality where the play of visibility/invisibility replaces the concept of oppressive power (HS1: 44; 76; 153)

is the visibility of sex itself that demands articulation. An example from Foucault's activism can demonstrate the nature of this visibility→articulation relation. During his involvement with *Groupe d'Information sur la Santé* (GIS), a brochure was published (*Oui Nous Avortons* [Yes, We Abort]) in suppport of the legalization of abortion, as a result of which he was summoned to court because he, and two other people, were considered to be the main authors of it. In *Summoned to Court*, Foucault takes issue with this incident and argues while the fact that abortion is widely practiced is common knowledge, writing about it is criminal (STC: 423). It is criminal, Foucault immediately adds, because writing about the whole economy of abortion and its connection with the apparatus of the State (who can make decisions about abortion, where a woman can abort, when it is legal) problematizes that apparently banal fact. Accordingly, one does not write to tell people things they do not know, but to subvert the self-evident knowledge by showing the circularity of power-knowledge.

Chapter 3 Subject

In previous chapters, I tried to explore two variations of articulation and visibility in terms of both their phases and the relationships that were established between each of them and other variations. However, the Articulation→Subject and the Visibility→Subject relations were only discussed very briefly. In this chapter, I will return to these relations in some detail and then focus on the variation of the subject. This 'return' entails repetition of some of the themes that I have already discussed in previous chapters, like the power relations and the body. Nevertheless, since here I will concentrate on different relationships among variations, the repetition will help to illustrate those aspects of Foucault's oeuvre that had remained unexplored so far.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the notion of subject in Foucault's earlier works, and I argue that it should be understood against the backdrop of his criticism of anthropologization of thought. Then, I will elaborate on the notion of the *assujettissement* (subjectification) in order to illustrate that at this stage the formulation of the notion of the subject was congruent with Foucault's conception of the power relations. Thus, when the conception changed, a new notion of the subject, i.e. *subjectivation*, emerged. This shift, moreover, made the subject the core of Foucault's analysis.

The aim of this threefold presentation is to dispute the idea that considers Foucault's engagement with the subject in his later works as a "surprise" (Han, 2002: 149; Dews, 1989). My contention is that the notion of subject plays a significant role in Foucault's oeuvre from the beginning, though before giving it a positive content, he had dealt with it negatively. This negative approach is rooted in the fact that his primary aim was to confront two different conceptions of the subject, that is to say, historical and philosophical: "most historians prefer a history of social processes (where society plays the role of the subject) and most philosophers prefer a subject without history" (ST, 176). To tackle the latter, he introduced the notion of subject-function, and in opposition to the former Foucault tried to demonstrate how power relations can give rise to subjectivity. It was after these two attempts that Foucault started giving subjectivity the positive content of "the subject's relationship to himself" (OGL: 115).

Subject-Function

Before *Archaeology of Knowledge*, the subject barely plays a substantial role in Foucault's works. In The *Order of Things*, what was at stake was the being of Man which functioned simultaneously "as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows" (OT: 340). As I have already shown, Foucault's endeavor does not hinge upon the constituent subject per se, but the emergence of man which amounts to assigning transcendental values to empirical contents (OT: 270). On the other hand, in his engagement with literature, the subject plays a negative role. Here Foucault elaborates on the 'being of language', arguing that the emergence of this being is mutually exclusive with a self-consciousness identity. I have also elaborated on this aspect of his thought which is explicitly articulated in his essay on Blanchot. The importance of Blanchot for Foucault lies in the fact that the subject has been excluded in his language: it is a "thought that stands outside subjectivity" (TO: 150). However, when "I speak" is replaced by "one speaks", when literature, instead of being a spatial event, became a type of discourse, the subject started to gain a positive functioning is Foucault's thought.

In *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault's aim is to analyze discourse without any recourse to meaning or formalism; and to fulfill this, he introduces the notion of the statement (*énoncé*). Then, the important question arises: what are the conditions for a series of signs to be considered, in distinction to sentence and proposition, as a statement? As Foucault's example of the series of alphabet on the keyboard of a typewriter ("A, Z, E, R, T") demonstrates, it is not enough to have merely an ensemble, arbitrary or not, of signs. Now, the same series of letters, this time printed in the typewriter's manual, "is the statement of the alphabetical order adopted by French typewriters" (AK: 66). What has constituted this series a statement? Foucault replies "a series of signs will become a statement on condition that it has a specific relation with `something else' (*autre chose*); a relation that concerns the series itself" (AK: 68; translation modified).[109] What makes this relation, which Foucault repeatedly distinguishes it from both the causal and formal relations, specific is that that 'something else' is far from being external to the statement is part and parcel of it. This subject differs from the grammatical subject or speaking subject in that it is an "empty

[109] Foucault's genealogy, as presented in the last chapter, started with a very similar question. However, here the answer is formulated in accordance with a quasi-independent conception of discourse and thus 'something else' is understood in terms of exteriority. When it comes to the notion of *savoir*, 'something else' becomes the materiality of non-knowledge.

function". As Deleuze (2006: 47-48) puts it, it is the gap through which "one speaks", that "anonymous murmur", erupts and *distributes* subject positions. However, my argument is that Deleuze does not make a distinction between two different notions of subject-function and subject-position when he states that 'author' is a subject position. While the former is necessary for the constitution of the statement, the latter is the product of the statement.

It is in *What is an Author?* that Foucault develops his idea of subject-function. It is a very complicated text that has been the source of misunderstandings and misinterpretations.[110] The lecture is divided into four parts.[111] To justify his engagement with the question of the author, Foucault presents it as a self-criticism for the "imprudence" that he has committed in his earlier works, particularly in *The Order of Things*. The imprudence that Foucault talks about is that he has used proper names "naïvely and savagely" (QA: 792). Then he formulates his approach as the study of the relation between an author and text. Foucault starts the second part by borrowing a sentence from Becket: "'what matter who is speaking' someone said 'what matter who is speaking'". This part, as the quotation suggests, deals with today's condition of writing (*écriture*) that is marked by two main themes, both of which are related to the question of the subject. The first theme is that writing has freed itself from the age-old shackles of expression and has become a transgressive play which has given rise to "a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears" (WA: 206). Writing has established a new relationship with death in the form of the "sacrifice of life" as well.[112]

[110] While it is one of Foucault's famous lectures, it has been discussed very rarely. In two companions dedicated to Foucault, for example, it is never mentioned. It has been mostly discussed among literary theorists (Long, 2000: 115-117). Due to its complexity, moreover, it has given rise to false criticisms and accusations. Sara Mills (2003: 11), for instance, in her book on Foucault quotes his definition of criticism in this essay ("the task of criticism is not to bring out the work's relationships with the author, nor to reconstruct through the text a thought or experience, but rather to analyze the work through its structure, its architecture, its intrinsic form, and the play of its internal relationships") only to show that he himself hasn't been faithful to this definition. However, Foucault actually finds the use of the notion of 'work' here problematic and thus has no sympathy for such definition of criticism. For another example see O'Hara (1988), who claims that at best it can be considered only as "a revisionary parodic text of self-revision".

[111] Foucault has delivered this lecture twice, first in the *Société Française de Philosophie*in February 1969, and then a modified version of it at the State University of New York in March 1970. Since the English translations are incomplete, for the most part I will rely on the text of the first talk published in *Dits et écrits* I, pp. 789-821.

[112] Miller (1993: 32) has a very literal understanding of "sacrifice of life" by implicating that Foucault has risked his life through the limit-experience of "sadomasochistic practices". However, here Foucault is not referring to his own experience but to the situation of literature in which death and author has gained a new relationship. It is a recurrent theme during this period in Foucault's writings. In *This is not a Pipe*, as the study of the situation of contemporary art, Foucault presents Rene Magritte's works as 'non-affirmative' paintings which are characterized by "an effacement of the 'common place'" (TNP: 194). This "'nonplace' emerges 'in person'", as the case of *Le Balcon* demonstrates: Magritte has replaced the personages of paintings with coffins. For more on this non-affirmative painting see Tanke, 2013, pp. 93-122.

Foucault tells us that these themes are not recent and the "death of the author" has been around for a while, at least since Mallarmé.[113] Thus Foucault is not trying to merely repeat an "empty affirmation" of this event, as he to some extent did in his previous engagements with Blanchot at Bataille, but to provide an analytical and theoretical tool that could address such disappearance. Two notions have already been proposed to replace that of the author: work (*oeuvre*) and writing. Foucault dismisses both notions as what "has hindered us from taking the full measure of the author's effacement" (WA: 208). These notions, Foucault argues, have attempted to account for our contemporary 'ruptures', opened up by the disappearance of the author, through recurse to the "historico-transcendental tradition of the nineteenth century". Foucault will try to do away with any traces of that transcendental tradition by claiming that the author and "the being of discourse" are co-constituted in the non-space of a rupture. The third part of the essay starts with the introduction of the "author-function". In the last part of the talk, Foucault makes an interesting distinction between 'establishers of discursivity' (*instaurateurs de discursivité*), e.g. Freud and Marx, and 'founders of science' (*fondateurs de sciences*) (QA: 804-808). While here he deals with the former, in *La situation de Cuvier dans l'histoire de la biologie*, as I showed in the previous chapter, he provides an analysis of the latter by discussing Cuvier. I will, nevertheless, only dwell on the notion of the "author-function" not simply because of its importance for illustrating the articulation-subject relation but for the role it plays in Foucault's transition to genealogy.

If Foucault does not want to join the celebration of the death of the author, then what he is trying to do with the notion of the author-function? Foucault claims that he is doing something similar to what he has already done in *The Order of Things*. In the case of the latter, his intention was not "to affirm the death of man, but starting from the theme … that man is dead (or he is disappearing, or he will be replaced by the superman) the aim was to see according to which rules the concept of man has been formed and functioned"; Here, in a similar fashion, he is doing "the same thing with the notion of the author", and "thus", he

[113] While for the immediate audience, at least in France, Foucault's lecture was not different from Barthes' idea of the death of the author, nowadays it is usually depicted as a 'response' to that claim (Green, 206-209; Elmo Raj, 2012; Burk, 1998). Barthes (1993: 185) justifies his analysis by stating that "we still lack a sociology of language". However, Foucault has carefully distinguished his thoughts from Barthes' ideas by stating at the beginning of his talk that he is not offering a "sociohistorical analysis of the author's persona" (WA: 205). Moreover, Foucault does not celebrate "the birth of the reader" but is keen to see how 'author' could reign for such a long time. To put it in a nutshell, it is not a hermeneutic event.

concludes, “let’s hold our tears” (QA: 817; my translation).[114] For Foucault, the clamour of the death cannot be anything but the symptom of a shift in a much more profound level, as the death of Man was to the last spatial event, i.e. literature. However, here Foucault has moved away from the idea of the spatial event. My claim is that what he understands by ‘death’ is connected to the notion of acceptability which we can observe its embryonic formation in this talk.

Foucault tells us that author-function has not had a universal and homogenous effect on all discourses throughout the history, which amounts to saying that author-function has not always been the “guarantee” for discourse to be accepted as ‘true’. For example, in the Middle Ages what now we would call scientific discourse “were accepted as ‘true’ only when marked with the name of their author” (WA: 212). At the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the situation changed and scientific discourses “began to be received in the anonymity of an established or always demonstrable truth”. Since what guaranteed them was not anymore their reference to the person who produced them, Foucault claims that the author-function faded away in relation to the scientific discourse while it preserved its reign over the literary discourses. The author-function ceased to be the condition of acceptability of scientific discourse, but this does not mean that it has no role to play. What the author-function has endowed them with, similar to the literary discourses, is the subject-position; Foucault’s example of a mathematical treatise is very revealing. In such a treatise, the “I” that speaks in the introduction is not the same as the “I” that speaks in the course of demonstration: the first self refers to a concrete person, while the second one can be performed by any individual (WA: 215-216; AK: 72). The subject-position denotes the distribution and types of the selves in a discourse, and when the author-function is not the guarantee of the truth, it is still responsible for giving rise to the subject-positions. One question remains, though. Does Foucault think that it is possible to have no guarantees of the truth? If the author-function is not anymore the condition of acceptability, does it mean that there is no condition at all?

As it is the case with the mathematical treatise (or the more radical example of Nicholas Bourbaki), although the author-function is not its condition of acceptability, the membership of the scientific discourse in “a systematic ensemble” stood as their guarantee (WA: 212-

[114] Chauncey Colwell (1994, 55-56) argues that “it is important to remember that Foucault does not announce the ‘death’ of the subject. The subject has not gone the way of God, man or the author”.

213). This means that for a mathematical discourse to *circulate* and *be received* (another way for saying the conditions of acceptability), it is not necessary to evoke the author-function. To put it another way, here it is not the producer of the text which speaks but an *anonymous* subject. As Foucault makes it clear, the author-function "without a doubt is one of the possible specifications of the subject-function", not a necessary one (QA: 811; my translation). The subject-function, as he explains in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, is required for the constitution of the discourse, but it can appear in different forms. It is imaginable, according to Foucault, to have a culture in which all discourses would develop not in relation to author-function but according to the "anonymity of a murmur"; in such a culture to the question "who is speaking?", a voice will hum "One speaks".

We are now in a position to see how it was possible for Foucault, by gradually shifting the object of his analysis from discourse to *savoir*, to replace three elements of subject-function, author-function, and subject-position with the series of the will to know, the will to truth and 'truth'. In *The Order of Discourse*, author-function is described merely as one of the procedures of control that discourse exercise on itself. It functions as "a foyer for the coherency of the discourse" that has always the form of individuality or the self (OT: 58-59; translation modified). The subject, accordingly, is nothing but an effect of discourse. In the next section, I will show that this articulation-subject relation was replaced by that of visibility-subject where the subject will become the effect of power.

Discipline, Strategy and Subjectification

Contrary to those who represent Foucault as a thoroughly "anti-subjectivist" who has rejected subjectivity completely (Mansfield, 2000; Kelly, 2013: 511), our previous discussion has demonstrated that it is possible to exhibit that, as he himself towards the end of his career claimed (SP: 326-327), he has never denied the existence of the subject.[115] In contrary, he saw the subject, understood as the constitutive and sovereign entity, a problem that needs to be tackled with. In *Ariane s'est pendue* (*Ariadne Hanged Herself*), a very short piece written in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (1969) on Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, Foucault states that the image of thought that Deleuze wants to free us from is the one that

[115] Amy Allen (2013: 337-352) is amongst the scholars who has taken Foucault's claim (SP: 327) that "it is not power, but subject, that is the general theme of my research" seriously and suggested a reading of his earlier works on the basis of their relation to subject. Her main claim is that Foucault's oeuvre can be read as his "lifelong engagement with the pressing political question of the relationship between power and the subject" (Allen, 2013: 338).

binds thought to a sovereign subject; this is, Foucault asserts, the real meaning of the word 'subjectified' (*assujetti*) (AP: 769). Foucault, moreover, understands his proclamation of the death of Man as "a particular case, or … a visible form of a much more general death … of the Subject with the capital 'S'" (LNM, 788; my translation). Although Western culture, Foucault claims, has been subjectified (*a été assujettie*) in the sense that thought or truth has always been referred to the Subject, we are witnessing the birth of a world where "the subject is not one, but split, not sovereign, but dependent, not absolute origin but a continuously modified function" (LMN: 789; my translation). Thus, what he presented in *What is an Author?* is in line with the characteristics of this new world which has been built upon the ruins of the sovereign subject. Nevertheless, in this section I will show that he moves away from the sovereign subject and its subjectifying status by the introduction of subjectification; an idea that is congruent with his analysis of power as a strategy.

While Foucault in the beginning understood subjectification as the relegation of truth to a constituent subject, he later, as the analysis of the will to truth showed, held that truth is bound to power relations. This shift of thought is explicit in his re-definition of humanism (Simons, 1995: 46-49). Humanism was defined by Foucault, on different occasions, in reference to the ambiguous situation of man, both being the object of human sciences and the 'origin' of any type of knowledge (HEM: 541; QPF: 607-608). When Foucault claimed that man is dying, he didn't mean that human sciences will disappear but that they will be deployed not in the horizon of humanism. "The man that disappears in philosophy", Foucault states, "is not the man as the object of knowledge (*savoir*) but as the subject of freedom and existence … which is a kind of correlative image of God" (FRS: 664; my translation)? Thus, Foucault's anti-humanism has as its target the sovereignty of man. In an interview conducted in 1971, *Par-delà le bien et le mal* (*Beyond Good and Evil*), Foucault speaks of humanism in terms of power. Humanism, in fact, Foucault now holds, invites the western man to let go their "will to power": "the more you renounce the exercise of power and the better you submit to one that is imposed on you, the more you will be sovereign" (PDBM: 226; my translation). The sovereignty of the subject is no longer a point of departure for Foucault's critical analysis, instead one needs to find beneath the claim of sovereignty a network of power relations which disguise subjugation under the cloak of sovereignty and humanity. I will first explicate the meaning of subjectification, this will provide a touchstone for assessing different claims about his understanding of subjectivity. Then, I will elaborate

the relation between subjectification and the way that he conceptualizes power relations, this will shed light on Foucault's shift from subjectification to *subjectivation*.

As Foucault's engagement with humanism reveals, for him now all the notions that could imply that the subject is sovereign are as a matter fact only proofs for the existence of the "subjectified sovereignties" (*souverainetés assujetties*): soul while sovereign over the body is subjugated to God or individual as the holder of sovereign rights is subjugated to the rules of society (PDBM: 225; PP: 57-59). Foucault recognises two types of attack against this 'latch' (*verrou*) of sovereignty-subjectification, each targeting merely one side of the entanglement, and more interestingly one of them can be identified with Foucault's own early endeavour, a sign that he has already moved beyond it. On the one hand Marxism, through turning the political struggle into a class struggle, has attempted to "desubjectify the will to power" and, on the contrary, literature has opened up a space for different experiences (including the elimination of taboos and sexual restrictions, practices of communal existence and disinhibition of drugs) by "destruction of the subject as pseudo-sovereign" (PDBM: 226-227). However, now he finds both of these approaches unsatisfactory insofar as they fail to address the both sides of the 'latch'. It is not surprising that he finds his notion of power-knowledge, understood as the "superimposition of subjectification and objectification" (DP: 305; modified translation), a better way to analyse this entanglement. This is because he has now realised that "to know (*connaître*) and to subjectify, to know (*savoir*) and to command … are firmly linked" (APMD: 790; my translation).

Disciplinary power, a term which first appeared in the lecture series *The Psychiatric Power* and then fully developed and analysed in *Discipline and Punish*, is the name that Foucault gives to the power-knowledge relation that has individualization as its effect. Thus, it would be misleading to reduce disciplinary power merely to a form of exercise of power (Smart, 2002: 82; Simons, 2013: 305). Examination, which according to Foucault lies at the core of the disciplinary power and functions to produce 'case', is where this superimposition of power relations and knowledge relations is very evident: "it manifests the subjectification of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjectified" (DP: 184-185; translation modified). Techniques of writing and articulation are here developed to make visible individuals in the form of cases (PP: 48-52; Schrift, 2013: 159). Nevertheless, for Foucault the productivity lies on the side of power relations and hence he can claim that "another power, another knowledge (*savoir*)" (DP: 226). It means while

objectification is not external to subjectification, the processes of the former "originate in the very tactics of power and of the arrangement of its exercise" (DP: 101)[116]. Rudi Visker (1995) emphasises the fact that understanding power-knowledge in terms of an external relation suffers from a "systematic inconsistency" (Visker,1995: 62). This reading, for which Visker admits that one can find confirmations in those parts of *Discipline and Punish* which deals with medicine and the "well-disciplined" hospital, understands power as the efficient cause ('*causa efficiens*') by which knowledge *attains* access to an object which is already there (Visker, 1995: 64). This approach is inconsistent with a critical endeavour which holds that the rearrangement of the power relation will result in "many profound changes in the episteme" (DP: 305). To overcome this deficiency, Visker argues that power-knowledge entanglement needs to be understood as an internal relation in which the power relation (subjectification) produces the object ('soul') for the object relation (objectification). It is only in this way that one can realize that power and knowledge have a commonality in their histories. Thus subjectification, far from being a sheer subjugation, 'fabricates' the object of knowledge. But what are the procedures of subjectification that function as the relations of fabrication?

As it has been suggested by different scholars[117], the notion of subjectification was emerged from Foucault's engagement with institutions (prison, school, army …). In the series of

[116] The nature of the power-knowledge relation has been debated in numerous ways and criticized from different aspects, for example see Joseph Roues, 2005; Wartenberg, 1990. Han (2002: 142-144) finds Foucault's claim that power-knowledge has merely a "methodological function", only an "analytical grid", problematic (WC: 60). As a matter of fact, for her, power-knowledge in Foucault's oeuvre swings between two opposite poles of "excessive essentialism or nominalism". In *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault talks about the "historical transformations" of power-knowledge, it appears as "a metaphysical entity" very similar to a Hegelian schema. But if, Han continues, power-knowledge is only an "analytical grid" it become identical with "the regime of truth", which was supposed to make the empirical functioning of the power-knowledge visible; thus Foucault will be the victim of one of the doubles of the transcendental (Han, 2002: 144). Oksala (2012-26-27) endorses this extreme nominalism by arguing that ontology and intelligibility are the same thing and thus Foucault byu8iy proposing the grid of power-knowledge is "fighting for hegemony in the game of truth". What is important for this study is to show that power as subjectification is internally linked to knowledge as objectification, I will discuss this issue shortly.

[117] For example see Bevir, 1999; Driver, 1985; O'neil, 1986. John S. Ransom's *Foucault's Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity* is still one of the best studies in this regard. There he depicts Foucault as a political theorist whose characteristic novelty lies in his different understanding of individuality. In contrast to empiricists and normativists, he claims, Foucault does not start with a "static or fundamental human nature" but studies different disciplinary institutions in the age of industrialization to show how they function "to create a particular capacity among a group of individuals" (Ransom, 1997:31). Ransom criticizes those commentators, mostly sympathetic to the Frankfurt school, who fail to appreciate the productive force of discipline that cannot be captured by the dominant categories like legal/illegal forms of authority (Ransom, 1997:36-40). However, in his study Ransom does not make a distinction between subjectification and subjectivation and generally understands the former behavioristically. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000: 22-26) in *Empire* argue that Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power fails to comprehend the

lectures delivered at Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Foucault ascribes three different functions to these "institutions of subjectification" ('*institutions d'assujettisement*') (VFJ: 616-618; TJF: 80-82). First, while in the feudal society the control over individuals had a spatial nature (mainly through localization), the modern society, beginning from the end of the eighteenth century, interested in people's time. To be able to put individual's time on the market, the worker's entire living time must be transformed into labour time. Thus, control in the modern society was temporal. The second function is to exercise control over bodies in order to make it more obedient and useful. The third function is to create a space for a form of 'polymorphous' power that not only links economic, political and juridical modes of power together, but its operation is fundamentally enmeshed with knowledge. As the functions of these institutions suggest, subjectification far from being a violent subjugation is a productive mechanism. Moreover, as the case of the Panopticon reveals, while these "distributions of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes" are *fictitious* they *mechanically* give rise to a "real subjectification" (DP: 202). This is what Foucault means by stating that "power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective" (HS1: 94-95). It is intentional because one can operate this mechanism out of curiosity, or for a philosophical end or merely because they are perverts and enjoy exercising control over others. Whatever is the reason behind it, the result is always the same and thus independent of the subjective objectives. The important point here is that while Foucault admits that discipline is a "calculated technology of subjectification", he considers this rationality external to the end result. As I will explain in the next section, with the introduction of subjectivation the status of rationality will be internal to power relations. But what does subjectification fabricate?

Most commentators conflate subjectification with identity formation.[118] Judith Butler[119] (1997: 84), for example, acknowledges that subjectification for Foucault "is neither simply the domination of a subject nor its production, but designates a certain kind of restriction in production". What is produced, according to Butler, is "a kind of psychic identity" that Foucault calls a 'soul'. Thus for Butler, subjectification, very similar to Althusser's interpellation, produces social identities. However, while according to this reading

postmodern power of the new Empire exactly because we have entered a control society where, contrary to the disciplinary society, power is not localized in institutions any more.

[118] For a list of such readings see Widder, 2004; McLaren, 2002.

[119] Butler translates *assujettissement* to subjectivation and as a result confuses it with the term *subjectivation* that Foucault will later introduce. For a strong criticism of Butler's misunderstanding see Kelly, 2009, pp. 78-104.

Foucault's endeavour is to demonstrate that identities are both necessary and problematic, Widder (2004) suggest that his oeuvre does something more radical: it tries to dispense with this necessity altogether. Widder (2004: 414), following a Deleuzian reading of Foucault, argues that "identity – both as a norm and as a multiplicity of deviations from a norm – does play a major role in Foucault's thought, but it operates as a simulacrum that arises from power relations rather than as a substantiality that relations of power and resistance constitute and demolish". Thus what power relations produce are "manageable differences" against which individuals are normalized, and to be subjected to the normal identity is not to be interpellated into that identity. Accordingly, identities are merely produced as "an optical 'effect'" (Deleuze, 1999: xix). While this reading is more compatible with Foucault's own claim that individuals are the "effects" of a subjectification, it still considers subjectification as the mechanism for the production of identities and ignores its connection with objectification. Beatrice Han (2002: 119-120) acknowledges "the circular dynamic" of subjectification-objectification, and argues that "conceptual objects are … the discursive correlates of the material points of application of disciplinary power" (Han, 2002: 119-120). She also acknowledges that what Foucault calls the production of the subject is very different from the traditional, and mainly legal, sense of the term. Foucault himself argues that this theoretical shift is necessary because the nature of power relations has changed from sovereignty to discipline.

The theory of sovereignty, according to Foucault, with its corresponding legal grid of intelligibility, was based on a cyclical notion of subject (SMD: 43). The subject, in the sense of the bearer of rights and capacities, will turn into the subject, this time in the sense of a "subjected element" in power relations. Thus, power in this system started with a given individual and proceeded by turning it into a subject vis-à-vis the sovereign. This power relation was not favourable to the bourgeoisie for two reasons. 1) It was discontinuous and lacunary, meaning that it was not possible for this power to control all individuals on the corporal level, something which was essential for the economic processes of the bourgeoisie. "The mesh of the net [of this power] was too large" and needed to be replaced by an atomizing and continuous power. 2) Subjection was mainly "predator" and "onerous", pivoting on taking and deducing (e.g. taxation), and thus was blocking the economic flow, but capitalism needed a power that could be exercised "in the very sense of the economic process" (MP: 158-159; HS1: 136). This shift in the form of power from sovereig to disciplinary led to the substitution of the circular subjectification with an anatomizing one:

"rather than worry about the problem of the central spirit [i.e. Leviathan's spirit], I believe that we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power" (TL: 98). Disciplinary power is the technology that is compatible with the spirit of capitalism because its aim is to produce docile and productive individuals. Foucault defines those technologies that "made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body" as discipline, which ensures the constant subjectification of bodies in order to impose on them the relation of "docility-utility" (DP: 137). As it was discussed in the previous section, body here should not be considered as the established notion of body in, for example, biology or philosophy. For him the disciplinary, as the dominant "technology of subjectification" of modernity, is the condition of possibility for the objectification of the man, as the subject of science or philosophy. It is true that knowledge is at work here at the level of bodies, which is linked to power, but it is neither about the function of body nor aimed at conquering it (DP: 26). Body itself is not an exception, and Foucault attentively demonstrates how the mechanical body has been replaced by a "natural body" through the disciplinary techniques of subjectification (DP: 155). Accordingly, when he says that discipline is a technique to control "operations of the body", one should understand it as an emphasis on the fact that power is corporal or, to put it differently, relations of force are material. This power which is exercised over bodies is the strategy that has individualization as its effect, an individualization at the level of the materiality of the body (STP: 12). Subjectification, as an anatomizing power, does not take individuals as its raw material, but rather produces individuality.

Han (2002: 119-121) emphasises this 'deep' and dialectical connection between objectification and subjectification by arguing that subjectification is "the empirical condition of possibility of the processes of objectification" and objectification in turn increases the rationality and profitability of the techniques of subjectification. However, this relation in the final analysis is a correlational one: subjectification produces 'malleable' bodies that can be observed and rendered into cases through the procedures of objectification. As I argued before, my contention is that objectification-subjectification are internally linked, which means that subjectification should not be reduced to subjection. Power relations do not merely control and rearrange bodies but also subjectify them, that is to say, attach a "subject-function" to "somatic singularities" in order to produce individuals (PP: 56). In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault calls this subject-function, a term whose implications we have already studied, 'soul' that duplicates the somatic existence of

the body.[120] Soul, far from being an ideological entity, is a reality upon which power and knowledge are hinged: subjectification, as an anatomizing power that targets bodies, gives rise to a soul that becomes the "reference of a certain type of knowledge" and it is upon this soul that concepts like subjectivity, psyche or consciousness have been constructed (DP: 29-30; PP:55-57). Thus, the circularity of objectification-subjectification is mediated by the soul. Moreover, while it is true that Foucault here does not talk about subjectivity, he is referring to something more profound than that, something that makes its emergence possible and thus contrary to what Kelly (2009: 89) suggests subjectification is not "simple investment by power". Subjectification is a productive mechanism that through a fictitious relation makes visible a real subject that is both the effect of power and the reference of knowledge. Now, I will explore the relation between subjectification and the way in which Foucault conceptualizes power as relations of force by using war/strategy as his "grid of intelligibility". This will shed light on the shift from subjectification to subjectivity as well.

In his 1975-76 series of lectures, *Society Must be Defended*,[121] Foucault asks a methodological question about the possible ways that one can analyse power, about tools that are at our disposal and the possibility of informing alternative tools. For Foucault, Marxism and liberal-juridical approaches both analyse political power on the ground of economics and in terms of repression. Power, in a juridical sense, is like a commodity that one possesses and can be surrendered or transferred, partly or wholly, to constitute a sovereignty. The Marxist conception of power is economist in the sense that power merely

[120] Accoring to Dreyfus and Rabinow's analysis (1982:111-112), Foucault has borrowed a phenomenological understanding of the body from Merleau-Ponty but has tried to situate the idea of the lived body and its 'nascent logic' in a historical context. They have concluded that this lived body, which "is more than the result of the disciplinary technologies that have been brought to bear upon it", can provide "a position from which to criticize these practices" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 133). However, as the notion of the 'soul' demonstrates, Foucault is not interested in the corporality of the body per se (the somatic singularity, as he puts it) but the effect of the relation between power and body (Levin, 1991). Oksala (2005: 13-134) argues for a 'non-foundational' reading of Merleau-Ponty's lived body that is compatible with Foucault's historically constructed body. However, her argument is based on making a distinction between body as presented in *Discipline and Punish* and the way that it depicted in *The History of Sexuality I*. According to her, while body in the former is passive, the latter presents the idea of an active and "experiential body". However, my contention is that in both occasions what is important for Foucault is not body in itself but either 'soul' (the counterpart to Kantorowitz's sovereign body) or sexuality that are effects of power. The aim of his study on sexuality, Foucault asserts, is to show "how deployments [dispositifs] of power are directly connected to the body- to bodies, functions, physiological processes, sensations and pleasures" (HS1: 150).

[121] These series of lectures occupy a unique place in Foucault's oeuvre (Neal, 2004: 373). As Paul Patton (2012: 174) suggests, these lectures mark "a turning point, a culmination and questioning of his [theoretical] approach" to that point. Here Foucault critically and genealogically contemplates on his own conception of power and while he will later repeat some of his ideas in *History of Sexuality I*, he will eventually dismiss this conception. For a deeper analysis of the shift in the nature of Foucault's lectures see Senellart, 2011.

functions to keep the relations of production alive and to reproduce the current class domination, which is itself established through the development of productive forces. Power is always secondary and derivative in relation to the profound and primary relations of production. Foucault rejects both "functional subordination and … formal isomorphism" and claims that power belongs to another order with its own specificity (SMD: 14). Anyone who wants to attempt a non-economic analysis of power, Foucault argues, is left with a conception of power which considers it primarily as the relationships of force (AMD: 15). What has been the origin of this conception of power and what does it entail?

The prominent consequence of this approach is that contrary to the theories of power that needed a *genesis*, the only task that one can assume now is to provide a "grid of analysis" which can make the analytic of these relations possible (CF: 199). Thus, power now should be analysed in terms of "conflict, confrontation and war", and one can say that Clausewitz's proposition needed to be inverted (Reid, 2003). He calls this conception, Nietzsche's schema[122] where, although repression exists, it is not a kind of abuse or transgression, as it was the case with the economic-juridical scheme, but rather the positive effect of a relationship of force (SMD: 17). This confirms the reading presented above that subjectification is not merely subjection but through producing the "soul" makes subjection possible. The relationship of force takes the form of domination, not in the sense of a global domination of one or some over others, but the multiplicity of relations at the level of their positive effects, i.e. the multiple subjectification that turns somatic singularities into individuals (IDS: 22). Foucault situates all his previous works within this Nietzschean scheme which here is considered only as a *hypothesis*.[123] The most important aspect of this hypothesis is that the relationship should not be analysed in terms of its relata but the other way around. The relationship is the primary element of analysis and determines the relata which can only be considered as its effect (SMD: 259). In relation to subjectification, Foucault asserts, one should not start the analysis by asking "ideal subjects what part of themselves … they have surrendered, allowing themselves to be subjectified [assujettir]", instead we should investigate the ways that these relations of subjectification (*relations d'assujettissement*) can manufacture subjects (SMD: 265; translation is modified).

[122] He calls the other scheme "Reich's hypothesis" (SMD: 16).

[123] Oksala (2012: 21) argues that Foucault explicitly turned towards this Nietzschean schema in his lectures delivered in Brazil in 1973, as a result of which he ceased to study the "condition of acceptability" of true interpretations at the level of discursive formation. Foucault found Nietzsche's idea that the meaningfulness is the result of domination, the best philosophical model to link knowledge to the political.

Foucault argues that the relationships of force, the plurality of domination, should be studied in the form of what he calls operators (*opérateur*). In one of its first usages in Foucault's oeuvre, operator implies something like a switch (*commutateur*) that allows the relationships of force to function (VFJ: 577). In *Discipline and Punish*, the operator was the disciplinary institutions that made it possible for power relations to arrange somatic singularities and fabricate novel relations. In *Society Must be Defended*, his aim is to do an archaeology of *discursive* operators whose primary function was to superimpose a grid of strategy on our understanding of society. From this perspective, the political analysis of discourse cannot be undertaken in terms of repression, an opposition between the dominant discourse and the dominated discourse (DND: 123). Discourse as an operator is a strategic field which far from being "a surface of inscription" for relations of force, actually makes those relations possible (DND: 124; Davidson, 2004: xx). If we accept Senellart's (2011) argument that Foucault's lectures before 1977 were a kind of political activism, one can conclude that this shift of attention from disciplinary institutions to discursive operators to some extent can be seen as an attempt on Foucault's part to demonstrate the link between discourse and the political systematically and historically. Thus he links his discourse on the prison, madness and psychology to the emerging modality of the critique that is practiced by the "specific intellectual" (T: 126-132). His attempt to redefine archaeology and genealogy in relation to critique is revealing in this regard.

At the beginning of these series of lectures Foucault gives a definition of archaeology and genealogy in relation to critique. Critique, Foucault observes, in the last "ten or fifteen years" has become discontinuous and local. The discontinuity of critique reveals itself in dispersed attacks against the established institutions and systems of knowledge. Foucault gives some examples of what he understands to be local critique: antipsychiatry discourses and Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*. Of course one can add *Discipline and Punish*, as a criticism of both disciplinary institutions and human science, to this list. The common feature of these instances is that they insert themselves at the level of everyday practices which are considered to be taken-for-granted and robust. The other aspect of these dispersed critiques is that they reveal the inhibiting effects of global theories, in place of which they attempt to put into practice local and non-centralized discourses. What has made this local critique possible, according to Foucault, is the return of the subjected knowledge (*savoir assujettir*). This subjected knowledge refers, on the one hand, to the "historical contents" that an expertise can unmask, and on the contrary, we have disqualified knowledge of the

combatants on the battleground (SMD: 4-6). What is common in these two apparently heterogeneous realms of knowledge is that they bear the memory of a real struggle. The erudite knowledge of expertise, which discloses the real dividing lines in struggles, and that of the people in their everyday practices of struggle come together and establish the "historical knowledge of struggles" (SMD:7- 8). When Foucault claims that he has "never written anything but fictions", he actually refers to this type of historical knowledge. This history is neither true nor false because it does not develop within the established regime of truth, i.e. a political reality that determines the boundary of truth. However, it does not mean that this history has nothing to do with reality, it is actually a radical attempt to make reality intelligible, the reality of a historical founding struggle, and develops a "political outlook" that, while it has not yet been realized, can induce effects of truth (PAB: 213; RM: 35-36).

Archaeology is the method to analyse local discursivities and shed light on the type of operators that are dominant at a particular time, and genealogy for its part brings into play these operators so that they can be used as contemporary tactics: genealogy re-introduces forgotten local memories into the present battlefield (SMD: 8-11). Thus, Foucault presents his genealogical studies not as critique per se but as the condition of possibility of the newly emerged form of specific critique. However, as we have already mentioned, what has dominated his archaeological and genealogical endeavours is a "grid of intelligibility" [124] that makes operators understandable and deployable in terms of strategy/war. This grid of intelligibility far from being Foucault's invention has its own roots in a historical discourse that emerged in the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. While historical discourse, up until the end of the Middle Ages, was "a ritual that reinforced

[124] In *The History of Sexuality I*, Foucault states that to conceptualize the social order one should be nominalist, and the term "grid of intelligibility" refers to such an approach: "[o]ne needs to be nominalistic no doubt: power is not an institution and not a structure . . . it is the name one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (HS1: 92-93). While Foucault introduced the term "grid of intelligibility" in reference to his own Nietzschean scheme and used it interchangeably with the "regime of truth" (SMD: 164-165), it later took on a different meaning in relation to subjectivation, a shift which I will discuss shortly. However, I would like to note in passing that Foucault's oeuvre can be studies as a shift from conceptualization in terms of 'possibility' to 'acceptability' to 'intelligibility'. Moreover, building upon this notion, Christopher Falzon responds to a critique raised by Habermas regarding Foucault's historical analysis. Habermas (1978: 249-251) argues that while Foucault rejects the presentism of traditional history by his genealogy that reveals the contingency of any regime of truth, he actually instrumentalizes the past in accordance with the needs of the present and thus he falls into the very presentism he wanted to reject . As Flazon (2013: 292-294) argues, Foucault does not instrumentalize the past but resists the present grid of intelligibility that instrumentalizes the past by introducing a different grid of intelligibility that has critical effect on the present.

sovereignty", it then became a discourse about the confrontation between races (SMD: 68-69). Foucault makes a distinction between racist discourse and a discourse of race struggle, the former being only "a localized episode" of the latter (SMD: 65). This discourse of race struggle was used to develop a discursive operator or a "coding" that was not a philosophical-juridical instrument but a political discourse whose aim was to impose a new grid of intelligibility, i.e. war, on the social order (SMD: 101-110). How has this grid been developed? Foucault analyses works of Henri de Boulainvilliers, a French historian of the early eighteenth century, who, contrary to Hobbes, was a political historicist. He developed war as the grid of intelligibility through three generalizations: 1) history always defeats nature, and thus it is history that establishes natural rights through war and as a result of struggle amongst races 2) war is not limited to the event of a battle but a general economy of domination within a state which encompasses a multiplicity of races 3) a relation of domination among races, established by a battle or invasion, can be inverted (SMD: 155-161). War, according to this discourse, is not an external element to history and state, but it is the element through which history reveals itself and state is constituted. This grid of intelligibility, with war being its primal element, become restricted and *colonized* by a new form of historical discourse which had started to emerge after the Revolution. This means that political historicism is one of those subjected knowledge, a discourse for real struggles, which not only has been unmasked by Foucault but he has also made some attempts to put it into practice against the historical discourse of modernity. This new grid of intelligibility of history inverts the former on its temporal axis. While political historicism always starts with an "initial rift", this new discourse starts from the established generalities of the present (SMD: 227). What is important at present is the State and the nation/race which is capable to "guarantee a totalizing function of the State", other nations/races within the same society are neither at the same level with this universal nation nor dominated by it but they are under State control (SMD: 222-223).[125] This grid of intelligibility discards the function of war as the analyser of social reality, and instead introduces a dialectical discourse into history: a universal State/Nation which enters the reality in the present (SMD: 236-237). To resist this juridical-historical discourse, with its dialectical nature, Foucault attempts to evoke the subjected political-historical discourse and put strategy-war, as the analyser of social

[125] For a detailed analysis of race/nation in Foucault's lectures see Taylor, 2011; Stone, 2013. Rasmussen (2011) deals with a very common critique of Foucault's engagement with racism that argues his "genealogy of racism" is an incomplete project since it is silent about European colonialism.

relations, into practice. Nevertheless, Foucault, starting from these lectures, shows some signs of dissatisfaction with this strategic model of analysis.

When, in an interview conducted at the beginning of 1977, he was asked why the "military metaphor" has dominated his analysis of power, he repeats his claim that we are left with only two options, either the juridical one or a strategic scheme. He seems to be more sympathetic with the latter provided that this analysis can be "tightened up" (EMS: 224). Although, he argues, the "vocabulary of the relations of forces" has become very popular, the consequence of this conception has been neglected: that power relations will be analysed in terms of the "vicissitude of a war" (EP: 239-240). Foucault admits that he is not ready to affirm or reject this grid categorically but emphasizes the fact that struggle is not a final analysis and one should avoid the logic of contradiction. What is at stake in this schema is that there is a danger of confusing two different, though related, notions of war and politics. In *History of Sexuality I*, he suggests that the tense and unbalanced relations of force can be coded either as politics or war, so one should not attempt to turn around the Clausewitzian formula (HS1: 93). Foucault's discontent with the war/strategy as the grid of intelligibility coincides with the introduction of a new technology of power.

In an interview, conducted just after the publication of *Discipline and Punish* in 1975, Foucault declares that from 1960s it was realized that in industrial societies the meticulous and continuous investment of the body by disciplinary regimes is not indispensable any longer, and thus a new form of power and a new body, i.e. *bios*, became necessary (BP: 57). Foucault will later change his mind about the date when this new technology of power emerged, but this interview can confirm Daniel Defert's claim that Foucault started the last chapter of *History of Sexuality* when he had just finished *Discipline and Punish* (Miller, 1994: 126). Actually Foucault, by claiming that life (*bios*) is the new strategic object of the state, not only introduces a new form of power, i.e. biopolitics,[126] but links it to disciplinary power (HS1: 139; STP: 16). In the family of technologies of power, on the one hand, there is the

[126] Foucault's biopolitics and biopower have become very important theoretical tools in political theory (Oksala, 2013; Lemke et al., 2011). Foucault himself distinguishes these concepts from other technologies of power on the basis of its object: "something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but what I would call a 'biopolitics' of the human race" (SMD: 243). And thus later when he moves beyond the analysis of population, he ceases to use the term. Interestingly enough, in his series of lectures whose title bears the terms biopolitics (i.e. *The Birth of Biopolitics*), he almost does not mention the concept (Patton, 178). The concept has become central to thinkers like Agamben and Roberto Esposito (Campbell, 2008), and we witness a growing number of literatures on biopolitical studies. Any analysis of these literature is beyond the scope of this thesis, I will focus here merely on relation between Biopower and subjectivity.

disciplinary power which is concerned with bodies in order to control them through individualization, on the other, we have biopolitics which targets population and species body (MP: 158-162; HS1: 139). What is interesting here is that Foucault, for the first time in his oeuvre, attempts to analyse the State through the *regulatory* mechanisms of biopolitics. His initial idea is that disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms are working at two different, but not mutually exclusive, levels of institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals and army) and the State (SMD: 250-251). While one disciplines bodies and manufacturers individuals, the other's aim is to control a multiplicity through 'massifying' the population according to phenomena like natality, longevity and public health (SMD: 240-245; HS1: 139). What differentiates these two mechanisms of power are their strategic object, that is to say, it is a matter of difference between individual and population. Foucault later will reformulate this relationship through the notion of government which targets *Omnes et Singulatim* at the same time.

But how is it possible for biopolitics to regulate this specific body, the population? What type of subjectification/subjectivity, if any, is involved in massifying this multiplicity? It should be noted here that while population remains the core of all the problems that he addresses, Foucault attempts to analyse biopolitics in two different ways, either through "the dispositif of security" or through *governmentality*. This shift in his thought from security to governmentality has a textual counterpart. In his lectures in 1978, *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault deals with the dispositif of security until the end of lecture three and in the fourth lecture introduces a new term, governmentality, which will bring with itself novel conceptual tools. I will discuss each of these approaches in relation to subjectivity.

While the notion of security was mentioned very briefly in *Society Must Be Defended*, it was during the Klaus Croissant affair that he declared "from now on security is above the laws" (SMD: 249; DSL: 366-8).[127] It worth to have a look at this affair -which was a major reason that brought the friendship between Foucault and Deleuze to an end- since it elucidates the importance of security for Foucault's analysis of power. Klaus Croissant, a West German lawyer for RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion), after being released from prison on bail, applied for political asylum in France. His application declined, and he was extradited. In campaigns against his imprisonment and extradition which were organized in his favour, French

[127] For an analysis of the law as the "catalyst of dissimulation" that occults the normalizing function of the biopower see Lincoln, 2012. Ojakangas (2005) builds upon this idea to criticize Agamben's reading of Foucault's biopolitics.

intellectuals, including Foucault, Sartre and Deleuze, played an active role. However, Foucault didn't sign the petition, which had been signed by Deleuze, where West Germany is referred to as a fascist state against which terrorism is a legitimate means (Marks, 1998: 109-110). He argues that any analysis that attempts to revive the old spectres of fascism or Stalinism in order to prove the totalitarian nature of states on the one hand, and to legitimize terrorism, on the other, is doomed to fail (SE: 385). The relation between state and population is now organized around the "pact of security", which indicates the emergence of a new modality of power that cannot be reduced to totalitarianism, in the form of fascism or Stalinism. The State always wants to be totalitarian, Foucault argues, but to analyze this new form of power in terms of old historical concepts ignores the specificity of the actual and its singularity (SE: 385-387). A "sacred effort" is needed to rework the tools we have at our disposal to be able to find words and descriptions that suit the singularity of this power. What makes security so different from other forms of power?

The title of his lectures is self-explanatory, while the state once was organized around the figure of the sovereign, whose relation with the multiplicity of subjects was based on territory, now the state guarantees the population against accidents, risks and any uncertainty: from the guarantor of intraterritorial peace to the guarantor of security (ES: 385; STP: 11-12).[128] The sovereign managed the territory by turning the multiplicity into subjects, disciplinary power, in turn, could be exercised on the multiplicity insofar as it could fabricate individuals according to its own ends and objectives. It should be noted that Foucault does not claim that these modalities of power substituted each other, so that we had first the juridical power of sovereign that was replaced by the disciplinary power, which in turn gave way to security. Although at each stage only one of them is the predominant organizer of the relations, the other two, far from being absent, play an active role (STP: 6-7). So, as I explained earlier, we have subjection (*sujétion*) and subjectification (*assujettissement*) in relation to two dominant forms of power. The notion of dispositif provided Foucault with a schema which made the development of a notion of strategy without a universal subject possible. It is possible, Foucault maintains, to have a fairly coherent and rational strategy without being possible to identify a subject, either in the form of an institution or a class, who can conceive it or proclaim it in a juridical form (CF: 204).

[128] There is a tendency, introduced and promoted mainly by Foucault's student Francois Ewald, to draw on the notions of risk and accident in relation to modern governmentality and claim that the welfare-state is nothing but an "insurance society" (Ewald, 1991). For an analysis of this approach and its critics, to which Negri gives the name "right Foucauldian", see Behrent, 2012.

Now, one could ask what type of subject does correspond to security. The short answer is that dispositif of security has no subjectivity. True, Foucault relates this modality of power to life, but if it does not target bodies, as disciplinary power does, what aspect of life it can be exercised upon? Foucault answers this question by using the two interconnected notions of the quotidian[129] and the given. In his introduction to an anthology of the prison archives, Foucault alludes to the term quotidian as the target of the sovereign power and the administrative state. While in confession, a practice dominant until the end of the sixteenth century, the one who speaks is the same as the one about whom they speak, the utterances should not outlive the act of utterance; from the seventeenth century, however, everything became recordable (LIM: 166-167). The transcribability of the quotidian was made possible through the figure of the sovereign, and thus whatever has been archived bears the sign of power which can be observed in the sumptuous language with which the banalities of the subject's lives have been narrated (LIM: 169-170). The administrative state can only integrate the quotidian, and thus penetrate the lives of its subjects when it has turned into a solemn discourse: the sovereign turns life into discourse. Dispositif of security deals with the quotidian as well, but its aim is, instead of transforming it into discourse, to manage (*gestion*) it (VK: 362). The starting point for the management of the quotidian is the reality of everyday life: security aims at managing the given.

Three modalities of power engage with reality in different ways. The legal dispositif of power has a non-relation with reality since its prohibition is based on the fact that it "imagines the negative" and thus there are certain things that must not be done (STP: 47). The legal code starts by imagining a disorderly situation in which desirable and unwanted elements coalesce, and then by expunging the unwanted elements, the order can be restored. The disciplinary power, on the contrary, is not so much about the things that must not be done as what must be done at every moment. Here, the system of prohibitions is informed positively: one should avoid doing things that are not on their must-to-do list. Disciplinary power, thus, does not imagine but since the defects of reality cannot be nullified, it tries to compensate for that by introducing an artificial space of prescriptions and prohibitions: it is a "complementary to reality" (Crampton, 2013). Security starts from reality and works within it in order to make the components of reality function in relation to each other. In dealing

[129] The criticism (Valdes, 1999: 103) levelled at Foucault on the basis that in his conception of power he has ignored the quotidian ignores the fact that it plays an important role in his analysis of the biopolitics (Taylor, 2013: 412). To argue that the temporal scale of the quotidian is different from that of the political misses the nature of the political power that has quotidian as its managerial target.

with the given, security attempts in "finding support in the reality of the phenomenon, and instead of trying to prevent it, making other elements of reality function in relation to it, in such a way that the phenomenon is cancelled out" (STP: 59). Instead of prohibiting some phenomena or compensating for them in an artificial space, it is now necessary to manage relations among the elements of reality to reach much more desirable, but far from ideal, arrangements. On the basis of this diverse relation to reality, while he recognizes the importance of norm for security and disciplinary power, Foucault makes a distinction between *normation* and *normalization* (Taylor, 2005). Disciplinary techniques start with an "optimal model" according to which it is possible to construct the normal/abnormal dichotomy, thus it is norm that is fundamental and primary for these techniques: this is called normation (STP: 57). Normalization, on the contrary, starts with "a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality" and then proceeds to find those distributions that are considered to be more favourable or normal, and then they can function as the norm. In normalization, thus, the norm is deduced from the normal (STP: 61). Now we should see how it is possible to normalize the quotidian without any recourse to subjectivity.

The particular characteristic of the quotidian is that it is marked by uncertainty, probability, risk and accident, and the reason is that it happens in the element of a juncture where two series of events come together, i.e. the events of population and a series of (quasi-)natural events (STP: 20-23). The events of population refer to those phenomena that belong to population which functions as a species (e.g. natality) and (quasi-)natural events refer to natural or artificial givens of reality (e.g. rivers or streets). Techniques of security manage the quotidian through the fabricated space of *milieu*, a space where "a multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live" (STP: 21; Crampton, 2013: 390). With the notion of milieu Foucault is able to analyse power relations that are linked to bios, to the lives of individuals, without any form of subjectivity being involved.

After having studied the dispositif of security and Foucault's analytical tool of strategy, it is possible to account for the break in his lectures. This shift is marked by the introduction of the notion of governmentality which made him to express the wish to give a new title to his lectures (i.e. "history of 'governmentality'") (STP: 108). There are some theoretical problems that Foucault could deal with by this new term. To start with, by replacing the juridico-

political grid of analysis with one based on strategy Foucault was left with a negative relation between acceptability and intelligibility, which implies that he has not been able to successfully get rid of the juridical grid. Secondly, there is a tension and overlap between genealogy and strategy. Thirdly, his attempt to extend the analytics of power to the state, when he has already cut off the king's head, could not answer this vital question: "how is it possible that his headless body often behaves as if it indeed had a head?" (Dean, 1994:156). Finally, the lack of subjectivity in the idea of milieu introduces a discrepancy between power relations and practices of resistance. We will study these problems in some details.

Let's have a look at the relation between acceptability and intelligibility. As we have already seen, for Foucault there is an essential link between acceptability and intelligibility. The strategic intelligibility gives rise to a system of acceptability by establishing a division between truth and error. Truth in the historical-political discourse is always perspectival and strategic, the aim of which is to lead to victory. The subject of this discourse, who cannot be a universal subject because they are in a battle, uses truth as a weapon against any universal truth (SMD: 52-53; 268-269). Here it is clear that although he has tried to move away from the notion of truth as it was formulated in *The Order of Discourse*, in the strategic grid of intelligibility it reappears, indicating that Foucault has not been successful in his attempt. Accordingly, he is not able to account for acceptability in a positive way (Lemke, 2011: 31). To overcome this problem, Foucault makes a double move, first he strips acceptability from its analytical values because it could be confused with mentality and ideology and, secondly, he relegates intelligibility to the level of practices. This shift is one of the aspects of a more general shift where Foucault moves from strategy and relations of force to government and governmentality. Here acceptability still refers to a division (e.g. state/society), but it should not be analysed any more in terms of the grid of intelligibility that has been superimposed on reality; actually this grid itself needs to be accounted for (IP: 276). American neoliberalism, for example, applies an economic grid on areas and objects previously considered to be non-economic, and Foucault instead of taking this as a given tries to explain its condition of emergence and development (BB: 240-247). Grid of intelligibility is also substituted by the "grid of the concrete practices", because according to the notion of government, power relations can be characterized as "conduct of conducts" (BB: 186). Foucault has already used the term practice, as an analytical tool in *Discipline and Punish,* but then it was in relation either to institutions (e.g. penal practices) or to microphysics of disciplinary power. In relation to government, however, practices "being understood … as

places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect" (IP: 276).[130] The grid of practices, as a methodological tool that makes historical mechanisms intelligible, will enable Foucault to reveal the *hinge* upon which a group of heterogeneous elements are *grafted* upon each other.

The grid of practice, this "conduct of conduct", should not be perceived in terms of strategy, because it can easily be misunderstood with the logic of contradiction (PS: 141-142). However, it does not mean that he rejects the idea of dialectic or cause totally, instead his aim is to reformulate them in a way that can serve the idea of government. What is he rejecting is not the causal analysis per se but rather the idea of the possibility of finding *the cause*[131], in the form of either a final cause (e.g. economic) or an originary cause ("a pyramid formation") (WC: 59-60). Instead of looking for the cause, one needs to establish a "field of intelligibility" by "showing the bundle of processes and the network of relations that ultimately induced … a cumulative, overall effect" (STP: 239). Of course Foucault is not denying the fact that there are causes at work, but since his claim is that the causal relation is not graspable if one starts from the cause, he changes the point of view and starts with a global effect that consists of *heterogeneous* elements. Heterogeneous elements do not exclude each other, but coexist, and thus any analysis that, through a dialectical logic, perceives them in terms of contradiction that can be resolved in a unity, is reductionist (BB: 20-22). Foucault suggests that the contradictory logic should be replaced by a "strategic logic" according to which while heterogeneous elements are connected, they remain *disparate*. The strategic dialectic, which should be distinguished from the strategic grid of intelligibility, helps Foucault to respond to a (auto-)criticism that levelled at him: although he has tried to step outside the local and regional institutions (e.g. hospitals and prisons), isn't it the case that he has trapped in a more universal institution called state? Even if he has been successful to single out the sites where the mechanisms of power are put into

[130] As Paul Veyne(2010:10) argues, Foucault's nominalism consist not in rejecting the present categories and frameworks, but to show how they have arisen from specific and concert practices and thus to that extent themselves are contingent. Flynn (2005: 32) argues in the same line when claims that Foucault is not merely interested in the past as a dispersed field of events but with the contingency of the present. However, it should be noted that while Foucault at first accepted Veyn's suggestion that he is a nominalist (BB: 318), he later expressed his dissatisfaction with this identification. He argues that he is not willing to call the rejection of the universal 'nominalism' "for a host of reasons, the main one being that nominalism is a very specific and technical conception, practice, and philosophical method" (OGL: 80).

[131] In his lecture on 17 January, 1979, when he is saying that it is not possible to pinpoint the cause, he repeats the words "the cause" (*la cause*), putting an emphasis on the definitive article "*la*" (BB: 33).

practice, is this not ignoring the fact that one who is responsible for their application is the state[132]?

Accordingly, it seems that this localized analysis of power finally and inevitability is only a matter of passing from the micro to the macro (STP: 117-119). This is a legitimate critique because when state is analysed according to the mechanisms of security, one remains within the most universal institution of the state and its function, while Foucault's aim is to go beyond that. It was at the same time a problem for genealogy, which attempts to analyse mechanism and dynamism of power relations "on the basis of processes that are something other than relations of power" (STP: 119n). Strategy, as a grid of intelligibility, is trapped in a sort of circular analysis that relates one relation of power (like that of prison) to another (that of state). The only way out is to adopt a strategic dialectic that makes it possible to "arrive at overall effects" by bringing to the fore the "general economy of the whole" (STP: 120n). It is this general economy that enables the headless sovereign to act as if it had a head, and Foucault instead of attacking this fictitious monster, brings into play a grid of analysis that rests on the procedures of governmentality. This means that Foucault has shifted from a microscopic analysis of power to a micro-power perspective, because it is not any more a matter of scale or sector, but a "method of decipherment" that is valid for the whole (Kelly, 2014: 70). Now with the example of Foucault's analysis of the modern state we will try to see how this methodological shift has been exercised in relation to the concrete historical procedures.

As Foucault emphasises in different occasions, although he undertakes the study of the state, he will not do a genealogy of the state as such but a genealogy of the state as a practice, as a "reflexive prism" through which the problem of the state was understood and discussed (STP: 276). This historical analysis differs from that of science because in the latter knowledge (intelligibility) vis-à-vis reality (the given) has autonomy; whatever we think about the earth-sun relation, for example, the cosmos will remain unaffected by it. State, as "an active concerted, and reflected practice" – differentiated from the state as an institution that has been functioned for more than a millennia- is an event which appeared at the end

[132] Before Foucault's lectures on governmentality becoming widely available, he was criticized for not being engaged with the concept of the state (Routledge, 2014:21; Jessop: 2006). Now that his notion of governmentality has widely discussed, scholars do not agree upon the ways that this notion is related to that of the state. While some commentators like Lemke (2007) argue for the new avenues that Foucault's governmentality has opened up for the state theory, Paul Patton (2010: 209) states that his aim is to do away with any analysis that takes state as its point of departure, either in the form of essentialism or "state phobia".

of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Foucault calls it the "reflexive event", i.e. "the set of processes by which the state [as an institution] effectively entered into the reflected practice of people at a given moment" (STP: 276; my additions). State, as a reflexive event, is where the reality of state (army, taxation, justice) makes entry into the reflected practices, and thus here knowledge and reality are not autonomous. But how is it possible to do a genealogy of this reflexive event?

We know Foucault's answer, by studying something altogether different, but not irrelevant. Genealogy (which differs from genesis) is the study of the "way that [relations of power] are formed, connect up with each other, develop, multiply and transformed on the basis of something other than themselves" (STO: 199). Disciplinarization of the military, for example, might be the result of the *étatisation* of the army, but when it is connected with population, then we have a genealogy of military discipline. In this way we can avoid the circularity of those analysis of relations of power that refer it from one institution to the other. Here we have moved to a specific point of *origin*, where the multiplicity is constituted. What is at stake here is the entrance of religious elements into the art of government at the beginning of the seventeenth century, through which it was possible at that time to reflect upon the state. The question is how three fundamental elements of pastoral power, i.e. salvation, obedience and truth, are colonized and transformed by political power in a way that finally constituted three elements of the raison d'état (STP: 261-275).[133] The Marxist tradition will use ideology to say that it is the political and economic aspirations of each class that actually has been translated into religious ideas and beliefs (Jessop, 2007). Foucault declines this analysis because for him this phenomenon cannot be reduced to ideology and its representational function (STP: 215). Instead, Foucault tries to constitute a "field of intelligibility" which can account for the points of entry (*les entrées*) that made it possible for the political and economic struggles and concerns to penetrate the pastoral power (STP: 216). The point of entry was actually a crisis of conduct (*conduit*). The Christian pastorate gave rise to an art of conduct, a term which can mean the activity through which one directs the other, or the way in which one is conducted by others or even the processes through which an individual conducts themselves (STP: 192-193). The whole economy of the pastorate was pivoting around the art of conduct. Now the resistance to the pastorate was not external to it, but in fact it was coming from the will "to be conducted differently", and

[133] The transformation is as follow: salvation → coup d'état, obedience → constant danger of sedition of people, truth → knowledge of things rather than knowledge of law.

thus there is an "immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct" (STP: 194-196; Carrette, 2013: 377-378). These counter-conducts were distinct from political and economic revolts and struggles, at least until the beginning of the seventeenth century. Over an extended period of time, the development of the counter-conduct led to an internal crisis of the pastorate, which then functioned as a point of entry for political struggles that penetrated the pastorate and developed their own tactics, while the justification and rational basis of these actions is rooted in religious beliefs (STP: 216-222). Faced with the question of the religion-politics relation, instead of trying to resolve it to a unity or recurse to ideology, Foucault uses a strategic dialectic to explain the relation between these heterogeneous elements and the way that a global effect was developed.

This type of analysis had the far-reaching consequences for Foucault's studies. One of the most fundamental ones was the introduction of governmentality and government that provided for the analysis of power a more general perspective which at the same time does not cease to remain at the level of micro-power. However, in the beginning Foucault introduced the notion of governmentality as something specific to the state: "can we talk of something like a 'governmentality' that would be to the state what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the penal system, and what biopolitics was to medical institutions?" (STP: 120). In this first phase, governmentality is used to designate three different, although related and interconnected, phenomena: 1) the ensemble of heterogeneous elements (institutions, calculations, procedures, …) that allow for the exercise of a specific type of power which has political economy as its *savoir*, population as its target and dispositifs of security as its technical instrument. 2) governmentality also refers to the tendency, "the line of force", or a long historical dynamism in the west that has led to the pre-eminence of the government, as a modality of power, over other types of power (sovereignty and discipline) and the development of apparatuses (*appareils*) and knowledges (savoirs) specific to the governmental power. 3) "the process, or rather, the result of the process" by which the state of justice gave way to an administrative state in the sixteenth century: the gradual governmentalization of the state (STP: 108-109). The second definition is very vague and mostly has been conflated and confused with the third one (Dean: 30). Although both refer to historical dynamisms, one refers to the more general phenomenon of the government that can be traced back to the beginning of Christianity or even the Greek antiquity, the other refers to a historical event, when government becomes not only the sole "real space of political struggle and

contestation" but also the element which by defining the limits of state makes its survival possible: governmentality is "at the same time both external and internal to the state" (STP: 109). Here Foucault is trying to make a distinction between government and governmentality. This distinction is blurred, and it seems that in *The Birth of Biopolitics*, he uses them interchangeably:

> "this notion of governmentality … is valid for the analysis of ways of conducting the conduct of mad people, patients, delinquents, and children, may equally be valid when we are dealing with phenomena of a completely different scale, such as an economic policy, for example, or the management of a whole social body, and so on" (BB: 186).

The shift consists in the fact that he abandons the first notion of governmentality that might be suggesting a structural grid of intelligibility which constitutes "a relational invariant between … variables" (Foucault, 1979 in Senellart, 2007: 389).

Governmentality is a "singular generality", the reality of which is only that of the event and any attempt at its intelligibility needs to apply "a strategic logic". Senellart suggests that Foucault here has departed from governmentality as a determinate historical arrangement and now, like any power relation, it needs to be subjected to strategic analysis (Senellart, 2007: 389). However, this undermines Foucault's notion of the event and ignores the very specific meaning of "strategic logic". My contention is that what Foucault is trying to do here is to link government and eventalization. If governmental relation can be identified in all forms of "conducting the conduct", what accounts for their difference? Although it is a singular generality (which distinguishes it from discipline or any other modality of power relation (Deleuze, 1992)), its concrete manifestations can only be grasped as an event, that is to say a global effect, where heterogeneous elements enter into a relation guided by a strategic logic. This analysis allows for a singularity to become intelligible precisely in terms of what has made it singular, and thus the event and the historical analysis are superimposed on each other. This singular effect, however, should be counterbalanced with the renunciation of the principle of closure. Any attempt to establish a singular effect needs to affirm that there is not just one unique plane of relationships that can account for that. While it is possible to situate any relationship in a "game that exceeds it", at the same time since no relationship is primary, it is possible to find other games that can affect this localized relationship (WQ: 65). Here we are in a position to understand better Foucault's claim that

he writes historical fiction in order to make a connection between our present reality, as what is informed by the event, and the knowledge of the past; a relation that is emancipatory (TIF: 301). Historical analyses are fictions insofar as different networks of relationships can be established, and it is only after this has been done, and a continuity of knowledge-event constituted, that one can detach oneself from them by imagining a different type of relation (RM: 33-34; WQ: 64-65). I will return to the idea of rationality shortly.

The other consequence is Foucault's conviction that the only possible way to account for the singular effect is to devise a grid of intelligibility which analyses relationships in terms of "interactions between individuals or groups" (WQ: 64). As we have already seen, this is the grid of practice which does not look into the "nature of things" but considers relationships that involve "subjects, types of behaviour, decisions and choices". This shift is evident when Foucault replaces the notion of the plan with that of the programme. He, for a while, was concerned with the relation between a plan, e.g. an architectural plan like that of Bentham's Panopticon, and its actualisations in reality (CF: 198). The notion of dispositif helped Foucault to avoid preferring the discursive (the plan) over the institution or vice versa, but rather remain on the level of this dynamic relation which includes heterogeneous elements and their development. However, there is still a distinction between reality and the theoretical work (plan) that Foucault wants to abolish through the notion of the programme. Programme is not an ideal type, which always start with generalities constructed after the fact and has nothing to do with the rationality involved in practices and behaviours of individuals. True, Max Weber has also developed four types of rationality, but again they are ideal types that help historians to categorize concrete behaviours not at the level of their reality but in relation to general principles (Gordon, 1987). Programme, on the contrary, attempts to grasp the logic of interactions, the rationality inherent to behaviours and institutions (TIF: 299; WQ: 64). Thus, it not only enables the analysis to remain indifferent to the scale but to account for the conditions of acceptability on the level of rationality inherent to 'conducts'. Nevertheless, one should not confuse reality, as the rationality of practices, with "real life" which is, in comparison to programme, a "witches' brew" (IP: 281-282). The programme, for example, to reform the penal mechanisms was, on the one hand, a response to socio-economic and juridical demands, and on the other, gave rise to a series of effects in the real (including prisoners' resistance or the emergence of new forms of criminality). What is important for Foucault is not a matter of identity between programme and

practices, but he is concerned with the effect of the programme in the real, which can only be grasped in terms of its rationality. Programme enables him to go beyond the local rationality and intentionality of individuals/groups involved in the interaction and reveal a much more general rationality: it is the methodological counterpart of the reflexive event. Does this mean, as Thomas Lemke (2012: 18) suggests, that "government only refers to those power relations that rely on calculated and rational … forms of knowledge"? It seems that for Foucault there is no human behaviour that is not "scheduled and programmed through rationality" to the extent that even in the most violent behaviours one can find rationality, they are not incompatible (TIF: 299). What is at stake is to find the specific rationality that corresponds to the dominant government at each historical period, a rationality which is different from that of economic processes, communication techniques or scientific discourse (OS: 324). Any resistance against a form of power needs to ask the question "how are such relations of power rationalized?" Thus, liberation does not come from merely criticizing institutions or reason per se, as the root of all evils, but from attacking the roots of rationality specific to the dominant governmentality. Resistance is not any more a local activity or an attack on the weakest link, but the objective is to cut the thread of the rosary.

The most important consequence, however, is the shift in his thought in relation to the subject. The far-reaching implications of this shift propel Foucault to claim retrospectively that the main theme of his research has always been subject and not power (SP: 326-327). We have already seen that the notion of subjectification (*assujettissement*) provided Foucault with a strategic analysis where the subject did not have a pre-eminent role, but it was fabricated by power relations. What was the consequence of this for the conception of resistance and liberation? In his analysis of power through the notion of dispositif, as the dynamism of diagram-assemblage, to account for its historical movement he needed a surplus that can account for this dynamism. This surplus was "a centrifugal movement" or "an inverse energy" that constituted the limit of power relations and responded to every movement of the network of power (PS: 137). Foucault calls this surplus energy the plebian (*la plebe*) to distinguish it from the sociological notion of the plebes (as the target of subjection and agent of revolt) and to insist on its omnipresence (the plebian exists in different forms of energies and irreducibilities in bodies, souls, individuals, proletariat and even bourgeoisie) (PS: 138). There are, nevertheless, three ways that this energy can be reduced and utilized: 1) to subjugate it effectively as in the case of the total slavery where

the possibility of resistance, according to Foucault, has been obliterated 2) to integrate it into the power relations by turning it into a pleb, like the delinquency in the nineteenth century as studied in *Discipline and Punish* 3) this energy can stabilize itself by being invested in a strategic resistance. Is this an inconsistency in Foucault's thought that on the one hand he claims that the plebian is irreducible and centrifugal, and on the other he talks about the ways that it can be reduced (Smart, 2002:156)? To reply to this question, it is vital to see whether, as some have suggested, the plebian constitutes the outside of power (Strozier, 2002: 68).

If the plebian is the outside of power relations, very similar to the idea that he put forward in his essay on Blanchot, then it will make the power relations/plebian dichotomy, the fabrication of some other elements. The plebian, in this reading, will be merely a "pure essence of rebellion" that as soon as assumed an organization will be neutralized (like I speak) (Smart, 2002: 157). We know, however, that Foucault tries to give power relations a quasi-independency and posits them as "co-extensive with the social body". Moreover, we have already demonstrated that power relations are productive and fabricate their own limits by giving rise to the points of resistance. When Foucault says that it is possible for power relations to subject the plebian, it means that power relations actually annihilate themselves and turn into sheer violence. Furthermore, the plebian, when organized into a strategic resistance, does not neutralize itself but changes the game of power, and thus new power relations with its plebian will emerge. Thus, while there is no inconsistency in his thought, one cannot fail but to recognize that this conception of resistance suffers from the same problems as the strategic grid of intelligibility when it is applied in relation to the state. Foucault on his first attempt to adapt the conception of resistance to the grid of government introduces the figure of the "perpetual dissident" (VK: 364). The perpetual dissident is not the one who seeks power, they are not the "future governors", but they defend "the rights of the governed" against a government that attempts to manage the quotidian (VK: 362-365). Foucault, however, later abandons the notion of dissidence and replaces it with the counter-conduct. Foucault gives two reasons for this preference. First, dissidence as a term that has been used in the Soviet Union to designate a struggle and revolt against a power that takes as its responsibility the conducting of individuals in their everyday life, a party power that has been pastoralized (STP: 201). Exactly because dissidence is "too localized today in this kind of phenomenon … it cannot be used without drawbacks". Secondly, and most importantly, the word dissidence entails a certain substantification by referring to the

act of the one who is dissident. It sanctifies the dissident (which might be a delinquent or a mad person) as a hero and obscures the acts and counter-acts that are played in the field of power relations (STP: 202). One can say that the notion of dissidence implies a thick subjectivity that is not compatible with Foucault's microanalysis. He is looking for a subjectivity that, while it can be related to resistance, at the same time can be situated at the level of rationality of practices. In the next section, I will argue that such subjectivity should be understood in relation to the rational art of government.

Rationality and Subjectivation

Foucault's later works, those that belong to the period 1976-1984, have been criticized more often than his earlier works. On the one hand, his analysis of the liberal art of government in *The Birth of Biopolitics* has given rise to many fiery debates about his understanding and valorization of neoliberalism.[134] Jason Read argues that here Foucault has ignored "practical documents" (e.g. panopticon) and instead has merely focused on theoretical discussions of liberal thinkers; as a result this analysis is devoid of the "Foucauldian spirit" (Read, 2014: 7). Moreover, it has been argued that because of ideological confusion of the 1970s and disillusionment with Marxism in the late twentieth century, Foucault had no other choice but to "flirt with neoliberalism" (Behrent, 2014:17-19). Foucault believed that, Michel Behrent holds, since neoliberalism is not a disciplinary practice, far from being a "sinister power", it can actually be seen as a liberating force. On the other, the alleged return of the subject in the "late Foucault" has opened up a space for commentators to approach his later works critically or apologetically. Peter Dews (1989: 37-39), for example, considers the return of the "self-constituting subject" in Foucault's final writing as a break that arises from "intractable dilemmas" inherent in the anti-humanism of his earlier works. However, he concludes that this notion of subject can easily reinforce the "pseudo-individuality" of the present, which has been criticized by the Frankfurt School (Dews, 1989: 40). Thomas Flynn (1985: 538-539), in turn, argues that the introduction of subjectivation, liberates us from the

[134] The nature of Foucault's valorization of neoliberalism has given rise to fiery debates. One of the last incidents of such debates provoked when the translation of an interview with Daniel Zamora published in *Jacobin*, where he argued that Foucault was sympathetic towards neoliberalism. Its publication gave rise to a series of controversies and passionate exchanges (Clare O'farrell rounds up the key posts in her website). Moreover, we are witnessing the publication of a growing number of articles and books that take issue with Foucault's understanding with neoliberalism. Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, for example, in their book *The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society* argue that Foucault's idea that neoliberalism is more than a merely economic paradigm needs to be taken seriously. Neoliberalism should be analyzed in terms of subjectivity and marked-based relations that it has given rise to.

philosophy of "the meaning-giving subject" while at the same time preserves freedom and creativity; thus Foucault "fills a gap in 'structuralist' historiography, namely, the absence of the individual, responsible agent". Sebastian Harrer (2005:75-96), instead of providing an assessment of the notion of subjectivity, takes issue with the periodization itself. According to him, the fabrication of subject through mechanisms of power-knowledge and self-constituting subject are only two aspects of subjectivation and thus we are dealing with a conceptual continuity. I will argue that both the criticism of Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism and the praise for the introduction of the notion of subjectivity are one-sided and insufficient because they have failed to consider the connection between the rational art of government and subjectivation. I will first provide an outline of the notion of the rational art of government and then will turn to Foucault's lectures in order to show that, as Lazzarto (2006: 15) has argued, the problematization of the subject is "an internal necessity" for his analysis of the government.

While it is argued that Foucault uses the term "art of government" synonymously with governmentality (McNay, 2007: 197), I contend that at least a theoretical distinction between the two is necessary. The art of government implies that government has a specific mode of rationality internal to itself. Foucault argues that it differs from "the rationalization peculiar to economic processes, or to production and communication techniques" or even scientific discourses (OES: 324). Thus, as Oksala (2014: 122) states, Foucault's claim is not that "an epistemological threshold had been reached on the basis of which the art of government could become scientific". Foucault is trying to avoid using rationality as a principle, either as a historical singularity that has its origin in Enlightenment (an idea developed by the members of the Frankfurt School) or a categorical rationality that is based on the dichotomy of reason/unreason (OES: 299).[135] This rationality, as I have discussed earlier, should be understood in relation to practices because "'practices' don't exist without a certain regime of rationality" (QM: 79). Hence, Foucault defines the art of government as follow: "the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing. That is to say, I have tried to grasp the level of reflection in the

[135] As Thomas Lemke (2000: 8) argues, "we need to refrain from a 'rationalist conception of rationality'". A political rationality is not external to the governmental procedures but it is an element of government that gives rise to a discursive filed in which governmental practices can be understood as rational forms of exercise of power.

practice of government and on the practice of government" (BB: 2).[136] Thus for Foucault the rational art of government is characterized by the fact that rationality becomes internal to the mechanism of government, which can manifest itself in debates over the limits of governing.[137]

The question of the exercise of sovereign power and its limitation, a reflection upon the practices of government has gone through three successive stages. More importantly, Foucault argues that in each art of government, the exercise of power is linked to a form of knowledge and truth "internal and useful" for the exercise of power. To highlight the emergence of the modern art of government, Foucault contrasts and at the same time links it to two different modes of government. The first type of government is the Christian art of government in which the model for the government was driven from the relation between God and his creatures: a founding relation (OET: 315). This art of government was rooted in the idea that this founding act establishes a continuity between God and nature in the modality of natural laws. The new art of government that emerged in the sixteenth century was "atheist" to the extent that it was concerned not with natural law but the state itself. The other type of the art of government, in opposition to which this "reason of state" emerged, was the Machiavellian model. The problem of sovereignty, as Machiavelli's analysis sets forth, was to maintain a link between prince and state. Moreover, this link can

[136] Foucault's claim that he wants to study reflections at the level of practices has led some commentators to argue that "this method bore in practice suspicious resemblance to traditional *histoir de la pensé*", that is to say to the very discipline that Foucault had criticized in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Paras, 2006: 119-120). Paras argues that the question which forms Foucault's analysis is "what … was being said in what was said?". However, as the relation between practice and rationality demonstrates, Foucault is not so much interested in the meaning of what was said as in how practices are reflected upon pragmatically. Moreover, what he understands by the term "art", as a "technique conforming to certain rules", is closely linked to Heidegger's interpretation of *techne*. According to Heidegger, "*techne* never signifies the action of making" but is related to knowing, the essence of which consist in "*aletheia*" (Heidegger, 2010: 184). Not only Foucault's choice of terminology (i.e. *alethurgy*) confirms this link, but he explicitly expresses that regarding the question of truth and subject he has "tried to reflect on it from the side of Heidegger and starting from Heidegger" (HOS: 189).

[137] While most scholars have considered a continuity in Foucault's conceptualization of "government", my contention is that a close reading of his lectures tells us another story. In *The Birth of Biopolitics* he explains that "in using the word 'to govern' [he] left out the thousand and one different modalities and possible ways that exist for guiding men, directing their *conduct*, constraining their actions and reactions, and so on. Thus [he] left to one side all that is usually understood, and that for a long time was understood, as the government of children, of families, of a household, of souls, of communities, and so forth. [He] only considered … the government of men insofar as it appears as the exercise of political sovereignty" (BB: 1-2; my italics). However, in the lectures delivered the next year, he shifts to the "old sense" of the government that should be understood as "mechanisms and procedures intended to conduct men, to direct their conduct, to conduct their conduct" (GOL: 12). To put it schematically, one can say that while in his two lectures on biopolitics he understands government in relation to the state, starting from his lecture series titled *On the Government of The Living*, he broadens his conceptualization to the extent that it can be applied to different forms of relations, e.g. madness, delinquency, and sexuality.

be measured and curbed only through the wisdom of the one who governs, and thus the rationality of the government was external to state (BB: 311). It was in opposition to this model that economy (understood in its old meaning: management of household) entered into the political arena and the question became: how to manage the state as an autonomous entity. This means that from the sixteenth and seventeenth century, a new art of government emerged, i.e. raison d'État, in which knowledge and truth were internal to the government of state (STP: 285-287). The reason of state, the rationality that prevails government, consists in reinforcing the state itself and, at the same time, limiting its power by posing some juridical questions (e.g. social contract) (BB: 312; OES: 314). What characterizes the succeeding forms of the arts of government, i.e. liberal and neo-liberal governmentality, is that the limitation becomes intrinsic and non-legal (BB: 10-12). In the liberal art of government, political economy is the regime of truth that functions as the principle of self-limitation of government (BB: 18-19). It means that starting from the eighteenth century, the market became the "site of veridication" (or "site of verification-falsification") and the rationality of government should be based on its spontaneous regime of truth (BB: 29-32). Neo-liberalism, in turn, takes the formal principles of the market economy and projects them on to a general art of government. What distinguishes these two arts of government is the nature of their intervention which is based on a different understanding of competition. However, what is important for this study is that Foucault argues for an inherent link between the rationality of government and a mode of subjectivity. The modern state, Foucault asserts, has not developed "above individuals" but it is an entity that attempts to integrate individuals under the condition that their individuality is already submitted to a very specific matrix of individualization (SP: 334). I will explore the relation between rationality and subjectivity through the notion of *homo oeconomicus*. This will help us to understand why subject and truth will become the central themes in Foucault's later works.

The characteristic of the liberal and neo-liberal arts of government is that the government of the state and the government of man are homogenous in the sense that both are organized according to market-based principles. As Fredrick Jameson (1991: 263) has summarized it, the most challenging proposition of our age is that "the market is in human

nature".[138] Moreover, Foucault makes a distinction between liberalism and neoliberalism in terms of their conception of homo oeconomicus (McNay, 2009). While in the classical liberalism homo oeconomicus was the "man of exchange", in neoliberalism homo oeconomicus is "an entrepreneur of himself" (BB: 225-226). Foucault traces the former back to English Empiricism, which gave rise to an autonomous subject of interest, i.e. "a subject as the source of interest, the starting point of an interest, or the site of a mechanism of interests" (BB: 273). Moreover, Foucault state that there is a fundamental link between homo oeconomicus, who calculates his interests autonomously, and Adam Smith's "invisible hand", which asserts that the egoistic behavior of individuals in calculating their own interests while being ignorant of the totality of the situation results in the public good (BB: 277-279). Accordingly, homo oeconomicus, and market, in general should be let alone (*laissez-faire*). What is important in Foucault's detailed study of the subject of interest is that the liberal art of government is contingent upon a self-referential subject who is also an autonomous and spontaneous site of truth. The neoliberal homo oeconomicus is "someone who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment" and thus "appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment" (BB: 270). The stark difference between the two conceptions of homo oeconomicus is that while in the liberal government he is an "intangible element", for the neoliberal government he becomes "governable". Thus, as Hamann (2009: 42) puts it, the neoliberal homo oeconomicus is "a form of subjectivity that must be brought into being and maintained through social mechanisms of subjectification". This subjectivity, moreover, is again a circular one which constitutes "a homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (BB: 226). For Foucault a specific "anthropology" of man, that is to say, an economic man understood as a self-referential subjectivity is the basis of the rational art of government (Read, 2009: 25).

[138] David Harvey's (2007: 3) observation that "neoliberalism … has pervasive effect on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world", hints towards this idea.

This particular self-referentiality of the economic man, which is constructed according to the calculating[139] and utilitarian rationality of the (neo-)liberal art of government is necessary for the operation of the government because:

> "the individual becomes governmentalizable, … power gets a hold on him to the extent, and only to the extent, that he is a homo oeconomicus. That is to say, the surface of contact between the individual and the power exercised on him, and so the principle of the regulation of power over the individual, will be only this kind of grid of homo oeconomicus" (BB: 252-253).

It is on the basis of this analysis that one can understand why in Foucault's later lectures "the subject's relation to himself" becomes a central theme (GL: 115). His aim is to show that this relation between the exercise of power and self-referentiality of the subject is much older than the rational art of government and that the subject can be constituted in ways other than according to the principles of calculation and utility. Here I will focus on the series of lectures, *On the Government of the Living*, delivered just after his biopolitical lectures to illustrate this point. In the next chapter and in relation to the notion of experience I will return subjectivation and technologies of the self.

Foucault's main claim here is that any form of exercise of power is accompanied by *alethurgy*. He begins his lectures with a story about Septimius Severus, Roman emperor from 193 to 211, and the star-studded sky that was painted on the ceiling of his hall of justice. This sky, under which he exercised his power by passing judgments, actually manifested a truth about emperor's good fortune and the permanency of this power. Foucault employs this stoic emperor as an example to show that apart from a knowledge useful for government, power is accompanied by another form of manifestation of truth that is "ritualistic", "excessive", "non-economic" and "luxurious" (GL: 5). This truth, which cannot be reduced to calculation and utility, is manifested ritualistically and thus should be distinguished from the rational activity of knowledge. Foucault introduces the term *alethurgy*, derived from the Greek word *aléthourgés* (*aléthés* + *ergon*), to designate

[139] Foucault has already noted the importance of calculation in the power relations. In *Discipline and Punish*, for example, he refers to torture and discipline as two different types of calculated practices of punishment (DP: 32; 146).

> "the set of possible verbal or non-verbal procedures by which one brings to light what is laid down as true as opposed to false, hidden inexpressible, unforeseeable, or forgotten" (ibid, 7).

Alethurgy, thus, is a concept that covers both the conscious manifestation of truth as well as the ritualistic manifestation of truth.

In this series of lectures he mainly focuses on alethurgy in Christianity and while he admits that its functioning can be conceived properly by considering the form of power that accompanies it, he does not discuss or even name that power (GL: 312). Considering his previous lectures, nevertheless, one can assume that here he is referring to pastoral power. He then lists five ways in which the relation of government and alethurgy has been perceived, and attributes each to a theorist. What all these reflections on the relation between government and truth have in common, and Foucault criticizes them for, is that they are informed in terms of an objective knowledge of the State, society or economics (GL: 15-17). From raison d'État to German and American neoliberalism, the art of government has been linked to the rationality of these phenomena; Foucault's aim here is to show that the government-truth relation is much older than this and has a deeper connection in which alethurgy goes beyond the rational and intended aim of the government. As it was emphasized in his previous lectures on the art of government, he understands neoliberalism not as an economic or political theory but as a way of perceiving the government-truth relation through calculation. *On the Government of the Living,* thus, can be seen as a critique of this type of conception, a critique that consists in demonstrating genealogically another mode of intelligibility for this relation. Foucault's analysis of the tragedy of *Oedipus the King* makes this point clear.

The tragedy of Oedipus is organized upon the game of halves (sumbolon), that is to say, truth manifests itself in pairs. Here we are dealing with three levels of alethurgy and their correspondent veridiction: the divine manifestation of truth through oracle and prophecy (Apollo-Teiresias), kings' and chiefs' manifestation of truth by oath (Oedipus-Jocasta) and testimony as the juridical veridiction of servants (the Corinthian messenger- the shepherd). Although they all tell the same truth, each case presents a different mode of truth-telling. Oedipus is caught between the religious truth-telling and the juridical one. While the former's authority lies in the identity of God and truth, the latter is authorized on the basis

of a self-reflexivity or recognition[140], i.e. the ability of shepherds to utter "I". What enables Oedipus to govern, to enact his supreme art of government (tekhné teckhés), is not the divine veridiction but the veridiction of those who can say "Yes, I did it" (WDTT: 78-79). Thus, the King Oedipus discloses the articulation of the art of government and self-alethurgy or subjectivation (GL: 43-69). In the remaining of the lectures, Foucault will study Christianity's art of government through confession (*aveu*) and the way that subjectivity paradoxically became linked to mortification: constitution of the self through destruction of the self.

Here Foucault makes a relation between the art of government and a self-referentiality that is not based on calculation but on truth-telling. Foucault calls "the formation of a definite relationship of self to self" by the term subjectivity (GL: 250). In *The Birth of Biopolitics,* he explored a specific type of subjectivation that was constituted through rational calculation. What Foucault will develop in his later lectures is the notion of *Parrhesia*[141] which is an art of government that is based on subjectivation through truth-telling: "*Parrhesia* … is situated at the meeting point of the obligation to speak the truth, procedures and techniques of governmentality, and the constitution of the relationship to self" (GSO: 45). Foucault recognizes two types of problematization of the truth in Western civilizations, one dealing with the conditions of the true statement ('analytic of truth') and the other is concerned with truth-telling ('critical attitude'). His aim is to illustrate that the critical attitude is genealogically linked to parrhesia (FS: 170-171). Starting from political parrhesia (Pericles's paradigm), Foucault follows the development of this notion, and demonstrates that Cynicism functioned as a "bridge" that allowed parrhesia to be transferred to Christianity (CT: 307-338). The importance of parrhesia for a critical engagement with the predominant governmentality is that it provides an alternative "political reasoning" that can challenge the calculative rationality of neoliberalism (Dyrberg, 2014: 23-26).

[140] Nevertheless, Foucault's use of the term 'recognition' should not be confused with Hegel's *Erfahrung*. The latter refers to the dialectical journey of consciousness that passes through a series of forms of subjectivity only to reach "pure self-recognition" (Beiser, 2005: 170). As Han (2002, 163-164) has remarked, Foucault's notion of recognition should not be understood as "a teleological dialectic", but as the Nietzschean perspective of the creation/destruction.

[141] Foucault's notion of parrhesia has recently been discussed widely. O'Leary (2006) undertakes a detailed study of parrhesia, by mainly focusing on Foucault's later lectures and interviews, in order to provide a 'coherent' understanding of morality as the "aesthetics of existence". Dyrberg (2014) argues that Foucault, through the introduction of the notion of parrhesia, initiated an approach to "political authority" and "freedom" which was critical of both "mainstream and radical views of the relationship between politics and democracy". For more on parrhesia see Koopman, 2013; Flynn, 1984.

Foucault's distinction between the "critical attitude" and the "analytics of truth" leads us towards the concluding chapter, where I will discuss critique in Foucault's oeuvre in terms of both the practical and the conceptual level.

Chapter 4 Critique: Practice and Concept

In the previous chapters, I provided a detailed analysis of three variations of articulation, visibility and subject. Now it is time to work on the bigger picture, where all these pieces will finally fit together. As I already explained in the introduction, the overall relations between these three variations, and their modalities constitute the Foucauldian concept of critique. In this chapter, I will fulfill a double task. First, I will focus on those texts that have attempted to provide a reading of Foucault's oeuvre as a critical endeavor. According to this strand, Foucault is to be seen as the reviver of the Kantian critical tradition. However, while Beatrice Han (2002) recognizes a 'failed' attempt to reformulate the critical question of the 'condition of possibility', Colin Koopman (2014) argues for a productive effort to resuscitate the Kantian tradition of enlightenment. Using insights from commentators who emphasise the importance of the notion of experience for understanding Foucault's critical project, I will show that Koopman's reading, with some modifications, can help us to have a better understanding of Foucault's "critical attitude".

What all these literature have in common is their concern to apprehend the *what* of Foucault's oeuvre. In order to accomplish this, they use Foucault's own conceptual toolkit (problematization, experience, or historical a priori) to grasp his critical activity. However, I will argue that it is possible to make a distinction between what Foucault was doing (the critical activity) and what made that activity possible (the 'how' of his oeuvre). Using Iain MacKenzie's reading of Deleuze and Guattari, I will demonstrate that their tripartite system of *concept*, *plane of immanence*, and *conceptual personae* can provide us with a conceptual framework to distinguish and at the same time link the two aspects of 'what' and 'how' in Foucault's oeuvre.

The Critical Attitude

Beatrice Han in *Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical*, claims that it is possible, in the face of apparent discontinuities and shifts, to grasp a coherency in Foucault's oeuvre. This coherency is based on a "central theme", that is to say 'the condition of possibility'[142], that appears again and again in his work under different

[142] Different scholars have expressed the view that Foucault belongs to the Kantian tradition. Ian Hacking (1991) acknowledges that "Foucault was a remarkably able Kantian". Amy Allen (2008) argues that Foucault's oeuvre belongs to Kant's project of critique because it "constitutes a critique of critique itself" and thus it should be understood as "a continuation-through-transformation of that project". Andrew Cutrofello in *Discipline and Critique* argues in the same vein and demonstrates that Foucault's genealogy

'avatars' (i.e. historical a priori, conditions of acceptability and problematization) and thus informs three successive "investigative methods" of archeology, genealogy and ethics. Hence, while Foucault criticizes Kant in *The Order of Things*, he actually inscribes his oeuvre within the Kantian tradition of Critique. As Gary Gutting (2003) in his review of Han's book puts it, her claim can be summarized as follows: "all of Foucault's works can be read as the (failed) effort to revive the project of transcendental philosophy". It is failed because, according to Han, despite his endeavor Foucault is not able to overcome the tension between the transcendental and the historical: he is a failed transcendental phenomenologist. For example she suggests that Foucault's definition of historical a priori in *The Birth of Clinic* as the "originary distribution of the visible and the invisible insofar as it is linked with the division between what can be stated and what remains unsaid" (BC, xi) hints towards Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. She suggests that it might be possible to interpret archeology on the basis of the foundations laid out by *The Phenomenology of Perception* "as an attempt to identify historical variations of the structures of perception in a given domain" (Han, 2002: 49). However, according to Han, Foucault rejects the primacy of perception when he characterizes historical a priori as a "deep space, anterior to all perceptions and governing them from afar" (BC, 5). Thus, she concludes that Foucault's archaeology loses a real theoretical support. Gutting argues that Han has rightly realized that Foucault's historical a priori cannot be explicated in terms of the transcendental phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, because he is primarily doing a historical analysis and not philosophy in its traditional sense. His aim is to forge "a new approach to historical analysis but not with the meta-question of how to understand and justify this approach philosophically" (Gutting, 2003).

In response to Gutting, Han (2005) argues that Foucault is a philosopher who attempts to "reinterpret the Kantian critical project by providing … a 'transcendental history' of the conditions of possibility of knowledge". Han, echoing Dreyfus and Rabinow's criticism, holds that Foucault is the victim of the founding-founded double that he himself had demonstrated to constitute the analytic of finitude. If historical a priori is a set of rules that

enables us to realize that Kant's critique, because of its subscription to "the juridical model of power", is caught in an experience of subjectivity that is formed by disciplinary relations of power. Thus, Kant, confronted by disciplinary power, invokes a new form of discipline metaphysically: "Thus the juridical battle between power (heteronomy) and critique (autonomy) becomes a struggle between two sorts of discipline—a discipline of domination (heteronomy) versus a discipline of resistance (autonomy)" (1994: 33). Deleuze (2006: 60) also suggests that Foucault's concern with conditions makes his work "a sort of neo-Kantianism", however he is fundamentally different from Kant in the way that he understands experience.

serves as the condition of possibility for what is acceptable, then it can only be an "empirical regulatory". Foucault's project, thus, to find a transcendental foundation has been left unfulfilled and instead we are left with an "unacknowledged empiricism". Han's suggestion is that considering Foucault's admission that most of his philosophical endeavour was determined by his reading of Heidegger, it is possible to consider the Heideggerian ontology as "the *unthought* of Foucault's oeuvre" (Han, 2002: 13; italics in original text). Han's argument that Foucault's philosophy is a modified (and failed) transcendental project has been criticized from two different perspectives. Before presenting these two criticisms, I would like to give some textual evidence that is at odds with Han's general perspective.

If one investigates Foucault's works in relation to the idea of transcendental phenomenology,[143] one finds nothing but a stubborn refutation. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault concludes the book by reiterating clearly that his aim is to cleanse the history of thought from "transcendental narcissism" (AK: 156). A few lines later, he clarifies that "it had to be shown that the history of thought could not have this role of revealing the transcendental moment that rational mechanics has not possessed since Kant, mathematical idealities since Husserl, and the meanings of the perceived world since Merleau-Ponty". The failure of "transcendental reflexion" lies in the fact that it has avoided an "analysis of practice" (AK: 157). Foucault, then, states that his analysis of "the set of conditions in accordance with which practice is exercised" stands in sharp contrast to any "historicotranscendental" analysis. Foucault's claim here is not that he wants to purify or modify the transcendental project but "to free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence". As he explains in an interview, his aim is to historicize in order to "leave as little space as possible to the transcendental" (HC: 58). Any claim that Foucault has tried to revive transcendental project needs to tackle with these anti-transcendental statements in Foucault's oeuvre.

Nevertheless, there are statements in Foucault's work that might suggest he is trying to situate his work within a very specific phenomenological tradition that can be traced back to Jean Cavaillès through Bachelard and Canguilhem. In his introduction to the translation of Canguilhem's *The Normal and The Pathological*, Foucault recognizes two "profoundly heterogeneous" modalities of phenomenology in France. The dividing line "separates a

[143] Oksala in *Foucault On Freedom*, argues that both archaeology and genealogy share with phenomenology "the transcendental mode of questioning" but their methodological starting point is not the subject. For more on a phenomenological interpretation of Foucault's work see, Todd May, 2005; Rudi Visker, 1999.

philosophy of experience, of sense and of the subject and a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality and of concept" (INP: 8). On the one side, thus, we have Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and on the other hand Cavailles, Bachelard and Canguilhem. Foucault argues that while the second remained academic on its surface, when a "crisis" began (he refers to May 68'), it was this strand that could play a significant role and turned out that it was "profoundly tied to the present". Foucault explains that its success lies in the fact that it was linked to Enlightenment by taking up the same task that once Kant and Mendelson had fulfilled: to put rationality in question "as to its immediate past and its present reality; as to its time and its place" (INP: 9).[144]

Thompson in *Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and The Phenomenology of the Concept*, starts with these statements to establish a phenomenological lineage for Foucault's oeuvre. He argues that Han's conclusion that "the transcendental must be acknowledged as nothing other than the empirical in disguise", is due to a "profound misreading" of Foucault's project (Thomson, 5). What she has failed to recognize is that Foucault's notion of a priori should not be understood as incapable of change. To understand the novelty of this conception, Thompson suggests, we should situate it in the tradition of the phenomenology of the concept that can be traced back to Husserl through Cavaillès. The historical a priori for Husserl is "suprahistorical", an unchanging structure of history, and thus it cannot account for the unique development of science. Cavaillès, in turn, starts his investigation with the idea that there is a specific historical a priori for science and attempts to capture "the eruptive historicity of these conditions" that give rise to specific scientific concepts. Canguilhem moved this investigation further by focusing on the interiority of science and marked out the epistemic breaks in science. Foucault's criticism of Canguilhem is that it is unable to account for the structure of these breaks; it cannot reveal the "shifting rules" of scientificity as a whole. Foucault's attempt, Thompson concludes, was to retrieve a phenomenology of concept in which "transcendentality and historicity can be thought together". Contrary to Han's argument, for Thompson, Foucault has successfully accomplished this task.

Colin Koopman (2010) criticizes both these readings, not for their attempt to outline Foucault's critical project but for failing to realize that his work can only be categorized as

[144] See *What is Critique?*, pp. 53-55, where Foucault discusses the "return of the question of *Aufklarung*" to France under the guise of phenomenology. For Rabinow's analysis of Foucault's "insider's humor" about phenomenology see his introduction to Canguilhem's *A Vital Rationalist*.

non-transcendental critique. For him, there are "two Kantian lineages" of critique, one of which has become dominant thanks to phenomenology. The fundamental endeavour of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl, has been to "integrate a transcendental inquiry into universal and necessary conditions of possibility with historical forms of inquiry that acknowledge the situated contexts within which all human thought apparently unfolds" (Koopman, 2010: 101). Koopman, however, argues that it is not necessary to interpret Foucault in this way. While Foucault belongs to the Kantian project of critique that investigates the conditions of possibility, Koopman argues, he has stubbornly shunned away from chaining it to transcendality. He even states that the methodological transition from archaeology to genealogy should be read as a "self-revision" through which Foucault tries to get rid of any traces of transcendentality that might have crept in to his work because of his training in phenomenology. Koopman has recently published several articles and a book to illustrate his point that Foucault belongs to the tradition of "historical critique" and can be properly understood through the notion of problematization. Considering recent debates about his ideas (Allen, 2013; Shea, 2014), I will present his work in some details and will show that while his discussion is very illuminating, some of his arguments cannot be easily reconciled with some aspects of Foucault's oeuvre.

Koopman's ambitious project is, through offering a different reading of Foucault's critical project, to reconcile Kantian historical critique with "pragmatist critical theory" that has been put forward by pragmatists like Dewey and Rorty. The key to understanding Foucault's oeuvre is the notion of problematization, while other notions like dispositif, episteme and discursive formation should be understood as Foucault's "successive attempts to work out the kind of idea that achieves self-clarity with the concept of problematization" (Koopman, 2013: 53). Critique is genealogical to the extent that one understands it through problematization. For him genealogy, however, does not offer a "rupture" in Foucault's thought but it should be regarded as "an expansion" of archaeology. The proper metaphor for Foucault's genealogical critique is an hourglass:

> "At the bottom is a complex analysis of multiple kinds of constraints on the emergence of practices but in a rather inchoate fashion [i.e. *History Of Madness*], in the middle is realized a procedure for isolating just one of these kinds of constraint [i.e. *The Order of Things*], and at the top is evidenced an analytic in

> which multiple kinds of constraint are treated in their interaction [i.e. *The History of Sexuality II* and *III*]" (Koopman, 2010: 112; 2013: 49-50; my additions).

The summit of Foucault's thought is the "master concept" of problematization which is the revival of Kant's non-transcendental critique. Problematization has two dimensions: "the nominal object of inquiry" and "a verbal activity of inquiry" (Koopman, 2010: 110; 2013: 97-99).[145] Foucault sways between these two dimensions: he takes the existing problematizations as his object of inquiry (thus reveals their contingency) and positions his inquiry in a way to problematize those practices that are elaborated on the basis of these already existing objects. He complicates the notion of problematization further by ascribing two senses to each dimension. In their nominal dimension, problematizations refer negatively to emergent practices that can render older practices which do not operate effectively problematic, and positively to the way that those deficiencies present themselves as problems. In their verbal dimension, problematizations descriptively articulates past problematizations that have made the present practices possible and critically intensifies our concern with these problematizations that still inform our present practices (Koopman, 2013: 98-101).

These problematizations are the conditions of possibility of our present. The next step is to demonstrate that Kant's critical project can be read non-transcendentally. Koopman makes a distinction between Kant's general critical project and transcendental critique, as an inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of a synthetic a priori knowledge of objects. The latter is only one instant of the former. Accordingly, Koopman concludes that Foucault's genealogy belongs to the Kantian project of critique in its wider sense, and thus we can safely say that he was an *empiricist* (Koopman, 2013: 110). Koopman's reading, as he himself claims, can bring to an end all disputes regarding Foucault's failed/successful attempt to retrieve a transcendental critique. I will now turn to those textual and methodological aspects of Foucault's work that cannot support Koopman's claim for interpreting his work as a critical project, understood in terms of problematization, from beginning to end.

[145] Kimberly Hutchings (1996: 120-122) makes a very similar distinction in Foucault's "critical ontology". For her the fact that Foucault invokes both Kant and Baudelaire implies the dual nature of critique. On the one hand, critical ontology is reflection on limits that flushes out the contingency of the present mode of thought and, on the other, it is "the work of thought" that presents thoughts "capacity" to operate in disconnection from power relations.

However, I will show that his reading can help us overcome some difficulties that has resulted from the misinterpretation of the notion of experience.

As I have already stated, Foucault has the tendency to reinterpret all his previous works according to what were his present preoccupation. In an interview conducted very close to his death, Foucault claims that "the notion common to all the work I have done since *History of Madness* is that of problematization" (CFT: 257).[146] Koopman has taken this statement seriously and tries to demonstrate it, a task that Foucault never did himself. However, since problematization has been presented as "an ontology of the present", there will be some difficulties in reconciling this idea with Foucault's different approach towards the 'present' in his earlier works. As he explicitly puts it in *The Order of Things*, apprehension of each episteme is possible insofar as it no longer regulates thought, and one cannot comprehend their own episteme as those that have been precede (OT: 217-218). In this approach, the present is grasped merely negatively as something different from the past. But in his later works, Foucault's aim is to problematize the present, which consist in "managing to grasp why and how that-which-is might no longer be that-which-is" (CTIH: 36). Investigation in the past is done in order to substantiate the present and reveal its singularity. These two contradictory approaches toward present cannot be reconciled within a single critical project.

More importantly, Koopman's claim that there are two Kantian lineages is very close to Foucault's reading of Kant. However, my contention is that we can find two types of such bifurcation in Foucault's oeuvre. The first one can be found in his earlier works, e.g. in his introduction to Kant's anthropology or in *The Order of Things*. I have already discussed it in the first chapter, Foucault's claim there was that while Kant opened up a space in Western philosophy by articulating "metaphysical discourse and reflection on the limits of our reason", he finally closed this "opening" by relegating "all critical investigation to an anthropological question" (PT: 76-77). Thus, we are dealing with two Kantianisms, one that reveals that the nature of critique is 'the Limit' and the other that 'anthropologizes' this limit by making man its origin.[147] Foucault here establishess a contradiction between Critique and Anthropology, which is consistent with the anti-subjectivity in his earlier works. In his later works, however, Foucault will turn to the question of Aufklarung and will consider Kant's

[146] Foucault has already said the same thing about power (CP: 125) and subject (SP: 226).
[147] For more on "antoropologization" of West see Rabinow, 1986, pp. 35-37; Kampf, 2014.

three critiques as a failure to embrace the implication of that question. The apparent inconsistency between Foucault's claim that his critique belongs to the tradition which evolves around the Kantian question of Aufklarung and his earlier works where he accused Kant of lulling philosophy into an "anthropological sleep" have perplexed Foucault's readers and commentators (Norris, 1993: 29-87; Rajchman, 1985; Couzens-Hoy, 1986: 239). Jürgen Habermas (1994: 150) is one of the most influential critics of Foucault who makes such a claim:

> "In Foucault's lecture [on Kant's *What is Enlightenment?*], we do not meet the Kant familiar from *The Order of Things*, the epistemologist who thrust open the door to the age of anthropological thought and the human sciences with his analysis of finiteness. Instead we encounter a different Kant – the precursor of the Young Hegelians, the Kant who was the first to make a serious break with the metaphysical heritage, who turned philosophy away from the Eternal Verities and concentrated on what philosophers had until then considered to be without concept and nonexistent, merely contingent and transitory."

This discrepancy in Foucault's oeuvre, Habermas argues, indicates a "fundamental contradiction" in his thought that allows him to, on the one hand, praise modern philosophizing and, on the other, critique modernity. James Schmidt and Thomas E. Wartenberg (1994: 287) responded to this criticism by rejecting the idea, put forward by Habermas, that Foucault's engagement with Enlightenment is either "a deathbed concession of defeat" or "ironic gesture". Rather, by confirming the existence of different interpretations of the tradition of Enlightenment in Foucault's oeuvre, they stress the importance and persistence of this affirmative view for his works in the last decade. Amy Allen (2003: 181), however, argues that Habermas' charge should be answered in a more radical way by disproving the existence of two contradictory Kant's in Foucault's thought. To do this, she turns to Foucault's thèse complémentaire on Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* to suggest that since in the thèse Foucault considers the question of man to be fundamental for Kant's thought, it can be demonstrated that there is a continuity in Foucault's oeuvre concerning the question of subjectivity (Allen, 2003: 183-190). As I have already discussed, Foucault's engagement with the question of the subject has gone through different phases, and thus it cannot provide us with a framework of continuity. My argument is that Habermas is right in saying that Foucault's later engagement

with Kant differs from what he had presented in his earlier works. Here Foucault makes a distinction between Aufklarung as a general attitude and Kant's three critiques as merely one possible response to such an attitude.

Foucault explicitly makes a distinction between critique and what he calls "the critical attitude" (WC: 41-43; GSO: 20-21). Critique is an instrument that can be used against the positively constituted domains of philosophy, science, politics, literature, etc., with some utilitarian aims in mind. This dispersed and heterogeneous activity, Foucault states, "is supported by some kind of … general imperative" and thus a unity is discernible. This unity is based on "something in critique which is akin to virtue" (WC: 43). The critical attitude as a virtue, however, far from being an abstract idea is a historical phenomenon which emerges in relation to the process of society's governmentalization in the sixteenth century. Again, this historical aspect of critique which links it to Foucault's engagement with the rational art of government is something that Koopman has ignored. While the question of Aufklarung is "how not to be governed thusly?", Critique is Kant's reply to this question, in which the order to obey is founded on autonomy itself. The idea of autonomy here is understood in terms of knowledge and its limits and thus, in the final analysis, it is juridical. The critical attitude, however, is about the courage of confronting and questioning the present, and thus it is "an ontology of the present … an ontology of ourselves" (GSO: 21).[148] For Foucault, Aufklarung is a "particular event" that continues to determine our present, and hence we should examine closely the notion of event to gain a clearer understanding of the critical attitude (GSO: 14; WC). If Aufklarung, as Foucault states, is an event, what type of event are we dealing with here?

For Foucault, there is a continuity between Kant's 1784 text on Aufklarung and his reflection on the French Revolution. What accounts for this continuity is not only that they complement each other's goal for autonomy but they both are "self-referring events" (GSO: 15). To be able to answer the question about whether the human race is progressing, Kant argues that one needs to determine the existence of a cause. Instead of a teleological structure, historical progress should be thought in terms of the cause-effect relationship.

[148] In *The Government of Self and Others*, Foucault refers to these two Kantianism by 'analytic of truth' and 'ontology of the present': "It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course, I link myself insofar as I can" (GSO: 21).

However, Kant is not looking for the cause itself but "an event which indicates the existence of such a cause" (Kant, in GSO: 23). Thus, Foucault explains, in order to establish the reality of an effect Kant thought that we need to "isolate an event in history which will have … the value of a sign" (GSO: 16). This is in line with what Foucault tells us about his own genealogical analysis which far from rejecting the idea of causality in toto, tries to bring into play a new causal analysis (WC: 63-64). Here instead of looking for a single cause that gives rise to a multiplicity of descendants, one should attempt to identify an event as the conditions of the appearance of a singularity. What is very important in this type of analysis is that since event, as the ontological conditions of a singularity, functions as a sign, it is inseparable from a hermeneutics. I will return to this point shortly. The event that Kant is looking for cannot be found in "the lofty deeds or major crimes of men … or in ancient and magnificent political structures", but one should look for it in what is almost imperceptible and insignificant (Kant, in GSO: 16-17). In the case of the Revolution, Kant argues, what constitutes the sign is not the *gesticulations* of the drama of revolution but its existence as *spectacle*. The content of revolution and its failure or success are not important, and revolution in itself is not something desirable. What is significant is the relation between those who are not actors in the Revolution with the Revolution or, to put it differently, it is the *enthusiasm* for the revolution that matters, the formation of a will. Such enthusiasm is a sign of a phenomenon that is not forgettable because it has revealed a *tendency* or *aptitude* in human history (GSO: 17-21). The event shifts the conditions of intelligibility (the hermeneutics aspect) and makes those things self-evident which hitherto were not part of the collective experience and made former self-evident things problematic.

Moreover, the event-singularity relation does not follow a chronological order because it should account for a tendency and not just a historical episode. The event as a sign, Foucault says, has three characteristics: rememorative, demonstrative and prognostic (GSO: 16). The event is a sign that indicates that there is a permanent cause which makes sure the continuity of its effect as a tendency: it has always been thus, it is thus and it will be thus. The event, Foucault says, "constitutes a permanent virtuality" that guarantees the continuity of its effect. One can say that event opens up a self-referent space in which time and memory are constituted, and thus decadence happens when it loses its energy and significance. Therefore, when Foucault talks about the present he is not referring to "a certain era of the world" (as did Plato), a "heralding sign of a forthcoming event" (as did Augustine), or "a point of transition toward the dawning of a new world" (as did Vico) (WE:

304-305). The present should be understood substantially, in Kant's own words, as an *Ausgang* (a way out). Or to be more precise, the question of Aufklarung, in essence, is a search for a difference: how not to be thus anymore. Here a problem is discernable. If the event is defined as being-perpetually-thus, then Aufklarung is an event which is self-differential: its being-thus is constituted as not-being-thus. As it was put forward vigorously by Tom Keenan, according to Foucault's conception of event "there is 'no way out,' because there is no 'out', not because the present is somehow self-enclosed or self-identical, but on the contrary precisely because it differs itself" (Keenan, 1987: 29). Foucault has been criticized for this paradox by Jürgen Habermas (1981, 1987), Nancy Fraser (1981), and Charles Taylor (1985). What they have found problematic in Foucault's genealogical critique, more than being a methodological deficiency is a political one: any critical endeavor is caught in the historical present and the material available to it in the present (Lemke, 2011: 33). In order to tackle this difficulty, I will argue that this problem only arises when one understands Aufklarung as a socio-political event while for Foucault it was an event of thought.

Critical attitude is not a doctrine or a methodological tool, but "a way of thinking, of saying, of acting" that determines an individual's relation to "what exists, to what is known, to what is done" (WC: 37). We need to make a distinction between critical attitude and Aufklarung as an event because this attitude is not the fruit of Enlightenment but has its roots in a different soil. The pre-philosophical origin of the critical attitude, as I have already mentioned, goes back to the sixteenth century, when pastoral power became politicized. What Foucault calls "counter-conduct" is a critical attitude that was formed in response to governmentalization. As Marc Djaballah (2013: 270) argues, "the attitude of being critical is not a rejection of being governed from the outside, but a counter-attack from within the internal dynamic, its technique of subjugation". To put it in a nutshell, the critical attitude here is non-discursive. Aufklarung, on the other hand, as it was put forward by Kant and Mendelson, is an event in the "field of philosophical reflection". Aufklarung as discursive behavior makes a reflection on non-discursive critical attitude possible, and conversely, it was the critical attitude that made it possible for Kant to problematize the present and ask "what is happening today? What is happening now? What is this 'now' each one of us is inside, and which is the place, the point from which I write?" (GSO: 14). Discursive and non-discursive critical attitude should be differentiated while they are historically related. More importantly, the present is neither the tip of the historical vector nor the given of the

philosophical reflection, but it is the result of a discursive critical attitude. Foucault's "ontology of the present" or "historical ontology of ourselves" gains its emancipatory force through problematizing the present in such a way that critical attitude can be practiced. In the next section, I will show the relation between this critical attitude, experience, and problematization.

Experience and Problematization

As has been suggested by some commentators, one can understand Foucault's critical project through the notion of experience (Rayner, 2003; Gutting, 2002). Foucault himself in the original introduction to *The History of Sexuality II*, states that his work can be seen as an attempt to consider "the very historicity of forms of experience" (HS-UP: 200). Or, on another occasion, Foucault tells the interviewer that "my books are experience … I am an experimenter" (RM: 48). Through examining different readings of this notion that have been put forward by Foucault scholars, I will argue that two interlinked notions of experience and problematization can help us to understand what Foucault calls critical attitude.

Han is amongst the first commentators who have emphasized the importance of the notion of experience for understanding 'the final Foucault'. Her analysis is mainly based on a passage in *The Use of Pleasure* where Foucault explains what he wanted to do under the title of the history of sexuality:

> "It was a matter of seeing how an "*experience*" came to be constituted in modern Western societies, an *experience* that caused individuals to *recognize* themselves as subjects of a "sexuality," which was accessible to very diverse fields of knowledge and linked to a system of rules and constraints. What I planned, therefore, was a history of sexuality as an *experience*, where experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture" (HS2: 4; modified translation; my italics).

Han argues that here Foucault has used the term 'experience' in two different and irreconcilable meanings. Experience, in the second stance, is used as an "objective … anonymous and general structure" which functions to link three different domains of knowledge, normativity and subjectivity (Han, 2002: 153-155). In the first stance, however, the experience is used as a "quasi-Hegelian" sense of recognition in which subjects

reflectively constitute themselves. Han concludes that for Foucault sexuality, as "a set of objective conditions" which are definable, has shaped the relationship of individuals to themselves from the inside (Han, 2002: 156-158). These two contradictory concepts of experience undermine Foucault's claim that subjective experience (i.e. subjectivation) can play any critical or transformative role.

Timothy O'Leary (2010) while accepts that there are two concepts of experience in Foucault's work, rejects Han's claim that they are contradictory. Moreover, Han has limited her interpretation of the notion of experience to Foucault's later works, but O'Leary comprehends a greater project that starts with *History of Madness* that is gradually refined.[149] For him one can find similar attempts to make a distinctions between two types of experience: in Dewey we have inchoate experience and everyday experience and in Gadamer we have *Erlebnis* (immediate experience) and *Erfahrung* (accumulated experience). Foucault, according to O'Leary, has made a similar distinction between two interconnected concepts of experience. On the one hand we have the "everyday experience" which refers to general forms and structures of experience and the range of "actual experiences" (e.g. experience of Renaissance) and, on the other, the term is used to indicate a "transformative experience" (e.g. the idea of limit-experience) (O'Leary, 2010: 165-166). Foucault refers to the former by the term *foyer*, which, O'Leary suggests, should be understood as a *dispositif*. The latter sense of the term experience refers to the "deliberate human practices" that can bring changes to experience as structures and forms. While O'Leary's reading is more compelling than that of Han's, a problem remains unsolved. If the variety of our everyday experience (O'Leary gives the example of an encounter with a beggar) is determined by a general structure, how one can detach oneself from them in order to problematize it? Considering the objective form of experience which forms our subjectivity, how can we understand "deliberate human practices" as a source of change?

Thomas Lemke's article (2011) is the latest attempt to scrutinize Foucault's notion of experience. He argues that "there is an intimate link between the inquiry into critique and the interest in experience in Foucault's later works" (2011: 27). Foucault has redefined his critical approach through a novel notion of experience which is radically different from the

[149] Gary Gutting (2002) also argues for the importance of the notion of experience in Foucault's earlier works. However, he recognizes a division of labour in the ways that he deals with it. While in his books Foucault works towards a "patient dissection of normal experience", in his literary essays he moves beyond these normal regimes of truth and historical practices in order to explore forms of transgression and limit-experience. For a similar argument see Rayner, 2003.

one that was present in his earlier works. The new concept of experience is intrinsically transformative because of its three dimensions of rarity (problematization), relationality ("voluntary insubordination") and risk ("the audacity to expose oneself as a subject"). However, while Lemke at the beginning recognizes an inconsistency in the way that Foucault understands experience "as dominant structure and transformative force, as existing background of practices and transcending event" (2011: 26), he surprisingly never suggests a reconciliation between these two senses. In what follows, I will provide a reading of experience and problematization that can render such inconsistency superficial.

As I have already shown, experience and limit-experience were crucial for Foucault's engagement with literature and the being of language. The notion of experience re-emerges, after an interregnum, in his later works and Foucault claims that his work has always been the history of what could be called 'experiences'" (GSO: 5). Thus, he has studied the fundamental experiences of madness, illness, criminality and sexuality (OES: 299). If he writes about these fundamental experiences, moreover, it is because they are linked to Foucault's own experiences: "I haven't written a single book that was not inspired … by a direct personal experience" (IMF: 244). In his famous interview with the Italian journalist, Duccio Trombadori, he states that all his studies have their root in his personal experiences, but since they are linkable to the collective way of thinking and practices, they have made a collective transformation possible (RM: 38-39). He makes it clear that the link between the personal and the collective experience is not constituted through the possibility of re-experience, but rather through escaping the subjectivity of the personal experience. Thus, he makes a distinction between his notion of experience and that of people like Bataille and Artaud. Limit-experience, in Bataille for example, is an individual attempt for desubjectification by experiencing in life what is the closest to the impossibility of living (RM: 31-32). Foucault claims that he has shifted this individualistic notion of experience to the level of collective history (RM: 71).

There are speculations about why Foucault returns to the notion of experience. One argument is that Foucault never dismissed the idea itself but refrained from using the concept because of his "hostility toward phenomenology" (O'Leary, 2011: 168-169; Gutting, 2002). My suggestion is that Foucault, faced with some criticism about the object of his study

and inspired by Paul Veyne's ideas[150], retrospectively contemplated on his methodology and consequently tried to redefine some of his conceptual tools. What is at stake here is the mode of the being of Foucault's objects of study. What can one say, for example, about madness? Is Foucault a historicist who studies universals? If it is an experience, how he can distinguish his own method from a phenomenological approach?

It is regarding these questions that Foucault tells us that his "methodological decision" in studying madness consists in saying "if we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history make of these different events and practices which are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be madness?" (BB: 3). Thus, his historical analysis does not start from a priori universals. However, this does not make madness unreal. Foucault argues that contrary to phenomenological perception, although "madness does not exist … this does not mean it is nothing" (Veyne, 1997: 170).[151] Madness, sexuality, illness and civil society are "transactional realities" ("*réalités de transaction*"), that is to say: "although they have not always existed are nonetheless real, are born precisely from the interplay of relations of power and everything which constantly eludes them, at the interface, so to speak, of governors and governed" (BB: 316). Experience is the name that Foucault gives to these transactional realities. Experience refers to the general effect of a bundle of relations between "fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity" in a historical moment of a specific culture (HS2: 4; GSO: 3; WC: 47). These three axes or as Foucault calls them the "foyer of experience"[152], are the conditions that make possible the emergence of those singular realities. Here Foucault has reversed the general tendency of historical intelligibility. While historical intelligibility traditionally consists in making a unitary source visible as the origin or cause, Foucault argues that one should look for singular effects that arise out of "the multiplicity of extraordinarily diverse procedures": this approach "involves showing the bundle of processes and the network of relations that ultimately induced as a cumulative, overall effect" (STP: 208). Now, one question remains. If the foyer of experience

[150] For example see STP, pp. 315-316, where Foucault mentions Veyn and explicitly admits the influence of his nominalist approach on the way that he wants to study government. In BB, p. 317, Foucault again mentions Veyne and explains that in conceptualizing "liberalism" he has "relied on Paul Veyne's reflections concerning historical universals".

[151] Foucault repeats this statement in different occasions, for example see *The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom*, p. 297. Veyn reports that Raymond Aron was amongst those who understood *History of Madness* in this way.

[152] Timothy O'Leary (2010: 171) suggest that the translation of *foyer* to locus is misleading, because the latter implies that Foucault is looking for the location in which something happens. The French word foyer, however, is ambiguous and in Foucault's usage refers to conditions that makes the emergence of something possible.

refers to, using O'Leary's terminology, the *synchronic* aspect of each culture that makes possible the range of experiences, how one should understand Foucault's claim about the transformative experiences that can, for example, "wrench the subject from itself"?

My suggestion is that, using Koopman's ideas, we need to make a distinction between verbal and nominal aspects of experience. However, while for Koopman these two aspects are independent, my argument is that they are internally linked through the principle of intelligibility. Foucault clearly assets that both the object and the objective of his historical analysis of experience are the same:

> "The experience through which we grasp the *intelligibility* of certain mechanisms (for example, imprisonment, punishment, and so on) and the way in which we are enabled to detach ourselves from them by perceiving them differently will be … one and the same thing" (IMF: 244; my italics).

To understand this internal relation, I will explore the way that Foucault makes things intelligible.

In the manuscript of his lectures on *The Government of Self and Others*, when Foucault attempts to describe his methodology, he recognizes a "nihilistic tendency" that informs his enterprise. This nihilistic tendency is "a form of reflection which, instead of indexing practices to systems of values …, inserts these systems of values in the interplay of arbitrary but intelligible practices" (GSO: 5). Practices here refer to the different axes of the foyer of experience. Thus the way that, for example, madness has been made intelligible at the same time illustrates discursive and non-discursive practices which have historically constituted the value system in which madness can be assessed. This means that instead of assessing and modifying madness in terms of the dominant value system, one can *imagine* a different value system by putting different practices to work. To give another concrete example, instead of examining the penal system and its development, one should start from the prison, mechanisms of imprisonment, the knowledge that these mechanisms produce and make use of, and technologies of subjectification in order to understand and at the same time undermine the penal system by robbing it of its taken-for-granted status (WOP: 408-415). The historical study of experience, thus, can neither be true nor false –because it cannot be assessed by the established value system- but a fiction that has the effects of the real: "experience is neither true nor false; an experience is always a fiction: it's something that one fabricates oneself, that doesn't exist before and will exist afterward" (RM: 62). Fiction is the capacity to "explore the distance between that which does not exist and that

which is" (O'Leary, 2009: 87). Experience as fiction has an emancipatory force, since it shows us that we are not trapped in ties that we cannot untie, but rather our ties are fragile ones which has been historically constituted and thus "can be politically destroyed" (WOP: 412).

The mode of intelligibility that links experience as the foyer of singularities and experience as the transformative effect of practices is based on Foucault's specific conception of ontology. As Foucault made it clear, he starts with the multiplicity of practices, chosen arbitrarily, which constitute the foyer of experience. This ontological aspect of experience, however, has been made intelligible in a way that can undermine and transform the dominant system of veridiction by proposing an alternative one. Foucault's methodological nihilism, which is obviously Nietzschean, implies that "every discourse of truth, every veridiction, be considered essentially as a practice" (GSO: 310). The second implication is that any ontology is inherently a veridiction and hence should "be analyzed as a fiction". It is, for example, possible to start from a different multiplicity of practices than that of Foucault's to show that madness as a singularity has been constituted in a specific way. Foucault's analysis of the shift in the mode of government from raison d'État to liberalism is illuminating. While in the former the state was the starting point, the latter started from the idea that the raison d'etre of the state cannot lie in itself, but one should start from society. Foucault's historical analysis is aimed at revealing these ontologies-veridictions because the former only "as the history of veridiction … has a political significance" (BB: 37-38). Now one question remains, how can one propose a new mode of intelligibility? Foucault's answer is that through problematization as a critical attitude.

Problematization and experience in Foucault's later work have been used in relation to his primary domain of study, i.e. thought. From the beginning of his career, Foucault's aim was to study thought (remember that his chair was called "The History of Systems of Thought"). Throughout his career, he defined thought in different ways, but he has always been careful to distinguish what he calls thought from mentalities and representations. If we consider mentalities as the relation between acts and expressions and representations as the relation between conduct and its meaning, thought for Foucault is related to the "foyer of experience" (HS2: 6-7; GSO: 2-3; PPP: 388). Is thought then, as Lemke (2011: 33) suggests, "almost equivalent" to the concept of experience, or, as O'Leary (2010: 176) states, something "irreducible to concrete social arrangements" that transforms experience? My contention is that thought should be understood in relation to ontology and subjectivity.

If ontology is nothing but a system of veridiction, then the "history of thought ... should be conceived of as a history of ontologies" which give rise to singularities (GSO: 310). Thus, when Foucault claims that what he is doing is "the ontology of the present", he is referring to the mode of thought that gives rise to the singularity of our present. This is because thought is "the domain where the formation, development, and transformation of forms of experience can situate themselves" (HS-UP: 200). On the other hand, Foucault's definition of thought refers to the three axes of the foyer of experience but now these axes are formulated in relation to the subject:

> "By 'thought', I mean that which institutes, in diverse possible forms, the game of truth and falsehood and which, consequently, constitutes the human being as a *subject of knowledge*; that which founds the acceptance or the refusal of the rule and constitutes the human being as a *social and juridical subject*; that which institutes the relation to self and to others, and constitutes the human being as *ethical subject*" (HS-UP: 200-201; modified translation; my italics).

These three aspects of thought are related to Foucault's general project which "has been to create a history of different modes of by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (SP: 326; modified translation).[153] The next step is to see how Foucault gives a positive content to thought.

Foucault's claim is that "the proper task of a history of thought … is to define the conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live" (HS2: 10). Problematization is what makes the link between the problematic and the diversity of solutions possible; through problematization "being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought" (HS2: 11). Here we see that problematization is what makes the link between ontology and veridiction possible. Thus problematization has a double, and yet interconnected, task to fulfill: to transform a given (the multiplicity of practices) into a problem and to provide soil for different responses.[154] A group of behaviors, or practices, first need to become uncertain or give rise to a number of difficulties in order to become a problematic, and this can be done by economic, social, or political practices. However,

[153] As Thomas Flynn (1994: 115) argues, Foucault's engagement with the subject in his later works should not be understood as "growing soft on subjectivism" and putting aside power-knowledge. Rather, Foucault is "translating" his earlier concepts by subjectivation.

[154] This transformation of given to problem should not be confused with the unmasking of the ideological claims of the dominant groups. The latter view is held, for example, by Paulo Freire whose objective was to turn into problems the "myths fed to the people by the oppressors" (Freire, 1972: 132).

Foucault makes it clear that it is possible for these processes to exist without giving rise to any "effective problematization" and thus the only role that they can play is that of instigation (P: 421). The mode of thought is only transformed when, through an effective problematization, different, and sometimes contradictory, responses are simultaneously proposed for that set of difficulties. For the problem of mental illness in the eighteenth century, for example, different solutions were proposed including Tuke's and Pinel's. This is why madness is called a transactional experience: it is the meeting point of problems and solutions. Now it is also possible to understand what Foucault means by saying that madness does not exist but is real. Its reality is the reality of thought which functions in the economy of problem-solutions and is immanent to "our knowledge, ideas, theories, techniques, social relations and economic processes" (P: 418).

Foucault's critical endeavor does not consist in engaging in problems and responses but to uncover the soil that has nourished them both. His aim is not to provide new responses or ask unprecedented questions, because in that case he will fall into the predicament of immanence or, to put it differently, he will become the victim of the bad self-referentiality, an example of which is deconstruction (P: 423; PPP: 389). What needs to be addressed is problematization itself in terms of the limits that it imposes and the freedom that permits us to enjoy. The critical attitude towards our present is nothing other than the study of problematization which at the same time is a historical analysis of the apparent necessity limits and an experience of the possibility to cross these limits once their contingency has been revealed. This "work on our limits" is a way out of the predicament of immanence but does not go as far as to propose global and radical transformations to "escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall program of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, [or] another vision of the world" (WE: 316). The emphasis on the "contemporary reality" should not be confused with a concern to keep up with fashion. Instead of recognizing the discontinuity of time and the ephemeral present, we need to look for what is eternal "not beyond the present, nor behind it, but within it" (WE: 310). The task is not, thus, to destroy the reality but to exercise freedom which means to simultaneously respect this reality and transgress it. Freedom for Foucault is not a universal with distinguishable particular forms in history, but it is a relational concept: "an actual relation … in which the measures of the 'too little' existing freedom is given by the 'even more' freedom demanded" (BB: 63). Freedom and limit are not external to each other, and thus any attempt to find what is eternal in the present (i.e. problematization) reveals

the play of limit-freedom. If historical analysis of the modes of problematization has any emancipatory force, it is because it can show that in whatever given as universal and necessary limit, there is something singular and contingent. Thus, this historico-critical attitude allows us to exercise our freedom to "test the limits" and cross-over them, to imagine it differently. It starts from the dominant problematization, rather than an imaginary plan to be projected onto the present, but its aim is to cross the limit of this reality.

The Concept of Critique

So far I have shown *what* Foucault's critique was, mostly in relation to his later works. In the last three chapters, however, a detailed analysis of Foucault's oeuvre revealed that he hasn't remained in the same framework, and even a same concept should be understood differently and in relation to his predominant mode of thought. Discourse, for example, once was the primary concept of analysis that accounted for the formation of subject-function, but then, as the case was with the *Parrhesiast*, it was the discursive subject that could define the mode of being of the discourse. On the other hand, I have showed that in each phase of his conceptualization, there have always been three elements at work, though they had a different sense in each phase. Is it possible, then, to argue that Foucault has always been doing the same thing? Is it only possible to do this through retrospectively imposing the newly emerged concepts (e.g. problematization, experience or genealogy) to the whole of his oeuvre?

My contention is that it is possible to show that Foucault has always been doing the same thing, but differently. What accounts for the sameness is the *how* of his critical attitude. My argument is that the novelty of Foucault's critique lies in the fact that his oeuvre not only opens up a *plane of immanence* but allows for the emergence of its conceptual ramifications within itself. Thus, the question that confronts us is to see how one can link the *how* and *what* of his oeuvre. I will first have a look at Bruno Latour's idea of critique which is based on the distinction between process ('how') and conceptualization ('what'). Then, using Iain Mackenzie's reading of *What is Philosophy?*, I will show that Deleuze and Guattari's tripartite system of concept, plane of immanence and conceptual personae can provide us with a conceptual framework to understand Foucault's oeuvre. I have chosen Latour and Mackenzie not only because they can help us understand the dynamic of Foucault's oeuvre, but their disagreement over the usefulness of Kantian critique can contribute to the previous discussions we had about Foucault's relation to that tradition.

Bruno Latour in *We have Never been Modern*, argues that we need to make a distinction between modernity as *what* moderns do and modernity as a 'constitution'. The constitution of modernity is based on a division between the natural world and the social world (Latour, 1993: 13-18). Hence, the definition of modernity as humanism overlooks the simultaneous birth of nonhumanity; it is this double "ontological distinction" and their lack of communication that constitutes modernity. And once one realizes the *how* of modernity, they cease to be modern exactly because they have transcended the realm of *what*. Interestingly enough, Latour's ontological reading of modernity has been inspired by historian's revision of the French Revolution. This revision consists in arguing that "revolutionary reading," the way that actors and chronicles understood and discussed what they were doing, cannot define "the events themselves" (ibid: 40). François Furet, for example, proposes that "Revolution as 'modality of historical action' is to be distinguished from the Revolution as 'process'". This relation between history and ontology reminds us of Foucault's idea of history as fiction. Nevertheless, what is interesting in Latour's work is that he holds that the predominant notion of critique corresponds to the modern constitution that makes the link between the event and its conceptualization impossible.[155] His aim is to provide a novel notion of critique that can overcome such difficulty.

Latour starts his provocative essay on critique, *Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern*, by reffering to some examples in relation to the recent events (most significantly, Baudrillard's analysis of 9/11) that show that a sharp distinction between conspiracy theories and "popularized … versions of critique" cannot be held anymore (Latour, 2004: 228). He argues that this situation is due to the fact that we have remained too faithful to "the unfortunate" critical philosophy of Kant. This critical tradition functions through an unjustifiable 'subtraction' that relegates "matters of fact" to their condition of possibility. In this way, we are left with two contradictory critical gestures, which Latour calls 'fairy' and 'fact'. The former designates the position that starts from people's belief in some object (e.g. fashion or poetry) only to illustrate that they are nothing but "mere empty white screens on which is projected the power of society, domination, whatever" (ibid, 237-238). The latter, in contrast, attacks the belief in freedom to make objects by showing how things that they have no control over it (e.g. neurobiology or unconsciousness) have determined this belief. Critique is thus an "ambiguous pharmakon"

[155] For an analysis of Latour's claim that modernity and iconoclastic criticism are inherently linked see Mallavarapu and Prasad, 2006; Blok and Jensen, 2011, pp. 52-74.

that is always right (ibid, 239-240). Latour's suggestion is that we need a third way, a "fair position" that instead of subtraction functions according the principle of "hybridization" (ibid, 243). The role of critic, according to Latour, is not to debunk but to assemble.

While Latour's emphasis on making a distinction between process and historical activity is very helpful, his suggestion for the third way presupposes a knowledge about the process itself on the basis of which he can propose a new modality: new critical tools are necessary because we, who are not modern anymore, cannot use the tools that belong to modernity. The link that he makes between 'how' and 'what' is based on a very strong historicism which in the final analysis presupposes the former uncritically. If one wanted to apply Latour's insight to the analysis of Foucault's oeuvre, they would say that, for example, the concept of parrhesia is essential for Foucault's later works, because he was a Parrhesiast at that time. But isn't it possible to have an idea of Foucault's oeuvre that links 'what' and 'how' without prioritizing one over the other? I will show that MacKenzie in *The Idea of Pure Critique* proposes such an approach.

MacKenzie makes a distinction between the critical activity and the idea of critique and argues that the latter should be understood as "pure critique". Impurity of critique implies that critique "contains an investment in that which it criticizes and, therefore, can never bring that which it criticizes fully to account" (MacKenzie, 2004: XVI). It means that these impure criticisms will entrap us perpetually in the present. Pure critique, on the other hand, provides us with a liminality to render the present past and move towards a future. Thus, "the task of a pure idea of critique is to ensure that the given is never surreptitiously reintroduced into the gestures of critique" (ibid, XVII). Generally speaking, MacKenzie argues, three modes of critique are discernable: partial criticism, total critique, and pure critique. The distinction is made on the basis of their relation to "a regime of justification". Partial criticism remains within the system of justification of the very thing that it criticizes (e.g. criticizing one aspect of democracy), total critique moves beyond the terrain of what it criticizes only to recourse to a deeper one (e.g. criticizing democracy from the point of oligarchy, while both share a common justificatory foundation in normative political theory), but pure critique is not justified by reference to anything other than itself (ibid, 22-25).

Purity, moreover, far from "being anathema to the understanding of complexity and interconnectedness", is actually a "preparatory work" which is necessary for such an understanding (ibid, XI). In Kant, for example, the idea of purity denotes the

incommensurability of the transcendental concepts and the empirical contents which have been made possible by the former (ibid, XIII). Thus, the essence of purity lies in *subtraction*: after removing impurity of the empirical, the pure transcendental will remain. On the basis of this idea Mackenzie argues that pure critique is the result of a "three-fold subtraction": "by subtracting from the idea of critique *pre-given conceptions* of the world to be criticized, the activity of critique itself and the nature of the critic that carries out the critical gesture" (ibid, XIV; original emphasis). This three-fold subtraction guarantees that critique is purely immanent and that no transcendent element will find its way into critique on the basis of any type of shared justificatory framework. This means that pure critique must reject the commonality of world, concept and agent (ibid, 27). What remains, however, is not a pure negativity but rather, as Husserl's "phenomenological reduction" illustrates, provides a basis for "expansion".[156]

MacKenzie then argues that what pure critique should do away with is indifference. Kant understands indifference as *philodoxy*, which happens when metaphysical subtleties, thanks to the debate between dogmatism and skepticism, turn into fashionable popularities that have no substance. Here MacKenzie introduces a very helpful distinction between critique and criticism. While criticism refers to the unreflective reciprocation of claim and counter-claim (all examples that Latour gives in his essay belong to this framework), which gives rise to indifference, critique is "a mode of inquiry aimed at overcoming indifference (ibid, 6). Indifference that critique must confront and overcome, thus, functions "liminally" between the pre-critical mode of thought and the critical thought (ibid, 4-5). MacKenzie argues that while Kant inaugurated the inquiry into the totality of the domain of reason in order to uproot indifference, he finally defined this domain by appealing to indifference. MacKenzie gives two reasons for this failure. On the one hand, the result of the problematic relation between pure and practical reason: the aim of pure reason is to pave the way for settling theological and moral criticisms, but such an aim can be achieved only through assuming something which cannot be known, i.e. freedom, within the framework of pure reason. On the other hand, Kant's proclaimed indifference towards a theologians-atheists debate about

[156] Critique as subtraction is also compatible with Heidegger's (1969: 119) exploration of this concept. He traces back the term critique to the Greek verb *krinein*, which "means 'to sort' *[sondern]*, 'to sort out' and thus 'to lift out that of special sort' [*das Besondere herausheben*]". Thus critique, far from having a negative sense, "designates the most positive activity": "to criticize means to select and to bring out what is special, uncommon, and at the same time measure-giving, it is also to reject what is commonplace and unsuitable".

God rests on the objectification of reason, which is formulated as "there is no antithetic of pure reason". Accordingly, indifference returns doubly.

To develop the idea of pure critique, MacKenzie reads Deleuze and Guattari's work in the light of the critical attitude that was inaugurated by Kant, that is to say, critique as overcoming indifference. What makes their endeavor very specific is that instead of developing Kant's critical philosophy they have attempted to radicalize "*the idea of critique itself*" (ibid, XXIII; original emphasis).[157] He illustrates that the three elements of their constructivist philosophy, i.e. concept, plane of immanence and conceptual persona, which were presented in *What is Philosophy?*, are the first steps towards giving a positive content to the three-fold subtraction (28). What is important for our study is that MacKenzie shows that if one wants to understand the idea of critique which can account for both the diversity of conceptual creation and transformations and the continuity of a critical project, one needs to take into account the relation between three elements of constructivism. Now I will turn to Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy?* in order to explicate these three elements. This will enable me to illustrate that the continuity of Foucault's critical endeavour ('how' of critique) can be accounted for through a plane of immanence which has three different concepts-events ('what' of critique). Accordingly, instead of trying to impose unity on Foucault's work using his own notions and concepts, one can acknowledge different phases of his career in relation to a unitary terrain.

Deleuze and Guattari's (2013:5) rather a straightforward answer to the question of what is philosophy? is that philosophy "is the discipline that involves creating concepts".[158] Nevertheless, what they mean by the term 'concept' needs to be elaborated on because they don't use it in its ordinary sense. As Smith (2012: 122-123) argues, for example, one of the main features of their notion of concept is that it is not an identity but can only be grasped as becoming. Philosophy as the creation of concepts is distinguished from, and at the same time linked to, science, which creates prospects, and art, which creates percepts and affects. But how should we understand the concept? They make a distinction between concepts, as the products of thought (what thinking does), and the "conceptless" thought

[157] Koopman (2014: 11) argues that Foucault should be considered among those philosophers who "have sought to transform Kant's critical project on the basis of elements internal to that project". Thus, one can say that while Foucault and Deleuze belong to the same project, one has emphasized more on the critical activity and the other on its conceptual framework. See also Allen, 2008.

[158] See also Deleuze, 1990, p. 321, one of Deleuze's early works, where he states that "the power of a philosophy is measured by the concepts it creates, or whose meaning it rejuvenates—concepts that impose a new set of divisions on things and actions".

(how of thinking) (MacKenzie,2004:33). When philosophy is defined as contemplation, reflection, or communication, this distinction has been blurred, a problem which they call 'idealism'. To avoid idealism, we need two separate, and yet externally connected, realms of concept and plane of immanence, and a third element, i.e. conceptual personae, to establish the connection.

The concept is totalizing and yet fragmentary; it is a bridge between chaos and explanation. The concept combines different elements, but it cannot possess the whole because in that case it will turn into chaos. Since concepts are neither singular nor universal, two types of relations are discernable: endoconsitency (Zone) and exoconsistency (Bridge) of concepts. The former refers to the relation between the components of a concept, these components while are distinct, there are areas (zones) that belong to more than one component, it is here that they become inseparable or indiscernible. This renders the concept "the point of … condensation of its own components": concept is an Event (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013:20). The latter refers to the fact that each concept is related to other concepts "that constitute other regions of the same plane". This means that while the closure of each concept is attained through the relation of its components, each element has the possibility to "branch off" to other concepts. To illustrate these aspects of the concept, I will stick to the example of the Cartesian Cogito, which has been explained in some details by Deleuze and Guattari.

For Deleuze and Guattari Descartes's concept of self is one of "the best-knowing signed philosophical concepts". This concept has three components, or three I, the consolidation of which is the Cartesian concept of self. This concept consists of the doubting I, the thinking I and the mode of the being of I, thus Descartes's statement can be rewritten as follow: "Myself who doubts, I think, I am, I am a thinking thing". To understand the endoconsitency of the Cogito, we need to find indiscernibilities or zones. The first zone is constituted through the relation between thinking and being ('in order to think it is necessary to be') and the second zone emerges out of the relation between thinking and doubting ('the one who doubts, cannot doubt that doubting is thinking'). What is important here is that the Cartesian self, as a concept, is the combination (*chiffre*) of these three components. Now two questions remain, firstly, how it is possible for a concept to "bridge" and, secondly, how the order of the combination should be determined.

The answer to the first question is found in the way that Deleuze and Guattari define the components. They argue that the components are "neither constants nor variables but pure and simple variations" (ibid, 20). More importantly, each variable has several phases. The phases of being, for example, include "infinite being, finite thinking being, and extended being". In the Cartesian Cogito, only the second phase of the being retained, which ensures the closure of the concept. Thus, to pass to other phases we need a *bridge* to move to another concept: the concept of God. Again, through another phase of the being, this new concept "branches off" to the concept of the extended objective world. These relations on the basis of the phases of the components ensure the exoconsistency between concepts. However, it should be noted that within each concept, it is possible that components retain more than one phase. For example, the mode of thought in Cartesian self consists of feeling, having ideas and imagination. Now, to answer the second question we need first to see what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the plane of immanence.

While concepts and the plane of immanence are correlative, they should not be confused with each other: "concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013:36). It was already established that for them philosophy starts with the creation of concepts, therefore the plane of immanence must be understood as "prephilosophical". But how one can explain this prephilosophical and its relation to philosophy? Does prephilosophy mean subjective presuppositions? In the case of the Cartesian self, Deleuze and Guattari argue, the novelty of Descartes's Cogito is that it challenges the objective presuppositions and substitutes it with "implicit and subjective propositions". Accordingly, the prephilosophical does not necessarily refer to common presuppositions but it is only one of the possibilities. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the plane of immanence is "the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think", and it should be distinguished from method, 'state of knowledge', program, design, end, or opinions (ibid, 37-41). The subjective presupposition is the plane of immanence presupposed by the Cartesian concept of self. The plane of immanence, thus, cannot preexist the concept, and yet at the same time it is the "absolute ground" upon which philosophy creates concepts. For example, the possibility of stating 'the present happens' is grounded in the presupposition of a 'past becoming- future' as a limitless expanse of time, and in the same way the concept is grounded in a conceptless image of thought (MacKenzie, 2004: 31).

The idea of the plane of immanence enables Deleuze and Guattari to avoid the trap of idealism. The problem of idealism, as I explained, consists in confusing the creation of concepts with the plane of immanence. To put it differently, "the prephilosophical plane of immanence is always made immanent to the privileged concept (contemplation, reflection or communication)" and thus gives rise to "illusions of transcendence" (ibid, 31-32). Constructivism, as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, clearly distinguished between created concepts and instituted plane, while at the same time claim that they have an 'indirect relationship'. Before moving to the explanation of this relationship, it should be noted that it is possible to create new concepts but remain on the same plane. The possibility of being a 'disciple', to be, for example, a neo-Kantian is based on the fact that while they create new concepts, they still remain faithful to the Kantian image of thought. Deleuze and Guattari (2013: 57-58) distinguish this type of concept-creation, which only gives the existing plane new 'curves', from the critical concept-creation: "the fact that Kant 'criticizes' Descartes means only that he sets up a plane … that could not be occupied or completed by the Cartesian Cogito" (ibid, 32). Regarding the main concerns of this thesis, it would be interesting to see what we should make of Foucault's claim that "we are all neo-Kantians". Isn't it possible to understand Foucault as a 'disciple' who tries to add a new curve to the Kantian plane? Or it might be the case that his work only gives rise to 'doubts': "is this not a different plane that is woven in the mesh of the first one?" (ibid, 56).

Although the relationship between the plane of immanence and concept can help to overcome the transcendental illusion of idealism, we still need to grasp the nature of this relationship. Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is something 'mysterious' between the concept and the plane of immanence. In the case of the Cartesian self, for example, we need a third element between the concept of Cogito and the subjective presupposition. The third element is called conceptual personae which, generally speaking, constitute 'points of view' (ibid, 74-76). These points of view make the passage from the plane of immanence to the infinity of concepts that occupy it possible. However, the conceptual personae should not be confused with the philosopher but rather "the philosopher is the envelope of his principal conceptual persona and of all the other subjects of his philosophy" (MacKenzie, 2004: 35). This is why Deleuze and Guattari (2013: 24) argue that proper names in philosophy "designate intrinsic conceptual personae who haunt a particular plane of consistency". Since the conceptual personae make the external relation between the plane of immanence and

concept possible, one should be careful not to let this point of view be dominated by one of the concepts.

Deleuze and Guattari's tripartite system enables me to offer a reading of Foucault's oeuvre that can account both for the creation of different critical concepts and the institution of a plane of immanence. Foucault's insistence to not remain the same, in this reading, should be understood as the recognition of the constructedness of his perspective. In the next chapter, I will apply this framework to Foucault's oeuvre and explore its implications.

Conclusion

In each chapter of this dissertation, we studied one variable of Foucault's concepts of critique and its modifications. It was only in the last chapter that Foucault's critical activity was discussed to the extent that it could be distinguished from what made that activity possible. Now it is time to bring all those variables together and give flesh to the bones of Foucault's concepts of critique. However, the first task is to discuss very briefly Foucault's image of thought or the plane of immanence, as it became clear during his final lectures. We will then proceed by putting together the components of each concept and constructing its schema. By way of illustration we will see that Foucault's critical activity at each stage of his career corresponds to the respective dominant concept of critique.

Foucault defines thought as the "foyer of experience", where three elements of "forms of possible knowledge (*savoir*), normative frameworks of behavior, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects" are articulated (GSO: 3; modified translation). We have already discussed the relation between experience and thought, but what is interesting here is that Foucault provides us with an image of thought as a foyer which is based on the relation between three elements. These elements correspond to the three concepts of critique that we have discussed in this study. Moreover, Foucault claims that while these three elements were presented in his first book, i.e. *History of Madness*, in those studies that came after that he only emphasized one dimension of this foyer. Thus, the first characteristic of Foucault's image of thought is that it is correlational.

We have already discussed other characteristics of Foucault's image of thought in the introduction. Thought for him is a "line of displacement" that traces the continuous shifts in 'positions'. Thinking as plotting entails that it is a continuous process and at any moment the 'curve' of thought can be shifted drastically due to the fact that positions are not static. What is important here is that Foucault links this movement to conceptual personae. As Deleuze and Guattari (2014: 64) put it, "conceptual personae are the philosopher's 'heteronyms', and the philosopher's name is the simple pseudonym of his personae"; to put it more generally, the conceptual persona is "a point of view" (MacKenzie, 2004: 35). Foucault's 'changing position' is another name for the conceptual persona. It is possible to highlight three principal conceptual personae, each corresponding to one of his concepts of critique: Writer, Warrior and Parrhesiast. These are not psychological or empirical determinations but conceptual personae that 'deterritorialize' and 'reterritorialize' thought.

It is here that critique as an activity ('how') shines forth. As it was demonstrated by MacKenzie (2004: 42), critique as an activity should be considered in relation to a "point of view" or a conceptual persona. In previous chapters we made it clear that this "point of view" is immanent to the oeuvre. Thus, one can capture the multiplicities of critique only through a detailed analysis of Foucault's oeuvre as an experience, or as a shifting "point of view". Now it is time to return to each of those multiplicities and see how the relation between variables provided the space for its relevant conceptual persona.



Figure 1

In the first concept of critique, the relation between the three variables of Articulation, Visibility, and Subject are arranged in an order that Articulation plays the most prominent role (Figure 1). This prominence shows itself in Foucault's engagement with mad-philosophers, literary criticism, discourse, and commentary. The two other variables gain their significance only in relation to Articulation. The Subject, for example, is understood as subject-function whose being is dependent on discourse: the subject has no other existence than a function constituted through the discursive formation. Foucault's own style of writing in this period plays a significant role in emphasizing the superiority of Articulation over other elements. When he is writing, at this stage, his aim is not to write about things that are visible or express his own ideas but to "write in such a way that people feel a kind of physical pleasure in reading them" (FL: 137). It is writing itself that can make things visible and sensible. The Writer in this phase does not refer to any specific author, but it is the point of view that makes critical thinking possible; it is what Deleuze and Guattari call the conceptual persona. The Writer is the internal condition of thought that makes it possible to "face the world … even destroy it" in order to give rise to a "counter-universe", while itself always 'scintillating' outside any universe (FL: 11). Here, thought itself requires the thinker to be a

writer so that thinking as an act of writing can be exercised. Foucault's critical activity in this period, as discussed in chapter 1, hinges upon the analysis of "systems that envelope discourse" (OD: 73).



Figure 2

Visibility in the first concept of critique was related to the spatiality of Articulation (literature). It was through the other phase of Visibility, i.e. the material, that the second concept of critique could emerge. In this concept of critique, Visibility came to occupy the central place and determine other variables (Figure 2). As Foucault's analysis of prison showed, the main issue here was the question of visibility (i.e. panopticon) and other variables derived their sense from it. The subject, for example, could acquire its new phase, i.e. subjectification, because it should be understood in relation to its materiality. Here again, Foucault's style of writing is very revealing: the dramatic scenes at the beginning of *Discipline and Punish* were not rhetorical devices but a visible arena that required explanation. In this phase, it was visibility, or even banality, that made an analysis necessary. Here what determines the point of view is the Warrior, because the thinker is presented as thinking in terms of confrontations. In the series of lectures titled *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault returns to the themes that he had already discussed in *History of Madness*, but since the point of view has changed, his mode of thinking is not the same. Instead of transgression and tragic structures, which could only be made visible through discourse and literature, he now deals with a "scene" which stages a "battle" or a "relationship of force": "a confrontation of two wills", that of doctors and patients (PP: 8-10). It is for this reason that Foucault thought it

was necessary to adopt military terminologies of strategy and tactic. Thus, an "effective critique" consists in attacking the dominant play of visibility in order to bring to the fore confrontations and struggles that have been made invisible. The task of critical activity is to enable us "to see the dividing lines in the confrontations and struggles that functional arrangements or systematic organizations are designed to mask" (SMD: 7).



Figure 3

The third concept of critique only emerged when the Subject could attain a new phase (Figure 3). Foucault starts to recognize other phases of the subject by arguing that subjection refers to individuals' "constitution as subjects in both senses of the word" (HS1: 60). He later explains these two senses: "there are two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to someone else by control and dependence and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (SP: 331). Gradually the second sense of the subject becomes the determining variable, and other variables are interpreted in relation to the self-referentiality of the subject. Here, for example, Foucault claims that he is still interested in the "being of discourse". But this time he does not understand it in relation to a spatial event, neither it is conceived through its confrontational nature. The being of discourse should be analyzed in terms of the subject, and thus the relevant question is: "what is the mode of being that this discourse of veridiction imposes on the subject who employs it, such that this subject can play this particular game of truth properly" (GSO: 310-311)? The conceptual persona in this case is the truth-teller or Parrhesiast. Accordingly, critical thinking does not consist in asking questions about formal or transcendental conditions of possibility of statements or strategies. Rather, Foucault, "from the point of view of veridiction", attempts to investigate "how subjects are effectively tied within and by the forms of veridiction in which they

engage" (WDTT: 20). Foucault calls the former approach "the analytics of truth" and argues that it is only the latter that referes to a "critical tradition" in the west (FS, 170-171).

Foucault's critical project opens up a plane of immanence and brings about the multiplicity of concepts. We are not dealing with one Foucault, but different conceptual personae and thus any attempt to reduce his thought to one of those concepts cannot do justice to its theoretical ramifications. His oeuvre is a foyer which makes it possible to have a critical experience without falling on either side of transcendentalism or empiricism. This dissertation is an attempt to remap Foucault's oeuvre in order to bring to the fore the importance of critique as an activity. Most studies focus on ideas and thoughts developed in his works ('what'), but the aim of this study was to shift the attention towards his thinking ('how') and the experience of critique. This displacement will enable us to consider all those familiar concepts and ideas, such as discourse, subject, and power, in a new light. At the same time, critique as an experience in itself paves the way for new line of inquiries and investigations. Instead of projecting static concepts onto a evershifting world, it will be possible to construct a dynamic multiplicity that could reflect that changing nature of our world.

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