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**Puppets of the Barbarian:  
How Persia controlled Greek relations with the Persian Empire**

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## Abstract

The study of Graeco-Persian relations is not new to academia, however, as much of our information is found within Greek literary texts, we are largely at the mercy of Greek bias concerning these relations. This thesis will present a detailed re-examination of the relevant sources to gain further understanding of Graeco-Persian relations, with a view to looking beyond Greek literary bias. This thesis proposes that the influence of the Persian Empire upon the Greeks was greater than is initially implied by our sources and I argue that in the majority of the contacts between Greek and Persian, Persia took control. The notable exception to this is the highly debated Peace of Callias, which forced Persia to offer concessions to the Greeks, but it should be noted that we have no record of possible Greek concessions to Persia, and so we must treat this topic with caution. This thesis expands our knowledge of Graeco-Persian relations by taking a view of the entire period of these relations, from initial contacts until the accession of Alexander the Great, allowing us to view more general trends throughout this period, rather than viewing shorter phases within the whole period.

## Acknowledgements

The production of this thesis has taken much longer than originally planned and has to some extent been a team effort for my family and friends. I am eternally to grateful to my parents who have both spent many hours proof reading various chapters at various stages of completion. The many 'care' packages sent by my sister have been blessings and have helped to keep me sane when it has seemed that I would never finish. I am thankful for the support and encouragement of my partner, James, who has helped to keep me motivated in the final staged of completing this work. I need to thank and acknowledge the support of my boss, Susan Tingle, for allowing me such flexibility at work which has enabled me to fit my studies around my 'day job'. I would like to thank Miss Louise Gaukroger who has studied alongside me every step of the way, making the journey more bearable. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Dr Csaba La'da, who took over the supervision of my work in the wake of Dr Keaveney's retirement. Finally, it cannot be understated how incredibly grateful I am to Dr Arthur Keaveney, who has guided me, argued with me, fed me tea and biscuits, and gone above and beyond in his supervision of my work; even after taking retirement in July 2015. His unfailing efforts have kept me on track.

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## Introduction

The study of Greek history during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. is not new. In the English speaking world alone we may take as examples G. Grote's, *History of Greece*, written in the nineteenth century, and, in our own time, works such as N.G.L. Hammond's *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* and S. Hornblower's, *The Greek World 479-323 B.C.* Achaemenid history, however, has largely been ignored, as is acknowledged by G. Cawkwell.<sup>1</sup> For a long time the standard work was A.T. Olmstead's *History of the Persian Empire*, posthumously published in 1948. It was not until 1983 that J.M. Cook produced *The Persian Empire*, which coincided with the *Achaemenid Workshops* which ran from 1987-1994. Two noteworthy works have relatively recently been produced, P. Briant's *From Cyrus to Alexander: a History of the Persian Empire*, and A. Kuhrt's source book, *The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period*.

This recent growth in Achaemenid studies has provided a greater understanding of the Empire, however, they tend to focus on Persian culture and history, and not especially on international relations. Kuhrt, however, notes that "it is worth remembering that the lives of Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries were intimately bound up with the Achaemenid Empire,"<sup>2</sup> and that many of our Greek sources had considerable experience of the Empire. Herodotus was born within its borders, Ctesias was a doctor for the Persian court, and Xenophon had commanded Greek mercenaries within and against the Persian Empire.

Notable of the scholarship above is that it is divided between Greek history and Achaemenid history, but it is self-evident that there is reason for them to be studied together in an attempt to understand the influence of each upon the other. This has previously been attempted by A.R. Burn in *Persia and the Greeks* and H. Bengtson in *The Greeks and Persia*, however, both Bengtson and Burn were published a number of years ago, 1970 and 1962 respectively; although Burn was republished in 1984 with a postscript there were no major additions to the main body of his work from 1962. Likewise, D. Gillis'

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<sup>1</sup> G. Cawkwell, 2005, preface.

<sup>2</sup> Kuhrt, 2010, p. 7.

*Collaboration with the Persians* examines with the subject, but was published in 1979. Therefore, a fresh study of the question would seem to be required.

In the same way that the Persian Empire was a constant factor in Greek politics,<sup>3</sup> it is easy to underestimate the importance of the Greeks in Persian politics and, thus, the need for Persia to attempt to control this. It should not be forgotten that the resistance of the Greek states prevented the expansion of the Persian Empire West. Also, this subsequent assertion of Greek power interfered with Persian control of those peoples who had already been conquered, for example, the Egyptians, the Cypriots and the Ionian Greeks. These actions forced Xerxes and his successors to abandon the previous Persian policy of expansionism and, instead, look to consolidating the territory already held by the Persian Empire. It cannot be ignored that the use of Greek mercenaries by Cyrus the Younger in 401 B.C. and their subsequent employment by Egypt and the rebellious satraps in the 360s B.C. was a major concern for Artaxerxes II. Indeed, the presence of Greek mercenaries in Egypt, which rebelled in the 390s, can, arguably, explain why it was able to rebel from Persia for such a long period of time: it was not reconquered by Persia until 343 B.C., again with the use of Greek mercenaries. Thus, we can see that the Greeks were not simply of minor concern to the Persian Empire.<sup>4</sup> A separate study looking at these political interactions is necessary, therefore, to provide a more comprehensive view of Greek and Persian international relations during this period.

This thesis intends to focus on the political relationship between Greece and Persia, looking especially at the methods used by Persia in an attempt to dominate this relationship to her own advantage. These methods include dividing Greek resistance to Persia by seducing individual Greeks, as well as whole states, to support Persia, or, in some cases, to not resist Persia. This was most prevalent during the initial phase of the relationship between the two peoples in the sixth century through to the mid-fifth century until the Peace of Callias, and was termed 'medism' by the Greeks. Persia was also able to

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<sup>3</sup> A similar relationship can be seen in that between Ireland and the United Kingdom.

<sup>4</sup> Lenfant, 2015, pp. 281-283, argues that much of the modern notion of Greek-Persian natural hostility originates from Isocrates.



dominate political negotiations with the Greeks through the embassies sent by both peoples and the resulting treaties made after the Persian Invasion. We will see that in the fourth century Persia had achieved such dominance over the Greeks and, despite not actually conquering them, Artaxerxes II was able to dictate to them how to settle their internal wars in order to employ Greek mercenaries within the Persian Empire.

It is hoped that, as a result of studying the ways by which Persia attempted to dominate the Greeks, conclusions can be reached which expand our knowledge of how international relations between Greece and Persia impacted on their more general foreign policies.

This thesis will argue that Persia's impact on Greek interstate and international policy was largely as the result of a Persian policy, which attempted to control their relationship with the Greeks. This will become apparent by Persian attempts not only to conquer the Greeks, by invading Greece in the early fifth century, but also to woo them through bribery, which was employed not only during the Persia invasion but also during the second Peloponnesian War. It is hoped that by studying the political interactions between the Greeks and Persia it will become apparent that there was a general Persian foreign policy concerning the Greeks. It has been suggested to me that this, in some ways, resembles Britain's Irish Question in that we have a greater power attempting to dominate a lesser one.

It must be noted that this study will be governed by the nature of the sources available. Persian sources, with the exception of the Behistun Inscription, do not provide an historical narrative, but instead emphasise the physical and mental qualities of the king, and the vastness of the Persian Empire.<sup>5</sup> Thus, we are forced to use primarily Greek sources, the majority of which are literary. The most important historical sources of Herodotus, Ctesias of Cnidus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus are central to our

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<sup>5</sup> Behistun: Brosius, 2000, n. 44. For samples of other inscriptions regarding the vastness of the Persian Empire see Brosius n. 12, n. 45, n. 46, n. 48, n. 63, n. 103, n. 104. Much of the remaining inscriptions are related to Persian building programs. Cf. Briant, 2002, p. 5.

research and will be accompanied by relevant available inscriptions and epigraphical evidence. We are fortunate that the sources we have cover most of the period of study, enabling us to assess historical developments. Whilst we are forced to work within the limitations of the sources available, in many cases we may also make reasonable conjectures based on the basis of this material. Kuhrt notes the “wealth of potential information” available from Greek sources concerning the Achaemenid Empire, but warns that we must take into account their context and the aims of the writers to ensure we account for their bias and exaggerations.<sup>6</sup>

Kuhrt suggests Herodotus’ partisan attitude towards the leading Greeks during the Persian Wars should be borne in mind. However, Briant correctly notes that Herodotus shows “no evidence of systematic hostility to the Persians”<sup>7</sup> and, thus, we are able to learn much from him. Bengtson, whilst recognising that in general he is to be trusted, notes that when consulting Herodotus we should use “strict critical judgement”.<sup>8</sup> Thus, we must be mindful that Herodotus’ conception of historical truth is different to ours.<sup>9</sup> Despite advising that some of Herodotus’ accounts of much earlier history to the fifth century lead to caution against taking Herodotus’ narrative at “face value”, Flower concedes that Herodotus still remains the “best and fullest sources for Achaemenid history.”<sup>10</sup> Despite the classical opinions of Cicero and Plutarch, charging Herodotus with falsifying his accounts of the East, A. Momigliano notes that most of Herodotus’ accounts of the East have now been verified by archaeological evidence and the modern ability to translate inscriptions from Egypt, Persia, and Babylon, which Herodotus was unable to do. Taken into consideration with his account of the Persian invasion of Greece, Momigliano concludes that the information we can double check gives no reason to doubt Herodotus.<sup>11</sup> He notes that the classical tradition to doubt Herodotus stems from Thucydides’ criticism of his methods to

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<sup>6</sup> Kuhrt, 2010, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Briant, 2002, p. 7. This opinion is supported by Flower, 2006, p. 286.

<sup>8</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 38.

<sup>9</sup> Flower, 2006, p. 278.

<sup>10</sup> Flower, 2006, pp. 280-281.

<sup>11</sup> Momigliano, 2013, p. 33. Cf. Pritchett, 1993, *passim*.

enquire into the remote past rather than simply account contemporaneous events. Finley suggests, however, that despite his apparent criticism of Herodotus, the fact that Thucydides did not recount the Persian Wars suggests he felt that he did not need to.<sup>12</sup>

Most of Ctesias' work, which was 23 books in total, is lost to us and the remainder is available only via references in other works and the summary by Photius. Ctesias' writings were derived from personal observation as well as the oral tradition of the Persian court. Brosius' argument that Ctesias may never have been at the Persian, which rests on the examination of the extant fragments, ignores completely this fragmentary nature.<sup>13</sup> It has been suggested that Ctesias began his medical career in Persia c. 415 B.C.<sup>14</sup> and that he returned to Greece after 399 B.C.<sup>15</sup> Llewellyn-Jones notes his poor reputation, due to the fragmentary state of his work,<sup>16</sup> but Kuhrt defends his accounts "for events closer to his own time in Persia ... appear to be reliable" and suggests he provides a different perspective rather than false testimony.<sup>17</sup> Stronk suggests that it is feasible that Ctesias could have "orally consulted the temple scribes at Babylon" which is suggested in Diodorus Siculus XI.22.5, thus, he should not be dismissed entirely.<sup>18</sup> Stronk reminds us that one of the criteria of Photius for selecting what he did of Ctesias was that it differed from Herodotus' accounts, thus, we are left primarily with the contentious parts of Ctesias and cannot judge their historical value fairly against the backdrop of Herodotus. He notes the further issue with the extant work is that historical copyists had a tendency to adapt work to their own purpose, thus, we cannot be one hundred per cent sure of the accuracy of that which is attributed to Ctesias.<sup>19</sup> He believes that Ctesias' *Persica* "fails as a history" due to his interest in form rather than matter.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Finley, 1972, p. 15.

<sup>13</sup> Brosius, 2011, pp. 73-77.

<sup>14</sup> Eck, 1990, pp. 430-431.

<sup>15</sup> Stronk, 2010, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> Llewellyn-Jones, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Kuhrt, 2010, p.8.

<sup>18</sup> Stronk, 2010, p. 32.

<sup>19</sup> Stronk, 2010, pp. 35-36.

<sup>20</sup> Stronk, 2010, pp. 36.

Llewellyn-Jones treats Ctesias as he would a historical novel, which necessarily has fictional and historical elements interwoven, believing that it was not Ctesias' aim to write a history, per se. Thus, he suggests, the history in Ctesias must be "filter(ed) through other literary genres that interweave throughout the narrative."<sup>21</sup> He notes that the oral traditions of the East suggest an interest in general trends rather than specific facts or dates, thus, the *Persica* was subject to these constraints and operates within them.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, it is necessary to be wary of the information we can obtain from Ctesias as we must take into account the controversy which surrounds his *Persica*.

Adcock, discussing Thucydides' motives, notes that we should not judge him by "the modern practice of a historian" because the main purpose for his writing was purely "intellectual enlightenment."<sup>23</sup> Thucydides himself says that his aim was simply to report the facts of the Peloponnesian War without comment to instruct future generations of the actions of the War and then let them make their own conclusions. Finley notes that Thucydides' lack of references to his sources makes it difficult to "assess the account intelligently."<sup>24</sup> This is especially true because his manuscript was published posthumously and the manuscript seems to be unfinished. We are fortunate in that Thucydides was contemporaneous to the events he relates and, more so for his exile in 424 B.C., which allowed him to collect information from both sides of the war. Adcock believes that Thucydides wrote at least notes of events and a draft of his work as they occurred and that Thucydides was "conscious of writing in the present about the present".<sup>25</sup> Of particular interest to this research is Finley's comment that Book VIII suggests Thucydides' realisation of the importance of Persia to the Peloponnesian War. Thus, he poses the question whether Thucydides would not have supplemented his earlier books in light of this.<sup>26</sup> Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides does not give alternative views to his accounts and, so Finley notes,

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<sup>21</sup> Llewellyn-Jones, 2010, pp.4-5.

<sup>22</sup> Llewellyn-Jones, 2010, p. 66.

<sup>23</sup> Adcock, 1963, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Finley, 1972, p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> Adcock, 1963, pp. 110-111.

<sup>26</sup> Finley, 1972, p. 13.

we must take his account on faith.<sup>27</sup> In some cases he is supported by inscriptions, against which we can cross reference his work and, also, later works by the likes of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch, with whom we will deal below.

Xenophon, writing after Thucydides, continues the narrative of the Peloponnesian War in his *Hellenica* and, we are led to believe, attempted to mimic Thucydides' style. Cawkwell, however, notes that Xenophon lacks Thucydides' accuracy and it is believed that he wrote his *Hellenica* in, at least, two parts, the break being at II.3.10 with the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War. The part prior to II.3.10 it is believed was written roughly contemporaneously and the rest was written after c. 350 B.C., thus many years after the events had occurred. The primary problem with Xenophon's narrative is his notorious omissions of facts, which we must discern from other sources. Indeed, Cawkwell claims Xenophon's "historical judgements are superficial, his interests narrow and his omissions outstanding, even within the range of his interests."<sup>28</sup> Thus, it is necessary to supplement his account with the likes of Plutarch and the Oxyrhynchus Historian, who is judged to be more accurate than Xenophon. It is believed likely that Xenophon did not use other sources available to him but wrote from his own memories, thus, Cawkwell likens Xenophon's *Hellenica* to a memoir rather than a history. This explains in part why the events at which he was personally present have more details than other events, from which he was absent.<sup>29</sup> Cawkwell suggests Xenophon obtained much of his information from first-hand experience or from contact with those who had first-hand experience of the events and was, therefore, subject to their perspective on events.<sup>30</sup> It is apparent that much of his *Hellenica* is influenced by his anti-Theban and pro-Spartan feelings: Xenophon underplays Sparta's medising with Persia and the various peace treaties of the fourth century until Thebes' involvement in the 360s. However, taking all this into consideration, Xenophon did serve with the ten thousand and was contemporary to the events

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<sup>27</sup> Finley, 1972, pp. 29-30.

<sup>28</sup> Cawkwell, 1979, p. 13.

<sup>29</sup> Cawkwell, 1979, p. 23.

<sup>30</sup> Cawkwell, 1979, pp. 24-28.

he records in both his *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*. Flower notes that Xenophon's audience would expect his *Anabasis* to be "free from outright fabrications."<sup>31</sup> We must be mindful that Xenophon was not the only one to write of the Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor or, indeed, a history of Greece in the fourth century B.C.: we have already noted the Oxyrhynchus Historian above. Thus, we can suggest that, although subject to Xenophon's feelings and the effects of time on his memory, the essential facts of his *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* are correct. His experiences, first in Athens and then later Persia, Sparta and Corinth, make him uniquely placed in that it is likely, as we have said, he had first-hand experience of the events he narrates.

Peter Green notes that Diodorus Siculus, despite his poor reputation as simply a copyist, provides the only continuous narrative of events from the Persian Wars through to Alexander the Great.<sup>32</sup> That he has a reputation as a copyist is possibly the real value to be placed on him, in that texts now lost to us are available via Diodorus Siculus. Specifically of value to this study is Ephorus of Cyme, c. 405-330 B.C., who was roughly contemporary with Xenophon and whom Diodorus Siculus seems to have followed.<sup>33</sup> Green notes that, in his attempt to date events, Diodorus Siculus was occasionally caught out by his misunderstanding of non-consular interregna. However, he also believes that the charges of "uncertain autopsy, lack of military experience, ignorance of geography, over dependence on earlier written sources" levelled against Timaeus by Polybius recurred as regular charges against "universal historians", including Diodorus Siculus and Green believes that in the case of Diodorus Siculus they have been over emphasised.<sup>34</sup> He suggests that Diodorus Siculus is a "typical product" of the late Hellenistic age affected by the works of his historical predecessors and believes that he had read the likes of Herodotus and Thucydides, amongst others, in their original as part of his basic education.<sup>35</sup> Gray notes that Ephorus, who Diodorus Siculus is believed to have copied for

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<sup>31</sup> Flower, 2012, p. 64.

<sup>32</sup> Green, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Dates taken from Green, 2010, p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Polybius, XII.3-4. Green, 2010, pp. 5-6.

<sup>35</sup> Green, 2010, p. 7.

the majority of his account of the later fifth and early fourth centuries, was himself copying the Oxyrhynchus Historian and warns us to be mindful of distortions as a result of the double transmission.<sup>36</sup>

We have discussed above the strengths and weakness of our primary classical sources and will finally turn to Plutarch, who has been useful to supplement some of our above sources. Like Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch wrote much later than the events he relates in his Greek lives, living and writing in the first century A.D. Unlike our other classical sources his intention was not to write history for the sake of it, but to draw parallels between the lives of famous Greeks and Romans from a moral standpoint. Also like Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch draws on a range of sources, however, Scott-Kilvert warns us that Plutarch was “better at amassing evidence than sifting it.”<sup>37</sup> We must be especially careful of his stylistic exaggerations of his characters for dramatic effect. Pelling notes that Plutarch’s “critical alertness is variable rather than constant”, although he concedes that he is more rigorous “when writing of a Themistocles or Caesar”.<sup>38</sup> Despite his apparent exaggerations, Pelling notes that “there are many things which (Plutarch) would not invent. Reality can be bent, but not too far.”<sup>39</sup> Thus, as with many of the other classical historians mentioned above, although we must be wary of taking Plutarch at face value, the essential facts he relates in his *Lives* are likely to be correct.

Reviewing the classical historical sources above, we can ascertain that we must, in most instances, be wary of taking them at face value to ascertain the likely facts of the situation.

Although this study will look at three distinct aspects of Greek and Persian political relations, rather than approaching the study thematically, it will be conducted chronologically. This is so that the impact of each theme is more apparently obvious on the general question of international relations. A

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<sup>36</sup> Gray, 1987, p. 73.

<sup>37</sup> Scott-Kilvert, 1960, p. 10.

<sup>38</sup> Pelling, 2002, p. 160.

<sup>39</sup> Pelling, 2002, p. 161.

chronological approach facilitates a view of the period from the perspective of the *longue durée* enabling us to isolate those factors which are constant over the period. Also, it enables us, therefore, to view elements which change from generation to generation. As mentioned above, Greek history and Achaemenid studies tend to be seen as separate disciplines and it is hoped that by combining the two disciplines a more rounded perspective of the history of both can be achieved.

The first chapter of the thesis begins with the initial contacts between the Greek states and Persia, and discusses the origins of the negative connotations of medism in Greek ideology. It begins with the subjugation of the Greeks of Asia Minor by Cyrus the Great and considers the reactions to this by the Greeks of the islands and mainland. It concludes with the Greek involvement in the Ionian Revolt led by Aristagoras. The second chapter treats the first Persian invasion of mainland Greece, led by Datis, and the Greek response to the Athenian victory at Marathon. The third chapter researches Greek attitudes to submission to and collaboration with Persia preceding and during the Persian invasion of Xerxes, with a look at the actions of both individuals and states. The fourth chapter looks at the period known as the Pentecontaetia, discussing the consequences of Xerxes' invasion in relation to the war of the Delian League, and the accusations of medism of Pausanias and Themistocles; it concludes with a discussion concerning the Peace of Callias. The fifth chapter focuses on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 430 B.C. and the attempts by Athens and Sparta to woo Persia. It investigates the implications of the evolving political situation as a result of a new generation of Greeks, who did not personally witness the Persian invasions of Greece, and concludes with the Spartan victory over Athens in 405 B.C. The sixth chapter investigates the implications of the Greek involvement in the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, and the outbreak of the Corinthian War. The final chapter discusses the Greek attempts to dominate the other Greek states by utilising Persia's influence as arbiter of the Greek common peaces. It also discusses the implications of and the Greek reactions to Persia's newly gained dominance over Greek interstate and international affairs. It finishes with Philip



of Macedon's League of Corinth and Alexander the Great's siege of Thebes, prior to his invasion of Asia Minor.

Then, by way of conclusion, we shall draw together the various threads of our detailed investigation in order to draw as wide a picture as possible of the issue we are addressing.

## **Chapter 1: First contacts and the Ionian Revolt**

The initial conflict between Greek and Persian took place almost at the point when Persian imperialism began to manifest itself. The period in question is delimited by Cyrus' conquest of Lydia and Ionia, and the crushing of the Ionian Revolt by Darius. It is marked off from the period which immediately follows by two characteristics. The Greeks' direct and immediate dealings with the Persians were confined to Asia Minor, the islands, Thrace and Macedon. For the mainland Greeks relations were largely conducted at a distance and by means of diplomacy. With Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian Revolt this changed and the next phase of relations, with direct attacks on the Greek mainland, was ushered in.

In this initial phase we shall be concerned with how Greek viewed Persian and how Persian viewed Greek, and we shall attempt to define the characteristics of that relationship. Once this has been done, we shall be in a position to see, in subsequent chapters, what elements remained the same and what changed over time.

### **The Persian conquest of Asia Minor**

To begin this investigation it is necessary to look at the Persian conquest of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. This conquest brought about the initial contact between the mainland Greeks, primarily those states which had colonised the coast of Asia Minor, and the Persian Empire. Thus, from these initial contacts, we will be able to study how the two peoples first reacted to each other, and also the direct causes of Greek hostility to Persia, which led to the Ionian Revolt from Persia, instigated by Aristagoras, and its support by Athens and Eretria. Greek hostility to Persian rule is particularly interesting when we consider that there seems, in contrast, to have been little apparent hostility to Lydian domination of the Greeks of Asia Minor. The Spartan alliance with Croesus suggests that the Greek states of the mainland similarly did not object to this.

The Greek colonisation of the coast of Asia Minor during the 8th century B.C. led to the establishment there of 12 cities: Mycale, Miletus, Ephesus, Samos,

Chios, Priene, Colophon, Phocaea, Clazomenai, Erythrai, Myous and Smyrna.<sup>40</sup> These eventually formed the Ionian League, which rebelled from the Persian Empire in 499 B.C.<sup>41</sup> The majority of these early colonies seem to have been linked to Athens, although some were founded by other cities, - for example, Priene was of apparent Theban origins.<sup>42</sup> Prior to their first Pan Ionian meeting mentioned in Herodotus, I.141, the cities apparently acted largely on an individual basis without any major co-ordination. Certainly, when Alyattes was campaigning against Miletus in the late sixth century the city received help only from Chios, indicating a lack of unity amongst the cities at that time.<sup>43</sup> It is possible that this lack of support was remembered by Miletus when Cyrus the Great offered an alliance against Croesus. M.O.B. Caspari argues that the destruction of Melie indicates that the members of the Pan Ionian League had, in fact, formed a league by 650 B.C.<sup>44</sup> L.H. Jeffery notes that Pan Ionian action is not, in fact, attested prior to the Persian attacks of the 540s, but she concedes that the attempt by Thales of Miletus to form a common government based at Teos in the first half of the sixth century supports the idea of a Pan Ionian League at this time.<sup>45</sup> Thus, on this evidence it is likely there was some form of unification of the Ionian Greeks, albeit very loose, possibly based on their common cultural heritage, and that it was formed prior to their subjugation to the Lydian Empire. Herodotus says that the Ionian Greek cities were subjugated to the Lydian Empire one at a time; some by conquest and others by treaties of friendship.<sup>46</sup> He says that this was begun under Gyges and was completed by the reign of

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<sup>40</sup> Emlyn-Jones, 1980, p. 17, notes there was a thirteenth Ionian city, Melie, which was destroyed by the other league members. Cf. *Vitr.*, IV.1.3-5.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. pp. 39-48 for the Ionian Revolt. Caspari, 1915, p. 181, notes that after the Ionian Revolt it is almost beyond doubt that the League was disbanded, despite the lack of direct evidence to support this. Contra Cawkwell, 2005, p. 80.

<sup>42</sup> Herodotus, I.142. Emlyn-Jones, 1980, p. 21, notes the close connection with Boeotian names and cults.

<sup>43</sup> Herodotus, I.18. Also, for the Milesian-Lydian treaty of friendship see Herodotus, I. 18-22. Asheri, 2007, p. 88, notes that the campaigns of Sadyattes and Alyattes against Miletus coincided with Periander's rule, thus we can suggest that this took place between 625-585 B.C., cf. Herodotus, I. 20.

<sup>44</sup> Caspari, 1915, pp. 174-176.

<sup>45</sup> L.H. Jeffery, 1976, p. 209.

<sup>46</sup> Herodotus, I.6.

Croesus.<sup>47</sup> Thus, by the mid-sixth century all the Ionian cities were under the rule of the Lydian Empire.

For many of the Ionian Greek cities, loss of political independence may not have been too arduous. Croesus is known for his philhellenic sympathies and there seems to have been religious tolerance for the Ionian Greeks under the Lydians. As far back as the eighth century, we find Gyges dedicating gifts to Delphi.<sup>48</sup> This tradition seems to have been maintained by Croesus and it is likely that intervening generations also dedicated to Greek sanctuaries.<sup>49</sup> Herodotus states at I. 6 that Croesus only took tribute from those Ionian cities he conquered militarily but that with the others he made treaties of friendship, which implies exemption from paying tribute. Hirsch argues that the lack of a Lydian navy was a 'psychological safety-valve' for the Greeks who could, if the situation demanded, take to their ships, as some did in response to Cyrus the Great's reprisals.<sup>50</sup>

The first contacts between the Greeks of the mainland and the Persian Empire were a result of the Lydian aggression against the Persians. We learn from Herodotus of the alliance between Sparta and Croesus when he was recruiting allies for his campaign against Cyrus, and also that prior to this alliance Sparta, had had friendly dealings with Croesus. Herodotus, I.69-70, mentions that the Spartans were well disposed to Croesus, not only because they were flattered by his interpretation of the oracle from Delphi, but also because he had granted them a favour in donating gold to them for a statue of Apollo. Burn suggests that the gift of gold was, in fact, Croesus' attempt to woo the Spartans into an alliance against Persia.<sup>51</sup> Herodotus further states that by the time Croesus had received the oracle 'the Spartans had subdued most of the Peloponnese'<sup>52</sup>, thus, we can see that Croesus was courting the most powerful state in Greece at the time. When Croesus called on the Spartans for support

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<sup>47</sup> Herodotus, I.2, cf. Asheri, 2007, pp. 80, 95.

<sup>48</sup> Herodotus, I.14.

<sup>49</sup> Herodotus, I.14, 25, 50, 85. We also find Croesus re-building the temple at Didyma and dedicating gifts there as well as to other Greek sanctuaries, Herodotus, I.92.

<sup>50</sup> S.W. Hirsch, 1986, p. 227.

<sup>51</sup> A.R. Burn, 1984, p. 39.

<sup>52</sup> Herodotus, I.68.

during his campaign against Cyrus the Great, they were brought into conflict with the newly emerging Persian Empire.

The Ionian response in the face of Persian conquest was varied; some simply fled, for example the Phocaeans and Teians,<sup>53</sup> whilst others joined Croesus' campaign against Cyrus. It should be borne in mind that prior to the fall of Sardis Cyrus offered the Ionian Greeks friendly submission if they defected from Croesus. These Ionian cities refused, except Miletus, and were unable to achieve the same terms with Cyrus afterwards.<sup>54</sup> The treatment of the Ionian Greeks is a good example of Persia's policy of trying to divide its enemies by seduce elements of their armies, an earlier example of which can be found in Cyrus' conquest of Babylon.<sup>55</sup>

Despite Croesus' flattery and gift of gold, the Spartans do not seem to have been initially moved by the capture of Croesus and the conquest of the Ionian Greeks. Herodotus notes that Ionian and Aeolian envoys went to Sparta to ask for help against subsequent Persian aggression and were refused. When the Spartans did send an envoy to Persia it was in a pentekonter and the Spartan envoy simply forbade Cyrus from harming the Ionian Greeks.<sup>56</sup> The Ionian and Aeolian embassy is an interesting precursor to the journey of Aristagoras at the beginning of the Ionian Revolt of 494 B.C. Although the details of the story of the Ionian and Aeolian embassy to Sparta could be deemed unhistorical, Asheri maintains that the embassy from Sparta to Cyrus at Sardis may have an element of truth in it, despite the influence of fifth century Spartan characteristics seemingly being applied retrospectively onto the sixth century Spartan envoy, Lacrines.<sup>57</sup> If we believe an embassy was sent from Sparta to Cyrus quite soon

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<sup>53</sup> Herodotus, I.163-169.

<sup>54</sup> Herodotus, I.76 and 141. Balcer, 1995, p. 56, believes that after the death of Alyattes the treaty of friendship between Lydia and Miletus was not renewed. Subsequently Miletus' ports had been subject to numerous Lydian attacks, which may have encouraged Miletus to accept Cyrus' offer to defect.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Briant, 2002, pp. 40-42. Also, Brosius, 2000, 12.13-19.

<sup>56</sup> Herodotus, I.152. Wallinga, 1984, p. 407, notes that pentekonters were a new military innovation and were still rare at this time. Thus, we may suggest the use of one by Sparta in this instance was also part of their threat. For general remarks on Greek embassies see Piccirelli, 2002, pp. 23-31.

<sup>57</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 125, Asheri, 2007, p. 180.

after the defeat of Croesus, we must consider the motivation for this. Herodotus asserts that the primary reason was to ascertain the might of Cyrus in the wake of his success against Croesus.<sup>58</sup> Certainly it was in the interests of Sparta to gauge the potential Persian impact on its interests in the Aegean, for example, the islands Thera, Melos and the other islands settled by the Spartans in the eighth century B.C.<sup>59</sup> It is worth bearing in mind that the Spartans may have refused to help the Ionian and Aeolian embassy because they did not think this was in Sparta's direct interests and because the envoys were not Dorian. However, the embassy of Lacrines may also have been motivated by the realisation that the expansion of the Persian Empire westwards might affect Sparta's interests.

Nearly all agree that Herodotus' purpose here is to demonstrate the cultural differences between Greece and Persia.<sup>60</sup> He highlights the difference between Persian palace culture and Greek polis culture, contrasting Greek society, particularly the presence of market places, with barbarian society, stating that there are no markets in the Persian Empire.<sup>61</sup> It is interesting to observe that Cyrus' response to Lacrines is generally dismissive. He is apparently not yet aware of Sparta and is forced to consult those Greeks present about the Spartans. This is not too surprising when we consider that Cyrus was not the aggressor in the Persian – Lydian conflict and he had been distracted from subduing Babylon by Croesus' belligerence. Therefore, Cyrus would not yet have needed to know about the Greeks living across the sea from Asia Minor. Cyrus' ignorance of Sparta mirrors their ignorance of Persia, as is seen from their response to the potential threat from Persia was to send Lacrines in one ship with a threat.

The capture of Croesus did not mark the full subjugation of the Ionian cities, which were quick to rebel with the Lydians when Cyrus marched away from Sardis.<sup>62</sup> The rebellion of the Ionian Greeks may have been motivated as much by their desire to regain their privileged position previously held under the Lydians as by their loyalty to their former masters. Balcer claims that the

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<sup>58</sup> Herodotus, I.152. Burn, 1984, p. 44.

<sup>59</sup> See Craik, 1980, p. 30.

<sup>60</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 125, Asheri, 2007, p. 180.

<sup>61</sup> Asheri, 2007, p. 180.

<sup>62</sup> Herodotus, I.154-161.

Ionian Greeks believed that Croesus' Lydian cavalry would defeat Cyrus when he attacked him. Although this may be correct prior to the defeat of Croesus, it does not explain why the Ionians rebelled with and remained loyal to the defeated Lydians.<sup>63</sup> On the advice of Croesus, the Lydians surprisingly are not punished for their rebellion but are simply disarmed.<sup>64</sup> The Ionians, however, were treated more harshly. Herodotus notes that Cyrus commanded Mazares to enslave all those who supported the Lydian rebellion against Sardis.<sup>65</sup> The implication behind the sentence is that Cyrus is referring to all who supported the Lydian rebellion but not the Lydians themselves. Furthermore, the use of the verb ἐξάνδραποδίζω indicates that Cyrus wanted to apply a finite solution to the rebellion.<sup>66</sup>

In response to the efforts of Harpagos, the new satrap of Sparda based at Sardis, to re-conquer the rebellious Ionian cities the Phocaeans and Teians fled their cities.<sup>67</sup> The remaining Ionian cities were defeated piecemeal and the islands 'took fright and surrendered to Cyrus.'<sup>68</sup> How and Wells note that whilst Herodotus seems to be referring here to the larger islands of Samos and Chios, Samos at least, in fact, was independent. This is demonstrated in his later account of the assassination of Polycrates of Samos by Oroetes, satrap of Sardis, which we will consider below.<sup>69</sup> It is noteworthy that, despite the Spartan show of strength after the initial subjugation of Lydia and the Ionian Greeks, they were not involved in this rebellion. This suggests that the Spartan threat to 'punish' Cyrus should he harm the Greeks was empty. Looking at these very first contacts between the Ionian Greeks and the Persian Empire, we notice certain prominent features. Firstly, that the Persians seem to have known very little about the Greeks, which is not surprising when we consider that until attacked by Croesus, Cyrus seems to have had no intention of expanding the Empire that

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<sup>63</sup> Balcer, 1995, p. 59.

<sup>64</sup> Herodotus, I.154-156.

<sup>65</sup> Herodotus, I.156.

<sup>66</sup> Asheri, 2007, p. 181, notes that the practice of ἐξάνδραποδίζειν was inherited from the Neobabylonians and literally meant 'the annihilation of a city through mass-deportation of its inhabitants'.

<sup>67</sup> Herodotus, I.163-169.

<sup>68</sup> Herodotus, I.169.

<sup>69</sup> Herodotus, III.120-125. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 129.

far West at that time. He was pulled to the West by the attack of Croesus and had not had an opportunity to reconnoitre the peoples in that region. However, it seems clear that by the time of the rebellion of the Lydians and Ionians, Cyrus understood that these were two separate peoples since he punished the Ionians but simply disarmed the Lydians.

We also notice that not all of the Ionian cities were loyal to Lydia, as is shown by the example of Miletus. We may suggest that Ionian loyalty was based largely on self-interest. The fact that the Ionians rebelled against Cyrus with the Lydians indicates they believed the Lydians would defeat Cyrus this second time, despite losing to him initially. Thus we may conjecture that neither the Lydians nor the Ionian Greeks knew much about Cyrus who had quite an impressive military record by this time. We also see that despite Sparta's threat to Cyrus, Sparta was too cautious to follow this up when the opportunity arose. That the threat was made at all suggests Sparta was equally ignorant of the newly emerging Persian Empire, however, the lack of support of the Lydian and Ionian rebellion from Cyrus suggests that the Spartans were not keen to antagonise too greatly this new empire.

#### Samos, Polycrates and Syloson

As the Persian Empire expanded west it subjugated Samos, which was a strong, independent island and had started to intrude on Persia's interests. The subjugation of Samos began with the assassination of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, by Oroetes, satrap of Sardis. Although Polycrates had sent a naval force with Cambyses for the latter's campaign against Egypt, it is worth noting that this, according to Herodotus, was Polycrates' own suggestion to remove his political enemies from the island.<sup>70</sup> This is a good early example of a Greek tyrant medising for his own direct gain, i.e. the removal of his political enemies whilst allying with the Persian Empire. Balcer notes that there is evidence of a Persian attack against Samos in the 540s and believes the island was subjugated

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<sup>70</sup> Herodotus, III.44. Balcer, 1995, p. 65, doesn't believe that Polycrates' alliance with Egypt was not at variance with Samos' subjugation to the Persian Empire.



by Harpagos, prior to the reign of Cambyses.<sup>71</sup> If this is the case, it appears that Samos was accorded a good degree of independence by Cyrus. Prior to his assassination, Herodotus mentions that Polycrates' power was so great that his actions were becoming a threat to Oroetes' control of his satrapy and that Polycrates, who had a powerful navy, may have had designs on Ionia and the islands along that coast.<sup>72</sup> Herodotus notes that Polycrates was:

'the talk of Ionia and the rest of Greece. All his campaigns were victorious, his every venture a success. He (had) a fleet of a hundred pentekonteres and a force of a thousand bowmen. His plundering raids were wide and indiscriminate .... He captured many of the islands and a number of the towns on the mainland as well.'<sup>73</sup>

Herodotus further emphasises the power and the fall of Polycrates in his story of the ring which Polycrates discarded on the advice of Amasis of Egypt. At this time Polycrates and Amasis were allies, but, according to Herodotus, Amasis, uneasy at Polycrates' 'mounting success', advised him to discard something of value in an attempt to avert the bad fortune he believed would accompany Polycrates' previous good fortune. When the ring which Polycrates had discarded was returned to him, Amasis broke off the alliance.<sup>74</sup> Herodotus' story of the ring demonstrates his belief that Polycrates' assassination was the result of fate rather than for political reasons.<sup>75</sup> Asheri, noting Herodotus' failure to consider political motivations behind the assassination, suggests that Polycrates' support of Cambyses against Oroetes may have been one of them.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Pausanias VII.5.2, Balcer, 1995, p. 92, citing Boardman, 1959, pp. 199-201, and Shipley, 1987, p. 80, believes the destruction of the Heraion to be evidence of 'wide-scale fighting' c. 540.

<sup>72</sup> Herodotus, III.122. Herodotus later assigns the motivation behind Oroetes' assassination of Polycrates to personal reasons, i.e. Oroetes' verbal abuse by a fellow satrap for not having conquered Samos, or because Polycrates had snubbed a messenger of Oroetes. Both tales would have resulted in damaged prestige for Oroetes, which would have been further reason for Oroetes to have desired the removal of Polycrates. This contrasts with the friendly relationships of Alcibiades and Lysander with Persia, which also affected Persian foreign policy, albeit to their benefit rather than their detriment.

<sup>73</sup> Herodotus, III.39. Asheri, 2007, p. 439, quoting D. Fehling, 1989, pp. 230-231, notes that Herodotus' reference to a hundred pentekonteres is a typical number.

<sup>74</sup> Herodotus, III.40-43. Modern scholarship suggests that it was Polycrates' later support of Cambyses' Egyptian campaign that broke the alliance between Samos and Egypt. See Asheri, 2007, pp. 440-441, How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, pp. 266-267.

<sup>75</sup> Herodotus, III.40-42. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 268, describe the 'whole story (as) a folk tale'. Asheri, 2007, pp. 440-441, describes it as 'pure literary fiction'.

<sup>76</sup> Herodotus, III.122-123. Asheri, 2007, p. 507.

On the other hand, Balcer suggests the assassination took place later, during the period of Oroetes' rebellion against Darius.<sup>77</sup> In his message to Polycrates, Herodotus states that Oroetes was inviting Polycrates to revolt against Cambyses and Polycrates was assassinated by Oroetes whilst in Sardis to discuss this proposal. Therefore, it may be, contrary to Balcer, that Polycrates was assassinated not because he supported Cambyses against Oroetes, but because he had shown his hand as a potential threat to the Persian Empire or at least Oroetes' area of influence over it: i.e. Polycrates planned to conquer Ionia and the islands and, also, he was willing to become involved in a rebellion against Cambyses. That Oroetes later rebelled against Darius, who may have been involved to some degree in the death of Cambyses and the usurpation of the Persian throne, may suggest his support for Cambyses. What is clear is that Polycrates, as a Greek tyrant accorded relative leniency by Persia, was happy to take advantage of this relationship and to play along with Persia until he overreached himself by becoming involved in a possible rebellion. The crucifixion of Polycrates after his assassination indicates the severity of the charges against him.<sup>78</sup>

Herodotus notes that when Polycrates was assassinated, Oroetes released the Samians and allowed them to return to Samos, but took as prisoners those who were 'either foreigners or slaves'.<sup>79</sup> The assassination of Polycrates confirmed the island's loyalty to the Persian Empire; when Darius became king he had Oroetes executed and he re-instated on Samos Syloson, the brother of Polycrates, who was loyal to Darius.<sup>80</sup> According to Herodotus the installation of Syloson was at Syloson's own request and was not a Persian-led initiative. We are told that Syloson and Darius were briefly acquainted whilst Darius was serving in Cambyses' Egyptian campaign and during this time Syloson gave

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<sup>77</sup> Balcer, 1995, p. 119.

<sup>78</sup> Herodotus, VII. 194. Histiaeus was likewise impaled when he was captured after the Ionian Revolt and Herodotus uses the same verb, ἀνασταυρόω, to describe the crucifixion of Polycrates. Likewise, Herodotus, VII. 238 and IX. 78, Leonidas' head was cut off and ἀνασταύρωσαι on a stake after his defeat at Thermopylae. Thus, we may be able to glean the seriousness of the offense committed by Polycrates when we look to other uses of the verb ἀνασταυρόω.

<sup>79</sup> Herodotus, III.125.

<sup>80</sup> Herodotus, III.140.

Darius his cloak.<sup>81</sup> Upon the assassination of Polycrates, Syloson approached Darius and asked to be installed as the tyrant of Samos. This would have been a wise choice of tyrant for Darius. Syloson supposedly was personally known to him and, therefore, likely to remain loyal and trustworthy. Also he had previously shared the tyranny over Samos with Polycrates and another brother, Pantagnotus, and, therefore, had experience of ruling it.<sup>82</sup> Syloson was installed as tyrant with the backing of Otanes and a Persian army against resistance from a faction on the island.<sup>83</sup> This faction fled to Sparta looking for military support there, but due to the increasing Persian influence this military aid, unlike on previous occasions, was no longer forthcoming.<sup>84</sup>

From a Persian perspective the installation of Syloson not only ensured that the island was friendly to Persia and removed the threat to Persian control of the coast of Asia Minor as had been presented by Polycrates. It also was a further expansion of Persian power in the Aegean. Furthermore, due to Otanes' slaughter of the men and boys on the island, it will have removed Samian piracy from the coast of Asia Minor and the islands, further securing that territory for the Persian Empire and keeping the Greeks of Asia Minor affected by Samian piracy content, until Otanes repopulated the island later.<sup>85</sup>

From a Greek perspective, the subjugation of Samos and installation of Syloson demonstrated that Darius was willing to support individuals, namely tyrants, who would be loyal to him. M.M. Austin notes that Samos and Syloson's family were closely linked to Darius and the Persian royal family after this.<sup>86</sup> Syloson's son ruled during Persia's Scythian campaign and was reinstated after the Ionian revolt.<sup>87</sup> It is likely that the example of Syloson affected Hippias' decision to approach Persia whilst in exile from Athens.<sup>88</sup> The examples of Syloson and Polycrates likely contributed to the Greek notion that Persia had a

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<sup>81</sup> Herodotus, III.139.

<sup>82</sup> Herodotus, III.39.

<sup>83</sup> Herodotus, III.144.

<sup>84</sup> Herodotus, III.148.

<sup>85</sup> Herodotus, III.149.

<sup>86</sup> M.M. Austin, 1990, p. 300.

<sup>87</sup> Herodotus, VI.13. and VI.25.

<sup>88</sup> For Hippias, cf. pp. 32-38.

pro-tyranny stance. They also indicate that Persia was willing to exploit personal quarrels to their advantage.

### Democedes of Croton

Another consequence of the assassination of Polycrates was the capture of Democedes of Croton, a friend of and doctor to Polycrates who had travelled to Sardis with him. Democedes was taken prisoner by Oroetes when Polycrates was assassinated.<sup>89</sup> When Darius had Oroetes murdered, Democedes became one of Darius' slaves and gained fame in the Persian court initially when he cured Darius' dislocated ankle and later when he cured a breast malady for Queen Atossa.<sup>90</sup> Despite A. Griffiths' assertions that the tale of Democedes has too many folk-tale features to be believable, he does still maintain that it is likely that Democedes was a doctor at the Persian court and argues he was there on a contract rather than as a slave.<sup>91</sup> Griffiths suggests that the account was romanticised during the Persian wars to dispel accusations of medism against Croton. Davies takes this argument one stage further marrying folk-tale motifs to each section of Herodotus' account of Democedes.<sup>92</sup> However, even Davies concedes that historical narrative can be shaped by folk-tales without being a folk-tale itself, and he agrees with Griffiths that this may have been due to the fact that Herodotus' sources were likely to have been descendants of Democedes and were prone to exaggeration.<sup>93</sup> In weighing up such stories it is advisable that at all times we should be aware of Greek tendencies to exaggerate their importance in the Persian Empire.<sup>94</sup>

Whether the tale of Democedes as related by Herodotus is strictly true or not is not the subject of this study. The tale of Democedes is a good example of a named individual Greek living and working within the Persian Empire.<sup>95</sup> Herodotus stresses that Democedes became wealthy and influential because of

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<sup>89</sup> Herodotus, III.120-125.

<sup>90</sup> Herodotus, III.130.

<sup>91</sup> A. Griffiths, 1987, pp. 37-46. Although this may seem unlikely, it is worth noting that Persia hired Greek mercenaries. Thus, the idea of Democedes working on a 'contract' is not impossible.

<sup>92</sup> M. Davies, 2010, pp. 31-39.

<sup>93</sup> Davies, 2010, p. 22. Griffiths, 1987, p. 47.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Keaveney, 2012, *passim*.

<sup>95</sup> For evidence for Ionian Greeks working within the Persian Empire cf. Fornara, 1983, n. 45 which records rations given to Ionian wives. Also, Kuhrt, 2010, n. 40.

his skills as a doctor: he was influential enough to be able to liberate from jail the Elean prophet, Sciton, and also to intercede on behalf of the Egyptian doctors who had failed to cure Darius and were due to be executed. Herodotus also implausibly attributes Darius' invasion of Greece to the influence of Democedes on Atossa.<sup>96</sup> Thus, we can see that by the end of the sixth century skilled Greeks were being employed in the Persian Empire and were able to become wealthy and, perhaps influential, as a result of their skills. Despite his supposed influence, Herodotus emphasises Democedes' lowly status. Democedes' status, whether literal or not, would have been important in Herodotus' narration, which continues that Democedes was employed as a guide for the Persians sent to survey the coast of Greece and that he escaped during this time.<sup>97</sup> Democedes' assistance to Darius in surveying Greece will need to have been portrayed as involuntary to avoid parallels being drawn with Hippias and Demaratus, who freely acted as guides for Persian invasions of Greece.<sup>98</sup> M. Brosius notes that Democedes was not unusual in being employed at the Persian court and notes, also, that in most cases foreign (Greek and Egyptian) doctors arrived at the Persian court either at the king's request or voluntarily.<sup>99</sup> However, she also notes that since non-Persians only filled positions at court below those of Persians, it is 'highly unlikely' that Democedes was able to influence Atossa to the degree that she could persuade Darius to campaign in Greece.<sup>100</sup> Thus, it seems more likely that Darius, when considering the notion of expanding the Persian Empire west, knew that there was a Greek doctor at court and consulted him for local information. We can suggest, then, a more plausible account of Democedes which supports our contention that, despite the bias in our Greek sources, the Persians were the ones in control of their relationships with the

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<sup>96</sup> That Democedes escaped the Persians in Italy may be seen as a Persian attempt to expand the Empire that far. In contrast to the later deference of Gelon, we find the Italians of Croton unafraid of Persia when they refuse to hand over Democedes. Herodotus, III.137. Thus, Democedes' escape also shows the limitations of Persian power at that time.

<sup>97</sup> Herodotus, III.135-137. Whether Democedes was employed on a contract as Griffiths believes or was a slave captured when Polycrates was assassinated is not overly important if we consider that to the Greeks all subjects of the King were slaves. What seems to have been important is the need to emphasise Democedes' powerlessness to refuse working for Darius, which assisted the eventual invasion of Greece.

<sup>98</sup> For Hippias cf. pp. 32-38 and for Demaratus cf. pp. 73-76.

<sup>99</sup> M. Brosius, 2011, pp. 72-73.

<sup>100</sup> Brosius, 2011, p. 76.

Greeks. It seems more plausible that, arriving at the Persian court whether as a slave or on a commission, Democedes became known to Darius through his medical expertise and was eventually called upon for his knowledge of Greece when Darius was beginning to consider expanding Persian influence there. Thus, he was seemingly the first in a list of Greek guides working for the Persian Empire.

### Thrace and Macedon

We have discussed above the expansion of the Persian Empire through the Levant and the Aegean islands, but the Persian Empire also expanded north-west into Thrace and Macedon. In 513 B.C., whilst en route to the Danube on his Scythian campaign, Darius received the surrender of some of the Thracian tribes without any fighting whilst others, namely the Getae, resisted and were defeated.<sup>101</sup> The Scythian envoys at Herodotus, IV. 118 claim that Darius had conquered Thrace before bridging the Danube. However, Balcer notes that, despite Herodotus, IV. 118, Darius had only conquered Byzantium, parts of the Thracian Pontic coast, and the Hebros valley at this time.<sup>102</sup> Miltiades, the future Athenian hero of Marathon, was the tyrant of one of the cities which surrendered to Darius prior to his Scythian campaign. During Darius' Scythian campaign Miltiades was amongst the Ionian Greeks guarding the bridge across the Danube.<sup>103</sup> If Herodotus is correct, we can see the first signs of Miltiades' disaffection from the Persian Empire when he initially supports the Scythian invitation to abandon Darius in Scythia. Herodotus states that Miltiades subsequently fled his city in the Thracian Chersonese fearing he would be captured by Phoenician triremes at Tenedos due to his advice given at the Danube.<sup>104</sup> However, we must treat this account with caution and bear in mind that Herodotus wrote it nearly 60 years after Miltiades led the Athenians to victory at Marathon. Balcer notes that there is no sign that Miltiades was coerced to support Darius' Scythian campaign<sup>105</sup> and we may suggest that the evidence

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<sup>101</sup> Herodotus, IV.93.

<sup>102</sup> Balcer, 1988, p. 9.

<sup>103</sup> Herodotus, IV.137-138.

<sup>104</sup> Herodotus, VI.40-41.

<sup>105</sup> Balcer, 1995, p. 150.

for Miltiades' support of the Scythian proposal to abandon Darius came from Herodotus' pro-Athenian sources. Cawkwell believes the account to be entirely fictitious and was part of Miltiades' apologia in his trial in 493 B.C.<sup>106</sup> Certainly this seems convincing, given the lack of reprisals against his son, who was captured during the family's flight from the Chersonese and given a Persian wife and cities to support him. This is improbable treatment for the son of a supposed traitor, although we should not discredit Persian generosity.<sup>107</sup>

On his return from his campaign Darius left behind Megabazus to conquer the rest of Thrace.<sup>108</sup> Burn suggests Megabazus seems to have completed this task in one campaign as he was able to return to Asia with the Paeonians before Darius arrived in Susa.<sup>109</sup> However, again, Balcer notes that the conquest of Megabazus only included the lower Hebrus valley and Doriskos; Byzantium and the Pontic coast seem to have been lost from Persian control. Byzantium was later re-conquered by Otanes, who replaced Megabazus.<sup>110</sup> Balcer notes that Persian control of Thrace was not consistent and that after the Ionian Revolt the cities of the Thracian Chersonese needed to be reconquered. Likewise, the Thracian cities along the coast of the Aegean were not properly subjected until Datis' campaign against Eretria and Athens in 490 B.C.<sup>111</sup> Persian control of the Thracian coast lasted only until 479 B.C. and Balcer suggests that Artabazos' retreat inland to Byzantium after Plataea from where he crossed to Asia 'suggests his fear of the hostile and rebellious Greeks and Thracians, and a critical concern for his safety at Sestos.'<sup>112</sup> Persian control of Thrace was

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<sup>106</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 48.

<sup>107</sup> Herodotus, VI.41. Thucydides, I.138, and below pp. 122-128 for Xerxes' generosity toward Themistocles. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. I, p. 343, noting Thirlwall, 1845, p. 486 that Darius returned from his Scythian expedition through Miltiades' territory and 'there is no hint ... the tyrant was disloyal.' Burn, 1985, p. 133, n. 14, notes the chronological issues presented by Herodotus here which leads us to conclude that either Miltiades did not speak treacherously against Darius or he fled immediately and returned only at the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt. How and Wells reconcile this discrepancy with Cornelius Nepos' account that Miltiades immediately fled after the Scythian expedition and note evidence that he seems to have served as a condottiero with the Thracian prince Olorus.

<sup>108</sup> Herodotus, V.2.

<sup>109</sup> Herodotus, V.1-25. Burn, 1984, p. 134.

<sup>110</sup> Herodotus, V.26. Otanes also captured Chalcedon, Antandrus and Lamponium along with the islands of Lemnos and Imbros.

<sup>111</sup> Balcer, 1988, pp. 12-13.

<sup>112</sup> Balcer, 1988, p. 16.

terminated by the Hellenic and, later, Delian League fleets, which we will discuss in detail later.<sup>113</sup>

During his campaign in Thrace Megabazos sent an embassy to Amyntas, king of Macedon.<sup>114</sup> This embassy is informative on the composition and importance of embassies sent overseas by Darius. Herodotus tells us that Megabazos πέμπει ἀγγέλους ἐς Μακεδονίην ἄνδρας ἑπτὰ Πέρσας, οἳ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ἦσαν δοκιμώτατοι ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ.<sup>115</sup> The description δοκιμώτατοι used by Herodotus is useful when noting the importance of these envoys in the Persian hierarchical system. The Persian Empire had a heavy military bias which was natural in an ever expanding empire, where holding onto your throne could mean fighting off the competition, in a somewhat literal fashion at times. An example of how military talents were valued in the Achaemenid Empire is found in the annual prizes given from the king to the man who produced the most male children or most distinguished himself in battle.<sup>116</sup> That the δοκιμώτατοι in the army after the commander were sent as envoys is reasonable, given their likely knowledge of and vested interest in the campaign. It is also in keeping with the significance of these initial offers of submission.

When Diodorus Siculus<sup>117</sup> speaks of the ambassadors, in the fourth century, as friends of Artaxerxes II, this may mean that the “δοκιμώτατοι” in an embassy may also have had personal connections to the Great King, or may have been formally “enrolled” amongst his “friends”.<sup>118</sup> Those who distinguished

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<sup>113</sup> Balcer, 1988, pp. 1-21, argues that Thrace was never fully conquered by the Persian Empire but that some Thracian cities were controlled from Sardis under the satrapy of Sparda.

<sup>114</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 7, date Amyntas' reign to c. 540-498 B.C.

<sup>115</sup> Herodotus, V.17. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, pp. 7-8, find this whole affair implausible describing the subsequent actions of Alexander as inconsistent. They also note that the story is very similar to another told in Pausanias, IV.4.3, Plutarch, *Solon* VIII, Polyaeus, I.20 and Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.4.4-6. The importance of the number 7 in the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism can be seen in the number of the good forces (the Spentas and Ahuramazda). This number is also reflected in the number of conspirators involved in the assassination of Smerdis, the Magus who usurped the Persian throne, which ultimately led to Darius I being chosen as king in 522 B.C. Later recorded embassies from Persia do not tell us exactly how many envoys were involved, however, we may conjecture that accompanying the named ambassador there may have been another six *dokimotatoi*.

<sup>116</sup> Herodotus, I.135 on prowess and producing male children.

<sup>117</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.74.5 specifically describes those sent by Artaxerxes as “certain of his friends”.

<sup>118</sup> For the importance of being a “friend” of the Great King, cf. how Orontes was demoted from being a “friend” of Artaxerxes II when he was found guilty of slandering Tiribazus during Persia's



themselves militarily would have been granted favours by the king and would, undoubtedly, have become better personally connected to him, thus, as they became more distinguished they became more favoured. Briant notes that within the Persian court “any promotion brought the noble into the circle of cronies,”<sup>119</sup> citing Tiribazus as a good example. He notes how after Tiribazus’ “great deeds during a campaign against the Cardusians ... (he) ... set out homewards in the company of the King.”<sup>120</sup> As Tiribazus did not ride with the king initially during this campaign, this is a clear indication of his increased prestige. Briant notes that status in the Persian court was generally symbolized by a title indicating the recipient’s proximity to the king, either as a family relation or in a literal sense i.e. his cupbearer, arms-bearer etc. That these titles were primarily honorific does not detract from the point that the bearer of the title held a position of favour at the royal court. The status of the envoys sent to Macedonia, as “δοκιμώτατοι”, likely reflects the importance of the embassy’s purpose and demonstrates Darius’ appreciation of diplomacy when expanding the territory under the control of the Persian Empire.

Herodotus claims that the Persian envoys insulted Macedonian royal women at a dinner provided by Amyntas and they were murdered by Prince Alexander.<sup>121</sup> The notion that this story was a later fabrication to “prove the patriotism of Alexander” after the withdrawal of the Persian army is proposed by How and Wells, and also supported by Badian.<sup>122</sup> Badian suggests that the envoys were so high ranking to cover the fact that initial overtures for an alliance came from Macedon rather than Persia. He also believes that the bribe paid by Alexander to pay off the Persian army sent to investigate the missing envoys is in fact a ‘skilful interpretation’ of Macedonian tribute being paid to Persia as a vassal state.<sup>123</sup> Whether the story of the murders is a fabrication or not, one result

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Cypriot campaign of the 490s. Orontes was also given a smaller satrapy. Diodorus Siculus, XV.911.2. cf. Wiesehöfer, 1996, p. 37.

<sup>119</sup> Briant, 2002, p. 311. Also see Keaveney, 2003, p. 81.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. taken from Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, 14.9.

<sup>121</sup> Herodotus, V.18-20.

<sup>122</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 7. Badian, 1994, p. 108.

<sup>123</sup> Badian, 1994, p. 108, n.1.

of the embassy is that Alexander's sister, Gygaea, married the Persian general, Bubares, and Macedonia became tied by marriage to this Persian family.<sup>124</sup>

We know that by c. 492 B.C. Macedon was a full vassal state of the Persian Empire. Herodotus states that whilst en route to Greece Mardonius' land troops re-conquered Macedonia and added the Macedonians to 'the list of Darius' slaves'.<sup>125</sup> The strategic importance of Macedon is illustrated by its use by Xerxes as a supplies depot for the Persian army during preparations for his invasion of Greece in the 480s and also its use as a base, from which the invasion could take place.<sup>126</sup> Badian suggests that between the initial offer of tribute and the time of the reconquest of Macedon by Megabazus, Alexander likely ceased to pay tribute and resumed paying upon the reconquest.<sup>127</sup>

Once subjugated to the Persian Empire, Macedon worked in the interests of Persia, which no doubt coincided with its own interests, and Alexander was used as an envoy to the Greeks when necessary. Alexander is an interesting character in that during the Persian invasion he not only acted in an official capacity as a messenger for Mardonius, but also he seems to have been able to act in an unofficial and private capacity, sending messages to the Greeks at Tempe and Plataea. He claimed to have been of ancient Greek descent<sup>128</sup> and Herodotus states that he was specifically chosen as a Persian envoy to Athens because of his "official relationship" with the city, which "was backed by deeds."<sup>129</sup> Thus, we find Mardonius exploiting a pre-existing relationship

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<sup>124</sup> Herodotus, VIII.136, states that Gygaea and Bubares "had a son who stayed in Asia, named Amyntas after his maternal grandfather, who enjoyed by the King's gift the revenue of the important Phrygian town of Alabanda." Briant, 2002, p. 145, notes that Bubares was the son of Megabazus, who was jointly in command of the subjugation of Macedonia prior to the Persian invasion proper by Darius at Herodotus, VII.108. Badian, 1994, p. 116, suggests that the young Amyntas was so called because he was the intended heir to Macedonia after Alexander and would have been a loyal Persian vassal. However, Badian doesn't explain what he believes would have happened to Alexander's heir, who he suggests would have been supplanted by the young Amyntas.

<sup>125</sup> Herodotus, VI.44. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 80, note that Herodotus implies that Megabazus had conquered Macedon before Mardonius, but that it is likely that the Persian army did not cross the Strymon until 492 B.C.

<sup>126</sup> Herodotus, VII.25.

<sup>127</sup> Badian, 1994, p. 117.

<sup>128</sup> Herodotus, IX.45. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 283, doubt that Alexander and the Macedonian royal family was of Greek descent, claiming the story to be a 'folk tale'.

<sup>129</sup> Herodotus, VIII.136.

between Athens and Alexander.<sup>130</sup> How and Wells suggest that the “deeds” mentioned may refer to Alexander’s involvement in the withdrawal of Greek forces from Tempe, which we will discuss below.<sup>131</sup> However, Badian believes that Herodotus’ omission of the specific information indicate the deeds were more politically embarrassing. He believes that it was Alexander who suggested to Athens they should approach Persia for an alliance in 507 B.C. when threatened by the invasion of Cleomenes.<sup>132</sup> Whilst this proposal is attractive, we should bear in mind that there is a good deal of speculation in Badian’s reconstruction. Wallace suggests that the *xenia* of Alexander’s father, Amyntas, will have ceased in 510 B.C. when he backed Hippias in exile. However, it is likely to have resumed with the accession of Alexander during a period when it was least likely to cause offense in Persia and he could point to the fact that Hippias didn’t actually reside in Macedonia, despite the offer.<sup>133</sup>

Like Thrace, after the Persian defeat at Salamis, Persian control of Macedon ceased. We may conjecture that, had Xerxes’ campaign in Greece succeeded, both Thrace and Macedon would have been organised into a satrapy or individual satrapies. However, due to the failure of the campaign and the subsequent actions of the Hellenic League fleet, direct Persian control of both countries was limited to the time when there was a Persian army in them.

Noteworthy of the Persian ‘conquest’ of Macedon is the Persian attempt to ‘woo’ the state politically, which, despite Herodotus’ tale of the assassinated envoys, seems to have worked. One might argue that this worked only because there was a Persian army on Macedon’s ‘door-step’, as soon as it withdrew Persian control diminished. However, the marriage of Gygaea to Bubares suggests an attempt at an amicable arrangement for both Persia and Macedon and it may simply be that as the Persian army was called away to other business Macedon was forced to look to its own interests and, consequently became independent again.

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<sup>130</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 282 note the prestige attached to the proxenos of a city.

<sup>131</sup> Herodotus, VII.173.

<sup>132</sup> Badian, 1994, p. 125.

<sup>133</sup> Wallace, 1970, p. 199. Badian, 1994, p. 121.

### Cleomenes' invasion of Attica and the Athenian embassy to Persia

We have noted above the possibility that Alexander may have suggested that Athens turn to Persia for some form of alliance in c. 507 B.C. in response to Cleomenes' invasion of Attica. The embassy sent from Athens is recorded in Herodotus V.73. At this time the Athenians were beginning to establish themselves as a democracy and during the civil unrest between the parties of Isagoras and Cleisthenes, Isagoras turned to Cleomenes, one of the kings of Sparta, for help. Isagoras, Cleomenes, and a small force of men were able to banish Cleisthenes, but when they occupied the Acropolis they encountered resistance from the remaining Athenians and were forced to leave Athens under truce after two days. In response to this humiliation Cleomenes amassed a large force from the Peloponnesian League and invaded Attica. It was during these movements that the Athenians sent an embassy to Sardis from fear of Cleomenes' reprisals<sup>134</sup> and we may conjecture that they knew he had started to call up the various Peloponnesian League contingents by the time of their embassy. This fear was confirmed by Cleomenes' invasion of Attica.<sup>135</sup> Fortunately for the Athenians, the Corinthian contingent, supported by Demaratus, the other Spartan king, withdrew from the Peloponnesian League forces at Eleusis, causing many of the other contingents to follow suit.<sup>136</sup>

The greater impact of Cleomenes' invasion of Attica, and of more direct concern to us here, was the Athenian embassy's submission of earth and water to Artaphernes. The direct aim of this embassy is unclear. Herodotus states that the Athenians wished to conclude an alliance with Persia, but we don't know whether they believed this would result in a Persian force actually being sent to help defend Athens from Cleomenes' invasion or whether they believed that threat of a Persian force alone would be sufficient. Once the envoys had submitted earth and water the Persians deemed Athens to be part of the Persian Empire. Furthermore, although we are told that the envoys were censured on

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<sup>134</sup> Herodotus, V.73, states that the Athenians "were well aware that they were now in a state of war with Cleomenes and Sparta."

<sup>135</sup> Berthold, 2002, p. 260, notes that at this time Athens did not have any other allies to which to turn. He notes that the alliance with Thessaly "likely rested on a personal relationship" and that it was "improbable that the Thessalian cavalry could have provided decisive support against armies of hoplites."

<sup>136</sup> Herodotus, V.75.

their return to Athens, we are not told that Athens formally retracted this treaty, which would have been not only politically embarrassing but may have been perceived as tantamount to declaring war with Persia.<sup>137</sup>

N.K. Kramer suggests that no treaty was formally ratified, however, later he contradicts himself believing that the envoys did take earth and water with them, which he also concedes were signs of submission.<sup>138</sup> Balcer's suggestion that the Athenians simply 'forgot' about the treaty seems a little farfetched, but we can see that they certainly seem to have ignored it once it was no longer necessary.<sup>139</sup> R.M. Berthold suggests that, in his desperation, Cleisthenes turned to his family's connections in Sardis and he questions the notion that Cleisthenes would have made a treaty with Persia without giving "the envoys instructions regarding submission."<sup>140</sup> This lends itself to the notion that due to the urgency of the situation perhaps the envoys were given prior instructions by Cleisthenes, as suggested by Berthold. That the treaty was concluded upon the first embassy suggests the negotiations were rushed. D.J. Mosley notes that this is the only instance during the Classical Period when a treaty was concluded by one state with another seemingly upon the first embassy. He notes that usually "a minimum of three embassies would be required in most cases .... before a treaty came into force".<sup>141</sup> Therefore, this first treaty between Athens and Persia is exceptional in that it was concluded so quickly. It is unlikely that the concept of providing earth and water to Persia was completely unknown to Athens, who had a proxenia with Macedon, which had already provided earth and water in submission to Darius only a few years earlier.<sup>142</sup> It seems likely, however, that the Athenians didn't fully understand the implications of providing earth and water to the Persian Empire. That the Athenian embassy was able to furnish earth and

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<sup>137</sup> Herodotus, V.73.

<sup>138</sup> Kramer, 2004, pp. 259-264.

<sup>139</sup> Balcer, 1995, p. 159.

<sup>140</sup> Berthold, 2002, p. 260. Also Gillis, 1969, p. 135, suggests the possibility of the envoys being Alcmeonidae since Cleisthenes was the leading man of this "clan". See also A.E. Raubitschek, 1964, p. 153, who believes the ostracisms of Megacles and Xanthippos indicate a connection between the Alcmeonidae and the embassy to Persia.

<sup>141</sup> Mosley, 1973, p. 70. Mosley, 1973, p. 23, also notes that envoys did not usually use their own initiative unless they were forced by circumstances. In this instance the envoys did not have time to return to Athens for advice, which is perhaps further evidence that Athens was aware of Cleomenes' pending invasion of Attica. He notes "it was a choice of doing something which was not covered by their instructions or failing in their mission".

<sup>142</sup> Herodotus, V.17-18.

water upon its first and the only known visit to Sardis suggests these items were taken with them.<sup>143</sup> Although Hornblower notes that Herodotus states the envoys only ‘promised to submit’ the earth and water, not that they gave earth and water to Artaphernes, he concedes that the actions of Sparta’s allies imply that earth and water was actually given.<sup>144</sup> Also, we may suggest that the Athenians could not have hoped to have concluded a military treaty with Persia without these items. Therefore, it seems most likely that the embassy expected to submit them as part of the terms of the treaty with Persia and in order to save time pre-empted the expected request and took the tokens with them.

Herodotus speaks specifically of the alliance using the noun *συμμαχία*, thus, we can see that Herodotus believed the Athenians were looking for a defensive military alliance. Bauslaugh notes that non-military alliances were usually termed *φιλία*, which was an alliance of friendship with no military functions attached.<sup>145</sup> From this we may conclude that Athens was looking specifically for military aid from Persia, either *de facto* or *de iure*. The relative ease with which the Athenians ignored the treaty further suggests that, although submitting earth and water to Persia, the Athenians did not fully understand the significance of such an act. Berthold is likely correct in suggesting that the actions of the envoys were condemned due to the change in the circumstances to which the Athenian envoys returned. Had Cleomenes still been marching on Athens, the Athenians would have been much less hostile to an alliance with Persia but once the threat of invasion had subsided, the need for an alliance was no longer there.<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, having defeated both the Boeotians and Chalcidians, Berthold suggests, the Athenians would not have agreed to the terms of an alliance which suggested “an inferior status”.<sup>147</sup>

We may conclude that Athens was in an impossible situation after its envoys agreed to an alliance with Persia. Having given earth and water, Athens

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<sup>143</sup> For a discussion on the significance of earth and water in Persian diplomacy see Rung, Forthcoming.

<sup>144</sup> Hornblower, 2013, p. 218.

<sup>145</sup> Bauslaugh, 1990, pp. 61-62.

<sup>146</sup> Berthold convincingly argues that not only was it possible that Cleomenes could have marched on Attica for a second time in 508/7, but that Cleomenes was probably disposed to do so. Berthold, 2002, p. 265.

<sup>147</sup> Berthold, 2002, p. 262.

became either subject to the Persian Empire or, if it reneged on this, was at war with it. It seems that, if we take Herodotus at face value, the Athenian response to this situation was to do simply nothing. Mosley seems to be correct when he notes that “it was likely that the agreement was ignored rather than formally repudiated.”<sup>148</sup>

From the Athenian attitude to their treaty with Persia we can see that the Athenians were not impressed by Persia, despite the gains it had made, or at least not enough to honour their treaty fully. It seems that Athens viewed Persia not as an empire, but in the same way it seems to have viewed other Greek states; as an equal power which could be called upon or ignored when necessary. This may have been the result of the seemingly lenient treatment of Macedon, which may have convinced the Athenians that an alliance with Persia was not a serious burden. It was not until Athens became involved in the Ionian Revolt that there were serious ramifications for their apparent submission. However, the Athenian refusal to reinstate Hippias at the behest of Artaphernes, which we will discuss below, did not help relations between Athens and Persia. From the Persian point of view, once Athens had submitted earth and water it had submitted to the Persian Empire. Simply because Athens chose to ignore this submission will not have made it any less real to Persia, especially as the submission was apparently not formally retracted. There will have been other peoples within the Persian Empire which also did not require constant reminding that they were part of it and it is likely that Darius simply viewed the Athenians in this way.

### The medism of Hippias

Prior to Athens' submission, in 510 B.C the Athenian tyrant, Hippias, had been deposed and, when the Spartan attempt to reinstate him failed, he took residence in exile and maligned the Athenians to Artaphernes, the Satrap of Lydia and governor of Sardis.<sup>149</sup> When Artaphernes sent messengers to Athens

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<sup>148</sup> Mosley, 1973, p. 70.

<sup>149</sup> Herodotus, V.65, states that Hippias lived at Sigeum on the Scamander River. Hornblower, 2013, p. 191, notes that Sigeum appears to have been Athenian territory at the time and concludes that Hippias was *persona grata* in Athenian overseas territories but not at Athens itself.

commanding the reinstatement of Hippias, the Athenians refused. Artaphernes seems to have considered Athens subject to the Persian Empire by this time and, since they did not submit earth and water until c. 507 B.C., it is probable Hippias arrived at Artaphernes' court after this time.<sup>150</sup> As a subject Athens was obliged to obey Persian commands. If the Athenians deemed themselves not to be subject to Persian commands, then Herodotus' statement that the Athenians sent envoys to Sardis to complain about Hippias' slandering of them makes no sense.<sup>151</sup> A.E. Raubitschek suggests that by sending the envoy to Sardis, to complain about Hippias, we can see that Athens was still on friendly terms with Persia. In fact, the only grounds for complaint the Athenians would be able to use would be from the position of an ally, if not a subject, of Persia.<sup>152</sup> We should bear in mind that it is unlikely that news of the Athenian denouncement of the embassy once it returned to Athens did not reach Sardis. However, without official action in the form of a new embassy to Persia to officially renegotiate the terms of their treaty, the existing situation would have been deemed correct by both Athens and Persia. We must consider, therefore, that the Athenian complaints against Hippias may have been motivated by a desire to appease Artaphernes and from fear of possible retributions.<sup>153</sup> A third possibility is that Athens and Persia genuinely misunderstood the nature of their treaty: Athens believing them to be equals and allies; Persia believing Athens to have submitted. In Greece cities did not submit to each other, they were allies, enemies or were conquered and annexed (as in the case of the Messenians to the Spartans). However, Persia did not make alliances which deemed both parties to be equal, rather it accepted the submission of cities and states with terms of varyingly favourable degrees for the submissive party depending on the circumstances. Therefore, Athens' complaint about Hippias may have been sent in light of the Athenian belief that it was complaining to an ally of equal status.

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<sup>150</sup> Herodotus, V.91-96 relates how Hippias initially fled to Sigeum, near Miletus, but then was taken to Sparta as part of their planned invasion of Attica to reinstate him. This invasion was thwarted by Sparta's allies, and Hippias returned to Sigeum. Herodotus states that Hippias began maligning the Athenians to Artaphernes upon his return to Sigeum.

<sup>151</sup> Herodotus, V.96.

<sup>152</sup> Raubitschek, 1991, p. 154.

<sup>153</sup> This view is supported by Arnush who believes that the embassy was part of a wider Athenian rapprochement with Persia. Arnush, 1995, p. 143.



Kramer develops this idea of an asymmetrical relationship between Athens and Persia, believing that Artaphernes' demand that they take back Hippias was in response to an Athenian enquiry how best to protect themselves from the expanding Persian Empire.<sup>154</sup> However, if this was the case we would expect some mention of it in Herodotus, who simply says that the Athenians went to Artaphernes to complain.

Persia did not always install tyrants in cities to ensure its loyalty, although this was frequently the case. For example, after the Ionian Revolt Mardonius installed democratic governments in some of the Ionian cities. Mardonius may have been unique in this, but this suggests that he recognised the need to be flexible in such matters to ensure the loyalty of these cities.<sup>155</sup> It seems that after the Ionian Revolt the Persians were happy to support whatever type of government ensured the loyalty of the city, be it a tyranny or democracy. Although the Ionian Revolt occurred after this Athenian embassy to Artaphernes, this does not preclude a similar Persian attitude prior to the Ionian Revolt. We may suggest that the Athenians may have hoped to confirm their previous and existing relationship with Persia, via Artaphernes, as a democracy rather than under the leadership of Hippias. It is worth bearing in mind that the embassy which promised to submit earth and water took place in 507/6 B.C. after Hippias was ejected from Athens in 510/9 B.C. Thus, the envoys submitted Athens when it was a democracy and it seems probable that the embassy to Persia was sent in order to maintain the status quo. The Athenian idea that Persia was linked with imposing tyrants on Greek cities may be traced back to this embassy.

Upon Athens' refusal of Artaphernes' command, Hippias began actively encouraging a Persian invasion of Greece with a view to being reinstated tyrant of Athens. Hippias had shown pro-Persian inclinations prior to his exile, especially when he married his daughter, Archedice, to Aeantidas, son of Hippoklos, the tyrant of Lampsacus. The reason given by Thucydides for this is

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<sup>154</sup> Kramer, 2004, p. 268.

<sup>155</sup> Herodotus, VI.43.

that Hippoklos of Lampsacus had “great influence with Darius”.<sup>156</sup> Thucydides also notes that when Hippias went from Sigeum to the court of Darius he went via Lampsacus, further supporting the notion of a close relationship between Hippoklos and Hippias. Not only did Hippias have pro-Persian inclinations before his exile, but he also had land in the north Aegean, namely the Thracian Chersonese. Miltiades, the pre-eminent Athenian general at the battle of Marathon, was sent by Hippias to be tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese and returned to Athens only as the result of Persian expansion.<sup>157</sup> That Hippias, whilst in exile, took up residence at Sigeum on the Scamander River, in the Hellespont, opposite the Chersonese, clearly demonstrates that he still had some territory or friends remaining after Miltiades had left the area in 496 B.C.<sup>158</sup>

Hippias’ desire to strengthen his Asiatic contacts by marrying his daughter to Aeantidas may have been motivated by the murder of Hipparchus, which also led to Hippias’ tightening his control over the people of Athens, as recorded by Herodotus and *Athenian Constitution*.<sup>159</sup> It is likely he thought of his father’s many depositions from, and reclaiming of, power in Athens and assumed that he could do the same.<sup>160</sup> However, it was not until after the Athenians became involved in the Ionian Revolt that Hippias was actually able to join the Persian invasion at Marathon, twenty years after he had left Athens. Hippias’ inability to find allies in Greece may have been the result of anti-tyrannical sentiments at the time. The refusal of Sparta’s allies to help Hippias may have been motivated as much by their distaste of tyranny as by their unhappiness with Cleomenes’ leadership.

We can see that on one level Hippias’ role in the invasion of Greece, similar to that of Democedes, was little more than as a guide to Datis and

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<sup>156</sup> Thucydides, VI.59.3. H. Wade-Gery, 1951, argues that the tyrant of Lampsacus, Hippoklos, had gained such a position demonstrating his loyalty to Darius during the Scythian campaign when Miltiades supported destroying the bridge across the Danube and Hippoklos opposed him.

<sup>157</sup> Herodotus, VI.40-41. Cf p. 23 above.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid. Miltiades was forced to flee the Chersonese twice. The first time was due to the migration of the Scythians who had congregated there as a result of Persian expansion. The second time was due to the approach of the Phoenician fleet which captured his eldest son. Both the migration of the Scythians and the presence of the Phoenician fleet suggest that Miltiades had lost whatever territory he had previously controlled. Marincola, 2003, p. 661, n. 17, suggests that Miltiades’ exile took place from 511-496 B.C.

<sup>159</sup> Herodotus, V.62. (Aristotle), *Athenian Constitution*, 19.

<sup>160</sup> For the repeated exiles and returns of Pisistratus, see Herodotus, I.60-64.

Artaphernes, although had it been successful he may have been installed as a vassal tyrant for Persia. He may have been at the court of Artaphernes since 510 B.C., but Hippias clearly did not have enough influence to persuade Darius to organise a Persian invasion of Attica simply because he wished for it. If Hippias believed he could persuade the Persians to invade in 510 B.C., he was optimistic at best and somewhat naive. The invasion was eventually conducted only in response and retaliation to the Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian Revolt, which we will discuss later. H. Bengtson notes that the reasons given by Herodotus for this first Persian invasion of Greece are: firstly in retaliation for involvement in the Ionian Revolt, secondly due to the urgings of Hippias and thirdly because Darius wished to expand the Empire westward.<sup>161</sup> I would suggest that the sequence of reasons given by Herodotus reflects the importance of each reason, decreasing in order. That is, the invasion of Greece was primarily in retaliation to the Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian Revolt. That the retaliation of Persia against Greece was able to quiet Hippias' complaints was an added benefit and that Hippias was available to help with the invasion was also useful. It can be argued that a Persian invasion of Greece was inevitable due to the Persian policy of expansion. Herodotus claims that Persia had been planning on conquering mainland Greece since Democedes' treatment of Atossa.<sup>162</sup> Also, Sparta would have been aware of this since the time of the Ionian and Aeolian embassy during the Persian conquest of Lydia.<sup>163</sup> It should not be forgotten that Darius had a general interest in expanding the empire and had not only campaigned north in an attempt to expand the empire beyond the Danube, but prior to that he had expanded the empire east into India.<sup>164</sup> Hippias, who will have been aware of this general Persian attitude via his own contacts in Asia Minor, may have hoped to use the Persian expansion to effect his reinstatement in Athens. An illustrative example for Persian installation of friendly tyrants can

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<sup>161</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 44.

<sup>162</sup> Herodotus, III.135-135.

<sup>163</sup> Herodotus, I.152.

<sup>164</sup> Herodotus, IV.44.

be found in the case of Aeaces of Samos, who was reinstated by “the Persians” after the Ionian Revolt.<sup>165</sup>

It is apparent from Hippias’ case that in the early fifth century Greeks may have been welcome to live in exile in Persia. However, if they wished to achieve a particular personal aim, they had to wait until the King was ready. That is, Hippias may have loudly protested about his ejection from Athens but Darius wasn’t going to reinstate him as tyrant unless it tied in with his other plans, i.e. punishment and expansion. Darius clearly did not intend to mete out the same punishment to Athens as he did to Eretria and this may be simply because Hippias was in exile living in Persia and Darius saw an opportunity in him. Rather than destroying Athens and deporting the population, as he did with Eretria, Darius could reinstate Hippias as tyrant, as a vassal of the Persian Empire, and have a foothold in mainland Greece. A. Keaveney notes that Hippias would not be a “mere figurehead or man of straw” as a Persian installed tyrant; the Persians had “long been accustomed to allow a great deal of latitude to their underlings provided those underlings acknowledged the suzerainty of their overlords.”<sup>166</sup>

M.M. Austin’s suggestion that by the time of the Ionian Revolt it was well established that self-interested Greeks could approach the King “in the justified expectation of gaining power and rewards in return for services rendered to him”<sup>167</sup> is supported by the evidence that Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, received Myrcinus in reward for keeping the bridge across the Bosphorus safe for Darius’ retreat during the Scythian campaign of 513-512 B.C.<sup>168</sup> Austin argues that by the time of Hippias’ eviction from Athens, Darius had already created a reputation for richly rewarding Greeks who could perform services for him. If Austin is correct we could surmise that Hippias, in order to gain Persian assistance, may well have offered Athens to Darius as an initial landing post for his invasion of Greece. We know that Hippias was living in exile in the Persian Empire with a

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<sup>165</sup> Herodotus, V.25, states that Aeaces was reinstated as tyrant because “the Persians considered him to be a man of great worth, who had done them great service.”

<sup>166</sup> Keaveney, 2011, p. 28. Cf. pp. 17-20, above for Polycrates of Samos who was an ally at least, if not a full vassal, of Persia and yet was allowed enough independence to encroach on the Persian control of the Ionian islands and desired to encroach on the Ionian cities of the coast of Asia Minor.

<sup>167</sup> Austin, 1990, p. 291.

<sup>168</sup> Herodotus, IV.137 for bridge, Herodotus, V.11 for reward by Darius.

view to using Persian assistance to be reinstated as tyrant of Athens. Hippias will have been aware that were Darius to reinstate him as tyrant of Athens he would be a vassal of the Persian Empire, but he may also have recognised the relative leniency he would have received due to Athens being so far from the coast of Asia Minor. Recognising that he would need to perform a service for Darius in order to gain a reciprocal service back, we may speculate that Hippias went to Darius specifically offering Athens to him and may speculate further that the idea was initiated by Hippias rather than Darius. It is at least plausible that Darius, with a view to expanding the Persian Empire but having been prevented from expanding northwards by the Scythians, would look favourably upon a Greek arriving at his court offering a city in the West as a prospect for expansion in that direction. Thrace and Macedonia had already submitted to the Persian Empire by this time.<sup>169</sup>

If it is correct that Hippias, or indeed Democedes before him, suggested Darius should expand the Persian Empire westward, this confirms that prior to the Persian invasion of 480 B.C. self-interested Greeks medised pro-actively rather than reactively. In this respect Hippias is similar to Syloson of Samos.<sup>170</sup> Hippias actively lobbied Darius to support his reinstallation as tyrant of Athens and the notion of westward expansion may have been the primary argument used by Hippias which persuaded Darius. Thus, we may suggest that the early Persian kings, at least, were open to good ideas regardless of their origin. Whilst it may well be that Demaratus and Hippias suggested expanding the Persian Empire west, it seems far more probable that the king already conceived such notions. Thus, we should be mindful of following the Greeks in exaggerating their own role in the Persian court. We will see again, particularly with Alcibiades and Lysander, how Greeks might have influenced Persian policy, but here again they may simply have suggested already conceived ideas.

We may also suggest that this was common enough knowledge for Greeks such as Hippias to attempt to use this to their own advantage. However, if this is the case, we must be mindful that it took nearly 20 years after Hippias'

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<sup>169</sup> Macedonia submitted earth and water at Herodotus, V.17. Thrace had been subdued by the time we reach IV.118 in Herodotus. See the discussion on Macedon pp. 22.27.

<sup>170</sup> Cf. pp. 19-20.

exile for Darius to invade Attica, proving that Darius took action in his own time and not at the urgings of the Greeks.

We hear no more of Hippias after Marathon, although we know of the Persian defeat and can conclude his death took place very shortly after this; he was, after all, an old man of 80 during the invasion. Looking at the Greek attitudes to the Persian Empire as portrayed through Hippias' medism we can see how negative connotations became associated with the notion of medism for the Greeks and how, for the Athenians, Persia became linked with deposed tyrants and, thus, became an enemy to Greek democracy. This transition appears to have occurred in the space of only a few years. In 507 B.C. the Athenians offered tokens of submission to Persia in response to the threat of invasion from Sparta. We may speculate that, it is unlikely that Hippias was with Artaphernes before 507 B.C., since the Athenians seem to have submitted before he began maligning them to Artaphernes. The primary point of conflict occurred when Athens refused to take him back when they were ordered to do so by Artaphernes, which indicates that Persia viewed Athens as a subject of the empire rather than as an ally, despite what the Athenians may have previously believed. By refusing to obey Artaphernes and by becoming involved in the Ionian Revolt, the Athenians became rebellious subjects in the eyes of Persia and it is clear that Hippias played on this idea. Far from being so influential that he could persuade Darius to invade Greece, Hippias, we can see, was merely taking advantage of the political situation at the time.

#### Aristagoras and the Ionian revolt

We noted above that the Athenian involvement in the Ionian Revolt was the catalyst for Datis' invasion in 490 B.C. In Herodotus' account of the Ionian revolt, Aristagoras approached Artaphernes, "the son of Histaspes and brother of Darius"<sup>171</sup> and satrap of Sardis, with a plan to subdue Naxos by reinstalling the island's exiled leaders. However, due to a dispute with Megabates, the Persian commander of the force, which subsequently led to the failed siege of

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<sup>171</sup> Herodotus, V.30.

Naxos, Aristagoras was forced either to await punishment from Darius, or to look for ways to avoid this.<sup>172</sup>

Looking at the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C. in more detail and briefly reconstructing the events from our sources,<sup>173</sup> we can see that Aristagoras approached Artaphernes to gain permission from Darius to launch his offensive against Naxos.<sup>174</sup> This indicates that in matters of foreign policy all things required the Great King's approval. Aristagoras' main argument was that the island "in spite of its small size, was a rich and fertile island, close to the Ionian coast, and rich both in treasure and slaves".<sup>175</sup> Aristagoras stated further that, if Artaphernes were to restore the Naxian exiles (who had approached Aristagoras in the first place), he would not only add to the Great King's land but would also be able to use the island and its dependent islands as a base for further military campaigning to expand the empire. As an added argument, he stated that he was able to fund the whole operation himself (which was not strictly true as it was the Naxian exiles who had agreed to fund the operations), therefore, Artaphernes would not lose any money at the outset but only stand to gain. These arguments appear to have been enough to persuade Artaphernes, who not only set about gaining approval from Darius but also set about preparing an expeditionary fleet twice the size suggested by Aristagoras.

We can discern Aristagoras' own motivation for his offensive against Naxos from the arguments he gave Artaphernes, i.e. that the island was rich in natural resources, treasure and slaves. Despite the supposed reason for Aristagoras' offensive against Naxos being to install the exiled leaders, Herodotus states that Aristagoras, in reality, wanted to gain the island for himself. His arguments about using the island as a place from which Darius could expand the Persian Empire presupposes that, with the reinstated exiles, or

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<sup>172</sup> Herodotus, V.33-35. Herodotus also states that Aristagoras had lost a lot of his personal fortune on the venture and due to his quarrel with Megabates feared he would lose his position in Miletus. See Keaveney, 1988, pp. 76-81 and Tozzi, 1978, pp. 136-137.

<sup>173</sup> We must be mindful that our sources for the Ionian Revolt are all Greek and therefore the accounts they produce have a Greek perspective.

<sup>174</sup> H.T. Wallinga, 1984, p. 428, suggests that this was the first occasion the Persian navy was used against trained sailors.

<sup>175</sup> Herodotus, V.31.

indeed Aristagoras himself, in control of the island, Naxos would be on friendly terms with Darius.

It seems plausible to argue that the main part of the scheme which caught Darius' attention was the idea of using Naxos as a base for further expansion of the Persian Empire into the Cyclades and Euboea.<sup>176</sup> This is supported by the size of the force sent to capture the island, which was double the size suggested by Aristagoras. In order for Aristagoras to obtain a fleet from Artaphernes, the matter would need to be referred to Darius for approval and it is because of this that Aristagoras was so fearful of the consequences when the campaign turned sour.<sup>177</sup>

Herodotus claims that the campaign against Naxos failed due to a dispute between Aristagoras and Megabates concerning the leadership of the Persian fleet. In anger Megabates informed the islanders on Naxos of the impending invasion and they were able to prepare for a siege, which lasted 4 months before Aristagoras and the Persians gave up.<sup>178</sup> Whilst Cawkwell denies the historicity of this account,<sup>179</sup> Keaveney puts forward two arguments for accepting it. He points out that whilst Aristagoras had command of the fleet itself, Megabates had overall command of the campaign. From this clumsy command structure quarrels arose. Keaveney also argues that Megabates account of events would have been believed over that of Aristagoras, hence he had nothing to fear.<sup>180</sup> Two weaknesses in Keaveney's arguments must be noted. Firstly, would Megabates dislike of Aristagoras be sufficient to lead him to sabotage his own expedition? Secondly, it would have taken a considerable amount of time for Naxos to have been able to prepare for a siege which lasted for 4 months.

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<sup>176</sup> Darius' interest in expanding the Persian Empire had been demonstrated earlier in Herodotus III.134 in the story concerning Atossa and Democedes.

<sup>177</sup> See Keaveney, 1988, for a full study regarding who betrayed the Persian forces to Naxos. Also, Keaveney, forthcoming, for further discussion regarding the absolute authority of Persian kings over their satraps.

<sup>178</sup> Herodotus, V. 34.

<sup>179</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, pp. 67-68.

<sup>180</sup> Keaveney, 1988. On the command structure cf. Hauben, 1970, Hornblower, 2013, pp. 134-135.



Herodotus continues that after the siege Aristagoras, fearing for his position as tyrant of Miletus abdicated his position in favour of democracy in order to organise an Ionian-wide revolt from the Persian Empire and appealed to Sparta for aid in this new objective.<sup>181</sup> It is interesting to speculate why, rather than simply fleeing the Persian Empire, Aristagoras decided to foment revolt amongst the other Ionian Greek cities. It would seem reasonable to suppose that he believed the other Ionian cities would revolt which suggests the Ionian cities were generally unhappy with Persian dominance at this time. P. Tozzi suggests that Aristagoras received such a large following in Ionia due to his new anti-tyrannical stance<sup>182</sup> and that sympathy with another new democracy against Persian backed tyrannies was one of the factors which persuaded the Athenians to become involved in the Ionian Revolt, to which we might add the democratic movement in Athens may have inspired the Ionians.<sup>183</sup> Certainly the fact that after the revolt Mardonius installed democracies suggests this was a reason behind Ionian dissatisfaction.<sup>184</sup> Cawkwell on the other hand would not give as much weight to the question of tyranny, pointing out that only ten tyrants gathered at the Danube, which may reflect that only ten Ionian cities within the Persian Empire were ruled by tyrannies. However, this fails to carry complete conviction as it does not take into account the possibility that there may have been other tyrants who were not present at that time, i.e. they were not called up by Darius. He also notes that the removal of tyrants from the Ionian cities was not mentioned by Aristagoras when he tried to persuade Cleomenes to support the revolt.<sup>185</sup> However, it is unlikely that this line of argument would interest Sparta which, in fact, had suffered humiliation at the hands of the Athenian democracy.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Aristagoras was not unique in appealing to Sparta for aid against Persia, see also the Aeolian and Ionian embassy to Sparta at Herodotus, I. 141, mentioned above pp. 14-15, and also the Spartan support of Samian exiles against Polycrates at Herodotus, III.44.

<sup>182</sup> Herodotus, V.37. P. Tozzi, 1978, p. 141.

<sup>183</sup> P. Tozzi, 1978, p. 161, also suggests that the Athenians became involved in the revolt due to a desire to regain from Persian rule the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros and also that they had been suffering commercial difficulties due to Persian control of the Straits.

<sup>184</sup> Herodotus, VI.43.

<sup>185</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, pp. 71-74.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. pp. 28-29 above.

A number of other reasons are suggested by H.T. Wallinga for Ionian displeasure with Persian rule, the primary one being a general misunderstanding of their relationship with Darius. Wallinga suggests that prior to the Scythian campaign the Milesians believed themselves to be allies rather than subjects of the Persian Empire, unlike the other Ionian cities, who will have been under no illusions after their re-subjugation by Mazares in the 540s B.C.<sup>187</sup> Wallinga also notes the increase in tribute imposed by Cambyses to fund his Egyptian campaign, resulting in rebellions across the Empire.<sup>188</sup> This may have exacerbated resentment by the Ionian Greeks. If the story of the debate on the Danube is correct, the need for Histiaeus to persuade the leaders of the Ionian contingents on the Scythian campaign not to cut off Darius' retreat suggests Ionian resentment as early as the late 520s B.C.<sup>189</sup> Corcella notes that, as Darius' orders were to wait 60 days at the bridge, the Ionians would not have been considered to have disobeyed Darius had they abandoned their position, this is also what Herodotus has the Scythians argue to the Ionians.<sup>190</sup> Although Cawkwell argues that the Ionian cities had previously paid tribute to the Lydians and that this tribute is unlikely to have increased, he fails to note that the Lydian Empire did not seem to undertake the same number of military campaigns as the Persian Empire did and did not seem to have undertaken naval campaigns. The Egyptian campaign of Cambyses seems to have been particularly costly and the creation of a Persian navy, albeit mostly Phoenician, will have increased the tribute of the Ionian Greek cities from that under the Lydian Empire. That this was a factor is evidenced by Darius' re-assessment of tribute after the Ionian Revolt. Cawkwell may argue from Diodorus Siculus<sup>191</sup> that the tribute amount prior to the re-assessment was not so burdensome for the Ionians, but simply because a city was able to pay the increased tribute doesn't necessarily mean that it was happy to do so. Furthermore, the increase and collection of tribute will have been a reminder of their subjugation by the Persians.

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<sup>187</sup> Wallinga, 1984, pp. 414-415.

<sup>188</sup> Wallinga, 1984, pp. 407-408.

<sup>189</sup> Herodotus, IV. 137.

<sup>190</sup> Herodotus, IV. 136. Corcella, 2007, p. 667. See Cawkwell, 2005, p. 48 for a good discussion of this.

<sup>191</sup> Diodorus Siculus, X.25.

The idea that Aristagoras could turn to Sparta for military aid after the failure of the Naxian expedition may have come from his recollection of the actions of Croesus and knowledge of previous embassies from Scythia and Samos, who had all applied to Sparta for an alliance against the expanding Persian Empire.<sup>192</sup> However, we must bear in mind that the Spartans did not take up these offers. In his efforts to persuade Cleomenes he produced a bronze map of the then known world to demonstrate the geography of Asia Minor and the relative wealth of each region, attempting to persuade Cleomenes what wealth he may be able to gain from the various regions of Asia Minor on the campaign.<sup>193</sup> Thus, we find Aristagoras tried to employ economic incentives in Sparta as well as in Athens later. Aristagoras also appealed to their common Greek ancestry and belittled Persian valour. Ultimately, Cleomenes rejected Aristagoras' appeal on the grounds that Susa was too far from the coast and, therefore, too dangerous an expedition for Sparta, even with the promise of land and wealth. It is noteworthy that in Herodotus the primary reason for refusing to give aid was the distance of Susa from the coast of Asia Minor.<sup>194</sup> This indicates that Aristagoras was not simply intent on liberating the Ionian cities along the coast of Asia Minor, but his plan to march further inland suggests grander ideas, although we do not know exactly what these may have been.<sup>195</sup> Cawkwell disputes this, claiming that Herodotus was retrospectively transposing later Pan-Hellenic ideas onto the situation, but he fails to take into account the fact that Athens did actually march to Susa.<sup>196</sup> It is true that rather than marching three months inland the Athenians only marched three days to Sardis. However, this may have been their response to Aristagoras suggestion to march inland, i.e. they had only agreed to go as far as Sardis.

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<sup>192</sup> Herodotus, VI.84 and III.148.

<sup>193</sup> Herodotus, V.49. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 20, recommend Myers, 1896, pp. 605f, for a reconstruction of a possible map and for further information on the history of Greek geographical maps. Nenci, 1994, pp. 233-234, more recently gives a full discussion believing it was the "map of Anaximander improved by Hecataeus".

<sup>194</sup> Herodotus, V.50. Nenci, 1994, p. 228, argues that, as Aristagoras was Ionian and not from mainland Greece, he would not have realised that travelling long distances inland from the sea was not common for a Greek from mainland Greece such as the Spartans.

<sup>195</sup> P. Tozzi, 1978, p. 155, believes, however, it is unlikely the Ionians thought of attacking Susa and overthrowing the Persian Empire.

<sup>196</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 77.

Cleomenes' response to Aristagoras may also have come from political motives as well as traditionally practical ones. The constant threat of a helot revolt in Sparta meant that deploying Spartan hoplites abroad for any long periods of time was risky. Had Sparta supported Aristagoras by sending hoplites to Ionia, it would then be lacking the same hoplites to defend itself against any potential revolt by the helots. In addition, the long standing enmity between Sparta and Argos also meant that Sparta may have feared sending any of its hoplites out of the Peloponnese in case of an Argive invasion. J.A.O. Larson notes that "the domestic conditions in Greece were such as to make Spartan intervention in the Ionian Revolt impossible."<sup>197</sup> Furthermore, at this time the logistics of transporting Spartan forces to Ionia, although not impossible, would have been a daunting task. If we consider that the campaign might be potentially three months' march from the coast, the idea may have seemed more trouble than it was worth. It is likely that Cleomenes wished to veto the idea before proposing it to the council, where it would be dismissed, and, thus, he would lose face.<sup>198</sup> Larson speculates that at this time Cleomenes' political and military prestige was in a period of decline and that this, combined with practical considerations due to the distance of the campaign and potential hindrance from the newly formed Peloponnesian League, as occurred during Cleomenes' invasion of Attica, would have been the other reasons behind the lack of Spartan support.<sup>199</sup> Through the leadership of Cleomenes, Sparta had expanded its influence in Greece, compelling many of the Peloponnesian Greek states to join the Peloponnesian League. Although Sparta was technically leader of the Peloponnesian League, because it was a League and not Sparta's empire, the League members could choose not to follow Spartan leadership. As noted above, Corinth had refused to march with Cleomenes when the Corinthians had realised that he was intent on invading Attica to subdue Athens.<sup>200</sup> Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnesian League may have been the primary reason Aristagoras approached Cleomenes, in the hope that he may have received not

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<sup>197</sup> Larson, 1932, p. 150.

<sup>198</sup> This had occurred only a few years previously when Cleomenes wished to re-install Hippias to Athens and was voted against by the members of the Peloponnesian League. Herodotus, V. 91-94.

<sup>199</sup> Larson, 1932, p. 149.

<sup>200</sup> Herodotus, V.76.

only Spartan support, but also support from some of the other league members. To Aristagoras, and many others viewing the situation from Asia Minor, the Peloponnesian League was led by, if not completely under the control of, Sparta and, therefore, ultimately Cleomenes. The embassies to Sparta from Maiandrios of Samos in c.517-516 and from the Scythians in c.513 in retaliation for the failed Persian invasion also suggest this.<sup>201</sup> W.G. Forrest notes that until the failed Spartan invasion of Attica Sparta had been able to use the League army for its own purposes, but afterwards League actions were voted on by its members.<sup>202</sup> It seems Aristagoras had not realised the change in this situation when he approached Cleomenes. However incorrect Aristagoras' view of the situation may have been, it is conceivable that he would have applied to Sparta for military aid thinking that this would include aid from other members of the League too.<sup>203</sup>

It is interesting that Herodotus does not mention the expansion of the Persian Empire as one of Aristagoras' arguments to persuade Sparta or, indeed, Athens. Darius had been expanding the Persian Empire since the beginning of his reign, which was evidenced by their newly acquired control of Samos, their failed campaign north into Scythia, their successful expansion into Thrace and Macedonia, and their failed campaign against Naxos. Despite the failure of Naxos and Scythia, these campaigns show Darius' intent to expand his empire beyond the coast of Asia Minor. Sparta will have been able to see the trend from the Samian exiles who went to Sparta upon the installation of Syloson of Samos and the embassy from Scythia.<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, it was Aristagoras who suggested to Artaphernes that one of the reasons for a campaign against Naxos was to use it as a naval stepping stone to the rest of the Cyclades and, ultimately, Greece. Both Larson and G. De Sanctis agree that Greek aid and intervention in

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<sup>201</sup> For Maiandrios see Herodotus, III. 48, which W.G. Forrest, 1968, p. 81 dates to 516 B.C. and Jeffery, 1976, p. 126 dates to 517 B.C. For the Scythians in Sparta, which Forrest, 1968, p. 81 and Jeffery, 1976, p. 126 dates to 513 B.C., see Herodotus, VI.84, who claims an alliance was made between Sparta and the Scythians, although we only hear of it in the context of Cleomenes' supposed drinking problem, acquired from the Scythians. Whether or not an alliance was made, it seems tolerably clear that a Scythian embassy to Sparta occurred.

<sup>202</sup> Forrest, 1968, p. 88.

<sup>203</sup> For a more in depth discussion of the Peloponnesian League in relation to Spartan foreign policy, see Larson, 1932.

<sup>204</sup> For the Samian exiles in Sparta see Herodotus, III. 144-148. for the embassy from Scythia see Herodotus, VI. 82.

the Ionian Revolt may have been “wise to have forestalled (the) invasion”.<sup>205</sup> It seems that Aristagoras may have been trying to down play the might of Persia in an attempt to persuade Sparta, and, later Athens, to campaign in Asia Minor. We can see that he represents the campaign as a Greek attack on the Persian Empire, rather than a defensive intervention; but this Greek attack in order to liberate the Ionian Greeks was not realised until the fourth century.

Aristagoras next applied to Athens using the same arguments he used at Sparta. He also made an appeal to their common kinship as “Miletus had been founded by Athenian settlers.”<sup>206</sup> As commented above, Aristagoras’ political career was in a precarious position at that time, more so than it was when he approached Sparta, and we may conjecture that by the time he arrived in Athens Aristagoras would probably have promised the Athenians anything. If we are to believe Herodotus’ chronology, Aristagoras arrived at the same time that the Athenians refused to reinstate Hippias.<sup>207</sup> We may conjecture that Aristagoras may have known about this dispute between Artaphernes and Athens. Athens’ anti-tyranny stance and recent dispute with Artaphernes may have been one of the factors which persuaded him to appeal to them. It is suggested by J.F. Lazenby that the Athenians may have sent aid to the Ionians in an attempt “to remove a potential source of support for Hippias.”<sup>208</sup> Thus, feelings of Greek freedom and sympathy for their Greek counterparts in Ionia seem to have been a factor in the Athenian decision to aid Aristagoras. Also, as mentioned above, the expansion of the Persian Empire will have been noticed by Athens and the other Greek *poleis*, as well as Sparta. For Athens specifically, an opportunity to halt

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<sup>205</sup> De Sanctis, 1931, pp. 63-91. Larson, 1932, p. 136. Even after being refused aid, Aristagoras followed Cleomenes as a suppliant and tried to bribe him until finally he was sent away and went to Athens. Herodotus V. 51. It would appear that Aristagoras was either unaware of the other king of Sparta or that Herodotus for some unknown reason did not want to mention him in this account. It seems unusual that, on being refused by Cleomenes and going to the extent of trying to bribe him, Aristagoras did not then approach Demaratus. This may be simply due to Cleomenes’ greater political influence in comparison with Demaratus’ even if Cleomenes’ powers were beginning to diminish. Hornblower, 2013, p. 162 also notes Herodotus’ omission of Demaratus.

<sup>206</sup> Herodotus, V.97. Tozzi, 1987, p. 157, notes that Aristagoras emphasised the kinship of Athens and Miletus rather than Athens and the Ionians in general.

<sup>207</sup> Herodotus, V.97.

<sup>208</sup> Lazenby, 1993, p. 42.

this expansion and, perhaps, regain control of their commercial interests in Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros may have seemed economically wise.<sup>209</sup>

With Athenian and Eretrian support Aristagoras achieved some early successes in his rebellion. They managed to reach Sardis and fire the city including the temple of Cybele, although not “the acropolis of the town which was defended by Artaphernes in person with a considerable force.”<sup>210</sup> Although the Athenians were defeated in battle at Ephesus, there were far reaching results of Athens’ involvement in Aristagoras’ Ionian revolt. Firstly was the subsequent refusal of Athens to lend any further support to Aristagoras “in spite of frequent appeals.”<sup>211</sup> Also, with the attention of Darius drawn to Athens and Eretria, Herodotus would also have us believe this was the primary reason for the Persian invasion of Greece.<sup>212</sup> Ultimately Herodotus believed that the destruction of the Acropolis of Athens was in retaliation for the firing of the temple of Cybele. C. Hignett declares that this view demonstrates Herodotus’ “weak grasp of historical causation”<sup>213</sup> although Hignett seems not to have taken into account the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism, which advocated the idea of balance. Darius was a follower of this religion and in light of this it is not implausible that he would fire the Acropolis, as a site of religious sanctuaries, in retaliation for the firing of the temple of Cybele by the Athenians. I feel it is fair to argue that, although Darius would most probably have invaded Greece as part of his expansions of the Persian Empire, the involvement of the Athenians and Eretrians acted as a catalyst for this invasion. The Ionian revolt itself did not end

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<sup>209</sup> Cf. Tozzi, 1978, pp. 160-161. Balcer, 1995, p. 177, believes that Persian dominance of Eretrian commercial interests on Andros persuaded the Eretrians to support Aristagoras. Cf. also Cawkwell, 2005, p. 76.

<sup>210</sup> Herodotus, V.100.

<sup>211</sup> Herodotus, V.103. Also see Nenci, 1994, p. 312, and Tozzi, 1978, p. 171, for further conjecture regarding the withdrawal of Athenian aid. The withdrawal itself often seems puzzling to commentators and is often linked to political developments within Athens, specifically pro- and anti-Persian sentiments within the different factions within the city.

<sup>212</sup> Although Herodotus V.105 seems to believe that before the Ionian revolt Darius had never heard of Athens, in light of Raubitschek, 1991, it seems more plausible that the initial Persian invasion was actually Darius’ reprisal against a state he believed to be a subject and breaking the terms of their treaty. Darius’ ignorance of Athens may have been due to the fact that he had never had personal contact with the Athenians, who had always dealt with Persia via Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis. Similarly, Cyrus was ignorant of Sparta until the embassy of Lacrines.

<sup>213</sup> Hignett, 1963, p. 86.

until after the naval battle of Lade, in 496 B.C. when Miletus finally fell.<sup>214</sup> During the revolt Aristagoras was killed besieging a town in Thrace.<sup>215</sup>

We can see that Aristagoras, like Polycrates and Hippias, tried to take advantage of the current political situation in Persia, i.e. the expanding empire. As an Ionian, he would have been much more aware of the possible repercussions for the failure of the Naxian expedition. Despite Herodotus' assertion that Aristagoras tried to 'pull rank' on Megabates, I believe it is unlikely that he would have been unaware of the Persian belief that all non-Persians were inferior to them.<sup>216</sup> It seems more likely that Aristagoras fled to cause rebellion because he realised that he would be blamed for the failed Naxian expedition since he was its primary advocate. Interestingly, we find that Aristagoras seemingly exploited the Greek lack of knowledge of the Persians and the Persian Empire, by belittling the valour of the Persians and emphasising the financial gains. Although this did not work for the more cautious Spartans, the Athenians, who may have known more, took the opportunity to assert their independence from Persia by joining Aristagoras.

### **Summary and Conclusion**

When looking at the initial contacts between the Ionian Greeks and the Lydians and later the Persians we note a number of points. Firstly, whilst being culturally different from the Lydians, the Ionian cities did not object to being subjugated to that Empire because they were afforded privileged treatment, especially in relation to religion. If we believe, as Caspari does, that prior to their subjugation by Lydia the Pan Ionian League was formed in defence against Aeolian encroachments on Ionian territory, we may suggest that under the protection of the Lydian Empire the need for a Pan Ionian League became primarily religious.<sup>217</sup> Further, Cawkwell notes that Croesus had family ties with the Ionian Greeks in his Ionian step-brothers.<sup>218</sup> Ionian loyalty to Lydia is

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<sup>214</sup> Herodotus, VI.18.

<sup>215</sup> Herodotus, V.126. See Wallinga, 1984 and Tozzi, 1978, for good discussions of the Ionian Revolt.

<sup>216</sup> Herodotus, I. 134. The inferiority of non-Persians increased dependant on how far the nation was from the Persian Empire.

<sup>217</sup> Caspari, 1915, p. 177.

<sup>218</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 39.



demonstrated by the refusal of the Ionian cities to join Cyrus before the capture of Croesus, with the notable exception of Miletus, which continued to enjoy its privileged status because it defected to Cyrus when the other cities did not. The Ionian affinity with the Lydians was such that the Ionian Greeks were willing to join a rebellion against Cyrus, shortly after their initial subjugation.

Further, if we are to believe Herodotus, it becomes clear that Cyrus the Great did not intend at first to subdue Lydia and Asia Minor at the time that he did, being more concerned with conquering the Mesopotamian cities north of the Tigris, which was delayed by Croesus' invasion.<sup>219</sup> Croesus' invasion of Cappadocia forced Cyrus to look westward and to protect the Persian frontier there. This provocation by Croesus brought Cyrus and the Persian Empire to the attention of the Greeks and we find that from these very first contacts Cyrus dominated this relationship. Miletus switched allegiances to Persia prior to the defeat of Croesus and when the other Ionian states subsequently tried to follow suit Cyrus would only accept them as subjects and dealt with their rebellion decisively.<sup>220</sup> From the outset we can see that Cyrus' policy was to win over at least some of his enemies by diplomacy. We can't be privy to Cyrus' exact thoughts but we can argue for mixed motivations. On one level this would sow dissension among his enemies and weaken them, on another it could argue for a certain amount of magnanimity. Whatever the truth of this, we find Darius pursuing a broadly similar policy. He gave Macedon the opportunity to submit peacefully and it did so. In Thrace, by contrast, some tribes had to be subdued by force whilst others yielded peacefully. This policy was also continued by Xerxes, as we shall see.

The assassination of Polycrates of Samos may have been in response to a perceived threat to Persian territory. Herodotus states that Polycrates, taking advantage of Persian leniency, had already captured Ionian cities on the mainland, which was now Persian, and so his assassination by Oroetes seems to have been a practical way of removing a potential threat and installing a vassal tyrant to ensure a compliant island. Although affecting the Ionian Greek cities,

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<sup>219</sup> Boardman, 2000, p. 17.

<sup>220</sup> Herodotus, I. 163. Rather than suffer Persian reprisals the Phocaeans abandoned their city and sailed to Corsica.

the Persian subjugation of the Lydian Empire did not directly affect the interests of the mainland Greeks. Sparta may have sent an envoy threatening Cyrus to leave the Ionian Greeks alone but did not follow through with this threat when the Ionians rebelled and were re-conquered by Persia. Hirsch argues that for the mainland Greeks the lack of Persian navy under Cyrus provided a psychological barrier against further Persian expansion.<sup>221</sup> This seems to be true in that part of Sparta's threat was the use of a pentekonter to carry the embassy of Lacrines to Persia.

The lack of direct impact on the interests of mainland Greeks continued under Cambyses, who expanded the Persian Empire into Egypt. If Wallinga is correct, it was Cambyses who first formed a Persian navy.<sup>222</sup> Prior to Cambyses' Egyptian campaign there was no need for a navy and Cambyses' influence still only affected some of the islands along the coast of Asia Minor. Hirsch notes that until the Naxian campaign of Aristagoras and Artaphernes the Persian fleet seems to have been made up of requisitioned ships from their island subjects.<sup>223</sup> This is evident from when Samos, which was the most powerful of these islands during Cambyses' reign, sent men and ships for Cambyses' Egyptian campaign. As Samos may not yet have been fully subject to the Persian Empire, they seem to have been sent voluntarily and were not conscripted. It is noteworthy that sending these volunteers was to the advantage of Polycrates as they were political opponents. Thus, not only did he remove these political opponents but he also showed his loyalty to the Persian Empire.<sup>224</sup> Polycrates' sending men voluntarily suggests, by contrast, that those islands and towns which were subject to the Persian Empire had men and ships requisitioned for the campaign.

The first clash of interests between Persia and the mainland Greeks appears in the reign of Darius. Samos, which seems to have acted relatively independently, was brought fully into the Persian Empire when Syloson was reinstated as tyrant of the island. Under Cambyses Sparta had sheltered Samian exiles and attempted to besiege the island with no success, but under Darius

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<sup>221</sup> Hirsch, 1986, p. 227.

<sup>222</sup> Wallinga, 1984, p. 407.

<sup>223</sup> Hirsch, 1986, p. 228.

<sup>224</sup> Cf. pp. 100-101, for similar actions of Thebes sending men to Thermopylae with Leonidas during Xerxes' invasion.

Cleomenes of Sparta refused to help Maiandrios against Syloson and eventually had Maiandrios evicted from Sparta.<sup>225</sup> Also, Darius' Scythian campaign provoked the Scythians to look to Sparta for help retaliating, but they were refused too. Under Cyrus and Cambyses the Spartans had been willing to become involved in Greek affairs in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands to a limited extent, but they were not so willing to do this under Darius. This new Spartan policy not to become involved in Persian affairs is highlighted by Aristagoras' appeal to the Spartans, which was also refused. This may have been due to their preoccupation with mainland Greek affairs, as argued by Jeffery, but there is a correlation between the growing Persian involvement in the Aegean, the formation of a Persian navy and the lack of Spartan involvement in the Aegean when asked. Hirsch suggests that a contributing factor to the reasons behind the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C. was the removal of the Ionian 'safety valve', i.e. their ability simply to leave the Persian Empire by sea if they wished.<sup>226</sup> We may suggest that the growth of the Persian navy and Persia's activities in the Aegean also may have cowed Spartan bravado, and Spartan caution of this new empire may have encouraged the kings to look to mainland issues rather than engage in overseas ones.

Much of these early contacts between the Lydian and then Persian Empire and the Greeks of the mainland concern Sparta and the occasional Peloponnesian state, such as Corinth.<sup>227</sup> We might suggest that the Spartan threat delivered by Lacrines upon the Persian conquest of Asia Minor, followed by Spartan inaction upon Persia's re-conquest after the Lydian and Ionian rebellion, made Sparta appear weak to Persia. Thus, Persia dealt with all future Greek interactions from a position of superiority and strength.

We find that Greek states beyond the Isthmus of Corinth did not become involved in relations with Persia until later, certainly the Athenians did not become involved until after the exile of Hippias. This may have been due to the internal politics within Athens and the apparently friendly relationship between

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<sup>225</sup> For the Spartan siege of Samos see Herodotus, III. 45-56. For Maiandrios see Herodotus, III.148.

<sup>226</sup> Hirsch, 1986, p. 228.

<sup>227</sup> Herodotus, III.48. Corinth joined Sparta's expedition against Samos in retaliation for when Samos sheltered Corcyraean boys sent by Corinth to become eunuchs for Alyattes a generation earlier.

the Pisistratids and Persia. The new democracy tried to continue this friendly policy with Persia until it believed that Persia was trying to interfere with her constitution. This new attitude, coupled with Athenian sympathies with and sense of cultural unity with the Ionian Greeks, encouraged their involvement in the Ionian Revolt of 499 B.C, thus, breaking their *συμμαχία* with Persia. We may conclude that, although it was Athens which first broke this treaty with Persia, it was Persia which provoked this by trying to meddle in Athens' political affairs and to install Hippias. Thus, we can see that from their earliest contacts Persia viewed the Ionian Greeks, the Athenians and the Spartans with condescension, whilst the Greek initial response was generally one which underestimated Persian might.

Looking at those individuals who medised during the rise of the Persian Empire we notice that, in general, they approached the Persian king rather than the other way round. Polycrates, Syloson and Hippias all sought to take advantage of Persian power to their own benefit and medised pro-actively rather than reactively. In the case of Polycrates it was to remove political opponents from Samos by sending them on Cambyses' Egyptian campaign. However, it would also appear that Polycrates early on appreciated the power of Persia and this was a further motivation for his joining the Egyptian expedition. In the case of Syloson it was to be reinstated as tyrant of Samos and in the case of Hippias it was to be reinstated as the tyrant of Athens. We can see that the relationships between these three tyrants and the Persian Empire were all controlled by Persia. In the case of Polycrates, he was eventually assassinated for becoming a threat, in the case of Syloson he was unable to be reinstated without Persian aid and the same can be said of Hippias, who was forced to wait twenty years before an attempt was made to reinstall him as tyrant of Athens.

Although Democedes seems to have been employed by the Persian court rather than as a slave in the traditional sense, we still find that in order for him to realise his plan to return to Greece, like Syloson and Hippias, he was forced to wait upon the king to send a reconnaissance ship to Greece. We are not told how long it took for Darius to send the reconnaissance ship, but it is unlikely that he would have sent it until it tied in with his other plans. Thus, yet again, we find a

Greek dependent on taking advantage of the plans of the King, rather than influencing him into making them.

A notable exception amongst the Greek individuals in the Persian Empire is Miltiades, who we briefly mentioned was at one time a tyrant of a city in the Thracian Chersonese, allied with Darius and supported him in his Scythian campaign. His seeming freedom seems to stem from his location on the edge of the Persian Empire, which in turn afforded him the ability to abandon his city and return to Greece when he thought it necessary.<sup>228</sup> When subject to the Persian Empire we can conclude he was loyal, since his son who was captured whilst fleeing to Athens was given cities and a Persian wife by Darius. Had Miltiades been suspect of dissident behaviour we would not expect his son to have been so well treated when he was captured.<sup>229</sup> In fact, we may note that the only evidence for Miltiades' supposedly rebellious behaviour comes from Herodotus' pro-Athenian sources.

We can conclude that from the first contacts between the Greeks and the Persian Empire, the relationships were dominated by Persia. For the Greeks of Asia Minor, the islands, Thrace and Macedon the choice was simple. They could accept the offer of peaceful submission or be conquered. The mainland Greeks largely ignored the issue until Sparta forced Athens to look to her own safety. However, she reneged on her treaty almost immediately.

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<sup>228</sup> Earlier other Greeks such as the Phocaeans at Herodotus, I. 164 had fled Persian reprisals and we may perhaps suggest Miltiades fits this pattern.

<sup>229</sup> Although it was not unheard of for Darius to be generous towards his enemies, e.g. Demaratus and Themistocles, I believe in this case his treatment of Miltiades' son is evidence of Miltiades' loyalty.



## Chapter 2: Datis' Invasion of Greece

### The invasions of Greece

After the defeat of the Ionians in 496 B.C., Persian policy turned to securing its borders and consolidating its territory before expanding further into the West. We have already noted (p.31) that Mardonius allowed the Ionian cities to choose how they wished to be governed, i.e. democracy or tyranny. Artaphernes reassessed their tribute amounts which quieted any residual unrest after the Ionian Revolt.<sup>230</sup> Eventually Darius seems to have taken up Hippias on his postulated offer to become a Persian installed vassal tyrant of Athens, which would create a foothold for further Persian expansion into Greece. The primary question concerning Persian expansion into the West is whether this was motivated solely by the desire to punish Athens and Eretria for breaking their *συμμαχία* treaty and supporting the Ionian Revolt, or whether this was part of a more general policy to expand the Persian Empire.

Herodotus claims that the initial expedition, led by Datis, had Athens and Eretria as its primary goal. However, he also states that "the Persians intended to subject as many Greek towns as they could" and relates how Mardonius subjected Thasos and secured Persian control over Macedon.<sup>231</sup> Balcer suggests that rather than retaliation for Greek involvement in the Ionian Revolt, it was the "new imperial policies of the Great King after 520 B.C." which provoked the Persian invasion of Greece.<sup>232</sup> This idea is accepted by Cawkwell and Sealey.<sup>233</sup> Given the size of the Persian forces sent first to Eretria and then Marathon, I am inclined also to believe that Datis' campaign was intended to be the first stage in a Persian expansion into Greece and the West. Herodotus' account of Mardonius' campaign against Thasos and Macedonia indicates that Darius

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<sup>230</sup> Herodotus, VI.42-43.

<sup>231</sup> Herodotus, VI.44.

<sup>232</sup> Balcer, 1989, p. 128.

<sup>233</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 88, notes that envoys were sent to the islands to request earth and water which seems to indicate Darius' wider aim to conquer Greece. Although Hignett, 1963, p. 87, believes the account of these envoys to be unhistorical suggesting that Mardonius would not have attempted his first conquest by sea had this been the case, but rather would have secured northern and central Greece and then marched there, he recognises that the wider aims of the campaign was to create a "bridgehead" for further expansion into Greece. Sealey, 1976, p. 16, suggests Darius' Scythian expedition and conquest of Thrace shows his intention to expand the Persian Empire westwards, as did the reconnaissance expedition of Democedes.

expanded Persian control to the north of Greece with the apparent intention eventually to expand into Greece itself.<sup>234</sup>

The following chapter intends to discuss the Greek reaction to the first Persian invasion of Greece. We have seen how the hostile relationship between the Athenians and Persians developed in the sixth century and we will now look at how this view affected the Athenian attitude towards those Greeks who submitted to Persia in the wake of the Empire's expansion.

### The medism of Aegina

Part of the Persian expansion plan seems to have been, yet again, to exploit the divisions between the Greek states, inviting those states which wished to medise to submit earth and water. Of the islands which did submit earth and water, Herodotus highlights the response of Athens to the submission of Aegina, which they believed had acted out of personal "enmity" towards Athens. The Athenian response was to accuse Aegina of treachery and also to call on Sparta to join in the island's condemnation.<sup>235</sup>

The strong response of Athens and Sparta to the medism of Aegina, compared to their treatment of the other medising islands, invites us to take a closer look at it. On the face of it we may suggest that it was the proximity of Aegina to Attica which provoked such a strong Athenian response, this may also explain the Spartan willingness to become involved. However, Aegina was not the only island off the coast of Attica which submitted to Persia, there was also Ceos, Paros, Andros, Melos and Delos. We will look at Miltiades' treatment of Paros in due course, but we ought also to remember that, although levelling the accusation, Athens had also submitted earth and water to Persia in the not so distant past, as mentioned above.<sup>236</sup> Herodotus' statement that the Athenians believed the Aeginetans had medised out of personal enmity to Athens is telling and it is worth noting that Aegina is the only island named by Herodotus, despite the claim that all of the islands visited, except Naxos, submitted earth

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<sup>234</sup> Herodotus, VI.44.

<sup>235</sup> Herodotus, VI.49.

<sup>236</sup> Herodotus, V.73.



and water.<sup>237</sup> Herodotus also states that Athens used Aeginetan submission as a pretext<sup>238</sup> to call upon Sparta. Thus, we must ask: what was it about Aegina in particular that upset Athens so much?

Behind the obvious reason for the accusation of Aegina's medism, i.e. Aegina did actually submit earth and water, is the animosity between Aegina and Athens. This animosity was firmly rooted by the 490s. Herodotus gives us two reasons for the animosity between the two cities: the Aeginetan raids on the Attic coast in c. 506-505 B.C.<sup>239</sup> and the dispute between the two cities regarding the olive wood statues of Epidaurus.<sup>240</sup> Both of these seem to have been the result of Aegina's increase in wealth from trade.<sup>241</sup> P. Green suggests in the decade between Marathon and Xerxes' invasion, Aegina rivalled Athens in the area of trade and, indeed, intercepted much of the trade that would have gone to Athens. We may speculate that this would have begun prior to Marathon and was the reason Aegina could build up a navy large enough to raid the Attic coast. Only the windfall of silver from Laurium enabled Athens to build enough ships to deal with their war against Aegina and to break "Aegina's trade-monopoly."<sup>242</sup> At V.81 Herodotus explains the Aeginetan attacks on the Attic coast were due in part to their "great prosperity", which appears to coincide with the growth of the Aeginetan navy. Figueira conjectures that the growth of the Aeginetan navy may have led to their rebellion from, and later their raids against, Epidaurus, which led to the taking of the olive wood statues.<sup>243</sup> The perception that the foundation story of the Aeginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia,

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<sup>237</sup> Herodotus, VI.49. T. Kelly, 2003, p. 184 argues that evidence in Herodotus of the Persian force taking hostages from the Aegean islands en route to Carystus and evidence of the inhabitants of Naxos and Delos fleeing these islands indicates that many of the Aegean islands likely had not submitted earth and water the previous year. He also notes that the Lindian Temple Chronicle states that Rhodes only submitted after Lindos had been besieged and had run out of water.

<sup>238</sup> [καὶ ἄσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο](#)

<sup>239</sup> Herodotus, V.82.

<sup>240</sup> Herodotus, V.82-85 tells us of some olive wood statues given by the Athenians to Epidaurus and stolen by Aegina during a raid. Whereas Epidaurus paid tribute to Athens during its possession of the statues, it ceased doing so once the statues had been stolen and the Aeginetans also refused despite possessing them. L. Jeffery believes that the hostilities between Athens and Aegina lasted with varying intensity for 24 years in total and ended just after Marathon in 489 B.C., contrary to Herodotus, VIII.145. Jeffery, 1962, pp. 46 and 54. Cf. p. 82. For Herodotus, VIII.145. Burn, 1985, pp. 294-295, suggests a more likely date of 483 B.C. Cf p. 57.

<sup>241</sup> Scott, 2005, p. 547, Figueira, 1985, p. 62.

<sup>242</sup> Green, 1970, pp. 49 and 58.

<sup>243</sup> Figueira, 1985, p. 62.

to whom the olive wood statues were dedicated, which is so closely connected with the theft of these statues and the hostility with Athens, may signify that the hostility between Athens and Aegina stemmed from the beginning of Aegina's independence from Epidaurus and the growth of the Aeginetan navy. These rivalries and hostilities, coupled with the difference in their ethnicities, Athens being Ionian and Aegina being Dorian, would have made Aegina an easy target of Athenian censure when Aegina submitted to Persia; thus, we can see there were many reasons for Athenian-Aeginetan hostility.

A further reason behind the Athenian accusations may have been the fear of a Persian supported Aeginetan navy.<sup>244</sup> R. Sealey notes that, with Persian backing, the Aeginetan navy would have vastly outnumbered the Athenian navy, giving Aegina a clear advantage in the on-going skirmishes of the "Herald less War."<sup>245</sup> Figueira's claim that "medising was the final result of the ... "Herald less War" opened by the Aegenitan attack on the Attic coast in 506"<sup>246</sup> is incorrect. He seems to have forgotten that the end of the "Herald less War" occurred when the members of the Hellenic League agreed to put aside their disputes in order to work together in the defence of Greece, nearly a decade later.<sup>247</sup> Thus, we can conclude that the Athenian response to Aegina's medism was largely the result of animosity between the two cities tinged with the fear of a Persian supported Aegina against her.

Spartan intervention at Aegina, at the Athenian behest, creates additional interest. Only a few years prior to Darius' heralds, the Spartans themselves had tried to reinstall Hippias as tyrant of Athens. It was precisely because of this action that Athens had turned to an alliance with Persia. It can hardly be claimed that Sparta and Athens had had friendly relations in the intervening years before Aegina's medism and the Athenian accusation need not necessarily

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<sup>244</sup> Figueira, 1985, p. 72 presents a convincing argument that the Aeginetan story concerning the justification of its attacks along the Attic coast, i.e. at the behest of Thebes due to the oracle regarding Thebes and Aegina, is most probably the remembrance of public justifications for actions with private motives now forgotten. Although there is no way of confirming this from the contemporary sources, or of discerning the more probable and private reasons, it does suggest that the Aeginetan raids along the Attic coast may have had less honourable reasons behind them. This would give even further justification for Athenian animosity towards Aegina. Herodotus, V.82-89.

<sup>245</sup> Sealey, 1976, p. 20.

<sup>246</sup> Figueira, 1985, p. 50.

<sup>247</sup> Herodotus, VIII.145. Cf. Herodotus, V.82-89.

have been of interest to Sparta. What appears to have caught Sparta's attention was that the Aeginetans, prior to this submission, had allied themselves with Argos.<sup>248</sup> When Aegina stole the olive wood statues from Epidaurus and Athens retaliated, Argos sent men to help Aegina in the fighting.<sup>249</sup> We cannot be certain what Athens hoped to achieve by appealing to Sparta and Sparta's actions may be attributed primarily to the impulsive nature of Cleomenes. However, we can surmise that the opportunity to act against an ally of Argos, and thereby weaken Argos with the gloss of legitimacy, was a tempting offer presented to Sparta by Athens.<sup>250</sup>

R.A. Tomlinson's believes that Cleomenes' desire to secure Sparta's hegemony was in preparation against the growing Persian menace.<sup>251</sup> However, we should treat this suggestion with caution. It seems more likely that the Spartan desire to secure its position as hegemon was due to the fact that Argos challenging it and not necessarily because of the Persian threat. It is true that Sparta will have been aware of the growing Persian menace and we noted above, pp. 49-50, that as Persian might grew, Spartan interference in Ionia and the Aegean diminished. However, if Cleomenes was as far-sighted as Tomlinson suggests and if this was part of an anti-Persian policy as suggested by Sealey,<sup>252</sup> we must question why Cleomenes refused to help the Scythians, Samians and Ionians when they requested help against Persia years earlier? It seems more reasonable to suggest that Cleomenes became involved in punishing Aegina primarily for mainland Greek reasons, rather than due to a specific anti-Persian agenda. I would suggest that these reasons were to assert Sparta's position as hegemon and to retaliate against Argos via Argos' alliance with Aegina.

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<sup>248</sup> [ἔσωθέντες δὲ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ἐπεκαλέοντο τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ πρότερον](#), Ἀργείους Herodotus, VI.92.

<sup>249</sup> Scott, 2005, p. 329, suggests possible religious connections via the cult of Pythian Apollo at Asine.

<sup>250</sup> Kelly, 1970, argues that enmity between Sparta and Argos began in the mid-sixth century BC and was not "traditional". However, this does not affect our argument here, that there was and had been for some time enmity between Sparta and Argos by the 490s BC. For a more in depth discussion of this, see the medism of Argos below, p. 37-43.

<sup>251</sup> Tomlinson, 1972, p. 92, also Sealey, 1976, p. 16.

<sup>252</sup> Sealey, 1976, pp. 17-18, suggests that Spartan involvement in this affair is symptomatic of Cleomenes' anti-Persian policy, claiming that this was Cleomenes' attempt to resist Persian encroachment south of Thessaly.

The notion of an understanding between Athens and Sparta, as proposed by Lazenby,<sup>253</sup> is supported by Cleomenes' actions when he left ten Aeginetan hostages in Athenian care, having arrested them. The arrest of these ten leading men suggests that they may have been members of the ruling party responsible for Aegina's submission of earth and water. It is true that Athens would not have called on Sparta if there wasn't some form of 'understanding' between the two states, especially after Cleomenes' previous interference in Athenian politics. However, not knowing what this might have been we must tread carefully when speculating about it.

Looking to the motivation for Aegina's submission to Persia we must admit that we cannot really know whether or not Aegina medised as part of their 'Herald less War' and to spite Athens. I do not believe that the animosity between the two states did not contribute in some measure to the Aeginetan reasoning behind submitting, however, I disagree with T. Kelly's argument that Aegina did not submit from fear of Persia, but rather for "their own selfish reasons".<sup>254</sup> We can as easily conjecture that Aegina medised from a real belief that all the other Greek islands and cities which had been approached by Persia had already submitted, or were about to submit, and Aegina simply did not want to become isolated in this instance. It is worth remembering that the Ionians had just been defeated in their rebellion and Mardonius had recently subdued Thasos and re-secured Persian control of Macedon; these Persian victories will have influenced the reasoning behind the submission of all of the islands, Aegina included. The actions of Aegina during Xerxes' invasion clear the island of any later suspicion and may indicate a change in governance between this first request for submission and Xerxes' invasion.<sup>255</sup> We may

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<sup>253</sup> Lazenby, 1993, p. 46.

<sup>254</sup> Kelly, 2003, p. 184.

<sup>255</sup> Proof of Athens' accusations are dispelled when we see that the Aeginetans distinguished themselves in the defence of Greece. Examples of Aeginetan loyalty can be found in Herodotus, VII.147, VII.179 VIII.41-46 and Diodorus Siculus XI.18.2. Also, in the Troezen decree we find the Aeginetans listed alongside the Athenians, "Lacedaemonians, Corinthians ... and all others who wish to share the danger." (Taken from the copy of the Troezen decree in Green, 1970, p. 98. Cf. Mikael Johansson, 2001, pp. 69-92. The decree is mentioned in Thucydides, I.132, Herodotus, IX.81. Also see Tod, 1933, 19. Rhodes & Osborne, 2003, p. 445, acknowledge the doubtfulness of the authenticity of the decree and refer to Meiggs and Lewis, 1969, p. 50, for a full discussion. Aegina is present on the "Serpent-Column" dedicated by the allies after Plataea. (Meiggs & Lewis, 1969, 27.) Whether we regard the Troezen Decree as authentic or as a third century forgery, this

suggest that the islanders may have initially submitted to Persia without further thought of the consequences of their actions, i.e. they didn't believe that Darius or Xerxes would actually invade Greece. The change in Aeginetan attitude to Persia seems to have stemmed from the Athenian victory at Marathon, the occurrence of which will have demonstrated to the Aeginetans and the other Greek states that resistance to the Persian threat was possible. It would also have demonstrated Athenian strength. We mentioned above the possibility of the ruling party at the time of Aegina's submission being pro-Persian and the removal of this party by Cleomenes may also explain Aegina's U-turn in foreign policy regarding Persia.

The case of Aegina is a good example of the Persian policy of factionalism being used against the Greeks. It is noteworthy that once Cleomenes had removed the ten leading Aeginetans the island seems to have become anti-Persia. Thus, we may speculate that the Persian request for submission caused the island to divide along pro-Persian and anti-Persian lines. The heavy handed approach of Athens and Sparta to Aegina may not only have been retaliation for past grievances, but may have served as a warning of similar treatment to the other islands which had submitted. If this is the case, this warning was not as strong as the Persian threat. It is not impossible that the islands may have remembered the treatment by Cyrus the Great of the Ionian cities which did not submit when asked and were treated harshly later. It would certainly be in the interests of Persia to stress this and we may speculate that the Persian envoys sent to the islands may have done so. As mentioned above, the more recent treatment of the Ionian Greeks will have demonstrated more easily Persia's might over the Greeks. Despite later opinions that the Ionian Greeks were not as valiant as the mainland Greeks, there is no indication that these beliefs were held in the 490s. It is likely that these opinions were conceived after Marathon,

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evidence with the "Serpent-Column" and Herodotus attests to the Aeginetan commitment to the Hellenic League's cause. Both Diodorus Siculus, XI.27.2 and Herodotus, VIII.93 give Aegina the award for valour after Salamis. Aegina sent men and ships to Mycale in Ionia, indicating the island was an active and leading participant in the war effort with Sparta and Athens. (Diodorus Siculus, XI.34.2, Herodotus, IX.131ff.)

Salamis, Plataea and Mycale, when the mainland Greeks had proved they could resist Persian might.

### Eretria

Evidence for a possible Persian policy of causing factionalism in Greece prior to Datis' invasion may also be found at Eretria. Herodotus says "one party proposed abandoning the town and taking refuge in the Euboean hills, another ... was preparing to betray the city."<sup>256</sup> The talk of a split counsel, How and Wells suggest, can go some way to explain the inadequate Athenian action to defend their ally.<sup>257</sup> F Maurice suggests that, as the Eretrians were able to withstand the siege until the seventh day, the medisers within Eretria were a "small minority".<sup>258</sup> However, this is contradicted by How and Wells, who note Herodotus' implication that Aeschines was the only honest man in a "rotten" state.<sup>259</sup> We are told by Herodotus that, on the advice of Aeschines, "those of the Athenians who had already arrived"<sup>260</sup> of the four thousand Athenians, who had been sent to help defend the island, returned home before any action was taken. This implies that the Athenians returned home before the whole force had arrived on the island. How and Wells suggest that Herodotus' anxious justification of Athenian actions may be the result of the "thought that after Marathon a bold stand might have been made at Eretria."<sup>261</sup> This may be a true interpretation of Athenian sentiments after Marathon, however, it is worth remembering that prior to Marathon Persian conquests had only been halted by the Scythians, and the Greek victory at Marathon was largely due to the Greek attack occurring seemingly as the Persians were preparing to abandon the plain.

Once the Eretrians had decided to make their stand against the Persian force, we are told that the town was betrayed by two particular Eretrians,

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<sup>256</sup> Herodotus, VI.100.

<sup>257</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 105.

<sup>258</sup> Maurice, 1932, p. 16.

<sup>259</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 105.

<sup>260</sup> Herodotus, VI.100.

<sup>261</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p 105.

“Euphorbus the son of Alchimachus and Philagrus the son of Cyneas.”<sup>262</sup> We hear nothing further of these two men after the defeat of Eretria. The mention of these two specific Eretrians may reflect Herodotus’ sympathy with the island, by diverting the blame from the general population to two specific individuals. Herodotus’ treatment of Eretria contrasts with that of Aegina, which he suggests medised specifically from motives of malice against Athens.<sup>263</sup> The diversion of blame from the population to two specific individuals calls to mind Herodotus’ treatment of Thebes, where he denounced Timagenidas and Attaginus as the primary medisers.<sup>264</sup> Herodotus’ portrayal of Eretria suggests that the Eretrians recognised that with such minimal support from the rest of Greece and with medising elements within the city, resistance to Datis’ invasion would be futile. It may also suggest that there may have been fewer medising elements within the city compared to Athens. We see that, unlike with Athens, Datis besieged the city immediately rather than waiting for a number of days for the medising elements to hand over the city.

We may also suggest that the return of the Athenian force would have benefitted Eretria too. Had the Athenian force remained, it would have made it more difficult for the Eretrians to submit to Persia and it would have prolonged the battle for the island. It was not until after Marathon that the Greek states believed that a Persian invasion force could be resisted. Were the Eretrians to maintain the Athenians, believing that no other defence force from Greece was coming, the situation may have been exacerbated. And, so, after an initial short struggle the island submitted.

The treatment of Eretria, after its betrayal is also disputed. J.R. Green and R.K. Sinclair note that those Eretrians who were captured by the Persians were probably not the entirety of the population and suggest that many Eretrians fled the polis and took refuge in the hills of the island.<sup>265</sup> This theory contradicts Plato who states that “soldiers marched to the limits of [Eretria](#) and posted themselves at intervals from sea to sea; then they joined hands and passed

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<sup>262</sup> Herodotus, VI.100.

<sup>263</sup> Herodotus, VI.49. We may suggest that the account of Aegina may have stemmed from pro-Athenian sources.

<sup>264</sup> Herodotus, IX.86.

<sup>265</sup> J.R. Green & R.K. Sinclair, 1970, p. 517.

through the whole of the country, in order that they might be able to report to the king that not a man had escaped out of their hands.”<sup>266</sup> However, we find that the Eretrians were able to field 600 men at Plataea and supply seven ships for Artemisium and Salamis, which suggests that, in fact, a number of Eretrians were not deported by Datis.<sup>267</sup> This treatment of the Eretrians by Persia will have served to strengthen the idea that resistance to Persia was not only futile but that the repercussions of resisting were high. For Persia it is likely that they considered it more economic to relocate the skilled Ionian population to another part of the Empire than to kill them all outright.

### Marathon

Having subdued Eretria, Datis proceeded to Attica aiming for the plain of Marathon as suggested by Hippias. Herodotus mentions that the decision to fight a pitched battle was divided amongst the 10 generals chosen by Athens, echoing the situation on Eretria, and that half of the generals feared that the Athenian army was too small.<sup>268</sup> It took the vote of Callimachus the polemarch to sway the council to fight at Marathon. In his arguments to convince Callimachus, Miltiades

Miltiades claimed that if the Athenians did not fight against the Persian army, then Hippias would certainly return to his position as tyrant of Athens. Herodotus’ sentence, “[ἔλπομαι τινὰ στάσιν μεγάλην διασείσειν ἐμπεσοῦσαν τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονήματα ὥστε μηδίσαι](#)” in essence accuses those generals, who did not wish to fight, of medism. Miltiades also may have recalled the previous tensions between Hippias and himself, when Hippias was in power in Athens. N.A. Doenges suggests that the story may be “Philiad political propaganda” but notes that it also indicates that there was a delay of some days between the Athenian arrival at Marathon and the battle.<sup>269</sup> He does not dispute that there were possible Persian supporters in Athens, but believes that had Datis had a vast numerical superiority as suggested by Herodotus, VI.44, he would not have

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<sup>266</sup> Plato, *Menexenus*, 240a-c.

<sup>267</sup> Herodotus, VI.101.

<sup>268</sup> Herodotus, VI.109.

<sup>269</sup> Doenges, 1998, pp. 10-12.



been so dependent on the need for an uprising in Athens itself.<sup>270</sup> Whether Datis had as vast a numerical superiority as suggested by Herodotus or not does not affect Datis' desire for treachery from within Athens. As can be seen with Eretria, treachery was quicker, and therefore cheaper, than sieges regardless how big the attacking force is. Hignett is likely correct in believing that Hippias probably still had some supporters remaining in Athens.<sup>271</sup> A.-H. Chroust notes that ties of loyalty to friendship and political clubs based on common beliefs tended to out-weigh patriotism to one's city.<sup>272</sup> On this basis, we may suggest that many of Hippias' supporters were pro-oligarchy, rather than pro-Hippias per se. Furthermore, that there were pro-Persian factions in Eretria and not Athens is unlikely. C.A. Robinson, disagreeing with A.W. Gomme, argues that prior to the Athenian victory at Marathon there were no major repercussions for pro-Persian sympathisers in Athens, noting Aristotle's comment that "the Athenians, with the usual leniency of democracy, allowed all the friends of the tyrants, who had not joined in their evil deeds in the time of troubles, to remain in the city."<sup>273</sup> This also seems to be reflected by the erection of an altar by Hippias the younger in the 490s and the presence in Athens of his kinsman Hipparchus, who was ostracised in 488/7 B.C.<sup>274</sup> However, we can see that there seems to be a connection between the suspicion of medism and ostracism, which is evidenced by some of the ostraca dating to the 480s B.C. R. McMullin notes that two of the first three Athenians ostracised were connected to the Alcmeonidae, who were suspected of medism at Marathon.<sup>275</sup> Robinson

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<sup>270</sup> Doenges argues that the Persian forces were not much numerically superior to the Athenians, suggesting that the Persians infantry numbered closer to 12,000-15,000 rather than 20,000-25,000. He suggests that a Persian navy of 600 triremes to combat just over 50 Athenian triremes (the size of the Athenian navy against Aegina in 490) is unlikely. He also suggests that the logistics of moving such a large force and then evacuating them after the battle, as was the case, limits the number. His final argument is that, had there been 20,000-25,000, it is unlikely that the Athenians would have beaten the Persians at Marathon. Doenges, 1998, pp. 4-6.

<sup>271</sup> Hignett, 1963, pp. 71.

<sup>272</sup> Chroust, 1954, p. 280-281. Chroust notes that later, during the Athenian political turmoil of the 5<sup>th</sup> century, many of these political clubs "combined for common political action" p. 282. See also Mitchell, 1997, pp. 41-44 for her discussion on *φιλία* concerning clubs and associations and in political contexts.

<sup>273</sup> (Aristotle), *Athenian Constitution*, 22.4. C.A. Robinson, 1945, p. 247. A.W. Gomme, 1944, pp. 321-322.

<sup>274</sup> Arnush, 1995, pp. 135-162.

<sup>275</sup> McMullin, 2001, pp. 62-63, notes the ostraca against Callias son of Cratias, referring to him as a Mede, and those against Aristides, who is called the "brother of Datis."

continues to argue that at the end of the sixth century the aristocratic “party” within Athens was not only pro-tyrannist but also pro-Spartan, citing the Spartan congress in 504 B.C. to restore Hippias to Athens.<sup>276</sup> He concludes that, since the Athenian aristocracy were largely pro-tyranny and pro-Sparta, and also Persia was helping to restore Hippias, the aristocratic “party” within Athens was also, therefore, pro-Persian.<sup>277</sup> Robinson’s argument centres on the primary idea all parties had in common, which was the desire to overthrow the democratic constitution.<sup>278</sup> I agree that those Athenians which were pro-tyranny we also likely pro-Persia, however, Robinson fails to acknowledge that Sparta was involved in removing the leaders of the medising party from Aegina. In light of this I would suggest that those Athenians which were pro-Sparta were unlikely also to be pro-Persia. We may suggest that, of those who didn’t wish to engage in a pitched battle, not all of them came to that decision because of their desire to reinstate Hippias.<sup>279</sup> We have already noted a possible fear of the Persian army and the doubt of an Athenian victory. It seems likely that the Athenian victory at Marathon was largely due to the fact they seem to have attacked whilst the Persians were leaving the field and embarking back on their ships. Cawkwell believes that this would explain the small number of Athenian casualties and also the small number of Persian ships captured by the Athenians, i.e. the rest were already out to sea.<sup>280</sup>

We learn from Herodotus that after the battle a shield signal was given to the Persians who were embarked on their ships ready to sail to Athens.<sup>281</sup> The debate regarding the origin of the shield signal is wide and from Herodotus’

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<sup>276</sup> Herodotus, V.91-94, Robinson, 1945, p. 250.

<sup>277</sup> Robinson clarifies his description of an aristocratic party in Athens using McGregor’s definition: “the conservative or oligarchical nobles, as opposed to the liberal, though by birth aristocratic, Alkmaionidai”. Robinson, 1945, p. 39. n.3.

<sup>278</sup> Robinson, 1945, p. 250. Robinson argues that, although the Alcmeonidae and the Spartans had worked together to overthrow Hippias, they were unable to work together further and in 508/7 B.C. Isagoras invited Cleomenes back to Athens and shortly later Cleomenes suggested the restoration of Hippias.

<sup>279</sup> Hignett, 1963, p. 71.

<sup>280</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 89.

<sup>281</sup> Herodotus, VI.115. Plutarch, *De Malignitate Herodoti*, 27, denies such a signal existed, however we know that Plutarch was writing polemic when he wrote this piece. A.T. Hodge and L.A. Losada, 1970, pp. 31-36, observe that a shield signal could be given at any time of day, not simply before noon as suggested by Hammond, 1977, p. 216, n. 2. They also note the difficulty in the ability to angle the signal in precisely the correct direction that it can be seen from the plain of Marathon.

information we cannot know for certain who gave the signal, if, indeed, it was a deliberate signal. Herodotus defends the Alcmeonidae, almost to the point of suspicion, who were accused of the act back in Athens.<sup>282</sup> Much speculation exists.

If we believe that a signal was given to the Persians, we can infer, whether Alcmeonid or not, that communication between some party from inside Athens and the Persian army was taking place. Given the divided feelings amongst the generals prior to the battle, this seems more than likely. P.K. Baillie Reynolds suggests that instead of the shield signal sending a message of confirmation to Datis, as commonly thought, it actually sent a signal to let the Persians know that something had gone wrong. He believes that Datis had arranged for the capture of Athens by treachery, as with Eretria, and that the shield signal was a warning from those who were working for him that the treachery had not worked.<sup>283</sup> However, K. Gillis presenting arguments counter to Herodotus, notes that despite defending the Alcmeonidae Herodotus does not suggest other culprits who were likely to have given the shield signal.<sup>284</sup> Kelly similarly notes that official charges were not brought against the Alcmeonidae, which seems testament to the lack of evidence that they had medised.<sup>285</sup> We can discount Maurice's contention that the signal was not intended for the Persians but was caused by Miltiades' own men signalling to him the movements of the Persian fleet, as we may assume Herodotus' sources would know of this.<sup>286</sup> Despite the many attempts to interpret the shield signal, we must resign ourselves to the fact they are speculation.

The dissension and potential medism present in the Athenian army likely reflected a similar situation back in Athens and suggests either pro-Pisistratid sympathies, pro-Persian sympathies or, perhaps, simply pro-oligarchic

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<sup>282</sup> Herodotus, VI.121.

<sup>283</sup> Baillie Reynolds, 1929, pp. 100-105.

<sup>284</sup> Gillis, 1969, pp. 139-140. Gillis also notes the awkward placement of the defence in the narrative and suggests that, since it concludes with the birth of Pericles, it may have been included in defence of Pericles, connected to the Alcmeonidae through his mother, on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>285</sup> Kelly, 2003, p. 192.

<sup>286</sup> Maurice, 1932, pp. 17-18.

sympathies were present amongst the Athenians. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Hippias would have lost all contact with his former supporters. Hippias' presence in the campaign testifies to his belief that he still had supporters within Athens. Therefore, it is not too great a leap to suggest that he and they may have been working together, regardless of the individual motivations behind this. It may be that a few individuals within Athens, realising the size of the Persian force and believing that resistance would only aggravate the Persians further, believed that by betraying Athens they were acting in the city's best interests, i.e. if the city willingly medised, the Athenians would be treated more leniently than if it fell to the Persians unwillingly.<sup>287</sup> Likewise it may be that the unknown medisers were partisans of Hippias or, more opportunistically, were already in contact with Datis. We cannot know the motivations of the medising individuals but can surmise that they were probably a combination of all of the possible reasons above.

Whatever the message, if we believe that a signal was deliberately given, it confirms communication between a faction within Athens itself and the Persians. Fortunately for the relatively young democracy, the medisers were too few to act effectively after the Athenian victory at Marathon and, we may conjecture that, the result of Marathon directly influenced whether the city would medise. It is worth bearing in mind, as noted by Chroust, that political dissension within Athens formed around clubs was not a new idea, conceived upon the invasion of Hippias and Datis in an attempt to reinstate Hippias as tyrant. Chroust notes that in 632 B.C., Cylon and his fellow club-members, joined by Megarian mercenaries, tried to seize the city; in 508/7 B.C., Isagoras and his "partisans" called upon Sparta to suppress Cleisthenes; and later, on the eve of Plataea some Athenian oligarchs attempted to overthrow the democratic regime by betraying the Greek cause to the Persians.<sup>288</sup> Chroust demonstrates that political club-loyalties tended to out-weigh patriotism and so we may also conclude that the dissension within the army noted by Miltiades and a shield

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<sup>287</sup> Gillis, 1969, p. 138.

<sup>288</sup> Chroust, 1954, pp. 283-284, citing Thucydides 1.126 for the affair of Cylon. (Aristotle), *Athenian Constitution*, 20.1-4, Herodotus, V.70-73 for Isagoras and Cleisthenes; Plutarch, *Aristides*, 13 for the conspirators on the eve of the Battle of Plataea.

signal to the Persian army are evidence of Greek political factionalism, which the Persians attempted to exploit. From this we may conclude, as mentioned above p. 62, that there may have been a larger medising element in Athens compared to Eretria. Datis was willing to wait a number of days for these medisers to betray the city to him even though the Spartans were eventually expected to arrive to help the Athenians.<sup>289</sup>

### Miltiades' punishment of Paros

Herodotus tells us that, after the Athenian victory at Marathon and the defence of Athens, Miltiades asked for seventy ships and the required men and money for an attack against Paros, which had medised at the same time as Eretria.<sup>290</sup> Herodotus claims that Miltiades' attack against Paros was because the Parians "had sent a trireme to Marathon with the Persian fleet."<sup>291</sup> He also claims that Miltiades was angry with a certain Parian, Lysagoras son of Teisias, who "had slandered him to Hydarnes the Persian."<sup>292</sup> At Paros Miltiades demanded a hundred talents to prevent him besieging the city, which seems to have been the actual reason for his attack. However, the siege failed and Miltiades returned to Athens having achieved nothing more than destroying the crops and injuring his leg.

Of significant interest to our research is the retaliation for Paros' medism being used to cover other motives; namely Paros' wealth. Herodotus' explanation that Miltiades wanted revenge against Paros solely because of the slander of one Parian seems farfetched. However, the accusation of medism seems to be an obvious attempt to make the blatant Athenian aggression more acceptable. How and Wells note the prosperity of the island, especially in marble.<sup>293</sup> They also note that when Paros paid tribute to Athens, later in the fifth century, it paid 16 ½ talents, which is only exceeded by Thasos and Aegina and is more than twice as much as Naxos and Andros, both larger islands. Paros was not only wealthy from its marble, Green notes that it was also on one of the

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<sup>289</sup> Scott, 2005, pp. 434-435.

<sup>290</sup> Herodotus, VI.132.

<sup>291</sup> Herodotus, VI.133.

<sup>292</sup> Herodotus, VI.133.

<sup>293</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 120.

busiest Aegean sea routes and so we may assume that it also gained some of its wealth from trade. The blackmail of 100 talents indicates that Miltiades was primarily interested in Parian wealth, particularly since Athens had only recently fought Marathon. This seems to be a constant in Greek history as we can see below. Scott notes that when Aristagoras succeeded in persuading the Athenians to send aid for the Ionian Revolt one of the reasons given was the wealth of Persia. He also notes that the wealth of Sicily was part of the lure when the Athenians prepared for the disastrous Sicilian expedition which failed in 413 B.C.<sup>294</sup> Conversely, Paros' wealth from trade, as well as turning Athens against them, is another likely reason the island medised, i.e. in an attempt to protect the trade routes to and from Asia Minor, as well as medising from a basic sense of self-preservation, like Aegina.

After the battle of Salamis we learn that Themistocles also demanded large sums of money from Paros, as one of a number of Aegean islands which had supposedly medised.<sup>295</sup> Herodotus informs us that both Paros and Carystus paid the demanded sums as soon as they heard that Themistocles was besieging Andros. However, Herodotus, VII.67 states that as Xerxes' army marched through Attica the Parians did not join him. Rather, they stayed behind to watch the course of the war. Thus, the actions of Themistocles leads us to conclude two things. Firstly that the Greeks believed that neutrality or abstention was equivalent to medism. Secondly, Athens was interested in punishing primarily those islands and states from which they could benefit financially. Clearly whilst repelling medism, Athens still had an eye on her commercial interests. Herodotus confirms that, once Paros paid the demanded sum, Themistocles left the island alone and no more is heard regarding accusations of Parian medism.

### **Summary and Conclusion**

Looking at the first Persian invasion of Greece, we can see much of the relationship between them concerns the struggle for Greek independence in the wake of the expanding Persian Empire. The Athenian and Eretrian involvement

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<sup>294</sup> Green, 1970, p. 44. Link, 2000, thinks Miltiades' aim was exclusively to obtain money as he holds that Athens at this time was pursuing a foreign policy with short term goals.

<sup>295</sup> Herodotus, VIII.112.

in the rebellion of Aristagoras, it may be argued, was a catalyst for the invasion of Datis. To Darius Athens was a rebellious state, which had aided the Ionians in their rebellion. Athens' and Eretria's involvement in the Ionian Revolt provided a good opportunity to expand the Persian Empire westward via these two places.

The presence of Hippias would have acted as a constant reminder that not only had the Athenians broken their *συμμαχία* with Persia and aided the Ionians, but also that Darius could prevent this from happening again by installing Hippias as a vassal tyrant of the city and expand Persian control further west. We have already noted that despite Herodotus' assertion that Hippias was able to persuade Darius to order the invasion, it is more likely that the real motivation behind Datis' invasion of Attica was Darius' desire to expand the Persian Empire west, beyond Macedon, which was already subject, whilst simultaneously punishing those Greeks which were involved in the Ionian Revolt.<sup>296</sup> Contrary to Hignett, we can agree with Balcer that Datis' Marathon campaign was part of a wider Persian policy of expansion westward rather than a small campaign simply to create a bridgehead to Athens and to reinstall Hippias as tyrant. If the campaign was merely to punish Athens, it is unlikely there would have been demands for earth and water.<sup>297</sup>

It was in response to this, very real, threat to Greece that the negative connotations of medism were confirmed. We can see that, once these negative feelings were established, Athens opportunistically used the charge of medism as a device to punish her political enemies and attempted to profit from it. This is clear from the case of Aegina, against whom Athens had had previous conflict, and, later, Paros, a wealthy island, from which Miltiades attempted to extort money. Due to lack of evidence to the contrary, we may suggest that both actions were the result of political opportunism, in which, in the case of Aegina, Sparta was willing to become involved. That said, the threat of a Persian invasion and the fear of medism and Persian instigated factionalism must be emphasised. In the face of Persia's expansion, only the Scythians had successfully resisted and the punishment of Miletus and Eretria will have served as a reminder of what could happen if resistance failed.

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<sup>296</sup> Cf. pp. 46-47 above.

<sup>297</sup> Hignett, 1963, p. 87, Balcer, 1989, p. 128.

We can see from the division within the Greek islands and states that in order to expand the Persian Empire Darius continued the policy whereby he invited cities and islands to medise prior to invading them, causing factionalism, which he then exploited. The only city on which this policy failed was Athens, and it can be argued that this was because Athens likely believed that, in light of the treatment of Eretria, it would be treated harshly by the Persians. It is also worth remembering that, had the Athenians lost at Marathon, this policy may have succeeded.





### Chapter 3: Xerxes' Invasion of Greece

Upon the failure of Datis and Artaphernes, Darius planned a larger invasion of Greece, which was realised by Xerxes, once he had confirmed his royal succession. It is noteworthy that Herodotus spends VII. 5-20 narrating Xerxes' hesitation to campaign against Greece possibly indicating that the new king may have deemed it less of a priority than his father had done. However, once Xerxes is persuaded to campaign against Greece we see that he employs dissension amongst his enemies in a similar way to Cyrus and Darius. This begs the question; was Xerxes continuing the policy of Cyrus and Darius and had this approach become a standard Persian tactic by this time? It may be considered that Xerxes' campaign was very similar to that of Darius in terms of causing factionalism, but on a much wider scale.

This chapter will look at the interactions between the Greeks and the Persian Empire with a particular emphasis on the medism of these states and individuals at this time. We will discuss the causes for this medism and how these relationships were controlled by Persia. We will see that the medism of individuals and states in Greece was, as we have said, a continuation of the Persian policy to cause factionalism in order to conquer the Greeks piecemeal. This chapter will consider the Greek response to this Persian policy, looking at the development of attitudes between Persia and the Greeks, in light of the Athenian victory at Marathon.

#### The medism of Demaratus

A notable figure in the Persian invasion of Greece was the Spartan King Demaratus who, having been deposed, was living in exile at the Persian royal court.<sup>298</sup> Demaratus' exile at the Persian court was not unprecedented behaviour; Hippias of Athens had done the same thing 20 years earlier and may have still

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<sup>298</sup> Herodotus, VII.101. See Parke, 1945, pp. 106-112, for a discussion on the deposing of Spartan Kings including that of Demaratus. Briant, 1996, p. 520, suggests that Xerxes was named Darius' heir prior to 490 B.C. Thus, we can conclude that, for Demaratus to have been present during the discussions regarding Darius' successor, he must have been at the court prior to 490 B.C.

been there when Demaratus arrived.<sup>299</sup> By accompanying Xerxes on his invasion of Greece he made the transition from exile to mediser. We noted above that the tale of Democedes of Croton made a point to emphasise that he did not aid the Persians willingly so as to avoid accusations of medism.<sup>300</sup> Demaratus' intent to medise is not entirely obvious and his retort that his exile "would be the beginning for Sparta of either immense evil or immense good,"<sup>301</sup> is ambiguous at best. If we are to believe from this statement alone that Demaratus planned from the start to medise in order to re-claim his throne, as Hippias did, I think we would be reading more into it than is there. We should note that Demaratus initially took exile at Elis and fled to Persia as a result of being pursued from Elis by Spartan forces.<sup>302</sup> Thus, we may suggest that perhaps Demaratus intended to spend his exile in Elis. However, when he was pursued from Elis, it is likely that Demaratus may have recognised that Persia was the safest place for him considering the circumstances. It would be to the advantage of Cleomenes, the Agiad king of Sparta and rival of Demaratus, to denounce him, especially after Demaratus had supported the Corinthian mutiny during Cleomenes' invasion of Attica. Despite the Corinthian mutiny, Cleomenes still carried great influence throughout the Peloponnese, limiting Demaratus' options for places of exile. The only state traditionally capable of standing up to Sparta was Argos, which was unlikely to welcome a Spartan king, albeit a dethroned one, because of the Argive defeat at Sepeia which had occurred only 4 years earlier. Thus, despite particularly strong Argive sentiments, Argos was not yet strong enough to face Sparta again and would have wished to avoid such provocation by offering refuge to an exiled Spartan king. Another option may have been Athens. However, Athenian might had not been fully tested against Sparta and the later

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<sup>299</sup> Hippias went to the court of Artaphernes c. 510 (Herodotus, V.96) and Demaratus went to Darius' court c. 490 (Herodotus, VI.70).

<sup>300</sup> Cf. pp. 21-22 above.

<sup>301</sup> Herodotus, VI.67.

<sup>302</sup> Scott, 2005, p. 270. In an attempt to explain why Spartan forces appeared at Elis Plutarch, *Agis*, XI mentions a law invoked against Agis, which forbade any Heracleid settling abroad. However, once Demaratus was proclaimed illegitimate he was, thus, also no longer a Heracleid and would not be breaking this law by living in Elis. Trying to arrest him would suggest that either the Spartan authorities believed him to be legitimate, or they had another reason to return him to Sparta. The flight of Demaratus recall the similar flight of Themistocles, cf. pp. 130-131 below.

prominence of Athens was primarily due to their victory at Marathon, which is unlikely to have taken place before Demaratus had left Elis.<sup>303</sup>

It is noteworthy that when Demaratus went to Darius' court, he would have known of Persia's hostile intentions towards the Greeks, from the envoys sent demanding earth and water prior to the battle of Marathon.<sup>304</sup> Furthermore, he would have been aware of the expansion of the Persian Empire and the Ionian Revolt, since the various envoys to Sparta from the Scythians, Samians, and Aristagoras, which saw Cleomenes, will not have been unknown to him. Indeed, we may postulate that he fled to Persia from Elis because of the impending expedition of Datis and Artaphernes, and that perhaps he thought along the same lines as Hippias when he fled to the court of Artaphernes, i.e. to be reinstated upon a successful Persian invasion.<sup>305</sup> That is, he did not necessarily leave Sparta thinking to flee to Persia to be reinstated in Sparta, but after being chased from Elis his thoughts then turned that way since Persia was now one of the few places he could go in exile. It is worth bearing in mind, as stated above in the discussion regarding Hippias' medism, Greeks exiles were welcomed to the Persian King, but in payment for this some form of service was required. It is likely that Demaratus, like the Greek islands which submitted, expected this first campaign to be successful. Thus, had it been successful, he would have been able to offer Darius another city into which he could have expanded the Persian Empire from Attica. The failure of the first invasion will not necessarily have dashed Demaratus' hopes of being installed in Sparta with Persian backing. It may be apt to note that Darius, recognising his own intention to invade Greece again, probably wanted to be able to call on Demaratus when necessary. Like other exiles, he had to help expand the Persian Empire. At the court of Darius

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<sup>303</sup> The battle of Marathon took place in 490 B.C. and Demaratus arrived at Darius' court, presumably Susa, in 490 B.C. Thus, taking into account the time taken for Datis to travel to Marathon and for Demaratus to travel to Susa it is very likely that Demaratus would have left Greece before the battle took place.

<sup>304</sup> Herodotus, VII. 133.

<sup>305</sup> Herodotus, V.96.

Demaratus was given a royal welcome and three cities for his income: Pergamus, Halisarna, and Teuthrania.<sup>306</sup>

Whilst in Persia we find Demaratus courting Xerxes, who had not yet been named heir to Darius at that time. Herodotus credits Xerxes' eventual succession to the Persian throne to advice given by Demaratus.<sup>307</sup> It seems far-fetched that Xerxes would have called on Demaratus for advice concerning his accession, and more likely that, in an attempt to gain favour with Xerxes, Demaratus may have given him his thoughts on the matter if the opportunity arose. We are aware that Herodotus liked to exaggerate the importance of Greeks within the Persian court and Herodotus contradicts himself when he states that, even without Demaratus' arguments, Xerxes would have gained the throne due to the influences of his mother, Atossa.<sup>308</sup> Thus, we can see that Demaratus' advice is unlikely to have had any direct influence. It is probable that in offering good advice to Xerxes, Demaratus was attempting to enhance his status and gain favour with Xerxes in the future, thus, securing a good position at court. It is worth noting that, when Xerxes was planning his invasion of Greece, Herodotus states that the medising Greeks, who helped persuade him, were the Pisistratidae of Athens and the Aleuadae of Thessaly, there is no mention of Demaratus in the account.<sup>309</sup> This further suggests that Demaratus medised reactively rather than pro-actively.

It appears that Demaratus primary purpose on Xerxes' invasion campaign was in an advisory capacity once the Persian army was in Greece.<sup>310</sup> This seems to have been limited to information regarding the geography and peoples of Greece. At Thermopylae, when Xerxes needed fuller details on the activities of the Lacedaemonians, he, naturally, called on Demaratus for his expertise. We learn at this point that Demaratus was not wholly trusted by the Persian court and Xerxes' brother, Achaemenes, accused him of plotting against

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<sup>306</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.I.6, claims that the cities were given to Demaratus as a reward for his services during the Persian invasion of Greece, whereas Herodotus, VI.70, claims that gifts of land and cities were given before the invasion, although he does not name the cities.

<sup>307</sup> Herodotus, VII.3.

<sup>308</sup> Briant, 2002, p. 520, disputes the power of Atossa's influence prior to Xerxes' being named heir to Darius. That there was a dispute over the succession is denied by Balcer, 1995, p. 223, who notes a period of joint rule of Darius and Xerxes at the end of Darius reign.

<sup>309</sup> Herodotus, VII.6. Nor, for that matter, Argos.

<sup>310</sup> Herodotus, VII.101.

Xerxes.<sup>311</sup> Mistrust of Demaratus by Achaemenes is not surprising when we consider that the advice given by Demaratus primarily focused on praise of Sparta and the Spartans.<sup>312</sup> It is also worth considering that Achaemenes distrusted Demaratus on the grounds that he was not a Persian, which recalls Megabates dislike of Aristagoras.<sup>313</sup> Although Herodotus would have us believe Demaratus carried great influence with Xerxes, it appears that, in reality, Demaratus was only asked for advice when it suited Xerxes.<sup>314</sup>

We can see that Demaratus' medism was motivated primarily by necessity and it appears that he did so almost unwillingly at times: Herodotus notes that, before the Persian invasion, Demaratus warned the Spartans with a secret message.<sup>315</sup> His actions seem to have been motivated by his need to survive as an exile. His flight to Persia was probably because Spartan forces were unlikely to pursue him as far as Persia.<sup>316</sup> Persia had already sheltered at least one Greek exile, Hippias, so had set a precedent and, with the planned invasion of Greece, would likely welcome Demaratus as well. Once at the Persian court, realising that he could no longer return to Sparta, Demaratus tried to secure a comfortable position and attempted to curry favour with the heir to the throne. Prior to the launch of Xerxes' invasion, he may have sent a warning to Sparta, but, necessarily, joined the expedition as one of the members of Xerxes' court, who had vital geographic knowledge of the region and its peoples. We are left to speculate precisely what service Xerxes expected from Demaratus, but the

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<sup>311</sup> Herodotus, VII.236. The accusation derived from Demaratus' advice to split the Persian fleet and capture Cythera, thereby putting pressure on the Spartans at home and forcing them to withdraw from helping the Greeks north of the Isthmus. Balcer, 1989, p. 137, conjectures that had Xerxes waited for Greek unity to collapse the Persians would have been able to conquer the Greeks piecemeal.

<sup>312</sup> Herodotus, VII.102-105.

<sup>313</sup> Herodotus, V.35.

<sup>314</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.6, records only the comments given by Demaratus to Xerxes at Thermopylae, which embellishes Herodotus' account but does not add much to our knowledge of Demaratus' role in Xerxes' army.

<sup>315</sup> Herodotus, VII.239. Keaveney believes this is a fabricated tale. Keaveney, 2011, p. 74. An alternative interpretation of Demaratus' supposed message was to warn his supporters in Sparta, if any remained, so that when the time came they might help the state medise for Demaratus. This is the same idea that Hippias harboured during the first Persian invasion. The third interpretation was that his warning was, in fact, a threat since Demaratus may have expected to be set up as tyrant of Sparta if/when the state was defeated.

<sup>316</sup> Cf. pp. 43-46 for the Aristagoras' appeal to Sparta at the start of the Ionian Revolt and Cleomenes' refusal due to the distances involved.

most obvious suggestion would be to act as a vassal king, loyal to Xerxes and the Persian Empire, and, as we have seen, an agent of Persian dominance.

What is certainly clear from looking at Demaratus is that, in sheltering with Darius and Xerxes, and then joining the Greek invasion, Demaratus was unable ever to return to Sparta or Greece without the support of Persia. We hear in Xenophon that Demaratus' descendants were still living in the Persian Empire when Agesilaus invaded.<sup>317</sup> This confirms that Demaratus ended his days at Xerxes' court as mentioned by Plutarch in his *Life of Themistocles*.

After the failed Persian invasion we hear very little of Demaratus. From the little evidence we do find, we see that Demaratus is reduced to living dependant on the king's favour. Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* narrates how Themistocles reconciled the Persian king to Demaratus, who had offended the king when he asked to wear the royal diadem when riding in state through Sardis.<sup>318</sup> The offense caused by this is more apparent when we note that, in Persian society, royal garments were part of a Persian king's identity. The tale of Artabanus wearing Xerxes' clothes in order to trick a phantom highlights the Persian belief in a connection between the royal garments and accoutrements of office and the role of king.<sup>319</sup> To be allowed to wear the king's clothing was a very great honour, which was bestowed by the king at his discretion; it was not something for which one could ask. Demaratus' request to wear the royal diadem and ride in state through Sardis was, in essence, a request to become the king and seems to have been a greater honour than Demaratus deserved.<sup>320</sup>

It is clear that once Demaratus had arrived at Darius' court he was almost completely under Persian control and Demaratus' attempt to curry favour with Xerxes prior to his enthronement suggests he knew this. Furthermore, his advisory role whilst on the campaign was definitely not as an equal to Xerxes, but rather he was called upon as and when he was needed. His one act of

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<sup>317</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.I.6. Demaratus' sons Eurysthenes and Procles had inherited from Demaratus Teuthrania and Halisarna, cities given to him by Xerxes. Demaratus' descendants, like Miltiades' oldest son, apparently "went native" and were treated as Persian subjects.

<sup>318</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XIV.5. Plutarch doesn't state explicitly which Persian king was on the throne at this time but it is likely it was Artaxerxes I.

<sup>319</sup> Herodotus, VII.17. Cf. Keaveney, 1998, pp. 239-241.

<sup>320</sup> Keaveney, 2003, pp. 61-64. Also, Briant, 2002, p. 523, for the importance of Cyrus the Great's robe during the royal accession ceremony.

independence, to warn Sparta of the invasion, was performed in such secrecy that only Gorgo, daughter of Cleomenes, was able to understand how to read the message.<sup>321</sup> Thus, one might equate his role to that of no more than a servant, albeit one of distinguished rank.

We can see from the account of Demaratus that Persia was still deemed a safe place for exiles. The knowledge that exiles would need to perform a service for the king was likely a bonus for Darius and Xerxes, since it may have encouraged dissatisfied Greeks to support the invasion; we know of Hippias and Demaratus, but we can conjecture there will have been exiled Greeks from other states who will have been able to contribute in an advisory role too.<sup>322</sup> Viewing Demaratus in this way, we can see that he is, in fact, one in a line of Greeks, from Hippias to Themistocles, utilised by Persia for their knowledge of Greece. We also know of the Aleuadae, who we will discuss below. What is interesting is the apparent lack of concern in Sparta that a Spartan king had fled to the Persian Empire, which they knew to be expanding westward and, possibly, on the eve of an invasion. This might account for Sparta's support of Athens at Marathon, albeit belatedly, but it is not immediately obvious that this is the case since we are unsure of the exact date when Demaratus fled Elis.

#### Pisistratids in Xerxes' army

Demaratus was not the only Greek present in Xerxes' army, there were also members of the Pisistratids, who had been in exile in the Persian Empire, and Aleuadae from Thessaly, who we will discuss later.<sup>323</sup> The presence of Pisistratids in Xerxes' campaign indicates that their dreams of returning to and ruling Athens were not completely dead and, by this time, their loyalty to Persia made them ideal vassal rulers. Not unsurprisingly, we do not hear of them until the Persian army is actually in Athens attacking the Acropolis and they are

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<sup>321</sup> Herodotus, VII. 239.

<sup>322</sup> We know of Greeks from other states in the later fifth century working for Persian satraps and so we may speculate this would have also occurred in the early fifth century. Cf below, pp. 156 for Calligeitus, son of Laophon, from Megara and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, from Cyzicus. Miller, 1997, pp. 132-133, notes that during these year Persia will have needed Greeks not only to act as guides but also to act as translators since it is unlikely the Persians will have spoken fluent Greek nor will the Greeks have spoken Persian.

<sup>323</sup> Cf. pp. 93-96.



employed to try to persuade the few defending Athenians to submit.<sup>324</sup> That we do not hear of them until this point in the campaign is not unsurprising since it is unlikely they will have been as familiar with the geography of northern Greece as Demaratus, since by this time all living Pisistratids will have been born and raised entirely from within the Persian Empire. Their lack of success at the Acropolis suggests that whilst anti-democratic elements had not been entirely removed from the city, these elements were not obviously loyal to the Pisistratids. Plutarch mentions that prior to Plataea there was a failed attempt at revolution in Athens, but we may suggest that the revolutionaries held oligarchic sympathies rather than tyrannist ones.<sup>325</sup>

Taking a closer look at the oligarchic revolutionaries, we can see that elements within the city would have been happy to take-up Mardonius' offer. Herodotus states that Lycidas and his family were punished for suggesting accepting Mardonius' offer and so it is unsurprising that there were other prominent Athenians who thought the same.<sup>326</sup> We can see here how close to success came the Persian policy of creating and exploiting dissension within Athens.

#### Argive neutrality during the Persian invasion

The actions of Argos prior to and during Xerxes' invasion have provoked debate regarding whether the state medised fully or simply remained neutral rather than joining the Hellenic League. In preparation for the invasion, Xerxes sent envoys demanding earth and water, the traditional signs of submission. Whilst some Greek states decided to resist the Persian advance, forming the Hellenic League, others such as Thessaly and Argos did not do this. Herodotus, reporting traditional Greek attitudes to neutrality, interprets Argive apathy to Xerxes' invasion as medism. He notes that although the Argives declined to join the Hellenic League, claiming that they had been advised by the oracle of Apollo not to join the confederacy,<sup>327</sup> they were willing to ignore this oracle, if the

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<sup>324</sup> Herodotus, VIII.52.

<sup>325</sup> Plutarch, *Aristides*, XIII.

<sup>326</sup> Herodotus, IX. 5.

<sup>327</sup> Herodotus, VII.149. Cf. PA Brunt, 1993, pp. 47-80, for an interesting discussion on the original member states of the "Hellenic League", as he terms the united Greek alliance.

Spartans would agree to a thirty year truce with Argos. They also requested that the Spartans divide the leadership of the confederacy equally with them.<sup>328</sup> The invocation of the oracle and the request for joint leadership of the Hellenic League are usually interpreted as convenient excuses for Argos not to join the Hellenic League, allowing it to medise by remaining neutral. R.A. Bauslaugh notes that Greek suspicion of neutrality can be found as far back as Solon who made it illegal for Athenians to abstain from political stasis.<sup>329</sup> He suggests that neutral states were distrusted by the Greeks as potential enemies. This mistrust would probably have been greater during the Persian invasion since Persia did not respect neutrality, as can be seen by Darius' attack on Carystus which attempted to remain neutral in the 490s.<sup>330</sup> Thus, Greek suspicions of neutral states seems to be derived from the belief that it was simply a cover for later medism as the neutral states knew Xerxes would not respect their neutrality so were likely to medise when he arrived 'at their door'.

Looking at the Argives reasons for neutrality, we note the Argive claim that they had been driven to seek advice from Delphi due to the dire position they were in after their defeat by Cleomenes at Sepeia in 494 B.C.<sup>331</sup> How and Wells believe that the oracle in question may be dated to the earlier invasion of 490 B.C., rather than c. 482 B.C.<sup>332</sup> They note that there is no reason to discredit the oracle itself and there is no mention in Herodotus of a denial from Delphi, which we might expect if the oracle was false.<sup>333</sup> We may suggest that, had the oracle been given only shortly prior to the envoys' arrival, the Argives would have been less willing to ignore it for the prize of joint leadership of the Hellenic League. The apparent ease with which the Argives were willing to ignore the oracle suggests that it should be dated to earlier than 482 B.C. This in turn suggests that perhaps it was being used by the Argives as a pretext to disguise their real objections to joining the League, i.e. failing to obtain joint leadership.

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<sup>328</sup> Mosley notes that Herodotus, VII.149.2, states [τῶν δὲ ἀγγέλων τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Σπάρτης](#) thus we can deduce that the embassy was composed of more envoys from other states not just Sparta.

Mosley, 1973, p. 62.

<sup>329</sup> (Aristotle), *Athenian Constitution*, 8. Bauslaugh, 1990, p.75.

<sup>330</sup> Herodotus, VI. 99.

<sup>331</sup> Herodotus, I.82-83.

<sup>332</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, pp. 187-188.

<sup>333</sup> Also, Bauslaugh, 1990, p. 93.

Of particular note here is the pro-Persian inclination of the oracles from Delphi throughout Herodotus. Ehrenberg describes the Delphic attitude toward Persia as “cautious, even pessimistic”.<sup>334</sup> Burn believes that the generally “safe” policy of Delphi was influenced by the treatment of other sanctuaries of Apollo by Persia. “Delos at the time of Datis’ expedition, had won the favour of the Persians. Miletus, on the other hand, had courted disaster.”<sup>335</sup> However, it may also have been influenced by the direct treatment of Delos itself in the 490s. Herodotus states that in the wake of Datis’ landing on Delos the islanders fled from fear of him.<sup>336</sup> However, he won them over by sacrificing three hundred talents of incense at the temple. This more than anything, I suggest, would have won over the Pythia and her priests prior to the invasion of Xerxes. Green notes that most of the oracles, if not strictly pro-Persian, were anti-resistance in nature. He suggests Delphi truly believed that Xerxes would be victorious.<sup>337</sup> This is a true enough estimation of Delphi’s sentiments and it is more curious that Argos, apparently, was willing to ignore this oracle for a stake in the leadership of the League, unless, indeed, it was dated to an earlier occasion.

Looking at Argos’ request for a thirty year truce with Sparta, we can suggest that it is unlikely that Sparta would have refused this, since one of the first actions of the League members was to resolve all of their inter-state disputes.<sup>338</sup> Indeed, of the two states Sparta was the more dominant at the time and so would be likely to settle affairs to its advantage.<sup>339</sup> Thus, we can see that Argos’ request was in keeping with the sentiments of the Hellenic League and would not have been a prohibiting factor.

The primary point Sparta was not willing to concede was sharing the leadership of the Hellenic League with Argos. Prior to the battle of Sepeia, in 494 B.C., Argos rivalled Spartan dominance of the Peloponnese. Had Sparta

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<sup>334</sup> Ehrenberg, 1993, p.152.

<sup>335</sup> Burn, 1984, p. 348

<sup>336</sup> Herodotus, VI.97.

<sup>337</sup> Green, 1970, p. 67.

<sup>338</sup> Cf. Herodotus, VII.145.

<sup>339</sup> Kelly, 1970, thinks that the notion of a “traditional” enmity between Argos and Sparta was a myth created in the fourth century; he bases his arguments on the political geography of the Peloponnese in the sixth century B.C. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why Argos would have reservations in submitting to Spartan leadership in 482.

conceded this point to Argos, it would have been tantamount to Spartan recognition that Argos was an equal power in the Peloponnese again. Sparta was not willing to defend Greece at the expense of her own interests.<sup>340</sup> Likewise a recently defeated and, therefore, depleted Argos would not want to let her enemy take command of her forces. Diodorus Siculus, reiterating Herodotus, does not mention any Argive oracle or requests for a peace treaty, but simply states that Argos claimed it would join the Hellenic League “if offered a share in the command.”<sup>341</sup> This seems to distil the primary reason why Argos declined to join the Hellenic League. It is noteworthy that no charge of medism is levied by Diodorus Siculus.

Argive mistrust of Spartan leadership may have been genuine and enough to prevent Argos from joining the League. It is worth noting that, despite the lapse of fourteen years between the Argive defeat at Sepeia and the second Persian invasion, Argos was still in a relatively weakened state. Having lost up to six thousand men at Sepeia, Argos then lost a further 1000 men supporting Aegina when it was attacked by Athens before Marathon.<sup>342</sup> Herodotus relates how, due to the loss of Argive men, their widows married their *perioikoi* and *douloi* in order to repopulate Argos.<sup>343</sup> When the children of the dead Argive men of Sepeia grew to maturity there was conflict between the two groups, resulting in the *perioikoi* and *douloi* seizing Tiryns and setting themselves up in independence.<sup>344</sup> When the Argives were approached to join the Greek coalition, not only was Argos trying to rebuild its army after Sepeia, but at the same time it was using the men it had to conquer Tiryns.

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<sup>340</sup> Evidence for Spartan self-interest during the Persian invasion can be taken from Herodotus, VIII.40, where we find Sparta, along with the other Peloponnesians, wanting to abandon the rest of Hellas after building a wall across the Isthmus so that they only needed to defend the Peloponnese. Huxley, 1967, argues that Sparta’s unwillingness to fight north of the Isthmus may have been the result of the medism of Caryae in Arcadia, which posed a potential threat to Spartan security in the Peloponnese. Cawkwell, 2005, p. 113, suggests that it was general Peloponnesian fear or pessimism, rather than that of the Spartans themselves, which delayed their crossing the Isthmus.

<sup>341</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.4.

<sup>342</sup> Herodotus, VI.92.

<sup>343</sup> For fuller discussion on this see Tomlinson, 1972, pp. 97-100, and Scott, 2005, pp. 306-308. Forrest, 1970, pp. 222-225, argues that the term *douloi* was not literal but was political abuse by opponents of an Argive democracy.

<sup>344</sup> The conflict between Argos and Tiryns was not resolved until the mid-460s. Scott, 2005, p. 308. See also Forrest, 1960.

Herodotus gives two further and different accounts, alongside this first one, to explain why Argos did not join the Pan-Hellenic League. The first story given runs thus. Xerxes, before setting out with his army, sent a man to Argos claiming that the Persians and the Argives had a common ancestor in Perseus. Therefore, he did not want to come into conflict with Argos, promising that, if Argos remained aloof, Xerxes would hold it in great esteem. The Argives, impressed by the Persian offer, gave no initial overtures or demands to the Pan-Hellenic League. The later demand for a share in commanding the Pan-Hellenic army was made deliberately, with the knowledge that Sparta would refuse, allowing Argos to remain inactive. Herodotus finishes this account by reporting the Argive embassy to Susa on the accession of Artaxerxes I, asking to continue the same friendly relationship with Artaxerxes as they had had with his father Xerxes.<sup>345</sup> We will discuss this embassy below.<sup>346</sup> This account, I would suggest, is a fictitious embellishment of the likely facts.<sup>347</sup> Since Xerxes sent envoys to all states demanding submission, it is likely that an envoy did go to Argos. However, the tale that the envoy claimed a common ancestor for Persia and Argos via Perseus seems like a malicious exaggeration by Herodotus' sources.

Herodotus' second alternative account describes the Argives inviting the Persian invasion in order to gain support in the war against Sparta.<sup>348</sup> However, we find no evidence of envoys from Argos at Xerxes' court encouraging him to invade, as we find the Aleuadae and Alcmeonids did.<sup>349</sup> Thus, we are able to discount this account.

When relating these accounts, Herodotus claims that he is simply reporting them and that he does not believe either of them. However, despite these claims to impartiality, we ought to remember that Herodotus made a deliberate choice to add those accounts that are in his history and omit others, he did not simply list his different stories with no purpose. We may conjecture that, if he gave more than one account of something, it was either to support or discredit a previous one. The three accounts get progressively more damning for

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<sup>345</sup> Herodotus, VII.150-151. Xerxes died and Artaxerxes ascended the Persian throne in 465 B.C.

<sup>346</sup> Below p. 50.

<sup>347</sup> Contra Bauslaugh, 1990, p.94.

<sup>348</sup> Herodotus, VII.152.3.

<sup>349</sup> Herodotus, VII.6, above p. 41

the Argives with nothing but circumstantial evidence to support the claims. Herodotus uses the Argive embassy to Susa in the 460s as retrospective evidence to verify his second account of Argive medism; he then compounds the accusation with the third, even more damning, account.

We may suggest that the problem for Herodotus' sources with the neutrality of Argos stemmed from Argive demands for joint leadership with Sparta. It is noteworthy that, whilst describing the Persian advance through Attica towards the Peloponnese, Herodotus lists those Peloponnesian towns which were neutral, condemning neutrality as tantamount to medism.<sup>350</sup> The second two stories clearly demonstrate suspicion amongst the allied Greeks regarding Argive neutrality. Herodotus does not condemn cities which refused to participate for religious reasons alone, only those which had secondary agendas, hidden behind the facade of religion. If the Argives had remained neutral on purely religious grounds, I believe they would not have faced such censure from Herodotus' sources. That they were so ready to ignore the oracle from Delphi may suggest that there was a hidden agenda. It should be remembered, however, that despite mistrust of those cities which remained neutral, including Argos, they were not punished by the Hellenic League after the Persian invasion. Only those states which openly medised were punished.<sup>351</sup>

Diodorus Siculus relates neither of these other details, but simply claims that Argos asked for a share in the leadership, as we noted above.<sup>352</sup> Diodorus Siculus claims that, after the allied Greeks sent envoys to all the Greek states, the Argives sent their own to Corinth, offering Argive terms. In Herodotus' account we are told that the Argives gave their demands when the initial envoy arrived in Argos; the difference is only subtle, but it highlights a possible difference in Argive sentiments. Herodotus' account suggests that the Argive religious claims and request for a share in the leadership were empty. However, Diodorus

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<sup>350</sup> Herodotus, VIII.73.

<sup>351</sup> Herodotus, IX. 86, for the punishment of Thebes, and IX. 106 for the Athenian refusal to replace medisers with loyal Ionians.

<sup>352</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI. 3. 4-6.

Siculus' account suggests that there was a genuine interest from Argos in resisting Xerxes' invasion. The Argives would not have taken the trouble to send an envoy had they not been interested. Of course, we can speculate that Diodorus Siculus may have become confused with the sequence of events and, eventually, arrived at the same conclusion, i.e. that Argos claimed to wish to join the League provided that it could have a share in the leadership. We may suggest, therefore, that, perhaps, Argos indeed wished to help the allied Greeks, but felt it could not do this under Spartan leadership. Herodotus concludes this part of his account of Argos that "the Argives were not the worst offenders"<sup>353</sup> referring to other medising and neutral states.

The primary evidence for Argive medism is at IX.13, when the Argives failed to prevent the Spartans from leaving the Peloponnese and also failed to give notice to Mardonius of this. Thus, we can see that the Argives did not medise very effectively.<sup>354</sup>

From the evidence presented above, it can be conjectured that Herodotus' condemnation of Argos is based more on the hearsay of his sources than on hard facts. I do not want to discredit Herodotus to the same degree as Plutarch, who declares that Herodotus [αἰτίαν κακοηθεστάτην ὑποβάλλεται](#).<sup>355</sup> However, Herodotus deliberately brings his audience's attention to the rumours of medism surrounding Argos.<sup>356</sup> He may not have had overt proof of Argive medism, but, I believe, Herodotus and his sources did not want the Argives to get off "scot free" for their neutrality. Plutarch also notes the discrepancies in Herodotus' portrayal of Argive behaviour and asks: "why did (the Argives) not medise openly when (Xerxes) came? And if they did not want to serve in the King's army, why did they not at least plunder Laconia when they stayed behind or seize Thyrea again or do something else to harass the Spartans and impede their operations?"<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>353</sup> Herodotus, VI.152.

<sup>354</sup> Herodotus, IX.9-13. 5,000 Spartans, along with their helots, had been sent secretly to Plataea in response to an Athenian embassy to the Sparta.

<sup>355</sup> Plutarch, *De Herodoti Malignitate*, 28.

<sup>356</sup> Herodotus, VII.150-152.

<sup>357</sup> Plutarch, *De Herodoti Malignitate*, 28.

We may suggest that, as the only “hard” evidence of Argive medism during the Persian invasion was to prevent Sparta leaving the Peloponnese, it may have been that a specific faction within Argos that medised and not the entire state. Bauslaugh believes the entire account of Argos failing to prevent this Peloponnesian force from leaving is fictitious, but this in my view is going too far.<sup>358</sup> Certainly, I find it difficult to believe that, had the whole state medised, Argos would have performed so few deeds for the Persians. Despite the seemingly friendly relations between Argos and Athens, no embassy was sent to persuade Athens to join the Persians, like Alexander of Macedon did.<sup>359</sup> Men were not sent to help the Thebans and Thessalians at Plataea, nor to fight for Xerxes or Mardonius at any time. Furthermore, Leonidas took men from Thebes, who Herodotus believes were hostages, to fight with him at Thermopylae and, thus, ensure the loyalty of Thebes, albeit temporarily, but he did not do the same to Argos.<sup>360</sup> We have already noted that Argive numbers were still recovering after Sepeia, which may have been a factor in Argive neutrality; however, that is not to say that had they desired, or been ordered by Xerxes, they would not have been able to contribute some men to the Persian army. They had been willing, apparently, to ignore an oracle had they been given joint leadership of the Hellenic League’s forces and so, presumably, this would have included contributing men to the Hellenic League’s army. It is noteworthy that only four years after Sepeia 1000 Argive volunteers went to help Aegina. Had Argos truly wished to medise, we could expect to see it able to raise possibly another 1000 men to contribute to the Persian army a decade after Marathon. It is also worth noting that, had Argos medised prior to Xerxes’ invasion, we would expect to find an Argive envoy at Xerxes’ court prior to the invasion which, as we noted above, we do not.<sup>361</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Bauslaugh, 1990, p. 93.

<sup>359</sup> For the embassy of Alexander of Macedon to Athens, cf. pp. 96-97. Although it may be argued that Argos aided Aegina against Athens, it is worth noting that the Argives who participated were not there in an official capacity but volunteered when approached by the Aeginetans. This may indicate some factional differences within Argos.

<sup>360</sup> Cf. pp. 100-103, for a discussion on the loyalty of the Thebans sent with Leonidas to Thermopylae.

<sup>361</sup> Herodotus, VII.6, above p. 41 and p. 46.



In compensation for the absence of proof, Herodotus appears to cast doubt on Argive motives for remaining neutral. I believe, like Plutarch, that if Argos as a whole had medised there would be more evidence for this, although we must be careful of deploying *argumentum ex silentio*. That is not to say that there would not have been medising factions within Argos, but this can be said for all Greek cities at the time, even those who were members of the Hellenic League.

Herodotus' accusations of Argive medism may be explained if we consider Herodotus' likely sources and the roles played by Athens and Sparta, at this time, and their relationships with Argos. I believe it is likely that Argos was genuine in its request for joint command of the Hellenic League with Sparta, despite its state of weakness. If Argos had simply wanted to medise, I do not think it would have gone to the effort of fabricating an excuse for neutrality when asked to join the Hellenic League. The Aleuadae of Thessaly did not explain their behaviour, nor did Thebes or any other Greek city which voluntarily submitted to Persia. As the second greatest power in Greece during the sixth century, it would not be unreasonable for Argos to request joint leadership with Sparta. Since Sparta, along with Athens, was the saviour of Greece against the barbarian invasion, it follows that Herodotus' sources did not wish to concede that the primary reason for Argive neutrality may have been Spartan obstinacy regarding leadership of the League. To prevent Sparta appearing badly for refusing to share command of the League with Argos, it would be easier for Herodotus' sources to cast doubt on the genuineness of Argive claims to neutrality.<sup>362</sup> Furthermore, the animosity between Argos and Sparta, during the sixth and fifth centuries, makes the Herodotean account of supposed Argive medising more plausible. We can see that Herodotus considered those Greek cities which did not join the Hellenic League to be medisers, whether they acted on behalf of Persia or not. Furthermore, due to the size of Argos, and the potential number of men and resources she could have supplied had she wished to join the Hellenic League, despite the losses of Sepeia

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<sup>362</sup> Cf. p. 81 above.

and the ongoing conflict with Tiryns, Argive neutrality was tantamount to medism in the eyes of Herodotus' sources.

If we compare Herodotus' accounts of other medising states with that of supposed Argive medism, we can see that there are, in fact, very few similarities. Herodotus tells us that the Thessalians supplied scouts to the Persians to lead them through Greece,<sup>363</sup> and that Thebes provided men to fight in the Persian army at Plataea.<sup>364</sup> As far as we can tell, the only thing required of the medising faction within Argos was to watch and to prevent the Peloponnesians from leaving the Peloponnese, which they failed to do.<sup>365</sup>

Finally, it is necessary to turn our attention to the Argive embassy at the court of Artaxerxes I in the 460s.<sup>366</sup> Herodotus states that the aim of this embassy was to renew the friendship between Argos and Persia which had existed during Xerxes' reign, which might appear to confirm that during the Xerxes' invasion Argos had, indeed, medised. However, we do not know exactly when the friendship between Argos and Xerxes began. Looking at the evidence above, it seems more likely that this occurred sometime in the years after Xerxes' invasion rather than before or during it. It is noteworthy that the first concrete evidence we find for a formal alliance between Argos and Persia is when Athens was trying to do the same, i.e. in the 460s when Athens and Persia had fought each other to a standstill and Athens was beginning its negotiations for the Peace of Callias. This embassy was sent to renew with Artaxerxes a previous treaty made with Xerxes, and, thus, it is possible that the formal alliance between Argos and Persia mentioned by Herodotus was made sometime between 479 B.C. and 465 B.C. It is not impossible, in an attempt to secure a strong ally during the rise to prominence of Athens and Sparta, Argos looked to Persia for an alliance at this time. The Greeks may have viewed the repulsion of Xerxes and the Persians as a victory but this does not mean that subsequently they viewed the Persian Empire as weak. Unfortunately, we are lacking necessary sources for the period between the end of Xerxes' invasion and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and, so,

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<sup>363</sup> Herodotus, VII.174.

<sup>364</sup> Herodotus, IX.2ff.

<sup>365</sup> Herodotus, IX.12.

<sup>366</sup> Herodotus, VII.150.

we must admit that this is speculation based on what is likely rather than what is fact. However, it is noteworthy that, despite the Greek victories in winning Byzantium and Sestos from Persia, Eion and Doriskos remained Persian.<sup>367</sup> Furthermore, as Cawkwell notes, the accusations of medism against Pausanias are only credited because the Greeks expected another Persian invasion,<sup>368</sup> indicating their belief that the Persian Empire was strong enough after Xerxes' failed invasion to mount yet another. With regards to Argos, our source material is abundant and we believe we have been able to dispel some myths concerning one of the most powerful of Greek states.

### Sicily and Crete

Herodotus' treatment of the neutrality of Sicily and Crete strikingly contrasts with his treatment of Argos. Gelon, tyrant of Sicily, was also willing to join the Hellenic League, providing that he was polemarch of all the Greek forces. Like with the Argives, the Spartans refused this condition.<sup>369</sup> When he compromised and asked to command either the land forces or the navy, the Athenians refused. The narration continues that Gelon, fearing for the fate of the Greeks, made preparations so that, should the Persian army defeat the Greeks, he could submit to Persia. According to Herodotus, Gelon sent three pentekonteres to Delphi with a large sum of money to wait for the outcome. If the Persians were successful, his man in Delphi had orders to give the money to Xerxes along with Sicilian earth and water. If the Greeks were successful, the man had orders to return with the money to Sicily.

Despite the similarity in Herodotus' portrayal of Argive behaviour, Herodotus does not charge Gelon with rumours of treachery, as he did the Argives. Instead, he excuses Gelon's actions with the story present in Sicily at the time that Gelon would have helped the Greeks, even under Spartan

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<sup>367</sup> Cf. pp. 115-116 below.

<sup>368</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 129. Cf. Plato, *Menexenus*, 241d.

<sup>369</sup> Herodotus, VII.157-163.

leadership, had there not been a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily.<sup>370</sup> Diodorus Siculus' claims that this Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was timed to coincide with the battle at Salamis in a Persian-Carthaginian conspiracy are highly unlikely.<sup>371</sup> Due to the scale of the Persian invasion, we can postulate that the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily may have been opportunistically timed because of the knowledge that the Greeks would be unable to spare any men to send to Gelon's aid. Brunt argues that this latter account of a pending Carthaginian invasion is "clearly to extol Gelon's patriotism and services to the Greeks."<sup>372</sup> He conjectures that Herodotus' Sicilian sources were concerned to answer the charge that Gelon had not helped the Greeks when asked and so, without denying this primary fact, they embellished the account.<sup>373</sup> Brunt's proposal, however, ignores the fact that a Carthaginian invasion was expected and actually did take place. It is curious that Herodotus let Gelon off so lightly compared to Argos, considering that Herodotus believed Gelon sent a man to pro-Persian Delphi with a view to medising should it be necessary. This medism is more overt than Argos' actions and reflects his pro-Sicilian and anti-Argive sources for their respective sections of his history. It also brings to mind earlier Persian intentions towards Sicily, which we can see in Democedes' flight there during Persia's reconnaissance of the area.<sup>374</sup> It is likely Gelon was aware of these earlier intentions.

Also similar to the actions of Argos, at VII.169 Herodotus tells of the embassy sent to Crete for help against the Persian invasion. The Cretans sent to Delphi for advice on the matter and as a result of this decided to abstain from joining the Hellenic League. Herodotus, unlike his treatment of the Argives, does not accuse the Cretans of medising through neutrality, but rather explains why the Delphic priestess had advised them against joining the Hellenic League, in order to preserve the population.<sup>375</sup> How and Wells comment that Busolt

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<sup>370</sup> Herodotus, VII.165.

<sup>371</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.20ff.

<sup>372</sup> Brunt, 1953, p. 160.

<sup>373</sup> Brunt, 1953, *ibid.*

<sup>374</sup> Cf. p. 22, above.

<sup>375</sup> According to Herodotus, the Pythia had advised against the Cretans participating in the war because they were the third people to have populated the island. The first had migrated to Iapygia after they had been ship-wrecked there, with no way of returning to Crete. The second, on

suspects the oracular response to be a later forgery primarily because of the iambic meter,<sup>376</sup> which is unusual since oracles were usually recorded in hexameter.<sup>377</sup> They also note, whether a forgery or not, Herodotus clearly believed it was genuine, thus, his lack of censure against the Cretans.<sup>378</sup>

The lenient treatment Herodotus gives the Cretans and Sicilians is notable in comparison with his treatment of Argos, especially in light of Crete's religious excuses which seemingly were believed in contrast to Argos' religious excuses.

### The Procrastination of Corcyra

Corcyra is also condemned by Herodotus which promised to send ships to join the Hellenic League, but procrastinated so the ships did not arrive in time. He claims that, like Gelon, the Corcyraeans wanted to wait to see the outcome of Salamis so that, if the Persian invasion was successful, the Corcyraeans could claim to have deliberately not helped Persia's enemies. The Corcyraean excuse for arriving late is that the island had sent sixty triremes which had been prevented from sailing round Cape Malea by "prevailing north-easters."<sup>379</sup> Diodorus Siculus confirms this Corcyraean claim<sup>380</sup> but he does recognise Herodotus' story, that they were watching how events fell before committing to action, ascribing this account to "certain historians."<sup>381</sup> How and Wells comment that the winds mentioned by both Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus lasted "for about forty days in August and September"<sup>382</sup> and we see evidence, possibly of the same winds, wrecking some of the Persian fleet off Sepia in Herodotus, VII.188. The winds, therefore, were a real problem for the Corcyraeans. However, looking at Corcyra's traditional attitude to foreign policy, which we

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returning from the Trojan War, had been devastated by famine and plague. The Pythia then was protecting this third population by advising them against becoming involved in the war.

<sup>376</sup> Busolt, 1967, ii. 658 n.6, states that due to the iambic trimeter the words appear to be a later Cretan invention.

"Der delphische Spruch, auf den sich die Kreter beziehen, ist schon des iambischen Trimeter wegen verdächtig. Er scheint in Kreta nachträglich zur Entschuldigung erdichtet worden zu sein".

<sup>377</sup> Parke, 1967, p. 84.

<sup>378</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 203.

<sup>379</sup> Herodotus, VII.168.

<sup>380</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.15.1.

<sup>381</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.15.1.

<sup>382</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 202.

will discuss shortly, the winds may also have been a convenient excuse. The north-easterly winds, which cause sailing difficulties around cape Malea, occur annually, even today, and so the Corcyraeans would have been aware of them.<sup>383</sup> Had Corcyra wished to join the Hellenic League, she could have compensated for the winds, one might argue, and set out earlier.

At Thucydides I.32 the Corcyraean envoys note that Corcyra had not been an ally of Athens before and, being so far removed from many of the Greek states who were major players in the fifth century, it seems likely that Corcyra may not have made many, if any, alliances prior to that made with Athens in 433 B.C. It is not too far-fetched to think that Corcyra genuinely was preparing for the necessity of submission to Persia, believing that, if the Hellenic League could not curtail the expanding Persian Empire, then Corcyra would similarly be unable to prevent being absorbed into it. How and Wells note that, in addition to her lack of allies in Greece, the threat of a Carthaginian invasion and the desire not to leave the island undefended for too long may also have prevented Corcyra from acting quickly.<sup>384</sup>

Thucydides' comment that Corcyra had not previously been an ally of Athens is noteworthy. Had Corcyra been a member of the Hellenic League, surely she would have deemed this membership as an alliance with Athens, as well as the other members. Thucydides also claims that Corcyra "deliberately avoided all alliances" prior to the one she was seeking with Athens in 433 B.C., which is strong evidence against Corcyra joining the Hellenic League in 481 B.C. Herodotus does not actually claim that Corcyra joined the Hellenic League, but merely promised to send ships to support its navy, a promise which she failed to realise. Marincola suggests Corcyra secretly wished for a Persian victory "whereby they could profit at Corinth's expense."<sup>385</sup> Believing that the Hellenic League would fail and preparing for any possible profit that may be gained from this failure, we may conjecture that Corcyra may have promised aid to the envoys sent by the Hellenic League with no intention of fulfilling the promise. In

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<sup>383</sup> Burn, 1984, p. 442, refers to the winds as "notorious" and also to the suspicion of the other Greeks that the Corcyraean "had not tried very hard."

<sup>384</sup> How and Wells, 1991, vol. II, p. 202. See also Bengtson, 1970, p. 52.

<sup>385</sup> Marincola, 2006, p. 671.

this way Corcyra would avoid the censure of the other Greek states whilst, at the same time, placing itself in a position whereby it could gain favour with Persia, should this course of action become necessary. However, again, we should beware of *argumentum ex silentio*.

Corcyra was not alone in this type of action: the Mantineans and Eleans arrived for the battle of Plataea late and, upon realising that they had missed the battle, exiled the leaders of their army.<sup>386</sup> How and Wells suggest that this delay was likely due to the medism of the Mantinean generals, deliberately delaying their arrival.<sup>387</sup> Like Corcyra, it appears that at least some individuals, if not actual factions, within Mantinea and Elea preferred not to support the Hellenic League too much until the issue of the Persian invasion was decided more clearly. In these actions we can see that some Greek states, whilst still ostensibly loyal to the Hellenic League, did not wish to stand against Persia too obviously in an attempt to keep in with the Persians should the Hellenic League be unsuccessful.

Herodotus' accounts of Argos, Crete and Corcyra suggest that these states were half-hearted in their support of the Hellenic League and may have been preparing for a Persian victory. Certainly we can see that fear of Persian might and uncertainty of a Greek victory led to much prevarication of the Greek states. We will now turn our attention to the clear and transparent medism of Thessaly, Thebes, and Macedon which openly and pro-actively supported Xerxes' invasion.

### Thessaly

The first mention of Thessalian medising is found at Herodotus, VII. 6, when we are told that messengers from the Aleuadae arrived at the court of Xerxes supporting Mardonius' plan to invade Greece.<sup>388</sup> Herodotus describes the Aleuadae as the [Θεσσαλῆς βασιλῆες](#), Thessalian kings, which may be seen as

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<sup>386</sup> Herodotus, IX.77.

<sup>387</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II p. 320.

<sup>388</sup> Also Diodorus Siculus, XI.2. Keaveney places this at 485 B.C. Keaveney, 1995, p. 30, but also cf. n. 380.

literally true, albeit slightly misleading. In effect the Aleuadae, despite opposition, were the most influential family in Thessaly at this time.<sup>389</sup> With the fall of Macedon to Persia, Thessaly was exposed to Persian intentions earlier than most other Greek states. For Xerxes to invade Greece, Thessaly needed to be pacified; the Aleuadae knew this and likely wanted to submit on the most favourable terms possible. Westlake proposes that, since Mardonius pacified Macedonia in 492 B.C., it is probable that actual negotiations between Persia and the Aleuadae began at about that time.<sup>390</sup> This does not seem unreasonable, and, as we noted, since a date of 485 B.C. is probable for the despatch of the embassy to Xerxes, Aleuad submission probably was proffered sometime between 492 B.C. and 485 B.C.

Despite the assurances of the Aleuadae, apparently not all of Thessaly wanted to medise. Herodotus states plainly that, as Xerxes' army approached Thessaly, an envoy was sent to the Hellenic League in the Peloponnese requesting support against the invading army. The envoy claimed that without support the Thessalians would have no choice but to submit to Persian domination. Herodotus eloquently quotes them, "you cannot compel us to fight your battle for you; for sheer inability is stronger than compulsion."<sup>391</sup> Clearly the envoy represented a group of Thessalians who did not want to submit to Persia and whose options were limited. We may speculate that this desire by some of the Thessalians not to submit may correspond with opposition to the medising Aleuadae. The Aleuadae were one of the leading families in Thessaly but opposing factions from different families will likely have wished to usurp their position. Thus, we can see that there were some Thessalians who wished to support the medism of the Aleuadae and others who did not, creating a divided state.

The argument whether or not the whole of Thessaly submitted with the Aleuadae prior to Xerxes' invasion rests on whether or not the Aleuadae held the *tageia*. This elected position enabled them to control Thessalian military and foreign policy decisions. N.D. Robertson believes that the Aleuadae did not hold

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<sup>389</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 126.

<sup>390</sup> Westlake, 1936, pp. 12-16.

<sup>391</sup> Herodotus, VII.172. Translation taken from De Selincourt, Penguin, 2003.



the tageia noting that, of those who held the office, none were from distinguished families. He believes the Aleuadae were simply the leading family of Larissa and not of Thessaly as a whole, and suggests that when Herodotus calls them “kings of Thessaly” he actually means “kings from Thessaly” or “Thessalian kings” acknowledging their social standing within their own geographical domain.<sup>392</sup> At VII.130 Herodotus states that Xerxes incorrectly believed the Aleuadae had sworn fealty to Persia on behalf of the whole of Thessaly.<sup>393</sup> Herodotus implies that this was a misunderstanding by Xerxes and from this we can suggest that, in fact, the Aleuadae did not represent the whole of Thessaly. Westlake’s suggestion that the Aleuadae held the tageia and that Aleuad opposition was a minority, therefore, seems unlikely in light of Herodotus VII. 130.<sup>394</sup> Whether this misunderstanding by Xerxes was a deliberate action by the Aleuadae or not is unclear. Keaveney suggests that, although coming to some sort of arrangement with Xerxes before the invasion, the Thessalians developed “cold feet” when Xerxes actually began his invasion. He believes that Thessaly sent for help when it seemed resistance might work but, as soon as it became clear that this was no longer an option, Thessaly committed to its medism.<sup>395</sup> Whatever the truth of the matter, we can see that in the wake of the Persian invasion Thessaly, like Eretria in 490 B.C., was divided.<sup>396</sup> Such divisions nearly always favoured the Persian invasion as the Greek allies, when faced with them, eventually abandoned the state to the Persians.

In answer to the Thessalian plea, a land force of the Hellenic League was sent to the pass of Tempe, which led from Macedon into Thessaly, between mounts Olympus and Ossa. Diodorus Siculus states that the Hellenic League wanted to “head off” the invading Persian army at Tempe as soon as they realised its size. Plutarch stating that, since Themistocles’ plan “to meet the Barbarians at sea as far away as possible” was rejected, he accompanied the army

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<sup>392</sup> Robertson, 1976, pp. 105-106.

<sup>393</sup> Brunt, 1993, p. 81. In light of this we can see that Robertson’s notion that the Aleuadae and their supporters medised at the same time as the rest of Thessaly, i.e. once the Persian army was about to pass into Thessaly, is incorrect.

<sup>394</sup> Westlake, 1936, p. 19.

<sup>395</sup> Keaveney, 2011, p. 53, also, 1995, p. 35.

<sup>396</sup> Hignett, 1963, p. 102, suggests that the appeal to the allied Greeks was probably led by the Echekratidae of Pharsalus, who held the tageia at a later date.

to Tempe, implying that the defence of Tempe was the next best option.<sup>397</sup> However, upon the advice of Alexander of Macedon, the Hellenic army withdrew from Thessaly after only a few days.<sup>398</sup> Herodotus claims that the message from Alexander reported the numbers of the Persian army which intimidated the allied force. They also learned of a second pass into Thessaly and both of these new pieces of information encouraged them to withdraw. Robertson disputes the notion that, upon arriving at Tempe, the Hellenic League's army was not acquainted with the territory and asserts that this would mean either that there were no Thessalians within the high command in this expedition, or that the high command had no means to obtain intelligence of this area of Thessaly. Both situations are unlikely since the Hellenic League's army was present at the request of Thessaly.

Robertson is likely correct in suggesting that the allied army would have been aware of the other passes leading from Macedon to Thessaly.<sup>399</sup> Westlake suggests that the Hellenic League's army probably believed that these passes would have been guarded by Thessalian levies.<sup>400</sup> Robertson notes that the position at Tempe was largely commanded from southern Thessaly. Thus, we may conjecture that the Aleuad supporters were in the northern, mountainous region of Thessaly, and we must allow, therefore, that the Thessalians charged with, or presumed to be, guarding the other passes into Thessaly may have had divided, pro-Aleuad loyalties. That the Aleuadae as the leading family of Larissa had supporters back in Thessaly whilst Thorax was with the Persian army seems highly likely.<sup>401</sup> Hignett suggests that the arrival of the army of the Hellenic League so prematurely at Tempe is evidence that the Hellenic League was trying to convince those Aleuad supporters to join them.<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, VII.1. Diodorus Siculus XI. 2. 5-6.

<sup>398</sup> Herodotus, VIII.173. Macedon had already medised by this time. Cf. pp. 22-28 for a discussion on Alexander of Macedon who frequently appears as a "go-between" for Persia and Greece.

<sup>399</sup> Robertson, 1976, pp. 113-115, suggests that the other routes would have been too arduous to be realistic routes for an invasion, leading the Persian army too far away from its supplies. He suggests that the Hellenic League's army decided to guard the most likely entry into Thessaly they believed Xerxes' army would take.

<sup>400</sup> Westlake, 1936, p. 19.

<sup>401</sup> Hignett, 1963, pp. 102-103.

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*

The knowledge of the size of the Persian army given by Alexander of Macedon also should not have affected the Greek army overly much. Burn notes that it would have been in the interests of Macedon to promote the pro-Persian propaganda and possibly exaggerate the numbers he reported in an attempt to persuade the Greeks of the futility of their resistance.<sup>403</sup> Alexander would not have wanted any unnecessary delay on the Persian army's passage through Macedon considering the cost to the hosting nation when supporting the vast force. However, the Greek spies sent to reconnoitre the Persian army mentioned by Herodotus, VII.146, would also have been able to give a rough size of the Persian army long before the Greeks decided to invest Tempe. We can estimate that the size of the army sent to Tempe by the Greeks, combined with the men supplied by Thessaly itself, numbered roughly 10,000 hoplites and Robertson conjectures there would have been an equal number of light armed troops, which would accompany the hoplites, and 6,000 cavalry from Thessaly.<sup>404</sup> This would have been a large enough force to delay Xerxes' army for a considerable amount of time if not indefinitely, especially if we consider the pass at Tempe to be as easily defensible as Thermopylae.<sup>405</sup> We can suggest that the Greeks believed they had sent a strong enough force to combat the size of the Persian invasion as provided by their own intelligence. Furthermore, the report on the numbers of the Persian army should, in fact, have increased the Greek conviction to halt its advance into Greece at Thessaly rather than further south in Greece.<sup>406</sup> Therefore, we should consider that Alexander likely used additional arguments to persuade the Greeks not to make a stand at Tempe.

Evidence for these additional arguments may be found in Damastes of Sigeum<sup>407</sup> who claims that Alexander told the Greeks of treachery within Thessaly. Despite the size of the Hellenic League's army, without concrete support from the Thessalians, the allied army's lines of supply and retreat would have been exposed to attack. In short, it would be at risk of what actually happened at Thermopylae. By confirming to the Hellenic League the idea that

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<sup>403</sup> Burn, 1984, p. 344. Also, Kelly, 2003, p. 202.

<sup>404</sup> Robertson, 1976, pp. 109-10.

<sup>405</sup> Robertson, 1976, p. 116.

<sup>406</sup> Westlake, 1936, p. 18.

<sup>407</sup> Cited in Speusipus, Letter to Phillip 30 = FGH 5 F4.

factions within Thessaly were about to medise, Alexander seems to have persuaded the Greek army to abandon Thessaly. That the army left so quickly can be taken as evidence that the Hellenic League was unable to convince the Aleuadae and their supporters to join them. Herodotus does not state explicitly that the reason for the withdrawal from Tempe was due to the suspicions of the medism of Thessaly. He does not even comment on this when he says that the Thessalians worked “whole heartedly in the Persian interest”. However, the combination of the size of the Persian army, the knowledge of the other passes, and the probability of Thessalian medism present themselves convincingly enough to us.<sup>408</sup> It seems that even the suspicion of medism was enough to influence the Hellenic League’s army and from this we can see that Persian influence, albeit indirect, had permeated as far as Thessaly ahead of the actual invasion.

During the Persian invasion we find Thessaly attempting to exploit its relationship with Persia to the detriment of its enemies. After the battle of Thermopylae the Thessalians attempted to blackmail their traditional enemy Phocis, claiming to have sufficient influence with Xerxes, by this time, that they could divert the Persian army from Phocian land for the sum of fifty talents.<sup>409</sup> In contrast, Herodotus states that, whilst the Persian army was advancing through Dryopis, the inhabitants were not injured because they were friendly and also because “the Thessalians wished them to be spared.”<sup>410</sup> We may suggest that the blackmail of Phocis was a bluff or exaggeration on the part of Thessaly in an opportunistic attempt to injure their long-standing neighbour and enemy. Herodotus claims that, at the instigation of the Thessalians, the Persian army devastated all of Phocis, which included the burning and plundering of the temple of Apollo at Abae and excessive brutality against the Phocians. However, it is likely that Phocis would have been punished by Xerxes for not submitting,

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<sup>408</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.2. and XI.3, claims that the Thessalians medised both before the allied army arrived at Tempe and also after the allied army had retreated and can be explained in this light. We may conjecture that the Thessalians mentioned in Diodorus Siculus’ first statement are the mountainous, northern Thessalians, loyal to the Aleuadae and his later statement refers to the remaining Thessalians, who lived in the plains of Thessaly.

<sup>409</sup> Herodotus, VIII.28-31.

<sup>410</sup> Herodotus, VIII.31. Diodorus Siculus, XI.14.2 also says that the Dryopians were allies of Persia, although he simply says “The King traversed the territory of the Dorians” without telling his readers which specific Dorians. Clearly at this point Ephorus was paraphrasing Herodotus.

regardless of the sentiments of Thessaly. At best we can concede that Thessaly, knowing that Phocis would not submit, may have influenced the degree to which the state was punished.<sup>411</sup> We can see similarities in the treatments of both Phocis and Athens. When Xerxes sacked that city the Acropolis was fired and the remaining inhabitants were slaughtered. The primary difference is that most of the population had been saved when they abandoned the city, an option which Phocis did not have. We may even suggest that the treatment of Phocis served as a warning to the Greek cities of the kind of treatment they could expect, if they did not submit readily. This, in turn may have led to the submission of cities such as Dryopis and it would not have been in Persia's interests to treat badly submissive states.

After Xerxes' withdrawal from Greece, Thessaly did not defect from her Persian alliance.<sup>412</sup> We are informed that Thorax of Larissa escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont before returning with Mardonius and encouraged him in his efforts. How and Wells comment on Herodotus' emphasis on the apparent free-will of the Aleuadae concerning Persian affairs, but note that this is inconsistent with Herodotus VIII.126 and VIII. 131.<sup>413</sup> After Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont, we are informed that Mardonius wintered both his army and the remainder of the fleet in Thessaly.<sup>414</sup> Thus, had Thessaly wished to renounce ties with Persia, it would have been unable. We noted earlier the cost of hosting the Persian army<sup>415</sup> and even the reduced Persian forces would have depleted the resources of Thessaly immensely. We may suggest, somewhat cynically, that the encouragement by the Aleuadae may simply have been an attempt to remove the Persian army and fleet from Thessaly before the state became impoverished.

Looking at the actions of Thessaly during the Persian invasion we can suggest that the Aleuadae had probably realised, along with the rest of Greece,

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<sup>411</sup> Keaveney, 1995, convincingly asserts that although the Aleuadae may initially have cited using the Persian army to help Thessaly retaliate against Phocis as one of the reasons for making an alliance with Xerxes, in reality this would also have meant inviting Xerxes and his army into Thessaly and therefore Greece and so would not have been as attractive as it first seemed. However, this does not mean that, once it was in Greece, Thessaly would not opportunistically use the Persian army to its advantage and against its enemies.

<sup>412</sup> Herodotus, IX.1.

<sup>413</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 287.

<sup>414</sup> Herodotus, VIII.126 and 131.

<sup>415</sup> Herodotus, VII.118-120.

that a Persian invasion was being planned and so sent an embassy to Xerxes in order to ensure Thessaly not only survived but that they themselves profited from it. We noted above that it is unlikely that they held the *tageia* and so it is possible that the Aleuadae wished either to gain this elected position or to create a more permanent one, both with Persian backing. That there was opposition to the Aleuadae's policy is apparent from the situation at Tempe. The "Thessalian cavalry" which Herodotus notes joined the Hellenic League at Tempe would have amounted to Thessalian "gentlemen and their retainers", in essence members of those leading families in Thessaly who opposed the Aleuadae.<sup>416</sup> Certainly from the time of the withdrawal of the Hellenic League's army from Tempe, we find that Thessaly medised fully and attempted to turn the situation to its advantage as the opportunity arose, most notably against Phocis. Interestingly the enmity between Thessaly and Phocis was enough that it was this enmity, rather than fear of the Persian Empire, which caused Phocis not to submit.<sup>417</sup>

### Thebes

The other prominent state which willingly and openly medised during Xerxes' invasion was Thebes. The first we hear about suspicions of Theban medism is when Leonidas compelled the city to contribute men to the stand at Thermopylae. Herodotus states plainly that, although men were sent with Leonidas, Theban "sympathy was nevertheless with the enemy".<sup>418</sup> How and Wells note that, whereas the other city states were sent messages requesting men to join Leonidas' army, Leonidas personally went to Thebes and brought the Thebans back with him.<sup>419</sup> Leonidas' presence would carry a certain amount of a threat compelling Thebes to declare its loyalties, one way or the other.<sup>420</sup> The

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<sup>416</sup> Burn, 1984, p. 342.

<sup>417</sup> Herodotus, VIII.30.

<sup>418</sup> Herodotus, VII.205.

<sup>419</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 223.

<sup>420</sup> Herodotus, VII.205. Also see Keaveney, 1996, p. 38-48.

situation can be compared to the taking of political hostages by one state to ensure the loyalty of another.<sup>421</sup>

Plutarch, in his attack on Herodotus, claims that, not only did Thebes send men with Leonidas to Thermopylae, but Thebes had also sent a force to Tempe.<sup>422</sup> Buck, following Hignett, believes that accounts of Thebans at Tempe come from Aristophanes of Boeotia, which Hignett believes to be a tainted source and appears to contradict circumstantial evidence in Herodotus, who describes how the allied Greeks sailed to Halos around Boeotia.<sup>423</sup> However, Hignett does not take in to account the fact that Plutarch, as a Boeotian, may have drawn his information from other, more trustworthy sources. Robertson suggests that the allied Greeks sailed around Boeotia due to speed and convenience, rather than to avoid Thebes.<sup>424</sup> It is worth remembering that Herodotus does not say that the allied Greeks sailed around Boeotia in order to avoid Thebes and the pro-Persian Boeotians. Had this been the case, it is reasonable to assume Herodotus would have mentioned something of it. Also any kind of attempted resistance in Thessaly, had both Thebes and the Boeotians medised, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. We may conjecture that the allied Greeks may have sailed to Halos in an attempt to save time and energy, possibly to begin defence fortifications, and to consolidate a base against the invasion with the view that further reinforcements would arrive later over land. Although it would be logical to collect Theban men *en route* to Tempe had the army marched there, this does not mean that the Thebans could not march directly to Tempe on their own, since it would have been an easier distance for them than the allied Greeks. I suggest that Thebes was undecided at this time and that their allegiance was dependent upon the position of Thessaly. It was also dependant on the attitudes of the rest of Greece. Knowing this, Buck believes, the allies did not want to

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<sup>421</sup> An example of this can be found at Herodotus, VI.76 where Cleomenes and Leotychides placed ten of Aegina's wealthiest and most distinguished citizens with Athens to ensure the loyalty of the island in the wake of Darius' Persian invasion.

<sup>422</sup> Plutarch, *De Herodoti Malignitate*, XXXI.

<sup>423</sup> Buck, 1979, p. 129, Hignett, 1963, pp. 22-23.

<sup>424</sup> Robertson, 1976, p. 111.

“precipitate matters” and, at this time, did not want to force Thebes’ hand.<sup>425</sup> N.H. Demand notes that, since Thebes medised after Thermopylae, it was also in their interests for a stand to be made at Tempe.<sup>426</sup> She also suggests that, since Plutarch is able to name the commander of the Theban force at Tempe, it is likely a force was sent.<sup>427</sup>

Herodotus, listing those states, which gave earth and water to Xerxes prior to Thermopylae, includes Thebes and Boeotia.<sup>428</sup> Buck suggests that, since there were Thebans and Thespians in the final stand at Thermopylae, we may suggest that the Boeotian League sent earth and water to Persia sometime between Tempe and Thermopylae as an “insurance policy” to ensure the survival of Thebes and the other Boeotian cities.<sup>429</sup> Once they were able to detach themselves from the Spartan and Thespian army, we find the Thebans fell back on this “insurance policy”, in which they were supported by the Thessalians.<sup>430</sup> Keaveney argues, contrary to Buck, that those Thebans who fought at Thermopylae, and by extension possibly also Tempe, were likely pro-Greek supporters, of whom the rest of Thebes was gladly rid.<sup>431</sup>

Theban loyalty is also questioned by Herodotus when Leonidas dismissed all men from Thermopylae, apart from the honour-bound Spartans and the Thebans, who he kept with him as hostages.<sup>432</sup> This highlights that there are some problems with Herodotus’ account of the Thebans at Thermopylae. The first, presented by Plutarch,<sup>433</sup> is that keeping hostages, whilst trying to defend the entry to Greece, would not only be a foolish action for Leonidas, but, as a consequence, would also be unlikely. Plutarch also asserts that, since those Thebans who were at Thermopylae were branded, along with Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans, this should be taken as a sign of Theban fidelity to the

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<sup>425</sup> Buck, 1979, p. 130. Keaveney, 1996, p. 40, agrees with the view that Thebes, like Thessaly and Syracuse, probably did submit as an insurance policy, albeit with a somewhat blasé attitude at the time.

<sup>426</sup> Demand, 1982, p. 21.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid. Cf. Cozzoli, 1958, p. 275, who is inclined to doubt that the Thebans participated at Tempe, despite their presence at Thermopylae.

<sup>428</sup> That is all of the cities in Boeotia apart from Plataea and Thespieae.

<sup>429</sup> Buck, 1979, p. 132

<sup>430</sup> Herodotus, VII.233.

<sup>431</sup> Keaveney, 1996, p. 42. This situation mirrors that of Polycrates of Samos who sent his political enemies with Cambyses to campaign against Egypt. Cf. p. 17 above.

<sup>432</sup> Herodotus, VII.222.

<sup>433</sup> Plutarch, *De Herodoti Malignitate*, XXXI.



Hellenic League. Furthermore, if we are to believe that those Thebans who went with Leonidas went willingly holding them as hostages would be an unnecessary action.<sup>434</sup> How and Wells suggest that Herodotus was merely a victim of malignant Athenian gossip and that, as suggested by Diodorus Siculus,<sup>435</sup> those Thebans who fought at Thermopylae were likely political enemies of the current political “party” in Thebes. They recognised that, if the Greeks failed at Thermopylae, Boeotian loyalists within Thebes would be doomed.<sup>436</sup> Therefore, those Thebans at Thermopylae were likely to fight willingly with the Spartans. Herodotus states that, at the end, the Thebans deserted to Xerxes,<sup>437</sup> which Keaveney suggests was only when the situation had obviously become untenable.<sup>438</sup> Apart from sending earth and water to Xerxes, Thebes and the Boeotian League did not act in an openly pro-Persian manner until the fall of the allied Greeks at Thermopylae.

The defection of the Thebans at Thermopylae after the fall of the Spartans does not resolve the question of Theban loyalty. On the one hand, we may speculate that, had those Thebans at Thermopylae been there under compulsion, there would be no way for them to defect to the Persian army until the Spartans were defeated, at which point, as Herodotus states, they were able to detach themselves. On the other hand, had the Thebans been loyal to the Hellenic League’s army, the realisation that the force at Thermopylae would be defeated may have led them to medise for purely practical purposes. Had the Thebans openly declared that they were pro-Persian supporters prior to Thermopylae, as the Aleuadae did, they would not have been asked for men. Furthermore, if this had been the case, it is unlikely that serious action would have been taken against them by the Hellenic League at this time. By the time the Hellenic League had managed to mount serious resistance to the Persian invasion at Thermopylae, Thebes was under the protection of Xerxes and any

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<sup>434</sup> Demand, 1982, pp. 21-22.

<sup>435</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.4.

<sup>436</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 229.

<sup>437</sup> Herodotus, VII.233. Cozzoli, 1958, p. 280, suggests that the Boeotians discovered by Alexander the Great en route between Susa and Ecbatana were those re-located by Xerxes after the fall of Thermopylae.

<sup>438</sup> Keaveney, as noted above, suggests that those who joined Leonidas were not pro-Persian sympathisers, as the rest of Thebes, and so when they submitted to Xerxes after Thermopylae, although their lives were spared, they were branded for their cowardice. Cf. Keaveney, 1996, p. 45.

serious retribution by the allied Greeks was not “on the cards”. That Thebes did not openly declare their pro-Persian support until after Thermopylae suggests indecision within the city, which was resolved by the outcome of Thermopylae.<sup>439</sup> Once it had defeated the Greeks at Thermopylae, the Persian army continued into Boeotia and any towns which did not submit were sacked by the invading army. The Theban force likely realised as soon as the situation seemed hopeless that, if they did not surrender, at the very least they themselves would lose their lives, at worst Thebes would likely be sacked. The Thebans will have noted what happened to Phocis prior to Thermopylae, as we mentioned above, which did not submit to Xerxes and suffered the plundering of the temple of Apollo at Abae and excessive brutality towards its people.<sup>440</sup> Herodotus mentions that upon reaching Boeotia the Persian army found all Boeotian cities protected by Alexander of Macedon’s men, stationed within the cities, who indicated to the Persians that the Boeotians were friendly to the invading army.<sup>441</sup>

We can see that once Thebes had submitted to Persia, she committed herself fully. When Mardonius marched through Boeotia after Xerxes’ withdrawal from Greece, the Thebans suggested he bribe the leaders of the Hellenic League to medise.<sup>442</sup> Further evidence for friendly relations between the Persians and Thebans is found at the banquet of Attaginus, who hosted high ranking Persians and Thebans on the eve of the battle of Plataea.<sup>443</sup> When Mardonius sent Mys, the Carian, to consult various different oracles, whilst he was wintering in Thessaly, he sent three Thebans with him, presumably to help Mys gain access to the relevant sanctuaries and to act as translators where necessary.<sup>444</sup> At the battle of Plataea, Herodotus distinguishes the Thebans,

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<sup>439</sup> We may suggest that, had the allied Greeks won at Thermopylae, those Thebans who were involved would have swayed the decision of the rest in Thebes to unite with the allied Greeks against Xerxes. As it was, due to the defeat at Thermopylae, the Thebans who fought there were required to acquiesce and conform to the rest of the pro-Persian Thebans.

<sup>440</sup> Cf. pp. 98-99.

<sup>441</sup> Herodotus, VIII.34.

<sup>442</sup> Herodotus, IX.2.

<sup>443</sup> Herodotus, IX.16.

<sup>444</sup> Herodotus, VIII.135. Cozzoli, 1958, p. 283, suggests that Mys was more likely trying to ascertain Greek sentiments concerning the Persians under the guise of consulting oracles. This, however, is not necessarily the case as we find Mardonius also consulting Greek seers prior to Plataea. Herodotus, IX.37.

labelling them “Persia’s firm friends”<sup>445</sup> and attributing the cavalry attacks on the Greek forces to Thebes. During the rout of the Persian army, Herodotus notes that, whilst the other Greek forces which fought for the Persians retreated in disorder, the Thebans “fought so hard that three hundred of their bravest and best men were killed.”<sup>446</sup> It seems apparent that, once the Thebans and Boeotians had committed to the Persian cause, they realised that they would need to commit completely and they also realised that the retaliation from the allied Greeks, should the Persian invasion fail, would likely be extreme. It is also worth noting that at Plataea the Thebans were “in effect fighting on their own territory and for their own survival.”<sup>447</sup> Thus, although Herodotus comments on how bravely and fiercely the Thebans fought at the battle, we may note that this was, in reality, to defend their own land.

After Plataea the Hellenic League besieged Thebes for the role it played in the Persian invasion.<sup>448</sup> The League demanded that [αὐτῶν τοὺς μηδίσαντας](#) be handed over, especially Timagenides and Attaginus. Initially we are told that the state refused and it was not until the twentieth day of the siege that Timagenides persuaded the citizens of Thebes to hand him and Attaginus over to Pausanias in order that “Boeotia should not suffer any longer.”<sup>449</sup> That Timagenides was compelled to persuade the Boeotians to hand him over indicates that it was not only a few oligarchical leaders who were responsible for the medism of Thebes.<sup>450</sup> In Timagenides’ speech he states that “it was with public approval” that the Thebans joined the Persians. He also states that, if the Hellenic League simply wished to hold him and Attaginus as a pretext for financial gain, then the ransom money could be taken from public funds, further proof that Timagenides’ and Attaginus’ actions were publically approved.<sup>451</sup>

The demand for the surrender of the Theban medisers suggests that the Hellenic League wished to end the siege quickly and were willing to hold only

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<sup>445</sup> Herodotus, IX.40.

<sup>446</sup> Herodotus, IX.67.

<sup>447</sup> Demand, 1982, p. 25.

<sup>448</sup> Herodotus, IX.86.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid.

<sup>450</sup> Cozzoli, 1958, p. 285, notes that Herodotus contradicts himself, blaming a few oligarchs for the actions of Thebes and the Boeotians when previously he implies everything was done with the consent of the majority of the citizens.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid.

the leaders responsible.<sup>452</sup> Although Timagenides persuaded the Boeotians to hand him and Attaginus over to the League, Attaginus escaped at the earliest opportunity. Other pro-Persian Thebans, who were surrendered, were handed over to the allies at the Isthmus of Corinth and were executed on the orders of Pausanias.<sup>453</sup> Hignett suggest that this seems to have been a favourite action of Thebes, “to shift responsibility for inconvenient acts from the citizens in general to their leaders” and cites Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.V.8 as an example.<sup>454</sup> However, “punishing” a few leading individuals who were avid pro-Persian sympathisers ended the siege quickly, allowing the Hellenic League to disband its forces sooner, and it also spared the punishment in the entirety of such a prominent city in Greece. This supports McMullin’s theory that, in the spirit of reconciliation, individuals rather than cities, which were too numerous, were condemned for their medism.<sup>455</sup>

We can see from Herodotus’ account two quite different Theban policies during the Persian invasion. The first, whereby the state helped the Hellenic League by sending men to join those at Thermopylae, and, if we are to believe Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, possibly also to Tempe. The second, after Thermopylae, whereby the Thebans openly supported the Persian army from the time they were protected by Alexander of Macedon. The besieging of Thebes was a considered action by the Hellenic League and so we must acknowledge that the motivations for besieging the city given by Herodotus to be true, i.e. punishment for medising. Looking at the two conflicting behaviours of Thebes we may conjecture that the dramatic “U-turn” in Theban foreign policy was probably motivated by self-interest and a desire to survive. Plutarch is correct in noting that it would have been foolish for Leonidas to attempt to hold hostages at Thermopylae and, so, we must conjecture that these men, at least, were loyal

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<sup>452</sup> Keaveney, 2011, p. 114, notes the inefficiency of Greek siege craft until Dionysius I of Syracuse in the fourth century.

<sup>453</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 327, suggest that when Herodotus states that the men were handed over to Corinth he meant they were taken to the allies at the Isthmus, which sounds more reasonable than assuming that the Spartans simply left their trial and execution to one state.

<sup>454</sup> Hignett, 1963, p. 23 ff. At *Hellenica* III.V.8, the Thebans blame the decision to vote for the destruction of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War on one man in order to escape blame, whilst requesting that Athens send aid to them against the Spartans.

<sup>455</sup> McMullin, 2001, p. 66.

to the Hellenic League at this time and medised after the battle from a desire for self-preservation.

If we are to believe Diodorus Siculus, the men sent to Thermopylae and to Tempe were probably willing volunteers. Diodorus Siculus' claim that they belonged to the "opposition" party in Thebes is likely when we consider Timagenides' later speech claiming that Thebes medised with "public approval". Those who wished to support the allied Greeks at both Tempe and Thermopylae may have been willingly dispatched by the state to do this.<sup>456</sup> The implication from Herodotus is that the Thebans went to Thermopylae voluntarily and it is not until Leonidas dismissed the other Greeks that Herodotus states explicitly that the Thebans were being held against their will. We may conjecture that the Theban desire to leave Thermopylae, when the other Greek forces were dismissed, may have been motivated as much from the desire not to be slaughtered as the desire to return to Thebes in order to join the rest of the state in medising. We can easily conjecture that, knowing the size of the Persian army and wanting to be rid of potential sources of trouble within the city, the Thebans sent anti-Persian sympathisers to Thermopylae knowing the likelihood of their return. Thus, Thebes would both remove political opposition and also reassure the Hellenic League that it was not medising for a long enough period of time, until Alexander of Macedon and then the Persian army arrived in Boeotia. When considering the above evidence we may surmise that there were at least two factions within Thebes at this time: pro-Persian and anti-Persian. In this Thebes was not unique, we have already discussed Thessaly above but also in the wake of Datis' invasion Eretria suffered the same situation. The fall of the anti-Persian faction at Thermopylae left the pro-Persian faction in control.

Herodotus does not explicitly state why Thebes medised, but we may conjecture the most obvious motive is that Thebes believed that resistance by the Hellenic League was futile, or, perhaps, unreliable given their withdrawal from Tempe. Thermopylae was intended to slow down the invasion, but not to stop it; at Tempe the force sent by the allied Greeks to stop Xerxes' army had withdrawn. With this borne in mind, the Thebans, and the rest of the Boeotians,

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<sup>456</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.4.

probably recognised the Greek hesitation to defend Boeotia from the invading Persian army and so, with minimal help sent from the rest of Greece, they submitted to ensure they were not destroyed. We may also suggest, somewhat cynically, that had Sparta and Athens been destroyed by Persia, Thebes probably hoped to make the best of the situation and to expand its own sphere of influence and territory, as a vassal of the Persian Empire after a successful Persian invasion.<sup>457</sup>

### Macedon

We noted above that as a consequence of Megabazus' campaign in Thrace, Macedon became a vassal state of the Persian Empire.<sup>458</sup> During Xerxes' invasion it was used as a staging post and supply depot for the Persian Army.<sup>459</sup> Like Hippias and Demaratus, we find examples of Xerxes and, later Mardonius, using Alexander of Macedon to further Persian interests. The first instance we find of this is when Alexander persuaded the Greek forces at Tempe to withdraw from the pass, allowing the Persian army through. We have already discussed the likely reasons the Greeks were persuaded, however, it is worth noting here Xerxes' decision to use Alexander here.<sup>460</sup>

Similarly, Mardonius employed Alexander, after Xerxes' withdrawal from Greece, to persuade the Athenians to medise.<sup>461</sup> It is worth noting that Mardonius would not have sent Alexander, if he had thought there was no possibility of him succeeding. Likewise, the Spartans would not have sent their own embassy in response to this if they did not think the same. Both of these opinions were likely based on Alexander's success at Tempe. The terms offered by Xerxes were that, if the Athenians joined the Persians, they would be forgiven all the injuries they had committed against Persia, Mardonius would restore Athenian territory and give them any extra land they wished to govern

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<sup>457</sup> Cf. Herodotus VIII. 140-142 where a similar opportunity was offered to Athens by Mardonius.

<sup>458</sup> Cf. p. 27.

<sup>459</sup> Herodotus, VII. 127-132.

<sup>460</sup> Herodotus, VIII.173. Cf. pp. 97-98. We have already notes Miller, 1997, p. 132, who comments on the necessity to use Alexander to translate for both Persians and Greeks.

<sup>461</sup> Herodotus, VIII.136. There is no mention of Alexander by name in Diodorus Siculus, XI.28. Herodotus seems to believe that an Athenian-Persian alliance may have been predicted in the oracle given a little earlier at VIII.135-6.

autonomously, and, also, Mardonius would rebuild the destroyed Athenian temples. The mention by Xerxes that he would forgive all the injuries committed by Athens against Persia seems to offer even more support to Raubitschek's suggestion that before the Ionian revolt the Athenians were considered subjects of Persia.<sup>462</sup> It is also worth considering that this reward is in keeping with Persia's general policy of rewarding good subjects and punishing bad ones. Had the Athenians submitted and been rewarded, other Greek states would have been more likely to submit to Persian advances.<sup>463</sup> Diodorus Siculus records the Athenian response "the Persians had neither good enough land nor sufficient gold to induce the Athenians to desert their fellow Hellenes."<sup>464</sup> And so, Alexander returned to Mardonius, having failed in his mission. Despite the Athenian rejection of Xerxes' terms, it is worth noting that Alexander's mission wasn't a complete failure. Herodotus states that the Athenians rebuked the Spartans for not trusting them but then when they were forced to abandon Attica a second time they sent an embassy to Sparta to remind them that without Spartan support the Athenians would make the best terms they could with Mardonius.<sup>465</sup> Thus, despite Herodotus' assertions at VIII. 144, we find that Athenian resolve depended largely on Spartan support against Persia.

Turning our attention back to Alexander we can see that he was employed by Xerxes and Mardonius due to his persuasive abilities and also due to his pre-existing good relationship with Athens. Alexander claimed to have been of ancient Greek descent himself<sup>466</sup> and Herodotus states that he was specifically chosen as a Persian envoy to Athens "because ... Alexander's relationship with Athens was an official relationship, and was backed by deeds."<sup>467</sup> How and Wells mention that Alexander's title "*proxenos kai euergetes*" was honorific and they suggest that the "*euergetes*" mentioned may refer to Alexander's involvement in the withdrawal of Greek forces from Tempe.<sup>468</sup> If

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<sup>462</sup> Herodotus, V.73. Raubitschek, 1991, p. 4, cf. pp. 32-34 above.

<sup>463</sup> Cf. pp. 98-100 for the Persian treatment of Dryopis and Phocis which emphasises this point.

<sup>464</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.28.

<sup>465</sup> Herodotus, IX. 6.

<sup>466</sup> Herodotus, IX.45. How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 283, doubt that Alexander and the Macedonian royal family were of Greek descent, claiming the story to be a 'folk tale'.

<sup>467</sup> Herodotus, VIII.136.

<sup>468</sup> Herodotus, VII. 173. Cf. pp. 96-98 above.

this is the case we may suggest this is illustrative of Alexander's diplomatic charisma.<sup>469</sup> However, I believe Badian's argument that his title referred to his role in brokering the Athenian alliance with Persia of 507 B.C. is more persuasive.<sup>470</sup> Although this earlier alliance was politically embarrassing, it seems to me more likely that his title would refer to this earlier incident than the more recent one, where he enabled Xerxes' army to enter Greece by persuading the Greeks to abandon Tempe; even if he did persuade them that their position was untenable due to medising factions within Thessaly.

We find Alexander trying to maintain his good relationship with Athens when he sent a warning to the Athenians on the eve of the battle of Plataea that Mardonius intended to attack the next day, despite bad omens.<sup>471</sup> How and Wells note there is no reason to doubt Alexander's philhellenism and that there probably were communications between the Athenians and the Macedonians. However, they also note that this story has some suspicious elements, such as Alexander's ability to avoid the Persian sentinels.<sup>472</sup> Thus, this information may also be from the same pro-Macedonian sources who claimed that Alexander murdered the Persian envoys.<sup>473</sup> I would suggest, contra How and Wells, that Alexander became more philhellenic when he realised that the Persian invasion had failed and I believe that the accounts of Macedonian philhellenism are apologia from after the invasion.

We can see that during the expansion of the Persian Empire Macedon attempted to take advantage of whatever situation was presented to her. It seems likely that Amyntas submitted early to Darius to gain the most favourable terms possible.<sup>474</sup> Later, we find Alexander employed by Xerxes to help pacify the Greek states prior to the Persian army's need to march through them. He was also employed to persuade the resisting states to medise. It may be argued that Macedon had little choice but to submit to Persian dominance.

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<sup>469</sup> Wallace, 1970, p. 199, suggests that, although Alexander's father, Amyntas, was, apparently, also a proxenos of Athens, this will have ceased in 510 B.C. when he backed Hippias in exile. He believes that the proxeny is likely to have resumed with the accession of Alexander, during a period when it was least likely to cause offense in Persia.

<sup>470</sup> Badian, 1994, p. 125. Cf. p. 27, above.

<sup>471</sup> Herodotus, IX.44-46.

<sup>472</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 307.

<sup>473</sup> Herodotus, V.18. Cf. p. 26.

<sup>474</sup> Badian, 1994, p. 113.



## Summary and Conclusion

The abundance of source material available for this period had made possible a detailed analysis of Persian attempts to control most of the prominent states of Greece. Looking at the actions of the Greeks in the wake of and during Xerxes invasion we immediately notice two things. Firstly it is clear that, despite the previous Athenian victory at Marathon, few states believed in resistance to the invasion and those which did were mostly quite southerly; therefore, they were directly impacted only later in the invasion. Thus, we can see quite a strong divide between those states in the north of Greece and those in the south.

Secondly, those states which did medise seem to have done so when, arguably, they lacked other options. Indeed, the Thessalian claim that “sheer inability”<sup>475</sup> to resist the Persian advance without help from the Hellenic League was true. A debatable exception to this is Macedon, which medised in the late 6<sup>th</sup> century prior to Xerxes’ invasion when Darius was expanding the Persian Empire via Thrace. It could be argued that the states which worked pro-actively for Persia, notably the Thebans, Thessalians, and Macedonians first did this when the Persian army was “on their doorstep”. We can see within all of them there was factionalism. Although the Aleuadae of Thessaly submitted to Persia prior to the invasion, it should be noted that they only represented Larissa, regardless of what they told Xerxes. Also, prior to their medism we find evidence of attempted resistance from both Thessaly and Thebes at Tempe and Thermopylae. Thus, we should note the presence of factions, both medising and pro-resistance, of varying degrees of power and influence and we can suggest that this situation was probably reflected in most of the Greek states north of the Isthmus. We can see from the actions of Thessaly and Thebes that, once the Persian army had invaded a Greek state, it was better for that state to medise and to support the Persian army wholly, rather than to resist the army and be sacked. Even with the later retaliation of the Greeks after the Persian invasion, those states which medised seem to have fared better than those which did not.

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<sup>475</sup> Herodotus, VII.172.

With the medising states and those which resisted Xerxes' invasion is a third group of Greek states; those which abstained from action to await the outcome. Although Herodotus names only a few, which were mostly islands with the notable and important exception of Argos and also Sicily, Bauslaugh suggests that most of the Arcadian cities in the north-west Peloponnese also remained neutral as we hear very little about them.<sup>476</sup> However, we do find Arcadians helping to build the wall across the Isthmus and also they were present at Plataea so we must tread carefully with this suggestion.<sup>477</sup> Despite Herodotus' assertions, the situation at Argos was ambiguous at best, probably deliberately so.

Thus, we see three types of reactions from the Greek states in the wake of and during Xerxes' invasion: submission, resistance and neutrality, and we can see the Persian policy of dividing its enemies and then conquering them piecemeal was largely successful when applied to the Greeks. This policy resulted in only a few Greek states willing to pro-actively resist the Persian army by the time it invaded. Bauslaugh argues that even those states which remained neutral would have been considered a successful result of this policy as it is likely they would have eventually submitted without any extra effort for the Persian army, and, we may add, they would have brought Sicily into the range of Persian conquest.<sup>478</sup>

T. Kelly discusses the Persian use of psychological warfare during Xerxes' invasion of Greece and we may concede that the minimal resistance of the Greeks prior to Thermopylae and the number of states which medised or seem to have remained neutral are evidence of this.<sup>479</sup> The Persian victory at Thermopylae reinforced the Persian propaganda of the futility of resistance and this idea is supported by the Peloponnesian abandonment of Attica to concentrate on building a wall across the Isthmus to protect themselves from the invading Persians. The need for Themistocles to threaten Eurybiades with Athenian desertion prior to Salamis further indicates how demoralised the

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<sup>476</sup> Bauslaugh, 1990, pp. 96-97.

<sup>477</sup> Herodotus, VIII. 72, IX, 28-29.

<sup>478</sup> Bauslaugh, 1990, p. 96.

<sup>479</sup> Kelly, 2003.

Peloponnesians were after Thermopylae.<sup>480</sup> Despite the Persian defeat at Salamis and Xerxes' return to Sardis, the presence of Mardonius in central Greece will have maintained Persian pressure on the Greeks.<sup>481</sup> Both Briant and Cawkwell dispute Herodotus' account that Xerxes' 'fled' to Sardis; Cawkwell noting the Persian tradition that their kings generally only campaigned for one season and then left their generals to 'mop up'<sup>482</sup>, and Briant noting that Xerxes was in constant communication with Mardonius and oversaw the campaign from Sardis.<sup>483</sup> After Salamis Xerxes still attempted to divide the Greeks, ordering Mardonius to offer favourable terms to Athens.<sup>484</sup> These terms were rejected by Athens but the presence of the Spartan delegation suggests that Sparta feared the terms would be accepted and the later attempt at oligarchic revolution prior to Plataea suggests the Spartans may have been right to worry.

We can see that throughout Xerxes' invasion the Persians were able to control their relationship with the Greeks, most notably by applying their technique of dividing their enemies' forces. This they seem to have done mostly by propaganda and exploiting division, encouraging the states to medise by impressing on them the size of the Persian army and the futility of resistance. This worked most effectively on the northern and central Greek states. Fear of the Persian army almost led to divisions amongst the states of the Hellenic League, which can be seen as lasting even until the battle at Plataea when the Hellenic League forces retreated in disorder.<sup>485</sup> It was only with the death of Mardonius and the Greek victory at Plataea that Persian control of central Greece was severed.

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<sup>480</sup> Herodotus, VIII. 40, 62.

<sup>481</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 97, suggests Mardonius wintered south of Thermopylae rather than in central Thessaly, as claimed by Herodotus, to avoid needing to recapture the pass.

<sup>482</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, p. 108.

<sup>483</sup> Briant, 2002, p. 531.

<sup>484</sup> Herodotus, VIII. 140.

<sup>485</sup> Cawkwell, 2005, pp. 113-115, notes how Mardonius controlled the situation prior to the battle at Plataea by harassing the Greek forces for the ten days prior to battle, severing the supply lines and polluting their water supply, which forced the Greeks to retreat when they did.



## Chapter 4: The Pentecontaetia and the Peace of Callias

In the period between the expulsion of the Persians from Greece and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in 432 B.C., known as the Pentecontaetia, we learn from Herodotus and Thucydides of the ongoing conflict between Greece and Persia. Despite expelling the Persians from mainland Greece, we find that the Greek fear of further invasions led to the formation of the Delian League and also led to accusations of medism, most notably against Pausanias and Themistocles.<sup>486</sup> Both of these are indications that the Greeks believed that offensive action would deter further Persian invasions.

### Mycale and the actions of the Hellenic League

After the Greek victory at Plataea and the retreat of the Persian army, the Hellenic League was invited to help the Ionian Greek cities rebel from Persian control, once again. This resulted in the Greek victory at Mycale, although it is argued by Balcer that this victory was only ever intended to neutralise the Persian navy, which had been beached there, and wasn't intended to cause an Ionian wide rebellion as Herodotus suggests it did.<sup>487</sup> Cawkwell notes that although there is limited evidence of Persian resistance to Greek incursions after Mycale, there is also limited evidence for Greek campaigns.<sup>488</sup> The evidence we do have indicates that in the immediate years after Mycale the Hellenic League captured Sestos, Cyprus and Byzantium.<sup>489</sup> However, the Persian fortress at Doriskos proves that Persia still controlled this region of Thrace.<sup>490</sup> After the campaigns against Cyprus and Byzantium, and with the Spartan withdrawal from active campaigning as a result of accusations against Pausanias, the Delian League was founded on the premise of offensive action against Persia.<sup>491</sup>

Under the leadership of Athens, Delian League actions resulted in expeditions against Rhodes and Cyprus, and land and sea victories at

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<sup>486</sup> Thucydides, I.128-137.

<sup>487</sup> Herodotus, IX. 104. Balcer, 1995, pp. 290-291.

<sup>488</sup> Cawkwell, 1995, pp. 126-127.

<sup>489</sup> For the chronology of the Pentecontaetia I am following that of Meiggs, 1972, pp. 68-204.

<sup>490</sup> Herodotus, VII. 105-108.

<sup>491</sup> Thucydides, I.96. Meiggs, 1972, p. 47.

Eurymedon and in the early 460s.<sup>492</sup> It is in the context of this active campaigning against Persia that the charges of medism against Pausanias and Themistocles were brought.

### The medism of Pausanias

There are few references to Pausanias' medism in Herodotus, which is unsurprising since most of Herodotus' history concerns Pausanias' generalship during the Persian invasion.<sup>493</sup> Thucydides, however, gives a fuller account in his *Pentecontaetia* in Book I, a condensed version of which can be found in Diodorus Siculus<sup>494</sup> which, although omitting much of Thucydides' narrative, agrees with him on the basic facts. Diodorus Siculus' version of events simply says that Pausanias was put to death by Sparta because of [πλεονεξίαν καὶ προδοσίαν \(greed \(of power\) and treason\)](#).<sup>495</sup>

In brief, Thucydides states that when Pausanias was commander of the Hellenic League's fleet after the Persian invasion, the Greek allies complained about his leadership and requested that Athens take it on instead. Pausanias was also accused of collaborating with Persia and was recalled to Sparta for an inquiry where he was acquitted.<sup>496</sup> Despite Sparta replacing Pausanias with Dorkis, the allied Greeks refused to follow Spartan leadership and no attempt was made to enforce it; Dorkis was recalled, but Pausanias went on to Byzantium as a private citizen.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>492</sup> Diodorus Siculus XI.60 5-62, places these expeditions in the archonship of Demotion, i.e. 470/469 B.C. However, he places the Athenian victory at Eurymedon as 'later', which Meiggs, 1972, pp. 74-80, suggests was 466/465 B.C.

<sup>493</sup> Herodotus' only mention of the medism of Pausanias is in relation to Megabates at V.32. Westlake, 1955, suggests that Thucydides may have incorporated the medism of Pausanias and Themistocles into his *Pentecontaetia* in response to what he viewed to be Herodotus' generous portrayal of Pausanias. He conjectures that, due to Thucydides' Herodotean style for this section, it was based on earlier research done prior to his writing of his *Histories*. Westlake further conjectures that Thucydides initially had only intended to write about the Archidamian War and realised later, whilst in exile, that he needed to write his *Pentecontaetia*, thus his only source of information was the earlier research he had done on Pausanias and Themistocles, which he likely had with him.

<sup>494</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.44.3-XI.45.

<sup>495</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.23.3.

<sup>496</sup> Thucydides, I.95.

<sup>497</sup> Thucydides, I.128.

Thucydides states that Pausanias' ostensible reason for being in the Hellespont was to help in the war against Persia, but that, in fact, he resumed his intrigues with Xerxes. He claims that, during the Greek capture of Byzantium, Pausanias had returned to Xerxes some of his friends and relatives who had been captured, in order to gain favour with him.<sup>498</sup> Thucydides further claims that Pausanias had contacted Xerxes requesting to marry his daughter and to bring Greece into the Persian Empire, with himself as its dynast. Xerxes replied favourably to Pausanias, who by this time was in Byzantium in a private capacity and who then began to act like a tyrant. Pausanias was driven out of Byzantium by the Athenians and went to Coloniae in the Troad. From there he was recalled to Sparta for the second time and was betrayed to the ephors by a trusted slave. Thucydides narrates how the ephors, wishing to hear Pausanias condemn himself, staged a scene where Pausanias was confronted by the slave, whilst the ephors secretly listened to the confession. Rather than arresting Pausanias instantly, they attempted to arrest him at a later date, but Pausanias took refuge in the temple of the goddess of the Brazen House inside which he was trapped and starved to death.<sup>499</sup>

The primary points of interest to this research are the reasons for the accusations of medism against Pausanias and the evidence supporting these accusations.

When looking at the story given by Thucydides, we notice some anomalies. He states that complaints had been made concerning Pausanias' "arrogant nature" and that "instead of acting as commander-in-chief, he appeared to be trying to set himself up as a dictator". However, although Pausanias was condemned for individual acts of injustice, he was acquitted on all the main counts. We should remember that Herodotus, who was closer to the facts than Thucydides, states that Pausanias was recalled on the "pretext of highhandedness"<sup>500</sup> but mentions nothing about his supposed medism. Thus, it

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<sup>498</sup> Thucydides, I.128.

<sup>499</sup> Thucydides, I.34.3, states he was removed from the temple immediately before expiring in order to avoid polluting the temple. Diodorus Siculus, XI.44.6, claims that he died whilst still within the temple.

<sup>500</sup> Herodotus, VIII.3.2.

appears the main accusation was Pausanias' 'arrogant nature', which likely was emphasised by the Athenians who wished to win the hegemony from Sparta.<sup>501</sup>

Pausanias' 'arrogant nature' may be explained by the fact he was a Spartan Regent and he had commanded the Greeks to victory over the Persians at Plataea.<sup>502</sup> The Spartans were known for their harsh natures,<sup>503</sup> although it can be argued that in battle the Athenians and Spartans were probably matched in terms of valour, the two cultures and, specifically, the attitudes of the two peoples were vastly different. The successes of the Athenians give a sense of the "under-dog" winning "against all odds";<sup>504</sup> however, the Spartan ethos was to train to ensure military success.<sup>505</sup> We can speculate that this Spartan harshness of character would have been a cultural "eye-opener" for many of the other Greeks in the fleet.<sup>506</sup> We should consider also that, having evicted Persian forces from the Greek mainland, many Greeks in the allied fleet may have considered their participation in the war over or, perhaps, may have become complacent in their military duties. The continued Spartan military strictness seems to have upset many of the allies. It was not uncommon for the Ionians in particular to be aggrieved by such things.<sup>507</sup>

It seems probable from the overall picture of events prior to Pausanias' first recall to Sparta, that he simply upset the rest of the allied Greek fleet. This notion is supported by their refusal to follow Dorkis, Pausanias' replacement. If the Greeks did not want to follow Pausanias personally, due to his questionable loyalty, surely they would have accepted his replacement from Sparta, which at this time still commanded the hegemony over the Hellenic League. This was the

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<sup>501</sup> Blamire, 1970, p. 298.

<sup>502</sup> Pausanias' arrogance is noted in Thucydides when he recalls how Pausanias inscribed the Greek victory dedication to Apollo at Delphi, claiming sole credit for the Greek victory over the Persians and also how he re-inscribed a bowl, which had already been dedicated at the Bosphorus. Both are clear evidence of Pausanias' personal arrogance. Thucydides, I.132.2-3

<sup>503</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, 23. 3-5.

<sup>504</sup> Balcer, 1989, pp. 137-143 suggests that the Athenian victories had as much to do with Persian failures as Greek successes.

<sup>505</sup> Cartledge 2002, p. 5, notes succinctly "the threat of helot revolt ... was almost constant and the Spartans responded by turning themselves into a sort of army camp ... Male Spartans were forbidden any trade, profession or business other than war."

<sup>506</sup> Note how Alcibiades was known as a chameleon for his ability to fit in at Sparta - this would not have been so noteworthy had the two cultures not been so different. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXIII.

<sup>507</sup> Herodotus, V.33-34. Also, Herodotus, VI. 12. Ionians complaints about Dionysius of Phocaea for working them hard during the Ionian Revolt.



situation at the end of the fifth century, when Thibron was denounced by Sparta's allies and replaced by Dercylidas.<sup>508</sup> Here, however, the allied Greeks refused to follow any Spartan general, indicating that they took issue with the Spartan style of leadership, rather than the individual leader who was applying it.

Looking at Thucydides' more specific evidence of Pausanias' medism, we are given a number of examples; Pausanias returned the high ranking Persians captured at Byzantium, he sent a letter with them to Xerxes offering Greece to him, he received Xerxes' approval for this, he began dressing in Persian clothes, holding Persian banquets and employing Egyptian and Median bodyguards.<sup>509</sup>

Thucydides claims that Pausanias secretly returned the political prisoners to Xerxes and sent a letter with Gongylus about which no-one knew, which begs the question that, if no-one knew about it, how did Thucydides' sources find out? Thucydides states that the text of the letter was revealed "afterwards," but doesn't say how he came to learn of its contents. It is unlikely that Pausanias would have revealed anything about it to "the man of Argilus" when confronted by him; the only evidence is from Xerxes' responding letter which is very vague. That both letters were discovered after Pausanias' death raises our suspicions, especially as Pausanias' letter to Xerxes logically should have been somewhere in Susa and not back in Sparta. Blamire's argument that Pausanias would have needed to keep some of his important correspondence for "reference and for the establishment or confirmation of credentials"<sup>510</sup> is countered by the fact that the only credentials confirmed by the letter are no more than repetitions of the charges against Pausanias. i.e. that Pausanias returned some high ranking Persians to Xerxes and that he had agreed to advance Xerxes' interests. They do not prove that Xerxes was responding to Pausanias' offer to "bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under (Xerxes') control."<sup>511</sup> There is also no mention in Thucydides that Xerxes' response acknowledged a request to marry one of

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<sup>508</sup> Cf. p. 198.

<sup>509</sup> Miller, 1997, p. 77, suggests that Pausanias' medising clothes may have been Persian silks, which were popular in Ionia as well as the rest of the Achaemenid Empire.

<sup>510</sup> Blamire, 1970, p. 302.

<sup>511</sup> Thucydides, I. 128.

Xerxes' daughters, which Herodotus reports as a request to marry Megabates' daughter and which Herodotus himself does not seem to believe.<sup>512</sup> It is possible that Thucydides' sources may have recalled the marriage of Gygaea of Macedon to Bubares son of Megabazus, and emulated the tale for Pausanias.<sup>513</sup>

Olmstead's argument for the authenticity of Xerxes' letter is that the text has convincing phraseology similar to other Persian decrees in the Book of Ezra which leads him to conclude "Thucydides copied the letter from an Ionic translation of an original Persian."<sup>514</sup> However, we could claim also that the letter shown to Thucydides may have been created using the format of other Persian decrees. At most we can conclude that Thucydides saw a letter in Ionic Greek which he believed had been copied from an original Persian. The phraseology is convincingly challenged by J.F. Lazenby who notes the unusual use of *τῆς Σπάρτης* rather than *τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων* at Thucydides, I. 128.7.<sup>515</sup> Fornara concedes that Thucydides genuinely saw some letters but believes the letters themselves were unhistorical on the grounds that it is unlikely that Pausanias would have kept copies of such incriminating letters together "for a period of years."<sup>516</sup> Finally, the letters were supposedly exchanged during Pausanias' first occupation of Byzantium, however, looking at the chronology it appears that there was 'scarcely time' for this to have happened since it will have taken time for Pausanias to besiege and capture Byzantium, then return the prisoners with a letter and await the response from Xerxes.<sup>517</sup> If Loomis is correct it is unlikely Byzantium capitulated until spring 477 B.C. leaving but a few months for Pausanias and Xerxes to correspond by letter, which, due to the distances involved, will have taken considerable time.<sup>518</sup> Thus, we can agree with the *communis opinio* in disputing the authenticity of these letters.<sup>519</sup>

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<sup>512</sup> Thucydides, 1.129, Herodotus, V. 32.

<sup>513</sup> Herodotus, VIII. 136.

<sup>514</sup> A.T. Olmstead, 1933, p. 161.

<sup>515</sup> Thucydides, I. 128.7. Lazenby, 1975, p. 235, n. 3.

<sup>516</sup> Fornara, 1966, p. 262. A parallel case is recorded by Keaveney where, after his death, Mirabeau's correspondence with Louis XVI during the French Revolution was discovered. Keaveney, 2003, p. 133, n. 48.

<sup>517</sup> Fornara, 1966, pp. 264ff, suggests that due to the dating of events, the letters dated to before Pausanias' first recall to Sparta are fabricated. Also, Rhodes, 1970, p. 389.

<sup>518</sup> Loomis, 1990, pp. 491-492. We cannot discount the efficiency of the Persian couriers, who would have quickly borne the correspondence between Pausanias and Xerxes. However, even with

If we believe that the letters between Pausanias and Xerxes are suspicious, the next pieces of evidence are frankly absurd. That is, his supposed adorning of Persian clothes, his use of Persian and Egyptian bodyguards, and his hosting of Persian style banquets. An explanation for Pausanias' Persian clothing may be found in Miller, who suggests that he may have worn silks which he acquired as part of the booty taken from Mardonius' tent after Plataea.<sup>520</sup> Thus, we may accuse him of cultural medism rather than political medism here. However, the intent in Thucydides is sufficiently clear for us to understand that he believed Pausanias was wearing overtly suspicious clothing, and we may suggest the Greeks will have been aware that he possessed silk taken from Mardonius' tent. Thus, the Persian clothing in the accusations appear to be new additions to his wardrobe. Similarly, the accusations of Pausanias holding Persian style banquets, may be based in his eating local produce, cooked in the local tradition, but again, we should not discredit Thucydides intent that these actions were somewhat suspicious in themselves.<sup>521</sup> I cannot account for the accusations of using Persian and Egyptian body guards, however, it would be unusual and quite foolish for a Greek trying to conceal his medism to act in this way.

Thucydides' account states that, on hearing of Pausanias' behaviour, the ephors recalled him to Sparta, warning that if he did not return, he would be declared a public enemy. However, he also states that Pausanias 'ὡς ἥκιστα ὑποπτος εἶναι' and that he returned to Sparta because he felt confident that he could clear his name through bribery.<sup>522</sup> If Pausanias particularly wished to avoid suspicion he didn't do a very good job of it.

So far we have seen that the evidence for Pausanias' medism prior to his second recall is not particularly convincing. Further questions arise as the account continues. When Pausanias returned to Sparta the ephors, having

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efficient couriers, I do not believe that Xerxes will have responded to Pausanias' letter without some deliberation which will have taken time.

<sup>519</sup> Rhodes, 1970, pp. 389-390. Lang, 1967, p. 84, Fornara, 1966, pp. 264 ff., Westlake, 1977, p. 103, contra Keaveney, 2003, p. 9.

<sup>520</sup> Miller, 1997, p. 77.

<sup>521</sup> Herodotus, IX.82, describes how Pausanias had Persian food prepared in Mardonius' tent after Plataea to demonstrate the superiority of Persian food and, thus, the foolishness of the Persian campaign.

<sup>522</sup> Thucydides, I. 131.

arrested him, had to release him due to lack of evidence; it was not until a nameless “man from Argilus” came forward to condemn Pausanias that the ephors appear to have had any evidence, and, even then, they did not believe this nameless man and so the scene with the hidden ephors was staged.

This provokes two questions: firstly, if Pausanias did medise and was issued orders to return to Sparta, why did he return? He was on the border of the Persian Empire, which had developed a reputation for sheltering exiles. If Pausanias was guilty of medism, why did he not simply take shelter in the Persian Empire? This question is particularly pertinent if we believe that Pausanias was already in correspondence with Xerxes and attempting to marry into the Achaemenid family, in a similar way to the family of Alexander of Macedon had married Alexander’s sister Gygaea to the Persian Bubares.<sup>523</sup> Thucydides’ claim, that Pausanias only returned because he believed he could use bribery to clear his name, emphasises the previous point. If Pausanias actually was guilty, it would be more effort to return to Sparta to attempt to bribe the ephors than simply to “hop across” the border and take shelter in the Persian Empire. Even Bengtson states that the reasons for Pausanias’ return are a mystery.<sup>524</sup> I would suggest that Pausanias’ return to Sparta should be taken as evidence of his innocence, rather than his guilt. Thucydides clearly states that the ephors had no irrefutable evidence to charge him when he returned to Sparta and so were forced to release him from jail.<sup>525</sup> If there was enough evidence to recall Pausanias on charges of medism, surely there was also enough evidence to keep him in jail.

Thus, it seems that Pausanias was recalled for other reasons. Blamire notes that the herald sent to recall Pausanias to Sparta the second time carried a *skytale*, suggesting that Pausanias’ presence in Byzantium as a “private citizen” was, in fact, with “some official function to discharge.”<sup>526</sup> This seems likely when

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<sup>523</sup> Cf. p. 26 above.

<sup>524</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 73.

<sup>525</sup> Thucydides, I.132.1

<sup>526</sup> Thucydides, I.131.1 with Blamire, 1970, p. 299. Fornara, 1966, p. 262, notes that Pausanias’ possession of a *skytale* suggests he was in Byzantium with the “power and authority” of a Spartan king and, thus, questions Thucydides’ sources for claiming that Pausanias was there in a “private” capacity. Lazenby, 1975, pp. 240-243, also suggests Pausanias return was an attempt to win back the hegemony from Athens.

we consider that Pausanias would have needed official sanction in order to have commissioned a ship to sail to the Hellespont. Spartans were forbidden personal wealth, although we know of cases of corruption which are generally seen as exceptions to the rule. Pausanias may have acquired some wealth as a result of the Persian invasion and his subsequent campaigning in Cyprus and Byzantium, but I doubt he would have managed to conceal the necessary amount needed to personally fund a crew and boat from Hermione to Byzantium. Thus, we can conjecture that the funds likely came from Sparta. If this was the case, we can see that Pausanias may have returned to Byzantium on a discrete matter with Spartan sanction. However, what Pausanias was actually doing in the Hellespont remains a mystery and is open to conjecture. Indeed, Blamire suggests that Pausanias was sent to covertly impede Athenian activities. He postulates that Pausanias medised from Colonae, having been expelled from Byzantium by Athens, and then he was recalled to Sparta. Certainly we can verify Thucydides' claims that Pausanias' presence in Byzantium was justified on a *pretence* of helping in the war against the Persians; it is unlikely he would have been expelled from Byzantium had he been working with the Athenians whilst there. That he medised from Colonae can be refuted on the same grounds as argued above. Whether Pausanias medised from Byzantium or from Colonae, why would he return to Sparta when summoned? It is simply illogical.

The final stage in Pausanias' story is of his eventual self-incrimination when confronted by the "man from Argilus". This account also presents questions. Firstly, who is this nameless "man from Argilus"? We are told he had once been the lover of Pausanias, a favoured and trusted servant of his, but apparently without a name. Although not all characters in Thucydides are named, we may speculate that it would have added verisimilitude to Thucydides' account, which has raised so many questions already. We may suspect this 'man from Argilus' is no more than a stock character. Furthermore, if this man did exist and was supplying the ephors with sought after evidence for the case against Pausanias, whom they had recently been forced to release from jail, we would expect the ephors to accept this evidence enthusiastically. However, we are told that initially the ephors did not believe him. The scenario

leading to Pausanias' self-incrimination pushes the bounds of credulity, especially as even then the ephors did not arrest Pausanias. It seems that either the ephors simply did not want to arrest him and were doing everything in their power to avoid doing this, or they had no evidence to arrest him on these charges. There is certainly a fair amount of inconsistent behaviour on the part of the ephors in the account.

So far we have found the evidence for Pausanias' medism unsatisfactory. We can conclude that his arrogance upset the Greek allies in the Hellenic League and that his return to Byzantium may have been discrete but it is likely it had Sparta's blessing, whatever he was doing there. However, there is one piece of evidence we have not yet discussed which raises some real interest; the charge of intriguing with the helots.<sup>527</sup> Thucydides claims that Pausanias was offering the helots their freedom and full rights, which would have been enough to raise an alarm in the minds of the ephors.<sup>528</sup> Helots had served with the Spartans during the Persian wars and would no doubt have fought alongside them: perhaps Pausanias' attitude towards them had softened? However, Thucydides says that the ephors mistrusted the evidence of the helots, i.e. it was too unreliable to use. Rhodes makes the point that, although intriguing with the helots was popular amongst "wayward Spartans", it is also likely that, since the helots rebelled within a few years of his death, Pausanias "was almost bound to be accused of having done something to foment it, even if he was entirely innocent."<sup>529</sup> The threat of a helot rebellion was ever present in Spartan minds and it is worth noting that, had the ephors been reluctant to arrest Pausanias previously, this charge alone would have been sufficient reason to arrest him. However, the fact that there wasn't enough evidence for this suggests that Pausanias' connection to the later helot rebellion was fabricated.

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<sup>527</sup> Thucydides, I.132.4.

<sup>528</sup> Thucydides, I.132.

<sup>529</sup> Rhodes, 1970, p. 392.

Looking through the account in Thucydides, we can conclude that the evidence for Pausanias medism is unconvincing and we must consider the real reasons behind his recall and subsequent death.

I agree with Lang's proposal that Thucydides' source for this section of work possibly was the Spartan government, which, she suggests, explains why Thucydides does not appear to question the account himself. It is unusual for Thucydides to be so uncritical of his sources, when presented with a weak account of events, and the most logical reason for this would be because his source was the Spartan government.<sup>530</sup> However, there is not enough evidence to support her view that the Spartan government was covering up a change in their foreign policy to support Persia against an ever increasing Athenian threat to the Spartan hegemony over Greece.<sup>531</sup> Furthermore, I doubt that Pausanias, who was awarded the individual prize for valour during the Persian Wars,<sup>532</sup> who had made a specific point of mocking Persian extravagance after capturing Mardonius' tent, and who had subsequently captured Cyprus and Byzantium from Persia, would be willing to court Persia so soon afterwards, even though he may have worn Persian clothes.<sup>533</sup>

Rhodes acknowledges that the account had probably undergone "improvements" before it reached Thucydides and suggests that the reluctance of the ephors to prosecute Pausanias successfully would indicate that his actions may have seemed more distasteful than strictly treasonous.<sup>534</sup> Certainly his actions were enough to warrant his recall but not enough to convict him of anything without causing embarrassment – it is noteworthy that Pausanias did not stand trial before his death.

We have spent a good deal of time discussing Pausanias because the most important thing about the accusation of medism is that the Greeks were

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<sup>530</sup> Lang, 1967, pp. 79-85. Westlake, 1977, pp. 107-109, reaches the same conclusion although he believes Thucydides was following an account by Charon of Lampsacus who likely received his information from Sparta.

<sup>531</sup> Lang, 1967, p. 82.

<sup>532</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.33.

<sup>533</sup> Herodotus, IX.82. Given that Pausanias was campaigning much further north than any Spartan had previously, the practicalities of wearing silk in winter, where the average temperatures were 5 degrees Celsius colder, should not be ignored.

<sup>534</sup> Rhodes, 1970, p. 390.

persuaded of his conspiring with Xerxes against Greece. We have already noted that Pausanias' actions during and after the Persian invasion can be used as evidence for his defence and yet Thucydides, at least, and probably many others, believed it was possible. That such accusations were credited indicates that despite the Greek victories over Persia they still feared another Persian invasion. The Delian League was formed specifically to address this fear by taking the war into Asia Minor.<sup>535</sup> It is in this context that we also turn to Themistocles, another prominent figure, who was accused of medism by Sparta as a direct consequence of the accusations and death of Pausanias in 471/470 B.C.

### The medism of Themistocles

The first instance of Themistocles' actual medism, contrary to Herodotus' assertions, seems likely to have been as Thucydides states, after he was accused of medism and when he fled to the Persian Empire as an exile.<sup>536</sup> Herodotus' claims that Themistocles' advice to the allied Greek forces not to pursue the retreating Persians across the Hellespont back to Asia Minor, was with a view to later medism seems to have been applied retrospectively in light of Themistocles' later actions.<sup>537</sup> Herodotus claims that should Themistocles have needed to flee Greece and live in exile, he would have been able to claim responsibility for this lack of Greek pursuit and, thus, gain favour with Xerxes. However, despite Keaveney,<sup>538</sup> it is unlikely that Themistocles would have envisioned the future need to take refuge at Xerxes' court and, therefore, it is also unlikely that his actions were motivated with a view to gaining favour with Xerxes. Indeed, Herodotus states that Themistocles was persuaded of the advice not to pursue the Persians by Eurybiades.<sup>539</sup> This suggests that his intent really was to encourage the removal from Greece of as many Persians as possible, which is supported by Diodorus Siculus,<sup>540</sup> unless we are to make the unlikely assumption that Eurybiades also had half a thought to future medism. Gillis,

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<sup>535</sup> Thucydides, I.96

<sup>536</sup> Thucydides, I.136.

<sup>537</sup> Herodotus, VIII.109.

<sup>538</sup> Cf. Blösel, 2004, pp. 204-221, 265-284, and Keaveney, 2011, p. 88.

<sup>539</sup> Herodotus, VIII.108.2-4.

<sup>540</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.19.



noting what he believes to be Herodotus' pro-Alcmeonid bias and, conversely, his anti-Themistoclean bias, suggests that, rather than directly attacking Themistocles in his narrative, Herodotus undercuts his achievements, stresses his desire for acquiring money by taking bribes and fails to give him due credit for his achievements during the Persian invasion. He notes an example of this is Herodotus' paraphrasing of Themistocles' speech on the eve of Salamis into one sentence, which is striking "in a book overloaded with lengthy speeches, not all of them by any means relevant or even interesting."<sup>541</sup> We can agree with Gillis that it seems that Herodotus is guilty of applying his own bias onto the motivations of Themistocles, which realistically he cannot have known.

Briefly recapping the events surrounding Themistocles' medism, we are told that when Themistocles was accused, he had already been ostracised from Athens and was at the time living in Argos; when he was informed that both Athenian and Spartan officials had been sent to arrest him, he fled to Corcyra.<sup>542</sup> The Corcyraeans, in fear of retribution from both Athens and Sparta, sent him back to the mainland where he took refuge with Admetus, the King of the Molossi. From there, Themistocles made his way to Ionia on a merchant ship and thence sent a letter to Artaxerxes who had recently ascended to the Persian throne. The letter stated that, although he had hindered the Persian invasion while acting in the defence of Greece, he had also performed good deeds for Artaxerxes during the Persian retreat, taking claim for the lack of Greek pursuit of the retreating Persian army.<sup>543</sup> He asked for a year before giving an account of himself in front of Artaxerxes personally. Thucydides says that during this year Themistocles learnt the Persian language and customs and after he arrived at Artaxerxes' court he "became a person of importance". Thucydides' brief account states that Themistocles gained a position of influence at the court during the rest of his life-time and died either from illness or poison.

Fuller, more colourful accounts can be found in Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, who give additional information, padding out the basic account given in Thucydides. Plutarch claims that when Themistocles arrived in Ionia he

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<sup>541</sup> Gillis, 1969, p. 143.

<sup>542</sup> For the chronology of Themistocles' flight from Greece to Asia see Keaveney, 2003, p. 116.

<sup>543</sup> Thucydides, I.137. Cf. Keaveney, 2003, pp. 33-34.

discovered that the King had declared that he would give a reward of 2 talents for the capture of Themistocles and that, as a result of this, Themistocles was forced to travel to the Persian court hidden in a woman's carriage.<sup>544</sup> When he arrived, he first had an audience with Artabanus, Artaxerxes' Chiliarch, during which Themistocles did not declare that he wanted to live as an exile in Persia but, rather, that his purpose was to increase the fame and power of the king and to increase the number of those who did homage to him. We are told that he won over the king and was awarded the 2 talents for handing himself in, he was also given three cities for his support - Magnesia, Lampsacus and Myus.<sup>545</sup> On information from Neanthes of Cyzicus and Phanias, Plutarch says that Themistocles was also given, in addition, Percote and Palaescepsis. Plutarch's account of Themistocles' death states that when Cimon was sailing with the Athenian fleet to Cyprus, Egypt and the coast of Asia Minor, Themistocles was called upon by Artaxerxes to fulfil his promise of subjugating Greece to Persia. Themistocles committed suicide in response to this summoning, rather than betray Greece.<sup>546</sup>

Looking at the medism of Themistocles, we can see that when he was accused, rather than returning to Athens to defend himself against the charges, like Pausanias who returned to Sparta, he preferred to take his chances living in exile. He would have known what had happened to Pausanias and, thus, likely rated his chances of acquittal poorly;<sup>547</sup> Keaveney notes that Themistocles was not well disposed to Sparta nor Sparta to him.<sup>548</sup> The Spartan account, that Pausanias had supposedly contacted Themistocles inviting him to join in his medism may have reached Themistocles - whether this was true or not, the Spartan authorities had clearly already persuaded the Athenian authorities to arrest him. According to Plutarch, when Themistocles was approached by Pausanias he refused to join in with his medising plans.<sup>549</sup> As we concluded earlier, the evidence suggests Pausanias did not medise and, therefore, we can

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<sup>544</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XXVIII.

<sup>545</sup> Thucydides, I. 138, Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XXIX, Diodorus Siculus, XI.57.

<sup>546</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XXXI. Keaveney, 2003, p. 83.

<sup>547</sup> Forrest argues that Pausanias would have died about 4 years prior to Themistocles' accusations, stating that he must have been dead by 473. Forrest, 1960, p. 237.

<sup>548</sup> Keaveney, 2003 p. 8.

<sup>549</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XXIII.

suggest that also he did not invite Themistocles to join him. Keaveney notes that, with Pausanias dead, evidence may have been produced which had the potential to be less than the whole truth. He suggests that the grounds for the charges of medism was that Themistocles had not denounced Pausanias when he had the opportunity and was, therefore, guilty of covering up the affair,<sup>550</sup> while Forrest suggests that the accusation was partly the result of the popularity of Cimon, Themistocles' political enemy, and partly the result of Themistocles' pro-Argive policy in an attempt to curb the growth of Spartan power.<sup>551</sup>

In Plutarch's account we are told that Themistocles attempted to defend himself in exile, writing a letter arguing that a man who "constantly sought authority over others .... could never have sold himself and Greece to barbarians."<sup>552</sup> However, there are number of problems with Plutarch. Firstly, Themistocles' supposed defence, that those who had been ostracised for aiming at dominion would not medise, is weak as many Athenians would still remember Hippias, who had done just that. It is unlikely that such an astute character as Themistocles would give such a weak defence. Keaveney rightly believes it more plausible that, rather than accusing him whilst he was in Argos and alerting him to the situation, Themistocles' enemies would have summoned him back to Athens (just as Pausanias was recalled to Sparta) to answer the charge of medism, ensuring that he couldn't flee.<sup>553</sup> Plutarch's further claim that Themistocles was then summoned before a Pan-Hellenic council, seems likely to be a later fiction, only found in Plutarch.<sup>554</sup> It seems that, in order to "pad-out" his story of Themistocles, Plutarch is guilty of repeating fabrications, which, however implausible, make Plutarch's account more colourful. Forrest notes that Plutarch's account here is "an extraordinary muddle of Thucydides, Ephorus (?), Krateros, and no doubt others as well."<sup>555</sup> He suggests that the fabricated charges were used against Themistocles precisely because Cimon was so

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<sup>550</sup> Keaveney, 2003, p. 9.

<sup>551</sup> Forrest, 1960.

<sup>552</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XXIII.

<sup>553</sup> Keaveney, 2003, p. 10.

<sup>554</sup> Plutarch, *Aristides*, XXI.

<sup>555</sup> Forrest, 1960, p. 237.

popular, thus, they would be believed with little real evidence. It is noteworthy that Themistocles previously had been charged with medism and acquitted in 472 B.C.<sup>556</sup> He was ostracised shortly after and so we can see that he had become unpopular in Athens by 472 B.C.<sup>557</sup> It is not difficult to consider that his political enemies in Athens may have joined his enemies in Sparta to denounce him.<sup>558</sup> Forrest notes that Aeschylus, an ally of Themistocles, lost in the Dionysia of 468 B.C., after a winning streak of 8 or 9 plays. He also observes that this was the same year that Cimon sat on the judging panel.<sup>559</sup> Lenardon also believes in collaboration between Cimon and Sparta for the removal of Themistocles, noting Themistocles' animosity with Sparta concerning the building of Athens' wall and his role at the Amphictyonic council in 471 B.C., which helped to defeat all of Sparta's proposals.<sup>560</sup> That Sparta was able to impose its wishes upon the domestic policy of an allied state, from time to time, is convincingly argued by Yates.<sup>561</sup> This seems plausible to me given the power and influence of Sparta at the time.

Once Themistocles had learnt of these second charges he fled to Corcyra, which was friendly to him and treated him as a benefactor.<sup>562</sup> However, the Corcyraean fear of resisting a combined force of Spartans and Athenians was enough for them to pass him back to the mainland and, thus, not incur the joint enmity of the two states.<sup>563</sup> Themistocles' apparent reluctance to go to Persia may be interpreted as evidence of his innocence. If he had medised, the more natural place to go would have been Asia Minor. Konishi notes that Thucydides' description of Themistocles' "long-wandering flight" indicates Thucydides' belief that Themistocles was unwilling to go over to Persia and live in exile

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<sup>556</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.54.4-5.

<sup>557</sup> Green, 2006, p. 115, n. 204, suggests that his popularity lasted only until 477/476 B.C. with his last public appearance at the Olympic Games.

<sup>558</sup> Keaveney, 2003, p. 9.

<sup>559</sup> Forrest, 1960, p. 238.

<sup>560</sup> Lenardon, 1959, p. 33.

<sup>561</sup> Yates, 2005, pp. 65-76, notes the Spartan tradition of supporting Laconizing factions within allied and friendly cities and the Spartan ability to present a demand as mutually beneficial in order to persuade allied and friendly cities to acquiesce. He recognizes that such cities could not be 'bulldozed' into supporting Spartan wishes and that the policy was mercurial as it relied on the support of Laconizing factions within cities.

<sup>562</sup> Thucydides, I.136.

<sup>563</sup> Keaveney, 2003, p. 7, notes that the pressure from Sparta and Athens was sufficient for Argos either to be unwilling or unable to protect him from them, hence his flight to Corcyra.

there.<sup>564</sup> He supports this argument by noting that Themistocles, at one point, was forced to beg refuge from an enemy, Admetus, King of the Molossi in Epirus.<sup>565</sup>

By the time Themistocles reached the court of Artaxerxes he must have realised that Artaxerxes was his last hope of safety: if Artaxerxes did not let him live in exile, he would be executed. And yet, if we believe Thucydides, Themistocles still did not ask anything greater than to live in exile in the Persian Empire and only hinted at a promise in return. He gave account of his actions both for and against the Persian Empire and let Artaxerxes decide for himself. Whether he was innocent of medising prior to his arrival in Ephesus is open to speculation, but, I propose that the lack of evidence against Pausanias implicating Themistocles and Themistocles' route via Corcyra and Ephesus to Persia, suggests that it is unlikely that he did medise, the accusations of medism seemingly were politically fabricated by his enemies. Clearly, once he was living at the court of Artaxerxes, if he was required to perform military duties for another invasion of Greece, he would not have had a choice.<sup>566</sup>

As with Pausanias we find an unconvincing case against Themistocles and yet it further supports our notion that the Greeks also believed that Persia was preparing for another invasion. This is emphasised by the tales surrounding the death of Themistocles, one of which claims that he poisoned himself when called to assist Artaxerxes I against the Greeks in the 460s.<sup>567</sup> Thus, paranoia claimed two great defenders of Greece.

Noteworthy in the account is the role of Persia in the case of Themistocles. Artaxerxes I, like his predecessors, was willing to accept exiled Greeks to his court; it is upon this premise that the accounts of Themistocles'

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<sup>564</sup> Konishi, 1970, p. 62.

<sup>565</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XXIV, notes an account in Stesimbrotus, which reports that Themistocles also attempted to find refuge in Sicily, after he fled the Molossii and before he sailed to Persia. This account is disputed by Plutarch and Keaveney, 2003, p. 19, notes the likelihood that it is a doublet created by Stesimbrotus of Themistocles' wooing of Artaxerxes I.

<sup>566</sup> Keaveney, 2003, pp. 93-95, believes that Themistocles may have been able to offer other services besides military ones, such as using his influence back in Athens to cause unrest and stasis.

<sup>567</sup> Thucydides, I.138.4, Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 31.3-5.

medism is based.<sup>568</sup> However, as we have already noted, the fate of Themistocles was 'in the hands' of Artaxerxes. Once in the Persian Empire, Themistocles may have recognised that he would be completely subject to Artaxerxes, which may explain why he spent many years seeking refuge in different Greek states prior to his arrival at Artaxerxes' court.<sup>569</sup> It is easy to believe the misconception that high-ranking Greeks, such as Themistocles, could simply turn up in the Persian Empire and be automatically welcomed. However, it should be noted that Themistocles spent a year learning to speak Persian and building his case for his audience with Artaxerxes I, which suggests that it was not easy to 'win' the king over. It should also be remembered that had Themistocles failed to persuade Artaxerxes I, it is likely he would have been imprisoned and executed as a former enemy of Persia.

We can conclude from the cases of both Pausanias and Themistocles that, despite the Greek victories in the Persian War and despite the successes of the Delian League, the threat of another Persian invasion was a serious consideration and one, I would suggest, likely encouraged by Persia itself.<sup>570</sup>

### The first Peloponnesian War

Whilst Themistocles was in exile in the Persian Empire, tensions between Athens and her allies and Sparta and her allies resulted in the outbreak of the first Peloponnesian War in c. 461 B.C. These tensions had increased significantly after 465 B.C., when the Athenians were singularly dismissed from the allied forces sent to Ithome to help the Spartans besiege the rebellious Helots who had taken shelter there. The consequence of this was the ostracism of the 'Laconophile' Cimon and an Athenian alliance with Argos, the traditional enemy of Sparta. Later, in 459 B.C. Megara also sought protection and an alliance with Athens during a border dispute with Corinth. This eventually brought Sparta

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<sup>568</sup> That Themistocles arrived during the reign of Artaxerxes rather than Xerxes, as presented by Diodorus Siculus XI.56.5, is dealt with by Keaveney, 2003, pp. 24-25, who prefers the account of Thucydides over that of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch.

<sup>569</sup> Themistocles was ostracised in 470 B.C. and indicted for medism in 466 B.C. He arrived at the court of Artaxerxes in 465 B.C. having first sought refuge in Corcyra and with the Molossi. Green, 2006, does not agree with Keaveney, 2003, p. 116, that Themistocles spent 4 years in Argos.

<sup>570</sup> Cf. Kelly, 2003, passim for Persian propaganda during the Persian Wars, which I doubt will have ceased entirely after Plataea.

into conflict with Athens, and a Spartan victory over Athens in 457 B.C. at Tanagra.<sup>571</sup> Athens successfully defeated Boeotian forces at Oenophyta shortly afterwards in the same year. The Five Years Truce, between Sparta and Athens, and the Thirty Years Peace, between Sparta and Argos, effectively ended this first Peloponnesian War, in 452/1 B.C.

### Persian bribery during Cimon's Egyptian Campaign

As a result of the succession struggles of Artaxerxes I upon the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C., the Persian satrapy of Egypt revolted and called upon Athens for assistance which sent 20 ships.<sup>572</sup> Athens was a good choice for Inaros; Athenian influence over the Delian League had increased since it was formed in 476/475 B.C., which is evidenced by the attempted, unsuccessful revolts of Naxos and Thasos.<sup>573</sup> Also, under the leadership of Cimon, the Delian League had defeated Persian forces at the Eurymedon River and there is evidence for operations led by Cimon in Lykia and Caria prior to this.<sup>574</sup>

In response to Athenian support of Inaros' rebellion, Artaxerxes "sent to Sparta a Persian named Megabazus with money to bribe the Spartans to invade Attica and so force the Athenians to recall their fleet from Egypt."<sup>575</sup> When that failed Artaxerxes "sent out to Egypt a Persian, Megabazus, son of Zopyrus, with a large army,"<sup>576</sup> who then crushed the rebellion there.<sup>577</sup> The failure of the Egyptian rebellion forced the Athenians to come to terms with Persia in order to release those Athenians who had been captured during the campaign.<sup>578</sup>

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<sup>571</sup> Meiggs, 1972, p. 99.

<sup>572</sup> Thucydides, I.104.

<sup>573</sup> Thucydides, I. 98, and I. 100-105. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 70, 83-85. Naxos unsuccessfully revolted from the league in 467 B.C. Thasos revolted in 465 B.C. and was besieged for 3 years before capitulating.

<sup>574</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, 12.1. Diodorus Siculus, XI.60-63. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 73-76.

<sup>575</sup> c. 460. Thucydides, I.104-109. Diodorus Siculus, XI.71. This was the third revolt of the Egyptians since it was initially conquered by Cambyses in 525 B.C.

<sup>576</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>577</sup> Cf. Diodorus Siculus, XII.3.1. The result of the rebellion is disputed in that both Diodorus Siculus and Ctesias, FrGH 688 F14, agree that the Greek forces, on being abandoned by the Egyptians, destroyed their own ships forcing Megabazus into an armistice in which he released the Greek forces. However, Gomme, 1962, p. 322, comments that this is not consistent with Megabazus taking the Greeks to Persia as prisoners where Artaxerxes beheaded 50 before Megabazus managed to free the rest.

<sup>578</sup> See M. Caspari, 1913, W. Wallace, 1936, Westlake, 1950, J. Libourel, 1971, E. Robinson, 1999, for discussions regarding the size of the Athenian and allied fleet and, thus, the scale of Athenian and

Looking to Megabazus' journey to Sparta, Diodorus Siculus states that Megabazus led an embassy comprising 'Friends' of Artaxerxes I, which suggests it was more than a covert attempt to bribe a Greek state and recalls the initial Persian embassy to Macedon in the sixth century B.C.<sup>579</sup> Diodorus Siculus claims that the Spartans "neither accepted the money nor paid any attention whatever to the requests of the Persians."<sup>580</sup> Whereas the more reliable Thucydides states that the Spartans spent part of Artaxerxes' gold, but did not invade Attica, therefore Megabazus and the rest of the gold was subsequently recalled.<sup>581</sup>

Lewis questions the notion that the money sent by Artaxerxes was intended as a bribe. He suggests that the confusion may have come about as δῶρον can refer both to a gift and a bribe.<sup>582</sup> It is likely that the money sent was to "defray expenses"<sup>583</sup> and examples of this can be found during the second Peloponnesian War and the Corinthian War. Whilst the Peloponnesian forces were operating on behalf of Persia's interests in Persian territory it was agreed that Persia would pay their expenses and wages. However, when the Peloponnesians were operating outside of Persian territory it was agreed that gold would be lent to them which would be repaid later. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that Megabazus and his embassy had travelled to Sparta not to 'bribe' the Spartans but rather to employ them and, thus, gold was provided for this.

Whether or not the Spartans accepted or used the gold is not strictly relevant, the point of note here is that Artaxerxes I thought they might. It is worth speculating why Artaxerxes had confidence in Sparta's cooperation.<sup>584</sup> Clearly, relations between Sparta and Persia had changed in the preceding 20 years. Unfortunately, the information we have concerning this period deals primarily with the relationship between Athens and Sparta, and only mentions Persia incidentally. Not only had Sparta's authority been challenged by the

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allied losses in this campaign. Also, see J. Barns, 1953, concerning Cimon's actions in Egypt in the 460s.

<sup>579</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.74.5. For the embassy to Macedon cf. p. 26 above.

<sup>580</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XI.74.

<sup>581</sup> Thucydides, I.109.

<sup>582</sup> Lewis, 1997, p. 371.

<sup>583</sup> McGregor, 1987, p. 58.

<sup>584</sup> Eddy, 1973, pp. 245.



rebuilding of Athenian fortifications,<sup>585</sup> but Athens had now gained leadership of the Hellenic League's fleet and, therefore, led all operations against the Persian Empire. Furthermore, the break-down in relations between the two powers at Ithome<sup>586</sup> and the Athenian alliance with Argos, led to the first Peloponnesian War in c.461 B.C. whilst Athens was already involved in Inaros' rebellion.

We may consider it logical that Artaxerxes would try to ally himself with the enemy of his enemy, in this case - a Persian-Spartan alliance against Athens, and Thucydides states as much.<sup>587</sup> It is possible that belated Spartan actions during the Persian invasion and their apparent initial willingness to abandon the Greek states north of the Isthmus of Corinth was remembered by Artaxerxes I. Meiggs observes a period of open hostility between Athens and Sparta prior to the 1<sup>st</sup> Peloponnesian War, noting the Athenian victory over Sparta at Oenoe on the Argive border and the Athenian capture of Halies which was later seized by Sparta.<sup>588</sup> Despite the scanty evidence for this period, we may conjecture that the lack of Spartan involvement in anti-Persian operations, their open hostility with Athens and the subsequent 1<sup>st</sup> Peloponnesian War may have been enough to persuade Artaxerxes that the Spartans would not be averse to making a deal with Persia against Athens.

Although Sparta was not quite ready to "make the leap" whereby it funded its war efforts from Persia's coffers, we may speculate that this first offer by Artaxerxes may have encouraged Sparta in the second Peloponnesian War when finance was needed. It is also certain that by this time Artaxerxes I was attempting to exploit interstate rivalries in Greece.

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<sup>585</sup> Thucydides, I.89-93 describes how Athens was able to rebuild the city's fortifications only by deceiving Sparta and the Peloponnesians. During the Persian wars, Sparta was undoubtedly the leading state of Greece - largely due to its leadership of the Peloponnesian League but also in part due to lack of credible opposition - and probably wished to continue in this position. Athens, in challenging Sparta's wishes concerning the re-fortification of the city, also challenged Sparta's authority as the leading state of Greece as a whole. See also Diodorus Siculus, XI.50, whose historicity is doubted (cf. Green, 2006, p. 1) but may reflect the general feeling in Sparta at this time.

<sup>586</sup> During the helot revolt, the Athenians were asked, along with other Spartan allies, to help in the siege at Ithome, c. 465. Thucydides, I.101-102.

<sup>587</sup> Thucydides, I.109.

<sup>588</sup> Meiggs, 1972, p. 97.

Although the Athenian defeat at the White Fort in Egypt in 454 B.C. is depicted by Thucydides as a total disaster,<sup>589</sup> Athenian actions after this suggest that the city was quick to recover from it and reassert its control over those cities and islands which had attempted to revolt from the League.<sup>590</sup> Meiggs suggests that fragments from two decrees concerning Erythrae and Miletus respectively, passed in Athens and dated to the late 450s,<sup>591</sup> indicate an attempt by Artaxerxes to expand his influence over the islands of Asia Minor, which had been previously under Persian control, in the wake of the Athenian defeat in Egypt.<sup>592</sup> ATL ii. D 10 specifically forbids Erythrae from taking back the exiled oligarchs who seem to have been responsible for the island's rebellion and who had taken refuge 'with the Mede'. The Cimonian campaign against Cyprus in 451 B.C.<sup>593</sup> indicates this island was also lost to Persia but also shows that the losses were not so crippling that Athens could not put out a fleet to successfully campaign on the island only 3-4 years later.<sup>594</sup>

#### The Peace of Callias

One result of the Athenian victories at Cyprus was the apparent cessation of hostilities between Athens and Persia, which supports the likelihood of a peace treaty between the two powers. Whether a formal peace treaty actually existed is much debated principally because it is known to us primarily from fourth century sources. However, negotiations between Athens and Persia are suggested by Herodotus in his digression regarding the loyalty of Argos to the Hellenic League and its relationship with Persia. He states that, in the 460s, "Callias, son of Hipponicus, and a number of other Athenians were in Susa on other business."<sup>595</sup> An approximate date for this is ascertainable from the accession of Artaxerxes I. Badian proposes that as Xerxes died in August 465

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<sup>589</sup> Thucydides, I. 110.

<sup>590</sup> Meiggs, 1972, pp. 112-15, notes that Miletus and Erythrae are noticeably absent from the tribute lists of 453 and 452 and reappear in 451, suggesting they did not pay tribute in 453 and 452 due to rebellion from the League but were brought back into it by 451 B.C.

<sup>591</sup> ATL ii. D 10 and ATL ii. D 11.

<sup>592</sup> Meiggs, 1972, pp. 113-117.

<sup>593</sup> Meiggs, 1972, p. 124.

<sup>594</sup> There is confusion in the sources whether the land victory occurred before that at sea or vice versa, regardless of this confusion it is apparent that there were two victories against Persian forces. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 75-76.

<sup>595</sup> Herodotus, VII.151. *Callias* in Hoffstetter, 1978, 168.

B.C.,<sup>596</sup> if we take into account the time it would take for Artaxerxes I to gain the throne and then for the Argive envoy to prepare for and make the journey to Susa, we can conjecture that the Argive embassy arrived by about the end of 464 B.C. This would place Callias and his companions at Susa during 464 B.C.

That a state of peace between Athens and Persia existed is supported by evidence of trade between Persia and Athens during the initial years of the 2nd Peloponnesian War. Thucydides states that six ships under the command of Melesander were sent by Athens to Caria and Lycia to collect tribute from those areas and “to prevent Peloponnesian privateers from using it as a base from which to attack the merchant ships sailing from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the Asiatic coast-line.”<sup>597</sup> It is unlikely much trade would have taken place during a state of war due to the risk of the ships being captured. Furthermore, How and Wells note, Herodotus, as a subject of the Athenian Empire, was able to travel freely through Persian territory. Finally, the Athenians turned to Persia for financial aid at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, indicating at least an understanding of peace between the two powers.<sup>598</sup>

Further evidence can be found in Plato’s *Menexenus*, which mentions the lack of hostility between Athens and Persia after the Athenian victories at Eurymedon and Cyprian Salamis.<sup>599</sup> Although Plato does not mention any specific treaty between Athens and Persia, he does comment that the hostility between the two powers ceased for a period. Plato does not specify when this change in relations occurred exactly, he simply says “these were the men who fought by sea at the river Eurymedon, and who went on the expedition to Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt and divers other places; ... they compelled the king in fear for himself to look to his own safety instead of plotting the destruction of Hellas.”<sup>600</sup> Plutarch<sup>601</sup> and Diodorus Siculus<sup>602</sup> claim that the Persian king looked “to his own safety” either as a result of a signed treaty or as the result of a specific Athenian action, i.e. the Athenian victory at Eurymedon,

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<sup>596</sup> Badian, 1987, p. 3. See also Kuhrt, 2010, pp. 306-307, for the date of Xerxes’ death.

<sup>597</sup> Thucydides, II.69.

<sup>598</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol. II, p. 190.

<sup>599</sup> Plato, *Menexenus*, 241e.

<sup>600</sup> Plato, *Menexenus*, 241e.

<sup>601</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, XIII.5.

<sup>602</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XII.4ff.

or the successful Cypriot campaign, (see further remarks on this below). However, Plato seems to group the two Athenian successes together, implying that it took both actions to change Persian policy towards Athens. Noteworthy in this sentence is that Plato's subjects are not only the champions at Eurymedon and Cyprus, but also Egypt and "divers other places." This suggests that the change in Persia's attitude to Athens was due not to any one specific event, but was the result of the Athenian victories cumulatively. Plato recognises that Persian policy changed from offensive to defensive, but does not give a specific date or singular event for this, which, it can be argued, is due to the lapse of time between these events and the writing of the *Menexenus*.<sup>603</sup>

Thus, we can see that a state of peace can be attested, but the more difficult question is whether a formal treaty was agreed.<sup>604</sup> It should be noted that simply because Plato did not refer to the signing of a specific treaty does not mean he was not aware of the existence of one or that one did not exist. One cannot cite silence in a source regarding a specific event as negative evidence against that event, one can only note that a particular source failed to mention it.<sup>605</sup> However, this works both ways and so we are now forced to tread carefully with our conjectures. Looking at Plato's *Menexenus* it is noteworthy that its purpose was not to recount Greek history during the fifth century, but to mock the nature of funeral orations, specifically Pericles' funeral oration. That Plato includes events from the fifth century, including information regarding a state of peace between Athens and Persia, is fortunate for us, but his historical chronology is confused in places, and perhaps deliberately so. It would appear that the events Plato included are ones which were so well known that he used them as part of an elaborate satire, which is the purpose of the *Menexenus*. The piece is deliberately ironic; Plato has Socrates include events, about which he could not possibly have known since he was dead when they took place, such as

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<sup>603</sup> The date of *Menexenus* is unknown, but Kahn, 1963, p. 229 suggests it was delivered in response to the Peace of Antalcidas and, thus, should be dated to c. 387/386 B.C.

<sup>604</sup> How and Wells, 1991, Vol.II, p. 190.

<sup>605</sup> Stockton, 1959, is vehement in his denial of a formal peace treaty. Arguing from silence, he believes that Theopompus, who denies the authenticity of the Ionic lettering of the fourth century inscription, had further arguments now lost to us. As we shall see, he also cites as negative evidence the failure to mention the peace treaty in Lysias' *Epitaphios* and Andocides' *de Pace*. However, these arguments are countered by Thompson, 1981, p. 175-177.

the formation of the second Athenian League and the King's Peace of 387/6 B.C. Furthermore, the speech was supposed to have been originally written by Aspasia, who died before even Socrates.<sup>606</sup>

Looking at other sources both Demosthenes (19.271ff) and Lycurgus (1.73) state a peace treaty was signed. Demosthenes, at lines 271 ff., states that the treaty negotiated by Callias "is in the mouths of all men," indicating that by the late 340s it was commonly believed that such a peace treaty existed formally. However, this is many years since the first mention of a stele containing the terms of a formal treaty appeared in Theopompus.<sup>607</sup> Rung, noting Plato's mention of Ppyrilampes<sup>608</sup> and Strabo's mention of Diotimus,<sup>609</sup> suggests that a number of embassies took place between Athens and Persia before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, in 432 B.C.<sup>610</sup> In my opinion, if Rung is correct, then these embassies may in some way be connected with the Peace of Callias. Details are scant, but, as will emerge later, we may be able to find a context for the embassy of Diotimus. Thus, during a period of military inactivity we can see diplomatic relations were under way. It seems most probable that Ppyrilampes accompanied Callias during the peace negotiations which resulted in the Peace of Callias.<sup>611</sup> We do not know enough of Diotimus' embassy to Persia to date it confidently. However, it seems likely he was sent to complain about Pissuthnes' involvement in the Samian revolt of the later 440s.<sup>612</sup> As the only grounds for complaint would be Pissuthnes' breaking the terms of an agreement between Athens and Persia, we may conclude the embassy of Diotimus is evidence supporting an official peace treaty between Athens and Persia. Thus, we can see not only was there an apparent state of peace or, at least military inactivity,

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<sup>606</sup> For a good discussion regarding the purpose of the *Menexenus* see Kahn, 1963.

<sup>607</sup> FrGH 115 F15(4).

<sup>608</sup> Plato, *Charmides*, 158a. Rung, 2008, p. 34 suggests there were ties of *xenia* between Ppyrilampes and the Persian kings.

<sup>609</sup> Strabo, I.3.1.

<sup>610</sup> Rung, 2008, pp. 33-34.

<sup>611</sup> Hoffstetter, 1978, No. 278. Davies, 1971, p. 330.

<sup>612</sup> Hoffstetter, 1978, No. 91. Miller, 1997, p. 110, believes that he was sent either in response to the Samian Revolt in the 440s or at the start of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. and that there is a connection between this embassy and that mentioned by Aristophanes (*Archarnians* 65-7). The possibility of a link between Diotimus and the envoy mentioned by Aristophanes is suggested by the connection of Diotimus' love of wine and the volume of wine drunk by the envoys in Aristophanes. Both Hoffstetter, 1978, and Rung, 2008, p. 34 suggest that it is unlikely that Diotimus stayed in Persia for 12 years, as joked by Aristophanes (*Archarnians* 65-7).

between Athens and Persia, but also it seems probable that this was the result of an official treaty.

### Authenticity

Turning our attention to the authenticity of the evidence for a formal peace treaty, we find Theopompus is the primary classical source which denies it, contrary to Isocrates and Plutarch. Theopompus claims that the Ionic lettering of the stele containing the decree, indicates it is a forgery.<sup>613</sup> However, Thompson provides two convincing arguments for the legitimacy of the stele.<sup>614</sup> Firstly, as the treaty was concluded between Persia and Athens and her allies, “it would be reasonable to have it inscribed in Ionic letters.” He also suggests that the stele, which Theopompus saw, was a re-inscription from the fourth century, erected after the conclusion of the Peace of Antalcidas. He suggests that the original stele may have been destroyed by the Athenians in 412 B.C. when Persia began aiding Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. We may further suggest that the original stele may perhaps have actually been destroyed at the end of the Peloponnesian War. The argument against the veracity of the treaty due to the lettering on the stele, therefore, is not a strong one and, although it is not wise to sweep it to one side completely, explanations for the Ionic lettering can be found. Although the argument against the Ionic lettering may not have been Isocrates’ only argument, as argued by Stockton,<sup>615</sup> we need to be careful speculating on this without evidence.

Additional arguments against the authenticity of the treaty rest on the lack of evidence in the fifth century, followed by the sudden wealth of it in the fourth. However, this can be explained by considerations of politics in the two centuries and the purposes of the sources which mention and omit mention of the treaty. Thucydides does not mention the treaty, but since the Peace of Callias concerns Athens and Persia and not Athens and Sparta, we should not be too

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<sup>613</sup> FrGH. 688 F15 (4).

<sup>614</sup> Thompson, 1981, p. 165.

<sup>615</sup> Stockton, 1959, p. 62.

surprised by this omission.<sup>616</sup> Likewise Herodotus does not mention the Peace, but his history ends well before 449 B.C., when, I believe, the peace was signed.<sup>617</sup> In contrast to Herodotus and Thucydides, the fourth century sources most likely were writing in response to the conclusion of the Peace of Antalcidas and, therefore, they were concerned very much with Graeco-Persian relations. Cawkwell comments that the process of creating a peace simply to shame the Peace of Antalcidas makes the idea of a fabricated treaty even less credible.<sup>618</sup> How would Athens have invented a treaty and had the supposed terms inscribed in stone without a massive outcry by sources other than Theopompus?

Of the sources which do mention the treaty, it may be surprising that Isocrates' *Panagyricus* only mentions it briefly. However, the treaty was not necessary to fulfil the purposes of his speech and also, it can be argued that if a treaty did exist, as I believe it did, it was common knowledge in the 380s and, therefore, did not need explicit mention, especially in a context where it was not the main subject of the speech. Thompson maintains that Isocrates implies that one existed and, if we are to assume a treaty between Athens and Persia is fiction, then "it almost certainly follows that Isocrates himself ... invented (it)."<sup>619</sup>

Plutarch states that the Athenian double victory at Eurymedon "so dashed the King's hopes that he agreed to the notorious peace."<sup>620</sup> Plutarch's reference to Callisthenes' supposed denial of the treaty, at XIII.5, suggests that Callisthenes was his primary source for this section of *Cimon's Life*. Plutarch states καίτοι Καλλισθένης οὐ φησὶ ταῦτα συνθέσθαι τὸν βάρβαρον, ἔργω δὲ ποιεῖν διὰ φόβον τῆς ἥττης ἐκείνης (the Persians never agreed to observe any such terms ... this was merely how they behaved in practice, because of the fear

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<sup>616</sup> Thucydides omits mention of other notable events which we know occurred so we must be cautious reading the omission of the Peace of Callias as negative evidence. See Goldstein, 1975, for a discussion on the discrepancy in manuscripts between A, B, E, F, M and G, and manuscript C for Thucydides, VIII.56.4. Where manuscript C uses *ἑαυτῶν* the other manuscripts use *ἑαυτοῦ*; the presence of *ἑαυτοῦ* could potentially indicate Thucydides' awareness of an official treaty between Athens and Persia.

<sup>617</sup> Cf. pp. 145-148.

<sup>618</sup> Cawkwell, 1997, p. 120.

<sup>619</sup> Thompson, 1981, p. 165.

<sup>620</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, XIII.5. Justin, 3.1.1-2, incorrectly claims that the Greek victories over Persia upset the Persian nobility to such an extent that they assassinated Xerxes at about the time of the Greek victory at the Eurymedon River.

which the victory of the Eurymedon had implanted in them.)<sup>621</sup> Callisthenes' argument for a *de facto* peace treaty is based on the naval pursuits of Pericles and Ephialtes. However, Bosworth notes that, since the sentence in Plutarch is a compound sentence, the translation should not read that Callisthenes "denies X and maintains Y,"<sup>622</sup> where X would be the peace treaty and Y the claim that the Persians allowed the naval expeditions of Pericles and Ephialtes through fear. Bosworth believes that Plutarch's *Cimon* XIII.5 actually means that, although Callisthenes did not mention a peace treaty, he did comment on the naval expeditions of Pericles and Ephialtes. "In other words the idiom draws attention to an omission of significant detail and reports what variant material is actually given."<sup>623</sup> Bosworth concludes that Callisthenes did not deny the existence of a peace treaty between Athens and Persia, but simply omitted mention of a peace treaty and, instead, reported the actual behaviour of the King. Thus, we can conclude that the evidence in Plutarch from Callisthenes confirms the change in relations between Persia and Athens, but no more.<sup>624</sup>

### Terms

The biggest argument used against the authenticity of a peace treaty is the apparent inconsistency in the sources giving its terms. Plutarch says that the Great King agreed "to move his forces no nearer the Aegean coast than the distance which a mounted rider can cover in a day, and to keep his warships and bronze beaked galleys out of the water bounded by the Cyanean Islands and the Chelidonian Islands."<sup>625</sup> Diodorus Siculus states that "the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian

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<sup>621</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, XIII.5.

<sup>622</sup> Bosworth, 1990, p. 2.

<sup>623</sup> Bosworth, 1990, p. 2.

<sup>624</sup> Holladay, 1986, proposes a *media via*, suggesting a cessation of hostilities as the result of the Egyptian disaster, followed closely by the recall of Cimon and the Athenian victory at Cyprian Salamis, which also resulted in the death of Cimon. He suggests that, with Persia's foreign policy defensive rather than offensive and with Athens militarily fatigued, hostilities simply ceased. He denies an official signing of a treaty between Athens and Persia and attributes the fourth century stele to Callias' descendants, who would emphasise Callias' deeds in contrast to the King's Peace of 387/6 B.C. This would suggest that, had Callias' family had inscribed a fictitious treaty. However, it is far more likely that the family had the terms of the treaty re-inscribed in the fourth century, after the destruction of the original.

<sup>625</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, XIII.5.



warship is to sail inside of Phaselis or the Cyanean Rocks.”<sup>626</sup> Blamire surmises that these two clauses, concerning the king’s army and fleet, “must have constituted the core of the agreement,”<sup>627</sup> but suggests that others may have existed, for example, such as Diodorus Siculus’ claims that “the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the King is ruler.”<sup>628</sup> It is worth noting, as Thompson does, that it appears much of the discrepancy regarding the terms of the peace treaty were “half-truths and selective presentation” as a result of the rhetorical style of our sources.<sup>629</sup>

The terms concerning limiting the king’s forces may be divided into two parts: limitations on Persian land forces, and limitations on the Persian navy. The limitations on Persian land forces, despite first appearances do not create serious problems. Diodorus Siculus’ distance of three days march for the army is roughly equivalent to Plutarch’s distance a mounted rider could travel in a day from the coast, i.e. roughly 60 miles depending on conditions. Demosthenes also states that the king’s army was not to come “within a day’s ride of the coast.”<sup>630</sup> It is likely that the exact distance was written down in official documentation and the distance given by these two sources most probably came from the fourth century stele mentioned by Theopompus. Thus, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch have recorded them in terms which an Athenian could comprehend. That Plutarch does not mention the distance travelled by foot and Diodorus Siculus does not mention the equivalent by horse is not surprising as only one form of measuring the same distance was necessary. Only if the distance by foot and horse were different, would it be worth mentioning both. Badian make the attractive suggestion that the distance would have been described originally in parasangs, so it would be natural for Greeks to interpret the distance in a way that would make sense to them.<sup>631</sup>

Isocrates states that, after the Athenian victory at Eurymedon, the Persian

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<sup>626</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XII.4.4.

<sup>627</sup> Blamire, 1989, p. 146.

<sup>628</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XII.4.4, cf. pp. 144-145 for further discussion.

<sup>629</sup> Thompson, 1981, p. 164.

<sup>630</sup> Demosthenes, XIX. 273.

<sup>631</sup> Badian, 1987, p. 34.

army was not allowed to march across the Halys River,<sup>632</sup> the modern Kizilirmak in eastern Turkey. Although this limit is not impossible, I would think it would be highly improbable that Artaxerxes would agree not to send any army across a place which is over one thousand kilometres from the coast of Asia Minor. Badian suggests that the limit of the Halys was imposed on the Royal Army, rather than on any general armed forces. This would be a reasonable interpretation of this clause since the Royal Army was not the same as the personal army of the satraps of Asia Minor. He suggests that “the purpose of this clause must have been to ensure that there would be no preparations for an invasion of Europe: historically, that was the only purpose for which a royal army had ever appeared in Asia Minor ... and the only conceivable purpose for which one would be needed.”<sup>633</sup>

The discrepancy of the limitations for the Persian fleet is also not too difficult to explain. The Cyanean rocks or islands, mentioned in Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch, according to Aelius Aristides are in the entrance to the Black Sea.<sup>634</sup> The Chelidonian Islands, also mentioned in Plutarch, are seemingly the peninsula off the south east coast of Lycia, near modern day Kumluca in Turkey. Diodorus Siculus does not mention the Chelidonian Islands, but states that the Persian navy was not “to sail inside of Phaselis” which we may assume is the city only a few miles north of the Chelidonian Islands along the Lycian coast. Isocrates also mentions Phaselis as a point beyond which the Persians were forbidden to sail.<sup>635</sup> So we can see that the Persian navy was forbidden to sail out of the Black Sea, beyond Byzantium, and also it was forbidden to sail beyond the satrapy of Lycia.

Diodorus Siculus mentions two additional terms, which are not found in the other sources. Firstly, that “all the Greek cities are to live under laws of their own making.”<sup>636</sup> We know that Diodorus Siculus used Ephorus for this section

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<sup>632</sup> Isocrates, XII.59. Nearly identical information is given in VI.117-118 and XII.59.

<sup>633</sup> Badian, 1987, p. 35.

<sup>634</sup> Aelius Aristides, XIII.153.

<sup>635</sup> Isocrates, XII.59.

<sup>636</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XII.4.4.

in his history and the mention of an autonomy clause for the Asiatic Greeks is present in this account and that given by Lycurgus only.<sup>637</sup> Thompson notes that these two accounts are the latest accounts chronologically and the presence of an autonomy clause in these two accounts alone is significant. It is worth bearing in mind that Diodorus Siculus was writing in the first century B.C. and not the fourth century B.C. The lapse of time between the sources may have allowed for romantic embellishment of the terms. Thus, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that, since Diodorus Siculus was consulting sources, which themselves were only mentioning the treaty in contrast to the King's Peace, the addition of an autonomy clause as an embellishment is not impossible. The fourth century sources declare the Spartan abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, so it would be appropriate for a contrast in the Peace of Callias, where the Great King gave the Asiatic Greeks autonomy. I disagree with Thompson's suggestion that the silence of this clause in other fourth century sources is due to its lack of rhetorical place, since this clause would have made a perfect contrast to the King's Peace.<sup>638</sup> It is unknown whether the Ionian Greeks were allowed political autonomy by Persia at this time, however, I would suggest not, or, at least, not at the behest of Athens since the Athenian League did not have a significant enough claim to them at this time and were not in a position to negotiate more than the security of mainland Greece.

Diodorus Siculus also mentions a reciprocal term that the Athenians would not attack the Persian Empire if the king kept to the terms. For our fourth century sources it would not be necessarily pertinent to their aims to mention every term of the peace treaty, only those pertaining to their arguments and so we should not necessarily be surprised to find this clause not mentioned. Green suggests this final clause explains the Athenian "withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean ... and the final abandonment of Kimonian policy."<sup>639</sup> Although all the evidence for the peace treaty has a pro-Athenian bias to it, we should not forget that of the two powers the Persian Empire was mightier. Artaxerxes I

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<sup>637</sup> Lycurgus, I.73.

<sup>638</sup> Thompson, 1981, p. 173.

<sup>639</sup> Green, 2006, p. 184.

would expect concessions from Athens if he was to agree to limit the movements of his armies and navy.

### Dating

The final cause of doubt for a peace treaty is the discrepancy in the sources concerning the dating of the treaty. Plutarch places the treaty immediately after Cimon's defeat of Persian forces at Eurymedon in 466 B.C.<sup>640</sup> However, Diodorus Siculus (XII.4) places it as a consequence of Cimon's last expedition to Cyprus in 450-449 B.C. Blamire suggests this discrepancy is due to their different sources.<sup>641</sup> It is commonly accepted that Diodorus Siculus' account of the fifth century followed that of Ephorus and so, Blamire believes, Plutarch's dating "may have derived from a misunderstanding of Kallisthenes."<sup>642</sup>

Evidence against Plutarch's date can be found when we consider that rather than ceasing military operations after Eurymedon, as one would expect from a peace treaty, the Greeks and Persians simply moved the theatre of war from the coast of Asia Minor to Egypt and Cyprus. We learn from Diodorus Siculus that Athenian involvement in Egypt only stopped when they were defeated at the White Fort in 461 B.C. Had there been a peace treaty between Athens and Persia, we would expect Artaxerxes to complain to Athens directly about her behaviour rather than send Megabazus to Sparta in an attempt to distract Athens.<sup>643</sup> Also, during this time Pericles and Ephialtes conducted their naval sweeps along the coast of Asia Minor which Meiggs dates to c. 462- 461 B.C.<sup>644</sup> Badian's argument that these naval sweeps beyond the Chelidonian Islands is evidence of their political opposition to Cimon's foreign policy concerning Persia is surely correct.<sup>645</sup> As there is no evidence in our sources that there was a boundary beyond which the Greek fleet could not cross, we cannot take this as evidence that a term concerning a boundary was broken when the

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<sup>640</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon* XIII.5. I accept the date in Meiggs, 1972, p. 81, for the Greek victory at the Eurymedon River.

<sup>641</sup> Blamire, 1989, p. 144.

<sup>642</sup> *Ibid*, p. 144.

<sup>643</sup> Cf. p. 223, for a discussion concerning Chabrias, who was recalled from Egypt at Persia's behest in the fourth century.

<sup>644</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, XIII.4. Meiggs, 1972, p. 79.

<sup>645</sup> Badian, 1987, p. 9.

Greek fleets of Pericles and Ephialtes crossed it. Rather than suggesting that a peace treaty signed in the 460s had been broken by this time, or was broken by these specific actions, or indeed not broken because these actions did not break a specific term, it would be more logical for us to assume that a peace treaty had not been signed by then. The most we can say is that both Pericles and Ephialtes sailed along the coast of Asia Minor and there is no known Persian retaliation for these actions.<sup>646</sup> Finally, we find evidence of Athenian Persian fighting over the Aegean islands, Cyprus and Egypt from 452 B.C. and 449 B.C.<sup>647</sup> The continued fighting contradicts Plutarch's statement that peace was concluded as a result of the Athenians' victory at Eurymedon, unless it was broken immediately.

The evidence in Herodotus of an Athenian embassy at Susa in the 460s does not necessarily mean that an official peace treaty was concluded at that time. If an official peace treaty had been concluded during this embassy, we would expect Herodotus to say so at this point. However, as we have seen, we would not expect to hear of a treaty signed in 449 B.C. as it was in a period after which Herodotus was writing. Badian reminds us that the omission in Herodotus should not be taken as negative evidence and claims that "Herodotus is in any case deliberately suppressing what the Athenian embassy was doing."<sup>648</sup> Much can be made of the ambiguous language in Herodotus when he describes Callias as being in Susa "on other business." However, whilst Callias was in Persia Athens was still in an alliance with Sparta against Persia, and did not repudiate this alliance until 462 B.C. after the Athenian dismissal from Ithome in 464 B.C.<sup>649</sup> Thus, we can see that Callias may have opened talks with Persia in the 460s but no treaty was actually agreed at this point and a later date is, thus,

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<sup>646</sup> Burn, 1984, p. 276, who notes the comments of Corinth to Athens in Thucydides, I.40.4, concerning the Athenians alliance with Corcyra against Corinth. Burn notes that the apparent implication is that unless there was a treaty preventing it, the Greeks assumed that war was the natural state of affairs between states. We can suggest this was also true regarding the Persian Empire.

<sup>647</sup> It is worth noting that the Athenian campaign for Cyprus between 452 B.C. and 449 B.C. was because the Persians seem to have reclaimed it after Pausanias captured the island in the 470s. Unz, 1986, suggests that Thucydides, rather than depicting events in a strictly chronological order, had a tendency to jump ahead to the conclusion of campaigns such as Egypt. His reconstruction of the chronology of the Pentecontaetia suggests that a Peace was concluded in 451 B.C. rather than 449 B.C.

<sup>648</sup> Badian, 1987, p. 7.

<sup>649</sup> Cawkwell, 1997, p. 115.

preferred.

Although there are inconsistencies concerning the Peace of Callias I do not believe they are enough to deny its existence. Diodorus Siculus, who gives the most information regarding the peace treaty, is known for his historical inaccuracy when dating events, but he is not credited with creating events from fiction. The silences in Thucydides and Herodotus are not enough evidence to deny the existence of a peace treaty. The mention of an Athenian embassy in Susa in the 460s may be taken only as evidence that there were overtures for peace by the Athenians during this time. Further speculation would be putting words into Herodotus' mouth to suit our own theories. The events during this period lend support to the theory of an official peace treaty signed in 449 B.C., after the Athenian victories in Cyprus. The military activity in Cyprus and Egypt prior to 449 B.C. indicates that the war between Athens and Persia so far as we can tell was simply moved there from the Ionian coast: it had not stopped during this time.

The contradictory terms presented by our sources may not be so, after all, but were simply attempts to interpret the terms in ways that fellow Greeks could understand. Thus, these apparent contradictions should not be taken to discredit the treaty's authenticity. Badian explains that "the Peace of Callias must be assumed to have been made, not because the contracting parties had come to love one another and wanted to be friendly, but because they had fought each other to a standstill and had come to think that there was more to be lost than gained by the continued fighting."<sup>650</sup> It is therefore natural to conclude that a peace treaty was signed in 449/8 B.C., in order that both sides could consolidate what they possessed at that time.

The Peace of Callias is important not only because it is seemingly the first time that Persia negotiated with a Greek state, rather than simply issuing demands, but also because of the wider implications concerning Greek foreign policy. Similar to Persian backing of a Greek state in the fourth century, the Peace of Callias was Persian recognition of Athens' hegemony over Greek foreign

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<sup>650</sup> Badian, 1987, p. 22.

affairs in the Aegean which, consequently, prevented Sparta from participating in them for the foreseeable future. Of the other Greek states, none were affected more than Sparta, who became victims of their own conservatism and others, such as Corinth, Thebes and Argos, seem to have been indifferent. Significantly for the Greeks, the Peace of Callias concluded Persian attempts to invade mainland Greece.

#### Pissuthnes and Samos

Despite the Peace of Callias, by the late 440s Pissuthnes, satrap of Lydia, had become involved in the hostilities between Samos and Athens.<sup>651</sup> Civil unrest on Samos occurred during the 440s, after Athens had intervened in the Samian dispute with Miletus and established a democracy on the island. Those Samians opposed to the new democracy requested aid from Pissuthnes against Pericles, who had been sent from Athens to put down the unrest. Pissuthnes sent men to Samos to help them retrieve the hostages from Lemnos and to support the Samian attempt to secede from the Athenian Empire.<sup>652</sup> After their initial victory over the Athenian forces left on the island by Pericles, the Samians were decisively defeated in a naval battle when he returned and Samos, itself, was besieged. The Samians subsequently lost the siege, in the ninth month, their walls were removed and the island was fined.<sup>653</sup>

Of interest to this study is the involvement of Pissuthnes and rumour of the Phoenician triremes sent to Samos, which Pericles was forced to intercept after his second victory there. The involvement of Pissuthnes indicates a friendly relationship existed between Samos and the satrap at this time. Diodorus Siculus gives us further details of the episode, but the basic facts are the same as in Plutarch and Thucydides.<sup>654</sup> In all three accounts we find evidence that Samos requested the aid of Pissuthnes, who not only responded positively but also proactively. Clearly, despite the Peace of Callias, Pissuthnes was willing to

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<sup>651</sup> Thucydides, I.116, Diodorus, XII.27, Plutarch, *Pericles* XXV.

<sup>652</sup> Ibid. Although Thucydides does not explicitly say that Pissuthnes provided the 700 mercenaries for the Samians, it is likely that this was the case. The Samians would have been unable to recruit mercenaries from Pissuthnes' territory without his permission.

<sup>653</sup> A good discussion of the rebellion of Samos can be found in Meiggs, 1972, pp. 188-192.

<sup>654</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XII. 27.

intervene against Athens when invited. We might conjecture that Persia was beginning to adopt a new foreign policy with a view to regaining control of the islands along the Ionian coast. However, despite Pissuthnes' initial involvement in the Samian rebellion, it is noteworthy that none of the sources state that the Phoenician fleet actually appeared. Had it appeared, this demonstration of force by Persia would break the terms of the Peace of Callias and would begin an official renewal of hostilities between Greece and Persia. It was one thing to send some mercenaries to a rebellious island when requested and during a period when Athens was trying to reassert its control of its Empire in the wake of its defeat in Egypt. However, it was another to send the royal fleet to attack the Athenian fleet putting down the same rebellion. We could conjecture that in the time since the Peace of Callias was agreed Persia had become sufficiently secure to begin attempting to expand its influence in the Aegean, but only opportunistically and covertly.<sup>655</sup> However, we should be mindful that these actions may also have been those of a rogue satrap. That Pericles took the threat of the arrival of the Phoenician fleet seriously confirms that Athens was aware and wary of such attempts by Persia.

Marsh and Lateiner, discussing Tissaphernes' relationship with the Phoenician fleet at Thucydides, VIII.81, believe that the Phoenician fleet usually was mobilised at the instigation of the Great King, not at the whim of a satrap.<sup>656</sup> In light of this, we may suggest that Pissuthnes' support of Samos was not an official directive from Artaxerxes I. S.K. Eddy thinks that Pissuthnes may have covertly supported a number of the states which failed to pay tribute in the years 440-438.<sup>657</sup> Therefore, although it is unlikely that Artaxerxes I ordered Pissuthnes' support of Samos and despite the embassy of Diotimus,<sup>658</sup> it is likely that Pissuthnes did receive sanction retrospectively.

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<sup>655</sup> Cf. Eddy, 1973, p. 245.

<sup>656</sup> Marsh, 1932, p. 19. Lateiner, 1976, p. 287. Cf. p. 196.

<sup>657</sup> Eddy, 1973, pp. 251-252.

<sup>658</sup> As mentioned above, p. 148, the involvement of Pissuthnes in the Samian revolt and the rumours that the Phoenician fleet may also have become involved, may have been the cause for Diotimus' embassy to Persia. It is worth remembering that Athenian prisoners captured by the Samians during the revolt were given over to Pissuthnes and so it is likely that their release was also on Diotimus' agenda.



On the other hand, Pissuthnes' revolt from Darius II in the 420s suggests that he may have started to act independently as early as the 440s and that over the course of the intervening twenty years he grew accustomed to this independence.<sup>659</sup> Certainly, we do not hear of reprisals for his actions which were seemingly contrary to the supposed interests of Artaxerxes I, i.e. support of Samos' rebellion which directly contravened the terms of the Peace of Callias. Overall, the actions do not seem to have been considered a serious breach of the Peace and may possibly have been unauthorised.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

Reviewing the Graeco-Persian relations for the period known as the Pentecontaetia, we can suggest that there may have been much more contact between Greece and Persia than is mentioned by Thucydides and it is possible to divide this period into two parts. The first, during which time the Delian League was formed and Pausanias and Themistocles were accused of medism, indicates a period of mistrust of Persia based on the belief that Xerxes and Artaxerxes were still intent on invading Greece. It may be suggested that had the Greeks believed that Persia was no longer a threat they would not have taken steps to forestall it, nor would the Delian League have been so active.

The supposed evidence of Pausanias' medism suggests a Spartan "cover up" for his actions: whatever they were, they were clearly an embarrassment to Sparta. After the grumblings of the Hellenic League fleet about Spartan leadership and the Athenian use of accusations of medism prior to the Persian invasion as a political weapon, it is not surprising that such accusations were used against Pausanias. The accusation of medism against Themistocles seems to have been in retaliation for those against Pausanias and Themistocles' actions, like those of Demaratus, suggest that he medised reactively rather than proactively.

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<sup>659</sup> Ctesias FrGH 688 F14 (53), related the rebellion of Pissuthnes, which he says happened shortly after Darius II took the throne. I agree with the general consensus that, although Ctesias is unreliable, the general basic facts of rebellion are to be believed. We may conjecture that by the 420s Pissuthnes had grown accustomed to acting on his own initiative under Artaxerxes I and this may have been a contributing factor to his revolt. Cf. p. 155, for Ionian and Lesbian claims of support from Pissuthnes in 427 B.C.

Notable of this period is the seeming Persian lack of aggression in contrast to the Delian League's overt aggression. The Delian League attacked points on the coast of Asia Minor and Persia responded reactively. Unlike Darius' reaction to the Ionian Revolt, Xerxes and Artaxerxes did not try to retaliate until the mid-460s when they mustered the Phoenician fleet and Persian army which was defeated at Eurymedon. I suggest that during the period prior to Eurymedon Xerxes and Artaxerxes may have been dealing with other, more important issues in the Persian Empire, although we cannot be certain of this due to lack of sources. It is easy to forget that the Persian Empire was vast and that Persian kings would need to prioritise their actions. The victories of the Delian League seem to have been limited and focused primarily on Byzantium, the Ionian Islands and Cyprus. Moreover, we know of Persians such as Mascames of Doriskos who held out against the Greeks.<sup>660</sup> Furthermore, we know that despite Pausanias' capture of Cyprus in the early 470s, the Delian League campaigned against the island again in the 460s and then again in the 450s – clearly the Greeks were unable to hold Cyprus for very long.<sup>661</sup> I believe that Xerxes and Artaxerxes were happy to leave their satraps of Asia Minor to deal with the Greeks whilst they themselves may have been preoccupied with other matters, and planned to retaliate fully when Cimon destroyed these forces which were still mustering at Eurymedon.

The second part of the Pentecontaetia is prefaced by the Persian attempt to employ Sparta against Athens during the Egyptian rebellion of the 460s and to involve them, once again, in international relations. We can see that during the preceding years Sparta had reverted to its traditional policy of isolationism. The embassy of Megabazus indicates that Artaxerxes was fully aware of Greek politics and the dispute between Athens and Sparta, and that he was prepared to exploit this situation to his own gain, employing the traditional Persian policy of dividing and conquering his enemies; a situation which was to be repeated during the final years of the Peloponnesian War. We can also see that mistrust of

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<sup>660</sup> Thucydides, I.94.

<sup>661</sup> For the campaigns against Cyprus in the 470s Thucydides, I. 94; in the 460s, Thucydides, I. 104; in the 450s Thucydides, I. 112.

Persia and mistrust of any treaties with Persia was strong enough at this time to prevent Sparta from acting in Persia's interests by invading Athens, whether or not they accepted the gold, which, as we have seen, should probably not be interpreted as a bribe.

The Peace of Callias significantly changed the relationship between Athens and Persia, allowing both powers to consolidate their territories without the threat of intervention by the other. The treaty suggests that Athens' involvement in Egypt had overstretched her resources. It also suggests that whilst Artaxerxes had managed to reassert Persian might and had regained control of Egypt, he required assurances that Athens would not try to interfere there again whilst conceding Athenian victories at Cyprus and Eurymedon, and giving assurances not to mobilise the royal fleet beyond these places. That the two sides had, effectively, fought themselves to a "stalemate" is apparent, but, as argued above, it is unlikely that this situation was not ratified by a peace treaty in 449 B.C. which allowed both powers to turn their attention to other matters. On the narrower view, it also confirmed Athenian hegemony over Greek international affairs, excluding Sparta from them. Despite Pissuthnes' support of the anti-democratic Samians in the 440s, which may or may not have had the tacit approval of Artaxerxes I, the treaty does not seem to have been deemed broken by the Athenians, although a complaint does seem to have been lodged by Diotimus. On the broader view, it brought to a close a period when Greece feared further Persian invasions.

## Chapter 5: The Peloponnesian War

We have seen in the previous chapter how, during the first Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, Persia had started to become involved in Greek inter-state politics.<sup>662</sup> The Persian attitude to Greece seems to have led to a closer relationship between the two peoples which was prompted by the demands of Greek internal wars. We noted above that prior to the Peace of Callias, Persia attempted to woo Sparta to support her cause against Athens and yet, despite Spartan attempts, we will see that it took a further twenty years after the outbreak of war for a Spartan-Persian treaty to be made. The following chapter will look at how both Athens and Sparta vied for Persian support during the second Peloponnesian War and how Persia exploited this situation to her own benefit to secure her own borders, to reclaim the Ionian Greeks and to weaken any Greek threat by employing them against each other; in essence to reverse many of the concessions made in the Peace of Callias. Inevitably much of the focus will be on the actual actions of Athens and Sparta, which willingly drew Persia into their quarrels.

### Greek Overtures to Persia

Thucydides informs us that, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War of 432 B.C., the Spartans and Athenians planned to send to Persia for alliances.<sup>663</sup> Thucydides does not state explicitly at this point whether embassies actually left for Persia, but clearly by this time such an alliance was a viable option for both the Athenians and the Spartans. We are informed that Sparta also contacted her allies in Sicily and Italy, and 200 triremes were sent to help the Spartan effort.<sup>664</sup> From this we can deduce that, since a successful embassy went to Sicily and Italy, an embassy was likely also sent to Persia. We hear nothing further from Thucydides of this embassy implying that either it was unsuccessful or it was delayed. Hornblower also notes the relationship in the text here to the intent

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<sup>662</sup> Cf. pp. 132-135 above, for Persia's attempt to employ Sparta when Athens was supporting Egypt's rebellion.

<sup>663</sup> Thucydides, II.7. c. 431 B.C. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 243, notes the use of *ἐκάτεροι* in Thucydides is evidence that both parties had decided to look to Persia for support.

<sup>664</sup> Diodorus Siculus also notes this at XII.41.1.

expressed earlier at I.82, when at the start of the war Archidamus of Sparta quite openly declared his desire for Persian funding for the Spartan war effort.<sup>665</sup> From this it is apparent that Sparta recognised the need to engage, once again, in international relations with Persia in order to gain the necessary finances required for war. It would have been natural for Athens to have looked to Persia at this time given their relationship as a result of the Peace of Callias.

The trail of these embassies may be picked up during the following summer of 430 B.C., after the failed Spartan siege of Zakyntos.<sup>666</sup> Thucydides informs us of a Peloponnesian embassy which had stopped in Thrace en route to Persia and attempted to persuade Sitalces, the son of Teres, to abandon his alliance with Athens and to send aid to relieve Potidaea, which the Athenians were besieging.<sup>667</sup> Thucydides also states that they wanted his help in getting across the Hellespont to meet Pharnaces, son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to the King. When the Spartan embassy arrived in Thrace, Thucydides says that Sitalces was already hosting the Athenian envoys, "Learchus, son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon."<sup>668</sup> Learchus and Ameiniades persuaded Sitalces' son, Sadocus, to hand over the Peloponnesians to them who were taken to Athens and who were executed without trial.<sup>669</sup> The ruthlessness of this violation of the sanctity of ambassadors indicates the extent of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta for Persian support.

From this incident we can see that both the Peloponnesians and the Athenians were looking to increase the number of their allies as part of their preparations for the war. It is worth noting that Thucydides states that both Sparta and Athens looked not only to Persia for support, but to "any other foreign power" too.<sup>670</sup> We find evidence of this in the alliance made between Perdiccas of Macedon and Athens, and the Athenian appointment of

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<sup>665</sup> ἄλλοσε πρὸς τοὺς Βαρβάρους. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 243.

<sup>666</sup> Thucydides, II.67.

<sup>667</sup> We first hear of this story incidentally in Herodotus, VII.137 who concentrates on the connection with the fathers of Aneristus and Nicolaus.

<sup>668</sup> Thucydides, II.67.

<sup>669</sup> Gomme, 1962, pp. 200-1, agrees with Marchant, that it may have been on the orders of Cleon, rather than Pericles, that the Peloponnesian ambassadors were executed. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 351, does not comment regarding whose orders the Athenians were following, but does note that Thucydides' language indicates his indignation at the treatment of the Peloponnesian envoys despite Athenian justification.

<sup>670</sup> Thucydides, II.7.

Nymphodorus from Abdera to be their proxenos.<sup>671</sup> It is plausible that it was for these negotiations that Learchus and Ameiniades were in Thrace when they captured the Peloponnesian embassy. As noted above, the embassies sent by Sparta and Athens, mentioned by Thucydides at II.67, may in fact be the embassies which were being planned at II.7. If this is correct, it may help explain why an official treaty between Persia and the Peloponnesians was not established until 412/411 B.C. Clearly, since Thrace and Macedon were Athenian allies at this time, and in control of the Hellespont, both states were able to intercept any Spartan envoys to Persia which journeyed via that route.

Interestingly we hear nothing further from Thucydides regarding any possible embassy to Persia from Athens despite his earlier claims. However, it is possible that the embassy involving Diotimus took place at this time.<sup>672</sup> We may conjecture that perhaps Learchus and Ameiniades were tasked with securing an alliance with Thrace and Macedon prior to securing an alliance with Persia after these objectives had been achieved.<sup>673</sup> Thucydides states that both Athens and Sparta had decided to make alliances with Persia and we have seen that Sparta had already secured alliances and ships from Italy and Sicily. It can be suggested that whilst Sparta was looking west to its allies in the Mediterranean, Athens was looking north-east to its allies in the Hellespont, thus we can see that alliances with Persia were part of a larger picture for both the Athenians and the Spartans.

#### Pissuthnes' further involvement with Ionian Greeks

In 427 B.C., after the failed revolt of Mytilene, we find Pissuthnes involved again in Ionian Greek affairs. We learn that some of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians in the Spartan fleet, which had been sent to help Mytilene, suggested seizing some of the cities in Ionia in an attempt to cut off the Athenians from their Ionian resources. As part of their arguments to persuade the Spartan commander Alcidas the Ionians and Lesbians claimed that "they

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<sup>671</sup> Thucydides, II.29. Previously Athens had considered Nymphodorus an enemy, but in 431 B.C. in order to gain favour with Teres, the king of Thrace, Athens made Nymphodorus, Teres' brother-in-law, their proxenos and secured an alliance with Thrace. Sadocus, the grandson of Teres, was also made an Athenian citizen and later Thracians supported Athenian forces active in Thrace.

<sup>672</sup> Cf. p. 138.

<sup>673</sup> It should be borne in mind that the Peace of Callias was not a military alliance but more a non-aggression pact between Athens and Persian.

thought they could persuade Pissuthnes to come in on their side.”<sup>674</sup> Their arguments failed to persuade Alcidas, but it is worth noting that the Lesbians and Ionians felt that they would be able to persuade Pissuthnes to help against the Athenians. Presumably they would argue to Pissuthnes that, by helping Sparta to cut off Athenian access to her Ionian resources, he would be able to take control of the Ionian cities himself and therefore re-establish Persian control of that territory. We have already discussed Pissuthnes’ involvement in the Samian-Athenian hostilities above, so we can argue that the Ionians and Lesbians knew Pissuthnes may be willing to intervene should they approach him.<sup>675</sup> It is clear that they also believed Sparta would not be averse to an alliance with him.

Despite Alcidas’ declining the advice to involve Pissuthnes, we find evidence Pissuthnes’ involvement with the political stasis in Notium.<sup>676</sup> Thucydides describes how Notium was divided along the lines of anti-Persian and pro-Persian sympathies. The pro-Persian sympathisers had called in Arcadian and other foreign mercenaries from Pissuthnes, quartered them within, and effectively taken over, the city. The anti-Persian sympathisers had fled the city and called on the aid of Paches, the Athenian general, who then retook the city after capturing the general of the Arcadian mercenaries.

We find here another instance of factional opportunism within a Greek, this time Ionian, city. As with Samos, a specific faction within the city had turned to Persia for help in securing their control of the city. It is unsurprising that an Ionian city would do this since potential Persian help was closer and easier to obtain than for a Greek island. On Samos the factional conflict was divided along the lines of pro- and anti-democracy, whereas for Notium it appears to have been pro- and anti-Persian divisions. However, if we consider that Athens installed democracies in many allied cities, we may speculate that the pro-Athenian faction was likely also pro-democracy and the pro-Persian faction likely was pro-oligarchy. Thus we can see that the two situations are similar. Importantly the situation also demonstrates Pissuthnes’, and therefore

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<sup>674</sup> Thucydides, III.31.

<sup>675</sup> Thucydides, I.116. Cf. pp. 155-157.

<sup>676</sup> Thucydides, III.32.

Persia's, attempts to remove Athenian control from what he undoubtedly considered Persian territory.

Although we have confirmed evidence of Pissuthnes' involvement only with Samos and Notium, since Mytilene suggested asking him for assistance, we may suggest that the Mytilenians also considered Pissuthnes a viable option as an alternative to Athenian dominance. If we consider the distance between these three locations we can see that potentially a large section of the Ionian coast may have felt the same in turning to Persia for assistance against Athens. Despite the conclusion of the Peace of Callias of 449 B.C., Pissuthnes clearly did not see any problems helping the Ionian Greeks opportunistically. Either he did not view it as contravening the treaty or he did not care that it did whilst Athens was preoccupied dealing with Sparta. We do not know what official sanction Pissuthnes received for his involvement with the Ionian Greeks and we may suggest possibly he neither sought nor gained official backing for his actions, given that he was later executed for rebelling from Artaxerxes.<sup>677</sup> Thus, we cannot say for certain if Pissuthnes was acting with the permission of Artaxerxes or simply consolidating a base from which he could later rebel.

#### The capture of Artaphernes

In the winter of 425 B.C., after the capture of Anactorium, Aristides, son of Archippus, captured Artaphernes, obtaining the messages he carried back to Artaxerxes from Sparta.<sup>678</sup> The Athenians learned that Sparta had been trying to make an alliance with Artaxerxes but, as the "many ambassadors" had given him different messages, Artaxerxes requested "some delegates" with definite proposals.<sup>679</sup> Although Thucydides says that the Athenians were shocked at this news, it is more probable that they were shocked the Spartans had managed to get so far in negotiations with Persia, rather than shocked that the Spartans were trying to make a treaty with Persia at all, since they knew from the capture of

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<sup>677</sup> Ctesias FRG688 F15 (53).

<sup>678</sup> Thucydides, IV.50.

<sup>679</sup> Thucydides, IV.50. Hornblower, 2011, p. 127 & 1996, p. 207, argues that the Persian documents were not translated from Assyrian as mentioned in Thucydides IV.50 or Old Persian Cuneiform supposed by Gomme, 1962, Vol. III, p. 498, but Aramaic.



Callimachus and Ameiniades that Sparta had been trying to secure an alliance before now.

Sparta had been in talks with Persia in order to obtain money to build up the Spartan fleet or to obtain the use of the Phoenician fleet. Hornblower suggests that, although it might simply indicate indecisiveness in Spartan foreign policy, this claim by Artaxerxes I may have been a diplomatic ploy to make clear to the Spartans that, if they wanted Persian financial backing, “they must make clear that they had no territorial claims in Asia Minor.”<sup>680</sup> This seems plausible given the subsequent treaty of 412/411 B.C. between Persia and Sparta.<sup>681</sup> The Athenians reacted to this event by sending Artaphernes back to Ephesus with some of their own delegates but, on learning of Artaxerxes’ death in 424 B.C., the Athenian delegates returned to Athens having achieved nothing.

#### Delos and Pharnaces

Persian intentions toward the Greek islands can be seen again when in 426/425 B.C. the Athenians expelled the inhabitants of Delos from the island in order to cleanse it; interestingly the Delians were re-homed by Pharnaces in the town of Atramyttium in Asia.<sup>682</sup> This re-homing of the Delians by Pharnaces might indicate an established relationship between Delos and Pharnaces prior to the Delian expulsion by Athens. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that Persia clearly still had a reputation for taking in refugees. After their expulsion, we can conjecture that the Delians turned to Pharnaces for help and were given Atramyttium. Diodorus Siculus states that it was due to Athenian suspicions of a Delian-Spartan alliance that they were displaced.<sup>683</sup>

As noted by both Hornblower and Andrewes, this episode falls in the middle of a 10-year gap in Thucydides regarding relations between the Greek states and Persia, which Andrewes suggests would have been corrected with subsequent revision.<sup>684</sup> We are told later that the Delians, who were re-homed in Atramyttium, were mistrusted by the Persians and we learn of their ill treatment

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<sup>680</sup> Hornblower, 1991, Vol. II, p. 207.

<sup>681</sup> Cf. pp. 161-166, 179-184.

<sup>682</sup> Thucydides, V.1, Diodorus Siculus, XII.73.1. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. II, pp. 421-424.

<sup>683</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XII.73.1.

<sup>684</sup> Andrewes, 1961, pp. 1-18. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. II, p. 423.

at the hands of Arsaces, hyparch of Tissaphernes.<sup>685</sup> We can suggest that the Delians applied to Pharnaces due to enmity towards Athens, in the same way that Notium, Samos and, perhaps, Mytilene did. That Pharnaces gave them Atramyttium may indicate a policy by Artaxerxes that in order to coax the Ionian cities and islands back to the Persian Empire the satraps of the Ionian coast were to help in any way that they could, thus generating good will. Of course, the notion may also simply have occurred to the satraps themselves without the need of an official royal edict. The unfortunate treatment of the Delians by Arsaces should not detract from the fact that they were given Atramyttium. Interestingly, the Athenian re-homing of the Delians back to Delos mentioned by Thucydides V.32<sup>686</sup> is ascribed to both religious and emotional reasons. Thucydides states that the Athenians “brought back the Delians to Delos, moved by her misfortunes in the field and by the commands of the god at Delphi.” Whilst we recognise the high esteem in which the Athenians held the Pythia at Delphi, we may also think that the Athenians may have finally recognised that, with the medism of the Delians, Notium, Samos, and, perhaps, Mytilene, discontented Greeks were turning to Persia and, in this way, Athens was rapidly losing control of her empire. Another consideration is that, of the islands that had turned to Persia for support Delos was not on the coast of Ionia but considerably further west. We may conjecture that, Athens may have thought that, had they not returned Delos to the islanders, there would have been a good reason for Persia to support their eventual return and this would have spread Persian power worryingly close to the Greek mainland and may have provided a good opportunity for Persia to strike at Greece again.

#### Peace of Epilycus 423 B.C.

It is worth briefly discussing Andocides' claims that, in c.423 B.C., the Athenians concluded a treaty with Persia as the result of an embassy led by his uncle, Epilycus.<sup>687</sup> Andocides appears to be the only literary evidence for this

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<sup>685</sup> Thucydides, VIII.108. The Delians were invited to dinner by Arsaces and then killed by his men.

<sup>686</sup> Presumably the Delians brought back to Delos by Athens at Thucydides V.32.1 were the survivors of the massacre at the hands of Arsaces.

<sup>687</sup> Andocides, III.29.

treaty and unfortunately even his supporters warrant that he “is never a reliable historical witness.”<sup>688</sup> The only other potential piece of evidence to support this embassy is the so called Heracleides decree<sup>689</sup>, which honours his co-operation with ambassadors in peace negotiations.

Harris’ recent analysis of the Heracleides decree inscription concludes, however, that it is likely it does not refer to a peace treaty between Athens and Persia at all. Harris believes that, with the use of ἠκῶν rather than πεμφθέντας, the Heracleides decree refers to foreign envoys coming from an unknown foreign king, rather than Athenian envoys returning from the Great King.<sup>690</sup> Harris argues that the Ionic script suggests the inscription had been made after 403 B.C., but there is no certainty concerning the date of this peace itself. The date is assumed on the belief that the Heracleides mentioned is Heracleides of Clazomenai, but this is an assumption and is not supported by the inscription itself. Furthermore, Andocides does not mention any terms to the peace, which Epilycus had helped to conclude. Thus, we are left with the possibility that the Peace of Epilycus mentioned in Andocides may not have existed. On the other hand, Blamire, citing Wade-Gery, believes that a peace treaty between Athens and Persia is confirmed by this stele, and suggest that, if a peace treaty between Athens and Persia was concluded at this time, then the previous Peace of Callias could not have existed.<sup>691</sup> I do not think this argument is particularly convincing as the recent Persian interventions in the affairs of the Ionian Greek islands and Delos, as discussed above, and the negotiations between Persia and Sparta, would warrant an Athenian embassy to Persia. Furthermore, it is likely that, with the recent death of Artaxerxes I, an embassy would have been sent to Persia to re-establish friendly relations with Darius II, as had been established by the Peace of Callias with his father. This may be the embassy led by Epilycus, but we must be cautious against ascribing certainty to this.

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<sup>688</sup> Blamire, 1975, p. 21, disbelieving in an earlier Peace of 449 B.C., believes that Epilycus successfully negotiated a peace between Athens and Persia to formalise the de facto situation, which had been in place since 449 B.C., and in response to Spartan attempts to form an alliance with Persia. Whilst Blamire is right to see this embassy as a response, it does not disprove the existence of a treaty in 449 B.C. For further information on Epilycus cf. Hoffstetter, 1978, 140.

<sup>689</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 8

<sup>690</sup> Harris, 1999.

<sup>691</sup> Blamire, 1975, p. 22. See also Meiggs, 1972, pp.134-135 who also believes this treaty was a renewal of the previous Peace of Callias.

## Tissaphernes and Sparta

In response to the Athenian disaster in Sicily and whilst Agis was raising money to build a Spartan fleet from his position in Decelea, we learn that Tissaphernes, governor of the coastal regions of the Persian Empire had journeyed to Sparta to form an alliance.<sup>692</sup> Tissaphernes had been appointed by Darius II to capture Amorges, satrap of Lydia, who was in rebellion and was being supported by Athens.<sup>693</sup> Thucydides states that damaging Athenian interests in Asia Minor and winning an alliance with Sparta were part of Tissaphernes' strategy to end this rebellion.<sup>694</sup> Lewis believes that Tissaphernes wished to use Spartan hoplites to end the revolt of Amorges and any additional benefits, i.e. damaging Athenian interests in Asia and gaining the Spartans as allies, whilst they would be welcome they were not central to his plan.<sup>695</sup> We find here that Persia, yet again, turned to using money to achieve her aims and during the negotiations with Sparta, Tissaphernes "promised to maintain" the Spartan army.<sup>696</sup>

The negotiations between Tissaphernes and Sparta beg the question - in what position was Tissaphernes that he had enough authority to broker an alliance with Sparta? Previously Persia had dictated terms to the Greeks, with the exception of the Peace of Callias. Thucydides states that Tissaphernes was sent by Darius as στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω.<sup>697</sup> Thucydides does not describe Tissaphernes as a Satrap and we learn that he gained Sardis from Amorges only

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<sup>692</sup> Thucydides, VIII.5.

<sup>693</sup> For Athenian support of Amorges Thucydides, VIII.19 and VIII.28. Westlake, 1977, pp. 319-329, argues that the alliance between Amorges and Athens was concluded in response to Tissaphernes actions and was not the cause. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. III pp. 766-767, citing Ctesias FrGH 688 F15 (53), notes the Athenian Lykon helped Pissuthnes' revolt with Greek mercenaries. However, whether this was with official backing or not is unknown.

<sup>694</sup> Thucydides, VIII.5.

<sup>695</sup> Lewis, 1977, p. 87.

<sup>696</sup> According to Thucydides VIII.5, Tissaphernes was unable to pay his tribute to Darius due to Athenian intervention along the coast of Ionia and so made an alliance with Sparta in order to stop this intervention and collect his tribute from the Ionian cities.

<sup>697</sup> "Those of the territory below." i.e. subject peoples of provinces. The interpretation of this title can be divided into two schools of thought, either that the 'territory below' refers to "on the coast" as used by Thucydides at I.120 or it refers to the "lower region" as used by Thucydides at II.99, when κάτω is used to describe Lower Macedon. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. III, p. 766. In this instance both interpretations relate to the same geographical area within Tissaphernes' command, i.e. the coastal/lower regions of the Persian Empire.

when he had ended the latter's revolt.<sup>698</sup> Hornblower notes that Tissaphernes' command area was Ionia as a general whole, which was not a common command. He makes a convincing argument that, taken with the inheritance of Sardis, which in turn implies the inheritance of the satrapy of Lydia, Tissaphernes seems to have been given a unique command similar to that given to Struthas, Tiribazus and Cyrus the younger.<sup>699</sup> All three were given command of the entire region of Ionia in order to deal with a very specific threat to that region of the Persian Empire and, therefore, more sweeping powers were required than those of an ordinary satrap. It seems that Tissaphernes then, in response to the rebellion of Amorges and possibly with a view to dealing with the Athenians too, was given a more general command to deal with the problem and from this position Tissaphernes wished to recruit Spartan help.<sup>700</sup>

Removing Athens from Asia Minor would not only have restored Tissaphernes' ability to collect his tribute, but would have weakened Amorges' rebellion making it easier to crush. Gomme, Andrews and Dover note that the Sicilian disaster and the subsequent weakening of Athens may have encouraged Tissaphernes and the other satraps of the opportunity to remove Athenian influence from Asia Minor.<sup>701</sup> However, they do concede the point made by Lewis that the news of Sicily may not have reached the coast of Asia Minor by this time.<sup>702</sup> That said, there is no explicit evidence supporting a long time lapse. It is worth observing that, by this time, the peace between Persia and Athens clearly had collapsed. We may conjecture that, knowing only the limitations on the Great King and not Athens, one of the terms may have been that Athens could not land forces in Asia Minor.<sup>703</sup> Even had this not been an explicit clause, the Athenian support of Amorges would have been enough to provoke the King into sanctioning an alliance with Sparta.

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<sup>698</sup> Ctesias, FrGH 688 F15 (2).

<sup>699</sup> Hornblower, 1991, vol. 3, p. 767.

<sup>700</sup> Compare with Keaveney, *Frustrated Frondeurs*, forthcoming.

<sup>701</sup> Gomme, Andrews & Dover, 1981, p. 17.

<sup>702</sup> Lewis, 1977, p. 87, n. 5.

<sup>703</sup> Cf. pp. 145-146. Pericles and Ephialtes, despite sailing along the coast of Asia Minor, never actually landed on the coast.

At this time, we also learn of two Greeks living at the court of Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who had also been sent by Darius to stop Athenian intervention amongst the cities of the Ionian coast and to bring Sparta in to an alliance with Darius directly. These Greeks were Calligeitus, son of Laophon, from Megara and Timagoras, son of Athenagoras, from Cyzicus, both exiles from their cities.<sup>704</sup> The presence of Calligeitus and Timagoras indicates once more that it was not uncommon for aristocratic Greeks to find refuge in the court of a Persian satrap. It is likely that Pharnabazus had seen how successful the Spartans and Peloponnesians had been in removing the Athenians from Tissaphernes' territory and, once this had been done, wanted to use them for the same purpose for his own satrapy. This first attempt to procure the Spartan and Peloponnesian fleet was not successful, Thucydides says, because Alcibiades was still in Sparta and the Spartans favoured supporting the Chians at his suggestion.<sup>705</sup> Thucydides comments that Pharnabazus wanted to gain the credit for removing the Athenians from Ionia and for bringing Sparta into a treaty with Persia, from which we can deduce two things.<sup>706</sup> First, that the Athenian actions along the Ionian coast, and the disruptions this had caused, was no longer considered a problem for Tissaphernes and his satrapy alone. Second, that Darius' desire for an alliance with Sparta was public knowledge since there were now two satraps attempting to achieve this. This satrapal rivalry between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus became acute after the death of Cyrus the Younger.<sup>707</sup>

Tissaphernes began working with the Peloponnesians, sending Stages to help Teos rebel from Athenian control, in 413 B.C.,<sup>708</sup> and after the revolt of Miletus, in 412 B.C., the alliance between Tissaphernes and Sparta was formally ratified. Thucydides records that the terms were agreed between Sparta and

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<sup>704</sup> Thucydides, VIII.6. Cf. Hoffstetter, 1978, 321 and 169.

<sup>705</sup> Thucydides, VIII.12.

<sup>706</sup> Thucydides, VIII. 6

<sup>707</sup> Balcer, 1983, p. 267, notes that with stronger satrapal independence came greater Persian cultural influence upon the Ionian Greeks.

<sup>708</sup> Thucydides, VIII.16.

“the King and Tissaphernes”<sup>709</sup> indicating that official royal backing for Tissaphernes’ endeavours. The terms of this treaty were; that all the territory held by the King or held by his ancestors in the past should belong to him; the Spartans and the Persians would attempt to prevent the Athenians collecting tribute from the Ionian Greeks; operations were to be carried out jointly between Sparta and Persia; the war with Athens could not be brought to an end without the consent of both parties; and Persia and Sparta were to have the same friends and enemies.<sup>710</sup> The abandonment of the Ionian Greeks indicates a break from the general Greek policy of resistance to Persian overlordship there, which we find in the Spartan embassy to Cyrus in the sixth century,<sup>711</sup> the Athenian and Eretrian involvement in the Ionian Revolt,<sup>712</sup> and the actions of the Delian League.<sup>713</sup> Sparta and Persia now were perforce to co-operate to achieve their own particular goals, although Spartan qualms soon became manifest, and once more the Ionian Greeks became a political issue.

Upon the conclusion of this treaty, we find joint operations against the Argives and Athenians at Miletus,<sup>714</sup> operations on Iasus, and to capture the rebel Amorges.<sup>715</sup> For Tissaphernes it was necessary to crush Amorges’ rebellion before he could bring the Ionian Greek cities back into the Persian fold. Having dealt with Amorges, we find Tissaphernes fully engaged in removing the Athenians from Ionia. He was personally present in the battle at Miletus<sup>716</sup> and he sent Tamos<sup>717</sup> to help in the attempt to remove the pro-Athenian faction from Clazomenai.<sup>718</sup> Thucydides’ use of the verb *συνεκέλευε* implies a joint effort on the part of Tamos and the Peloponnesians. Thus, we can see that, whilst Peloponnesian forces were working with the forces of Tissaphernes in Asia

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<sup>709</sup> Thucydides, VIII.18.

<sup>710</sup> Thucydides, VIII.18.

<sup>711</sup> Herodotus, I. 152-3, cf. pp. 14-15 above.

<sup>712</sup> Herodotus, V. 99, cf. pp. 46-47 above.

<sup>713</sup> Thucydides, I. 96, cf. pp. 115-116 above.

<sup>714</sup> Thucydides, VIII.25.

<sup>715</sup> Thucydides, VIII.28.

<sup>716</sup> Thucydides, VIII.25.

<sup>717</sup> Tamos is officially described in Thucydides VIII.31 as the “King of Persia’s officer in Ionia,” from which Hornblower rightly infers that he was an officer of Tissaphernes since Tissaphernes, as we have already established, had been given command over the coastal/lower regions of the Persian Empire which would have included Ionia. Hornblower, 1991, Vol. III, p. 840.

<sup>718</sup> Thucydides, VIII.31.

Minor, the good relationship between the two powers enabled both sides were able to further their respective aims.

By 412 B.C., Tissaphernes and Sparta had put an end to the rebellion of Amorges, who had been captured, and they had also captured some of the Athenian controlled cities in Ionia, most notably Miletus and Teos. The loss of these cities will have affected the collection of Athenian tribute, but it is notable that Athens was still able to collect tribute from other Ionian cities and to continue fighting the war.<sup>719</sup>

### Initial Revisions to the Spartan-Persian Treaty

In the winter of 412 B.C. revisions to the treaty between Tissaphernes and Sparta were proposed by the Spartan Therimenes, who was with the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus.<sup>720</sup> Since Sparta at this time had little interest in affairs outside of the Peloponnese and Aegean, it could be argued that her actions in Asia Minor had benefited only Tissaphernes, who was now able to collect taxes from the newly conquered Ionian cities. Peloponnesian grumblings whilst they were at Miletus about the apparent one-sidedness of their relationship with Persia are understandable when we consider that, having achieved many of Tissaphernes' aims, he then reduced the amount paid to the Spartan forces.<sup>721</sup>

Two significant amendments to the terms were proposed: firstly, that the Spartan forces and their allies were not to attack the territory of the King's or that held by his ancestors, nor were the Spartans to exact tribute from any of this territory. Likewise the King and his subjects would not attack Sparta or her allies. Both of these terms recall the Peace of Callias, and we may speculate about the impact this treaty had upon the terms between Sparta and Persia now being agreed. Also included was a term stating that should any of the allies of one of the parties attack the other, then all members of the treaty would aid the victim. Clearly, now that the Athenians had been removed from Tissaphernes' territory,

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<sup>719</sup> Meiggs, 1972, pp. 348-349

<sup>720</sup> Thucydides, VIII.37. Miletus had revolted from the Athenians a few months prior to the signing of the first treaty between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians. Thucydides, VIII. 17.

<sup>721</sup> Thucydides, VIII.29.



Darius did not want Sparta 'stepping into Athens' shoes'. These revisions requiring the Spartans to agree not to attack any territory under Persian control and to punish any state which might do so is clearly an attempt by Darius to neutralise any potential threat from Sparta. The second proposed amendment was that the Spartan forces in Persian territory at the request of the King were to be maintained by the King. The initial treaty made no mention that Tissaphernes was to pay the Peloponnesians, but this seems to have simply been understood. His reduction of the Peloponnesian pay from 1 drachma to 3 obols prompted the Spartans to request guarantees of pay from him. The revised terms seem to have been sent back to Sparta for approval and, upon the arrival of Spartan reinforcements to Cnidus with eleven Spartan commissioners, they were discussed with Tissaphernes.<sup>722</sup> Sparta's unease with the previous terms regarding the Ionians and the Greek islands can be seen in the arguments of Lichas, one of the commissioners. Lichas argued that since the Ionian Islands had been liberated, the clause stating that all of the territory which belonged to Darius and had belonged to his ancestors should remain in Persian control was not relevant. Conforming to this term would mean handing over these liberated islands into Persian control again. In their desire for Tissaphernes' support the Peloponnesians, apparently, originally agreed to recognise Persian domination over all territory currently and previously held by Persia, which no doubt included the Greek cities of Ionia. Lichas complaint indicates that the Peloponnesians now recognised the full impact of this. Westlake notes that by the time of Lichas' complaint tensions between the Spartans and Tissaphernes had been growing for some time, believing that the "specific point made by Lichas ... was largely academic: a Persian claim to Greek territory extending as far as the forces of Xerxes had penetrated could hardly in 412 have been seriously pursued to its extreme limits."<sup>723</sup> However, this issue was not wholly dead, as can be seen by the actions of Conon and Pharnabazus in the 390s B.C.<sup>724</sup>

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<sup>722</sup> Thucydides, VIII.43.

<sup>723</sup> Westlake, 1985, p. 49.

<sup>724</sup> Cf. pp. 210-211 below.

Reviewing the treaty between Sparta and Persia and its revisions we can see that the motivation for the initial treaty was primarily an alliance against the Athenians in an attempt to prevent them collecting tribute from the cities along the Ionian coast. These initial revisions were intended to regulate Peloponnesian expenses, whilst still protecting Persia's interests. The additional revision regarding the King's territory seems to have been an attempt by the Spartans to assuage their consciences. We can see a progression from the initial treaty, where both parties were mutually dependant to achieve their objectives, through to this newly proposed revision, indicating that the Spartans and their allies were negotiating for more equality in their relationship with Persia. Westlake suggests that Tissaphernes' treatment of the Spartans "suggest that he regarded them rather as mercenaries hired to do his bidding than as partners with rights equal to his own."<sup>725</sup> The result of this attempt to gain a more equal footing with Tissaphernes was that the satrap left the meeting, infuriated, with nothing having been achieved. Lewis accepts Thucydides' view that, by this time, Tissaphernes was suspicious of Peloponnesian intentions and was being convinced by Alcibiades that "an excessive strengthening of the Spartans would present him with a serious threat."<sup>726</sup> Lichas' complaint concerning the territory, which was under Persian control, coupled with Alcibiades' arguments may have confirmed these suspicions.

### Alcibiades

Prior to Sparta's occupation of Miletus, Alcibiades fell out of Spartan favour, and his arrest and execution were ordered. Subsequently, he fled to the court of Tissaphernes, and he is credited with suggesting the reduction in the Spartan pay and with giving the advice to Tissaphernes that he should help both Athens and the Peloponnesians enough to ensure that they weakened each other.<sup>727</sup> It is not clear whether Alcibiades already knew of the Persian policy of dividing its enemies but his advice certainly follows this policy. In light of this

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<sup>725</sup> Westlake, 1985, p. 48.

<sup>726</sup> Lewis, 1977, p. 98.

<sup>727</sup> Thucydides, VIII.45-47. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXV.

we will now turn our attention to Alcibiades and consider his involvement in the Graeco-Persian affairs of the fifth century.

Briefly recapping the life of Alcibiades prior to his time with Tissaphernes, he is first introduced by Thucydides sabotaging the negotiations between Athens and Sparta in 420 B.C., and effecting an alliance between Athens and Argos instead.<sup>728</sup> However, he came to notoriety when he was accused of mutilating Hermae the night before the Athenians' Sicilian Expedition of 415 B.C.<sup>729</sup> He was recalled from the expedition for trial but fearing political bias he went into exile in the Peloponnese.<sup>730</sup> In his absence he was condemned to death and was invited to live in Sparta.<sup>731</sup> Alcibiades subsequently worked for the Spartans against Athens but when he was also denounced in Sparta he fled to the court of Tissaphernes.

Alcibiades subsequently worked against the Peloponnesians and he is credited with souring their relationship with Tissaphernes.<sup>732</sup> We are told that Alcibiades suggested to Tissaphernes that he should reduce the rate and regularity of pay for the Peloponnesian fleet and, Thucydides claims, he intercepted and refused admission to the cities which approached Tissaphernes for financial aid.<sup>733</sup> We have already noted that he is credited with the idea that Tissaphernes should let the Athenians and the Peloponnesians weaken each other through war and, thus, avoid becoming a threat to Persian interests.<sup>734</sup> Thucydides claims this was not out of loyalty to Darius II or Tissaphernes but rather as part of a scheme, to enable his recall to Athens with all charges against him dropped. Thucydides claims that Alcibiades recognised that if he appeared on friendly terms with Tissaphernes the Athenians would eventually recall him to Athens to gain Tissaphernes' favour themselves and the financial benefits this

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<sup>728</sup> Thucydides, V.43-47.

<sup>729</sup> Thucydides, VI.8. Plutarch, *Alcibiades* XVIII-XIX.

<sup>730</sup> The Athenian ship, Salamina, was sent to escort Alcibiades back to Athens but he evaded the Athenian authorities by losing the Salamina at Thurii and making his way to the Peloponnese. Thucydides, VI.61. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, 21-22.

<sup>731</sup> Thucydides, VI.60. Considering how Alcibiades treated the Spartans when they attempted to renew their treaty with Athens in 420 B.C. this may seem surprising, but Thucydides states Alcibiades' family had ties to Sparta, which the Spartans ignored when negotiating the terms of the treaty and which was the cause of Alcibiades' actions at that time.

<sup>732</sup> Thucydides, VIII.45.

<sup>733</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>734</sup> Thucydides, VIII.46.

entailed. The actions of Alcibiades here make an interesting comparison with those of Aristagoras during the Ionian Revolt, who initially enjoyed the favour of Darius I, but then attempted to win favour with Sparta and Athens in an attempt to secure his position as ἐπίτροπος of Miletus, which had become threatened by his dispute with Megabates.<sup>735</sup> It also shows that Alcibiades was attempting to influence Persian foreign policy for his own ends; how far what he suggested had already been decided by Persia is a moot point.

From Tissaphernes' court Alcibiades contacted the Athenian fleet at Samos, and persuaded them that, if Athens became an oligarchy and recalled him, he would be able to convince Tissaphernes to support them.<sup>736</sup> As a result of this, the Athenians were persuaded by Pisander to change their form of government, resulting in much political upheaval within Athens, and Alcibiades was recalled in the summer of 411.<sup>737</sup> He was made supreme general of the Athenian fleet in the war. However, after the battle at Abydus he was captured and imprisoned by Tissaphernes,<sup>738</sup> who he was attempting to bring over to support the Athenians. He escaped after thirty days and made his way to Clazomenai from where he continued to progress the war in the interests of Athens. Alcibiades worked fervently for the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war until the battle of Notium, where the Athenian fleet was defeated by Lysander and Alcibiades fell into disgrace again. He was replaced as general of the Athenian fleet by ten new generals, at which point he retired to his estates in the Chersonese.<sup>739</sup> After the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami and the fall of Athens, Alcibiades decided to approach Darius as an exile via the help of Pharnabazus.<sup>740</sup> He was assassinated by Pharnabazus at the behest of Sparta and

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<sup>735</sup> Cf. pp. 39-48 for Aristagoras and the Ionian Revolt.

<sup>736</sup> Thucydides, VIII. 47.

<sup>737</sup> Thucydides, VIII.81.

<sup>738</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.9-10. Alcibiades had gone to see Tissaphernes on his ship, as a friend and taking gifts, after the battle and it was there that he was arrested and taken to Sardis.

<sup>739</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.5.17

<sup>740</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXXVII. As Alcibiades had been staying in the Chersonese, Pharnabazus was probably the best person because he was geographically the closest satrap, and also Alcibiades' only other choice was Tissaphernes who had already arrested Alcibiades once and so couldn't be trusted not to do so again.

we may speculate that he had outlived his usefulness to Persia and so needed to be removed.<sup>741</sup>

Looking at the career of Alcibiades it can be seen that, although he did work for Tissaphernes, his relationship was different to that of other Greeks previously accused of medism. Alcibiades did not work for Tissaphernes directly for any substantial length of time; the majority of the time he was working for Sparta, who had an agreement with Tissaphernes. The only time he was a guest of Tissaphernes whilst not working for Sparta was after the Athenian victory at Miletus<sup>742</sup> and before he joined the Athenian fleet at Samos. Therefore, it is on this period we will concentrate.

Thucydides states that the primary reasons for Alcibiades' flight from Sparta were that he had made an enemy of the Spartan king, Agis, and that he had been denounced by the Peloponnesians. Ellis argues that Alcibiades had influence with the Spartan Endius,<sup>743</sup> who was a *xenos* of Alcibiades' family and was one of the Ephors in position in 411 B.C. As Endius finished his term in office just prior to Alcibiades' flight from Sparta, we may speculate he was no longer in a position to protect Alcibiades.<sup>744</sup> Ellis notes that when Alcibiades arrived at the court of Tissaphernes he will have been received initially as a Spartan adviser. In order to secure his position, knowing that news of his displacement from Sparta would eventually reach Tissaphernes, Alcibiades will have needed to work quickly to gain Tissaphernes' confidence on a personal basis.<sup>745</sup>

Gribble suggests that, although Alcibiades is described διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόμενος to Tissaphernes as with other Greek medisers, this may not be entirely true.<sup>746</sup> We are only told by Thucydides that Alcibiades advised

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<sup>741</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXXIX.

<sup>742</sup> Thucydides, VIII.88.

<sup>743</sup> Ellis, 1989, p. 69. R. Kebric, 1976, pp. 249-252, presents an interesting, if speculative, article on the relationship of Alcibiades and Endius

<sup>744</sup> Endius also had been one of the Spartan ambassadors sent to negotiate a new treaty with Athens in 420 B.C. and who had so offended Alcibiades that he sabotaged the negotiations. Clearly by 412 B.C. the old family ties mentioned by Thucydides had been renewed and any slight felt by Alcibiades had been resolved. Thucydides, V.44.

<sup>745</sup> Ellis, 1989, p. 71.

<sup>746</sup> Gribble, 1999, p. 200.

Tissaphernes twice. Firstly, concerning the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet; and secondly, concerning Persian policy towards Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades' suggestions concerning paying the Peloponnesian fleet may be genuine and will have been willingly accepted as a way for Tissaphernes to save money. We have already noted how, once Athenian forces had been removed from Tissaphernes' territory, he became less enthusiastic for the Spartan cause. It is quite easy to comprehend that, having used these forces to his benefit, Tissaphernes took Alcibiades' advice because the Peloponnesians had served his direct purpose and he did not wish to keep paying them. Gribble also notes that Alcibiades' advice on Persian foreign policy was "the logical policy for Tissaphernes to pursue in any case."<sup>747</sup> Therefore, Alcibiades' influence with Tissaphernes may have gone no further than having suggested a couple of good ideas which were in Tissaphernes' interests and which, as we have noted, he may already have worked out for himself. Plutarch states only that Alcibiades "came to occupy the highest place in his (Tissaphernes') favour";<sup>748</sup> and that Tissaphernes renamed his favourite park after Alcibiades.<sup>749</sup> Furthermore, Thucydides informs us that when Phrynichus denounced Alcibiades to Astyochus, the Spartan Admiral, Tissaphernes passed the information onto Alcibiades twice.<sup>750</sup> Clearly the men had a close personal friendship at the time, but this does not indicate how far Alcibiades was able to influence Tissaphernes politically.<sup>751</sup> By the time Alcibiades was recalled to Athens his position of favour with Tissaphernes seems to have ended, confirming that any real political influence he may have had was exaggerated or, at least, of limited duration. We should not forget that after Alcibiades left Tissaphernes' court and achieved the Athenian victory at Abydos, Tissaphernes had Alcibiades arrested, having been given direct orders from Darius that he was to wage war against the Athenians. Mitchell notes that, during his talks with the Athenians in an attempt to be recalled, Alcibiades exploited the Greek custom of

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<sup>747</sup> Gribble, *Ibid.*

<sup>748</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXIV.

<sup>749</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXIV.

<sup>750</sup> Thucydides, VIII.50.

<sup>751</sup> Alcibiades' medism is omitted in Diodorus Siculus, who confuses Tissaphernes with Pharnabazus and only mentions a connection between him and Alcibiades in reference to the Phoenician fleet stationed at Aspendus. Diodorus Siculus, XIII.37.

ξενία, and suggests that, by claiming to be a ξένιος of Tissaphernes, Alcibiades managed to persuade the Athenians that he had concrete support from Tissaphernes, which he did not. She maintains that Alcibiades was clearly trying to obtain an official ξενία relationship with Tissaphernes; however, when Alcibiades attempted to formalise the friendship, his ξενία gifts and δῶρα were refused by Tissaphernes. It appears that Tissaphernes viewed Alcibiades as a useful courtier, rather than an equal, as is evidenced by Alcibiades' arrest.<sup>752</sup> Alcibiades' exaggeration of his influence was not an uncommon Greek trait, as we have seen from Herodotus' depiction of Hippias' influence at the court of Darius I and is also apparent in Xenophon's depiction of the role of Clearchus at the trial of Orontas.<sup>753</sup>

On looking at the dates when Alcibiades fled Sparta and then went to Samos, we can suggest that Alcibiades was at Tissaphernes' court for no longer than a year.<sup>754</sup> This suggests that Alcibiades did not have much time to gain as much influence as is claimed by Thucydides. Furthermore, as is demonstrated by Alcibiades' arrest, Tissaphernes did not have as much freedom with Persian foreign policy as Alcibiades would have liked, and once he had been given a direct order from Darius he was unable to act contrary to this.

Gribble acutely points out that, as we progress through book VIII of Thucydides, Alcibiades' influence with Tissaphernes seems to diminish until we find him deceiving the Athenians during their negotiations with Tissaphernes.<sup>755</sup> The fact that Tissaphernes made a new alliance with the Peloponnesians εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι<sup>756</sup> indicates that, despite Alcibiades' ideas, Tissaphernes either had no intention of supporting the Athenians or lacked the freedom to do this.

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<sup>752</sup> Mitchell, 1997, pp. 116-117.

<sup>753</sup> Herodotus, V. 96, also Keaveney, 2012, *passim*.

<sup>754</sup> Ellis, 1989, pp. 71, 82, suggests that Alcibiades fled to Tissaphernes in perhaps the later autumn of 412 B.C. He then went to Samos in 411 B.C. Ellis also suggests that Alcibiades then sailed to Aspendus shortly before Mindarus was defeated in battle by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus in late August or early September 411 B.C.

<sup>755</sup> Gribble, 1999, p. 201.

<sup>756</sup> Thucydides, VIII. 57.

Thucydides, despite his earlier claim, recognises Alcibiades' actual lack of influence when he states that he "exaggerated wildly" his influence with Tissaphernes to the Athenian fleet at Samos. He gives three reasons for this exaggeration; firstly, to increase his own reputation amongst the Athenians, secondly, to intimidate the 400, who had taken control of Athens and were ruling as an oligarchy, and thirdly, to cast doubt on the relationship between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes.<sup>757</sup> Thus, we can see that, in fact, Alcibiades had very little actual influence with Tissaphernes. Alcibiades' claim to have prevented the Phoenician fleet from sailing to the Spartans from Aspendus can also be seen as an exaggeration. Tissaphernes had travelled to Aspendus, with Lichas the Spartan general, followed by Alcibiades, supposedly to collect the Phoenician fleet there. However, Tissaphernes returned from Aspendus without the Phoenician fleet, after the Peloponnesian defeat at Miletus. Marsh and Lateiner note that Tissaphernes did not have the authority to command the Phoenician fleet. Marsh believes that, as Phoenicia was not part of his satrapy, Tissaphernes did not have command over the Phoenician fleet.<sup>758</sup> Thus, if the fleet was dispatched to Aspendus for Tissaphernes' use, it had been ordered there by Darius II himself.<sup>759</sup> By extension of this argument, the fleet did not depart from Aspendus not due to the actions of Tissaphernes, but because it had been ordered not to. Marsh reminds us that Tissaphernes would not have sent the fleet away without the official sanction of Darius II.<sup>760</sup> Lateiner believes that not using the Phoenician fleet was a deliberate Persian policy and maintains that Persian awareness of the ineffectiveness of the Phoenician fleet against the Athenian navy meant that "Persian commanders did not use the Phoenician navy ... unless their numbers were overwhelmingly superior."<sup>761</sup> This argument is supported by the defeat of the Phoenician fleet at Salamis, which Darius II may have recalled. Lateiner plausibly notes that the threat and/or promise of the Phoenician fleet, which if allied with either the Spartan or Athenian fleets could

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<sup>757</sup> Thucydides, VIII.81.

<sup>758</sup> Marsh, 1932, p. 19.

<sup>759</sup> Marsh, 1932, p. 19.

<sup>760</sup> Marsh, 1932, p. 21

<sup>761</sup> Lateiner, 1976, p. 287.



win a decisive battle, thus potentially ending the Peloponnesian War, was a cheaper and more politically effective tool for the Persians.<sup>762</sup>

On reviewing Alcibiades' medism we can conclude that Alcibiades, rather than staying at Tissaphernes court in order to medise, was actually there because he had nowhere else that he could go. He had been exiled from Athens and Sparta, both of which had issued death warrants against him, and his options were extremely limited. We can see strong similarities with Themistocles, who also sought refuge in the Persian Empire during his exile because he had nowhere in Greece he could stay. Alcibiades, as I have argued, did not spend enough time with Tissaphernes to gain any significant political influence, despite the fact the two men apparently became personal friends. It is interesting to compare Alcibiades' sojourn with Tissaphernes to Themistocles' exile in the Persian Empire. Whilst Themistocles seems to have recognised that once he had taken refuge in Persia there was no possibility of effecting a return to Greece, Alcibiades' time with Tissaphernes may be seen as a sojourn, during which he was planning his return to Athens. We can suggest that this difference may be because Themistocles had been branded a mediser prior to his flight to Persia and, therefore, could not return, whereas there is no evidence that Alcibiades was accused of medising, even after he had stayed with Tissaphernes. The charges against both men were serious. However, those against Alcibiades did not threaten the security of the state and, once he had removed his political enemies, he was acquitted of his charges.

We can see that Alcibiades stayed with Tissaphernes only for as long as it took him to persuade the Athenian fleet at Samos to recall him, at which time he went to Samos. Alcibiades' actions whilst he stayed with Tissaphernes do not particularly suggest he wished to medise at that time. He did not fight any engagements for Tissaphernes, he does not seem to have been there long enough to do this, and his activities seem to have been limited to giving two pieces of good advice and having a *paradeisos* named after him. Interestingly, after Aegospotami Alcibiades did try to medise, in the conventional sense, when he

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<sup>762</sup> Lateiner, 1976, p. 289.

approached Pharnabazus, in much the same way as Themistocles had done. By this time his circumstances had changed and now resembled those of Themistocles, in that, this time there was no effecting a return to Athens in his foreseeable future. That he approached Pharnabazus rather than Tissaphernes is not surprising after his arrest,<sup>763</sup> but it does suggest that Alcibiades did not realise that his arrest warrant had been issued by Darius II and was not a whim of Tissaphernes.

#### Tissaphernes, Alcibiades and Athens

Turning our attention from Alcibiades' alleged medism to his involvement in the negotiations between Persia and Athens, we can see that by 411 B.C. Alcibiades had begun to cultivate the notion amongst the Athenian fleet at Samos of an Athenian-Persian treaty.<sup>764</sup> Upon his return to Athens, he can be found working even harder to promote a treaty between Athens and Persia. It is clear that, after the disastrous losses suffered in Sicily, the Athenians had come to recognise the importance of Persian finance for the war. In the winter of 411 B.C., just after the blockade of Chios had been reinstated and strengthened by the Athenians, an Athenian embassy arrived at the court of Tissaphernes.<sup>765</sup> Whereas the Athenians were ready to make a treaty, Thucydides claims that Alcibiades sabotaged the negotiations and convinced the Athenians that they "were not offering enough"<sup>766</sup> to Tissaphernes, when he realised that a treaty was no longer possible. However, Lewis offers a different interpretation of the situation.<sup>767</sup> If we are to believe that Tissaphernes had gained as much as he felt necessary from his alliance with the Peloponnesians and that, due to the complaint by Lichas, he felt that they were now becoming troublesome, we may suggest that Tissaphernes may have begun to start considering other options available to him besides an alliance with the Peloponnesians. Lewis notes the omission in Thucydides of how Tissaphernes would have explained his complete

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<sup>763</sup> Mitchell, 1997, p. 118, believes that, having been refused *ξενία* with Tissaphernes, Alcibiades managed to arrange this relationship with Pharnabazus, citing the exchange of oaths mentioned in Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.3.13, as evidence.

<sup>764</sup> Thucydides, VIII.47.

<sup>765</sup> Thucydides VIII.56

<sup>766</sup> Thucydides VIII.56.

<sup>767</sup> Lewis, 1977, p. 102.

reversal in strategy to Darius, had a treaty with Athens succeeded. He suggests that Tissaphernes may have been seriously considering making a treaty with Athens, but only if he could gain enough concessions to ensure the approval of Darius.<sup>768</sup> Hence, the Athenians had agreed to relinquish Ionia and the islands along the Ionian coast and a complete reversal of the terms in the Peace of Callias. It is only when Tissaphernes wanted to include a clause in the proposed peace that allowed Darius to build up a fleet along the Ionian coast that the ambassadors backed out of the negotiations, and for good reason. The freedom to build a fleet along the Ionian coast would remove the means by which Athens would be able to detect any preparations for another possible invasion of Greece and might threaten the Athenian Empire. We may conclude that the Athenians were willing to agree not to meddle in the affairs of Darius and, even, to cut some of their losses in the form of the Ionian Greeks, but they were not prepared to allow him any possibility that would lead to the loss of their own liberty. For Tissaphernes' part, we may agree with Lewis, the best way for him to convince Darius that an alliance with Athens was more beneficial than the current one in place with Sparta would be to convince him that Athens would give greater concessions to Persia than Sparta would. The Peloponnesians had already agreed not to attack the King's territory and not to attempt to collect tribute from the Ionian cities, so there would be little gain in eliciting the same terms from Athens. Lewis' argument is convincing and helps focus our attention on the realities of Tissaphernes' situation outside of the sphere of Alcibiades' supposed influence. He comments that, "getting an agreement out of Athens which (would) satisfy the King (was) always slim."<sup>769</sup> However, he also notes that the negotiations will have demonstrated to Sparta that Tissaphernes had other options. It is interesting to consider how far Tissaphernes looked for the same concessions from both cities to see which would actually deliver. Perhaps we may conclude that the negotiations with Athens were actually a demonstration to the Spartans that they were not Tissaphernes' only possible allies, rather than his desire to come to terms with Athens.

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<sup>768</sup> See also Marsh, 1932, p. 19.

<sup>769</sup> Lewis, 1977, p. 101.

### Astyochus of Sparta

One result of Tissaphernes' reduction in pay for the Peloponnesian fleet is the charges of medism against the Spartan general, Astyochus. Rumours had begun circulating amongst the disaffected Peloponnesians that "in order to make money for himself he had sold his services to Tissaphernes."<sup>770</sup> The issues concerning pay climaxed after Alcibiades' recall and the fleet turned against Astyochus. Thucydides reiterates that the fleet blamed Astyochus for the irregularity and shortness of their pay and, furthermore, that it was due to Astyochus' intention to profit financially from his friendship with Tissaphernes that he did not try harder to recover their pay. As a result of these complaints, Astyochus was nearly stoned and only escaped by taking refuge at an altar.<sup>771</sup> We can see that Astyochus was not very popular with the fleet for other reasons too. Hornblower notes that when Astyochus chastised Dorieus, a free Rhodian complaining about pay, Thucydides mentions that "he raise(d) his *bakteria* against him", the *bakteria* was the Spartan stick used to signify command. Hornblower comments that although the *bakteria* was not a proper weapon, it was "appropriate as a repressive device for coercing or threatening a helot."<sup>772</sup> Thus, we can see that a likely part of the problem the Peloponnesians had with Astyochus, as with Pausanias before him, was his rough treatment of them.

Thucydides reports further damning rumours against Astyochus relating how, when the Athenian Phrynichus was trying to prevent the recall of Alcibiades to Athens in 411 B.C.<sup>773</sup> Phrynichus had sent a letter denouncing Alcibiades to Astyochus, not realising that Alcibiades had already fled to the court of Tissaphernes. The letter stated that Alcibiades was attempting to persuade Tissaphernes to support the Athenians instead of the Spartans. Astyochus' response to Phrynichus' letter was to visit Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, rather than report anything back to Sparta and, according to Thucydides, "turned informer himself."<sup>774</sup>

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<sup>770</sup> Ibid.

<sup>771</sup> Thucydides, VIII.84.

<sup>772</sup> Hornblower, 2011, pp. 124-125.

<sup>773</sup> Thucydides, VIII.50.

<sup>774</sup> Thucydides, VIII.50.

The final evidence for the supposed medism of Astyochus is rooted in the complaints within the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus.<sup>775</sup> The complaints were that both Astyochus and Tissaphernes had refused action against the weakened Athenian navy, after the failed Sicilian expedition, and they were still delaying action when the Athenian fleet was suffering from political unrest whilst stationed at Samos. Astyochus did eventually order the Peloponnesian fleet to attempt to draw the Athenian fleet into a battle, but the Athenians refused battle and retired to Samos.

Looking at the supposed medism of Astyochus, his apparent motivation is personal financial gain from Tissaphernes. Whilst Ellis notes that the entire Spartan fleet was in the pay of Tissaphernes,<sup>776</sup> this misses the point, which was that the average sailor only sought what he considered just pay, whereas Astyochus was suspected of profiteering. Ellis is correct, however, when he notes that in Sparta Astyochus was acquitted of the charges brought against him. Furthermore, the only reference to Astyochus in Xenophon concerns him supporting Hermocrates in denouncing Tissaphernes, where he is described as a trustworthy witness.<sup>777</sup> The primary case against Astyochus seems to be based on two things. Firstly, lack of pay from Tissaphernes for the Peloponnesian fleet, secondly betraying Phrynichus' confidence by reporting the contents of his letters to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. When Thucydides states that Alcibiades suggested to Tissaphernes to reduce the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet he also states that Tissaphernes successfully bribed the captains of each ship to gain their help with this.<sup>778</sup> Astyochus may well have received a bribe along with the other captains, or indeed a larger bribe considering his rank as admiral; however, it could be claimed that, like the other captains, he did not directly betray Sparta in doing this.

With regards to betraying Phrynichus' confidence we may suggest that, rather than going to Tissaphernes to betray Phrynichus, he went there to protest

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<sup>775</sup> Thucydides, VIII.78.

<sup>776</sup> Ellis, 1989, p. 75.

<sup>777</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.31.

<sup>778</sup> Thucydides, VIII.45.

about the supposed support Tissaphernes was giving the Athenians.<sup>779</sup> This seems the more likely actions of a man who is later found being treated with respect and was seemingly acquitted of the charges of medism. It is worth noting that Spartans convicted of medism either escaped to Persia, as did Demaratus, or they were condemned and executed, as was Pausanias. The fact that Astyochus was both alive and apparently well in Sparta after these charges had been brought against him by the Peloponnesians further confirms his apparent acquittal.

Having acquitted Astyochus of the charges of medism, we can look to their causes. It is clear that the Peloponnesian fleet was disaffected and this stemmed from their irregular and reduced pay from Tissaphernes. Despite previous pro-Persian sentiments, we can see that the negative connotations of medism could quickly be recalled when the relationship between Sparta and Persia soured. However, it should be noted that the charges against Astyochus are now an exception to the general rule of pro-Persian sentiment. We can see how, even remotely, Tissaphernes, and, therefore, the Persian Empire, was able to affect Peloponnesian morale. By financing the Peloponnesian fleet and then removing this Tissaphernes had created an environment whereby the Peloponnesians were more desirous of a treaty with Persia than previously and would make further concessions in future negotiations.

#### Spartan-Persian Treaty – Third Revisions

Within three months of the breakdown in negotiations between Sparta and Tissaphernes both sides recognised the need for an alliance in order to achieve their aims; Sparta was unable to defeat the Athenian fleet and thus win the war, and Tissaphernes was unable to remove the remaining Athenians from his territory. In these new revisions to the treaty no mention is made regarding the territory of Darius beyond that which he currently held. Furthermore, Tissaphernes agreed to pay the Peloponnesians as in the second treaty, i.e. to pay those Peloponnesians in Persia who had been invited there by Darius, until a Persian fleet arrived to relieve them. However, the treaty also stated that, once

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<sup>779</sup> Ellis, 1989, p. 75.

the King's fleet had arrived, the Peloponnesians would be responsible for funding their own fleet but, should they wish, Tissaphernes could finance the fleet and the Peloponnesians would be able to repay him after the war had finished. Also, there was a clause stating that the King's fleet and the Peloponnesian fleet were to act in concert and a peace treaty with Athens could only be concluded if both Sparta and Persia were involved.<sup>780</sup> We see in these third revisions that the clause, which had previously stated that all of the territory belonging to Darius and his ancestors should be relinquished to Persia, was replaced with one stating that only the territory belonging to Darius at that time would be included. The clause regarding the funding of the fleet suggests that, whilst Tissaphernes was willing to compromise, he wanted Sparta to remember which was the dominant power in their relationship. The necessity for three revisions to the treaty show the difficulties of both sides working together as relative equals.

### Sparta and Pharnabazus

Despite the third revisions of the treaty, Tissaphernes continued to pay the Peloponnesian fleet inadequately,<sup>781</sup> and, so, Sparta sent Clearchus to make an agreement with Pharnabazus, who was still making overtures to the Peloponnesians for assistance in removing Athenian control from the Ionian cities in his satrapy.<sup>782</sup> Similar to Tissaphernes apparently demonstrating his other options to the Spartans prior to the third revisions of the treaty, we find here that when Tissaphernes continued to be difficult the Spartans were able to go to Pharnabazus instead. At this time Byzantium had offered to revolt<sup>783</sup> and the potential to interrupt the Athenian controlled grain routes to Greece was an

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<sup>780</sup> Thucydides, VIII.58. Paci, 2008, pp. 225-240, believes that Thucydides' language here reflects the language of the decree and that there is a strong possibility that he had seen the actual treaty.

<sup>781</sup> Lewis, 1997, p. 374, notes that Tissaphernes "merely promised a *trophe* for a Spartan fleet. Pharnabazus' envoys actually had 25 talents with them."

<sup>782</sup> Thucydides, VIII.99. Xenophon, Hellenica, I.3.15, states Clearchus later became the "Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρμοστής" for Byzantium.

<sup>783</sup> Thucydides VIII.80, ἅμα καὶ τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐπειρηκεύετο αὐτοῖς ἀποστήναι.

additional incentive for the Spartans to visit Pharnabazus in the Hellespont.<sup>784</sup> Clearchus was sent to Chalcedon and Byzantium because he was proxenos of Byzantium.<sup>785</sup> Krentz's belief that Clearchus' only aims were to arrange a treaty with Pharnabazus and to bring about the rebellion in Byzantium seems short sighted.<sup>786</sup> I agree it is likely that Xenophon had read Thucydides prior to his writing the *Hellenica*, but it is unlikely that the Spartans had not considered the Athenians' grain supplies when they agreed to support Pharnabazus and the rebellion of Byzantium. After 20 years of war, during which time Athens' crop fields had been routinely destroyed, the Athenians were dependent on the grain coming from the Hellespont. As we observe at the end of the Peloponnesian War, once these supplies were intercepted the city starved. Sparta will have known of this Athenian dependency on grain from the Hellespont and, we must assume, it was a factor in their decision to support Pharnabazus and Byzantium.

Having concluded an arrangement with Sparta, we can see that Pharnabazus enthusiastically supported the Peloponnesians whilst they were operating in the Hellespont. At *Hellenica* I.1.6 we find evidence of Pharnabazus' cavalry supporting the Spartans in an engagement against the Athenian forces at Abydos. This episode in Xenophon continues the narrative of the Peloponnesian war from Thucydides.<sup>787</sup> Xenophon also narrates Alcibiades' statement that the Peloponnesians had "unlimited funding from the King" at that time, most likely referring to the financial support given by both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes to maintain the Peloponnesian fleet.<sup>788</sup> Furthermore, after Hermocrates the Sicilian had denounced Tissaphernes at the Spartan assembly, he visited Pharnabazus and received funding "before he asked for it."<sup>789</sup> Hermocrates will be discussed in greater detail later, but it is worth noting here that Pharnabazus' financial aid also extended to Sparta's allies and we can see that Persian influence by this time

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<sup>784</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* I.1.36.

<sup>785</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* I.1.35.

<sup>786</sup> Krentz, 1989, p. 107, n. 35.

<sup>787</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIII.45. The episode is depicted with minor differences by Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, but both sources agree that during the battle Pharnabazus' cavalry supported the Peloponnesians, and in Xenophon's account we are told that Pharnabazus himself rode into the sea during this battle.

<sup>788</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.15. Xenophon's use of "ἄφθονα" (bountiful) most likely refers to Tissaphernes' support rather than Pharnabazus' who, as we have seen above, was sporadic with his assistance.

<sup>789</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.31.



still reached as far as Sicily.<sup>790</sup> We find Pharnabazus helping the Peloponnesians further when Alcibiades blockaded Chalchedon, after his success at Abydos.<sup>791</sup> The Peloponnesians, led by Hippocrates, were defeated in battle and Hippocrates himself was killed. The result of this second defeat was the conclusion of a temporary treaty between Athens and Pharnabazus, who agreed to give the Athenians 20 talents and to convey Athenian envoys to the Great King. It was also agreed that the Chalchedonians should pay Athens the usual tribute and their missed arrears and the Athenians would not wage war against Chalchedon until their envoys returned.<sup>792</sup> The Chalchedonians had clearly not been paying tribute to Athens prior to this, which indicates it is likely they were paying some form of tribute to Pharnabazus. Whether this was due to pro-Persian or anti-Athenian sympathies is not apparent. It is worth noting that, although the Athenians and their allies requested “safe conduct ... to the king”, the envoys never actually made it there as they were delayed by Pharnabazus for three years, on the advice of Cyrus the younger, before returning to Greece having achieved nothing.<sup>793</sup>

Xenophon mentions that at the same time that the Athenian embassy journeyed to Darius II, an embassy of the Lacedaemonians was also sent.<sup>794</sup> We do not hear of this embassy later in Xenophon and may conjecture that it may be the same embassy that visited Cyrus with Lysander at *Hellenica*, 1.V.2. Looking at the Spartan embassy we find that two of the three had previously worked alongside either Tissaphernes or Pharnabazus.

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<sup>790</sup> We find during the Persian invasion Gelon of Sicily, ‘hedging his bets’ but still suitably respectful of Persian ambition, sent a man with earth and water, and gold, to submit to Xerxes’ should he succeed in conquering Greece. Cf. p. 90 above. Also, before this, Herodotus, III, 136-137 states that when Darius I sent Democedes of Croton to reconnoitre Greece, Democedes escaped and was pursued to Tarentum, suggesting the Persians were happy to sail as far as southern Italy at this time.

<sup>791</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.3.5-9.

<sup>792</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.3.8-9.

<sup>793</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.4.7. Mosley, 1973, p. 19, claims that the fact that the Athenian envoys were delayed by winter but the Spartan envoys arrived at the King’s court just before winter, suggests that the Athenian envoys had followed the Spartans soon after. This “indicates that Alcibiades and the Athenians had obtained some information on Spartan intentions, and only just failed in an attempt to achieve a speedy diplomatic counter-stroke.”

<sup>794</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.3.13. Πασιππίδας καὶ ἕτεροι, μετὰ δὲ τούτων καὶ Ἐρμοκράτης, ἤδη φεύγων ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πιρόξενος.

Pasippidas previously had been exiled from Sparta having been held responsible for the rejection of the Spartan sympathisers at Thasos, in collusion with Tissaphernes.<sup>795</sup> It is believed that he had been recalled from exile by the time of the embassy to Darius, since he is mentioned at the time of the Spartan embassy sent to Susa after Alcibiades' victory at Chalcedon. It would be impossible for Pasippidas to hold a command at this time, if he was still an exile. Clearly he had been acquitted of the charges of medism by this time.<sup>796</sup> Hermocrates was a very prominent Syracusan general and had been exiled from Syracuse after the naval battle at Cyzicus.<sup>797</sup> We have seen above that, by working with the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War, Hermocrates came into contact with Pharnabazus and was able to use this to his own advantage. It was whilst he was working with the Spartans that Hermocrates was denounced by his political opponents and exiled.<sup>798</sup> Later he approached Pharnabazus "since he had struck up a friendship with (him),"<sup>799</sup> accepted his gold to rebuild a fleet and hired mercenaries for a personal campaign against Syracuse in which he was killed.<sup>800</sup> Whilst this seems to have been the last time Persian influence may have been felt as far as Sicily, it demonstrates that when offered the opportunity to expand her influence Persia couldn't resist.

Hermocrates demonstrates that, although not a mainland Greek, but a Sicilian, his contact with Pharnabazus via Sparta enabled him to access Persian gold to fund his own personal agenda. It may seem obvious but, had Hermocrates not led a fleet to assist Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, he would not have come into contact with Pharnabazus. We are told that Hermocrates was a persuasive orator and a more than competent general;<sup>801</sup> he likely persuaded Pharnabazus of the advantages of giving him gold to build a fleet and mercenaries to man it. We might even suppose that this may be an early example of Persian intervention in "Greek" affairs in order to consolidate a

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<sup>795</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.32.

<sup>796</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.3.13-17.

<sup>797</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.27.

<sup>798</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.27.

<sup>799</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIII.63.

<sup>800</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIII.75.

<sup>801</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.1.31., Thucydides, IV.58. For the speeches of Hermocrates see Thucydides, IV.58-65, VI.32-35, VI.72-73, VI.75-81.

Greek fighting force for Persian use. As we shall see, this practice became common in the fourth century. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Pharnabazus funded Hermocrates' campaign in order to secure the extra 35 Sicilian triremes, which had previously been part of the Peloponnesian fleet and which were now absent. We may conjecture that, although Hermocrates had been exiled from Sicily, this did not mean that, once he returned, the men who had previously been under his command would not serve with him again. Diodorus Siculus' claims that Pharnabazus was influenced by his personal friendship with Hermocrates may not be implausible; Pharnabazus no doubt respected Hermocrates for his military capabilities. Thus, we may conclude that the combination of Hermocrates' persuasion, the respect Pharnabazus probably had for Hermocrates' military abilities and, also, Pharnabazus' desire to reunite the 35 Sicilian triremes with the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet led to Pharnabazus granting gold to Hermocrates to campaign against Sicily.

It is perhaps as a result of the last two skirmishes in the Hellespont, at *Hellenica*, I.2.15-17 and I.3.5-9, in addition to the attempt by the Athenians to contact Darius II, that Cyrus the Younger was appointed *Karanos*. We can see from the first half of *Hellenica* I that Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes clearly did not have control of the situation on the Ionian Coast. Tissaphernes seems to have been more successful than Pharnabazus in protecting the Ionian coast from Athenian incursions; however, he appears to have been concerned primarily with his own satrapy and not with the Ionian coast as a whole. We are told that Cyrus arrived in Ionia at the same time as a Spartan embassy from Persia led by Boeotius and so it is reasonable to assume that this embassy is somehow connected with the arrival of Cyrus. Xenophon states that Boeotius and his colleagues announced that the Spartans had achieved everything they wanted with the King.<sup>802</sup> Although we are not told what their aims were, we may conjecture that Boeotius may have been sent to Darius to complain about the lack of co-ordination between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. It is worth remembering that although Tissaphernes negotiated with the Spartans, the treaty

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<sup>802</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.4.2.

made was with the King and Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were merely acting on his behalf. Thus, the issues over pay with Tissaphernes and not employing the Phoenician fleet may have been discussed and Cyrus the Younger subsequently sent to take command of the situation. The appointment of Cyrus the Younger as *Karanos*, with wider powers than either Pharnabazus or Tissaphernes, will have provided strong leadership for the entire area rather than the divided leadership, which had been in place until then. It indicates that a possible reason for Alcibiades' success is that, although Tissaphernes was able to utilize the Peloponnesians against Alcibiades successfully, he did not want or was unable to help Pharnabazus do the same. A possible reason for this may be that Tissaphernes recognised that by stabilizing Pharnabazus' satrapy he would enable Pharnabazus to encroach on his own satrapy should the occasion arise. It is worth noting that in the Persian court rivalry amongst the satraps was keen and was used as a tool by the Great King to ensure that his satraps did not become a threat to himself.<sup>803</sup>

### Lysander and Cyrus

We learn that, upon the appointment of Cyrus as *Karanos*, Lysander, who was also newly appointed, visited Cyrus with some Lacedaemonian ambassadors.<sup>804</sup> Krentz believes that these were probably the same ambassadors who had already seen Darius II, mentioned above, i.e. Pasippidas, Hermocrates and Proxenus, however, it seems more likely to me that the Spartans would use Boeotius and his colleagues again since he seems to have been connected with Cyrus appointment and likely knew the prince.<sup>805</sup> According to Xenophon, Lysander's purpose was "to denounce the proceedings of Tissaphernes, and at the same time to beg Cyrus himself to show as much zeal as possible in the prosecution of the war".<sup>806</sup> The result of the meeting was Cyrus' promise of full backing from both himself and the King and we learn that, although initially Cyrus asserted he only had the power to give 30 minae per vessel, however

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<sup>803</sup> Keaveney, forthcoming.

<sup>804</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.4.1 and I.5.1. Lysander was put in command of the Spartan navy in 408 B.C. and it was from this position that he petitioned Cyrus.

<sup>805</sup> Krentz, 1989, p. 135. Xenophon, *Hellenica* I.4.7.

<sup>806</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.5.2.

many that may have been per month as expressly decreed by Darius, Lysander persuaded him to increase the sailors' pay from three obols to four obols.<sup>807</sup>

We learn later that, in response to Cyrus' support of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians attempted to send some ambassadors of their own to Cyrus, but were refused an audience. Xenophon notes that when Tissaphernes tried to intercede on their behalf he was unable to convince Cyrus to adopt his policy. Krentz suspects that the Athenian embassy was led by Alcibiades, believing that the generalised expression of "the Athenians"<sup>808</sup> and the lack of specific names of those involved in the embassy "conceals his failure in these negotiations."<sup>809</sup> Although this is possible, it is unlikely.

We can suggest that Cyrus' support for the Peloponnesians was based largely on his personal friendship with Lysander. Whilst this friendship is similar in some respects to that of Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, we can see that due to his royal status Cyrus was able to act more independently with regards to this friendship. Cyrus' treatment of Kallikratidas, who was Lysander's replacement upon the completion of his term in office as admiral, supports this notion. Xenophon tells us that Cyrus delayed his audience with Kallikratidas, infuriating the Spartan. Kallikratidas' comments from this episode highlight the official Spartan policy toward Persia, i.e. that the Spartans were courting Persia purely for financial help. That Kallikratidas did not obtain pay for his sailors because he refused to court Cyrus, demonstrates the degree of control Cyrus had over this Spartan-Persian relationship. It also demonstrates how much this relationship was founded on personalities. When the Peloponnesian fleet requested that Lysander resume command of the fleet from Kallikratidas, we are told that this request was supported by Cyrus.<sup>810</sup> Furthermore, when Lysander was reinstated as admiral (nominally as vice-admiral under Arakos), in response to this request, and sent with ambassadors to obtain funding from Cyrus, he was given all the finances he asked for. Indeed, he was given further funding when

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<sup>807</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.5.6. Mitchell, 1997, p. 119, notes that the story, as given by Xenophon, displays the language of "friendship-making".

<sup>808</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.5.8.

<sup>809</sup> Krentz, 1989, p. 137, n. 8-9.

<sup>810</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.1.7.

Cyrus was recalled to court.<sup>811</sup> It is apparent that the tensions between Lysander and Kallikratidas are mirrored in the relationship, or lack of relationship, between Kallikratidas and Cyrus, leading to the reinstatement of Lysander.

The strong relationship between Cyrus and Lysander, and by extension between Cyrus and Sparta, leads me to conclude that Cyrus may already have been fostering this relationship with a view to using Spartan hoplites to support his claim to the throne against that of his brother Artaxerxes. We may suggest that Cyrus' close relationship with Lysander stemmed not only from Cyrus' admiration of Lysander's military abilities,<sup>812</sup> but also from the belief that Lysander was more likely than Kallikratidas to support Cyrus in his rebellion, due to the *φιλία* which existed between them.

With Cyrus' support, Lysander defeated the Athenian fleet at Notium in 406 B.C. and at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.; he later took Athens itself at the end of the siege in September 404 B.C.<sup>813</sup> Plutarch attributes the installation of the thirty tyrants at Athens to Lysander and also the installation of Agesilaus to the Spartan throne after the death of Agis.<sup>814</sup> The installation of Agesilaus over Leotychides demonstrates the amount of personal influence Lysander carried in Sparta at that time. This is especially true when we consider that he was able to manipulate the interpretation of an apparently negative oracle in favour of Agesilaus.<sup>815</sup> Lysander's military prowess is evident from the fact he was given the command of the Spartan navy and it is easy to assume that he was heavily involved in the Peloponnesian war before 408 B.C. to warrant his receiving this command. Certainly his influence increased by his association with Cyrus, who seems to have favoured him. In the *Oeconomicus* Xenophon tells us of Lysander's praise of Cyrus' *paradeisos* at Sardis,<sup>816</sup> demonstrating Lysander's close personal relationship with Cyrus, which recalls the *paradeisos* Tissaphernes named after

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<sup>811</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.1.6-15.

<sup>812</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIII.70.3 claims that when they first met, Lysander *παροξύνει τὸν νεανίσκον εἰς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον* ([he stirred up the youth's enthusiasm for the war against the Athenians](#)).

<sup>813</sup> Plutarch, *Lysander*, XIV.

<sup>814</sup> For the Thirty see Plutarch, *Lysander*, XV, for the installation of Agesilaus see Plutarch, *Lysander*, XXII.

<sup>815</sup> The events and Graeco-Persian relations of the 4<sup>th</sup> century will be dealt with in full below, pp. 182-208.

<sup>816</sup> Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, IV.

Alcibiades.<sup>817</sup> The degree of friendship between Cyrus and Lysander can be seen in that it seems Lysander went to Cyrus on a personal initiative in order to acquire money for his fleet and that he was given this money, not as the representative of Sparta, but on a personal basis. This may not have been the original intent of the embassy, but it was the result, as is demonstrated by Lysander's treatment of Kallikratidas when Kallikratidas took over the fleet. It may be argued that, if the money given to Lysander was for the Spartan fleet in general, rather than Lysander's personal fleet, he would have left the money with Kallikratidas rather than "telling Kallikratidas that he must ask for it himself if he wanted it and must make his own arrangements to pay his men."<sup>818</sup> On this same note it may also be argued that, if Lysander was given money on a personal basis, it may have been that his relationship with Cyrus became greater than initially expected and his status increased whilst he was there. Therefore, it seems likely his personal importance may have been the result of his journey to Cyrus to ask for the money rather than the reason for it. Thus, we find that personal relationships now start to take precedence over political ones.

### **Summary and conclusions**

Reviewing Graeco-Persian relations during the Peloponnesian War, we can see that due to the complex and shifting nature of these relations it is necessary to furnish a detailed narrative since those relations are no longer as simple as they had been at the start of the fifth century. We see that the many embassies from Greece to Persia were primarily concerned with funding from the start of the War, and both Athens and Sparta sent embassies to Persia to win Persian financial support. Most striking about these early attempts for an alliance is the complete reversal of Greek opinion of Persia. The Peace of Callias seems to have been concluded not because both parties desired peace, but because they had fought themselves to a 'stand still'. Similarly, the Spartans had refused to work for Persian interests in the 460s, when Megabazus was sent with gold for them. However, in the space of 30 years we find both states pro-actively trying to make an alliance with Persia. Clearly during those years not only had

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<sup>817</sup> Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXIV

<sup>818</sup> Plutarch, *Lysander*, VI.

the relationship between the Greek states broken down, but also the relationship between the Greek states and Persia seems to have improved to such an extent that an alliance with that power was preferable to negotiations aimed at preventing the outbreak of war in 432 B.C.

By 425 B.C. Sparta had sent a number of embassies to Persia, but it was not until 412 B.C. that any formal alliance was concluded. It seems likely that Persia's support for Sparta was connected with Athens' Sicilian disaster and diminishing influence amongst the Ionian Greek cities. We may conjecture that Persia did not wish to repudiate its alliance with Athens until Athens was in a weakened state and Persia could take advantage of this. That said, Persia did not have a direct reason to repudiate the treaty until Athens supported the rebellion of Amorges, which directly conflicted with Persia's interests. It should be born in mind that Tissaphernes seems to have been sent to deal with Amorges in the first instance and his agreement with Sparta was simply part of his strategy to do this. Tissaphernes' treatment of the Peloponnesians after the capture of Amorges suggests his lack of interest in an alliance with Sparta once his primary aims had been achieved. What is apparent is that Darius II used his support of Sparta as leverage to confirm formal Greek renunciation of the Ionian Greeks and Greek recognition of his territory. The primary reason there were so many rescripts of the treaty between Sparta and Persia was because of the difficulties defining what territory belonged to Persia. Also, we should not discount the effect the distances involved when negotiating the terms may have upon the negotiation. It is easy to recognise that some of the terms, which were later revised, may have been agreed initially by Sparta as they wished to speed up the process in order to gain Persian gold sooner. This leverage seems to be a precursor to the King's Peace of 387/6 B.C. Despite Darius II's nominal involvement in the Spartan-Persian treaty and its revisions, it is clear that Tissaphernes viewed the Peloponnesians as hired mercenaries rather than allies. That Tissaphernes' treatment of the Peloponnesians could induce them to make an alliance with Pharnabazus, demonstrates the disunity within the Persian satrapal system. The lack of coordinated action from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, despite the Athenian encroachment into Ionia and Asia Minor, indicates that the Persian



custom of inducing the satraps to vie for power amongst themselves, thus distracting them from rebelling against the king, could interfere with more general Persian foreign policy. This is demonstrated further by the appointment of a *Karanos*, in the person of Cyrus the Younger, to co-ordinate a response to the Athenian threat to Persian interests. Although we have mentioned above that Cyrus seems to have arrived as the result of the embassy of Boeotius, I suggest that this was not precisely the case. The Athenian successes against Pharnabazus and the lack of co-ordination are the more likely reason for Cyrus' appointment and Boeotius, perhaps, may simply have been the messenger of these events. We do not know when Boeotius was sent to Darius II, but it is likely that he will have waited to travel back at the same time as Cyrus when the opportunity arose. The appointment of Cyrus the Younger further changed the dynamic of Graeco-Persian relations. For the first time the official relationship became based heavily on personalities. Cyrus' apparent youthful enthusiasm for the war against Athens and his friendship with Lysander resulted in regular pay for the Peloponnesian forces enabling them to defeat Athens in the Hellespont and, thus, in the War. We can see that the Peloponnesian War acted as a catalyst in the development of Graeco-Persian relations. It was because of this war that Sparta looked for Persian support, which overrode the previous, apparent aversion to an alliance.<sup>819</sup>

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<sup>819</sup> Sparta had rejected the Persian overtures during the previous Peloponnesian War, when Athens became involved in Inaros' Egyptian rebellion from the Persian Empire in the 460s.



## Chapter 6: Towards a Common Peace

### The Rebellion of Cyrus the Younger

The Spartan-Persian alliance during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War marked a distinct change in the relationship between Greek and Persian, and how the two peoples viewed each other. It could be argued that Greek involvement in the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger was the direct result of this alliance and marked the advent of the prolific use of Greek mercenaries overseas.<sup>820</sup> It is worth noting that by the end of the fifth century B.C. two generations had passed since the Persian invasions of 490 B.C. and 480/479 B.C. Furthermore, the Peloponnesian War had been waged from 432 B.C. until 404 B.C., and Persians had helped to fund the Peloponnesians from 412 B.C. Therefore, two, perhaps three, generations of Greeks will have grown up associating Persia with funding for the Peloponnesians War whilst losing the negative feelings resulting from the Persian Invasions of the early fifth century. Negative feelings also will have diminished as the survivors of the Persian Wars died from old age.

Not only will the Greek view of Persia's political relationship with Greece have changed, but culturally the Greeks will have become more familiar with Persia. M. Miller notes that, as a result of the spoils from the Persian Wars, Persian material culture will have been divided amongst those who fought and would have eventually filtered down through all levels of society.<sup>821</sup> Furthermore, we may argue that the continued campaigning in Asia Minor during the Pentecontaetia and the numerous embassies to Persia during the fifth century will have encouraged familiarity with Persia.<sup>822</sup> Thus, during the course

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<sup>820</sup> Xenophon, *Anabasis*, passim.

<sup>821</sup> Miller, 1997, p. 45. Miller specifically notes that the Greeks will have benefits from the spoils from the wrecked ships off Mount Athos and the capture of Mardonius' tent at Plataea. She believes that this will have been distributed amongst those Greeks present, following the example of the Athenians who planned to distribute the silver from the mines at Laurium before they were persuaded by Themistocles to build up their navy. Herodotus, VII. 144.

<sup>822</sup> Cf. Miller, 1997, passim, for the effect of Persian material culture on Athens during the fifth century and specifically the impact of Persian material culture on Athenian culture after the Persian Wars. Although Miller concentrates her study specifically upon Athens, we may suspect similar trends occurred across Greece. Also, Balcer, 1983, pp. 259-260.

of the fifth century, Persian material culture likely will have spread, however unevenly, throughout Greece.

The Peloponnesian experiences of working for Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger meant that these Greeks had become experienced in campaigning in Asia Minor prior to Cyrus' rebellion. Furthermore, it is clear that the Spartans had largely lost their fear of campaigning further in-land than the coasts of Asia Minor. M. Trundle notes that, although the idea of hiring mercenaries was not unusual during the sixth and fifth centuries,<sup>823</sup> it is at the end of the fifth century, with the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, that Greeks serving as mercenaries for non-Greek paymasters really "took off".<sup>824</sup> A number of factors caused this; the political upheavals which took place during the Peloponnesian War led to a large number of exiled Greeks turning to mercenary service to make a living. Many Greeks had lost their primary source of income during the war, in the case of Athens those who had previously farmed small holdings were destroyed by the annual Spartan invasions. Inflation of basic food prices, due to fewer farmed goods in Greece and the import of cheaper foods, which in turn were in high demand, forced many Greeks to look for better paid work.<sup>825</sup> H.F. Miller, citing Rostovtzeff, suggests that another cause of the inflation was the increasing availability of money from external sources in the forms of bribes, gifts and cash subsidies from Persia and, later, Macedon.<sup>826</sup> Isocrates, although prone to rhetorical exaggeration, is informative when he states that mercenaries were "wandering around for lack of even their daily bread."<sup>827</sup> Although poverty in Greece may have made it impossible for some Greeks to stay at home, wealthy

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<sup>823</sup> We find Greek cities hiring mercenaries from other Greek cities, for example, the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus hiring Argive mercenaries in 546 B.C. (Aristotle), *Athenian Constitution*, XVII.

<sup>824</sup> Trundle, 2004, pp. 44-46. Trundle notes an earlier instance of this in the Carians and Ionians who took service with Psammetichus in the sixth century B.C. (Herodotus, II.152-4; Diodorus Siculus, I.66.12, 67.1-3, 68.5), but describes this as an isolated incident prior to the fifth century B.C.

<sup>825</sup> Miller states that "in general prices doubled between 404 and 330, but wheat went up from two drachmae in 404 to ten around 300, while oil trebled in price." Miller, 1984, p. 154 following W. W. Tarn, 1930, pp. 98, 103, 110; *C.A.H.* V. pp. 24ff.; G. Glotz, 1926, p. 237.

<sup>826</sup> Miller, 1984, p. 154.

<sup>827</sup> Isocrates, *Philippicus*, 120.

Greeks, such as Xenophon, also became mercenaries, attracted by the promise of fame and Persian gold.<sup>828</sup>

Miller also believes that another factor was the growth of the Greek population since they did not practice primogeniture. Property was divided equally amongst the sons of a family resulting over time in smaller, poorer land holdings.<sup>829</sup> However, Miller does not take into account that the Greeks had been at war for 27 years and much of this excess man-power will have been absorbed by the military losses on both sides. A notable example of this are the Athenian losses suffered as a result of their disastrous Sicilian campaign.<sup>830</sup>

Taking into consideration these circumstances, and bearing in mind that many of these dispossessed Greeks had experienced 27 years fighting in the Peloponnesian War, it is not too surprising that many Greeks turned to mercenary service for their living.<sup>831</sup>

We have mentioned above that the increase in mercenary service is most noticeable with the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, against his brother, Artaxerxes II.<sup>832</sup> Cyrus the Younger had also been a contender for the throne and, upon losing, attempted to assassinate Artaxerxes II. The failed assassination resulted in the loss of Cyrus' prestige and lands, which Ruzicka believes were given over to Tissaphernes.<sup>833</sup> That Tissaphernes was unable to take full control of these lands seems to have been the result of a Cyrus' fleeing back to Sardis and resuming control *de facto*, although not *de jure*. Ruzicka believes that this situation was tolerated by Artaxerxes II, who was distracted by rebellions in Egypt and who was still receiving tribute from Cyrus. He notes that for Artaxerxes "this was a pragmatic arrangement which would permit him to concentrate on the recovery of Egypt."<sup>834</sup> However, whilst Artaxerxes II was preparing for his Egyptian campaign, Cyrus was planning his rebellion. Cyrus

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<sup>828</sup> Miller, 1984, pp. 59-60.

<sup>829</sup> Miller, 1984, p. 157.

<sup>830</sup> Thucydides, VII. 59-87.

<sup>831</sup> I suggest that any Greek under the age of 35 in 404 B.C. will have struggled to remember a time of peace prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>832</sup> Artaxerxes II took the throne of Persia upon the death of Darius II, in 404 B.C.

<sup>833</sup> Ruzicka, 1985, p. 208.

<sup>834</sup> Ruzicka, 1985, p. 208.

will have been fully aware that Artaxerxes' tolerance for him would end with his Egyptian campaign and likely planned to act whilst Artaxerxes and the majority of his forces were absent in Egypt. Xenophon records how "Cyrus sent messengers to Sparta and appealed to the Spartans to show themselves as good friends to him as he had been to them in their war with Athens."<sup>835</sup> The message referred to the financial aid Cyrus had given to Sparta from his personal funds, due to his friendship with Lysander, and also referred to the Phoenician navy, which had supported the Spartans in the war against Athens.<sup>836</sup> In response to this request Sparta sent Samius, the Spartan admiral, to Cyrus and also sent Cheirisophus with seven hundred hoplites, which joined Cyrus' army in Cilicia.<sup>837</sup> P.A. Rahe suggests that Cyrus, aware of their fighting reputation, desired to combine Greek hoplites with Persian cavalry, an idea, he suggests, which was originally conceived by Megabyzus during his rebellion from Artaxerxes I in the 440s.<sup>838</sup> Thus, Greek hoplites would seem an obvious source of man-power for Cyrus given his experience of them during the final years of the Peloponnesian War and also given that his own area of influence, and, therefore, the geography from which he could recruit his own men, had been curtailed by Artaxerxes II. It is worth noting that when Cyrus recruited his Greek mercenaries, they were led to believe they would be fighting either against the Cilicians<sup>839</sup> or against Tissaphernes.<sup>840</sup> When they became suspicious of Cyrus' true aim they mutinied.<sup>841</sup> Thus, we can see that whilst the Spartans were now happy to campaign further in-land than they had previously, they did not wish to antagonise Artaxerxes II. Sparta may have become bolder, but Sparta's

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<sup>835</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* III.1.1.

<sup>836</sup> The most notable use of the Persian funded navy was at the naval battle of Notium.

<sup>837</sup> For Samius, see *Hellenica*, III.1.1. In the *Anabasis* we are told that the Spartan triremes were being commanded by Tamos not Samius, *Anabasis* I.2.21. Diodorus claims that Tamos was the barbarian commander of the fleet but that the Spartan Samus, clearly a corruption of Samius, was the admiral contacted in the first place and Cheirisophus was the Spartan general commanding the hoplites. Diodorus Siculus, XIV.19.5.

<sup>838</sup> Rahe, 1980, p. 88.

<sup>839</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIII.19.3.

<sup>840</sup> Xenophon, *Anabasis*, I.1.6-9.

<sup>841</sup> Xenophon, *Anabasis*, I.3.1. Hamilton, 1970, suggests that between 405 and 401 there were three factions influencing Spartan foreign policy. The first two were led by Lysander and Agis respectively, both of these factions favoured Spartan overseas campaigning and the financial benefits this brought, the primary difference between the two factions being that of leadership. The third faction influencing Spartan foreign policy was led by Pausanias, who favoured a conservative foreign policy akin to that of the early fifth century.

lingering fear of Persia meant the Spartans were still respectful of Artaxerxes II. Xenophon states that Cyrus also used personal connections to recruit mercenaries, to support the army he had raised from his own territory in Ionia.<sup>842</sup> Miller suggests the likelihood that a system for recruiting mercenaries which utilised the Greek institution of *proxenoi* was in place by the time Cyrus recruited his Greeks. She suggests that the majority of the mercenaries recruited were the equivalent of the retainers of the Greeks Cyrus had contacted.<sup>843</sup> Thus “the Greek army was originally composed of separate contingents commanded by Xenias, Proxenus, Sphaenetus, Pasion, Meno, Clearchus and Chirisophus”.<sup>844</sup> L.G. Mitchell notes that these generals were nearly all there as *χένοι* of Cyrus, which we may suggest was likely the due to their campaigning with him during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>845</sup>

We need not discuss here the details of Cyrus’ rebellion and the retreat of the Greek mercenaries back to the coast of Asia Minor. Suffice it to say that, although defeating Artaxerxes II’s army at Cunaxa, Cyrus was killed in the battle and the Greek mercenaries were pursued to the coast of Asia Minor chased by Persian forces. The closeness of Cyrus and his Greek mercenaries is noticeable early in his campaign and a good example of this is found in the trial of Orontas, who had betrayed Cyrus three times. Cyrus invited Clearchus the Spartan to sit as one of the judges, which was unusual given that Persians generally believed non-Persians to be inferior.<sup>846</sup> That said, we can see that the relationship between Cyrus and his mercenaries was essentially pragmatic. Furthermore, their reluctance to fight against Artaxerxes II suggests that they still held a certain amount of fear and respect for him at this time.

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<sup>842</sup> Xenophon, *Anabasis*, I.2.1-4, names: Clearchus the Lacedaemonian exile, Aristippus the Thessalian, Xenias the Arcadian, Proxenus the Boeotian, Sphaenetus the Stymphalian, Socrates the Achaean and Pasion the Megarian

<sup>843</sup> Miller, 1984, pp. 105-106. See also Mitchell, 1997, p. 120.

<sup>844</sup> Roy, 1967, p. 287.

<sup>845</sup> Mitchell, 1997, p. 120.

<sup>846</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I.6. Cf. p. 77 for the mistrust of Demaratus by Achaemenes in Herodotus, VII.263. Also Herodotus, V.23 for Megabazus’ mistrust of Histiaeus. For the trial of Orontas see Keaveney, 2012.

We may observe that the actions of the Greek mercenaries in Asia Minor can be seen as a direct forerunner to Spartan campaigning in Ionia, ostensibly to liberate the Ionian Greeks, who had sided with Cyrus against Artaxerxes and who expected reprisals. The experiences of the 'Cyreans' in Persia was a turning point in Graeco-Persian relations in that, after this, we find further instances of Greeks being employed overseas as mercenaries. As a result of the Greeks obtaining a wider knowledge of the Persian Empire and deploying their mercenaries in Asia Minor, Persian fear of a Greek invasion became a new factor in Persia's Fourth century foreign policy; an inversion of the Fifth century situation.

### The Spartan invasion of Asia Minor

After the defeat of Cyrus, Artaxerxes gave the satrapies which had previously belonged to him to Tissaphernes, who then "demand(ed) the submission of all the Greek cities in Ionia."<sup>847</sup> These cities sent ambassadors to Sparta requesting protection from Tissaphernes' reprisals. Thus, we find that the issue of the liberation of the Ionian Greeks from Persia resurfaces again.<sup>848</sup> Xenophon gives no further details of this embassy, but states that Sparta sent Thibron, as governor, to the Greeks in Asia.<sup>849</sup> Westlake suggests that Tissaphernes was likely the cause of the Spartan invasion, primarily because of his belligerence to the Ionian Greeks in the belief that the Spartans would not send the requested aid. However, all of the evidence would seem to be against this theory.<sup>850</sup> He was given command of the combined Spartan and Athenian troops and others he had raised from mainland Greece;<sup>851</sup> he was later joined by

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<sup>847</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.1.3. Ruzicka, 1985, p. 205, notes that Tissaphernes may have been given the lands of Cyrus as early as 404 B.C., as the result of Cyrus' attempted assassination of Artaxerxes II. Also, cf. p. 184.

<sup>848</sup> Cf. R. Seager and C. Tuplin, 1980, *passim*, for a discussion on the concept of the Greeks of Asia Minor being considered a whole body.

<sup>849</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.1.

<sup>850</sup> Westlake, 1981, pp. 277.

<sup>851</sup> Xenophon states specifically that the Athenians sent cavalry who had served under the Thirty, indicating the Athenian attitude at the time. The Athenians obviously did not trust Sparta or Spartan elements within the city. Sending a large portion of these Spartan elements to serve in Asia Minor not only obeyed the orders sent from Sparta but also removed a large portion of the Pro-Spartan threat from the city. This brings to mind similar action by Polycrates who sent political opponents to Egypt for Cambyses' campaign, and, also, when Thebes sent men with Leonidas to Thermopylae. Cf. p. 17 and p. 101.



the remnants of those Greek mercenaries who had marched with Cyrus against Artaxerxes. The embassies sent by the Greeks of Asia Minor instigated the Spartan campaigning there, and we can suggest that the Ionian Greeks merely gave Sparta the excuse it needed to execute a plan already conceived. Ryder argues that the Spartan surrender of the Ionian Greeks in favour of Persian aid during the final years of the Peloponnesian war had caused concern in Sparta as early as 406 B.C.<sup>852</sup> At the start of the fifth century Sparta had refused to help the Ionian Greeks, led by Aristagoras, due to the distance of Ionia from the Peloponnese. Similarly, Sparta relinquished leadership of the Hellenic League to Athens in 478 B.C. after the area of operations had moved to the coast of Asia Minor. However, in 401 we see a very different response to the Ionian plea for help. The Spartan experiences during the Peloponnesian War and their involvement in Cyrus' rebellion had changed the Spartan attitude of isolationism. It is interesting to ponder that, had Cyrus won at Cunaxa, the Spartan relationship with Persia may have been very different. The march of the Ten Thousand had not only proved that the Persian Empire was not impregnable, but it also widened the scope of Greek geographical knowledge. This knowledge, combined with the recent naval experiences from the Peloponnesian War, meant that many in Sparta no longer felt that the distance was so great as to be prohibitive. Sparta's involvement in Cyrus' rebellion soured the Spartan relationship with Persia and, shortly after the Ionian Greek cities requested help, Agesilaus authorised Thibron's invasion.<sup>853</sup>

In Asia Minor Thibron subdued some of the Ionian Greek cities whilst other cities willingly joined him. Notable were Teuthrania and Halisarna, cities belonging to Eurysthenes and Procles,<sup>854</sup> the sons of Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who had joined Xerxes on his invasion of Greece. Likewise, Gorgion, ruler of Gambrium and Palaegambrium, and Gongylus, ruler of Myrna and

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<sup>852</sup> Thucydides, VIII.58. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.1.3, Ryder, 1965, p. 11. Thucydides, VIII.37, states that in the terms of the peace treaty between Sparta and Persia, Sparta agreed not to attack, injure or exact tribute from any cities or countries that belong to Darius, including those cities on the Ionian coast. Cf. p. 165 above.

<sup>853</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.2.15

<sup>854</sup> Procles had served with Cyrus in his *Anabasis*, and informed the Greeks of Cyrus' death after the battle of Cunaxa. *Anabasis*, 2.1.3

Gryneum, both of whom were descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, joined him.<sup>855</sup> Gongylus, the father, is best known as the man who returned the Persian nobles to Xerxes, who had been captured by Pausanias on Cyprus, and supposedly he also bore Pausanias' first letter to Xerxes in the 460s.<sup>856</sup> The presence here of Gongylus' descendants settled with their own cities indicates the family had provided some good service to Xerxes, or to one of Xerxes' successors, after Gongylus had arrived in Persia, and they had been rewarded accordingly.<sup>857</sup> This reminds us once again that refugees were welcome in the Persian Empire.

We do not learn what happened to Gongylus and Gorgion after Agesilaus' retreat from Asia Minor. Presumably they were punished for joining Thibron's forces during the Spartan invasion. It is interesting to observe that due to their location the descendants of Demaratus and Gongylus were caught between the Peloponnesian invasion force and the Tissaphernes' and Pharnabazus' forces. Therefore, they seem to have had little choice but to side with whichever one was 'on their door step' at the time.

#### Dercylidas in Asia Minor

Thibron was replaced by Dercylidas, whilst he was at Ephesus, preparing for the campaign into Caria.<sup>858</sup> From the actions of Dercylidas, who exploited the tension between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, we can see that the Persian response to the Spartan invasion had reverted to the same response as when the Athenians had supported Amorges and were fighting in Asia Minor. Both satraps were dealing with the Spartan invasion without working together, thus, Dercylidas was able to come to terms with Tissaphernes and concentrate his efforts against Pharnabazus. Dercylidas, after some initial campaigning in Pharnabazus' satrapy, also made a truce with him which allowed Dercylidas to

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<sup>855</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.1.6-7

<sup>856</sup> Thucydides, 1.28. We are not told why Gongylus wished to medise, we know simply that he was exiled from Eretria for his pro-Persian sympathies. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.1.6.

<sup>857</sup> Ibid.

<sup>858</sup> *Hellenica*, III.1.8. Thibron had been denounced by Sparta's Ionian allies for exploiting them and so Dercylidas was sent to replace him. Westlake, 1981, p. 259, notes that Thibron's treatment of the allied Ionian Greek cities suggests lack of funding.

winter his troops in Bithynian Thrace.<sup>859</sup> This truce was later renewed allowing Dercylidas to cross the Hellespont to Greece, to build a wall cutting off the Chersonese to protect it from Thracian invasions.<sup>860</sup> According to Diodorus the truce was set for 8 months.

When Dercylidas returned to Asia, Sparta received ambassadors from the Ionian Greek cities advising that Dercylidas should attack Tissaphernes' own establishment at Caria, in order to persuade him to give the Ionian Greek cities their independence.<sup>861</sup> Westlake points out that, although Tissaphernes held the superior command, Dercylidas seems to have concentrated his efforts against Pharnabazus, who was given little aid by Tissaphernes.<sup>862</sup> It is likely, therefore, that the Ionian Greeks believed that if Dercylidas were to attack Caria, this would put pressure on Tissaphernes to grant them autonomy.<sup>863</sup> This tactic seems to have worked as Dercylidas was ordered to invade Caria prompting Tissaphernes to arrange a meeting for himself, Pharnabazus and Dercylidas, to discuss the terms of a possible truce. That Tissaphernes organised this meeting is significant as it indicates the degree of disruption Dercylidas was causing in Asia Minor. Dercylidas' terms, which became a Spartan slogan for much of their campaigning in Ionia, were that the "King should allow the Greek cities their independence,"<sup>864</sup> whilst Tissaphernes' and Pharnabazus' terms were that "the Greek army should leave the country and the Spartan governors should be withdrawn from the cities."<sup>865</sup> Whether both sides actually wanted to agree a formal treaty is unclear and appears unlikely given the generally local nature of the skirmishes. Neither set of terms may be seen as conducive to arranging a permanent treaty with a wider significance, yet we are told that the two sides made a truce to last until both Artaxerxes and Sparta had been consulted. In making the truce, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear to have achieved their aim of halting the Greek forces, *de facto*. Xenophon does not return to this matter,

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<sup>859</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.2.1.

<sup>860</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.38.7, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.2.8.

<sup>861</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.2.12.

<sup>862</sup> Westlake, 1981, p. 259.

<sup>863</sup> Westlake, 1981, p. 258, notes that Artaxerxes was apparently content that the Ionian Greek cities pay tribute to him, but that it was Tissaphernes who desired to deprive them of their autonomy.

<sup>864</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.2.20.

<sup>865</sup> *Ibid.*

which we may propose is confirmation of this. The terms given by each side were not likely to be approved by the other and yet, by seeking permission from their respective higher authorities, time was bought. We may observe that the Persians appear to have benefited more from this situation than the Spartans, who were prevented from harassing Persian territory, which gave Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus time to recover before resuming hostilities. At the same time the delay forced Dercylidas' forces to remain unproductive whilst using up their limited supplies. It can be suggested that Tissaphernes' request for a truce and the terms given by each side were simply a Persian delaying tactic, which temporarily neutralised the Spartan military threat. Dercylidas' demands that Artaxerxes give the Ionian Greeks their independence, suggests that he was unable to achieve this aim by military means alone. It is worth noting that Dercylidas was outnumbered considerably by the Persian army; Diodorus Siculus tells us that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had "twenty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry" whereas Dercylidas had "in all not more than seven thousand men."<sup>866</sup> For Dercylidas the decision to risk his men, who were so greatly outnumbered, in a pitched battle or have them safely removed to another place does not seem too difficult to comprehend, especially if we consider the decreasing number of Spartiates back in Sparta.<sup>867</sup> Westlake disputes Xenophon's reasoning that Tissaphernes proposed negotiations from fear of the Cyrean Greeks with Dercylidas. He conjectures that Tissaphernes' lack of interest in fighting was motivated by the belief that he stood a better chance of achieving his aims by deceit and/or bribery rather than by military efforts.<sup>868</sup> Westlake is probably correct in this assertion, we know that Tissaphernes was a wily character;<sup>869</sup> however, it should be borne in mind that

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<sup>866</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39.5. As these seven thousand men will have included roughly that many 'Cyreans' we can suggest that Diodorus Siculus is exaggerating the low number of Greeks for dramatic purposes. That said, I still believe that the Persian forces will have outnumbered the Greeks by roughly 2:1.

<sup>867</sup> When Agesilaus campaigned in Asia Minor he took with him primarily allied troops and *neodamadeis*, emancipated helots, only taking 30 full Spartiates in advisory roles. Xenophon, *Hellenica*. III.4.2. Cartledge, 1979, p. 276 notes the omission of spartiate or perioikic hoplites and the large number of *neodamodeis* sent with Agesilaus in 397 B.C.

<sup>868</sup> Westlake, 1981, p. 264, bases this belief on the lack of Spartan finances at this time, maintaining that Tissaphernes perhaps hoped that this would result in the withdrawal of Dercylidas.

<sup>869</sup> Cf. Xenophon, *Hellenic*, II.5, for Tissaphernes' murder of the Greek generals who went to see him under truce.

Greek hoplites had a reputation for being better than Persian infantry. Furthermore, the Cyreans had an even stronger reputation, having survived months of harassment during their return to the coast of Asia Minor. Therefore, I don't think we can discredit Xenophon's reasoning out of hand. The reputation of the Cyreans as well as the general reputation of Greek hoplites, I believe, will have been a factor in Tissaphernes reasoning.

### The invasion of Agesilaus

Shortly after the accession of Agesilaus at Sparta in 397 B.C., we learn from Xenophon that a Syracusan merchant, named Herodas, arrived in Sparta stating that he had observed Phoenician triremes being prepared for Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes II.<sup>870</sup> It is worth remembering that the Persian Royal Navy predominantly comprised Phoenician ships and that the Royal Navy was employed only at the command of the king himself. Therefore, the sight of them suggests they were part of grander naval plans for the Aegean wider than heretofore seen.<sup>871</sup> Certainly the Spartans will have viewed it this way, and they may have learnt that Conon had begun working with Pharnabazus by this time too.<sup>872</sup> In response to this information and on the advice of Lysander, Agesilaus prepared to campaign in Asia Minor himself. We learn that when Agesilaus had reached Ephesus "Tissaphernes sent to him,"<sup>873</sup> asking him why he was there. On Agesilaus' response, that his intent was to liberate the Ionian Greeks, Tissaphernes suggested making a truce until he could "send to the King."<sup>874</sup> As we are not told the outcome of the previous messengers sent by Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Dercylidas, mentioned in the *Hellenica* at III.2.10, we are left to assume that those proposals were unsuccessful. Tissaphernes' response to Agesilaus may be seen to confirm this. Buckler astutely notes that, since Agesilaus only had six months provisions for his forces, Tissaphernes seems to

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<sup>870</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.1. Note the similarity with Plutarch, *Nicias* XXX where the Athenians learn of their defeat at Syracuse from a barber. Mosley, 1973, p. 8, notes both instances for their evidence of how information on foreign policy was transmitted informally.

<sup>871</sup> Cf. p. 50 above for the creation of Persia's navy by Cambyses. Also, cf. p. 173 for observations of the command of the Phoenician fleet.

<sup>872</sup> It seems likely that the fleet Herodas saw being prepared was part of the same fleet under Conon's command.

<sup>873</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.5.

<sup>874</sup> *Ibid.*

have been simply buying time for these supplies to run out whilst saving his own troops from any fighting.<sup>875</sup> We may observe that Tissaphernes was simply repeating the tactics, which had seemingly already worked on Dercylidas and which would buy time for the completion of the Persian fleet observed by Herodas. Buckler rightly calls Tissaphernes disingenuous as the conversation between Agesilaus and Tissaphernes borders on farcical and Tissaphernes broke his side of the agreement immediately. Although Westlake believes that Tissaphernes' breaking of the truce is "questionable" and may have been Spartan propaganda, this seems unlikely given Tissaphernes' subsequent behaviour.<sup>876</sup> Hamilton suggests that one reason Agesilaus agreed to the truce with Tissaphernes was so that he could familiarise himself with the locality. He suggests also that Agesilaus used the time to establish his own authority over his army, which had previously been under the commands of Thibron and Dercylidas.<sup>877</sup> He notes that during the time of the truce Agesilaus ended a lot of the civil disorder that was affecting the Ionian cities at the time, earning good will and becoming further acquainted with the geography of Ionia. The result of the truce was that Agesilaus was delayed from damaging Tissaphernes' land, allowing time for Tissaphernes' reinforcements to arrive. From his new position with an army to back him Tissaphernes demanded that Agesilaus leave Ionia to avoid a declaration of war.

Agesilaus eventually was recalled to Sparta by the outbreak of the Corinthian War, having campaigned for only 2 years in Asia Minor. Whilst in Asia Minor his most notable success was his victory over Tissaphernes at the battle of Sardis.<sup>878</sup> This resulted in Tissaphernes' execution and replacement by Tithraustes.<sup>879</sup> Krentz correctly notes that the direct intervention of Artaxerxes

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<sup>875</sup> Buckler, 2003, p. 61.

<sup>876</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.6. Westlake, 1981, p. 265.

<sup>877</sup> Hamilton, 1991, p. 96. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.7-10, finds Agesilaus curbing Lysander's authority and Lysander's departure for service in the Hellespont.

<sup>878</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.22-25. Cf. Gray, 1981, for discussion on the particulars of the Battle of Sardis.

<sup>879</sup> Westlake, 1981, pp. 268-276, suggests that Tissaphernes' inactivity and refusal to work with Pharnabazus was reported to Artaxerxes as potentially rebellious. His defeat at Pactolus, he suggests, was the final evidence which condemned him. For a detailed discussion and bibliography regarding the relationship of Tissaphernes and Agesilaus see Orsi, 2008, pp.209-224.

highlights the severity of the Persian defeat in this battle.<sup>880</sup> Upon his appointment Tithraustes sent a message to Agesilaus claiming that Tissaphernes had been the cause of the conflict between Sparta and Persia, he had now been executed and that the Ionian Greeks were free to govern themselves. Therefore, Artaxerxes required that Agesilaus withdraw from Persia. Agesilaus agreed to withdraw as far as the territory of Pharnabazus whilst he waited for instructions from Sparta and was given supplies from Tithraustes to ensure he marched his army to Phrygia.<sup>881</sup>

Through his satraps we can see a change in Artaxerxes II's policy towards the Spartan invasion of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes had made a number of treaties in order to send to Artaxerxes for advice on the terms offered by Sparta, in this we can see that it was necessary for Tissaphernes to consult Artaxerxes II each time and, thus, all refusals in reality came from Artaxerxes. However, Tithraustes arrived in Asia Minor with a new policy having already been decided, i.e. that Artaxerxes was willing to let the Ionian Greeks govern themselves autonomously provided they paid the tribute they had previously paid to Persia. We do not know from Xenophon whether Ionian Greek tribute had previously been discussed, but it seems that after Agesilaus' victory at Sardis, Artaxerxes was willing to make nominal concessions to Sparta and the Ionian Greeks.<sup>882</sup>

The Spartan invasion of Asia Minor was a significant turning point in the relationship of the Greeks with Persia. The Spartan invasion broke Persian trust in them and put Persia on the defensive, making it necessary for Artaxerxes II to consult the other Greek states in order to remove these forces. Whilst we can observe a continued Persian policy of exploiting factionalism in Greece, we can see, also, that it opened the way for the other states to attempt to break Sparta's dominance in Greece.

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<sup>880</sup> Krentz, 1989, p. 191.

<sup>881</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.26. Diodorus Siculus, XIV.80, informs us that Tithraustes "concluded with him a truce of six months."

<sup>882</sup> Diodorus Siculus' account of the battle of Sardis differs drastically to that of Xenophon. The Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica* in the London fragments XI.3-12.4 gives a very similar account to that of Diodorus Siculus. McKechnie and Kern, 1988, p. 146, comment that Diodorus Siculus probably took his account from the account given by the Oxyrhynchus Historian.

We may also observe that as a result of the multiple re-negotiations of the terms of the treaty between the Spartans and Persians, with which we have been dealing in detail, both sides will have become better acquainted with each other when negotiating later treaties. A detailed treatment of these negotiations serves to highlight the increasing complexity of the relationship between the Greeks and Persia, especially when we compare these negotiations with the simple diktats sent from Persia in the fifth century.

### The Corinthian War

After the 6 month truce, Agesilaus resumed his campaigning in Asia Minor and we find that Artaxerxes II resorted to the tactic used by Artaxerxes I to remove the Athenians from Egypt in the 460s.<sup>883</sup> An embassy from Persia is recorded in Polyaeus, being sent to Greece, in 397/6, on the advice of Conon the Athenian.<sup>884</sup> According to Polyaeus, Conon suggested bribing the political leaders of the "cities of Hellas" in order that they would declare war on Sparta. He also notes that after war was declared Agesilaus was recalled from Asia indicating that his recall was, indeed, behind the Persian bribe. We are given no details by Polyaeus regarding those involved in bribing the Greeks, but Plutarch records Agesilaus' statement that "the King was driving him out of Asia with the help of ten thousand archers,"<sup>885</sup> referring to the archer motif on Persian darics. Fuller information can be obtained from Xenophon, who states explicitly, "Tithraustes ... sent Timocrates of Rhodes to Greece with gold to the value of fifty talents of silver and told him to distribute the money on the basis ... that they would make war on Sparta."<sup>886</sup> If we are to believe that it was Conon's idea to bribe the Greek states, we can assume that he, and through him Tithraustes who I believe sent Timocrates, understood how to manipulate the hostile Greek feelings toward Sparta. Xenophon states that Thebes, Corinth and Argos, accepted the bribe and that Athens, contrary to the Oxyrhynchus Historian, did

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<sup>883</sup> Cf. pp. 132-135.

<sup>884</sup> Polyaeus, *Stratagemata*, I.48.4.

<sup>885</sup> Plutarch, *Agesilaus* XV. The reference to the archers also indicates the Greek familiarity with Persian darics and may suggest a wide dissemination of these within Greece by this time.

<sup>886</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.5.1-2. Also, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1, Pausanias, III.9.7-8, Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, XX who believe that Tithraustes sent Timocrates, but the Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica* (London Fragment VII.5) implies Timocrates was sent by Pharnabazus.



not accept the gold, but still agreed to wage war against Sparta.<sup>887</sup> Anti-Spartan sentiments in Greece are demonstrable by the fact that there were at least 4 Greek states willing to wage war against Sparta by 397/6 B.C., one of which supposedly needed no further motivation in the form of Tithraustes' bribe. We noted above that this bribery may have been the suggestion of Conon. This may be indicative of Greek attitudes towards Persia; that Persian gold could be used to defray the expenses of their inter-state wars. It is also indicative of Persia's attitude towards the Greeks that they would take Persian gold when offered. The gold sent to all four states collectively, whether accepted or not, seems to have been the catalyst for the outbreak of the Corinthian War, but the primary cause of the war seems to have been general dissatisfaction with Spartan aggression after the Peloponnesian War.<sup>888</sup> We can surmise that the Persian gold, although not the primary cause of the Corinthian war, was an extra bonus which offset the costs of the campaign. G. Schepens notes that the Oxyrhynchus Historian offers a different chronology to Xenophon that Timocrates arrived with Persian gold after hostilities had started.<sup>889</sup> I prefer the chronology of Xenophon because once war had broken out in Greece and Agesilaus had been recalled, there would have been little point in Artaxerxes II sending gold – Persia would no longer have been affected. However, it was in the interests of Artaxerxes II to remove Agesilaus from Asia Minor and I believe that, knowing the unrest in Greece, Artaxerxes II knew it was likely the Greeks would accept the gold to offset the costs of war against Sparta. We find Artaxerxes II employing the familiar Persian tactic of exploiting Greek inter-state divisions; a tactic employed by Cyrus the Great, Darius I, Xerxes and Darius II.<sup>890</sup>

### Argos

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<sup>887</sup> Cf. p. 205, for the Oxyrhynchus Historian.

<sup>888</sup> McKechnie & Kern, 1988, p. 135.

<sup>889</sup> Schepens, 2012, p. 215. Schepens later argues that Xenophon's account demonstrates his Spartan sources for this period, which "exploited... the chronological coincidence of the war that had broken out in Greece with the one they were conducting in Persia" in order to gloss over dissatisfaction with Sparta, p. 232. March, 1997, p. 266, also believes that the Oxyrhynchus Historian offers a different chronology to Xenophon, but interprets Timocrates' arrival as prior to the Demaenetus affair.

<sup>890</sup> For Cyrus the Great see pp. 13-16, for Darius I see pp. 23, 30, 49, for Xerxes see Herodotus, VII. 32, and for Darius II see pp. 158-164.

Turning our attention to the causes of unrest in Greece, we can see that Argive acceptance of Persian gold is not at all surprising since Argos was constantly contesting Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnese. Sparta will have been even more of a threat to Argos after the Peloponnesian War with its increased revenue from the other Greek states and from its campaigning in Asia Minor. It is also worth pondering whether the treaty between Argos and Xerxes witnessed by Callias was still in effect? At present there is no way to know this.

### Thebes

Theban enmity toward Sparta was to such a degree at this time that they had refused to permit Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis when he was preparing his invasion of Asia Minor.<sup>891</sup> Hammond claims that when Thebes sheltered Athenian exiles from the Thirty Tyrants, prior to the Corinthian War, both Ismenias and Androclidas, who accepted the gold on behalf of Thebes, helped the exiles to plan their return to Athens.<sup>892</sup> Contrary to Pausanias and Plutarch,<sup>893</sup> I.A.F. Bruce suggests that it is unlikely that Ismenias deliberately caused the Corinthian War and believes that the Theban – Athenian alliance was a defensive one. He notes the Spartan aggression against Orchomenus “before the Theban ambassadors visited Athens to request an alliance.”<sup>894</sup> It is worth bearing in mind that an alliance with Athens may not have been guaranteed considering that Thebes, along with Corinth, had demanded the destruction of the city when it fell at the end of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>895</sup> Lendon notes that fear of Spartan imperialism and discontent at Spartan attempted interference with Theban internal politics were major factors in Theban defection from Sparta.<sup>896</sup> Whilst these sentiments seem to have replaced Theban fear of Persia, we should not

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<sup>891</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.4.3-4.

<sup>892</sup> Hammond, 1977, pp. 449-50, refers to Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.4.1 and Diodorus Siculus, XIV.6.3, who states that in Thebes, when the exiles were recalled by the Thirty Tyrants, they voted that “anyone witnessing an exile being led off and did not render him all aid within his power should be subject to a fine”.

<sup>893</sup> Pausanias, III.9.9, Plutarch, *Lysander*, XXVII.1. Also, Diodorus Siculus, XIV.82.7 for Ismenias persuading the Aenianians and Athamanians to secede from Sparta.

<sup>894</sup> Bruce, 1960, p. 82.

<sup>895</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.2.19.

<sup>896</sup> Lendon, 1989, p. 309, argues that the envoy sent to Thebes for men for Agesilaus' campaign against Persia was actually an attempt to support philo-Laonian factions in Thebes.

ignore long standing Theban pro-Persian sympathies which were apparent during the Persian invasions.

### Corinth

As with Thebes, it is probable that Corinth accepted Tithraustes' gold due to dissatisfaction with Spartan aggression at this time.<sup>897</sup> However, we find that accepting this gold caused civil unrest and dissension in Corinth. Xenophon mentions that during the Corinthian war a revolution took place due to a faction in Corinth desiring peace with Sparta.<sup>898</sup> This faction opposed those who had accepted the Persian gold, which obliged Corinth to continue the War, primarily because much of the fighting was taking place in Corinth and damaging Corinthian land. The account of the revolution given by Xenophon indicates that not everyone in Corinth was in favour of a war against Sparta, especially once the fighting had started. Therefore, it was necessary for Pharnabazus to encourage his Corinthian allies to "continue energetically with the prosecution of the war, and to show the King that they were men whom he could trust".<sup>899</sup> Thus, we can see that by accepting the gold the Corinthians, and likely the other Greek states which accepted Persian gold, seemingly became allies with Persia. Pharnabazus' language here indicates that Persia was firmly in control of this relationship as we find that it is the Greek states who seemingly need to win Artaxerxes II's trust and not him trying to win theirs.

Before leaving the Corinthians, Pharnabazus left more money with them, with which Corinth built a new fleet and took control of the gulf around Achaea and Lychaeum. It is apparent that Corinthian finances were not adequate prior to the additional gold given by Pharnabazus to carry on campaigning against Sparta to the extent desired by Pharnabazus. We may add that the receipt of this additional funding was a possible result of the civil unrest in Corinth mentioned above. Hamilton notes that the "U-turn" in Corinthian and Theban attitudes towards Sparta in the period between 404 B.C. and 395 B.C. stemmed from the Spartan refusal to listen to the proposals of Corinth and Thebes at the end of the

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<sup>897</sup> See Hornblower, 1982, and Hamilton, 1970, *passim*.

<sup>898</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV.4.1.

<sup>899</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.9.

Peloponnesian War; both Corinth and Thebes had proposed that the Athenians be enslaved and their city destroyed.<sup>900</sup> Not only did Sparta ignore the proposals of its allies but, furthermore, Lysander took all of the spoils from the war directly back to Sparta. Thebes was able to declare a tithe of the spoils from Decelea for Apollo at Delphi, but Corinth received nothing, despite having suffered from lack of income due to interruptions to trade during the war.<sup>901</sup> The anger of the Corinthians and Thebans is understandable, for they had entered into the Peloponnesian War as a member of the Peloponnesian League, and, thus, allies of Sparta. Sparta's refusal to consult its allies or share the spoils with them demonstrated a new Spartan attitude, which threatened Corinth and Thebes. This new Spartan attitude towards its allies is demonstrated by the Spartan interference in Syracuse, a Corinthian colony.<sup>902</sup>

### Athens

Turning our attention to Athens, the Oxyrhynchus Historian claims that Athens did accept Persian gold.<sup>903</sup> However, he also states that "all had long been ill-disposed towards the Spartans, looking out for a way that they might make the cities adopt a war policy."<sup>904</sup>

Athenian enmity towards Sparta will have increased upon the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War and with the Spartan introduction and support of the Thirty Tyrants, which caused so much civil unrest in the city. Hamilton suggests that many Athenians dreamt of the old "glory days" when Athens had its empire and many Athenians would have eagerly joined an alliance against Sparta in an attempt to reclaim its former position in Greece.<sup>905</sup> He further notes that Sparta's unwillingness to arbitrate over the Phocis-Locris affair confirmed Sparta's policy of aggression to Athens.<sup>906</sup> The sending of Demaenetus as an envoy to Conon seems to support the notion of revived Athenian imperialism in the fourth

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<sup>900</sup> Hamilton, 1991, p. 200.

<sup>901</sup> Hamilton, 1991, p. 199 and p. 261.

<sup>902</sup> Hornblower, 1992.

<sup>903</sup> Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica*, X.2. Cf. p. 204 for the contrary opinion of Xenophon.

<sup>904</sup> Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica*, VII.2.

<sup>905</sup> Hamilton, 1991, p. 165.

<sup>906</sup> Hamilton, 1991, p. 205.

century, although the subsequent abandonment of him would suggest that, at that time, the Athenians were still fearful of Spartan retribution.<sup>907</sup> R. Seager suggests that Thrasybulus, Aesimus and Anytus, named by the Oxyrhynchus Historian as those men in Athens who censured Demaenetus, did so due to the fear of a war against Sparta without allies and being unprepared.<sup>908</sup> However, he notes that, on the strength of the Theban speech to Athens persuading the Athenians to make an alliance, Xenophon “believed ... the Athenians were eager for the restoration of the empire.”<sup>909</sup> We can agree that, despite the apparent Athenian desire to regain her Empire, there were rivalries in the demos concerning when the opportune moment would be to instigate the break from Sparta. We have seen that similar divisions existed in Corinth.<sup>910</sup> The naval successes of Conon in the Aegean would have given the Athenian demos confidence, but the more conservative members of the demos clearly did not want to rebel against Sparta without allied backing. The offer of Persian support by Timocrates will have put pressure on this internal splitting of opinion, and Athens eventually decided to join Argos, Corinth and Thebes against Sparta.

We find further evidence of an Athenian–Persian “agreement” when Xenophon retrospectively narrates the previously omitted naval operations of the Corinthian War and he introduces Conon, the exiled Athenian general, who was working with Pharnabazus.<sup>911</sup> We will discuss the deeds of Conon later, but it is worth noting here confirmation of an apparent Athenian-Persian agreement, albeit possibly an unofficial one, in a united effort against Sparta. We see Conon and Pharnabazus working together against Abydos and Sestos, pro-Spartan cities which were supporting Dercylidas in Asia. Conon is clearly working with Pharnabazus against Greek cities ostensibly because of their Spartan sympathies.<sup>912</sup>

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<sup>907</sup> Demainetos took a trireme from Athens to aid Conon without the authority of the Athenian people.

<sup>908</sup> Seager, 1967, p. 96. Strauss, 1984, believes that the sending and then abandonment of Demaenetus was simply a symptom of the personal rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus.

<sup>909</sup> Seager, 1967, p. 98.

<sup>910</sup> Cf. pp. 206-207 above.

<sup>911</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV.8.

<sup>912</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* IV.8.6-7.

The Oxyrhynchus Historian informs us of another embassy sent after the Corinthian War had broken out. On this occasion we are told that “ambassadors had been sent to the Great King (led by) –krates and Hagnias and Tele(sag)oros.”<sup>913</sup> This is mentioned in the context of Athens’ anti-Spartan actions prior to the Demainetos incident. We are told by both the Oxyrhynchus Historian and Harpocration<sup>914</sup> that the embassy, which appears to have been led by Hagnias, was captured by the Nauarch Phrax and sent to Sparta where the ambassadors were executed.<sup>915</sup> After the fate of these ambassadors the Oxyrhynchus Historian continues where Polyaeus finishes by telling us that the money sent to bribe the Greeks was brought by Timocrates, of whom little else is known beyond this role.<sup>916</sup> Bruce, attempting to reconcile our two sources, suggests that this Athenian embassy led by Hagnias was actually an Athenian attempt to secure the gold offered by Timocrates, which had been initially rejected by the Athenians.<sup>917</sup>

### Conon

When discussing the Corinthian war it is appropriate to discuss Conon, the Athenian general who worked with Pharnabazus during the Corinthian War. Conon was elected as one of the ten generals who replaced Alcibiades after the Athenian naval defeat at Notium. He was the only general of the ten who was not condemned after the Athenian victory at Arginusae and one of the few who escaped the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami, making his way to the court of Evagoras at Salamis on Cyprus.<sup>918</sup> Conon was unable to return to Athens and, whilst at the court of Evagoras, he was appointed commander of the Persian fleet.<sup>919</sup> None of the sources explain much about the circumstances surrounding Conon’s appointment; we are simply told that Conon fled to the court of

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<sup>913</sup> Oxyrhynchus Historian, *Hellenica*, VII.1. Although only three names are found here, Mosley claims that the embassy contained more than three men. Mosley, 1973, p. 56.

<sup>914</sup> Harpocration, *Lexicon* sv Hagnias.

<sup>915</sup> This is the second time we hear of the violation of the sanctity of ambassadors. Cf. p. 154 above.

<sup>916</sup> Pausanias, III.9.8-9, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.5.1, Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*. XX.

<sup>917</sup> Bruce, 1966, p. 277.

<sup>918</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.1.29. Diodorus Siculus, XIII. 106.

<sup>919</sup> Mitchell, 1997, p. 68, citing Diodorus Siculus, XIII.106.6 and Isocrates IX.53, suggests that Conon and Evagoras were *xenoi* and notes that Athens gave Evagoras citizenship in 411 B.C. He also notes the aid Evagoras had given to Athens during the Peloponnesian War when Sparta was trying to blockade Athens in 407 B.C.

Evagoras and that the King appointed him commander of the fleet. Ctesias' story that there was some correspondence by letter between Conon and Artaxerxes and a discussion between Conon and Evagoras about Conon's travelling up to the court of Artaxerxes is as acceptable as any, although there are variants in the sources.<sup>920</sup> Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos agree on the detail of a letter; Cornelius Nepos states that Conon took this option as preferable to performing proskynesis to Artaxerxes.<sup>921</sup> Cornelius Nepos continues that Conon actively befriended Pharnabazus in an attempt to re-establish Athens' status within Greece.<sup>922</sup> The fragments of Ctesias imply, also, that the initiative for Conon's appointment may have come from Conon himself. Diodorus Siculus, omitting details, states simply that Pharnabazus appointed him as the admiral of the Persian fleet.<sup>923</sup> He says that Pharnabazus, after persuading Artaxerxes II, appointed Conon specifically because his experience of naval warfare against the Peloponnesians; Pharnabazus had been on the receiving end of Conon's skills during the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>924</sup> Diodorus Siculus also states that Pharnabazus, when he went to Cyprus to commission the building of the Persian fleet, had discussions with Conon before he appointed him to the supreme command of the fleet.

Conon will have been aware that as a refugee in the Persian Empire he will have needed to offer something in return for his safety, as others had before him. Although he was not at the court of Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes or Artaxerxes, being at the court of Evagoras did still mean that Conon had taken refuge within the Persian Empire.<sup>925</sup> It is worth remembering that Conon still commanded a few ships from his Athenian fleet, which had escaped

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<sup>920</sup> Ctesias FrGH 688 F14 (73-74).

<sup>921</sup> Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, XXI. Cornelius Nepos, *Conon*, III.

<sup>922</sup> Cornelius Nepos, *Conon*, IV.

<sup>923</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39.

<sup>924</sup> March, 1997, p. 257, conjectures that Conon's appointment may have been suggested by Pharnabazus when he visited Artaxerxes in 398, whilst Dercylidas was wintering in Bithynian Thrace. However, cf. Ctesias above.

<sup>925</sup> We have seen how Conon's predecessors had taken refuge at the court of the satraps of either Hellenistic Phrygia or Ionia or at the court of the Great King himself. However, considering Artaxerxes II's support Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, Conon will have quite sensibly decided not to take refuge at any of these courts, aware of Alcibiades' fate at the behest of Sparta, until he had gauged the political situation more fully.

Aegospotami with him and which would have been valuable as a nucleus for this new Persian fleet. We are not told what the discussions with Pharnabazus were about, whether or not Pharnabazus needed to persuade Conon to take the command, but Diodorus Siculus says that Conon took on the role in the hope of re-establishing Athens as the leading state of Greece and to win great personal renown for himself.<sup>926</sup> Isocrates maintains that Conon's intent was to overthrow the Spartan fleet.<sup>927</sup> With Conon's help Artaxerxes II was able to put a check on Sparta's advance into Asia Minor and go on the offensive, providing an opportunity for Athens to build up a fleet again and, thus, act as a balance to Sparta's dominance of Greece.<sup>928</sup> D.A. March maintains that, due to the old problem of lack of Persian funding, Conon was unable to act effectively until after Agesilaus had been recalled to Sparta.<sup>929</sup>

Conon, as commander of the Persian fleet, proceeded to take over the islands in the Aegean from Sparta; most notable was Rhodes, which, when it changed allegiance, deprived Sparta of weapons and grain unwittingly sent from Egypt.<sup>930</sup> During his command of the Persian fleet Conon encouraged the defection of many of the Greek islands; Diodorus Siculus claims that Conon and Pharnabazus induced Cos, Nysiros, Teos, Chios, Mitylene, Ephesus and Erythraea, Cythera and all of the islands of the Cyclades to revolt from Sparta.<sup>931</sup> On the advice of Conon, Pharnabazus encouraged the cities and islands to revolt, claiming that the Persians would leave them to govern themselves independently and not build any fortified citadels within the cities.<sup>932</sup> Thus, we find a new Persian approach to the question of independence for the Ionian Greeks, which is not dissimilar to that of Mardonius when settling the Ionian cities after the Ionian Revolt at the beginning of the fifth century.<sup>933</sup> The islands will have also been persuaded by Conon's victory over the Spartan fleet at

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<sup>926</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39.3.

<sup>927</sup> Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 154.

<sup>928</sup> In Diodorus Siculus we only hear of Conon helping Pharnabazus after a truce had been made with Agesilaus during the Spartan invasion of Ionia. Diodorus Siculus, XIV.39.

<sup>929</sup> March, 1997, *passim*.

<sup>930</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.79.

<sup>931</sup> Diodorus Siculus XIV.84.

<sup>932</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.1.

<sup>933</sup> Herodotus, VI.43. Cf. p. 33 above.



Cnidus,<sup>934</sup> demonstrating his ability to break Sparta's control of the Aegean. Fear of retribution after this Spartan defeat will have been less and the promise of independent governance without interference from Persia will have been tempting. It should be noted that, although the islands were promised independence in their choice of governance, they would still have been considered part of the Persian Empire once they had seceded from Sparta and so would have been expected to pay tribute to Persia. Thus, we find Persia employing both military and diplomatic tactics in order to break Spartan dominance of the Aegean. We can see here a Persian compromise regarding the islands along the Ionian coast, which recalls the behaviour of Mardonius after the Ionian Revolt in the 490s B.C.<sup>935</sup>

With Conon working for Persia, he was able to break Sparta's control of the Aegean, after which he was free to go to Athens where he began rebuilding the long walls to Piraeus and Athens' city walls.<sup>936</sup> In breaking Sparta's dominance of the Aegean Conon was also attempting to reinstate some of Athens' influence there. According to Xenophon, Conon was "winning over for Athens the islands and the cities on the coast of the mainland."<sup>937</sup> However, Seager notes that Diodorus Siculus distinguishes between those islands which expelled the Spartans, but did not join the Persians, and those which did join the Persians.<sup>938</sup> We have already noted above how during the Corinthian War Pharnabazus and Conon visited the Corinthians with gold to ensure they continued in the prosecution of the war. It is interesting to ponder the possibility that part of the discussions between Pharnabazus and Conon in Cyprus included terms that enabled Conon to rebuild Athens' defences once Sparta's dominance of the Aegean had been broken. Xenophon claims that when Conon persuaded Pharnabazus that rebuilding Athens' walls would be a heavy blow against Sparta, Pharnabazus gave Conon extra financing for this.<sup>939</sup> In response the Spartans sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus hoping that "he would either bring

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<sup>934</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.83, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.3.11.

<sup>935</sup> Cf. pp. 33-34 above.

<sup>936</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV. 85, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.12.

<sup>937</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.12.

<sup>938</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.84.4. Seager, 1967, p. 101.

<sup>939</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.9, Diodorus Siculus, XIV.85.

(Tiribazus) over into an alliance with (Sparta) or, at least, stop him from maintaining Conon's fleet."<sup>940</sup> If we are to believe Xenophon, Conon was rebuilding Athens' walls not only with Pharnabazus' money but also seemingly with his prior consent. Thus, we can infer that the Greek states understood satrapal rivalry within Persia and exploited it as the need demanded.

Conon died in Cyprus after a term in jail, having been arrested by Tiribazus.<sup>941</sup> Hammond suggests that Artaxerxes was wary of Conon's double dealing and did not wish to create another Alcibiades.<sup>942</sup> We know that Athens erected a statue to Conon, in gratitude for his bringing Persian gold to rebuild Athens' city walls and the Great Walls to Pireaus. However, whether or not we can claim, as Hammond does, that Artaxerxes was wary of Conon creating a position of power for himself based on his image as a liberator and Persian friend, as Alcibiades did, may be stretching our evidence. We can say with a degree of certainty that Conon had fulfilled his purpose in the eyes of Artaxerxes<sup>943</sup> and also that he had gained some reputation as a liberator<sup>944</sup> and so we can take the view that "retiring" him to stop him causing trouble would have seemed wise. With Spartan dominance of the Aegean broken and Athens regaining its strength, having an Athenian in charge of the Persian fleet may have seemed an unnecessary risk after the task was completed; the last time Athens had had a strong unchallenged navy it caused trouble for Persia, 'liberating' Greek islands in the Aegean and cities along the Ionian coast. Therefore, we may suggest that Artaxerxes II did not wish to replace one troublemaker with another one.

Looking at the role of Conon we may view him as one of the first Greeks, about whom we have much information, to make the transition from mediser, as we have previously defined the term, to mercenary. He had been staying with Evagoras since 405 B.C., but it was not until Sparta's invasion of Ionia that Conon became active in the Aegean, i.e. like Hippias before him he was not used by

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<sup>940</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.12.

<sup>941</sup> Lysias, XIX, 39-41.

<sup>942</sup> Hammond, 1977, p. 462.

<sup>943</sup> March, 1997, p. 268, notes that Conon's limited command is demonstrated by his need to request men from Leonymus when his Cypriot mercenaries were close to rebellion.

<sup>944</sup> W. Dittenberger, *SIG*, No. 126.

Persia until needed. Whether he offered his services to Persia, as is implied by Ctesias, or whether he was approached by Pharnabazus and accepted the “job”, as is stated in Diodorus Siculus, does not really matter. What is notable is that Conon was “managed” to do a task with a limited scope when Athenian interests coincided with those of Persia. Once the task had been completed we could argue that Conon was no longer in Artaxerxes’ employment, thus, Tiribazus was not condemned for arresting him. Apparent from the activities of Conon is his seeming realisation that, so long as he kept his Persian employers happy, he could also work on his own interest. Thus, we find Conon rebuilding the walls of Piraeus, whilst he is employed by Persia. He may have been arrested by Tiribazus, but this was without the authority of Artaxerxes II. The only contentious actions we may attribute to Conon was his liberation of the Ionian Greek islands, leaving them to govern autonomously. This may be interpreted as an attempt not only to diminish Spartan supremacy, but also to weaken Persian control of the islands. However, this is speculation and is dependent on interpretation of Conon’s motives, which we will never be able to ascertain. Also, we must remember that Persia accepted this. What is clear from the actions of Conon is that he provided an example that employment as a mercenary, rather than simply medising, was politically acceptable to the Greeks. It is also clear that of all those compelled to seek refuge in Persia, he accomplished the most.

### **Summary and conclusions**

The period from Cyrus the Younger’s rebellion and the subsequent actions of the Greeks culminating in the Corinthian War demonstrates another shift in Greek attitudes to Persia. As a result of Persia’s involvement in the Peloponnesian War, the Greeks and Persians became more familiar with each other. The increase in the availability of mercenaries also expanded the Greek geographical knowledge of Persia. It is worth noting that, despite limited evidence, there were also Greek mercenaries working in Persia but not for Cyrus the Younger.<sup>945</sup> We also find instances of Greek generals employed as military specialists. Although we know more about Conon due to his role in both the

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<sup>945</sup> See Nicarchus the Arcadian (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, III.3.5.) and the Greek mercenaries employed by Mania (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III.1.10-13).

Peloponnesian War and Corinthian War, prior to him Phalinus of Zacynthus was employed by Tissaphernes as a specialist in hoplite warfare.<sup>946</sup> It might even be argued that Artaxerxes II's previous experience with Phalinus in his army at Cunaxa helped to persuade him to employ Conon as a naval specialist. This trend continues into the Fourth century with Persian attempts to re-conquer Egypt.<sup>947</sup> The Spartan invasion of Ionia was facilitated by the growing familiarity between Greeks and Persians, and was successful enough for Artaxerxes II not only to employ Conon, but also to send gold to the dissatisfied Greek states. The contrast between the Spartan invasion in the fourth century and the response to Aristagoras in the fifth century is striking and highlights the change in Spartan attitudes to Persia and Sparta's growing confidence largely due to the Peloponnesian War, even if Cyrus' mercenaries originally balked at the idea of going against the king.

The "bribing" of the Greek states and the outbreak of the Corinthian War demonstrate Persia's reciprocal familiarity with the Greeks. We have already noted above that the "bribe" itself should be viewed as a catalyst for the outbreak of the Corinthian War, rather than the cause, and Persia's support of Sparta in the final years of the Peloponnesian War would likely reassure those Greek states allied against Sparta. Due to the effectiveness of Persian gold, we can see that by the outbreak of the Corinthian War Persian support had become a desirable commodity itself. Thus, we can see that through his ability to fund the Greek states, Artaxerxes II strengthened his position of influence over the Greeks by sowing seeds of dissent.

In this period, a notable change we find is that Artaxerxes II apparently increases Persian use of diplomacy and also the use of his subordinates, who seem to have possessed a large degree of independence at the time. Artaxerxes is, at first, forced to act defensively in response to Sparta's invasion. It may be simply that more sources are available for this period, however, we find that whilst campaigning in Asia Minor, Dercylidas made four truces with Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, and he also met with them to discuss terms to a possible treaty. Agesilaus also made two truces with Tissaphernes and

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<sup>946</sup> Xenophon, *Anabasis*, II.1.7. Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, XIII.

<sup>947</sup> Cf. pp. 226-228, for the employment of Iphicrates.

Tithraustes whilst campaigning. Furthermore, we find that Artaxerxes was willing to recognise Ionian Greek autonomy provided the cities resumed paying tribute. This treatment was also applied to the Ionian Greek islands which Conon and Pharnabazus won over from Sparta. Thus, we can see that Artaxerxes II recognised that Asia Minor and the islands along the coast would be more stable if he granted them nominal concessions. By exploiting the tensions within Greece and granting these nominal concessions Artaxerxes II was able to stabilise the Persian Empire. There is a notable shift in Persian tactics from defensive diplomacy, stalling the Spartan advance in to Persia with truces, to offensive diplomacy, 'bribing' the Greek states to wage war against Sparta at about the same time as Conon is employed to lead the Persian fleet. We will see later that, with the Persian Empire in the west more stable, Artaxerxes and his successors were able to take advantage of their position of influence to maintain peace in Greece in order to recruit Greeks as mercenaries to help take back other lost satrapies, most notably Egypt.

## Chapter 7: The King's Peace & the Rise of Macedon

Greece in the fourth century B.C. was in a period of significant turmoil. Having defeated the Athenian Empire in the Peloponnesian War and having invaded Persia, Sparta was the dominant state in Greece until its defeat by Thebes in 371 B.C. However, it is clear that Sparta, and subsequently Thebes, was unable to dominate Greece fully without Persian backing. Persian gold was able to support Sparta against Athens, but later it was also able to support Athens, Corinth, Thebes and Argos against Sparta. So we begin to see that, on the one hand, Persian gold itself was desirable to the Greeks to fund their wars against each other, and, on the other hand, the threat of Persian gold being bestowed upon their enemies could be used as a potent threat against the Greeks. Both the appeal and the threat of Persian gold were used by Persian kings in the fourth century to control not only Persia's relationship with the Greek states, but also their relationship with each other via the King's Peace and its renewals. The King's Peace allows us to divide Persian foreign policy in the fourth century into two general phases; defensive and offensive. Prior to the King's Peace Persia employed a defensive policy aimed at protecting the Empire's borders by dividing the Greek states against each other. Having secured its borders in the King's Peace and its revisions, Persia became the great arbiter of Greek affairs, which allowed the Great King to employ Greek mercenaries as part of Persia's offensive foreign policy against Cyprus and Egypt to recover these former territories. This chapter will look at the events of the fourth century and the ways Persia attempted to control the Greek states and the subsequent reaction to this by the Greeks.

### Towards a King's Peace

In 393/2<sup>948</sup> after 4 years of war with Corinth, Athens, Thebes and Argos, which, as we have seen, was financed by Persia, Sparta sent Antalcidas to the

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<sup>948</sup> Philochorus apud Didymus, *On Demosthenes*, VII.11-28, suggests another embassy which Keen, 1995, believes took place in to 392/1 based on the archonship of Philocles mentioned in Philochorus. DeVoto, 1986, p. 191, believes the embassy in Philochorus and that in Xenophon are two separate embassies. However, A.G. Keen, 1995, believes they are the same embassy and Cawkwell, 1981, p. 70, noting Andocides' *De Pace*, suggests that, after the initial meeting with

Persian satrap, Tiribazus, to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with Persia. We may suggest that Sparta had learnt from the Peace of Callias that when a Greek state concluded a peace treaty with Persia, this enabled that Greek state to achieve a dominant position in Greece. It should be noted that the previous treaties between Sparta and Persia were *symmachia* alliances against Athens and not peace treaties in the same sense as the Peace of Callias. Those Greek states which had been warring against Sparta, not wishing to lose their funding from Pharnabazus, sent their own embassy to Tiribazus.<sup>949</sup>

No treaty was concluded at this time, however, foundations were laid which enabled the King's Peace, which was agreed 5 years later. On the evidence of Andocides<sup>950</sup>, Cawkwell concludes that the terms for this attempted treaty were not simply dictated to the Greeks by Tiribazus, as sent down by the King, and there appears to have been opportunity for negotiating them. This ties in with the political situation in Greece at the time; Sparta was unable to impose a peace treaty on the other Greek states, which offered them the opportunity to the debate and to reject the terms proposed by Sparta. Xenophon is silent on the details of these negotiations beyond the term calling for political autonomy for all of the Greek cities. This may be interpreted as an attempt to limit Athenian imperial ambitions and also to damage the interests of Corinth, Argos and Thebes. Ryder notes that, in 392 B.C., whilst Antalcidas had initially intended to make a bilateral treaty between Sparta and Persia, the arrival of the other envoys inclined Antalcidas to offer up the Asian Greeks in return for Persian support of an autonomy clause.<sup>951</sup> Each state allied against Sparta feared losing the cities under their own authority: in the case of Athens it was the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, the Thebans had captured cities in Boeotia, and the Argives, who had created a state of *isopoliteia* with Corinth.<sup>952</sup>

The failure of the Greeks to agree to this treaty did not prevent Tiribazus from supporting Sparta with Persian gold, given to Antalcidas, and by arresting

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Tiribazus, at which time initial terms were proposed, the envoys returned to their cities with the terms and then met at Sparta after forty days, at which time the treaty was to be sealed with oaths.

<sup>949</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.12. Mosley, 1973, pp. 17-21, for an argument supporting the authenticity of Xenophon's account.

<sup>950</sup> Andocides, *De Pace*, XII-XV. Cawkwell, 1981, p. 70.

<sup>951</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.12. Ryder, 1965, p. 28. Seager, 1974, p. 36.

<sup>952</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 209.

Conon on the charge of misusing the gold given him by Pharnabazus. Tiribazus had been persuaded by Antalcidas that, once Conon and the Phoenician fleet had removed Spartan influence from Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean, funding from Persia should have stopped, as it seems to have been when Tissaphernes became difficult about paying the Peloponnesian fleet once Athens had been removed from Asia Minor at the end of the second Peloponnesian War; it should have not been used to rebuild Athens' walls and the walls to Piraeus.<sup>953</sup> Tiribazus' inability to persuade Artaxerxes II of this led to his replacement by the, seemingly, pro-Athenian Struthas.

We may suggest that despite Spartan promises, Artaxerxes II did not trust this state, which had invaded Asia Minor to liberate the Ionian Greeks only two years earlier. Ryder rightly argues that, despite misgivings concerning the restoration of Athenian influence in the Aegean, "things had not yet gone very far and the Athenian attitude to (Persian) claims in Asia Minor seems to have been respectful."<sup>954</sup>

#### The King's Peace of 386 B.C.

The reappointment of Tiribazus to Asia Minor in 387/6, led to a renewed effort by Antalcidas to gain Persian support. It is likely that the reappointment of Tiribazus was motivated by Athens' involvement in Evagoras' Cypriot rebellion. In 390 B.C. Evagoras and Athens made an alliance, resulting in Thrasybulus' operations in the Hellespont against Artaxerxes.<sup>955</sup> In 387 B.C. Athens sent further aid to Evagoras in the form of "800 peltasts ... and ten triremes" under the command of Chabrias.<sup>956</sup> Athenian attempts to support Cyprus may have been considered as tantamount to Athenian reassertion of their control over the Aegean, as it was in the fifth century.

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<sup>953</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.85 claims that Tiribazus arrested Conon due to jealousy of Conon's successes with the Phoenician fleets.

<sup>954</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 29.

<sup>955</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.8.24. Diodorus Siculus XIV.98. Cf. Tuplin, 1983, pp. 178-179, who dates the Cypriot War with Persia beginning 391/390 B.C. in order for Athens to send 10 triremes to Evagoras in 390/389 B.C. He further conjectures (pp. 182-185) that the limited assistance offered to Evagoras by Athens, i.e. only 10 triremes, was due to the impending departure of Thrasybulus to Rhodes.

<sup>956</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1.10.



In his meeting with Antalcidas Tiribazus agreed that Persia would support Sparta if the Athenians and her allies did not accept the peace treaty dictated by the Artaxerxes II.<sup>957</sup> There may be truth in Ryder's suggestion that Tiribazus, wanting to secure Athenian interest in accepting a Pan-Hellenic peace treaty, did not summon Athens until after a reinforced Spartan fleet had threatened Athenian control of the Hellespont and the import of grain to Athens.<sup>958</sup> Also, due to the mobilization of the Spartan army, the Argives were also prepared to accept the peace treaty.<sup>959</sup> It is for these reasons that, when Tiribazus finally called a meeting in 386 B.C., "all parties came ... with alacrity."<sup>960</sup>

Artaxerxes' terms were that the Greeks of Asia, and also Cyprus and Clazomenai, were subject to the King and all others were to be autonomous, with the exceptions of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were to be governed by Athens as they had been in the past. Cawkwell on the basis of Isocrates, *On the Peace*, 16, believes that the autonomy clause may have given more details regarding what each city possessed and also concerned the removal of garrisons,<sup>961</sup> which is possible, but it is not certain.

The King's Peace of 386 B.C. signifies a number of important changes for the Greeks and also demonstrates the degree of Persian influence over Greece. The most notable feature of the Peace is that it had no stipulated duration and included all of the Greek states, not simply those fighting in the Corinthian War.<sup>962</sup> Thus, we can see that it was intended to be inclusive and long lasting.

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<sup>957</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1.25.

<sup>958</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 35.

<sup>959</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1.15.

<sup>960</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1.31, Isocrates *Panegyricus*, 120. Those leading these embassies were Antalcidas for Sparta, Hermogenes, half-brother of Callias the younger, for Athens (cf. Hoffstetter, 1978, No. 145.), and Callisthenes, Callimedon and Dion. Antalcidas is known to us primarily in connection with the many fourth century Graeco-Persian treaties, but his military credentials are confirmed by his participation in the naval battle at Cyzicus where he captured an Athenian trireme. Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, XXII states he was an ephor 370/369 B.C. Rice, 1974, p. 171, claims he was likely a supporter of Agesipolis against Agesilaus. Hermogenes, Callisthenes, Callimedon and Dion are known to us only from their involvement in the King's Peace.

<sup>961</sup> Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 72-73, also notes that Didymus' comment on the treaty of 375 B.C. being similar to that of 386 B.C. would suggest that the autonomy clause and the removal of garrisons may date back to the treaty of 386 B.C.

<sup>962</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 2, notes that the unilateral nature of the King's Peace of 386 B.C. is observed primarily in contrast to preceding peace treaties, which were of a deliberately bilateral nature. He

Traditionally, Greek treaties were for a fixed duration and so we may suggest that this was a Persian innovation. By appointing Sparta to enforce the treaty in Greece, Persia was able to enforce stability in Greece whilst preventing the Greek states becoming involved in Cyprus and Egypt. The benefit of supporting Sparta over the other states was that Artaxerxes had curbed Sparta's overseas ambitions in Asia Minor and Sparta had not shown itself interested in being involved in Cyprus or Egypt at that time. Furthermore, Sparta had instigated the idea of a King's Peace, recognising it was the only way to gain dominance over the other Greek states, and they had little choice but to accept it. It should be reflected that whilst Artaxerxes II accepted the alliance of Corinth, Thebes, Argos and Athens against Sparta in the Corinthian War, it is doubtful he would have been too keen on a larger alliance in which he did not play a part, which may have constituted a threat to his interests.

Ryder astutely notes that the autonomy clause was included for no other reason than that it "suited primarily ... the interests of the Spartans and Persia, to whom the principle of city-state independence was a means rather than an end."<sup>963</sup> That the Spartans hoped to profit by their enforcement of the autonomy clause is apparent from their subsequent treatment of Thebes, Corinth and Argos. Sparta used the autonomy clause to prevent Thebes from signing the treaty on behalf of Boeotia and to disband the isopoliteia of Argos and Corinth.<sup>964</sup> Once the clause had served Sparta's direct interests, it seems to have been largely ignored. Spartan treatment of Mantinea demonstrates not only Spartan disregard of the autonomy clause, but that Sparta had reverted to acting in terms of what best suited Sparta rather than what was in accordance with the Peace. Seager notes that the Phliasian exiles and Olynthus both appealed to Sparta's personal military desires, rather than Sparta's position as *prostates* (defender) of the Peace.<sup>965</sup>

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gives as an example the refusal of the Athenians and Spartans to include Argos in the peace treaty concluding the Thirty-Years in the Fifth Century.

<sup>963</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 39.

<sup>964</sup> Seager, 1974, pp. 39-40, notes that having used the autonomy clause against Thebes, Argos and Corinth, Sparta does not appear to have used it against the smaller states of Mantinea, Phlius or Olynthus. Rather, Sparta simply issued orders to these cities from its position of military strength with no consideration of the autonomy clause.

<sup>965</sup> Seager, 1974, pp. 40-41.

Ryder suggests that the Persian support of the autonomy clause was not necessarily due to Persian attempts to re-conquer the islands of the Aegean, but rather to prevent a single Greek state becoming strong enough to dominate the Aegean.<sup>966</sup> During the 380s Persia's primary interests were the consolidation of Asia Minor and the re-conquest of Cyprus and Egypt. The removal of an added distraction, in the form of Greek interference in the Aegean, enabled Persia to concentrate on these interests. We can enlarge this argument and suggest that, with the Greek states in a weaker position, they were less likely to launch major campaigns against each other, thus, freeing up much needed mercenaries for Artaxerxes' campaigns against Cyprus and Egypt, as well as to protect Asia Minor. This may be deemed another example of the Persian policy of dividing its enemies with a view to dominating them, although in this instance Persia was dividing the Greek states to protect itself, and Sparta was utilising the situation to its own benefit.

A final comment ought to be made concerning the Greek need for outside intervention to settle their disputes. By backing one Greek state over the others since 411 B.C., Persia had created a situation where the Greek states, rather than trying to settle their disputes amongst themselves, turned to Persia to arbitrate them. This gave Persia more control over the Greeks than it had ever previously held and it also gave Artaxerxes II the opportunity to turn his attention to other matters, such as the re-conquest of Cyprus and Egypt, without fear of major Greek intervention.

The stipulation that the Greeks of Asia Minor were to belong to Artaxerxes was a clear message that he would not tolerate Greek interference in his interests in the Aegean. However, we still find minor instances where both Athens and Sparta became involved in Asiatic concerns, which contradicted Persian interests. Chabrias, who had been sent by Athens to Evagoras in Cyprus, subsequently assisted the rebel Pharaoh, Akoris, and, although Artaxerxes was able to reclaim Cyprus, Chabrias' involvement in Egypt hindered Persia's re-conquest there. Diodorus Siculus' claims that Chabrias acted without first

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<sup>966</sup> Ryder, 1965, pp. 32-33.

securing official Athenian authorisation are contradicted by evidence from his later statement that Chabrias returned to Athens when recalled, after he had been denounced, at the behest of Pharnabazus.<sup>967</sup> If we assume that Chabrias had been acting outside of the official Athenian line, it is peculiar that he was not punished when he returned to Athens. Rather, he was commissioned as one of the generals against Sparta when the Athenians deemed Sparta to have broken the King's Peace, which we will discuss below.<sup>968</sup> In response to Chabrias' recall and at Persia's request, Iphicrates was sent to Pharnabazus.<sup>969</sup>

Similarly, when Glos, son-in-law of Tiribazus, rebelled against Artaxerxes II at the start of the 380s, Sparta made an alliance with him. This was supposedly in an attempt to improve their bad reputation in Greece resulting from their abandonment of the Ionian Greeks in the King's Peace; a popular theme throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>970</sup> This appears to be the same Glos who had fought with Cyrus against Artaxerxes II and brought news of Cyrus' death to the Greeks after the battle of Cunaxa.<sup>971</sup> We may speculate that this is one of the reasons why Glos approached Sparta for an alliance and their previous dealings with him may have persuaded them. We are led to believe that Sparta was looking for a pretext for war with Artaxerxes II, however, given his reluctance to leave Asia Minor in 397/6 B.C., it is more probable that it was Agesilaus who was looking for a pretext for war with Artaxerxes II, rather than all of Sparta. Also, Ryder correctly observes that, despite Xenophon, Spartan unpopularity was likely more closely connected to Sparta's heavy-handed policy in Greece rather than to its abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks, contrary to the popular theme they promoted during Agesilaus' campaign in Asia Minor.<sup>972</sup> Ryder also notes Beloch's suggestion that, perhaps, the alliance with Glos

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<sup>967</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.3-4.

<sup>968</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.7

<sup>969</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV.4. Diodorus Siculus, XV.29. For a fuller discussion of this Persian campaign against Egypt, cf. pp. 226-228.

<sup>970</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.9.3-5.

<sup>971</sup> Xenophon, *Anabasis*, II.1.3.

<sup>972</sup> Ryder, 1965, pp. 52-53. Rice, 1974, argues that Agesilaus' aggressive imperialist policy during 386-379 was only rivalled by Agesipolis, who practised a more moderate policy but who died campaigning against Olynthus.

signified eventual renewed Spartan interest in the Ionian Greeks.<sup>973</sup> However, nothing seems to have come of this Spartan alliance with Glos.

### Persia's Cypriot and Egyptian Campaigns

With the removal of the Greeks from Asia Minor Artaxerxes was able to concentrate his attention on further consolidating his empire. We mentioned above Athens' support of Evagoras revolt, which motivated Artaxerxes II to dictate the King's Peace to the Greeks. Therefore, it is worth briefly recapping the events of this rebellion. In 390 B.C. Artaxerxes determined that Evagoras' subjugation of the other cities on Cyprus was an act of revolt.<sup>974</sup> Diodorus Siculus says explicitly that a primary motive for the enmity between Artaxerxes II and Evagoras, and, therefore, the motive behind Artaxerxes' alliance with the other kings of Cyprus in 390 B.C., was "the strategic position of Cyprus and its great naval strength whereby it would be able to protect Asia in front."<sup>975</sup> The strategic significance of Cyprus was due to its proximity to both Asia Minor and Egypt, whilst at the same time being physically separate from them. This military significance is as true now as it was then and has been the case throughout the history of conflict in the Middle East.<sup>976</sup> Cyprus was pivotal in any Persian attempts to re-conquer Egypt.<sup>977</sup> Once secure, Cyprus remained under Persian control until the time of Alexander the Great, a fact which was reasserted by Artaxerxes II in his King's Peace as a reminder to both the Greeks and the Cypriot kings.<sup>978</sup> We are told by Diodorus Siculus that, with the King's Peace concluded, Artaxerxes was able to prepare for his war with Evagoras.<sup>979</sup> G. Shrimpton proposes an attractive chronology for Persian, Cypriot and Egyptian operations for 390-380 B.C., suggesting that, after Evagoras' defeat at Citium in 387/6 B.C., Artaxerxes decided to campaign against both Egypt and Cyprus simultaneously, to prevent them from aiding each other.<sup>980</sup> He correctly notes

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<sup>973</sup> Ryder, 1963, p. 106.

<sup>974</sup> Cf. Costa, 1974, for a review of the career of Evagoras prior to 391 B.C.

<sup>975</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XIV.98-99.

<sup>976</sup> There are still British military bases on Cyprus and European forces used it during the Crusades of the Middle Ages.

<sup>977</sup> It is noteworthy that Cimon's activities in Egypt in the 460s also involved Cyprus. Thucydides, I.112, Diodorus Siculus, XII.3, Plutarch, *Cimon*, XVIII.

<sup>978</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1.31. Cf. p. 220 above.

<sup>979</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.110.

<sup>980</sup> G. Shrimpton, 1991.

that “Persia’s main objective through the mid-390s was the recovery of Egypt,”<sup>981</sup> as well as, we would add, the defence of Asia Minor, which was hindered by Evagoras’ revolt.

Diodorus Siculus informs us that, at the start of his rebellion Evagoras made an alliance with Akoris, king of Egypt, and received a strong force from him.<sup>982</sup> This recalls the one-time alliance of Egypt and Samos in the sixth century in the time of Polycrates.<sup>983</sup> When Evagoras had cut off transport supplies to the Persians besieging Cyprus, Akoris also sent supplies and money to him enabling him to withstand the siege. The alliance between Evagoras and Akoris was significant enough to induce Artaxerxes II to send both Tiribazus and Orontes to deal with them; the location of the island was such that any instability there seems to have been considered a threat to the Persian Empire. In 385 B.C., Evagoras, on his return from Egypt and finding his home city of Salamis besieged, entered into negotiations with Tiribazus.<sup>984</sup> The terms offered were that Evagoras was to “withdraw from all cities of Cyprus, that as king of Salamis alone he should pay the Persian King a fixed annual tribute, and that he should obey orders as a slave to master.”<sup>985</sup> However, it was not until Tiribazus was replaced by Orontes that Evagoras agreed to the amended terms to “obey as a king the orders of the King.”<sup>986</sup> We can suggest that it was only because Orontes had denounced Tiribazus and felt obliged to produce speedy results in the matter of Cyprus, that Evagoras was offered this amendment.

The significance of Evagoras’ rebellion to this study is that we find that, similar to the operations of Conon in the fourth century, the conflict between Greek and Persian had moved to Cyprus. However, unlike the fifth century when Artaxerxes I came to terms with Athens in the Peace of Callias, Artaxerxes II was able to reassert Persian authority over all of the Greeks and to compel Athens to cease helping Evagoras. We can see here most clearly evidence of the reassertion of Persian authority over its territories.

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<sup>981</sup> Shrimpton, 1991, p. 5. Contra P.J. Stylianou, 1998, p. 260, who believes that Artaxerxes II turned his attention to Egypt upon the conclusion of his retaking Cyprus, in summer 380 B.C.

<sup>982</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.2.3.

<sup>983</sup> Cf. p. 18 above.

<sup>984</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.8.1.

<sup>985</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.8.2.

<sup>986</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.9.2.

## Egypt 387/6

We noted above that a primary aim of Persia in the fourth century B.C. was the re-conquest of Egypt. We find under Artaxerxes II 3 failed campaigns against Egypt, the first of which took place after the surrender of Evagoras of Cyprus. It has been suggested that Akoris, motivated largely by his desire to use Evagoras as a buffer between Persia and Egypt, had organised the wider rebellion of the Levant, of which Evagoras was merely a part.<sup>987</sup> Ruzicka notes that it is likely Artaxerxes' preparations for an Egyptian campaign in 392-391, were interrupted by Evagoras' rebellion and the Egyptian campaign, which resulted from these preparations, took place 390/389-388/387.<sup>988</sup> It has been suggested that, with the collapse of Evagoras' rebellion and the conclusion of the King's Peace in 387/386 B.C., subsequently, Chabrias went to Egypt upon the recommendation of Evagoras.<sup>989</sup> Knowledge of this Persian campaign against Egypt is limited and based mostly on conjecture using Isocrates, but it is apparent that it did not succeed.<sup>990</sup>

The next Persian invasion of Egypt did not occur until 374 B.C.<sup>991</sup> Commanded by Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, who commanded the mercenary forces numbering twenty thousand.<sup>992</sup> This campaign also failed due to a number of factors. Firstly, Pharnabazus spent a number of years planning and equipping for the campaign, giving ample time for Nectanebo, king of Egypt, to strengthen Egypt's defences and he was able to resist long enough for the annual floods to make the campaign untenable for the Persians, who were forced to

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<sup>987</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 86.

<sup>988</sup> Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 140-141. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 66, pp. 249-250. n.1, pp. 68-69.

<sup>989</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 102.

<sup>990</sup> Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 140-141.

<sup>991</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.1, claims that Chabrias was initially employed by Akoris. However, by the time Persian preparations were complete Akoris had been succeeded by his son Nepherites II, who was then deposed by Nectanebo, in 380 B.C. Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 74-75. See also, K. Mysliwiec, 2000, pp. 168-169 and A.B. Lloyd, 1994, pp. 346-349 for concise accounts of Persia's campaigns against Egypt in the fourth century.

<sup>992</sup> Threats of Persian action against Athens led to Chabrias' recall and Iphicrates was sent to Pharnabazus, as noted above, p. 178. Diodorus Siculus, XV.29.1-5.

withdraw.<sup>993</sup> We are told that Iphicrates, fearing that he would be arrested as Conon had been, fled the Persians and returned to Athens.<sup>994</sup>

Another reason for the failure of the campaign seems to have been the contrasting leadership styles of Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, who seems to have become exasperated at the delay starting the campaign.<sup>995</sup> Iphicrates had been sent to Pharnabazus after Evagoras' capitulation in c. 381/380 B.C., thus, he had been with Pharnabazus for about 6 years before the invasion of Egypt. Ruzicka notes at least one occasion when Iphicrates' mercenaries became restless due to lack of pay and it is likely that his exasperation at Pharnabazus' delays was primarily due to the effort it was taking to control his mercenaries for such a long period of time.<sup>996</sup> Lack of Persian pay was not a new problem for the Greeks and the Spartans suffered from the same issue during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>997</sup>

The contrasting leadership styles led to arguments between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates during the initial operations of the invasion, causing Pharnabazus' suspicions of Iphicrates' intentions.<sup>998</sup> Diodorus Siculus states that, it was a combination of Iphicrates' insistence on a quick campaign and the slander of jealous Persians against Iphicrates that caused Pharnabazus' suspicions.<sup>999</sup> Ruzicka's belief that Iphicrates' flight to Athens was likely due to quarrelling with Pharnabazus concerning the specific operations of the

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<sup>993</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.41. Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 118-119, suggests that the Persian withdrawal was due to inclement weather, primarily the annual gale force winds at the time of the flooding, as well as the flooding itself. However, he also notes that due to the long period of preparation and the short duration of campaign the withdrawal was more likely intended as a strategic retreat before a renewed attack rather than a complete abandonment of the campaign.

<sup>994</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.43.

<sup>995</sup> Diodorus notes Iphicrates' perception that Pharnabazus was quick with his speech but slow with his actions. Diodorus Siculus, XV.41.2. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 109, suggests that Artaxerxes' delay was due to his involvement in the assassination of Evagoras of Cyprus, in order to remove any possible threat from the island during his campaign in Egypt.

<sup>996</sup> Polyaeus III.9.56 records Iphicrates' treatment of some rebellious generals in his mercenary army.

Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 108-109 suggests the generals were motivated to rebellion due to their treatment by and lack of pay from Pharnabazus.

<sup>997</sup> Thucydides, VIII. 29. Cf. pp. 165, 176.

<sup>998</sup> Cook, 1983, p. 218, notes that the delays and suspicions were not necessarily symptoms of Pharnabazus' "senility" and reflects that Agesilaus successfully campaigned in Egypt when he was in his eighties. Rather, they were symptoms of Artaxerxes' micro-management and suspicions, for which he was known in his later life.

<sup>999</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.43.2. Persian jealousy and mistrust of non-Persians is a common theme throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. A good example is the mistrust of Demaratus by Achaemenes in Herodotus, VII.263.



campaign, is likely correct, but we should not discard Diodorus Siculus' assertion that Iphicrates was also the victim of Persian slander.<sup>1000</sup> A good example of the mistrust of Greeks by Persia can be found in the treatment of Histiaeus by Megabazus and Demaratus by Achaemenes, brother of Xerxes.<sup>1001</sup>

The failure of the Persian campaign was likely closely linked to Iphicrates' return to Athens. Diodorus Siculus states that Iphicrates was blamed by Pharnabazus for the failure and we can suggest this is probably correct in that, without Iphicrates to control the Greek mercenaries vital to the campaign, Pharnabazus would have been unable to renew his attack when the Nile flooding had receded. Furthermore, he may have feared that his Greek mercenaries would go over to Nectanebo, who already employed a number of mercenaries and may have seemed a more reliable paymaster.<sup>1002</sup>

We have already seen how Persia employed Conon to break Sparta's control of the Aegean and we may suggest that the employment of Iphicrates was with a similar scope, this time in Egypt.<sup>1003</sup> Of interest here is the willingness by Athens to send one of their generals to be employed by Persia. This indicates that Persian influence in Athens, if not also in the rest of Greece, was to such an extent that it was difficult for the Greeks to refuse his requests and it was economically advantageous to accept them.

When Iphicrates returned to Athens from Egypt, Ruzicka believes he was replaced by Timotheus, the son of Conon.<sup>1004</sup> Also, Datames was sent to aid Pharnabazus and then seems to have taken over from Timotheus; Ruzicka suggests that this indicates a Persian intention to carry on their Egyptian campaign and, despite the loss of Iphicrates, their desire for Greek mercenaries.<sup>1005</sup> If this is correct, we can see two further Egyptian campaigns, or at least two parts to the same campaign, which involved the recruitment of

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<sup>1000</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 119.

<sup>1001</sup> Herodotus, V.23 and VII.263. Cf. pp. 76-77.

<sup>1002</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 120-121.

<sup>1003</sup> Cf. pp. 210-214.

<sup>1004</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 123.

<sup>1005</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 123.

Greek mercenaries and which seem to coincide with both the peace negotiations of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C., which we will discuss below.<sup>1006</sup>

### The Second Athenian League

Before we discuss the peace treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C., it is necessary to turn our attention briefly to the second Athenian League, created in response to Spartan aggression when it took on its position as enforcer of the King's Peace.

In 377 B.C. the decree of Aristoteles (*I.G.ii<sup>2</sup>.43*) invited Greeks and barbarians, islanders and those living on the Greek mainland, to join Athens in a defensive alliance against Spartan aggression, in contrast to Athens' earlier Delian League against Persia. As early as 384 B.C. Athens had made bilateral treaties with Chios, Mytilene, Byzantium, and Rhodes and it is likely that a number of other alliances had been made since then. Thebes joined in 377 B.C. after it had sought and, apparently received, aid from Athens in response to Sparta's capture of the Theban Cadmeia and the imposition of a Spartan garrison there. The removal of this Spartan garrison and the formation of a League, Cawkwell believes, caused not only Sphodrias' attempt to capture Piraeus, but also was the reason for the Spartan embassy which was in Athens at this time.<sup>1007</sup> The acquittal of Sphodrias led to the Athenian declaration that the King's Peace of 387/6 had broken down.<sup>1008</sup>

By 375 B.C. this new Athenian League had 75 members, according to Diodorus Siculus XV.28.3, although only 58 names appear on the decree stele.<sup>1009</sup> The decree assured the autonomy and freedom of all of its members, assured them of freedom from occupation and tribute, assured them that Athens would not acquire territory in the area belonging to its allies, and promised aid would

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<sup>1006</sup> Cf. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 125.

<sup>1007</sup> Cawkwell, 1973, p. 55. Also, R.M. Kallet-Marx, 1985, for a discussion and dating of the Theban alliance with the second Athenian League, which he also believes to be the result of the raid of Sphodrias, but he places the Decree of Aristoteles prior to the raid of Sphodrias.

<sup>1008</sup> The gates on Piraeus seem to have been taken down in accordance with the term of the King's Peace of 387/6, although this term is not explicitly mentioned in our available evidence.

<sup>1009</sup> Cawkwell, 1981, p. 46, notes that there were likely members who joined after 375 B.C. and who were not listed. He cites the joining of Corcyra as an example where the decree states that they had joined and their name should be added to the stele, and he suggests that it is likely other states had similar decrees issued when they joined but these later decrees omitted that their names be added to the stele.

be given to its members if they suffered aggression.<sup>1010</sup> There may be evidence, suggested by the deletion of lines 12-15 on the stele, that when the League was formed in 377 B.C. it was still respectful of the King's Peace. Lines 15-20 state that only those who *μη βασιλέως εἰσίν* were invited to join the League. Thus, we can conclude that, whilst Athens was leading a League aimed at checking Spartan aggression, it did not wish to antagonise Artaxerxes II, and, indeed, was still constrained by the King's Peace and kept rigidly within its terms.

#### The Peace Treaties with Persia in 375 B.C. and 371 B.C.

In 375/4 B.C., the Greeks were compelled by Artaxerxes to renew the Peace of 387/386 B.C.<sup>1011</sup> The Persian campaign against Egypt in 374 B.C. suggests that Artaxerxes II wished to settle the disputes in Greece in order to 'free-up' Greek mercenaries for this campaign.<sup>1012</sup> Although Seager suggests that the Athenian initiative for the negotiations of 375 B.C. was due to the failure of the decree of Aristoteles,<sup>1013</sup> Philochorus, in Demosthenes, mentions Artaxerxes' involvement in these negotiations.<sup>1014</sup> This treaty seems to have broken down within a year or so<sup>1015</sup> and it was not until 371 B.C., after Thebes had coerced Thespieae and Tanagra into their Boeotian League and had destroyed Plataea, that the Athenians called for another attempted renewal of the King's Peace of

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<sup>1010</sup> Cf. Cargill, 1981, for a full commentary on the decree. Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 47-51, notes that despite the Sparta defeat at Leuctra, which removed the Athenian League's purpose, it seems to have continued into the 340s but with the new purpose of policing the Aegean against piracy.

<sup>1011</sup> For scholarly debate regarding dating this peace treaty to 375 B.C. see Buckler, 1971, p. 353, n. 4. Buckler himself believes that "the peace cannot be fixed beyond all doubt to either date, because the evidence for the date is a blend of the exact and the relative." However, he is in favour of 375 rather than 374. For a good chronology of events in Greece 375-371 B.C. cf. Gray, 1980, pp. 306-326. Cf. Burnett, 1962, for discussion concerning the alliance of Thebes and the "second Athenian League".

<sup>1012</sup> Cf. pp. 226-228.

<sup>1013</sup> Seager, 1974, p. 47, notes that Athenian "respect for Persian sensibilities is still prominent" because the Athenians did not invite any of the Ionian Greek cities which belonged to the king. Despite this, it did not prevent war breaking out in Greece, nor did it protect its members from aggression from those states not party to the decree.

<sup>1014</sup> Roos, 1949, p. 277. Isocrates, XV.109. Philochorus *apud* Didymus VII.62. That Philochorus is referring to the peace of 375 B.C. and not 371 B.C. is confirmed by the mention of the Athenian erection of an altar to the Peace goddess, which was built on the conclusion of the war in 375 B.C.

<sup>1015</sup> Cawkwell, 1963, pp. 87-88, notes that the Athenians were able to celebrate the *Συνόικια* twice, at which they celebrated the new cult of Peace, before the outbreak of war after the peace of 375 B.C. Thus, he dates the breaking of this peace treaty to "autumn 373".

387/386 B.C.<sup>1016</sup> Despite confusion in Diodorus Siculus, Isocrates' *Plataicus* indicates that Thebes was, indeed, party to this peace<sup>1017</sup> and was excluded only from the later treaty of 371 B.C. The Plataean complaint, that Thebes attacked the city in a time of peace, would be groundless had Plataea still been at war with Thebes. Also, a Spartan garrison was present in Plataea and was then removed in accordance with the terms of the peace of 375 B.C. Had Thebes not been party to this peace, it is unlikely that Sparta would have recalled the garrison.<sup>1018</sup> Ryder suggests that whilst Thebes was threatened with expulsion from the peace of 375 B.C., it was, in fact, included.<sup>1019</sup>

Ryder, noting Callistratus' reference to rumours that "Antalcidas may arrive with money from the King"<sup>1020</sup> believes Antalcidas was still with the king when the Athenian envoys were in Sparta in 371 B.C. and that, had the king initiated this peace treaty, he would have sent a representative as he did in 387 B.C.<sup>1021</sup> Therefore, he believes it is unlikely that Artaxerxes did initiate the talks in 371 B.C. However, Xenophon refers to the "King's message" regarding the autonomy clause, which suggests that, prior to the Athenian embassy to Sparta, Artaxerxes had sent out, at least, a rescript of the treaty of 375 B.C. and that the Athenian envoys were in Sparta to swear to this rescript.<sup>1022</sup> Therefore, we may suggest that Antalcidas was with Artaxerxes II in response to this re-script sent sometime between 375 B.C. and 371 B.C., and had not yet returned by the time the Athenian embassy had arrived in Sparta.

### Terms

Roos suggests that the two treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C. were simply a "confirmation" of the treaty of 387/6 B.C. and from these we may cautiously infer some of the possible terms for the treaty of 387/6 B.C.<sup>1023</sup> The least contentious given in 371 B.C. was a reassertion of the autonomy clause and the assertion that

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<sup>1016</sup> Roos, 1949, p. 277, notes that Xenophon's account omits mention of Artaxerxes in the peace of 371 B.C., although he was likely involved as per the peace of 375 B.C.

<sup>1017</sup> Isocrates, *Plataicus*.

<sup>1018</sup> Roos, 1949, p. 274.

<sup>1019</sup> Ryder, 1963, p. 237.

<sup>1020</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VI.3.10ff.

<sup>1021</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 127. Also, Seager, 1974, pp. 54-55.

<sup>1022</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VI.3.10ff.

<sup>1023</sup> Roos, 1949, p. 278.

the foreign garrisons within each state were to be removed.<sup>1024</sup> Ryder believes the removal of garrisons was an Athenian attempt in 375 B.C. to protect Thebes from Spartan aggression since Sparta would be compelled to remove its garrison for Plataea.<sup>1025</sup> In addition to these terms the landing of the exiles on Zacynthus by Timotheus, may suggest that a returning of exiles may have been a term of the peace of 375 B.C. Cawkwell postulates the possibility that it may have been present in the peace of 387/6 B.C. also.<sup>1026</sup> Cawkwell notes that, despite Xenophon's claims that resumption of hostilities was due to Timotheus' actions, hostilities did not resume until over two years later, indicating that it is "improbably" the direct cause.<sup>1027</sup>

Xenophon mentions in his account of the peace of 371 B.C. a clause regarding the dissolution of armaments.<sup>1028</sup> Cawkwell conjectures that this also may have been present in the peace of 375 B.C. and 387/6 B.C., citing the hanging of the gates on the harbour at Piraeus as possible evidence that they had previously been removed in adherence to a demobilisation clause of 387/6 B.C.; they were then rehung when the acquittal of Sphodrias was deemed to have broken that peace.<sup>1029</sup>

An addition to the peace of 371 B.C., apparently not present in 375 B.C., is a sanctions clause, which offered a lack of obligation by impartial states to enforce the terms of the treaty on transgressors.<sup>1030</sup> Noting the common view that this is deemed an Athenian invention allowing the city not to become involved in the struggle between Thebes and Sparta, Cawkwell observes that the

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<sup>1024</sup> Cawkwell, 1981, p. 72, suggests that the autonomy clause was fully defined, rather than stated as a general concept. He notes that, in the treaty of 366 B.C., Xenophon states that each city was to "hold its own territory" (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VIII. 4.10) and believes this probably came down from the treaty of 375 B.C.

<sup>1025</sup> Ryder, 1963, p. 240, suggests this garrison had the potential to threaten Thebes should Sparta wish to invade.

<sup>1026</sup> See Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 80-83, concerning the possible "return of exiles" clause for 387/6 B.C., 375 B.C. and 371 B.C.

<sup>1027</sup> Cawkwell, 1963, p. 95. "The exiles were landed in mid-375 and hostilities were not resumed until autumn 373."

<sup>1028</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VI.3.18.

<sup>1029</sup> Cawkwell, 1981, pp. 74-76, suggests that the removal of the gates of Piraeus was a good will gesture by the Athenians to show openly that they were not building ships and generally re-arming. Thus, the re-hanging of the gates was a declaration that Athens was re-arming and a symbolic gesture that the period of peace had ended.

<sup>1030</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VI.3.18.

clause also invites those volunteers “who wish are to give aid to the cities being unjustly treated.”<sup>1031</sup>

It is apparent from the treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C that the threat of Persian intervention was sufficient to compel the Greeks and Artaxerxes was happy to let his *prostates* enforce stability in Greece without becoming personally involved as long as it did not directly affect his interests. It appears that Artaxerxes was willing to support whichever Greek state was deemed the most militarily powerful: thus, after 371 B.C. Athens’ alliance and hegemony over the sea is recognised in concert with Sparta’s hegemony over land. Although we hear very little about Artaxerxes, it seems likely the treaties of 375 B.C. and 371 B.C. were, in fact, instigated by him; his involvement in 371 B.C. is probable given that we know he was involved in 375 B.C.

#### The ramifications of Leuctra

A major ramification of the peace of 371 B.C. was the exclusion of Thebes from the treaty, as we noted above; this was shortly followed by Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra. We are informed by Xenophon that, in 367 B.C., Ariobarzanes sent Philiscus of Abydus with gold to help re-establish peace in Greece.<sup>1032</sup> Diodorus Siculus claims that it was Artaxerxes himself who sent Philiscus and that “all but the Thebans responded willingly.”<sup>1033</sup> Ryder notes that, as Ariobarzanes was the King’s officer, the two accounts are not entirely incompatible, however, he conjectures that, if Diodorus Siculus is mistaken, this could be early evidence of Ariobarzanes pursuing his own agenda in advance of his rebellion two years later.<sup>1034</sup> The secret recruitment of Greek mercenaries had occurred with the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, which had only failed with his death in the battle of Cunaxa, and so we may conjecture that this may have seemed a good model for Ariobarzanes to copy.

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<sup>1031</sup> Cawkwell, 1981, p.78.

<sup>1032</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.26.

<sup>1033</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.70.2. Theban presence at the meeting is attested by Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.1.27 and by Diodorus Siculus himself, who states that it was the Thebans who were unwilling to commit Messenia to Spartan control.

<sup>1034</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 80.

Thebes had risen to prominence in Greece, having defeated Sparta at Leuctra and invaded Laconia in both 370 B.C. and 369 B.C. The actions of Thebes, in calling a conference for a new *Koine Eirene*, indicates that the Greeks now recognised that with the King's favour came the ability to dominate the rest of Greece. The conference called by Philiscus failed, according to Xenophon, over the issue of Messene, and Philiscus "started to raise a large mercenary army to fight on the side of the Spartans."<sup>1035</sup>

This incident seems to demonstrate yet another occasion of Persian intervention in what, at first, seems to be a purely Greek matter. It may simply be that Ariobarzanes, due to his personal friendship with Antalcidas, was trying to help Sparta in their war against Thebes. That Philiscus felt it necessary to leave mercenaries with the Spartans is evidence of Sparta's military decline. Although we have commented that this may at first seem to be an entirely Greek matter, it is worth remembering that, once Artaxerxes had intervened in Greek affairs by officiating the King's Peace, he had a vested interest especially in Greek mercenaries which he required for his re-conquest of Egypt, which was not complete until 343/342 B.C.<sup>1036</sup>

#### Peace of Thebes in 367 B.C.

In 367 B.C., we find further embassies from the Greeks to Artaxerxes II to negotiate terms for a new *koine eirene*.<sup>1037</sup> We are told that the Thebans sent Pelopidas and, from Thebes' allies, Antiochus of Arcadia and Archidamus of Elea. According to Plutarch, Pelopidas was sent specifically due to his reputation.<sup>1038</sup> Sparta sent an embassy led by Euthicles and Athens sent Timagoras and Leon.<sup>1039</sup> We are given the impression by Xenophon that the embassy of Pelopidas led the negotiations and Pelopidas claimed to be the only man of them who could say his country, i.e. Thebes, had fought not against but

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<sup>1035</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.1.27, also Diodorus Siculus, XV.70.2. states that two thousand mercenaries were left with Sparta.

<sup>1036</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 266. Diodorus Siculus, XVI.51.

<sup>1037</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.1.33.

<sup>1038</sup> Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, XXX.

<sup>1039</sup> It is uncertain whether they were part of an allied embassy sent with Sparta or whether they were acting for the interests of Athens alone; the latter seems more likely from Xenophon's sentence structure.

with the King at Plataea, as previously noted above.<sup>1040</sup> This argument seems to have been novel in negotiations with Persia; previously Athens and Sparta had negotiated from the stance that they would not negatively affect Persian interests in the future, having already done so in the past whilst Pelopidas was able to recall previous good service to Persia.

The terms dictated by Pelopidas were similar to those of previous treaties, but with stricter applications. They asserted that Messene was to be liberated from Sparta and that Athens should “draw up her ships on land.”<sup>1041</sup> These terms were designed to cripple both Athens and Sparta, removing their military advantages in the forms of Athens’ navy and Sparta’s luxury to train Spartiates for purely military purposes. Thebes also removed the lack of obligation clause, which was introduced in the treaty of 371 B.C., which allowed impartial states not to become involved in inter-state conflicts.

Having spoken of this embassy to Persia, Xenophon is silent on the subsequent peace treaty, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus at XV.76.3, beyond saying that when the Thebans sent representatives to the Greek states the terms were refused, following the example of Corinth.<sup>1042</sup> This causes a contradiction in our sources. Xenophon states that during the congress in Susa, when Leon complained of Thebes’ terms, Artaxerxes offered Athens the opportunity to present fairer terms if they had them.<sup>1043</sup> Thus, it is plausible there were further negotiations and, later, an agreement was made, about which Xenophon is silent.<sup>1044</sup> Cawkwell argues that the Corinthian embassy to Sparta, when the Sparta were invited to join them in a peace treaty with Thebes, is Xenophon’s only reference to the peace treaty of 366/365 B.C.<sup>1045</sup> Xenophon’s account, therefore, suggests that this peace treaty was primarily an agreement between Thebes and Corinth, and a few

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<sup>1040</sup> Cf. pp. 104-105 above.

<sup>1041</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V.1.36.

<sup>1042</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.40. Ryder, 1957, p. 200, notes that Ephorus was Diodorus Siculus’ source here and so Diodorus’ information, despite its lack of details, would seem trustworthy. However, he concludes his article that, perhaps, Diodorus was not following Ephorus but a pro-Theban source and was repeating Theban claims that the peace treaty of 366/5 B.C. was “common” to all Greeks when, in fact, it involved much fewer states.

<sup>1043</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.1.37.

<sup>1044</sup> Cawkwell, 1961, pp. 81-82, suggests it is at this treaty of 366/365 B.C. that Athens’ claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese is recognised by both Artaxerxes and the Greeks.

<sup>1045</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.4.7



other Greek states, and he makes no mention of Athenian or Persian involvement.

The question of whether this treaty was a further King's Peace, similar in nature to those discussed above and linked to the negotiations of 367 B.C., rests on whether Athens and Persia were involved; having observed already that Sparta had declined. It has been noted that Athenian campaigning in the Aegean, in 367 B.C., suggests lack of Athenian involvement.<sup>1046</sup> The Athenian involvement in the rebellion of Ariobarzanes is certainly connected to Thebes' embassy to Susa and possibly to a later treaty of 366/365 B.C. Ryder argues that, in backing the unpopular Thebans and then providing a rider for the Athenians during the negotiations of 367 B.C., Artaxerxes appeared weak and Athens took advantage of this.<sup>1047</sup> Cawkwell, arguing that "Xenophon's account is in some degree not to be trusted,"<sup>1048</sup> suggests that Athens' involvement in Ariobarzanes' rebellion may have been politically motivated to put pressure on Artaxerxes prior to confirmation of a treaty of 366/365 B.C., to ensure recognition of Athenian claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese.<sup>1049</sup> In light of Athens' desire to re-possess Amphipolis and the Chersonese, which affected both powers, it seems likely that an official treaty did involve both Athens and Persia. Therefore, we agree with Cawkwell that Athens may deliberately have put pressure on Artaxerxes in order to achieve these aims. The lack of Spartan involvement indicates that not all of the states were 'on side' with this Theban-led treaty, although it also indicates that, due Sparta's diminished status in Greece by this time, the other Greeks were unconcerned about this.

Another result of the Theban led negotiations is that Timagoras, the Athenian, was executed for working against the interests of Athens.<sup>1050</sup> Charges

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<sup>1046</sup> Ryder, 1957, p. 203.

<sup>1047</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 82. Ryder further notes that in the 380s Chabrias' presence in Egypt provoked a strong enough reaction that he was recalled. However, despite Timotheus leaving Ariobarzanes before his revolt became open, fear of Artaxerxes as had existed in the 380s was clearly no longer an issue for the Athenians in the late 360s.

<sup>1048</sup> Cawkwell, 1961, p. 83.

<sup>1049</sup> Cawkwell, 1961, p. 85.

<sup>1050</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.1.33.

of medism had been, all but, dropped by the 460s due to the Greek desire to win Persian backing to support their own wars, making this instance noteworthy.

When he was denounced back in Athens, Timagoras was accused of refusing to share quarters with his colleague, Leon, and of working “hand in glove with Pelopidas in all negotiations.”<sup>1051</sup> Plutarch claims that, during his stay at Artaxerxes’ court, Timagoras sent a secret message to Artaxerxes and was richly rewarded.<sup>1052</sup> Plutarch also records a comment by Ostanes, a brother of Artaxerxes, who, he claims, said “Timagoras, remember this table; it is no slight return which you must make for such an array.”<sup>1053</sup> We may assume that, if Plutarch’s facts are correct, Timagoras did promise Artaxerxes some sort of service, although we do not know what this service may have been. It is a well-known fact that within the Achaemenid court, as we have discussed above,<sup>1054</sup> nothing was for free, however it is hard to imagine what Timagoras could have promised to Artaxerxes which Artaxerxes could not have gained from Athens without subterfuge.

It is worth noting that charges of bribe taking did not surface until Demosthenes XIX.136-137 and, also, that accusations of accepting bribes was a common political weapon used against political opponents. Thus, actions may have been misrepresented deliberately by Timagoras’ political enemies. We must, therefore, be cautious in pronouncing Timagoras guilty of accepting bribes when he was condemned on other charges. Furthermore, charges of bribery would have been difficult to prove due to the customary exchange of gifts, which would have taken place at the Persian court.<sup>1055</sup>

Whilst a strict charge of medism is not used against Timagoras, he is condemned on the grounds that he had worked against the interests of

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<sup>1051</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.I.37-38.

<sup>1052</sup> Plutarch *Artaxerxes*, XXII.5-6, claims Timagoras received “ten thousand darics, and eighty milk cows to follow in his train because he was sick and required cow’s milk; and besides, he sent him a couch, with bedding for it, and servants to make the bed ... and bearers to carry him down to the sea-coast, enfeebled as he was.”

<sup>1053</sup> Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, XX.5-6, see also Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, XXX.

<sup>1054</sup> Cf. Demaratus, pp. 75-79, Themistocles, pp. 130-132.

<sup>1055</sup> See Perlman, 1976, p. 229. Also, Tuplin, 1997, p. 174, notes that the acceptance of extravagant gifts from Persia was not uncommon. Furthermore, we may suggest that in a gift-based culture gifts carried the expectation of a commensurate service in return. In light of the evidence above it is easy to see how such gifts can be politically interpreted as a bribe. In this context, the extravagance of Timagoras’ gifts will have condemned him.

Athens.<sup>1056</sup> From this we can discern a further aspect to the definition of medism, which seems to encompass working for Persia against the specific interests of a home state rather than working for Persia against the interests of Hellas in general, as was the case during the Persian Wars.

#### The Satraps' Revolt 362-360

Despite the peace treaties involving Persia, both Athens and Sparta worked against Persian interests when they became involved in the revolts of the satraps from the Great King in the late 360s. The actual revolt of the satraps is a highly debatable matter, with scholarship arguing either: that it was an organised event, involving a co-ordinated effort between a number of satraps, primarily Ariobarzanes, Mausolus, Autophradates and Datames; or, that the individual events were related only through the proximity of their dates.<sup>1057</sup> A number of different arguments regarding this issue can be found in A.R. Burn, Hornblower and M. Weiskopf.<sup>1058</sup>

In summary, we can state that Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, revolted in 369/8.<sup>1059</sup> In 366/5 B.C., Ariobarzanes was declared a rebel and then in 365/4 B.C. came the rebellion of Orontes. Ruzicka suggests that fear of Tiribazus' influence with Darius, the designated successor to Artaxerxes, may have played a part in the rebellions of Orontes and Autophradates.<sup>1060</sup> When Autophradates and Mausolus were sent to deal with Ariobarzanes they too rebelled. Ruzicka suggests that when Autophradates rebelled, fearing that his lack of success against Datames and Ariobarzanes would result in his replacement, Mausolus followed suit in order not to become isolated as the only remaining loyal satrap

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<sup>1056</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VII.1.38.

<sup>1057</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 78, suggests a coalition of Ariobarzanes, Orontes, Autophradates and Mausolus and suggests that Datames acted separately from these satraps. He dates this coalition to c. 361 B.C.

<sup>1058</sup> Weiskopf, 1989, presents a good argument that all of the events were related and that the overall rebellion was the consequence of a number of smaller incidents which had a "knock on" effect. Cf. also, Burn, 1985, pp. 375-384, and Hornblower, 1982, pp. 256-260.

<sup>1059</sup> See Moysey, 1992, and Ruzicka, 2012, p. 127, for causes of Datames' rebellion.

<sup>1060</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, pp. 77-80, suggests that the death of Tiribazus in 361 B.C. may have led Orontes to seek reconciliation with Artaxerxes. By 361 B.C. Orontes controlled all of the land on the Ionian coast from Pergamum to Cyme. Ruzicka thinks Orontes probably wished for this to be officially recognised by Artaxerxes and his betrayal of the other satraps suggests he was successful in this.

in Anatolia.<sup>1061</sup> He believes that evidence for the date of Mausolus' rebellion, or impending rebellion, can be taken from the Carian and Egyptian escort of Agesilaus dated 364/3.<sup>1062</sup>

Ruzicka believes *GHI 145 = IG 4<sup>2</sup>* is a united "official" Greek response to a formal appeal made by Orontes as the most senior of the satraps in revolt.<sup>1063</sup> Despite the apparent refusal of the Greeks in *GHI 145 = IG 4<sup>2</sup>*, Weiskopf brings our attention to fragmentary epigraphic evidence of an alliance between Athens and Orontes, which he dates to 361/0 B.C.<sup>1064</sup> These fragments describe Orontes as someone who had been of service to Athens and would co-operate with Athens and her allies commercially. He is honoured with a 1,000 drachma gold crown and perhaps, Weiskopf suggests, Athenian citizenship. These fragments seem to relate to agreements between Athens and Orontes concerning the sale and transport of grain from Mysia in Orontes' satrapy.<sup>1065</sup> The dating of these fragments suggest the agreement may have been more important than a simple trade agreement. Furthermore, Demosthenes XV. 9 records that Timotheus was sent to Ariobarzanes with instructions to help "provided he does not violate (the Athenian) treaty with the King." R.P. Austen suggests that, whilst avoiding directly breaching any peace agreements with Persia, Athens was "making use of Persia's difficulties ... to increase her influence in the Eastern Mediterranean."<sup>1066</sup> He cites *IG II<sup>2</sup> 141* as evidence of Athenian interest in the Satraps' Revolt since

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<sup>1061</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 77.

<sup>1062</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, pp. 76-77, believes that evidence of Mausolus' involvement in Agesilaus' escort from Egypt to Greece is to be found in the Carian aspect of this escort and suggest the Carian envoy travelling with Tachos may have been sent by Mausolus. Thus, we are able to date Mausolus' rebellion, or pending rebellion, to 364 B.C.

<sup>1063</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 79. Also, Rhodes & Osborne, 2003, pp. 215-216, note that the date of this stele *GHI 145 = IG 4<sup>2</sup>* is not confirmed but only conjectured by its context. Another dates for this stele of 344 B.C. is suggested by Beloch, 1927.

<sup>1064</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 207*. As the evidence is fragmentary, the dating of it rests on a now lost piece recorded by Pittakys. Much debate surrounds Pittakys' copy in relation to the archon name listed, *Nikomachou*. Nikomachus is not a name listed in the list of archons and was amended first by Rangabe to *Kammachou* and then later by Moysey to *Kallimachou*. Kallimachus was archon 349/8. However, Osborne suggests that *Nikomachou* is a mistaken copy of *Nikophemou*, who was archon 361/0. Weiskopf, 1989, p. 77.

<sup>1065</sup> Orontes had been demoted from his satrapy of Armenia after Persia's Cypriot campaign against Evagoras in the 370s, when he had slandered Tiribazus and been proved false. He was demoted to the satrapy of Mysia in the Hellespont. Diodorus Siculus, XV.11 and XV.90.

<sup>1066</sup> Tod & Austen, 1944, p. 100.

Strato, vassal king of Sidon, was likely part of this revolt.<sup>1067</sup> These two pieces of evidence suggest that Athens was pro-actively securing her commercial interests in the Hellespont, whilst attempting not to directly antagonise Artaxerxes II.

When Tachos,<sup>1068</sup> king of Egypt, also revolted from Artaxerxes II in c. 362 B.C., we learn from Diodorus Siculus that he recruited Greek mercenaries for his cause, specifically Spartans led by Agesilaus, and also that he placed Chabrias, the Athenian, in command of the naval contingents.<sup>1069</sup> Chabrias' previous dealings with Egypt made him an obvious candidate. Plutarch's claims that Agesilaus was employed by Tachos as a mercenary<sup>1070</sup> are disputed by Trundle, who believes a more formal arrangement was in place.<sup>1071</sup> Bengtson notes that "every enemy of Persia became the natural friend of Egypt."<sup>1072</sup> Due to Spartan dissatisfaction with Persia's support of Thebes, we can see that Sparta was certainly "estranged" from Artaxerxes.<sup>1073</sup> Trundle's suggestion is more persuasive as it is unlikely Sparta would risk one of its Kings in anything less than an official campaign. Egyptian finances also seem to have been a factor in the *symmachia* in light of Xenophon's claims that after the campaign Agesilaus sailed home in great haste, "although it was winter", having received a great sum, so that the state would be in a position to take action against its enemies the following campaigning season.

Tachos' campaigns against Phoenicia and Syria resulted in internal rebellion and his being deposed by Nectanebo II.<sup>1074</sup> Tachos fled to Artaxerxes

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<sup>1067</sup> Tod & Austen, 1944, pp. 98-100, note Strato's close relationship with Tachos, who he sheltered in 359 B.C., and also Strato's death when Persia recovered Sidon at the conclusion of the Satraps' Revolt. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, p. 88-91, date *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 141 to 378/7-377/6, based on the requirement for the decree to be published within ten days.

<sup>1068</sup> Tachos took the throne of Egypt in 363/2 B.C. and almost immediately rebelled against Artaxerxes.

<sup>1069</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV. 90-92. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 137, suggests that Tachos had been planning his rebellion since 364 B.C. and that the Egyptian-Spartan *symmachia* may be datable to then. Clearly Artaxerxes II had managed to subdue at least this area of Egypt after the failed attempt led by Pharnabazus in 374 B.C. Cf. pp. 226-227 above.

<sup>1070</sup> Plutarch, *Agesilaus*, XXXVI.

<sup>1071</sup> Trundle, 2004, p. 156, "it is hard to see that a king of Sparta, with advisers and 1,000 neodamodeis hoplites, could be anything but an ally of the power for which he was fighting."

<sup>1072</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 347.

<sup>1073</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XV.90.2. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 138, suggests that Agesilaus' involvement may have been an attempt to force Artaxerxes II to make concessions.

<sup>1074</sup> See Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 147-150, for the Egyptian inter-dynastic struggles of this time.

but, no longer Pharaoh, did not bring Egypt back into the Persian fold. Plutarch states that Agesilaus joined Nectanebo and was rewarded with two hundred and thirty talents of silver, but we may believe Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon are likely correct when then both claim that he stayed supporting Tachos.<sup>1075</sup>

The actions of Athens and Sparta, prior to the rebellion of Tachos, suggest that at this stage of the satraps' revolts they took advantage of this situation as best they could but they were still sufficiently respectful to avoid direct conflict with Artaxerxes II. The rebellion of Tachos seems to have changed such sentiments. It is possible that the rebellion of Tachos was a subconscious signal to the Greeks that there was enough turmoil in west of the Persian Empire allowing them to work openly against the interests of Artaxerxes II, who now supported Thebes in Greece to their detriment. Certainly this seems to have been the motivation for Sparta, which had already refused to join in the treaty initiated by Thebes in 367 B.C. It is unlikely that either state would have foreseen that Tachos would fall to his own internal rebellion.

#### Mausolus & Athens' Social War (359 B.C.)

Shortly after the conclusion of the revolt of the satraps, Athens was embroiled in the social war with some of its Aegean allies: namely Rhodes, Byzantium and Chios.<sup>1076</sup> We hear from Diodorus Siculus of Mausolus, satrap of Caria, sending aid to the defecting allies of Athens.<sup>1077</sup> Whilst Demosthenes claims that Mausolus was the instigator of the Social War, we can see that he is mentioned as a passing reference, thus, his culpability may be viewed primarily as rhetoric.<sup>1078</sup> The real cause of the Social War was undoubtedly "deep-seated dissatisfaction with Athenian leadership".<sup>1079</sup> Schäfer notes the establishment of cleruchies upon Athens' allies, probably begun as early as 365 B.C., undermining

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<sup>1075</sup> Plutarch, *Agesilaus*, XXXVII, Diodorus Siculus, XV.93, Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.28-31. Plutarch, *Agesilaus*, XXX, states that Agesilaus died on the return journey to Sparta from Egypt, at a location on the Libyan coast called the Harbour of Menelaus.

<sup>1076</sup> Ruzicka, 1998, p. 60-62, suggests that these islands had been detached from alliance with Athens in 364 B.C. by Epaminondas in an attempt to assert a Theban naval hegemony and thus validate Thebes' position as *prostates* of the peace treaty of 367 B.C. He further asserts (pp. 64-67) that these islands joined Thebes willingly, believing Thebes to be acting with Persian backing, in an attempt to avert embroilment in a potential Athenian - Persian war.

<sup>1077</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.7.3.

<sup>1078</sup> Demosthenes XV.3, Diodorus Siculus, XVI.7.3. Hornblower, 1982, pp. 206-211.

<sup>1079</sup> Ryder, 1965, p. 89.

Greek communities like Samos, and the reintroduction of the *syntaxeis*, the 5% trade tax.<sup>1080</sup> Ruzicka notes that it was when the Athenians demanded *syntaxeis* from their recalcitrant allies, Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes, that they rebelled. He believes that, although Mausolus did not initiate the rebellions, he may well have been “instrumental in bringing these states together,” noting that Athenian operations against Rhodes potentially could threaten Mausolus’ interests on other islands, such as Cos and Samos.<sup>1081</sup> Demosthenes XV.15 may be a reference to Mausolus’ introduction of Carian garrisons on Rhodes and we find a Carian garrison on Cos in 351 B.C.<sup>1082</sup> both of which seem to be in reaction to Athens’ actions.

During these Athenian naval operations, Chares joined Artabazus, who was, once again, in rebellion. When Artaxerxes III, known as Artaxerxes Ochus, took the throne, in 359/8 B.C., he had ordered his satraps to disband their mercenary armies in an attempt to quell the rebellions, which had dominated the preceding decade.<sup>1083</sup> Thus, when Artabazus rebelled he called on Chares, who was lacking finance for Athens’ naval operations. When Chares joined Artabazus and stopped his Aegean operations, the allies and Mausolus appear to have become inactive too, which Ruzicka ascribes to poor sailing conditions due to the end of the season; it is also likely that Mausolus was occupied fighting against Artabazus.<sup>1084</sup> We are later informed by Diodorus Siculus that Artaxerxes Ochus sent an embassy to Athens demanding the recall of Chares.<sup>1085</sup> The Athenians obeyed and concluded their Social War, hearing that Artaxerxes had promised “Athens’ enemies that he would join them in their war against the Athenians with three hundred ships”<sup>1086</sup> if they did not. We may conclude that, after sustaining such losses at Chios in 357 B.C. and at Embata in 356 B.C., the

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<sup>1080</sup> Schäfer, 1885, p. 165. Ryder, 1965, p. 89.

<sup>1081</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 92.

<sup>1082</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 93.

<sup>1083</sup> Artaxerxes III took the name Artaxerxes Ochus, when he was crowned. His father Artaxerxes II, was known as Artaxerxes Memon.

<sup>1084</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 95, notes that although not mentioned in the ancient sources, it is likely that Mausolus was involved in Artabazus’ rebellion fighting against him, as the strongest satrap in the region. Whereas the other satraps had been forced to disband their mercenary armies, Ruzicka believes that since Mausolus’ mercenaries were primarily for guard duty etc., it is unlikely these were disbanded and, therefore, he would have been the only satrap in Anatolia with enough men to counter Artabazus.

<sup>1085</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 95. Cf. Salmond, 1996, for a discussion regarding the career of Chares.

<sup>1086</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.22.2.

Athenians could ill afford to continue to fight their rebellious allies, especially against Persian backing.<sup>1087</sup> Ruzicka suggests that at this time Athens also sent an embassy to negotiate with Mausolus, in order to neutralise his continued hostility.<sup>1088</sup>

The rebellion of Artabazus may be viewed as part of the usual turmoil which took place during the succession struggles for the Achaemenid throne. It is unsurprising that Athens might ignore Chares' opportunistic involvement in this, given Athens' attitude to Chabrias' involvement in the rebellion of Tachos. The embassy from Artaxerxes Ochus, however, indicates that upon taking the Persian throne he was able to reassert Persian power over Athenian foreign policy as it conflicted with Persian interests, and that he was well aware that he could bring the Athenians 'to heel' by threatening to support their enemies: a policy frequently employed against the Greeks by Artaxerxes II.

From the accession of Artaxerxes Ochus, Greek and Persian foreign policy seem to be divided into two parts. We will see that Artaxerxes Ochus was primarily preoccupied with the re-conquest of Egypt, resulting in possibly two campaigns in the 350s and the final, successful campaign in 343 B.C. Artaxerxes Ochus, like his predecessor, required Greek mercenaries for these campaigns. At the same time, Macedon under the leadership of Philip, was emerging as a new power, thus, diverting much Greek attention towards north Greece. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss both situations which impacted on the Greeks and Persia.

#### Artaxerxes III's Egyptian campaign 351-350

Diodorus Siculus suggests two possible expeditions by Artaxerxes Ochus, in 358 B.C. and in 351 B.C.<sup>1089</sup> Cook claims that "effectively Ochus was commander of the King's armies from about 362 B.C.,"<sup>1090</sup> thus, plausibly he could have commanded an invasion of Egypt as a prince in 358 B.C. before he

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<sup>1087</sup> Buckler, 2003, p. 383.

<sup>1088</sup> Ruzicka, 1946, p. 97.

<sup>1089</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.40.4 only seems to mention the one invasion by Artaxerxes III of 351 B.C.

<sup>1090</sup> Cook, 1983, p. 222.



took the throne.<sup>1091</sup> Ruzicka suggests that the lack of information on this campaign points to its failure and holds that it was cut short due the death of Artaxerxes II, compelling Artaxerxes Ochus to return to Persia and assert his claim to throne.<sup>1092</sup>

The invasion of 351 B.C. is more certain, but it is still only mentioned in passing by Diodorus Siculus who claims that Artaxerxes Ochus sent out generals and armies in this invasion, but did not accompany them himself, which contradicts Demosthenes and Isocrates.<sup>1093</sup> Ruzicka believes that the “300 ships” used to threaten the Athenians in 355 B.C. may be evidence of a Persian fleet being assembled for this campaign.<sup>1094</sup> The presence of Greek mercenaries within the Egyptian forces are unsurprising since Greek mercenaries had been involved on both sides in previous Persian campaigns against Egypt. Diophantes of Athens and Lamius of Sparta were with Nectanebo during Artaxerxes Ochus’ invasion of 351 B.C. and we are able to learn fragments of information about this invasion when he describes the invasion of 343 B.C.<sup>1095</sup> We may suggest that Mentor and his four thousand Greek mercenaries, who were sent to Tennes, king of Sidon, by Nectanebo in 346 B.C.,<sup>1096</sup> also may have been present in Egypt as early as 351 B.C. as well as the garrison at Pelusium, which later was defeated by Artaxerxes Ochus in 343 B.C.

#### The Persian reconquest of Egypt in 343 B.C.

The re-conquest of Egypt by Artaxerxes Ochus eventually came in 343 B.C. and was not only a long term desire of both Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes Ochus, but was also in response to Nectanebo’s support of rebellious factions in both Phoenicia and Cyprus. We noted above that Nectanebo had sent four

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<sup>1091</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 350, suggests that perhaps the deposed Tachos accompanied Artaxerxes Ochus in 358 B.C.

<sup>1092</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, pp. 151-153, cites the Byzantine chronographer George Syncellus, *Eclogia Chronographica*, 487. He also postulates a number of reasons, including lack of preparation and Artaxerxes II’s death, why the sources do not record further information regarding this campaign.

<sup>1093</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.48.2.

<sup>1094</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 158.

<sup>1095</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.48.2. Ruzicka, 2012, p. 161, notes the presence of Diophantus and Lamius does not necessarily confirm the involvement of Athens, but merely confirms that Greek mercenaries were popular in Egypt and Persia during the mid-fourth century B.C.

<sup>1096</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.42.

thousand mercenaries to Tennes, king of Sidon, indicating that Egypt was secure enough not to need Mentor and his mercenaries at that time. It is worth postulating that these mercenaries were part of the reason why the Persian invasion of Egypt in 351 B.C. had failed.<sup>1097</sup> Diodorus Siculus states that it was with the aid of Mentor and his mercenaries that the Sidonians were able to defeat the satraps of Phoenicia when they first rebelled. If Nectanebo was hoping to divert the Persian threat of invasion away from Egypt, it would be logical for him to help the Sidonian rebellion, to create a “buffer” between Egypt and the Persian Empire. Mentor changed allegiances to Artaxerxes Ochus when Tennes was betrayed by the Sidonians, ending the Phoenician revolt.<sup>1098</sup>

Whilst the Phoenicians were rebelling, the kings of Cyprus also united in revolt from Persia. The rebellion of the Cypriot kings does not seem to have lasted long and we may assume that, by this time, since Artaxerxes Ochus was with his army in Phoenicia, Idreaus, Phocion and Evagoras, who quelled the Cypriot rebellions,<sup>1099</sup> may have simply joined him in Egypt. In preparation for the re-conquest of Egypt, Diodorus Siculus informs us that, Artaxerxes sent “envoys to the greatest cities of Greece requesting them to join the Persians in the campaign against the Egyptians.”<sup>1100</sup> We learn that, although Sparta and Athens declined to send anyone to Artaxerxes, Lacrates of Thebes and Nicostatus of Argos were personally requested by Artaxerxes.<sup>1101</sup> Lacrates of Thebes commanded a thousand men, whilst Nicostratus of Argos commanded three thousand men.<sup>1102</sup> Artaxerxes divided his Greeks into three contingents between Lacrates, Nicostratus and Mentor of Rhodes, who were each accompanied by a Persian; Rhosaces, Aristazanes, and Bagoas, respectively.<sup>1103</sup> Ruzicka notes that the combination of a Greek commander with a high ranking Persian was an

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<sup>1097</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 182, suggests that the loss of men at Lake Sebonis, which Diodorus Siculus places as part of the 343 B.C. campaign, should actually belong to the 351 campaign reasoning that with the presence of Mentor and therefore his knowledge of Egypt this is unlikely to have occurred in the later campaign.

<sup>1098</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.45 and XVI.50.

<sup>1099</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.42.7.

<sup>1100</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI. 44.1.

<sup>1101</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.44.1.

<sup>1102</sup> Six thousand Ionian Greek mercenaries also joined Artaxerxes Ochus’ army. As these were Ionian Greeks, we may be able to speculate that, unlike Thebes and Argos, they were likely compelled to service. Diodorus Siculus XVI.44.4.

<sup>1103</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.47.

effective guard against potential Greek perfidy,<sup>1104</sup> and the terminology used by Diodorus Siculus suggests that the Greeks seem to have held equal command status to their Persian counterparts, although this does not necessarily follow.<sup>1105</sup> It seems that the Athenians and Spartans declined Artaxerxes' request primarily because twenty thousand Greek mercenaries, still under the commands of Diophantes and Lamius, were still serving under Nectanebo.<sup>1106</sup> We are told that a Spartan garrison of five thousand men, under the command of Philophon, guarded the fortress of Pelusium, on the entrance to Egypt on the Nile.<sup>1107</sup>

Diodorus Siculus claims that Artaxerxes Ochus III subdued Egypt partly by use of his army and partly by the employment of treachery, turning the native Egyptians against the Greek mercenaries until the cities of Egypt capitulated voluntarily. Nectanebo having fortified Memphis ready for a siege, fled to Ethiopia. Many of the Egyptian cities surrendered because the Greek mercenaries realised that they would no longer be paid by Nectanebo and, also, because the local Egyptian soldiers likely realised that no reinforcements would be forthcoming. The presence of Greek mercenaries both in the Persian and Egyptian forces suggests that they were pivotal to the re-conquest of Egypt and had Artaxerxes Ochus not divided the Greek mercenaries from their Egyptian counterparts, we may suggest the campaign would have been longer. It has been noted that the intelligence which Mentor could provide, after a decade in Egypt, was likely the "gallant actions", for which he was rewarded, as noted by Diodorus Siculus.<sup>1108</sup>

Noteworthy of this Persian campaign is the lack of official Athenian and Spartan backing of the Persians whilst there were Spartan and Athenian mercenaries active in Egypt. Although it could be claimed that, as mercenaries, Diophantes and Lamius may have been acting in a private capacity and without sanction from their home states, it is interesting that neither of them was recalled. It might be argued that, by not recalling them, Sparta and Athens condoned their

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<sup>1104</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 198.

<sup>1105</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 183, notes the terminology *strategos*, *synarchontes*, *synestratoueto* used to describe the actions and statuses of the Greek commanders.

<sup>1106</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.42-48.

<sup>1107</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.44.

<sup>1108</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.52.1-2.

opposition to this Persian campaign. I would suggest that whilst it may seem that this complicity suggests political, if not actual, rebellion, it is likely that, had Artaxerxes Ochus demanded their recall, Athens and Sparta would have complied as neither state was in a position to refuse. It is also worth noting, as we shall see below, that the Greek states were preoccupied with the rise of Macedon and none were in a position to fight wars on two fronts at this time.

### The Rise of Macedon

The political upheavals in Greece and Persia seem to have allowed for Philip to secure Macedon and also to look towards Greece for expansion. In 359 B.C., the same year that Artaxerxes Ochus was crowned, Philip became the guardian of Amyntas, infant king of Macedon.<sup>1109</sup> Philip was able to increase Macedon's political standing and power within Greece so quickly largely due to the turmoil between the Greek states at the time. Sparta and Thebes were in conflict, Athens was fighting its Social War, and the Sacred War was being fought by the Phocians and Boeotians. Thus, many Greek states were preoccupied with their own affairs and regarded Macedon's rise only in relation to their own interests, i.e. with a view to gaining Macedonian military support for their own wars.<sup>1110</sup> Philip's defeat of Argaeus, a rival for the throne, who had obtained Athenian backing resulted in a treaty with Athens, and Macedon's supposed relinquishment of Amphipolis.<sup>1111</sup> With Macedonian backing in the Sacred War, Thebes was able to defeat the alliance of Athens, Phocis and the Thessalians of Pherae, culminating in the Macedonian victory at the battle of the Crocus Field.<sup>1112</sup> Philip was made archon of the newly re-formed Thessalian League in 353 B.C. In 352 B.C. Philip led his army to Thrace challenging

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<sup>1109</sup> It is unknown when Philip actually deposed his nephew, but Bengtson suggests that it was likely before 354 B.C. Bengtson, 1970, p. 285.

<sup>1110</sup> Hornblower, 2011, p. 268.

<sup>1111</sup> Two years later, Philip attacked and subjugated Amphipolis to Macedonian rule. The defeat of Argaeus will have been a major set-back for Athens, despite the subsequent treaty in which Philip renounced Macedonian claims to Amphipolis. Hammond, 1994, p. 24, notes that, the number of men sent by Athens in support of Argaeus, matched those sent in 432 B.C. against Perdiccas II, when Athens was much stronger, indicating the strength of Athenian feeling on this matter. Thus, the loss of these men in 359 B.C., about 4000 in number, will have been all the more damaging to Athens. Furthermore, with the defeat and subjugation of the Illyrians, Philip was able to double the size of both Macedon and its army.

<sup>1112</sup> Bengtson, 1970, p. 289, notes that the Phocian mercenaries were able to defeat Philip twice in 353 B.C. before his ultimate victory at the Crocus field.

Athenian authority there.<sup>1113</sup> This is the first time we find Philip fighting in the Chersonese to secure territory for Macedon, and Hammond believes this campaign led to Macedon control of the Bosphorus.<sup>1114</sup> After the fall of Phocis, Athens sent envoys to Philip to negotiate a treaty, resulting in the Peace of Philocrates of 346 B.C.<sup>1115</sup>

#### Philip shelters Artabazus

During this period there is little contact between Macedon and Persia. Parmenion and his Thebans aided Artabazus in his revolt from Artaxerxes in 353 B.C. and Philip provided a place of exile for Artabazus and his son-in-law Memnon, in 350 B.C.<sup>1116</sup> We are given no further details by Diodorus Siculus concerning Artabazus and Memnon, and Persian-Macedonian communications are silent until after Philip's League of Corinth of 337 B.C. This is explicable by Philip's inability to spare men to become involved in Persian affairs, due to his own campaigns, and Persia's preoccupation with the Phoenician and Cypriot rebellions followed by the re-conquest of Egypt. By 342 B.C. Philip had furthered his interests in Thessaly, defeating the remaining Greek states not already allied with him at Chaeronea, and Persia had subdued its rebellions and re-conquered Egypt. Hammond believes in the possibility that at this time, c. 343/342 B.C., an agreement was reached by Philip and Artaxerxes. Plutarch mentions that, as a boy, Alexander entertained Persian envoys at the Macedonian court in Philip's absence.<sup>1117</sup> Hammond links this to a reference in a letter from Artaxerxes Ochus to Alexander referring to a treaty of *φιλία καὶ*

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<sup>1113</sup> Whilst Philip had been fighting Onomarchus in the Sacred War, the Athenian general Chares had captured Sestos and Cersobleptes had ceded all Thracian cities, except Cardia, to Athens.

<sup>1114</sup> Hammond, 1994, p. 50.

<sup>1115</sup> See Ryder, 1965, appendix IX for a good discussion of this treaty.

<sup>1116</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.52. They were both offered clemency by Artaxerxes III as a reward to Mentor for his services during Artaxerxes' Egyptian campaign in 343 B.C. Hammond, 1994, p. 130, on the basis of Ephorus, XXVI, suggests that Parmenion was sent to Artabazus by Philip in his position as leader of the Thessalian League.

<sup>1117</sup> Plutarch, *Alexander*, V. Hammond, 1994, p. 130 notes that the ambassadors were sent at the instigation of Artaxerxes himself, rather than in response to an embassy sent to Persia by Philip. He argues that Artaxerxes would have known of the link between Philip and Hermeias, ruler of Atarneus, in the person of Aristotle, son-in-law of Hermeias, who Philip had invited to his court in 342 B.C. to educate Alexander. Hammond believes that it was this link, in the persons of Aristotle and Hermeias, which prompted Artaxerxes to send the envoy.

ξυμμαχία between Persia and Macedon.<sup>1118</sup> Kuhrt, citing Bosworth, holds that Plutarch's account should be rejected, especially in light of Philip's actions against Byzantium in 340 B.C., which we will discuss below.<sup>1119</sup> Plutarch's account is designed to emphasise Alexander's prowess, thus, Philip was absent when the supposed Persian embassy arrived. However, in reality, with Philip absent a treaty cannot have been concluded.<sup>1120</sup>

In 340 B.C. Byzantium had been in negotiations with Athens, which had in turn been in negotiations with Artaxerxes Ochus, about an alliance against Philip.<sup>1121</sup> This anti-Macedonian alliance manifested itself when Artaxerxes Ochus ordered his satraps to support Perinthus with food, money, mercenaries and missiles whilst it was besieged by Philip.<sup>1122</sup> Persian intervention at Perinthus is a clear sign that Artaxerxes Ochus recognised the threat posed by Philip.<sup>1123</sup> Diodorus Siculus states that Artaxerxes ὑφορώμενος τοῦ Φιλίππου ([viewed Philip with suspicion](#)).<sup>1124</sup> The great speed of Philip's expansion of Macedonian influence signified his eventual encroachment upon Persia's territory and, in 336 B.C., Philip sent Attalus and Parmenion to Asia Minor, "assigning to them a part of his forces and ordering them to liberate the Greek cities,"<sup>1125</sup> employing the traditional common slogan in an attempt to unify the Greeks. Justin explicitly claims that Philip had the Greek states who attended the council at Corinth prepare for war and it is implied that the conference was a deliberate precursor for this.<sup>1126</sup>

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<sup>1118</sup> Hammond, 1994, p. 130. See Arrian, *Anabasis*, II.14.2 and Plutarch, *Alexander*, V.

<sup>1119</sup> Kuhrt, 2010, p. 417. See also, Buckler, 1994, p. 109.

<sup>1120</sup> Buckler, 1994, p. 110, notes that the embassy mentioned in Plutarch cannot be dated. Therefore, we may suggest that this was a general account of a non-specific embassy from Persia to Macedon in order to high-light the prowess of Alexander. It was not the purpose of the account to relate political history and, thus, such details were omitted.

<sup>1121</sup> Demosthenes, IX.71, Ps. Demosthenes, XII.6-7.

<sup>1122</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.75.2, Arrian, *Anabasis*, II.14.5. Hammond, 1959, p. 130, argues that, when Artaxerxes Ochus sent help to Perinthus, he broke a Macedonian-Persian "non-aggression pact in which Philip undertook not to intervene in Asia ... and Artaxerxes agreed not to cross into Thrace or act against Philip at sea."

<sup>1123</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.77, Demosthenes XVIII.76 & 139. Philip divided his forces to attack both Perinthus and Byzantium.

<sup>1124</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.75.1-2.

<sup>1125</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.91.3.

<sup>1126</sup> Justin, *Epitoma*, IX.5.1-6, Diodorus Siculus, XVI.89.4. See Buckler, 1994, pp. 112-118, for a discussion on the League at Corinth and Philip's election as hegemon against Persia.

Between 359 B.C. and 336 B.C., we can see that Artaxerxes Ochus was largely preoccupied with consolidating his control of Persia by disbanding the mercenary armies of his satraps and then successfully re-conquering Egypt. We have already discussed above the Egyptian invasions of 358 B.C., 351/350 B.C. and 343/2 B.C., the last of which was delayed by Cypriot and Syrian rebellions in 349 B.C. We are hampered by lack of information regarding Persia in our Greek sources after 342 B.C. and before 336 B.C.<sup>1127</sup> However we do know that, in 338 B.C., Artaxerxes Ochus was assassinated, and replaced by Arses, who in turn was assassinated and replaced by Darius Codomannus in 336 B.C.<sup>1128</sup> Whatever the actualities of the situation, this is clear evidence of succession problems and turmoil within the Persian Empire which seem to have distracted Persia from dealing with the growing threat from Philip of Macedon.

During Philip and Macedon's rise to prominence in Greece there is much less diplomacy between Greece and Persia. Hornblower suggests that the lack of Persian intervention in Greek affairs is due to the Persian belief that Philip was keeping Greece under control and, therefore, it was in Persia's interests not to send help to the Greek states against the advance of Macedonia.<sup>1129</sup> Hornblower further argues that Artaxerxes Ochus welcomed Macedonian limitations on Athenian naval power. However, we should be mindful that Artaxerxes Ochus was also preoccupied with re-conquering and stabilising recalcitrant elements of the Persian Empire for which he required a substantial number of Greek mercenaries. Artaxerxes II intervened in Greece in the 370s in order to free-up mercenaries for his Egyptian campaigns, thus, Artaxerxes Ochus, in fact, may not have welcomed Macedonian aggression which impacted on his designs. It is more likely that these distractions prevented Persia from becoming involved. Buckler believes that, in deliberately omitting Artaxerxes Ochus from the Peace

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<sup>1127</sup> Ruzicka, 2012, p. 201, noting Diodorus Siculus' lack of details regarding Artaxerxes Ochus' activities in Egypt, suggests that his army did not move south of Memphis. Further, he cites evidence of Nectanebo's actions in Egypt outside of Memphis and the Delta and also the presence of another Egyptian king at Thebes, Memphis and in the Delta, suggesting lack of Persian control after Artaxerxes Ochus had returned to Persia.

<sup>1128</sup> According to Diodorus Siculus, XVII.5, Artaxerxes Ochus was assassinated by a eunuch named Bagoas, who placed Artaxerxes Ochus' son Arses on the throne. Bagoas later killed Arses and his family, extinguishing the direct royal line and put Darius Codomannus, an extended member of the royal family, on the throne. According to Diodorus Siculus, in Bagoas' attempt to poison Darius he was discovered and he was forced to drink the poison himself.

<sup>1129</sup> Hornblower, 2011, pp. 270 ff.

of Philocrates in 338 B.C., Philip was both declaring his position as sole mediator in Greek affairs and was also, in effect, making a “Greek declaration of independence”, thus, the treaty made at Corinth was tantamount to a declaration of war against Persia.<sup>1130</sup> Diodorus Siculus states explicitly that Philip “spread the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians” at the League of Corinth, which effectively concluded the era of negotiations between Greek and Persian.<sup>1131</sup>

### Alexander the Great

We have already noted above Plutarch’s account of Alexander’s reception of Artaxerxes Ochus’ supposed embassy in 342 B.C. Prior to this we find Alexander’s involvement in Persian affairs when he interfered in Philip’s plans for marrying Arrhidaeus to the daughter of Pixodarus satrap of Caria.<sup>1132</sup> The account is noteworthy in that the initial marriage proposal was suggested by Pixodarus, rather than Philip indicating that the satrap of Caria recognised the growth of Macedonian power in Greece. The instability within the Persia Empire seems to have provoked Pixodarus to attempt an alliance with the new “super-power” of Greece.<sup>1133</sup> Shortly after this Philip was assassinated and Alexander swiftly took the Macedonian throne.

### Alexander’s siege of Thebes

It seems clear that Darius III did not send aid to the Greeks whilst Alexander was securing his control of Greece, despite Theban claims of an alliance with Darius III.<sup>1134</sup> Although we should not discredit the long friendship between Thebes and Persia, it is possible the Thebans were bluffing in an attempt to encourage rebellion from the other Greek cities. Whilst a Theban-Persian understanding is not impossible, Diodorus Siculus says that Darius started to

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<sup>1130</sup> Buckler, 2003, p. 512. See also Bengtson, 1970, p. 302, Hornblower, 2011, p. 288. Roebuck, 1948, gives a good account of Greek affairs in the lead up to the meeting at Corinth.

<sup>1131</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVI.89.

<sup>1132</sup> Arrhidaeus was Philip’s illegitimate son by Philinna of Larissa. Plutarch, *Alexander*, X. Philip banished four of Alexander’s friends as punishment for his meddling.

<sup>1133</sup> From Scot-Kilvert’s dating of Plutarch we may place this embassy to have taken place in 336 B.C. Scott-Kilvert, 1960, p.?

<sup>1134</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVII.9.5-6



prepare against Macedon, only after Alexander had secured the leadership of all Greece.<sup>1135</sup> Furthermore, the proposed timescale does not favour an alliance; both Alexander and Darius took to their respective thrones in 336 B.C., during which year Alexander also began the siege of Thebes. Persian successions were notoriously turbulent and it is unlikely that Darius would have had time to secure his throne and then respond to a Theban request for an alliance against Alexander, especially in light of the time it would take for envoys to travel between Thebes and Persia before Alexander besieged the city. If there had been an understanding, at least, between Thebes and Persia at this time, we can see that it was not honoured. The destruction of Thebes enabled Alexander to prepare his campaign against Persia, which he undertook in 336 B.C.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

We noted at the beginning of this chapter the dramatic change in the relationship between Greek and Persian, which led to Persia asserting its position of authority over the Greeks. We can suggest that Persia was interested in Greek affairs chiefly when they directly affected Persian interests; these were, primarily, stability within the Empire and the re-conquest of Egypt. We can see that these Persian interests also affected its relationship with the Greeks and as the familiarity between Greek and Persian increased, Persia recognised the need not only to prevent the Greeks interfering in Egypt, Cyprus and Asia Minor, but also the need to employ Greeks in its campaigns against Egypt. Thus, a relatively stable Greece was necessary in order to 'free up' these mercenaries.

Persia's support of Sparta in the second Peloponnesian War demonstrated to the Greek states that, if they wished to dominate Greece Persian sponsorship was now necessary. When Sparta approached Persia, in 392 B.C, it was to conclude a bilateral treaty, similar in nature to those concluded in the fifth century with Tissaphernes. This similarity is emphasised by Sparta's willingness again to abandon the Greeks of Asia Minor in order to gain Persian backing against its enemies in Greece. However, Sparta's invasion of Asia Minor had damaged their previously 'special' relationship and Persia had supported

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<sup>1135</sup> Diodorus Siculus, XVII.7.1-3.

Sparta's enemies in Greece to remove these invading forces. The presence of Athenian, Argive, Corinthian and Theban envoys meant that any treaty would be common to all of these states, and, therefore, required their approval. Thus, the Greeks were now in a position to negotiate the terms of their treaties. It should be noted that, despite this new ability to negotiate in their treaties, the negotiations were amongst themselves not with Persia, which had adopted the role of arbiter.

Persian claims to Cyprus and Clazomenai in the King's Peace in 387/6 B.C. indicates that that Persian influence over Greece had increased further since 392 B.C. By 386 B.C. Persia was able to force the Greeks to recognise Persian authority over Cyprus, and secure the island in preparation for the Persian reconquest of Egypt. The impact of the peace on the Greeks was that it demonstrated Persia's support for Sparta's dominance of Greece, but it also limited any Greek threat to Persia by preventing any one state from becoming strong enough to dominate the others without Persian backing. Thus, the King's Peace created a situation whereby Persian support against their enemies made the Greeks compliant with Persia's wishes.

These sentiments can be seen to have continued in the treaties of the 370s. Artaxerxes II intervened to settle the inter-state wars in Greece seemingly in order to recruit the Greek mercenaries necessary for his Egyptian campaigns. The debate whether or not Artaxerxes was involved in the treaty of 375 B.C. emphasises the fact that the apparent threat of Persian interference alone was enough to make the Greeks resolve matters. It might also suggest that the Greeks needed this Persian threat in order to conclude their treaties; the second Athenian League does not seem to have been strong enough to replace the need for Persian backed treaties, which induced all of the Greek states to abide by the terms.

Thebes' usurpation of Sparta's dominance over Greece does not seem to have affected Persia's attitude to the Greeks. Thus, in 367 B.C., Artaxerxes II was willing to back Thebes' claims to the *prostates*. The degree of power the *Koine Eirene* had over the Greeks is indicated by Thebes' ability to liberate Messene from Sparta and to attempt to beach Athens' fleet. Although being militarily

dominant, we find that Thebes, the old friends of Persia, still required Persian support to confirm its position in Greece.

Having spoken of the many treaties of the fourth century, it is necessary to recognise another trend, which seems to run in the background to all of these political negotiations: the use of Greek mercenaries by Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes Ochus, as well as some of their rebellious satraps. The effectiveness of Greek mercenaries over standard Persian forces will have been emphasised by the Greek victory at Cunaxa, despite the death of Cyrus the Younger, and their ability to return to the coast of Asia Minor whilst being harassed by Persian forces. By the fourth century, like Artaxerxes II, the Greeks realised the usefulness of Greek mercenaries as a commodity, which they could use also to demonstrate their displeasure with Persia, by supporting subversive elements of the Empire. This is most notable when Sparta became involved with Egypt's rebellion from Persia in 362 B.C., possibly in response to Persian backing of Thebes' liberation of Messene. We also saw in 343 B.C. that, apparently, neither Athens nor Sparta recalled Diophantes and Lamius, who were campaigning, perhaps privately, with Nectanebo of Egypt, which may also be interpreted as signs of their displeasure with Persia's backing of Thebes in Greece. Certainly there is a correlation between Persian involvement in Greek inter-state wars and Persia's desire for Greek mercenaries for its Egyptian campaigns and also, conversely, Greek mercenary support of subversive elements of the Persian Empire by states which were disappointed with their treatment by Persia. Despite this Greek support, it should be noted that Athens and Sparta obeyed Persian commands to recall their mercenaries when these commands were issued. Thus we may suggest that the use of mercenaries by the Greeks was to display their displeasure with Persia but not necessarily to provoke Persian anger.

We can see that the Greek preoccupation with medism in the fifth century was abandoned for the most part during the fourth century. Persian support

was now a desirable tool to promote self-interest by the various Greek states and those charges which were brought were, in consequence, rare.

The rise to prominence of Macedon does not seem to have affected the general policy of Persia toward Greece. Artaxerxes Ochus did not seem to heed the expansion of Macedonian influence until Philip began campaigning in Thrace when it was perceived that Philip might threaten Persian interests. That said, it would appear that during Philip's rise to prominence Persia was distracted. When Artaxerxes Ochus took to the throne he had suffered the usual succession problems, and, during his early years, he needed to suppress a number of revolts from his satraps before he could re-conquer Egypt. By the time Persia became stable enough to interfere in Greek affairs again, Philip was planning an invasion and Persia could no longer call on any Greek mercenaries.<sup>1136</sup> Moysey contends that, despite the traditional view that the Achaemenid dynasty and Persian Empire was a "sick man", in the latter half of the fourth century, the dynastic disputes and satrapal attempts to exploit these weaknesses were not new in Achaemenid history.<sup>1137</sup> Indeed, the strength of the Persian Empire under Artaxerxes Ochus may be ascertained by his re-conquest of Egypt in the 340s. It was primarily the dynastic upheavals of the decade after Artaxerxes Ochus, with the short reigns of Arses (Artaxerxes IV) and then Darius III, i.e. 336-330, that gave Alexander the Great the necessary opportunity to invade the Persian Empire.

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<sup>1136</sup> Sparta, Athens and Thebes were unable to supply any after their defeats at Chaeronea and Argos and Corinth were, likely, uninterested as pro-Macedonian states.

<sup>1137</sup> Moysey, 1992, p. 165.



## Conclusion

The relationship between Persia and the Greeks was constantly evolving from the initial contacts in the sixth century until the invasion of Alexander the Great in the fourth century. As a result of our detailed study we are able to reach the general conclusion that the period in question can be divided into three parts; that prior to the Persian Wars, the Persian Wars until the Peloponnesian War, and from the Peloponnesian War until the rise of Macedon. From their first contacts and throughout all three periods, Persia largely dominated its relationship with the Greeks, and it did so through a number of devices.

The most obvious device was that of dividing her enemies in order to conquer them piecemeal. This Persian policy of offering friendly submission to her enemies before conquering them not only reduced the number of those remaining, but also it caused internal divisions and dissention within their ranks so that those who did stand against Persia were doubly weakened: they were fewer in number and also, subsequently, mistrustful of each other. This general policy can be observed particularly during the time of the Persian conquest of Ionia by Cyrus the Great, and, subsequently, was followed by Darius and Xerxes. We can see that this policy begins with Cyrus the Great offering his enemies friendly submission, as is seen in his tale of the dancing fish to the Ionians, who did not submit when initially approached, with the exception of Miletus, and were denied the generous terms previously offered when subsequently they were conquered.<sup>1138</sup> This was followed by heavy-handed rule.

It is of some importance to observe that this policy was not always carried out in person by the Persian king, but was sometimes delegated to subordinate: for example, Cyrus did act in person, but under Darius we find Mardonius and Megabates being employed for Thrace and Macedon, and Datis for Athens and Eretria. Likewise, under Xerxes it was employed by Mardonius to separate the Athenians from the Hellenic League, prior to Plataea.<sup>1139</sup>

This policy was employed throughout the period of contact between the Greeks and the Persian Empire, evolving to fit the situation at hand. In the 490s B.C., prior to Datis' invasion of Greece, Darius offered friendly submission to the

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<sup>1138</sup> Herodotus, I.76 and 141.

<sup>1139</sup> Herodotus, VIII.136.

Greek islands, a number of which submitted including the militarily strong Aegina and wealthy Paros.<sup>1140</sup> The secondary benefit of their submission, noted above, can be exemplified in the suspicions of medising factions within the Athenian army at Marathon and within Athens itself.<sup>1141</sup> Similarly, prior to Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 481 B.C., he offered the Greeks early submission, which was accepted by the Aleuadae of Thessaly and, later, Thebes and Argos.<sup>1142</sup> As we noted above, this offer was also extended to Athens, after Xerxes' departure from Greece and prior to their second abandonment of the city, in an attempt to separate them from the Hellenic League.<sup>1143</sup> The subsequent suspicions caused by Xerxes' invasion led to the later accusations of medism against Pausanias and Themistocles, which, in turn suggest there may have been accusations against less famous Greeks too.

Another aspect of this Persian policy was the befriending and encouraging of Greek tyrants and states, which subsequently became friendly to Persia, i.e. Persian support of a tyrant ensured his loyalty. This can be seen in Darius I's support of Syloson of Samos after the assassination of his brother Polycrates<sup>1144</sup> and, also, in the speech of Histiaeus to the Ionian tyrants on Darius' Scythian campaign, which informs us that the Greek tyrants recognised that their positions were largely dependent on Persian support.<sup>1145</sup> At the same time, if these rulers did not fulfil their obligations in the way that the king required, then they could be disposed of in various ways. Histiaeus himself fell under the king's suspicions and was kept a virtual prisoner in the royal palace. Polycrates is an example of one who aimed at too much power, whilst Aristagoras actually wasted it. Persian support of Greek tyrants clearly became known as far as Greece since both Hippias of Athens and, possibly, Demaratus of Sparta went to the Persian Empire, having been deposed from their respective cities, looking for Persian support to be reinstated. Although, Herodotus does not say this explicitly of Demaratus, it is unlikely that he accompanied Xerxes' invasion

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<sup>1140</sup> Herodotus, VI.49 and 132.

<sup>1141</sup> Herodotus, VI.109, cf. p. 64, 66.

<sup>1142</sup> Herodotus, VII.6, 149 and 233.

<sup>1143</sup> Herodotus, VIII.136.

<sup>1144</sup> Herodotus III.140., cf. pp. 19-20.

<sup>1145</sup> Herodotus IV. 137.

without this in mind. Thus, in addition to exercising rule within the Empire by means of compliant rulers, a natural extension was this taking in of exiles because they could be employed to further Persian expansion. Indeed, we can see this employment of Greeks for this particular purpose even extended to non-political figures, such as Democedes.

The Persian policies of offering friendly submission and Persia's support of Greek tyrants, can be seen as the direct cause of Greek medism, which gained negative connotation only when Persia's interests ran counter to those immediate interests of the Greeks. Thus, Athens willingly offered friendly submission to Persia in 507/6 B.C. but, when Persia supported Hippias' claims to be reinstalled, Athens worked against the interests of Persia by supporting the Ionian Revolt of 499-496 B.C. Similarly, many Greeks submitted prior to Datis' and Xerxes' invasions, preferring to accept friendly terms rather than being conquered. No doubt, as argued by Kelly, pro-Persian propaganda was disseminated by Persia and her allies in order to persuade the Greeks of the benefits of early submission.<sup>1146</sup>

The success of Persia's policy can be seen in the Greek reaction to the expansion of the Persian Empire, which was, in general, a lack of resistance. Initially we find that some of the Ionian Greeks, such as the Phocaeans and Teians, fled Asia Minor.<sup>1147</sup> Also, the Ionians rebelled twice after they had been conquered. However, by the time the Persian Empire consolidated its control over coast of Asia Minor little resistance is found amongst the Greeks until Datis' invasion and not much more is found in response to Xerxes' invasion. Indeed, many Greek islands, such as Aegina, and states, such as Thessaly, voluntarily surrendered. Others, such as Macedon and Thebes, actively collaborated when called upon by Persia. Others actively sought alliances with Persia to help progress their own interests and to overcome their enemies. Prime examples are Athens' alliance with Persia in reaction to the threat of a Spartan invasion of Attica, and the presence of the Aleuadae at Xerxes' court, who were aiming at mastery of all of Thessaly. It should also not be ignored that some states and island chose to 'hedge their bets' by neither openly supporting nor resisting

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<sup>1146</sup> Kelly, 2003, *passim*.

<sup>1147</sup> Herodotus, I.163-169.



Persian expansion, such as Argos and Syracuse. Thus, we can see that whilst Persia was expanding her borders she was deemed the most dominant power in the Aegean and so the Greeks either courted her power or submitted to it. Notable of this period is the apparent abandonment of the Ionians after their conquest by Cyrus the Great. Sparta had been on friendly terms with Croesus, and threatened Cyrus the Great when he initially conquered the Lydians and Ionians, but did not follow up on this threat. Interest in the Ionian question was dramatically rekindled with the intervention of the Athenians and Eretrians in the Ionian Revolt, and this interest continued until the Peloponnesian War.

The claims of Herodotus and Thucydides that exiled Greeks could influence the Persian king of the time, indicates the status of the Persian king in Greek psyche, i.e. the statuses of these individuals was increased by their supposed ability to influence the king of Persia. As the result of discussions on a case by case basis, we have seen that these tales largely contain exaggerations and whilst these Greeks, such as Hippias, Demaratus, Alcibiades, and, possibly, Themistocles introduced their own ideas for discussions what they were suggesting seems to have been in agreement with policy already decided by the king. That said, these claims of influence over the Persian king are useful in gauging the Greek reaction to the status of the king of Persia. An example of this can be found in Aristophanes' *Archarnians*, where the chorus claims that the king of Persia had heard of Aristophanes' fame and good advice to Athens.<sup>1148</sup>

Persia's inability to conquer Greece separates the period of early relations between Greece and Persia, whereby the majority of Greeks courted Persian favour, from the next period, whereby the Greeks actively rejected Persia. Under Cyrus the Great, Darius I and Xerxes, the Empire was ruled with a view to expanding its borders. This policy can be seen in Persian attempts to conquer Scythia, and to expand Persian borders through Thrace and Macedon; we even find Persian interests as far as the west Mediterranean from the tale of Democedes of Croton who escaped whilst reconnoitring Greece for Darius and was pursued as far as Italy.<sup>1149</sup> After the Greek victories in the Persian Wars,

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<sup>1148</sup> Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, lines 628ff.

<sup>1149</sup> Cf. Ch. 1, pp. 22-23 above.

however, the Empire looked to consolidating its borders, seemingly in reaction to the activities of the Delian League.

The Peace of Callias was the natural outcome of this situation. It would appear that, whatever details we lack, both sides had fought each other to a stand-still, and a solution was sought. We need to emphasise that, although we do not know what the Athenians yielded, the Persians were forced to offer concessions in the form of limitations on the movements of the Persian army and navy.

Despite Persia's inability to conquer Greece, we find the Persian policy of enticing, or attempting to entice, Greeks into submissive alliances. Also Persia continued to spreading dissension and exploit divisions within Greece. This policy was employed to protect Persia's borders and interests, and to suppress rebellions within the Empire, rather than enabling Persia to expand her borders. Herodotus informs us of the Argive alliance with Persia, renewed with Artaxerxes I upon his accession.<sup>1150</sup> Also, prior to the Peace of Callias Artaxerxes I sent Megabazus to Sparta in an attempt to entice Sparta into working for Persia's interests by attacking Athens, who was at that time supporting Egypt's rebellion from the Persian Empire.<sup>1151</sup> This Persian policy came to fruition during the Peloponnesian War of 430-404 B.C., when both Athens and Sparta sent numerous embassies to Persia in order to gain Persian support against the other.<sup>1152</sup> The eventual treaty with Sparta in 411 B.C. can be seen as the result of this Persian policy, however, we should bear in mind that this treaty was concluded after nearly two decades of envoys from Sparta to Persia, and only when Persia wished to defeat Amorges and the Athenians who were supporting his rebellion.<sup>1153</sup> It is apparent that the actions of the Delian League eventually removed the Greek fear of further Persian invasions, which was prevalent during and after the Persian Wars and is exemplified by the charges against Pausanias and Themistocles. Thus, these actions and the desire to gain a strong ally against their Greek enemies enabled the Greeks to come to terms with Persia. With the

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<sup>1150</sup> Herodotus, VII.151

<sup>1151</sup> Thucydides, I.104-109.

<sup>1152</sup> Thucydides, II.7, cf. pp. 153-154.

<sup>1153</sup> Thucydides, VIII.5, cf. pp. 161 ff.

Spartan-Persian treaties also came the abandonment of the Ionian Greeks, again. The question of the Greeks of Asia Minor was re-opened at this time with the Spartans initially acknowledging the King's dominance in this area in exchange for Persian gold. Some years later, when this financial need was not so acute, the Spartans attempted but failed to liberate the Ionian Greeks. The Ionian Question was put to rest with the conclusion of the King's Peace, and the Greek acknowledgement of Persian over-lordship there.

Persian support of the Greeks from the start had self-evidently been from self-interest. We have seen that, once the rebellion of Amorges had been defeated, Tissaphernes lost interest in working with the Peloponnesians.<sup>1154</sup> Likewise, although the Peloponnesians then turned to Pharnabazus for support, it should be noted that he, too, was interested in an alliance primarily to remove the Athenian threat from his territory.<sup>1155</sup> As we have seen from our examination of the complex set of negotiations which took place at this time, the situation was far from simple. Greek interest in Asia Minor overlapped with Persian interest there, resulting in much diplomatic wrangling and this contrasted greatly with the simplicity of the diktats of an earlier period. The situation only became simpler with the arrival of Cyrus the Younger that Persia, who worked for the interests of Sparta, and we may suggest that here, also, he had an ulterior agenda of gaining Spartan support against his brother Artaxerxes II.<sup>1156</sup>

The conclusion of the Peloponnesian War begins the final period in Graeco-Persian relations, and we find the Greeks return to their sixth century attitudes towards Persia, especially after Sparta's withdrawal from Asia Minor. Throughout the fourth century B.C. we find Artaxerxes II and his successors employing this Persian policy of dividing Persia's enemies was much increased as the Greeks recognised the benefit of acquiring Persian support against their Greek enemies. Furthermore, the negative connotations of medism were lost as

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<sup>1154</sup> Cf. pp. 165, 176.

<sup>1155</sup> Thucydides, VIII.6.

<sup>1156</sup> Whilst Cyrus the Younger did not rebel against Artaxerxes II until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, it should be borne in mind that Darius II was ill and dying during the final years of the war and Persian successions were notoriously troublesome. We can conclude it is likely that whilst working with the Peloponnesians Cyrus the Younger had hopes of succeeding Darius and was aware he may need to fight for his throne, thus, he was working with them with this in mind.

the result of *Realpolitik*, and were only occasionally resurrected for political purposes. We may attribute this change to four things. Firstly, the generation who had fought in the Persian Wars was long gone by the start of the fourth century. Secondly, as a result of Persian involvement in the Peloponnesian War and Sparta's invasion of Asia Minor, there was increased familiarity between Greek and Persian. Thirdly, from this familiarity paradoxically rose the realisation on both sides that each other's interests could be accommodated. Finally, inter-state animosity had reached such an intensity after the Peloponnesian War that the Greeks preferred to look to Persia for support against their enemies, rather than attempt to arbitrate a peace settlement amongst themselves. Thus, Artaxerxes II supported Corinth, Thebes, Athens, and Argos against Sparta in the Corinthian War. In the King's Peace Artaxerxes II supported Sparta to the detriment of the other Greek states. The subsequent revisions of this Peace can be seen as continuing this Persian policy in that it ultimately supported one state over the others to prevent them from working together against the interests of Persia.

The phenomenon of political refugees also vanishes and Conon is a pivotal figure in this transition. He may be seen as the last political refugee and one of the first of those Greeks who took a command within the Empire. Subsequently, those who might perhaps once have been political refugees became legitimately employed by the Empire to further Persian interests. Thus, we find Iphicrates of Athens employed on Persia's Egyptian campaign in 374 B.C. and, later, Locrates of Thebes, Nicostatus of Argos, and Mentor of Rhodes were all employed in the Persia's reconquest of Egypt in 343 B.C.

The increase in diplomacy during the fourth century may be seen as a Persian reaction to the activities of the Greeks in the fifth century. Greater familiarity with Greece as a result of the Peace of Callias, their treaties with Sparta during the Peloponnesian War and then, later, during the Spartan invasion seems to have convinced Persia of the benefits of diplomacy with the Greeks. However, it is also clear that diplomacy was often only one tool in Persia's foreign policy. Artaxerxes II was unable to remove Sparta entirely from Asia Minor without inciting the Corinthian War and without employing Conon

to defeat Spartan naval forces. Furthermore, the King's Peace demonstrates that whilst the Persian king was happy to engage in diplomatic negotiations, it was still necessary to advertise that military force could and would be used if necessary. For the Greeks the desire for Persian support against their enemies within Greece, in the form of Persian gold and backing in the various attempts at common peaces, overrode previous negativity towards the Persian Empire, unless Persian interests ran contrary to each city's immediate interest. However, lack of unity within Greece meant that it did not return to its previously anti-Persian and hostile stance prevalent during and immediately after the Persian Wars. At best, the Athenians and Spartans showed their discontent by supporting subversive elements within the Persian Empire, but it is noteworthy that when commanded to desist from this they obeyed. Thus we find that by the start of the Peloponnesian War in 430 B.C., Greek attitudes largely had returned pre-existing sixth century views. They recognised the desirability of Persian support, albeit largely in the form of gold, to achieve their particular aims. These views continued until the accession of Alexander the Great and, even then, Thebes optimistically seems to have held out hope of Persian support against Alexander.

Thus, having been able to conveniently divide the period of Graeco-Persian relations into three phases, we can see that whilst Persia was a dominant, if relatively unknown, power in the sixth century B.C., the Greeks either looked for alliances or, at least, tried not to antagonise Persia. Greater familiarity and conflicting interests led to the rejection of Persia by some Greek states and, consequently, Greek hostility and opposition during and after the Persian Wars. Finally, when the threat of Persian invasion had been removed, Greek hostility towards each other had increased, and the Greeks had recognised the advantages of Persian friendship, the Greeks returned to their previous stance of the sixth century. Throughout these three phases we can see that the one constant is that in her dealings with the Greeks, Persia, by and large, was able to control this relationship with the Greeks.

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