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*Towards a European Global Security Strategy:
Challenges and Opportunities*

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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN GLOBAL SECURITY STRATEGY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Executive summary

This report briefly examines the interplay between the European security strategic vision and *capabilities*, its institutional architecture and policy implementation practices, with a particular focus on the EU consular affairs, EU democracy promotion and EU engagement in frozen conflicts under the Neighbourhood Policy (Appendices 1-3).

This report contends that in order for the EU to develop an effective and sustainable global security strategy, it first, has to reconcile the vision of its *strategic priorities* within its *inter-* and *intra-institutional settings*. Second, a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security, which does not only focus on the internal dimensions of the EU Security strategy (*capabilities*), but also equally draws on its external aspects – a *genuinely inclusive approach* that would blur *internal* and *external* dimensions of security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-building process (especially of *strategic partnership*) is needed. Finally, while legitimisation of the new security vision is essential within the EU, a greater emphasis should be placed on its external environment, which must not only include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy instruments as suggested by the EEAs, but more essentially, their *connection with the interests* and needs of third parties. Case-studies in appendices elaborate further on some specific aspects of the EU security within the eastern neighbourhood context.

¹ A summary of this policy paper was published as written evidence by the House of Lords as part of the Call for Evidence 'The Strategic Review of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy', available at <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/strategic-review-of-the-eus-foreign-and-security-policy/written/22127.html>



SETTING THE SCENE: FROM FRAGMENTED TO A MORE INTEGRATED EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The EU has considerably progressed in fostering a common vision for the *European Security Strategy*. It moved beyond the national priorities of individual Member States to collectively consider the interests of the European Union (EU) as a whole, and to separately articulate its external (2003) and internal (2010) security priorities. At the same time, more challenging tasks still lie ahead relating to (i) the facilitation of a *joined-up vision, merging external and internal dimensions of security*; (ii) the development of a *joined-up inter-institutional approach* involving all Member States and EU institutions, and connecting policy instruments and geographical silos into a European Security Model (ESM); and (iii) the fostering of *sustainable partnerships* (including of strategic interest) with regional and global actors.³ If successful, this would enable the EU to extend its security impact well beyond its borders, and to move closer to its aspiration to become a global (rather than regional) security player.

The overview below explores the opportunities and gaps in the EU security thinking in the process of fostering an effective, sustainable and legitimate *European Global Security Strategy (EGSS)* (June 2016). In particular, sections 1.1-1.3 highlight a rather *fragmented inter-institutional vision* of EU security strategy and its priorities, underscoring the need for (i) a more *integrated* understanding of the external and internal aspects of EU security; (ii) a more comprehensive *inter-institutional architecture* and its objectives; and (iii) more reflective external approach, with an emphasis on *strategic partnerships*. These three priorities are subsequently evaluated in sections 2-4, and conclude with general and specific recommendations relating to EU consular affairs, EU democracy promotion and EU conflict approach under the ENP/EaP in the appendices.

European (External) Security Strategy 2003 (EESS)

The 2003 ESS of 2003 was explicitly *externally* facing, underlying the importance of developing a uniform response ('effective multilateralism') to global challenges – 'No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own (2003:1) – and the need to enhance the EU's presence and leadership in the global governance system.

Three particular objectives were recognised as strategically important:

- *Addressing global threats*: including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, and state failure
- *Building security in the neighbourhood* – to 'promote a ring of well governed countries, with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations' (Ibid:8)
- *Fostering effective multilateralism* – 'a rule-based international order' (Ibid:9) – by developing closer cooperation with WTO, NATO, OSCE and regional organisations (ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and African Union)

Four Action Guidelines were envisaged for the implementation of the EU's external security strategy:

- a more active approach to realising EU strategic objectives;
- developing more capabilities especially via EU-NATO cooperation;
- more coherent alignment of the EU Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);
- and a more open approach to strategic partnership-building

In summary, the EESS was strategically focused on the EU's *external aspects* of security. It was *context-laden* and particularly relevant to a specific time period promoting narrowly defined *multilateralism* and *strategic partnerships*. This precipitated a review of the EU security strategy in 2008, in an attempt to balance out its strategic priorities, which the next section addresses.

European (Internal) Security Strategy 2010 (EISS)

The 2010 ESS focused more exclusively on the *internal* aspects of the ESS, with the purpose to strengthen the EU operational capacity, and develop 'a larger consensus on the vision, values and objectives which underpin EU security' (2010:7).

It identified three strategic objectives:

- *Protecting people in Europe* as part of the global response
- *Addressing global threats*: including terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, cross-border crime, violence, and natural and man-made disasters
- *Developing a European Security Model (ESM)* consisting of common tools; cooperation and solidarity between Member States (MS) and all EU institutions; and recognising 'a greater interdependence between internal and external security' (Ibid: 12).

Ten Action Guidelines were envisaged for the implementation of EU *internal* security strategy:

- a wider and more comprehensive approach to facilitate horizontal and vertical cooperation synergies;
- more effective democratic control and judicial supervision of security activities;
- a more proactive and intelligence-led approach – for prevention and anticipation of conflicts
- a more comprehensive model for information exchange
- more operational cooperation, involving effective coordination by COSI of law-enforcement and border-management authorities and EU agencies
- more cooperation in judicial matters
- better integrated border management
- commitment to innovation and training
- more cooperation with third countries, based on 'mutual interest, concerns and possibilities' (Ibid:29)
- more flexibility to adapt to future challenges



² Corresponding author. We wish to thank Professor Richard Whitman for his feedback on the earlier draft of this paper

³ Sustainable partnerships when defined, should account for the interests and needs of participating sides to avoid breakdown of communication as in the case of EU-Russia relations in 2014 and EU-China relations in early 2000s

SETTING THE SCENE: FROM FRAGMENTED TO A MORE INTEGRATED EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY CONT

Furthermore, two specific operational steps were prioritised, which remit and rationale, however, caused much contention at the national level of Member States (Home Office 8293/15, 2015):

- 1 the development of the operational capacity of COSI – Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security;
- 2 the establishment of an *internal security fund* to promote the implementation of EISS.

In summary, this EISS focussed exclusively on developing internal capabilities and institutions to improve the strategy's implementation practices. Consequently, this excessive emphasis on internal instruments, capacities and agencies brought about more inter-institutional fragmentation and conflict of interests than the desired unity of response and coordinated action.

Towards a European (Global) Security Strategy 2015/16 (EGSS)

The EU currently finds itself in the process of reflection and development of a new ESS, this time aiming to foster an *integrated* (cross-institutional and cross-thematic) global vision on European security. Not only is it driven by a changing global environment, which has become more interconnected, more complex and more contested (EEAS 2015), the process also involves much-needed reflection of (i) possible synergies between external and internal aspects of security, (ii) existing incoherence between the multitude of instruments and agencies; and (iii) the limited leverage over the external environment, which prevents the EU to punch its weight and act a global effective player (Ibid: 1-2).

The High Representative's (HR) report (EEAS 2015) offers a comprehensive overview of the achieved, and also outlines the challenges ahead. Notably, it identifies five specific geographic regions – a broader European neighbourhood (Western Balkans, EaP region, and Turkey), MENA, Africa, Atlantic partnerships and Asia – where it believes the EU could make a difference, and should treat these regions as its priority. To do so, it requires the EU's external action instruments to be fit for purpose and have:

- more direction and strategic vision
- more flexibility
- more coordination
- more leverage and
- more capabilities

At the same time, while acknowledging the availability of multiple instruments and policies (Ibid:14-15) – ie CFSP, CSDP, counter-terrorism (CT), cyber issues, humanitarian assistance, trade, migration policy, climate policy, ENP and enlargement – the HR's report underscores the need not for their proliferation, but rather, for their more effective, better integrated and coordinated use.

The report suggests that this could be achieved by way of fostering:

- a *joined-up approach* which would (i) connect the above policy instruments 'not only in conflicts and crises, but across all fields of EU external action' (Ibid:20), and (ii) overcome geographical silos, and vertical and horizontal inter- and intra-institutional divisions;
- a sharper definition of '*strategic partnerships*' for maximising the EU's global influence (Ibid: 15).

This call for reflection, however, instead of synergising the internal and external dimensions of security, shifts the emphasis back on to the latter (the external aspect of EU security), and the development of capabilities, which would not succeed without a proper partnership-building approach and the EU's decentring from its own agenda. Global (and a more comprehensive) vision is effectively missing from the discussion.

In summary, the above overview of the EU strategic objectives and actions explicitly highlights the following 'disconnects' in the EU' security thinking:

- *there is a definitive need to develop an integrated approach to European security which would merge the external and internal aspects into a comprehensive and global strategy;*
- *there is an urgent need for a joined-up approach, which would draw on cross-institutional, cross-governmental and cross-policy thematic perspectives – for the purpose of building a comprehensive EU security model, which could be applied across the board;*
- *there is urgency to understand and connect with the EU external environment, especially by way of defining the meaning of partnerships (including of strategic interest), and developing greater awareness about the recipient side.*

We will explore and offer recommendations for each of the three priorities below.

1 Towards a comprehensive and global strategy (Member States and EU institutions)

While a joined-up strategy is envisaged for the developed of the EGSS, across institutions, government agencies and thematic policies, there is no integrated vision and understanding between the main EU institutions as to how to achieve this objective and drive it forward.

The European Council is tasked by the treaties to offer a strategic direction for the EU's development, especially at the time of crises. While realising the importance of developing a 'common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy', it nevertheless narrows its concerns to the capability-building initiatives (by way of empowering COSI to coordinate and monitor implementation actions) and to renewing the EISS for 2015-20, with a particular responsibility for fostering systematic EU defence cooperation, mobilising EU instruments, ensuring sufficient defence budget in support of EU defence actions and monitoring the progress of implementation of Internal Security strategy (9798/15; JAI442: 10-11). The external dimension of security is circumscribed to an area of intensifying partnerships with the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU (EUCO 22/15:5-6), the kind of multilateralism which so far has not proved effective. This 'micro-management' and selective multilateralism (while ignoring new and emergent regional and global players – BRICS, Eurasian Union etc), may hinder EU leverage, and hamper its positioning (2020+) as a global leader.

The *EEAS* has offered an apt and reflective report outlining the need to radically rethink the EU's security strategy. It believes that traditional multilateralism is no longer responsive to the new challenges, and the EU needs a more inclusive strategy forward. At the same time, the report shows a limited understanding, on the one hand, of how the synergies between the external





and internal dimensions of security could be achieved (still placing more salience on the internal aspects of security); and on the other, how to foster a joined-up approach to overcome 'horizontal and vertical silos which hamper the EU's potential global role' (EEAS 2015:20).

Conversely, *the Commission*, while also advocating for the development of a *shared* European Security Agenda on Security between the Union and Member States, places more emphasis on forging 'a global perspective with security as one of our main external priorities' (COM (2015) 185: 20). At the same time, likewise the Council and the EEAS, it prioritises the reconfiguration of the EU instruments and policies, rather than developing a full understanding of the external environment, eg by way of defining the meaning and objectives of a partnership-building approach.

The *European Parliament*, in turn, believes, that the main priorities should lie in developing mechanisms of legitimising security strategy (via EU Security Consultative Forum) and establishing performance indicators for key EU instruments (including benchmarks and road-mapping, and their regular monitoring) (PE557.263v01-00).

In summary, while there is an understanding of the need to develop a joined-up approach to security which would synergise its external and internal dimensions, and would define common priorities to advance the EU's global potential, there is a limited inter-institutional vision for the shared agenda and for the need to develop a more 'outside-in' perspective – via strategic partnerships and joint interests.

2 Institutional architecture and capabilities: tensions and opportunities

Stemming from the above, there are also a number of tensions emerging from the envisaged institutional operationalisation of the forthcoming European Security Model.

While *the Council* believes that empowering COSI should be a priority, to facilitate its closer cooperation with the Commission, EEAS and JHA agencies; its remit and capability are seriously questioned by the European and national agencies.

The Commission, on the other hand, insists on empowering EU delegations and their better integration into decision-making processes in Brussels. *The EEAS*, conversely, is more concerned with a top-down re-building of the cross-sectoral architecture of the external action policies, which may cause further intra- and inter-institutional tensions. *Consequently, an institutional re-mapping may require further institutional changes involving greater discretion and leadership by the EEAS, if a genuine 'joined-up approach to all EU fields of EU external action' were to be forged.*

Overall, there is no vision or understanding of what the ESM should be, institutionally and thematically, and whether (and how) it should pursue an all-encompassing security style over the targeted set of policy priorities.

In relation to the individual thematic policies – enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CT and Security and defence – the EEAS calls for the dismantlement of policy and geographical silos. At the same time, the conclusions of the inter-parliamentary conference (September 2015) suggest that a more differentiated approach to individual policy's contents and objectives should be the priority.

The best way forward would be indeed to prioritise individual policies – the ENP, migration, trade, border management and energy – with the view to expand their impact and connectivity, before considering blurring their operational and geographical silos. For more detailed overview and suggestion see Appendix 1 on the EU strategic role in consular affairs; Appendix 2 – on EU relations with Azerbaijan; and Appendix 3 – on EU approach to frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

3 Towards more effective and sustainable Strategic Partnerships

To enable the successful development and implementation of the EGSS, the EU needs to radically rethink the meaning of 'partnership' (including of strategic interest). While the notion of partnership has been extensively used in the EU external discourse, it avails no proper meaning.⁴ As one EU senior official commented: 'It is true the EU has an evolving meaning of "partnership". The EU has developed strategic partnerships and special relations with substantial partners, whom the EU takes seriously... whereas, [for example] partnership under the ENP is [aimed] for smaller countries.'⁵ This differentiation also infers whether partnership-building should be driven by mutual interests (as in strategic partnerships) or solely by EU norms (known as conditionality approach). As practice shows, even if it is driven by reciprocity in strategic partnerships, the EU tends to dominate and behave as a norm-maker, in trying to 'socialise' its partners into the EU's way of thinking.⁶ This is problematic as it violates the very nature of partnership, and prevents the EU from learning about its external environment, as EU-Russian relations have recently attested to.

Recommendations

Premised on the above analysis, the following general recommendations could be made:

- *First, in order for the EU to develop an effective and sustainable global security strategy, it has to reconcile its vision and understanding of strategic priorities within its inter- and intra-institutional settings, which would involve more coordination from the EEAS*
- *Second, a serious effort is required to develop an integrated view on European security, which will not only focus on the internal dimensions of EU Security model, but will equally or even to a greater extent, consider the external aspects of security – a genuine inclusive approach that would blur internal and external dimensions of security. For this to succeed a deeper understanding of a partnership-building process (especially of strategic partnership) is needed.*
- *Finally, while legitimisation of the new security vision is essential within the EU (by way of security consultative forums), the emphasis should also be placed on its external environment, which will not only include a cross-cutting approach to multiple policy dimensions, but more essentially, their connection with the interests and needs of the third parties. Case-studies in appendices offer some specific recommendation on selected aspects of EU security vis-à-vis the eastern neighbourhood: the EU's role in consular affairs, democracy promotion and engagement in frozen conflicts.*

⁴For detailed discussion see Korosteleva, E (2014) *The EU and its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a more Ambitious Partnership?* Routledge

⁵Interview with a senior official, DG RELEX, College of Europe, 6 September 2010

⁶This has been especially noted and openly resisted by Chinese and Russian officials. For more details see Korosteleva (2014)

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: A case-study of the EU's role in Consular Affairs

Igor Merheim-Eyre

New external security threats and the process of European integration have resulted in the emergence of new actors and practices, not traditionally associated with the consular sphere, including the protection of EU citizens outside of the European Union (EU), and the issuance of Schengen visa.

Over the past two decades Member States of the European Union have been developing a framework within which a citizen in distress may seek assistance from consular or diplomatic representatives of another Member State if their state is not represented in a particular third country outside of the Union.

The consular protection of EU citizens can be linked to a general shift within the EU towards 'soft' security issues, such as man-made and natural disasters (Merheim-Eyre 2014), but also on post-disaster resilience (Lundborg & Vaughan-Williams 2011). Over the past two decades, EU Member States have sought various way of developing joint post-disaster contingency planning both within and outside the borders of the EU. In this context, consular protection of citizens takes place in the form of evacuations, immediate humanitarian or medical assistance through EU-funded or individual Member States' responses. While daily assistance to EU citizens in areas such as loss of passport or imprisonment remains the most frequent consular tasks, post-disaster response is an increasingly important part of local and national contingency planning.

Issuance of Schengen visa to non-EU citizens is another consular dimension that has known a shift towards growing competencies at the European level and towards externalisation beyond the Union.

Externalisation in this case refers not merely to 'Smart Borders', but also to the increasing participation of third countries in the management of EU external borders, a particularly important tool in the EU's eastern neighbourhood. The externalisation of EU border management through visa issuance ('visa diplomacy') is, unlike in the case of consular protection of EU citizens, about the prevention of potential risks reaching the borders of the EU, by managing migratory flows and security threats beyond the borders of the Union. Rather than based on exclusionary politics of fence-building, it acts as a filter by incentivising local reform and capacity-building through a managed but inclusionary process of visa facilitation and visa liberalisation. The success of such approach is highlighted in the low number of illegal crossings on the eastern borders (Frontex 2015), and Moldova's successful reforms in border and migration management.

Recommendations

To consider the growing importance of consular affairs as a vital external aspect of EU internal security, highlighting the need for reciprocity between the internal and external dimensions of EU security

To utilise the new Council Directive on consular protection (Council of the EU; 2015/637) as an opportunity to strengthen consular cooperation between Member States on both inter-ministerial and local level, and make a more strategic use of existing structures on the European level, in particular, the EU's Civil Protection Mechanism in contingency planning

To explore the emerging 'visa diplomacy' in the EU's eastern neighbourhood, as an important instrument of facilitating more 'inclusive' relations with our immediate neighbours, and managing potential security risks beyond the borders of the Union, which relates to point 3 of general recommendations (p7).

Appendix 2: A case-study of EU-Azerbaijan relations and recommendations

Eske Van Gils

Relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are generally conducted in an amicable way, and co-operation is overall strong, in particular in the field of economy and (energy) trade. However, there are significant tensions over two policy areas, namely value promotion and the way the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is being addressed in bilateral relations.

In both cases, a main hindrance appears to be that current policy-making mechanisms do not allow for sufficient input from Azerbaijan, and that the relationship is therefore not truly based on principles of partnership. Azerbaijan appears to be increasingly denouncing this EU's one-sided policy. The Azerbaijani government has indicated that it feels 'not heard' by Brussels, and that its own national (security) concerns are not being taken serious the EU (interviews with Azerbaijani representatives, May 2015). There are signals that the country is now re-considering certain aspects of co-operation with the EU (see eg APA 2015).

In terms of security this is problematic because reduced co-operation with Azerbaijan may harm the EU's own security interests as well, and due to limited input the EU might systematically miss out on valuable information on the regional context that Azerbaijan possesses.

With regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan has indicated that it wishes further engagement from the EU in the conflict resolution process, following disappointment in the OSCE Minsk Group's efforts (Babayev 2014). While the EU is reluctant to become directly involved (Council 2010b: 2), it does not appear to communicate its views and arguments clearly, and moreover, Azerbaijan perceives that the EU upholds different narratives on the matter in relations with Armenia. This issue not only undermines the EU's credibility but also increases Azerbaijan's frustration over the matter – the government has indicated that it is losing its patience and that it may undertake military action in case the international community does not intervene pro-actively. Again, allowing more input from Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) would benefit the case, and a strategy should be designed not solely by the EU but together with all relevant actors.





Recommendations

The EU should focus its resources on its neighbourhood, however, only on the basis of a differentiated approach: countries such as Azerbaijan have no need for financial support, however they may appreciate political and security support – which should also become available outside of the policy frameworks currently on offer (notably the AA and membership). Since Azerbaijan is not interested in EU membership or integration, enlargement is no useful tool in these relations and more diverse and effective instruments for co-operation should be made available.

Equal input from partner states is essential: these partner states hold crucial information about the situation in the region (national governments as well as civil society and experts). Moreover, without an equal input and acknowledgement of national security interests, partner states may lose interest in in-depth cooperation with the EU. Therefore, the review of the ESS should indeed pay more attention to the operational plans as well as resourcing and allocate a strong role for partners in this process.

The capacity of the EEAS in Brussels should be increased, to enable thorough processing of policy input coming from both the EU Delegation in Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijani actors including civil society organisations and the national government. Because of its in-depth knowledge and close cooperation with the local government, the EU Delegation should also obtain a greater role in the design of the policies vis-à-vis Azerbaijan.

To prevent losing credibility or partners' confidence, the EU should pay more close consideration to the country's national security priorities, notably the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While the EU may not want to get actively involved in the conflict mediation, what is very important at this point is *clarity* about the Union's policy, towards Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, which underscores points 2 and 3 of the recommendations (p7).

Appendix 3: A case-study of the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space

Irena Mnatsakanyan

The unresolved conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have the potential to become the next unavoidable wars in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood, with a spill-over effect for the wider Europe. So far the EU's response and engagement with frozen conflicts on the post-soviet space have been limited. Its major achievements included appointing an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and developing regional cooperation under the ENP/EaP to positively contribute to conflict resolution. At the same time, the practice reveals much inconsistency and ineffectiveness in the EU security approach towards these specific conflicts, which however enjoy much similarity in terms of their geographic proximity to the EU, geopolitical environment, historical roots and dynamics of conflict escalation. While the EU remains the biggest international donor supporting post-conflict rehabilitation in the conflict regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Astrov 2011:87) for the past ten years, in the NK's case it did not manage to establish direct engagement in the region. So far, none of the EU representatives managed to visit NK and there have been no needs-assessment or fact finding missions there. Furthermore, EU Action Plans (APs) for Armenia and Azerbaijan include two contradictory principles: 'territorial integrity' for Azerbaijan, and the 'right of nations for self-determination' for Armenia (Kuzmicheva 2011). Additionally, in the Azeri AP the NK resolution is number one priority,⁷ while in the Armenian AP it is number seven⁸.

It is believed that more internal inter-institutional coherence for the development of the EGSS is necessary, as well as greater awareness of other geopolitical players in the region.

Recommendations for improving *internal coherence*

- The EU should eliminate inconsistency between the two ENP APs for Armenia and Azerbaijan, and include unconditional support to the OSCE proposed peace plan based on Madrid Principles⁹
- It is necessary to improve coordination between the activities of the Council and the Commission not only at the policy planning stage, but also at the implementation stage. The inter-institutional division of policy responsibilities within the EU mainly between the Commission and Council is highly fragmented (Wolf 2007:4)
- One of the most crucial issues is to increase cooperation between the actors in Brussels (Commission, EEAS) and in-country officials (EUSR, EU Delegations) during the implementation of the EU crisis management activities.¹⁰

Recommendations for improving *external coherence*:

- Considering the recognition of Kosovo by most EU member states, and the EU engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is essential that the EU directly engage in N-K in the form of financial and humanitarian support, de-mining activities, and fact finding missions is significant.
- The EU cooperation with Russia is an essential factor. Russia's politicization of frozen conflicts has led some Russia-friendly EU member states to withdraw from supporting a more active EU engagement in the frozen conflicts. Hence, a more uniform position is needed, to develop a coherent security policy towards these conflicts
- There is a need to increase EU cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU's performance in the frozen conflicts also depends on the local demand from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia for its involvement in the frozen conflicts. In the conflicts where there was high local demand, the EU involvement was significant. Compared with Georgia, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan enjoys very close relations with the EU, and hence the local demand for the EU's greater involvement in NK is limited.

⁷ EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf (p3).

⁸ EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf (p9)

⁹ Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries. 10 July 2009. <http://www.osce.org/mg/51152>

¹⁰ European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue. 2012. Debriefing EU Mediators. Summary and Key Lessons from a debriefing with former EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby (p6)

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