



PREPARING FOR NATO'S WARSAW SUMMIT

The Challenges of Adapting to Strategic Change

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AU	African Union
CPG	Comprehensive Political Guidance
DCDC	Development Concept and Doctrine Center
DDPR	Defence and Deterrence Posture Review
EU	European Union
FC	Framework Nation
FNC	Framework Nation Concept
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRF	High Readiness Force
IS	Islamic State
MSC	Munich Security Conference
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Association
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
PC	Political Committee
PII	Partnership Interoperability Initiative
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
SAC	Strategic Analysis Capability
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

RESUMÉ

This report is about how NATO might adapt to a shifting strategic environment. The strategic environment that is currently unfolding seems likely to be characterized by complexity and increased diversity in both power and principle. The report focuses on how the Alliance needs to respond to the on-going changes by moving forward at the upcoming Warsaw Summit from the decisions taken at the September 2014 summit in Wales. The report starts from the premise that, although the decisions taken in Wales were important and long overdue, they are not sufficient to facilitate NATO's continued adaptation to a fundamentally changed strategic environment. The challenge for NATO in the future will be to find a way to contribute to European and global security in a strategic environment in which the Alliance and 'the West' have a diminished role among new and (re)-emerging actors and in which liberal values and Western principles for order-making can no longer be assumed to be universal. The report suggests that NATO should assume the development of a future strategic environment that can best be described as a 'multi-order world'. NATO should prepare for such a multi-order world by collective defence initiatives from the Wales Summit and by revitalizing NATO's partnership policy. The report suggests that 'going back to basics' by concentrating on collective defense would be an inappropriate response, as the new strategic environment requires the Alliance to undertake change in all of its three core tasks if it is to remain relevant in a 'multi-order world'.



INTRODUCTION

” Looking back, few of us could have predicted the events of 2014, which will be remembered as a year of significant change in the global security environment. ”

General Knud Bartels,
Chairman of NATO's Military Committee,
21st January 2015

The events referred to by General Bartels – the Russian annexation of Crimea, Russia's continuing actions to destabilize Ukraine, and the rapid rise of Daesh¹ on NATO's southern border – have turned the European strategic security environment upside down. For many the dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia suggested that NATO should go 'back to basics' by increasing its focus on its traditional role as a territorial defense alliance while reducing NATO's other core tasks, namely crisis management and cooperative security. These concerns were addressed at the Wales Summit in September 2014, where a number of initiatives were agreed that were designed to bolster the readiness and ability of the Alliance to live up to its Article Five commitments. However, the Wales Summit happened so soon after the dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia, and only a few weeks after the surprising appearance of Daesh in Mosul in June 2014, that the wider strategic repercussions of these events and the demands they place on NATO's transformation could not be fully covered. It is expected that the fuller implications of the events will be addressed at the next summit, which will take place in Warsaw in July 2016.²

The challenge ahead is to ensure the peaceful transition to a 'multi-order world' and to forge an overall consensus for how to maintain order and stability in a more diffuse and complex strategic environment.

This report is about how NATO should prepare for a new strategic environment, and in particular how the Alliance might move forward from the decisions taken in Wales to be able to undertake further adaptation at the Warsaw Summit to ensure that the Alliance will still be relevant in a dramatically changed strategic environment. The report starts from the premise that rather than the events of 2014 questioning the international order and demanding that NATO should concentrate on its defense capability to meet particular challenges on NATO's eastern and southern borders, the events of 2014 happened because the international order is in question and they suggest that NATO must step up its efforts to move towards major transformation to

remain relevant in a dramatically altered global strategic environment. From this perspective, NATO's transformation and its ability to adapt to strategic change take on a more critical importance. Moreover, this suggests that, although 'going back to basics' should be seen as an urgent and necessary repair to elements of the Alliance that have long been neglected, the task ahead is to respond to more far-reaching strategic change, which challenges the fundamental principles of the international order that was established after the Second World War.³

The report demonstrates that change in the international system, which is often talked about as belonging in a distant future, is already materializing as witnessed in the Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine, the rise of Daesh and the increased tensions on NATO's southern flank, as well as the 'rebalancing' of the United States towards Asia. All of these seemingly separate developments are symptoms of fundamental change in the global strategic environment that NATO can ill afford to ignore. The report argues that NATO now needs to prepare more specifically than it has done in the past for the emerging strategic environment. The report presents three different possible interpretations of the character of that environment. Although all three interpretations envisage plausible futures, the most likely strategic reality is a 'multi-order world' in which different international orders, each with different aims and different ordering principles, will co-exist. The challenge ahead is to ensure the peaceful transition to a 'multi-order world' and to forge an overall consensus for how to maintain order and stability in a more diffuse and complex strategic environment. Key to the success of such an undertaking is to establish partnerships across dividing lines, whilst also maintaining unity within the 'liberal order' and maintaining sufficient defence and crisis management capabilities to deter incursions such as those seen in Ukraine and to be able to respond to crisis management needs as they arise. Based on this analysis, the report argues that privileging just one of NATO's core tasks – collective defence – at the expense of crisis management and cooperative security would be a mistake that NATO cannot afford to make.

The report aims to contribute to the debate about NATO in a changing world, in particular to contribute to the preparations for the upcoming Warsaw Summit and to make the case for looking past the immediate and clearly visible challenges to less tangible, though no less important, changes in the international system. It is hoped that the analysis presented in the following pages will contribute to building a consensus for decisions at Warsaw, one that may move the Alliance into a position where it may be able to achieve more than merely 'tinkering' with the balance between the three core tasks. If so the Alliance will be better equipped for meeting the challenges ahead.

THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SIX SECTIONS:

- 1** In the first section, the report briefly outlines the decisions taken at the Wales Summit.
- 2** In the second section, the report turns to NATO's three core tasks as deeply embedded characteristics that have contributed to its remarkable longevity and its ability to adapt to strategic change.
- 3** In the third section, the report outlines the changes that are currently taking place in the global strategic environment and describes how both NATO and the EU are engaged in strategic analysis as part of their preparations for the Warsaw Summit and for a new Global Security Strategy document. The report argues that it would be beneficial if the two processes could be aligned so that both organizations take their point of departure in the same overall interpretation of what kind of international order is in the making.
- 4** In the fourth section, the report turns to three competing narratives about what kind of international order is emerging. Each of the three narratives offers a plausible future, but they also differ on important issues. Deciding which one to follow appears to be the first step in the process of adaptation, a decision that will have important policy implications for how NATO (and the EU) move forward.
- 5** In the fifth section, the report suggests that the narrative about a multi-order future provides the most relevant interpretation of what kind of international order is in the making. The report outlines how the emerging order is different from past historical international systems, and it highlights the growing requirement of new thinking on institutional frameworks and forms of cooperation, especially through partnerships. On this basis the report argues that the multi-order narrative and the emergence of a multi-order world should form the foundation for NATO's process of adapting.
- 6** In the final section, the report outlines what is regarded as necessary change in NATO's three core tasks to ensure that the Alliance is ready for a multi-order world characterized by diversity in power, principles, institutional architecture and domestic governance structures. In the scenario outlined in the report, going 'back to basics' is not an option if NATO is to remain relevant within a profoundly different strategic environment.

BOX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS

The Alliance (and the EU) should decide – preferably coordinated and in agreement – on what kind of strategic environment they view as likely to characterize the future. This must be the starting point for any consideration of adaptation measures and policy direction in a new and rapidly changing strategic environment. The report recommends that NATO and the EU both adopt the notion of a 'multi-order future' as the most accurate description of the emerging strategic environment.

The Alliance should recognize that NATO's core tasks are not just nice-to-have elements, but that all three core tasks are essential for maintaining Alliance cohesion and relevance in the new emerging environment. In particular, if the Alliance decides (as is reported) to adopt a new Strategic Concept earlier than anticipated, the new Concept should recognize the continued importance of all three tasks, even though the importance afforded to individual core tasks may vary according to the strategic context at any given time.

NATO (and indeed the West more generally) should prioritize two overarching strategic goals: 1) to work towards establishing the conditions for a peaceful transformation to a cooperative multi-order world by seeking a working consensus on order-making principles at the global level; and 2) to work towards strengthening the 'liberal core' of the liberal order by addressing existing internal weaknesses, living up to its own liberal principles, and continuing to encourage those states that share liberal core values to associate themselves with the liberal order.

Although NATO should consider carefully each case of possible involvement in crisis management, it should be recognised that crisis management is NOT an optional extra, but is increasingly the foundation of a new transatlantic bargain in which the United States has 're-balanced' towards Asia but continues to underwrite Article Five in return for the Allies' willingness to contribute to crisis management operations when called for.

The role of cooperative security and partnership as an essential diplomatic tool in a multi-order world must be recognized, and NATO should aim to revitalize its partnership policy in accordance with a revised Berlin Agreement which incorporates the understanding of the emerging strategic environment suggested above.



**THE WALES SUMMIT
– GOING BACK TO BASICS?**

The dramatic events during 2014 led almost immediately to calls for NATO to go ‘back to basics’ through a renewed emphasis on collective defence. These calls were to some extent met at NATO’s Summit in Wales, as the Summit Declaration reiterated that ‘the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and populations against attack, as set out in Article Five of the Washington Treaty’ (NATO, 2014: para 2). In order to be able to live up to those commitments better, the summit agreed a new Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to reassure jittery eastern members and to bolster NATO’s readiness and its ability to live up to its Article Five commitments. The RAP included both measures to reassure those member states that felt at risk and adaptation measures, including a number of components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face (see Box 2).

The centrepiece of the adaptation measures is the decision to develop a permanent, brigade-sized ‘spearhead’ force, the rather clumsily named Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The VJTF constitutes an enhancement of the much bigger and already existing NATO Response Force (NRF) and will consist of a land brigade of around 5,000 troops, which will be supported by air, sea, and special operations forces. The VJTF will be backed up by two brigades forming a rapid reinforcement capability of approximately 15,000 troops (Lute, 2014). The ‘spearhead’ force will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to any security challenges that might arise on NATO’s periphery, and it will be supported by a permanent command and control presence and in-place force enablers such as vehicles, weapons and other equipment to be stored on the territories of its eastern members.

To reassure primarily its eastern members, the Wales Summit agreed that NATO would shift its posture towards the eastern part of the Alliance by setting up six small command and control centres across its eastern flank, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is envisaged that the centres could serve as reception bases either for exercising forces, or—in the event of a crisis—for facilitating the reinforcement of an eastern member, including the deployment of the VJTF. In addition to the six centres, the existing corps-level headquarters in Szczecin, Poland, will be restructured as a High Readiness Forces (HRF) headquarters, which will serve as a regional hub designed to focus on the defence of NATO’s northeastern territory (Lute, 2014). Although these measures are regarded by most as quite significant, they probably only partly fulfil the aspirations of the Baltic states and Poland, who had their minds set on permanent bases on their territory as part of the RAP. However, this initiative was deemed to be in breach of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and in any case it presupposed the availability of hardware that is no longer available.

BOX 2: THE DECISIONS OF THE WALES SUMMIT

At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO members agreed to ‘move towards’ the two percent threshold for defence expenditure within a decade and to spend twenty percent of that on major equipment. The summit launched a series of initiatives designed to bolster NATO’s readiness and ability to live up to its Article Five commitments. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) contains two pillars – Assurance Measures and Adaptation Measures.

ASSURANCE MEASURES	ADAPTATION MEASURES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Continuous (rotational) air, land and sea presence and activity in the eastern part of the Alliance ■ Increased Baltic air-policing ■ AWACS surveillance over NATO’s eastern area ■ Increased sea patrols in the Baltic, Black Sea and Mediterranean ■ Deployed (on a rotational basis) troops to NATO’s eastern area for training and exercises ■ Significant increase in NATO and national exercises ■ Increased presence of air and ground forces (on a bilateral basis) in NATO’s eastern area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Enhancing the NATO Response Force (NRF) ■ As part of NRF enhancement, the establishment of a new quick reaction ‘Spearhead Force’ (VJTF) ■ Enhancing NATO’s Standing Naval Forces ■ Establish a multinational NATO command and control presence on the territories of NATO’s eastern members with rotational personnel ■ Raising the readiness and capabilities of the HQ Multinational Corps North East (Szczecin) and enhancing its role as a hub for regional cooperation ■ Pre-positioning of military equipment and supplies ■ Improvements to NATO’s ability to reinforce its eastern members through the preparation of national infrastructure (airfields and ports) ■ Update NATO defence plans for eastern Europe

The Russian use of hybrid warfare in Crimea and eastern Ukraine also resulted in the Wales Summit addressing this issue. The Summit Declaration tasked the work on hybrid warfare to be reviewed alongside the implementation of the RAP. This would include enhancing strategic communications, developing hybrid exercise scenarios, and strengthening the coordination between NATO and other organizations with a view to improving information-sharing, political consultations and staff-to-staff coordination. However, as Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee point out (2014), non-traditional threats short of open warfare require non-traditional responses. Yet were such tactics to be used on the territory of a NATO member, sending a rapid response force would do little against propaganda, political manipulation and armed gangs at the local level. Moreover, other organizations such as the EU may be better suited to responding to hybrid threats, which makes the Alliance more dependent on the decisions of other actors and further complicates the design of coherent and effective responses to these new challenges (Drent and Zandee, 2014:18).

The centrepiece of the adaptation measures is the decision to develop a permanent, brigade-sized 'spearhead' force, the rather clumsily named Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

In addition to the specific measures agreed at the Wales Summit, the summit also sought to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and to make the most efficient use of the funds available through greater defense industrial cooperation, pooling and sharing and cooperative initiatives where possible. Allies pledged to halt the decline in defense spending and pledged to increase defense expenditure in real terms as GDP grows and to move towards the two percent guideline within a decade, allocating twenty percent of total defense expenditure to major new equipment and research and development. However, no sooner was the print dry on the Summit Declaration before several members indicated their doubts as to the economic feasibility of achieving the two percent aim. Moreover, although referred to as a 'pledge', it is a pledge devoid of any binding commitment.

Originally the Wales Summit had been intended as a post-Afghanistan Summit designed to examine how the Alliance could maintain the expertise and interoperability achieved through more than a decade of involvement in Afghanistan. In the event, the topics of Russia and the Ukraine crisis became the central issues the summit dealt with, and the question of partnerships took on a more modest role. However, the summit launched a new Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) with partners who had built up interoperability with NATO through their participation in NATO operations – especially in Afghanistan. The initiative included 24 different partners, of which five 'super partners' – Sweden, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Australia – were offered enhanced opportunities within the initiative. More generally, the Declaration stressed that NATO and its partners form a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and stressed that NATO would continue to engage actively with what the text refers to as 'relevant countries' and international organizations. The Summit Declaration also acknowledged that the current strategic environment highlighted the need for strengthening the relationship between the EU and NATO, and especially for them to continue to work side by side in crisis management operations, broaden political consultations, and promote complementarity between the two organizations. However, although cooperative security was clearly alluded to in the Declaration, and although new partnership initiatives were established, the overall profile of the latter appeared to be rather modest. Indeed one NATO official complained that cooperative security appeared to 'have fallen off the wagon', with too many partners and not enough substantive political engagement.

Is traditional deterrence still a viable strategy in the face of new forms of warfare such as hybrid warfare and new forms of actors such as Daesh?

The Summit Declaration also tried valiantly to include issues related to NATO's other core tasks, crisis management and cooperative security. The Declaration stressed the growing insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa and reiterated that the RAP was not only oriented towards Russia, but should also be regarded as a response to challenges in the Alliance's southern neighborhood. It was stressed that the planned measures were intended to strengthen not only collective defense,

but also the crisis management capabilities of the alliance as a whole. However, given the emphasis on the pre-placement of equipment and the enhancement of command and control in the eastern part of the Alliance, it is difficult to see how the RAP can address the concerns of NATO's southern members. Moreover, although the enhanced attention to territorial defense was clearly necessary to reassure those members who felt particularly vulnerable, and despite the efforts to point to the simultaneous crisis management capabilities contained in the RAP, the overall framing of the Wales initiatives seemed to contradict two decades of evolving NATO doctrine, culminating in the agreement expressed in the Strategic Concept from 2010 that NATO has three core tasks – collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2010).


Within the context of the calls to 'go back to basics', and notwithstanding the assurances that the RAP may be equally relevant for Article Five contingencies in the east and for crisis management contingencies to the south, the Wales Summit seems to have been interpreted by many to have elevated collective defense into a special position. Moreover, although there is agreement that NATO's readiness and reassurance capability needs to be strengthened, there is less agreement on what that actually entails. Can the threats from the east and the south really be met with the same initiatives? Is traditional deterrence still a viable strategy in the face of new forms of warfare such as hybrid warfare and new forms of actors such as Daesh? How useful is a very high degree of military readiness if the political decision-making procedures for using that readiness are slow and cumbersome? Moreover, what kind of relationship can NATO (re)-build with Russia, and what role will partnerships play in a future strategic environment where the assumption of a community of values cannot be assumed to be the driving force? These are some of the questions that have arisen from the Wales Summit and which the Warsaw Summit in 2016 needs to address.





LIBER

NATO - OTAN



2:00

**AN ALLIANCE RESTING ON
THREE PILLARS**

LITUANIE

LIE

HON

CHYPRE

REPUB. TCHÉQUE

DANIE MARIE

ESTONIE

FRANCE

MAGNE

NATO's current Strategic Concept, agreed in Lisbon in 2010, is often credited with the introduction of NATO's 'three Cs' or three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2010). The move to elevate crisis management and cooperative security to core tasks on a par with NATO's traditionally regarded primary task of collective defense was controversial when it was introduced in 2010, and it was never fully endorsed by all member states, especially those in the east (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2011). Nevertheless, the inclusion was politically possible partly because the move merely codified what was already established practice, and partly because the consultation process prior to the formulation of the Strategic Concept had emphasized the growing complexity of the emerging strategic environment and the necessity of the Alliance to be able to play a full role in all three core tasks. The result has been that NATO's current Strategic Concept – the key operational strategic document of the Alliance – has defined the Alliance as essentially an organization resting on three equal pillars.

The Alliance was called on more times than anticipated, and in situations that turned out to be far more demanding than expected.

NATO is – and always was – more than 'just' a defense alliance. This is clearly stated in the Washington Treaty, which emphasizes collective defense in Article Five, but which also expresses a commitment to cooperative security through Article Two by committing the Alliance to contribute toward peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening a rule-based international order and by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which that order is based (NATO, 1949: art 2). In this sense NATO had from its inception two different roles based on two different identities rooted in both power and partnership. Although the 'partner identity' was secondary in practice and less clearly articulated than the power-based 'defense alliance identity', both were in line with American grand strategy, which always emphasized both power and partnership (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007) and which was visible in the parallel policies of containment and internationalism.

Although the power identity was clearly more prevalent during the Cold War, the partnership role was invoked on several occasions, initially internally, as the Alliance worked as a forum for dialogue and cooperation among its members to overcome past divisions and to cement cooperative practices between the (West) European

states. This became manifest with the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In the late 1960s, NATO also started to define its partner identity along an external dimension as a commitment to a more cooperative approach in its relations with the Warsaw Pact. This was expressed in the Harmel Report (NATO 1967: paragraph 5), which stated that 'the way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente'. However, it must be acknowledged that throughout the Cold War the external dimension of the 'partner identity' was secondary to its internal dimension and that overall primacy was consistently given to the 'defense alliance identity' (Flockhart, 2015). Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance was able to shift from a focus on collective defense to cooperative security, in the process giving greater prominence to the partner identity, whilst the defense alliance identity was afforded a lesser role. The rebalancing of the two identities and roles gave rise to NATO's extensive partnership activities and enlargement process from the mid-1990s onwards.

In this way, having three pillars (rather than just one or two) has contributed to NATO's remarkable ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment and is therefore an attribute that should be valued and safeguarded.

It is important to note that, had NATO 'just' been a defense alliance, it would have had little *raison d'être* in the new post-Cold War environment and would probably have disappeared along with the Cold War. However, there was probably also some doubt that the partnership identity and the severely reduced role of the defense alliance identity would be adequate to sustain the Alliance as a significant security actor. The concern was that the primarily political nature of the partnership identity would be insufficient to sustain an Alliance based chiefly on military competences. At the same time, the strategic environment of the early 1990s was (much like today) characterized by an arch of actual or potential crisis and instability to NATO's east and south, which seemed to call for NATO to take on a (military) role in crisis management. As the tragedy in Yugoslavia deepened whilst NATO stood on the side-lines without an obvious role but with plenty of military hardware and strategic planning expertise, the idea that it should take on a crisis management role soon became an incontestable maxim that NATO had to either go 'out-of-area' or 'out-of-business'. Since then NATO has effectively acquired a third identity as a security institution that is able to engage in crisis management and peacekeeping situations when called on to do so.

The Alliance was called on more times than anticipated, and in situations that turned out to be far more demanding than expected. Moreover, the role was never fully accepted by the new member states, whose primary reason for joining NATO in the first place was that they viewed NATO as a defense alliance, not as the avowedly expeditionary crisis management actor it became on the eve of the new eastern members joining the Alliance in 1999. It is well known that the Alliance and its partners have been engaged in a number of crisis management operations mainly in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, and that the outcome of these operations remains an issue surrounded by some dispute. As a result some member states are now eager to reduce NATO's crisis management activities and the status of crisis management as a core task. However, the idea that NATO can abandon its commitment to crisis management at a time of growing instability on its southern flank seems untenable. To be sure, the move into a crisis management role was remarkable because, while NATO clearly was born as an organization resting on the twin pillars of power and partnership, the Washington Treaty makes no particular provisions for a role in crisis management and so-called 'out-of area' operations. However, the by now long-standing practice of engagement in crisis management operations and the clear expectation on the part of the United States that European NATO allies 'do their part' in non-Article Five contingencies in the vicinity of Europe in return for continued Article Five commitment from the United States makes crisis management an integral part of the Alliance as both a practical role and an additional identity. As the United States continues its 'rebalancing' towards Asia, the expectation that NATO's European members take on a leading role in crisis management contingencies in the vicinity of Europe is likely to become more pronounced.

In the emerging strategic environment, it is clear that the dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia calls for the Alliance to bring the 'old' defence alliance identity' forward again and to enhance the capabilities required for such a role.

Over the years, the dual, and since the 1990s, the triple character of the Alliance has given rise to some perplexity and apparent contradictions in NATO's multi-pronged approach to security, which has at times led to uncertainty about its primary role. However, arguably it is precisely such ambiguity and uncertainty that is the lifeblood of an Alliance that rests on assumptions which only barely hang together logically, and which can never be proven until the day they are called for. The promise contained

in Article Five hinges on trust and political will rather than on certainty and proven capability. That has always been the case and will undoubtedly remain so in the future, although it seems unlikely that it is this uncertainty that the proponents of the 'back to basics strategy' have in mind. The benefit of the three core tasks is that the Alliance has been able to focus on one or two of them at any one time depending on the specific security challenges of the time and to adjust their balance with relative ease. This is essentially what NATO continues to do as the Wales Summit adjusted the balance back towards a more prominent role for collective defence. In this way, having three pillars (rather than just one or two) has contributed to NATO's remarkable ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment and is therefore an attribute that should be valued and safeguarded.

The fact that NATO rests on three pillars offers the Alliance an unusual degree of simultaneous stability and flexibility that may well be an important reason for its endurance. Most military alliances in history have only lasted for as long as a clear and imminent danger was present. Moreover, in most alliances throughout history, alliance members feared each other almost as much as they feared the enemy (Thies, 2009: 87). NATO is special because it is an alliance of democracies that do not fear each other, and it rests on practices that do not challenge the many ambiguities inherent within it and – a factor that is often overlooked – because it is able to switch from one role and identity to another. In this way, during the Cold War NATO focused almost exclusively on collective defence, whereas the post-Cold War period has been characterized by a shared focus on cooperative security through NATO's growing circle of partnerships and increasingly – though at times reluctantly – on crisis management through its operations.

In the emerging strategic environment, it is clear that the dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia calls for the Alliance to bring the 'old' defence alliance identity' forward again and to enhance the capabilities required for such a role. However, it is also the case that the security challenges emerging to the south and further afield cannot be met by a role as a defense alliance, but will continue to require NATO's readiness to act in a crisis management and expeditionary capacity. Moreover, the changed relationship with Russia, the diminished prospects of membership for states that are unlikely to fulfil NATO's membership criteria, and the fundamentally changed political structures in many of NATO's current partners in the Middle East will require a fundamental rethink of its partnership policy, though not a diminished role for cooperative security or for NATO's partnership identity.



The suggestion that NATO should go ‘back to basics’ therefore not only goes to the heart of the structure of the Alliance as an institution resting on three pillars and which reaches further than simply challenging the validity of the current Strategic Concept. It is also a suggestion that flies in the face of the challenges arising from the emerging strategic environment and which would be likely to diminish NATO’s ability to adapt and would undermine the very foundations that have contributed to its continued relevance across very different strategic environments for more than six decades. In the new strategic environment, Alliance cohesion will be paramount, and all of NATO’s three core tasks will be needed. It is therefore important to reiterate the need for all NATO members to accept that one core task cannot be privileged over another, and that it is the co-existence of all three core tasks that has enabled the Alliance to endure – now into its seventh decade. Permanently downgrading one or the other of the three core tasks is likely to undermine the strength and stability of the Alliance.



**STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
IN A CHANGING WORLD**

NATO has always moved forward through persuasion and negotiation to forge the necessary consensus. Although the process has often been frustratingly cumbersome, as Secretary General Stoltenberg has pointed out, NATO's greatest strength may well be its ability to (eventually) adapt.⁴ However, to be able to undertake the right adaptation hinges critically on having sufficient strategic analysis capabilities and being able to prioritise the challenges of different changes. Yet, these are precisely the skills the Alliance is less adept at. In the current situation, few will disagree that the world is changing, but it is less clear how it is changing or what the consequences will be. The dramatic events of 2014 clearly heralded major change in NATO's immediate strategic environment on its eastern and southern borders. However, what if these changes are only part of a much larger structural change that is every bit as important as the end of the Cold War? What if we are currently living through systemic transformation and the end of the global reach of the rule-based, liberal international order? What if NATO is currently busy responding to the symptoms of large-scale systemic change, but in the process fails to address the underlying root causes of the challenges emerging on NATO's eastern and southern borders?

The dramatic events of 2014 clearly heralded major change in NATO's immediate strategic environment on its eastern and southern borders.

The problem is that, even though NATO has access to significant strategic analysis capabilities within its own organization, its member states and some of its agencies, – NATO is often hampered in its ability to respond in the optimal way. In an organization where the practical reality is that decisions are taken according to what is politically possible rather than on the basis of what is strategically necessary long term forecasts are often ignored. It is no coincidence that the history of the development of the Alliance is also a history of crises because NATO's ability to adapt has always been prompted by a sense of urgency. When the change in the strategic environment has been imperceptible or intangible, the ability of the Alliance to respond has been less remarkable. In an alliance of 28 sovereign states, each with its own distinct security priorities, such a pattern is of course to be expected, and it is fully recognized that the Alliance is structurally predetermined to take decisions that reflect the lowest common denominator, rather than bold and forward-looking initiatives in anticipation of change that has not yet happened. Yet the emerging systemic change calls for a new approach

and a renewed emphasis on NATO's strategic analysis capabilities, as well as its capacity to forge a consensus on far-reaching transformations before the 'help' of a clear and unambiguous crisis might concentrate the mind.

At the 2015 Munich Security Conference (MSC), it was clear that the concerns about the future of the current order that had been percolating for some time in scholarly circles had also reached the top of the transatlantic policy community. The growing concerns about the future of the existing order were clearly expressed in the conference theme, Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians (Munich Security Conference, 2015). The conference seemed to mark an important turning point in how policy circles view the changes taking place in the international order by implicitly acknowledging that the combination of shifting power in the international system and the declining attractiveness of the liberal principles supporting the order were undermining the essential assumptions that had informed policy for more than six decades. Moreover, the same concerns had been expressed for some time by several strategic foresight establishments, all of which agree that major transformation is taking place with even more change to come.⁵ Their findings concur that not only is change surely on its way but also that the changes taking place in the European and in the global strategic security environment are truly transformational and may render the existing institutional landscape unrecognizable within just a couple of decades.

CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT:

- Changes in the power structure of the international system, as new powers rise or (re)-emerge and as Western powers struggle with their own economic, political and societal challenges
- Changes in the principles of how to maintain order in the international system, as long-established (liberal) values and (Western) practices are challenged and losing some of their magnetism
- Changes in the institutional architecture, as (Western) multilateral institutions face decreasing levels of legitimacy and efficiency and as new alternative institutional structures are established
- Changes in domestic structures, as some non-Western societies reject the (Western) democratic model and the idea that there is just one route to modernity and the good life

In addition, new (and re-emerging old) security challenges related to vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures such as in cyber, energy and supply lines and to actual and forecasted changes in climate, technology, demographics and migration (NATO, 2013) look set to test conventional military and security thinking and established organizational practices. Moreover, the endurance of the role of the United States as a global hegemon is coming into doubt, whilst its attention is increasingly diverted towards Asia and to domestic matters.

Although these issues had been circulating in academic circles for some time, and although it had long been accepted that change was taking place, the Munich Security Conference constituted a turning point because it articulated explicitly within a highly influential political framework the possibility of the collapse of the current international order. The delay in fully engaging with these issues may partly have been because questions of international order are inextricably bound up with the related – but politically toxic – debate about the future of American power, especially the question of American decline and whether the United States should retrench from its commitments or continue to underwrite the existing international order (Bremmer, 2015). This issue goes straight to the heart of the cohesion of the Alliance and the credibility of the American security guarantee. Opening up these issues within an Alliance setting is therefore something that is likely to be instinctively dodged.

The endurance of the role of the United States as a global hegemon is coming into doubt, whilst its attention is increasingly diverted towards Asia and to domestic matters.

Apart from the ingrained reluctance within the Alliance to discuss issues that could bring its cohesion and credibility into question, the ability to fully engage with the structural changes facing the Alliance has also been hampered by the nature of the change itself. The current situation has been described as ‘an era of compounding complexity’ – understood as an environment in which challenges grow exponentially rather than simply by addition, as complex trends interact with one another and as new security challenges emerge and old ones are reasserted (Smith and Stokes, 2014). The problem with compounding complexity for NATO is that it points to no clear and unambiguous crisis whilst offering plenty of scope for the 28 member states to interpret a truly overwhelming array of changes in different ways and to arrive at diverging security priorities. In a situation characterized by ‘compounding complexity’,

the link between young western Muslims travelling to Syria or ‘little green men’ in Crimea and transformational change in the international order is not easy to demonstrate. In this situation it is perhaps not surprising that the Alliance has focused its attention on the clear and unambiguous challenges on NATO’s eastern and southern borders, even if many are fully aware that these challenges may simply be symptoms of more fundamental change.

In a situation characterized by ‘compounding complexity’, the link between young western Muslims travelling to Syria or ‘little green men’ in Crimea and transformational change in the international order is not easy to demonstrate.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in demonstrating the connection between the many and diverse changes that are taking place in the international environment, and despite the reluctance in policy circles to address, even implicitly, the issue of America’s declining relative position, by the autumn of 2015 it was undeniable that major change was taking place in the international system that could not be ignored even by the most ardent believer in America’s enduring power and in the universal benefits of the liberal order. Apart from the deterioration in the relationship with Russia and the continued atrocities committed by new unruly actors such as Daesh, the Charlie Hebdo and November attacks in Paris, the persistent crises in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq and the escalating crises in Libya, Yemen and the Sahel all served as a reminder of an international strategic environment in flux. The gravity of the situation was even more apparent in the unfolding tragedy of an unprecedented number of displaced persons fleeing violence or poverty. Moreover, the challenge to the values underpinning the international order was underscored by the many young western-educated Muslims travelling in the opposite direction to those fleeing violence with the intention of fighting for Daesh.

Despite NATO’s structural inability to engage with future change without an actual crisis ‘snapping at the heels’ of decision-makers, the Alliance actually has both an internal capacity for strategic analysis and access to externally derived strategic foresight analysis. Moreover, the establishment of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in 2003 furnished the Alliance with its own strategic foresight analysis division, which produces regular reports on strategic change and its implications such as the Multiple Futures Project⁶ and the Strategic Foresight Analysis Report for 2013 (NATO,

2013). The latter serves as the foundation for future Alliance operations and for how NATO should execute its three core tasks defined in the Strategic Concept (NATO, 2013). Within NATO headquarters the growing recognition of NATO's need to ensure that the Alliance has an enhanced Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC) to monitor and anticipate international developments that could affect Alliance security led recently to the re-establishment of the Political Committee (PC) to discuss issues of overall strategic importance. Among other things, the PC discusses internally produced Strategic Analysis Capability papers produced by the Emerging Security Challenges Division on specific operational and strategic issues. Indeed a sizable proportion of NATO's international staff are de facto engaged in strategic analysis through the Alliance's continuous defense planning processes. Nevertheless, despite the considerable resources spent on strategic analysis, the general feeling within the organization seems to be that the Alliance 'is not very good at it' or that the process 'lacks political guidance'. The concern about significant change in the strategic environment is evidenced by NATO's adoption of a new Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) document. The document is classified, so its value is difficult to assess, but its adoption is a clear indication that NATO Headquarters takes the prospect of strategic change seriously.⁷

NATO and the EU both have to adapt to the strategic change, and both organizations are in the process of preparing major strategic policy decisions.

NATO and the EU both have to adapt to the strategic change, and both organizations are in the process of preparing major strategic policy decisions. The EU, under the leadership of High Representative Frederica Mogherini, is currently working on formulating a new Global Security Strategy to replace the document agreed in 2003. A report on the state of the strategic environment will be presented at the June 2016 European Council meeting, just a few weeks before the NATO Warsaw Summit. It goes without saying that, in an ideal world, the two organizations (which have 22 member states in common) should coordinate their strategic analyses and ensure that at the minimum they start from the same premise regarding what kind of global order is emerging. However, this is easier said than done because not only is the EU–NATO relationship constrained by well-known political blockages, but it is also not certain that the two organizations, despite their considerable overlap, will arrive at the same conclusions on the nature of the emerging global strategic environment.

In addition to utilizing their extensive access to internal and externally derived strategic analysis, the two organizations could also turn to the by now extensive scholarly literature on the subject. However, although there is widespread agreement on the changes taking place, there is less agreement on their ranking and importance or on what kind of international order is likely to result from the current complex changes. The challenges of encouraging the two organizations to proceed from a common starting point are therefore considerable. The next section will turn to (considering the voluminous literature available) a brief review of the literature on the emerging international order, which may form a useful starting point for the two organizations' processes of strategic analysis.



**NARRATIVES ABOUT
THE COMING INTERNATIONAL ORDER**

The current literature can usefully be divided into three different narratives on the coming international order: one that harks back to the past, one that seeks to extend the present into the future, and one that looks to a profoundly different future. The three narratives have been labeled here 'a multipolar future', 'a multi-partner future' and 'a multi-order future'.

A MULTIPOLAR FUTURE

The first narrative is probably the most commonly articulated one in the media and in policy circles. It is also the simplest of the three narratives, as it suggests that we are currently witnessing a return to multipolarity because new powers are rising. In its most widely cited form it is based on the logic that, as some powers rise, the unipolar moment will be over (Krauthammer, 1990) and will be replaced with either a return to bipolarity or, more likely, a shift to global multipolarity (Blagden, 2015). Some versions of the narrative foresee a 'post-American world' in which 'the rise of the rest' fundamentally alters the structure of the international system (Zakaria, 2008). The narrative emphasizes military and economic power, and stresses that military power rests on economic strength (Jacques, 2009), which leads to the persuasive argument that as rising powers increase their economic strength, increases in their military power will follow. The narrative is persuasive because it can be backed up with an array of empirical evidence, it has clear historical precedents, and it is easy to convey to a broader audience. As a result it has gained considerable traction in both the popular media and within some policy circles.

However, the narrative is split on the question of the position of the United States in the coming international system – especially if the United States will be able to maintain its hegemonic position by balancing itself against rising powers such as China. Logically a multipolar narrative implies the end of hegemony, which is why many of its proponents are reluctant to characterize the coming order as multipolar, but do emphasize balance of power dynamics. What is at issue is that a return to multipolarity suggests American decline – a position that most American IR scholars working within a balance-of-power perspective are unwilling to take. However, although there is a reluctance to accept the logical consequence of a return of multipolarity, proponents of the narrative accept the necessity of balance-of-power politics and agree that the West – especially the United States – must act now to cement its position for the future.⁸ In doing so, they accept that the United States

should certainly think twice before using force, especially where key national interests are not at stake, but they also maintain that diplomacy must always be backed with force (Nau, 2013). Proponents of this narrative foresee a return to past practices of power politics, instability and rivalry, and they reject the idea that the fundamental nature of international politics has altered in any significant way (Blagden, 2015: 314).

A MULTI-PARTNER FUTURE

The second narrative accepts that the rise of new powers will affect the coming international order, but it vehemently rejects the idea that the United States is in decline or that the coming order will represent a return to multipolarity. Proponents of the multi-partner narrative stress that America is an enduring power, but they also maintain that the United States shares more interests with other powers than the multipolar narrative suggests (Jones, 2014: 2). In policy circles this narrative was most clearly articulated by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as a move to establish a 'cooperative architecture' leading to a 'multi-partner world' rather than a 'multipolar world'.⁹

The second narrative is more optimistic than the 'multipolar narrative'. It bases its optimism on the belief that the current liberal order is highly resilient, able to adapt, and open and easy to join by new rising powers that wish to align themselves with the current liberal order (Ikenberry, 2011). In this view, change is certainly envisaged and is based on optimism that a reformed version of the current order can be maintained in an altered strategic environment and that the soft power of its founding (liberal) ideas will continue to act as a magnet to emerging democratic powers. In the 'multi-partner narrative', Anne-Marie Slaughter's 'networked world' is what policy-makers should strive towards to produce a system of global governance that institutionalizes cooperation and contains conflict sufficiently such that all nations and their peoples may achieve greater peace and prosperity and reach minimum standards of human dignity (Slaughter, 2004: 15). The 'multi-partner narrative' therefore seeks to extend the present into the future, although it also accepts the necessity of repairing those aspects of the liberal order that are currently acknowledged to be in crisis and that have clearly failed to deliver on the liberal promise of freedom and prosperity. Urgent reform of the existing multilateral institutions is therefore needed, and the West needs to address expeditiously the persistent domestic economic and political ills that detract from the appeal and efficiency of the liberal order.

A MULTI-ORDER FUTURE

The third narrative is much more diverse than the two previous narratives and includes both optimistic and pessimistic versions. I call it the multi-order narrative, but it could also be called a 'de-centered future' or a 'no one's future'. One of the most prominent examples of this narrative is Charles Kupchan's 'No One's World' in which Kupchan argues that the West is losing not only its material primacy as new powers rise, but also its ideological dominance (Kupchan, 2012: 2). In Kupchan's view, Asia is likely to be the main beneficiary of the ongoing global changes, but even so it is doubtful that any country, region or model will dominate the world of the future. The emergent international system will be populated by numerous power centers at different stages on their way to multiple versions of modernity and so will 'belong' to no one in particular (Kupchan, 2012: 3). The challenge in 'no one's world' will be to establish a global consensus between different power centers (or orders) each adhering to their particular principles and practices and pursuing their particular vision of order and the good life. Establishing a consensus on the fundamental terms of a new order and managing a peaceful transformation towards it will be the main challenge for the years to come.

Establishing a consensus on the fundamental terms of a new order and managing a peaceful transformation towards it will be the main challenge for the years to come.

Where Kupchan emphasizes emerging differences, Buzan and Lawson point out that, while power is admittedly becoming more diffuse, nearly all states now adhere to a form of capitalism (Buzan and Lawson, 2015). However, despite the growing convergence in the economic sphere, they acknowledge the existence of a wide span of governance structures, suggesting that the challenge ahead is how to manage relations between diverse modes of capitalist governance in a system that can best be described as 'de-centered globalism' in which no single power – or cluster of powers – is preeminent (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 72). Buzan and Lawson stress four principles of decentered globalism: global non-hegemony, responsible great powers, regionalization alongside globalization, and common security being based on shared fates. Provided that these four principles can be adhered to, which the authors acknowledge is not without question, a new international society based on the principles of decentered globalism could offer the prospect of managing competition between integrated but diverse models of political economy (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 303).

The perspectives in the multi-order narrative have in common that they foresee the replacement of American/Western hegemony with a more de-centered, polycentric or diverse system and acceptance that the US in particular and the West more generally will need to get used to the fact that the vision of the universalization of liberal values is wishful thinking. They see an emerging global order characterized by diversity and diffusion of power, of crisscrossing and overlapping multiple forms of relationships, of many different forms of domestic governance, organizational practices and institutional architectures. The multi-order narrative agrees with the multi-partner perspective that the challenge ahead will be to facilitate global cooperation to address collective security problems such as climate change, crime, trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), migration and arms control (Buzan, 2012: 46), but they do not share the optimism that such cooperation can be forged according to Western principles, nor that rising powers – either democratic or autocratic – can be enticed into the current liberal order.

The challenge will be to establish dialogue and cooperation across these new dividing lines. This is the essential task that NATO must now address.

These three narratives are, of course, ideal types that are unlikely to materialize in the exact form outlined here. However, each captures important qualities of the changes and challenges that are likely to face policymakers in the first quarter of the 21st century, and they each point to a plausible future. This report finds that the multi-order future seems to be the most accurate and realistic one because it incorporates the elements of the first two narratives, while adding other assumptions that seem more realistic for the emerging strategic environment. In relation to the multipolar narrative and its focus on the balance of power, the multi-order narrative has the benefit of not focusing so exclusively on material factors, but includes an understanding that the primacy of the Western liberal set of ideas is no longer shared with a growing number of increasingly important and powerful actors in the international system. In relation to the multi-partner narrative, the multi-order narrative shares the idea that partnership, dialogue and cooperation will be necessary elements of the coming order, but it does not share the optimism that in the future relationships can be based on the continuation of western ideological hegemony. What seems more likely is that several different international orders will coexist, each characterized by different principles, institutions and structures of domestic governance. The challenge will be to establish dialogue and cooperation across these new dividing lines. This is the essential task that NATO must now address.



ADAPTING TO A MULTI-ORDER FUTURE

It is always easier to react to a tangible crisis than to adapt to a projected – and disputed – future such as the three versions outlined here. However, it may now be time to accept that the three possible futures are not of equal status and that elements of the multi-order future is already part of the present strategic reality. In other words, it is time to base policy and strategic planning on the strategic environment as it really is, rather than on what policy makers would prefer it to be. Such a move would require acceptance that, rather than the events of the last couple of years questioning the international order, it may be that events such as the crisis in Ukraine, the emergence of IS and the establishment of new alternative institutions like the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) represent concrete manifestations of the arrival of the multi-order future.

Accepting the arrival of a de-centered world, or Kupchan's No One's World, or my preferred name – a multi-order world – requires acceptance that the liberal international order established after the end of the Second World War no longer has a universal claim to order-making on a global scale. This was, of course, also the case during the Cold War, where two ideologically opposed orders (the Soviet communist order and the Western liberal order) co-existed in a confrontational relationship with very few open lines of communication and cooperation between them.¹⁰ However, it would be a mistake to assume that a multi-order world would be similar to the bipolar world of the Cold War, or for that matter that it would be similar to the multipolar world that went before it, although it has similarities with both.

It is time to base policy and strategic planning on the strategic environment as it really is, rather than on what policy makers would prefer it to be.

The multi-order world shares with the bipolar world of the Cold War the fact that different international orders coexist and that each is based on its own specific principles, institutions and structures of domestic governance and that a specific power relationship between them influences their room of manoeuvre. The multi-order world shares with the multipolar world the fact that there is likely to be more than two power centres, but it is different from the multipolar world of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because in the multipolar world the European powers


shared a roughly similar culture and shared basic principles about how to maintain order between them. Until the rise of Fascism and Nazism they also appeared to share a (roughly) similar developmental path towards governance structures based on liberal enlightenment principles and to share an institutional framework, though an immature one, for interstate cooperation.

In a multi-order world, partnerships will acquire a more prominent position, albeit in a more challenging environment for establishing politically acceptable partnerships.

The international systems depicted in Figure 1 are different because they differ in their constitutive elements – here conceptualized as power, principles, institutions and domestic governance structures. Moreover, as suggested by Alexander Wendt more than twenty years ago, 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt, 1992). Thus, whether the coming multi-order world turns out to be conflictual, cooperative or competitive will very much depend on the cultures of anarchy that develop through political practice. This is to a large extent where NATO might be able to play a significant role, as the Alliance may contribute towards establishing practices that are conducive to a cooperative multi-order world, rather than a competitive or conflictual multi-order world. In a multi-order world, however, the challenge is that, although relations between the different orders are likely to be harder to establish and sustain, there is no alternative to having relationships across many forms of dividing lines because globalization, WMD proliferation, international terrorism, environmental degradation and climate change, along with many other issues, will continue to demand the attention of policy-makers without offering any single-actor based solutions. In other words, in a multi-order world, partnerships will acquire a more prominent position, albeit in a more challenging environment for establishing politically acceptable partnerships.'

The difference between the international systems is outlined in Figure 1, where the colours of individual triangles signify similarity or difference in power, principles, institutions and domestic governance structures. The arrows between the different orders signify multiple forms of relationships, which will be what is likely to define the 'culture of anarchy'.

Figure 1. Varieties of international systems



In the coming multi-order world, the challenge will be to maintain a global cooperative institutional framework for meeting common global problems and challenges, whilst at the same time accepting that each individual order is likely to develop its own order-specific institutions for meeting order-specific challenges and capturing opportunities. In such an international system, the emphasis will be on exploring the possibilities for developing cooperation across dividing lines either through issue-specific partnerships or by working towards cooperation between (mainly regional) order-specific institutions. At the same time, it should be realized that the coming multi-order world will be characterized by both economic and military competition

between old and emerging power centres, and that some emerging orders are likely to be dysfunctional and characterized by high levels of conflict, poverty and instability, which likely will have a significant impact on other orders in the system. The current perception of 'compounding complexity' arises from the new and more complex multi-order world and an increasing lack of legitimacy of (western) multilateral institutions among emerging powers, coupled with a growing frustration with the inability of existing institutions to meet the many challenges they face and to undertake reform (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014).





**NATO'S ADAPTATION TO THE
COMING MULTI-ORDER WORLD**

If the multi-order narrative becomes the starting point accepted by NATO, and indeed the EU, this will clearly have major policy implications for both organizations, and in the case of NATO it is likely to require significant adaptation measures in all three of its core tasks. The Alliance can, of course, only hope to play a limited role in the emerging multi-order world, but recognising as a first step the multi-order character of the emerging strategic environment may help it adjust each of its three core tasks in ways that follow logically from the actual strategic environment. The following section will outline the adaptation measures that will be necessary for NATO to meet the challenges of a multi-order world.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

The sense of urgency generated by the dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia and by the sudden rise of Daesh paved the way for the decisions taken at the 2014 Wales Summit. As outlined in Box 2, the decisions at that summit included a pledge by all members to move towards the two percent defence expenditure goal within a decade and to launch a series of initiatives designed to bolster NATO's readiness and ability to live up to its Article Five commitments. To be sure these were necessary initiatives that were long overdue, as shrinking defence budgets over a number of years and uncoordinated defence cuts had certainly left NATO's collective defence capability severely overstretched. Perhaps a little polemically, one could say that Mr Putin has done more to spur NATO members into taking the necessary action than any number of 'thunder speeches' by outgoing defence secretaries, secretary generals and other practitioners and analysts in recent years. However, although the Wales initiatives are a step in the right direction, there is a danger that some member states will see the initiatives as the sum total of what NATO needs to do because they are focused on the change in the relationship with Russia and the changed security challenge from Daesh, rather than on the overall systemic strategic change outlined above. If so, then the damage could be immense and would eventually leave NATO as an irrelevant relic of a past international order.

The inter-connectedness of NATO's challenges and the demands on its ability to muster its collective defence was also demonstrated in the October 2015 incursions of Russian combat aircraft into Turkish airspace and the incident in November 2015 when the Turkish air force shot down a Russian plane. These incidents suggest, as NATO's southern members argue, that the issue of collective defence under Article

Five is not restricted to eastern members. Moreover, they serve to underline the importance of cooperation and communication and the necessity for having measures in place to be able to 'de-conflict' in areas where two independent actors such as Russia and Turkey are operating in the same geographical space.

In a multi-order world, relationships are likely to be multi-faceted and may range from cooperative relations in some issue areas to competitive and even conflictual relationships in others. Therefore, in the case of Russia, NATO needs to adopt a two-pronged approach (much as it did during the Cold War) based on the strengthened territorial defence of its eastern members, whilst at the same time also working towards (re)-establishing cooperative relations with Russia in areas characterized by shared interests. In this sense, therefore, the decisions that were taken at the Wales Summit are significant and their implementation of paramount importance, but they should not be allowed to stand alone or to dominate NATO's own narrative about its strategic adaptation.

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While the Wales decisions were clearly important – albeit only as part of a wider strategy necessary both in relation to the immediate challenges in the relationship with Russia and as part of NATO's adaptation to the overall changes in the strategic environment – the Alliance needs to decide whether the Wales decisions are far-reaching enough and, if not, which supplementary decisions need to be taken at the up-coming Warsaw Summit. Of these considerations, one of the most urgent (and difficult) questions to be considered is the relevance of the deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance in the significantly altered strategic environment. The questions to be asked include whether the measures resulting from the implemented RAP really are sufficient to deter a threat to NATO's eastern members, whether the deterrence posture of the Alliance as a whole is suitable for a strategic environment in which hybrid threats seem more likely than unambiguous territorial incursions, and whether the existing decision-making procedures are adequate for the ambitions of rapid response expressed in the RAP.

It is ironic that NATO undertook a full review of its deterrence and defense posture (DDPR) in 2012 as part of the adaptation to the 2010 Strategic Concept. However, although the review was intended to appraise NATO's defense and deterrence posture in the new and emerging environment, it failed to address any of the issues that now seem so important and concluded that 'the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound' (NATO, 2012: §31). To be fair, the language of the DDPR is vague enough to fit almost any situation, hence at least allowing for the possibility of the Alliance developing further and reviewing its defense and deterrence posture in light of the recent changes in the European security environment, especially contingency plans for ambiguous situations developing in the most vulnerable member states, namely the three Baltic states, and for NATO's nuclear posture.

Nevertheless a considerable gap does seem to exist between the expectations of the eastern members for a deterrence posture reminiscent of the deterrence posture of the Cold War and the actual availability of hardware and manpower to make such a posture credible. Moreover, it is simply not clear how NATO would respond to a security situation at a low level which might prompt calls for Article Five protection from the Baltic states, but which might not lead other less vulnerable member states to agree to invoke Article Five. These questions are already being addressed in NATO, and at the Defense Ministers' Meeting in June 2015, the Alliance agreed to grant enhanced authority to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) so that SACEUR will be able to 'alert, stage and prepare our troops to be ready to go' (Stoltenberg, 2015). Although this move clearly makes sense in terms of the ambition for the Spearhead Force to be ready within 48 hours, it does not indicate whether the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would agree to its release in an ambiguous situation even if SACEUR had given the initial go-ahead. Such a 'mismatch' could lead to increased tensions in the Alliance.

All in all, the Alliance has certainly refocused its attentions to the core task of collective defense. The decisions were clearly needed after a long hiatus in attention to the Alliance's Article Five commitments. However, a considerable capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1993) remains in place, as it seems somewhat doubtful whether the capabilities necessary to fully honor the commitments expressed in Article Five are still available and operational after a quarter of a century of transforming NATO from a stationary territorial defense Alliance into a security institution with a mobile and expeditionary emphasis. This has, of course, always been the tricky aspect of the Article Five commitment, namely that it contains a promise that ultimately hinges on political will rather than material capability; but if the material capability is in doubt, then so is the promise. During the Cold War, Europeans were not convinced that

Western Europe could be defended conventionally with more than 350,000 American personnel stationed in West Germany – if such 'jittery' feelings are now characteristic of NATO's eastern members, it seems unlikely that the prospect of a 30,000 NATO Rapid Response Force will reassure them.

Another problem with concentrating on collective defense is that doing so is unlikely to contribute to the peaceful transition to a cooperative multi-order world, a political aim that NATO could do well to prioritize, including working towards, as the Wales Declaration expressed it, '(re)-establishing a cooperative and constructive relationship with Russia' (NATO, 2014: § 22). The Declaration quite rightly stressed that these aspirations are contingent on seeing a change in Russia's actions to demonstrate its compliance with international law and international obligations and responsibilities. However, the dilemma is that the more NATO works towards strengthening its capability for meeting Article Five contingencies, the more the prospects for Russia changing its behavior diminishes, and along with it the prospect for a reasonably constructive relationship with Russia. So although the Wales decisions were in many ways a welcome initiative that may well have contributed to narrowing the capability - expectations gap and thereby contributed to Alliance cohesion, it is unlikely to have contributed to the wider political ambition of a peaceful transition to a multi-order world.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Although most of the political attention at the Wales Summit was directed towards the perceived need to re-establish the collective defense capability of the Alliance in response to Russia's actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the second core task – crisis management – was also quite prominent, at least rhetorically. The Declaration reaffirmed the commitment to all three core tasks and reiterated that the RAP simultaneously strengthens collective defense and NATO's crisis management capability (NATO, 2014: §3). In particular, the Wales Summit Declaration emphasized that the RAP complements and boosts the ambitious goals set at the 2012 Chicago Summit for the so-called Forces 2020: 'modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so as to enable them to operate together and with partners in any environment' (NATO, 2014: §63). The commitment to the Forces 2020 initiative was further enhanced through the endorsement of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), which is a commitment to try to ensure that the bonds forged between Alliance and partner nations' armed forces through combat operations in Afghanistan are maintained through the launch of a new Interoperability Platform in

which 24 partners have been invited to work with NATO through dialogue and practical cooperation on interoperability issues (NATO, 2014: §88). Both are clearly seen as elements that contribute to NATO's crisis management capability.

The Washington perspective maintains that the United States should not be the main contributor to crisis management situations but should be able to rely on its allies to put substantial resources into meeting non-Article Five security challenges in Europe's own 'backyard'.

The link between the RAP and NATO's crisis management capability was further strengthened at the Wales Summit through the endorsement of the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). The FNC is a German proposal aimed to encourage joint capability development by clusters of nations and to provide a new impetus for multinational cooperation in NATO defense planning (Mattelaer, 2014). It is anticipated that the FNC will facilitate enhanced cooperation between the larger member states acting as 'framework nations' and smaller members that may not on their own be able to mount specific capabilities, but who may be able to 'plug in' to capabilities offered by a larger framework nation. Thus Germany acts as a framework nation with nine other member states to 'work systematically together by deepening and intensifying cooperation to create a number of multinational projects to address Alliance priority areas across a broad spectrum of capabilities' (NATO, 2014: §67). However, it should be noted that, even though Germany acts as framework nation, any use of the deepened and intensified cooperation would still have to be accepted by the Bundestag, which does put some doubt on the actual availability of the enhanced capabilities. Indeed, as suggested by Claudia Major and Christian Mölling (2014), doubts about Berlin's reliability as a partner may well be the Achilles heel of the project. Other FN projects include a group of seven allies (Denmark included) with the United Kingdom as FN, which have agreed to establish a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including high-intensity operations. It is anticipated that the JEF will be operational by 2018. Other FN groups are in the process of being developed, but at present it seems too early to fully assess the impact the FNC is likely to have on NATO's crisis management capability.

The FNC seems to be geared towards addressing the imbalance between contributions by European members and the United States and as such is primarily about the delicate issue of transatlantic burden-sharing. Although the Summit Declaration does not explicitly say so, it is well known that the Washington perspective maintains that the United States should not be the main contributor to crisis management situations but should be able to rely on its allies to put substantial resources into meeting non-Article Five security challenges in Europe's own 'backyard'. As suggested by Derek Chollet (2015), the Obama administration has focused on US contributions being defined through 'unique capabilities' and expects a more equal distribution of labor, with substantial contributions from its European partners. The emerging Washington perspective cannot be separated from the changing global strategic environment, where the attention of the United States will increasingly be focused on Asia and on American domestic issues. It is simply no longer politically viable for American taxpayers to pay the lion's share of crisis management on top of underwriting the security guarantee expressed in Article Five. The FNC is certainly a step in the right direction of addressing the issue of unequal burden-sharing in a practical manner, but it is unlikely to fully address the sensitive issue of transatlantic burden-sharing or to fully facilitate the transition to a new division of labor between NATO's European members and the United States that is increasingly being called for (Chollet, 2015).

The good news is that the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that the Obama Administration has no intention of retrenching from the European security guarantee.

Indeed, the issues at hand tear at the very heart of the transatlantic relationship. It is clear that the transatlantic relationship can no longer be based on starkly unequal burden- and risk-sharing. The good news is that the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that the Obama Administration has no intention of retrenching from the European security guarantee. This was underlined in June 2014 with the launch of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), for which Congress appropriated and authorized nearly a billion dollars in funding (Brzezinski, 2015). The initiative was designed to demonstrate the steadfast commitment of the United States to the security of NATO allies and partners in Europe, including an increased American rotational presence on the territories of the eastern members, security assistance to countries threatened by Russia, and a number of steps to increase the responsiveness of US forces to

contingencies in central Europe, including 'exploring initiatives such as prepositioning of equipment and improving reception facilities in Europe' (Brzezinski, 2015). However, it would be naïve to think that such a commitment comes 'free of charge'. In return the United States expects its European allies to contribute more both in monetary terms and in practice. As President Obama stated at the launch of ERI: 'They expect full membership when it comes to their defense; then that means that they've also got to make a contribution that is commensurate with full membership'.¹¹ In other words, participation in crisis management situations when called for is NOT an optional extra, but is increasingly the 'price' to be paid for the American security guarantee. In this sense, the link between collective defense and crisis management is clear – the new transatlantic bargain will be based on a division of labor where the Americans deliver on collective defense and in return the European allies step up to the plate of crisis management when needed.

There is understandably very little appetite in the Alliance at present for engagement in crisis management operations. More than a decade of involvement in Afghanistan has left its toll on the willingness of the Alliance to risk entanglement in protracted conflicts. Moreover, those members who have been consistently involved in high-end combat operations are facing serious issues of overuse of their deployable forces and equipment. This, for example, is the case with the Danish F-16 fighter contribution to the coalition (not a NATO operation) against Daesh, which has been temporarily suspended to allow personnel to recuperate and the planes to be overhauled. Yet as the growing instability on NATO's southern borders shows, it is probably naïve to think that there will be no call for crisis management in the near future. Moreover, it is important that the Alliance as a whole understands the link between the increasing demands for European contributions, including leadership, in crisis management situations in Europe's vicinity and the altered strategic environment. In the new strategic environment, the stark reality is that the US will be increasingly preoccupied in Asia (and at home) and will expect Europeans to take the lead in all non-Article Five contingencies in Europe's vicinity. As the ERI initiatives show, such a move is not an expression of US abandonment, but simply of a new transatlantic bargain resting on a geographical division of labor. There is little doubt that the Warsaw Summit will have to address the perceived discrepancy in attention between NATO's eastern and southern flanks, that the southern members will demand a re-balance towards the crises in the Middle East and North Africa, and that the United States will stress its contribution in the ERI and expect tangible European commitments to enhancing NATO's crisis management capability in return. This is the new reality, and NATO members will have to get used to thinking in these terms.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Since the 'events' of 2014, partnerships and cooperative security have occupied a less prominent position in the deliberations of the Alliance than has been the case over the previous twenty years. In addition, there is perhaps an implicit understanding in the Alliance that issues related to partnership were settled by the 2011 Berlin agreement, which endorsed a new NATO Partnership Policy (NATO, 2011). Nevertheless the Wales Summit did contain two important decisions related to cooperative security: the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which aims to maintain and deepen the ability of partner forces to work alongside Allied forces, thus building on, and maintaining a level of interoperability that was largely achieved through the operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere; and the Defense and related Security Capacity Building Initiative, which builds on NATO's extensive track record and expertise in supporting, advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity-building. The latter is aimed at reinforcing NATO's commitment to its partner nations and to enable the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces as part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security, stability and conflict prevention. However, although the two initiatives in the Wales Declaration certainly constitute a positive step forward, they do not reflect the importance that partnerships of many different kinds are likely to play in a multi-order world.

A return to a prominent role for collective security at the expense of cooperative security is unlikely to be the best solution for a multi-order world.

The shift in attention away from cooperative security is partly explained by the enhanced attention to collective security and is reminiscent of the switch between these two roles at the end of the Cold War, when a new emphasis on partnerships paved the way for a more prominent role for cooperative security, whilst collective security faded more into the background. Although it is arguably precisely this kind of flexibility that has facilitated NATO's endurance across very different strategic environments, a return to a prominent role for collective security at the expense of cooperative security is unlikely to be the best solution for a multi-order world. As indicated by the many arrows in the graphical depiction of the multi-order world in Figure 1, a multi-order world will require many different forms of relationships, which are very likely to be based on a variety of different partnerships. This was fully understood by the proponents of the 2011 Berlin Agreement and the architects of the

2010 Strategic Concept, as well as in the preparations for the Strategic Concept in the so-called Expert Group under leadership of Madeleine Albright. What the architects of NATO's new partnership policy have in common is that they are strong advocates of (and in some cases contributors to) the multi-partner narrative. This narrative had a prominent position in the first Obama administration, which strongly advocated a wide variety of different partnerships – including difficult partnerships such as those with Russia, and between NATO and the EU. Although the multi-partner narrative is different from the multi-order narrative in as much as the former is more optimistic about the prospects of promoting liberal values through partnerships, both narratives recognise the importance of partnerships and that the main challenge ahead is to establish a broad consensus on the principles for order-making in a global cooperative order. For this reason, it is useful to take a brief look at the 2011 Partnership Policy.

With regard to the issue of how the Alliance might adapt to a multi-order world and move forward at the Warsaw Summit, it is useful briefly to reiterate the distinction already made by the Alliance between three different categories of partnership.¹² The classification introduced in the Berlin Agreement is important because it distinguishes between partners along functional lines rather than by using geographical or value-based criteria.

THE THREE CURRENT CATEGORIES ARE:

- Political Partners: partners with established partnership relations with NATO who are likely to participate in some of NATO's partnership activities, but who are generally speaking not contributing to NATO-led operations.
- Operational Partners: partners who participate in NATO-led operations and are regarded as making a significant contribution to them.
- Strategic Partners: partners with whom NATO may or may not have a formal partnership agreement, but with whom the Alliance has an interest in developing closer relations.¹³

In addition to these different categories of partnership, the Berlin Agreement also includes a ranked list of criteria for allocating NATO resources to partnership objectives. It is worth reproducing the list in its entirety, as it provides the main tangible clue to the value NATO attaches to individual partnerships. As can be seen from the list, the criteria of shared values ranks high on the list, even if it is absent in the three categories of partnership.

THE ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN ALLOCATING PARTNER-RELATED RESOURCES ARE:

- Whether the partner concerned aspires to join the Alliance.
- Whether the partner in question shares the values on which NATO is based and, where appropriate, is engaged in defense and larger reforms based on these values.
- Whether the partner concerned supports militarily, politically, financially or otherwise NATO's ongoing operations and missions or NATO's efforts to meet new security challenges.
- Whether the partner is of special strategic importance for NATO.
- Whether the partner has a special and developed bilateral cooperation framework with the Alliance.
- The capacity of the partner to finance its cooperative activities with NATO.
- Whether the cooperative activity is in accordance with the priority areas as outlined in this policy (NATO, 2011: 3).

The cooling of relations with Russia and a growing realization that NATO may in some cases be more eager to seek out partnerships than prospective partners are in entering into partnerships with NATO have contributed to an apparently diminished enthusiasm for partnerships and cooperative security in the Alliance. However, such a reaction would appear to be a mistake. The demands of the coming multi-order world call for increased rather than diminished attention to partnerships, although partnerships will have to be approached in a much more pragmatic manner, with the understanding that limited and issue-specific partnerships based on shared interests rather than shared values may hold a valuable potential for working across lines that would otherwise divide. For this reason, NATO could do well to reconsider its ranked list of criteria for resourcing partnerships by moving the question of whether the partner is of special strategic importance for NATO up the list. In doing so, it should prioritize the category of partnerships known as 'strategic partnerships' more clearly than has hitherto been the case, including with states geographically far afield such as India and China, as well as with international organizations such as the EU, the African Union (AU) and ASEAN.



CONCLUSION

This report has examined how NATO might move forward in a world that is characterized by 'compounding complexity' and which seems to be moving towards a new strategic environment, argued here to be a 'multi-order world'. In particular the report has focused on how the Alliance might move forward from the decisions taken at the Wales Summit in September 2014 to be able to prepare for a multi-order world at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. The challenge for NATO will be to find a way to contribute to European and global security in a shifting strategic environment that looks set to afford the Alliance and 'the West' a diminished role among a growing number of new and (re)-emerging actors, and within a climate in which liberal values and Western principles of order-making can no longer be assumed to be (almost) universally accepted. The report has argued that, while this may not be the world of NATO's choice, it is likely to be the world as it really is. On the basis of the analysis in this report, it appears that NATO (and indeed the West more generally) should prioritize two overarching strategic goals:

- To work towards establishing the conditions for a peaceful transformation to a cooperative multi-order world by seeking a working consensus on order-making principles at the global level.
- To work towards strengthening the 'liberal core' of the liberal order by addressing existing internal weaknesses, living up to its own liberal principles, and continuing to encourage those states that share liberal core values to associate themselves with the liberal order.¹⁴

NATO can, of course, only play a limited role in working towards these two overarching goals, but they should nevertheless be regarded as the guiding principles informing NATO policies.

The Wales initiatives can be seen as an important contribution to the second strategic goal. The reassurance and adaptation measures adopted in Wales address longstanding issues within the Alliance, in particular that member states in close proximity to Russia have long seen NATO's increasingly global role as alarming and its 'out-of-area' missions as at best a distraction and at worst as a dangerous drain on resources that ought to be spent on NATO's own territorial defence. However, although the importance of the crisis in Ukraine should not be underestimated, and even though those arguing that Russia could not be trusted were vindicated, the call for the Alliance to 'go back to basics' must be resisted. The problem is that going 'back to basics' assumes a largely unchanged strategic environment and implies a downgrading of NATO's other roles whilst failing to appreciate the importance of the strategic goal of seeking a consensus on order-making at the global level. Focusing exclusively on 'going back to basics' would therefore constitute a major error.

Although the importance of the crisis in Ukraine should not be underestimated, and even though those arguing that Russia could not be trusted were vindicated, the call for the Alliance to 'go back to basics' must be resisted.

Crisis management remains a crucial core task of the Alliance because the transition to a new international order is likely to be accompanied by an increased risk of instability, unrest and armed conflict.¹⁵ However, it is true that, although NATO might have the capabilities for undertaking crisis management operations in the future, the Alliance should consider very carefully whether its involvement is the right way to proceed, or whether other actors may be better suited – possibly with NATO support. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the need for crisis management will lessen in years to come or that the need for NATO to undertake crisis management operations will be significantly reduced. However, crisis management is not just important as a policy tool in a changing strategic environment, it is also an essential element of the second strategic objective – to strengthen the liberal core. Crisis management is increasingly becoming an important part of maintaining Alliance cohesion. This is the case internally amongst the European members, where the recent emphasis on the

threat from the east has prompted the southern members to argue that threats also exists on NATO's southern borders. Moreover, as emphasized in this report, European willingness to contribute to crisis management when called for is NOT an optional extra, but is very much an expectation in return for the continued American commitment to Article Five protection of its European allies.

It would be a strategic error if NATO was to not remain ahead of the game in terms of building partnerships with countries that are thought to be of strategic value to the Alliance.

Finally, the third core task – cooperative security – appears to be almost disappearing, or, as one of those interviewed for this report expressed it, 'to be falling off the wagon'. If this trend were to continue, the West would be depriving itself of a potentially important avenue towards establishing the conditions for a peaceful transformation to a cooperative multi-order world. In a multi-order world, relationships of many different kinds will be required to facilitate cooperation across dividing lines. In addition it is likely that current global multilateral institutional structures will suffer from a decline in legitimacy and efficiency, hence opening up a need for more pragmatic frameworks for meeting collective challenges. In the multi-order world, partnerships and coalitions of the willing based on shared interests in specific policy issues are therefore likely to take on an increasingly important role. In such a situation, it would be a strategic error if NATO was to not remain ahead of the game in terms of building partnerships with countries that are thought to be of strategic value to the Alliance. However, doing so – and doing it in a way that might contribute to the overall strategic goal of ensuring a peaceful transformation to a new international order in which divergence in both power and principle will be key characteristics – will require the Alliance to revisit the issue of partnership and build on the principles established in the 2011 Berlin agreement. At present there is no sign of such a renewed effort to establish new strategic partnerships or to deepen and widen existing ones. Indeed, to establish the political conditions within NATO to return to cooperative security with a renewed emphasis on partnerships may well be the most difficult political challenge facing the Alliance in the short term – yet if it fails to do so, that could well undermine the very foundations of its own existence in the long term.

NOTES

- 1 The group will be referred to as Daesh throughout the report rather than the more common name Islamic State.
- 2 This report is funded by the Danish Ministry of Defense and is based on interviews with policy practitioners in Copenhagen, Brussels and Washington DC, as well as with practitioners from a broad range of other member states with whom the author has engaged at a number of policy conferences and events. However, the views put forward in the report do not reflect any official positions.
- 3 The report is based on interviews held at NATO in September 2014 and 2015, as well as many formal and informal discussions with a number of decision-makers and officials associated with NATO and foreign and defence policy in a large section of member states. Unless otherwise stated, interviews were conducted for background only and on the understanding of anonymity.
- 4 'A Policy address by Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO', German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 28 October 2014. See the presentation at <http://www.gmfus.org/events/policy-address-jens-stoltenberg-secretary-general-nato>
- 5 Apart from NATO's own strategic foresight capacity in the Allied Command Transformation, the capacities for strategic analysis available to the Alliance include the capacity available in some of the member states – especially the larger ones. These include the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), which regularly publishes its Global Trend Reports with a time span of 25 years; and the British Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), which is an in-house think-tank of the UK Ministry of Defence, which publishes the Strategic Trends programme designed to inform UK policy-makers of the opportunities and threats that the future could bring and what impact their choices could have on the future.
- 6 For some of the main documents related to the Multiple Futures Project which ran until 2010, see <http://www.act.nato.int/nato-multiple-futures-project-documents>
- 7 See, for example, Mearsheimer 2014, Kagan 2014.
- 8 Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, Foreign Policy Address at the Council of Foreign Relations, Washington DC, June 15, 2009.
- 9 Lines of communication did, of course, exist, but until the establishment of the 'hotline' following the Cuban missile crisis and the arms control negotiation regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, direct communication between the two 'blocs' was extremely limited in number and scope.
- 10 See the speech by President Obama at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/obama-pledge-military-europe-ukraine-crisis>
- 11 The issue of partnership and the distinctions between the various different categories of partnership have been treated in more detail elsewhere. See T. Flockhart, 2013 and 2014.
- 12 One of the sub-headings in the document refers to 'International Organizations', which clearly is another partner category. However, IOs have not been included in the list here, as it seems that they can themselves be grouped into political, operational and strategic partnerships.
- 13 These two overarching aims were identified in the Transatlantic Academy Report, Liberal Order in a Post-Western World; see Flockhart et al. 2014.
- 14 At a recent ACT workshop on Strategic Foresight Analysis, it was agreed that the risk of armed conflict increases during periods of transition.

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