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When Bad Becomes Good (and Vice Versa): Why Social Exclusion Is Not Based on Difference

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The chapter describes our work on the Subjective Group Dynamics model. The model proposes that whether deviant group members attract positive or negative reactions depends on the implications of their actions or attitudes for the validity of ingroup norms. As differences between ingroups and outgroups become more important, members also become more likely to endorse or reject specific individuals from either group that uphold ingroup norms. Therefore, some "pro-norm" ingroup deviants are likely to be tolerated, whereas other "anti-norm" ingroup deviants are likely to be rejected. The direction, rather than magnitude of deviance drives decisions to exclude or include them. We describe evidence that reactions to deviants serve to sustain social identity of group members and to sustain positive ingroup stereotypes. Developmental evidence suggests that these reactions are a relatively sophisticated form of ingroup bias, which may allow people to include and exclude others apparently as individuals, when in fact the reactions are group-serving.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

*T*he capacity of groups for intolerance is well known (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Traitors are rarely tolerated for long, and vengeance is often brutal. For example, members of criminal organizations such as the mafia have been known to torture and kill ingroup members that violate accepted codes of conduct. Historically, western societies have also been known to marginalize and exclude certain people from partaking in the benefits of being members of the society. Homosexual or homeless people have historically

been marginalized or socially excluded on the basis of their "deviant" social status. However, this capacity for groups to dehumanize and demonize their members (see Leyens, et al., 2001) is only part of the story. In other ways, groups are, and have to be, open to new ideas, new directions, and even the inclusion of outsiders. These qualities permit groups to survive, adapt, and grow (see Caporael & Brewer, 2000; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Moscovici, Mugny, & van Avermaet, 1985). The ideas presented in this chapter derive from a program of research exploring the subjective group dynamics model (Abrams, Marques, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison, & Bown (in press); Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998). We propose that social inclusion or exclusion of individuals within groups is substantially affected by intergroup context and may not depend so much on the objective magnitude or nature of their differences from others within their group. Thus, social inclusion and exclusion are often phenomena that need to be understood in terms of intergroup relations rather than interpersonal relationships or personal characteristics of individuals. This chapter describes some key aspects of the model, and introduces several areas to which it can be applied.

We begin by considering the criteria that group members may use to judge deviants. We propose that the intergroup context shapes the way group norms are perceived and defended, and that the social identity approach to intergroup relations provides a useful way of understanding the reasons for this. We propose that people use judgments and evaluations of individual group members to sustain the prescriptive norms of their ingroup. We describe some of our work on the "black sheep effect" and related patterns, which shows that differences in evaluations of normative and deviant members within groups co-occur with intergroup differentiation. Intragroup differentiation increases when intergroup relationships are more salient, are competitive, and attract higher identification among their members. When people value ingroups over outgroups as a whole they then favor other individuals from either group that endorse the value of the ingroup. We describe some research demonstrating that this more subtle form of ingroup bias follows a developmental sequence, which implies the development of a "theory of group mind" during childhood. The developmental changes provide a sociocognitive basis for the acceptance or rejection of people based on their endorsement of ingroup norms.

Group members are particularly sensitive to the direction in which others deviate, rating antinormative deviance as more atypical than pronormative deviance. Evaluations are not based on extremity or the actual behavior of deviant members, but on the extent to which the deviant helps to validate the ingroup norm relative to other members of the same group. Moreover, the presence of antinormative deviants may provoke efforts to validate the ingroup norm by strengthening, rather than weakening, a positive ingroup stereotype. Therefore, by isolating antinorm deviants from the ingroup, the norms of the group are both clarified and strengthened. Similarly by isolating outgroup

antinorm deviants (i.e., those who endorse ingroup norms) from the outgroup, the distance between groups is sustained while the superiority of the ingroup is supported. Finally, we consider whether, and under what conditions, certain group members, specifically leaders, may be given license to deviate without inviting exclusion from their group members.

DEVIANCE WITHIN GROUPS

For a group to exist, and to be entitative, there must be a perception of unity at some level (see Campbell, 1958; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille (in press). Sherman, Hamilton, and Lewis (1999) proposed that, "members of highly entitative groups will perceive greater differentiation from outgroups and thus show a greater degree of ingroup bias in perceptions and interpretations of events . . . [In addition] . . . entitative ingroups should be seen as having more power to do good things and to achieve positive goals . . . highly entitative groups are more likely to develop clear group norms" (p. 102). It follows that the presence of deviant group members might undermine group entitativity and thus evoke strong reactions from other group members. Moreover, for groups to define and achieve their goals they rely on compliance and co-operation among their members. Dissent or diversity may potentially derail the group's plans and call into question the premises on which it acts. Challenges to the group's ethos may be met with strong criticism and even overt hostility. For example, in the UK, a Labour member of parliament, George Galloway, was excluded from membership of the Labour Party for depicting the war with Iraq as unjust and illegal. A civil servant weapons inspector, David Kelly, was apparently driven to commit suicide after having shared with journalists his doubts about the government's evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

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We follow the classic ideas proposed by Festinger and others in holding that people depend on social consensus to achieve a subjectively valid sense of reality, particularly social reality. When groups show disunity there are counterveiling pressures to sustain consensus (e.g., Asch, 1952; Boyanowsky & Allen, 1973; Festinger, 1950; Hogg & Hains, 1998; Janis, 1982; Levine, 1989; Sherif, 1936). Given that so much may be at stake, psychologically and sometimes materially, it is not surprising that group members tend to conform to group norms and may pressurize other members of the group to do likewise (see Berkowitz & Howard, 1959; Davis & Witte, 1996; Schachter, 1951; Shaw, 1976). In an effort to maintain or support this social reality, deviant people may then be socially excluded from the benefits afforded to nondeviant ingroup members.

In general terms it is likely that members who deviate more extremely are likely to attract more attention from the rest of the group (cf. Mullen, 1991). However, not all dimensions are likely to be equally important to judgments of

group members. For example, a business meeting to discuss the sales pitch for a new product may include a set of people that is diverse in terms of language, culture, nonverbal behavior and political attitudes. However, the group may care little about these variations because none are relevant to the group's goal, which is to sell the product. Diversity within the group may have no bearing on the value of the group's goals—the belief that what the group is doing or stands for is valid and worthwhile and reflects positively on its members.

What factors may influence relevance of deviance for the group? One important factor is the intergroup context. The social identity approach (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) holds that groups and intergroup relationships affect perception and behavior through the process of social categorization. When social identity is salient, category-based features will be attributed to all category members, thereby minimizing individual differences within categories, and maximizing intercategory differences (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) strengthens this idea. SCT considers two aspects of the fit between individuals and social categories, comparative and normative fit (Oakes, 1996; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). According to SCT, perceptions of group members are determined by a metacontrast, which can be approximated mathematically as a ratio of intragroup differences versus intergroup differences (Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This contrast produces abstract prototypes that represent the positions (e.g., on an attitude continuum) that best capture differences between the ingroup and outgroup to the detriment of intracategorical differences.

How do people make sense of a situation in which categorization fits well, but particular individuals differ markedly from their fellow group members? One possibility is that deviants may be overlooked or disregarded under the operation of the metacontrast principle, particularly when the categories are highly salient. Another possibility is that deviants are simply reclassified (e.g., a former ingroup member is now classified as an outgroup member). Alternatively, the presence of the deviant may invoke reassessment of the way all people are classified and may invoke a different dimension for categorization, reflecting a revised intergroup context (see Abrams, 1996, 1999; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997; Turner & Oakes, 1997). These responses would improve the fit between the social categorization in use and the characteristics of the people being categorized (Oakes et al., 1991, 1994). This outcome would be psychologically satisfying to the extent that it would clarify intergroup boundaries (see Hogg, 1993). However, if the existing categorizations are highly meaningful, and deviants are not, or *cannot be*, disregarded or recategorized, it might be inevitable that their presence would alter the clarity of distinctions between the groups. A possible cognitive response could be to assimilate the group prototype toward the position held by the deviant, a

process that would likely depend on the extremity of deviance (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1997). However, in many situations adapting the group norm to take account of a specific group member may be difficult, undesirable, or unwarranted. Thus, the problem for other group members is how to deal with the deviant without imperiling the group's norms.

SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS

The Subjective Group Dynamics model (SGD) Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001) follows social identity theory's tenet that group members wish to ensure that ingroups have higher value than relevant outgroups. It also adopts the presumption from SCT that the categorization process is largely driven by a search for meaning and reduction of uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2000). It follows that people are motivated to ensure the validity of a subjective sense of reality that is defined and shared by the ingroup (Abrams, 1990, 1992; Abrams & Hogg, 1988, 2001; Hogg, 2001a; Marques & Páez, 1994). This certainty is strengthened to the extent that self and ingroup are seen as sharing a common set of norms and values (e.g., Turner, 1991; see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger & Clement, 1996). The SGD model proposes that people generally strive to confirm ingroup reality. To achieve this, group members should resist evidence that weakens the validity of ingroup norms, and accept evidence that confirms those norms. In sum, group members have two related motives; to maximize and sustain positive intergroup distinctiveness whilst also maximizing and sustaining the relative validity of prescriptive ingroup norms. The SGD model holds that these motives are satisfied through parallel and complementary processes of *inter*group differentiation and *intra* group differentiation (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Taboada, 1998).

Ingroup superiority may often be achieved through category differentiation, whereby the ingroup is favored globally over the outgroup (see Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). However, validation of ingroup norms often depends on making distinctions within groups to determine which individual members either reinforce or undermine those norms. The SGD model assumes that judgments of individual group members remain essentially depersonalized, that is, they are framed with reference to group norms and stereotypes. The intergroup and intragroup processes operate in conjunction so that it becomes possible, rather than paradoxical, that group members favor the ingroup over the outgroup as a whole, while also preferring particular outgroup members over particular ingroup members.

Bases for Differentiation—Descriptive and Prescriptive

To develop this idea, Marques, Abrams et al. (1998) distinguished between denotative and prescriptive norms. Denotative norms provide the descriptive

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criteria for categorization and are thus relevant to the metacontrast principle, based on comparative and normative fit, as defined in SCT. Denotative norms are perceived as essential for, inherent in, or entirely indicative of category membership. For example, physical appearance provides clear sets of attributes associated with, and largely diagnostic of, race. Ingroup bias may result from a category membership inference that is based on denotative characteristics alone. In many instances, category membership is likely to be perceived as inextricably linked to denotative norms, such that category ascriptions can be made immediately from a person's adherence to these norms. It seems likely that denotative norms are often applied nonconsciously or at least relatively unreflectively. However, people may devote conscious attention to denotative norms when there is a high degree of initial ambiguity regarding category memberships (e.g., Abrams, 1990, 1996; Abrams & Brown, 1989; Abrams & Masser, 1998), when it is important to ensure that no outgroup members are categorized as ingroup members (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), when perceivers are prejudiced (Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997), when they need to preserve cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), or when they want to avoid expressing prejudice (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 1998). Norms that denote category membership may be strongly associated with judgments, but they are not the sole basis for evaluation of ingroup and outgroup members.

The SGD model holds that group members are vigilant about deviation from norms that are prescriptive of values, attitudes, and behavior for their own and other groups. Whereas denotative norms are indicative of group membership, prescriptive norms relate to the validity of the group's social standing. A simple illustration of the denotative/prescriptive distinction may clarify this point. Soccer teams sometimes have to wear different colored outfits, depending on the colors of the home team. The fans need to know how the colors indicate the membership of the team, and ingroup bias is determined by the category membership denoted by those colors rather than the colors themselves. In contrast, ingroup prescriptive norms are that fans should cheer when their team performs well. Upholding consensus for prescriptive ingroup norms provides a way of ensuring that the positive evaluation of the ingroup is subjectively valid (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; McGarty, 1999).

Ingroup and outgroup norms differ in many situations (e.g., in the Champion's League, English people should support Manchester United, Spanish people should support Real Madrid). However, there are also norms and standards which are not oppositional, but which are still very important for ingroup members (see Forsyth, 1990). For example, ingroups may desire to embody generic societal, cultural or moral norms to a greater extent than outgroups (e.g., to be law abiding, to work hard, to be loyal, to be attractive, etc.). This line of reasoning is compatible with evidence that people are liable

to project their ingroup attributes more than outgroup attributes onto superordinate groups (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). It is also consistent with research showing that the ingroup is usually accorded a more human essence than outgroups (Leyens et al., 2001). Group members' aspiration that the ingroup has superior standing on these generically valued attributes requires some validation—instances that confirm such perceptions. In sum, both oppositional and generic norms can take on a *prescriptive* character.

Inclusive and exclusive reactions to particular group members will depend on whether they appear to be an ingroup or outgroup member *and* whether their behavior undermines or validates the ingroup prescriptive norm. Evaluations of group members may also depend on backward processing (see Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001), a form of counterfactual thinking that occurs when observed events run counter to expectations (Miller & Prentice, 1996). In these situations, people generate a specific frame of reference that accounts for the counterintuitive event, and they construct, online, a standard of comparison relevant to that particular context (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Deviants violate normative expectancies, and this makes prescriptive norms highly salient as standards against which to judge ingroup and outgroup behavior. These judgments reflect the evaluative consequences of group members' characteristics and behavior for the ingroup and hence for the social self. Ingroup members attend to prescriptive norms so as to ensure consensus on criteria for positive ingroup evaluation. The value of ingroup consensus is often made all the more real when a member breaks ranks or deviates from the group norms (e.g., Holtz & Miller, 1985; Miller, Gross, & Holtz, 1991). Salient variations from prescriptive norms are therefore very likely to induce active regulation of the subjective image of the group. Specifically, because group members are motivated to preserve the subjective validity of their group's norms, they will wish to correct or remove challenges to that norm within the group, and to gather evidence from outside the group to bolster the ingroup norm.

A relatively untested aspect of the SGD model is based on Abrams (1990, 1994, 1996, 1999) Social Self-Regulation (SSR) model. This holds that specific goals or standards for group members can be determined by several variables, including the nature of the intergroup context (e.g., competitive vs. co-operative intergroup relations), group members' motivation to sustain a positive identity, their skills and ability to enact certain behaviors, and anticipated responses from a potential audience. Nonadherence to a group goal may occur either because of failure to regulate action or because of disruption. In either case, if group membership remains important, members are likely to engage in corrective action that diverges from routine forms of intergroup differentiation and intragroup conformity (e.g., diverges from a simple rule of favoring ingroup members over outgroup members).

There is a variety of direct and indirect evidence that self-regulation processes can be engaged to influence intergroup and intragroup behavior

(e.g., Abrams, 1985; Abrams & Brown, 1989; Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Monteith, et al., 1998; Plant & Devine, 1998; see also Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Spears, 2001). We believe that social self-regulation processes underpin reactions to ingroup and outgroup deviance because maintenance of ingroup standards is a means of validating the standards that are used to regulate the self. Therefore, when social identity is salient or important, one aspect of group members' self-regulation is the regulation of the *group's* adherence to group standards. The presence of a deviant group member indicates that a group is failing to sustain its norms and values. This is likely to require group members to stop and think, to select actions consciously and strategically, so as to sustain the ingroup norm. Specifically, evaluations of such deviants should depend on whether the deviant's behavior provides a source of validation for ingroup norms, either directly or by undermining outgroup norms in relative terms.

Evidence: Responses to Ingroup and Outgroup Deviance

People tend to evaluatively upgrade attractive ingroup members and downgrade unattractive ingroup members, as compared to analogous outgroup members (for a review, see Marques & Páez, 1994). This phenomenon has been labeled the "black sheep effect" (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). The black sheep effect occurs even when individuals show a strong overall preference for the ingroup (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992), and the effect is larger when individuals identify with the ingroup (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Hutchison, Abrams, & Viki, 2002). It arises either when perceivers judge members singly (Marques et al., 1988), or when they directly compare normative and deviant members from the same group, or two members from different groups (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). The black sheep effect emerges when differences between group members are relevant to the maintenance of positive ingroup valence or to intergroup distinctiveness. The effect represents one manifestation of the operation of subjective group dynamics. Similar patterns of evaluation occur when group members deviate in terms of their attitudes rather than their attractiveness or likeability (for reviews, see Abrams et al., in press; Marques, Abrams et al., 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994). Moreover, the effects are magnified when the ingroup's status is threatened or insecure (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; see also Christian, Hutchison, & Abrams, 2003).

Negative evaluations of deviant group members should not be taken to imply that the group members would always want to evict the deviant from the group. Different methods may be used to sustain ingroup norms. For example, Marques et al. (2001, Experiment 1) found that when the ingroup norm was undermined, participants reported higher willingness to persuade deviant targets to change their opinion in a forthcoming discussion. In Experiment 2, the

black sheep effect emerged most clearly when the ingroup lacked normative uniformity. Once again participants were most willing to influence deviant individuals to change their opinion when the ingroup norm was potentially undermined by low ingroup uniformity. The Marques et al. (2001) studies illustrate that norm-reinforcing responses may not only take the form of derogatory judgments but also willingness to reintegrate deviants. Norm reinforcement emerges more strongly when the validity of a relevant ingroup norm is endangered by lack of perceived ingroup consensus. In addition, the studies showed that norm-reinforcing responses emerge primarily where deviants are deemed to be ingroup members, rather than in interpersonal or in outgroup settings.

The Relationship Between Intergroup and Intragroup Differentiation and Social Identity

According to the SGD model, phenomena such as the black sheep effect result from people's desire to sustain valued differences between groups. Therefore, differentiation between categories as a whole should be accompanied, and validated by prescriptive norm differentiation among members within groups. In a series of studies, Marques, Abrams, et al. (1998) showed that differentiation between and within groups may both arise in the same situation. A minimal (bogus) criterion was used to assign participants to different social categories (e.g., "X" and "Y"). They were informed of the norms associated with each category and were asked to evaluate the groups as a whole, and four "normative" members and one deviant member from either the ingroup or the outgroup. Participants judged the ingroup as a whole more favorably than the outgroup (denotative norm differentiation), and they *also* upgraded members whose responses were closer to the ingroup norm and derogated members whose responses were opposed to this norm, irrespective of whether these were ingroup or outgroup members (prescriptive norm differentiation). In subsequent experiments we found this pattern was more extreme when the prescriptive norm was made more salient, and when participants felt accountable to ingroup rather than outgroup members. Finally, we found that evaluations of group members was related to participants' identification with the ingroup. Those who initially identified more strongly with the ingroup favored individuals from *either* group who provided relatively greater support for the ingroup norm. In turn, those who engaged in more prescriptive norm differentiation subsequently showed greater increases in identification. Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the idea that people selectively evaluate members within groups in a way that sustains their ingroup norm and their social identity.

The Development of Subjective Group Dynamics—A Theory of Group Mind?

Previously, we have argued that the motivation to favor the ingroup over the outgroup also motivates the upgrading of normative relative to deviant ingroup members. However, the latter phenomenon seems likely to

require a more sophisticated understanding of intergroup relationships. Before people can make distinctions among group members they need to understand the relevant criteria for judgment. In turn, this involves an appreciation of the consensual value of prescriptive norms that uphold the ingroup's validity. Intragroup differentiation involves distinguishing among group members in terms of their adherence to group-related attributes. It is not simply a matter of treating each group member as an individual.

One way to investigate the idea that subjective group dynamics are a sophisticated aspect of intergroup bias is to examine intergroup and intragroup judgments made by children of different ages. Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, and Marques (2003) conducted a study in the context of a summer play scheme for children. Children attending these schemes were drawn from a range of different schools, and thus were effectively in a new ad-hoc group, much like the children in the summer camp studies conducted by Sherif (e.g., Sherif & Sherif, 1953). We used the fact that a number of different schemes operated in the region to present children aged 6–7 years or 10–11 years with statements that were ostensibly made by ingroup members or by outgroup members. The children were first asked to evaluate the ingroup and outgroup as a whole. Children of all ages expressed significant levels of global bias in favor of their own play scheme. Next, children were presented with the statements. Two group members made normative statements, which simply involved praising the play scheme that they attended. A third group member was a deviant who praised their own play scheme but also praised the other play scheme. Manipulation checks established that children of all ages did perceive the normative targets to be typical and the deviant to be less typical of the group. Younger children favored ingroup targets over outgroup, but did not differentiate significantly between normative and deviant targets. In contrast, older children favored the normative ingroup target over the deviant ingroup target, and favored the deviant outgroup target over the normative outgroup target. Thus, only the older children displayed the pattern we expect when subjective group dynamics are operating. Of equal importance was that evaluative differentiation among the targets was significantly related to ingroup bias.

A further test of the development of subjective group dynamics was conducted by Abrams, Rutland and Cameron (2003). In that study, nearly 500 children aged between 5 and 12 years were presented with statements made by supporters of their own (England) or an outgroup (Germany) soccer team during the World Cup Soccer championships in 2002. As in the play scheme study, children of all ages showed significant global intergroup bias, but intragroup differentiation increased significantly with age, as did the relationship between intragroup bias and intergroup bias. Moreover, in the soccer study we measured group identification. It emerged that identification became more strongly related to intragroup differentiation with age. Finally, both of these studies revealed a further link in the chain between intergroup and intragroup

FIGURE 8.1   Development of subjective group dynamics in children

Note: All arrows depict significant relationships between variables in results from studies involving children aged 6–7 and 10–11 (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003) and aged 5–12 (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). Broken lines depict paths that are mediated significantly by differential inclusions.

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processes. The extent to which children favored ingroup normative members over deviant members, and the reverse pattern for outgroup members, was associated with the extent to which they recognized how acceptable each target would be to other ingroup and outgroup members (measured on an index we called differential inclusion). As shown in Figure 8.1, we found that differential inclusion mediated the effects of age on differential evaluation of the group members. In summary, the development of subjective group dynamics appears to be contingent on a developing understanding of how group dynamics operate in an intergroup context. We conjecture that this development is akin to the emergence of a "theory of mind" (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987; Perner, Ruffman & Leekam, 1994) but at the group level—a "theory of group mind." We are currently investigating whether this is associated with cognitive and social perspective taking abilities, and whether it is limited to particular types of group membership.

These two developmental studies challenge conventional ideas that older children's increasing cognitive sophistication leads them away from strong or blatant intergroup biases (see Aboud, 1988). Instead, we find that older children become more discerning about who, within both the ingroup and the outgroup, should be evaluated highly. Rather than showing a simple blanket prejudice in favor of the ingroup, they endorse individuals whose attitudes provide relative validation of the ingroup's positive status or position. Second, these studies suggest that whereas global intergroup bias may be a relatively basic response to salient social categorization, the linkage of intergroup bias to intragroup bias is a more subtle, and perhaps more powerful, aspect of the way group members sustain their own group's advantages. By reserving criticism for deviant ingroup

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members, and allowing praise for deviant outgroup members who implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the ingroup's value, it is possible to avoid censure for being biased against members of the outgroup, while bolstering the ingroup's position. Thus the social control of group members may operate through the potential sanctions that are in place if they undermine prescriptive ingroup norms. The targets of these sanctions are likely to vary depending on the relative vulnerability of ingroup norms at particular times. Thus, although individual children may be victimized or rejected by others, it may well be that the locus of these forms of rejection is the norm, not the person. As a result, resolutions to problems such as bullying and victimization in school may reside at least as much in understanding the intergroup context and group norms as in the particular behavior of specific individual victims or perpetrators.

Deviant Derogation as Stereotype Maintenance   The research presented so far shows that reactions to deviant ingroup members serve as an identity maintenance function. Those members whose behavior or characteristics present the greatest threat to the integrity or value of the ingroup consistently attract the most negative and extreme evaluations (see also Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), and invite efforts to change their position. Hutchison and Abrams (2003) suggested that the reactions to undesirable ingroup members might function in other ways to protect the ingroup stereotype (see also Marques & Páez, 1994). Hutchison and Abrams (2003) examined the impact of a clearly undesirable ingroup member on participants' perceptions of their groups. Psychology students who differed in their level of ingroup identification rated "psychologists" on a series of pretested positive and negative stereotypical characteristics before and after reading information about a desirable (e.g., competent, ethical) or undesirable (e.g., incompetent, unethical) psychologist. In line with previous findings, high identifiers were more positive than low identifiers in their evaluation of a desirable ingroup member but were more negative than low identifiers in their evaluation of an undesirable ingroup member (see also Branscombe et al., 1993). Moreover, high identifiers expressed a more positive ingroup stereotype after, compared to before, reading about an undesirable ingroup member. They also expressed a more positive ingroup stereotype than high identifiers who read about a desirable ingroup member. In contrast, low identifiers' stereotypes were relatively unaffected by the target manipulation. This pattern of intragroup evaluations is consistent with Marques and Páez's (1994) suggestion that in derogating undesirable ingroup members, people would attempt to protect the ingroup stereotype by separating the good representatives from the "black sheep". Further support for this conjecture is provided by recent research showing that, relative to low identifiers, high identifiers tend to perceive undesirable exemplars as less typical of the ingroup (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002a), are more concerned with erroneously including outgroup members in the ingroup

(Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002b), and will expend more cognitive resources to psychologically exclude undesirable members from the ingroup (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, & Leemans, 2001).

A second study (Hutchison, 2003) examined effects of identification with the ingroup on university students' reactions to a positive or negative ingroup member. Participants first read a series of statements supposedly made by a target student who expressed either a positive (i.e., friendly, welcoming) or negative (i.e., unfriendly, hostile) attitude toward other students at the same university. They evaluated the target and rated the impact of the target on the image of the group. They then rated the group on a series of positive and negative stereotypical attributes. Relative to low identifiers, high identifiers were more positive in their evaluation of a desirable ingroup member, but were more negative in their evaluation of an undesirable ingroup member. Moreover, relative to low identifiers, high identifiers believed that the image conveyed by the desirable target was more positive for the image of the ingroup, but that the image conveyed by the undesirable target was more negative for the image of the ingroup. A control condition was included to examine the stereotype of the group when no target information was provided. Low identifiers' stereotypes were relatively unaffected by the target manipulation. However, higher identifiers who read about a negative group member estimated that fewer students had negative stereotypical characteristics and more had positive characteristics than those who read about a positive group member, as shown in Figure 8.2.

These findings show that the presence of deviant ingroup members provokes reactions with contrasting valence at the intragroup and intergroup levels. Among people who identify highly with the group, an individual deviant ingroup member is more strongly derogated and is perceived to convey a negative image of the group, while at the same time the positive stereotype of the group becomes reinforced or bolstered. Thus, it seems that deviants serve as exemplars from which the group norm can be contrasted, consistent with the idea of backward processing, described above.

Pro-Norm and Anti-Norm Deviance   Much of the research described above concerned judgments of ingroup and outgroup deviants who were different from the norms of both groups. However, it did not address the specific questions of whether evaluative differentiation between normative and deviant members reflects either the magnitude and/or the particular direction, of deviance. In common with social identity and self-categorization theories, the SGD model assumes that groups have normative *direction*. It may be difficult for group members to know the precise normative position for their group, but they may be relatively sure about the directions in which their group's norms differ from those of relevant other groups. It follows that deviation may be judged in terms of its perceived departure from the group's normative direction rather than objective or absolute differences from the norm.

Negative Characteristics

Positive Characteristics

FIGURE 8.2   Negative and positive stereotyping of the ingroup following exposure to a desirable, undesirable or no ingroup target

In an intergroup context, members who deviate towards the opposing group (who we label "anti-norm" deviants) should be perceived as more atypical than those who deviate away from the opposing group (who we label "pro-norm" deviants, see Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000), because anti-norm deviants pose a greater contrast with the normative direction of the group. Anti-norm deviants may sometimes be members who adopt positions that are broadly moderate, and pro-norm deviants may sometimes be extremists or

fanatics when judged in a wider context (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Onorato, 1995). However, this will not always be true, and must depend upon the wider context. For example, members of the UK Labour Party who strongly support joining the Euro currency (a pro-norm position in line with the direction of Labour Party policy) would clearly not be judged as extremists by members of countries that have already joined. According to the SGD model, deviance that potentially undermines ingroup norms is highly likely to attract hostile reactions. Conversely, if objective deviance potentially validates ingroup norms, it is likely to attract positive evaluations. For this reason group members may be tolerant, or even approving, of deviants whose differences from other group members mean they can contribute positively to the subjective validity of the group norm. To investigate this possibility we extended our research paradigm to distinguish the two types of deviance. The normative direction taken by anti-norm deviance *undermines* or rejects the group's position, and may imply relative validation of the norms of opposing groups. The direction taken by pro-norm deviance, in contrast, *validates* and supports the group's aims or ethos and may enhance its distinctiveness relative to opposing outgroups (Abrams et al., 2000). Two studies examined reactions to anti- and pro-norm deviants and normative members when intergroup context was implicit. A further two studies examined reactions when the intergroup context was made more explicit.

Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 1) asked teenage participants to evaluate people from their own gender group who were ostensibly being considered for promotion in an organization. Candidates were depicted as all being very similar in levels of competence, intelligence, politeness, and other features. One candidate was much more feminine, and another was much more masculine than the remaining (normative) candidates. The magnitude of deviation from the norm was objectively equivalent for both the highly feminine and the highly masculine candidate, and these differences were subsequently reported accurately by participants. Participants regarded themselves as significantly more similar to the normative candidates than to either of the deviant candidates. However, despite the objective equivalence in the magnitude of deviance by the anti- and pro-norm candidates, participants rated the pro-norm target as having more in common with the group. The normative candidates were rated as more attractive than the pro-norm and anti-norm candidates, but the pro-norm candidate was also rated as more attractive than the anti-norm candidate. Thus, although pro-norm deviants were disliked, they were tolerated more than anti-norm deviants, consistent with the idea that ingroup pro-norm deviants were less undermining of ingroup norms.

A further study (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 2002, Experiment 1), examined reactions to deviance in a commercial banking organization. Employees in a major UK offshore bank read descriptions of behavior by other ingroup workers. All participants read about a normative worker. Half the

participants also read about an anti-norm deviant who was critical of the organization, refused to do overtime work, and so forth. The other participants read about a pro-norm deviant who was obsessed with supporting the organization, and chose to work additional hours, recruit new members, and so forth. As in Abrams et al.'s (2000) Experiment 1, evaluations of the anti-norm deviant were significantly more negative than those of the pro-norm deviant, even though they were both perceived as being equally different from the ingroup norm. Moreover, more negative evaluations of deviants were significantly associated with prior identification with the organization. Taken together, Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 1) and Abrams et al. (2002, Experiment 1) suggest that when distinguishing among ingroup members, people are equally able to detect the magnitude of pro-norm and anti-norm deviance, but they reserve their most negative evaluative reactions for anti-norm deviants.

Turning to an explicitly intergroup context, Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 2) focused on British psychology students' attitudes about the number of asylum seekers that should be allowed entry to Britain each year. Participants read the results of national surveys that ostensibly had been conducted among psychology students or customs and immigration officers. They were informed (accurately) that psychology students wanted no change in the percentage of asylum seekers allowed to remain in Britain, but that immigration officers advocated a reduction in the numbers granted asylum by 30%. Participants then viewed responses to several of the survey items by six respondents, ostensibly either from a Psychology Survey or from a Customs Officers Survey. Four target group members were normative in their opinions, one was pronormative and the other was antinormative. Across conditions and types of deviant the mathematical difference between normative and deviant targets was kept constant. Moreover, the anti-norm target in the ingroup and outgroup conditions actually expressed an identical attitude (i.e., that there should be a 15% reduction in the numbers of asylum seekers allowed to remain in Britain).

As in our previous studies, participants were accurate when asked to report the actual opinion position espoused by each target member. However, unlike the results from the implicit intergroup context studies, pro-norm deviants were judged to be equally typical of their group as the four normative members. Only the anti-norm members were viewed as being atypical. This suggests that judgments of typicality were made with reference to how much the target helps to validate prescriptive norms, and not with reference to statistical typicality. In the intergroup context of the study it seems reasonable to suppose that typicality judgments reflected *prototypicality* as defined by the metacontrast ratio in SCT (e.g., Haslam, et al., 1995). In line with the typicality ratings, evaluations of ingroup normative members and ingroup pro-norm deviants were more positive than evaluations of ingroup anti-norm deviants. The reverse pattern was obtained for outgroup targets (see Figure 8.3). Indeed, the outgroup anti-norm deviant was evaluated more positively than the ingroup

FIGURE 8.3 Favorability to pro-norm, normative, and anti-norm group members as a function of group membership

Source: Abrams, Marques et al. (2000, Experiment 2).

anti-norm deviant, even though both targets expressed identical attitudes. Finally, the more that participants identified with the ingroup the more strongly they favored deviants that validated, as compared with deviants that undermined, the ingroup norm, regardless of whether the deviants were members of the ingroup or the outgroup.

Abrams et al. (2002, Experiment 2) conducted an analogous study in the context of the University of Kent's policy for admission of students from outside Europe ("Overseas Students"). British universities charge a higher level of tuition fees to students from outside Europe, but accordingly they try to provide some advantages for these students, including privileged access to accommodation on campus and related schemes. Pilot studies confirmed that both groups of students did not object to the status quo. However, the normative direction among overseas students was that further privileges would be justified. The normative direction among British students was that a reduction in privileges for Overseas students would be appropriate. Participants were then presented with statements, ostensibly taken from the pilot study, made by three targets from each group about University policy for future cohorts of Overseas students. From each group one target expressed the normative opinion for the group, one expressed an anti-norm position and the other expressed a pro-norm position. In fact, the anti-norm ingroup target and a pro-norm outgroup target expressed identical attitudes (more privileges for future members of the outgroup), that were equally divergent from the current norm (maintain the status quo). Conversely, the pro-norm ingroup and the anti-norm outgroup

targets also expressed identical attitudes (fewer privileges for future members of the outgroup).

Consistent with Abrams et al. (2000, Experiment 2) anti-norm deviants were rated as significantly more atypical than normative members and pro-norm members. Typicality ratings of normative and pro-norm members did not differ. Thus, despite potentially strong demand characteristics to distinguish among all six targets on a single continuum, perceived typicality followed a principle of *relative* normativeness, or prototypicality, independent of the actual attitude position expressed and independent of objective similarities among targets. This is consistent with the idea that typicality judgments are attributable to prototypicality defined in the intergroup context, and not to absolute differences among targets or to whether the positions adopted by the target are ingroup validating per se.

The pattern of evaluations was also consistent with that found by Abrams et al.'s (2000) Experiment 2. The pro-norm ingroup deviant was evaluated more positively than the normative member, and both were evaluated more positively than the anti-norm deviant. The reverse pattern was obtained for outgroup targets; evaluations of the pro-norm ingroup and anti-norm outgroup deviant were equally positive. Moreover, differential evaluations of the pro- and anti-norm deviants were strongly associated with the extent to which participants rated the two types of deviants as differing in typicality.

Across the Abrams et al. (2000, 2002) studies the evidence converges to show that as group membership becomes more salient (i.e., as the context becomes more explicitly intergroup), people may engage in more intragroup differentiation in terms of prescriptive norms. Anti-norm deviants are judged to be more atypical of their group than equally divergent pro-norm deviants. For ingroup targets, anti-norm deviants are evaluated very negatively, but pro-norm deviants are often evaluated similarly to normative members (in an intragroup setting) or even more favorably than normative members (in an intergroup setting). Evaluations of particular group members reflect the extent to which they help to validate rather than undermine the normative direction of the group, and hence sustain social identity. In line with this, differential evaluations in favor of ingroup validating targets within the ingroup and the outgroup are associated with higher group identification. An interesting question concerns the conditions under which ingroup anti-norm deviants are likely to be ousted by group members, or indeed whether outgroup deviants might be invited to join the ingroup.

Deviant Leadership   A further direction of our research has been to examine the moderating effects of the intragroup context on evaluations of group members. We have used the leadership role as one variant of the intragroup context and we have examined how deviant group members are evaluated when members hold a leadership position compared to when they do not.

This work also draws upon social identity research on leadership and normative prototypicality (e.g., Haslam, 2001; Hogg, 2001b). Although it is arguable that leaders cannot be socially excluded, it is still a possibility. For exmple, the recent changes in Iraq clearly indicate that a person who is a leader in one inter-group context (e.g., Saddam Hussein during the war), can be viewed as a deviant and be socially excluded in another context (e.g., Saddam Hussein after the war). Thus, the focus on group leaders further emphasises our argument that social exclusion or inclusion is not just based on the characteristics of the individual but rather on the inter-group context in which these characteristics are manifested.

Hogg (2001b) argues that the most prototypical group member will gener-ally emerge as group leader. For example, Hogg, Hains, and Mason (1998) found that participants selected leaders who they perceived to be significantly more prototypical than other group members. It also seems that the link between normative prototypicality and leadership emergence is enhanced when prototypes are internalized to the self-concept (social identity). For example, Hains, Hogg, and Duck (1997) found that participants who identified highly with their ingroup rated a (randomly assigned) leader as more effective when they had been previously informed that the leader was prototypical of their ingroup. Overall, we interpret Hogg's (2001b) social identity theory of leadership as holding that leadership accrues from prototypicality. Thus, the prototypical member is both the most included (psychologically) and the one who is most desired as leader.

Other research suggests an alternative (or additional) process may be oper-ating with group leaders, whereby leadership confers prototypicality. For example, Fielding and Hogg (1997) found that the longer a group member held the leadership position the more prototypical they were perceived to be. It seems reasonable to suppose that the presence of a leader may increase the sense that the group has purpose, direction, and perhaps entitativity. Not only are leaders likely to be perceived as more prototypical than other members, it is also possible that they establish a focal point that makes the group prototype concrete, and this may support the subjective reality of the group. For exam-ple, Randsley de Moura and Abrams (2001a) found that the presence of a nor-mative leader increased the perceived entitativity of the group.

Leaders may also be given scope to deviate from group norms and to rede-fine the goals or values of their group (see Hollander, 1958). Haslam and his colleagues examined reactions to non-prototypical group leaders (e.g., Haslam & Platow, 2001; Haslam et al., 2001). For example, Haslam et al. (2001) suggested that perceived leader charisma may depend on whether a leader affirms ingroup identity. They conducted a study examining whether the leader role may attract increased perceived charisma if the organization's outcomes show a positive turnaround rather than a decline. They found that the leader was perceived as more charismatic when their prior behavior had been even-handed

or identity affirming, rather than identity negating. Furthermore, even-handed leaders were perceived as more charismatic following a positive turnaround, and identity-affirming behavior protected leaders from negative reactions following a decline.

In Haslam and Platow's (2001) study participants viewed a video recording of an ingroup student leader discussing a decision to nominate union board members for a prize. The leadership manipulation was devised so that in the discussion the leader either appeared to be "identity-affirming" (ingroup favoring), "even-handed", or "identity negating" (outgroup favoring) in their nominations. While the leader was judged to be the fairest in the even-handed condition, the support of the leader was greatest when they were ingroup favoring.

Platow and van Knippenberg (2001) varied the prototypicality and behavior of ingroup leaders and found similar results regarding non-prototypical leaders. To manipulate leader prototypicality, participants viewed information demonstrating two overlapping distributions for the ingroup and the outgroup. They were then informed about a leader who was in the centre of the ingroup's distribution ("normative"), or a leader in the tail away from the outgroup's distribution ("outlier"), or in the tail towards the outgroup norm ("outgroup bordering"). To manipulate leader behavior, participants were informed about the leader's allocation of a mix of enjoyable and boring tasks to an anonymous ingroup member and to an anonymous outgroup member. Based on SCT it was predicted that non-prototypical leaders would need to demonstrate ingroup favoring behavior to secure endorsement. Results confirmed that endorsement for the outgroup bordering (anti-norm deviant) leader was high when that leader demonstrated ingroup favoritism but significantly lower when the leader demonstrated outgroup favoritism.

The research into leadership and prototypicality suggests that non-prototypical group leaders are particularly interesting because of the conflict they create between their group norm and their own opinion/preference. These leaders often face difficult decisions and are likely to be vulnerable to criticism from other group members. Based on the SGD model, several interesting research questions arise from the research outlined above. For example, we wondered whether the pattern of evaluations and reactions to non-prototypical leaders has anything to do with leadership at all. In the studies outlined above (Haslam et al., 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001), the targets were already labeled as leaders. No comparable non-leaders were presented. Moreover, all targets were ingroup members. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether the effects of prototypicality were unique to the leadership role and/or unique to ingroup judgments. Using the SGD model as a theoretical framework, we directly tested the question of whether non-prototypical group leaders are evaluated differently from non-prototypical group members who are not group leaders.

FIGURE 8.4   Favorability Ratings of Ingroup Targets as a Function of Leadership

Source: Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2001b.

Randsley de Moura and Abrams (2001b) used the asylum attitudes paradigm from Abrams et al. (2000), in which participants viewed pro-norm, normative and anti-norm targets from either the ingroup or the outgroup. Participants were either told that the anti-norm target was the leader of the group, or participants were told that there was a leader but not which member it was. When an ingroup anti-norm deviant was specified as the leader, we found greater intragroup differentiation between targets than when no leader was specified. Specifically, as shown in Figure 8.4, the ingroup anti-norm target was downgraded and the ingroup pro-norm target was upgraded relative to the control condition. This evidence suggests that current leaders who undermine group norms are likely to attract strongly negative reactions from group members, as compared with reactions to similarly deviant nonleaders. That is, having broken ranks with the group, leaders may be just as vulnerable to rejection as other deviant members.

We were also interested in whether prospective anti-norm leaders might be afforded greater leeway to define the group norm in relation to future activities, perhaps because they are judged to be more prototypical than similarly anti-norm nonleaders. Accordingly, Randsley de Moura and Abrams (2002a) used the asylum paradigm again, and manipulated leadership by telling participants either that the anti-norm target had been selected to be a future leader or merely that one of the targets would be a leader, without specifying which

one. We found that future leadership in the hands of an anti-norm target reduced the participants' ratings of typicality for pro-norm targets. We also found that anti-norm targets were perceived more favorably when they were specified as leaders compared to when they were not. This seems consistent with the conferral hypothesis, suggesting that being a *future* leader may offset potential criticism of anti-norm targets (Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2002a; 2002b; 2003). This raises interesting questions about the capacity of leaders to shape and shift group norms rather than being at the mercy of social control processes typically associated with subjective group dynamics. For example, the recent history of successive leadership battles in the Conservative Party in Britain suggests that leaders are often elected with a mandate to set a "new" agenda or manifesto, but tolerance for new leaders may not be sustained if they fail to reflect the norms of the group (e.g., strong Euro-scepticism, traditional values). In such a situation, the leaders may be ejected from their positions of power and excluded from the leadership group while they languish on the backbenches of parliament.

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CONCLUSIONS

The SGD model holds important implications for the management of deviance and diversity within society. People who are rejected by groups are not necessarily their most deviant members in objective terms. Quite extreme forms of (pro-norm) deviance may be tolerated by groups, and may be regarded as relatively normal. This may hold the key to phenomena such as group extremity shifts, groupthink, and polarization (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Janis, 1982; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989), whereby a group's norms may become increasingly extreme under the influence of pro-norm deviants. As groups become more extreme, their "moderate" (i.e., anti-norm) members may lose the ear of the group, be vilified and either conform or be rejected. Thus, for all kinds of group decisions it may be that voices of reason—those who countenance the views of outgroups, for example, may be disregarded, coerced into conformity, and seen as vindicating the group's norm. These phenomena suggest that policy makers who are concerned with issues of social exclusion should consider the situation in not just terms of the "victim" and the excluders, but also the intergroup context. A consideration of subjective group dynamics processes could be useful in contexts such as school, organizations with multiple teams, the management of sports fans, and those working to establish communities that include diverse groups. Under some circumstances, despite apparently tolerant attitudes towards particular outgroup individuals, forcing groups together may result in a hardening of intergroup norm differences, and a resistance to change rather than integration and tolerance.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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