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Text and Event in Early Modern Europe (TEEME)
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Ph.D. thesis

**The End of the Anglo-Spanish Match in Global Context,
1617-1624**

Valentina Caldari

Supervisors:
Prof. Kenneth Fincham (University of Kent)
Prof. Fátima Vieira (University of Porto)

2015

For as things now stand throughout the whole worlde, there is no place so remote, but that the consideration thereof is mediately or immediately of consequence to our affaires heere.

Archbishop Abbot to Sir Thomas Roe, 20 January 1617

With the Spanish his Majesty exchanges good correspondence, and it would be even better if the marriage was successfully concluded; very often, however, frictions arise because English vessels flow to the Indies to plunder.

Pietro Contarini, *Relazione* to the Doge and the Senate, 1618

True it is, that the Spaniards cannot endure that the English nation should look upon any part of America, being above a fourth part of the whole world; and the hundredth part neither possessed by the Spaniards, nor to them known.

Sir Walter Raleigh, *Apology*, 1618

A Protestant is hee that fain would take / occasion from the East or West to shake / our league with the Vnited Provinces / to which end hee hath many faire pretences.

[Thomas Scott], *The Interpreter*, 1622

Before going further in the conclusion of this business [the Anglo-Spanish Match], the point concerning the East Indies is very important. By solving it, great strength will benefit the marriage. If not solved, we cannot grant a dowry of two millions.

Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623

Abstract

A marriage between the English Prince and the Spanish Infanta was deemed desirable following the signing of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty in London in 1604. After several years of tortuous negotiations, the match failed in 1624 and England declared war on Spain the following year. This thesis addresses the end of the Anglo-Spanish Match negotiations in the period 1617-1624 by placing reasons for its failure in the global context of European diplomacy and dynastic politics in the early seventeenth century. Traditional historiography has considered the failure of the marriage diplomacy as the inevitable consequence of religious differences and cultural misunderstandings between England and Spain. Consequently, scholars have only looked within Europe when investigating the end of the union. My research, however, depicts a more composite picture not only by expanding the geographical boundaries of the investigation but also by demonstrating the extent to which new imperial rivalries played a much greater role in the marriage diplomacy than has previously been recognised. In the first chapter, I discuss the notion of reason of state in the relationship between England and Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth century and I investigate the way in which the choice politically and/or economically most favourable was often taken regardless of religious considerations and increasingly in response to extra-European concerns. The body of the thesis is then dedicated to a few episodes when the imperial rivalry between England and the Iberian Peninsula influenced the end of the negotiations. In the second chapter, I look at Walter Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana and the actions of the Spanish ambassador in London, Count of Gondomar, who asked that Raleigh should receive an exemplary punishment in order to maintain the marriage agreement after the English explorer had attacked Spanish settlements. In the following chapter, I move towards the East and analyse the taking of the Portuguese port of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf by the English East India Company in 1622. In doing so, I outline the complex dynamics underlying the union of the Iberian crowns (1580-1640) as well as the specific repercussions of this episode on the Infanta's dowry to be given by Spain to England. The fourth chapter introduces a further key player in both European diplomacy and the imperial rivalry between Spain and England, which is to say the Dutch. By looking at the 'massacre' at Amboyna in 1623, I prove that the rivalry with the Dutch in the Spice Islands, and especially the executions at Amboyna, initially pushed King James to pursue the marriage alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs with even greater commitment. In the last chapter, I look back at Europe to discuss how the two composite monarchies reacted to the arrival at their respective courts of the news of recent episodes of conflict in the West and East Indies. This concluding chapter argues that the awareness in Madrid and London of what had happened in the Indies put additional burdens onto the already deteriorating marriage negotiations and fundamentally contributed to their failure. Thus, the thesis sheds light on a well-known episode of Anglo-Spanish relations by observing it through a new lens. As a result, I improve our traditional understanding of the end of Anglo-Spanish Match as well as of global connectedness in the early seventeenth century.

Resumo

Um casamento entre o príncipe inglês e a infanta espanhola foi considerado desejável após a assinatura do tratado de paz anglo-espanhol em Londres em 1604. Após vários anos de tortuosas negociações, em 1624 o casamento falhou e a Inglaterra declarou guerra à Espanha no ano seguinte. Esta tese aborda o fim das negociações matrimoniais anglo-espanholas, no período 1617-1624, colocando as razões para o seu fracasso no contexto global da diplomacia europeia e política dinástica no início do século XVII. A historiografia tradicional considera o fracasso diplomático do casamento como consequência inevitável das diferenças religiosas e mal-entendidos culturais entre Inglaterra e Espanha. Consequentemente, os historiadores tendem a contextualizar a questão num quadro Europeu apenas em relação ao fim da união. O presente estudo, porém, descreve um quadro mais completo, não só por meio da expansão das fronteiras geográficas da investigação, mas também por demonstrar em que medida novas rivalidades imperiais desempenharam um papel muito maior na diplomacia do casamento do que tem sido reconhecido previamente. No primeiro capítulo, é discutida a noção de razão de estado na relação entre Inglaterra e Espanha no início do século XVII e investiga-se a maneira pela qual as escolhas política e/ou economicamente mais favoráveis foram muitas vezes tomadas independentemente de quaisquer considerações religiosas e cada vez mais em resposta a preocupações extra-europeias. O corpo da tese é então dedicado a alguns episódios em que a rivalidade imperial entre a Inglaterra e a Península Ibérica influenciou o fim das negociações. No segundo capítulo, examina-se a segunda expedição de Walter Raleigh à Guiana e as acções do embaixador espanhol em Londres, o Conde de Gondomar, que pediu uma punição exemplar para Raleigh – na sequência do ataque do explorador Inglês a colónias espanholas –, a fim de manter o acordo de casamento. No capítulo seguinte, a atenção move-se para Este, analisando a tomada do porto Português de Ormuz, no Golfo Pérsico, pela Companhia das Índias Orientais Inglesa em 1622. No processo, delineiam-se as complexidades subjacentes à união das coroas ibéricas (1580 -1640), bem como as repercussões específicas deste episódio sobre o dote da Infanta espanhola negociado para o casamento Inglês. O quarto capítulo introduz um personagem-chave tanto para a diplomacia europeia como para a rivalidade imperial entre Espanha e Inglaterra – a Holanda. Ao estudar a ‘carnificina’ de Amboyna em 1623, demonstra-se que a rivalidade com os holandeses nas Molucas, e as execuções em Amboyna em particular, forçaram o Rei Jaime I a procurar a aliança matrimonial com os Habsburgos espanhóis com ainda maior empenho. No último capítulo, o foco volta de novo para a Europa discutindo como as duas monarquias reagiram à chegada das notícias dos recentes episódios de conflito no oeste e nas Índias Orientais às suas respectivas cortes. Este capítulo final argumenta que a consciência em Madrid e Londres do que tinha acontecido nas Índias colocou dificuldades adicionais às negociações de casamento, já em deterioramento, e, fundamentalmente, contribuíram para o seu fracasso. Assim, este estudo lança uma nova luz sobre um celebre episódio das relações anglo-espanholas, observando o seu complexo intercâmbio político e diplomático através de uma nova lente. Como resultado, pretende-se aprofundar a compreensão tradicional do final do casamento anglo-espanhol, bem como das conexões globais no início do século XVII.

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List of Abbreviations

AGS	Archivo General de Simancas
AGI	Archivo de Indias, Seville
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino
ANTT	Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon
APC	<i>Acts of the Privy Council of England</i>
BL	British Library, London
BNE	Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid
BNP	Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon
BPMP	Biblioteca Pública e Municipal do Porto
BPR	Biblioteca de Palacio Real, Madrid
Bustamante	<i>El Conde de Gondomar y su intervención en el proceso, prisión y muerte de Sir Walter Raleigh</i> , ed. C. Pérez Bustamante (Santiago: Paredes, 1928)
CCSP	<i>Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodleian Library</i> , eds. O. Ogle and W. H. Bliss (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1872)
CD 1621	<i>Commons Debates</i> , eds. Wallace Notestein, Helen Relf, Hartly Simpson (1935)
CJ	<i>Journals of the House of Commons</i>
CODOIN	<i>Collección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España</i>
CSPCol, East	<i>Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan</i>
CSPCol, West	<i>Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies</i>

<i>CSPD</i>	<i>Calendar of State Papers Domestic</i>
<i>CSPVen</i>	<i>Calendar of State Papers Venetian</i>
<i>DRI</i>	<i>Documentos remetidos da Índia</i>
<i>DUP</i>	<i>Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa</i>
E.	Sección de Estado
EEBO	Early English Books Online
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
EIC	East India Company
FSL	Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington DC
<i>HJ</i>	<i>Historical Journal</i>
HL	Huntington Library, San Marino, California
<i>HLQ</i>	<i>Huntington Library Quarterly</i>
HMC Trumbull	Historical Manuscripts Commission, <i>Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, vol. VI, Papers of William Trumbull the elder, 1616-1618</i> (London, 1995)
HPO	History of Parliament Online
IOR	India Office Records
Larkin and Hughes	<i>Stuart Royal Proclamations</i> , eds. James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes (Oxford, 1973)
Leg.	Legajo
<i>LJ</i>	<i>The Journals of the House of Lords</i>
Loomie	<i>Spain and the Jacobean Catholics</i> , ed. A. J. Loomie (Catholic Record Society, 1973; 1978), 2 vols.
<i>Narrative</i>	Francisco de Jesús, <i>Narrative of the Spanish Marriage Treaty</i> , ed. Samuel R. Gardiner
<i>ODNB</i>	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>
<i>P&P</i>	<i>Past & Present</i>

Questier	<i>Stuart Dynastic Policy and Religious Politics, 1621-1625</i> , ed. Michael Questier (Camden Fifth Series, vol. 34, Cambridge University Press, 2009)
RAH	Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid
<i>Raleigh's Last Voyage</i>	V.T. Harlow, <i>Raleigh's Last Voyage. Being an account drawn out of contemporary letters and relations both Spanish and English</i> (London, 1932)
<i>Raleigh's Works</i>	<i>The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh</i> , eds. William Oldys and Thomas Birch (Oxford, 1829), 8 vols.
SP	<i>State Papers</i>
<i>SP, Bombay</i>	<i>Selections from State Papers, Bombay Regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf with a summary of events 1600-1800</i> , ed. J. A. Saldanha (1908)
Tanner	<i>Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I 1603-1625</i> , ed. J. R. Tanner (Cambridge, 1961)
TNA	The National Archives, London
<i>Treaties</i>	<i>A General Collection of Treatys, Manifestos, Tracts of Marriage, Renunciations, and other Publick Papers, from the Year 1495, to the Year 1712</i> (1746), 2 vols.
VC	Virginia Company
VOC	Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United East Indian Company)

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Note on Dates, Names, and Spelling

In the early seventeenth century, the Gregorian calendar (New style) was in use in continental Europe, while the Julian Calendar (Old style) was still in use in England. I have retained dates as presented in the original sources, which is to say in the Old Style for English documents and in the New Style for European documents. When relevant, both dates are used in footnotes. In early modern England, the year began on 25 March. The beginning of the new year, however, is consistently taken as 1 January.

The original spelling and punctuation of archival sources has been retained except when it impeded a clear understanding of the content.

For the purpose of clarity, all names are anglicised when an English version is known, for example, I use Philip III rather than Felipe III. Also, while Philip III of Spain was Philip II of Portugal and Philip IV of Spain was Philip III of Portugal, I always refer to their Spanish title to avoid confusion.

I refer to the Spanish Ambassador in London as Diego Sarmiento de Acuña before 1617 as he only received the title of Count of Gondomar in 1617. However, I mostly refer to George Villiers as Duke of Buckingham throughout the thesis, despite Villiers having obtained the Dukedom only in 1623.

INTRODUCTION

In January 1617 George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote to the English Ambassador in India, Sir Thomas Roe.¹ In thanking him for the letters he had recently received, Abbot expressed his belief that it was essential to maintain a flow of information from abroad, not only from neighbouring countries but also from those far away. According to the Archbishop, ‘there is no place so remote, but that the consideration is mediately or immediately of consequence to our affaires heere’. It was crucial therefore to be acquainted with circumstances in the Indies² in order to provide better counsel to the King of England. Not only was trade at stake, continued Abbot, but it was also important for the sovereigns of Europe to be aware that their wealth and reputation depended upon events distant from their courts. This was true for the Iberian sovereign as well as the ‘Kinge of France, the Prince of Italy, and especially the Hollanders our neerest neighbours’.³

By taking into account the multilayered relations among these parties within and outside of Europe, this thesis addresses the diplomatic discussions for a union between Charles, son and heir of King James I of England, and the Infanta María, daughter of King Philip III of Spain and sister of King Philip IV. Specifically, I consider the final period of the negotiations, between 1617 and 1624, just before the hostilities with Spain, which King James had spent most of his reign trying to avoid, broke out. In

¹ On Abbot’s correspondence with English ambassadors abroad, see Kenneth Fincham, ‘Abbot, George (1562-1633) archbishop of Canterbury’, *ODNB*.

² Abbott specifically refers to the *East Indies*, ‘those Eastern parts’, as he is writing to Thomas Roe who was ambassador in Mughal India between 1615 and 1619.

³ TNA, SP 14/90, fols. 65-66, Archbishop Abbot to Sir Thomas Roe, Lambeth, 20 January 1617. For the complete text of this letter, see Appendix A.

doing so, I aim to contribute to the debate concerning the reasons why the marriage diplomacy failed and why it did so between 1623 and 1624.

The failure of the long-running marriage negotiations is here considered in its wider global context in which the decisions taken and the actions performed overseas by European rulers and their agents affected the end of the Anglo-Spanish entente more significantly than has previously been acknowledged. The present study thus adds one crucial reason to the list of causes for the failure of the Habsburg-Stuart negotiations. It does so by addressing the imperial rivalry between England, the Iberian powers, and the Dutch in the East and West Indies. Not only did religious differences and the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War contribute to the unsuccessful end of the marriage diplomacy, but also a new awareness of the delicate balance in the Indies. European states in fact represented themselves not only in relation to contiguous territories but also to those geographically distant from them.⁴ I argue that when that balance was lacking outside of Europe, the consequences were concretely observable on the dynastic negotiations between the two European ruling houses. Indeed, as noted by Archbishop Abbot, European rulers were 'the greater or the lesser for the event of those things which they or others have in those Eastern parts'.⁵

The dates chosen as the timeframe for this study define the final period of the marriage negotiations. Following the untimely death of his eldest son Henry in 1612, and his daughter Elizabeth's marriage with the Protestant Frederick V of the Palatinate, the King of England ended the consultations for a potential French marriage in order to

⁴ Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 22.

⁵ TNA, SP 14/90, fols. 65-66, Archbishop Abbot to Sir Thomas Roe, Lambeth, 20 January 1617.

concentrate entirely on the alliance with Spain.⁶ James officially re-opened negotiations with the Catholic Monarchy by sending John Digby as his ambassador to Madrid in 1617 to discuss the articles of the marriage treaty between Prince Charles and the Infanta María.⁷ In November 1624, when a marriage agreement was signed instead for a union between the Prince of Wales and Henrietta Maria, sister of the King of France, Louis XIII, the Anglo-Spanish negotiations came to an abrupt end.⁸ I consider the period between 1617 and 1624 as a coherent unit from James I's point of view as in those years the English King was consistent in his desire for a dynastic union with the Habsburgs of Spain. Certainly, it was not a homogeneous period *per se* due to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the death of Philip III, and the succession of three Popes⁹ and also to increasing conflicts in overseas dominions.

Various historians of the Anglo-Spanish match have stopped at 1623 in their investigations into the marriage diplomacy, by focusing on the journey of Prince Charles and the Duke of Buckingham to Madrid and considering their return as the end point in the negotiations.¹⁰ Instead, this thesis is based on the premise that an Anglo-Spanish union was still considered possible by King James in the first half of 1624, despite several members of Parliament in England expressing their opinions in favour of

⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 77. See also Andrew Thrush, 'The French Marriage and the Origins of the 1614 Parliament', in *The Crisis of 1614 and the Addled Parliament: Literary and Historical Perspectives*, eds. Stephen Clucas and Rosalind Davies (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 25-36.

⁷ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 18. See also Glyn Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta. The Cultural Politics of the Spanish Match* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 17.

⁸ Caroline M. Hibbard, 'Henrietta Maria, Princess of France, Queen of England, Scotland, and Ireland, consort of Charles I', *ODNB*. See also, Sara Joy Wolfson, 'Aristocratic Women of the Household and Court of Henrietta Maria, 1625-1659' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2011); Thomas Cogswell, 'Foreign Policy and Parliament: the case of La Rochelle, 1625-1626', *EHR*, 99 (1984), 241-267.

⁹ Between 1617 and 1624, three Popes were faced with the challenge of whether or not to grant the dispensation: Paul V (1605-1621); Gregory XV (1621-1623); and Urban VIII (1623-1644).

¹⁰ See, for example, A. J. Loomie's opinion in his biographical entry on Walter Aston: A. J. Loomie, 'Aston, Walter, Baron Aston of Forfar (1584-1639)', *ODNB*. On scholarship focusing on the 1623 journey to Madrid, see Alexander Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match. Prince Charles's Journey to Madrid, 1623* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Juan Pérez de Guzmán y Gallo, 'Las últimas negociaciones de matrimonios regios entre Inglaterra y España, en 1623', *La España Moderna* (Analecta Editorial, 1906).

breaking any alliances with the Catholic monarchy.¹¹ In 1623 and 1624 King James insisted that the Palatinate's restoration should be linked to the marriage between Charles and the Infanta. While in Madrid, Prince Charles made this intention known to the King of Spain but failed to obtain any binding confirmation of Spanish help to alter the *status quo* regarding the possessions of the Elector Palatine and his wife.¹² Charles returned to London empty-handed in the Autumn of 1623 without the Infanta nor any promise on the part of the Spanish sovereign that the restitution of Frederick V's lands would follow the conclusion of the union scheduled for Christmas of that year. Because of this, many historians have assumed that plans for the dynastic marriage had been definitively aborted by then.

The two issues, however, as Glyn Redworth has demonstrated, did not necessarily go hand in hand,¹³ and both were still being discussed in 1624. Prince Charles had in fact postponed his decision on the marriage by means of prolonging the proxy until the Spring of 1624.¹⁴ Moreover, King James still believed it would be possible to reach a diplomatic agreement on the Palatinate through a conference to be held in Cologne, similar to that which had previously failed in Brussels.¹⁵

The Spanish ambassador in England, the Count of Gondomar, continued in 1624 to be a strong supporter of the match. He also considered a peace conference as a way to

¹¹ On the validity of considering the match still feasible in 1624, see Thomas Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution. English Politics and the coming of war 1621-1624* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 310.

¹² Brennan Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', *HJ*, 45 (2002), 699-726.

¹³ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 3-5, and p. 56. On a contrary opinion, see Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', pp. 701-702.

¹⁴ TNA, SP 108/543, Prince of Wales's Instrument for proroguing y^e celebration of his Marriage with the Infanta from December 25 to March and constituting the K. and Prince of Spaine his Proxy, 14/24 November 1623.

¹⁵ Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', pp. 708-709. On agreements reached with the Infanta Isabella concerning the situation in Germany in 1623, see TNA, SP 108/96 and SP 108/464. On the conference in Brussels between May and September 1622, see W. B. Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 311.

obtain the restitution of the Palatinate without appearing as if the King of Spain had been forced to agree to it because of the marriage negotiations, but rather testifying to the Iberian sovereign's good will in solving the complex situation originated from Frederick's actions in 1619.¹⁶ Furthermore, the positive English response to Thomas Middleton's play *A Game at Chess*, performed at the Globe Theatre for nine consecutive days in 1624, testifies to a continuing interest for the dynastic union,¹⁷ even if in terms of making sure that the plan was abandoned in favour of war against Spain as hoped by the 'Patriot' coalition.¹⁸

The fact that King James considered the marriage between his heir and the Spanish Infanta still attainable in 1624 is crucial when addressing English reactions to the Dutch aggression against English factors in the Spice Islands. In fact, the news of the incident at Amboyna only arrived in Europe in May 1624, as discussed in chapter IV. Rather than this episode being peripheral to the end of the marriage diplomacy, conflict with the Dutch in the East had perceivable consequences on the end of the negotiations in 1624, and made last-ditch efforts to bring the match to a successful conclusion impossible.

Eminent scholars have significantly contributed to the debate concerning the end of the Anglo-Spanish match negotiations. Their opinions can be summarised in three main issues considered as the causes of the marriage diplomacy's failure: cultural

¹⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2560, Parecér, 29 April 1624, quot. in Charles Howard Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 100-101.

¹⁷ See John Holles to the Earl of Somerset, 11 August 1624; John Woolley to William Trumbull, 11 August 1624, BL, Trumbull papers 48/135; Carlos Coloma to the Count-Duke of Olivares, 10 August 1624, BNE ms 18203. All letters are quoted in Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino (ed.), *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture. A companion to the Collected Works* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 865-868. See also Edward M. Wilson and Olga Turner, 'The Spanish protest against *A Game at Chess*', *Modern Language Review*, 44 (1949).

¹⁸ Thomas Cogswell, 'Thomas Middleton and the Court, 1624: "A Game at Chess" in Context', *HLQ*, 47 (1984), 273-288 (p. 277).

misunderstandings, religious differences, and the question of the Palatinate.¹⁹ This thesis takes into account all three as intrinsic conditions that contributed to and had an impact on the long-running negotiations between England and Spain (with the situation in the Palatinate coming into play after the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618). The scope of the present study is to go beyond whether or not the negotiations were destined to fail from the start because of cultural misunderstandings and religious differences. While the idea of something being inevitably doomed from its inception was most certainly alien to early modern diplomacy, various historians have expressed their opinion that the Anglo-Spanish match was in fact necessarily bound to come to nothing.²⁰ Glyn Redworth, author of *The Prince and the Infanta*,²¹ looked at the dynastic negotiations whilst being convinced that Spain had never seriously intended to carry forward the marriage of the Infanta with a heretic Prince. Redworth asserts that probably neither Philip III nor Philip IV planned to conclude a dynastic union with England.²²

By believing that cultural misunderstandings between England and Spain were necessarily stronger than any plans to accomplish the marriage, however, we underestimate the necessity of amicable relations between the two countries, which was instead evident to contemporaries, especially after 1618. During a meeting of the

¹⁹ Redworth attributed the end of the Anglo-Spanish Match to overarching religious differences and cultural misunderstandings. Pursell instead considered the Palatinate as *the* central issue. See Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', *HJ*, 45 (2002), 699-726.

²⁰ See for example, Samuel R. Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish marriage, 1617-1623* (London, 1869), 2 vols. Gardiner's outdated and chauvinistic position is outlined in Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', p. 700.

²¹ Redworth's *The Prince and the Infanta* is the first major study of the Spanish Match after Gardiner's *Prince Charles and the Spanish marriage*. Redworth's monograph follows Cogswell's assertion that 'a thorough study of the Spanish match is pending' and that Charles's journey to Madrid in 1623 was 'one of the most mysterious episodes in early modern English history'. See Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 57 and p. 12.

²² Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 10 and p. 17. On a different opinion, see Robert Cross, 'Pretense and Perception in the Spanish Match, or History in a Fake Beard', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 37 (2007), 563-83 (p. 565 and p. 568).

Council of State in Madrid in 1623, for example, members agreed that they could not ‘in good prudence and reason of state advise Your Majesty to break war with England given that the royal treasury is so drained’.²³ Treasurer Lionel Cranfield used a similar argument at the same time in London.²⁴ We know that the Count-Duke of Olivares was particularly opposed to the union.²⁵ However, to consider his opinion as representative of that of the Spanish King and the Council of State, and to portray the intentions of the Spanish as false and deceptive for the whole duration of the negotiations, involves taking the same position as that of the English Puritan political nation and a few foreign ambassadors in the early seventeenth century.²⁶

This historiographical position has profound ramifications. To state, as Garrett Mattingly did, that ‘Madrid had never intended to let Prince Charles have a princess on any terms that the English could possibly grant’²⁷ means to overlook the differences in opinion between Philip III and Philip IV, the distinct attitudes of individual Popes, and the rapidly changing global scenario. Furthermore, it implies, as in the case of Mattingly referring to the marriage diplomacy as ‘vain negotiations’,²⁸ that diplomatic exchanges concerning the union were only kept in place by Spain as long as they were useful to avoid James’s intervention in the Thirty Years’ War. In turn, this means to ignore the early negotiations for a union between James’s eldest son, Henry, and the Infanta Ana

²³ AGS, E., Leg. 2559, doc. 71.

²⁴ See chp. V below.

²⁵ John H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 203-43; Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England from the accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War 1603-1642* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883), vol V, pp. 15-16; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 104-5, p. 110.

²⁶ See, for example, the opinion of the Venetian ambassador Valaresso in September 1623: *CSPVen*, vol. 18, pp. 119-121. On contemporary Spanish opinions that the marriage was never meant to be, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 67-69.

²⁷ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 267.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

which were discussed in conjunction with the signing of the 1604 peace treaty and therefore well before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618.²⁹

In the nineteenth-century, Thomas Carlyle, considered the purpose of the Spanish Match as essentially one of religious re-union when stating that the pursuing of a marriage with the Habsburgs gave James the possibility of 'healing up the Reformation split itself'.³⁰ Since then, historians of early modern Britain and Europe have recognised religion as pervasive and all encompassing, affecting any decisions in both domestic and foreign politics.³¹ W. B. Patterson's excellent book *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* devotes ample space to the King of England's attempts to solve the European crisis that originated from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and discusses the Spanish Match briefly.³² This thesis builds upon Patterson's work on James's long-term policy of peace in Christendom to bring out even further the role of the King of England as mediator in an ever-increasing web of global connections that influenced the dynastic union he was hoping to achieve with the Spanish Habsburgs.

Redworth ascribed a crucial role to religion, and especially the difference in religious beliefs between the two betrothed, by agreeing with Spanish contemporaries according to whom 'to be at the Spanish court meant to be a Catholic'.³³ To consider religion as

²⁹ On the negotiations for a union between Prince Henry and the Infanta Ana, see AGS, E., Leg. 2557, docs. 8, 12, and 13.

³⁰ Alexander Carlyle (ed.), *Historical Sketches of Notable Persons and Events in the Reigns of James I and Charles I* by Thomas Carlyle (London: Chapman and Hall, 1898), p. 148.

³¹ On James's role as Supreme Governor of the Church, see Kenneth Fincham, *Prelate as Pastor. The Episcopate of James I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 362. See also, Robert Cross, 'To Counterbalance the World: England, Spain, and Peace in the early seventeenth century' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 2012), p. 64. Cross quotes an interesting passage from BNE, ms. 2347, f.73v.: '[L]a religion abrira camino a las alianzas, y casamientos que sobre este fundamento se podrian concluir, que no pueden de otra manera.' ('religion will open the way to alliances, and it will be on this foundation that marriages will be concluded, and in no other way').

³² Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*, pp. 314-38.

³³ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 51. Redworth is here referring to Spanish reactions to Charles's arrival in Madrid in 1623.

the solely decisive factor means not only do we oversimplify the intricacy of the topic but we also make misleading assumptions based on what we know to have actually happened subsequently. More recently, in his collection on Prince Charles's journey to Madrid, Alexander Samson has recognised how neither religion nor solving the Palatinate issue can be considered as the main reasons for the end of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations.³⁴ The archival material presented in the essays edited by Samson shows the importance of Olivares's role and also proves that King James was ready to grant more concessions to English Catholics than was previously believed.³⁵

Throughout this thesis, while religion is considered as a pervasive element of seventeenth-century politics and diplomacy, reason of state, which is to say what was *politically* convenient and not necessarily *religiously* acceptable, is recognised as crucial in the management of foreign policy. In his seminal doctoral thesis, later published as *The Winter King*, Brennan Pursell has recognised how 'it is commonplace to state that religion and politics were closely linked in the early seventeenth century'.³⁶ Therefore, I will not restate the obvious. Pursell's intention, as it is mine, is not to deny that religion played a role in the events of the seventeenth century but rather 'to put it in its proper place'.³⁷

Various meanings have been attributed to the notion of 'reason of state' during the early modern period itself as well as in any subsequent historiographical study. Reason of state was indeed a versatile argument used in the early modern period to pursue and justify different agendas. In this thesis, it remains an underlying factor and it is used to

³⁴ Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*, p. 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Brennan Pursell, 'The Constitutional Causes of the Thirty Years' War: Friedrich V, the Palatinate Crisis, and European Politics, 1618-1632' (Harvard University, PhD thesis, 1999), p. viii. Pursell reiterates this point in the published version of his doctoral thesis; see Brennan Pursell, *The Winter King. Frederick V of the Palatinate and the Coming of the Thirty Years' War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 2.

³⁷ Pursell, *The Winter King*, p. 1.

explain the decisions and actions of James I as well as those of Philip III and Philip IV. The most common meaning of ‘reason of state’ is that of ‘cynical art of political domination divorced from any moral consideration’,³⁸ which has clear Machiavellian origins and is always used in a derogatory sense. I use the concept of reason of state without any pejorative connotation but rather as meaning ‘the political science concerning the means by which the prince may preserve and extend his power’.³⁹

In this sense, I address the diplomacy of the Spanish Match in its political and economic aspects more than through Manichean religious dichotomies. I am interested, for example, in European countries allying with local Muslim powers in the East against fellow European Christians in 1622 and in the English questioning their traditional alliance with the Protestant Dutch in 1624, more than in seeing the marriage diplomacy through the traditional religious lens which highlighted the impossibility that Catholic Spain would have helped Protestant England to restore Frederick V’s title against the Austrian Habsburgs. While explaining seventeenth-century history through religious conflict is not unfounded, and indeed it proved to be true that Philip IV did not help England in restoring the lands and title of the Elector Palatine, this study aims to go beyond what contemporaries perceived to be confessional divisions in order to uncover broader political and economic interests that at times, in the final period of the Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations, brought closer rather than set apart religiously-different countries.

The historiography relating to ‘reason of state’ is extensive, especially concerning Italy and France. Less attention has been given to the concept in Spain and especially in

³⁸ Geoff Baldwin, ‘Reason of State and English Parliaments, 1610-42’ *History of Political Thought*, XXV (2004), 620-641 (p. 623).

³⁹ Joan-Pau Rubiés, ‘Reason of State and Constitutional Thought in the Crown of Aragon, 1580-1640’, *HJ*, 38 (1995), 1-28 (p.1).

England. In both countries, sovereigns and their advisers used reason of state to legitimise their actions at home and abroad. In Spain, seventeenth-century observers offered their opinions on the extent to which the union with England would be convenient for reason(s) of state but detrimental for religion.⁴⁰ The political ends towards which the government should act were *conservación y aumento* and, in achieving them, the sovereign could act, at times, at the expense of faith and religion.⁴¹ This was the position of some of the theologians writing *pareceres* concerning the Spanish match: if the union with England was advantageous for the preservation of the monarchy, religious concerns could be set aside for a while. However, when reason of state has been employed in the past by Spanish historians to explain the Anglo-Spanish match, this has often been only to frame the dynastic negotiations as a way for Spain to keep England out of the Thirty Years' War.⁴²

Underlying the notion of reason of state, there is also the idea of *necessitas*, which is to say what was necessary for the good of the state. Any alliances, wars, peace treaties, and commercial agreements could be justified on the grounds of a higher common good, which in the case of James I meant the reunion of Christendom.⁴³ In England, the notion of reason of state has often been likened to that of *arcana imperii*, the mysteries of states, thus attaching to it a connotation of secrecy. Undoubtedly, King James repeatedly referred to the importance for certain issues to remain secret and prevented them from being discussed in public by those who did not have neither the knowledge

⁴⁰ On the opinions of Spanish theologians concerning the marriage between Prince Charles and the Infanta María, see chp. I below.

⁴¹ José A. Fernández-Santamaria, 'Reason of State and Statecraft in Spain (1595-1640)', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 41 (1980), 355-379 (p. 355 and p. 358). The author discusses the work of Jerónimo Gracián concerning the difference between 'political convenience' and 'true Christian reason'.

⁴² See, for example, Porfirio Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia Hispano-Inglesa en el siglo XVII. Razón de Estado y Relaciones de Poder durante la Guerra de los Treinta años, 1618-1648* (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2002), p. 56.

⁴³ Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 362.

nor the right to discuss them.⁴⁴ Indeed, despite James's proclamations in December 1620 and in July 1621 against 'excesse of Lavish and Licentious speech of matters of State,'⁴⁵ the King still had to reprimand MPs. Not only had they taken the liberty to discuss issues that were a matter of royal prerogative but also they 'speake with less respect of foreign princes our allies than were fit for any subject to do of any anointed King'.⁴⁶

In addressing James's attempts to silence his (at times undisciplined) political nation, I touch upon the English Parliaments of 1621 and 1624. These Parliaments are considered as moments when the dynastic alliance with Spain was put under severe scrutiny, not only for the dangers that a Spanish bride could bring at home,⁴⁷ but also for the global consequences that a closer alliance with the Habsburg would produce on trade in the East and newly-created English settlements in the Americas. In considering the debates within the Commons, I rely on the vast corpus of scholarship produced on early Stuart parliaments.

Before the 1970s, British historiography focused on King James's rule and his parliaments, mostly, if not exclusively, hoping to find there the origins of the Civil Wars. Historians of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, among them Samuel R. Gardiner, stressed the opposition between Crown and Parliament/Court and Country. They argued for a necessary connection between the parliamentary clashes

⁴⁴ On secrecy as a device in James's politics, see David Coast, *News and Rumour in Jacobean England. Information, Court Politics and Diplomacy, 1618-1625* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), pp. 48-81. On the King of England demands for secrecy concerning any correspondence coming from Madrid during Prince Charles's stay at the Spanish court, see *Ibid.*, p. 154. See also David Coast, 'Misinformation and disinformation in late Jacobean court politics', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 16 (4-5), 335-54.

⁴⁵ Larkin and Hughes, pp. 495-96 and 519-20.

⁴⁶ Tanner, p. 293. Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 36.

⁴⁷ On the hopes that English Catholics linked to a successful conclusion of the Anglo-Spanish union, see Questier, pp. 131-379

of the 1620s, especially the debates concerning foreign policy and the Protestation of the Commons in the 1621 Parliament, and the outbreak of the Civil Wars.⁴⁸

From the 1970s, revisionist and subsequently post-revisionist historiography was instead more interested in the presence of factions within the Parliament than in the alleged Manichean opposition between the King and his subjects, demonstrating that the same MPs could change side from one parliament (or even from one session) to another.⁴⁹ The careful scholarship of historians such as Conrad Russell, Simon Adams, and Robert Zaller has shown the importance of looking at the 1620s, and in particular at the parliaments held in the first half of the decade, for their complexity and uniqueness rather than to prove the inevitability of future events.⁵⁰

In his seminal work on *Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629*, Russell stated that ‘in the 1620s, a Parliament was an event and not an institution’.⁵¹ Parliament not being an institution meeting on a regular basis has significant implications. Not only many events occurred in the periods in which the assembly was not meeting, and many issues were discussed outside the Parliament,⁵² but also the fact that the Spanish ambassador would report to the Council of State in Madrid that James would certainly not call another parliament during his reign, must be contextualised in a period when it

⁴⁸ Gardiner, *History of England*.

⁴⁹ See, for example, Kevin Sharpe (ed.), *Faction and Parliament. Essays on Early Stuart History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Howard Tomlinson (ed.), *Before the English Civil War. Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983); Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds.), *Conflict in Early Stuart England. Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603-1642* (London and New York: Longman, 1989); J. F. Merritt (ed.), *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth earl of Strafford, 1621-1641* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Chris R. Kyle (ed.), *Parliament, Politics and Elections 1604-1648* (London: Camden Fifth Series, 2001).

⁵⁰ Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 4-5. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, pp. 1-54; Tim Harris, *Rebellion. Britain's First Stuart Kings* (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp. 186-230.

⁵¹ Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*, p. 3.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 1: ‘In England in the 1620s, the majority of important political events took place outside Parliament. [...] Parliaments, if they are to be seen in perspective, should not be seen as the makers of the major historical events of the 1620s but as ad hoc gatherings of men reacting to events taking place elsewhere’.

was common for Parliaments not to be summoned for several years in a row.⁵³ It is thus understandable that the English political nation believed that it was possible that the King would rule for the time being without Parliament.

More recently, however, Brennan Pursell, Andrew Thrush, Thomas Cogswell, Peter Lake, and Tim Harris have highlighted the shortcomings of revisionist historiography.⁵⁴ In *The Blessed Revolution*, Cogswell has demonstrated that while not convened at regular intervals, Parliament had in the 1620s much greater power than recognised by Russell. Cogswell went beyond revisionist assumptions by considering the crucial importance of Parliament in James's decision to end his policy of alliance with Spain in 1624.⁵⁵ Aside from giving a detailed account of parliamentary politics in a period of crisis, Cogswell addressed the ongoing marriage negotiations and Prince Charles's journey to Madrid in his prologue dedicated to the 'evill time' of 1622 and 1623.⁵⁶

Russell rightly considered the two crucial issues in the political debate of the 1620s to be foreign affairs and marriage.⁵⁷ More specifically, Cogswell identified the central concern of the period between 1621-1624 as 'the appropriate English reaction to the disintegrating Protestant position on the continent'.⁵⁸ In addressing the inextricable links among these matters during the tumultuous years between 1617 and 1624, I am once again indebted to the work of numerous scholars.

Since the publication of Gardiner's *History of England from the accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, early modern historians have agreed on

⁵³ See Andrew Thrush, 'The Personal Rule of James I, 1611-1620' in *Politics, Religion and Popularity. Early Stuart Essays in Honour of Conrad Russell*, eds. Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust, and Peter Lake (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 84-102 (p. 84).

⁵⁴ See, *inter alia*, fn 47 above.

⁵⁵ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 321.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-54.

⁵⁷ Conrad Russell, 'What was new in the 1620s?', in *King James VI & I and his English Parliaments*, eds. Richard Cust and Andrew Thrush (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 177-188 (p. 180).

⁵⁸ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 4.

the importance, not only in political but also in diplomatic and cultural terms, of the planned Spanish Match between Charles and the Infanta of Spain, and especially of the journey of the Prince and the Duke of Buckingham to Madrid in 1623.⁵⁹ The work carried out by Gardiner is undoubtedly remarkable and useful to scholars of early Stuart diplomacy, especially in terms of his edition of primary material such as Francisco de Jesús's account of the marriage negotiations.⁶⁰ Indeed, many historians have used and still use Gardiner's seminal work. Yet, despite his multi-volume history remaining a good place to start, some of his positions are outdated and misleading. For example, Gardiner regarded King James as an inept sovereign unable to make decisions on his own.⁶¹ While this was arguably the opinion of some of James's own contemporaries,⁶² the policies of the first Stuart King have been more recently revisited by several scholars, *inter alia* Pauline Croft, W. B. Patterson, and Jenny Wormald, who have demonstrated that he was instead a very active ruler who consistently pursued a sophisticated irenic policy throughout his reign.⁶³

In the last few decades the academic debate on the Spanish Match has produced two books and a few articles specifically dedicated to the planned Habsburg-Stuart union, as well as various publications which touched tangentially on the marriage diplomacy.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 12; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 1-2; Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*, p. 2 and p. 27.

⁶⁰ Francisco de Jesús, *Narrative of the Spanish Marriage Treaty*, ed. and transl. by Samuel R. Gardiner (London: Camden Society, 1869).

⁶¹ On the tradition of historiography who considered James lacking in character and qualities as a ruler that originated from Gardiner's work, see Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 361, fn 109.

⁶² See, for example, 'Sir Anthony Weldon's Character of King James I', in *James I by his contemporaries. An Account of his career and character as seen by some of his contemporaries*, ed. Robert Ashton (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 10-16

⁶³ Pauline Croft, *King James* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Jenny Wormald, 'James VI and I: two Kings or one?', *History*, 68 (1983), pp. 187-209; Jenny Wormald, 'James VI and I (1566-1625), king of Scotland, England, and Ireland', *ODNB*; Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', 699-726; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*; Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*.

The collection of essays edited by Samson is the most recent published contribution on the planned Spanish Match.⁶⁵ Taking into consideration the intentionally cultural focus of Samson's collection, little attention is given to the political and diplomatic implications of a possible marriage alliance between England and Spain in their wider European and extra-European scenario. Yet, the interdisciplinary contributions in this volume are testimony to the cultural richness of the subject and to the lasting interest surrounding this unsuccessful dynastic union.⁶⁶

Spanish historiography has mostly progressed in parallel with rather than complementarily to Anglophone scholarship. Already in the 1970s, in his *Razón de Estado y Dogmatismo Religioso en la España del XVII*, Rafael Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano acknowledged the need to include Spanish sources when discussing the marriage negotiations. He argued that the only sources ever used were those in Simancas, while many others, in Madrid and Seville, were necessary to present a complete picture.⁶⁷ The situation has not changed much since then and most British historians refer almost exclusively to the Archivo General de Simancas when writing Spanish history.⁶⁸

Similar to Samson's collection, Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano intentionally focused on the year 1623 as the crucial moment in the marriage diplomacy when the Prince of Wales arrived in Madrid. So too had done Guzmán y Gallo at the beginning of the

⁶⁵ Samson's edited collection *The Spanish Match. Prince Charles's Journey to Madrid, 1623* was published in 2006.

⁶⁶ On the continuing interest demonstrated towards this dynastic union, see also the movie *Alatriste*, directed by Agustín Díaz Yanes in 2006.

⁶⁷ Rafael Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano, *Razon de Estado y Dogmatismo Religioso en la España del XVII. Negociaciones Hispano-Inglesas de 1623* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1976), p. 13.

⁶⁸ As always, there are some notable exceptions. *Inter alia*, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, and Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*.

twentieth century.⁶⁹ A wider picture of the political and diplomatic relations between Spain and England is presented in Spanish by Porfirio Sanz Camañes who has discussed Anglo-Spanish relations in the first half of the seventeenth century. Sanz Camañes not only addresses the diplomacy between London and Madrid in the light of the Thirty Years' War and the diplomatic games played by the two countries through important figures such as Buckingham, Olivares, and Gondomar, but also sheds light on long-term dynamics between the two countries. The author's interpretation of the Spanish Match, remains, once more, very traditional, and restricted to the idea that it was a way for Spain to gain the necessary time to improve its armies' situation in Europe.⁷⁰

While the thesis is clearly focused on a specific episode in European diplomacy - a potential union between the Stuarts and the Spanish Habsburgs - the purpose of this research is to establish the extent to which European empires were entangled in a broader global context that influenced and shaped their dynastic interactions.⁷¹ Indeed, the early modern period was precisely when people started to perceive 'in its entirety a world once experienced only in fragments'.⁷² The case studies presented in this work consider episodes when the European interaction in the Indies was antagonistic. As William S. Maltby acutely expressed in *The Black Legend in England*

⁶⁹ Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*; Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano, *Razón de estado y dogmatismo religioso*; Pérez de Guzmán y Gallo, 'Las últimas negociaciones'. The focus on 1623 is a common choice when discussing the Anglo-Spanish Match. On the problems generated by focusing only on 1623, see above in this Introduction.

⁷⁰ Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia Hispano-Inglesa*, p. 15.

⁷¹ See Jeremy Adelman, 'Mimesis and rivalry: European empires and Global Regimes', *Journal of Global History*, 10 (2015), 77-98.

⁷² Alison Games, *The Web of Empire. English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 6.

In any protracted struggle between two powers, people tend to develop an unwanted interest in their enemy and the society that produced him. This curiosity is largely hostile, aiming at the discovery of weak points.⁷³

This, however, was not always the case. In the integrated global context of the early seventeenth century, there was ample room for compromise and short-term alliances. For example, the East India Company temporarily allied with the Persians against the Portuguese in 1622. Moreover, the English decided to maintain the alliance with the Dutch in Europe in 1624, even following their attack on English merchants in the Spice Islands.⁷⁴

Those encounters are discussed from a Eurocentric point of view, with the awareness that Europe was not the dominant power, especially in the East where Islamic rulers played a significant role in shaping European identities. Chapter III, by considering the taking of Hormuz, demonstrates how European commercial companies did not consider themselves as superior to local powers in the East. On the contrary, they were aware that they did not enjoy there the perceived superiority that they had in the Americas.⁷⁵ Indeed, they were cautious in negotiating agreements with local authorities whom ambassadors and correspondents defined as ‘the most powerful Kings in the world’.⁷⁶ Because of this, the case studies addressed in this thesis show that any explorations or attempts to set up new trading routes were often carried out by European countries not

⁷³ William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England. The Development of anti-Spanish Sentiment 1558-1660* (Duke University Press, 1971), p. 88.

⁷⁴ *CCSP*, vol. I, p. 29, *Traité entre Jacques Roi de la Grande Bretagne et les Etats Generaux des Provinces Unies*, 5/15 June 1624. For the text of the treaty, see *Treaties*, pp. 226-36.

⁷⁵ Alison P. Coudert, ‘Orientalism in Early Modern Europe?’, in *East meets West in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times. Transcultural Experiences and Early Modern Times*, ed. Albrecht Classen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), pp. 715-55 (pp. 718 and 730).

⁷⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated.

in opposition to indigenous worlds but rather among themselves.⁷⁷ For example, England and the Iberian monarchy were competing to gain the favour of Shah Abbas I in the Persian Gulf.⁷⁸

It is clear that this was a very unstable scenario and the purpose of the present study is not to simplify it but rather to demonstrate the significance of extra-European entanglements with regard to a specific diplomatic episode in Europe. In doing so, on the one hand I build upon existing secondary literature, and on the other hand, by using archival sources, I question previous studies that have addressed the Spanish Match only within European boundaries. In fact, the Iberian monarchy was not only regarded as the foremost enemy of the Protestant religion but also of English expansion overseas. The novelty of this study thus lies in showing the extent to which antagonism in the Indies concretely influenced the marriage negotiations, something that those who have previously written about the Spanish Match failed to evaluate.

Early modern contemporaries strongly believed that the marriage negotiations were to be feared for the wider context to which they belonged. Indeed, in Thomas Scott's *Vox Populi*, the character of Gondomar stated that the aim of all peace treaties, declarations of war, and marriage negotiations, was for Spain to gain 'the whole possession of the world, and to reduce all to unitie under one temporal head'.⁷⁹ The political discourse emerging from both pamphlet literature and parliamentary debates in the 1610s and

⁷⁷ See Coudert, 'Orientalism', pp. 750-51.

⁷⁸ See chapter III below.

⁷⁹ Thomas Scott, *Vox Populi* (1620), p. 5. On the extent to which Scott can be considered representative of the Puritan public opinion, see Peter Lake, 'Constitutional Consensus and the Puritan Opposition in the 1620s: Thomas Scott and the Spanish Match', *HJ*, 25 (1982), 805-25 (p. 806).

1620s has been extensively studied.⁸⁰ The concrete consequences of events taking place in the Indies on European diplomacy concerning the Habsburg-Stuart union, however, have been largely overlooked as scholarly research on the Spanish Match has remained separate from any scholarship regarding overseas empires. With a few notable exceptions,⁸¹ the two fields of inquiry continue to stay distinct by focusing on either intra-European diplomacy or overseas imperial projects rather than on their reciprocal influence. This thesis aims to redress this lacuna by considering specific case studies to answer broader questions on the diplomatic relations between England and the Iberian powers, and the increasing global connectedness of the early modern world.⁸² Indeed, by maintaining a boundary, one fails to recognise the symbiotic relationship between Europe and the rest of the world in the early modern period. As stated by Cooper and Stoler in the introduction of their *Tensions of Empire*,

Europe's colonies were never empty spaces to be made over in Europe's image or fashioned in its interests; nor, indeed, were European self-contained entities that at one point projected themselves overseas. Europe was made by imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within Europe itself.⁸³

⁸⁰ See Eroulla Demetriou, 'The Spanish Match and the Literary Image of Spain and the Spaniards in English Pamphlets (1617-1624)' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Jaén, 2003).

⁸¹ Elliott has addressed both the workings of European diplomacy and comparative history of Empires. J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). See also, Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (eds.), *Spain, Europe, and the Atlantic. Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁸² Games, *The Web of Empire*, p. 6.

⁸³ Cooper and Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire*, p. 1.

Therefore, while I address a quintessentially European story,⁸⁴ I endeavour to do so by taking into account its global context. At first glance, this may seem a teleological approach guided by our modern notion that the world is linked in many more ways than any of us, as individuals, can perceive.⁸⁵ It is not. I use instead early modern sources that testify to the significant impact that episodes in the Indies as well as an increased awareness of the potentials and the dangers of imperial cooperation and competition had on the marriage diplomacy for an Habsburg-Stuart union at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Abbot's letter to Roe, quoted at the beginning of this introduction, is only one of many instances that prove such acute awareness among contemporaries. Already in the 1580s, Richard Hakluyt considered how the King of Spain was economically and politically dependent on the Indies. Consequently, 'if you touch him in the Indies', according to Hakluyt, 'you touch the apple of his eye, for you take away his treasure which is *nervus belli*'.⁸⁶ During the 1624 Parliament, a comparable reasoning was behind the idea of waging a war of diversion against Spain in the Indies rather than on European soil.⁸⁷

In the early 1620s, Scott commented that the Spanish boundless ambition was not extinguished 'with the Conquest of all the New World discovered by them, nor with so great a part which they possess in the old'.⁸⁸ Spain was also concerned about the increasingly strong links between European diplomacy and its overseas dominions.

⁸⁴ I mean 'European' in a geographical sense, to include Britain. This is useful throughout the thesis to make a distinction between Europe and outside Europe (i.e. the East and West Indies).

⁸⁵ On the importance of connections to avoid a compartmentalised knowledge that produces 'ignorances globales', see Edgar Morin, *La Voie pour l'avenir de l'Humanité* (Paris: Fayard, 2011), pp. 239-240.

⁸⁶ Richard Hakluyt, *A particular discourse concerning the great necessity and manifold commodities that are like to grow to this Realm of England by the Western discoveries lately attempted* (London, 1584).

⁸⁷ See chapter V below.

⁸⁸ [Thomas Scott], transl. by, *News from Pernaassvs* (1622), p. 46. This pamphlet was originally in Italian: Trajano Boccalini, *Pietra del Paragone politico* (1614).

Indeed, already in 1604, the Council of State had agreed that the maintenance of peace with England was ‘the only possibility for the security of the Indies’.⁸⁹

The necessity of considering far-away realities when discussing intra-European diplomacy is made apparent by archival evidence and is also validated by well-known methodologies. Taking into account their respective limitation, ‘world history’ and ‘global history’ do not seek to deal with every part of the globe but rather to pursue an ‘historical perspective that transcends national frontiers’.⁹⁰ I take into account the entangled histories of European powers in the Indies and assess the extent to which events occurring in different parts of the world in the same period influenced each other.⁹¹ Undoubtedly the focus of this study remains on England and the Iberian Monarchy. Even within the intentionally narrow chronological focus of the thesis, a comparative history of the two countries’ motivations for and reactions to the dynastic union and its difficulties proved hard to accomplish, and in specific chapters one voice

⁸⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2557, doc. 22.

⁹⁰ The most significant shortcoming of ‘global history’ is probably that it still remains very much Eurocentric. Michael N. Pearson, *Port Cities and Intruders. The Swahili Coast, India, Portugal in the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 5-7. In addition, a field of study known as ‘spatiality studies’ has emerged in the last two decades following the pioneering studies of Fernand Braudel. Between the 1980s and the 1990s authors such as Michel Foucault and Edward Soja have reaffirmed the importance of the concept of space. Such space is fluid which is to say it is not only a physical space but rather a notion that, for example, reflects Braudel’s world-economies or the concept of ‘merchant networks’ applied by Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Luis Filipe Thomaz to the reality of the Portuguese Estado da Índia. See Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, p. 20; Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: the Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1999), p. 11. On their theories applied to historical research, see Luís Filipe R. Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Algés: Difel, 1994), p. 208; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World, 1450-1800* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1996).

⁹¹ Antoni Picazo Muntaner, ‘A Global Dream. The Indian Ocean in the European Trading Horizon’, in *Oceans Connect. Reflections on Water Worlds across Time and Space*, ed. Rila Mukherjee (New Delhi: Primus, 2013), pp. 205-14. On methodology, see Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, ‘Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?’, *The American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), 787-99.

is more prominent than the other. This is mostly due to the availability of sources and time constraints.⁹²

Throughout this study, I have used material in different languages originating from European and overseas archives. The variety of sources reflects the broad range of events analysed and relationships involved in the final period of the Spanish Match negotiations.

I have looked at the relevant State Papers for the period covered by the thesis to include political and diplomatic communication concerning the dynastic negotiations and the perceived reasons for their failure.⁹³ In the Archivo General de Simancas, I have looked at the records of the Council of State in Madrid for the years 1617-1624. At times, I have also enlarged my enquiry into the period 1603-1604, to be able to outline the proceedings and the consequences of the 1604 Treaty of London, and into 1625, to address the reactions to Prince Charles's French marriage.⁹⁴ For reasons of time, I have mostly focused on Estado Inglaterra and Estado Portugal, which is to say on those meetings of the Council of State where matters relevant to England and Portugal

⁹² In an interview in 2008, John Elliott said that comparative history is not for the young or for the graduate student. The interview's transcript can be found at http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/interviews/Elliott_John.html. See also J. H. Elliott, *History in the Making* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 168-195.

⁹³ For the period 1617 to 1624, I have looked at SP 14 (Domestic, James); SP 94 (Spain); SP 89 (Portugal); SP 84 (Holland); SP 85 (Italian States and Rome); SP 101 (Newsletters); SP 103 (Treaty Papers); SP 108 (Treaties). I have consulted calendars for State Papers Colonial (East and West), and State Papers Venice.

⁹⁴ In Simancas, I have also looked at Legajos concerning 1660-1661 to consider the Anglo-Portuguese alliance that followed the British Civil Wars and the end of the Union of the Iberian Crowns. While the marriage between Charles II and Catherine of Braganza remains extremely useful in order to understand the development of dowry provisions that included overseas territories, an in-depth analysis of that dynastic union goes beyond the scope of this study.

respectively were discussed. I have briefly examined Legajos concerning Germany, France, and Rome but further research is needed to evaluate the actual contribution of these actors in the final period of the negotiations.

In the National Library of Spain and the Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid, I have looked at specific authors, such as Anthony Sherley, who was English by birth but spent most of his time at the service of the Spanish crown, and appears therefore to be a significant observer of the dynamics between the two countries. Moreover, I have analysed newsletters and *avisos* to understand how the dynastic negotiations were perceived alongside other European events happening in the same period, such as the Thirty Years' War, the Synod of Dort, or the death of monarchs.⁹⁵ While to uncover one shared opinion within the political nation remain elusive, and much of a pointless effort as the views of the English, the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the Dutch were divided on any given topic at any given time, I have attempted to reconstruct the feeling of the majority thanks to the correspondence of a few influential individuals. In order to do so, I have looked at the correspondence of ordinary and extra-ordinary ambassadors, as well as informal envoys, such as the Count of Gondomar, the Duke of Buckingham, Sir Dudley Carleton, William Trumbull, Sir Thomas Roe, Sir John Digby, and to a lesser extent Walter Aston and Carlos Coloma. In addition, I have consulted in Madrid various *pareceres*, which is to say 'opinions' written mostly by Spanish theologians to advise the sovereign on the suitability of a marriage with England for the Infanta and the potential consequences of such a union on her faith.

For the case-study chapters, I have used Walter Raleigh's own writings as well as correspondence between King James and Ambassador Gondomar and between the

⁹⁵ On the importance of newsletters, see Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 324. Because of time constraints, I was only able to investigate SP 101 (Newsletters), vol. 90 (Spain and Portugal, 1580-1625).

Spanish Ambassador and the Council of State in Madrid regarding Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana. In addition, I have consulted material in the Archivo de Indias in Seville relating to the precautions put in place by local authorities before and as a consequence of Raleigh's expedition. Moreover, I have examined East India Company records for the period 1617 to 1624 (IOR/E/3/6 to IOR/E/10) and Dutch documents with regard to the Dutch East India Company's justification of its actions in the Spice Islands and the decisions taken by the States General in response to King James's demands. This material can be found among the State Papers Holland (SP84) and in The Hague.⁹⁶ In the Folger Shakespeare Library and the Huntington Library, I have consulted pamphlets and manuscripts on the situation in the 1620s and in particular on Frederick V.

Given my focus on the global context of the last period of the marriage negotiations, these sources, while not unknown *per se*, have never been used before to address the Anglo-Spanish match. I have included in the Appendix documents that testify to the strong link between events in the Indies and the ongoing marriage negotiations. The transcriptions cover both private correspondence and records of official meetings in an effort to demonstrate, through the primary sources themselves, the extent to which different levels of the political nation in both the Iberian Peninsula and England considered rivalry in overseas territories as a strong component of the negotiations for the dynastic union.

⁹⁶ Records of the special committee of judges on the Amboyna Massacre (Amboonse moorden) are in the Nationaal Archief of the Netherlands in The Hague (part of the records of the Staten Generaal). I did not see these records in person.

The thesis is not strictly divided chronologically. While I have tried to maintain a broadly chronological order for the chapters regarding case studies in the West (chp. II) and East Indies (chps. III and IV), the first and last chapters serve as a wider contextualisation of the reasons underlying the development of the marriage negotiations (chp. I) and their failure (chp. V).

The first chapter discusses the complex notion of reason of state and the circumstances in which it was applied by England and the Iberian Monarchy at the beginning of the seventeenth century. I demonstrate how the choice politically and/or economically most favourable was often taken, regardless of religious considerations and increasingly in response to extra-European concerns. The body of the thesis is then dedicated to several episodes when imperial rivalry between England and the Iberian Peninsula fatally influenced the end of the negotiations. In the second chapter, I look at Walter Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana and the reactions of the Spanish ambassador in London. The Count of Gondomar asked for Raleigh to receive an exemplary punishment in order to safeguard the marriage agreement after the English explorer had attacked Spanish settlements in the New World. In the following chapter, I move towards the East and analyse the taking of the Portuguese possession of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf by the East India Company in 1622. In doing so, I outline the complex dynamics underlying the union of the Iberian crowns (1580-1640) as well as the specific repercussions of this episode on the Infanta's dowry to be given by Spain to England. The fourth chapter introduces a further key player in both the European diplomacy of the marriage and the imperial rivalry between Spain and England, which is to say, the Dutch. By looking at the 'massacre' at Amboyna in 1623, I prove that the rivalry with the Dutch in the Spice Islands, and especially the executions at Amboyna,

initially pushed King James to pursue the marriage alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs with even more commitment.

It is evident that other case studies could have been presented here.⁹⁷ I consider the chosen examples as representative because they address both the West and the East Indies and take into account not only Spain and England, but also Portugal, whose *Estado da Índia* the Iberian Crown struggled to defend, as well as the Dutch. Moreover, these chapters demonstrate the extent to which local demands and contingencies at times pushed individuals and mercantile companies to disregard the Crown's policies of alliance or dynastic union with other European powers.⁹⁸ In the last chapter, I look back at Europe to discuss how the two composite monarchies⁹⁹ reacted to the arrival at court of the news about these episodes of imperial rivalry. Beyond a brief examination of news circulation in the rapidly expanding early modern world, this concluding chapter argues that the awareness in Madrid and London of what had happened in the West and East Indies put an additional burden on the already complicated marriage negotiations and fundamentally contributed to their failure.

According to Carter, the increasing amount of diplomatic activity in the early seventeenth century is demonstrated by 'the plethora of negotiations for marriage

⁹⁷ For example, I could have focused on the conflict between Captain Roger North and the pro-Spanish faction following the granting of a charter for the Amazon Company by King James. The expedition was strongly opposed by Ambassador Gondomar as detrimental to the ongoing negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish Match in 1620. I mention this episode briefly in chapter II below. Or I could have addressed the occupation by the Dutch of certain areas of Virginia despite 'the title of King James to all that territory'. *CSPCol, West*, vol. I, Sir Dudley Carleton's protest to the States General, 30 January 1622.

⁹⁸ On the EIC not following Crown's policies, see Philip Lawson, *The East India Company* (London and New York: Longman, 1987), p. 28.

⁹⁹ On the concept of 'Composite Monarchy', see John Elliott, 'A Europe of composite monarchies', *P&P*, 137 (1992), 48-71.

alliances between ruling houses'.¹⁰⁰ Dynastic marriages were of crucial importance in early modern Europe.¹⁰¹ The consequences of a marriage agreement between royal families could be compared, on the international chessboard, to those generated by the outbreak of a war or the signing of a peace treaty. Dynastic agreements were indeed often added to treaties as no peace in early modern Europe was considered fully binding without a union to sanction it.¹⁰²

There is no doubt that the potential match between the Prince of Wales and the Spanish Infanta was the most controversial diplomatic issue in James's reign.¹⁰³ There was no dynastic marriage to follow the peace agreement signed by the King of England and King Philip III in 1604. If successful, the Anglo-Spanish Match could have had dramatic consequences not only on the European scenario but also on the increasingly problematic balance of power in the Indies.¹⁰⁴ This thesis's contribution is to add one crucial element to the reasons why such a delicate matter came to nothing after long-running negotiations.

By discussing case studies that testify to the increasingly complex interplay among the parties involved in the negotiations and those, like the Dutch, who had something to gain from the outcome of the marriage diplomacy, I demonstrate the impossibility of considering the Match as an isolated event detached from its European and extra-

¹⁰⁰ Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 98.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁰² On James's idea that peace could be achieved via the royal marriages of his children, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 8.

¹⁰³ John Cramsie, *Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I, 1603-1625* (Boydell and Brewer for the Royal Historical Society, 2002), p. 195.

¹⁰⁴ On the importance of commercial interests in dynastic unions, see Alexander Samson, 'The Marriage of Philip of Habsburg and Mary Tudor and Anti-Spanish Sentiment in England: Political Economies and Culture, 1553-1557' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 1999), p. 13, and p. 18.

European context.¹⁰⁵ Not only pirates were involved in actions potentially disruptive to the peace agreement of 1604 and the ongoing marriage negotiations,¹⁰⁶ but also chartered companies and individuals carrying patents granted by the sovereign himself, as in the case of Walter Raleigh.

Thus, I revise not only the prevailing vision of the Spanish Match as a uniquely European affair doomed from the start, but also the traditional interpretation stemming from nineteenth-century historiography of King James I as an inactive and quintessentially unsuccessful ruler, and of the Spanish sovereigns as never truly committed to a union with the House of Stuart. Recognising the contribution of extra-European events and their impact on European diplomacy to the end of the marriage negotiations will increase our understanding of the global context within which the interested parties were moving in the early seventeenth century.

Archbishop Abbot was not alone in considering knowledge from the East as crucial for Europe. Sir George Carew, soon to become a member of the Privy Council, also believed that it was important to know about the Indies as ‘there are large kingdomes whereof we are neerlye ignorant’.¹⁰⁷ When Abbot wrote to Roe in 1617 he considered awareness and control of both spaces, Europe and overseas territories, as crucial to the survival of any monarch. If the King of Spain was a ‘remarkable Monarcke among those of *Christendom*’, the rulers’ attention had to be devoted not only to Christendom/Europe but rather at how ‘things now stand throughout the *whole*

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Scott, *Vox Regis* (1624), p. 13. Scott wrote ‘[Spain] is the same Nation, whose ambitions to satisfie, the East and West Indies are not sufficient, nor all Europe: but all the earth must become slaues of their pride, and the prey of their cruelties, as if all other men and places had been made for them’.

¹⁰⁶ On piracy being condemned more during James’s reign than it had been under Queen Elizabeth, see Claire Jowitt, *The Culture of Piracy, 1580-1630: English Literature and Seaborne Crime* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 137.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Letter III, Savoy, 18 January 1616’, in *Letters from George Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, Ambassador to the Court of the Great Moghul 1615-1617*, ed. by John Maclean (London: Camden Society, 1860), pp. 27-79 (p. 52). On Sir Carew, see Ute Lotz-Heumann, ‘Carew, George, earl of Totnes (1555–1629)’, *ODNB*. Carew became a member of the Privy Council on 20 July 1616.

worlde'.¹⁰⁸ This study addresses those moments, at the end of the Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations, when 'Christendom' and the 'worlde' interacted with each other leading to tangible consequences on the dynastic diplomacy for a union between Prince Charles and the Infanta María.

¹⁰⁸ TNA, SP 14/90, ff.65-66, Archbishop Abbot to Sir Thomas Roe, Lambeth, 20 January 1617. Emphasis mine.

Chapter I

‘The pretences of marriages between princes.’¹ Religion and Reason of State during the marriage negotiations, 1604-1624

England has three compelling reasons for moving [war against Spain];
one being the head of its side in matters of religion; [...] second to restore his son-in-law, the Palatine, to his states, [...] third to secure trade that was usurped in the West and East Indies.

Anthony Sherley²

On 16 August 1604 a peace agreement between England and the Iberian Monarchy was signed in London by representatives of James I of England and Philip III of Spain.³ Not only English and Spanish commissioners, but also Flemish delegates met around the carpeted table famously portrayed in the Somerset House painting, thus linking two of the major European powers in a multifaceted set of binding relationships. As much as the 1604 Treaty of London, the lengthy marriage negotiations that followed for a union between the Prince of Wales and the Spanish Infanta transcended national boundaries. Indeed, the relations among countries directly or indirectly interested in the outcome of the dynastic diplomacy were intertwined with concerns in the Indies as well as in Europe.

¹ Walter Raleigh, ‘A Discourse touching the a marriage between Prince Henry of England, and a daughter of Savoy,’ in *Raleigh’s Works*, p. 237.

² BNE, Mss/4013, f. 267, Anthony Sherley, *Discurso en razón de lo que pueden los Reyes y Potentados contra esta Monarquía y sobre el aumento de ella* (1625): ‘Inglaterra tiene tres forzosas razones de su movimiento; la una por ser cabeza de su parcialidad en materia de religión; [...] segunda para reponer en sus estados a su yerno el Palatino, [...] Tercero para asegurar las contrataciones y poblaciones que tiene usurpadas en las Indias Occidentales y Orientales.’

³ For recent scholarship on the Anglo-Spanish peace, see Cross, ‘To Counterbalance the World’.



Image 1. Unknown Artist, *The Somerset House Conference (1604)* ©National Portrait Gallery

Following the signing of the peace treaty in 1604 and until the English declaration of war against Spain in 1625, the relations between the two countries were characterised by a long period of peace, which went hand in hand with the discussions for a potential marriage between the respective heirs. Negotiations were undertaken first for a marital alliance between Ana and then, after her French marriage,⁴ her younger sister María with the heir to the English throne, first Henry, and then Charles after his older brother's unexpected death in 1612.⁵ Despite England and Spain being officially at peace and the period being defined by an absence of direct conflict, the years between 1604 and 1624

⁴ J. H. Elliott, 'The Political Context of the 1612-1615 Franco-Spanish Treaty', in *Dynastic Marriages 1612/1615. A Celebration of the Habsburg and Bourbon Unions*, ed. Margaret McGowan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 5-18.

⁵ TNA, SP 14/71, f.44, Sir Thomas Lake to Carleton, Charing Cross, 10 November 1612.

experienced recurring tensions.⁶ Such tensions were due to the divergent agendas of the diplomatic parties at play. The political situation in Europe changed dramatically following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618; the change of the Spanish sovereign (Philip III died in 1621) and the succession of Popes in Rome also played a role. In the Indies, increasing rivalries characterised the relations among European rulers both in the East, where Spain proved ineffective in protecting the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*, and in the West, where new imperial projects threatened the existing balance dominated by the Iberian powers according to the right of first discovery.⁷

The rapid alterations in the global scenario were felt in the diplomatic correspondence of the early 1620s,⁸ where it is common to find Spanish envoys in London admitting that 'things around here change really fast from one moment to the other'.⁹ Thus, they intended to testify to their sovereign the uncertainty of the situation and the possibility that, between the time when the ambassador was writing and the king receiving the letter, the scenario might have already changed. Indeed, when referring to the long negotiations for the marriage, modern historiography agrees with early modern commentators in recognising that attitudes to the Anglo-Spanish dynastic alliance changed very often according to circumstances. Consequently, Carter admits, it is very hard to pinpoint the official position of the two courts at any given time.¹⁰

⁶ On James's desire for peace, Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*; on Philip III's peace strategy, see Paul Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621. The Failure of a Grand Strategy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), and Bernardo J. García García and José Luis Pardo (eds.), *Tiempo de Paces. 1609-2009. La Pax Hispanica y la Tregua de los Doce Años* (Fundación Carlos Amberes, 2009).

⁷ Carla Gardina Pestana, 'Cruelty and Religious Justification for Conquest in the Mid-Seventeenth-Century English Atlantic', in *Empires of God. Religious Encounters in the Early Modern Atlantic*, ed. by Linda Gregerson and Susan Juster (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), pp. 37-57 (p. 38).

⁸ See Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 255.

⁹ AGS, E., Libro 374, f. 7: 'las cosas de aquí tienen tanta mudanza de una hora a otra.' On uncertainty in late 1623, see Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 106.

¹⁰ Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 100.

During the twenty years of discussion about a possible Habsburg-Stuart union, several factors were considered as pros and cons in the ongoing negotiations. Religion was certainly the most debated aspect in diplomatic letters, due to exasperated written exchanges between the ambassadors and their respective rulers.¹¹ Some problems identified by the Spanish authorities about a potential English marriage in the 1610s and 1620s had already become known following the signing of the peace treaty between Philip III and James I. An interested observer, the Archbishop of Valencia Don Juan de Ribera, considered in 1608 the risks involved in any agreement signed with heretics.¹² During the long-running negotiations, the Spanish sovereigns always tried to maintain their reputation as Catholic Kings by bringing together a junta of theologians and incessantly sending envoys to the Pope. Many among the Spanish theologians believed that there was no guarantee in any of King James's promises¹³ as they accused him of changing his 'religion whenever he thinks is convenient or useful'.¹⁴ Being untrustworthy was a common accusation against Protestants, but James was considered particularly unreliable because he had changed religion from that of his mother, Mary Stuart.¹⁵

In England, the fact that King James was highly dedicated to pursuing an alliance with Habsburg Spain meant that his religious commitment towards Protestantism was often questioned.¹⁶ Doubts concerning his loyalty to the Protestant cause had various

¹¹ *CSPD*, vol. II, Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 7 February 1618. See also *AGS, E.*, Leg. 2514, doc. 18; and *AGS, E.*, Leg. 2557, doc. 12.

¹² *RAH*, N-31, doc. 8.

¹³ *RAH*, Z-8, f. 56v: 'gran engaño sea pensar q pueda auer seguridad en palabra o juramentos de personas de tal condicion y que las esperancas fundadas en ella lo será en el ayre.'

¹⁴ *RAH*, Z-8, f. 55v.

¹⁵ *RAH*, Z-8, f. 56v. See also, Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 44; *Narrative*, p. 249. .

¹⁶ On James's lukewarm support to his son-in-law, Frederick V, and to the Elector Palatine's hope for a pan-Protestant anti-Habsburgs league, see Glyn Redworth, 'Of Pimps and Princes: Three Unpublished

origins. Already before his accession to the English throne, a Scottish observer wrote to Spain stating that ‘he promises to become a Catholic’.¹⁷ Moreover, the King of England’s wife, Queen Anne, was considered to be strongly pro-Spanish and ‘desiring much a union between the Infanta and her son’.¹⁸ Consequently, the religious convictions of the first Stuart King of England were under scrutiny at home, by those who believed him to be *less* Protestant than Elizabeth I and less willing to answer the call for a pan-Protestant movement.¹⁹ Furthermore, the political nation both within and outside Parliament believed that English Catholics would grow bolder and England would be more strongly subjected to Papal influence if the Match with Spain were to succeed. Doubts also existed abroad where he was considered more influenceable than his predecessors in regard to potential religious concessions.²⁰

After a brief outline of the main stages of the marriage negotiations, from 1604 when a Habsburg-Stuart union was first envisioned to its failure in 1624, and by considering a few episodes in the ongoing marriage diplomacy when the success of the agreement appeared within reach, I address religion as the most controversial issue in the ongoing Anglo-Spanish negotiations. Despite its crucial importance, however, I demonstrate in this chapter the extent to which the different religious confessions of the Prince and the

Letters from James I and the Prince of Wales relating to the Spanish Match’, *HJ*, 37 (1994), 401-409 (p. 401).

¹⁷ Quoted in Albert J. Loomie, ‘Philip III and the Stuart Succession in England, 1600-1603’, *Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire*, 43 (1965), 492-514 (p. 497).

¹⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2557, doc. 8 and 12 and AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 73. See also, Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York: Cosimo Classics, repr. 2008), p. 260; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 12; and Glyn Redworth, ‘Sarmiento de Acuña, Diego, count of Gondomar in the Spanish nobility (1567–1626)’, *ODNB*.

¹⁹ See, for example, ‘Negotiations with Catholic Powers before James’ accession to the English throne’, in Ashton (ed.), *James I*, pp. 188-191; [John Reynolds], *Vox Coeli* (London, 1624). On a different interpretation than my own, Sharpe stated that despite James’s desire for a Spanish marriage, few doubted the King’s protestantism. See Kevin Sharpe, ‘Parliamentary History 1603-1629: In or out of Perspective?’, in Sharpe (ed.), *Faction and Parliament*, p. 22.

²⁰ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 7.

Infanta were considered within, and superseded by, higher reason(s) of state.²¹ This interpretation is of critical importance since in the final period of negotiations, despite the parties having reached an agreement on the religious articles, and even following the arrival of Pope Urban VIII's dispensation to Spain in 1623, the dynastic marriage never took place.

1.1 The Marriage Negotiations

When James I and Philip III signed the peace treaty at Somerset House in 1604, because the agreement was reached so early on in their respective reigns, the subjects of both countries were convinced that conflict between the Protestant country and the Catholic monarchy was not necessary. Many considered that the tensions must have resulted from the actions of the previous sovereigns.²² Peace between England and Spain was an event of great importance for contemporaries. It had significant repercussions, not only in Europe, but also in the division of areas of influence in the East and West Indies. As Walter Raleigh considered before the peace was signed, the potential consequences of an agreement with Spain were 'many and most weighty'.²³ Among those, the alliance between the English and the Spanish crowns was aimed at strengthening trading relations between the two countries.²⁴ Indeed, commerce between England and the

²¹ In Spanish documents, the terms 'razón' and 'conveniencia' are often used interchangeably when referring to Reason of State.

²² On the 1604 Anglo-Spanish peace and the importance of James I's initiative in the conclusion of the treaty, see Cross, 'To Counterbalance the World', pp. 33-70. RAH, Z-8, Anthony Sherley, *Discurso excelentísimo de la conueniencia de Los Casamientos del Principe de Inglaterra con la serenissima Infanta de Hespaña*, f. 9v: 'Esta guerra que nació entre España y Inglaterra tuvo su principio mas de lo imaginado que de lo esencial, y se apago luego con la mudanza de los Reyes que la encendieron, como cossa que Realmente nacio de la opinion dellos.' Another copy of Sherley's text can be found at BNE, Mss/10794, fols. 151r-200v.

²³ Walter Raleigh, 'A Discourse Touching a War with Spain, and of the Protecting of the Netherlands', in *Raleigh's Works*, vol. 8, p. 314.

²⁴ BL, Stowe, ms 164, f. 86r. On Anglo-Habsburg trade relations being intertwined with politics, see Samson, 'The Marriage of Philip of Habsburg and Mary Tudor', p. 22.

Iberian Peninsula had always been crucially beneficial to both powers and commercial relations had not stopped even during the long war between Philip II and Elizabeth I in the late sixteenth century.²⁵

According to article IX of the 1604 Treaty of London, free commerce was to be established and maintained between the King of Spain and the King of England ‘as well by Land as by Sea and fresh Water, in all and singular the Kingdoms, Dominions and Islands’. The kingdoms and dominions mentioned in the treaty, however, were by no means all the territories belonging to the King of Spain but only those ‘in which commerce was held before the breaking out of the War’.²⁶ As such, the article did not include the Indies. The Spanish believed that while the peace treaty was strictly necessary for the safety of the overseas possessions of the Iberian monarchy,²⁷ it was, nevertheless, imperative for the freedom of trade only to be granted to territories that had previously held such freedom. The East Indies therefore ought to remain excluded from the free trade ‘as they always have been’.²⁸

As was expected given the criticism that accompanied the signing of the Treaty in 1604, the first articles to be disregarded were precisely those concerning trade in the Indies. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the English did not agree with the Iberian powers forbidding their commerce in the East. Contemporary commentators criticised Philip III and his ministers for restricting trade despite the treaty concluded

²⁵ Pauline Croft, ‘Trading with the Enemy 1585-1604’, *HJ*, 32 (1989), 281-302. See also Richard Stone, ‘The Overseas Trade of Bristol before the Civil War’, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 23 (2011), 211-39.

²⁶ ‘A Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Alliance between Philip III, King of Spain, and the Archduke and Archdutches Albert and Isabella on the one side, and James I of England on the other side, 1604’, in *Treaties*, p. 137.

²⁷ AGS, E., Leg., 2557, doc. 22, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 14 April 1604.

²⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2557, doc. 12, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 25 March 1604: ‘El comercio entre sus Reynos sea abierto comun y libre y asegurado en las partes donde por lo pasado lo a sido, fuera de las Indias [...] que deven quedar excluydas dellas como siempre lo han sido’.

with England, and English merchants often complained of the treatment the Spanish subjected them to.²⁹

In order to make the peace effectively binding and reduce rivalry overseas, the possibility of a marriage agreement between Henry, James's eldest son, and the Spanish Infanta Ana started to be considered even before the peace treaty was concluded in 1604. King James I hoped that a dynastic union between the Stuarts and the Habsburgs of Spain would maintain peace in Europe. The Spanish considered the marriage as an effective means of strengthening the peace but they agreed during a meeting of the Council of State in March 1604 that any potential dynastic union had to be discussed only *after* the peace agreement was ratified 'according to the order that has always been followed in matters of this kind'.³⁰ Since the beginning, the Spanish linked the possibility of a marriage to an increased tolerance for English Catholics and also advanced the idea that the Prince of Wales would be raised at the Spanish court.³¹ They could not believe that the King of England was 'so foolish (*desatinado*) to think that he can obtain this without becoming a Catholic'.³²

Despite rumours of a Spanish marriage for Prince Henry, the dynastic alliance did not materialise. In contrast, Philip III preferred to strengthen ties with France thanks to the double marriage in 1615 between the Infanta Ana and King Louis XIII of France

²⁹ Thomas Roe to the Earl of Salisbury, 28 February 1611: 'they [Spanish] use us whose hands are bound [by Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1604] with any contumely and treachery', quot. in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 104.

³⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2557, doc. 12, Meeting of the Council of State, 25 March 1604: 'in order to discuss this [marriage between Prince Henry and the Infanta Ana] it is convenient that the Prince becomes Catholic and so does his Kingdom'.

³¹ See Robert Cross, 'Closer Together and Further Apart. Religious Politics and Political Culture in the British-Spanish Match, 1596-1625', in *Diplomacy and Marriage Early Stuart Dynastic Politics, 1604-1630*, ed. by Valentina Caldari and Sara Wolfson (Boydell and Brewer, forthcoming 2016).

³² AGS, E., Leg. 2557, doc. 12. On the importance of Prince Henry's conversion given that the Infanta Ana was then Philip III's heiress presumptive as the Spanish King had not yet fathered a son, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 8-9.

and between Philip, the future Philip IV of Spain, and Elizabeth of Bourbon, sister of the French king.³³ The numerous marriage agreements being signed in this period were a consequence of Spain decreasing its involvement in European conflicts, and was partly encouraged, for the Spanish-French unions, by Pope Clement VIII.³⁴ While negotiating the Spanish union, France experienced the same difficulties that were forthcoming for James when he decided to pursue a Spanish Match for his son and heir. The French Huguenots in fact believed that an alliance with the Catholic Monarchy threatened the very existence of the Protestant religion.³⁵ Meanwhile, Marie de Medici considered the Franco-Spanish marriages and the subsequent peace as her greatest diplomatic success.³⁶ James I would think the same of his attempts to conclude the Anglo-Spanish match.

Having attempted a French and a Savoyard marriage, after the death of his heir apparent Henry in 1612, and especially following his daughter Elizabeth's marriage to the Protestant Frederick V of the Palatinate in 1613,³⁷ James tried to revive negotiations for a Spanish match in order to rebalance the European confessional chessboard. The marriage negotiations, this time concerning Prince Charles and the Infanta María, were officially reopened by King James between 1616 and 1617. In the previous years, the King of England had considered a dynastic union with France for his son.³⁸ Spain

³³ On the cultural aspects of the double marriage celebrations, see McGowan, *Dynastic Marriages*.

³⁴ Elliott, 'The Political Context' in McGowan (ed.), *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 5-18 (p.8).

³⁵ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter I, p. 3. See also, Nicolas Le Roux, 'A Time of Frenzy: Dreams of Union and Aristocratic Turmoil (1610-1615)', in McGowan (ed.), *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 19-38 (p. 34).

³⁶ See Ian Fenlon 'Competition and Emulation: Music and Dance for the Celebrations in Paris, 1612-1615', in McGowan (ed.), *Dynastic Marriages*, pp. 137-54. See also Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter II, Savoy, 24 January 1616, pp. 10-27 (pp. 24-25). In addition to the Match with Spain, 'the iniquitie of the murder of Kinge Henry 4.', 'corrupt councillors', and religious Edicts' were considered among the principal causes for disturbance in France.

³⁷ Sara Smart and Mara R. Wade (eds.), *The Palatine Wedding of 1613. Protestant Alliance and Court Festival* (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013).

³⁸ Thrush, 'The French marriage'.

regarded the possibility of an Anglo-French union as alarming because of ‘the concerns and dangerous designs that can follow from the alliance between the two crowns’.³⁹ In 1606, James I and Henry IV had signed an agreement that allowed their merchants to ‘traffick safely and freely with one another’.⁴⁰ Such sharing in trade was critical if the Iberian crown hoped to maintain its monopoly in the Indies as well as having favourable bilateral agreements with other powers in Europe. As a ‘special relation’ between the Dutch and the English was already in place, as confirmed by treaties signed in 1608 and 1619,⁴¹ Spain could not allow a potential dynastic union between England and France to threaten its position further.

In 1616 James had already sent assurances to Spain that the negotiations for a marriage between England and France had been abandoned and he was now ready to devote himself to an agreement with Spain for his heir Charles.⁴² The situation in 1616 and early 1617, however, remained ambivalent, as it is evident from the news circulating in Europe and from letters by various correspondents. It still appeared to many that the possibility was to marry either in Spain or France as the King of England was constantly wooed by the two countries to marry the Prince of Wales to their respective daughters. James intended to keep most of his negotiations secret and, as a consequence, Sir George Carew commented that ‘no man knows’ upon which of them the lot will fall’.⁴³

³⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 10.

⁴⁰ ‘A Treaty between Henry IVth, King of France, and James the Ist, King of England, for the Security and Freedom of Commerce between their Subjects’, Paris 24th 1606, in *Treaties*, p. 148.

⁴¹ ‘A Treaty of Guaranty by James I for the Treaty between the Archduke and Archduchess Albert and Isabella, and the States General of the United Provinces’, The Hague, 26 June 1608, in *Treaties*, pp. 157-61. According to this treaty, the help to the United Provinces and any other agreement ratified by Elizabeth I was going to remain in place during James’s reign. See also, ‘A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies’, London, 2 June 1619, in *Treaties*, pp. 188-202.

⁴² AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 77. According to Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano, the Anglo-French marriage negotiations had already stopped in 1615. See Rodríguez-Moñino Soriano, *Razon de Estado*, p. 50.

⁴³ Maclean (ed), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter III, Savoy, 18 January 1616, pp. 27-79 (p. 69).

From Cologne, there were rumours of difficulties concerning the points of religion.⁴⁴ William Trumbull, James I's agent at the court of Archdukes Albert and Isabella,⁴⁵ received news that 'this marriage between England and Spain is not as certain as is generally feared by some and wished by others'.⁴⁶ Indeed, it is common to find in the correspondence of the years 1616-1617 a shared sense of uncertainty on both sides concerning the proceedings of the Spanish Match and whether or not 'it was so forward as reported'.⁴⁷

The seriousness of the new negotiations, however, seemed to be confirmed in 1617 by King James's decision to send Sir John Digby as his envoy to Madrid with articles to be considered by the King of Spain. This was a reason for some commentators to assert that those in favour of the match were then greater in number and held more power than those who were opposed to the union.⁴⁸ Carew, also commenting on the marriage between the Prince and the Infanta in a letter to Sir Thomas Roe in January 1617, considered that, despite Digby having been sent to Spain by King James, the union remained 'dowbtfull'.⁴⁹ Even once the news of Digby's arrival in Madrid reached London where he was reported that James's ambassador had been received with great

⁴⁴ News from Cologne, 9/19 December 1616, HMC Trumbull, p. 60.

⁴⁵ Sonia P. Anderson, 'Trumbull, William (1576–1635), diplomat and government official', *ODNB*.

⁴⁶ Benjamin Buwinckhausen to William Trumbull, 2 January 1617, HMC Trumbull, p. 83. See also Macanzio to Cavendish, Venice, 17 June 1616, in *Fulgenzio Macanzio, Lettere a William Cavendish (1615-1628) nella versione inglese di Thomas Hobbes*, ed. Roberto Ferrini (Roma: Istituto storico, 1987), p. 58.

⁴⁷ *CSPD*, vol. II, Sir John Throgmorton to Carleton, Whitefriars, 1 January 1617. See also TNA, SP 14/94, f. 115, Sir Gerard Herbert to Carleton, London, 20 December 1617; TNA, SP 14/95, f. 6, Nathaniel Brent to Carleton, London, 2 January 1618; AGS, E., Leg. 2514, docs. 77 and 79.

⁴⁸ HMC Trumbull, Jean Beaulieu to William Trumbull, 31 January 1617: 'The Spanish marriage is so wholly pursued by the favorers of the same, who are most powerfull in credit and number that the opponents [...] are much discomforted in the hope of their endeavors; and nowe the speech is much revived on the sending of Sir John Digby into Spaine about this occasion.'

⁴⁹ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter IV, Savoy, 18 January 1617, pp. 80-139 (p. 113).

honour at the Spanish court, no news were learned of the main ‘employment’ that he was sent to conclude.⁵⁰

Although it is difficult to get an idea of the English and the Spanish respective political nations’ opinion, I argue that when the Junta of theologians drafted its recommendations in Madrid and Digby brought the articles proposed by King James to Spain in 1617, the marriage negotiations seemed closer to a successful conclusion than they ever had previously.⁵¹ In fact, by comparing what the Spanish theologians agreed on in 1617 with the articles presented in Madrid by the English ambassador in the same year, we can find strong resemblances. King James agreed with the majority of the requests proposed by the divines. Regarding the Oath of Allegiance, the Spanish junta decided that it should bind Catholics only on temporal and political matters and not in the religious sphere. In the marriage articles that King James sent to Spain it was stated that Catholics ‘suscipient juramentum fidelitatis Regi Magnae Britanniae’ but the oath would not include any clause or word against the Catholic religion.⁵² Moreover, James also acknowledged the theologians’ request that the King of Spain should decide the members of the Infanta’s household in England.⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 129.

⁵¹ An Anglo-Spanish dynastic union had been negotiated with alternate fortunes since 1603-1604. See Cross, ‘To Counterbalance the World’, p. 57 and p. 64; Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 12

⁵² The theologians decided ‘Que a lós Catholicos no se pidan el juramento de fidelidad en la forma que ahora se hace en aquel Reyno; este es que en solo lo temporal y politico los obligue, y no en materia tocante á religion’ and James’s proposed articles given to Digby stated ‘Quod Catholici qui in Angliam migrabunt suscipient juramentum fidelitatis Regi Magnae Britanniae cum omnibus clausulis et cautionibus, quas sua Majestas mandaverit, modo nulla sit clausula neque verbum in dicto juramento quod contradicat religioni Catholicae, neque conscientiis Catholicorum.’ Emphasis mine.

⁵³ According to the theologians ‘the number of servants, both lay and clerical, may be such her Highness shall wish by the orders of the King our Lord [Philip III]. King James agreed ‘Quod Serma Domina Infanta servos et familiam suam hinc habitura est per electionem et nominationem patris sui Serma Regis Hispaniae.’ Emphasis mine.

While the negotiations seemed to progress positively at the high levels of politics, the English public sphere was still for the most part opposed to a union with the Spanish Habsburgs. In turn, the Spanish were sceptical that King James would agree to eliminate penal laws against Catholics in England.⁵⁴ Despite the progress made by 1617, many still saw major problems to overcome before considering an Anglo-Spanish union.

Moreover, by the end of 1616, the Spanish ambassador in London, Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, had asked the Spanish King for permission to return to Spain due to his health.⁵⁵ Philip III postponed his departure from England as he considered Sarmiento to be a key intermediary in the marriage negotiations with King James.⁵⁶ In fact, by the end of 1617, Sarmiento was assigned the title he had requested of ‘Count of Gondomar’, yet he was not allowed to go back to Spain and was only given permission to return to his home country in 1618.⁵⁷ In his place, a special agent, Juan Sanchez de Ulloa, was at James’s court between 1618 and 1620. On more than one occasion, Ulloa wrote to Madrid that there was urgent need for Gondomar to return to England in his place, since he was the only one who knew England well enough and the best placed to manage ‘these important negotiations’ while maintaining the King of England’s friendship.⁵⁸

The envoy hoped for the resident ambassador to be back in London at his earliest convenience, especially once one of the most well-known opponents of any alliance with Spain, Walter Raleigh, was released after a long imprisonment in the Tower of London. Not only was he released from prison, but King James also granted him a patent to pursue a new journey to Guyana where Raleigh was to go in search of the El

⁵⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 37. See also AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 28.

⁵⁵ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, docs. 69, 77, and 84.

⁵⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 84: ‘importa tanto alli su asistencia para la platica de casamiento.’ See also BPR, II/2107, docs. 50, 51, and 56.

⁵⁷ On people congratulating Sarmiento on his new title of Count of Gondomar, see BPR, II/2107, docs. 15-25.

⁵⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 845, doc. 131.

Dorado mines that he believed would bring him back to royal favour. While James's patent required him not to cross the border to Spanish territories,⁵⁹ Raleigh attacked the Spanish settlement of San Thomé in January 1618.⁶⁰ Upon his return to England, Raleigh was executed for treason, formally for the accusation still pending on him from 1603.⁶¹

Ulloa was not the only one to hope for Gondomar's reappearance in London. The hispanophiles at the English court feared that a prolonged absence by the ambassador would strengthen the anti-Spanish faction at court and all those within the political nation against the Stuart-Habsburg match. In fact, Cottington wrote to Gondomar explaining how urgent his return to England was, given that people opposing the marriage were insisting that Spain was no longer interested in the negotiations.⁶²

The Venetian ambassador was particularly active in spreading rumours against Spanish commitment to the dynastic union as he declared that the Spaniards were merely aiming at distracting the Prince of Wales and had no intention of marrying the Infanta to him unless he became a Catholic. For this reason, according to the Venetian envoy, the King of Spain was still discussing the possibility of marrying the Infanta to the son of the Emperor.⁶³ This was indeed a long-standing rumour, whose circulation only increased following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. Carew had already

⁵⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2515, docs. 6 and 7.

⁶⁰ Mark Nicholls and Penry Williams, 'Raleigh, Sir Walter (1554-1618), courtier, explorer and author', *ODNB*.

⁶¹ On this episode in the context of the Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations, see chp II below.

⁶² AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 22. See also Óscar Ruiz Fernández, 'Las relaciones hispano-inglesas entre 1603 y 1625. Diplomacia, comercio, y guerra naval' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Valladolid, 2012), p. 184.

⁶³ BPR, II/2198, doc. 78, Relación sobre las dificultades para llevar a cabo la boda entre el principe de Gales y la Infanta María [1623]. See also, *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Girolamo Lando to the Doge and Senate, 3 September 1621. On the parallel negotiations for a marriage between the Infanta and the Emperor's son, see Rubén González Cuerva 'The Austrian Match: The dynastic Alternative of the Habsburgs and European Politics', in Caldari and Wolfson (eds), *Diplomacy and Marriage*. See also, Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 70; Pursell, 'The End of the Anglo-Spanish Match', p. 707.

reported in January 1617 of rumours ‘from all the parts of Europe’ that Philip III had promised the Infanta to the Habsburgs of Austria. Carew could not judge on the reliability of the source and had considered wise then to wait for the intelligence gathered by Sir John Digby, recently sent as ambassador to Madrid.⁶⁴

The outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War in 1618 and the acceptance of the crown of Bohemia by James’s son-in-law, Frederick V of the Palatinate, in 1619, made the marriage negotiations even more complex. The King of England disapproved of Frederick’s actions and decided to try to prevent his subjects, ‘dear to him as his children’, from being involved in ‘an unjust and needless quarrel’.⁶⁵

Frederick stated that he accepted the crown of Bohemia because he had been chosen by unanimous vote and in order to ‘prevent further misfortune’.⁶⁶ The Austrian Habsburgs, however, considered Bohemia to be *de facto* their hereditary possession rather than a territory governed by an elected ruler. Frederick V tried to prevent likely accusations that he had acted impulsively when accepting the crown by assuring the audience of his proclamation that he had first appealed to God in order to make the right decision.⁶⁷

The Elector Palatine’s acceptance of the Bohemian crown, however, made him a rebel in the eyes of the Habsburgs as well as in those of James I. From the start of the conflict, Frederick received little official support from the King of England as he was not willing to get involved in the Empire’s political and confessional divisions. James

⁶⁴ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter IV, Savoy, 18 January 1617, pp. 80-139 (p. 117).

⁶⁵ TNA, SP 14/110, f. 46v., Chamberlain to Carleton, 2 October 1619. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 13.

⁶⁶ ‘Open Letter from Frederick V regarding his acceptance of the Bohemian Crown’, 7 November 1619, in *The Thirty Years’ War. A Sourcebook*, ed. by Peter Wilson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 47-52 (p. 49 and p. 51). See also, Questier, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Wilson (ed.), *Sourcebook*, p. 50.

decided not to directly intervene on behalf of his son-in-law in spite of the King of Spain and his allies not respecting the cessation of arms they had promised to maintain.⁶⁸ King James's daughter, Elizabeth, appealed in vain for assistance to her father and asked Charles to act as an intermediary to the King. According to the Queen of Bohemia, James was to act quickly if he wanted to prevent the Palatinate to be completely occupied as 'his slackness to assist us doth make the Princes of the Union slack too, who do nothing with their army'.⁶⁹

To the English protests that territories belonging to the Palatine and his wife had been taken at a time when the Habsburgs had agreed on a truce, Philip IV answered that the conquest was justified because the Elector Palatine had never formally accepted the truce. In addition, Frederick would no longer enjoy the title of Elector which was assigned instead to Maximilian of Bavaria 'because of the links of friendship between the King [of Spain] and the House of Austria'.⁷⁰ The same argument of familiarity between the two Habsburg branches was used by the proponents of an Austrian marriage for the Infanta, rather than a dynastic union with England.⁷¹

Given the precarious situation of James's son-in-law title and possessions, in November 1620 the King of England issued a summons for Parliament to meet the following January in order to obtain subsidies for a potential war against the Habsburgs. War was going to be necessary if diplomatic means, which James still preferred and hoped to employ in order to restore Frederick and Elizabeth to the Palatinate, were to fail. On 6

⁶⁸ See *CSPD*, vol. III, Chamberlain to Carleton, 24 November 1621.

⁶⁹ 'Queen Elizabeth appeals for assistance', 25 September 1620, in Wilson (ed.), *Sourcebook*, p. 53.

⁷⁰ BPR, II/2167, doc. 89, Philip IV's answer to the Duke of Bristol and Walter Aston, Madrid, 29 December 1623.

⁷¹ John H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 203 onwards. See also, BNE, Mss/2354, f.13: Parecer del Consejo de Estado dela Corte de España sobre el Casamiento del Principe de Gales, y parecer particular del Conde Duque de Olivares disuadiendo del dicho casamiento con la Ynfanta de Castilla.

January 1622, King James issued a proclamation to dissolve that same Parliament. The reasons for the dissolution, as stated by the King's Proclamation, were that James needed subsidies to solve the difficult situation of Christianity in Europe and restore his children, Frederick V and his wife Elizabeth, to what was rightfully theirs.⁷² Some members, however, had taken the liberty not only to discuss issues that were a matter of royal prerogative but also 'to speake with less respect of foreign princes our allies than were fit for any subject to do of any anointed King.'⁷³ Outside the Parliament, those who spoke ill of the King of Spain, or of his ambassadors, were to be punished severely.⁷⁴

James found himself in 1620-21 reluctantly forced to convene the assembly: the reason was that he needed to be able, in the eyes of his subjects and those of other European monarchs, to finance a war. The Parliament of 1621 was summoned in a crucial moment of the marriage negotiations between Charles and the Infanta. While King James did not want to intervene in what he perceived as a war of religion, he also realised he could not remain a spectator. To make himself credible as a mediator, and persuade the other European powers that he was going to intervene in favour of his son-in-law if his possessions were unreturned, he needed the promise of financial support from his Parliament. Before the beginning of the first session, Buckingham wrote to Ambassador Gondomar to reassure him that the King of England had never 'advised nor compelled his sonne in law to accept the kingdome of Bohemia but, on the opposite he had tried to dissuade him'. For this reason, Buckingham continued, the King of England

⁷² Tanner, pp. 289-295; Larkin and Hughes, vol. I, pp. 527-34. On 'this time of miserable distraction throughout Christendom' as defined by James in his proclamation, see also FSL, ms.V.b.207, 'Mirabilia Huius Anni.'

⁷³ Tanner, p. 293.

⁷⁴ TNA, SP 94/24, f. 160. See also, *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Relazione of England by Girolamo Lando, Venetian Ambassador, 21 September 1622.

wished to remain neutral as he believed that it was the right choice to make according to his conscience and in order to maintain his honour.⁷⁵ Shortly after, Gondomar reported to Philip III the assurances obtained from James⁷⁶ when the ambassador described how ‘puritan pressures’ were urging the King of England to intervene in defence of his grandchildren's inheritance.⁷⁷

The negotiating position of James in 1621 was probably stronger than he himself had realised. Despite the Stuart sovereign experiencing problems with his House of Commons questioning the suitability of the match with Spain, the Council of State in Madrid dreaded the possibility of a break with England as the Spanish treasury was empty.⁷⁸ Moreover, any Spanish fleet coming from the Indies constantly risked of being assaulted by enemies of Spain.⁷⁹ The outbreak of conflict with England would have only contributed to worsen the situation. In 1621, the Spanish monarchy had ‘greater need to keep friends than to lose them’.⁸⁰

After explaining to MPs that the Parliament depended upon the King, as the sovereign was the head and the assembly the body,⁸¹ King James made sure in his opening speech, on 30 January 1621, that it was clear what he was expecting from the assembly: subsidies for ‘an urgent cause’. Secretary Calvert echoed the King on 5 February by asserting that the issue of the Palatinate was pressing and the Commons had to make

⁷⁵ TNA, SP 94/24, fols. 46-52.

⁷⁶ Gondomar to Philip III, 28 March 1620, *CODOIN*, vol. II, pp. 280-281.

⁷⁷ AGS, E., Leg. 2558, doc. 6, Gondomar to State Council, 2 January 1622: ‘este Rey no le juntará mas en su vida, a los menos con tal gente como la que havía.’ On an excellent discussion concerning ‘tal gente’ which Gondomar often defined as ‘Puritanos’, see Glyn Redworth, *Gondomar and Parliaments* (forthcoming, 2016), pp. 4-7.

⁷⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2559, doc. 71.

⁷⁹ Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 105.

⁸⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2849, quot. in Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 105.

⁸¹ King James's opening speech, *CD 1621*, vol. II, p. 3.

sure to do their best to help James as ‘an akeing head makes a sicke bodie’.⁸² In fact, if war and peace depended on the will of the sovereign, it was the duty of the Parliament to provide supply. If MPs would fulfil their duty, James said in his opening speech, ‘then will there be a happie Kinge and a happie Parliament’.⁸³ Even if he had been reluctantly compelled to summon the MPs, the King had intended to make sure that this was ‘the happiest Parliament that ever was’, as he stated in the 1622 Proclamation for its dissolution. Indeed, the first session, was held in great harmony ‘as can not be paralleled by any former time’.⁸⁴ The Commons voted two subsidies without passing any legislation first and James thanked them for having ‘given reputation to his affairs at home and abroad’.⁸⁵ The Venetian ambassador reported that the parliament was working harmoniously with the King and the MPs were trying to please the sovereign by proceeding with moderation concerning foreign affairs and avoiding to address issues that might upset him.⁸⁶

During the sessions of the 1621 Parliament, aside from the issue of the Palatinate, a crucial item among James’s priorities was religion. The King was eager to demonstrate to his subjects that he would neither abandon his own nor his kingdom’s religion for the sake of a match with Spain and he would not allow English Catholics to grow powerful in the hope for a marriage with the Catholic power.⁸⁷ Despite King James’s assurance that he would only agree to a marriage for the prince if the union promoted the glory of

⁸² *CD 1621*, vol. IV, pp. 3-4 and p. 13.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Tanner, p. 290.

⁸⁵ Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage*, vol. I, p. 401.

⁸⁶ *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Lando to the Doge and Senate, 2 April 1621.

⁸⁷ *CD 1621*, vol. IV, pp. 3-4; *CD 1621*, vol. II, p.7.

God and the welfare of the kingdom, MPs remained doubtful. Indeed, in the words of Edward Gyles in one of the most animated foreign policy debates in November 1621:

Our King the Chief of true Religion, the King of Spayne of the other. Either of these will do his best for their Religion. How can these two great Kings agree in Peace, and yet have Wars?⁸⁸

A crucial question, which admitted no easy solution, was addressed to Parliament: how could King James continue to pursue a Spanish marriage at a time when the Habsburgs were jeopardising the integrity of Frederick V and Elizabeth's territories?⁸⁹ In 1621, MPs were asked to provide subsidies to achieve war and peace at the same time: they were requested to fight the Spanish in the Palatinate and be friends with them everywhere else.⁹⁰ This possibility, mostly ignored by the English East India Company which continued to be in conflict with the Iberian monarchy in the East,⁹¹ would be reversed during the Parliament of 1624. Then, instead of a conflict in Europe and peace elsewhere, the MPs proposed to have a war of diversion in the Indies to drain Spanish soldiers and finances and avoid a conflict in Europe after the breaking of the treaties.⁹²

⁸⁸ *CJ*, vol. I (1547-1629), pp. 644-47, 26 November 1621.

⁸⁹ Harris, *Rebellion*, p. 187.

⁹⁰ *CD 1621*, vol. IV, p. 438.

⁹¹ See chp. III below.

⁹² Among others, Sir Robert Phelips called for a war of diversion in 1624; Journal of the House of Commons, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/12. See also chp. V below. See also Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 72. On the possibility of a war of diversion mentioned in the 1621 Parliament, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 30-32. Redworth rightly states that MPs in 1621 were ready to call for 'a worldwide religious war against the Spanish Empire', I do not believe, however, that the war they intended in the Indies had strong religious connotations.

The status of the negotiations seemed to improve again at the end of 1622 as by then Charles was learning Spanish⁹³ and, it was reported, a few court ladies in London had already become Catholic ‘in expectation of the Spanish match’.⁹⁴ Moreover, before returning to Spain, Gondomar had successfully persuaded Prince Charles to go to Madrid the following year in order to bring the Infanta back with him.⁹⁵ The Prince’s ‘alcalhuete’ was convinced that Charles was ready to travel to the Spanish capital and put himself in the hands of the Spanish King.⁹⁶

As soon as Charles arrived in Spain in disguise with the Duke of Buckingham in March 1623, Philip IV granted Gondomar the honour that he had hoped to gain for a long time, to sit among the members of the Council of State in Madrid.⁹⁷ The position was given to him as recognition of the great efforts demonstrated in favour of the marriage negotiations, for having maintained good relations between Madrid and London, and especially for having convinced the heir to the English throne to come to Spain, which gave Philip IV a strong negotiating advantage.⁹⁸ Once Charles was in Madrid, not only were the theologians able to ask for stricter religious conditions, but also the Council of State was able to put pressure on the Prince concerning reparation for the East India Company’s recent taking of a critical Portuguese port in the East Indies.⁹⁹

By 1624, the marriage negotiations between Prince Charles and the Infanta Maria had not led to any results. While formally the agreement was still in place as Charles

⁹³ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 51; Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 41. On Spanish material being translated into English see, Alexander Samson, ‘1623 and the Politics of Translation’, in Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*, pp. 91-106.

⁹⁴ TNA, SP 14/96, f. 89, Nathaniel Brent to Carleton, London, 14 February 1618.

⁹⁵ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 54-55; Pursell, ‘The End of the Spanish Match’, p. 705.

⁹⁶ Redworth, ‘Pimps and Princes’, pp. 405-406.

⁹⁷ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 236.

⁹⁸ BPR, II/2167, doc 12, Royal Order of His Majesty, Madrid, 21 March 1623.

⁹⁹ On the taking of Hormuz by the East India Company in 1622 and its consequences on the marriage negotiations, see chp. III below.

had left a proxy behind with the Earl of Bristol,¹⁰⁰ and preparations were made for the Infanta to move to England, many in London were convinced that neither marriage nor the Palatinate's restitution was to be expected from Spain.¹⁰¹ During the 1624 Parliament, King James asked MPs to express their opinion on whether or not the treaties with Spain should be rescinded.¹⁰² Following the Duke of Buckingham's report concerning his stay in Madrid with Prince Charles, most MPs agreed that it was time to break the treaties with the King of Spain, especially since the Prince himself 'seems very averse to it'.¹⁰³ After the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham's journey to Madrid in 1623 and the problematic parliament of 1624, Charles married a French bride, Henrietta Maria,¹⁰⁴ and decided to declare war on Spain in 1625.

Despite Ambassador Gondomar's attempts to act as an intermediary between the two crowns, the chartered companies, and the Council of Portugal, between 1617 and 1624 various episodes of conflict in the Indies had contributed to delay the marriage negotiations. Twenty years after the Treaty of London, the agreement had failed. No dynastic marriage had intervened to maintain the fragile peace between the two countries.

1.2 Religion and the 'Puritan Faction'

¹⁰⁰ Proxy was to expire by Christmas 1623 but was then extended until March 1624. See TNA, SP 108/543, 'Prince of Wales's Instrument for proroguing ye celebration of his Marriage with the Infanta from December 25 to March', 14/24 November 1623.

¹⁰¹ *CSPD*, vol. IV, Conway to Carleton, Whitehall, 26 February 1624. On news arriving to London concerning the Palatinate, see Jayne E. E. Boys, *London's News Press and the Thirty Years' War* (Boydell & Brewer, 2011). On Spanish preparations for wedding celebrations in Madrid, see AGI, Indiferente General, 428, L. 35.

¹⁰² Marvin Arthur Breslow, *A Mirror of England. English Puritan Views of the Foreign Nations, 1618-1640* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 27-30.

¹⁰³ TNA, SP 14/158, fols. 91-92, Chamberlain to Carleton, 31 January 1624.

¹⁰⁴ *CSPD*, vol. IV, Dudley Carleton to Sir Carleton, London, 26 June 1624.

Commenting on the 1604 Anglo-Spanish peace, the Archbishop of Valencia had stated that not only peace and friendship with ‘infidels’ were forbidden by the Holy Scriptures, but also that the treaty would lead to disastrous consequences. There were only two conditions under which peace between Catholics and heretics could be considered lawful: if there was hope that the heretic country would convert to the obedience of Rome or if the heretical armies were superior to those of the Catholic country. According to the Archbishop, neither of these reasons were valid in the case of the 1604 peace between England and Spain. There was no hope for England’s conversion to Catholicism but instead English Catholics continued to send news of their persecution as being worse than it was in Elizabethan times. As to armed forces, it was unthinkable that ‘the forces of a King master of only one Island were larger than those of the most powerful King that the world has ever had’.¹⁰⁵ According to Anthony Sherley, however, even if there were no other benefits to the marriage between England and Spain, the fact that ‘all Christianity would enjoy peace and tranquility [...] and the conflicts in the world would be solved,’ was a good reason in itself for both Kings to agree to the union.¹⁰⁶

In order for the long-term religious benefits of a union with a heretical country to overcome the short-term disadvantages, Popes hoped to obtain guarantees from the Catholic sovereigns that the terms agreed in the marriage contract would be respected. For example, in 1626, Pope Urban VIII wrote to the French King instructing him to

¹⁰⁵ RAH, N-31, doc. 8, Copya de una carta que escriuio el patriarca de Valencia Don Juan de Riuera a Su Mag.d contra las paces de Ynglaterra, 27 January 1608, fols. 193v-194r: ‘sean mayores las fuerças de un Rey señor de una Ysla sola que las de el mas poderoso Rey que a tenido el mundo.’ Other copies of the Archbishop of Valencia’s account at RAH, L-24, fols. 680r-700r; AGS, Estado 212, Meeting of the Council of State, 15 March 1608. See also Bernardo J. García García, ‘Tiempo de paces’, in *Tiempo de Paces*, pp. 17-35 (pp. 30-33).

¹⁰⁶ RAH, Z-8, f. 21v.

ensure that Charles I would meet the religious conditions promised in the marriage capitulations agreed with his sister, Henrietta Maria. According to the Pope, it was the duty of the Most Christian French King that the improvements for the English Catholics were complied with. Otherwise, he should never have agreed to marry his sister to a heretic prince. The purpose of such a union was, in the short-term, improved conditions for the Catholics in England and, in the long-term, the King of England's conversion to Catholicism. This was the task to which the King of France was called and great glory would have arisen if he were to restore England to the obedience of Rome.¹⁰⁷ Not only did Charles not convert to Catholicism but he also did not respect many of the articles in the marriage agreement, for example regarding Henrietta's Catholic household.¹⁰⁸

The same task had been given by the Pope to the Spanish King Philip III while he was negotiating a wedding with the prince of Wales for his daughter, the Infanta Ana, and then to Philip IV for his sister, the Infanta María. Pope Gregory XV, and then Urban VIII, asked the Catholic Kings in the early 1620s to guarantee the respect of the religious conditions as adjusted by the theologians in Rome.¹⁰⁹ The Junta in Spain discussed methods to encourage the conversion of the English subjects to the Catholic religion: for example, the Infanta had to carefully choose the ladies that would have accompanied her to England.¹¹⁰ Specifically, they had 'to follow the example of Dona Luisa de Carvajal'.¹¹¹ Philip IV was hesitant to make promises to the Pope concerning something over which he had little control such as the behaviour of the King and the

¹⁰⁷ RAH, N-32, fols. 81-82 Copia de una carta de nuestro muy S. Padre Urbano VIII Para el Christianissimo Rey de Francia, Rome, 10 May 1626.

¹⁰⁸ Wolfson, 'Aristocratic Women', p. 18.

¹⁰⁹ BNE, VE/208/13, fols. 450-451; AGS, E., Leg. 2866, unfoliated. See also, Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', p. 710.

¹¹⁰ BPR, II/2165, doc. 75, Memorial sobre el medio de convertir a los ingleses al Catolicismo, S.I, [1618].

¹¹¹ Ibid. On Luisa de Carvajal and her missionary role in England, see Anne J. Cruz (ed. and transl), *The Life and Writings of Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza* (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2014), pp. 1-109 and Glyn Redworth, *The She-Apostle. The Extraordinary Life and Death of Luisa de Carvajal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Prince of Wales following the marriage and once the Infanta had gone to live in England. For this reason, among the articles added by the Spanish King there was one stating that James would abolish the laws against Catholics for a year (stretched by the Pope to three years) before the Infanta's arrival to England.¹¹²

The Count of Gondomar, however, insisted that it was better not to force the King of England to abolish the anti-Catholics laws publicly before the wedding, as this would have required convening Parliament where many enemies of James and the Anglo-Spanish Match would gather.¹¹³ At various stages of the marriage negotiations, the ambassador had reported to Spain the impossibility for the King of England to grant toleration for Catholics without the assembly to repeal the relevant legislation,¹¹⁴ and the Spanish envoy believed it was unadvisable to gather MPs. According to Gondomar, Philip III had to trust the King of England's promise that he would not persecute Catholics. One of the many tracts written on the topic stated that even considering the mission of the Catholic Kings in bringing the King of England back to Catholicism, the Spanish King had to consider the difficult situation of Europe and aim to maintain the union and friendship with the English King. Despite Philip III being expected to punish King James for his treatment of Catholics and for his disobedience to the Church of Rome, at that moment this was not possible, and 'God does not force us to [achieve] the impossible'.¹¹⁵ The Count Duke of Olivares believed that it was necessary instead to ask for much stricter guarantees than those proposed by the ambassador in London.¹¹⁶

¹¹² See *Narrative*, pp. 216-17.

¹¹³ BPR, II/2124, doc. 254, Joseph Creswell to the Count of Gondomar, Brussels, 28 May 1619.

¹¹⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 36.

¹¹⁵ BNE, Mss/10794, f. 213r. For a copy of the same document, see RAH, L-24, f. 594r.

¹¹⁶ Henar Pizarro Llorente, 'El Proyecto Matrimonial entre el Príncipe de Gales y la Infanta María (1623): Una polémica política y teológica', in *Fray Francisco de Jesús Jódar, Papeles sobre el Tratado de Matrimonio entre el Príncipe de Gales y la Infanta María de Austria (1623)*, eds. Henar Pizarro Llorente and Pablo María Garrido (Madrid: Ediciones Carmelitanas, 2009), pp. 9-78 (p. 26).

A council of theologians appointed by the King of Spain debated in several meetings the advantages and disadvantages of a marriage with England. The junta agreed that the ultimate goal of the union had necessarily to be the advancement of the Catholic cause in Europe¹¹⁷ as the Kings of Spain had always been the Catholic Kings and more than anybody else in the world should contribute to the spread of that religion.¹¹⁸ Their views on the ways in which this would occur, however, were discordant. Many of the Spanish theologians felt compelled to give counsel to the King about the marriage between Charles and María. There were two main recurring points of view in the numerous works concerning the union of the Catholic Infanta with the Protestant Prince.¹¹⁹

According to some, the marriage was against the law of God, which was made evident to the reader through examples taken from the Old and the New Testament of divine punishment inflicted to those who had decided to marry an infidel.¹²⁰ Even if the papal dispensation could overcome the problem of divine law, there was a risk that, once in England, the Infanta would convert to Protestantism and consequently undo the primary objective of the marriage, which was the increase of Catholicism in Europe. According to others, the marriage would result in the conversion of the Prince and the King of England, and would therefore lead to a glorious result for the King of Spain who would forever be remembered as the ruler who had brought England back to the obedience of Rome.¹²¹ Those who supported this point of view claimed that it was not the first time that a wedding would be celebrated between England and Spain, and that

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹¹⁸ RAH, L-24, f. 617r.

¹¹⁹ See, for example, RAH, L-24, fols. 535r-562r, Opinion of Doctor Roco Campofrio; fols. 606r-624r, Opinion of Friar Antonio Perez; fols. 626r-645r Opinion of Doctor Juan Miguel; fols. 663r-678r, Opinion of the Jesuit Father Ivan de Montemayor; and BNE, fols. 201- 212 Opinion of Pedro Mantuano.

¹²⁰ The non-Christian infidel is compared by Spanish theologians to the Protestant who has fallen into error by breaking away from the Church of Rome.

¹²¹ RAH, Z-8, f. 53v.

any potential risks were uncertain but instead the benefits that the union would bring to the Catholic religion and the peace of Christianity were certain.¹²²

Ideally, the Spanish sovereign would have liked Ambassador Gondomar to obtain all the religious conditions suggested by the Spanish theologians but as the two betrothed were of different confessions, it was to be expected that not all all of the theologians' requests would be accommodated by King James.¹²³ While a few theologians considered *all* of the religious requirements they listed as *conditio sine qua non* for the success of the Anglo-Spanish union,¹²⁴ towards the end of the marriage negotiations the majority of the Council of State and the King of Spain himself were more willing to compromise.

One of the greatest risks mentioned by those in Spain who were favourable to a union with England was that, if the Match were unsuccessful and Charles was to remain childless, Frederick V and his descendants would effectively inherit the English throne. Given the difficult situation in the territories of the Habsburgs of Austria following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the Spanish wanted to avoid at all costs a succession to the English throne by the Palatine's family.¹²⁵ When writing to Pope Gregory XV to speed up the dispensation, among the advantages of a marriage with England, Philip IV stressed precisely a rapid solution for the succession of that kingdom so that 'it could be avoided that the throne would fall into the hands of the Palatine, enemy of the Catholic religion'.¹²⁶ Indeed, according to some commentators, Frederick V had already tried to

¹²² BNE, Mss/10794, f. 199v.

¹²³ Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 103.

¹²⁴ See fn. 119.

¹²⁵ On the same position on the English side, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 19.

¹²⁶ BPR, II/2191, doc. 10, Philip IV to Pope Gregory XV, Madrid, 4 March 1623: 'conveniencia de que el matrimonio asegure la sucesión de su Corona y se evite que caiga en manos del palatino enemigo de la religion catolica'. See also RAH, Z-8, f. 41v.

poison the heir to the throne, Charles, in order to take his place.¹²⁷ Beyond the exaggerations carrying a clear propagandistic purpose, the Spanish envoys were aware that they could put pressure on the King of England because James hoped to conclude a marriage agreement for his son as soon as possible as Charles was already in his early twenties at the beginning of the 1620s.

Very often the junta of theologians asked James to grant more concessions to the English Catholics.¹²⁸ While the pretext used was always that these concessions would have made the granting of the papal dispensation easier, the underlying reason why the Spaniards knew they could ask for more religious concessions was precisely Charles's age and the health of his father, who might soon have been in need of a successor.¹²⁹ James's well-known desire to counterbalance the Protestant marriage of his daughter Elizabeth, especially in light of the new struggles created by the continental conflict was a further reason.

For his part, the King of England seemed to agree with Spain in wanting to avoid the succession of Frederick V's descendents.¹³⁰ His son-in-law's acceptance of the Bohemian crown in 1619 put King James in a difficult position. It was hard for him to keep the negotiations for a marriage with the Spanish Habsburgs running while the Elector Palatine was involved in an open conflict with the Habsburgs of Austria. The English political nation was mostly in disagreement with James's policy to keep equidistant from European conflicts and they hoped instead for a direct intervention in favour of the King's daughter and her husband. In the well-known pamphlet *Vox Coeli*,

¹²⁷ RAH, Z-8, f. 39v.

¹²⁸ BPR, II/2191, docs. 64 and 66, Philip III to the Count of Gondomar, Madrid, 10 December 1620.

¹²⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 50. See also Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 39.

¹³⁰ Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', p. 704; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 46-47, and p. 65.

set in Heaven and constructed as a dialogue between past rulers of England, John Reynolds used the voice of Queen Anne to express the contradiction inherent in negotiating an alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs while the family of the Palatine was in such a difficult situation:

Q.E [Queen Elizabeth] It were farre better, that Prince Charles were married to an English Milke-Maid [...]

Q.A. [Queen Anne] Yea, for how can my Sonne Prince Charles thinke the king of Spaine loues him, when he sees that vnder-hand, he is a mortall and professed enemy to his Brother and Sister, the King and Queene of Bohemia?¹³¹

The moment this opinion was expressed most clearly was shortly after the convening of the 1621 Parliament when MPs believed that the summons was due to the decision of the King to break his alliance with Spain and, for this reason, they were ready to grant subsidies, even before discussing grievances.¹³² When the Commons entered the topic of Charles's marriage, however, James silenced them by stating that 'yt was so far proceded in on his part, that yf those conditions and covenantes he hath propounded may be accepted and kept, there is no more speach to be used in yt'. It was therefore purposeless that 'they should busie themselves and entermeddle so much in this marriage'.¹³³

As already mentioned, Gondomar had alerted both King James and the Council of State in Madrid of the risks that could arise from convening the parliamentary assembly, especially from those 'calvinists puritans' ('puritanos calvinistas') in the House of

¹³¹ [Reynolds], *Vox Coeli*, p. 46.

¹³² On an analysis of the 1621 Parliament, see Robert Zaller, *The Parliament of 1621. A Study in Constitutional Conflict* (University of California Press, 1971); Sharpe (ed.), *Faction and Parliament*; Merritt (ed.), *The Political World*.

¹³³ TNA, SP 14/124 fols.92-93, Chamberlain to Carleton, 15 December 1621.

Commons.¹³⁴ According to the Spanish ambassador, the only thing that was in the interest of the Puritan faction was to convince the King to break the peace treaty with Spain, to strengthen the laws against Catholics, and to marry his son with a wife of his own religion. Gondomar was convinced, however, that none of these measures would pass because King James assured him that he would never approve them and instead would punish those who proposed them.¹³⁵

The English Parliament considered among the causes of the decline of the Protestant religion the ambitions of the Pope and the King of Spain, and the disastrous state of Protestantism outside of England given that the King's children were in exile. According to some MPs, this was due to the incompatibility between the Catholic and Protestant confessions and to the strong links between English recusants and foreign rulers, which is to say the King of Spain. The only remedy, therefore, lay in marrying the Prince to a Protestant bride and in helping Protestants in Europe.¹³⁶

As discussed by Carter, when addressing the religious conditions in Madrid, members of the Council of State and theologians used a variety of documents concerning the confessional situation in England. In order to understand the confessional behaviour of King James and Prince Charles, they looked at precedents among recent unions, such as the one between Louis XIII and the Infanta Ana, and past marriages, such as those between Mary Tudor and Philip II, and Henry VIII with Katherine of Aragon.¹³⁷ The interpretation of precedents was crucial, as the long-term goal was for England to return to the Catholic faith. In order to evaluate the likelihood that the union between Charles and María could contribute to this end, the theologians

¹³⁴ BPR, II/2108, doc. 99, Count of Gondomar to the Duke of Albuquerque, London, 17 December 1621; and BPR, II/2108, doc. 76, Ferdinand II to Baltasar de Zuñiga, 1621.

¹³⁵ BPR, II/2108, doc. 98, James I to Thomas Richardson, Newmarket, 3 December 1621.

¹³⁶ FSL, Ms.V.b.207; BPR, II/2108, doc. 100; *CJ*, vol. I (1547-1629), 26 November 1621.

¹³⁷ Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 93.

discussed the risk that the Infanta would pose to the faith of her husband and viceversa.¹³⁸ While the Spaniards considered among the greatest risks of an Anglo-Spanish union the possible conversion of the Infanta to Protestantism, the English feared especially that new concessions would be made to the English Catholics and the pan-Protestant cause would be forgotten.¹³⁹

According to the religious articles in the marriage treaty, the union could only be concluded after a dispensation was obtained from the Pope and it was the King of Spain's duty to obtain the Pope's permission. The Infanta's household would only include Catholic members decided by the Iberian monarch and no English person could be nominated to serve the Princess without Philip IV's prior consent. The Infanta would have a chapel to listen to mass that could be attended by members of her family and household. As already mentioned, while those accompanying the Infanta to England had to swear an oath of allegiance to James I, the wording of the oath would not mention anything against the Catholic religion. Any children born from the union between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta would have the right to inherit the Stuart throne after their father.¹⁴⁰

Moreover, the King of Spain repeated numerous times to the Count of Gondomar that it was impossible for him to agree on the marriage contract without having guarantees that freedom of conscience for English Catholics was to be granted and maintained.¹⁴¹ The King sent word to the ambassador that without these guarantees, he would slow down the action of his envoy in Rome, Diego de la Fuente. Moreover,

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 94.

¹³⁹ [Reynolds], *Vox Coeli*.

¹⁴⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2849, docs. 73 and 74. Other religious conditions were included among secret articles agreed by James I and Philip III that were to remain unknown to their subjects. For the secret articles, see *Narrative*, pp. 343-44. See also Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 49.

¹⁴¹ AGS, E., Leg. 2866, unfoliated.

Philip III prevented John Digby from returning to Spain to discuss the conditions of the agreement, at least until he had received news of the Pope's opinion.¹⁴²

While these were the articles agreed upon, with minor variations between 1617 and 1623,¹⁴³ and the Spanish sovereign often asked his envoys to obtain binding guarantees that the religious conditions would be respected, the possibility of bending the terms was often entertained, especially in 1623 following Charles's arrival in Madrid. Once in the Spanish capital, the Prince was told that if the Pope did not grant the dispensation, he could have the Infanta as his mistress.

In 1623, Gregory XV interpreted the arrival of Charles in the Spanish capital as a sign that he was open to convert to Catholicism in order to marry his bride. With this in mind, the Pope, until his death in July of the same year, wrote numerous letters to the Prince of Wales hoping that the 'ancient seed of Christian piety, which so happily flourished in the hearts of British kings, could rejuvenate with divine favour in [his] chest'.¹⁴⁴ The Pope, *in lieu* of the ones previously agreed, requested new and more demanding religious conditions from Charles. Consequently, the Prince felt the need to write to Gondomar asking the ambassador:

not to looke now so much to the *bonum publicum* which the Pope so earnestlie preases to be added, but rather to looke backe and consider how much we have alreadie granted.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² BPR, II/2191, doc. 66, Philip III to the Count of Gondomar, Madrid, 10 December, 1620. See also doc. 65, Philip III to King James I; and doc. 28, Philip III to the Count of Gondomar, Madrid, 10 June 1620.

¹⁴³ For the development of each marriage article between 1617 and 1623, see *Narrative*, pp. 327-342.

¹⁴⁴ BNE, VE/208/13, fols. 450-451. See also RAH, N-35, fols. 357-358, Pope Gregory XV to Gondomar, 21 August 1621.

¹⁴⁵ BPR, II/2191, doc. 9, Prince Charles to the Count de Gondomar. The letter is not dated but from the content it seems to be written between March and July 1623.

1.3 Dynastic Politics and Reason of State

The *bonum publicum* that the Pope hoped to gain from the marriage was different from what the King of Spain and the King of England were trying to achieve in the short term.¹⁴⁶ The Pope sought England's return to Catholicism. The King of Spain, while in the long term hoped to obtain eternal glory as the sovereign who had brought James back to the obedience of Rome, had worries that were more urgent. Among those, keeping England out of the Thirty Years' War, obtaining the English King's support in his struggle against the Dutch rebels at the end of the Twelve Years' truce, and limiting the damage inflicted by English access to the Indies, had been long-running priorities of the Catholic Monarchy.¹⁴⁷ The King of England hoped that Spain would help him to achieve a cessation of arms in the Palatinate so that his daughter and grandchildren could return from exile.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, James expected the title of Elector to be re-granted to his son-in-law Frederick V or that an agreement could be reached for it to be transferred onto his descendants. In the long term, James wanted to be remembered for his efforts as a peacemaker in Christendom.¹⁴⁹

In addition to the large dowry, in England a union with Spain was considered positive for the dynasty with which James I wanted to marry his heir: the Spanish Infanta was in fact 'a great king's daughter'¹⁵⁰ as the Habsburgs were considered the most powerful ruling family in Europe. Following the death of the last of Philip III's daughters, Catalina Francisca, however, two different views of what was more

¹⁴⁶ On *bonum publicum*, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 47 and Appendix 2, p. 175. See also Redworth, 'Pimps and Princes', p. 402.

¹⁴⁷ García García, 'Tiempo de Paces', p. 29.

¹⁴⁸ BPR, II/2198, doc. 2, Carlos Coloma to Juan de Ciriza, London, 20 May 1622; and doc. 9, Carlos Coloma to Philip III, London, 26 July 1622.

¹⁴⁹ John Williams, Bishop of Lincoln preached the funeral sermon and defined James as Solomon. See 'James I and King Solomon: Bishop Williams' Funeral Oration on James, 1625', in Ashton (ed.), *James I*, pp. 19-21.

¹⁵⁰ [Anonym.] *Considerations vpon the marriage Treaty between England and Spain* [1617?], p. 1.

convenient politically had become even more divergent in Madrid in 1617.¹⁵¹ As Redworth has demonstrated, once the Infanta María was left as the only available princess to marry, those who considered a union with the Austrian Habsburgs as essential believed that it was then evident the need to abandon the marriage with the English crown and marry the Infanta to the emperor's son.¹⁵²

The Duke of Lerma, after the premature death of the youngest Infanta, stated in a meeting of the Council of State in April 1617 that it was then impossible to have one Infanta married in the Empire and one in England, and for that reason, the latter was not going to take place. He added that the blame was to be given to the delays and the doubts of the Pope in granting the dispensation so that the King of England would not think that Spain was against the marriage.¹⁵³ Among others, the Count-Duke of Olivares supported this option and told the Earl of Bristol that Spain could never help England against the forces of the Emperor.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, at the end of 1622, Olivares proposed to the Council of State that Charles should marry the eldest daughter of the Emperor instead of the Infanta.¹⁵⁵

Some English blamed the Spanish for not being honest and only having aims at gaining political advantage:

¹⁵¹ BPR, II/2107, doc. 13, fols. 25-26, Juan de Ciriza to Diego Sarmiento, Madrid, 13 March 1617.

¹⁵² See Glyn Redworth, "El luterano vino con seiscientos herejes". Gran Bretaña y la Pax Hispanica', in García García (ed.), *Tiempo de Paces*, pp. 151-173. On the support for this option of Margarita de la Cruz and Mariana de San José, see Rubén González Cuerva, *Baltasar de Zúñiga. Una encrucijada de la Monarquía Hispana (1561-1622)* (Madrid: Polifemo, 2012), pp. 372-373.

¹⁵³ AGS, E., Leg. 2326, f. 17, 9 April 1617.

¹⁵⁴ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, pp. 203 onwards. See also, BNE, Mss/2354, f. 13, Parecer del Consejo de Estado dela Corte de España sobre el Casamiento del Principe de Gales, y parecer particular del Conde Duque de Olivares disuadiendo del d.ho casam.to con la Ynfanta de Castilla.

¹⁵⁵ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 207.

To me, the Spaniards are not honest in their dealings and are merely seeking political advantages; they would, if necessary use *religion as an excuse* to break off negotiations.¹⁵⁶

The idea of setting aside religion to follow the interest of state was not new in the early seventeenth century. It was in fact a recurrent *topos* in the literature on political thought since the sixteenth century, when religion was seen as an instrument of government by writers such as Giovanni Botero and Niccoló Machiavelli.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, the conflict between divine law and reason of state had already been touched upon by other thinkers, such as Tommaso Campanella. Being strongly religious, Campanella believed that the reason of state should stop before performing any actions that contradicted the divine law.¹⁵⁸ This dialectic between divine law and reason of state was a fundamental element of the theory behind the marriage between Charles and the Infanta at the beginning of the seventeenth century. When discussing the consequences of the marriage, the author of one of the many opinions written for the King of Spain and conserved at the National Library in Madrid stated that such a union could not have any positive advantage in terms of reason of state. The marriage would have caused many and disastrous punishments from God who is superior to the interests of any ruler.¹⁵⁹

The fact, however, that some at the Spanish court were opposed to the marriage with England did not mean that consequently they were in favour of a war against James I. On the contrary, members of the Council of State in Madrid, like the Count-Duke of

¹⁵⁶ HMC Trumbull, John Castle to William Trumbull, 6 March 1617. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵⁷ Niccoló Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1515), chp. XVIII.

¹⁵⁸ Anthony Pagden, 'Instrumentos del Imperio: Tommaso Campanella y la Monarquía Universal de España', in *El Imperialismo español y la imaginación política: estudios sobre teoría social y política europea e hispanoamericana (1513-1830)* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), transl. Soledad Silió (1991), pp. 67-105.

¹⁵⁹ BNE, Mss/10794, fols. 209-222 (f. 209r and 211r).

Olivares, believed that the interests of England and Spain were already intrinsically linked in the desire, for example, to remain as neutral as possible in the conflicts of the Thirty Years' War. There was thus no need for a marriage to seal their shared goals.¹⁶⁰

Others considered that the alliance with the Habsburgs of Austria was already strong due to the family ties that bound together the two branches of the dynasty and regarded a marriage alliance with England as more advantageous to solve the difficult crisis in Europe and protect Iberian overseas possessions. Indeed, according to a contemporary commentator, the King of Spain would not gain anything from a union with Austria as the Empire was already under the control of and dependent upon the sovereign of the Catholic monarchy. Instead, Philip III had to use the Infanta to expand his own power and the best way to do so was to marry her in England.¹⁶¹ This was the opinion of Ambassador Gondomar, who continued to stress the importance of maintaining friendship with James I.¹⁶² Balthasar de Zuñiga, ambassador at Brussels and uncle of the Count-Duke of Olivares, also believed that the alliance with Emperor Ferdinand was already solid while an union with England was strategically more valuable.¹⁶³ Moreover, such a match would bring advantages regarding trade outside Europe where the Iberian empire had begun to falter in the competition against both the Dutch and the English.¹⁶⁴ It would also prevent James from providing help to the Dutch rebels and avoid a marriage between England and France that the Spanish ambassador thought was still being discussed at court.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ *Narrative*, p. 222.

¹⁶¹ BNE, Mss/10794, f. 186r.

¹⁶² BPR, II/2108, doc.38, Count of Gondomar to Baltasar de Zúñiga, London, 30 March 1622.

¹⁶³ González Cuerva, *Balthasar de Zuñiga*, p. 373.

¹⁶⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2558, doc.136.

¹⁶⁵ For Gondomar's conversations with James Hay, Viscount Doncaster, who had been sent to France by James between 1621 and 1624, see BPR, II/2108, docs. 23 and 27.

In October 1620, the Venetian envoy in London, Girolamo Lando, reported that King James had issued a declaration approving of the German Princes' actions in defence of the Palatinate so that his children could get reparation for the damage inflicted on their patrimony. Even though we now know that this action was going to change neither the course of the Thirty Years' War nor the fate of James's son-in-law's possessions, it is interesting to look at the reason for the rejoicing of the English political nation according to the ambassador. Lando considered the universal rejoicing in London as unexpected because many had lost hope concerning James's intervention in favour of Frederick V. While the 'general behaviour led to an expectation of something different,' according to the ambassador 'every reason of state pointed that way'.¹⁶⁶ In fact, despite the tardiness in the King of England's intervention, the ambassador considered self-evident that James would act in defence of Frederick V, given his ties of kinship and especially reason of state, which is to say his political advantage. James's position as a Protestant sovereign was in fact much more effective if he could count on family ties in the German territories.

Reason of state in early seventeenth century Anglo-Spanish relations was far from static and involved not only what was politically convenient with regard to the situation in the Holy Roman Empire, but also what needed to be done in order to control and safeguard the situation in the Indies. Starting from the peace treaty signed in 1604 and until the outbreak of war in 1625 a great many of the concerns attached to Anglo-Spanish relations were related to overseas territories. If religion was widely present in the diplomatic correspondence, the major turning points in the long negotiations hinged upon events occurring in the Indies. This is clearly visible when we broaden our view of

¹⁶⁶ *CSPVen*, vol. 16, Girolamo Lando to the Doge and Senate, 8 October 1620.

the period to include what was happening outside Europe. The 1604 peace agreement contained several articles regarding overseas trade and, following the Treaty of London, the English, the Iberian powers, the Dutch, and the French agreed on numerous treaties to regulate commerce in the East and West Indies, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. Such agreements, which were initially to work in conjunction with ongoing alliances in Europe, often proceeded instead parallel to European politics. Once Raleigh's expedition to Guyana and the actions of the Dutch and English East India Companies produced negative reactions in Europe, however, the negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish Match were intended by both the English crown and the Iberian sovereign to contribute in solving the situation.¹⁶⁷

More than King James, the Kings of Spain, had to respond to a crucial actor when negotiating a marriage for the Infanta with a Protestant Prince: the Pope. In an effort to maintain their reputation of Catholic Kings, Philip III and Philip IV proved themselves attentive to the Pope's demands. Yet, for twenty years, Philip III negotiated a dynastic alliance with a Protestant King. Although both Philip III and Philip IV had decided to appoint a council of theologians to dictate the religious conditions of the marriage, more than once the Spanish monarchs had decided to present James with less onerous conditions than those proposed by the theologians. Therefore, as with the English side, likewise the dialectic that characterised the opinions at the Spanish court shows that religion was not the King's primary concern when considering the advantages and disadvantages of a union with England in the short term. Despite the Spanish monarchs' responsibilities as Catholic sovereigns, committed against heretics, Philip III and Philip

¹⁶⁷ For example, following the taking of Hormuz, the Council of Portugal exerted pressure on the Council of State to include provisions for the East Indies in the marriage contract between the Infanta and the Prince of Wales. See chapters III and V below.

IV were aware that beyond any religious considerations, they had to take into account other factors when choosing a husband for the Infanta. As the Spanish empire was seen as overambitious¹⁶⁸ and its territories in the East and West Indies were attacked by various European powers, in many of the works listing the positives of a union between with England, we find ‘safety of the Indies’.¹⁶⁹

The Pope’s dispensation finally reached Madrid in the summer of 1623.¹⁷⁰ If the one and only interest of the Spanish King had been to act in favour of the Catholic religion and follow the dictates of the Pope, with the granting of the dispensation, the last obstacle was cleared for a successful conclusion of the Habsburg-Stuart union. Negotiations for this had begun twenty years earlier with the signing of the peace treaty in London. Despite the arrival of the dispensation, however, the wedding was not celebrated in 1623 or in the following year. This demonstrates that while the Habsburg rulers always tried to live up to their reputation as ‘the Most Catholic Kings’, their decisions were often driven by non-religious concerns. The Council of State’s attention was indeed directed more towards reason of state, the more *politically* convenient choice, than to religion. Even when religion was involved in the discussion, as in the case of preferring a marriage between Charles and the Infanta rather than the risk that the very Protestant family of the Palatine ascended to the English throne, it was for strictly political reasons. Charles, if he were to marry the Infanta, would be easier for the Habsburgs to control than Frederick V.

¹⁶⁸ See, for example, [Scott], transl., *News from Parnassus*, p. 46: ‘The ambitious Spanish Nation, [...] cannot extinguish the ardent thirst they have of commanding, neither with the Conquest of all the New World discovered by them, nor with so great a part which they possess in the old’.

¹⁶⁹ RAH, L-24, f. 555v; BNE, Mss/10794, f. 155r.

¹⁷⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2866, unfoliated. *CSPD*, vol. IV, Conway to Lord Treasurer Cranfield, 20 April 1623.

In 1630 Philip IV and Charles I signed a peace treaty that ended five years of war between Spain and England. In the introductory text of the agreement, the recent conflict was considered as an exception to the fraternal relation between the two countries. Since 1604, they had formed an unbreakable bond thanks to the efforts of Philip III and James I. According to the peace treaty, despite the short period of war started in 1625, the rulers had never forgotten the friendship between the two crowns and the efforts of their predecessors for peace in Christendom.¹⁷¹

Between 1604 and 1624, James continuously pursued a Spanish marriage for his son, the heir to the English throne. According to the Stuart King, the Infanta's religious confession was not to be considered a problem, but rather a resource in the European scenario characterised by recurrent wars of religion. By marrying his daughter to one of the leaders of Protestantism and his son into the most powerful Catholic dynasty, James hoped to create a lasting balance on the European chessboard.¹⁷² He aimed at supporting a dense network of dynastic relations that would have not only put an end to the conflicts of the Thirty Years' War but also created easier commercial ties and shared areas of influence in the Indies between the sovereigns involved.

Old confessional divisions and new political contingencies played a crucial role in informing the decisions of the actors involved in the last phase of the marriage negotiations, especially when James I's hopes to secure peace in Europe without getting personally involved in any confessional struggles met with the King of Spain's attempt to maintain his reputation as Catholic King. The situation came to a standstill in 1618-1619 following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War which became, at least initially

¹⁷¹ RAH, N-32, Fols. 91-96, Capitulaciones de la Paz hecha entre el Rey nuestro señor, y el Serenissimo Rey de la Gran Bretaña, las quales se concluyeron por los Diputados que en ellas se dize, Madrid 15 November 1630.

¹⁷² On James's plans for peace in Christendom, see Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 315.

and despite James's efforts to prevent it, a war of religion between Catholics Habsburgs and European Protestants.¹⁷³ At the same time, Philip III and Philip IV were called to fulfil their role in defending their growing empire in the Indies in a period when new actors, especially the English and the Dutch, were interested in creating their own.

The rest of this thesis investigates the causes for the failure of the negotiations between 1617 and 1624. Such causes must be sought not only or not mainly in the confessional tensions between England and Spain, despite them becoming more urgent in 1618. The reason why, after twenty years of discussions for a potential Hasburg-Stuart union, the marriage did not take place is to be found instead in the conflicting political agendas between James I and the Spanish sovereigns, especially because of increasingly conflicting imperial interests. Therefore, the divergent views of crucial figures such as the Count of Gondomar and the Count-Duke of Olivares should be considered along with some crucial episodes of imperial and commercial rivalry. These include Walter Raleigh's expedition to Guyana in 1617-1618, the taking of Hormuz by the East India Company in 1622, and the Dutch attack at Amboyna in 1623,¹⁷⁴ when the promises regarding the dynastic union between England and Spain faltered as both states began to raise doubts on their own priorities. While the connection between reason of state and imperial concerns has been widely studied for the second half of the seventeenth century and certainly for the eighteenth, no historian has focused on the connection between the European diplomacy concerning the Anglo-Spanish Match at the beginning of the seventeenth century and the extra-European concerns of the declining Iberian Crown and the upcoming English empire.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ TNA, SP 14/110, 2 October 1619.

¹⁷⁴ See BL, IOR/E/3/10, doc. 1137.

¹⁷⁵ One of the recurrent points in both the 1604 peace treaty and the marriage negotiations was trade and the right of merchants to sell and buy products in each other's ports. Moreover, the agreement discussed

The frequent quarrels on trading rights together with incidents in the Indies were widely reported in diplomatic correspondence and used by ambassadors and sovereigns to further their agenda in the marriage diplomacy. The following chapters will discuss the extent to which conflicting episodes in the Indies in 1618, 1622, and 1623 as well as the intervention of other interested parties, such as the Dutch and indigenous powers, delayed the marriage diplomacy and worsened the trust relationship between England and Spain. By 1624, they posed an unsolvable contradiction to James I and Philip IV on whether to pursue a dynastic alliance in Europe or defend their respective overseas possessions.

security against pirates at sea and the relationship between European commercial companies and local powers. See, for example, RAH, Z-8, f. 53v.

Chapter II

‘Exemplary Punishment as it is Fitting.’¹ Walter Raleigh’s Second Expedition to Guyana (1617-1618) and Anglo-Iberian rivalry in the Americas

*My true intent was to go to a mine of Gold in Guiana;
It was not feigned, but it is true,
that such a mine there is within three miles of St. Thome.
[...] These things are most true as there is God.
Sir Walter Raleigh²*

On 14 November 1616, the Duke of Lerma reported to the Council of State in Madrid that ‘an Englishman’ had declared that Sir Walter Raleigh was preparing an expedition to Virginia. The Council agreed that it was necessary to know the identity of Lerma’s informant in order to decide on the reliability of the source and discuss potential countermeasures.³ Despite previous discussions within the Spanish Council of State over the potential risks of Raleigh’s expedition to Guyana, in 1616 a voyage to Virginia was deemed possible as well.⁴ Recent scholarly debate on the Ibero-American Atlantic has recognised the importance of analysing the history of Virginia in the North together with that of the Iberian settlements in the South. This chapter starts from the assumption that, in the words of Jorge Cañizares-

¹ Count of Gondomar to Philip III, 15 November 1617, in Bustamante, pp. 63-64: ‘remedio y castigo tan exemplar como conviene [...] el Rey [King of England] dize publicamente que si sale cierto que el Rale tal aya hecho o yntentado lo han de pagar con sus cabezas’.

² Walter Raleigh, ‘Apology’, in *Raleigh’s Works*, p. 507.

³ Reports from the President of the Council to Philip III summarising the proceedings taken in respect of Sir Walter Raleigh’s expedition, AGI, Indiferente General, 147, 5, Leg. 17, quot. in *Raleigh’s Last Voyage*, pp. 133-35.

⁴ On other planned voyages to Virginia, see *CSPCol, West*, vol. I, October 1618.

Esguerra, ‘processes initiated in the South profoundly affected historical developments in the North’.⁵

The Spanish claim to a monopoly in the Americas was based on the papal bull granted by Alexander VI in 1493 and the subsequent Treaty of Tordesillas.⁶ The Iberian Monarchy used the Pope’s bull as the legal basis to ground its claims. As John Smith stated in his history of Virginia ‘His Majesty of Spaine permits none to passe the Popes order, for the East and West Indies but by his permission, or at their perils’.⁷ In more than one circumstance, European powers had ignored the bull by exploring territories and creating settlements in areas which, according to the papal document, belonged to the Iberian monarchy. For example, the monopoly had already been challenged by the creation of an English colony in Virginia in the late sixteenth century and by the most concrete attempts to turn it into a permanent settlement with the creation of Jamestown at the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁸ For this reason, the Spanish wanted to prevent any further challenges to their claims in the West Indies that could originate from Raleigh’s voyage to either Virginia or Guyana.

The fact that Raleigh had assured the King of England that there were no Spanish settlements in the area of the mines he wanted to explore, was enough for James to grant Sir Walter a patent for his expedition. The Papal Bull of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 were not taken into account by the English (‘no hazen caso de la

⁵ Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, ‘Foreword’, in *Theorising the Ibero-American Atlantic*, eds. Harold E. Braun and Lisa Vollendorf (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), p. vii. See also Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, *Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of Americas, 1585-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁶ See Ken MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World. The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2, p. 8, and p. 186.

⁷ John Smith, *The Generall historie of Virginia, New England, and the Summer Iles* (London, 1625), *EEBO*, p. 243.

⁸ James B. Bell, *Empire, Religion and Revolution in Early Virginia, 1607-1786* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 15-16; MacMillan, *Sovereignty and Possession*, p. 3.

general donación de los summos pontefices’).⁹ Neither the Iberian King nor his ambassador in London used the legal documents agreed in the fifteenth century among Spain, Portugal, and the Pope as a reason to stop Raleigh. What they did use instead was the threat of the consequences that his expedition could have on the dynastic negotiations between Prince Charles and the Infanta María.

Not only was the Council of the Indies informed of the incoming danger and asked to prepare the necessary countermeasures, but Spain had been carrying out a systematic elimination of foreign settlements, especially by the English and the Dutch in South America, since the beginning of the seventeenth century. The president of the Council of the Indies wrote to King Philip III to inform him of various alarming reports received by Gondomar regarding Raleigh’s voyage.¹⁰ While the *Junta de Guerra y de Indias* had already alerted the local governors in South America, the reports were contradictory concerning both the modalities and the final destination of the expedition and therefore nothing further could be done.¹¹

Early modern observers questioned Raleigh’s motivations for his second journey and they were not persuaded by the evidence that he used to prove the existence of a gold mine. According to many, his own interests drove Raleigh, and some considered his expedition doomed to fail.¹² King James used this shared perception in his official declaration following Raleigh’s return in 1618. The King stated that Raleigh never

⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36, James Wadsworth, Madrid, 12 May 1618.

¹⁰ The President to the King, 20 June 1617, in *Raleigh’s Last Voyage*, pp. 137-140. See also AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 86, Meeting of the Council of State, 29 April 1617 and doc. 88, Meeting of the Council of State, 21 August 1617. See also AGI, Santo Domingo, 869, fols.18-19. On a report of the consequences of the attack on San Thomé, see *ivi*, fols. 51-52.

¹¹ *Raleigh’s Last Voyage.*, p. 140.

¹² TNA, SP 14/90, f. 250v., Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 29 March 1617; AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36. See Jack H. Adamson and Harold F. Folland, *The Shepherd of the Ocean. A Biography of Sir Walter Raleigh* (London: The Bodley Head, 1969), pp. 402-403.

intended to find the gold mine but instead his goal was to become a pirate and attack Spain in the West Indies.¹³ The opinion of subsequent historiography has generally not been much more favourable towards Raleigh's last voyage than his seventeenth-century contemporaries. His second expedition to Guyana is often defined as 'the hopeless pursuit of a fantasy' and has been little studied compared to his first voyage in the 1590s.¹⁴

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Gardiner recognised the importance of Raleigh's voyages within the context of Anglo-Spanish relations, by addressing both his first journey in 1595 and his last expedition. Regarding Raleigh's second voyage in 1617-1618, Gardiner stated that it was 'truly marvellous' that King James had given him permission to sail to Guyana while he was reassuring the Spanish ambassador of his true intentions to pursue a pro-Spanish policy which included an Anglo-Spanish dynastic marriage.¹⁵ Following Gardiner's work, hitherto no historian has focused attention on Raleigh's second expedition alongside the evolution of the marriage negotiations, despite the overlap in the timing of his journey with a crucial moment in the diplomatic discussions for the union between Charles and the Infanta.¹⁶ Raleigh's second expedition and his attack on St Thom e entailed consequences that forced James to condemn him to death precisely in order to keep the marriage negotiations alive and, with them, the possibility of a reunion of Christendom.

¹³ King James, 'A Declaration of the Demeanour and Carriage of Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight, as well in his voyage, as in and sithence his return; and of the true motives and inducements which occasioned his majesty to proceed in doing justice upon him, as hath been done', in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 335-56. See also 'A Proclamation declaring His Majesties pleasure concerning Sir Walter Rawleigh, and those who adventured with him', Greenwich, 9 June 1618, in Larkin and Hughes, pp. 391-92. TNA, SP 14/97, f. 250.

¹⁴ See Nicholls and Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 285. For contemporary opinions, see AGI, Filipinas, 200, fols. 643-4.

¹⁵ Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage*, vol. I, p. 48.

¹⁶ See chp. I above on the likelihood that the marriage agreement could have been concluded in 1617.

The most comprehensive recent study concerning Raleigh is Mark Nicholls and Penry Williams's *Sir Walter Raleigh in Life and Legend*. In addition to presenting a detailed reconstruction of the events, the authors agree that the journey of 1617-1618 has received insufficient historiographical attention.¹⁷ Nicholls and Williams analyse the journey in the broader context of European diplomacy by considering how Raleigh's expedition may have been a 'means to foment dissent between England and Spain' and 'to frustrate the carefully nurtured plans of James I and the Spanish ambassador Gondomar' in terms of the marriage negotiations.¹⁸ Despite the attention given to Sir Walter Raleigh's second and final voyage, however, the two authors intentionally did not investigate the impact of the expedition on the dynastic union between Charles and the Infanta, as this was beyond the scope of their biographical study.

A very thought-provoking interpretation of Raleigh's second voyage, which takes into account the fragile relationship between England and Spain and the existence of pro- and anti-Spanish factions in London, was given by V. T. Harlow in the 1930s.¹⁹ According to Harlow, both Raleigh and King James were well aware that his expedition to Guyana in 1617 would have caused conflict with the Spanish.²⁰ Stephen Greenblatt discussed Raleigh's long-term dreams of glory and empire and followed Harlow in his narrative of Sir Walter's expedition in 1617-1618. Likewise, my own explanation of the events relies much on Harlow's analysis and the documents he edited in his *Raleigh's Last Voyage*. In addition, I have used the Hakluyt Society's edition of the *Discovery of*

¹⁷ Nicholls and Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, pp. 285-301.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

¹⁹ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58 and p. 97.

Guiana edited by Joyce Lorimer²¹ which includes a valuable documentary appendix containing letters covering the period between Raleigh's first and second voyage.

I believe it is fruitful to include Raleigh's second expedition in the wider context of the delicate diplomatic situation between England and Spain both in Europe, where they were negotiating a dynastic union, and in the West Indies, where the two countries aimed at increasing their respective areas of influence.²² This chapter therefore seeks to restore the crucial connection between Sir Walter Raleigh's second expedition and the ongoing project for a dynastic union between England and Spain by also partially taking into account parallel events in Virginia. Raleigh's voyage in 1617-1618 was the manifestation of a larger underlying issue, that of the growing rivalry between the two crowns in the Americas. The rivalry was also evident in the development of the Virginia colony and the subsequent problems between the Company and the English crown. Both Raleigh's expedition and the Virginia Company's trade were indeed a direct challenge to Spanish power overseas and consequently to any plans for a dynastic alliance.

In investigating the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in the Americas, I have used a variety of sources: the writings of Sir Walter Raleigh, starting from his work on El Dorado in the 1590s to his *Apology* written shortly before his death.²³ I also considered the Spanish Council of State's discussions between 1616 and 1618, paying particular attention to those sessions when Raleigh's journey was mentioned together with the marriage

²¹ Joyce Lorimer (ed.), *Sir Walter Raleigh's Discoverie of Guiana* (London: Ashgate for the Hakluyt Society, 2006).

²² On the importance of the Amazon as a focus of imperial rivalry, see Joyce Lorimer (ed.), *English and Irish Settlements on the River Amazon, 1550-1648* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1989), p. XV.

²³ Walter Raleigh, 'Apology for the ill successe of his enterprise to Guiana', in *Raleigh's Works*, pp. 479-507.

negotiations.²⁴ Additionally, I consulted the diplomatic correspondence where the respective ambassadors referred to the dangers of an expedition whose point of arrival was deemed very close to the King of Spain's territories. Concerning Virginia, I mention the increasing problems of the English colony at the end of the 1610s in order to understand later parliamentary debates in 1621 and 1624 when the profits of the Company and the situation of the settlement were investigated.²⁵ The importation of tobacco exclusively from the colony and the possibility of ending any importation of Spanish tobacco was in fact weighted against the ongoing alliance with the Catholic monarchy. Furthermore, I consider the debates among old and current members of the Virginia Company regarding the inherent problems of the colony and potential solutions for the future. By looking at different sources and by adding relevant documents from Spanish archives to the traditional image of Raleigh's expedition drawn by English-speaking historians, I aim to demonstrate the extent to which the progress of Raleigh's expedition, from his initial project to his failure and execution, corresponded to different stages in the marriage negotiations between Spain and England.²⁶

The first part of the chapter will discuss the reasons for the expedition, taking into account the years that Raleigh spent in prison and the risks that his freedom posed to King James. Before and during his long imprisonment in the Tower, Raleigh penned various anti-Spanish works that worried King James and the hispanophiles at his court, given the Crown's pro-Spanish policy following the Treaty of London.²⁷ I will also outline Raleigh's actions between June 1617 and June 1618 and address the

²⁴ For example, AGS, E. Leg. 2515, doc. 7. See also appendix E.

²⁵ I address this in chp. V.

²⁶ This chapter focuses specifically on the years 1617-1618. For an assessment of the consequences of Raleigh's expedition in the short-term, and a discussion of the extent to which his actions directly contributed to the end of the marriage diplomacy, see chp. V below.

²⁷ See, for example, Walter Raleigh, 'A Discourse touching a war with Spain', in *Raleigh's Works*, pp. 299-316.

consequences of his journey. This will be done by looking at the reactions of the two sovereigns involved, James I and Philip III, once the news of the attack on the Spanish settlement of St Thomé arrived in Europe.²⁸ The second part of the chapter will focus on the English side of Raleigh's expedition from the granting of the patent by King James until his execution. On 29 October 1618, Raleigh formally paid not for the mistakes committed in Guyana but rather for the wrongs of which he had been accused in 1603.²⁹ The third and final part will concentrate on Spain by considering the precautions that Ambassador Gondomar had asked King Philip III to take before Sir Walter's departure and by analysing the discussions in the Spanish Council of State upon Raleigh's return to England, at a time when the resident ambassador in London was already on his way back to Spain.

The chapter thus demonstrates the importance of two key factors in the marriage diplomacy of 1617-1618. On the one hand, increasing imperial concerns meant that events in the West Indies had a crucial role in the development of the marriage diplomacy in Europe. Raleigh's actions in Guyana could indeed determine the failure of the long-standing marriage diplomacy. On the other hand, the untimely absence of one of the key agents in the discussions for the Anglo-Spanish marriage, the Count of Gondomar (who left England in July 1618 only to return in March 1620), meant that a rapid solution to the events in Guyana was more difficult to achieve.³⁰ Both factors contributed to a deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations and the lessening of the chances that the marriage agreement could be reached in the short-term. I argue that this was not exclusively due to the attack at St Thomé but instead to a wider English

²⁸ TNA, SP 14/96, f. 158, Sir Conway to [Carleton], [March] 1618; TNA SP 14/104, f. 59, Sir Francis Cottington to [Lake], Madrid, 25 June 1618. AGS, E., 2515, docs. 6 and 7.

²⁹ Mark Nicholls, 'Sir Walter Raleigh's Treason: A Prosecution Document', *EHR*, 110 (1995), 902-24. See also *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 254-315.

³⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 9, Meeting of the Council of State, 13 September 1618.

imperial project in the West Indies to the detriment of Spain, which was embodied by both Raleigh and the Virginia Company.

2.1 Motives for, and Consequences of, Raleigh's second expedition

Walter Raleigh led a first expedition to Guyana in search of El Dorado in 1595 and, upon his return, wrote an account entitled *The Discovery of the large, rich, and beautiful Empire of Guiana, with a relation of the great and golden city of Manoa (which the Spaniards call El Dorado)*.³¹ The *Discovery* was a detailed description of the country and the infinite possibilities of enrichment offered by its mines. In the account of his first voyage, Raleigh argued that the major problem for the Spanish in Guyana was the fact that the natives hated their control and were ready to welcome any power who would free them from the Iberian tyranny.³² The natives' hostility towards the Spanish was thus a weak point for the Catholic Monarchy and a potential weapon for the English to use to their advantage.

Raleigh was treated as a hero in 1595 having established long-lasting business contacts with the indigenous population and, despite not being able to return to Guyana in person, Sir Walter maintained commercial relationships with the local inhabitants even after his return to England.³³ Raleigh expected to use to his advantage this well-established connection with the indigenous population during his second expedition. This was also King James's idea regarding the prosperity of English settlements in North America as he discussed in November 1618 with the new governor of Virginia,

³¹ Walter Raleigh, *The discovery of the large, rich, and beautiful Empire of Guiana, with a relation of the great and golden city of Manoa* (London, 1595).

³² Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie*, pp. 27-29. See also, TNA SP 14/96, f. 24, Nathaniel Brent to [Carleton], London, 7 February 1618; TNA SP 14/96, f. 28, Captain Sir Gerard Herbert to Carleton, London, 13 February 1618.

³³ Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie*, Appendix IV, pp. 279-88. See also 'Noticias de la mina de oro reconocida por Raley gracias a las indicaciones de un anciano cacique', in *Ibid.*, pp. 299-302 (p. 300).

Sir George Yeardley: James asked the governor to treat the Indians gently and with respect and not to ‘tyrannize over them like the Spannyards’.³⁴

In 1617, Raleigh sent his lieutenant Keymis with a few members of the crew up the river Orinoco to resume contacts with the inhabitants in the hope that they would rebel against Spain. While this did not happen, Harlow considered this the perfect scenario for Raleigh: if the natives were to rebel against Spain and prefer the sovereignty of the English, the Englishmen did not have to commit any violent act against the Spanish settlement in order to gain passage to the gold mine.³⁵ Assuming that there was a mine, Raleigh and his companions would have come back to England with gold and without having broken the promise made to King James ‘to invade none of the Spanish towns’.³⁶ The Spanish were indeed concerned about the possibility of an attack from the indigenous population as proven by correspondence concerning potential counter-measures.³⁷

The 1604 peace treaty had left English and Spanish rights in the Americas mostly unsettled.³⁸ Article IV of the agreement, however, applied perfectly to the situation in Guyana. While it was meant to keep the fluctuating relationship between England and the United Provinces under control, it stated that Spain and England could not provide assistance to any vassals or subjects ‘to foment war with the enemies and rebels of the other party.’ This included also the prohibition to encourage the other Crown’s subjects

³⁴ Malcolm Gaskill, *Between Two Worlds. How the English Became Americans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 52. On the importance of establishing long-term trade relations with the natives in the Americas, see *CSPCol, West*, vol. I, October 1618.

³⁵ *Raleigh’s Last Voyage*, pp. 44-46.

³⁶ Walter Raleigh to Robert Cecil, Tower of London, July 1607, in Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh’s Discoverie*, pp. 289-290; TNA, SP 14/92, f. 65, Orders to be observed by the commanders of the fleet, Plymouth, 3 May 1617.

³⁷ The President to the King, 20 June 1617, in *Raleigh’s Last Voyage*, pp. 137-140 (p. 138). In this letter, the author is worried of Raleigh’s plan to settle in Guyana ‘with the help of the natives’.

³⁸ Norman Lloyd Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), p. 235.

to ‘withdraw themselves from the Obedience and Dominion of the other’³⁹ which was precisely what Raleigh and Keymis were hoping would happen with the indigenous population in Guyana.

Shortly after his first expedition in 1595, Raleigh had tried to convince Queen Elizabeth of the necessity of a further voyage in order to obtain the gold before other European powers did. The Queen was not then very interested in pursuing costly expeditions in South America as she was confronted with other problems closer to her court. The continuing conflict with Spain, in fact, meant that it was necessary to maintain defences on the English coast and so it would be financially prohibitive to send a fleet to the Americas.⁴⁰ Elizabeth believed that the threat of foreign invasion was much more urgent than further explorations in the Indies. Therefore, in 1596, the Queen considered Cadiz more pressing than a second expedition to Guyana.⁴¹

Other powers in Europe, however, were well impressed by Raleigh’s narrative of his voyage and, shortly after 1595, decided to send expeditions to Guyana in search of El Dorado. This was the case for the Dutch and the French. The Dutch organised an expedition already in 1597 as they believed it was important to act rapidly, before the Spanish could send reinforcements.⁴² In France, King Henry IV granted patents for the ‘conquest and planting of Guiana’ in 1602.⁴³

Despite Raleigh having neither the financial backing nor the political legitimisation of the Crown, he continued to send his trusted men to Guyana in the following years. In

³⁹ ‘A Treaty of Perpetual Peace between Philip III, King of Spain and James I, King of England’, in *Treaties*, p. 135.

⁴⁰ Stephen Greenblatt, *Sir Walter Raleigh. The Renaissance Man and His Roles* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 157.

⁴¹ See Mark Nicholls and Penry Williams, ‘Raleigh, Sir Walter (1554-1618)’, *ODNB*.

⁴² Adrian Cabeliau of Zeeland to Sir Walter Raleigh, 20 March 1597, in Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh’s Discoverie*, pp. 307-8.

⁴³ *Raleigh’s Last Voyage*, p. 7.

1596, Lawrence Keymis went looking for further evidence of the presence of gold in Guyana that would convince the Queen to send a large shipment that could claim the area for the English.⁴⁴ During his expedition, Keymis discovered that the Spanish had built a small settlement at the mouth of the Caroni River. The consequence of the Spanish presence was clearly that any future English expedition in that area would have involved an open conflict with the Spanish monarchy. In turn, this means that, by the time of his second voyage in 1617, Raleigh was well aware of the presence of Spanish settlements in the area where he wanted to look for the gold mine and it is likely that King James was conscious of this as well as Raleigh.⁴⁵

Since 1616, Gondomar had questioned Raleigh's position that the territories towards which he was directed were not under Spanish control. According to the Ambassador, while Raleigh claimed that the mine he was looking for in Guyana was very far from the King of Spain's territories, the King of England had to be convinced to prevent Raleigh's expedition as all territories around the Orinoco river belonged to the King of Spain. Gondomar used Antonio de Herrera's *History of Philip II* to prove that the area had already been claimed by the Spanish.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Greenblatt, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 157.

⁴⁵ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 36.

⁴⁶ Redworth, 'Sarmiento de Acuña'. On Gondomar's numerous attempts to prevent Raleigh's departure, see also AGS, E., Leg. 2850, doc. 28; *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 24.




Image 2. Map of Guyana, in Edmund Gosse, *Raleigh* (London: Longmans, 1886)

Raleigh spent most of the years between 1603 and his eventual death sentence in 1618, as a prisoner in the Tower of London. Following James's accession, Sir Walter was found guilty of having plotted to encourage a foreign invasion and James's death in order to replace him with Arabella Stuart.⁴⁷ Therefore, according to many contemporary observers and to King James himself, the risk of granting Raleigh the chance to carry out his journey across the Atlantic in search of the mine was that, once he obtained the ships, he could practise piracy to increase his own wealth.⁴⁸ Ambassador Gondomar believed that the principal reason why Raleigh wanted to leave for the alleged gold mine in Guyana was finally to regain freedom after his long imprisonment.⁴⁹ The greatest of the Spanish diplomat's concerns and the criticism expressed towards King

⁴⁷ On Cobham's testimony against Raleigh being problematic, see Nicholls, 'Walter Raleigh's Treason', 902-24. See also, Nicholls and Williams, 'Raleigh, Sir Walter (1554-1618)'.

⁴⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 86; TNA, SP 14/90, f. 250v.

⁴⁹ 'Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña to Philip III', 2 September 1616, in Bustamante, pp. 14-5: 'lo principal que le ha mouido a esta inbención fue el librarse de la prison donde estaba condenado a muerte años ha por culpado en una conspiración contra este Rey.'

James regarding the authorisation granted to Raleigh was that Sir Walter would not stop at the Orinoco but instead would attack other Spanish territories.

As Raleigh was aware that this was one of the reasons preventing his release, during the years spent in the Tower of London he tried to reassure the members of the Privy Council that he was not going to become a fugitive. If they deemed it necessary, the command of the ships for the journey to Guyana could be entrusted to another. Raleigh stated that he did not intend to become 'a runnegate' and was happy 'to go and cumm as a private man'.⁵⁰ Moreover, while he recognised the difficulty of finding the same piece of land where in the 1590s he had stated that the gold mine was located, he was certain that he could reach the place again, if he were allowed to undertake his journey, and thanks to his loyal lieutenant Lawrence Keymis's memory.⁵¹

In the past, biographers of Walter Raleigh and historians who have discussed his expeditions to Guyana disagreed concerning Raleigh's stated belief, by 1617, that the gold mine actually existed. Most historians now concur that he must have believed in its existence or else he would not have risked his life and fortune as well as his wife's possessions in order to undertake the voyage.⁵² It would be overly simplistic, however, to think that Raleigh's only interest in Guyana was to find the gold mine or that the position he had indicated on the map delivered to James was only in order to mislead the King to give his approval for the expedition. The region of the Orinoco was crucial, and in order for the Orinoco to be controlled, Guyana needed to be occupied.⁵³

⁵⁰ 'Walter Raleigh to Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury from the Tower', July 1607, in Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie*, p. 290.

⁵¹ 'Walter Raleigh to Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury and the Privy Council', 1611, in Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie*, p. 295.

⁵² Nicholls and Williams, 'Raleigh, Sir Walter', *ODNB*.

⁵³ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 1.

If the gold mine was not Raleigh's only goal, it seems likely that his overarching intention was to increase the English territory in South America at the expense of Spain. The gold mine was not Raleigh's main purpose, instead, he was hoping for an empire to be created by the English in South America.⁵⁴ This risk was considered evident by Gondomar whose letters were discussed several times by the Council of State at the beginning of 1617. According to the Spanish ambassador, it was unlikely that Raleigh's intention was simply to explore the area in search of a mine as, if this were the case, he would not need as many ships and weapons as Sir Walter planned to bring along with him.⁵⁵

Raleigh hoped to establish lasting trade relations with the indigenous population and find commodities, other than bullion, that could be used to establish a long-term settlement.⁵⁶ This idea that gold and silver were not to be regarded as the only valuable resource in the New World was shared by John Smith when writing about Virginia:

Now I know the common question is, For all those miseries, where is the wealth they have got, or the Gold or Silver Mines? To such greedy unworthy minds I say once again: the Sea is better than the richest Mine knowne.⁵⁷

It is over-simplistic and misleading to state that Raleigh invented the story of the gold mine in order to be freed from the Tower. Raleigh was by no means alone in believing in the existence of gold to be found in the area of the Orinoco River. On the contrary, it

⁵⁴ Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie*, p. 15; *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 4 and p. 6.

⁵⁵ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 86, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 29 April 1617; AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 88, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 21 August 1617.

⁵⁶ 'A Commission for John Chudleigh as Captain of a Ship, from Sir Walter Raleigh', in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 117-121

⁵⁷ Smith, *Generall historie of Virginia*, p. 240.

was a common idea shared by various explorers and writers in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.⁵⁸ Regardless of whether he believed that the mine was there or if instead it was only a way to regain his freedom, I am interested in addressing the extent to which his actions in the West Indies affected England's relation with Spain and the developing marriage negotiations. Already in the 1580s, Richard Hakluyt had advocated the creation of an English empire in the West Indies that could profit from the same wealth and resources that the Spanish King was enjoying there. According to Hakluyt, the King of Spain was not as powerful in the West Indies as 'falsely given out by the popish clergy' but instead his actual control on the area was 'nothing so large as is generally imagined and surmised'.⁵⁹ Samuel Purchas, collecting Hakluyt's writings together with those of several other authors, wrote of Guyana and the various voyages of exploration that had been made in the area before and after Raleigh's two voyages.⁶⁰ Purchas also discussed North America and used Virginia Company's tracts among his sources.⁶¹

Raleigh's release from the Tower in 1616 depended on the change of circumstances at court.⁶² The main supporter of a Spanish alliance, the Earl Somerset, was replaced by

⁵⁸ On knowledge exchange regarding the existence of a gold mine, I am grateful to Rachel Winchcombe for her interesting paper on 'The formation, transmission and rationalisation of an early modern idea: Sir Walter Raleigh and the search for El Dorado' at the Institute of Historical Research on 18 May 2015.

⁵⁹ Richard Hakluyt, *A particular discourse concerning the great necessity and manifold commodities that are like to grow to this Realm of England by the Western discoveries lately attempted* (1584) [known as Discourse on Western Planting].

⁶⁰ Samuel Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimes* (London: William Stansby for Henrie Fetherstone, 1625), vol. IV, p. 1286: '[...] Thus much of Guianian affaires. Some other Voyages thither haue been at large published by Sir W. R. and Master Keymis, recorded by Master Hakl.'

⁶¹ D. B. Quinn, 'North America', in *The Purchas Handbook. Studies of the Life, Times, and Writings of Samuel Purchas, 1577-1626*, ed. L. E. Pennington (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1997), vol. I, pp. 312-325 (p. 312).

⁶² Greenblatt, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 161.

the anti-Spanish Sir Ralph Winwood as Secretary of State.⁶³ This change, together with Queen Anne's pressure, was able to achieve the desired effect. When Raleigh was released from the Tower, he immediately began preparations for a new expedition to Guyana in search of the gold mine.

This second voyage was welcomed and supported by Spain's enemies at the English court. The anti-Spanish faction in London hoped in fact that the expedition would cause the breakup of the marriage treaty and potentially a declaration of war.⁶⁴ Among others, Winwood was against the alliance with Spain and shared Raleigh's concerns regarding the detrimental consequences of a potential dynastic alliance with the Catholic Monarchy.⁶⁵ Regardless of the success of the expedition in finding the gold, Raleigh's voyage was expected to provoke conflict with Spain and therefore prevent the conclusion of the marriage alliance between the Prince and the Infanta. This was the hope of the anti-Spanish faction in London and they were ready to support Raleigh's voyage in order to stop the ongoing negotiations.⁶⁶

Proof of this is given in a letter written to the Doge and the Senate by the Venetian Ambassador Piero Contarini in October 1618.⁶⁷ While the Venetians had a long list of reasons to express anti-Habsburg opinions, Contarini's analysis is worth mentioning as he described Raleigh's examination. According to Contarini, Sir Walter's line of defence was indeed that leading ministers and courtiers in London, among whom he mentioned Winwood, had persuaded him to attack either the fleet or the territories of the

⁶³ The Earl and Countess of Somerset were imprisoned following the trial in May 1616 for the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury. See M. Greengrass, 'Winwood, Sir Ralph (1562/3–1617), diplomat and secretary of state', *ODNB*.

⁶⁴ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 23 and p. 35.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23. See also, Walter Raleigh, 'A Discourse Touching a Marriage between Prince Henry of England and a Daughter of Savoy', in *Raleigh's Works*, vol. VIII, pp. 237-252 (p. 238)

⁶⁶ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 23.

⁶⁷ *CSPVen*, vol. 15, Piero Contarini, Venetian Ambassador Extra-ordinary in London to the Doge and Senate, 26 October 1618, See Appendix C.

King of Spain. The final goal to be achieved was not only to worsen the relations between the two Crowns but ‘to give cause to a rupture’.⁶⁸

During the preparations for his voyage to Guyana, Raleigh established contact with the French ambassador, Count des Marez, in order to secure a refuge away from England in case the journey did not achieve the expected results.⁶⁹ After Raleigh’s return, his negotiations with France were considered by the Spanish ambassador as further evidence that he had always intended to jeopardise the friendship between England and Spain. Discussions with France were considered particularly alarming by Gondomar as James had already signed a trade agreement with France in 1606⁷⁰ and it was clear that if the marriage between Prince Charles and the Infanta were to fail, King James would have looked to France to find a bride for his heir, as in fact happened in 1624.⁷¹

During Raleigh’s days in prison in 1618, King James used Thomas Wilson as Sir Walter’s keeper in the hope that he would confess to him to having allied with the French in order to ‘do some mischief to the Spaniards and thereby cause a rupture between his Majesty and the King of Spain’.⁷² This would have proven his guilt in clear infringement of the King’s orders. According to James’s patent, Raleigh would have had control of the ships and full powers over the crew involved in the expedition.⁷³ Although the King had not made any specific reference to Spanish territories in the permission granted to Raleigh, the King had assured Gondomar that Sir Walter would

⁶⁸ Piero Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 26 October 1618, transcribed in *Raleigh’s Last Voyage*, pp. 301-302.

⁶⁹ Nicholls and Williams, ‘Raleigh, Sir Walter’, *ODNB*.

⁷⁰ ‘Treaty between Henry IV and James I’, in *Treaties*, pp. 147-56.

⁷¹ See ‘James I to Louis XIII, King of France’, 21 July 1624, in *Letters of King James VI and I*, ed. by G. P. V. Akrigg (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 434-5.

⁷² TNA, SP 14/103, f. 19, Sir Thomas Wilson to King James, Tower of London, 4 October 1618.

⁷³ ‘A Proclamation concerning His Majesties pleasure’, in Larkin and Hughes, pp. 391-93.

not attack territories belonging to sovereigns with whom England was at peace.⁷⁴ King James, however, was aware that those at court supporting Raleigh's expedition were against his pro-Spanish policy and must have also been aware that Raleigh was going to look for his mine very close to Spanish dominions as Philip III had claimed vast areas of land in the Orinoco-Trinidad area.⁷⁵

On 12 June 1617 Raleigh set sail from Plymouth to the Americas in search of gold that he believed was to be found in Guyana.⁷⁶ In England, many remained unconvinced of his motivations and sceptical regarding his chances of success. Prince Charles himself was said to be against the journey.⁷⁷ In Madrid, the Council of State had discussed the voyage in great detail and agreed with Gondomar on the need to stop Raleigh's departure. Once the Spanish ambassador became aware of the unlikelihood of preventing the expedition, he advised Madrid to contact governors in the West Indies in order for them to take the necessary precautions.⁷⁸

Therefore, when Raleigh left England with his ships, he did so 'with all the speed he can for feare of a countermand'.⁷⁹ As Raleigh had to wait to sail because of the bad weather, many were unsure concerning his whereabouts in early 1617. If the correspondent was not at court in the months preceding Sir Walter's departure, approximations can frequently be found along with educated guesses in letters. When writing to Roe, Sir George Carew excused himself for not being able to send an exact

⁷⁴ See 'Buckingham to Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, 28 March 1617', in Bustamante, p. 27.

⁷⁵ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 1-5.

⁷⁶ Nicholls and Williams, 'Raleigh, Sir Walter', *ODNB*.

⁷⁷ TNA, SP 14/90, f. 250v., Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 29 March 1617. See also SP 14/90, f. 237, Gerrard to Carleton, London, 20 March 1617.

⁷⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 86, Meeting of the Council of State, 29 April 1617.

⁷⁹ TNA, SP 14/90, f. 250v., Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 29 March 1617.

report concerning Raleigh's ships or men.⁸⁰ Carew, who had been friends with Raleigh for many years wished for Sir Walter to come back with plenty of 'Guianan gold'.⁸¹

Raleigh's journey itself took longer than normal because of bad weather and sickness among the crew. Only a few months after his departure, one of Raleigh's officers, Captain Bayly, arrived back in London with news that Sir Walter had abandoned his original plan in order to become a pirate and enrich himself.⁸² Aside from Raleigh's wife, many among Sir Walter's acquaintances did not believe he had turned pirate and asserted in private correspondence that they would never trust anybody stating that he did.⁸³ Not even the Council of State in Spain believed that Raleigh should have been considered a pirate as he carried with him a commission from the King of England. He had therefore the King's permission to explore a certain area of South America and he was not allowed to go beyond what his sovereign had prescribed and was forbidden to act against Spain for his own enrichment.⁸⁴

When Raleigh arrived at his destination in November 1617, he was still unwell from the voyage and did not join his group of vessels continuing up the Orinoco River in search of the gold mine that he was convinced to be near St Thom . The small group of Englishmen who had managed to navigate the river, among whom was Raleigh's eldest son, arrived where they thought the mine was and found instead a Spanish settlement. In January 1618, the English attacked the settlement of St Thom  and during the conflict

⁸⁰ Ute Lotz-Heumann, 'Carew, George, earl of Totnes (1555–1629)', *ODNB*. Sir George Carew was a member of the Privy Council since 20 July 1616 and would become a member of the Council of War in July 1624.

⁸¹ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter IV, Savoy, 18 January 1617, pp. 80-139 (p. 97).

⁸² AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36. See also Add TNA, SP 14/93, f. 228.

⁸³ Carew to Roe: 'those that mallice him boldlye affirme his to be a piratt, which for my part, I will never beleeve', Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter IV, Savoy, 18 January 1617, pp. 80-139 (p. 129).

⁸⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 89.

both the Spanish governor Diego Palomeque de Acuña and Raleigh's son were killed. After nearly a month of guerrilla warfare, the town was burnt to the ground and the group of Englishmen returned to the river to meet the other part of the company, including Walter Raleigh, who had already received news of the disastrous attack and the death of his son.⁸⁵

In London, in June 1618, King James asked all those who had evidence against Raleigh, regarding the decisions made and the actions taken during his journey to Guyana, to come forward. James had advised him to avoid 'any Acte of hostility, wrong, or violence whatsoever, upon any of the Territories, States, or Subjects of any forraine Princes, with whom We are in amitie'.⁸⁶ Therefore, Raleigh was considered guilty of attacking St Thomé as the town was 'under the obedience of Our deare Brother the King of Spaine'.⁸⁷

While Raleigh's expedition made sense as part of a broader anti-Spanish stance shared by some members of the English court, the King of England was pursuing a pro-Spanish policy that he had no intention of jeopardising, especially if he was not going to gain any personal or economic advantages in exchange for breaking the treaties with Spain. If James were to obtain any proof that there was gold to be found as Raleigh had promised, it is likely that he would have broken the treaties with Spain in 1617-1618 rather than six years later.⁸⁸ Most certainly, the gold would have solved some of the King of England's long-term financial problems and removed any pressing need for a large Spanish dowry.

⁸⁵ Nicholls and Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, pp. 293-4.

⁸⁶ 'A Proclamation declaring His Majesties pleasure', in Larkin and Hughes, p. 392.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ See *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 20.

Not always James's proceedings in the West Indies appeared consistent in the eyes of his contemporaries. In 1620, the King of England revoked a charter previously granted to Captain Roger North to reach the Amazon. The King of England wished to show good will towards Spain, following the protests of the Spanish ambassador regarding the new alarming expedition. According to English commentators, the Spanish had fewer claims on this area than they had on the area of the Orinoco that Raleigh had intended to reach in 1617.⁸⁹ King James, however, allowed Raleigh to go while he seized North and tried to prevent his departure.⁹⁰

North had participated in Raleigh's expedition in 1617-1618 and, despite its failure, he had remained interested in the area of the Amazon. In 1619, he obtained a patent from King James for the creation of the Amazon Company and started to organise a new voyage in the area of Guyana, near the river Amazon.⁹¹ The expedition was strongly criticised by the pro-Spanish faction in London. According to Chamberlain, John Digby argued in 1620 against North's voyage as detrimental to the Spanish sovereign and the dynastic negotiations and added that most certainly Ambassador Gondomar would have stopped the voyage upon his return to London.

Indeed, King Philip III wrote to the Count Gondomar asking him to hinder North's expedition to the Indies in order to avoid 'what had happened to Walter Raleigh'.⁹² The Spanish Ambassador reminded King James from Madrid that Raleigh had failed to keep his word concerning Spanish territories,⁹³ and, upon his return to England in March

⁸⁹ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 36.

⁹⁰ *APC*, 2/30, f. 487, A Letter to the Lord Deputy of Ireland, 7 May 1620. See also Anita McConnell, 'North, Roger (1588–1652/3), soldier and projector of the Amazon Company', *ODNB*.

⁹¹ *CSPCol, West*, vol. I, 30 April 1619.

⁹² *BPR*, II/2191, doc. 29, Philip III to the Count of Gondomar, Madrid, 10 June 1620.

⁹³ McConnell, 'North, Roger', *ODNB*.

1620, he presented a case against North's voyage to the Privy Council and the departure of the Englishman's fleet was postponed as a consequence.

Captain North, however, sailed towards the Amazon without the King's permission.⁹⁴ James not only issued a proclamation asking North and his crew to return to England but also revoked the Amazon Company's patent, and imprisoned the Captain in the Tower of London on his return.⁹⁵ This was clearly a result of Ambassador Gondomar's threat that an expedition to the Amazon would have jeopardised the marriage negotiations as well as the peace between the two countries.⁹⁶

Furthermore, the King of England's reaction to North's expedition shows James's increased awareness that Spain considered English explorers' actions in the Americas as strongly related to the continuation of the Anglo-Spanish alliance and the ongoing marriage negotiations.⁹⁷ As Raleigh's expedition in 1617-1618 had already endangered the diplomacy between London and Madrid, King James wanted to avoid running the same risk in 1620.

In fact, it appears from manuscript sources at the Archivo General in Simancas and in the Archivo de Indias in Seville that the strong link between the European marriage negotiations and Walter Raleigh's expedition to Guyana in 1617 was perfectly evident to King James as well as to the Count of Gondomar. The diplomatic correspondence between James and the Spanish Ambassador and between the latter and Madrid concerning Walter Raleigh and his planned journey was very frequent both before the

⁹⁴ *APC*, 2/30, f. 487, 'Captaine Roger North is of late gone out of the port of Plymouth in a shipe bound for the river of Amazons in the West Indies without lycence or leave from his Majestie or the State here and contrary to his Majesty's comaundment, and that it is held very requisite and expedient to make stay and recall the sayd shipe and company'. See also Anita McConnell, 'North, Roger', *ODNB*.

⁹⁵ *APC*, 2/30, f. 661, A warrant to committ Captain Roger North to the Tower of London, 6 January 1621.

⁹⁶ *AGS*, E., Leg. 2558, doc. 20.

⁹⁷ *APC*, 2/31, f. 101, A Letter to the Lieutenant of the Tower, 18 July 1621. Captain North was freed from the Tower but on the condition that he would renounce 'his voyage and adventure to the river of the Amazons'.

voyage and when news of the destruction of St Thomé first reached Europe. What happened between June 1617 and June 1618 was intimately tied to the diplomatic pressures exercised by the Spanish ambassador on King James with regard to the ongoing marriage negotiations.

According to Raleigh's account, the Spanish settlement had been moved on purpose in order to jeopardise the English mission.⁹⁸ Indeed, thanks to King James, Gondomar knew in advance of Raleigh's plans and even had a copy of the map with the route that he was going to follow.⁹⁹ The fact that the King himself had provided the Spanish ambassador with the secret map showing Raleigh's destination testifies to the ability of Gondomar as a diplomat¹⁰⁰ as well as to James's desire to maintain friendly relations with Spain in order to prevent any disruption to the marriage diplomacy. Raleigh's execution in October 1618 was seen, in the eyes of many, as King James's subjection to the will of the King of Spain. Sir Walter's death was in fact deemed as a way to 'give them [the Spanish] satisfaction.'¹⁰¹ To some, this made Raleigh a Protestant martyr and, for this reason, he was not easily forgotten by the English political nation, which continued to consider him as a hero in the following years.¹⁰²

2.2 The English Side

⁹⁸ TNA, SP 14/96, f. 118, Walter Raleigh to Ralph Winwood, Antilles, 21 March 1618.

⁹⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 63; AGS, E., Leg. 845, doc. 127. See also AGI, MP-Venezuela, 22, Planta de la ciudad de Santo Tomé de la Guayana. *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁰ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 262.

¹⁰¹ 'Letter from an English Minister of State to Francis Cottington, English agent in Spain [1618]', in Ashton (ed.), *James I*, pp. 213-15 (p. 214).

¹⁰² See for example, Thomas Gainsford, *Vox Spiritus or Sir Walter Rawleighs Ghost. A conference between Sig.r Gondomar his Mg.ts Ambassador of Spaine, the Frier Confessor, and father Baldwin the Jesuite at Elys House in Holborne* (London, 1621).

In 1617, a first draft of the marriage articles, including the religious conditions, was approved and the dynastic negotiations appeared close to a successful conclusion.¹⁰³ Even when plans for Raleigh's second voyage to Guyana began to take shape, King James and the hispanophiles in London continued to reassure the Spanish ambassador of English commitment to a union between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta. For this purpose, James had given Ambassador Gondomar a copy of the documentation concerning Raleigh's expedition. Gondomar was therefore in possession not only of the patent granted by King James authorising Raleigh to 'undertake a voyage by sea and shipping to the south partes of America or else where in America',¹⁰⁴ but also of the map and all the plans made by Raleigh before his departure. In a letter dated 28 March 1617, the Duke of Buckingham reminded Gondomar that King James was doing everything he could to monitor Raleigh's journey and therefore maintain the friendship between England and Spain:

Regarding the journey of Raleigh, His Majesty [King of England] paid much attention [...] in helping in every possible way to preserve the friendship [between England and Spain] by asking him [Walter Raleigh] to declare in writing all the places where he planned to go.¹⁰⁵

In his *Orders to be observed by the Commanders of the Fleet*, issued on 3 May 1617, Raleigh showed himself to be respectful, at least outwardly, towards the Crown's policy of alliance with Spain and the ongoing marriage negotiations. The *Orders* not only included details of the behaviour to be observed onboard during the journey but the crew was also asked to obey their officers at any time and not to attack any enemy ship

¹⁰³ See chp. I above.

¹⁰⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 63; AGS, E., Leg. 845, doc. 127.

¹⁰⁵ Duke of Buckingham to the Count of Gondomar, 28 March 1617, in Bustamante, p. 27.

‘without a direct order’.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, nothing could be taken from ships ‘belonging to any Prince or State in League or Amity with his Majestie’. Those who disobeyed could be punished as pirates.¹⁰⁷

While the divide concerning religious conditions to be included in the marriage treaty was visibly reduced by 1617, and Digby was sent by James to Madrid to conclude the dynastic union, relations between London and Madrid became, once again, tense because of Raleigh’s attack on St Thomé and the absence of Gondomar from London. The Ambassador, who had returned to Spain in the summer of 1618, was replaced by two agents extraordinary, Juan Sanchez de Ulloa (in England from July 1618 to March 1620) and Diego de la La Fuente (in England from October 1618 to October 1620).¹⁰⁸ The two envoys were less familiar with the delicate diplomatic situation concerning Raleigh’s journey and with the implications that his expedition could have on the marriage negotiations between the two countries. Neither of them managed to establish the same relationship, based on trust and friendship, that Gondomar had been able to cement with King James.¹⁰⁹

When the news of what had happened at St Thomé reached Europe, the King of England realised that a strong and rapid response against Raleigh and his crew was needed in order to preserve the fragile peace between the two countries, and to secure the marriage negotiations. For his part, Raleigh wrote an *Apology for the ill success of this enterprise to Guyana* where his primary defence was that Guyana was in fact an

¹⁰⁶ SP 14/92, fols. 65-71.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ On the ambassadors at James’s court, see Roberta Anderson, ‘Diplomatic Representatives from the Hapsburg Monarchy to the Court of James VI and I’, Appendix to Samson (ed.) *The Spanish Match*, pp. 209-25.

¹⁰⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 9, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 13 September 1618.

English territory. He considered himself as a very unfortunate man as he believed he was paying for a crime he had not committed since these territories belonged to the crown of England.¹¹⁰ Therefore, in Sir Walter's opinion, the attack was simply a response to the unjustified aggression of the Spaniards. He stated that he never had any intention to undermine the reputation of his sovereign but that his purpose was truly to find the gold.¹¹¹ According to Raleigh, 'to break the peace where there is no peace is impossible'.¹¹² Anglo-Spanish conflict in the Americas was in fact recurrent despite the ongoing marriage negotiations in Europe.

James had already promised the Spanish court, in April 1617, that if Raleigh were to offend one of King Philip's vassals or to set foot in any of his territories, he would send him and all those guilty to Spain so that they could be punished in Madrid.¹¹³ In 1618, however, Philip III preferred to leave James to carry out the problematic execution. According to article XXIX of the 1604 peace treaty, Raleigh, guilty of the attack at St Thom , had to be punished in order for the alliance between the two countries to be upheld: 'those attempting and doing damage only shall be punished, and no others'.¹¹⁴

The reason for Raleigh's death sentence in 1618 - as Thomas Carlyle put it at the end of the nineteenth century - was precisely that 'he had been unfortunate; had become an eyesore¹¹⁵ to the Spaniards, and did not discover the El Dorado mine'.¹¹⁶ As already mentioned, Raleigh was not formally sentenced to death on the basis of his actions in

¹¹⁰ Raleigh, 'Apology', in *Raleigh's Works*, p. 499.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 507.

¹¹² Quoted in Nicholls and Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 301. See also Raleigh, 'Apology', in *Raleigh's Works*, pp. 500-501: 'True it is, that the Spaniards cannot endure that the English nation should look upon any part of America, being above a fourth part of the whole known world'; 'we did not have any peace with the Spaniards in those parts of the world'.

¹¹³ Don Diego Sarmiento de Acu a to Philip III, 6 April 1617, in Bustamante, p. 31.

¹¹⁴ 'Treaty between Philip III and James I', in *Treaties*, p. 144.

¹¹⁵ Archaic for 'eyesore'.

¹¹⁶ Carlyle (ed.), *Historical Sketches*, p. 140.

Guyana in 1617-1618 but instead because of the sentence of 1603, when he was found guilty of treason for allegedly conspiring against James's accession to the throne, in favour of Arabella Stuart.¹¹⁷ Various observers were aware of the fact that while James had granted Walter Raleigh permission to sail towards Guyana, the patent did not include a pardon for his previous offences. In fact, as considered by Sir George Carew upon his departure, Raleigh 'remains unpardoned untill his retourne'.¹¹⁸ Sir Walter had assumed instead that permission to go implied a full pardon, as he would state in his *Apology*.¹¹⁹ During the hearing that followed his return from Guyana, Raleigh was told that 'there could be no implicit pardon for high treason'.¹²⁰

At the end of 1620, just after the summoning of Parliament for January 1621 was announced by Royal Proclamation, Thomas Gainsford wrote a pamphlet titled *Vox Spiritus or Sir Walter Raleigh Ghost*. The work is characterised by the strong anti-Spanish tone typical of the author.¹²¹ Through a dialogue between Diego de La Fuente and the Jesuit Father Baldwin, the author satirically outlined the risks for Catholics that were inherent in the parliamentary debate that was to begin shortly.¹²² Gainsford's opinion was clearly expressed through the voice of Raleigh's ghost who, in a long soliloquy, discussed the spread of popery and the risks of the Catholic threat. It is interesting to note the extent to which the pamphleteer was aware of the importance of

¹¹⁷ On Raleigh's execution and his speech on 29 October 1618, see *CSPD* 1611-18, p. 53. On the accusations in 1603, see Nicholls and Williams, 'Raleigh, Sir Walter', *ODNB*.

¹¹⁸ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter III, Savoy, 18 January 1616, pp. 27-79 (p. 31).

¹¹⁹ Raleigh, 'Apology', in *Raleigh's Works*, p. 499.

¹²⁰ Adamson and Folland, *The Shepherd of the Ocean*, p. 435.

¹²¹ S. A. Baron, 'Gainsford, Thomas (bap. 1566, d. 1624), soldier and historian', *ODNB*. See also Boys, *London's News Press*, pp. 123-42.

¹²² On the identification of the pamphlet's characters, see Simon L. Adams, 'Captain Thomas Gainsford, the "Vox Spiritus" and the "Vox Populi"', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 59 (1976), 141-4.

the 1621 parliamentary debate and sought to influence King James's policy.¹²³ Gainsford, in fact, through the evocative figure of Raleigh, tried to convince public opinion of the importance of helping James's son-in-law. According to the author, the help to be given to Frederick V was opposed to any alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs.

One of Gainsford's contemporaries, Thomas Scott, also tried to influence James's decisions in anti-Spanish terms. In *Vox Populi*, Scott expressed his disdain for the King's peaceful policy and for his prolonged attempts to accomplish a Spanish marriage while he should have instead helped Frederick in the Palatinate.¹²⁴ Despite using different figures, these two authors can both be considered as typical of a large part of the English political nation which considered the Anglo-Spanish Match to be not as important as the survival of Protestantism in Europe and indeed inimical to it.

2.3 The Spanish Side

As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1604 peace treaty included articles concerning trade and commercial relations between England and the Iberian powers. These articles were not always respected by the parties involved. Indeed, England had been sending complaints to Madrid regarding the mistreatment of its merchants since shortly after the signing of the treaty at Somerset House, and in May 1606 King James had ratified an agreement of mutual assistance with France.¹²⁵

¹²³ See Christopher Hill, 'Parliament and People in Seventeenth-Century England', *P&P*, 92 (1981), 100-124 (pp. 114-15)

¹²⁴ Sean Kelsey, 'Scott, Thomas (d. 1626)', *ODNB*.

¹²⁵ 'A Treaty between Henry IV, King of France and James I, King of England, for the security and freedom of commerce betwee their subjects', 26 May 1606, in *Treaties*, pp. 147-56. See also, *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 104.

Therefore, even before Raleigh's voyage, the rivalry between the English and the Spanish in the West Indies was testified to by various contemporaries. There was particular concern for the illicit trade carried out in the Orinoco area by English and Dutch merchants.¹²⁶ Accordingly, Diego Palomeque de Acuna, governor of Trinidad and Guyana, had specific instructions to eliminate enemy settlements by cooperating with the Governor of Puerto Rico.¹²⁷ Before the journey, Gondomar wrote to Spain in early 1616 concerning Walter Raleigh's plans. According to the Spanish ambassador, the risk was not only in Guyana, but Raleigh might, in fact, move to other Spanish territories in the West Indies in his quest for gold.¹²⁸ Even the East Indies were mentioned as a possible destination for Raleigh's journey as it was believed that Raleigh's intention might have been 'to round the Cape of Good Hope and go to the Red Sea and other parts of the East Indies'.¹²⁹

When discussing counter-measures to be taken in advance of Raleigh's journey, Lerma shared Gondomar's reports concerning Raleigh's preparation for a voyage towards the Orinoco with the Council of State. During the long-running marriage diplomacy, and even more so concerning Raleigh's expedition, Gondomar had a difficult role as intermediary between the King of England and the King of Spain. He reassured Philip III of James's promise that Raleigh would be given 'a fitting punishment' if he attacked Spanish territories in the West Indies. At the same time, he protested in London that Raleigh's voyage might result in the seizing of Spanish territories and asked James to stop him before departure as he was not convinced that Sir Walter would keep his promise. In his correspondence, Gondomar expressed what

¹²⁶ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 128-32.

¹²⁷ The King of Spain to the Governor of Puerto Rico, El Pardo, 12 December 1615, in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 132-33.

¹²⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 88: 'succedia bien la jornada de la Guiana pasar a otras partes de las Indias'.

¹²⁹ Gondomar to Philip III, London, 26 June 1617, quot. in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 140-41.

he perceived as an inconsistency on the part of James I. According to the Spanish ambassador, it was 'inconvenient' to grant permission to Raleigh to go to Guyana at such a crucial moment for the marriage negotiations.¹³⁰

Gondomar's opinion was not the only one to be taken into account. As mentioned above, the Duke of Lerma also considered the opinion of 'an Englishman,' likely to be a spy, according to whom three large vessels were being armed for Virginia.¹³¹ Both Guyana and Virginia were in fact territories over which the Iberian sovereign was hoping to assert his claims by threatening the English court that any actions in those areas would have detrimental consequences on the dynastic union.

The Spanish Ambassador had sent a full report of Raleigh's plans already in August 1616 and added some more detailed intelligence in October of the same year. The Council of State, however, considered that more particulars were needed in order to make an informed decision. Specifically, it was believed that a great fleet would be too expensive to organise in such a short time especially considering the uncertainty surrounding Raleigh's final destination. The extensive discussions within the Council demonstrate that, despite Gondomar's close relationship with King James, the ambassador's opinion was not considered reliable only on the basis that it was coming from such a respected source.¹³² Instead, Gondomar's reports concerning Raleigh's plans, King James's patent, and the map outlining his journey were considered alongside accounts from different correspondents reporting a different number of vessels and a different potential destination, which is to say Virginia or even the East

¹³⁰ BPR II/2185, doc. 32, Count of Gondomar to Philip III, London, 15 November 1617. See below for a discussion of the word 'inconvenient'. Raleigh's *Last Voyage*, p. 35.

¹³¹ AGI, Indiferente General, Junta de Guerra, Consultas Originales, 1612 á 1618, Leg. 17, quot. in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 133-40. On Gondomar not being well informed about plans made and decisions taken in Madrid, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 26.

¹³² *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 133-35.

Indies rather than Guyana. This testifies to the fact that despite the belief in England that Gondomar had a strong influence over the King of Spain, his reports were not valued as much as it was popularly perceived and instead his advice was mediated by that of others in Madrid.¹³³

We know that the Spanish Council of State possessed a copy of the patent that King James had given to Walter Raleigh and that Gondomar had obtained James's guarantee that Raleigh would not cross the border to Spanish territories and would not engage in combat with the Spanish.¹³⁴ The councillors believed that if Raleigh's fleet were to commit actions against the intentions of King James, which is to say to attack Spanish territories, England had to give 'a great demonstration of punishment'.¹³⁵ Indeed, according to the Council of State in Madrid it was necessary that James himself would punish Raleigh for his misbehaviour to demonstrate his commitment to the dynastic alliance that was being negotiated between Charles and the Infanta. The clarification, regarding the fact that the King of Spain wanted Raleigh to be punished in England, was needed because King James had offered ambassador Gondomar the possibility that Raleigh could be hanged in Madrid if he were to act against the King's patent during his expedition to Guyana.¹³⁶

In the patent granted to Raleigh on 26 August 1616, James avoided the customary words 'trusty and wellbeloved' as neither of the two adjectives reflected James's feelings towards Sir Walter. As the King did not want to risk that Raleigh's expedition

¹³³ The best examples of English perception of Gondomar's extensive power in England, are Scott's *Vox Populi* (1620) and Middleton's *A Game at Chess* (1624). See also Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia Hispano-Inglesa*, p. 60.

¹³⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 845, doc. 127; AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 6, Meeting of the Council of State, 3 July 1618. See also, *Mare Clausum. Mare Liberum. La Piratería en la America Española* (Sevilla: Archivo General de Indias, 2010), p. 67.

¹³⁵ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 89.

¹³⁶ Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña to Philip III, London, 6 April 1617, in Bustamante, pp. 31-33 (p. 31).

would jeopardise the ongoing marriage negotiations that had been carried on since the signing of the peace treaty in 1604, he had been very clear about what powers Raleigh had and what was absolutely prohibited during his voyage. As much as Ambassador Gondomar, King James also had to act as a mediator. On the one hand, to punish Raleigh meant that the King of England had to recognise that he had committed a crime by entering Spanish territories. Whereas, to admit that the Spanish had a better claim on the area of the Orinoco implied that the King was partly responsible for the events as he had granted Raleigh the patent to travel towards Guyana. On the other hand, if James did not give satisfaction to Gondomar and the Spanish Council of State in Madrid, he would have endangered the marriage diplomacy. James was aware that he could not execute Sir Walter without a hearing. Indeed, according to Sir Edward Harwood, as much as he was ‘inclined to hang Raleigh, it cannot handsomely be done’.¹³⁷ Raleigh was first questioned on 17 August 1618 and summoned before the Privy Council on 22 October.¹³⁸

Gondomar was rightly convinced that the Stuart King did not want a war against Spain nor could he afford it.¹³⁹ For this reason, before Raleigh’s departure, the ambassador reported to his sovereign that James would do everything in his power to stop Raleigh, or to punish him if necessary. Precisely because Gondomar was aware that James would neither endanger the peace nor the marriage negotiations with Spain, he asked the King of England to implement important safeguards in case Raleigh did not comply with the agreement. The very fact that the King of England had agreed that one of his subjects

¹³⁷ TNA, SP 14/103, f. 16, Sir Edward Harwood to Carleton, London, 3 October 1618.

¹³⁸ Nicholls and Williams, ‘Raleigh, Sir Walter’, *ODNB*.

¹³⁹ Count of Gondomar to King Philip III, 22 October 1617, in Bustamante, p. 45: ‘es ciertissimo que este Rey ni quiere guerra ni le combiene.’

might be convicted in Spain was, according to Gondomar, evidence of James's commitment towards 'those peace articles [of 1604]' and the dynastic union.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, both Gondomar and Philip III knew the likelihood was quite high that Raleigh would not comply with the King's prescriptions.¹⁴¹

Gondomar feared the voyage as he did not want his carefully crafted diplomacy to fall apart because of Raleigh's misbehaviour far away from the European courts where the alliance had been laboriously achieved. It was a risk that he believed was not to be taken and he advised the Council of State and the King to take the necessary precautions.¹⁴² Gondomar expressed very clearly his position to James: if Raleigh had not complied with the orders of his sovereign, there could be irreparable damage.¹⁴³ On a personal level, he wanted to gain membership of the prestigious Council of State in Madrid and he knew that such a possibility was only really an option if he was able to bring the marriage negotiations with England to a successful conclusion.¹⁴⁴

Before Raleigh's departure, the Council of State in Madrid discussed the number of vessels with which Raleigh was departing to Guyana. Sir Walter was considered a threat to Spanish territories in South America, and the word most used to define his journey to Guyana, in both the minutes of the meetings of the State Council in Madrid and the Council of the Indies in Seville, was 'inconvenient'. The voyage was designed to cause *inconveniences*¹⁴⁵ as it was evident the extent to which Raleigh's expedition could result

¹⁴⁰ Count of Gondomar to the Council of State, London 23 October 1617, in Bustamante, pp. 52-53 (p. 52).

¹⁴¹ AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36.

¹⁴² AGS, E., Leg. 2514, docs. 86, 88, and 89. AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 7; AGS, E., Leg. 2850, doc. 28.

¹⁴³ Diego Sarmiento de Acuña to King James, 30 March 1617, in Bustamante, p. 29: 'que los daños esten hechos, y sehan ynremediabes'. See also Bustamante, pp. 54-5: 'haziendo las cosas irremediabes y incurabes contra los fines que vos y yo desseamos'.

¹⁴⁴ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 236.

¹⁴⁵ Diego Sarmiento de Acuña to Thomas Lake, Secretary of State of the King of Great Britain, 30 March 1616, in Bustamante, p. 5. In this instance, the ambassador meant 'disadvantages'.

in ‘damage and *inconvenience*’.¹⁴⁶ While the journey could have *inconveniences* for everybody¹⁴⁷ and the Council had to be careful of the ‘*inconvenient* drawbacks of Walter Raleigh’s journey,¹⁴⁸ Gondomar stated that the ‘great *inconveniences*’ of Raleigh’s expedition would be paid for by England more than by Spain.¹⁴⁹

According to the Spanish ambassador, it was necessary not only to take precautions in Guyana, but also to have an army ready in Trinidad. Walter Raleigh was not to be trusted in his promises as he was a heretic and had always been always hostile to Spanish interests.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, Raleigh had expressed his opinion regarding the advantages for England of a war with Spain multiple times. For example, Sir Walter believed that England had a duty to and a strong economic interest in protecting the Netherlands from Spanish subjection. This was crucial especially for trade as if the King of England declared war on Spain ‘the trade also is free and open to all parts of the east.’ If King James, however, were to let the Spanish control the Netherlands, trade would be restrained ‘on both sides’.¹⁵¹

Gondomar’s requests for precautions to be taken with respect to Walter Raleigh’s forthcoming journey were discussed not only within the Council of State but also in the

¹⁴⁶ Diego Sarmiento de Acuña on Walter Raleigh’s voyage, 2 September 1616, in Bustamante, pp. 11-13 (p. 12).

¹⁴⁷ Diego Sarmiento de Acuña to His Majesty, 30 November 1616, in Bustamante, pp. 22-26 (p. 22).

¹⁴⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 845, doc. 102, Meeting of the State Council, 29 April 1617: ‘Gualtero Rale, de cuya jornada para la Guiana ha dado cuenta a VM.d diversas vezes [...] representado aquel Rey los inconvenientes q podría tener esto.’

¹⁴⁹ Diego Sarmiento de Acuña to His Majesty, 7 April 1617, in Bustamante, p. 37.

¹⁵⁰ Gondomar to the President of the Hacienda, 1618, in Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh’s Discoverie*, p. 305.

¹⁵¹ Raleigh, ‘A Discourse Touching a War with Spain, 1603’, in *Raleigh’s Works*, vol. VIII, p. 306. See also AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 47: from the Spanish side, Gondomar was well aware of the risks that a commercial union between England and the Netherlands might bring, and the Ambassador tried to make it clear to the members of the Council of State. Gondomar considered such a union as a consequence of the delays in the marriage negotiations and of King James’s fears that the Anglo-Spanish dynastic union would not be finalised.

Council of War within the Council of the Indies in April 1617.¹⁵² Already in early 1617 the Council of the Indies warned the governor of Venezuela that disturbing news had arrived from England according to which ‘gualtero real’ wanted to pass through those provinces in his way to Guyana and up the Orinoco.¹⁵³ In addition to the concerned correspondence from Ambassador Gondomar, various agents of the King of Spain confirmed the alarming progress of Raleigh’s preparations soon after he was released from the Tower of London. Miguel Coronel, for example, commented on ‘the artillery and armed men’ under Raleigh’s command. His letter was one of many implying that Raleigh was not interested in the mine but instead he had bellicose intentions against Spanish territories in the Americas.¹⁵⁴

It is essential to note that the timing of Raleigh’s trip, and especially the arrival of the news concerning his attack on St Thomé, coincided with Gondomar’s temporary return to Spain in the summer of 1618.¹⁵⁵ During the period of the Spanish Ambassador’s absence from England, both the envoys extra-ordinary, and mainly Juan Sanchez de Ulloa, continued to highlight the importance of the Count’s return to England, especially once they believed that Sir Walter Raleigh’s expedition was going to

¹⁵² Antonia Heredia Heredia (ed.), *Catalogo de las consultas del Consejo de Indias, 1617-1625* (Sevilla: Publicaciones de la Escuela de Estudios Ibero-Americanos, 1985), see Juntas of War of 7 and 28 April 1617.

¹⁵³ AGI, Santo Domingo, 869, L. 7, fols. 18-9.

¹⁵⁴ AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 177, fols. 643-4: ‘[Miguel Coronel] dice que en el río de Londres se aprestaban 10 o 12 bajeles con mucha artillería y gente de guerra bajo el mando de Guaterral que estaba preso en la Torre de Londres’.

¹⁵⁵ A similar situation of Gondomar wanting to leave England and go back to Spain will present itself between the end of 1621 and the beginning of 1622. See AGS, E., Leg. 2558, docs. 15, 128, and 129.

compromise ‘the most important negotiation, and of such consequences’, which is to say the union between Charles and the Infanta María.¹⁵⁶

Since the end of 1617, Gondomar had complained about various afflictions to his health that did not allow him to work and engage in diplomatic matters with the speed and effectiveness that he wanted. Because of his poor physical condition, for example, Gondomar could not visit Queen Anne as frequently as he had done previously.¹⁵⁷ In November 1617, the ambassador wrote to Buckingham that Raleigh’s actions were not a good medicine for his illness.¹⁵⁸ After various requests, Philip III allowed Gondomar to return to Spain in 1618. His replacement, Sanchez de Ulloa, considered Gondomar’s return to England at his earliest convenience of crucial importance if Spain wanted to keep the ‘good disposition’ of King James, since he was the only one who knew England well enough.¹⁵⁹

Following the arrival of the news to Madrid that Raleigh had attacked and destroyed the Spanish settlement of St Thomé, in a meeting of the Council of State on 11 August 1618, Raleigh’s actions were discussed and measured against what King James had promised Gondomar in 1616-1617 together with the promises of the English ambassador in Madrid, John Digby, to Philip III. The English Crown had assured Spain that Raleigh ‘would not commit any offence, and if he did [Spain] would have got

¹⁵⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 845, doc. 131: ‘el negocio principal, tan grave y de tantas consecuencias’. On the extraordinary envoys asking for Gondomar’s return to England as soon as possible, see AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 9, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 13 September 1618.

¹⁵⁷ Count of Gondomar to Philip III, 15 November 1617, in Bustamante, p. 60.

¹⁵⁸ Copy of a letter by the Count of Gondomar to Buckingham, 3 November 1617, in Bustamante, p. 54: ‘[...] me ha tenido y tiene con continuos dolores y muy trabajado; y assi os confieso que no hauía menester diferentes medicinas de las obras que va haziendo Walter Raleigh.’

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. See also, Count of Gondomar to Philip III’, 15 November 1617, in Bustamante, pp. 56-62. During his years as ambassador in England, Gondomar had succeeded in fostering the friendship between the two Crowns and always maintained that ‘His Majesty [the King of Spain] was very consistent in wanting the union with this king, and to marry his daughter to this prince.’

complete satisfaction'.¹⁶⁰ Digby had reassured Philip III that Raleigh would pay for his mistakes if he were to do anything 'improper' ('cosa indevida').¹⁶¹ Indeed, during the meeting, Madrid called for an exemplary punishment to be given to the 'pirates traitors' who committed such crimes in St Thomé.¹⁶²

In September 1618, the Junta of War met to discuss the assistance to be sent to the islands affected by the passage of the 'heretic enemies'.¹⁶³ The members reiterated the need for Gondomar to go back to England, because of the difficult diplomatic situation between the two countries.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, in 1619 the governors of St Thomé and Trinidad asked the Spanish crown for financial help and protection. Because of the damage caused by 'the English enemy' the previous year, they were still poor and in need.¹⁶⁵ In March 1619 the new governor of Trinidad, Don Juan de Villoria y Quinones, was appointed to replace Diego Palomeque who had died during the charge against St Thomé the previous year, opened an enquiry into the English attack.¹⁶⁶

The preliminary agreement between James and Gondomar that, if Raleigh had not complied with the King's conditions, Philip III would have had the right to punish him in Spain, marked a crucial turning point in the balance of power between the two countries. The increasing rivalry between England and Spain in the Americas became deeply connected with questions of dynastic alliances at home as demonstrated by both

¹⁶⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 7: '[...] asegurando que no haría offensa ninguna; y si la hiziesse se daría entera satisfacción'.

¹⁶¹ AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 7; AGS, E., Leg. 2850, doc. 28.

¹⁶² AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 7.

¹⁶³ AGI, Santo Domingo, 869, L. 7, fols. 38-41 and fols. 51-52. In the latter is discussed a letter dated 26 January 1618 concerning the attack in San Thomé and it is mentioned the brave behaviour of those who fought to defend it.

¹⁶⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 9.

¹⁶⁵ AGI, Santo Domingo, 179, R. 4, N. 81: 'Señor, la isla de Trinidad y Sancto Thomé de la guaiana dizen que a causa de hauer les robado este año un enemigo yngles y lleuandoles todo quanto tenían an quedado tan necesitados pobres y desnudos'.

¹⁶⁶ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 70, and pp. 217-20.

Gondomar's concerns and King James's reaction. Indeed, while Raleigh's execution in October 1618 allowed the King of England to demonstrate to the Spanish sovereign his continuing support for the dynastic union, it also contributed to the worsening of some of the political nation's opinions towards the marriage negotiations with the Spanish Habsburgs.

If Raleigh had actually found the mine and returned to England with his ships loaded with gold, it is likely that James would have forgiven him for his attack on St Thom . The King of England would have tried to avoid a war against the Habsburgs in Europe but perhaps given up the long-term marriage negotiations preferring to exploit the riches of the mine rather than marrying his heir to the Infanta. As James was in a difficult financial situation since the beginning of his reign and his Parliaments had not improved the precarious state of royal revenues, any discovery of gold by Raleigh would have improved the English King's finances in the short-term. Indeed, Sir Walter's hope was that the gold of the Indies would have avoided the need for a Spanish dowry.¹⁶⁷ Even if we assume that James would have confronted Spain if Raleigh had found the gold mine, the Stuart King was not ready to do so if Sir Walter's expedition did not bring any direct economic or territorial advantage to the Crown. As Raleigh did not find El Dorado, and since James had sworn to Gondomar that there would be 'no injury to the vassals or the territories' of Philip III,¹⁶⁸ Sir Walter's life mattered little compared to James's long-term interest in an Anglo-Spanish alliance. The King of England, in fact, considered it essential to demonstrate to Gondomar that he intended to keep the promises made to the King of Spain. This demonstration took on an even greater value given Gondomar's absence from England in the period 1618-1620.

¹⁶⁷ On a discussion of James's finances and the importance of obtaining the large Spanish dowry, see chp. III below.

¹⁶⁸ Nicholls and Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 302.

As he had already expressed earlier in his life, Sir Walter was against a dynastic union between England and Spain.¹⁶⁹ In 1617, Raleigh meant his second voyage to Guyana to bring an end to the marriage negotiations for a union between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta by creating ‘a rupture’ between the two countries.¹⁷⁰ James used Raleigh’s execution in 1618 to safeguard those same marriage negotiations that Raleigh had hoped to destroy. It was preposterous to pursue a marriage alliance with Spain while granting Raleigh a patent that allowed him to sail towards Spanish territories to find a gold mine for the benefit of the English Crown.¹⁷¹ As King James was neither inept nor foolish, this appeared to be a well-calculated plan that would have guaranteed a victory for the King in any case. If Raleigh had found the gold mine and claimed the territory on behalf of James, the King of England would have had the necessary financial resources without needing the Spanish dowry nor to convene a Parliament.¹⁷² If, as it happened, Raleigh had attacked Spanish possessions without finding any gold, the King could blame Raleigh and keep his promise to Gondomar to condemn the explorer to ‘a fitting punishment’.¹⁷³

Raleigh's expedition was not driven solely by personal interest or the desire to be freed from the Tower of London to increase his personal wealth, as some believed both in England and in Spain.¹⁷⁴ Raleigh believed in the possibility of an English Empire in

¹⁶⁹ ‘A Discourse touching a marriage’, in *Raleigh's Works*, pp. 237-52.

¹⁷⁰ TNA, SP 14/103, f. 19, Sir Thomas Wilson to King James, Tower of London, 4 October 1618. See also Appendix C below.

¹⁷¹ *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 24.

¹⁷² On the existence of a tacit understanding in this terms between King James and Raleigh, see *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 36-38. See also, Greenblatt, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 163.

¹⁷³ Count of Gondomar to Philip III, 15 November 1617, in Bustamante, pp. 63-64.

¹⁷⁴ TNA, SP 14/90, f. 250v., Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 29 March 1617; AGS, E., Leg. 2514, docs. 88 and 89.

the West Indies and he was by no means alone in his project of empire.¹⁷⁵ When the Spanish asked King James to execute Raleigh after his return from Guyana, the punishment was not only sought because he had attacked the small village of St Thomé, although this was the pretext used by Gondomar with James, but instead originated from the concern for a possible English penetration in the area of Guyana that could have been the beginning of an increased English presence in the West Indies to replace the existing Spanish one.

The Spanish concern originated from a distinct possibility given Raleigh's bold statement in 1595 that England would have a *Casa de Contratación* for Guyana larger than the Iberian one in Seville for the Indies.¹⁷⁶ The *Casa de Contratación* in Seville was the institution devoted to the management of profits and expenditures from the Indies and Raleigh was convinced that England could gain an equally profitable empire if only the sovereign had accepted the burden of occupying the strategic territory around the Orinoco. For this reason, during his second expedition, Raleigh was not only interested in finding the gold, but rather in the availability of commodities that could support the English against the Spanish in their attempt to create an English Empire in South America. One of these commodities was tobacco.

Reporting to Sir Thomas Roe about Sir Dale's return from Virginia, Carew considered the current situation in the English settlements of Virginia and Bermuda. He considered the worst period of the colonies to be passed but also recognised that 'yet no profit is returned'. The only commodity that was being, at least partially, profitable,

¹⁷⁵ Richard Hakluyt, *Western Planting* (London, 1584); Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie*, p. 15; *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, p. 4 and p. 6.

¹⁷⁶ See Lorimer (ed.), *Raleigh's Discoverie of Guyana*.

was ‘some tobacco’.¹⁷⁷ Tobacco was indeed a commodity strongly contentious in the struggle between England and Spain for primacy in the West Indies, as demonstrated by the debates concerning tobacco trade in the Parliaments of the early seventeenth century.¹⁷⁸

In a letter written on 12 May 1618, James Wadsworth, an English clergyman who converted to Catholicism and was living in Spain at the time of Raleigh’s voyage,¹⁷⁹ informed the Spanish sovereign of Raleigh’s stop in the Canary Islands on his way to Guyana. Wadsworth advised Philip III not to be worried concerning Raleigh’s actions as it was a shared perception that Sir Walter’s expedition was not going to have major consequences. He compared Raleigh’s voyage to the enterprise in Virginia ‘of little benefit and with very few consequences’.¹⁸⁰ He stated in fact that the majority of England’s wealth at the time resided in the trade with the East Indies, where King James had sent several embassies since the previous decade, the most important of which led by Sir Thomas Roe.¹⁸¹ I believe that the perceived shift in the major source of European enrichment from the West to the East was a slow and gradual process of which England became aware before Spain, whose possessions in the East originated mainly from the union with Portugal in 1580. Raleigh was one of the last exponents of his generation, whose idea of wealth was deeply tied to the Americas. By 1618 when Raleigh was

¹⁷⁷ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter III, Savoy, 18 January 1616, pp. 27-79 (p. 36). See also *CSPCol, West*, vol. I, John Pory to Sir Dudley Carleton, London, 25 October 1618. The situation had not much improved in the early 1620s, *CSPCol, West*, vol. I, Lord President Mandeville to Conway, Whitehall, 2 July 1623.

¹⁷⁸ For those debates see chp. V below.

¹⁷⁹ See G. Martin Murphy, ‘Wadsworth, James (c.1572–1623), Church of England clergyman and Roman Catholic convert’, *ODNB*.

¹⁸⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36. See Appendix B below.

¹⁸¹ On Sir Thomas Roe’s embassy to the East, see G. Gerrard to Carleton, 9 January 1619, in *CSPD*, James I, vol. CV, 8. See also, AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36.

executed, America was not any longer the most popular area where to invest capital.¹⁸²
The following chapters will move to the East Indies towards what was increasingly considered as the major source of English wealth in the early seventeenth century.

¹⁸² Lloyd Williams, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, p. 234.

Chapter III

‘Alteration in the main business.’¹ The Match and the Taking of Hormuz, 1622

And Thou shalt see the Erythrean, lose
Its native *red*, and *pale* with Terrou look:
And see the potent *Kingdom* of Ormuse
Twice taken, *twice* subdu’de unto their yoak:
And see the furious Moor stand in a Muze
With his *reverberated* Arrows strook
That he may learn, if against *Thine* he fight;
His Treacherie on his *own* pate shall light.

Luís de Camoes²

In a letter dated January 1624, Francisco da Gama, viceroy of the *Estado da India*, discussed the aid that was sent to the East Indies by the Iberian monarchy following the loss of the Portuguese port of Hormuz in 1622. Commenting on the number of ships and the delays in preparing the necessary countermeasures to regain the fortress, the viceroy considered the galleon St Andre’s stop in Lisbon as fortuitous. Because the galleon was not appropriately equipped (‘desaparelhado’) for the journey, it had been forced to stop in the Portuguese capital in 1623. The news of the Prince of Wales’s stay in Madrid, in order to bring to a successful conclusion his marriage to the Infanta, had arrived at the East Indies only because of this unplanned stopover. The viceroy believed that the Iberian King’s vassals in the East would have been very

¹ CSPCol., East, Earl of Bristol to Secretary Calvert, Madrid, 26 December 1622.

² Richard Fanshaw (transl.), *The Lusiad or Portugals Historicall Poem written in Portingal language by Lewis de Camoens and now newly put in English* (London, 1655), canto II, stanza 49.

pleased to hear the news, and the situation in the *Estado* would calm down as a consequence.³

The viceroy's assumption was indeed that foreign attacks on Portuguese ports and trade routes would decrease as a result of the dynastic union between England and Spain. The Portuguese presence in the East, however, extending from the East Coast of Africa to Japan, was an extremely complex conglomerate whose interests were not always aligned with those of the Crown.⁴ As the seminal work of Luís Filipe Thomaz as demonstrated, the *Estado da Índia* was 'a network and not a space',⁵ which is to say it included a number of different territories, people, interests, and commodities rather than being a coherent spatial or political entity.⁶ The Portuguese empire was in fact dispersed and characterised by mobility, hybridity and cosmopolitanism⁷ resulting from numerous outposts established in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.⁸ In this sense, the Portuguese presence in the East exceeded the *Estado* to include a great number of settlements and relations that were beyond the control of the Iberian crown.⁹ Furthermore, Portuguese trading networks were characterised by a high level of 'economic and cultural dialogue

³ DRI, vol. X, pp. 3-4.

⁴ Francisco Bethencourt, 'Political Configurations and Local Powers', in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 197-254 (pp. 200-221); Jorge M. Pedreira, "'To Have and to Have not.'" The Economic Consequences of Empire: Portugal (1415-1822)', in *Revista de Historia Económica*, Twelfth International Economic History Congress (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1998), p. 97.

⁵ Luís Filipe Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Algés: Difel, 1994), p. 210.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁷ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea. Portugal's Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492-1640* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 13.

⁸ Patrick O'Brien and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, 'The Costs and Benefits for Europeans from their Empires Overseas', in *Revista de Historia Económica*, Twelfth International Economic History Congress (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1998), pp. 29-89 (p.39)

⁹ See Amélia Polónia, 'Global Interactions: Representations of the East and the Far East in Portugal in the Sixteenth Century', in *Networks in the First Global Age*, ed. by Rila Mukherjee (New Delhi: Primus, 2011), pp. 263-301 (pp. 272-73). On the difficulties of using the term *Estado da Índia* to only refer to 'formal, official-acknowledged Portuguese possessions' rather than including informal settlements and interests as well, see Anthony R. Disney, *A History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vol II, pp. 145-46. The author recognises that this is an artificial division as 'they overlapped and were linked in many significant ways'. See also Thomaz, *De Ceuta*, pp. 207-208.

rather than domination'.¹⁰ Such dialogue was pragmatically essential, as Portuguese domination over powerful indigenous dynasties would have been otherwise impossible to achieve.

While some early modern accounts described the island of Hormuz as sterile and in need of all resources necessary for survival, the majority of early modern commentators writing about the Portuguese possession agreed on the importance of the fortress for the maintenance ('conservación') of the *Estado da Índia*.¹¹ During the early modern period European empire-builders and Muslim powers in the East, which is to say Safavids, Ottomans, and Mughals, interacted, at times cooperating and at times clashing with each other in order to gain advantages in strategic regions and control territory as well as trading routes.¹² Hormuz was essential to such interaction.

The importance of Hormuz, in modern-day Iran, was recognised in the 1560s by Portugal's greatest poet, Luís de Camões, in his *The Lusiads*, published for the first time in 1572. In the epigraph opening this chapter, the poet recalls how the fortress of Hormuz had required two consecutive attempts to be conquered at the beginning of the sixteenth century: the reference is to Afonso de Albuquerque's expeditions in 1507 and 1515.¹³ By the sixteenth century, Hormuz was indeed one of the most active centres of Portuguese trade thanks to its strategic position as a point of encounter between Europeans, Safavids, and Ottomans.¹⁴ The awareness of Hormuz's strategic value had

¹⁰ Amândio Jorge Morais Barros, 'The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in the First Global Age. Transoceanic Exchanges, Naval Power, Port Organization and Trade', in *Oceans Connect. Reflections on Water Worlds across time and space* (New Delhi: Primus, 2013), pp. 143-202 (p. 159).

¹¹ See for example, AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated.

¹² See also, Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol. II, pp. 177-78.

¹³ BL, Sloane ms. 197, fols. 10-12. See also AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated; and Dejanira Couto and Rui Manuel Loureiro, *Ormuz 1507 e 1622. Conquista e Perda* (Lisbon: Tribuna, 2007).

¹⁴ On the 'global location' of Hormuz within the Gulf, see Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 'Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf, 1620-1680' (Durham University, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1999), p. 16.

not declined in the seventeenth century. In fact, such a successful trading centre soon attracted the attention of newly-founded mercantile companies, especially the English and the Dutch East India Companies. In 1622, at the zenith of Anglo-Spanish negotiations for a dynastic union between Prince Charles and the Infanta María, the English East India Company struck a deal with the Persians in order to capture Hormuz at the expense of the Portuguese.




Image 3. Pieter van der Aa, Map of the Arabian Peninsula and adjacent regions (1707)

Empire building overseas was happening parallel to political centralisation in Europe. The same centralisation characterised Asian States in the early modern period, as in the case of the Safavids in Iran, the Ottomans in Anatolia, and the Mughals in India.¹⁵

¹⁵ Charles H. Parker, *Global Interaction in the early modern age, 1400-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 39 and p. 65.

These Muslim rulers were leaders of vast territorial empires¹⁶ and fostered trade relations in cooperation with European powers and consequently in competition with others. Following Albuquerque's taking of Hormuz in the early sixteenth century, the port became one of the central possessions of the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* and therefore remained closed to any attempts on the part, *inter alia*, of the English and the Dutch to gain a share in the spice trade. Spices were 'the long-distance luxury trade *par excellence* of the early modern world economy'.¹⁷ As such, it is understandable that the English East India Company deemed it profitable to ally with the Persians to expel the Portuguese from Hormuz in the early 1620s, regardless of the ongoing negotiations for a dynastic union in Europe.

The causes of the fall of Hormuz, however, are more complex and multifaceted than it may seem at first glance. The loss of one of Portuguese Asia's most prestigious fortresses has often been regarded as a demonstration of the economic decline of the Iberian powers, which proved unable to manage their overseas territories.¹⁸ Aside from the structural problems inherent in the *Estado da Índia*, however, one has to consider other reasons why the Catholic monarchy was no longer able to protect its dominions. Firstly, the increasing power of the English East India Company and the Dutch VOC who were hoping to gain a share in the Eastern trade. Secondly, the goal of the Persian ruler, Shah Abbas, to regain control of the coastal regions of the Persian Gulf, which he had pursued since the beginning of the century.¹⁹

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹⁷ Stefan Halikowski Smith, 'Profits sprout like tropical plants': a fresh look at what went wrong with the Eurasian spice trade c. 1550–1800', *Journal of Global History*, 3 (2008), 389–418 (389).

¹⁸ Rui Manuel Loureiro and Vasco Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don Garcia de Silva y Figueroa e os 'Commentarios' da embaixada à Pérsia (1614-1624)*, (Lisbon: Centro de Historia de Alem-Mar, 2011), p. 85.

¹⁹ Rudi Matthee and Jorge Flores, *Portugal, the Persian Gulf and Safavid Persia*, *Acta Iranica*, 52 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), p. 121 and p. 203.

Portuguese historians have looked at Iberian possessions in the East, the specific episode of the taking of Hormuz, and the reasons behind the Iberian Monarchy's decline in power both at home and overseas. Joan-Pau Rubiés is one of the few historians who mentioned the loss of the Portuguese possession of Hormuz together with the marriage negotiations between Prince Charles and the Infanta in an essay published in 2011. With regard to the possible dynastic union, however, the author decided to leave 'aside for a moment the tragicomic unraveling of that particular plan', without ever returning to the topic over the course of his forty-page contribution.²⁰ Despite the attack of the English Company taking place at the height of the negotiations, no historian has yet carried out a thorough study of the link between the subjugation of one of the most important Portuguese possessions in Asia and the failure of the marriage agreements between 1622 and 1624.

In this chapter, I aim to redress this lacuna by discussing the extent to which the imperial competition in the Persian Gulf, and specifically the capture of the Portuguese possession of Hormuz by a combined force of English and Persian troops, influenced the European negotiations for the marriage between Prince Charles and the Infanta of Spain. Firstly, I outline the dynamics between the Spanish monarchy and the other European powers during the Union of the Crowns of Spain and Portugal (1580-1640). Secondly, I place the taking of Hormuz in the context of the negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish match. Lastly, I look at how the East India Company's actions in the East were reflected in the diplomatic discussions concerning the dowry. In doing so, I aim to shed light on a little-known episode of imperial rivalry between England and the Iberian monarchy in the East, as well as to demonstrate the practical consequences and the

²⁰ Joan-Pau Rubiés, 'A Dysfunctional Empire? The European Context to Don García de Silva y Figueroa's embassy to Shah Abbas', in Loureiro and Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don García de Silva y Figueroa*, pp. 85-133.

wider significance of the taking of Hormuz in the European chessboard of dynastic states.

3.1 Before and after Tomar (1581): the impact of the Union of the Crowns

After Columbus's westward journey at the end of the fifteenth century, the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 and the Treaty of Zaragoza in 1529, concerning the Atlantic and the Pacific respectively, divided the spheres of influence of Spain and Portugal thus creating the conditions for a lasting peace between the two empires.

Following the disappearance of King Sebastian in Africa in 1578 and the death of his uncle and successor, Cardinal Henry, in 1580, Philip II of Spain ascended to the Portuguese throne as Philip I of Portugal.²¹ Consequently, the two halves of the globe divided at Tordesillas and Zaragoza were brought together under one king. This led to a radical readjustment of the European scenario, to the detriment of the Nordic countries and especially of England and the United Provinces.²² After Philip II 'inherited, bought, and conquered' the Kingdom of Portugal,²³ the two Crowns remained united for the next sixty years, a period which was considered by early modern Portuguese as comparable to the Babylonian captivity of the Jews.²⁴

²¹ Geoffrey Parker, *Imprudent King. A New Life of Philip II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), pp. 268-271.

²² The Portuguese version of the Treaty of Tordesillas is kept in AGI in Seville; the Spanish version in ANTT in Lisbon. Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in European and World History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2009), pp. 15 and 83.

²³ 'Yo lo heredé, yo lo compré, yo lo conquisté', quot. in Charles R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 107-8. On Philip's succession to the Portuguese throne, see P. de Medina, *Primera y Segunda Parte de la Grandezas y cosas notables de España* (Alcalá: Iuan Cracian, 1595), pp. 97-8. Since 1581, Philip was 'Rey de Portugal e dos Algarves, daquem e dalem mar em Africa señor de Guine e da conquista navegação, comercio de Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia e da India', ANTT, Colleção de São Vicente, Livro 14, f. 144.

²⁴ Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea. Portugal's Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492-1640* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 4-5.

In 1581, at Tomar, Philip agreed to respect the independence of Portugal as a kingdom through compliance with the existing laws, guaranteeing that the King would always be represented by a member of the royal family, that the Cortes would be gathered in Lisbon, and that the language used in the administration of Portugal would continue to be Portuguese.²⁵ In addition, before leaving Lisbon in 1583, Philip II established a Council of Portugal.²⁶ Despite the agreements reached at Tomar in 1581, Portugal continued to consider itself a periphery within a larger Castilian-controlled entity whose interests did not always coincide with those of Lisbon.

With regard to the Portuguese territories in Asia, the *Estado da Índia*, it was decided that their administration and defence would remain under the exclusive control of Lisbon.²⁷ However, within the *Estado da Índia*, commerce was rarely controlled by state intervention.²⁸ A contemporary observer, Pedro Fernández Navarrete, wrote that the division of powers between Spain and Portugal had remained as it was before the union:

It is fair that the burden is fairly distributed; Castile continues to take care of the Royal House and the defence of her coasts and the route to the Indies; and Portugal pays his own military defences and armies for the East Indies as it did before its union with Castile.²⁹

²⁵ Couto and Loureiro, *Ormuz 1507 e 1622*, p. 65.

²⁶ On the Council of Portugal, see Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol I, p. 201; Joaquim Romero Magalhaes, *História de Portugal, vol. III, No alvorecer da Modernidade (1480-1620)* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1997), pp. 87-88.

²⁷ Couto and Loureiro, *Ormuz 1507 e 1622*, p. 65. See also Loureiro and Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don García de Silva y Figueroa*, p. 89 and Fernández, in *Revisiting Hormuz*, p. 177.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁹ 'É justo que a carga seja justamente distribuída; que a Castela continue a zelar pela Casa Real e pela defesa das suas costas e da rota para as Índias; que Portugal pague as suas proprias defesas militares e as armadas para as Índias Orientais, como fazia antes dea sua junção a Castela', quot. in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese empire in Asia 1500-1700: A political and economic history* (London and New York: Longman, 1993), p. 219.

Although Spain was in conflict with the United Provinces from the 1560s and its relations with England were worsening in the 1570s, Portugal had been able to maintain friendly relationships and extensive business connections with both the English and the Dutch. After 1580, however, Portuguese territories were considered as a justified target. English activity in the Indian Ocean grew exponentially, especially after the East India Company was chartered by Queen Elizabeth in 1600, and largely in response to the closure of the Portuguese ports to English and Dutch ships imposed by Spain after the outbreak of war in the 1580s.³⁰ Overall, the impact of the union with Spain was disadvantageous for Portugal: because of the union with Castile, Portugal ‘acquired new and more powerful enemies than it previously had’, especially in the East Indies.³¹ If we turn to counterfactual history, as attempted on this subject by both Geoffrey Parker and Anthony Disney, it seems likely that *if* Portugal had not become part of the Habsburg monarchy, it would not have closed its ports to the English and the Dutch, and consequently the northern powers would not have challenged Portugal as they did.³²

The enemies, however, were not only Europeans. Indeed, the Portuguese had recurring tensions with the Shah of Persia, Abbas I,³³ ruling over modern-day Iran. The Persian ruler aimed to gain back the control of the coastal regions of the Persian Gulf. In order to do so, he played European powers against each other in order to counterbalance

³⁰ Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol. I, pp. 210-11; Couto and Loureiro, *Ormuz 1507 e 1622*, p. 66.

³¹ BL, Eg. ms. 1131, f. 103v: ‘adquirio nouos and muitos mayores enemigos, do que antes tinha’. The new enemies listed were ‘the Dutch, the English and the Danish who infest the [East] Indies with big armies and became masters of the sea’ (‘Olandeses, Ingrezes e dinamarquezes que todos infestão a Índia com grossas armadas e se tem feito senhores do mar’). See also, AGS, E., Leg. 437, doc. 118: ‘se le descubrian nuevos enemigos con quien pensaua que tenia Paz’; and BL, Eg. ms. 1133, f. 268r: according to Mendo da Mota major problems for the Portuguese kingdom were caused by the union with Castile which affected ‘severely [...]the natural and essential principles of good government’ (‘graumentemente [...]los principios naturales y esenciales de su buon gouierno’).

³² See Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol. I, p. 212.

³³ Among the Muslim empires in the East, the Safavids were slower in creating a state structure to govern their territory efficiently. Shah Abbas I (1571-1629) is considered to be the architect of the Safavid state. See Parker, *Global Interaction*, p. 55.

his traditional enemy, the Ottomans. As much as the Persian ruler intended to use the rivalry between European powers for his own gain, the Europeans hoped to use the war between Turkey and Persia to their advantage, especially regarding the silk trade.³⁴

The Portuguese awareness that other European countries feared a pan-Hispanic Catholic union together with the continuous attacks on Portuguese possessions overseas resurrected anti-Spanish feelings.³⁵ Only one year after the union of the crowns, Gian Francesco Morosini spoke of the ‘immortal hate that reigned, reigns, and will always reign between Castilians and Portuguese’.³⁶ In this context, it is easy to understand why the Portuguese continued to consider the trade via Hormuz as their own exclusive deal. They did not approve the fact that a Castilian, Don García de Silva y Figueroa, was chosen by Philip III in 1612 as ambassador to Persia.³⁷ The embassy brought into the open the many tensions between the two Iberian countries, as stated by the author of the *Relación de la Embaxada* in 1620:

The viceroy and the captains of Hormuz, like most of the Portuguese gentlemen [...] have always shown a clear enmity, conceived no more [...] since it was not convenient for the reputation of the Portuguese nation that a

³⁴ Consultation of Surat Factors, 2-6 October 1616, in *SP, Bombay*, p. iv. On commercial treaties between countries of different religion, see Saliha Belmessous, ‘The Paradox Of An Empire By Treaty’, in *Empire by Treaty. Negotiating European Expansion, 1600–1900*, ed. Saliha Belmessous (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 1-18 (p. 3).

³⁵ See BL, Eg. ms. 1131, f. 2r: the enemies of the Spanish Crown ‘attempt to enter and seize the East Indies and the trade of China and Persia’ (‘procuran yntroducirse apoderarse y de las Indias Orientales y de la China Trafico y de la Persia’).

³⁶ ‘L’odio immortale che ha regnato, regna, e regnerà sempre fra Castigliani e Portoghesi’, quot. in Diogo Ramada Curto, *Cultura política no tempo dos Filipes: 1580-1640* (Lisbon: Edições 70, 2011), p. 516. The author also mentions Girolamo Soranzo, who wrote of the Portuguese as ‘ancient enemies of the of the Castilians’ in 1602, and Ottaviano Bon, according to whom the Portuguese ‘have always hated the name of the Spaniards and hardly bear to be under their power’.

³⁷ Joan-Pau Rubiés (ed.), ‘Relación de la Embaxada que hizo en Persia Don Garçia de Silva y Figueroa (1620) by his secretary Saulisante’, in Loureiro and Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don García de Silva y Figueroa*, pp. 135-72 (p. 141): ‘not agreeing the Portuguese nation that this embassy was sent to Persia by the Crown of Castile’ (‘no viendo bién la nación Portuguesa en que se enbiase esta embaixada a Persia por la Corona de Castilla’).

Castilian ambassador went to Persia. And they did not say this because of a hate towards this particular man [the Castilian ambassador] but because of general hate towards this Crown of Castile.³⁸

As for England, it was in conflict with Spain since the 1580s, and the rivalry was often extended to the Indies, especially in the area of the Caribbean.³⁹ In 1604, in spite of the peace agreement between King Philip III and King James I signed in London, Spain continued to refuse the English a presence in the East.⁴⁰ The peace between the two powers was therefore vulnerable. After a first failed attempt in 1603-1604, James's proposal for a dynastic marriage that would have made, in his mind, the treaty fully binding went unanswered until at least 1612-13.⁴¹ The attempt to pursue a dynastic union was strongly tied to imperial concerns and commercial rivalry at the end of the 1610s and especially in the early 1620s, being 'continuance of trade' with the Iberian powers one of the key advantages of the Match identified by the English political nation.⁴²

At the same time as the marriage between the Prince and the Infanta was negotiated, however, the East India Company had organised an anti-Iberian alliance with the Dutch VOC in the East Indies. The agreement, signed in 1619, was intended to last twenty

³⁸ 'Assí el virrey y capitanes de Ormuz, como los demás hidalgos portugueses [...] han siempre mostrado una enemistad clara, conçevida no más, como ellos decían, porque não era raçao, nem comvin a reputaçao de nação portuguesa, que fora un embaxador castelchano a Persia. Y esto no lo decían por odio particular de este cavallero, sino general que tienen a esta Corona de Castilla', quot. in *ibid.*, p. 145. De Silva y Figueroa's relation and part of his correspondence, can be found at AGS, E., Leg. 437, docs. 104-112. See also AGS, E., Leg. 437, doc. 114: De Silva y Figueroa reports to Madrid how the Portuguese were unhappy concerning the English and the Dutch having usurped their trade in the Indies.

³⁹ On the trade between Spain and England during periods of conflict, see Croft, 'Trading with the Enemy'.

⁴⁰ BL, Add. ms. 38139, fols. 71v-73r: the 1604 peace was intended to 'bee observed and kept by their subiectes throughe all their Dominions'. See also Santiago Martínez Hernández, (ed.), *Governo, Política e Representações do Poder no Portugal Habsburgo e nos seus Territórios Ultramarinos (1581-1640)* (Lisbon: Centro de Historia de Alem-Mar, 2011), pp. 177-8.

⁴¹ See Pauline Croft, *King James* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 84-5.

⁴² BL, Add. ms 72392, Trumbull Papers, f. 1r. Among the other advantages that could result from a Spanish Match, the author listed: 'Great King daughter', 'much money', and 'security and safety'.

years and aspired to counterbalance the power of the Iberian monarchy in the spice trade.⁴³ Various concerns emerged in the Council of State in Madrid regarding the alliance between the two trading companies, especially given the numerous letters received in the Spanish capital concerning rivalries between the English and the Portuguese, and the difficulties in reaching any compromise between the English Company and the Council of Portugal.⁴⁴ The union between England and the Dutch, however, lasted less than four years, until the ‘massacre’ at Amboyna in 1623, when English Company’s factors were killed by Dutch officers convinced that the English were plotting a rebellion, and sentenced them to death on charges of treason.⁴⁵

In the 1610s and the early 1620s, the Council of Portugal’s concerns, with regard to the difficulty of defending the *Estado da Índia* against numerous European and non-European enemies, increased. As Portugal had helped the crown of Castile in the past, the Portuguese believed that it was now time for Castile to help Portugal.⁴⁶ Since the beginning of Philip IV’s reign in 1621, and especially following the capture of Hormuz in 1622, several influential figures in the Council of State were convinced that the only way to save what was left of the Portuguese possessions in Asia was through an alliance with the English East India Company in order to share the trade in the Indies.⁴⁷ A

⁴³ John Keay, *The Honourable Company. A History of the English East India Company* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 47-48.

⁴⁴ On Spanish reactions to the agreement between the EIC and the VOC, see AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 37; AGS, E., Leg. 437, doc. 30; AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 10. See also AGS, E. Leg. 2598, doc. 94: in a letter dated 10 September 1618, Francis Cottington complained of Portuguese cruelties against the English.

⁴⁵ On the Amboyna incident and its relevance within the marriage negotiations, see chapter IV below. *CSPCol, East*, Vol. 4. See also Martínez Hernández, *Governo, Política e Representações*, p. 178; André Murteira, ‘Ingleses and Neerlandeses contra a Carreira da Índia no Índico Ocidental, 1621-1623’, *Oriente*, 19 (2008), 3-26.

⁴⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of Portugal discussed in Madrid on 12 March 1623.

⁴⁷ Among those influential figures, the most important was Mendo da Mota, member of the Council of Portugal since 1612. His correspondence with Bishop António de Gouveia concerning the necessity of an alliance is to be found in BL, Eg. ms 1133, fols. 258r-261r.

formal agreement with the English regarding trade in the East was considered necessary, as it appeared to the Council of Portugal that the long-running dynastic negotiations between King James and Spain were not enough to deter the English from attacking Portuguese possessions.⁴⁸

Although there had been preliminary discussions of an agreement between England and Portugal in the East in 1622, such an agreement was only reached in 1635 thanks to the Viceroy Count of Linares. This result must be considered in the context of the creation of a Portuguese East India Company in 1628.⁴⁹ The continuous delays in the marriage negotiations, accompanied by the news of the taking of Hormuz, which arrived in Spain during the stay of Prince Charles in Madrid in 1623, made war between England and the Iberian monarchy very likely in the short-term.

3.2 The taking of Hormuz

King James and his ambassadors had frequent correspondence with the Persian ruler. In 1616, the King of England wrote a letter to Shah Abbas thanking him for the favour demonstrated to the English.⁵⁰ In the same year, the English Ambassador in India, Sir Thomas Roe, was worried by the decision of the Shah to send an embassy to Spain. The Persian ambassador at the Mughal court had informed Roe that while the Shah was happy to welcome all Christians, Robert Sherley had been sent ‘with offer of the ports to Spain’.⁵¹

In writing to the Shah in February 1616, Roe stated that it was unadvisable to open commerce to only one nation as such a decision would force England to attack Spain in

⁴⁸ RAH, L-24, fols. 551v-552v.

⁴⁹ Loureiro and Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don García de Silva y Figueroa*, pp. 127-8. Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol. II, p. 153.

⁵⁰ Appendix D. See also, Al-Qasimi, ‘Power Struggles’, p. 37.

⁵¹ Sir Thomas Roe’s Journal, 3 January 1616/7, in *SP, Bombay*, p. vi.

order to trade in the Persian Gulf. According to the English ambassador in India, it was more profitable for all the parties involved to leave the Gulf open to all nations.⁵² Therefore, ‘by warning Shah Abbas against selling his country to a nation like Spain’, Roe hoped to prevent the success of Sherley’s mission.⁵³ The King of England considered a treaty with the Shah as crucial especially for the commerce of silk, and praised Roe for his efforts to reach a trade agreement.⁵⁴

Shah Abbas I’s desire to regain the control of the Persian Gulf was already evident before 1622. In a letter dated 1619 considering the need to defend Hormuz, the Portuguese author discussed the Persian attacks perpetrated against the fortress of Bandel in 1616.⁵⁵ Furthermore, Roe had written from India to England explaining that Shah Abbas had already expelled the Portuguese from Gombroon, a territory that was considered crucial for the securing of provisions for Hormuz.⁵⁶ In fact, indigenous rulers did not intend to have all their external trade monopolised by the Portuguese and they rather hoped to gain larger profits from the competition among European powers.

Hormuz was considered essential by the Iberian King Philip III and the Shah of Persia as both ‘had put the[ir] eyes and minds [on Hormuz] more than on anything else’.⁵⁷ Already in 1619, the Portuguese were aware that ‘foreigners from Europe’ (as

⁵² Sir Thomas Roe to the King of Persia, 14 February 1615/16, in *SP, Bombay*, p. iii.

⁵³ Sir Thomas Roe to William Robbins, Ispahan, 17 January 1616/7, in *SP, Bombay*, p. vi.

⁵⁴ King James to Sir Thomas Roe, 4 February 1616/7 in *SP, Bombay*, p. vii.

⁵⁵ DRI, vol V, doc. 1137, pp. 247-55 (p. 247).

⁵⁶ Sir Thomas Roe to Lord Carew, Ajmere, 17 January 1615/16, in *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul, 1615-1619, as narrated in his Journal and correspondence*, ed. William Foster (London: Hakluyt Society, 1899), vol. I, p. 110; Purchas, *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, vol. I, p. 581.

⁵⁷ DRI, vol V, doc. 1137, pp. 247-255 (p. 251).

opposed to local powers in the East such as Ottomans and Persians), were entering the Strait of Hormuz since a few years.⁵⁸

Not yet in response to any specific threat, but in order to avoid that Dutch, English, and French ships would become a routine presence in the Persian Gulf, Francisco de Lucena suggested sending a fleet to Hormuz under the command of Captain Ruy Freire de Andrade to help the ordinary ships stationed there.⁵⁹

The most important point that Lucena wanted the Captain to be aware of was the need to engage in conflict with European competitors rather than with the Persians. Lucena stated in fact that the good diplomatic relationship between the Portuguese and the Persians had to be maintained to avoid giving the Persians ‘any pretexts to break their friendship’.⁶⁰ This was repeated by King Philip IV in his instructions to Ruy Freire. In order to prevent creating an opportunity for the Persians to declare war, it was important that the Iberian attack was only perpetrated ‘upon [European] foreigners’ and not ‘upon the Persians or other vassals of the Shah’ with whom it was imperative to maintain amicable exchanges.⁶¹ Thus, the foreigners were those Europeans, like the English and the Dutch, who were in competition with the Iberian powers for a share in the spice trade in the Persian Gulf.

In his instructions, Philip IV also proved to be fully aware of the fact that already for some years the ships of other European powers were entering the Gulf of Hormuz. The

⁵⁸ Francisco de Lucena to Ruy Freire de Andrade, Madrid, 15 January 1619, in *DRI*, vol. V, doc. 1139, pp. 255-60 (p. 255). See Keay, *The Honourable Company*, p. 106: Hormuz was considered the ‘key of all India’.

⁵⁹ Keay, *The Honourable Company*, p. 104.

⁶⁰ Francisco de Lucena to Ruy Freire de Andrade, Madrid, 15 January 1619, in *DRI*, vol. V, p. 258.

⁶¹ ‘The King’s Letter for Ruy Freire de Andrade, containing the Instructions for his expedition, 15 January 1622 in *Commentaries of Ruy Freire de Andrada*, ed. C. R. Boxer (London: Routledge, 1930), Appendix I, pp. 211-18 (p. 215).

purpose of this European presence was clearly to open trade relations with Persia. To prevent this from happening and in order to protect the fortress of Hormuz, the Iberian sovereign decided to send a fleet to the Strait.⁶² Philip IV asked Ruy Freire to judge whether his Armada was strong enough to expel foreign ships from the port of Jasques or other ports in the area. If so, the Iberian sovereign wanted Ruy Freire to attack them.⁶³ According to Philip IV's instructions, neither religion nor existing alliances in Europe, such as the peace treaty and the ongoing negotiations for a dynastic union between England and Spain, counted in Asia. However, this was only true *before* the taking of Hormuz.

Competition among European states for primacy in the eastern trade meant that they allied with a range of different entities, commercial companies, individual merchants, and indigenous powers, in order to increase their share. The English perceived that the Portuguese spice trade was in decline and therefore there would be space for them to trade with the Persians.⁶⁴ What Hakluyt had expressed in the 1580s with regard to the Americas and the need for England to profit from overseas trade, was conceptualised in the 1620s by the economic theory of mercantilism. The English East India Company was created to develop trade in the East to support England's economic growth and improve its presence within the spice trade, which had been dominated by the Portuguese since the previous century.⁶⁵ The charter granted to the English Company *de facto* allowed individual investors and adventurers to manage their own trade in the

⁶² 'The King's Letter for Ruy Freire de Andrade, containing the Instructions for his expedition, 15 January 1622', in *Commentaries of Ruy Freire*, Appendix I, pp. 211-18 (p. 211).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁶⁴ Edward Connock and Thomas Barker to William Keeling and Factors, Banta, 19 January 1616/17 in *SP, Bombay*, p. vii.

⁶⁵ See Parker, *Global Interaction*, p. 17.

East: only if the Company's actions interfered or threatened English diplomatic agreements with foreign powers would the Crown intervene to control the East India Company.⁶⁶ The English Company did in fact often act parallel to or in open conflict with the English Crown's policies, as in the case of the taking of Hormuz in 1622.



Image 4. Stylized map of Hormuz Island and New Hormuz City in Johann Caspar Arkstee and Henricus Merkus' *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und Lande, oder Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen* (Leipzig, 1747)

The Iberian preoccupation concerning the danger faced by the island of Hormuz was greater than it was for any other territories in the East Indies.⁶⁷ Indeed, much of the diplomatic correspondence from the second half of the 1610s onwards is characterised

⁶⁶ Lawson, *The East India Company*, p. 23 and p. 28.

⁶⁷ *DRI*, vol. VIII, p. 25, and p. 29.

by the same resigned tone of this letter where the most perceptive and incisive member of the Council of Portugal, Mendo da Mota, expressed his concern about defending the *Estado da Índia*. He was especially worried following the agreement between the English and the Dutch East India Companies in 1619:

Your Majesty, it is not [possible] to defend the Indies from two such powerful enemies as the Persians and the King of England, especially being the king of England united with the Dutch. In the sea I do not think that your Majesty has more [powerful] enemies than England and the Dutch therefore it is impossible to defend the Indies by force from enemies [coming] both from land and sea.⁶⁸

In January 1616, King Philip III had received news from Sir Luis da Gama, Captain of Hormuz, that there had been a rupture ('rompimiento') with the agents of the Shah. It was crucial, according to the King, to understand the intentions of the Persian ruler. In order to do so, Philip III wanted the new ambassador to Persia, Don García da Silva y Figueroa, to pass by Hormuz in order to calm the situation with the Shah.⁶⁹ When writing to João Coutinho, Viceroy of the *Estado da Índia*, in January 1618, the Iberian King reiterated the importance of defending the fortress of Hormuz and the water resources of the neighbouring Queixome on which Hormuz counted for its sustenance.

The King argued that there was no time to lose.⁷⁰ In a letter sent the following month, Philip III reminded the Viceroy that 'Hormuz is one of the most important

⁶⁸ BL, Eg. ms. 1131, f. 67r., 'No lo es [posible] deffender su Mag^d la India de dos tan poderosos enemigos como el Persa y el Rey de Inglaterra unidos especialmente estando el re de Inglaterra unido con Olandeses. Que por mar no vee que tenga su M^d mas enemigos que a ynglaterra y olandeses y supuesto que por fuerzas es imposible deffender la India de ambos enemigos de tierra y mar'.

⁶⁹ King Philip III to viceroy Don Jeronymo de Azevedo, Lisbon, 27 January 1616, *DRI*, vol. III, pp. 366-68.

⁷⁰ King Philip III to Viceroy D. João Coutinho, Lisbon, 23 January 1618, *DRI*, vol. IV, pp. 284-5.

fortresses of the Estado and it is much wanted by the Persians'. In order to dissuade the Shah from attacking the Portuguese possession, it was necessary to make Hormuz more defensible.⁷¹ Some measures were indeed taken to safeguard Hormuz in 1619, when about ten ships, under the command of Ruy Freire de Andrade, were sent to the Persian Gulf.⁷² Despite the help sent by the Iberian monarchy in the person of Ruy Freire, the new captain of Hormuz, Simão de Melo Pereira, seemed to believe that the danger posed by the possibility of an Anglo-Persian alliance was not as great as deemed by the central authorities in Goa and Lisbon.⁷³

Alexander Hamilton, an East India Company member who wrote *A New Account of the East Indies* a century after the events at Hormuz, reported that Sir Thomas Roe had agreed with the Shah very favourable conditions for the English.⁷⁴ According to the agreement described by Hamilton, the Persian ruler was to pay for the English ships sent to his aid and the English Company were to enjoy free trade in all Persian territories.⁷⁵ As demonstrated by Al-Qasimi, however, the actual agreement was rather less advantageous and was not discussed by Roe as stated by Hamilton, who was never Ambassador in Persia and had left the area in 1618, but rather by Edward Monnox, on behalf of the East India Company.⁷⁶

The agreement signed in January 1622 between the English Company and Shah Abbas concerning Hormuz detailed the division of money and goods following its

⁷¹ King Philip III to Viceroy D. João Coutinho, Lisbon, 5 February 1618, *DRI*, vol. IV, p. 316. See also Count of Redondo to King Philip III, Goa, 8 February 1619, *DRI*, vol. V, p. 3.

⁷² Couto and Loureiro, *Ormuz 1507 e 1622*, p. 82.

⁷³ On the different contemporary assessments of the danger faced by Hormuz, see *Ibid.*, pp. 97-101.

⁷⁴ Tony Ballantyne, 'Hamilton, Alexander (b. before 1688, d. in or after 1733), East India Company servant and writer', *ODNB*.

⁷⁵ For this version of the agreement extremely favourable to the English, see 'Monnox MS. 'History at large of the taking of Ormuz Castle', in *Ibid*, Appendix X, pp. 254-310 (p. 256).

⁷⁶ Al-Qasimi, 'Power struggles', pp. 38-39.

capture. Everything was to be shared equally between the Persian ruler and the Company; both an English and a Persian governor were to reside in the castle; Muslim prisoners were to be taken by the Persians, and Christian men by the English. Lastly, any territories conquered from then onwards in the East Indies by one of the two parties were to be used as trading posts by both.⁷⁷ The only reason why Shah Abbas had waited to attack Hormuz was that he needed a naval force in order to attack the fortress, as without it ‘he will doubtless be able to do little hurt to Ormuz’.⁷⁸ The East India Company was in effect the perfect ally for the Persians and in May 1622, after a three-month siege, Hormuz fell under a combined attack. The consequences of this capture were felt both in Asia and in Europe.

From Asia, the Captain of Hormuz, Simão de Melo, reported the arrival of the English and the sacking of the city. According to the Captain, the English attack by sea and the Persian by land, made it impossible to defend the fortress of Hormuz.⁷⁹ He blamed Rui Freire de Andrade for having stopped at Queixome, and Luís Barreto de Brito, the admiral of the Portuguese fleet, for having refused to face the English galleons. However, both Simão de Melo and Luís de Brito were sentenced to death, while no blame was attributed to Ruy Freire as he was believed to have dutifully followed the King’s orders.⁸⁰ According to the Portuguese, in 1624 the Persians were still keenly acting in conjunction with neighbouring powers in the East in order to divert the Iberian monarchy from its purpose of restoring Hormuz.⁸¹

⁷⁷ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, 11 January 1622.

⁷⁸ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, Walter Aston to John Digby, 23 March 1622.

⁷⁹ ‘Simao de Mello’s Account of the siege of Ormuz’, in *Commentaries of Ruy Freire*, Appendix II, pp. 220-23. See also, ‘Letter of Manuel Borges de Sousa written from Ormuz during the Siege, 28 April 1622’, in *Ibid.*, Appendix IV, pp. 223-28.

⁸⁰ Paulo Craesbeeck (ed.), *Commentarios do Grande Capitam Ruy Freyre de Andrada* (Lisbon, 1647). See also Rui Manuel Loureiro, ‘After the fall of Ormuz’, in Couto and Loureiro, *Revisiting Hormuz*, pp. 261-9.

⁸¹ Ferdinand of Albuquerque to Philip IV, Goa, January 1624, *DRI*, vol. X, pp. 111-13.

In Europe, in March 1623, which is to say at a crucial time for the marriage negotiations and only a few days after Prince Charles's arrival in the capital, Philip IV wrote:

I received with utmost displeasure the news of the fall of Hormuz, one of the most important strongholds of the Estado, because, as well as considerable resources, much reputation was lost with it.⁸²

Not only was Philip concerned about the alliance between the English and the Persians, but also about the ongoing agreement between the English and the Dutch for the sharing of East Indian trade.⁸³ Writing to the Viceroy in the East Indies in January 1624, the Iberian King expressed his concern regarding the recent Dutch attack against Macau and asked him to prevent the Dutch and the English from making agreements with local powers in the area.⁸⁴

As the English and the Portuguese enjoyed an 'ancient friendship', it was considered necessary to find an amicable resolution to the taking of Hormuz.⁸⁵ Indeed, the decision to attack Hormuz had been taken by the leaders of the East India Company in Asia, on whom the Persian sovereign was putting pressure for some time, rather than in Europe. It is not surprising, however, that such a decision could be quite popular in England if one considers the reading that some historians have given to works such as Fletcher's *The Island Princess* (first performed in 1621) and *The Sea Voyage* (1622) by Fletcher

⁸² Quoted in Maria Manuela Sobral Blanco, 'O Estado Português da Índia: da rendição de Ormuz á perda de Cochim (1622-1663)' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Lisbon 1992), vol. 2, p. 93.

⁸³ On the 1619 Anglo-Dutch trade agreement, see chp. IV below.

⁸⁴ Philip IV to Ferdinand of Albuquerque, Lisbon, 25 January 1624, *DRI*, vol. X, p. 232.

⁸⁵ 'Monnox MS. History at large of the taking of Ormuz Castle', in *Commentaries of Ruy Freire*, Appendix X, pp. 254-310 (p. 285).

and Massinger. Especially *The Island Princess, or Generous Portugal*, was seen by many as a request to the English court for a more assertive and aggressive imperial policy.⁸⁶ James I, however, considered the 1604 peace treaty with Spain as sacrosanct and for years he had tried to strengthen it through a dynastic union. Therefore, even after the news of the taking of Hormuz reached Europe, he tried to do everything that was in his power to keep the marriage negotiations running, especially with Prince Charles in Madrid poised to bring his bride back to England.

When in March 1623 the information reached the Count-Duke of Olivares and the other members of the Council of State in Madrid, they demanded that King James write to the East India Company asking them to help the Portuguese to regain Hormuz.⁸⁷ The Duke of Buckingham, who, together with James, had received a large sum of money from the English merchants as a ‘justification’ for the incident, only wished to send a letter expressing consternation at the action of the English company in the Persian Gulf. The English court was well aware of the extent to which the situation risked compromising the delicate diplomacy between England and Spain, and indeed, in a letter dated June 1623, Secretary Conway expressed concern about the potential consequences of the taking of the Portuguese fortress:

⁸⁶ Anthony Parr (ed.), *Three Renaissance Travel Plays* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). On the interpretation of *The Island Princess* in the light of imperial competition, see Rui Carvalho Homem, ‘Space and Spices: The Island Princess’, in *‘And Gladly wolde [s]he lerne and teche’. Homenagem a Júlia Dias Ferreira* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 2006), pp. 675-85. On the relationship between the EIC and the British Crown, see Philip, J. Stern, *The Company-State. Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The author rethinks the idea of nation-state and looks at the EIC among other Early Modern political systems. See also, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁸⁷ *DUP*, vol. II, pp. 434-8.

His Majesty recommends [...] judicious handling of complaints [...] by Ambassadors of Spain against the EIC regarding the great wrongs and spoils made by them to their infinite enriching at Armuse [Hormuz].⁸⁸

In such a critical situation, the former Spanish ambassador in London, the Count of Gondomar, who had recently left England to return to Madrid but had continued to correspond frequently with King James, intervened. On the one hand, Gondomar agreed with the Spanish Council of State that a letter to the English Company along the lines of the one proposed by Buckingham was not enough. On the other hand, he was of the opinion that the English had been pushed to attack Hormuz by the Portuguese themselves. According to the Spanish Ambassador, the Portuguese should have pursued an agreement with the English East India Company concerning Asian trade, rather than instigate conflicts.⁸⁹

Already at the beginning of his first embassy to London in 1613, Gondomar was aware of the possibility of an alliance between the Persians and the English to gain control of the silk trade. Since then, he had recommended that the Council of Portugal find an agreement with the English, especially following the defensive alliance between the English and the Dutch Companies.⁹⁰ The Ambassador's position was in fact the same taken by the English following the *History of the taking of Hormuz* by Monnox. Monnox was in Persia in January 1622 at the time of the agreement between Shah

⁸⁸ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, Conway to Calvert, Greenwich, 30 June 1623.

⁸⁹ BL, Eg. ms 1133, fols. 258r-260v. Mendo da Mota considered three reasons for the current state of Portuguese overseas territories in the 1620s, the third being that powerful European countries invaded Asia; he recognised that there was no chance that Portugal could continue a war against all its enemies given the lack of money, armies and reputation: 'quando nos estamos en este estado sin dinero, sin fuerças, sin reputacion y corruptos con vicios intrinsecos: com se decia pensar que se puede proseguir la guerra contra Olandezes, Inglezes, Dinamarcos y otros enemigos en un mismo tiempo y todos juntos?'. See also BL, Eg. ms 1131, f. 103v and BL, Eg. ms 1135, f. 78. On Gondomar's opinion, see Loureiro and Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don García de Silva y Figueroa*, p. 131.

⁹⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 436, 166. See also AGS, Est., 845, 184: in a letter dated 9 April 1620, Gondomar states that the Portuguese would not listen.

Abbas and the English Company, and when the attack on Hormuz took place.⁹¹ In his journal Monnox defined the attack on Hormuz as aiming at ‘the weakening and ruining of the Portugals that had fought with our ships, slain our men, and impeached the freedom of our trade’.⁹²

As mentioned above, Gondomar was not in London in 1623 and could not negotiate directly with King James. Carlos Coloma was reporting to Madrid from London and was required by the State Council to obtain James’s condemnation of the English Company’s actions and the promise that the English would not only avoid giving further help to the Persians, but they would instead actively contribute to restoring Hormuz to the Iberian monarchy.⁹³ Indeed, during Charles’s stay in Madrid, the Earl of Bristol had assured Gondomar that once the details regarding the wrongdoings of the East India Company in Hormuz were clarified, King James would give the Catholic King full satisfaction.⁹⁴ As soon as Charles left Madrid in September 1623, however, Coloma reported not only of the rejoicing at the Prince’s safe return to London, but also that he did not get either satisfaction nor a response concerning ‘the possession stolen from the Portuguese’.⁹⁵

Some members of the Council of State in Madrid even alluded to Sir Walter Raleigh’s execution in 1618 and proposed that the perpetrators of the attack on the Portuguese territory would suffer the same punishment as that imposed on Raleigh.⁹⁶ Being aware of the negative attitude of most of the English public towards Spain,

⁹¹ Edward Monnox, ‘History at large of the taking of Ormuz Castle’, in *Commentaries of Rui Freire de Andrade*, pp. 256-7.

⁹² *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, 25 July 1623.

⁹³ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, docs. 32 and 33, Council of State, Madrid, 26 April 1623.

⁹⁴ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated, Earl of Bristol to Count of Gondomar, 14 March 1623; AGS, E., Libro 369, fols. 332-3, Earl of Bristol to the Council of State, Madrid, 13 January 1623.

⁹⁵ AGS, E. Leg. 2516, docs. 50 and 51, Council of State, Madrid, 27 November 1623. See also, RAH, L-24, fols. 535r-562r.

⁹⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated, Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623. See Appendix E.

Gondomar sought to avoid enflaming them by convincing the Spanish Council not to ask for capital punishment for the East India Company's members who had attacked Hormuz in 1622. It was unrealistic and counterproductive, so he argued, to ask James for such a sentence against the English Company, as the King of England had already demonstrated his commitment towards the Anglo-Spanish Match when executing Raleigh in 1618. According to the former ambassador, Carlos Coloma was neither to question James's commitment nor to mention Raleigh's execution but instead focus on the restitution of Hormuz.⁹⁷ It was considered necessary, however, that the King of England would inflict adequate punishment on those guilty of attacking Hormuz and that England would contribute to the recovery of the Portuguese fortress. Any delay in this matter would result in irreparable damage to the negotiations for the dynastic union between England and the Iberian Monarchy.⁹⁸

Spain did not ascribe the blame only to the attacking forces. In a letter to Francisco da Gama, King Philip IV discussed how some people had done their duty in defending Hormuz while the behaviour of others was full of shortcomings. According to the news arriving at the court of Madrid, it would have been possible to defend the Portuguese fortress longer and wait for reinforcements if only those who had to defend it had not behaved like cowards.⁹⁹ Still in 1624, the governor Ferdinand of Albuquerque was discussing with Lisbon the punishment to be given to those considered guilty of having abandoned Hormuz to the English and the Persians.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ On Walter Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana and its consequences, see chapter II.

⁹⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated.

⁹⁹ King Philip IV to viceroy Francisco da Gama, Madrid, 4 March 1623, *DRI*, vol. IX, pp. 362-63 (p. 363).

¹⁰⁰ Ferdinand of Albuquerque to King Philip IV, Goa, January 1624, *DRI*, vol. X, pp. 56-57.

In his answer, the Iberian King stated that it was necessary to prosecute the captain of Hormuz, Simão de Melo Pereira. He had left the Castle following the Portuguese defeat and according to the King it was crucial that all those guilty of misconduct were punished, as had been the case with Luís de Brito, Admiral of the Fleet, who had been executed the previous year.¹⁰¹ Indeed, while the death sentence against Luís de Brito was put in place shortly after the arrival of the news of the taking of Hormuz in Europe, Simão de Melo, considered the main offender for the loss of the Portuguese outpost, was condemned *in absentia*.¹⁰²

Not all the Iberian captains were deemed to have behaved poorly or cowardly by the authorities in Lisbon. Costantino de Sá de Noronha, Captain of Ceilão, went to help Hormuz in April 1622 but it was already too late, as upon his arrival he discovered that the fortress had already been taken. He decided to spend the winter in Muscat where he met Ruy Freire de Andrade who had also been unsuccessful in protecting Hormuz from the Anglo-Persian attack. At first, Ruy Freire had been taken prisoner by the English during the seige and imprisoned in Surat, and only after escaping had arrived in Muscat. Rui Freire and Sá de Noronha were commended for their actions in defending the Portuguese port.¹⁰³

As soon as he received the news, Philip IV stated that the recuperation of Hormuz was crucial for the defence and survival of the *Estado da Índia* and therefore all the necessary resources were to be used for that purpose. It was the King's will that the retaking of Hormuz was to be the first priority in order to drive out any European

¹⁰¹ King Philip IV to Ferdinand of Albuquerque, Lisbon, 9 February 1624, *DRI*, vol. X, pp. 322-23.

¹⁰² Francisco da Gama to Philip IV, Goa, 18 March 1623, *DRI*, vol. IX, pp. 189-90. See also, Keay, *The Honourable Company*, p. 106.

¹⁰³ Letter of the viceroy Francisco de Gama, Goa, 5 January 1623, *DRI*, vol. IX, pp. 132-134 (p. 134).

enemies and thus for ‘this *Estado* to return to what it was’ (‘esse Estado torne ao que foi’). According to Philip, there were only two possibilities for improving the situation of Iberian territories in the East: either alienate the English from the Dutch or ignite war between the Persians and the Mughals.¹⁰⁴

In fact, the Council of Portugal believed that the Persian ruler was not powerful enough to maintain his presence in the Strait of Hormuz without help from the English. Without the English Company’s support and having to face the ‘power of their enemies, the Turks’, it would have been easy for the Iberian powers to regain the fortress of Hormuz from the Shah.¹⁰⁵ In order to distance the English from the Persians, it was advisable to conclude an agreement with the former. Such an agreement would not only benefit Hormuz but also prevent any further intervention by other European nations in the Strait. Indeed, it was feared that a potential action of European powers combined would lead the loss of ‘the whole of India’.¹⁰⁶

The possibility of an agreement with England, however, although considered more favourable than a treaty with other European countries because of the ongoing marriage negotiations between the Prince and the Infanta, was not considered ideal by all the members of the Council of Portugal. According to some in the Council, it was a mistake to ratify any treaty with a European country in the Indies, including England, despite King James having an ongoing alliance in Europe with the Iberian Monarchy. In those members’ opinion, such a treaty would show weakness and cause Philip IV a loss of

¹⁰⁴ King Philip IV to viceroy Francisco da Gama, Madrid, 7 March 1623, *DRI*, vol. IX, pp. 436-39 (pp. 438-39)

¹⁰⁵ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated, Discursos sobre los medios q se deuen tomar para la redificacion del comercio de Ormuz a para la restauracion de aquella fortaleza para V.M.d mandar considerar y Ver, 10 February 1623.

¹⁰⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of Portugal discussed in Madrid, 12 March 1623.

reputation. This loss would be detrimental since the Portuguese territories in the *Estado da Índia* bordered with those ‘of the most powerful Kings in the world’.¹⁰⁷

Again, as in Abbot’s letter mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, we find the dichotomy between Europe/World and Christendom/others. It is not a linear dichotomy, however, but one in which alliances shifted rapidly. This explains why some members of the Council of Portugal advised Philip not to ally with England in the East. If Philip IV had allied with its enemies in the Indies [i.e. the English], especially after the capture of Hormuz, indigenous rulers would lose the respect they had for the Iberian sovereign. The delicate balance that Philip IV had managed to maintain between Portuguese territories and the local powers of Safavids and Ottomans was not to be jeopardised by European dynastic politics. If it was absolutely necessary to make an agreement with a European country, only then, should the Iberian King choose England.¹⁰⁸

3.3 Debts and Dowry

In 1623, the public sale in London of spoils originating from the taking of Hormuz¹⁰⁹ had a negative impact on Spanish opinion concerning the possibility of a rapid conclusion of the dynastic union with England. According to the Spanish, the taking of the Portuguese fort in 1622 was in fact further testimony that the English were sworn enemies of the Apostolic Roman Church. Not only did the English ally with the Persians, a country outside of the Christian religion, but they also did so ‘at the zenith of the marriage negotiations’.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 28 February 1623.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 213.

¹¹⁰ RAH, L-24, fols. 551v-52v. Keay, *The Honourable Company*, p. 105.

In order to understand the consequences of the taking of Hormuz in Europe, it is crucial to consider that James I's reign, like that of the majority of early modern European sovereigns, had been accompanied by the constant presence of debt.¹¹¹ From the moment he started to consider the possibility of a Spanish marriage, the King of England saw the prospect of a rich dowry not only as the solution to many of his financial problems but also as a reason not to convene Parliament. In fact, although the Parliament was the principal means by which James could obtain the raising of new taxes or the granting of subsidies, the King was hoping to use the dowry to prevent a new summons, especially after the negative experiences of the abrupt dissolutions of 1614 and 1621.¹¹² At the level of the political nation, pamphlets concerning the marriage listed 'much mony' as one of the (few) crucial advantages of a possible marriage with the Catholic monarchy.¹¹³ Anthony Sherley provided one of the most lucid accounts dedicated to the pros and cons of such a union. He considered that not only the dowry was greater than any other¹¹⁴ but also that marriage and friendship were more secure and lasting means on which to base the relationship between the two countries than a costly war with uncertain results.¹¹⁵

There were two fundamentally opposed views concerning the money to be earned from an Anglo-Spanish union: those who believed that it was worth it to carry out the marriage to benefit from the dowry, and those who considered that England had nothing

¹¹¹ Cramsie, *Kingship and Crown Finance*, p. 195.

¹¹² See Andrew Thrush, 'The Personal Rule of James I, 1611-1620', in *Politics, Religion and Popularity. Early Stuart Essays in Honour of Conrad Russell*, eds. Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust, and Peter Lake, pp. 84-102 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 84-87. On the large dowry promised by Spain, see Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 57; Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 16 and p. 42; Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', p. 702.

¹¹³ Anon., *Considerations vpon the treaty of marriage between England and Spain* [sl, sd], p. 1.

¹¹⁴ Sherley compares the Spanish dowry to that proposed by the French in the 1610s.

¹¹⁵ BNE, Mss/10794, fols. 192-199, *Discurso Excelientissimo de la conveniencia de los casamientos del Principe de Inglaterra con la señora Infanta de Hespaña Por el conde Sirley*. On a different opinion, see AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated, Madrid, 12 March 1623.

to gain, even in terms of wealth, by an alliance with the Catholic Monarchy. The latter view was expressed in 1624 in Reynolds's *Vox Coeli*:

For profit, what Indies is richer than England? For if England want money, her selfe is more powerful and capable to inrich it selfe, if it would be lesse vaine, and more frugall and industrious, &c. what is a few thousand Pounds to England, if England be thereby exposed to the danger of Spaine?¹¹⁶

By 1623, King James had already asked numerous times for part of the dowry to be sent to him in advance of the marriage, which would have helped him to partially reduce his increasing debts and to postpone the convening of a Parliament. The Spanish State Council refused to send money in advance, in case the marriage was not going to be concluded successfully, as well as because of Spain's own financial difficulties.

The events at Hormuz in 1622 strongly affected the debate on the dowry, especially regarding how the money was to be delivered to England. After attempting to obtain a public declaration from the English Crown concerning the restoration of Hormuz, the Council of State proposed that the Crown should get its compensation from the Infanta's dowry. When in 1623 the State Council discussed the dowry, it was not in terms of whether to grant it or not but rather in terms of how to make the payment. The vast amount promised ('2 millones de escudos') was not called into question since that was the figure agreed by King Philip III and to renege on his word would have been damaging to the reputation of the Spanish crown. Various possibilities were considered in relation to the payment, and the members of the Council of State expressed their opinions as to which they considered more convenient.

¹¹⁶ [Reynolds], *Vox Coeli*, p. 41.

According to Pedro de Toledo, there were four possibilities: the first was to deliver the amount in cash; the second was to ‘make Virginia and Bermuda assets of this [the Spanish] Crown and value both in price, together with the damage received at Hormuz, and make the body of the dowry of these three parts’. The third option was to pay in instalments at the King of Spain’s convenience, and the fourth was to distribute the expenditure among all the kingdoms of the Iberian King. Pedro de Toledo considered the first option, giving the full sum in cash, as impossible and the second ‘as impossible as the first possibility, if not more’. The modality that he considered best was the fourth.¹¹⁷ In Gondomar’s opinion instead, the Spanish ambassador in London had to insist on the restitution of Hormuz and avoid linking the episode to the the amount of the dowry, as provided by the second option listed by Pedro de Toledo.¹¹⁸ Discussing the dowry rather than the restitution risked antagonising the Council of Portugal and decreasing any advantage of the King of Spain in his attempt to reach a shared agreement on East Indian trade.

Pedro de Toledo also acknowledged that if Spain were to grant two millions to England to be delivered with the Infanta ‘India would cease to be in our power’.¹¹⁹ This prominent member of the Council of State considered in fact how, by granting such a large dowry, the already precarious financial situation of the Iberian Crown would worsen to the point of no return and subsequently it would prove impossible to protect the Indies. The colonies of Virginia and Bermuda, also mentioned as a possible part of the dowry provisions, had been considered problematic since the beginning, and the King of Spain had asked Gondomar to keep a strict surveillance over any proceedings

¹¹⁷ AGS, E., Leg. 2559, doc. 46.

¹¹⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated.

¹¹⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623. See Appendix E, Second extract.

with regard to the two colonies already during his first residence as ambassador in London.¹²⁰

It seems all the more clear then, that when beset by the problem of too high a dowry to pay given the current financial situation of Philip IV's Spain, the members of the Council of State had decided to use the English presence in Virginia and Bermuda to their advantage. It was not the first nor the last time that the Spaniards were trying to use their right of first discovery and the Papal bull of 1493 to reinstate their monopoly. Although until then Spain had allowed English presence in North America, as the Iberian sovereign and his counsellors were conscious that it would have been impossible to expel the English from their settlements there, in 1623 the Council of State hoped to quantify the damage exerted by the British with their presence in Virginia and Bermuda in order to decrease the amount of actual cash to be sent to England as dowry for the Infanta.

Discussions on the dowry should not be regarded only as secondary 'mundane considerations'.¹²¹ On the contrary, different opinions regarding the dowry to be granted to England within the Spanish Council of State indicate deep preoccupations for the survival of the Iberian overseas empire. The Indies were crucial to the marriage negotiations and a solution for the frequent English attacks on Spanish and Portuguese possessions had to be found in order for the dynastic union to be advantageous. If an agreement could not be reached in this regard, it would be impossible to grant a two-million ducat dowry.¹²² The Indies had to be protected as they were 'the biggest and best part that this Monarchy owns', and thus the Council of Portugal hoped that the

¹²⁰ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 264.

¹²¹ Carter defines dowry payments as 'mundane considerations' in Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, pp. 98-99.

¹²² AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623.

precarious situation of Portuguese India would be taken into account when settling the marriage articles between Charles and the Infanta.¹²³

Aside from Philip IV's complaint regarding the taking of Hormuz in terms of 'loss of reputation',¹²⁴ Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Anthony Disney recognised that the loss of the Portuguese port had, in material terms, less impact than one might think.¹²⁵ The fortress was more of a symbolically prestigious possession, and it was for this reason that the Portuguese made significant efforts to win it back.¹²⁶ The loss of Hormuz did not mean the end of Portuguese commerce in the area: Portuguese territories in the Indies were in fact a network consisting of trading contacts, rather than a territorial empire under the control of the Crown, as explained earlier in this chapter.¹²⁷

The loss of Portuguese Hormuz, which occurred at the same time as the diplomatic failure of the dynastic marriage between Spain and England, seems to testify to the lack of cooperation between the two Iberian powers, more than to the inevitable decline of the composite Spanish monarchy. Spain and Portugal needed one another and shared the difficulties of trying to maintain cohesion within their respective scattered empires.¹²⁸ In 1625, the Portuguese fleet attacked Hormuz, but the Iberian power failed to regain control of the fortress, which was defended by English and Dutch forces.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Blanco, 'O Estado Português da Índia', vol. 2, p. 93.

¹²⁵ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *O Império Asiático Português, 1500-1700. Uma História política e económica* (Lisbon: Difel, 1996), p. 223 and Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol. II, p. 169. See AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated.

¹²⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated.

¹²⁷ Thomaz, De Ceuta, p. 208. To understand the difference between the official/formally acknowledged Portuguese possessions and the informal networks, see Amelia Polónia, 'Jumping Frontiers, Crossing Barriers. Transfers between Oceans: A Case study of the Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1800', in Mukherjee (ed.), *Oceans Connect*, pp. 121-42.

¹²⁸ See Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea*, p. 180.

In order fully to understand the impact that the loss of Hormuz had in Europe at a crucial time when the Thirty Years' War was taking place and England was trying to conclude a marriage with the Spanish Habsburgs, one must grasp the implications of imperial concerns for European diplomacy in the early seventeenth century. While it is difficult to draw conclusions concerning the extent to which the news of the taking of Hormuz reaching Europe in 1623 contributed individually to the end of the negotiations, it is, however, unquestionable that the episode had a significant impact on the marriage diplomacy.¹²⁹ It affected the development of the dynastic negotiations, especially with regard to the payment of the dowry, and consequently to the Iberian monarchy's ability to maintain and defend its possessions in the East.

At the end of January 1623, Sherley listed Hormuz within a number of recent events proving that the world was filled with powers acting against the Iberian Monarchy, both in Europe and in the Indies.¹³⁰ The near future would demonstrate that the rivalry between England and Portugal was not the only ongoing conflict between European powers in the East Indies. From this moment onwards, another core rivalry in the East would be that between the English and the Dutch.¹³¹

¹²⁹ For the full extent of such impact, see chp. V below.

¹³⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2847, unfoliated, Granada, 31 January 1623.

¹³¹ Al-Qasimi, 'Power struggles', p. 39.

Chapter IV

‘More disprofit than the former hostility.’¹
The incident at Amboyna and its consequences for the marriage negotiations

The doteage of some Englishmen is such
To fawn on those who ruine them; the Dutch.
They shall have all rather than make a War
With those who of the same Religion are.

John Dryden²

In 1623 Dudley Carleton, English ambassador to the United Provinces, wrote to the Duke of Buckingham after Prince Charles’s return from Madrid. According to the diplomat, ‘the entering [by the Dutch] into open hostility in the East Indies’ had made the King of England more inclined to an alliance with Spain than ever before.³ The alliance to which Carleton was referring was the dynastic agreement for the union between Prince Charles and the Spanish Infanta. The hostility mentioned by the Ambassador was the incident at Amboyna, today part of the province of Maluku,⁴ where in February 1623⁵ the Dutch, under the orders of their governor Harman Van Speult, had tortured and executed ten English merchants together with nine Japanese mercenaries. They were executed after being accused of plotting to conquer the fort on

¹ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, John Goningen to the EIC, 15 December 1623.

² John Dryden, *Amboyna: a Tragedy* (London, 1673), Prologue.

³ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, Carleton to the Duke of Buckingham, s.d. [1624].

⁴ Alison Games, ‘Violence on the Fringes: the Virginia (1622) and Amboyna (1623) Massacres’, *History*, (2014), 505-29 (506).

⁵ English pamphlets reported the date as February 1622, as in the Old Style the year started on 25 March. See for example, *A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruell, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna in the East Indies, by the Neatherlandish Govenour, and Council there* (London, 1624).

the island under Dutch control.⁶ This episode was termed a ‘massacre’ by the English immediately after the event, but it is now defined as an ‘incident’ in the most recent historiography on the subject.⁷

Although conflict was common in overseas territories,⁸ the incident had a great impact in terms of circulation of news and public debate.⁹ The strong reactions to this specific episode were not only due to the fact that England and the United Provinces were at peace at the time of the executions at Amboyna. They are also attributable to the two countries having signed an agreement in 1619 concerning division of trade and profits in the East Indies, at the expense of the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁰ While this event may seem only peripheral to the marriage diplomacy between London and Madrid, the Netherlands’ importance in the negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish union at the beginning of the seventeenth century should not be underestimated. In fact, the Spanish were well aware of the ‘special relationship’ between England and the Dutch. At the end of 1617, the Spanish ambassador in London even warned the King of England that the Dutch had previously tried to stop the marriage diplomacy between Prince Henry and the Infanta Ana in the early 1600s. According to Gondomar, the Dutch were in

⁶ Karen Chancey, ‘The Amboyna Massacre in English Politics, 1624-1632’, *Albion*, 30 (1998), pp. 583-98.

⁷ For recent historiography on the subject, see Chancey, ‘The Amboyna Massacre’; Anton Poot, *Crucial Years in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1625-1642). The Political and diplomatic contacts* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013); and Femme Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company: expansion and decline* (Walburg Pers, 2003). For a traditional, nineteenth-century view on the Amboyna events, see Alex Charles Ewald, ‘The Massacre at Amboyna’, in *Stories from the State Papers* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1882), Vol. II, pp. 73-103. The author considered trade rivalry as the result of ‘the bitter jealousy of Spain and Portugal at the success of our factors’, and the Amboyna episode as testifying to ‘how false was the amity of the Dutch’.

⁸ Carla Gardina Pestana, ‘Cruelty and Religious Justification for Conquest in the Mid-Seventeenth-Century English Atlantic’, in *Empires of God. Religious Encounters in the Early Modern Atlantic*, eds. Linda Gregerson and Susan Juster (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), pp. 37-57.

⁹ See Anthony Milton, ‘Marketing a massacre: Amboyna, the East India Company and the public sphere in early Stuart England’, in *The Politics of the public sphere in early modern England*, eds. Peter Lake and Steven Pincus (Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 168-90. See also Keay, *The Honourable Company*, p. 50.

¹⁰ ‘A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies, Relating to the Differences that had arose between them, London 2 June 1619,’ in *Treaties*, pp. 188-195.

1617 hindering the new match between Prince Charles and the Infanta María by offering bribes to Buckingham and other courtiers in order to curb the dynastic negotiations.¹¹

The ‘Hollanders’ not only had a strong interest in the outcome of the marriage negotiations in Europe, but they were also strong rivals for overseas trade. On both chessboards, they played a crucial role in the ongoing diplomacy between England and Spain as they were strongly against the dynastic alliance between Prince Charles and the Infanta María. The crucial reason why the Dutch were opposed to the marriage was that they wanted to prevent losing their traditional alliance with the English Protestants. They believed that such an eventuality would have directly followed the dynastic union with Habsburg Spain. If the marriage diplomacy were to reach a successful conclusion, the Dutch would have lost English support both in Europe and overseas.

In Europe, the end of the Twelve Years’ Truce in 1621 meant that the Dutch were hoping to retain English support against Spain, especially since the Iberian monarchy appeared willing to restart the conflict at the end of the truce.¹² The Netherlands were part of the Empire ruled by the Spanish Habsburgs. As explained by Geoffrey Parker, while the Southern Netherlands were formally under the control of the Archdukes, which is to say Isabella, Philip III’s sister, and her husband Albert, foreign policy was still managed from Madrid. This was crucial as in 1621 the Archdukes were hoping to maintain the truce with the United Provinces while Philip III was preparing for war.¹³ In

¹¹ TNA, SP 14/95, f. 74, Peter Lugge to John Lugge, London, 10 December 1617.

¹² AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 41. Paul C. Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621. The Failure of a Grand Strategy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 233; Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favouritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 244.

¹³ Parker (ed.), *The Thirty Years’ War*, p. 2.

the East Indies, the Dutch, like the English, were hoping to gain a share in the spice trade that had been under the monopoly of Portugal since the previous century. In order to replace the Portuguese, the Dutch East India Company signed a trade agreement with the English in 1619, which was clearly aimed, even if not stated explicitly, against the Iberian monarchy.




Image 5. Map of the Maluku Islands (Indonesia)

In an article dealing with the Amboyna incident published in 1998, Karen Chancey stated that ‘no one has presented a detailed account of the massacre with the resulting political, social, and diplomatic repercussions’.¹⁴ Chancey focussed her contribution on the political consequences in England of the events of 1623. In contrast with traditional historiographical interpretations, according to which King James and subsequently King Charles did not react to English merchants being executed at Amboyna, she successfully demonstrated that instead they condemned the action and urged the Dutch to provide reparation. Various ultimatums were in fact imposed by James even if with little result, as Maurice of Nassau’s promises of compensation were contingent to the situation, and

¹⁴ Chancey, ‘The Amboyna Massacre’, p. 584.

only lasted as long as he needed the King of England's help.¹⁵

Other scholars, including Anthony Milton, Carla Gardina Pestana, and Alison Games have mostly used the Amboyna episode to investigate specific fields of enquiry, respectively the spread of news in England following the massacre, intra-European violence between the Dutch and the English, and the global connectedness of the early modern world.¹⁶ Milton explored the consequences of the events at Amboyna within the concept of English public sphere, as did Chancey, and addressed the crucial difficulty underlying Protestant responses to the incident in the East Indies, which is to say that the English and the Dutch were on the same side of the European religious divide.

Robert Markley and Antoon Poot, in contrast, have looked at Amboyna in a wider geographical and chronological context and placed the 1623 incident as part of longer-term cultural and political dynamics.¹⁷ Markley discussed the repercussions of the Amboyna's executions not only by referring to the contemporary debates concerning the EIC but also by considering how the episode was often re-used during the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries to serve different agendas. Poot addressed the period preceding the Anglo-Dutch wars in the seventeenth century and marked the Amboyna events as a crucial precedent in the strained relations between the two countries. This was due to the entangled political scenario following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War as well as the increasingly complex trade relations among the Iberian Peninsula, the Dutch, and the English.¹⁸

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 587-90.

¹⁶ Milton, 'Marketing a massacre'; Gardina Pestana, 'Cruelty and Religious Justification'; Games, 'Violence on the Fringes'.

¹⁷ Robert Markley, *The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Poot, *Crucial Years*.

¹⁸ See Poot, *Crucial Years*, pp. 25-26.

This chapter goes beyond a mere description of the events that led to the torture and execution of English merchants. It also avoids any considerations regarding whether or not there actually was a conspiracy by the English against the Dutch fort in Amboyna in 1623.¹⁹ I look instead at the repercussions generated by the incident on trade relations between the Iberian Peninsula, the Dutch, and the English as well as at the impact of these events on the ongoing negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish Match between Prince Charles and the Infanta María.

First, I outline Anglo-Dutch relations in Europe and in the East Indies between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. Second, I address the reaction to the events in England where the political nation was divided between those who insisted on reparation and those who were willing to justify the Dutch in the name of a common religious confession. Third, I look at the consequences in the Netherlands where the VOC had formally to answer James's request for the punishing of those responsible for the executions at Amboyna. It was indeed in the interest of the States General to satisfy James I as failing to do so could have strengthened the alliance between the King of England and Philip IV of Spain.

The news of the events at Amboyna only reached Europe in May 1624. According to much of the previous historiography on the Anglo-Spanish Match, at this point the negotiations had already failed. Following the return of Charles and Buckingham from Madrid, however, King James still considered it possible to achieve a dynastic alliance with Spain. The episode at Amboyna is therefore strongly relevant to the developments in the last months of the marriage diplomacy. Indeed, when the news of the incident arrived in London, King James reiterated his position that it was then more important

¹⁹ For an outline of the historiographical debate considering the plot as an English conspiracy as well as for the opinion of historians dismissing the plot as a Dutch fabrication, see Games, 'Violence on the Fringes', p. 505, fn. 1.

than ever to conclude the match with Spain. In discussing Anglo-Dutch relations in the early seventeenth century, I aim to demonstrate the inextricable link between the diplomacy of the Anglo-Spanish Match, especially in the final period of the negotiations, and the increasing rivalries amidst the English and the Dutch with regard to the East-Indian trade.

4.1 Anglo-Dutch Relations in the East Indies

Following James's accession, Walter Raleigh had presented the King with a work concerning 'trade and commerce with the Hollander, and other nations'.²⁰ Raleigh aimed to prove that other countries, and especially the Dutch, were profiting from English trade and resources more than the English themselves. While England was 'sending into the east kingdoms yearly but one hundred ships', according to the author, 'the Low Countries send into the east kingdoms yearly about three thousand ships'.²¹ Raleigh's main argument, that England had plenty of resources ('God hath blessed your majesty with incomparable benefits') but was not using them appropriately, therefore leaving 'neighbour princes' to enrich themselves at England's expenses,²² was to be reiterated in the 1620s after the Amboyna incident.

The Dutch had a prominent status within the Iberian composite monarchy and they presented a threat to the Spanish sovereigns who often feared a potential alliance between the United Provinces' and England.²³ Elizabeth I had guaranteed protection, albeit lukewarm, to Dutch Protestants not only in the name of a common religious

²⁰ Walter Raleigh, 'Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander' in *Raleigh's Works*, vol. VIII, pp. 351-76.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 363-64.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 365-66.

²³ Parker (ed.), *The Thirty Years' War*, pp. 2-3. AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 41; AGS, E., Leg. 2515, doc. 47.

brotherhood but especially to counterbalance Philip II's growing power. The reason why the Queen of England's support was no more than tepid was her deep awareness of the risks inherent in supporting any subjects' rebellion against their legitimate sovereign.²⁴ Only after 1585, following the assassination of William the Silent in 1584 and various military successes by the Duke of Parma, did Elizabeth decide to take the side of the Dutch rebels against the King of Spain. In exchange for her help, the Queen of England received the ports of Flushing and Brill and the fort of Rammekens as guarantee for her expenses.²⁵ These cities, known as the 'cautionary towns', remained as evidence of the strong relationship between England and the Dutch until well into James's reign. During the rule of the Stuart King, the towns were often a controversial topic of debate in the relationship between Spain and England, especially in the last period of the marriage negotiations.

In June 1616, Gondomar protested to King James that the terms for the towns' restitution that he had agreed with the United Provinces were against article VII of the 1604 peace treaty.²⁶ According to articles VII and VIII, the terms of the restitution had to be discussed with the Archdukes and James could not use the cautionary towns in any way that could be considered inimical to either the King of Spain or Albert and Isabella.²⁷ Gondomar believed that James should have transferred the towns to the Archdukes for safekeeping while the King of England interpreted the same articles as a clear indication that he could not deliver the towns to them without losing his honour and reputation. He was only ready to return the towns to their rightful owners, the

²⁴ George Edmundson, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the first half of the seventeenth century, being the Ford lectures delivered at Oxford in 1910* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 4 and p. 12.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13

²⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 77, 18 June 1616. On the cautionary towns, see also Simon Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy', in Tomlinson (ed), *Before the English Civil War*, p. 85.

²⁷ 'A Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Alliance between Philip III, King of Spain, and James I, King of England, 1604' in *Treaties*, pp. 131-46.

United Provinces.²⁸

Given the difficult situation of James's finances in the second part of his reign, it is no surprise that a satirical image was produced in the Low Countries picturing the economic advantages gained by the English crown thanks to the restitution of the cautionary towns, in exchange for their payment. In March 1617, Sir William Lovelace described the content of the image in a letter to Carleton: King James had 'his pockets drawne out hanging loose' with the incription 'have you any more townes to sell?'²⁹

The interaction between England and the Dutch, however, was not limited to their shared possession of the cautionary towns. In 1588, the Dutch rebels' fleet had played a crucial role in stopping the ports and preventing the troops of the Duke of Parma from joining Medina Sidonia's fleet for the invasion of England during the Armada campaign.³⁰ The defeat of the Spanish fleet contributed to a shared opinion in England, from the late sixteenth century and even more following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, that the goal of English foreign policy should be the 'defence of the Protestant cause on the continent'.³¹

In the late 1580s and especially in the 1590s, the Dutch gained more influence in Europe as well as in the Eastern trade; consequently, an alliance with them became increasingly more valuable for European rulers. Following the peace treaty signed between Spain and France in 1598, the United Provinces and England concluded an

²⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2514, doc. 77, 18 June 1616.

²⁹ TNA, SP 14/90, fols. 205-206, Sir William Lovelace to Carleton, London, 11 March 1617.

³⁰ Mia J. Rodríguez-Salgado, 'Philip II and the 'Great Armada' of 1588: An Introduction', in *Armada 1588-1988. An International Exhibition to commemorate the Spanish Armada* (London: Penguin Books in association with the National Maritime Museum, 1988), pp. 12-38.

³¹ Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands?', pp. 79-80. Jonathan Scott, 'England's troubles 1603-1702', in *The Stuart Court and Europe. Essays in politics and political culture*, ed. Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 20-38 (pp. 29-30). On the long-term consequences of the Armada campaign in the relations among England, Spain, and the Dutch, see Porfirio Sanz Camañes, *Los ecos de la Armada. España, Inglaterra y la estabilidad del Norte (1585-1660)* (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), pp. 101-70.

agreement which testified to a new balance of power between the two countries. One Englishman was to sit in the Council of State of the Provinces and the English troops in the Netherlands were to be under the control of and take an oath of allegiance to the States General. In the case of a Spanish attack against England, the Dutch were to assist Queen Elizabeth.³²

In the early seventeenth century, the Portuguese were still the major European protagonists in the East Indian trade, with the Dutch and the English trying to break the Iberian monopoly by granting charters to commercial companies. The English presence was more limited than that of the other parties, and the Protestant political nation was hoping for a more aggressive imperial policy on the part of James I.³³ When the Anglo-Spanish peace was signed in London in 1604, representatives of the southern Spanish Netherlands sat at the table among the representatives of the Iberian Monarchy, reflecting the strategic importance of these territories for the Habsburgs.³⁴ No representatives of the United Provinces, however, were present.

In 1605, as a direct consequence of the Somerset House treaty, King James's *Proclamation of neutrality in the Spanish-Dutch war* guaranteed 'free and safe passage' to Dutch and Spanish merchants alike.³⁵ Already at the time of James I's accession, however, and especially following the 1604 Peace, some criticised the lack of consistent financial support and military troops granted by the King to Dutch correligionists.³⁶

³² Edmundson, *Anglo-Dutch rivalry*, pp. 15-16.

³³ See chp. III above.

³⁴ See *Painting of the Somerset House Conference* National Portrait Gallery (author unknown, c.1604) in chp. I.

³⁵ Patricia Springborg, 'Hobbes, Donne And The Virginia Company: Terra Nullius and 'The Bulimia Of Dominion'', *History of Political Thought*, 36 (2015), 113-64 (p. 116).

³⁶ Edmundson, *Anglo-Dutch rivalry*, pp. 16-17.

While relations with the Dutch had been a constant element on the agenda in English foreign policy, I believe that what was new at the beginning of the seventeenth century was the awareness of the strategic importance of the East Indian trade for the European balance of power. The Spanish had formal control over the territories of the East Indies from 1580, when Philip II had succeeded to the Portuguese throne. The defence of *Estado da Índia*, however, was under the responsibility of the Portuguese, as decided by the agreement of Tomar in 1581.³⁷

The Iberian monarchy had enjoyed an almost unchallenged monopoly of trade in the East Indies for decades. From 1619, Anglo-Dutch relations relied on a new trade agreement between the two powers concerning specifically the division of commerce in the East Indies, to the detriment of the Iberian Monarchy. The agreement, which was intended to reduce the Spanish and Portuguese presence, was extremely beneficial for both powers: the Dutch were looking for allies before the end of the truce with Spain in 1621, and England was seeking a greater share in Asian trade, increasingly controlled by the Dutch East India Company. According to article VIII of the trade agreement signed in 1619, the English were to enjoy one third of the commerce in ‘the Molucca islands, Banda and Amboyna’, and the United Provinces would have the remaining two thirds. Moreover, the treaty provided for a shared defence of the trade routes in the East, as commerce could not be ‘secured without a vigorous defence’.³⁸

The agreement also stated that neither of the East India Companies could exclude the other from trading in the East and the ‘whole trade shall be free and common to both Companies’.³⁹ The treaty was to last twenty years and if disputes were to arise that

³⁷ See chp. III above.

³⁸ ‘A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies Relating to the Differences that had arose between them, London 2 June 1619’, in *Treaties*, pp. 188-195. See article X.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, see article XXVII.

could not be solved in the East Indies or by a discussion between the two Companies, then they should be referred to the King of England and the States General who should work to accommodate the conflict to the satisfaction of both the East India Companies. After Amboyna, the King of England did refer to the treaty in the hope that the United Provinces would keep their word and grant satisfaction for the executions. James's and Charles's hopes, however, were to fade as the States General continued to postpone any binding promise concerning reparation.⁴⁰

Negotiations for a potential agreement between England and the United Provinces concerning trade in the East Indies had already started a few years earlier than 1619. Nothing was concluded then, however, as the States General insisted that, if it was to join the East Indian trade, England had to provide for half of the expenses for any garrisons and fortifications and to participate in the war against the Iberian powers in the East. The latter would have clearly meant to break what had been agreed in the Treaty of London in 1604. Writing to Sir Thomas Roe, Sir George Carew stated that considering 'how severe the king is in performing every article in the treatie of peace and amitie betwene vs and Spayne', the negotiations for shared trade in the East with the Dutch would have produced little effect.⁴¹ According to Carew, the alliance between England and Spain was very dear to the King of England, and he was not ready to jeopardise the dynastic union by making trade agreements with the Dutch, especially as the profit to be gained from such a treaty could not yet be quantified.

Indeed, in order for the two powers to reach an agreement on Eastern trade, we have

⁴⁰ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 593-94.

⁴¹ 'Letter I, Savoy, 18 April 1615', in *Letters from George Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, Ambassador to the Court of the Great Moghul 1615-1617*, ed. by John Maclean (London: Camden Society, 1860), pp. 1-9 (pp. 5-6).

to wait 1619. By then, the Habsburgs seemed ready to intervene in the Thirty Years' War and threaten the existence of Protestantism in Europe. Therefore, James agreed with the States General on trade in the East, and especially the Spice Islands, in the hope of diminishing Iberian revenue and thus limit the financial resources that they could use in continental Europe. Yet, the agreement that James signed in 1619 was solely *defensive* and did not include any obligations for England for an offensive war against Iberian possessions.⁴²

The Spanish had tried to prevent an agreement concerning commerce being signed between the Dutch and the English, as they were aware of the threat this would create to Iberian possessions and trading routes.⁴³ The Spanish fleet could have been destroyed by an alliance between the two Protestant powers. Moreover, the risk was that once a powerful Protestant alliance was formed, the other (Catholic) enemies of Spain, *inter alia* Savoy, France, and Venice, would join the anti-Habsburg coalition.⁴⁴

The Spanish ambassador in London, the Count of Gondomar, had repeatedly urged the Council of State in Madrid to encourage the members of the Council of Portugal to realise the importance of achieving an agreement with King James concerning the possibility of shared trade in the East Indies. This was considered a prudent course of action in order to prevent England from engaging with other European countries, which is to say the United Provinces, or with indigenous powers.⁴⁵ The English East India Company had indeed previously allied with local powers to oust the Portuguese during

⁴² 'A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies, relating to the Differences that had arose between them', 2 June 1619, in *Treaties*, pp. 188-202 (pp. 191-192), esp. articles X-XIV. See also TNA, E 30/1184.

⁴³ See, for example, AGS, E., Leg. 2514, docs 41 and 50.

⁴⁴ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 265.

⁴⁵ For example, James exchanged letters with Shah Abbas I and the Great Moghul. For King James's letter to Shah Abbas I in 1621, see Appendix D; for James's letter to the Mughal Emperor, see Bodl., Additional ms. C132.

the taking of Hormuz in 1622.⁴⁶ In that case, Gondomar had reprimanded the Portuguese for not acting sooner in seeking a mutually beneficial agreement with the English.⁴⁷

Even after the 1619 agreement was signed, the Spanish tried various times to come between the English and the Dutch. Dudley Carleton stated that, in exchange for breaking off the agreement with the Dutch, the Spanish ambassador had promised the King of England free trade in the East Indies.⁴⁸ While it is possible that the Spanish would have granted some concessions, it is hard to believe that the English would have obtained free trade in an area where the Iberians had claimed their monopoly for decades. According to the treaty with the United Provinces, the English enjoyed one-third of the spice trade in the Moluccas, but were not able to erect forts in the East.⁴⁹ Notwithstanding the clear disparity in the agreement, which reflected the greater Dutch presence in the East, the treaty was welcomed by Protestant England. Following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618, most of the political nation was in fact strongly sympathetic to the United Provinces as they were considered an example to follow for their commitment to the Protestant religion as well as to the exiled Palatine family.

According to various international observers, the United Provinces were the only power ready to stand up against Spanish tyranny. Cristoforo Surian, Venetian Secretary in the Netherlands, stated that 'no one [else] ventures to oppose the Spaniards'.⁵⁰ Indeed, the impression coming from the Netherlands was that the Spanish were by then

⁴⁶ See chp. III above.

⁴⁷ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 10.

⁴⁸ *CSPVen*, vol. 17, 31 January 1622. On Carleton diplomatic career, see L. J. Reeve, 'Carleton, Dudley, Viscount Dorchester (1574–1632)', *ODNB*.

⁴⁹ 'A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies', in *Treaties*, in p. 191.

⁵⁰ *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Cristoforo Surian to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 31 January 1622.

in control of the King of England and successfully convincing him to act against the interests of 'these provinces'.⁵¹

Those in England who were dissatisfied with King James's peaceful policy, among them the pamphleteer Thomas Scott,⁵² also regarded the Dutch as being aware that the real enemy was Habsburg Spain and the only people ready to fight 'the Lord's battle against the Antichrist'.⁵³ As I will discuss later in the chapter, such admiration among English Protestants for the Dutch in the early seventeenth century is difficult to reconcile with the contrasting reactions following the events at Amboyna. John Chamberlain, for example, wished for James to 'say lesse and do more'[□] against the Dutch who insulted the English nation at Amboyna.⁵⁴

Because of the shared religious confession between the English and the Dutch, early modern contemporaries expected a clear alliance of the two Protestant countries against the Catholic Habsburgs. The divide, however, was not as clear in political terms, as King James was looking for a closer alliance with Philip IV of Spain through a dynastic marriage, nor in terms of trade, despite the treaty signed in 1619 which systematically demarcated spaces and profits in the East Indies. In fact, while many in England were satisfied by the trade agreement between the English and the Dutch, as it was considered a valuable means to block Habsburg tyranny, various members of the East

⁵¹ Ibid. See also *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Christoforo Surian to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 3 May 1621; Girolamo Lando, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, London, 25 June 1621; Christoforo Surian to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 14 November 1622.

⁵² See Thomas Scott, *The Belgick Souldier* (Dort, 1624), p. 39: 'What hath the peace done? It hath made vs drunke with ease and carelesnesse, forget our God, be vncharitable to our neighbours, neglect our calling, sleepe in security, accustome our selues to foolish exercise.'; and Id., *The Interpreter* (1622), p.7: 'A Protestant is one that shakes the head / And pitties much the Palsgrave was mislead / To middle with Bohemia, and incense / The Spanish wrath'.

⁵³ Scott, *The Belgick Souldier*, p. 36, quot. in Breslow, *A Mirror of England*, p. 82.

⁵⁴ TNA SP 14/170/78, John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, 24 July 1624, quot. in Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 583.

India Company were unhappy about the terms of the treaty, which markedly favoured the Dutch in the East Indies.⁵⁵ The English Company was explicitly protesting against the article concerning forts, and asked King James to review the agreement, as not doing so would mean:

utterly cutting off the Company from all hope and expectation of their obtaining any parts of the forts at any time hereafter, which in the end would utterly exclude the Company from the whole trade of the Indies.⁵⁶

Indeed, even before the incident at Amboyna, there had been various conflicts between the English and the Dutch. We find traces of these rivalries in diplomatic dispatches as well as in private correspondence and in the Court minutes of the East India Company.⁵⁷ A year before the execution of the English merchants, for example, the States General had complained that the English had captured a Dutch ship coming from the East Indies, and presented a strong remonstrance to the English ambassador.⁵⁸ Just two months before the events at Amboyna, the English Company had once more complained against the Dutch preventing English merchants from enjoying ‘a third part of the fruits of the Moluccas’, as had been agreed in July 1619.⁵⁹

As the rivalry between the English and the Dutch increased in the mid-seventeenth century, the incident at Amboyna had a long afterlife. During the second half of the century, and especially as a consequence of the Anglo-Dutch wars, between 1652 and

⁵⁵ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 3, June 1619.

⁵⁶ Petition of the East India Company to the King, *CSPCol, East*, vol. 3, June 1619.

⁵⁷ See, for example, *CSPCol, East*, Court Minutes East India Company, vol.4, 14-18 June 1622: ‘The Dutch, howsoever they make fair show of good correspondency at shore there, yet at sea they practise by robbing and spoiling of all ships and boats they meet withall to ruin that trade to the English’; *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, 27 August 1622, President R. Fursland, T. Brockedon, and A. Spaldinge to the East India Company: ‘The wrongs of the Dutch are so gross that we cannot endure them’.

⁵⁸ *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Surian to Doge, 18 April 1622.

⁵⁹ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, 9 January 1623.

1674,⁶⁰ anti-Dutch propaganda circulated widely, and the Amboyna incident was often used as example of the Dutch deceptive nature and betrayal. This was the case, for example, of John Dryden's *Amboyna*, from which is taken the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter.⁶¹

4.2 English Reactions to the Amboyna Incident

Soon after the incident, both the English and the Dutch East India Companies published *official* accounts of the events, which were then reprinted in various European languages. The English Company's narrative explained the situation on the island of Amboyna before the incident and blamed the Dutch for not respecting the treaty signed in 1619 and 'the ancient bonds of amity between both nations'.⁶² According to the English reconstruction of the events, on 11 February a Japanese soldier had asked a Dutch sentinel a few questions regarding the Castle of Amboyna and was subsequently imprisoned. Under torture, he had confessed and implicated other Japanese residents on the island in a plot to overthrow the Dutch.

The Japanese were tortured for three days together with a Portuguese, who was at Amboyna under Dutch service, and between 15 and 16 February the English merchants were summoned by the Dutch governor, accused of 'a conspiracy to surprize the castle', and imprisoned.⁶³ The East India Company's pamphlet also described in detail the torments to which English merchants were subjected and how most of them refused to

⁶⁰ See C. R. Boxer, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century 1652-1674* (London: National Maritime Museum, 1974).

⁶¹ John Dryden, *Amboyna: a Tragedy* (London, 1673).

⁶² East India Company, *A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruell, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna in the East Indies, by the Neatherlandish Govenour, and Council there* (London, 1624), To the Reader, EEBO. All dates in the pamphlet are in the Old Style. See also the ballad *Newes out of East India of the cruell and bloody vsage of our English merchants and others at Amboyna, by the Netherlandish gouernour and councill there* (London, [1624/5]), EEBO.

⁶³ East India Company, *A True Relation*, pp. 4-5.

confess something of which they were not guilty, despite this leading to long and gruelling torture.⁶⁴ When some of the English prisoners decided to provide a false confession in order to escape torture ('they should do him a great favour, to tell him what they would have him say, and he would speak it, to avoid the Torture'),⁶⁵ the Dutch questioning them tried to implicate Captain Gabriel Towerson, leader of the English merchants at Amboyna.

[He] asked whether Captain Towerson were not of that Conspiracy. He answered, No. You lye, said the Fiscal; Did not he call you all, and tell you, That those daily Abuses of the Dutch had caused him to think of a Plot, and that he wanted nothing but your Consent and Secrecy? [...] Did not you all swear upon a Bible to be secret to him?⁶⁶

This alleged episode, in which Towerson summoned all the English merchants to organise the taking of the Castle after having sworn secrecy, was denied by the English but reported as taking place around New Year's Day by the VOC's account of the events.⁶⁷

Both those who never confessed to being complicit, and those who admitted their involvement in the plan to attack the Dutch castle to avoid further torture, proclaimed their innocence on the day of the execution. In declaring their innocence against the accusations of the Dutch, the condemned merchants asked their compatriots who had

⁶⁴ For a similar account of the tortures, see *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, Thomas Brockedon, Henrie Hawley, and John Goninge to the East India Company, Batavia, 14 December 1623.

⁶⁵ Throughout the pamphlet, there are various references to the English confessions being insincere and only made to avoid further torture. For example, see p. 8; p. 10; p. 11; p. 13; and p. 14.

⁶⁶ East India Company, *A True Relation*, p. 7.

⁶⁷ The Dutch version was rapidly translated into English, see *A True Declaration of the News That Came out of the East Indies, with the Pinace Called the Hare, Which Arrived in Texel in June, 1624* (London, 1624). See also Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 587.

escaped the sentence to ‘bear witness to their friends in England of their innocency’. Not only they wanted their friends and families to know that ‘they died not Traytors [...] but Murthered by the Hollanders’ but also asked ‘that our Employers may understand these wrongs’.⁶⁸ The great concern of the English condemned to death at Amboyna, that events were recounted truthfully at home, was due to their awareness that part of the political nation would blame the English Company’s merchants for what had happened in the Spice Islands.

The English reconstruction of the events of 1623 ended with the statement that it was highly unlikely that the English could have planned a conspiracy against the Dutch at Amboyna. In fact, the ten English merchants were unarmed and so were the Japanese accused of the plot, while the Castle was strongly fortified and the Dutch had ‘two or three hundred men, besides as many more of their free Burgers’ on the island.⁶⁹ The East India Company not only mentioned the unpracticality of the conspiracy but also noted that the English did not have any reasons to attack the fort given the reputation of King James as a peaceful king, who would have not acted against the treaty signed with the States General in 1619. On the contrary, the Dutch seemed to have had no qualms in executing English merchants, despite the agreement.⁷⁰

EIC representatives had recurrently complained against the United Provinces for not respecting the treaty’s clauses, while the English ‘to the uttermost of their power inviolably kept the articles of the treaty of 1619 concerning the general trade’.⁷¹ According to the English, the Dutch were imposing twice as many exactions as agreed,

⁶⁸ East India Company, *A True Relation*, p. 17 and p. 23.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

⁷¹ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, ‘Protest by John Goninge, Richard Welden, and George Bruen, by order of President Thomas Brockedon, against the Dutch General, Pieter de Carpentier and Council’, Batavia, 12 December 1623. On the EIC’s protest against the Governor of Amboyna, see Appendix G.

as well as inflicting corporal punishments on merchants living on the Spice Islands.

It appears therefore evident that the executions in the early 1620s accentuated existing tensions already perceived since the beginning of the seventeenth century between the English Company and the United Provinces. The EIC had in fact previously been accused by the English political nation itself of jeopardising the relationship with the Dutch through their actions in the East and being scarcely committed to the Protestant religion.⁷² Their rivalry with the VOC merchants, in fact, was considered as proof that of the Company being interested solely in economic gain rather than in the common good, the latter associated by most Protestants with the protection of their religious confession at home and abroad. The East India Company's quarrels against the VOC were considered counterproductive at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and especially after the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 when the Dutch stood as the only defenders of European Protestantism and had welcomed the exiled Palatine family.⁷³

As recognised by Milton, and as I will address in some detail in the next chapter when discussing the 1624 Parliament, it was crucial for the English Company's members to demonstrate a strong and unshakeable dedication towards the Protestant religion, especially the Parliament being in session when the news of the Amboyna events arrived in England.⁷⁴ The Company's representatives knew that Parliament had disapproved of chartered companies during earlier sessions and wanted to avoid further criticism. During the 1624 sitting indeed the actions and profits of the EIC as well as of other trading companies, such as the Virginia Company, were put under scrutiny and

⁷² See, for example, Scott, *The Interpreter*, pp. 8-9.

⁷³ Frances Yates, *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (London and New York: Routledge, 1972), p. 39.

⁷⁴ Milton, 'Marketing a Massacre', p. 172.

their value for the commonwealth questioned. In this light, it is crucial to consider the extent to which through the official account of the events presented by the Company, members and investors urged the political nation to consider the English merchants as martyrs⁷⁵ rather than as guilty of undermining England's relation with the Protestant Dutch. In order for this to happen, the East India Company needed to produce a dramatic narrative of the events, which in the case of the official account was accompanied by powerful images of the English merchants being brutally tortured. Indeed, thanks to this account and its crude woodcuts, the English Company was able to obtain a strong public reaction and a guarantee from King James that he would pursue reparation from the Dutch for what had had happened on the island of Amboyna in 1623.⁷⁶

By openly fighting against the Dutch, the English Company could have been accused of having forgotten that the real enemy were the Catholic Habsburgs with whom King James was pursuing a dynastic union. Therefore, what the account wanted to achieve was to dispel the negative association, built by Puritans in England, between the EIC's rivalry with the Dutch in the East and their alleged lack of commitment against Iberian tyranny (and consequently to Protestantism). According to the treaty signed in July 1619, the English Company maintained the right to punish its own people 'in the Moluccas, Banda, and Amboyna';⁷⁷ therefore, regardless of whether or not Towerson and his men were guilty at Amboyna, the EIC stated that the Dutch governor Van Speult should not have inflicted torture nor executed them.

⁷⁵ On the use of sermons and martyrological images, see *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79.

⁷⁶ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', pp. 588-90.

⁷⁷ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, 'Copy of the treaty agreed upon by the English Lords Commissioners and the States Ambassadors on behalf of the English and Dutch East India Companie', 9 February 1623.




Image 6. East India Company, *A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruell, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna in the East Indies, by the Neatherlandish Govenour, and Council there* (London, 1624)

The news that in February 1623 Dutch merchants at Amboyna had accused a handful of English factors of treason and executed them after a hasty trial arrived in England on 29 May 1624. When the information reached the court, King James, disheartened by Charles's unsuccessful journey to Madrid the previous year, was negotiating English help to the United Provinces against the Spanish Habsburgs. The political nation was divided in their expectations regarding King James's reaction against the Dutch as the two powers shared the same Protestant religion.

Indeed, while some asked James to act against the Dutch in order to obtain compensation for the events at Amboyna,⁷⁸ others considered their shared Protestant religion as a reason not to fight the United Provinces given the precarious situation of

⁷⁸ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', pp. 588-93.

Protestantism in Europe.⁷⁹ As briefly noted above, Thomas Scott wrote a pamphlet defending the actions of the Dutch in the name of a higher Protestant fraternity. According to the author, because of their shared religion, the English and the Dutch were ‘all one, good neighbours and friends’.⁸⁰ Due to the English public’s response to the Amboyna events once the details of Dutch actions arrived in Europe in 1624, the Crown decided to place more men than usual to maintain calm in London and avoid potential anti-Dutch riots on Shrove Tuesday.⁸¹

Despite the polarised reactions of the English political nation to the events in the Spice Islands, James decided to help the Dutch in their struggle and signed an agreement with the States General on 5 June 1624, according to which he was to guarantee 6000 infantry for two years.⁸² A document signed just ten days after the Anglo-Dutch treaty gave further explanations concerning the second and eleventh articles of the agreement. This testifies to the possibility that those specific articles had been misinterpreted by one or both parties, or that the King of England had asked for further clarifications regarding guarantees in exchange for his help.⁸³ In fact, the explanation of the second article was concerned with the payment of the 6000 troops, and the eleventh article stated that the United Provinces were to provide an ‘Acte d’obligation’ as a guarantee for the advance installment paid by King James.⁸⁴ The treaty of mutual defence was signed on behalf of both James and the Elector Palatine in

⁷⁹ This side was taken by what can be considered the ‘Puritan’ public opinion according to whom the confessional bond with the Dutch and the shared fight against the common Habsburg enemy was more valuable than reparation for the incident at Amboyna. See Chancey, ‘The Amboyna Massacre’, pp. 589-90.

⁸⁰ Scott, *The Belgick Souldier*, p. 42.

⁸¹ Milton, ‘Marketing a Massacre’, p. 168.

⁸² Chancey, ‘The Amboyna Massacre’, p. 592; Poot, *Crucial Years*, p. 26.

⁸³ TNA, SP 84/295, ‘Explanation of the 2nd and 11th Articles of the defensive Alliance between England and the States General, 15 June 1624’.

⁸⁴ TNA, SP 84/295: ‘Pour explicquer plus plenement l’onziesme Article auquel il est dit q pour l’assurance de la restitution des aduances faites desbourser par sad Ma.té pour las Leuée, il sera baille a sad Ma.té un Acte d’obligation’.

an effort to harness potential Dutch help against Spain in the restitution of the Palatinate.⁸⁵

The King of England, as well as the majority of the political nation, expected the new agreement to encourage the States General to condemn the actions of the Governor and the VOC merchants at Amboyna, bring them to trial, and provide reparation. More than a month after the signing of the Treaty, on 19 July 1624, James gave an ultimatum to the Provinces through Ambassador Carleton, proclaiming that if those responsible were not brought to trial by 12 August, England would take the necessary actions to obtain justice.⁸⁶

After the executions at Amboyna, representatives of the English Company had repeatedly asked for an explanation of Van Speult's proceedings but were denied a copy of the English merchants' 'forced and tortured confessions and examinations'.⁸⁷ The East India Company wanted to obtain a copy of the proceedings to circulate them within Europe in the hope that the pressure coming from other countries would urge the Provinces to answer for the wrongs of 'such cruel and inhuman butchers'.⁸⁸ Maurice of Nassau, stadtholder of the United Provinces, reassured King James, just before the expiration of the ultimatum, that measures were in place to accommodate his requests. The English, however, never obtained the expected reparations, despite being repeatedly requested during Charles's reign.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Poot, *Crucial Years*, p. 26.

⁸⁶ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 593.

⁸⁷ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, August 1623. See also, *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, Batavia, 12 December 1623, 'Protest by John Goninge, Richard Welden, and George Bruen, by order of President Thomas Brockedon, against the Dutch General, Pieter de Carpentier and Council'.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 598.

4.3 Dutch Reactions to the Amboyna Incident

The Dutch presence in the East Indies had always been wider than that of the English, and this balance was recognised in 1619 when the English obtained one-third of the profits in the Moluccas compared to the two-thirds of the Dutch.⁹⁰ After having agreed to the conditions outlined in the treaty, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Governor of the Dutch possessions in the East Indies between 1618 and 1623, considered that the agreement was extremely advantageous for the English given that they had ‘no claim to a single grain of sand on the coast of the Moluccas, Amboyna, or Banda’.⁹¹ In 1609, the Dutch had agreed on articles regarding trade with the other major player in the East Indies, the Iberian Peninsula, as part of the Twelve Years’ Truce signed at Antwerp on 9 April.⁹²

As stipulated in the truce, there was to be an halt to all hostilities on land and sea between the King of Spain, the Archdukes, and the States General, which included all of their kingdoms, countries, and dominions. The acquired rights of the United Provinces were equated to those granted by Spain to England by the peace treaty of 1604. Moreover, article V declared that hostilities were to be avoided in extra-European dominions, but that given the time needed for the news to arrive in far-away territories, the truce there would begin the following year, or as soon as the news reached the land.⁹³

Already before the executions at Amboyna, in both VOC correspondence and East India Company’s minutes, we find complaints regarding trade quarrels with other European

⁹⁰ ‘A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies’, in *Treaties*, p. 191. See also IOR/E/3/8, doc. 958, 8/18 June 1621.

⁹¹ Quot. in Chancey, ‘The Amboyna Massacre’, p. 585.

⁹² Jesús María Usunáriz (ed.), *España y sus tratados internacionales, 1516-1700* (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2006), pp. 250-64.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-60, esp. articles II, V, and VII.

states as well as with local powers.⁹⁴ For example, a report from Ambon on 7 June 1621 stated that Van Speult, the Amboyna Governor, was finding his task very difficult as a consequence of the VOC trying to prevent the indigenous populations from trading with other foreign powers (especially the English).⁹⁵ In October of the same year, a similar concern was voiced at Djambi where the relations between representatives of the VOC and the English Company were worsening and a new agreement was deemed necessary.⁹⁶

After 1623, the VOC reported the events at Amboyna in a similar manner than the English account, while stressing the evidence of the English conspiracy and legitimising the actions of the Dutch Governor on the basis that some of the English had indeed confessed their participation in the plot. The EIC's narrative, published in 1624, accused the VOC merchants at Amboyna of having spent the day following the executions, 28 February 1623, celebrating the events and 'rejoycing for the deliverance from this pretended treason'.⁹⁷ On the one hand, as mentioned above, one of the English East India Company's main points when accusing the Dutch was that they had no right to prosecute the English in the East. On the other hand, the Dutch affirmed that the Amboyna governor's authority derived directly from that of the States General of the United Provinces and, for this reason, he had jurisdiction over the island and the right to condemn to death any traitors.

There was little consternation when torture was used against indigenous population in the East or West Indies. It was uncommon, however, for torture to be used by

⁹⁴ For Dutch correspondence and agreements with local powers in the East Indies, see J. E. Heeres (ed.), *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum, verzameling van Politieke contracten en verdere Verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van Privilegebrieven, aan hen verleend, enz., 1596-1650* (Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907).

⁹⁵ Heeres (ed.), *Corpus Diplomaticum*, pp. 170-72.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 174-75.

⁹⁷ East India Company, *A True Relation*, p. 25.

Europeans against citizens of another European country. In responding to the loud protests of the English which considered Van Speult's methods as 'not heretofore heard of amongst Christians',⁹⁸ the VOC representatives stated that while they were aware that torture was not used in England, 'the legality or illegality of a case [...] must be judged according to the laws of the lands where the case took place, and not of other countries'.⁹⁹

The English account discussed above reported that, even under torture, the English merchants denied that Towerson had met them to plot a conspiracy against the Dutch. The VOC's account, however, stated that the English captain had convinced the Japanese to assist the English in conquering the Castle. Subsequently, around New Year's day 1623, he had summoned all the English merchants in his room and explained his plan to overturn the Dutch, but only after they had sworn secrecy, 'because if these things I will reveal to you were to come out, it would cost us all our lives'.¹⁰⁰ It was essential for the Dutch narrative to implicate the Captain in order to prove the betrayal of the majority of the East India Company's merchants trading in the Spice Islands.

Having been asked to provide reparation by King James since May 1624, when the

⁹⁸ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, Batavia, 12 December 1623.

⁹⁹ TNA, SP 84/118, f. 169v: 'wy wel weten dat aldaer gheen torture en wort ghebruyckt; daer ter contrarie een sake aengaende hare legaliteyt ofte illegaliteyt [soo als hier vooren is ghesecht] moet gheoordeelt worden naer de wetten van't lant daer de sake gheschiet is: ende niet van ander landen'.

¹⁰⁰ TNA, SP 84/118, f. 166: 'Dat alle de voorsz(eiden) Japponders op het versoeck van Gabriel Towrson ende andere Enghelsche Cooplieden ende Officieren verwillicht hadden de voorschreven Enghelschen te assisteren omme het casteel nevens d'Enghelsche te verraden ende aende Enghelsche over te geven. [...] Gabriel Towrson ontrent nieuw jaers dach 1623 meest alle de Enghelsche Cooplieden van alle de buyten comptoiren in Amboyna by hem hebbende heeft de selve binnen in zijn camer doen vergaderen ende haer voorghestelt: dat hy met haer hadde te communiceren eene ghewichtighe saecke doch dat hijt t'selve niet en conde doen als naer voorgaende eedt van dat sy t'selve secreet houden ende ghetrouw souden wesen: segghende sulckx is noodigh want quamen de saecken uut die ick u openbaren wil het soude ons allen t'leven kosten'.

news arrived in Europe, and given the ultimatum to bring those responsible to trial by 12 August, the States General returned to address the Amboyna incident in November 1624 ‘in order to give further satisfaction to his Kingly Majesty of Great Britain concerning the executions’.¹⁰¹ They agreed that the Amboyna governor as well as those who had presided over the executions had to be summoned to answer for their actions. For this purpose, an envoy was sent to the Indies ‘to bring them here before their High Mightinesses to give an account of their procedures’.¹⁰² This should have been carried out ‘punctually and absolutely and accomplish it without dissimulation and without fail’, to avoid further delays which would have displeased King James and potentially brought him closer to an alliance with the Iberian powers against the Dutch.

4.4 Amboyna and the Anglo-Spanish Match

The beginning of the seventeenth century proved to be a particularly complex period in the association between England and the United Provinces as England was negotiating a marriage alliance with Spain at the same time as trying to support the Dutch in the name of a common Protestant faith. In the early 1620s, various interested observers, for instance in the Netherlands and Venice, started to realise the extent to which these two positions - a marriage alliance sought by James with Habsburg Spain and the link between England and the Netherlands - could no longer be carried out at the same time.

In December 1623, it was clear to many in the East that the arrogance of the Dutch had grown to such a level that it was unwise, if not impossible, ‘to live under their

¹⁰¹ TNA, SP 84/121, fols. 78r-80r, ‘Extract from register of State General, touching Amboyna [in Dutch]’, 10/20 November 1624; the document is translated into English at fols. 82r-84r. See also *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, 17 December 1623.

¹⁰² TNA, SP 84/121, f. 82v.

subjection' any longer.¹⁰³ The dissatisfaction with the current relation between the English and the Dutch was made bitter by the awareness that King James, as well as his predecessors, had provided help and assistance to the United Provinces, when they were in need. This had been the case, for example when in 1618 the religious connection between England and the United Provinces had been strengthened by English divines attending the Synod of Dort.

The Synod was convened by the Dutch to resolve an internal conflict over predestination between Remonstrants (following the teaching of Jacobus Arminius) and Contra-Remonstrants. As demonstrated by Milton's thorough study, it was indeed remarkable that representatives of the Church of England attended the meeting.¹⁰⁴ In 1617, the importance of convening a national (rather than a provincial) Synod to solve the unrest was advocated by King James,¹⁰⁵ and especially by the English ambassador Dudley Carleton. Carleton stated that the separation within the Church was producing detrimental consequences such as factions and animosity from which the enemies of Protestantism could profit.¹⁰⁶ This eventuality was feared by many Englishmen who expected the Dutch to remain united against the Habsburg threat.

Various English correspondents were preoccupied about the religious situation in the United Provinces as they worried that religious divisions could result in political upheaval.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, the division between those following the opinion of Arminius and the followers of Gomarus produced 'yll effects' that English commentators considered

¹⁰³ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, 'Thomas Brockedon, Henrie Hawley, and John Goninge to the East India Company', Batavia, 14 December 1623.

¹⁰⁴ Anthony Milton (ed.), *The British Delegation at the Synod of Dort (1618-1619)* (Church of England Record Society, The Boydell Press, 2005), p. xvii.

¹⁰⁵ See 'King James I to the States General, 20/30 March 1617', in Milton (ed.), *Synod of Dort*, p. 6. According to the King, it was important to prevent 'this gangrene to spread any further' as it was pointless to involve the common people 'for whom these issues are too high and obscure.

¹⁰⁶ 'Speech of Sir Dudley Carleton in the Assembly of the States General, 26 September/6 October 1617', in Milton (ed.), *Synod of Dort*, pp. 16-20 (p. 18).

¹⁰⁷ Maclean (ed.), *Letters from George Lord Carew*, Letter III, Savoy, 18 January 1616, pp. 27-79 (p. 73).

could only be solved by uniting around opposition to Spain, which is to say that the Provinces needed a common enemy against whom they would unify. If the Spanish were not to give them any cause to ally again amongst themselves to defend their survival, Carew was convinced that the situation would produce ‘fearfull effects’ and ‘a general distraction will dissolve their union’.¹⁰⁸

Following the incident at Amboyna, the English deepest regret was that they ‘could not have received greater loss from an open enemy’.¹⁰⁹ By acknowledging the share of ships and profits, the East India Company believed to have entered a mutually beneficial agreement in 1619. The situation in the early 1620s, and the brutal executions in the Spice Islands, were instead forcing the English Company not only to revoke the treaty with the Dutch but also to consider the possibility of giving up trade completely.¹¹⁰

Despite the recurring criticism against the EIC, the idea that the Company would abandon trade, expressed in a petition to the King in July 1624,¹¹¹ was alarming for the Crown. Therefore, the Company’s requests for a resolution against the actions committed by the VOC were listened to, and the States General informed. Many still considered England’s wealth as partly coming from the Spice Islands and therefore believed that the English Company should maintain trading privileges in the East. Among those defending the chartered Company, Thomas Mun, an EIC official, discussed in his *Discourse of Trade* the extent to which the spice trade could enrich

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Letter IV, Savoy, 18 January 1617, pp. 80-139 (pp. 88 and 108).

¹⁰⁹ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, Miscellaneous 1623, ‘Translation out of Gallo-belgicus upon the Prince’s journey’.

¹¹⁰ TNA, SP 84/121, f. 83v.: ‘Out of the difficulty of Amboyna [...] seem to tend to the dissolution of the treaty which was solemnly concluded between the two companies’. Keay, *The Honourable Company*, p. 50.

¹¹¹ See also Milton, ‘Marketing a Massacre’, p. 174; and Games, ‘Violence at the Fringes’, p. 507.

both merchants and the country as a whole.¹¹² Puritan public opinion, however, was still fundamentally opposed to the East India Company, and believed that the Company's expeditions were an economic burden for England as well as a way of unknowingly promote Catholic gains, by focusing on the wrong priorities.¹¹³ This was, for example, Thomas's Scott position in *The Interpreter*:

A Protestant is hee that fain would take
occasion from the East or West to shake
our league with the Vnited Provinces
to which end hee hath many faire pretences.¹¹⁴

The association implied by Scott between Protestants who were not committed to the defence of the exiled Palatine family and those in the East Indies who were acting against the Protestant Dutch was particularly persuasive given the political scenario of the early 1620s, and the debates on the ongoing marriage diplomacy.¹¹⁵ It is therefore evident that King James found himself on the horns of a dilemma.

The East was by then firmly entangled in the balance of power among the Dutch, the Iberian Peninsula, and the English. This fragile equilibrium had never been more crucial than in the 1620s when the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War coincided with a period of stasis in the marriage negotiations between the Stuarts and the Habsburgs as well as with the Dutch executions at Amboyna. Despite the incident in the Moluccas was not the only episode when imperial rivalries in the East affected the diplomatic negotiations

¹¹² Markley, *The Far East*, p. 18.

¹¹³ See, for example, Thomas Scott, *Vox Populi* and *The Interpreter*, both published in 1622. On Scott's representativeness, see Lake, 'Constitutional Consensus and Puritan Opposition', p. 806.

¹¹⁴ Scott, *The Interpreter*, pp. 8-9, quot. in Milton, 'Marketing a Massacre', p. 171.

¹¹⁵ See Milton, 'Marketing a massacre', p. 171.

for the marriage in Europe, this was the first instance where all the three major powers, who had an interest in both the European diplomacy surrounding the union between Charles and the Infanta and in the East Indian trade, were involved. In the previous case, assessed in chapter III, the EIC had attacked the Portuguese port of Hormuz. Any complaints, repercussions, and requests for explanations were only bilateral, involving exclusively the Iberian monarchy and England. The situation was solved by the Spanish asking reparation as part of the Infanta's dowry, and within England, by the English Company paying a 'fee' to both King James and the Duke of Buckingham.¹¹⁶

While local powers were coordinating the attack against Hormuz with the English, the Persians had no interest in the European marriage negotiations. Their concern rested in economic gain: by using one European power against the other, they aimed at increasing their profit in the Persian Gulf. In the case of Amboyna, however, the three parties affected were closely concerned with the marriage negotiations as well as with East Indian trade. The result was a series of treaties and secret agreements between 1604 and 1624 in an attempt to regulate their multifaceted triangular relation.

Such a triangular relation was based on the shared religious confession between the English and the Dutch against the Catholic Habsburgs. According to the Puritans, the Anglo-Dutch bond should have not been forgotten, even following the events at Amboyna.¹¹⁷ Denying the religious affinity between the two countries, would have meant giving an unfair advantage to Spain, especially considering that King James had still not definitively abandoned the project of an Anglo-Spanish union. Indeed, during the Parliament of 1624, when advising King James to break the marriage treaty with

¹¹⁶ See chp. III.

¹¹⁷ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', pp. 589-90.

Spain, the MPs mentioned among the reasons in favour of breaking the treaties with Spain not only the situation of Protestantism in Europe and the treatment received by Prince Charles in Madrid, but also ‘the discomfort of our friends the Hollanders.’ In his diary reporting the proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, John Holles considered the Dutch as the ‘bulwarks of Christendom.’ If they were to fall again under Spanish domination, the English would soon follow.¹¹⁸

The English Company’s representatives were aware that no further agreements with the Dutch were possible in the East as they had caused ‘more disprofit than the losses sustained by the former hostility’.¹¹⁹ I believe that, in order to prevent any accusations of not being committed to the protection of European Protestantism, the Company’s members crafted a well-informed narrative according to which the cruel actions of the Dutch at Amboyna and elsewhere had demonstrated that they were ‘faithlesse’¹²⁰ and therefore not worth protecting or justifying. While using this rhetoric, however, the English East India Company had to be cautious of the possible association being made by those opposing the Stuart-Habsburg union. Because of Dutch cruelty, and the impossibility for England of maintaining friendly relations with the United Provinces, King James might have then been ready to ally with Catholic Spain, making use of the potential support generated by the anger at the executions at Amboyna. As David Coast noted, however, ‘while popular anti-Dutch sentiment certainly existed in England, many of James’s subjects would also be hostile to the prospect of a war against their fellow

¹¹⁸ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, BL, Harl. ms 6383, Diary of John Holles, f. 86v., 1 March 1624.

¹¹⁹ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, Batavia, 15 December 1623: John Goninge to the East India Company.

¹²⁰ BL, IOR/3/10, doc. 1138, fols. 72r-75v: ‘their faithlesse proceedings in the last exploits for Goa and Mozambique, with other unsufferable exactions and abuses complained with o.r redresse which being dubie (double?) waighed and coonsidered wee cannott be iustlie blamed for refusing to conioine our Fortes in such offensive exploits, tending more to the particular ende of the Netherlanders and upholding their greedy desire of soueraigntie then anie expectation of bennifitt to the respectiue Comp.as (companies)’.

Protestants in alliance with a Catholic power'.¹²¹

James's revived commitment to the Anglo-Spanish dynastic union in response to the Dutch incident at Amboyna, therefore, was short-lived. It is crucial, however, to consider that Gondomar ascribed further delays in the marriage negotiations to the English decision to sign a treaty with the Dutch in 1619. In this light, the 'massacre' was seen as the inevitable result of an unfortunate alliance. The Dutch had always been an interested party in the marriage negotiations between Charles and the Infanta as they hoped that the failure of the marriage diplomacy would result in a stronger relationship between the United Provinces and England in both Europe and in the East Indies. Despite the incident at Amboyna, the relationship was indeed to remain firm until the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch war in the 1650s.¹²²

¹²¹ Coast, *News and Rumour*, p. 147.

¹²² Charles R. Boxer, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 17th Century 1652-1674* (London: National Maritime Museum, 1974), p. 4.

Chapter V

‘The wish being father to the thought.’¹ The End of the Anglo-Spanish Match in London and Madrid, 1623-1624

E.6 [Edward VI] How doth King James
relish this Match?

Q.M. [Queen Mary] His Exchequer is
poore, and King Philips Indies rich, and
therefore his Maiestie likes it so well, as
he will hearken to no other.
[John Reynolds]²

On 24 February 1624, when reporting to Parliament the details of his journey to Madrid with Prince Charles, the Duke of Buckingham stated that the Count-Duke of Olivares, favourably impressed with their arrival in March 1623, had declared that it was then time to conclude the Anglo-Spanish Match and thus ‘be friends, and divide the world between us’.³ That world that Olivares aspired to share between Philip IV and James I, however, was already divided not only among various European rulers, but also inhabited by powerful indigenous dynasties and disputed between rival mercantile companies whose economic interests were often more decisive than any of their respective crowns’ political concerns.

The arrival of the heir to the Stuart throne in the Spanish capital in 1623 failed to resolve the contradictions underlying the negotiations and only contributed toward

¹ *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Christoforo Surian to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 21 March 1622.

² [Reynolds], *Vox Coeli*, p. 38.

³ BL, Add. ms. 46191, f. 4, Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, Diary of Sir Nathaniel Rich, 24 February 1624.

exacerbating existing difficulties and highlighting new inextricable controversies.⁴ Describing to Carleton the Prince's arrival at the court of Madrid at the beginning of March, the Earl of Bristol used a sentence that it is understandable when we think that the English ambassador in Spain had not been warned of Charles's plans. Bristol stated that 'nothing could have happened more strange and unexpected unto me'. He added that, if informed in advance of Prince Charles's project to travel to Madrid with the Duke of Buckingham in disguise, he would have done all that was in his power to stop him from undertaking such a dangerous journey.⁵ Aside from the difficulties inherent in the long ride between London and Madrid, the ambassador was rightly worried that the Stuart heir's presence at the court of Philip IV would increase Spanish demands for a successful conclusion of the marriage agreement.⁶

The growing distance between mutual expectations and the political contingencies surrounding the negotiations for the Habsburg-Stuart union was never as evident as during Charles's stay in Madrid when the news of further conflicts in the Indies reached Europe between 1623 and 1624.

In August 1623 a public sale was held in London of booty gained the previous year at Hormuz by the East India Company.⁷ While the English Company saw the occasion as a moment to celebrate their lucrative success in front of a political nation increasingly critical of chartered companies, the event was seen by the Habsburgs as testifying to the

⁴ See Roger Lockyer, *Buckingham. The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 1592-1628* (New York: Longman, 1981), p. 165. On the 1623 journey to Madrid, see Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*; Pérez de Guzmán y Gallo, 'Las últimas negociaciones'. On Charles's public entrance in Madrid, see TNA, SP 94/26, f. 89, Aston to Carleton, Madrid, 17/27 March 1623. On Charles's reception in Madrid, see TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 93-98, Bristol to King James, 18 March 1623; SP 94/26, fols. 117-124; and *Narrative*, pp. 202-07. For a list of newsletters and pamphlets on Charles's visit, see Samson, 'Politics of Translation', p. 91, fn 2.

⁵ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 81, Bristol to Carleton, Madrid, 10/20 March 1623.

⁶ See Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 75; Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 37.

⁷ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 213.

untrustworthiness of English intentions towards a dynastic alliance with Spain.⁸ Indeed, already in July 1623, the Spanish ambassador said that he intended to arrest three English Company's ships that had arrived in London 'richly laden'. According to Chamberlain, the ambassador justified his right to take the English Company's vessels 'on pretense of the business of Ormus'.⁹ For a few months before the public sale, Spanish envoys in London had complained to James I concerning the English East India Company's attack against the Portuguese possession, and asked that England would help the Iberian monarchy in the restoration of Hormuz.¹⁰ The English crown promised justice to the Catholic monarchy, but only following the arrival of a detailed report on the extent of the Company's involvement.¹¹

This feeling of betrayal had already been conveyed on the part of Spain by Ambassador Gondomar in the case of Walter Raleigh's expedition to Guyana in 1617-1618. On multiple occasions since then, the Spanish had expressed their hope that 'it would not happen again what happened with Raleigh'.¹² Similar to 1618 when news of Raleigh's attack on St Thomé reached London and Madrid, in 1623 Spanish diplomats considered the attack on Hormuz as a direct violation not only of the 1604 peace treaty but also as a reason to question English commitment towards a dynastic union with the Habsburgs.

Building upon the evidence presented in previous chapters, this last chapter argues that the arrival of the news from the fringes of the two European empires concerning rivalry and conflict in 1623 and 1624 further complicated the final stages of the negotiations and intrinsically contributed to their failure. This aspect has been entirely

⁸ RAH, L-24, fols. 551v-52v.

⁹ TNA, SP 14/149, f. 64, Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 26 July 1623.

¹⁰ TNA, SP 14/151, f. 51, Conway to Calvert, Beaulieu, 22 August 1623.

¹¹ See chp III above.

¹² See, for example, BPR, II/2191, doc. 29, Philip III to the Count of Gondomar, Madrid, 10 June 1620.

overlooked by historians and literary scholars who have considered the last two years of the marriage diplomacy only in the light of Charles's journey to Madrid, his meetings with the Spanish theologians hoping to convert him, and the festivities set in place during his stay.¹³ It is, however, a crucial aspect to consider when discussing the end of the marriage negotiations. Iberian interests in the East and West Indies were strongly linked to their wealth and *reputación*, and therefore any actions by European rivals in those areas had an impact not only on their commercial gain but also on their wider struggle for primacy.¹⁴

5.1 Global News

When in March 1622 the Venetian Ambassador stated in his report to the Doge 'the wish being father to the thought', he was referring to the widespread rumour in England that the marriage diplomacy had failed. The rumour, according to the ambassador, was constructed on the hope of many that the marriage would not take place.¹⁵ Creating a rumour based on wishful thinking was not new and indeed, as David Coast has recently demonstrated, rumours were at the basis of most of the interpretations of James's behaviour by his courtiers and foreign observers.¹⁶

Various problems came to light between 1622 and 1624 which resulted in many hoping that the union between England and Spain would not take place. Indeed, in 1622 the situation had deteriorated in the Palatinate and the chances of the Elector Palatine

¹³ See Samson (ed.), *The Spanish Match*; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*; Pérez de Guzmán y Gallo, 'Las últimas negociaciones'.

¹⁴ Games, *The Web of Empire*, p. 8.

¹⁵ *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Christoforo Surian to the Doge and Senate, The Hague, 21 March 1622.

¹⁶ Coast, *News and Rumour*, p. 154 and p. 160.

and his wife Elizabeth being restored to their lands and title had further decreased.¹⁷ According to MPs, the alliance between Spain and England had brought enormous advantages to the King of Spain who had used it as a weapon and led England to lose 'our friends abroad, ourselves at home and almost God Almighty'.¹⁸ The suggestion of the MPs was thus to break the treaties with the Catholic Monarchy as soon as possible.¹⁹ As late as 1624, however, the hopes of many within the English political nation that James would abandon his project of a dynastic alliance with Habsburg Spain, had still not been fulfilled.

The arrival of the news from the Indies to Europe was a long and complicated process. As the latest historiography on the dissemination of news in the early modern period suggests, by the late sixteenth and certainly by the beginning of the seventeenth century, news had created its own market. Despite its growing abundance, however, the accuracy and reliability of such news remained a crucial issue for most European sovereigns.²⁰ Indeed, not only did rulers hope to know the news from other countries, both near and far away, as soon as possible, but also wished for the reliability of the source to be confirmed. This had been the case when the Council of State in Madrid doubted an informant bringing news that Raleigh's voyage was directed to Virginia in 1617 as well as when in January 1623 Ambassador Coloma questioned the news that the English had helped in the conquest of the Portuguese Hormuz the previous year.²¹ In

¹⁷ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War. Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 354-57.

¹⁸ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, *CJ*, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/13, 1 March 1624.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 27 February 1624.

²⁰ Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News. How the World came to know about itself* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 3; Boys, *London's News Press*, p. 58.

²¹ See Reports from the President of the Council to Philip III summarising the proceedings taken in respect of Sir Walter Raleigh's expedition, AGI, Indiferente General, 147, 5, Leg. 17, quot. in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 133-35; and AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 32, Meeting of the Council of State, 26 April 1623. During the meeting in April, the Council discussed Carlos Coloma's letters dated between 27 January and 28 March 1623.

both cases, the news was considered unreliable as England had ongoing dynastic negotiations with Spain and it was thought unlikely that the King of England would allow his subjects to act against the Iberian sovereign's overseas possessions and imperial interests.

The taking of Hormuz had significantly destabilised the marriage negotiations as soon as the news had reached the courts of London and Madrid where the reports were greeted with a mixture of disbelief and annoyance.²² By the end of 1622, some rumours of the capture had reached the Spanish ambassador in London. At first, many diplomats decided not to believe the news, as it seemed too absurd to be true. Carlos Coloma, who had recently arrived in London as Spanish envoy to replace Gondomar, reported to Philip IV that 'it is a spread rumour here that the English together with the Persians have taken Hormuz and despite I don't believe it, it is in the interest of Your Majesty that I discover the truth'.²³

The news of the Amboyna 'massacre' reached Europe on 29 May 1624,²⁴ therefore well after Charles and Buckingham had left the Spanish capital, but when a successful conclusion of the union was still believed formally possible by the two Crowns. Indeed, even following the Prince and the Duke's return to England, on 10 October 1623 Dudley Carleton stated that the marriage between Prince Charles and the Infanta was proceeding 'just as before the Prince went to Spain.' It was in fact to happen by proxy before Christmas and the Infanta would be sent to England in March of the following

²² AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 32, Meeting of the Council of State, 26 April 1623.

²³ BPR, II/2198, doc. 27, Don Carlos Coloma to Philip IV, 1 November 1622.

²⁴ Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 583.

year.²⁵ This was a confirmation of what had been decided in July when the marriage articles were publicly read and King James and the Privy Council had sworn to observe them.²⁶

The English political nation, who was traditionally linked to the Dutch due to their shared Protestant religion, found it hard to justify the Dutch East India Company's actions in the East Indies in 1624 and entertained for a while the possibility that the gruesome episode in the Spice Islands may have a positive impact on the ongoing marriage negotiations with Spain.²⁷ This position, however, was not shared by everyone as the Dutch were considered by many as the only obstacle left against a Habsburg universal monarchy and therefore the only possible ally for England.²⁸

In a mass-market of news where the bond of trust between those who brought the news and those who received it had almost completely disappeared, it was common practice therefore that those who could afford it waited for a second or third report regarding any crucial events, before acting upon it.²⁹ This was the case with both the taking of Hormuz and the incident at Amboyna, where the parties involved expected further reports before deciding on any punishments or countermeasures.

²⁵ TNA, SP 14/153, fols. 37-38, Dudley Carleton to Sir Dudley Carleton, Royston, 10 October 1623. As with most diplomatic correspondence, it is difficult to judge on the tone of this letter. Carleton may have been ironic when stating that the marriage was proceeding 'just as before' meaning that it was proceeding very slowly and perhaps with little chances of success. See also AGS, E., Leg., 2866, unfoliated.

²⁶ TNA, SP 14/149, fols. 32-33, Sir Richard Younge to Lord Zouch, Weybridge, 23 July 1623. According to the agreement, the Infanta had a chapel for her household, twenty-four priests, and she was allowed to care for the education of her children until they were 10 years old. Her servants, however, had to swear loyalty to King James. On the marriage articles being approved by the Privy Council, see *Narrative*, p. 247; Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 46.

²⁷ See chp. IV above.

²⁸ A speaker in the 1624 Parliament considered the Dutch as 'those whome god hath by miracle rayzed and supported, who have been the only remora of the Spaniards greatenes over the Christian world', quot. in Breslow, *A Mirror of England*, p. 75.

²⁹ Pettegree, *The Invention of News*, pp. 3-5.

Confirmation of the attack on Hormuz by the combined English and Persian forces arrived in Europe at the beginning of the following year, in 1623. The episode led to far-reaching consequences not only in the relations between England and Spain but also in the balance of power within the Indies among England, the Iberian Powers, the Dutch, and local dynasties.³⁰ The Spanish were in a position of great advantage in negotiating the restitution of the Portuguese port as the heir to the Stuart throne was in Madrid when evidence of English contribution to the capture arrived in Europe.³¹ From the moment when the news was first verified, the Spanish ambassador began to complain about James's lack of action in punishing the perpetrators and procuring the restoration of, or at least financial redress for, Hormuz.³² Given the pressure from the Spanish envoys, King James promised that he would soon take a decision about the appropriate punishment for the members of the English East India Company guilty of the action. The King would then send his decision to the Company's Governor in order for him to impose the appropriate sanction.³³

James's decision, however, was by no means certain since the King did not really intend formally to punish the Company, especially after having received a generous payment by the English Company from the booty obtained at Hormuz.³⁴ Further delay in granting any binding promises of reparation to Philip IV occurred because of this. It is therefore understandable that, when the three 'richly laden' ships belonging to the English Company arrived in England at the end of July 1623, it was the intention of the

³⁰ Joan-Pau Rubiés, 'A Dysfunctional Empire?', in Loureiro and Resende (eds.), *Estudos sobre Don García de Silva y Figueroa*, p. 85 and p. 125.

³¹ TNA, SP 14/151, f. 51, Conway to Calvert, Beaulieu, 22 August 1623.

³² For example, see TNA, SP 14/151, f. 51, Conway to Calvert, Beaulieu, 22 August 1623; TNA, SP 14/149, f. 64, Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 26 July 1623.

³³ TNA, SP 14/148, f. 6, Calvert to Conway, St. Martin's Lane, 1 July 1623.

³⁴ See chp. III above.

Spanish ambassador to exert pressure on the relevant authorities to seize them as reparation for the taking of the Portuguese fortress.³⁵

Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter III, while in Madrid, Prince Charles was asked by the Spanish to write to his father and to the East India Company in order to prosecute those guilty of the attack against Hormuz and obtain reparation for the Iberian monarchy.³⁶ Charles's presence in Madrid was an unmissable opportunity for Philip IV to obtain rapid satisfaction for the English Company's attack. However, not only did the Spanish not obtain restitution nor reparation, but the English were also publically selling booty in London in August 1623.

In February 1623 Bristol had reported to King James that there was no delay to be expected on the part of the Spanish as they seemed to desire an advantageous and speedy conclusion of the marriage diplomacy as much as the English. Moreover, the temporal articles were agreed upon. The only obstacle could be the Pope as it was believed that the 'business will stick at Rome'.³⁷ In March 1623, there seemed to be a shared consensus in England and Spain that the dispensation was the only element missing for the dynastic union to reach 'a happie conclusion'.³⁸

In London, Ambassador Coloma confirmed that they were only waiting for the news of the granting of the dispensation and, once the Pope had agreed to the union, Charles would be free to bring the Infanta with him as he deserved to do 'after exposing himself to so many dangers'.³⁹ In Madrid, Buckingham was also certain that the dispensation

³⁵ TNA, SP 14/149, f. 64, Chamberlain to Carleton, London, 26 July 1623.

³⁶ See chp III above.

³⁷ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 42, Bristol to King James, Madrid, 22 February 1623.

³⁸ TNA SP 94/26, f. 91, Buckingham to Conway, Madrid, 18 March 1623.

³⁹ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 87, Carlos Coloma to King James, 14/24 March 1623: 'Nous manque seulement d'entendre bientost l'heureuse arriver de Sa.d A a Madrid, et qu'il q aye esté receu de sa Dame, comme il

would soon arrive and the marriage diplomacy would be successful at last. At the end of March, Walter Aston, King James's ambassador at the court of Spain alongside the Earl of Bristol, received letters from Rome confirming that the Pope and the Cardinals had agreed on the dispensation and were going to send it to Madrid shortly.⁴⁰

At the Spanish court, Bristol had been assured that the dispensation would reach Madrid at the beginning of April at the latest. If that was the case and the marriage was to be concluded upon the arrival of the Pope's permission, the English Ambassador considered the Palatinate as an issue that could easily be solved by agreeing on a further dynastic union to reinforce the bond between England and the Habsburgs. The initial proposal was in fact that Frederick V's son would marry the Emperor's daughter and would be living at the Imperial court.⁴¹ This was not a proposal that Frederick was willing to accept but it was, in Bristol's estimation, testimony to the good intentions of the Spanish. The Elector Palatine, however, had various issues that he wanted to 'bee cleared before hee signe' a truce with the King of Spain and the Infanta. King James hoped that a truce would lead to a wider peace with the Emperor, and diplomats on both sides aspired to make the agreement more binding by a union between Frederick's son and the Emperor's daughter.⁴²

Certainly, the Palatinate was an important item of contention in 1623 when Charles's presence in Madrid led to the belief that he would convert to Catholicism and consequently leave behind his exiled family members and religious compatriots. The Earl of Bristol wrote to the English King that while the Iberian sovereign seemed to be

est a deu a ses merites, apres s'estre expose a tant de perils'. See also, *Narrative*, p. 239; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 102.

⁴⁰ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 106, Aston to Carleton, 23 March/2 April 1623.

⁴¹ TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 48-50, Bristol to Calvert, 23 February 1623.

⁴² TNA, SP 94/27, f. 42, Conway to Buckingham, 25 June 1623. See also, Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 138.

very accommodating concerning the situation in the Palatinate, he doubted that James I's intentions would soon be executed. Not only did things 'never proceeded in Spayne with that slownesse as at present' but also it was unthinkable that the King of Spain would declare war against his own family, the House of Austria, and his own religion.⁴³

According to the Earl of Bristol the Palatinate was indeed an issue of 'greate difficultye'. The English Ambassador, however, was also convinced that the Spanish were sincere in their desire to accomplish the match and had no reason to delay it. Proof of this was, according to Bristol, the fact that Philip IV had already decided on who was to accompany the Infanta to England. Among them was Don Duarte of Portugal whom Bristol himself had suggested when given a list of possible candidates to accompany the Princess.⁴⁴

In the conclusion of a dynastic alliance with Spain, the English were not only troubled by the difficult situation in the Palatinate but also by 'the taking of Ormuz' which aggravated the delicate relationship between the King of England and the Iberian monarch. For this reason, the English Ambassador wrote to James informing him of the complaints in Madrid and promising a full report on the events once the extent of English help in the taking of the Portuguese fortress was clarified. Clearly, the Ambassador left any decisions concerning the reparation which 'shalbe thought fittinge' to the King. He was hoping, however, that incidents 'of this nature', which is to say the conflicts caused by Anglo-Iberian rivalry in the Indies, would not interrupt 'the mayne busines we are treating of'.⁴⁵

⁴³ TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 13-16, Bristol to Calvert, Madrid, 28 January 1623. See also TNA, SP 94/26, f. 23v., Bristol to Calvert, Madrid, 9 February 1623.

⁴⁴ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 23, Bristol to Calvert, Madrid, 9 February 1623. See also TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 48-50, Bristol to Calvert, 23 February 1623.

⁴⁵ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 4, Letters from Madrid, Madrid, 12/22 January 1623.

‘Accidents of such nature’, which is to say imperial conflicts in the Indies, were indeed common between trading companies and local powers but could generally be resolved within the local context. In the early seventeenth century, however, as the end of the negotiations for the Spanish Match demonstrates, European diplomacy was deeply entangled with what was happening in overseas territories and conflicting episode had consequences on European agreements. Overseas, European powers divided their respective spheres of influence not only among each other but also with indigenous and powerful long-standing local empires with their own existing trading networks. The events at Hormuz, however, did have consequences on the marriage diplomacy in Europe. Following the arrival of the first rumours about the taking of the Portuguese port, the Spanish waited several weeks before complaining to James in order to get a full relation of the events to send to the King of England so that ‘such satisfaction may be given as shall be thought fitting’.⁴⁶

The main business was evidently negotiations for the union between Charles and the Infanta. The ambassador hoped that the taking of Hormuz would not affect the marriage diplomacy, not only because the events had taken place far away from Europe but also because the taking of the Portuguese fortress was not to be considered as an act of provocation on the part of the King of England. Instead, English envoys expected the Iberian monarch to view episode as a decision taken by the East India Company in agreement with the Safavid Shah Abbas I.

At the end of January 1623, Bristol reiterated to the Prince of Wales that, while the discussion of the temporal marriage articles was well underway, the general advancement of the dynastic union was proceeding very slowly in Spain. The

⁴⁶ *CSPCol, East*, vol. 4, 1622-1624, 12/22 January 1623.

Ambassador also reassured the Prince and other correspondents in London that he would keep them posted of any developments that could ‘advance the same’.⁴⁷

According to Aston, in March 1623 the success of the union appeared to depend on both the Pope’s dispensation and the situation in the Palatinate. Echoing Bristol’s opinion, the English envoy believed that neither of these two issues were putting the dynastic negotiations in danger as the Spanish were ‘fully resolved to give y^c King our master satisfaction’. In order to do so, Philip IV would overcome any difficulties that could intervene to disrupt the accomplishment of the match.⁴⁸ The Earl of Bristol had used the solution of a further dynastic marriage between Frederick’s son and the Emperor’s daughter as testimony of Spain’s good will. Aston also considered the King of Spain’s decision to send Gondomar to Germany as extraordinary ambassador to the Emperor to be a clear sign that the Spanish Habsburgs were strongly dedicated to a successful conclusion for the union between the Prince and the Infanta.⁴⁹

Taking into account Gondomar’s long-term commitment to the Anglo-Spanish match, the choice of sending him as envoy to solve the Palatinate issue seemed to Aston a very significant one.⁵⁰ Furthermore, in early May, the English envoy reported to Carleton that since the dispensation had been granted, the Spanish were very inclined to speed up the conclusion of the marriage without deferring it any longer.⁵¹ There was then no apparent obstacle left for a fruitful completion of the marriage diplomacy in 1623.

⁴⁷ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 17, Bristol to Prince of Wales, Madrid, 28 January 1623. See also SP 94/26, f. 19, Bristol to Calvert, Madrid, 2/12 February 1623.

⁴⁸ TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 75-76, Aston to [Carleton], Madrid, 4/14 March 1623.

⁴⁹ Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia Hispano-Inglesa*, p. 62.

⁵⁰ TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 75-76, Aston to [Carleton], Madrid, 4/14 March 1623.

⁵¹ SP 94/26, f.184, Aston to Carleton, Madrid, 22 April/ 2 May 1623. See also *Narrative*, p. 220.

In England, James was very eager to welcome back his son and the Duke of Buckingham to London, and to meet the Infanta.⁵² The King wrote letters directly to the Spanish princess expressing his desire to welcome her in London as a daughter as soon as possible.⁵³ At the same time, the King of England wrote to Olivares to ask for all proceedings to be concluded rapidly in order to see his son back to England ‘in the company of this beautiful Princess’.⁵⁴ The Spanish princess was described by Bristol to the Prince of Wales as a ‘beautifull and daynty Ladye’.⁵⁵ The Ambassador was not alone in praising the Infanta’s beauty. Endymion Porter described to Conway Buckingham’s visit to the Spanish princess in April 1623. Her beauty, according to Porter, gave reason to love her and to pray for a successful conclusion of the match.⁵⁶

Less than a year later, however, despite a minority, including King James, remaining convinced of the possibility of fruitfully concluding the union with the Spanish Habsburgs, many within the Parliament and the wider political nation believed that it was necessary to break the treaties with Spain as ‘we have suffered by Spain pretending a marriage’.⁵⁷ What some MPs in the Commons suggested in March 1624 was to prepare for a war of diversion against Spain, not on European soil but in the Indies for, regarding the Palatinate, they believed that ‘Spain got it, [and] keeps it, by his Indies.’⁵⁸

⁵² TNA, SP 94/27, f. 20, James I to Prince and Buckingham, 14 June 1623. See also Bodl., Tanner ms. 73/2, f. 287 and f. 316. On other courtiers and diplomatic envoys wishing that Charles would soon return to London, see TNA, SP 94/27, f. 42, Conway to Buckingham, 25 June 1623.

⁵³ Bodl., Tanner ms. 73/2, f. 285r.

⁵⁴ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 196, King James to Count-Duke of Olivares, 27 April 1623.

⁵⁵ TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 38-40, Bristol to Prince of Wales, Madrid 22 February 1623.

⁵⁶ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 150, Endymion Porter to Conway, Madrid, 8 April 1623. On a detailed portrait of the Infanta, see Sir Toby Matthew’s description, TNA, SP 94/27, f. 59, Madrid, 28 June 1623.

⁵⁷ *CJ, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/12*, Sir Miles Fleetwood, 1 March 1624. See also Robert E. Ruigh, *The Parliament of 1624. Politics and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 206-207.

⁵⁸ *CJ, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/12*, see speeches by Sir Robert Phelips and Sir Miles Fleetwood, 1 March 1624.

This proposal was considered at length as the Iberian Empire was deemed to be weaker in the Indies than it was in Europe. To attack Spain through its overseas dominions would have had long-term advantages in stopping the wealth from the Indies from reaching Madrid. The Marques de la Inojosa, Spanish Ambassador in London, also lamented the worsening of the relations between the Catholic Monarchy and England in June 1624. From mutual friendship and polite correspondence in the previous year, Anglo-Spanish relations had become, in mid-1624, characterised by ‘anger and poison’.⁵⁹

The rest of this chapter is concerned with what happened between the optimistic reports of early 1623, when everything seemed ready for the marriage to be concluded, and the end of the negotiations in 1624, ‘when plans for a Spanish war almost immediately replaced plans for an Anglo-Spanish domestic alliance’.⁶⁰ As neither the dispensation nor the situation in the Palatinate were considered by contemporary commentators as threatening the accomplishment of the match, rivalry in the East and West Indies should be given a more prominent place when discussing the last period of the marriage diplomacy. In January 1623, when the taking of Hormuz was first discussed in Madrid, English diplomats hoped that ‘accidents of this nature’ were not going to disrupt the ‘mayne business wee are treating of’.⁶¹ They did.

5.2 Charles’s sojourn in Madrid and the Parliament of 1624

From March to September 1623, the presence of the Prince of Wales in Madrid had created the impression among ambassadors and diplomatic commentators that the success of the marriage was close. Aston described the ‘friendlie familiarity’ between

⁵⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 80, 18 June 1624.

⁶⁰ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 2.

⁶¹ SP 94/26, f. 4, Letters from Madrid, Madrid, 12/22 January 1623.

the Prince of Wales and the King of Spain since Charles arrived in the Spanish capital. Not only was the Prince in very good health,⁶² but the English envoy was also pleasantly surprised by the ‘love and estimation’ that Charles had managed to obtain in such a short time at the Spanish court.⁶³ Bristol’s counterpart in London, Carlos Coloma, reported to King James the Spanish reactions to the Prince’s arrival in Madrid and his solemn entry into the city. ‘There had not been a more beautiful day at the Court of King Philip IV than the 17th of the last month’.⁶⁴ Indeed, Philip expressed the same feeling to James directly by stating that the unexpected arrival of the Prince of Wales to his court had brought great joy to his heart. The King of Spain was hoping that the great festivities offered to Charles in Madrid upon his arrival were manifest proof of the Spanish court’s happiness and appreciation towards the Prince’s visit.⁶⁵

There was a recent precedent to Charles’s choice to fetch his bride from her country of origin, so the journey was not as unprecedented as it has often been portrayed.⁶⁶ Charles’s father, King James, had travelled across the North Sea to bring back his wife, Anne of Denmark in 1589.⁶⁷ Indeed the Prince was hoping to do the same in 1623 having been assured by the Count of Gondomar at the end of the previous year that it would be very easy to bring the Infanta back if he only were to come to Madrid.⁶⁸ Cogswell, however, is correct in defining this as ‘one of the most mysterious episodes

⁶² On the good health of the Prince, see TNA, SP 94/26, f. 240, Aston to Conway, Madrid, 22 May 1623.

⁶³ TNA, SP 94/26, fols. 134-135, Aston to Calvert, Madrid, 8 April 1623.

⁶⁴ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 110, Coloma to James, London 25 March/4 April 1623. Charles and Buckingham arrived in Madrid on 17 March 1623 according to the New Style calendar (7 March in Old Style). See Pursell, ‘The End of the Spanish Match’, p. 699.

⁶⁵ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 212, Philip IV to James I, 2/12 May 1623. See also, *Narrative*, p. 206.

⁶⁶ Lockyer, *Buckingham*, pp. 136-37.

⁶⁷ Maureen M. Meikle and Helen Payne, ‘Anne of Denmark (1574–1619), queen of England, Scotland, and Ireland, consort of James VI and I’, *ODNB*.

⁶⁸ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 54-55; Pursell, ‘The End of the Spanish Match’, p. 705; Lockyer, *Buckingham*, p. 135; González Cuerva, *Baltasar de Zúñiga*, p. 551.

in early modern English history'.⁶⁹ While it was not unprecedented to fetch the bride from her country of origin once the marriage was concluded,⁷⁰ King James himself recognised that it was 'without example in manie ages' for a King's only son to travel to meet another King's daughter before the marriage articles were agreed upon.⁷¹ The King of England, among others, used this reason in June 1623, to ask the Prince of Wales to return as soon as possible to England.⁷²

Despite the various problems that the negotiations had encountered over the previous years, and especially as a consequence of the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the presence of the English prince in the Spanish capital made many believe that the time had finally arrived when the King of Spain and the King of England were ready to put aside their differences and sign the marriage agreement.⁷³ According to various ambassadors, for example the Venetian envoy, the decisive push forward in the marriage diplomacy was due to the decision of Prince Charles to convert to Catholicism, which was believed to be the only plausible reason for his journey to Madrid.⁷⁴

The Venetian ambassador was not the only one who thought that the Prince's arrival in Madrid meant that he was ready to convert. The Count-Duke of Olivares, being informed by Gondomar that Charles had arrived in the capital with the Duke of Buckingham, decided to agree on a meeting as soon as possible to judge on the duo's

⁶⁹ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 12.

⁷⁰ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 4.

⁷¹ TNA, SP 94/27, f. 22, James I to the Prince of Wales, 14 June 1623.

⁷² *Ibid.* and TNA, SP 94/27, f. 20, James I to Prince and Buckingham, 14 June 1623

⁷³ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 106, Aston to Carleton, 23 March/2 April 1623; TNA, SP 94/26, f. 91, Buckingham to Conway, 18 March 1623. *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Valerio Antelmi, Venetian Secretary at Florence, to the Doge and Senate, 29 April 1623.

⁷⁴ *Narrative*, p. 207.

true intentions. Buckingham narrated what followed as part of his relation of the events in Spain that he was asked to make in front of the 1624 Parliament.⁷⁵

When Olivares met Buckingham in the gardens of the Royal Palace in March 1623, the Count-Duke asserted that the time had arrived to conclude the dynastic union and strengthen the existing friendship between the two crowns.⁷⁶ The underlying assumption, as Buckingham was soon to discover, was that Charles would then become a Catholic as his ancestors once were. Indeed, a few days later Olivares discussed with the Prince the example of his grandmother, Mary Queen of Scots, whom he considered a martyr for the Roman Church.⁷⁷ With Charles's conversion, Olivares continued, there was no need to wait for Papal approval and the match would be celebrated shortly.⁷⁸

The Duke of Buckingham was horrified by the proposal and stated that the Prince had not come to Madrid to convert and in fact he was ready to renounce the match rather than change his religion. Because of this, Olivares replied, there was the need to obtain the Papal dispensation and the Count-Duke agreed to send a letter to Rome to press the Pope to grant his permission at his earliest convenience.⁷⁹ Buckingham reported to the MPs sitting in Parliament in 1624 that he was highly unsatisfied with Olivares's letter which he found 'very cold' and he believed would be insufficient to convince the Pope.

Despite the Prince's conversion being considered imminent by many at the Court of Madrid and feared by some in London, the Venetian Fulgenzio Macanzio wrote to William Cavendish that it was not at all obvious that the Prince had come to Spain to

⁷⁵ Ruigh, *The Parliament of 1624*, p. 155 and pp. 163-65.

⁷⁶ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, Diary of John Holles, BL, Harl. Ms 6,383, f. 81v., 24 February 1624.

⁷⁷ *Narrative*, p. 208. Lockyer, *Buckingham*, p. 144.

⁷⁸ BL, Add. ms. 46191, f. 4, Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, Diary of Sir Nathaniel Rich, 24 February 1624.

⁷⁹ *Narrative*, p. 208.

convert. Instead, Charles and Buckingham's journey was likely part of a wider strategy to facilitate the granting of the dispensation by the Pope as 'ordinarily Princes keepe secrett their true ends'.⁸⁰

Later during their stay in Madrid, the Prince and the Duke were presented with an alternative solution that would have eased the discussions regarding the dangers of sending the Infanta to England before James had put into practice the toleration for Catholics that he had promised to allow. Olivares stated that it would have been good enough if Buckingham would convert.⁸¹ Various Spanish observers had in fact often commented on the strong influence that Buckingham was able to exert over both the King and the Prince.⁸² Some believed therefore that the Duke's conversion was a sufficient guarantee that the English would keep their promises once the Infanta was in England.⁸³

Shortly after his arrival at the Spanish court, Charles was presented with new conditions by the Pope. Indeed, according to Aston, the religious articles agreed by the King of England were modified in Rome and returned from there 'somewhat different from those which His Majesty sent thyther'.⁸⁴ For example, the Prince and the Infanta's children were to remain with their mother and be educated as Catholics until they were twelve years of age, instead of the previously agreed nine.⁸⁵ The new articles were discussed in Madrid by the Junta of theologians as well as among English and Spanish diplomats in order to reach an agreement on those requests that had been altered. One of

⁸⁰ Macanzio to Cavendish, 8 June 1623, in Macanzio, *Lettere a William Cavendish*, p. 237.

⁸¹ BL, Add. Ms 46191, Diary of Sir Nathaniel Rich, 24 February 1624.

⁸² BPR, II/2124, docs. 241 and 244.

⁸³ See BPR, II/2191, doc. 8, Philip IV to Gondomar, Madrid, 23 March 1623.

⁸⁴ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 245, Aston to [Carleton], Madrid, 22 May/1 June 1623. See *Narrative*, p. 200.

⁸⁵ *Narrative*, p. 217.

the Pope's requirements was that the King of Spain would swear an oath guaranteeing that the King of England would respect the articles agreed in the marriage treaty, especially those regarding religious liberty for the Infanta and her household and religious concessions to English Catholics.⁸⁶

Following the further requests of the Pope, Olivares wrote to the Prince of Wales in May to reassure him of Spanish commitment towards the success of the marriage as the councillors and ministers of King Philip IV wholeheartedly desired the conclusion of the union ('aman y dessean la efectuación y conclusión deste negocio'). For this purpose, Olivares asked Charles to accept the alterations in the articles as decided by the Pope. It was necessary, according to the Count-Duke, in order for the two monarchies to gain advantages from the union and preserve the existing friendship, that both parties 'maintained a good disposition' in order to obtain the Papal dispensation.⁸⁷

Olivares's words can easily be read in light of the Spanish sovereign not making any real effort to obtain the Papal permission but rather hoping that the Pope would take long time in granting the dispensation so that they could blame any delays on the Roman curia. Nonetheless, it is also important to consider Buckingham's self-interest in portraying the situation to his advantage in front of the 1624 Parliament. The assembly was asked to consider whether James was to break the treaties with Spain.⁸⁸ Despite the King directly asking the question to MPs, they had not forgotten what had happened in the two previous sessions, in 1614 and 1621, and feared for another abrupt ending of the Parliamentary session.⁸⁹ It was therefore with much caution that some members expressed their opinion according to which the alliance with Spain had only brought

⁸⁶ TNA, SP 94/27, f. 15, Letters from Madrid, 10/20 June 1623.

⁸⁷ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 254, Olivares to Prince of Wales, May 1623.

⁸⁸ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, *CJ*, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/13, 27 February 1624; 1 March 1624. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 166. Ruigh, *The Parliament of 1624*, pp. 149-150.

⁸⁹ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 167.

‘dishonor and scorn’.⁹⁰ Prince Charles and the Duke of Buckingham were hoping to use these shared feeling not only to create a strong consensus in favour of breaking the treaty of marriage with the Spanish Habsburgs but also to openly declare a war.⁹¹

Despite some within the political nation having more or less openly criticised James’s appeasement policies towards Spain,⁹² to publicly criticise a sovereign was not advisable as those who would do so were likely to be censored or arrested. This had been one of the reasons for the dissolution of the 1621 Parliament, when a few MPs had taken the liberty to talk ill of the King of Spain, who was an anointed King and therefore, in James I’s view, could not be subjected to the criticism of the people.⁹³ In 1624, this was also the case for Thomas Middleton’s *A Game at Chess*, performed in August for nine consecutive days at the Globe Theatre in London.⁹⁴ ‘Rebus sic stantibus’, commented John Holles to the Earl of Somerset in August 1624, with the marriage still formally in place and King James trying to maintain friendly relations with Spain even in the case that the dynastic union was not going to take place, the play was a dishonour to England, not only to Spain.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, Diary of Sir Nathaniel Rich, BL, Add. Ms. 46191, f. 7.

⁹¹ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 313. Ruigh, *The Parliament of 1624*, p. 150.

⁹² See chp. I above. See also *CSPVen*, vol. 17, Relazione of England by Girolamo Lando, Venetian Ambassador, 21 September 1622.

⁹³ Tanner, p. 293; TNA, SP 94/24, f. 160. See also Gondomar to Philip III, 28 March 1620, *CODOIN*, vol. II, pp. 280-281; AGS, E., Leg. 2558, doc. 6; BPR, II/2108, doc. 99, Count of Gondomar to the Duke of Albuquerque, London, 17 December 1621; and BPR, II/2108, doc. 76, Ferdinand II to Baltasar de Zuñiga, 1621; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 35.

⁹⁴ TNA, SP 14/171/49, Sir Francis Nethersole to Sir Dudley Carleton, 14 August 1624. Cogswell, *Thomas Middleton and the Court*, p. 273.

⁹⁵ John Holles to the Earl of Somerset, 11 August 1624, quot. in *Thomas Middleton and Early Modern Textual Culture. A companion to the Collected Works*, eds. Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 867-68.

In such a delicate phase of the parliamentary proceedings in 1624, it is understandable that the Duke of Buckingham needed to appear in a good light, as the one who had done everything that was in his power, during his stay in Madrid, to safeguard the honour of his King and Prince rather than as the one who had hindered the progress of the negotiations because of his bad character and lack of respect.⁹⁶ The latter was Olivares's opinion as well as that of many others at the Spanish court. Buckingham was in fact accused of arrogance, ill will, and insolence, and a dispatch describing his behaviour was sent to England before Charles left Spain in September 1623.⁹⁷

The Earl of Bristol, who was to be Buckingham's scapegoat in the Parliament of 1626, also considered the Duke's attitude in Madrid detrimental to the negotiations. Bristol had been the leading figure on the English side of the marriage diplomacy since 1616 and found himself in a difficult position after Charles and Buckingham's return from Madrid empty-handed. The Earl maintained that he had always followed King James's orders and acted in good faith rather than to mislead the court on the actual prospects of the negotiations being successful.⁹⁸ It was in Buckingham's interest, however, to portray not only the Spanish ambassador Gondomar, but also his English counterpart, Bristol, as the ones to blame for the overly optimistic reports from Madrid and the perception they helped to create in London that the marriage was ready to be celebrated and the temporal and religious conditions agreed upon.

⁹⁶ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, Diary of Sir Walter Earle, BL, Add. ms 18597, 28 February 1624.

⁹⁷ On the Spanish opinion that Buckingham had been the biggest obstacle to the negotiations during his presence in Madrid in 1623, see AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 50, Meeting of the Council of State, 27 November 1623. See also, *Narrative*, pp. 251-54.

⁹⁸ Samuel R. Gardiner (ed.), 'The Earl of Bristol's Defence of his Negotiations in Spain', *Camden Miscellany*, Vol. VI (London: Camden Society, 1871), pp. 1-56.

For a time, the English ambassador had appeared to be right in his hopes that the conclusion of the union was forthcoming. Pope Gregory XV's dispensation had arrived in Madrid on 4 May 1623 and despite the delays created by the Pope's death in early July, King James and the Privy Council had sworn to observe the marriage articles agreed with the King of Spain on 20 July.⁹⁹ Moreover, on 24 November, the Spanish court received a letter from Rome from the new Pope, Urban VIII, confirming the dispensation granted by his predecessor and giving his blessing for the union between the Prince of Wales and the Spanish Infanta.¹⁰⁰

Once the date was set for the ceremony to take place, on 9 December, Prince Charles revoked the proxy left in Madrid with Bristol and stated very clearly that the Earl was not to proceed unless he was given written permission by the Prince himself to do so. At least formally, however, the door for a successful conclusion of the Habsburg-Stuart union was still open in early 1624, as in November 1623 Charles had agreed to have the proxy prolonged until March of the following year.¹⁰¹ This may have just been a diplomatic move by the Prince who did not want to appear as the one who broke the marriage treaty with Spain. It was crucial to first have the approval of Parliament in order to obtain the necessary supply for a war against the Catholic Monarchy.

Even if he formally prolonged the legal value of the proxy, Charles had already planned to gain support through Parliament for a declaration of war, therefore legitimising his action in light of the higher good of the Commonwealth. Regardless of the Prince's and the Duke's 'true' intentions upon their return from Madrid, I believe that the formality of the marriage negotiations and the façade maintained by both parties counted as much as the internal workings, behind-the-scenes, of the marriage

⁹⁹ *Narrative*, p. 213 and p. 247; Elliott, *The Count Duke of Olivares*, p. 208.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

¹⁰¹ TNA, SP 108/543, 14/24 November 1623. See also *Narrative*, p. 268.

diplomacy, at least as far as public perceptions were concerned. It is therefore misleading to conclude that the negotiations for the dynastic union had completely collapsed once Charles and Buckingham left Madrid in September 1623 because they could not get binding guarantees for the restoration of the Palatinate,¹⁰² or because of the cultural humiliation they had suffered at the Spanish court.¹⁰³

Not only were the Spanish treaties discussed in detail during the 1624 Parliament, but also the East India Company and the Virginia Company were subjected to intense scrutiny.¹⁰⁴ The chartered Companies' interests were intrinsically connected to both domestic and foreign politics. In the case of the Virginia Company, for example, in the 1610s and 1620s the tobacco trade was extensively discussed within and outside Parliament. The crucial issue was whether Spanish tobacco could be prohibited in favour of tobacco produced in the English colonies. This was considered a viable option by many, which explains the circulation of pamphlets that illustrate the practicalities of growing tobacco in England and condemning the use of Spanish tobacco.¹⁰⁵ Others, however, commented that such a proposition was detrimental to England's relationship with Spain due to the 1604 peace agreement guaranteeing free trade between the two countries, and could therefore jeopardise the dynastic union.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Pursell, 'The end of the Spanish Match', pp. 702-3. Pursell has argued that the very fact that when in Madrid the Prince of Wales was unable to obtain binding guarantees from Philip regarding restitution for his sister and brother-in-law was the main reason for Charles's return empty-handed to England from the Spanish capital, and for the annulment of the marriage proxy that he had left behind just a few days before.

¹⁰³ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 99.

¹⁰⁴ BL, Add. ms 46191, Diary of Nathaniel Rich, 26 February 1624.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, [C. T.], *An aduice how to plant tobacco in England and how to bring it to colour and perfection, to whom it may be profitable, and to whom harmful. The vertues of the hearbe in generall, as well in the outward application as taken in fume. With the danger of the Spanish tobacco* (London, 1615). I would like to thank Misha Ewen and her IHR paper on 18 May 2015 for explaining the complexities of tobacco trade in the early seventeenth century.

¹⁰⁶ BL, Add. ms 18597, Diary of Sir Walter Earle, 23 February 1624.

To this objection, Edwin Sandys answered during the 1621 Parliament that there was no trading of Spanish tobacco when the Treaty of London was signed and therefore the treaty was not binding on the issue.¹⁰⁷ It appears that individuals within the Companies were in conflict with each other as they had different opinions with regard to royal policy to be implemented concerning Spanish commodities in the early 1620s.¹⁰⁸

The war of diversion wished for by some MPs in 1621 and 1624 had different connotations than its Elizabethan antecedent. In the last period of her reign, Queen Elizabeth had been in constant conflict with Philip II's Spain and therefore the possibility of further battles outside of Europe was considered in the context of a wide-ranging effort against the Catholic Monarchy. In 1621 and 1624, proposals by MPs for a the war of diversion must be seen instead as a direct consequence of the increasing power of the East India Company, which had begun to challenge the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies, and the creation of permanent settlements in North America, which challenged Spanish claims.

In 1621, some MPs asked James to consider attacking Spain in the West Indies, where Spanish gold came from, rather than fighting the Duke of Bavaria in the hope of obtaining the restoration of the Palatinate.¹⁰⁹ James dissolved Parliament to prevent MPs from jeopardising the dynastic negotiations by demanding, among other requests, Crown-sanctioned conflict in the Indies. By 1624, however, the increasing number of conflicting episodes in the East and West Indies proved too much to continue pursuing a parallel marriage agreement with the Spanish Habsburgs in Europe.

¹⁰⁷ Andrew Thrush, 'Sir Edwin Sandys (1561-1629)', *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1604-1629*, eds. Andrew Thrush and John P. Ferris (2010).

¹⁰⁸ Wesley Frank Craven, *The Dissolution of the Virginia Company. The failure of a Colonial Experiment* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 310.

¹⁰⁹ Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution*, p. 72. Craven, *The Dissolution of the Virginia Company*, p. 28. On the war of diversion called for already during the 1621 Parliament, see also Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, pp. 30-32.

5.3 The Council of State in Madrid

Early on during the Prince and the Duke's stay in Madrid, Olivares was presented with the unpalatable truth that Charles had not come to the Spanish capital to convert. Even after this discovery, Spanish correspondence is filled with evidence of preparations for the wedding to take place, both in terms of the Council of State deciding on who was to accompany the Infanta to England and with regard to logistics and practicalities for the actual ceremony. For example, various letters in the Archivo de Indias in Seville detail the payment for individuals who took care of lights or other decorative elements not only for the entrance of the Prince of Wales in Madrid in March 1623, but also for the marriage itself.¹¹⁰ Despite the wedding never taking place, it is clear that advanced preparations were being made in Madrid even after Prince Charles's declaration that he had not travelled to Madrid to convert and his return to London.

In the Council of State, many members agreed that the marriage should be concluded as soon as possible even if the Prince of Wales had decided to wait for his father's approval before giving his consent to the new conditions required by the Pope.¹¹¹ Only one disagreed - the Count-Duke of Olivares. While recognising that the union between the Prince and the Infanta María was an event of extraordinary importance, Olivares believed that the marriage would bring honour to the King of Spain only if the greatest benefit for the Catholic religion could be achieved.

Significantly, Olivares considered one of the most important advantages to be gained by a union with England the fact that an alliance with the Stuart monarchy 'would

¹¹⁰ AGI, Indiferente General, 428, L.35, fols. 244-245 and f. 254. The marriage agreement included an article concerning the celebration of the marriage in both London and Madrid. See also, TNA, SP 94/26, f.23, Bristol to Calvert, Madrid, 9 February 1623.

¹¹¹ *Narrative*, p. 220.

resuscitate Your Majesty's kingdoms from the constrained position in which they are'.¹¹² The Count-Duke was not only referring to Europe, which was instead mentioned separately when expressing his belief that an alliance between Spain and England would be more powerful than any other European forces combined, but he was including instead the Catholic Monarchy's overseas possessions. Olivares considered that those would be the first to benefit from a dynastic union with England.

The Count-Duke's position was not one of absolute rejection of the union with the Stuart monarchy. Instead, the royal favourite believed that a dynastic marriage was not necessary as Spain and England had a community of interests within and outside Europe that would allow them to continue their friendship and alliance regardless of the success of the match between Prince Charles and the Infanta María.¹¹³ Olivares, however, had not taken into account the possibility that in Madrid the Council of State itself would link the outcome of the dynastic union with the current situation in the East and West Indies.

Already in January 1623, the Earl of Bristol had written to Calvert that, in order to create a full report on the taking of Hormuz and formulate demands for reparation, King Philip IV had gathered a committee composed of the Marques of Montesclaros, the Count of Gondomar, and Mendo da Mota, member of the Council of Portugal. Aside from discussing the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf, the committee was also to provide information on English trade in the East Indies and the extent to which the English East India Company could share commerce there with the Portuguese.¹¹⁴ It was

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹¹³ *Narrative*, p. 222; Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 210; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 107.

¹¹⁴ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 6, Bristol to Calvert, 12/22 January 1623.

feared by Bristol that the Portuguese would insist on reparation for Hormuz as part of the final negotiations for the marriage between Charles and the Infanta. Bristol was right. The Council of Portugal did ask Madrid to include, among the temporal articles, provisions regarding trade in the East Indies.¹¹⁵

In August 1623, the Marques of Montesclaros expressed his opinion concerning the marriage negotiations with England and the current situation in the East Indies.¹¹⁶ According to Montesclaros, the report received from the Council of Portugal following the loss of Hormuz was a clear sign that the Portuguese expected Spain to take the *status quo* in the Indies into consideration when settling the temporal articles of the marriage agreement with England.¹¹⁷ Did the Council of Portugal's pressures for a solution to be reached concerning the East Indies directly influence the end of the marriage diplomacy?

It appears that while English envoys had already sent news to London in early May confirming that the temporal articles of the marriage contract were agreed upon, the Spanish Council of State was instead considering the Portuguese proposal of re-opening the discussion to include provisions concerning the situation of the Iberian monarchy in the East. This is further proof not only of the importance of the Indies in the dialectic between Spain and Portugal during the union of the crowns, but also of the firm connection made by the European countries involved in the dynastic diplomacy between the wellbeing of their overseas empire and the conclusion of the marriage negotiations.

Still in 1624, some in the Council of State in Madrid as well as the viceroy in the East Indies believed that England would help in retaking Hormuz as a consequence of

¹¹⁵ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of State, 19 August 1623. See Appendix E.

¹¹⁶ See chp. III for a discussion of the Council of State's proceedings and the different members' opinions on the Infanta's dowry following the taking of Hormuz.

¹¹⁷ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623. See Appendix E.

the successful dynastic marriage. Thus, as proven by letters arriving from Madrid as well as from correspondence between Bristol and Calvert, the taking of Hormuz was not secondary when discussing the dynastic union but instead it was fundamental. Hormuz was discussed alongside the ‘businesses in Germany’ as something to be solved through the marriage articles between Charles and the Infanta. Only once the dynastic alliance definitively failed in the second half of 1624, did it become clear that a different solution was needed to improve the Iberian situation in the East Indies.

By the end of 1624, the possibility of solving the difficulties of the Portuguese East Indies thanks to the Anglo-Spanish marriage diplomacy had vanished. Moreover, neither Castile nor Portugal had the financial resources to send further help to the East. Therefore, an old idea, that Ambassador Gondomar had strongly supported during the reign of Philip III and especially after the taking of Hormuz, resurfaced.¹¹⁸ The proposal to create a Portuguese trading company similar to the Dutch and the English East India Companies was reconsidered and finally accomplished in 1628.¹¹⁹

The same solution had been proposed for the West Indies by Anthony Sherley, in his work *Peso político de todo el mundo* dedicated to the Count-Duke of Olivares in 1622. Sherley considered the importance for the Iberian monarchy of protecting its maritime trade against the intrusion of the English and the Dutch and proposed, as a possible solution, the creation of chartered companies that would have the monopoly between Spain and the West Indies in order to reduce smuggling.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Peter Thomas Rooney, ‘The Habsburg Government of Portugal in the Reign of Philip IV’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Keele University, 1988), p. 155.

¹¹⁹ A. R. Disney, ‘The First Portuguese India Company, 1628-33’, *Economic History Review*, 30 (1977), 242-258 (p. 242).

¹²⁰ Anthony Sherley, *Peso Político de todo el mundo* (1625) (Madrid, CSCI, 1961), pp. 90-91. See Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia Hispano-Inglesa*, pp. 57-58.

5.4 The end of the negotiations

In 1623 and 1624 all grievances concerning past and present rivalries in the West and East Indies came together. On the one hand, this was due, as mentioned above, to the long time needed for the information regarding any events happening overseas to arrive to Europe. This meant that reports concerning the events at Hormuz between January and May 1622 only arrived in the Spanish capital in early 1623,¹²¹ and the information on the incident with the Dutch at the Spice Islands in 1623 only reached James's ears at the beginning of the following year.¹²²

On the other hand, Charles's presence in Madrid in 1623 clearly contributed to various agents - private individuals, ambassadors, the East India Company, and the King of Spain - considering him as the perfect intermediary to ensure that justice would be made and reparation granted. Due to the ongoing marriage negotiations, the King of England's intervention in answer to petitions and requests for reparation that followed episodes of conflict in the East and West Indies was crucial in order to maintain the 'bond of amitie between his Majestie and his deare brother of Spain'.¹²³

As a result, Prince Charles's presence in the Spanish capital produced a number of requests for restitution once the news of English participation in the recent attack against the Portuguese fortress of Hormuz arrived in Europe. Additionally, old quarrels concerning Raleigh's attack on St. Thomé in 1618 came to light again as Charles was then expected to be more willing to listen to complaints originating from the Spanish court.

¹²¹ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 32, Meeting of the Council of State, 26 April 1623.

¹²² Chancey, 'The Amboyna Massacre', p. 583.

¹²³ TNA, SP 14/151, f. 51, Conway to Calvert, Beaulieu, 22 August 1623.

On 26 June 1623 Buckingham wrote to King James from Madrid asking for his intervention in answer to one Francisco Davila's petition.¹²⁴ Davila had petitioned Prince Charles stating that he had been robbed of his possessions when Raleigh had attacked the Spanish settlement in Guyana in 1618, which was against the peace agreement between England and Spain.¹²⁵ Therefore, Davila was hoping to obtain compensation from the King of England by asking the Prince of Wales to act as intermediary.

By referring to King James's reputation as a just King, Davila was asking in 1623 compensation for Raleigh's attack in 1618. As the marriage negotiations were then close to a conclusion, Charles was in the Spanish capital, and the dispensation had been granted, Buckingham asked the King of England to take the business into serious consideration and enclosed in his letter a translation of Davila's petition.¹²⁶ While an individual petition might not have mattered much at any other time, in 1623 it assumed a very different value as English diplomats were hoping for incidents happening in the Indies not to alter the course of the marriage negotiations.¹²⁷

The rivalry in the East that characterised the triangular relationship among England, the Iberian Monarchy, and the United Provinces between 1622 and 1624 should not be considered in isolation but rather in dialogue with previous clashes between European powers. In 1618, Raleigh's death sentence had consequences and repercussions beyond the personal interests of the rulers involved. In December 1618, the Marques of

¹²⁴ TNA, SP 94/27, f. 27, Buckingham to King James, Madrid, 16/26 June 1623. On Davila's previous attempt to obtain compensation, see BPR, II/2191, doc. 22, Philip III to Gondomar, 29 March 1620.

¹²⁵ TNA, SP 94/27, fols. 29-32, Petition of Francis Davila, and translation, June 1623. See also HL, HM 60032.

¹²⁶ See Appendix H.

¹²⁷ TNA, SP 94/26, f. 4, Letters from Madrid, Madrid, 12/22 January 1623.

Alenquer had sent a letter from Lisbon to Philip III stating that the King of England had ‘cut off the head of Walter Raleigh because he had ascended the Orinoco and broke war in Trinidad’.¹²⁸ In the same letter, Alenquer reported that he had sent a fleet to the East Indies in the area of Jasques, Surat, and Hormuz since various English ships were around and it was dangerous that they were stationed there without control.

The connection between Raleigh’s journey to the West Indies and the commercial rivalry in the East during the marriage negotiations was not limited to Alenquer’s letter. The Iberian monarchy had indeed begun to consider rivalry in both the East and West Indies as a concerted and holistic effort by various European powers against its primacy. The dynastic union with England was a possible solution against a pan-European anti-Spanish league.

In 1623, Raleigh’s execution was mentioned again following the taking of Hormuz when some members of the Spanish Council of State proposed that the perpetrators of the attack on the Portuguese territory in the Persian Gulf would suffer the same punishment as Walter Raleigh.¹²⁹ Being aware of the negative attitude of most of the English public towards Spain and hoping to safeguard the dynastic negotiations with England, Gondomar sought to mitigate their opinion by convincing the Council not to ask for a similar punishment to that imposed on Walter Raleigh for the members of the East India Company who had attacked the Portuguese port. The King of England had already demonstrated his commitment towards the Anglo-Spanish Match when executing Raleigh ‘who wanted to conquer the land of Guyana’ in 1618.¹³⁰ Moreover,

¹²⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 437, doc. 184: ‘[...] A Ser Gualterrale el que quiso entrar por el rio Orinoco, y rompio la Guerra en la Trinidad, le hizo cortar la caueca el Rey de Inglaterra’.

¹²⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623.

¹³⁰ AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated.

continued the Spanish ambassador, Captain North had also been punished by King of James when attempting the same against Iberian territories two years later.¹³¹

For the same reasons that it was unadvisable for the Iberian monarchy to antagonise England, it was also counterproductive for the Dutch to push the English in the East beyond the limits of what they were willing to endure in the light of the United Provinces's long-term strategy of weakening the Iberian monarchy both in Europe and in its overseas dominions. It is therefore crucial to recognise the impact of the Amboyna incident on European diplomacy, not only between the two parties involved, the English and the Dutch, but also in the wider European balance of power.

Once the 1619 treaty had been broken, it was likely that James would look at Portugal for an alliance in the East Indies and continue pursuing a dynastic alliance with Spain in Europe. Not only was the Council of Portugal very keen to negotiate such an agreement with England since the late 1610s¹³² but also an Anglo-Iberian alliance in the East would complement the marriage agreement being negotiated in Europe. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ambassador Carleton believed that by declaring themselves open enemies of England in the East Indies, the Dutch had inadvertently encouraged James to conclude the agreement with Spain, even when many in the political nation doubted that the union would bring any advantages to England.¹³³

These events taking place far away from both London and Madrid may appear to be quite distant from the daily concerns of European sovereigns. Yet the news arrived in Europe at a very delicate and crucial period of the marriage negotiations, when each

¹³¹ Ibid.; See chp. II above.

¹³² AGS, E., 2516, doc. 10; Rooney, 'The Habsburg Government', pp. 153-54.

¹³³ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, Carleton to the Duke of Buckingham, s.d. [1624].

side was intent to negotiate a dynastic union while also dealing with the Thirty Years' War and administering opposition at home. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the reputation as well as the financial stability of European rulers strongly depended on their ability to defend and enlarge their overseas possessions.¹³⁴ In fact, the difficulties created for the Portuguese by the taking of Hormuz and the rivalry between the Dutch and the English in the East Indies were tied to the long-running debate on commercial companies that ignited the English Parliament in 1621 and 1624 and to the doubts regarding the ability of the Iberian Monarchy to defend its imperial possessions in the light of the economic crisis of the 1620s.¹³⁵

According to various MPs, a major cause of the financial crisis was the 'decay of trade' which was in turn caused by chartered companies and their 'patents of monopolizing of trade'.¹³⁶ The downside of such monopolies was that the profit arrived in the hands of only a few individuals and was therefore detrimental to domestic production.¹³⁷ While in the past exports exceeded imports, in the early 1620s, the situation was reversed and the trading Companies were chosen as scapegoats.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ See Games, *The Web of Empire*, p. 8; Cooper and Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire*, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500- 1640', *The American Historical Review* (112) 2007, 1359-1385 (p. 1359, and pp. 1377-78).

¹³⁵ H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'The General Crisis of the 17th century', *P&P*, 16 (1959), 31-64 (pp. 48-51 and 54-55); Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, 'Spain and the seventeenth century crisis in Europe: some final considerations', in *The Castilian Crisis of the seventeenth century. New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of seventeenth-century Spain*, eds. I. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 301-21 (p. 314); Helen Rawlings, *The Debate on the Decline of Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 45; Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis. War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 254.

¹³⁶ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, 24 February 1624, *CJ*, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/12.

¹³⁷ Proceedings of the 1624 Parliament, Diary of Sir Nathaniel Rich, BL, Add. Ms 46,191, f. 4.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

In a period when the real and definitive news was often replaced by wishful thinking,¹³⁹ it was common that misleading assumptions about certain events would spread within the political nation. For example, the belief that it was not possible for the English to have contributed to the taking of Hormuz,¹⁴⁰ or that King James would certainly decide to break the treaties with Spain after the Habsburg further attacked his son-in-law's territories.¹⁴¹ In the case of negotiations for the Spanish Match, the arrival of the news from the fringes of the empires in 1623 and 1624, created the foundation for the failure of the marriage diplomacy that many hoped for, both in London and Madrid.¹⁴² Added to this was the Spanish resentment for Walter Raleigh's expedition in 1618 and new territorial claims caused by the Thirty Years' War.

The great distance that separates the territories taken into consideration is essential in order to grasp some of the dynamics that are often left in the background, such as the difficulties in communication between the metropolis and overseas territories. During Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana, Sherley commented that it was crucial to delegate decision power to local Governors instead of maintaining it exclusively in Madrid. According to Sherley, if power was given to the Spanish King's agents in the West Indies, 'within two or three years neither Virginia nor the Bermudas nor any rebels or trace of them would be left in the Indies'.¹⁴³ Moreover, precisely 'the distance between Hormuz and Goa and between Goa and Lisbon prevented the timely completion of the orders of the viceroy and the king'.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Pettegree, *Invention of the News*, p. 3; Coast, *News and Rumour*, p. 154.

¹⁴⁰ BPR, II/2198, doc. 27, Don Carlos Coloma to Philip IV, 1 November 1622.

¹⁴¹ On this, see the opinion of the Venetian envoy already in 1620, *CSPVen*, vol. 16, Girolamo Lando to the Doge and Senate, 8 October 1620.

¹⁴² See Breslow, *A Mirror of England*, p. 75.

¹⁴³ *Raleigh's last voyage*, p. 141.

¹⁴⁴ Luis Gil Fernández, 'Ormuz pendant l'union dynastique du Portugal et de l'Espagne (1582-1622)', in Couto and Loureiro (eds.), *Revisiting Hormuz*, pp. 177-90 (p. 188). See also BNP, Reservados, Codice 1976, f. 149r where the great distance between India and Portugal is mentioned.

Throughout his reign, and once more in his opening speech for the 1624 Parliament, King James expressed his desire to ‘settle the peace in Christendom’.¹⁴⁵ Between 1623 and 1624, negotiations for the marriage of Charles and the Infanta were deeply entangled with concerns in the Indies and so was the peace in Christendom. In fact, it was not possible to maintain peaceful relations in Europe without taking into account the increasingly complex links and ever-growing interest that countries had overseas, both with each other and with local powers in the Indies.

I have argued that when discussing the rapidity of the shift between an Anglo-Spanish dynastic union to a war against Spain, we must consider the events that had recently happened in the East and West Indies. The news of the taking of Hormuz by the East India Company and the ‘massacre’ at Amboyna perpetrated by the Dutch further complicated the situation of stalemate created by the arrival of Prince Charles in Madrid. These most recent incidents were used by the Spanish as a pretext to create a long-term narrative of English deceit in threatening Iberian possessions, as they had already begun to do in regard to Walter Raleigh’s actions in 1618.

The incident at Amboyna itself was ascribed by the Iberian Monarchy to England’s wrong choice of allying with the Dutch at the expense of the Catholic powers.¹⁴⁶ It was inevitable, according to the Spanish ambassador, that such an alliance would bring disastrous consequences. Thus, an imperfect triangular relationship was created between the English, the Spanish, and the Dutch. An alliance between the latter and the English could only work at the expense of the Iberian Monarchy and the recent rivalry between the English and the Dutch had briefly resulted in the reinforcement of James’s efforts to

¹⁴⁵ TNA, SP 14/159, f. 98, The King’s speech on the opening of Parliament, London, 19 February 1624.

¹⁴⁶ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, docs. 83 and 84.

obtain a marriage alliance with Philip IV.¹⁴⁷ These multifaceted and complex dynamics only surface when enlarging the traditional lens through which we look at the Spanish Match to encompass European borders and include episodes of competition in the West and East Indies.

In Madrid, the members of the Council of State agreed in 1624 that attacks on the Iberian monarchy overseas possessions had costed them losses and disadvantages in the previous years *as if* they were at war with England. The peace was therefore only *pretended* ('fingida') and not real.¹⁴⁸ It was purposeless to maintain a peace during which the Iberian monarchy had to defend itself in the Indies without declaring an open war only because of the negotiations for a dynastic union with the Stuarts.

Since the end of the 1610s and especially at the beginning of the 1620s, conflict in the Indies had been a way to make war without formally declaring it. Rivalry in the Indies helped to cause the end of the marriage diplomacy. The failure of the dynastic union, which had been negotiated with various ups and downs since the beginning of the seventeenth century was accompanied by the collapse of the alliance on which it was based, the 1604 Treaty of London. Once the marriage alliance with England, which had been connected by both parties to increased profits and security in overseas trade since the beginning, was aborted, the alliance between the two countries decreased in value and England declared war against Spain.

In 1623-1624, the two spheres, that of European diplomacy and that of imperial conflict outside of Europe, could not be kept separate any longer when imperial claims on contested territories together with petitions for restitution negatively affected the

¹⁴⁷ *CSPCol., East*, vol. 4, Carleton to the Duke of Buckingham, s.d. [1624].

¹⁴⁸ AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 83, Meeting of the Council of State, Madrid, 8 July 1624.

outcome of the marriage negotiations. Such a negative outcome was satirically portrayed in Thomas Middleton's *A Game at Chess* in 1624. As noted by Gary Taylor in his edition of the play, Middleton 'manages to stage invisibility'.¹⁴⁹ Taylor is referring to the absence of a player moving the black (Spain) and white (England) chess pieces impersonating the protagonists of the marriage diplomacy. Who is moving them? I have argued that events happening far away from Europe's diplomatic centres decisively affected the marriage negotiations between Prince Charles and Infanta María on several occasions.

Raleigh and his crew during their voyage to Guyana, the East India Company attacking Hormuz, and the factors residing in Amboyna were more than pieces to be moved on the global chessboard according to the desire of the King of England and the Iberian sovereign to achieve an advantageous dynastic union. They were 'players not just executants',¹⁵⁰ with their own interests and goals concerning the high levels of politics. Therefore, by inverting the traditional hierarchy, we can consider those increasingly conflicting events in the East and West Indies as the players deciding the game at chess between England and Spain in 1617-1624, rather than as tangential episodes happening in the background.

¹⁴⁹ Gary Taylor (ed.), 'A Game at Chess: An Early Form', in *Thomas Middleton. The Collected Works* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 1828.

¹⁵⁰ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 254. Here Mattingly is referring to resident ambassadors in the early modern period but I believe his definition fits as well those agents enacting imperial interests in the early seventeenth century.

CONCLUSION

In his book on the Thirty Years' War, Geoffrey Parker stated that 'the course of European diplomacy in the 1620s is littered with repudiated negotiations and unratified treaties.'¹ The argument of this thesis has been that such negotiations and treaties must be understood as part of a wider global context which played a prominent role in the European dynastic politics of the early seventeenth century. In the case of the Anglo-Spanish Match between Prince Charles and the Infanta María, the negotiations were affected by Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana, the East India Company's attack on Hormuz, and the incident at Amboyna. These episodes combined contributed to the end of the marriage diplomacy in very pragmatic and discernible terms.

The thesis has shown that Raleigh's expedition was used by Spanish diplomats to ask for strong measures to be taken to protect the ongoing negotiations for the dynastic union. Moreover, the taking of Hormuz re-opened discussions on the dowry to be brought with the Infanta to England, and the incident at Amboyna urged King James to pursue the marriage agreement with an even stronger commitment at a time when most of his political nation was instead calling for a breaking of the treaties with Spain. As the news of the Dutch executions in the Spice Islands only arrived in 1624, this study has argued that the marriage was still deemed possible by King James and some members of the Privy Council after Charles and Buckingham's return from the Spanish capital.

¹ Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 43. See also, Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy*, p. 98.

The answers we get are always shaped by the questions we ask. If we agree that the negotiations failed in 1624 rather than in 1623 following Charles and Buckingham's journey to Madrid, the answer to why the marriage diplomacy failed cannot be religion - as Charles and the Infanta believed in two different confessions from the start and Charles ended up marrying a French Catholic bride - nor the Palatinate - as war had started in 1618 and Frederick had accepted the Bohemian crown already in 1619, while the union continued to be negotiated until the first half of 1624.

There are three intertwined areas in which this thesis has brought scholarship forward. First, King James I was not 'the wisest fool in Christendom' in pursuing a policy of appeasement with Spain but instead was conscious of the importance of maintaining peace in Europe and overseas.² The King of England tried to achieve his long-term goal through dynastic unions for his children. Thanks to his daughter Elizabeth's marriage with the Elector Palatine and the hope of a union between his son Charles and the Spanish Infanta María, James aspired to maintain peace by counterbalancing opposing powers in Europe.

This study has gone one step further. I have demonstrated that James was as careful in trying to avoid conflict with his main competitors in the Americas, which is to say Spain, and in the East, which is to say Portugal and the Dutch, as he was in acting as a peacemaker in Europe. The King of England proved to be aware of the effects of global events on his dynastic politics on more than one occasion: for example, when executing Raleigh as promised to the Spanish ambassador and when signing an agreement with the Dutch for the sharing of trade in the East. Indeed, the King of England was able to

² William McElwee, *The Wisest Fool in Christendom. The Reign of King James I and VI* (London: Faber and Faber, 1958). For an outline of scholarship depicting James as an inept King, see Patterson, *The Reunion of Christendom*, p. 361, fn. 109.

adjust his actions to rapidly changing circumstances, as in the case of accepting a 'donation' from the East India Company following the attack on Portuguese Hormuz. This also contributes to the idea that James was not a weak ruler subservient to the will of a powerful Spanish ambassador. Instead, the King of England and the Count of Gondomar shared the goal of a union between England and Spain and cooperated to achieve it.³

Second, by looking outside of Europe, this thesis has proven that King Philip III and Philip IV were ready to leave aside their role as most Catholic Kings in order to protect Iberian possessions in the East and the West Indies. While various theologians advised the Spanish sovereigns of the dangers that would follow a marriage with a heretic, for twenty years they were ready to negotiate a union with Protestant England, especially if, as a consequence, the English would help protect Portuguese territories in the East and prevent further settlements in the Americas.

Neither James nor the Iberian Kings, however, were able to maintain a close watch on events happening so far away from their courts because of the long time needed for any correspondence to arrive, the private interests of commercial companies not always committed to following the Crown's policies or agreements ratified in Europe, and especially because of pre-existing indigenous powers who played European countries against each other to gain profit in trade and territorial acquisitions.⁴

Third, this study has crucially highlighted the practical effects that rivalry outside Europe had on the terms of the marriage negotiations and the delays of the dynastic diplomacy. Raleigh's expedition in 1617-1618 was intended to break off the ongoing discussions for a union with the Spanish Habsburgs. Following Raleigh's failure to find

³ See Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 266; Redworth, 'Sarmiento de Acuña', *ODNB*.

⁴ Craven, *The Dissolution of the Virginia Company*, p. 310.

gold, his execution was an attempt by King James to safeguard the chances of an Anglo-Spanish match. The East India Company's participation in the taking of Hormuz made the Iberian King painfully aware of the difficulties of protecting the *Estado da Índia*. As a consequence, the Council of Portugal asked for a solution regarding trade in the East to be included among the temporal articles of the marriage treaty between England and Spain, as well as reparations for Hormuz to be taken from the Infanta's dowry. Lastly, the incident at Amboyna worsened relations between England and its traditional Dutch ally to the point that James appeared again committed to the union with Spain in early 1624, when many had already started to side with Charles and Buckingham for a declaration of war instead.

The Count-Duke of Olivares stated in 1630 that it was exclusively thanks to him that the negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish marriage had failed.⁵ While certainly the agency of individuals such as Olivares, the Duke of Buckingham, and the sovereigns involved contributed to the eventual failure of the marriage diplomacy, it is misleading to ascribe the end of the negotiations to any singular person or issue.

Previous scholarship has attributed the end of the negotiations to either religion or the Palatinate issue. Scholars who have argued that religion was the main reason for the failure of the Spanish match have stated that the marriage diplomacy was just a long process of misunderstandings due to two quintessentially different religions and cultures.⁶ Most certainly, religion played a crucial role as it is undeniable that both King James and the Iberian sovereigns had concerns regarding their role as protectors of their respective confessions in Europe.

⁵ Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, p. 207; Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 103.

⁶ Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*. See Cross, 'Pretense and Perception', pp. 565-66.

Other historians have emphasised the centrality of the restitution of the Palatinate as the central cause for the failure of the marriage agreement between 1623 and 1624. Indeed, not only did the situation in the Palatinate assume a critical importance during the negotiations between England and Spain following the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and Frederick V's acceptance of the Crown of Bohemia, but in fact Charles tied his desire to leave Madrid in 1623 to Philip IV's rejection to link the marriage agreement to the restoration of the Palatinate.⁷ To assess whether this link was real or rather an excuse to cover the humiliation of having failed to bring back the Infanta from Madrid in 1623, was beyond the scope of this study.

While I agree that the two issues mentioned above, religion and the Palatinate, played a significant role in the eventual failure of the Spanish Match, this thesis has argued that one crucial aspect, that of the increasing extra-European rivalry between the parties at play, has been overlooked in previous historiography on the end of the marriage diplomacy. Only by looking at the subject on a global scale does the importance of this perspective become clear, especially when addressing the final period of the negotiations between 1617 and 1624. In the 1610s and 1620s, Europeans became aware that those they considered 'new worlds' were in fact strongly entangled with policies carried out in the 'old' continent.⁸ It was neither solely religion nor the Palatinate but instead the practical consequences of increasing rivalry in the Indies that brought the negotiations to an abrupt end in 1624.

Between 1604 and 1624, European powers had signed several agreements to regulate their respective areas of influence overseas. These treaties functioned as an intermediary between European diplomacy and events in the East and West Indies. At times,

⁷ Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', p. 702.

⁸ On intersections between the local and the global and between Europe and other worlds in the early modern period, see Amélia Polónia, 'Global Interactions', Mukherjee (ed.), *Networks*, p. 265.

European diplomacy met with the consequences of the failure of such agreements, as in the case of Raleigh's attack on St Thomé, the taking of Hormuz by the East India Company, and the Amboyna incident. When this happened, intra-European treaties, such as the marriage contract between Charles and the Infanta, attempted to solve conflict by binding the parties to cooperate in the Indies as well as within the European court where the new couple would reside.

The time restrictions that characterise any doctorate, and this joint European PhD in particular, required me to finish this thesis in three years and therefore to limit myself to five chapters. This restricted the study to a short timeframe and a limited number of case-studies. Therefore, it is hard to comment on the extent to which my conclusion - that global events had a significant impact on the end of the Anglo-Spanish match at the beginning of the seventeenth century - can be generalised to cover other dynastic unions.

Thus, these are necessarily provisional conclusions. I believe that further research is needed especially into two important parties that have been underplayed in this work: the Papacy and the Virginia Company. Both are promising avenues of research that I intend to pursue. With regard to the Papacy, in a tract written in 1624 on 'the marriage of the Infanta María with the Prince of Wales', the author considered how the marriage negotiations had taken a very long time from their inception to their failure. Aside from the unexpected death of Prince Henry in 1612, the author found reasons for the delay in Pope Paul V's decision not to grant a dispensation and in Pope Gregory XV's hesitancy

regarding the religious articles of the marriage treaty. Only during the Pontificate of Urban VIII, he concluded, was the dispensation sent to Madrid.⁹

As was the case for the Spanish and English sovereigns, each Pope relied on and listened to the advice of a selected group of theologians in order to decide whether or not it was advantageous for a Spanish Princess to marry the Prince of Wales. Contemporaries appeared well aware of the significance of Papal influence and the role of the theologians in the curia on the developing marriage diplomacy.¹⁰ Thus, I believe it would be fruitful to study in detail the theologians in Rome who contributed to the granting of the dispensation in 1623. They have been largely overlooked as historians have focused on individual Popes rather than on those advising them.

Concerning the Virginia Company, I would like to address in more detail the relation between the dissolution of the Company and the failure of the Anglo-Spanish Match in 1624. Indeed, the end of the marriage negotiations corresponded to the Virginia Company being placed under Crown control during the Parliament of 1624. Historians have advanced several hypotheses as to why the King decided to revoke the Company's charter and the dissolution is often regarded as a direct consequence of the massacre of 1622.¹¹ The complicated and erratic Anglo-Spanish relations between 1623 and 1624, however, appear to have played a crucial role as well. It is likely that looking at the dissolution of the Virginia Company within the context of the end of the marriage negotiations would allow us to draw wider conclusions concerning the relationship between the Crown and chartered companies.

⁹ AGS, E., Leg. 1869.

¹⁰ See for example AGS, E., Libro 369; BL, Add. ms. 46191, f. 4; Samuel R. Gardiner (ed.) *Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords, officially taken by Henry Helsing, clerk of the Parliaments, A.D. 1624 and 1626* (Camden Society, 1879), p. 11.

¹¹ Wesley Frank Craven, *The Dissolution of the Virginia Company. The failure of a Colonial Experiment* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 292.

In 2003, Redworth recognised that it was then possible to study the Anglo-Spanish Match as more than ‘a bilateral relation’.¹² While the author of *The Prince and the Infanta* was referring to the heterogeneity within the governments at London and Madrid, this study, by multiplying the parties at play, has demonstrated the complexity of that relation which at no point can any longer be considered as bilateral.

Ultimately, by considering a European dynastic union within its global context, this thesis has shown the extent to which the early modern world was connected by multilayered relations. Clearly, it is hard to reconstruct the extent to which each of these relations individually contributed to the eventual failure of marriage diplomacy. It is undeniable, however, that the three episodes discussed in this thesis played a significant role in the end of the Anglo-Spanish Match in 1624.

The work has contributed to the scholarly awareness that Europe should not be discussed in isolation from the rest of the world in the early seventeenth century.¹³ Not even the quintessentially European marriage negotiations between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta of Spain can be understood by only looking within the borders of the Old World. It goes without saying that this work does not intend to be the last word on the topic but rather aims at contributing to ongoing debates on early modern diplomacy and global connectedness. The thesis has demonstrated that any attempt to reconstruct the composite scenario of the last period of the Anglo-Spanish Match negotiations must take into account its global context. Indeed, by enlarging the geographical focus of our enquiries, different answers are steadily emerging to well-known questions and perhaps

¹² Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta*, p. 5.

¹³ See Coudert, ‘Orientalism in Early Modern Europe?’, p. 752.

this will ultimately lead to a rethinking of the categories in which early modern European diplomacy was played out.

Appendices

Appendix A

TNA, SP 14/90, ff.65-66

**Archbishop Abbot to Sir Thomas Roe
Lambeth, 20 January 1617**

In this letter, to be found among the State Papers domestic of James I's reign, the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot, writes to Sir Thomas Roe, English Ambassador in India. The missive testifies to the importance of gathering information from the East Indies as events happening there are considered to be of crucial importance for European sovereigns.
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(f.65r)

Good Sir Thomas

I have received two letters from you, the one of January, the other of February last, by both w.ch I perceive how mindefull you are of that promise, w.ch before your departure you made onto mee. I thanke you hastily for them, and pray you to continue the same course of advertisements, because thereby wee heere shall bee the better enabled to do service vnto our greate master. For as thinges now stand throughout the whole worlde, there is no place so remote, but that the consideration thereof is mediatly or immediately of consequence to our affaires heere. Not onely for the customes and traficke of merchandize which is the more mechanicke and subservient part, but principally for the wellfare or illfare of the Portugals and the Kinge of Spaine, who is a remarkable Monarcke among those of Christendome. And a man is simple that doth not see, that the kinge of France, the Prince of Italy, and especially the Hollanders our neerest neighbours are the greater or the lesser for the event of those thinges w.ch they or others have in those Eastern parts. What may bee thought of that trade for Persia, I cannot hastily resolve, for there are two maine exceptions at the first, that is the peace concluded by that kinge with the Portugalls, whom hee had certainly ruinated, if it had not bene for the applying of his strength against the Turkish invasion: And the want of a haven commodious to harbour in, whereof although there bee some darke report that there is one to bee found, yet, wee cannot hitherto have certainty thereof. As for Sir Robert Sherley, it hath bene the happe of his fathers children to bee all of them shifters,

to venter on greate matters, and to carry high shewes, and in the end to come to beggery. Sir Thomas the elder brother lyeth heere in the Fleete, for the multitude of his debts

(f.65v)

Sir Anthony in Spaine hath his pension seized, and the greatest part goeth toward his debts, some small portion being assigned unto him, to keepe him onely from starving. Sir Robert Sherley if hee have any religion is a Papist, as appeared when he was at Rome, and being not able to gett one penny out of the Popes purse, hee desired certaine Faculties, Indulgences, Medals, and Agnus Dei to bee bestowed upon him. Those hee obtained, and among them one was, that he had a power to legitimate bastards, of all which hee made use in the Popish partes of Christendome where he passed, openly, and of some of them secretly in England. Being with mee, I did chalenge him for the same, as also in pointe of religion which hee avowed to mee to bee conformable to the Church of England, and layd the faulte for dispersing of the other upon his wife, upon hee acknowledged to mee to bee by profession a Romanist, and told mee that from that time forward, hee would so restraine her, that shee should giue no stand all. In a word you know that hee is an hungry felow, and liveth meerely by his witt, and therefore you are not to marvell at whatsoever hee doth against his Prince, Country, or the religion there professed. I trouble you now no farther, but wish you to rest assured, that in all your occasions amongst us, you shall finde mee louing and respectfull unto you. And so with my best commendations I leave you to the safe keeping of the Almighty. From Lambeth. Jan. 20. 1616 [1617]

Appendix B

AGS, E., Leg. 2598, doc. 36

Jacobo Vadesfort [James Wadsworth]

Madrid, 12 May 1618

This report was written by James Wadsworth, an Englishman who had converted to Catholicism and moved to Madrid. It is today preserved in the Archivo General de Simancas. Wadsworth describes Raleigh's departure and Captain Baily's accusations that he had turned a pirate. The second half of the letter is significant as it explains how many in England believed that Raleigh's second expedition to Guyana would bring very little economic profit to England. In Wadsworth's opinion, England obtained its major economic gain from the East Indies (rather than from the Americas), especially since they had started to make arrangements with the Persians.

Lo que tengo entendido de Don Gualtero Raley despues que partió de yrlanda es que antes que llego a las Yslas Terceras encontró con unos franceses de los quales tomo algun refrescos de vituallas con alguna violencia segun los mismos franceses contaron en San Lucar de Barrameda. Y también despues en una de las yslas saltaron en tierra algunos de los yngleses de dicho esquadron de Don Gualter para tomar agua y otros refrescos en lo qual parece que no guardaron buen termino porque los vezinos dieron sobre ellos pensando que eran cossarios y matandoles (segun dizen) nueve o dies personas. De manera que uno de sus propios capitanes llamado el Capitan Baily volviere a Ynglaterra con su navio a donde publico que Don Gualter segun su proceder mostraa quererse hazer cossario y que por esso el aviale dexado. Pero la muger del dicho Don Gualter y sus amigos y abonadores han sahido diziendo que el dicho Copitan Baily era per una parte revoltoso y por otra que era galina y por esso avia dexado a su General a quien avia rehusado de obedecer y assi le tienen preso por desfamador revoltoso y fugitivo hasta que se averigüe mas el caso. La voz comun es que el Don Gualter va a las partes de Guiana o a qualquier parte de importancia adonde los españoles agora no viven actualmente ni residen con possession personal; porque no hazen caso dela general donacion de los summos pontifices.

Pero lo yngleses mas entendidos piensan que sera empresa como la de Virginea de poco provecho sin el qual tendrá muy pequeño efeto: como quiera no se ha de menospreciar porque lleva catorze o quinze navios y dos mil hombres para saltar en tierra y poblar.

Y sobre todo no se ha de menospreciar el comercio que ya tienen los yngleses en las Indias orientales ni el que agora yo se que buscan con el persiano mas que la otra vez

porque despues aca han hallado que es de grandissimo provecho de manera que es notoriamente el mejor trato y de mayor ganancia que oy dia tienen en ynglaterra y es certissimo que el presente embaxador de ynglaterra ha embiado dos vezes un cavallero muy principal para ganar el embaxador de Persia, a quien parece seria mejor ganarle por aca o buscar como descomponerle. Pero en todo me someto y ofresco mi pobre servicio.

Jacobo Vadesforte

Appendix C

CSPVen, vol. 15¹

Piero Contarini, Venetian Ambassador Extra-ordinary in London to the Doge and Senate
26 October 1618

The Venetian Ambassador Piero Contarini reported to the Doge and the Senate that Walter Raleigh had departed in 1617 with the intention of breaking the alliance between England and Spain. Raleigh was not alone in pursuing this goal of 'rupture' with the Habsburgs, and was in fact supported by some at court; amongst whom, referred to by the Ambassador, was the late Secretary of State, Sir Ralph Winwood.²

Upon the close examination made for the purpose of passing a sentence upon Sir Walter Raleigh, he confessed spontaneously that when he departed hence for the West Indies, some of the leading ministers or members of the Council, disinclined towards Spain and extremely averse to the alliance with the Crown, among whom he mentioned the deceased Secretary Winwood, advised and persuaded him to take every opportunity of attacking the fleets or territories of the King of Spain, so as not only to generate distrust between the two crowns, but even to give cause for rupture. Moreover, M. Desmartez, the late French ambassador at this court, promised him not merely positive permission to withdraw to France, but likewise, in case of any need, he guaranteed him the protection and favour of his most Christian Majesty.

¹ The letter is fully transcribed in *Raleigh's Last Voyage*, pp. 301-302.

² Greengrass, 'Winwood, Sir Ralph', *ODNB*.

Appendix D

King James I to Shah Abbas I 19 March 1621³

King James had frequent correspondence with Muslim rulers in the East.⁴ This letter clearly states the King of England's intention to strengthen his relation with the Persian ruler, Shah Abbas I, in order to gain trading privileges for English merchants. In the letter, sent a year before the East India Company's attack on Hormuz, James complains against the unfair behaviour of the Portuguese whom he accuses of wanting to expel the English from any commerce in the East.

James by the Grace of Almighty God, Creator of Heaven and Earth, King of Great Brittain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Christian Faith

To the High and Mighty Monarch, the Great Lord Abbas Emperor of Persia, Media and Armenia &c. High and Mighty Prince, not long since we directed our princely Letters unto you which were delivered by our Agent Thomas Barker to your Royal Hands, since which time we are advertised that you have not only lovingly received them, but have with all princely regard afforded many princely favors to ours residing within your Dominions and Territories, for which as we cannot omit to render unto you thanks, so we have thought meet to further the Advancement and establishing of this Trade, which upon mature deliberation we foresee (being once settled) will prove of great importance for the behalf of the Subjects of both our Kingdoms and Dominions, yet because no design can be prosecuted much less brought to perfection without many interruptions which do from time to time occur to the prejudice and impeachment thereof.

We have therefore once again addressed our Royal Letters to you, wherein we recommend to your princely consideration not only the furtherance of the Trade in general by accommodation thereof with such privileges and immunity as may most conduce to the advancement of so important a Business, but also certain particularities incident thereto, amongst which one is that the place from whence our Merchants fetch the Silk is so far remote from the Port at Jasques where their Ships come and the carriage of the Silk so far by Land, subject to so many difficulties and dangers, that unless you shall be pleased

³ The original is among the India Office Records at the British Library. The letter is transcribed in Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 'Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf, 1620-1680' (Durham University, Unpublished PhD thesis, 1999), p. 305.

⁴ On King James's correspondence with the Mughal Emperor, see Bodl., Additional ms C132.

to appoint some convenient mart Town near the Port whither our Subjects may resort to buy their silks and speedily put them aboard their Ships, it will not only much indamage and discourage our Merchants in the prosecution of their Trade but to expose their Ships which ride off at Sea expecting their lading, to the attempts of the Portugalls who being ill willers of their Trade seeke, by indirect meanes, to drive our Subjects from all trade in those parts. And other is that our Merchants may have that freedom of Commerce and traffick with your Subjects as is usual among the Subjects of Princes in amity one with another and whereof at present they are restrained. And that the native Commodities of our Kingdoms and such other Merchandizes as our People shall import into your Territories and are useful for your Subjects may be accepted in part of satisfaction for such Silk of your Dominions as our Merchants shall contract for. For the better accommodation of which circumstances, and out of our affection to the prosperity of the trade, we have been pleased to interpose our mediation unto you on the behalf of our Subjects and more particularly to signify that we have appointed and authorised our Trusty Subject and Servant to be our Agent to negotiate with your Royal Person for obtaining such privileges as may be advantageous for your benefit and establishing of that trade and for the removing of all such impedements and redressing of such inconveniences as our Subjects have incountered and may interrupt the prosperous proceeding thereof. Expecting that you will give full credit to our Agent and grant him access to your Royal Person upon all occasions wherein he shall have cause to address himself unto you.

Appendix E

Extracts from AGS, E., Leg. 2645, unfoliated

Both extracts are preserved in the Archivo General de Simancas and report meetings of the Council of State in Madrid in 1623. During the meeting on 5 January, the members of the Council discussed the recently-arrived news of the taking of Hormuz. After considering the opinion of the ambassador extraordinary that those Englishmen guilty of the attack should be punished in the same way as Raleigh was in 1618, Pedro de Toledo, one of the most prominent members of the Council of State, declared that it was unwise to ask such a punishment from King James.

In the second meeting included in this appendix, three members of the Council of State, Pedro de Toledo, the Marquis of Montesclaros, and the Count of Gondomar, expressed their opinions concerning the situation in the Indies following the taking of Hormuz. Crucially, the Marquis of Montesclaros believes that the Council of Portugal's report on the difficult situation of the *Estado da Índia* is meant to encourage the Council of State to include provisions in this regard when agreeing on the final version of the temporal articles for the marriage contract between Charles and the Infanta.

Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid, 5 January 1623

Señor

V.M.d. fue servido de mandar q se viese en el consejo la consulta inclusa del [Consejo] de Portugal y los papeles que con ella binieron que todo trata de la perdida de Ormuz y lo demas que en esto ha passado. Y lo que V.M.d ha sido servido de mandar se escriba a los gobernadores de Portugal en orden a la forma de socorro que se podría enviar luego a la India, para la recuperacion desta plaze y prevencion de lo demas de aquellas partes. Y tambien se ha visto con esta occassion un papel que embio al Secretario Juan de Ciriça el conde de Bristol en que apunta el sentimiento con que esta desta perdida y de haver entendido fuese ayudando a ella navios y Vassallos de su amo. [...] Offrezendo que si se averiguase tener culpa los mercaderes que tienen este comercio que seran castigados muy seberamente como se castigo a Gualtero Rale por lo que cometio en las Indias occidentales. Y habiendo platicado el Consejo sobre esta materia con particular atencion voto come se sigue.

Don Pedro de Toledo [...] castigarlos como el embaxador extraordinario⁵ ofreze no sera remedio eficaz supuesto que no lo sera el castigo. Pues quando se corten algunas cavezas como la de Gualtero Rale quedaron otras muchas contan poco escarimiento

⁵ Pedro de Toledo is here referring to Carlos Coloma, the ambassador extra-ordinary who replaced the Count of Gondomar as Spanish agent in London between April 1622 and October 1624.

dellas como de Gualtero. La an tenido los que han hecho este exceso. Y tambien juzga que pedir al Rey de Inglaterra cosas imposible quitarles el comercio de la seda.

Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid, 19 August 1623

Don Pedro de Toledo: [...] Las cosas de la India las vee en estado que cada dia espera peores nuevas si Inglaterra continua en la confederacion con Olandeses. y si ellos y Ingleses ande guerrear en el Oriente no halla que el Rey de Inglaterra pueda darnos provechos pues en las cosas de Olanda los della estan sobre si y no penden si no de sus conveniencias. [...] Esto le ha dado de hablar en este consejo del numero del dotte y del estado que tiene que si han de ser dos millones. con ellos acabara la yndia de salir de nuestro poder. Y antes de pasar mas adelante en la conclusion deste negocio este punto de la India es tan ymportante que compuniendolo bien dara gran fuerza al provecho del cassamiento y si no se compusiere no se puede [illegible] dotte dos millones. y la yndia siendo la mayor y mejor parte que esta monarquia posee.

El Marques de Montesclaros: [...] En quanto a lo que el Consejo de Portugal dize del estado de la India Oriental tiene por cierto, es para recuerdo y advertencia de los Capitulos que se ban confiriendo para asentar todo lo temporal en el casamiento y asi se satisfaze con solo mandar V.Md (como tiene mandado) se vea para este efecto la consulta del consejo de Portugal que se cita en esta ultima.

El Conde de Gondomar: [...] Verdad sea que en Inglaterra esta este punto ya vencido y executado en beneficio de V.M.d restituyendose todas las haziendas a los españoles que consto haverseles robado. y cortando la cabeza a Gualtero Rale por haver querido descubrir y conquistar Tierra en la Guayana y el Capitan Norte fue preso y castigado por haver yntentado lo mismo agora dos años en el Rio de las Amazonas y assi sera bien escribir al Marques de la Inojosa y a Don Carlos Coloma alegandoles estos exemplos. Y dandole gracias por el cuydado que tubieron de tratar del remedio de lo robado en Ormuz y ordenandoles que ynsisten en la averiguacion y en la restitucion sin tornar a hablar mas en lo del dotte.

Appendix F

AGS, E., Leg. 2516, doc. 33

(Annex to Leg. 2516, doc. 32 Consulta of the Council of State, Madrid, 26 April 1623)

Lo que al Conde de Gondomar passo con el Principe de Gales sobre lo que se ha de escribir al cabo de los navios y Gente que asistio a la toma de Ormuz

This account, on the situation in the East Indies, followed a report by Ambassador Gondomar concerning the taking of Hormuz and the presence of Prince Charles in Madrid. The members of the Council of State considered that while English trade in the East was relatively recent, having started in the last years of Elizabeth's reign, it had proven very profitable for England. According to this account, the Persians would have not been able to conquer Hormuz without assistance from the English. The Council hoped that Charles's presence in Madrid in 1623 would help the Iberian Monarchy to regain the Portuguese fortress.

Que la navegacion de los Ingleses a la India Oriental ha poco mas de veynte años que la comenzaron en los ultimos de la Reyna Isabel con dos navios solos y muy moderado caudal de algunos particulares. Que para este fin hizieron Compañia y bolsa comun a perdida y ganancia cosa muy ordenada en aquel Reyno donde todo el comercio y navegaciones esta cassi reducida a compañías con governador y consageros de los mismos que tienen su dinero en cada compañía y son mas capaces y Inteligentes de lo que alli se trata y de las partes adonde aquello toca. Porque como en Inglaterra ay tanto dinero y se aumenta con mas de tres millones que entran cada ano de oro y Plata en retorno de los Paños y otras mercaderias que los naturales Ingleses sacan en sus navios a vender por todo el mundo y no haver en Inglaterra juro ni censos en que frutifique el dinero mas de la labranza y criança y el comercio destas compañías entrando en ellas o dandolo a interes a los que son dellas y no tener necessidad el Rey ni el publico de sacar el dinero para ninguna parte mas de solo algunos reales de a ocho para este comercio del Oriente. Y los particulares hallan en Londres letras para donde quiera que las han menester con esto van creciendo cada año los caudales y el comercio y las compañías de manera q esta de la India oriental tiene oy mas de seys millones de ducados puestos en ella por particulares a perdida y ganancia y las quantas de lo perdido o ganado no las hazen sino de en quatro en quatro anos ni el que ha puesto alli su dinero le puede sacar antes pero puede vender o renunciar su derecho a quien quisiere. Y aunque las ganancias desta compañía an sido muy grandes an tambien recibido perdidas y embarazos. Con el comercio de los olandeses que an procurado quedarse ellos solos en

la navegacion y trato de lo mas importante de aquellas partes y quitalles a los Ingleses. Y por esto desearon y procuraron mucho los ingleses (havra ochos años) juntarse con los Portugueses y hechar a los Olandeses de alli. Y aquel Rey hablo diversas vezes sobre ello al conde de Gondomar y el lo aviso muy particularmente al Rey nuestro que aya gloria y Don Francisco Cotinton (qui era entonzes agente en esta corte) hizo aqui la misma ynstancia y despues Don Juan Digbi veniendo por Embaxador extraordinario. Y visto que no lo podian conseguir se concertaron con los olandeses ha quatro años en Londres estando aqui en España el Conde de Gondomar, pero tampoco esta liga los conformo en el Oriente antes se hizieron muy particulares obstelidades hechandose navios a fondo y matandose mucha gente aunque quedandos siempre superiores los Olandeses. y assi quando torno esta segunda vez el conde a Inglaterra ha tres años le ofrecieron apartarse de la liga delos olandeses y hazerla con los Portugueses de que el conde aviso muy particularmente a su Magestad y de como viendo los Ingleses la mala compañía que les hazian los olandeses y que los Portugueses venian tambien contra ellos con armadas cada año tratavan de hazer liga con los Persianos y pedirles el Puerto de Jasques para su contratacion. Y aviso tambien el conde como el Persa se le avia ofrecido y le embiavan un presente en agradecimiento y comencavan alli el comercio con mucho caudal en la entrada y salida y lo mucho que convenia que por del Rey nuestro se hiziesen luego apretadas negociaciones con el Persa para estorbar esto supo tambien el conde en Inglaterra como el Virrey de la India avia procurado ultimamente hechar del Puerto de Jasques a los Ingleses yendo con mucho numero de Velas y que aunque los Ingleses no se hallavan con mas de cinco navios Ingleses eran tan grandes tan fuertes y bien armados que hizieron retirar a los nuestros con mucho dano y al conde de llevaron los de la misma compañía en Londres a uno de los portugueses que prendieron en este enquentro y le hizieron traer alli y el conto al conde lo subcedido culpando a los del nuestra armada por no haver peleado ni dispuesto las cosas desta empresa como convenia.

Con esto segun se ha entendido despues los Persianos juntos con los Ingleses passaron contra Ormuz en los navios Ingleses y con ellos y la gente y Artilleria Inglesa hizieron lo que fuera ymposible sin esto. Y cree el Conde aunque no lo há oydo que los Ingleses persuadirian al Persa a esta conquista y se la facilitarían y dispondrian. Y que sin esto ni el se atreviera hazerla ni quiza pensara en ella y assi tampoco duda el Conde de quelos

Ingleses en el estado presente de las cosas sentiran y les pesara de que el Rey nuestro torne a cobrar a Ormuz. Pero sin embargo desto le parece que haziendose para ello de nuestra parte todo el esfuerzo de fuerzas que sea possible se procure tambien templar y disminuir quanto lo sea las fuerzas del enemigo. Y para esto parecio a proposito hallandose aqui el Principe de Gales y el Almirante de Inglaterra que escriviesen a los suyos que asisten en aquellas partes reprovando lo hecho y mandandoles que no den ningun socorro ni asistencia a los Persas contra los Portugueses antes tengan muy buena amistad y correspondencia con ellos y en esta conformidad an dado las cartas escusandose de no mandarlo con ymperio y penas por no poder sin su Rey pero han ofrecido que el Rey las dara. En esta conformidad con mandato y penas muy rigurosas si no lo cumplieren.

Con que todo lo que por agora parece que puede hazerse en esto es acudir con la fuerza de los socorros fiando poco destas cartas pero embiallas pues no puede dañar que los Ingleses sepan en la India que su Principe esta en España y dar quenta desto a Don Carlo Coloma para que en conformidad de lo que aqui han prometido y es razon procure que el Rey de Inglaterra escriua a sus Ingleses mandandoles so grabisimas penas se aparten en esto de los Persianos y le pida cartas duplicadas dello para embiarlas por diferentes partes y luego.

Appendix G

**British Library, India Office Records
IOR/E/3/10, Doc.1137, fols. 70r-71r**

**Protest by President Thomas Brockedon, and Council against Harman Van Speult,
Governor of Amboyna
Batavia, 20 December 1623**

This is a protest by the English East India Company against the Dutch governor of Amboyna. The author complains that, despite the friendship and alliance between England and the United Provinces sealed by the agreement in 1619,⁶ the Dutch had unjustly executed English merchants at Amboyna. The English Company expects reparation from the Dutch East India Company for the execution of ten Englishmen and the confiscation of their property.

To the Right Worshipful Harman Van Speult, Governour of Amboyna

The infallible signs of neighbourly respect between the Realme of England and the United Netherlands, being in nothing more conspicuous than in the late agreement of differences between his Majesty of Great Britagne and the high and mighty Lords States of the United Netherlands in the year 1619, for the regulating the subjects of both nations in these parts of India with equal place and power by proceeding and successive turns monthly, doth seriously enforce us to admiration how you, Harman Van Speult, Governor of Amboyna, do presume and authorise not only to exact and extort upon his Majesty's subjects of Great Britain, contrary to all that can be intended by any of the said articles, but to imprison, torture, and condemn, and bloodily to execute his Majesty's subjects, with confiscation of their goods, to the violating of that bond of amity and unity in the said articles, and in contempt of those acts so sincerely agreed between his Majesty of Great Britain and the Lords States aforesaid.

Now forasmuch as, contrary to the said articles and in contempt of both our Sovereigns, you have not only assumed the power of magistracy, but proceeded against his Majesty's subjects by tormented confessions and without either voluntary accuser or probable accusation, and thereto have added such tyrannical torments neither usual nor tolerable amongst Christians.

We, the President and Council for the honourable Company of England, are thereby sufficiently grounded solemnly to protest against all your said presumptuous

⁶ 'A Treaty between the English and Dutch East India Companies, Relating to the Differences that had arose between them, London 2 June 1619,' in *Treaties*, pp. 188-195.

proceedings, and in particular for imprisoning 18 of his Majesty's subjects, whereof 10 bloodily executed, their own proper goods confiscated, and the goods of our noble employers by the execution havocked and ruined, the majesty and renown of our gracious Sovereign in these parts with disgrace dishonoured, the nation in general scandalised, and in particular the poor innocent released prisoners bereaved of all credit and estimation. For which notorious wrongs, violence, and indignities, together with your former exactions, couched under the name of necessary maintenance for forts and garrisons.

We, the President and Council aforesaid, do by these presents make public your said oppressions, which is not only in and by your own person to be answered and satisfied, but as you are substitute and have your power from superiors, so is it also intended against your honourable employers, the Company of the United Netherlands trading East India, or any else whom it shall or may concern, from whom in general and particular we, in the name of his Majesty of Great Britain and for our honourable employers, the English East India Company, do and will expect satisfaction.

1. First, the breach of confederacy intended by the articles agreed anno 1619.
2. For your barbarous and bloody execution of 10 of his Majesty's subjects and our honourable employers' factors and servants.
3. For reparation of credit for those poor eight innocents pardoned and acquitted.
4. For the restoration of all their goods and estates, as well theirs executed as theirs pardoned and acquitted.
5. For satisfaction of our honourable employers' goods and estate in those parts by your own occasion havocked and ruined even in quantity and value, to be restored as they were rated and valued by general consent of both Dutch and English, to be sold at Amboyna without defalcation of whatsoever since sold by Richard Welden or Henry Sill, that had them from your hands after the execution without our order or consent. Yet whatsoever the said Richard Welden or Henry Sill have out of the said capital and means (by you committed unto their ordering) paid and disbursed for the use of our noble employers, that shall be defalked and deducted out of the general estate of those parts. The rest we must expect restorable at your hands and the hands of your noble employers as aforesaid.

6. We expect repayment of all your former exactions passed under the name of necessary maintenance for forts and garrisons.

7. We require repair for the dishonour unto his Majesty of Great Britain and our noble employers for your preposterous dealings to the disgrace of our nation in general.

8. And lastly, for our honorable employers' loss and trade in those isles of Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda, for our loss of houses and building there, and our abandoning of those parts, all which being occasioned by your said intolerable exactions, usurpation of authority over his Majesty's subjects of Great Britain, and this said barbarous execution. We will (as reason is we should) expect from you and your honourable employers, the Netherlands Company aforementioned, reparation, satisfaction, and really in every part, redress of all our said losses and disgraces, with such interests, damages, penalties, and inconveniences as by our Christian laws for such wilful and presumptuous offences is and shall be found fitting.

For which purpose we, the President and Council for the honourable Company aforesaid, do make this act authentic by our joint subscription, and send the same to Henry Sill, to be delivered unto you, the said Governor Speult, that thereby both himself and his noble employers and those whom it may concern may be prepared for answers to each particular before our competent judges in Europe or elsewhere.

Dated in Batavia,
the 20 December 1623,
stilo Angliæ.

Thomas Brockedon.

Henry Hawley

John Gonninge.

Appendix H

SP 94/27, f. 27

Buckingham to King James, Madrid, 16/26 June 1623

In 1623, five years after Raleigh's second voyage to Guayana, Prince Charles was petitioned by one Francisco Davila concerning reparation for the losses he had suffered as a result of Raleigh's attack on St Thomé. Davila expects Prince Charles, then in Madrid, to act as an intermediary with King James in order to obtain reparation. The Duke of Buckingham reports the content of the petition to King James encouraging the King to give satisfaction to the petitioner.

Maye yt please y^r Ma^{tie}

His hig^s hauing bin petitioned here concerning ye business of s^r Walter Rawley, hath commanded me to inclose herein the petition and to signifie unto y^r Ma^{tie} that his desire is that y^r Ma^{tie} would be pleased to take the abovesaid business into your gracious consideration; and besides I being much importuned by the Partie whom yt concerns doe become an humble suiter unto y^r Ma^{tie} to command that there be some speedie course taken in the tryall of this business, that he may receave such satisfaction, as in justice he can expect. And thus with my continued prayer for y^r Ma^{ties} longe life and health I rest.

Most humble servant and subiect

Buckingham

SP 94/27, fols. 29-32⁷

Petition of Francis Davila, and translation, Madrid, June 1623

(f.31r) Most Illustrious Prince

Francis of Avila saith, That Sir Walter Raley and his fellowes, your Highness Subiects, robbed him in Santo Tome de Guayana, above 40 thousand pounds sterling, contrarie to the agreement of peace established betweene the two Crownes; for Remedy whereof. Induced of one side; for the great reputation that His Ma:tie your High^s father hath

⁷ Francisco Davila's petition and the depositions of various witnesses can be found at HL, HM 60032. The petition can be found in Spanish at SP 94/27, f. 29r.

through the world, of a Just Administrator of Justice; And of the other side by the letter that the Marques of Buckingham did write to Counte Gondomar to lett the Catholicke King of Spaine his Maister know, the resolution that the King of Great Britainne had, to satisfy effectually, without the ordinary course of Law, the Particular due of those that are interested in the received losse and dammage, that it might be restored. Vppon this assurance he sent to your highnesses Court one James de Castro Cortazar, whoe continually, by meanes of supplie and expenses, with other inconveniences which are well knowne, hath pursued and sollicited to this purpose, these foure yeares; without having obtayned so much as a meane recompence; rather there comes a great hinderance, and losse by the reference that the Kings Ma:tie made unto his Treasurer, that he should administer Justice, whose Decree was, that the Instance should be pursued, as is proceeded with the legall of the realm, contradictorie to that which had bene promised and ratiffyed between both kingdomes, and against the lawe of Nations, Politick agreement, and contrary to the last motives of the Marquis of Buckingham's letter, by his Ma:tie your Highnes his Fathers Command. And that he may the better be beleevd concerning the said dammages, he referres a more exact relation of it to the Marquis of Buckingham, and Count Gondomar, whoe being circumspect subiects, and well seene in all kind of Matters, and in this case; they may informe

(f.31v) your Highnes sufficiently to the purpose of this Cause.

Humbly beseeching your Highnes, that as much as shallbe lawfull, and possible, the justification of this pretender may resulte (being protected in Justice by your Highnes) with Effects answerable.

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