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Principles for understanding trust in artificial intelligence

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Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly performs tasks once reserved for humans, raising questions about when, why, and how people trust machines—and whether they should in the first place. In this Review, we identify six principles that help structure understanding of trust in AI and highlight its socially embedded nature: trust in AI is inferred; trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour are distinct; trust in AI is about both morality and performance; and that trust in AI is agent-specific; individually variable; and strategically motivated. The inferred, multidimensional, dynamic, and contextual nature of trust in AI illustrates that ‘trust in AI’ is not one thing, but varies across different systems, individuals, and contexts. We end by considering broader ethical implications of studying trust in AI and argue that trust in AI requires both studying how people think and reflecting on the kind of world that trust in AI serves to create.

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Principles for understanding trust in artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly being used to assist—or even take over—tasks that were once the preserve of humans. It is therefore no surprise that questions about trust in AI have moved to the centre of public and scientific debate. Computer scientists are building AI in ways they hope will mean it is trusted to ensure adoption and drive uptake¹. Psychologists are studying the antecedents of trust in AI^{2,3}, validating self-report scales of trust in AI^{4,5}, and exploring how people trust and use AI in applied settings^{6,7}. Ethicists are outlining principles for ‘trustworthy AI’ to ensure that AI is safe and effective^{8,9} and the European Union has official guidelines for building trustworthy AI¹⁰.

Determining when, why, and how people trust machines, what trust in AI means in the first place and what kind of trust is desirable, however, is far from straightforward, in part because ‘trust’ can mean different things (Box 1). ‘Trust’ includes an assessment of performance or reliability, but also more psychologically-driven inferences about intentions and good motivations. ‘Trustworthiness’ is both a normative assessment of whether trust is warranted and a psychologically inferred process that leads to an attitude and behaviour of trust. People do not trust all AI systems equally, not all people trust the same AI system in the same way, and even the same person might trust the same AI system differently in different contexts based on their strategic motivations and goals. All of these factors play out against a broader ethical background concerning—perhaps paradoxically—whether trust in AI is the right vision for society.

In this Review, we combine classic perspectives on trust with contemporary perspectives and empirical findings emerging in a rapidly evolving landscape of AI trust research. Trust in AI has been widely considered across multiple disciplines including psychology, philosophy, and computer science. Large-scale reviews and meta-analyses have already compiled literature on trust in AI generally^{2,11–15} as well as in aversion to AI^{16,17}, AI in moral decision-making^{18,19}, AI in managerial decision-making^{20,21}, and trust in autonomous vehicles²². Here we take a different approach. Instead of attempting the Sisyphean task of presenting all available literature in a fast-moving landscape, we identify guiding principles to help structure insight into the topic and understand the way it is changing. First, we discuss the definition of ‘trust in AI’. Next, we combine insights from psychology and other disciplines to identify six principles that can guide understanding of trust in AI. These principles are not intended as hard-and-fast rules, but as a framework for considering trust in AI and avenues for future research. Fundamentally, trust in AI is not a single attitude or feature, but a dynamic, context-dependent, and socially embedded process. We then consider the ethical implications of studying trust in AI and conclude with directions for future research.

Defining ‘trust in AI’

‘Artificial intelligence’ can mean different things to different people. Here we adopt a typical understanding of AI as referring to machines or systems that use any kind of algorithm or statistical model to perform tasks or make decisions that usually require human intelligence²³.

‘Trust in AI’ can also mean different things. For example, when someone says they trust a specific AI tool, they might be expressing a belief that the AI has good performance and does things reliably and competently; they could mean that they think they could rely on the AI in cases of uncertainty; they could mean something richer, like when people say they trust another person, meaning they think the AI is sincere or ‘good’ in some way; or they could mean that they actually use the tool and it has some influence on their behaviour.

In the psychology literature, trust is most commonly understood as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party”²⁴, or “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action”²⁵. Drawing on these ideas, one of the most-commonly cited definitions of ‘trust in AI’ defines trust as “the attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterised by uncertainty and vulnerability”²⁶.

Although researchers and the public discuss trust in AI, some philosophers have argued that trust in AI is “conceptual nonsense”²⁷, because “people trust people, not technology”²⁸. The standard philosophical claim (which comes out of decades of philosophical work on trust^{29,30}) is that genuine trust requires rich interpersonal attitudes between a trustor and a trustee. These depend on agentic capacities, such as being motivated by good will or responding to normative commitments^{31–33}. Thus, although AI can be relied upon just as someone might be able to rely on a chair or a computer, it does not make sense to talk about genuinely trusting AI: AI simply does not have the kind of mental states and motivations required for the interpersonal relationship of trust^{31,32}. According to such arguments, trust in AI is merely reliance on AI, and the idea of trust in AI is mistaken, misleading, or even potentially dangerous^{27,32–34}.

Even if these philosophical arguments are correct and AI is not the kind of thing that could genuinely participate in an interpersonal relationship of trust, it is an entirely separate question whether people nevertheless treat AI systems as social agents that can be meaningfully trusted. Indeed, evidence suggests that they do. In line with the computers as social actors framework^{35–37}, people apply social rules and expectations to machines³⁸ and perceive computer personalities³⁹. People also anthropomorphise AI in much the same way that they anthropomorphise other non-human agents⁴⁰, and conform their moral judgements with AI avatars in virtual reality, just like they do when making moral judgements with a group of other humans⁴¹. Most pertinently, a preprint suggests that people do think AI is the kind of thing that

can have good intentions and be trusted, like other social agents, with participants reporting that it makes sense and is natural to say “I trust the AI” but not “I trust the moon” or “I trust the number five”⁴².

In sum, ‘trust in AI’ can mean different things, and is perhaps even, strictly speaking, a conceptual mistake³². But it is also psychologically meaningful, intensely debated, and therefore pragmatically indispensable for understanding the ways in which people interact with AI systems.

Principles for understanding trust in AI

In this section we identify six principles that can guide understanding of trust in AI. First, we discuss how trust in AI cannot be engineered into a machine because it is inferred. Second, we highlight how trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour are connected but distinct constructs. Third, we show that trust in AI is multidimensional and includes assumptions of competence and ability as well as broader perceptions of the system’s morality. Fourth, we show the richness of understanding trust in AI is likely to come not from generalities, but from recognising the agent-specificity of trust in AI: just as people do not trust all humans in the same way, people do not trust all AI systems in the same way. Fifth, we discuss how even the same AI system can be trusted in different ways by different people because trust is influenced by various individual and cultural differences. Finally, and most underexplored in the current literature, we discuss how people might trust AI systems differently depending on their specific strategic goals and motivations in different kinds of interactions.

Trust in AI is inferred

Trustworthiness can be understood as a normative, evaluative question: Is this entity worthy of trust? In the context of AI, the normative aspect of trustworthiness often leads to a prevailing assumption in AI ethics and governance that trustworthiness is something that can and should be engineered into machines to enhance trust. The European Commission’s *Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI* has argued that “trustworthiness is a prerequisite for people and societies to develop, deploy and use AI systems”¹⁰. Scholars have highlighted numerous principles for what would make AI trustworthy⁴³, including the European Commission guidelines positing that a trustworthy system is one that is lawful, ethical, and robust. This framing assumes that trustworthiness is something that can be built. Consequently, computer scientists, developers, and regulators have become interested in understanding how these principles can be translated into practice^{1,44}.

Some work treats trustworthiness as an objective characteristic. For example, in AI ethics, trustworthiness is conceptualised as a normative question that refers to capacities of the system, such that trustworthiness is “an objective attribute of the trustee”, distinct from trust which is “a subjective attitude and attribute of

the vulnerable party”⁴⁵. By contrast, other work treats trustworthiness as a psychological and inferred characteristic. For example, much of the psychological literature on trust in AI draws on an influential model of organisational trust²⁵ and treats trustworthiness as a perceived assessment of the characteristics of the agent that forms the basis of trust^{3,26,46}.

Importantly, whether a system objectively has characteristics that make it worthy of trust (actual trustworthiness) and whether people perceive that the system has those characteristics (perceived trustworthiness) are separate. A system can be actually trustworthy while not perceived as trustworthy, and a system can lack actual trustworthiness but still be perceived as trustworthy^{47,48}. Thus, although engineers might be able to program AI systems that are objectively safe and reliable, they cannot program trust. Indeed, trust is not something that can be identified in computer code or governance regulations because it is a product of human impression formation. These impressions are influenced by objective features of the system, but these objective features are interpreted and inferred by humans.

Psychology research shows that people form judgements of competence and morality from minimal cues to build an overall picture of someone’s character^{49,50}. These inferences are made heuristically and often automatically^{51,52} and people can be misled by irrelevant features like attractiveness⁵³. When AI systems are posited to be and treated as social or quasi-social actors, people extend these same inferential mechanisms to them⁵⁴. Thus, people form implicit and explicit impressions of AI⁵⁵ based on limited information that is not necessarily driven by an AI’s actual trustworthiness. Even the assessment of seemingly objective AI system characteristics, such as its accuracy, varies between observers⁵⁶.

One example of a mismatch between actual trustworthiness and perceived trustworthiness comes from work on interpretability. Many contemporary AI systems can work as black boxes with internal processes that are largely inscrutable. This lack of transparency has raised concerns about the ethical risks and safety of using such systems, which has led to a focus on designing explainable AI⁵⁷. But interpretability will not necessarily increase trust in practice because trust is an inferred process, not a feature of the machine. Indeed, evidence on whether interpretability actually increases trust in AI is mixed^{58–61}. These results highlight the tension between what should make a system trustworthy and what people actually trust.

In sum, developers can focus on building normatively trustworthy systems, which is likely to increase people’s trust in their products. However, these points are distinct: the fact that something has characteristics that increase its actual trustworthiness does not guarantee people will perceive it as such, and the fact that people perceive a system as trustworthy does not mean it is actually trustworthy.

Trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour are distinct

Most psychology research on trust in AI draws on the tripartite model of interpersonal trust²⁵, which has since been adapted to the AI context⁶². This model can be drawn on to distinguish between perceived trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour: an assessment of trustworthiness leads to an attitude of trust, which can in turn translate to a behaviour of trust (Figure 1). Correspondingly, trustworthiness is typically understood as the basis of trust, or as a perceived assessment of the characteristics of the agent that forms the basis of trust^{3,26,46}, whereas trust is an attitude or belief indicating a willingness to rely on the agent²⁵. Some research subdivides this attitude or belief further, and distinguishes rational trust that is based on evidence of the other person's capacities (cognitive trust) from a more irrational expression of trust that is based on an emotional response to the other person (affective trust)⁶³.

However, the distinction between trustworthiness and attitudinal trust is complicated by how the latter is typically measured. Although attitudinal trust can be measured by direct self-report with questions like "Do you trust ChatGPT?", it is also measured by a plethora of multi-item self-report scales (Table 1) that often ask participants both about whether they trust AI and about the perceived capabilities or trustworthiness of the system (for example, "Is ChatGPT reliable?")^{4,5}. Such questions are clearly about the characteristics that would form a basis of trust (perceived trustworthiness), but they also reflect an overall attitude that can be referred to as trust itself.

Indeed, it is difficult—and perhaps not even desirable—to distinguish expectations of the capacities of a system from trust simpliciter⁴. Oftentimes attitudinal trust is not separate from an assessment of performance, and the performance assessment itself can be meaningfully understood as trust⁴. At the same time, however, it is clear that attitudinal trust is not identical to perceived trustworthiness because even perceptions of an AI's ability do not perfectly correlate with ratings of attitudinal trust and other factors, such as general propensity to trust⁶⁴. 'Trust' can therefore refer to both an assessment of the capacities of the AI system as well as a self-reported willingness to rely on the system.

Trust in AI can also manifest behaviourally⁶⁵. Trusting behaviour is captured with behavioural measures such as people's decisions to rely on an AI system⁶⁶, delegate to a system⁶⁷, or update their judgements following a system's recommendations⁶⁸. The latter is often discussed as persuasion, not a manifestation of behavioural trust per se^{69,70}, highlighting a potential jingle-jangle fallacy^{71–73} (using the same term to mean different things and/or different terms to mean similar things). Some researchers have measured behavioural trust in AI by adapting the incentivised trust game⁷⁴ from experimental economics in which one player (trustor) sends some amount of money to another player (trustee), who then decides how much money to return to the first player. In the adapted game, an AI is placed in the position of the trustee instead of a human^{75–77}. Although the trust game has been widely used as a behavioural measure of trust (how much the trustor gives to the trustee) and trustworthiness (how much the trustee returns) between humans, AI systems are unlikely to value money in the same way that humans do, which highlights

potential challenges with applying standard behavioural methods for assessing human-human interactions to human-AI interactions.

According to the classic model of interpersonal trust, perceived trustworthiness leads to attitudinal trust, which then leads to trusting behaviour²⁵ (with actual trustworthiness feeding into perceived trustworthiness). But this is far from a rule. Risk and stakes play a role in moving from attitudes to behaviour²⁵, and researchers have long-known that behaviour does not always directly follow from attitudes^{78,79}. Indeed, much research has highlighted situations where people report that they trust an AI system but do not actually use the technology in practice^{48,65,80}. This disconnect between trusting attitudes and behaviour might occur when people are anxious about new technologies or perceive high levels of risk in using the AI system⁸¹⁻⁸³. There is also emerging evidence for an opposite and less explored pattern: that people might hold explicit attitudes about AI being untrustworthy, but still engage in trusting behaviour such as updating their judgements based on AI moral advice⁸⁴. A cross-cultural study presented in a preprint found that people reported trusting AI moral advisors less than human advisors, but updated their judgements similarly based on advice from AI and humans⁶⁸. These findings underscore the need for conceptual clarity in the measurement and discussion of trust in AI, as well as consideration of how increasing use of AI could reshape classic debates about attitude-behaviour mismatches.

In sum, ‘trust’ can refer to an assessment of the capacities of an agent, an expression of a willingness to rely on it in cases of uncertainty, and a behavioural manifestation. All these meanings are justifiably referred to under the umbrella of ‘trust’ and are included in measures of trust, but they can also meaningfully diverge (Figure 2). The difficulties associated with broad and competing understandings of trust and trustworthiness is a barrier in the literature on trust in AI^{48,65,80}. It is therefore important that researchers are clear about what is meant by ‘trust’ (assessments of trustworthiness or capacities, a self-reported attitude about trust, or trusting behaviour).

Trust in AI is about both morality and performance

When a user asks themselves whether they should trust an AI system, in one sense they are simply asking “Can I rely on this system to function reliably and accurately?”. This dimension of trust that focuses on reliability, ability, or performance (performance trust) has been suggested to be the primary driver of trust in AI^{15,26,85}. Indeed, the perceived performance capability of an AI system is a key predictor of trust in that system⁸⁵, and trust in an AI system quickly declines when algorithms are shown to perform incorrectly, especially on tasks that are considered easy^{86,87}.

It might have made sense to focus on performance trust for early AI systems that had limited functionality. However, the rise of more complex and socially-situated AI systems has made clear that thinking about

trust in AI requires considering more than performance capabilities. For example, with enhanced sensors autonomous weapons could be more efficient than humans on the battlefield. However, people strongly distrust and disapprove of autonomous weapons being used in military strikes, largely because they are seen as less moral⁸⁸.

According to classic tripartite models of human interpersonal trust, trust and trustworthiness are based not only on perceived ability, but also on the integrity and benevolence of the trustee⁴⁶. Others have identified competence and responsibility⁸⁹, ability and intentions^{90,91}, and expertise and motivation to lie⁹², as dimensions of trust, in line with theories of impression formation showing that people care not only about whether a person is competent, but also whether they are warm, moral, and trustworthy^{49,51}.

Trust in AI is not solely dependent on perceptions of performance or ability (“Does it get the job done?”), but also concerns about moral trust⁴, or the system’s purpose and process²⁶ (“Is it ‘good’?”). Research on trust in AI does not consistently distinguish between performance and ability vs. purpose and process (or morality)^{15,93,94}. People can, do, and should care about the ability and performance of AI systems^{4,26,85} because these characteristics enable the truster to have confidence in the trustee’s skills. But people also can, do, and should care about the system’s process and purpose²⁶, benevolence and integrity⁴⁶, and ethicality⁴, that is, whether the perceived intentions and motivations of the trusted system are good. An AI system can be highly capable but deceptive, reliable but unethical, or ethically aligned yet unreliable.

One multidimensional model of trust in AI distinguishes between performance trust and moral trust⁴. As a psychological inference, moral trust does not require that the AI is a moral agent or genuinely has benevolence, integrity, or honesty. Instead, moral trust depends on whether people treat the AI as a moral agent and evaluate it not only for its performance but also for its potential to do harm. Thus, moral trust involves assessing whether the AI is ethical (follows moral norms and adheres to principles that seek to do good) and whether it is sincere (is genuine and authentic). Sincerity has received less attention than integrity and benevolence (here broadly analogous to the ethical subdimension) in work on interpersonal trust⁴, and was potentially less relevant for early algorithmic systems. However, sincerity is increasingly important in discussions of generative large language model (LLM) products like ChatGPT given their reputations for ‘lying’ to users by producing factually false outputs⁹⁵.

Meta-analytic work shows that both performance and perceptions of benevolent rule-following influence trust in AI systems². Other work shows that perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity of a virtual chatbot agent form a latent factor of trustworthiness that influences trust³, that perceived authenticity of healthcare chatbots influences trust⁹⁶, and people perceive AI as more trustworthy both when its morality increases and when its performance increases⁹⁷.

Although there is moderate consensus that trust in AI can be driven by both performance and moral elements, the literature does not consistently distinguish between performance and moral dimensions of trust^{15,93,94}. Similarly, many scales of trust in AI include items related to both morality and performance, broadly construed, although they are rarely referred to with the same terminology and are not always explicitly distinguished in separate dimensions or subscales (Table 1). For example, the widely-used trust in automation scale includes items related to both performance (for example, “The system is reliable”) and morality (for example, “The system has integrity”) within a single scale⁵.

In sum, both morality and performance drive trust in AI, but they are also distinct: there is no guarantee that an AI that is more intelligent will necessarily be more moral^{97–99}, and no guarantee that perceiving an AI as more reliable means it is perceived as more ethical given the multidimensional nature of trust^{4,25,100}. It will be important for future research to investigate the independent—and perhaps even competing—roles that perceptions of performance and morality play in shaping trust in AI.

Trust in AI is agent-specific

Much existing work has focused on people’s trust in AI in general, and have identified principles of trustworthy AI that should be generally applicable to any autonomous system or agent^{8,9}. However, there are many different types of AI systems with different characteristics that are used for different purposes, and it is far from clear that people’s trust in general ‘AI’ develops and extends in the same way across, for instance, GPS navigation systems, LLM chatbots, and AIs used in drone warfare. Moreover, variables that are known to influence trust in AI in general (such as transparency or interpretability^{57–60,101} and degree of anthropomorphism^{102,103}) might have different effects on trust for different systems. For example, higher interpretability that enables a human to evaluate a machine’s internal processes is likely to be more important for trust in an AI system that makes more consequential decisions about parole recommendations than an AI-system like DALL-E that creates images⁵⁸.

Given this variability in AI systems, the tendency to generalise across empirical findings has been argued to be one of the greatest challenges in the study of trust in AI⁴⁵; the question ‘Do people trust AI?’ must be qualified: ‘Trust which AI to do what?’. For example, a large global survey (n = 48,340) found that although almost half of respondents reported being willing to trust an AI overall, there were notable differences in their willingness to trust AI built for specific contexts¹⁰⁴, such that people trusted healthcare AI more than generative AI and AI used for human resource management. Other empirical studies show that people are more averse to machines making moral decisions than to machines making other kinds of decisions¹⁰⁵, and people even trust AI systems differently based on the AI’s recommendations in moral dilemmas^{68,106}. Thus, people’s ratings of trust in AI generally can differ substantially from their rated trust in specific AI applications.

The agent-specificity of trust in AI means that people not only trust systems differently depending on their characteristics and domain of use, but that there are also different bases of trust for different systems. For example, a meta-analysis found that AI performance predicted trust across five categories of AI, but the performance of the system was relatively more predictive of trust in general algorithms and automated vehicles than trust in socially-situated robots and chatbots². Similarly, according to a non-peer-reviewed preprint, although performance and moral indicators were positively related to overall trust across 20 AI systems, their relative importance varied such that performance was a stronger indicator of trust for some systems (such as Google Maps AI), whereas morality was a stronger indicator of trust for others (such as autonomous killer drones)¹⁰⁰.

Moreover, when AI systems are designed for different contexts, their perceived capabilities might or might not align with the traits that are expected for that specific context. For example, a survey of 10,000 participants across 20 countries found that people were more fearful of AI the more their expectations about its abilities were misaligned with the abilities required for the occupation in which it was being deployed¹⁰⁷. Thus, trust in different AI systems is not only dependent on which capacities they have, but how these capacities match the context.

In sum, although much existing work has focused on trust in AI as a broad umbrella category, research shows that trust in AI is agent-specific. People trust specific AI systems differently depending on their particular functions, capacities, and domains of application.

Trust in AI is individually variable

People differ in their general propensity to trust others (for example, their agreement with the statement “most people can be counted on to do what they promise to do”), and this disposition tends to be higher in collectivist societies¹⁰⁸. Such dispositional tendencies provide a foundation for how individuals form trust judgements towards humans and non-humans alike. However, individuals’ propensity to trust automation (defined as a general tendency to trust technologies such as robots, autonomous vehicles, and AI-based systems) is correlated with, but conceptually distinct from, the propensity to trust other humans¹⁰⁹. Specifically, it has been suggested that the propensity to trust other humans forms the broader dispositional basis from which trust in automated technology emerges¹⁰⁹; this hierarchical relationship is supported by moderate correlations between the two constructs in England ($r \approx .45$; but see ref¹¹⁰ for more modest correlations in Germany and Singapore).

Further large-scale evidence demonstrates the heterogeneity of individuals’ trust in artificial systems. A systematic review of over 500 empirical studies across 62 countries identified a range of individual

characteristics (for example, personality traits, self-efficacy, technological experience and risk orientation) as among the most consistent antecedents of trust in AI¹². In general, people high in extraversion, openness, and agreeableness tend to trust different AI systems more readily¹¹¹. For example, people higher in extraversion report greater trust in AI-enabled user interfaces¹¹²; people higher in openness report greater trust in robots¹¹³ and autonomous vehicles¹¹⁴; and people higher in agreeableness report greater trust in conversational AI¹¹⁵. It is therefore possible to identify personality profiles for potential users of autonomous vehicles¹¹⁶. In addition, people with higher AI competence self-report more trust in AI in general¹¹⁷, whereas people with higher attachment anxiety report lower trust in different AI systems¹¹⁸.

Other individual difference variables, such as age and gender, have also been examined as predictors of trust in artificial systems. However, meta-analytic evidence reveals inconsistencies or even null effects across studies^{2,12}. This variation in the literature might reflect the fact that trust in AI is agent-specific. For instance, women trusted an autonomous ‘robo-cop’ more so than men¹¹⁹, whereas a study of older adults’ acceptance of ‘assistive social robots’ showed the opposite gender effect (more trust among men than women)¹²⁰.

Effects of age and gender also vary in size across cultures¹²¹. Indeed, there are robust cross-cultural differences in how people trust AI. For example, one systematic review found striking variation across countries’ average trust in AI systems, with scores ranging from 47.39 in Spain to 79.80 in Malaysia (on a standardised scale from 0–100, with 100 indicating complete trust)¹². These results reveal that global trust in AI is far from uniform. Participants in many Asian and Middle Eastern nations (including Malaysia, Singapore, and Iraq) reported higher baseline trust than participants in Western European and East Asian nations (such as Germany, Spain, and Japan). Participants in the U.S and Canada fell between these extremes, indicating cautious but generally optimistic attitudes toward AI. The authors attribute these differences to distinct cultural value systems and societal experiences with technology, such as different levels of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and exposure to automation¹². Other global investigations found higher trust in AI in countries with emerging economies¹⁰⁴ (such as Nigeria, India and Egypt) or lower prevalence of English (such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand)¹²². These findings might reflect participants’ trust in their governments to regulate AI development effectively.

Cross-cultural experiments further support the role of cultural values in trust in AI. For instance, although overall trust levels were similar between participants from the US and India, the underlying drivers of trust differed¹²³: concerns about uniqueness neglect (the feeling that algorithms overlook individual distinctiveness) were associated with lower trust among US participants, whereas familiarity with the algorithm was associated with aversion and increased acceptance among Indian participants. These findings suggest that cultural frameworks can influence not only the extent to which people trust AI, but also why they come to do so.

In sum, trust in artificial intelligence can vary across a host of individual and cultural characteristics. All else being equal, a single AI system might inspire trust in some and skepticism in others. However, it is important to recognise that the results of cross-cultural surveys and experiments can be difficult to interpret because they might reflect sampling biases, differences in response styles, and a potential lack of measurement invariance for scale items across cultures.

Trust in AI is strategically motivated

It is often either implicitly or explicitly assumed that there is a linear relationship between trust and trustworthiness: an AI that is ‘better’ (or objectively worthy of trust) will be perceived as more trustworthy, which will generally lead to a higher attitude of trust. Such a linear relationship would be rational, but people take the risk of trust in a given situation into account²⁵ and, of course, humans rarely display full rationality. Instead, humans are influenced by a range of cognitive biases, and such biases even impact how people perceive risk¹²⁴. In particular, people often exhibit motivated social cognition: they act less like scientists seeking the truth and more like lawyers confirming existing intuitions^{125–127}. Applied to trust in AI, such motivated social cognition suggests that an individual might trust even the same AI differently depending on their strategic goals and motivations in a particular situation.

AI products like ChatGPT or ‘AI mode’ for Google Search might be intended to provide information, even if there are reasons to doubt the reliability of their answers⁹⁵. How people seek out and use information can be influenced by strategic motivations, biases, or demands that are separate from the system itself. For instance, trust in AI is more likely when there are higher task demands that reduce cognitive resources^{128,129}. This finding dovetails with an extensive literature on confirmation biases¹³⁰, according to which people pay more attention to information that favours their beliefs¹³¹ and neglect information that goes against their initial view¹³². In the same way, people tend to search for information with AI in biased ways that can foster inaccurate beliefs¹³³. A preprint suggests that these biases can be exacerbated by ‘sycophantic’ AI tools, which are also seen as more intelligent and moral¹³⁴; other work finds that people are persuaded by AI giving moral advice in the absence of good reasons, as if they are applying a heuristic of ‘this advice seems good enough’⁸⁴.

There are reasons to expect that people might seek out and trust AI in motivated ways in other cases beyond information retrieval. We know that using AI shapes perceptions of the user themselves, highlighting how trust in AI is not just about one what does, but the message it sends¹³⁵. Although morality dominates impression formation in general⁴⁹, and people preferentially seek out information about others’ moral character¹³⁶, there are exceptions: sometimes people might prefer to seek information about a partner’s willingness to break rules or be less moral. For example, there is evidence that people

prioritise less moral partners if there is a strategic reason to do so, such as when selecting a defense lawyer¹³⁷. Regarding trust in AI, evidence suggests people are more trusting of self-driving cars for other people than they are for themselves¹³⁸ and trust self-driving cars that protect themselves as passengers more than cars that protect pedestrians¹³⁹. People are less likely to perceive an AI as immoral or unjust when they personally benefit from the AI's unfair decision¹⁴⁰, and some people might be more persuaded by an AI that gives selfish rather than altruistic advice⁸⁴. Other work suggests that people are more likely to engage in dishonest behaviour in a die-rolling task when they can delegate their decision-making to an opaque algorithm¹⁴¹. These effects could be partly explained by the combination of psychological distance¹⁴², plausible deniability¹⁴³, and deflection of moral responsibility¹⁴⁴ that AI systems offer their users. These findings raise concerns that people might not only trust AI because they perceive it as a good, reliable system but because that system aligns with their incentives, and might therefore over-rely on AI in situations where there is an incentive to engage in ethically questionable behaviour¹⁸.

In sum, the idea that trust in AI systems might be strategically motivated has received less attention than the other principles. However, exploring how trust in AI is dependent on a motivated assessment of its alignment with strategic incentives, needs, and motives is a particularly promising area of future research. Even the same person could trust the same AI differently in different contexts based on their motives in that particular situation.

Ethical considerations

Trust in AI is a multifaceted, multidimensional, agent-specific, individually variable, and motivated phenomenon. By reviewing evidence from multiple disciplines, we have sought to document how, when, and why people might trust AI. But such evidence does not speak to how much people should trust AI in the first place, or how much researchers and policymakers should focus on increasing trust in AI.

AI clearly has the potential to do good in society. AI tools can be used to increase agricultural yields and improve food security^{145–147}, deliver faster disaster management in crises^{148,149}, monitor extreme weather and climate events¹⁵⁰, assist conservation efforts^{151,152}, and create breakthroughs in protein folding to discover new drugs^{153,154}. Given these potential societal benefits, it is unsurprising that there is so much focus on trust in AI: trust is valued, important, and necessary in the human social world, and the potential benefits of AI tools will only be achieved if people trust those systems. However, trust is also dangerous when misplaced.

For all the potential benefits of AI systems, blind trust in AI is not the right goal, and it is important that researchers avoid a trap of assuming more trust is better¹⁵⁵. Empirical work has documented concerning effects of over-trust in AI in different domains, including risky financial decisions¹⁵⁶, threat-identification

of enemy combatants vs. civilians¹⁵⁷, and food identification tasks¹⁵⁸. It is therefore more important that AI is trustworthy (that is, the system has the capacities that make it worthy of trust) rather than trusted (that is, people perceive the system as good and are willing to rely on it)³⁴. Just as people can be epistemically and ethically misled and even harmed by placing trust in other humans who are not worthy of that trust, people can be misled and harmed by placing trust in AI systems that are not worthy of that trust. Trust should therefore be appropriately calibrated such that an AI is trusted to the degree that the system is trustworthy¹⁵⁹ and designed to be relied upon in a particular situation⁶². For this reason, regulation and oversight are needed to ensure system limitations are acknowledged^{160,161}, and that this information is used to foster an appropriate level of trust¹⁶².

However, even if researchers or policymakers focus on appropriate or calibrated trust there are deeper potential ethical implications of ‘trust in AI’ because the concept is inherently value-laden. Concerns have been raised about the commodification of trust¹⁶³, whereby the banner of ‘trustworthy AI’ can serve as a form of ethics-washing: corporations and governments can signal moral responsibility while avoiding substantive ethical or regulatory commitments or enquiry^{27,164}. Critics have argued that frameworks such as the European Commission guidelines on trustworthy AI¹⁰ function less as true safeguards and instead as “elegant public decorations for a large-scale investment strategy”²⁷. Even badges or certification labels for ‘trustworthy’ AI could be misused by developers to drive unwarranted trust in a form of ‘machine washing’, just as companies can greenwash by presenting products as more environmentally friendly than they are¹⁶⁵.

Others have argued that describing AI as something that can be trusted assigns capacities to AI that it does not have, in essence implicitly treating AI as a moral subject with rights and responsibilities rather than a tool^{42,166}. Framing AI as a trustworthy agent might obscure and shift responsibility away from AI developers to the systems themselves^{167,168}. This form of ‘agency laundering’¹⁶⁹ focuses attention on the responsibilities of AI as agents rather than the responsibilities of the developers, users, and regulators, and the way that AI systems can and do cause harm to real people¹⁷⁰. Empirically, there is evidence that having AI recommendations led to more errors of commission and omission in simulated flight tasks than when AI recommendations were not provided, suggesting that people felt less accountable when responsibility can be assigned to AI than when it lies in the hands of the user alone¹⁷¹. Consistent with this interpretation, people perceived themselves to have less responsibility for decisions in a simulated drone strike task when they received AI assistance compared to when they did not¹⁷².

When people learn about new concepts, labels assigned to that concept influence perceptions of concept valence¹⁷³, and research from cognitive linguistics suggests that when a familiar word is used in an unconventional manner, people tend to import features of the word’s primary meaning^{174,175}. Thus, the concept of ‘trustworthy AI’ might itself influence people’s perceptions of trust and responsibility. A

preprint that has not been peer-reviewed suggests that people imbue AI with agential capacities that it does not have⁴², suggesting that it is possible that considering AI as trustworthy agents shape perceptions of responsibility.

At the most abstract level, there are ethical debates about whether trust in AI—even appropriately calibrated trust—is desirable in the first place. Put differently, even if it became clear that a proprietary AI could be trusted to deliver teaching and grade student assignments to the same standard as human teachers, it is not automatically a given that the goal should be to ensure that students, parents, and administrations use these systems in lieu of human teachers. Scholars have raised concerns about the threat of ‘algocracy’, in which the proliferation of algorithm-based systems structure and constrain opportunities for human participation¹⁷⁶, lead to a technologically advanced but ethically deskilled society¹⁷⁷, and prioritise technological innovation at the expense of human flourishing¹⁷⁸.

Although rarely discussed in the context of psychological work, discussion of trust in AI can never be fully isolated from the context in which AI is developed and used—a context in which technology companies can use their money and influence to change policies to align with their own economic interests¹⁷⁹, where AI systems harm the most vulnerable people in society¹⁸⁰, where AI systems have stark environmental effects¹⁸¹, and where the labour of training systems is often outsourced to underpaid and exploited workers in the global South¹⁸². These ethical and political contexts cannot be fully isolated from the task of understanding trust in AI because they constitute the conditions under which trust judgements are formed and expressed.

Psychologists studying trust are not—and should not be—held responsible for this ethically-fraught background. At the same time, it is impossible to fully divorce values from science, because ethical, political, and social assumptions shape not only which questions are asked, but how results are interpreted and used. For example, research that identifies features that increase trust in AI systems can easily be interpreted as guidance for designing systems that are more trusted, even though being more trusted does not correspond to being more trustworthy. Researchers studying trust in AI should therefore reflect on the potential uses and misuses of their findings, distinguish clearly between trust and trustworthiness in their framing of results, reflect on how their results exist within a broader context, and where suitable make explicit the assumptions and values that guide their research. Practices such as greater reflexivity about researchers’ perspectives and, where appropriate, the use of positionality statements might help make these influences more transparent.

Summary and future directions

Drawing from research in psychology, philosophy, behavioural economics, human-computer interaction, and AI ethics, we formulated six key principles that underlie the burgeoning literature on trust in AI. The emerging picture is that trust in AI is not a static or unitary phenomenon. Instead, trust in AI is composed of multiple dimensions and constructs, is dynamically inferred, and varies substantially depending on the characteristics of the particular AI system, the individual doing the trusting, the cultural context, and the strategic affordances of the situation. Our Review is by no means exhaustive and the literature on trust in AI is growing every day. However, recognising the theoretical and empirical work underlying these principles and their interplay, as well as the ethical and practical challenges of studying trust in AI, has implications for researchers, developers, and policymakers (Table 2).

Although some aspects of trust in AI have been heavily studied, important areas are receiving less attention. There is a wealth of research on individual and cultural differences in trust in AI or characteristics that might influence trust in AI in general. However, there is much less research on people's strategic motivations for trusting AI, the way that performance and moral trust might diverge for different agents, or how characteristics of the AI will be differentially important for different systems based on the perceived degree of fit. Understanding of trust in AI could also be enhanced by exploring the interplay between the different principles we outlined here, such as how people might trust the same system in different ways, how even the same system may be trusted differently by different people in different contexts, and how the same predictor or characteristic may lead to trust differently across different systems. For example, one global report found that relative trust rankings for different AI systems vary substantially across cultures¹⁰⁴. Future work should extend this finding by investigating whether there are individual and cultural differences in how people prioritise performance and moral trust in AI, the cues that people use to infer the trustworthiness of different AI systems, and people's strategic trust in AI.

Much of the research cited in this Review is cross-sectional. However, this is a fast-moving space, and new AI systems are released every day. The type of machine systems that discussions of automation focused on two decades ago²⁶, or that were included in studies of algorithm aversion just a decade ago⁸⁶, are very different from the kinds of LLMs that people routinely interact with today. For this reason, scholars have highlighted a temporal validity problem^{183,184} and have questioned whether empirical findings in this space might have an expiration date¹⁸⁵. Moreover, research suggests that people's general attitudes towards AI are evolving as these technologies become ever more embedded in daily life^{186,187}. Future research should use longitudinal methods and developmental approaches to explore how trust in AI is changing over time, what predicts these changes in trust, and whether longitudinal changes vary across individuals and cultures.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the study of trust in AI must be placed in context. Fully understanding the behavioural science of trust in AI requires considering interdisciplinary and critical perspectives on what trust does. Considering trust in isolation from the social and political context in

which it occurs risks unintentional ethics-washing by reinforcing a discursive space in which talking about how to increase trust in AI implicitly supports the idea that a world of algorithms is desirable in the first place. Understanding trust in AI requires studying not only how people think, but also reflecting on the kind of world that trust in AI serves to create.

Table 1. Selected scales used to measure trust in AI.

Scale name	Number of items	Items relating to performance and morality	Subscales or subdimensions	Example items	Internal consistency ^a	Selected other scale validation ^b
System trustworthiness scale ¹⁸⁸	15	No ^c	Performance	“The system performs the task accurately.”	$\alpha = 0.87 - 0.95$	Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) Structural validity (EFA; CFA) Construct validity (convergent validity; divergent validity; criterion validity through experimental manipulation)
			Purpose	“The system is programmed specifically to complete this task”	$\alpha = 0.80 - 0.90$	
			Process	“I understand how the system is supposed to work.”	$\alpha = 0.82 - 0.92$	
			-	-	Overall: Not assessed	
Human–computer trust scale ¹⁸⁹	12	Yes	Benevolence	“I believe that (—) will act in my best interest”	$\alpha = 0.83 - 0.84$	Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha; composite reliability) Structural validity (partial least square structural equation modelling)
			Competence	“I think that (—) is competent and effective in (—)”	$\alpha = 0.84 - 0.88$	
			Perceived risk	“I believe that there could be negative consequences when using (—)”	$\alpha = 0.86 - 0.90$	
			Trust	“I can trust the information presented to me by (—)”	$\alpha = 0.84 - 0.89$	
			-	-	Overall: Not assessed	

Trust in automation scale ⁵	12	Yes	None	“The system is deceptive” “I am confident in the system”	Not assessed	Structural validity (PCA; cluster analysis)
Trust in automation questionnaire ¹⁹⁰	19	No	Reliability/competence	“The system is capable of interpreting situations correctly”	$\omega_t = 0.92$	Reliability (Omega; Cronbach’s alpha; Spearman-Brown coefficient)
			Understandability/predictability	“I was able to understand why things happened”	$\omega_t = 0.81$	Structural validity (EFA with parallel analysis; model fit evaluated with CFA-type indices)
			Familiarity	“I have already used similar systems”	$r_{SB} = 0.83$	
			Intention of developers	“The developers are trustworthy”	$r_{SB} = 0.79$	
			Propensity to trust	“I rather trust a system than I mistrust it”	$\omega_t = 0.78$	Construct validity (convergent validity with single trust item; criterion validity through experimental manipulation; predictive validity)
			[General] Trust in automation	“I trust the system”	$\alpha = 0.63\text{--}0.85$	
			-	-	Overall : Not assessed	
Trust attitude measurement instrument ¹⁹¹	16	No	Understandability	“I understand how the AI system works and I feel confident I will be able to use it in the future.”	$\alpha = 0.79$	Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha; omega; test-retest reliability; composite reliability)
			Technical competence	“The AI system uses appropriate methods to get results based on the information I input”	$\alpha = 0.84$	Structural validity (CFA)
			Reliability	“The AI system consistently provides the results it is expected to produce.”	$\alpha = 0.72$	Construct validity (content validity through experts and content validity index;
			Helpfulness	“When I need help, the AI system responds to my needs effectively and responsively”	$\alpha = 0.87$	

			Personal attachment	"I like using the AI system because it suits me, and always want to use it"	$\alpha = 0.84$	
			User autonomy	"I feel in control when operating the various functions and features of the AI system"	$\alpha = 0.83$	
			Faith	"When I am unsure about the AI system's result, I believe in the AI system rather than myself."	$\alpha = 0.83$	
			Institutional credibility	"I feel assured using the AI system because it is made by a reputable institution and therefore already went through a credible regulation."	$\alpha = 0.91$	
			-	-	Overall : $\alpha = 0.95$	
Human-computer trust ¹⁹²	25	No	Reliability	"I can rely on the system to function properly."	$\alpha = 0.85$	Reliability (Cronbach's alpha)
			Technical competence	"The system uses appropriate methods to reach decisions"	$\alpha = 0.74$	Structural validity (PCA)
			Understandability	"It is easy to follow what the system does"	$\alpha = 0.84$	Construct validity (content validity through nominal group technique)
			Faith	"I believe advice from the system even when I don't know for certain that it is correct"	$\alpha = 0.88$	Other (inter-rater reliability)
			Personal attachment	"I like using the system for decision making."	$\alpha = 0.90$	
			-	-	Overall : $\alpha = 0.94$	
Multi-dimensional measure of trust ⁴	16	Yes	Performance dimension: reliability	"Can count on"	$\alpha = 0.92$	Reliability (Cronbach's alpha)
			Performance	"Skilled"	$\alpha = 0.92$	Structural validity (PCA)

			dimension: capability			Construct validity (Content validity through sorting task; Criterion validity through experimental manipulation)
			Moral dimension: sincerity	“Authentic”	$\alpha = 0.79$	
			Moral dimension: ethicality	“Has integrity”	$\alpha = 0.81$	
			-		Overall : Not assessed	
Short trust in automation scale ¹⁹³	3	No	No	“I am confident in the AI assistant” “The AI assistant is reliable”	Overall : $\alpha = 0.97$	Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) Construct validity (Convergent validity with other scales; criterion validity through experimental manipulation; predictive validity)
Trust perception scale–human robot interaction ^{194, d}	40	Yes	No	“What % of the time will this robot:” ... “Function successfully” “ ... Protect people”	Not assessed	Structural validity (PCA) Construct validity (content validity through experts and content validity ratio; convergent validity with other scales; criterion validity through experimental manipulation)
AI trust score ¹⁹⁵	4	No	No	“[The AI feature] will help me do my job more efficiently and effectively.” “I understand how and when to use [the AI feature].”	Overall : $\alpha = 0.70$	Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) Structural validity (EFA) Construct validity (convergent validity; content validity through qualitative data; predictive validity)
Human- generative artificial intelligence trust scale ¹⁹⁶	9	Yes	Benevolence	“I believe that artificial intelligence (such as ChatGPT, ERNIE Bo, etc.) acts in my best interest”	CR = 0.81	Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha; composite reliability) Structural Validity

			Competence	"I believe that artificial intelligence (...) is capable of effectively supporting my learning process"	CR = .81	(ESEM; CFA) Construct Validity (convergent validity; criterion validity; content validity through translations)
			Reciprocity	"If I use artificial intelligence (...), I believe I can fully rely on it"	CR = .81	
			-	-	Overall: $\alpha = 0.89$; CR = .93	
Trust in AI scale ¹⁹⁷	30	Yes	Global Trust	"I trust %system%."	$\alpha = 0.92 - 0.94$	Reliability (Cronbach's alpha) Structural validity (EFA; CFA) Construct validity (convergent validity) Other (measurement invariance)
			Vigilance	"I am careful when using %system%."	$\alpha = 0.90 - 0.91$	
			Unbiasedness	"%system% was designed to be responsible."	$\alpha = 0.79 - 0.90$	
			Integrity	"%system% is sincere."	$\alpha = 0.91 - 0.93$	
			Transparency	"The inner workings of %system% are comprehensible."	$\alpha = 0.84 - 0.86$	
			Ability	"%system% is capable."	$\alpha = 0.95 - 0.96$	
			-	-	Overall: Not assessed	

Note. α : Cronbach's alpha; r_{SB} : Spearman-Brown coefficient; ω : Omega total; ω_r : Revelle's omega; CR: Composite Reliability; EFA: Exploratory Factor Analysis; CFA: Confirmatory Factor Analysis; ESEM: Exploratory Structural Equation Modelling; PCA: Principal Components Analysis

^a Although we report internal consistency measurements taken from the cited publications, it is important to place these values within our broader arguments about the agent-specificity, multi-dimensionality, and even temporal validity of trust in AI. Some scales have been developed with a specific AI type in mind (for example, chatbots) and might not show the same internal consistency for other types of AI, and reliability estimates for scales with only performance items may be higher than those with moral trust items.

^b There are different methods and approaches to scale validation and similar terms can be used in different ways (for example, convergent validity typically refers to whether scores on a scale converge with other established scales, but in some work it can instead be used to refer to whether the individual subscales are correlated. We present a selection of common validation, approaches used to highlight the diversity in this space, not to critique or compare scales.

^cThe system trustworthiness scale follows the adaptation of the tripartite trust model based on ability, benevolence, and integrity²⁵ to distinguish trust in AI based on performance, purpose, and process⁶². However, the items in the purpose subscale here are more focused on whether the machine is designed for a specific purpose by its developers, not whether the system necessarily has good intentions or morality. A system can be designed with unethical intentions in mind and used in that way, but that does not mean the system would be (perceived as) benevolent or having a good purpose.

^d This scale includes a short 14-item version which can be used to measure change in trust over time or in an assessment with multiple trials, which focuses on the functional capabilities of the system.

Table 2. Implications for understanding, building, and regulating AI.

Principle	Meaning	Implications for Researchers	Implications for Developers	Implications for Policymakers
Trust in AI is inferred	Trust is a psychologically inferred process based on social cognition; it does not lie in computer code.	Theory and measurement should distinguish between actual trustworthiness and perceived trustworthiness.	Designing trustworthy systems does not guarantee that they will be perceived as trustworthy by users. Systems should be designed to be trustworthy, not trusted.	Regulation should not assume that certified or compliant AI will automatically be trusted by the public.
Trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour are distinct	Trust in AI can manifest in conceptually and empirically different ways.	Theory and measurement should distinguish between trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour.	User trust might not translate into use, and use might occur without trust.	AI use should not be taken as evidence of public trust or acceptance.
Trust in AI is multidimensional	Trust in AI depends on perceptions of both performance and morality.	Research should explore performance and moral dimensions of trust separately.	Improving performance alone might not increase moral trust in an AI system.	Governance frameworks should address ethical concerns, not just technical performance.
Trust in AI is agent-specific	People trust different AI systems differently depending on context, purpose, and domain.	Findings about trust in 'AI' might not generalise across different systems and applications.	Trust cues vary across specific domains of AI application.	Regulation should take domain differences into account rather than treating all AI systems as the same.
Trust in AI is individually variable	Trust in AI varies across individuals and cultures.	Research should account for and explore individual and cultural differences when studying trust in AI.	AI designers should anticipate diverse trust responses rather than a single user profile.	Regulation should account for the fact that trust in AI will not be uniform across populations.
Trust in AI is strategically motivated	People might trust or rely on AI based on strategic motivations, incentives, and goals.	Research should explore how strategic motivations shape trust and reliance on AI systems.	Developers should anticipate that users might over-rely on AI in situations where reduced responsibility or effort are desirable.	Regulation should address strategic misuse or overreliance.

Figure captions

Figure 1: Trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour. The relationship between trustworthiness, trust, and trusting behaviour as typically understood based on the tripartite model of trust²⁵ and its adaptation to trust in AI^{48,62}.

Figure 2: The meaning of ‘trust in AI’. A) Trustworthiness can refer an actual assessment of whether the system is deserving of trust^{1,9,21,44} or a perception of whether the system deserves trust¹². B) Perceived trustworthiness can be driven by expectations of both performance (for example, reliability or capability) and morality (for example, ethicality, sincerity or benevolence)^{3,13,84}, which can also be called bases of trust. C) Trust can be an attitude reflecting a willingness to rely on another in a situation characterised by uncertainty (attitudinal trust)^{11,12}, measured by explicit questions like “I can trust the system”⁶³. D) Trust can be an attitude reflecting or including the perception of the system’s capabilities that would enable someone to rely on it in a situation of uncertainty, measured by questions like “The system is reliable” and “The system is ethical”^{3,63}. E) Trust can be used broadly to refer to all the psychological aspects of trust, including an assessment of the system, a self-reported willingness to rely on the system, and a behaviour, distinct only from actual trustworthiness^{4,34,45}.

Box 1. Trust terminology

Actual trustworthiness

Trustworthiness based on objective characteristics that make someone or something worthy of trust.

Perceived trustworthiness

Trustworthiness based on the perception of characteristics that make someone or something worthy of trust.

Attitudinal trust

Trust as an attitude that reflects a willingness to rely on someone or something in a situation characterised by uncertainty.

Cognitive trust

Trust as rationally concluded based on evidence of someone's or something's capacities.

Affective trust

Trust based on an emotional response to someone or something.

Performance trust

Trust in the reliability, ability, and performance of someone or something.

Moral trust

Trust in someone or something to be ethical, sincere, genuine and authentic, follow moral norms and principles, and seek to do good.

Calibrated trust

Trust that is appropriate to the degree to which the object of trust is trustworthy.

Trusting behaviour

Behaviour that reflects a trusting attitude towards someone or something.

Notes

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

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