

Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, c.1558-1568: a study of the ambassadors and diplomatic practices.

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Abstract

This thesis compares and analyses the personnel, procedures, and practices in English and Scottish diplomacy between 1558 and 1568. Drawing comparisons between the two countries is necessary for several reasons. First, in this period, both the English and Scottish diplomatic services were unique as the ambassadors did not receive official diplomatic training. Instead, they relied on their political experience and time abroad in the party of a diplomat to guide their own actions on an embassy. Secondly, after England, France, and Scotland concluded peace in July 1560 in the Treaty of Edinburgh, the new Anglo-Scottish amity created an environment in which queen-to-queen diplomacy could flourish. Although there was no open conflict, the tensions from the previous years of war and mistrust that underlay this period need to be explored in relation to how they influenced the choice of ambassadors, when ambassadors were exchanged, and for what purpose.

There is already an extensive body of literature on the diplomatic relationship between the English and Scottish monarchs, regents, and secretaries, which is heavily supplemented with contemporary reports and correspondence of ambassadors whose presence at the rival court helped to reduce the need for meetings between the high-ranking agents. Since the 1960s, the 'new diplomatic history' has made a conscious effort to understand the careers and actions of the individuals who were commissioned. Unfortunately, in the context of the Anglo-Scottish relationship, this has led to an oversight of the broader structural patterns and themes in the diplomatic exchanges. This research identifies that the number and frequency of diplomatic personnel (resident ambassadors, regular ambassadors, extraordinary ambassadors, commissioners, and representatives) sent between England and Scotland increased in the 1560s to, on the face of it, sustain the new amity. However, behind the peaceful façade, diplomatic practices

used by previous English and Scottish monarchs were continued to gather intelligence with the objective of protecting the country from threats and tensions that still underpinned the relationship.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter showcases that not only was there a clear increase in how frequently the two courts exchanged ambassadors but also the types of diplomatic personnel and embassies – the accredited ambassadors and representatives, and embassies that were rumoured or planned but did not take place – were more varied than has previously been identified. On the face of it, this was an attempt to uphold the new Anglo-Scottish amity. By comparing the different diplomatic personnel, we can use the similarities and differences to understand how the representatives compared to the sixteenth-century continental model. The second chapter argues that whilst an ambassador represented his monarch, he was also expected, and at times forced, to exert agency in a fast-paced and complex political environment. The models of how an ambassador exerted agency are used to reassess the Anglo-Scottish tensions in 1565 through the narrative of the diplomatic exchanges. This demonstrates how the power shifted in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in less than a year. The final chapter moves away from examining the changes in diplomacy that have drawn more attention from scholars and instead acknowledges that even after peace was established in 1560, intelligence-gathering practices that were used by previous monarchs continued to serve the broader objective of defending the national interests and security of each country. This reveals a greater degree of tensions than the historians who have focused on the ‘amity’ are yet to appreciate. In this decade, the type of person who was commissioned as an ambassador and their responsibilities changed to reflect the broader changes that we see in continental diplomacy and, in the context of Anglo-Scottish relations, tensions from the previous centuries of conflict that were still at the forefront of the government’s mind.

It was these tensions, caused by unprecedented situations, that forced ambassadors to use their own agency and the English or Scottish government to employ practices in intelligence gathering to defend their national interests.

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I would like to give my greatest thanks to my partner, Thomas Roe, and our two guinea pigs. Thank you, Tom, for standing up to me whenever I told you that I could not do this and for helping get me to the finish line. At this moment I need to thank myself. You told yourself you could not do this from day one until today. Look where you are now and what you have done. It is time to say you did it. Be proud of yourself.

A note to the reader in the words of the ambassadors whose correspondence has consumed me day and night, I am better ‘leavinge the iudgemente of my whole doynges vnto yo[ur] h[onours] wysedome’.¹

¹ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 28r-34v, Sir Thomas Randolph to Sir William Cecil, 21 February 1564 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 181].

DEDICATION

For showing up, pushing through, and finishing the research I started.

List of Abbreviations

<i>APC</i>	Dasent, John Roche, ed., <i>Acts of the Privy Council of England 1540-97</i> , 27 vols., (London, 1890-1964)
<i>BL</i>	British Library, London.
<i>CLP Borders</i>	Bain, Joseph, ed., <i>Calendar of Letters and Papers Relating to the Affairs of the Borders of England and Scotland</i> 2 vols., (Edinburgh, 1894-1896)
<i>CSP Domestic</i>	Lemon, Robert, and Mary Anne Everett Green, eds., <i>Calendar of State Papers: Domestic Series of the Reign of Elizabeth</i> , 7 vols., (London, 1856-1871)
<i>CSP Foreign</i>	Lomas, S. C., Allen B. Hinds, and Richard Bruce Wernham, eds., <i>Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth.</i> , 22 vols. (London, 1861-1950)
<i>CSP Scot</i>	Bain, Joseph, William K. Boyd, Henry W. Meikle, and Annie Isabella Dunlop, eds., <i>Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots</i> , 13 vols., (Edinburgh, 1898-1969)
<i>CSP Spain</i>	Hume, Martin Andrew Sharp, ed., <i>Calendar of State Papers Relating to the Negotiations Between England and Spain Preserved in the Archives of Simancas and Elsewhere.</i> 19 vols., (London, 1864-1947)
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review.</i>
<i>EUSC</i>	Edinburgh University Special Collections, Edinburgh.

Hatfield House, CP	Cecil Papers (Hatfield House, England). < http://cecilpapers.chadwyck.com/ >.
<i>HJ</i>	<i>Historical Journal</i>
NLS	The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
NRS	The National Records of Scotland (formerly known as the National Archives of Scotland), Edinburgh.
<i>ODNB</i>	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i> .
<i>RPCS</i>	Burton, John Hill, ed., <i>The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1545-1569</i> , vol. 1, (Edinburgh, 1877)
<i>RPS</i>	Brown, K.M., et al eds, <i>The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707</i> (St Andrews, 2007-2024). < https://www.rps.ac.uk/static/bottom_frame.html >.
<i>Sadler Papers</i>	Clifton, Arthur, ed., <i>The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler</i> , 3 vols., (Edinburgh, 1809)
<i>SHR</i>	<i>Scottish Historical Review</i> .
<i>Salisbury</i>	Scargill-Bird, S. R., ed., <i>Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Salisbury [Robert Cecil]</i> , Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire. Vol. 1 (London, 1833)
TNA	The National Archives, Kew.

Stylistic Conventions

All dates have been recorded using the Gregorian calendar. This assumes that the new year begins on 1 January, unless otherwise indicated, and printed and archive material are cited in the new style (i.e., 1558, not 1557/8). All quotations from primary sources retain the early modern spelling and square brackets have been used to expand the early modern contractions. One exception is the early modern word ‘yt’ that has been expanded to ‘the’ or ‘that’ throughout. Primary letters or documents with sections that have been crossed-out by the original scribe or by a second author are included in this thesis and are indicated using strike-through (~~ambassador~~). Similarly, where sections of text have been added to a document by the original author or a second author, this has been included in the transcriptions using an asterisks (*ambassador*) to mark the beginning and end of the added section. The removal of sections and additions to texts were an important part of the drafting and editing process and necessary for this research. The modern spelling has been used when a place was named (using Edinburgh instead of Edinbvrgh), or when a personal name was used (i.e., using Mary, Queen of Scots instead of Marie). The Privy Council in each country are differentiated between by using the terms English Privy Council and the Scottish Privy Council. Financial currencies (with clarification added for £ sterling, £ Scots, or crowns) have been left as they were found in the sources unless explicitly otherwise stated.

The appendices for this thesis are lists of the official ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents sent between England and Scotland between 1558 and 1568. In Appendix One and Two, the catalogues of embassies are arranged chronologically, apart from when multiple instructions were sent to the same ambassador who remained resident in the country. For example, after Sir Thomas Randolph returned from the English court in September 1563, he remained in Scotland until March 1566. During this

time, Randolph received further direction from Elizabeth in the form of memorials in 1564 and 1565, which are included in one section of his 1563 to 1566 embassy. The heading of Appendices One and Two include the name or names of the ambassador or agent and the dates they were sent and returned. Within the appendices, when the author was uncertain of the exact dates, they are preceded with a “c.”, or where an event is known to have been before or after a specific date, this is indicated using the less than “<” or greater than “>” symbol to provide an estimated date for this catalogue. Where the specific day or month of the embassy or mission is not known at all, the month or year is included but the information for the day or month has a “?” in its place. Where names or ranks of the ambassador are unknown, this is also indicated by a question mark “?”.

Documents from the British Library and The National Archives of Great Britain were partly obtained from State Papers Online. Where necessary, unspecified names have been added in square brackets to help finding aids. For example, ‘Throckmorton to the Queen [Elizabeth I]’. The names were used in full the first time they were cited, and this was shortened afterwards. The exception are the brothers Robert Melville and James Melville whose full names are maintained to keep the distinction clear.

Introduction

As the longest serving Elizabethan ambassador between 1558 and 1568, Sir Thomas Randolph understood the duty of an ambassador better than anyone else in this period. In a letter to Sir William Cecil, Randolph summarised the role perfectly, that ‘I [Randolph] serve in publicke affaires I do some tyme wryte vnto yo[ur] h[onour] of private menes’.¹ Before returning to the English court in 1563 on personal affairs, Randolph reported that Mary ‘was glade that I [Randolph] myght be the reporter ther of w[ith] whom she had so maynie tymes conferred and vtterde her mynde’.² It is the embassy, instructions and reports, and responsibilities of the English and Scottish ambassadors that this thesis is primarily concerned with. An ambassador represented the monarch and government in person whilst he was commissioned abroad so, every word or action was scrutinised. He was also the voice of the host monarch and government in his correspondence as well as in his audiences with his own monarch when he returned home. Whilst on the face of it the primary responsibility of an ambassador was to maintain the amicable relationship between the two countries, he was also tasked with gathering intelligence to detect, deter, or pre-empt possible points of friction.

In the context of Anglo-Scottish relations, a comparative study of the English and Scottish ambassadors is best placed to explore the role as well as the impact of the individuals on the frontline of diplomacy, simply because this allows us to compare and contrast the changes and continuities in diplomatic procedure and practices during the 1560s. The English and Scottish personages who were sent between the two courts, and the outcome of each embassy is already well-established. The objectives and events of diplomacy in this period have received attention in the context of studies of the personal

¹ TNA SP 52/8, f. 74v, Randolph to Cecil, 3 June 1563 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 9].

² TNA SP 52/8, f. 84r, Randolph to Cecil, 19 June 1563; [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 16].

rule of Mary, the reign of Elizabeth, and the analysis of the relationship between the two. However, fundamental questions about how diplomacy was conducted and whether England and Scotland took a similar or divergent approaches still remains. Chapters One and Two take a step back to look at the structures of diplomacy, why certain ambassadors were selected and how both ambassadors and representatives operated in their distinctive cultures. Methodologically, a comparison of the ambassadors was influenced by the ‘new diplomatic history’s’ approach to exploring the structures of diplomacy and how the identified topics developed under the political and religious changes in the sixteenth century. England and Scotland are especially suited to such a comparison because of their geographical proximity, and their shared history of conflict as old enemies. Nevertheless, diplomacy was, self-evidently, a transnational activity, and the broad context of the developing diplomatic changes still need to be explored within the context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy between 1560 and 1568.

Whilst the events of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy have been investigated in a range of studies, the diplomatic practice of each country – including diplomatic personnel and their careers, as well as similarities and differences between the diplomatic practices and procedures of the two countries – needs to be at the centre of this study. This thesis draws on several distinct literatures, including those that focus on diplomatic service, the roles of ambassadors and agents, intelligence-gathering, and border diplomacy. These themes will be brought together to draw a direct comparison between the diplomatic practices of both England and Scotland.³ Through an assessment of the personnel, procedures, and

³ For literature on English and Scottish ambassadors, diplomatic service, and intelligence-gathering see, A. J. Slavin, *Politics and Profit: A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507-1547* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Amos C. Miller, *Sir Henry Killigrew: Elizabethan Soldier and Diplomat* (Leicester, 1963); Katherine Pitman Frescoln, ‘Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in Scotland’ (PhD Thesis, West Virginia University, 1971); Gary M. Bell, ‘John Man: The Last Elizabethan Resident Ambassador in Spain’, *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1976), pp. 75-93; F. Jeffrey Platt, ‘The Elizabethan Diplomatic Service’, *Quidditas*, Vol. 9, Article 9 (1988), pp. 93-114.; Mark Loughlin, ‘The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573’ (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991); M. S. Anderson, *Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (New York, 1993); Gary M. Bell, ‘Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution’, Malcolm

practices, this thesis identifies that there was a significant increase in the accredited ambassadors and non-official representatives sent between England and Scotland in order to maintain the new amicable relationship, provisionally established in the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560. However, this does not indicate that relations ‘improved’ overall. Behind this façade, continuities in diplomatic practice, notably the deep-rooted practice of intelligence gathering and border defence, revealed that long-standing suspicions remained and the intense diplomatic efforts of the ambassadors and representatives continued to be directed towards maintaining the security of their own country.

A comparative study holds particular value in the broader field of diplomatic history. It has been nearly ten years since Tracey Sowerby’s overview of the development of early modern diplomatic history identified that there was still a significant gap where scholarship typically analysed a diplomatic relationship from the perspective of a single court.⁴ By contrast, a comparative analysis offers the opportunity to identify patterns in religion, polity, and diplomatic practices. In research into early modern European history,

R. Thorp and Arthur J. Slavin, ed., *Politics, Religion, and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe, Essays in Honor of De Lamar Jensen* (Kirkville: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994); Gary M. Bell, ‘Tudor-Stuart Diplomatic History and the Henrician Experience’, Charles Carlton, Robert L. Woods, et al, ed., *State, Sovereigns & Society in Early Modern England: Essays in Honour of A. J. Slavin* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1998); MacMahon, Luke, ‘The Ambassadors of Henry VIII, The Personnel of English Diplomacy, c.1500 - c.1550’ (PhD Thesis, University of Kent, 1999); Susan Doran, *Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 1558-1603* (London: Routledge, 2000); Claire L. Webb, ‘The ‘Gude Regent’? A Diplomatic Perspective upon the Earl of Moray, Mary Queen of Scots and the Scottish Regency, 1567-70’ (PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2008); Tracey Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morison* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Cynthia Fry, ‘Diplomacy and Deception: King James VI of Scotland’s Foreign Relations with Europe (c.1584-1603)’ (PhD Thesis, St Andrews, 2014); Amy Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2015); Tracey Sowerby, ‘Parables and Dark Sentences: The Correspondence of Sir William Cecil and William Maitland (1559–73)’, Paul M. Dover, ed., *Secretaries and Statecraft in the early modern world* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016); Louise J. Wilkinson and Sara J. Wolfson, ‘Introduction: premodern queenship and diplomacy’, *Women’s History Review*, Vol. 30, No. 5 (2021), pp. 713-72; Rosalyn Cousins, ‘The diplomatic authority of William Davison’, *Historical Research*, Vol. 20, (2024), pp. 1-13.

For literature on border diplomacy see, Paul Gerard Bosche, ‘Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border, 1550-1560’, (PhD Thesis, University of Durham, 1985); Meikle, Maureen M., *A British Frontier? Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders, 1540-1603* (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press Ltd, 2004).

⁴ Tracey Sowerby, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, *History Compass*, Vol. 14, No. 9 (2016), p. 449.

however, such a comparative analysis is rarely found, with the only complete undertaking being Daniel Riches's comparative study of the diplomatic relationship between the Hohenzollern Electorate of Brandenburg and the Vasa Kingdom of Sweden in the seventeenth century. Through an application of the framework of the 'new diplomatic history', Riches compares the two relatively minor states when resident ambassadors were still in their early stages of development and non-accredited state actors were also operating in diplomatic roles.⁵ Notably, Riches identifies the difficulties in navigating the competing religious influences and differences between the Calvinist Brandenburg and Lutheran Swedish kingdoms. This comparative study has shown that the comparison of two countries can be fruitful, and if Riches claims his work to be the first 'to look carefully at *both* sides of an early modern diplomatic relationship over time', then this thesis adds its name to the relatively short list of comparative studies.⁶ In the context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, who was sent on an embassy and what the outcome was in the broader picture of Anglo-Scottish relations is already well rehearsed.⁷ However, the reason certain men were selected as ambassadors and how they operated in their distinctive English and Scottish diplomatic cultures still needs to be understood. This study contributes to the necessary comparative literature in diplomacy and also adopts the

⁵ Daniel Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg–Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Brill: Leiden, 2013), pp. 7-8; *ibid.*, p. 13; *ibid.*, pp. 141-180; *ibid.*, pp. 225-268.

⁶ Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture*, p. 6.

⁷ For general studies of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy from either the English or Scottish perspective see, W. Ferguson, *Scotland's Relations with England* (John Donald, 1977); Jane E. Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', *International History Review*, no. 8 (1986), pp. 1-24; Roger A. Mason, ed., *Scotland and England 1286-1815* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987); Jane E. Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British Dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy', *History*, Vol. 74, No. 241 (1989), pp. 196-216; Roger A. Mason, 'Imagining Scotland: Scottish political thought and the problem of Britain, 1560-1650', Roger A. Mason, ed., *Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Stephen Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 1558-1569* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jane E. A. Dawson, *The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots: The Earl of Argyll and the Struggle for Britain and Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Rayne Allinson, *A Monarchy of Letters: Royal Correspondence and English Diplomacy in the Reign of Elizabeth I* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), pp. 74-91; Keith Brown, 'Early Modern Scottish History – A Survey', *SHR*, 92, Supplement (April, 2013), pp. 5-24; Andy King and Claire Etty, *England and Scotland, 1286-1603* (Red Press Globe, 2015).

‘new diplomatic history’s’ actor-centred approach by including both accredited ambassadors and unofficial representatives who were operating in a diplomatic role. In order to understand the context, we first need to explore the changes in diplomacy that swept the British Isles and Western Europe in the 1560s as a reaction to the previous and ongoing religious reformations. Then, the themes that are unique to English and Scottish diplomacy, for example the issues of control and their shared border, will be explored in order to understand the impact this had on diplomatic practices.

Before delving into the literature that focuses on diplomatic service and what has already been studied in Anglo-Scottish relations, the rationale behind this period of study, from 1558 to 1568, needs to be explained. It has been deliberately selected to offer an alternative perspective to existing studies. This thesis agrees with the ‘new diplomatic history’ that strict periodisation needs to be removed and in doing so the chronology of the events underpins one of the main arguments of this thesis, that suspicions and concerns about national security continued throughout this period.⁸ The current literature singles out the year 1560. Between February and March, the terms of the Treaty of Berwick were negotiated to finalise what aid the English government would provide to the Scottish rebel group known as the Lords of the Congregation. Claire Kellar argues that the English government anticipated this treaty would ‘allow England some hope of guiding Scottish policy’.⁹ It was the conclusion of peace in July 1560 between England, Scotland, and France in the Treaty of Edinburgh that offered an opportunity to re-set the recently turbulent relations and there was ‘an atmosphere of lively optimism and possibilities’.¹⁰ However, cutting off or starting at either of the 1560 treaties has created

⁸ Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings, ed., *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World, c.1410-1800* (Abington: Routledge, 2017), p. 18.

⁹ Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England and the Reformation, 1534-61* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 204.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

a false division in what this research refers to as the first of two periods of diplomatic abnormality that bookended the six years of more normal diplomacy. The first period of diplomacy abnormality took place between April 1558 and July 1561, when the Anglo-Scottish relationship transitioned from one of warfare and suspicion to setting the foundations for amity. This period was, however, highly unusual, in diplomatic terms, since between May 1559 and June 1560 (when Mary of Guise died), two rival Scottish groups had attempted to establish a diplomatic relationship with the English government.¹¹ Thereafter, from June 1560 until Mary's return to Scotland in August 1561, a regime of uncertain legitimacy ruled Scotland whilst its sovereign Queen continued to conduct diplomacy from France. Simultaneously, Mary also navigated the changing position of Scotland's relationship with France, following the death of her first husband Francois II, November 1560.

By contrast, August 1561 to August 1567 witnessed a period of relatively normal English and Scottish diplomatic activity, when the ambassadors and embassies that were sent between the two monarchs largely reflected the terms of the peace created in 1560. By examining this period alongside the two exceptional periods that bookended diplomatic practices, we can identify that tensions did, in fact, persist. Indeed, from August 1567 until 1568, the second period of diplomatic abnormality, some similarities with 1559-61 are evident. In the aftermath of Mary's deposition, diplomacy became more important than ever as a way of demonstrating the legitimacy of James Stewart, Earl of Moray as the new regent and a way of securing English acceptance of his regime. The opening of the York-Westminster Conference in October 1568 is an appropriate place to end this study since here the question of legitimacy began to be resolved and so a return

¹¹ Appendix 2: Scottish ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 340-346.

to diplomatic normality was facilitated. The York-Westminster conference consisted of two separate meetings, one at York in October and the second in Westminster in November, with commissioners representing Mary, the Regent Moray/the young James VI, and Elizabeth.¹² Initially the meeting was supposed to explore how Scotland ought to be governed, but Mary's opponents – led by the Regent Moray who was also supported by the English secretary Cecil – gradually shifted ground so the focus instead became on whether Mary was involved in the murder of her second husband Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley.¹³ In the 1570s, the groups supporting Mary and James were more commonly known as the Queen and King's party. Although the membership of these groups altered considerably, these terms are helpful to distinguish between the two groups in the late 1560s.¹⁴ The York-Westminster conference and the events that immediately followed were a diplomatic watershed. Before the conference began, there was a period when Elizabeth supported restoring Mary to her throne, but Claire Webb identified that Cecil favoured keeping the Regent Moray in power and looked for ways to delay Mary's restoration.¹⁵ Despite this division, Elizabeth maintained a diplomatic relationship with both parties. It was only after the conference that Elizabeth gravitated towards Cecil's position of favouring the new status quo. This was evident from Elizabeth's actions. Following the conclusion of the conference, in early 1569 Elizabeth willingly lent Moray money. Later that same year, once Moray had helped to secure and return English rebels

¹² For literature on the York-Westminster Conferences see, Goodall, Walter, *An Examination of the Letters, Said to be Written by Mary, Queen of Scots, to James, Earl of Bothwell, Volume 2* (Edinburgh: T. and W. Ruddimans, 1754); Thomas Finlayson Henderson, *The Casket Letters and Mary Queen of Scots* (Edinburgh, 1890); Gordon Donaldson, *The first trial of Mary, queen of Scots* (1969); Guy, *My Heart is My Own*; Claire L. Webb, "The Gude Regent?: a diplomatic perspective upon the Earl of Moray, Mary, Queen of Scots and the Scottish Regency, 1567-1570" (PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2008), pp. 100-109.

¹³ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 174.

¹⁴ For divisions and allegiances before and during the Scottish Civil war see, Gordon Donaldson, *All the Queen's Men: Power and politics in Mary Stewart's Scotland* (London: Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd, 1983).

¹⁵ Webb, "The Gude Regent?", pp. 138-139.

who had sought asylum in Scotland following the failed Northern Rising, the English Queen acknowledged Moray as the Regent of Scotland in her correspondence – something she had actively avoided since his acceptance of the regency in August 1567.¹⁶ The York-Westminster conference itself represented a diplomatic anomaly, since, as Donaldson acknowledged, the Regent Moray attended in person and, therefore, his representatives were not acting in the same manner as those who were representing Mary or Elizabeth. Mary's representatives were completely accountable for acting in the place of the absent and deposed Scottish Queen. Cecil requested that Mary's representatives, John Maxwell, fourth Lord Herries, and John Lesley, Bishop of Ross, declare themselves as official representatives of Mary so the pair could not claim ignorance about her situation.¹⁷ Excluding the York-Westminster conference and the events that followed allows us to better assess activities that led to the Regent Moray's government using diplomatic representatives to secure his legitimacy.¹⁸ By framing the Queen-to-Queen diplomacy of 1561 to 1567 with the two exceptional periods which bookended it, the importance of diplomacy in establishing legitimacy, the choice of personnel, and the nature of the commissions becomes evident. Having outlined the chronology of this thesis, we will now turn to the broader diplomatic context in which this period sits.

Changes in the Sixteenth-Century British Isles and Western European Diplomacy

The sixteenth century saw changes in political alliances and religious reformations that spread across Western Europe and altered the diplomatic stage. One crucial change was where monarchs had previously relied on warfare to resolve their conflicts, they now

¹⁶ Amy Blakeway, 'Kinship and diplomacy in sixteenth-century Scotland: the earl of Northumberland's captivity in its domestic and international context, 1569-72', *Institute of Historical Research*, Vol. 87, No. 236 (May 2014), pp. 229-250; Blakeway, *Regency*, p. 214.

¹⁷ Webb, "The Gude Regent?", p. 103.

¹⁸ Donaldson, *All the Queen's Men*, pp. 88-89; Webb, "The Gude Regent?", pp. 102-107.

exchanged ambassadors to pre-empt or to end hostilities. The change can be identified from the early-sixteenth century onwards when monarchs slowly implemented what Mattingly has described as the Italian model of resident diplomacy. This shift was identified through the opening of embassies at different courts in order to cement deeper connections between courts and provide frequent and detailed communication.¹⁹ In some cases, an ambassador was not enough and monarchs reverted to the ‘personal diplomacy of sovereigns’, characterised by summits between the rulers, such as the Field of the Cloth of Gold conference between Henry VIII and Francis I in 1520.²⁰ By the late-sixteenth century, there were fewer meetings between monarchs because of the security risks involved and the monarch could not always afford to be absent from the court for an extended period of time. In the summer of 1562, Mary and Elizabeth had planned to meet in the north of England. However, after Mary’s half-brother, François de Lorraine, second Duke of Guise, assaulted a group of French Huguenots in the towns of Tours and Sens, there was a danger that, for Elizabeth, the meeting between the two Queens would send the wrong message to the world stage. She felt there was no choice but to cancel the meeting. In 1563 and 1565, English and Scottish counsellors attempted to rekindle the enthusiasm for a meeting between the two queens. However, the importance was lost because Mary’s search for her second husband took precedence and the need for the spectacle of a meeting between the two courts had lost its momentum. Thankfully, the presence of the English resident ambassador in Scotland, Randolph, and the regular

¹⁹ See, Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Johnathan Cape, 1955)

²⁰ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 151-153; *ibid.*, p. 172; Glenn Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy: the reigns of Henry VIII, Francis I, and Charles V* (London: Arnold, 2002); Glenn Richardson, *The Field of the Cloth of Gold* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

For examples of religious change see, Agnes Mure Mackenzie, *Rival Establishments in Scotland, 1560-1690* (London: S.P.C.K, 1952); Diane Fett, ‘Information, Intelligence, and Negotiation in the West European Diplomatic World, 1558-1588’ (PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 2009).

Scottish ambassador to England, Maitland, helped to sustain the Anglo-Scottish relationship between 1563 and 1565.

The exchange of resident ambassadors first became common in the early decades of the sixteenth century. In the context of English diplomacy, Mattingly outlined a clear transition between the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, with an increased use of the resident ambassador during Cardinal Thomas Wolsey's influential years (1515-29), as he enacted Henry VIII's desire to present himself on a European stage. This style of Italian diplomacy then slowly spread throughout the rest of Europe in the early decades of the sixteenth century.²¹ However, the use of the resident ambassador was not evenly spread throughout Europe.²² As far as we know, the first Italian resident embassy was sent in the 1450s and, as this study has identified, the first Scottish resident embassy that Mary decided to commission to England was Sir Robert Melville in 1566.²³ Sending a resident ambassador demonstrated that one monarch wanted to maintain amicable relations with another country and to receive frequent information. In the context of the Anglo-Scottish tensions highlighted in this thesis, the sending of a resident ambassador also indicated that a monarch was interested in furthering their own agenda or protecting the security of their country through intelligence-gathering.

A secure diplomatic relationship between England and Scotland continued to struggle to flourish between 1558 and 1560 because three hundred years of warfare had broken down any trust. This was further complicated by a third country, France. Between 1296 and 1560, the Auld Alliance was a military pact between France and Scotland. It was continually reinstated as a defence mechanism should the English attack the other

²¹ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 139.

²² Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', *History Compass*, Vol. 14, No. 9 (2016), p. 442.

²³ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 57-58.

country.²⁴ It was not until April 1558 when the marriage of Mary and Francois – the sovereign Scottish monarch and the heir to the French throne – created an alliance between Scotland and France that was even stronger than the ancient pact. As a gesture, before the wedding, Mary submitted her inherited titles to her father-in-law, Henry II. Such a bold move was later reflected in the news reports of the English ambassador to France, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton. He warned the English government by sending a copy of the new French coat of arms that declared Mary was ‘Quene Dolphines of france’ and ‘Off Scotland quene and of Ingland also Off Ireland als’.²⁵ Mary’s claim to the English throne dated back to her paternal grandmother, Margaret Tudor who married James V in 1502 under the terms of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace. It was this dynastic claim that continued to threaten the English until Mary’s death in 1587. Although the longstanding Auld Alliance between France and Scotland was legally severed in July 1560 when the Treaty of Edinburgh was signed, Elizabeth Bonner and Siobhan Talbot have more recently argued that social, cultural, and economic benefits continued and were evident long after.²⁶ This thesis adds and builds on Bonner and Talbot’s arguments through the less examined Franco-Scottish diplomatic relationship of the 1560s. The absence of a signed document for the Auld Alliance in the 1560s did not eradicate the threat of an unofficial Franco-Scottish alliance or prevent France from sending money or military aid to Scotland.

²⁴ Gordon Donaldson, *James V to James VII* (Oliver & Boyd, 1965); Richard Glen Eaves, *Henry VIII’s Scottish Diplomacy, 1513-1524: England’s Relations with the Regency Government of James V* (New York: Exposition Press Inc., 1971); W. Ferguson, *Scotland’s Relations with England* (John Donald, 1977); Elizabeth Bonner, ‘French Naturalization of the Scots in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century’, *Historical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December, 1997), pp. 1085-1115; Elizabeth Bonner, ‘Scotland’s ‘Auld Alliance’ with France, 1295-1560’, *The Historical Association*, Vol. 84, No. 273 (January, 1999), pp. 5-30. The Auld Alliance was renewed 1371, 1390-1, 1407-8, 1423, 1428, 1484, 1491-2. France and Scotland established a joined nation after the marriage to Mary, Queen of Scots to Francois Dauphine of France on 24 April 1558.

²⁵ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 17v-18r, False Arms of Mary, Queen of Scots, [n.d.] July 1559.

²⁶ Elizabeth Bonner, ‘Scotland’s ‘Auld Alliance’ with France, 1295-1560’, *The Historical Association*, Vol. 84, No. 273 (January, 1999), p. 29; Siobhan Talbot, *Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 1560-1713* (Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), pp. 15-33.

Religious alliances and rivalries contributed to how diplomacy was conducted in the 1560s. After the conclusion of peace between England, Scotland, France, and Spain in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, Mattingly emphasises that religious tensions ‘nearly wrecked the diplomatic institutions with which Europe had been trying to adjust its quarrels’.²⁷ The tensions were partly the result of the passage of the Elizabethan religious settlement, 1559; the Scottish Reformation revolt, 1559, and the French Wars of religion, 1562. Mattingly gives the example of Gómez Suárez de Figueroa y Córdoba, Count of Feria and the Spanish resident ambassador in England, and Sir Thomas Challenor, English resident ambassador in Spain, both of whom felt excluded from their host court due to the religious preference of their monarch in the 1560s.²⁸ Thus, the resident ambassador was used less frequently after religious changes caused divisions in Europe, and if one was sent, he needed to be selected carefully. Whilst Mattingly has provided a framework for understanding the changes in diplomatic service in the sixteenth century, this thesis examines the structures of diplomacy in the context of the 1560s when religious changes in England were more settled than earlier in the century but, in the case of Scotland, these were still in the process of being established.

With new and exciting religious and political changes in the sixteenth century and in the context of diplomacy, scholarship has been quick to focus on other changes in structures of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy post-1560. Platt and Gary M. Bell were the first to identify changes in the way Elizabeth’s diplomacy was conducted. A few examples were: the frequency of the commissions, the length of the embassy, the increased involvement of the principal secretary (specifically in the 1560s), and finally the training,

²⁷ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 167.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-192.

if any, that an ambassador received.²⁹ In the specific context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, Bell has already laid the groundwork for understanding patterns and personnel during Elizabeth's reign, arguing that these key changes laid the foundations for a proto-modern model of diplomacy.³⁰ The permanent changes included the role of the principal secretary in diplomacy from the home court; one-man missions; the repeated use of men; the inclusion of a broader geographical context; the increase in planning and finance dedicated to diplomacy, and the appointment of the embassy secretary or secretaries.³¹ Recently, Luke MacMahon has argued that the patterns that Bell identified as being distinctive to Elizabethan diplomacy were actually present during the reign of her father Henry VIII.³² This thesis builds on both Bell and MacMahon's arguments by the comparing the patterns in English diplomacy to those of Scotland in the 1560s. It identifies that there were clear differences between the experience of the personnel selected for commissions as well as the type and length of the embassies. All this depends on the rationale for sending each embassy – and these ideas will be further developed in Chapter One.³³ Furthermore, this thesis also takes into account MacMahon's approach in examining diplomatic practices and procedures over a period not constrained by one monarch's rule, in this case examining Elizabeth and Mary's predecessors, to understand whether there were continuations in the 1560s.

There is no equivalent study for the changes in people, practice, and procedures in Scottish diplomacy during Mary's personal rule. In 2013, Keith Brown identified beyond simple questions of success and failure that Scottish foreign policy post-1560 had

²⁹ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', pp. 267-288; F. Jeffrey Platt, 'The Elizabethan Diplomatic Service' *Quidditas*, Vol. 9, Article 9 (1988), pp. 93-114; F. Jeffrey Platt, 'The Elizabethan "Foreign Office"', *The Historian*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1994), pp. 725-740.

³⁰ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', p. 284.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VII, c. 1509-1548', p. 280.

³³ See Chapter 1: The Personnel in England and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 51-81.

not yet ‘inspired a major study’.³⁴ What little has been conducted focuses on Mary’s foreign policy in the 1560s through her marriage negotiations with Portugal and the Holy Roman Empire.³⁵ Cynthia Fry was the first to place Scottish diplomacy in the wider context of James VI’s diplomatic relationship with Europe by understanding how, tactically, James would favour one country, and used this to his advantage in his relationship with other countries.³⁶ The patterns in the personnel and procedure in English and Scottish diplomacy need to be assimilated from a study of the 1560s to understand the origins of amicable diplomacy in the isle and what similarities there were between Marian and Jacobean diplomacy after 1584.

As highlighted earlier, Mattingly identified that the use of the resident ambassador increased in the early-sixteenth century.³⁷ This came at the expense of letter bearers or heralds on diplomatic embassies.³⁸ Between the fourteenth and early-sixteenth century, the terms *legatus*, *missus*, and *nuncius* were used to describe the bearers of messages, both written and verbal.³⁹ These men carried messages between the two courts and were trusted with important and often secret information. Recent scholarship has recognised the heralds’ importance in maintaining political and diplomatic relations in medieval England, Scotland, and on the continent.⁴⁰ The men who held the post of herald were well-educated, had experience in civil law or politics, had a high status (through a title or

³⁴ Keith Brown, ‘Early Modern Scottish History – A Survey’, *SHR*, 92, Supplement (April, 2013), p. 6.

³⁵ For literature on Mary’s marriages see, Wormald, *Mary, Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure*, pp. 129-148; *ibid.* pp. 181-183; Elizabeth Bonner, ‘Mary Queen of Scots: The Young Queen’ *Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish*, Vol. 10 (2006), p. 57; Martin Hume, *The Love Affairs of Mary Queen of Scots* (USA: First Racehorse Publishing edition, 2020).

³⁶ Cynthia Fry, ‘Diplomacy and Deception: King James VI of Scotland’s Foreign Relations with Europe (c.1584-1603)’ (PhD Thesis: St Andrews, 2014), p. 24.

³⁷ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 139.

³⁸ Other terms that refer to the bearer of messages are letter bearer, herald, messenger, and bute pursuivant.

³⁹ Donald Queller, *The Office of the Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 4.

⁴⁰ Katie Stephenson, ‘Introduction’, Katie Stephenson, ed., *The Herald in Late Medieval Europe* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2009), p. 3.

land), spoke foreign languages, and were of good moral character.⁴¹ The qualities were not dissimilar to those required of an ambassador. The Scottish court relied on the use of heralds for more than a century longer than the English court. This was because in the late fifteenth century the herald in England was incorporated into the creation of colleges of heralds, which naturally led to the professionalisation of the role and took them away from the control of the crown. This made them less attractive for diplomatic missions because they were not operating under the patronage of the monarch.⁴² In contrast, Scottish heralds were chosen by the monarch in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and were closely linked to land that was owned by the crown. It was not until the sixteenth century that heralds were managed by the Lyon Kings of Arms and were able to assert their independence from the crown. Even then, heralds in Scotland did not become a professional body until 1587 at the earliest.⁴³ M. S. Anderson argues that it was ‘without deliberate planning on the part of any government, a group of men [were employed] who can fairly be described as professional diplomats in the sixteenth century’.⁴⁴ However, this professional body in England had already emerged. In the 1560s, it was still not uncommon for heralds or letter bearers to be used to carry oral messages alongside an actual letter in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, but ambassadors were the main accredited diplomats.⁴⁵

⁴¹ See, Katie Stephenson, ‘Introduction’, Katie Stephenson, ed., *The Herald in Late Medieval Europe* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2009), p. 7; Katie Stephenson, ‘The Officers of Arms of Late Medieval Scotland’, Katie Stephenson, ed., *The Herald in Late Medieval Europe* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2009), p. 64.

⁴² For the discussion of the professionalisation of English heralds in the late-fifteenth century see, Jackson Armstrong, ‘The Development of the Office of the Arms in England’, in Katie Stephenson, ed., *The Herald in Late Medieval Europe* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2009), pp. 25-27.

⁴³ Katie Stephenson, ‘The Officers of Arms of Late Medieval Scotland’, Katie Stephenson, ed., *The Herald in Late Medieval Europe* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2009), pp. 43-48, 50-53, 66.

⁴⁴ M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1415-1919* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 11. Arguably, Anderson provides the best overview of the changes that took place in diplomacy in the sixteenth century.

⁴⁵ For an English example, TNA SP 52/3, ff. 7r-8v, Norfolk and his Council to Cecil, 4 April 1560 [CSP Scot 1547-63, no. 709]. Henry Ray was sent from Berwick-upon-Tweed to Mary of Guise, Regent of Scotland, and was stopped on his return at Dunbar.

As well as the changes to the type of person selected as an ambassador, the ‘new diplomatic history’ has also expanded boundaries to understand how formal diplomacy needs to be understood alongside strict periodisation, different modes of communication and the role of religion.⁴⁶ Religion was an important factor in Sowerby’s study of the diplomatic career of Sir Richard Morison, the resident ambassador to the Holy Roman Emperor, under Henry VIII. She examines how the religious preferences of the ambassador complicated the already strained Anglo-Imperial relations in the 1550s. During his embassy, Morison protested to Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, about being prevented from practising his Protestant religion privately during his embassy to the Catholic court.⁴⁷ Whilst ambassadorial handbooks spent little time discussing the importance of religious worship during an embassy, Alberico Gentili believed that for an ambassador his religion was his top priority. He wrote that ‘not even a resident ambassador should obey, if his sovereign should want him to do something which detracts even in the smallest degree from his obligations to God’.⁴⁸ However, Sowerby engages with how Morison utilised this point of contention to his advantage by communicating with his own personal, Protestant religious networks outside the Imperial court, to acquire news and gossip to report back to the English government.⁴⁹

A second way in which religion changed diplomacy was linked to the religious reformations and counter-reformations that spread across the continent from the early-sixteenth century. As a result, clerics, whose education and family credentials had previously made them popular choices as diplomats in the fifteenth century, were now

⁴⁶ M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1415-1919* (London: Longman, 1993), p. 11.

⁴⁷ Tracey Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morison* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 197.

⁴⁸ Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 173.

⁴⁹ Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England*, p. 197.

viewed as a controversial, or provocative choice.⁵⁰ Luke MacMahon identified that clergymen were deployed less frequently after Henry VIII's break with the Roman Catholic Church in the mid-1530s, and clerical men tended to be commissioned tactically to countries where they already had a network or whose rulers supported their religious reformation.⁵¹ This is not to say that ambassadors who had no clerical training or position did not have their own religious beliefs; their belief which might impact the negotiations during an embassy – something we have already seen this was the case with Morison. In Anglo-Scottish relations in the 1560s, this thesis identifies that the vast majority of ambassadors were Reformed, generally speaking Calvinists in theological terms, and worshipped in their respective established churches. The exception was Mary's decision to send David Chalmers in 1565 to both the English and French court. Chalmers was the only openly known Catholic of all the English and Scottish ambassadors in the 1560s and was commissioned at a time when the tension between the queens was mirrored in the diplomatic commissions. However, the frequent exchange of known Protestant ambassadors in Anglo-Scottish relations was in keeping with already recognised patterns of continental diplomacy in the mid-sixteenth century.⁵²

By 1558, the practice of sending ambassadors instead of heralds and exchanging a resident ambassador was firmly established in English and Scottish diplomacy. There has been a renewed interest in scholarship to understand the resident ambassador. Sowerby's research on the life and career of Richard Morison as the English resident ambassador to the Holy Roman Empire during the reign of Henry VIII shifted the focus

⁵⁰ See, MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII: The Personnel of English Diplomacy', pp. 63-114; Diane Fett, 'Information, Intelligence and Negotiation in the West European Diplomatic World, 1558-1588' (PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 2009). Fett points to the influences of religion of countries, religious beliefs of ambassadors, and religious alliances throughout her thesis.

⁵¹ MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII, The Personnel of English Diplomacy', p. 64.

⁵² See, MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII, The Personnel of English Diplomacy', p. 110; Denise Fett, Denise Fett, 'Information, Intelligence, and Negotiations in the West European Diplomatic World, 1558-1588' (PhD Thesis, Ohio State University, 2009), pp. 18-19.

to understanding the longevity of embassies.⁵³ By focusing on the individuals commissioned, including ambassadors and other agents, this thesis takes its cue from the emphasis in the ‘new diplomatic history’ on ‘the actions, behaviour, and status of diplomatic agents and the responses they triggered rather than the influence they exerted upon big turns’.⁵⁴ More recently, the ‘new diplomatic history’ has expanded its focus on diplomatic personnel to examine more than just an ambassadors but to encompass a wider range of different people who were involved in negotiations, information-gathering, and diplomatic networks. This includes the ambassador’s personal network; non-state actors, such as merchants and travellers; as well as *Hofdamen*, or women at court.⁵⁵ If these individuals, women in particular, could not be dispatched on diplomatic missions, then women both at the court or from noble families became part of an ambassador’s network. In recent years, the role of elite women in politics at the English, Scottish, and European court and their role in national and international politics is recognised by scholars.⁵⁶ On the English side of the border, there is evidence of women’s involvement in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. A queen was surrounded by women in her privy chamber and this

⁵³ Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England*, pp. 190-203; see also, Neil Younger, *Religion and Politics in Elizabethan England: The Life of Sir Christopher Hatton* (Manchester University Press: Politics, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain series, 2022); Rosalyn Cousins, ‘The diplomatic authority of William Davison’, *Historical Research*, Vol. 20, (2024), pp. 1-13.

⁵⁴ Sowerby and Hennings, ed., *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*, p. 18.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ For the English court, see, Natalie Mears, ‘Politics in the Elizabethan privy chamber: Lady Mary Sidney and Kat Ashley’, J. Daybell, ed., *Women and politics in Early modern England, 1450-1700* (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 67-82; Barbara J. Harris, ‘Sisterhood, Friendship and the Power of English Aristocratic Women, 1450-1550’, J. Daybell, ed., *Women and politics in Early modern England, 1450-1700* (Aldershot, 2004); James Daybell, ‘Gender, Politics and Diplomacy: Women, News and Intelligence Networks in Elizabethan England’, Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, ed., *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), pp. 101-114; Gemma Allen, *The Cooke sisters: education, piety and politics in early modern England* (Manchester, 2013), pp. 126-136; Helen Graham-Matheson, ‘Petticoats and Politics: Elisabeth Parr and Female Agency at the Early Elizabethan Court’, Nadine Akkerman and Birgit Houben, eds., *The Politics of the Female Households: Ladies-in-Waiting across Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Felicity Heal, *The Power of Gifts: Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 39, p. 43, p. 57.

For the Scottish court, see, Rosalind K. Marshall, *Queen Mary’s Women: Female relatives, servants, friends and enemies of Mary, Queen of Scots* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2006).

For European courts, see, Nadine Akkerman and Birgit Houben, eds., *The Politics of the Female Households: Ladies-in-Waiting across Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2013), and the early chapters of G. Sluga and C. James, eds., *Women, diplomacy and international politics since 1500* (Abingdon, 2016).

exclusive access made women useful to the queen's male courtiers.⁵⁷ James Daybell demonstrates that noble women enjoyed access to information extending beyond court.⁵⁸ This drew attention to how women's epistolary networks helped them keep in contact with government officials, above all Cecil, and how they used their family status to gain this privileged access.⁵⁹ Building on this gives us an opportunity to redefine women's roles in diplomacy in relation to their relationships with ambassadors has emerged. Notably, Gemma Allen's groundbreaking work on ambassadresses (the wives of ambassadors) has demonstrated that women were actively involved in cultivating intelligence networks at the host court as well as their own.⁶⁰ Using the framework of the 'new diplomatic history', Allen has already drawn attention to the important role the wife of an ambassador played in his own and in other diplomatic networks at the host and home court. Whilst this thesis praises Allen's framework, it also leads us to the conclusion that we need to reconsider the type of person who should be identified as 'diplomatic personnel', which will be addressed in Chapter One.⁶¹

The 'new diplomatic history' has attempted to step away from an ambassador's role as simply being a mouthpiece of the monarch to examine other functions. Mattingly emphasised that one of the chief functions of an ambassador was to negotiate.⁶² However, more recent scholarship has shown that ambassadors had a more extensive range of responsibilities. The importance of ambassadors as purveyors of news for their own

⁵⁷ Natalie Mears, 'Politics in the Elizabethan Privy Chamber: Lady Mary Sidney and Kat Ashley' in James Daybell, ed., *Women and Politics in Early Modern England, 1470-1700* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 69.

⁵⁸ James Daybell, 'Gender, Politics and Diplomacy: Women, News and Intelligence Networks in Elizabethan England', Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, ed., *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 101.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁶⁰ Gemma Allen, 'The Rise of the Ambadress: English Ambassadorial Wives and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture', *The Historic Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2019), pp. 617-638.

⁶¹ See Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 81-124.

⁶² Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 253.

monarch and government is well established in a range of contexts.⁶³ Catherine Fletcher has shown that the house and household of the ambassador were viewed as domestic spaces where diplomatic meetings took place to gather information more privately than in the court.⁶⁴ One especially challenging area was the reporting of gossip and rumours in oral circulation. Ambassadors' reports were filled with gossip and rumours as well as legitimate political discussions and debates. The reporting of rumours is demonstrated in Retha Warnicke's study of the Spanish ambassador, Bernardino de Mendoza. In short, Mendoza reported on the interaction between Elizabeth and the Scottish ambassador to Spain, although he had misunderstood what had occurred and his report was erroneous. This changed the outcome of what was decided during the Scottish embassy.⁶⁵ Warnicke demonstrates the importance of accurate news reporting and the ambassador's skills in being able to identify and convey useful information. Not all news came from official audiences with the monarch, and reporting wider currents of opinion and information was also necessary. Amy Blakeway's study draws attention to the importance of news that was transported across the Anglo-Scottish border.⁶⁶ News from Scottish ambassadors took a variety of forms: prints sent by ambassadors, texts translated and reprinted in England as well as oral messages.⁶⁷ Literature in the forms of printed pamphlets and

⁶³ For literature on news and news networks of ambassadors see, Diane Fett 'Information, Intelligence, and Negotiation in the West European Diplomatic World, 1558-1588' (PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 2009); Joad Raymond, 'News Networks: Putting the 'News' and 'Networks' Back in', Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham, ed., *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2016); Tracey Sowerby, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks and the Spread of News' Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham, ed., *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

⁶⁴ Catherine Fletcher, 'Furnished with gentlemen': the ambassador's house in sixteenth-century Italy', *Renaissance Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4, (Sept., 2010), p. 534.

⁶⁵ Retha Warnicke, 'Diplomatic Rumour-Mongering: An Analysis of Mendoza's Report on Elizabeth I's Audience with Scottish Ambassadors in 1583', Robert S. Struges, ed., *Law and Sovereignty: in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), p. 128.

⁶⁶ See, Amy Blakeway, 'Newes from Scotland' in England, 1559-1602', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 79, No. 4, (2016), pp. 533-559.

⁶⁷ Amy Blakeway, 'Newes from Scotland' in England, 1559-1602', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 79, No. 4, (2016), pp.535-6.

ballads travelled with the ambassadors.⁶⁸ Specifically, Tricia McElroy identifies that in the aftermath of Mary's deposition, ambassadors, such as Throckmorton, used the opportunity of the national unrest to send copies of ballads south of the border.⁶⁹ Likewise, Robert Sempill's ballads written after the assassination of the Regent Moray in 1570, were of interest to the English court in understanding public opinion in Scotland and were duly sent south.⁷⁰ Embassies such as these, which coincided with a domestic, national or international altercation, often prompted political commentary.⁷¹ This created the perfect opportunity for diplomats to engage with the news from printed sources.

The sixteenth century saw the rise in both the career diplomat and the principal secretary's involvement in diplomacy. The monarch's personal secretaries were actively involved in the smooth running of diplomacy through the organisation of correspondence belonging to both the monarch as well as the ambassador.⁷² Arnold Hunt describes the secretary as 'an invisible servant' which supports the argument that he 'was the power behind the throne, keeper of secrets and guardian of the *arcana imperii*'.⁷³ During the reign of Elizabeth, this was the responsibility of Cecil. He oversaw the running of daily business, national and international, and royal correspondence.⁷⁴ Cecil's greatest

⁶⁸ Priscilla Bawcett, 'Crossing the Border: Scottish Poetry and the English Readers in the Sixteenth Century' in Sally Mapstone and Juliette Wood, ed., *The Rose and the Thistle: Essays on the Culture of Medieval and Renaissance Scotland* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press Ltd, 1998), p. 63.

⁶⁹ Tricia A. McElroy, 'Imagining the "Scottis Natioun": Populism and Propaganda in Scottish Satirical Broadside', *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, Vol. 49, No. 4, (2007), pp. 319-339; Tricia McElroy, 'A "Quarrell sett out in metre": Towards a New Edition of Scottish Reformation Satirical Literature', *Studies in Scottish Literature*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2013), pp. 22-30.

⁷⁰ Amy Blakeway, 'The Response to the Regent Moray's Assassination', *SHR*, Vol. 88, No. 225 (2009), pp. 19-24.

⁷¹ Amy Blakeway, 'A Scottish Anti-Catholic Satire Crossing the Border: 'Ane bull of our haly fader the paip quhairby it is lessum to everie man to haif tua wyffis' and the Redeswyre Raid of 1575', *EHR*, Vol. 79, No. 541 (2015), p. 1349.

⁷² Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 225; Arnold Hunt, 'The Early Modern Secretary and the Early Modern Archive', Kate Peters, Alexandra Walsham, Liesbeth Corens, ed., *Archives and information in the early modern world* (Oxford: The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 113.

⁷³ Hunt, 'The Early Modern Secretary and the Early Modern Archive', p. 106.

⁷⁴ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 32.

contribution to diplomacy was the control he exerted over his own personal correspondence network – this contained both English and other foreign ambassadors – as well as the drafting of correspondence and documents on Elizabeth’s behalf. A large quantity of the meticulous note-taker’s work survives in the *State Papers*, Cotton collections, Lansdowne collection and at Hatfield House.⁷⁵ Susan Doran draws attention to Cecil’s importance at the English court as his influence drew correspondents to write to him instead of Elizabeth.⁷⁶ However, Doran concludes that whilst this allowed Cecil to be involved in English national and international affairs, Elizabeth still had the final say and approval on all major policies.⁷⁷ One example dates from 1559, when Cecil and Elizabeth disagreed about assisting the Scottish Lords of the Congregation against the French forces, which we will explore more in Chapter Three. Cecil favoured intervention and Elizabeth’s lack of action on assisting the rebels almost led to the secretary’s resignation. Between 1559 and 1560, Cecil’s correspondence with English officials stationed at Berwick paved the way for the negotiations to aid the Lords of Congregation and to finalise the Treaty of Edinburgh. The treaty was concluded by Cecil himself and Sir Nicholas Wotton in Newcastle and Edinburgh.⁷⁸ Whilst the conclusion of the contents of the Treaty of Edinburgh was successful, Cecil’s skills were more effective at the English court as he was the centre of a vast news network, acting as the key contact at the English court for ambassadors, noble men, and noblewomen. Alford describes Cecil as a contradiction, he was both a loyal servant to the crown but also acted how he saw necessary to preserve the Elizabethan monarchy.⁷⁹ As Elizabeth’s principal secretary,

⁷⁵ For examples of where to find Cecil’s correspondence and letters from correspondents in relation to Anglo-Scottish relations, see TNA SP 70; TNA SP 52; TNA SP 12/2; BL MSS Cotton Caligula B VIII-X; BL MSS Cotton Caligula CI-V; BL Lansdowne MS 13-34; Hatfield House, Cecil Papers.

⁷⁶ Doran, *Elizabeth and her Circle*, p. 221.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 80-83.

⁷⁹ Stephen Alford, ‘The Political Creed of William Cecil, John F. McDiarmid, *The Monarchical Republic of early Modern England: essays in response to Patrick Collinson* (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), p. 75.

these two attributes were useful but as an ambassador, this could have resulted in him following his own agenda whilst representing his monarch abroad.

Cecil's Scottish opposite, Maitland, took a different approach in his involvement in Scotland's diplomatic relationship with England. He started his career as secretary of state to Mary of Guise in 1558, and then openly defected to the Lords of the Congregation in October 1559. Between 1561 and 1567, Maitland returned to the position of principal secretary when Mary, Queen of Scots returned from France to Scotland, and later served in the Regent Moray's regime after the Scottish Queen was deposed. Maitland was perhaps the most important man in the Scottish Privy Council during Mary's personal reign and was frequently sent on embassies to England.⁸⁰ Traditionally, Maitland was understood to be promoting a pro-British agenda in his position as principal secretary.⁸¹ Mark Loughlin, the author of the political biography of Maitland, rejects the idea of the secretary as an Anglophile.⁸² To give an example, Loughlin demonstrates that Maitland toyed with the English government's hopes of a union in order to secure financial and military aid during negotiations for the 1560 Treaty of Berwick. Ultimately, Maitland ensured that the Treaty's text did not mention a religious or a political union so there was no legal obligation. Instead, he continued to push this narrative in his correspondence throughout the 1560s.⁸³ Thus, Loughlin argues that Maitland 'was able to expose the amity for what it was, nothing more than a precarious, private, personal friendship between the two queens unendorsed by any public contract'.⁸⁴ His argument is supported by this thesis. Chapter Three identifies the continuation of diplomatic practices used by England and Scotland to gather intelligence and to protect their own country as part of a

⁸⁰ BL MS Cotton Caligula B X f. 198, Sir Ralph Sadler and Sir James Croft to Cecil, 25 November 1559.

⁸¹ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 89.

⁸² See, Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573'.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

broader pattern representing what was underlying mistrust in the amicable relationship. Loughlin's study of the political actions and correspondence of Maitland identifies that Anglo-Scottish relations were not as strong in this period as was first thought and the English and Scottish governments both wanted different outcomes from the 1560 negotiations.⁸⁵

Whilst the two principal secretaries are usually compared in the broader context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, Allinson brought Cecil and Maitland together to compare and contrast their backgrounds, political and personal relationship, and influence from the point of view of their role as secretaries.⁸⁶ On an international stage, both Cecil and Maitland were recognised by foreign ambassadors as having 'influence over their respective queens'.⁸⁷ In reality, their influence was limited. Between 1560 and 1568, Cecil and Maitland's efforts in influencing Anglo-Scottish diplomacy was clear through their joint objective in their correspondence of uniting the two countries in peace and amity.⁸⁸ This was accomplished in two different ways. For Cecil, this was achieved by being the centre of a correspondence network whilst he remained present at the English court. Whereas for four years, Maitland was juggling his responsibilities at the Scottish court alongside his face-to-face diplomatic negotiations at the English court. Both Cecil and Maitland were undeniably central to a discussion of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and were heavily involved in the development of the relationship between the two nations. However, beyond Maitland's embassies to London in the first half of the 1560s, diplomacy was conducted through the correspondence and presence of the resident and extraordinary ambassadors.

⁸⁵ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573', p. 343.

⁸⁶ Rayne Allinson, 'Parables and Dark Sentences: The Correspondence of Sir William Cecil and Sir William Maitland (1559-1573)', P. Dover, ed., *Secretaries and Statecraft* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 91.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

The 1560s saw the establishment of career diplomats in both England, as was drawn attention to by Bell, and Scotland.⁸⁹ In terms of English ambassadors, only Randolph, Throckmorton and Sir Henry Killigrew have had their lives and diplomatic careers studied.⁹⁰ Turning attention to biographies of men with extensive diplomatic careers, Amos C. Miller described Killigrew's employment as 'one of the most interesting and varied careers of any man in the Elizabethan age'.⁹¹ Miller demonstrates that Killigrew moved up the diplomatic ranking to secretary to the ambassador and finally to an ambassador in his own right. This was the definition of a professional diplomat in the sixteenth century. Katharine Frescoln assessed the role of Randolph as an English ambassador to Scotland between 1559 and 1565 and his reappointment as an ambassador to Scotland in the 1570s and 1580s.⁹² Frescoln demonstrated through Randolph's diplomatic career that he was a 'dedicated and resourceful servant' and credited him with being a contributing factor to the success of Elizabeth's reign.⁹³ The focus on Scotland, however, needs to be contextualised within Randolph's overall career as an English ambassador to Russia, a Member of Parliament, and a successful Master of the Post, which was a position given to him as a result of his efforts in Scotland. Despite

⁸⁹ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', p. 284.

⁹⁰ For *ODNB* entries on the English ambassador see, Arnold Bronckorst, 'Sidney, Sir Henry (1529-1586)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Stanford Lehmborg, 'Throckmorton, Sir Nicholas (1515/16-1571)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Carol Levin, 'Percy, Henry, eighth earl of Northumberland (c. 1532-1585)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Michael A. R. Graves, 'Howard, Thomas, fourth Duke of Norfolk (1538-1572)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Julian Lock, 'Thomas Randolph (1525/6-1590)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Luke MacMahon, 'Sir Henry Killigrew (1525x8-1603)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Wallace T. MacCaffrey, 'Russell, Francis, second earl of Bedford (1526/7-15850)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); D. M. Ogier, 'Leighton, Sir Thomas (c. 1530-1610)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Michael Zell, 'Wotton, Nicholas (c. 1497-1567)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

There is no *ODNB* records for Sir Peter Mewtas, Sir John Tamworth, and Sir Henry Middlemore.

⁹¹ See, V. Smith, 'Diplomatic Counsel and the Shaping of Anglo-Scottish Relations (1558-69): the British Perspectives of Nicholas Throckmorton and Thomas Randolph', (PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2024). This thesis is under embargo from April 2024 and therefore could not be taken into account in this research.

⁹² Amos C. Miller, *Sir Henry Killigrew: Elizabethan Soldier and Diplomat* (Leicester, 1963), p. 1.

⁹³ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', p. 508.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

Throckmorton's two, short, crisis management embassies to Scotland in the 1560s, only his career in France between 1559 and 1562 has been studied in detail by Kenneth Kisner. Through an application of the framework of the 'new diplomatic history', Kisner argues that Throckmorton sent advice and counsel in the form of news to Elizabeth and Cecil to advance their decision to support the Lords of the Congregation against the French forces in Scotland. Whilst there are only a handful of studies focusing on individual English ambassadors, dedicated works which concentrate on the individual Scottish ambassadors commissioned to England are non-existent. Maitland, Robert Melville, and James Melville are the best known of the Scottish ambassadors.⁹⁴ Robert Melville was sent to England in 1559, 1565 and 1586, and James Melville was dispatched to England in 1564.⁹⁵ James is especially well-known as the author of a famous memoir recalling his firsthand experience as a diplomat.⁹⁶ The two different transcriptions of his memoirs emphasise the significance of the diary of a former Scottish ambassador to England. As well as the Scottish extraordinary ambassador's memoirs, we are also fortunate to have John Maxwell, fourth Lord Herries's memoirs survive. This offers a different perspective on the events of the 1560s and more importantly from the perspective of one of Mary's closest supporters in 1568.

⁹⁴ For *ODNB* entries on the Scottish ambassador see, ee Elaine Finnie Greig, 'Melville, Sir James, of Halhill (1535/6-1617)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Julian Goodare, 'Chalmers [Chambers], David, of Ormond, (c. 1533-1592)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mark Loughlin, 'Maitland, William of Leighton (1525x30 - 1573)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); R. R. Zulager, 'Melville, Robert, first Lord Melville (1527/8-1621)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); John Simmons, 'Wood, John (d. 1570)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

There are no *ODNB* entries for Yves de Rubay, Sir John Hay, and Nicholas Elphinstone.

⁹⁵ Greig, 'Melville, Sir James, of Halhill (1535/6-1617)'; R. R. Zulager, 'Melville, Robert, first Lord Melville (1527/8-1621)'.

⁹⁶ For James Melville, see *The Autobiography and Diary of Mr James Melville*, Robert Pitcairn, ed. (Edinburgh: Printed for the Wodrow Society, 1842); *The memoirs of Sir James Melville of Halhill*, Gordon Donaldson, ed. (London: Folio Society, 1969); *Memoirs of his own life, by Sir James Melville, of Halhill. 1549-93. From the original manuscript*, T. Thompson, ed. (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1827).

For Lord Herries, see, *Historical Memoirs of the Reign of Mary, Queen of Scots*, by John Maxwell, Lord Herries (Edinburgh, 1836).

Whilst Melville and Herries's memoirs were significant because they were anomalies, the correspondence of the ambassadors and monarchs was the bread-and-butter of diplomacy – and the main source for this thesis. The interest in the material letter has informed the approach in this thesis through the examination of ambassadorial correspondence. However, the 'new diplomatic history' approach has also widened the focus to examine different forms of communication. One form which is evident amongst monarchs in the sixteenth century was gift-exchange. Gifts were part of ceremonial practice between monarchs.⁹⁷ In broad terms, Natalie Zemon Davies's study of gift exchange in sixteenth-century France identified that gifts carried social meaning and agency.⁹⁸ More recently, Felicity Heal argues that by the mid-sixteenth century the extravagance and volume of gift-exchange was not what it used to be.⁹⁹ However, this cultural form of diplomatic communication was still active during the reign of Elizabeth, Mary, and James. Heal's study aims to understand the nature and meaning of gift-giving in early modern society, with a focus on the people involved in the process of the exchange rather than what was exchanged.¹⁰⁰ Heal identifies that gifts came in a number of forms: objects, titles, land, money, or even gossip. She is one of the only scholars to focus exclusively on Anglo-Scottish royal gift-exchange.¹⁰¹ In general, gift-giving between monarchs 'marked alliances, provided a form of dialogue with fellow monarchs', and was made more complex in Anglo-Scottish relations by 'neighbourhood, enmity and

⁹⁷ For literature on gifts and ceremonies see, Felicity Heal, *The Power of Gifts: Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 177; Natalie Zemon Davies, *The gift in sixteenth-century France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)

⁹⁸ Davies, *The gift in sixteenth-century France*, p. 14; *ibid.*, p. 209.

⁹⁹ Felicity Heal, 'Royal Gifts and Gift-Exchange in Sixteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Politics' in Steve Boardman, ed., *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 292.

¹⁰⁰ Felicity Heal, *The Power of Gifts: Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 6.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-60.

the imbalance of material resources'.¹⁰² Thus, the type of gift given, who gave the gift, the context in which the gift was given, and how it was received needs to be understood as a part of the wider dialogue between monarchs.

The most intimate gift was arguably a portrait. Sowerby maintains that because monarchs rarely met in person in the mid-sixteenth century, portraiture offered the type of intimacy that diplomatic summits had afforded.¹⁰³ Although both Heal and Sowerby focused on the gifts exchanged between monarchs, they also considered the role of the ambassadors who were transporting and presenting the gifts.¹⁰⁴ To broaden the focus on gift exchange, Heal engages with rewards for ambassadors from both Scotland and England: from England, Cecil, and from Scotland, Sir James Melville, and Maitland.¹⁰⁵ Whilst Heal does not directly compare the role gifts played in the embassies of these English and Scottish ambassadors, she does explore the context of gift-giving and how this reflected Anglo-Scottish relations. These encounters could be politically charged. For example, Blakeway has shown the important symbolism of gifts in 1567 when Throckmorton was commissioned on an embassy to the imprisoned Mary Stuart.¹⁰⁶ This embassy was disrupted when Moray, ruling on behalf of the young James VI, was appointed as regent whilst Throckmorton was residing in Edinburgh. There was still tension between Elizabeth and Moray over the English Queen's firm belief that Mary was still rightfully queen, which needed to be upheld by Throckmorton as Elizabeth's representative. Acting on his Queen's behalf, Throckmorton refused to accept the gift offered by the Regent upon his departure to England and by doing so he refused to accept

¹⁰² Felicity Heal, 'Royal Gifts and Gift-Exchange in Sixteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Politics' in Steve Boardman, ed., *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 300.

¹⁰³ Tracey Sowerby, 'A Memorial and a Pledge of Faith': Portraiture and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture', *EHR*, Vol. 79, No. 537 (2014), p. 309.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 286–287.

¹⁰⁵ Heal, *The Power of Gifts*, pp. 87–91; *ibid.*, p. 176.

¹⁰⁶ Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland*, p. 213.

Moray's authority as Regent.¹⁰⁷ Blakeway emphasises that diplomatic protocol did not always help the regent to assert their position, but the ambassador was confined to act as the representative of their monarch.

The above focuses on important aspects of the 'new diplomatic history' such as individual studies of ambassadors, gift-exchange, and other diplomatic personnel. And whilst studies of continental diplomacy still outnumber those of English, Scottish, or Anglo-Scottish diplomacy specifically, the scholarship which does exist in this area has shown broad areas of similarity with wider European norms. This thesis follows the framework set out in the 'new diplomatic history' by focusing on the actions of the individual and an understanding of what falls under the umbrella term of diplomatic personnel. Its emphasis is on those who were active in diplomacy, and it places this concept into the context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy.

The question remains, what in fact is still new about the 'new diplomatic history'. The term has been in use since the early 2000s and the framework of an actor-centred approach has been applied since the 1960s.¹⁰⁸ In her assessment of the historiography of diplomacy, Sowerby described the 'new diplomatic history' as 'no longer so new' but instead 'a broad church' that has 'successfully integrated wider concerns into a field that was once dominated by the study of bureaucracy and foreign policy'.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, this newly expanded framework is still being applied to different actors, countries, cultures, and genders, as well as across different disciplines, and using new sources to deliver new perspectives to the history of diplomacy. This helps to explain gaps that have been left in traditional assessments of diplomatic documents and foreign policy decisions. However, it must be noted that comparative approaches are still relatively new to the framework of

¹⁰⁷ Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland*, p. 213.

¹⁰⁸ Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages*; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*.

¹⁰⁹ Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', p. 448.

the ‘new diplomatic history’ where individual countries were still the focus. This thesis brings together what is, traditionally, separate assessments of English and Scottish diplomacy and combines this with the framework of the actor-centred approach of the ‘new diplomatic history’.

Changes to Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy

We have seen how the British Isles shared many practices and patterns with continental Europe as well as the benefits of a ‘new diplomatic history’ approach. However, there were of course unique factors within the context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, and it is now important to discuss the historiography related to this period more specifically. The concept of who maintained greater control in the relationship between England and Scotland is an especially important theme. One crucial element was the financial incentives offered by England to prevent the Scots from seeking alternative assistance from France.¹¹⁰ Recognising the importance of money to diplomacy does not, then, equate to the now outdated position that the Scots were subservient to or totally dependent on English favour. This view was epitomised by Maurice Lee who argued that the Regent James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton’s fall from power occurred because Scotland was a ‘satellite’ state to England, which was sacrificed by Elizabeth to increase her influence in the Low Countries (Netherlands) in the 1570s.¹¹¹ In contrast to Lee’s argument, Blakeway demonstrates that the English government was still keenly interested in Scotland but there was a lack of willingness to intervene for Regent Morton and that

¹¹⁰ Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland*, p. 205; *ibid.*, pp. 213-217; *ibid.*, p. 228; Julian Goodare, ‘James VI’s English Subsidy’ in Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, ed., *The Reign of James VI* (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2000), pp. 113-4.

¹¹¹ See Maurice Lee Jr., ‘The Fall of the Regent Morton: A Problem in Satellite Diplomacy’, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1956), pp. 111-129.

exerting influence over a distance proved impossible.¹¹² More successful English intervention occurred with support for the Ruthven Raid, a *coup d'état* by a small group of Scottish nobles, including William Ruthven and John Erskine, second Earl of Mar.¹¹³

In these examples, the issue of agency was related to arguments surrounding royal minority and regency. In fact, it is now more convincingly argued that regents used their diplomatic ties with England to their advantage and made concerted efforts to strengthen relations. Claire Webb's study of the pro-English, and pro-British, Protestant Regent Moray reveals how he used the young James VI as part of a strategy to legitimise his own position.¹¹⁴ In 1567, James's custody was fiercely debated and for Moray, 'losing custody of James would reduce any possible bargaining power they [Scotland] might hope to gain with either France or England, or even with Mary'.¹¹⁵ The theme of control continued to be an issue after James VI succeeded to the English throne.

A second important factor that shaped the relationship between England and Scotland in distinctive ways was their shared border. On both sides of the border, the English and Scottish Marches were divided into three parts: East, Middle and West. On the English side of the border, the Council of the North exerted royal power over the north of England, but the authority in the border region had been with the English wardens, who had managed the day to day running of the Marches, rather than the Council, since the later years of Henry VIII's reign. No such council was necessary in Scotland due to the close proximity of Edinburgh and Glasgow to the borders and the general management

¹¹² Amy Blakeway, 'James VI and James Douglas, Earl of Morton' in Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid, ed., *James VI and Noble Power in Scotland, 1578-1603* (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 12.

¹¹³ Steven J. Reid, 'Of bairns and bearded men: James VI and the Ruthven Raid' in Miles Kerr-Peterson and Steven J. Reid, ed., *James VI and Noble Power in Scotland, 1578-1603* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), p. 34.

¹¹⁴ Webb, "The Gude Regent?", p.1. The only and earliest biographical work of the Earl of Moray was written by M. Lee, *James Stewart, Earl of Moray: a political study of the Reformation in Scotland* (Greenwood Press, 1971).

¹¹⁵ Webb, "The Gude Regent?", pp. 41-42.

of the three Marches was overseen by the Scottish Lord-Lieutenant.¹¹⁶ The border region proved to be a hotspot for domestic and national political activity, away from the traditional diplomatic setting of the court.¹¹⁷ Every ambassador who travelled by land had to secure a passport from their host monarch to cross the border and interact with the officials, including the border warden, town captains, or military leaders who, like the ambassadors, were always active in sending information that helped to protect their own country.¹¹⁸ Maureen Meikle demonstrates that the border between the Scottish and English East March was permeable, which helped to facilitate good diplomatic relations.¹¹⁹ This thesis identifies that the border needs to be viewed as a second key location for diplomatic activity where, in the English context, important officials were stationed, meetings were held, and intelligence was gathered that was passed between the two courts.

Border towns, specifically Berwick-upon-Tweed on the English side and Eyemouth on the Scottish side, have also been of interest to scholars because of their vulnerability.¹²⁰ Here diplomats, Wardens of the Marches, and town/garrison Captains

¹¹⁶ Thomas I. Rae, *The Administration of the Scottish Frontier: 1513-1603* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), p. 107.

¹¹⁷ Maureen M. Meikle, *A British Frontier? Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders, 1540-1603* (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press Ltd, 2004); Kesselring, K. J., ‘Berwick is Our England’: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town’ in Norman Jones and Daniel Woolf, ed., *Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Anna Groundwater, *The Scottish Middle March, 1573-1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010); Janine Maria Van Vliet, ‘From a “strong Town of War” To The “very Heart Of The Country”: The English Border Town of Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 1558-1625’ (University of Pennsylvania, 2017); Jenna M. Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands, 1552-1652* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019)

¹¹⁸ See, Amy Blakeway, ‘A Scottish Anti-Catholic Satire Crossing the Border: ‘Ane bull of our haly fader the paip quhairby it is lessum to everie man to haif tua wyffis’ and the Redeswyre Raid of 1575’, *EHR*, Vol. 79, No. 541 (2015), pp. 1346-1370.

¹¹⁹ Meikle, *A British Frontier?*, p. 253.

¹²⁰ K. J. Kesselring, ‘Berwick is Our England’: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town’, Norman Jones and Daniel Woolf, ed., *Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Amy Blakeway, ‘The Anglo-Scottish War of 1558 and the Scottish Reformation’, *Journal of the Historical Association*, Vol.102, No. 305 (2017), p. 207; Janine Maria Van Vliet, ‘From a “strong Town of War” To The “very Heart Of The Country”: The English Border Town of Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 1558-1625’ (University of Pennsylvania, 2017); K. J. Kesselring and Sara M. Butler, *Crossing Borders: Boundaries and Margins in Medieval and Early Modern Britain. Essays in Honours of Cynthia J. Neville* (Brill, 2018); Jenna Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands, 1552-1652* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019).

gathered information and rumours, held meetings with diplomats from the neighbouring nation, and sent correspondence quickly across the border. Berwick was one of the busiest places for diplomatic activity, and Jenna Schultz and Maureen Meikle argue for its particular importance. Schultz directly compares the importance of Berwick and Carlisle in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and considers Berwick to have the superior role in the East.¹²¹ Chapter Three expands Schultz's argument through an examination of the role of Berwick as part of an English intelligence network and a second location where diplomatic activity was carried out between England and Scotland in times of crisis.¹²² However, as a prominent town in the English West March, Carlisle also played its part as this was the first of many location in England where Mary was imprisoned.¹²³ On the Scottish side of the border, Anna Groundwater's study of the Scottish Middle March demonstrates that Jedburgh played a significant role in Scottish politics.¹²⁴ Groundwater explores the close proximity of the march regions to Edinburgh, being less than one day's ride, and how Jedburgh acted as a location for concluding Privy Council meetings when border matters required further discussion.

Finally, the overarching theme across much of this scholarship embraces the issue of dynastic union and how movements towards a united island in the sixteenth century – through the themes of control, religion, succession, and dynasty – affected diplomatic relations. The signing of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace in 1502 between England and Scotland and the marriage treaty of Margaret Tudor, eldest daughter of Henry VII, to James IV, suspended hostilities between the nations. This strengthened subsequent

¹²¹ Jenna M. Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands, 1552-1652* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019), pp. 153-209; Meikle, *A British Frontier? Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders*, p. 100; *ibid*, pp. 253-254.

¹²² See Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 230-281.

¹²³ Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands*, p. 213.

¹²⁴ Anna Groundwater, *The Scottish Middle March, 1573-1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010), p.104.

English concerns about Margaret's granddaughter Mary, Queen of Scots's position in the English succession. This first became evident during the reign of Henry VIII when in the 1543 terms of the Treaty of Greenwich proposed a marital alliance between Edward VI and the infant Scottish Queen. In reality, it was Henry's intention to use the young Queen to exert influence over Scotland. Marcus Merriman described Henry, who was the first monarch since Edward III to attempt to conquer Scotland, as the 'hammer of the Scots'.¹²⁵ In 1543, as part of the negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Greenwich, a match was proposed between Elizabeth and the eldest son of James Hamilton, the then second earl of Arran, Mary's Governor and heir apparent to the Scottish throne. In the first embassy after the peace in October 1560, the same match was proposed between Elizabeth and James Hamilton, now third Earl of Arran. This was politely declined by Elizabeth and the action did not initially appear to tarnish the new amity.¹²⁶ For the purpose of this study, however, the Elizabethan influence on Mary's marriage is more relevant because the majority of Mary's English marriage negotiations and the question of her inclusion in the English succession was handled through the commissions of the English and Scottish ambassadors. Whilst the ambassadors were given instructions about the intended result, they were forced to use their own agency to influence the final outcome. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.¹²⁷ The above themes are unique to the Anglo-Scottish relationship, and the idea of succession, power, and defence are at the forefront of the national and international politics in the 1560s.

¹²⁵ Marcus Merriman, *The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots, 1542-1551* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), p. 57.

¹²⁶ For the embassy of Morton, Alexander Cunningham, fifth Earl of Glencairn, and Maitland to England in October 1560, see Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 345-346.

¹²⁷ See, Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 133-155.

Sources

The work that still needs to be conducted on Anglo-Scottish diplomacy rests on an imbalance in the source material and the unwillingness, amongst English historians, to understand the Scottish political structures and a reluctance to explore the Scottish archives. In drawing widely on archives on both sides of the border, and correspondence from English and Scottish perspectives, this thesis has an expanded source base. It is focused first and foremost on the rich, albeit well-known, reports of ambassadors, personal correspondence, and instructions given to English and Scottish ambassadors and representatives. Although historians have repeatedly recognised the importance of these sources, they must be approached with caution. Firstly, ambassadors were obsequious men who were bound by their instructions as well as their duty to their monarch as part of the nature of early modern diplomacy. Ambassadors tended to exaggerate events when the situation required in order to get a reaction from their monarch. Nonetheless, it was a part of an ambassador's job to send detailed reports and regularly correspond with their home court – practices that have left a valuable repository of information for scholars.

As well as the content of the sources, care must also be exercised due to disparities within the archives. Fry has shown that studies of diplomatic history in the British Isles are frequently based on English reports in the State Papers and the *Calendars* – domestic, foreign, and negotiations between other foreign nations, between England and other kingdoms, as well as the Borders series.¹²⁸ The *Calendars* provide researchers with an overview of the content of the letters and documents where, in some cases, the author only chose to include what they felt was relevant in the summary. Using only the *Calendars* has led historians to bypass the corrections made to letters and the additional

¹²⁸ Cynthia Ann Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception: King James VI of Scotland's Foreign Relations with Europe (c. 1584-1603)' (PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014), pp. 18-19.

information added during the drafting process, when the letters in the volumes were not the final version. Furthermore, the authors of the *Calendars* were only human and they often make mistakes in their reading or transcription of the letters. This thesis, therefore, avoided quoting from the *Calendars* – whilst still including the references for researchers – and instead went back to reading the original manuscripts. Whilst the letters and papers of ambassadors are viewed as traditional sources, in their manuscript form they still offer a vast untapped wealth of material.

The ‘archival turn’ refers to a period when scholars started to rethink the political and cultural constructions of the archive.¹²⁹ For this research, the structure of the largest repository of this material, namely the collections in London’s National Archives, raises problems for research into Anglo-Scottish relations.¹³⁰ Victorian archivists drew a sharp distinction between correspondence that belonged in the state papers (court to court relations), which were given the designation as ‘Scottish relations’ and the classmark SP52, and letters written by English officials commissioned to the border. The English officials were writing to other border officials, as well as correspondents at the English and Scottish court, which was catalogued separately under SP59. In the years 1559 to 1560 and 1564 to 1566, English border officials formed part of a crucial intelligence network between the English government, the Scottish government, and the Scottish rebel faction. As a result, some Scottish letters are labelled with ‘Borders’ on the reverse of the last folio, indicating the archivist’s deliberation about whether the letter should be catalogued as correspondence with Scotland or with the Borders.¹³¹ In addition, major

¹²⁹ Anne J. Gilliland, Sue McKemmish, et al., ed., *Research in the Archival Multiverse* (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2017), p. 47. ‘Archival turn’ is associated with Cambridge scholars around Alex Walsham, but it has parallels in this French work, and in Markus Friedrich, *Birth of the Archive: A History of Knowledge* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013).

¹³⁰ Stephen Alford, ‘Introduction to State Papers Online and Sixteenth Century State Papers, 1509-1603’, *State Papers Online 1509-1714*, Cengage Learning EMEA Ltd., (2008).

¹³¹ To showcase a few examples, TNA SP 52/1, ff. 127r-v, Mary of Guise to Croft, 22 July 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 1002]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 161 ar-v, John Knox to Henry Percy, 2 August 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 1113]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 167r-168v, Archibald Campbell, fifth Earl of Argyll and

offshoots of the collection, which both classmarks once belonged to, are now held in the British Library and Hatfield House. In approaching this correspondence, we must first escape the Victorian – and earlier – archive structures imposed upon it and bring the letters together.

This quantity of ambassadors' correspondence is greater from the English side because the English government had their resident ambassador, Randolph, stationed in Scotland for over six years. This created a vast quantity of paperwork, most of which was diligently and meticulously kept by Cecil, and largely survived in the *State Papers* and Cotton collection. Since no equivalent archive survives for Scotland – Robert Melville's correspondence with Mary and Maitland, for instance – the direction of the sources has led, in some cases, to a focus on English diplomatic activity at the expense of the Scottish. In the absence of a Scottish equivalent to the English State Papers, other sources – such as reports of the English and Scottish Privy Council proceedings, journals, diaries, and financial records – have been consulted to place ambassadors in the broader political context of both countries. Collectively, these sources offer insight into the practices and structures of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and help to draw a picture of continuity as well as a change over time.

Structure

Despite the already expansive literature focusing on early modern European diplomacy and the number of studies that compare Mary and Elizabeth's personal and political relationship, important avenues remain as yet unexplored. This thesis addresses three of these: the personnel, procedures, and practices of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy

James Stewart, Prior of St Andrews to Croft, 6 August 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 516]. On the reverse of the two letters the word 'Border' is crossed out, and it was decided that the letter merited an inclusion in the State Papers of Scotland instead.

between 1558 and 1568. This structural approach allows us to move on from narratives based on correspondence and instead consider how diplomacy operated between the two countries. Although this approach allows for revision of the already well-trodden narratives of the period, it fundamentally reveals the priorities of the two diplomatic cultures on the island of Great Britain. The first two chapters focus on the English and Scottish ambassadors commissioned between 1558 and 1568 and, most notably, the type of men commissioned and the reasons for the increased diplomatic activity in both countries. The first chapter demonstrates that there was an increase in both ambassadors and non-ambassadorial agents (representatives for the purpose of this research) sent between the English and Scottish governments. This reflects an increased interest in the other country after the recently concluded amity. Furthermore, this also identifies potential moments of tension when the presence of an ambassador was necessary to maintain the peace and to send frequent reports. The comparative study in Chapter One shows that both the English and Scottish ambassadors shared similar backgrounds in the political offices they held in their own country, and both had experience working of the French court. Furthermore, the changes in English diplomacy under Elizabeth, that derived from continental structures, were also seen in less-studied embassies initiated by Mary. During these two exceptional periods of diplomacy, when a person was sent by the rebel faction, they are referred to as a representative because he was used to facilitate negotiations between the English government, Scottish government and the second group claiming authority in Scotland. A representative did not receive ambassadorial documentation (such as instructions or a letter of credence to the other monarch) but his presence was necessary to fill a gap when traditional diplomatic negotiations could not take place. The final part of this chapter includes a novel approach to the study of diplomatic personnel and embassies through an examination of embassies that were

planned but not carried out. This gives us a unique insight into the drafting process when the governments planned to send diplomats to negotiate during times of crisis and what happened instead to maintain amity.

The backbone of Chapter Two are the accredited ambassador's instructions. These are used to explore how an ambassador could exercise independent agency on behalf of their monarch when the distance between two courts and the time to deliver a letter could not keep pace with fast-moving diplomacy. One of the aims of the 'new diplomatic history' is to bring the focus back to the men and women involved in diplomatic negotiations. It explores the impact of the decisions made by the government of the host and home country had and when and how an ambassador was forced to exercise agency on the frontline.¹³² The ambassadors' instructions would often specify how much agency an ambassador should exercise. Ambassadors were always expected to exercise a minimum amount of agency, through public and private audiences with the monarch. However, when an embassy was sent in response to a particular crisis, this agency could be significantly expanded. The year 1565 was the pinnacle of Anglo-Scottish tension and crisis during Elizabeth and Mary's personal reigns. Dawson and Loughlin have already identified that there was a shift in the power dynamic before Mary's marriage to Darnley.¹³³ This chapter reinforces Dawson and Loughlin's argument through a diplomatic perspective and it examines the accredited ambassadors and representatives exchanges in this year as well as the actions that the men were forced to take in order to uphold their duty. The ambassadors were forced to use different types of agency whilst still being constrained by their original instructions and to think on their feet. The Scottish

¹³² John Watkins, 'Towards a New Diplomatic History', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008), p. 13; Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', pp. 444-445.

¹³³ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 200-205; Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22; Jane Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish relations: security and succession', Robert Tittler and Norman Leslie Jones, ed., *A Companion to Tudor Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004).

embassies before Mary's marriage hint at the Scottish Queen starting to act more independently. A change occurred after the marriage ceremony had taken place when the diplomatic embassies commissioned by Elizabeth were reactionary and ill-conceived. Therefore, in this one year we see that the degree of agency awarded to an ambassador often reflected the current state of Anglo-Scottish politics and affairs.

Chapter Three turns away from individual ambassadors, looking towards broader diplomatic practices. This chapter refutes the idea that 1560 was part of a new era of peace and instead shows that tensions between England and Scotland were prevalent throughout the continuities of diplomatic practice. On the surface, the increased number of ambassador and representative missions was driven by a desire to continue the amicable relations established in 1560. However, after years of conflict and under a façade created by the frequency of diplomatic embassies, both governments were still highly suspicious of the other and continued to use diplomatic practices inherited from their predecessors. Ultimately, the aim of diplomacy was, still, to gather information to protect their own interests.

As we have seen whilst reviewing the historiography of the ambassadors and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, there is a clear disparity in simultaneous understanding of the two national arguments. The three chapters address this imbalance using a comparative analysis of the English and Scottish ambassadors, which considers elements of prosopography. Lawrence Stone defined prosopography as the examination of packets of information about individuals that 'are then juxtaposed and combined, and are examined for significant variables. They are tested both for internal correlations and for correlations

with other forms of behavior or action'.¹³⁴ Applying this methodology allows us to understand the root of political action and the social structures of an individual. However, such an undertaking would not benefit a larger comparative study.¹³⁵ Whilst this thesis has considered this methodology, it is not the focus because this approach can overemphasise the personal and not the practices and procedures that bring this study of English and Scottish diplomacy together.

The foundational material of the embassies is outlined in three appendices. The first two appendices are catalogues of the English and Scottish ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents who travelled to the neighbouring country in this decade. Appendix Two contains the first complete catalogue of official ambassadors and representatives commissioned by the Scottish crown between 1558 and 1568. The English material in Appendix One also marks a new departure. Gary M. Bell's handlist of British diplomats fits within clearly specified parameters and was the first complete list of English ambassadors sent to Scotland. However, in the context of the historiographies of Anglo-Scottish relations and the 'new diplomatic history', several issues remain unanswered. There were, for example, misunderstandings surrounding whether an individual was an ambassador or a representative. The two appendices include the journeys of English and Scottish representatives and agents who were not official ambassadors between 1558 and 1568. This is especially important because, as noted above, the two distinct periods of diplomatic activity between England and Scotland were bookended by more exceptional diplomatic circumstances from 1559 to 1561 and 1567 to 1568. During the two exceptional periods of diplomacy, ambassadors were sent from

¹³⁴ Lawrence Stone, 'Prosopography', *Daedalus, Historical Studies Today*, Vol. 100, No. 1, (Winter, 1971), p. 46.

Also see, Lewis Bernstein Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1929); Lewis Bernstein Namier, *Personalities and Power* (Greenwood Press, 1974).

¹³⁵ Lawrence Stone, 'Prosopography', p. 46.

the appointed monarch or regent, and representatives were sent from the rebel group or the deposed monarch. Making a decision not to include the representatives is problematic and devalues the rich diplomatic activity in the 1560s. Appendix Three brings together the catalogues of ambassadors created in appendices one and two, by showing the chronology of the English and Scottish ambassadors' embassies. This highlights both the frequency of diplomatic commissions and gaps in intelligence gathering when no ambassador was resident in the other country.

The wealth of studies into Anglo-Scottish diplomacy currently focuses on the individuals commissioned to negotiate and complete the government's objectives (such as the succession, united Protestantism, or British identity). Thus far, the literature has not addressed the three categories of personnel, practices, and procedures. By studying these three distinct, but related themes in the context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, this thesis demonstrates that the sending and receiving of diplomatic personnel was, on the surface, used to maintain a certain balance in amicable relations between the two countries. However, in moments of national or international crisis, when there was more pressure on the role of diplomatic personnel, former intelligence-gathering practices, that were used by previous monarchs, were relied upon. From these practices, we can acknowledge that the English and Scottish government's priority was, and had always been, to promote their own unique objectives and personal security.

Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy

On 19 August 1561, Mary landed in Leith after living at the French court for thirteen years. Upon her return Mary, sent her Principal Secretary, Maitland, to England to announce her safe return and express her goodwill towards Elizabeth.¹ After Maitland returned to Scotland, Elizabeth sent her own extraordinary ambassador, Sir Peter Mewtas, in September to extend her greetings and enquire why Mary was yet to ratify the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh. Once both the welcoming embassies had been sent, Elizabeth wrote to Mary on 23 November 1561 emphasising that she believed that ‘our affairres be more secretly, more directly, and as speedely resolved, as by ambassades’.² During their embassies, an ambassador would correspond regularly with their home court. Whilst the importance of correspondence – including its material qualities – has already been emphasised, the same level of detail has not been given to the selection process of English and Scottish ambassadors, the timing of their embassies, and how all of this correlates with the structural patterns of diplomacy. Chapter One uses the framework of the ‘new diplomatic history’ to examine the diplomatic personnel (accredited ambassadors, representatives, and cancelled commissions) who were sent between England and Scotland in the period 1558 to 1568. Ultimately, the new Anglo-Scottish amity, established in the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh, was largely sustained by the frequent exchange of accredited ambassadors. When an accredited ambassador could not be sent, the sending and receiving of representatives was used to facilitate negotiations and maintain a peaceful relationship. From a comparative analysis of the English and Scottish diplomatic personnel, there was clearly a shared pattern of increased interest in the other

¹ See Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 345-346.

² BL Lansdowne MS 5, f. 81r, Copy Elizabeth to Mary, Queen of Scots, 23 November 1561.

court, especially when anxiety and unease lay beneath what on the surface appeared to indicate amicable relations.

Of the three groups mentioned above, accredited ambassadors have received the most attention. For the definition of an ambassador, this thesis adheres to Gary M. Bell's definition where, in the context of English diplomacy, he defined an ambassador as 'a man warranted by his sovereign to represent, officially, the English government to a foreign power or interest outside of English territory'.³ In his research, Bell set clear parameters for who met the criteria of an ambassador. He excluded men not sent from the monarch; only conveying messages or gifts; men from specific groups such as military representatives; miscellaneous groups; merchants; consuls, and finally heralds.⁴ Identifying who was an ambassador in early modern sources can be problematic as the term 'ambassador' is not used consistently in correspondence and sources. The terms 'trusty man', 'trusted man', 'man', 'commissioner', or even 'bearer' was used to refer to what today we would call ambassadors. Furthermore, the term ambassador was used misleadingly to describe men, who we now know, were acting as representatives. For example, in the printed memoir of Lord Herries, he referred to the English commissioners, James VI's commissioners, and Mary's representatives at the 1568 York-Westminster conference as ambassadors. The three groups had gathered to discuss and debate Mary's role in the plot to murder Darnley, her second husband.⁵ They cannot be defined as ambassadors because they were not sent from one monarch to another; this was a meeting of the three groups to discuss and debate Mary's fate in a setting not dissimilar to a court

³ Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 2-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁵ *Historical Memoirs of the Reign of Mary, Queen of Scots*, by John Maxwell, Lord Herries, pp. 111-112. The term commissioners must be used for Elizabeth and James VI's men because they were sent from a monarch whereas Mary's men were representatives because she had been deposed.

hearing. Therefore, this thesis uses caution when identifying who the official ambassadors were. In other studies, more care should be taken to clarify the different types of diplomatic personnel.

The statistics detailing the number of embassies dispatched and the range of ambassadors commissioned indicate that this was a period of increased diplomatic activity. Between 1558 and 1568, sixteen accredited English embassies (with a total of sixteen different ambassadors) were sent to the Scottish court and twenty-two accredited Scottish embassies (with a total of twelve different ambassadors) were sent to England.⁶ To meet the purpose of each embassy, different types of ambassadors – either a resident, extraordinary, regular, or commissioner(s) depending on the length or purpose of their commission – was selected. A resident ambassador was sent to remain in the host court for an extended period of time and was expected to be involved in court life in order to convey frequent news reports to their home court. An extraordinary ambassador was sent to focus on a specific area that the monarch required to be negotiated, debated or resolved in person. A regular ambassador is a term created for this research, specifically relating to the frequent embassies of Maitland to England. He was the only man selected for the embassies to a specific foreign country but, due to personal or political situations, was unable to remain in the country as a resident ambassador. Finally, a commissioner was sent for the purpose of specific negotiations, such as treaties, and they were usually sent in teams. Commissioners typically had the political and legal expertise to conclude any formal agreement. In some instances, the same ambassadors who were sent on multiple embassies, who we can define as having a diplomatic career, were Randolph,

⁶ See, Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 322-337. This included a total of sixteen different ambassadors. This does not include the men this research has identified as representatives.

See Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 340-361. This included the names of twelve different men commissioned.

Throckmorton, and Killigrew from the English court, and Maitland, James Melville, and Robert Melville from Scotland.

When an embassy was sent and for how long was a clear reflection of the English and Scottish government's interest in the affairs of their rival. The longest serving English ambassador was Randolph who officially began his time under the title of resident ambassador in August 1561 and was expelled from Scotland in March 1566. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, during a crisis in Anglo-Scottish relations, Elizabeth continued to send extraordinary ambassadors even with a resident ambassador in Scotland to convey new messages or to try to diffuse a crisis situation.⁷ During the same period that Randolph was active in Scotland, Mary did not send a resident Scottish ambassador to the English court. Instead, her regular ambassador and secretary, Maitland, was commissioned almost annually to England between 1561 and 1565, which made him the regular Scottish ambassador in this period of study. As the principal secretary, Maitland's embassy included time constraints because he was required to continue his role in managing domestic and foreign affairs in Scotland. On the face of it, Mary's decision to not send a resident ambassador of her own at the English court made the Scottish Queen appear somewhat restrained in her interest in English affairs. As we will see in Chapter Three, Mary facilitated her need for a resident ambassador in the early years of her return to Scotland by employing her mother's practice of corresponding with the French ambassadors who were resident at the English court.⁸ However, a change occurred between 1565 and 1566. Maitland fell out of favour with Mary and de Foix, the French ambassador resident at the English court, was recalled to France. It was only then, in February 1566, that Mary commissioned her first Scottish resident ambassador, Sir

⁷ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 155-193.

⁸ David Potter *The Letters of Paul de Foix, French ambassador at the court of Elizabeth I, 1562-1566* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 32; see Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practice, pp. 205-230.

Robert Melville, to the English court.⁹ Whilst the English and Scottish ambassadors have not been neglected from broader narratives of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy or, in some cases, have received their own studies of their careers, the experience and skills needs to be understood in comparison to their Scottish or English counterparts.

In addition to the accredited ambassadors, this thesis has also identified representatives as important diplomatic personnel. Although rebels and other non-state actors were not officially recognised as legitimate diplomatic groups, they still attempted to engage in negotiations when an accredited ambassador could not be sent. The ‘new diplomatic history’ has made moves to understand the role of the non-official actors and bring them into the narratives of diplomacy.¹⁰ Mark Netzloff argued that ‘even if not recognized as a nation within the states system, they [the representatives] can nonetheless take on the attributes of sovereign authority: making alliances, negotiating with foreign princes...and exercising agency through the strategic use of violence’.¹¹ Netzloff has convincingly argued that ‘in practice they [the representatives of the Cimarron and Maroon people] did achieve a status as diplomatic agents’ through their authority in diplomatic negotiations and their recognition by the other party.¹² The acceptance of non-state agents or rebels in diplomatic negotiations also depended on whether their political or religious beliefs were in alignment with another nation. Blakeway has indicated that Frederick II of Denmark accepted the authority of James VI after Mary was deposed in 1567. This was part of a broader shift to ‘prioritise confessional solidarity over support for established authority’.¹³ This research has identified four journeys of English

⁹ See Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 353-354.

¹⁰ Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture*; Sowerby, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, p. 444.; Sowerby, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, pp. 441-456.

¹¹ Mark Netzloff, ‘Lines of Amity and the Law of Nations’, Craigwood and Sowerby, *Cultural Diplomacy* (2019), pp. 55-56.

¹² Netzloff, ‘Lines of Amity and the Law of Nations’, p. 68.

¹³ Blakeway, *Regency*, p. 216.

representatives to Scotland or Berwick and ten journeys of Scottish representatives to the English court.¹⁴ Representatives from the English court were always sent under the authority of Elizabeth whereas the Scottish situation was more complex. Between May 1559 and 1561, the Lords of the Congregation sent representatives to both Berwick and the English court, and then from July 1567 until 1568, representatives were sent from Mary and her supporters (from Scotland and England) after she was deposed. Both groups were not the legitimate rulers but wanted to claim legitimacy through the acceptance of their diplomatic commissions.

To properly assess the diplomatic personnel in this period, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first part is a comparative study of the English and Scottish accredited ambassadors sent between Scotland and England between 1558 and 1568.¹⁵ Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ambassadorial handbooks were used as guidelines to understand what, in theory, was required of an ambassador. Ambassadorial handbooks provide an important insight into the personal and political qualities that were considered when the monarch and their government were selecting the man for the mission.¹⁶ Furthermore, the handbooks also had an advisory function, reminding an ambassador how to act whilst on their embassy as well as a legal function, outlining an ambassador's

¹⁴ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568; Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568. A representative's mission is referred to as a 'journey' because the term embassy and mission are terms linked with official embassies.

¹⁵ Between August 1567 and 1568, Scotland was largely divided between those who supported Mary, even after her deposition, and then those who supported young James VI as the now rightful ruler of Scotland. Therefore, in this period the two groups are referred to as the King and Queen's party to differentiate between the ambassadors sent from each side.

¹⁶ The themes were chosen after examining ambassadors' handbooks and narrowing down what the main categories that were discussed, and themes that were broadly related to both English and Scottish diplomats. This is not to say that other parts of diplomatic handbooks did not apply exclusively to English ambassadors and Scottish ambassadors. Not every topic in the handbooks can be mirrored in this study but the majority of those mentioned were reflected in the following prosopographical study: Kisner, Kenneth M., 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen' (Master's Thesis, Utah State University, 2003), p. 60.

position in international law, their own court, and their host court.¹⁷ Then, the travel experience and political experience of the diplomatic personnel as well as the types of embassies are compared in order to analyse any differences in the structural patterns between England and Scotland.

The second section focuses on the two periods of exceptional diplomacy (1559-61 and 1567-68) that bookended the more normal queen-to-queen diplomacy (1561-67) where both ambassadors and representatives were exchanged when competing political groups existed in Scotland. Both periods need to be examined in isolation from the main period of normal diplomacy to understand how the English and Scottish ambassadors and representatives operated using the formal structures of diplomacy and how these men facilitated negotiations in order to maintain amicable relations.¹⁸ This section also includes a discussion of the 1565 representatives, sent by the Chaseabout Raid rebels, who hoped to obtain assistance from the English. Therefore, representatives were sent during national and international crises to help with the progress of negotiations when an accredited ambassador could or would not be accepted.

In the final section, this thesis makes a novel methodological contribution by setting the embassies that were not sent (rumoured in correspondence, drafted, cancelled, or received a change in the diplomatic personnel that was chosen) alongside the accredited

¹⁷ These skills were collated from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century diplomatic handbooks, which can loosely be divided into their political experience, personal attributes, and the embassy.

See, Alexander ab Alexandro, *Genialium Dierum Libri Sex* (Paris, 1561); Gentili, *De Legationi bus Libri Tres*; Torquato Tasso, *Il Messaggiero. Dialogo del Signor Torquato Tasso* (Venice: Bertrando Giunti e fratelli, 1582); Krzysztof Warszewicki, *De Legato et Lagatione* (1595); Jean Hotman, *The Ambassador* (London, 1603); Francis Thynne, *Francis Thynne, The Perfect Ambassadors: Treating of the Antiquitie, Priveledges, and behaviour of Men belonging to that Function* (London, 1652).

For secondary literature that addresses the qualities of an ambassador see, Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*; 'Introduction', Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*; M. S. Anderson, *Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (New York, 1993); Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution'; MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII'; Sowerby and Hennings, ed., *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*.

¹⁸ It is important to note that in this thesis, the movements of the rebels cannot be described as commissions because this term was used to describe an ambassador's embassy. Therefore, the term journey has been used in its place.

embassies that were.¹⁹ Whilst the embassies of accredited ambassadors and the journeys of representatives are the main focus in the narratives of both reigns, they do not tell the whole story of potential diplomatic activity and personnel selected. An examination of the three different embassies that did not happen in this decade has helped us to understand the governments' reactions to particular crises. When they are placed alongside the advance preparations for an unspecified future mission, this expands the picture of the type of qualities required of an ambassador. This provides a unique insight into the planning stages of English and Scottish diplomacy and the types of men who were deemed suitable for an embassy in the 1560s.

A comparative study of the diplomatic personnel operating between 1558 and 1568 is most useful to assess the similarities and differences in the diplomatic service between England and Scotland. Previous studies of groups of ambassadorial groups have adopted one of two approaches. The first is a chronological method, which integrates the ambassadors into a linear narrative.²⁰ However, if we remove the chronology, we can instead examine the personnel, procedures, and changes in diplomatic practice over time.²¹ Therefore, this chapter adopts the second approach informed by the understanding that the 'one key to unlocking the enigma of early Elizabethan diplomats is to understand their education and experience before they entered into an ambassadorship'.²² There has already been some work on the backgrounds and patterns of the Elizabethan ambassadors.²³ Through his assessment, Bell recognised that there were permanent changes to English diplomacy, which included the frequent use of the principal secretary

¹⁹ This research has only found cancelled commissions in English sources.

²⁰ For example, Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception'.

²¹ For example, MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VII'.

²² Kisner, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen', p. 60; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (London: Penguin, 1990).

²³ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', pp. 267-284.

in diplomatic commissions, one-man missions, the reuse of ambassadors, and the appointment of an embassy secretary. These developments now warrant examination in the Scottish context and then compared with their English counterparts to understand the differences in personnel and the structural organisation of both diplomatic services.

The Ideal Ambassador

It is already well known that English ambassadors did not receive official diplomatic training. It was more about on the job training, which will shortly be explained in more detail.²⁴ What has not yet been identified was that Scottish ambassadors were in the same position as their English counterparts. Ambassadorial handbooks were guidebooks on how to select ambassadors and have prompted a number of fruitful avenues of research. Firstly, they provide an insight into the system of patronage at court. A second insight this has provided for historians was about who read the handbooks and in what circles they were circulated. Sowerby argues that handbooks show how diplomatic knowledge was disseminated.²⁵ Another use of studying handbooks is that they help us to understand the types of works the authors read and the type of men the authors observed in order to form their conceptions about ambassadors. Finally, handbooks tell us a lot about the men who were chosen as ambassadors in this period. In the context of English and Scottish diplomacy, handbooks were both a part of an attempted professionalisation of the diplomatic corps in the sixteenth century.

²⁴ For literature on ambassador training more generally see, J. J. Jusserand, 'The School for Ambassadors', *The American History Review* (1922); Heidrun Kugeler, 'Le Parfait Ambassadeur' The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia' (D.Phil, Oxford, 2006).

For literature on English diplomatic training see, Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy'; Kisner, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen', p. 60; Timothy Hampton, *Fictions of Embassy* (2011).

²⁵ Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Francis Thynne's Perfect Ambassador and the Construction of Diplomatic Thought in Elizabethan England', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2019), p. 542.

Before comparing the similarities and differences it is important to understand the three diplomatic handbooks compared here; they were influenced by English diplomacy and in one instance has also been written by an English author. This chapter must briefly divert from the objective of maintaining a balanced approach towards English and Scottish diplomacy because no ambassadorial handbook that we currently know of was written by a Scottish author. The three handbooks used in this research are Francis Thynne's *The Perfect Ambassadovr*, Alberito Gentili's *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, and Hotman's *L'Ambassadeur*.²⁶ They were selected for this research because they were all written with a link to sixteenth-century English diplomacy whilst still being influenced by the evolving Elizabethan diplomatic procedures. However, the three handbooks were all written after 1568 and should be taken as a guideline of how the diplomatic professionalism was understood. Whilst there were guidelines outlining a perfect ambassador, one man with all these qualities did not exist except in the imagination of the authors. It was often a case that the right person was available at the right time.

Before we discuss what made the perfect ambassador, we need to understand the context in which the three handbooks were created. Thynne wrote *The Perfect Ambassadovr* in the summer of 1578, when he was supposed to have been part of the party of William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham and warden of the five ports, and Sir Francis Walsingham, principal secretary to Elizabeth, on their embassy to the Low Countries, Flanders, to agree to a peace and report the state of affairs.²⁷ Unfortunately, Thynne received news of the mission too late and missed his opportunity to accompany the embassy, which resulted in Thynne spending the summer writing *The Perfect*

²⁶ Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*; Jean Hotman, *The Ambassador* (London, 1603).

²⁷ TNA SP 104/163 ff. 148r-150v, Instructions to William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham, and Sir Francis Walsingham, for their commission to the Low Countries, 12 June 1568 [*CSP Foreign 1578-79*, no. 18]; for an earlier draft of Cobham's and Walsingham's instructions see, TNA SP 83/7, ff. 11r-16v [*CSP Foreign 1578-79*, no. 16].

Ambassador with no experience. The handbook was completed in January 1579, and it was dedicated and gifted to Lord Cobham on his return to England. Thynne's handbook was unique because he wrote it without consulting other diplomatic handbooks or having first hand experience, Thynne was able to construct a plausible theory of diplomacy that resembles the later ambassadorial handbooks produced by authors in England and on the Continent.²⁸ The handbooks of Gentili and Hotman differ from Thynne for two reasons: they had experience in English diplomacy and they were both from the continent.²⁹ In 1586, Gentili left England with Horatio Pallavicino, an Italian financier and political agent in England. He was later recommended to Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester in the Low Countries, and travelled in his party to Saxony. Although his experience in diplomacy was brief, Gentili was in the company of an ambassador for his journey to the continent and was able to observe and learn about how a diplomat conducted himself abroad. Gentili dedicated his handbooks to Sir Philip Sidney, whom he believed was the example of a perfect ambassador. Of the three handbook authors, Hotman had the most diplomatic experience. Hotman was a Calvinist Frenchman who had a network of connections that led all the way up to Henri IV of France, upon whom he had relied on to acquire him a position of patronage in the party of Marques de Villers-St-Paul. In the 1570s, Hotman was brought to England to tutor the sons of Sir Amias Paulet, English diplomat and Governor of Guernsey. In 1585, Hotman served as counsellor and Master of Requests to Henry III of France, and in 1585 he travelled to the Low Countries with Leicester on his first diplomatic commission as part of the ambassador's party. In 1589,

²⁸ Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Francis Thynne's Perfect Ambassador and the Construction of Diplomatic Thought in Elizabethan England', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2019), p. 556.

²⁹ For literature on Gentili see, Minnucci Giovanni, *Alberico Gentili tra mos Italicus e mos Gallicus: L'Inedito Commentario ad legem Juliam de Adulteriis* (2002); Minnucci, Giovanni, ed., *Alberici Gentilis De papatu Romano Antichristo: Recognovit e codice autographo bodleiano D'Orville* (Milan: Monduzzi Editoriale, 2018); Cristiano Ragni, *Il Teatro e la Nazione. Shakespeare, Gentili e l'Inghilterra elisabettiana* (Passignano sul Trarnesino: Aguaplano, 2020).

For literature on Hotman see, Marie-Celine Daniel, 'A Diplomat and a Translator: Jean Hotman and the Good Use of Translations for Soft Diplomacy', *Caliban*, Vol. 54 (2015), pp. 35-49.

Hotman travelled with Henry Constable to Scotland to meet James VI at Falkland Palace and presented him with the gift of a diamond ring.³⁰ Before 1619, Hotman had also served as the ambassador to the Duchy of Berg at Dusseldorf, his first and only embassy as the lead ambassador. His two decades of diplomatic service made Hotman the most experienced.³¹

The handbooks by Thynne, Gentili and Hotman were written twenty-five years apart, and each author had a different educational background and experiences of English diplomacy. Furthermore, the way in which diplomatic relations were adapted and changed depended on the country and the reason for the embassy. Thynne declared that the purpose of his work was to 'shew the original privileges, the wisdom, the valour, the quick wits, and other behaviours of ambassadors, as examples for us in all respects to imitate'.³² After missing his opportunity to be part of an ambassador's entourage in 1578, he wanted to demonstrate that he had the knowledge and skills to be an ambassador or at least part of an ambassadorial party. One main feature of Thynne's handbook is that it focuses more on the risks of being an ambassador, which reflects his own lack of experience.³³ Above all else, Gentili was concerned that the ambassador should follow the rules set out in international law and not use their own agency or agenda on the commission. However, he also believed that an ambassador needed to think for himself in difficult situations in order to effectively carry out his instructions. Gentili referred to the way in which the contract of the ambassador omitted any previous actions that might have been considered inappropriate as an ambassador and obligated him to work under

³⁰ David Baird Smith, 'Jean de Villiers Hotman', *SHR*, Vol. 14, No. 54 (January, 1917), p. 160.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Thynne, *The Perfect Ambassador*, pp. IVv-Vr.

³³ Thynne, *The Perfect Ambassador*, pp. 73-161. Chapters six to eleven between these pages are titled, 'Ambassadours that dyed in their embassie', 'Ambassadors evilly entreated in their embassie', 'The revengement of cruelty used to ambassodours against the law of nature', 'Ambassadours evilly rewarded at their return into their countries', 'Trayterous ambassadours towards their masters and princes', and 'Of the foolish sayings, and doings of ambassadours'.

the rules of international law.³⁴ Should, however, international law be broken the ambassador would be at risk. Hotman focused on the advantages that the ambassador was born with rather than the skills he was taught or how he should act whilst on commission. He believed that an ambassador should and usually did maintain high standards, since ‘none were called ordinarily to this charge but men of great honour, vertue and experience, attained, by hauing passed through the goodliest and greatest charges of the Common wealth’.³⁵ Hotman was more concerned with the qualities and qualifications required to be an ambassador than he was with their position once they were commissioned. Whilst the authors of diplomatic handbooks included a long list of desirable qualities of what makes the perfect ambassador or the perfect embassy, the list that governments worked from was shorter and often focused on who was available and what they needed to achieve rather than the desired qualities of the role.

Ambassadorial handbooks noted that the appearance and personality of the ambassador, his religious beliefs, and his participation in court activities were as important as his political experience at his host court. In fact, during the period 1561-67 an ambassador’s age was used to his monarch’s advantage. Typically, the ambassador sent would be a similar age to the host monarch, in the hope that it would have a positive influence on how negotiations were conducted. For example, when James Melville was first commissioned to Elizabeth in 1564, he was a similar age to her being around twenty-nine years old when she was thirty-one. This worked the same way by selecting an older man for the role. Commissioning an older ambassador capitalised on their experience in diplomacy and their wisdom. One example was the first ambassador Elizabeth sent to

³⁴ Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 106.

³⁵ Jean Hotman, *The Ambassador* (London, 1603), p. 1r-v.

Mary. In September 1561, Sir Peter Mewtas was commissioned to greet Mary on her return to Scotland.³⁶ Mewtas was sixty-one years old when he was commissioned to Scotland to welcome the eighteen-year-old Mary, on behalf of the twenty-eight years old Elizabeth. Even the resident ambassador, Randolph was almost twenty years Mary's superior, but when other English ambassadors are taken into account, he was about the average age of an ambassador sent from England to Scotland. In fact, by choosing an ambassador who was older than Mary, Elizabeth was asserting her own authority and experience over the young Mary. The oldest Scot sent in this decade was Alexander Cunningham, fifth earl of Glencairn. At forty-five years old, he was sent in a party of representatives from the Lords of the Congregation after they held a parliament and took control without Mary's permission. This was not a reflection of the ambassador Mary sent. They were usually of a similar age to Elizabeth or younger to reflect Mary's youthfulness and submission to Elizabeth in age.

As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the religious reformations of the sixteenth century contributed to the changes in the way diplomacy was conducted. MacMahon argued that as a result of the reformations fewer monarchs were inclined to send clerical men.³⁷ In an English context, the number of men studying canon law dropped considerably after England's break from Rome and instead Elizabeth appointed younger legal experts as diplomats who instead practiced common or civil law.³⁸ Religious beliefs caused complications in diplomatic relationships. Alberico Gentili believed that 'not even a resident ambassador should obey, if his sovereign should want him to do something which detracts even in the smallest degree from his obligations to

³⁶ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 328-329.

³⁷ MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII', p. 112.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

God'.³⁹ Religion was the only issue on which Gentili questioned the moral allegiance of an ambassador to his sovereign. At the host court, Hotman understood that it was a problem for diplomacy if the ambassador had a 'difference of humours, conditions, and religion of Princes and people towards whom they are employed'.⁴⁰ Sowerby agree that religious beliefs were of pivotal importance when appointing a successful ambassador.⁴¹ In the 1560s, Anglo-Scottish relations benefited from their mutual desire for the establishment of Protestant religion in both countries. Loughlin identified that there was an understanding between English and Scottish ambassadors, agents, privy counsellors, and others on the inside of government meant that they worked towards a Protestant Island and, perhaps, in the future a single Protestant nation.⁴²

Part of the duty of an ambassador was to participate in lavish entertainment at his host court. This 'provided space and medium for political exchange', which included but was not limited to celebrations, feasts, court performances, hunts and games.⁴³ On 21 February 1564, Randolph described the Shrove tide feast at the Scottish court.⁴⁴ Mary was elsewhere dining privately with chief Lords and Ladies of the Scottish court and requested Randolph to be placed at her table so they could converse during the feast. However, the excessive amount of food and drink impaired Randolph's ability to recount more precise details of the evening and act as a diligent informant to his home court.⁴⁵ Whilst Randolph's description of the feast provides some insight into the displays of magnificence at the Scottish court, the significance of the event, for Randolph, was to use the opportunity to question Mary about the arrival of French artillery in Scotland.⁴⁶

³⁹ Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 173.

⁴⁰ Jean Hotman, *The Ambassador* (London, 1603), p. 5v.

⁴¹ Sowerby, *Richard Morrison*, pp. 201-203.

⁴² Loughlin, 'The career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 74-75, pp. 91-92, p. 130.

⁴³ Sowerby and Hennings, ed., *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*, p. 11.

⁴⁴ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 28r-35v, Randolph to Cecil, 21 February 1564; *CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 181.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Banquets and dinners with courtiers was a more relaxed environment to continue political discussions. Similarly, at the English court, Maitland also used dinners to continue political discussions more privately. He dined with the Spanish ambassador resident at the English court in his lodgings and later spoke with the French ambassador to gather information from both sides.⁴⁷ The above factors were important to the early modern handbooks but it was his experience that actually helped the ambassador to complete his instructions and navigate the different diplomatic cultures. Having explored the suggestion made by ambassadorial handbooks about the type of person suitable to serve as an ambassador, we can now examine and compare the unique political experience and background of the English and Scottish ambassadors appointed between 1558 and 1568.

Ambassadors and their Experience: Travel

For an ambassador, travel was quite literally in the job description.⁴⁸ The first order of business was for the ambassador to arrive safely in their host country, which involved navigating the dangerous seas, crossing borders, and avoiding areas of conflict. After arriving, the ambassador needed to be prepared to travel with their host court, on a progress or summer travels, in order to keep up to date with the domestic and foreign affairs of the country.⁴⁹ An ambassador's embassy was at an end when either he was recalled by his home monarch or if he was dismissed by his host monarch. On his return,

⁴⁷ Add. MS 32091, ff. 195r-198v, Copy Sir William Maitland of Lethington to Mary, 9 March 1563.

⁴⁸ Paul M. Dover, 'Ambassadors as travellers in Italy in the second half of the fifteenth century', Gábor Gelléri, Rachel Willie *Travel and Conflict in the Early Modern World* (London: Routledge, 2020); Jan Hennings, 'Textual Ambassadors and Ambassadorial Texts: Literary Representatives and Diplomatic Practice in George Turberville's and Thomas Randolph's Account of Russia (1568-9)', Tracey A. Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood, ed., *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

⁴⁹ When, on the rare occasion in the sixteenth century, the host monarch travelled abroad, the ambassador commissioned to this monarch from a foreign monarch would not usually travel as part of their party but would remain resident at their host court.

the ambassador needed the correct documents to travel safely back to his home country by land, typically on horseback, or on board a ship.

Sixteenth-century diplomatic handbooks refer to travel as an essential skill for an ambassador. In understanding the behaviour of the ambassador, Hotman explained that an ambassador could not be experienced in worldly affairs ‘if he haue not seene and trauelled abroad’.⁵⁰ Travel allowed an ambassador to immerse himself in the history and culture of another country and to form networks. From his experience abroad, an ambassador would ‘alwayes haue an eye abroad [a network] into the country, to discouer, if there be any stirring against the seruice of his Maister, or against the confederates’.⁵¹ Even if the ambassador did not have ample travel experience, he could still use his networks abroad to extend his monarchs influence. Although he was not as direct as Hotman, Gentili understood that travel experience was an important prerequisite to a diplomat’s experience. In his ambassadorial handbooks, Gentili stated that in order to be judicious, the ambassador should be a mature man who also had experience in travelling.⁵² Firstly, it is unclear why the combination of this personal attribute and experience of travel make a man wise in his commission, and secondly how they related to one another. As this experience is not mentioned elsewhere in Gentili’s handbook, travel feels out of place and just another skill required of an ambassador. Unlike Hotman and Gentili’s handbooks, Francis Thynne does not directly list travel as an important skill for an ambassador but he does acknowledge that an ambassador should be ‘furnished with diuers languages’.⁵³ Whilst, gentlemen and noblemen were taught languages as part of their education with their tutors or at university, they developed this skill by spending

⁵⁰ Jean Hotman, *The Ambassador* (London, 1603), f. 8r.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 38v-39r.

⁵² Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 170.

⁵³ Thynne, *The Perfect Ambassador*, p. 13.

time in the country and thus Thynne was inferring that having experience abroad was ideal.

In the sixteenth century, there were six reasons for travelling abroad. The first was for education: either travelling with their tutor, attending university, or educating themselves in the history and culture of the country. The second was typically for older men who wanted to find remedies for health issues. Thirdly, people might be sent abroad because they were exiled from their home country. Another reason for travelling was to experience the natural and man-made phenomena of another country. A fifth reason was for military service, either for their own or a foreign monarch. Finally, and most importantly, a great deal of diplomatic experience was gained abroad as part of an ambassador's party or the person was sent on a short test commission. Bell has argued that early modern English ambassadors 'had experience overseas' and this 'was a prerequisite upon which the queen and her ministers placed heavy emphasis in selecting persons for employment abroad'.⁵⁴ This now needs to be examined in the context of Scottish ambassadors. In the 1560s, the English and Scottish ambassadors commissioned had travel experience, mainly in an ambassador's party and this was most commonly at the French court. This provided the foundation for on-the-job diplomatic training as well as essential knowledge of the third country – France – in the Anglo-Scottish relationship.

An ambassador gained an insight into diplomacy whilst travelling as part of an ambassador's party, carrying messages, escorting an important noble or political figure across the country, or acting as an agent to another country. As Bell has argued, the Elizabethan government placed heavy emphasis on their ambassadors having diplomatic experience and their numbers reflected this. Between 1558 and 1568, ten of the sixteen (65%) of the accredited English ambassadors had previously been part of an ambassador's

⁵⁴ Bell, 'John Man: The Last Elizabethan Resident Ambassador in Spain', p. 81.

party or led their own embassies. Frescoln noted that after Randolph was recalled from Scotland in 1566, he can be identified as one of the first men in England whom we can possibly describe as a career diplomat. He had spent over ten years abroad and, at home, was frequently called upon to receive distinguished foreign visitors.⁵⁵ Of the Scottish ambassadors commissioned in this period, eight of the twelve ambassadors (66%) had previous diplomatic experience. Diplomatic experience took a number of forms. As previously mentioned, France was the country where most of the individuals gained their diplomatic experience. Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, Sir Henry Killigrew, Sir Henry Middlemore, and Sir Nicholas Wotton all had experience as English ambassadors to the French court.⁵⁶ On the Scottish side, in 1558 Maitland was supposed to have accompanied Yves de Rumbay on an embassy to France but they were unable to manage the Channel crossing.⁵⁷

Education was another common way one gained travel experience. In the sixteenth century, this could refer to travelling for leisure, being stationed at a court, or travel as part of the party of an ambassador or attend an educational establishment. Only two Scottish diplomats attended a university abroad.⁵⁸ Between 1540 and 1542, Maitland studied at the University of Paris.⁵⁹ Other Scottish men spent more time focusing on their education in France. James Beaton, future Archbishop of Glasgow was sent by his uncle, Cardinal David Beaton, to study in France (Paris and then Poitou) in the 1530s and 1540s.

⁵⁵ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 452-453.

⁵⁶ Wotton was back and forth from in the 1550s as the resident ambassador and to negotiate the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis. In the 1560s, Throckmorton, Killigrew, and Middlemore served as the English ambassador to France.

⁵⁷ Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, p. 340.

⁵⁸ For literature on extensive travel in the seventeenth century see, John Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad, 1604-1667* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Edward Chaney, *The Evolution of the Grand Tour: Anglo-Italian Cultural Relations since the Renaissance* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1988).; Matthew Glozier, 'Scottish Travellers Abroad, 1660-1688', *Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish History*, Vol. 8, (2000).

⁵⁹ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 22. Loughlin questions whether Maitland's birth date is inaccurate because 14 years old seems young to be attending university.

From his time in France, Beaton not only received a good knowledge of the French languages but also won the approval of Mary and influence at the French court. After Mary returned to Scotland in August 1561, Beaton was asked to remain at the French court as the Scottish ambassador to France.⁶⁰ Furthermore, education abroad was not only about the institution they attended but also provided the opportunity to learn languages and become immersed in a country's culture. The prime examples were James and Robert Melville. In 1550, James Melville was sent by the Regent Mary of Guise, to France as a page to the young Mary. Likewise, his older brother Robert gained an education at the French court.

There are two examples of English ambassadors travelling to further their own education. The first was Nicholas Wotton who travelled to Italy, Perugia, between 1520 and 1528. There are two reasons why Wotton was in Italy. Barbara Ficara argued against the idea that Wotton went to Italy to finish his final university degree as he would have been around 30 years old at this point.⁶¹ Another reason, identified by Michael Zell, refers to Wotton as spending time with Juan Luis Vives, a Spanish humanist, and other members of a humanist circle.⁶² Wotton's experience was not an academic or cultural education but he developed a humanist network abroad. The second example of an English ambassador's education abroad was Killigrew. As part of John Dudley's household in 1545, he travelled to Italy in 1546 as his agent. He then travelled with Thomas Hoby in Italy for a time in 1549.⁶³ This was the beginning of his experience on the continent before he was sent to France as part of the English ambassador's party.

⁶⁰ Mark Dilworth, 'Beaton, James (1524-1603)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁶¹ Barbara Ficara, 'Nicholas Wotton: Dean and Diplomat' (PhD Thesis, University of Kent, 1981), p. 31.

⁶² Michael Zell, 'Wotton, Nicholas (c. 1497-1567)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁶³ Johnathan Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors: English Students in Italy 1485-1603* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co Ltd, 1998), pp. 248-249.

Exile was another unusual example of travel experience. Whilst it is unclear if this was the type of experience the authors of the ambassadorial handbooks had in mind, when men fled their home country into exile abroad due to religious or political differences, this did provide them with travel experience. It gave them the chance to make connections and learn about the culture of another country. James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton, was the only Scottish ambassador to have lived in exile. Morton's exile rose directly from his family's fall from grace during the personal reign of James V. His father, Archibald Douglas, sixth Earl of Angus, was stepfather to the young James V. When the Duke of Albany was out of the country on business in France, Margaret Tudor, Queen Dowager and wife of Angus, ejected him from the Governorship. Angus then staged a coup to retake control. From 1528, the beginning of James V's personal reign, the Douglas family were exiled from Scotland and fled to England. The future Earl of Morton, being around twelve years old, fled with his father and uncle, Sir George Douglas, into exile and during his stay in England he spent the majority of his time in Berwick with occasional visits to the court of Henry VIII in the company of his father, who had proclaimed his loyalty to the English king in order to retain his goodwill.⁶⁴ Morton gained substantial geographical and social benefits from his exile. He would have been familiar with routes between Scotland and England, as well as towns in the English East March, and had a network of men in the English border as well as among younger Henrician courtiers. In contrast to Morton, who entered exile due to political discontent, the English ambassadors who had experienced exile did so as committed Protestants during the Marian restoration of Catholicism. The three English ambassadors who exiled themselves or were exiled were Randolph (1557-1559), Killigrew (1553), and Throckmorton (1555-1557). All three

⁶⁴ Marcus Merriman, 'Douglas, Archibald, sixth earl of Angus (c. 1489-1557)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); G. R. Hewitt, 'Douglas, James, fourth earl of Morton (c. 1516-1581)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

ambassadors returned to England between 1558 and 1560 and served as prominent members of the Elizabethan English diplomatic corps. This demonstration of loyalty to the Protestant faith would have been recognised but was not the only reason they were selected as trusted ambassadors.

Whilst diplomatic travel was not an essential skill when appointing an ambassador, it provided an ambassador with important skills that both began and ended an embassy. In the context of Anglo-Scottish relations, the repeated mention of the English and Scottish ambassadors having some experience in France demonstrates a pattern on two counts. First, that the ambassadors had diplomatic experience from their time travelling in an ambassador's party. And secondly, that knowledge of France, the French language, and the French court was a useful stepping-stone for English and Scottish ambassadors appointed in the 1560s.

Ambassadors and their Experience: The Privy Councillor

Political experience, like travel, was touched on by the three ambassadorial handbooks mentioned above. One difference that has emerged in the structural patterns of ambassadors was whether they were members of the Privy Council. The Scottish ambassadors who were most frequently commissioned (Maitland, James Melville, and Robert Melville) were appointed from the Scottish Privy Council because Mary wanted to use men she trusted and who were well versed on discussions at the heart of Scottish government to represent her interests in England. In contrast, the more frequently appointed English ambassadors were largely career diplomats not councillors. Therefore, they would never have been back at their home court long enough to attend a Privy Council meeting before they were shipped off to their next posting abroad.

The Privy Council was not only the central point of early modern government but has been the central point of much historiography. The history of the English Privy Council is already well-known.⁶⁵ Scholarly interest in the Scottish Privy Council was slower to develop but has recently made significant leaps. Until recently it was presumed that it did not emerge as an independent executive body until 1543 during the minority of Mary.⁶⁶ However, Blakeway has argued that in Scotland a Privy Council was in fact operational during the personal reign of James V, and played an active role in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy between 1528 and 1542.⁶⁷

When a new member was appointed to the Privy Council, in Scotland or in England, the person took an oath to affirm what their responsibilities were to the monarch. Therefore, when a monarch needed an ambassador who would give a trustworthy and honest opinion, the best pool of men to choose from in this author's opinion was from those who had already demonstrated their loyalty through their appointment to the English or Scottish Privy Council, or Parliament.⁶⁸ The council assisted the monarch in both domestic and foreign affairs of the country and the loyalty of its advice and opinions

⁶⁵ Details of the English administration: Lord Eustace Percy, *The privy council under the Tudors* (Oxford, 1907); A. F. Pollard, 'Council, Star Chamber, and privy council under the Tudors', *EHR*, no. 37 (1922), pp. 42-60; Dorothy Gladish, *The Tudor privy council* (Retford, 1915). Work on the English administration: G. R. Elton, *The Tudor revolution in government: administrative changes in the reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge, 1953); G. R. Elton, 'Tudor government: the points of contact, 2: The Council', *TRHS*, 5th ser., 25 (1975), pp. 195-211; G. R. Elton, 'Tudor government,' *HJ*, 31 (1988), pp. 425-34. Reassessments: David Starkey, 'A reply: Tudor government: the facts?', *Historical Journal*, 31 (1988), 921-31; Christopher Coleman and David Starkey, ed., *Revolution Reassessed: revisions in the history of Tudor government and administration* (Oxford, 1986); Claire Cross, David Loades, J.J. Scarisbrick eds., *Law and Government under the Tudors* (Cambridge, 1988); David Loades, *Tudor government: structures of authority in the sixteenth century* (Oxford, 1997); John Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford, 1988); Steven J. Gunn, *Early Tudor government, 1485-1558* (London, 1995).

⁶⁶ Julian Goodare, *State and Society in Early Modern Scotland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 73; the Register of the Privy Council only dates from 1545, which has led scholars to believe that it was around this date that the Privy Council was established in Scotland. History of the development of the Scottish Privy Council: Julian Goodare, *The Government of Scotland, 1560-1625* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁶⁷ Amy Blakeway, 'The Privy Council of James V of Scotland, 1528-1542', *Historical Journal*, 59, 1 (2016), pp. 30-31; pp. 38-39; there are still more questions about the Privy Council that this study identified, p. 43.

⁶⁸ For this thesis, the use of the term Privy Council will refer to the English Privy Council and the term Scottish Privy Council will refer to the Scottish equivalent. Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 7.

was secured by the oath they swore before their appointment. To date, there is no known record of the oath used to swear in new Scottish privy councillors during the personal reign of James V.⁶⁹ In the 1561 Great Council and Mary's Scottish Privy Council on 5 November 1565, the newly appointed members of the council took their oath. Again, it is unfortunate that no script for the oath survives.⁷⁰ With no evidence to know what the wording was, it was likely that the same oath continued to be used for the entirety of Mary's personal reign. The earliest version of the oath for the Scottish Privy Council recorded in full was entered in the *Register of the Privy Council* on 15 December 1598 during the reign of James VI. The councillor had to swear five statements: 'that we sall geif his Majestie oure trew, unpricht and efauld counsall in all effairis quhilk it sall pleis his Hienes to communicat unto us'; remain a councillor until the king dismisses them; keep information secret; not advise the King against God or the King's royal honour, and not to flatter the King.⁷¹

For the oath sworn by an English Privy Councillor, multiple versions used by different Tudor monarchs survive.⁷² McGovern argues that the oath used depended on the type of authority the monarch wanted to assert.⁷³ Two different versions of an early Elizabethan oath survive. The first was a draft by Cecil, which stated that the councillor should 'gyve such counsell to hir Ma[ies]ty as maye best serue in yo[w]r co[n]science tend to the safety of hir M[aiesties] person and to the co[m]men weal of this realme'.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Amy Blakeway, 'The Privy Council of James V of Scotland, 1528-1542', *Historical Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2016), p. 43.

⁷⁰ *RPCS*, Vol. 5, 1592-1599, p. 102.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 500-501.

⁷² Jonathan McGovern, 'The development of the privy council oath in Tudor England', *Historical Research*, Vol. 93, No. 260 (2020), pp. 273-285.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 273-285.

⁷⁴ TNA SP 12/1, f. 3v, Draft Oath by Cecil, [c. 17] November 1558 [*CSP Domestic, 1547-1580*, no. 2]. On the recto side of the manuscript, Cecil had drafted a memorandum of matters that needed to be addressed before Elizabeth's accession. This implies this was drafted in the early months of Elizabeth's accession and Cecil already had redrafting the oath of a Privy Councillor in mind to secure a loyal team to advise the Queen.

The second, which was used by Elizabethan privy councillors, was the 1558 oath that required the counsellor to swear to advise the monarch, to maintain the safety of the realm, and to not put forward their own personal designs.⁷⁵ The Elizabethan oath used rhetoric from the Henrician rather than the Edwardian oath as a sign that her reign would be different from Edward's and to reassert her authority as a monarch.⁷⁶ By 1566, the Elizabethan oath had been edited to read, 'ye shall as far forth as your cunning and discretion sufficeth truely, justlye, and uprightlye counsaile and advise the Queenes Highnese in the matters which you shall be made prively'.⁷⁷ The amendments made to the oath of a Privy Councillor between different periods indicate that the role of a Councillor was not fixed and could be adapted to the political role they needed to fulfil. This specifically applied to roles outside of the court.

Whilst the English and Scottish oaths were developed in different political contexts and so varied between countries and, over time, they consistently emphasised the importance of honest advice. Diplomats or ambassadors were not bound by the same oath, unless of course they were appointed to both positions. The Scottish oath explicitly stated that those who took the oath remained a Councillor until the monarch dismissed them – we can assume that the same was probably true in England.⁷⁸ Therefore, when a privy councillor was sent on an embassy, he remained bound by the oath that he had taken upon his admission to the council. For an ambassador, he needed to act on behalf of his monarch and was, therefore, bound more closely to his instructions to understand how to best represent his monarch abroad.

⁷⁵ TNA SP 12/1, f. 137r, Oath, 1558 [*CSP Domestic, 1547-1580*, no. 62]. Another copy of this oath is recorded in BL Add. 48018, f. 1v.

⁷⁶ Jonathan McGovern, 'The development of the privy council oath in Tudor England', *Historical Research*, Vol. 93, No. 260 (2020), p. 281.

⁷⁷ BL Add. MS 34216, f. 1r-v, Form of oath taken by Sir Walter Mildmay on admission to PC, 7 July 1566; Stanford E. Lehmberg, *Sir Walter Mildmay and Tudor Government* (Austin: University of Texas, 1964), p. 65.

⁷⁸ *RPCS*, pp. 500-501.

It made sense to appoint a councillor as an ambassador because both positions required two basic but essential skills: gathering information as an expert and giving advice. The first was to report information that they learnt during audiences with their host monarch, meetings with government officials, and interactions with people at court in their host country. Secondly an ambassador occasionally offered advice to their home monarch, but they reframed this as news or a suggestion to avoid directly telling their monarch what actions they should take. Ambassadors were simultaneously responsible for being information-gatherers at their host court and information-interpreters on behalf of their home court. Whilst a monarch was advised to take good counsel, they did not necessarily have to listen to it. However, the monarch was aware that the ambassador grew and learnt to be the expert in the country he was commissioned to and he was expected to give trustworthy advice. When an ambassador was stationed at their host court, whether for days, months, or years, he was expected to send frequent correspondence and reports of any news or rumours he had learnt. It must be taken into account how much we can trust the letters and reports of the ambassador. Devices such as and including reported speech, sending copies of letters, or mentioning multiple named individuals who overheard certain news were employed in an attempt to validate their reports. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ambassadorial handbooks recognised giving advice based on the news he received was an important part of an ambassador's duty; he 'dooth not giue him better counsell which he is bound to doe by the dutie of his charge, which charge comprehendeth the qualitie of a Counsellour of Estate for the time of this Ambassage'.⁷⁹ If the ability to advise their monarch and give advice on their behalf was so important for an ambassador, someone who was sworn and well-practised in giving

⁷⁹ Hotman, *The Ambassador*, f. 51r.

good and honest counsel was a sensible and appropriate choice. This awareness is likely to have underpinned the Scottish preference for ambassadors who were privy councillors.

Although privy councillors were more commonly chosen as Scottish ambassadors, between 1561 and 1566, both courts commissioned men from their Privy Council. To start with the English ambassadors, four of the sixteen men (25%) were members of the Privy Council before they were commissioned: Sir Peter Mewtas, Cecil, Sir Nicholas Wotton, and Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford.⁸⁰ In England, Privy councillors were appointed as ambassadors for brief ceremonial duties rather than to be resident for any length of time. For example, Bedford was sent to Scotland to represent Elizabeth at the baptismal ceremony of Prince James in December 1566. Between 1565 and 1567, Bedford was still a member of the English Privy Council but was stationed at the English border as the Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East March. Prior to being stationed in the north of England, Bedford was a regular attendee at Council meetings.⁸¹ With the records available between 21 November 1558 and 10 August 1563, Bedford attended ninety-nine meetings. Even after 1563 during his journeys back to London, Bedford resumed his seat at the Council.⁸² Only one English ambassador was appointed to the Privy Council after his embassy to Scotland. Sir Henry Sidney's appointment was directly related to his new position as Lord Deputy to Ireland in 1565 in order to elevate his status. Of the Scottish ambassadors, three of the twelve (33%) appointed in this period were members of the Privy Council before or between

⁸⁰ See, Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568.

⁸¹ *APC*, pp. 4-140, this is every embassy with the exception of one where Bedford was absent but still discussed during the meeting.

⁸² *APC*, pp. 217-235.

commissions: Maitland, Robert Melville, James Melville.⁸³ This relatively low number does not reflect the fact that these three names were the most regularly appointed ambassadors to the English court.

Even during the exceptional periods of diplomatic exchange between 1559 and 1561, we see that Scottish Privy Councillors were the preferred choice in the negotiations with Elizabeth. In October 1560, Glencairn, Maitland and Morton were sent to Elizabeth, as representatives of the Lords of the Congregation to negotiate a way of continuing the alliance of 1559-60. This also reflected that the Scottish Lords wanted their negotiations to be handled by skilled and trusted councillors. It must be noted that Morton and Glencairn were not recommissioned as ambassadors after Mary returned to Scotland. However, this was a part of a pattern of selecting Scottish ambassadors and representatives who were former Councillors, and this developed into an established Scottish practice.

Two of the men at the heart of the English and Scottish Privy Council, Cecil on the English side and Maitland on the Scottish, need to be considered separately from the other ambassadors. Allinson has already drawn attention to the striking similarities between the two men. They were both university educated, shared a Protestant faith, were from 'middling' lairds and minor gentry families, and were appointed as secretary of state. In such privileged positions, the 'burden of diplomacy' very much fell upon them.⁸⁴ It was clear that a different set of exceptional circumstances drove Cecil's appointment as an English commissioner compared to Maitland's. In July 1560, Cecil and Wotton were sent to sign the Treaty of Edinburgh. As the first man appointed to Elizabeth's Privy

⁸³ See, Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568.

⁸⁴ Rayne Allinson, 'Parables and Dark Sentences: The Correspondence of Sir William Cecil and Sir William Maitland (1559-1573)', p. 91.

Council in 1558, he was a trusted advisor and a worthy representative of her government. Cecil also had connections with the members of the Lords of the Congregation, who had asked for English assistance against the French and had been in frequent communication with Maitland and Sir Henry Balnaves. This short and extraordinary commission was Cecil's only embassy with the objective of concluding the Treaty of Edinburgh with the Scottish and French commissioners. As the heart of the Elizabethan government, Cecil did not have the time to be an ambassador, and his skills were more beneficial in the micro-management of the Elizabethan government and foreign affairs. Instead, Cecil wanted the men commissioned to Scotland to be part of his network and to know they could be trusted to do the job properly.

Maitland, principal secretary to Mary of Guise and later Mary herself, was sent on more commissions to England than any other ambassador, until he fell out of favour with Mary in 1565. Even with a regular ambassador visiting the English court, between 1562 and 1565, Mary relied on her communication with de Foix, the French ambassador, for frequent news from England.⁸⁵ Despite this epistolary relationship, Maitland's position as the most important Scottish diplomat before 1565 is consistent with Scottish monarchs appointing a Privy Councillor as an ambassador for multiple embassies. On average, Maitland's commissions to England were two-months long, and out of eighty-seven months (seven years and three months) he was on an embassy to England for twenty-three months. This was in direct contrast to Cecil's role as secretary. He could only afford to be absent from his position at the English court for less than two months (May to July 1560) to conclude the negotiations of the Treaty of Edinburgh. As will be explained in Chapter Three, Cecil received reports from English ambassadors in Scotland and English officials stationed on the border. It was his responsibility to send information

⁸⁵ See, Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practice, pp. 205-230.

to Elizabeth and the English Privy Council that he deemed important and then coordinate a response.⁸⁶

The differences in the diplomatic roles of Maitland and Cecil emerged because of the differing positions of the Secretary in their respective countries. By the 1560s, the role of the principal secretary under Elizabeth was a well-established political office and managed the Privy Council in its 'administrative or institutional form'.⁸⁷ Cecil organised meetings of the Privy Council (especially when the monarch was not present), organised national and international correspondence, and advised the monarch. In contrast, the Scottish principal secretary 'enjoyed a certain amount of scope and initiative as far as direction of policy in the whole sphere of state affairs'.⁸⁸ This was a blessing and a curse since the wide scope of the role of Scottish secretary led to an extensive list of commitments. Like Cecil, Maitland enjoyed influence over Scottish foreign policy and was commissioned on embassies by Mary of Guise and Mary, Queen of Scots.⁸⁹ This was possible because the Scottish principal secretary was assisted by two deputies, which gave Maitland freedom to be involved in diplomatic affairs on the frontline.⁹⁰

After Maitland's political alienation from Mary in 1565, Robert Melville was commissioned as the Scottish resident ambassador to the English court. Both Melville brothers had grown-up near Mary during her time in France, although we do not know how much contact they had.⁹¹ Mary chose to fill it with men she knew and could trust and then elevated their status. They were commissioned as diplomats to garner greater respect. This is not dissimilar to theories about the composition of Elizabeth's Privy Council as

⁸⁶ See Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practice, pp. 242-244.

⁸⁷ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 10.

⁸⁸ Loughlin, 'The Political Career of Maitland', p. 4.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁹¹ Elaine Finnie Greig, 'Melville, Sir James of Halhill (1535/6-1617)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). After the death of her husband and the King of France Francois II, James Melville travelled to the French court to offer his condolences to Mary.

she appointed men who were close to her during the reigns of Edward VI and Mary I of England. Robert Melville was appointed to the Scottish Privy Council in 1562, this was after his return to Scotland and before his embassy to England in 1564. His brother and occasional diplomat James Melville was also appointed to the Scottish Privy Council.⁹² This was partly to enhance their status as ambassadors sent to Elizabeth as neither Melville brother was frequently present at the Scottish Privy Council.⁹³ They were appointed to the Scottish Privy Council because Mary trusted them – it is likely that Maitland's fall from grace also hastened their appointments as ambassadors. The difference between the men appointed from Elizabeth's Privy Council and the men appointed from Mary's Privy Council was that the ambassadors who were considered career diplomats under Elizabeth – Randolph, Killigrew, Middlemore, Throckmorton – were not appointed to the English Privy Council. Scottish ambassadors were more likely to be councillors at the time of their embassy than their English counterparts. This was firstly a difference in status between the way in which each queen wanted to present themselves abroad, and secondly a reflection of the availability of an individual to leave when it was required. By keeping her Councillors and ambassadors separate, Elizabeth was able to build a team of experts abroad whose reports could be discussed by other experts at home.

The political background and diplomatic training between England and Scotland is comparable because both countries expected their ambassadors to have certain skill sets before they were sent on embassy. Unlike Cecil, Maitland had the flexibility to leave his position at the Scottish Privy Council to be directly involved in Anglo-Scottish affairs.

⁹² R. R. Zulager, 'Melville, Robert, first Lord Melville (1527/8–1621)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Greig, 'Melville, Sir James of Halhill (1535/6–1617)'.

⁹³ In the *RPCS*, vol. 1, there is no record of the appointment of James Melville or Robert Melville, and their names are not mentioned in the index of the volume, which suggests they were not present at Privy Council meetings in the 1560s. However, on 28 December 1598, we note the oath Robert Melville gave when he was sworn in during the reign of James VI; *RPCS*, p. 508.

Without the English secretary as a viable option as an ambassador, the English government was forced to pick from another pool of men without pending political obligations and this led them to men who had previous diplomatic experience.

English and Scottish Embassies

The format and structure of the embassies commissioned between 1558 and 1568 are just as important to understanding English and Scottish diplomacy in the 1560s as the experience and social background of the ambassadors. Mattingly divided embassies into the categories of resident, special, or extraordinary, which highlighted a structural distinction that helped to shape our understanding of sixteenth-century diplomatic practice.⁹⁴ According to MacMahon, the rise of the resident ambassador in the early sixteenth century coincided with the increased use of experienced laymen in diplomacy in the later reign of Henry VIII.⁹⁵ Through this study of Anglo-Scottish relations, a similar pattern can be identified in the 1560s and the structure of their embassies were adapted to the shifting political circumstances.

Between 1558 and 1568, there were only two resident ambassadors, Randolph from the English court (1561-1566) and Robert Melville from the Scottish court (1566-1567).⁹⁶ When Randolph was first commissioned to Scotland, he was not an accredited ambassador but the English representative to the Lords of the Congregation between September 1559 and August 1561, a role that is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.⁹⁷ It was not until a few days after Mary returned to Scotland in August 1561 that

⁹⁴ For the reference to extraordinary embassies see, Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 32-33. For the reference to resident ambassadors see, *ibid.*, pp. 54-70 (Italian foundations of resident diplomacy).

⁹⁵ MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII', pp. 110-114.

⁹⁶ For Randolph, see Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 327-331.

For Robert Melville, see Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 353-357.

⁹⁷ See Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 84-85.

Randolph's position was changed to an English resident ambassador. As the English expert in Scotland, his role required a combination of information-gathering and advice-giving to the English government during the four years he served, which was a period of largely peaceful relations.

When Anglo-Scottish relations began to deteriorate in 1565 after it was rumoured that Mary had chosen Darnley as her future husband, this impacted Randolph's position at the Scottish court. His position became more precarious after he was directed by Elizabeth to secretly and illegally send a sum of money to the Scottish rebels in that same year. Instead of writing to Bedford about sending the Scottish rebels financial aid, Elizabeth sent a letter to Randolph declaring that 'the sayd Erle [of Moray] wold nedes com hyther to sollicite in the name of all his co[m]pany ther co[m]en cause to us of whose comi[n]g we did not allow so sodde[n]ly for money respectes and therfor sent word back w[ith] all spede to the said Erle of Bedford to stay the other fro[m] com[m]ing'.⁹⁸ In February 1566, Mary accused the English ambassador of sending money to the rebels.⁹⁹ The accusation against Randolph was that he 'lente vnto my L[ord] of Murraye 3000 crownes'.¹⁰⁰ Randolph's main concern was to make it clear that Elizabeth was in 'no wayes burdayned but playnely defended by this Q[ueen] self that she new[er] was of that mynde to supporte my L[ord] Murraye, and what so ev[er] is done in this poynte procedethe onlye frome me'.¹⁰¹ Two days before Randolph was told of the accusations and asked to leave Scotland, Mary had already informed her ambassador Robert Melville about the traitorous actions of the English ambassador and sent him to the English court to address Elizabeth about the charges. As a result, on 3 March 1566, Randolph finally

⁹⁸ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 171r-174v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 29 October 1565 [*CSP Scot*, 1563-69, no. 291].

⁹⁹ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 17r-v, Randolph to Cecil, 19 February 1566 [*CSP Foreign*, 1564-65, no. 1372]; BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 41r-42v: Randolph to Robert Dudley, 19 February 1566.

¹⁰⁰ BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 41r-42v: Randolph to Robert Dudley, 19 February 1566.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

left Scotland at Mary's request with no charges having been brought against him under Scottish or English law. Gentili's handbook stated that 'dismissal is a serious stigma with which an ambassador and his sovereign ought not to be branded'.¹⁰² Fortunately for Randolph, his dismissal from Scotland did not colour his diplomatic career as in the year following his return to Scotland he was commissioned to Russia.¹⁰³ Furthermore, he was recommissioned to Scotland in 1572 on an extraordinary embassy after the assassination of Regent Moray. He even arrived in time to attend the funeral on Elizabeth's behalf. After Randolph was dismissed, Elizabeth did not send another resident ambassador to Scotland, which reflected the division that had grown between the two countries as a result of the events in 1565 after Mary began to make independent decisions and this meant she no longer sought Elizabeth's advice. The shift in power and authority in this year is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to Elizabeth, Mary did not immediately send a resident ambassador to the English court. There was evidence that Mary had planned to send someone when Randolph reported the rumours that 'embassadeurs are appoynted to France, Eng[land], Spayne & their anmes you shall knowe when I am better assured'.¹⁰⁵ There was evidence that Mary planned to send a resident ambassador to Elizabeth as early as November 1561. Randolph, reported to Cecil that,

The Quene here is determined to have one to serve her in Englande. He is not yet resolved upon. Ther hathe byne some previe mention made of Mr Henrie Balnaues or David Forreste.

¹⁰² Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 114.

¹⁰³ Jan Hennings, 'Textual Ambassadors and Ambassadors Texts: Literary Representation and Diplomatic Practice in George Turbville's and Thomas Randolph's Accounts of Russia (1568-9)', Tracey A. Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood, ed., *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writings in the Early Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 175-189.

¹⁰⁴ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy pp. 155-193.

¹⁰⁵ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 131r- 132v, Randolph to Throckmorton, 26 August 1561 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 941].

I knowe not what credyt those men cane have to serve her in the rowme. Other I know none here to that effecte she dyserethe. What so men he be I truste to fynde the meanes to mayke hym be knowne vnto you.¹⁰⁶

English and Scottish correspondence and Privy Council records show no evidence that either of the proposed ambassadors were officially commissioned to the English court. However, the rumour persisted because Randolph reported the news that David Forest might be commissioned to Elizabeth in January 1562, five months after he first suggested a diplomatic appointment.¹⁰⁷ Mary's change of mind about sending Forest was directly linked to the arrival of Paul de Foix, an extraordinary French ambassador sent to Scotland in November 1561 to welcome Mary. Then, by early 1562, de Foix was commissioned as the French resident ambassador to the English court and how this aided Mary's intelligence gathering in England will be explained in more detail in Chapter Three.¹⁰⁸ Between September 1561 and May 1565, Maitland was the only ambassador who was regularly sent to the English court. It was only after he fell out of favour with Mary upon his final return to Edinburgh that a more permanent Scottish residency at the English court was created. In his place, Robert Melville was appointed as Mary's first resident ambassador to the English court between February 1566 and June 1567. Robert Melville frequently returned to Scotland during his embassy. This was evident through the four sets of instructions or memorials he received during his residency. However, after Mary was deposed, Robert Melville's role as the resident ambassador was terminated, which was consistent when the regime changed. The appointment of resident ambassadors by the English and Scottish courts were both consistent with moments when each monarch was interested in the rival court. Elizabeth appointed a resident ambassador early on to

¹⁰⁶ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 164r-166v, Randolph to Cecil, 27 October 1561 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 1038].

¹⁰⁷ TNA SP 52/7, ff. 15r-v, Randolph to Cecil, 30 January 1562 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 1057].

¹⁰⁸ See Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practice, pp. 213-223.

assert her authority and influence events in Scotland, whereas Mary delayed her appointment until she was in a stronger political position, using it as a declaration of her own interest in English affairs.

Short, extraordinary embassies were most frequently used in this decade, though there was significant variety in the person, purpose, and length of the embassy. Seventeen of the twenty-two (77%) accredited Scottish embassies sent from the Scottish court were extraordinary embassies. On the English side, thirteen out of sixteen (81%) were extraordinary English embassies. The lower number of extraordinary embassies from the English court can be easily explained. The English had a resident ambassador; Randolph was stationed at the Scottish court for almost four years with only a short return to England in 1563 and no replacement sent in his two-month hiatus. Therefore, extraordinary embassies were typically sent when a domestic crisis occurred in Scotland to support Randolph's embassy with more information. By nature, extraordinary embassies were shorter because the man was sent with a specific purpose and was then to return to their home court. The shortest, extraordinary embassy from the Scottish court to the English court was when James Melville was sent to London between June and July 1566. Melville was positioned at Berwick ready to travel to the English court as soon as he received news of the gender of Mary's baby.¹⁰⁹ As an embassy with specific instructions and a set purpose, the turnaround of Melville's journey was roughly eighteen days from his arrival in London to his return to Scotland. From England, it was in May 1565 that Throckmorton had the shortest English embassy in this period of study. The English extraordinary ambassador arrived in Scotland on 13 May and after just eleven

¹⁰⁹ *Melville Memoirs*, pp. 130-38; TNA SP 59/11, ff. 277r-278v, Drury to Cecil, 20 June 1566 [*CSP Foreign*, 1566-68, no. 508]; Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, p. 355.

days he had arrived back at the English court.¹¹⁰ Throckmorton's embassy should have been longer. However, his instructions were no longer valid as the ceremony to bestow marital titles on Darnley had already taken place so, he had failed before he could even begin to intervene.¹¹¹

Whilst Mattingly's distinction between resident and extraordinary ambassadors remains helpful, it risks occluding the differences between very different types of short-term embassy. Notably, it ignores the difference between an individual being sent on a one-off or occasional mission, and someone who was sent regularly with the opportunity to develop the type of contacts open to a resident ambassador. This pattern was exceptional to Maitland in this period of study who is referred to in this research as a 'regular ambassador'. Between August 1561 and May 1565, with the exception of one embassy for James Melville, Maitland was the Scottish ambassador to the English court on four occasions with each trip varying in length and purpose.¹¹² Broadly speaking, Maitland's embassies were to announce Mary's arrival back in Scotland and confirm her place in the succession; to organise the meeting between the two queens; to understand what the English parliament's position was regarding her place in the succession; and finally, to ask Elizabeth to approve her marriage to Darnley. Whilst this research uses the terms resident and extraordinary ambassador, they are too limiting for the broad spectrum of embassies. The term regular ambassador does well to fill the void in terms with this research. However, when these are applied to other studies, more terms for different ambassadors and other types of embassies need to be considered.

¹¹⁰ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, p. 332.

¹¹¹ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 168-181.

¹¹² Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-68, pp. 346-350.

As well as distinguishing between the types of embassies and how frequently they were sent, the gaps between diplomatic activity also contribute to our understanding of how Anglo-Scottish diplomatic relationships were crafted. The first two appendices, which focus on official embassies and the journeys of representatives, are brought together in Appendix Three as a timeline of the diplomatic activity between England and Scotland. Over the decade of study for this research, there was no Scottish ambassador or representative in England for seventy-five months (56% of the period between 1558 and 1568) and there was no English ambassador or representative in Scotland for thirty-five months (26% of the period between 1558 and 1568).¹¹³ This disparity can be easily explained by the consistent presence of the English resident ambassador in Scotland for two years as a representative to the Lords of the Congregation and five years as an ambassador.

Periods of diplomatic silence between England and Scotland are just as revealing as moments of active engagement. Gaps often reflected shifting political priorities, unresolved tensions, or strategic hesitation on both sides. Examining these absences provides insight into how each monarchy managed diplomacy during moments of uncertainty or conflict. The longest gap when there was no English ambassador resident at the Scottish court was during the first period of exceptional diplomacy between August 1558 and October 1561. This coincided with the death of Mary I of England, the conclusion of Anglo-Franco-Scottish peace negotiations, and the beginning of the Scottish Reformation Rebellion. Here we see that national interests and security were the priority over strengthening diplomatic ties. Between October 1567 and December 1568, this was the longest period with no diplomatic personnel in either England or Scotland.

¹¹³ See Appendix 3: Timeline of the English and Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents, 1558-1568, pp. 363-367.

This gap occurred after Throckmorton was recalled back to England in September 1567, where he found himself in diplomatic limbo because he was refused access to the recently deposed Mary, who was imprisoned in Loch Leven, and could not present his instructions to the Lords of Scotland without acknowledging their authority. The absence of a diplomatic presence in Scotland represented a stalemate between Elizabeth and the Regent Moray where a waiting game began of who would send an ambassador first and how they would be received.¹¹⁴ Gaps in diplomatic activity between England and Scotland draw our attention to when there was tension between the two and also the way in which they chose to manage the situation.

Periods of Exceptional Diplomacy

The above analysis is useful for understanding the similarities and differences between the accredited ambassadors and how this compared to broader structural patterns of sixteenth century diplomacy. To fully grasp the nature of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy in the 1560s, it is important to examine not only the accredited ambassadors but also the diplomatic activity during the two periods of exceptional diplomacy (1559-60 and 1567-68). that bookended a more conventional period of queen-to queen diplomatic relations (1561-67). In these two periods, a mixed bag of ambassadors and representatives were sent between the English and Scottish courts, and Berwick. Between May 1559 and August 1561, a group who styled themselves as the Lords of the Congregation rebelled against the Regent Mary of Guise on both political and religious grounds.¹¹⁵ In fact, it is

¹¹⁴ This is addressed in the 'Periods of Exception Diplomacy' section in Chapter One: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 81-108.

¹¹⁵ For literature on the Lords of the Congregation as an established group see, Edward J. Cowan, 'The making of the National Covenant', in John Morrill, ed., *The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context* (Edinburgh, 1990); Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England, and the Reformation, 1534-1561* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Alec Ryrie, *The Origins of the Scottish Reformation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Jane Dawson, 'Bonding, religious allegiance and covenanting, 1557-1638', J. Goodare & S. Boardman, eds., *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300-1625: Essays in honour of Jenny Wormald* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

more accurate to understand that the Lords of the Congregation were both rebels and an established group. To provide some context, the First Band, or the covenant, was signed in 1557 by Scottish nobles who opposed the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots, and Francois, Dauphin of France. This document was a bond of maintenance that offered protection to the signatories through an alliance.¹¹⁶ Then, after the outbreak of the Scottish Reformation in May 1559, the First Band was expanded as ‘a general and public bond’ by July to include a variety of social ranks.¹¹⁷ Between May 1559 and March 1560, the English government negotiated with representatives of the Lords of the Congregation, which resulted in a military alliance between the two parties. The English government justified their actions using the old English tradition of identifying breaches in treaties to help explain any potentially illegal actions on their part. Without this evidence, Elizabeth would not have been able to aid the rebels openly.

The second period where there were patterns of unusual diplomatic activity was between August 1567 and 1568.¹¹⁸ This period was different from the one at the beginning of the decade because this was not about a rebel faction working in opposition to the appointed monarch, this was an overthrow of the Marian regime. However, comparisons can still be drawn between the two periods by the way in which representatives and official ambassadors were received at the English court. After Mary was deposed from the throne and her infant son was crowned King of Scotland, the Earl of Moray returned to Scotland to accept the regency and rule on behalf of James VI. This led to a division between what was more commonly referred to in the literature on the Scottish civil war

¹¹⁶ Dawson, ‘Bonding, religious allegiance and covenanting, 1557-1638’, p. 161.

¹¹⁷ Dawson, ‘Bonding, religious allegiance and covenanting, 1557-1638’, pp. 161-162. For this research, the Lords of the Congregation will be referred to as a rebel group to distinguish them from the Regent’s ambassadors but, it was acknowledged that they were an established and legitimate faction.

¹¹⁸ For literature on the Donaldson, *All the Queen’s Men*: Lynch, *Mary Stewart*, p. 7; Webb, ‘The “Gude Regent”?’; Blakeway, *Regency*.

as the King's and Queen's parties.¹¹⁹ The two terms will be used in this thesis to distinguish between people who were supporters of Mary or James and their diplomatic personnel. Blakeway has already convincingly argued that the Regent Moray used diplomatic protocols to assert his legitimacy after 1567.¹²⁰ This section will expand Blakeway's argument through an examination of the embassies and examine how groups from the King and Queen's party used the diplomatic protocols of embassies and the missions of representatives to negotiate during a period of political crisis and tension.¹²¹ After Mary crossed the border into England in May 1568, Elizabeth was tactical and sent the same missions to both Moray and Mary, refusing to show allegiances to either side. Whilst this thesis has loosely identified Sir Thomas Leighton and Sir Henry Middlemore as ambassadors because they were sent with instructions (or an instruction-like document) to the Scottish court, questions remain around whether the two men should be classified as accredited ambassadors or representatives. This must be questioned because they were both sent to Mary and Moray in one trip. The parameters of this study proposes that men sent to Mary were representatives and those sent to Moray were ambassadors.

The two exceptional periods identified in this thesis coincided with periods of national crises in Scotland and heightened tension in the Anglo-Scottish relationship. Even during more typical years of diplomatic exchange, moments of instability could disrupt normal diplomatic protocol. A crisis took place in 1565 after Mary's marriage to Darnley when, between July and October, the Chaseabout Raid rebels, chose to send representatives to communicate and plead their case with Elizabeth. The journeys of representatives were, by Bell's definition, not embassies. However, the representative

¹¹⁹ In the two exceptional periods, the Lords of the Congregation and the Queen's party were the unofficial groups whose men are described as representatives. Regent Mary of Guise and James VI or the Regent Moray's representatives were the official parties whose men are referred to as ambassadors.

¹²⁰ Blakeway, *Regency*, pp. 212-216.

¹²¹ Donaldson, *All the Queen's Men*, p. 83-116. Donaldson has best assessed the alliances and divisions in his under-studied work about the foundational events that led to the Scottish Civil war.

could act in a diplomatic capacity using the formal structures of diplomacy. The use of procedures, such as unofficial secretaries, instructions, gift-giving, and negotiations, will be explored through the sending and receiving of representatives and ambassadors in the two periods identified and the exceptional circumstances in 1565.

Between 1559 and 1560, Elizabeth deployed two representatives to be stationed with the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland or on the English border to monitor and gather intelligence. The first representative was Randolph who travelled to Berwick in September 1559. The purpose of Randolph's time in Scotland between September 1559 and March 1566 has problematically been identified as an embassy for the entirety of the period.¹²² Frescoln drew attention to the changed nature of Randolph's position in 1560 but this has not been examined in the context of the exceptional periods of diplomacy that bookended the more typical exchanges.¹²³ In September 1559, Randolph was sent to accompany James Hamilton, third Earl of Arran from the continent back to Scotland upon the request of his father James Hamilton, the Duke of Châtellherault and heir-apparent to Scotland.¹²⁴ This request was a crucial bargaining tool for the English government, who felt the Lords of the Congregation lacked leadership and direction with their cause, and wanted someone they could trust on the frontline to gain access to information in Scotland from the faction. As Elizabeth had hoped, as a result of their time travelling together, Randolph was invited by Arran to join him into Scotland and reside with the Lords of the Congregation where he could report any news from the frontline.¹²⁵ In an attempt to keep Randolph's presence in Scotland a secret, Randolph used the alias 'Thomas Barnaby' or

¹²² Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, p. 239.

¹²³ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in England', pp. 13-73. This covers Randolph's time in Scotland as the English representative to the Lords of the Congregation.

¹²⁴ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 324-325.

¹²⁵ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 212r-v, Earl of Arran to Sadler, 21 September 1559 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 541].

‘Thomas Barnaby’ in his correspondence, wrote important information in cipher, and directed his correspondence to Berwick instead of directly to the English court because it provided a shorter route for the information to travel.¹²⁶ We know that Randolph was using the alias ‘Barnaby’ or ‘Barnabye’ because when Sir Ralph Sadler, English official stationed in Berwick, forwarded his correspondence on to the English court, Cecil’s secretary often labelled the reverse of the letter ‘Mr Randall’ so he or any other reader would know the real identity of the author.¹²⁷ It was important to keep Randolph’s presence a secret because stationing an English representative amongst the Lords of the Congregation would have signalled to Mary of Guise that Elizabeth supported the rebel group.

To facilitate the English government’s desire for information from Scotland in this uncertain period, a second English representative was sent to reside in Berwick. The representative in question was the above mentioned Sadler who was instructed to manage information between the two countries and meet with members of the Lords of the Congregation who travelled through or to Berwick.¹²⁸ The Lords of the Congregation and English representatives used Berwick as a diplomatic space to hold meetings with the Scottish representatives when meetings at the opposite court were not possible. The details of Sadler’s mission to Berwick will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.¹²⁹ Instead, this chapter focuses on representatives who were sent to the leaders of the Lords of the Congregation or to the English court to operate within the formal structures of diplomacy.

¹²⁶ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 236r-237v, Randolph [Barnaby] to Sadler, 29 October 1559 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 55].

¹²⁷ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 236r-237v, Randolph [Barnaby] to Sadler, 29 October 1559 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 55].

¹²⁸ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 323-324.

¹²⁹ See Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practices, pp. 233-267.

Between July and December 1559, the Lords of the Congregation sent representatives to Berwick to meet with English border officials and the English court to meet with Elizabeth. The focus of all meetings was to persuade Elizabeth to provide them with financial and military support. At the end of July 1559, John Knox was sent to Berwick-upon-Tweed as a representative of the Lords of the Congregation to meet with Croft. This meeting lay the foundation for the possibility of the English providing aid to the rebel group.¹³⁰ After Knox's pleasant reception on the border, the Lords of the Congregation frequently sent representatives, namely Henry Balnaves and Alexander Whitelaw, between September and November 1559, to meet with Sadler and Croft. Again, this is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.¹³¹ Balnaves and Whitelaw were Scottish politicians, who had served in Parliament under James V and continued in their offices under the Regent James Hamilton (later Châtelherault). Both men had initially supported Mary of Guises's regime when she became Regent in 1554, but Balnaves and Whitelaw became discontent with the French-Catholic rule of Scotland and supported the Lords of the Congregation's rebellion in 1559. The need for aid became more desperate in the summer and short meetings with letter bearers were not enough to bridge the gap in important political negotiations. Therefore, after Knox's success with English border representatives in July, his name was put forward to travel to the English court to encourage Elizabeth and her Privy Council to provide financial and military assistance to the rebel group against the Regent.¹³² However, by 29 October, Knox wrote to Croft that Balnaves or Maitland was relieving him of his journey to the English court.¹³³

¹³⁰ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 151r-152v, Cecil to Croft, 29 July 1559 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 508]; Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 340-341.

¹³¹ See Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practices, pp. 233-267.

¹³² Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 44; Jane Dawson, *John Knox*, pp. 186-187.

¹³³ BL Add. MS 33591, f. 31r; BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 150r-153v, draft letter from Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 29 September 1559; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 79v-80v, Knox to Croft, 29 October 1559.

Three factors influenced the decision to change the representative. In Knox's letter, he reported that he should not be sent to the English court because he is not suited for a discussion on such important matters. Instead, Balnaves or 'some other wyse man' should be sent to discuss what will happen if the French invade.¹³⁴ This leads to the second reason that Croft believed Knox was not an appropriate choice of representative because 'in no wyse he can be long from his flock'.¹³⁵ Whilst his religious zeal aligned him with the ambitions of the Lords of the Congregation, Knox was far too religiously motivated and politically opinionated to be sent to negotiate with Elizabeth. To add to the case for not sending him to England, Knox's recent publication, *The First Blast of a Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* in 1559 spoke out against female monarchs and had offended Elizabeth. All of the above factors made him a completely unsuitable choice to send as a representative to negotiate with Elizabeth on behalf of the Lords of the Congregation.¹³⁶ It was politically suicidal for the group to send someone who may not have even had the chance to organise an opportunity to speak with Elizabeth to ask for her support. Knox tried to apologise to Elizabeth through Cecil. He asked the secretary to 'reqyr you to deliuer this other l[ett]re enclosed to the quenes grace qlk conteaneth in few and sempill wordes my confession what I think of hir authortie, how far it is just, and what may mak it odious in goddess presence'.¹³⁷ He left the letter open and gave Cecil permission to present the letter to Elizabeth so he can 'read and present it if ye think meatte'.¹³⁸ The third and final reason Knox was removed from the mission was because

¹³⁴ TNA SP 52/1 ff. 162r-163v, Croft to Cecil, 4 August 1559 [*CSP Scot*, 1547-63, no. 513].

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ See, John Knox, *The First Blast of a Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women*, Edward Arber, ed. (London, 1878); TNA SP 52/1, ff. 84r-85v, Knox to Cecil, 28 June 1559 [*CSP Scot* 1547-63, no. 475]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 123r-124v, Knox to Elizabeth, 20 July 1559 [*CSP Scot* 1547-63, no. 496].

¹³⁷ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 110r-111v, Knox to Cecil, 12 July 1559 [*CSP Scot* 1547-63, no. 57].

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

at the end of October, Maitland finally openly defected to the Lords of the Congregation and was a far stronger candidate politically and religiously to negotiate with Elizabeth.

Nearly three weeks after Knox was removed from the mission, on 19 November, Balnaves confirmed that Maitland was the man who would travel to the English court.¹³⁹ Loughlin has already identified that Maitland's journey was successful and that he had helped to persuade the English Privy Council that it was necessary to assist the Lords of the Congregation.¹⁴⁰ In November 1559, Maitland and Robert Melville travelled as 'bearers' sent to the English court and were joined by David Forrest, Master of the Mint, and John Willock, a Calvinist preacher.¹⁴¹ The team of four men covered all necessary bases that an ambassador, or in this case representatives, would require: political expertise, experience in France, religious passion, and a variety of ages. As the recently defected secretary, Maitland's knowledge of secret French intentions towards England and Scotland and his familiarity with the Scottish crisis was unparalleled and added to the reasons why the former Principal Secretary was chosen for the journey.¹⁴² After almost a month at the English court, in December, Robert Melville received a list of questions from the Lords of the Congregation to be answered by Elizabeth and her Privy Council.¹⁴³ The questions focused on the topics of what had already been promised to the Lords of the Congregation, and, primarily, the amount of aid the English could provide. When he had the answers in hand, Melville departed for Scotland and left Maitland to continue negotiations for the remainder of December. The journey of Maitland and Robert Melville to England in December 1559 was only a part of the reason the English government felt

¹³⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 85r-v, Sir Henry Balnaves of Halhill to Croft and Sadler, 19 November 1559.

¹⁴⁰ Loughlin, 'The Political Career of William Maitland', pp. 48-53.

¹⁴¹ TNA SP 52/2, f. 48r, [Elizabeth or the Privy Council of England] to Norfolk, 16 February 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 733].

¹⁴² Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 44.

¹⁴³ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff.88r-93v, Instructions to [the English PC?] from Lords of the Congregation, 24 December 1559.

compelled to aid the Lords of the Congregation. Being able to explain and debate their case in person was beneficial and demonstrated how diplomatic procedures were used to help the Lords of the Congregation's cause.

Even after the victory over Mary of Guise, the Lords of the Congregation still sent diplomatic representatives between June 1560 and Mary's return in August 1561 to continue amicable relations through typical diplomatic procedures. Shortly after the victory at the Siege of Leith, the Regent Mary of Guise died in June 1560 and Mary – who was still in France – did not appoint a new Regent in her place. It was the heir apparent, Châtelherault, who took the lead in the Scottish Queen's absence. In August 1560, the Lords of the Congregation called a Parliament illegally without the consent of Mary and began to construct a new Protestant doctrine for the Scottish kirk. In order to demonstrate their gratitude to Elizabeth for her assistance, to further unite the two nations and end the 'inconvenience we and our forefathers have felt by the continual wars between the two nations', the August 1560 Reformation Parliament concluded that they wanted Elizabeth to,

join in marriage with the Earl of Arran, being of the lawful blood of this realm, and failing of succession of the queen, our sovereign lady's body, next to his father [*James Hamilton*], his grace the duke of Châtelherault, declared by an act of parliament second person of the realm, heir apparent to the crown.¹⁴⁴

At the end of the manuscript a clause was crossed out that stated that the marriage was to be discussed in a 'secret manner' and 'not to be divulged or communicated to any person before being dispatched towards her majesty'.¹⁴⁵ As a result of the discussions in the

¹⁴⁴ *RPS*, A1560/8/7.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

parliament, James Douglas, Earl of Morton, Glencairn, and Maitland were dispatched to England in October 1560 to negotiate the secret marital plan.¹⁴⁶

Before discussing the commission, attention must be drawn to the actions taken by the Lords of the Congregation in this parliament to legitimise themselves. On 24 August 1560, the parliament ‘approved the Treaty of Berwick and Lord James requested and received special confirmation that the actions of the Lords of the Congregation were lawful’.¹⁴⁷ Goodare identifies that in the 1563 Scottish Parliament, the Act of Oblivion was the only section that was repeated from the 1560 Reformation Parliament.¹⁴⁸ The Act of Oblivion was a general amnesty used to forgive actions of the Lords of the Congregation during the Scottish reformation. This found it ‘profitable and necessary for the good government and administration of the realm and commonwealth’ that ‘the statute, law and ordinance of perpetual oblivion be made and established’.¹⁴⁹ On 1 August it was declared ‘by this act that whosoever does not pursue within the said space of time, they, their heirs, executors or assignees shall never be heard to pursue the same or have action thereto against those who will allege the foresaid law of oblivion’.¹⁵⁰ The legislation in 1560 was only the beginning of legitimising the actions of the Lords of the Congregation against the sovereign ruler in order for them to gain recognition on the diplomatic stage.

Returning to the journey in October 1560, the three representatives, Morton, Glencairn, and Maitland, made a spectacle of their journey to London, one that rivalled an accredited ambassador’s entrance. The men crossed the border and travelled through

¹⁴⁶ See Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 345-346.

¹⁴⁷ *RPS*, A1560/8/7.

¹⁴⁸ Julian Goodare, ‘The Scottish Political Community and the Parliament of 1563’, *A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn, 2003), p. 389; Julian Goodare, ‘The First Parliament of Mary, Queen of Scots’, *Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), p. 69.

¹⁴⁹ *RPS*, A1563/6/1.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Berwick on 16 October 1560 with a large train of seventy-four horses to celebrate their expulsion of the French from Scotland and to emphasise their thanks to the English for their assistance.¹⁵¹ Loughlin has already unpacked the main purpose of the mission as a proposal of marriage between Elizabeth and Arran, with Maitland sent to handle the negotiation portion of the discussions.¹⁵² Even during the negotiations, Maitland was ‘in keeping with the traditional procedural pattern of royal marriage negotiations’, which was usually part of a diplomatic commission.¹⁵³ The most recent Anglo-Scottish marriage negotiation had been proposed in March 1543 when Sadler was sent to Scotland to conclude a marriage alliance between Edward VI and the young Mary.¹⁵⁴ The result of the failed negotiations was a long, expensive, and devastating war between 1543 and 1550 that is more commonly known as the Rough Wooings.¹⁵⁵ Although in 1560 Elizabeth rejected their proposal, this was handled with care and the real success was that the new amity remained. This proposal was improbable for two reasons. The first was that it would have damaged Elizabeth’s international reputation if she had accepted the son of the heir apparent of Scotland shortly after she had aided rebel activity against the appointed Regent of Scotland. Secondly, this was a reused marriage proposal that was first offered during the 1543 Treaty of Greenwich negotiations between England and Scotland when Elizabeth was only third in line to the throne. By 1560, Elizabeth was a much stronger marital candidate and had more options to explore and exploit.

¹⁵¹ TNA SP 59/3, ff. 165r-v, Francis Leek to Cecil, 16 October 1561 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 642]; TNA 59/3, ff. 166r-168v, Horses of the Lords of Scotland, 16 October 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 643].

¹⁵² Loughlin, ‘The Political Career of William Maitland’, pp. 86-92; *A diurnal of remarkable occurrences that have passed within the country of Scotland since the death of King James the Fourth till the year 1575* (Edinburgh, Banatynne Club, 1833), p. 62.

¹⁵³ Loughlin, ‘The Political Career of William Maitland’, p. 88.

¹⁵⁴ For more explanation on the marriage negotiations in 1543 see, A. J. Slavin, *Politics and Profit: A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507-1547* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

¹⁵⁵ For the political events and ramifications of the Rough Wooings see, Marcus Merriman, ‘War and Propaganda During the ‘Rough Wooing’’, *International Review of Scottish Studies*, Vol. 10 (1980); Elizabeth A. Bonner, ‘The Genesis of Henry VIII’s ‘Rough Wooings’ of the Scots’, Vol. 33, No. 1, *Northern History* (1997), pp. 36-53; Marcus Merriman, *The Rough Wooings: Mary, Queen of Scots, 1542-1551* (Tuckwell Press, 2000).

Having examined the situation for the Lords of the Congregation and Scottish nobility, it is necessary to refocus on the position of the English representative in Scotland. Randolph was the English representative to the Lords of the Congregation between September 1559 and August 1561, after which he was promoted to be the English resident ambassador at the Scottish court and served from August 1561 until March 1566.¹⁵⁶ After gaining experience under the English resident ambassador in France, Wotton, between 1554 and 1558, Scotland was Randolph's chance to step out on his own to independently take on the diplomatic role. He received an unstable start as between July 1560 and August 1561, Randolph was in diplomatic limbo. In 1559, Randolph was sent to reside with the Lords of the Congregation and report intelligence to Berwick to be forwarded on to the English court. However, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh on 5 July 1560 between English and French representatives, Randolph needed to be told what he was to do now that his original mission was null and void. After five months of waiting in Scotland, Elizabeth wrote to Randolph praising his 'diligent and faythfull in s[er]vice to us' and 'as we understand of such goo[d] acquaynta[n]ce w[ith] the nobilitie and estates of the land'.¹⁵⁷ As a result of his work during the Scottish Reformation rebellion, Elizabeth instructed him to remain in Scotland to 'tend to the mayntena[n]ce of the sayd estates in ther good devotion towards us' and remain close to the company of Châtelherault – the heir apparent – and his son Arran to 'furder the co[n]tyna[n]ce of ye good intelligence that is bego[n] betwixt vs and that realme'.¹⁵⁸ Around February 1561, Randolph reported rumours that Mary was planning to return to Scotland. Elizabeth reacted to the news by sending Randolph a memorial on 21 March to give her representative some direction in case the news that the Scottish Queen planned

¹⁵⁶ See Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 81-124.

¹⁵⁷ TNA SP 52/5, ff. 61r-62v, Elizabeth to Randolph, December 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 823].

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

to return was true. In the memorial, Randolph was instructed to use his new network to focus on furthering the Protestant religion in Scotland, securing the political alliance between England and Scotland (pushing out French influences), and preventing Mary's next marriage from being a foreign match.¹⁵⁹ From the memorial, this was the beginning of a long line of similar instructions to Randolph throughout the next five years. This reflected the trust Elizabeth and the English government had in Randolph's understanding of the English objectives in Scotland. Furthermore, the purpose of Elizabeth's memorial was to validate Randolph's continued residency in Scotland with news that the Scottish Queen would return; this simultaneously did not provide him with an accredited commission whilst she was still absent.

After Mary had returned, Elizabeth finally commissioned Randolph as her ambassador in Scotland without appearing to have sent an ambassador to the Lords of the Congregation. On 25 August, Elizabeth wrote to Mary explaining that Randolph was 'now being appointed by vs to presenthes o[ur] l[ett]res to yo[ur] handes'.¹⁶⁰ It was not until 1 September 1561 that Randolph had his first audience with Mary when he could begin his duties as a diplomat and deliver Elizabeth's letters.¹⁶¹ In this first period of diplomatic uncertainty the English government and the Lords of the Congregation used representatives to gather information. However, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh, the rebel group, the Lords of the Congregation, sent representatives to Elizabeth in an attempt to establish normal diplomatic exchanges to strengthen the Anglo-Scottish amity, whilst legitimising their own position in Scotland.

¹⁵⁹ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 77r-78v, Memorial for Randolph, 20 March 1561 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 981]; Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 90-92.

¹⁶⁰ BL Harley MS 290, ff. 11r-12v: Elizabeth to Mary Queen of Scots, 25 August 1561.

¹⁶¹ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 96-98.

Even during the more conventional period of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy between August 1561 and August 1567, representatives were often employed to negotiate English military aid on behalf of Scottish factions and from the English court during times of crisis. Between 28 July 1565 and 6 October, a small Scottish group referred to as the Chaseabout Raid rebels, or the Lords of the Congregation in reference to the Reformation rebellion between 1559 and 1560, rebelled against their sovereign queen as a political and religious protest against her sudden marriage to Darnley.¹⁶² Moray declared himself the leader of the rebellion and was denounced as a rebel by Mary and Darnley on 10 August.¹⁶³ Moray's insubordination was quickly followed by several leading Scottish nobles: James Hamilton, Duke of Châtellherault, Archibald Campbell, fifth Earl of Argyll, Alexander Cunningham, fifth Earl of Glencairn, Andrew Leslie, fifth Earl of Rothes, Robert, fifth Lord Boyd, and William Kirkcaldy of Grange. During the three-month period of rebellion against Mary and Darnley, both sides never came to open warfare. However, the Chaseabout Raid rebels were hopeful that they could secure financial and military support from Elizabeth and the English government – as they had done five years earlier – to provide themselves with the best chance if war was the only solution. In order to secure English aid, the Chaseabout Raid rebels resorted to using diplomatic procedures and sent Moray and Robert Melville as their representatives to negotiate and plead their case.

Despite the requests of the Chaseabout Raid rebels being similar to those of the Lords of the Congregation in 1559, the situation was in fact very different. Firstly, the

¹⁶² For specific literature on the Chaseabout Raid see, Rachel J. Omansky, ‘“Their Nation Dishonored, The Queen Shamed, and Country Undone”: Feuding, Factionalism, and Religion in the Chaseabout Raid’ (Master’s Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2008). Notable biographies of Mary, Queen of Scots cover the Chaseabout Raid see, Wormald, *Mary, Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure*; Guy, *My Heart is My Own*; Warnicke, *Mary, Queen of Scots*.

¹⁶³ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 13r-14v, Tamworth and Randolph to Cecil, 10 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1370].

French influences in Mary's court were not the same French influences as under the Regent Mary of Guise between 1554 and 1560. Secondly, there was a sovereign queen on the throne ruling in her own right and by aiding the rebels against Mary, Elizabeth would be consenting to a scenario where rebels could take action against her. Finally, the situation had changed from a national concern to an international issue when the Chaseabout Raid rebels voluntarily crossed the border into the English West March on 6 October 1565. This redefined them from rebels against the queen to political refugees seeking asylum in Elizabeth's realm.

The representative selected from the Chaseabout Raid rebels for the journey to the English court was not always going to be Moray. In September, Randolph heard a rumour that Andrew Lesley, fifth Earl of Rothes had his name put forward selected as the representative of the rebels and to be sent south to negotiate their case for English military aid.¹⁶⁴ Although Elizabeth would not have accepted the rebel representatives willingly, Rothes was a less risky choice than Moray. What was precarious about Moray's presence at the English court was firstly that, he was Mary's illegitimate half-brother. This leads on to a second issue; Moray's visit to Elizabeth was not just a meeting with a representative of the Lords of the Congregation, he was also their leader. A meeting between the leader of the rebel faction and monarch of another country would indicate that Elizabeth recognised the Scottish group's cause as legitimate. In every respect, Moray's visit to the English court was detrimental to Elizabeth. As early as September, the English government were warned that Moray would be sent as their representative to thank Elizabeth for the liberty she had granted to them to remain in England.¹⁶⁵ It was not

¹⁶⁴ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 71r-72v, Randolph to Cecil, 9 September 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 251].

¹⁶⁵ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 79r-80v, Lords of Scotland to Cecil, 10 September 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 255].

until October 1565 that Moray and his companion, the Abbot of Kilwinning, prepared to travel to the English court to request Elizabeth's support.¹⁶⁶

Whilst we know that under the 'new diplomatic history' Moray was a representative of the rebel group, there were elements of his journey that relied on traditional diplomatic protocols to highlight the legitimacy of the journey and meeting. The first was that before Moray departed for the English court, Robert Melville was sent ahead to announce who was arriving and to arrange the time and date for a meeting between Moray and Elizabeth.¹⁶⁷ This was a diplomatic protocol that was often used when an ambassador was travelling to his host court; the ambassador's secretary was sent ahead of him to announce his arrival. On 10 September, Robert Melville was given a letter of instructions by the Chaseabout Raid Lords. The main objectives in his instructions were to secure military aid from Elizabeth (primarily 3,000 men, 1,000 harqubusiers 1,000 pikemen, 500 bowmen and horses); financial aid (to be sent to Lord Scrope in the English West March), and to secure a method of communication using ships between the English court and the rebels that would not be intercepted by the French.¹⁶⁸ Even with correspondence and Robert Melville sent head of Moray's journey to the English court, Elizabeth still tried to prevent Moray from arriving in London. At Ware, Moray received letters from Elizabeth stating 'It wer not mete for me to cam at this tyme but to forbear such open dealing w[ith] hir Ma[jestie] vntill It may be forther consydyert wuhat salbe meter for me to do'.¹⁶⁹ Before continuing his journey, Moray 'willyt thar bearar forther to decalyr to yo[ur] honouris to quhome it may please fid credit', this was to make sure

¹⁶⁶ Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 352-353.

¹⁶⁷ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 79r-80v, Lords of Scotland to Cecil, 10 September 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 255].

¹⁶⁸ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 83r-v, Instructions for Robert Melville, 10 September 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 257]. This is a contemporary copy of the original.

¹⁶⁹ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 148r-149v, Moray to PC, 21 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 286].

he would be accepted at the English court.¹⁷⁰ Another element of diplomatic procedure that was evident in Moray's journey was that his meeting with Elizabeth was held in the presence of the French and Spanish ambassadors at the English court.¹⁷¹ From Elizabeth's perspective, holding a public meeting with Moray was necessary to quickly deny any false allegations that she was aiding or planning to aid the rebels against Mary.

As one would expect from Moray's meeting with Elizabeth, he 'could obtain nothing but disdain and scorn'.¹⁷² Returning empty handed and with an empty heart, Moray departed from London and travelled back to rejoin the Lords of the Congregation. Robert Melville was asked to remain at the English court to report news of any change in their decisions from the English government but also keep to the pressure on and to continue to push for assistance.¹⁷³ Although the 1565 rebels never received military aid from the English government, it is well-known, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, that from September Elizabeth directed Bedford, Governor of Berwick, and her resident ambassador in Scotland, Randolph, to discreetly send financial aid to the Lords of the Congregation.¹⁷⁴ In the letter Elizabeth asked Bedford to take the blame if he were caught, when she wrote that 'we wold but wink at yo[ur] doing herein' and 'seme to blame yo[u] for attempting such'.¹⁷⁵ By sending financial aid to the rebels, Elizabeth had given the group hope that she would extend her generosity to military aid.

Turning to the second exceptional period that bookended the more typical years of diplomacy between 1567 and 1568, the situation was differed significantly from the

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ BL Add. MS 37977, Autograph copy of James Melville's memoirs, (c. 1621), ff. 36v-37r; *Memoirs of Sir James Melville of Halhill, 1535-1617*, p. 108.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ NLS Adv.MS.1.2.2/13, Moray to Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, 30 October 1565.

¹⁷⁴ TNA SP 59/10, f. 31r, Elizabeth to Bedford, 12 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1491].

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

rebel factions between 1559 and 1560 and again in 1565. To provide some context for the political upheaval in Scotland, from 16 June 1567, Mary was imprisoned in Loch Leven Castle after being defeated by a group known as the Confederate Lords at the Battle of Carberry Hill.¹⁷⁶ Then, on 24 July 1567, a group of twelve earls and fourteen lords banded together against their rightful sovereign monarch and forced her to resign the government and abdicate the crown.¹⁷⁷ Only five days later on 29 July, Mary's infant son James was crowned King James VI in the Church of the Holy Rude at Stirling. In August 1567, Moray was invited to return to Scotland to accept the regency and almost one month after Mary was deposed, on 23 August Moray was inaugurated as Regent. It is well-known that Elizabeth did not accept Moray as Regent in 1567, which was reflected in her diplomatic commissions.¹⁷⁸ As will be discussed in Chapter Two, the English special ambassador, Throckmorton, was put in a difficult position between July and August 1567.¹⁷⁹ His instructions and letters of credence were addressed to Mary as she had not been deposed when he departed for Scotland. However, when he arrived, he was refused access to Mary, who was imprisoned in Loch Leven by the Confederate Lords. Subsequently, the Scottish Queen was deposed in favour of her infant son, which invalidated Throckmorton's instructions. Without delivering his letters and instructions to Mary, Throckmorton never officially began his embassy and, after a brief stint in Scotland, he was recalled back to England. This was the outset of the longest cessation of diplomatic exchanges between England and Scotland. It lasted from early-September 1567 until January 1568. Prior to 1569, Elizabeth favoured restoring Mary to her throne and refused to accept her status as a deposed queen. However, the lack of action from the

¹⁷⁶ BL Add. MS 4126, ff. 40r-41v, Order of Commit for Confining Mary in the Castle of Loch Leven, 16 June 1567.

¹⁷⁷ Webb, 'The "The Gude Regent?"', pp. 26-27.

¹⁷⁸ Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland*, pp. 213-214.

¹⁷⁹ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 138-144.

English government can be understood as a delay tactic by Cecil, who still hoped for a united Protestant nation, and thought the unique political opportunity in Scotland, with Mary as a political prisoner, would help achieve this.¹⁸⁰

The embassies and journeys of representatives in 1568 provide a valuable insight into where Elizabeth's favour lay. This can be understood through the choice of diplomatic personnel she sent and how the ambassadors and representatives from the competing groups in Scotland were received. Between January and December 1568, the Regent Moray (otherwise referred to as the King's party) sent six embassies (either Nicholas Elphinstone or his secretary, John Wood) and Mary (otherwise referred to as the Queen's party) sent two representatives (John Maxwell, Lord Herries and Robert Melville). In the same year, Elizabeth also sent two embassies to Scotland (Thomas Leighton and Sir Henry Middlemore). After Throckmorton returned from Scotland in September 1567, no ambassadors or representatives were exchanged until January 1568 whilst all sides tried to make sense of the situation.

The silence in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy was broken when the Regent Moray commissioned his first ambassador, on behalf of James VI, Nicholas Elphinstone to Elizabeth in January 1568.¹⁸¹ As an ambassador, Elphinstone had already travelled to the English court in July 1565 on behalf of Moray to try to obtain money from Elizabeth to support the Chaseabout Raid rebels.¹⁸² Despite his unsuccessful journey as Moray's representative, Elphinstone was a suitable choice for an ambassador because he had already travelled to the English court and Elizabeth was familiar with him. No records

¹⁸⁰ Jane Dawson, 'William Cecil and the British Dimension of Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy', *History* 74 (1989) pp. 196–216.

¹⁸¹ Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558–1568, pp. 357–358; TNA SP 52/15, ff. 1r–2v, Regent Moray to Elizabeth, 1 January 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563–69* no. 638]; TNA SP 52/15, ff. 3r–4v, Regent Moray to Cecil, 1 January 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563–69* no. 639].

¹⁸² Laing, *History of the Reformation by John Knox*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1848), p. 496. Elphinstone's journey to the English court in July 1565 was not included in Appendix 2 because Moray was not denounced as a rebel by Mary until early-August and therefore Elphinstone's journey was during a period of uncertainty.

survive of Elphinstone's time at the English court, but we can get an insight into his treatment from a letter from Elizabeth to the Regent Moray. On 31 January, the English Queen outlined that she refused to give Elphinstone an audience in person. Instead of meeting Elizabeth it was arranged that 'certe[n] of o[ur] [English] Counselle to have ~~your~~ s[er]uant *hym* and vppo[n] report made to vs by them of his charge, we caused such answer to be made to hym by our ~~said Counsellors~~ *them*'.¹⁸³ Elizabeth's treatment of Elphinstone was a direct reflection of her refusal to accept Moray as the Regent. Even after a less than successful embassy, Elphinstone was commissioned to London a further two times as the ambassador to James VI.¹⁸⁴

As well as Elphinstone, Moray also sent his Scottish secretary of state, John Wood, on his behalf to the English court in 1568.¹⁸⁵ The role of the secretary in sixteenth-century diplomacy is already well-established. Mattingly argued that the secretaries of state had an increasing role in managing diplomatic correspondence.¹⁸⁶ To clarify, there is a difference between the secretary of state and a personal secretary. The emergence of the office of the secretary of state in the sixteenth century coincided with the development of the modern state in managing domestic and international affairs.¹⁸⁷ A personal or private secretary was a highly influential member of a royal or noble household. This is important because Wood was previously Moray's private secretary but was appointed to the position of Scottish secretary of state after Moray accepted the regency. In the specific context of mid-sixteenth century diplomatic relations, Bell has argued that the secretary

¹⁸³ TNA SP 52/15, f. 5r, Elizabeth to Moray, 31 January 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 640].

¹⁸⁴ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 15r-16v, Regent Moray to Cecil, 20 April 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 646]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 444r-445v, Drury to Cecil, 12 May 1568; TNA SP 52/15, ff. 42r-43v, Nicholas Elphinstone to Cecil, 21 May 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 666].

¹⁸⁵ Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 357-359.

¹⁸⁶ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 225.

¹⁸⁷ Paul Dover, 'Introduction', P. Dover, ed., *Secretaries and Statecraft* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 6.

of state was more actively involved in diplomacy because he was sent on embassies.¹⁸⁸ Whilst Cecil was secretary, this was not the case in Elizabethan diplomatic commissions in the 1560s. However, this changed after Sir Francis Walsingham's appointment as Elizabeth's private secretary. He was involved in embassies to France in the early 1570s. In Scottish diplomacy, Mary of Guise commissioned her secretaries of state, David Painter and Maitland, abroad. In keeping with her mother's use of her secretary, Mary commissioned Maitland to England between 1561 and 1565 demonstrating that appointing a secretary on an embassy was a normal part of diplomatic service. Therefore, Wood's appointments in 1568 showed Scottish compliance with this shift in diplomatic appointments. In June, Wood was sent with copies of the casket letters to the English court ahead of the York-Westminster Conference.¹⁸⁹ The casket letters were used by the King's party as evidence to condemn Mary of conspiring in the murder of her second husband, Darnley, with the accused Bothwell. As Moray's representative in London before the meeting, Wood was sent to England without instructions but correspondence between Wood and Moray reveals that they were sent to him after his departure. His instructions were not sent until 3 June, and they arrived some time before 13 June. These acted as an update on Wood's commission and asked him to remain in England longer to agree on a time when the first part of the York-Westminster Conference would be held. In correspondence from Elizabeth to Moray, we know that Wood was still at the English court on 8 June.¹⁹⁰ Unfortunately, there is limited information about Wood's time at the English court, especially because, in contrast to the report on Elphinstone, Elizabeth never mentioned whether she met with Wood. However, in separate correspondence the Regent Moray understood from his ambassador Wood that he had not made any good progress

¹⁸⁸ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', pp. 267-284.

¹⁸⁹ BL Add. MS 32091, ff. 213r-214v, Regent Moray to Wood, 13 July 1568.

¹⁹⁰ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 56v-57r, Elizabeth to Regent Moray, 8 June 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 693].

with Elizabeth and we can assume he was kept at arm's length like his predecessor. Regent Moray continued to send embassies as he 'intend godwilling with all diligence to direct vnto zour hienes ane or mo[re] men of gude credit well instructit'.¹⁹¹ After Mary's escape from Scotland in May 1568, Moray's embassies to Elizabeth and the English court continued to be unproductive in securing support for the King's party from Elizabeth. Even if his ambassadors did not speak with Elizabeth directly, the fact that they were allowed access to the English court and spoke with other English councillors showed some acceptance and, in a way, helped navigate the difficult situation. This still did not legitimise Moray as Regent in the eyes of the English.

Now we have understood how the official Scottish embassies were received at the English court, this can be contrasted directly to the reception of Herries, Mary's representative. For context, Herries had commanded her cavalry at the battle of Langside and was one of the few loyal supporters who followed Mary to England. In May 1568, after escaping from Loch Leven Castle in Fife, Mary travelled through the English West March and was escorted to Carlisle Castle. It was here that she prepared representatives to be sent to the English and French court to plead for military support to help to restore her to the Scottish throne. After only one month in England, Mary chose Lord Herries as her representative to travel to London and John Fleming, fifth Lord Fleming to travel to France.¹⁹² Like Herries, Fleming had fought for Mary at Langside and also travelled across the Anglo-Scottish border to support Mary in person. For the journey to the English court, Herries was an appropriate choice as a representative because he was already indirectly in communication with Elizabeth through the questions he had asked Sir

¹⁹¹ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 61r-62v, Regent Moray to Middlemore, 22 June 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 711].

¹⁹² BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, ff. 346r-v, Francis Knollys to [William Cecil], 30 May 1568; TNA SP 52/15, TNA SP 52/14, ff. 53r-v, Alexander Clark to Cecil, 2 June 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 686].

Francis Knollys, Mary's keeper at Carlisle, and had been forwarded on to London.¹⁹³ Between May and August, Herries travelled back and forth between Mary's residence in Bolton, the English court (for Mary's undertaking), and Scotland (for his own affairs). In contrast to the reception of Elphinstone and Wood, Herries received a much warmer welcome from Elizabeth and was even accorded the honour of a meeting with her in person.¹⁹⁴ We know this because to make sure all parties knew about Mary's representative, Elizabeth wrote to the Regent Moray to explain that the purpose of Herries's journey was to complain about Mary's imprisonment in Scotland and that she 'requireth our ayde, as hir next cosin and neighbour'.¹⁹⁵ We are fortunate to have Herries's *Memoirs* that are a valuable resource to provide a different perspective on events in Scotland during the reign of Mary and then James VI. Unfortunately, Herries provided limited details of his audience and even his time at the English court. He only wrote that he was sent to London with letters from Mary to Elizabeth in her own hand and also the gift of a diamond ring as a token of friendship.¹⁹⁶ As Herries did not mention in his *Memoirs* that Elizabeth rejected the ring, it should be assumed that Elizabeth accepted the token. The practice of giving and receiving gifts was an important part of court culture and usually took place whilst an ambassador was present. Heal has argued that 'Royal giving and receiving should ideally be performative, as part of those gestures of majesty which in some senses include all of courtly cultural behaviour—hospitality, entertainment, and ritual'.¹⁹⁷ If the ring was sent, then Elizabeth did not include this detail

¹⁹³ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, ff. 332r-v, Sir Francis Knollys to [William Cecil], 30 May 1568. Herries asked Knollys if Elizabeth about let Mary travel through England, specifically from Newcastle to France.

¹⁹⁴ TNA SP 59/15, ff. 94r-95v, Drury to Cecil, 13 June 1568 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 2269]. Drury heard from Herries that he was well received at the English court; *Historical Memoirs of the Reign of Mary, Queen of Scots*, by John Maxwell, Lord Herries (Edinburgh, 1836), p. 103.

¹⁹⁵ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 56r-57v, Elizabeth to Moray, 8 June 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 693].

¹⁹⁶ *Historical Memoirs of the Reign of Mary, Queen of Scots*, by John Maxwell, Lord Herries (Edinburgh, 1836), p. 103.

¹⁹⁷ Heal, *The Power of Gifts*, p. 89.

in her letter to Moray because she understood the diplomatic ramifications of accepting a gift from Mary's representative.

Herries was a loyal Marian supporter and, like Elizabeth, openly denied that Moray was the Regent of Scotland. In August 1568, Drury reported that a letter from Herries to Moray had passed through the intelligence hub of Berwick. In the superscript, Herries simply wrote 'to the Erle of Murrey w[ith]out address of his office of Regency'.¹⁹⁸ For causing such offence, Moray 'would not open the l[etter] himself but sent it to his associate in counsel who all noted the Lord Harris of contempt and therefore would *not* open the l[ett]re but sent it sealed as it cam back agaune vnto him'.¹⁹⁹ Herries was the only representative sent by Mary to negotiate on her behalf after she fled to England. His acceptance at the English court gave Mary false hope of more open support from Elizabeth.

In 1568, the Elizabeth was in a unique position where she openly received representatives from both Mary and Moray in order to show no favour and continue peaceful relations with both parties – even if she never met with the representative herself. The way in which Elizabeth responded with her own embassies of Leighton and Middlemore was a further indication of where her support lay. Both men were more than suited to serve as Elizabethan ambassadors to Scotland. Middlemore was the cousin of Throckmorton and had served as his secretary when he was in France from 1559 until 1560, and in Scotland during his 1565 and 1567 embassies. Leighton's diplomatic career was not as well established as Middlemore's. He had served in Rouen where he had commanded the English forces in 1562. His skills in French and his expertise in military strategy gave him the necessary skills to manage the delicate political situation. Whilst

¹⁹⁸ TNA SP 59/15, f. 167r, Drury to Cecil, 15 August 1568 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 2430].

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

Leighton and Middlemore fit the requirements for an English ambassador in the 1560s, they were not from Elizabeth's usual pool of men that she sent to Scotland. After the unusual situation Throckmorton was put in in 1567, Elizabeth and her government could not risk sending an ambassador to Scotland and having the situation repeat itself or worse recognise the Regent Moray as legitimate. However, after Mary fled across the border to England, Elizabeth decided this political crisis was a good reason to abstain from sending an ambassador for four months. Between May and July 1568, Elizabeth demonstrated her neutrality by sending each ambassador to travel to both Mary in Carlisle (or later Bolton) and then on to the Regent Moray. The instructions for Leighton's embassy were drawn up as a reaction to Mary's arrival in England. As was common in diplomatic procedure, Elizabeth wrote to both parties to warn them that her ambassador Leighton was to be sent. However, Elizabeth wrote to Mary on 17 May to warn her of his arrival, which was one day before she wrote to Moray.²⁰⁰ Logistically, it made sense to write to Mary first as Carlisle was his first stop on the way to Scotland. Leighton received just one set of instructions that contained everything he needed to report to both parties. When he visited Mary, Leighton was to make it clear that unless the former Scottish queen was compliant, then she would not receive assistance from the English government.²⁰¹ Furthermore, Leighton had to set the firm rule that Mary should not ally herself with France.²⁰² When he arrived at the Scottish court, Leighton reported that Elizabeth was compelled to hear Mary's case because she was her blood relative but this might change if Elizabeth received news that Mary planned to renew the Auld Alliance with France.²⁰³ This thesis

²⁰⁰ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 34r-v, Elizabeth to Mary, 17 May 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69* no. 656]; TNA SP 52/15, ff. 35r-v, Elizabeth to Moray, 18 May 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69* no. 659].

²⁰¹ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 38r-39v, Instructions of Thomas Leighton, 18 May 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69* no. 660]. This was a draft of the instructions written by Cecil with minor corrections throughout; TNA SP 52/15, ff. 40r-42v, Instructions for Leighton, [June] 1568 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68* no. 2204].

²⁰² TNA SP 52/15, ff. 40r-42v, Instructions for Leighton, [June] 1568 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68* no. 2204].

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

identifies Leighton's commission as a new addition to the list of English ambassadors who were given instructions and sent to Scotland in this period. Bell's *Handlist* did not include Leighton's embassy and there is no explanation for this oversight in his research.²⁰⁴ Without the inclusion of Leighton, this would mistakenly imply that Elizabeth sent her second embassy, Sir Henry Middlemore, in mid-June 1568, which would have been after Mary's representative Herries was sent to the English court. This would have suggested that Mary initiated the exchange of diplomatic personnel rather than Elizabeth and would have led to an oversight of Elizabeth's interest in Mary's case.

The second English embassy for Middlemore was sent in June, which gave the English government time to prepare more specific instructions for Mary and Moray, after taking Leighton's report into consideration.²⁰⁵ Middlemore was more experienced in diplomacy than Leighton, having already accompanied Throckmorton to Scotland as his secretary on two occasions in 1565 and 1567. In contrast to Leighton's embassy, Middlemore did not receive official instructions but instead was given three copies of instructional sources that were described as 'notes' or 'memorials'.²⁰⁶ There are two possible ways the lack of official instructional material can be interpreted. The first was about remaining neutral. Whilst Alford has recognised the importance of Middlemore's embassy in understanding the changed relationship between Elizabeth and Mary, he is not certain whether Middlemore received a full set of instructions.²⁰⁷ Secondly, the

²⁰⁴ Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, p. 242.

²⁰⁵ We know the Regent Moray's representative, Wood, was at the English court the day that Middlemore's instructions were drafted. This is evidence to suggest that what Elizabeth discussed with Wood or had reported to her after he had met with her counsellors contributed to the reason for Middlemore's embassy.

²⁰⁶ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 58r-60v, A Memorial for Middlemore, 8 June 1568 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 689]; BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, ff. 122r-23v, A brief note for Henry Middlemore, 8 June 1568; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, ff. 378r-v, Copy of 'A brief note for Mr [Henry] Middlemore', [n.d.] 1568. Both documents were written in Cecil's handwriting, but the 'brief note' was signed by Cecil at the bottom, which was unusual if he was drafting the document on behalf of Elizabeth.

²⁰⁷ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 165.

documents Middlemore received may have been early drafts of the final version of the instructions. The content of the memorials identifies that this document was written in a format similar to instructions to Moray. The memorial listed two main objectives: to understand the position of the Earl of Moray in Scottish politics and to report that Elizabeth would continue to deal with Mary because she ‘doth not condemn hir of the same nor yet can acquit hir untill she shall heare what may be sayd therein’.²⁰⁸ Middlemore was instructed to provide a report of Herries’ time at the English court; to indicate that she did not condone the actions of Mary, if she had participated in the death of Darnley, and report Elizabeth’s dealings with Moray.²⁰⁹ Middlemore’s instructional sources also reflected a shift in the level of confidentiality maintained by the English government, particularly in terms of what information the ambassadors were permitted to share with Mary and Moray about one another. This marks a clear departure from the approach taken during Leighton’s embassy, highlighting a change in favour and strategy from the Elizabeth and the English government.

Whether by instruction or by his own discretion on his return from Moray, Middlemore, again, passed through Carlisle on 22 June and reported what he had discussed with Moray to Mary.²¹⁰ We know that the question of involving France in 1568 was not outside the realm of possibility for Mary. After her meeting with Middlemore, Mary wrote to Lord Smeaton to warn him that ‘gif she [Elizabeth] will not assist us we sall haue baythe men and money of France’.²¹¹ As a result of Middlemore’s embassy, the English government began to plan what would happen to Mary. Alford demonstrated that Cecil took a hard line on the subject of Mary to protect English security, Protestantism, and the succession. He argued that Mary could not be returned to her throne in Scotland

²⁰⁸ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 58r-60v, A Memorial for Middlemore, 8 June 1568 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 689].

²⁰⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, ff. 122r-23v, A brief note for Henry Middlemore, 8 June 1568.

²¹⁰ NRS GD103/2/4/25 Mary to Lord Smeaton, 25 June 1568.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

nor remain in England.²¹² On the surface, Elizabeth remained impartial by sending ambassadors to both Mary and Moray but the subtle differences between Leighton and Middlemore's embassies reflected Elizabeth's view on the two groups claiming authority in Scotland.

The sending and receiving of representatives during the periods of 1559-61, the rebellion of 1565, and 1567-68 played a key role in maintaining Anglo-Scottish diplomacy during crises. Diplomatic protocols were used to navigate the changing political landscapes. Between 1559 and 1560, Elizabeth accepted both ambassadors from Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation. Although the meetings with the representatives of the Lords of the Congregation were conducted more privately away from the eye of the courts, this still acknowledged Elizabeth's partial acceptance of the group's legitimacy. In direct contrast, between 1567 and 1568, Elizabeth clearly indicated where her political support lay, even as she outwardly sought to maintain an appearance of impartiality through her diplomatic commissions to both factions.

Rumoured, Unsent, or Changed Embassies

The way ambassadors and representatives operated in periods of exceptional diplomacy has highlighted the vital role that diplomatic exchange played in negotiation and the maintenance of peace. What has been overlooked in narratives of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy are the embassies that were planned or altered before they were sent to the English or Scottish court. Between 1558 and 1568, these included the names of men who had previously been commissioned in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy as well as new names with no experience in diplomatic service. This discussion brings to light the embassies

²¹² Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 165-167.

that were planned but did not happen and how they expand our understanding of when the English or Scottish government identified a potential crisis and used diplomacy to avoid any repercussions. These embassies fall into three categories: rumoured embassies, drafted and cancelled embassies, and embassies that were changed after the drafting process. A discussion of embassies that did not happen demonstrates how the rigid structures of diplomacy could adapt during the fast-paced political landscape.²¹³ The men mentioned would have been an ambassadors because if they had been sent they would have adhered to Bell's definition.²¹⁴ However, we must consider that the diplomatic missions do not comply with the normal idea of an embassy because they were cancelled or changed, and thus the chosen ambassador or ambassadors can only be described as provisional ambassadors. It must be noted that for this reason the provisional ambassadors identified, who were fit to serve but were not commissioned in diplomacy, are not included in the appendices of this thesis as the embassies never took place.

The rumoured embassies, which did not eventuate but circulated in correspondence, played a role in facilitating when Anglo-Scottish relations were deteriorating. The individuals named in the rumoured embassies – Maitland and Robert Melville – had both previously served as ambassadors to the English court. However, the cancelled embassies help to explain any gaps we see in the exchange in diplomatic personnel in this period and reveal less commonly known moments when each government was concerned about specific situations causing tensions and needed a resolution.²¹⁵ Between July 1566 and February 1567, there were two examples when

²¹³ There may be more rumoured or cancelled embassies that were not identified during the course of this research.

²¹⁴ Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 2-3.

²¹⁵ See Appendix 3: Timeline of the English and Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents, 1558-1568., pp. 363-367.

rumours of either an English or a Scottish embassy were reported and then anticipated at the opposite court. The first occurred after the highpoint of Anglo-Scottish tension in 1565 where the power dynamic changed as Mary started to act more independently. Whilst this research agrees with Loughlin's study of the political career of Maitland which stated that the secretary's final embassy to England was between April and May 1565, plans were made to send Maitland to England in May 1566, August 1566, and finally between January and February 1567.²¹⁶ As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, in 1565 Maitland rejected a new commission to travel to the English court, having already returned from London. As a result of this deviation from Mary's order, he fell out of favour with Mary and she was cautious of trusting him.²¹⁷ Although the principal secretary retained his political offices in Scotland, this was the end of his diplomatic career.²¹⁸ The rumour that Maitland was travelling to the English court in 1566 came from Sir William Drury, who had stepped in as Warden of the East March whilst Bedford was absent at the English court. On 8 May 1566, Drury reported that he had heard from the French extraordinary ambassador, Michel de Castelnau Sieur de Mauvissière, as he was passing through Berwick towards Scotland, that the rumour that Maitland was coming to London was untrue.²¹⁹ No correspondence survives about where the rumour originated. However, just over three months later, after Bedford had returned from London, he heard news that there were plans for Maitland to travel to the French court as well as spend a short amount of time in England.²²⁰ From the embassy that was sent in May 1566, we know that this was Robert Melville's second embassy to England where he was instructed to deliver the news that the publication of *Mr Randolph's Fantasy* had caused upset at the

²¹⁶ Loughlin, 'The political career of William Maitland', pp. 197-200.

²¹⁷ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 161-168.

²¹⁸ Loughlin, 'The political career of William Maitland', p. 209.

²¹⁹ TNA SP 59/11, ff. 190r-191v, Sir William Drury to Cecil, 8 May 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 363].

²²⁰ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 397r-389v: Letter from Bedford to Cecil, 12 August 1566.

Scottish court as well as to continue the discussion of Randolph's betrayal by sending money to the rebels.²²¹ It was likely that this would have been the same reason for Maitland's rumoured commission.

A year later, in the early months of 1567, Maitland's name was once again mentioned around a rumoured plan for a Scottish embassy to England. Between 23 January and 26 January, Drury reported to Cecil that he had heard either Maitland or Robert Melville would shortly arrive at Berwick.²²² Finally, on 14 February, Drury confirmed that Maitland was not coming.²²³ Scottish Privy Council records contain no evidence that Maitland's name was put forward for this embassy in this period.²²⁴ There are three reasons why it was unlikely that Maitland was selected for the mission. The first, as Loughlin explained, was that it was unlikely that Maitland turned down an embassy to England and, if he did, it would have been linked to his recent marriage to Mary Fleming on 6 January 1567.²²⁵ Secondly, we know that Robert Melville, the other name mentioned in Drury's correspondence, had been the Scottish resident ambassador to England since February 1566 and by continuing to send Melville instead, Maitland could focus on the political aftermath of Darnley's murder in Scotland.²²⁶ Maitland was the regular Scottish ambassador commissioned by Mary to the English court between 1561 and 1565 and it was expected that Maitland, as he had done previously, would be used to help rebuild the amity. Finally, although Maitland already had knowledge of the English court and the

²²¹ Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, p. 353-354.

²²² TNA SP 59/12, ff. 164r-165v, Drury to Cecil, 23 January 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 906]; TNA SP 59/12, ff. 166r-167v, Drury to Cecil, 26 January 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 912]; TNA SP 59/12, ff. 168r-169v, Bedford to Cecil, 26 January 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 913].

²²³ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 196r-197v, Drury to Cecil, 14 February 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 949].

²²⁴ *RPCS*, pp. 443-462, pp. 470-477, pp. 495-499. There is no mention of Maitland's name being put forward for an embassy in the records between April-May 1566, July-August 1566, or January-February 1567.

²²⁵ Loughlin, 'The Political Career of William Maitland', pp. 238-244. Loughlin examines Maitland's involvement in the renegotiation of the Anglo-Scottish amity in 1567 through the correspondence Maitland sent from the Scottish court.

²²⁶ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 247-249; Guy, *My Heart is My Own*, pp. 297-352.

courtiers, Melville was more familiar with the current political landscape, and it was ideal to continue his commission. From the two rumoured embassies identified in this period, Robert Melville was sent on an embassy in the same months that Maitland's name was mentioned. This points to a broader picture of information-gathering by English officials stationed on the border or at Berwick. Even information of a rumoured embassy was just as important as a man being sent on an embassy because this gave the English government a chance to prepare their own response.

An embassy could be cancelled even further into the planning process after the instructions were drafted and it became common knowledge. South of the border, there are two examples of instructions for two English embassies that never happened that survive in the archives. The first was an embassy for John, Lord Lumley and Sir Walter Mildmay in late October and early November 1565.²²⁷ The second was in April 1567, when Arthur Grey, fourteenth Lord Grey of Wilton had his instructions drafted. Interestingly, none of the men mentioned in these instructions had previously been commissioned to Scotland by Elizabeth. The selection of Mildmay and Lord Grey was not completely unusual from the patterns that both Bell and this thesis have identified in Elizabethan diplomacy. Mildmay was appointed to Elizabeth's Privy Council in 1558 when she ascended the throne. Furthermore, Grey had experience in conflict and was an English official on the Anglo-Scottish border. Elizabeth appointed border officials, such as Bedford, because of their proximity to Scotland and this became a recurring pattern with the appointment of Bowes in the 1570s and 80s. In contrast to the other two new ambassadors, Lumley was a more unusual choice, firstly because he was a Catholic, and also because he had little political or diplomatic experience. The three ambassadors had

²²⁷ This will be referred to as the Lumley-Mildmay commission.

not had their names mentioned previously for an embassy. This reflected the haphazard position of the English government whose regular career ambassadors were unavailable and they needed someone they could trust to represent their objectives during a crisis in Scotland.

The first surviving instructions chronologically culminated in the October/November 1565 embassy. Three names put forward for this embassy, Thomas Radcliffe, Earl of Sussex, Lumley, or Mildmay were to visit Scotland but only the latter two were recorded on the heading of the instruction. Alford has identified that the instructions for this embassy were drafted but he failed to mention that this embassy was never sent. It does not receive the attention it deserves in the context of the year 1565.²²⁸ This cancelled embassy will be placed into the context of the changing political situation in more detail in Chapter Two to examine how this was part of a power play between Elizabeth and Mary.²²⁹ For our present purposes, we will examine the men in more detail to understand what stage in the planning process the proposed embassy had reached and how they fit into the broader pattern of English and Scottish diplomatic personnel.

To provide some context to the planned embassy, by October 1565, the air was thick with tension in Anglo-Scottish relations, and the overall purpose of the drafted embassy was to help restore the amity between England and Scotland through a continued discussion of the English acceptance of Mary's recent marriage to Darnley. The casting out of the resident ambassador Randolph from the Scottish court and imprisonment of her extraordinary ambassador Sir John Tamworth in Hume Castle meant Elizabeth needed to send new men to negotiate. Tamworth travelled to Scotland as an extraordinary English ambassador to ask Mary to repeal her marriage to Darnley. However, after he rejected a

²²⁸ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 140.

²²⁹ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 155-193.

letter of safe conduct that was signed by both Mary and Darnley, the Scottish queen had no choice but to send troops to pursue him. The purpose of the Lumley-Mildmay commission was to explain that Elizabeth was not supporting the Chaseabout Raid rebels who had exiled themselves to England; to ask Mary to ratify the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh, and to discuss the possibility of a restitution between Mary and the Scottish rebel group.²³⁰ Securing Mary's ratification of the treaty of Edinburgh had been a constant objective in the instructions of English ambassadors since Elizabeth commissioned her first ambassador, Mewtas, to Mary in September 1561.²³¹ Mary's regime, however, continued to withhold her signature until the English met their condition that Elizabeth declared Mary as her successor to the English throne.²³²

With the tension between Elizabeth and Mary reaching its peak, the instructions were revised in response to developments in the relationship. The earliest draft of the instructions was dated 24 October 1565, which was written in the hand of a clerk but heavily edited by Cecil.²³³ The second draft, created around November 1565, received fewer revisions from Cecil and was almost ready for the ambassadors to travel to Scotland.²³⁴ The embassy was spoken of at both the English and Scottish courts and it was even reported in the correspondence of the resident Spanish ambassador in England, Guzman de Silva.²³⁵ The embassy came to a standstill after the second draft of the

²³⁰ BL Cotton MS Caligula, B X, ff. 367r-382v, Instructions for Ambassadors to Scotland, [n.d.] November 1565; Frescoln argued that the primary purpose of the commission was to redress the poor treatment of Tamworth, see Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', p. 240.

For Mewtas's embassy, see Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 328-329.

²³¹ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 327-328.

²³² Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', pp. 8-9.

²³³ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 154r-168v, Instructions for Ambassadors to Scotland, 24 October 1565 [*CSP Scot* 1563-69, no. 288].

²³⁴ BL Cotton MS Caligula, B X, ff. 367r-382v, Instructions for Ambassadors to Scotland, [?] November 1565.

²³⁵ Edith Milner, ed., *Records of the Lumleys of Lumley Castle* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1904), p. 52.

instructions and by 26 November 1565 Elizabeth confirmed that the embassy would not go ahead.²³⁶ The decision to cancel the embassy can be explained because Elizabeth did not want to adhere to Mary's demands to send an ambassador to her court.

Sussex, Lumley, and Mildmay's names were rumoured as the potential ambassadors. But only two ambassadors were required for the embassy. In the copies of the instructions that have survived, only Lumley and Mildmay's names were recorded.²³⁷ However, in contemporary correspondence about the embassy, there was no mention of Mildmay. Instead, the authors wrote about the commission of Sussex, and Lumley. On 5 November 1565, Sussex and Lumley were first mentioned in de Silva's report to Philip II of Spain.²³⁸ He wrote that Lumley was appointed for the commission to Mary and De Silva described him as 'a very worthy gentleman, a good Catholic, and a devoted adherent of your Majesty'.²³⁹ De Silva continued,

The appointment has not yet been announced unless it was done after I left. I always write in fear about things that are not actually past as changes are so continual, and I am grieved to communicate things which do not happen even though the fault be not mine.²⁴⁰

²³⁶ TNA SP 52/11, f. 206, Elizabeth to Randolph, 26 November 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 308].

²³⁷ For manuscript two see, TNA SP 52/11, f. 154r, Instructions for Ambassadors to Scotland, 24 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 288]. This has significant water damage around the edge of the pages; TNA SP 52/11, f. 167v, Instructions for Ambassadors to Scotland, 24 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 288]. On the reverse of this set of instructions, the second line of the barely legible instructions, the reader can make out 'L[ord] Lu[?]' before the water damage obscures the rest of the name. On the third line of the barely legible address section, the reader can identify 'Mild[m?]' before the water damage obscures the name. *CSP Scot*, Vol. 2, p. 229, this identified the commissioner as 'Lord Lumley' on the reverse of the instructions.

For manuscript two see, BL Cotton MS Caligula, B X, f. 367r, Instructions for Ambassadors to Scotland, [?] November 1565. Before the cyber-attack in October 2023, the British Library's catalogue entry for this manuscript, only one ambassador, Mildmay, and needs to be updated with Lord Lumley's name.

²³⁸ *CSP Spain*, pp. 499-504, Guzman de Silva to the King of Spain, 5 November 1565.

²³⁹ *CSP Spain*, pp. 499-504, Guzman de Silva to the King of Spain, 5 November 1565; *Records of the Lumleys of Lumley Castle*, ed. Edith Milner (London: George Bell and Sons, 1904), p. 53.

²⁴⁰ *Records of the Lumleys of Lumley Castle*, p. 53.

The rumour of both names was also report by the English ambassador. Around 8 November 1565, Randolph wrote to Cecil ‘that my men here them told in the street’ that Sussex and Lumley were chosen as the ambassadors for the embassy to Scotland.²⁴¹ Since both De Silva and Randolph had heard Sussex and Lumley were appointed, it seems likely that this rumour was fairly well disseminated in the Scottish court. Randolph corresponded with Cecil about the embassy over a few weeks and, whilst Cecil had been correcting the instructions addressed to Mildmay and Lumley since October, it is mystifying that Cecil did not correct Randolph’s misinformation.²⁴²

Although Sussex’s name was never put forward for this commission, of the three men he was the only one with diplomatic experience. In 1554, he travelled to Brussels to the Holy Roman Emperor to report on Wyatt’s rebellion, and later the same year he was sent to Spain with the Earl of Bedford to ratify Mary and Philip’s marriage treaty. In 1558, Sussex was sent to Brussels again to request military aid to save Calais from French reoccupation.²⁴³ As was proven above through an assessment of both drafts of the instructions, we know that Sussex’s name was not mentioned on either draft and, therefore, this was part of a broader problem of reporting and receiving false information. MacCaffrey has placed too much emphasis on Sussex’s selection for this embassy. We now know this was a mistake because the Earl favoured Mary’s marriage to Darnley, which went against the nature of the instructions.²⁴⁴

By the standards of other Elizabethan ambassadors, Mildmay met a lot of the requirements.²⁴⁵ He started his education in 1538 at Christ’s College, Cambridge but

²⁴¹ TNA SP 52/11, f. 187r, Randolph to Cecil, 8 November 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 298].

²⁴² TNA SP 52/11, ff. 171v, Randolph to Cecil, 29 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 291].

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Wallace T. MacCaffrey, ‘Radcliffe, Thomas, third earl of Sussex (1526/7-1583)’, *ODNB* online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁴⁵ This checklist came from Bell’s study of English ambassadors who identified the patterns in Elizabethan diplomacy 1558-1603. See, Bell, ‘Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution’, pp. 267-284.

failed to complete his degree and instead in 1546 was a student of law at Gray's Inn, employed by his father in the Court of Augmentations. This elevated his career as an Elizabethan financier and by 1565 he was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer.²⁴⁶ Mildmay also had travel experience. In 1544 he was sent to France with Sir Richard Rich as Treasurer of War. Regarding his religious preferences, Mildmay was described by his biographer as one of the Puritan gentlemen of Northamptonshire, so we know he was a recognised supporter of further religious changes.²⁴⁷ Mildmay was also a man who was well connected to the inner circle of the English Privy Council. He married Mary Walsingham, sister of Sir Francis Walsingham and during his limited time at Cambridge Mildmay began a friendship with Cecil. Their acquaintance must have been long enough because in 1556 Mildmay was asked to be the godfather to Cecil's daughter, Anne Cecil.²⁴⁸ Walsingham and Cecil are both well-known for concentrating the efforts of the Elizabethan government on the Protestant cause in both foreign and domestic policy. The only grey area in Mildmay's thorough list of positive skills an ambassador required was the absence of first-hand diplomatic experience. The opportunities came later in Mildmay's career when on 17 September 1570 he and Cecil (then Lord Burghley) were instructed to interview the imprisoned Mary at Chatsworth in the aftermath of Moray's assassination to negotiate the possibility of her restoration.²⁴⁹ Other than his work as a commissioner, Mildmay was never an accredited ambassador to Scotland and his skills were best used in committee meetings at the English court debating Anglo-Scottish relations.

²⁴⁶ Lehmborg, *Sir Walter Mildmay and Tudor Government*, pp. 48-60; L. L. Ford, 'Mildmay, Sir Walter (1520/21-1589)', *ODNB* online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁴⁷ L. L. Ford, 'Mildmay, Sir Walter (1520/21-1589)', *ODNB*.

²⁴⁸ Lehmborg, *Sir Walter Mildmay and Tudor Government*, pp. 88-104.

²⁴⁹ Lehmborg, *Sir Walter Mildmay and Tudor Government*, pp. 90-101; Ford, L. L., 'Mildmay, Sir Walter (1520/21-1589)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Of the three men, Lumley was the most unusual choice for an Elizabethan ambassador because he would have been the first Catholic representative sent to Scotland. He made important connections through his marriage to Jane, the eldest daughter to Henry FitzAlan, Earl of Arundel in 1550, which aided Lumley's political appointments. However, Lumley was from a known Catholic family. His father, George Lumley, was executed in 1537 for his part in the Pilgrimage of the Grace rising against Henry VIII.²⁵⁰ Lumley himself was part of Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk's network at the English court and was described by de Silva as a 'good Catholic'.²⁵¹ Randolph questioned the choice of Lumley in his correspondence with Cecil, stating that 'the godlye [Protestant noblemen and gentlemen in Scotland] wolde have other and inspeciall yo[ur] self'.²⁵² Randolph agreed that Cecil and Sussex were a better choice for the commission.²⁵³ However, eleven days later on 19 November, Randolph wrote to Cecil that he 'dowte not but theie [Sussex and Lumley] wyll shewe them selves more erneste protestants as I knowe their L[ords] [Sussex and Lumley] to be, then theie are here reported'.²⁵⁴

Sometime between 19 and 26 November, Elizabeth changed her mind about sending the embassy to Mary.²⁵⁵ Although Mary asked Elizabeth to send an ambassador to Scotland, to which Elizabeth initially agreed, by the end of November, Elizabeth wanted Mary to be the one to send an ambassador to England.²⁵⁶ Randolph was instructed

²⁵⁰ Kathryn Barron, 'Lumley, John, Baron Lumley (c. 1533-1609), *ODNB* online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

²⁵¹ Milner, ed., *Records of the Lumleys of Lumley Castle*, p. 53.

²⁵² TNA SP 52/11, f. 187v, Randolph to Cecil, [8 November 1565] [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 298]; *CSP Foreign, 1564-65, Vol. 7*, pp. 508-509, 8 November 1565, Randolph to Cecil.

Randolph repeated this opinion to Bedford, but he did not express his opinion about who should be sent. See, TNA SP 52/11, f. 193r, Randolph to Bedford, 9 November 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 301]; *CSP Foreign*, pp. 509-510, November 1565, Randolph to Bedford.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 198r-200v, Randolph to Cecil, 19 November 1565; *CSP Foreign*, pp. 520-521 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 304].

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; this is the last letter acknowledging Mildmay and Lumley's commission.

TNA SP 52/11, f. 206, Elizabeth to Randolph, 26 November 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 308]; a letter acknowledging that the commission was cancelled.

²⁵⁶ TNA SP 52/11, f. 206, Elizabeth to Randolph, 26 November 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 308]; BL Lansdowne MS 8, f. 101, Randolph to the Scottish Privy Council [November/December] 1565.

to tell Mary he had misinterpreted Elizabeth's letter and made a mistake about the possible English embassy. This tainted Mary's opinion of Randolph's skills as an ambassador for the next four months until his dismissal in March 1566. Randolph confirmed the embassy was called off in a letter to Cecil and indicated that it would go ahead again at another more convenient time.²⁵⁷ Looking at the future careers of the three candidates, Randolph's concerns about Lumley's religion were justified because Lumley was convicted for his involvement in the Ridolfi plot in 1571. He conspired with the Spanish ambassador, Guerau de Spes in 1569 who promised he could provide troops to assist overthrowing Elizabeth and instead placing Mary on the English throne.²⁵⁸ For such a treasonous act, Lumley was tried and incarcerated in the Tower of London for eighteen months.²⁵⁹ The political and diplomatic ramifications of this cancelled embassy will be placed into the context of the year 1565 in Chapter Two. We do know that Elizabeth chose to send ambassadors in a crisis when correspondence could not fill the void, and when she desired a more direct outcome.²⁶⁰ Therefore Elizabeth's decision to cancel Lumley and Mildmay's embassy was a change in the process of personnel selection and the timing of her diplomatic commissions.

This embassy represented an important change in Anglo-Scottish relations because Elizabeth was making concessions in both her choice of ambassadors and how she negotiated. The active decision to appoint a Catholic man as her ambassador, with another known Catholic also rumoured to be part of the embassy, was a monumental change in the previous pattern of Elizabethan diplomatic personnel. It represented that the English Queen needed her ambassador to be approved and accepted by Mary.

²⁵⁷ TNA SP 52/11, f. 217, Randolph to Cecil, 3 December 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 313].

²⁵⁸ Hatfield House, CP 156/76, Interrogation of Lumley, 29 September 1569.

²⁵⁹ Kathryn Barron, 'Lumley, John, Baron Lumley (c. 1533-1609)', *ODNB* online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

²⁶⁰ See Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 155-193.

Secondly, what Lumley and Mildmay were instructed to offer would have started to undo uncompromising negotiations that Elizabeth had worked adamantly to maintain. Ultimately, this embassy represented that Elizabeth was losing the upper hand, and her last-minute cancellation was her attempt to claw back some authority.

The second example of an embassy that was cancelled by the English government occurred less than two years later in April 1567 and, again, was a reaction to a national crisis in Scotland. Instructions were drafted for Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton to travel to Scotland. Between 1559 and 1560, Grey played an important role in the English border conflict in January 1560 when he was appointed as the Warden of the East March of England to relieve Sir Ralph Sadler of the position. As far as we know, Grey was well-liked and was described by Cecil as a ‘Noble, valiant, careful gentleman’.²⁶¹ As the son and heir of William Grey, thirteenth Baron Grey of Wilton and his wife Mary, daughter of the Earl of Worcester, Grey’s noble birth would have pleased the authors of the ambassadorial handbooks. In 1553, William Grey was given a lucrative opportunity with an offer from John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland and Protector of Edward VI, for his son Arthur to marry Lady Jane Grey’s sister Mary in exchange for his backing of the succession device.²⁶² Arthur Grey had no diplomatic experience but he had accrued military experience, having commanded two hundred men during the siege of Leith in 1560. Even without diplomatic experience, Grey was regarded as a trusted individual. In a 1570s politics register, Lord Grey was listed in the section of noblemen ‘that haue not serued, but are fitt to serue’.²⁶³ A decade after his embassy to Scotland was planned, Grey

²⁶¹ TNA SP 52/4, ff. 54r-56v, Cecil to [English Privy Council], 26 June 1560 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 832].

²⁶² Julian Lock, ‘Grey, Arthur, fourteenth Baron Grey of Wilton, (1536-1593)’, *ODNB* online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

²⁶³ BL Lansdowne MS 683, f. 49r, ‘Noblemen and gentlemen that haue seued and are fitt to be employed in forrein messages’.

was still considered a suitable candidate and remained part of the short list in case Elizabeth needed to select an ambassador at short notice.

The primary reason the instructions for this embassy were drafted was for an ambassador to make a personal appearance at the Scottish court to understand the state of affairs in Scotland since the last English embassy of Killigrew, which took place between February and March 1567.²⁶⁴ Killigrew was sent to investigate the aftermath of the events following the death of Darnley. However, between March and April 1567, political events in Scotland were changing rapidly. On 12 April, Francis Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell was tried with charges of orchestrating the murder of Darnley but was acquitted. The outcome of this trial was one of the contributing factors in creating Grey's commission because Elizabeth wanted to ensure that Darnley's murderers were convicted. Grey's instructions declared that Elizabeth thought the circumstances and the actions following Darnley's murder were highly suspicious and wanted to send her ambassador to investigate further.²⁶⁵

Around 25 April, instructions for Grey to travel to Scotland were drafted in the hand of Cecil.²⁶⁶ In the title of this manuscript, the ambassador's name was left out but Grey is referred to in the main body of text as well as in the title of the *State Papers* calendar.²⁶⁷ Naming Grey suggests that plans for this embassy had reached an advanced stage. The instructions reported that Grey was sent to uncover the truth of the situation in Scotland; to comprehend the rewards Bothwell had received since Darnley's death; to condemn the treatment and deprivation of the offices of Matthew Stewart, Earl of Lennox,

²⁶⁴ See Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 333-334.

²⁶⁵ TNA SP 52/13, ff. 39r-41v, Instructions for Lord Grey sent to the Queen of Scots, [25] April 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1129].

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

and to understand why Darnley had not yet been buried.²⁶⁸ Unfortunately, the projected embassy was not mentioned in other contemporary correspondence. It is possible that high levels of secrecy were maintained because tensions had escalated in Scotland in the month following Killigrew's return to the English court. One reason why this drafted embassy was cancelled was because the domestic situation in Scotland had reached a point of political unrest. On 24 April, the day before Grey was supposed to travel to Scotland, Mary was captured by Bothwell on her return journey from Stirling to Edinburgh and was imprisoned in Dunbar Castle. Such a hostile situation required an ambassador with more experience. Instead, the English government began planning the instructions for Throckmorton to travel to Scotland. He was a more appropriate choice as an ambassador. Not only did Throckmorton already have a network in Scotland, but he also had experience of gathering intelligence at the French court during the turbulent years of the French Wars of Religion between 1559 and 1562.

The final type of embassy that was not sent was when the personnel were changed before the men began their journey. Between 1558 and 1568, there is only one example. In December 1566, Bedford was sent instructions to attend the baptism of Prince James VI at Stirling castle. The Scottish nobles had their own thoughts on which English representatives should attend the baptism. In August 1566, months before the invitations to the baptism were officially sent out to the monarchs of the continent, Moray wrote to Throckmorton with his opinions about who Elizabeth should select for the occasion.²⁶⁹ He was insistent that no one but Leicester was a more appropriate choice 'gif it hath pleis the Q[ueen] Ma[i]estie to employ him' and if, for any reason, Leicester could not be

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ NRS SP13/94: James Stewart, Earl of Moray to Throckmorton, 13 August 1566.

spared, then Moray noted that the second choice for the baptism was Bedford 'quhome I wold be glad to seezou [Throckmorton] accompany'.²⁷⁰ It is already known that Leicester and Moray were corresponding in October 1565, when Moray and the other Chaseabout Raid rebels had exiled themselves into England, and again in 1568 when Leicester was part of an embassy to France.²⁷¹ This adds to the narrative of why the two men remained correspondents. Moray used the English Earl as a source of information and to influence decisions at the English court. Moray's request to Throckmorton came only eighteen months before the English ambassador had recalled himself from Scotland after arriving too late to prevent Darnley from receiving the ceremonial titles that pointed to him becoming the next King of Scotland. Throckmorton's embassy in 1565 was a disaster. The only positive outcome was that Mary agreed to postpone her marriage to Darnley for a period of three months. Even this small success did not last. One can assume that Moray hoped Throckmorton would be able to influence Elizabeth's decision on who was sent as ambassador.

When the time came to appoint ambassadors for the 1566 baptism, on 7 November Bedford and Sir John Tamworth were selected.²⁷² From the Scottish perspective this would have been an upset for Mary. Only the year before, Tamworth was captured and imprisoned in Hume Castle on his return from the embassy for refusing to accept documentation that included Mary and her new husband Darnley's name. To send an ambassador who had tried to leave Scotland without recognising her husband's authority as King of Scotland would have been humiliating. However, Tamworth did not make the cut in the final commission for the baptism. Two days later, on 9 November 1566, Elizabeth revised her decision to send Tamworth and gave the vague reason that he did

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ Simon Adams, 'The Lauderdale Papers 1561-1570: The Maitland of Lethington State Papers and the Leicester Correspondence', *SHR*, Vol. 67, No. 183, Part 1 (April, 1988), p. 41; *ibid.*, p. 52.

²⁷² BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 399r-401v, Instructions for Bedford and Tamworth, 7 November 1566.

not satisfy the requirements. Elizabeth explained that ‘we had then resolved to haue sent and ioyned w[ith] yo[u]’ but instead now ‘require and authroise yow to deale in the whole matter alone, according to our said instruccions’.²⁷³ Bedford was given one further instruction to announce, if Mary so requested, that the English government changed their intention and now ‘forbear to send Tamworth’ that it would only be Bedford.²⁷⁴ Between the 7 and 9 of November, no correspondence has survived that included any discussion about removing Tamworth from this embassy. It was possible that Tamworth was not sent because his skills were needed elsewhere in government. Furthermore, in the records of the English Privy Council, there was no meeting held between these two dates and, therefore, no official discussion about removing Tamworth from the embassy.²⁷⁵

In this case, the rumoured embassies were just that, rumours. We know about the above embassies because ambassadors and courtiers recorded the mentioned embassies to inform and warn their home monarch. Embassies that made it beyond an oral discussion moved on to the drafting process and instructions were written for the proposed ambassadors. The three types of embassies that were not sent demonstrate that the exchange of diplomatic personnel especially between 1565 and 1568 was the backbone of keeping peace when a crisis arose. This also points to the English government’s desire for information, which was best to come from the appointment of an ambassador on the frontline.

²⁷³ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 402r: Copy of a letter from Elizabeth to Bedford, 9 November 1566.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ *APC*, pp. 316-318; the Privy Council meetings outside of these dates were held on 31 October 1566 and 14 November 1566.

Conclusion

Early modern ambassadorial handbooks reveal the types of considerations that contemporaries faced when selecting an ambassador. It was clear that there was no precise set of guidelines in the three handbooks compared in this research. However, what can be concluded is that it was clear, as Bell identified previously, that the English diplomatic corps had evolved to become more in line with the Western European model of the type of men selected for commissions. For example, career diplomats were used more regularly and the secretary maintained his role in diplomacy from his desk at the home court rather than out in the field. Similar changes only appeared in Scotland from 1566. This came following a power struggle in Anglo-Scottish relations in 1565, and therefore this was an indication of Mary strengthening her position in diplomacy as well as in Scottish politics.

From the outset of queen-to-queen diplomacy, this chapter has shown that it was the English government who were more interested in Scottish affairs. This was evident with the continued residency of an ambassador in Scotland immediately following Mary's return. Between Mary's marriage to Darnley and her deposition, Mary's appointment of Robert Melville as her resident ambassador to the English court showed her renewed interest and her desire for more frequent updates.

This chapter also expands our understanding of who should be included in discussions about diplomatic personnel. The comparison of accredited ambassadors was necessary in this study, as they had only previously been examined as a group in an English context. This needed to be applied to the Scottish embassies to England. However, the analysis of the exceptional periods of diplomacy, where representatives were commissioned by a second group claiming authority, showed that the formal structures of diplomacy such as presenting gifts, negotiating marriages, and holding

meetings (similar to an audience) with Elizabeth, were used to reinforce continue amicable relations.

One topic of interest in early ambassadorial handbooks that was not included in this chapter is the role and behaviour of an ambassador whilst they were stationed abroad. Kugeler argued that ‘political theory treated diplomacy not as a distinct office but as a subfunction of the councillor, statesman and courtier’.²⁷⁶ These qualities included their loyalty to their host and home monarch through their words and actions and their agency. The second chapter examines the agency of the English and Scottish ambassadors commissioned between 1561 and 1567. It aims to explore and understand what agency an ambassador had at their home court and their host court, as well as how this changed during their embassy or in the context of developments in the Anglo-Scottish relationship. To facilitate this discussion, we must focus on the content and rhetoric of their instructions as well as the actions they took or how they were forced to act beyond the constraints and limitations of their official instructions.

²⁷⁶ Kugeler, ‘ ‘Le Parfait Ambassadeur’ The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy’, p. 30.

Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy

Understanding who the diplomatic personnel were and what political experience they had in diplomacy is essential to evaluating the actions and agency of the English and Scottish ambassadors whilst they were stationed abroad. An ambassador's agency refers to what he was required to do and what he felt empowered to do in exceptional or unforeseen circumstances. Early modern handbooks overlook the agency and independent actions of an ambassador because he was a representative of the monarch. To point to one example, Gentili understood that an ambassador was responsible 'for the negotiation and performance of everything which during the whole period may happen to be in the interest of the person sending them'.¹ Whilst drafting instructions for an ambassador was, usually, straightforward, it was difficult to predict every unprecedented situation and circumstance they would encounter. Therefore, it was logical to appoint men who were trusted to operate independently, if the situation arose.

This chapter explores three themes that are prominent in the discussion of diplomatic agency: the nature of agency in diplomatic documents, what agency an ambassador could exercise, and in what circumstances he was forced to exercise agency. In doing so, this chapter argues that the ability to act independently was part of an ambassadors commission, it was during exceptional circumstances in the 1560s that English and Scottish ambassadors were forced to exercise agency to maintain the new Anglo-Scottish amity as well as to protect their monarch's interests. As Chapter One has identified, there was an increase in the number of diplomatic exchanges – in other words accredited ambassadors, representatives, and embassies that were amended or did not happen – which reflected when and why the English or Scottish governments were

¹ Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 14.

particularly interested in the activities of their counterparts.² Furthermore, the increase in diplomatic exchanges also indicated when a national or international crisis might potentially arise or had already taken place. The assessment of the structures of English and Scottish diplomacy is developed in this chapter through the examination of what an ambassador was instructed or required to do in unprecedented situations. The first chapter of this thesis warranted a discussion of all diplomatic personnel; however, the primary focus of the second chapter is the agency of the accredited ambassadors commissioned between 1561 and 1567. The decision not to include the representatives was justified for two reasons. Firstly, diplomatic agency depended on whether the individual was officially recognised by the host court.³ Secondly, evaluating an ambassador's agency relies heavily on the content and phrasing of their official instructions. Representatives, by contrast, were not usually dispatched with official, written instructions, which makes it nearly impossible to judge whether they were acting on behalf of the sender or on their own terms. As we have discussed in Chapter One, representatives might carry a list of questions or a memorandum of the agenda, which aligns them loosely with formal diplomatic structures.⁴ Therefore, the actions of a representative are not directly comparable to those of an ambassador. This is not to say that the representatives that are identified in Chapter One and the appendices go unmentioned in this chapter, but how they asserted agency or independent actions cannot be assessed in the same way.

During an embassy, an ambassador was supposed to articulate their master's position and was, therefore, limited in their independent actions. The exception was when they needed to respond to events or conversations that had not been planned for. Typically, ambassadors who were sent on ceremonial embassies (such as to witness

² See, Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 81-124.

³ Sowerby and Hennings, *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*, p. 5.

⁴ See, Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 81-108.

marriages or baptisms), or men with less diplomatic experience, were not directed to use their own discretion in their instructions and were tied to their government's objectives. Moments of international crisis might lead to change in this field. For example, if an ambassador's instructions were no longer relevant or valid, he was still able to use his experience and his discretion to act beyond the now outdated instructions and to represent his monarch and their interests. A crisis could be anything from the threat of Mary's marriage to Darnley in 1565 to Elizabeth being disturbed by Mary's phrasing in her correspondence. In this decade, the crises were mainly on the Scottish side of the border and how the English government reacted demonstrated their continued interest in these international and national crises.

Previous scholarship has already drawn attention to the agency of ambassadors through their roles as counsellors. Stephen Alford identified that diplomatic experts such as Randolph, Sadler, and Throckmorton gave counsel in their correspondence, reports, or in person which 'was often filtered through Cecil and the Privy Council'.⁵ This played an important role in the 1560s Elizabethan conciliar government, which included ambassadors as part of its extended network to expand intelligence gathering.⁶ Natalie Mears agrees with Alford's identification and demonstrates that diplomatic experts, such as ambassadors can be categorised as 'probouleutic groups' or 'ad hoc and extra-conciliar groups' who operated as part of the wider network of men on the English Privy Council.⁷ Mears also drew attention to the way counsel was presented to Elizabeth. This was not always direct, and the lines between Elizabeth being counselled and receiving unsolicited

⁵ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 214.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Natalie Mears, *Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 36-40.

advice from her advisors and extended network often became blurred.⁸ If the boundaries existed, news and debate would often cross that line, which then means that we should consider ambassadors' correspondence as prime examples of councillor advice. Susan Doran and Jacqueline Rose have demonstrated that ambassadors can be used to bridge the gap in discussions of counsel and agency.⁹ Being somewhat detached from their court, ambassadors needed to include as much detailed information as possible in their reports. This included, but was not limited to, audiences and private meetings with the host monarch; conversations with courtiers; summaries of parliamentary or privy council sessions; foreign or domestic news reported in their host country; news from others' correspondence; important literature attached to their correspondence; and rumoured information.

Only a few studies have applied Mears's approach to individuals or groups of ambassadorial correspondence. Doran identifies that 'when important decisions had to be made about foreign policy, she [Elizabeth] consulted her resident ambassadors or agents, and would on occasion send out special envoys with instructions to report back to her the exact state of affairs abroad'.¹⁰ Using the example of Throckmorton's time as the English ambassador in France, Kenneth Kisner argues convincingly that ambassadors were capable of thinking for themselves and advising the Queen. Throckmorton's reports in December 1559, indicated that the French troops that were expelled from Calais would soon arrive in Scotland to support Mary of Guise against the rebel group, the Lords of the Congregation. Kisner argued that Throckmorton's news had a causal effect for both

⁸ Mears, *Queenship and Political Discourse*, p. 50; *ibid.*, p. 104.

⁹ Doran, 'Elizabeth I and Counsel', Jacqueline Rose, ed., *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 152; Jacqueline Rose, 'The problem of political counsel in medieval and early modern England and Scotland', Jacqueline Rose, ed., *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 15.

¹⁰ Susan Doran, 'Elizabeth I and Counsel', Jacqueline Rose, ed., *The Politics of Counsel in England and Scotland, 1286-1707* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 156.

defending England and securing English intervention on behalf of the Lords of the Congregation.¹¹ Furthermore, Kisner believed that an ambassador had a greater responsibility than being a cog in Cecil's extended network and could judge situations for themselves.¹² Using Kisner's model in his study of Throckmorton, this chapter assesses what agency an ambassador was granted in his instructions, how and when it was used during their embassies, and what impact this had on Anglo-Scottish diplomacy.

The aforementioned literature has focused on how an ambassador exercised agency when advising their monarch in their correspondence. The 'new diplomatic history' has identified that agency can also be identified through actions of individuals.¹³ How an ambassador acted, dressed, and his participation in daily court life was part of the performance of diplomacy that could be used to gain access to information. Whilst these developments in the 'new diplomatic history' need to be explored, this chapter instead wants to return to the essential documents and their instructions to examine an ambassador's position between representing the monarch and functioning independently. Sowerby and Hennings argue that doing so 'offers important insights into the ways in which diplomatic representatives realised political agency and established relations in other cultural contexts by suspending ceremonial rules, posing as domestic actors, or blending into local forms of sociability'.¹⁴ Using the instructions, correspondence, and reports sent by ambassadors, this chapter focuses on an ambassador's agency; when he was put in a position to exercise this, and how this was exercised. Although directions to use agency were not always written into an ambassador's instructions, it was

¹¹ Kisner, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen', p. 95.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹³ For emerging themes in the 'new diplomatic history' see, John Watkins, 'Towards a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern History*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2008), p. 13; Tracey Sowerby, 'Early Modern Diplomatic History', *History Compass*, Vol. 14, No. 9 (2016), pp. 444-445.

¹⁴ Sowerby and Hennings, *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*, p. 8.

acknowledged that an ambassador was always in a position where he represented his monarch and needed to make sure that his actions reflected this. An ambassador was considered to be an expert sent abroad to receive and report first-hand information. By understanding information in other contexts as well as the responses and reactions of his host court, the ambassador could make an informed judgement on the best course of action.

In order to assess the nature of agency in diplomacy, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on what agency an ambassador was expected to use during his embassy through an assessment of his documentation and audiences. This brings us to a wider issue; that even if the ambassadors had strict instructions, he could be excused or granted leeway to act as he saw fit when a crisis emerged. In the second section, the themes of expected agency and agency used in a crisis are brought together with a study of the diplomatic watershed in the year 1565. By analysing the embassies sent and received in this one year in isolation, we see an important shift in influence and authority in July 1565, both before and after Mary's marriage to Darnley. Dawson has already acknowledged there was a change in the Anglo-Scottish relationship in the year 1565 as a result of the marriage. This chapter supports her argument that Mary's marriage to Darnley was the catalyst for the shift in power in Anglo-Scottish relations. This can be interpreted and understood through an examination of the diplomatic exchanges.¹⁵ This identified two important points. The first was that this one year saw a reversal in the previous men selected as ambassadors from both Elizabeth and Mary and new men were sent or proposed for an embassy. The second important change was that the situation

¹⁵ Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22; see also, Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish relations: security and succession'.

forced the ambassadors to use their initiative in an unprecedented way; diplomacy moved faster than advice could be written and conveyed, and the ambassador was the expert who needed to monitor the national or international situation on behalf of their monarch.

The Expected Agency of an Ambassador

Every ambassador was required to exercise a minimum amount of agency during their embassy. This was locked into the formal structures of diplomacy, such as the requirement to deliver and execute their instructions as well as holding audiences and meetings with their host monarch. Sowerby and Hennings have identified that not only humans, but animals and objects could carry agency.¹⁶ This section argues that the documents that an ambassador carried with him on his journey to his host court held their own agency because it allowed him to travel and cross the border without interference and helped to establish his legitimacy in an audience with the host monarch. As well as the physical agency in helping the ambassador arrive at his host court, the rhetoric in ambassadorial instructions either restricted or allowed the ambassador to operate with some independence, especially when an unprecedented national or international situation occurred. Finally, an ambassador was expected to meet with his host monarch in audiences, and the outcome of these was determined by how he used his skill to execute the objectives set out in his instructions. An audience had a performative function where an ambassador could discuss the agenda laid out in his instructions and use the setting to negotiate or understand their host monarch's perspective.

Before considering the different ways in which agency was written into an ambassador's instructions, it is important to understand the different documents that an

¹⁶ Sowerby and Hennings, *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*, p. 14.

ambassador was presented with to take on his embassy. In the sixteenth century, an ambassador was presented with a pack of three documents from his home monarch.¹⁷ This consisted of his instructions (one for his own reference and a copy for his host monarch), a letter of credence from his home monarch (to give legitimacy to the embassy), and a letter of safe-conduct (to ensure his safe arrival). In most cases, only the main set of instructions for the ambassador survive, and for this research, the survival of the instructions to English ambassadors outweighs those of their Scottish counterparts. Whilst the letter of credence and safe conduct were largely formulaic, the instructions were carefully crafted for each embassy (for which multiple drafts remain). They included information about important diplomatic issues; topics to discuss during audiences; predicted replies to the host monarch's answers; mentions of oral messages; who the ambassadors needed to speak to or avoid speaking to at his host court; and, occasionally how to address the monarch. However, the document package, as a whole, carried important agency from the start of their embassy to their final departure. It is important to distinguish between what paperwork a resident ambassador received and an embassy that was more time-limited, such as one for an extraordinary ambassador, received. In terms of the material documents, both types of ambassadors received the same or very similar documents. The differences arise, as will be discussed later, in the phrasing used that allowed the resident ambassador more scope during his commission whereas extraordinary ambassadors were typically bound to more specific objectives.

Of the documents sent in an ambassador's pack, the instructions were the most important part. They outline when an ambassador was to adhere to a particular course of action, and when he might use his own discretion. Depending on how experienced an ambassador was, this determined how much flexibility he was given in his instructions.

¹⁷ Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 32-33; *ibid.*, p. 36.

Therefore, agency in an ambassador's instructions needs to be understood as falling within a range of permissions or licences. At one end of the spectrum was the ambassador who was simply sent only to communicate a message on his monarch's behalf, and at the opposite end, we find the ambassador who was ordered to use his discretion during his embassy if it would further the objective of his mission. Whether an ambassador was instructed to use agency depended on the ambassador's experience, the length of the embassy, its purpose, and whether anything unexpected occurred. For the Anglo-Scottish ambassadors commissioned between 1558 and 1568, those with a more extensive diplomatic career were the men who were asked to use more discretion. This applied to both resident and extraordinary ambassadors.

Occasionally, an ambassador was presented with or was sent additional documents to supplement the required embassy documentation after they had arrived at their host court. Three types of documents were identified in this research: a secret set of instructions, a memorial, and correspondence from his home court. A secret set of instructions was not a common part of an ambassador's diplomatic document package. To maintain its secrecy, the additional instructions were typically set out in the format of a letter rather than instructions. One example of an ambassador being sent with a second set of instructions was in September 1561 when Maitland was commissioned to England to announce Mary's safe arrival back to Scotland and express her good will towards her cousin.¹⁸ During this same embassy, Maitland was given a separate set of instructions signed by a group of Scottish temporal Lords, of whom seven out of the nine were previously members of the Lords of the Congregation. They instructed Maitland to ask Elizabeth to consider Mary as her successor whilst sidestepping the issue of the Scottish

¹⁸ Labanoff, *Lettres*, pp. 104-105.

Queen's delay in ratifying the Treaty of Edinburgh.¹⁹ As far as we know, Mary was unaware of Maitland's second set of instructions and, perhaps, this was also the case for Elizabeth. During his audience with Elizabeth, Maitland was expected to present only Mary's set of instructions because they were a part of the performative function of the first audience. Subsequently, Maitland would attempt to weave the objectives in the instructions from the Scottish Lords surreptitiously into his further discussions with Elizabeth without detection.

The second additional document that an ambassador might receive or send during his embassy was a memorial. A memorial is often included under the umbrella term of instructions, which has led to its importance being overlooked. It is more helpful to understand a memorial as an extension of the original instructions that was necessary for longer or resident embassies to keep the objectives of the original commission up to date with the changing political landscape. The format of a memorial lies somewhere between both a set of instructions and a letter. Helen Newsome identifies that, in theory, a memorial was designed to be read privately by the ambassador or messenger to remind him of the issues discussed in a diplomatic meeting.²⁰ However, a memorial also had a public function. The document could be presented to the monarch, like instructions, but the content was not necessarily to be read aloud exactly as it was written.²¹ This gave the ambassador greater flexibility and he was able to use his discretion about what information to share with the host monarch and what he chose to keep private. The

¹⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, Instructions from the Scottish Lords to Maitland, f. 157r. Signed by James Hamilton, Duke of Châtelherault; James Hamilton, third Earl of Arran; James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; John Stewart, fourth Earl of Atholl; John Gordon, eleventh Earl of Sutherland; George, Earl of Huntly; William Keith, fourth Earl of Marischal; Gilbert Kennedy, fourth Earl of Cassillis; James Stewart, Prior of St Andrews; Patrick Ruthven, third Earl of Ruthven; James Lord Ogilvy, George Seaton, seventh Lord Seaton; John Stewart, fourth Lord Innermeath; Robert, Lord Boyd, and Saint John.

²⁰ Helen Newsome, 'The function, format and performance of Margaret Tudor's January 1522 diplomatic memorial', *Renaissance Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2020), p. 406.

²¹ Newsome, 'The function, format and performance of Margaret Tudor's January 1522 diplomatic memorial', pp. 406-407; Queller, *The Office of Ambassador*, p. 125.

purpose of writing a memorial instead of a letter, therefore, was to update and expand the ambassador's commission without it being public knowledge. Between 1559 and 1566, Randolph received six memorials during his long residency in Scotland that were additions to his original instructions. During his six years there, English objectives in Scotland changed, especially in relation to Mary's marital plans. Thus, Randolph's memorials updated his previous instructions in line with the revised English policy.²²

The final type of document in an ambassador's pack were letters that were carried to the host court. These were either correspondence from the ambassador's monarch to his host monarch, from his monarch to members of government, or from members of his own government to the host government. As well as negotiating with his host monarch on behalf of his own monarch, an ambassador also played a joint role as a letter bearer simply for the convenience of time and cost. Ultimately, the role of the above three additional documents sent with the ambassador were to expand or update the original instructions.

Any small mistake in the documentation or if the ambassador was carrying incorrect papers would delay the embassy and the progress of the negotiations. This was a lesson Elizabeth learnt early on in her reign. Less than six months after Elizabeth succeeded to the English throne, she selected a group of four commissioners to meet with Mary of Guise's representatives from Scotland to conclude the Treaty of Upsetlington.²³ From this group of commissioners, Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham, wrote to the young queen to notify her that her instructions for the English commissioners 'dothe lacke

²² BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 218r-219v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 20 August 1562; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 228r-229v, Memorial of matters committed to Randolph, 24 August 1563; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 249r-v, Copy of further instructions to Randolph, 17 November 1563; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 261r-262v, Memorial from Elizabeth to Randolph, 17 November 1563; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 270r-273v, Memorial from Elizabeth to Randolph, 4 October 1564; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 348r-349r: Memorial from Elizabeth to Randolph, [n.d.] September 1565.

²³ Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, p. 323.

the date of the daye of this mounthe'.²⁴ Tunstall requested that a new commission was sent 'for ells the Scotts will thinke wee mocke them, that maye be wrytten sealyed and sent before o[ur] metinge'.²⁵ If the contents of the documentation were incorrect, this could hinder the progress of the embassy during fast-moving political events in the 1560s.

Not having the correct documents was also problematic and could stop an embassy in its tracks, even before an ambassador had reached the other court. On 23 May 1566, Robert Melville was stopped at the English border and not permitted to travel into England because he did not have a letter of credence from Mary.²⁶ Drury reported that Melville's journey would be delayed 'vntil I may vnderstande from the Quene his m[istre]ss whether he be an expresse messenger from her Ma[jes]tie or not offeringe hym neidthelesse that if he haue either l[ett]res or other thinge to the Quenes Ma[jes]tie my m[ist]res that require expedience I will sende them await w[i]th all the spede'.²⁷ After travelling back to Edinburgh and returning, again, to Berwick three days later on 26 May, Robert Melville was in possession of the correct documents signed by Mary and was permitted to continue his journey.²⁸

A change in a regime would affect the validity of diplomatic documentation, depending on whether the new ruler – or the individual who had claimed power – was accepted or recognised by the ambassador's home court. This leads us to the example of the last 'normal' English embassy during the period of queen-to-queen diplomacy: in July 1567, Throckmorton was commissioned to Mary during her imprisonment in Loch Leven

²⁴ TNA SP 52/1, f. 23r, Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham to Elizabeth, 12 May 1559 [*CSP Scots*, 1547-63, no. 449].

²⁵ TNA SP 52/1, f. 23r, Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham to Elizabeth, 12 May 1559 [*CSP Scots*, 1547-63, no. 449].

²⁶ TNA SP 52/12, f. 63r, Sir Robert Melville to Elizabeth, 23 May 1566 [*CSP Scots*, 1563-69, no. 388]; TNA SP 52/12, f. 62r, Robert Melville to Cecil, 23 May 1566 [*CSP Scots*, 1563-69, no. 387].

²⁷ TNA SP 59/11, f. 218r, Drury to Cecil, 23 May 1566 [*CSP Foreign*, 1566-68, no. 410].

²⁸ TNA SP 59/11, f. 237r, Drury to Cecil, 26 May 1566 [*CSP Foreign*, 1566-68, no. 428].

Castle. The embassy began in June before the Scottish Queen was deposed on 24 July 1567. Whilst, in theory, this embassy was part of queen-to-queen diplomacy, the situation became more complex after Throckmorton arrived in Scotland, as it became unclear whether he was to report to Mary, or, after August, the Regent Moray. As an experienced ambassador, Throckmorton was equipped to handle the changing political culture in Scotland and forced to use his agency to best represent Elizabeth whilst also remaining constrained by his instructions.

Three versions of the instructions were drafted for Throckmorton's commission. The first draft was created on 24 April 1567, before Mary was imprisoned, and was sent as a reaction to the news that Mary had been kidnapped by Bothwell. In this context, Throckmorton's original instructions stated that he was to understand Mary's version of events about Darnley's death and the charges against Bothwell, to assure Mary that Elizabeth planned to offer her aid (on the condition that Mary did not renew the Auld Alliance with France), and to enquire about the situation concerning Mary's son, Prince James. When he arrived at the Scottish court, Throckmorton was to '*alter*~~beare~~ all the *order afor p[re]scribed* ~~or m[?] proceeding~~, and deale in this sort following yow shall shew ye messadge done by ye L[ord] ~~Darnly~~ Lyddington [Maitland]'.²⁹ With events in Scotland changing so quickly, the English government waited to send Throckmorton until they were more certain that having an extraordinary ambassador in Scotland was necessary. It was only once it was confirmed that Mary had been imprisoned in Loch Leven Castle in June that on 30 June the second draft of Throckmorton's instructions were written. This draft now required Throckmorton to visit Mary in prison to discuss Elizabeth's thoughts on her situation and to warn Mary about the dangers of linking

²⁹ TNA SP 52/10, f. 63r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 24 April 1565 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 170].

herself to the French.³⁰ Although Mary was not yet deposed, it was included in Throckmorton's instruction that he was granted permission, if not instructed to do so by the Scottish Lords, to address Mary as the Scottish queen.³¹ It was only after the third and final draft of the instructions around the 1 July that Throckmorton was actually sent to Scotland. In comparison to the previous two versions, the third set of instructions was more direct about what the English Privy Council needed to achieve from the ambassador's negotiations with Mary and the Scottish Lords. He was instructed to declare that Mary should be set free with the following provisions: a divorce from Bothwell, a commission for the Scottish Lords to proceed against Bothwell, to establish a Parliament to proclaim a national peace and religion, and finally to appoint Elizabeth as the maintainer of the Scottish Parliament.³² The English government's decision to delay sending Throckmorton was a tactical one as it intended to allow the political situation in Scotland to stabilise. However, a comparison of the three sets of instructions reveals that English anxieties over their own security only intensified. By the third set of instructions, extreme measures were proposed, including offering English oversight of the Scottish Parliament, in order to ease tensions in Scotland and to secure a political foothold for the English government during the vacuum in power. By July, the long delay had undermined the effectiveness of Throckmorton's embassy, and he had lost the opportunity to speak to Mary in person.

Between 2 and 14 of July, Throckmorton travelled from London to Edinburgh, with strategic stops at Newcastle and Berwick to gather news from English officials who

³⁰ TNA SP 52/13, ff. 83r-v, Instructions to Throckmorton, 30 June 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 540].

³¹ TNA SP 52/13, ff. 83r-v, Instructions to Throckmorton, 30 June 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 540]; BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, ff. 4r-6v, Copy of Instructions to Throckmorton, 30 June 1567; Add. MS 4126, ff. 42r-v, Elizabeth to Mary, 30 June 1567.

³² TNA SP 52/14, ff. 1r-2v, Instructions to Throckmorton, [1/2] July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 542]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 13r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 7 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 552]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 20r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 10 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 557]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 21r-22v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 12 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 558].

were station in the north about the situation in Scotland. Once in Scotland, his journey also included an overnight stop at Fast Castle, in the Scottish East March, with Lord Home and Maitland, to discuss matters away from the eyes of the court. When Throckmorton arrived in Scotland on 15 July, the Scottish Lords refused to grant him access to Mary in Loch Leven Castle and thus, it must be argued, that his embassy never truly began because he did not present his instructions to the crowned monarch. Lehmberg asserts that Throckmorton was recalled home because he ‘accomplished nothing’.³³ This is an unfair assessment of Throckmorton’s embassy. Once he arrived in Scotland, Throckmorton was in diplomatic limbo; he was refused access to Mary and could not present his instructions. If he had presented his instructions to the Scottish Lords who had imprisoned Mary, this would have acknowledged their authority. Even before he reached Scotland, Throckmorton was aware that he might not be allowed access to Mary and was prepared to navigate the unprecedented political situation.³⁴

Although he did not meet her in person, Throckmorton could still communicate with Mary through other individuals. Prior to his journey to Scotland in 1567, Mary corresponded with Throckmorton before he selected for the embassy to Scotland.³⁵ However, we cannot be certain if Throckmorton received this letter and whether there was further evidence of their communication. During his time in Scotland, if Throckmorton and Mary communicated, the most likely method was using members of his party or servants in Scotland who were trusted people in their network to convey oral messages. Unless this was reported in Throckmorton’s correspondence, there is no way

³³ Stanford E. Lehmberg, *Sir Walter Mildmay and Tudor Government* (Austin: University of Texas, 1964), p. 62.

³⁴ TNA SP 52/14, ff. 8r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 2 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 547].

³⁵ For Throckmorton’s communication with Mary whilst he was ambassador to France see, Kisner, ‘Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen’.

For Throckmorton’s communication with Mary before his 1565 embassy see, T. Thomson, ed., *Sir James Melville, Memoirs of His Own Life*, pp. 141-143.

For Throckmorton’s correspondence before his 1567 embassy see, NRS GD 124/151/1 – 11, Letter from Mary to Throckmorton, 5 June 1567.

of knowing what was said. What Throckmorton did include in his reports to the English court was news that he heard from supporters of the King's party about Mary's health, how she was being treated during her imprisonment, and who from the King's party had access to the queen.³⁶

Just as Throckmorton, Elizabeth, and Cecil did not think the situation could get any worse when trying to negotiate Mary's release, nine days after he arrived in Scotland, on 25 July 1567, Mary was forced to abdicate her throne to her infant son. Once the English government was aware of the reality of the situation, the logical response was to create a new set of instructions for Throckmorton in order to adapt his embassy as the crisis of authority developed in Scotland. On 27 July, three days after Mary was forced to abdicate, the new instructions were drafted, and we know that they were written in direct response to the new national Scottish circumstances. At the end of the same document, Elizabeth wrote that I 'prohibite yo[w] [Throckmorton] to assent therto [James's coronation] by any meanes'.³⁷ This was only something that would have been included if they were already aware that Mary's authority had been revoked. Throckmorton's, now, fourth set of instructions asked him to 'contynue in prosecution of your first charge [the third draft he was sent with], to procure the libertie of the Queene and to haue licence to speake with here, to thintent she may vnderstand how muche we mislyke her doinge'.³⁸ Whilst the fourth set of instructions had been adapted due to the

³⁶ Examples of when Throckmorton was reporting news to Elizabeth and Cecil with news about Mary. It was not always specified who he learnt the information from and TNA SP 52/14, ff. 24r-27v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 14 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 560]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 33r-34v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 16 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 562]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 36r-37v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 18 July 1567; [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 563]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 38r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 18 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 564]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 61r-64v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 26 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 574]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 81r-84v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 31 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 581]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 87r-88v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 2 August 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 583]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 96r-100v, Throckmorton to Eliz, 9 August 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 588].

³⁷ BL Add. MS 88966, f. 2v, Instructions to Throckmorton, 27 July 1567; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 71r-74v, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 27 July 1567 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 577]. This is an earlier draft of instructions for Throckmorton.

³⁸ BL Add. MS 88966, f. 1r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 27 July 1567.

change in authority, ultimately the core purpose of the instructions was to continue on with his objective to speak to and secure Mary's release. To combat Throckmorton's limited access to Mary, Elizabeth directed him to speak with members of the King's party and present thirteen points that broadly covered the English Queen's disapproval of their actions and issued them with an ultimatum. It was agreed that the English government would 'not ayding of them [the Scottish Lords] at this present with money whilest she [Mary] is captyvitee'.³⁹ Between 1559 and 1560 and in 1565, such an offer would have aligned with the rebel groups goal and Elizabeth hoped it was lucrative enough and the King's party would accept. Such a generous and open offer of aid would have enticed the opposing groups in Scotland in 1559-60 and 1565 but the situation was different in 1567. With the sovereign queen imprisoned, the power had shifted in favour of the opposing group.

Although both Throckmorton's original and his new instructions were no longer valid because he could not report to Mary, Elizabeth wanted to keep an extraordinary ambassador in Scotland to continue to monitor the unusual situation of having a deposed queen imprisoned in her own country. This helps to explain why Throckmorton was not immediately recalled from Scotland after Mary was deposed. On 26 July, the day before James's coronation, Throckmorton sent his first request to Elizabeth asking her to recall him to the English court. It was not until almost two weeks later, on 6 August, Elizabeth officially recalled Throckmorton from Scotland. His decision to stay coincided with the preparations for James Stewart, Earl of Moray to return from France and accept the position of Regent. As an experienced ambassador, Throckmorton understood that Elizabeth would have needed firsthand information on this political change. It was not until 1 September 1567, nearly one month after he was allowed to return to England, that

³⁹ BL Add. MS 88966, f. 1r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 27 July 1567, f. 2v.

Throckmorton arrived back in Berwick.⁴⁰ The English ambassador chose to remain in Scotland for a few more weeks to gather information and to make the best of what was already a bad situation. Throckmorton represented Elizabeth's position accurately whilst he resided in Scotland. He was not allowed to meet Mary but did not hold an audience with the Regent Moray. This would have acknowledged his authority as regent.⁴¹ Whilst extraordinary ambassadors were not always given discretion in their instructions, because of the brevity or objective of their embassy, unconventional circumstances, such as those during Throckmorton's embassy, forced experienced ambassadors to use their initiative to navigate the political landscape. Throckmorton's case was especially unusual because of the dynamic nature of the situation when he was in Scotland. His instructions were irrelevant upon arrival, and yet he was still required to stay in Scotland to represent Elizabeth's position whilst gathering as much information as possible.

The degree of agency an ambassador was granted in their instructions depended on three key factors: the length and purpose of the embassy, the ambassador's experience, and whether any unpredictable events took place. Typically, a resident ambassador was afforded greater discretion in their instructions in comparison to an extraordinary or a special ambassador, as they received broader objectives and their mission was less time-sensitive. In contrast for a short, extraordinary embassy, the instructions were focused on direct objectives that needed to be achieved. The experience of the men abroad was not always bound to whether it was a resident or extraordinary embassy. Career diplomats, such as James Melville and Throckmorton, had years of diplomatic experience under their belt and were given more discretion in their instructions because of the nature of their

⁴⁰ TNA SP 52/14 ff. 18r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 9 July 1567; *CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 556.

⁴¹ Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth Century Scotland*, p. 212.

commissions. Finally, during moments of crisis in the Anglo-Scottish relations, ambassadors were forced to use agency, whether by offering advice to their monarch or taking independent action, to protect the political amity.

Using the examples of the three ambassadors who were commissioned most frequently in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy – Randolph from the English court, and Maitland and Robert Melville from the Scottish court – this section will examine how and when they were able to or forced to act with some independence. Before 25 August 1561, only days after Mary had returned, Randolph finally received his full accreditation as an ambassador at the Scottish court.⁴² Earlier in March the same year, Randolph was sent a memorial which directed him to report any news on the Protestant changes in Germany; to ensure peace was kept in Scotland; and to initiate a discussion about Mary's future second husband before she returned to Scotland. The purpose of this memorial was to give Randolph some direction ahead of Mary's anticipated return. In addition, he was to 'p[ro]ceede according to his discretion' to confer with people whom he knew favoured the Protestant goals and the desire for an amicable relationship that was preached by the English government.⁴³ Randolph had an established network in Scotland and used this to confer with Châtelherault, Arran, and Lord James Stewart. The three men were prominent members of the Scottish court and members of the Lords of the Congregation, and most importantly were in favour of both the establishment of the Protestant religion within both England and Scotland.⁴⁴ This memorial only had a short shelf-life and was outdated in five months when, in August, Mary returned to Scotland. As previously stated, Randolph received six memorials during his residency in Scotland between 1559 and 1565, each of which was used to update the previous one and added new objectives to his embassy or

⁴² BL Harley MS 290, ff. 11r–12v, Elizabeth to Mary, 25 August 1561.

⁴³ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 77r–v, A Memorial to Randolph about service to Elizabeth in Scotland, 20 March 1561 [*CSP Scots, 1547–63*, no. 981].

⁴⁴ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 83r–84v, Randolph to Cecil, 20 March 1561 [*CSP Scots, 1547–63*, no. 983].

items of discussion for his audiences. However, not every memorial Randolph received instructed him to use agency. After his brief sojourn to the English court, Randolph once again returned to Scotland on 20 August 1563 with a new ‘memorial’. This diplomatic document used rhetoric that was more commonly employed in the instructions of extraordinary ambassadors, which bound them to the limited instructions they would receive. For example, the memorial stated, ‘ye shall declare’ Elizabeth’s mind on the matter of Mary’s marriage, and ‘ye may saye’ that Mary will require English advice.⁴⁵ The purpose of this memorial was to update Randolph on Elizabeth and her government’s position as discussions about Mary’s next husband became more serious. From the English perspective, who Mary chose as her husband also impacted the new Anglo-Scottish amity and any future heirs to the Scottish, or even English, throne. Therefore, the change in rhetoric was to match the English need to retain more control over how marriage discussions were managed by the English ambassador in Scotland.

From the Scottish court, before 1566, Maitland was the ambassador regularly commissioned to England on short, specific embassies, much like an extraordinary ambassador. However, as principal secretary to Mary, the flexibility of his office allowed him to travel to England but not to be absent from his position for months on end. In February 1563, Maitland was sent to Elizabeth with instructions to help reconcile the relationship between England and France. In 1562, Elizabeth saw an opportunity to reclaim the Pale of Calais, which was lost in the 1557-1559 Anglo-French Wars, and also used this opportunity to assist the Huguenots.⁴⁶ The first draft of his instructions, written at the end of December 1562, outlined that Maitland was to express Mary’s desire for a mediation between Elizabeth and Charles IX of France and settle their disputes over the

⁴⁵ TNA SP 52/8, ff. 100r-101r, Instructions to Randolph, 20 August 1563 [*CSP Scots, 1563-69*, no. 23].

⁴⁶ See William A. Heap, *Elizabeth’s French Wars, 1562-1598: English Intervention in the French Wars of Religion* (London: Unicorn Publishing Group, 2020); Kisner, ‘Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen’, pp. 37-38.

recent French treatment of the Huguenots.⁴⁷ On 1 January 1563, a set of 'uther instructionis' revealed the reason Maitland was sent to the English court. The document was private instructions for Maitland to carry out a personal task for Mary. He was directed to attend the English Parliament and to report what was discussed on matters relating to the English succession; more specifically about whether Mary was being considered. In 1562, this was a controversial topic for Mary because in October Elizabeth had been seriously ill with smallpox and the English councillors feared for her life. Whilst the aim of the instructions was specific, Maitland needed to use his discretion 'gif the caus sa requiris'.⁴⁸ His use of discretion was contingent upon if he were given permission to attend the session, and secondly whether the issue of the succession was raised in the debate in the English Parliament.

From 1565, Maitland was out of favour with Mary after he rejected a new commission on his return to the Scottish court in May the previous year. His replacement as the Scottish ambassador to England was Robert Melville, who was sent as Mary's first resident ambassador to England. He was first sent on an embassy in February 1566, and whilst Melville was still in England, he received a letter from Mary who had already renewed his commission. Robert Melville was instructed to continue to find favour with Elizabeth, present a gentle and friendly manner, and inquire about Mary as Elizabeth's possible successor.⁴⁹ In July 1566, whilst still in England, Robert Melville received a letter from Mary that instructed him to use his discretion and continue to work from his previous instructions.⁵⁰ This letter was a memorial, like those Randolph received, and it

⁴⁷ Labanoff, *Lettres*, pp. 162-166; Keith, *History of the Affairs of Church and State in Scotland*, Vol. 2, pp. 235.

⁴⁸ Labanoff, *Lettres*, pp. 166-169; Keith, *History of the Affairs of Church and State in Scotland*, Vol. 2, pp. 236.

⁴⁹ Labanoff, *Lettres*, pp. 360-363, Mary to Robert Melville, 11 July 1566.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

confirmed the work the resident ambassador was undertaking and kept them informed about their government's diplomatic objectives.

An ambassador did not always abide by the restrictions placed on him in his instructions. To refer to just one example, in September 1561, Maitland was commissioned to England to greet Elizabeth on behalf of Mary after she returned to Scotland. The point of contention of his embassy was that Mary had not yet ratified the Treaty of Edinburgh that was confirmed in June 1560. By the bounds of his instructions, Maitland was not to answer about the ratification 'gif I ether suld say scho wald or scho wald not ratifie it, I suld transcend my boundaries, and speke farther than I knaw'.⁵¹ Mary did not want to give an answer on the ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh because she was using this as a bargaining chip to secure her place as Elizabeth's successor. Whilst Maitland was not legally bound by his instructions, he was confined to represent his monarch and any word on the ratification that was out of place would be taken as Mary's word. And yet, this did not stop him from giving his own opinion on the matter,

I think that treaty sa preiudiciall to hir maiestie that scho will newer conform it, and in sic forme consauit as hir maiestie is nocht in honour bound to do it, for sic reassonis as I vpoun the first sycht and onelie inspectioun of the treatie haif collectit; nocht doubting bot men of greter iugment and hes mair deiplie weyit the effect of it quhais adviss and consultatioun scho hes haid in it, hes bene able to gadder a gret deill ma, and mair valeable.⁵²

It was common for an ambassador's report to contain reported speech in their letter to their home court. The reported element would not have been written as the conversation

⁵¹ *A letter from Mary Queen of Scots to the Duke of Guise, January 1562: reproduced in facsimile from the original manuscript in the possession of the late John Scott, of Halkhill, Esq., C.B.*, ed. John Hungerford Pollen (Edinburgh: T. and A. Constable, 1904), p. 43.

⁵² *Ibid.*

took place and, therefore, this relied on the ambassador's memory to report the conversation as accurately as possible. Whilst Maitland could not share Mary's views on the ratification of the treaty, this was a cunning strategy to share his own views without compromising the plan of the Scottish government. By 1561, this was Maitland's fifth visit to the English court, and he felt he was able to share his views amongst friends.

Between May and July 1562, Maitland was sent to Elizabeth to finalise the details of a projected meeting between the two queens. In his report to Mary on 10 June, Maitland advised that, regarding the 1,000 person train that Mary required to accompany her to the meeting, 'I p[er]ceave they wald be glade the nombre were reduced to as few as yo[ur] Ma[jes]ty may for the better ac[c]omoding off the trayne in logingis and other necessaryes'.⁵³ This was enough to report to Mary but Maitland also added, 'and for my opinion sen it is theyr desyer zo[ur] ma[jes]ty sall do weill to diminish the nomber and therby save charges to zo[ur] realme provided alwayes that the p[er]sones be weill chosen weill arrayed so in god order'.⁵⁴ In the same letter, Maitland offered Mary advice on how to maintain the affection of Elizabeth and therefore the amity, which was broadly a shared Anglo-Scottish goal. He wrote, 'I wald advise yo[ur] ma[jes]tie to write off onto hir as gentle and luffing l[ett]res as ye can devise behink yo[ur] self and yo[ur] ma[jes]ty on love how ze wald dyd yo[ur] l[ett]res to p[er]suade and write to hir in this sam sort'.⁵⁵ During his absence from Scotland, Maitland continued to fulfil his role as a councillor and gave Mary advice on how to handle affairs with England.

Even extraordinary ambassadors were occasionally required to use discretion, particularly when circumstances changed or an unknown situation arose. On his embassy to England in 1564, James Melville was instructed to report Mary's successful progress

⁵³ BL Add. MS 32091, f. 193r, Maitland to Mary, 10 June 1562.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 193r.

⁵⁵ BL Add. MS 32091, ff. 193v-194r, Maitland to Mary, 10 June 1562.

into the northern parts of Scotland, to repair the relationship between the two queens, and discuss Mary's potential suitors. Elizabeth had been displeased with Mary's letter, and James Melville was instructed that 'we have further hereupon imparted our mind to you by mouth, which you may enlarge as occasion requires'.⁵⁶ Whilst this was more about Melville relaying information, he and Mary discussed this in person before he departed for England. He was given a basic set of guidelines on which he was able to elaborate.

Even when an ambassador was told to use his discretion, his flexibility was limited to what he could say during in-person meetings. The ambassador's instructions could not provide him a full script to anticipate the unpredictability of what might be discussed during an audience. The section examines the limited knowledge about what we know was discussed in a meeting or audience between the ambassador and the host monarch. This demonstrated the adaptability of English and Scottish ambassadors, who used their instructions as a foundation for their response. Randolph spoke about the limitations between keeping to his instructions and speaking his mind on the issue of marriage. Whilst Randolph did not include the details of what he had said to Mary, he stated that 'I have moughe to saye and have left nothyng unspoken as well of my soveregenes mynde towards the partie self, as of her Ma[jesties] sincere meaninge, and dealinge in these cases' but 'to speake frelye my mynde vnto thys Quene, I have free libertie, to p[er]suade throughelie wher so maynie thynges stonde agaynste me I dowte howe I shalbe hable'.⁵⁷ It was during an audience that an ambassador was put in a position where he needed to use his own initiative to give the best advice possible. He was under quick-fire questioning, and he needed to make progress on the issues outlined in his instructions,

⁵⁶ *Melville Memoirs*, p. 87.

⁵⁷ TNA SP 52/9, f. 29r, Randolph to Cecil, 21 February 1564 [*CSP Scots*, no. 181].

during which he would advise his host monarch on behalf of their own. After arriving at the host court, the ambassador needed to organise a first audience. If he did not have a network in his host country, he would send his bearer on ahead to ask a prominent member of the monarch's Privy Council to arrange an audience with the monarch. Alternatively, if he was well connected, the ambassador wrote directly to a prominent courtier or councillor who arranged the audience for later the same day or the following day. An audience was typically held in the formal setting of the council chamber. However, an ambassador also conversed with the monarch during dinners and banquets (if they were fortunate enough to be seated close enough to the monarch in question), in the monarch's bedchamber, or even in the palace gardens. There was no limit to the number of audiences that an ambassador could have with their host monarch, if the monarch agreed. The correspondence and memoirs of ambassadors offer a rare insight into the person-to-person negotiation process between two countries. During an audience, the ambassador would deliver his instructions and correspondence for the host monarch to read and discuss with the ambassador. This was followed by a discussion with the ambassador of any other business brought forward. However, the Privy Council could not predict all the answers to the outcomes of an ambassador's discussion with their host monarch. In this scenario, an ambassador was always required to use his own initiative and skill as an orator to mediate between monarchs.

In 1562, Maitland wrote a detailed account of his audience with Elizabeth. Between May and June 1562, Maitland was sent to the English court to finalise and arrange the anticipated meeting between Elizabeth and Mary.⁵⁸ Only days after Maitland departed from the Scottish court, on 30 May, Mary wrote to John Cockburn, Laird of Ormiston asking him to prepare himself and his men to be ready by 15 July to accompany

⁵⁸ BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 20r-v, Copy of instructions for Maitland.

her to travel to York in anticipation of Maitland's successful embassy.⁵⁹ In contrast, a week earlier on 8 June, Cecil was already confident in his report to Chalenor, the English resident ambassador to Spain, that the troubles in France between the Catholic and Huguenot factions would result in the cancellation of the meeting in this summer. Cecil insisted that Elizabeth could not leave London, and the English court should not be interacting with anyone associated with François of Lorraine, second Duke of Guise.⁶⁰ This was considered the view not only of Maitland upon his arrival at the English court in Greenwich but also of Elizabeth herself. On 31 May, Maitland arrived at the English court and at two o'clock in the afternoon the following day, after sending a letter to Cecil to ask to meet Elizabeth, he was granted an audience. Maitland was aware of the potential, practical limitations of negotiations with Elizabeth, and that 'the agreement vpon her p[ar]t is com[m]oned vpon co[n]ditionally giff the co[n]troversyes in France may be compounded or aided before the last off this moneth off Juni w[i]thout preiudice to the state off the realme off England'.⁶¹ It was his responsibility to keep the meeting between the two queens an open possibility. The report is written as a back-and-forth discussion between Elizabeth and Maitland, as it would have been in the audience. At the first turn, Elizabeth told Maitland that it was already so far into the year that the meeting between the two queens could not take place.⁶² Maitland replied by positively reaffirming that there was still adequate time to arrange their meeting.⁶³

Maitland had followed his instructions, held frequent audiences with Elizabeth, and returned to the Scottish court victorious with articles for Mary to agree to for the

⁵⁹ TNA SP 52/7, ff. 51i r-v, Mary to John Cockburn, Laird of Ormeston, 30 May 1562 [*CSP Foreign* 1562, no. 117].

⁶⁰ TNA SP 70/38, ff. 71r-77v, Cecil to Sir Thomas Challoner, 8 June 1562 [*CSP Foreign* 1562, no. 170].

⁶¹ BL Add. MS 32091, f. 193r, Maitland to Mary, 10 June 1562.

⁶² NLS MS 3657, f. 1v, Maitland to Mary, [c. 1-2] July 1562.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, ff. 1v-2r.

meeting between the two queens, which were drawn-up and concluded on 15 July 1562.⁶⁴ However, the situation in France was complicated. In July, there was no other choice for Elizabeth but to cancel the meeting between the two queens after the Duke of Guise, Mary's uncle, led an attack on the Huguenots in the French towns of Tours and Sens.⁶⁵ This built-upon the already devastating massacre in Vassy where over three hundred Huguenots had been murdered only four months earlier on 1 March. This news meant the cancellation of the meeting was now unavoidable.⁶⁶ This was out of Maitland's control but his work during the embassy and his negotiations with Elizabeth had been commendable.

Audiences between an ambassador and the host monarch often reflected the relationship between the two monarchs themselves and, in this case, the state of Anglo-Scottish relations. In 1564, James Melville was commissioned to the English court to ask for Elizabeth's opinion about Mary's marriage and to enquire about who would be her heir. James Melville was only at the English court for a few weeks but he claimed to have conferred with Elizabeth every day, sometimes two or three times a day, in the morning, after dinner, and after supper.⁶⁷ His first audience with Elizabeth was in a passage in the royal gardens, and other audiences were in the Greenwich Palace gardens and in the Queen's bedchamber.⁶⁸ Elizabeth treated Melville with great honour and this reflected the respect she would have shown to Mary had the queens met in person.⁶⁹ Melville was

⁶⁴ BL Cotton MS Caligula, IX/1, f. 178, Agreement of meeting at York, 15 July 1562; TNA SP 52/7, ff. 63r-v, Articles for the Postponement of the Interview, 15 July 1562 [CSP Scots 1547-63, no. 1126].

⁶⁵ For more context on the 1562 massacre, see R. J. Knecht, *The French Wars of Religion, 1559-1598* (London: Routledge, 2010); Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion (1562-1569)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁶⁶ TNA SP 70/39, f. 38, Deciphered from Throckmorton to Eliz, 12 July 1562 [CSP Foreign 1562, no. 304]; TNA SP 70/39, f. 67, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 16 July 1562 [CSP Foreign 1562, no. 324].

⁶⁷ *Melville Memoirs*, p. 92.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95; *ibid.*, p. 96.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

given the rare opportunity to witness Elizabeth's outward measure and expression of affection for her cousin during his private audiences.

When political tensions were high between two courts, this would have a direct impact on an ambassador's access and acceptance where he was resident. In 1565, Randolph described how the tension in Anglo-Scottish relations, because of Mary's marriage to Darnley, had affected his own relationship with Mary during a recent audience. Randolph wrote that he was 'receaved in stranger sorte then eu[er] I was before as a man newe and fyrst come into her presence whome she had neu[er] seen'.⁷⁰ The subject of Lennox and Darnley's return to England was the main topic of discussion during their audience. Randolph reported that Elizabeth claimed she would be fair to her subjects [Lennox and Darnley] when they returned to England and even warned Mary of the danger that she was putting them in by keeping them in Scotland. Randolph wrote that 'I wolde be bolde to saye vnto her g[race] [Mary] in the Q[ueen] Ma[jes]tie [Elizabeth] my mestres behalf' if she refused to return them then Elizabeth has the 'power, mynde and will to be revenged vpon them beinge her subiectes'.⁷¹ His words conveyed a cautionary explanation that Mary was the reason for the collapse of their friendship, and this would now be witnessed internationally. Randolph expressed his shrewd opinion, which was shared by Elizabeth. Letting them go had been a major miscalculation and she was desperate for their return.

It is clear that even the smallest amount of agency employed by an important and often unwritten part of an ambassador's was a part of their mission. Even with a limited commission, an ambassador needed to be able to remain flexible in his approach for the sake of the mission's success. Anything less than this adaptable approach from an ambassador might put the embassy and the relationship between two countries at risk.

⁷⁰ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 311r, Randolph to Cecil, 2 July 1565.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

1565: Crisis Management in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy

The above themes of expected ambassadorial agency and the use of discretion during crises are brought together during the unusual situation in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy between April 1565 and February 1566. This exceptional year marked a watershed in a period of peaceful relations that had existed between England and Scotland for the previous four years. The turning point was the possibility – and eventually the reality – of the marriage of Mary and Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley on 29 July 1565. Mary chose Darnley as a potential husband as a decisive rejection of earlier Anglo-Scottish negotiations that had tried to force a match between Mary and the English subject Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. Elizabeth had set one condition for Mary to consider when choosing her next husband, that he needed to be an English man, and the lucrative offer of a place in the English succession was used to entice Mary to continue to accept Elizabeth's advice and abide by her rules.⁷² Darnley was a prime candidate for Mary. He was born in England but his father, Lennox, was Scottish, while his mother, Margaret Douglas, although born in England to Elizabeth's aunt, Margaret Tudor, had a Scottish father, Archibald Douglas, Earl of Angus. In May 1544, following his treason against the crown of Scotland, Lennox fled into exile in England (under the protection of Henry VIII). Whilst Darnley's English lineage added to his appeal as a suitor for Mary, this was problematic in the eyes of the English government since it would strengthen Mary and her future heir's position in the English succession. In addition, if Mary chose Darnley, this would assert her independence from the English government's proposal of Leicester

⁷² TNA SP 52/10, ff. 100r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 21 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 184]. The provision not to marry Darnley for three months was first mentioned after Throckmorton's audience with Mary in May where she promised to forbear a marriage to Darnley until 25 August. TNA SP 52/10, ff. 156r-161v, Instructions to Tamworth, 30 July 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 220]. This promise was brought to Mary's attention again in Tamworth's instructions.

and lay the foundations for her to initiate making her own decisions.⁷³ Under these circumstances, by setting her sights on Darnley, Mary was beginning to make it clear to Elizabeth that she was no longer prepared to accept orders.

The prospect of a match between these two was, in fact, not new nor completely unexpected in 1565 as it had been mentioned on a number of occasions in the three years previously. On 22 February 1562, Peter Osbourne, English Keeper of the Privy Purse, wrote to Sir Thomas Chaloner, English resident ambassador to Spain, with the news that there was a rumour being circulated of a plan to organise a marriage between Mary and Darnley.⁷⁴ Chaloner did not confirm whether there was a rumour from the Spanish court or from another country. Similar news was reported at the French court. Thomas Bishop sent a report to an unknown correspondent that states, 'my Lorde Darnley was much spoken of in France' specifically 'his stature: age: and upbringing: elder said he shew the quene of Scottes in France my Lorde Darnleys hande'.⁷⁵ Whilst the two examples above were news to or from men at the French and Spanish court, the possibility of a match between Mary and Darnley was also spoken of at the Scottish court, by the resident English ambassador to Scotland himself. As early as February 1564, Randolph reported to Cecil that he had mentioned to Mary and her Privy Council that 'Lord Darnley' was one possible option for her marriage.⁷⁶ He had been asked to put forward another candidate but as he had been provided with no other name he refused to comply.⁷⁷ This miscalculation by Randolph had sown the seeds at the Scottish court for a match between Mary and Darnley long before the Lennox family was restored in Scotland. As Elizabeth's representative,

⁷³ Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22.

⁷⁴ TNA SP 12/21, ff. 105r-v, Peter Osbourne to Sir Thomas Chaloner, 22 February 1562; [*CSP Domestic*, no. 55].

⁷⁵ BL Harley MS 289, f. 75r: News from Thomas Bishop [n.d.]. This was presumably before Antoine, King of Navarre's death in November 1562.

⁷⁶ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 28r-34v, Randolph to Cecil, 21 February 1564 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 60].

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

Mary may have taken Randolph's suggestion of Darnley as emanating from Elizabeth herself. Randolph's proposal of Darnley as a suitor for Mary was as problematic as Elizabeth allowing Darnley to return to Scotland. The problem began in June 1563. Elizabeth requested that Mary should end Lennox's long exile in England in order for the Earl to return to Scotland. The reason for his return to Scotland was to have his lands restored, an appeal that was originally made in 1561 and by 22 September 1564, Lennox his triumphant return to Edinburgh. Nearly six months later, on 17 February 1565, Darnley followed his father to Scotland. As we will learn from the reports of Randolph, only a month after Darnley's arrival in Scotland, the reality of the two becoming husband and wife was a real danger. On 23 April, Elizabeth decided to recall Lennox and Darnley and claimed they should obey because they were English subjects. Relating to the above context on Darnley's family history, Elizabeth saw Darnley's presence in Scotland as a threat because the Mary-Darnley match would reduce her influence in Scottish affairs. However, the more pressing issue was that this match would increase the likelihood of Mary being Elizabeth's successor as well as the claim of any heirs, something Elizabeth had been actively trying to avoid since 1560.

The crisis that Mary's marriage caused in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy has overshadowed just how unusual the diplomatic situation was in the context of the ambassadors exchanged in 1565 and how they were forced to act quickly during this politically charged year. This one year alone saw three important changes in the diplomatic personnel and procedures. The most obvious was the increase in extraordinary ambassadors sent from both England and Scotland to try and keep the peace. Secondly, the men who were selected for these more frequent extraordinary embassies had not been or were not typically appointed to diplomatic posts. Finally, the embassies drafted or sent by the English government were reactionary and rather haphazard in nature, which

reflected the tremendous anxiety to the unpredictable circumstances in Scotland. In the examination of English and Scottish embassies exchanged in 1565, this thesis adds to the already established argument that after Mary married Darnley, there was a shift in the power dynamic between the two queens.⁷⁸ As a representative of the monarch, how and when ambassadors were forced to exercise agency was a direct reflection of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy during the fast-paced events in this single year.

Rather than this moment defining the start of the deterioration in relations, Goodare argues that Anglo-Scottish relations had broken down before 1565 and this had directly led to Mary's decision to marry Darnley.⁷⁹ This chapter expands Goodare's argument by highlighting that the underlying tensions during the peaceful relations since 1560 came to the surface in 1565 when Mary finally chose Darnley. Her decision was a threat to the English government for two reasons: firstly, Mary had rejected Elizabeth's proposal of Leicester as a suitor, and secondly, Darnley's claim to the English throne, through his maternal grandmother, would strengthen the claim of any heirs should Mary have children. Jenny Wormald acknowledged that the marriage between Mary and Darnley was not a popular one in Scotland either. The domestic unrest increased after Mary's marriage to Darnley and the Chaseabout Raid, led by a group of Scottish Lords, began only days after their union.⁸⁰ As previously stated, Mary's marriage to Darnley marked a change in the power dynamic in Anglo-Scottish relations. This argument was put forward by Dawson who maintains that Mary's marriage was her first step in independent decision-making without the advice of Maitland, the Scottish Privy Council,

⁷⁸ Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22; Jane Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish relations: security and succession', Robert Tittler and Norman Leslie Jones, ed., *A Companion to Tudor Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004).

⁷⁹ Julian Goodare, 'Mary [Mary Stewart] (1542-1587)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁸⁰ Jenny Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure* (London: George Philip, 1988), p. 159, p. 174; Omansky, Rachel J., ' "Their Nation Dishonored, The Queen Shamed, and Country Undone": Feuding, Factionalism, and Religion in the Chaseabout Raid' (Master's Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2008).

or Elizabeth.⁸¹ Previously Goodare has argued that it was not actually until after the birth of her son James VI in 1566, once her line of succession was secured, that Mary began to act independently.⁸² However, this chapter supports and expands Dawson's argument that it was Mary's marriage to Darnley that instigated a change in her political decision-making and, for the case of this research, there is evidence to support this through the diplomatic exchanges which took place in this one year.

In order to understand just how unusual the situation was, we need to bring together four key strands of agency: the rhetoric in the ambassadors' instructions, events which took place during the embassies, the diplomatic personnel involved, and the objectives of the English and Scottish governments. In ten short months, a combination of accredited embassies, cancelled embassies, and representatives from the rebels were sent between the English and Scottish courts. From Scotland, Mary sent three accredited embassies to the English court, which was as many as she had sent between 1563 and early 1565.⁸³ The figure from the English government was identical as Elizabeth only sent three accredited embassies to Scotland. This figure includes Randolph who was still resident in Scotland. Although some of the embassies overlapped by a few days, this chapter explores the embassies chronologically to demonstrate how and when the ambassadors were exchanged. It encapsulates the transition in political power between Elizabeth and Mary.

The diplomatic exchanges in 1565 are divided into three phases: before Mary's marriage, immediately after the marriage, and the longer-term impact in the aftermath of the marriage. The first period, before Mary's marriage to Darnley between April and June

⁸¹ Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22; Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish relations: security and succession'.

⁸² Julian Goodare, 'Mary [Mary Stewart] (1542-1587)', *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁸³ Appendix 3: Timeline of the English and Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents, 1558-1568, pp. 363-367.

1565, was when the English embassies of Randolph (resident in Scotland) and Throckmorton (May-June), were initiated in order to prevent Mary from bestowing the titles of Earl of Ross and Duke of Albany on Darnley, which were reserved for a future King of Scotland. Then, Maitland (April-May) and John Hay (June), were sent one month apart from Mary to ask Elizabeth on two separate occasions to approve a match with Darnley. Following this, the second chronological period demonstrated how the English government were able to adapt an embassy in order to reflect the national changes and developments in Scotland in the immediate aftermath of the marriage. In July, the English ambassador Tamworth was sent to Scotland with instructions that were drafted before the English government became aware that the marriage had already taken place. The English government changed Tamworth's instructions and he – as well as Randolph who was still resident in Scotland – was forced to navigate the unexpected situation. This manifested the delicate and sensitive nature of Anglo-Scottish relations at this point. The final crucial period was between October 1565 and February 1566, when the verbal and diplomatic tug of war between Mary and Elizabeth demonstrated a struggle to determine who now had the upper hand in their relationship. The location of who sent and who received an ambassador also played a part in determining where the political power lay. In order to regain authority in Anglo-Scottish relations, the English government cancelled an embassy in November, which would have offered Mary monumental concessions that she had been asking for since 1561. This resulted instead, in a meeting three months later between English and Scottish border commissioners. Whilst the meeting was a compromise, it still highlighted that the position of control Elizabeth had held for the last four years was undone by Mary's new-found political confidence.

The year 1565 was a turning point for Randolph's role in Scotland. His usually comprehensive reports failed to capture the strength of the growing affection between Mary and Darnley after his return in February. In comparison, the previous four years had been straightforward. They had allowed him to focus on establishing his role, as well as a network in Scotland. After the restoration of Lennox in 1564 and the return of his son Darnley in February 1565, Randolph sent diligent reports describing the situation to the English government.⁸⁴ The English ambassador reported the way in which the Scottish Lords and Mary reacted to his return and how well he was accepted. In the postscript of a letter to Cecil, Randolph wrote, 'I trust all thyng shall torne to the best and as I fynde yo[ur] h[onour] shalbe adw[er]tysed'.⁸⁵ Before Darnley's return, the English government was busy preparing the match between Leicester, and Mary. Therefore, in the postscript of Randolph's letter, he gave his opinion to Cecil that he hoped that Darnley's arrival would not derail the effort that had been made in proposing Leicester as a future husband.⁸⁶ Between February and April 1565, Randolph was a witness to the growing relationship between Mary and Darnley.⁸⁷ This sounded alarm bells for the English ambassador. By 29 April, Randolph's correspondence became more anxious as a match between Mary and Darnley was becoming more and more likely. He reported to Cecil, that the 'sending of the L[ord] Darlie home was a thyng done of purpose'.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ NRS SP13/87: Precept of Mary on process of forfeiture against Lennox, 1564; BL Egerton MS 1818, f. 32r-v: 'A device for therle of Lenox & his son towching ther possessions in Scotl[and].' [1564?].

⁸⁵ TNA SP 52/10, f. 24v, Randolph to Cecil, 12 February 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 146].

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ For reports on Mary and Darnley see, TNA SP 52/10, f. 54r, Randolph to Cecil, 15 April 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 166]; TNA SP 52/10, f. 57r, Randolph to Cecil, 18 April 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 168]; TNA SP 52/10, f. 64r, Randolph to Cecil, 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 171].

For literature on the Darnley match see, Simon Adams, 'The Release of Darnley and the failure of the amity', *Innes Review*, no. 38 (1987), pp. 121-153; Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 180-236; Dawson, 'Mary, Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', pp. 1-24; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 128.

⁸⁸ TNA SP 52/10, f. 64r, Randolph to Cecil, 29 April 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 171].

The two courts had polarised objectives between April and June 1565. The objective of the English embassies (Randolph and Throckmorton) was to prevent a marriage between Mary and Darnley. The Scottish embassies (Maitland and Hay) were sent to ask for Elizabeth's approval of Mary's choice of husband. As late as June, Mary still felt compelled to ask for Elizabeth to consent to her choice of husband, even though she had more than made up her mind. The first attempt to ask for Elizabeth to approve a marriage between Mary and Darnley was Maitland's embassy between April and May. To demonstrate the English commitment to his message, there was a meeting of the English Privy Council to debate the issue.⁸⁹ On 1 May 1565, the Council conducted long discussions and concluded that a marriage between Mary and Darnley would be 'vnmete, vnprofitable and directly preiudiciall to the sincere amity betwixt bothe the Quenes, and consquently perillous to the continuance of the mutual good concord and tranquillity'.⁹⁰ One key observation from Maitland's audience was that he was uncharacteristically quiet and would not give his own opinion on Mary's proposed marriage. Elizabeth was frustrated with the lack of clarity and found him 'so tyed to his message for the L[ord] Darnley as he semeth to haue no power to hear or at the least to treat of any other matter'.⁹¹ Whilst this showed Maitland to be a loyal Marian ambassador, it resulted in an unproductive discussion at the English court with neither side shifting.

Loughlin argued that Maitland was compliant with Mary's instructions because he had hoped that he could secure a European match for Mary and privately opposed her selection of Darnley.⁹² In order to protect his views on the future Scottish King at the English court, Maitland remained close to his instructions and promoted the Darnley match to maintain the appearance of a loyal ambassador and servant of the Scottish crown.

⁸⁹ NLS MS 3657, f. 18; *RPCS Vol. XIV, Addenda, 1545-1625*, pp. 213-214.

⁹⁰ BL Harley MS 6990, f. 68r, PC papers on Mary's marriage to [Darnley], 1 May 1565.

⁹¹ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 72v, Instructions for Throckmorton, 2 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 173].

⁹² Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 198, p. 202.

However, Elizabeth and her council knew Maitland well after he had been commissioned to the English court almost every year since 1559, as both an accredited ambassador and a representative of the Lords of the Congregation. The English were familiar with how Maitland normally expressed himself in a court audience. When the Scottish Secretary remained tightly bound to the message, his reluctance to break from his instructions silently communicated a subliminal message that he himself had very different personal views on her proposed marriage to Darnley.⁹³ Despite less than enthusiastically representing Mary's instructions at the English court, Maitland remained still unsuccessful in securing Elizabeth's approval of a match between Mary and Darnley. With nothing left to keep him in England, he began his return journey to Scotland to face the consequences of failing to secure Elizabeth's approval. The news of Maitland's unsuccessful negotiations had already reached the Scottish court before he could cross the border. On 29 April 1565, William Fowler, one of Cecil's servants, delivered news to Cecil regarding Maitland's message from Elizabeth – that she refused to accept Mary's marriage to Darnley. This was 'greatlye misliked' by Mary and Maitland was 'not so welcome' at the Scottish court.⁹⁴ In reaction to Maitland's proposal of a marriage between Mary and Darnley, Elizabeth sent her extraordinary ambassador, Throckmorton, to Scotland to negotiate with Mary. Throckmorton's embassy needs to be unpacked separately in more detail from Maitland's. What it is important to note now, is that during Maitland's return to Scotland, he travelled in the company of Throckmorton for the majority of the journey through England.

Before Maitland could reach the Scottish court, John Beaton, an express messenger, was sent from Mary with letters and other diplomatic documentation for a

⁹³ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 202, p. 204.

⁹⁴ TNA SP 52/10, f. 87r, Throckmorton to Leicester, and Cecil, 11 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 178]; TNA SP 52/10, f. 65v, Randolph to Cecil, 29 April 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 171].

second embassy. He delivered the new instructions to Maitland who was still on English soil. Unfortunately, the new set of instructions has not survived but we know that what Beaton brought was a request from Mary that Maitland return to London, before then travelling on to France, to announce her plans to marry Darnley.⁹⁵ When Maitland received the new set of instructions, he was in a diplomatic liminal space. He had completed his time at the English court and, therefore, was no longer under Elizabeth's jurisdiction. However, he was still in England and on the way back from completing his original commission. Maitland was in a unique position where he could exercise agency and, in an astonishing turn of events, chose to reject his monarch's command and continued on his return journey to Scotland. By rejecting a new set of instructions, Maitland demonstrated a highly unusual example of an ambassador asserting his own agency over and above his monarch's request. There were two main reasons for this. The first was because Maitland had already exercised agency while observing Mary's initial instructions. Secondly, as the situation changed, Maitland was required to react to Beaton's delivery of his new embassy but as a close advisor to Mary, Maitland's privileged political position contributed to the confidence he felt in making his own decision. Maitland continued to his home court and once he arrived he travelled straight to his monarch to give his report on the lack of progress with Elizabeth and to face the consequences of rejecting new instructions.

Maitland rejected Mary's commands on two fronts. First, he rejected the new instructions to announce her intention to marry. Loughlin has argued that Maitland's main objections to the Darnley marriage were due to 'outrage at his loss of personal control over the direction of Mary's policy' and his – and Moray's – dislike of the Lennox's

⁹⁵ TNA SP 52/10, f. 83r, Randolph to Cecil, 8 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 175].

because of their continual attempts to exercise control in Scotland.⁹⁶ Then, on his return to Scotland, Maitland also did not try to prevent Throckmorton – the English extraordinary ambassador sent in May 1565 – from passing into Scotland, as Mary had requested.⁹⁷ Again, we know this was part of his instructions because whilst Maitland and Throckmorton were in Berwick together on their journey to Scotland, the English ambassador received a short letter from Randolph declaring Mary's plans to bestow titles on Darnley in a ceremony on 14 May. Throckmorton shared this news with Maitland who declared he was unaware of this and described that he had 'neuer sene hym [Maitland] in so great perplexitye nor passyon'.⁹⁸ He recognised that Maitland 'is as lytle affected to this marryage as anye other'.⁹⁹ In a retaliatory act towards Mary, Maitland disclosed to Throckmorton that Mary had requested that he stop the English ambassador from entering Scotland, which Throckmorton in turn reported to Cecil and Leicester. Maitland even went as far to assure Throckmorton that he would not travel from Berwick without him.¹⁰⁰ Although there was no attempt to stop them crossing the border or to capture and restrain the English diplomat, Throckmorton was already aware that he was neither welcome nor wanted by Mary at the Scottish court. Yet, Throckmorton continued on his journey to Scotland, as he had already received instructions, and was bound to obey his monarch. Loughlin has argued convincingly that Maitland's rejection of the commission was because he felt he no longer had influence over discussions surrounding Mary's marriage and that the Scottish Queen was now taking advice from the Scottish estates.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Loughlin, 'The Political Career of William Maitland', p. 203.

⁹⁷ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 82v-83r, Randolph to Cecil, 8 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 175].

⁹⁸ TNA SP 52/10, f. 87v, Throckmorton to Leicester and Cecil, 11 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 178].

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 200-205; TNA SP 52/10, f. 87r, Throckmorton to Leicester and Cecil, 11 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 178].

Whilst Maitland had not outwardly rejected Mary's decision to marry Darnley, he indicated that he was strictly carrying out his monarch's instructions to the letter. On his return to Scotland, Maitland's disregard for his new commission did not result in the loss of his position as secretary nor alter his loyalty to Mary during Moray's rebellion, despite sympathising with the rebel views about Darnley. This earned him some trust again.¹⁰² Thynne's diplomatic treatise outlined that if an ambassador was traitorous towards a prince or his master, that 'all injuries which tend to the subversion of a common-wealth are to bee punished'.¹⁰³ Whilst Maitland's actions were not treasonable, his disobedience over the rejection of the instructions was compensated for by his loyalty to Mary during the Chaseabout Raid rebellion. This was an unexpected move from Maitland, especially considering his defection to the Lords of the Congregation in late 1559. However, Maitland was not outwardly punished for his rejection of Mary's further instructions and survived the Chaseabout affair with his political position still intact.¹⁰⁴ Maitland's embassy in May 1565 was his last official embassy to the English court after which he was replaced in this role with the residency of Robert Melville, between February 1566 and June 1567. The political offices Maitland held in Scotland were, in fact, an advantage to his position at the Scottish court. Whilst he was not dismissed and replaced as the principal secretary, he was more isolated from Mary and the centre of decision making, especially now she had decided to exercise her own agency. The example of Maitland's embassy demonstrates that an ambassador could both represent his monarch's objective and then make a stand when he disagreed. Whilst an ambassador was not bound to accept an embassy, Maitland was firstly compelled to complete his original mission before he could accept a new mission. This was concluded after an audience with Mary to

¹⁰² Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 204.

¹⁰³ Thynne, *The Perfect Ambassador*, p. 140.

¹⁰⁴ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', p. 209.

understand what had happened since his departure and to update her on his failed attempt to secure Elizabeth's support for the Darnley match.

After Maitland had returned to the Scottish court in May, a marriage between Mary and Darnley looked unstoppable. The Scottish Privy Council had approved a ceremony to take place where Mary planned to make Darnley the Earl of Ross. Since this title was reserved for the King or Queen of Scotland's son, the heir to the throne, this clearly revealed Mary's intentions. The invitations were sent, and the date was set for the ceremony to take place in Stirling on 15 May 1565.¹⁰⁵ This sent Randolph and the English government into crisis response mode after their own plans for Mary to marry Leicester were no longer viable. As Elizabeth's resident ambassador in Scotland, Randolph took precautions in case the extraordinary ambassador, Throckmorton, did not arrive in time to execute his instructions. Between 10 and 12 May, Randolph wrote a letter to Mary with news that Throckmorton had arrived in Berwick on 10 or 11 May in the company of Maitland. He also made the Queen aware that Randolph planned to travel to Stirling the following day to understand the situation with Darnley from Mary herself. Randolph anticipated that Throckmorton would not arrive in time and composed a letter to Mary, sometime between the 11 and 13 May. The letter presented a strong case for maintaining Anglo-Scottish amity and carefully advised Mary that in her current situation she could either be 'tender' in her friendship with Elizabeth or demonstrate that she was simply no longer concerned about the opinions of the English queen.¹⁰⁶ If it were the former, he suggested that she should put her marriage plans on hold until she had more information

¹⁰⁵ BL Harley MS 289, ff. 93r–94v: Creation of Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley, as the Earl of Ross, by Mary Queen of Scots, 15 May 1565; *RPCS*, pp. 334–335. The following nobles and lords were present 'Presente suprema Domina nostra Regina'; Châtelherault; James, Earl of Morton, Chancellor; Moray; John, Earl of Athol; Glencairn; John, Lord Erskine; Patrick, Lord Ruthven; John Maxwell of Terreglis; Maitland, Secretary; John Bellenden of Auchnole and Broughton, Lord Justice Clerk.

¹⁰⁶ BL Lansdowne Vol. 8, ff. 122r–v, Copy of Randolph to Mary, [c. 10–12] May 1565.

from Elizabeth after she had spoken with Throckmorton.¹⁰⁷ Randolph concluded his letter by asking that ‘this request maytake effect’, being careful not to refer to the advice as his own.¹⁰⁸ The surviving version of this letter is a copy of the ambassador’s original letter to Mary. This was sent in a packet to Cecil to keep him informed about what advice had already been given to Mary before Throckmorton’s arrival. Like all diligent ambassadors, Randolph wanted to ensure his host court was informed about any *ad hoc* advice he had given to Mary.

Randolph chose to write to Mary instead of requesting an audience because she was already in Stirling to prepare for the ceremony. Writing a letter to the host monarch whilst the ambassador was still in the country was not the most effective way to give advice because of the time delay in sending correspondence. However, in an unprecedented situation, or when the ambassador was out of favour with the monarch, this remained an option. The limitation of this method was that the ambassador could not debate and negotiate with his host monarch and, therefore, it took longer to conclude their business. Furthermore, the ambassador could not guarantee that the monarch had received and read their letter. In this case, Mary prevented Randolph’s servant from delivering any letters until Throckmorton arrived in mid-May. This was a deliberate act to further delay further English interference in her marital choice.¹⁰⁹ If Mary did receive and read Randolph’s letter, there was no evidence that the content was discussed in an audience or his words were acted upon. When Randolph next saw Mary, the ceremony had already taken place and one of the titles had been bestowed upon Darnley.

¹⁰⁷ BL Lansdowne Vol. 8, ff. 122r-v, Copy of Randolph to Mary, [c. 10-12] May 1565. This letter is undated. However, Randolph mentions that Throckmorton had arrived at Berwick so, he would have received this news on the day or at the latest the day after Throckmorton arrived in the border town.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 122v.

¹⁰⁹ TNA SP 52/10, f. 105r, Randolph to Cecil, 21 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 187].

To give some context to the interlinked narrative of Maitland and Throckmorton's journey to Scotland, in May 1565, it was clear that, from the English perspective, the situation had become more desperate when instructions were created for an extraordinary English embassy. Natalie Mears recognises that Throckmorton was sent specifically to offer guidance about the potential marriage to Darnley in 1565.¹¹⁰ Throckmorton was the obvious choice for an ambassador in an unprecedented situation because of his diplomatic experience at the French court at the height of Anglo-Scottish-French tensions in the 1560s. Between 1559 and 1562, Throckmorton served as the English resident ambassador to France, where his post partially overlapped with Mary's time as the Queen of France and later the dowager queen of France. Kenneth Kisner argues that Throckmorton's skills thrived in an environment of complex negotiations and covert operations.¹¹¹ The reports he sent whilst serving as the resident ambassador to France divulged crucial information about French goals for Scotland and he included his own advice on how Elizabeth and her government should act on this information.¹¹²

For Throckmorton's 1565 embassy to Scotland, there are two different drafts of his instructions, an earlier and a final draft. This example offers a rare insight into the drafting process and how diplomacy had to evolve quickly. The earliest draft was written on 24 April by Cecil. To place this into the context of the other embassies, the drafting of Throckmorton's instructions began only a week after Maitland had arrived at the English court; this alone indicates how tightly bound Maitland was to the Marian-Darnley marital match. The first draft outlined that the basic objective of the commission was to 'vnderstand how farr forward the intention of any mariadge is betwixt the sayd Quene and Lord Dar[n]ly' and to explain 'by what meanes the same hath begon and how is

¹¹⁰ Natalie Mears, *Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realm* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 43-44.

¹¹¹ Kisner, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen', p. 114; *ibid.*, pp. 86-112.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

co[n]tynued and how it is lyked and mislyked’ and ‘how the same may be stayed and dissolved’.¹¹³ Throckmorton was ‘to procure the sayd Quene to be content to accept ether the Erle of Lecester, or some such other forray[n] p[ri]nce’.¹¹⁴ The rhetoric of this draft asked Throckmorton to act as a mouthpiece for the English Queen and council rather than someone who should advise the government on how to proceed with Mary and Darnley. The second and revised draft of the instructions was written on 2 May, the day after the English Privy Council met to discuss the potential threat of the proposed marriage.¹¹⁵ Whilst this largely used most of the same rhetoric as the first draft, it also included a few key phrases that indicated Throckmorton was asked to use his own agency on this embassy. In the section that described how Throckmorton should negotiate with Mary, he was told ‘yow shall haue regard of these thinge follwing as therby to direct your self’ and asked him to ‘vse your discretions to diminish or amplefy the same, or if the cause so require to forbear from vttrance of any part seming not nedefull’.¹¹⁶ In addition, Throckmorton was instructed to assess the situation in Scotland regarding Mary’s marriage to Darnley, and to discuss the options of a ‘*more honorable and proffitable matche for hir [Mary, Queen of Scots]’.¹¹⁷ The main difference between the two drafts of the instructions was that the second draft required Throckmorton to take more extreme actions to prevent the marriage by any means he saw possible. As the drafts were created only two weeks apart, this pointed to the rapid escalation of the situation whilst Maitland was still present at the English court.

On his way to Scotland, Throckmorton arrived at Berwick with Maitland on 11 May and heard rumours about the meeting at Stirling with the purpose to conclude the

¹¹³ TNA SP 52/10, f. 60r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 24 April 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 170].

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ BL Harley MS 6990, f. 68r, PC papers on Mary’s marriage to [Darnley], 1 May 1565.

¹¹⁶ TNA SP 52/10, f. 75r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 2 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 173]; *ibid.*, TNA SP 52/10, f. 76r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 2 May 1565; [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 173].

¹¹⁷ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 75r, Instructions to Throckmorton, 2 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 173].

pre-marital titles of Ross and Albany. These titles were typically reserved for the heir to the Scottish throne and by giving them to Darnley, Mary was confidently moving forward with her choice of husband. Here, he received the letter from Randolph warning him that events in Scotland were moving quickly and ‘seinge you [Throckmorton] cane not be here at thys creation I truste we shalbe bothe at the marriage’.¹¹⁸ Throckmorton wrote to Leicester and Cecil that this ‘probable meanes I doe vndrestande that the mattre is verye earnestlye mynded and prosecuted by the Quene of Scotlande and w[i]th suche vehmencye as she would be verye lothe to be disswaded from that’.¹¹⁹ The English and Scottish ambassador quickly travelled to Edinburgh and arrived on 13 May.¹²⁰ Maitland immediately went forward to Stirling to brief Mary of their arrival, and Throckmorton’s audience at court was purposely delayed by a few days and instead was planned to be after the title ceremony at Stirling. Despite this deliberate obstruction to diplomacy by Mary, Throckmorton went straight to Stirling and arrived on 15 May. Kept outside the gate, Throckmorton was denied the opportunity to witness or intervene when the ceremony.¹²¹ This was even after Throckmorton had followed diplomatic etiquette and sent his secretary and cousin, Henry Middlemore, ahead of him to request an audience. If it is to be believed that Mary’s putative marriage to Darnley was a deliberate act against Elizabeth, then the Scots viewed Throckmorton’s embassy to Scotland as part of a

¹¹⁸ TNA SP 52/10, f. 89r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 10 May 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1156].

¹¹⁹ TNA SP 52/10, f. 87r, Throckmorton to Leicester and Cecil, 11 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 178].

¹²⁰ TNA SP 52/10, f. 81vr, Randolph to Cecil, 3 May 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1140]. A messenger arrived on 3 May says Maitland will be back in 8 days and Throckmorton will be here soon; TNA SP 52/10, f. 87r, Throckmorton to Leicester and Cecil, 11 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 178]. Throckmorton wrote to Cecil that Mary wrote a gentle letter to Maitland and Throckmorton reported that he had not seen Maitland in such perplexity or passion and did not know he could be so moved, and shocked Maitland wanted Throckmorton to threaten Mary with war.

¹²¹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 296r-297r, The oaths as Knight and Earl of Ross taken by Darnley. With the names of 14 knights then created by him, at Stirling, 15 May 1565; BL Harley MS 289, ff. 93r-94v: Creation of Darnley, Earl of Ross, by Mary, 15 May 1565; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 99r-v, Oaths taken by Darnley at Stirling, 15 May 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1172].

carefully constructed plan by the English to continue to intervene in her marriage.¹²² On 18 May, after Throckmorton dined at Mary's table, Maitland delivered his dispatch documents for his return to England to his lodgings. Throckmorton's decision to leave was made either earlier in the day during his audience with Mary or during the dinner itself. When an ambassador's embassy was at an end, he received letters from his home monarch recalling him to court to provide a report. The situation had moved so quickly during his short stay in Scotland that Throckmorton took the initiative to return to the English court as soon as possible. This was of course not without a short stint in Scotland to gather information, so she was better able to report the situation. Throckmorton's instructions were entirely irrelevant upon arrival as the ceremony he had hoped to prevent had taken place, and he had completed what information-gathering he could to the best of his ability.

From his lodgings in Berwick whilst on his return journey to London, on 21 May Throckmorton wrote three letters – addressed to Cecil and Leicester, Elizabeth and finally Cecil alone – with advice on what action should be taken as a result of what he had learnt in Scotland. As far as we know only one copy of each letter existed to keep the information from Scotland top secret. Throckmorton wrote a memorial summarising the events in Scotland and this was addressed to both Leicester and Cecil. This memorial contained his main advice on what should be done regarding Mary and Darnley's relationship.¹²³ We can be confident that this was written first because he refers to a memorial in his report to Elizabeth. To make sure he was reporting the information accurately, Throckmorton wrote the correspondence whilst in Scotland and then edited or added this to his report after he arrived in Berwick. The first piece of advice that he

¹²² Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 14.

¹²³ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 101r-v, Memorial to Leicester and Cecil, to communicate matters continued in the same to Eliz, 21 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 185].

offered was to have the English Wardens of the Marches ready with forces on the borders in case force from the English side was the only way to proceed.¹²⁴ Secondly, Throckmorton advised that Thomas Percy, Earl of Northumberland was removed from the border region because he had papist sympathies.¹²⁵ A third step that needed to be taken was to prevent the imprisoned Margaret Douglas, Countess of Lennox and mother of Darnley, from receiving intelligence from France or Spain.¹²⁶ Finally, the English government needed to keep themselves informed with news from France and Spain and any channels of communication with Scotland.¹²⁷ This memorial outlines the steps that could be taken to mitigate vulnerabilities towards Scotland. The border was the greatest concern for the English government. It was the first location that violence would break out and threaten the security of England. Hence when Throckmorton stopped at Berwick on his return journey to London, he took time to inspect the ongoing fortifications and conferred with Forster and Bedford to warn them to prepare for potential threats from Scotland.¹²⁸ Beyond these practical suggestions, Throckmorton also offered his opinion that only Elizabeth had the power to dissolve the established relationship between Mary and Darnley.

Throckmorton's principal report to Elizabeth provided an overview of the seven days he had spent in Scotland. The best-known part of Throckmorton's instructions had directed him to gather information about how much manoeuvrability was still possible at this point, despite the new titles that had been conferred upon Darnley. Throckmorton wrote to Elizabeth that 'may lyke yo[ur] Ma[jes]tie to vnderstande this Quene is so farre passed in this matter w[i]th the L[ord] Darnley as that is Irrevocable and no place leeste

¹²⁴ TNA SP 52/10, f. 97v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 183].

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

to dissolve the same by p[er]sqacon or reasonable meanes, otherwise then by vyolence'.¹²⁹ Throckmorton used his knowledge of the situation in Scotland to advise Elizabeth on how she should manage the situation between Mary and Darnley. Throckmorton wrote 'I doe well preyve that it is in yo[ur] Ma[jes]tie power eyther to dissolue this matter betwixt the Quene of Scotland and the L[ord] Derneleye (yf yo[u] shall lyke to vse yo[ur] power as at my cominge'.¹³⁰ To conclude this letter, Throckmorton wrote that he would 'declare more p[ar]ticulerlie vnto yo[ur] Ma[jes]tie): or that resteth at yo[ur] pleas[or] to ende the matter more amyablie w[i]th suche condyc[i]ons as maye be (in my simple iudgeme[n]te) to yo[u]r hono[ur] to yo[ur] suertie & to yo[ur] felycytie'.¹³¹ Throckmorton built on his original assessment of the situation that described it as immovable and later advised Elizabeth that she, and only she, had the power to change the situation.

In a similar but shorter letter to Cecil, Throckmorton reported most of the same proceedings that he had written to Elizabeth.¹³² Throckmorton repeated that the English Queen has the power 'eyther to dissolue the same vyolentlye (for yt will admyt non other cure) or her Ma[jes]tie maye wynne by her allowances ther (in myne opynyon) a reasonable co[m]posicon and suche a one as yo[u] seeme by yo[ur] l[ett]re of the xiii of Maye (w[hi]ch I haue recyued).¹³³ Without the copy of Cecil's reply to Throckmorton or what they later discussed in person, we cannot be sure what resolution Cecil offered to him. This document was also highly unusual because Cecil usually received long reports from English ambassadors at foreign courts but this time, he received the memorial with

¹²⁹ TNA SP 52/10, f. 97r, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 183].

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² TNA SP 52/10, ff. 100r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 21 May 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 184].

¹³³ *Ibid.*

Leicester and a shorter letter for himself.¹³⁴ This was significant because it demonstrated that the matter of Mary's prospective marriage was so great a concern to the English government that it require debate and discussion between knowledgeable men to navigate a solution. Throckmorton's correspondence from 21 May demonstrated that there was a difference between what was appropriate to report in writing and what was necessary to report in person. In his report to Elizabeth and his memorial to Leicester and Cecil, Throckmorton was clear that he was only sending part of the information he had obtained, there was other more sensitive material to be communicated in person when he returned to England.¹³⁵ Although the sources are incomplete, we know that Throckmorton's advice was taken seriously and in part acted upon.

One small success from Throckmorton's embassy was that Mary had agreed not to give Darnley the title Duke of Albany – the second Scottish title for an heir – for a period of three months (until the 25 August). The knowledge that they had a pause during the marriage crisis gave the English government a short window of opportunity to calculate their next move. With hindsight, we know that Mary and Darnley were married on 29 July, which was three weeks before the three-month postponement had finished. The offer to delay was another act of control by Mary to let the English government believe that they had time to plan their response to Mary's independent actions, but this also gave her time to covertly arrange her marriage to Darnley.

On 25 May, after only seven days at the Scottish court – the shortest English embassy sent by Elizabeth to date – Throckmorton travelled back to London through

¹³⁴ See, Simon Adams, *Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002) Simon Adams, 'Favourites and Factions at the Elizabethan Court', Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke, ed., *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age c.1450-1650* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹³⁵ TNA SP 52/10, f. 97v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21 May 1565 [CSP Scots 1563-69, no. 183]; TNA SP 52/10, f. 101v, Memorial to Leicester and Cecil, to communicate matters continued in the same to Eliz, 21 May 1565 [CSP Scots 1563-69, no. 185].

Berwick. If Throckmorton's journey ran smoothly, he would have arrived in London around 28 or 29 May at the earliest. However, the urgency of the situation in Scotland had required Throckmorton to send the reports to Elizabeth, Cecil and Leicester ahead of his return, so arrangements could be made in advance for his audience with Elizabeth – and possibly the Privy Council. As far as we know, Throckmorton's audience must have been held sometime between 28 May and early June. This can be identified because around the end of a speculated period, a memorandum in the hand of Cecil was produced either for or from a Privy Council meeting. This listed the potential perils of the marriage between Mary and Darnley.¹³⁶ The Cecil memorandum focused on two key concerns: the marriage posed a threat to the English succession and a threat to the religious amity between both countries.¹³⁷ Although both threats would not have escaped Cecil's consideration, neither featured in Throckmorton's three pieces of correspondence from 21 May. We can assume that this was part of the more private news that Throckmorton reported to Elizabeth and her council in person.

No written evidence survives from Throckmorton's audience with Elizabeth after he returned from Scotland. To add to this, there is also no evidence of a meeting between Throckmorton and Cecil to discuss his time in Scotland. What can be determined is that Throckmorton was not present at the ad hoc meeting of councillors. His involvement in the Mary-Darnley marriage was at an end, and he had completed his role as an ambassador. Throckmorton had successfully reported information, provided his expert first hand opinion of the matter, and delayed the marriage to give the government time to make their own plans. Even with Throckmorton's advice, the conference memorandum concluded 'finally that this advisees being considered by hir Ma[jes]ty it may please hir

¹³⁶ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 117r-122v, Conference by the Privy Council in the marriage of Mary, 4 June 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 194].

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

to chose which of them she lyketh and to [putt] them in executio[n] in dedes and not to pass them over in co[n]sultatio[n]s'.¹³⁸ Whilst an ambassador provided all the information and could give his opinion to the monarch, ultimately the monarch was asked to make the final decision.

After Throckmorton had reported his embassy at greater length to Elizabeth and Cecil, events moved quickly at the English court and a committee meeting was organised for 4 June 1565. This was composed of members of the English Privy Council and other Lords who were not ordinary councillors in order to confer on the threats facing their government. We know that Throckmorton reported to Elizabeth and her Council because Randolph reported to the Scottish Privy Council that now Throckmorton had negotiated his part in Scotland, he would continue to do so in England.¹³⁹ Mears drew attention to this committee as an example of how Elizabeth favoured using small, consultative commissions to sort out political business.¹⁴⁰ This attendance shows it was not a simple Privy Council meeting – affirmed by the fact that no meetings were recorded as being held between the 29 May and 9 June in the English Privy Council Register.¹⁴¹ The name of those who attended this conference on 4 June were Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper; William Paulet, Marquess of Winchester, Lord Treasurer; Ferdinando Stanley, fifth Earl of Derby; Bedford; Leicester; Lord Edward Clinton, Lord Admiral; Lord Howard of Effingham, Lord Chamberlain; Sir Edward Rogers, Comptroller of the Household; Sir Francis Knollys, Vice Chamberlain; Secretary Cecil; Sir Ambrose Cave; Sir William Petre; and Sir John Mason. One important name missing from this list was

¹³⁸ TNA SP 52/10, f. 120r, Conference by the Lords and English Privy Council on the marriage of Mary, 4 June 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 194].

¹³⁹ BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 117r-118v, Copy Randolph to Scottish PC, [early-June?] 1565.

¹⁴⁰ Mears, *Queenship and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realm*, pp. 36-40.

¹⁴¹ TNA SP 52/10, f. 117r, Conference by the Lords and English Privy Council on the marriage of Mary, 4 June 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 194]. The document is presented and structured like a Privy Council paper.

Throckmorton's. As he was not a privy councillor, this explains why Throckmorton was not invited to join the ad hoc meeting of councillors. He had completed his task by finding out as much information from the Scottish court as possible. It was not the responsibility of the selected councillors to deliberate the situation at length. Out of the eleven men who had been present at the most recent Privy Council meeting on 29 May, ten were present at the conference on 4 June, which only excludes Richard Sackville.¹⁴² Similarly, out of the nine men who attended the subsequent Privy Council meeting on 9 June, eight were present at the ad hoc meeting.¹⁴³ Stephen Alford argues that the meeting was a panicked move by the Privy Council who needed to establish a plan as a reaction to Mary's exploits.¹⁴⁴ In fact, this was a strategic gathering of any Privy Councillors who were still at court and other experts to debate and agree a calculated decision. Therefore, it can be argued that although Mary's decision to marry Darnley caused a political storm, rather than acting haphazardly, Elizabeth and her government were still using the formal political and diplomatic structures to conduct negotiations between England and Scotland and to make decisions.

The memorandum produced by the ad hoc meeting of councillors explored what perils Elizabeth would face if Mary and Darnley were married, and how this could be remedied. In answer to the first, the greatest threats to England were the strength of Catholicism (in both England and Scotland) as a result of her marriage and the strength of Mary's claim to the English throne.¹⁴⁵ These threats could be countered with a drive to

¹⁴² *RPCS*, p. 217, Sir Nicholas Bacon; John Paulet, second Marquess of Winchester; Bedford; Edward Clinton, Earl of Lincoln; William Howard, Baron Howard of Effingham; Sir Francis Knollys; Cecil; Sir Peter Cave; Sir John Mason, and William Petre.

¹⁴³ *RPCS*, p. 218, Bacon, Clinton, Effingham, Rogers, Knollys, Cecil, Cave, and Petre. Winchester, Bedford, and Mason were not present at this Privy Council meeting.

¹⁴⁴ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 128-130.

¹⁴⁵ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 117r-120v, Conference by the Lords and English Privy Council on the marriage of Mary, 4 June 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 194]; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 121r-125v, Copy of Summary of the consultation and advice given by the Lords and others of the Privy Council [of England] [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1125]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 301r-308v, Summary of Consultation and advice by Lords of PC and others, 4 June 1565.

strengthen the English borders; to request that Darnley and Lennox were returned to England and remove their English lands (weakening their claim to be 'English' on which Darnley's place in the succession rested).¹⁴⁶ They might also give remission to Lady Catherine Grey and Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford who had been imprisoned in the Tower of London since 1562. Lady Catherine had a claim to the English throne through her shared heritage with Lady Jane Grey. By acknowledging Lady Catherine's lineage, Elizabeth would show vulnerability and reveal how desperate her government was to prevent Mary's marriage to Darnley. These solutions were never acted upon as the situation changed too quickly in Scotland.

The small success of Throckmorton's embassy was short-lived. After a two-month stalemate in Anglo-Scottish relations, Mary impatiently fired a warning shot by sending a new embassy with a different ambassador to continue to exert pressure on the English Queen, indicating that she was determined for her marriage to Darnley to take place. In late-June, Sir John Hay, Commendator of Balmerino, was sent to the English court with a company of eight men to ask Elizabeth through the formal structures of diplomatic negotiations to accept a marriage between Mary and Darnley.¹⁴⁷ Hay was not an unusual choice as one of Mary's ambassadors. He was the Master of Requests and acted as an advisor to the Scottish Privy Council. Therefore, Hay's appointment supported the pattern of Mary selecting men who were part of her inner circle. Now that Maitland had failed to continue his previous embassy, Mary had no choice but to choose another councillor. It can be assumed from the nature of the instructions that Mary's intention

¹⁴⁶ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 116r-118v, Parliament of Scotland notes, 27 September 1564 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 97]; TNA SP 52/9, ff. 170r-171v, Randolph to Cecil, 2 December 1564 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 119]. In 1564, Lennox returned to Scotland in order to reclaim his title and Scottish lands.

¹⁴⁷ TNA SP 15/12, ff. 158r-159v, Drury to Bedford, 15 June 1566 [*CSP Domestic 1601-3, Addenda 1547-65*, no. 63]. Hay and his party left Berwick on 15 June 1565 and arrived at court sometime before 26 July 1565. Hay returned to Scotland before 7 July but stopped somewhere in Yorkshire on this way, TNA SP 59/9, ff. 172r-173v, Drury to Cecil, 7 July 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1292].

was to demonstrate her determination to marry a man of her choosing. Secondly, success from Hay's embassy would have brought her a step closer to securing her or her offspring's succession to the English throne. Although the purpose of the embassy was nothing new, the man selected was the beginning of a change in Mary's diplomatic practices that reflected her change in independent decision making. After Maitland had previously chosen to reject further instructions from Mary, she could not trust her principal secretary to carry out almost identical instructions just two months later, despite his commendable work in the Scottish Privy Council in the following months since.

Little evidence survives about Hay's embassy to England, which has led to it being overlooked in the context of the other fast-paced events in 1565. However, this was the final Scottish embassy before Mary and Darnley were married and its impact needs to be considered.¹⁴⁸ In his instructions, Hay was to declare Mary's discontent with Elizabeth's rejection of her choice of the Earl of Ross (Darnley's title since May 1565) as her husband. She requested that the English Queen send commissioners to meet Scottish representatives – from a combination of two, three or four out of Moray, Morton, Glencairn, Ruthven, Maitland, Bellenden, and Robert Carnagie of Kinnard – in order to persuade Elizabeth to allow the marriage to go ahead.¹⁴⁹ Putting Maitland's name forward as one of the possible commissioners, this indicated that the principal secretary had retained his position at the Scottish court. This was evident from his attendance at the Scottish Privy Council meetings in Perth in June.¹⁵⁰ Even after the failure of his May embassy and his disobedience, his fundamental skills as a politician and his connections with leading English courtiers, such as Cecil and Leicester, were essential in order to

¹⁴⁸ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 219-234. This embassy was not mentioned by Frescoln.

¹⁴⁹ *Labanoff*, 'Instructions from Mary to John Hay', 14 July 1565, p. 283. This further adds to the evidence that Maitland was not as out of favour as has previously been stated because he was put forward for a commission less than two months after his previously disastrous embassy.

¹⁵⁰ Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 209-210.

secure Mary's marriage. Whilst this proposed meeting between the English and Scottish commissioners never took place, it demonstrated that as late as June, Mary was still prepared to use official diplomatic channels for negotiations.

The main objective of Mary's demands was to have her future marriage approved, and the other parts of Hay's instruction reinforced her goal of a union with Darnley. Hay was to demand the liberation and restitution of Margaret, Countess of Lennox, and to allow the Earl of Lennox to travel freely between England and Scotland, whilst Charles Stuart (his other son) and the Countess of Lennox remained in England.¹⁵¹ The two parts of Hay's instructions regarding the Lennox's reflected Mary's commitment to her future family and could be seen as a direct confrontation with Elizabeth to show that she intended to get her own way. There is limited evidence to show how Elizabeth received and reacted to the three demands. All we know is that on his return to Scotland, Hay was given a short letter Elizabeth to deliver to Mary that declared that after hearing the message 'we ar sorry to fynd so small cause of satisfaction, after soch cause offred to vs of offence and mislyking' and left the rest for Hay to declare 'playnely and frendly'.¹⁵² Upon his return to the Scottish court, Mary was equally displeased with Elizabeth's response to her second request to marry Darnley.¹⁵³ Hay's embassy represented Mary's final attempt to have her request approved through the formal structures of diplomatic negotiation and left Mary with, what she believed, was no other choice but to take matters into her own hands.

The Anglo-Scottish negotiations between April and July 1565 showed that Mary used the official channels of diplomacy to ask for Elizabeth's approval of her marriage. From the English perspective, during the extraordinary embassy of Throckmorton and the

¹⁵¹ *Labanoff*, 'Instructions from Mary to John Hay', 14 July 1565, p. 283.

¹⁵² TNA SP 52/10, ff. 132r-134v, Elizabeth to Mary, 27 June 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 201].

¹⁵³ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 137r-138v, Randolph to Cecil, 7 July 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 205].

continued residency of Randolph, the two ambassadors were forced to act during the exceptional circumstances of this year to work around the unexpected crises in Scotland. Maitland and Hay were limited to their instructions, and their main objective was to have Elizabeth recognise that Mary could choose her own husband. On 10 May, before Darnley's title ceremony had taken place, Randolph eloquently summarised the outcome of the English embassies, that 'both of vs [Randolph and Throckmorton] lyke to fayle of o[ur] purpose'.¹⁵⁴

After the build-up of tension between April and June 1565, the English government believed they had given themselves time by delaying the marriage between Mary and Darnley. In an expected turn of events, Mary married Darnley in a secret ceremony on 29 July 1565.¹⁵⁵ Still in Scotland, Randolph had been invited but declined to attend the wedding breakfast of the new husband and wife.¹⁵⁶ Randolph knew Elizabeth disliked the idea of Mary marrying Darnley and by opting out of the meal, he avoided a potentially difficult political situation as his presence at the wedding breakfast would have been interpreted as Elizabeth accepting the marriage.

Before news that Mary had married Darnley reached the English court, the English government had drafted instructions on 30 July for the extraordinary English ambassador Sir John Tamworth. To put the instructions into context, the first draft was finalised and dispatched before the unexpected news of Mary's marriage was received at the English court. The main objective of Tamworth's instructions was to reiterate that the offer for Mary to marry an English nobleman was 'by vs [Elizabeth and her government] syncerly serioossly and lovingly ment and intended for hir weale', which was now clearly

¹⁵⁴ TNA SP 52/10, f. 89r, Randolph to Throckmorton, 10 May 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1156].

¹⁵⁵ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 151r-v, Randolph to Bedford, 28 July 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 216]; TNA SP 52/10, f. 156, Elizabeth Instructions for Tamworth, 30 July 1565; [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 220].

¹⁵⁶ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, f. 225r, Randolph to Cecil, 31 July 1565.

outdated.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, Tamworth was to report on the unexpected result of Maitland's embassy to England in May 1565 and to attempt to heal the rift this embassy had caused in Anglo-Scottish relations.¹⁵⁸ Whilst Frescoln has drawn attention to Tamworth's time in Scotland, she has overlooked the unusual timeline between the first draft of the instructions and when he arrived.¹⁵⁹

As soon as the English government received news of Mary's marriage to Darnley, they were forced to adapt the objectives in Tamworth's instructions to reflect the new political climate. It was as late as 1 August that the English government received news that Mary had married Darnley and realised that they had sent Tamworth to Scotland completely unprepared. In order to remedy the situation, Elizabeth wrote a letter to Tamworth, which was clarified on the reverse as 'seco[n]d instructions for Mr Tho[m]worth but not sent'.¹⁶⁰ This was so that Mary did not think the English government were unaware of her recent marriage. The purpose of the new 'instructions' was to have Mary 'if she shall requyre to vnderstand what the speciall poynts *be* that moveth vs to be offended w[ith] this hir Mariadg, and what thynes be they that we wold desyre of hir'.¹⁶¹ In contrast to his first set of official instructions, Elizabeth's letter gave Tamworth the reason to exercise more agency after the English's worst fear that Mary had married without their consent were confirmed. Tamworth's instructions were concluded by stating 'we com[m]ytt to your discretion vsing therin ye Advise of our s[er]vant Tho[mas] Randolph'.¹⁶² The main similarity between the two sets of instructions was that they were,

¹⁵⁷ See Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 333-334; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 156r-160v, Instructions to Tamworth to Mary 'in messadg', 30 July 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 220].

¹⁵⁸ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 156r-160v, Instructions to Tamworth to Mary 'in messadg', 30 July 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 220].

¹⁵⁹ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 233-239. Frescoln spells Tamworth as Thomworth throughout her thesis.

¹⁶⁰ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 1r-4v, Elizabeth to Tamworth, 1 August 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 221].

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

still, only addressed to Mary, intentionally disenfranchising Darnley's recently acquired authority.

At this juncture, Berwick proved its use as a diplomatic and intelligence hub. Here, Tamworth could break his journey before arriving in Scotland to consult with Bedford and, in this instance, reassess the changes to his embassy. Bedford, who was stationed at Berwick, had already received news of Mary's marriage and the proclamation of Darnley as King of Scotland.¹⁶³ As will be explained in more detail in Chapter Three, Berwick proved to be a useful intelligence hub on the Anglo-Scottish border for sending and receiving news.¹⁶⁴ With this knowledge in mind, Bedford needed to stop Tamworth's journey at Berwick and inform him of the changed situation in Scotland before he entered blindly into negotiations that were now irrelevant in the light of the recent marriage. There was only one week between the drafting of Tamworth's instructions and his arrival in Scotland on 5 August. This embassy demonstrates that rapidly changing events and the slow movement of correspondence and ambassadors was a significant disadvantage in diplomatic relations. With hindsight, it was an irresponsible move for Elizabeth to have continued Tamworth's embassy to Scotland with the knowledge that Mary had married Darnley against her wishes.

Tamworth took full advantage of Randolph's expert knowledge of the political situation in Scotland when he arrived. In a discussion with Randolph on Sunday 5 August 1565, Tamworth began to deal with the first matter, which was to understand his new instructions. Then, after two days of preparations, on Tuesday 7 August, Tamworth had an audience with Mary. During his audience Tamworth gave a speech on behalf of

¹⁶³ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 211r-212v, Bedford to Cecil, 29 July 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1331].

¹⁶⁴ See Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practice, pp. 230-281.

Elizabeth.¹⁶⁵ On the matter of the marriage, which took priority as the first point of his address, Tamworth declared that Elizabeth's proposal of a marriage between Mary and Leicester was 'seriouslye and lovinglye ment' and was 'intended for yo[ur] gr[ace] weale and to advance yo[ur] desire in yo[ur] greateste matter (being acknowledged as Elizabeth's heir)'.¹⁶⁶ The second point Tamworth's speech made about the marriage discussed how it was unusual that Mary had sent Maitland to 'requeare her Ma[jesties] opinion and good will in yo[ur] gravis marriage' and then married Darnley 'w[ith]owte anye cause notyfyed to her hig[hness]'.¹⁶⁷ Two copies of the speech survive: one was written by a sixteenth-century secretary, and the other is a copy in the Cotton collection.¹⁶⁸ The speech was out of place because it was most likely written at the English court and sent to Tamworth after his instructions were updated. In an audience, an ambassador usually had some scope to exercise agency in how he responded to his host monarch, even if his instructions focused upon specific objectives. However, Tamworth was clearly not sent to re-establish Leicester as a suitor to Mary. He was there to represent Elizabeth's own opinion on the matter of Mary's marriage. From Tamworth's embassy, Randolph described that 'no man coulde w[ith] greater diligens, nor more erneste care truayle, nor vse no perswations or greater reasons to moue the Q[ueen] and suche of her Counsel'.¹⁶⁹

Unfortunately for Tamworth, the situation in Scotland had changed before he had even reached his host country's court. This forced him to adapt to the new political landscape with only haphazardly prepared documents from his home court. On this occasion, Tamworth was fortunate to receive an update to his instructions to reflect the

¹⁶⁵ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 10r-14v, Speech used by Tamworth to Mary, 7 August 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 225]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 338r-343v, Tamworth's speech concerning Mary's marriage, [n.d.] August 1565.

¹⁶⁶ TNA SP 52/11, f. 10r, Speech used by Tamworth to Mary, 7 August 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 225].

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 10v-11v.

¹⁶⁸ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 10r-14v, Speech used by Tamworth to Mary, 7 August 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 225]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 338r-343v, Tamworth's speech concerning Mary's marriage, [n.d.] August 1565. The handwriting does not match Randolph or Tamworth's.

¹⁶⁹ TNA SP 52/11, f. 36r, Randolph to Elizabeth, 20 August 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 233].

current political circumstances of the country. However, Darnley's name had still not been included in the new instructions. This put Tamworth in a difficult position when he came to leave Scotland. Tamworth could not accept his letters of return that were signed by Mary and Darnley. His instructions were only addressed to Mary, even after Elizabeth had learnt that Mary was now married and had proclaimed Darnley as King of Scotland. Therefore, to represent Elizabeth's views accurately, he could only accept letters of return with Mary's name on them or not at all.

Tamworth had to reject a letter of safe conduct that was signed by Mary and Darnley and travelled through Scotland at his own risk towards the border. Whilst it was possible for Tamworth to travel without a letter of safe conduct, this was not without consequences. Tamworth was captured in the Scottish Marches on his way to the English border and imprisoned at Castle Hume for five days.¹⁷⁰ Tamworth was not instructed to reject the letters of safe return but, as Elizabeth's representative he was aware of the ramifications of his actions should he fail to do so. Therefore, his rejection of the letters signed by Mary and Darnley was Tamworth's way of exercising agency to reflect Elizabeth's position. After Tamworth was imprisoned, this called into question whether rejecting letters of safe conduct or any documentation that was signed by both Mary and Darnley was now a standard English practice for anyone travelling from Scotland. Bedford, Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East March of England, asked Elizabeth what he should do if merchants, travellers, or other people brought letters of safe conduct that were signed by both Mary and Darnley.¹⁷¹ Less than six months later, in February 1566, when Mary was in the process of trying to expel Elizabeth's resident ambassador Randolph from Scotland, he too rejected letters of safe conduct from Mary

¹⁷⁰ TNA SP 52/10, f.156r, Instructions for Tamworth to Mary, 30 July 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 220].

¹⁷¹ TNA SP 59/9, f. 245r, Elizabeth to Bedford, 12 August 1565; [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1379].

and Darnley. Whilst this was still a reflection of Elizabeth's attitude towards the marriage, it was part of a broader delaying tactic so that he might continue to gather intelligence from Scotland after having his commission revoked. On 19 February, Randolph wrote to Leicester that he hoped to stay in Scotland long enough to gather more information before he left.¹⁷² An ambassador could use his agency to reject documentation that adhered to his monarch's perspective on the diplomatic situation but also for his own benefit. The documents could assume a position in discussions surrounding the legitimacy of a regime and should they fail to match precisely, then negotiations could fall through.

In the immediate aftermath of Mary's marriage to Darnley, Tamworth's embassy marked a turning point in the relationship between Elizabeth and Mary, particularly in terms of influence and authority. Tamworth was not granted the flexibility that was typically afforded to resident ambassadors; instead, he was to deliver a direct message in the speech that he gave to Mary. However, on his journey to the Scottish court, Tamworth was forced to adapt his approach to reflect the subsequent revisions in his instructions. This illustrated how even tightly controlled embassies could shift in response to changing circumstances on the ground.

The final period of diplomatic exchanges, which need to be analysed during the complex negotiations in 1565, took place in the aftermath of Mary's marriage to Darnley when she showed a new confidence and independence in her actions. For the first time, Mary boldly asked Elizabeth to send an English embassy to Scotland. This was a problematic request for two reasons. The first was whether, two months on from Tamworth's embassy, the ambassador(s) would be sent to Mary, or to Mary and Darnley. In addition, by bending to Mary's request, Elizabeth would be accepting where the

¹⁷² BL Egerton MS 1818, Randolph to Leicester, 19 February 1566.

authority in their relationship now lay. Between October 1565 and February 1566, the crisis in power in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy was evident when late in the planning stages Elizabeth cancelled an English embassy to Scotland. At this moment, Mary was in a position of considerable strength, having recently married a man of her choosing and after defeating the Chaseabout Raid rebels, without any open warfare, who had fled into England. From the Scottish court, Randolph described how Mary spoke fiercely about never allowing ‘her rebelles’ to set foot in Scotland again.¹⁷³ In contrast, Elizabeth was in a precarious position. She was willingly harbouring Scottish rebels in England and had met with the leader of the rebel group, Moray, at her own court. In order to defuse tensions between the two countries and at Mary’s request, the English government drafted instructions for an embassy to Scotland.¹⁷⁴

This cancelled embassy has already been discussed in Chapter One in the context of how the men chosen for the embassy were not selected from the usual Elizabethan diplomatic pool.¹⁷⁵ This now needs to be placed into the context of the English government’s plans and provisions during a crisis. Two drafts of the instructions were created for the embassy of Lord John Lumley and Sir Walter Mildmay. As was discussed in Chapter 1, Mildmay was an English Privy Councillor and one of the Puritan gentlemen of Northamptonshire. Lumley was part of Norfolk’s faction at the English court and a Catholic sympathiser. Had this embassy been sent, this would have been both of their first diplomatic missions. The first set of instructions was drafted on 24 October 1565, in the

¹⁷³ BL Add. MS 35125, ff. 14r-15v, Randolph to Leicester, 19 October 1565.

¹⁷⁴ TNA SP 52/11, f. 154r-167v, Draft instructions to Lumley and Mildmay, 24 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 288]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 367r-382v, Draft instructions to Lumley and Mildmay, [early] November 1565. The BL draft of the instructions is listed as ‘Q. Elizabeth’s instructions to [...] [...] and Sir Walter Mildmay’ in the State Papers Online. This thesis identifies who the people named were and has updated the reference to reflect this.

¹⁷⁵ See Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 108-124.

hand of a clerk but heavily edited by Cecil.¹⁷⁶ It was not until after this draft on 25 October, that Elizabeth sent a letter to Mary to announce that the English government had plans to send ambassadors to Scotland. The draft stated that,

we haue thought meete ~~w[ith]out regard of any synister iudgement of the euill disposed persons in the world,~~ to send vnto you very shortly an Ambassade of persons of good estimation and honor. First to vnderstand certainly your disposition and determination towards the obseruation of good peace and amytie with vs and our contrees, And thervpon to giue you also to vnderstand what our disposition is, or shalbe agreable to yours. And finally if no *iust* cause shalbe giuen by you to the contrary, *than* to treat & conclude a firme and perfect league and amytie betwixt vs both, ~~which may endure to both our commodities, and the quietnes of our Realmes and people com[m]itted vnto vs by almighty God~~ *wherof our selves our subiectes and co[n]trees may take good*.¹⁷⁷

In the broader context of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy, the first draft of the instructions was created the day after Moray, the leader of the Chaseabout Raid rebels, travelled to the English court without Elizabeth's permission and appealed for English financial and military support against Mary. It was no coincidence that the English government planned to send an ambassador, and this acknowledged that they understood the meeting with Moray to be diplomatically inappropriate.

Whilst the instructions for the new embassy were being drafted and redrafted, Randolph was still serving as the English resident ambassador to Scotland. Elizabeth had not forgotten her ambassador and wrote to him on 29 October explaining that the English government, 'thought very convenie[n]t to send so[m]e p[er]so[n]s of good degree

¹⁷⁶ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 154r-167v, Draft instructions to Lumley and Mildmay, 24 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 288].

¹⁷⁷ TNA SP 52/11, f. 168v, Elizabeth to Mary, Queen of Scots, 25 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 289].

thyth[er] to ~~under~~ make it appeare to that Quene, in what sent by sondry date accidentes o[ur] amyty co[m]en amyty'.¹⁷⁸ Before the new extraordinary English embassy could be sent, Randolph was asked to explain to Mary that the aim of the embassy was once again to try to achieve peace between the two realms. To accomplish this, Elizabeth had gone back to the fundamentals of diplomacy: exchanging ambassadors.

By early November, the second draft of the instructions for the new extraordinary embassy was completed. This received fewer Cecilian annotations because his revisions to the October draft had been incorporated, which meant it was closer to a final version of the instructions.¹⁷⁹ Not only were Lumley and Mildmay as ambassadors a change in Elizabethan diplomatic practices but what they were to offer in their instructions to Mary were also revolutionary for English and Scottish negotiations in the 1560s. The main points in the November instructions for the ambassadors were to negotiate with Mary and Darnley on were for the English government to recognise Darnley as King of Scotland, to finally ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh, to prevent Scotland creating a league with France (their old ally), and to restore the rebel Scottish Lords who were exiled in England. The main sweetener offered to Mary was to consider her position in the English succession. The wording for Mary's consideration was as follows,

and yet to satisfy that Q[ueen] as farr as possibly we can streyne our hart, we shalbe co[n]tent, to grant that whansoever Almighty God shall make a determinatio[n] never to marry, w[hich] two we meane in a short tyme to resolve that one way or the other.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 171r-174v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 29 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 291].

¹⁷⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula, B X, ff. 367r-382v, Draft instructions to Lumley and Mildmay, [early] November 1565.

¹⁸⁰ BL Cotton MS Caligula, B X, f. 377v, Draft instructions to Lumley and Mildmay, [early] November 1565.

The question of Mary as Elizabeth's successor had underpinned much of the relationship between the two queens, even before Mary had returned to Scotland. By returning to the discussion of the succession, Elizabeth continued to dangle the carrot in front of Mary, hoping to entice her to overlook her wrongful meeting with the rebel Moray.

Roughly three weeks after the second draft was created, Elizabeth cancelled the embassy of Lumley and Mildmay. She recognised that there was a shift in the power dynamic, and she wanted to avoid putting herself in a position where she was subject to Mary's bidding. If she could, Elizabeth wanted Mary to be the one to send an ambassador to England and attempted to reverse the power dynamic in their relationship. When Elizabeth cancelled the embassy in November 1565, she made sure to emphasise that, 'vppon good consideratio[n] had se[n]ce of ye matter we thynk it not mete for our part to send any to hir as ye case resteth betwixt vs'.¹⁸¹ Continuing this letter, Elizabeth also wrote that instead the issues would be sorted 'by com[m]issionars o[n] both sydes to mete for the purpose, or that so[m]e might be sent from hir to vs' and that Randolph needed to explain that he had misinterpreted earlier letters that there would be an English embassy sent to Scotland.¹⁸² This tainted Mary's opinion of Randolph as a competent ambassador and in Mary's eyes he was to blame for not receiving the embassy that she had asked Elizabeth to send. Mary's mistrust of Randolph led to her further mistrust of Elizabeth.

In discussions for the new meeting of commissioners, Elizabeth requested that they met in the border region, or if this was not possible, that Mary send her ambassadors to England. In late November, Randolph wrote to the Council of Scotland that 'ether to the Q[ueen] my Sou[er]eign whear she is or ~~her~~ commissioners to meete at ~~some~~ anye indifferent place w[i]th in her Ma[jes]ties Realm, that *then* the Q[ueen] my myestress

¹⁸¹ TNA SP 52/11, f. 206, Elizabeth to Randolph, 26 November 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 308].

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

wyll willinglye accorde.¹⁸³ Dawson has argued that when the 1565 embassy was cancelled and the 1566 meeting of commissioners was proposed, it was in essence, ‘stripped of its power to negotiate when its brief was restricted to Border problems’.¹⁸⁴ On 1 December, only five days after the English embassy to Scotland was abandoned, Bedford was sent a request for letters of safe conduct for a meeting between English and Scottish border commissioners.¹⁸⁵ On the same day, a letter from Cecil to Bedford asked the border officials ‘not to go forwarde into Scotlande’.¹⁸⁶ This demonstrated the English desperation to continue to organise a meeting between commissioners on their own terms and on their side of the border.

On 10 January 1566, the English commissioners were appointed. Elizabeth selected Bedford and Sir John Forster, Warden of the English Middle March, both of whom were already conveniently in the border region.¹⁸⁷ Mary put forward the names Francis Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell and Walter Kerr, Laird of Cessford as her representatives.¹⁸⁸ Elizabeth saw the inequality between her appointments and Mary used this opportunity to try to reclaim some authority by asking the Scottish Queen to select someone more appropriate than Bothwell for the meeting. In early February 1566, Elizabeth wrote to Randolph with instructions on which Scottish representatives should be sent to meet with the English commissioners. He was left under no illusion that the choice of Bothwell was inappropriate and ‘it might be compassed by yo[w] dealin w[i]t[h] some of the counsellor[urs] there that have both good meaning to peace and credit’.¹⁸⁹ Elizabeth requested that Randolph either secure the appointment of ‘some other Erle of

¹⁸³ BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 101r-v, Randolph to the Council of Scotland, [November/December] 1565.

¹⁸⁴ Dawson, ‘Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley and Anglo-Scottish Relations’, p. 20.

¹⁸⁵ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 220r-221v, Bedford to Cecil, 1 December 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1712].

¹⁸⁶ TNA SP 59/10, f. 222r, Bedford to Cecil, 1 December 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1713].

¹⁸⁷ BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 175r-176v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 10 January 1566; TNA SP 52/12, ff. 5r-6v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 10 January 1566 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 329].

¹⁸⁸ TNA SP 59/11, ff. 53r-54v, Bedford to Cecil, 24 January 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 44].

¹⁸⁹ BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 95r-96v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 2 February 1566; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 241r-242v, Randolph to Cecil, 10 February 1566.

better disposition' or in the worst case scenario, that Randolph could not dissuade Mary from appointing Bothwell, that he 'might be ioyned ether to the L[ord] Hume or to Cesford' or both (if my be gotten)'.¹⁹⁰ The Scottish commissioners chosen in the end were Alexander Lord Hume, Warden of the Scottish East March and the Laird of Cessford. By February, Elizabeth's request for these changes to be made to the border commission showed her to be making a desperate attempt to regain any of the last vestiges of the power she had exerted over Mary before July 1565. Arguably, the removal of Bothwell from the commission was a small success for Elizabeth but it was too late. Four months later, the birth of Prince James, yet again, strengthened Mary's decision to act independently. In turn, this also enhanced Mary's heir's claim to the English throne and by proximity her own too. Without the context of the entirety of the English and Scottish commissions in 1565, the border commission would wrongly be interpreted as merely an alternative method for diplomacy. However, in the longer context, it was the only way Anglo-Scottish diplomacy could operate considering the vulnerable position Elizabeth had found herself in the previous year.

The year 1565 saw a dramatic shift in the political power dynamic between England and Scotland. After she had secured a suitable second husband, Mary began to exert more independence and to make her own decisions. This was in direct contrast to Elizabeth who used the formal structures of diplomacy to try and claw back her position. Whilst we already know that Mary's authority in Scotland flourished in the advent and aftermath of her marriage to Darnley, the analysis of diplomatic commissions reinforces this view. In 1565, Elizabeth's embassies became more indiscriminate and reactionary to the events in Scotland. Furthermore, the English ambassadors in Scotland, whether resident or extraordinary embassies, in 1565 were forced to use their initiative in order to

¹⁹⁰ BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 95r-96v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 2 February 1566.

try and prevent and then navigate the unprecedented situation of Mary's empowerment and her subsequent political activity and political decision making. A close examination of the diplomatic personnel exchanged in this year is key to understanding how and when there was a change from Mary's perspective and how the English government tried to respond.

Conclusion

An ambassador's agency – what he was given in his instructions and when he was compelled to exercise it in exception circumstances – were determined by a number of factors: diplomatic documentation (instructions and correspondence), the ambassador's experience, and, more importantly, the circumstances in which they were sent. Chapter Two builds on the argument established in Chapter One by examining the watershed moment in 1565, which disrupted normal diplomacy, in order to understand how diplomatic personnel operated in unusual circumstances to continue amicable relations and negotiations. By examining the diplomatic exchanges in 1565, during a period that initially reflected relatively normal diplomacy, this chapter has shown that when tensions between England and Scotland escalated, diplomatic commissions evolved to reflect the changing international situation.

This chapter has also demonstrated that when on an embassy, agency was not exclusively linked to an ambassador's instructions. All ambassadors used agency on some level to represent their monarch, for example the way they conversed with their host and with their own monarch. Other instances required the ambassador to think on his feet without instruction from their court. Between September 1561 and June 1567, English and Scottish ambassadors were continually placed in situations where they used their own initiative during moments of crisis when the situation surpassed their instructions or

correspondence was simply not quick enough to provide them with direction. In times of uncertainty, when the government foresaw an unprecedented situation, experienced, extraordinary men such as Throckmorton, who was known for exercising his initiative, were selected because he was trusted to act appropriately to these changes.

The first two chapters have focused on the structural changes in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy through an examination of the personnel and the procedures. In doing so, both chapters have supported Gary M. Bell's argument that there was a continually shifting situation both in Elizabethan diplomacy in the 1560s and, in fact, in Scottish diplomacy as well.¹⁹¹ This has been shown through how changes of diplomatic personnel fit into the continental patterns. Whilst the argument for the changes in the structure of diplomacy is evident, this thesis has also identified that there were clear continuities from previous diplomatic practices. Intelligence-gathering, Franco-Scottish diplomatic relations, and protecting the security of the realm were diplomatic practices that were continued from hostile periods and have not yet been explored in the context of the peaceful and personal reigns.

¹⁹¹ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', pp. 267-288.

Chapter 3: Continuities in English and Scottish Diplomatic Practice

Chapters one and two have concluded that there was a clear increase in diplomatic activity between England and Scotland after Mary returned in 1561. This activity took the forms of embassies, cancelled or changed commissions, and continued to involve unofficial representatives or agents. It was also evident that the ambassadors chose, or were sometimes forced by fast moving diplomacy, to exercise agency during times of tension to protect the Anglo-Scottish amity and defend national interests. This chapter, by contrast, examines how diplomatic practices that were established earlier in the sixteenth century continued to shape English and Scottish diplomacy. Providing security was a key objective for sixteenth-century monarchs and gathering intelligence was an important mechanism that helped to ensure the safety of the realm and to keep the peace between two countries.

The continuities identified and examined in this chapter reveal that there was a pattern of mistrust and tension between the English and Scottish governments. This is especially insightful considering that on 5 July 1560 the Treaty of Edinburgh concluded a peace between England, Scotland, and France.¹ With hindsight, we know this peace was a watershed moment and helped to end centuries of violent warfare between England and Scotland as well as, on the face of it, end the military alliance – known as the Auld Alliance – between Scotland and France. However, in the context of the period, the English and Scottish governments could not have known that the immediate threat of conflict was eradicated and were, therefore, still highly suspicious of one another. Roger Mason identified that at a local level, even with the provisions in the Treaty of Edinburgh, the Scottish population did not regard the Anglo-Scottish alliance as a reason to rule out

¹ See, Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 83-85.

a relationship with France in the future.² It was not until 1567, at the end of Mary's personal reign, that the Scottish people officially rejected the Auld Alliance with France and were instead looking towards an alliance with England with the prospect of James VI being Elizabeth's successor.³ Therefore, the practices implemented by the English and Scottish governments to keep the peace need to be studied in the context of mistrust and the general changes in diplomacy in the 1560s.

It is already well-known that after 1520, the spread of the Reformation altered the diplomatic stage.⁴ Mattingly identified that 'throughout the second half of the sixteenth century diplomacy declined because of an ideological issue' and the division between Catholic and Protestants were split into 'two camps more bitterly irreconcilable and more firmly aligned'.⁵ After 1560, there were also important political and religious developments in England and Scotland and scholarship has focused on understanding how diplomacy adapted.⁶ For Scotland, the reformation presented an opportunity for the government to establish diplomatic relationships with other Protestant nations.⁷ The

² Roger A. Mason, 'Imagining Scotland: Scottish political thought and the problem of Britain, 1560-1650', Roger A. Mason, ed., *Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See, Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*; MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII'; J. H. Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559-1598* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2000); Mack Holt, *The French wars of religion, 1562-1629*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Paul E. J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: war, government and society in Tudor England, 1544- 1604* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Fett, 'Information, Intelligence, and Negotiations in the West European Diplomatic World'; Tracey Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morrison, c. 1513-1556* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁵ Garrett Mattingly, 'International Diplomacy and International Law', *The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. III*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 155.

⁶ Bell, 'The Subtle Revolution in Elizabethan Diplomacy', pp. 267-288.

⁷ We already know that the relationship between Scotland and Denmark-Norway and Scotland and Sweden developed through their establishment of Protestant churches, and this has mainly been studied in the context of the late sixteenth century. For literature on Scotland and Denmark-Norway see, Steve Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660: A Diplomatic and Military Analysis* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2003); Cynthia Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception: James VI of Scotland's Foreign Relations with Europe (c. 1584-1603)', (PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014), pp. 22-24, pp. 53-80; Paul Douglas Lockhart, *Frederik II and the Protestant Cause: Denmark's Role in the Wars of Religion, 1559-1596* (Leiden, 2004). For literature on the relationship between Scotland and Sweden see, Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance, Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654* (Brill, 2003).

English government was once again restored to what was largely a Protestant doctrine, and only one year later the Scottish Reformation Parliament reformed the Scottish Kirk along similar lines with a policy of toleration of the existing religious situation was agreed. The changes in both countries created a new opportunity for religious collaboration between England and Scotland. Clare Kellar argues that it was the religious alliance between the English representatives in Berwick, the English government, and the Lords of the Congregation that helped to establish a political discourse between England and Scotland both before and after the 1560 peace was concluded, and this continued throughout the 1560s.⁸ Between the movement towards Scottish Protestantism and before Mary's return to Scotland, in February 1561, Mary's illegitimate half-brother, Lord James Stewart, travelled to France to negotiate the conditions of her return. Lord James and Mary came to an agreement that the Scottish church could retain its Protestant doctrine with the condition that she could continue to hear Catholic Mass in private.⁹ After Mary returned to Scotland in August 1561, the religious doctrine was confirmed once again. With some cross-over in religious doctrines in England and Scotland, both Monarchs – even Mary as a Catholic – made use of Protestant ambassadors. This was not new or different in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy but an established tactic of sixteenth-century monarchs, in the wake of the reformation, to continue a fruitful diplomatic relationship. Like other sixteenth century monarchs, Mary selected her ambassadors, so that their own religious beliefs were aligned with the religion of the monarch or country to which they

For the relationship between Scotland and Denmark-Norway in this period from this research see, NRS SP1/3/1, Instructions for Instructions for Laird of [?] to our ambassador to King of Denmark, 1 July 1564; Hiram Morgan, 'Scotland in Renaissance Diplomacy, 1473-1603', pp. 24-25.

⁸ Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England and the Reformation, 1534-1561* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 213-219; *ibid.*, p. 221.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

For correspondence around Lord James Stewart's journey to visit Mary in France to discuss her return and religious conformity see, TNA SP 52/6, ff. 26r-27v, Mary to Elizabeth, 4 February 1561 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 958]; TNA SP 52/6, ff. 29r-33v, Maitland to Cecil, 6 February 1561 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 308]; Knox, *History*, David Laing, ed., ii, pp. 142-43; Calderwood, ii, p. 47; pp. 121-122; p. 129.

were being sent. For example, between December 1561 and February 1567, James Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow was the Scottish resident ambassador to France, and Mary's decision to send Beaton reflected her own personal Catholic beliefs as well as her desire to continue fruitful, diplomatic relations with the Catholic Medici faction.¹⁰ A second example was Mary's ambassadors to Rome. For three years, between 1564 and 1567, Stephen Wilson was selected as Mary's Papal Nuncio. However, in August 1565, Mary moved away from her usual choice of Wilson for the embassy. Instead she sent William Chisholm, Bishop of Dunblane because she needed to appeal to Pope Pius IV for a special dispensation for her marriage to Darnley.¹¹ Dunblane was a practising Catholic whom Knox described as 'one of the chief pillars of the Papisticall Kirk'.¹² Mary chose a Catholic man in a clerical position for such a sensitive and important embassy to emphasise her own and Darnley's objective to support and to defend the Catholic faith in Scotland. Religious inclinations were, however, only one of the vicissitudes that Anglo-Scottish ambassadors had to navigate in the mid-sixteenth century.

After 1560, political alliances between England, Scotland, and Western Europe had also shifted. R. B. Wernham argues that Elizabeth's foreign policy was not a revolution but 'at least a remarkable reversal of alliances' to that which had been made by her predecessors, notably the greatest change being England's new amity with Scotland.¹³ However, Susan Doran identifies that whilst there were clear differences in Elizabeth's alliances, she also continued to adopt more traditional English policies.¹⁴ These continuities included her alliances with the French House of Burgundy and the

¹⁰ Hiram Morgan, 'Scotland in Renaissance Diplomacy, 1473-1603' Database, 2008, p. 177; p. 178; p. 179.

¹¹ Morgan, 'Scotland in Renaissance Diplomacy, 1473-1603', p. 237; *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Vatican Archives, Vol. 1, 1558-1571*, ed. J. M. Rigg (London, 1916), pp. 224-240.

¹² David Laing, ed., *The Works of John Knox, Vol. 2* (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1848), p. 88.

¹³ R. B. Wernham, *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603* (London: University of California Press, Ltd, 1980), p. 1.

¹⁴ Susan Doran, *Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 1558-1603* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 6-12; *ibid.*, pp. 13-24.

Hapsburg's (despite religious differences); support and aiding Protestants in Scotland and France; intervening in Scotland as an ally, and finally her military failures in France. This thesis focuses on the changes that had a significant impact on the political relationship between England and Scotland. And for these two old enemies, the conflict in France between the French monarchy and the Huguenots continued for most of the sixteenth century and even after 1560 affected the political decisions of the English and Scottish government. The death of Mary's first husband Francois in December 1560, meant that Scotland's recent lockstep with France was broken, and despite their continued cultural links, ultimately, heralded the end of the military facets of the Auld Alliance.¹⁵ Recent developments in the historiography by Elizabeth Bonner identifies that the Auld Alliance was more than a military pact. It created bountiful links between the two countries (social, cultural, architectural, commercial, artistic, literary, educational) that did not just cease to exist after July 1560.¹⁶ This argument is built upon by Siobhan Talbott who demonstrates convincingly that France and Scotland maintained a special relationship through commercial privileges that continued almost two hundred years after the Franco-Scottish relationship supposedly ended.¹⁷ This chapter continues to build upon the argument that continuity prevailed in Franco-Scottish relations after 1560, and that this still needs to be examined through the structural continuities in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy.

As already addressed in the introduction, political and religious developments in the sixteenth century directly impacted changes in diplomatic practice, such as the rise of

¹⁵ Gordon Donaldson, *James V to James VII* (Oliver & Boyd, 1965); W. Ferguson, *Scotland's Relations with England* (John Donald, 1977); Elizabeth Bonner, 'French Naturalization of the Scots in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century', *Historical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December, 1997), pp. 1085-1115; Elizabeth Bonner, 'Scotland's 'Auld Alliance' with France, 1295-1560', *The Historical Association*, Vol. 84, No. 273 (January, 1999), pp. 5-30.

¹⁶ Elizabeth Bonner, 'Scotland's 'Auld Alliance' with France, 1295-1560', *The Historical Association*, Vol. 84, No. 273 (January, 1999), p. 29.

¹⁷ Siobhan Talbott, *Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 1560-1713* (Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), pp. 15-33; *ibid.*, p. 153.

the resident ambassador and the decline in meetings between monarchs.¹⁸ With new and exciting revelations in the bigger picture of diplomacy, scholarship has been quick to focus on changes rather than continuity in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy post-1560. Specifically, Platt and Bell identified changes in how Elizabeth's diplomacy was conducted. The changes ranged from the frequency of the commissions to the length of the embassy, the increased involvement of the principal secretary (specifically in the 1560s), and finally to the training, if any, that an ambassador received.¹⁹

The novel developments that Bell highlights in English diplomacy were part of a strategy to maintain intelligence networks in the defence of Elizabeth's realm. This was also part of a broader shift, which this work investigates, to examine information networks outside those established by the ambassador at their host court. Notably, Neil Murphy identifies that in the 1530s, border officials relied on their espionage networks on both the English and Scottish sides of the border to gather information in times of crisis.²⁰ The use of these networks was the focus of research on the developments made in the 1570s under Sir Francis Walsingham and now needs to move forward to examine the interim period.²¹ Studies need to examine the diplomatic practices and not just the ambassadors on the frontline in order to consider the continuities and their impact as well as changes and developments that took place.

¹⁸ See, Jeffrey F. Platt, 'The Elizabethan Diplomatic Service', *Quidditas*, Vol. 9, Article 9 (1988), pp. 93-114; Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', pp. 267-288.

¹⁹ Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomacy: The Subtle Revolution', pp. 267-288.

²⁰ Neil Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War, 1522-24* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2023), pp. 196-199.

²¹ Alan Hynes, *The Elizabethan Secret Service* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2000), p. 35; *ibid.*, pp. 113-115; Stephen Budiansky, *Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham and the Birth of Modern Espionage* (London: Penguin Group, 2006); John Cooper, *The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I* (London: Faber and Faber, 2012), pp. 175-178; Stephen Alford, *The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I* (London: Penguin Group, 2013), pp. 125-178.

This chapter argues that there are clear continuities in diplomatic practices, that were already evident in the 1560s, which were used previously by English and Scottish monarchs and designed to gather information to safeguard the security of each country. As highlighted in Chapter Two, it was the duty of an ambassador to gather and report information from his host court. The problem with relying on an ambassador was that he could easily fall out of favour with the host monarch, resulting in him being excluded from court discussions, or in extreme cases – as we saw with Randolph in 1566 – dismissed. Furthermore, if no ambassador was resident at the rival court for an extended period of time, then other strategies were put in place to collect information. The two different intelligence-gathering techniques that continued in both England and Scotland are examined in the first two sections of this chapter. In Scotland, Mary communicated with the French ambassador resident at the English court, and their correspondence contained information about the actions, conversations, and rumours in Anglo-Franco-Scottish affairs. This practice began in 1553 when Mary of Guise was dowager queen of Scotland, and she continued to use this intelligence-gathering practice when she became regent. Guise received reports from Antoine de Noailles (1553-1556), Francois de Noailles (1556-1557), and Gilles de Noailles (1558-1559), all of whom were separately French resident ambassador to the English court. This chapter builds on Bonner and Talbott's arguments, demonstrating that diplomatic practices were continued by Mary who corresponded with the French ambassador stationed at the English court. This relationship has been overlooked in Mary's reign for two reasons. The first is because what little attention has been paid to Marian diplomacy focuses on the embassies of Sir William Maitland and Sir James Melville. Secondly, because of the way in which the sources were dispersed, the correspondence of the French ambassador has not been assimilated and incorporated. David Potter's volume of the correspondence of Paul de

Foix has brought his letters, reports, and instructions together from the English, French, and private archives. Five letters have survived between Mary and de Foix (one from 1561, one from 1564, and three from 1565).²² From other correspondence of English and Scottish courtiers, we know that Mary and de Foix had a much longer epistolary relationship than the five letters suggest.²³ Whilst it is limiting that we do not have more of the Marian-de Foix correspondence, the very idea of this relationship disturbed the English and threatened not only the security of information at the English court but also the security of England itself. In order to safeguard their own security, the English government continued to employ their former intelligence-gathering strategies. The English government used the small English coastal town of Berwick as an intelligence hub to report and gather information from Scotland. Throughout the early sixteenth century, it is already known that Berwick acted as an external location for diplomatic meetings. The town's proximity to the border made it a useful location to conclude peace treaties and organise meetings between English and Scottish border officials. Between 1559 and 1560, the role of Berwick as an intelligence centre was an integral part of English planning, and the officials based in Berwick played an essential role in advancing the English government's decision to aid the Lords of the Congregation's struggle against Mary of Guise. Although Berwick was never used to gather information on the same scale again, it continued to play a role in reporting important information, and this was drawn-upon by the English government in times of crises or when reports from ambassadors in

²² See, Potter, *The Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 39-41; *ibid.*, pp. 334-335; *ibid.*, pp. 369-371; *ibid.*, p. 372. A fifth letter was discovered in the BL archives, BL Add. 19401, ff. 103r-104v, de Foix to Mary, 7 May 1564.

²³ This thesis checked English archives, (BL and TNA), Scottish archives (NRS and NLS), French archives (BnF and AE); printed primary material (Teulet, Labanoff), collected works of (Potter, *de Foix*; Potter, *de Seure*) for evidence of communication between Mary and French ambassadors at the English court. This only revealed three letters that survived, TNA SP 52/11, f. 55r, de Foix to Mary, 1 September 1565 [CSP Scots 1563-69, no. 242], BnF na fr.23165 (coll. Susan Bliss), Mary to de Foix, 26 October 1565, and BnF supplement francais in Labanoff, Mary to de Foix, 8 November 1565. David Potter's transcription of the correspondence of Paul de Foix revealed a fourth letter survived Pierpoint Morgan MA, no. 7, de Foix to Mary, 10 February 1562 endorsed 'Minute d'une letter escripte a la Royne d'Ecosse'.

Scotland proved inadequate. The development of spy networks was encouraged and was a prominent feature in the later web of intelligence organised by Sir Francis Walsingham in the 1570s and 80s.

The primary purpose of secret intelligence-gathering was to keep the government up to date, to understand potential threats to the country, and to protect the country's interests. In the context of Anglo-Scottish relations, the objective of keeping the country secure was also a localised issue along the Anglo-Scottish border. The old anxieties and prejudices from the years of warfare between England and Scotland dated back to 1296, specifically focusing on the governance and control of Berwick. After several changes in ownership, the coastal town had remained in English hands since 1482. Although, the officials at Berwick still mistrusted the Scots and believed Berwick was vulnerable to a Scottish, or even a French attack by sea or from within Scotland itself. Whether the threat to Berwick was real or imagined, the concerns were part of the internal deliberations of the English government and correspondence with border officials who prepared for the threat as if it was a reality. Examining these three continuities reveals the extent to which mutual mistrust continued to influence the conduct of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. Mistrust remained a powerful force counterbalanced by the development of a new 'amity' in the English and Scottish relationship. This has yet to receive appropriate scholarly attention. Traditional diplomatic practices such as finalising and then safeguarding diplomatic agreements and treaties, or the exchange of correspondence and gifts between monarchs, helped to maintain the Anglo-Scottish amity.²⁴ By examining the anxieties that

²⁴ For the exchange of correspondence see James Daybell, *Women Letter-Writers in Tudor England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Allinson, *A Monarch of Letters*; Tracey Sowerby, 'Parables and Dark Sentences: The Correspondence of Sir William Cecil and William Maitland (1559–73)', Paul M. Dover, ed., *Secretaries and Statecraft in the early modern world* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).

For the exchange of gifts see, Heal, *The Power of Gifts*; Heal; Sowerby 'Royal Gifts and Gift-Exchange in Sixteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Politics'; Sowerby, 'Portraiture and Early Modern Diplomatic Culture'; Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland*.

accompanied intelligence-gathering, in this case the English concerns about Berwick's vulnerability, this reveals how continuities of attitudes necessitated and ultimately led to continuities in behaviour and activity between the two countries.

Scottish Monarchs and French Ambassadors at the English Court

Much of the research into Franco-Scottish relations has not been fully developed because it was understood that the relationship between the two countries was severed in 1560. Jenny Wormald argued that once the French representatives agreed to the Treaty of Edinburgh, it lost them the position they had held in Scotland since 1548 when the betrothal between the young Mary and Francois was concluded, and the young Scottish Queen was sent to reside at the French court.²⁵ This treaty terminated Scotland's Auld Alliance with France, which was first established between the two nations in 1297 as a defence mechanism to counter English aggression and conquests. More recently, Pamela E. Richie has argued that the termination of relations came after the conclusion of the Treaty of Edinburgh. As the 'Protector' of Scotland, Henri II of France had the authority to appoint Mary of Guise as Regent of Scotland in 1553 and thus the regency became an extension of French authority. When Mary of Guise died on 11 June 1560, this signalled 'the death of the French cause in Scotland'.²⁶ Then, the death of Francois II of France on 5 December 1560 was the final confirmation as Mary's return to Scotland became inevitable.²⁷ This scholarship is still advocated in the context of Franco-Scottish military relations. Potter argued that 'the years 1559-60 mark a significant watershed in French international and military operations that had begun in 1494'.²⁸ Even in the context of

²⁵ Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure*, p. 103.

²⁶ Pamela Richie, *Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560: A Political Career* (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2002), p. 244.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ David Potter, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2008), p. 13.

national conflict, James Wood convincingly argues that the French royal armies skilled in foreign campaigns before 1560, were not as well-equipped for civil war and rebellion in the later-1560s.²⁹ However, simply assessing the military relationship between Scotland and France is misleading and it needs to be examined in a wider context of social and, in this case, diplomatic ties.

A more recent and now largely accepted line of argument has drawn attention to how Franco-Scottish relations continued after the watershed of the Treaty of Edinburgh. As has already been stated, Bonner and Talbott are the primary scholars who have argued that the year 1560 only marked the end of the Franco-Scottish military alliance and that the continuities in the relationship between the two countries needs to be explored in different contexts.³⁰ During her personal reign, Mary attempted to continue a relationship between Scotland and France through her correspondence with her network of family members and courtiers at the French court. The French influence on Scottish affairs was apparent in the context of Mary's marital negotiations and continental alliances between 1563 and 1564. In a letter from Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine to Philbert du Croc, French ambassador to Scotland, he requested that the ambassador who was sent between Mary and the Archduke had been purposefully delayed for two reasons.³¹ The first was to wait until the matter of the English succession was settled by Elizabeth in order to give Mary a full understanding of what other titles she had to offer suitors.³² Secondly, the French ambassador was also instructed to wait until the French court had fully explored the possibility of a match between Mary and Don Carlos.³³ Ultimately, Catherine de Medici

²⁹ See, James B. Wood, *The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562–76* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³⁰ See, Elizabeth Bonner, 'Scotland's 'Auld Alliance' with France, 1295-1560', *The Historical Association*, Vol. 84, No. 273 (January, 1999); Siobhan Talbott, *Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 1560-1713* (Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), pp. 15-33.

³¹ Guy, *My Heart is my Own*, p. 175.

³² NLS MS 6135, ff. 24-27, Memorials of Cardinal of Lorraine sent to De Croc, 20 May 1563.

³³ *Ibid.*

and Charles IX took the view that a match between Mary and Don Carlos should be rejected in favour of a more beneficial one with the Archduke Charles of Austria since he was a more powerful dynastic match for the succession.³⁴ Mary's marital negotiations between 1563 and 1564 presented the French government with an opportunity to try to influence her choice of husband, which in turn helped to maintain the Franco-Scottish relationship. However, it was more than just the themes of control and influence that kept the Franco-Scottish relationship alight.

As late as the end of the sixteenth century, France and Scotland were still closely affiliated. Bonner identified that this relationship came full circle when James VI of Scotland made a conscious effort to promote a pro-French policy towards Henry IV and, ultimately, resurrected the 'Auld Alliance' in 1594 as a political manoeuvre to scare monger Elizabeth and secure himself the English succession.³⁵ However, rebuilding the friendship between France and Scotland would not have been possible without cultural, economic, and diplomatic continuities that were already present between 1560 and 1594. This chapter expands Bonner's argument in the context of the diplomatic relationship between France and Scotland and how this continued even after French forces were expelled from Scotland post-July 1560. The most notable continuation in diplomacy was Mary's relationship with the French ambassadors at the English court. This epistolary relationship was not identified by her biographers such as John Guy and Jenny Wormald and has, therefore, led to a lack of appreciation of our understanding of Mary's own command of external diplomatic networks and alliances.³⁶ And whilst Potter has

³⁴ See Michael Lynch, *Queen in Three Kingdoms*; Guy, *My Heart is My Own* (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), pp. 174-175.

³⁵ Elizabeth Bonner, 'Why Was James VI So Interested in Resurrecting Scotland's 'Auld Alliance' with France in the 1590s', *Journal of the Sydney Society for Scottish History*, Vol. 14 (2013), pp. 76-93.

³⁶ See for examples of when Guy refers to when French ambassadors at the English court were involved with Mary. John Guy, *My Heart is My Own: The Life of Mary Queen of Scots* (Harper Collins, 2004), p. 149; p. 236; Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure*; Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish relations in 1565', p. 15.

recognised that Mary communicated with de Foix, he did not acknowledge that this was a continuation of a previous diplomatic practice used by her mother to gather intelligence from the English court during potential moments of exigency.³⁷ Although only five known letters exchanged between Mary and de Foix survive, they are sufficient to offer insight into the impact this had on Anglo-Franco-Scottish relations. The correspondence suggests that Mary relied on de Foix's information to provide reassurance about the discussions and actions taken by the English government regarding their response to the 1565 Chaseabout Raid rebels, which was the height of tension during the personal reigns of the two queens. Moreover, English reports of Mary's relationships with French ambassadors showed that the English government felt threatened, and these reports continued to play on old anxieties that a renewal of the Auld Alliance was on the horizon. From an examination of the surviving correspondence between Mary and de Foix, we know that their correspondence contained information he had mainly learnt at the English court. However, from the experience of previous Scottish monarch's correspondence with French ambassadors, the knowledge that this relationship still existed was enough to cause alarm at the English court.

Mary of Guise's biographers have recognised that she corresponded with French ambassadors at the English court both before she was regent (from around 1553) and during her regency (between April 1554 and June 1560). She used the men as a covert source of information.³⁸ Before 1554, Mary of Guise frequently corresponded with Antoine Noailles, the French resident ambassador at the English court. During his early days in service, Noailles wrote to both Henri II and Mary of Guise about a potential

³⁷ Potter, *The Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 30-32.

³⁸ Ritchie, *Mary of Guise, 1548-1560*, p. 93; Rosalind K. Marshall, *Mary of Guise* (London: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd, 1977), p. 196; pp. 233-34; pp. 241-42.

French ambassadors at the Scottish court between 1553 and 1560 were Antoine de Noailles, Count of Noailles (1553-1556); Francois de Noailles (1556-1557); Gilles de Noailles (1558-1559), and Michel de Seure (1560-1562).

marriage match between Mary I of England and Philip II of Spain and warned her of the dangerous consequences of this match for international relations.³⁹ Therefore, the timing was convenient when only weeks after the Anglo-Spanish marriage match between Mary I of England and Philip II of Spain was ratified in the English parliament in April 1554, Mary of Guise was appointed as Regent to Scotland. As their correspondence developed, Noailles reported similar news to both Henri II of France and to Mary of Guise, in order to coordinate Franco-Scottish military preparations. In 1555, Noailles reported that Scotland was at risk if the English government chose to invade and recommended that the two monarchs act to defend the two realms.⁴⁰ Noailles advised the two rulers to declare war against England on either the French or the Scottish side and as a direct result of his warning Mary of Guise started to fortify Scotland.⁴¹ During the height of Anglo-Franco-Scottish tension in 1559, Gilles de Noailles, French ambassador to the English court, sent reports about interactions between Elizabeth and the Lords of the Congregation to Mary of Guise. On 21 December 1559, Noailles reported that the Lords of the Congregation had sent Maitland and Robert Melville, the Laird of Halton as their representatives to secretly meet with Elizabeth to ask her for assistance.⁴² As a result of the meeting, English commissions began to gather money, and ships were prepared to be sent to Scotland.

Mary of Guise's practice of communicating with the French ambassadors who were resident at the English court was sustained even when the ambassador was replaced in the post. In 1560, Michel de Seure replaced Gilles de Noailles and corresponded with Mary of Guise on Mary's use of the English heraldry and reported that the English

³⁹ Ritchie, *Mary of Guise, 1548-1560*; TNA SP 51/1, ff. 2r-3v, Mary of Guise, Dowager of Scotland to Mary I of England, 25 September 1553 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 398].

⁴⁰ Ritchie, *Mary of Guise, 1548-1560*, pp. 107-8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 108-11.

⁴² Hatfield House, CP 152/88, Gilles de Noailles to Catherine de Medici, 21 December 1559; *Salisbury*, pp. 157-158. Noailles to Regent Mary of Guise, 21 December 1559.

Captain, Admiral William Winter had attacked ships travelling to France. De Seure aimed to create a divide between Elizabeth and the Lords of the Congregation, and in order to achieve this goal, de Seure reported false information, that was leaked to the English government. His false news indicated that the Châtellherault and other members of the Lords of the Congregation had asked for a pardon from Francois and Mary for their involvement thus far in the reformation rebellion.⁴³ This was an attempt to persuade Elizabeth to revoke her decision against openly aiding the Lords of the Congregation by creating the fictive relationship between the Lords of the Congregation and the French monarchs. However, as far as sources have demonstrated, we know De Seure's rumour did not have an impact on the alliance between the Lords of the Congregation and the English government. Châtellherault even wrote to de Seure to voice his complaints about the lie.⁴⁴ Whilst De Seure was stationed in England towards the end of Mary of Guise's regency and when Mary's return to Scotland, no correspondence between Mary and de Seure, if it existed, has survived.⁴⁵

The above are just a few examples in a much longer narrative identified by Pamela Ritchie when Mary of Guise's actions in Scotland were a direct result of news that she received from a French ambassador at the English court. However, the implications of Ritchie's findings have not been considered in the context of Mary's reign. This chapter identifies that the practice of the Scottish monarch or regent communicating with the French ambassador at the English court did not end with Mary of Guise. It was also adopted by her daughter Mary. In the 1560s, Mary was aware of the Anglo-French

⁴³ *Salisbury*, p. 195, Châtellherault to Monsieur de Seure, French ambassador to England, 21 March 1560; *Salisbury*, pp. 198-99; Michael Seure to Châtellherault, 28 March 1560.

⁴⁴ *Salisbury*, pp. 198-99; Michael Seure to Châtellherault, 28 March 1560.

⁴⁵ David Potter, *A Knight of Malta at the Court of Elizabeth I: Correspondence of Michel de Seure, French Ambassador* (London: Camden Society, 2014); *Les Mémoires de messire Michel de Castelnau, seigneur de Mauvissière*, 3 (Brussels, 1731); Estelle Paraque, *Elizabeth I of England through Valois Eyes* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

rapprochement and used the opportunity to establish a channel of communication between Scotland and France to cover any gaps in intelligence that arose during a crisis.⁴⁶ Before discussing Mary's communication with the French ambassadors at the English court, it is important to note who the ambassadors were. Currently, there is no complete list of French ambassadors who were sent to the English or the Scottish court in the sixteenth century. To facilitate this, this chapter identifies the resident and extraordinary ambassadors sent to England and Scotland between 1561 and 1568 from correspondence and memoirs.⁴⁷ Between Mary's return to Scotland in 1561 and her imprisonment in England from May 1568 onwards, four resident French ambassadors were sent to the English court: Michel de Seure (1560-62), de Foix (1562-1566); Jacques Bochetel de la Forest (1566-68), and Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénélon (1568-1574).⁴⁸ There were also four special embassies commissioned to the English court: James Stewart, Lord Doune (or later Lord St. Colm) and Arthur Askin, Monsieur Danville, Mauvissière, and Marquis de Rambouillet. Of the resident and special French embassies, three were sent to both the English and Scottish court. In 1561, de Foix's embassy was primarily to Scotland and included a brief stop at the English court to make Elizabeth's acquaintance.⁴⁹ Then, in 1565, Mauvissière was sent to England and Scotland provide arbitration in disagreements between Elizabeth and Mary.⁵⁰ And finally, in 1566, Rambouillet was commissioned to both England and Scotland to deliver the order of Saint

⁴⁶ For literature on the Anglo-French rapprochement see, Susan Doran, 'Elizabeth I and Catherine de Medici', Glenn Richardson, ed., *Contending Kingdoms: France and England, 1420-1700* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Glenn John Richardson, 'England and France in the Sixteenth Century', *History Compass*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2008), pp. 510-528.

⁴⁷ Hiram Mogan's database 'Scotland in Renaissance Diplomacy, 1473-1604' started to compile the commissions of diplomatic embassies between Scotland and other countries. However, as an incomplete database, this was used as a starting point to compile a list of embassies between France and Scotland.

⁴⁸ Estelle Paranque, *Elizabeth I of England through Valois Eyes* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 11-14.

⁴⁹ TNA SP 52/6, ff.180r-181v, Randolph to Cecil, 10 December 1561 [CSP Scots 1547-63, no. 1051]. Randolph reported that he found de Foix ready to further amity and peace between the two kingdoms and was a good Protestant man.

⁵⁰ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 55r-56v, de Foix to Mary, 1 September 1565 [CSP Scots 1563-69, no. 242].

Michael to selected members of the English court. It was not unusual for French ambassadors to be sent to both courts. On his long journey to Scotland, it was customary for the French ambassador to visit the English court to greet Elizabeth and deliver correspondence.

Before and after this period of study, French ambassadors were resident at the Scottish court infrequently. In 1546, Henri Cleutin, Monsieur d'Oysel, was commissioned as the French ambassador to Scotland during the Rough Wooings – otherwise known as the Anglo-Scottish war of the 1540s – to monitor and report on the situation. D'Oysel's remained in Scotland for over two years, with one short trip to France to discuss how the Scots should proceed following their defeat at the Battle of Pinkie in 1547. After this period of study, Cynthia Fry identified that there were only eight French resident and extraordinary embassies sent to Scotland between 1586 and 1603, which was during the personal reign of James VI.⁵¹ The first was sent before James's personal rule and began his time in Scotland in 1585 when Charles de Prunelé, Baron d'Esneval was sent to Scotland to promote the Auld Alliance. It was not until 1602 that the first French resident ambassador was consigned to Scotland. Fry identifies that the purpose of this mission was 'to strengthen Franco-Scottish relations in light of the ageing Elizabeth's health and James's likely succession'.⁵² Although there was no resident French ambassador at the Scottish court during Mary's personal reign, she still received frequent extraordinary embassies from France. Between Mary's return in 1561 until Mary's deposition in 1567, eleven French extraordinary ambassadors were sent to Scotland: de Foix; Gilles de Noailles; Mauvissière; Nicolas d'Angennes, Marquis de Rambouillet; Jean de Luxembourg, Count de Brienne; Monsieur de Villamonte; Philibert du Croc, and

⁵¹ Cynthia Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception: King James VI of Scotland's Foreign Relations with Europe (c.1584-1603)' (PhD Thesis, St Andrews, 2014), pp. 154-156.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

Monsieur de Beaumont. The longest serving French ambassador at the Scottish court was Phillibert du Croc who was described by James Melville as ‘a grave, aged, discreet gentlemen, advanced by the house of Guise’.⁵³ Du Croc travelled back and forth between France and Scotland between 1565 and 1567, during which time he was present for the baptism of Prince James VI, the murder of Darnley, and Mary’s imprisonment in Scotland. Even with all these events taken into consideration, the absence of a resident French ambassador helps to explain why Mary continued her mother’s practices of communicating with the French ambassador resident at the English court.

The longest serving French ambassador at the English court in this period of study was Paul de Foix who resided there for almost four and a half years starting in February 1562. He was sent to replace de Seure, and remained in England until July 1566, when he was replaced by Mothe-Fénélon. On average, de Foix wrote a letter in cipher every three weeks to the French court, to either Catherine de Medici, Dowager Queen of France or Charles IX, and he received frequent replies.⁵⁴ Whilst his traditional role as an ambassador was to report information to his home court has received attention, the reasons for and the impact of de Foix’s role as a key correspondent of Mary’s at the English court still needs to be addressed. How and where the correspondence has survived is the reason why Mary and de Foix’s epistolary relationship has been overlooked. As previously mentioned, five letters have survived, one from 1562, one from 1564, and three from 1565 that were dispersed between English, French, and private archives. Four of these letters were brought together in Potter’s volume of de Foix’s correspondence and one is from the collections at the British Library that was not identified by Potter.⁵⁵

⁵³ *Memoirs of Sir James Melville of Halhill, 1535-1617*, p. 153; TNA SP 59/12, ff. 166r-167v, Drury to Cecil, 26 January 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 912].

⁵⁴ Diane Fett, ‘Information, Intelligence and Negotiation in the West European Diplomatic World, 1558-1588’, p. 209; *ibid.*, p. 226.

⁵⁵ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 39-41; *ibid.*, pp. 334-335; *ibid.*, pp. 369-371; *ibid.*, p. 372; BL Add. 19401, ff. 103r-104v, de Foix to Mary, 7 May 1564.

We know that de Foix and Mary were corresponding just before 1565 and even before de Foix started his residency in England in 1562. De Foix first came to England in November 1561 as part of his journey to Scotland for a special commission. As far as we know, de Foix practised Protestantism and was sent on behalf of Charles IX of France with instructions to find out about the purpose of the ambassador of Savoy, Carlo Ubertino Solaro, Count of Moretta's, mission to Scotland. Whilst he was stationed in England, de Foix's role as resident ambassador to England was already being prepared and less than two months after he returned from Scotland, de Foix was sent to England. The objective of this embassy, as described by Throckmorton, was to polarise the relationship between England and Scotland.⁵⁶ This explains why de Foix was commissioned first to Scotland, to establish connections, and not sent to replace de Seure at the English court sooner. The embassy to Scotland was also to welcome Mary back to Scottish soil and, more importantly, for de Foix to make the Scottish Queen's acquaintance in person and secure her as a correspondent. However, Mary found de Foix overly familiar and his habit of visiting her at least once a day without any warning was very irritating.⁵⁷ During de Foix's mission to Scotland, Maitland gave Cecil a favourable report of the French ambassador's presence at the Scottish court. In contrast to his own private discussions, he was quick to draw attention to some of the negatives. Although the French ambassador was a Protestant, he chose to attend Mass with Mary, a tactic used to earn her favour and secure private conversations.⁵⁸ De Foix's efforts in Scotland established him as capable of taking on a residency in England.

As will also be demonstrated from an examination of the correspondence of English and Scottish ambassadors and courtiers, Mary and de Foix were communicating

⁵⁶ TNA SP 70/34, ff. 95r-96v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 26 January 1562 [*CSP Foreign 1561-62*, no. 839].

⁵⁷ Hiram Morgan, 'To Scotland: From France (1561-2)', p. 165; 'il venoit privement une fois le jour sans advertir'.

⁵⁸ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 178r-179v, Maitland to Cecil, 7 December 1561 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 1048].

before the date of the letter in Potter's volume. A fifth letter has been identified that was sent from de Foix to Mary on 7 May 1564 that survives in the archives of the British Library.⁵⁹ This one letter expands our knowledge of when the pair were communicating. If we had been guided by Potter's research, the first letter sent from de Foix to Mary was not until 1 September 1565. This supports the argument that the Scottish practice of sustaining an epistolary relationship with the French ambassador resident at the English court was not only relied upon when a crisis arose but was instead, also an established practice that helped to sustain Franco-Scottish diplomatic relations.

In the first 1564 letter, de Foix sent a report to Mary that peace treaty negotiations in the Treaty of Troyes had been concluded between Elizabeth and Charles IX earlier that year in April 1564. A month later, Charles IX was appointed a Knight of the Order of the Garter and it was de Foix's duty to report the details of the version of the ceremony at the English court. This honour acted as a sweetener after the conclusion of Anglo-French peace. If one was only to consult Potter's volume of de Foix's correspondence, then this would lead us to assume that Mary and de Foix started exchanging correspondence frequently in the aftermath of her marriage to Darnley and during the Scottish national crisis of the Chaseabout Raid rebellion. However, the addition of this letter from May 1564 supports the argument that de Foix was a more regular correspondent of Mary's and was not simply called upon to act as a secret informer during a crisis but was supplying information more consistently, which has perhaps now been lost.

Mentions of Mary and de Foix in other correspondence also supports the argument that there was a longer history to their epistolary relationship. The English ambassadors in Scotland kept a close eye on any news relating to Mary and other ambassadors and provided updates on the connection between France and Scotland. Reports from the

⁵⁹ BL Add. MS 19401, ff. 103r-104v, de Foix to Mary, 7 May 1564.

English ambassador have expanded the period when we knew Mary and de Foix were corresponding. As early as January 1564, Randolph reported to Elizabeth that de Foix was corresponding with Catherine de Medici as well as Mary about Elizabeth's preference for Leicester or Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick as a suitable husband for the Scottish Queen.⁶⁰ From what Randolph knew of de Foix's report, he understood that he regarded Elizabeth's proposals favourably and supported the idea of Mary taking her advice on the matter. Unfortunately, the letters have not survived. The five letters were only the beginning of what we know about the correspondence between Mary and de Foix, and they, as well as others of de Foix's correspondence, contain references to additional materials.

Turning to the letters in Potter's volume, three of the four letters sent between Mary and de Foix that have survived are from 1565. To put the letters into context, we have already discussed how tensions between England and Scotland grew after Mary decided to marry Darnley. This emphasised a shift towards independent decision-making on Mary's part for the next two years of her personal rule. Between Tamworth's embassy to Scotland, to complain about Elizabeth's displeasure at Mary's marriage, and his imprisonment at Hume Castle, de Foix was corresponding with Mary. A letter from 15 August 1565 written from de Foix to Cecil asked the English secretary to forward a letter that he had written to Mary.⁶¹ Whilst the letter he asked the English secretary to send may not have been from the French resident ambassador, Cecil was aware that Mary and de Foix were at least sending packets. We cannot be sure whether Cecil was suspicious or even deterred by their epistolary relationship, but their letters were not always sent secretly between England and Scotland. De Foix's reference to sending correspondence

⁶⁰ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 7r-8v, Randolph to Elizabeth, 21 January 1564 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 49].

⁶¹ TNA SP 70/79, ff. 135r-v, De Foix to Cecil, 15 August 1565 [*CSF 1564-65*, no. 1387].

to Mary on 15 August predates any known letter sent by Mary or the French ambassador in 1565. In Potter's volume, the first letter sent from de Foix to Mary that year was on 1 September. This demonstrates that de Foix was writing to Mary, possibly with news from the English and French court about their reaction to her marriage to Darnley. In Potter's edition, it was not until 26 October 1565 that Mary wrote her first letter to de Foix. However, she referred to other correspondence she had previously received from de Foix, 'Car par voz deulx dernieres lettres' and referred to him as an 'affectionné et bon amy'.⁶² Again, on 8 November, Mary stated that 'j'ay receu ce courier présent porteur troys de voz lettres'.⁶³ None of these letters survive.

We know that correspondence was carried between the English and Scottish court by one 'Captain Cobron', who was sometimes referred to as Comberon.⁶⁴ The individual in question is likely to have been a Scottish informant and spy Captain Ninian Cockburn – who also used the alias Beaumont in his correspondence. Cockburn was appointed a captain in 1553 and worked with the English, Scottish and French governments in the 1550s and 1560s.⁶⁵ As early as 22 May 1560, Cockburn was operating covert activities for the English government. In a letter that was written almost entirely in cipher, Throckmorton asked Cecil to instruct Norfolk and Grey on the border to 'wink' at Cockburn's passage through the border region so he could carry messages from the Cardinal and the Duke of Guise in France to Leith.⁶⁶ The idea that Cockburn was operating between the English and Scottish governments in this decade cannot be

⁶² Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 369-371. French transcription: 'because in your last two letters' and referred to him as an 'affectionate and good friend'.

⁶³ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, p. 372, 'I received this courier present carrying three of your [de Foix] letters'.

⁶⁴ See, Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, p. 336, footnote 567; 'an agent used in relations between France and Scotland'.

⁶⁵ Amy Blakeway, 'Cockburn, Ninian [Rinean; pseud. George Beaumont] (d. 1579)', *ODNB* online edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018)

⁶⁶ TNA SP 70/14, ff. 105r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 22 May 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 116]. In the calendar reference for the letter, Cockburn is spelt as 'Cocborne'.

dismissed. From his correspondence, we can identify that Cockburn was travelling between England and Scotland at around the same dates as de Foix and Mary were corresponding. On 21 September 1565, Cockburn sent a letter to Cecil from Edinburgh warning the English secretary about the past consequences of James V banishing the Earl of Angus from Scotland after he had hoped to receive aid from the English. Cockburn hoped this would deter the English government from aiding the Chaseabout Raid rebels against Mary. In the same letter, Cockburn detailed his journey on his return to Scotland where he stopped at Berwick on 21 September before travelling on to Scotland for an audience with Mary to present her with letters from England.⁶⁷ Cockburn was in Scotland until at least the final days of October, after which he returned to the English court.⁶⁸ However, in October 1565, Mary confronted Cockburn on his role as a double agent who worked with both the English and Scottish government and from 1566, Cockburn was relocated to France to operate intelligence-gathering on Mary's behalf.⁶⁹ On 7 November, a passport was issued for Christopher Cockburn that stated he was travelling to France following his uncle, Captain Cockburn.⁷⁰ It is, therefore, highly likely that Cobron and Cockburn were the same person. We also know that Cockburn carried oral and written messages between de Foix and Mary, which were used to convey more secret information involving Scottish networks. This may help to explain why there was a lack of surviving correspondence between the two.⁷¹ Whilst Cockburn was trusted to carry the information between the two correspondents, his role was only as a letter bearer, and he delivered messages verbally rather than being involved in the discussions about direct negotiations.

⁶⁷ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 116r-117v, Ninian Cockburn to Cecil, 2 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 273].

⁶⁸ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 159-160, Bedford to Cecil, 31 October 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1637].

⁶⁹ Blakeway, 'Cockburn, Ninian [Rinean; pseud. George Beaumont] (d. 1579)', *ODNB*.

⁷⁰ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 174-175, Passport for Christopher Cockburn, 7 November 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1653]; TNA SP 52/12, ff. 1r-2v, Captain Cockburn to Cecil, 8 January 1566 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 325]. From January, we know Cockburn was in France and still corresponded on a monthly basis throughout 1566.

⁷¹ J. E. A. Dawson, *Clan Campbell Letters* (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1997), pp. 4-7.

When discussing her actions towards the Chaseabout Raid rebels, Mary directly told de Foix ‘Et encores que je vous aye escript bien au long par Cobron l’yssue de ces troubles, je vous prie ne laisser à luy remonstrer ce que je vous escriptz’.⁷² The correspondence between Mary and de Foix was part of a wider Franco-Scottish chain of communication, as the French ambassador resident in England was also asked to pass on information to France. In a long letter, Mary complained to de Foix about the actions of the Chaseabout Raid Rebels. Mary added that she hoped de Foix ‘je m’en assure et d’advertir le Roy mon beau frere de toutes les choses lesquelles je vous mande’.⁷³ This was another method that Mary used to update the French court on actions taking place in Scotland away from prying English eyes.

What we can infer from the five surviving letters that were sent directly between Mary and de Foix is that Mary understood the importance of using the French resident ambassador as a confidential contact at the English court. Despite her complaints about his frequent visits during his embassy to Scotland, Mary was highly complimentary of de Foix in the correspondence during the Chaseabout Raid and this reflects the importance of the policy at that time. Mary wrote to de Foix that, ‘je vous prieray doresnavant comme ung de mes plus speciaux amys et proteste que me trouverez telle en vostre endroict tant que je vivray, pour la demonstration que me faictes de vostre bonne volonté’.⁷⁴ She went on to ask de Foix to inquire if ‘la Royne d’Angleterre faict, comme l’on dict, armer par mer et terre pour supporter noz rebelles, affin que selon cela nous pourvoions à noz

⁷² Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, p. 336, ‘And even though I have written to you at length through Cobron about the outcome of these troubles, I ask you not to show him what I am writing to you’.

⁷³ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 369-371, ‘I am assured and warning the King [of France], my brother-in-law, of all the things of which I am telling you’.

⁷⁴ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 369-371; ‘I pray to you from now on, as one of my most special friends, and protest that I will find myself such in your agreement as long as I live, as a demonstration given to me of your good will’.

affaires'.⁷⁵ The threat of defending the English border was enough to make Mary consider actions against Elizabeth. In his first letter, dated 1 September 1565, de Foix focused on the purpose of Mauvissière's commission in his report to Mary. Mauvissière was commissioned to both the English and Scottish courts between June and October 1565 with instructions to help mediate between the two queens after the tense relations since Mary's marriage to Darnley. He was simultaneously instructed to put pressure on Elizabeth to support Mary against the Chaseabout Raid rebels and to persuade her to free the Countess of Lennox.⁷⁶ This demonstrated a turning point in the relationship between the two queens and a lack of trust, based on Elizabeth's previous record of aiding and abetting the Lords of the Congregation between 1559 and 1560. Randolph reported to Cecil that it was common hearsay at the Scottish court that it was doubted whether Elizabeth was assisting the Scottish rebels. This was paired with Randolph reiterating that the Scottish rebels were waiting for aid from England.⁷⁷

It is widely acknowledged that Randolph was in favour of and provided aid to the Chaseabout Raid rebels in 1565.⁷⁸ In other letters, Randolph put pressure on Cecil and Leicester to influence Elizabeth's decision to assist the Lords of the Congregation.⁷⁹ As discussed in Chapter One, we know from other sources that Mary was aware that Elizabeth aided the Chaseabout Raid rebels and this was the real reason why Randolph was dismissed in March 1566.⁸⁰ The men who dispersed the English funds to the rebels were Randolph, as the English ambassador in Scotland, and Bedford, the Governor of

⁷⁵ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 369-371; 'the Queen of England [Elizabeth] is, as they say, building up an arm on sea and land to support our [Chaseabout Raid] rebels, so that according to this we can attend to our affairs'.

⁷⁶ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 334-335; TNA SP 52/11, ff. 64r-65v, Mary to Randolph, 7 September 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 247].

⁷⁷ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 89r-91v, Randolph to Cecil, [19-20] September 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 261].

⁷⁸ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: An Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 243-244.

⁷⁹ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 146r-147v, Randolph to Cecil, 19 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 285]; TNA SP 52/11, ff. 143r-145v, Randolph to the Earl of Leicester, 10 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 284].

⁸⁰ See Chapter 1: The Personnel in English and Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 94-97.

Berwick. As well as acting covertly, Randolph was also responsible for monitoring rumours from Mary or anyone else passing through the Scottish court. In September, correspondence between Bedford and Elizabeth provided clear evidence that Elizabeth knew and approved of the giving of financial and military aid – in the form of troops – to the rebels.⁸¹ Elizabeth sent £3,000 (sterling) to Bedford of which £1,000 was to be sent to Moray secretly and the other £2,000 was to be used towards the troops of footmen and horsemen at Berwick.⁸² A month later, on 29 October, Elizabeth wrote separately to Randolph and instructed him to use his discretion to help the rebels. The exact phrasing in her letter was ‘if it may appeare that they depend uppo[n] vs in ther sute and therefore therein yow may doo as yow shall see cause as to ~~hel~~ help them’.⁸³ This was, in itself, a continuation of what became a pattern in Elizabethan foreign policy where the English government provided aid to a Scottish rebel group.

Whether de Foix knew about Elizabeth and her government’s secret financial aid to the Scottish rebels, we cannot be certain. However, we know Elizabeth and her government were aware of Mary’s relationship with the French ambassadors at the English court, and it was likely that they used the epistolary relationship of the Scottish Queen and the French ambassador to deceive Mary about Elizabeth’s support for the rebels. On 24 October 1565, Randolph reported to Cecil that Mary had received letters from the French ambassador with a report that it was known in England ‘that the Q[ueen] Ma[jes]tie hathe assuredlye promised that theie shall gette no releef at her hands’.⁸⁴

⁸¹ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 31r-32v, Elizabeth to Bedford, 12 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1491]; TNA SP 59/10, ff. 46r-48v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 19 September 1565 [*CSP Scots 1564-65*, no. 1509]; TNA SP 59/10, ff. 58r-59v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 28 September 1565 [*CSP Scots 1564-65*, no. 1532]; TNA SP 59/10, ff. 62r-64v, Bedford to Cecil, 28 September 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 1532].

⁸² TNA SP 59/10, ff. 11r-12v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 5 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1461]. Bedford wrote to Elizabeth that he had received £3000 (sterling) from Captain Brickwell and would keep the money in Berwick until its service was needed. TNA SP 59/10, ff. 31r-32v, Elizabeth to Bedford, 12 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1491]. This was a second sum of money sent specifically to be delivered to Moray.

⁸³ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 171r-174v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 29 October 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 291].

⁸⁴ BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 35r-36v, Randolph to Cecil, 24 October 1565.

However, Randolph shared his view that he was worried that without English support, the Scottish rebels' cause would be hopeless and instead, advised the Scottish Lords to be patient.⁸⁵ However, in her last surviving letter to de Foix, on 8 November 1565 Mary thanked the French ambassador for his work at the English court and 'm'assurant que voz bons offices l'auront beaucoup advance je vous ay bien voulu remercier et vous prier d'y continuer et faire mes recommandations à milord de lecestre de qui jes desire estre bonne amye'.⁸⁶ Mary did not or could not explicitly thank de Foix for the information he had sent. Unfortunately, what de Foix reported is in one of the letters that has not survived so, we cannot be certain what was written or reported that deserved the Scottish Queen's praise. It was clear that de Foix was an essential contact for Mary to receive information from the English court, and their correspondence reveals how, practically, she continued relations with France despite the lack of warmth in her relationship with Catherine de Medici after Mary returned to Scotland.⁸⁷

De Foix was officially recalled to the French court in July 1566 and replaced by Mothe-Fénélon, who did not frequently correspond with Mary until the 1570s. This was a year longer than was intended for de Foix's commission. In February 1565, Sir Thomas Smith, English resident ambassador to France, reported news from the French court that he had overheard that de Foix was being recalled and was going to be replaced by de la Mothe-Fénélon in order to send him on a new embassy to Spain.⁸⁸ For the French government, the decision to continue de Foix's residency at the English court coincided with Darnley's return to Scotland. As previously stated, King Charles IX of France and

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Potter, *Letters of Paul de Foix*, pp. 369-371; 'assuring that my good offices will have advanced it [Mary's cause at the English court], I kindly thank you and ask you to continue to recommend me to Lord Leicester with whom I would like to be a good friend'.

⁸⁷ For literature on cooler relations between Mary and Catherine de Medici see, Warnicke, *Mary Queen of Scots*, p. 61.

⁸⁸ TNA SP 70/76, ff. 108r-109v, Sir Thomas Smith to Cecil, 10 February 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 980].

Catherine de Medici took an active role from 1563 onwards in deciding who Mary's second husband should be. Once Mary was married, Charles IX and Catherine de Medici needed to keep an eye on what impact her marital match had upon her relationship with both France and England. In early 1566, the Anglo-Scottish relationship became more distant and in July, de Foix was recalled to France and his replacement resident ambassador, Mothe-Fénélon, was dispatched. No correspondence between Mary and de Foix's replacement has survived, if it existed at all, during the remainder of her personal reign or time in Scotland. We do know that during her imprisonment in England in the 1570s when support for Mary dwindled, she wrote to Mothe-Fénélon as a last resort, hoping to secure French support.⁸⁹ During a crisis, even as a deposed queen, Mary revived the practice of corresponding with the French ambassador resident at the English court in order to expand her intelligence-gathering network in England and maintain her influence with France.

Mary relied on French ambassadors at the English court for information rather than sending a Scottish ambassador to reside in England in the first half of the 1560s. As previously discussed in Chapter One, Mary did not send a resident Scottish ambassador to the English court until Robert Melville was commissioned in May 1566. There are two points to note here. The first is that between 1561 and 1565, Mary regularly appointed her principal secretary, Maitland, as the ambassador to the English court when the situation required a personal representative. However, only months after her return to Scotland, Randolph had reported a rumour that Mary planned to send resident ambassadors to England. In October 1561, Randolph recounted how Balnaves and David Forest's names were put forward as Scottish ambassadors to the English court. This

⁸⁹ For correspondence of Mothe-Fénélon see, NLS MS.572, Typescripts of letters of Mary and Charles IX., 1565-1589, 1839, 1930; *Correspondance diplomatique de Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fénélon*, M. Charles Purton Cooper, ed. (Paris, 1840); Labanoff, *Lettres*, Vol. 4, pp. 2-423 (various pages).

embassy never happened.⁹⁰ Maitland was only commissioned to Elizabeth when Mary needed to have her secretary conduct a private discussion in person on her behalf or when he was involved in a lengthier negotiation. Unfortunately, due to his time-consuming work as Mary's principal secretary, Maitland could not be in England for extended periods. Mary's communication with de Foix was a method used to bridge the gap when she did not receive frequent intelligence from the English court and also to create a closer relationship between France and Scotland. Secondly, the decision to appoint her first resident ambassador to the English court was part of a strategy to continue Mary's supply of information from England. After Captain Ninian Cockburn was sent to France in October 1565, there was a break in Mary's correspondence with de Foix. However, in February 1566, during his first embassy to the English court as the Scottish resident ambassador, Robert Melville was instructed by Mary to communicate with de Foix. His instructions stated that he was to 'haue w[ri]ttin pa[r]tlie to the fransche ambassato[r] to quhome ze sall pass' and 'his p[ar]ts the mat[er] wilbe estemit the mair wechty'.⁹¹ Perhaps we can infer that Robert Melville's communication with de Foix was, in part, linked to a handover of his network and informants to help Melville establish his own intelligence networks in England. With no trusted messenger to deliver correspondence between Scotland and England, Mary changed her policy and appointed a resident ambassador from Scotland to the English court in order to secure a private source of information from England.

Communicating with other ambassadors, monarchs, and courtiers was part of the duty of an ambassador. It was not only Mary who used the French ambassadors commissioned to England and Scotland as part of her intelligence network, but English

⁹⁰ TNA SP 52/6, ff. 164r-164v, Randolph to Cecil, 27 October 1561 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 1038].

⁹¹ NRS GD26/1/1, f. 5br, Mary to Robert Melville, 17 February 1566.

officials also relied on the special French ambassadors at the Scottish court to learn information. In 1567, there was no English resident ambassador in Scotland after Randolph was dismissed the year before. Therefore, the English government had to rely on their extraordinary embassies to Scotland, other foreign ambassadors, and spies to receive regular updates and reports from the Scottish court. As will be discussed below in more detail, after Randolph was dismissed in the previous year, the role of border officials and border espionage networks became the main method of gathering intelligence from Scotland. However, the border officials expanded their network from just Scottish courtiers and borderers to extraordinary French ambassadors who they met during their journeys to Scotland. On 20 May 1567, Drury, Governor of Berwick, wrote to Cecil with information that he had learnt from the French ambassador [du Croc], that the Regent Moray ruled with the advice of the Scottish Privy Council and had discussed Mary's situation.⁹² Philbert du Croc was commissioned to Scotland in 1566 and travelled between France and Scotland until July 1567 when he made his final return to France. Drury was aware that watching the movements of the French ambassador in Scotland was an important part of intelligence-reporting. On 26 April 1568, Drury sent a letter with intelligence that was gathered from Scotland and made sure to include the fact that a French ambassador had arrived in Edinburgh and he understood he was planning to travel to Glasgow the next day.⁹³ The French ambassador was not at the centre of English intelligence networks. However, when it was difficult to obtain information from the Scottish court through their usual sources and methods, French ambassadors proved an important resource. The French government also commissioned ambassadors to the English court as an important part of their own intelligence-gathering strategy. One key

⁹² TNA SP 59/13, ff. 106r-v, Drury to Cecil, 20 May 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1232].

⁹³ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, ff. 350r-v, Intelligence from Drury, 26 April 1568.

example was Maitland's correspondence with François of Lorraine, second Duke of Guise during his embassy in 1563. Maitland wrote to the Duke of Guise with reports about the discussions of the succession in the English Parliament.⁹⁴ However, no response from the Duke of Guise survives because he was assassinated at the end of February during the Siege of Orleans. Therefore, we cannot know how this epistolary relationship would have developed during Maitland's other embassies to the English court.

From the perspective of the French and Scottish courts, Mary's communication with de Foix, whilst he was resident at the English court, was a useful intelligence-gathering strategy to assist the Scottish objective of defending the country against potential English aggression. Even though it is disappointing that only a few letters survive, the very idea of Mary receiving information from a French ambassador at the English court disturbed the English. With diligent English ambassadors in Scotland and representatives on the border, this network of information between Mary and de Foix did not go unnoticed. It was the duty of an English ambassador and representatives to report news, gossip and rumours from foreign courts relating to Franco-Scottish activity. English Border officials and ambassadors knew that Mary received information about England from France and French ambassadors in England. Even before there was a French ambassador resident in London, the English were fearful of French intelligence networks operating in the city. On 18 August 1561, only days after Mary returned to Scotland, Thomas Wharton, first Baron Wharton, wrote to Cecil indicating that one of his spies in the border region, who had travelled from Hexham, had reported that Mary had as good an intelligence network from out of London and the English court as they received

⁹⁴ NLS MS 6135, Copy Maitland to François of Lorraine, second Duke of Guise [end of February 1563].

from Scotland in the border.⁹⁵ However, by 1566, Randolph understood in more detail that Mary received information from the French ambassador in England (de Foix), as well as her own Scottish ambassador (Robert Melville), and Margaret Douglas, Countess of Lennox.⁹⁶

At the Scottish court, any blossoming relationship between France and Scotland strained the Anglo-Scottish relationship and as a result the ambassador, Randolph, felt the tension on his own position. On 18 November 1562, a servant from Monsieur Danville arrived in Scotland with a letter from Charles IX.⁹⁷ Whilst Randolph was present when the letter was delivered and witnessed Mary reading the letter that reported on the state of affairs in France, the French messenger subsequently had a long discussion with Mary in secret with only Maitland present. Maitland did not tell Randolph what was said but assured him it did not concern Elizabeth. It was part of an ambassador's duty to decide what information needed to be reported to their home court, and this included when an ambassador was isolated from that information, especially that involving Franco-Scottish relations.

As well as intelligence, the English government also monitored the military relationship between Scotland and France. The Auld Alliance had only recently been severed with the reduction of French troops in Scotland acting as a crucial part of the provisions of the Treaty of Edinburgh. During moments of tension between England and Scotland, the correspondence of English ambassadors in Scotland and English officials on the border monitored the ships that travelled from France, which might be used to send troops or munitions. None of the shipments were a threat to English security. However, the reports of a potential threat were part of the continuing role of an English ambassador

⁹⁵ TNA SP 59/4, ff. 266r-267v, Lord Wharton to Cecil, 18 August 1561 [*CSP Foreign 1561-62*, no. 420].

⁹⁶ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 21r-v, Randolph to Cecil, 25 February 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 578].

⁹⁷ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 223r-225v, Randolph to [Cecil], 18 November 1562.

to survey and report any possible breaches in security. In 1563, Randolph received news from the English Privy Council that they understood that two French ships were on route to Scotland on 8 February filled with arms, powder, and other munitions ‘(as is to be thought) to attempte some explote vpon the frontiers of this realme, adwuneting to Scotland’.⁹⁸ The English Privy Council instructed Randolph to monitor the French aid coming to Scotland and to send a letter if he had any further information regarding France. It was an expected duty of the English officials in Scotland and on the border to report any news relating to the safety of the kingdom, and this mainly related to the actions of France.

The fear of France aiding Scotland, or vice versa, was a recurring theme between 1559 and 1560. In 1559, this fear was exploited when Knox exaggerated the likelihood that France would use Scotland as a base against England as a method to encourage the English to aid the Lords of the Congregation.⁹⁹ After peace was concluded, the delicate nature of the new alliance was brought into question. In 1564, Bedford reported that he had news from Scotland that powders had been sent from Catherine de Medici to Mary.¹⁰⁰ Nine days later, Bedford followed up on the report with news confirming that artillery sent from Catherine de Medici to Mary had landed in Scotland and wanted to know what his next action should be to defend the English frontier.¹⁰¹ The English government suspected France and Scotland would form an alliance, or that France would at the very least send more aid to Scotland. To diversify her own support, in 1565 Elizabeth started what we now know was part of a four-year marriage negotiation with Archduke Charles

⁹⁸ BL Lansdowne MS 6, ff. 65r-66v, English Privy Council to Randolph, 10 February 1563.

⁹⁹ Andrew Lang, *Scotland Vol. II*, pp. 62-3.

¹⁰⁰ TNA SP 59/8, ff. 130r-v, Bedford to Cecil, 30 June 1564 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 529].

¹⁰¹ TNA SP 59/8, ff. 137r-138v, Bedford to the English Privy Council, 9 July 1564 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 548].

of Austria.¹⁰² In hindsight, this was a defensive manoeuvre designed to strengthen her own alliances in case a military pact was formed between France and Scotland.

On several occasions, this fear became a reality sparked by tensions within the Anglo-Scottish relationship. On 23 November 1565, Sir Thomas Smith, the English resident ambassador to the French court, reported to Leicester that he had learnt from a Scottish individual there were rumours that Mary would garner support from France, Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, Philip II of Spain, and Pope Pius IV against the Chaseabout Raid rebels in Scotland.¹⁰³ If this were to prove true, Smith alarmingly estimated that from such widespread continental support she would receive 300,000 men in total. An opportunity for the English government to exert influence arose between Mary's imprisonment in Scotland and her deposition in July 1567 from the Scottish throne. By 1567, England and France were in direct competition to secure influence in Scotland. Throckmorton was hard at work at the Scottish court attempting to negotiate for the young Prince James to be delivered to the English court and brought up under Elizabeth's protection.¹⁰⁴ Meanwhile, the French ambassador in Scotland was trying to secure a similar arrangement with a request that James should be brought to France. Bedford reported to Cecil that the French ambassador had offered large pensions to Scottish nobles if they sent Prince James to France.¹⁰⁵ By 1568, as the Anglo-Scottish situation had reached the height of tension with Mary imprisoned in England and

¹⁰² For Elizabeth's marriage negotiations with France see, Susan Doran, *Monarch and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I* (London: Routledge, 1995); Simon Adams, 'Tudor England's Relations with France', *State Papers Online 1509-1714*, Cengage Learning EMEA Ltd., 2009.

¹⁰³ TNA SP 70/81, ff. 47r-48v, Sir Thomas Smith to Leicester, 23 November 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1689].

¹⁰⁴ For James's protection during his infancy see, Stephen Reid, *The Early Life of James VI: A Long Apprenticeship, 1566-1585* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2023); Alexander Courtney, *James VI, Britannic Price: King of Scots and Elizabeth's Heir, 1566-1603* (Abington: Routledge, 2024).

¹⁰⁵ TNA SP 59/13, ff. 148r-149v, Bedford to Leicester, 15 June 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1304]. We know that Prince James was under the authority of the Earl of Mar. See, NLS MS.6135, ff. 21-22, [Maitland?] to Mary, 10 September 1568; NRS GD 124/10/18, Copy of Instructions to the Earl of Mar for upbringing of James VI, 19 March 1568.

examining her options, she reached out to France and Spain to secure their direct assistance to help restore her to the throne. With hindsight, we know that in the 1560s, Mary did not receive aid from France or Spain, but the English government could not risk letting their guard down on such a crucial matter of security.

Of the few letters that have survived, there is strong evidence of consistent correspondence between Mary and the French ambassador who was resident at the English court. She had lost confidence in Elizabeth's actions, regarding how negotiations were to be concluded over Le Harve and whether Elizabeth would aid the Scottish Chaseabout Raid rebels in 1565. In this situation, de Foix was simply doing what any Scottish ambassador resident at the English court would have done: reported what he knew and when it was requested. There was no specific Franco-Scottish arrangement or plot to divide the Anglo-Scottish relationship in the 1560s. In fact, the opposite can be concluded. In the surviving correspondence, de Foix claimed Elizabeth supported Mary and did not act against the interests of their friendship. In fact, the main purpose of de Foix's relationship with Mary, specifically in 1565, was to report any activity that implied Elizabeth intended to support the rebel group. This points to a new level of mistrust in the relationship between Mary and Elizabeth, which had underpinned the 'amicable' Anglo-Scottish relationship since 1561. Whilst we do not know the full extent of de Foix's reports to Mary, their epistolary relationship was certainly important enough to be monitored by the English government. Even in the context of the newly transformed Anglo-Franco-Scottish relationship, Mary's communication with de Foix continued the previous Scottish diplomatic practices implemented in the 1550s into the 1560s and helped to strengthen Franco-Scottish relations. It was not only at the Scottish court that they continued to use diplomatic practices developed by their predecessors to gather

intelligence from the rival court. On the English side of the border, the English government also used external officials to gather information but, in contrast with the Scottish connection to the French ambassador, the officials were stationed in England and gathered intelligence from the English border town of Berwick to which we now turn.

Berwick as an English Intelligence Centre

Continuities in methods of intelligence gathering were also retained by the English government. Previous scholarship has already recognised the important role that the officials appointed to border positions in or near Berwick played in reporting and sending information relating to international relations in the first half of the sixteenth century.¹⁰⁶ It was often the duties of the officials stationed in Berwick to conclude peace treaties in Berwick and Carlisle.¹⁰⁷ Nobles and courtiers were appointed to the frontier town because of their political background and were either trusted by the monarch or were part of the extended network of the councillors at the English court. The key positions of authority in Berwick were the Warden of the East March of England, the Deputy Warden of the East March, the Governor of Berwick, the Marshall of Berwick, and the Captain of the Garrison of Berwick who together had the combined duty to defend the English East border against Scotland and maintain peace in the region.¹⁰⁸ The instructions of a Warden of the March typically focused on their domestic role to maintain

¹⁰⁶ For literature on Berwick's diplomatic role see, Tough, *The Last Years of a Frontier*; Meikle, *A British Frontier?*; Kellar, *Scotland, England and the Reformation*, p. 208 and p. 214; Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands*.

¹⁰⁷ Gary M. Bell, 'Tudor-Stuart Diplomatic History and the Henrician Experience', Charles Carlton, Robert L. Woods, et al, ed., *State, Sovereigns & Society in Early Modern England: Essays in Honour of A. J. Slavin* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1998), p. 34; MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII', p. 167; Neil Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War, 1522-24* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2023), p. 65; *ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁰⁸ The positions of the English Warden of the East March and the Governor of Berwick were usually given to the same man. In 1565, the Marshall of Berwick was required to step into the Governor's role during his absence from Berwick.

and defend the border.¹⁰⁹ However, it was often an unwritten responsibility that they were to use their position and proximity to gather intelligence and act in international interests.

After the unrest in the north caused by the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536, English border wardens were actively encouraged to send reports to the English Privy Council, principal secretary, and monarch to keep the government in the south in touch with news of unrest in the north.¹¹⁰ Garrison officers in Berwick and Carlisle had networks that they maintained whilst they were in office, which involved employing spies, reporting information to the English government or conversing with ambassadors on their journey.¹¹¹ By 1560, wardens sent regular reports to the English government focusing on border affairs but they would also include international news if relevant, even though it was not part of their instructions. As well as reporting information, wardens were also commissioned on embassies to Scotland, to conferred with the Scots at Berwick, or with Scottish Border Wardens on the border. An official stationed in Berwick was usually appointed because of their military or political experience, and their proximity to the border meant that they could easily reach Scotland if the situation required their presence. In the 1530s, Thomas Clifford, Captain of Berwick was sent on missions to Scotland and this practice continued in the 1560s when Bedford, Governor of Berwick, was sent to Scotland for the baptism of Prince James.¹¹² Even after this particular period of study, officials operating from Berwick were sent on diplomatic missions. In 1570, Sir William

¹⁰⁹ For example, BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, ff. 205r-206v, Instructions to Lord Hunsdon, Warden of the East March, 23 August 1568.

¹¹⁰ Thomas I. Rae, *The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 1513-1603* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1966), p. 82. It was not a requirement for Scottish Border Wardens to report information to their monarch until 1579 but, again, it was an unwritten responsibility. See, *ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

¹¹¹ MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII', pp. 167-168; Neil Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War of 1522-24* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2023), pp. 196-99. Likewise, Blakeway had proven that spies were more heavily relied upon in a time of war. See, Amy Blakeway, 'Spies and Intelligence in Scotland, c.1530-1550', S. Butler, & K. J. Kesselring, ed., *Crossing Borders: Boundaries and Margins in Medieval and Early Modern Britain* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 86.

¹¹² MacMahon, 'The Ambassadors of Henry VIII', pp. 167-168; *ibid.*, 'Appendix B: The Ambassadors of Henry VIII', p. 343.

Drury was commissioned to Scotland with Sir Henry Gates to meet the Regent, James Stewart Earl of Moray whose assassination took place whilst the pair were still in Scotland. In 1576, Sir Robert Bowes, was created Treasurer of Berwick and only a year later was instructed to manage English affairs in Scotland. He was sent on several short embassies until 1590 when he was appointed as the resident ambassador.¹¹³

The officials stationed in Berwick operated as part of a chain of written correspondence and oral communication between Scotland and England, but they were also encouraged to report news from their own intelligence networks. Even though officials in Berwick did not have such good access to information from Scotland as the resident ambassador, when the ambassador was absent or unavailable, or if there was tension in Anglo-Scottish relations, officials at Berwick were used to bridge the gap. Berwick needs to be considered as an important second location for the English government to conduct diplomacy with Scotland. Having an ambassador in Scotland did not, however, mean the officials in Berwick stopped reporting information, it simply meant the weight of the responsibility was shared. Historians of the late sixteenth century have focused attention on the European and Berwick spy networks that evolved after the 1570s under the management of Sir Francis Walsingham.¹¹⁴ More recently, an understanding of the role of spies in the first half of the sixteenth century, on both the

¹¹³ TNA SP 104/163, ff. 45r-v, Instructions to Robert Bowes, 8 September 1577 [*CSP Foreign 1577-78*, no. 200]; TNA SP 104/163, ff. 46r-v, Letters of Credence for Robert Bowes, 8 September 1577 [*CSP Foreign 1577-78*, no. 201]; TNA SP 15/25, ff. 81r-85r, Killigrew to [William] Davison, 12 December 1577 [*CSP Domestic 1566-79*, no. 49]; Gary M. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomats: 1509-1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 242; *ibid.*, pp. 244-249.

Examples of when Robert Bowes was sent to Scotland but retained his position as Treasurer of Berwick, TNA SP 59/20, ff. 62r-63v, Treasurer of Berwick's Account, 1578 [*Calendar of Border Papers, Vol. 1*, no. 35]; TNA SP 52/28, ff. 19r-20v, Elizabeth to James VI, 16 April 1580 [*CSP Scots 1574-81*, no. 472]; BL Harley MS 6999, ff. 18r-19v, English Privy Council to Sir Robert Bowes, 15 January 1581; TNA SP 52/30, ff. 399r-401v, James VI to Elizabeth, 29 September 1582 [*CSP Scots 1581-83*, no. 184].

¹¹⁴ Alan Hynes, *The Elizabethan Secret Service* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2000), p. 35; *ibid.*, pp. 113-115; Stephen Budiansky, *Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham and the Birth of Modern Espionage* (London: Penguin Group, 2006); John Cooper, *The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I* (London: Faber and Faber, 2012), pp. 175-178; Stephen Alford, *The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I* (London: Penguin Group, 2013), pp. 125-178.

English and Scottish side of the border, has shown that Walsingham's efforts were rooted in earlier English appreciation of the importance of intelligence and were not an exclusively English phenomenon.¹¹⁵ The role that officials based in Berwick played in gathering and reporting information to the English court changed during the period and three distinct phases can be identified. The first period, between May 1559 and June 1560, is already well studied in relation to the development of Anglo-Scottish amity and policy.¹¹⁶ Between these dates, the regular and special officials employed at Berwick were critical for gathering information about the conflict between Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland. Their reports were critical in facilitating decisions made by Elizabeth and her government. Between June 1560 and March 1566, Randolph, the English ambassador in Scotland, communicated directly with leading Scots so that regular conferences at Berwick were no longer necessary. Whilst Wardens and officials in Berwick continued to pass any information they received regarding affairs in Scotland, it was only when the English ambassador was absent or had poor access to court activity that the officials deployed in the East March assumed a more active role. Finally, in March 1566, an important change occurred when Randolph was dismissed from Scotland and stationed himself in Berwick for three months to remain close to his intelligence networks. No resident ambassador was sent to replace him. After Randolph was recalled to London in June for a new mission to Russia, the loss of regular reports from the resident ambassador was supplemented with six short extraordinary English embassies between

¹¹⁵ Amy Blakeway, 'Spies and Intelligence in Scotland, c.1530-1550', S. Butler, & K. J. Kesselring, ed., *Crossing Borders: Boundaries and Margins in Medieval and Early Modern Britain* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 83-106; Neil Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War of 1522-24* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2023), pp. 195-213.

¹¹⁶ For literature on the foundations of the Anglo-Scottish amity, 1559-60, see, Roger A. Mason, 'Covenant and Commonweal: The language of politics in Reformation Scotland', Norman Macdougall, ed., *Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408-1929* (J. Donald, 1983), pp. 97-98; Roger A. Mason, 'Imagining Scotland: Scottish political thought and the problem of Britain, 1560-1650', Roger A. Mason, ed., *Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 5-7; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 71-96; Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England, and the Reformation, 1534-1561* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 184-219.

March 1566 and July 1568.¹¹⁷ The embassies were sent during moments of crisis, whether between England or Scotland or domestically in Scotland, to keep the English government informed of the events in closer proximity to the Scottish court. However, the most regular correspondence came from the Governor and Marshall of Berwick (Bedford and Drury) who expanded their spy network and took charge of reporting intelligence from Scotland. Whilst the frequency of international information reported from Berwick fluctuated throughout this decade, it remained part of a range of English intelligence-gathering long before Walsingham established his influence in the 1570s and 1580s. We will now examine the three phases described above in turn.

Berwick is characterised by its unsolicited involvement in national warfare, border conflict, and a range of local English, Scottish and border identities.¹¹⁸ However, it was between 1559 and 1560 that Berwick played a crucial role in intelligence-gathering during the Scottish reformation rebellion. Scholarship has focused on the importance of the correspondence that passed through Berwick and the meetings between the Lords of the Congregation and the English representatives in Berwick that helped inform decisions made by the English government.¹¹⁹ This has overlooked Berwick's importance as a convenient location to receive up-to-date news from Scotland that supported negotiations between the English government and the Lords of the Congregation.¹²⁰ The internal

¹¹⁷ See Appendix 3: Timeline of the English and Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents, 1558-1568, pp. 363-367.

¹¹⁸ For work on civic life in Berwick and about the inhabitants see, K. J. Kesselring, 'Berwick is Our England': Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town' in Norman Jones and Daniel Woolf, ed., *Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Janine Maria Van Vliet, 'From a "strong Town of War" To The "very Heart Of The Country": The English Border Town of Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 1558-1625' (PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2017).

¹¹⁹ See, Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*; Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England, and the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

¹²⁰ For literature on the beginnings of the Scottish reformation see, Gordon Donaldson, *The Scottish Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Ian B. Cowan, *The Scottish Reformation: Church and Society in Sixteenth-Century Scotland* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982); Michael

conflict in Scotland revived fears from before the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis about the potential for a French invasion of England, if the Regent, Mary of Guise’s troops were successful or, more pertinently, received reinforcements from her brother, the Duke of Guise who had successfully reclaimed Calais.¹²¹ Between May and August, the Lords of the Congregation wrote to the officials stationed at Berwick hoping to persuade Elizabeth, or Cecil, her principal secretary, and the English Privy Council to assist them against the French forces.¹²² Only one month before the Scottish Reformation Rebellion broke out in May 1559, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis between the English and the French concluded peace, which legally constrained the English government from any declaration of war against France and by extension Scotland. The English government could not risk making an enemy of the French so early in Elizabeth’s reign and, therefore, were ambiguous in their replies to the Lords of the Congregation on whether they should provide assistance in the form of men or money. This was a tactic to stall for more time in case they did not need to assist the Lords of the Congregation or until they identified a suitable loophole in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis. However, in early August, after Cecil had penned copious memoranda, it was agreed that the English should give advice to the Lords of the Congregation.¹²³ This decision coincided with a previous request from

Lynch, *Edinburgh and the Reformation* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1983), pp. 90-122; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 43-70; Ritchie, *Mary of Guise, 1548-1560*, pp. 205-244; Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England, and the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 113-219; Alex Ryrie, *The origins of the Scottish Reformation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

¹²¹ Alec Ryrie, *The Origins of the Scottish Reformation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 162; David Grummitt, ‘Three Narratives of the Fall of Calais in 1558: Explaining Defeat in Tudor England’, Joanna Bellis and Laura Slater, ed., *Representing war and violence: 1250-1600* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), p. 180. Grummitt argued that the ‘the fall of Calais was due to a combination of English inactivity and the operational brilliance of the duke of Guise’.

¹²² Evidence of the Lords of the Congregation pressing the English government for advice and assistance in July 1559: TNA SP 59/1, ff. 190r-191v, Sir Henry Percy to Cecil, 31 May 1559 [*CSP Foreign* 1558-59, no. 796]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. ff.95r-96v, Knox to Sir Henry Percy, 1 July 1559 [*CSP Scots* 1547-63, no. 481]; TNA SP 52/1, ff.119r-120v, Argyll, Glencairn, Prior of St Andrews, Lord Ruthven, Lord Boyd, Lord Ochiltree to Cecil, 19 July 1559 [*CSP Scots* 1547-63, no. 493]; TNA 52/1, ff.121r-v [Lords of the Congregation] to Elizabeth, 19 July 1559 [*CSP Scots* 1547-63, no. 494]; TNA SP 52/1, ff.76-v, William of Kirkcaldy to [Cecil?], [n.d.] 1559 [*CSP Scots* 1547-63, no. 471].

¹²³ *Sadler Papers*, pp. 375-384; TNA SP 52/1, ff.155r-156v, Croft to Cecil, 3 August 1559 [*CSP Scots* 1547-63, no. 511]; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, pp. 68-69.

Sir Richard Lee, Surveyor of the Works at Berwick, who in July asked Elizabeth to send a trusted man to Berwick to inspect and maintain the fortifications in the coastal town in secret.¹²⁴ It was not until nearly a month later on 7 August that Elizabeth replied to Lee's request confirming that she planned to send Sir Ralph Sadler.¹²⁵

Sadler was sent to Berwick to work as part of a team of English officials who were already stationed in the coastal town and he was described by Jeffrey Becker as having a role 'somewhere between an administrator and chief of policy' in the border region.¹²⁶ Positions were assigned to each man to divide responsibilities to focus on local, border, and national interest.¹²⁷ Amongst the ordinary border officials, the extraordinary position of Lieutenant General of the North was revived when the threat of military tensions arose between England and Scotland.¹²⁸ The position was first created in 1480 and had the power to raise troops across all three Marches of England to defend the border. It was only after tensions escalated between Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation in January 1560, that Norfolk, was appointed Lieutenant General of the North and sent to Berwick.¹²⁹ In a time of peace, the duty of the Lieutenant was divided among the Wardens.¹³⁰ In 1559, Sadler's appointment to Berwick was also an ad hoc position. The purpose of Sadler's appointment was to communicate with the Lords of the Congregation

¹²⁴ TNA SP 59/1, ff. 226r-227v, Sir Richard Lee to Elizabeth, 9 July 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 116].

¹²⁵ TNA SP 59/1, ff. 244r-v, Elizabeth to Sir Richard Lee, 7 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 566].

¹²⁶ Jeffrey Marcus Becker, 'Armed Conflict and Border Society: The East and Middle Marches, 1536-60', (PhD Thesis, University of Durham, 2006)

¹²⁷ The men stationed at Berwick were Thomas Percy, the seventh Earl of Northumberland (Warden of the East and Middle March until October 1559); Sir Henry Percy (Deputy Warden of the East and Middle March); Croft (Governor of Berwick), and Sir Anthony Brown (Captain of the garrison of Berwick).

¹²⁸ Examples of previous Lieutenant-Generals of the North included, Richard, Duke of Gloucester (1480); Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond and Somerset (18 June 1525); Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey (September 1536); Norfolk (29 January 1541); Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford (1544); Henry Neville, fifth Earl of Westmorland (January 1558); Norfolk (December 1560); Bedford (August 1565).

¹²⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 86r-87v, Elizabeth's instructions to Norfolk, 25 December 1559; TNA SP 59/2, ff. 54r-55v, Instructions to Norfolk, 25 December 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 497]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 320r-321v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 31 December 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 605]. Norfolk's predecessor was Henry Neville, fifth Earl of Westmorland who was appointed Lieutenant General of the North between January 1558 until December 1559.

¹³⁰ R. R. Reid, *The King's Council in the North* (Wakefield: EP Publishing Limited, 1975), p. 164.

on behalf of the English government and his skills from experience in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy during the 1530s and early 1540s were crucial to his appointment.¹³¹ Sadler's role in Berwick even mistakenly led Cecil's secretary to describe him as 'Master Imbassador upon our frontiers or at Barwyk'.¹³² Cecil's secretary may have had a better understanding of what an ambassador's role was and, therefore, understood that Sadler's role as an information-gatherer and negotiator in the border region was the equivalent of an ambassador. Another possible reason why Sadler's role was wrongly delineated was because he was intended to be an English ambassador to the Lords of the Congregation, potentially reprising his role in Scotland from his last journey in 1543.

It must be noted that, in general, the governance of the North of England was in the hands of the judicial and administrative body of the English Council of the North.¹³³ The Council was headed by the President and its members were chosen from northern nobles or people with local influence who were then appointed by the monarch and overseen by the President of the Council.¹³⁴ In 1484, the Council was created to oversee the general administration and ensure peace in the north of England. The defence of the border was largely left to the three Wardens.¹³⁵ Henry VIII attempted to bring the Marches under the authority of the Council of the North, but this was severed almost as soon as the ties between the two were established and the wardenries continued to operate as a

¹³¹ For literature on Sadler see, Arthur Joseph Slavin, *Politics and Profit: a study of Sir Ralph Sadler* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); David Byrd Franklin, *The Scottish regency of the Earl of Arran: a study in the failure of Anglo-Scottish relations* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), pp. 35-100; Phillip Gervase, 'Sadler, Sir Ralph (1507-1587)', *ODNB* online edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹³² BL Add. MS 33591, f. 71r, Cecil to Sadler, 31 August 1559.

Similar phrasing was used in a letter from Sadler to Cecil. TNA SP 52/1 f. 198v, Sadler to Cecil, 29 August 1559 is this letter Sadler identifies and corrects this mistake [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 534].

¹³³ For literature on the Council of the North see, F. W. Brooks, *York and the Council of the North* (York: Morley and Sons Ltd, 1954); R. R. Reid, *The King's Council in the North* (Wakefield: EP Publishing Limited, 1975).

¹³⁴ Presidents of the Council of the North: Francis Talbott, fifth Earl of Shrewsbury, 1549-1560; Henry Manners, second Earl of Rutland, 1561-1563; Ambrose Dudley, third Earl of Warwick, 1564; Thomas Young, Archbishop of York, 1564-1568; Thomas Radcliffe, third Earl of Sussex, 1568-1572.

¹³⁵ F. W. Brooks, *York and the Council of the North*, p. 4.

separate authority to the council.¹³⁶ The Wardens and the officials in Berwick corresponded with the Council of the North when they needed cooperation on military matters but ultimately they came under the authority and direction of the English Privy Council.¹³⁷ In the 1560s, the Wardens were an authority independent of the Council of the North and their priority was to defend the English border.¹³⁸

For the officials stationed in Berwick in 1559 to conduct their work effectively, three sets of instructions were drawn up. The first instructions, directed solely to Sadler on his appointment, were written on 7 August 1559. Alongside various domestic duties, Sadler was given two specific but connected tasks relating to Scotland and other general instructions relating to border administration: to deliver letters to Francis Talbott, fifth Earl of Shrewsbury and President of the Council of the North, and Lady Carnaby; to discuss the state of Berwick with Northumberland; to examine Richard Lee's fortifications, and to decide where the meeting concerning border redress was to be held. Sadler's appointment to the border region was not unusual. In 1545 he had been sent to inspect the fortifications at Berwick and this excuse was reprised for his 1559-60 mission to the English border.¹³⁹ The final line of Sadler's instructions was purposely ambiguous, instructing him to 'use his wisdom to cause thyngs there at Barwyk to be put better gov[er]ned'.¹⁴⁰ This gave Sadler autonomy in his actions. A day later on 8 August, joint

¹³⁶ R. R. Reid, *The King's Council in the North* (Wakefield: EP Publishing Limited, 1975), p. 164.

¹³⁷ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 250r-259r, Copy of Instructions for the appointment of Bedford as Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East Marches, also the orders for Berwick, 27 February 1564.

¹³⁸ D. L. W. Tough, *The Last Years of a Frontier: A history of the Borders during the Reign of Elizabeth I* (Alnwick: Sandhill Press, 1928), pp. 164-5; although Tough makes very few comparisons between the responsibilities of men stationed in the Marches and the Council of the North, he does demonstrate that later in their career men from the Marches were appointed to the Council. However, the infrequency of Council meetings meant border duties were the priority.

¹³⁹ H. M. Colvin, ed., *The History of the King's Works, Vol. IV 1485-1660* (Part 2) (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1982), p. 612.

¹⁴⁰ TNA SP 59/1, f. 245r, 'Instructions for Sadler', 7 August 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 1140]; BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 13r-15v, Instructions for Sadler sent to Berwick, [c. 7/8] August 1559.

instructions addressed to Northumberland, Croft, and Sadler were drafted.¹⁴¹ In brief, the instructions asked them to communicate with Mary of Guise to arrange a border redress and ‘appoint some of hir ministers of lyke qualities to mete with the sayd Erle and ye sayd Sir Raff [Sadler] and Sir James [Croft] to determyne some better order in causees according to the last treaty there concluded’.¹⁴² Their joint objective was to invoke anything that ‘may tend to com[m]o[n] q[u]ett of those fro[n]tiers’ on behalf of Elizabeth with Scotland.¹⁴³ This set of instructions was an attempt to continue to reduce friction between the two countries.¹⁴⁴ On the same day, a short, separate letter addressed to Sadler from Elizabeth stated that ‘we haue vppo[n] greate truste conceaved in yow conferred for certen speciall s[er]uice to be doone by yow vppon o[ur] frontiers towards Scotland’ and laid out the more sensitive tasks that needed to be accomplished in Berwick.¹⁴⁵ Sadler was given the power to ‘co[n]ferr treate or practise w[ith] any person of Scotland man[n], ether in Scotland or England’ with the aim that it would ‘tend to make a perpetuall co[n]cord betwixt that natio[n] and ours’.¹⁴⁶ On top of this, Sadler was given £3,000 (sterling) with no specific instruction about what it should be spent on.¹⁴⁷ The wording of the whole letter was ambiguous and clouded in secrecy so Sadler was given flexibility in the meaning of his instructions. Due to the distance from London, which was an

¹⁴¹ Northumberland was from a long line of Percy’s who held the position as Warden of the East and Middle Marches and a member of the Council of the North. Croft was appointed Governor of Berwick in 1559 to secure the defences but was previously Lord Deputy of Ireland.

¹⁴² TNA SP 52/1, f. 175r, ‘Instructions for the Duke of Northumberland, Sadler and Croft’, 8 August 1559; [CSP Scots 1547-63, no. 519]; BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 20r- 21v, Instructions to Earl of Northumberland, Sadler, and Croft, 8 August 1559.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p.13. The three sets of instructions used in this research were all written separately by Cecil. They contain corrections to the text which signifies that they were either drafts presented to Elizabeth for correction or approval. The corrections are in Cecil’s hand but whether Elizabeth had any input in them is unclear. These drafts were sent because the fold marks and fading demonstrate they were sent or carried outside the English court.

¹⁴⁵ BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 16r-19v, Elizabeth to Sadler, 8 August 1559.

¹⁴⁶ TNA SP 52/1, f. 177r, Elizabeth to Sadler, 8 August 1559 [CSP Scots 1547-63, no. 520]; BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 16r-19v, Elizabeth to Sadler, 8 August 1559.

¹⁴⁷ TNA SP 52/1, f. 177r, Elizabeth to Sadler, 8 August 1559 [CSP Scots 1547-63, no. 520]; BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 16r-19v, Elizabeth to Sadler, 8 August 1559; D. L. W. Tough, *The Last Years of a Frontier: A history of the Borders during the reign of Elizabeth I* (Alnwick: Sandhill Press, 1928), pp. 189-190.

advantage of Berwick's location, an ambassador or representative needed to be able to act alone or with advice from people they could talk to in the area. Together the three sets of instructions helped to delineate the roles of the newcomer from the established officials already in the border region. With their instructions in hand, it was now the objective of the men stationed in Berwick to use their advantageous position in the town to meet and correspond with the Lords of the Congregation.

Berwick was most useful as a correspondence hub on the route between Scotland and London. Randolph was frequently sent into Scotland to meet with members of the Lords of the Congregation, but they needed skilled and trustworthy officials nearby to manage, keep secure, and forward the information. Before Sadler arrived on the English border, Sir James Croft was the main correspondent on affairs in Scotland. He wrote fourteen letters in the space of two months (on average one every four days) with updates about the movements of the Lords in Scotland and reports on the progress of the works at Berwick.¹⁴⁸ After 5 August, Croft was only involved in joint correspondence with Sadler, who evidently managed the correspondence chain between Scotland and London. After the 18 August 1559, it was part of Sadler's duty to report news on the movements of both Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation. However, Berwick still proved too distant from the action to receive regular news from Scotland. By the end of the month, Sadler reported that he had 'h[e]ard nothing from the protestants', despite the fact they

¹⁴⁸ For correspondence between Croft and Cecil see, TNA SP 52/1, ff. 66r-67v, Croft to Cecil, 5 June 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 464]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 97r-v, Croft to Cecil, 3 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 482]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 103r-104v, Croft to Cecil, 6 July [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 485]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 107r-v, Croft to Cecil, 11 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 487]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 115r-116v, Croft to Cecil, 14 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 491]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 125r-126v, Croft to Cecil, 20 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 497]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 130r-131v, Croft to Cecil, 22 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 499]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 136r-137v, Croft to Cecil, 24 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 502]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 139r-140v, Croft to Cecil, 26 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 504]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 141r-v, Croft to Cecil, 26 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 505]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 153r-154v, Croft to Cecil, 1 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 510]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 155r-156v, Croft to Cecil, 3 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 511]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 162r-163v, Croft to Cecil, 4 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 513]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 164r-165v, Croft to Cecil, 5 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 514].

had held several meetings at Glasgow and Stirling.¹⁴⁹ The lack of information from Sadler and Croft prompted the English government to send someone, Randolph, as the English agent to liaise with the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland and then to communicate information directly from the source. As explained in Chapter One, Randolph was secretly sent to reside with the Lords of the Congregation to gather information on behalf of the English government. He was not sent as an ambassador. This would have openly demonstrated that Elizabeth wanted to support the Lords of the Congregation against the rightful ruler. As an agent, Randolph's role was to send information to the English government to help them determine whether it was beneficial for the safety of the realm to intervene in the confrontation between Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation. Katherine Frescoln argued that Randolph served as a channel of communication between the Lords of the Congregation and England, often acting as their clerk and handling their correspondence. This gave Randolph access to valuable information which was then added to his own reports to Berwick.¹⁵⁰ The team in Berwick worked in tandem with Randolph to report information as quickly as possible between the two sides and it was only after Randolph's appointment that the officials at Berwick received regular updates about the Lords of the Congregation's movements. Between September 1559 and March 1560, Randolph wrote sixteen letters to Sadler and Croft at Berwick, and it was their duty to forward his correspondence to the English court.¹⁵¹

The English ambassadors stationed in Scotland sent their letters to Berwick and typically addressed the packets to the Governor of Berwick, which in this period was Croft. However, Randolph's letters were addressed to both Sadler and Croft, showing that

¹⁴⁹ TNA SP 52/1 f. 200r, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 29 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 535]; this implied they were receiving news from spies or men involved with the Lords of the Congregation.

¹⁵⁰ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', p. 18.

¹⁵¹ This figure has been taken from reviewing TNA SP 52/1-2; TNA SP 59/1-2; BL Add. MS 33591-2. This is not to say this is the final number, but it is what this research has uncovered.

Randolph acknowledged Sadler as a key correspondent in Berwick.¹⁵² Randolph frequently wrote to Sadler and Croft in cipher, which was then deciphered by Sadler's secretary, Gregory Railton. This process helped to speed up decisions when the reports were received in London.¹⁵³ It was common for ambassadors and agents to use ciphers in their reports because they were sending highly sensitive information.¹⁵⁴ From Berwick, Sadler and Croft addressed the packets to Cecil and between August 1559 and January 1560, they wrote thirty-eight letters to the secretary, which on average was a letter every five days.¹⁵⁵ As will be explained later in this chapter, members of the Lords of the Congregation often travelled to Berwick by land or sea to meet Sadler and Croft and discuss at length their requirements from the English government. Therefore, the officials at Berwick wrote more frequently to London than Randolph wrote to the men at Berwick because they had their own information to deliver. Railton was Sadler's secretary, which explains why the correspondence was mainly written in Sadler's voice. If Croft or Norfolk (after January 1560) had anything they needed to communicate with the English government in Sadler's letters, then this was added to the letter in the first person; for example, this might include their expertise concerning the fortification at Berwick or the military actions taken to aid the Scots.¹⁵⁶ Croft and Norfolk wrote letters either in their

¹⁵² Randolph also wrote five letters just to Sadler in these same months.

¹⁵³ Fett, 'Information, Intelligence and Negotiation in the West European Diplomatic Word, 1558-1588' (PhD Thesis, Ohio State University, 2009), pp. 228-229.

¹⁵⁴ Tracy Sowerby, 'The Role of the Ambassador and the Use of Ciphers', State Papers Online (2009); Nadine Akkerman, 'The Postmistress, the Diplomat, and a Black Chamber?: Alexandrine of Taxis, Sir Balthazar Gerbier and the Power of Postal Control', Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox, ed., *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 172-88; Osborne, *Dynasty and Diplomacy*, pp. 279-81.

¹⁵⁵ The longest gap in their correspondence with Cecil was between 29 August 1559 and 8 September 1559 and this was called out in a letter from Cecil on 31 August 1559 who was desperate for frequent intelligence on the situation in Scotland.

¹⁵⁶ *Sadler Papers*, p. 136. In the final paragraph of the letter, Croft adds his input, saying 'that I sir James Croft lately sent up a boke, conteyning a perfite declaracion of all such kynds of armour weapon and amunicion, and of the store of powder'; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 73r-74v, Copy of Sadler and Croft to Randolph (decyphered), 27 October 1559; Croft put his input into letters on military matters: 'Tell the Earle of Arrain that I the Cap[tain] of Barwicke have for him in a readines a fayre Morian [ship] and a targett w[hich] I would he had but he must p[ro]vide one to co[n]ven the same unto him secretlie and lykewise for all othe thinges w[hich] they requyer of us' (f. 73v).

own hand or that of their secretary to Cecil but they also added to the more frequently written correspondence of Sadler and Croft that was sent to the English court.

As part of their role in Berwick, Sadler and Croft had an obligation to give advice to Randolph or any correspondents who were part of the Lords of the Congregation. Both men were chosen to represent the English government in Berwick because they had experience of acting on English interests during periods of conflict. Although the correspondence of Sadler and Croft with Cecil repeatedly asked for guidance, they were in a position of trust where they could offer advice in the interim when the correspondence from London took too long to arrive. The conflict between Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation in November unsettled the English government. The representatives in Berwick were instructed to provide written support and encouragement to Randolph and the Lords of the Congregation, especially in relation to the military occupation of Leith and objective to defend their realm from the conquest of the French.¹⁵⁷ Being stationed in Berwick gave the English team the advantage of being in closer proximity to the action and in times of crisis they were trusted to give advice on behalf of Elizabeth, as her representatives, to the Lords of the Congregation. Even though the main purpose of the team in Berwick was to report Randolph's news to the English court as quickly and as safely as possible, Sadler and Croft also corresponded with the Lords of the Congregation on their own terms.

Whilst reporting news received from Randolph, the officials in Berwick also maintained their own correspondence and information networks from the border. Both Sadler and Croft recognised that it was useful for each of them to write to different members of the Lords of the Congregation based on their shared interests or existing

¹⁵⁷ *Sadler Papers*, pp. 556-7; TNA SP 52/1 f. 305r, Sadler and Croft to the Earl Arran and Lord James, 6 December 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 387].

relationships. Croft corresponded with Knox between June and October 1559, sharing expressively devotional sentiments in their letters.¹⁵⁸ Although a Protestant, as his previous actions under Edward and Mary demonstrate, Sadler was not outwardly zealous in his letters. Members of the Lords of the Congregation that were part of Sadler's correspondence were mainly people he had previously known during his residency in Scotland in 1543. For example, Sadler was sent to the Regent Arran (now referred to as Châtelherault) and also consulted with Henry Balnaves. Both men were useful contacts for Sadler: Balnaves was a prominent Scottish politician (who had served in the Scottish Parliament under James V and then the Regent Arran) and Arran had an extensive network of Scottish nobles and lairds. The correspondence network established by Sadler and Croft was necessary for sustaining communication with the Lords of the Congregation in case Randolph was absent from Scotland, which in this period only happened once.

During Randolph's absence, the officials at Berwick needed to have an alternative plan for the way in which they received information about what was happening in Scotland. Between 23 November and 25 December 1559, Randolph accompanied Maitland, a representative of the Lords of the Congregation, to London to plead with Elizabeth for aid. Frescoln has already unpacked the importance of the mission from the perspective of the meeting's actions at the English court. Randolph used this opportunity to meet with Cecil and give him a more detailed breakdown of the events and people in Scotland and created a memorial of answers and questions to bring back to the Lords of the Congregation.¹⁵⁹ Whilst Randolph was absent from Scotland, he continued to receive updates at the English court on the movements of the Lords of the Congregation and the

¹⁵⁸ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 75r-76v, Copy of Croft's letter to Knox, 27 October 1559; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 79r-80v, Knox to Croft, 29 October.

¹⁵⁹ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 30-33; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX, ff. 298r-299v, Memorial by Cecil of affairs of Scotland, 12 December 1559.

events in Scotland from John Wood, who was part of his network in Scotland.¹⁶⁰ At Berwick, Randolph's absence was a catalyst for Sadler and Croft to begin to correspond directly with Arran and Lord James Stewart. In September 1559, Arran made the acquaintance of Sadler and Croft during his return journey to Scotland through Berwick. Lord James was already familiar with Sadler who he had met in 1543 during Sadler's embassy to Scotland as the English ambassador. One week after Randolph left Scotland, Arran and Lord James wrote to Sadler and Croft expressing their thanks for their service and requesting money to be delivered by the bearer Alexander Whitelaw.¹⁶¹ After this initial letter, the two groups corresponded regularly until March 1560, whilst still receiving updates from Randolph, and the two key members of the Lords of the Congregation tried to persuade the team in Berwick to aid their cause.¹⁶² Illness also had an impact, but did not completely impair, Randolph's ability to send information to the officials in Berwick. After Randolph returned to Scotland in December 1559, he was bed-ridden for six days but continued to write to Sadler and Croft. In February 1560, Randolph was once again struck down with illness and Norfolk requested that he should have been informed by Balnaves to explain any slothfulness in writing from Randolph's end.¹⁶³ When Randolph was absent, there was a disparity in information both at Berwick and at the English court, but being closer to the events unfolding in Scotland, the men stationed at Berwick needed to fill the gap.

When reports from Randolph and the Lords of the Congregation were not frequent enough, Sadler and Croft relied on espionage networks from Berwick, 'to occupie the

¹⁶⁰ *Sadler Papers*, pp. 155-158. We know Wood was sent to England by the Regent Moray on behalf of James VI in 1567 and 1568 see, Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568, pp. 359-360.

¹⁶¹ *Sadler Papers*, p. 158.

¹⁶² Between November 1559 and March 1560, 17 letters were exchanged between Arran and Lord James, and Sadler and Croft and twelve were exchanged between Randolph and Sadler and Croft (only one was from the pair in Berwick).

¹⁶³ TNA SP 52/2, ff. 55r-v, Randolph to Norfolk, [n.d.] February 1560 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 661].

postes w[ith]such matier as we can gette by espiell and otherwise by com[m]en brute'.¹⁶⁴

The espionage networks operating out of Berwick in 1559 and throughout the 1560s were part of a longer line of spy networks from the border region. The use of spy networks in the border has been brought to scholars' attention most recently by Neil Murphy's studies of the 1530s.¹⁶⁵ His research contributes to this understudied area of history; an area that has only been examined after Walsingham developed espionage networks in the 1570s. It was the traditional role of the Governor of Berwick, Croft in this case, to maintain a spy network in and around Berwick.¹⁶⁶ On 13 February 1560, when the officials at Berwick moved to Newcastle to negotiate terms with the Lords of the Congregation, Norfolk asked Croft to stay in Berwick to receive intelligence from Scotland, which could then be passed to the English court and Newcastle.¹⁶⁷ The officials at Berwick divided the responsibility to make sure that they continued to report information that was received in different border locations. Only limited evidence of notes written by spies survive and we only know information that was reported when it was indicated in letters by other people. Papers titled 'intelligence from Scotland' were a common source of information in intelligence gathering. One such example was written on 10 November 1559 in a Scottish hand and then sent to the English court. It reported the news that Bothwell had taken money sent from the officials in Berwick to the Lords of the Congregation. It provided an update on the movements of the Scottish rebels and the military movements of the French and Scottish faction. It also reported that the Scots were not yet ready for a skirmish between France and England.¹⁶⁸ On other occasions, a spy's report would be summarised in Croft's correspondence to the English court. On 16 January 1560, 'D.S.'

¹⁶⁴ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, f. 71r, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 23 October 1559.

¹⁶⁵ Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War, 1522-24*, p. 65; *ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁶⁶ TNA SP 59/3, ff. 22r-23v, Croft to Cecil, [n.d.] August 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560*, no. 436].

¹⁶⁷ TNA SP 59/2, ff. 123r-124v, Croft to Sadler, 13 February 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 719].

¹⁶⁸ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 244r-245v, Intelligence from Scotland, 10 November 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 566]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 59r-60v, Copy, Intelligence from Scotland, 10 November 1559.

reported to Croft that the French had occupied Kinghorn and Burntisland with the purpose of building a fort; that there was a great store of artillery in Inchkeith island, and the French had very few victuals.¹⁶⁹ Two days later, Norfolk, Sadler and Croft wrote to Cecil and reported word for word what they had been warned about by their spy.¹⁷⁰ The English government was also not opposed to using French spies to gather information in tense situations. In 1560, Norfolk, complained to Elizabeth that there was a lack of good spies on the French side in the border region who were either willing to supply the English with covert information or who had access to good information.¹⁷¹ Spies were a less reliable source than Randolph and were used only when Sadler and Croft did not have any updates from an English agent, when they were pressured for information by the English government, or if the context of the specific situation required immediate intelligence.

Officials at Berwick needed to juggle other responsibilities as well as manage the correspondence between Scotland and London. It is well known that the English government, with Elizabeth's approval, provided the Lords of the Congregation with money, which was either sent from London or supplemented from the Treasury in Berwick. It is less well known that Sadler and Croft attempted to provide their own financial aid to the rebel group.¹⁷² On 31 October, in letters to both Randolph and Cecil, Sadler and Croft declared that they had sent £1000 (sterling) of their own money (including some borrowed from friends) with the stand-in postman John Cockburn, Lord of Ormeston to the Lords of the Congregation in order for them to pay their soldiers.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ TNA SP 59/2, ff. 76r-v, D.S. to Croft, 16 January 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 585].

¹⁷⁰ TNA SP 59/2, ff. 77r-78v, Norfolk, Sadler, and Croft, to Cecil, 18 January 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 592].

¹⁷¹ TNA SP 59/2, ff. 105r-106v, Lord Grey to Elizabeth, 8 February 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 700].

¹⁷² Ridpath, *The Border History of England and Scotland*, p.410; Stephen Alford, *Burghley: William Cecil at the Court of Elizabeth I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 106.

¹⁷³ *Sadler Papers*, p. 528; BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 6r-8v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 4 November 1559; BL, Cotton Caligula B/IX/1 f. 81r, Sadler and Sir James Croft to Cecil, 31 October 1559; BL Cotton MS Caligula, ff. 83r-84v, Balnaves to Sadler, 1 November 1559.

Unfortunately, Ormeston was ambushed by Bothwell, who stole the funds.¹⁷⁴ This event was crucial. Firstly, it demonstrated that there were spies working for Mary of Guise or that news was being leaked from the privacy of Berwick or more broadly from the East March. Secondly, and more importantly, it shows that Sadler and Croft were dedicated to providing support for the Lords of the Congregation. Even though she had already given aid to the Lords of the Congregation from the outset of Sadler's embassy, their personal financial involvement bypassed Elizabeth's approval because they needed to make rapid decisions. This was not the only occasion when the English government sent money to the Lords of the Congregation. A month later, Sadler and Croft satisfied Arran and Lord James's request for £2000 (sterling), and the English officials sent the money with Whitelaw from Berwick. To avoid the same fate as the last payment, the money was conducted safely to Scotland by sea on 15 December 1559.¹⁷⁵ Both sides had learnt their lesson about the precarious nature of conducting secretive operations.

With such a small team working on both domestic and international matters, the men at Berwick were expected to divide the responsibilities to keep the English Marches and Berwick running smoothly. At the end of September, Cecil requested that Sadler should write a detailed letter, almost entirely in cipher, explaining who he believed should be appointed (if the need arose) as Wardens of the English Marches. Sadler's subsequent appointment as Warden was profoundly ironic since his own suggestions for candidates, which did not include himself, were entirely ignored by Cecil.¹⁷⁶ Meikle argued that Sadler's suggestions hinted that border officials, such as Northumberland, should be dismissed and replaced with the more favourable recommendation of Forster, who

¹⁷⁴ TNA SP 59/2 f. 3r, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 5 November 1559; *Sadler Papers*, pp. 536-538 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 160].

¹⁷⁵ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 305r-306v, Copy of Sadler and Croft letter to Arran and Lord James, 6 December 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 439]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 300r-301v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 15 December 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 388].

¹⁷⁶ TNA SP 59/1 f. 262, Sadler to Cecil, 30 September 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 1339].

already had sufficient experience in the area.¹⁷⁷ At the end of October, after Northumberland's presence was required at the English court, Elizabeth wrote that Sadler was appointed as Warden because of his 'present abode in those parties for other our affaires, and your good acquayntance, credit, and estimation, by your so longe experience and travaile in service of those countries'.¹⁷⁸ In contrast, Northumberland claimed he was ordered to 'appoint some one convenient' but his brother, Henry Percy, the only person he saw fit to serve in the position, was already nearly in London.¹⁷⁹ Tough argued that there was tension between Sadler and Northumberland after he declared that the Earl was unfit for the position.¹⁸⁰ However, Northumberland continued to be involved in border affairs and he asked Sadler to relay correspondence relating to the Marches on to him in London.¹⁸¹ Sadler was an unusual appointment because he was not a northern noble. This was about using his knowledge and access to the area, as well as his instructions which already focused on the defence of the border. However, his appointment as Warden of the East March was short lived because Sadler wanted to focus on his correspondence with the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland. To relieve him of his responsibilities as Warden, on 23 January 1560 Lord Grey was appointed to take his place.¹⁸² Grey was instructed to consider what present dangers there were towards the conquest of Scotland and to confirm the security of English towns on the border more generally.¹⁸³ After military appointments and operations became more serious, Sadler and Croft began sending correspondence directly to Arran and Lord James to understand the placement of English ships on the Firth. This action was to show some support for the Lords of the

¹⁷⁷ Maureen M. Meikle, *A British Frontier? Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders, 1540-1603* (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press Ltd, 2004), p. 105.

¹⁷⁸ *Sadler Papers*, p. 527; BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 62r-v; BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 63r-v.

¹⁷⁹ *Sadler Papers*, pp. 540-1.

¹⁸⁰ D. L. W. Tough, *The Last Years of a Frontier: A history of the Borders during the reign of Elizabeth I* (Alnwick: Sandhill Press, 1928), p. 191.

¹⁸¹ *Sadler Papers*, p. 549.

¹⁸² Hatfield House, CP 152/42, Instructions for Lord Grey, 23 January 1560.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

Congregation but also to demonstrate the English were prepared to take action to defend their border. For the English government, dividing authority between the officials in the border region was a practical matter. This became more clear as tensions increased and Sadler and Croft needed to focus on reporting intelligence as quickly as possible so the English government could plan any necessary counter measures.

Apart from being able to gather intelligence quickly, in 1559 Berwick offered the advantage of being a convenient location for English and Scottish officials to meet in person. The town was easily accessible by land and sea, which made it the ideal location to liaise with Scottish informants for more secretive or personal matters. As Knox rightly put it, ‘this had I rather com[m]unicat face to face then committ to paper and ink’.¹⁸⁴ Some information was too sensitive to put in writing in case the correspondence was intercepted, and so members of the Lords of the Congregation would occasionally travel to Berwick to meet with the English officials stationed in the town. Clare Kellar has argued convincingly that the meetings at Berwick were an important part of the developing political and religious relations between England and Scotland.¹⁸⁵ Building on Kellar’s insight, this section argues that the meetings at Berwick reasserted the town’s position on the border as a location, in addition to the English and Scottish courts, to carry out diplomatic discussions and negotiations. The first member of the Lords of the Congregation to visit Berwick was Knox, whose visits were short-lived after the Scottish Reformation in May. By 4 August, Croft reported to Cecil that Knox was in the town only a few days because ‘in no wyse he can be long from his flock’, and that Knox was unable to travel to Berwick again.¹⁸⁶ During the summer of 1559, Knox served as ‘army chaplain’ to the Lords of the Congregation and made trips to Berwick to encourage the English to

¹⁸⁴ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 95r-96v, Knox to Henry Percy, 1 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 481].

¹⁸⁵ Clare Kellar, *Scotland, England, and the Reformation, 1534-1561* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 184-219.

¹⁸⁶ TNA SP 52/1 f. 162r, Croft to Cecil, 4 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 513].

support the Scottish rebel group against the French forces.¹⁸⁷ However, Knox's extreme religious and misogynistic views offended Elizabeth and hindered his progress in Berwick.¹⁸⁸ The Scots were therefore also aware that the representatives they sent to London needed to be palatable to Elizabeth in order to progress their petition for financial and military aid to overthrow Mary of Guise. Between August and December, Knox and Croft continued to correspond but for in person trips to Berwick, a 'discret and trustie man' was preferred to Knox.¹⁸⁹

The Lords of the Congregation typically selected more minor members of the group to send to Berwick. It was dangerous for more prominent nobles to travel through the border region under threat of attack, or by sea, in case of a French assault. Furthermore, leading nobles such as Châtelherault, Arran, Lord James, and Kirkaldy were often preoccupied with organising their forces against Mary of Guise and felt that meeting English officials at Berwick was less essential in comparison. Meetings with more prominent members only occurred when they passed through Berwick on their way to the English court. In September 1559, the Earl of Arran passed through Berwick and Cecil emphasised that he wanted him to speak to Sadler when he arrived.¹⁹⁰ Unfortunately, Sadler did not provide any detail of their discussion in his correspondence with Cecil. On 23 November, Maitland travelled with Randolph to the English court, and the pair stayed and talked in Berwick for two days before travelling further south.¹⁹¹ The purpose of these meetings was not necessarily to impart new information but more about the importance of making personal connections to facilitate future diplomacy. A single meeting locked

¹⁸⁷ Jane Dawson, *John Knox*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 177; Alec Ryrie, *The Origins of the Scottish Reformation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 164. Ryrie described Knox as a secretary to the Lords of the Congregation May 1559-January 1560 and he was an unlikely diplomat who was sent to negotiate with the English.

¹⁸⁸ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 123r-124v, Knox to Elizabeth, 20 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 496].

¹⁸⁹ TNA SP 52/1, f. 194r, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 20 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 530].

¹⁹⁰ *Sadler Papers*, p. 417.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 507.

someone in as a contact and opened the possibility of a channel of correspondence. However, personal interactions also provided an additional opportunity to persuade the officials based in Berwick and the English government to provide military aid. In early September, Balnaves was sent to Berwick to request that Elizabeth ‘shoulde remain still in peax, which he sayed should also serve better for their purpose, than if we were in warres’.¹⁹² This was one of the few times Elizabeth and the Lords of the Congregation were in agreement.

The position of the Lords of the Congregation soon changed as their situation became more desperate. French troops arrived in vast numbers in August and September and forced the Lords to retreat from Edinburgh.¹⁹³ This move from France prompted Sadler and Croft to request that ‘Mr Henry Balnaves or som other discrete and trustie man might repayer in such secret man[er] and to such a place as I haue apoynted her to thintent we might conferre w[i]t[h] him touching their affayrees’.¹⁹⁴ This threat prompted the visit from Balnaves at Berwick to put more pressure on the English officials in the town to support the Lords of the Congregation. On 15 November, Balnaves and Maitland, passed through Berwick on their way to London to negotiate directly with the English government as representatives of the Lords of the Congregation.¹⁹⁵ Fellow members, David Forest and John Willock (Calvinist preacher), travelled by sea from Scotland to meet Maitland and Melville.¹⁹⁶ To maintain the secrecy of the Lords of the Congregation’s first representatives travelling to the English court, Robert Melville was

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 430-436.

¹⁹³ TNA SP52/1, ff.187r-188v, Knox to Cecil, 15 August 1559, Knox sent news that Mary of Guise was trying to buy support. TNA SP 59/2, ff. ff. 50r-53v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 22 December 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 474]. Sadler and Croft reported that they had news that in December Guise had requested troops from France to make her numbers up to 6000.

¹⁹⁴ BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 27r-30v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 20 August 1559.

¹⁹⁵ BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 117r-v, deciphered letter about Maitland and Randolph being at Berwick soon, 9 November 1559.

¹⁹⁶ Kellar, *Scotland, England and the Reformation*, p. 189; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 64; Duncan Shaw, ‘Willock, John, d. 1585’, *ODNB*, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

sent ahead to privately Elizabeth warn about their imminent arrival and the reason for travelling to London.¹⁹⁷ The postscript of Maitland's letter outlined that Robert Melville was given the false name of 'David Heiburn' to keep the journey a secret from Mary of Guise.¹⁹⁸ Having met the English officials when he passed through Berwick, Balnaves utilised this connection and maintained correspondence with them, writing monthly to Sadler and Croft.¹⁹⁹ Unfortunately, there is no surviving evidence of Sadler and Croft's responses, however, they sent copies of letters containing news from Scotland to Cecil and, on occasion, these were seen by Elizabeth.²⁰⁰ It was not until Balnaves personally met Cecil in November 1559 at the English court, and thereafter secured him as a correspondent, that his correspondence chain through Sadler and Croft was unnecessary.²⁰¹ When more prominent members of the Lords of the Congregation were regularly unable to visit Berwick, they sent their own letter bearers who could also convey sensitive information orally instead of trusting the postal system. Alexander Whitelaw travelled between Berwick and the Lords of the Congregation to deliver correspondence to Sadler and Croft and then returned with their packets of letters.²⁰² Knowing the Lords of the Congregation's desperation for aid from the English government, Whitelaw's trips

¹⁹⁷ BL Add. MS 33952, ff. 169r-v, Maitland to Sadler and Croft, 9 December 1559.

¹⁹⁸ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 256r-257v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 15 November 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 576]. Sadler's letter mentions only Maitland and Forest as representatives travelling to England; BL Add. MS 33952, ff. 169r-v, Maitland to Sadler and Croft, 9 December 1559.

¹⁹⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 44r-v, Balnaves to [Sadler], 22 September 1559; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, f.83r-84v, Balnaves to Sadler, 1 November 1559; BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, f. 85r-v, Balnaves to Sadler and Croft, 19 November 1559.

²⁰⁰ *Sadler Papers*, pp. 445-6; *ibid.*, pp. 467-70.

²⁰¹ TNA SP 52/1 f. 270, Balnaves to Cecil, 19 November 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 584].

²⁰² For Whitelaw's frequent trip to Berwick as a letter bearer see, TNA SP 52/1, ff. 110r-111v, Knox to Cecil, 12 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 488]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 112r-113v, Croft intelligence to Cecil, 12 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 489]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 121r-v Congregation to Elizabeth, 19 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 494]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 130r-131v, Croft to Cecil, 22 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 499]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 151r-152v, Cecil to Croft, 29 July 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 508]; TNA SP 52/1, ff.155r-156v, Croft to Cecil, 3 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 511]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 162r-163v – Croft to Cecil, 4 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 513]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 185r-186v, Argyll, Prior of St Andrews to Cecil, 13 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 525]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 187r-188v, John Knox to Cecil, 15 August 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 526]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 233r-v, Henry Balnaves to Sadler and Croft, 28 October 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 555].

to Berwick were used to place pressure on Sadler and Croft, who acted as a buffer between the rebels and Westminster. On 28 October, Balnaves wrote to Sadler about the Lords of the Congregation's plans for the 'co[n]vening of the army and also the disposing of the Quenene Regent' and asked 'for money to int[er]teyn the souldiours', for an 'interprise' which 'alexe quihitlaw mentiond'.²⁰³ By December, this request was met when officials from Berwick delivered 2000 [French] crowns to the Lords of the Congregation.²⁰⁴ After January 1560, personal meetings at Berwick were not nearly as frequent. The Lords of the Congregation had the financial aid they desired from the English government and focused their efforts on securing military aid to prepare to fight against Mary of Guise's forces.

Berwick played a historic role as a location used to negotiate and conclude peace treaties between England and Scotland.²⁰⁵ In a turn of events, in February 1560 Berwick was used to negotiate an alliance between England and Scotland instead of peace. This confirmed the town as an important location for conducting Anglo-Scottish affairs. Within two weeks of receiving instructions from Elizabeth, in January, Sadler started to organise the meeting between the English representatives and Lord James Stewart, Lord Ruthven, Sir John Maxwell, Laird of Pittarow, and Balnaves as the representatives from the Scottish rebel faction. Maitland also joined the discussions on his return from London. Admiral William Winter, commander of a fleet of English ships stationed in the Firth, was instructed to send a ship to the representatives of the Lords of the Congregation who were at Pittenweem to convey them safely to Berwick.²⁰⁶ This was for two reasons: the first was because English officials at Berwick wanted to ensure the discussions at Berwick

²⁰³ TNA SP 52/1 f. 233r, Balnaves to Sadler, 28 October 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 555].

²⁰⁴ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 289r-290v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 5 December 1559 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 591].

²⁰⁵ Treaties were signed at Berwick between England and Scotland in 1357, 1461, and 1526; Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War*, p. 1, p. 221.

²⁰⁶ TNA SP 52/2, ff. 43r-46v, Randolph to Sadler and Croft, 10 February 1560 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 647].

remained private so that they were not accused of breaking the terms of the 1558 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. The second reason was that after the attempt on Ormeston back in late-October 1559, the borders proved to be too dangerous and any rumour about the meeting in Berwick would have created the perfect opportunity for an attack from the French faction. Therefore, during times of Anglo-Scottish conflict, travelling by ship proved to be the safest mode of transport. The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate how and in what manner the English government would assist the Lords of the Congregation and to 'Ioyne w[ith] him in this cause for meynenance of the *Christian* religion and defence of the *au[n]cient rightes and* libertyes of thare countrie'.²⁰⁷ To ensure all bases were covered, the English government sent Norfolk a list of questions to put to the Lords of the Congregation.²⁰⁸ One of the objectives that the Scottish representatives wanted to secure from the meeting at Berwick was to gain military aid to help expel the French forces from Scotland. The short compact of the agreements made at Berwick was a precursor to the final treaty and it gave the English government an opportunity to provide a commitment with which they were satisfied and agree to aid the Scots. In terms of military support, the summary of the agreements stated that the English government would send Englishmen to fight alongside the Lords of the Congregation's troops and the troops would remain in Scotland until specified.²⁰⁹ As an added insurance, the English representatives included a provision that if the French were to invade England, then on the English border there would be 6000 footmen and 2000 horsemen ready to defend the region. Whilst the English government was finally content to support

²⁰⁷ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 35r-36v, Compact between Norfolk and Châtelherault, 27 February 1560.

²⁰⁸ TNA SP 52/2, ff. 69r-70v, Questions to the Lords for the meeting, [n.d.] February 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 754].

²⁰⁹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 35r-36v, Compact between Norfolk and Châtelherault, 27 February 1560.

the Lords of the Congregation, they were still concerned with prioritising their own protection.

Three days after the meeting, Norfolk reported the success of the proceedings and eagerly awaited their reply to the questions.²¹⁰ The negotiations in February eventually led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Berwick by the end of March between the English and Scottish representatives.²¹¹ With little hesitation, the Lords of the Congregation confidently wrote to Mary of Guise with news that they had agreed with Elizabeth that she would assist the rebel group to expel the French from Scotland.²¹² The outcome of the treaty was that the English openly agreed to support the Lords of the Congregation against Mary of Guise, and the Scots had secured what they had been after since July 1559. The meeting at Berwick and the signing of the Treaty of Berwick acted as a catalyst for avoiding Berwick in the correspondence chain. From April 1560, Randolph wrote reports directly to Cecil. This further reduced Sadler and Croft to the position of overqualified postmen in the town when their intelligence gathering skills could be used elsewhere. Berwick had been successful in establishing and creating contacts in a crisis, but this was now redundant as more normal diplomatic procedures took root.

After the adrenaline fuelled year between July 1559 and July 1560, the role of the officials in Berwick reverted to their pre-conflict priorities of domestic border responsibilities and keeping the peace. Intelligence-gathering became secondary for the officials stationed in Berwick when there was an English ambassador resident in Scotland. Elizabeth requested that Randolph remain in Scotland after July 1560 in order

²¹⁰ TNA SP 59/2, ff. 149r-150v, Duke of Norfolk and Council to Privy Council, 26 February 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 774].

²¹¹ BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 9r-10v, Draft confirming treaty of Berwick [29 March 1560].

²¹² BL Royal MS 18 B VI, ff. 273v-274r: The Lords of the Congregation to Mary of Guise, [4] April 1560.

to continue to send reports to Elizabeth and Cecil. As Randolph was now the chief informer, Sadler and Croft were no longer required to reside in Berwick or be employed in extraordinary information-gathering roles.²¹³ On 19 June, Norfolk wrote to Cecil that he would be sorry to see Sadler leave Berwick and would miss his company.²¹⁴ In contrast, Croft's service at Berwick did not end on a positive note. On 19 August, Croft was charged with trying to sabotage English efforts to aid the Lords of the Congregation. The charges included withholding information from Sadler, not completing his responsibilities on the battlefield (during the Siege of Leith), conspiring with French aids, and being absent from his duty in Berwick without explanation.²¹⁵ Ultimately, Croft was found not guilty, but this incident tainted his reputation and he was not commissioned to a public office for another ten years.²¹⁶ Even though Croft was cleared of blame, the concern that information had been leaked from Berwick was real. Whilst there was an English resident ambassador at the Scottish court, the intelligence-gathering network used by the officials at Berwick was not as significant but cultivating contacts north of the border remained an important part of the officials' duties. If Randolph was unable to send reports, Berwick was considered a second point of call to gather information from Scotland and always needed to be ready.

From 1560 onwards, the English intelligence-gathering team in Scotland and Berwick was changed. Randolph was asked to remain in Scotland and to continue his role in reporting intelligence to the English government. However, he was not commissioned as an English ambassador until six days after Mary returned to Scotland in August 1561.

²¹³ From April 1560, Randolph had started writing directly to Cecil and his reports to Sadler and Croft stopped on 11 April.

²¹⁴ TNA SP 52/4, f. 35r, Norfolk to Cecil, 19 June 1560 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 824].

²¹⁵ TNA SP 59/3, ff. 20r-21v, Charges against Croft, 19 August 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 435].

²¹⁶ Robert Joseph Mueller, 'Service to the sovereign: A prosopographical study of the royal household, court and privy council of Elizabeth of England through an examination of the careers of Sir Francis Knollys, Croft and Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford', (PhD Thesis, University of California, 1993), p. 258.

This was a tactical manoeuvre by Elizabeth to demonstrate to Mary that she would only send ambassadors to an anointed monarch rather than a rebel faction. Before Mary returned, Randolph's role in Scotland was not made official because after Mary of Guise's death in June 1560, Mary did not appoint another Regent and the Lords of the Congregation illegally took control and called a Parliament.²¹⁷ Therefore, Randolph was strictly to focus on sending information. With an English agent still in Scotland and the national Scottish conflict at an end, there was no need for frequent meetings in Berwick, like those that were conducted between September 1559 and February 1560. This also allowed the English government to reduce the number of personal channels and officials at Berwick. As a result, between 1560 and 1564, the positions of the Warden of the English East March and Governor of Berwick either changed hands regularly or were even left vacant for periods of time.²¹⁸ However, in 1564, when tensions between England and Scotland increased in the light of Mary's continental marital negotiations, the English government recognised that they needed a strong team at Berwick to support Randolph and reinstated a stable chain of communication from Scotland.²¹⁹ In February 1564, Drury was appointed to succeed Sir Thomas Dacre as the Marshall of Berwick.²²⁰ During the 1559-60 Scottish reformation, Drury served as a Captain, leading forces at Berwick during the conflict between Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation and had

²¹⁷ Peter G. B. McNeil, '“Our Religion, established neither by Law nor Parliament”: was the Reformation legislation of 1560 valid?', *Scottish Church History*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2005), pp. 68-89.

²¹⁸ English Wardens of the East March, 1558-1568: Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland (1557-1559); Sadler (1559); William Grey, thirteenth Baron Grey de Wilton (1559-1562); Bedford (1564-1567); Henry Carey, Baron Hunsdon (1568-?1596).

Governor of Berwick, 1558-1568: Sadler (temporarily in 1560); William Grey, thirteenth Baron Grey of Wilton (1559-1562); Bedford (1564-1568).

²¹⁹ Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 123-129; Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 186-211.

²²⁰ TNA SP 59/7, ff. 186r-v, Elizabeth to [Treasurer of Berwick], 21 February 1564 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 182]; TNA SP 59/7, ff. 207r-211v, Garrison at Berwick [Instruction for the Marshall and other officers of Berwick how to proceed in the alteration of the garrison there, for the diminution of certain extraordinary charges set there in time of war], 26 February 1564 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 198]; TNA SP 59/8, ff. 9r-10v, Drury to Cecil, 6 April 1564 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 293].

even been sent to Edinburgh to better understand the Lords of the Congregation's situation.²²¹ One month later, Bedford, cousin to Elizabeth, was appointed as the Governor of Berwick and Warden of the English East March.²²² After the division of power on the border during the crisis of the Scottish Reformation Rebellion, it made sense to appoint the same man to the position of Governor of Berwick and the Warden of the English East March.²²³ This decision was implemented to defend the security of the East March by placing the power to both survey the area and raise troops in the hands of one man. Appointing Bedford was a tactical choice since his experience made him a suitable candidate to hold the role at a time of increased Anglo-Scottish tension. In 1557, Bedford was stationed in Calais and frequently corresponded with Cecil about the state of the fortifications and military preparations in the English Pale. Bedford also knew Randolph well from having spent time in exile with him during Mary Tudor's reign.²²⁴ His connections with Randolph combined with his political experience made him the ideal candidate for the position.

Even if frequent meetings at Berwick were no longer needed, the town was still on one of the major postal routes and offered a break in the journey between England and Scotland, upon which the officials at Berwick could capitalise. There was an increase in the number of ambassadors exchanged between England and Scotland in the 1560s and most embassies chose to travel by land. Between August 1561 and February 1566, seven Scottish and four English journeys were sent to the rival court. The first Scottish journey of the Lords of the Congregation's representatives to London entered Berwick full of pageantry and celebration. On 16 October 1560, James Douglas, Earl of Morton, Alexander Cunningham, Earl of Glencairn, and Maitland passed through Berwick with a

²²¹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 81r-82v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 31 October 1559.

²²² BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 250r-259v, Instructions for the Governor of Berwick, 27 February 1564.

²²³ BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 44r-45v, A Devise for the establishing of the 3 Marches of England [n.d.].

²²⁴ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', p. 169.

large train of seventy-four horses to celebrate their expulsion of the French forces from Scotland and to emphasise their thanks to the English for their assistance.²²⁵ Whilst the extravagance of their journey to England resembled an ambassadorial embassy, it cannot ultimately be described as an embassy. Morton, Glencairn, and Maitland were sent from the Lords of the Congregation who had taken control and called a Parliament without Mary's permission. However, there is no evidence to suggest that between 1560 and 1566 ambassadors used their journey through the English border town to do anything more than exchange cordial greetings with English border officials. The ambassadors' priority was to reach their host court and meetings with the officials in Berwick were scaled back.

Meetings were held at Berwick when negotiations through correspondence and ambassadorial discussions in person could not create an agreement between the two courts. Berwick was, however, used for a meeting between English and Scottish representatives when they needed to outline an initial agreement. This included the agreements concerning Mary's marriage. The Scottish representatives, James Stewart, Earl of Moray and Maitland were ordered to join Bedford and Randolph at Berwick on 18 November 1564. Randolph was eager to meet privately with Bedford beforehand to agree how to secure a match between Mary and Leicester. Consequently, he arrived in Berwick early on 11 November, which was a week before the negotiations took place.²²⁶

From the English perspective, the purpose of the meeting was to promote Elizabeth's proposed marital match between Mary and Leicester. In Elizabeth's instructions to Randolph and Bedford, the overall objectives were to continue the amity between England and Scotland, and to agree that Mary would be 'maryed to son of the noble blud of this o[ur] realme'.²²⁷ The two English representatives were then given

²²⁵ TNA SP 59/3, ff. 165r-v, Francis Leek to Cecil, 16 October 1561 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 642]; TNA SP 59/3, ff. 166r-168v, Horses of the Lords of Scotland, 16 October 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 643].

²²⁶ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 166r-167v, Randolph to Cecil, 12 November 1564 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 117].

²²⁷ BL Harley MS 290, ff. 13r-v: Instructions from Elizabeth to Bedford and Randolph, 4 October 1564.

detailed instructions about why Leicester was such an esteemed choice for Mary. As the English resident ambassador to Scotland, Randolph was familiar with Moray and Maitland and was specifically tasked to understand ‘how this mision hath byn and how farre that hath passed’.²²⁸

Five days after the meeting, Randolph was still at Berwick to unpack the details of the meeting with Bedford. The result of their discussions was a joint report of their experience that was sent to the English court. The first point to note from their report was that they described that ‘nothyng is concludede nor the matter it self in other case then when we begynne, savinge that these men for their owne partes have protested that theie do wysse that in your L[ordship] that tooke effecte’.²²⁹ Bedford and Randolph assured the English Privy Council that ‘We have in nothyng passed our Instructions nor towards the Amytie in our iudgementes done anye thyng that myghte demenyshe the same to write about the meeting in more detail’.²³⁰ Over three months later, in February 1565, Randolph was still attempting to find out from Mary what she thought about what Moray and Maitland had reported from the conference at Berwick.²³¹

Ultimately, the meeting failed due to the inflexibility of both parties. Loughlin argued that Maitland went into the Berwick conference with the firm view that there was only one possible marriage option for Mary and was unwilling to debate Mary’s claim to the English succession.²³² From an English perspective, Alford emphasised that it was Elizabeth’s decision that Leicester was the only appropriate match for Mary that caused the failure of the negotiations.²³³ The impractical decision to meet in Berwick also

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 13v.

²²⁹ Bedford Office, HMC 8, Vol. I (Miscellaneous Letters, 1564-1657), f. 3.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 16r-20v, Randolph to Eliz, 5 February 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 142]; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 26r-27v, Moray to Randolph, 1565 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 148].

²³² Loughlin, ‘The Career of Maitland of Lethington’, pp. 190-194.

²³³ Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 75.

contributed to the failure of the Mary-Leicester marriage negotiation. After the meeting, Randolph complained that Cecil's letters from 13 and 20 November arrived a long time after advice was needed.²³⁴ Bedford and Randolph were unprepared to negotiate and the long delays between correspondence from Berwick and London caused an interruption in diplomatic negotiations. Berwick did offer one important advantage for such an important meeting. In theory, the four representatives had the opportunity to speak more openly and honestly about their government's objectives away from the prying eyes of both courts.²³⁵ However, Frescoln identifies that this was a wasted opportunity. Maitland complained that Randolph spoke very generally about Elizabeth's marriage recommendations for Mary and only repeated what Elizabeth had told him.²³⁶ Whilst this provides evidence that the English ambassadors were loyal to their instructions, we will never know if Maitland's comment was truthful or if this was in fact a ruse to disguise their real discussions. This was the last time Berwick was used for international negotiation in this decade; whilst ambassadors, letter bearers, and merchants continued to pass through the town, it was better deployed as a correspondence and information hub.

Whilst meetings on the border region were not that frequent, it was a central role for the English border officials who continued to forward the English ambassador's correspondence from Scotland to the English court. Packets of Randolph's reports, copies of letters, and other letters from Scottish individuals were delivered to Berwick and forwarded on by the Governor or Marshall.²³⁷ This was different from what happened between 1559 and 1560. During the Scottish internal conflict, Randolph's correspondence was addressed to the Governor. After 1560, Randolph wrote his correspondence directly

²³⁴ TNA SP 52/9, ff. 168r-169v, Bedford and Randolph to Cecil, 23 November 1564 [*CSP Scots 1563-69*, no. 118].

²³⁵ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 279r-283v, Bedford and Randolph to Cecil, 23 November 1565.

²³⁶ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph, an Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 181-182.

²³⁷ For more detailed information on what Randolph was reporting from Scotland see, Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', p. 15, p. 18.

to Cecil and the Governor only forwarded the packets of correspondence on to the English court, unless he was expressly instructed to read the letter himself. Between 1560 and 1566, Randolph was clearly the main correspondent in Scotland for the English government and his reports still travelled through Berwick.²³⁸ In his correspondence with Cecil, Bedford simply referred the English Secretary to Randolph's letters for news about Scotland, which he enclosed in the packets of correspondence he sent to London.²³⁹ Whilst Bedford may have felt he lacked additional news, from the perspective of the Scots, however, he was well situated in Berwick to receive information from Scotland, and this was perceived as a threat. An undated fragment of instructions to a Scottish ambassador warned them that Bedford was now stationed in Berwick so 'it wilbe hard to kepe hy[m] fro[m] the knowled off o[ur] estate'.²⁴⁰ The document was part of a surviving draft of a Scottish ambassador's instructions dated between March 1564, after Bedford arrived in Berwick, and June 1565, before Mary married Darnley and whilst she was still described as 'the greatest [marriage] this day in europe'.²⁴¹ As discussed below, the Scots were right to fear Bedford's ability to uncover additional information because he was forced to step in when Randolph was not able to send reports from Scotland.

There were two key reasons why the English resident ambassador was absent from Scotland in this period. The first was Randolph's frequent trips to Berwick.²⁴² The main

²³⁸ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 16r-17v, Bedford to Cecil, 6 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1466]; TNA SP 59/10, ff. 92r-93v, Bedford to Cecil, 6 October 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1560]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 405r-406v: Letter from Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford to Cecil, 14 February 1566.

²³⁹ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 64r-65v, 15 April 1566, Bedford to Cecil [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1098]; TNA SP 59/10, ff. 16r-17v, Bedford to Cecil, 6 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1466]; TNA SP 59/10, ff. 92r-93v, Bedford to Cecil, 6 October 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1560]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 405r-406v, Bedford to Cecil, 14 February 1566.

²⁴⁰ BL Egerton MS 1818, f. 18r, Fragment of instructions of Scottish Ambassador to [England] about marriage of Mary [c. 1564/65].

²⁴¹ BL Egerton MS 1818, f. 18r, Fragment of instructions of Scottish Ambassador to [England] about marriage of Mary [c. 1564/65].

²⁴² Examples of when Randolph was about to travel to or was already stationed at Berwick between 1562 and 1565, TNA SP 52/7, ff. 67r-v, Randolph to Cecil, 1 August 1562 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 1129]; TNA SP 52/7, ff. 93r-94v, Randolph to Killigrew, 18 November 1562 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 1157]; TNA SP 52/8, ff. 168r-169v, Randolph to Cecil, 13 December 1563 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 40]; TNA SP 52/9, ff.

reasons for these journeys was to report and gather information, to greet important officials (such as Bedford when he was appointed to Berwick in March 1564, and Darnley on his return journey to Scotland in February 1565), to collect money from the Berwick Treasury for his commission, and to send correspondence cheaply and more efficiently to the English court. Between 1565 and 1566, when there was clear tension in the Anglo-Scottish relationship, Berwick acted as a second diplomatic location for Randolph. In October 1565, Elizabeth received news that Randolph had been shot at whilst in Edinburgh and advised him that ‘we haue thought it meete not onely to advise yow, if yo[w] fynde any such parell but also to lycence yo[w] to w[i]t[h]draw your self for a tyme to Barwike’.²⁴³ If Randolph was questioned about his trips to the border, he was told to report that it was for his own private business. Furthermore, Randolph’s time in Berwick was also about collecting information. In February 1566, Randolph was to ‘perswade by my L[ord] of Bedforde to tarrie the Fr[ench] Emb[assador]’ as well as ‘to pleade my saide L[ord] as for my owne case’.²⁴⁴ The French ambassador Mauvissière had travelled to both England and France, and notably through Berwick, where Randolph was encouraged to extend his time in the border town to talk with him. The English ambassador’s frequent trips to the border further supports the argument that Berwick’s role as an intelligence centre meant it was used as a second location for English diplomacy.

The second occasion when Randolph was absent from his commission in Scotland was between July 1563 and November 1563 after he received permission to return to the English court. The lack of correspondence from Berwick during Randolph’s absence

51r-52v, Randolph to Eliz, 30 March 1564 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 44]; TNA SP 52/9, ff. 141r-142v, Randolph to Cecil, 16 October 1564 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 107]; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 24r-24av, Randolph to Cecil, 12 February 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 146]; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 54r-55v, Randolph to Cecil, 15 April 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 166]; TNA SP 52/10, ff. 107r-108v, Randolph to Cecil, 24 May 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 188].

²⁴³ BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 99r-v, Elizabeth to Randolph, 3 October 1565.

²⁴⁴ NLS Adv.MS.1.2.2/39, Randolph to Throckmorton, 7 February 156[6].

draws attention to two important points. Firstly, there was clearly nothing worth reporting that occurred during these two months but, more importantly, information was still being directed by Randolph to London.²⁴⁵ The lack of correspondence from the border during Randolph's short absence from Scotland reflected the lack of urgency in Anglo-Scottish relations at this point. A second alternative view is that the officials at Berwick stepped up to gather and report information. This was particularly evident in a crisis when the English government's information from Scotland was especially inadequate. From July 1565, Randolph was out of favour with Mary and was excluded from the Scottish court for refusing to attend Mary's marriage to Darnley. Had he attended, it would have been interpreted as England and Elizabeth supporting Mary's choice of husband.²⁴⁶ On 2 July, Randolph described that during his audience with Mary, he was 'receaved in stranger sorte then eu[er] I was before as a man newe and fyrst come into her presence whome she had neu[er] seen'.²⁴⁷ We know that by September, Randolph was still not in a favourable position with Mary after he wrote to Leicester with the request that he might persuade Elizabeth to recall him from Scotland.²⁴⁸ Between July and September, the weight of reporting intelligence shifted to the border officials. Bedford accordingly expressed concerns about how he would secure information from the Scottish court now that Randolph was cast of the Scottish court.²⁴⁹ He noted that they had already conspired with Scottish borderers for information but since the borderers did not possess knowledge about English affairs, even if their effort was well meaning, they did not know what type of information was useful to the English government.²⁵⁰ This incident points to three

²⁴⁵ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', pp. 147-148.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 226-231.

²⁴⁷ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 311r, Randolph to Cecil, 2 July 1565.

²⁴⁸ NLS Adv.1.2.2/27, Randolph to Leicester, 19 September 1565.

²⁴⁹ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 215r-216v, Bedford to Captain Brickwell, [n.d.] August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1341].

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

distinct issues with intelligence gathering in the Scottish borders. Bedford needed to decide whether to trust the informer and their information, what ability the borderers had to acquire information in the first place, which could be limited, and the risk of sending information from Scotland to England – this might lead to delays in getting it to Berwick.

Despite the problems with receiving information from the English ambassador, one of Bedford's letters to Cecil gives us an exceptionally full insight into a wider phenomenon that officials in Berwick experienced when cultivating some relatively successful intelligence networks amongst the borderers. On 22 August, he reported that the borderers 'serve vs very well of intelligence for Mr Tamworthes stay I heard by divers of them [Scottish borderers] and so I hope I shall do of other thinges'.²⁵¹ Whilst Tamworth was held captive in Castle Hume in the Scottish East March, it was logical to use local Scottish men from the area to uncover any information. With Randolph away from his network, Bedford made the best of the situation and used the flexibility of communications in the English and Scottish East Marches to his advantage. On 3 March 1566, Randolph was expelled from Scotland after Mary accused him of conspiring with and aiding the Chaseabout Raid rebels. After leaving, Randolph had a short residency in Berwick for two reasons. The first was because he had not officially been recalled from his commission in Scotland by Elizabeth and was, therefore, legally bound to continue his duties as an ambassador in any legal way possible. Secondly, the border town still offered access to his spy network in Scotland, and he was able to operate international affairs from the second location.²⁵² For three months, with no English ambassador commissioned to Scotland, Berwick, again, became the centre of information from Scotland. Berwick offered flexibility in intelligence-gathering. The officials could

²⁵¹ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 253r-255v, Bedford to Cecil, 22 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1407].

²⁵² TNA SP 52/12, ff. 18r-v, Mary to Elizabeth, 20 February 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 344].

maintain their network of informers and continue to receive news when they were required to take the lead on reporting information.

There was a clear change in intelligence gathering after March 1566. Between March and June 1566, the English officials at Berwick, including the newly relocated Randolph, needed to navigate the way in which they were receiving information from Scotland without an ambassador at the Scottish court. Randolph had been dismissed from Scotland and forced to operate his intelligence network from Berwick. The absence of a resident ambassador in Scotland put pressure on border officials not only to continue reporting information from the border but also to collect information from Scotland. The first test came only six days after Randolph was expelled when, on 9 March, Mary's beloved secretary David Rizzio was murdered by a group of Scottish Lords. This was led by Darnley and other co-conspirators including James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; James Stewart, first Earl of Moray; Alexander Campbell, third Earl of Argyll; Patrick Lindsey, sixth Lord Lindsey; Patrick Ruthven, third Lord Ruthven, and Alexander Cunningham, fourth Earl of Glencairn to name a few of the notable men.²⁵³ With no resident ambassador stationed in Scotland, Randolph and the team of officials at Berwick used their spy networks to uncover the news, which was reported to the English government two days after the incident had taken place. Randolph stated that the 'more of the matter or manor weknowe not as yet but you shalbe adw[er]tysed as we gete that how all thynges have passed'.²⁵⁴ Although significantly slower than having information reported from the Scottish court, this important incident demonstrated Randolph was still able to operate his intelligence network effectively from Berwick.

²⁵³ For literature on the murder of David Rizzio see, Patrick Ruthven, Lord Ruthven, *The Murder of Rizzio* (Edinburgh: E. & G. Goldsmid, 1891); Donaldson, *All the Queen's Men*, pp. 78 ; Wormald, *Mary, Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure*, pp. 160-165; Guy, *My Heart is My Own*, pp. 248-262.

²⁵⁴ BL Add. MS 35831, ff. 261r-262v, Randolph to Throckmorton, 11 March 1566.

The English border officials also continued to play a role in gathering information. Those who were most involved in reporting intelligence from Scotland were Bedford and Drury who had been stationed in Berwick since early 1564. Correspondence sent by these two men to the English court after March 1566 demonstrated Drury's increasing involvement in managing intelligence from Berwick. The frequency and importance of the correspondence depended on whether Bedford or Drury was in charge in Berwick at the time, but it was no surprise that the main correspondent for both men was Cecil. This helps us to understand how frequently the Governor and Marshall were writing to him and what sort of information they were reporting. Between Drury's appointment as Marshall in February 1564 and Randolph's dismissal from Scotland in early March 1566, Drury wrote twenty-five letters to Cecil, whereas Bedford wrote Cecil one hundred and fifty-three letters. Mueller demonstrated that in their epistolary relationship, Bedford reported important information on national events in Scotland.²⁵⁵ It makes sense that Bedford corresponded with Cecil more frequently during this period as he was the Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East and Middle March.

In the event that Bedford, Randolph, or any ambassador, was absent, the responsibility to keep the English court updated on news fell to Drury. From April 1566, Bedford left Berwick to attend the Feast of St George at the English court. Before leaving, Bedford wrote a memorial for Drury with guidance on maintaining his work as Governor of Berwick as he took over the role. Bedford prioritised who Drury needed to maintain contact with (Cecil, Randolph, the Lords of Scotland, such as Sir William Kirkaldy of Grange) and how to keep the border secure generally.²⁵⁶ Drury's time standing in for Bedford in Berwick was only supposed to be for twenty-one days but we know Bedford

²⁵⁵ Mueller, 'Service to the sovereign: A prosopographical study', pp. 336-338.

²⁵⁶ TNA SP 59/11, ff. 164r-165v, Memorial by Bedford of things to remember by him [Drury] for Berwick, 28 April 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 319].

did not return until the end of June at the earliest.²⁵⁷ This was a testament to Drury's efficiency in the role. As the *de facto* Governor of Berwick, Drury took information-gathering and reporting seriously and this was reflected in his more frequent correspondence to Cecil. He wrote twenty-four letters in the short space of just three months between March and June. The increase in volume of correspondence indicates Drury must have had new informants to supply him with information.

When Randolph was finally recalled from Berwick on 9 June 1566, he needed to pass on his own intelligence network in Scotland and the borders. Elizabeth instructed him upon his departure, that his intelligence network was 'to be imparted to o[ur] Marshall [William Drury] there vntil the coming of o[ur] Cosin the Erle of Bedford'.²⁵⁸ The plan was that this would transfer the weight of responsibility for intelligence-gathering to the officials stationed in Berwick, initially to Drury during Bedford's temporary absence in London, but longer term, to Bedford as the Warden. However, even after Bedford's return, there is evidence that it was Drury who maintained Randolph's spy network. This is a point that we will come back to later to understand the length of Drury's involvement in espionage networks. As the Governor of Berwick, Bedford already had his informants in the border region as well as his domestic responsibilities as Warden of the East March to focus on. Mueller argues that Bedford's time in Berwick was 'not especially flashy' because he was not involved in cross-border warfare.²⁵⁹ However, he was Governor 'during one of the most tumultuous periods of the whole reign' and his efforts were focused on having 'a united command for the English borders' and 'coordinating the efforts of the Wardens of the west and middle marches with his own in the east'.²⁶⁰ Having many officials built flexibility and robustness into the

²⁵⁷ TNA SP 59/11, ff. 131r-132v, Drury to Cecil, 27 March 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 224].

²⁵⁸ BL Lansdowne MS 9, f. 55r, Elizabeth to Randolph, 9 June 1566.

²⁵⁹ Mueller, 'Service to the sovereign: A prosopographical study', p. 340.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 342; *ibid.*, p. 340.

operation of the border town as one could take over from another when necessary and Berwick's status as a garrison town facilitated this necessity.

After Randolph left Berwick in June 1566 and Bedford returned in July, Drury's presence at Berwick was no longer necessary. This explains why there is no correspondence written to or from Drury from Berwick between 19 July 1566 and 23 January 1567 in the *State Papers*. We know that Drury was in Berwick until Bedford returned from London at the end of June 1566. After taking some time to discuss his service managing Berwick in Bedford's absence, Drury then took his leave from the border town.²⁶¹ Clearly, the change in officials at Berwick was not well advertised in the border region because Forster, English Warden of the Middle March, continued to write to Drury nine days later with news about possible threats from the Scottish side of the border.²⁶² From July 1566, Bedford stepped easily back into carrying out his duties at Berwick without an issue. Mueller has already recognised Bedford sent Cecil key information, such as Mary's pregnancy, and when Moray accepted the regency.²⁶³ As Governor and Warden of the East March, Bedford maintained a wider network of correspondents and, therefore, Drury's increased communication with Cecil was part of a wider programme of shared responsibilities at Berwick now that Randolph's spy network was absorbed and consolidated into the network of the officials in the border town.²⁶⁴ In the same period where we have no correspondence from Drury, this research has identified that Bedford's main correspondent was unsurprisingly Cecil to whom he wrote eighty-one letters between June 1566 and October 1567. In addition to the English

²⁶¹ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 127r-128v, Drury to Cecil, 19 July 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 764].

²⁶² This does not include the exception of a letter written to Drury in see, TNA SP 59/12, ff. 45r-46v, Sir John Forster to Drury, 28 July 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 604].

²⁶³ Mueller, 'Service to the sovereign: A prosopographical study', p. 342.

²⁶⁴ On the English side Bedford received letters from Elizabeth, Cecil, Earl of Pembroke, Forster, Drury, Christopher Turner, Captain Cockburn, Throckmorton. On the Scottish side, Bedford received letters from Mary, Earl of Morton, Earl of Ruthven, Master of Semple, William Kirkcaldy of Grange, Scottish Privy Council, David Sinclair, Robert Melville.

secretary, he also corresponded with the English Privy Council, Elizabeth, Throckmorton (both before and during his 1567 embassy in Scotland), Leicester, and the Earl of Pembroke.²⁶⁵ Drury had successfully operated in his elevated position in Berwick by maintaining correspondence with prominent members of the English court.

Bedford was absent from his position in the border region for periods other than the three months between April and June 1566. We know Bedford left Berwick in December 1566 until January 1567 to attend the Christening of James VI in Scotland. Due to the absence of correspondence from Drury, we know he was not appointed in his place, because Bedford was still close to the border region and, as an extraordinary ambassador, he was only commissioned to Scotland for a set period of time. However, once Bedford had returned from the baptismal celebrations, his presence was once again required in London and this did required Drury to step into Bedford's position in Berwick as the main correspondent with the English court.²⁶⁶ Between January 1567 and his departure from Berwick September 1568, Drury wrote one hundred and twenty-four letters to Cecil as well as other correspondents at the English court (such as Leicester, Throckmorton, and the English Privy Council) and Scottish court (Maitland). Less than a month after Bedford had departed for the English court, in February Drury was faced with the unexpected news that Darnley was dead in Edinburgh. For such an important piece of information, he needed to check that the news he had received about Darnley's death in Scotland was in fact true. On 11 February, one day after the event had taken place, Drury wrote to Cecil that he had learnt that Darnley was killed in his lodgings in Edinburgh and he had sent two people into Scotland to confirm this news.²⁶⁷ Later the same day, Drury

²⁶⁵ The correspondence of Bedford was identified from an examination of TNA SP 52 and TNA SP 59, and this was supplemented with BL Add. MS 35381 and BL Cotton MS Caligula B X.

²⁶⁶ TNA SP 59/12, ff. ff. 168r-169v, Bedford to Cecil, 26 January 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 913].

²⁶⁷ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 189r-190v, Drury to Cecil, 11 February 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 943]. This was written before Drury received the scrap of intelligence in a Scottish hand.

received a short scrap of paper in the hand of a Scottish informant that simply stated Darnley 'is deid'.²⁶⁸ The report he received described how his lodgings had been blown up, and his strangled body was left in a field.²⁶⁹ After this was confirmed, Drury sent this fragment of information to Cecil along with a letter stating that in his last letter he 'was nott then assured' and repeated the same information as in the fragment but in his own hand at 10pm that night.²⁷⁰ Despite Drury's absence from Berwick and his intelligence networks, he was able to receive, check, and report information to the English court all on the same day to ensure that the government had accurate information on a critical, national event. Drury's experience in managing the East March, corresponding on important events with the English court, and gathering information on events from Scotland led to his temporary appointment as the Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East March after Bedford was relieved of his position in October 1567 and before Henry Carey, first Baron Hunsdon was appointed as the next Warden in August 1568.²⁷¹ It is undeniable that Drury's correspondence whilst he was in Berwick played an important part in maintaining English intelligence networks.

Drury's involvement in the maintenance of Randolph's intelligence network at Berwick was also evident in the records of reimbursements made to him for sending spies into Scotland and around the border region. The Berwick Treasurer's accounts show that the Governor of Berwick was allocated £40 (sterling) per year to disperse as he saw appropriate for gathering intelligence.²⁷² The Marshall of Berwick did not have a special pre-agreed budget for espionage but he could be reimbursed for paying spies out of his

²⁶⁸ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 191r-v, Death of Darnley, 11 February 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 944].

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 192r-193v, Drury to Cecil, 11 February 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 945].

²⁷¹ Sean Kelsey, 'Drury, Sir William (1527-1579)', *ODNB*, online edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

²⁷² TNA E 351/3472, Works and Military Fortifications at Berwick, 29 September 1560 – 29 September 1563; TNA E 351/3473, Works and Military Fortifications at Berwick, 29 September 1563 – 29 September 1567.

own pocket.²⁷³ Between 1560 and 1563, Marshall of Berwick, Lord Thomas Dacre, was reimbursed £42 for helping spies cross the border from Scotland.²⁷⁴ Between January 1566 and July 1567, Drury was reimbursed for payments that were beyond his regular expenditure, which included paying spies, conveying letters, and any other necessary causes. The following year Drury was again reimbursed £51 13s and 8d for the same reasons.²⁷⁵ It cannot be a coincidence that only after Randolph handed over his spy network to Drury that the Marshall needed to claim for any payments relating to espionage.

Even with Drury and Bedford's intelligence networks in operation, Bedford raised his concerns to Cecil about Elizabeth and the possible lack of intelligence following Randolph's expulsion and, after 1567, when Killigrew departed Scotland. Bedford complained to Cecil regarding news out of Scotland that, 'I can saye little' and referred Cecil to Killigrew's report when he returned to the English court.²⁷⁶ Bedford asked Cecil to send an ambassador to Scotland fearing that otherwise there 'wilbe a greate lacke to her Ma[jesties] Service, and therefore the more chargeable to me for the compassing of intelligence meete to be aduertised w[hich] I trust yo[ur] wisdom can consider'.²⁷⁷ In contrast, in his letter to Elizabeth dated the same day, Bedford asked Elizabeth 'to haue consideracon of the [Sir William Kirkcaldy] Lard of Grange, who nowe (sy[n]th both Mr Randolphe and Mr Killigrew are gone thence) is both best able and most willing to supplie the lack than their absence shall cause'.²⁷⁸ In fact, Grange was a key

²⁷³ TNA E 351/3472, Works and Military Fortifications at Berwick, 29 September 1560 – 29 September 1563.

²⁷⁴ Dacre was not reimbursed for paying spies but for meeting them and helping them to safely cross the Anglo-Scottish border. This is not comparable to Drury's work with spies.

²⁷⁵ TNA E 351/3473, Works and Military Fortifications at Berwick, 29 September 1563 – 29 September 1567; TNA E 351/3474, Works and Military Fortifications at Berwick, 29 September 1567 - 29 September 1570.

²⁷⁶ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 16r-17v, Bedford to Cecil, 17 July 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 575].

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 16r-17v.

²⁷⁸ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 19r-20v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 17 July 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 576].

correspondent who only communicated with Bedford in the border region in the late 1560s.

During the Scottish religious reformation in 1559, Grange communicated with English officials in Berwick as well as members of the English court.²⁷⁹ Grange corresponded most frequently with Cecil to try and influence the decisions at the centre of the English government to aid the Lords of the Congregation. It has already been identified that Randolph's correspondence was sent to the officials in Berwick between 1559 and 1560, Grange and Cecil's correspondence received similar treatment. When Cecil was unable to communicate with Grange secretly, he asked the English officials on the border to speak with him on his behalf.²⁸⁰ While Croft was the main informant on affairs in Scotland between May and August 1559, he received information from Grange.²⁸¹ In July, Grange reported that there was a meeting between Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation and the main purpose was to discuss and debate the religious motivations behind the rebellion and reaction.

Whilst Bedford did not take over Randolph's spy network from Drury, his noble status opened doors for him to communicate with more influential Scottish nobles, notably Grange. In 1566, Bedford and Drury both asked Cecil to thank Grange but it was not until April 1567 that Bedford regularly exchanged letters with him. Between 20 April 1567 and 1 October 1567, Bedford and Grange exchanged seven letters about events in Scotland.²⁸² The contents of their correspondence was not kept private and it was a

²⁷⁹ Grange was also part of the Chaseabout Raid rebellion and took refuge in England between October 1565 and March 1566. When he returned to Scotland, Grange was a participant in the murder of David Rizzio. It was during his short stay in England that Grange met Bedford in the English East March in person and secured him as a key correspondent.

²⁸⁰ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 99r-100v, Cecil to Sir Henry Percy, 4 July 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 484].

²⁸¹ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 141r-v, Croft to Cecil, 26 July 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 504]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 142r-143v – Intelligence out of Scotland, [Kirkcaldy to Croft?], 24 July 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 505].

²⁸² TNA SP 52/13, f. 35, Grange to Bedford, 20 April 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 493]; TNA SP 52/13, f. 37, Grange to Bedford, 24 April 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 496]; TNA SP 52/13, ff. 40r-v, Grange to Bedford, 26 April 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 499]; TNA SP 52/13, ff. 43r-44v, Grange to Bedford, 8 May 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 502]; TNA SP 52/13, f. 68, Grange to Bedford, 20 June 1567 [*CSP Scot*

frequent topic in Bedford's correspondence with Cecil. The nature of their relationship was for Grange to use Bedford to put pressure on the English government and to garner Elizabeth's support, especially after divisions in Scotland became more extreme. On 19 April 1567, the Ainslie Bond was signed by politically active Scottish nobles who agreed to support the Earl of Bothwell's proposed marriage to Mary.²⁸³ In light of the signing of the Bond on 20 April, it was only six days later that Grange expressed fear of Bothwell's new influence in Scotland and his own suspicions that it was in fact Bothwell who had murdered Darnley. Grange played upon the old fear of an alliance between France and Scotland, writing to Bedford that 'I pray you let know what your mistress will do, for if we seek France, we may find favour: but I would rather persuade to lean to England'.²⁸⁴ Fear of the Lords in Scotland turning to France for assistance pressed Bedford to send Grange's alarming news to the English court in separate letters to both Elizabeth and Cecil, urging them to provide him with an answer.²⁸⁵ Bedford's position in 1567 can be compared to the position that Sadler and Croft were in between 1559 and 1560, where he was used to put pressure on and secure aid from the English government.

Even with an established border spy network and communication with Scottish Lords operating from Berwick, other English embassies were still sent to Scotland between 1566 and 1568 when the English government required more detailed information or needed to better understand what had happened in a crisis. The officials in Berwick often referred Cecil and Elizabeth to the ambassador's correspondence for detailed updates, while they focused their time on producing their own reports relating to border

1563-69, no. 526]; TNA SP 52/14, f. 105, Grange to Bedford 10 August 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 591]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 190r-191v, Grange to Bedford, 1 October 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 6274].

²⁸³ Julian Goodare, 'The Ainslie Bond', Steve Boardman and Julian Goodare, ed., *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300-1625* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 301-319.

²⁸⁴ TNA SP 52/13, ff. 40r-v, William Kirkcaldy of Grange to Bedford, 26 April 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 499].

²⁸⁵ TNA SP 59/13, ff. 49r-v, Bedford to Eliz, 28 April 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1141]; TNA SP 59/13, ff. 50r-51v, Bedford to Cecil, 28 April 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1142]. Bedford put pressure on both Elizabeth and Cecil to take action after this alarming news.

affairs and general defence of the country. Between June 1566 and December 1568, there were six English embassies to Scotland.²⁸⁶ The first English embassy sent to Scotland after Randolph's departure was Sir Henry Killigrew. Frescoln argued that this was an attempt to replace the English intelligence-gathering after Randolph had been dismissed.²⁸⁷ However, an examination of the purpose of the embassy suggests otherwise. Killigrew's instructions were limited to particular topics. First he needed to discover why Ruxby, a double agent, was being detained in Scotland and secondly, to find out why Mary was in contact with the Irish rebel, Shane O'Neil, in case she was planning to aid him against the English forces in Ireland.²⁸⁸ Killigrew's instructions were drafted between 13 and 15 June 1566. This was over three months after Randolph had been expelled from Scotland and just as he was recalled from Berwick. Furthermore, Killigrew was at the Scottish court for less than three weeks and it would, therefore, be incorrect to define Killigrew as Randolph's replacement. This embassy was used to fill this gap, learn more about the Rizzio murder, supplemented by the correspondence of the officials in Berwick, and to assess the situation in Scotland in the aftermath of Randolph's expulsion.

The most diligent and detailed reports were written by Throckmorton. On 11 July 1567, Throckmorton left Berwick and passed into Scotland on his embassy to negotiate the release of Mary from her imprisonment.²⁸⁹ As already explained in Chapter One, Throckmorton was the former English ambassador to France who had proven himself a skilled intelligencer during the French wars of religion between 1559 and 1562.²⁹⁰ This embassy was not created because Bedford and Drury were doing a poor job sending

²⁸⁶ See Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, pp. 333-337.

²⁸⁷ Frescoln, 'Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland', p. 268.

²⁸⁸ See, Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568, p. 333.

²⁸⁹ TNA SP 59/13, ff. 223r-v, Drury to Cecil, 11 July 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1431].

²⁹⁰ See, Kenneth M. Kisner, 'Sir Nicholas Throckmorton: A Diplomatic Advisor to the Queen' (Master's Thesis, Utah State University, 2003)

intelligence to the English court but it was a response to the crisis of an anointed monarch being imprisoned by her subjects. Once Throckmorton was in Scotland, and moving between the circles of Mary's and James's supporters, he had more direct access to information. In his correspondence with Cecil, Bedford referred the Secretary to Throckmorton's letters, which he assured provided him with more accurate information.²⁹¹ However, Mueller acknowledged that between 1566 and 1567, Bedford continued to report on the main events in Scotland, providing a much broader compilation of information and leaving the more detailed court reports to Throckmorton.²⁹² In fact, Throckmorton was such a reliable informant in Scotland that Bedford was worried about how the officers in Berwick would receive any updates from Scotland after Throckmorton departed. With no ambassador present at the Scottish court this, in turn, curtailed opportunities to find out what the new regime was planning.²⁹³ Throckmorton's importance was also recognised by correspondents at the English court. Sir Walter Mildmay wrote to him only weeks before he was to leave Scotland, wishing he would remain longer.²⁹⁴ The officials at Berwick bridged an important interruption in information-reporting from Scotland but it was not comparable to having an ambassador at the Scottish court.

Furthermore, after 1566, news reports from Berwick were now competing with contacts between the English government and the resident Scottish ambassador to England. In February 1566, Robert Melville reconciled with Mary after his involvement in the Chaseabout Raid and was sent to the English court as the first Scottish resident ambassador. During his first embassy, Robert Melville was sent to report the news to Elizabeth that Randolph had been accused of delivering 'thre sackettis full of money' to

²⁹¹ TNA SP 59/13, ff. 289r-209v, Bedford to Cecil, 26 July 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1520].

²⁹² Mueller, 'Service to the sovereign: A prosopographical study', pp. 338-342.

²⁹³ TNA SP 59/14, ff. 31r-32v, Bedford to Cecil, 14 August 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1593].

²⁹⁴ TNA SP 59/14, ff. 33r-v, Mildmay to Throckmorton, 15 August 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1599].

the Chaseabout Raid Rebels in 1565.²⁹⁵ Between April 1566 and June 1567, Robert Melville wrote to Elizabeth and Cecil on his occasional returns to the Scottish court. Three letters to Elizabeth and five to Cecil survive.²⁹⁶ His correspondence with Elizabeth contained standard reports about delivering her letters to Mary, whereas Robert Melville's correspondence with Cecil focused on the situation in Scotland. On 3 April 1566, Robert Melville wrote to Cecil with an update explaining that the Chaseabout Raid rebels had been pardoned by Mary, and on 14 August 1566, he sent Cecil details about the political feuds between Moray and Bothwell, and Maitland. The imbalance in the volume and the content of the correspondence to Elizabeth and Cecil can be explained because it was implied that the Secretary would report the information to the English Queen without the need to trouble her on every occasion. On his journeys between England and Scotland, Robert Melville also passed through Berwick. In January 1566, in the postscript of a letter to Throckmorton, Bedford specifically noted that he had heard no news from Robert Melville or about the position of the Scottish Earls at court.²⁹⁷ No correspondence, if indeed there was any, survives between the officials based in Berwick and Robert Melville whilst he was commissioned to England. The only letter that survives from Robert Melville to Bedford was written on 14 October 1567, after he had returned to Scotland, to report Moray's actions against the Queen's supporters.²⁹⁸ We cannot be sure that Robert Melville met with English officials on his journeys between London and

²⁹⁵ NRS GD 26/1/1, f. 5ar, Mary to Robert Melville, 17 February 1566.

²⁹⁶ Letters to Elizabeth: TNA SP 52/12, ff. 43r-v, Sir Robert Melville to Elizabeth, 1 April 1566 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 367]; TNA SP 52/12, ff. 63r-v, Robert Melville to Elizabeth, 23 May 1566 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 388]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 75r-76v, Robert Melville to [Elizabeth], 29 July 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 578]; BL Add. MS 4126, ff. 45r-46v, Maitland to Cecil, 1 July 1567.

Letters to Cecil: TNA SP 52/12, ff. 62r-v, Robert Melville to Cecil, 23 May 1566 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 387]; TNA SP 52/12, ff. 94r-v, Robert Melville to Cecil, 31 July 1566 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 420]; TNA SP 52/12, ff. 99r-v, Robert Melville to Cecil, 14 August 1566 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 425]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 4r-v, Robert Melville to Cecil, 1 July 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 544]; TNA SP 52/14, ff. 16r-v, Robert Melville to Cecil, 8 July 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 554].

²⁹⁷ TNA SP 59/11, ff. 35r-36v, Bedford to Throckmorton, 18 January 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 7].

²⁹⁸ TNA SP 52/14, ff. 196r-197v, Robert Melville to Bedford, [14] October 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 630].

Edinburgh but it gave him the opportunity, like those who travelled before him, to meet English border officials in person.

During the 1560s, officials stationed in Berwick were relied upon by the English government to gather intelligence when there was political conflict between the two countries or domestic conflict in Scotland. When English ambassadors were stationed in Scotland, Berwick was primarily used as a hub to send news from the ambassadors as well as any information the officials in the town wanted to add. However, when there were no ambassadors, the officials in Berwick were forced to become the first line of response for news from Scotland and they took a more prominent role in sending intelligence. This only increased when the English government was anxious to receive up-to-date information on international events. These changes reflected a pattern of mistrust between England and Scotland, which continued after the peace concluded in 1560 and is often overlooked. This period also saw an important change in the roles of the officials in Berwick regarding who was to manage information. After 1566, the Marshall of Berwick, Drury, was more involved in the international situation. Having taken over Randolph's spy network, he continued to report intelligence to the English government even after the Governor, Bedford, was decommissioned from Berwick. This demonstrated a flexibility in the positions and management at Berwick and the distribution of international responsibilities. It was undeniable that Berwick's value to the English government lay in its proximity to the Scottish border. However, this was the very factor that made it one of the greatest anxieties for the English government who were constantly on edge about losing the coastal town to Scottish or even French hands. The next part of this chapter argues that throughout the 1560s the English officials at Berwick were on the lookout for any threat against their garrison town. It was only in 1482 that

Berwick had most recently been won back from Scottish hands.²⁹⁹ The fear that Berwick would suffer a Scottish attack lingered in the minds of the English government. This was especially true in the context of the recent and humiliating loss of Calais in 1558, an event that was described by David Grummitt as ‘one of the worst military defeats suffered by English arms on the Continent between the end of the Hundred Years War and the debacle at Dunkirk in 1940’.³⁰⁰

Threats to Berwick

The advantage of Berwick, to the English government, was its proximity to Scotland, which allowed quick access to information, but it was also the English border town’s greatest weakness.³⁰¹ The border town changed hands multiple times until 1482 when the English made their final conquest.³⁰² As a relatively new addition to the English East March, it is unsurprising that between 1482 and the peace concluded in the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560, Berwick was viewed as a weakness to the English border and considered vulnerable to Scottish, or even French, attacks. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that the a possibility of an attack on Berwick after 1560 was still considered to be a very real threat by the English government and officials stationed in the border town.³⁰³ In the context of the tense relations between England and Scotland in

²⁹⁹ For lists or summaries of the Anglo-Scottish conflict that occurred between 1296 and 1558 see, Norman Macdougall, *James III: A Political Study* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982); Ian Donnachie and George Hewitt, ed., *A Companion to Scottish History: From the Reformation to the Present* (London: Batsford Ltd, 1989), p. 17; Susan Doran, *Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 1558-1603* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 2-3; Jackson W. Armstrong, ‘Local Society and the Defence of the English Frontier in Fifteenth-Century Scotland: The War Measures of 1482’, *Florilegium*, vol. 25 (2008), pp. 127-149.

³⁰⁰ David Grummitt, ‘Three Narratives of the Fall of Calais in 1558: Explaining Defeat in Tudor England’, Joanna Bellis and Laura Slater, ed., *Representing war and violence: 1250-1600* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), p. 178.

³⁰¹ Jackson W. Armstrong, *England’s Northern Frontier: Conflict and Local Society in the Fifteenth-Century Scottish Marches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 81.

³⁰² Berwick changed hands thirteen times between 1174 and 1482.

³⁰³ K. J. Kesselring, ‘‘Berwick is our England’’: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town’, Norman L. Jones and Daniel Woolf, ed., *Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 92.

1565, Bedford, Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East March, continued to describe Berwick as ‘a Frontier towne and a towne of warre’.³⁰⁴ The town needed to be well defended with fortifications, men, and intelligence in order to prepare for an attack.

Border literature traditionally focuses on the themes of conflict in the border region and also the cohesion of the area. Firstly, it focuses on the insurrections, crossings and warfare, which was defined by cross-border society. Thomas Rae argued that border society was ‘turbulent by nature’.³⁰⁵ Similarly, Stephen Ellis’s study of Northumberland and the Ulster borders demonstrates that the area was somewhat beyond the control of the central government. There was an attempt made by Henry VIII to exercise control of the area from the centre of power in London.³⁰⁶ However, the view of the borders as a wild and violent area was shaped by the use of primary material such as Privy Council records from both England and Scotland. These records have coloured scholars’ views because reports about the borders were traditionally made when a disturbance had occurred.³⁰⁷ A second important theme is border identity. Anna Groundwater emphasises that the area should be viewed more like a zone, where the inhabitants of the border region had a shared border identity.³⁰⁸ K. J. Kesselringer and Janine Maria Van Vilet both individually concur that the inhabitants of the border town Berwick cared more about local interest than the national politics of England and Scotland.³⁰⁹ Both these themes in the literature focus

³⁰⁴ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 241r-242v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 11 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1374].

³⁰⁵ Rae, *The Administration of the Scottish Frontier*, pp. 10-11.

³⁰⁶ Steven Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: the making of the British State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 269.

³⁰⁷ Anna Groundwater, *The Scottish Middle March, 1573-1625: Power, Kinship, Allegiance* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010), p. 10.

³⁰⁸ Anna Groundwater, ‘Renewing the Anglo-Scottish Frontier: Reassessing Early Modern Frontier Societies’ in Raingard Esser and Steven G. Ellis, *Frontier and Border Regions in Early Modern Europe* (Germany: Wehrhahn Verlag, 2013), p. 20.

³⁰⁹ See, K. J. Kesselring, ‘Berwick is Our England’: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town’ in Norman Jones and Daniel Woolf, ed., *Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Janine Maria Van Vilet, ‘From a “strong Town of War” To The “very Heart Of The Country”: The English Border Town of Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 1558-1625’ (PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2017).

more on the local issues rather than how this can be assimilated into the wider picture of Anglo-Scottish relations.

Studies of Berwick as a border town have largely focused on the town's changing identities. Kesselring and Van Vliet agree that the inhabitants of Berwick experienced conflicted identity, divided not between Scottish and English but, rather, between local and national interests.³¹⁰ However, Maureen Meikle has examined Berwick in the context of the English and Scottish East Marches and emphasises that it was the mixed identity of the town as a local and national political hub that aided the development of good relations between the border Wardens of the Scottish and English East Marches.³¹¹ There has also been some debate about Berwick's importance in comparison to its equivalent, Carlisle, in the West March of England. Schultz compares the roles of Berwick and Carlisle on the border and concludes that it was Berwick that acted at the epicentre of both border and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy.³¹² Berwick was further threatened by the proximity of a military presence in Scottish towns across the border. Both Merriman and Blakeway have convincingly argued that in 1558 the fortifications in the Scottish haven of Eyemouth played on English anxieties because this offered the perfect location and opportunity for an attack from Scottish soil.³¹³ The anxieties were largely rooted in the long history of conflict between England and Scotland. Whilst this provides a useful context for the threat Eyemouth posed between 1547 and 1560, this needs to be examined

³¹⁰ K. J. Kesselring, '“Berwick is Our England”: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town' in Norman Jones and Daniel Woolf, ed., *Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007); Van Vliet, 'The English Border Town of Berwick-Upon-Tweed, 1558-1625', pp. 34-55.

³¹¹ Meikle, *A British Frontier? Lairds and Gentlemen in the Eastern Borders*, p. 100.

³¹² Jenna Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands, 1552-1652* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019), pp. 162-163; *ibid.*, p. 167; *ibid.*, p. 170.

³¹³ M. H. Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth: Anvils of British Union?', *SHR*, Vol. 67, No. 184, Part 2 (October, 1988), pp.142-155; Amy Blakeway, 'The Anglo-Scottish War of 1558 and the Scottish Reformation', *History*, Vol. 102, No. 350 (2017), p. 205; NRS E21/51, ff. 90r-96v, Treasurer's Accounts Expenses for the forts at Eyemouth between March and October 1558. The payments in this five-month period demonstrate that Mary of Guise spent a total of £1861 17s (Scots) on the fortifications.

in the broader context of the amicable Anglo-Scottish relations in the 1560s. R. B. Wernham has boldly claimed that after England had allied itself with Scotland during the Scottish Reformation rebellion and expelled the satellite French leadership, ‘England need now no longer fear a Franco-Scottish stab in the back’ as ‘the “postern gate” no longer would face the probability of war on two fronts if relations with France again deteriorated’.³¹⁴ This was not the case. In fact, the threat of the renewal of the Auld Alliance or any sort of friendly relations caused alarm on the English side. As demonstrated in the first part of this chapter, when an international crisis arose, the English government was careful to monitor news or to intercept information on the Franco-Scottish relationship. The officials at Berwick also surveyed news and rumours relating to potential military threats to Berwick. This chapter builds upon Merriman and Blakeway’s argument that Berwick was a weakness in England’s armour, how threats to Berwick influenced English policies before 1560, and demonstrates that the threat was not eradicated after 1560. Berwick became one of the first points of concern for the English government, and this was especially the case when there was tension in the Anglo-Scottish relationship or domestic conflict in Scotland.

Intelligence-gathering practices used outside the main English court were about defending Berwick and securing the English border. In order to understand why the English government was so anxious about the possibility of an attack on Berwick in the 1560s, we need to unpack the events which took place during the reign of Mary I. After the devastating loss of Calais, in 1558 Mary began a serious programme to re-build fortifications to defend Berwick and also lay the groundwork for concluding peace with France in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis, all of which were inherited by Elizabeth after

³¹⁴ R. B. Wernham, *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603* (London: University of California Press, Ltd, 1980), pp. 27-28.

she ascended to the throne.³¹⁵ As well as these policies, Elizabeth's regime did not forget the deep-rooted fears of losing Berwick itself. This fear came to its height between 1559 and 1560 during the Scottish Reformation, when attention to the defence of Berwick was thrust into the spotlight. The previous section has already re-examined Berwick in the context of being an important intelligence centre for the English government; that it was used to convey correspondence between England, Scotland, and France for personal and diplomatic meetings, and to survey threats to Berwick. Now we can demonstrate that the security of Berwick also played a key role in the English government's decision to aid the Lords of the Congregation. Whilst after 1560, the risk of an invasion of Berwick was significantly reduced, it was not eliminated. In 1565, the threat of a Scottish invasion across the East March was so real in the eyes of the English border officials in Berwick and the English government, that the necessary preparations were made in case an invasion occurred. From a close examination of the English anxieties toward Berwick, it was evident that localised conflict in the border region directly reflected the political tension between the English and Scottish governments.

Before examining the foundations of these tensions, it is important to understand the key English and Scottish border towns in the East March in the midst of which Berwick and Eyemouth were situated. After six years of building the fortifications at Berwick, in 1564 William Paulet, Marquess of Winchester and Richard Sackville reviewed other English border towns' defences and found that the fortifications in the towns of Carlisle in the English West March, and Norham and Wark in the English East March, half a mile from the Tweed and the border, were in great decay.³¹⁶ As previously mentioned, Carlisle was Berwick's equivalent in the English West March but was only a

³¹⁵ Paul Gerard Bosche, 'Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border, 1550-1560', (PhD Thesis, University of Durham, 1985), p. 448.

³¹⁶ TNA SP 59/8, ff. 54r-v, Marquis of Winchester and Richard Sackville to Cecil, 18 May 1564 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 403].

secondary focus for the English government.³¹⁷ The first reason for this related to how easy the town was to access. The Great North Road ran between London and Berwick with a number of postal stops along the route and this made travelling to Berwick much quicker and easier.³¹⁸ Secondly, the largest city in Scotland and the centre of political power, Edinburgh, was situated in the east of the lowlands of Scotland and, therefore, it was more advantageous to establish a base of power on the Anglo-Scottish border that was closer to this political hub. On the Scottish side, Schultz argued that ‘there was no town in the Scottish Borders that could match their [the English] fortresses, population size, economic strength or military prowess’.³¹⁹ However, it was not the quantity and size of the Scottish town that was the determinant but the historic fears that this represented from previous Anglo-Franco-Scottish conflicts.³²⁰ The greatest threat posed to Berwick was the fortification of the small Scottish haven of Eyemouth. It had been fortified in the past by both English, Scottish and French defences whilst remaining a Scottish territory.³²¹ Being only ten miles along the coast from Berwick, Eyemouth was the most daunting threat by both land and sea should troops be stationed there. For contemporaries, Eyemouth continued to pose a threat. It was not the Scottish equivalent to Berwick as an intelligence-gathering and -reporting centre on the border. The town was not as developed as Berwick and had frequently had fortifications build and demolished in the 1550s. The only other Scottish town that posed such a threat in the East March was Dunbar, located thirty miles further north along the coast half-way between Edinburgh and Berwick. The town was accessible by both land and sea and was larger in size and population than

³¹⁷ Jenna Schultz, *National Identity and the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands, 1552-1652* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2019), pp. 170-172.

³¹⁸ See, Helen M. Wallace, ‘Berwick in the Reign of Elizabeth’, *EHR*, Vol. 46, No. 181 (January 1931), p. 84; Mark Brayshay, *Land Travel and Communications in Tudor and Stuart England: Achieving a Joined-up Realm* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), pp. 78-82.

³¹⁹ Brayshay, *Land Travel and Communications*, p. 153.

³²⁰ See, Merriman, ‘The Forts of Eyemouth: Anvils of British Union?’, pp.142-155.

³²¹ In early modern correspondence and records, Eyemouth is often spelled as Ayemouth, Aymouth, or Haymouth.

Eyemouth but, being much further from the border it was not as direct a threat to Berwick. This chapter focuses on how, in 1565, tensions between rival courts played out on a micro level in the border region, particularly in relation to the ongoing threat of an attack on Berwick from Eyemouth.

In the protracted context of Anglo-Scottish warfare, it is difficult to exaggerate just how concerning the threat of troops in a coastal town near, such as Berwick, was to the English defences. Since 1486, the fear of an invasion from Berwick had troubled the English government and officials stationed on the border. To point to one example, on 4 April 1539, Thomas Wharton, English Warden of the Marches, sent a warning letter to the Duke of Norfolk with unsettling news from one of his ‘espiall’ in Scotland.³²² Wharton declared in a letter to James V, that he had learnt Francis ‘wold levye anne harmy with in the Realme of Scotland, and to the marche towerdes Berwicke, as to make wars against the same’.³²³ In the context of the decade of this study, the last major conflict that directly threatened Berwick was the Anglo-Scottish war of 1558. Bosche has identified that during this period of conflict, Mary of Guise also played on the vulnerability of Berwick to provoke a reaction from the English.³²⁴ After the detrimental loss of Calais, the English government was in a precarious position where all external territories appeared to come under threat, the most obvious being Berwick. From the perspective of the Scots, there was an awareness that the vulnerability of Berwick still caused anxiety for the English government. Maitland wrote that,

³²² See, David Grummit, ‘Thomas Wharton, first Baron Wharton (c.1495-1568)’, *ODNB*, online edn (Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2008). Grummit is sceptical whether Wharton was Deputy Warden.

³²³ TNA SP 1/146, f. 266r, Thomas Warton, Barton Wharton to Norfolk, 4 April 1539; James Gardiner, *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII, Vol. XIV Part 1* (London: Her Majesties Stationery Office, 1894), no. 697.

³²⁴ Bosche, ‘Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border’, p. 266.

the Quein Regent be advyse of the Frenchemen and uthers of the Councell... did resolute to mak warre against England and to induce or force the nobilitie and Cuntrie verye unwilling thai resolvit to mak and fort neir to Heymouthe on the seysyde in the Mers and in 6 myles to Berwick.³²⁵

Maitland went on to state that ‘the verye true caus wes that thai considerit Ingland wald intend to stop the fartifying thairof and so invade the Scots grund and giue thairby just occasion of warre on our pairt’.³²⁶ However, the fortification was a direct violation of both the 1550 Treaty of Boulogne and the 1551 Treaty of Norham.³²⁷ After the war was concluded in 1558, the English officials at Berwick were instructed to survey the border region and secure the area. The instructions stated that the fortifications at Berwick needed to be speedily and cheaply repaired and there were to be between 5,000 and 6,000 soldiers stationed at Berwick for three months in case there was to be another attack.³²⁸ This was a direct contrast to Elizabeth’s approach to strengthening and rebuilding the fortifications in Berwick, which took place for over a decade and was far more expensive. The English government’s new peace with Scotland and France afforded them the luxury of time even though English anxieties after the 1558 Anglo-Scottish war were at an all-time high.

In the last few months of Mary I’s reign in 1558 until the first year after Elizabeth succeeded to the throne, there were two main continuities in policy and action concerning the defence of English border security: the construction of fortifications on the border, and the successful conclusion of the peace Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis with France, Spain and Scotland. The catalyst for implementing these policies was Mary’s loss of

³²⁵Lambeth Palace Library Talbott MS D. f. 67, Maitland to Cecil, 1558 quoted in Bosche, ‘Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border’, p. 266, n. 53.

³²⁶*Ibid.*

³²⁷ Treaty of Boulogne (24 March 1550) and Treaty of Norham (1 May 1551).

³²⁸ TNA SP 51/1, ff. 64r-68v, Memorials as to the North, [n.d.] 1558 [*CSP Scots 1547-63*, no. 437].

Calais in January 1558, which was the most devastating loss of a conquered territory suffered by an English monarch. C. S. L. Davies argued that for Mary I ‘the loss of Calais hangs like a pale across the last year of the reign’.³²⁹ Since 1347, Calais had been an important part of English identity and defence. The loss separated England from Western Europe physically, heightened issues of security in the country, and had an economic impact with the loss of wool for the Company of the Merchants of the Staple. More recently, Susan Rose has argued that the loss of the wool trade could in fact have been a result of sixteenth-century trading prices in general as opposed to solely pinning the fiscal impact of Calais.³³⁰ Although the fall of Calais had an immediate impact during the reign of Mary I, the long-term ramifications also had implications for the reign of Elizabeth.³³¹

The greatest consequence of the fall of Calais was the realisation that other English border towns were ill-prepared to defend themselves against external threats. The shift in policy to focus on re-building these fortifications demonstrated the strategic importance of building and maintaining defences. Should foreign relations sour again, the coastal town that had previously been the Scottish town of Berwick was the most obvious target. Jackson Armstrong argues that, by the fifteenth century, Berwick was already at the point of collapse so by the 1550s there was a lot of foundational work that still needed to be done so that Berwick could become a town with strong defences.³³² Under Mary I, the government initiated large-scale repair and construction of the fortifications of Berwick.³³³ In the later reign of Mary I and the early years of Elizabeth, Berwick was viewed by the English as the next potential target, especially after the French began to

³²⁹ C. S. L. Davies, ‘England and the French War, 1557-9’ in Jennifer Loach and Robert Tittler, ed., *The Mid-Tudor Polity c.1540-1560* (Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1980), p. 159.

³³⁰ Susan Rose, *Calais: An English Town in France, 1347-1558* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), pp. 173-174.

³³¹ Jane E. Dawson, ‘William Cecil and the British Dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy’, *History*, Vol. 74, No. 241 (1989), p. 200.

³³² Armstrong, *England’s Northern Frontier*, p. 91.

³³³ Bosche, ‘Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border’, pp. 195-207.

fortify Eyemouth.³³⁴ In no less than three letters, all written in January 1558, Mary I expressed her concern about the vulnerability of Berwick.³³⁵ After the loss of Calais, this led to the immediate creation of instructions to improve the fortifications there.³³⁶ Blakeway demonstrated that Mary's concerns for Berwick's safety were far from imaginary. On 6 February, instructions were sent to France from Mary of Guise, carried by her ambassador by Yves de Rubay, proposing a Franco-Scottish invasion of the border town.³³⁷ Whether the English government was aware of these plans or was concerned solely about England's security, it is uncertain. In April 1558, the development of a closer and stronger Franco-Scottish alliance with the marriage of Mary and Francois caused the anxiety for the safety of Berwick to be rekindled. The construction of the fortifications began initially after the loss of Calais in 1558 and were restarted by Elizabeth in 1559 until 1570. An impressive amount of over £130,000 (sterling) was spent on them over the twelve years.³³⁸ Berwick was a constant concern for the English government and was not eradicated because a diplomatic peace in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had been concluded. The final continuity from this period was the conclusion of the peace between England, France, and Spain. This began under Mary I but was not finalised until the early

³³⁴ Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth: Anvils of British Union?', pp. 142-155.

³³⁵ TNA SP 15/8, f. 125r-v, Mary I to Croft, 16 January 1558 [*CSP Domestic 1601-3, Addenda 1547-65*, no. 67]; TNA SP 15/8, f. 127r, Mary I of England to Sir Richard Lee, 18 January 1558 [*CSP Domestic 1601-3, Addenda 1547-65*, no. 68]; TNA SP 15/8, f. 130r, Mary I of England to Thomas Percy, Duke of Northumberland, 20 January 1558 [*CSP Domestic 1601-3, Addenda 1547-65*, no. 70]; Blakeway, 'The Anglo-Scottish War', p. 206.

³³⁶ For more information on the fortifications at Berwick see, I. MacIvor, 'The Elizabethan Fortifications of Berwick-upon-Tweed', *The Antiquaries Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 1, (1965), pp. 64-96; Stephen Walton, 'State Building through Building for the State: Foreign and Domestic Expertise in Tudor Fortifications', *Osiris*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2010), pp. 66-84.

³³⁷ 'Memoir baille au sieur de Rubbay, venant d'Escosse en France', 6 February 1558, in A. Teulet, ed., *Papiers d'État, pièces et documents inédits ou peu connus relatifs à l'histoire de l'Écosse au XVIe siècle*, Bannatyne Club, 3 vols (Paris, 1851-60), I, p. 289 in Blakeway, 'The Anglo-Scottish War', p. 207.

³³⁸ Paul E. J. Hammer, 'The Burden of War: Operations and developments, 1558-c.1572'.

There is uncertainty about whether the total expenditure was in fact higher than originally thought. Van Vliet, 'The English Border Town of Berwick-Upon-Tweed', p. 46, see footnote 127. Van Vliet used the TNA E351/3471-9 records and believes that the figure was in fact much higher than has previously been understood.

Colvin, ed., *The History of the King's Works*, p. 402. In contrast, Colvin used the AO /12400-2500 records to produce his figure of £130,000.

months of in Elizabeth's reign. During negotiations, the English government had little leverage and offered the unrealistic provision of repurchasing Calais in eight years. Susan Rose argued that in the bigger picture, the proposal to repurchase Calais 'was a blatant face-saving device and did little to assuage English anger'.³³⁹ On 31 May 1559, the final negotiations for the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis were concluded in France. It included one clause that was important to the English government, the demolition of the fortifications at Eyemouth.³⁴⁰ As late as three months after the treaty was concluded, Croft wrote that 'a messinger com[m]en hether [Berwick] from Aymouthe requestinge me to send some folkes to see howe the same [fortifications] ys rasyd'.³⁴¹ Demolishing the French forts at Eyemouth was a slow process that was closely monitored by the English government to guarantee the security of the border, and therefore the security of the nation as a whole.

The relief was short-lived. Soon after the conclusion of the treaty, the threats to Berwick were at the forefront of the English government's mind when domestic matters in Scotland became strained after the Scottish Reformation Rebellion. On 15 November 1559, the English Privy Council wrote to Croft, Governor of Berwick, and Sadler, warning them that 'considering the stirs in Scotland, it is thought necessary to see well to that piece [Berwick], lest things happen contrary to what might be desired'.³⁴² Between August and December, troops were sent regularly to Berwick as a precautionary measure. On 25 September, Henry Lord Stafford, Lord Robert Dudley, Sir Ambrose Cave, and Lord Williams, were commanded to raise three hundred men in Staffordshire,

³³⁹ Susan Rose, *Calais: An English Town in France, 1347-1558* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), p. 169. Rose argued that the loss of Calais was actually beneficial in the long-term for the English government but the main reason they wanted it back was because it was a useful diplomatic post for correspondence and spy networks.

³⁴⁰ *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae etc.*, XV, p. 505, pp. 513-516; quoted in Bosche, 'Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border', p. 256; *CSP Foreign*, 1558-59, p. 3.

³⁴¹ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 153r-154v, Croft to Cecil, 1 August 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 510].

³⁴² *Sadler Papers*, pp. 581-2.

Warwickshire, and Shropshire for service at Berwick.³⁴³ Again, on 2 December, Francis Leek was commanded to bring a further three hundred footmen to Berwick.³⁴⁴ It was not until 9 December that the imagined threat appeared to have become a reality. Sadler and Croft wrote a short letter to Cecil reporting that, ‘this night past 300 french men cam to Aymouth and that this day 5th we wolbe there intending to fortifie there as it is supposed’.³⁴⁵ Whilst Sadler and Croft felt this threat was important enough to report, they made sure to cover their backs adding that ‘we know not the assured trouth’.³⁴⁶ This information was reported to Cecil on 13 December, but both he and Elizabeth sent individual letters to Sadler and Croft, thanking them for the diligent delivery of their intelligence.³⁴⁷ This incident was important for two reasons. Firstly, it posed a threat to Berwick and therefore the whole of England. And secondly, the placement of troops in Eyemouth breached the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. The fourteenth article of the treaty stated that the French would be prevented from rebuilding or fortifying the town of Eyemouth.³⁴⁸ Identifying breaches of treaties in order to justify war with Scotland was an established English strategy. This was evident in 1543 when Henry VIII declared that the renewal of the Franco-Scottish Auld Alliance repudiated the Treaty of Greenwich.³⁴⁹

In fact, the news of the threat was changed within one day. On 10 December 1559, correspondence from Sadler and Croft stated that, ‘we understande now for trouth that ther is no such thing’ as a new fort or troops at Eyemouth.³⁵⁰ Despite the rumour proving to be false, the English government continued to move to fortify Berwick. Whether Sadler

³⁴³ TNA SP 12/6 f.110r, Elizabeth to Henry, Lord Stafford, 25 September 1559 [*CSP Domestic 1547-80*, no. 51].

³⁴⁴ TNA SP 70/9 f. 17, Sir Francis Leek to Cecil, 2 December 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 364].

³⁴⁵ TNA SP 52/1 f. 294r, Croft and Sadler to Cecil, 9 December 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 593].

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ *Sadler Papers*, pp. 638-41; *ibid.*, pp. 641-2.

³⁴⁸ TNA SP 70/3 f. 115r, Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, 2 April 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 483].

³⁴⁹ For literature on Anglo-Scottish relations during and after the Treaty of Greenwich see, Slavin, *Politics and Profit: A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507-1547*; David Franklin, *The Scottish Regency of the Earl of Arran: A Study in Failure of Anglo-Scottish Relations* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995).

³⁵⁰ TNA SP 52/1 f. 296r, Croft and Sadler to Cecil, 10 December 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 594].

and Croft's second letter ever reached Elizabeth's eyes cannot be said for certain: she did not reply to this letter, and there is no report of her reaction to the news in other correspondence. We can be confident that Elizabeth was informed about Sadler and Croft's initial report that Mary of Guise's men had occupied Eyemouth. Only four days after Sadler and Croft's updated, short letter, Elizabeth wrote that she had heard 'by your l[ett]res sent in hast to our secretary' it was understood that two hundred Frenchmen had come to Eyemouth and a further five hundred more were arriving the same day as Sadler and Croft's letter was written.³⁵¹ This action was 'against the treatye'.³⁵² As a short-term reaction to this shocking news, Elizabeth asked Sadler and Croft to put the border on alert and granted Sadler, as Warden of the East March, the power to 'further succours as may tende to the removing of the sayd Frenchmen and w[i]th spede aduertise vs of yo[ur] purposes'.³⁵³ While we can be sure Elizabeth was notified of the rumour, she may not have been updated by Cecil about the retraction of the false news.

Considering the defensive manoeuvres that were implemented in the English border in late-1559 and 1560 after the rumour about Eyemouth, Elizabeth's actions suggested that the threat of the French fortifying Eyemouth appeared very real. Given that Cecil was at this time trying to coax her into providing military support for the Lords of the Congregation, there were very good reasons why it might have slipped his mind to report Sadler and Croft's second letter to Elizabeth. The English secretary was so desperate to aid the Lords of the Congregation and demonstrate his commitment to the Protestant cause that Cecil was only moments away from resigning his position as Elizabeth's secretary if she had not had a change in policy.³⁵⁴ If Mary of Guise had not breached the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis, then the threat that troops in Eyemouth posed

³⁵¹ BL Add. MS 33592, f. 174r, Elizabeth to Sadler and Croft, 13 December 1559.

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ BL Add. MS 33592, f. 174r, Elizabeth to Sadler and Croft, 13 December 1559.

³⁵⁴ BL Lansdowne MS 102, ff. 1r-v, Cecil to Elizabeth [1559]; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 70.

to Berwick would not have caused a chain reaction in English attitudes, which led to them openly supporting the Lords of the Congregation.

How the English government reacted to the crisis can be determined through these discussions and debates. Unfortunately, the loss of English Privy Council records between 12 May 1559 and 28 May 1562 mean that we do not have an insight into the reactions or planning after Sadler and Croft's shocking news was received in London.³⁵⁵ We can determine that the information was taken seriously because the English government set several actions in place. This included military appointments and the movement of military defences. Two appointments were made to bolster Berwick's defences. Firstly, on 16 December 1559, Admiral William Winter's 'Instructions' from Elizabeth were finalised. They stated Winter was to defend Tynemouth, the Holy Island, and Berwick with a fleet of fourteen ships.³⁵⁶ Within ten days of the issue of Winter's instructions, the English ships were stationed upon the east coast of England. By 26 December, Knox wrote to Croft demanding that 'y[ou]r shippes, with possible expedition, schew them selves upon these coastes' and went on to emphasise that the 'tym was never mor fit'.³⁵⁷ The Lords of the Congregation saw the manoeuvring of ships as a signal that the English had sent military support for their cause. However, Elizabeth's primary goal was in fact English security. Secondly, on 25 December the Duke of Norfolk was commissioned as Lord Lieutenant of the North. Norfolk's instructions stated he was 'to haste all that we may possibly putt our realme in strength, and specially those o[u]r norten frontyers and towne of Barwyck'.³⁵⁸ Regarding the recent events in Eyemouth,

³⁵⁵ *ACP*, pp. 103-105.

³⁵⁶ TNA SP 12/7 f. 169r, Instructions to Admiral William Winter, 16 December 1559 [*CSP Domestic 1547-80*, no. 65]; For more information on the use of the ships in this war see, Tom Glasgow jr, 'The Navy in the First Elizabethan Undeclared War, 1559-60', *The Mariner's Mirror*, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 23-27.

³⁵⁷ TNA SP 52/1 f. 324r, Knox to Croft, 26 December 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 502].

³⁵⁸ TNA SP 59/2 ff. 54r-55r, Instructions to the Duke of Norfolk, 25 December 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 497].

Norfolk's instructions even required him to 'collor all these preparation[n]s with reportes that you understand out of Scotland of the French purposes to approche Barwyck with some sodde[n] [assault], or to Fortefy Aymouth, and to invade the realme'.³⁵⁹ This phrasing suggests that Sadler and Croft's updated letter had been taken into account by the English. They did not believe the threat of a French invasion of England was immediate. Despite the fortification works, which had started the previous year when Norfolk arrived in Berwick, he reported to Cecil that the town 'is marvellously unapt to be fortified without great pain, travail, and industry'.³⁶⁰ Berwick's weakness was not just in its location but its own poor defences.

All this activity in Berwick was not just valuable to the English but also, in turn, worth reporting back to France. On 21 December 1559, Gilles de Noailles, French resident diplomat in London, reported to Catherine de Medici, that Berwick was 'the chief key of her [Elizabeth's] realm' and that Elizabeth 'sends horse and foot soldiers thither for its protection and that of the borders'.³⁶¹ The English paranoia about Berwick's security could have been understood by Mary of Guise as the English preparing to attack Scotland. The paranoia continued into the following year. On 29 January 1560, Norfolk alerted the Privy Council that there was 'one greate hoye laden with two culveringes, twelve peaces of brasse, and twelve pypes of powder, besides a grete number of spades, matlockes, shoveles and other suche necessarye thinges for fortyfication,' being sent from

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ TNA SP 59/2 f. 83r, Norfolk to Cecil, 23 January 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1559-60*, no. 510].

³⁶¹ Hatfield House, CP 152/88, Gilles de Noailles to Catherine de Medici, 21 December 1559; *Salisbury*, pp. 157-158. Noailles to Regent Mary of Guise, 21 December 1559.

France.³⁶² Norfolk believed that the ships ‘ment (as we suppose) to have donn at Aymowth, or some other place, to the defeate and annoye of Barwicke’.³⁶³

The actions taken by the early Elizabethan regime to ensure Berwick’s safety were a direct continuation of Marian policies. Similar provisions in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis were reiterated only one year later in the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh to secure Berwick from future Scottish or French threats. In the notes for what should be included in the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, it stated that ‘Aymouthe must be rayseed before the 25th June’.³⁶⁴ Then in the final instructions for Cecil and Wotton’s commission to negotiate the Treaty of Edinburgh, Elizabeth emphasised it was important that the fortifications at Eyemouth were demolished. She instructed that the commissioners ‘must and shall of them sellves earnestly press if the same be not allready well demolished, using nevertheles theyr difrences therein, as the casse shall require, and imp[or]ting the same to the Scottes’.³⁶⁵ Bosche identified that in a draft of the Treaty of Edinburgh, there was a suggestion that the English might maintain a small garrison in Eyemouth to protect Berwick.³⁶⁶ However, this clause did not appear in the final version of the treaty. Between May 1559 and June 1560, Berwick played a pivotal role in the actions of the English government towards aiding the Lords of the Congregation as both an intelligence centre and creating a strong defence on the border and by the coast. The English government took action based on a rumour from the first mention of Eyemouth from Sadler and Croft. This was not an isolated incident in the 1560s. However, for a short period between 1561

³⁶² TNA SP 52/2 f. 29r, Duke of Norfolk and Council to the English Privy Council, 29 January 1560 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 634]; *A Collection of State Papers, relating to affairs in the reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, Queen Mary, and Queen Elizabeth, from the year 1542 to 1570. Transcribed from original letters and other authentic memorials, left by William Cecill Lord Burghley and now remaining at Hatfield House, in the Library of the Right Honourable the present Earl of Salisbury*, Samuel Haynes, ed. (London, 1740), p. 231.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ TNA SP 70/3 f. 78, Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, 28 March 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 456].

³⁶⁵ BL Cotton MS Caligula IX/1, ff. 121r-124v, Instructions to Cecil from Elizabeth, 26 May 1560.

³⁶⁶ *Foedera*, xv, 569-571; Haynes, 253-255, quoted in Bosche, ‘Politics, Administration, and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scottish Border’, p. 362, n. 69,

and 1564, the amicable relations between Elizabeth and Mary were reflected on the border. There was no mention of rebuilding fortifications at Eyemouth – just the slow process of removing them – and no immediate threats to Berwick. It was not until the upheaval after the marriage of Mary and Darnley in 1565 that border officials perceived new threats from across the Anglo-Scottish border.

After five years of peaceful relations, with the occasional dispute relating to thieves on the border, Eyemouth once again emerged at the centre of English anxieties. Between August and November 1565, the Earl of Bedford reported that he had reliable information from his spy network that the Scots were planning to fortify Eyemouth once again.³⁶⁷ As we saw in Chapter Two, the year 1565 has already been identified by several historians as a moment when there was a shift in the balance of power between the two queens when Mary started to take greater control and make her own decisions.³⁶⁸ After months of meetings and correspondence between English and Scottish ambassadors, border officials, and councillors, as well as pressure from the English government, Mary made the decision to exercise her own agency and marry Darnley. As Chapter Two demonstrated, the tension between these two queens was evident in the embassies they commissioned in this year. Dawson went as far to argue that the dynastic tensions between Elizabeth and Mary led to a danger of war in the autumn of 1565 and that Mary sent men to check on the Scottish border town but no border incidents were ‘serious enough to justify open war’.³⁶⁹ However, Dawson failed to appreciate the historic role that Eyemouth had played in Anglo-Scottish conflicts since the 1540s and that from the

³⁶⁷ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 11r-12v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 5 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1461].

³⁶⁸ Dawson, ‘Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565’, p. 22; Goodare, ‘Mary [Mary Stewart] (1542-1587)’, *ODNB* online edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); see Chapter 2: Agency in Anglo-Scottish Diplomacy, pp. 155-193.

³⁶⁹ Dawson, ‘Mary Queen of Scots, Lord Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565’, p. 1.

English perspective, the government would need to take the news of troops in and near Eyemouth as a serious threat.

Bedford presented the 1565 news of the threat posed by Eyemouth very differently in two separate letters to Elizabeth and Cecil. On 5 August, Bedford wrote to Elizabeth that ‘heare by good meanes out of Scotlande that the Quene there meaneth to foretfie in Ayemouthe, and otherwise kepe to worke all maner annoyaunce and hurte to yo[ur] Realme and Subiectes that by any meanes she can’.³⁷⁰ He followed this news with a short letter asking Elizabeth for permission to allow him, as Governor, to take action against the Scots in Eyemouth should this prove to be the case. However, in his letter to Cecil, Bedford warned the Secretary about the fortification of Eyemouth, the ‘place you knowe and the importance of the same’.³⁷¹ If he found the news to be accurate, Bedford warned Cecil that ‘I [Bedford] meane to empeche them’ as it is ‘contrary to the last treatye [of Edinburgh]’.³⁷² This assertion demonstrated two important points about Bedford’s role. Firstly, Bedford was well informed about the terms of the Treaty of Edinburgh, signed five years prior, and what he needed to monitor on the border in relation to these conditions. The second was that Bedford was not afraid to act in his role as Governor of Berwick and Warden of the East March to defend the security of England. Bedford spent the rest of his letter laying out the military supplies, victuals ready on the border, and fortification preparations at Berwick in case this threat materialised. If the Scots were fortifying Eyemouth, Bedford knew from the historic precedence that he needed to take action rather than wait for a directive to arrive too late from the English court. By warning Cecil, Bedford hoped that he would procure Elizabeth’s support for any future action.

³⁷⁰ TNA SP 59/9, f. 233v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 5 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1361].

³⁷¹ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X/1, f. 233r, Bedford to Cecil, 5 August 1565.

³⁷² BL Cotton MS Caligula B X/1, f. 233r, Bedford to Cecil, 5 August 1565.

We know from her response to Bedford's news of the Eyemouth threat that either Cecil was successful in persuading Elizabeth, or the English Queen agreed that taking Eyemouth was the best course of action to protect English security. An early draft of the Queen's response written on 12 August by Cecil, instructed Bedford about what actions to take regarding his report about the presence of Scottish men at Eyemouth. Bedford was to use his resources to find out what Mary's intentions with Eyemouth were, to understand how many people were at Eyemouth, and to check the frontier at Berwick.³⁷³ There are two points of interest to note from this draft that would have alarmed the Scots. The first was identified by Mueller, that Bedford was directly instructed to be ready to take Eyemouth if he had strong and reliable evidence that Mary planned to fortify the Scottish haven.³⁷⁴ However, Mueller did not place the situation in the wider context of past incidents with Eyemouth or acknowledge the severity of the situation.³⁷⁵ The English approach of fortifying Eyemouth to preserve their own security was not new. In 1547, Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset and Protector to Edward VI, chose to fortify Eyemouth for three reasons: it would garrison the Scottish/French approach to England, it was the only haven between Dunbar and Berwick, and it was a 'virgin site' with no existing structures.³⁷⁶ In comparison to the extensive fortifications at Berwick, the English structures at Eyemouth were relatively cheap, costing only £1,908 (Scots).³⁷⁷ However, both the 1547 Eyemouth and 1558-60 fortifications at Berwick were managed by Sir Richard Lee, English surveyor of the works, and used Italianate angle-bastionate artillery forts. Merriman demonstrates that building the fortifications was not without its

³⁷³ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 245r-246v, Elizabeth to Bedford, 12 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1379].

³⁷⁴ Mueller, 'Service to the sovereign: A prosopographical study', pp. 333-334.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁶ Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth: Anvils of British Union?', p. 147; Gervase Phillips, *The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550: A Military History* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), pp. 178-255.

³⁷⁷ Colvin, ed., *The History of the Kings Works*, pp. 702-3.

difficulties for the English.³⁷⁸ The English government recognised the importance of fortifying Eyemouth and using it to their advantage. The proposal to take Berwick in 1565 was supposed to send warning to the Scottish government that their actions contravened the Treaty of Edinburgh, and that the English were willing to act defensively in their own interests instead of safeguarding their foreign alliances. The second alarming part of Bedford's instructions was not included in the second draft of the letter. Cecil added in and then deleted a section that states 'wherin it is much that yowe have good regard that yow be not abused by such as for ther particular interests could be co[n]tent to induce vs into a warr'.³⁷⁹ The fear of war explains why Elizabeth appointed Bedford as the Lord Lieutenant of the North and instructed him to be ready to gather troops in case he needed to engage in combat.

Whilst the exchange of correspondence between Bedford, Elizabeth, and Cecil was useful for conveying urgent news about the actions of the Scots in the border region, personal communication during a tense situation helped speed up the decision about what actions to take. Bedford planned to use Tamworth, who was due to travel via Berwick to Scotland to meet Mary as the English special ambassador, as his messenger to the Scottish court to convey more private thoughts and questions about her plans in Eyemouth.³⁸⁰ However, Tamworth was captured and imprisoned at Hume castle on his return from Scotland as he did not accept letters of safe conduct from both Mary and her new husband Darnley. To prevent further delays in receiving instructions from the English court, on or around 21 August Bedford sent Captain Brickwell, a trusted man stationed at Berwick, to the English court to deliver information about 'the situacon of Aymouthe' and the threat that the Scots 'maye come by sea and lande to it before we can[n] vnder stande that they

³⁷⁸ Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth: Anvils of British Union?', pp. 142-155.

³⁷⁹ TNA SP 59/9, f. 245r, Elizabeth to Bedford, 12 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1379].

³⁸⁰ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 360r-361r, Bedford, Warden of the East Marches and Governor of Berwick, to Elizabeth, 18 August 1565.

be there'.³⁸¹ The matter was of such urgency that Captain Brickwell was directed to London to report the news in person to Elizabeth.³⁸² Captain Brickwell was at the English court for about a week.³⁸³ During this time, Brickwell discussed the matters in detail with Elizabeth and Cecil to make more permanent plans for a solution than had been previously discussed in correspondence. In early September, he arrived back in Berwick with full instructions for Bedford from Elizabeth and presumably a detailed oral report. Bedford was instructed to prioritise three points of defence. The first was to increase the forces at Berwick to six hundred footmen and one hundred horsemen, and to not make any attack on Eyemouth.³⁸⁴ He was also ordered to increase the number of boats stationed in Berwick by taking ships from Newcastle, and to increase the victuals and munitions. Lastly, Bedford was to appoint people to positions as he saw fit and to ensure tougher enforcement of March laws in Berwick. The main purpose of this crack-down was to expel the Scots who were already in Berwick and, it was feared, could leak information about the English intentions with Eyemouth or information about the increased forces and supplies. Upon receipt of this letter Bedford responded to the queen, setting out his plans, which included garrisoning other English border towns, such as Norham and Wark, and making sure there were good supplies in the storerooms at Berwick.³⁸⁵

At the English court, the threat of Eyemouth was not discussed in a Privy Council meeting or in more private discussions because trying to reverse Mary's decision to marry Darnley took precedence. However, in preparation for a Privy Council meeting on 26 September, Cecil wrote a summary of events that had occurred between 18 November 1564 and 19 September 1565. Captain Brickwell's visit from Berwick in August was

³⁸¹ TNA SP 59/9, ff. 215r-216v, Bedford to Captain Brickwell, [n.d.] August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1379].

³⁸² TNA SP 59/9, f. 270r, Elizabeth to Bedford, 28 August 1568 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1422].

³⁸³ BL Add. MS 35381, ff. 243r-244v, Bedford to Cecil, 1 September 1565.

³⁸⁴ TNA SP 59/9, f. 270r, Elizabeth to Bedford, 28 August 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1422].

³⁸⁵ TNA SP 59/10, ff. 11r-12v, Bedford to Elizabeth, 5 September 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1461].

recorded with no information about the reason for his journey.³⁸⁶ As the matter of Eyemouth had not escalated since it was first reported in early August, it was not an urgent threat but something upon which Bedford was keeping a close eye. The English government did not want the threat at Eyemouth to deter them from the other pressing matters that needed to be discussed during the meeting. The main items on the agenda were Mary's marriage to Darnley and the Chaseabout Raid rebels who were up in arms because of her marriage. Without any additional advice from the English government or anything further to report from the border, between September and October, Bedford was limited to surveying Eyemouth, to prioritising defence manoeuvres, and waiting to guarantee that Berwick was in a strong position in case he needed to impose his powers as Lord Lieutenant of the North. One response that Bedford could focus on was ensuring the fortifications at Berwick were prepared if war did break out. Between 1565 and 1566, the English government spent £10,000 on repairing the fortifications, whereas in 1567 and 1568 only between £1,000 and £2,000 was spent each year.³⁸⁷ This alone highlights that Bedford believed the combination of the political tension between Mary and Elizabeth and the presence of Scots in Eyemouth was a realistic threat.

In 1565, Berwick had, once again, been thrust into the spotlight with the threat of Scottish soldiers near Eyemouth. In fact, the threats to the English coastal town were exaggerated in the minds of the English border officials and the English government because in October 1565, the Scottish Privy Council was focused on the issue of the Chaseabout Raid rebels. In a Council meeting on 10 October, there were sixteen council members present with Mary and Darnley to confirm the battle plan against the rebels –

³⁸⁶ BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 357r-v, Draft summary of events in Scotland between 18 November 1564 and 19 September 1565. In the hand of Cecil, 24 September 1565.

³⁸⁷ Colvin, ed., *The History of the King's Works*, p. 661.

not knowing that they had already crossed the border and moved into the English borderlands. On 14 October, Moray wrote to Leicester from Carlisle and by 17 October he had written a letter to Cecil from Newcastle.³⁸⁸ In both letters, Moray complained about how Elizabeth continued to deprive the rebels of aid and advice and he indicates that her lack of support was the reason that they were forced to cross over the border into England. On 19 October 1565, the Scottish Privy Council heard news that the Chaseabout rebels had been dispersed through Scotland and ‘by sey and utherwyse throw the cuntreis of Lowtheane Fyff and Angus’.³⁸⁹ The next step was to watch the borders in case the rebels decided to cross back into Scotland. In order to guard all possible routes back, forty-nine locations were monitored along the Scottish border, including coastal towns.³⁹⁰ Alexander, Lord Home, Scottish Warden of the East March, was assigned to watch ‘Thorntoun, Loch Skaitraw, and Aymouth’.³⁹¹ This explains why the English officials at Berwick reported that they had received information about Scottish action in and around the haven of Eyemouth. Mary did not have any information that the rebels had escaped into England until 22 October but she needed to monitor her own border in case they returned with English troops to assist them.³⁹² Whilst the threat to Berwick was not real, the actions of the Scots needed to be taken seriously so that English defences were ready and in place.

After 1565, Eyemouth was not mentioned in English or Scottish correspondence in the context of a security threat. From the English perspective, it was still worth monitoring the Scottish border in case the town once again became an issue. Even the presence of Mary in the border region was enough to provoke panic amongst the English

³⁸⁸ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 137r-138v, Moray to Leicester, 14 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 281].

³⁸⁹ *RPCS*, p. 379.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 379-382.

³⁹¹ *RPCS*, p. 382.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 383.

border officials. This only occurred once during her personal reign when in November 1566, Mary decided to ride to the Anglo-Scottish border and asked to meet with Forster, English Warden of the Middle March. Forster wrote to Cecil to warn him that Mary planned to travel to Hume to view her frontiers and she specifically requested to pass through part of the English bounds.³⁹³ In preparation for Mary's arrival, Forster gave orders for Berwick to be properly manned and fortified. This was a defensive manoeuvre to demonstrate to the Scots that Berwick was still well-defended. Mary travelled with Moray, George Gordon, fifth Earl of Huntly, Francis Hepburn, fifth Earl of Bothwell, Maitland, and Alexander Home, first Earl of Home to Halidon Hill, a summit two miles north-west of Berwick. Historically, the summit of Halidon Hill was significant because in 1333 a battle took place between the English army, under the command of King Edward III of England who was fighting for Balliol, and the Scottish army, commanded by Sir Archibald Douglas.³⁹⁴ The purpose of Mary's meeting with Forster was to discuss why the English had shown favour towards the Earl of Morton after he exiled himself in England.³⁹⁵ Morton and other Scottish Lords fled to England in March 1566 after conspiring and participating in the murder of David Rizzio. The English agenda for the meeting was to convince Mary to restore conspirators who had exiled themselves into England back into favour so that they could return to Scotland. The presence of Scottish troops on the border, let alone Mary's presence, caused great unrest amongst borderers and English officials needed to monitor the security of the area.

In international, domestic, and border related correspondence, there was no mention of Eyemouth again until 10 August 1567, when Bedford wrote to Cecil notifying him that a town crier had travelled to Eyemouth from the Earl of Bothwell for munitions

³⁹³ TNA SP 59/12, f. 136r, Forster to Cecil, 16 November 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 804].

³⁹⁴ Ranald Nicholson, 'The Siege of Berwick, 1333', *SHR*, Vol. 40, No. 129 (1961), pp. 19–42; Mark Ormrod, 'War in Scotland, 1332-1336', *ODNB* online edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

³⁹⁵ TNA SP 59/12, ff. 136r-v, Forster to Cecil, 16 November 1566 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 804].

with letters from gentlemen of the Scottish March.³⁹⁶ There is no evidence to suggest that this incident was raised in discussion in the English or Scottish Privy Council nor that it was treated as a serious threat to security. During the Scottish Civil war (between 1567 and 1573), the English Wardens of the East March continued to monitor Eyemouth because the English government believed that the French might use the haven as a base to land and invade.³⁹⁷ It was most frequently mentioned between April and May 1572 during Anglo-Scottish negotiations as a location for the safe return of Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland to English soil.³⁹⁸ The Scots wanted the English to send ships to the north of the Firth of Forth, further from the Anglo-Scottish border. Eyemouth was also used as a safe location for an English official to retire from the Scottish court. In 1581, Lord Hunsdon, English Warden of the East March asked King James VI for permission to leave the Scottish court and retire to Eyemouth after being narrowly missed by the shot from a harquebusier the previous day.³⁹⁹ Finally, Eyemouth continued to be used as a coastal haven and as a location for people to enter or leave Scotland.⁴⁰⁰

Between 1560 and 1568, the English and Scottish governments were bound by the Treaty of Edinburgh to conduct amicable relations with one another. The fortifications at Eyemouth created by the French between January and April 1560 were the greatest threat to Berwick and thus English security, which continued to plague the minds of

³⁹⁶ TNA SP 59/14, ff. 17r-18v, Bedford to Cecil, 10 August 1567 [*CSP Foreign 1566-68*, no. 1576].

³⁹⁷ TNA SP 52/18, f. 5, Sussex to Elizabeth, 1 May 1570 [*CSP Scots 1569-71*, no. 209]; TNA SP 70/126, f. 39, Sir Francis Walsingham to Cecil, Lord Burghley, 24 January 1573 [*CSP Foreign 1572-74*, no. 729].

³⁹⁸ TNA SP 52/22, f. 101, Lord Hunsdon to Burghley, 28 April 1572 [*CSP Scot 1571-74*, no. 272]; TNA SP 52/23/1, f. 24, Lord Hunsdon to Elizabeth, 9 May 1572 [*CSP Scots 1571-74*, no. 313]; TNA SP 52/23/1, f. 36, [Regent Matthew Stewart, Earl of Lennox?] to Lord Hunsdon, 13 May 1572 [*CSP Scots 1571-74*, no. 319]; TNA SP 52/23/1, f. 38, Burghley to Lord Hunsdon, 14 May 1572 [*CSP Scots 1571-74*, no. 320]; TNA SP 52/23/1, f. 62, Lord Hunsdon to Cecil, Lord Burghley, 29 May 1572 [*CSP Scots 1571-74*, no. 338].

³⁹⁹ BL Harley MS 6999, f. 211, Henry Carey, Baron Hunsdon to Sir Francis Walsingham, 28 June 1581.

⁴⁰⁰ TNA SP 52/53, f. 48r, Robert Bowes to Burghley, 10 May 1584 [*CSP Scots 1580-1603*, no. 48]; TNA SP 52/53, f. 58, Robert Bowes to Sir Robert Cecil, 23 May 1594 [*CSP Scots 1580-1603*, no. 58]; TNA SP 52/62, f. 8, George Nicholson to Burghley, 5 March 1598 [*CSP Scots 1580-1603*, no. 128].

English officials stationed on the border as well as the English Privy Council in the south. This chapter has added to Merriman and Blakeway's arguments that Eyemouth caused tension in Anglo-Scottish relations and instinctively defensive reactions from the English government. It was particularly evident in 1565 when Eyemouth posed a heightened threat due to the political context of the period. In Scotland, the domestic rebellion between Mary and the Chaseabout raid rebels developed an international dimension after the rebels crossed the border into the West March of England. Furthermore, relations between England and Scotland became strained after Mary moved away from Elizabeth's guidance regarding her choice of husband. Whilst on the Scottish side of the border, it was clear that the agenda surrounding Eyemouth remained domestic, the English government and border officials took extreme but precautionary measures to protect the territory of Berwick. International conflict between the two governments was directly reflected in the tension and anxieties in the border region. Whilst there is a tendency to focus on what actually happened, these events remind us that for contemporaries what might happen was just as important.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how diplomatic practices and objectives rooted in earlier sixteenth-century traditions were continued in the 1560s and reflected a pattern of mistrust between the English and Scottish governments. Intelligence-gathering was used to achieve the objective of maintaining the security of each nation from international threats on both sides of the border. This helped to preserve amicable relations as the potential threats were not raised and discussed between the two courts but instead monitored separately and privately by each government. As has been highlighted throughout this chapter, despite the impetus for amicable relations between Elizabeth and

Mary in the early years of the decade, these continuities of suspicion, intrigue and espionage were sustained. When the international relationship was strained, it took little prompting for previously established patterns of behaviour and activity to resurface.

The years of built-up tension in Anglo-Scottish relations came to light in 1565. This chapter has built upon a wider consensus that the year 1565 was a turning point in Anglo-Scottish relations. Whilst scholarship has drawn attention to the year 1565 as a key moment when the relationship between Elizabeth and Mary changed after Mary's marriage to Darnley, this chapter has examined the impact of these events on diplomatic practices.⁴⁰¹ The year 1565 put pressure on both governments to obtain information covertly from the other court in order to determine what actions their own government might take if a response was required. Furthermore, the identification of Berwick as an intelligence-gathering centre has built on Murphy's research on the Henrician use of intelligence networks and the use of spies in the Anglo-Scottish border region.⁴⁰² In the case of the English, border officials and spies played their role in maintaining intelligence networks in Scotland and sourcing information relating to the security of the border. As Scottish border towns were distant from the English court, Mary put her trust in her old ally France, specifically de Foix at the English court, to provide her with information. Arguably, the information was more direct and reliable than the English spy network but came with its own problems; the issue of keeping this network correspondence chain hidden from the eyes and ears of the English government. After 1565, the two governments navigated the fallout of the conflict and looked for a way to maintain amity through the more typical structures of diplomacy.

⁴⁰¹ For literature on 1565 as a moment of change in relations see, Simon Adams, 'The Release of Darnley and the failure of the amity', *Innes Review*, no. 38 (1987), pp. 121-153; Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington', pp. 180-236; Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', pp. 1-24; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 128.

⁴⁰² See, Neil Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War, 1522-24* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2023).

Historians are quick to examine the differences after the conclusion of the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh because we know on the international stage, this was a moment of monumental transformation. However, the reconstruction of the relationship from adversary to ally has been greatly exaggerated. In fact, in both the English and Scottish courts, and in the border region itself, there was still an understanding that mutual trust and cooperation could by no means be guaranteed.

Conclusion

This study of the English and Scottish diplomatic personnel – ambassadors, commissioners, representatives and agents – demonstrates that the frequent diplomatic exchanges during the personal reigns of Elizabeth and Mary were, at a first glance, part of a usual strategy of maintaining continental diplomatic practices and upholding the new amicable Anglo-Scottish relationship that was established after the conclusion of the 1560 Treaty of Edinburgh. However, even with this new peace, both monarchs continued to use procedures and practices that were first adopted by their predecessors to collect covert information in order to defend their realm. Through the assessment of these diplomatic practices, this thesis is not attempting to develop a new diplomatic narrative between England and Scotland, which has already been well-established in the historiography.¹ Instead, by applying the framework of the individual actions from the ‘new diplomatic history’, alongside a comparative study of the diplomatic practices of both countries, this research demonstrates that the increased frequency of diplomatic exchanges was a mask for concealing the underlying tension in the Anglo-Scottish relationship.

Chapter One identified that there was a significant increase in the number of ambassadors and non-ambassadors (in this case, representatives and agents) who were sent between 1558 and 1568 from both the English and Scottish courts, and also to the border region. This reflected the general foreign policy aims of both nations; to maintain amicable relations. With this increase in diplomatic activity, and in an environment where politics and diplomacy moved quickly, this chapter privileges discussions about who could claim diplomatic agency and in what circumstances they were sent. Chapter Two emphasises that this shift in frequent diplomacy needs to be examined in the context of the fast-paced national and international events. By studying the actions and

¹ Guy, *My Heart*; Warnicke, *Mary Queen of Scots*; Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity*.

correspondence of mainly ambassadors, but also non-ambassadors, during their time at the other court, this thesis demonstrates that they were forced to rely on their experience and to test the boundaries of their instructions to ensure that they were able to represent their monarch's interests. However, alongside the structural changes to English and Scottish diplomacy, Chapter Three reveals that there were also clear continuities in both English and Scottish diplomatic practice that originated before the 1560s. These were used to gather intelligence, which ultimately helped to anticipate actions at the other court and, in extreme cases, defend the country. Throughout the three chapters, four significant themes have emerged: the importance of a comparative study of English and Scottish diplomatic protocols and procedures; the increased frequency of embassies and the missions of representatives; the 1565 watershed in diplomacy, and the importance of studying the consequences of anticipated actions and events in alongside the events themselves.

This thesis is the first to compare the structural patterns of ambassadors and agents exchanged between England and Scotland, where both sides, when possible, are given equal weighting.² Elements of prosopography were used in this comparative study to allow the similarities and differences between the experiences of the ambassadors and the types of embassies to be understood in the wider context of Anglo-Scottish relations. From this comparison, this thesis has highlighted that the activities of Scottish individuals such as Robert Melville, John Wood and Nicholas Elphinstone, who were sent regularly to the English court, still need to have the entirety of their career studied.³ One key

² Where evidence did not allow equality was in the section on embassies that had instructions drafted but were not sent. Only two English examples of this survive but these have been understood in the context of Anglo-Scottish relations.

³ See, V. Smith, 'Diplomatic Counsel and the Shaping of Anglo-Scottish Relations (1558-69): the British Perspectives of Nicholas Throckmorton and Thomas Randolph', (PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2024). From the abstract, this thesis would indeed cover the careers of Randolph and Throckmorton in more detail

observation has been the similarities between the extensive political and diplomatic travel experience and the on-the-job training of the two groups. Whilst the ambassadors from England and Scotland did not have the same diplomatic education as continental ambassadors, they largely had hands-on experience of travelling abroad for personal reasons or as part of an ambassador's party.⁴ Specifically, the ambassadors or agents who were commissioned for the longest period had usually spent time in France and acquired knowledge that was essential for navigating Anglo-Franco-Scottish relations.

Two major differences have also emerged. The first was that the men selected as English ambassadors were largely career diplomats in the Elizabethan diplomatic corps. They received their diplomatic education whilst in an ambassador's party and rose through the ranks to be appointed as ambassadors in their own right. In contrast, before 1564, only Sir William Maitland, Mary's principal secretary, was commissioned as the regular Scottish ambassador to England. Whilst he was a skilled diplomat with experience on embassies under Mary of Guise and as the regular ambassador to England between 1560 and 1564, his main responsibilities were at the Scottish court. Such a regular appointment would not have been possible for the English secretary, Sir William Cecil, who could not have been away from his position at court for a similar length of time because he acted as the epicentre for all English diplomatic correspondence. In the Scottish case, it was not until the appointment of Robert Melville in February 1566 that a pattern emerged and we might go as far as claiming that this was the beginning of the Scottish diplomatic corps. The second major difference from a comparison of the English and Scottish ambassadors was revealed from understanding when Elizabeth and Mary chose to send their ambassadors. Almost as soon as Mary returned to Scotland in August

in Anglo-Scottish relations. This thesis is under embargo from April 2024 and therefore could not be taken into account in this research.

⁴ Wolfgang Reinhard, *Power Elites and State Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Tracey Sowerby, 'The Perfect Ambassador', p. 541.

1561, Elizabeth appointed her extraordinary ambassador, Sir Peter Mewtas, and upgraded her representative in Scotland, Randolph, to a resident ambassador, indicating that she was interested in receiving frequent news on what was happening at Mary's court.⁵ Between this first commission and after Randolph was dismissed in March 1566, no English resident ambassador was sent as his replacement. From Mary's perspective this move indicated that as she had cast out the English representative at the Scottish court and, by doing so, had cast out Elizabeth. In retaliation to removing the English resident ambassador from Scotland, Mary decided it was the appropriate opportunity, only a month after Randolph's dismissal, to send her first Scottish resident ambassador to the English court. This was a decision that also coincided with her contact at the English court, French resident ambassador de Foix, being recalled home to France. By dismissing the English resident ambassador and commissioning her own to the English court, this reflected the shift in power in the Elizabethan-Marian relationship after Mary's marriage to Darnley in 1565. Thus, Mary's interest in news from the English court and her own position in the English succession grew as her own Scottish line became more secure. Guy argued that Mary's independence was first demonstrated when in May 1563 she rejected a marriage proposal from Archduke Charles of Austria.⁶ However, this marital rejection was in fact a decision that was in line with both English and French views, rather than Mary making her own decision. It is convincingly argued by Jane Dawson that Mary's position was strengthened mainly after her marriage to Darnley, when the prospect that she could be Elizabeth's successor became more of a reality.⁷ Whilst this thesis supports Dawson's argument, it has also shed new light on the shift in Mary's

⁵ BL Lansdowne MS 5, ff. 81r-v, Copy Elizabeth to Mary, Queen of Scots, 23 November 1561. After Sir Peter Mewtas returned to London with no success on the ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh, Elizabeth wrote to Mary to understand why she refused to ratify the treaty.

⁶ Guy, *My Heart is My Own* (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), p. 175.

⁷ Dawson, 'Mary Queen of Scots, Darnley, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in 1565', p. 22.

power through an examination of the English and Scottish ambassadors who were exchanged in this decade.

Taking a step back from a comparison of the structural patterns between the English and Scottish ambassadors, the peaceful relations during the respective reigns of Elizabeth and Mary also led to a huge increase in the number of diplomatic personnel – ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents – who were exchanged.⁸ As other studies did not consider representatives in their lists and statistics of their diplomatic personnel, it is only possible to compare the number of accredited ambassadorial exchanges. Bell's research helpfully provides us with what we know are mostly completed lists of the official ambassadors sent to Scotland between 1509 and 1688. To widen the scope to the predecessors and successors in the sixteenth century, only the number of English embassies sent to Scotland during the reign of Henry VIII were anywhere near as frequent as between 1560 and 1568. Between 1509 and 1547, twenty-two embassies were commissioned to Scotland.⁹ Whilst the thirty-eight-year period cannot be directly compared, it does allow us to understand that both Henry VIII and Elizabeth were aware of the importance of a relationship with Scotland. During the short reigns of Edward VI (1547-1553) and Mary I (1553-1558), each monarch sent four embassies to Scotland. The lack of attention both monarchs paid to Scotland can be explained by the ongoing conflict with Scotland during Edward's reign and then the Marian Anglo-Spanish alliance that took precedence. In contrast, between 1558 and 1568, sixteen accredited English embassies (an average of one and half embassies per year) were sent. This was the highest number of ambassadors exchanged between England and

⁸ This assumption is based on the accredited embassies in Bell's handbooks that adhere to his definition of an ambassador. Therefore, the statistics for this research only refer to the official ambassadors and not the representatives in order to this this comparison because we do not have same catalogue of ambassadorial commissions for the reigns of James IV, James V and during the regencies of Albany, Arran, and Mary of Guise.

⁹ Gary M. Bell, *The Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 234-238.

Scotland before the union of the crowns under James VI. Between 1569 and 1604, a further thirty-six English embassies were sent to Scotland, which averages at only one ambassador a year.¹⁰ We are fortunate that we have accurate figures for part of this period on the Scottish side. Fry identified that sixteen Scottish embassies were sent to England in the period 1586 to 1603 with fewer sent in the final few years. This aligns with her argument that at the end of the reign of James V his focus was on alliances with Western Europe in order to alarm Elizabeth and to secure his place in the English succession.¹¹ The number of embassies that Elizabeth sent to Scotland between 1561 and 1568, during Mary's personal reign, was the most active period of diplomatic exchanges between England and Scotland. This grew out of the context of Anglo-Scottish peace and the establishment of a newly established Protestant church in Scotland, which created an environment where a closer relationship could now thrive.

The 'new diplomatic history' identifies that diplomacy was conducted at different times, by different individuals as well as ambassadors. Hennings and Sowerby argue that it was, in fact, hard to pinpoint where diplomacy began and ended in the complex layers of political exchanges. The difficulty lies in the fact that 'not every person involved in diplomatic business was a diplomat, and not every diplomat's main concern was diplomatic negotiation'.¹² An examination of the different types of embassy and diplomatic personnel in this decade reveals three distinct periods in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy. The years between 1561 and 1567 saw a relatively unremarkable period of diplomacy where ambassadors were exchanged between the two queens. However, this thesis has identified that this was bookended by two distinctive periods; between May

¹⁰ Gary M. Bell, *The Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 242-251. Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception', pp. 144-154, Fry identified that there were twenty-six Scottish embassies that were sent to England between 1586 and 1603. This points to a problem in Bell's work both and that there were in fact more embassies than he first found.

¹¹ Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception', pp. 166-174.

¹² Hennings and Sowerby, *Practices of Diplomacy* (2017), p. 2.

1559 to July 1561 and August 1567 to October 1568, where the two factions in Scotland blurred the distinctions between an ambassador and a diplomatic agent. It was only after the conclusion of the York-Westminster conference in January 1569 that Elizabeth first recognised Moray as the Regent of Scotland and Anglo-Scottish diplomacy returned to more normal monarch to regent relations.¹³ This has shown that greater precision is necessary when discussing the nature of agents sent during periods of crisis and identifying how the context changes the status of the diplomatic personnel.¹⁴ Whilst Bell's definition of an official ambassador is essential for distinguishing between the different types of commissions, his approach only focuses on ambassadors sent to monarchs and this needs to be refined in context where each rival group claimed the existence of a government. Appendix One and Two of this thesis are complete lists of the English and Scottish diplomatic personnel, which helpfully includes the representatives and agents. This demonstrates when an ambassador could not be sent and how the gap in traditional diplomatic activity was filled.

The purpose of this thesis is to prompt new questions about what normal diplomacy was in this period and why the sending and receiving of representatives and agents needs to be brought into the wider narrative of diplomatic relations. Within the period of 'normal' diplomatic relations, however, a change did occur. This research has drawn further attention to the year 1565 as a turning point in diplomacy between Elizabeth and Mary. It was already well known that this year was a high point in Anglo-Scottish tensions as each chapter of the thesis has already identified. However, there was an increase in the number of ambassadors exchanged in this single year, particularly when correspondence alone could not resolve Mary's complicated marital relations, and a large

¹³ Blakeway, *Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland*, pp. 213-214.

¹⁴ See, Gary M. Bell, *The Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*. Bell's distinction of who was an ambassador and who fell into the other category without identifying when the representative that was sent had a diplomatic role.

number of new names appeared. In terms of Scottish embassies, this year also reversed Mary's usual pattern of sending the same ambassador, Maitland, to England. This change was instigated by Maitland's outright refusal to accept an additional commission from Mary in May 1565 whilst on his return journey back to Scotland. Although the power dynamic shifted between the two monarchs, Elizabeth and Mary's diplomatic exchanges remained unremarkable on the surface so that the appearance of amicable relations could be maintained.

This thesis also highlights the way in which rumours and misinformation play a role in initiating and, in some cases, facilitating the political decision-making process at the centre of both courts. Rumours and diplomacy go hand in hand when examining ambassadors' correspondence and potential embassies. However, rumoured embassies are often overlooked because they did not take place and were therefore assumed to have no impact upon diplomatic relations. The late-sixteenth century political register of a list of men 'that haue not serued but are fitt to serue' afforded us the opportunity to understand the planning behind English and Scottish diplomatic commissions.¹⁵ The first chapter emphasises that there were frequent rumours about embassies, changes to embassies, or embassies that were cancelled between 1561 and 1567. This, in turn, adds to our understanding of how the English and Scottish governments responded to the actions and reactions of the other court and how crises were managed. In fact, this thesis demonstrates that rumours were especially useful in ascertaining what could have happened in diplomacy as well as what did happen and recognises the consequences of amending embassies.

¹⁵ BL Lansdowne MS 683, ff. 49r-50v, Political Register (c. 1570).

A comparative approach to diplomatic practices and the selection of ambassadors has enhanced our understanding of the English and Scottish government's objectives towards maintaining amity whilst ensuring the country was secure in the 1560s. This thesis suggests that such an approach would add new perspectives to other periods. Cynthia Fry identified that 'until 1586, Scotland and England were not at war, but neither were they tied to any form of peace, and traditionally had been enemies more often than friends'.¹⁶ Therefore, this framework should be applied to another more settled period of Anglo-Scottish peace. This thesis contributes to the broader argument that practices previously understood as novel in the 1580s and onwards had deeper roots. This includes the foundations of espionage networks, the cross-over between ambassadors and border officials, and the commissioning of the same men in diplomacy; all of which was established during previous decades. Now there is a need to examine whether the patterns identified in the 1560s continued in the same way or were further developed and reorganised according to the context of the 1570s and 1580s. The first pattern was the repeated use of men from 1560s diplomacy in later missions. It is already known that in the 1570s Elizabeth recommissioned Randolph to Scotland. Other repeat career ambassadors were sent to Scotland in the 1570s and 80s. These included Sir Henry Killigrew, a career diplomat, and Sir Robert Bowes, an English border official stationed in Berwick who was sent because of his proximity and knowledge of affairs in Scotland. From the Scottish court, James VI commissioned James and Robert Melville on embassies to England, after their position was restored in Scotland during his personal reign. A second area that merits further discussion was the use of Anglo-Scottish spies on the border. As indicated in Chapter Three, the English espionage network in Berwick in the 1560s was part of a broader pattern of spy networks being used in the borders. This

¹⁶ Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception', p. 137.

was first drawn to our attention by Neil Murphy who identifies that in the 1530s, Henry VIII used English and Scottish spy networks in the border to gather intelligence during times of conflict.¹⁷ This occurred again under the eye of English spymaster Sir Francis Walsingham in the 1570s and 80s who expanded his networks outside of the English court to the border. This must now be explored in the context of the 1590s Anglo-Scottish relationship. In this decade Fry identified that James VI moved away from focusing on his relationship with England and instead engaged in diplomatic relationships with France, Spain, and Denmark-Norway.¹⁸ Therefore, the framework of how the late-Elizabethan government used border espionage networks during this period of Anglo-Scottish tension needs to be addressed. A final area that can be expanded from the work of this thesis is that it was not solely official Anglo-Scottish diplomatic commissions that contributed towards diplomatic relations. Sowerby and Hennings drew attention to other non-state activities such as merchants, translators, traders, missionaries, military leaders and their units, and expatriates who also developed and facilitated diplomatic relations.¹⁹ Ultimately, there were other groups of men sent to Scotland or England, or through England to France who can be grouped under the broad term diplomatic personnel. Whilst this was touched upon throughout this thesis, how or if the journeys of these groups linked to diplomacy needs to be further explored under different regimes or groups claiming legitimacy. For example, examining how the English dealt with periods when two rival governments claimed legitimacy, and sought acknowledgement as the true authority from their neighbours, offers a possible new approach or point of comparison to negotiations between the Scottish crown and members of the Irish nobility – most notably Seán mac

¹⁷ Murphy, *Henry VIII, the Duke of Albany and the Anglo-Scottish War*, pp. 195-213.

¹⁸ Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception', pp. 137-138.

¹⁹ Sowerby and Hennings, ed., *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World*, p. 3.

Cuinn Ó'Neill (anglicised to Shane O'Neill) – who negotiated with Mary and Scottish rebels.²⁰

Through a comparative study of Anglo-Scottish diplomatic personnel and practices, this research has identified that the increased number of ambassadors exchanged during this period must be examined in a broader framework of continuity. Focusing on the practices of diplomacy remains relatively rare in either English or Scottish historiography. In so doing, this thesis reveals distinct diplomatic cultures and priorities that influenced the selection and deployment of ambassadors, shaped by the broader differences in each administration. It shows how decisions about who was sent to represent the monarch as their ambassador were especially important, since fast-moving political situations required ambassadors to use their own agency. It also demonstrates the reluctance or the sense of duty some ambassadors felt when they were forced to act independently from their commissions. Finally, in widening the scope to encompass broader diplomatic practices – such as Scottish engagement with French ambassadors in London, and continuities in the English use of intelligence networks to counter concerns focused upon the security of Berwick – this research emphasises continuities with the pre-1560 status quo. In order to avoid some of the pitfalls and criticisms that studies of an 'exceptional' individual or a single country have experienced, this study has tried intentionally to broaden its remit and to focus on the wider process and the diplomatic communities, which are often underestimated and undervalued, all of which play a significant role in Anglo-Scottish relations during this period.

²⁰ For initial work on the Irish Lords and their relationship with the Scottish Lords see, Fiona Anne MacDonald, 'Ireland and Scotland: historical perspectives on the Gaelic dimension 1560-1760' (PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1994); Brady Ciaran, 'O'Neill, Shane (Seaan)', *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (2009).

Appendices

Appendix 1: English Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to Scotland, 1558-1568.

The first Appendix is a list of twenty English ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents who were sent between 1558 and 1568 by the English government to perform diplomatic duties at the Scottish court or who met and negotiated with Scottish representatives. This thesis has identified a total of twenty embassies or journeys in this decade, sixteen of which were carried out by individuals who adhere to Bell's definition of an official ambassador. The other four fall into the categories of representative or agent.¹ Appendix one includes, the important and relevant dates of the mission; the reason he was sent or travelled, and a list of relevant primary and secondary material including instructions and payment records. The ambassadors are listed chronologically from when the embassy or journey began, and italics are used in the heading of each section to distinguish the representatives from the accredited ambassadors. The date section includes, if known, the date when the instruction(s) were drafted or written, when the ambassador or representative arrived in their host country (this was rarely the same date as when the ambassador had his first audience with the monarch), when the ambassador was recalled or received their return documentation, and the point at which they arrived back in their home court. The dates have been recorded as accurately as possible. Where specific dates are not known, a less than (<) or greater than (>) symbol is used to indicate a rough timescale of the ambassador's journey from other surviving evidence. If the date or month of the embassy cannot be estimated, a question mark (?) is used. This section provides details on the embassy or journey including the

¹ Gary M. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, 1509-1688* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer Limited, 1990), pp. 2-3.

diplomatic status of the person selected (whether a resident or special ambassador, a commissioner, representative, or agent); when he was sent; who he was sent by; the purpose of the mission, and where he was commissioned to (the English or Scottish court, or to Berwick).

The starting point for compiling Appendix One was the list of fourteen English embassies identified by Bell.² Whilst this provided a useful foundation for this Appendix, it limits our understanding of the diplomatic role of representatives and agents who were not sent by the monarch or those who were sent without official instructions. This thesis has expanded who should be included under the term diplomatic personnel to reflect the ‘new diplomatic history’ by including men who did not carry ambassadorial instructions, but who were sent in a diplomatic capacity. Therefore, the first reason Bell’s research is considered outdated is because by only examining the official ambassadors, in the context of Anglo-Scottish relations, he has overlooked the two periods of irregular diplomatic activity between 1559 and 1561, and 1567 and 1568 that bookended the six years of relatively normal diplomatic relations. During these two periods, Elizabeth sent representatives to the rebel group the Lords of the Congregation, and embassies to both the Regent Moray and Mary after she was deposed.

Secondly, Bell’s research cannot be defined as a complete list of accredited English embassies between 1558 and 1568. He does not include the embassy of Thomas Leighton (between May and June 1568) who was sent to both the imprisoned Mary and then to the Regent Moray at the Scottish court. Bell’s failure to include this embassy was not because Leighton was sent to both Scottish factions as he included the journey of Sir

² Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 3-4; *ibid.*, pp. 239-242. Bell’s handlist has identified fourteen embassies, which included a total of twelve different ambassadors. However, some of the embassies identified by Bell were categorised as missions of representatives instead of accredited ambassadors.

Henry Middlemore, who travelled to both the Regent Moray and Mary, in his list of accredited embassies.

A final reason that Bell's *Handlist* also needs readdressing is because the dates he used to identify the start and end of an embassy do not properly reflect the time between an ambassador being commissioned and his first audience with the host monarch. Bell stated that an embassy began from the moment the instructions were written. This is problematic for two reasons. The first was because, in some cases, multiple drafts of the instructions were created weeks apart. Secondly, the ambassador did not always receive his instructions and travel to his host country on the same day. To combat these potential issues, this Appendix provides the date(s) that the instructions were drafted and the date that the ambassador or representative arrived in Scotland or met with commissioners. This has also helped to identify if or when an ambassador stopped at Berwick or any other English or Scottish towns during their travels.

Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland and Doctor Robert Hyndmer/Hindmer 23 January 1558 – [February/March] 1558	
Dates	Instructions – 23 January 1558. Arrived in Scotland – [January/February] 1558. Arrived back - [Agreement of observation of truce – 18 March] 1558.
Purpose	Commissioners. To conclude a truce with the commissioners of Mary of Guise, Dowager Queen of Scotland to end the conflict in the border region.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 51/1, ff. 71r-72v; ff. 73r-76v. <i>CSP Foreign 1553-1558</i> . <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 203-4.
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 15/8, ff. 104r-105v; ff.124r-v; ff.130r-131v; f. 170r. TNA SP 51/1, ff. 78r-80v; ff. 81r-82v; ff. 76r-77v. <i>State Papers relating to Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Eliz</i> , p. 209. <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i> , (London, 1883), p. 152. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 203-208. NRS E 21/51, ff. 87r-89v.
Secondary	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 239.

Payments	-

Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland, William third Lord Dacre of Gilsland, Sir James Croft and Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham >8 May 1559 – [?] July 1559	
Dates	Instructions – [?] Arrived in the border – [?] May 1559. Arrived back – [?] July 1559.
Purpose	Commissioners. Sent to conclude peace in the Treaty of Upsetlington with Scottish Commissioners about the matters that were not settled about the seventh article of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. ³
Instructions Sources	<i>CSP Foreign 1558-1559</i> , p. 10.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 59r-66v, Treaty of Upsetlington, 31 May 1559. <i>CSP Foreign 1558-1559</i> , pp. 15-20.
Secondary	-
Payments	-

Sir Ralph Sadler c. 18 August 1559 – c. July 1560	
Dates	Instructions – [July] 1559 / [7 August] 1559. Arrived in Berwick – c. 18 August 1559. ⁴ Arrived back – c. July 1560. ⁵
Purpose	Representative. Ambassadors on the border. Sadler was commissioned to Berwick to communicate and advise the Scottish Lords of the Congregation on behalf of the English government. Sadler was to work as part of a team in Berwick with Sir James Croft (Governor of Berwick) and Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk (Lieutenant General of the North, January 1560) as part

³ The seventh article concerned Henri II's possession of Calais, Ruysbank, Nyhuse, Merk, Oye, Hammes, Sandgate, and Guisnes for the space of eight years and then they would be restored to England.

⁴ TNA SP 59/1, ff. 247r-248v, Croft to Cecil, 17 August 1559 [*CSP Foreign 1558-59*, no. 1211]. Croft wrote that Sadler would arrive on 18 August 1559.

⁵ The last correspondence of Sadler from the East March, TNA SP 52/3, ff. 14r-15v, Sadler to Norfolk, 11 May 1560 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 712]; TNA SP 52/3, ff. 232r-233v, Lord Grey, Lord Scrope, Sadler, Croft, and Francis Leek to Norfolk, 17 May 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 101].

TNA SP 59/3, ff. 30r-31v, Elizabeth to Leek. Elizabeth wrote that Croft was discharged on [n.d.] July 1560. Sadler as the Captain of Berwick in his final months at Berwick, see TNA SP 52/4, ff. 35r-36v, Norfolk to Cecil, 19 June 1560 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 824]. Norfolk wrote that Sadler briefly held the office of Captain of Berwick and hoped Wharton would be appointed to the position soon; TNA SP 59/3, ff. 32r-33v, Sir Francis Leek to Cecil, 29 August 1560 [*CSP Foreign 1560-61*, no. 471]. Leek wrote that from 29 March 1560 Sadler took Captain of Berwick until Sir George Bowes took over before Sir Francis Leek finally took charge.

	of a mission to secretly communication with the Lords of the Congregation.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 111r-113v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 16r-v; f. 26; f. 29. TNA SP 52/1, ff. 175r-176v; ff. 177r-v; ff. 178r-179v. TNA SP 59/1, f. 245. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 241-242.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 33591. BL Add. MS 33592. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 54r-57v; ff. 197r-198v. TNA SP 52/1, ff. 171r-174v; ff. 214r-215v. TNA SP 52/2. TNA SP 52/3. TNA SP 52/4. <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i> , (London, 1883). <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 210-430. <i>Two missions of Jacques de la Brosse</i> , p. 109.
Secondary	-
Payments	-

<i>Sir Thomas Randolph</i> [7] September 1559 – 25 August 1561	
Dates	Instructions – [?] September 1559. Arrived in Berwick – [c. 7] September 1559. Summoned to Scotland – 16 September 1559. Arrived back – [?] July 1563 (letters of safe conduct to return to England were issued on 18 June 1563)
Purpose	Agent to the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland. In September 1559, Randolph accompanied James Hamilton, third Earl of Arran from France to Berwick. Then, Randolph was invited to reside with the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland as a secret agent. He remained in Scotland secretly to gather intelligence on the situation between the Regent Mary of Guise and the Lords of the Congregation. Between November-December 1559, Randolph escorted Maitland to London. ⁶ After the victory at the Siege of Leith in 1560, Randolph was asked to remain in Scotland and gather intelligence on behalf of the English government.
Instructions Sources	1559 BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 73r-74v. BL Lansdowne MS 4, ff. 26r-27v.

⁶ Maitland and Randolph arrived in Berwick on 23 November and stayed for two nights. The pair returned to Scotland, via Carlisle, to Glasgow on 25 December.

	TNA SP 52/1, f. 298
	1560 NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i> , (London, 1883), p. 258. TNA SP 52/5, ff. 152r-153v.
Selected Correspondence	1559 BL Add. MS 33591. BL Add. MS 33592. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 75r-76v; ff. 81r-82v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 54r-v; ff. 58r-62v. TNA SP 52/1, ff. 212r-v; f. 122; f. 224; f. 226; f. 228. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House, Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883), p. 42, 19 October 1559. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , pp. 79-81. <i>CSP Foreign, Vol. 1, 1558-1559</i> . <i>CSP Scot, Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 241-430.
	1560 TNA SP 52/5, ff. 152r-153v. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 2, 1559-1560</i> . <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561</i> . <i>Calendar of the Marquis of Bath, Vol. II</i> (Dublin, 1097), pp. 16-17.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 239.
Payments	Official although <i>ad hoc</i> pay, 20s/d (Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 239).

Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk [?] February 1560 – [March] 1560	
Dates	Instructions – [?] February 1560 Arrived in Berwick – [?] February 1560 Arrived back – [March] 1560
Purpose	Commissioner. Appointed Lieutenant General of the North in December 1559 and stayed in Berwick. Sent to agree the Articles at Berwick with Lord James Stewart, Patrick Ruthven, third Lord Ruthven, Sir John Maxwell of Terricles, John Wyschert of Pittarrow, and Henry Balnaves in the name of James Hamilton, Duke of Châtellherault to sign the Treaty of Berwick as the English representative.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 59/2, ff. 149r-151v.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula X/1 ff. 77r-85v. BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 9r-10v, Draft of the Treaty of Berwick TNA SP 52/2, ff. 56r-57v; ff. 61r-v, Articles of Berwick, 27 February 1560.

	TNA SP 52/9, ff. 149r-151v.
Secondary Correspondence	-
Payments	-

Henry Killigrew 6 April 1560 - [11] May 1560	
Dates	Instructions – 23 March 1560. Arrived in Scotland – 6 April 1560. Arrived back – [11] May 1560.
Purpose	Agent. To escort Jean de Monluc, Bishop of Valence to Scotland. He was accredited by Francis and Mary to the Earl of Arran in Scotland, which makes his journey part of an official Franco-Scottish mission. However, Killigrew used this journey to talk to the Bishop and gather information as a representative of the English government.
Instructions Sources	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 2, 1559-1560.</i>
Selected Correspondence	BL Lansdowne MS 103. TNA SP 52/3, ff. 27-28; f. 55; f. 60; f. 62; f. 67; f. 83; f. 91; f. 106; f. 136; f. 147; f. 175. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 359-362; p. 370; pp. 373-4; p. 376; p. 379; p. 388, pp. 396-7. <i>Two missions of Jacques de la Brosse</i> , p. 105; p. 115; p. 119. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883).
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 239.
Payments	BL Add. MS 33924, ff. 3r-v. TNA SP 59/2, f. 188. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 351-2. <i>Two missions of Jacques de la Brosse</i> , p. 121.

Sir William Cecil and Sir Nicholas Wotton 26 May 1560 – [?] July 1560	
Dates	Instructions – 26 May 1560. Arrived in Scotland – [7] June 1560. ⁷ Arrived back – [August] 1560 (letters of safe conduct to return to England were issued on [28] July 1560) Treaty signed 6 July 1560.
Purpose	Commissioners. 17 June: preliminary articles at Edinburgh.

⁷ Hatfield House, CP 152/165, Cecil to William Petre, 2 June 1560; Hatfield House, CP 152/168, Cecil to Petre, 4 June 1560.

	6 July: Treaty of Edinburgh. 7 July: Peace proclaimed in Scotland. To negotiate and conclude the articles of the Treaty of Edinburgh with French and Scottish commissioners. The discussions were held in Newcastle and Edinburgh.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/I, ff. 121r-124v; f. 151r; ff. 152r-155v. Hatfield House, CP 152/173; CC 153/32. TNA SP 52/3, f. 240; f. 243; f. 247; f. 253. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561.</i> <i>CSP Scot, Vol. 1, 1547-63</i>, p. 413.
Selected Correspondence	BL Lansdowne MS 103. TNA SP 59/2, f. 233. TNA SP 52/1, f. 23. TNA SP 52/4, f. 1; f. 2; ff. 6r-7v; f. 10; ff. 12r-v; ff. 13r-v; ff. 14r-v; f. 27; f. 29; ff. 45r-v (added instructions from Elizabeth on the negotiations); ff. 54r-56v; ff. 88r-89v; ff. 119r-126v (Treaty of Edinburgh). <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i>, (London, 1883), p. 231; p. 236. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House, Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883) <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i>, pp. 411-452. <i>Two missions of Jacques de la Brosse</i>, p. 179.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i>, p. 239.
Payments	BL Lansdowne MS 103, ff. 5r-6v, expenses 27 May to 28 July 1560, £252 (sterling) for 63 days in Scotland.

Sir Thomas Randolph 25 August 1561 – >18 June 1563	
Dates	Instructions – [?] October 1561. Arrived in Scotland – still there from his time as an agent. Return letters – Letters of safe conduct to return to England were issued on 18 June 1563 but Randolph stayed longer to witness the arrival of a Swedish representative at the Scottish court. Arrived back – >18 June 1563.
Purpose	1561-1566 - Resident Ambassador. Randolph was an accredited English ambassador to Scotland after Mary returned. From 1563, Randolph was asked by Elizabeth and Cecil to steer Mary towards marrying an English nobleman, specifically, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester.
Instructions	1561 BL Harley MS 290, ff. 11r-12v. Hatfield House, CP 152/108.

	TNA SP 52/6, ff. 77r-78v, A Memorial for Randolph, 20 March 1561.
Selected Correspondence	1561 BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 173r-174v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 157r-161v; ff. 186r-188v; ff. 190r-196v; ff. 199r-208v. BL Lansdowne MS 4, ff. 132r-133v. BL Harley MS 6986, ff. 31r-32v. BL Harley MS 6990, ff. 13r-16v. NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. TNA SP 52/6, f. 144. TNA SP 52/8, ff. 86r-87v; ff. 98r-99v. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883), pp. 155-156. <i>Salisbury, Vol. 1</i> , pp. 258-9. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561.</i> <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 5, 1562.</i> <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 6, 1563-1564.</i>
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 239.
Payments	Official although <i>ad hoc</i> pay, 20s/d (Bell, p. 239). Randolph was sent a gold cup in 1562. ⁸

Sir Peter Mewtas [>17] September 1561 – 11 October 1561	
Dates	Instructions – < 17 September 1561. Arrived in Scotland – > 17 September 1561. Arrived back – [11] October 1561 (letters of safe conduct to return to England were issued on 7 October 1561)
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. To greet Mary Queen of Scots after she returned to Scotland. The specific purpose of Mewtas's embassy was to encourage her to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/6, ff. 141r-142v. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 4, 1561-1562.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , p. 553.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 35831, f. 1. TNA SP 52/6, f. 150; f. 162; f. 174. TNA SP 52/7, f. 4. TNA SP 70/30, f. 107. TNA SP 70/32, f. 11.

⁸ Felicity Heal, 'Royal Gifts and Gift-Exchange in Sixteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Politics' in Steve Boardman, ed., *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald* (2014), p. 292.

	<i>Collection of SP from the reigns of Henry, Edward, Mary and Elizabeth, left by Burghley, Vol. 1, 1542-1570, p. 373; p. 375. CSP Foreign Vol. 4, 1561-1562. Lettres, pp. 410-411; pp. 423-427.</i>
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 240.
Payments	NRS E 21/53, ff. 14v-16v. 1561 – gold chain worth £400 (sterling). ⁹

Sir Henry Sidney 21 July 1562 – <6 August 1562	
Dates	Instructions – 16 July 1562 (departed same day). ¹⁰ Arrived in Scotland – 21 July 1562. Arrived back – [6] August 1562 ¹¹ (letters of safe conduct to return to England were issued on [July/August] 1562)
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. To inform Mary that the interview between the two queens was cancelled for the summer of 1562 and to explain that this would be moved to the summer of 1563.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 213-217v. BL Lansdowne MS 4, ff. 147r-148v. Hatfield House, CP 153/109. NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. TNA SP 52/7. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883) <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 635-6. <i>Salisbury, Vol. 1</i> , p. 267.
Selected Correspondence	BL Royal MS 18 B VI, ff. 276r-v. TNA SP 70/39, Elizabeth to Throckmorton, [16 July] 1562. TNA SP 52/7, f. 65; f. 69. TNA SP 59/6, f. 98. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 4, 1561-1562</i> . <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 642-645.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 240.
Payments	-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

¹⁰ TNA SP 70/39, f. 65, William Hawes to Throckmorton, 15 July 1562 [*CSP Foreign 1562*, no. 323]. This states that Sidney departed on 15; *CSP Foreign*, Henry Sidney to Cecil, 25 July 1562 – this states that Sidney departed on 16 July.

¹¹ TNA SP 59/6, f. 98r, Lord Grey to Cecil, 3 August 1562 [*CSP Foreign 1562*, no. 417]. Henry Sidney was in Berwick on this date.

Sir Thomas Randolph 1 September 1563 – 3 March 1566	
Dates	Instructions – 20 August 1563. Arrived in Scotland – 1 September 1563. Recalled – issued on 18 October 1565 and [?] February 1566. Arrived in Berwick – 3 March 1566. Arrived back to Court – c. June 1566.
Purpose	Resident ambassador to Scotland (1561-1566). Sent to discuss the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots and propose a match with Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. Expelled from Scotland by Mary, Queen of Scots on 3 March 1566 based on evidence that Randolph had supplied the Chaseabout Raid rebels with money.
Instructions Sources	1563 BL Add. MS 5935, ff. 151r-155r. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 205r-206v. BL Egerton 2790, ff. 143r-146v. BL Harley 6986, ff. 29r-30v; ff. 31r-32v. BL Harley MS 289, ff. 164r-165r. BL Lansdowne MS 155, ff. 377v-378. BL Sloane MS 2442, ff. 142r-147v. NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. TNA SP 52/8, ff. 100-104; f. 105; f. 106. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 6, 1563-1564.</i>
	1564 BL Add. MS 5935, ff. 155v-157v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 249, ff. 270r-273v. BL Egerton MS 2790, ff. 147r-149r. BL Harley MS 289, ff. 164r-165r. BL Sloane MS 2442, ff. 142r-147v. TNA SP 52/9, ff. 18r-19v; ff. 28r-34v; ff. 51r-52v; ff. 123r-125v. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569, p. 27.</i>
	1565 BL Lansdowne MS 8, f. 89. TNA SP 52/11, f. 112; f. 154r. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569, pp. 215-216.</i>
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 5935, f. 151; f. 153. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 188r-196v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 310r-326r. BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 23r-24v. BL Harley 6986, ff. 31r-32v. BL Harley MS 6990, ff. 13r-14v; ff. 15r-16v. NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. TNA SP 52/8, ff. 113r-114v; ff. 156r-159v; f. 156, f. 160; ff. 168r-169v. TNA SP 52/9, f. 159. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883) <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 6, 1563-1564.</i>

	<i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63.</i> 1564.¹² BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, f. 220r-v. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i>, pp. 28-93. 1565 BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 227r-230v; ff. 237r-238v; ff. 384r-6v. BL Lansdowne 155, f. 379r-81. TNA SP 52/10, f. 139-140, Elizabeth to Randolph, 10 July 1565 (instructed him to give advice to Mary, Queen of Scots and the Scottish Lords on the conditions of their country). TNA SP 52/12, f. 18; f. 21. <i>CSP Foreign, Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569.</i>
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 240.
Payments	-

<i>Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford and Sir Thomas Randolph</i> <i>October 1564 – November 1564</i>	
Dates	Instructions – 4, 7, 12 October 1564. Arrived in Berwick – 14 October 1564. Arrived back in Scotland – [November] 1564.
Purpose	Agents, Conference at Berwick. Sent to treat with Scottish commissioners, Sir William Maitland of Lethington and James Stewart, Earl of Moray, mainly discussing Mary, Queen of Scots's marriage and where she stands in the English succession. Bedford was already stationed in the border town as the Governor of Berwick and Randolph travelled from Edinburgh to Berwick.
Instructions Sources	BL Harley MS 290, f. 13r-16v. TNA SP 52/9, f. 102; f. 123; f. 127; f. 129; f. 130; f. 192. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 79-82. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 81.
Selected Correspondence	NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. TNA SP 52/9, f. 109; f. 144. TNA SP 59/8, f. 194, f. 196. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 82-98. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883)

¹² Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, p. 240. Bell has the months June to October 1564 as a gap in Randolph's commission.

Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 240.
Payments	-

Sir Nicholas Throckmorton [Throgmorton] [c. 13/15] May 1565 – c. 24/26 May 1565	
Dates	Instructions – 24 April, 1 and 2 May 1565. Arrived in Scotland – [c. 13 ¹³ /15] May 1565. Arrived back in England – c. 24/26 May 1565.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Secretary, Henry Middlemore. At the Scottish court 15-18 May 1565. Sent to discourage Mary from marrying Darnley and to encourage the Protestant Lords to stand in opposition to the proposed marriage.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/10, f. 60; f. 71. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 145-147; pp. 150-152.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 291r-294v; ff. 296r-297r. BL Harley MS 289, ff. 93r-94v. BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 117r-118v. TNA SP 52/10, f. 106. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 160-166. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 113-120. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i>
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 241.
Payments	66s 8d p.d. BL Add. MS 24127, f. 3v.

Sir John Tamworth [Thomworth] c. 6 August 1565 – c. 1 September 1565	
Dates	Instructions – 30 July 1565. Arrived in Scotland – c. 6 August 1565. ¹⁴ Arrived back – c. 1 September 1565 (delayed departure from Scotland because he was imprisoned in Hume Castle).
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Tamworth also worked to reconcile the differences between Mary, Queen of Scots and James Stewart, Earl of Moray.

¹³ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 96r-97v, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21 May 1565] [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 183.

¹⁴ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 13r-14v, Tamworth and Randolph to Cecil, 10 August 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 226]; BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 360r-361r, Bedford to Elizabeth, 18 August 1565.

	After Mary married Darley on 29 July, Tamworth was given updated instructions to question why the marriage between Mary and Darnley took place before the agreed three-month waiting period had ended.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton Caligula B IX/1, ff. 243r-244v. BL Royal MS 18 B VI, f. 234v. TNA SP 52/10, ff. 156-160. TNA SP 52/11, ff. 1r-4v (updated instructions since his departure). <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 185-7.
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 52/10, f. 155. TNA SP 52/11, f. 10; f. 13; f. 17; f. 19. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 188-192.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 241.
Payments	-

Sir Henry Killigrew >15 June 1566 – [mid] July 1566	
Dates	Instructions – 13 June 1566 / 15 June 1566. Arrived in Scotland – >15 June 1566. Arrived back – [sent back to England shortly after Melville arrived back in Scotland] July 1566. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 135.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Secretary – William Davidson. To complain about Mary, Queen of Scots harbouring Ruxby, a renegade English papist (he discovered from Robert Melville that Ruxby was a double agent). To discuss Mary's contact with Irish rebel Shane O'Neil, and the depredations with Scottish borderers.
Instructions Sources	BL Add. MS 5935, f. 158r-164r. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IV, f. 248. BL Egerton MS 2790, ff. 149-57r. BL Harley MS 289, f. 166r-v. BL Lansdowne MS 155, f. 386, 91. BL Sloane MS 2442, ff. 148-51. TNA SP 52/12, f. 72. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 128-129; p. 132; p. 135. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 286-88.
Selected Correspondence	<i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883) <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 288-293.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 241.

Payments	20s p.d. <i>Memoirs of Sir James Melville of Halhill, 1535, 1617</i> , ed. A. Francis Steuart (London, George Routledge & Sons, Ltd, 1929), p. 135.
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Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford 9 December 1566 – 9 January 1567	
Dates	Instructions – 7 November 1566 and 1 December 1566. Arrived in Scotland – 9 December 1566. Arrived back (Berwick) – 9 January 1567.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Sent as the English representative for the baptism of Prince James at Stirling Castle. In his party were Christopher Hatton, Mr Carey (son of Lord Hudson), Mr Lingish (Norfolk's man), and a gentlemen from Yorkshire.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 399. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568</i> .
Selected Correspondence	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568</i> . <i>CSP Scots Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 306-310. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , pp. 139-143.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 241.
Payments	Bedford - diamond chain worth 2,000 crowns. Mr Carey – chain of pearls. Mr Christopher Hatton – chain with Mary, Queen of Scots's picture and a ring. Mr Lingish and five other quality men, each had chains'. ¹⁵

Sir Henry Killigrew 19 February/1 March 1567 – >15 March 1567	
Dates	Instructions - 19 February 1567 / 1 March 1567. Arrived in Scotland – 19 February 1567 / 1 March 1567. Arrived back – >15 March 1567 (letters of safe conduct for his return to England were issued on [before 14] March 1567)
Purpose	Special Ambassador. Sent to Scotland to console Mary about the death of her husband Darnley, and also to investigate the events surrounding his death. Audience with Mary, Queen of Scots on 8 March 1567. ¹⁶
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IV, ff. 248r-249v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B V.

¹⁵ *Melville Memoirs*, pp. 143-144.

¹⁶ TNA SP 52/13, ff. 19r-v, Killigrew to Cecil, 8 March 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 479].

Selected Correspondence	<i>A diurnal of remarkable occurrents</i> , pp. 106-7.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 241.
Payments	<i>CSP Foreign</i> , 29 March 1567, Drury to [Cecil] – the Scots were scraping together money at court for Killigrew's chain.

Sir Nicholas Throckmorton [Throgmorton] <15 July 1567 – 5 September 1567	
Dates	Instructions – 1 July 1567 / 29 June 1567. Arrived in Scotland – <15 July 1567 (planned to leave England on 2 July 1567 (TNA SP 52/13, ff. 3r-v, Throckmorton to Cecil, 1 July) Recalled – [6] August 1567. Arrived back – 5 September 1567 (letters of safe conduct for his return to England were issued on 27 August 1567)
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Secretary – Henry Middlemore. To visit the recently detained Mary, Queen of Scots in Loch Leven and to encourage her that she had Elizabeth's support. However, Throckmorton was refused access to Mary by the Lords of Scotland. Instead, Throckmorton met with Lord Athol and Morton. During Throckmorton's embassy, Mary was forced to abdicate the throne to her infant son who was crowned James VI on 29 July 1567. From this moment, Throckmorton's instructions to Mary were void and he was left in diplomatic limbo.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/13, f. 81; f. 83. BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, ff. 4r-10r. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scots Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 339-342.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, ff. 20r-21v; ff. 22r-25r; ff. 28r-48v. BL Stowe MS 142, f. 23. TNA SP 52/14, f. 4; f. 33; f. 36; f. 75; f. 127. TNA SP 59/13, f. 278. TNA SP 59/14, f. 81. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scots: Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , p. 342-396. <i>A diurnal of remarkable occurrents</i> , p. 120.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i> , p. 242.
Payments	66s 8d p.d. <i>Accounts of the Treasurer of Scotland, Vol. 12</i> , ed. Thomas Dickson (Edinburgh: H.M General Register House, 1877), p. 67 - £79 16s 9d (Scots) towards his lodgings

Thomas Leighton [?] May 1568 – [?] June 1568	
Dates	Instructions – 18 May 1568. Arrived in Scotland – [May] 1568. Arrived back – [?] June 1568.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. To assure Mary, Queen of Scots that Elizabeth will provide aid to her and her Queen's party followers on the condition that they accept advice from Elizabeth and her government. Leighton was to tell Mary that the reasons the English would assist her were because both her and Elizabeth were queens in their own right, England and Scotland are close to one another, and if the English help, it will encourage French assistance. If Mary refused the English conditions, then the English would change their mind on their decision to assist her. After his visit to Mary, Leighton was to travel to James Stewart, Earl of Moray to discuss the intention to cease fighting on both sides.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 75r-v. TNA SP 52/15, f. 38; f. 40. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569, p. 409.</i>
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 76r-v. TNA SP 52/15, f. 34; f. 35. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i>
Secondary Correspondence	-
Payments	-

Sir Henry Middlemore >8 June 1568 – 25 July 1568	
Dates	Instructions – [8] June 1568. Arrived in Carlisle – 12 June 1568. Arrived in Scotland – [?] June 1568. Arrived back – [c. 25] July 1568 (letters of safe conduct for his return to England were issued [c. 13] July 1568)
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Sent to Mary: Had an audience with Mary on 13 June and she allowed him to pass to the Regent Moray. Sent to Moray: Sent to learn about the state of Scotland. To talk to the Regent James Stewart, Earl of Moray about Mary's offences in Scotland and to convince him not to fight.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/15, f. 58. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, f. 378r-v.

	BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 88. NLS Adv.MS.31.2.19. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883). <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i>, pp. 424-5.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, f. 354r-v. BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 127; f. 130; f. 143. EUSC LA I 47. NRS GD 103/2/4/25. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i>, pp. 431-436; pp. 441-3, pp. 446-7; p. 455-6.
Secondary Correspondence	Bell, <i>A Handlist of British Diplomats</i>, p. 242.
Payments	-

Appendix 2: Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents sent to England, 1558-1568.

The second Appendix constitutes the first complete list of Scottish ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents sent by the Scottish monarch, regent or a group of rebels who performed diplomatic duties at the English court or who met with English representatives between 1558 and 1568. This thesis has identified thirty-two embassies or journeys, twenty-two of which were undertaken by individuals who would comply with Bell's definition of an accredited ambassador.¹⁷ The other ten were carried out by men who fall into the categories of representatives or agents, who were sent by the Lords of the Congregation, Chaseabout Raid rebels, or Mary, after she was deposed from the Scottish throne. Appendix Two includes, the important dates of the embassies or journeys; the reason he was sent or travelled, and a list of relevant primary and secondary material including instructions and payment records. The ambassadors are listed chronologically, and italics are used in the heading of each section to distinguish between the representatives and the accredited ambassadors. The date section here also includes, if known, when the instruction(s) were drafted or written, when the ambassador or representative arrived in their host country (this was rarely the same date as when the ambassador had their first audience with the monarch), when the ambassador was recalled or received their return documentation, and when they arrived back in their home country. The dates have been recorded as accurately as possible. Where specific dates are not known, a less than (<) or greater than (>) symbol is used to indicate a rough timescale of the ambassador's journey from other surviving evidence. If the date or month of the embassy cannot be estimated, a question mark (?) is used. The section provides more details about the embassy or journey including the status of the person chosen (whether a

¹⁷ Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 2-3.

resident or special ambassador, commissioner, representative, or agent); when he was sent; who he was sent by; the purpose of the mission, and where he was commissioned (the English or Scottish court, or to Berwick).

This Appendix draws on Hiram Morgan's incomplete, systematic study of ambassadors travelling to and from Scotland between 1473 and 1603.¹⁸ Although incomplete, Morgan's project helped to lay the groundwork for future studies of Scottish diplomacy. Morgan's database identifies eleven embassies and missions sent from Scotland to England. This research only agreed that seven of the eleven embassies in Morgan's study had an important role in shaping Anglo-Scottish relations. The problem with Morgan's database is that it mainly identified embassies from payments recorded in the Treasurer's Accounts of Scotland and other commissions that were mentioned in James Melville's *Memoirs*. Using only the information in the Treasurer's Accounts is misleading. It lists the journeys of letter bearers or heralds who were sent to the English court as well as other embassies that were sent through England. For example, Alexander Clerk was sent from the Scottish court on to France, which required him to travel through England as part of his journey. Similarly, using Melville's *Memoirs* are also a misleading source. This was written long after the 1560s embassies had taken place. He references the embassies of Scottish ambassadors as late as 1598. Therefore, the accuracy of his recall of events that took place thirty years earlier must be taken into consideration. The thirty-two embassies and missions in this Appendix were identified from instructions; letters of safe conduct; references to embassies in the correspondence of English and Scottish monarchs, regents, ambassadors, and courtiers, and Privy Council records from the English and Scottish archives.

¹⁸ Hiram Morgan, 'Scotland in Renaissance Diplomacy, 1473-1603' Database, 2008.

This thesis has identified two distinct periods of English and Scottish diplomacy (1559-61) and (1567-68) that bookended the more typical period of diplomatic exchanges (1561-67). Between 1559 and 1560, five representatives were sent from the Lords of the Congregation, and then two were sent by Mary (later referred to as the Queen's Party) between 1567 and 1568. The year 1565 also saw three representatives sent from the Chaseabout Raid rebels after they fled into exile in England, taking refuge in Newcastle, in order to escape Mary and Darnley's forces. The men dispatched during these two periods of exceptional diplomatic activity and the representatives sent by rebels in 1565 were sent in a diplomatic capacity to negotiate with another monarch, with the ultimate goal of bringing peace, but they were not ambassadors.

Yves de Rubay and Sir William Maitland of Lethington [?] February 1558 – [?] March 1558	
Dates	Instructions – c. 11 February 1558. Arrived in England – [?] February 1558. Return letters – c. 1 March 1558. Arrived back – [?] March 1558.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Sent with Monsieur Yves du Rubay, Master of Requests and Keeper of the Seals of the Regent Mary of Guise, to England and France. The pair never arrived in France.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 51/1, ff. 69r-70v.
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 51/1, f. 84; f. 85. TNA PC 2/8, f. 50.
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 23-25.
Payments	NRS E21/52, ff. 29v-30r, 1 February 1558, passed from Edinburgh to London with 600 crowns of the son.

Sir William Maitland of Lethington >4 March 1559 – [?] May 1559	
Dates	Instructions – 4 March 1559. Arrived in England – [?] March 1559. Arrived in France – [?] April 1559. Arrived back – [?] May 1559.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador.

	Sent by the Regent Mary of Guise to conclude matters tending to the stability, commodity, and wealth of both realms. Secretly, Maitland played the role of a double-agent and used his official commission to discuss the possibility of English intervention in Scotland.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 52/1, f. 9r-v; ff. 46r-v. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 1, 1558-1559</i> , p. 159; pp. 199-202. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , p. 210. <i>CSP Spain Vol. 1, 1558-1567</i> , pp. 38.
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 40-42.
Payments	NRS E21/51, ff. 87r-89v, 1 March 1559, passed from Edinburgh to London and France in the affairs of Mary of Guise with 600 crowns of the son.

James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; James Douglas, Lord Dalkeith; Alexander, Lord Hume; Henry Sinclair, Dean of Glasgow, and James Makgill [?] May 1559 – [?] July 1559	
Dates	Instructions – [?] Arrived on the border – [?] May 1559. Arrived back – [?] July 1559.
Purpose	Commissioners. Sent to conclude peace in the Treaty of Upsetlington with English Commissioners about the matters that were not settled about the seventh article of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr�sis. ¹⁹
Instructions Sources	<i>CSP Foreign 1558-1559</i> , p. 21.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 59r-66v, Treaty of Upsetlington, 31 May 1559. <i>CSP Foreign 1558-1559</i> , pp. 15-20.
Secondary	-
Payments	-

John Knox c. 1 August – c. 5 August 1559	
Dates	Instructions – 30 July 1559. Arrived in England (Berwick) – c. 1 August 1559. Arrived back – [c. 5] August 1559.

¹⁹ The seventh article concerned Henri II's possession of Calais, Ruysbank, Nyhuse, Merk, Oye, Hammes, Sandgate, and Guisnes for the space of eight years and then they would be restored to England.

Purpose	To meet with English commissioners at Berwick to secure help in the form of either advice, money, or military assistance from the English government for the Lords of the Congregation. Knox was also supposed to be commissioned to the English court in October 1559. However, his presence was not welcome after the publication of <i>The Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women</i> and this was changed for William Maitland of Lethington.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/1, f. 157r-158v.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 33591, ff. 24r-25v; ff. 31r-32v. BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 1r-2v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/1, ff. 75-76; ff. 79r-80v. TNA SP 52/1, f. 110; f. 119; f. 123; ff. 151r-152v; ff. 153r-154v; ff. 155r-156v; ff. 159r-160v; f. 162; ff. 166r-v; ff. 187r-188v. TNA SP 70/5, f. 107; f. 154. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 1, 1558-1559.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i>, p. 232; pp. 236-239, p. 243.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 1, 1559-1560</i>, p. 79. TNA SP 52/2, f. 97.

Yves de Rubay >16 November 1559 – <23 November 1559	
Dates	Instructions – [?] Arrived in England (Berwick) – 14 November 1559.²⁰ Arrived back – <23 November 1559.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador, Rubay was Master of Requests and Keeper of the Seals. Accompanied by [unknown] Ross herald. Audience was before 23 November 1559. Sent to Elizabeth from Mary of Guise to understand if the English queen had provided aid to the rebels. In her audience with Rubay and in a letter to Mary of Guise, Elizabeth assured her that there had been no English support given to the Scottish rebels.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 61v. TNA SP 52/1, ff. 250r-251v; ff. 256r-257v; ff. 276r-278v. <i>CSP Scot</i>, vol. 1, p. 270.

²⁰ TNA SP 52/1, ff. 256r-257v, Sadler and Croft to Cecil, 15 November 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 576]; TNA SP 52/1, ff. 270r-271v, Balnaves to Cecil, 19 November 1559 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 584]; Balnaves arrived at Berwick the day after Yves de Rubay departed.

Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

<i>Sir William Maitland of Lethington and Robert Melville</i> >25 November 1559 – >24 February 1560	
Dates	Instructions – 24 September 1559 / 24 November 1559. Arrived in Berwick – 23 November (stayed for 2 days).²¹ Arrived in England – [after 25 November] 1559. Arrived in Berwick – [after 24 February] 1560.²²
Purpose	Representatives of the Lords of the Congregation. Described as ‘bearer’.²³ Sent secretly to discuss, on behalf of heir apparent James Hamilton, Duke of Châtellherault and the Lords of the Congregation, the cruelty of the French in Scotland and their suffering under the Regent Mary of Guise. To push for the English to openly support their cause with military aid for the preservation of Scotland, to prevent the French conquest of England, and to stop Elizabeth being under the control of the house of Guise. Stopped at Berwick on his return to speak with Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, Lieutenant General. John Knox was originally intended for this embassy but was replaced by Maitland because of the controversy caused when Knox’s <i>The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women</i> was printed. Henry Balnaves and David Forest were also part of this embassy and travelled to London by sea.
Instructions Sources	September/October 1559 Written before his open defection or before Knox knew he was being replaced as the representative to the English council. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 2, 1559-1560.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63, p. 252.</i> November 1559 BL Add. MS 23108, f. 11. BL Add. MS 32091, ff. 174r-175v. BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 137r-142v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 186r-188v. BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 5r-6v; ff. 7r-8v. TNA SP 52/1, ff. 258r-259v (Arran to Cecil, 17 November 1559, commission for Maitland); ff. 270r-271v. <i>CSP Foreign Elizabeth, Vol. 2, 1559-1560</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63, p. 270-271.</i>

²¹ Frescoln, ‘Thomas Randolph: an Elizabethan in Scotland’, p. 30; Maitland and Robert Melville.

²² Add. MS 33592, ff. 201r-v, Arran and Lord James to Sadler and Croft, 20 December 1559. Arran and Lord James reported that Robert Melville had arrived back to Scotland.

²³ TNA SP 52/2, f. 48r, Privy Council of England to Norfolk, 16 February 1560 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 651].

Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 33531, ff. 27r-30v; ff. 31r-32v. BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 133-137; f. 169r-v. BL Cotton MS Caligula, B IX/1, ff. 75-76; ff. 79r-80v; ff. 85r-v; ff. 88r-94v; ff. 142r-v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 41r-42v. TNA SP 52/1, ff. 162r-163v; ff. 224r-225v; ff. 226r-227v; ff. 246r-v; ff. 255r-v; ff. 256r-257v; ff. 258r-259v; ff. 261r-262v; ff. 263r-264v; ff. 270r-271v; ff. 300r-301v; ff. 307r-308v; ff. 309-310v. TNA SP 52/2, ff. 3r-v; f. 7. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883) <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i>, p. 157. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 1, 1558-1559.</i> <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 2, 1559-1560.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i>, p. 254; pp. 269-272; p. 279; p. 316. <i>Two missions of Jacques de la Brosse.</i> W. Fraser, ed., <i>The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslies, Earls of Leven</i>, 1 (1890), p. 83.
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 48-53.
Payments	-

<i>Lord James Stewart, Patrick Ruthven, third Lord Ruthven, Sir John Maxwell of Terricles, Sir John Wishart of Pittarrow, Sir William Maitland of Lethington and Sir Henry Balnaves</i> c. 23/24 February 1560 – c. 28/29 March 1560	
Dates	Instructions – N/A Arrived in England (Berwick) – c. 23/24 February 1560.²⁴ Arrived back – c. 28/29 March 1560.
Purpose	Commissioners. To discuss and agree the articles for the Treaty of Berwick at Berwick in the name of James Hamilton, Duke of Châtellherault. On 27 February 1560, the Treaty of Berwick was signed. After the negotiations, Maitland was sent again to the English court to continue discussions with Elizabeth about the possibility of the supply of military aid to the Lords of the Congregation.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 33592, f. 293. BL Cotton MS Caligula X/1, ff. 77r-85v. TNA SP 52/2, f. 61; f. 48, ff. 58, f. 95. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i>, ed. Joseph Bain (London, 1898), p. 313. <i>Cecil Papers.</i>

²⁴ TNA SP 52/2, f. 58r, Norfolk and his Council to Cecil, 24 February 1560 [*CSP Scot 1547-63*, no. 662].

Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 53-54.
Payments	-

<i>Robert Melville</i> <i>c. October 1560 – c. October 1560</i>	
Dates	Instructions – N/A Arrived in England – October 1560. Arrived back – October 1560.
Purpose	Representative. Sent to receive money for the nobility of Scotland. Part of the team of special representatives (Morton, Glencairn, and Maitland) who were sent to Elizabeth. Lord St John was supposed to travel with Robert Melville but this was altered. ²⁵
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 33592, ff. 169r-v. TNA SP 52/5, f. 38. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561.</i>
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

<i>James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; Alexander Cunningham, fifth Earl of Glencairn, and William Maitland of Lethington</i> <i>>21 October 1560 – 3 January 1561</i>	
Dates	Instructions – 11/12 October 1560. Left Scotland – [21] October 1560. Arrived in England – [October/November] 1560. Return letters – December 1560. Arrived back – 3 January 1561.
Purpose	Representatives. Sent to strengthen the new amity between England and Scotland and this would be secured by reproposing (first put forward in 1543) a marriage between Elizabeth and James Hamilton, third Earl of Arran. Robert Melville was sent ahead of the embassy to receive money and as a letter bearer.
Instructions Sources	<i>A diurnal of remarkable occurrents</i> , p. 62.

²⁵ *Salisbury*, p. 252, Robert Melville to Lady Anne Cecil, 21 September 1560.

Selected Correspondence	BL Add MS 23109, ff. 4r-5v; ff. 6r-9v. BL Add. MS 48027, ff. 17-19. BL Cotton MS Caligula B V, ff. 326r-v. BL Royal MS 18 B VI, f. 277r. TNA SP 52/5, ff. 16r-v; ff. 54r-55v; ff. 83r-84v; 87r-88v; 106r-107v. <i>Cecil Papers.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i>, pp. 489-495; p. 500. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 3, 1560-1561</i>, pp. 433-35. <i>A diurnal of remarkable occurrents</i>, p. 63. W. Fraser, ed., <i>The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslies, Earls of Leven, Vol. 1</i> (1890), p. 83.
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 85-92. John Simmons, 'Wood, John (d. 1570)', <i>ODNB</i>, online edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).²⁶
Payments	-

Sir William Maitland of Lethington c. 9 September 1561 – >10 September 1561	
Dates	Instructions – [?] August 1561. Arrived in England – c. 9 September 1561. Return letters – [?] September 1561. Arrived back – [after 10] September 1561.
Purpose	Regular Ambassador. For this embassy, there were two sets of instructions (from Mary and the Lords of the Congregation) and two letters for Elizabeth. Mary, Queen of Scots instructed Maitland to officially announce her safe arrival back to Scotland and express her good will. The nobility of Scotland (formerly the Lords of the Congregation) instructions wanted to discuss the idea of Mary as Elizabeth's successor and the ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh.
Instructions Sources	Mary, Queen of Scots's Instruction Robert Keith, <i>History of the Affairs of Church and State in Scotland, Vol. 2</i>, pp. 72-73. Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i>, pp. 104-105. Lords of Scotland Instruction Keith, <i>History of the Affairs of Church and State in Scotland, Vol. 2</i>, pp. 73-78. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 157r.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 35830, ff. 175r-182v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 100r-v. BL Royal MS 18 B VI, ff. 266r-269r.

²⁶ Wood was sent with a party in September, and this was the only party sent around this time in 1560.

	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 4, 1561-1562</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63, p. 548.</i>
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 121-124.
Payments	NRS E21/53, f. 1r.

Sir William Maitland of Lethington > 31 May 1562 – >14 July 1562	
Dates	Instructions – 24 May 1562. Arrived in England – 31 May 1562 / [between 9 and 14] June 1562. Return letters – 11/12 July 1562. Arrived back – [after 14 ²⁷] July 1562.
Purpose	Regular Ambassador. Accompanied by John Wishart of Pitarrow, Comptroller. Sent to agree to articles between Mary, Queen of Scots and Elizabeth for their meeting in the summer of 1562. There was the possibility that this was not a genuine commission as rumours were already spreading that the meeting between the two Queens would not happen.
Instructions Sources	BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 20r-v. 24 May 1562, Copy of instruction for Sir William Maitland of Lethington. ²⁸
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 32091, ff. 193-194. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, f. 100r-v. BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 209r-212. BL Royal MS 18 B VI, ff. 274r-v; ff. 274v-276r. NLS MS.6135, ff. 13-14. <i>Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> (London, 1883). <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i> , pp. 266-267. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 5, 1562.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , p. 629; pp. 631-2; p. 634. <i>A diurnal of Remarkable Occurrents</i> , pp. 72-73. Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , p. 437; pp. 439-440.
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 140-144.
Payments	-

²⁷ TNA SP 12/23, f. 121r, Killigrew to Lord [Robert Dudley], 12 July 1562 [*CSP Foreign 1562*, no. 309]. Killigrew wrote that Maitland departed on 11 June 1562, and it was roughly 3- or 4-days travel between England and Scotland.

²⁸ The BL catalogue mentions that Randolph was the ambassador, but the instructions are for a Scottish ambassador.

Sir William Maitland of Lethington [?] February 1563 – >3 <26 June 1563	
Dates	Instructions – [31] December 1562. Arrived in England – [?] February 1563. Commission to France – [13 February] 1563. Arrived in France 11 April 1563. Return letters – 22 May 1563 (returned in the company of Killigrew) Arrived back – [after 3 ²⁹ , before 26] June 1563.
Purpose	Regular ambassador. This was a two-part mission to England with an additional commission to France afterwards. Sent to England to maintain the amity between the two countries and to discuss the possibility of a marriage between Mary, Queen of Scots and the Archduke Charles. Maitland was then sent to France to discuss with Catherine de Medici about the possibility of renewing the Auld Alliance between France and Scotland. Also, he was sent to discuss a match with Don Carlos with the Spanish ambassador. ³⁰
Instructions Sources	<i>A diurnal of Remarkable Occurrents</i> , p. 75. Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , 1844), pp. 162-166; pp. 166-169. Keith, pp. 188-94.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 32091, ff. 195-8; ff. 199-200. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 6, 1563-1564</i> . <i>CSP Scot Vol. 1, 1547-63</i> , pp. 8-12; p. 19. <i>CSP Spain Vol. 1, 1558-1567</i> .
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), p. 119; pp. 149-176.
Payments	Felicity Heal, 'Royal Gifts and Gift-Exchange in Sixteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Politics' in Steve Boardman, ed., <i>Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald</i> (2014), p. 287. Maitland received a 328-ounce gold plate – Heal says this was in 1564 but Maitland only went to Berwick in 1564, and other embassies were in 1563 and 1565. So, this gift must be linked to the 1563 commission.

Sir James Melville > 26 September 1564 – [>4 October] 1564	
Dates	Instructions – [28] September 1564. ³¹

²⁹ TNA SP 52/7, f. 50r, Randolph to Cecil, 3 June 1562 [*CSP Scot* 1547-63, no. 1110]. Mary passed to Dunfermline to wait for Maitland's return.

³⁰ Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure*, pp. 142-143.

³¹ Labanoff, *Lettres*, pp. 231.

	Arrived in England – [September] 1564. ³² Arrived back – [>4] October 1564.
Purpose of Commission	Extraordinary ambassador. Instructed to ask Elizabeth's opinion on Mary's marriage and the possibility of announcing the Scottish queen as her heir. He was secretly charged to meet with Margaret Douglas, Countess of Lennox to obtain a passport for Darnley to travel to Scotland. ³³ At the English court for 9 days.
Instructions Sources	Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , pp. 231-234. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , pp. 85-88.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 37977. TNA SP 59/8, f. 178. <i>CSP Foreign</i> , Vol. 7, 1564-1565. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , pp. 85-102.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	<i>Melville Memoirs</i> , pp. 88-89 – Sir Nicholas Throckmorton secured a pension from Elizabeth for James Melville for his entertainment during his time in England. Gold chain from Cecil. ³⁴

<i>James Stewart, Earl of Moray and Sir William Maitland of Lethington</i> >24 October 1564 – [October/November] 1564	
Dates	Instructions – N/A Arrived in England – [before 24] October 1564. Arrived back - [October/November] 1564.
Purpose	Agents, Berwick Conference. Sent to meet with Scottish commissioners, William Maitland of Lethington and James Stewart, Earl of Moray, mainly discussing Mary, Queen of Scots marriage and where she stands in the English succession.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B X, ff. 275r-283v. TNA SP 52/10, ff. 79r-80v. <i>CSP Foreign</i> Vol. 7, 1564-1565. <i>CSP Scot</i> Vol. 2, 1564-1569, p. 84-88; pp. 102-116. Keith, pp. 250-256.

³² Guy *My Heart* p. 198. Guy states that Melville was at the Scottish court before 26 September forced to stay whilst Dudley was made Leicester in September but his instructions were only written on 28 September so this much be incorrect.

³³ Fraser, *Melvilles*, p. 138.

³⁴ Felicity Heal, 'Royal Gifts and Gift-Exchange in Sixteenth-Century Anglo-Scottish Politics' in Steve Boardman, ed., *Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300–1625: Essays in Honour of Jenny Wormald* (2014), p. 287.

Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 193-194.
Payments	-

Sir William Maitland of Lethington >16 April 1565 – 13 May 1565	
Dates	Instructions – [March/April] 1565. Arrived in England – [after 16] April 1565. Return letters – 7 May 1565 (departed 8 May) Second instruction to England and France – c. 11 May 1565 (Newark) Arrived back – 13 May 1565.
Purpose	Regular ambassador. Final mission to England to ask Elizabeth for her permission for Mary, Queen of Scots to marry Darnley and to recognise Mary as her heir. Maitland also attempted to discuss the possibility of a Spanish marriage match.
Instructions Sources	NLS MS 3657, f. 18. <i>RPCS Vol. XIV, Addenda, 1545-1625</i> , pp. 213-214. New commission on his return TNA SP 52/10, f. 86. Maitland to Leicester, received a new commission from a man at Newark on his journey back to court. Maitland was instructed to return to the English court and declare that Mary will marry Darnley. The Scottish secretary did not share the same view so, he ignored the instructions and continued on his return to Scotland.
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 52/10, f. 82r-83v; f. 86r; f. 87r; ff. 96r-98av. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565</i> . <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 141-3. <i>Lettres</i> , p. 260.
Secondary Material	Mark Loughlin, 'The Career of Maitland of Lethington, c. 1526-1573' (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 197-200; p. 204.
Payments	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565</i> .

Sir John Hay [26] June 1565 – 6 July 1565	
Dates	Instructions – 14 June 1565. Arrived in England – [26] June 1565. Return letters – [?] 1565.

	Arrived back – 6 July 1565 – staying in Yorkshire on his return home. ³⁵
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Master of Requests. Maitland describes Hay as a ‘bearer’ but his letters asked him to request an audience with Elizabeth. ³⁶ Sent to convince Elizabeth of a marriage between Mary and Darnley before the wedding took place and obtain the release of Darnley’s mother, Countess of Lennox.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/10, ff. 96r-98av; f. 126; f. 129. Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , pp. 266-271, Instructions from Mary, Queen of Scots to John Hay, 14 July 1565.
Selected Correspondence	BL Royal MS 18 B VI, f. 251v. BL Add. MS 4126, ff. 30r-v. TNA SP 15/12, f. 158. TNA SP 52/10, ff. 96r-98v; f. 114; f. 126; f. 129; f. 130; f. 131; f. 133; f. 134; f. 137. TNA SP 59/9, f. 172. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565</i> . Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , pp. 273-4.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Sir David Chalmers [Chambers ³⁷] >21 September – >19 November 1565	
Dates	Instructions – N/A Arrived in England – >21 September 1565 (also sent to France). ³⁸ Arrived back – >19 November 1565.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. [Unsure on the purpose of the embassy]. Scottish Privy Councillor and Lord of the Session. Sent with James Balfour and John Leslie, to France.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	BL Lansdowne MS 8, f. 114. TNA SP 52/11, ff. 89r-91v; f. 109; f. 118; f. 198. TNA SP 59/10, f. 52; f. 81.

³⁵ TNA SP 59/9, f. 172, Drury to Cecil, 7 July 1565 [*CSP Foreign 1564-65*, no. 1292]; BL Cotton MS Caligula, ff. 322r-326r, Letter from Randolph to Cecil, 16 July 1565.

³⁶ TNA SP 52/10, ff. 130r-v, Maitland to Cecil, 14 June 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 199].

³⁷ Chambers refers to the English spelling of his name or Chamber as the French spelling.

³⁸ TNA SP 52/11, f. 89r, Randolph to Cecil, 20 September 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 261].

	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 209-211; pp. 217-218. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , Appendix, pp. 827-828.
Secondary Material	Martin Philippon, <i>Histoire de regne de Marie Stuart</i> , Vol. 3 (Paris, 1892), p. 45. Margaret J. Beckett, 'The Political Words of John Lesley, Bishop of Ross (1527-96)', (PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2002), pp. 20-21.
Payments	-

<i>Sir Robert Melville</i> <i>>15 September 1565 – [1] December 1565</i>	
Dates	Instructions – 10 September 1565. Arrived in England – September 1565. Arrived in Scotland – Before 12 October 1565. Arrived in England – [October/November] 1565. Return letters – 24 November. Arrived in Scotland – 1 December 1565.
Purpose	Representative of the Chaseabout Raid rebels. Sent as a representative of the Chaseabout Raid rebels to ask Elizabeth for money and military aid to support their cause against Mary. Melville travelled to England with Moray but he remained in England after Moray departed.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/11, f. 83; ff. 175r-176v. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 207-8.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 37977. NLS Adv.MS.1.2.2/13. TNA SP 52/11, f. 77; f. 79; f. 81; f. 85; f. 114, f. 134; f. 175; f. 204; f. 209. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , pp. 208-241. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 120; p. 126.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

<i>James Stewart, Earl of Moray</i> <i><22 October 1565 – >30 October 1565</i>	
Dates	Instructions – N/A Arrived in England (Newcastle to London) – [<22] October 1565. Arrived back (London to Newcastle) – [>30] October 1565. ³⁹
Purpose	Representative of the Chaseabout Raid rebels.

³⁹ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 175r-176v, Moray to Elizabeth, 30 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 292].

	Sent with Gavin Hamilton, Abbot of Kilwinning.⁴⁰ Travelled to the English court to ask Elizabeth to openly aid the Chaseabout Raid rebels against Mary and Darnley. He refused a letter of safe conduct from the Earl of Bedford. On his journey to the English court, he stopped at Ware after learning Elizabeth did not favour his visit.⁴¹
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	NLS Adv.MS.1.2.2/13. TNA SP 52/11, ff. 171r-172v; ff. 175r-176v. TNA SP 59/10, ff. 132r-133v; ff. 134r-135v; ff. 137r-138v; ff. 142r-143v; ff. 148r-149v; ff. 149r-150v; ff. 150r-154v. <i>CSP Spain Vol. 1</i>, 1558-1567.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Sir Robert Melville [>10] February 1566 – [>15] March 1566	
Dates	Instructions – [c. early February] 1566. Arrived in England – [after 10] February 1566. Return letters – [15] March 1566. Arrived back – [March] 1566.
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Sent to discuss Randolph's, former English ambassador to Scotland, role in secretly supplying the Chaseabout Raid rebels with financial aid. After receiving a pardon from Mary for his participation in the Chaseabout Raid rebellion, Melville was also sent with a commission to repair the amity between England and Scotland and to ask for the release of the Countess of Lennox.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/12, f. 9. Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i>, pp. 324-325; pp. 325-334.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 35831, ff. 256r-v. BL Add. MS 35844, f. 220r. BL Add. MS 37977. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, ff. 241r-242v. NLS Adv.MS.1.2.2/39; /40. TNA SP 52/11, f. 204; f. 224.

⁴⁰ Robert Keith, *History of the affairs of the Church and State of Scotland from the beginning of the Reformation to the Year 1568*, Lawson, John Parker, ed. (Edinburgh: Spottiswoode Society, 1845), p. 377.

⁴¹ TNA SP 52/11, ff. 148r-149v, Earl of Moray to English PC, 21 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 286]. Moray stopped at Ware.

TNA SP 52/11, ff. 150r-151v, [PC of England] to [English ambassador in France, Sir Thomas Smith], 23 October 1565 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 287]. Moray stopped at Royston.

	TNA SP 52/12, f. 6; f. 12; f. 14; f. 15; f. 18; f. 21; f. 24; f. 29; f. 37; f. 43; f. 46, f. 69; f. 71. TNA SP 59/11, f. 79. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 7, 1564-1565.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569.</i> Robert Keith, <i>History of the affairs of the Church and State of Scotland from the beginning of the Reformation to the Year 1568</i>, Lawson, John Parker, ed. (Edinburgh: Spottiswoode Society, 1845), p. 389.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Sir Robert Melville >26 May 1566 – [?] July 1566	
Dates	Instructions – May 1566. Arrived in England – [after 26 May/June] 1566. Arrived back – [?] July 1566.
Purpose	Resident ambassador. Audience on 2 June. Dispatched with news of the publication of the <i>Mr Randolph's Fantasy's</i> and was to report the distress this had caused Mary. He was also sent to charge Randolph with sending money to rebels and to discuss the idea of the two queens meeting in the summer of 1566. He was stopped at Berwick because he did not have the correct documentation for his journey.
Instructions Sources	Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , pp. 358-360; pp. 360-363; pp. 380-82.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 37977. BL Lansdowne MS 8, ff. 119r-120v. TNA SP 15/13, f. 39. TNA SP 52/12, f. 62; f. 63; f. 64; f. 65; f. 68; f. 69; f. 71; f. 72; f. 80; f. 98; f. 99; f. 104; f. 106; f. 117; f. 118; f. 120, f. 124. TNA SP 59/11, f. 218; f. 237; f. 239; f. 274. TNA SP 59/11, f. 138. <i>Cecil Papers.</i> <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i>, p. 337. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i>, p. 307. <i>Melville Memoirs</i>, p. 126. W. Fraser, ed., <i>The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslies, Earls of Leven</i>, 1 (1890), p. 85.
Secondary Material	-

Payments	-
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Sir James Melville 23 June 1566 - [11 July] 1566	
Dates	Instructions – 19 June 1566. Arrived in England – [c. 23] June 1566. Arrived back – [<11 July] 1566. ⁴²
Purpose	Extraordinary ambassador. Audience on 24 June 1566. Sent to England to announce birth of Mary, Queen of Scots's son, Prince James – a gap was intentionally left blank for Melville to fill in the gender of the baby after the news was reported to him at Berwick. He was also sent to satisfy the demands made by Killigrew on his embassy to Scotland between June and July 1566.
Instructions Sources	TNA SP 52/11, f. 77. TNA SP 59/11, f. 277. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 130; pp. 136-137; pp. 137-138.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 37977. TNA SP 15/13 f. 39. TNA SP 52/12, f. 71; f. 74; f. 75; f. 80; f. 85. TNA SP 70/84, f. 231. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , pp. 130-38. <i>CSP Foreign Elizabeth, Vol. 7, 1564-1565</i> .
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Sir Robert Melville October 1566- [<30] December 1566	
Dates	Instructions –1566 Arrived in England – [?] October 1566 Return letters – c.11 December 1566 Arrived back – [before 30] December
Purpose	Resident ambassador. 14 October 1566: audience about the English succession. Dispatched by Mary, Queen of Scots and the Scottish Privy Council to find out about the book <i>Mr Randolph's Fantasy</i> , to charge Randolph with sending money to rebels, and to discuss the idea of the two queens meeting that summer.

⁴² TNA SP 52/12 f. 85, Moray to Cecil, 11 July 1566 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 410]. Moray must have left the English court at the latest on 8 July.

	He was stopped at Berwick because he did not have the correct documentation for his journey.
Instructions Sources	Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , pp. 358-360; pp. 360-363; pp. 380-82.
Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 37977. TNA SP 15/13, f. 39. TNA SP 52/12, f. 62; f. 63; f. 64; f. 65; f. 68; f. 69; f. 71; f. 72; f. 80; f. 98; f. 99; f. 104; f. 106; f. 117; f. 118; f. 120, f. 124. TNA SP 59/11, f. 218; f. 237; f. 239; f. 274. TNA SP 59/11, f. 138. <i>Cecil Papers</i> . <i>Salisbury Vol. 1</i> , p. 337. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568</i> . <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , p. 307. <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 136-139. W. Fraser, ed., <i>The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslie, Earls of Leven</i> , 1 (1890), p. 85.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Sir Robert Melville February 1567 - [March] 1567	
Dates	Instructions – [?] Arrived in England – [after 14, before 23] February 1567. Arrived back – >1 March 1567.
Purpose	Resident ambassador. Sent to reassure Elizabeth after the murder of Mary's second husband, Henry Stuart, Lord Darnley.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 52/13, f. 1; f. 2; f. 9; f. 11; f. 13; f. 16; f. 18; f. 42; f. 43, f. 44. TNA SP 59/12, f. 164; f. 196; f. 214. TNA SP 63/20, f. 95. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568</i> . Labanoff, <i>Letters</i> , p. 5.
Secondary Material	W. Fraser, ed., <i>The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslie, Earls of Leven</i> , 1 (1890), p. 90.
Reward	-

Sir Robert Melville [<16 and >23] June 1567 – >29 July 1567	
Dates of Commission	Instructions – 1/5 June 1567. Arrived in England – [?] June 1567.

	Return letters – [before 26] June 1567. Arrived back – 29 June 1567 ⁴³
Purpose	To explain Mary, Queen of Scots's marriage to Francis Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell and Duke of Orkney. Sent from Mary and Bothwell in separate letters. ⁴⁴
Instruction Sources	Labanoff, <i>Lettres</i> , pp. 44-49.
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 52/13, f. 50; f. 51; f. 52; f. 68; f. 71; f. 72; f. 74; f. 76; f. 77; f. 78; f. 80. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot, Vol. 2</i> , p. 329. W. Fraser, ed., <i>The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslie, Earls of Leven</i> , 1 (1890), p. 90.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Nicholas Elphinstone c. 25 January 1568 – [January/February] 1568	
Dates	Instructions – [?] Arrived in England – c. 25 January 1568. Arrived back – [?] February 1568.
Purpose	Moray wrote to Elizabeth in [n.d.] January and requested that she give Elphinstone an audience so he can declare Moray's mind and maintain the amity between England and Scotland. Described as 'my servant' by Moray rather than as an ambassador. ⁴⁵ Before 31 January 1568, selected members of Elizabeth's Privy Council spoke with Elphinstone but as far as we know he never spoke directly with Elizabeth. He was refused an audience on 2 February.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 52/15, ff. 1r-2v; ff. 3r-4v; ff. 5r-v. <i>CSP Foreign</i> , Vol. 8, 1566-1568.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

⁴³ W. Fraser, ed., *The Melvilles, earls of Melville and the Leslie, earls of Leven*, 1 (1890), p. 91.

⁴⁴ TNA SP 52/13, ff. 52r-53v, Mary to Cecil, 5 June 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 513]; TNA SP 52/13, ff. 50r-51v, Duke of Orkney [Bothwell] to Cecil, 5 June 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 511]; TNA SP 52/13, ff. 51r-52v, Duke of Orkney [Bothwell] to Elizabeth, 5 June 1567 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 512].

⁴⁵ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 3r-v, Regent Moray to Cecil, [n.d.] January 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 639].

Nicholas Elphinstone April 1568 – [May] 1568	
Dates	Instructions – [20] April 1568. Arrived in England – [after 25] April 1568. Arrived back – By 21 May 1568. ⁴⁶
Purpose	Sent on behalf of James VI to give the Regent Moray's mind on matters about Mary, Queen of Scots's imprisonment in Scotland.
Instructions Sources	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i>
Selected Correspondence	<i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> TNA SP 52/15, ff. 15r-16v.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	

John Maxwell, fourth Lord Herries ? May 1568 – <10 August 1568	
Dates	Instructions – [?] Arrived in Cumberland – May 1568. Arrived in England – [?] May 1568. ⁴⁷ Leaves England – >21 June 1568. ⁴⁸ Arrived in Bolton – [25] July 1568. ⁴⁹ Arrived in England – 30 July 1568. Arrived in Bolton – 7 July 1568. In Scotland – August 1568. ⁵⁰ Arrived in Bolton – 15 August 1568.
Purpose	Agent, sent on behalf of Mary, Queen of Scots. Audience on 5 June 1568 and 17 June 1568 (Havering). To negotiate with Elizabeth about how she could assist Mary and discuss what relief she can offer her. He travelled with John Fleming, fifth Lord Fleming (who also accompanied Mary, Queen of Scots to England. There were other occasions that Herries travelled to Bolton to confer with Mary (17 October 1568).
Instructions Sources	-

⁴⁶ TNA SP 52/15, ff. 42r-43v, Elphinstone to Cecil, 21 May 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 666].

⁴⁷ TNA SP 53/1, ff. 12r-v, Mary to Elizabeth, 28 May 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 674].

⁴⁸ TNA SP 53/1, ff. 19r-v, Lord Herries to [Cecil or Leicester], 12 June 1568; TNA SP 53/1, ff. 24r-v, Elizabeth to Mary, 30 June 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 699].

⁴⁹ TNA SP 53/1, ff. 25r-v, 'A collection of such things', 16 July 1568; TNA SP 53/1, ff. 28r-v, Sir Francis Knollys to Cecil, 25 July 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 7345].

⁵⁰ TNA SP 53/1, ff. 35r-v, Francis Knollys to the Duke of Norfolk, 10 August 1568. Herries went to be present at the Parliament [*CSP Scot 1563-69*, no. 758].

Selected Correspondence	BL Add. MS 33531, f. 39. BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX/2, ff. 320r-321v; f. 332r-v, ff. 357r-358v; f. 361r-v; ff. 338r-389v. BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 122; f. 114, f. 130, ff. 160r-161v, f. 201. Hatfield House, CP 147/30; 147/32. <i>A diurnal of remarkable Remarkable Occurents</i>, p. 133. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i>, p. 415, p. 420, pp. 426-7, pp. 431-436; p. 448, pp. 462-3; p. 470, p. 474, p. 478, pp. 483-4, p. 495. TNA SP 53/1, ff. 24r-v (Elizabeth to Mary, Queen of Scots, 30 June 1568); ff. 26r-v, (Another statement on Mary, Queen of Scots, 16 July 1568); ff. 51r-v, (Scrope and Francis Knollys to Herries, 11 September 1568). <i>Historical Memoirs of the Reign of Mary, Queen of Scots, by John Maxwell, Lord Herries</i> (Edinburgh, 1836), pp. 103-104.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Nicholas Elphinstone [June] 1568 – [June] 1568	
Dates	Instructions – 30 May 1568.⁵¹ Arrived in England – [June] 1568. Arrived back - [?]
Purpose	Sent to England after Mary, Queen of Scots escaped from Loch Leven.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 121. <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568.</i> <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2</i>, p. 427; p. 429.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	NRS E 21/57 ff. 47r-v, 100 crowns of the son, £172 10s (Scots)

Sir John Wood [<3 June] 1568 – [July] 1568	
Dates	Instructions – <3 June 1568. Arrived in England – [?] June 1568. Arrived back – [July] 1568.

⁵¹ James Maitland, *Maitland's Narrative*, Regent Moray to Leicester, 3 May 1568, sending Nicholas Elphinstone to Elizabeth after Mary escaped from Loch Leven castle, pp. 39-40.

Purpose	Agent. ⁵² Sent to deliver a copy of the casket letters from the Regent Moray.
Instructions Sources	The item below references instructions for Wood to continue in England. BL Add. MS 32091, ff. 213r-214v.
Selected Correspondence	NRS GD 406/1/26. <i>Catalogue of a Valuable Collection of Autograph Letters of Distinguished Persons</i> (London: Sotheby, 16 December 1824), p. 4. <i>CSP Scot Vol. 2</i> , pp. 426-7.
Secondary Material	Stanford E. Lehmberg, <i>Sir Walter Mildmay and Tudor Government</i> (Austin: University of Texas, 1964), p. 74.
Payments	-

Sir John Wood August 1568 - [>4] September 1568	
Dates	Instructions – [c. 31] July 1568. Arrived in England – [after 12] August 1568. Arrived back – [>4] September 1568. ⁵³
Purpose	Sent by Moray to resolve Elizabeth's doubts that Mary, Queen of Scots was guilty of murdering her husband, Darnley. He was also sent to inform Elizabeth why the Regent Moray could not suspend the Scottish Parliament and to specifically confer with Cecil.
Instructions Sources	BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 219. TNA SP 52/15, f. 106. <i>CSP Scot: Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , p. 471, p. 476, p. 484, pp. 489-90, pp. 494-5, p. 497, p. 501.
Selected Correspondence	BL Cotton MS Caligula B IX ii, ff. 331r-v. BL Cotton MS Caligula C I, f. 123. BL Egerton MS 1818, ff. 49r-v; ff. 50r-51v. Hatfield House, CP 147/33. TNA SP 52/15, f. 44; f. 65; f. 89r. TNA SP 59/15, f. 113; f. 120. <i>Cecil Papers: Vol. 1, 1306-1571</i> . <i>CSP Foreign Vol. 8, 1566-1568</i> . <i>Melville Memoirs</i> , p. 173; pp. 183-6.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Sir Robert Melville October 1568 – December 1568	
Dates	Instructions – [?] October 1568.

⁵² Described as 'Murra's Agent' see, *Catalogue of a Valuable Collection of Autograph Letters of Distinguished Persons* (London: Sotheby, 16 December 1824), p. 4.

⁵³ TNA SP 53/1, ff. 49r-v, Sir Francis Knollys to Cecil, 4 September 1568 [*CSP Scot 1563-68*, no. 803].

	Arrived in England – [?] October 1568. Arrived back – [?] December 1568.
Purpose	Sent to deliver a letter from Mary, Queen of Scots to Elizabeth and presumably oral information as well.
Instructions Sources	-
Selected Correspondence	TNA SP 53/2, Knollys to Cecil, 25 October 1568, f. 29. <i>CSP Scot: Vol. 2, 1564-1569</i> , p. 539.
Secondary Material	-
Payments	-

Appendix 3: Timeline of the English and Scottish Ambassadors, Commissioners, Representatives, and Agents, 1558-1568.

The third and final Appendix presents a comparative chronological timeline of the English and Scottish ambassadors, commissioners, representatives, and agents – drawn from the previous two appendices – who were sent between 1558 and 1568. The primary purpose of the timeline is to show how frequently an ambassador or representative was sent and stationed in England and Scotland. In some cases, they were not sent to the court but to the border town of Berwick, which has been indicated in (brackets). The timeline includes the start and end month as well as the year that the embassy or journey took place. The ambassador or representatives name has been written in black on arrival to their host country and in red when they departed. In some cases, the exact day or month that the ambassador arrived or returned to their host country could not be found. This research has estimated the dates depending on how long it took to travel from other locations as was recorded in the correspondence from the ambassador or representative. Further details on the exact dates can be found in Appendices One and Two. Italics were used to identify whether the person was a representative or agent sent to or from the Lords of the Congregation, Chaseabout Raid rebels, or Mary (following her forced abdication). In order to understand just how frequently an ambassador or representative visited England or Scotland, the yellow spaces in the table represent periods when there was no diplomatic representative residing or present in the other country.

Throughout this thesis, it has been made clear that Berwick was another location where diplomatic negotiations took place. This was especially the case for the English representatives and the Lords of the Congregation between 1559 and 1560. Not every instance when an ambassador stopped in Berwick has been recorded. Representatives sent to Berwick have only been included if they received instructions or official directions

from the monarch or leader of the Scottish faction to meet with officials from the other country in Berwick. Furthermore, during his residency at the Scottish court, Randolph frequently travelled to Berwick between 1559 and 1561 as a representative, and also from 1561 to 1563, and from 1563 to 1566 as an ambassador to meet with other English officials and to send secure correspondence to the English court. However, his individual journeys to Berwick were not included in this timeline because he chose travel to the town on his own personal business.

Year	Month	English	Scottish
1558	J	Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland and Dr Robert Henmer	
	F		Yves de Rubay and Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	M	Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland and Dr Robert Henmer	Yves de Rubay and Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	A		
	M		
	J		
	J		
	A		
	S		
	O		
	N		
	D		
1559	J		
	F		
	M		Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	A		
	M	Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland; William third Lord Dacre of Gilsland; Sir James Croft, and Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham (border)	Sir William Maitland of Lethington James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; James Douglas, Lord Dalkeith; Alexander, Lord Hume; Henry Sinclair, Dean of Glasgow, and James Makgill (border)
	J		

	J	Thomas Percy, seventh Earl of Northumberland; William third Lord Dacre of Gilsland; Sir James Croft, and Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham (border)	James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; James Douglas, Lord Dalkeith; Alexander, Lord Hume; Henry Sinclair, Dean of Glasgow, and James Makgill (border)
	A	<i>Sir Ralph Sadler (Berwick)</i>	<i>John Knox (Berwick)</i> <i>John Knox (Berwick)</i>
	S	<i>Thomas Randolph</i> ⁵⁴	
	O		
	N		Yves de Rubay <i>Yves de Rubay</i> <i>Sir William Maitland of Lethington</i> ⁵⁵ , Robert Melville
	D		<i>Robert Melville</i>
1560	J		
	F	<i>Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk (Berwick)</i>	<i>Sir William Maitland of Lethington</i> <i>Lord James Stewart; Lord Ruthven; Sir John Maxwell; Sir William Maitland of Lethington; John Wischert of Pittarrow, and Henry Balnaves (Berwick)</i>
	M	<i>Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk (Berwick)</i>	<i>Lord James Stewart; Lord Ruthven; Sir John Maxwell; Sir William Maitland of Lethington; John Wischert of Pittarrow, and Henry Balnaves (Berwick)</i>
	A	Henry Killigrew	
	M	<i>Henry Killigrew</i>	
	J	Sir William Cecil and Sir Nicholas Wotton	
	J	<i>Sir Ralph Sadler (Berwick)</i>	
	A	<i>Sir William Cecil and Sir Nicholas Wotton</i>	
	S		
	O		<i>Robert Melville</i> <i>Robert Melville</i> <i>James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; Alexander Cunningham, fifth Earl of Glencairn, and Sir William Maitland of Lethington</i>
	N		
	D		
	J		<i>James Douglas, fourth Earl of Morton; Alexander Cunningham,</i>

⁵⁴ Randolph and Maitland travelled to the English court between October and December 1559.

⁵⁵ For this embassy, Maitland carried instructions from the Regent Mary of Guise as well as from the Lords of the Congregation and the Scottish secretary had not yet openly defected to the Lords of the Congregation. Therefore, Maitland's name is not in italics but his position as a double agent must be acknowledged.

			<i>fifth Earl of Glencairn, and Sir William Maitland of Lethington</i>
	F		
	M		
	A		
	M		
	J		
	J		
	A	<i>Thomas Randolph</i> ⁵⁶ Sir Thomas Randolph	
	S	Sir Peter Mewtas	Sir William Maitland of Lethington ⁵⁷ Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	O	Sir Peter Mewtas	
	N		
	D		
1562	J		
	F		
	M		
	A		
	M		Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	J		
	J	Sir Henry Sidney	Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	A	Sir Henry Sidney	
	S		
	O		
	N		
	D		
1563	J		
	F		Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	M		
	A		
	M		
	J		Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	J	Thomas Randolph	
	A		
	S	Thomas Randolph	
	O		
	N		

⁵⁶ Randolph did not leave and then returned to Scotland in August 1561. He was sent a memorial in March 1561, but it was only after Mary returned to Scotland on 19 August 1561 that Randolph was an official ambassador. Elizabeth sent a letter to Mary asking her to accept Randolph as her representative in Scotland.

⁵⁷ Maitland carried instructions from the Lords of Scotland, formerly associated with the Lords of the Congregation, and from Mary, Queen of Scots.

	D		
1564	J		
	F		
	M		
	A		
	M		
	J		
	J		
	A		
	S		James Melville
	O	<i>Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford and Sir Thomas Randolph (Berwick)</i>	<i>James Stewart, Earl of Moray and Sir William Maitland of Lethington (Berwick)</i> James Melville
	N	<i>Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford and Sir Thomas Randolph (Berwick)</i>	<i>James Stewart, Earl of Moray and Sir William Maitland of Lethington (Berwick)</i>
	D		
1565	J		
	F		
	M		
	A		Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	M	Sir Nicholas Throckmorton Sir Nicholas Throckmorton	Sir William Maitland of Lethington
	J		John Hay
	J		John Hay
	A	Sir John Tamworth	
	S	Sir John Tamworth	Robert Melville David Chalmers
	O		James Stewart, Earl of Moray James Stewart Earl of Moray
	N		David Chalmers
	D		Robert Melville
1566	J		
	F		Robert Melville
	M	Sir Thomas Randolph ⁵⁸	Robert Melville
	A		
	M		Robert Melville
	J	Sir Henry Killigrew	James Melville Robert Melville
	J	Sir Henry Killigrew	James Melville
	A		
	S		
	O		Robert Melville
	N		

⁵⁸ Between March and June 1566, after Randolph was expelled from Scotland, he was stationed in Berwick and continued to receive information from his network and spies in Scotland.

	D	Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford	Robert Melville
1567	J	Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford	
	F	Sir Henry Killigrew	Robert Melville
	M	Sir Henry Killigrew	Robert Melville
	A		
	M		
	J		Robert Melville
	J	Sir Nicholas Throckmorton	Robert Melville
	A		
	S	Sir Nicholas Throckmorton	
	O		
	N		
	D		
1568	J		Nicholas Elphinstone
	F		Nicholas Elphinstone
	M		
	A		Nicholas Elphinstone
	M	Thomas Leighton	John Wood John Wood Nicholas Elphinstone <i>John Maxwell, fourth Lord Herries</i>
	J	Thomas Leighton Sir Henry Middlemore	Nicholas Elphinstone Nicholas Elphinstone John Wood
	J	Sir Henry Middlemore	John Wood
	A		John Wood
	S		John Wood
	O		Robert Melville <i>John Maxwell, fourth Lord Herries</i>
	N		
	D		Robert Melville

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