Forging Positive Peace: The British Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1934-1946.

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Abstract

The Women's International League (WIL) was the British section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a non-profit organisation founded in 1915. The League brought together members from different countries who believed women had a unique role in peacekeeping. They argued that gender inequality and social injustice were directly proportional to conflict and suffering, from which their dual aims of peace and freedom emerged. However, the advent of the Second World War appeared to pit peace against freedom, exasperating old, and creating new, fractures not only between the WIL and WILPF but within the British section itself. It appeared that choosing peace meant, in effect, not resisting Nazism, but advocating for freedom meant supporting the war. After heated deliberation, the WIL decided to remain officially pacifist. This was not because they had chosen peace over freedom but rather because they had a dynamic and complex understanding of pacifism. An understanding of pacifism that involved both negative peace, regarding the absence of war, and positive peace, concerning creating 'just' structural changes to society that would make anything but peace impossible.

This project draws on archival material, including many understudied official and personal records from WIL(PF) members, to reveal the WIL's peace policies and how they changed from 1934 to 1946. It develops current historiography that has largely overlooked the WIL during this period and challenges the idea that the movement 'screeched to a halt in 1939' and did not reform until the late 1940s. It does so in the first three sections, which identify the WIL's different periods of peace work: 1934-1937, 1938-1943 and 1944-1946. Here, the British section's ideological work and tangible strategies are analysed and contextualised within the League's international work. The final section takes a closer look at the WIL's gendered policies to challenge literature that discounts the League's work due to the association that is made between feminist pacifism and the essentialist idea that women are naturally peaceful.

Overall, it is argued that the WIL continued to engage in substantial and essential peace work from 1934 to 1946, despite the numerous ongoing conflicts.

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Abbreviations

ARP	Air Raid Precautions
CFIDP	*Comité féminin d'initiative pour la défense de la paix*
CMF	*Comité Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascism* or Women's World Committee Against War and Fascism
CDDF	*Comité pour la défense des droits des femmes*
IFFF	*Internationale Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit*
LIFPL	*Ligue internationale des femmes pour la paix et la liberté* (French Section of the WILPF)
LSE	London School of Economic Archives
RAF	Royal Air Force
RUP	Rassemblement Universel pour la Paix
SCPC	Swarthmore College Peace Collection
TNA	The National Archives of the UK
UMN	The University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections
UN	The United Nations
WIL	Women's International League (British Section of the WILPF)
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Introduction

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) was formed in April 1915 during the International Congress of Women held at The Hague. Over a thousand female delegates from neutral, Allied and Central Powers countries met to establish the League's twin goals: peace and freedom.[1] They renounced war and called for universal enfranchisement, believing that women held a 'special point of view' on conflict and should contribute to the construction of peace.[2]

Just across the Channel, a small group of British women waited anxiously to hear the results of the Congress.[3] They had met in the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) but broke away to follow their pacifist calling once the war was declared. Having been refused travel permits by the government, they could only await the return of the three British delegates who had attended the Congress owing to already being outside the country.[4] Once the Congress ended, the Women's International League (WIL) sprang into action, working as one of many national sections of the WILPF. During the war, they adopted the motto 'Live Dangerously' as an intellectual call to arms rather than inciting aggression or violent behaviour. It meant finding the courage to pursue peace when everyone else was coerced, misled, or eager to choose violence.[5] The WILPF felt it necessary to begin their work during the war, to highlight their avant-garde or errant 'spirit', rather than put their activism on pause and wait until the armistice when it would have been easier to work both at home and internationally.[6]

In line with this spirit, the British section understood the primary cause of war to be the idea that 'Might is Right', impressed on the minds of children 'by the way women are treated because they are physically weaker than men'. Women, the WIL recognised, were shut out of

[1] Woman's Peace Party, *Report of the International Congress of Women: The Hague – The Netherlands April 28th to May 1st, 1915* (New York: Trades Council, 1915), pp.3-4.
[2] Ibid, p.20.
[3] Helen Ward, *A Venture in Goodwill: Being the Story of the Women's International League 1915-1929* (London: International House, 1929), pp.1-2.
[4] Sarah Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism: The Women's International League, 1915-1935' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Northumbria, 2017), p.37; Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, *Pioneers for Peace: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 1915-1965* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1965), p.19.
[5] Helena Swanwick, *Live Dangerously* (London: International House, 1940 [reprint from 1916]), p.1.
[6] WIL, *First Yearly Report October 1915- October 1916* (London: WIL, 1916), p.19.

'government' and 'all sorts of professions and privileges not because they are less good or less wise than men, but because they are not so [physically] strong'. They understood this same notion applied to the relationship between 'big nations' and 'small nations', that the winner was not necessarily the one in the right but simply the strongest one.[7] Hence, they felt peace and freedom were intertwined – gender equality was a prerequisite for peace.

Figure 1.1: This cartoon was published in the *Tatler* mocking the WIL's failure to reach the 1915 International Congress – pictured on the right. [8]

Over the next two and a half decades, the WILPF worked to combat war and social injustice, following their dual aims of peace and freedom. However, the coming of the Second World War appeared to pit peace against freedom, exasperating old, and creating new, fractures not only between the WIL and WILPF but within the British section itself. It appeared that choosing peace meant, in effect, not resisting Nazism, but advocating for freedom meant supporting the war. After heated deliberation, the WIL decided to remain officially pacifist. This was not because they had chosen peace over freedom but rather because they had a dynamic and complex understanding of pacifism. An understanding of pacifism that involved both negative peace, regarding the absence of war, and positive peace, concerning making

[7] LSE, WILPF/2009/19/1, 'Why the Women of the Nations Met in War-Time', 1916, p.1.
[8] LSE, WILPF/2011/9; 'A little fit of the (H)ague', *Tatler,* 5 May 1915, p.4.

'just' structural changes to society that would make anything but peace impossible.[9] By engaging with both positive and negative peace, the WIL operated with surprising liberty during the war: their publications, meetings, and government lobbying continued, and they sustained their (albeit limited) international efforts, facilitating immediate action to reconnect and rebuild post-war.

This thesis traces the British section's ideological and tangible peace work from 1934 to 1946 and their complex relationship with the wider League. It will demonstrate that the WIL experienced three periods of peace policy (1934-1937, 1938-1943 and 1944-1946), best understood through the negative-positive peace framework. It will also take a closer look at the WIL's gendered policies to challenge literature that discounts the WILPF's work due to the association between feminist pacifism and the essentialist idea of naturally peaceful women. Overall, it reveals that the WIL continued to engage in substantial and essential peace work during this often-disregarded period in their history.

Historiography

The WILPF has a well-established historiography indebted to the 'transnational turn'. As a prolific member of the international community, the League has captured many scholars' interests since the late 1990s.[10] These works have yielded some wonderful results from which this thesis profits. Leila Rupp has produced an exhaustive study of the first wave of the international women's movement, which she argues began in the late nineteenth century and ended in 1939 before swelling into the second wave post-war. She focuses on three major bodies, the International Council of Women, the International Alliance of Women and the WILPF, seeing them as the movement's grandmother, mother, and daughter. Rupp takes a thematic approach to reveal who made up these groups, how they worked, and their

[9] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research,* 6.3 (1969), 167-191 (pp. 168-172, 182, 184-6).

[10] Julie Gottlieb and Gaynor Johnson, *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* (2020) 31.4, 601-820; Julie Gottlieb, *'Guilty Women', Foreign Policy, and Appeasement in Inter-war Britain* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Martin Pugh, *Women and the Women's Movement in Britain, 1914-1959* (London: Macmillan, 1992); Marie Sandell, *The Rise of Women's Transitional Activism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); Ingrid Sharp, *Women Activism between War and Peace* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 1997).

relationship with one another, and uncovers that the women's international movement can challenge the traditional Western-based timeline of the suffrage movement, which did not collapse at the turn of the twentieth century but transitioned into an international programme.[11] Marie Sandell further developed Rupp's work, examining these women's experiences but through the notion of 'international sisterhood'. She argues convincingly that while international sisterhood is ambiguous and dominated by the West, it was used successfully to unify women internationally for the common struggle for justice and peace.[12]

Building on these transnational studies, more national works have emerged concerning the USA, Australia, China, France, Germany, and New Zealand.[13] A few works have also explored the British section. Sarah Hellawell's seminal study of the British section from 1915 to 1935 builds on Rupp's argument, noting that the suffrage movement did not die out in Britain but transitioned to a focus on internationalism. She demonstrates that a national study can bring new insight into the international movement and highlights the importance of studying the WIL in the context of internationalism.[14] Laura Beers has also taken this approach. In her article, she examines the WIL's political makeup from 1919 to 1945, revealing that liberal and socialist women transcended ideological differences in their commitment to international peace. By applying her national finding internationally, Beers helps reveal the WIL's commitment to internationalism and the complex consequences this had on the Section's pacifism. [15] This project will do the same, focusing on the British section, but also analysing the relationship and impact the League had on the WIL and their policies. This was especially

[11] Rupp, pp.3, 13, 208.
[12] Sandell, pp.3,223.
[13] For example, Carrie Foster, *The Women and the Warriors: The U.S. Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1946* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Malcolm Saunders, 'Are women more peaceful than men?: The experience of the Australian section of the women's international league for peace and freedom, 1915–39', *Global Change, Peace & Security,* 3.1 (1991), 45-61; Mona Siegel, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Political Violence in Europe and China in the Era of the World Wars', *Gender and History,* 28.3 (2016), p.641-659; Celine Kearney and Megan Hutching, 'Reflections for the Field: Imagining Peace – One Hundred Years of WILPF in Aotearoa/New Zealand', *Women's Studies Journal,* 30.1 (2016), 71-76; Brigitte Schuchard, *Frauen. Freiheit. Frieden. 100 Jahre Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Internationale Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit WILPF / IFFF* (Germany: WILPF, 2015).
[14] Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', p.3.
[15] Laura Beers, 'Bridging the Ideological Divide: Liberal and Socialist Collaboration in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1919–1945', *Journal of Women's History,* 22.2 (2021), 111-135 (p.122).

important during the Second World War, as internationalism was less apparent and difficult to achieve, but it became central to the WIL's work and reason to remain pacifist during the war.

While studies have focused on the British section, few have moved beyond the mid-1930s. One exception is Jill Liddington's *Road to Greenham Common*, which tracks the WIL from its nineteenth century roots to the 1980s. She rightly challenges work by peace historians, including Martin Ceadel, who had overlooked the WIL, unable, due to 'gender blindness', to fit them into their pacifist categories.[16] She reveals the British section's work, exploring some of the crises it faced throughout the 1930s. However, her narrative is solely one of decline, arguing that the WILPF fell out of touch. She omits the WIL's war work and returns to them in 1950; her only remark on war was that Nazism had crushed the organisation's spirit.[17] While she is right that the 1930s and 40s proved very difficult for the WILPF, this thesis will challenge parts of this argument, revealing the WIL's approach to peace, and its growth and development during the Second World War.

Similarly, Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims' book *Pioneers for Peace* covers the WILPF broadly, from 1915 to 1965 and is the most substantial work post-1935. The book is both a secondary and primary source, compiled by WILPF members in the late 1950s and early 60s as a volume to preserve the League's legacy. The book achieves just that: it is a compelling narrative overview of their work, yet it provides just a single paragraph on the WIL's war and post-war work.[18] In her article on women and appeasement, Julie Gottlieb reserves a similar amount of space for the British section's war work, which informatively contextualises the WIL in the broader feminist and pacifist movement.[19] Beers has perhaps given the most attention to the WIL post-1935 in her analysis of liberals and socialists in the organisation. However, she focuses mainly on the pre-war or early war period.[20]

This gap in chronology is not contained to the WILPF, as Krista Cowman has recognised, but concerns the whole international women's movement. Cowman has argued that this is

[16] Jill Liddington, *The Road to Greenham Common: Feminism and Anti-Militarism in Britain since 1820* (London: Virago Press, 1989), p.133.
[17] Ibid, p.174.
[18] Bussey, pp.12-13, 185.
[19] Julie Gottlieb, 'The Women's Movement Took the Wrong Turning': British Feminist, Pacifism and the Politics of Appeasement', *Women's History Review,* 23.3 (2014), 441-462.
[20] Beers, pp.126-129/

due to scholars problematically only focusing on the first and second wave of feminism, meaning they focus on the 1910s and 1920s and then jump to the 1960s.[21] The justification for only focusing on these periods is not strong as these two waves of feminism do not match the waves of the international women's movement that Rupp has foregrounded.[22] Moreover, Caitriona Beaumont has challenged the idea that there even was a first and second wave of feminism. Through her work, she has demonstrated that the women's movement did not decline in the inter-war period until the 1960s but continued to develop throughout the century in different political, ideological, and religious ways.[23]

There is, however, perhaps a second reason why many scholars have overlooked this period, especially considering the WILPF's post-1935 period. This reason is arguably due to the question 'peace or freedom?' that troubles historians just as much as it did the League. This thesis will provide a fresh perspective on this.

Peace or Freedom?

There is often a misconception produced in the literature that the Second World War and the immediate post-war period was a 'dead zone' in the WILPF's history. For example, Rupp has argued that the movement 'nearly screeched to a halt in 1939', not reforming until the late 1940s.[24] This misconstruction is perhaps due to the League's core and co-dependent values: peace and freedom.

In the early interwar years, albeit from a predominantly western perspective, these aims proved complementary, noble, and 'progressive'. The WILPF's work with the League of Nations, campaigns for women's rights, and international collaboration make for an inspiring, if at times romanticised, story of women 'from around the world' uniting to push gendered constraints and find their voices on the stage of international diplomacy. The idea of being in favour of peace *and* freedom appeared unproblematic. However, the 1930s challenged this. As dictatorships strengthened and the League of Nations weakened, the WILPF and those who

[21] Krista Cowman, 'The Women's Movement and Internationalism in the 20th Century', *Moving the Social,* 55 (2016), 55-74 (p.74).
[22] Rupp, p. 3.
[23] Caitriona Beaumont, *Housewives and Citizen: Domesticity and the Women's Movement in England, 1928-64* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).
[24] Ibid, p.47.

study it are increasingly troubled by the question: peace *or* freedom? If the League remained pacifist, it appeared to be refusing to resist Nazism, standing by while it engulfed all previously won freedoms, yet if the WILPF chose freedom, turning *pacificist,* it meant giving their support to war, violence and mass destruction. Understandably, this caused fractures and debates within the League, and many members resigned, supporting the war effort or movements that they believed would resist fascism, such as communism. This has caused historians to speak of a 'crisis' or 'turning point'. Jo Vellacott has argued that 1929-31 was the crisis point where the WILPF deteriorated socially, economically, and politically and failed under pressure caused by the rise of fascism and communism.[25] Hellawell has challenged this, citing the League's dedication to disarmament in the early 1930s. However, she reasons that the crisis point was 1935 when the WILPF gave up on internationalism preventing war.[26] I would contend that the League did not collapse or abandon internationalism in the post-1935 period. Nevertheless, Hellawell and Vellacott are correct to suggest that the period presented new and demanding challenges and their sentiment that 1915 to 1935 were the League's golden years is telling.

Many historians view the WILPF's choice to remain officially pacifist during the war as a mistake or a departure from their 'liberal' and 'honourable' early work. The idea that the League chose peace, seemingly looking the other way while fascism and its spiralling moral and physical destruction swept across Europe, is hard to reconcile. Indeed, Gottlieb's article touches on the WIL's work during the late 1930s and early war years, where she focuses on the female pacifists' journey to *pacificism* or becoming pro-war. At times, she suggests they were 'awakening', thus implying that pacifists were naïve or 'asleep' to war.[27] This, and her focus on women's transition, demonstrate that women who remained pacifists are difficult or uncomfortable to place, whereas those who were part of the golden age of the WILPF who then shifted to *pacificism* or pro-war work continue the narrative of the 'right sort' of rebellious women. This same view is also present in broader British pacifist scholarship. For instance, Ceadel has argued that during the Second World War, an increasing number of pacifists stopped suggesting that they had a practical policy to offer, instead arguing that they were simply following their faith, and many were still keen to do work of 'national

[25] Jo Vellacott, 'Feminism as if All People Mattered: Working to Remove the Cause of War, 1919-1929', *Contemporary European History,* 10.3 (2001), 275-394 (p. 392).
[26] Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', pp. 156, 305.
[27] Gottlieb, 'The Women's Movement Took the Wrong Turning', p.451.

importance'.[28] This depicts pacifists as detached from, or resigned to, the political situation or, in their keenness to become involved in presumably non-combatant war work, that they were not pacifists at all. Similarly, Overy has contended that those once part of the anti-war movement became resigned to war and accepted there was little more to be done than plan for a post-war future. He then suggests that pacifists were regarded with increasing suspicion that 'wittingly or not' they were aiding the enemy.[29] Again, he presents pacifists as dubious or ignorant of their present situation but more problematically portrays post-war planning as a last resort.

Clearly, by the eve of the war, scholars have little love left for the pacifist. The role the WILPF played in the 1920s, as a group of 'progressive' and boundary-pushing women, is eclipsed in the '30s and '40s by stories of women who actively resisted Nazism or helped win the war. There is nothing wrong with this. The choice to remain pacifist in wartime was a privileged one. A failure to win the war would have destroyed the WILPF, but that was perhaps the point. The League did not hide their privilege and, at times, were blindsided by it. They knew, maybe better than everyone, that they could exercise pacifism when many could not, and they used this, as they believed, to serve wider society and humanity in the long term. Admittedly, this is somewhat self-righteous, but no more so than those of the WILPF in 1915 or the interwar period – which historians have studied in depth, not always recognising this. Their choice to remain pacifist was essential to their relief work, post-war planning (and executing of this plan), the nurturing of internationalism, and conceivably, the survival of the WILPF. This thesis will challenge Ceadel's and Overy's claims, arguing that pacifists were painfully engaged with the war and its politics and that their post-war planning was sincere and essential work, particularly concerning their relationship with the UN. It will bring life to a 'dead zone' in WILPF history, demonstrating that the League's female pacifists in this period had just as much integrity as their predecessors, were equally 'progressive', and continued to push gender norms. Such a reassessment can diversify our understanding of women's activism during the Second World War.

[28] Martin Ceadel, 'A Legitimate Peace Movement: The Case of Britain, 1918-1945' in *Challenge to Mars: Pacifism from 1918 to 1945,* ed.by Peter Brock and Thomas Socknat (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp.134-148 (pp. 141,143).

[29] Richard Overy, *Blood and Ruins: The Great Imperial War 1931-1945* (London: Penguin, 2021), p.649.

Conceptual Framework

Peace history remains on the fringes of historical and peace studies (international relations) disciplines.[30] In his recent work on *The Future of Peace History,* Goode explains that this alienation is due to each discipline feeling the other should adopt peace history. This hampers both peace research outside of history due to a lack of historicisation, and historians of peace due to a lack of theorisation. Goode believes that 'if the struggle for peace is to have a future, then we need more voices, stories and histories', thus implying that studies of peace in history and IR disciplines must communicate if world peace is to be achieved.[31] This thesis aims to contribute to this by applying and developing theory in peace research to a historical study in a useful way to the historian while also advancing how current peace-making is viewed.

Rethinking Negative and Positive Peace

In peace research there are two types of peace, 'negative peace' and 'positive peace'.[32] Ideally, both wings of peace function evenly to help peace 'fly straight' to yield the best results. However, in reality, one is usually dominant or leaned upon, depending on the circumstance. The field adopted the terms after Johan Galtung put them forward in the late 1960s, and they have remained largely unchallenged. 'Negative peace' is defined as the absence of violence or threat, and 'positive peace' is the absence of structural violence, sometimes hidden and embedded in institutions, societal structures, and culture. In practical terms, 'making' negative peace is often viewed as preventing war or threat of war – it does not always involve solely peaceful measures, such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. To 'make' positive peace is to pursue social justice, making structural changes to society that would make anything but peace impossible. Galtung admits these definitions are intimately linked if not blurred, as violent systems better facilitate violent individuals and vice versa. For example, a society that allows authoritarian regimes to grow also allows the regimes to indoctrinate and

[30] Michael Goode, 'The Future of Peace History' in *The Oxford Handbook of Peace History,* ed.by Charles Howlett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
[31] Ibid.
[32] Nils Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle and Håvard Strand, 'Peace research – Just the Study of War?', *Journal of Peace Research,* 51.2 (2014), 145-158.

force their people to engage in war and commit vicious acts.[33] Still, the distinction remains important.

These definitions of peace have stood the test of time. However, if they are to be helpful to the historians they ought to be renamed, as the labels do a disservice to the kinds of activities and politics with which proponents were engaged. While Galtung has explained that neither type of peace is more important than the other, the notion that one is 'positive' and the other 'negative' forces scholars to make a value judgement.[34] This is perhaps less an issue for contemporaries, as 'positive peace' will appear as just that – if peacemakers did not believe their work towards 'positive peace' was good, they would, in theory, not be working towards it. Yet even so, the ambiguity around what is 'positive' impedes present peace research. For example, Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand's bibliometric study of the *Journal of Peace Research* found alarmingly that most articles on peace focused on the study of war and 'negative peace'. At first glance, this might be read as a disinterest in 'positive peace,' but studies that concern 'human rights, 'democratic peace,' and 'peacebuilding' are rising.[35] These might be considered specific forms of 'positive peace', which scholars prefer to refer to rather than 'positive' as it proves too ambiguous or sets too high a moral standard for their work, making critical analysis and admitting flaws more difficult.

This issue is intensified when reflecting on the past. Firstly, historians have less, if any, need to debate what 'positive peace' should be now or in the future, but a great need to establish how those from the past viewed and worked for 'positive peace' (of course, this might then be used or applied to contemporary peace work). The idea that such peace must be 'just' or 'right' is counterproductive to the historian, forcing a disregard of past 'positive peace' work that no longer fits current moral standards, which may lead to whitewashing or sanitising of the past, lacking in critical analysis. Goode recognised this issue and proposed that the positive-negative theory should be replaced with his theory of 'Right Ordering'. Goode argues that all societies naturally work towards 'positive peace' and do so by ordering society in a way they view as 'harmonious'. Those with power may inflict violence on those 'lower' in the social hierarchy in the name of achieving what they believe to be permanent

[33] Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', pp. 168-172, 182, 184-6.
[34] Ibid, p.185.
[35] Gleditsch, 'Peace research – Just the Study of War?', p.152.

'peace'.[36] While this definition solves the issue of value judgement, recognising that 'positive peace' is subjective and controlled by those with influence, it is an extreme and potentially dangerous concept. Under this definition, there is nothing to stop someone malevolent from stretching the definition to argue that even Nazi Germany was working for peace – through mass genocide and world domination, they eliminated those they felt did not fit their vision of an eventual 'harmonious' ordering of society. This seems to be diluting what is meant by 'peace' too much. Therefore, this project will argue in favour of keeping the positive-negative classification in content but not in name.

Indeed, Galtung's theory is derived from understanding violence first and then applying that to peace. Therefore, he views 'positive peace' as the absence of structural violence and 'negative peace' as the absence of personal violence. He defines personal violence as any *direct* result of tools or organisations that affect or threaten to affect human beings. This would include shooting someone but also the production of the guns to do so. It would include a lone individual and the mob or army he joins or grows. It is, simply, the 'means and modes' of production of direct bodily (or psychological) harm. On the other hand, structural violence is any *indirect* result of 'repressive structures' that humans uphold as a collective. Structural violence is the mechanics behind human life, the orders, structures or cultures that facilitate our interactions on 'unequal' grounds that lead to a certain lack of social justice (or presence of violence).[37] In his later work, Galtung complicates this theory, pulling out sub-types or 'super-types' of violence, like cultural violence, which concerns the aspect of culture that can be used to justify brutality. However, these sub-categories can arguably remain nestled into his original positive-negative theory if it is recognised that personal and structural violence are symbiotic, e.g. cultural violence might develop from direct or indirect violence and flow into the other.[38]

This framework is essential to understand why I will utilise the term proactive peace rather than 'positive peace' and reactive peace instead of 'negative peace'. Many other names might be given to negative and positive peace: responsive and constructive; individual and collective; short-term and long-term; low-level and high-level; or even direct and indirect peace. Each

[36] Goode, 'The Future of Peace History'
[37] Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research' p.183, 174, 178.
[38] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage Publishing, 1996), pp.196-7.

set has its strengths and weaknesses, but it is argued here that reactive and proactive peace are the most useful for this thesis. This is because direct violence (or the threat of it) calls for a reactive response. This type of violence is easier to identify but is unstable, often unpredictable and fluctuating – to combat this, usually one must wait for it to exist before responding. For example, one cannot campaign against a country's armament or introduction of conscription if they do not call for arms and men in the first place. Indirect violence requires a proactive response or at least more so than the former. This type of violence, as Galtung suggests, is usually stable or static; it is entrenched and embedded into the fabric of society, often hidden from those who are not looking.[39] For example, to prevent the threat of armament or conscription completely, you would have to develop the means and desire in countries to settle disputes peacefully, perhaps through an international court and changes to cultural attitudes towards power and wealth. Hence, proactive peace and reactive peace replaces negative and positive peace.

Methodology

This project considers three key methodological issues concerning archive use, the focus on a gendered study, and the use of peace theory in a historical study.

Indeed, this thesis benefits from an impressive array of primary materials, including newspapers, reports, and private and official correspondence. Much of this research was undertaken at the London School of Economics' archives and the British Library and benefited from the wealth of material the WILPF has left behind due to their meticulous preserving and archiving material. They made efforts to do so as they believed education and understanding the history and causes of war would help to bring peace.[40] These records were even preserved during the war when they were moved from the Geneva headquarters to the USA, saving them from destruction during the Second World War.[41]

However, the WIL's material was less lucky. The International House, the head office, suffered damage during the blitz and was evacuated to the country home of prominent WIL

[39] Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', p.173.
[40] Bruce Montgomery, 'The Archives of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom', *Peace and Freedom,* 31.1 (2011), 97-104 (p.97).
[41] Rupp, p.8.

member, Kathleen Innes. The material that survived is currently held at LSE and in private papers. [42] Therefore, this project relies heavily upon the British section's newssheet and the WILPF's international newssheets and circular letters. When consulting these documents, it is important to remember that they are a collection of articles, so it is often difficult to tell which represents a personal opinion and which a collective feeling within the League. To tackle this, care has been taken to make note of the author of articles where possible so as not to overrepresent their view. Similarly, the WIL newssheet would often replicate and report on useful peace articles, lectures, ideas, and conferences from outside their organisation, so it is hard to know what their original ideas were and what they reproduced for education matters. The overcome this the best care has been taken to highlight the difference between the WIL reproducing, commenting and developing other's ideas, and the organisation's own policies.

Another problem considered when consulting the WILPF archives is that much of their material is self-curated. As Sandel and Hellawell have highlighted, the WILPF's close connection with their archives means they act as sites of memory.[43] This suggests relying solely on official records, like reports and newssheets, can be problematic, guaranteeing the most prominent members a voice to the detriment of less high-ranking members whose experiences were just as meaningful.[44] This is a complicated issue to overcome, for even letters and memoirs were often written by prominent members, sometimes drowning out the voices and opinions of the majority. For example, a debate over the constitution in 1934 led to Hilda Clark feeling that the WIL should form an independent movement. Her opinion was recorded meticulously, yet other records reveal that a majority of the section voted against her policy. [45] By just focusing on Hilda's perspective, which is well documented, the opinion of the majority would have been overlooked. Therefore, to best represent the WIL's work, this thesis will not rely solely on newssheets but on a broad network of sources; official documents, minutes, and publications will be examined along with memoirs, letters, and personal notes.

The second methodological problem arises in considering the extent to which this project should be a gendered study. Gender is an important factor. However, much of the WIL's work

[42] Bussey, p.185.
[43] Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', p.21.
[44] Sandell, short title p.17.
[45] Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', p.124.

focused on social justice for all, their work concerning diplomatic, international, and ideological issues within and beyond the League that did not centre on gender. This is important to note as some historians, like Norman Ingram, have argued that these ideological debates and arguments led to the WILPF abandoning feminist pacifism because they had acted 'like men'.[46] Not only does this suggest that feminist pacifism cannot be political beyond feminist circles, but this also implies that feminist pacifists' work loses credibility when women disagree, debate, compromise, or engage with broader political debates. To challenge this, this thesis aims to reveal the broad range of work the WIL engaged with in three chronological chapters, making only the final chapter a gendered analysis. This is done to prove that it was not just 'feminine issues' that made the WILPF feminist but also their broad engagement with social justice, democracy and diplomacy – peace and feminism were intertwined through their proactive peace work.

Finally, applying the 'negative-positive theory' could be problematic as it might be asked how the modern framework can be applied effectively in retrospect. Fortunately, the theory is not entirely artificial. The League understood and worked towards both forms of peace while developing terminology to define their differences – eventually becoming 'negative-positive peace'. For example, at the 1915 Hague Congress, they asserted they must establish the principle 'of co-operation rather than conflict, in national and international affairs [and] develop the ideals underlying modern democracy in the interests of constructive peace'.[47] Constructive peace can be seen as the WIL's attempt to define proactive peace. Again, in 1941, the WIL asserted, 'the evil of total war cannot be countered by negatives, or "anti" policies'.[48] By anti-policies or 'negatives', they meant, in modern terms, negative peace. Both these statements exemplify that the WILPF believed proactive peace to be central to their work and that they felt it was important to differentiate proactive peace from reactive peace. It is, therefore, possible to effectively apply the 'negative-positive theory' to the WILPF's work.

[46] Emmanuelle Carle, 'Women, Anti-fascism and Peace in Interwar France: Gabrielle Duchêne's Itinerary', *French History,* 18.3 (2004), 291-314 (p.292, 291, 293).
[47] LSE, WILPF 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, May 1935, p.1.
[48] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, December 1940, p.1.

Chapter Outline

This project is made up of four chapters. The first three chapters are chronological and trace the three periods of shifting peace policy. Chapter One focuses on 1934 to 1937, where, it is argued, the WIL held a reactive-led peace policy, focusing primarily on strategies like campaigning for disarmament. Doing so placed the WIL in conflict with other national sections of the League, such as the French and German branches. This chapter explores this clash of opinion in depth.

The second chapter studies the years 1938 to 1943 to reveal the WIL's shift from a reactive-led policy to almost a solely proactive one. It traces the struggle within the British section to decide whether they should support the war and how deciding to remain pacifist meant most of their work concerned post-war reconstruction.

Chapter Three tackles the final period, 1944 to 1946. It explores how the WIL moved towards a proactive-led peace policy as they began to seek tangible strategies to help implement their intellectual work. It pays particular attention to the WIL's changes to diversify its membership and effort with the new United Nations.

Finally, Chapter Four presents a case study of the WIL's engagement with gendered ideas, such as 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?', how they attribute the imposition of gendered values as a cause for war, and the positives and negatives to their pursuit for a gendered collective identity.

Overall, this thesis argues the importance of considering the negative-positive peace framework when studying the WILPF. In considering both forms of peace, social justice and anti-war, to reveal that the WIL continued to engage in substantial and essential peace work during this often-disregarded period in their history.

Chapter One: Disunity, Disarmament and a Divided League, 1934-1937

In September 1934, 148 women gathered in Zurich for the WILPF's Eighth International Congress. Held in the same location as fifteen years prior, delegates knew this gathering, like the 1919 Congress, would be a landmark in the League's history. Yet the hopeful optimism of 1919 that led delegates to rise and pledge 'I dedicate my life to the cause of peace!' was replaced with tension, weariness and resentment, the price of honouring that pledge for fifteen years.[1] This culminated in a complex debate between the WIL and other League members.

Julie Gottlieb has argued that the splits like this in the international women's movement have received little attention, unlike those in the early 1900s. She suggests that this is not because it is less exciting but because it is 'messier'.[2] This chapter brings some more order to one split within the late 1930s international women's movement by revealing the clash between the British and Franco-German opinions in the WILPF. It foregrounds that this divide in the WILPF is best understood as one between proactive-led and reactive-led policy. It will reveal how the WIL negotiated the two forms of peace nationally and internationally through three ideological battles in this period: realising a new world order, disarmament, and the League's constitution. Overall, it will argue that the British section, while led by a reactive peace policy, still engaged in proactive work.

A New World Order: Peace or Freedom?

Mosa Anderson, one of the fifteen WIL delegates in attendance, was tasked with publishing the WIL's report at the 1934 International Congress. Not immune to the building weariness and resentment, she expressed low expectations for the Congress, bracing herself for dreary and sterile discussions. Yet she was delighted when proved wrong.[3]

Clara Ragaz opened the Congress emphasising the need to revisit the WILPF's core aims laid down in 1919:

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[1] Helen Ward, *A Venture in Goodwill: Being the Story of the Women's International League 1915-1929* (London: International House, 1929), p.36.
[2] Julie Gottlieb, ''Broken Friendships and Vanished Loyalties': Gender, Collective (In)Security and Anti-Fascism in Britain in the 1930s', *Politics, Religion & Ideology,* 13.2 (2012), 197-219 (p.215).
[3] LSE, WILPF 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October 1934, p.3.

> We must surely admit that the fundamental principles which had brought us together to our common work never stood so low as they do to-day and that the catastrophic course of events, as they have developed since 1919, did not follow the line that we foresaw.[4]

She continued that a spirit of militarism, destruction, and power was having a 'brutalising effect upon the community of human life', the 'catastrophic course' being that this existed not only in fascism but in all economies and industries, social spheres, and religions. Ragaz insisted that to assess if the 1919 principles were still relevant, the WILPF's view on violence needed to be discussed. She believed wars against nations should still be denounced, but what about internal conflicts? If the WILPF could agree that there is a close connection between fascism, militarism and capitalism and that peace can never exist in this present system, 'why do we not join ourselves to those who are working for this overthrow?' Yet if this is the case, she asked, and we cannot trust armed forces to understand right against wrong nationally, how can we expect class conflicts to be different? She concluded with a plea to prevent the WILPF from splitting along ideological lines and hoped they could find a way to remain united.[5]

The tense atmosphere Ragaz addressed was the culmination of a decade of disputes and debates. The Congress had been called early to address these rising tensions, worsened by growing militarism, marked by Hitler's rise to power and the failure of the Disarmament Conference (1932-4).[6] This split Ragaz feared relates to what Ingram has described as two poles of thought within the League that most debates revolved. One pole represented the French and German sections, the other the British, (sometimes the American) and Scandinavian sections.[7] Broadly, the Franco-German perspective (led by the French) called for a more 'radical' response to fascism, whereas the British perspective preferred a more 'conservative' approach. This was reflected in the discussion had by Kathleen Innes and Elisabeth Wærn-Bugge, presenting for the British perspective, and Gertrud Baer and Gabrielle Duchêne for the French, which followed Ragaz's speech.

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[4] Clara Ragaz, 'Problems resulting for the Work and Methods of the WILPF', Appendix in *Report of the Eighth International Congress: Zurich, September 3rd to 9th 1934* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1934), p.2.

[5] Ragaz, 'Problems resulting for the Work and Methods of the WILPF', pp.5,7,9.

[6] Sarah Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism: The Women's International League, 1915-1935' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Northumbria, 2017), p.26.

[7] Norman Ingram, *The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.286.

Figure 2.1: WILPF members represented at the 1934 Congress. Top left, Kathleen Innes (1919). Top right, Gertrude Baer (c.1900). Bottom left Elisabeth Wærn-Bugge (c.1920). Bottom right Gabrielle Duchêne (c.1910).[8]

Innes, a British delegate, agreed that social change was necessary but stood against violence and asked the League to remain loyal to democratic principles and governments. She recognised the real temptation of dictatorship (by which she meant Russian communism), which created an illusion of a shortcut towards the WILPF's aims – peace and freedom. Yet, Innes explained, 'peace is a method and not a state' and 'under every system there will be

[8] LSE, WILPF/22/1; *https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/wilpfexhibit/individuals/individualsAtoD.htm*; *https://skbl.se/en/article/GustavaElisabethWrnBugge*.

causes for clash'. The only real solution, she felt, was to address the psychological causes of war with peaceful methods like education and persuasion – violence or the endorsement of it had no place in this, in fact, it would be completely counterproductive. However, she recognised that opposing all violence might create 'minor problems' nationally. For example, Innes explained that while the WIL believed in total disarmament, they still supported the government's attempts at a partial limitation of arms as they viewed this as a stage of progress towards total disarmament.[9]

Baer's (German delegate) speech, vaguer in nature, argued that the WILPF had fallen out of sync with the times, becoming an 'intellectual desert' and failing to appeal to youth. She called for the WILPF to study the causes of war internationally and recognise fascism as the enemy.[10]

Wærn-Bugge, leader of the Swedish section (*Internationella kvinnoförbundet för fred och frihet* or IKFF), backed Innes, highlighting that everyone can agree that a new system of genuine democracy must be created to gain peace and freedom.[11] However, some members, she explained, prefer this to be obtained through 'education and persuasion', others cannot wait so long and seek to bring about a new social system, even if that requires revolution. She did not believe revolution could be achieved peacefully and agreed with Innes, doubting that this new system would actually bring peace and freedom, as promised. Yet she recognised that Baer's call for spending more time studying international events was a sound principle so long as it is done with unity and respect for the other's point of view.[12]

Gabrielle Duchêne (French delegate) concluded the symposium, agreeing with Baer, and explained that the WILPF needed to keep in touch with 'reality', reminding the Congress that the WILPF's choice to oppose the war in 1915 had, in fact, been a revolutionary act. She recounted the efforts made since 1919 for moral and material disarmament, economic and social justice, and propaganda, all thwarted, she argued, by governments and the existing systems. Hence, Duchêne explained that such reform for peace and freedom could only be

[9] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress: Zurich, September 3rd to 9th 1934* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1934), p.2.
[10] Ibid, p.4.
[11] Irene Andersson, 'Gustava Elisabeth Wærn-Bugge' (2021), <*https://skbl.se/en/article/GustavaElisabethWrnBugge*> [accessed 28/4/2023].
[12] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress'*, p.5.

achieved once a new social order was realised. Duchêne cited as evidence a letter she had received from a fellow female pacifist, reading:

> Whatever attitude one takes to-day, one takes part indirectly or directly in violence – We must decide either for capitalism or for revolution, there is no place for neutrality. Anyone who says: I am against any violence, only shows that he or she does not understand anything of the world she lives in. If she thinks she is free from violence, she is not aware of the fact that she lives in the present system which makes her an accomplice for violence.[13]

In feeling that a transformation of society was inevitable, Duchêne asked the delegation why not then hasten this by destroying 'bad institutions', 'since the building of a new society will take time and a great number of us will not see it'. This would be a more immediate, perhaps gratifying, task, she argued.[14]

Historians have interpreted the divide in opinions at the Congress differently. Hellawell has recognised that the division boiled down to different interpretations of the League's aims, peace and freedom, centring around whether the ends justify the means.[15] There was a tendency for the Franco-German perspective to argue that freedom should come first in the League's policy, whereas the British argued the opposite, explaining that 'without peace there could be no freedom'.[16] However, as stated in the introduction, the focus on the perceived clash between peace and freedom can be problematic, especially as the debate is often viewed concerning fascism or communism rather than having deeper roots. This occasionally leads to assumptions that those pro-peace (British view) were passive to fascism and those pro-freedom (Franco-German view) were enablers of the USSR.

For instance, Beers has recognised that the issues raised pertained to the WILPF's attitudes towards fascism. She argued that Baer felt fascism was incompatible with 'true peace' while Innes 'was less certain that fascism, as a social order, was inimical to peace'.[17]

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[13] Ibid, p.7.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', p.15.
[16] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, August 1936, p.1.
[17] Laura Beers, 'Bridging the Ideological Divide: Liberal and Socialist Collaboration in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1919–1945', *Journal of Women's History,* 22.2 (2021), 111-135 (p.125).

While Beers is correct, attitudes towards fascism did influence the debate, the League's views on communism and the USSR were just as important. When this is considered, Innes' remark that there is no guarantee for peace under any social order was more a commendation of the WILPF supporting or engaging with revolutionary (and violent) activities rather than her making a case for fascism. Whereas Ingram has more heavily criticised the Franco-German perspective, asking, 'one wonders if the French section would ever have seen the light of day in 1915 if Duchêne and the other women of that first hour had considered the organised violence let loose over European society "unavoidable"'.[18] While it is true that Duchêne, arguably at her most 'revolutionary' in the mid-1930s due to her various trips to Russia, felt the decline of capitalism inevitable, she was not necessarily supporting a violent revolution. She did not feel communism, in its current state, would bring peace and freedom.

The issue of peace versus freedom follows a similar path as integral versus realist pacifism, with the British saying they were for peace and the Franco-German for freedom, which they believed was 'real peace'. In reality, both valued peace and freedom; otherwise, they would have left the League for different organisations (as a minority had done). Whether peace or freedom should come first was just a front for the British perspective's tendency for reactive-led peace policy and the Franco-German perspective's inclination for proactive-led peace policy. These perspectives had existed almost as long as the League, and ingrained practices before peace and freedom were seen at odds. For example, in January 1926, Madeleine Doty, an American WILPF member, summarised the two perspectives in *Pax,* the WILPF journal circulated to all national sections. She explained that the British perspective tended 'to work from the concrete to the ideal', and the Franco-German perspective 'wants to start the other way round'.[19] Members from each section even referred to proactive and reactive-led policy in principle.

In the discussion following the speeches at the Congress, Dr Hilda Clark, a British delegate, responded to Duchêne's ultimatum of revolution or capitalism and explained that a clear distinction must be made between 'the conception of a real peace in which all have justice, and peace in the sense of the abolition of war' – proactive and reactive peace. She felt it paramount that the League found a way to work for proactive peace without involving itself

[18] Ingram, p. 296.
[19] LSE, WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', *Pax International,* Vol.1 No.3, Jan 1926, p.2-4.

in a war 'that might destroy our civilisation'.[20] While recognising the importance of proactive peace, Clark warned against the dangers of neglecting its partner, feeling that the prevention of the looming war was paramount. Duchêne's ultimatum, on the other hand, was a clear, if extreme, case for proactive peace that almost mirrors Galtung's definition: the fight against violence caused by any *indirect* result of 'repressive structures' that are upheld by the collective actions of human beings.[21] Again, Duchêne urged the WILPF to 'lay aside all dogmas, even pacifist dogmas, face reality and, freeing ourselves from the intoxication of formulas which too easily satisfy the mind, take up positive action'.[22] By positive action, she meant proactive peace, expressing frustration at the British members' desire for reactive policies over proactive ones. However, neither side, despite Duchêne's call for revolution, worked exclusively for one form of peace, a dominant one simply led them. For example, as Ingram has recognised, the British perspective did not deny that a new social order was necessary.[23] Both Innes and Wærn-Bugge admitted to the need for a new social order.

Both perspectives also shared a similar methodology. As Rupp has emphasised, the WILPF was founded on moral power, not numbers – it was not a mass movement.[24] The WILPF believed in education and understanding the causes of war. They were almost self-righteous, understanding that they needed to guide humanity towards peace and freedom – 'diluting' their principles to attract more members was largely avoided.[25] Hence, the WILPF remained a non-partisan organisation, concealed its membership figures and had faith in internationalism. In honouring their role as a compass for peace and freedom, Innes and the British perspective felt they should work with existing democracies or institutions like the League of Nations. This shared interest in a new social order and the method behind achieving this arguably intensified the clash of opinions, worsened further by the Franco-German view's engagement with reactive peace.

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[20] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress*, p.11.
[21] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research,* 6.3 (1969), 167-191 (p.183, 174, 178).
[22] Gabrielle Duchêne, 'To Pacifists!', *Fight: Against War and Fascism,* Vol1. No.11, September 1936, p.6.
[23] Ingram, p. 293.
[24] Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.30.
[25] Bruce Montgomery, 'The Archives of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom', *Peace and Freedom,* 31.1 (2011), 97-104 (p.97).

Certainly, while Baer and Duchêne felt that supporting anti-fascist organisations would increase the League's reach and attract the young, they too held the 'moral power' perspective. That is why Baer urged the WILPF to study the causes of war internationally, and Wærn-Bugge agreed but warned that both perspectives be considered. Broadly, Baer wanted the WILPF to divert attention to understanding communism so they might guide and change a new social order along these lines, whereas Wærn-Bugge wanted a broader study of what a new order might look like. The Franco-German perspective was aware of the issues with communism and the USSR, even if they were often played down. Ragaz, for example, explained that those who agree with the goal of communism recognised that it had not been worked towards any differently than the usual political methods (i.e., violence, power, and force).[26] Yet, unlike the British, they felt this social order had the potential to bring permanent peace, whereas capitalism was not only incompatible with peace but, as Duchêne argued, was inevitably declining.

They had not turned their back on reactive peace, however. Lida Gustava Heymann (German) heavily opposed violence, explaining that it only eternally promotes 'counter-violence and so on'. But she sympathised with the oppressed who turned to violence and urged the WILPF to 'work with them side by side and while showing our sympathy, convince them that they do harm to their own work by urging violence in their fight'.[27] Duchêne expressed a similar sentiment in her speech, declaring that 'we must work for the union of manual and intellectual workers and take part in all action against war and fascism trying to influence them in the direction which we judge to be the right one' – meaning towards non- or limited violence.[28] Again, like the British, the Franco-German perspective's engagement with their less dominant policy, reactive peace, through their awareness of tackling revolutionaries' violence, complicated the debate.

It was paralysing. In trying to avoid war and find a peaceful way of work, the British had to negotiate with fascism, urging for disarmament and peace settlements while following the British government's policy of non-intervention.[29] The Franco-German perspective saw this

[26] Clara Ragaz, 'Problems resulting for the Work and Methods of the WILPF', p.7.
[27] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress*, p.12.
[28] Ibid, p.7.
[29] The WIL followed a policy on non-intervention throughout the 1930s. See Paul Horsler 'The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the coming of the Second World War',

not only as futile but a betrayal of those suffering under fascism. The rapidly increasing destruction of both peace and freedom in Nazi Germany forced the French and German sections to call for more immediate action. Hence, Wærn-Bugge highlighted that not all members could wait for the slow progress as they had before. On the other hand, the USSR had done little to dispel concerns that it too would jeopardise peace and freedom. The British members did not view Communist Russia as any different than Nazi Germany, and felt that breaking neutrality, rather than fighting for both to disarm and sue for peace, would incite war (that many felt humanity would not survive). They believed the Franco-German view had been swept up by violence. Supporting revolutionaries, even if it were to guide them towards peaceful methods, would destroy their non-partisan stance, ruining the core of the League, which, they argued, was supposed to bring together women of all nations and beliefs for the cause of peace.

Nevertheless, six days later, despite the impossibility of the debate, the delegates managed to avoid the fracture Ragaz feared, perhaps due to their shared methods and belief in proactive and reactive peace. While neither side returned home happy, they had compromised and renewed their collective faith in the League through earnest, exciting and passionate discussions – much to Anderson's relief.

In conclusion, the different perspectives in the League concerning peace or freedom were not new to the 1930s but had existed since early in the preceding decade. Therefore, it is appropriate to identify the British approach as reactive-led and the Franco-German approach as proactive-led. Yet it must be remembered they were simply *led* by this policy, not engulfed by it; just as both views valued peace and freedom, they also engaged with both forms of peace. This is essential to understanding the two other critical points of contention the WIL encountered in the latter half of the 1930s.

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Disarmament: Moral or Material?

Disarmament had always been a core policy of the WILPF. In 1915, the League called for universal disarmament, believing that private profits from the arms industry were standing in the way of permanent peace.[30] They urged an international agreement to control the manufacturing of munitions.[31] While this appears to be a reactive policy, working to reduce military spending and quantities of weapons, universal disarmament quickly adopted a proactive meaning as well, involving both material and moral disarmament. This was achieved through political campaigns and conferences to restrict arms and through education to raise a new generation on peaceful morals.[32] The distinction between material disarmament (reactive) and moral disarmament (proactive) is important for two reasons: first, because this divide was foundational to the WIL's clash with other national sections, and second, it allows for nuance in the WIL's pacifism. Overall, this part of the chapter reveals that while the British section focused on a reactive peace approach to disarmament, they still believed in and engaged with a proactive approach.

While all the League's national sections invested in moral and material disarmament, they disagreed over which should come first, or which should be more important. The Franco-German perspective, predictably, favoured moral disarmament and the British view material. This difference in opinion laid the foundations for the WILPF's infighting that surfaced at the 1934 Congress. This is important as it uncovers that the 'crisis point' of the League that Hellawell and Vellacott have highlighted, largely caused by the clash between the French and British perspective, was not a new issue but actually just an extension, and an intensification, of divisions that formed nearly ten years prior.[33]

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[30] This was a view held by many other groups in this period including the Oxford Group's Moral Re-armament movement (MRA), who often viewed political questions by focusing on people rather than policies to bring permanent peace. See Philip Boobbyer, *The Spiritual Vision of Frank Buchman* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013).

[31] Woman's Peace Party, *Report of the International Congress of Women: The Hague – The Netherlands April 28th to May 1st, 1915* (New York: Trades Council, 1915), p.156.

[32] Mona Siegel, *The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Pacifism, and Patriotism, 1914-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.221.

[33] Jo Vellacott, 'Feminism as if All People Mattered: Working to Remove the Cause of War, 1919-1929', *Contemporary European History,* 10.3 (2001), 275-394 (p. 392); Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', pp. 156, 305.

Indeed, since 1924, the WIL and French section (LIFPL) had clashed over disarmament. In the 1920s, the LIFPL stood against violence and believed moral disarmament needed to precede material disarmament. French society was arguably more focused on the family unit than was the case in Britain. Moreover, as women were still unable to vote, French pacifists believed mothers and teachers were responsible for educating children to hold peaceful rather than militaristic morals. Hence, they had a proactive-led policy, though they did engage in disarmament petitions and campaigns.[34] The WIL, on the other hand, while they did engage in education work, favoured pursuing more reactive-led tactics. They organised the Women's Peace Crusade to capitalise on the unique opportunity the 1929 general election would provide, following the Equal Franchise Act of 1928, to persuade the government to honour the Kellogg Pact and increase pressure during the World Disarmament Conference.[35]

These differences manifested at the 1926 Congress in a debate over the wording of their constitution: the WIL wanted to remove the latter part of the statement: 'The W.I.L[PF] aims at binding together women in every country who oppose all war and all preparation for war, whether offensive or defensive, international or civil'.[36] The WIL, along with the Swedish, Polish and Irish, felt the specificity of the types of wars would lose them members and make it difficult for them to work. As, for example, this prohibited them from supporting the Geneva Protocol, a treaty signed in 1925 preventing biological warfare, which as a last resort allowed military sanctions.[37] The French and German sections felt it disastrous to return to the 1919 constitution, jeopardising their avant-garde nature, arguing that any war might be deemed defensive.[38] In the end, a new constitution was drawn, replacing the statement with 'every kind of war':

> [The WILPF] aims at uniting women in all countries who are opposed to every kind of war, exploitation and oppression, and who work for the solution of conflicts not by force or

[34] See Lauren Jannette, 'Gendering the Aesthetics of Peace: Women and Veterans in French Nouveau Pacifist
Propaganda, 1915-1939' (unpublished doctoral thesis, The George Washington University, 2022), pp. 230-248; Siegel, *The Moral Disarmament of France*, p.221.
[35] LSE, WILPF/3/5, 'Executive Committee Minutes'1929, p.19; WILPF, *Report of the Seventh Congress of the Women International League for Peace and Freedom: Grenoble, May 15th to 19th 1932* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1932).
[36] LSE, WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', *Pax International,* Vol.1 No.5, March 1926, p.2.
[37] Ibid, pp.2-4.
[38] Ibid.

> domination but by the recognition of human solidarity, by world cooperation, and by the establishment of social, political and economic justice for all, without distinction of sex, race, class or creed.[39]

However, by 1934, the British and Franco-German perspectives appear to have switched. The WIL pushed for total disarmament and non-violence, while the LIFPL began to flirt with violence in the name of anti-fascism and to create a new world order. For instance, in the February 1935 edition of *Pax,* the difference in opinion towards armament was summarised. Emily Balch, American WILPF member and chair of the WILPF, explained how she viewed the French and British sections. She felt that the WIL had a 'prefer a half loaf to none' mentality, throwing all their force towards disarmament and preventing fascism through instruments like the Sedition law, which prevented those who encouraged hate on the government to be disqualified from military or ecclesiastical office. Above all, the WIL believed in democratic methods and thus opposed 'every kind of dictatorship whatever its ultimate aims'. The French section, she argued, considered social transformation as its priority, focusing its effort on building a popular movement against war and fascism.[40] Ingram has argued that this switching of roles occurred because the French Section went from 'integral' pacifism towards a 'realist' stance.[41]

Yet the British and French perspectives followed the same thinking as in 1926. The 1926 Congress was eerily similar to that of 1934. The WIL's request for less specificity to support 'progress' like the Geneva Protocol was what Innes argued when she explained in 1934 the 'minor problem' of supporting partial disarmament. The Franco-German frustration at the WIL threatening the WILPF's avant-garde nature by their reactive policy resembles their call for revolution rooted in frustration at the slow progress in 1934. In 1935, just as they had done in the 1920s, the British aimed at pushing a reactive-led approach to peace by focusing on disarmament, while the French favoured a more proactive-led approach to peace attempting mass societal change, now through anti-fascism and communism rather than moral disarmament. Therefore, while the opinions on violence and disarmament appeared to shift

[39] WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', March 1926, p.4.
[40] LSE, WILPF, 'The Present Political Situation a WILPF Symposium', *Pax International,* Vol.10 No.1, February 1935, pp.1-2.
[41] Ingram, p.292.

drastically from the 1920s to the 1930s, at their core, they were the same; the British view remained a reactive-led peace policy, and the Franco-German proactive.

It might be tempting to argue then that the British faction were ideological pacifists, and the Franco-German faction were utopian pacifists or *Ancien* versus *Nouveau* pacifists. Such a case may well be made; however, these dichotomous definitions cannot be applied universally. For example, in Balch's 1935 *Pax* article, Camille Drevet, LIFPL secretary, responded by explaining that France should not abandon disarmament because they had yet made any genuine attempt at it and that they ought to pursue a concrete public policy for peace and disarmament.[42] As Ingram explained, Drevet was primarily responsible for organising the LIFPL's disarmament campaigns and supporting it for almost as long as the British did.[43] She led a significant French proportion that favoured a reactive-led policy. Moreover, while League members either took a reactive or proactive-led approach, it did not mean they had completely turned their back on the other policy – quite the opposite. A more in-depth view of the WIL's disarmament work will be taken to demonstrate this.

The WILPF generally viewed the World Disarmament Conference (1932-34) as their last real chance, the theme of the 1932 Congress being 'World Disarmament or World Disaster'.[44] The failure of the conference, as Kitching has explained, ended the hopeful era that disarmament might be achieved internationally, causing members who had a proactive-led policy towards disarmament to turn their attention elsewhere.[45] The WIL, however, refused to yield, instead turning their attention to the sky. In the February 1935 edition of *Pax,* Innes explained that nothing had been done to tackle disarmament in the air seriously and urged all national sections to direct attention towards this.[46] The WIL had developed the belief that aviation would be the deciding factor in a coming war; therefore, air disarmament would have a disproportionately positive impact than other forms of disarmament.

This aligned with the general mood in Britain in 1935 that was marked by a phase of heightened fear (lasting until 1938) for 'the knock-out blow from the air: a sudden, rapid and

[42] WILPF, 'The Present Political Situation a WILPF Symposium', February 1935, p.5.
[43] Ingram, p.257.
[44] WILPF, *Report of the Seventh Congress.*
[45] Carolyn Kitching, *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference: A Study in International History* (London: Palgrave, 2003), p.1; Jannette, p.248.
[46] WILPF, 'The Present Political Situation a WILPF Symposium', February 1935, p.5.

overwhelming aerial bombardment' able to paralyse a country's war effort and wider infrastructure.[47] Spurred by the conference's failure and the announcement of the Luftwaffe (and Hitler's aggrandised claims surrounding it), arguments for immediate air rearmament or disarmament intensified.[48] Stanley Baldwin's speech to Parliament in 1932 was a touchpoint for this:

> I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through […] The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.[49]

Those quoting Baldwin either expressed the need for a reduction of air armament as the only way to protect the public, or a swift increase in armament, either to build a 'protective' force or to better crush the opponent's 'women and children' as, stripped from context, Baldwin seems to suggest as the only defence.[50] In reality, Baldwin's speech was not for rearmament or unilateral disarmament. He believed it impossible to take back a new military invention, but feeling war was far off, he proposed that countries with an air force (and Germany) should begin discussing the issue of civil aviation and disarmament in the air.[51] The WIL did just that and believed, despite widespread fear of the knock-out blow, that civil aviation was not the problem; its benefits, like transportation of goods and people, being, as Kathleen Courtney, WIL leader, considered, consistently hampered by the government's use of aviation for military purposes. The British section urged that the air forces be abolished and aviation brought under international control for solely civilian purposes.[52] Here, the WIL's reactive policy was clear; their primary aim was material disarmament to remove the air force and control civil aviation in a way that kept it from the hands of the military. Yet the WIL also had concerns over moral disarmament.

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[47] Brett Holman, *The Next War in the Air: Britain's Fear of the Bomber, 1908-1941* (London: Routledge, 2016), p.3.
[48] Ibid, pp.189, 192.
[49] HC Deb, 10 November 1932, vol. 270, col. 632.
[50] See 'You Must Not Be Deceived', *Reynolds's Newspaper,* 21 July 1935, p.2; 'War By Reprisals', *Reading Standard,* 27 November 1936.
[51] HC Deb, vol. 270, col. 635.
[52] LSE, WILPF 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1935, pp.1-2.

Unlike much of Britain, the WIL feared not what would emerge from the skies but what was taking shape in the public's minds. While they, like many pacifists, believed in the 'knock-out blow', feeling that an attack from the air can never be defended against, the propaganda and fear surrounding the idea concerned the WIL more.[53] In early 1935, following the Air Pact, the creation of the Air Raid Precautions Department (ARP), and plans announced to develop the RAF, the British section began campaigning against military aviation.[54] This included fighting against the introduction of gas drills, aviation displays, and air raid precautions by sending statements of outcry to the press and government; supporting the Air Disarmament Campaign run by the Women's Peace Crusade; helping to create anti-air armament shop window displays to enrol the public in the cause and publicise books and pamphlets on the subject; and sending an international appeal asking all women to unite against air-raid drills to prevent 'being in this way absorbed by the war machinery and thus accepting the war idea as a dominant factor in daily life'.[55] This work aimed to tackle the psychological impact of the 'knock-out blow', which had caused the introduction of ARP.

Indeed, the WIL released a statement on active and future attempts to drill the public for air attacks and explained that 'such preparation is bound to contribute to the creation of a war mentality which in itself is a contributory factor in causing war'. Believing indeed that 'the bomber will always get through', the WIL deemed these drills as an illusory defence, a false security blanket that concealed what the drilling truly meant – the acceptance that killing women and children of other nations can be the only defence in war. The WIL condemned the 'slaughter [of any] men, women and children' in all countries.[56] They feared not the 'knock-out blow' itself but its broader impact: practising for air-raids, they knew, was warmongering. It was arming the public mind, ultimately preparing them to shift towards war rather than peace.

Another example of this can been seen in Innes' published pamphlet titled *To Mothers and Educators: Women Unite for Peace* (c.1937). This work critiqued the Air Raid Precautions Act of 1937, which required the council to prepare for air attacks. 'What are we doing to the

[53] Brett Holman, 'The Air Panic of 1935: British Press Opinion between Disarmament and Rearmament', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 46.2 (2011), 288-307 (p.293).
[54] Holman, *The Next War in the Air,* p.56; Holman, 'The Air Panic of 1935' p.287.
[55] LSE, WILPF 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, August and October 1935.
[56] LSE, WILPF, 'Air Attack', *Pax International,* Vol.10 No.5, July 1935, p.4.

minds of a whole generation of children if we surround them with these ever-present and tangible proofs of our expectation of war?' she asked, using the image of children playing in gas masks to emphasise her message. She referred to the illusionary defence of the ARP and appealed to parents and educators to write to the press and their local MPs to demand disarmament. After all, peace, she concluded, was not built from warmongering and fear but through understanding and friendship.[57] Overall, these attempts to stop drills and displays and reshape the public's thoughts through literature paralleled the early work of the LIFPL.[58]

Figure 2.2: Children playing in gasmasks published in Innes's pamphlet *To Mothers and Educators: Women Unite for Peace* (c.1937).[59]

[57] Kathleen Innes, *To Mothers and Educators: Women Unite for Peace* (Grower Street, London: WILPF, c.1937), pp.1-3.

[58] For more on impact of gas masks, particularly concerning normalising war to the civilian population see, Susan Grayzel, *The Age of the Gas Mask: How British Civilians Faced the Terrors of Total War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022); Susan Grayzel, 'A promise of terror to come': Air Power and the Destruction of Cities in British Imagination and Experience, 1908–39', ed. by Stefan Goebel and Derek Keene (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2011).

[59] Ibid.

Yet this proactive peace work was rooted in a more immediate and concrete issue: the general election set for early November 1935.[60] The WIL felt that this was their last chance to push for disarmament and ominously summarised the situation:

> The coming month may be a fateful one for the cause of peace throughout the world. Seventeen years after the War which was to end war the country will be divided by a General Election, the issue of which will determine whether the British government is prepared to throw its weight into the cause of agreed reductions of armaments by all the nations, or is going to take the lead in rearmament.[61]

Much of the issue of armament centred around the Air Pact, signed between the Locarno powers (Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy) in February 1935, which offered mutual air force backing if any signatory was attacked. Baldwin used the support the public gave to this pact, as Holman has argued, to gauge that public opinion was beginning to support rearmament to defend collective security instead of disarmament. The WIL contested this, feeling that collective security was being misused as an excuse to rearm and that its proper form would only come from disarming.[62] This, combined with the all-too-timely drilling of the public for air attacks, which they felt was purposefully resigning the public to war, the WIL threw their energies at influencing the election in favour of disarmament. It is therefore clear that while the WIL may have had a reactive-led policy to disarmament, they did supplement this with a proactive approach. Demonstrating that even discussions over disarmament, which ostensibly caused a clear-cut divide within the WILPF, were more nuanced than they seemed.

Ultimately, the WIL failed to achieve their goal, and the British section reflected on the results of Baldwin's election victory as 'an incredible chapter of history the disastrous effects of which is difficult to over-estimate. It has left us with general bewilderment'. The election, they felt, was dominated by 'idealism, demagogy and scare-mongering', and they condemned the government's programme and speeches as being dominated by a narrative of Britain's

[60] For information about the general election see Andrew Thrope, *Parties at War: Political Organizations in Second World War Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[61] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1935, p.1.
[62] LSE, WILPF 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, April 1935, p.1.; *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1935, p.1; LSE, WILPF, 'Resolutions Voted by The International Executive Committee March 25-30, 1935', *Pax International,* Vol.10 No.2, March 1935.

defencelessness and promise of building military forces.[63] Baldwin's election ended most of the WIL's work for air disarmament, which faded from importance by 1937, though they, like the rest of the WILPF, continued to release statements about the need for universal disarmament.

Consulting Body or Committee: Who Should Have Constitutional Power?

The issue of the constitution ran alongside debates over moral and material disarmament, at the 1934 Zurich Congress. The divide in opinion was again rooted in the reactive-led versus proactive-led view. To understand this, a quick note should be given to the WILPF and WIL's structure (see *Appendix 1.1*). The International Executive Committee was comprised of (usually twelve) presidents elected at the International Congresses from a list of nomination by the national sections. In this role, presidents could appoint sub-committee members (to work on particular issues such as disarmament, education, and youth work). These sub-committee members, reviewed annually, chaired congresses, and meet once a year to discuss progress. If a president stepped down between congresses, the WILPF would reach out to the national sections for nominations.[64] While these national sections had significant autonomy, the International Executive Committee was the steering force of the WILPF.[65] This meant its Constitution became a pertinent issue in the early 1930s because, as Hellawell has explained, this period saw a significant restructuring of the Committee due to the passing of the founding generation of the WILPF.[66]

The debate concerned how much power the International Executive Committee should exercise. The Franco-German proposal urged the Committee to be given 'full power' to act.[67] The British proposal, backed by Denmark and Poland, insisted that the national sections be consulted before acting, the Committee becoming a 'clearing house' for the national branches.[68] The Franco-German argument for 'full power' suggested democracy might mean

[63] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, December 1935, p.1.
[64] WILPF, *Report of the Fourth Congress of the Women International League for Peace and Freedom: Washington May 1st to 7th, 1924* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1924), p.146.
[65] Beers, p.122.
[66] Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', p.26.
[67] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress*, p.39.
[68] Ibid.

a ‘majority ruling over a more progressive minority’ as the ‘Western’ countries dominated the WILPF national section. They also highlighted that the League was naturally international, and leaving power with national sections rather than the International Committee might threaten this. On the other hand, the British argument against ‘full power’ warned of the danger in the current period of leaving authority with a few; Edith Pye, a member of the WIL and chair of the International Executive Committee, insisted that she could not ‘accept any form of dictatorship either in our own ranks or outside’.[69]

Both perspectives of the debate were reasonable. Those for the Franco-German proposal were generally from countries feeling the greater effects of fascism and Nazism, as Sandell has highlighted.[70] It was a genuine possibility that their national sections – take Germany, for example – would cease to exist swiftly, leaving a vast and active branch with little say if the British proposal was adopted. Baer, in particular, was in danger, as she was Jewish and an active pacifist feminist living in Nazi Germany. Favouring proactive-led policy and prioritising a new social order, the Franco-German view wanted the Executive Committee to act transnationally, not tied to national sections (though in communication with them). This was linked to their view of ‘moral power’ over numbers. Internationalism was paramount to them, growing in importance as they increasingly lost their connection with the general population who saw pacifism as less and less honourable or illegal due to the rise of fascism and the coming of the Second World War. On the other hand, the British perspective was justifiably cautious of leaving the power with a council with members aligned with communist and revolutionary ideas. They were concerned about Duchêne, whose increasingly authoritarian leadership of the LIFPL was unnerving.[71] Their opposition to the abandonment of democracy in a time when it was most needed was hardly a deplorable stance. In the end, the delegates at Zurich compromised: the Committee could act on their authority only if national sections could not be consulted and all twelve presidents agreed.[72]

Yet historiography has somewhat overlooked that within the WIL, there were various viewpoints, perhaps because this only became clear after 1934, again demonstrating that

[69] Ibid, pp.2,41.
[70] Marie Sandell, *The Rise of Women’s Transnational Activism: Identity and Sisterhood Between the World Wars* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015), p.102.
[71] Ingram, pp.248-310.
[72] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress*, p.46.

while the British section might have been led by a reactive peace policy, they still engaged with proactive peace work and thought. Indeed, at the WIL's Annual Council held in March 1935, the section debated the compromised constitution passed at Zurich. Three different responses to the new constitution were proposed. Dr Hilda Clark's resolution argued that if democracy was not honoured, the WIL should split from the WILPF, becoming an independent but consultative member of the League. She felt this would allow the WIL autonomy and independence while keeping its international spirit through consultation. The second proposal came from the Manchester Branch (one of the largest in the WIL) and disagreed with Clark's solution, arguing it would disenfranchise the WIL and that they should wait to act until they have 'won over' sections for 'consulting' rather than 'full power'. They added that internationalism should be paramount and felt Clark's resolution would destroy this. Finally, Kathleen Innes presented a resolution representing the view of those who were for 'full power' and cooperation with the WILPF, who she explained had often been accused of denialism. A discussion then ensued, and Innes stressed the dangers of Clark's proposal and highlighted that the WILPF could not override the WIL regardless of the constitution. Clark's proposal for independence was put to a vote and lost 28 votes to 35.[73]

Despite receiving support from many key WIL members, a large part of Clark's failure can be attributed to Innes, who had a knack for chairing and mediating complex debates, bringing strength to the seeming minority view. The council's outcome led some key members, including Clark and Kathleen Courtney, to resign from the Executive Committee, though they continued to work for the WIL and contribute to the newssheet as their resignation was over method rather than principle.[74] Innes moved to fill the power vacuum, and as crisis after crisis arose in the late 1930s, she took on an increasing level of responsibility and power. This contributed to the WIL's shift towards a proactive-led peace policy in the late 1930s and most notably in 1940, as Innes, unlike Courtney and Clark, held a far more proactive-led view on peace – though her talent for mediation often made it difficult to ascertain her true beliefs. Overall, Innes exposes, not only through her views but in her defence of those in favour of cooperation, that the WIL was far from homogeneous in opinion and that many members

[73] LSE, WILPF 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, March 1935, pp.1-3.
[74] Ibid.

valued the League's broad goals of internationalism, peace and freedom over concrete reactive policies.

This is further exemplified by a statement from Barbara Duncan Harris, a colleague and friend of Innes, following the meeting of the International Executive Committee and their debate on the constitution. Harris hoped that the WIL might 'make a step forward in interpreting the spirit of democracy, not by a rigid application of majority rule, but by the living fusion of a rich variety of experiences' and that while the British urgencies were not the same as those of Central Europe, the British section needed to contribute to the 'international picture', as Europe's problems were 'in essence world problems, common to all who seek to establish peace and freedom'.[75] This approach upheld the idea that while their policy of reactive peace might be very different to other national sections, the cause of war was universal and rooted in social injustice, such as the spirit of democracy. Harris spoke of individuals' ability to exhibit tolerance, openness to others' opinions, and peaceful compromise and cooperation rather than losing these values in pursuit of majority rule on paper. Like Innes and many she represented, she did not necessarily agree with the Franco-German perspective nor support Duchêne's behaviour, but they were asking the WIL to make policy decisions based increasingly on proactive peace values – mainly to keep the WILPF united.

The constitution issue however was not dropped until October 1937, when the WIL proposed the constitution be discussed at an International Executive Committee meeting, and the Dutch section proposed a veto until the next congress, which due to the war, ended up not taking place until 1946. The Dutch proposal won 62 votes to 36.[76]

[75] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, March 1935, p.4
[76] LSE, WILPF, *Pax International,* Vol.12 No.7, October 1937, p.2.

Figure 2.3: WILPF members represented at the 9th International WILPF Congress, Luhacovice, Czechoslovakia, 1937.[77]

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By the end of 1937, the power dynamic of the WIL was shifting, and those like Innes and Harris, who held a more proactive-led view on peace work, were gaining increasing influence. The world was also changing around the British section, and, lagging behind their French and German counterparts, they increasingly realised that little meaningful work towards immediate disarmament remained possible. The WIL's reactive-led policy was questioned. A change had to be made. It was clear they were not going to follow the Franco-German perspective towards communism or revolution, yet they had to define, perhaps for the first time, what a proactive policy meant to them.

[77] WILPF.2009.18.18.

Chapter Two: Panic, Pacifism and Post-War Planning, 1939-1943

'A sad, bad old year', Barbara Duncan Harris, WIL member, reflected at the end of 1937. It had given the WILPF little to celebrate. Italy had withdrawn from the League of Nations, and Germany had officially refused to re-join it. There was a mounting arms race, the Second Sino-Japanese War had begun, the Spanish Civil War continued, and there was a general rise in ideological clashes and persecution. 'Has the new [year] any hope to offer?' she asked in the newssheet. 'We have chosen what is perhaps the most difficult path to follow at this moment', but 'the W.I.L was never fashion by or for fairweather folk'. 'The new year may still be dark and difficult', but Harris assured her readers it posed an opportunity for the League to unite. To study the 'injustices and maladjustments' involving imperialism, trade, and refugees, and less tangibly, greed, prestige and 'the will to dominate'. Alongside tackling issues of reactive peace like rearmament and violence, Harris felt hope lay in this new focus on proactive peace.[1] Throughout 1938, many adopted Harris' focus on proactive peace, feeling they could no longer prevent war. Yet they stressed that their moral power, built on tolerance and non-violence, should not be lost, even if sympathy could be given to those fighting against oppression.[2]

This section explores some of the key dilemmas the WIL faced throughout the first half of the war. It will test Harris' claim that WIL members could 'weather' the coming of war by exploring the section's membership figures. It asked if these figures even mattered to an organisation that increasingly favoured 'moral power' over numerical strength. Second, this section argues that the Second World War caused the WIL to shift from a reactive-led peace policy to a proactive one, as Harris held, and reveals how and why this occurred. Thirdly, it exposes what adopting a proactive policy looked like, and its impact on the section's wartime aims – what did the study of 'injustices and maladjustments' reveal? Finally, it looks at the WILPF's response to Jewish persecution to reveal some of the potential problems with proactive peace. Overall, it argues that the British section, once led by a reactive peace policy, now shifted focus to proactive work.

[1] LSE, WILPF/2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, January 1938, p.1.
[2] LSE, WILPF/2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, September 1938, p.1.

'Look Round and Get in Fresh Blood': The WIL's Wartime Membership

It appeared that Harris was correct, WIL members were 'weathering' the coming of war. For in 1938, WIL member, Mrs McGregor Wood's appeal for 'fresh blood' came not out of the usual panic the WILPF exhibited towards their inability to attract the younger generation but in excitement at the WIL's growing membership. Following the success of the Spring Peace Campaign, McGregor Wood urged larger regional branches to 'look round' and create satellite groups while offering advice to the several newer branches on when, where and what should be done at meetings and how to obtain guest speakers for the WIL headquarters.[3] Her advice was taken, and by 1939, the section reported a steady increase of women joining the League, imbuing them with courage, 'faith, hope and charity in large measures'.[4] This narrative differs drastically from historians who present the WILPF as having 'nearly screeched to a halt in 1939', not reforming until the late 1940s.[5] It appears quite the contrary for the British section. But did this growth last beyond the widespread panicked pacifism of 1938? And was the 'fresh blood' of 1938 fickle to popular opinion, or did the WIL maintain its strength during wartime despite its goals becoming subversive? To ascertain this, the section's membership figures must be studied.

Yet, measuring solely the WIL's number of members can be problematic. For example, historians like Martin Pugh have compared the smaller membership of the WIL with the larger Voluntary Aid Detachment or Women's Patriotic League, which her serves to lessen the WIL's importance.[6] However, preferring 'moral power' over a mass movement, the WILPF saw themselves as guiding humanity towards permanent peace.[7] McGregor Wood explained in her appeal explicitly that 'the W.I.L is not a mass organisation' and clarified to the newly founded branches that it was the responsibility of individual members to 'share in propaganda and work' towards peace and freedom. They, she argued, were the 'nerve centre for progressive, active Internationalism' in Britain and beyond.[8] While the WIL wanted to grow its

[3] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, September 1938, pp.3-4.
[4] LSE 2009.15.5.1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, January 1939, p.1.
[5] Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.47.
[6] Martin Pugh, *Women and the Women's Movement in Britain 1914-1949* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p.105.
[7] Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, p.30.
[8] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, September 1938, pp.3-4.

membership, and its 'moral power' attitude might be viewed as a convenient policy to justify low figures, a deep-rooted culture undoubtedly favoured moral reach over mass support. The WILPF was born during war to be avant-garde and at odds with the masses in favour of peace. The return of a world war reignited this in a way that had not been seen in peacetime. It is therefore important to measure, as well as membership figures, the WIL's geographical reach (through the number of regional branches) and circulation of literature to analyse their size and impact.

While the WIL concealed or reported in no consistent manner their membership figures and literature sales, they can be inferred. Many interesting insights can be drawn using the British section's yearly financial records and list of branches provided in the annual reports.[9] Figure 1.1 (see *Appendix 1.2*) portrays the numbers of regional branches within the WIL yearly between 1915 and 1950. While there are data gaps between 1933 and 1937 (represented by the dotted line), the graph reveals that while the beginning of the Second World War saw a decrease in branches, by the middle of the conflict, numbers had recovered to their pre-war level – challenging historians' popular conception that the WIL's work fizzled out after 1938. It should be remembered that the number of branches does not necessarily represent membership figures. The war may have caused members to leave their group, but it does show that there were enough dedicated women in each branch to keep them open. Therefore, it can be said to represent the WIL's geographical reach accurately.

Further information can be drawn from Chart 1.1 (*see Appendix 1.5*), which uncovers the activity of each branch, again from 1915 to 1950. The chart does reveal that Bristol, Cheltenham and Preston, longstanding branches, folded following the outbreak of the Second World War, yet all other well-established branches before the war survived and most continued work after the conflict. It is also clear that McGregor Wood's claim of an increase in regional groups extended to the war, as many branches were founded during or just before the outbreak. These included Childwall, Croydon, Ditchling, Farmborough, Golders Green, Harrow, Nottingham, Peppard, Peterborough, S.W London, Saffron Walden and Sheffield. This would suggest that the migration of women caused by the war's economic, social, and geographical impacts allowed the formation of more regional branches, even if some ultimately folded after a few years.

[9] See collection LSE, WILPF/2, Annual Reports.

Indeed, the Manchester branch reported a desire for its members to form groups, as they were moving from the city and could no longer attend central meetings.[10] This desire was accelerated following the outbreak of war. Between the 1st and 3rd of September 1939, as Robert Mackay explains, roughly 1.5 million people, predominantly women and children, evacuated city areas deemed dangerous.[11] This evacuation continued into the war and, at the end of 1941, the WIL explained that members who had been 'scattered' should write to the headquarters, which would be able to put them in contact with nearby individual members, in the hope of establishing new connections and branches together.[12] This is also seen in Muriel Prichard and Greta James' 1944 publication, the most detailed review of membership figures since 1920.[13]



Figure 3.1: Map representing the WIL's membership in 1943, published in *Two Steps Forward* (1944).

[10] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, September 1938, p.3.
[11] Robert Mackay, *Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain During the Second World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p.46.
[12] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, December 1941, p.4.
[13] WIL, *Fifth Yearly Report October 1919 - October 1920* (London: WIL, 1920), p.5.

Figure 3.1 summarises their findings from 1943, showing that smaller groups clustered close to larger city groups, suggesting larger regional sections were branching out. Prichard and James also expressed a particular interest in individual members in each county, which fits the narrative of valuing moral power and McGregor Wood's call for members to be their own propagandists and establish and grow groups.[14] In valuing individual impact over a mass movement, the WIL highly favoured personal connections and networking of women to expand their organisation in a way they felt kept its 'purity'. Overall, this evidence, along with Chart 1.1, helps reveal that the WIL maintained a robust national reach and grew or entered new regions during the war, meaning it remained dynamic and active despite, or perhaps because of, the conflict.

However, these regional branches only reveal half the picture. A more complete one can be crafted using Graph 1.2 (*see Appendix 1.3*). The graph compares the WIL's annual income from subscriptions, publications and donations between 1917 and 1950. The graph is expressed in 1917 Sterling (£) to offset inflation. It reveals that the income from subscriptions decreased following the outbreak of the Second World War but, like the branch numbers, began to increase by the middle of the war. Graph 1.3 (*see Appendix 1.4*) overlays this with branch numbers, revealing a similar pattern. This match can imply, tentatively, that while the number of branches decreased at the outbreak of the war, it recovered and increased by the end of the conflict, along with the actual number of women affiliated with the WIL. Moreover, Prichard and James' count of 2,500 members in 1943 is considerable on several levels: first, as membership at its peak in 1917-18 only sat at roughly 3,600, which was never reached again, and second, the fact that the WIL were ready to publish their membership figures since 1920 demonstrates a certain pride in the section's growth – this was also combined with a change in attitude towards policy.[15] In conclusion, it is clear that the WIL did not collapse but continued to work effectively throughout and after the war due to both moral and numerical strength.

Graph 1.2 also shows that donations generally decreased but peaked significantly in the 1938 financial year. This could be read as a last-ditch attempt from the public to fund peace

[14] Muriel Prichard and Greta James, *Two Steps Forward: A Memorandum on the Education of Women in the Cause of Peace* (London: Percy Brothers, 1944)

[15] WIL, *Third Yearly Report October 1917 - October 1918* (London: WIL, 1918), p.4; WIL, *Fifth Yearly Report*, p.5.

during the Munich Crisis before it was too late. The Spring Peace Campaign may also have drawn donations due to the fresh influx of branches that McGregor Wood has highlighted. Nonetheless, the war harmed the number of donations the WIL received. This does not mean they no longer supported the League's aims; it is perhaps instead an indication of the economic hardship caused by war.

Finally, Graph 1.2, which depicts revenue generated through publications, presents something interesting. It drops at the outbreak of war, remaining lower than pre-war rates, but does steadily increase for each year after 1940. This is not due to an increase in the price of the monthly newssheet, which remained at one penny until 1945. Moreover, even ignoring 1945, when the price of newssheets increased, publications did not follow membership rates proportionately as in previous years. This slight difference suggests that interest in the WIL's publications was more significant than their membership. This may be due to the cost of membership, both financial and moral, meaning past members may have felt more comfortable distancing themselves from the WIL while remaining connected and updated by the newssheets. It may also show an increased interest either by secret support or opposition or a greater interest in their relief work at home and abroad.

The steady increase in literature sales from 1940 also coincided with a change of editorship of the newssheet from Hilda Clark, who held a reactive-led peace policy, to Innes, who favoured proactive peace work. Perhaps this is a coincidence, but it may also suggest members and outsiders were more supportive of the newssheet once it held a proactive peace stance. This was potentially more popular as it struck a better balance between allowing personal support of the war effort while remaining a pacifist working towards permanent peace. Either way, the fact that the WIL only suffered a slight drop in membership, which quickly recovered and then increased in moral and numerical reach, is significant. It suggests that the shift to a proactive peace policy benefited or did not harm the British section. This is important as the policy change was not inevitable nor universally held until 1941.

'Something Has Died': Redefining Peace Policy During War

On 10 May 1940, Hitler launched an offensive on France and the Low Countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), ending the so-called 'Phoney War'.[16] The mood in Britain was a blend of perverse 'almost relief' that the worst had finally arrived, stoic enthusiasm exhibited by thousands who volunteered and accepted longer working weeks, and initially naivety.[17] For many, it was not until several days later that they grasped the seriousness of the situation, preoccupied with their new Prime Minister Winston Churchill and false press reports that claimed the Allies had halted the German assault. By 22 May, public fear had increased as more accurate news trickled through the headlines. The British public broadly welcomed the subsequent precautions, including the extension of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939, which gave the Government unprecedented powers to control all aspects of public life during the war, and the arrest of Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of Fascists.[18] The growing proximity of the German offensive and its consequences also troubled the WIL.

Figure 3.2: Dr Hilda Clark c.1915.[19]

[16] Antony Beevor, *The Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012 [2014 edition]), p.100.
[17] Robert Mackay, *Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain During the Second World War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p.61.
[18] Beevor, *The Second World War,* p.106.
[19] Lib. Ref. PIC 89/A 217.

In the June 1940 edition of the section's newssheet, Kathleen Innes and Hilda Clark clashed again over the unfolding situation. Five years after their disagreement over the constitution, the wrangle between Innes's proactive and Clark's reactive policies intensified. Clark opened the debate with an article, 'The Test of Democracy'. She argued that the 'German "totalitarian" method of war', which she added Hitler gave full warning of in *Mein Kampf* (1925), was bringing tragedy to democratic countries and 'now reaches the climax of its threat to ourselves'. She continued:

> As the danger draws nearer to this country we are brought to a sense of unity in the realisation of what the success of the Nazi regime would mean. Whatever views may be held as to mistakes in the past, whether of policy or of methods in preparation, it had now become impossible to look to any other way of saving such progress as our democracy had made towards its ideals except through the overthrow of the forces battling against us.

To Clark, the WIL's task was to win the war while saving 'true civilisation' and liberty for which they were fighting.[20] She now viewed winning the war as the only way to achieve peace.

Superficially, Clark appeared to have taken a U-turn in policy. She had pivoted from pursuing the WIL's independence to avoid entanglement with the Franco-German perspective, which wanted to support anti-fascist action, even if it involved violence, to sharing that very desire. Now that Nazi Germany was threatening Britain – which she problematically viewed as the peak of its threat to democracy – she felt a sense of unity with her former opponents. Just as Gabrielle Duchêne and Gertrud Baer had realised years earlier, Clark now concluded that potentially violent action could be justified. However, Clark had not necessarily changed her core policy; war, instead, had aligned Clark's reactive-led policy and the Franco-Germans' proactive-led in accepting violence to combat Nazism and Fascism. Crucially, Clark was not working from 'ideal to concrete' as the Franco-German view had but maintained a reactive-led stance starting with the concrete.[21] It was, in fact, WIL members who continued to stand against violence, opposing Clark's view, that shifted their policy from reactive-led to almost entirely focused on proactive peace – from starting with the concrete to starting from the ideal. This section will explore these two perspectives, revealing why Clark maintained a

[20] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1940, p.1.
[21] LSE, WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', *Pax International,* Vol.1 No.3, Jan 1926, p.2-4.

reactive-led approach to peace, how and why Innes wanted to shift the WIL towards a proactive approach, and why Innes succeeded.

Following her call to arms, Clark remarked, 'There is no need to be alarmed at the power we are allowing the Government to take'. Reflecting on the extension of the Emergency Powers Act, she was careful to assure the British public, and some rather nervous WIL members, that they had agency and choice, thus '*allowing* [own emphasis] the Government to take' power rather than it being taken outright – even if this was not necessarily true. She admitted that there was a risk, and abuses would arise, but felt these could be better prevented and an equalling of sacrifices achieved by those co-operating with the national war effort rather than 'those who stand outside and criticise'.[22] In keeping with the League's tendency to educate, she felt the WIL would be more impactful working with existing legislation and governments. This was quite the opposite of the French and German proactive view in the 1930s, which wanted a complete overhaul of the current social order. Clark desired to work with and police existing policies directly relating to war rather than criticising from the outside based on ideals, which she frowned upon. Therefore, while appearing to shift her policy, Clark was still at heart reactively led. This becomes more apparent when understanding those opposing Clark's view.

Innes countered Clark in her article *Ourselves and Our Critics.* She began the article by reminding readers of the WIL's two main tasks, which she viewed as reactive, 'work for the preservation of peace', and proactive peace, 'endeavour to build up a world-in which war shall be impossible'. She then questioned members: if the ideals the Allies are fighting for are righteous, how can we remain committed to peace rather than supporting the war effort? 'Our attitudes seem to them [i.e. non-pacifists] weak and non-committal'.[23] Innes' phrasing is clever as it frames the WIL's critics as those – including Clark – who asked why the WIL was not supporting the war effort. Having established these 'critics', Innes then provided an answer to their suspended question:

[22] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1940, p.2.
[23] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, July 1940, p.3.

> If our beliefs and principles were generally held, they would prevent war. To forsake them, therefore, in support of this or any war for national existence, would be a serious setback to the coming of the day when war will be abolished. What respect could anyone have for a peace movement that abandoned its principles when war came?[24]

Much like the constitutional issue in 1935, Innes favoured the League's broader, more proactive aims – peace, freedom, and internationalism. She feared that the WIL, a moral rather than a mass movement and as an organisation of women guiding humanity towards permanent peace, would ruin the League's core purpose by supporting war. To her, jeopardising these values risked the Nazis being overthrown on the 'material plane' while leaving the Nazi philosophy and spirit very much alive. This spirit was viewed as the antithesis of peace, including values like militarism that the WIL would have to support if they followed Clark's policy. True, this was also why Innes opposed the Franco-Germans group's engagement with revolutionaries at the Zurich Congress. This might lead to the claim that Innes' policy remained unchanged – even Innes herself argued that her pacifism remained unaffected by war.[25] While this is fair, Innes had always been an absolute pacifist, but the war changed her approach. Now that violence was 'official policy' due to the war, her strategy shifted from being reactively led (though disarmament and peace negotiations) to proactively led in terms of focusing on the new social order. Indeed, Innes became disenchanted and angry at world leadership, continuing:

> If Governments had followed the lines of development towards international organisation, which Peace Societies or even the W.I.L. alone laid down in 1915 and succeeding years, and have pursued in resolutions and pronouncements since, we should not now be involved in this terrible struggle. […] Governments have no right at the last stage of a series of actions or inactions, which we have all along criticised, to demand such a sacrifice. [26]

Her anger at world governments was not dissimilar to Gabrielle Duchêne's frustrations at the 1934 Congress.[27] She, of course, was not to turn to communism, but the (potentially violent)

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Kathryn Harvey, '"Driven by War into Politics!": A Feminist Biography of Kathleen Innes' (unpublished thesis, University of Alberta, 1995), p.169; LSE, WILPF/3/2, Circular Letter, No.4, 1941.
[26] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, July 1940, p.3.
[27] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress: Zurich, September 3rd to 9th 1934* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1934), p.7.

watershed moment that the French and German sections had wanted and that Innes had opposed had come anyhow under the guise of a world war. This meant that, like Duchêne at Zurich, Innes now felt little was left to be done regarding reactive peace.

The divorce from a reactive policy was rooted in the belief that the WILPF had lost their battle against war-making in 1939. In March 1939, Innes wrote to co-chair Gertrude Baer following Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia, explaining:

> I feel absolutely confused as to any possible suggestion of action that would be any good, and I feel it better for a few days to do nothing than propose actions right in themselves but quite ineffective. There may for the moment be nothing a peace society can do […] I suppose my feeling is the equivalent of yours that something has died.[28]

As Kathryn Harvey has argued, this was a common feeling among WILPF pacifists that the coming and then the arrival of war understandably caused confusion and ended direct anti-war action.[29] Ceadel also argued this when he contended that during the war, many pacifists stopped suggesting that they had a practical policy but were simply following their faith.[30] While this might be an accurate reading of Innes' feelings in 1939, by 1940, she, among others, had used this confusion to argue that the League should now encourage the study of how 'constructive and permanent peace' can be achieved – by this, she meant proactive peace, as she laid out as the second task of the WIL at the beginning of her article. While this proactive work was not instant or 'practical' in opposing war, it was still incredibly impactful.

Overall, Innes and those who supported her view, including Barbara Duncan Harris, had shifted to an arguably outright proactive peace policy, feeling that any immediate and reactive action, such us supporting the war effort, at least officially, was inappropriate. Meanwhile, Clark and those in agreement with her continued to walk a reactive-led line, even if that meant supporting the war.

[28] Harvey, p.154.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Martin Ceadel, 'A Legitimate Peace Movement: the Case of Britain, 1918-1945' in *Challenge to Mars: Pacifism from 1918 to 1945,* ed.by Peter Brock and Thomas Socknat (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp.134-148 (pp. 141,143).

In Clark's reply to Innes, this becomes clearer still. Clark argued that the position of 'absolute pacifist', which she felt Innes was taking, was not the policy of the WIL 'which has always endeavoured to find and to work for immediate measures that can be expected to lead to the abolition of war and a just international order'. Clark felt the WIL should focus on 'immediate methods' relating to the war as it had always done. She saw focusing on a new post-war order instead of responding to Nazism now risked submitting to the enemy. If the WILPF did yield, Clark argued, it would bring the Nazi menace to the minds and souls of British children – Britain's resources used to extend Hitler's world domination. Clark knew this was not a risk the WIL could afford, explaining that permanent peace can never be realised until the war is won. Unlike Innes, she wanted to focus on the concrete issue of Hitler on Britain's doorstep and then work for social justice when possible. Therefore, to her, supporting the war did not undermine the League's principles but upheld them as she viewed the war as a righteous one – losing the war would mean the death of peace and freedom.[31]

This is an adequate perspective, and Clark is correct in her assumption that the WIL had always held a reactive-led policy, accepting a level of indirect violence if peaceful progress was being achieved. Namely, at the 1926 Congress when the WIL objected to being completely anti-violence to allow military sanctions as a last resort, or in 1934 when even Innes recognised that the WIL might support partial arms reductions as progress towards universal disarmament.[32] Nevertheless, supporting these half-peace policies was done on the belief that governments were working, or could be influenced to work, for reactive and proactive peace. Therefore, as Innes expressed, supporting war outright was too jarring. It betrayed the work of the women of the WILPF in 1915, who held onto peace while everyone else favoured violence as placeholders or defenders of peaceful values. Indeed, at the 1939 Annual Council, Catherine Marshall, a veteran WIL member, reasoned that during the war, the WILPF were placeholders for human progress, reminding humanity of the past while waiting until they returned from war.[33] The WILPF prided itself on being avant-garde, feeling uniquely positioned as female pacifists to bring change.

[31] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, July 1940, p.4.
[32] WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', March 1926, p.2; WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress*, p.2.
[33] LSE, WILPF/4/1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, March 1939, p.1.

Another facet of Innes' view was linked to an unusual but not uncommon belief that the Axis powers' defeat was inevitable. It was a frequent feeling, as Dan Stone explained in his analysis of literature on Nazi Germany published in Britain between 1935 and 1939 – many authors concluded that if Germany were to wage war, it would almost certainly lose. Most of these works focused on tangible reasons like insufficient economic resources and transport restrictions.[34] Paul Tabor's work, however, *The Nazi Myth: The Real Face of the Third Reich* (1939), took a more ideological approach, arguing that as a totalitarian state, Nazi Germany could 'never look back'; having to feed the constant need for popular support and ambition was its death sentence.[35] Like Tabor's the WIL took an ideological look at Nazism. While the WIL were under no illusion of the danger of fascism, many members shared Tabor's blind faith that Nazism would fall based on ideals. However it was faith based not on the belief that totalitarianism would implode but rather that it was regenerative. For example, Vera Brittain, an associate member of the WIL, wrote for the newssheet and explained that she thought 'Hitlerism' was Phoenix-like rising from 'Kaiserism', which had risen from 'Prussianism' and so backwards. As Innes stressed, she felt the war, if won, would only eradicate fascism on the material and not the moral plane. Brittain sensed that another totalitarian and military state would simply rise 'from the ashes of defeat' unless the WILPF, and pacifists more broadly, were prepared with a clear path for peaceful post-war reconstruction. Like those who felt Nazism's downfall was inevitable for economic or military reasons, the WIL felt its end was likely as it had grown from the 'defeat' of something poisonous and would equally give rise to a new sinister force.

This allowed many members to personally support the war effort through external organisations and the WILPF though relief work. Even Innes agreed that the only way to stop Hitler was through force. Yet this was quite different to the WILPF officially supporting the war – as Clark wished for. This may seem hypocritical. There is undoubtedly a certain privilege in agreeing that winning the war was necessary while avoiding participating in it. However, for those who held Innes' view, this was exactly the purpose of the League and always had been. In 1915, the WIL determined that peace would never be realised until the idea of 'might is

[34] Dan Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-39: Before the Holocaust* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 [2012 edition]), p.71.
[35] Paul Tabor, *The Nazi Myth: The Real Face of the Third Reich* (London: Pallas Publishing Co.,1939) cited in Stone, p.71.

right' was replaced with social justice. Hence, Innes felt that by participating officially in war, the WILPF was saying, 'might is *sometimes* right', ruining the idea that every war is avoidable if people work for social justice and against militarism. As Innes remarked, it was too late by 1939 to avoid the Second World War, but the WILPF knew war would come again unless all governments rebuilt with peace and freedom in mind. Innes realised this after writing to Baer – something had indeed died within the peace movement, but a renewed passion for proactive peace had risen.

Having reoriented herself, Innes called the WIL to action. She urged that they study and petition governments to develop an international order suitable for permanent peace. The day for peace-making would come, she assured, but 'can we be ready in time?', 'we must devote all our energies NOW' if there is any chance at building permanent peace after war.[36]

Innes' message proved more powerful than Clark's, and a proactive policy was taken over the old reactive-led way. This was firstly due to the relentless bombing of London during the Blitz, where their office, 55 Gower Street, suffered damage, which led to it and its key members transfer to Innes' country home. It can be implied that this either gave Clark a reason to resign or gave Innes more leverage to enforce Clark's resignation as editor of the newssheet, a role that then Innes took on.[37] This should not necessarily be read as a personal dislike for one another. Not only did the WILPF have a culture of disagreeing on a political, logistical, and moral plane while remaining civil and even friends, but Clark and Innes shared mutual connections. Actual evidence of personal correspondence between Clark and Innes is scarce. However, Innes and Harris were close friends, and Clark refers to meeting and attending lunch with Harris in her letters to Edith Pye.[38] Clark shared a close female companionship with Pye, who also served on the WIL's Executive Committee until 1944.[39] Secondly, in 1941, Innes and Clark sat down together and poured over old documents and resolutions to settle the dispute. Innes felt they proved 'absolute pacifism' had always been the League stance. When she presented her finding to the Executive Committee, neither Clark nor those who agreed with

[36] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1939, p.1.
[37] LSE, WILPF/15/1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October and November 1940, p.1.
[38] Alfred Gillett Trust Clark Family Archives, Whitenights (WN), WN/78/n Hilda Clark 1940-04-05, p.1.
[39] See collection LSE, WILPF/2, Annual Reports.

her objected, dropping the case for supporting the war effort.[40] It appeared that personal objections to the war by 1941 were enough, even for Clark, to drop their call for the WIL to officially support the war effort.

With this in mind, it is apparent that the outbreak of the Second World War caused a shift in the WIL's policy. They became almost entirely focused on proactive peace, as they could no longer deny that Hitler must be stopped by force, rendering their reactive policies of little value. They continued focusing solely on a proactive peace policy until 1943. However, this shift was much more than a question of supporting the war effort, and it led the WIL to discuss, design and disseminate plans for a new peaceful social order.

A New Social Order: Planning for Post-War Reconstruction

1939 to 1943 was arguably the first phase of the WIL's post-war planning, primarily concerning intellectual work. The WILPF had to develop 'concrete peace aims' in theory before they could guide peacemakers post-war. After Hilda Clark had stepped down as editor in late 1940, the WIL's leaders (Barbra Duncan Harris, Agatha Harrison, Mary Sheepshanks, Kathleen Innes, and Mrs McGregor Wood) began this work and reiterated the section's aims. They explained that the greatest attention should be given to planning a 'new social order':

> To do this we must be prepared for sacrifice, for the abolition of privilege whether of class or of race or nation. We must face and condemn the injustices which in the past have thwarted the efforts and stunted the lives of men and women. We must combine with all like-minded people of every class, creed and country to work for worldwide co-operation and mutual help. In this way we may hope to get rid of the envies, ambitions and rivalries which lead to war and in this way only we can prepare for a new era of peace.[41]

In content, this statement appears little different to the constitution accepted at the 1926 Congress or even that of 1919 – a testament perhaps to the WILPF's enduring understanding of peace.[42] However, the new focus on proactive peace and years of experience meant the WIL could develop new and stirring ways of achieving this. Indeed, their work towards a new

[40] Harvey, 'Driven by War into Politics' p.170.
[41] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October and November 1940, p.1.
[42] WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', March 1926, p.4.

social order was achieved in two ways, explored in this section. The first way took the traditionally negative view of war – working to create something completely different from conflict and violent states. This was achieved by adapting old peace resolutions and creating new ones, asserting the importance of human rights, and laying out how peace treaties and world governments should be organised. The second way is perhaps more surprising. This work involved the WIL looking at the positive and negative changes caused by the conflict and then asking how they could use these. In other words, they asked, what good can war bring the peace movement? Together, these approaches made up the WIL's early proactive work on post-war reconstruction.

Having processed the defeat of the pacifist cause in 1939 and beginning the process of rebuilding hope through their proactive peace policy, the WIL's early war work mirrored the efforts of 1919. The return of a world war brought back memories and created myths of their pioneering work. As Kathleen Innes' frustration at world leadership proved, the WIL were confident that the fundamental policies delegates passed in 1919 would still bring permanent peace. This led to a revival of their old work. That is not to say they had discarded the early constitution throughout the 1930s, but the decline of the League of Nations tainted and made work towards it challenging. The war, in one sense, brought a fresh beginning. It gave the WIL a second chance at building a world government and upholding universal human rights, which they achieved through discussing, adapting, and revamping their seminal work.

In 1942, Gertrud Baer proposed in the WILPF's international circular letter what she believed these peace aims were:

1. The Maintenance of Freedom and Human Rights in a Planned Society.
2. Economic Cooperation through Economic Planning (Cooperatives on European basis).
3. Planning for Social Security through a world wide "free cooperative effort".
4. Training in International Mindedness.[43]

The WIL largely supported the League's aims: human rights had always been a core principle of the League; British colonialism in India was used to develop ideas of the cooperative economy; the war provided an opportunity for the WIL to enhance social security; and in 1944

[43] LSE, WILPF/3/3, 'Circular Letters', No.2, 1942, p.4.

the British section aimed to implement an education programme to help build 'international mindedness'. As Baer explained, these values – social, political and economic justice and peaceful principles – were the foundations on which the WILPF was built in 1915, with members recognising that justice must be realised to bring permanent peace. She was indeed correct, as the list of resolutions from the 1919 Zurich Congress was very similar:

1. Guaranteeing the representation and protection of the civil and political rights of minorities. […] Equality of women with men politically, socially and economically.
2. Universal free trade […] Adoption of a plan of world economy for the production and distribution of the necessities of life at the smallest cost.
3. Organisation by the League of international resources to combat disease and improve health.[44]

The fourth aim, while alluded to in 1919, flourished a year later. The WILPF organised summer schools to connect with the young and aimed to cultivate international mindedness through education and social activities in Britain, Europe, and the USA.[45] The League also established the Maison Internationale in mid-1920. The Maison was the WILPF's international headquarters, a beautiful building in Geneva, home to offices and accommodation (as pictured in Figure 3.3).[46] It was designed to be a centre for internationally minded members to come together and live, work and socialise, breaking national boundaries.[47] Such internationalism was enabled by developing skills in lecturing, foreign languages, writing, and management in a largely safe space.[48] They foresaw an international house in every capital of the world.[49] It is, therefore, apparent that much of the WIL's proactive peace work during the Second World War was built upon their work during the First. This, however, posed a pressing problem.

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[44] WILPF, *Report of the International Congress: Zurich, May 12th to 17th 1919* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1919), pp.241-262.
[45] WIL, *Seventh Yearly Report January – December 1922* (London: International House, 1923), p.4;
[46] LSE, WILPF/2009/15/5/1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October 1920, p.1.
[47] WIL, *Sixth Yearly Report October 1920 – January 1922* (London: International House, 1922), p.4; WIL, *Eighth Yearly Report January – December 1923* (London: International House, 1924), p.6.
[48] Rupp, p.186.
[49] The headquarters were designed to be safe and private spaces for WILPF members to engage with internationalism. What they learnt in these spaces could then be taken and employed in there more public campaigns, like marches and petitions. For a comparison with the public nature of the League of Nations rituals and spaces see, Helen McCarthy, 'The League of Nations, Public Ritual and National Identity in Britain, c.1919–56', *History Workshop Journal,* 70, (2010), 108-132.

Indeed, the WILPF had chosen the location of their headquarters carefully and purposefully, not because of the pretty scenery and spacious rooms, but because it was near the League of Nations.[50] They did this to ensure they could lobby, pressure, and make themselves known to its delegates. The 1919 resolutions hinged greatly on the success of the League of Nations, as they saw the idea of democratic international governance as vital for peace and freedom.[51] However, by 1939, it was clear the League of Nations had not been successful nor organised in a way the WILPF saw appropriate. They, therefore, had to decide if they were to work at saving the *existing* League of Nations or plan to establish a *new* League of Nations. They quickly settled on the latter, feeling it best to establish a League-like world federation or government.[52] Many scholars, as Krista Cowman has recognised, have argued it was not until the 'United Nations Decade for Women' beginning in 1975 that the international women's movement developed. Yet, as Cowman has explained, this was not wholly the case, and the WILPF's work during this period serves to further her case.[53] Indeed, it is clear that



the League's work with the UN evolved from earlier work with the League of Nations starting in 1919.

[50] LSE, WILPF/2009/15/5/1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October 1920, p.1.
[51] WILPF, *Report of the International Congress, 1919,* pp.250-4.
[52] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1939.
[53] Krista Cowman, 'The Women's Movement and Internationalism in the 20th Century', *Moving the Social,* 55 (2016), 55-74 (p.70).

Figure 3.3: The first image shows the Maison Internationale, No. 6 Rue du Vieux College, Geneva, 1926 – the second shows inside c.1948.[54]

One of the main reasons they believed in a world federation was to safeguard human rights, another critical part of their war work. Again, at the outset of the First World War, protecting and establishing human rights for all was a central peace aim, shown through the *Women's Charter* (1919). The International Executive Committee, comprised of Dorothy Detzer, Innes, Pye and Harris, met in Geneva in December 1939, where they pleaded that women maintain their belief in safeguarding human rights during conflict.[55] The newest advancement towards human rights involved the WIL considering H.G Wells and Lord Sankey's *The Rights of Man* (1940).[56] Little of the publication was novel to the WILPF; most points they had established at the 1919 Congress or developed over the subsequent twenty years. Innes reminded the Annual Council of just that, in 1942, following the WILPF's most recent conference on human rights. At the conference, H.G Wells gave a keynote on his publication and was anxious that his document be studied widely by different organisations and that, if they accepted it, they would offer aid in making it a reality. The WIL critiqued the document, as they would with the Beveridge Report, and they warned against taking the document at face value. However, they accepted it, pledging to study the document and find ways to make it more widely understood.[57]

Overall, the WIL began their new wartime peace work with the old. This was not because they were archaic or stagnant but because the constitution they laid down in 1919 grasped the core of proactive peace. The League had always known the importance of a democratic global federation and universal justice and adapted their past work to suit the new political climate. However, while war was the antithesis of world governance and human rights, the WIL used it, perhaps perversely, to inspire peace policies.

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[54] LSE, WILPF/2009/15/5/1, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, December 1920, p.2; *https://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/Exhibits/wilpfexhibit/1930to1949/1930to1949.htm* [accessed 9/12/2013].

[55] LSE, WILPF/15/1, 'Resolutions adopted at the Executive Committee Meetings of The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Geneva, December 5th-9th, 1939'; LSE, WILPF/4/1, 'Annual Council Meeting', March 1939.

[56] H.G. Wells, *The Rights of Man or What Are We Fighting For?* (London: Renard Press, 2022 [originally published 1940]).

[57] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, May 1942, p.2.

Much of their intellectual work involved establishing the Second World War's 'benefits' . Again, they believed the conflict allowed them to start afresh, an opportunity they had not had since 1915.[58] For example, Dorothy Detzer, secretary of the American WILPF section, quoted Rousseau in her memorandum *Pacifist in Wartime,* 'Men only think when prevented from action'. She explained that while the world was preoccupied, the League, unable to work for reactive peace and their tangible proactive work limited, had the opportunity and responsibility to use their freed time and energy to 'breakthrough into some deeper areas of the human mind and human behaviour'. By observing events, there were aspects of war that the WIL felt were useful to the peace movement.

Indeed, the WIL recognised that the totality of war, the money, human resources and energy governments committed to it could and should be replicated for the cause of peace. Detzer, for instance, complained that 'Men will pour their blood and money for war' but 'When will they give their brains and money for peace?' She was angry, explaining that since 1920, only 135 million dollars had been spent on the League of Nations, the International Labour Organisation, and the World Court combined, while the USA alone had spent that on armaments throughout 1940.[59] While the accuracy of her claim is unclear, the premise that the resources and energy given for the cause of peace never rivalled the sheer amount

sacrificed and wasted on war remains essential. However, the WIL did not simply criticise the government's spilling of blood and money but weaponised it. They used wartime policies and

[58] LSE, WILPF/3/1, 'Circular Letters', No.19, 1939.

[59] The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was founded in 1919 by the League of Nations to ensure a just social and economic system, it still serve the same purpose of the United Nations. The World Court, officially known as the Permanent Court of International Justice was formed by the League of Nations in 1922 running until 1946. LSE, COLL.P21191 Dorothy Detzer, *The Pacifist in Wartime* (Washington: WILPF National Headquarters, 1940).

provisions as proof that governments could work towards the WILPF's new social order if only they valued peace as much as they did war.

Figure 3.4: Dorothy Detzer**.** The second picture shows Detzer questioning a speaker at a UN Consultants Meeting 17 May 1946.

This is clear in the WIL's 'Social Changes Under War Conditions' study (1941-2). In collaboration with the American WILPF, the British section highlighted eleven fundamental societal changes since 1939. The study aimed to pool intelligence so the League could develop an international (or rather Western) image of the impact of war.[60] It tracked pertinent issues to the WILPF, like the standard of living, which the British section reported had fallen considerably and, while not, in their opinion, drastically affecting the middle classes, was seriously impacting nutrition and health among the working class.[61] This shared intelligence was then used to inform the new social order, and from this came the recording of the 'benefits' of war.

One change they noted was the evacuation of thousands of children to the countryside, which they felt 'opened the eyes of the middle classes' to the poverty in larger cities as they housed working-class children. Some members felt that this encounter might flourish into a new understanding of poverty that could be used to develop better welfare provisions. They also believed that public air-raid shelters, particularly in the London Underground, had the same effect, feeling it brought classes together – though they did note many middle-class citizens had private shelters.[62] These observations might be argued as inaccurate; historians like Angus Calder have long recognised that wartime class breakdown was a myth.[63] Sonya Rose, too, has argued that the idea that cross-class unity was 'levelling', making people more equal, was a powerful myth.[64] Travis Crosby has highlighted that this myth extended to evacuations, with class-related resentment festering between some hosts and evacuees.[65] However, the WIL were not necessarily claiming a breakdown of classes but more significant class interactions and awareness of one another's lives. As Rose explains, this was truthful;

[60] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1941, p.1.
[61] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, January 1942, p.2.
[62] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1941, p.1
[63] Angus Calder, *The Myth of the Blitz* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), p.3.
[64] Sonya Rose, *Which People's War?: National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 29.
[65] Travis Crosby*, The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 3, 29.

evacuation did reveal greater contrasts between the working and middle classes.[66] The WIL aimed to capitalise on the classes' crossing of paths while upholding the myth of 'national cross-class unity' not as something that existed but as an end goal. This idea was not specific to the WIL, and many organisations used evacuation to inspire reform.[67] Women's groups and health professionals felt particularly strongly about the issue. For example, Caroline Haslett, an electrical engineer and secretary of the Women's Engineering Society, spoke at the Electrical Association for Women in 1940, proposing an organised electric grid system to create 'beautiful, clean and healthy cities'.[68] She felt women had a unique part to play in this. Evacuation, she asserted, was revealing to women the poor condition some children endured growing up in cities, and clever engineering could improve this.[69] Evacuation's evident impact on home life gave the WIL a similar opportunity to reach women yet to engage with politics. This allowed the section to reveal social injustice through war and link it to women's lived wartime experiences, helping to add pertinence and immediacy to the issue.

On a similar note, the WIL recognised the work of local authorities and voluntary bodies who arranged 'communal feeding' for those evacuated to relieve the pressure of smaller host households. Centres were set up as hubs to provide midday meals cheaply. This also happened in bombed areas for those who had lost their homes. The WIL saw the growth of people using communal kitchens and billets as a move towards a more permanent habit of eating away from home, which they argued the English had hitherto been resisting. After the war, they felt that these centres could help working-class mothers and their children facing hardship with this changed perspective.[70] Again, the British section identified evidence of injustice and welfare solutions that they could use as proof to create a more just social order after the war.

The war economy also inspired the WILPF's new social order. The WIL believed a post-war economic order must be founded on the community's needs, not profit.[71] However, a focus

[66] Rose, p. 60.
[67] See Maggie Andrews, *Women and Evacuation in the Second World War Femininity, Domesticity and Motherhood* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).
[68] The Electrical Association for Women was founded in 1924 with the aim of modernizing the British home to reduce household labour, educating women on the benefits of electricity and the need for a national gird. They also sought to represent the 'women's point of view' in the electrical industry. See Carroll Pursell, 'Domesticating Modernity: The Electrical Association for Women, 1924-86'*, The British Journal for the History and Science,* 32 (1999), 47-67.
[69] 'Work for Women in Shaping the Future', *Birmingham Daily Gazette,* 23 February 1940, p.4.
[70] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1941, p.1.
[71] LSE, WILPF/4/1, 'Annual Council Meeting', March 1939.

on economics was relatively new to the WIL, perhaps previously avoided as communism was bound closely to these discussions among other WILPF members and sections.[72] To overcome this, they would invite guest speakers, such as Honor Croome (an economist working at the London School of Economics), who in 1940 explained that the fallout of the mass destruction caused by the conflict, yet unknown, *should* require government planning. She felt that all resources 'as far as practicable' had been transferred from individual needs to the government and the war effort 'whether by conscription, requisition, taxation or borrowing'. Hence, Parliament had also become responsible for supplying necessities to all after the war. Croome explained that the Allied Purchasing Commission and Military Health Services, designed for war, could help buy and distribute food and medical care post-war.[73] Essentially, she recognised these significant changes and the need for essential resources post-war as an opportunity. An opportunity for the WIL's to hold governments accountable for building a better social economy.

The WIL's understanding of the economy was also boosted when Dr Richenda Scott, who held a PhD in Economics, joined the Executive Committee in 1939 (until 1943).[74] For the 'Social Changes' report, she synthesise that while there was good in restricting excess tax profits to prevent profiteering and the centralisation of agriculture policy, the same centralisation had failed to be implemented well in industry.[75] She, like Croome, helped identify changes and what was and was not working with the war economy logistically so the WILPF could narrow their focus and use suitable existing programmes to grow and demand a new social order. As one WIL member put it, 'with the knowledge and the control of material things which we have, achieving a plan which will give every man, woman, and child in every land an adequate living' is possible.[76]

Following the 'Social Changes' statement, the WIL welcomed the publication of *Social Insurance and Allied Services* (1942), better-known as the Beveridge Report. The report tackled five issues – 'Want, Idleness, Disease, Squalor and Ignorance' – and laid the

[72] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, May 1941, p.1.
[73] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1940, p.1.
[74] See collection LSE, WILPF/2, Annual Reports; Reginald Hine, *Relics of an Un-Common Attorney* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1951).
[75] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, January 1942, p.3; BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, February 1942, p.3.
[76] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, January 1943.

foundations for the welfare state.[77] It aimed to support all those who had sacrificed for war and, therefore, drew inspiration from war to implement post-war changes. In April 1943, shortly before their Annual Council Meeting, the WIL declared a 'general support' for the report. They felt the plan brought 'order out of chaos' and praised the security and support it would provide many, especially from the working class. However, the British section urged that the allowance for having a child should be implemented immediately to alleviate wartime poverty. They also urged that there be benefits for 'housewives'. While they provided general support, they were wary not to accept this as a solution to 'social security problems' but rather the beginning of a long overdue welfare system.[78]

They were arguably correctly cautious of this because, as some scholars in the late 1990s have explained, the welfare state, once established, did indeed stagnate and continued to disadvantage women and immigrants, who were never the target demographic. As Marese O'Brien has argued, Beveridge, by focusing on 'the five giants – Want, Squalor, Idleness, Ignorance and Disease, hid the giants of racism and sexism'.[79] Nonetheless, the WIL saw the Beveridge Report as an opportunity to focus on an international order for social security. They compared similar policies in the USA, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union. They concluded that a viable social security system was overdue in Britain and everywhere in capitalist countries. The WIL felt the Beveridge Report and other similar policies were inspired by the memory of the economy's failure during the interwar years. To prevent another poorly designed peace, they believed, international social security was necessary for post-Second World War reconstruction.[80]

It was not just the physical aspects of war that pacifists took inspiration from; they were also concerned by war's 'charisma'. Several WIL members felt the peace movement appeared drab and unexciting, especially to the young, compared to combat and militarism. 'We have yet to provide an alternative to war that is strong, courageous, chivalrous and beautiful', one

[77] William Beveridge, *Social Insurance and Allied Services* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1942); Noel Whiteside, 'The Beveridge Report and Its Implementation: A Revolutionary Project', *Histoire@Politique,* 3.24 (2014), 24-37 (p.24).
[78] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1943, pp.2-3.
[79] Marese O'Brien, 'The Beveridge Report: Its Impact on Women and Migrants', *Socheolas*, 2.2 (2010), 21-38 (p.36).
[80] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, July 1943.

member claimed.[81] Another explained that the young are drawn to comradeship and belonging, and the peace movement must adapt to present to them a 'philosophy of Unity' to rival militaristic movements.[82] Harris believed the solution was to turn a 'static word like "peace"' into something captivating and exciting to the young through proactive peace and designing a new world order. This reflects that the WIL realised that negative or "anti" policies', by which she meant reactive peace work, could not counter 'the evil of total war'. She mimicked the values used by war propagandists and asked WILPF members to muster 'all the sacrifice' and 'spirit of adventure' they could for the cause of peace.[83]

This behaviour is similar to what Dan Stone has identified in his work on interwar intellectuals. He revealed that interwar anti-fascist writers felt that rationality alone was not enough to reject fascism. Instead, 'they argue that it is necessary to try to experience the mythical sense of belonging that fascists enjoy'. Intellectuals deemed the rationality and dry doctrine of anti-fascism would fail to pull fascism's 'true believers' from the movement. Stone evidenced Collingwood, who believed fascism was democracy's greatest threat not because of 'racism, corporatism or nationalism' but its 'fanaticism'.[84] Stone has noted the irony in this and recognised that, by engaging with the mythicism of fascism, anti-fascists came very close to the regime they condemned. However, many WIL members were unapologetic about this.

Innes, for instance, felt that the totalitarian states had a lot to teach democratic economies. She noted that one of Russia's most important policies was economic stability, while Germany's unemployment was no longer an issue. Yet for this, they had sacrificed any sense of 'liberty of conscience' and 'free speech, press and party'. She felt that if democracies were to rival fascism, they had to show that economic stability could be achieved without sacrificing all 'intellectual and spiritual liberties'.[85] It is, of course, a gross misreading to argue that Nazi Germany or Communist Russia reached any form of economic stability, even based on persecution. However, her recognition was founded in the perceived mythicism and popular support whipped up by these regimes based on economic stability and cohesion. As a propagandist herself, like many WIL members, Innes was begrudgingly impressed and quite

[81] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, May 1942.
[82] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, February 1943.
[83] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, December 1940.
[84] Stone, *Responses to Nazism,* p.19,21.
[85] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, March 1939.

distressed by the narrative dictatorships were often able to weave successfully. Like Harris and other WIL members, she felt the new social order needed to create a similar 'fanaticism' for peace and social justice.

The WIL's engagement with spiritualism is particularly interesting, first because it extended beyond 1939 and second because the WIL saw not only the spiritual draw of fascism but war in general. This was a questionable approach, especially coming from those who attacked militarism and its psychological impact. However, this was perhaps a consequence of their belief that totalitarianism was regenerative. Feeling that its spirit of militarism, violence and suffering was phoenix-like rather than unique to Nazism, they were left with a dilemma. This belief was only further reinforced by the WIL's longstanding understanding of the psychological factors of war – such as 'might is right'. As they saw it, until they could transfer war's energy and 'charisma' to the peace movement, world leaders and individuals would continue to create, be coerced into, and get caught up in war. Some argued that peace needed to become as 'exciting' as war, and creating a new social order provided just the opportunity.

The Casualties of Proactive Peace

While a proactive peace policy was an effective approach, protecting the WIL's fight against 'might is right', their focus on the future meant they often failed to address those suffering in the present. This is particularly notable in the WILPF's response to the Holocaust during the Second World War. A brief examination of this will serve as a case study which reveals the potential pitfalls of proactive peace.

The WILPF had been aware of the growing antisemitism within and beyond Germany since 1915.[86] In 1935, the newssheet declared that 'the worst tragedy in the world today is to have been born into a Jewish family in Germany'.[87] The WIL agreed that Germany was 'disregarding elementary human rights' and regularly reported on this injustice throughout the mid-1930s.[88] They were aware that the Nazis were increasingly depriving Jewish people of citizenship, inflicting starvation and imprisonment, destroying memorials, synagogues and

[86] LSE, WILPF/3/4, 'Circular Letters', No.3, 1943, p.3.
[87] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, January 1935, p.1.
[88]Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism'; Julie Gottlieb, 'The Women's Movement Took the Wrong Turning': British Feminist, Pacifism and the Politics of Appeasement', *Women's History Review*, 23.3 (2014), 441-462 (p.445).

culture, withholding charitable aid, and committing mass murder.[89] By 1938, the WIL pleaded that the British government lift the Aliens Act to provide shelter to those fleeing German persecution; the slow bureaucratic process of applying for permits proved fatal. They recognised that many WIL members were a part of private charities which were left with the 'whole burden' of supporting refugees and urged that the government step in to help due to the exponentially growing scale of funds and aid needed.[90] However, once war broke out, the WILPF struggled with justifying being pacifist during the Holocaust.

This became particularly evident in their response to the emerging news of mass murder in Poland. As Michael Fleming has explained, from 9 July 1942, the BBC began to report to the British public that in Poland, the Gestapo were killing people en masse with bullets, grenades, and mobile gas chambers. Although news of Germany's order of mass extermination of the Jews was not officially announced to the broader British Government until the end of that year, the WILPF appeared aware, at least in part, of the specific targeting of Jews.[91] The League commented in their international circular letter on this recent news of the killings in Poland, expressing indignation. They admitted this was 'emotional and unconstructive' but felt such anger was necessary as the 'barometer of man's conscience' and 'his moral strength'. They concluded that, 'he who loses his sense of just indignation loses his inner capacity of sifting right from wrong and becomes a victim to moral and mental petrifaction'.[92] The central argument of the letter appeared to urge members to remain indignant and avoid becoming desensitised by the mounting tales of suffering. However, to do this, Jewish suffering was mobilised to reinforce 'the spirit of Zurich'. The document continued:

> The majority has always spoken for the minority, the strong for the weak. At our Zurich Congress in May 1919 representatives of the victor nations denounced the Treaties as carrying the germ of new wars. Representatives of the defeated peoples kept silent. Our work against anti-semitism was carried on by Christian not Jewish co-workers. Any number of

[89] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October 1935; WIL Southwest London Branch, First Annual Report 1938-9 (London: International House, 1939); 'Germany's Dead Jews Dishonoured', *Liverpool Daily Post,* 12 March 1936, p.5.
[90] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, December 1938, p.1.
[91] Michael Fleming, 'Knowledge in Britain of the Holocaust During the Second World War', in *The Palgrave Handbook of Britain and the Holocaust,* ed. by Tom Lawson and Andy Pearce (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 115-133 (p.119).
[92] LSE, WILPF/3/3, 'Circular Letters', No.3-4, 1942, p.4.

> instances to illustrate this practice of ours could be added. And this practice must stand. Our voice will reach those who cannot raise their own. We who are free to work for freedom will continue to be the keepers of those who are silenced in exile, enslaved in labor camps or killed by torture – wherever they are, whatever their race, their creed or their nationality.[93]

It is evident that the realisation of proactive peace. By connecting the fact that universal social justice was needed to create and maintain peace if was often easy for members to cross the line between advocating and speaking for minorities. While recognising the 'victors'' or 'majorities'' role in causing injustice and acknowledging their responsibility in healing such damage was groundbreaking, the maintenance of silent or silenced victims hollowed the act. It could prove equally if not more damaging than the 'minority' denying any fault at all. This was exasperated by the WILPF's failure to include most minorities in their membership. Rupp explained that the League was predominantly home to white upper and middle-class women, and European and American women dominated its leadership. Their membership was also decidedly Christian, though Jews, such as Gertrud Baer, also held central leadership roles.[94] This meant that the WILPF had little authority in most 'minorities' experiences', relying upon existing members to visit and report on international affairs outside the USA and Western Europe.[95] However, because proactive peace created a false sense of unity, that one injustice was equivalent to all injustices in the face of peace, the WILPF attempted to justify the majority speaking for the minority. [96]

This can be evidenced in the WILPF's address to Jewish organisations in 1943. While they did partially admit responsibility and complicity in antisemitic persecution, it was from a stance of helplessness.[97] The League explained they had always advocated for 'equality of all races' and 'watched with anxiety' as antisemitism grew following the First World War, which they emphasised they had always denounced in resolutions, pamphlets and lectures.[98] For example, they argued that:

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[93] Ibid.
[94] Rupp, *Worlds of Women,* pp. 69,57.
[95] Sandell, *The Rise of Women's Transnational Activism,* pp.137-170.
[96] This idea will be returned to later in Chapter 4, see section titled 'Peace-Loving Women, Collective Identity and The Race to Innocence'.
[97] 'Circular Letters', No.3, 1943, p.4.
[98] Ibid, p.3.

> Since the outbreak [of the Second World War] all work to that end had unfortunately become ineffective in the face of the weight and the measure of what actually happened. To be thus reduced to powerlessness in face of a disgrace for which there are no words, fills us with profound pain.[99]

As the WILPF viewed themselves as working against all injustices, as was required for proactive peace, they could justify their helplessness. Some even viewed the Holocaust as evidence of the correctness of the WIL's work, for had their policies been accepted by international governments, as Innes complained in 1939, such persecution would not have happened – or at least not to the same extent.[100] As proactive peace involved everybody, the League could turn a myriad of suffering into propaganda to fuel their work. This was not necessarily wrong but was handled particularly poorly. The League quickly claimed Jewish people were persecuted or murdered as victims for their cause for peace, irrespective of whether those victims were pacifists.

For example, Emily Balch, in the international circular letter, relayed news of the death of feminist Rosa Manus. Manus helped organise the International Congress of Women in 1915 and worked for the WILPF throughout the First World War but distanced herself by 1919. She continued her efforts for peace through the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA), working with the League of Nations for the Disarmament Campaign and the International Peace Campaign (RUP).[101] In 1942, Balch reported that Manus had died in a concentration camp. Manus had been arrested by Dutch police in August 1941 as a 'political opponent' of Nazi Germany due to her work with the communist-inspired RUP, her Jewishness initially playing no role. However, once she was transferred to Ravensbrück concentration camp, she was marked as both a Jew and a 'political opponent' and was transferred to the euthanasia centre in Bernburg and murdered by gas in March 1942, along with the other Jewish women from her block.[102] Balch reflected on Manus's death, reflecting, 'how little any of us could

[99] Ibid, p.4.
[100] *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1940, p.1.
[101] Annika Wilmers, 'Rosa Manus at the 1915 International Congress of Women in The Hague and Her Involvement in the Early WILPF', in *Rosa Manus (1881-1942): The International Life and Legacy of a Jewish Dutch Feminist,* ed.by Myriam Everard and Francisca de Haan (Boston: Brill, 2016), pp.59-87 (pp.67,84,87).
[102] Myriam Everard, 'Fateful Politics: The Itinerary of Rosa Manus, 1933-1942', in *Rosa Manus (1881-1942): The International Life and Legacy of a Jewish Dutch Feminist,* ed.by Myriam Everard and Francisca de Haan (Boston: Brill, 2016), pp.240-300 (pp.286, 289, 294).

dream of the ghastly future that would face this serene, conservative, conscientious worker for peace. May it prove that her sacrifices were not in vain'.[103] Manus' death was clearly viewed as a reason for WILPF members to keep working and planning for a peaceful post-war order. Her murder was handled almost as a cautionary tale.

The WILPF might be forgiven for this. Perhaps they were simply memorialising Manus for her peace work; after all, Manus had always had a complex relationship with her Jewishness, preferring to remain neutral and a feminist first.[104] However, Balch's report sits neatly under the title 'The Persecuted', which explicitly refers to the oppression of Jews.[105] Strikingly, Manus is heroised for dying as a Jew rather than for her feminist and pacifist work, which was her primary interest. Perhaps this was easier for the WILPF as they could simplify her life in this way that smoothed over her work with the communist-tainted RUP and Women Against War and Fascism World Committee (CMF), the latter organisation being particularly unpopular within the WILPF. Nonetheless, the League claimed Manus' death for their cause for peace, seeing her as sacrificing her life for them.

Figure 3.5: The first Picture shows WILPF president Emily Balch (Noble Prize Winner 1946)**.** The second picture shows Rosa Manus in her office.[106]

[103] LSE, WILPF/3/4, 'Circular Letters', No.3/4, 1942, p.4.
[104] Everard, 'Fateful Politics', pp.241, 251.
[105] 'Circular Letters', No.3, 1943, p.4.
[106] LSE, WILPF, UKLSE_DL1_PI01_004_001_0003_0001, p.2.; *https://institute-genderequality.org/news-publications/divers/atria-posts/annual-rosa-manus-lecture/* [accessed 9/12/2023]

While Manus was connected to general peace work, such connection was not necessary for the WILPF's narrative as Jews as a collective were also claimed as martyrs of peace. In the League's address to Jewish organisations in 1943, after laying out their position of powerlessness, they reflected on the persecuted:

> Encouraging and fortifying, however, are the many instances among those so cruelly persecuted, of persistence of sublime mastery of fate, of generous resignation and of readiness to sacrifice for the sake of others. These examples fill us with the conviction that a people which possesses such a spiritual power of resignation has certainly still great values to contribute to the world. It must not perish.[107]

It is striking that the WILPF thought this statement would have comforted Jewish organisations. They appear to be praising Jewish people for resigning or even coming willingly to persecution and suggesting that their deaths were perhaps fate, while claiming such 'spiritual power of resignation' was the main reason the Jewish faith should not 'perish'. This statement clearly reflected more on the League's aims than the actual Jewish experience. It seems more a musing on what the WILPF can learn from Jewish suffering, or rather how their suffering can reinforce what the League already knew. The continued emphasis on resignation is furthered by Emily Balch's follow-up statement where she expressed 'admiration for the heroic constancy of Jewish endurance and the noble freedom from the futility of hatred and thoughts of revenge, of which Jews have given such noble examples'.[108] Again, she praised Jews for resigning and not seeking vengeance. Balch's narrative played into the harmful myth that was particularly taken up by some Israeli Jews post-war who felt European Jews were weak and had failed to fight for themselves.[109] However, this narrative allowed the League to reinforce their fight against hatred.

During the Second World War, the WILPF feared the growth of racial and national hatred; conflict was disastrous for international-mindedness. For example, in 1940, Kathleen Innes warned the WIL that 'as the war goes on the wave of bitterness and hatred rises'. War propaganda, she asserted, aimed to spread 'half-truths', destroying the public's ability to

[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Keith Lowe, *The Fear and The Freedom: Why the Second World War Still Matters,* (London: Penguin, 2017), p.60.

sympathise with the 'enemy'.[110] Innes explained that the WIL's role should be to salvage human sympathies and to remind the world of a shared humanity. She did not deny the widespread suffering and persecution but highlighted that hatred and bitterness caused this in the first place – breaking the cycle was the only way to find peace.[111] Balch held the same view: after she praised Jews for their lack of vengeance, she admitted regret that even within the League, members had not been able to keep themselves 'clean of the contagion of the destructive feeling of race prejudice'.[112] This demonstrates how the WILPF claimed Jewish suffering for their own cause. Balch and other WILPF members who shared her sentiment were not necessarily ill-intentioned in their actions, but the lack of diversity in the League, blended with proactive peace, led to them claiming, and in turn silencing, certain minorities' experiences.

That said, this mistake was far from unique to the WILPF. As Keith Lowe has argued, following the Second World War, Jews became, at least in Western narratives, the universal victim. As the Jewish population did not have a single nation, collective mourning and narratives could be formed without stoking new or igniting old national rivalries. The Holocaust is still used and misused by many societies as a moral compass, taught as a 'cautionary tale' of villains, heroes and martyrs.[113] Lowe has argued that Holocaust mythology has taken a global turn, moving away from the imagery of 'lambs to the slaughter' to Jews as martyrs, whose 'sacrifice' led to a redeemed and peaceful Europe.[114] Yet it seems the WILPF were already at this point in 1942. This is not surprising as the WIL's shift from reactive to proactive peace, focusing on post-war reconstruction, meant that suffering had to be contextualised within the context of building a peaceful future. This was how they justified their temporary position of helplessness, as they believed their policies would have prevented suffering had they been listened to. While the WILPF recognised the specific targeting of Jews, they approached their persecution as one injustice was equivalent to all injustices, as proactive peace theory suggests. This was not necessarily incorrect, but the lack of diversity

[110] WIL Monthly Newssheet, July 1940, p.4.
[111] Ibid.
[112] 'Circular Letters', No.3, 1943, p.4.
[113] Lowe, p.59.
[114] Ibid, p.64.

in the League meant individual 'minorities' voices were lost or spoken for, and some members saw little wrong with this.

Therefore, while proactive peace policy was an effective war policy, the WILPF's focus on the future meant they would often dominate narratives of suffering with little direct experience. This is perhaps a casualty of proactive peace, in understanding that all injustice must be tackled for permanent peace, the line between advocating and speaking for minorities is easily crossed.

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By the end of 1943, the WIL's solely proactive peace policy was beginning to shift again. The Allied powers had become confident they would win the war and began preparing for peace. No one knew how long war would last, but the government's change in outlook increased opportunities for the League to put their intellectual work into practice.[115] The United Nations, a humanitarian crisis, denazification, and the WILPF's next international congress all became pertinent issues. Innes was about to find the answer to her question, 'can we be ready in time?'

[115] Daniel Todman, *Britain's War: A New World 1942-1947* (London: Penguin, 2020).

Chapter Three: Regeneration, Reconstruction and Reconnection, 1944-1946

The WIL began 1944 sensing a shift in the international sphere. Barbara Duncan Harris, WIL leader, reflected in her annual New Year's newssheet speech that 'in all human probability this new year on which we enter will see a pattern of life set for our children and our children's children yet unborn'.[1] 'This is the moment of hope, not certainty', she continued, referencing the launch of the United Nations (UN). From this point forward, Harris urged the WIL to try again to push for a new and fairer world.[2] Just as the WILPF had hoped the League of Nations would provide the machinery for lasting peace in 1919, they wanted, although with more scepticism, the UN to aid in establishing a just and lasting peace. The WIL followed and critically analysed most developments from the first plans in 1941 to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which worked to establish the UN in August 1944.[3] These new developments and the knowledge that the allied powers would almost certainly win the war meant the WIL could move into their second phase of post-war planning.[4] They could now work to make their largely intellectual strategy from 1938 to 1943 a reality. However, the return to concrete peace policies did not mean they returned to their reactive-led peace outlook from 1934 to 1937. What emerged was more attuned to a proactive-led policy: they were not primarily led by preventing immediate war but by creating a new world order that ensured lasting peace.

This chapter explores the WIL's new proactive-led peace policy through three key issues that the WIL navigated between 1944 and 1946. The first part will analyse how the WIL consolidated and shared with the WILPF the outcome of their solely proactive peace work from 1938. The second section will explore the WIL's post-war evaluation of the role of the women's peace movement and how they justified their existence in a new era. The final part investigates the WILPF's 1946 Congress that brought League members back together after nine years apart. Overall, this chapter argues that from 1944, the WIL shifted its peace policy from solely proactive to proactive-led.

[1] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, January 1944, p.1.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Justin Morris, 'Origins of the United Nations', in *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations,* ed. by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 41-58 (p.42).
[4] Daniel Todman, *Britain's War: A New World 1942-1947* (London: Penguin, 2020)

The Pool of Opinion: 'Never Has There Been a Greater Need for Pooled Intelligence'

In June 1943, the WILPF released a questionnaire to its national sections entitled 'A Pool of Opinion'. The questionnaire was designed to bring together assorted national sections' opinions on many peace issues. The Pool, once collected, was conceived to form the framework of the League's post-war reconstruction.[5] The need for 'pooled intelligence' was particularly stressed due to the increasing focus on the emerging UN. Having a collective understanding of the WILPF's views would make it easier to critique or support UN developments.[6] For example, the Pool of Opinion helped the WILPF formulate an analysis of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The conference was held in August 1944 and was led by the USA, Britain, the Soviet Union and China to establish a proposal for an international organisation that would become the UN. After deliberation, the WILPF published their response to the conference in November, criticising its proposal to maintain peace by military forces, the exclusiveness of its membership, and the lack of mention of education for international mindedness. The WIL did, however, welcome the idea of the organisation that included humanitarian work and its proposal for a Court of Justice.[7] This was just one way the Pool of Opinion was used to create some sense of unity in the WILPF's work. While the Pool's international relevance is important, a close analysis of just the British section's responses can reveal the details of the WIL's proactive-led policy post-1943 and how this differed from their previous work.

The Pool of Opinion posed twelve questions about world organisation, international law and human rights, economic planning, migration and refugees, and denazification.[8] In the latter months of 1943 and 1944, the WIL worked to formulate answers, eight of which are particularly notable.

Indeed, the second question demonstrates the British section's proactive-led peace policy. The question sought to establish what kind of world organisation the WIL wanted. Did they want a World State based on Switzerland's or the USA's federal system, a revived League of

[5] LSE, WILPF/3/4, 'Circular Letters', No.2, 1943, p.1.
[6] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, August 1944, p.1.
[7] LSE, WILPF/3/5, 'Circular Letters', No.4, 1944, p.5.
[8] LSE, WILPF/3/4, 'Circular Letters', *Appendix A,* No.2, 1943, pp.1-4.

Nations, a World Federation based on the Culbertson Plan, or something else?[9] The British section believed ultimately that there must be a World Federation, although they were concerned with rivalry between federations and the lack of representation of people at the international executive level. These were fair anxieties, especially considering the Culbertson Plan, which proposed dividing the world into eleven regions that would send representatives to the World Federation Government.[10] However, Culbertson proposed that only 'initiating states' – France, Germany, Poland, Turkey, Russia, China, and Japan, and Britain and the USA represented twice as they were placed in control of India and Malaysia – could join the World Federation on behalf of their region. These initiating states dominated the judiciary, legislative, and executive branches. For example, the World Supreme Court would comprise eleven members from 'initiating states' and only two from non-initiating states – all of which were appointed for life. Moreover, the first 'World President', ruling for six years, must be from the United States and the second from the British federation.[11] The WIL feared that the significant lack of representation, particularly in the Executive, would fail to evade war and rivalries. They believed the lessons learned from the League of Nations should be applied to a World Federation as they recognised the UN had the potential to achieve permanent peace.

Here, much of the WIL's response concerns theory. However, the British section also began considering the practicalities of establishing a World Federation. For example, the WIL argued that 'we must ask ourselves both what would be ideal, and what will – after this war – be practicable'.[12] They asserted that the planning for a world organisation would be worthless without proper financing, through nations contributing to it annually, and incentivised membership, which should be open to all. This financial, social or political incentive would encourage nations to join and accept a constitution that the WIL felt needed to include the Charter of Human Rights.[13] This was a considerable effort to move their proactive peace from

[9] Ibid, p.1.

[10] These regions were Pan-American, British, Latin European, Germanic, Middle European, Middle Eastern, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Malaysian (autonomous under 'the trusteeship' of the United States), Indian (autonomous under the 'trusteeship' of Britain). See UMN, Radio Station KUOM, 'Is the Culbertson Plan a Solution for Post-War Problems?', *Special Bulletin,* no.48, p16022; Ely Culbertson, *Total Peace: What Makes Wars and How to Organize Peace* (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1943), p. 242.

[11] Culbertson, *Total Peace,* pp. 243, 258, 248.

[12] LSE, WILPF/3/5, 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1944, p.3.

[13] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, November 1943, p.2; 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1944, p.4.

the ideal to the concrete. However, their stress on the dangers of an international police force and call for an international limit to armaments prove that while secondary, reactive peace issues became important again. It is, therefore, fair to suggest that from this point onwards, the WIL has had a proactive-led peace policy.

Questions five and six dealt with economic planning and imperialism. What should economic planning look like? Should the WILPF continue to advocate for the end of colonies? And how can 'hitherto dependent' states be helped to achieve social, political and economic freedom?[14] In response to the economy, the WIL asserted that women should be employed and represented in all governments. They highlighted the need for social security and a change in goal for the economy from profit to fulfilling human needs. Regarding imperialism, they agreed that colonisation needed to end, and that India needed immediate self-government. More broadly, they wanted an 'International Supervisory Body' to help all states achieve self-governance and establish fair economic distribution, though they do not specify the structure of this supervisory body.[15] While reactive peace plays little importance in this response, the WIL situated their call for 'justice for all, without distinction of sex, race, class or creed' within the proposed framework of the UN. The UN would fall far short of the WILPF's proposals, but it demonstrates the British section's attempt to reframe their proactive peace policies based on real international developments.[16]

In contrast, the WIL's response to question seven reveals their reactive peace work – Question seven considered disarmament and international policing.[17] The British section maintained that universal disarmament was a vital goal of the League, suggesting it could be achieved by the planned transfer of military resources to resources that served human needs (for instance, food, housing or employment). Conversely, the WIL were less certain about a police force and questioned what exactly it meant. If it implied a police force that would be linked to the World Court for matters of conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, it was acceptable. However, they were less clear on an international armed force that would fight to prevent or quash wars. Overall, they felt disarmament rather than the police force should be

[14] 'Circular Letters', *Appendix A,* No.2, 1943, p.2.
[15] WIL Monthly Newssheet, November 1943, p.2.
[16] LSE, WILPF, 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', *Pax International,* Vol.1 No.5, March 1926, p.4.
[17] 'Circular Letters', *Appendix A,* No.2, 1943, p.3.

their focus as this would more effectively secure permanent peace.[18] It is not surprising that the WIL would respond this way as this question is reminiscent of the fractures from 1934 to 1937 between the British and French sections. Just as in the 1930s, the British section favoured disarmament over more radical social change, and while their feelings were now more isolated to military issues, they still, in some ways, remained faithful to reactive peace policies. It would, therefore, be unfair to suggest the WIL's policies were simply proactive, as reactive peace was still prevalent – hence, they held a proactive-led peace policy.

Regarding questions nine and ten, they returned to favouring proactive peace. These questions dealt with refugees and 'minorities'. The questions referred to displaced peoples and how they should be cared for.[19] The WIL stressed the importance of autonomy, meaning refugees could choose whether to return home or somewhere new (though returning home should be encouraged). An Intergovernmental Committee should organise this.[20] They felt adequate food, housing, and opportunities must be funded through the UN or a similar body for those relocating or returning home.[21] Turning to 'minorities', the WIL explained that while self-determination seemed attractive, it was not attainable considering all those with similar demands. They, therefore, argued that for minorities, cultural autonomy was deemed more important than self-government. Thus, they believed cultural autonomy in a political federation with adequate representation of that minority was best – human rights must be ensured for all in this federation. The British section also considered world citizenship. They recognised that national citizenship should remain the norm but felt those who had lost their nation might become world citizens. Indeed, the WIL hoped that one day, everyone would become world and national citizens.[22] Again, it is clear the WIL were applying their wish for a 'just' society based on the machinery that the UN could provide through their belief in the need for an Intergovernmental Committee. Yet, they moved towards a more concrete proactive policy regarding self-determination. In 1919, the WILPF asserted that the League of Nations needed to guarantee 'the representation and protection of the civil and political rights of minorities', and while they had not changed their mind, they believed it was better if

[18] LSE, WILPF/3/6, 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1945, p.10.
[19] 'Circular Letters', *Appendix A,* No.2, 1943, pp.3,4.
[20] 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1945, pp.11,12.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.

cultural autonomy and political representation were prioritised over complete national freedom.[23] This is akin to their answer concerning the issue of the World Federation, which aimed to make their proactive policy more 'realistic'. However, it should be noted that it is unclear how much the WIL consulted these 'minorities' in their formulation of this answer.

Finally, questions eleven and twelve further emphasise the importance to the WIL of pursuing proactive peace policies while not completely disregarding their reactive ones. These questions deal with the post-war problems posed by the Axis powers and their occupied states. The Pool asked if Germany should be federated, by having other countries, and Germany, make up the German government, in particular Switzerland and Sweden, who should help rebuild Germany's education systems. It also asked if Axis-occupied territories should be given their normal control back or require non-military intervention.[24] The British section answered by calling for the withdrawal of Axis and Allied occupation as quickly as possible once a responsible government was established. The WIL felt Germany should not be federated and should have the opportunity to join the UN or a world federation. They also felt Germany (and implied the other Axis powers) should be allowed to reform their own educational system.[25] While the WIL proactively wanted Germany and the other Axis powers to be culturally free as quickly as possible, avoiding interventionism, this was also due to reactive peace concerns. For example, the British section wanted to withdraw and demobilise the military quickly in order to accelerate disarmament.

Overall, it is evident that the WIL favoured proactive peace in a concrete way rather than simply theoretically. The British section still held reactive peace policies, especially concerning disarmament. This relationship with reactive peace would again lead to conflict at the 1946 Congress as it had at Congresses since 1924.[26] The continued presence of reactive peace work would suggest that the WIL had a proactive-led, rather than just a proactive, peace policy

[23] WILPF, *Report of the International Congress: Zurich, May 12th to 17th 1919* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1919), pp.241-262.
[24] 'Circular Letters', *Appendix A,* No.2, 1943, p.4.
[25] 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1945, p.13.
[26] See Lauren Jannette, 'Gendering the Aesthetics of Peace: Women and Veterans in French Nouveau Pacifist
Propaganda, 1915-1939' (unpublished doctoral thesis, The George Washington University, 2022), pp. 230-248; Mona Siegel, *The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Pacifism, and Patriotism, 1914-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.221.

following 1944. All this, however, could have suddenly become meaningless following the questions posed after the Poll of Opinion was submitted.

'Surely the Time for Our *Regeneration Has Come': Reflecting on the WIL's Future*

Following the Pool of Opinion, the International Chair presented two further questions ahead of the 1946 International Congress. These queries questioned the League's very purpose and whether it should continue. Just as the WILPF had reflected on their purpose in the post-war world in 1919, they wanted to ensure they all shared a similar passion for the League's future work.[27] On a national level, the WIL also considered its purpose as a section. 'Surely the time for *our* regeneration has come?' Greta James, a WIL member, exclaimed in the newssheet.[28] This chapter will explain exactly how James and the WIL envisioned their 'regeneration', exploring the WIL's responses to the Chair's questions and their plans for future membership.

The Chair's questions published in the Circular Letter asked: 'Is there still a need for a women's movement?' and 'Are there within the unity of international objectives such differences of interpretation as may prevent us from making a useful contribution to programmes and policies?'[29] Some League members felt that through the Pool, they had prepared for the 1946 Conference regarding policies but had not reflected on their 'fellowship'.[30] They, therefore, sought to pool intelligence on these issues too.

The first question was easily considered. The issue of whether the WILPF should be single-sex, admit men, or merge with mixed peace groups was debated in 1915. While the WIL's policies involved working closely with male organisations, diplomats and donors, they decided that remaining female-only served their work better. They gave two reasons for this. The first connected with the idea that women had a special relationship with peace (as explored in Chapter Four) and that it was best debated without men. The second point was made by many members who felt that men dominated the discussion in joint meetings, leaving women without a say.[31] Thus, despite anxieties over the lack of youth and single-sex organisations

[27] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, January 1945, p.1.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp.89-90.

falling out of fashion, the WILPF remained remarkably silent on the matter once they had decided on their path during the early years. That was until 1945.

In response to the 1945 question, the WIL acknowledged that there were many women who no longer wanted to associate 'only with women' and that the aim of the women's movement was sex integration rather than antagonism. However, they countered that women still experienced great oppression, especially in the international sphere; 'as long as there are women who are not free none of us is free, or safe from renewed tyranny and degradation'.[32] Therefore, the WIL concluded (like most other WILPF members) that there was still a need for a women's movement. This reason blended the two main arguments from 1915 but broadened the WIL's focus on all women rather than those just in Britain. This was perhaps due to the British section's broader effort to increase, or at least plan to increase diversity.

Certainly, in late 1945, the WIL appeared to reconsider their conviction in the belief that 'the majority had always spoken for the minority'.[33] The British section began to recognise officially that they had experienced a very different war from those from other nations. For example, they discussed the difficulty of understanding the experiences of those who had suffered under Nazi occupation, feeling they could learn a great deal from members in Eastern countries when planning for post-war reconstruction.[34] Moreover, in 1946, before Congress, Mosa Anderson, a WIL member particularly interested in proactive peace, questioned what was meant by world cooperation.[35] Anderson noted that when the 'victors' are creating the post-war structure, they should consider the voices of neutral and Axis power countries, not least to avert further conflict. She requested that the WIL remember this when attending the 1946 Congress.[36] It can, therefore, be observed that the WIL was beginning to break its arguably problematic affinity for the majority speaking for the minority.

At home, too, the WIL wished to reform their membership. For example, in 1944, Greta James and her WIL colleague Muriel Prichard published a plan to revamp and 'future proof' the WIL's membership. James reflected that 'the hopes of 1915 were not realised because although machinery for peace existed, enough trained people to use and understand it did

[32] WIL Monthly Newssheet, January 1945, p.1.
[33] 'Circular Letters', No.3-4, 1942, p.4.
[34] WIL Monthly Newssheet, October 1945, p.1.
[35] For more on Mosa Anderson see Mosa Anderson, *Opening the Empire Door: A Positive Policy for Peace* (London: WIL, 1937); BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, January 1946.
[36] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, January 1946.

not exist'.[37] Female leaders are no longer unique in their field, she argued, there are now thousands of women educated, freed and capable enough to become international secretaries and specialists.[38] If only they had the correct training, James concluded.

Figure 4.1: The WIL's London Headquarters c.1940.[39]

Two Steps Forward: A Memorandum on the Education of Women in the Cause of Peace (1944), James and Prichard's plan, aimed to provide this training.[40] In line with the WIL's emphasis on a more 'realistic' proactive-led peace policy, their book aimed to guide the WIL towards training these people in two achievable steps. *Two Steps Forward* aimed to capitalise on the WIL's recent membership growth, which, as Graph 1.3 shows, had been increasing to equal and even surpass pre-war levels.[41] By 1943, the WIL Headquarters moved back to London, leaving the safety of Kathleen Innes's country home behind – moving not because London was safe, quite the opposite, but because their work had outgrown the countryside.[42] *Two Steps Forward* also contributed to the British section's shift in attitude as it no longer felt

[37] Muriel Prichard and Greta James, *Two Steps Forward: A Memorandum on the Education of Women in the Cause of Peace* (London: Percy Brothers, 1944), p.1.
[38] WIL Monthly Newssheet, January 1945, p.2.
[39] LSE, Inter-war Feminist Pamphlet Collection, UKLSE-DL1IF010030010173
[40] 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1945, p.7.
[41] See Appendix 2.4.
[42] 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1943, p.3.

the preference of 'moral power' over a mass movement was the right policy. The plan functioned as a solution to the WIL's recent regret, in the International Circular Letter, that they had failed to reach the masses hitherto and should focus on educating the public on peace.

The first step of the *Two Steps Forward* plan dealt with the WIL's short-term policy and focused on reviewing and recruitment. James and Prichard wanted to understand their membership demographics and which branches were fading so they could provide targeted support. They also expressed the need to reach out to longstanding members and women in other educational bodies, such as the National Union of Women Teachers (NUWT) and the Association of Assistant Mistresses (AAM).[43] While the WIL was leaving behind the 'moral power' over a 'mass movement' belief to create peace realistically, this step reveals that they wanted to ensure a strong 'moral' foundation remained before meeting the masses. So, while attempting to attract women outside the peace movement, they still wanted professional women. They did not completely disregard the importance of 'moral power', avoiding broad, cheap or hollow propaganda work.

The second step dealt with long-term development. The WIL sought to build a Women's Education Association, leading to a Pacifist College for Women. Training would be provided to women on international relations, management, lectureship, languages, and peace policy. Their Pacifist College would be open to women over 30 who had not had the chance to undertake university education and would be funded by the WIL. The college would be populated by 50% British students and 50% from international backgrounds, and it was estimated that ten students each year needed to graduate for service in the WILPF, averaging a cost of £1,000.[44] This stage spoke to the WILPF's fourth peace aim from 1942 – the development of training in International Mindedness.[45] The League wanted to train peace-educated women to sustain the WIL's activities and to work with international organisations like the UN. This again shows the League's attempt to create concrete steps towards achieving proactive peace, proving their proactive-led stance.

[43] Prichard, pp.5-7.
[44] Ibid, pp.8-14.
[45] LSE, WILPF/3/3, 'Circular Letters', No.2, 1942, p.4.

Of course, further research beyond 1946 would be needed to establish the effectiveness of the *Two Steps Forward* plan. Yet the premise is promising. James and Prichard's plan was the first time in many years that the WIL had adequately reflected on their membership and arguably the first time they laid methodological plans for expansion and education. It demonstrates that not only were the WIL confident in their membership but also had a clear plan for future development in line with proactive peace. Less can be said, however, for the second question posed by the Chair concerning the 'unity of international objective' and 'differences of interpretation' that might prevent the League from operating effectively.

Indeed, the Chair's second question was certainly pricklier. It addressed the fracture between the British section and the Franco-German perspective, heatedly debated at the 1934 Congress. It was the clash between a reactive-led and proactive-led peace policy, or as member Madeleine Doty put it, the debate over whether the ideal or concrete should come first.[46] Yet the war had changed quite dramatically what each side stood for; perhaps this would dampen the heat of the debate, or maybe it would further fuel it. Regardless, this question was considered greatly important, arguably more than the first, as member Emily Balch explained in the months preceding the 1946 Congress.[47] It would be up to the nearly 180 delegates from fifteen countries congregating in Luxembourg.[48]

The 1946 International Congress: Let Us Become Pioneers Again

It had been nine long years since the last international congress and twenty-seven years since delegates had proudly pledged to dedicate their lives to peace in Zurich.[49] It was this spirit from the 1919 Congress that WILPF delegates hoped they could reignite as they gathered in Luxembourg. Gertrude Baer reflected on this in the newssheet ahead of the Congress, explaining that the WILPF's most significant challenge would be to become pioneers again as they had once been in 1919.[50] Thirty-six British delegates travelled to attend the Congress,

[46] 'Executive Committee Meeting in Paris', Vol.1 No.3, Jan 1926, p.2-4.
[47] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, April 1946, p.1.
[48] WILPF, Xth International Congress of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom at Luxembourg (The International Headquarters: Geneva, 1946), pp.214-219.
[49] Helen Ward, *A Venture in Goodwill: Being the Story of the Women's International League 1915-1929* (London: International House, 1929), p.36.
[50] WIL Monthly Newssheet, April 1946, p.3.

seventeen more than initially forecasted.[51] They were welcomed to Luxembourg by old friends and made new, frequenting 'stocked shops and gay cafés', freed from the gloom of post-wartime rations.[52] Before long it was time for the Congress to begin, delegates settled into a grand meeting hall, and were there welcomed by Clara Ragaz with an opening speech.



Figure 4.2: Clara Ragaz in c.1900, 1923 (with her husband Leonhard Ragaz) and c.1940.

In her opening speech Ragaz recounted the pain experienced by League members since they had last met, recounting the members' lives lost from persecution, concentration camps, ill health, and old age.[53] She then reopened the issue of the fracture between the French and British perspectives, arguing:

> Up to now, we have perhaps too often placed the main emphasis on peace; I believe that many of us have come to regard freedom as an even more precious good whether it be individual freedom, freedom of belief, freedom to express one's opinion, or the freedom of peoples large or small, strong or weak. […] Eminent Swiss philosopher, Alexandre Vinet, expressed this thought in the words with which I would like to close my speech and open this congress: "When all the perils would be in freedom, all the peace in servitude, I would still prefer freedom, because freedom is life, servitude is death".[54]

This triggered the debate not because one group sided with peace and the other freedom but because the pitting of peace against freedom was a front for the differing views on communism and fascism. Just as had occurred in the 1934 Congress, the French-led

[51] WILPF, Xth International Congress, p.216; BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, August 1946, p.1.
[52] Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, *Pioneers for Peace: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 1915-1965* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1965), p.180.
[53] Ibid, p.181.
[54] Translated, WILPF, Xth International Congress p.17.

perspective wished to crush fascism in all countries and support aspects of the USSR. The British-led perspective was more concerned with developing the UN and a world government.

The issue of the difference in 'interpretation' remained strong at the Congress. Indeed, WIL delegate Mary Phillips reported that a 'spirit of intolerance' was all too present in Luxembourg, explaining that people often did not respect others' opinions. She attributed this to the language barriers (which she felt would be solved by an international language) and the divide between national sections.[55] Kathleen Innes expanded on this, referring to the divide as one between 'pacifists' and 'meliorists'.[56]

It is unclear exactly what Innes means by these terms or what she felt the WIL was. Pacifism is difficult to define but largely considers those who believe war and violence are never acceptable and that conflict should only be solved by peaceful means. Meliorism, on the other hand, is the theory that humanity, through progress, can change its natural course for the better through social change. Jane Addam, founding member of the WILPF, engaged with meliorism through her term 'lateral progress'.[57] Lateral progress was defined as the idea that the achievement of the few could not mark social advancement, only improving life for the majority could. Addams explained this concept through the metaphor, 'He has not taught his contemporaries to climb mountains, but he has persuaded the villagers to move up a few feet higher'.[58] She explained, as Maurice Hamington has argued, why charity work, while good, was not lateral progress and would, therefore, fail to transform society permanently.[59] Lateral progress, however, is comparable to, if not the same as, proactive peace – making structural changes to society to develop permanent peace (social justice). Hence, Addams worked to develop the WILPF, which was not a charity but an organisation that aimed to change society internationally through political and educational means. Considering this, it would seem that the WIL, with a proactive-led policy, embraced both ideals. However, in the context of this debate, Innes likely felt the WIL sided with pacifism and the French with

[55] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October 1946, p.1.
[56] LSE, WILPF/3/7, 'Circular Letters', No.3, 1946, p.29.
[57] Tadd Ruetenik, 'Jane Addams, "Pragmatic" Compromise, and Anti-War Pragmatism', *The Pluralist,* 14.1 (2019), 102-118 (p.102); Maurice Hamington, 'Jane Addams', in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019) <*https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/addams-jane/*> [accessed 1/12/2023].
[58] Maurice Hamington, 'Jane Addams', in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019) <*https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/addams-jane/*> [accessed 1/12/2023].
[59] Ibid.

meliorism. This was not because the WIL did not believe in lateral progress but because meliorism does not require using solely peaceful means to create a fairer society.

This fracture is made clearer by the US section's reflection on the Congress, published in their own newssheet *Four Lights. Four Lights* saw the debate as one between pacifists and non-pacifists. Non-pacifists, including the French and Czechoslovakian sections, argued that 'pacifism' (which they called integral pacifism) was unrealistic and lacked concrete measures. They saw fascism and racism as the leading causes of war and therefore felt the WILPF's task should be to work against 'Fascism in all its manifestations'. The US report argued that pacifists, including the WIL, believed in creating the 'economic, social and political conditions for peace'.[60] In practice, this was seen, just as at the 1934 Congress, in Kathleen Innes and Gabrielle Duchêne's speeches.

Innes took a psychological approach to the international political-economic situation, as she had in 1934, but had a greater influence on the WIL's overall policy following Hilda Clark's stepping down during the war. She, therefore, demonstrated the WIL proactive-led stance that sought a permanent route to tackle war but in more concrete ways by working with the UN. Innes felt the WILPF, except the Swedish and Dutch sections, had overlooked the importance of psychology. This was problematic, she argued, because 'until our political and economic planners for peace pay more attention to psychology, they are dooming themselves to periodic, and even constantly recurring failure'.[61] She researched emotions and behaviours and applied these to the world state. Economically, she stressed the importance of community control of essential goods. Politically, she warned against the tendency to pick the lesser of two evils. For example, many people justified the use of the atomic bomb as it shortened the war and, therefore, saved more lives than it took. This outlook, she explained, would inevitably lead to more conflicts as a nation can easily impute incorrect motives onto another nation to justify its aggressive and defensive actions. The only solution for this was surrendering national forces for an international tribunal and 'genuine police force'. This, of course, was not a new realisation; the WILPF has always been wary of nationalism and propaganda, and in support of the establishment of international organisations. However, Innes felt that psychological work, completed partly through educational programmes, calling for

[60] BL, P.P.1126.abk., *Four Lights*, Vol.VI. No.4, October 1946, p.1.
[61] WILPF, Xth International Congress, p.135.

international conferences, and lobbying for improved international power structures, such as the UN, needed to be prioritised with a new urgency.[62]

Duchêne also spoke on the political situation. She asserted that peace must first be ensured to create a new world, and peace can only be ensured by an agreement between democratic nations. Duchêne explained that if 'democracies' had only united against Mussolini and Hitler, 'the world would have been spared untold horrors of the Second World War'. She felt that the democracies' failure was due to the fact that democracy was never successfully realised in these countries, and the public could not steer their government towards peace. She highlighted that some leaders feared 'left-wing' parties and turned to Hitler as a defence against 'Bolshevism', while others simply underestimated the dangers of fascism. This led to an absence of proper resistance in the Italo-Ethiopian and Spanish Civil Wars and the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Now, after the war, Duchêne argued, this same disunity had returned. She felt the Allied powers seemed to have forgotten their 'wartime friendships', particularly with regard to the USSR, to which Duchêne believed victory was owed. She concluded that democracy and peace were inextricably linked; 'one cannot defend one without defending the other'. The solution, Duchêne felt, included ensuring the United Nations followed through on its commitments to campaign against foreign intervention, to 'destroy the vestiges of fascism within other countries', and to nationalise key industries and public services.[63]

While Duchêne and Innes were not in direct conversation this time, they refer to each other's perspective. Innes, for example, made clear that while psychological work was 'long-term', it should never 'be entirely ousted for any short-term policies', arguably referring to the fight against fascist governments, where she implied that the authoritarian or militaristic aspects of communism are not overlooked.[64] Duchêne emphasises the false 'democracies'' and the importance of the USSR, hinting at the failure of the 1934 British perspective to influence states towards genuine democracy through 'education and persuasion' rather than revolution.[65] However, this debate was less paralysing than the dispute the WILPF had in 1934.

[62] Ibid, pp.136-138.
[63] Ibid, p.130-147.
[64] Ibid, pp.136-138.
[65] WILPF, *Report of the Eighth International Congress: Zurich, September 3rd to 9th 1934* (Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1934), p.5.

This was first because they both recognised the importance of influencing and lobbying the new and promising UN, whereas, in 1934, they were facing the decline of the League of Nations. Secondly, Duchêne wielded less power following the disbanding of the communist-sponsored organisation, *Comité Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascism* (Women Against War and Fascism World Committee) (CMF).[66]

Consequently, 24 resolutions were agreed upon at the Congress, grouped under four headings: human rights, world organisation, world security, and education.[67] The WIL were particularly interested in human rights, world security, and education. Indeed, in keeping with Innes's statement at the Congress, the resolutions on human rights urged the UN to hold an international congress to create a migration deal, allowing people to move safely and fairly. In a similar vein, they insisted that the Peace Conference (meeting at the same time as the WILPF's Congress) should consider provisions to end 'slave labour' and the return of all prisoners-of-war.[68] These resolutions were not dissimilar to the WIL's answers to questions nine and ten in the Pool of Opinion.[69] However, the more explicit focus on the UN rather than a general 'Intergovernmental Committee' proves how the British section solidified their proactive-led stance, placing their desire for a 'just' society that respects human rights in the tangible machinery that the UN could provide.

This more realistic stance on proactive peace also manifested in WIL's interest in the resolutions concerning World Security. The resolution they were particularly interested in renounced atomic weapons, calling for their immediate destruction and a public education programme raising awareness of the great danger and need for international control of such weapons. To achieve this, they called for creating a civilian International Atomic Development Authority to control the world supply of uranium and thorium. This body, the resolution argued, should encourage the use of these resources not for weapons but for research into the benefits of atomic energy, namely in medicine and industry.[70] While this resolution concerned the reactive issue of atomic weapon disarmament, the solutions given for this were

[66] For information on the CMF see Jasmine Calver, *Anti-Fascism, Gender, and International Communism: The Comité Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascism, 1934-1941* (London: Routledge, 2023).
[67] BL, Mic.C.819, WIL Monthly Newssheet, September 1946.
[68] WIL Monthly Newssheet, September 1946.
[69] LSE, WILPF/3/6, 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1945, p.13.
[70] WIL Monthly Newssheet, September 1946.

proactive-led calling for moral disarmament and education, and the idea of civilian control of radioactive materials.

Similarly, the WIL highlighted the importance of the resolution that requested the creation of a UN broadcasting station to establish a programme (radio and television) that would be in the 'spirit of international cooperation and conciliation'. It would report news and be run by a 'team composed of as many nationalities as possible'.[71] Again, this station attempted to present ideas of proactive peace and international mindedness to the masses in a realistic way. Overall, the WIL focused on the Congress resolutions that allowed a realistic implementation of positive peace, demonstrating their proactive-led stance during this period – both idealistic and achievable.

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The 1946 Congress closed with the election of new International Chairs, replacing Kathleen Innes, Clara Ragaz and Gertrude Baer, who were eager to step down both due to their age and because they had held the position for longer than healthy for them and the League.[72] The Congress elected new Chairs, Gertrude Bussey (USA) and Marie Lous-Monr (Norway), who were to guide the WILPF into a new era.[73] Moving forward, they emphasised the necessity of ensuring human rights in all economic and political relations. Above all, they highlighted the 'inseparability of peace and freedom', hoping to foster a larger, more unified, and reinvigorated League that would carry forward the pioneering spirit of 1919.[74]

[71] Ibid.
[72] Bussey, p.1.
[73] Ibid, p.188.
[74] SCPC, WILPF, Part II WILPF International Office, Box 2 (Part II), 'Circular Letters 1-19, September 1946- May 1949', No.1, 1946, p.1.

Chapter Four: Imposition, Gender Identity, and Innocence

'How much safer we would be if only men would stop protecting us', Kathleen Innes reflected in 1934.[1] Innes was quoting Helena Swanwick, a founding member of the WILPF, who originally made the remark in 1928, in reference to the League of Nations.[2] Though primarily meant as a throwaway line, Innes' comment reveals the importance of gender within the WILPF's culture. It is a funny or striking line to certain WIL members, not necessarily because they disliked men or thought them any more incapable of peace than women, but because it parodied traditional gendered stereotypes. Its humour is steeped in the WIL's understanding of the absurdity of militarism, of men being taught and believing that there is honour in war, aggression and domination. And that this is done in the name of protecting women and children (which many women also believed and upheld) when, in reality, it only harms and silences them. Swanwick's remark criticised men and women who perform these masculinities and femininities. This is perhaps a lot to infer from one line, yet when contextualised with the fact that many WILPF members had a strong understanding of the performativity of gender and the impact on peace, the inference is worth considering.[3]

Indeed, this chapter will explore the WIL's engagement with gender, exploring how they drifted between understanding its difference from sex and seeing it as the same, causing them to have contradictory and often fascinating takes on people and peace. Special attention will be given to how they navigated the prevalent and persistent myth of women being naturally peaceful.

Do Women have a Natural Affinity for Peace? An Overview of the Historiography

Peace, like war, is highly gendered. Those considering gender and peacekeeping will eventually face questions like 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?' whether posed by

[1] Kathryn Harvey, '"Driven by War into Politics!": A Feminist Biography of Kathleen Innes' (unpublished thesis, University of Alberta, 1995), p.80.
[2] Ibid, p.80; Helena Swanwick and W. Arnold-Foster, *Sanctions of the League of Nations Covenant* (London: 1928), p.5 cited in Jan Stöckmann, 'Women, wars, and world affairs: Recovering feminist International Relations, 1915–39', *Review of International Studies*, 44.2 (2017), 215-235 (p.216).
[3] Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1990).

the public, fellow scholars, or those they study.[4] Connections between women and peace have a long history, with 'peace' appearing as the Greek goddess Eirene and Roman goddess Pax.[5] They are usually steeped in gendered stereotypes viewing women as mothers, passive and nurturing, juxtaposed with men as protectors, active and aggressive.[6]

These stereotypes have long concerned scholars and have led many feminists to keep pacifism at arm's length, including in their engagement with history.[7] This places the WILPF in a problematic position in literature as a substantial part of their ideology was feminist pacifism, blending both principles. While having roots in the nineteenth century, feminist pacifism developed into a substantial and sophisticated conviction in 1915 when the founding members of the WILPF split from the suffrage movement to create the League.[8] One of these members was WIL leader Helena Swanwick who rationalised the shift from feminism to feminist pacifism, explaining, 'every suffrage society ought to be a pacifist society and realise that pacifist propaganda is an integral part of suffrage propaganda'.[9] Swanwick's belief in the shift was part of the WILPF's discovery of proactive peace and the roots of their foundational and innovative work. However, the implication that women and peace should be inherently connected has frustrated and caused some feminists and pacifists to disregard the WILPF and feminist pacifism. This not only does a disservice to current scholarship but overlooks the advanced theory the League developed around sex and gender. Yet their reasoning for separating pacifism and feminism is worth exploring.

Berenice Carroll highlights, in her seminal work *Women and Peace* (1987), that many of these feminists feel that to achieve feminism based on equality, women should have equal opportunities in war-related roles. If women are to be pacifists, they leave the military, an

[4] Julie Gottlieb and Gaynor Johnson, 'Gendering Peace in Europe', *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* 31.4 (2020), 601-608 (p.602).
[5] Sahla Aroussi, 'Women, Peace and Security: Moving Beyond Feminist Pacifism', unpublished paper delivered at the conference 'Destabilising Gender in Conflict, Peacemaking and Care' (University of Pittsburgh, 2009), p.2; Jean Elshtain, *Women and War* (Sussex: The Harvest Press, 1987), p.223.
[6] Lynne Roper, 'Feminism is NOT Pacifism: A Personal View of the Politics of War', 2.1 (2002), 149-151 (p.149).
[7] Berenice Carroll, 'Feminism and Pacifism: Historical and Theoretical Connections' in *Women and Peace: Theoretical, Historical and Practical Perspectives,* ed.by Ruth Pierson (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 2-3; Jane Duran, 'Women's Effort for Peace and the Feminist Movement', *A Journal of Social Justice,* 31 (2019), 348-356 (p.354).
[8] Annika Wilmers, 'Feminist Pacifism', in *1914-1918 Online Encyclopedia* (2015) < *https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/feminist_pacifism* > [accessed 23/6/2023].
[9] Helena Swanwick, *Women and War* (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1915), p.11.

excellent arena for power, in exclusively male hands.[10] This point was echoed by Lynne Roper in 2002 when she emphatically argued, 'Feminism is NOT Pacifism'. As an RAF officer, she felt the link between feminism and pacifism was rooted in sexism, upholding stereotypes – she found nothing anti-feminist about working in the military.[11] Sahla Aroussi also felt, in 2009, that femininity and stereotypes surrounding women and peace, perpetuated by feminist writing, needed to end. Aroussi attributed feminism based on difference – women were biologically wired for peace and men are programmed for war – as dangerous for peace work.[12] Aroussi rightly highlighted these constructions as fictitious, citing Judith Butler's work that recognised multiple coexisting culturally learned masculinities and femininities rather than a unitary biological one – essentially separating sex and gender.[13] Aroussi concluded that the essentialist ideas continue to shut women out of the negotiating rooms, as peace negotiations are often based on conflict models, peace being made by (historically male) military and political leaders rather than by mothers and caregivers.[14]

Aroussi's anxieties are founded as historiography concerned with feminist and pacifism often focus on essentialist values. In Gottlieb and Gaynor Johnson's 'Gendering Peace in Europe' (2020) journal collection, they recognised that a common thread in those researching peace and gender is the issue of the construction of women as natural peacekeepers. Gottlieb and Johnson highlighted that the study of gendering peace moves beyond just studying women's pacifist groups and should focus on men and women, along with efforts to reorder national and international relations. However, most articles focus on testing and contesting how women reinforced the myth that they had an affinity for peace.[15] This leads to the impression that Aroussi is perhaps correct: the essentialist construction remains an overly dominant aspect of those studying female pacifists. Gottlieb herself found it 'ambiguous as to whether the cultural and rhetorical construction of women as peace lovers is a function of this [women's peace] activism or whether there is a biological imperative and feminine penchant

[10] Carroll, p.3.
[11] Lynne Roper, 'Feminism is NOT Pacifism: A Personal View of the Politics of War', *Feminist Media Studies,* 2.1 (2002), 149-151 (p.149).
[12] Sahla Aroussi, 'Women, Peace and Security: Moving Beyond Feminist Pacifism', unpublished paper delivered at the conference 'Destabilising Gender in Conflict, Peacemaking and Care' (University of Pittsburgh, 2009), p.4.
[13] Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.*
[14] Aroussi, p.10.
[15] Gottlieb 'Gendering Peace in Europe', p.602.

for peace'.[16] Yet the essentialist argument cannot be ignored when studying women and peacekeeping, not least because it was a vital issue of past activists.

Arguably, part of the issue feminists have with linking pacifism and feminism stems from the gender stereotypes it perpetuates – women being peaceful and nurturing and men strong and aggressive. However, as Carroll explained, there is quite a difference between the concepts of 'women and peace' and 'feminism and pacifism'. The latter concept is active. For example, not everyone who values peace is a pacifist – pacifism, like feminism, is a political and ideological commitment.[17] Therefore, while the essentialist question 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?' needs to be explored, it should be done in terms of the WILPF's political and ideological work rather than using the League to try and answer the question. To achieve this, it is first important to understand the current historiography.

Historians have long debated the role of essentialist values in the WILPF. Julie Gottlieb, for example, in her study on gender and anti-fascism in 1930s Britain, has argued that even at the end of the interwar years, the belief that women were the world's natural pacifists remained prominent. She revealed that certain WIL members continued to feel a difference between men and women and argued in 1938 that women as a collective did not like war and that if men shared the same feeling, wars would cease to exist.[18] Malcolm Saunders has agreed with Gottlieb but has cautioned that while the belief that women were more peaceful may have been confirmed for some, it was not reality for all. Specifically, Saunders recognised that the Australian section of the WILPF seemed devoid of this belief. They did not believe women were more peaceful but instead that they were underrepresented in pacifist work, and once admitted to such work, they felt pacifists would be powerful enough to challenge the status quo. This was partly due to a disconnect caused by the distance between Australia and Western Europe, and because its leaders Reverend Dr Charles Strong, who suggested women form the section in 1915, providing male influence, and Eleanor Moore. Moore shared the traditional view of the WILPF on peace biology, feeling that neither men nor women were biologically driven to war. She did not feel women were closer to realising the 'naturalness' of

[16] Julie Gottlieb, 'Gender and the "Jews' War": Women, Anti-Semitism, and Anti-War Campaigns in Britain, 1938-1940', *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* 31.2 (2020), 745-770 (p.746).
[17] Carroll, p.15.
[18] Julie Gottlieb, ''Broken Friendships and Vanished Loyalties': Gender, Collective (In)Security and Anti-Fascism in Britain in the 1930s', *Politics, Religion & Ideology,* 13.2 (2012), 197-219 (pp.206, 212).

peace, recognising that they were capable of hurting others and could be ardent supporters of war.[19] However, Saunders argued, like Gottlieb, that Western Europe and the USA believed in the essentialist myth.

Figure 5.1 : WILPF Australia collecting signatures for disarmament (1931).

On the other hand, some historians feel the WILPF's connection to maternalist rhetoric has been overstated and used to overshadow their international peace work. For instance, Jo Vellacott has argued that the work of the WILPF existed beyond the 'motherhood-and-apple-pie' mythology. Vellacott proved instead that the League had a firm feminist and political policy. She explained that 'women issues', linked with enfranchisement and traditional suffrage groups, were only one part of the WILPF's agenda, arguing that women should enter the entire 'public sphere' on international and national matters.[20] The WILPF did not wait to prove why women should be permitted in the existing system but worked at once to change the system by discussing international affairs.[21] Sarah Hellawell has also contended that

[19] Malcolm Saunders, 'Are Women more Peaceful than Men?: The Experience of the Australian Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1939', *Global Change, Peace & Security,* 3.1 (1991), 45-61 (pp.45, 46, 49, 55).
[20] Jo Vellacott, 'A Place for Pacifism and Transnationalism in Feminist Theory: The Early World of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom', *Women's History Review,* 2.1 (1993), 23-56 (pp.23, 30).
[21] Vellacott, p.381.

maternalist rhetoric lived alongside more radical feminist agendas.[22] This certainly seems plausible, at least from 1934 to 1946. As the last three chapters have shown, the WIL had a complex peace policy, and while this concerned female enfranchisement and family issues, it also campaigned broadly for human rights for all, economic reconstruction, and international mindedness. Vellacott and Hellawell do, however, recognise that motherhood and essentialist connections between women and peace were mobilised to create a sense of collective identity, even if this had little to do with governing and concrete peace work.[23] This was especially important during the First World War when WILPF members were seen as unpatriotic. The League provided them with an opportunity to join an international community while they were being alienated at home.[24] Arguably, this reoccurred by the end of 1938 when the WIL's pacifism was again at odds with popular opinion.

Collectively, historians reveal two key aspects of using essentialist values within the WILPF. This section will take each in turn and expand on them further. The first aspect concerns biology or the nature versus nurture debate within the League. Here, instead of focusing on finding an answer to the question, attention will be given to how, regardless of whether members agreed women were naturally peace-loving, the WIL developed existing pre-1915 essentialist beliefs of women and peace to suit feminist pacifism and the role of these beliefs in developing proactive peace theory. It is also important to explore the League's understanding of the difference between sex and gender and its impact on their peace work. Historians have emphasised the practical use of essentialist values, especially those wrapped in materialist and familial rhetoric. Historians suggest that the idea of peace-loving women helped unify the League. This notion will be tested in the post-1934 period, where disunity and fractures were commonplace within the WILPF. Attention here will also be given to the problematic impact of the League's use of collective womanhood to conjure unity. Overall, this next part of the chapter will further complicate our understanding of the WILPF's relationship with sex, gender, and essentialist values and how this impacted their political thoughts.

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[22] Sarah Hellawell, 'Antimilitarism, Citizenship and Motherhood: The Formation and Early Years of the Women's International League (WIL), 1915-1919', *Women's History Review* 27.4 (2018), 551-564 (p.554).
[23] Hellawell, 'Antimilitarism, Citizenship and Motherhood', p.557.
[24] Vellacott, p.32.

Feminist Pacifism and the Creation of the Peace-Loving Woman

In 1915, Swanwick, a founding member of the WIL, addressed the question 'do women have a natural affinity for peace' in her publication *Women and War* (1915), written for the Union of Democratic Control. She, aligned with the WILPF constitution, and felt women did have a special perspective on peace that should entitle them to enfranchisement. Swanwick gave a blend of learned behaviours and 'biological' factors as evidence, blending nature and nurture.[25]

As mothers, Swanwick felt women not only experienced the waste of war, having to spend energy, time and resources on raising children only for them to be slaughtered in (young) adulthood but that through this, they gained rights. Problematically, she claims man 'is the work of women: they [women] have rights in him and in what he does with the life they have given and sustained'.[26] In this way, simply through 'biology', women had a claim to oppose war. Yet, this was not reserved solely for mothers. Many WILPF members did not have children and were disproportionately drawn to the League because they had more time and money to work and travel internationally.[27] Swanwick never had children and, while admitting she longed for them, was glad she had not when war came.[28] Therefore, as Hellawell has argued, maternal rhetoric and sentiment were equally, if not more, important than actually giving birth.[29] Motherhood was associated with a universal female experience and used not only as propaganda to recruit more women to join their cause but also as a way of connection. As Ingrid Sharp has shown, ideas of motherly love and sisterhood created a sense of unity, especially among international communities.[30]

Maternalism and anti-war rhetoric, however, was not new. As Jill Liddington has explained, it was the most influential strand of anti-militarist feminism until 1915.[31] Many feminists published on the topic; of particular relevance are Olive Schreiner's *Women and War*

[25] Swanwick, *Women and War.*
[26] Ibid, p.2.
[27] Hellawell, 'Antimilitarism, Citizenship and Motherhood', p.553.
[28] Sarah Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism: The Women's International League, 1915-1935' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Northumbria, 2017), p.48.
[29] Hellawell, 'Antimilitarism, Citizenship and Motherhood', p.559.
[30] Ingrid Sharp, 'Love as Moral Imperative and Gendered Anti-war Strategy in the International Women's Movement 1914-1919', *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* 31.4 (2020), 630-647, (p.636).
[31] Jill Liddington, *The Road to Greenham Common: Feminism and Anti-Militarism in Britain since 1820* (London: Virago Press, 1989), p.89.

(1911) and Frances Hallowes' *Women and War: An Appeal to the Women of All Nations* (1914). While 'Women and War' is a common phrase, it seems beyond coincidence that Swanwick would also adopt this title. It can then be assumed that Swanwick was in conversation with these pieces, which reveals something more complicated about her feelings on motherhood and peace.

Schreiner's *Women and War* was first published as an essay in *Women and Labour* in 1911 and was reprinted as a pamphlet in 1914 due to its popularity.[32] The pamphlet gave two key and contradictory reasons in favour of women being enfranchised and given equal opportunity in governance and national life. Firstly, Schreiner fought the notion that women are incapable of anything beyond domesticity and asserted that women could make a valuable contribution to diplomacy if given a chance. She argued that the physical differences between men and women and differing values, fashion, and jobs prescribed by society should not imply an intellectual difference.[33] 'Throw the puppy into the water', Schreiner summarised, 'if it swims, well; if it sinks, well; but do not tie a rope round its throat and weight it with a brick, and then assess its incapacity to keep afloat'.[34] Schreiner is clear that external factors kept women from the professional sphere constructed by men (and, to a certain extent, women). However, her second point contradicts her illustrative analogy and her assertion that physical differences between men and women do not impact intellectual ability. Schreiner believed women, through their experience of motherhood, had a superior knowledge to men. 'Men's bodies are our women's works of art[, [g]iven to us the power of control', she remarked, which Swanwick borrows for her 'man is the work of women' argument.[35] Schreiner reflects on sex and childbirth and asserts that 'to the male, the giving of life is a laugh; to the female blood, anguish, and sometimes death'.[36] By this, she assumed the effort that women go through raising a child meant they have a better understanding of the value of life and are, therefore, far less careless and enthusiastic to take it – human or animal. Schreiner concluded that war would be outlawed once women and men gained equal footing in the intellectual and diplomatic fields.[37]

[32] Ibid, p.90.
[33] Olive Schreiner, *Women and War* (London: Fisher Unwin, 1914).
[34] Ibid, p.35.
[35] Ibid, p.52.
[36] Ibid, p.54.
[37] Ibid, pp.56,60.

Hallowes' *Appeal to the Women* argued, as Schreiner had, that maternalism taught the price of life, and that female enfranchisement would end war – though she also felt fathers that mimicked the role of mothers could bring peace. She believed governments could not declare war if they felt public opinion would oppose it too strongly. Once enfranchised, she thought women would balance society towards peace. However, differing from Schreiner, Hallowes extended the importance of mothers further and urged them to educate the next generation for peace, fighting militarism and the myth of glory in combat. Again, Hallowes also promoted contradictory ideas; women have the gift of peace through motherhood, yet this 'gift' can be taught to anyone, as it was militarism and a detachment from fatherhood that led men to war, rather than simply because they were men.[38]

By understanding Schreiner and Hallowes' perspective, Swanwick's work can be viewed as not simply an echo of past maternal rhetoric but a shift to something new. While Schreiner and Hallowes felt the lessons women learnt through motherhood made them more peaceful, Swanwick focused more on the waste of this work. She explained that when men were slaughtered at war, 'women are called upon to spend (and frequently to give up) their lives in child-bearing' to repair society. This, she reasoned, gave militaristic states the ability to continually 'degrade women to the position of breeders and slaves'.[39] So while Swanwick borrowed her 'man is the work of women' argument from Schreiner and agreed that having children is labour intensive, she saw motherhood, when the state freely wasted lives, as the external barrier to women's intellectual freedom. Swanwick then applied this to world peace. She agreed with Hallowes and Schreiner's hypothesis that female enfranchisement would bring peace, due in part to motherhood, but foregrounded an arguably stronger reason. Here, Swanwick links motherhood to the 'might is right' argument, foundational to the WILPF, and used by Kathleen Innes to push the WIL towards proactive peace during the Second World War. Swanwick explained that the states' attitude toward oppressed women was akin to their view on militarism. Just as men controlled women, small nations were dominated by 'big nations', not because these larger countries were right or deserved to win but because they were stronger. To Swanwick and many WIL members, permanent peace was only possible

[38] Frances Hallowes, *Women and War: An Appeal to the Women of All Nations* (London: Headley Brothers, 1914).
[39] Swanwick, *Women and War*, p.3.

when moral force was valued over physical – respecting women's rights, which also meant valuing the life they created, would lead to the respect of other nations, leading to peace.[40] This was essentially proactive peace. Unlike Schreiner and Hallowes, who suggested the enfranchisement of women would end war as women are inherently anti-war, Swanwick saw enfranchisement as a step towards transforming society's psychology, thus leading to justice and peace.

Swanwick also challenged Schreiner and Hallowes' narrative. While she agreed that male and female bodies are different, their lives unalike, and their character somewhat dissimilar, she emphasised that their core interests were one. She knew humanity as a collective should be pacifist – 'war is bad business for men in the mass, always and all the time; it is not less bad for men because it is even worse for women'.[41] This reasoning was linked to certain WILPF members' faith in 'peace biology', which saw war as unnecessary and unnatural. Inspired by social evolutionary theory, they felt human instinct was for peaceful cooperation, or at least coexisting without fighting in large masses.[42] This complicates Swanwick's view on maternalism as, arguably, she believed that not only women but all people were 'biologically' peaceful. To her then, women, through motherhood and being non-combatant, were not necessarily the peaceful sex but perhaps closer to realising the unnaturalness of war, as they only suffered rather than profited from it. Hence, Swanwick placed blame on women who upheld militaristic values or succumbed to war propaganda and recognised that there were 'good' male pacifists and men who championed female enfranchisement. Swanwick believed that if women shook their role as enablers of militarism and worked alongside pacifist men, the 'natural' policy of permanent peace could be achieved.[43]

It is, therefore, clear that while the WIL did engage with the question, 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?', they complicated existing opinions on women and peace. The WIL revitalised maternalist rhetoric, which was falling out of fashion in Britain by 1915, by linking it to 'peace biology' and international peace politics.[44] In doing so, the WIL foregrounded an arguably more robust and more exciting claim for female enfranchisement and feminist

[40] Ibid, p.3.
[41] Ibid, p.14.
[42] Elizabeth Agnew, 'A Will to Peace: Jane Addams, World War 1, and 'Pacifism in Practice', *Peace & Change,* 41.1 (2017), 5-31 (p.9).
[43] Swanwick, pp.8,14.
[44] Liddington, p.93; Sarah Hellawell, 'Antimilitarism, Citizenship and Motherhood', p.559.

pacifism through the 'might is right' idea. This idea was the foundation of proactive peace and, while grown partly from essentialist beliefs, developed into a more sophisticated theory on gender.

The also WIL understood the difference between sex and gender and the impact of learned masculinities and femininities. For example, Swanwick attributed war in 1915 to the idea that 'might is right', impressed on the minds of children 'by the way women are treated because they are physically weaker than men'.[45] Aligned with a strong understanding of proactive peace, the WIL understood that experiencing injustice and its normalisation taught to, and lived by, children and adults was the enemy of peace. This theory continued to develop, and in 1936, Joan Stirland, a WIL member, published an article on 'Psychology and War' in the WIL's newssheet. She argued that parents who encourage 'childish imagination' in their children would contribute to peace. She felt social creativeness was stifled in teenagers and young adults when they were pulled from school into adult life without 'wise' guidance socially. In essence, she suggested that in this pivotal time, helped by raising the child gently, ideals like social harmony that would create international citizens should be taught – instead of nationalism or social instability.[46] While it might be mistaken that this was an attack on mothers, asking them to raise their children better, Stirland and other WIL members saw it as everyone's role to raise the young in terms of peace. This would become the foundation of the WILPF's fourth war aim of developing international mindedness.

In 1943, another WIL member, Grace Stuart, developed Stirland's work, linking it to the separation of sex and gender. In her essay, Stuart explained a phenomenon of a 'taboo on tenderness', when people lose affection and unconditional love for the young when they grow from babies to children. She felt the 'adult code' was harshly imposed on the young before they had explored the world. Stuart argued that a child not given enough encouragement and kindness would see the world as unfriendly and repress their feelings, which would be released when the opportunity of war or violence occurs. Stuart then gave examples of the impositions of the 'adult code' where children begin to hear from their elders' remarks like:

[45] LSE, WILPF/2009/19/1, 'Why the Women of the Nations Met in War-Time', 1916, p.1.
[46] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1936.

> Eve is not the pretty one. Adam is not the clever one. Isn't it a pity that Jane and Mary are both girls? Jack isn't like the other boys, he seems to prefer reading to games. Jill isn't interested in dolls. All before the children, too! So much to make them feel they are not quite "right", so much to make for hidden, half-known resentments.[47]

To Stuart, never feeling quite "right" as a child translated to a resentful adult, unable to develop an international mind and deep empathy – a child raised with little love, gentleness and affection would, in theory, struggle to replicate these values in adulthood.[48] What is striking, however, is how apparent gender is in raising resentful children. The 'adult code' was a gendered one, girls being less desired, expected to be pretty and drawn to dolls, while boys were meant to be clever, but not so clever that they chose to stay inside to read. The social creativeness Stirland introduced was applied to allow children, and indeed adults, to explore a range of masculinities and femininities. Hence, the WIL understood the impact gender stereotypes had on boys and girls and correlated imposing them to the lack of proactive peace. Disallowing creativity of spirit and freedom of interest was the root of an emotionally unhealthy and unoriginal society, within which, Stuart argued, violence or injustice was rife. She concluded:

> Thwarted creativity never remains merely thwarted. It is the nature of the life energy that if it is not given, and cannot find, constructive channels for its outflow, it changes in quality and becomes destructive.[49]

The insight that imposed masculinities and femininities were to blame for destruction and war demonstrates that the WIL understood peace beyond essentialist values. They extended their belief in the toxicity of militarism to the development of all children, even in more peaceful environments. Therefore, while the concept of peace-loving women did exist in the League's ideology, it did so alongside more complex theories on sex and gender. Perhaps then, essentialist values, or collective womanhood, remained popular beyond the 1930s for propaganda purposes – to help craft a narrative of unity.

[47] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, April 1942.
[48] Ibid.
[49] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, June 1942.

Peace-Loving Women, Collective Identity and The Race to Innocence

Vellacott and Hellawell have argued that the concept of peace-loving women was mobilised by women's organisations to create a sense of collective identity, regardless of its value in concrete peace work.[50] Beyond 1934, this seems to continue to hold truth. For example, in 1938, following a very long and troubling year, Barbara Duncan Harris expressed the following in the newssheet to motivate and call WIL members to action:

> We are only a small group of women in most of the countries where the W.I.L.P.F is represented but just because we are women we have a common bond and a contribution to make to the thought of the world. By reason of our common experience we are more closely bound up than the other half of the human race with the preservation, not only of the physical life of each new generation, but of all that our own generation has achieved — of culture, of progress, of the raising of life to a finer plane — which we can pass on to those in whose hands the future lies.[51]

It might be assumed that simply existing as a woman allowed the WILPF to find a common bond, especially when Harris directly compares women with the less 'closely bound up' men. However, she is not necessarily speaking of 'biological' differences but rather that the oppression and fight against this had provided them a greater unity. While she did admit that the 'physical life' of generations played a role, she felt culture, and a shared fight built the strongest bonds. If motherhood was alluded to here, it was to place faith in a cross-generational transfer and to foster a familial environment. In the face of another world war, this perhaps aimed to salvage the little hope many members had left. This can also be seen in terms of sisterhood. For example, in late 1937, Edith Hayler reflected on the 1937 International Congress, mimicking a marriage proposal. She pledged, 'in sickness and in health, they [WILPF members] shared all the duties in truly sisterly fashion'.[52] This was not meant romantically in terms of sexual relationships – though there were female same-sex couples within the WILPF, and they were often celebrated – but rather to romanticise platonic

[50] Hellawell, 'Antimilitarism, Citizenship and Motherhood', p.557.
[51] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1938, p.1.
[52] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, October 1937, p.1.

female friendships and connections.[53] This approach again aimed to unite WILPF members but was also helpful in reaching out to women worldwide.

This sense of collective identity was also represented in the newsreels the WILPF created to build community and collect donations by showing groups of women working and socialising. In the WILPF's promotional video Austrian members in exile, helping refugees escape, are shown enjoying the sunshine, an appeal to women worldwide to stand against war.[54] The second promotional video was a collection of newsreels that were shown to WILPF members and the wider public. They highlighted the 'feminine' community spirit of the Maison Internationale, showing its pretty gardens juxtaposed with their pragmatic international. They hoped that this would appeal to the broader community of educated women.[55]

Such unity also existed beyond rhetoric, which can be seen clearly in the WILPF's relationship with Gabrielle Duchêne. Duchêne, leader of the French Section until 1954, had clashed with the League since the late 1920s due to her admiration and work with Communist Russia.[56] In the 1930s, Duchêne urged the WILPF to partake in anti-fascist work, leading many members to fear she would join the Comintern or incite violence or revolution in the name of anti-fascism.[57] Yet, instead of joining the Communist Party, Duchêne created the *Comité*

[53] WILPF members were generally accepting of most relationships, they supported women who were happily or unhappily married, single, those inclined to 'frivolous' sexual relationships, in a homosexual relationship or close companionship with other women or abstaining from a relationship whether with a man or woman. Prominent German members of the WILPF, Anita Augspurg and Lida Gustava Heymann, were a couple, well-loved by many League members, and worked and travelled together, later in life moving to the country where they began a farm. (see promotional video for images of them together <*https://archive.org/details/motionpicture0045*>). Jane Addams and Mary Rozet Smith were also companions and lived and worked together, as did Edith Pye and Hilda Clark (WIL members). In contrast, Emily Balch refused to enter a relationship with Helen Cheever because Balch both loved and found her annoying. See Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp.97-104.

[54] Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Promotional, (1938), <*https://archive.org/details/motionpicture0045*>, [accessed 9/12/2023].

[55] Some Glimpses of the Maison Internationale in Geneva & Devoted WIL Members (1920-1930s), <*https://archive.org/details/motionpicture0014*>, [accessed 9/12/2023].

[56] Duchêne's lifelong support for the Soviet Union was cemented by her Russian famine relief work in the early 1920s, her visit to the USSR in 1927, and upon her return her work to establish *Le Cercle de la Russie neuve* which promoted the 'cultural achievements' of the USSR in French academic and artistic circles.

[57] Emmanuelle Carle, 'Gabrielle Duchêne et la recherche d'une autre route: entre le pacifisme féministe et l'antifascisme', (unpublished doctoral thesis, McGill University, 2005), p.4; Jasmine Calver, *Anti-Fascism, Gender, and International Communism: The Comité Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et*

Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascism (CMF), which she presided over until it collapsed due to the outbreak of the Second World War.[58] The CMF was an attempt to bring together communist-sponsored anti-fascism and feminist pacifism.[59] Yet working for the LIFPL *and* the CMF made her unpopular amongst both groups, and she arguably would have had more impact picking either the anti-fascist or the pacifist cause.[60] However, as Carle has highlighted, Duchêne, a feminist first, could not leave the WILPF for the Communist Party, not least because the French Communist Party lacked female members (1.7% in 1926 and 0.6% in 1929).[61] Duchêne believed in a united female desire for peace and the centrality of social justice or proactive peace. This shared goal meant Duchêne remained tethered to the WILPF despite it hampering the impact of her anti-fascist work. In return, the WILPF did not oust Duchêne and continued to publish her work in the newssheet, meeting and working with her on international peace matters.[62]

Overall, then, it is clear that essentialist, maternal and familial values based on upholding gender stereotypes and experiencing sexism did impact the WILPF's work. While it may not have affected their peace policy, which sought to eradicate injustice for all and work beyond 'female-specific issues', it was still significant. It affected their language and helped create a sense of community that they mobilised to branch out and connect, not always successfully, to women beyond the WILPF. It also helped keep the WILPF from completely fracturing in the 1930s, and both the League and Duchêne remained, albeit begrudgingly connected due to a

le Fascism, 1934-1941 (London: Routledge, 2023), p.19; Lorraine Coons, 'Gabrielle Duchêne: Feminist, Pacifist, Reluctant Bourgeoise', *Peace & Change,* (1999) 24.2, 121-147, (p.136).

[58] Calver, pp.2,31.

[59] Ibid. The CMF was an attempt by Duchêne to unite her faith in pacifism, feminism and support for the USSR into one organisation, made clear by her forming of two committees in the CMF: the *Comité féminin d'initiative pour la défense de la paix* (CFIDP) and *Comité pour la défense des droits des femmes* (CDDF). The CFIDP stood for peace, and the CDDF for feminism; thus, she capitalised on recruiting as many women as possible who might have been discouraged on the ground of the need to be for both peace and feminism.

[60] For information about Duchêne's work with the CMF and WILPF see Emmanuelle Carle, 'Gabrielle Duchêne et la recherche d'une autre route: entre le pacifisme féministe et l'antifascisme', (unpublished doctoral thesis, McGill University, 2005), pp.306,313,407-428,448 ; Coons, p.135; Norman Ingram, The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 272-5.

[61] Carle, 'Gabrielle Duchêne et la recherche d'une autre route', p.188.

[62] LSE, WILPF/1, 'Executive Committee Minuets', 1936, p.37; LSE, WILPF, 'The Emergency Meeting of the Executive Committee', *Pax International,* Vol.14 No.5, May 1939, p.2; Alfred Gillett Trust Clark Family Archives, Whitenights (WN), WN/78/n Hilda Clark 1938-06-29, p.3.

common feminist cause. That said, there were significant limits to using a collective female experience, especially when the WILPF engaged with those outside of the USA and Western Europe.

The WILPF would often collaborate with other female organisations on specific issues, such as work on women's labour rights, and sent appeals to women more broadly.[63] For example, in 1941, Gertrude Baer wrote to the women of Peru and Ecuador following the Ecuadorian–Peruvian War (5-31 July 1941). She reflected on the work she had done some years ago in these countries, explaining that when she spoke to women from different social classes, they all made the same comment: 'We women have nothing to say in this country. We suffer from an atmosphere poisoned by these eternal feuds. Our men fight, and we should like to live in peace'.[64] So Baer brought women from both countries together to discuss the 'feud' between the conflicting nations. She had spoken with each beforehand, designed a programme, and watched tensely as the discussion unfolded. Baer reported that both women made their perspectives clear. While they maintained different opinions on territory changes, they each agreed that any development must be achieved through mutual consent rather than violence and that women in their respective countries should lobby their governments for peaceful agreements rather than war. Baer used this experience to plead that the women of Peru and Ecuador find a peaceful way to resolve this conflict. She felt, from her experiences in Europe, that with a concrete peace programme, women could realise a common interest in solving the 'larger issues of humanity'.[65] While the notion that women wanted peace and men wanted war is questionable, Baer used this to emphasise the exclusion of women from negotiations, and as a common connection point between her and women she did not know. As she saw it, she was reaching out a hand of friendship and explaining the beautiful community these women could find if only they worked towards peace. The rhetoric of common interest was a wonderful propaganda method.

Unfortunately, the method was rarely appropriately used, as many women from Western Europe and the USA exhibited underlying, or sometimes outright, racial biases. Baer was

[63] Sarah Hellawell, 'Feminism, Pacifism and Internationalism', p.149.
[64] LSE, WILPF/3/2, Circular Letter, No.3, 1941, p.14.
[65] Ibid, p.15.

judgemental of the women of Peru and Ecuador, explaining to them that 'all of us have the ONE important issue in mind', which she felt was ensuring that 'national feuds' in South America (which, she adds, 'they are fully able to settle among themselves') should not evolve into a 'major war'. She did not believe conflicts in South America to be as complicated or difficult to resolve as those in Europe, or, at least, she placed more pressure and expectation on the women in Peru and Ecuador than those in Europe.[66]

This, again, is another example of the imperfections of proactive peace. As established in the WILPF response to antisemitism, the League had little first-hand experience of events and cultures outside of the USA and Western Europe.[67] Yet they maintained, until 1945, that they, 'the majority[, had] always spoken for the minority, the strong for the weak'.[68] This often led to failed connections with women beyond the USA and Western Europe, as their experiences were not represented or were trampled by 'the majority' – whether intentionally or not. There is a risk of the narrative of a 'collective female experience' or 'womanhood'. This narrative was helpful to the WILPF and allowed them, albeit imperfectly, to lay the foundations for *knowing* the impact of interlocking systems of oppression and the need to remove all social injustices. However, the emotional work to actually *feel* this was yet to be achieved.

Indeed, in 1998, Mary Fellows and Sherene Razack published a seminal article addressing the issue of competing hierarchical relations among women. They recognised a phenomenon that they termed the 'race to innocence'. The 'race', they argued, occurs when women claim innocence though their marginality, feeling it the worst or most urgent, and therefore fail to recognise their role in other oppressive systems within which they are dominant. For example, a white feminist may fail to recognise or refuse to accept her privileged position in a racist society – feeling that the marginality of womanhood exonerates her from racism, whether overt or internalised. Fellows and Razack have recognised that many women, just as the WILPF knew, 'often *know* the futility of the race to innocence'; feminism that is based on competing marginalities will almost always fail as it cannot address the complex and 'interlocking' systems of oppression like 'capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy'. However, just because

[66] Ibid, p.16.
[67] See Marie Sandell, *The Rise of Women's Transnational Activism: Identity and Sisterhood Between the World Wars* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015), pp.137-170.
[68] LSE, WILPF/3/3, 'Circular Letters', No.3-4, 1942, p.4.

women acknowledge the futility does not mean they *feel* it.[69] Fellows and Razack have foregrounded a few reasons for this: first, because, in theory, if a woman does not claim her place on the 'margins', she risks erasure or the lessening of the importance of her marginality. Secondly, recognising one's marginality is the first step to fighting oppression. Thirdly, when a woman encounters another woman's experience as a marginality, she will likely view that experience though a lens of privilege, such as white feminism.[70] So, while the idea of a collective female experience was useful to the WILPF and continues to be used by feminists, it is important to remember its limitations. 'Collective womanhood' can be hidden behind by those who wish to maintain 'innocence' or avoid tackling specific issues, which was precisely the opposite of what the League intended when they problematically argued that 'the majority has always spoken for the minority, the strong for the weak'.[71]

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In conclusion, it is clear that the WILPF's relationship with the question 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?' was twofold and complex. While they did debate the biological significance of the supposed 'peace-loving women', they developed the old narrative to foreground a more exciting and impactful theory that would develop into proactive peace. They understood the significance of performed masculinities and femininities yet continued to push the rhetoric of common womanhood in the hope of unifying a fractured League. This worked partially, especially in the USA and Western Europe, but failed to transcend racial biases, which continue to remain an issue in the feminist movement today.

[69] Mary Fellows and Sherene Razack, The Race to Innocence: Confronting Hierarchical Relations among Women, *The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice,* 1 (1998), 336-352 (p.336).
[70] Ibid, pp.339,340.
[71] 'Circular Letters', No.3-4, 1942, p.4.

Conclusion

This thesis has traced the WIL's ideological and tangible peace work from 1934 to 1946 while revealing their complex relationship with the wider League, highlighting the British section's diverse and essential peace work.

The first three chapters are chronological and track the three periods of shifting peace policy. Chapter One focused on 1934 to 1937, arguing that the British section, while led by a reactive peace policy, still engaged in proactive work. Building on the current work on the fracture within the international women's movement in the 1930s, it revealed how the WIL struggled to negotiate the two forms of peace. It did so nationally and internationally through this period's three key ideological battles: realising a new world order, disarmament, and the League's constitution. It found that the clash between the British and French sections was paralysing. In trying to avoid war and find a peaceful way of work, the British had to negotiate with fascism, urging for disarmament and peace settlements. The Franco-German perspective saw this not only as futile but a betrayal of those suffering under fascism. Yet despite the impossibility of the debate, the delegates managed to get the WILPF together after a tense 1934 Congress. This chapter also revealed the WIL's work towards disarmament, moral and material, and how Baldwin's election victory marked the end of final substantial campaign for material disarmament of the 1930s. It finally established the British section's constitutional beliefs and tendency to favour a more traditionally democratic system rather than creating a more 'international' executive committee. Overall, it was revealed that the WIL's reactive-led policy guided their work from 1934 to 1937, which was the central reason why they clashed with the more proactive-led French and German sections. However, it also must be remembered that they were simply led by this policy, not engulfed by it, and just as both views valued peace and freedom, they also engaged with both forms of peace.

The second chapter told a different story, charting the WIL's shift from reactive-led to proactive peace policy from 1938 to 1943. It explored some of the key dilemmas the British section faced throughout the first half of the war. Thus, the WIL could have followed two very different paths, depending on whether Kathleen Innes or Hilda Clark had been chosen as leader. This chapter also used quantitative data with archival material to explore the membership figures and challenged again the assumption that their work 'screeched to a halt'

in 1938, proving a continuation and the growth in membership during the war.[1] It established these membership-increasing aims, revealing that the WIL focused on planning for post-war reconstruction with a commitment to human rights. Additionally, through the *Social Changes Under War Conditions* (1941-2) report and the WIL's perception of fascism, it has been shown how the war shaped the British section's peace aims.[2] Finally, this chapter handled the casualties of proactive peace, revealing how the attitude that one injustice is like all injustices can lead to the trampling on and silencing of minorities, which the WIL did not fully work to fix until 1945. Overall, it argues that the British section, once led by reactive peace policy, had shifted focus solely onto proactive work as the war rendered reactive peace work largely redundant.

Chapter Three worked to determine if the WIL could answer the question Innes posed to the League in 1939: 'can we be ready in time?'[3] This section focuses on 1944 to 1946. It explores how the WIL moved towards a proactive-led peace policy as they began to seek tangible strategies to help implement their intellectual work. It argued that the Pool of Opinion was key to turning their intellectual work into concrete strategies.[4] It explored how their approach to world government had changed since their 1915 charter targeted the newly formed League of Nations. It also revealed how the WIL planned to make considerable changes to its growing membership, guided by James and Prichard's *Two Steps Forward* plan.[5] They aimed to diversify the League through education, building new sections and uplifting more voices. All this work concluded with the 1946 Congress. The delegates faced the same divide led by the British and French sections, however this time, they had far more in common in their faith in the UN. The election of new Chairs, Gertrude Bussey (USA) and Marie Lous-Monr (Norway) propelled the WILPF into a new era.[6] Overall, this chapter argued that from 1944, the WIL shifted its peace policy from solely proactive to proactive-led to help build a brighter post-war future.

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[1] Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.47.
[2] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1941, p.1.
[3] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, November 1939, p.1.
[4] LSE, WILPF/3/4, 'Circular Letters', No.2, 1943, p.1.
[5] LSE, WILPF/3/6, 'Circular Letters', No.1, 1945, p.7.
[6] Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, *Pioneers for Peace: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 1915-1965* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1965), p.188.

Finally, Chapter Four presented an exploration of the WIL's engagement with gendered ideas, such as 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?', how they attribute the imposition of gendered values as a cause for war, and the positives and negatives of their pursuit for a gender collective identity. Overall, it is clear that the WILPF's relationship with the question 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?' was twofold and complex. It did so first by working to chart the present literature of the essentialist myth and how this impacted the relationship between feminists and pacifists. Retracing the WIL's early peace policies found that while the WIL did engage with the question, 'do women have a natural affinity for peace?' they revitalised maternalist rhetoric. By linking to 'peace biology' and international peace politics, the WIL foregrounded a stronger and more exciting claim for female enfranchisement and feminist pacifism through the 'might is right' idea. This idea was the foundation of proactive peace. This section explored how WIL members used the 'might is right' idea to create a complex understanding of masculinities and femininities – separating sex and gender. An understanding that revealed that the imposition of gendered values on children would, and did, lead to conflict. Secondly, this chapter revealed the importance of the unity that the peace-loving women myth created. However, it warned that the idea of a collective female experience has limitations. As 'collective womanhood' can be hidden behind by those who wish to maintain 'innocence' or avoid tackling specific issues of intersecting identities.

In completing these chapters, it is clear that there are areas for further research. Firstly, while Chapters One and Three touched upon the impact national identities had on opinions at the WILPF's international congresses, there is still much scope for applying this more broadly. A comparative analysis of the impact of national identities on female international work would surely reveal some interesting results. Secondly, in a future project, I aim to compare the WIL's peace policies with male and mixed-sex organisations, drawing conclusions on the similarities and differences between them and the gendered nature of the British peace movement. Thirdly, I seek to trace the WIL's relationship with India and how this impacted their proactive peace policy. This large section of the WIL's history had been overlooked here due to the sheer amount of archival material – a new project dedicated to the topic alone would better do it justice. Finally, there is still much to be discovered about the use of religious language within the WIL and WILPF, and the Quaker influence on this movement, especially concerning work

with refugees. The WIL had a complicated relationship with relief work. Feeling that the movement was one of international politics and diplomacy rather than a charity, relief efforts were only carried out by members' work outside the WILPF or in times of crisis, like during the late 1930s to mid-1940s.[7] During this period, members like Hilda Clark and Edith Pye helped orphaned child refugees fleeing from the Spanish Civil War and Jewish children.[8] Further investigation is needed on this topic, and Rose Holmes' research is perhaps a great place to start.[9]

In conclusion, it is fair to answer no to the question, 'did the WILPF's work screech to a halt in 1939 until the late 1940s?'[10] The WIL's membership numbers grew, and they worked to develop substantial and impactful peace policies. There is no doubt that members despaired at the events of the 1930s and '40s. For instance, Kathleen Innes wrote to co-chair Clara Ragaz in the late 1930s that, 'it is simply a topsy-turvy world with no standard left […] it really is a dreadful world'.[11] Yet, while Innes and many other members despaired, endured failure, and argued profusely, they never lost faith, fighting to build a world that would one day value both peace and freedom.

[7] BL, Mic.C.819, *WIL Monthly Newssheet*, May-June 1945, p.4; WILPF/4/1, 'Annual Council Meeting of the WILPF, March 1939'.
[8] Rose Holmes, 'A Moral Business: British Quaker work with Refugees from Fascism, 1933-39', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 2013), pp.77-8.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Rupp, *Worlds of Women,* p.47.
[11] Kathryn Harvey, '"Driven by War into Politics!": A Feminist Biography of Kathleen Innes' (unpublished thesis, University of Alberta, 1995), p.158.

Appendices

Appendix 1.1



Appendix 1.2: Graph 1.1

	First and Second World War
	Other years
	No data



Appendix 1.3: Graph 1.2



Appendix 1.4: Graph 1.3



Appendix 1.5: Chart 1.1

Key:

X	Branch active
	No data

Name:	15/16	16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
Aberdeen		X	X	X	X	X																								
Acock's Green												X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Balham	X	X	X	X																										
Barnet			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																		
Bath				X	X																									
Beaconsfield	X	X	X	X																										
Birkenhead												X																		
Birmingham	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Blackpool																							X							
Bolton	X		X	X																										
Bournemouth	X	X	X																											
Brighton				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bristol	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X											
Bromley																							X						X	X
Bury St. Edmunds																								X	X	X				
Cambridge		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cardiff	X	X																												
Catford			X	X																										
Chelsea	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																		

Cheltenham											X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X									
Childwall																							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Church Stretton																X														
Coventry																								X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Croydon			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Darlington	X	X	X	X				X	X																					
Daryl								X	X																					
Ditchling																							X	X	X					
Derwent Valley	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X																					
Dundee			X	X	X	X	X																							
E and W Central		X																												
E. Cheshire	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																		
Edgbaston								X	X	X	X																			
Edinburgh	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Enfield			X																											
Farnborough																							X	X	X	X	X			
Folkestone																											X	X	X	X
Glasgow	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Golder's Green	X	X	X	X									X	X		X	X	X							X	X				
Hampstead	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																			
Hampstead Garden										X	X	X																		
Harlesden			X	X																										
Harpenden										X							X	X	X		X									
Harrow								X																	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hereford	X	X	X																											
Heywood				X	X																									
Hitchin					X																									
Huddersfield		X	X	X	X	X	X																							
Hull																	X	X												

Hyde			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																						
Hyde Park	X	X	X																													
Kensington	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																				
Keynsham																		X	X													
King's Norton											X	X																				
Kingston-on-Thames			X	X	X																											
Leeds	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X							
Leicester													X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Letchworth	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																									
Liverpool	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Long Eaton																														X	X	X
Loughborough																		X	X		X											
Manchester	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Marazion													X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X						
Mayfield																								X								
Midlothian	X	X	X																													
Newcastle	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X																
North London																											X	X	X			
North Wales													X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Northern Heights		X	X	X																												
Northampton	X	X	X															X	X													
Norwich	X	X	X	X	X																											
Nottingham																								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Oldham	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																									
Orpington																														X	X	X
Oxford	X		X																								X	X	X	X	X	X
Paisley			X																													
Pepard																								X	X	X						
Peterborough																		X	X							X	X	X	X			

Petersfield		X	X	X																											
Preston						X					X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X												
Reading																			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Rochdale	X	X	X																												
Rossendale		X																													
S.E. London																X	X	X	X												
S.W London																		X	X		X			X	X	X					
Saffron Walden																						X	X	X	X						
Sheffield			X	X																			X	X	X		X	X	X		
Shipley		X	X	X																											
Shrewsbury													X	X			X	X													
St. Helens													X	X		X															
Stevenage			X	X																											
Stockport		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					
Street	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																								
Swinton			X	X																											
Tunbridge Wells								X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X												
Warrington		X	X								X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Welwyn Garden City								X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X							
West Derby																													X	X	X
West Kerby																															X
Wimbledon		X																													
Woolwich								X																							
Worcester												X																			
Worthing																X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
York	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																			
East Liverpool	X																														
East London	X																														
Westminster	X																														

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October 1935

November 1935

December 1935

June 1936

August 1936

October 1937

September 1938

November 1938

December 1938

March 1939

November 1939

June 1940

July 1940

December 1940

May 1941

November 1941

December 1941

January 1942

February 1942

April 1942

May 1942

June 1942

January 1943

February 1943

June 1943

July 1943

November 1943

January 1944

August 1944

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