

Different Modes of Migrant Belonging in a Global City:
An Analysis of Turkish Migrants in Brussels Beyond
Stereotypes

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Abstract

Recent scholarship highlights the proliferation of heterogeneities within contemporary ethnic migrant groups and points, especially, to cities as places where this in-group diversity is ever-growing. With this perspective, this thesis investigated the sense of belonging in an ethnic group through the prism of in-group diversity. The Turkish migrant community in Brussels was chosen as the case study, and the data were collected through 53 semi-structured interviews supplemented with participant observations.

The investigation demonstrated that the Brussels Turkish migrant community involves vast heterogeneities, and in line with this, it identified different segments with different characteristics within the community. This research is based on three segments within the community -the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group, and the religious sub-group- each of which holds distinct characteristics.

This thesis analyzed the sense of belonging in these three segments with a multidimensional approach, understanding migrant belonging as a phenomenon that comes into being through migrant interaction with different socio-political levels: neighbourhood, city, nation-state, transnational, supranational, and cosmopolitan. These different dimensions of belonging do not exclude each other; migrants feel they belong to all or a few simultaneously, albeit in varying degrees. The research concluded that each segment of the Turkish community developed a distinct mode of belonging, a different mixture of the dimensions mentioned above.

Further, this thesis puts particular emphasis on the global city context in its investigation of belonging. Literature on migrants in global cities usually relies on the economy-oriented description of the global city, in which migrants are generally perceived as passive subjects of socio-economic polarization and exclusion. In contrast, this thesis adopted a migrant-centred approach in its analysis, which sees migrants as active agents and cocreators of global cities. It demonstrated that global cities provide a conducive environment for different segments of migrants, offering various socio-spatial spaces where each segment could live in a version of the city pertinent to its characteristics.

Against this background, this research argues that the lens of in-group diversity is instrumental in revealing different modes of belonging in contemporary ethnic migrant groups living in global cities. Thus, it helps to explore migrant belonging beyond stereotypes. In this view, this study illustrated that the Schaerbeek sub-group, seen as the representative of the Turkish community and associated with the Turkish migrant stereotype, is only one segment of the community; the other two segments are almost invisible to the literature and the public and political discourse.

This thesis asserts that associating migrants with certain neighbourhoods in the global city, such as ethnic enclaves, perpetuates the illusionary image that migrants in these neighbourhoods are representative of the whole ethnic group, neglecting the rest of the group in different parts of the city. This was evident in the case of the Schaerbeek sub-group, the

segment living in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, an ethnic enclave known as the Turkish neighbourhood of the city.

This thesis finally demonstrates, overall, that the lens of in-group diversity and the migrant-centred approach to global cities help researchers avoid the risk of generalizing a particular mode of belonging specific to only one segment to the whole group.

To my precious mother, Perihan, and lovely daughter, Irem

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I confirm that this is my own work, and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Chapter 1

Different Modes of Migrant Belonging in a Global City

1.1 Introduction

I discovered the idea to research the sense of belonging in the Turkish community when I visited Schaerbeek, the Turkish neighbourhood of Brussels, in the first week of my coming to the city in 2014. My first impression was a sense of puzzling; what I had seen did not correspond with what I had expected. I felt as if I was visiting a banlieue of Istanbul; shops, coffee houses, clothing, language, greetings, and behaviours all perfectly fitted in a picture of the banlieue of Istanbul in my mind. It reminds me of the message embedded in the classic Turkish movies about emigrants: people do not leave only material belongings behind when they migrate; they sometimes neither transfer their culture nor accept the new one, a situation that puts them socio-culturally in limbo. This observation also reminded me of a comment by a Turkish emigrant I met in Türkiye, who was there for tourist purposes, “We belong to neither Türkiye nor Belgium. We are discriminated against on both sides”. I thought famous Turkish novelist Elif Shafak’s novel “The Saint of Incipient Insanities” tells the story of a group of migrants who feel stuck between different cultures, identities, and countries. “Where do they feel they belong?” I asked myself, with a jungle of ideas in mind.

I started my PhD in 2017, almost three years after I settled in Brussels. In these three years, my familiarity with the Turkish community in Brussels increased; I met with different community segments in other parts of the city with different characteristics, lifestyles, and ideologies. Having realised this diversity, my curiosity was triggered, and I wanted to learn

more about their sense of belonging. Once an opportunity to conduct a PhD occurred, I decided to have them as my case study.

Against this background, this thesis was guided by the research question, “*How is the nature of belonging for ethnic migrant communities living in global cities?*” with a case study of the Turkish migrant community in Brussels.

1.2 Research Focus

This thesis investigates the sense of belonging within migrant communities in global cities. My investigation suggests three interrelated arguments; 1) Contemporary migrant communities include a wide range of heterogeneities beyond the most visible migrants, often held to be synonymous with an entire nationality, and in line with this, within-group diversity can manifest as distinct segments in the community. 2) Global cities are conducive contexts for such communities as they provide various socio-spatial opportunities to different segments in the community 3) In line with this, my analysis demonstrates that each segment in such a community develops a distinct sense of belonging specific to its characteristics. These three arguments shed light on the nexus between *belonging*, *in-group diversity*, and *the global city*.

This thesis looks at the migrant sense of belonging in the context of a global city, with a multidimensional approach and by operationalising the concept of in-group diversity (Crul 2016). Migrant belonging, until recent decades, was predominantly analysed with a dichotomic method, assuming that migrants develop belonging either towards their home country or host country and at nation-the state level (Caponio and Jones-Correa 2018). Lack of attachment to the host country at the state level was considered a failure in integration, neglecting the levels of belonging below the nation-state. However, this understanding has changed in a direction that sees belonging as a multidimensional phenomenon, especially in the face of rapid

globalisation, which enables migrants to maintain a simultaneous belonging to more than one level of polity, below and above the nation-state and transnationally (Yuval-Davis 2011).

A growing literature (Boccagni et al. 2020; Wessendorf 2019; Vasta 2013; Antonsich 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006) notes that migrants develop a sense of belonging at various levels within the host country -at the neighbourhood level, city level, regional level, and the state level-, and can unproblematically combine it with transnational belonging. Also, they can identify with supranational level, as in the form of EU belonging, even some migrants might attach more meaning to the EU citizenship over the citizenship of the country of residence. Furthermore, they may feel attached to nowhere or everywhere in the world, as in the example of cosmopolitan belonging. These dimensions do not have to be at the expense of each other, one migrant can generate belonging to more than one dimension at the same time, but the place of each dimension in the repertoire of their belonging differs depending on various contextual and agential reasons. For example, while transnational belonging prevails for some, some may feel more attached to the neighbourhood or the city where they reside, and at the same time, they might feel a distance from the host country at the national level.

Against this background, I aim to explore how contemporary *multidimensional belonging* manifests itself in migrant communities, and while doing so, I take in-group diversity as the starting point. That is to say, I try to see how in-group diversity reflects on belonging. In-group diversity is the proliferation of heterogeneities within ethnic migrant groups (Crul 2016). To do that, I put aside the ethnic lens, which considers migrant groups as intact homogeneous units and, therefore, prevents us from looking into them. An ethnic lens proposes single explanations for the issues about a particular ethnic group and, thus, neglects in-group differences (Wimmer 2013). As a remedy, I draw on the concept of in-group diversity, which is instrumental for revealing the differences, variations, and heterogeneities in ethnic communities and for

investigating the transformations and reformations in their structures as a result of vast heterogeneities, such as the formation of distinct segments, and thus allows us to analyse different modes of belonging developed by these various segments within the community.

Diversity has been a buzzword in social sciences. It is also widely used in migration studies, particularly in connection with rapid globalisation, to describe the proliferation of ethnic groups in the cities and the sociocultural diversification associated with it. Vertovec (2010) describes the historical process of migrant diversity through two consecutive phases indicating that in the post-war period until the 1980s, the migration was in the form of “large numbers moving from particular places to particular places”, whereas, since the 1980s, we see migration flows as “small numbers moving from many places to many places” (p.3-4). While the first phase increased the number of migrants originating from the same country, the second phase brought a proliferation of ethnicities in one place. In this vein, migration studies have extensively examined diversity in terms of ethnic proliferation in urban areas. Scholarly attention to the diversity within ethnic groups is relatively new. Albeit it is theoretically highlighted by several scholars and mostly in the context of the risks the ethnic lens would pose (Crul 2019 and 2016; Schiller and Caglar 2009; Wimmer 2013 and 2008), it is still an empirically under-researched phenomenon.

As Crul (2019) put forward, the concept of in-group diversity points to the ever-growing heterogeneities within contemporary ethnic groups in many respects, such as age, gender, educational attainment, occupation, socio-economic condition, migratory history, lifestyle, ideology, socio-spatial preferences, and many more. This new outlook requires us to revisit our one-fits-all theories about migrant groups’ integration and belonging processes. Against this background, this study brings distinct explanations for the belonging of each segment of an ethnic migrant group and, thus, seeks to refute the stereotypes on two fronts; first, by stressing

that migrant groups involve vast heterogeneities beyond the stereotypical image about the group's characteristics, and secondly, by demonstrating that different segments within the group develop modes of belonging specific to themselves.

Pertinent to the third part of my argument, this study acknowledges the impact of the city context in the formation and sustainability of in-group diversities. In this sense, it operationalises the global city concept with a broader understanding than the concept's economy-centric definition; that is, it analyses the city with a combination of the concept of the global city, as defined by Sassen (2012 and 2005), and city-scaling approach, as suggested by Nina Glick-Schiller and Ayse Caglar Simsek (2018 and 2009). This combination allows me to analyse the global city by putting migrants at the centre to see what kind of interaction occurs between the city and migrants and how it reflects on their belonging. According to the city-scaling approach, the global city context comes into being through an interaction between local and global features of the city, and migrants are an integral part of this process; that is, they influence and are influenced by every aspect of this context. This way of looking at the relationship between migrants and the global cities negates the illusionary image which confines migrants to specific neighborhoods like ethnic enclaves and ghettos. In this thesis, I draw on the concept of the ethnic enclave to explain how a segment in a migrant community, misleadingly, emerges as the most visible and thus, thus, becomes representative of the whole community. With this in mind, this thesis puts the magnifier on the less visible segments of the community living in other parts of the city.

Based on what has been explained above, my investigation of the sense of belonging in one ethnic community shows that, actually, there is no single form of belonging that would be valid for the whole community; each segment of the community has a particular repertoire of belonging specific to its characteristics.

1.3 Turkish migrant community in Brussels

Within the framework explained above, I would like to explain how the Brussels Turkish community is diversified in a historical context, split up into sub-groups with distinct characteristics, and how they took residence in different parts of the city, in addition to the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek.

The western part of Schaerbeek, known as the Turkish neighbourhood in the city, constitutes the oldest residential area for Turks, which has been the primary settlement locale for the guest workers and their descendants since the 1960s. Guest workers' migration to Belgium started when the country embarked on a policy of labour recruitment for its mining sector after World War II. To this end, it enacted bilateral agreements first with southern European countries and then with non-EU states, including Türkiye (Gsir et al. 2016). These migrants were being called “guest workers” as they were temporary workers and were supposed to return after a certain period. However, difficult economic conditions back home led them to stay, bring their families and settle permanently. Even though, since then, Turkish migration has continued in different forms and from various segments of the population; this group, so far, has been the most studied segment, around whom the Turkish migrant stereotype is constructed, which is an image of low education, limited linguistic skills, low socio-economic status and unsuccessful integration (Van Kerckem 2014).

The evolution of Schaerbeek into a Turkish ethnic enclave is rooted in the guest-workers history in the city and also the urban restructuring of Brussels in the 1970s. Due to the economic recession, Belgium stopped collective recruitment from non-EC countries after the oil crisis of 1973 (Wets 2007). Contrary to the expectations, as was the case across Europe, Turkish guest workers in Belgium did not return but settled mainly in the cities like Charleroi and Liege, where they had been recruited in the mining sector. After the closure of the mines, they spread

to other parts of the country, Brussels being one of the primary choices because of labour needs in the infrastructural sector of the city (Manco and Kanmaz 2005). This development coincided with urban restructuring in Brussels, resulting in native residents moving to the suburbs and Turkish guest workers settling in Schaerbeek (Desle 1990). The Turkish population in Schaerbeek has expanded via family reunification, family formation and clandestine labour migration throughout the years, and they transformed the neighbourhood into one of their own with ethnic shops, restaurants, coffeehouses, mosques, bookstores, travel agencies, dress styles, language, and social relations etc. Literature (Kaya 2019; Gsir et al. 2016; Adam 2013) notes that the lack of sound integration policies in Belgium -partially because of the supposedly temporary status of migrants- on the one hand, and on the other hand, the low human capital of the guest-workers -as they originated from socio-economically lower segments of Turkish society- made it difficult for them to overcome socio-political challenges in the country of residence. Under these circumstances, concentration in one neighbourhood offered the optimum living conditions, as they could maintain almost the same lifestyle they were used to in Türkiye before the migration. The neighbourhood gives the sense of “our place” where Turks feel the least pressure to learn the local language, assimilate into the host-state culture, or share a social life with natives. Also, they are provided with employment opportunities without having to meet the competitive Brussels job market requirements. We can say that Schaerbeek has served as a refuge for a segment of Turkish migrants who find other parts of the city too alien to reside in.

Although they chose Schaerbeek as a refuge, in the first decades of their arrival, the socio-political context in the neighbourhood was not welcoming. The neighbourhood was governed from 1970 to 1989 by Mayor Nols, who was famous for his anti-migrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric, and his colleagues in the municipality followed his footsteps until 1994 after Nols’s mayorship (Manco and Kacmaz, 2005). The extraordinary anti-immigrant politics of the Nols

administration has been gradually replaced by more liberal and inclusive policies from the beginning of the 2000s. The expansion of electoral rights first to migrants from the EU member countries and then to the ones from non-EU countries, the ever-growing interest of political parties in the migrant vote, and liberal citizenship policies have significantly changed the institutional context in the country to the advantage of migrants (Jacobs et al. 2006; Jacobs et al. 2002). However, Schaerbeek has remained a neighbourhood for socio-economically disadvantaged, socio-spatially segregated Turks in the city, whose number has continued to increase since the 1970s, mainly through migration from the same town called Emirdag in central Anatolia via family formation, clandestine labour migration and irregular migration (Manco and Kanmaz 2005).

Schaerbeek is an excellent example of the illusionary image the ethnic enclaves create about migrant spatiality in urban areas (Caglar 2001). It is part of the city from where the Turkish migrant image is superficially generated around the guest-workers image of the 1960s and the 70s associated with a low level of education, disadvantaged socio-economic conditions, poor language skills and unsuccessful integration. Indeed, only the first generation of the Schaerbeek sub-group is composed of guest workers, which makes the image even more misleading as it also disguises potential differences between the first and the subsequent generations in the neighbourhood.

Although Schaerbeek is perceived as the representative place for Turkish migrants in Brussels, this does not reflect the situation on the ground, as a large and ever-growing group of Turkish immigrants is scattered around the city. While the Schaerbeek cohort enlarged within its own dynamics throughout the years, migration from Türkiye concurrently has continued in different formats to other parts of the city. The contexts of exit and reception (Portes 2003) -the conditions in the home country at the time of migrants leaving and the circumstances they find

in the country of residence once they enter- were significantly different for the first wave of emigration and the following waves. Unlike the first wave that brought guest workers from the rural parts of central Anatolia, the successive waves brought people from mainly big cities of Türkiye and different segments of Turkish society. Briefly speaking, the second wave of emigration from Türkiye happened after the 1980 military coup, after which a large number of political opponents sought asylum in Western European countries, including Belgium. The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a third wave in which Kurds fled the country because of the unrest emanating from the fight in southeastern Anatolia between the Turkish military and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a Kurdish separatist organisation, which Türkiye declares as a radical left terrorist organisation. These groups of the second and third waves were primarily composed of well-educated migrants, including community leaders, intellectuals, artists, writers and journalists. Another wave to Europe took place from the end of the 1990s until 2016 with a diverging pattern comprising but not limited to students and highly skilled migrants mainly towards big cities (Icduygu and Aksel 2013). This wave is very much shaped by globalisation and a liberal domestic and international system that enables people to move easier than before (Urry 2000).

Furthermore, the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye sparked a new migration wave after a massive purge of public employees and the imprisonment of regime opponents. As a result, a large number of primarily well-educated, highly skilled Turkish citizens fled to Europe, the United States and Canada. Additionally, as economic and democratic conditions severely deteriorated after 2016, many people chose to move abroad to have better living standards and educational opportunities for their children. Brussels has been one of the locations for these migrants because of its multicultural environment, English-friendly social life and international employment sector. Most of these migrants coming after the first wave has neither settled in

Schaerbeek but scattered around the city nor socially joined the Schaerbeek sub-group but established their own social circles.

Against this background, my investigation of diversity within the Brussels Turkish community demonstrated that since the first wave of guest-workers mass migration, the heterogeneities in the community have gradually proliferated in many respects, including but not limited to educational and occupational attainment, socio-cultural characteristics, political ideology, lifestyle, religiosity, age and gender. The wide range of diversity manifests itself in the community's migratory histories, expectations from the city, neighbourhood preferences, transnational practices, and perceptions of the EU. Throughout this process, the community, in its sociocultural dynamics, is split into segments with distinct characteristics.

Literature notes two opposing perceptions when it comes to migrants originating from Türkiye. One is the old, widespread perception that sees Turkish migrants with the image constructed around guest-workers of the 1960s and the 70s. The other is a recently emerging discussion highlighting a highly skilled Turkish migrant cohort that came to Western European cities mostly in the new millennium benefitting from the opportunities that globalisation provides (Kaya 2019 and 2011; Sanchez-Montijano et al. 2018; Kaya and Kentel 2005). My research shows that, for the case of the Brussels Turkish community, indeed, both lines of thought are valid. Furthermore, the situation on the ground is even more complex than what these two contrasting approaches suggest. The community comprises a large diversity, and in line with this, different social segments exist within it. I based my study on three segments I identified in the community; they are 1) the Schaerbeek sub-group, 2) the secular sub-group 3) the religious sub-group.

The secular and religious sub-groups, contrary to the Schaerbeek sub-group, are the “invisible” segments of the community, primarily well-educated, with good socio-economic conditions and living in neighbourhoods other than Schaerbeek. The primary factor

differentiating these two segments is their social identity; the religious sub-group prioritises Islam in its identification, whereas the secular sub-group highlights a secular worldview as a salient factor of its identity. I call them sub-groups as they still have a symbolic attachment to the Brussels Turkish community and are conscious of it. They do not reject that they are part of the Turkish community in Brussels, even though they have separate social lives and particular characteristics. I also should indicate that I use the term “community” for Turkish migrants in Brussels in the meaning of Cohen’s (1985) symbolic community rather than a more narrow sense. Symbolic community constitutes a loose and flexible umbrella that convenes these segments with their particularities and without a request for a specific relationship, and it bonds them for symbolic resources. In this understanding, the community does not necessarily look for the integration of its members but works as an aggregating mechanism. The significance of a symbolic community is its capacity to provide room for diversities, and in this way, it allows me to conceptualise the group, which comprises the sub-groups with distinct characteristics and with different socio-spatial preferences, as a “community”.

1.4 Significance of this study

My study primarily aims to contribute to the literature by focusing on “in-group diversity” (Crul 2016), which refers to heterogeneities within ethnic migrant groups. My review of the literature shows that despite diversity being a widely used concept in migration studies, in-group diversity has recently taken scholarly attention. This thesis puts the magnifier on one ethnic group to see what kind of transformations the group has gone through in the face of ever-growing diversity within itself.

It can broaden the literature by applying the concept of in-group diversity to migrant belonging. Recent literature well-noted the multidimensionality of migrant belonging, which clearly lays

down that migrant belonging includes parts and parcels of various dimensions, sub-national, national, transnational, and supranational. Indeed, it is a repertoire, a blend of all. Based on this note, my research aims to show the nature of this repertoire in ethnic migrant groups. I will argue that diversity within ethnic groups manifests as different modes of belonging; in other words, different segments in one ethnic group develop distinct forms of attachment. By so doing, I also aim to contribute to the literature which argues that using the ethnic lens in research hides the internal dynamics of ethnic units (Wimmer 2013).

Another contribution my thesis can make to the literature will be refuting stereotypes by putting aside the ethnic lens. Migrants are often subjects of stereotyping, usually based on ethnic origins, such as “Turkish migrants have limited language skills”. Stereotyping, in this way, helps the perpetuation of the ethnic lens. The ethnic lens implies that migrants originating from a particular country are one intact group with unique social and cultural characteristics and a single form of integration and a sense of belonging. This study also seeks to refute stereotypical perceptions of migrant spatiality in cities. Caglar (2001), in her study on Turks in Berlin, stresses how the notion of ghetto constrains public and scholarly narratives by restricting migrant locations to stigmatised neighbourhoods in the city. I align with Caglar in her argument and believe this stigma should be researched more. My study is a contribution to the literature in this sense, as it demonstrates that ethnic enclave misleadingly brings one segment of an ethnic group to the fore and hides the others in the city. In this way, it perpetuates stereotypes.

This thesis analyses global cities with a migrant-centred approach, and this is another contribution to the literature. Migration studies have extensively relied on Sassen’s (2005) global city concept, which has an economy-centred definition and portrays migrants as disadvantaged and passive sections of the city population and as subjects of segregation and polarisation. To include the sections of migrants which do not fit into this portrayal, which I

call “Invisibles” in this thesis, I use the global city concept of Sassen in combination with the city-scaling approach of Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009), which sees migrants as active contributors to the global cities. This thesis argues that to have a sound understanding of ethnic migrant groups in cities, researchers should pay due attention not to fall into the ethnic enclave trap. Otherwise, the conclusions specific to certain neighbourhoods misleadingly might be expanded to the whole city, even in some cases, to the entire country. My study shows that global cities attract many different migrants from different backgrounds from the same country, and these migrants choose to settle in various neighbourhoods in addition to ethnic enclaves.

A specific contribution, I believe, will be that this thesis is about Turkish migrants in Brussels, an under-researched group. It is common to look at German cities such as Berlin and Cologne, French cities such as Paris and Lyon, and Dutch cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. However, Belgium and Belgian cities do not receive much attention regarding research on Turkish migrants. Further, in line with Bousetta et al. (2018) and Jacobs et al. (2004), I argue that Brussels is an interesting location to study migrant belonging. Its local and global characteristics compromise each other and produce a context in which distinct segments of migrant groups can find a space of living. It has two official languages -French and Dutch- and two official sub-national identities -Flemish and Walloon- besides Belgian identity. The complexity of its political system at the local level established to keep the intricate balance between the two constituent communities, namely the city’s French-speaking and Flemish-speaking native populations (Bousetta et al. 2018), is commented, in my research, by migrants as challenging to understand and to navigate through. However, Brussels’s global characteristics, such as its multicultural environment where migrants number more than the natives (The Belgian Statistical Office), its English-friendly job sector, and low expectations in terms of migrant integration compared to other regions of the country make the city an attractive place for many migrants. Migrants in Brussels do not feel pressured to learn the local

languages and identify with sub-national identities. The city offers migrants a flexible and inclusive environment. Investigating migrant belonging in such a city taught me how belonging can be complex, fluid and sometimes hard to define.

1.5 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is designed as seven chapters, and this introductory chapter constitutes *Chapter 1*.

Chapter 2, based on the existing literature, defines and critically discusses the main concepts - *the migrant sense of belonging, in-group diversity, and global city*- on which this thesis rests. It situates the thesis in the broader relevant literature and highlights the gaps this study will address. It first examines the migrant sense of belonging with a multidimensional perspective. It then introduces the two analytical lenses -transnationalism and (perceived) discrimination- used in this thesis to investigate different dimensions of belonging. Further, it focuses on the concept of the global city; after critically discussing it, the chapter indicates that the global city concept will be used along with the city-scaling approach and explains how this combination will serve the purpose of this thesis. The last part of the chapter defines and discusses the concept of in-group diversity, situating it into the broader literature on diversity. The chapter concludes by pointing at the nexus between these three concepts, which this thesis aims to shed light on.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this thesis. It lays out the research design composed of qualitative research that benefitted from semi-structured interviewing supplemented by participant observations as the data collection techniques. It also explains the sampling strategy - purposive sampling and snowballing technique- and the data analysis method of this study.

The chapter, lastly, discusses positionality and reflexivity, ethical considerations, and the limitations of the research.

Chapter 4 constitutes the first empirical chapter of this thesis. It describes and discusses the Brussels context of belonging based on secondary literature and my empirical findings. This chapter plays a preparatory role for the following two empirical chapters by setting the scene in the city. It operationalises the concept of global city along with the city-scaling approach, which allows an analysis of the context at the intersection of the local and global characteristics of the city and with a migrant-centred perspective. It also investigates the impact of the nation-state on the formation of a global city context by referring to state institutions such as citizenship. The chapter emphasises the ethnic enclave exploring its relations with the global city. Then, it looks at Turkish migrants in the city, highlighting different segments' distinct socio-spatial locations. The chapter shows that the city offers a multicultural and inclusive environment to migrants, in which they can find various socio-spatial options to live in their distinctiveness.

Chapter 5, based on the findings about city context in Chapter 4, analyses migrant sense of belonging through the prism of transnationalism and also looks at supranational belonging at the EU level. The chapter examines transnational belonging with two themes elicited from my research as leading factors that shape Turkish migrants' attachment towards home state; these themes are home country emigrant/diaspora policies and the contexts of exit and reception. The second part of the chapter looks at supranational belonging. Two factors emerged from my research -Türkiye's EU membership process and Turkish migrants' identification with Europeanness- as determinants of Turkish migrants' stance vis-à-vis the EU. The chapter makes its analysis of supranational belonging based on these two themes. Lastly, the chapter

points to a link between transnational and supranational belonging of Turkish migrants, that they are intertwined and shaping each other.

After Chapter 5's focus on transnational and supranational belonging, **Chapter 6** uses the lens of (perceived) discrimination to analyse belonging in the place of residence. It looks at different types of discrimination -religious, ethnic, and the type against well-educated migrants- and sheds light on different experiences and perceptions of three sub-groups in the Turkish migrant community and stresses their distinctiveness in their responses and strategies to cope with (perceived) discrimination. While stereotyping is a cross-cutting concept operationalised throughout this thesis, this chapter discusses it in detail as it is one of the crucial reasons that pave the way to prejudice and discriminatory acts.

Chapter 7 constitutes the concluding chapter which recapitulates the research findings and suggests avenues for further research.

Chapter 2

The Nexus between Belonging, Diversity, and Global City

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contributes to the overall thesis by introducing the reader to the problematisation and the theoretical discussions around the three core concepts that provide the analytical basis for this study -belonging, diversity, and global city. By so doing, it designates the broad literature that frames this research and shows in which aspects this thesis intends to contribute to the literature.

The chapter starts with critically analysing the literature on the migrant sense of belonging with a multi-dimensional perspective; that is, it takes migrant belonging as a complex phenomenon including social, cultural, political, and legal aspects, which comes into being through migrants' interactions with different political layers stretching from local to global. In this framework, it defines and discusses in-depth two analytical lenses - transnationalism and (perceived) discrimination - that I deploy in this thesis to investigate different modes of belonging within the same ethnic community. The second concept this chapter examines is global cities which will be discussed as a tool to explicate how the context of urban places, on the one hand with its diverse and multicultural population, and on the other, with its socio-economic conflicts and contradictions, supports or challenges the migrant sense of belonging. Then, it looks at diversity at two levels; first, as a concept that describes the state-of-the-art in urban areas in terms of heterogeneities in general and second, as a tool that examines heterogeneities within ethnic migrant groups (in-group diversity). The chapter concludes with a discussion on integrating these three concepts to show the reader the direction this thesis takes within the broad literature introduced above.

2.2 PART I: SENSE OF BELONGING

2.2.1 Sense of belonging as a concept

Belonging is a complex concept; subjective, abstract, and difficult to operationalise. The concept is also approached from various disciplines, from education, health, psychology, sociology, and anthropology to political science. I agree with Lähdesmäki et al. (2016) in their affirmation that “Belonging is best understood as an entanglement of multiple and intersecting, affective and material, spatially experienced and socio-politically conditioned relations that are context-specific and thus require contextualised definitions.” (p. 28).

Literature on belonging roughly focuses on two questions; “to whom to belong”, which relates to group belonging and “to where to belong”, which implies place-belongingness (Boccagni et al. 2020; Wessendorf 2019; Plöger and Kubiak 2019; Liu 2014; Vasta 2013; Antonsich 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006). Group belonging is described as a two-sided coin for which an individual’s self-identification with a group and acceptance of the individual by the group are two constituting elements, and it is “formed between the interplay of the subjective self, collective agency and structural positioning” (Vasta 2013:198). The need to belong to a group is considered a fundamental human motivation closely linked with individuals' psychological and social well-being (Baumeister and Leary 1995). In their study on belonging, Baumeister and Leary (1995) argue that relationships should be frequent and enduring to establish a sense of belonging to a social group; short-term or occasional connections or superficial everyday encounters do not work towards a sense of belonging. As argued in social identity theory, people identify themselves with belonging to a group and, at the same time, with not belonging to the other, and depending on the permeability of the group borders; they can choose to exit

from one group and join the other (Abrams and Hogg 1998). In this sense, the notions of exclusion, stereotyping and discrimination play roles in the process of belonging.

In addition to membership in a group, literature often refers to ownership of a place as an essential aspect of belonging (Gilmartin and Migge 2016; Kalandides and Vaiou 2012; Antonsich 2010; Crowley 1999; Fortier 1997), and in this vein, the relationship between territory, in association with its geographical, social, cultural and political features, and a person (body) elicits as a discussion point. In some instances, belonging becomes displaced, as in the case of migration such that as people move to different territories, they may not cut their relationships with the places they left, and in this way, the places to which they feel belong or do not belong multiply, the spaces of belonging enlarge and thus belonging becomes multi-dimensional ((Yuval-Davis 2006). Similarly, belonging can occur on different scales, for example, a village, a neighbourhood, a city or a state can be the space of belonging (Erdal 2020; Visser 2020; Simsek-Çaglar and Schiller 2018), and in the case of border crossing, the scope of belonging comprises more than one nation-state, which brings in the notion of transnational belonging (Klingenberg et al. 2020; Vertovec 2009; Koopmans and Statham 2003; Bauböck 2003; Vertovec 2001; Basch et al. 1993;) and further, the globe can be considered as the place of belonging which brings the notion of cosmopolitan belonging (Schiller and Irving 2015; Werbner 2006; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Furthermore, a place does not always need to be a real one; sometimes, an imagined place can fulfil the need to belong, as in the case of diasporas (Grossman 2018; Cohen 2022; Brubaker 2005). Even though migrant belonging often reminds us of place (s), places do not only consist of physical territories, they are, at the same time, socio-spatial spaces which come with a group of people, social and political institutions and a particular culture, and migrant belonging develops at the intersection of all. In this light, while this thesis investigates migrant belonging in the

framework of place-belongingness, it takes place not only as a mere territory but as a context with socio-cultural and political characteristics embedded in it.

Yuval-Davis (2006:197) distinguishes belonging from the politics of belonging; the former generally refers to an emotion, a feeling of “being at home”, while the latter implies political projects constructing belonging in particular ways for particular collectivities. However, as Antonsich (2010) puts it, belonging and politics of belonging are closely interrelated since it is the latter that prepares the ground for the former. For example, the receiving country’s exclusionary policies may create a feeling of alienation for migrants in their place of residence. In reaction to it, they may develop a strong homeland attachment. Similarly, it is noted in the literature that citizenship regimes of both sending and receiving states have a considerable effect on migrants’ feelings of belonging (Alba and Foner 2016). In line with Antonsich, the findings of this thesis confirm that belonging is a “person-centred” concept (May 2001:364) that has an “individual and institutional level” (Crul and Schneider 2010:1260) and analyses belonging as a feeling that is shaped by migrants’ subjective perceptions as well as by external socio-political conditions.

Another characteristic of belonging that is often emphasised is that it is not a fixed phenomenon but temporal in the sense that identities change, and diverge from one point to another; people opt for one and leave the other and combine different ones at different times (Appadurai 1996; Vertovec and Cohen 2002; Antonsich 2010). For example, the study conducted by Guma and Jones (2018) shows changing nature of the sense of belonging for migrants living in Wales in the face of negative emotions experienced during and after the Brexit referendum campaign. Similarly, Fathi (2021), in a study on male migrants in Ireland whose significant others have

not yet come to join them, found out that these migrants see the homes they are living in as temporary. They feel they belong to a future home they would share with their beloved ones.

The notion of “home” functions as a compass in the migrant sense of belonging. Boccagni et al. (2020), in their book “Home on the Move”, point out that multiple homes can be possible, especially for migrants, as in the course of movement, homes may change, or new homes may be added to the old ones. The authors underline that home is a multiscale concept meaning that it can be a private home, a neighbourhood or a state, and it may have different connotations under different conditions; it may mean a territory “here” or “there”, a place in childhood memories or even a country that ceased to exist. On the other hand, Hannertz (2002) looks at home in connection with “rootedness”, and this reminds us of the fact that migrants are people whose roots are usually embedded in a cross-border location, which makes transnational belonging an essential element in the repertoire of migrant belonging. Some scholars emphasise the feeling of safety while explaining the notion of home (Ignatieff 2001). In this scope, home can be a place where people feel safe in the face of exclusion and discrimination, for which ethnic neighbourhoods come in as the places where migrants feel safe and at home (Ehrkamp 2005). Home also does not need to refer to a concrete place as in the case of diasporic communities’ nostalgic attachment to and longing for an imagined “homeland” (Brubaker 2004). In this thesis, as Boccagni et al. (2020) describe it, home is understood as something on the move, something that could take different forms, and as Hannertz (2002) suggests, it relates to “rootedness”, which transcends borders and multiplies.

2.2.2 Belonging and integration

I want to explicate how this research distinguishes the concept of belonging from integration, two terms whose meanings intersect. Before that, I would like to briefly note the discussion

around integration and assimilation, two terms used for the same process. While integration and assimilation broadly refer to migrant adaptation to the host society, integration is primarily deployed in the European context, whereas assimilation was originally thought of as the expected course of integration in the US. Thus, their meanings are attuned to the history of migration on both sides of the Atlantic. In this thesis, I adhere to the definition of integration by Erdal (2020), who, in reference to Kivisto (2003), defines it as “a two-way process of adaptation, where newcomers find their places, whilst society facilitates these processes by ensuring there is room to find space, and by implication, both newcomers and society undergo change” (p.5). For assimilation, scholarship is very much inspired by Gordon’s (1964) definition of the term in seven stages: cultural or behavioural assimilation (acculturation) is the first stage that refers to the change of cultural patterns to those of host society, such as language, ethical values, dress, music, and manners; structural assimilation is a large-scale entrance into institutions and social networks of the host population; marital assimilation (amalgamation) means the high number of intermarriages; identificational assimilation is the development of a sense of peoplehood with the host society; attitude receptional assimilation is encountering no prejudice; behaviour receptional assimilation refers to the lack of discrimination; civic assimilation means the absence of value and power conflict. (p. 69-71).

On the other hand, varying definitions of assimilation in the literature reflect the evolving meaning of the concept across time and space (Kivisto 2016; Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993). In this vein, among others, the segmented assimilation theory and the new assimilation theory have been mostly referred to while explaining contemporary migrant incorporation. Segmented assimilation, as introduced by Portes and Zhou (1993), refers to an assimilation process that can occur differently for different immigrant groups, depending on the context of reception and specific group characteristics. It underscores that immigrant

groups do not necessarily need to assimilate into the mainstream section of society; instead, they can incorporate into one of the various segments of society. On the other hand, the new assimilation theory is actually a reformulation of classic assimilation in such a way that it underlines the intergenerational changes during the assimilation process. The founders of the theory, Alba and Nee (1997), indicate it as a “social process that occurs spontaneously and often unintendedly in the course of interaction between majority and minority groups” (p. 827) and assert that the patterns of migrant incorporation in the new era still proves that assimilation is taking place as such, yet the ways of interaction between the mainstream of society and immigrant groups cannot be explained by the straight-line notion anymore.

The term assimilation, although referring to the same process, has a negative historical reputation and is identified with the most criticised governmental policies regarding migrant incorporation, as stated by Brubaker (2001), particularly in the European context, it is, in general, a contaminated term, for example, in Germany, it is associated with forcible Germanization, in France, with homogenising aspirations (Brubaker 2001:533), and also elsewhere. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) define integration in relation to assimilation as below.

“Integration has been used as a normative description of a middle ground between multiculturalism and assimilation. It has then focused on migrants’ full participation in the labour market and their formal citizenship but left matters of social membership and cultural preferences open to personal choice” (p. 869).

As said above, I will not go into the details of the literary discussions on integration and assimilation. While I acknowledge the historical contextual differences between the two terms and that they are mostly used interchangeably nowadays, this thesis sees the migrant adaptation

in European cities in the framework of the definition of integration indicated above by Erdal and Oeppen (2013).

Coming to the main topic of this sub-section, namely the relationship between integration and belonging, scholarship shows that while integration is understood as a process taking place within the limits of the host country, belonging has a broader scope encompassing multiple scales within and beyond receiving state. For example, Milton Gordon (1964) includes “identification with the host society”, or belonging, as one stage in assimilation, automatically following structural assimilation. According to Gordon, once migrants overcome linguistic barriers, and vocationally and socially establish close interactions with native society, their identification with the host country increases. In this classic understanding, belonging is considered part of the assimilation process and is analysed in the framework of migrant adaptation to the host society. However, interdisciplinary scholarship investigating migrant belonging with its psychological and sociological aspects has explored that institutional adaptation does not always take migrants to a stage of identification with the host society (Diehl et al. 2016). Being well-integrated into the host country is considered a facilitating factor for migrants to develop a healthy sense of belonging in their place of residence. Still, it neither guarantees migrant attachment towards the host country nor prevents migrants from maintaining belonging to the place of origin. In some cases, despite being socio-politically well-integrated - in the form of accessing employment, education, obtaining citizenship, social security, and political participation- migrants may still feel alienated in the host country, as is often noted in the literature on highly-skilled migrants (Geurts et al. 2021; Dietz et al. 2015), or they may develop reactive transnational belonging as in the face of discrimination (Snel et al. 2016), or they may not feel they belong to either home-state or host-state.

Further to that, with the increasing scholarly interest in migrant transnational engagement from the 1980s onwards, the classic approach that successful integration into the country of residence would result in a gradual detachment from the home country has lost its significance (De Haas 2005; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Schiller and Fouron 1999). “The term “belonging” entails the possibility of simultaneousness, of different forms of belonging in different contexts and of possible changes over time” (Crul and Schneider 2010:1260), and the idea that migrants’ loyalty is an either/or situation has been challenged by many scholars who defend that migrants can successfully develop a simultaneous affiliation with both the place of residence and the home country (De Haas 2005; Ehrkamp 2005; Guarnizo et al. 2003).

Studies show that the space of migrant belonging has enlarged in today’s globally interconnected world, and in line with this, approaching migrant integration as a process between migrants and receiving states could only shed light on one side of the story, and therefore, including sending countries as an actor into the process is gaining ground in academia and policy circles (Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx 2016; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003).

While all aspects of integration -social, cultural, economic, and political- are deemed influential in the process of migrant belonging, political integration is specifically highlighted in the literature (Joppke 2018; Baubock 2010; Itzigsohn 2000). Political integration, at first instance, invokes issues such as citizenship, political participation in the form of the right to vote and stand for elections, lobbying and protesting (Martiniello 2005). Still, it also encompasses a belonging dimension, and this dimension constitutes a definitive element for the term. In line with this, Gerstle (2013) defines political integration as “the process through which immigrants and their descendants come to think of themselves as members of a polity with political rights and with a voice in politics, should they choose to exercise it” (p. 306).

According to this definition, the sense of belonging is the ultimate goal of political integration. Political integration aims to take migrants to a state of mind where they feel like members of the polity with equal rights and opportunities with the mainstream society.

It should be noted here that studies are urging us that in some circumstances, participation in politics may lead to an increase in the sense of belonging, in contrast, in others, migrants' interest in politics may not be a sign of attachment to the country of residence. Stepping aside from politics may be a way of sending messages to the political arena (Maxwell, 2005), or some migrants simply may not be interested in anything political in the host state (Ireland 1994) but still feel they belong to the polity. Therefore, it is not plausible to suggest a positive correlation between the sense of belonging and the political engagements of migrants.

Against this background, this thesis acknowledges that belonging and integration are intersecting and, in some cases, complementary concepts, however, belonging has a broader scope and does not always go hand in hand with integration. Thus, this thesis analyses belonging beyond the receiving state with a multidimensional approach, which will be explained in the following section.

2.2.3 Migrant sense of belonging and multi-dimensionality

Migrants are individuals born and spent a part of their lives in at least one other place different from the one they reside in, and this fact makes migrant belonging complex and multi-dimensional (Yuval-Davis 2006). Therefore, migrant belonging is often defined as a process generated by roots and movement (Fortier 1997). As an ongoing process subject to change as migrants move, it also remains attached to the place (s) where migrants' roots lay (Savage et al. 2004). While moving, they keep emotional, physical and virtual connections with the places


they left, and further to it, they develop belonging to the places they arrive. In this sense, developing multiple forms of belonging seems an expected consequence in a century marked by mobility, global networks and fluidity, and virtual spaces (Urry 2000) for any individual, but particularly for migrants who are, by definition, a category of people with connection to multiple locations and layers of political systems.

The literature explains the multi-dimensionality of migrant belonging in connection to the mutual interdependence of the local and the global in the present globalised world and stresses that this makes the space of belonging composed of various layers entrenching from local to global (Urry 2000; Massey 1994; Robertson 1992). At this point, scholarship urges us that the relationship between the local and the global should not be perceived in a hierarchical order; that is, the local is not a passive dependent of the global, but they influence each other in a dialectical relationship. Urry (2000:199) emphasises the symbiotic relationship between the global and the local, indicating that they trigger each other and pave the way for the transformation of one another.

As the multi-layered and situated character of contemporary belonging suggests (Yuval-Davis 2011), migrant sense of belonging may be directed towards the place of origin and place of residence; in both places, this may happen at national and sub-national levels, i.e., towards nation-state, a city, a town, a village or a neighbourhood. Furthermore, migrants might also feel belonging to an imagined homeland, as in the case of diasporas or belonging everywhere with a cosmopolitan view, or simply nowhere, which reflects exclusion and alienation. Additionally, given the emergence of supra-national entities and globalised interconnectedness in the contemporary era, forms of sense of belonging have further proliferated in that it also includes post-national membership, as in the example of EU citizenship (Soysal 1994).

However, a clear-cut division does not exist between the dimensions of belonging mentioned; in most cases, it takes place at the intersection of all.

In light of the above, this thesis takes migrant belonging as a product of relationships migrants establish with the place of origin (not only the home state but also the village, neighbourhood, city and region they come from), the place of residence (not only host state but also the village, the neighbourhood, the city and the region they settle in), supranational entities (as in the case of post-national membership to the European Union), and with the globe (as in the case of cosmopolitan belonging), as illustrated below in [Figure 1](#).



[Figure 1](#): Multidimensionality of belonging

In this scope, the following sections of this part (Part 1) are structured to discuss the literature within the limits of the dimensions of belonging, as depicted in [Figure 1](#). Since, in this thesis, I use transnationalism and (perceived) discrimination as two analytical lenses to shed light on different forms of belonging within an ethnic migrant community, in this part, I also explain and discuss these two concepts and relevant theories.

2.2.4 Migrant sense of belonging in the place of residence: nation-state, city, and neighbourhood

This section will look at the factors that determine the context for the sense of belonging in the place of residence. I consciously do not use “receiving country” but “place of residence” because this thesis puts the city at the centre of its analysis and investigates other dimensions in connection to it. That is to say; it takes a group of migrants living within the borders of a city. It tries to see what kind of attachments these migrants create with the city as well as with the other levels, below (neighbourhood) and above (nation-state, transnational, supranational and globally). It investigates how residing in a city impacts their belonging to other dimensions. In this scope, this section first discusses the role of the nation-state in the formation of the city context with a focus on citizenship policies and integration models. Then, it looks at city belonging with a focus on neighbourhood belonging, drawing on the concept of the ethnic enclave.

2.2.4.1 Nation-state

The role of the nation-state in the socio-political context of belonging is an important debate in the literature (Amelina et al. 2012; Brubaker 2010; Gilmartin 2008). Yasemin Soysal (1994), in her seminal work on the changing meaning of citizenship in Europe, drives our attention to the shift from territorially bounded national membership to a more universal model, a model that is the outcome of an inconsistency between nation-state sovereignty and universal human rights. Her argument is based on the idea that the nation-state's capacity to develop its policies for migrant incorporation is restricted by the enhancement of universal human rights and supranational conventions and treaties. Proponents of this opinion (Beck 2006; Sassen 1991) point to the fluidity and interconnectedness brought by globalisation and the establishment of a post-national structure that diminishes the state's role. However, some scholars (Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Koopmans 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003) urge us that the context established by the receiving nation-state remains an essential factor in the construction of

socio-political integration context such that it is the nation-state that designates the limits of post-national and transnational influences by setting the rules and regulations within its borders. It is underlined that we have seen not the decline of the nation-state but only a modification of its roles. Alba and Foner (2016) highlight that migrants, in most instances, have to act within the boundaries of institutional settings established by the receiving state, including citizenship regimes, electoral laws, social welfare regimes, education systems, and market-related regulations. Another strand of literature argues that giving too much credit to the role of the nation-state brings the risk of falling into the trap of methodological nationalism, which Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002:302) define as “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world”.

I follow an in-between line in the discussion. While acknowledging the risk of methodological nationalism, I do not neglect the changing role of the state in the socio-political incorporation process. I see the nation-state as an important constructor in the formation of the context, and at the same time, I acknowledge the growing share of sub-national and supranational actors in the process. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) perceive methodological nationalism as an obstacle limiting the horizons of analysis to state borders and thus missing transborder connections of migrants, saying that “The social sciences have become obsessed with describing processes within nation-state boundaries as contrasted with those outside and have correspondingly lost sight of the connections between such nationally defined territories’ (p. 307).

Bearing this in mind, in the next section, I dwell on citizenship, the nation-state’s most outstanding tool for migrant membership.

i. Citizenship

The concepts of belonging and citizenship are closely interrelated but do not refer to the same process. Scholarship describes belonging as a “thicker” concept than citizenship (Yuval-Davis 2004; Crowley 1999). In addition to the rights and responsibilities associated with membership in a group, belonging refers to a person’s “emotional need to feel safe and sound, and not to feel isolated or marginalized” (Vieten 2006:266). Secondly, citizenship is traditionally a formally ascribed status; still, belonging has a subjective aspect in the sense that even though individuals formally attain the citizenship status, they can emotionally embrace or reject the membership to that specific community (Vieten 2006). Nevertheless, citizenship regimes tell a lot about the political context of belonging.

Citizenship is regarded as the attestation of membership to a national political entity (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012:79). The citizenship regimes of the receiving states have considerable influence on migrant identity (Odmalm 2009; Koopmans 2004). Immigrants do not generally hold citizenship of the receiving state when they enter the territory, and in the best-case scenario, it takes quite a few years to be eligible for it. In any case, no matter whether they have citizenship or not, receiving countries’ national models of citizenship give a message to newly arrived migrants about the receiving state’s approach towards potential members.

States basically adopt two types of citizenship regimes. They grant citizenship based on place of birth (*jus soli*) or descent (*jus sanguinis*), and some states apply both. When it comes to immigrants, naturalisation is at the forefront. Naturalisation requirements vary from country to country, but usually, immigrants are expected to be able to speak the language/languages of the society at a certain level and have basic knowledge about the socio-political system in the country (Bloemraad et al. 2008:156). Boccagni et al. (2016) explain that states elevate barriers to naturalisation when they find it in their interest to keep immigrants as non-citizens and pave

the way for naturalisation when they want to increase the number of members of their polities. Citizenship tool allows them to encourage “less desirable migrants” to go back home (p.446). In this regard, civic integration has become a widespread policy of European governments to make sure future citizens are donated with the necessary skills and values (Vermeulen 2018; Joppke 2007; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2012). The intent behind civic integration, whether it aims to facilitate integration or constitute a high barrier for migrants to be considered eligible for membership to the state, is a debatable issue (Goodman 2010).

ii. Dual citizenship

Dual citizenship represents a specific condition regarding migrant belonging as it can be interpreted as implying dual loyalty; to the state in whose territory they reside and to the one from which they originate. The dual loyalty issue raises the question of how it influences migrants’ identification in their country of residence. Bell (2015) reminds us of the challenge of maintaining relations with both country of origin and country of residence, which might cause “a feeling of disjuncture, discontinuity of relations, and ceaseless negotiation between inclusion and exclusion” (p.80). On the other hand, Caglar (2001) critiques the tendency of the classical integration approach, which expects an exclusive loyalty to the receiving state. The author argues that expecting migrants to be loyal to only receiving state does not correspond with the realities of the global era, as migrants arrive at the place of residence with cultural baggage from their homeland. While generating a sense of belonging to the new place, they also keep relations with other places they come from. Some empirical studies, such as the one conducted by Snel et al. (2006) in the Netherlands on Moroccans and Antilleans, confirm that the transnational engagement of migrants does not hinder them from establishing a healthy attachment to their place of residence.

The receiving state's approach to the activities of immigrants is a determining factor in the question of dual loyalty. Baubock (2003) underlines that receiving countries, by allowing migrants to keep the citizenship of the country of origin, give explicit consent to transnational membership of its migrants, as dual citizenship provides legal ground for migrants to be active both "here" and "there". While the host state welcomes some political activities of immigrants, some others are seen as destructive to the well-being of society (Ostergard-Nielsen 2003). Migrants' focus on homeland politics might be a contested issue for some states and can be interpreted as hampering socio-political integration. Erdal and Oeppen (2013), in their theory on the relationship between integration and transnationalism, describe the two as constituents of the same social process in which migrants continuously seek a balance between demands of membership to receiving state and that of transnational ties.

Literature notes a tension between receiving states and sending states on migrant dual membership (Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx 2016; Bloemraad 2015; Mencutek and Yilmaz 2015). There are instances confirming that this may cause a conflict of interest between the two (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018). In this regard, extraterritorial voting has emerged as one of the main potential areas where tensions may occur (Mencutek and Baser 2018). Extraterritorial voting is "the active and passive voting rights of qualified individuals, independently of their professional status, to take part from outside the national territory in referenda or in supra-national, national, or sub-national elections held in a country of which they hold citizenship but where they permanently or temporarily do not reside." (Lafleur 2015:843). In line with the rise of diaspora politics, we see that extraterritorial voting has become a crucial instrument of sending state governments for various economic and policy benefits such as increasing remittances, electoral benefits for the political parties, strategic alliances, emigrants' loyalty, lobbying etc. (Turcu and Urbatsch 2014). On the other

hand, extraterritorial voting may cause concerns in the receiving state that ethnonational and religious disputes of sending state may be imported to its territory or migrants may be influenced by their home-country governments to the detriment of national interest (Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Baubock 2003)

iii. Membership beyond formal citizenship

Besides formal citizenship, in recent decades, states have been introducing a variety of social and political rights to resident third-country nationals, some of which had been strictly associated with formal citizenship in the past (Bloemraad 2018; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Soysal 1994). This partial divorce between formal citizenship and the rights led scholars to look at citizenship from a perspective broader than just having access to the nationality of the host state; additionally, they have included the rights given to third-country nationals and the rights granted to ethnic or religious groups of immigrant origin in the scope of the concept of citizenship (Koopmans et al. 2012; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Baubock 2005; Caramani and Grotz 2015). Briggs (2013) rightly underlines that “membership in the polity is a matter of degree, some forms of membership are reversible, and recognised, legal citizenship is but one form, albeit an important one for various forms of access, including access to the vote in most times and places” (p. 324). In this framework, the literature emphasises the importance of political opportunity structure in practising the rights associated with formal and non-formal membership in a society. Baubock (2006) defines political opportunity structure as a combination of legal, institutional, and cultural conditions in which migrants navigate:

“the political opportunity structure consists of laws that allocate different statuses and rights to various groups of migrants and formally constrain or enable their activities, of institutions of government and public administration in which migrants are or are not represented, of public policies that address migrants’ claims, concerns and interests or do not, and of a public culture

that is inclusive and accepts diversity or that supports national homogeneity and a myth of shared ancestry’ (p. 10).

I want to stress “public culture” in Baubock’s definition, which corresponds with what Koopmans (2004) calls the “discursive side of political opportunity structure”, and it refers to the established perception of who and what is deemed legitimate, sensible, and acceptable (p. 451). The discursive side of the political opportunity structure manifests itself as a crucial factor in the process of discrimination and exclusion, which will be discussed extensively in Chapter 6. As highlighted by Crul and Schneider (2010), political, social, and mediatic discourses majorly affect the migrant sense of belonging as they are the tools to disseminate implicit and explicit stereotypes and a hierarchical perception of the groups.

iv. EU citizenship

As a supranational institution, the EU provides membership to a polity above the nation-state, which comes in conjunction with citizenship of a member state; that is, one cannot be an EU citizen without having citizenship of one of the EU countries. This means that migrants granted formal citizenship of a member country automatically possess EU citizenship. EU citizenship is largely studied as a prominent example of post-national membership, and literature notes a debate on its philosophical and legal aspects (Bauböck 2019; Juverdeanu 2019; Brink 2018). For instance, a line of thought presents it as a unique and substantial innovation that grants member country citizens unprecedented rights such as free movement and easier settlement conditions in the Schengen Area, and another line brings critiques that EU citizenship gives rights without corresponding duties, which diminishes its impact and power in practice. Tambini (2001) describes EU citizenship as post-national citizenship, which refers to a partial detachment of the elements of citizenship, namely rights, participation and belonging, from the

territory of the nation-state. Yasemin Soysal (1994) links the emergence of post-national citizenship to an inconsistency between nation-state sovereignty and universal human rights, that is, rights are defined based on personhood rather than territory or citizenship in the country of residence.

On the other hand, Brink (2018) refuses to label it as post-national in the scope of Soysal's definition on the ground that EU citizenship is configured to include only citizens of member countries and exclude others; that is, it does not provide protection to all persons on its territory. In any case, as Tambini puts it (2001), "European citizenship is a reality: a thin one, but nonetheless a legal set of rights attached to the nominal status of European citizen" (p. 201). There is much more to be said about the discussions around the philosophy of EU citizenship; however, for the purposes here, this introduction will suffice.

This thesis is interested in EU citizenship because it constitutes a supra-national sphere of belonging for migrants in the EU member countries, including Turkish migrants, which is not always related to its legal aspects. Regardless of having formal citizenship, residing in Europe poses the question of "if they are European or not" to Turkish migrants. Europeanness is a contested identity for Turks living in European countries as it implies a "western culture and lifestyle" which does not compromise national identity for some (Kaya 2011; Kaya and Kentel 2005). I will discuss in Chapter 5 how Europeanness is considered a part of Turkish identity for some, and for others, a culture that contrasts Turkishness and Islam. On the other hand, the attitude of receiving society is noted as a factor which significantly shapes Turkish migrants' identification with Europe. Beyers (2008), in his study on the integration of Polish and Italian migrants in Belgium between the 1940s and 1990s, explains how Turkish migrants were perceived as "fundamentally culturally different" (p. 53) vis-à-vis Italians and Poles not only

by the Belgian society but also by other migrant groups. Italians were differentiating themselves from Turks with their Catholicism and European background. To prove their Belgianness, they were emphasising their cultural differences from Turks. I agree that the author is quite right in his conclusion that after several decades of their stay in Belgium, Italians and Poles have become insiders, while Turks, after more than five decades, are still perceived as foreigners (Beyers, 2008, p.58-59). In Chapter 6, I introduce the concept of "permanent foreignness" to explain Turkish migrants' perception of exclusion from European identity. Permanent foreignness refers to the condition that no matter how much they embrace European values or whether they have the citizenship of a European state, they are perceived as outsiders to Europe at political and societal levels. They face this perception in different spheres of life as a whole community regardless of how much they embrace European identity. I will explain that the community's reaction to being excluded differs according to the segment in question. In this context, Europeanness does not only refer to the ethnic origin of immigrants; it is a phenomenon also closely associated with culture and religion. An important point to make here is that it is not only ethnicity, culture or religion, but studies show that identification with Europe seems high among highly skilled Turkish migrants in Europe. Geurts et al. (2020), in their research on Turkish migrants in the Netherlands, found that many Turks, who are mostly highly educated identify with the EU. I will expand on this topic in Chapter 6 with an argument similar to that of Geurts et al.

EU has brought in a distinction between "migrants from the EU countries" and the "ones from non-EU countries"; in this way, it causes new versions of legal and political divisions and thus leads to new types of exclusion and discrimination. For instance, statistical data on the population in Belgium categorises migrants as such (The Belgian Statistical Office-Statbel). It is well documented in the literature that non-EU migrants are in a disadvantaged position

compared to the migrants from the EU countries in many spheres, from occupation, education, and housing to cultural and religious life opportunities (Naveed and Wang, 2020).

This thesis also tries to understand how migrants perceive the supra-national political opportunity structure provided by the EU, where they can, in theory pursue the interests which may not be fulfilled at the national level. I will explain in Chapter 5 that pursuing interests at the EU level is not actually the case for Turkish migrants.

2.2.4.2 Migrant belonging at the local level: city and neighbourhood levels

A growing body of literature (Ersanilli and Saharso 2011; Crul and Schneider 2010; Baubock 2003) defends the idea that local affiliations may better serve the diverse contemporary communities, as cities and neighbourhoods are prevailed as the immediate addressees for different groups of migrants to pursue an interest. As a reflection, Ireland (2017) indicates that over the past few decades, on both sides of the Atlantic, there has been a downward shift of responsibilities for integration policies from the national to sub-national levels. In this framework, Vasta (2013), in her study on migrants in London, elucidates that a sense of belonging at the national level is not a must for social cohesion claiming that in multicultural urban areas, migrants develop various forms of local attachments that do not necessarily contradict with national identity. Furthermore, Baubock (2003) suggests that urban identity can better be combined with transnational belonging as dual loyalty is a contested issue at the state level, and local belonging is less rigid and can better comply with a transnational identity.

Koopmans (2007) sees the local level as a point of interaction for migrants and the host society because migrants find it easier to access and develop an attachment to the local level than the inflexible and distant national political system. Additionally, Koopmans argues that as the

nation-state introduces itself as the representative of the mainstream, migrants may find it easy to opt for a locally defined sense of belonging. She exemplifies her argument with a vast number of Turks in Berlin who have developed a sense of belonging to Berlin easier than to Germany (p.450). Similarly, Ehrkamp (2005), in her study on Marxloh, a neighbourhood of Duisburg-Germany, which is known as a place for Turkish migrants, concludes that Turkish migrants feel more comfortable developing a sense of belonging towards the neighbourhood than towards the nation-state.

City belonging is often studied in association with the diverse and multicultural city context open to the effects of globalisation (Simsek-Caglar and Schiller 2018; Ireland 2017; Brettell 2006; Sassen 2005). Cities are places where global and local meet, interact and hence produce a context that speaks to divergent groups of people. The research by Savage et al. (2004) on inhabitants of four different neighbourhoods in Manchester sheds light on how migrant belonging comes into being at the intersection of the local characteristics of neighbourhoods and globalisation. The study argues that it is misleading to make a clear-cut distinction between cosmopolitan belonging and local belonging on the ground that a cosmopolitan way of life does not mean a total detachment from local values, and locals cannot be defined as people completely embedded in the places they grew up. In line with this, Sassen (2012) underlines the need for an optic that would identify the dynamics originating from specific local conditions of the cities and their relationship with globalisation. Likewise, Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) suggest that cities, apart from the similarities emanating from their position in the global economic system, also have local characteristics which play a crucial role in migrant adaptation. This thesis takes the city as the context of belonging and explores the ways in which migrants feel belonging to the city and how the city context impacts other levels of belonging, i.e., neighbourhood, state, transnational, supranational and global. I will elaborate more on this

in Part II of this chapter while explaining the concept of global cities. Here, I would like to pay special attention to the concept of the ethnic enclave, which I draw on to explain Turkish migrants' sense of belonging living in Schaerbeek, a neighbourhood in Brussels, also known as the Turkish neighbourhood of the city.

i. Ethnic neighbourhood and ethnic enclave

Ethnically populated areas in cities are referred to in the literature with three main concepts: ethnic neighbourhood, ethnic enclave and ghetto. This thesis is interested in the ethnic enclave. It takes it in its relationship with the city in Chapter 4 to explicate migrant belonging in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, where a certain segment of the Turkish community is cumulated. Ethnic enclave refers to “an area of spatial concentration in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of protecting and enhancing their economic, social, political, and cultural development” (Marcuse 2002:111). Whilst, in this broad definition by Marcuse, economic, social, political and cultural factors all are underlined as the reasons for the congregation of groups in certain neighbourhoods, an ethnic enclave is often described in association with ethnic enterprise, where co-ethnics support each other with employment opportunities (Lee 2019; Kim 2018; Werbner 2001; Portes 1981) In any case, whether economy-oriented or not, the ethnic enclave has a negative connotation in that it has been the location mainly for “undesirable” migrants living in isolation and failed in integration, and therefore, in need of protection by their own ethnic group, particularly in economic terms.

Here, I would like to clarify the difference between the ethnic enclave and ethnic neighbourhood, as the two are often used interchangeably. Ethnic enclave is widely regarded as having a more specific meaning in that it does provide protection to migrants to enhance

their socio-economic, political and cultural development. Measurement criteria for the ethnic enclave is a long-debated issue in the literature, and it can vary depending on the geography and the ethnic group in question (Waldinger 1993; 2001). Nevertheless, “providing protection” appears to be a specific characteristic of ethnic enclaves, which cannot be regarded as a determining factor for ethnic neighbourhoods. Logan et al. (2002) describe a methodology for the identification of ethnic neighbourhoods as such; “[E]thnic neighbourhoods are most often identified and studied through fieldwork, where the researcher typically begins with the knowledge that the ethnic character of a given locale is socially recognised – certainly by group members and perhaps also by others. This ethnic character may be visible through observation of people in public places, the names of shops or the languages found on signs or spoken by clerks or patrons, or by community institutions such as churches, social clubs, and associations” (pp. 303-304). Additionally, the negative connotation ethnic enclave holds is stronger than the one for ethnic neighbourhoods.

To distinguish ethnic enclave from similar concepts, I also want to put the definition of ghetto here: it is the term historically used for Jewish segregation in Europe. It refers to a place designated by the state for minority groups who are socially, economically and politically discriminated against and socio-spatially subjected to forced segregation (Wacquant 2004). It has the most negative connotation compared to the ethnic neighbourhood and ethnic enclave, as it refers to a socio-economically very deprived area, composed of four elements “stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement and an ethnic group” (Wacquant 2004:1).

There is a tendency in the migration scholarship that while city-level belonging is mainly linked with a cosmopolitan perspective (Baas et al. 2020; Beck 2006; Sassen 1991), neighbourhood-

level belonging is contextualised with spatially segregated communities (Andersson et al. 2018; Sager 2012; Ehrkamp 2005). There exist two opposite perceptions of ethnic neighbourhoods in the literature. One perception is that migrants affiliate with the neighbourhood if they cannot do so with the city or the state. This leads to self-segregation, hinders socio-political integration and strengthens home-country attachment (Barwick and Beaman 2019; Sager 2012). The other perception reads that neighbourhood-level belonging does not necessarily obscure integration; on the contrary, it makes migrants feel secure and comfortable in their place of residence (Kalandides and Vaiou 2012; Ehrkamp 2005). This thesis takes the concept of the ethnic enclave to point at the socio-spatial segregation of a certain segment of a migrant community and to analyse the impact of this segregation on their sense of belonging, how the city context impacts the belonging of migrants living in an ethnic enclave, how they combine it with transnational and supranational belonging.

Having presented relevant literature on migrant belonging in the place of residence by highlighting national and local levels, I will continue, in the following sub-section, with the (perceived) discrimination, which I use as a lens in Chapter 6 to magnify the different modes of (non) belonging particularly in the place of residence.

2.2.5 (Perceived) Discrimination and (non) belonging in the place of residence

As said at the beginning of this chapter, belonging is a two-sided coin for which an individual's self-identification with a group and acceptance of the individual by the group are two constituting elements, and it is "formed between the interplay of the subjective self, collective agency and structural positioning" (Vasta 2013:198). In this sense, discrimination refers to the flip side of belonging, that is, non-belonging (Lähdesmäki et al. 2016). In this section, I discuss

(perceived) discrimination with related theories which explain how (perceived) discrimination shapes migrant (non)belonging, as, in my research, discrimination came up as an important factor in shaping the Brussels Turkish community's belonging, for each segment of the community in a different way.

i. Concept of discrimination

Discrimination is defined as unequal treatment among groups, described in connection with prejudice. Prejudice means an “antipathy based on a faulty or inflexible generalization” (Allport 1954). Quillian (2006), based on Allport's definition of the term, underlines two factors that constitute prejudice: antipathy and stereotyping. That is to say; prejudice occurs when a negative emotion is directed towards members of a group who are poorly characterised. While prejudice is an attitude, discrimination is the behaviour associated with it.

Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) have identified two measures of prejudice. Blatant prejudice is the more traditional form, “hot, close and direct”, whereas subtle prejudice refers to the modern form, which is “cool, distant, and indirect” (p. 58). Blatant prejudice is a well-known and well-studied type in the literature. It comes with two components; either the group members are perceived as a threat and thus rejected, for example, believing the opinion that “Turkish migrants create a burden for the EU economy” and wanting them to leave the country. The other component includes opposition to intimate contact with the group members, such as resisting intermarriages or close friendships.

Pettigrew and Merteens (1995) note that subtle discrimination is the form migrants often encounter, indicating three components that explain how subtle prejudice arises. The first component is the defence of traditional values. In this case, migrants are discriminated against

on the ground that they do not behave in line with the traditional values of the receiving society; for this reason, migrants' actions are perceived as unacceptable. The second component originates from the exaggeration of cultural differences. The migrant culture is seen as an obstacle for migrants to adapt to the receiving society's culture. In this scenario, stereotyping leads to the exaggeration of existing cultural differences. The third component is the denial of positive emotions, where the receiving society does not accept and does not express the existence of negative feelings towards migrants but does not display sympathy either. In other words, they covertly deny positive emotions.

Uncovering discrimination is a challenging task as it is often indirectly and covertly inserted into behaviours. It is noted in the literature that discrimination in this new form is very subjective and open to interpretation (Steinmann 2018). Rejection of blatant discrimination has been a social norm in Europe (Quillian 2006), whereas subtle prejudice, as a covert form, is acted out in ways that would not be identified and proved easily.

Discrimination also takes different forms depending on the involvement of the state apparatus. Wimmer (2013) denotes three modes of discrimination in this regard: legalised discrimination, institutional discrimination, and everyday discrimination. Legalised discrimination is the most salient form where discrimination is inserted into law, and thus specific ethnic groups are denied certain rights available to other groups, which is not an issue anymore in the European context; therefore, it is not a topic to take into account in the framework of this thesis. In the case of institutional discrimination, the discriminative act is not supported by law; still, it exists in the routine functioning of the state administration, for which covert discrimination in public education institutions towards migrants can be an example (Colak et al. 2020; D'hondt et al. 2017). Also, I learned during my interviews that migrants often feel discriminated against in

the municipalities of Brussels, which I discuss in this thesis. Lastly, everyday discrimination is performed by different sectors of society in day-to-day interactions without the involvement of the state apparatus, which my informants also highlighted.

ii. Actual and perceived discrimination

This thesis analyses discrimination through the eyes of migrants and aims to see their interpretation of it. While it acknowledges that discrimination involves actual and perceived forms, its analysis does not go into that distinction. Therefore, use “perceived” in parenthesis while mentioning discrimination throughout this thesis; (perceived) discrimination. Here, I will briefly explain the two forms.

Literature reveals that actual and perceived discrimination are highly consequential but do not simply follow each other (Schaffer 2019; Quillian 2006). That is, while what migrants interpret as discrimination often relates to actual discriminatory acts, interpretations cannot be exempt from subjectivity. Perceived discrimination does not necessarily require an experience of a specific discriminatory act, as people act upon what they have perceived rather than what happened (Steinmann 2018; Salentin 2007). Schaffer (2019) points to the combination of two elements that trigger perceptions of ethnic discrimination; social exposure to actual discrimination and cognitive susceptibility to interpret acts of host society members in the framework of discrimination.

In social psychology, perceived discrimination is distinguished as “perceived personal discrimination” and “perceived group discrimination”. In the first form, it is the individual who faces discrimination; in the second, discrimination is directed at the whole group that the individual is a part of (Bourguignon et al. 2006). Individuals may feel discriminated against

even if they themselves do not encounter an actual discriminatory act; however, being aware of a negative public discourse and unfriendly environment for the group they belong to enhances cognitive skills for interpreting discrimination (Trittler 2018). It is confirmed by the studies that individuals often perceive discrimination towards themselves and towards their groups differently (Steinmann 2018). This inconsistency is conceptualised as ‘personal-group discrimination discrepancy’ (Taylor et al. 1990). In their study on Haitian and South Asian women migrants in Canada, Taylor and his colleagues brought in three possible explanations for the discrepancy; individuals may deny personal discrimination or exaggerate group discrimination, or there exist information-processing biases.

iii. Segregation and (perceived) discrimination

Literature shows that social and spatial segregation has a salient link with (perceived) discrimination such that discrimination strengthens ethnic group identification and within-group attachment (Snel et al. 2015; Philips 2010; Edin et al. 2003). Migrants turn to the co-ethnics in the case of facing discrimination from the host society, and ethnic neighbourhoods emerge as a choice to isolate from the natives, so that be protected from discriminatory acts (Bolt et al. 2010). Portes and Rumbaut (2001) conceptualise this phenomenon as ‘reactive ethnicity’. Reactive ethnicity emerges in opposition to a hostile environment in the host country where migrants do not feel respected and embraced, and in reaction to it, their attachment to the ethnic identity becomes stronger.

Social and spatial segregation can work as a protective measure against discrimination as it reduces the chances of contact with natives (Steinmann 2018). Studies have shown that discrimination, whether actual or not, causes negative implications on the social and psychological well-being of immigrants (Frank 2019; de Freitas et al. 2018). The degree of

resilience to discrimination depends on the agency of migrants. It is not only easier for migrants with a high level of human and social capital to be accepted by the native community, but also, have better social and professional resources to cope with discriminatory acts. On the other hand, studies confirm that increased contact and interaction with natives reduce prejudice and enhance intergroup relations (Tropp et al. 2021; Zick et al. 2008; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). However, Ahmed (2000) claims that interaction is not always helpful for being accepted; "not simply those who are not known in this dwelling, but those who are, in their very proximity, already recognised as not belonging, as being out of place" (p. 22).

iv. Education level and (perceived) discrimination

The relationship between migrants' perception of discrimination and their level of education is a topic of high interest in research (Geurtz et al. 2021; Dietz et al. 2015; de Vroome et al. 2014). It is intuitive that high-level education should facilitate integration as it increases migrants' skills to adapt to new environments and consequently open up the venues in social and political opportunity structure. Furthermore, it is more probable that educated migrants' social and professional circles are composed of educated natives who theoretically must have more egalitarian attitudes towards outgroup members. However, an alternative theory called the ideological refinement perspective argues that education makes people better aware of their interests and keener on preserving their upper status in the social hierarchy, and therefore they may not be more supportive of policies to eliminate inequalities (Voodtke 2012; Schuman et al. 1997). Studies also point to a similar inconsistency in the perception of discrimination by migrants with high-level education that the higher the level of education is, the more discrimination migrants perceive (Lajevardi et al. 2020; Geurts et al. 2021; de Vroome, Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014; Alanya, Baysu and Swyngedouw 2015, Alanya et al. 2017). This theory is called the "integration paradox". The theory is applied to the highly educated

segments of the Turkish community in Brussels in Chapter 6 to explore the distinctiveness of their mode of belonging.

Various theories explain the underlying mechanism for the integration paradox in the literature and point to a combination of multiple agency and structure-related factors. Following Steinmann (2018), I will touch upon three theories frequently referred to; opportunity structure, awareness, and relative deprivation. Opportunity structure becomes more available to the highly educated, which makes it more probable for them to be exposed to discrimination. Thanks to their education level, they can access various social and professional spheres and have more frequent contact with natives, and thus, chances of experiencing discrimination become higher. Another theory reads that a high education level enhances cognitive skills by which migrants become better aware of discriminatory acts. Given that contemporary discrimination often occurs covertly and is disguised behind behaviours and daily language, the theory of awareness gets significance. Well-educated migrants are better informed about negative discourses and stereotyping about migrants in general and about the group they belong to in particular through media and contact with natives in social circles or at the workplace (de Vroome et al. 2014). Also, the phenomenon of the integration paradox is explored by the theory of relative deprivation. The theory suggests that people assess “what they have deserved” by making comparisons with other individuals or groups, and in the situation that they perceive themselves in a disadvantageous position to the compared, they feel angry and resentful (Smith and Pettingew 2012). Thus, their sensitivity towards discrimination increases. Migrants with a high level of education tend to compare their statuses with natives with a similar educational background (de Vroome et al. 2014). The more educated the migrants are, the higher their expectations from the host society. Perceiving that they are relatively deprived of what they deserve makes them prefer heuristic interpretations of discrimination in their perception of

inequality. De Vroome et al. (2014) distinguish between migrants who took education in the host country and those educated in their home country regarding the degree of perceived discrimination. They argue that migrants educated in the host country feel more discriminated against as they expect to be treated with the same standards as the natives because they have the same educational level. Whereas the ones educated in the homeland usually do not see their education as fully transferable to the host country, thinking that education in the host country is more valid. I have observed that this is the case with highly educated refugees among the Turkish community in Brussels, which I will explain in Chapter 6.

V. Language and religion, and (perceived) discrimination

Language and religion are highlighted in the literature as two significant elements for the migrant sense of belonging in the place of residence. In Brubaker's (2013:3) words, "language and religion are basic sources and forms of social, cultural and political identification. They are ways of identifying oneself and others, construing sameness and difference, and naming fundamental social groups."

Language acquisition, in many cases, is seen as one of the primary criteria for formal membership (Goodman 2010; Oers et al. 2010). In Western European countries, it has been a standard that migrants are obliged to have a certain level of language proficiency to acquire citizenship (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2013). In the mechanism of belonging, language does not only function as an instrument of communication with native society, but it implies a connection to a particular culture and nation. Even though in most states, attaining basic language skills make migrants eligible for citizenship, it might not be enough to be accepted by native society as "one of us", and most of the time, this requires more than just speaking but proficiency. However, socialising in their native language may be preferable for migrants,

particularly if they are not good at speaking the receiving country's language. This situation may perpetuate segregation and strengthen the sense of belonging in their homeland. Although the Turkish community in Brussels is depicted as a community with limited linguistic skills (Van Kerckem 2014; Manco and Kanmaz 2005), my research reveals that this is valid for the guest workers and their family members to a certain extent. Turks attach importance to learning the language for professional purposes, but my interviewees expressed that they speak Turkish at home and in their social circles. Interestingly, I learned that they feel excluded in Brussels because of their low competency in French and Türkiye and their way of pronouncing the Turkish language. I will address this issue in Chapters 5 and 6.

Besides language, religion is widely discussed as a cultural factor with paramount importance that facilitates integration mainly in the case of migrants being from the same faith with mainstream society or obscure it mainly in the case of being from a different religion (Di Stasio et al. 2021; Artero and Chiodelli 2020; Cesari 2010). I agree with Zolberg and Long (1999) that the European context is less welcoming for Muslim migrants in comparison with the US. Zolberg and Long link discrimination on the ground of religion with the continent's long and difficult history of the separation of church and state. While Christian religions were retrieved from the European political domain with the establishment of secularism, Christianity remains a strong cultural frame for the European identity, serving as a tool to distinguish who is in and who is out. Similarly, Alba (2005) underlines religion as a bright boundary in the European context and finds the reason for it in the way religion is institutionalised. Alba claims that migrants who have the potential to cross the bright boundary of religion in Europe are the ones with a secular worldview and an above-average educational and occupational status.

On the other hand, Trittler (2018), in her study on religious discrimination in Western European societies, distinguishes between religious and secular boundaries. That is to say, religious boundaries prevail in some European societies where mainstream religion is taken as a point of reference for national belonging. On the other hand, in societies where secular boundaries are salient -namely, religion is not viewed as a determinant of national belonging- discrimination takes place on the ground of secular values. I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6 that religion is an issue when it comes to discrimination, and Turkish migrants in Brussels say they feel they are discriminated against on this ground; however, religion is not a concern for the whole community in the same degree as they have different stands towards religion.

While language works as a demarcation that shows “who is from us and who is not”, it also constitutes a permeable boundary between native society and migrant groups, and the boundary can be shifted once migrants learn the language of the country of residence (Brubaker 2013). Similarly, Brubaker (2013) also presents religion as a permeable boundary on the ground that it is not given but can be chosen, but a critical nuance should be noted here. Migrants do not have to abandon their native languages while acquiring mainstream language in the country of residence, i.e., they may be deprived of formal education in their native language but can transform it to their children in the family or by the support of migrant organisations. However, religion, most of the time, is an either/or situation, and it is not a common practice for migrants to adhere to another religion only for integration purposes. In this regard, I find Trittler’s (2018) distinction of religious and secular boundaries meaningful for the case of the Turkish migrant community in Brussels in that it acknowledges the existence of various forms of understanding and practices of religion within migrant groups and supports the idea that certain versions might be more in harmony with migrant attachment to the place of residence. I will

discuss this in the framework of Islam while analyzing Turkish migrants' perception of religious-based discrimination.

Having discussed (perceived) discrimination in connection with migrant belonging, in the next section, I will look, this time, into transnationalism as a lens to magnify different modes of belonging within the same community.

2.2.6 Belonging through the lens of transnationalism

Transnationalism is an effective lens to see in what ways different segments of migrant groups experience belonging, as this study does in Chapter 5. It came up from my research that Turkish migrants' attachment towards Türkiye is significantly shaped by two factors: home-country emigrant policies and contexts of exit and reception. I demonstrate in Chapter 5 that the sub-groups in the Turkish community receive/react/ reject/compromise these factors in different ways, and this reflects on their transnational belonging. For instance, while the home country's efforts to reach out to its emigrants produce positive results for one sub-group, the other may remain indifferent to these efforts. Similarly, while for a particular sub-group, their contexts of exit and reception can bear a nostalgic story that strengthens their home-country attachment, theirs may not mean much for others.

In this section, first, I introduce the reader to the concept of transnationalism, emphasising its impact on belonging.

i. The concept of transnationalism

Transnationalism is a concept that “broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states” (Vertovec 2005, p.3). While transnational practices have always been in the life of migrants, rapid development in

transportation facilities and communication technologies in the last decades have enormously increased immigrants' contact with the countries from which they originated. At this point, which practices can be considered transnational and when migrant becomes transnational comes in as a scholarly debate (Erdal 2020; Tsuda 2012; Martiniello and Lafleur 2008; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Baubock 2003; Vertovec 2001; Levitt 2001). Itzigsohn et al. (1999) make a distinction between “broad” and “narrow” transnational practices based on the degree of institutionalisation of the practice, the degree of involvement of migrants in the transnational fields and the degree of movement the practice generates between the home country and the receiving state. The narrow transnationality necessitates a high institutionalisation, regular involvement, and frequent movement of people, whereas the broad form of transnationality encompasses any practice migrants engage in concerning the home country. Martiniello and Lafleur (2008) state that intensity and sustainability are the two characteristics that differentiate transnational practices of today's world from the ones in the old times.

On the other hand, all activities that transcend national borders do not fall into the category of transnational practices. Baubock (2003) clarifies what is transnational as such; “Migration is basically an international phenomenon insofar as it involves a movement of persons between the territorial jurisdictions of independent states; it becomes transnational only when it creates overlapping memberships, rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different political communities.” (p. 705). As it is stated in Bauböck's definition, scholars underline “simultaneity” as a definitive element for transnationalism (Erdal 2020; Tsuda 2012; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004), and it is defined by Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) as “living lives that incorporate daily activities, routines, and institutions located both in destination country and transnationally” (p. 1003). Simultaneity is not only the acknowledgement of migrant's engagements on both sides but also it implies belonging to

“here” and “there” at the same time, and consequently brings the discussion that if simultaneous belonging to homeland and to the receiving state can be possible (Erdal 2020; Waldinger 2017). In this frame, Erdal (2020) underlines dual citizenship as the formal simultaneous membership to “here” and “there” and points to the informal side of it, that is, how belonging is felt by migrants and how it is acknowledged by receiving societies.

The theorisation of transnationalism by Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) particularly highlights belonging through the concept of “ways of belonging”. In line with the contemporary misfit between the physical borders of nation-state and society, the authors analyse the space in which transnational practices take place with the concept of “transnational social fields”, which comprises both the actual transborder practices and the consciousness of being immersed in them. According to the theory, migrants take part in transnational social fields through “ways of being”, which refers to actual practices such as commuting between sending state and receiving state, and through “ways of belonging”, which reflects “practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group” (p.1011) such as frequenting to an ethnic organisation in the receiving state. The concept of ways of belonging shows how migrant transnational belonging does not necessitate any tangible link with “there” but can be practised via identification with “there” while being in “here”, and thus, the concept broadens the scope of transnational social fields. For instance, a migrant might be well-connected with the country of origin but not feel strongly belonging there. In contrast, another one might be inactive in terms of engaging in actual activities with sending state but may maintain a strong attachment via the ways of belonging.

Concerning the theory of transnationalism, the term transnational community is introduced to define “situations in which international movers and stayers are connected by dense and strong

social and symbolic ties over time and across space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries – based upon solidarity” (Faist 2000:196). Although the transnational practices at first instance invoke two spaces, home-country and receiving country, such communities may expand to multiple locations that do not always need to be at the nation-state level. In this vein, Kivisto (2016) describes such communities as “bilocal or multilocal, based on the networks that arise between and among particular villages, towns, cities and regions in the homeland and receiving nation” (p.12). While, in this dissertation, I use Cohen’s symbolic community to define the Brussels Turkish community’s loose and flexible togetherness, which is comprehensive enough to convene different segments under one umbrella (explained in Chapter 3), I acknowledge that the segment in Schaerbeek beautifully fit into the definition of transnational community, as they create a solid social and cultural network between Schaerbeek and Emirdag (the town in Türkiye from where most of the segment originated). Symbolic community is the concept helpful to me in indicating that an ethnic migrant group can form a community while living in different socio-spatial spaces. The transnational community concept helps me highlight the dense transnational relations established by one segment of the Brussels Turkish community. I will elaborate on this in Chapter 5.

ii. Country of origin and migrant transnational belonging

In this section, I will engage with the discussions on the countries of origin’s various strategies to connect with their emigrants in general, and in the following section, about diaspora politics in particular. I do so because one of the factors this thesis looks at to shed light on the formation

of different modes of transnational belonging in the Brussels Turkish community is Türkiye's emigrant policies in general and its diaspora policy after the 2000s.

Countries of origin have emerged as important actors in shaping migrants' transnational ties in recent decades (Faist and Bilecen 2019). In the literature, sending states' emigrant policies are discussed with the concepts of "transnationalism from above" (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Itzigsohn 2000) or "state-led transnationalism" (Adamson 2019 Gamlen 2014, Margheritis 2007) and analysed generally in the framework of political transnationalism. Political transnationalism encompasses various types of engagements migrants construct with the homeland from narrowly defined political activities like external voting, funding political parties, lobbying and protests (Collyer 2014, Mugge 2012; Lafleur 2011; Boccagni 2011; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a and 2003b) to more passive and indirect practices like watching home-country TV channels, expressing opinions about home-country politics on social media or chatting on home-country politics in informal settings (Duru et al. 2019). It becomes transnationalism from above or state-led transnationalism when sending states to use various policy tools to connect with their emigrants. Goldring (2002) describes state-led transnationalism as "institutionalised national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state's political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory" (p.64). Even though engaging with emigrants is a rising trend in today's transnationally connected world, Boccagni et al. (2016) point to the fact that all states do not follow the same path. The authors divide the states into three categories; they call the first category as transnational nation states that treat their emigrants as long-term, long-distance members, grant dual citizenship and are dependent on remittances, for which El Salvador and the Dominican Republic are given as examples. The second category of states is strategic, selective states that selectively and strategically manage

what emigrants can and cannot do, want to ensure emigrants' continued involvement, and offer partial, changing packages of privileges and services. India, Philippines, Haiti and Türkiye are considered strategic, selective states. The last category is disinterested and denouncing states that see migrants as traitors as if they no longer belong to their homeland, and Cuba is a showcase for this. Boccagni et al. (2016) underline that disinterested and denouncing state type was common before the current period of globalisation.

Interconnected global political and economic systems and ever-growing disjuncture between politics and territory have furnished sending states with different tools to connect with members abroad easily. Tools and tactics that sending states use in this regard are subject to change depending on various internal (domestic) and external factors. Literature refers to the regime, political conjuncture and resources of the sending state as internal factors (Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Mugge 2012), and it points to various regional and global dynamics as the external factors which play a role in home-country policy choices (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Portes et al. 2007; Shain and Barth 2003). For example, granting migrants the right to vote abroad to gain more electorates, rallying them to lobby for foreign policy issues, bringing tax incentives, entering into bilateral agreements with receiving states to enhance emigrants' social security, and interacting with migrant associations to promote culture or to improve economic relations with receiving countries, and introducing bureaucratic reforms like increasing the number and services of consulates, establishing governmental institutions specifically for citizens abroad are used as tools by sending states in their outreach efforts (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003).

Koinova and Tsourapas (2018) discuss why sending states want to connect with emigrants under three headings: utilitarian perspective, identity-based approach, and governance

perspective. The utilitarian perspective points to the sending states' interest in increasing material power by the flow of remittances and by directing emigrants towards their domestic or international political agenda. Remittances, in the form of sending money back to family members or making economic investments in the country of origin, have been crucial for the economies of developing countries. Also, diasporas are instrumental for sending states to pursue foreign policy agendas by rallying them for lobbying in front of receiving state institutions or international organisations, as in the example of the Turkish diaspora's support for Türkiye's EU membership bid, particularly in the first decade of the 2000s (Kaya 2011). The identity-based approach looks at the sending states' interest in gaining symbolic power by expanding "nation" through connecting with members outside their territory. Lastly, the governance perspective highlights sending states' efforts to manage emigrants via diplomatic missions in receiving countries and to involve in regional and global migration governance processes.

Having discussed how countries of origin connect with their emigrants, in the following section, I will focus on a particular politics of these countries, namely diaspora politics, which has become a trend in the 2000s and adopted by Türkiye.

iii. Diaspora politics and the country of origin

Particularly with the rise of diaspora politics, which is defined as "forms of political engagement that link constituencies in one country with a real or imagined "homeland" somewhere else" (Adamson 2016:291), sending states eagerly assume an active role in shaping migrant belonging.

Diaspora is a term that points to ethnic communities' connections to their homeland. Once used to describe Jewish, Armenian and Greek dispersion, it has evolved and expanded in such a way

that it shares meanings with a larger semantic domain like ethnic community, immigrant, exile community, expatriate, refugee, etc. (Tölölyan 1991). In the last decades, as a reflection of sending states' interest in strengthening links with their emigrants, new groups have been named diasporas, like the Mexican diaspora, Turkish diaspora and Lebanese diaspora, and accordingly, the term has caught significant scholarly attention leading to a debate on framing the term (Cohen 2022).

The proliferation of meanings and expanding boundaries of the phenomenon makes it difficult to decide whether diaspora is a suitable term to apply to a particular group. Brubaker (2004), in his work called 'The 'diaspora' diaspora', mentions three overarching features of diasporas which he has derived from various definitions and discussions in the literature on the concept. The first one is dispersion in space. Dispersion can take place in many different forms, such as forcefully or for trading reasons or because of a change in state borders, or it can happen by cross-border movements or within state borders. The second feature is the orientation to a real or imagined homeland. Orientation comprises various meanings; a collective memory of the homeland; perceiving ancestral homeland as a true and ideal homeland; a myth of return to the homeland; committing to the restoration of the homeland, or seeing the homeland as a significant part of one's identity. The last feature is boundary maintenance. With reference to Armstrong, Brubaker defines boundary maintenance as 'the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society (or societies)' (ibid. p.17). Boundaries can be sustained by resistance to assimilation, such as in-group marriages or self-segregation. It is also crucial for boundary maintenance that it should continue over an extended time. Diasporas differ from other migrant groups by preserving boundaries across generations.

As seen from Brubaker's approach to the term, the criteria for eligibility to be named diaspora have significantly broadened in the last decades, making it possible for countries of origin to call their emigrants diaspora and configure for them a policy in this regard. We see the same trend in Türkiye: it was not until the 2000s that Turkish migrants were called diaspora. As explained in Chapter 5, after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2003, Türkiye changed its emigrant policy in such a way that it embarked on an intensive diaspora management policy (Adamson 2019). Then, the concept was entered into official documents and mentioned in speeches of Turkish politicians and bureaucrats. Baubock (2001) defines diaspora as "a politically mobilised claim about transnational citizenship, which can be pursued either by governmental actors from above or by non-governmental actors from below. In either case, diasporas are created through discourses about transnational belonging to a political community" (p. 299-300). In Türkiye's case, it has been a project from above - a top-down project administered by the Turkish government- and produced considerable effect on the belonging of at least some sections of the Turkish community abroad. Against this background, in this dissertation, I draw on the concept's explanatory power for investigating Turkish migrants' engagements in home-country politics and Türkiye's policy towards its emigrants, which are indicative of transnational belonging. (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). At this point, I want to note that this thesis acknowledges that diaspora and transnationalism originate from "different intellectual genealogies" and that while diaspora is often used to refer to national and religious groups who reside outside of their (imagined) homeland, transnationalism is used to explain migrants' established ties across countries (Faist 2010: 9). However, it does not use the concept of "diaspora" to define the Brussels Turkish community as such, but use it to refer to the community within a specific period when Türkiye's relations with its emigrants were maintained through putting into practice a diaspora politics.

In this part (Part I), I discussed the concept of belonging with a multidimensional perspective and presented the two lenses -transnationalism and (perceived) discrimination - that I draw on to investigate different modes of belonging in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. In the next part (Part II), I will discuss the literature on the global city concept; a concept that I operationalise in my analysis of the Brussels context of belonging in Chapter 4. In that chapter, I argue that the Brussels context comes into being through an interaction between local and global characteristics of the city and offers divergent socio-spatial spaces where different segments of migrants could find a space to live up to them.

2.3 PART II: GLOBAL CITY

Investigating migrant adaptation at the local level has gained growing attention in migration research in recent decades. Migrants in urban settings have long been studied with theories originating from the Chicago School of Urban Studies, mainly analysing groups on an ethnic basis and measuring integration in terms of linguistic skills, socio-economic status, spatial concentration, and intermarriage (Vertovec 2011). Nevertheless, globalisation has furnished urban areas with a set of new dynamics that have required different lenses to explore how migrant sense of belonging gets shaped in this new context. In this line, this study takes a broader approach to the city that it sees the city as a dense hub of transborder connections, where the impacts of globalisation are the most imminent. So it argues that belonging in global cities is shaped by factors beyond the receiving state.

Urry (2000), in his manifesto on the sociology of the 21st century, emphasises diverse forms of mobility as the new reality of contemporary societies, replacing the traditional understanding of 'territory' based sociology. Urry explains the new form of belonging in the globalisation era with 'roots and routes' involving both 'home' and 'away'. The new form of belonging is linked

with the fast and frequent international movement of capital, information, people, and objects which have increased the social contacts between people in different locales challenging the traditional understanding of state borders, boundaries of societies, and social relations. As stated by Yuval Davis (2010), people living in different locales are exposed to the same global agenda thanks to radio, cable TV, and international media. The development of the internet is essentially highlighted as it provides easy and cheap communication almost to all sections of societies, including migrants and in almost all parts of the world.

Against the background explained above, from the 1990s onwards, Sassen's (1991) global city concept has been one of the widely used tools in analyses of migrant integration in big urban areas. Sassen (2005) defines the global city as a locale where the economic activity of transnational agglomerates gets connected beyond national borders. Functioning as the hubs for global financial and economic networks, these cities, in a way, detached from the states they belong to and get closer to the centres similar to them across the world. In other words, economic transformation caused by globalisation elevates sub-national locales to a level where they integrate with global economic space bypassing the state as its container. Sassen (2012; 2005; 1991) emphasises that the economic networks between global cities are not only virtual but they also materially exist. For example, transnational corporations not only enter into financial relations with different cities around the world, but they also establish headquarters in the cities where they depend on the infrastructure of the city and the service supplied by the city population.

The global city is a concept often used in conjunction with various concepts like world cities, global capitalist cities, imperial cities, mega-cities, primate cities, and international financial centres (Beaverstock et al. 1999). This being the case, world cities prevail among others as the

most interchangeably used with global cities (Taylor 2010, Robinson 2002, Elmhorn 2001). For this reason, I want to mention why I opt for the global cities concept but not for the other. Friedmann (1986) notes the economic variable –the city's significance in the world economic system- as the decisive factor for describing an urban area as a world city. Beaverstock et al. (1999) claim that world cities include global cities such that top-rank world cities with transnational business connections are categorised as global cities and pinpoint the availability of transnational economic networks as the distinguishing element for global cities. Sassen (2001), while taking a similar approach as Beaverstock et al. in explaining the difference between the two concepts, brings in a historical dimension. She notes that world cities existed in earlier times in Asia and European colonial centres, whereas the global city is a contemporary phenomenon directly linked with globalisation. In this vein, major global cities are also world cities, but there are global cities that cannot be categorised as world cities. The author gives Miami as an example of a city with global city functions but does not possess the characteristics of a world city.

The concept is critiqued for standing on economic determinism as it puts economic factors at the very centre of the argument, whereas social and political dynamics are referred to as dependent factors that come along with the global interconnectedness of economies (Hu 2015; Robinson 2006). Economic determinism of the concept also reflects in the studies on migrants in global cities. Migrants are often illustrated as just one of the disadvantaged labour groups in the city and passive subjects of social polarisation and segregation. Benton-Short et al. (2005), in their study on the ranking of global cities in terms of their migrant population, underlined the economic determinism of the concept, concluding that some cities where migrants are highly influential in determining socio-cultural structure are lower on the rank of global cities, even, some of these cities are not present on the well-known lists of global cities. The study

calls for a new approach that links global cities and migration such that migrant contribution to the formation of global cities should be taken into account. Furthermore, Elmhorn (2001) suggests a comprehensive approach to global cities that also considers political and historical elements of urban places, which function as a pull factor for highly-skilled migrants.

Besides its economic determinism, global city studies are also critiqued for only focusing on a few cities, studies frequently referencing famous cities in Sassen's work; New York, London, and Tokyo (Schiller and Caglar 2009; Robinson 2002). As Savage et al. (2004) pointed out, this approach poses the risk of neglecting middle-ranking urban places that are increasingly taking an important place in the global economic network. Furthermore, in the works of Sassen and the following scholars, the boundary drawn between global and non-global ones is far from being clear; the fluidity allows room for diverse global city lists. Sassen (2005) sees the fluidity of boundaries as a result of the temporality of globality of cities such that cities may gain and also may lose global character over time; while some cities fade away from the global economic system, some others emerge as geographies of attraction for international conglomerates.

In Chapter 4, I explain that to remedy the shortcomings of the global city concept -namely economic determinism, which sees migrants and migration in international cities as a secondary topic, associating migrants with polarisation and segregation, limiting global cities to some well-known ones which prevent researchers from analyzing the cities where migrants and migration constitutes a crucial part in globality of the city- operationalise the concept in conjunction with the city-scaling approach of Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) in my description of the Brussels context.

Against this background, I draw on the city-scaling approach developed by Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009), which allows categorising any city as global on the ground that urban places are no longer immune from the effects of globalisation. The approach does not necessitate a distinction between global cities and non-global ones. The authors propose that instead of designating a limited number of cities as global, all cities can be positioned on a continuum of power hierarchies that indicates the relative globality of urban geographies in relation to the availability of pathways for migrant incorporation. It sees the relationship between urban transformation and migrant incorporation as mutually reinforcing, shaping each other. That is to say, migrants are not only figures of labour in the global cities, but they contribute to the social, political, and economic positioning of cities in the global power system with their agency. Glick-Schiller and Caglar build the city-scaling theory on the neoliberal urban restructuring approach that highlights capital's implications in the contemporary city transformation process. In this context, all cities, regardless of their strategic positions in industrial production, which was the denominator of a city's place in the international economic system in the past, compete to attract global capital by serving a conducive economic, social, and political infrastructure. One essential aspect of neoliberal urbanism is its emphasis on cities' historical and structural features. Particularities of each city have a say in its position in the global power system, and local authorities present these particularities as added values for cities to take a higher place in the global power system. Glick-Schiller and Caglar's theory sees migrants as part of the historical and structural legacies of the city and active agents in the city-scaling process stressing that migrants enhance the attractiveness of cities for the global economy by adding to cultural diversity and by enlarging transnational connections. 'Migrants contribute to the positioning of cities in national and global markets and within national, regional and global hierarchies as they labour, produce wealth, raise families, and create and reproduce social institutions' (Glick-Schiller and Caglar 2009:189).

On the other side, cities offer different incorporation pathways to migrants from diverse backgrounds, given the wide range of opportunities such as housing, neighbourhoods, jobs, education, and social and cultural life.

The theory argues that the availability of pathways for migrant incorporation positively correlates with the status of cities on the continuum of the power hierarchy. The cities closer to the low end of the continuum present limited incorporation pathways. Conversely, the more a city is situated towards the high end, the more pathways become available for the migrant inhabitants of that locality. Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) also note that geographic space and population sizes are not always indicators for the position of a city on the continuum because, even though some cities are small in size in terms of population and geography, their high accumulation of economic, political, and cultural capital put them to a higher place on the continuum.

City-scaling theory analyses cities as four groups that are defined in relation to each other rather than as distinct categories. In this sense, cities at the very high end of the continuum are top-scale cities, characterised by their importance for new global industries and large amounts of cultural and political capital. They present the broadest avenues for migrant local incorporation and transnational connections. The best examples of top-scale cities are London, Paris, and New York. These cities attract high-skilled, well-educated migrants for transnational agglomerates and, at the same time, low-skilled ones to support low-wage sectors. Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are salient features of top-scale cities. The second category on the continuum is called up-scale cities. They are the cities in the process of generating new global industries and increasing cultural and political capital, for which they need both high-skilled and low-skilled migrant labour. These cities also provide a wide range

of pathways for incorporation and strategically benefit from their diverse migrant population to maintain an up-scale position. To this end, they collaborate with ethnic organisations to increase the diversity of the workforce on the one hand and on the other, advertise diversity to promote the city. The third group is composed of low-scale cities that generally have a single new type of industry that is yet small in size. These cities rely on migrant talent to reposition and rebrand themselves in the global economic system but what they can offer to migrants is limited in scope. Lastly, at the low end of the continuum, there are localities called down-scale cities which have not yet developed new economy industries and henceforth could not provide significant employment opportunities and are consequently unable to attract high-skilled migrants. Thus, they cannot benefit from the cosmopolitan image that migrants would provide to the city.

To recap, in this section, I explained the approach I took in this study while examining the Brussels context of belonging; I analyze the context with the combination of the concept of the global city and city-scaling approach, which allows me to make an analysis of the city with a migrant-centred view. Against the background explained in this section, I will lay down the city's relationship with migrant belonging by interrogating cosmopolitanism and localism in the next section.

2.3.1 Cosmopolitanism and localism as two aspects of global cities

Global cities, on the one hand, with their multi-ethnic, multi-cultural composition, appeal to those who are longing for a cosmopolitan way of life; on the other, with their spatially segregated neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves serve as secure places for low-skilled migrants who look for an emotionally, socially and economically “secure” location in an unfamiliar metropolitan environment. As pointed out by Sassen (2005), the global city is “a strategic

terrain for a whole series of conflicts and contradictions” (p. 39), a place where cosmopolitan and local outlooks can be observed side by side. This is mainly because global city contains migrants from a wide spectrum; both professionals with high salaries as well as low-wage workers; highly educated ones and ones with limited education; conservatives and progressives; religious and secular ones; left-wing and right-wing ideologies and all find a place for themselves in global cities. I suggest that global cities are excellent places to analyse how different segments of migrants embrace or reject the influences of globalisation and how these interactions shape their sense of belonging. Cosmopolitan migrants constitute one of these segments, and they are the ones who look for “a society in which cosmopolitan values rate more highly than national values” (Beck, 2000b, 97). This does not mean that cosmopolitan migrants are only available in global cities, but I mean that some environments are more suitable for cosmopolitan lifestyles and that global cities are among them (Baas et al. 2020). Within this view, this thesis analyses cosmopolitan belonging as one of the dimensions of migrant belonging in global cities.

Although its origin goes back to the Greek Stoics, cosmopolitanism has been a reinvented concept in the last decades and has been instrumentalised widely alongside globalisation, universalism, and transnationalism (Beck 2006). This elusive and contested term speaks to a wide range of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, and political science, and is used in various contexts in everyday language. Cosmopolitanism is conceptualised with various adjectives that highlight different approaches to the term like rooted cosmopolitanism, vernacular cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan ethnicity, neo-cosmopolitanism, realistic cosmopolitanism, thin/cool cosmopolitanism, working-class cosmopolitanism, etc. (Vertovec and Cohen 2002).

Hannerz (1992) defines cosmopolitans in relation to locals such that while the former refers to the ones 'willing to engage with the other', the latter describes 'representatives of more circumscribed territorial cultures' (p. 252). The term cosmopolitan is historically associated with travelling and hence experiencing and appreciating different cultures, but which portion of travellers are cosmopolitans is a contested issue in the current scholarship. In the past, travel was a luxury experience limited to a small segment of societies, but the immense developments in commuting technology have made travelling a banal experience open to almost all people in different parts of the world. Vertovec and Cohen (2002) describe those traditional cosmopolitans as "privileged, bourgeois, politically uncommitted elites. They have been associated with the wealthy, jet setters, corporate managers, intergovernmental bureaucrats, artists, tax dodgers, academics, and intellectuals" (p.6). The mentioned description fits into the understanding that a cosmopolitan way of life is available to an elite group who are affluent enough to travel to different locations outside their native country and thus get familiar with and open to other cultures.

On the other hand, scholars like Werbner (2006) critique the elitist and Euro-centric approach to the term and argue that cosmopolitanism exists within very different human groups, including working-class people, religious groups, migrants, and in other parts of the world. Werbner puts those new forms of cosmopolitanism -that are referred to with different concepts such as rooted cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan ethnicity, cosmopolitan patriotism, and working-class cosmopolitanism- under the same umbrella because all these forms rest on the claim that cosmopolitanism is not restricted to a specific elite group and that it does not necessitate a total detachment from one's culture or origin. For instance, Werbner illustrates working-class cosmopolitanism with a Pakistani migrant worker in a Gulf country who is open to diverse cultures and, at the same time, maintains his identity as a Sufi. Similarly, the author

exemplifies vernacular cosmopolitanism by referring to Kalanga elites in Botswana, a highly educated elite minority who is liberal and tolerant of different cultures and, at the same time, attached to their vernacular culture. Both examples can also be presented as rooted cosmopolitanism, in which attachment to roots comes up as the distinguishing characteristic in contrast to the usual understanding of the concept. Rooted cosmopolitanism is noted in the literature as a form that combines feelings of belonging and loyalty to a particular culture with openness towards others (Werbner 2006; Roudometof 2005). At this point, Roudometof (2005) urges us that, in these forms of cosmopolitanism, the feeling of belonging to a place or a nation does not amount to ethnocentrism but relates to patriotism. Although place attachment reminds us of locals, Roudometof (2005) underlines that it is the type and the degree of attachment that differs cosmopolitanism from its opposite, localism. That is, cosmopolitans are more likely to have a lower degree of attachment to a locality, whereas locals tend to develop a stronger sense of belonging to the place they live in. He also argues that attachment to a state is more salient in locals and that cosmopolitans tend to attach more value to post-national citizenship. Nevertheless, studies point to a more complex and nuanced relationship between place attachment and mobility (Gustafson 2001) and how “roots and routes” shape the cosmopolitan outlook of today’s societies (Beck and Sznaider 2006).

As “roots and routes” cannot be neglected in the post-colonial understandings of cosmopolitanism (Beck 2000) and that migration by definition relates to roots and movement (Fortier 1997), migrants are a group of people where we can see different types of cosmopolitanism. Migration refers to an “origin” and “travelling”, albeit migrant travel mostly reminds us of a more difficult journey than classic cosmopolitan travel. Migrants flee their countries, escape from wars, disasters, or an authoritarian regime, exploit irregular routes to reach their destination, and the risk of exclusion, discrimination and the challenge of

integration is always there. Furthermore, they are often illustrated as a disadvantaged group with limited education and socioeconomic resources, lacking adaptation capability to the places they migrate. The above-mentioned stereotypical image generally leads us to categorically exclude migrants from cosmopolitans in its classic sense as an affluent group neglecting the existence of different segments of migrants with cosmopolitan aspirations, such as students, artists, academics and professionals who fit into the definition of cosmopolitanism “an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness towards divergent cultural experiences” (Hannerz 1990: 239).

On the other hand, there exists literature on migrant working-class cosmopolitans, such as the study by Wise (2016), where she analyses migrant workers in Singapur, and another by Datta (2009), which focused on the East European construction workers in London. Vertovec and Cohen (2002) stress migrants and refugees while indicating the increasing recognition of a wide variety of non-elites that hold cosmopolitan practices, dispositions, and philosophies. Unlike in the old times when wars or famine was the leading cause of migration, in the contemporary era, migration takes place for plenty of reasons ranging from education and lifestyle to political oppression, gender issues, sexual orientation, and climate change. The globalised world has made it easier for people to migrate to any place they can financially afford. The cost of travelling is relatively much lower in comparison to old times, which has changed the cliché that migration takes place from Global South to Global North and that only poor people with low human capital migrate (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014).

In this section, I showed how global cities, being places very open to the impacts of globalisation without losing local features, provide proper ground for both local and cosmopolitan belonging and that, in migrants’ case, cosmopolitanism can take various forms

beyond the term's classic definition. I will benefit from this background while explaining divergent modes of belonging within the Brussels Turkish community.

This brought me to the end of Part II, where I focused on my second concept, the global city, which constitutes one of the three main concepts – the sense of belonging, global city, and (in-group) diversity- on which this thesis stands. In the next part (Part III), I will dwell on the third and the last concept; (in-group) diversity.

2.4 PART III: (In-group) Diversity

This thesis draws on diversity (Vertovec 2011) to explain the contemporary proliferation of migrant heterogeneities in urban places; more specifically, it uses diversity to explain the situation in Brussels with regard to the city's socio-cultural context and political structure. Furthermore, it borrows the concept of “in-group diversity” (Crul 2019 and 2016) to explain how heterogeneities diffuse within the ethnic migrant communities, how this process transforms the ethnic communities, and how this transformation reflects on their belonging. Namely, in this thesis, in-group diversity is deployed to investigate diversity within the Brussels Turkish community and to see if this leads us to revisit our single explanation for the community's belonging.

2.4.1 Diversity as a concept

Literature links the acceleration of diversification in urban places to globalisation, emphasising that as moving across borders has become technologically easier and faster, and financially more affordable, people from various occupational, socio-cultural, educational, and political backgrounds find the opportunity to migrate from many geographical locations across the world to urban areas (Vertovec 2011; Faist 2009; Sassen 2005). A growing literature points to

the diversity in big cities in Western Europe, underlining that in addition to the migrants fleeing war-torn, politically unstable or economically deprived countries, students searching for better education opportunities, professionals looking for jobs, retired people desiring to move to warmer climates, lifestyle seekers longing for a cosmopolitan environment and so on, move to cities to fulfil their expectations where opportunities are more expansive than in rural areas (Foner et al. 2019; Vertovec 2019; Ireland 2017; Faist 2009) Thus, particularly in global cities, diversity shows itself in terms of education, employability skills, social class, gender, political ideology, lifestyle, legal status, etc., and beyond ethnicity. Further, diversification does not only happen through human movement but also through money, economical material, ideas, information, cultural products, belief systems and ideologies that flow into cities and turn urban places into hubs of differences (Urry 2002). Against this background, Vertovec (2007) asserts that heterogeneities in urban areas are far beyond the level in the past and calls state of the art super-diversity, which he defines as such.

“differential immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, divergent labour market experiences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents... The dynamic interaction of these variables is what is meant by “super-diversity”” (p.1025).

As seen from the definition, Vertovec’s super-diversity is not necessarily a concept pointing at the only proliferation of diversity in people but includes structural diversities and the dynamic interactions that come with it. On the other hand, Faist (2009) uses diversity as more than a concept putting it forward as a theoretical approach claiming that diversification generates a natural response from societal organisations to meet the divergent demands emanating from different conditions of migrants in urban places. For instance, hospitals consider hiring

employees who can communicate in migrants' languages. As indicated below in Faist's words, institutions themselves feel required to adapt to the needs of migrants.

"A diversity perspective, by contrast, takes the already existing skills and experiences of migrants as the starting point and interprets them as competencies to be used by organisations. It thus assumes that the institutions of the majority society must also adapt and accommodate for migrant experiences, implicitly referring to the need for mutual adjustment, albeit in an asymmetric way." (Faist 2009:175)

Diversity is not always used in a positive sense; literature underlines that it may come with segregation, inequality, prejudice and discrimination in global cities (Sassen 2018 and 2005; Ireland 2017; Vertovec 2011). Given that globalisation assumed global cities with the role of being transnational economic and financial centres, the spectrum for employment in these cities has become so broad as to include diverse talents from high-income professionals, experts, and artists to low-skilled workers with limited education and temporary employees. In addition to the visible aspect of global cities where plazas and headquarters of agglomerates are on the scene, they are home to large infrastructure and business sectors; in the words of Boudreau et al. (2009), global cities "become the political place where the dirty work of globalisation is being done" (p. 23). Diversity, on the one hand, gives cities a multicultural character, which is considered an asset for attracting global workforce; on the other, it brings polarisation of the society on economic, social and ethnic bases, and socio-spatial segregation in the city in the forms of the affluent central part and economically deprived ethnic enclaves. In sum, the advantages and challenges brought to cities by diversity are topics for discussion by policymakers and scholars (Ireland 2017; Kymlicka 2012). Brussels, for example, is characterised by its fragmented socio-spatial outlook (Bousetta et al. 2018), which will be analysed in Chapter 4 of this thesis in the framework of the global city context.

Besides diversity, multiculturalism is widely used to refer to the socio-political landscape of global cities, including in this thesis. Therefore, in the next section, I will compare the two concepts.

2.4.2 Diversity and Multiculturalism

Diversity and multiculturalism have been two concepts used in the literature to describe the proliferation of heterogeneities in urban places, and both are referred to as products of globalisation (Yuval-Davis 2006). Multiculturalism, in its elementary definition, refers to “a de facto situation marked by the coexistence of groups associated with culturally distinct heritages” (Bousetta and Jacobs 2006:26). In this scope, multiculturalism implies an ethnic lens such that it reminds coexistence of multiple ethnic cultures in one polity, for which the condition that Turkish culture, Moroccan culture, Polish culture, Italian culture live side by side in Brussels can be given as an example. However, diversity has a broader meaning: it refers to any heterogeneity beyond ethnicity.

Multiculturalism is used with two different meanings in the literature. In one sense, it is employed with reference to a liberal state policy which recognises migrant groups as distinct cultures and handles their incorporation as such, and in another sense, it refers to the philosophy that describes the contemporary reality of diverse, multicultural societies (Modood 2007 and 2013; Parekh 2008; Kymlicka 2012). Multiculturalism was first officially adopted by Sweden in Europe as a policy to manage the integration of immigrants at the end of the 1970s and then entered the policies of other European countries, albeit to different degrees. Bousetta and Jacobs (2006) point out that Belgium’s approach to multiculturalism was very much influenced by the need for a consensus between two different integration ideologies of two constituent communities, Walloons and Flemings, and the policy came forward on a case-by-case basis,

such as in the discussions on anti-discrimination, religious rights and right to vote. While the policy was a highly regarded one in Western Europe in the 1990s, it came down as a state policy at the beginning of the 2000s, which was explicitly announced by politicians like Merkel and Cameron with the famous phrase, “multiculturalism is dead” (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). The argument that it opens the gate for segregation, extremism and poverty, and thus hinders integration, was at the forefront, but literature often notes that this is not supported by sound empirical research (Vermeulen 2018; Bloemraad et al. 2008).

Indeed, Faist’s (2009) perception of diversity, which highlights the adaptation of societal organisations to migrant diversity, intersects with multiculturalism. Still, it is different in the sense that in the case of multiculturalist policies, the state is the leading actor in the management of the policy; however, in Faist’s theorisation, it is a natural bottom-up process emanating from the needs of society and implemented by organisations.

In this thesis, multiculturalism is used in both meanings depending on the context; as a policy, while referring to some integration policies in Belgium and as a concept to read the general outlook of the society in Brussels, which is multicultural by nature.

Literature also touches upon the relationship between multiculturalism and belonging (Parekh 2008; Yuval-Davis 2006). Parekh (2008) argues that multiculturalism better corresponds with a multidimensional sense of belonging, saying that migrants and ethnic communities “should also see their country of settlement as their home, whatever other homes they might also happen to have” (pp. 88-89). Similarly, Yuval-Davis (2006) sees multiculturalism, globalisation, and the sense of belonging as closely related phenomena such that globalisation enables the formation of multicultural societies in urban areas, and in turn, a multicultural environment

makes urban areas points of attraction for diverse groups of migrants to where they feel belong. Stuart Hall labels the new reality in contemporary societies as ‘the multicultural question’ that needs to be handled to ensure people can maintain a life in difference.

‘What are the terms for groups of people from different cultural, religious, linguistic, and historical backgrounds, who have applied to occupy the same social space, whether that is a city or a nation or a region, to live with one another without either one group [the less powerful group] having to become the imitative version of the dominant one/i.e. an assimilationism/or, on the other hand, the two groups hating one another, or projecting images of degradation? In other words, how can people live together in difference?’ (Hall 2004, cited in Yuval-Davis 2011:34).

2.4.3 In-group diversity in ethnic communities

As indicated in the section above, a large amount of literature is available on migrant diversity in cities; however, they either point to ethnic diversity or refer to increasing diversification based on usual features such as generation, religion, education level and linguistic skills (Vertovec 2007; Faist 2010). There is hardly any literature investigating the ways in which diversification affects the internal composition of ethnic communities, how it causes change within the communities, and if this requires us to revisit our stereotypical discourses on integration and belonging of ethnic communities. Against this backdrop, in this section, I introduce the reader to the concept of in-group diversity (Crul 2019), which is used in this thesis to explain diversification within the Turkish community in Brussels. To clarify, this thesis uses the term “diversity” to describe migrant heterogeneity in global cities in any aspect and “in-group diversity” to explain the internal change the ethnic communities have gone through based on within-group heterogeneities, as put forward in Chapter 3.

In-group diversity is an under-researched phenomenon, albeit a group of scholars point at it as the state-of-the-art for migrant groups in cities and call for a new approach beyond the ethnic lens, which is critiqued as a factor that prevents researchers from uncovering heterogeneities in migrant groups (Crul 2019 and 2016; Wimmer 2013; Schiller and Caglar 2009; Verkuyten 1991). Wimmer (2013), for example, in his critique of the ethnic lens in research on migrant integration, argues that taking ethnic groups as a unit of analysis and investigating how different ethnic groups integrate into various forms obscure us to see what is happening within ethnic groups and to explore the underlying dynamics.

Diversity in cities based on ethnicity has gained momentum after the 1980s when migration flow changed from ‘large numbers moving from particular places to particular places’ to ‘small numbers moving from many places to many places’ (Vertovec 2010a: 3,4). Thus, old understandings that link certain ethnic groups with certain places have lost their validity, particularly in large cities such as London, Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and New York. In some of these cities, diversity has reached such a level that neither natives nor any other ethnicity remain large enough to constitute the majority of the population. Crul (2016) calls these cities majority-minority cities, for which the author indicates Brussels as one of the best examples in Europe, where migrants compose approximately 60 per cent of the population (The Belgian Statistical Office). Crul notes that in these super-diverse cities, it is difficult to talk about a clear majority group into which migrants are expected to integrate; therefore, pressure to integrate is less intense. The group into which migrants integrate is usually “an amalgam of people of different ethnic backgrounds, migration cohorts, migration statuses and socio-economic positions” (p. 57).

Besides ethnic diversification, Crul (2016) stresses a further situation: growing heterogeneities within ethnic groups. The author asserts that heterogeneity in ethnic groups is undeniably visible and ever-growing and explains the process of diversification as such: New first generations continue to come to cities in various ways, and those new migrants coming from the same country are significantly different in terms of socio-political circumstances that motivate them to migrate from the ones who had come in the earlier migration waves, and thus, ethnic communities have diversified in many respects; age, gender, education, lifestyle, values, skills, identity, ideology, socio-economic background, reason of and expectation from migration, etc. Crul (2016), referring to Glick-Schiller and Caglar, claims that it does not make sense to think of migrants from the same ethnic or national background as homogenous while conducting research; therefore, we need new theoretical perspectives to investigate this new reality.

This contemporary situation of in-group diversity urges us to investigate ethnic communities internally. Brubaker (2002) underlines that groupism is taken for granted in social sciences, which refers to a tendency that looks at ethnic groups as “discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis” (p.164). The tendency for ethnic groupism also applies to migration studies such that research findings are generalised for all migrants from a particular country as if they all display similar characteristics and the same social identity and follow the same pathway in integration and belonging processes.

In this thesis, I use the concepts of diversity and in-group diversity to argue first that Brussels is a city that accommodates diversity through its multicultural and inclusive socio-political

context. Secondly and very important to this thesis's main argument, I stress that when we put aside the ethnic lens and take the lens of in-group diversity, we see that the Brussels Turkish community comprises various segments with different characteristics and different socio-spatial choices in the city. I will explain this in detail in Chapter 3.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to critically discuss the literature within the limits of this thesis. I framed my discussion with three core concepts on which this thesis rests: the migrant sense of belonging, in-group diversity, and global city. My review has shown that in-group diversity in ethnic communities living in global cities is an under-researched phenomenon, despite the fact that a burgeoning literature points at it as an ever-growing phenomenon that requires an analytical approach beyond the ethnic lens. That is, ethnic migrant communities are going through an internal change because of in-group diversity, and therefore, taking ethnic communities as homogenous intact groups would prevent researchers from revealing the very nature of belonging within ethnic communities. Despite a few scholars' theoretical emphases on in-group diversity, empirical research on the relationship between in-group diversity and belonging is lacking. This is one of the gaps in the literature my study aims to contribute. I followed the suggestion by scholars like Crul, Wimmer, Glick-Schiller and Caglar that migration researchers should look at migrant communities beyond the ethnic lens to see the internal dynamics of migrant groups. With this perspective, I looked into the Brussels Turkish community and demonstrated that the community involves a vast diversity, and further, it is split into distinct sub-groups with distinct characteristics.

Another contribution this research makes to the literature is refuting stereotypical perceptions about ethnic migrant groups and their belonging. Literature usually reflects a certain image of

migrants; for example, in the case of Turkish migrants, this image is constructed around guest workers of the 1960s. The image perpetuates if researchers take ethnic enclaves in global cities as representative of the community. I do not analyse the Brussels Turkish community only in Schaerbeek but include the segments residing in other parts of the city, which are invisible to the literature. Further, I have shown that each segment presents a distinct mode of belonging, by which I also refute the stereotypical perception about Turkish migrants that their attachment is predominantly towards the country of origin.

In the next chapter (Chapter 3), I will explain the methodological approach I follow in this project.

Chapter 3

Analysing the Belonging of an Ethnic Community in a Global City with the Lens of In-group Diversity

3.1 Introduction

Moving on from the literature review, which provides the necessary background for this thesis researching sense of belonging of the Turkish migrant community in Brussels through the prism of within-group diversity, this chapter discusses the methodological framework of this research project. It explains the research design, which is qualitative research based on a single case study, data collection techniques – primarily semi-structured interviewing, supplemented with participant observation –, purposive sampling as the sampling method, snowballing as the informant recruiting technique, data processing, and data analysis. The chapter also discusses the issues of positionality and reflexivity, ethical considerations, and the limitations that came up during the research.

This chapter consists of three parts. Part I explains the methodological approach and data collection techniques. Part II conceptually defines the research population and the research site, focuses on sampling criteria and informant recruiting technique and explains data analysis. Part III deals with positionality, ethics, and limitations to the research.

3.2 PART I

3.2.1 Research Design

This research is conducted with a qualitative approach focusing on a single case study in a single research site, namely Turkish migrants in Brussels. The very aim of my research guided me in my decision for qualitative methodology rather than a quantitative one. I wanted to analyse the phenomenon of belonging through the eyes of migrants. Researchers decide which method suits their studies by considering their research purpose, questions, and design (Morawska 2018). While quantitative research usually aims at testing theories through a deductive analysis of data, in qualitative research, data collected from individuals is usually analysed inductively to build conceptual relations or develop approaches (Iosifides 2018). Qualitative research “is mostly interested in how actors construct and interpret the world surrounding them, and how these interpretations affect their actions, identities and everyday experiences” (Barglowski 2018:154). I wanted to investigate migrant belonging with a migrant-centred approach, that is, by learning their perceptions, observations, experiences, and interpretations on the topic. In this view, the room qualitative research provides to informants to add their voices to the study served my purpose. At this point, I want to underline that I am looking at the migrant sense of belonging broadly through political science.

This research epistemologically follows an interpretivist approach highlighted as coherent with qualitative research (Bhattacharjee 2012; Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). Interpretivism stands on the ontological perspective that “reality is confined to agential action governed by subjective and inter-subjective interpretations and meaning” (Iosifides 2018:94).

I followed, in general, an inductive approach in my analysis, as I did not have a clear hypothesis or a theory to test at the beginning of the research, and my conceptual framework emerged

through my interpretation of the data during the research process. Before starting the fieldwork, I designed the research based on my literature review and my experiences and observations on the Brussels Turkish community. Then, I refined the topic and inductively built the conceptual framework as the research proceeded. However, I used inductive and deductive reasoning combined during different research cycles. Wengraf (2001) defines the inductivist model as a common-sensical model in which “theory emerges by a process of ‘induction’. The facts are believed to suggest -or even ‘require’ or ‘dictate’- the theorization” (p.2). The author also adds that researchers use inductivist and deductivist models at different stages of the same research. Similarly, Bhattacharjee (2012) describes qualitative research as a cyclic process where researchers move back and forth between theories and observations where both inductive and deductive reasoning are applied.

Case Study

To investigate the sense of belonging in ethnic migrant communities in global cities, I selected the Turkish migrant community in Brussels as my case study. Literature underlines the relevance of the case to the research question, research design and methods (Barglowski 2018). My case study is a descriptive one in the sense that it was “not organised around a central overarching causal hypothesis or theory” (Gerring 2016:57). Cases “are definable only by reference to a particular proposition and a corresponding research design” (Gerring 2004:342). I constructed the case at two levels: 1) the site of study and 2) the migrant group. Since the geographic context of my research was global cities, I chose Brussels as the locale and identified the city as such. Studying Brussels as a context for migrant belonging, along with its interaction with national, transnational and supranational levels, helped me avoid methodological nationalism, which refers to “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 302).

For the migrant community, I needed a large group to see how different members of the group interact with the city and, thus, to be able to analyse the impact of the global city context on their sense of belonging at different levels. Statistics point to Moroccans and Turks as the largest non-EU ethnic groups in Brussels (Statbel, 2021). For qualitative research composed of interviews and participant observations, the Turkish community was suitable for me, given that I am a member of the community and can speak the Turkish language. At first sight, my selection of the migrant group may invoke the discussion that critiques the practice of too much focus on ethnicity in migration research (Jacobs 2018; Barglowski 2018). However, my choice of an ethnic group aims to challenge the ethnic lens itself. Indeed, I had suspected a vast diversity within the ethnic group before starting the research, and then, when I started it, I realised just how very clearly and strongly it came out.

I modified the unit of analysis after the pilot study. Curtis et al. (2000) indicate that samples are decided based on a “theoretical framework, which underpins the research question from the outset or by an evolving theory which is derived inductively from the data as the research proceeds” (p. 1002). At the beginning of the research, my unit of analysis was the Turkish community in Brussels, whereas, after the pilot study, as my preliminary findings suggested, I discovered the sub-groups in the community and shifted my unit of analysis to those sub-groups. I subsequently redesigned the sample based on a purposive sampling strategy, which I explain later in this chapter in detail.

Based on this framework, I will explain in the following section the data collection techniques - semi-structured interviewing as the primary method and participant observations as the supporting method.

3.2.2 Semi-structured interviewing

Interviewing has been a widely used data collection technique in qualitative research in migration studies. It renders collaborative knowledge production, allowing respondents to actively contribute by bringing in their own voices. Different from more standardised methods such as surveys, respondents can add to the research inquiry by unveiling data that would otherwise remain off the researcher's radar (Fedyuk and Zentai 2018:172). The degree of flexibility provided to respondents depends on the interview type chosen for the research. Ruane (2005) points to the research goal as a precursor for the choice of interview type. Unstructured interviewing better serves explanatory research in that it helps describe a phenomenon comprehensively and enables researchers to grasp the interviewee's experience or viewpoint deeply. On the other side, structured interviewing may be a more effective tool for an overall picture of a research population concerning their values and perspectives. It also better serves to quantify data collected from informants. However, standardised questions and answers in structured interviews limit the convenience of extracting respondents' views but only checking the boxes provided. (Ruane 2005:149-154)

I opted for the third option, *semi-structured interviewing*, which allows combining the advantages of the previous two. In this type, a list of open-ended questions guides conversations and keeps the respondents close to the topic, and subsequent questions are improvised during the interview carefully in the framework of the research topic (Wengraf 2001:5). Flexibility of the interview style allows the researched to express viewpoints and broaden the discussion by bringing in their reflections.

Semi-structured interviewing has proved to be an appropriate choice for my research goal to explore respondents' genuine views as it allows them to bring forward the overlooked aspects

of the topic, which helped me to develop my research better. In this way, I could gradually build the conceptual structure and further configure the research design based on the knowledge produced in the course of the fieldwork. Semi-structured interviewing enables researchers to see overlooked aspects of the topic, which shapes the conceptualisation and theorisation through the research process (Fedyuk and Zentai 2018).

The interviews were in-person and on video-conferencing online applications such as Zoom and WhatsApp where necessary. I will discuss and compare in-person interviews and online ones below in the section titled Sample Selection. The respondents often expressed their satisfaction with having a one-to-one conversation while expressing their feelings about attachment and their perceptions and criticisms regarding their community with the guarantee of remaining anonymous. They told me that in-group pressure often discourages them from voicing criticism in front of community members, a statement which I took as an indication of the suitability of the individual interview method for my research rather than focus groups. The focus group technique allows researchers to gather high-quality data by organising interactive discussions within small groups of people, usually on controversial issues and without much intervention (Frisina 2018). However, as I said, my informants were sensitive about the privacy of the conversations, and even in individual interviews, they were sometimes cautious about making their views explicit.

Conversations were tape-recorded on the condition that respondents agreed, and in any case, I took notes during the interviews and added my descriptions after the conversations. Wengraf (2001) takes attention to “the tone of voice and the speed of delivery, the silences, the hesitations, the mode of delivery of the words”, which tells as much as the words themselves and suggests making immediate notes after each session to catch all realities surrounding the

interview. I tried to make “thick descriptions” (Geertz 1973) to portray in detail the unspoken part of the fieldwork, that is to say, background information and my observations about the respondents, the context in which the interviews took place and the relevant circumstances that help data exploration.

I prepared a set of open-ended questions that would allow respondents to express views and experiences in their own way and also allow me to manage the flow of conversation. Furthermore, I rearranged the list after a pilot study of around 10 interviews, which helped me to refine the questions, thus, get the most out of the interviews. I arranged my interview questions in a way to collect data on different dimensions of migrant belonging -local, national, transnational, and supranational- from migrants’ perspectives; how they see their belonging, what tangible and intangible factors affect their attachment, what role residing in a global city plays in the process of belonging, if a particular location or neighbourhood in Brussels feels home for them, etc. To extract their views on the topic, I prepared questions to prompt them to talk about their socio-political integration, transnational engagements, interest in socio-political matters in the neighbourhood they live in, in Brussels, Belgium, and Türkiye, and their perceptions about the EU. I asked questions to understand if they are interested in only migrant-related issues in the city or if they pay attention to issues wider in scope. I interrogated their political interest; if the interest is Brussels/Belgium oriented or if they are more inclined towards home-country politics. I also talked with them to understand how they identify with Brussels, Belgium, Türkiye, and the EU, how they identify with Schaerbeek ethnic enclave, how they combine their transnational attachment with neighbourhood-level, city-level, and state-level attachment, which ones go along with each well. I also asked questions to understand what the EU meant to them.

As done by Savage et al. (2005) in their study on belonging, I refrained from asking questions directly about their sense of belonging but asked broader questions to let them talk about belonging in their way. In line with this, Morawska (2018) comments that “When respondents suggest that they identify with the host country, one should seek to ascertain which qualities, specifically, they identify with and whether there are any aspects of the public and private lifestyles characteristic of their new environment that remain alien to them (and if so, why).” (p. 123). Following Morawska’s suggestion, for instance, I opened a conversation on languages and, by this, tried to understand how much they rely on their native language and how much on the language of their country of residence in their daily lives.

I did my best to manage the conversation to get the utmost in the framework of these sub-topics that would help me answer my main research question. I took my interview grid with me to every interview and benefitted from it to keep the conversations within the scope of my research, and at the same time, I did let my respondents enrich the interview with their experiences, opinions, and their life stories which they deem relevant to the topic. Some showed no interest in particular issues, such as Brussels politics or EU-level attachment. In those situations, I did not insist on chatting about the issues they were not interested in but diverted the conversation in a direction where they would willingly talk. For example, socially isolated women in Schaerbeek were very keen on telling me their life histories. I respectfully listened to them, asked my questions where possible, and realised that they felt more comfortable seeing my empathy for them and showed eagerness to maintain the conversation.

3.2.3 Participant observation as the secondary method

Semi-structured interviewing being the primary research method, I also did participant observations in the scope of my fieldwork. Literature highlights that participant observation

can be combined with several other research methods, such as interviews, surveys, document reviews etc., to strengthen the research findings and to support validation (Boccagni and Schrooten 2018; Adler and Adler 2000). Participant observation is “a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture” (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002:1). It differs from interviews in that it allows researchers to join the social world of the research population, observe them in their natural environment in extended periods and collect information beyond what has been said by interviewees, and thus, it increases researcher’s ability to make judgements (Boccagni and Schrooten 2018; Baker 2006).

During participant observations, I assumed, in Baker’s words (2006), a “fluid role” depending on the context of the event. As I am already a member of the Turkish community in Brussels, in some situations, my role as a researcher was overt, meaning that some participants already knew that I was there for research purposes, as was the case in some gatherings that otherwise I would not be able to attend, like some birthday parties or wedding ceremonies. In some other, such as feast celebrations and children’s activities, which are open to the public, I did not need to share with anybody that I was there as a researcher.

My Turkish nationality, knowledge of the Turkish language and residency in Brussels were advantages in conducting participant observations; I could understand the conversations going around, make meaning from mimics and jests because of familiarity with the cultural codes of Turkish society, do small talks with my encounters, read ethnic newspapers, brochures, understand the announcements in the event area. All of these helped me in engaging with the context. Kawulich (2005) stresses the importance of knowing the language and being familiar with the cultural codes of informants to make the most out of participant observations.

However, the degree of my involvement was not the same for all segments of the Turkish community. Whilst I managed to do this relatively more straightforward with the group in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood because of their congregation in one specific location, I encountered some difficulty in reaching out to the activities of the other segments of the Turkish migrants which are scattered around the city with no concentration in specific neighbourhoods. The latter does not have ethnic organisations and ethnic media from which one can follow their events. I regularly checked Turkish-language newspapers to follow social events in Schaerbeek and attended them; visited local markets, butcheries, and shops; ate at ethnic restaurants and cafes; and, where possible, had chats with residents of Schaerbeek. Those visits gave me great insight into their thinking, lifestyle, level of integration and nature of belonging. I encountered their conversations on Brussels life, how they keep contact with Türkiye, witnessed their political engagement during local elections in 2018 in Belgium and also during Turkish presidential elections (via extraterritorial voting) in 2018, observed how they interact with the community members from outside of Schaerbeek, heard their perceptions about other groups in the Turkish community, other ethnic communities and natives in the city.

I participated in a number of social gatherings organised by the other two sub-groups, namely the religious sub-group and the secular sub-group, which mainly were birthday parties, celebrations, feasts, and dinners where I had the chance to make informal conversations with the group members. Particularly religious sub-group members were keen on inviting me to their houses, where I witnessed casual discussions on Turks' social and political adaptation to Belgian society and their ties with Türkiye. Turkish people indeed love to chat about integration, belonging, home country, and host country in informal environments; therefore, participant observations helped me a lot in gathering first-hand data that I would not be able to obtain from a formal interview. The socio-cultural heterogeneity of the Turkish community

may seem like a communication challenge for researchers. Conversations were indeed opened naturally with some; however, with others, I had to make a mental preparation beforehand.

During participant observations, another challenge, in some instances, was my complete participation in the activities as a group member (Adler and Adler 1994), which on the one hand, enabled me to collect very precious data; on the other, I had to be very careful not to violate my observer role (Spradley 1980).

Below are two examples from my field notes taken during participant observations.

I participated in a picnic celebrating the " Eid " religious feast on 20 August 2018.

I was invited to a picnic to celebrate the religious feast of “Eid” by one of my interviewees, Kubra. As I am also a Turkish citizen speaking Turkish and celebrating Eid, I thought they would not be bothered by my presence, and I accepted the invitation. The celebration was in a lovely park in the heart of Brussels. It was a group of around 12 adults and 10 children. They warmly welcomed me. The table was full of Turkish dishes; almost all were homemade. I saw some Pakistani food, and later on, I learned that it was prepared by one Turkish woman married to a Pakistani man. In one corner were bags with children's presents, and the place was decorated with balloons hung on trees. Kubra had told me it was a religious cohort, which I could understand from the headscarf-wearing women and the distanced social interaction between males and females. I was privileged because of my guest status; I know well from Turkish culture how guests are treated with respect and are given much attention.

I sat with the women, therefore, did not hear much of what the men were talking about. A conversation started at the women’s table about children and how they celebrate feasts abroad. They chatted long on this topic, saying they should teach children Turkish traditions; otherwise, European celebrations could easily attract them. They talked about Christmas celebrations and their impact on children; they said they should not stay segregated like Turks who came earlier; children should integrate and at the same time know their religion and traditions. I observed that they feel insecure when it comes to children. They want both; children to be good Muslims and, at the same time, integrate into the city. They suggested to each other some sports activities and music clubs in Brussels.

Some of them had come to Brussels recently, looking for jobs, complaining that it is difficult to find employment equivalent to their qualifications, a constant comparison between Türkiye and Belgium/Brussels was going on, and they expressed how much they miss some restaurants in Istanbul indicating that halal restaurants here are not to their taste. They started to talk about Türkiye's political and economic situation, and I could observe how concerned and sad they became once this topic was opened. They criticised what was happening to the rule of law and told stories about what happened to their relatives in Türkiye.

Then, they gave the children presents, and an older man distributed small amounts of money to them (giving money is also a Turkish tradition I remember from childhood). Children went to play in the playground, and adults continued their conversation while having tea.

Table 1. Field notes from my participant observation at the picnic celebrating the " Eid " religious feast on 20 August 2018.

My observations from the Schaerbeek neighborhood during the 2018 Belgian local elections campaigns.

I can see photos of Turkish-origin candidates in municipal elections on shop windows, thinking this is very much Turkish political culture. I entered a grocery; it had a lot of Turkish products, even the products one cannot easily find in an ordinary market in Turkey, for instance, dried eggplants to prepare "dolma" and Turkish parsley (the shape of parsley leaves here are a bit different and the smell is a bit mild), I took some parsley and approached to the middle-aged man at the counter. He talked with my son in Turkish, made jokes and gave him candy. When I attempted to pay for it, he said: "no, no, this is a gift from me to this lovely boy". I thanked him in Turkish, and then he showed me a poster on the shop window and said that the woman on the sign (standing for elections) was his relative. "We are proud of her," he said. I smiled, congratulated her, and wished her success in the elections. I got the idea that he was introducing her to the clients to make her known to Turkish people and, thus, to gather votes for her. Then, I entered a snack shop, a branch of a chain in Turkey. While waiting for my snack to be ready, I chatted with the young man at the counter and said I felt so happy to see this branch there. "It was my favourite in Turkey," I said.

Interestingly he started to talk to me about Turkish politics in a critical way. Usually, in Schaerbeek, people do not criticise Turkish politics openly. I suspect he understood that I was not from the neighbourhood, so he felt comfortable talking with me. He nodded his head with resentment and added, "It was obvious from the beginning I knew they would ruin the country. You see, what they are doing". He migrated relatively new because of economic difficulties in Turkey. Like in the previous market, some Turkish-origin candidates' posters were on his windows, but he did not talk about Belgian elections. I thought that he was mentally still in Turkey because he migrated recently.

Table 2: Fieldnotes from my participant observation from the Schaerbeek neighbourhood during the 2018 Belgian local elections campaigns.

I wrote similar field notes after my observations, which helped me to remember the event and analyse the data.

In this part, which is Part I, I defined my methodological approach and data collection techniques. In the following part, Part II, I will first conceptually define the research population and the research site, then explain sampling criteria and how I modified the criteria after realising that the Turkish community in Brussels contains three sub-groups, with detailed descriptions of the sub-groups. Finally, I will focus on my respondent recruiting technique, which is snowballing, and the data analysis technique.

3.2.4 Defining the research population: The Turkish migrant community in Brussels

In this thesis, I study the Turkish migrant community in Brussels. I chose this particular group because it is an understudied group, especially in terms of belonging. My review of the literature shows that the studies on Turkish migrants in Europe have been concentrated on Germany, Netherlands, France and Austria. There exist very few studies on Turks in Belgium (Brussels); the available ones are predominantly about their (non) integration into the native society (for example, Colak et al. 2020; Galle et al. 2019; D'hondt et al. 2017; Alanya et al. 2015). Also, I chose this group because I had the insight that it is not homogenous.

To define my research population thoroughly, I deem it necessary to clarify three conceptual issues inherited in the phrase “Turkish migrant community”. These are discussed in greater depth below. 1) The term “migrant” in this phrase is being used to refer to the ones who experienced migration and their descendants regardless of generation. However, even though the concept of “migrants” is often used in the literature and in public discourse to refer to the group this thesis is interested in, it technically represents only the people with migration experience. 2) The word “Turkish” literally refers to a specific ethnic origin in Türkiye, but in

this thesis and in general, it is used to refer to people originating from Türkiye, no matter what ethnic origin they have. 3) The word “community” has various meanings; in this thesis, it is used in the sense of Cohen’s (1985) symbolic community, which, I argue, is compatible with the phenomenon of within-group diversity (Crul 2016), a concept that is used in this thesis to stress the heterogeneities within contemporary migrant communities. Below I will focus on these three conceptual issues separately.

The concept of “migrant”: How to conceptualise people who have migration experience together with their descendants is a grey area in the literature and policy-making circles. To exemplify it, “second generation” is an often-used term, especially in the US context, to refer to the children of migrants and there exists a vast literature using this concept (see, for example, Thompson and Crul 2007; Portes and Rumbaut 2005; Farley and Alba 2002). On the other hand, since the beginning of the 2000s, the concept of “persons with a migration background” has emerged in German literature to denote individuals who were themselves born abroad or had one or two parents born abroad, and it entered into official German documents (Will 2019). Technically, the UN Migration Agency, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from their habitual place of residence, regardless of the person’s legal status; whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; what the causes for the movement are; or what the length of the stay is. Against this background, I align with the practical usage in the literature such that I use the concept of “migrant” in this thesis to refer to individuals with migration experience and their descendants, second and third generations.

The concept of community: In the literature, one can find various definitions of the term community from classic forms introduced by scholars such as Tonnies and Durkheim (Bender 1978), which in general, refers to close ties, shared beliefs, similar lifestyles and physical

proximity; to contemporary forms such as Anderson's (1983) 'imagined communities' which views the community as an imaginary in the minds of its members who might have never met in person. The Turkish community in Brussels is neither a village-like community in the classic sense of the term nor a nation-like large group that could be named an imagined community. Further, I will explain in this chapter under the section about sampling that the Turkish community is a very diverse group, and it contains social sub-groups with distinct characteristics, which have rare contact with each other. In this thesis, I analyse the Turkish community with reference to these sub-groups. With these in mind, I suggest that Cohen's symbolic community better speaks to the research population in this study, which I see as an intermediary between the classic understanding and the new definitions of the concept which refer to larger groups. Cohen (1985) defines symbolic community as follows;

"It is a largely mental construct, whose 'objective' manifestations in locality or ethnicity give it credibility. It is highly symbolised, with the consequence that its members can invest it with their selves. Its character is sufficiently malleable that it can accommodate all of its members' selves without them feeling their individuality to be overly compromised. Indeed, the gloss of commonality which it paints over its diverse components gives to each of them an additional referent for their identities" (p.109).

Cohen's understanding of community is symbolic in that it is not limited to geographic or sociographic boundaries but exists in the minds of its members and is shaped by the meanings its members attribute to it. In his approach, the community does not need to be an integrating mechanism; instead, it works as an aggregating instrument. Its members may vary in terms of behaviour and ideas; however, the success of a community is to embrace this variety without deteriorating its coherence which is defined by its boundaries (ibid. p. 20). Symbolic community is used here as an overarching term for Turks in Brussels as it is flexible enough to

embrace their ideological, social, political and religious heterogeneities while still collecting them together under the same symbolic umbrella of "being from Türkiye". This broad and flexible definition of community does not seek close ties between members but loosely bonds individuals together for symbolic resources. In this way, it is appropriate here in two ways; first, it technically permits to include of any individual as a member who thinks of themselves as part of the community, in my case, all Turkish migrants and their descendants in Brussels who identify with the "Turkish community", and second, the loose and umbrella-like structure of it allows divergent sub-groups to come together under a single broader label and at the same time preserve their distinctiveness under that label. Thus, it permits the study of the Turkish community's sub-groups with their distinct modes of belonging.

The concept of "Turkish": I am aware that the word "Turkish" is not an ethnically comprehensive term for the people originating from Türkiye, and literally, it does not comprise the other ethnicities from the country such as Kurds, Assyrians, Circassians, etc. In most research, "Turkish" indicates nationality unless the research is specifically about other ethnic groups from Türkiye. My approach to the issue is similar to Ersanilli and Saharso's (2011) approach in their study on Turkish immigrants in Germany, France and the Netherlands:

"For lack of a better alternative, we have, however, chosen to nevertheless use this term. Because of the sensitivity of the Kurdish question in Türkiye and the Turkish diaspora, and because this would divert too much from our actual research subject, we have not further explored respondents' identification with (sub)categories of the Turkish population" (p. 917).

Like Ersanilli and Saharso, my research subject is not related to ethnic origins or diversity in ethnic terms. I used the words "Turks, Turkish people, Turkish community" during the interviews while communicating with my respondents and did not encounter any negative reactions to my language.

3.2.5 Defining the research site: Brussels

It has been customary for migration studies to make analyses at the national level and take the ethnic group as the unit of analysis, like Mexicans in the United States, Turks in Germany, and Algerians in France. The expectation has been that Turks should integrate into Germany, Mexicans into the United States, Algerians into France, etc. However, city-level research is getting more and more attention from academia as it is an effective prism to analyse migrants in various neighbourhoods with a closer look (Ireland 2017; Cinalli and El Hariri 2011). In this view, I chose Brussels as my research site.

In the context of Brussels, I studied different modes of belonging within the Turkish community, including its transborder dimensions, which speaks to my aim of not falling into methodological nationalism in my research. A growing body of literature (Sager 2021; Vertovec 2020; Wiess and Nohl 2012; Beck 2007; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) argues that giving too much credit to the role of the nation-state brings the risk of falling into the trap of methodological nationalism, a concept defined by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002:302) as “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world”. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) see methodological nationalism as an obstacle limiting the horizons of analysis to state borders and thus missing out on transborder connections of migrants, highlighting that “The social sciences have become obsessed with describing processes within nation-state boundaries as contrasted with those outside, and have correspondingly lost sight of the connections between such nationally defined territories” (p. 307). Proponents of this opinion point to fluidity and interconnectedness brought by globalisation between the local and the global, for which the global city concept that I use in this thesis to define Brussels is very pertinent, and the establishment of a post-national structure that diminishes the role of the state (see Beck 2006; Sassen 1991; Soysal 1994).

I conducted my research in only one single site rather than with a multi-local comparative design. In migration studies, there is a tendency to conduct comparative research on one ethnic group in several European cities or on several ethnic groups in one locale. While acknowledging the advantages of the comparative approach, I follow the line of thought that favours one group in one location over comparative research because it is not always possible to make an in-depth analysis due to the wide geographical scope. A large literature (Crul 2012, 2016; Schiller and Caglar 2009; Faist 2015; Ehrkamp 2005) asserts that studying migrants at the local level provides rich insights that may remain hidden and undiscovered at state-level research or international comparative research. The larger the geographical limits of a study, the more difficult it is to take a close picture of what is on the ground. Further, I adhere to the argument that migrants' attachment to the receiving country starts and is shaped locally (Ersanilli and Saharso 2011; Ehrkamp 2005).

Nation-level analysis tends to look at the parts of the country where migrants are accumulated; on the other hand, the neighbourhood-level study focuses on ethnic neighbourhoods, enclaves and ghettos. By doing so, they both bear the risk of highlighting only a certain image of migrants who are accumulated or segregated in specific locations. This way of research brings the risk of perpetuating stereotypes and neglecting migrant diversity. I conducted my study with a comprehensive perspective that I did not only look at the Turkish neighbourhood of Brussels but also aimed to include Turkish migrants in other parts of the city in my research. Thus, I could thoroughly analyse the city context as much as possible. The city-level analysis helped me take into account the ethnic neighbourhood where visible Turks live and simultaneously allowed me to discover "invisible" segments of the Turkish community scattered around the city. By doing so, I seek to refute migrant stereotypes, for which city-level analysis, especially global cities where diversity within a community is prominent, proved to be a good choice.

Another reason that led me to opt for city-level research was that I could allocate all my time and energy to one city, which allowed me to carry out in-depth analysis and thereby collect a richer set of data.

I have chosen a specific type of city, namely a global city, with strong transnational connections that made it possible for me to analyse belonging with its local, national, transnational, supranational, and global dimensions. As noted by Ulrich Beck (2002:23), “you cannot even think about globalisation without referring to specific locations and places”, and global cities prevail among others where the impact of globalisation is higher in comparison with smaller cities, albeit no city is exempt from globalisation nowadays. In this thesis, I paid particular attention to the city context and linked it with different levels (sub-national, national, transnational, and supranational) to explore various dimensions of migrant belonging. In this light, I operationalize the “global city” concept with the city-scaling approach of Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) to explore how the Brussels context influences migrant sense of belonging, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

In migration research, as Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) argued, studies at the local level are often generalised to the national level such that conclusions from a study on Turks in Amsterdam are presented in a way as if they are valid for all Turks in the Netherlands. This way of presenting research neglects the differences between migrants living in different parts of a country and perceives the whole migrant group under question as homogeneous. Rather than following the earlier erroneous practice of assuming that city-level findings could be generalised to the state level, my research, by producing rich conclusions on Brussels, opened up the way for further research with Turkish migrants in other Belgian cities, such as Antwerp or Liege.

Having defined the research population and the research site, I will explain how I did the sampling in the next section.

3.2.6 Sampling

I have done the sampling in two stages; 1) before starting the fieldwork, I determined the sampling criteria benefitting from the relevant literature and my experience with the Turkish community in Brussels. 2) After the first phase of fieldwork, I realised that the fact that there are three distinct sub-groups in the Turkish community and that these three sub-groups should be taken into account while examining the community's belonging as this within-group diversity might shed light on different modes of belonging within the community. Having seen this, I refined my sampling strategy in view of these sub-groups.

i. Sampling criteria before starting the fieldwork

I have chosen my sample among the research population based on the following criteria. I included Turkish community members older than 18 years old who have lived in Brussels for at least three years, regardless of their visa/residence permit or legal status. Immigrant groups, in general, are composed of individuals with various legal statuses. They may be permanent or temporary residents, asylum-seekers, or refugees, or they may hold citizenship of the receiving state. They may belong to various ideologies, social and economic classes, educational backgrounds etc. All these variations influence the sense of belonging in a particular way and, at an aggregate level, produce a picture specific to the group in question. While I did not look for a specific legal or political status while constructing my sample, I witnessed during the research those certain legal statuses prevail in some segments of the group. For instance, among the Turkish migrants who arrived in Brussels after the coup attempt in Türkiye in 2016, the number of refugees is very high; guest workers and their

descendants mostly hold dual citizenship; there is a large cohort staying in Belgium with permanent-residence card and have not applied for Belgian citizenship for various reasons, etc. I took the legal conditions of my sample into consideration, particularly during the data analysis phase.

In the beginning, I had considered setting the limit to five years of stay, given that it is the minimum requirement to be eligible for Belgian citizenship. But then, I changed it to three years for two reasons; first, had I remained with five years, I would mostly include the ones with Belgian citizenship and omit other legal statuses like asylum seekers and refugees, and second, I wanted to hear views of relative new-comers on their own belonging and on belonging of the wider community and how they navigate through Brussels socio-political system in the first years of their stay and how these experiences reflect on belonging. This approach proved a good one as I benefitted from the fresh observations of newcomers.

Portes (2010:1557) suggests that, in migration research, determining a middle timeframe encompassing two or three generations is needed to capture durable effects, which would not be possible with short-term approaches. In line with his suggestion, I chose my informants from three generations; first generation (the ones who experienced migration), second generation (the ones at least one of whose parents was born in Türkiye), and third generation (the ones whose both parents were born in Belgium). For the interviews, reaching out to the first generation took work as they were not in my established network and were mostly retired, travelling back and forth between Türkiye and Belgium. The second generation was the easiest to reach because they are generally employed and settled in permanent locations and could better arrange their schedule to accommodate my interview request.

My analysis at the end of the first phase of the fieldwork suggests that the existence of sub-

groups within the Turkish community is meaningful in the context of my research and led me to refine the sample accordingly. In the next section, I will explain how I fine-tuned the sampling strategy.

ii. Refining the sample after the first phase of the fieldwork

As I am a member of the Turkish community in Brussels, I was already aware that the Turkish community in Brussels is not an intact homogenous group and is composed of segments with socio-spatially separate lives. However, it was not until I did a preliminary analysis of my first set of data (I did my first analysis after the completion of 10 interviews and a few participant observations) that I figured out that the existence of segments within the community is meaningful for my research such that it is the testament of within-group diversity. In line with this, it is an analytical tool for investigating different modes of belonging.

In the previous section, I described the general criteria I adopted while framing my sampling. In this section, I will explain how I refined the sample upon my preliminary findings during the fieldwork. Barglowski (2018) indicates, with reference to Curtis et al. (2000:1002), that, in qualitative research, “Samples are usually not wholly pre-specified, but either there are some general criteria established before research or the selection is conducted in a circular process of data collection and analysis and identification of further relevant cases. Sampling is either driven by the 'theoretical framework, which underpins the research question from the outset or by an evolving theory which is derived inductively from the data as the research proceeds (Curtis et al. 2000:1002)' ” (p.157). In my study, sampling is evolved and refined as the research proceeds based on a circular data analysis. In the beginning, it was my literature review and my lived experiences that directed me in the configuration of the

sampling. Then, after the start of the fieldwork, I benefitted from my regular analysis of the data to refine the selection. As Ruane (2005) indicated, theoretical “hints” elicited during data collection may lead the researcher to frame the research. Given that the conceptualization of these groups was the first analytical finding of the study, the theoretical framings of these groups then followed and are correctly located here in the methodology chapter. Following the finding that there were three clearly defined sub-groups, I realised that I further needed to describe these sub-groups with a theoretical frame to explicate my sample better. For this, I decided to do purposive sampling once I realized through participant observations and early interviews that there were three sub-groups. Purposive sampling refers to “the deliberate choice of a participant due to the qualities the participant possesses.... Simply put, the researcher decides what needs to be known and sets out to find people who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of knowledge or experience (Etikan et al. 2016:2). I will come to this later in the section on Sample Selection.

iii. Description of the sub-groups

One of the early findings of my fieldwork is that the Turkish community in Brussels is very diverse and fragmented, and in this line, I have identified three segments in the community with distinct characteristics and socio-spatial features. Having seen that, I further designed my research on this finding and investigated how different is the nature of belonging for each one. The subsequent three chapters will discuss my conclusions in this regard.

I call them sub-groups rather than groups because they indeed compose a symbolic community (Cohen 1985), which is a cohort that is loosely bounded together with the consciousness that they are differentiated from the rest of the population in Brussels by “being Turkish”, or better to say, “originating from Türkiye”.

At this point, I would like to pinpoint that I am not constructing typologies by indicating the sub-groups in the Turkish community but by identifying something that already exists and is known to the Turkish community at large but yet unknown to the literature. In other words, it was not something hidden in the data I explored through my analysis of raw material (Wengraf 2001). Researchers classify a group of people as one “type” by overemphasising similarities among the members and distinguish “types” from each other by underemphasising similarities between them, they use a sampling strategy to depict the heterogeneity, and the strategy helps them to organise their findings to create types, each of which relates to specific explicative terms (Barglowski, 2018:159). However, in my case, I did not need to organise my findings to construct groups; I just highlighted what was already known to the community but had not appeared in the literature. Therefore, the names I call these sub-groups -1) Schaerbeek sub-group, 2) secular sub-group, and 3) religious sub-group- are not concepts to be generalised but merely descriptive names used by the Turkish community itself.

Before describing each sub-group separately and in detail, I would like to bring a theoretical explanation to the sub-group formation drawing on social identity theory. Social identity theory stands on the assumption that society consists of social categories differentiated from one another with power and status relations (Abrams and Hogg 1998:13). The central tenet of the theory is that belonging to a group (of whatever size and distribution) is primarily a psychological state which is quite distinct from that of being a unique and separate individual and that it confers social identity or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave. It says that the psychological processes associated with social identity are also responsible for generating distinctly ‘groupy’ behaviours, such as the solidarity within one’s group, conformity to group norms, and discrimination against outgroups (Abrams and Hogg 1998:3). Group features occur independently from the personal characteristics of its members. The theory claims that the participation of the self in the group happens through

social attraction, which comes into being as a result of the belief that members of the group depend upon each other and that their association enables them to achieve satisfaction; hence mutual attraction leads them to perceive their entity as a group (Turner et al. 1987). However, social attraction doesn't necessarily occur because of personal characteristics but because stereotypical sameness psychologically bonds members of the group together and makes them feel like a unity distinct from others. Individuals often differentiate between their own group and the outgroup with a biased perception favouring ingroup members over the individuals in the outgroup. In this sense, stereotyping performs as a tool to designate the group's place in the social competition for power and status.

Stereotyping plays a role not only for the Brussels Turkish migrants as a community in its classic sense of being stereotyped by the native society but also for the sub-groups that they stereotype each other to differentiate themselves from one another. I will discuss this in the empirical chapters.

The second point of which I would like to remind the reader is that the names I use in this dissertation for the sub-groups of the Turkish community -Schaerbeek, secular, and religious- are the ones the community itself uses to refer to these segments. Social identity theory stresses language as a tool for determining self-categorization by which people communicate knowledge about the group they belong to and the ones from which they distance themselves (Abrams and Hogg 1998:183). I have witnessed that the members of the Turkish community refer to the sub-groups with specific names; they call guest workers and their descendants living in Schaerbeek "Schaerbeek Turks (*Schaerbeek Turkleri*)", and following the same line, in this dissertation, this group is referred to as "Schaerbeek sub-group". For the other two groups, I have chosen the adjectives often used in everyday language to refer to them; "secular Turks" and "religious Turks" are the two phrases used by the community members. The sub-

groups use these adjectives to differentiate themselves from each other. However, I am aware that these terms are not exhaustive to describe the features of the sub-groups, but they are illustrative enough for one to distinguish them from one another.

iv. *A Discussion about Typology*

Before addressing the topic of the typology of a Turkish population within Brussels, it would be helpful to reiterate how I describe the research population, which involves different types (I discussed this in detail in this chapter, in section 3.2.4 “Defining the research population: The Turkish migrant community in Brussels”). I refer to the population as a “community” in the sense of Cohen’s (1985) symbolic community, which serves as an umbrella term for different segments of a migrant group with loose social connections among themselves and distinctive characteristics. In this framework, I use the word “Turkish” when referring to the community in my study, which is generally used in two meanings. First, it is the name for one of the ethnic origins in Türkiye, just as Kurdish, Assyrian, Circassian, Boshnak, Albanian, or Syrian -especially after the migration in large numbers from Syria to Türkiye in the last decade and second, it refers to the people originating from Türkiye/citizens of Türkiye. In the literature, it is common practice to refer to migrants from Türkiye as “Turkish” unless the specific study requires an analysis of the ethnic origins of those people from Türkiye. Following the same path, I used the word “Turkish” to refer to the nationals of Türkiye who migrated to Brussels. My study is not specifically about ethnic diversity, but it is about the interplay between in-group diversity and the global city. I let the research inductively elicit diversity in relation to the different contexts provided by the global city of Brussels, and in this sense, ethnic (such as Kurdish) or sectarian (such as Alawites, Yezidis) origins did not come to the fore. During the interviews, I neither posed questions regarding ethnicity (it is politically a very sensitive issue

for Turkish citizens) nor was the topic raised in any way by the participants. Only one of my interviewees, of Armenian origin, mentioned ethnicity while talking about his past in Türkiye.

Against this background, I will now discuss how we can classify the typology used in this dissertation. An initial analysis of the data from my first interviews indicated that three sub-groups could be identified in the Turkish community in Brussels -the Schaerbeek sub-group, the religious sub-group, and the secular sub-group- which are known to the wider Turkish community but not to the literature. I took this finding as a manifestation of in-group diversity and redesigned my fieldwork based on these three sub-groups, each of which holds different socio-spatial characteristics in relation to the city and presents different modes of belonging. These sub-groups did not emerge from my data; that is, I did not construct them during data analysis. I heard them from my respondents in the interviews and witnessed their existence during participant observations.

In view of the above, my sub-groups can be classified as “categories of practice”, for they emerge as my respondents’ “self and other identification” (Brubaker 2014) rather than being pre-constructed categories applied for analytical purposes. I acknowledge the interwoven relationship between the categories of analysis and categories of practice and see how difficult it is to draw a clear line between these two. Both have their own challenges and added value for research. Categories of analysis, on the one hand, represent the results of long-time practices and, in most cases, they hold sociological, political and academic consensus and provide a reliable base for research; on the other, they may pose the risk of perpetuating assumptions and prevent us from seeing the-state-of-the-art (Brubaker 2014; Goldring and Landolt 2014). For example, Brubaker (2014) rightly points to the fact that the use of “Muslim” as a category of analysis for migrants in Europe does not always reflect the self-identification of migrants coming from Muslim-populated countries (I made a similar argument about my

secular sub-group's stand vis-à-vis Muslim identity in Chapter 6, the section titled "Distancing from the stereotype: Which of us is a "true Muslim"?). Categories of practice can potentially reflect what is on the ground and show new avenues for research; however, on the other side, they may not always produce fruitful typologies to be applied to similar situations; they need the support of empirical research to be used as categories of analysis, which my research does provide.

My introduction of this tripartite typology in this thesis prompts a call for future research. Is it a category of analysis? It may well be, but future research will be needed. The sub-groups I identified do not fall into any categories already established in the literature; the Schaerbeek sub-group is a cohort of guest-workers and descendants who are characterised by their disadvantaged socio-economic background, whereas the other two, namely the secular sub-group and the religious sub-group, are cohorts which are named based on whether or not they put religion forward in their self-identification (not religiosity).

We should bear in mind that this typology is driven by the socio-spatial characteristics of Turkish migrants in Brussels and relates to the different contexts a global city provides to migrants. Namely, it should be read in connection with the socio-cultural composition of the migrant group as well as with different socio-spatial settings in the global city, such as ethnic enclaves, ghettos, ethnic neighbourhoods, cosmopolitan city centres, and affluent suburbs. Given that global cities provide similar settings, albeit with some variation, I suspect my typology is a fruitful one to shed light on the situation in different cities and for different migrant groups. Further research in other European cities, such as Paris, Berlin or Amsterdam, would shed further light on the nature of this typology as a category of analysis.

Against this background, I will now describe the characteristics of the sub-groups in detail below.

v. *Characteristics of the sub-groups*

The Schaerbeek sub-group, composed of guest workers and their descendants living in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, widely known as the Turkish neighbourhood of the city, is the most “visible” segment of the community in public and political discourse. This is partly because of their socio-spatial segregation in an ethnic enclave, an eminent address for whoever would like to reach out to “the Turks” in Brussels, and also because they are the ones around whom Turkish migrant image is shaped in Europe, namely the guest-worker stereotype of the 1970s. Furthermore, throughout the years, scholarship (Ozdora-Aksak and Molleda 2014; Teney et al. 2010; Jacobs et al. 2006) has usually chosen them as the case studies for research, and migration and integration policies have predominantly targeted this segment of the community. Members of the sub-group, compared to the other two sub-groups, have a lower level of education; most of whom have an education level below a bachelor’s degree, poor receiving country linguistic skills, and disadvantaged socio-economic conditions; men work in blue-collar jobs like the business sector, and women are generally housewives. They mainly originated from the Emirdag district of the city of Afyon in Türkiye and have kinship ties, making in-group relationships very close and intimate. Also, socio-spatial segregation in the ethnic neighbourhood of Schaerbeek strengthens socio-economic solidarity within the sub-group. This sub-group has a strong associational network with various ethnic organizations.

The other two sub-groups, namely *the secular sub-group* and *the religious sub-group*, in contrast to the Schaerbeek sub-group, are scattered across the city with no concentration in specific neighbourhoods. This can be counted as among the reasons for their invisibility. Given that they do not have a dense ethnic organisational network, different from the Schaerbeek sub-

group (see the study by Jacobs et al. (2004) on Turkish migrants' ethnic associational life in Brussels), it is more difficult for researchers to get in touch with these two cohorts. Their migratory background is also different in that they are the ones who arrived after the first wave of guest-workers migration and are socially and economically better integrated into the city. There have been several subsequent waves in different forms that resulted in the coming of Turkish migrants with diverse socio-economic backgrounds. While these two sub-groups resemble each other in some respects, I observed that religiosity as a social identity is the main factor that split them into two different groups such that while the religious sub-group put Muslim identity at the forefront in its identification, the secular sub-group identifies with a secular worldview, independent from their religiosity in their personal life (Ysseldyk et al. 2010).

The seculars whose members are well-educated; at least with a bachelor's degree, and with a high socio-economic status; working in sectors which demand highly-skilled workers such as health, banking, and finance, residing in mixed neighbourhoods or suburbs of the city like Kraainem, Woluwe, Auderghem and Uccle, and in general maintain a cosmopolitan lifestyle; having chosen Brussels for its multicultural socio-cultural environment. I have witnessed this subgroup's members contact each other via social media and come together for social purposes from time to time, and the socio-economic solidarity in the sub-group is not as strong as the Schaerbeek one.

The second invisible segment of the Turkish community is *the religious sub-group* for whom religiosity prevails as social identity. Like the seculars, it is composed of well-educated Turks, at least with Bachelor's degrees, living in mixed neighbourhoods but relatively with lower socio-economic status than the seculars. The religious sub-group is more or less situated

between the other two regarding group characteristics but maintains a social life separate from the other two.

My interviews and participant observation suggest that a large proportion of the religious sub-group's migration to Brussels was influenced by Türkiye's challenging political and economic context, especially after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. As I explained in this chapter in section 3.3.3, "Limitations and challenges", home-country politics was a very sensitive issue for all three sub-groups, and they were reluctant to talk about it with somebody they did not know well. Respecting the guidelines of ethical interviewing, I did not ask any questions that would make them uncomfortable, but, drawing on my knowledge of the situation and my secondary research, I did my best to read between the lines and make sense of the silences. I will draw a picture of Turkish politics in the last two decades to better explain the sensitivities of interviewees, particularly of the religious sub-group, about home-country politics.

Scholarship tends to examine the last two decades of Turkish politics as two periods in which the same political party, AKP (Justice and Development Party), has been in power. The first decade is mainly characterised by a salient economic improvement, democratic reforms, promising steps towards EU membership, and limitation of military influence in the public sphere. However, this period was not exempt from challenges; the AKP government was criticised for gradually eroding its dissidents' right to free speech and providing too much public space for religion, which was considered a long-term danger to the secular and democratic character of the Turkish state. While AKP's conservative and religious electorate has been content with the new situation, other segments of the Turkish population see the dominance of religious discourse in government politics and its spillover on the public space as a limitation to the secular lifestyle and an increase in authoritarianism in the country. All

these factors gradually prepared the background for the social unrest in the following decade, the Gezi protest in 2013 being the most prominent one (Onis 2015).

The Gezi Protest started as peaceful demonstrations against the redevelopment of Istanbul's Gezi Park, which was seen as a salient reflection of the AKP's populist urbanism policies aimed at demolishing the symbols of secular culture in the country (Eskinat 2013). Then, with the government's heavy-handed response, it turned into civil unrest, with a large section of the population of various backgrounds voicing their discontent against the AKP's increasingly authoritarian divisive politics, which ignores the demands of sectors of the society other than its own electorate. The government's crackdown on the protesters and Prime Minister Erdogan's strong critical language further polarised the society (Gole 2013; Ozen 2015). Conservative and religious sections of the society were not exempt from this authoritarian and divisive politics; particularly, the Hizmet/Gulen Movement, a religious group and a staunch supporter of AKP in the first decade, became one of the opponents and thus a target of the government.

Social unrest, unfolded by Gezi, accompanied by economic deterioration and political instability, and this chaotic environment produced the military coup attempt on 15 July 2016. The attempt was a failed one, but its repercussions on Turkish politics and society have been immense. The economy has fallen into a crisis, the supremacy of the rule of law and independence of the judiciary has become a concern, and the balance of power has shifted towards the executive, giving the government significant power without the necessary checks and balances. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the government purged thousands of civil servants and imprisoned tens of thousands of dissidents, and these actions were heavily criticised, both domestically and internationally, as actions without necessary legal justification (Tas 2018).

All those points mentioned above pushed many to emigrate, mainly to European countries, with Brussels being one of the destinations. From my research, I grew to understand that a large section of the religious sub-group fled to Belgium primarily because of political oppression. A smaller, but still significant, section of the secular sub-group had also fled to Belgium, generally because of their dislike of the dominant political ideology and poor economic conditions. For both of them, the difficult political and economic situation in Türkiye was also a factor. Some members of the religious sub-group mentioned their refugee status during the interviews but did not give much detail. Given the sensitivities around the topic, I refrained from asking questions about their fleeing the country, let them broach the topic, and, in the cases where they did mention their migration story, I showed my interest and furthered the conversation when appropriate.

I have chosen my interviewees from within these three sub-groups through purposive sampling, which I explain below.

vi. Sample selection/Networking by snowballing

I benefitted from my available networks to have access to the interviewees. Additionally, I enlarged my pool of potential interviewees during participant observations. WhatsApp has been my primary way of first contact as people feel more comfortable getting a written message before a live conversation, which gives them time to make up their minds about being an interviewee. For this reason, I was sending a WhatsApp message and waiting for their response, and after getting a positive reply, I was contacting them by phone to arrange a time and place. I always left the choice of time and place to the interviewees, clearly expressing my flexibility.

I used the snowballing technique to secure participation. Snowballing is a method of recruiting interviewees which relies on getting in touch with the gatekeepers who can provide the

researcher with candidates. Then, the pool of candidates grows as each interviewee suggests a further interviewee. The sample expands with each additional interviewee like a moving snowball (Amina 2015). Snowballing is the most common technique of reaching out to interviewees in qualitative research and is especially useful to recruit people from hidden groups (Noy 2008). Even though my target group cannot be considered a hidden group, especially conservative women staying home or retired people who are out of sight, they were difficult to get in touch with. My insider status helped me find gatekeepers, and then the gatekeepers put me in touch with potential members. To illustrate this, I interviewed a female doctor who has an office in Schaerbeek and then she acted as my gatekeeper, helping me to contact female interviewees in the Schaerbeek district. Another gatekeeper working at an ethnic organisation helped me access religious sub-group so that I could participate in their events and social gatherings. She also encouraged refugees in this sub-group to talk to me as they were hesitant to trust a Turkish researcher, given that they had escaped political repression in Türkiye.

I aimed to select the informants from whom I could get the most relevant data based on their characteristics in the framework of my three sub-groups. This is called purposive sampling in qualitative research (Campbell et al. 2020; Etikan et al. 2016). In this regard, after each interview, I noted the respondent's background carefully. As proceeding with interviews, I continuously checked the socio-economic status, education, vocation, migratory background, age, and sub-group of my pool of people, and when I realised an obvious bias towards a particular typology of people, I tried to balance it out with the new interviewees. For example, the first interviews mostly were with well-educated people, namely individuals with at least a bachelor's degree, because, with snowballing technique, I realised that they were referring me to the same type of interviewees. After all, their networks were composed of people similar to themselves. A couple of them told me they had tried to find "informed people about belonging,

politics and integration”. I repeatedly told my gatekeepers that I would like to interview people with diverse backgrounds who do not need to be highly educated. I always checked my interviewee list and refined it to include the most relevant ones in my pool. I interviewed 53 respondents; the list of interviewees is anonymised and attached to this thesis in Appendix C. It contains detailed information about age, occupation, gender, legal status, approximate time of arrival to Brussels, the reasons for their migration, which sub-group they are affiliated with, and whether the interview was face-to-face or online.

I observed the norm that sample sizes should not be too large to end up with unmanageable data (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007). “Saturation” is used as a criterion for determining the necessary number in sample size. The research reaches saturation when the researcher no longer discovers new information, but participants repeat the information gathered from previous ones (Mason 2010). I stopped interviewing each sub-group when the conversations started repeating themselves.

I met with them in cafes and at their houses, and some preferred to come to my own house. After the Covid-19 outbreak, all interviews were held on the phone or via WhatsApp video calls. My experience with three interviewing methods, face-to-face, videoconferencing, and phone, is worth mentioning here.

Face-to-face versus videoconferencing versus phone interviewing

I conducted 35 face-to-face interviews, most of which were before the Covid-19 outbreak, 15 video-conferencing, and 3 phone interviews.

Face-to-face interviews being the gold standard in qualitative research, video-conferencing online interviews have become widespread in research with technological advancement. Videoconferencing has both its advantages and drawbacks (‘T Hart 2021; Saarijärvi and Bratt

2021; Johnson et al. 2019; Rubin and Rubin 2012; Curasi 2001); it is advantageous because it remedies geographical constraints, it eases interview scheduling both for informants and for researchers, and it makes informants feel comfortable in a location of their own choice. On the other hand, the researcher does not have full access to the context and body language, two important factors in data collection during interviews. The possibility of technical problems that may interrupt the conversation or lower the quality of communication is also noted as a challenge of the video-conferencing technique (Irani 2018). Based on my experience, I prefer to observe the interviewee's gestures and mimics in a natural setting.

Nevertheless, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, video conferencing was a life-saving opportunity for me to continue with my fieldwork. Online interviewing made my interviewees feel more comfortable in their correspondence because we were all under quarantine and keeping away from each other. I also want to differentiate between video and phone call interviews here; interviewees sometimes prefer only phone calls in case they do not want to be seen while talking about sensitive issues. For instance, one of my female interviewees wanted to switch off the video and preferred only phone calls while talking about the hardships she endured in the past, and she told her story crying. However, it is evident that phone calls prevent the researcher from observing the interviewee physically, which is essential for analysing the silenced part of the conversation. I compensated for this challenge by "deep listening" (T Hart 2021) such that I tried to hear not only the words but also the emotions. I experienced that sometimes not being able to see your correspondent physically opens up your ears better, you strongly focus on the voice, and you can catch the meaning in between the words. It encourages the researcher more to listen than to talk with the interviewee, which is indeed the very aim of qualitative research, especially when one adopts an interpretivist approach, which was the case in my study. As I was following a semi-structured interviewing strategy, I let my respondents talk as much as they wanted on the phone without restricting them strictly with my questions,

and thus, I could concentrate on their voices. My advantage was that I could combine all three; face-to-face interviewing, videoconferencing, and phone interviewing. I benefited from the advantages of all by being cautious of their challenges.

After each interview, I analysed my interviewing style and revised it where necessary, following the model called “reflective practitioner” by Schon (1983). I tested my set of questions and modified them in light of my preliminary analysis and the interviewees’ reactions.

3.2.7 Data analysis

I analysed data at regular intervals during the continuing fieldwork. In field research, data collection and data analysis are not separate processes; analysis is done throughout the data collection phase, and they inform each other, as they did in my case.

I followed an interpretivist approach while analysing data. Data is assessed literally, and the researcher’s interpretations and understandings guide the process. Qualitative research, in most cases, aims to understand how respondents view and interpret the world and in which ways these interpretations shape their actions and experiences (Morawska 2018). The analysis of the data was made at three levels: 1) I carefully noted the responses, comments, opinions and interpretations of my interviewees -as belonging is a “person-centred” concept (May 2001:364) and largely shaped by subjective perceptions of the migrants. 2) I added my own comments: after each interview, I immediately did “post-interview debriefing”, where I pencilled in my comments and observations, ensuring that I noted these down before moving on to other interviews or other activities. I have closely seen the human brain freely construct its own perception and make connections, especially during data collection, and if not written immediately, these precious findings may get forgotten (Wengraf 2001). 3) I backed up my

findings from the interviews with my impressions from participant observation. In this scope, I visited the same places and attended similar activities several times, my impressions became clearer each time, and I noted them down as much as possible. I cross-read the texts of interviews and my notes from participant observation and saw that interviews supported by observations bring more coherent and reliable findings.

This is also true for the last phase of data analysis; while transcribing, uploading data to the computer, and coding the data, I always inserted my interpretations and comments in memos in NVivo and identified connections between my findings and the literature. Each stage of the analysis directed me to further literature and, over the course of the analysis, helped me build the theoretical and conceptual framework of the research.

All interviews were done in the Turkish language and translated into English by me. The notes and data were compiled and processed using Zotero and NVivo. NVivo was quite helpful in coding and determining the major themes that emerged from the data and organising my findings. I kept all my bibliography in Zotero and arranged it according to the themes; thus, I could easily reach the relevant literature while doing analysis. To make my thematic analysis efficient, I put notes from the literature on Zotero, arranged my fieldwork findings on N-Vivo and used both applications in parallel to each other.

Data interpretation needs reflexivity on behalf of the researchers. The power dynamics emanating from their various positions during different phases of the research - data collection, data analysis, interpreting the results, and reaching conclusions - need to be carefully considered. The researcher's position is not one but multiple, depending on the context, and it is temporal. In my case, it varied in each interview and even for the same interview at different times (I discussed this extensively in the "Positionality and Reflectivity" section of this chapter). Originating from the same country as my respondents, being a woman, my

worldviews, my socio-economic status, my political ideology, my knowledge of the cultural codes of different segments of Turkish society, and being able to speak the Turkish language put me in an insider and also outsider position depending on with whom I was talking, and these characteristics determined the power relations between myself and my participants (Carling et al. 2013). In this light, for data analysis, I kept in mind my “multiple positionalities” (Ryan 2015) while annotating the transcribed interview texts and English translations, identifying the themes and drawing the findings. As highlighted by Amelina and Faist (2012), my reflections helped me to move beyond the stereotypical views and clichés about this group of migrants (and my own biases) and to include the respondents’ interpretations and viewpoints as objectively as possible in the data analysis.

Finally, during the writing-up process, I was cautious in explaining my propositions with soft language following the suggestion by Morawska (2018), “Given the multi-faceted, fluid nature of the world we live in, and which qualitative investigations are to account for as faithfully as possible, the soft language of the propositions formulated in this genre of research is, in my opinion, yet another strength of this approach, not a limitation” (p.118).

3.3 PART II

3.3.1 Positionality and reflexivity

Positionality and reflexivity have gained ground in research methodology with the reaction of feminism to the neo-positivist empiricism that defends the neutral detachment of the researcher from the research process. As fieldwork is a dialogical process where the researcher and the researched are co-actors but in an unequal power relation, researchers should reflect on their own location to see how research is influenced by positions (England 1994:86-87; Holmes 2020; Robertson 2002; Rose 1997). Reflexivity refers to “reflection on self, process, and

representation, and critically examining power relations and politics in the research process, and researcher accountability in data collection and interpretation” (Sultana 2007:376)

In qualitative methods, be it interviews or participant observations, researchers situate within the interview process with any components of identity, characteristics, ethnic origin, nationality, class, gender, religion, political ideology, etc. Particularly in interviews, the researcher holds the power of setting the scene by organising the timing, place, and flow of the process. Furthermore, not only fieldwork but also data processing and analysing stages are also not immune from the positionality of the researcher. This does not mean that positionality diminishes the credibility of research, but it necessitates being cognizant of the researcher’s role in the process and reflecting upon it at all stages of the study (Fedyuk and Zentai, 2018:179). That is to say, the boundaries created by the researcher's positionality necessitate context-specific “identity management” for each case in varying degrees depending on the boundary in question (Boccagni 2018:218).

Being an insider or outsider is an important issue that researchers conducting qualitative methods need to pay specific attention to. For the researchers studying migrants, their ethnic status becomes the most salient marker of positionality; however, ethnic insiderness alone does not always qualify the researcher as “one of us” for the respondents. As rightly stated by Pustulka et al. (2019);

“The shallow insiderness of ethnicity and speaking the same language may not correspond to or cover the discrepancies linked to institutional, structural, class incompatibilities, and other aspects. (...) the insiderness at the data collection stage is weakened by the difficulty of disclosure and sudden realization that positionalities other than ethnicity may bring the researcher and respondent very far apart.” (p. 252)

Indeed, what Pustulka et al. indicate above corresponds to my experience. I have been a member of the Turkish community in Brussels since 2014. During my stay in the city, I have always been a part of the social and cultural life of the community; I attended wedding ceremonies, feast celebrations and parties, shopped in the Turkish neighbourhood, sent my children to activities organized by Turkish associations and established an extensive network of friends and acquaintances in the community. Also, I know the city by heart; its native society, the sociology of its neighbourhoods, socio-political system, integration policies, and migrant communities.

The fact that I was born and raised in Türkiye put me in an advantageous position in some respects; familiarity with the socio-cultural codes of my research population and being able to speak the Turkish language helped me in creating effective communication with the respondents during the interviews and analysis of the data collected. Furthermore, being embedded in the native culture of the respondents facilitated my management of the interviews and the process of the data. To illustrate it, in Turkish culture, contrary to western understanding, something written is not always perceived as a guarantee for self-protection; sometimes, it is concerning. For this reason, the interviewees were not obliged to sign the consent letter, but with each interviewee, I read the letter and answered their questions when something was not clear enough, and they gave me verbal consent.

I did not only enjoy the advantages but also faced the difficulties of being an ethnic insider. The issue of positionality was always on the table during the research. My ethnic insiderness sometimes was overshadowed by other positionalities such as gender, socioeconomic class, political ideology, and religiosity. I always needed to review my position in relation to the person interviewed. As Ganga and Scott (2006) said, positionality in research is a dynamic process that needs to be continuously negotiated.

My ethnic insiderness played differently with each sub-group of the Turkish community -the Scharbeek sub-group, the religious sub-group and the secular sub-group- if not with each person I interviewed, and always came up during participant observations. For example, it was not easy to get in contact with Turkish migrants in Schaerbeek, although It was supposed to be an easily accessible group as they are concentrated in the same neighbourhood. They were hesitant to talk in research on “Turks” as the political situation in Türkiye was conjecturally very delicate, and anything related to “their views on attachment,” which implicitly includes their ties with the home country, was making them a bit nervous. I realised that “someone outside of their neighbourhood”, no matter what nationality she holds, is considered a “foreigner”. At this point, ethnic insiderness was not enough to be “one of them” but to be from the neighborhood. I could only overcome this issue with the help of gatekeepers.

On the other hand, the well-educated, religious sub-group was usually open to a conversation on belonging, and they seemed ready to talk to anyone on the topic regardless of nationality. However, the ones who are asylum-seekers or holding refugee status showed reluctance to speak on the subject as the conversations always had a home-country dimension. They had to flee Türkiye because of political pressure, and it was difficult to talk to an unknown person about their relations with their home country. Again, gatekeepers helped me; they contacted candidates and introduced me and my topic to them. When the interview request was coming via a known person, they were more eagerly accepting my interview request.

Lastly, a few members of the secular sub-group were a bit reluctant to answer some questions about the homeland. As the conversation unfolded, they seemed more relaxed and eager to talk. At the start of each interview, I specifically explained that the interview did not have anything about home-country politics or their political ideology and that they have the right not to answer any question they do not want to. Again, I noticed that the reason for their reluctance was the

political situation in Türkiye, and this was making them think twice about my reliability to share their views on this topic, partly because of their distance to issues somehow related to politics, such as belonging. In sum, my nationality worked as a facilitating factor and, at the same time, as a barrier depending on the situation

My gender also played an important role in my positionality in the research. For conservative and traditional members of the Turkish community, most of whom I encountered in Schaerbeek and some in the religious sub-group, social interaction between men and women is limited and has its social codes. Thanks to familiarity with the traditional social codes in Türkiye, I was careful with my behaviours not to offend them. I sensed conservative men would be more open if they talked to a male interviewer. Nevertheless, I could maintain a fruitful conversation with them as I did my best to observe the cultural codes.

On the other hand, traditional women in Schaerbeek were pleased to talk to me. They were telling me their life stories, grievances, family problems etc., just because I was there as an educated woman and listening to them. I did not interrupt them even when they distanced from the research topic, I listened to them till the end, and afterwards, I coded the relevant sections for my research.

As Sultana (2007) argued, issues of positionality may emerge during the fieldwork, data analysis or write-up process, and it is only sometimes possible to prepare for it in advance. Therefore, continuous mindfulness is necessary to adjust for unforeseen challenges. For instance, during the fieldwork, I realised that my Turkish accent and way of speaking had been an issue of positionality such that I was placed in a particular social category by respondents. Some “othered” me, but some accepted me as “one of them” by judging the same criteria. I felt comfortable with my way of Turkish speaking while interviewing well-educated ones, but with less-educated respondents, I was careful not to use words that they might be unfamiliar with;

otherwise, I would confront an unbalanced power relation, which might make some of my respondents uncomfortable. Since insiderness is not a permanent situation, being an insider or outsider must be critically assessed with the questions of “according to whom? under which circumstances? and when?”. The unstable character of positionality requires the researcher to continuously reflect on her role across time and space (Merriam et al. 2001; Brayboy and Deyhle 2000).

Insiderness is not a factor to be considered only during data collection but also comes in when processing it. On the one hand, being from the researched population helps me capture nuances; on the other, I had to process the data from a certain distance that allowed me to see the broader picture and apply scientific knowledge (Pustulka et al. 2019). I observed reflexivity as much as possible while translating interviews from Turkish to English and interpreting the data. Nevertheless, I fully agree with Rose’s (1997) critique on transparent reflexivity that understanding self and context transparently is an almost impossible task, for which reason acknowledging uncertainties is a good tactic while doing research.

3.3.2 Ethics

I ensured the informants stayed *anonymous* during data storage and on any written documents, including drafts of the chapters. To this end, I always used pseudonyms and did not share personal information that might make them known in one way or another. For example, indicating the neighbourhood with the specific profession of the informant might be enough in some cases for the other members of the Turkish community to guess to whom I am referring, so I do not provide that detail.

Having the interviewees’ *consent to participate* in the interviews is a delicate ethical issue that I paid due attention to during my fieldwork. I clearly explained the research topic, how the data would be processed, that the findings would be used for a PhD thesis, and that the anonymity

rule would always be respected. In the cases where I found the interviewees through gatekeepers, I informed the gatekeepers in detail about my project, and they transferred this information to potential respondents while inviting them to participate in my project. Gatekeepers facilitated my fieldwork by reaching out to the interviewees, which would be challenging to do by myself, especially in overcoming the trust issue in the first place (Emmel et al. 2007). In any case, at the beginning of the interviews, I read the content of the consent letter, which is attached to this thesis as Appendix A and assured them that I would abide by the anonymity rule.

I realised that belonging is a delicate issue for some of them, especially the ones with refugee status because of their migratory history. Some of them did not feel comfortable talking about belonging in their home country, so I rephrased my questions to avoid hurting their feelings.

3.3.3 Limitations and challenges

An interesting challenge I encountered was some of my respondents' displeasure over being identified with the term "migrant". Only because the topic includes this term, a few of them did not want to participate in the interviews. Notably, the ones implying discontent with being portrayed as such were among community members with high socio-economic status and education levels. For example, a young man who had moved to Brussels for educational purposes and, after graduation, found a job and settled in the city did not accept the interview request because of the research topic, saying that as he was not a migrant and therefore, he could not be a subject of migration-related research. Even though their stories do not fit the definition of expatriate, these migrants prefer to be called as such. Klekowski von Koppenfels (2014), in her book "Migrants or Expatriates? Americans in Europe", beautifully illustrates how the term is associated with wealth and privilege. The term expatriate is technically defined as "referring explicitly to those who are either on short-term intra-company transfers or

working for international companies for the longer term” (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014:23). Apparently, the well-educated members of the Turkish community migrated in the last decades want to keep a distance with the negative stereotypical image of migrants in Western societies. Having observed their reaction in my initial pilot phase, I did not call them either migrant or expatriate in our dialogues, I just explained to them that the research population is the Turkish community living in Brussels and that being a Turk residing in Brussels is the only selection criterion for the respondents.

Political-temporal contingency

My research coincided with extraordinary political and social circumstances. In other words, “political-temporal contingency” (Hoogendoorn and Visser 2012) emerged as a challenge for which I needed to position myself as a researcher and design the fieldwork accordingly to remedy the repercussions on the research. Two significant circumstances deserve to be mentioned when it comes to political context and temporality: first, and the biggest one was the Covid-19 pandemic, and the other was the extraordinarily difficult political situation in Türkiye.

I started the fieldwork in January 2019 and completed it in December 2020; that is, I conducted a big part of my fieldwork under pandemic conditions. The covid-19 pandemic was a big challenge in recruiting respondents, which was partially overcome by video-conferencing interviews. Besides technical challenges, psychologically, it was not easy for me to conduct research.

The second challenge, the tough political situation in Türkiye, had an impact on recruiting informants, as the phenomenon of belonging automatically invokes the home country for migrants. Trust became an important issue as they were reluctant to talk to a “stranger” about

belonging, a topic somehow connected with their home country and its politics. Some potential informants did not accept my interview request, some were selective in their responses, and most did not want the interviews to be recorded. Nevertheless, the rejection of interview requests did not impact my research as I could reach enough interviewees. At the beginning of each interview, I emphasised that the study is exclusively on their sense of belonging and any question related to politics aims at understanding their interest in and knowledge of the political system of the host country and the home country and that I am not anyhow interested in their political ideology or viewpoint on Turkish politics.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explained how I handled this project from the beginning until the end. To this aim, I first discussed why I opted for qualitative research and explained my data collection techniques: semi-structured interviewing as the primary method and participant observation as the supporting method.

I followed an inductive approach primarily as I did not have a pre-determined theory to test or specific concepts on which to base my research. The theories and concepts were elicited gradually through an inductive analysis of the data as the research developed. However, I could see that I benefitted from both inductive and deductive reasoning during my study in a circular process. This was most obvious in deciding to redesign the research after the first phase of the study once I realised that the existence of three sub-groups in the Turkish community is an outstanding testament to in-group diversity and that this might suggest that there exist various modes of belonging within the same community. And the findings of the study presented this conclusion.

I also extensively discussed positionality and reflexivity, ethical considerations, and

limitations to the research in the last part of this chapter. Positionality was a very salient issue in different ways and required due attention. Ethnic insiderness, gender, political ideology, religiosity, and socio-economic class came to the front both positively and negatively during data collection, data processing and analysis phases. Lastly, I also mentioned the Covid-19 pandemic and political turmoil in Türkiye as political-temporal contingencies that I had to deal with during the research period. I highlighted the Covid-19 pandemic as my biggest challenge during this study.

Having explained the methodology of my research in this chapter (Chapter 3), from now on, I will continue with my empirical chapters. In this vein, in the next chapter (Chapter 4), based on my research findings and secondary literature combined, I will discuss how global cities embrace the ever-growing diversity within ethnic migrant communities. Furthermore, against the background created by Chapter 4, I will interrogate in Chapters 5, and 6 how in-group diversity reflects on migrant belonging, that is, how different sub-groups in a single ethnic community - Brussels Turkish community in my case- present distinct modes of belonging. While doing so, in Chapters 5 and 6, I will use two analytical lenses: transnationalism and (perceived) discrimination, respectively.

Chapter 4

The impact of city context on within-group diversity in ethnic migrant communities

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I presented the methodology of this thesis. This empirical chapter, based on both my research findings and secondary literature, drawing on the concept of the global city, investigates the Brussels context at the intersection of local and global features of the city, arguing that the city's local and global characteristics clash, blend and compromise with each other and bring about a context in favour of migrant diversity in general and in-group diversity in particular. By so doing, this chapter also does the preparatory work for the other two empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), where I will discuss how the nature of belonging for different segments of a migrant community living in a global city is multi-faceted, complex, and distinct, using two analytical lenses: transnationalism and (perceived) discrimination.

In this chapter, based on my identification of three distinct sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community -the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group, and the religious sub-group- which I explained in detail in Chapter 3, I demonstrate that Brussels is home to a diverse Turkish community: Turkish migrants are present not only in Schaerbeek, an ethnic enclave known as the Turkish neighbourhood, but also present – albeit less visibly, or even invisibly – across the city. I conclude that illusionary image of migrant spatiality in cities that associates migrants only with certain locations such as ethnic enclaves -as in the Schaerbeek case for Turkish migrants in Brussels- perpetuates migrant stereotypes and thus disguises within-group diversity. I seek to refute this illusion by shedding light on the Turkish community living in the other parts of the city and pointing at a wide range of heterogeneities the community holds.

This chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part, I will explain the theoretical basis on which I define the context of Brussels, drawing on the concept of the global city and the city-scaling approach. I will put particular emphasis on the ethnic enclave as a visible location in global cities that perpetuates stereotypical images regarding migrant spatiality. In the second part, I will apply the theoretical approach explained in the first part of this chapter to Brussels and demonstrate that the Brussels context comes into being as a result of an interaction between the local and global features of the city. Finally, in the third part, I will add the Turkish community to the picture discussing how each sub-group of the community finds a distinct socio-spatial location in the city.

4.2 PART I: CITIES, GLOBALISATION, AND MIGRANTS

This chapter combines the global cities concept (Sassen 2012 and 2005) and city-scaling approach (Schiller and Caglar 2009) in its exploration of city context and argues that the context comes into being through an interaction between the city's global and local features. While the global cities concept underlines the impact of globalisation on contemporary urban places, the city-scaling approach pinpoints that global impact should be studied in connection with local characteristics as the two interact and co-create the context. City-scaling approach complements three significant shortcomings of the global city concept; first, the city-scaling approach works as a remedy for the global cities concept's restrictive categorization, which defines only certain cities as global. It does so by paving the way to examine any city with a global lens. Second, it puts migrants at the centre of the analysis, which is not the case in the global cities concept thanks to its economic determinism, which puts transnational economic and financial links between cities at the centre of the analysis. Thirdly, the city-scaling approach emphasises local socio-political institutions and historical legacies of cities, arguing

that the impact of globalisation changes according to the specific local features of cities. Such emphasis is lacking in the global cities concept.

It is well-noted in the literature (Foner et al. 2019; Ireland 2017; Vertovec 2011 and 2010) that urban places have been attracting a high number of migrants from diverse backgrounds with the rise of globalisation. As globalisation makes moving across borders technologically easier, faster, and financially more affordable, migration has become an option for more people around the world. Data shows that the number of migrants choosing big cities as their destination point has been on the rise. IOM World Migration Report 2015 estimates that around one in five international migrants lives in just 20 cities, one of which is Brussels, and notes that Brussels is among the cities which have a higher percentage of foreign-born persons than the global average of 3.5 per cent (IOM 2015). In Brussels, the foreign-born population represents 62 per cent of the total population (ibid.). In parallel to this, the city context has been an area of study for migration studies in the last decades (Bass et al. 2020; Brenner 2019; King 1996) and new lenses are needed to analyse migrants in urban places as cities attain new characteristics with the rise of globalisation. Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) note that migration studies have often relied on Sassen's concept of global cities (2005) for exploring the relationship between cities and migration. Indeed, the concept has been quite instrumental in explaining the contemporary city context by emphasising the diverse and multicultural landscape of the city emanating from its transnational connections beyond the state in which it is located. It highlights new technologies of transport and communication which turn cities into hubs for the global economy and make them attractive for a large number of workers for a wide range of jobs; low-paid infrastructure industry, business sector, professional positions in international companies, etc. By so doing, the concept provides the basis for studying the city context in relation to its transnational dimension and global characteristics. One may ask why I chose the global city concept among terms used to refer to large urban areas such as world cities, global

capitalist cities, imperial cities, mega-cities, primate cities, and international financial centres (Beaverstock et al.1999). Indeed, global city prevails among others because of its emphasis on the global characteristics of contemporary cities, which, according to Sassen (2001), differentiates it from the other terms mentioned. The one most interchangeably used with global cities in the literature is the concept of world cities (Taylor 2010; Robinson 2002; Elmhorn 2001). Although both take the economic variable -the significance of the city in the world economic system- as the decisive factor (Friedmann 1986), world cities also existed in earlier times in Asia and in European colonial centres; however, global city is a contemporary phenomenon directly linked with globalisation (Sassen 2001).

Despite its explanatory power explained above, the concept falls short in some respects to describe the city context in relation to migrants because the concept is mainly economy-related, and migrants are not the core elements in its definition. Furthermore, as rightly indicated by Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009), in the concept of global cities, migrants are typically understood as being at the bottom of the hierarchy. They are often illustrated as one of the disadvantaged labour groups in the city and passive subjects of social polarization and segregation. Thus, it does not provide enough room to analyse migrants in their full diversity beyond the stereotypical perception that sees migrants in lower socio-economic segments of the city population and portrays them mainly in ethnic enclaves and ghettos. Therefore, to capture the complete picture of migrants in cities, I will utilise the global city concept in conjunction with the city-scaling approach of Glick- Schiller and Caglar (2009). The novelty of the city-scaling approach is that it puts migrants at the centre while analysing the place of a city in the global power hierarchy such that it sees the relationship between urban transformation in the neo-liberal system and migrant incorporation as mutually reinforcing, both shaping each other. In this way, it helps me to overcome the risks emanating from the economic determinism of the global city concept that puts economic factors at the forefront.

City-scaling approach also underlines migrant agency by considering them as contributors to the social, political and economic positioning of cities in the global power system. The approach acknowledges migrants' role in the historical and structural legacies of cities and sees them as actors in the globalisation process, arguing that migrants enhance the attractiveness of cities for the global economy by adding to cultural and social diversity, increasing the labour force and enlarging transnational connections. In return, cities offer multiple incorporation pathways to migrants from diverse backgrounds in that they present more varied opportunities in comparison with rural areas in terms of housing, neighbourhood, jobs, education and social and cultural life and by so doing, they speak to the needs of different segments of migrants. To illustrate it, socio-economically disadvantaged migrants have the option of ethnic neighbourhoods like enclaves and ghettos and an ethnic job sector; cosmopolitan life-seekers can settle in mixed neighbourhoods and set up a social circle of their desire, for high-income ones there are affluent neighbourhoods, for professionals there exist transnational companies, etc.

Another shortcoming of the global city concept that I aim to compensate for with the city-scaling approach is that it brings about a practice of listing a limited number of cities as global, which makes it challenging to analyse any urban place with this lens. This partly results from the fact that it puts economic factors at the very centre of the argument, whereas social and political dynamics take a backseat in the definition (Robinson, 2006); therefore, it does the ranking mainly with economic criteria. Benton-Short et al. (2005), in their study on the migrants' impact on the ranking of global cities, determined that some cities in which migrants are highly influential in the formation of the socio-cultural structure have a lower ranking on the existing lists of global cities and some of these cities are even not present on these lists. For example, Brussels is not often counted on global city lists; however, this does not change the city's embeddedness in the global financial network, its significance in European and

international politics and its genuinely multicultural and diverse population, whose two-thirds is composed of migrants.

City-scaling approach does not require categorising only certain cities as global, arguing that any urban place in the contemporary era is open to the effects of globalisation. Glick-Schiller and Caglar define city scale as “the differential positioning of cities determined by the articulation of institutions of political, cultural and economic power within regions, states and the globe” (2009:188). What the authors propose is that instead of designating a limited number of cities as global with a predominantly economic perspective -as is the practice in the framework of the global city concept- all cities can be positioned on a continuum of power hierarchies that indicates relative globality of urban geographies in relation to the availability of pathways for migrant incorporation. City-scaling is instrumental in my research, such that it provides the flexibility to analyse Brussels in terms of its globality without having to squeeze it into some global city lists. The approach locates any city on the continuum of power hierarchies and indicates four groups of cities that are defined in relation to one another rather than as distinct categories. In this sense, cities at the very high end of the continuum are top-scale cities characterised by their importance for new global industries and a large amount of cultural and political capital. They present the broadest range of avenues for migrant local incorporation and transnational connections. London, Paris and New York are the best examples of this category. These cities attract high-skilled, well-educated migrants for transnational agglomerates and, at the same time, low-skilled ones to support low-wage sectors. They are known for their multicultural and cosmopolitan environment. Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009) call the second category on the continuum up-scale cities. They are the ones in the process of generating new global industries and increasing cultural and political capital, for which they need both high-skilled and low-skilled migrant labour. These cities, as in the case of top-scale ones, provide a wide range of pathways for the incorporation of migrants and

strategically benefit from diverse migrant populations to maintain up-scale positions. To this end, they collaborate with ethnic organisations to increase the diversity of the workforce on the one hand and on the other, advertise diversity to promote the city aiming at attracting highly skilled migrants. The third category identified by Glick-Schiller and Caglar is low-scale cities that generally have a single new-type industry that is yet small in size. These cities rely on migrant talent to reposition and rebrand themselves in the global economic system but what they can offer to migrants is limited in scope.

Lastly, at the low end of the continuum, there are down-scale cities that have not yet developed new economy industries and henceforth could not provide significant employment opportunities. Consequently, they are unable to attract highly skilled migrants. Thus, they cannot benefit from the cosmopolitan image that migrants would provide. In view of these interdependent categories, the city-scaling approach emerges as an inclusive and flexible tool that can comfortably be applied to cities like Brussels. I should underline that although my research does not seek to put Brussels in one of the categories of the city-scaling approach, it suggests that Brussels should be considered a top-scale city given it is large and diverse migrant population, transnational connections, and cultural and political capital. I will analyse the globality of Brussels in detail in the next section.

Another aspect of the city-scaling approach that will be utilised in this chapter while examining the Brussels context is that the approach provides a holistic view to the analysis of the city context, arguing that the global dimension cannot be studied independently from the local characteristics of the city as they are complementary to each other. The approach underlines that city context comes into being through interaction between local factors and the city's position on the continuum of global power hierarchies. To explain it in Glick-Schiller and Caglar's words, "No matter how similar cities are in terms of overall scalar positioning, their

complex layers of social history and social structure result in specific local forms of incorporation built on place-specific representations, legacies and expectations.” (2009:196). While cities come closer to each other and attain similar characteristics with the impact of globalisation, each retains a specific socio-cultural structure formed by a unique historical process. My research findings on Brussels beautifully echo this: Brussels’ global features interact with local characteristics, and thus a context specific to the city emerges. This will be discussed later in detail in this chapter.

4.2.1 Global city, ethnic enclave, and migrant stereotyping

Migrant spatiality cannot be reduced to certain locations in global cities such as ethnic enclaves, given that migrants with diverse backgrounds choose these cities to find spaces of living speaking to their different living conditions. In this section, I highlight that while ethnic enclaves are home to a certain segment of migrant communities for various reasons such as employment and housing opportunities, ethnic in-group solidarity and a feeling of security, there exist some other segments who prefer other neighbourhoods in the city; for example, students choose to live in university neighbourhoods, high-income professionals in affluent neighbourhoods, cosmopolitans in multicultural places, etc., and their choices for which part of the city to live in are influenced by these characteristics, not only by their Turkish identity, but ethnic enclaves hide this reality. For example, as I will show in this chapter, the Brussels Turkish community is not limited only to the ones in the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek, which is known as the Turkish neighbourhood of the city; a large part scattered around the city remains invisible to literature and do not take much public and media attention. The ones in the ethnic enclave constitute one of the three sub-groups of the Brussels Turkish community in this thesis and are called the Schaerbeek sub-group. On the other hand, the ones in other parts of the city are the members of the two other sub-groups in this study, namely the secular sub-

group and the religious sub-group, composed of highly skilled migrants. The literature on highly skilled migrants in Europe is indeed expanding, and Turkish migrants have become the case studies in a few of these studies (Geurts et al. 2020; Kaya 2011; 2019; Ozcurumez and Aker 2016). However, there does not seem to be literature based on empirical studies investigating how spatial segregation in cities feeds into the stereotypical perception that links migrants from a certain ethnic background with a specific ethnic enclave in the city, dismissing the ones living in the other parts of the city. As rightly indicated by Caglar (2010), the spatiality of immigrants in the city is imagined in the way that immigrants are perceived as belonging to stigmatised ethnic neighbourhoods or cultural enclaves. “By limiting immigrants’ visibility in the society/city to the confines of ethnic neighbourhoods, this metaphor simplifies the complexities of immigrants’ presence in the society in a particular way.” (Caglar 2001:602). This imagined spatial positioning, in turn, feeds into the stereotypical image of migrant groups as it disguises diversity within migrant populations.

I use the term “ethnic enclave” to refer to the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, particularly for its spatial specification and the negative connotation it holds, which very much applies to Schaerbeek. The broad definition of the term refers to “an area of spatial concentration in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of protecting and enhancing their economic, social, political, and/or cultural development” (Marcuse 2002:111). Whilst in this broad definition by Marcuse, economic, social, political and cultural factors all are underlined as the reasons for the congregation of groups in specific neighbourhoods; an ethnic enclave is often described in association with ethnic enterprise, where co-ethnics support each other with employment opportunities (Lee 2019; Kim 2018; Werbner 2001; Portes 1981). In any case, whether economy-oriented or not, ethnic enclave has a negative connotation in that it has been the location mainly for “undesirable” type of migrants living in isolation and failed in

integration, and therefore, in need of protection by their ethnic group, particularly in economic terms.

Here, I would like to clarify the difference between the ethnic enclave and ethnic neighbourhood, as the two are often used interchangeably. Ethnic enclave seems to have a more specific meaning in that it does provide protection to migrants to enhance their socio-economic, political and cultural development. Measurement criteria for the ethnic enclave is a long-debated issue in the literature, and it can vary depending on the geography and the ethnic group in question (Waldinger 1993; 2001). Nevertheless, “providing protection” appears to be a specific characteristic of ethnic enclaves, which cannot be regarded as a determining factor for ethnic neighbourhoods. Logan et al. (2002) describe a methodology for the identification of ethnic neighbourhoods as such; “[E]thnic neighbourhoods are most often identified and studied through fieldwork, where the researcher typically begins with the knowledge that the ethnic character of a given locale is socially recognized – certainly by group members and perhaps also by others. This ethnic character may be visible through observation of people in public places, the names of shops or the languages found on signs or spoken by clerks or patrons, or by community institutions such as churches, social clubs, and associations” (pp. 303-304). Additionally, the negative connotation ethnic enclave holds is stronger than the one for ethnic neighbourhoods.

My research has demonstrated that this negative connotation indeed is the case for Schaerbeek in Brussels. Without exception, my interviewees from the Turkish community living outside of Schaerbeek referred to the neighbourhood with critical and negative language. This has also been my observation during my long stay in Brussels. Also, I have learnt from my interviewees from Schaerbeek that new generations seek ways to move out of the neighbourhood because of this negative image. The image is very much associated with the guest-worker image in that

it is viewed as a place for low-income people or people relying on the social security system with a low level of language proficiency and failing in integration. Schaerbeek has been home for Turkish guest-workers and their descendants, and they transformed it into a place of their own in which they can socially and economically support each other in the face of an alien socio-cultural environment (Manco and Kanmaz 2005) and a discriminatory housing and job market (Verstraete and Verhaeghe 2019; Rea 2013).

One can quickly feel in Schaerbeek an atmosphere reflecting Turkish socio-cultural life; shop names, the language spoken, behaviours, dress styles, music played around, ethnic restaurants and markets, coffeehouses, mosques, educational and recreational institutions, and Turkish political party offices, to name a few. A large number of ethnic enterprises are run by Turkish entrepreneurs, which constitute an essential employment sector for low-skilled and newly-arrived Turkish immigrants. I will elaborate on this in Part 3 of this chapter and explain how the image of the enclave sticks to the whole community in Brussels.

4.3 PART II: BRUSSELS CONTEXT

In this section, I draw on the global city and city scaling literature to discuss Brussels, which enables me to analyse city context as a phenomenon that comes into being through interaction between the city's local and global characteristics. The literature emphasises that even though cities are exposed to the same globalisation dynamics from the outside, they still differ in terms of the context they offer to migrants because of their unique local characteristics, including the socio-cultural and political structure and historical legacies (Simsek-Caglar and Glick Schiller 2018; Schiller and Caglar 2009;). In this light, I position Brussels within this literature by arguing that the Brussels context should be examined 1) with its transnational connections and multicultural environment and 2) with its bi-communal, bilingual socio-political structure, which, to a certain extent, is influenced by Belgian state structure. My research has

demonstrated that the context, which is a blend of these two aspects, brings in, in general, a conducive environment for the three segments of the Turkish community – the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group and the religious sub-group-, who have different expectations from the city, in other words, the city accommodates diversities of the Turkish community, embraces them by providing alternative living spaces and social circles. In this light, this section will give an in-depth picture of the Brussels context by discussing it with its local and global features. Also, it will consider that Brussels is a city within Belgium. Therefore, I will start by explaining the significance of the national context for the global city of Brussels.

4.3.1 What kind of container is Belgium for Brussels?

To fully understand the city context, it is essential to relate it to the state in which the city situates. While, in the global cities literature, the emphasis is on the city's emancipation from the nation-state, the city-scaling approach also points to the importance of national structure in the formation of the context. In this section, I will follow an in-between line: while acknowledging the fact that the interconnectedness of cities and the establishment of a post-national structure brought about by globalisation diminish the role of the state (Beck 2006; Sassen 1991), I adhere to the argument that state remains an important denominator in migrant socio-political integration in global cities. It is the nation-state that designates the limits of post-national and transnational influences by setting rules and regulations within its borders (Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Koopmans 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003), and migrants, in most instances, have to act within the boundaries of institutional settings established by the receiving state including citizenship regimes, electoral laws, social welfare regimes, education system, and market-related regulations (Alba and Foner 2016). These institutional settings have a crucial influence on the formation of the city context. In this light, this section will discuss what kind of socio-political container Belgium is for Brussels, arguing that the socio-political

set-up in the country partially shapes the context in Brussels. After exploring the significance of the nation-state, I will continue highlighting the city's local and global characteristics.

Belgium is a federal state composed of three geographical regions; Wallonia, Flanders and the Brussels Capital, and three cultural/linguistic communities; French-speaking, Dutch-speaking, and German-speaking (Figure 2). The geographical borders of the regions do not fully correspond to the borders of linguistic communities, particularly for Brussels Capital Region. Brussels Capital is a bi-communal region where Walloons and Flemings share the administration and is constitutionally bilingual, where all public services are arranged in French and Dutch. With a population of 1,219,970 as of January 2021, Brussels Capital is the smallest but most densely populated region of the country, compared to the Walloon Region, with a population of 3,648,206, and the Flemish region, with 6,653,062 (Table 3).



Figure 2: Map of Belgium

Source: cia.gov, wikipedia.org

Region/Community	Population on 1st January 2021
Brussels Capital Region	1,219,970
Flemish Region	6,653,062
Walloon Region	3,648,206
German Speaking Community	78,144

Table 3: Populations of the regions in Belgium

Source: statbel.gov.be

A short introduction to the historical evolvement of Belgian integration policy will help in understanding how the policy came reactively after the migrants emerged as “the problems” for the larger society and how it has gradually been transferred from the national level to the regional level in the country (Gsir et al. 2016; Beyers 2008). The policy has evolved in parallel to guest-workers history. Belgium did not introduce sound integration policies until the 1980s when social matters related to migrants emerged and became a “problem” for the larger society. In contrast to the expectation emanating from the bilateral agreements with the sending countries, guest-workers did not return but instead brought their families; new matters of concern have arisen for politicians, such as language, housing, education and employment of these migrants. Against this background, Belgium, for the first time, included integration in its legislation in 1984, two decades after the arrival of guest workers (Beyers 2008). Also, the rise of the far-right, anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok (later renamed Vlaams Belang) has been an alarm bell for the Federal Government to develop further policies for migrant integration. The success of this party was so striking that it got 3 per cent of votes in Flanders in 1988 and tripled it to 10.3 per cent after only three years in the elections of 1991. The Royal Commission for Immigrant Policy was established in 1989 to develop measures for migration-related matters

at the federal level. Fighting against social exclusion and improving integration via naturalisation were two primary components of the Commission's overall policy underpinning the current Belgian integration politics. The Commission was rearranged as the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism, and in addition to assuming most of the Commission's tasks, the Center became the coordinating body for the fight against racism. During the Nineties, policies were developed at federal and sub-state levels to fight against poverty and social exclusion, especially in urban areas where non-EU migrants were concentrated (Bousetta et al. 1999). As Belgium gradually transformed into a federal state, prerogatives of integration policy were transferred to subnational entities (Gsir et al. 2016). Since then, linguistic communities have become the main actors in determining the policies per their socio-political realities, which resulted in two very different contexts of belonging for migrants in the same country, as indicated below by one of my interviewees.

Mihrimah (religious sub-group): Duality is the main problem in Belgian politics. It was the same 10 years ago, still the same topic; they are susceptible to the division in the country. There are three languages, and communities do not tolerate the ones who cannot speak the language. In the Flemish region, TV is only in Flemish. Multilingualism is not something extraordinary in this world, but here it is a source of conflict, not tolerable. All discussions develop around the Flemish-Walloon issue. I think migrants may benefit from this competition in some circumstances but not always.

In light of the above, while studying migrant belonging in Belgium, always the question would be "belonging to what?" as each region and community present almost a distinct character in terms of integration context. It is difficult to talk about a single Belgian integration model as the communities retain the right to design and implement their one. That is, general policies regarding immigrant integration are determined at the federal level, but programming and implementation are totally dispersed to local levels with considerable autonomy. For example, it is the national government that decides about residency and citizenship requirements,

inclusion into the social system, access to education, and labour market regulations; however, regional governments tailor these policies according to their approaches to integration (Ahmat-Yar and Laurentzya 2020). Finally, municipalities have considerable jurisdiction to decide how to implement these policies (Plees 2005), which have resulted in significant differences in implementation, and this situation motivates migrants to strategically choose the municipality in which to reside. The fact that municipalities have extensive jurisdiction over the implementation of integration policy makes municipalities the most important door to the host state in Belgium; thus, migrant political activities are very much concentrated within the neighbourhood. For example, my research demonstrates that newly coming Turkish migrants choose the municipalities known for their migrant-friendly attitude, especially in issuing residence permits; those who plan to apply for citizenship opt for the communes with swift citizenship procedures; refugees prefer the communes with more material support etc.

Wallonia and Flanders, with their respective linguistic communities, have their own ideological standpoints and administrative arrangements for migrant integration. Flanders adopts an integration policy coherent with "Anglo-Saxon and Dutch ideas of group-based multiculturalism", whereas the French-speaking community follows the "assimilationist-republican model of France" (Jacobs 2000, p. 292). In the latter model, policies are not developed exclusively for migrant integration but are embedded in broader socio-economic policies which aim to secure socio-economic equality for all residents in the country (Banting and Kymlicka 2017). At least, in theory, Flemings pursue a multiculturalist approach; literature frequently underlines that assimilationist instruments have been gaining gravity in their integration policies since the end of the 1990s (Gsir et al. 2016). Flemish identity is formed around the Flemish struggle against francophone domination for linguistic and cultural emancipation. They are known for their assertive policy to make Flemish culture and language more visible in the country (Banting and Kymlicka 2017). To this end, they attract migrants by

offering better living conditions regarding social rights, employment and education opportunities. Brussels Capital Region makes both Flemish and Francophone integration models available to its residents and arranges its institutions accordingly, which I will analyse in the next section in detail.

Each linguistic community's approach to integration speaks for its perception of who can be "from us". Belgium is an example of a multi-national state where citizens identify with Walloon or Flemish sub-national identities alongside the overarching and subtle Belgian identity. Heylighen (2007) points to a highly varied and complex cultural landscape as a reason that makes the definition of Belgian identity difficult. In addition to Heylighen's point, it will not be wrong to say that the historical formulation of the political system that donates linguistic communities with large power on identity politics has a partial role in the formation of relatively weak and hard-to-define national identity. One can witness how sub-national identity is more dominant than national identity in everyday discourse in Belgium. This is also noticeable in migrants' perception of the country, such that they immediately highlight Walloon and Flemish differences when asked about Belgianness. While Flanders is more associated with "cultural nationalism", Wallonia follows the French model of "civic nationalism" (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017, p. 402). Cultural nationalism ties belonging with a common heritage, language, religion, and history, a set-up that is usually commented on as not very encouraging for migrants to celebrate ethnic culture. To be a member of the Flemish community, one should speak the Flemish language and embrace "Flemish values" that fall into the category of universal liberal values, such as democracy, the rule of law, equality and respect for human rights. (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017, p.411). Civic nationalism of Walloons links belonging with rights, duties and voluntary membership to the polity (Bloemraad et al. 2008). In Belgium, the context of belonging, to a large extent, is determined by these two very different approaches depending on which part of the country migrant lives. The research by

Maddens et al. (2010) points to the relationship between Belgians' perception of their identity and their attitudes towards foreigners. The authors note that this relationship works differently in Flanders and Wallonia. In Flanders, citizens who have a stronger Flemish identification than national identification tend to show a negative attitude towards foreigners, whereas the ones with a strong Belgian identity comparatively have more positive attitudes. Conversely, in Wallonia, while the ones with a strong Walloon identification show more positive attitudes towards foreigners, the ones with a stronger Belgian identity display more negative attitudes (Maddens et al. 2010). My research demonstrates that even though the rhetoric among Turkish migrants is that they find it more challenging to be accepted by the Flemish community, most of them still prefer themselves and recommend it to the newcomers to choose to reside in the Flemish region, where, they think a well-regulated and supportive integration system is functioning with educational and job-related opportunities for migrants and particularly for refugees.

Indeed, competition for political power between the two communities diffuses in all parts and parcels of life in Belgium, from education, social security system, and party politics to urban policies and migrant integration. Two strands of literature ((Bousetta et al. 2018; Veny and Jacobs 2014; Beyer 2008; Martiniello 1992) exist regarding the implications of this complex socio-political environment on migrants' adaptation to Belgian society. One strand claim that it widens opportunities by enabling migrants to strategically move in between the multi-layered political system to voice and attain their interests. The other argues that the Belgian fragmented political structure is to migrants' disadvantage as they are instrumentalised in the power struggle between constituent communities. The migrant disadvantage is often pointed out when it comes to party politics. Political opportunity structure is not formulated in such a way to provide effective channels for migrants to organise based on ethnic identity politically; as stated by Jacobs (2000), "The existence of ethnic minority groups has never been officially

recognised as a reason for group-differentiated rights and special representation. Ethnic minorities have no independent public recognition outside the dual Flemish-Francophone structure of the political field” (p.292). Raedt (2004) describes the Belgian political system as a paradox of pluralism where collective existence is enjoyed by three constituent communities but not migrant groups. In terms of migrant representation in politics at the group level, namely the success of political parties established by migrants primarily for focusing on minority politics, there have not been any successful examples so far. In other words, pluralism does not serve migrant groups because the system, by its creation, does not allow enough room for migrants to be politically active in their communities’ interests.

4.3.2 Brussels context: a compromise between the local and the global

In the previous section, I briefly explained the national context in which the Brussels context emerged and did it in the framework of the argument that global cities, despite their strong transnational connections with each other, still have to operate within the socio-political set-up established by the nation-state. Having done that, in this section, I will explore city context drawing on global cities and city-scaling literature which emphasises that even though cities are exposed to the same globalisation dynamics from outside, they still differ in terms of the context they offer to migrants because of their unique local characteristics including the socio-cultural and political structure and historical legacies. In this light, I position Brussels within this literature by arguing that Brussels context can be explored at the intersection of its global characteristics (transnational connections and multicultural environment which open different pathways for diverse segments of migrant communities) and local features (multi-layered, bi-communal, bilingual socio-political set-up which is perceived as challenging by migrants).

In light of the above, I will first demonstrate the rigidities of the local socio-political set-up in Brussels and argue that this set-up does not provide much flexibility to migrant diversity as it

is designed to maintain an intricate power balance to contain the political struggle between two competing constituent communities (Bousetta, Favel and Martiniello 2018). However, the global features of Brussels soften this rigidity in favour of migrants such that the global characteristics force the local set-up to change to accommodate the sociological reality on the ground that the population of the city is super-diverse and multicultural. I will demonstrate this with two examples that came up during my research; language and identity. My research shows that while language and identity are two potential areas of concern for migrants in the local socio-political set-up of Brussels, global dynamics have produced gateways for them. That is, English has arisen as an alternative to the bilingual system and the identity politics originating from the Flemish-Walloon rivalry is not much applicable in Brussels, where two-thirds of the population is composed of migrants.

i. Local socio-political structure in Brussels

Brussels Capital Region was created in 1989, long after the Walloon and Flemish regions, and thus became the third and the smallest in the country. Different from the other two regions where political and administrative power is possessed by a single linguistic community -Dutch-speaking Flemings in the Flemish region and French-speaking Walloons in Wallonia- Brussels is governed by both communities. Officially established as bilingual, all its 19 communes (municipalities) are obliged to deliver services both in the Flemish and French languages, and all institutions of the region are established in such a way that they respect this bilingualism in their day-to-day functioning.




Figure 3: Map of neighbourhoods in Brussels
 Source: The official web page of Brussels Region (be.brussels)

At the regional level in Brussels, two community commissions act as the competent authorities for the matters of respective communities: the French Community Commission (COCOF) and the Flemish Community Commission (VGC). Also, a third commission, Common Community Commission (COCOM), was established to be responsible for the matters that fall out of the scope of the linguistic communities. Despite these delicate arrangements in recognition of the communities, on the city's official website, it is particularly underlined that sub-nationality is not a reference point in the region's functioning.

“The action of the communities is based on the principle that **there is no such thing as a "sub-nationality"** (*original emphasis*). The inhabitants of the Brussels-Capital Region cannot be obliged to choose between one of the two communities to access the services of this community” (The official web page of Brussels Region).

Indeed, duality in Brussels is a manifestation of the Belgian political setup that has its roots in history. In a sense, Brussels symbolises the unity of Belgium, in which two historically competing communities living in separate regions in the country find a way to live together in another region. Although Brussels is geographically an enclave in the Flemish region and historically a Dutch-speaking city, it has gradually turned into a francophone city where French has become the most widely spoken language over time by more than 90% of its inhabitants (Vandenbroucke 2020). The increasing influence of the French has always been a matter of concern for the Flemish region, which perceives the Dutch-speaking population of Brussels as part of its subnational community and wants to keep its political and cultural gravity in the city on a par with Walloons. On the contrary, the French-speaking community of Brussels and Wallonia emerge as two separate identities without overlapping power and competencies (Jacobs 2000). Some call Brussels “the glue” for Belgian unity because both communities share political power that requires a consensus at every stage of policymaking. Some others identify it as the “axis of evil”, where the potential risk for conflict between the two sides is higher than in the other two regions because of the bi-communal political system.

In addition to these horizontal dualities, Brussels's political and administrative system is vertically arranged at three levels -municipal, regional and federal- which do not always function in a hierarchical order but display an interwoven character. “The City of Brussels”, which occupies the central part of the Brussels Capital Region, serves as the de-facto capital of the EU, the capital of Belgium, the capital of both the French linguistic community and the Flemish linguistic community and also it is home to the Parliament and the Government of Flemish region. The distribution of political power in this multi-layered system is uneven and varies from one policy area to the other. For instance, while integration policy is shaped by linguistic communities at the regional level, its implementation is almost totally left to the communes (municipalities). My case study shows that municipalities are the political and

administrative bodies with which Turkish migrants are the most familiar, whereas they have limited knowledge of political and administrative systems at regional and federal levels. My interviewees often described the system as “too complex and confusing”. Given that Brussels Capital Region, different from the other two regions in Belgium, is administered jointly by both linguistic communities and that each community aims to broaden its sphere of influence, migrants often find it hard to understand the political system in the city.

As indicated in the quotes from my interviews with Savas and with Ibrahim below, duality is very visible to migrants, especially in the education sector, where each school has two separate sections that provide education in different languages following different curricula designed by respective linguistic communities. Most of them do not see the dual system as something to their advantage and learn how to navigate through it. I have observed that they always compare French and Flemish communities and systems, and often this comparison comes as the topic of daily conversations.

Savas (Schaerbeek sub-group): If I had the power, I would end the duality in the education system and in language. We are happy with the Flemish education system for our kids. My wife had her education in French; she says it is more international. On the other hand, in Flemish schools, after-school activities are free of charge, but in French schools, it is not. Flemings work hard to teach their language to migrants. Duality is a barrier, I think.... Flemings are more hardworking and disciplined, and Walloons are relaxed and open-minded.

Ibrahim (secular sub-group): I was speaking Flemish in Leuven. When I moved here [to Brussels], I was immediately faced with the language difference. Still, I can do formal procedures with Flemish. I am not happy that French is dominant in the city. However, rarely do I meet a person who only speaks French. I can survive with my Flemish and English. For me, Flemings are easier to communicate with; maybe this is because I can speak Flemish, and I spent years as a student in the Flemish region. I have a Flemish social circle. I have a few French-speaking colleagues at work. I hear people saying that Flemings are not open to foreigners, but I also hear the opposite quite often. Here (in Brussels), there are two systems which make it complicated. I wish the education system would be simpler; it would have been better that way.

I came across very few interviewees who see duality as an advantage, like Piraye.

Piraye (secular sub-group): We can indeed benefit from the duality in language and culture. It depends on us, on how we see it. I see the advantages of being able to speak Flemish, in the commune, I use it. I also learned French. If people want to do it, it is not difficult.

On the other hand, some women interviewees who maintain isolated lives in the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek seemed indifferent to the dual system while they still needed to navigate through it. I will explain the influence of living in an ethnic enclave (as discussed above, I define Schaerbeek as an ethnic enclave in this thesis) on especially women migrants' perception of the city and its political system in detail later in this chapter. Hatun, for example, talks about the duality of the system as if it is only an issue for the native Belgians, not herself. She then explains how her family faces it and handles it in the employment and education sectors.

Hatun (Schaerbeek sub-group): Duality in Brussels does not mean much to me. It is a struggle between them [Flemings and Walloons]. Flemish-speaking people are pressing for their language, insisting on Flemish. Each language community defends its position. If I had the opportunity, I would go for Flemish. My kids went to Flemish schools because my husband was asked for Flemish in job interviews. We wanted to make life easy for them. My kids also learnt French in the street.

Brussels has to combine two distinct and competing integration ideologies, which require delicate coordination for policymaking in a multi-layered, multi-actor political structure (Bousetta et al. 2018). My interviewees rarely commented on this as a situation to the advantage of migrants; mostly, they pointed to it as an obstacle to incorporation. They perceive Brussels political system as challenging to participate in, and even if they manage to get in, they find it challenging to follow an agenda to prioritise migrant-related issues, believing that they are destined to be an instrument in the inter-community power struggle. Along the same line, existing literature often emphasizes the difficulty for migrants to pursue group-level interests in Brussels, given that it is an arena for Walloon and Flemish political rivalry (Jacobs et al. 2006; Jacobs et al. 2002).

My research coincided with local elections in 2018 and regional and federal elections in 2019; therefore, I had the chance to hear views and observe attitudes of the Turkish community members on the political opportunity structure but generally on local politics. I often heard about their dissatisfaction with party politics in Brussels in that migrant-origin candidates find it hard to elevate in the party structure and to be nominated for elections. They said that the political arena is not conducive enough for migrant-origin people to compete with others with a migration-focused agenda; they are not preferable for parties. The ones who succeeded in climbing the ladder did that with extraordinary effort. It is, they claim, difficult to bring migration-related topics to the front. My interviewees usually talked about local elections but very rarely about regional ones, which is the city politics level. As stated in the methods chapter of this dissertation, 14 of my 53 interviewees do not have Belgian citizenship, which means they cannot vote in regional elections, which might be the reason for their disinterest in regional politics. However, among the ones with Belgian citizenship, except for a few who are already active in party politics, hardly any seemed interested in regional-level politics. I interpreted this as a sign of their lack of knowledge and low interest in city politics and that they perceive the local level as the most proximate and instrumental in pursuing migrant interest. When it comes to the upper levels – the city level (regional level) and federal level – it becomes more complex, harder to connect with and more difficult to navigate through, as explained below by Asuman.

Asuman (religious sub-group): Bureaucracy takes too long here; you have to deal with many institutions to reach your target, which is so complex....As part of my job (she is working for a Turkish migrant association), I have contacts with federal politicians. I know some parties are extremists... In politics, there are Flemings alongside the French; Flemings are more conservative; they have a more traditional approach... As far as I know, Brussels politics is left-wing, which is relatively better for migrants, but in general, I do not think they take migrants that much into account.

Asuman, a highly educated woman with a master's degree in politics, defines the system in Brussels as "so complex", and I heard the same comment from almost all my respondents

regardless of their education level. The ones with limited education, namely without a university degree, mostly members of the Schaerbeek sub-group, only mentioned “municipality” when I asked about Belgian and Brussels politics; it seems that upper-level politics is totally out of their scope.

In this part, I examined the local socio-political set-up in Brussels designed to keep the power balance between the two constituent communities, namely Walloons and Flemings, and concluded that migrants often feel like being instruments of power struggle in this intricate dual political system. The fact that the jurisdictional boundaries between the political layers are blurry and hard to understand and that the political system is not an inviting one for ethnic groups but arranged to maintain a bi-communal set-up discourages migrants from pursuing migrant politics in the city.

ii. Global Brussels

In this section, I will discuss global Brussels and argue that Brussels as a global city is an inviting context for migrants and that it forces the rigid local set-up for a change in favour of a multicultural, multilingual landscape in the city. To do that, I will first describe global Brussels and then, in the next section, which is the last section of Part 2, based on my research findings, discuss how global and local dynamics compromise with each other to the advantage of migrants.

On its official website, Brussels Capital Region is described as a “melting pot of different cultures” where 180 nationalities live together. The city’s migrant population exceeds its native population, constituting almost 60 per cent of its total inhabitants. As Belgian statistics are not based on ethnic origin, it is difficult to determine the exact number of migrants coming from a specific country. Nevertheless, according to official 2021 population statistics based on

nationality at birth, 510,697 from the Brussels total population of 1,218,255 are registered as Belgians, 309,013 as nationals of EU member states and 398,545 as nationals of non-EU countries (Table 4). Studies note that the largest migrant groups from EU member states are from France, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain, and from non-EU countries are from Morocco, Türkiye and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bousetta et al. 2018; Deboorese et al. 2009).

The first 10 nationalities at birth in Brussels, according to official statistics of 2021

Morocco	148.940
France	70.483
Romania	47.465
Italy	39.204
Türkiye	33.291
Spain	29.183
Poland	27.310
Democratic Republic of Congo	23.282
Portugal	20.370
Bulgaria	13.877

Table 4: The first 10 nationalities at birth in Brussels

Source: STATBEL-The Belgian Statistical Office

Brussels' diverse population can roughly be divided into three groups that live in separate spatial and social spaces: *Euro bubble* in which professionals who work for or are, due to their jobs, related to European Union, *immigrants*, and *native Belgians*. Euro bubble people reside in the communes close to European institutions like Etterbeek, Ixelles and Woluwe; a large number of immigrant groups occupy mainly the central parts of the city with ethnic concentrations in various locations like Turks and Moroccans in Schaerbeek, Saint-Josse, Molenbeek, Koekelberg and Anderlecht; native Belgians generally reside in the suburban areas of the city (Bousetta et al. 2018; Deboorese et al. 2009). The European Quarter of Brussels,

which is at the very centre of the city and where the EU institutions are, has its own social network and cultural environment, excluding the multicultural landscape of the city (Lähdesmäki 2020). Some communes are associated with specific migrant groups such that a part of Schaerbeek is called the “Turkish district”, Molenbeek is seen as primarily inhabited by Arabic-speaking migrants, and Ixelles is known for its Congolese residents. My observations during eight years-long residence in Brussels confirm the picture mentioned above.

Desle (1990) points out that the Fordist urban restructuring coincided with the guest-worker migration in the 1960s and 70s as the reason for the geographical separation of natives and immigrants. Economically better-off natives moved from the city centre to the suburban neighbourhoods, and in parallel to this development, the neighbourhoods in the centre were restructured to be used for business purposes. The city centre turned into a cheaper area after the economically better-off natives left, and it became an area where low-income guest workers could afford to live because of affordable housing and could work as the low-skilled labour force in the infrastructure sector of the city. In addition, the fact that guest-workers migration was socially selective -they were coming from socially lower segments of their societies- further solidified social division between natives and migrants (Kesteloot and Meert 2000).

Costa and de Valk (2021) particularly refer to Turkish and Moroccan migrants whose life conditions led them to reside in the deprived neighbourhoods in the city centre, as upward mobility is limited for these two groups due to low-level education and discrimination in employment and the housing market. The authors claim that newly arriving non-EU migrants still tend to reside in the economically deprived city-centre, which resonates only with the case of the Schaerbeek sub-group in my study. As I explain in Part 3 of this chapter, migration indeed continues from the same towns where Turkish guest-workers had come in the 1960s and 70s via network migration. However, the statement by Costa and de Valk does not apply

to the other two invisible sub-groups -secular sub-group and religious sub-group- residing in other parts of the city.

Additionally, with Brussels being the de facto capital of the EU, the Euro bubble is established as a separate group in the city (Costa and de Valk 2021). The Euro bubble comprises high-income professionals from the EU member states to work in the EU Commission, Council, Parliament and affiliated bodies of the Union, and experts such as lobbyists, journalists, and consultants working in sectors related to the EU. Although they represent an important part of international Brussels, the elitist character of the EU bureaucracy, as Corjins et al. (2009:4) call it, a "European bureaucracy divorced from its people", reflects on this cohort's way of life. My observation from my work experience at the Permanent Delegation of Türkiye to the EU supports their social segregation from the rest of the city; they generally socialise with each other, use English as the primary language of communication among themselves, reside in similar neighbourhoods, and send their children to similar schools and thus, do not really mix with the rest of Brussels.

However, Brussels' sociological and spatial division does not stand on a tension between these three groups; even though they do not interact much, they live alongside each other in the inclusive context of the city, which provides room for differences.

iii. Multiple pathways in the global city for accommodating diversity

In the preceding two sections of this part, I drew two different pictures of Brussels, one showing a context from the local perspective and the other from a global perspective. I did so to demonstrate that, in line with Glick-Schiller and Caglar's (2009) city-scaling approach, the global city of Brussels, on the one side, is a multicultural and cosmopolitan city with its migrant population and with its diverse socio-cultural environment. On the other side, it poses

challenges for migrants with its tight bi-lingual, bi-communal political set-up, which does not provide a wide opportunity structure to migrants but is designed to observe the balance of power between two constituent native communities. In this section, I will investigate the intersection of the local and global characteristics of the city, arguing that these characteristics clash, blend and eventually compromise with each other, through which the city context becomes appealing to different migrant groups with diverse backgrounds. My research has shown that *language* and *identity* are two prominent areas where one can observe the dynamics of this intersection. I argue that the city is forced by globalisation to ease the tight jacket created by bilingualism and identity politics. As foreseen by Faist (2009), diversification caused by globalisation generates a natural response from societal institutions to meet divergent demands emanating from specific conditions of migrants in urban places. I will first demonstrate that globalisation has brought English as an alternative to French and Flemish in Brussels, and secondly show that globalisation has promoted multiculturalism where migrants do not feel obliged to identify with any of the two local identities, namely Walloon and Flemish.

Formally bilingual, in practice, multilingual Brussels

Language is an excellent example in Brussels that showcases how local and global features of the city compromise and offer gateways to migrants. One of the local features of Brussels is that it is officially a bi-lingual city in which migrants need to choose either French or Flemish to contact public institutions for their children's education and for acquiring Belgian citizenship. However, as beautifully put forward by my interviewee, Zeynep, "This is not in line with the sociological reality on the ground". For that, the global features of Brussels bring forward English as a third option and, thus, opens a gateway to migrants where they can survive and even thrive without mastering one of the city's official languages.

My research has demonstrated that the bilingual nature of Brussels is a factor that tends to complicate Turkish migrants' life rather than an opportunity for more language options. Literature highlights that language is used by the two constituent communities of the city, namely French-speaking and Flemish-speaking, as an instrument in power politics and comes up as an area for competition (Vandenbroucke 2020; Bousetta et al. 2018; Van Parijs 2007). Brussels was historically a Flemish-speaking city, but the French language has become more and more dominant among the city population in the last decades, and this situation has become a matter of concern for Flemings in their power struggle with Francophones over the city. My data show that the approach of migrants to the language duality in Brussels is instrumental and shaped by their future life plans rather than identity-related. This indicates that migrants' approach to bilingualism in Brussels differs from the approach of natives, for whom it implies a subnational identity. The ones who choose the French language for education do so mainly for two reasons; first, in the future, they think they could have options outside of Belgium for which French can multiply their international choices as it is a widely spoken language in many parts of the world. In contrast, the ones who consider building a permanent life in Belgium tend to learn Dutch and put their children in Flemish schools, which, they believe, would increase opportunities for jobs in Flemish industries that are more developed than Walloon industries. The quote below speaks for the situation illustrated above:

Utku (secular sub-group): I know immigrants see this as challenging. Newcomers ask which one to choose. Your life is getting shaped by the language you choose in this country. We made our decision to French education. We wanted to select an international language that is spoken widely so that our kids could use it in case of moving out of Belgium. Flemish is not like that. The ones who want to stay in Belgium prefer Flemish.

As Utku said, migrants choose one of the two official languages for practical reasons. On the other hand, English-speaking ones use English in daily life. Leyla, for example, emphasises

how life becomes easy in Brussels with the English language and takes her knowledge of English as an asset for socialising with international Brussels.

Zeynep (religious sub-group): I do not see one Belgium integrate into. I cannot speak French, but I can survive in this city forever with my English. I feel really comfortable here; there are many people from different cultures and ethnicities. I have never felt alone or different in the negative sense in Brussels... The only difficulty I experienced was in the job market because of my headscarf. My circle is international, with very few native Belgian friends.

According to the Language Barometer conducted by Rudi Janssens (BRIO) in 2018, English has become the second most widely spoken language in Brussels after French, taking precedence over Flemish. Janssens explains this situation with the ever-growing external migration and young generations' enthusiasm to learn and speak English. In line with this, in recent years, political actors in Brussels have started a discussion to ease the tight jacket of the bilingual system in Brussels, and they call for a more flexible approach that would officially recognise the diverse and multicultural landscape of the city. In this regard, making English the third official language of the Brussels Capital Region has become an agenda item which the regional political parties were debating during the period this thesis was written (Brussels Times, 13 December 2020). During the discussions, the multicultural population of the city is coming forward as the reason for considering English as the third official language, as it is said Brussels Minister Elke Van den Brandt, "The central issue is the following: how to organise policy in such a way that it takes into consideration the diversity of a city with all the cultures of the entire world, a Belgian and European capital." (Brussels Times, 13 December 2020). The discussion can be interpreted as a multiculturalist step in the city's perception of "who owns the city".

Indeed, the language issue beautifully attests that Brussel's local and global contexts inform each other, and the interaction between them forces the local structure to make changes in line with the sociological reality created by globalisation.

Gateways for migrants out of the box of two competing identities in Brussels

My second example of how global and local features of Brussels interact and ease the rigid expectations of local structure is identity politics. Indeed, identity politics originates from the Belgian political structure, where Brussels operates as an arena for the political rivalry between the Flemings and the Walloons. The two communities are separately established in their respective regions, and regional identity is embedded in their integration policies. Flemings produced an understanding of “one nation (Flanders) within another nation (Belgium)”, whereas Walloons have not developed either a notion of “Walloon people or a rejective attitude towards Belgian-ness” (Kaya 2012:107). On the one hand, the Flemish sense of nationhood developed through a historical struggle for emancipation from Francophone domination. On the other hand, Francophone sub-national identity is formed under the influence of French identity, which is defined by civic republicanism. Brussels is a different story entirely. It is sui-generis in terms of identification such that due to its bi-communal political system, in addition to the national identity, it offers migrants two sub-national identities simultaneously, Flemish and Francophone (Walloon). It would not be correct to say that the model of belonging Brussels offers to migrants is the sheer combination of the two models (Kaya 2012). The city's multicultural and diverse context allows one to live without necessarily having to identify with one of the sub-national identities. Although migrants must choose one of the two languages and the two education systems, my research shows they do not feel pressured to assimilate either into sub-national identities or the Belgian identity. Bousetta et al. (2018) describe Brussels as a place where “how little anyone needs to assimilate to ‘Belgian-ness’” (p.2080). I observe that Turkish migrants do not even have a clear idea of what Belgianness is meant to them; interviewees often expressed how belonging in Brussels is undetermined, complex and multifaceted;

Makbule (religious sub-group): Of course, I am Belgian. I am Belgian and, at the same time, Turkish. [asked what Belgianness means to her] Hmmmmmm, I think I am Bruxelloise. My aunt lives in a small town in Flanders. She tells us how difficult it is to live in small towns, and you feel you are different there. I feel lucky that I am living in Brussels. I cannot live in other parts of Belgium. I would not feel comfortable. Here, we do not feel any pressure.

Makbule is a Turkish-origin second-generation woman born and raised in Brussels. She compares Brussels with Belgium and clearly opts for the former. Her identification with Brussels does not originate only from an emotional attachment, but she sees the concrete advantages of residing in Brussels. When I asked what Belgianness is, she was confused and did not reply to me immediately. Then she mentioned how much she likes some Belgian street food.

As showcased by these two examples of language and identity politics, while the bi-communal, bi-lingual local system in Brussels most of the time constitutes a challenge for migrants, globalisation triggers the change in the local socio-political set-up in the city and produces different pathways to accommodate diverse migrant groups. That is, English has become an alternative to French and Flemish, not only in practice but also because it is discussed as the city's third official language. Moreover, even though identity politics originating from Flemish-Walloon rivalry is one of the cornerstones of the socio-political configuration of the city, migrants do not feel pressurised to identify with any identity -neither two subnational identities nor the national one- as the multinational and multicultural landscape of the city does not permit any of the identities to be dominant.

4.4 PART III: THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AND THE CITY OF BRUSSELS

In the previous section, I have described the Brussels context by applying Glick-Schiller and Caglar's (2009) approach that city context comes into being at the intersection of its global and local features, and I concluded that this interaction offers a flexible and inclusive socio-political structure in Brussels where migrant diversity is accommodated. In this section, I will situate

Turkish migrants in this context and discuss how different segments of the Turkish community with different characteristics can find conducive social and spatial environments in line with their living conditions and aspirations. I will do so by examining three sub-groups in the Turkish community, namely the Schaerbeek sub-group, secular sub-group and religious sub-group.

4.4.1 Schaerbeek sub-group and the city

In this section, I will discuss the Schaerbeek sub-group, the segment of the Brussels Turkish community, which predominantly resides in the western part of the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of the city, an ethnic enclave known as the Turkish neighbourhood (*Türk Mahallesi*). As I explained in Chapter 2, the Schaerbeek sub-group comprises guest workers who migrated to Belgium in the 1960s and the 70s via bilateral labour agreements between Türkiye and Belgium. The sub-group has expanded over time via family formation and family reunion and is further expanded by the migration of relatives and acquaintances via network migration. As I explained in detail in Chapter 1, the neighbourhood gradually turned into an ethnic enclave for Turkish migrants, a place for the ones who could seek social, cultural and economic support from their co-ethnics. Given that guest workers were economically from lower segments of Turkish society and had limited educational attainment and low linguistic skills, it was a challenge for them to economically and socially integrate into Brussels, which led them to seek refuge in the ethnic enclave (Manco and Kanmaz 2005).

Ethnic enclave characteristics of Schaerbeek, on the one hand, reproduce socio-culturally a closed society; on the other, it enables migrants to establish a strong sense of belonging to the neighbourhood. Turks of Schaerbeek embrace their neighbourhood politically; they increasingly participate in party politics, and they actively support electoral campaigns of Turkish-origin politicians who stand for municipal elections (Janssen 2020; Teney et al. 2010;

Jacobs et al. 2006). Being represented in the municipality of the ethnic enclave possess a symbolic meaning to migrants as it means that they have a say in the administration of “their own place”. I observed this in Schaerbeek during the Belgian local elections in 2018; there were photos of Turkish-origin candidates on almost all shop windows in the neighbourhood, and Turkish-language newspapers were full of news, comments and critiques about Turkish-origin candidates and their campaign programs, about the way these candidates were treated by political parties, their wrong-doings, and their promises to tackle Turkish community’s problems, etc. The main topic of conversation in the teahouses and shops was the elections. In contrast, Turkish migrants living in other parts of the city with whom I also conducted interviews and attended their social gatherings during the same period neither seemed that much involved in local elections nor gave much importance to having Turkish-origin candidates in their municipality.

An interesting point I observed during my research in Schaerbeek is that they call native Belgians “foreigners”. Basar (Schaerbeek sub-group), for example, said, “In Schaerbeek, we Turks are not in touch with foreigners [we were talking about their relationship with Belgians in other parts of the city]. I think this is because of our culture. I am positive about foreigners”. I often heard this word during interviews and interpreted it as a sign of how much they think Schaerbeek is theirs, they are in their own place, and they see Belgians in the city as foreigners. I believe this is a point that needs further research to understand migrants’ belonging to the ethnic enclave.

During the interviews, it is highlighted that guestworkers’ descendants have a growing demand for moving out of the ethnic enclave towards mixed neighbourhoods. It seems that a mixed neighbourhood comes forward as a more desirable option for young people because it helps them to get rid of the dichotomy of either living an isolated life in an ethnic enclave or having

to assimilate into native society in native-populated parts of the city. Options for exit make global cities attractive places for new generations in ethnic neighbourhoods (Barwick and Baermann 2019). However, as noted by Miray, parents are not really happy with this trend;

Miray (Schaerbeek sub-group): “New generations were born and grew here. Most of them are criticised by their parents for the way they adapted to the culture here. They move outside Schaerbeek to be free from pressure, but family pressure somehow continues”.

Miray refers to the neighbourhood pressure used as an instrument aiming to keep descendants of guest-workers in the Schaerbeek and, thus, to consolidate the community. While the first generation tends to stick to the conservative and traditional Schaerbeek life, younger generations want to leave the socially and geographically isolated life in the neighbourhood. My interviewees note that, in the case of moving, new generations are expected to keep close social connections with the neighbourhood. Van Kerckem et al. (2013), in their study in several cities of Belgium on co-ethnic pressure among Turkish migrants, conclude that the city's social geography plays a role in the process. I suggest that new generations constitute a bridge between the ethnic enclave and the wider city by being the transmitters of culture, even if the culture they are immersed in is the one in the mixed neighbourhoods, and this may not be Belgian culture but global city culture which is a blend of different cultures from different parts of the world.

4.4.2 Invisible ones: secular sub-group and religious sub-group, and the city

In this sub-section, I will show how differently situated are the other two sub-groups, namely the secular sub-group and religious sub-group. Here, I want to remind the reader of the reason I call them “invisibles”: because they are neither immediately visible to the casual observer nor to the researcher; they are under-researched, and despite their growing number, they take the back seat in media representation and in public discourse.

As discussed in Chapter 1, these two sub-groups migrated to Brussels through the waves after the first one that brought guest workers -the Schaerbeek sub-group- to Brussels. Their reasons for migration are also different from the Schaerbeek one; they migrated for educational purposes, as political dissidents after political turmoils in Türkiye, in search of a different lifestyle such as a cosmopolitan one, to benefit from better job opportunities, etc. Their high educational level -most of them have at least a university degree- and better linguistic skills - they generally speak English, as English is the primary foreign language taught at universities in Türkiye, and they are eager to learn French and Flemish- which helped them in integrating into Brussels. They do not necessarily rely on co-ethnic support to settle in the city, making it easier for them to choose different neighbourhoods as their residence than Schaerbeek. Bilge, a long-time resident of Brussels, shares her observations about the segment of the Turkish community living outside Schaerbeek.

Bilge (secular sub-group): The others who live outside of Schaerbeek have very different views, not in harmony with the ones in Schaerbeek. Their mentalities are so different. The number of others is growing. The ones who describe themselves as ex-pats are more successful in integration. As the lifestyles and viewpoints differ, each group has a separate life.

In Bilge's quote, "the others" is used for the ones I call Invisibles in this thesis, and she highlights that the number of "the others" is growing. Another point that needs explanation in Bilge's words is that she means seculars when saying "ex-pats". There is a tendency to call highly skilled migrants working in well-paid jobs ex-pats, which indeed does not fit into the technical meaning of expatriates (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). I discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 that some of the members of secular and religious sub-groups do not want to be called migrants but expatriates, mainly for the reason of keeping themselves away from the stereotypical perceptions about migrants. Like Bilge, Utku also underlines secular and religious sub-groups' social and geographical separation from the Schaerbeek sub-group:

Utku (secular sub-group): The well-educated secular Turks live in well-off parts of Brussels, apart from shopping, they do not have any contact with the Turks in Schaerbeek. They have their own circles... They are more successful and can speak the language fluently. The seculars do not have contact with either Schaerbeek Turks or religious Turks. These groups do not come together.

In any case, ethnic products in Schaerbeek make the neighbourhood a place to visit for secular and religious sub-groups.

My interviewees from the invisible group underlined that the most appealing feature of Brussels is that it gives migrants the option to maintain a cosmopolitan lifestyle where one can find diverse people from different corners of the world with various cultures, cuisines, ideologies, social lives and a socio-political system that embraces diversity. That is to say, they find in Brussels “a society in which cosmopolitan values rate more highly than national values” (Beck, 2000b, 97). I observe that while secular and religious sub-groups have cosmopolitan expectations from the city, each sub-group finds satisfaction in a different version of global Brussels. The quote from my interview with Ibrahim points to the aspects of the city to which the secular sub-group is attracted.

Ibrahim (secular sub-group): “After graduation from university, me and my wife, we decided to do our doctoral studies in Europe, and we came to Leuven. Indeed, life in Leuven was also pretty fine for us, an international environment, not bad; we had friends from the university. I am from Istanbul, and my wife is from Ankara. We are used to big cities, that lifestyle. We thought the only city that would serve our expectations in Belgium was Brussels. You know, here you can live your own life, side by side with others, different cultures, it is international, we love it. I am not a person looking for Turkish friends; I do not want to be surrounded only by Turks. No, that is not for me.”

As indicated by Ibrahim, seculars find in the city “a mainstream” that is not only composed of native Belgians but a mixed cohort comprising natives, migrants, expatriates, and EU elites. This is in line with what Crul (2016) argues that in majority-minority cities, migrants do not need to integrate into a native mainstream but into “an amalgam of people of different ethnic backgrounds, migration cohorts, migration statuses and socio-economic positions” (p.57).

Their spatial and socio-cultural proximity to that mixed mainstream and the ability to communicate with them in English plays a significant role in seculars' integration into the city.

The religious sub-group enjoys a different version of global Brussels. My analysis concludes that one of the main reasons this sub-group chose Brussels as a place of residence is the city's comfortable context for migrant religious life. During the interviews, they stressed how they do not feel "different" in the negative sense while carrying religious symbols like headscarves and how easier it is, in comparison to other regions of Belgium, to find different options for employment in Brussels. They also indicated that in the multicultural city of Brussels, physiologically, they feel accepted since they are not singled out, thanks to the existence of various other religious groups and practices in the city. Religious sub-group members are eager to interact with multicultural circles but within the limits of norms and practices of religious life. Brussels gives religious sub-group the flexibility in which they can introduce themselves in their way, get in contact with native/mainstream society on their own terms and benefit from the opportunities of an international city where they can pick and choose from the pool of international people with whom to get in contact. During interviews, they proudly talked about their friends and neighbours from different cultures and how they try to create good connections with other circles in the city. It came up that they try to find environments that do not conflict with religious norms while contacting different cultures, such as searching for suitable environments in which wearing headscarves or not drinking alcohol would not be an issue to socialise. They indicate that Brussels better accommodates religious lifestyles in comparison to small cities in Belgium.

4.4.3 Turkish migrant community and Brussels as the capital of the EU

Previously in this chapter, I noted the literature which argues that migrants, natives, and the EU bubble live side by side in Brussels instead of incorporating each other. My research

brought similar conclusions about the Turkish migrants' relations with the EU bubble without exception among the sub-groups. Some of my interviewees, mostly from the secular sub-group, live in the same neighbourhoods with the EU bubble. Given that this sub-group members tend to seek multicultural and cosmopolitan environments, one would expect a better relationship between them and the EU people. However, my analysis suggests that they rarely contact each other. My interviewees often pinpoint the isolation of the EU bubble from the rest of the city, as said by Makbule (religious sub-group), "Yes, EU adds its colour to Brussels, but this colour does not blend with other colours in the city. It is a colour in itself. It does not touch the lives of people residing in the city."

Mihrinur, while having well-established ties with multi-national groups in the city, she has yet to be in touch with EU people during her extended stay in Brussels.

Mihrinur (religious sub-group): "I only feel that I am living in the EU capital when I see the inflation of prices and traffic jams during the EU meetings. I wish they would go. EU bureaucrats have their community and do not come out of their circle. Turks here do not see the EU as a platform to discuss and solve their problems."

Ibrahim shared his detailed observations about different ethnic and social groups in Brussels, but when I asked about the EU, he just nodded and indicated that he does not know much about them.

Ibrahim (secular sub-group): I did not have any experience with the EU, nor do I have any friends working there. The only effect I see is high rents in Brussels because EU bureaucrats can pay for it. I do not feel close to the EU.

My interviewees expressed either discontent or indifference when asked if they saw any advantages of residing in the EU capital. Turkish migrants do not perceive living in the capital of the EU as an added value to their lives. Indeed, this perception persists regardless of educational or occupational status. Nevertheless, further research is needed to see if this conclusion applies to also other migrant groups from the EU and non-EU countries.

In this section, I discussed how different sub-groups of the Turkish community have situated in Brussels, arguing that the city context is inclusive enough to offer each sub-group a conducive environment up to their expectations. In this regard, I demonstrated that, in Brussels, ethnic enclave remains an option for socio-economically disadvantaged Turks and creates an illusionary imagination about migrant spatiality that associates migrants with only certain locations in the city. The illusion of migrant spatiality feeds into the stereotypical perception about Turkish migrants generated around the guest-workers' image of the 1970s. I seek to refute this illusion by shedding light on the other segments of the Turkish community in the rest of the city.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I investigated the context in which different sub-groups could emerge in the Turkish community of Brussels. I argue that the context in global cities comes into being through interaction between local and the global features of the city, such that local and global dynamics clash, blend and compromise, and eventually, co-create a context that embraces migrant diversity. My research findings demonstrated that Brussels's local socio-political set-up is challenging for migrants as it is designed to observe the intricate power balance between Walloons and Flemings, the two competing constituent communities of the city and that migrants feel instrumentalised in this power politics. On the other hand, globalisation pushes the local set-up to change and respond to the demands of the city's diverse population.

My research shows that language and identity are two significant areas where global dynamics brought a change in the local socio-political system in favour of migrants. French and Flemish are the two official languages of Brussels, and language is an area of competition for Walloons and Flemings in the city. However, in the last decades, English has become the second most widely spoken language after French, and at the time of this research, politicians of Brussels

were considering accepting it as the third official language. Also, in theory, migrants are expected to identify with one of the sub-national identities, namely Walloon identity or Flemish identity; however, this does not apply to Brussels because of its multicultural and multinational landscape, where the migrant population is higher than the natives.

In this light, I argue that this flexible and inclusive context offers conducive conditions in which different segments of migrant communities can find diverse socio-spatial locations that would speak to their characteristics. Although this is the case, migrants in global cities are usually perceived in association with certain locations like ethnic enclaves and ghettos, and this illusionary imagination about migrant spatiality feeds into the migrant stereotypes. My research demonstrated that this applies to Turkish migrants. Although Brussels is home to a diverse Turkish migrant community scattered around the city, the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek is perceived as representative of Turkish migrants of Brussels, but my research demonstrates the heterogeneity of Turkish migrants across the city.

In the next chapter, I will discuss how transnational and supranational belonging modes differ for each sub-group in the Brussels Turkish community.

Chapter 5

Different modes of transnational and supranational belonging within the same migrant community

5.1 Introduction

This empirical chapter draws on my research to shed light on different modes of transnational and supranational belonging within one ethnic migrant community, arguing that these two dimensions of belonging for each segment of the community are distinct and particular to the segment in question. By so doing, it contributes to the overall thesis argument that in-group diversity is instrumental in uncovering different modes of belonging within ethnic communities.

In the previous chapter, I investigated how the city is a conducive context which accommodates in-group diversity within an ethnic community by referring to the case study of the Turkish community in Brussels and concluded that global cities offer different socio-spatial options to different segments of ethnic communities and therefore, each segment can find a living space in a different version of the city. By so doing, I have prepared the ground for this chapter (Chapter 5) and the next one (Chapter 6), in each of which I analyse different dimensions of belonging and show how the nature of each dimension differs for various segments in an ethnic community living in a global city.

The segments that I am looking at are the sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community, which I have identified during my fieldwork and explained in detail in Chapter 3. To recall, they are 1) the Schaerbeek sub-group, 2) the secular sub-group, and 3) the religious sub-group.

This chapter empirically shows that the nature of transnational and supranational belonging varies across the sub-groups in the Turkish community. To showcase this, I will first examine transnational belonging by drawing on two elements; 1) the emigrant/diaspora policy of the

sending state and 2) the contexts of exit and reception, both of which emerged from my research as decisive elements in shaping the transnational belonging of the Turkish community in Brussels. My findings demonstrated that each sub-group reacts differently to the home country's diaspora engagement efforts. While the Schaerbeek sub-group is more receptive to the influences of diaspora politics, secular sub-group members keep a certain distance from the home country in that regard. Religious sub-group's position vis-a-vis home country emigrant politics changes in accordance with their political relations with Türkiye such that, at the time of this research, they were critical of Türkiye's politics and had tense relations with the government. Also, my research showed that the sub-groups' experiences of departure from Türkiye and arrival to Brussels are significantly different, and I argue that this difference manifests itself in their feeling of belonging to the country of origin. The Schaerbeek sub-group, whose members are generally guest workers and their descendants, has developed a romantic and nostalgic attachment to Türkiye around the well-known story of guest-worker migration in the 1960s and has kept a dream of return alive in their imagination and transmitted it to the new generations. Their segregation in the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek and perception of discrimination from the native society also play a role in their strong connections to the country of origin. On the other hand, the religious and secular communities do not have a big story to attach to; they exited the country under various conditions, such as political repression, in search of better occupational opportunities, a cosmopolitan lifestyle and educational purposes, as I discussed in Chapter 1. Different from the Schaerbeek sub-group, they have found better integration conditions in Brussels.

Secondly, I will analyse supranational belonging in the context of the EU by taking into account two factors that emerged in my research as two lenses which show the sub-groups' distinctiveness in terms of their perceived belonging to the EU. The first one is their perceptions toward Türkiye's EU membership and the second one is their understanding of

Europeanness (European identity), though both are closely interrelated. My findings demonstrate that the Schaerbeek sub-group is the least identified with Europeanness and that the pace of Türkiye-EU relations impacts their belonging to the EU such that their perception of the Union positively changes when Türkiye-EU relations are in good condition. On the other hand, the secular sub-group sees Europeanness as part of its identity and, in line with this, supports Türkiye's EU membership, which would be an attestation of that identity. I have observed that the religious sub-group has particular concerns about Europeanness emanating from Islamic norms and traditions despite their support for Türkiye's EU membership, as they think it would ameliorate the political situation in Türkiye.

5.2 PART 1: DIFFERENT MODES OF TRANSNATIONAL BELONGING

In this part, I will analyse different modes of transnational belonging in the light of two elements that came up from my research; 1) Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy 2) the contexts of exit and reception, which are practical tools to show how each sub-group in Brussels Turkish community is distinct in terms of its attachment to the country of origin.

To this end, in the first section of this part, I will examine the community's transnational belonging based on Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy and spare the next section for the contexts of exit and reception.

5.2.1 Transnational belonging in light of the emigrant/diaspora politics

In today's globalised world, transnational engagements have become an integral part of migrant life. Therefore, the question is no more whether migrants connect with the homeland but in what ways they do it and what kind of consequences this connection creates in terms of integration and belonging. Within this perspective, in this section, I am examining migrant belonging through the prism of home-country attachment, particularly focusing on how differently home-country policies are received or reacted to or refused by different segments

of an ethnic community and how this difference is reflected in their sense of belonging. I do so with my case study of the Turkish migrant community in Brussels.

My research has shown that Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy is an important element in shaping Turkish migrants' feeling of belonging to their home country, and based on this finding, I will analyse the reactions of three sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community - the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group, and the religious sub-group- to Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policies to shed light on the distinctiveness of each one's transnational belonging.

I draw on the concept of "state-led transnationalism" (Gamlén 2014, Goldring 2002; Margheritis 2007) to explore Türkiye's outreach efforts to strengthen links with its emigrants. Goldring (2002) describes state-led transnationalism as "institutionalized national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state's political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory" (p.64). Given the ever-growing disjuncture between politics and territory, sending states are furnished with different tools to prepare the ground for transnational engagements of their emigrants. That is, interconnected global political and economic system donated migrants with rights out of citizenship status and beyond the territorial nation-state, such as granting third-country nationals with political rights such as voting in local elections, the introduction of dual citizenship, enhancement of international law which protects migrant rights in the place of residence (Baubock 2019 and 2010; Caramani and Grotz 2015; Collyer 2014; Soysal 1994). Against this background, with the rise of diaspora politics at the beginning of the 2000s, sending countries, including Türkiye, have designed their emigrant politics to enhance their cultural, economic, and political relations with citizens abroad using various tools like establishing legal and political institutions to secure the right for dual citizenship and the right to vote abroad, facilitating remittance flow, organising social and cultural events, expanding

the scope of the consular services, rallying emigrants to lobby for foreign policy issues, interacting with migrant associations to promote culture and to enhance economic relations with receiving countries, and introducing bureaucratic reforms like increasing the number of consulates, establishing governmental institutions specifically for citizens abroad (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003; Itzigsohn 2000).

As I explained in Chapter 2, tools and tactics that sending states use in this regard are subject to change depending on various internal (domestic) and external factors. Literature refers to the regime, political conjuncture, and resources of the sending state as internal factors (Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Mugge 2012), and it points to various regional and global dynamics and the context in the receiving state as the external factors that play a role in home-country policy choices (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Portes et al. 2007; Shain and Barth 2003). In the same vein, Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policies have undergone changes in the face of internal and external socio-political conditions since the first wave of migration to Brussels in the 1960s. In this light, first, I will explain different phases of Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy and then analyse each sub-group based on my research findings to uncover how differently they react to the emigrant policy and how this reflects on their transnational belonging.

5.2.2 Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy

Migration from Türkiye to western Europe since the beginning of the 1960s has been a continuous phenomenon, which increased the number of Turkish people living in western Europe to 5.5 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, 2020). The fact that the total population of Turks abroad is around 6.5 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, 2020) indicates that the main destination of migration for Turkish people is Western Europe. Thus, the region has always been the political geography that the Turkish state gives special attention to while configuring its emigrant policy (see Mugge 2012).

Literature notes that one major factor that shapes the ties of Turkish migrants in Western Europe with the homeland has been the country's emigrant policy/diaspora policy (Adamson 2019; Aksel 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a). I am using both "emigrant" and "diaspora" while referring to Türkiye's policy in a historical context because it became "diaspora policy" only at the beginning of the 2000s (Oktem 2014) as "Turkish diaspora" is generated from above by the Turkish state replicating the diaspora shaping, diaspora generating, diaspora management trend in the world. As we will see in the next section, throughout its history, Türkiye has always followed policies to manage or control its emigrants, and these policies have been attuned according to internal and external circumstances (Mencutek and Baser 2017; Mugge 2012).

I will analyse Türkiye's emigrant policy in a historical context in four consecutive phases; from the 1960s to 1980s – a reactive policy shaped by the guest-worker migration; from the 1980s to 2000s - a selective policy shaped by turbulent domestic political circumstances; from the 2000s to 2010s - inclusive and proactive diaspora generating policy originating from promising economic and democratic conditions at home and liberal international system; and from the 2010s onwards -selective and assertive diaspora policy reflecting increasing authoritarian tendencies in the country, especially after the coup attempt of 2016.

i. Reactive emigrant policy from the 1960s to the 1980s

The labour shortage in Western European countries after World War II and the difficult economic conditions of the newly founded Republic of Türkiye led both sides to make arrangements for temporary labour migration from Türkiye to Western European countries (Arkilic 2020; Aksel 2014; Icduygu 2009). To this end, the first agreement was signed with Germany in 1961, then with Austria, Netherlands, and Belgium in 1964, and a few others in the following years. Türkiye's expectation from these arrangements was to boost the economy with remittances and to benefit from the know-how after workers returned home. However, the

Oil Crisis in 1973 and its aftermath economic difficulties resulted in the freezing of labour agreements, including the one with Belgium in 1974. Although arrangements on both sides were made for the workers to go back to their country of origin once the agreements were fulfilled, many remained instead. The fact that economic conditions in Türkiye were not at a good level convinced workers to stay, albeit their living and working conditions in the receiving countries were far below European standards (Kaya 2019; Manco and Kanmaz 2005). Migration to Europe continued as family reunion and family formation as workers wanted to bring their families who had been left back in Türkiye.

Until the 1980s, Türkiye perceived its emigrants mostly from an economic point of view and did not put in place any policies aiming at their social and political integration, given that emigrants were expected to return home (Icduygu and Aksel 2013).

ii. Selective emigrant policy from the 1980s to the 2000s

Only after the 1980s, acknowledging that emigrants permanently settled in the host countries, Türkiye revised its politics toward emigrants. To this end, new policies were put in place to secure emigrants' rights in the receiving states and strengthen their social and cultural links and loyalty to the homeland. This new understanding was incorporated in the 1982 Constitution as such;

“The Government takes measures to ensure family unity of the Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their coming back (Turkish Constitution, article 62)”.

The policy pursued in this period was in line with the ideological fault lines in domestic politics. This is the period that came right after the 1980 military coup, which happened after clashes between right and left groups in the country led to the fleeing of many to seek asylum in Europe.

These were predominantly highly skilled migrants, among whom there was a high number of intellectuals, artists, journalists, and writers who left the country due to political reasons (Icduygu and Aksel 2013). Furthermore, in the 1990s, Kurds fled the country due to the intensified conflict between the Turkish military and PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a radical Kurdish separatist organisation active in southeastern Anatolia, which Türkiye declares as a terrorist organisation. We see that the country's emigrant policy in this period very much mirrored the difficult political situation at home such that the groups such as Kurdish nationalists and the left and right ideological movements, which were labelled as regime opponents, were put in the category of undesirable citizens and they were not embraced abroad. Emigrants to be supported were selectively determined such that the groups that did not fit into the desirable category of citizens and/or co-ethnics were excluded from resources. Indeed, as argued by Boccagni et al. (2016), Türkiye's emigrant policy has always been strategic and selective. The strategy has been modified according to the circumstances such that the groups deemed "desirable" for the state have been changing. One can see this change clearly in the 2000s, which I explain below.

iii. The proactive diaspora policy from the 2000s to the 2010s

"My sisters and brothers abroad should keep in mind that they are not alone anymore. They are backed by the power of Türkiye" (Erdogan, Arti90, 2013).

President Erdogan's words beautifully explain the diaspora engagement policy of Türkiye in this period. The phrase "they are not alone anymore" implicitly criticises past reactive and selective policies and also points to a substantial modification in the approach to the emigrants.

At the beginning of the 2000s, AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power and reshaped Türkiye's emigrant policy drastically, adopting a more active and liberal stance, which is sometimes called the "new diaspora policy" (Oktem 2014). AKP's coming to power coincided with the rising of passionate diaspora politics by many sending states around the

world (Gamlen et al. 2013; Margheritis 2007; Goldring 2002), and diaspora politics has become an effective diplomatic tool for the sending countries (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). Adamson (2012) defines diaspora politics as “a form of strategic social identity construction in which political entrepreneurs attempt to create a transnational “imagined community” based on a particular identity category” (p. 24). To this end, sending states have introduced policies beyond traditional consular services, comprising a wide range of areas, rearranging the institutions responsible for emigrants and establishing new ones to better regulate diaspora policies such as *Türk ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı* (Türkiye’s Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities), signing bilateral agreements with receiving states in the areas like taxation and social security to enhance living conditions of emigrants, increasing the number of consulates and modernising consular services by digitalising them, broadening the scope and quality of cultural events, introducing additional educational and social programs, etc.

AKP successfully adapted to the new global environment by putting into force an inclusive and comprehensive policy that embraced all emigrants, different from the policy implemented before they came to power. However, the policy gradually turned from a state-led emigrant policy into a “party-led” one (Burgess, 2018). It is a shared perception among bureaucrats and elites in Türkiye that AKP was the most successful government in contacting different segments of its diaspora. They did so by increasing direct contact between politicians and emigrants, which enabled diaspora members to better voice their expectations and to convey messages to Turkish authorities more effectively. Before, state officials were criticised as being too elitist based on the claim that they were not really focusing on the problems of ordinary citizens abroad. After a decades-long selective emigrant policy implemented strategically to exclude some groups, the change was welcomed, particularly by the religious and conservative migrants that were traditional supporters of AKP.

Three factors made it easy for AKP to succeed in reaching out to emigrants: significant development in the country's economic conditions, enhancement of relations with the EU, and remarkable interest in diaspora engagement policies at the international level. Türkiye was doing well in its economy and decisively reforming its institutions in line with the EU requirements in the first decade of the AKP government. Economic prosperity and democratic reforms paved the way for Türkiye to gain candidate status in the EU, strengthening the country's democratisation process (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a). These developments positively reflected on emigrants: the increased financial resources enabled the government to better meet the diaspora's demands. Also, better conditions in the home country had a positive psychological impact on emigrants, especially on those who strongly identify with the home country and, at the same time, face exclusion and discrimination in receiving societies (Kaya and Kentel 2005). I will discuss this in detail concerning the Schaerbeek sub-group of the Turkish community in Brussels somewhere else in this chapter. In this period, a trend of return migration was seen among highly qualified Turks towards big cities in Türkiye like Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, where they could find jobs up to their expectations (Kaya 2011).

The country's EU candidacy also shaped the proactive diaspora policy of Türkiye. Türkiye was accepted as a candidate in 1999, and membership negotiations started in 2005. AKP government developed policy tools to get the support of different segments of emigrants, especially highly educated ones, for the promotion of Türkiye in the EU countries, aiming that they would be ambassadors and add to Türkiye's image in Europe (Mugge 2012). However, with the decline in the democratisation process, EU membership has lost its significance in Türkiye's diaspora politics, especially after the coup attempt in 2016.

In sum, Türkiye's relatively inclusive diaspora management policy could convene different segments of Turkish emigrants around the homeland interests, but only for a short period. The AKP government, for the first time in Türkiye's history, proved that an inclusive and proactive

emigrant policy could yield positive results for Turks abroad. However, in the 2010s, the scene dramatically changed in the way I explain below.

iv. *Selective diaspora policy in the 2010s and onward*

From the 2010s onwards AKP government's diaspora policy has very much turned into a policy based on a national identity formed around its imperial past (neo-Ottomanism) and Sunni-Muslim nationalism (Arkilic 2020). Türkiye, apart from being an emigrant state, is also a kin state given that it is the successor of the Ottoman Empire (Aksel 2014; Icduygu and Aksel 2003) and, therefore, its perception of diaspora, in addition to the ones who emigrated after the foundation of the Republic, includes Muslim Ottoman citizens left out in Europe because of the change in state borders. Türkiye's diaspora policy during this period of the AKP government is indeed a reflection of a broad foreign policy that seeks more geopolitical influence in the adjacent regions (Oktem 2014).

As I explained in the above section, the invigoration of Türkiye's EU membership process was leverage for the country's diaspora policy. However, in the second decade of the new millennium, the hope for EU membership is significantly diminished among the Turks in Türkiye and the ones in Europe. Backlash in democracy and the rule of law, and the rise of authoritarianism drifted the country from the West, the reform process slowed down, and membership talks came to a halt. All these developments were reflected in the country's diaspora policy such that emigrants were no more assigned with the "duty of promoting their homeland in the EU", but an approach that mainly aims at electoral support of emigrants for domestic politics has been put in place.

I took the paragraph below from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage describing the official diaspora policy. As seen, the policy is carefully balanced in such a way that it demands from the host countries that they should introduce inclusive policies to encourage

migrants to participate in societal life, and at the same time, migrants are expected to be loyal to their motherland, mother tongue and culture.

Integration should be regarded as a two-lane process. In this regard, not only immigrants but also host country governments should have responsibilities. Host country governments should undertake policies that encourage the active participation of immigrants in society and embrace them.

It is desired that members of the Turkish community actively participate in the social, economic, cultural, and political life of host countries while maintaining their ties to their motherland, mother tongue, and culture, and live as prosperous, successful individuals respecting local laws and customs (The website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye)

However, this balance could hardly be observed, particularly after emigrants had extraterritorial voting rights. The direct influence of emigrants on homeland politics made them a focal point for the party in power and the opposition. Extraterritorial voting rights emerged as an important showcase for the transnational engagement of Turkish migrants and the influence of Türkiye in this respect (Yanasmayan and Kasli 2019). It has become an important political tool for Türkiye's diaspora politics, and my research shows that it influences the transnational belonging of the Turkish community in Brussels. Therefore, under the next heading, I will focus on it to complete my section on Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy. Then, against this background, I will start with my analysis of the sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community.

v. A milestone: Extraterritorial Voting Right and its effect on the Turkish community

I particularly highlight the right to extraterritorial voting among the home-land policy tools because it has played a crucial role in Turkish migrants' transnational belonging since 2012 when the regulation entered into force.

Extraterritorial voting or absentee voting is “the active and passive voting rights of qualified individuals, independently of their professional status, to take part from outside the national territory in referenda or in supra-national, national, or sub-national elections held in a country of which they hold citizenship but where they permanently or temporarily do not reside”

(Lafleur 2015:843). In line with the rise of diaspora politics, we see that absentee voting has become a crucial instrument of sending state governments for various economic and policy benefits such as increasing remittances, electoral benefits for the political parties, strategic alliances, emigrant loyalty, lobbying, etc. (Turcu and Urbatsch 2014). On the other hand, external voting may cause concerns in the receiving state that ethnonational and religious disputes of sending state may be imported to its territory or migrants may be influenced by their home-country governments to the detriment of national interest (Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Baubock 2003)

Absentee voting was a demand from citizens abroad for a long time and was under consideration by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye since the 1970s, but only after the country embarked on an aggressive diaspora policy did it come into force as a law with an amendment to the Electoral Law in 2012. From then on, as indicated in the paragraph below taken from the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities website, it has served Türkiye as a tool to strengthen the emigrants' belonging to the homeland. Also, it opened a legal way for emigrants to influence Turkish politics.

A high level of participation in the elections by our citizens abroad is very important as it indicates their interest in and belonging to the homeland. In addition to this, being able to vote in the countries they reside in provides our citizens with the opportunity to influence Turkish politics and convey their demands and expectations (The website of Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities).

They cast votes for the first time in host countries in the presidential elections of 2014, and then, in 2015, for two consecutive parliamentary elections. Since the technical preparations could not be completed in time, turn-out in Western Europe was low (8.2%) in 2014 (Sahin-Mencutek and Erdogan 2016), but, it increased to 32.5% in parliamentary elections in 2015, and the increase in the ratio of turn-out in Belgium was even higher; from 6.3 % to 42%. In the presidential elections in 2018, the turnout in Belgium arisen to 54%, and Erdogan got the 75% of the votes (Anadolu News Agency, 25 June 2018). Political parties, particularly AKP, did

their best to win as many votes as possible from abroad in these elections because opinion polls were pointing at a very close rivalry and emigrant votes were critically important in the race. They implemented very ambitious campaign methods, including big rallies and meetings, displaying posters, and sending letters to electorates.

Although Turkish immigrants have always been interested in Turkish politics, being granted the right to vote from abroad has been a milestone for their transnational political engagement, as they, for the first time, had the opportunity to exert direct influence on homeland politics. I have witnessed from my participant observations in Schaerbeek, the Turkish neighbourhood of Brussels, during the campaigns in the 2018 Turkish Presidential elections how transnationally engaged they were. I will discuss it in the following sections of this chapter.

However, Türkiye's approach to its citizens abroad with regard to extraterritorial voting created tensions between Türkiye and the western European states, including Belgium. Although western European countries had allowed the elections to take place on their soil, they did not like how the election process was managed by Turkish politicians, particularly by AKP, the political party in government. Turkish migrants were content since their long-time demand was met, and Turkish politicians, in general, were happy since they had new electorates, but this has not been the case for western European countries. They openly expressed their discontent via media channels with how Türkiye held the campaigns. These countries complained that the polarisation in Turkish domestic politics was being imported to their territory, which had the potential to affect the integration of Turkish immigrants in Europe negatively. Rallies created tremendous tension between Türkiye and some of the European countries (Arkilic 2020); Brussels Mayor rejected the Turkish government's demand for a venue for Erdogan's meeting with the emigrants (Flandersnews, 13 May 2017), and the rejections were not limited to Brussels as the same happened in Germany and the Netherlands (Deutsche Welle, 12 March

2017). In the Netherlands, the dispute went as far as declaring a Turkish minister persona non grata because of her insistence on meeting with the Turkish community members in public.

Extraterritorial voting was a spark that exposed how divergent stances both sides have on “migrant loyalty”. Vermeulen (2018), in his study on the political integration of migrants in Amsterdam, notes that Erdogan has become a symbol of an illiberal Muslim leader for European politicians who promotes an ideology incompatible with European civic values of democracy, secularism, and tolerance. On the other hand, he is seen by many migrants as the protector of the ones who are discriminated against, including Turkish migrants in their countries of residence. It has been argued that the massive polarisation in Turkish politics with the rise of anti-migrant, anti-Muslim discourse in Europe pushes conservative Turkish immigrants towards establishing stronger ties with homeland politics and, thus, more identification with Türkiye (Arkilic, 2020, Kaya 2019 and 2012). For low-skilled immigrants that perceive non-recognition in the receiving country, the extraterritorial politics of their home country becomes an opportunity for expressing their identity.

In this section, I have discussed the historical transformation of Türkiye’s emigrant/diaspora policy, and by so doing, I set the scene for my discussion in the following section, which focuses on how differently the policies have influenced transnational belonging of the three sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community.

5.2.3 Different reactions of the Brussels Turkish community to Türkiye’s emigrant/diaspora policies

In this section, I discuss how the sub-groups of the Brussels Turkish community -namely the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group, and the religious sub-group- respond to Türkiye’s emigrant/diaspora policies and how this difference reflects on their transnational belonging.

My findings demonstrate that while Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policy has always been an important instrument in the development of transnational attachment of the Brussels Turkish community, each sub-group does not react to it in the same way. The Schaerbeek sub-group falls into the predominant perception in Western European countries that Turkish migrants' transnational political ties are strong, which became very visible, especially after they were granted extraterritorial voting rights, which I discussed above in this chapter. The Schaerbeek sub-group comprises those facing integration challenges peculiar to guest-worker migration and living in a transnational bubble in an ethnic neighbourhood. Thus, their socio-cultural and political exclusion from the native society puts them in a position where their expectation from the country of origin becomes high, and their attachment to the home country is stronger in comparison with the other two sub-groups. On the other hand, I have observed that secular and religious sub-groups keep a distance from diaspora politics, albeit for different reasons. Seculars who have high human capital do not seek the support of their country of origin to establish a decent life in Brussels, and their aspiration for a cosmopolitan life makes them less reliant on transnational political ties. Religious sub-group, I would say, falls in between the Schaerbeek and the secular sub-groups such that they do not necessarily in need of transnational ties due to their high human capital, but on the other hand, my observation suggests that they are not as distanced to Turkish politics as the seculars. I learned during interviews that, before the 2010s, they were actively supporting Türkiye's foreign policy agenda and lobbying for it; however, at the time of this research, they were in opposition to the regime in Türkiye, and their transnational engagements were at their lowest level. Therefore, I could not reach a clear answer to the question of how they would involve in transnational politics if the conditions were suitable for them.

My separate analysis of each sub-group is as follows:

i. The Schaerbeek sub-group

The Schaerbeek sub-group comprises guest workers and their descendants with low educational and occupational attainment living in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels. My research has pointed out that the interest in transnational politics is very visible in the ethnic neighbourhood of Schaerbeek, different from the Turkish migrants in other parts of the city who seem to have less interest in homeland politics. The quote from the interview with Osman below explains how Turkish politics is influential and how home-country political culture is translated to the neighbourhood.

Osman (the Schaerbeek sub-group): I know almost all Turkish-origin (Belgian) politicians here in Schaerbeek, Saint Joost, and Anderlecht. Turks are very much interested in Turkish politics. They do politics in the way it is done in Türkiye. They get votes from people in Brussels but are not really immersed in the political culture here. Of course, there are successful Turkish politicians [...], but they only aim for (the votes of) Turkish migrants. Well, maybe this is the nature of politics; they act in line with the expectations of their electorates. Perhaps, they feel the need to adopt a language close to Türkiye's politics to get the votes of Turkish migrants here. Turkish migrants become happy when they get help from Turkish-origin politicians here in matters related to Türkiye. Then, they vote for them. During the elections, they (politicians) make speeches on Turkish radio, and they go to mosques. People want them to focus on issues like retirement from Türkiye, flights between Belgium and Türkiye, issues such that [...] Politicians get most of the questions about queues at the customs, and expensive flight tickets to Türkiye. This is because those Turkish migrants are more interested in Türkiye than Belgium. Turks socialise and entertain very differently than Belgians. Each summer they go to Türkiye, after their weddings they spend their honeymoon in Antalya....

Osman's portrayal of Schaerbeek relates to the period after the 2000s when developments in the receiving state and the home country eased the political opportunity structure for Turkish migrants to claim interests from both sides. In 2004, Belgium gave non-EU migrants the right to vote in local elections provided they have resided in the country for at least five years (Seidle 2015; Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002). Likewise, Türkiye embarked on a proactive diaspora policy that paved the way for the passing of a long-awaited law on external voting in 2012 (Arkilic 2020; Adamson 2019). Yet, for Schaerbeek Turks, from the 1960s until the 2000s, transnational political engagement was not something they really sought; in this period, the

main concern was maintaining social and economic ties with those back in their home country. Guest workers at that time were so busy with structural integration, dealing with life-sustaining issues like finding a permanent shelter, having a stable job, bringing in families from Türkiye, and therefore, politics was out of their scope. Their social, economic, and cognitive resources were so scarce that political engagement was a “luxury good, lower on the priority list” (Segura 2013:265). This period can be explained by the thesis of political quiescence (Martiniello 2005), which claims that migrants display political apathy because of limits in political opportunity structure or lack of political culture. In the first decades of their arrival, guest workers were in political apathy not only in terms of engagement in local politics in the place of residence but also in terms of their transnational political practices. Türkiye’s emigrant policies were limited in scope, passively maintaining economic and cultural links with emigrants.

On the other hand, the diaspora policy implemented by the AKP government since the beginning of the 2000s has produced an atmosphere peculiar to the Schaerbeek sub-group. For the first time since they migrated, Türkiye introduced a policy by which low-skilled conservative Turkish migrants in Western European countries felt privileged. Until then, they were seen as a group to whom the government had to allocate resources without much expectation in return. However, from the 2000s onwards, they have become an asset for the Turkish government, especially because of their potential for votes in Türkiye’s elections. The right to vote in home-country elections allowed them to have a say in their home country and strengthen the ties with political actors in Türkiye, and in turn, this put them more on the radar of Türkiye’s diaspora policy. The government, by introducing policy packages that met their long-awaited expectation in the areas such as better regulations at customs, cheap flights to Türkiye, agreements with receiving states on social security, and taxation, helped them to

emerge as loyal voters for the AKP. As said by Adamson (2019), they were upgraded from guest workers to “a desirable constituency to enhance Turkish state power” (p. 225).

Nevertheless, a new label has been put on them in Türkiye and also in Brussels as “the supporters of an authoritarian regime” after AKP’s successive electoral victories in Belgium. In the presidential elections of 2018, turnout in Belgium was 54%, the highest among the European countries, and Erdogan got the 75% of the votes, again the highest ratio for Erdogan in Europe (Anatolian News Agency, 25 June 2018). Besides bringing political stigmatisation to the Schaerbeek sub-group, these developments also added to their nationalistic sentiments.



Figure 4: Turkish neighbourhood in Schaerbeek celebrating referendum results in Türkiye in 2017.

Anatolian News Agency/Taken by: Dursun Aydemir

The argument by Goldring (2002) that the increase in sending state-migrant relations gives way to the politicisation of transnational social spaces is valid in the context of Schaerbeek. A transnationalized space (Caglar 2001) is created materially and socially in Schaerbeek with all its elements; one can find almost everything ethnic in this neighbourhood, from markets,

hairdressers, clothing, and home appliances to political party branches, bookstores, teahouses, cultural and social associations, job opportunities, weekend schools for children, guesthouse of Directorate for Religious Affairs of Türkiye (*Diyanet*), etc. Transnationalisation of the space has made it practical for Türkiye to create strong political ties with the community in Schaerbeek such that for every political figure who seek the support of Turks in Belgium, this neighbourhood has become the main destination to visit.

As indicated by Suleyman in the quote above, their interest in transnational politics does not hinder them from engaging in local politics in Schaerbeek. Turkish migrants embrace their commune and actively participate in elections, and during the interviews, I witnessed that Scharbeek politics is a part of their daily conversations. For most of them, it is the Schaerbeek municipality (neighbourhood level) where they get in touch with anything related to politics; regional and federal levels do not really fall into their area of interest. My observations suggest that they nicely combine local (neighbourhood level) politics with transnational one and that this combination shapes their sense of belonging. That is to say, my analysis does not necessarily suggest a contradiction between neighbourhood-level belonging and transnational belonging of the Schaerbeek sub-group. I concluded in Chapter 3 that low-skilled migrants in global cities, in case they find it challenging to integrate into the city, as in the example of Schaerbeek, create a safe place in the ethnic neighbourhood where they can feel at home. In this situation, it is more likely that the neighbourhood can be influenced transnationally. To put it differently, while they keep away from the rest of the city, the neighbourhood becomes an arena where the local and the transnational closely interact. During the Belgian local elections in 2018, I witnessed how lively they were participating in the electoral campaigns but in the style that is done in Türkiye; there were photos of Turkish-origin candidates on every shop window in the neighbourhood, and a lively debate was going on about the candidates in ethnic newspapers and teahouses, very similar to the style in Turkish politics.

Socio-spatial segregation makes migrants in the Schaerbeek neighbourhood an easily reachable group for Turkish politicians. A strand of literature (Baas et al. 2020; Boudreau et al. 2009; Ireland 2017) argues that social and spatial segregation in global cities impedes migrant integration, as ethnic neighbourhoods are mostly situated in socio-economically disadvantaged parts of the city; thus, segregation limits migrants' educational, linguistic and socio-economic opportunities. Another strand (Bolt et al. 2010; Portes and Shafer 2007; Edin et al. 2003) brings a counterargument that having been clustered in the same residential area is to the advantage of migrants in terms of economic success, social capital and in-group cohesion. Indeed, Schaerbeek validates both arguments; while it provides a haven to migrants with limited socio-economic opportunities and poor linguistic skills, on the other hand, it encapsulates migrants in a transnationalized bubble and makes them the immediate target for sending state political actors. Ezra is one of my interviewees from the religious sub-group who was once socially close with the Scharbeek sub-group. She shared her observations on the Schaerbeek cohort's transnational political engagements.

Ezra (religious sub-group): I assume, unless their immediate interests require it, migrants here would not get interested in Belgian politics. Belgian politics does not get much attention from the public. Turkish migrants' interest in politics is the other way around. Even the ones born here are not interested, even if they could speak French... It is not only an issue of language or education; it is the 60s and 70s mentality that survives. They commute between Schaerbeek and their village in Türkiye.

Ezra highlights an important point that Brussels politics is not really interesting for Turkish migrants, and I often heard the same comment from my interviewees from all three sub-groups. Even though there are successful Turkish-origin politicians at different levels of Belgian politics, in general, Turkish migrants are not interested in the city's political agenda. I observed that the complex and hard-to-understand political system, as discussed in Chapter 3, plays a role in their disinterest in city politics. Besides, the stark difference in the political culture of Türkiye and Belgium/Brussels is another factor that leads the Schaerbeek sub-group towards

Türkiye's politics. Politics is diffused in almost all areas of life in Türkiye; one can easily come across conversations on politics in any context in Türkiye, whereas it does not take that much space in everyday life in Brussels.

Furthermore, Turkish-origin politicians are favourable in the neighbourhood. Huma, who has a large family in Schaerbeek, told me that her family, especially her grandparents and uncles, were very disappointed with her because she voted in local elections for a Belgian candidate but not for the Turkish-origin one. She said;

Huma (religious sub-group): Just because they did not know him, they opposed him. I did my best to show them they should also consider other candidates. I invited him [she knew the candidate in person] to our house for dinner and introduced him to my family. Now they love him. This is how politics in Schaerbeek, is so focused on Turkish candidates.

Huma's experience well fits into the argument below by Ozuekren and Ergoz-Karahan (2010):

The stories of the households show that the social environment of individuals affects their preferences and choices. When the social environment is limited to a segregated neighborhood, it seems that, as time goes by, the dominant values of the people living there would be shared by almost all inhabitants, as people with different values would either leave the neighborhood or choose an isolated lifestyle in the same neighborhood. (p. 369)

Huma's quote supports my observation that the social environment is conducive for diaspora politics to be effective in Schaerbeek. Being socially segregated in the neighbourhood makes Turkish migrants receptive to the outreach efforts of their home country.

ii. The secular sub-group and the religious sub-group

The two sub-groups I discuss in this sub-section are the secular and religious sub-groups. Seculars are the ones who generally live in affluent parts of the city, maintain a cosmopolitan lifestyle, with high education levels (at least with a bachelor's degree), have good socioeconomic statuses, and have good linguistic skills. They constitute the segment that is

comparatively better integrated into the city. On the other hand, the religious sub-group, despite their high education level (with at least a bachelor's degree), is a mixed group in terms of socioeconomic status, given that a considerable number came to Brussels because of the recent harsh economic and political situation in Türkiye. At the time of my research, they were in the process of settling in the city. The old comers generally work in the education sector, entrepreneurs, and professionals with varied expertise.

In this sub-section, I argue that these two sub-groups are significantly different from the Schaerbeek sub-group in their reactions to the home country's emigrant/diaspora politics and that the difference manifests in their transnational belonging as well. As I argued in the section above, the Schaerbeek sub-group is receptive to diaspora politics; they maintain close ties with the homeland, saying with the concepts of Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004), their transnational ties are in the form of both ways of being and ways of belonging. That is, they intensely engage in social, cultural and political transnational activities and are mentally embedded in the transnational social space. Regarding the difference between religious and secular sub-groups, I can say that they broadly resemble each other in that both keep a distance from home-country politics but differ for reasons. While the seculars' distance can be explained, to a great extent, by their cosmopolitan way of life, my research concludes that democratic backlash in Türkiye at the time of my fieldwork also played a considerable role. On the other hand, I would argue that the religious sub-group's distance originates from their suffering from the current political conditions in Türkiye; some had to flee the country, and some others stopped involving in transnational activities, all of which led them to think there is almost no room for them in the transnational political space.

During the interviews, the secular and religious sub-group expressed reluctance to engage in anything politically related to Türkiye. They were highly critical of the way the Schaerbeek cohort involves in Turkish politics, which they consider a sign of unsuccessful integration. I

have also observed that their disinterest in homeland politics has not been translated into a high engagement in Brussels politics, a situation that I explain in Chapter 3 with the complex political system of the city and with the cosmopolitan perception that these two sub-groups hold. Among the reasons why these two sub-groups do not engage in transnational politics much can partly be the fact that they are not concentrated in ethnic neighbourhoods. The quotes below from Sinem, Selim, and Leyla showcase the standpoints of religious and secular sub-groups vis a vis Türkiye's emigrant politics.

Sinem (secular sub-group): I voted in the last [Belgian] elections. I saw immigrant-origin candidates on the lists. I met with politicians during communal elections; they visited us (...). I have not seen any regional politicians so far. In Türkiye also, I was not interested in politics. I do not follow federal politics either; if something important happens, we hear it somehow.

Sinem is an economist working for a Belgian firm and resides in an affluent neighbourhood of Brussels. As showcased in her comments, Sinem's distance from politics is categorical, whether in Türkiye or Belgium. Her sentence, "if something important happens, we hear it somehow," stresses her non-interest. Sinem is not alone in her standpoint; my interviewees from this sub-group generally echoed her, for instance, Selim.

Selim (secular sub-group): Politics is not for me; very complicated. I follow the Belgian political agenda from newspapers and also a little bit about Türkiye, that's it.

I have observed a similar attitude from my interviewees from the religious sub-group. Leyla is a young university graduate woman who puts her religious identity forward by wearing a hijab. She said she did not want to talk much about home-country politics and explained her disinterest in politics, only referring to Belgian politics.

Leyla (religious sub-group): [upon my question if she follows Turkish politics] I am not interested in politics anyhow. I follow Belgian politics from English sources; I am only aware of the general agenda. Migration and education are two topics I am interested in. I only know the prevailing ideologies of political parties. I do not follow any specific politician or party. I know that migration and the environment are on the agenda of federal politics, but I do not know much about regional politics.

The reluctance to talk about Turkish politics was not specific to Leyla; almost all my interviewees from the religious sub-group were in this mood, albeit many of them were closely following developments in Türkiye, which I observed during participant observations. I sensed that this is partly because they need a more established relationship with the person with whom they would talk about Turkish politics, given that they or their relatives and friends were negatively affected by the political oppression in Türkiye during the time this research was conducted. For Sinem and Selim, two members of the secular sub-group, following Turkish politics or Turkish-origin politicians in Brussels is not part of their everyday life, and this can be generalised for the secular sub-group, which is, again, confirmed by my participant observations. However, their distancing from politics can better be explained by their cosmopolitan worldview, which gives them a broader perception of politics than being interested in the homeland.

I asked my interviewees about their expectations from local politicians and if they prefer to vote for Turkish-origin politicians. The respondents from these two sub-groups did not mention migrant-related issues in their expectations; instead, they noted issues like the environment, sanitation, traffic, etc. Participants from both sub-groups indicated performance but not ethnic origin as the criterion in their support for politicians. As noted in the section above, migrant-related issues and Turkish-origin politicians are at the forefront of the Schaerbeek sub-group. The two comments below, one from Osman (religious) and one from Ibrahim (secular), show the difference between the religious sub-group and the secular sub-group and how these two sub-groups differ from the Schaerbeek sub-group.

Osman (religious sub-group): There were no Turkish candidates in my neighbourhood, but if there were, I would not vote for them. Turkish politicians appear in mosques and migrant neighbourhoods during election times. Other than that, we do not see them. It is normal for them to pursue politics to appeal to migrants. However, sometimes those politicians put their

Turkish identity too much at the forefront. Identity-based politics does not always bring positive results.

Ibrahim (secular sub-group): I do not look at ethnic origin while voting. I looked at the party program but not the candidate profiles, I only wanted to know their approach on some issues. I am not interested in migrant-related issues; only I want to vote for the political party in line with my political ideology.

Osman and Ibrahim underline that they are not interested in migrant-related politics and do not vote specifically for Turkish-origin candidates. However, they differ because Osman has detailed knowledge of transnational politics but refrains from it, whereas Ibrahim says he has no interest in it whatsoever. In line with this, during the interviews, seculars did not mention Turkish-origin politicians' names, whereas I heard the names and stories of Turkish-origin politicians from the religious sub-group. Needless to say, I received the most extensive information about ethnic politics from the Schaerbeek sub-group.

On the other hand, a situation with religious ones deserves attention. A considerable number in this sub-group migrated to Brussels, fleeing from the political regime in Türkiye in the last decade. Because of the political pressure there, they already left Türkiye with a very negative attitude towards politics and political actors in Türkiye and, therefore, they keep a precise distance from all kinds of transnational engagements, especially from political ones. I have observed that negative experiences have caused emotional detachment from the home country even though they closely follow the developments in home-country politics without any active engagement. Mihrimah (religious sub-group) explains her feelings about homeland politics: "I had an interest in politics in the past. I lost my faith in it now." Also, the remark by Ekin (religious sub-group) that "I do not want to partake in politics. It makes people dirty" can be read in the same way.

5.2.4 Transnational belonging in the light of migratory history

My analysis unveils that one of the elements that distinguish the sub-groups of the Brussels Turkish community from each other in terms of transnational ties is the circumstances that caused them to move from Türkiye and the conditions they found at the place of arrival; in other words, “the context of exit” and “the context of reception” (Portes 2003). With this in mind, in this part, I discuss the transnational belonging of three sub-groups of the Brussels Turkish community -the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group, and the religious sub-group- drawing on their migratory histories.

My analysis suggests that the Schaerbeek sub-group’s attachment to the country of origin is influenced very much by the context in which guest-workers migration took place. Schaerbeek cohort migrated from rural areas of Türkiye due to difficult economic conditions, and the conditions they found in the place of arrival were equally challenging. Their guest-worker status and Belgian lack of sound integration policies combined with low educational and linguistic skills have made them always look back to Türkiye with a nostalgic and romantic view and led them to maintain a strong desire for return, which was put into action by very few of them. I have also discovered that the guest-worker stereotype, which is linked to their migratory history, brings in an emotional challenge not only in the receiving country but also in Türkiye, which leaves them with the feeling of exclusion from Turkish society in Türkiye. On the other hand, religious and secular sub-groups do not have a single coherent story of migration; they came under various circumstances like fleeing the country for political reasons or for finding a cosmopolitan multicultural place to live in, for educational or occupational reasons, etc. Their high human capital enabled them to find better conditions in Brussels. Against this background, they did not develop an emotional attachment to their past and to the country they left.

i. The Schaerbeek sub-group

Migration from Türkiye to Brussels has continued since the 1960s but in different socio-political contexts. In this regard, the Schaerbeek sub-group, composed of guest workers and their descendants, shares the well-known story of guest-workers migration. Guest-workers migration to Belgium was arranged by the labour agreement between Türkiye and Belgium, which entered into force in 1964, and resulted in mostly male workers to come to Belgium to work temporarily in the mining sector. It lasted only until 1974, as Belgium could not afford to continue with it because of difficult economic conditions. Workers did not return and later brought in their families via family reunification and family formation. Besides their immediate family members, many relatives, friends, and acquaintances migrated to Brussels via network migration. They also settled in Schaerbeek, where it is easier compared to other parts of Brussels to find jobs and have a sociocultural environment similar to the one they left behind. Their backgrounds are very similar, as I explained in detail in Chapter 3; they all came from rural parts of Anatolia, mainly from Emirdag (a small town in the city of Afyon), and the reason for migration is predominantly the economic hardships in Türkiye. I would say that migration was not something they aspired to but was dictated by difficult life circumstances. Hatun's story is one of the many stories one can hear from the Turkish migrants in Schaerbeek.

Hatun (Schaerbeek sub-group): I came to Brussels for marriage when I was 17 years old, almost 30 years ago. My husband's grandfather had come to Belgium as a guest worker in the mining sector, and then, his dad had settled in Brussels and worked in metro construction. My family lives in a small town in Türkiye (a town close to Emirdag); they have a standard life, not bad. When I first came here, I lived in the same house with my husband's family, in a small apartment [...] At that time, my husband did not have a job and was receiving unemployment benefits.

We literally had nothing [...] I was so unhappy but did not have even the freedom of expressing myself [she cries]. Life in Schaerbeek was very traditional and conservative, I cannot find words to explain it; it was worse than in remote rural areas in Türkiye. This was not the life I dreamed of. I would go to Europe, and it would be fun, but no...It was not like that at all....I had to take permission from the elderly and also from the husband to go out. This was not specific to me; it was the same with other women. Even some women were in harsher conditions than me [...] Also, communication with Türkiye was difficult. I was calling my family once a month with a phone card only for 3 minutes and always giving the impression

that I had a good life here [...] I did not want to make them unhappy. We should be thankful for the opportunities today.

The arrival of letters took a month. I was always crying and feeling so lonely. I was missing my family and my Türkiye so much. There was nobody to help me. My first contact with a Belgian was with my gynaecologist during my first pregnancy, and later, with the teachers in my children's school [...] My French is very limited. Finally, I found time to go to a language course, but due to the COVID pandemic, I had to postpone it.

As in the case of Hatun, guest workers and their descendants went through similar life experiences; they had to live in severely difficult living conditions, could not establish contact with natives, and struggled with language incompetency, and as a result, the ethnic neighbourhood and transnational space remain as the only option where they feel secure and at home. In the first decades of their migration, their transnational space was not institutionalised and was aimed at maintaining relations with their beloved ones and supporting them financially. As I elaborated on in Chapter 4, the context of reception in Schaerbeek was also challenging. Belgium had yet to develop a clear-cut integration policy aiming at incorporating guest workers. Job opportunities were scarce and only limited to the business and infrastructure sectors, given that Turkish migrants of that time were mostly low-skilled. Metin, for instance, as a second-generation migrant, explains how the context was difficult for his parents and still is for himself as well.

Metin (Schaerbeek sub-group): My parents did not come here because of the excellent conditions Belgium offered us. No, it was never easy. They had to live in a one-room temporary cabin located on the farm where he was working. Can you believe that I was born in that cabin? My mom had delivered me alone without a midwife. It was not only us; I heard many similar stories from our Turkish friends [...] We went through tough times here. No, no, we did not have any other choice; we had to endure the hardship...

Life is still tough for us here. We have to work till late hours to have a decent life. We do not feel we belong in this country. We do not want our kids to go through the same hardship [...]. During our childhood, we experienced discrimination at school, and now our kids are going through the same difficulty. This is because we are Muslims. Our Türkiye is a very developed country; life is very comfortable there.

Metin's words highlight a crucial point concerning the impact of the contexts of exit and reception on the Schaerbeek sub-group's transnational belonging. When I met Metin and his wife, Huriye, they were preparing to move to Türkiye with their two primary school-age children. They both are second-generation, Turkish-origin Belgian citizens in their mid-40s. I regularly met with Metin and Huriye over the course of 6 months, which allowed me to know them closely. Both their sets of parents had migrated to Belgium as guest workers and settled in Schaerbeek, and thus, Metin and Huriye grew up in the closed circle of the Turkish community in the neighborhood. In fact, Metin and Huriye had not lived in Türkiye, only went there for summer vacations, but they define themselves as truly Turkish. After marriage, they bought a house in a different neighbourhood in Brussels and moved from Schaerbeek to send their children to Belgian-populated schools. They are critical to the socio-cultural environment in Schaerbeek, thinking that Turks in Türkiye are different from the ones in the neighbourhood, and therefore, they would like to move to Türkiye. They see Türkiye as "home". Both frequently use the phrase "our Türkiye" during conversations and see Türkiye as the place they belong to.

Indeed, "their Türkiye" is an idealised land that does not always fit the realities on the ground, a place they altogether built in their imaginations, and their grievances in the receiving state helped to form "their Türkiye" as a far better place than it actually is. The collective memory of the homeland enriched by nostalgia and romanticism has a crucial impact on this sub-group's strong transnational belonging.

Migratory history, stereotyping, and transnational belonging of the Schaerbeek sub-group

My research has revealed that migratory history can be an element of stereotypical perception not only in the receiving state but also in the country of origin, and thus, it can influence migrant transnational belonging negatively. In Türkiye, there exists a stereotypical perception of Turkish guest workers who live in Europe. My findings suggest that this constitutes an

emotional challenge for the Schaerbeek sub-group concerning their attachment to Türkiye. There exists extensive literature on discrimination and stereotyping in the receiving state, but stereotyping in the homeland is rarely noted (see Kunuroglu et al. 2021).

“*Gurbetçi*” is the word that explains the Turkish emigrant stereotype in Türkiye, which corresponds with the term “guest worker” in Europe. In other words, they were called guest-worker in Europe and *gurbetçi* in Türkiye, and both terms refer to a stereotype in their own contexts. *Gurbetçi* is used in everyday language for Turkish emigrants living in Western European countries and has a rich meaning referring to a person who is abroad but desperately longing for the homeland (Kaya 2011). “*Almanci*” has the same meaning, but it is used only in the German context. *Gurbetçi* has been the topic of many songs, poems, films, and stories in Turkish literature and is portrayed as a person who is physically abroad but mentally in Türkiye. *Gurbetçi*’s life and ties with the rural areas they migrated from were highly popular topics for Turkish cinema in the 1970s and 80s. Many movies were made illustrating guest workers with a certain image showing the stark contradiction between the emigrant’s difficult life in the receiving country and his efforts to give an “affluent image” in the homeland. In the receiving country, he was living in ghettos, having difficulties in communication with natives because of low linguistic skills and cultural differences, working under harsh conditions in factories, staying in temporary shelters, and always living in nostalgia. In contrast, he comes to his village with a Mercedes car which was a sign of richness at that time in Türkiye, introduces new technology that the villagers had never seen before, and financially supports his family, for which they look up to him. However, this person always feels in limbo, belonging to neither Türkiye nor Europe, and feels culturally excluded on both sides (Kaya Tulay 2018).

The term “*Gurbetçi*” implies the place migrants left as “home”, not the one they migrated to. My research on the Turkish community in Brussels shows that “home” has different meanings

for different segments of the community; it is Schaerbeek or Brussels or Belgium or Türkiye or a town in Türkiye, etc. For the Schaerbeek cohort, I would say it is both Schaerbeek and Türkiye. They often refer to Türkiye as “my country, our Türkiye”, and I witnessed that the ones with dual citizenship are not exempt from this language.

The stereotype has not changed throughout the decades. The first impression of Turks in Türkiye when they come across a Turkish migrant from Western Europe is a common one; a person with limited educational background, socio-economically belonging to lower segments of Turkish society, working in low-level jobs under difficult conditions in Europe but financially looking good in Türkiye. In her comment below, Huriye indicates how she does not like the way she is treated in Türkiye despite her love and attachment to the country.

Huriye (Schaerbeek sub-group): I wouldn't say I like how they treat us in Türkiye. I feel sorry that when we enter a shop in Türkiye, one of the first questions we encounter is if we are "gurbetci". How do they understand it? Is it written on our foreheads? [...] Yeah, probably it will not be easy for us to adapt there (she talks about her decision to move to Türkiye). My uncle told me that I need to be very careful after I move to Eskisehir [the town she was planning to settle in]; people would understand easily that I have not been raised there, and they may take advantage of me [when asked if it would be difficult for her to live in Türkiye], sometimes I am scared of moving there, I know it would not be like going for a holiday, how would it be? I hope it will be good; our Türkiye is a good place to live in...

As seen from Huriye's comment, the image created around the context of exit in the 1960s has stuck to the Schaerbeek sub-group and becomes an issue in their identification with Türkiye.

Context of reception and the myth of return

A distinct feature of transnational belonging of the Schaerbeek sub-group is the desire to go back and settle in Türkiye, which has been conceptualised in the literature as a “myth of return” (Cakmak 2021; Kunuroglu et al. 2021; Simsek- Caglar 1995). It has been a dream put into practice by very few of them. In the guest-worker/*gurbetci* jargon, the term “*kesin donus* (permanent return)” implies their temporary residence in the receiving country for economic purposes and points to an expectation for a permanent return to home. Kunuroglu et al. (2018),

in their research on returned Turkish migrants from Western European countries, found out that the “dream of return” is the most influential factor in their decision to move back to Türkiye and that they were dreaming of it since the moment they migrated abroad.

The myth of return, in a sense, strengthens migrants' transnational ties but leaves them in between two polities, as if they are permanent guests in the receiving state. That is to say, the situation that they constantly wish for return but not be able to actualize it put them in limbo and negatively affects their belonging to the locale they live in. Simge, a secular sub-group member, in the quote below, brings critiques to the Schaerbeek sub-group, pointing at their status in limbo.

Simge (secular sub-group): The image of Turks in Belgium is not a good one; they are different from the Turks in Türkiye. The ones here are neither Belgian nor Turkish. Out of the fear that they might lose their Turkishness, they have become too introverted, a closed society.

The “myth of return” is always around and talked of among the Schaerbeek community. Metin and Huriye, as I explained in the previous section, were among very few who were taking action to realise their desire for return. What is interesting in their case is that theirs is not a “return” as technically they cannot return to a place where they did not come from; they are second-generation migrants born and raised in Schaerbeek; however, Türkiye is their ancestral homeland where they feel they belong to and decided to move there. Kunuroglu et al. (2018) note that the wish for return is transmitted to the second and third generations living an isolated life in the receiving country and that a nostalgic attachment to the parental “home” accompanies it. In the case of Turks in Brussels, only the Schaerbeek sub-group maintains the myth of return, whereas the other two sub-groups did not mention a desire for return during the interviews. Literature notes that the desire for return could only be put into practice by a few during the first decade of the AKP government when significant economic developments were

achieved, but it did not last long given the deterioration of political and economic conditions in the country later (Duru et al. 2019).

In this section, I analysed the nature of transnational belonging in the Schaerbeek sub-group drawing on the context of exit and the context of reception. I argued that the well-known story of guest-workers migration significantly shaped their ties with the homeland.

ii. The secular sub-group and the religious sub-group

In contrast to the Schaerbeek sub-group, secular and religious sub-groups do not have a single coherent story of migration. They came to Brussels from different social segments of Türkiye, not necessarily out of difficult economic conditions but for various reasons such as education, vocation, lifestyle, and political dissidence. Migration waves by which the members of these two sub-groups came to Brussels took place in different contexts than the guest-workers one. Even the ones from these two sub-groups who migrated under unfavourable conditions, like refugees, have found a safe haven in Brussels where they could establish a life up to their expectations thanks to their high skills. In this view, they mentioned during the interviews that they could find what the home country could not provide them in the city and that they do not look back to their country of origin.

These two sub-groups predominantly came by the mass migration waves after the first wave in the 60s and 70s, by which guest workers had migrated. To look at their context of exit, I will briefly remind the conditions in Türkiye during these waves. As I explained before in this chapter, the period between 1980 and the end of the 1990s was socio-politically very chaotic in Türkiye; a military coup took place in 1982, after which regime opponents escaped to Europe to seek asylum, and at the beginning of the 1990s, the mass migration of ethnically Kurdish citizens of Türkiye to European countries took place mainly from the southeastern part of

Anatolia where intense clashes were happening between Turkish military and PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party), a left-wing Kurdish separatist movement which is declared as a terrorist organisation in Türkiye. Then, conditions changed positively in Türkiye; from the end of the 1990s till 2016, the main reasons for migration were no more economic difficulties or harsh political situations. Highly skilled people like students, professionals, and life-style seekers were migrating to explore different opportunities in Europe and mainly aimed for big cities. This wave is very much shaped by globalisation and a liberal domestic and international system that enables people to move easier than before. However, with the coup attempt in 2016 political and economic situation deteriorated in Türkiye, which sparked a new migration wave which came after a huge purge of public employees and pressure on political dissidents. Many mostly well-educated, highly skilled migrants fled to Europe, the United States, and Canada. Many members of the socio-economically well-off section of Turkish society who did not face any imminent risk also preferred to move abroad to have better living standards and education opportunities for their children. As it is seen from secular and religious sub-groups' migratory history, for these two sub-groups, different from the Schaerbeek sub-group whose migration story is symbolised by the terms "guest-worker" and "*gurbetçi*", the migration stories are not at the forefront, and they do not show particular emotional attachment to their past. Indeed, during the interviews, they often underlined their difference from the Schaerbeek sub-group by referring to them as "guest-workers", as this term implies unsuccessful integration and an isolated life very much connected with the homeland, as indicated by Ibrahim below.

Ibrahim (secular sub-group): I think there is a general prejudice towards Turks here. This is to a certain extent because they cannot differentiate between us and those in Schaerbeek [...]. For me, Schaerbeek is only a place where I can find Turkish products, restaurants, and butcheries. I like its architecture. I came to Brussels for the first time years ago. At that time, Schaerbeek felt 20-30 years behind Türkiye. Schaerbeek people would be the same if they lived in a city other than Brussels. They only socialise with their relatives here.

Ibrahim's words express how unhappy he is with the Turkish image in Brussels, and he sees the Schaerbeek community as the reason for this negative image. Ibrahim had a good job in Istanbul, and he moved not because he had to but because he wanted to live in a cosmopolitan big European city; therefore, being perceived with the guest-workers stereotypical image is a source of discomfort for him.

I have witnessed that among secular and religious sub-groups, many do not consider Brussels their final place for settlement, as their human capital is rich enough for further migrating to different places, and their worldview supports the further movement. During the interviews, especially seculars said they are opting for French rather than Flemish because French as a widely spoken language may open new gates for them in different parts of the world. I observed that almost all seculars and many religious ones do not look back to Türkiye but want to continue in Brussels or move to other places in Western Europe or the US, or Canada. Bahriye, for example, a religious woman who came to Brussels to do a Ph.D. and then found a job, married, and settled in the city, defines herself as “Bruxellois” and thinks that her life has improved significantly after migrating and that she can personally and professionally develop more in this city, and therefore, Bahriye does not consider return as an option. Also, Ibrahim, whose immediate circle is composed of seculars, moved with his wife from Ankara to Brussels in search of European life and found a job in an international company. He thinks the way of life in Brussels appeals to him and that touristic visits to Türkiye are enough, only to see his family. Ekin, who identifies with a Muslim identity, decided to move to a big European city because of the political situation in Türkiye and came to Brussels, learned the Dutch language, and started to work as a teacher. She thinks the social environment in Brussels is conducive to raising her children and finds the political system inclusive enough that she can work in public schools with her headscarf. As showcased by these examples, the two sub-groups, contrary to

the Schaerbeek one, are satisfied with what the receiving city provides them and do not see their home-country as an option for their potential future destinations.

Among the religious sub-group, a group fled Türkiye for fear of persecution after the 2016 coup attempt. I observed that they have an emotional tie with their migration story; however, in contrast to the Schaerbeek sub-group, their stories emotionally and legally detach them from their home country. Guest-workers migrated under the supervision of the home state and the receiving state and with a formal guest-worker status; although they did not receive the necessary support for integration from both countries, especially in the first decades of migration, they do not have bitter experiences with Türkiye. Whereas the segment of the religious sub-group who escaped from the authoritarian regime in the homeland developed strong negative sentiments, and this is reflected in their transnational belonging as a decrease in home-country attachment. Likewise, there is a segment in the secular sub-group who are political dissidents of the regime, and their ties with the homeland seem weaker than the rest of the sub-group. As argued by Portes (2003), migrants from rural areas or small towns who are at peace with their homeland are generally more inclined to engage in transnational political activities in support of their home country, whereas the ones who flee the homeland because of a conflictual situation more tend to secure the place in the receiving state and refrain from transnational engagements.

In this section, I focused on religious and secular sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community. I concluded that despite some differences, the contexts of exit and reception, to a large extent, have been similar for the two and very different from the Schaerbeek sub-group and so their transnational belonging.

5.3 PART II: DIFFERENT MODES OF SUPRANATIONAL BELONGING

In Part 1 of this chapter, drawing on two elements that came up from my research; 1) the emigrant/diaspora policy of the sending state and 2) the migratory stories of the sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community, I analysed the transnational dimension of migrant belonging and concluded that each sub-group in the Brussels Turkish community presents a distinct mode of transnational belonging. I have demonstrated that the Schaerbeek sub-group's attachment differs from the rest; they have developed a strong transnational belonging influenced by the sending state's emigrant/diaspora policy and shaped by the story of guest-workers migration. On the other hand, while secular and religious sub-groups' sense of belonging toward their home country resemble each other in their less responsiveness to the emigrant/diaspora policies of the home country in comparison to the Schaerbeek sub-group and non-attachment to their migration stories, they still differ from each other as religious sub-group's reaction to the home-country politics seems conjectural primarily because of the difficult political situation in Türkiye at the time of this research, however, in the secular sub-group's case, their aspiration for a cosmopolitan life has a considerable impact in their relatively loose attachment to the home country.

In this part, I will discuss the supranational dimension of migrant belonging in the context of the EU by relying on one factor that arose from my research: the migrant perception of the EU and, in line with this, their identification with Europeanness. My conclusion is that Europeanness has different meanings for each sub-group, and this is indicative of their attachment at the EU level. Further, the Turkish migrants' case has shown that supranational and transnational belonging can be intertwined; the segments of the Turkish community in Brussels who identify with Europeanness and support Türkiye's EU membership seem to have relatively loose transnational belonging. On the other hand, supranational belonging of the ones

who have strong ties with the homeland depends on the homeland's relations with the supranational body.

Europeanness is a long-debated topic for Turks, and it is not only a topic for scholars and politicians but an important one also for ordinary citizens as it touches upon the very understanding of Turkish national identity, in other words, what Turkishness means to them. In Türkiye, one can hear conflicting answers to the question of whether or not Europeanness is compatible with Turkish national identity and with Islamic identity, and the answers generally reflect people's perceptions of Europe in general and the EU in particular. I should highlight that the country's long historical relations with Europe, not only at the political level but, more importantly, in cultural scope, have significant impacts on Turkish national identity. This impact is not perceived by all Turks positively, as some believe that Turkish culture, traditions, and Islamic values should be preserved from what they see as the destructive effects of Europeanness.

While some Turkish migrants identify with Europeanness, that is, they do not see any contradiction between Turkish and European identity, some others define Turkishness as distinct and incompatible with Europeanness. In this scope, Turkish migrants' perceptions of who is European and who is not and what Europeanness means are showcases for their sense of belonging at the EU level. My research has shown that each sub-group in the Brussels Turkish community has a particular stance towards Europeanness, and this comes out in their opinions on Türkiye's EU membership because Turkish migrants' opinions about the EU are very much shaped by Türkiye's long and volatile EU membership journey. Therefore, I will start by setting the scene, briefly indicating the history of Türkiye's EU membership, and then discuss how the sub-groups differentiate from each other in terms of their perceptions of the EU and identification with Europeanness.

5.3.1 The historical context of Turkish migrants' sense of belonging to the EU

By the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, Türkiye's EU membership process officially began, and since then, EU-Türkiye relations have been a focal point for Turkish migrants living in the EU countries. The relations could survive through hard times; despite stalemates on both sides, there have been breakthroughs from time to time, such as the country's acceptance as a candidate to the Union at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and the start of the negotiations in 2005. However, during my research, membership talks were at a standstill, and the relations were not in their best shape (Muftuler-Bac 2018; Icoz 2016). State of the art is that Türkiye has not been granted membership status after six-decade-long waiting. One can hear a long list of reasons from both sides at political and societal levels for this situation, but it is a well-noted fact that the Turkish migrants are the ones who are affected by the approach of both sides, Türkiye and the EU countries (Kaya 2019 and 2011; Kucukcan 2007; Kaya and Kentel 2005)

Türkiye's EU membership does not only point to some tangible advantages for Turkish migrants, which are associated with elevating from being migrants from third countries to the status of "migrants from an EU country", a status that would provide socio-economic, political, and legal rights within the European Union. Besides, it has an intangible value related to their identification with Europeanness. The tangible ones can also be attained once they become citizens of the receiving country. EU citizenship, which automatically comes with the citizenship of a member country provides important privileges concerning healthcare, settlement and employment, social security and taxation, consumer rights, consular services, and free movement (Bauböck 2019). In addition to these material benefits, which bring important practicalities to migrants in their everyday life, EU citizenship has a particular meaning in that it provides migrants with a sense of belonging to Europe and European culture. Indeed "Europeanness" has a long historical background for Turkish migrants, which is

embedded in Türkiye's long history with Europe, which goes back to the Ottoman era. While in the first decades of the Ottoman Empire, Europe was perceived in the context of the geographies to where the Empire aspired to expand, however, from the 1800s onwards, it became a source of inspiration for the reformation of the ill-functioning governing system and a point of cultural and social attraction at the societal level (Yavuz 2019; Keyman 2007). After the collapse of the Empire, the founders of the Republic of Türkiye, to a large extent, took the political and economic system of Europe as the model for the newly established state, a process called "westernisation". Türkiye's membership in western institutions like the Council of Europe, OSCE, and NATO is considered anchoring the country to the European system. Türkiye's bid for EU membership is pursued as part of this overarching ideology and is seen as a further step in westernisation. However, the westernisation of the country is still a hot debate since the foundation of the Republic, and there have always been some segments of Turkish society that do not support the ideology itself or the way the reforms were put in place by the elite criticising the top-down approach in the process (Keyman 2007). In this regard, Turkish migrants' identification with Europe is partially related to their ideological standpoint vis-à-vis the westernisation of Türkiye and the sociocultural change that came with it. In this vein, Türkiye's EU membership has different meanings for Turks depending on what one understands from Turkish identity and culture, and how compatible it is, they think, with the European identity and culture. It is in this historical context that the supranational belonging of Turkish migrants took its shape.

As I discussed in the first part of this chapter, Türkiye's EU membership was a significant tool of Türkiye's diaspora policy in the first decade of the 2000s, for which Turkish emigrants were mobilised successfully to lobby in front of receiving countries. The idea was that Türkiye was already in Europe with its large diaspora, and the diaspora would be a bridge between Türkiye and the EU (Arkilic 2020; Kucukcan 2007).

The political discourse that Türkiye already fulfilled the criteria for membership, but it is discriminated against based on culture and religion has been echoed among Turkish migrants (Kaya 2011). As I explained in Chapter 5, they have always been sensitive to discrimination based on culture and religion, and this significantly reflects on their sense of belonging to the societies they live in albeit in different forms for different segments. During this period, Turks in Europe had hope and enthusiasm for Türkiye's EU membership, which would be an attestation to their Europeanness. However, EU countries had concerns that there would be a huge migration wave from Türkiye to Europe, which was not a desirable situation not only for economic reasons but also and more importantly, for having to digest an oriental culture. Scholars have shown that the Western media often represents an orientalist construction of Türkiye and Turkish identity, depicting Türkiye as a 'non-European country' and Turkish identity as the 'out-group' or the 'other' (Arcan 2012:119). There were hot debates among European politicians, intellectuals, and societies on Türkiye's EU membership, discussing whether European borders include Türkiye, whether Türkiye's secularism is compatible with European secularism, and whether Turkish culture is too alien to Europe (Hurd, 2008). Literature generally supports the opinion that EU member states unjustly put barriers in front of Türkiye's membership due to religious and cultural differences is quite widespread among Turkish migrants (Sahin and Dugan 2017; Cil et al. 2011; Yagbasan 2008).

Against the background explained above, I will analyse below the three sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community, aiming at shedding light on the distinctiveness of each subgroup's supranational belonging.

i. The Schaerbeek sub-group

The migration of guest workers who compose the vast majority of the Schaerbeek sub-group goes back to the time when Türkiye signed the Ankara Agreement with the then European Economic Community in 1963, which constitutes the official beginning of the membership

process of the country. As they are the ones who closely witnessed the membership journey with its ups and downs and experienced the native society's reactions at firsthand, we can say that their stance vis a vis the EU has been shaped very much by the nature of Türkiye-EU relations. Given that they were faced with integration challenges in Brussels, as I explained in Chapter 4 and that their perception of discrimination has been significant, as I explained in Chapter 5, they are the ones who are the most susceptible to the nature of the relations between Türkiye and the EU. Against this background and based on my research, I can safely argue that their high identification with Türkiye and, thus, sensitivities towards Türkiye's EU membership is an outstanding factor that shapes their sense of belonging to the EU.

Most of my interviewees from this sub-group displayed a negative, sceptical attitude towards the European Union, claiming that whatever they do, Europe would not accept them as they are, and it would not provide membership to their mother country even if it fulfilled the criteria. They identify their place in Europe in connection with Türkiye's relations with the Union; bitter relations distance them from the EU, and when the relations are restored, they adopt a relatively positive approach. Türkiye-EU relations have generally been difficult, so they have developed a stand based on Euro-skepticism; the thorny and problematic relationship between Türkiye and the Union has perpetuated the negative discourse in the sub-group that both themselves and their homeland are the "unwanted ones". The negative discourse feeds into their distance from the EU institutions.

Another finding of my research is that the Schaerbeek sub-group has very limited knowledge of the EU compared to the other two sub-groups. I have found out that they are the ones who have the least contact with the EU institutions; in other words, they do not know and see the EU as a platform for pursuing their interests as a migrant community, as noted by Serkan, a journalist who worked with the EU institutions for long years, "The ones in Schaerbeek are not aware of the EU. They go to Turkish-origin politicians in case of a problem; also, yes, they

may go to Belgian politicians.” On the other hand, the situation for religious and secular sub-groups is significantly different regarding their understanding of Europeanness and the EU.

ii. The secular sub-group

My analysis suggests that the secular sub-group's sense of belonging to the EU has been closely shaped by their ideological standpoint, which supports the westernisation of Türkiye and socio-cultural alignment with Europe. For seculars, Europeanness is more of an identity issue, and it implies a set of liberal values for which some of them left their homeland and came to Europe, as stated below by Murat.

Murat (secular/cosmopolitan): The Turks in my circle are the ones who love the European way of life, their education level is high, and socio-economically they are good. They do not have a strong attachment to Türkiye. Maybe we want to socialise with only some Turks, but I am not sure. We like individualism here and want to be like Europeans.

Even though the question was why he migrated to Brussels, Murat stressed the European way of life in his answer without mentioning the advantages of Brussels itself. He would not care if the destination city of his migration had been any other big city in the EU, the only criterion is that it should enable him to have a “European way of life”. For Murat, European life means an open and democratic society where he would be free from traditional Turkish culture, which he sees as a limitation to his individualism. The quote from another interviewee, Savas, who has Belgian citizenship, well-exemplifies how seculars combine Belgian identity with Europeanness.

Savas (secular sub-group): I feel Belgian; I go to Türkiye only for vacation. I see here as my country. Belgianness means having European values and living in a civilised society. Europeans value each other, and social and economic rights are at a very good level.

My research has shown that the secular sub-group does not think of themselves as culturally different from Europe, and they embrace the identity as is evident in Savas’s comment. However, they believe that the Schaerbeek sub-group failed to adapt to the European culture; they claim it is a challenge in front of Türkiye’s EU membership. Furthermore, in contrast to

the religious sub-group, they do not put Islam forward as a primary element in their identity, which is seen as a reason for being excluded from the European culture, and therefore, I observe that they can better identify with Europeanness.

iii. The religious sub-group

The religious sub-group has an in-between position in terms of the sense of belonging to the EU; they resemble seculars in that the socioeconomic and democratic conditions provided by the EU speak to them; for example, during the interviews, they indicated that they prefer to be in Europe than in Türkiye in this respect, on the other hand, similar to the Schaerbeek sub-group's concerns on the incompatibility of European culture with the Turkish culture, they think European culture does not accommodate Islamic way of life, and therefore they feel a kind of cultural distance from Europeanness.

Nevertheless, my research has revealed that this sub-group has the most interaction with the EU institutions. Until the 2010s, they were regularly lobbying for Türkiye's membership via their own associations and platforms in Brussels, and they could establish good connections with the members of the European Parliament and the Commission. However, after the coup attempt in 2016, they stopped lobbying not only because Türkiye's membership process has entered a deadlock but also because a large section of them took back their support from the Turkish government in the face of increasing authoritarianism. I can say that they are not Eurosceptics but keep a partial distance from European values, which they think are not compatible with Islamic rules and norms.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I investigated different forms of transnational and supranational belonging in an ethnic community living in a global city. To do that, for transnational belonging, I draw on

two factors elicited from my fieldwork as important denominators of homeland belonging: 1) sending state's emigrant policy, and 2) the contexts of exit and reception. For supranational belonging, I analysed the Brussels Turkish community's belonging to the EU in relation to Türkiye's EU membership process, which, again, came up from my data as a lens that magnifies how they attach supranationally.

My research has demonstrated that the sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community -the Schaerbeek sub-group, the secular sub-group, and the religious sub-group- hold distinct modes of attachment to Türkiye. Upon my analysis of Türkiye's emigrant/diaspora policies, I have seen that the Brussels Turkish community has not reacted/responded to the policy in the same manner, while the Schaerbeek sub-group has generally been a well-recipient of it, the secular sub-groups interest and participation in the policy agenda have not been strong. On the other hand, the religious sub-group's reaction changes according to the homeland's approach; when Türkiye implements an inclusive policy, they eagerly participate, but in the case of being excluded from the diaspora engagement policies of the homeland, we see this group keeps a considerable distance from the political agenda of the home country. I have concluded that one of the reasons why the emigrant policy has been more successful for the Schaerbeek group is that they live in an ethnic enclave, a transnationalized space open to the impacts of home-country politics. On the other hand, I have seen that their strong transnational belonging does not hinder their local (ethnic neighbourhood) attachment. The fact that religious and secular sub-groups are not concentrated in certain neighbourhoods and that they are better integrated into Brussels has a role in their comparatively lower level of identification with the home country.

My analysis of the contexts of exit and reception also bears similar results. The sub-groups in the Brussels Turkish community have different migration stories, and this has a meaningful

link with their transnational belonging. The Schaerbeek cohort, who are mostly guest workers and their descendants, have a romantic and nostalgic attachment to the well-known story of guest-workers migration to Europe in the 1960s, and their ties with the homeland are very much affected by it. Likewise, their working under difficult conditions without necessary integration policies at the time of their arrival played a role in their orientation towards the homeland. It helped in the creation of an imagined homeland in their minds and a myth of return associated with that dream. On the other hand, secular and religious sub-groups do not have a single dramatic story of arrival to Brussels; they come as students, professionals, artists, lifestyle seekers, highly skilled refugees etc.; in other words, the host society did not perceive them as “unwanted” migrants who would be an economic burden, and also, the context in Brussels was conducive for them to integrate into the city. Hence, they did not stick to a nostalgic story to survive and did not develop a romantic attachment to the homeland.

I have demonstrated that the Brussels Turkish community is not an intact group in terms of its ties with the EU; the nature of supranational belonging varies across the sub-groups in the community. My analysis suggests that their stance towards the EU is linked with Türkiye’s EU membership, and I conclude that this link can be seen as how transnational and supranational belonging can be intertwined.

The next chapter, which is my last empirical chapter, will interrogate different modes of belonging in the city through the lens of (perceived) discrimination.

Chapter 6

Divergent Reflections of Migrant Belonging through the Lens of (Perceived) Discrimination

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I investigated the relationship between in-group diversity and the sense of transnational and supranational belonging. That analysis showed that each sub-group within the Turkish community has developed a distinct form of supranational and transnational belonging. In this chapter, I will draw on (perceived) discrimination as a lens to explore how in-group diversity is reflected in the sense of belonging. My findings demonstrate that different segments in one ethnic community perceive discrimination differently, and I argue that this difference manifests in their sense of belonging in various ways.

I should indicate that, as explained in Chapter 2, this thesis analyses discrimination through the eyes of migrants and aims to see their interpretation of it. While it acknowledges that discrimination involves actual and perceived forms, its analysis does not go into that distinction. Therefore, I use “perceived” in parentheses while mentioning discrimination throughout this thesis.

Perception of discrimination gives important insights about migrant belonging. Native society’s narratives about “Who is from us and who is not?” plays an important role in an individual’s conception of their place in that collectivity. Not only the existence of exclusionary demarcations drawn by the native society but also how those demarcations are perceived by the migrant community matter in the process of belonging. Nevertheless, my research demonstrates that migrant communities do not perceive discriminatory acts in one way;

different segments in the same community may develop divergent understandings, reactions and strategies in the face of discrimination, which influences their sense of belonging accordingly.

In the framework of this chapter, I pay particular attention to stereotyping for two reasons; first, it is well-documented in the literature and also confirmed in my empirical study that stereotyping leads to prejudice and discrimination by exaggerating differences between migrants and the native society and thus, diminishes feeling of attachment to the host country. Second, as I made clear in Chapter 2, it hinders the research from capturing within-group heterogeneities by dictating an understanding that sees ethnic groups as monolithic and static units (Wimmer 2008 and 2013). Similar to Van Kerckem (2014), I adopt an approach to avoid the pitfalls of groupism, which enables me to use the lens of discrimination beyond the stereotypes taking into account heterogeneities in the Turkish community. Indeed, there exists a considerable scholarship that notes multiple types of (perceived) discrimination in different contexts; this chapter complements the literature by clearly highlighting that all these variations can occur in the very same ethnic group and, more importantly, by empirically demonstrating how this connects with migrant sense of belonging in the global city context.

As in the previous chapter, I organise my analysis based on the three sub-groups I have identified within the Turkish community in Brussels; “the secular sub-group”, “the religious sub-group”, and “the Schaerbeek sub-group”. I have described the sub-groups in detail in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

This chapter starts with a brief theoretical discussion on the relationship between discrimination, the sense of belonging, and stereotyping. The rest of the chapter is divided into four parts based on the four themes that emerged from my data as the prominent areas where Turkish migrants in Brussels primarily experience discrimination. These themes are religion,

ethnicity, and educational/socio-economic background. Each section starts with a part that explores the context of discrimination specific to that particular theme and continues with a discussion of the topic based on my empirical findings.

6.2 An intricate relationship: discrimination, stereotyping and the sense of belonging

In this chapter, I lay down in-group differences that emerge in ethnic migrant groups with regard to their perception of discrimination and try to see how this reflects on their belonging. Discrimination in the first place bear results in the sense of belonging towards the place of residence; therefore, in this chapter, Turkish migrants' belonging towards the global city of Brussels is the main point of attention, and also the neighborhood and state levels are looked at as they are closely interrelated with the city level. To do that, I analyse several boundaries that emerged from my research as catalysts that trigger the perception of discrimination in the Brussels Turkish community, such as religion, ethnicity, and education level. In my analyses, I pay due attention to stereotyping for two reasons; first, stereotyping is among the causes and the results of ethnic and religious discrimination. Secondly and closely pertinent to the main argument of this dissertation, stereotypical perceptions work as blanket generalisations that hide in-group diversity in migrant communities, preventing us from seeing the different versions of belonging in ethnic communities.

When and how the boundaries between migrant groups and indigenous community disappears have been a difficult question to answer (Trittler 2019; Phalet et al. 2013; Bail 2008; Alba 2005; Goldring 2002). Which criteria shape the host society's perception of "foreignness"? For example, after how many decades does not a migrant surname sound "foreign", or how long does it take for a native community to see a migrant group as "insiders"? Milton Gordon, in his famous categorisation of migrant assimilation, describes belonging, or in his words, identification with the host society, as the last stage in migrant adaptation, which somehow

automatically follows structural assimilation. According to Gordon, migrants, once they overcome linguistic barriers, and vocationally and socially establish close interactions with native society, their identification with the host country increases (1964). However, a growing volume of studies has shown that this is not the case in many instances (Diehl et al. 2016). For example, Beyer's (2008) study on the integration process of Italians and Poles in Belgium shed light on a stark contradiction between Turks and the mentioned migrant groups that although all three groups more or less migrated in the same period under similar conditions and faced with similar challenges, Turks have remained "significantly different" while Italians and Poles have become "Belgians". No matter how far migrants go in structural integration, some other factors may be more decisive in native society's acceptance of migrants. Integration and belonging, although they are interrelated, do not refer to the same thing. Belonging is described as a psychological situation for which an individual's self-identification with a group and acceptance of the individual by the group are two necessary conditions, and they should happen simultaneously for an unproblematic attachment (Vasta 2013; Baumeister and Leary 1995). In this scope, theories of symbolic and social boundaries have gained ground in explaining migrant belonging in the integration process (Lamont 1992, Alba 2005, Wimmer 2008).

Richard Alba (2005) conceptualises boundary-making between immigrant groups and native societies as bright and blurred boundaries. While bright boundaries refer to the salient demarcations that are difficult to cross, such as race and religion, blurred ones signify indeterminate and flexible demarcations that provide room for migrants' adaptation, such as language. It is also highlighted that boundaries can be sources of discrimination and exclusion against minority groups and an impediment to their access to resources (Wimmer 2008). On the other side, the perception of boundaries by migrants plays a role in their identification with the host society. Bright boundaries that seem almost impossible to cross send the message that

migrants should always stay on the other side of the boundary, whereas blurred boundaries encourage them that they can cross if they strive for it (Diehl et al. 2016).

Boundaries may carry different meanings for different segments of an ethnic migrant group. As stated by Crul (2006), “the ideas, practices and goals within ethnic groups change over time, and as a result the diversity within groups is often ample and it grows.” (p.66). Within-group diversity manifests itself as divergent positions in the face of boundaries. At this point, I would like to emphasise that this dissertation follows the perspective that ethnic groups are not primordial and homogeneous entities but socially constructed and subject to change across time and space (Wimmer 2013). As rightly indicated by van Kerckem (2014), “ethnic groups should not be seen as self-evident units of analysis, endowed with a unique culture, shared identity and communitarian solidarity” (p.13). In line with this, my study has shown that different segments of the Turkish community prioritise different boundaries in their perceptions of discrimination. Turkish community has changed significantly since the first wave of migration in the 1960s; the group has expanded and become more diverse over time. Therefore, analysing this ever-changing and evolving phenomenon with an essentialist approach bear the risk of neglecting within-group heterogeneity. In line with this, this chapter brings stereotyping into the discussion, and by so doing, it aims to bring to light the parts of the community under the disguise of a stereotypical image and to explore different forms of relationship between discrimination and the sense of belonging.

Stereotypes are generalisations done without a thorough evaluation, based on the assumption that a group is composed of identical members. They are shared beliefs by large portions of society about who are the members of a particular group (Abrams and Hogg 1998). In the case of migrants, stereotypes are mostly derogatory and lead to prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory acts.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Turkish migrant stereotype in Europe is configured around the guest-workers image that refers to one with limited education, low socio-economic status, living in social and spatial segregation, socially conservative, unsuccessful in integration and with a sense of belonging towards the homeland rather than the places of residence. The image, indeed, is highly influenced by Europe's general approach to migration, as indicated by Zick et al. (2008);

“From the beginning, immigration was constructed and framed as a problem and often perceived as a threat by the native population. Indeed, the very term “guest worker” implies a temporary, low-status position in society.” (p.239)

However, the situation on the ground is more complex than what dominates media, political discourse and literature. The Turkish community in Brussels has extensively diversified since the guest-workers migration in the 1960s and expanded with professionals, students, academics, lifestyle seekers, refugees, etc. These migrants interact with their surroundings, whether other Turkish migrants, Belgian locals or other migrants, in different ways. As discussed in the previous chapter, their relationship with Türkiye also varies. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that they perceive discrimination differently. This chapter explores these diverse forms and shows how these forms relate with the sense of belonging.

Having mentioned the theoretical background of the chapter briefly, I will start with the first theme that emerged from my fieldwork: religious discrimination. After illustrating the context of religious discrimination in Brussels in the broader context of Western Europe, I will discuss the relationship between multiple forms of (perceived) religious discrimination and the sense of belonging in reference to my empirical findings.

6.3 PART 1: DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE SENSE OF BELONGING

6.3.1 An overview of the context for Muslim migrants in Brussels within the broader context of Western Europe

In this section, I will illustrate the context in which the Turkish community in Brussels perceives religious discrimination by situating it in the broader case of Western Europe.

Religion is considered an unambiguous demarcation for Western Europe's mainstream societies to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable (Bail 2008; Alba 2005; Lamont 1992). Alba (2005) states that the reason why religion plays such a decisive role in European identity lies in the way religion is institutionalised in the continent. In Europe, the separation of state and church and the establishment of secular norms have been achieved through a long and difficult socio-political struggle. While Christianity was retrieved from the state domain, it has remained a strong cultural frame for European identity. In this context, Islam is essentialised as significantly belonging to “the others” not only as a religion but also as a culture (Zolberg and Long 1999).

Mass migration from countries with overwhelmingly Muslim populations to Europe dates back to the 1950s. It started in the form of guest-workers migration from North Africa, the Middle East and Türkiye, aiming to meet the labour need in the face of heavy industrialisation after World War II. However, Muslim migrants were not on the political agenda or at the centre of public debates until the 1980s (Zolberg and Long 1999). The guest workers were assumed to stay temporarily, so neither their cultural integration nor religious needs took public or political attention. They were predominantly males who had left their family members behind and lived in temporary shelters around industrial zones isolated from the host society. Thus, guest workers did not bring forward any substantial religious demands, thinking they would return after a certain period.

Nevertheless, the economic crisis after the oil shock of 1973 forced the European states to stop labour recruitment outside the European Economic Community, and the doors were closed for additional labour migration. In contrast to expectations, the ones who had come before did not return, permanently settled and brought family members. From then on, Islam has become more visible in Western European societies as Muslim migrants' contact with and demands from public institutions have increased. Schools, hospitals, and social service institutions became more acquainted with Muslims and their requests related to Islamic practices such as wearing headscarves in public domains, religious slaughtering, procurement of halal meat, building mosques, the public call for prayers and Friday congregations.

It was not until the 1980s that Muslim migrants negatively became the centre of attention in the media and political circles. The events like the Rushdie affair in Britain in 1989, the murder of Teo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004, the headscarf issue in France, Danish cartoon affair in 2005 prepared favourable conditions for the growth of negative stigmatisation of Muslim migrants in Europe. These isolated and highly politicised events instrumentalised by the anti-migration, far-right movements in the host countries -such as Vlaams Belang in Belgium, National Rally in France, and Party for Freedom in the Netherlands- to stereotype migrants from Muslim populated countries around a derogatory perception of Islam. Moreover, the rise of religious fundamentalism and terrorist attacks in the name of Islam perpetuates the stigma that Muslim migrants are culturally and religiously too different to adhere to democratic and secular Western values. The fact that guest workers' educational and occupational statuses have been at lower levels than the average native society has also fed the negative image of Muslims and their culture in the host societies.

In this vein, the philosophy of multiculturalism that leaves culture out of the scope of integration policy came under attack on the ground that it was not serving the purpose of public

cohesion and has lost favour to the advantage of less inclusive policies (Moodod et al. 2006). Political actors like Merkel and Cameron declared it with the slogan “multiculturalism is dead” (Wright and Bloemraad 2012). The debate around multiculturalism is closely related to the questions of how to contain Islamic culture and how to find the delicate balance between the right to religious life and the prevention of extremism and radicalism in the name of Islam. Proponents of multiculturalism, such as Modood (2013) and Kymlicka (2012), argue that it is the very philosophy that speaks to the contemporary reality of multiculturally diverse societies in Europe. I discuss the topic more in detail in Chapters 2 and 4 while illustrating the diverse cultural landscape of Brussels.

Besides the fact that islamophobia, anti-migration, and anti-Islam perspectives have dominated the public and political discussions on relations between native societies and Muslim migrants, a reluctant acknowledgement has gradually established that Muslims have already been part and parcel of European societies. Against this background, European Islam has come to the fore as an intellectual and political debate in the search to find a way of tackling the question of Muslim migrant integration. For instance, one of the first attempts of the host states that could be interpreted as a project linked to the aspiration for European Islam has been the policy regarding the training of imams (King Baudouin Foundation 2007). Western countries, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany, embarked on preparing programs that envisage theological and civic courses for imams and teachers to integrate religious leaders of the Muslim migrant communities in line with European values. In the light of recurring brutal events by fundamentalists in the name of Islam, training of imams also entered the EU agenda; the President of the European Council made an announcement on the topic expressing the political desire for the foundation of a European institution for educating imams in the EU countries as a remedy for religious extremism (Euronews, 10 November 2020). However, several scholars such as Cesari (2014) bring the critique that the ethnic, cultural and social

diversity of European Muslims, which manifests itself in their understanding of religion, presents a challenge to the idea of European Islam. That is, one and a single version of Islam could not speak to European Muslims' different historical and political experiences originating from different parts of the world (Cesari 2014:803). It is still too early to say that the debate would produce a full-fledged policy that would serve the purpose of societal cohesion. It is obvious that it opens an area of hot debate in the field of migrant integration, multiculturalism and diversity.

As I briefly stated above, the context of reception in Europe is far from being friendly for migrants from countries with predominantly Muslim populations. These migrants, regardless of their connection with religion, confront a strong stigma.

6.3.2 Stereotyping on religious grounds

Stereotypes about Muslim migrants in Europe emerged and are shaped in the context explained above. Western Europe essentialises Islam in the description of its migrant population such that "Muslim" and "migrant" are almost interchangeable words in the public and political discourses (Foner and Alba 2008). As rightly pointed out by Shooman (2010), in Europe, foreigners have become Muslims, and religious identity replaced ethnic identity in determining social boundaries. It has gone unnoticed that Muslims in Europe are disparate groups in terms of their perception of Islam and how they practice it (Fadil 2019; Zollberg and Long 1999). There exist a wide range of variations in the understanding and the practice of religion across ethnic groups and within these groups, which this thesis is interested in. The generalisation poses the risk of missing out the different understandings and practices of Islam among migrants and also neglecting in-group diversification based on religion. European public and mediatic discourse often reflect the same negative image of a very large and heterogenous group whose population is estimated at around 25 million by Pew Research Center in 2017.

Shooman (2010) identifies four dominant stereotypical perspectives embedded in the discourse on Muslim migrants.

“1) Muslims are generalised as being part of one coherent and homogeneous group or pictured in a binary and simplistic representation of a good or an evil Islam; 2) Islam as a religion is depicted as a dangerous ideology that encourages violence, terrorism, and the suppression of women; 3) Islam is antagonistic to a European lifestyle and values characterised by enlightenment, humanism, and freedom; and 4) Europe is in great danger of being conquered by Islam through immigration, naturalisation, and birth rates of Muslims” (p. 652)

Based on this stereotypical understanding of Islam, the Muslim image in Europe is that Muslims are culturally too different, reluctant to adapt to European societies, and would not identify with Europeanness.

Vertovec and Peach (1997) stress the socio-economic class dimension of the anti-Muslim stereotype. That is, the first waves of Muslim migration to Europe in the 1950s and 60s were predominantly from lower socio-economic segments of the origin countries, and what they brought in their cultural baggage was perceived by the native societies as typical to Islam. In other words, Islam was first introduced to the European public by a group from rural areas whose version of Islam was mixed with rural cultural elements. Thus, Muslim stereotypes have been established around an image of low education, disadvantaged socio-economic status and gender inequality. Vertovec and Peach (1997) illustrate this situation with Margaret Pickles' 'frozen clock syndrome':

“Such a tendency has been part of, in Margaret Pickles' (1995, p. 107) term, the 'frozen clock syndrome' characterised by migrants who live as though the cultural clock stopped when they

left their homeland decades ago and by their children who are brought up in the new context 'synchronous with this frozen parental frame'." (p. 40)

However, the sociology of migration from countries with a Muslim majority population has significantly changed since the 1960s. For instance, as I have explained in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, emigration from Türkiye did not stop with the guest-workers migration; it continued with subsequent waves which brought in migrants with diverse backgrounds. Contrary to the guest-workers of the first wave, who generally had a traditional understanding of Islam mixed with conservative values and local culture, the following waves include migrants mostly from urban areas. In this vein, especially migration waves since the end of the 1990s deserve to be mentioned. This period is very much shaped by the ease globalisation provides for the migration of people with diverse backgrounds, such as professionals, students, artists, lifestyle seekers, regime opponents, political refugees, etc. In contrast to the perception of European societies that they are all categorically 'typical Muslims', these people have brought with them a great variety of standings in terms of religiosity both in faith and in practice; some do not identify with Islam at all, some prefer religion to say strictly private without any public visibility, some would like to carry symbols of Islam in everyday life, some other follows a line in-between, and so on. Yet, the stigma masks the diversity in the Muslim community squeezing all into a derogatory stereotype.

Against this background, in the following section, I will show the reader how diversity in the Turkish community manifests in their perception of discrimination on the religious ground and how these different perceptions relate to their sense of belonging.

6.3.3 Turkish community's diverse perceptions of discrimination on religious grounds

My empirical study has shown that the social sub-groups I have identified within the Turkish community in Brussels -namely secular, religious and conservative sub-groups- have a general

agreement on the existence of discrimination against the Turkish community on the ground of religion -namely based on Muslim stereotype, Muslim names, and Islamic symbols particularly headscarf-, but they differ in the ways they perceive and experience it. I will analyse these differences by showing the divergent strategies they use to distance themselves from the stereotype and navigate through potential discriminative acts due to carrying Muslim names and Islamic symbols.

i. Distancing from the stereotype: Which of us is a “true Muslim”?

During my empirical study, I observed that Turkish community members try to distance themselves from the Muslim stereotype through a discussion on the question of “Who are true Muslims?”. Vertovec and Peach (1997) underline the discrepancy between what “Muslim” refers to in the context of Europe and what it is meant to the people who are called by Europeans as such. In Europe, people originating from countries whose majority population are Muslim are presumably thought of as Muslims and perceived with a ‘Muslim stereotype’.

Their discussion on who represents true Muslims originates from the assumption that misconceptions and prejudices of the native society emanate from misrepresentation. A similar debate continues in the ethnicity context, which I will elaborate on somewhere else in this chapter. Guest workers and their descendants are the ones largely critiqued by the rest of the community for the reason that they supposedly misrepresent Muslims and thus give rise to prejudices about all members of the Turkish community. Below, I put one quote from each sub-group, then discuss their different perceptions by comparing them to each other to show the reader how different strategies they hold in the face of negative Muslim image in the host society.

Mihrinur (religious sub-group): In terms of Islam identity, we [referring to the Turkish community] are not good examples; that is why Belgians have an incorrect understanding of Islam. Only if somebody attacks our religion do we react defensively; we do not bother

introducing Islam as it should be. After September 11, my school friends told me they believed Mihrinur's religion could not approve of this. I am proud of being a good example.

Piraye (secular sub-group): We [referring to the Turkish community] introduce ourselves to Belgians differently than we are in reality. We put our Muslim identity at the forefront. I do not think Belgians really know Turks; they believe we are Arabs. Because we live isolated lives. When we express ourselves correctly, they get surprised. Turkish immigrants have the problem of trusting foreigners; language is another problem, and they are scared of losing their culture.

Huriye (Schaerbeek sub-group): No matter what Turkish migrants do, even if they eat pork, even if they celebrate Christmas, Belgians will discriminate. Especially at school, there is continuous discrimination against migrant kids.

The three quotes mentioned above exemplify different viewpoints in the discussion on Muslim representation. Mihrinur believes that Muslims should proactively do their best to introduce true Islam to Belgians so that the Muslim stereotype can be changed. When asked how she felt in Brussels about her Muslim identity, she said that she feels sorry for the Muslim image and that the natives are not really aware of divergent cultural and religious stands in the Muslim community. The second interviewee, Piraye, does not want to be ascribed to Muslim identity in the first place and desires to be differentiated from other Muslim ethnic groups. She underlines the social segregation of Turks as the underlying reason for misconceptions of natives.

On the other hand, Huriye's stand is unique among others. My observation is that the Schaerbeek cohort, one of whom is Huriye, is relatively more defensive in their position regarding Muslim identity; a significant portion of them tend to blame the native society for excluding Muslims. During the interview, Huriye extensively talked about the difficulty of crossing religious and ethnic boundaries in Brussels and told me about her childhood experiences of discrimination. While she was highly critical of Turkish migrants in the Turkish neighbourhood of Brussels (she is a guest-worker descendant and grew up in the neighbourhood) for their lack of integration, at the same time, she was criticising Belgians for creating unbreakable boundaries. She says she wants to move to Türkiye, believing that the

best place for a Turkish Muslim to live in peace is Türkiye. As seen from the quotes, while all three are very much aware of the negative Muslim image, each looks at it from a different angle; the religious one does not bother to be viewed through her religious identity, but she is concerned about the capability of the “others” (whomever they are) in representing Islam. The secular one does not neglect that she is Muslim but does not want to be labelled as such. Lastly, from the words of the interviewee from the Schaerbeek sub-group, namely Huriye, we see that she does not focus that much on the image but expresses her hopelessness about the native society’s prejudicial approach towards Muslims.

My research demonstrates that the secular sub-group is the most concerned about distancing from the Muslim stereotype. Their high education level (at least a bachelor’s degree) and non-attachment to Muslim identity remain among the reasons for their distancing, as illustrated by Bilge and Simge, two women from the secular sub-group.

Bilge (secular sub-group): The Muslim image is not good here. I know it from my husband’s family (her husband is Flemish). They have a certain image of Muslim women. I do not fit into it. One day I picked up my husband’s nephew from the school; there were Muslim mothers around with headscarves. Can you imagine the 4-year-old kid (the nephew) pointing at these ladies and saying that those are the mothers of misbehaving kids?

Simge (secular sub-group): I am not a practising Muslim, and from the outside, nobody notices that I am coming from a Muslim country. You know, we adults can cope with it, but I am very concerned for my little daughter; I should choose a good school for her, of course not one mainly migrant kids attend. I am trying to find a good school where ex-pat kids are the majority.

Simge and Bilge maintain a secular lifestyle, and it is not apparent from their appearance that they are Muslims because they do not carry any religious symbols. Both are critical of the Turks, who are ‘the reasons for the Muslim stereotype and contend that the society does not view them as “typical Muslims”. On the other hand, they acknowledge the negative attitude towards Muslims in Belgian society but do not see themselves as potential subjects of religious discrimination. Simge and Bilge expressed concerns about prejudicial thoughts that might

occur in the first instance. Nevertheless, they think the prejudices can easily be gone once the encounters realise that they are not “typical Muslims”. Bilge and Simge beautifully exemplify the stand of my interviewees from the secular sub-group on the Muslim stereotype. It also came out during the interviews that the rest of the community knows that the seculars have a very particular position vis-à-vis Muslim identity, and they believe the position helps the seculars to cross the boundary of religion, as indicated by Birsen and Miray below;

Birsen (religious sub-group): The secular Turks are better integrated. I think because they do not put their Muslim identity at the forefront. Seculars are more adaptable and braver. They express themselves better and do not stay in their shelves. I came across them as parents at the school, and I think they are more integrated into this society. They speak the language and obey the rules of this society.

Miray (Schaerbeek sub-group): The well-educated ones ignore their identity, and the others unfortunately live isolated lives. Well-educated Turks, they do not call themselves Turkish. I met some of them; they are like Belgians. One of them told me he did not want to be perceived as a Turkish migrant in Europe. He ignored his roots, his Turkishness. Those people are also far from Islam. I met with a bunch of Turkish lawyers here; most of them are far away from religion.

Birsen is an Islam teacher at a local school, and due to her job, she often meets with Turkish parents. She admires seculars for their better adaptation to the native society and emphasises that the better adaptability of seculars is related to not putting Muslim identity at the forefront. However, Miray, a member of the Schaerbeek sub-group, holds a critical view about seculars’ distancing from religion. She perceives Muslim identity in association with ethnic identity and desires Turkish migrants to make these two identities explicit.

As indicated by Alba and Foner (2008), Muslim migrants who can cross the bright boundary of religion in Europe are the ones with a secular worldview and educational and occupational status above the average. As Western European societies are overtly secular (Bail 2008; Zolberg and Long 1999), it is plausible that migrants possessing secular values can navigate better through the host country’s opportunity structure, which helps in their feeling of belonging to the place of residence. I suggest that, based on my interviewees’ comments, in

cosmopolitan urban areas like Brussels, secular boundaries are more visible than religious ones in comparison with small locales.

Trittler (2018) distinguishes between religious and secular boundaries and relates them with the conception of national belonging. In her study on religious discrimination in Western Europe, she argues that religious boundaries take precedence when the host society takes religion as a reference point in its description of national belonging. In this scenario, the groups identifying with a different religion are perceived as outgroup. On the other hand, in societies where secular boundaries are salient -meaning that religion is not viewed as an outstanding determinant of national belonging- discrimination takes place on the ground of the secular values of the society. Trittler's study shows that it is possible in Europe that different locales in a country may display different understandings of national belonging; for example, while one community or a city adopts an understanding of belonging heavily influenced by religion, the other one may treat migrants with a secular point of view. In my study, both by secular and religious respondents, Brussels is indicated as a preferable place to live in considering their lifestyles. As I have discussed in Chapter 4, Brussels's approach to integration compromises with its socio-cultural landscape, leaving room for diverse groups to establish their own communities. The city is very much acquainted with Muslims and Islamic culture. I do not claim that it embraces Muslims, but rather I say that it stays indifferent to religious particularities compared with Flemish and Walloon regions. The seculars and religious respondents both highlighted Brussels as the most inclusive place to live in Belgium. Seculars put religious discrimination in a broader cultural context because they do not deem religious symbols and practices indispensable in their daily life; religion remains one of the cultural components of their identity structure. In contrast, religious sub-group puts it at the centre of their identity and sees any religious prejudice or discrimination as a direct threat to their Islamic lifestyle, therefore, fighting religious discrimination remains a significant objective for them.

The ways these two sub-groups perceive Brussel's context with regard to religious discrimination showcase how the same locale can speak to diverse expectations. The quotes below from Sinem and Ekin are exemplary in this sense;

Sinem (secular sub-group): I do not think discrimination is a significant problem in Brussels. In this city, people can live however they want; religious, atheist, whatsoever. To protect myself, I prefer living in Brussels to other regions. In Brussels, I feel safe and comfortable, with no discrimination. It is good that there are many nationalities here. It is multicultural, and English is widely spoken.

Ekin (religious sub-group): I feel comfortable in Brussels. The ethnic composition of schools in Brussels is very diverse. There are lots of Muslim students [...] The fact that there are many nationalities in Brussels makes it a multicultural city. It provides a lot of comfort to migrants. In other cities, your (religious) identity is more explicit.

Sinem, with her secular lifestyle, feels comfortable in Brussels, yet she has concerns about the chances of discrimination stemming from Muslim stereotyping. During our conversation, she mentioned her worries about her child's education, saying that the child might confront discrimination at school. She has decided to buy a house in a neighbourhood where the residents are mostly expatriates so that she can send her child to a multinational school. She strategically benefits from the opportunities the city offers to overcome the repercussions of probable stereotyping on her family. Similarly, Ekin appreciates multicultural Brussels, for it makes Muslims part of the city. During the interview, she stressed how she prioritises her Muslim identity in her sense of belonging to Brussels. She especially chose Brussels as the place of residence for her family, among a few other options believing that it would not be problematic to maintain a life in coherence with Islam in such a cosmopolitan and multicultural city.

ii. Divergent strategies of hiding: Islamic names and stereotyping

My data show that, across the Turkish community of Brussels and, indeed, across all sub-groups (religious, secular and conservative sub-groups), individuals actively engage in tactics to avoid repercussions of religious discrimination with regard to Islamic names; these tactics

vary across the sub-groups. Previous research confirms that names make migrants recognisable and so that they become exposed to prejudice (Tuppart and Gerharts 2021). I found that many newcomers, a large proportion of whom are highly skilled, have mentioned concerns about Islamic names in educational institutions and the job sector.

Research by Baert et al. (2013) revealed that applicants with Turkish-sounding names were frequently discriminated against in the Belgian job market. The research concluded that individuals with Turkish-sounding names had to make twice as many applications as those with Flemish names to be invited for the same number of interviews. Another study by Blommaert et al. (2013) on the relationship between Arabic names and discrimination in the job market in the Netherlands brought similar results. The applicants with a Dutch name had 60 per cent more chances of being invited to interviews. Blommaert and his colleagues found that employers seeing an Arabic name tended not to look further in the resume. However, it is not possible to understand from these studies if the very reason for discrimination originates from ethnicity, religion, or both. It is very much possible to interpret Turkish names as Muslim names or vice versa. Nevertheless, I have seen from my fieldwork that this is a big worry among adult Turkish migrants for themselves and even a bigger one for their children.

A number of my interviewees, particularly the ones from the secular sub-group, prefer Turkish names which do not have an Islamic origin and, at the same time, which have similar phonetics to “European” names, for example, Defne (Daphne), Erin (Aeron), Selin (Celine), Aylin (Elin). They told me that they choose the names that they can use in Western countries (not only in Belgium, as they would like to prepare their children for any place they may live in the future), which could be easier for foreigners to pronounce and would not be associated with Muslim identity. On the other hand, some members of the religious sub-group said they wanted to choose their children’s names from Quran but hesitated because of the stories of discrimination

they heard from the early comers (a large section of the religious sub-group is composed of individuals who migrated in the last two decades). They have found an in-between solution such that they prefer religious names common to both Islam and Christianity, such as Ibrahim (Abraham), Davud (David), Yusuf (Josef), Adem (Adam), Nuh (Noah), Meryem (Myriam) along with a Turkish name. The advantage of this strategy is threefold; they fulfil their desire for an Islamic name, give their children a name which can be comfortably used at school and in the job sector, and use the Turkish middle name in Turkish circles and in Türkiye when they go there. My observation about the Schaerbeek sub-group is that although they are aware of discrimination because of Islamic names, in practice, they do not seem to adopt a particular strategy to navigate through it; I have seen that they give family names and traditional names but foreign names.

I find the religious sub-group's strategy unique among others in that it reflects this sub-group's eagerness to integrate into native society without compromising their religious identity. I think this is an interesting point for further research.

Having discussed different strategies used by the sub-groups to cope with religious discrimination, in the section below, I will discuss how differently they see and experience discrimination on religious symbols, namely the headscarf.

iii. Muslim women, with and without a headscarf

Perception of discrimination also differs according to whether or not one carries religious symbols; for example, it is relatively higher for women with headscarves than those without one. The headscarf is a salient religious marker on two levels; first, it clearly evinces the Muslim identity of women and is viewed by the host society as an attestation to a higher degree of religiosity. Weichselbaumer (2019) concludes that Turkish women who wear a headscarf face discrimination on multiple levels in the German job market; it is less likely for them to be

invited for an interview due to both stigmas, ethnicity and religion. For clarity, I discuss religious and ethnic stigma separately in this chapter; however, my research confirms that they are often seen together.

It is needless to say that it was mostly religious sub-group members who reported experiences of discrimination in the context of headscarf. 11 of my 30 female interviewees wear headscarves, and 8 of them are from the religious sub-group, the remaining three from the Schaerbeek sub-group. The religious sub-group's women are generally well-educated and aspire to professional jobs. They indicated headscarf as a heuristic for not being able to find employment equivalent to their qualifications. On the other hand, the women in the Schaerbeek sub-group, although a large section of them also wear headscarf, generally in a traditional style, did not bring it forward during the interviews as a topic of discrimination. This may be partially because of conservative women's low level of engagement with the professional job sector and limited social contact with the natives. My interviewees from this sub-group were generally housewives or working in the business sector, such as cleaning, cooking, and babysitting.

Similarly, secular women did not mention the headscarf as an issue in their experiences of discrimination but because of a different reason than the Schaerbeek women; none of my interviewees from this sub-group wore a headscarf. Nonetheless, their non-experiencing discrimination on this topic does not mean that they are not aware of the public and political discussions around it, thanks to their high level of education. Against this background, I discuss religious women's experiences of discrimination on headscarf with two quotes below.

Bahriye is a headscarf-wearing woman who completed a PhD and post-doctoral program in biology. Despite being highly skilled, Bahriye had a hard time finding a job and reported that her headscarf was the main obstacle in the labour market. Below is a quote from my interview with Bahriye;

Bahriye (religious sub-group): I could not find a job because of my headscarf. They were inviting me for interviews, but once they saw me, they turned negative. I experienced this many times in 7 years. But I did not stop; I struggled for it and finally managed to find a job. After they knew me, they understood that women with headscarves could be clever and hardworking. They even hired another one with headscarf. I think this is my success. My community was making jokes about my job search, all expected me to give up, but I did not. It is we who should demonstrate that we are good, hardworking people and that we are not stereotypes. I am doing my best to introduce myself to my neighbourhood; I put cards in neighbours' postboxes and send them gifts. I believe discrimination occurs because of our inability to introduce ourselves.

Leyla is a journalist who worked in Türkiye with her headscarf and could find a job in an international media company after she migrated to Brussels. Below, she talks about how she compromises with the opportunity structure in the city.

Leyla (religious sub-group): As Brussels is home to many nationalities, it makes it easy for me to live here, and I feel comfortable. With my headscarf, I have never felt lonely or different in a negative sense in this city. I think duality in language and culture lessens my enthusiasm for integration. I can live in this city only with the English language and as myself. When I came here seven years ago, I found a position in an international company. After my contract ended, I was not able to find a new one; I was not as lucky as the first time. Then I decided to work as a freelancer from home. In this way, the headscarf does not become an issue. Also, I can spare more time for my kids. You know what? I feel bad that I always have to arrange my professional life according to my headscarf. Never mind, I manage it anyhow.

Even though these two women confront discrimination because of religious symbols, their human capital enables them to find a way to overcome or somehow compromise with the challenge. Despite difficulties, they think Brussels is still advantageous for them because of its multicultural character, where they are not viewed as 'too different' and have relatively more options in the labour market. As the women of the religious sub-group of the Turkish community are generally well-educated and eager to integrate, they are capable of benefiting from the opportunities Brussels offer.

My research suggests that headscarf-wearing women's situation is remarkable in global cities in that these cities provide a flexible opportunity structure through which women can navigate to attain their interests, and I witnessed that this positively influences their sense of belonging towards the city.

6.4 DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

“Once they realise that you are Turkish, you could understand their feelings from their facial expressions.”
(Nalan, interviewee)

6.4.1 The context of ethnic discrimination in Brussels

Turks are the second largest non-EU migrant group in Brussels after Moroccans (The Belgian Statistical Office-Statbel). As explained in detail in Chapter 1, the first large influx of Turkish migrants to the city occurred after the decline of the coal mining sector in the 1970s (Manco and Kanmaz 2005). Those first settlers were guest workers and their families who had migrated from rural areas in Türkiye, aspiring for better economic conditions. The first place they settled in large numbers was Schaerbeek, also called the Turkish neighbourhood. The neighbourhood socially and culturally resembles a small town in a less developed region of Türkiye; intimate social relations, small ethnic shops, and traditionally dressed people maintaining conservative lifestyles. Literature and media often reflect a Turkish image shaped with the scenes from the neighbourhood and configured around the guest-worker image of the 1960s. The image is one with limited education, disadvantaged socio-economic background, and a conservative and traditional lifestyle, predominantly coming from rural parts of Anatolia and working in low-level jobs (Duru et al. 2019). While this is only one part of the picture, the following can explain why this section of the Turkish community is very much on the scene:

- 1) They are the ones who came in the very first wave of emigration from Türkiye and in large groups, so native society thinks of them as representatives of Turkish migrants.
- 2) They live in spatial segregation in Schaerbeek, which makes them more visible than the other Turks in the city and easily accessible to researchers. Also, their strong associational network (Jacobs et al. 2006) helps them to be at the forefront.

3) Compared to the other sections of the Turkish community, it is easier to label them with the stereotypical Turkish migrant in Europe as most of them have a guest-worker background.

However, Turks in the city are not limited to this group. Turkish migration to Brussels continued after the cessation of labour migration in the 1970s. As discussed in Chapter 1, Turks with diverse backgrounds continued to come to Brussels, but most of them did not choose Schaerbeek to live in but spread across the city without concentrating on any specific location. Particularly from the 1990s onwards, diversity within the community has significantly proliferated mainly for two reasons; first; the impact of globalisation that enlarges the scope of migration and makes it no more only an experience of socio-economically disadvantaged people, and second; the enhancement of Türkiye's economy and democracy that prepare a conducive environment for people to opt for choices outside the homeland. Having said that, I keep my reservation about the unfortunate developments after 2016 that ruined the democracy in the country and resulted in a vast number of political refugees flowing to Europe.

Nonetheless, my research has shown that the ones who migrated after 2016 also do not fit into the picture of guest-workers migration. However, these relatively new segments of the Turkish migrants, other than the old cohort, largely remain invisible to the literature and even more than that to the media and political discourse, a situation that sustains the negative stereotype misleadingly created around one segment of a large community, albeit it does not describe even that segment considering the new generations in it. It is evident in the literature (Zick et al. 2008; Quillian 2006) that a lack of accurate and comprehensive knowledge bears the risk of prejudicial perception and further fixes the stereotypes.

6.4.2 Distancing from the stereotype: Who are the “real Turks”?

The context explained above is quite determinant in the Turkish community's assessments of native society's approach to themselves. While the whole community agrees on the existence

of “Turkish disadvantage” (Van Kerckem 2014) in Brussels (and in Belgium), there exist different interpretations of it within the community. In this section, I analyse the variations in the perception of ethnic discrimination within the community, considering the three sub-groups: secular, religious, and Schaerbeek.

My findings have shown that Turkish migrants in Brussels distinguish between the social group they feel closer to and the rest of the community while commenting on discrimination. It is documented in the literature that individuals often perceive discrimination towards themselves and towards their group differently (Steinmann 2018). This inconsistency is conceptualised as ‘personal-group discrimination discrepancy’. (Taylor et al. 1990). In my study, the personal-group discrepancy is elicited as the sub-group-community discrepancy. One of my interviewees puts it bluntly by saying, “I think there is a general prejudice towards Turks here. This is to a certain extent because they cannot differentiate between “us” and the “ones in Schaerbeek”” (Selim, secular sub-group). Selim acknowledges the existence of prejudicial attitudes towards Turks in general, but he points to the ones in Schaerbeek as the reason for the negative Turkish stereotype. Selim also emphasises the inability of the native society to differentiate him and his group from the others.

Similar to Selim, Bilge, a member of the secular sub-group, also observes the native society’s prejudicial attitude towards Turks, saying that;

Bilge (secular sub-group): I did not experience any discrimination while living in Brussels. I can speak French, and I obey the rules of society. The closer I get to Belgians, the better I realise there is discrimination, but this is a taboo. Maybe, they discriminate according to appearance. I do not look like a typical Turk.”

The expression of ‘typical Turk’ in Bilge’s quote refers to the ones she thinks fit the Turkish stereotype, and she underlines that she is not one of them. Bilge distances herself from the stereotype through her physical characteristics and linguistic and social skills.

My analysis suggests that the perception of ethnic discrimination is high at the group level but low at the sub-group level in the secular sub-group. The interviewees from the said sub-group often emphasised that discrimination against Turks would not be so high if the host society had known “real Turks” who were indeed themselves. The myth of “real Turks” is often a topic of conversation among well-educated Turks, most of whom are members of my study's secular and religious sub-groups. The myth partially sits on ideological cleavage between the proponents of the European culture and those who identify with traditional culture. As discussed in Chapter 5, seculars identify with Europeanness; they think they are the true representatives of Turks and that if they were the only Turks in Brussels, the Turkish image would be more positive. Simge, for example, thinks that when foreigners see “real Turks” and Istanbul, the negative image turns into a positive one;

Simge (secular sub-group): I feel discriminated against. They have a negative perception of Turks, with limited education, not obeying rules...When foreigners go to Istanbul, they see Turks and Türkiye; they really like it. I feel happy when I hear something positive about my country. What to do, it is part of being a migrant, and we have to deal with this image; we have to accept it. The ones here are neither Belgian nor Turkish. They have become too introverted because of the fear that they may lose Turkish values. Actually, here nobody restricts their freedom; they have more freedom than in Türkiye. But they do not benefit from it enough.

As a last remark, as I said in the first part of this chapter, where I discussed religious discrimination, I would like to reiterate that the Turkish community's perception of ethnic discrimination is interwoven with discrimination on religious grounds. It is not easy in Europe to differentiate between ethnic and religious stereotypes as migrants from countries with predominantly Muslim populations are all put in the same basket of Muslim image (Shooman 2010). Interviewees from all three sub-groups reported many anecdotes about their discontent on not being differentiated from other Muslim groups; as Sevim said, “We show ourselves to

Belgians differently than how we are in reality. We put our Muslim identity at the forefront. I do not think Belgians really know Turks; they think we are Arabs”.

6.4.3 Diverse perceptions of ethnic discrimination in different parts of the city

In the previous section, I analysed different perceptions of ethnic discrimination within the Turkish community. Based on these findings, in the next section, I will enrich my analysis by adding the city to the picture; that is, I will try to show how the sub-groups’ socio-spatial location in Brussels influences their perception of ethnic discrimination putting particular emphasis on the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek. I argue that socio-spatial proximity with international Brussels diminishes Turkish migrants’ perception of ethnic discrimination, for which the secular sub-group takes precedence over the other two. On the other hand, living in an ethnic enclave brings in a “myth of native society”, and that myth may perpetuate the perception of ethnic discrimination if it illustrates the native society as discriminating.

i. Perceptions of ethnic discrimination in international Brussels

My study shows that having been integrated into international Brussels diminishes the perception of ethnic discrimination. Integration into international Brussels requires a high level of human capital, especially in language and education. The religious and secular sub-groups generally involve well-educated Turks, at least with a bachelor’s degree. My interviewees from these two sub-groups predominantly speak English and also can speak or are in the process of learning one of the two local languages, French and Dutch. As I have explained in Chapter 4, English has become the primary language of communication among international circles in the city. Therefore, speaking English fluently enables Turkish migrants to socialise with diverse groups in the city, including eurocrats, expatriates, and other minority groups. As explained below by Betül, social and spatial proximity with international Brussels makes migrants feel

distanced from ethnic discrimination, as they contact and socialise with various nationalities other than Belgians.

Betul (secular sub-group): “In my workplace, there are a few Turks and many foreigners. I do not have close Belgian friends. I do not feel that I live in Belgian culture in this city. Belgians live a domestic life. For Flemings, family is very important. Rather than “othering” or “discrimination”, I think this is their way of life. The neighbourhood I live in, the place I work in, all are multinational.”

Betul lives in the heart of the city and works for one of the EU institutions. Working in an international environment and living in the multicultural part of the global city put Betul’s mind at ease about ethnic discrimination.

On the other hand, the religious sub-group usually chooses the neighbourhoods close to the Flemish region to benefit from the Flemish's well-developed economic system and high-quality education system. Therefore, they are the sub-group, a large section living in the Belgian-populated parts of Brussels. During the interviews, I learnt that they aspire to fight ethnic discrimination by increasing contacts with Belgians to show the natives their friendliness.

Birsen (religious sub-group): I do not think there is discrimination, but we have been living in closed bubbles. Our neighbourhood was chosen as the one with the best social relations. We need to go out of our bubbles. Of course, there is a kind of pressure on migrants, and I am trying to introduce people to Turkish culture.

Birsen lives in a Belgian-populated neighbourhood. She told me that the neighbourhood administration also encouraged migrants to socialise with natives by organising some community activities. She eagerly participates in them and tries to enhance her relations with her neighbours.

In this section, I have discussed secular and religious sub-groups’ perception of ethnic discrimination with respect to the socio-spatial characteristics of the part of the city they live in and conclude that residing in and socialising with international Brussels makes secular ones feel at ease with discrimination from natives. On the other hand, religious ones residing in

Belgian-populated neighbourhoods try to develop friendly relations with Belgians. In the next section, I will focus on the Schaerbeek sub-group to analyse how ethnic discrimination is viewed in the ethnic enclave of the city.

ii. Perception of ethnic discrimination in a segregated community: the myth of native society

Literature shows that social and spatial segregation has a salient link with perceived discrimination, such that discrimination strengthens ethnic group identification and attachment to their neighbourhood. (Snel et al. 2015). Perceived discrimination can be counted among the reasons for the spatial segregation of one segment of the Turkish community in Brussels, which is overwhelmingly composed of the members of the Schaerbeek sub-group. Migrants' ability to navigate the symbolic barriers of native society crucially diminishes in the case of low human capital (Dietz et al. 2015). Therefore, migrants with limited language skills and low levels of educational and occupational attainment tend to search for economically and socially safe environments in big cities, for which ethnic enclaves appear to be ideal places (Philips 2010).

The guest workers and their descendants are heavily concentrated in the Schaerbeek district of Brussels, and their perception of ethnic discrimination differs not only from the other two sub-groups but also there exist variations among themselves, particularly between men and women. The female respondents in this sub-group, most of whom migrated via family formation, as Timmerman et al. (2009) also found in their research, often reported complaints about spatial segregation of their community, underlining that they are too much restricted to only their Turkish circles in social interactions. Not having many opportunities to socialise and to get acquainted with Belgians led these women to create a perception of the native society with their very limited experiences, such as meeting with Belgians at their children's school or the

hospital, and from exchanging these experiences with each other in the close social circle of within the neighbourhood. My observation suggests that a “myth of native society” is created by these women, built partly through little experience and partly through stories heard from each other within their limited social circle, where Belgians are actually almost non-present. However, I would say this myth is not necessarily a negative one. Their low knowledge of French is also an important factor in the creation of this myth. Below, one of my interviewees, Hatun, talks about her story in Schaerbeek.

Hatun came to Brussels via marriage migration and has lived in Schaerbeek for more than 20 years. She has survived with very basic French and rare contact with Belgians. After 15 years of staying at home, she started to work for a cleaning company, where she had the opportunity to contact with few Belgians.

Hatun (Schaerbeek sub-group): I have not learnt the language yet, because I did not need it. I learnt a few words from my sister-in-law. Once a social worker recommended my husband send me a language course, but he did not accept it. I could not even insist for it, how much pressure was on my shoulders... This year I registered for a language course, but because of covid, I could not continue. In my social environment, everybody speaks Turkish. I would like to live in a neighbourhood where also Belgians live. In the Turkish neighbourhood, I feel social pressure and cannot live my own life.

As understood from her comments, Hatun wants to contact Belgians more, and living in a segregated community, in her case, did not result in a negative perception towards Belgians. On the contrary, she blames her community for her limited contact with the native society. Similarly, Miray, another female interviewee from Schaerbeek, who has a similar lifestyle as Hatun, indicates below her positive views of the native society and her perception of non-discrimination.

Miray (Schaerbeek sub-group): The first Belgian person I contacted was my gynecologist during the pregnancy. All personnel at the hospital were very friendly and helpful. I did not meet many Belgians; I came across them in my kids’ schools; teachers were all friendly, and smiling. I do not think Belgians are racist; they approach you according to your approach. I

went to a cleaning company to apply for a job, I could not fill out the form because of my poor French, but a Belgian lady helped me with the form. How I can say that they are racist?

Miray occasionally gets the opportunity to contact natives; for example, when she goes to the hospital, she contacts doctors, talks with teachers at her children's schools, and the employer at the company where she applied for a job. Her everyday life passes in the Turkish neighbourhood, where she mainly socialises with Turks. Her perception of discrimination is shaped by her experiences in Schaerbeek. Hatun's and Miray's stories suggest that segregation may not always influence the migrant's perception of native society negatively; however, it depends on the type of experience the migrant has with the natives (Ehrkamp 2005). Also, this can be explained with the argument that low-skilled first generations who live in the ethnic enclave -these women are all first-generation migrants- have less perceived discrimination due to being less exposed to the native society and having less awareness about the institutional and societal structure of the host-country (Crul and Schneider 2010). Ceylan, for example, talks about her experiences with Belgians 30 years ago as good old days;

Ceylan (the Schaerbeek sub-group): Our relations with Belgians were different in the past. In old times, there was solidarity. When my mum first came here, she stayed at the hospital. Nuns in the school took care of me until my dad came. I did not encounter any discrimination at school. The school gave all materials, so my dad did not need to buy anything.

In this section, I focused on the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek to see how they perceive discrimination. I argued that their perceptions are formed around a myth of native society that they created based on rare experiences with the natives and what they heard in their close social circles. I should indicate that this argument is applied predominantly to the women in the enclave who are housewives with very limited language proficiency. In the next section, I will continue analysing Schaerbeek to shed light on how ethnic discrimination relates to the sense of belonging and how it affects the Schaerbeek segment's attachment to Brussels.

Segregated community, ethnic discrimination, and sense of belonging towards the global city

I argue that even though migrants choose to reside in ethnic neighbourhoods to be protected from exclusionary acts, they still see global cities' multicultural and flexible character as a source of comfort and security. Coming across many different nationalities, cultures, and lifestyles outside of their neighbourhood is preferable to meeting only with natives, a situation which lessens the feeling of being different and marginal.

Even though the Turkish migrants living in Schaerbeek do not really have much interaction with cosmopolitan Brussels, they still view residing in a big urban area as an advantage. As in the quote below from the conversation with Makbule, my interviewees were comparing themselves with their relatives living in small towns emphasising that integrating into Belgian society in small places is more challenging. Makbule was raised in a guest-worker family in Schaerbeek and settled in the same neighbourhood after marriage.

Makbule (the Schaerbeek sub-group): I prefer living in Brussels. My aunt moved to Arlon, and she is an English teacher there. It is totally a different mentality. It is not rich, and everything is white. They do not know what is happening in the world. In small towns, you have two options; you either have to assimilate or as a reaction; you would too much attach to your native identity.

Makbule points out that migrants in small towns do not have many options but two; they feel either to assimilate into the native society or to develop a reactive belonging to the ethnic identity. It is documented in the literature that migrants often turn to co-ethnics in case of facing discrimination from the host society, and ethnic neighbourhoods emerge as a choice to isolate themselves from the natives so that they are protected from discriminatory acts. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) conceptualize this phenomenon as 'reactive ethnicity'. Reactive ethnicity emerges in opposition to a hostile environment in the host country where migrants do not feel embraced, and in reaction to it, their attachment to the ethnic identity becomes stronger. However, strong ethnic identity does not always lead to less belonging to the place of residence;

reactive ethnicity may work differently at different levels. The conclusion I have drawn from Schaerbeek is close to the one Ehrkamp (2005) drew from Marxloh, the Turkish migrant-populated neighbourhood in Duisburg-Germany; that is, migrants may see their neighbourhood as a refuge where they feel at home. However, this does not always point to a feeling of non-belonging to the city. I assert that attachment to the neighbourhood does not necessarily happen at the expense of belonging to the city; ethnic neighbourhood elicits as a remedy in the case of not being able to harmonise with the city.

6.4.4 Perceptions of ethnic discrimination on the ground of Europeanness

Europeanness is a salient boundary that plays a crucial role in Western European societies' perception of immigrants. It is evident in the literature (Naveed and Wang 2021) that European migrants face fewer challenges in structural integration and identificational attachment in comparison to non-Europeans. Frontier's (1999) study on Italian migrants in London showcases how being from a European country lowers the ethnic barrier in the integration process of migrants. The study by Guma and Jhones (2019) also highlights British migrants' feelings of exclusion after the Brexit referendum. Europeanness does not only imply being from a specific geography and ethnicity, but it involves religious and cultural dimensions as well. One of my respondents pointed it out like this; "From my appearance, they cannot understand that I am Turkish. I have light skin and blue eyes. I look like Europeans. Only in case they know my origins I see how prejudiced they are towards Turks".

As discussed in Chapter 5, whether or not Turks belong to Europe is a highly politicised question cultivated in the long history of the relationships between Türkiye and European countries. Türkiye has always been at the centre of discussions on Europe's geographical, sociological and cultural borders (Hurd, 2008). The debate even dated back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and created an ideological divide among the intelligentsia. Aspiration

for Europeanness significantly shaped the societal and political foundations of the Republic of Türkiye as well (Yavuz 2019). On the other side, western media often presents an orientalist perception of Türkiye and Turkish identity, depicting Türkiye as a ‘non-European’ country and Turkish identity as the ‘out-group’ or the ‘other’ (Arcan 2012:119). Beyer (2008), in his study on the integration of Polish and Italian migrants in Belgium between the 1940s and 1990s, rightly indicates that after only a few decades of their stay in Belgium, Italians and Poles have become insiders while Turks, after more than five decades, are still perceived as foreigners. The author mentions how Italians and Poles in those years pointed at their cultural differences with Turks by emphasising their Catholicism and Europeanness to prove how similar they were to Belgians.

It would not be wrong to say that, regardless of their viewpoints on whether Turkish culture and identity belong to Europe, almost all Turks claim some sort of closeness to Europe and, at the same time, feel some sort of exclusion from the European identity. I introduce the concept of "permanent foreignness" to explain Turkish migrants’ perception of exclusion from Europeanness. Permanent foreignness refers to the condition that no matter how much they embrace European values or whether they have the citizenship of a European state, they are perceived as outsiders to Europe at both political and societal levels, and they face this perception in their everyday encounters.

Varied perceptions of Europeanness, harnessed with the perceptions of ethnic discrimination, influence the sense of belonging in various ways. For instance, Selim (secular sub-group), who works in an international company where he has colleagues from different European countries, shared his experiences with me, “I believe Europeans always see us as others. They approach us according to their interests. I lowered my expectations here”. The feeling of exclusion is even higher in the Schaerbeek cohort, as Huriye (Schaerbeek sub-group) illustrates it,

“Europeans always discriminate against us, everywhere, at school, at the workplace.”. I should note that when we were talking about Belgian society, sometimes, my interviewees unconsciously used the word “European” instead of Belgian. This can be commented as a sign of how they see the European identity and national identity of the country they reside in. They see them as a whole.

My findings confirm that Turkish migrants broadly think they are excluded from European identity. Nevertheless, the impact of the exclusion is not the same for all sections of the community; while the members of the Schaerbeek sub-group, such as Huriye, often develop a strong reactionary stance based on her perception of racism in Europe, the secular sub-group members, as it is indicated in the Selim’s quote above, tend to adopt a pragmatic approach to the matter.

In this part, Part II, I analysed the perceptions of ethnic discrimination among the Brussels Turkish community. I concluded that all three sub-groups perceive ethnic discrimination, but their interpretation of the causes of it and their strategies to cope differ.

6.5 PART III: DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AMONG WELL-EDUCATED MIGRANTS: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR SUB-GROUPS

In this part, I put the lens of (perceived) discrimination in relation to education level on the secular and religious sub-groups, given that they are the two segments in the Brussels Turkish community with a high level of education and saw that their level of education plays an important role in their perception of discrimination but in nuanced ways. This also differentiates these two sub-groups from the Schaerbeek cohort.

I first briefly remind the reader of the theoretical approaches to the relationship between the perception of discrimination and education level, then analyse these two sub-groups to shed light on their differences and similarities in this regard.

6.5.1 Education level and perception of discrimination

Migrants with a high level of education tend to compare their statuses with the natives having similar educational backgrounds. (de Vroome et al. 2014). The more educated the migrants, the higher their expectations from the host society are. If they perceive they are relatively deprived of what they deserve, they use their education level as a heuristic to explain the discrimination they confront.

Indeed, research shows that highly educated and structurally integrated migrants also encounter discrimination, but in different contexts (Steinmann 2017). Further, the literature (Lajevardi et al. 2020; Geurts et al. 2021; de Vroome, Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014; Alanya, Baysu and Swyngedouw 2015, Alanya et al. 2017) points to an inverse correlation between the education level and the perception of discrimination, and this is called “integration paradox”. The paradox asserts that the higher the education level is, the more discrimination migrants perceive.

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are various theories explaining why the integration paradox occurs. The three theories that come forward in this regard are as follows: opportunity structure, awareness, and relative deprivation (Steinmann 2018). Highly educated migrants have more frequent contact with natives in their social and professional circles as the opportunity structure is more open to them than those with lower education levels. This increases the probability for them to encounter discriminatory acts. On the other hand, the theory of awareness stresses the cognitive skills of highly educated migrants so that they can better notice discriminatory acts, especially the contemporary covert form, which is hidden behind the language and behaviours. They are more knowledgeable about the negative discourses and stereotypes about migrants in

general and about their own ethnic group in particular (de Vroome et al. 2014). In this sense, they are better capable of interpreting discrimination (Tritler 2018; Bourguignon et al. 2006). Relative deprivation is another theory that explains the underlying mechanism of the integration paradox. It argues that well-educated migrants compare themselves with the natives or other groups, and in case they find out that they are in a disadvantageous position, they become resentful and angry (Smith and Pettingew 2012) and, thus, more sensitive to discrimination.

Having very briefly reminded the reader of the theoretical background about the relationship between perception of discrimination and education level, I will compare the two well-educated segments of the Brussels Turkish community -the secular sub-group and the religious sub-group- in their perception of discrimination.

6.5.2 Divergent perceptions of discrimination among highly educated Turkish migrants

Secular and religious sub-groups constitute the well-educated cohort of the Brussels Turkish community. As indicated in Chapter 3, one of the reasons for the migration of these sub-groups to Brussels is education, particularly for master's and doctoral studies; my interviewees from this cohort were at least have a bachelor's degree. My observation is that learning the local language is one of their primary aims once they settle in the city. Thus, high-education levels and good linguistic skills make them cognitive to discrimination, especially in professional life.

Perception of professional discrimination is quite salient for highly skilled Turkish migrants in Brussels in the form that finding a job equivalent to their education and experience appears challenging. Global cities are known for migrant economic precarity; that is, the jobs created by the post-industrial economic system concentrated in these cities attract highly qualified workers; on the other hand, migrants with low education and limited skills confront the difficulty of finding jobs or can attain a position only in low-waged, insecure jobs in the casual

labour market (Jordon 2017). In Sassen's terminology (2011), it is the "polarization" that brings in the marginalisation of migrants in the economic system of global cities. The situation of highly skilled migrants is expected to be the other way around as their qualifications are up to the requirements of sectors of high professionalism. Still, recent studies show that this applies only to a small segment of these migrants who are wanted for their expertise in rare and critical positions. For the rest of the group, Zhan and Zhou (2019) use the term "precarious talent" as their study shows, in contrast to expectations, they are not immune from challenges in the employment sector due to various reasons, including high competition and unequal treatment in the workplace.

For example, Simge, who graduated from one of the top-ranking universities in Türkiye and completed a master's degree in her field, complains about the mismatch between her qualifications and job.

Simge (secular sub-group): I do not feel belonging to Brussels. I think I am detached from my background here. I got an excellent education in Türkiye and accumulated experience in a company in Istanbul, but it does not mean much here. This makes me uncomfortable. I do not feel integrated professionally. I am only an ordinary officer in a bank."

Simge thinks that it would have been much easier for her to find a better job if she had stayed in Istanbul, and she feels resentful in that aspect; however, she still prefers living in Brussels because of economic conditions back in Türkiye and good schools for her daughter in Brussels. Similarly, De Vroome et al. (2014) distinguish between migrants who took education in the host country and those educated in the country of origin regarding perceived discrimination. They argue that migrants educated in the host country feel more discriminated against as they expect to be treated with the same standards as the natives because they have the same education. Whereas the ones educated in the homeland usually do not see their education as fully transferable to the host country.

Selim's quote below shows how talented migrants lower their career expectations in the face of discrimination.

Selim (secular sub-group): I have not experienced any negative attitude from natives. However, I always think that they have a specific image of Turks in mind. No matter how good I am, I would not be appointed to a managerial position here because I am a migrant.

Migrants, mostly from religious sub-group with high professional backgrounds -such as doctors, lawyers, academics, and bankers- who fled Türkiye after the coup attempt in 2016 reported the difficulty they faced in the labour market despite their qualifications, and they pointed out Turkish and Muslim disadvantage as the underlying reason for it.

I have also witnessed some of these professionals continue to closely follow the developments in Türkiye, expecting the conditions in the homeland to ameliorate so that they can move back, which I interpret as a hindering factor in front of their adaptation to Brussels. Geurts et al. (2020) discovered an interesting situation in their study on the newly arrived highly skilled Turks in the Netherlands (2020), suggesting that exclusion from both native society and ethnic community may be among the reasons for the highly skilled migrants' low level of belonging to their place of residence. Their study has brought forward a paradox in that a large number of highly skilled migrants do not necessarily identify with the place of residence; instead, some of them reported supranational belonging, and some others who describe themselves as world citizens expressed belonging to nowhere. My findings do not suggest an immediate link between exclusion and non-belongingness of highly skilled Turks to Brussels; rather, I see that their low level of belonging is more related to their cosmopolitan lifestyle and worldview. On the other hand, for this group, supranational belonging (Europeanness, which manifests itself in EU citizenship in the form of political belonging) may elevate as an alternative in the case of being excluded from the national identity, such that seculars, most of whom are highly

skilled migrants, often emphasised Europeanness and European values when asked about their belonging to Brussels, rather than mentioning Brussels-related matters.

Sema is a highly educated woman working for an NGO specialising in migrant education. She defines herself as structurally well-integrated but still feels excluded individually and at the sub-group level.

Sema (religious): Turkish politicians are pushed to the bottom of electoral lists; in this country, racism is institutional, and everything seems politically correct. I felt it at school. They orient migrant children towards vocational schools. They could not do that to me because I worked hard. Sociologically Turkish kids were isolated in white schools. The more parents become conscious, the less discrimination will occur.

The two biggest problems in the country are environment and migration. Difficult to understand that they do not do enough on these issues. In such a country having large numbers of migrants, there are still no sound integration policies; they see migrants as a burden. I feel bad seeing people perceive us as “unwanted guests”. Teachers discriminate against migrant teachers. They send inspectors. The system in this county allows for this. I see more responsibility for the system. When you stay in your corner, it is ok, but the moment you try to do something, they warn you.

When asked if she feels Belgian, Sema replied, “Belgium is not like one country, so that difficult for me to explain Belgianness [...] For sure, I am Bruxelloise”. Despite her Belgian citizenship, having taken all her education in Brussels and her emotional attachment to the city, she expressed her disappointment for being seen as a foreigner. Her vast knowledge of the socio-political structure of Belgium and Brussels and her extensive network of migrants increases Sema’s susceptibility to discriminatory acts.

On the other hand, the degree of resilience to discrimination depends on the agency of migrants. It is not only easier for migrants with a high level of human and social capital to navigate through the opportunity structure, but they could also skillfully use the resources to protect themselves from discriminatory acts. My research has shown that highly skilled migrants are not homogeneous in coping with discrimination.

For example, Birsen, a member of the religious sub-group, believes in proactive and constructive efforts as a remedy for prejudice, and she sees the fight against discrimination as a collective responsibility of migrants.

Birsen (religious sub-group): We Turks live in closed bubbles. Our neighbourhood was chosen as the one with the best social relations. We need to go out of our bubbles. Of course, there is a kind of pressure on migrants; I am trying to introduce people to the Turkish culture, and when they know us, they change.

Whereas, Sinem, a member of the secular sub-group, have developed personal tactics to navigate through the system in order not to get harmed by discriminatory acts of the native society. From her comments below, it is apparent that she is well-informed about the discrimination the broader Turkish community perceives.

Sinem (secular sub-group): I have friends in the second generation; they use the language well and are integrated well. They tell me about the discrimination they encountered during their school years. I have my own way of protecting myself. I bought an apartment in Saint Lambert, a place full of different nationalities. It seems less likely that my kid will encounter discrimination in this neighbourhood.

In this section of Part III, I investigated the perception of discrimination among well-educated segments of the Brussels Turkish community -secular and religious sub-groups- and concluded that both sub-groups have a high level of perceived discrimination in the place of residence and that each has its way of coping with it. In the next, and at the same time, the last section of this part, I will shed light on an interesting finding of my research on the link between the perception of discrimination among well-educated migrants before they migrated to Brussels.

6.5.3 Perception of prejudice in the pre-migration period among well-educated migrants

Highly educated migrants are generally informed before migration about native society's attitude towards migrants. In this case, concerns about being discriminated against do not necessarily originate from any real experience but come from a cognition that the native society in the receiving country already has a negative view of the group they belong to.

The newly arrived migrants from the religious sub-group expressed during the interviews that they worried about discrimination while in Türkiye. Some of them told me they wanted to migrate to the United States, thinking that living in line with Islam would be easier there as prejudice towards Muslims is less. Not being able to go to the US, the second option was a big urban area where they thought they would feel more comfortable with a religious life than in small places. With this in mind, they chose Brussels. Ekin, for example, defines herself as a practising Muslim. She worked as a lawyer in Türkiye for long years, and because of the political turmoil in the country, she decided to migrate with her family to a western country. The first country in mind was Canada, but they could not get a visa. Then she researched Western European countries to determine a place with optimum benefits for her family. Brussels appeared as a good option where she could, at least at the beginning, survive with English and get emotional support from other Turks with a religious lifestyle. One of her relatives who had settled in Brussels before gave her positive feedback about the migrant life in the city, saying that it is an inclusive city for Muslims.

The same is also valid for members of the secular sub-group. They were well-informed about prejudice towards Turkish migrants in Western Europe before migrating to Brussels. On the other hand, they are the least concerned compared to the other two sub-groups because they believe their lifestyle is coherent with European norms and values and that their human capital is high enough to fight against discrimination. For example, Ibrahim said he chose Brussels to

provide good schools for his child. When asked what a good school meant to him, he said a good school is one where children are not treated with prejudice and then told me the stories he heard about discrimination at schools in other parts of Belgium.

The Schaerbeek sub-group did not mention any feelings or knowledge about discrimination before they migrated. Besides their low education level, their context of exit -their main reason for migration was economic concerns- also might be a factor that did not give them enough mental room to think on the issue of discrimination. This is certainly a point for further research.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used the lens of (perceived) discrimination to showcase how diversity within the ethnic migrant community demonstrates itself in the sense of belonging. The lens has shown that in contrast to stereotypical understanding, migrant groups, particularly those in global cities, are far from being homogeneous, and in relation to it, there exist divergent understandings, reactions and strategies in the event of discrimination. I have also concluded that divergent perceptions of discrimination lead to multiple forms of the sense of belonging. Furthermore, my study negated the cliché that discrimination always causes an increase in migrants belonging to the home country at the expense of attachment to the place of residence. The lens confirmed the argument that, in the globalisation era, belonging is not an either/or situation, but depending on the characteristics of migrants and the context, it is multi-faceted and situated (Yuval-Davis 2011).

My findings have shown that discrimination generates different reactions from the sub-groups in the Turkish community. For example, the Schaerbeek sub-group members respond to ethnic discrimination with strong transnational belonging and, simultaneously, develop a strong sense of belonging towards the ethnic neighbourhood. On the other hand, the secular sub-group

benefits from living in a multiethnic city in its coping mechanism with discrimination. Similarly, religious discrimination essentially leads to a proactive demand for belonging on the religious sub-group's side; they eagerly pay efforts to be included.

I have also investigated how residing in a global city impacts the sense of belonging in the case of discrimination and found out that global cities are conducive and preferable places for almost all segments of the ethnic migrant group because of their diverse and multicultural environment that allows developing multiple tactics and strategies to tackle discrimination.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Purpose of this research

Recent research on migrants often highlights diversity in different forms and contexts; however, diversity within ethnic groups is an under-researched topic, despite a burgeoning scholarship pointing to it as the state-of-the-art for contemporary migrant groups. This study took this gap in the literature as its starting point and approached the phenomenon of migrant belonging within this framework. It aimed to explore the nature of migrant belonging in the face of the ever-growing diversity in ethnic groups, with a case study of Turkish migrants in Brussels. The lens of in-group diversity helped to explore vast heterogeneities in the ethnic group, and in line with this, identified different segments that exist within the group. This thesis took the existence of these segments as the manifestation of in-group diversity, and based on this finding; it demonstrated that each segment develops a distinct mode of belonging pertinent to its characteristics. Thus, this research provides new insights into contemporary migrant belonging.

Moreover, this thesis's particular focus on the city context and the analysis of that city context deserves attention. It conceptually described Brussels as a global city adopting a migrant-centred approach and analysed its impact on the formation of different modes of belonging in the Turkish community. The migrant-centred approach to global cities, discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, and to be briefly touched upon in the following section, proved to be instrumental in researching migrant diversity in such cities, as it enables researchers to look at migrants beyond certain neighbourhoods such as ethnic enclaves.

I should underline that one other important element of this research is that it demonstrates the complexity of the Turkish community and, in so doing, demonstrates that commonly-held stereotypes do not hold:

1. By demonstrating vast heterogeneities in the Brussels Turkish community, it refutes the Turkish migrant stereotype.
2. By showing divergent modes of belonging in the same community, it challenges the perception that belonging is uniform for the whole ethnic group.
3. It illustrates that the socio-spatial space that the city provides to an ethnic group is not one but multiple; each segment in the group lives in a socio-spatial environment which speaks to its characteristics.

Within the framework explained above, in the following sections, first, I discuss the overall approach of this study and its main conclusions; second, I focus in detail on the findings; and third, I suggest topics for further research, which emerged from this study.

7.2 Overall approach and main conclusions of this research

As stated above, this thesis aimed to explore the nature of belonging in contemporary ethnic migrant groups living in cities. While answering this question on belonging, two concepts guided this research: in-group diversity and the global city. In-group diversity, which refers to a wide range of heterogeneities within contemporary ethnic migrant groups (Crul 2016), was helpful in shedding light on different modes of belonging within ethnic groups. The concept of the global cities, which refers to locales where the economic and financial activities of transnational agglomerates connect beyond national borders thanks to globalisation (Sassen 2005), was used in combination with the city-scaling approach of Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009), to define the flexible and inclusive context of belonging in Brussels. My analysis

concluded that the sense of belonging in an ethnic migrant group is not in one single form, but, thanks to in-group diversity, it is in various forms, and that the global city context is conducive to accommodate in-group diversity as it offers different socio-spatial choices to different segments in an ethnic group.

This thesis takes belonging as multidimensional (Yuval-Davis 2006). In contrast to the old understanding that sees migrant belonging from a dichotomous perspective -either towards the country of settlement or towards the country of origin-, it looks at belonging as a feeling shaped by migrants' interactions in the place of residence (at various levels; state, city, and neighbourhood), their transnational engagements with the country of origin, and their relations with supranational bodies as in the case of the EU. Further, the sense of belonging for some migrant segments can involve a cosmopolitan form which refers to belonging everywhere. Even in some extreme cases, they can feel they belong nowhere, reflecting alienation and exclusion. This multidimensional approach to belonging refutes the dichotomous understanding in which migrants are expected to develop a strong sense of belonging towards the country of settlement, which very much sees belonging as a subsection of integration that comes with successful adaptation; otherwise, they would end up with a strong belonging towards the country of origin, which is not the desired option, as far as receiving countries are concerned. However, literature of recent decades demonstrates otherwise (Boccagni et al. 2020; Wessendorf 2019; Vasta 2013; Antonsich 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006), reflecting the complexity of belonging, and this study contributes to the literature in this regard.

This study investigated this multidimensionality in one single ethnic group in a systematic way by analysing different segments in the same group. In so doing, it sheds light on the intersection of the multidimensional character of belonging and in-group diversity in ethnic groups. It came up that the ethnic lens, critiqued by prominent scholars in the field such as Wimmer (2013) and

Glick-Schiller and Caglar (2009), hides in-group diversity and thus produces a false image that the same mode of belonging is valid for the whole group. My study demonstrates that different segments in the group develop a sense of belonging pertinent to their characteristics. While belonging is always a mixture of dimensions mentioned above, the shares of the dimensions in this mixture differ from one segment to the other.

This thesis analyzes migrant belonging in the context of the global city. Global cities serve as excellent places to examine diversity within migrant groups; they attract migrants with different backgrounds, provide socio-spatial spaces for different cohorts to live in, and thus support migrant diversity. With this in mind, I took a migrant-centred approach while examining the global city context; that is, I drew on a theoretical perspective that combines the global city concept (Sassen 2002 and 2005) with the city-scaling approach (Schiller and Caglar 2009). With the perspective Sassen suggests, the global city concept enables me to see the city with its transnational connections beyond the nation-state, allowing me to analyse migrants in the city from a broader perspective in connection with their cross-border affiliations. Furthermore, the concept helps me in exploring the ethnic enclave context, which is considered a manifestation of migrant segregation and polarisation in cities.

On the other hand, the city-scaling approach remedies the insufficiencies of the global city concept by bringing a migration perspective in analysing such cities. It sees migrants as the cocreators of cities rather than passive and disadvantaged elements. In so doing, it shows us the other side of the coin that migrant communities are much more than what migrant stereotypes suggest. The city-scaling approach also urges us that, besides global characteristics, cities have local features that emerged in a specific historical context and that these features sustain and interact with global characteristics, so local aspects of the global city should not be undermined in the analysis of migrant integration and belonging. I described the Brussels

context in Chapter 4 with such an approach. My findings suggest that the global city is serving different segments of migrants in different ways because, by its nature, it is composed of very different, sometimes contrasting social, cultural, and economic geographies, and the political structure of the city is formed to meet the demands of this diversity. In this sense, the global and local characteristics of the city compromise with each other. For example, language and identity are two magnificent examples of this compromise in Brussels.

Brussels is a bilingual and bicomunal city, and the city's political and administrative system is arranged accordingly. Migrants must choose between French and Dutch languages in all their encounters with the city institutions, from deciding about their children's education to applying for citizenship in the country. However, the socio-cultural reality on the ground is different. As a common language for non-Belgians, English has become the city's second most widely spoken language after French. My research shows that migrants are happy with this situation, as the ones who cannot speak French or Dutch do not face significant problems in communication with the multilingual city population. This situation even has encouraged Belgian politicians to consider English as the third official language of Brussels. My findings suggest that Turkish migrants adopt an instrumental approach towards the language duality in Brussels; they choose according to their future life plans rather than identity-related. They choose the French language to enlarge their options for living and education outside Belgium, as French is a widely spoken language in different countries worldwide. On the other hand, Dutch is mainly chosen by the ones who aspire to permanently settle in Belgium as they think they can have better job opportunities in the Flemish industries, which are more developed than Walloon industries.

Besides language, ethnicity is an example of how the global city offers gateways to migrants outside its rigid local set-up. Brussels, different from the other two regions of Belgium, is

governed by two communities, Flemings and Walloons. Therefore, besides national identity, the Brussels native population identifies with one of the two sub-national identities. The sub-national identity constitutes an integral part of their identity, sometimes prevailing over the national one. However, with its multicultural and flexible social context, Brussels neither pressurises migrants to assimilate into one of the sub-national identities nor demands a strong belonging to the national identity (Bousetta et al. 2018).

This thesis emphasises the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek in its analysis of the global city. It thus demonstrates that ethnic enclaves very often are the only visible part of a migrant group in big cities, as they give the convenience of easy reach-out to the migrants from a specific country. Thus, they perpetuate stereotypes. Although migrants from Türkiye have largely diversified in many respects -such as education, occupation, socio-economic status, the parts of the city they live in, and migratory history- the Turkish migrant stereotype created around guest workers of the 1960s and the 70s still constitutes the Turkish image in Western Europe, including Brussels. My research gives attention to the invisible part of the story indicating that, in addition to ethnic enclaves, global cities comprise socio-spatially dispersed migrants from the same ethnic origin, and it argues that invisible segments should be taken into account in research to draw a more comprehensive picture of the state-of-the-art about migrant groups.

This study contributes to city-level research in migration studies. It is not common to choose Brussels when researching Turkish migrants in the big European cities, despite the fact that Turkish migrants constitute the second largest non-EU migrant group in the city. Conducting city-level research saved me from the trap of methodological nationalism, which refers to "the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world" (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 302). In migration studies, it is often the practice to generalise local-level findings to the state level such that the conclusions about a specific

migrant group in a city are presented as if they apply to the whole country (Schiller and Caglar 2009). This way of presenting research neglects the differences between migrants from the same ethnicity living in different parts of a city or a country and perceives the whole migrant group under question as homogeneous. Rather than following the earlier erroneous practice of assuming that city-level findings could be generalised to the state level, my research, by producing rich conclusions on Brussels, opened up the way for further study on Turkish migrants in other Belgian cities, such as Antwerp, Liege, or Charleroi.

The findings of this thesis paved the way for further research in other big – global - cities and for other migrant groups. I think the probability is high for obtaining similar results for Turkish migrant groups in other big European cities. Each migrant community holds distinct socio-cultural characteristics which come into being through a historical process, and this process also includes their experiences in the home country before migration and their transnational ties, which continuously shape their sense of belonging. In this light, each migrant community, and not only the Turkish, should be examined by taking into account the country of origin, the type of transnational ties they maintain and the global city in which they live (while also considering the institutions of the receiving state). Considering that the migratory history and socio-cultural characteristics of Turkish migration to European cities have some similarity, future research projects might examine cities such as Paris, London, Berlin, or Amsterdam to identify whether similar results are found.

However, a comparison between past periods of migration would not yield similar results because of the fact that in-group heterogeneities require a time frame with different periods to proliferate (Crul 2016; Vertovec 2019). For example, it is not possible to talk about the segments we see in the Turkish community today in the 1970s when guest-worker migration happened; that time, it was largely one segment corresponding to the Schaerbeek sub-group in

this thesis. Similarly, migration of well-educated Turks with high socio-economic status - largely the secular sub-group of this thesis- could only be possible in the new millennium, with better economic conditions in Türkiye and the facilitation of international movement, which enabled students, professionals, business people and the like to seek better educational and professional conditions and different lifestyles abroad. I noted the waves of migration from Türkiye to Europe in Chapter 4, indicating that each wave brought a different section of Turkish society. A comparison of the categories in this dissertation with the ones in the past periods of migration actually approves my argument that diversity has gradually proliferated with new migration waves and produced segments in the larger Turkish community.

Having recapitulated the main conclusions of my research, in the following section, I will present my findings on different modes of belonging based on various dimensions of belonging; national, transnational, supranational (EU), and local (city and neighbourhood), and by highlighting three sub-groups in the community -the Schaerbeek sub-group, the religious sub-group, and the secular sub-group. Here, I should indicate that I used the sub-groups as analytical instruments to present my data, such that, to bring forward the diversity within the Brussels Turkish community, I categorised my findings separately for each sub-group. Then I compared them to demonstrate the sub-group's distinctiveness in their modes of belonging. Also, I presented my findings in relation to the global city context.

7.3 Recapitulation of research findings in connection to various dimensions of belonging

Here, I deem it necessary to briefly describe the sub-groups as this is essential to understand my findings indicated in this section. The Schaerbeek sub-group comprises mainly guest workers -who migrated to Belgium in the framework of a bilateral agreement Belgium signed with Türkiye in 1964 to recruit temporary workers for its mining sector- and their families, descendants, and acquaintances who came via network migration. Its members have limited

education; predominantly without a university degree, low socio-economic status; working in the business sector or small-scale entrepreneurship. They mainly reside in the Turkish neighbourhood of Brussels and are the least exposed to global Brussels. The secular sub-group consists of highly skilled migrants with a good level of education -predominantly at least with a bachelor's degree and working in professional jobs- who generally reside in affluent neighbourhoods in different parts of the city and maintain a cosmopolitan lifestyle. They are well-integrated into the global Brussels. The last one, the religious sub-group, comprises Turkish migrants for whom religious identity is at the forefront. They are well-educated; most of whom are at least a bachelor's degree, with mixed socio-economic status; working in sectors like education and business, some are entrepreneurs, and some are professionals. Like the seculars, they are scattered around the city with a partial concentration in the neighbourhoods closer to the Flemish Region to benefit from multicultural Brussels and the educational and vocational opportunities of the Flemish region.

Before presenting my findings, I would like to reiterate that, in this thesis, I defined the Turkish migrant group in Brussels as a symbolic community (Cohen 1985), which refers to a community whose members are loosely bound. It works as an aggregating mechanism rather than requiring the integration of its members. I chose this version of the concept of "community" for its suitability to comprise diversity and still have the power to convene its members under a common identity. In this line, I use "Turkish migrant community" to refer to its members' symbolic identification with "originating from Türkiye". I refer to each segment as a "sub-group" to underline their consciousness of being a sub-section of the broader Turkish migrant population in the city but still retaining their distinctiveness.

In my investigation of belonging, I draw on two analytical themes that emerged from my research as outstanding instruments that can reveal the multidimensional character of

contemporary migrant belonging: transnationalism and discrimination. Indeed, these instruments are already regarded in the literature as closely linked with the migrant sense of belonging (Fathi 2022; Boccagni et al. 2020; Steinmann 2019; Lahdesmaki et al. 2016; Snel et al. 2016; Gilmartin 2008). Below I indicate my findings separately for each dimension.

Transnational belonging

I used transnationalism as a lens in Chapter 5 to analyse the belonging of the Turkish migrant community towards Türkiye. I drew on two elements: first, I looked at the emigrant/diaspora policy of Türkiye, and second, I analysed the contexts of exit and reception, both of which emerged from my research as decisive elements in shaping the transnational attachment. My findings demonstrated that each sub-group's responses to their home country's reach-out efforts are distinct. This distinctiveness of the responses stems from each sub-group's characteristics and is also affected by their socio-spatial location in the city. For instance, the Schaerbeek sub-group is more receptive to the influences of diaspora politics; this is partially because of their living in a segregated geography, namely the Schaerbeek neighbourhood of Brussels, which prepares a conducive environment for transnational politics.

On the other hand, secular sub-group members keep a certain distance from home country politics. My research shows that their aspirations for living a cosmopolitan life in an international multicultural European city play an important role in their stance towards transnational engagements in general and home-country politics in particular. The religious sub-group's position is unique in this regard that, at the time of this research, they were highly critical of the Turkish Government and its emigrant/diaspora policy, and therefore, their transnational engagements, especially political ones, were at a very low level. However, it came up during the interviews that, at the beginning of the 2000s, they had good relations with the government and were actively engaging in home-country politics.

Also, my research showed that contexts of exit and reception considerably impact migrants' sense of transnational belonging. My findings suggest that the sub-groups' experiences of departure from Türkiye and arrival to Brussels are significantly different. I argue that this difference manifests itself in the sub-groups' home-country attachment. For instance, the Schaerbeek sub-group, mainly composed of guest workers and their descendants, has developed a nostalgic and romantic belonging to Türkiye shaped by the well-known story of guest workers' migration in the 1960s. They left a country in economic hardship and came alone without their families. The conditions they found in Belgium/Brussels were equally difficult; they stayed in temporary shelters, separated from the natives, unable to speak the local language, and without integration support. The story combines them and strongly links them to Türkiye. The myth of return, which originated from their temporary status at the time of their arrival, could survive until today, and they even transmitted it to the new generations. Also, their difficult life conditions in Brussels at the time of arrival and the lack of sound integration policies on the Belgian side further increased the nostalgia. I would also add that their segregation in the ethnic enclave of Schaerbeek and perception of discrimination from the native society played a role in their strong connections to the country of origin. On the other hand, the religious and secular sub-groups, in contrast to the Schaerbeek sub-group, do not have a big story to stick to; they left Türkiye for various reasons like fleeing because of political repression, searching for better occupational opportunities, aspiring for a cosmopolitan and international environment, and finding a better education for themselves and their children. Considering that these two sub-groups migrated predominantly from the 1980s onwards and intensively after the 2000s, they could see better integration conditions in Brussels.

Supranational belonging

This thesis looks at migrant supranational belonging in the context of the EU. My research demonstrated that the Brussels Turkish community's attachment towards the EU is very much shaped by their perceptions of Türkiye's membership process and their understanding of the relationship between Turkish identity and Europeanness (European identity). As extensively discussed in Chapter 5, whether Turkish identity belongs to Europe or Asia and whether Europeanness is compatible with Turkish and Muslim identity is a long debate which has its roots deep in the history of Turkish-European relations. This debate dates back to the Ottoman Empire period, the predecessor of Türkiye (Yavuz 2019; Keyman 2007). Needless to say, the discussion becomes even hotter for the Turks residing in European countries (Kaya 2019 and 2011). In that sense, for Turkish migrants, the EU does not only mean a supranational body that provides the citizens of member countries with practical rights but also relates to the very identity of Europeanness. In this regard, Türkiye's EU membership also touches upon this sensitive topic of identity. Türkiye's EU membership process, which seems like a never-ending process continuing since 1963, influences Turkish migrants' sentiments towards the EU; however, this influence is not in the same form for all sub-groups. For instance, my findings suggest that the Schaerbeek sub-group is relatively less identified with Europeanness and European culture, and its stance towards the EU changes according to the nature of Türkiye-EU relations. In the first decade of the 2000s, Türkiye's membership talks were at a positive pace, which positively impacted them; the EU's "accepting their homeland" symbolically meant that "they were also acceptable" to the EU. However, at the time of this research, Türkiye's membership talks were at a standstill, and I observed that a feeling of exclusion prevails among this sub-group.

On the other hand, the secular sub-group members generally see Türkiye's place in the European Union and perceive Europeanness as compatible with the Turkish identity. To them, Belgianness, first and foremost, means European values and a European way of life, and they migrated to Brussels to live in a city where such values matter. While attaches importance to European values, I have observed that the religious sub-group has specific concerns about Europeanness emanating from Islamic norms and traditions. Nevertheless, they support Türkiye's EU membership as they think it would ameliorate the political situation in Türkiye.

As a last remark, my research revealed that transnational belonging and supranational belonging are intertwined. Keeping in mind that making sound correlations with one case study is difficult, I want to state my findings about the sub-groups. The Schaerbeek sub-group, with relatively strong transnational belonging, presents relatively a lower supranational belonging. On the other hand, seculars and, to a certain extent, the religious segment has strong supranational belonging but a relatively low transnational belonging. This comment should be read in connection with the fact that the migrants in my case study are from a non-EU country with close and sometimes difficult historical relations with Europe and a long-standing EU membership process. Further, as discussed in Chapter 5, Türkiye sees its diaspora as a bridge between the homeland and the EU and mobilises them to lobby in front of the EU countries where they live (Arkilic 2020; Kucukcan 2007). This also shows how these two dimensions are intertwined in the Turkish migrants' case.

Belonging in the place of residence

I analysed different modes of belonging in the place of residence with the lens of (perceived) discrimination. I refer to the location migrants reside in as "place of residence" rather than "country of residence" to underline that this study is not at the state level. At the same time, I have chosen a global city as the context of belonging and researched belonging at various levels

within the country of residence, comprising neighbourhood, city, and nation-state. By so doing, I aimed to avoid methodological nationalism, defined as "the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world" (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 302). Also, while using the lens of discrimination, this study brought actual and perceived discrimination together. While actual discrimination requires a real discriminatory act, in the case of perceived discrimination, migrants do not need to experience a discriminatory act by themselves but perceive its existence; therefore, it is difficult to differentiate one from the other (Schaffer 2019; Quillian 2006). With this in mind, I use the term "discrimination" with the word (perceived) in parentheses in this thesis.

A large amount of literature already exists analysing the impact of discrimination on migrant integration and belonging. My study prevails among others as it highlights that discrimination is faced and navigated differently within the same migrant community. These differences speak to the diverse forms of belonging in that community. Further, I analysed contrasting socio-spatial settings in which different segments of the same migrant community live, and I found that global cities offer various options for migrants to choose where they find it easy to tackle discrimination. For instance, the Schaerbeek sub-group feels emotionally safe in the ethnic enclave as they do not contact the natives much; however, their perceptions of discrimination are established either with their limited experiences of contact or with what they have heard within their closed ethnic social circle. These limited experiences and the heard stories create a myth of native society, based on which they develop various perceptions of discrimination. I saw that their perceptions based on the myth of native society are not necessarily negative. For example, a woman who has lived more than 40 years in the ethnic enclave with minimal correspondence with Belgians because of the lack of language capability developed a perception of the native society based on her few positive experiences, such as her encounter with doctors and nurses in a hospital many years ago.

On the other hand, another woman, a second generation, grown up and attended school in the same neighbourhood, living in a social circle made up of Turkish migrants, developed a highly negative perception. I argue that both perceptions are greatly affected by the myth of native society. Nevertheless, the Schaerbeek cohort appreciates residing in a multicultural city such as Brussels, although they do not have frequent contact with it. I see that the multicultural and flexible character of global cities provides comfort and security not only to migrants in mixed neighbourhoods but also to the ones in ethnic enclaves. Even though their immediate social and cultural circle is the ethnic enclave, it is still preferable for them to come across various cultures, ethnicities, languages, and, more importantly, with the migrants like themselves rather than only natives. The global city has a colourful scene which lessens the feeling of being different and marginal.

I witnessed that the secular and religious sub-groups' perception of discrimination is high partially due to their good level of education and more contact with the natives, especially in professional life. Religious sub-group members prioritise their religious identity, and thus, they are more sensitive to religious-based discrimination. The bright boundary of religion in Europe (Foner and Alba 2008) perpetuates this perception. On the other hand, secular sub-group members, who are highly aware of discriminatory acts, do not see religious discrimination as a real threat to themselves because they generally do not carry religious symbols and practice religion in private if they want to do so.

My data suggests that all segments of the Brussels Turkish community believe that religious and ethnic discrimination exists in Brussels. However, they have different views on the causes of it. The religious sub-group puts the responsibility for religious prejudice on the ones "who do not represent true Islam". The secular sub-group is more concerned about the representation

of Turkish identity, thinking that they are the "real Turks", and the rest, especially the Schaerbeek sub-group, can be the source of misrepresentation.

The discussion in the above paragraph brought me to the topic of stereotypes, which I analysed in different parts of this thesis from various angles. I examined how the sub-groups confront the "Turkish migrant stereotype". First, I should underline that stereotyping is a powerful way of neglecting in-group diversity in an ethnic group, as it claims that all group members are the same. The fact that migrant stereotypes often do not correspond with positive images makes stereotypes powerful sources of prejudice and discrimination (Zick et al. 2008). I interpreted my findings about "true Muslims" and "real Turks", stated above, as efforts of sub-groups to distance themselves from stereotypes. It emerged from my research that each sub-group uses different tactics to escape, and it seems that the least successful is the Schaerbeek sub-group as they are the ones who are guest-workers and their descendants, around whom the Turkish migrant stereotype is created. My research also shows that this sub-group face double exclusion, both in Brussels and in Türkiye; in Brussels, they encounter a prejudice originating from the Turkish migrant stereotype, and in Türkiye, they confront the stereotype of "gurbetçi", a term which reflects an image of an emigrant stuck in between two cultures.

Another important point I discovered while analysing the sub-groups through the lens of discrimination is the Turkish migrants' feeling of exclusion from Europeaness. As I said above, the sub-groups have distinct stances vis-à-vis European identity. However, the exclusion applies to all of them. To define this situation, I introduce the concept of "permanent foreignness", which refers to the condition that no matter how much Turkish migrants embrace European values or whether they have the citizenship of a European state, they are perceived as outsiders to Europe at political and societal levels and face this perception in different spheres of life as a whole community.

Having indicated my research findings based on different dimensions of belonging, I will put forward avenues for further research suggested by this study in the next section.

7.4 Avenues for further research

I conducted this research on one ethnic migrant group in Brussels. I believe broadening it to different ethnic groups in Brussels would help to see how in-group diversity manifests in other groups and what kind of segments they involve in the face of globalisation. Examining other ethnic groups in the same city would also allow seeing better the impact of the Brussels context on diversity within ethnic groups and the modes of belonging. Further, the study can be expanded to Turkish migrant groups in different cities in Europe to compare and contrast the cities and also have a picture of the impact of the European context on contemporary migrant diversity and belonging.

Another point I am inquisitive about is the distinction between EU and non-EU migrants in terms of supranational belonging. It is evident that migrant belonging in Europe has an EU dimension; however, how this dimension is felt by the migrants from EU countries and non-EU countries is a question to explore. My research shows that Turkish migrants still feel excluded from Europeanness, regardless of whether or not they have citizenship in Belgium. I introduce the concept of "permanent foreignness" to describe this puzzle in Chapter 6. Further research on the supranational belonging of migrants from non-EU countries can contribute to this relatively new dimension of belonging. EU citizenship is frequently critiqued for being exclusionary, providing rights to only citizens of EU member countries, and excluding third-country nationals (Brink 2018; Beyer 2008). However, my argument goes further than this; being granted EU citizenship, in some circumstances, may not be enough for third-country nationals to feel they belong to the EU. EU may need to formulate policies in this regard.

Moreover, my interviewees expressed either discontent or indifference when asked if they saw any advantages of residing in the EU capital. Turkish migrants do not perceive living in the capital of the EU as an added value to their lives. Indeed, this perception persists regardless of educational or occupational status. Nevertheless, further research is needed to see if this conclusion applies to also other migrant groups from EU and non-EU countries. The distance they feel might be a reason for them not to consider the EU as a platform to pursue their interests despite its geographical proximity.

I also find the link between the transnational and supranational belonging of Turkish migrants interesting. It seems that their home-country attachment has a particular impact on their belonging towards the EU. I explained in Chapter 5 that Türkiye's EU membership process and the Turkish migrants' perception of the relationship between Turkish identity and Europeanness influence their stance vis-à-vis the EU. This can be researched with regard to different third-country ethnic groups.

A further research area I want to propose would be the relationship between segregated communities/neighbourhoods and the global city. I argued that Turkish migrants in Schaerbeek see living in Brussels as advantageous despite their limited contact with the rest of the city. They like to come across a multinational environment full of people from different parts of the world similar to themselves rather than only natives once they go out of their ethnic enclave; this makes them feel comfortable and included. The research can be expanded to other global cities to see how Turkish migrants living in ethnic enclaves in other cities relate to the global city. In line with this, the relations of new generations with the global city can be particularly examined. My research shows that new generations would like to move outside the neighbourhood, but even if they could move, they still have to keep close social relations with the neighbourhood due to parents' expectations. I wonder if the new generations could play a

"cultural bridge" between the global city and the ethnic enclave transmitting global city culture to the ethnic enclave.

Also, the language used by migrants in the ethnic enclave for the natives caught my attention, as explained in Chapter 4. Turkish migrants in Schaerbeek unconsciously were calling natives "foreigners". I came across this word many times during the interviews. I interpret this language, on the one hand, as a sign of their high level of attachment to their neighbourhood and that they see themselves as the "natives" of that location; on the other, a sign of their distance from the host society.

Stereotyping in the homeland is another interesting topic that requires more research. I saw several studies about emigrant stereotypes mainly in the framework of return migration, such as the ones by Kunuroglu et al. (2021 and 2018); however, research on different migrant groups in European countries would shed light on how they feel excluded in the homeland and how this exclusion impacts their sense of belonging in the place of residence and transnationally.

Lastly, I want to highlight my finding about well-educated migrants' perception of discrimination in the pre-migration period. My research demonstrated that well-educated migrants are informed about (perceived) discrimination in potential countries of reception, and this information plays a role in their country/city choice. More research on this topic would shed light on a different aspect of (perceived) discrimination and show how various segments of ethnic groups perceive discrimination differently and how this perception changes after migration.

To recapture what I have done in this thesis, I sought to understand better where ethnic migrant groups feel they belong in this closely interconnected world. I put my magnifier below and beyond the nation-state and empirically saw that migrant belonging is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon, encompassing various socio-political levels not only in the country of settlement but also in the places they left; sometimes, it includes the whole world or nowhere on earth. I saw that the phenomenon of belonging takes different shapes for different groups in different circumstances. I looked into ethnic groups by putting the ethnic lens aside and clearly witnessed that the migrant stereotypes and the generalisations about belonging are very misleading in that ethnic groups involve vast heterogeneities; in line with this, different segments occur within them, and these segments develop distinct modes of belonging. Also, my analysis of Brussels demonstrated that migrants interact with the city differently, and the type of this interaction impacts their belonging. Above all, global cities are places in which migrants with various characteristics can each find a socio-cultural space of living.

Appendix A

Consent Letter

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About my project:

As part of my PhD studies at the BSIS-University of Kent, I am conducting a research on migrant sense of belonging in Brussels. My focus group is the Turkish community in the city. For that, I need to do interviews with community members to gather scientific data for writing my dissertation.

I ask people about how much they are familiar with socio-cultural and political life in their neighborhoods, Brussels, and Belgium, their adaptation process to the city, how they keep their ties with Türkiye, how they relate to the EU, etc. All my questions will exclusively remain in this general framework. I would like to underline that, during our conversation, you will not be asked in any way to express your political views or affiliations with any political parties or groups.

I also would like to remind you that you may just pass the questions that you choose not to answer, and you may stop the conversation at any time you want. Please feel free to contact me also after the interview in case you prefer your data not to be used in my research.

Conversations will be stored strictly anonymous, and every precaution will be taken for not using any identifying data such as name or any other specific information in publications of the research results.

If you would like to receive information on the results of my research, you can always get in touch with me from the contact information above.

Thank you very much for your participation.

Appendix B

Interview Grid

Gathering personal information and understanding their migratory trajectory

- 1- Please tell me about your background.
- 2- Where were you born? When did you come to Belgium/Brussels?
- 3- Which citizenship(s) do you have? What is your visa status?
- 4- Which school did you graduate from?
- 5- Where do you work?

Migrants' perception of their neighbourhoods and their level of engagement in the socio-political life of the neighbourhoods

- 6- Which commune do you live in?
- 7- Are you satisfied with the services at the Commune?
- 8- Have you ever had an issue with the Commune? How did you solve it?
- 9- Have you ever contacted local politicians?
- 10- Are any of them of Turkish origin? If so, what do you think about their performance?
- 11- If not, do you think having Turkish-origin politicians in your commune would change anything? For the better or for worse?
- 12- Is there something in your neighbourhood that you would like to change?
- 13- How are the social relations in your neighbourhood?
- 14- What are your sources to follow cultural and social activities in your neighbourhood?

Migrants' perception of Brussels and their level of engagement in Brussels's socio-political life

- 15- How do you describe Brussels?
- 16- Why did you choose Brussels as your city of settlement?
- 17- Which aspects of Brussels do you like? Which aspects of it do you not like?
- 18- Do you follow regional politics?
- 19- What areas of policy do you follow? Do you know about regional politicians' stance on migrant-related issues?
- 20- Could you please share your observations about Turkish community in Brussels?
- 21- What are your sources to follow cultural and social activities in your neighbourhood?

Migrants' perception of Belgium

- 22- How can you describe Belgium/Belgian identity?
- 23- What are the differences/similarities between Belgian and Turkish culture?
- 24- Do you follow federal politics?
- 25- Do you think the priorities of federal politicians are correct? Are there any issues that you believe federal politicians could focus on more?

Migrants' perception of the EU

- 26- What does it mean to you to live in the EU capital?
- 27- Have you ever met people working in EU-related jobs?
- 28- How do you see Türkiye's EU membership process?

Migrants' transnational ties/engagements

- 29- How is it living in another country than Türkiye?
- 30- How often do you visit Türkiye? For what reasons?
- 31- What are your future plans regarding your settlement in Belgium/Brussels? Would you like to move somewhere else? If so, why?
- 32- How do you follow Turkish politics?

Appendix C

LIST OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

Interviewee (Pseudonyms)	Gender/ Age	Time of Arrival To Belgium/ Legal Status	Sub-group	Occupation	Education	Interview technique	Reason for migration
Ekin	F/52	2016/Refugee	Religious	Teacher	Bachelor	Face-to- face	Political situation in Türkiye
Piraye	F/46	1991/dual citizen	Secular	Housewife	Bachelor	Video conference	Marriage
Niran	F/36	1996/dual citizen	Secular	Finance sector	Master	Face-to- face	Spouse's job
Gulay	F/38	Born in Belgium/ Dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Medical doctor	Medical School	Face-to- face	Born in Belgium
Savas	M/38	2007/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Finance sector	Bachelor	Face-to- face	Marriage
Bilge	F/35	2010/permanent resident	Secular	Pharma sector	Master	Face-to- face	Job
Betul	F/51	1991/dual citizen	Secular	IT sector	Master	Face-to- face	Job
Miray	F/51	1976/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Housewife	High school	Face-to- face	Family reunion
Simge	F/39	2013/permanent resident	Secular	Banking	Master	Face-to- face	Job
Olgun	M/40	2013/permanent resident	Secular	Lawyer	Master	Face-to- face	Job
Birsen	F/53	1984/dual citizen	Religious	Teacher	Bachelor	Video conference	Marriage
Nalan	F/47	2002/dual citizen	Secular	NGO	Bachelor	Video conference	Marriage
Guniz	F/42	1993/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Housewife	Primary school	Face-to- face	Marriage
Ibrahim	M38	2009/permanent resident	Secular	Architect	PhD	Video conference	Education
Selim	M/37	2014/permanent resident	Secular	Business	Bachelor	Face-to- face	Job
Bahriye	F/35	2001/dual citizen	Religious	Pharma	PhD	Video conference	Education
Ceylan	F/48	1982/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Housewife	Elementary School	Videoconfe rence	Marriage
Basar	M/28	2012/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Business sector	Bachelor	Video conference	Marriage
Zekiye	F/35	Born in Brussels/dual citizen	Religious	Lawyer	Master	Face-to- face	Born in Brussels

Sinem	F/31	2013/permanent resident	Secular	Economist	PhD	Face-to-face	Job
Elif	F/37	2007/dual citizen	Religious	Academic	PhD	Face-to-face	Education
Asuman	F/28	2015/permanent resident	Religious	NGO	Master	Video conference	Spouse's job
Huriye	F/35	Born in Brussels/ dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Business	High school	Video conference	Born in Brussels
Metin	M/36	Born in Brussels/ dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Business	High school	Face-to-face	Born in Brussels
Alim	M/43	Born in Brussels/ dual citizen	Religious	Health sector	Medical school	Phone interview	Born in Brussels
Osman	M/46	2002/dual citizen	Religious	Teacher	University	Phone interview	Job
Yasemin	F/30	2011/dual citizen	Religious	Academic	PhD	Video conference	Education
Leyla	F/31	2013/permanent resident	Religious	Journalist	University	Face-to-face	Marriage
Murat	M/33	2009/permanent resident	religious	NGO	Master	Face-to-face	Education
Mihrimah	F/46	2011/dual citizen	Religious	Health sector	Master	Video conference	Marriage
Melda	F/37	2015/refugee	Religious	Finance	PhD	Video conference	Political situation in Türkiye
Makbule	F/36	Born in Brussels/ dual citizen	Religious	NGO	Master	Face-to-face	Born in Brussels
Yakup	M/45	1979/dual citizen	Secular	Infrastructure	University	Face-to-face	Family reunion
Hatun	F/52	1985/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Housewife	Secondary school	Phone interview	Marriage
Sevda	F/49	1998/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Business sector	High school	Video conference	Marriage
Ahmet	M/38	2015/refugee	Secular	Regulatory affairs	Master	Video conference	Political situation in Türkiye
Enes	M/41	2014/permanent resident	Religious	Auditing	Master	Face-to-face	Education
Omer	M/36	2016/refugee	Secular	IT	Bachelor	Face-to-face	Political situation in Türkiye
Kadir	M/39	2012/permanent resident	Religious	NGO	Master	Face-to-face	occupation
Fatih	M/39	2016/refugee	Religious	IT	University	Face-to-face	Political situation
Aykut	M/45	2014/refugee	Secular	Pharma	Master	Face-to-face	occupation
Kerem	M/28	Born in Brussels/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Business	High school	Face-to-face	Born in Brussels

Hanim	F/36	2004/permanent resident	Schaerbeek	Business	Primary school	Face-to-face	job
Serdar	M/47	2016/refugee	Secular	Commerce	Bachelor	Face-to-face	Political situation in Türkiye
Mumtaz	M/53	2016/refugee	Religious	Commerce	Bachelor	Face-to-face	Political situation in Türkiye
Serkan	M/53	2014/permanent resident	Secular	Regulatory Affairs	Master	Face-to-face	job
Gulay	F/62	2002/dual citizen	Schaerbeek	Business	High school	Face-to-face	job
Bekir	M/40	2015/permanent resident	Secular	Auditing	Bachelor	Face-to-face	job
Bahriye	F/40	2015/permanent resident	Secular	Housewife	Bachelor	Face-to-face	Spouse's job
Rana	F/37	2013/permanent resident	Secular	Housewife	Bachelor	Face-to-face	Spouse's job
Candan	F/42	2013/permanent resident	Religious	NGO	Master	Face-to-face	education
Utku	M/37	2014/permanent resident	Secular	Journalism	Master	Face-to-face	job
Mihrinur	F/38	1995/dual citizen	Religious	Pharma	Bachelor	Video conference	Family reunion

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