

United Nations Peacekeeping and the Nexus between Conflict Settlement and Conflict Resolution

A Comparative Case Study of UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus and Cambodia

by

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Abstract

The two major approaches to conflict analysis, conflict settlement and conflict resolution, are identified in the literature as contrasting methodologies of third party intervention. The proponents of the conflict settlement approach criticise the other approach for its impracticality, whereas the advocates of the conflict resolution approach maintain that their efforts are undermined by the very method used by the other approach. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping (a conflict settlement tool) is often regarded as an impediment to conflict resolution in the literature.

Nevertheless, this study argues that each approach has a complementary role to play in the overall peace process, and that the key to successful conflict resolution is indeed to find a happy combination of the two approaches in which the various intermediary efforts can demonstrate their full potential. Based on this assumption, the study suggests that under a ripe moment and by performing an appropriate set of functions UN peacekeeping can serve as the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution.

To demonstrate this, two exemplifying cases of UN peacekeeping are examined using the notion of *timing* and *function contingencies* as a theoretical framework. The case studies highlight the importance of maintaining coherent and complementary relationship among peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in peace processes. In fact, the study argues that multi-function peacekeeping can provide a nifty framework within which the various intermediary efforts can be co-ordinated, and raise the prospect of turning UN peacekeeping into a stepping-stone to conflict resolution.

The study concludes that when a UN peacekeeping operation fulfils successfully the *transition assistance* functions it can nurture the complex transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution. On the other hand, when it fails to implement these functions, its presence tends to consolidate the settlement and keep the parties apart, as a result, making it an impediment to conflict resolution.

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Introduction

The Topic of the Study

“History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex [peace] operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work.”¹ This statement was made in the so-called ‘Brahimi Report’, which was submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations as a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations. Likewise, history has also indicated that peacekeepers and peacemakers are close partners in complex peace processes: while the peacekeepers may not be introduced before the peacemakers can secure some agreement, the peacemakers’ achievement may not bear fruit when the peacekeepers fail to assist the implementation of the agreement. In fact, successful conflict resolution requires an appropriate contribution from three key actors in peace processes: peacekeepers, peacemakers and peacebuilders.

A similar line of argument can be built with regard to the relationship between two major approaches to conflict analysis: conflict settlement and conflict resolution. Advocates of conflict settlement, and catalysts for conflict resolution are complementary partners in complex peace processes: while the latter group may not be able to intervene in a conflict without the support of the former group, the efforts of the former group cannot lead to a sustainable peace without the success of the latter group. At the same time, however, the empirical record of United Nations’ involvement in various peace processes also revealed that the three key actors in the peace process often failed to perform in a coherent manner, and that the two major approaches to conflict analysis often pursued contradictory objectives.

Strategies of peacekeeping that have been employed in various *interstate* conflicts are quite appropriate when the objective of peacemaking and peacebuilding is the separate development of two newly established entities. For example, the installation of the buffer zone between the combatants helps to demarcate the ‘international’ border between the contested parties. In this sense, the introduction of a UN peacekeeping operation can accelerate the peace process, and thus contributes to the resolution of a conflict.

On the contrary, such a peacekeeping strategy poses a serious problem when the objective of peacemaking and peacebuilding is the re-integration of separated entities. This is because the logic of peacekeeping stresses the need for creating a wall between the two contestants in the interest of forestalling the exchange of violent actions between them. In consequence of such a physical separation, positive interactions between the parties that are necessary for addressing the fundamental causes of the conflict are also precluded unwittingly. In short, the logic of peacekeeping may reduce the chance of conflict resolution. This problem is particularly acute when the parties are unable to find a mutually satisfactory

¹ UN Document (A/55/305-S/2000/809), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 21 August 2000, p. 5 (para. 28)

arrangement in sharing their power in the re-integrated society.

A corollary of such an argument is that the strategies of peacekeeping that can facilitate the re-integration of separated entities need to be identified. In other words, in *intra-state* conflicts, peacekeeping operations may have to serve as a focal point to co-ordinate the various activities that are necessary in the complex process between peacemaking and peacebuilding. Indeed, a number of UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed in *intra-state* conflicts to assist the re-integration of war-torn societies. The empirical record of UN peacekeeping indicates that under an appropriate set of circumstances UN peacekeeping has played a crucial role in facilitating the resolution of *intra-state* conflicts, although at other times it has stood as an impediment to such an end.

Therefore, this study explores the conditions under which and by performing what functions UN peacekeeping becomes, on the one hand, a part of conflict resolution and, on the other, a part of the problem. It emphasises that UN peacekeeping needs to be situated within the context of the overall peace process in order to appreciate its effectiveness properly.

This research question was arrived at while seeking an answer to the following question: Why in some cases can UN peacekeeping assist the transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution, while in other cases it impedes such a transition? As the first step towards clarifying this point, a theoretical framework is constructed in this study by drawing upon the academic studies of peacekeeping and the literature of conflict analysis. The literature of conflict analysis is reviewed to draw some fundamental logic for the overriding framework. Existing theoretical frameworks are modified to suit the objective of this study: examining the performance of UN peacekeeping operations in the context of overall peace processes. Then, insights and findings from the academic studies of peacekeeping are used to illuminate the empirical conditions in which UN peacekeepers have operated and the functions they have fulfilled.

Based on a review of the relevant theoretical frameworks, the study develops the following arguments. Conflict is a dynamic and complex phenomenon which goes through a number of distinguishable stages and involves not only tangible issues but also the psychological processes of the people concerned. Thus, intervention should be envisaged as a co-ordinated series of concurrent and consecutive strategies. Such a multiple intervention needs to be carried out by a wide variety of intermediaries, each addressing different aspects of the conflict at its different stages.

In other words, for a conflict to be resolved fully a wide range of intermediary activities are required and a positive interaction of various intermediary functions to facilitate conflict resolution is required. Hence, not only do the characteristics of the conflict situation and those of the operation but also the relationships between UN peacekeeping and other intermediary endeavours have an influence on the likelihood of UN peacekeeping serving as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution.

Therefore, a set of contextual factors (context-based conflict stages) is used to analyse the characteristics of the conflict situation, whereas three intermediary-centred factors (the peacekeeper's attributes, functions and relationships with other intermediaries) are used to analyse the characteristics of the operation. With this theoretical framework in hand, the study explores how these factors affected the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping as an agent of conflict resolution, and underscores the importance of envisaging a UN peacekeeping

operation that works in a complementary manner with other intermediaries on the ground.

The Scope of the Study

In the field of conflict analysis, at least two distinct approaches are identified. These approaches are classified as conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and are frequently presented as mutually exclusive alternatives. Although the differences that exist between these approaches can be understood as a spectrum in the real world, for the sake of discussion, distinctive features of their philosophy and methodology are characterised by the dichotomy. Conflict resolution is different from conflict settlement in the sense that it eliminates fundamental causes of the conflict and transforms the relationship between the parties to a self-sustaining legitimised one so that it does not depend upon the continued coercion of one party by another, or both by some more powerful third party.

UN peacekeeping has often been regarded as a form of conflict settlement because one of its primary functions is to control overt violence by physically separating the warring parties, and it does not usually address underlying sources of the conflict. Disengagement of the parties with the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation may jeopardise a set of constructive interactions that is indispensable for nurturing the peace process. Hence, proponents of the conflict resolution approach often regard UN peacekeeping as potentially counter-productive for the purpose of conflict resolution.

However, this study argues that there are complementary elements in each approach and that identifying an appropriate combination of the two approaches is, in fact, a key to successful conflict resolution. Moreover, the study goes on to argue that in some circumstances by performing certain functions UN peacekeeping can serve as the nexus that connects the two approaches. Thus rather than thinking of conflict settlement and conflict resolution as competitive concepts, they can be conceived as mutually supportive enterprises. Only then will it be possible to arrive at effective ways of tackling real-world conflicts.

This study seeks to identify a proper mix of various intermediary endeavours, focusing on a triangular relationship among peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, which can be defined respectively as a military operation designed to control the destructive behaviour of the antagonists, a diplomatic initiative aimed to bring the parties to an agreement and a humanitarian/civilian effort undertaken to foster reconstruction of a war-torn society and rehabilitation of the relationships among the contestants.

Originality and Significance of the Study

It is essential that UN peacekeeping be designed and operated in such a way as to fulfil a complementary role to peacemaking and peacebuilding so that it can contribute positively to the resolution of a conflict. Nevertheless, much of the current theorising on third party intervention hinges around the analysis of mediation and only a limited number of scholars have analysed UN peacekeeping as a third party intervention in the light of conflict theories. A thorough analysis of the relationships between the functions of UN peacekeeping and those of other intermediary efforts on the ground has been largely overlooked. The potential for

UN peacekeeping to act as an overarching umbrella framework that can co-ordinate various intermediaries has not always been explored seriously enough. In fact, many previous and current studies on UN peacekeeping revolve around the three lines of inquiry: what is permissible under international law, what is feasible under certain political situations and what is attainable under the current institutional capacity of the United Nations.

What seems to be lacking, however, is a clear understanding over when and how UN peacekeeping should be deployed as an effective means of third party intervention that can promote conflict resolution. In other words, UN peacekeeping needs to be situated within the context of the overall peace process and its effectiveness needs to be assessed in terms of its relationships with other intermediary efforts and its contributions to the overall process.

As this study aims to illuminate the features of UN peacekeeping by examining its activities through theoretical frameworks developed in the field of conflict analysis, it will contribute to the current discussions about the multiplicity in peace processes. This study, therefore, addresses the theoretical gap that exists in the literature by offering an additional viewpoint gained from the analyses of the conflict and its resolution. It relates UN peacekeeping operations to the conflict situation in which they intervene and to other intermediaries with whom they work in the conflict.

This viewpoint is particularly relevant because, in real-world conflicts where a wide range of actors can undertake a variety of initiatives in a rather clumsy way, a UN peacekeeping operation that bears no reference to other intermediary efforts is likely to become an impediment rather than an aid to the resolution of a conflict. Effective co-ordination of multiple intermediary efforts seems to be a key in bringing out complementarity among these initiatives and, thus, the possibility of effective conflict resolution.

Another original feature of this study lies in its emphasis on the complementarity of various intermediary endeavours, which are explored rigorously in the subsequent case studies. It is true that several scholars have already put forward a similar line of argument and one of the primary goals of this study is to offer an additional empirical analysis that supports such an argument. Nonetheless, this study is unique in the sense that it examines the potential for UN peacekeeping to act as an overarching umbrella framework that can be used to enhance the complementarity of various intermediaries by co-ordinating their activities.

While the study does not present an entirely new theory of UN peacekeeping, it does suggest a way to modify several existing theoretical models of conflict analysis so that they can be applied to the study of UN peacekeeping. For example, the contingency model is refined by incorporating the analysis of ripe moments and expanding the typology of third party functions. Moreover, the concept of ripeness is clarified by focusing on the favourable conditions for several specific intermediary functions carried out by UN peacekeeping operations, thus, contributing to the theoretical endeavour to delineate more precisely the conditions for various types of ripeness. Furthermore, two exemplifying case studies are undertaken to illustrate which third party functions are most needed and more likely to be effective under what conditions, and how best various intermediary efforts can be co-ordinated. While the findings and results of the two empirical case studies cannot be generalised automatically, they will make a modest contribution to such an endeavour.

In addition, the study also contributes to the field of conflict analysis by exploring complex transition processes from conflict settlement and conflict

resolution. The study seeks to clarify the process by examining what concrete steps exist in these processes and what kind of intermediary efforts is required to facilitate such a transition. It is no doubt that the performance of UN peacekeeping operations would affect transition processes as a number of missions are deployed to supervise cease-fires or to oversee the implementation of peace agreements. Indeed, the study examines the way in which and by performing what specific functions UN peacekeeping has become a stepping-stone or an impediment to conflict resolution.

This challenge presents an exciting area for further research in the field of conflict analysis. By examining the relationships between UN peacekeeping and the transition process from conflict settlement to conflict resolution, this study hopes to offer a way to approach the issue of complementarity and co-ordination of intermediaries in complex and dynamic conflict situations. In particular, it seeks to suggest a mechanism through which the differences between the two major approaches to conflict analysis can be mediated.

Research Design and Chapter Outline

To draw some empirical patterns of both positive and negative effects of UN peacekeeping operations upon the overall peace process, two exemplifying case studies will be conducted as a primary method of analysis. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is examined extensively as an exemplifying case in which UN peacekeeping failed to establish a constructive link to other intermediary efforts, and thus it was doomed to impede the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. On the other hand, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is reviewed thoroughly to demonstrate that UN peacekeeping could become a complementary part of the peace process and thus helped to facilitate the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. By comparing two UN peacekeeping operations that are in remarkable contrast to one another, the study seeks to illuminate the factors that might affect the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping as the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution.

The Introduction provides an overview of the remit of the thesis, clarifies the methodology used in the thesis, and justifies the topics of focus: the relationship between UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution. It introduces the main argument of this study that the likelihood of UN peacekeeping serving as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution has often been influenced not only by the contextual factors of the conflict situation and the characteristics of the mission but also by the relationships between the UN peacekeeping operation and other intermediary endeavours.

Chapter One (*A Conceptual Analysis of UN Peacekeeping*) presents a focused review of the academic studies and the practices of UN peacekeeping to summarise the current state of knowledge. The notion of UN peacekeeping has been discussed among various scholars and practitioners for more than a half a century. Nonetheless, its definition has been the subject of controversy for many years due to the fact that it is an evolving concept that emerged in the field. In order to overcome such problems in developing a comprehensive definition, this Chapter seeks to delineate the distinguishing features of UN peacekeeping by comparing its practices with those of other UN endeavours such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement.

Then, it purports to identify and classify a wide range of activities undertaken

by UN peacekeepers by developing a typology of UN peacekeeping. These criteria allow a systematic analysis of diverse practices of UN peacekeeping. Using three attributes (consent, impartiality and non-use of force) and three functions (interposition, transition assistance and humanitarian intervention) as indicators, the core spectrum of UN peacekeeping is outlined in this Chapter.

Chapter Two (*A Focused Survey of Theoretical Approaches to Conflict Analysis*) surveys the academic field of conflict analysis, and then introduces one of the most contested debates in the field: whether conflict should be settled or resolved. Two distinct approaches to conflict analysis (the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach) are summarised and their different assumptions about the nature of conflict, role of third parties and the range of possible outcomes are contrasted. Having outlined the distinguishing features of the two approaches, the Chapter rejects the idea that these approaches are opposing and goes on to argue that they can be employed in a complementary manner.

Chapter Three (*Developing a Conceptual Framework*) demonstrates how the conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches can be complementary to each other using the contingency model as a logical underpinning. The contingency model is refined in such a way as to incorporate the notion of contextual factors and a typology of multiple intermediary functions so that it can offer a macro-level theoretical perspective that situates UN peacekeeping within the broader context of a peace process. These refinements provide a viewpoint that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping is affected by at least two factors: the context and the strategy of intervention.

The concept of 'ripeness' is employed to construct a micro-level theoretical framework for assessing the contextual factors. A careful review of four models of ripe moments reveals that such a set of contextual factors (context-based conflict stages) needs to be defined by three sets of indicators: adversarial relationships, intra-party dynamics and external situations. The other micro-level theoretical framework is for analysing the strategies of intervention, which includes three attributes and three functional categories of UN peacekeeping.

Chapters Four (*An Impediment to Conflict Resolution: UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus*) and **Five** (*A Stepping-stone to Conflict Resolution: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia*) offer two case studies using each as an exemplar of UN peacekeeping that became an impediment or a stepping-stone to conflict resolution. The ripeness of the conflict situation, the characteristics of a UN peacekeeping operation and the relationships between the peacekeepers and other intermediaries are analysed here as determinants of the outcome of each UN peacekeeping operation. **Chapter Four** investigates why UN peacekeeping has not been able to facilitate conflict resolution in Cyprus by examining the contextual conditions and the functions that UN peacekeeping has and has not fulfilled. On the other hand, **Chapter Five** examines UN peacekeeping in Cambodia to illustrate what contextual conditions have helped it to perform effectively and the functions it was able to perform in order to facilitate the partial resolution of the Cambodian conflict.

Finally, **the Conclusion** sums up the findings of the study and attempts to draw some lessons for future UN peacekeeping. It offers some recommendations for consideration by practitioners and academics in improving the conduct of peacekeeping operations to facilitate the transition process from conflict settlement to conflict resolution and to prevent the recurrence of conflicts in troubled parts of the world.

Chapter One

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING

"It became apparent that since all international disputes were not at once to be resolved by peaceful means, some way had to be found to stop or contain those which escalated into armed conflict. Out of that need, United Nations peace-keeping operations evolved as, essentially, a holding action."¹

1. Introduction

The notion of United Nations peacekeeping has been discussed among scholars and practitioners for more than a half century. Because the United Nations has undertaken many shades of peacekeeping activity, the definition of UN peacekeeping has been the subject of controversy for many years. Hence it seems desirable to explore analytically contested views on the concept of UN peacekeeping before moving on to a main objective of this study. The United Nations, for example, defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well."² Although the United Nations claims that the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in 1948 was the first UN peacekeeping operation,³ the first use of UN presence in the midst of armed conflict occurred in 1947 when two United Nations missions were deployed to Indonesia and to the Balkans.

In August 1947, the Consular Commission of Indonesia was established by the UN Security Council to monitor a cease-fire between the Netherlands and Indonesia. As a result of the Renville Truce Agreement signed in 1948, military observers were deployed to monitor the demilitarised zone and to assist in disengagement of the forces. These UN efforts on the ground were reconstituted as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) in January 1949, which facilitated an end to hostilities between the Dutch and the Indonesians and a progress towards Indonesian independence. In October 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was established by the General Assembly resolution 109 (II). Its mandate was to "observe the compliance by the four Governments [Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia] concerned with the foregoing recommendations [and] be available to assist the four Governments concerned in the implementation of such recommendations."⁴

Despite the empirical fact that these UN missions fulfilled some of the functions that are performed by 'official' UN peacekeeping operations, the United

¹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985) p. 3

² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992) p.11, para. 20, (A/47/277, S/24111)

³ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (1985), p. 13

⁴ *UN Document*, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 109, 21 October 1947

Nations does not consider these as UN peacekeeping operations. The reasons for their exclusion given by the United Nations are that the small officer groups worked as members of the national delegations were comprising those missions and they were not under the UN Secretary-General's authority.⁵ To state when UN peacekeeping truly started is not the main point of this Chapter.⁶ Such an argument becomes absurd unless our claims are based on the same definition of the UN peacekeeping operation. The above remark, therefore, is introduced to indicate that UN peacekeeping needs to be international forces placed under the UN Secretary-General's command. In any case, the main purpose of this Chapter is to define the concept of UN peacekeeping by pointing up its differences from other related UN endeavours. At the same time, this Chapter also aims to identify and classify a wide range of activities that the UN peacekeepers perform by developing a typology of UN peacekeeping operations.

2. *Definition of UN Peacekeeping*

2.1. An Evolving Concept

Over the years, the United Nations has undertaken fifty-five peacekeeping operations of varying scope, duration and degree of success.⁷ The term, UN peacekeeping, means different things to different people. Some may regard UN peacekeeping as a not-fully-fledged military operation but still requiring sufficient combat capability for deterring the parties from seeking military aggression,⁸ while others define it as a form of peaceful third party intervention acting in the capacity of an impartial referee.⁹ Hence, we must clarify our central conception of UN peacekeeping before it is possible to enter into a detailed discussion of such an activity. This is because the analytical exercise becomes more complex through the confusing and inconsistent use of the term UN peacekeeping. Many scholars and practitioners have groped for definitions. But none of them seem to quite succeed in covering the diversity of its activities while capturing the key features that make UN peacekeeping distinct from other UN operations. Moreover, most of the existing definitions have been quite elementary and often without theoretical foundation.¹⁰

Among them, the United Nations provides us with one of the most comprehensive and authoritative definitions: peacekeeping is

“an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international

⁵ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (1985), p. 8

⁶ For this reason, UNTSO is regarded as the first UN peacekeeping operation in the following analysis.

⁷ At the time of writing in December 2002.

⁸ See, for example, *the US Army Field Manual: FM 100-23, Peace Operations*, Comprehensive Dummy (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 22 September 1994).

⁹ A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994) p. 145; and Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974) p. 10.

¹⁰ Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall, 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42, 1 (1998), p. 34

peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under Article 42."¹¹

However, even such a broad definition can no longer reflect the reality of UN peacekeeping operations on the ground. Among others the most remarkable defect of this definition concerns with the phrase "without enforcement powers." The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is a notable recent example against such a claim. The Security Council authorised UNOSOM II by its resolution 837 (1993) to take "all necessary measures" against those responsible for the attack on UNOSOM II personnel on 5 June 1993. Theoretically, it can be argued that if the United Nations uses the enforcement action to settle a conflict, then such an action is not a peacekeeping operation. This line of argument would exclude UNOSOM II from the list of UN peacekeeping operations, claiming that it was a peace-enforcement operation. However, besides UNOSOM II, at least the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) clearly failed to meet this definition of non-enforcement. Thus, this emphasis on the non-enforcement aspect of UN peacekeeping is at least debatable.

On the other hand, some of the recent operations such as the United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) do not involve any military personnel.¹² This is because these missions are accompanied by non-UN 'peacekeepers' who are responsible for overseeing the security of the unarmed UN personnel. Another reason is that they are aimed at providing technical assistance to a post-conflict society, which requires exclusively non-military expertise such as electoral supervision, human rights verification, and supervision of public administration including law enforcement. In short, a UN peacekeeping operation does not necessarily involve any military personnel.

It is an empirical fact that UN operations, which fall under the rubric of peacekeeping, range from quasi-enforcement to non-military technical assistance. It is also true that such a wide variety of operations cannot be deduced from any single operation. Nevertheless, many scholars and practitioners make reference to the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) when they define the term UN peacekeeping. For example, A. B. Fetherston argues "UNEF I established a basic set of principles and standards which have served as the basis for the creation of all other missions which have followed."¹³ In other words, they have regarded UNEF I as a prototype of UN peacekeeping operations. Five key principles which UNEF I was designed to maintain include: (1) the principle of consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission, (2) the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence, (3) the principle of voluntary contributions of contingents

¹¹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2nd edition (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1991) p. 4

¹² In addition, the United Nations Observer Group for Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) and the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the 1993 Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER) were also consisted entirely of civilian observers, although the United Nations does not count them as 'official' UN peacekeeping operations.

¹³ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 13

from small, neutral countries to participate in the force, (4) the principle of impartiality and non-intervention, and (5) the principle of day-to-day control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary-General.

It cannot be denied that UNEF I was the first mission explicitly labelled 'peacekeeping' and it set out certain precedents for the subsequent UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁴ Not all UN peacekeeping operations, however, followed the footsteps of UNEF I. We did not have to wait for UNOSOM II to see the emergence of a clear case of divergence from this prototype. In fact, ONUC that was established in July 1960, four years after the installation of UNEF I, strayed clearly from the basic principles.

ONUC was originally envisaged operating under similar principles as of UNEF I, however, as the situation deteriorated those principles began to be evaded.¹⁵ ONUC's initial mandates were assisting the Congo government to restore and maintain law and order and securing the withdrawal of all foreign military, paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the UN Command, and mercenaries.¹⁶ By December 1960 a massive breakdown of the internal political structure occurred in the Congo, which made it virtually a lawless area with no effective national government.

As Kantaga, Congo's richest province, and others declared secession, new tasks were added to ONUC's mandate. These tasks included assisting the Congo government to restore and maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo, and preventing a civil war. What has to be noticed is that ONUC was authorised to use force, as a last resort, to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo.¹⁷ Furthermore, ONUC's mandate was expanded by declaring its "full and firm support for the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo" and condemning and demanding the end of "secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provisional administration of Kantaga."¹⁸ Leopoldville and Elisabethville, the *de facto* authorities of Kantaga, interpreted this as an attempt to subdue them by force and, in retaliation, ordered a number of harassing measures against ONUC and its personnel.¹⁹ These diversions at least violated the three basic principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force.

Faced with this anomaly, many scholars and practitioners have regarded

¹⁴ William J. Durch, 'Introduction', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 7

¹⁵ ONUC's initial mandate that was adopted by S/4389 stipulated, "The Force was to be deployed in the Congo with the consent of the Congolese Government... The units of Force must not become parties to internal conflicts... The United Nations military units were not authorized to use force except in self-defence..." (United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (1985), pp. 219-220).

¹⁶ On 14 July 1960 the Security Council adopted the resolution S/4387 establishing ONUC. ONUC's specific tasks were mentioned in a second resolution S/4405 (22 July 1960). The second task did not become fully elaborated until the Security Council passed its resolution S/4741 of 21 February 1961 (Roselyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) p. 41). In both S/4387 and S/4405, the withdrawal of Belgium troops was called on.

¹⁷ *UN Document (S/4741)*, 21 February 1961. The fact that ONUC failed to protect Patrice Lumumba (Congo's Prime Minister) provoked the Security Council to pass this resolution (Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990) p. 295). Lumumba was arrested while he was under UN protection. He was handed over to his enemies in Kantaga and assassinated.

¹⁸ William J. Durch, 'The UN Operation in the Congo', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 328

¹⁹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p. 232

ONUC as an atypical operation. For example, McCoubry and White argue:

“It is very difficult to see ONUC as a true peacekeeping operation in that it was authorized to use force beyond that necessary for strict self-defence; it was not impartial in the conflict; it received little cooperation; and although it did have the formal consent of the central government, the fact was that for a period until August 1961 there was no real government in the Congo.”²⁰

However, a careful review of the practice of UN peacekeeping operations reveals that there are several operations that possess similar features to ONUC. These operations include UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, and to some extent, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). In fact, only the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) seem to share the traits with UNEF I.²¹

The difficulty of finding a right definition of UN peacekeeping is largely due to its nature and historical roots. First, because each UN peacekeeping operation is responsive to each particular conflict situation and every conflict has its unique character and dynamic, no operation shares the identical trait. As a matter of fact, it has been argued that the strength of UN peacekeeping operations lies in their creative and spontaneous adaptation of general principles to a specific situation.²² Hence, UN peacekeeping has avoided institutionalisation.²³ Secondly, since UN peacekeeping operations were not originally envisaged in the Charter as among the measures to preserve international peace and security, they are a purely empirical creation born of necessity.²⁴ It was born out of necessity during the Cold War as an *ad hoc* improvisation. As a result, its practice preceded the conceptualisation. The concept of UN peacekeeping has been empirically developed and a general theoretical framework of UN peacekeeping has emerged after repeated trial and error in the field. In short, it is “an evolving concept.”²⁵

2.2. Shortcomings of Existing Definition

Because it is still evolving, the practice of UN peacekeeping operations is difficult to conceptualise. The existing definitions of UN peacekeeping fall short of concreteness, by being either too specific or too extensive. Narrow definitions must always be accompanied by provisos, while broad definitions are often too comprehensive to mean anything. For example, a careful review of the empirical record of the UN peacekeeping operations reveals that the only common features shared by all fifty-five operations are their ‘United Nationsness’ and ‘conflict management’ orientation. In other words, UN peacekeeping operations are (1)

²⁰ Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, *The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations* (Aldershot and Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1996) p. 88

²¹ When Indarjit Rikhye categorised peacekeeping into three types (Peace Observation, Separation of Forces, and Maintaining Peace), he classified UNEF I, UNEF II and UNDOF as Separation of Forces, and ONUC, UNFICYP and UNIFIL as Maintaining Peace (Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1984) pp. 14-130).

²² Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Rethinking Peacekeeping’, in Indarjit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek (eds.), *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. and International Peace Association, 1990), p. 25

²³ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 124

²⁴ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (1985), p. 3

²⁵ *UN Document (A/46/48)*, operative para. 28

established and supported by the United Nations, and (2) aimed at preventing exacerbation of conflicts in which they intervene.

The first basic feature indicates that the UN peacekeeping operations are authorised only by a specific mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. A specific mandate is usually stipulated in the enabling resolutions of the Security Council or General Assembly and in the reports of the Secretary-General.²⁶ All personnel (except for internationally and locally recruited civilians) and equipment necessary to conduct these operations are provided voluntarily by the Member States. This feature distinguishes UN peacekeeping from peacekeeping efforts led by other international and regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The second feature points to the underlying objective of UN peacekeeping operations. Some operations have been more ambitious than others to seek de-escalation of the conflict or other achievements. Some have been more muscular than others in pursuit of mission accomplishment. But the fundamental basis is that regardless of their attributes or the strategies they employ, all of them are deployed at least to prevent the escalation and expansion of conflict in a very basic and general sense.

Nonetheless, such a definition encompasses the variety of different practices of UN activities. It is such a broad and inclusive definition that it is not clear in what way peacekeeping is different from other related UN endeavours: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement. Although there exists some significant overlap and important links among these related approaches, peacekeeping does possess some unique attributes and intervention strategies that provide the basis for distinguishing it from those other approaches.²⁷ One useful way to recognise distinguishing features of UN peacekeeping operations is to define related concepts and identify the clear thresholds that lie between them and peacekeeping. Hence, the characteristics of UN peacekeeping will be compared with other related UN endeavours in the following section.

2.3. Peacekeeping and Other UN Efforts

The United Nations has undertaken several different efforts for maintaining international peace and security. These UN efforts are usually classified into preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacebuilding. They can be categorised according to their objectives, means to achieve such objectives, players who carry out such efforts and sequence of their emplacement. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary-General, presented the official definitions of these concepts:

- *Preventive Diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- *Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially

²⁶ N. D. White, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993) p. 206

²⁷ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) p. 5

through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

- *Peacekeeping* is a United Nations presence in the field (normally including military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements), and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.
- *Peace-enforcement* may be needed when peaceful means fail. It consists of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
- *Peacebuilding* is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.²⁸

The labels given to each activity suggest their primary objectives. Preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects for peaceful settlement through confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning, and possibly preventive deployment of UN-authorized force.²⁹ Peacemaking is a political activity carried out by UN officials, which aims at assisting parties to reach an agreement through negotiation and mediation. It is the first diplomatic effort to terminate a conflict peacefully by the United Nations. When peacemaking is successful in achieving such an end, or at least obtaining the permission of the hosts for a UN presence on their soil, peacekeeping becomes a viable next option. But when it fails to do so, peace-enforcement may be introduced as a last resort. Peace-enforcement is a military operation undertaken by heavily equipped armed forces to eliminate a threat to the peace, to forestall a breach of the peace or to stop the act of aggression. Peacebuilding includes socio-economic and humanitarian activities carried out by various agencies of the United Nations in co-operation with other organizations including international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). One of the primary goals of peacebuilding is to consolidate the foundations for a peaceful society. While Boutros-Ghali's definition implies that peacebuilding should be instituted after peacemaking and peacekeeping are successfully completed because its activities emphasise on rehabilitation and reconstruction of the post-conflict society, others

²⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General (A/48/403, S/26450)', in Paul Taylor, Sam Daws and Ute Adamczick-Gerteis (eds.), *Documents on Reform of the United Nations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), p. 68. See also, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (A/47/277, S/24111) (New York: United Nations, 1992) p. 11 (para. 20-21) and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Building Peace and Development 1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) pp. 147-278 (para 397-787).

²⁹ Michael W. Doyle, 'Introduction: Discovering the Limits and Potential for Peacekeeping' in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (Lanham, New York, Boulder and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 2-3

argue that peacebuilding can be the essential bridge between peacekeeping and peacemaking.³⁰

In any case, what makes peacekeeping fundamentally different from other approaches is its overriding responsibility in controlling physical violence among the combatants. Peacemaking and peacebuilding seek to ameliorate the situation through peaceful means, whereas peace-enforcement imposes the cessation of hostilities on the recalcitrant parties. While peacemaking helps the parties to produce agreements, peacekeepers are there to help them to implement their pacific intentions. Although UN peacekeeping operations often accompany civilian personnel, they are largely military in task and composition. Both taxonomies presented above suggest a sequential application of different measures, but it can also be argued that the simultaneous application of different efforts in which peacemaking brings a wider political agreement and peacebuilding consolidates what has been implemented while peacekeeping defuses and stabilises the situation.

The above taxonomies of UN endeavours can provide clear theoretical thresholds between peacekeeping and other UN activities, and thus they help us to imagine distinct conceptual features of UN peacekeeping operations. At the same time, however, they consist primarily of conceptual categories that have very few recent empirical referents, though appealing in logical terms and having been applicable to UN operations in their nascent period. In short, it no longer reflects the reality on the ground. Indeed, recent examples of UN peacekeeping indicate that it begins to assume much wider responsibility and undertake more multifaceted and complex tasks so that its activity overlaps with that of other UN endeavours. While peacekeeping's expansion towards peacemaking and peacebuilding seems to be highly welcomed and regarded as a positive development,³¹ mixed views are offered to 'mission creep' towards peace-enforcement.³² In the following section of this Chapter, the expansion of the UN peacekeeping efforts will be elaborated on and mixed evaluations of such a trend will be presented.

2.4. The Expansion of UN Peacekeeping

It cannot be denied that the political environment in which UN peacekeeping operations are put to use has changed dramatically as the foundations of the Cold War crumbled. There has been a sharp increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations established since the end of the Cold War. In the last fourteen years (1989-2002), forty new UN peacekeeping operations have been introduced as compared with fifteen operations during forty years of Cold War era (1948-1988).

In addition to this quantum leap in the number of missions that have been established, many scholars and practitioners argue that UN peacekeeping has undergone some significant qualitative changes as a result of such a drastic change in

³⁰ See, for example, Ronald J. Fisher, 'The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking', *Peace & Change*, 18, 3 (1993), p. 249

³¹ See, for example, Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: the Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994) pp. 3-8; White, *Keeping the Peace*, pp. 208-211; and Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nation Peacekeeping*, p. 157.

³² The UN Secretary-General argues, "the logic of peace-keeping flows from the political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the validity of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel" (Routros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations* (A50/60-S/1995/1), 3 January 1995, para. 35).

its working environment.³³ They recognise a logical link between these categorical differences of UN peacekeeping operations and the end of the Cold War—a chronological change in the political environment. But, are these post-Cold War operations sufficiently distinct from ‘traditional’ ones so that they require a discrete conceptual category? Alan James argues that a distinctive sub-category of peacekeeping seems necessary although there is not a sufficient room for a third concept between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.³⁴ Based on such a view, post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations have been given new labels in order to distinguish them from ‘traditional’ or ‘first-generation’ operations. These labels included, for example, “second generation UN operations”,³⁵ “expanded peace keeping”,³⁶ “wider peacekeeping”,³⁷ “prickly peace-keeping”,³⁸ “second-generation operations”,³⁹ “multifunctional peacekeeping”,⁴⁰ and “new peacekeeping”.⁴¹

It has also been argued that UN peacekeepers began to intervene in intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War operations and they now assume a wide range of unprecedented activities.⁴² State institutions are often collapsed in intra-state conflicts and irregular armies play a major role in such a chaotic situation. Due to the lack of sufficient measures and structures to provide humanitarian relief efficiently as well as safely in collapsed states (often referred to as ‘failed states’), some UN peacekeepers are given a mandate to protect humanitarian operations. Because some UN peacekeeping operations are now deployed to oversee the implementation of a peace accord, they take on civilian tasks that require electoral, judicial and administrative expertise. Some also point out that UN peacekeeping has adopted more coercive tactics and strategies, making it increasingly less distinct from peace-enforcement.⁴³

These observations, however, are not wholly accurate. About a half of UN peacekeeping operations established during the Cold War era have been involved in intra-state conflicts although some of these conflicts had an interstate dimension. For example, ONUC was given a task of preventing civil war in the Congo although the presence of Belgian troops added an interstate dimension to the conflict. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) intervened in an inter-communal conflict in Cyprus although the intervention by Turkish troops in 1974 gave the conflict an interstate aspect. The Mission of the Representative of

³³ For example, see following publications: Adam Roberts, ‘The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’, *Survival*, 36, 3 (1994), pp. 93-120; Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds.), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); and Kiyotaka Kawabata and Shigeru Mochizuki, *PKO in New Era: Testimony from the UN Security Council* [PKO Shinjidai: Kokuren Anpori Karano Shougen (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997).

³⁴ Alan James, ‘UN Peace-keeping: Recent Developments and Current Problems’, *Paradigms*, 8, 2 (1994), p. 19

³⁵ John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, ‘Second Generation Multinational Operations’, *Washington Quarterly* 15, 3 (1992), pp. 113-131

³⁶ Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993)

³⁷ Charles Dobbie, ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, *Survival*, 36, 3 (1994), pp. 121-148

³⁸ James, ‘UN Peace-keeping,’ pp. 18-34

³⁹ Steven R. Ratner, *The New Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995)

⁴⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para. 8-22

⁴¹ Trevor Findlay, ‘The New Peacekeeping and the New Peacekeepers’, in Trevor Findlay (ed.), *Challenges for The New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report 12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 1-31

⁴² Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para. 8-22

⁴³ Diehl et al., ‘International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution’, p. 34

the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) was sent to monitor the cease-fire between the two *de facto* authorities in the Dominican Republic. The United Nations Executive Authority (UNTEA) assumed responsibility in government administration in West Irian during its transition from the colonial rule to Indonesian rule. The United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was deployed to a civil war in Yemen although Saudi Arabia supported the Royalist faction and the United Arab Republic supported the Republican faction. Two UN peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and UNIFIL, were sent in a civil war in the Lebanon, which started originally as a conflict between Israel and Lebanon.

What can be argued with regard to the expansion of UN peacekeeping is that the theoretical boundary between peacekeeping and other UN activities became blurred as the functions of UN peacekeeping operations expanded in three directions: peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement. For instance, the overlap between peacemaking and peacekeeping became enormous and institutionalised as UN peacekeeping operations took on new tasks such as supervising the implementation of peace accords and election processes. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) are clear examples of combinations of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Similarly, some of the tasks often labelled as peacebuilding are now carried out under the framework of UN peacekeeping operations. UNAMIR and UNOSOM II, for instance, sought to facilitate a reconciliation process although their attempts failed. In addition to promoting political reconciliation among former enemies UNTAC oversaw economic reconstruction, social rehabilitation and the repatriation of refugees, which used to be conducted outside the framework of UN peacekeeping through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations.

Furthermore, the grey area between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping seems to have widened. Several recent UN peacekeeping operations shifted temporarily or partly to enforcement. UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR, for example, involved a much larger number of more powerfully armed personnel. These operations were authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all necessary measures to accomplish their mission objectives.

Although the compendium of UN peacekeeping summarised above somewhat helps conceptualise the distinguishing features of UN peacekeeping operations, it does not reflect exhaustively its practice and development on the ground. UN peacekeeping is essentially a holding action, but its functions have expanded well beyond its fundamental role. The more UN peacekeeping seeks to perform beyond its original mandate, the more ambiguous the theoretical boundaries between peacekeeping and other UN endeavours become. Because UN peacekeeping is an evolving concept that emerged in the field, finding an all-encompassing definition of UN peacekeeping is almost impossible and any attempt to treat all operations as the same under the general rubric of peacekeeping seems misguided.⁴⁴

One way to avoid this pitfall but at the same time covering a wide range of UN peacekeeping practice is to identify systematically the variety of attributes and functions of UN peacekeeping operations. It does seem reasonable to sort out all

⁴⁴ Diehl et al., 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution', p. 34

operations according to the distinct attributes they hold and varying functions they undertake; therefore, the following section will be devoted to the development of a typology of UN peacekeeping characteristics. In order to categorise the differing nature and practice of UN peacekeeping, the core spectrum of UN peacekeeping operations can be outlined by their attributes and functions.

3. *Taxonomy of UN Peacekeeping*

There are as many types of UN peacekeeping operations as there are types of conflict. This is because the conceptualisation of UN peacekeeping operations has followed their practice that features *ad hoc* adjustments to changing circumstances. Hence, UN peacekeeping operations need to be defined descriptively in order to capture the diversity of their practice. A good description of complex activities must be guided through a clear and viable theoretical framework; therefore, the attributes and functions of UN peacekeeping operations will be used as a guiding framework in our effort to develop a sound taxonomy.

Practitioners and scholars have elicited some noticeable patterns of UN peacekeeping characteristics in the form of certain rules of thumb. These rules are often identified as 'peacekeeping principles.' The principles include (1) consent of the significant parties to the conflict, (2) impartiality by the peacekeepers between the parties, and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence by the peacekeepers. In practice, however, these principles have sometimes been very difficult to maintain. It is not surprising that the empirical record of UN peacekeeping shows varying levels of success in observing these principles. Nonetheless, the peacekeeping principles can serve as helpful yardsticks for categorisation and comparison of various types of UN peacekeeping operations.

Another good parameter of UN peacekeeping characteristics is the functions of UN peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping is proving to be very flexible in that sometimes it is given a task simply to supervise a cease-fire; on other occasions it performs complex and delicate functions such as nation building and maintenance of law and order in a failed state. Although the functions of UN peacekeeping operations generally follow from the peacekeeping principles, it is the specific mandate of each operation that the functions of the operations are outlined; therefore, the functions of UN peacekeeping will be examined by using mandate as an indicator.

Classifying the activities of UN peacekeeping by these criteria not only helps us distinguish peacekeeping from other UN operations such as peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement but also is useful in laying out the variety of differences and similarities among UN peacekeeping operations. By focusing on these categories, the concept of UN peacekeeping will be defined descriptively. This descriptive definition is an important first step in developing a conceptual framework of this study.

3.1. Attributes of UN Peacekeeping

Essential Elements of Consent

One of the distinguishing features of UN peacekeeping operations is the element of consent on which their establishment and sustenance are based. Consent has not always been pristine pure either in the invitation to a mission or in its

continued presence.⁴⁵ It has had a various degree of genuineness and durability. Some operations did not even seek explicitly the consent of the parties. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), for example, was imposed upon Iraq by the Security Council at the end of 1991 Gulf War as a consequence of Iraq's defeat.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, many UN peacekeeping operations have been granted at least 'tacit' consent to their deployment by major parties concerned.

Despite the empirical facts that there have been some non-consensual operations and it has always been difficult to acquire perfect consent, many believe that the first and most important principle of all UN peacekeeping is the consent of the parties to the United Nations' presence. Steven Ratner, for example, argues strongly that the consent of the parties clearly distinguishes it from a wholly different exercise of non-consensual enforcement, in which the United Nations imposes a solution on unwilling combatants.⁴⁷

The easiest way to articulate the concept of consent is to describe what is not a consent-based operation, that is, non-consensual enforcement action. The United Nations operation in Korea (1950) and the US-led Coalition force in the Gulf War (1991) constitute good examples for enforcement although they are not full-fledged UN Forces specified under Article 43 of the UN Charter. Upon deployment of the UN operation in Korea, the Security Council did not seek an invitation from North Korea whose troops crossed the 38th parallel (*de facto* border) that had divided the country after the Second World War. Instead, it viewed the North Korean attack as an act of aggression, and adopted resolution 82 which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.⁴⁸ When this demand was ignored by North Korea, the Security Council adopted resolution 83 recommending "that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea [South Korea] as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area", and resolution 84 which recommended "that all Members providing military forces ... make such forces available to a unified command under the United States of America."⁴⁹ Similarly, with regard to the US-led Coalition force, the Security Council determined Iraq's "invasion" of Kuwait as "a breach of international peace and security" and adopted resolution 660 which condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.⁵⁰ Hence, the consent of the host was not a prerequisite for the establishment and sustenance of these enforcement activities.

In other words, the essential element of the consent is almost equal to the permission of the hosts to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation on their territory. Although quality and quantity of consent differ from operation to operation and it may also be degraded or upgraded in quality and in number during the course of a single operation, the consent of the warning parties (hosts) to a United Nations'

⁴⁵ AJR Groom, *Peacekeeping*, Research Monograph No.4 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University, 1973) p. 22

⁴⁶ Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, p. 13

⁴⁷ Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, p. 2

⁴⁸ In the wording of the UN Security Council resolution, a more neutral term of 'breach of the peace' was selected to describe the North Korean attack.

⁴⁹ White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 50 and p. 106

⁵⁰ In connection with the Gulf War (1991), the Security Council adapted fourteen resolutions. Among them, Resolution 678 (1990), which was interpreted as authorising the use of force to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, provided the legal basis for the enforcement action of the US-led Coalition force, illustrates clearly the difference between the US-led Coalition force and a UN peacekeeping operation.

presence is essential for both the establishment and sustenance of UN peacekeeping operations.

However, paying attention to the consent of the contestants is not sufficient as the concept of consent has two dimensions. The other essential element of consent, which is often overlooked, implies that consensus exists among the three principal bodies of the United Nations—the Security Council (or when it fails to reach consensus, the General Assembly), the Member States, and the Secretariat—to set up a mission.⁵¹ The political support from the Security Council, particularly that from its permanent members (P5), is essential for the establishment of UN peacekeeping operations. This is because only specific resolutions from the Security Council or the General Assembly can provide the legal foundation of any UN peacekeeping operations.⁵² When one of the P5 objects explicitly to the establishment of a particular mission, such a plan will not be put into effect. For example, the United States, the most influential member of P5, blocked a Nicaraguan request for observers to monitor the activities of Contra guerrillas and France's proposal to have UN peacekeepers secure the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut in 1982.⁵³ Personnel and equipment necessary to run UN peacekeeping operations are to be provided voluntarily by some Member States: therefore, before any mission became effective, a sufficient number of the Member States must be willing to contribute their resources to the mission. Furthermore, the Secretariat that is responsible for the management of day-to-day operations of all UN peacekeeping operations on the ground must be capable of overseeing a new mission administratively, logistically and financially. In summary, UN peacekeeping operations require political support from the three principal organs of the United Nations to be established in the first place. Once missions are deployed, the level of support from these United Nations organs must be sustained in order for the missions to stay on the ground and to demonstrate their full potential.

Consent and Intra-state Conflict

In interstate conflicts fought between two legitimate governments, the United Nations often seeks to obtain the consent of both governments. In this case, it is clear from whom to get a consent and easier to get it because the United Nations normally has an established channel of communication to a legal government. However, in cases such as intra-state conflicts that involve only one legal government, the issue becomes much more complicated. Is the consent of a legal government alone enough to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in a conflict

⁵¹ A.J.R. Groom designates the Security Council as Sponsor, the Member States as Donor, and the Secretariat as Manager of UN peacekeeping (*United Nations Peacekeeping*, unpublished paper, 1997, p. 3).

⁵² Among fifty-five 'official' UN peacekeeping operations, all, except for three missions created by the General Assembly such as UNEF I, UNTAE and MINUGUA, have been authorised by the Security Council resolution. In addition, three 'unofficial' missions were established from the General Assembly resolution. Those missions include ONUVEH (electoral mission to Haiti), MICIVIH (civilian mission to Haiti) and UNOVER (electoral mission to Eritrea). ONUVEN (electoral mission to Nicaragua) was set up by the Secretary-General (Javier Pérez De Cuéllar) without any formal approval of the Security Council or the General Assembly. It seems that the United Nations does not consider these missions to be UN peacekeeping operations because their names do not appear in the list of all UN peacekeeping operations (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/> accessed on 17 March 1999).

⁵³ William J. Durch, 'Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 23

fought between the government and a resistance movement? What if the consent of non-state actors is not given or withdrawn in the midst of operation? In the conflict between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus, the explicit consent to UNFICYP's deployment was only obtained from the government of Cyprus (Greek-Cypriot). In this case, the mere absence of an explicit refusal of a UN presence by the recalcitrant party (Turkish-Cypriot) was interpreted that it had granted a 'tacit' consent.

But what if the legal government assumes only a minimum control over its territory and its adversary strongly opposes a United Nations' presence? The United Nations' experience in the Lebanon has implications for the consequences of the emplacement of UN peacekeepers in such a situation. Although UNIFIL did not face any serious resistance from the numerous factions that actually controlled southern Lebanon when it was deployed at the request of a very weak Lebanese government, it has been very difficult for UNIFIL to obtain and maintain co-operation of these numerous factions. UNIFIL has been the victim of harassment by recalcitrant factions or caught in the crossfire. Moreover, since Israel (another party to the conflict) has never fully accepted UNIFIL's presence in the Lebanon (although it has not explicitly denied it either), UNIFIL was deployed only in the jurisdiction of Lebanon and found itself unable to extend its area of operations to the Lebanese-Israeli border.

The situation gets even messier in conflicts within a failed state where numerous factions and warlords hold bits and pieces of the territory in the absence of national government. In such a case it is extremely difficult to gain the consent of all the factions to a United Nations' presence. When the 'illegitimate' authorities of Kantaga strove for secession in the Congo, ONUC decided to deter such an endeavour forcefully against the will of one of the major parties to the conflict, though these authorities were non-state actors.

On the other hand, the United Nations sought to gain the consent of all factions including some influential local warlords in Somalia. When the United Nations negotiated the deployment of fifty UN cease-fire observers (UNOSOM I) in 1992, there were conceivably at least eight major factions and dozens of independent militia groups present on the scene. Several clan elders also held limited leadership and popular support. Thus, the United Nations' efforts to obtain the consent of all factions proved to be time consuming and stressful. Due to the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining the consent of all the parties involved, UNOSOM I was replaced by a much more belligerent enforcement operation, the United Task Force (UNITAF), which operated under the command and control of the United States but was authorised by a Security Council mandate adopted under Chapter VII.⁵⁴ When UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF, it inherited the non-consensual nature of the mandate.

Qualities of Consent

Not only presence but also the qualities of consent play an important part in the characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations. The empirical accounts concerning the quality of consent may fall along the spectrum between two extremes. The best kind of consent grows out of the situation in which all parties sincerely seek assistance from the United Nations and perceive that a presence of UN peacekeepers is essential to implement their pacific intentions. It is a genuine consent

⁵⁴ McCoubrey and White, *The Blue Helmets*, p. 72

accompanied with full co-operation and the good faith of the parties.

On the other hand, the worst kind of consent is a product of coercion. The recalcitrant parties grudgingly give consent to a United Nations' presence because their arms are being twisted by outside sponsors or local constituents.⁵⁵ Such consent can be characterised as a dubious consent. UNDOF in the Golan Heights seems to have enjoyed genuine consent from both Syria and Israel, whereas UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II constitute good examples of dubious consent.

The consent of the parties has varying risks of decay over time, for the parties often gave their consent expediently hoping that emplacement of a UN peacekeeping operation would turn the stalemate in favour of their side. As a result, when the parties find that they cannot manipulate the presence of UN peacekeepers to their advantage, their consent either is withdrawn or decays in quality. Theoretically speaking, it is clear that if the consent of the government concerned is not given or is withdrawn, then a UN peacekeeping operation cannot remain on that state's territory, unless the United Nations is prepared to change its mandate to one of enforcement.⁵⁶ The peacekeepers could only stay as long as all the parties wish them to stay. The withdrawal of UNEF I after President Nasser of Egypt made it clear that Egypt's consent had been withdrawn and Israel continued to refuse to station UNEF I on its soil is a notable example of this situation. In practice, however, three other paths have also been chosen by the United Nations when it faced serious problem of eroding consent. These options include (1) switching to quasi-enforcement, (2) re-negotiating the mandate (revising the objectives), and (3) making no significant adjustment.

The first option is often referred to as 'mission creep.' As has been mentioned before, 'mission creep' occurred both in the Congo and in Somalia, when the United Nations decided to execute its mandate through the use of force, notwithstanding severe obstruction by the recalcitrant parties to UN peacekeeping efforts. On the other hand, the response of UNIFIL to the problem of decaying consent can be characterised as 'mission cringe.' When UNIFIL failed to prevent the 1982 Israeli re-intervention in the Lebanon and its original mandate became impossible to achieve, UNIFIL significantly reduced its mandate to what was feasible in that environment: providing humanitarian assistance to the population of southern Lebanon.⁵⁷ Another 'mission cringe' occurred when the Croatian government informed the Secretary-General that it was withdrawing its consent to UNPROFOR's mandate in March 1995. The United Nations carried out the reduction of UNPROFOR's mandate through the creation of a new, smaller UN peacekeeping operation—the United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCRO).

⁵⁵ Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, p. 28

⁵⁶ White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 202. Two legal positions concerning the issue of decaying consent have been identified. The first approach to consent advocates that consent is irrevocable so that the United Nations is allowed to execute its mandate notwithstanding obstructionist moves by the parties, and that its use of force for such an end is characterised as merely legitimate defence of the mission. At the other extreme, it is argued that the mission can perform its function only if it maintains the complete and continuing consent of the parties. Hence, the mission has to be either withdrawn or switched to peace-enforcement in the absence of complete co-operation (Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 38-39).

⁵⁷ The original mandate of UNIFIL was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area (United Nations, *United Nations Peace-keeping Information Notes* (1995) p. 16).

These examples indicate that the United Nations now faces a serious problem. More and more UN peacekeepers are sent into situations where consent-based operations are unfeasible, while no Member States have committed themselves to contribute necessary forces to conduct an enforcement action. At the same time, the United Nations is reluctant to withdraw its peacekeeping operations in the face of decaying consent, because of the fear that it might trigger the recurrence of the fighting. As a result, the United Nations tries to deal with the problem through the strategies of mission creep or mission cringe.⁵⁸ This would illustrate the mess and confusion that UN peacekeeping is now experiencing. What is clear, however, is that obtaining consent from all the factions, whether they are governmental or not, is ideal for all types of UN peacekeeping operations although in practice this is not always possible.⁵⁹

Subjective Nature of the Concept of Impartiality

Another distinguishing attribute of UN peacekeeping operations is its operational objectivity and impartiality. Impartiality in this context indicates that the United Nations has no initial bias towards any side and acts independently of their gains and losses.⁶⁰ This feature clearly distinguishes UN peacekeeping from enforcement. While enforcement presupposes an identifiable aggressor who then becomes the target of enforcement action (in this sense, there is a determination of victim and international criminal by the United Nations), peacekeeping operations do not brand one side or the other responsible for the military conflict nor do they overtly favour one side or the other in a conflict.⁶¹

The principle of impartiality faces similar problems to the principle of consent. Upon judging the validity of UN peacekeepers' impartiality the United Nations has to decide whose views need to be incorporated in such an assessment. Should the evaluation by legitimate governments only be taken into account? Should the United Nations seek to maintain its impartiality to all the parties concerned?

When UN peacekeeping operations deal with protracted intra-state conflicts, the principle of impartiality has been especially difficult to maintain and can be threatened in a number of ways. This is because in such conflicts UN peacekeepers are often exposed to the fluid nature of domestic politics and more particularly to the struggle for the reins of government.⁶² For instance, recognition of Ali Mahdi's status as interim-President of Somalia by the United Nations jeopardised the impartiality of the subsequent UN peacekeeping operation. Although such a move provided a formal link between the United Nations and a country without a government, it compromised the United Nations' impartiality in the eyes of General Aideed (an opponent of Mahdi) who was therefore very reluctant to accept the deployment of UNOSOM I. This reflected his concern that the introduction of peacekeepers would not only erode his competitive position with Mahdi in Mogadishu but also affect his political base elsewhere.⁶³

⁵⁸ Mission creep (in terms of expansion) and mission cringe (in terms of reduction) are the functions of a political unwillingness to make clear choices in uncomfortable circumstances (Groom, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 15).

⁵⁹ White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 204

⁶⁰ Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, p. 51

⁶¹ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 7-8

⁶² James, 'UN Peace-keeping', p. 21

⁶³ Robert G. Patman, 'The UN Operation in Somalia', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 90-91

Ideally, all parties concerned should perceive and acknowledge UN peacekeeping operations as being fully impartial although it has been next to impossible for the United Nations to perform as an absolutely neutral broker. Parties tend to jump to a conclusion that if UN peacekeepers are not for them, they are for the other side. This is partly because a third party's presence alone inevitably will affect the interaction between factions and consequently its outcome.⁶⁴ But this is mainly because 'objectively' impartial behaviour on the part of UN peacekeepers is not necessarily seen as impartial by all the contestants all of the time.⁶⁵ The validity of operational objectivity and impartiality are determined not by objective criteria but by each parties' independent perception and assessment of UN peacekeeping activity at a particular point in time.

For example, a purely humanitarian and impartial task of providing foods and medical treatment to anyone in a refugee camp irrespective of their identity can be seen by the parties as highly partisan act of sustaining the combat capability of their enemy.⁶⁶ UNPROFOR was seen by the Croats to be protecting Serb gains, but by the Serbs to be serving hostile German interests, and by the Muslims to be condoning ethnic cleansing and conspiring to prevent the legitimate Bosnian government from defending itself.⁶⁷

It is often the case that UN peacekeepers have to operate in an environment constituted by incompatible perceptions of the conflicts situation. The problems revolving around impartiality are addressed clearly by A.J.R. Groom in the following statement:

"complete impartiality is impossible since action must be decided on some criteria the incidence of which on the interests of the parties will vary over time. This is as true of the selection of criteria and the application of criteria as it is of the consequence for the parties. Nor does equal treatment ensure impartiality since the parties are not equal. In any case, impartiality is not an objective phenomenon; it is a subjective perception and it exists only when it is perceived to exist by all parties."⁶⁸

To complicate further the nature of impartiality is that being perceived as impartial depends not only on how a party interprets the presence and activity of UN peacekeepers but also on what roles the party expects them to play in a given situation. UN peacekeepers are often under pressure from both sides in a conflict to interpret the mandate in a manner that benefits one side or the other, and thus it is very hard for them to maintain impartiality between these self-seeking parties. When Archbishop Makarios (Greek-Cypriot) pressed UNFICYP to "help maintain law and order," in the sense of UNFICYP support for local police authority, the United Nations considered that its mandate required it to maintain the peace impartially between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Oran R. Young, 'Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1972), p. 51

⁶⁵ James, 'UN Peace-keeping', p. 21

⁶⁶ Alan James argues that impartiality of UN peacekeepers may be judged by the impact that their activity has on the fortunes and ambitions of the local contestants ('UN Peace-keeping', p. 22).

⁶⁷ Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) p. 100

⁶⁸ Groom, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 5

⁶⁹ Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) p. 25

On some occasions, parties have accused UN peacekeeping operations of not being impartial. While some of the accusations were relevant to genuine concerns on the part of parties, most of them seemed to have emerged as a result of parties' tactics to manipulate the activity of UN peacekeeping operations in a manner that enhances its position in a conflict. Rhetorical accusations against the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations occurred in Angola, Western Sahara, Somalia and to some extent in Cambodia.⁷⁰ In Somalia, for example, one of the warlords accused the United Nations claiming that a UN plane that had brought food to Somalia had carried military equipment and money for his rival.⁷¹ Such an accusation was made to provide a cover for his real intention: cutting off his enemy's supply of food. However non-discriminatory and humanitarian the nature of an operation may be, the presence and activity of UN peacekeepers are often seen as disadvantageous to one side or both when a major war aim of the conflicting parties is the reduction, displacement or elimination of the civilian population.

Losing Impartiality

Abandonment of impartiality, whether deliberate or inadvertent, runs the risk of turning the UN peacekeeping force into an enemy of one or more of the parties.⁷² For example, when NATO carried out UN-authorized air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, the impartiality of UNPROFOR was jeopardised seriously. This loss of impartiality made UNPROFOR a target of Serb reaction and some UNPROFOR personnel were taken as hostages in May 1995.⁷³ Having acknowledged such a risk, what kind of response should UN peacekeeping operations take when their presence and activity are no longer seen as impartial? This problem becomes acute when only one side is not satisfied with the UN presence and decides to break existing agreements or attack peacekeepers. In such a circumstance, impartiality is virtually impossible because UN peacekeepers may have to adopt defensive measures to protect themselves against that party.⁷⁴

The June 5 1993 incident in which Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) killed twenty-four UNOSOM II soldiers from the Pakistani contingent illustrates clearly the risk of abandonment of impartiality. After the incident, a confrontation between UNOSOM II and Somali factions became highly likely. When UNOSOM II changed its operational objective from protection of humanitarian assistance to the capture of General Aideed, the operation was doomed to failure. The attempted arrest of General Aideed represented the punishment of those responsible for the murder of the Pakistanis, which exceeded the primary mandate of UNOSOM II. It not only gave the operation a heavily military presence but it also eliminated an opportunity to negotiate with him.

The United Nations experience in Somalia led it to a serious dilemma. If UN

⁷⁰ *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) made a complaint that the Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) was colluding with the government. The POLISARIO's accused the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) that it was favouring Morocco in the drawing up of the census list of those entitled to vote in the referendum. These accusations were without foundation (McCoubrey and White, *The Blue Helmets*, p. 77).

⁷¹ *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 17 October 1992, p. 2 (quoted in Samuel M. Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) p. 33

⁷² Findlay, 'The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping', p. 26

⁷³ McCoubrey and White, *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 86-87

⁷⁴ Findlay, 'The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping', p. 26

peacekeepers rely heavily upon 'Chapter VI peacemaking activities' (mediation, negotiation) to deter the violations and defend their mandate, the parties may regard them as weak and may wreck the peace process. This would jeopardise the legitimacy and credibility of the UN peacekeeping operation. On the other hand, if UN peacekeepers respond forcefully to the violations and execute their mandate with their enforcement function based on Chapter VII, the recalcitrant party may see them as biased or even as another party to the conflict. This would seriously damage the impartiality and accountability of the UN peacekeeping operation. Thus, UN peacekeeping operations confront a continuous challenge to their impartiality and credibility. Ratner concludes his section on neutrality and impartiality saying that:

"The credibility of the operation in the eyes of the immediate parties and outside actors depends upon preserving this appearance of impartiality while not hesitating to respond to violations. Walking this thin line will often prove hazardous, for once one party regards the United Nations as partial, its trust may be lost irrevocably."⁷⁵

Non-use of Force

The third central concept of UN peacekeeping is the principle of non-use of force. The principle regarding the use of force has two interpretations. David Last highlights clearly the difference between the two:

"The first is minimum use of force, and the second is use of force for self-defence only. They are not synonymous. The first permits the use of force to achieve objectives related to the military mission, while the second restricts use of force to reaction to threats to person or property."⁷⁶

Dag Hammarskjöld defines this principle in line with the second interpretation, stating that UN peacekeepers engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of force, but are entitled to respond with force to an armed attack, including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupy under orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the United Nations.⁷⁷ On the other hand, Kurt Waldheim indicates that self-defence should include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent UN peacekeepers from discharging their duties under the Security Council's mandate.⁷⁸ Marrack Goulding also adopts Waldheim's view and argues that UN peacekeepers are allowed to use force to the minimum extent necessary.⁷⁹ Some UN peacekeeping operations such as UNEF I and UNDOF applied the principle defined as non-use of force except in self-defence, whereas others referred to a wider definition of self-defence and used force to defend their mandate within the acceptable parameter as non-enforcement operations. For example, during Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus in 1974, UNFICYP deterred the Turkish army from attacking and seizing Nicosia International Airport, a UN protected area, by expressing that it would firmly resist

⁷⁵ Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, p. 54

⁷⁶ David M. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Clementsport: the Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997) p. 46

⁷⁷ *UN Document (A/3943)*, para. 178

⁷⁸ *UN Document (S/11052/Rev. 1)*

⁷⁹ Personal interview with Marrack Goulding, a former Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping (1986-1993) and for Political Affairs (1993-1997), on 24 September 1998 in Cambridge; and Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', *International Affairs*, 69, 3 (1993), p. 455

by force if the Turkish army attempted to seize the airport.

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence (or that of minimum use of force) is closely linked with the principle of consent and impartiality.⁸⁰ When UN peacekeeping operations are granted consent and co-operation by the parties, this severe limitation on the use of force by UN peacekeepers does not unduly hinder their work. This strategy, however, does present problems in intra-state conflicts where obtaining the consent of all the factions is often impossible, or faction leaders are unable or unwilling to control their forces.⁸¹ The problem is particularly acute when this principle is interpreted in such a way that the minimum use of force is permitted to accomplish the mission's objectives. In such a circumstance, UN peacekeepers are expected to defend their mandate. From the recalcitrant party's perspective, allowing a force to take positive action in defence of its purposes is not different from allowing it to enforce them.⁸²

As has been mentioned before, the Security Council authorised ONUC to use force beyond self-defence to prevent civil war in the Congo and to expel foreign mercenaries working for the Kantagese secessionists. Hence, greater use of force runs the risk of transforming a UN mission from peacekeeping to enforcement, either suddenly or through mission creep.⁸³ UN peacekeeping operations have to find and remain within the acceptable limit with regard to their use of force. Otherwise, the recalcitrant parties will not regard the United Nations as an impartial third party, and hence they will treat UN peacekeepers as their enemy. If the UN peacekeepers were to use force against such recalcitrant parties in the face of decaying consent, they would cease to be seen as impartial and would be more likely to become a part of the problem, rather than a part of resolution.⁸⁴

Once UN peacekeepers lose their operational impartiality, they are no better than being deployed without their basis of credibility as a third party intermediary. At the same time, however, if UN peacekeeping operations prove to be ineffective in safeguarding the peace process as in the case of UNIFIL, they would also lose another basis of their credibility as a reliable guarantor of the peace process. For example, when the strategy of 'patient diplomacy' failed to prevent cease-fire violations, the killing of ethnic Vietnamese civilians and harassment of political opponents in Cambodia, immediate local parties as well as the international community questioned the United Nations' ability to broker a peace.

In sum, the characteristics of a UN peacekeeping operation can be described by examining the operation on these three peacekeeping principles. By so doing, the attributes of each operation can be outlined, and thus, the UN peacekeeping operation is defined descriptively.

3.2. Functions of UN Peacekeeping

The Mandate and Its Inherent Problems

The mandate of UN peacekeeping operations is often used in the literature to define the parameters of their activities as it sets out goals to be achieved through each operation. Because each UN peacekeeping operation is established only by a specific mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly, it is a good

⁸⁰ F. T. Liu, *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force*. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) pp. 11-12

⁸¹ White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 204

⁸² White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 240

⁸³ Findlay, 'The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping', p. 27

⁸⁴ Liu, *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force*, p. 12

touchstone to understand some characteristics of UN peacekeeping. Indeed, the mandate is an important guideline for categorising peacekeeping activities since it reflects the situation in the Security Council and provides us with formal criteria.⁸⁵

Nevertheless, it does pose a number of problems when one wishes to analyse the effects of a UN peacekeeping operation upon the peace process using the mandate as a criterion. This is because the mandates of UN peacekeeping are crafted through arduous negotiations and a consensus-building process involving members of the Security Council and the parties to the conflict.⁸⁶ As a result, contentious issues are left out and ambiguous wording is used in order for a mandate to get the required vote in the Security Council.⁸⁷ In other words, mandates are often a mere reflection of the underlying political situation on the mission. Moreover, some operations are given a completely unrealistic mandate that is cooked up to satisfy a Security Council member's domestic political interests.⁸⁸ Hence, the wording of mandates may not always mirror the 'true' and feasible objectives of the mission.

In addition, the mandate is often subject to modification over the course of deployment as a result of changes in the conflict situation or the international context. The mandate change and adaptation may occur very rapidly on a micro level during the performance of a specific operation, as much as it does at the macro level when fundamental changes in operations can occur.⁸⁹ It is a dynamic concept.

For instance, the mandate of UNPROFOR was constantly expanded. UNPROFOR was originally authorised to stabilise the situation, demilitarise or effect the withdrawal of armed forces, protect the local population, monitor traffic in and out of the UN Protected Areas, monitor local police forces and assist in the voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees.⁹⁰ Later, several new tasks were assigned to the mission. Among these, the most remarkable 'mission creep' occurred when the Security Council adopted resolution 770 under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.⁹¹ This resolution called upon all states to take "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.⁹²

Not only were new tasks added but also the operational area was extended as the situation deteriorated and the fighting spread. UNPROFOR's mandate, which was originally confined to certain areas of Croatia, was enlarged first to include Sarajevo, then the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually the mission split itself into three to cover still wider territory. UNPROFOR remained in charge of activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas UNCRO was established in Croatia, and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was deployed to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It cannot be denied that mandates represent only a partial feature of UN peacekeeping operations and that it is difficult to categorise dynamic concepts into some 'static' clusters. Moreover, different (sometimes contradictory) tasks are given to the same mission sequentially or even

⁸⁵ Duane Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', in Michael Pugh (ed.), *The UN, Peace and Force* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 67

⁸⁶ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 37

⁸⁷ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 37; and Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 33.

⁸⁸ Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', p. 67

⁸⁹ Diehl et al., 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution', p. 38

⁹⁰ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 75

⁹¹ *UN Document*, United Nations Security Council Resolution 770, 13 August 1992

⁹² Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 81

simultaneously.

Various Typologies of UN Peacekeeping Functions

The mandate is an important guideline for categorising peacekeeping activities, but for those reasons listed above, the analysis of the mandate needs to go one step further. In order to appreciate the actual effects of each operation upon the peace process, a specific set of functions that a UN peacekeeping operation seeks to fulfil in the overall process will be used as basic criteria for examining the nature of each operation. A. B. Fetherston, for example, presents a category of UN peacekeeping functions, which builds upon the list developed by Henry Wiseman.⁹³ She breaks peacekeeping functions down into three groups (military, governmental/political and civil functions), and identifies a number of tasks that are associated with each function. Fetherston's list is recapitulated as follows:

Military functions: observation and monitoring of cease-fires; supervision of the withdrawal of forces; maintenance of buffer zones; regulations of the disposition and movement of military forces; prevention of infiltration and prevention of civil war; verification of security agreements; disarming of warring factions; supervision of cantonment and repatriation of warring factions; escort/protection of humanitarian aid; mine clearance and training for mine clearance; and assisting in retraining and re-forming of military.

Governmental and Political functions: maintenance of territorial integrity; monitoring/supervision/provision of law and order; ensuring political independence; assisting in the establishment of a viable government; security of the population; coping/negotiating with non-governmental entities; assumption of temporary governmental authority and administration; administration of an election of a constituent assembly to write a constitution; conduct of elections and referendum; assisting in the formation of local administration; verification of human rights agreements; and provision of security for the re-establishment of economic life of local populations.

Civil functions: provision of humanitarian assistance; monitoring and regulation of the flow of refugees; assisting in the repatriation of refugees; management of local disputes; provision of confidence-building measures; and training police.⁹⁴

This is one of the most exhaustive lists of UN peacekeeping tasks and her effort to categorise various tasks into broader headings is quite useful. Fetherston divided the tasks into three headings based on the nature of each task. Hence, her category shows very clearly which component assumes the leading role in carrying out the listed tasks. However, the three headings need to be reconsidered in such a way that they are useful for the purpose of this study. One of the goals of this study is to place the functions of UN peacekeeping into the overall peace process. For the typology to serve as a sound theoretical framework for this study, it must be

⁹³ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 31-33; Henry Wiseman, 'Peacekeeping in the International Political Context: Historical Analysis and Future Directions', in Indarjit Rikhye and Skjelsbaek (eds.), *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects*. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. and International Peace Association, 1990), p. 35

⁹⁴ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 31-33

re-organised based on the objectives each task is expected to achieve. In short, functional categories of UN peacekeeping need to be developed.

As a step towards such an end, various tasks of UN peacekeeping will be identified below.⁹⁵ Indeed, wide ranges of tasks have been assigned to fifty-five UN peacekeeping operations. Several interesting attempts to classify various tasks of UN peacekeeping operations have been made by scholars and practitioners. Thus, the next step is to examine briefly these typologies.

First, Mats Berdal provides an excellent typology in which he identifies eight categories of UN peacekeeping tasks. These categories include (1) electoral support, (2) humanitarian assistance, (3) mine clearance, training and awareness programmes, (4) observation and verification of cease-fire agreements, buffer zones and foreign troop withdrawal, (5) preventive deployments, (6) separation of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, custody and/or destruction of weapons, (7) establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and (8) disarming paramilitary forces, private and irregular units.⁹⁶ Although Berdal allocates two separate categories for disarming regular forces and irregular forces, in the following analysis, these two tasks will be incorporated into a single heading: *Demobilisation and Regrouping*.

McCoubrey and White examine different types of functions performed by the UN peacekeeping operations and develop another good typology: (1) observation, (2) fact-finding, (3) supervision, (4) disarmament/demobilisation, (5) human rights monitoring, (6) election/referendum monitoring, and (7) humanitarian assistance.⁹⁷ Likewise, Diehl et al. classify peacekeeping operations in twelve categories: (1) traditional peacekeeping, (2) observation, (3) collective enforcement, (4) election supervision, (5) humanitarian assistance during conflict, (6) state/nation building, (7) pacification, (8) preventive deployment, (9) arms control verification, (10) protective services, (11) intervention in support of democracy, and (12) sanctions enforcement.⁹⁸ Similarly, Mackinlay and Chopra list nine distinct categories of UN-authorized military activity which can be summarised as follows: (1) conventional observer mission, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) preventive peacekeeping, (4) supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces, (5) assisting in the maintenance of law and order, (6) protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, (7) guarantee of rights of passage, (8) sanctions, and (9) enforcement.⁹⁹

'Supervision' (McCoubrey and White) and 'traditional peacekeeping' (Diehl et al., Mackinlay and Chopra) involves securing a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and disengagement of forces, whereas 'observation' (McCoubrey and White, Diehl et al.), 'fact-finding' (McCoubrey and White) and 'conventional observer mission' (Mackinlay and Chopra) merely involve monitoring and reporting of these actions.¹⁰⁰ When Mackinlay and Chopra dealt with cease-fire supervision they created a separate category for irregular forces; however, supervision of a cease-fire between irregular forces will not be considered as an independent category based on the understanding that the fundamental activities of peacekeepers in cease-fire

⁹⁵ See Table 1 (Overleaf) for the summaries of the various typologies that are used in this section.

⁹⁶ Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?: An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposal for its Enhancement*, Adelphi Paper 281 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993) pp. 12-23

⁹⁷ McCoubrey and White, *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 91-118

⁹⁸ Diehl et al., 'International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution', pp. 39-40

⁹⁹ Mackinlay and Chopra, 'Second Generation Multinational Operations', p. 117

¹⁰⁰ McCoubrey and White, *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 92-99

supervision are indifferent to the nature of the parties concerned.¹⁰¹ No UN peacekeeping operations seem to have assumed such functions as 'collective enforcement' and 'sanctions enforcement' (Diehl et al.) or 'sanctions' and 'enforcement' (Mackinlay and Chopra) that should clearly fall into a peace-enforcement category. For that reason, sanctions and enforcement will be excluded from the following analysis. 'Intervention in support of democracy' (McCoubrey and White) is interpreted as to include *Human Rights Verification* and *Institutional Reinforcement*.

Finally, Boutros-Ghali identifies eleven new tasks that the United Nations is asked to undertake. These include: (1) supervision of cease-fire, (2) regrouping and demobilisation of forces (including their re-integration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons), (3) design and implementation of de-mining programmes, (4) return of refugees and displaced persons, (5) provision of humanitarian assistance, (6) supervision of existing administrative structures, (7) establishment of new police forces, (8) verification of respect for human rights, (9) design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, (10) observation, supervision, organization and conduct of election, and (11) co-ordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.¹⁰² In the following, the term *Institutional Reinforcement* or *Nation Building* will be used to encompass the tasks such as supervision of existing administrative structures, establishment of new police forces, and design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms in the Ghali's typology.

Tasks	Berdal	McCoubrey	Diehl	Mackinlay	Ghali
Cease-fire Supervision	o	o	o	o	o
Disengagement of Forces	o	o	o	o	
Verification of w/d of Foreign Forces	o	o	o		
Armed Transfer Control		o	o		
Maintenance of Law and Order				o	
Preventive Deployment	o		o	o	
Institutional Reinforcement			o		
Nation Building			o		
Election Assistance	o	o	o		o
Demobilisation and Regrouping	o	o			o
De-mining	o				o
Refugee Assistance					o
Human Rights Verification		o	o		o
Socio-economic Rehabilitation					o
Securing Humanitarian Assistance	o	o	o	o	o
Protective Services			o	o	

Table 1: Summaries of the Five Typologies of UN Peacekeeping Functions

¹⁰¹ It may be true that the tasks of peacekeepers become more dangerous and complicated by the fact that not all parties are legitimate governments. Nonetheless, the nature of the job remains unchanged whether the peacekeepers work with legitimate governments or irregular forces; therefore, it does not require a separate category in this study.

¹⁰² Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, para 21. Boutros-Ghali points to a number of tasks that are overlooked in the previous four typologies. These tasks will be taken into consideration in the following analysis.

While the above lists are not exhaustive typologies of UN peacekeeping functions, they seize the essence of different tasks performed by various UN peacekeeping operations and can develop into a comprehensive set of categories. Since several similar functions and related tasks are listed as distinct categories, these will be summarised and merged into fewer sub-categories in the following analysis. Table 1 summarises the feature of the five typologies that were presented above.

Functional Category of UN Peacekeeping

Using these typologies as references, the functions of UN peacekeeping operations are carefully reviewed and specific tasks that have been assigned to UN peacekeeping operations are identified. Then, these tasks are broken down into various separate categories based on their similarity and relevance. The categories that will be presented below are not an exhaustive list although efforts are made to make the list as comprehensive as possible. Furthermore, the categories are not intended to be mutually exclusive. Single-task UN peacekeeping is rare. Most operations are assigned several different tasks either simultaneously or sequentially.

A careful review of the categories shows that the variety of tasks assigned to UN peacekeepers falls broadly into three main clusters: (1) *Interposition*, (2) *Transition Assistance*, and (3) *Humanitarian Intervention*. While these main clusters are helpful in understanding the fundamental difference among the variety of activities that UN peacekeeping operations undertake, more attention should be paid to the categories than the clusters. This is because the following list of categories can reveal the diversity of the tasks performed by UN peacekeepers and may allow us to discover a pattern that is useful in distinguishing between the various operations.

There are several fundamental features shared by the tasks that fall under *Interposition*. First of all, these tasks have been conducted primarily by military personnel and have been considered to require military expertise to be fulfilled effectively. A common objective of UN peacekeeping operations assigned to such tasks is to restrict overt violence through maintaining the *status quo* and to buy time for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In these operations, UN peacekeepers seek to defuse and then stabilise the conflict situation.¹⁰³ They provide physical, political and moral barriers to the escalation of the conflict by interposing themselves between the adversaries.¹⁰⁴ Presence of these barriers helps to prevent a tense situation from deteriorating into direct armed confrontation. At the same time, UN peacekeepers seek to help adversaries overcome co-ordination difficulties created by the hostility and the restriction of interaction between them.¹⁰⁵ Thus, UN peacekeeping operations that are assigned *interposition* functions act as a means for conflict settlement. The *Interposition* functions can be classified into the following six categories:

1. *Cease-fire Supervision* (cs) is the deployment of a small number of impartial, unarmed military observers in the disputed area with the consent of the host(s).

¹⁰³ James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, pp. 4-5

¹⁰⁴ Yasushi Akashi points out this political effect (political barrier) of UN peacekeeping operations by illustrating them as "show windows" (*Perseverance and Hope: 560 days in Cambodia* [Nintai to Kibou: Kanbojia no 560 Nichi (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1995) p. 41). The moral barrier is an equivalent of what Alan James refers to as the "prophylactic" function (quoted in Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 10).

¹⁰⁵ Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping', p. 452

Although these military observers sometimes constitute merely a part of a UN peacekeeping operation that comprises lightly armed troops, this task is carried out in conjunction with or as an integral part of other tasks. It usually follows a cease-fire or other security agreement and verifies the compliance with the agreement by monitoring the parties' activities, investigating and reporting violations, and patrolling along a cease-fire line or established areas of separation (buffer zone). In some cases, the head of the operation uses his good offices to reduce the communication difficulties between warring parties. By so doing, peacekeepers serve as confidence-building measures in highly hostile situations. They sometimes promote the release of political prisoners and the exchange of POWs. UNTSO is a typical example of this type.

2. *Disengagement of Forces* (df) is the stationing of impartial lightly armed troops as a buffer between opposing forces with the consent of the host(s). It usually follows a cease-fire or other security agreement and separates combatants physically by establishing a cease-fire line or demilitarised zone. In order to create a buffer, it oversees mutual or unilateral withdrawal of belligerents at the beginning of its emplacement. Once disengagement is completed it maintains the buffer to prevent the recurrence of the crossfire and minor incidents from escalating to a fully-fledged war. UNDOF oversaw the disengagement of Syrian and Israelis forces. Since a *de facto* separation of the island solidified in 1974, UNFICYP has prevented the recurrence of inter-communal fighting between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.
3. *Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops* (fw) is done by impartial unarmed military observers or lightly armed troops with the consent of the withdrawing troops and the host(s). It usually follows a cease-fire or other security agreement and verifies, monitors or supervises the withdrawal of foreign troops (both regular and irregular forces) that intervened in a conflict. For example, ONUC facilitated the withdrawal of Belgian troops and UNIFIL was deployed to verify the withdrawal of Israeli troops.¹⁰⁶
4. *Arms Transfer Control* (ac) includes the regulation of the disposition and movement of military forces, verification of arms flows into the area of deployment, the management of cross border military assistance, prevention of infiltration, and inspection of military facilities. Impartial unarmed military observers or lightly armed troops usually conduct these tasks with the consent of the host(s). Some of these tasks have been performed by UNOGIL.
5. *Maintenance of Law and Order* (lo) is conducted by impartial armed troops or civilian police depending on the level of disorder in the area of deployment. The degree of peacekeepers' responsibility in maintaining law and order would vary from merely monitoring to actually providing them. Normally peacekeepers are deployed to assist local authorities in maintaining law and order or to verify the neutrality of their police force, but in the absence of such

¹⁰⁶ In Diehl's typology, this task is listed under the task called Arms control verification. The category (4) Arms Transfer Control is the equivalent of Arms control verification. However, it seems that the supervision of foreign troop withdrawal is a short-term event as compared with other tasks identified in Arms Transfer Control such as the management of cross border military assistance; therefore, a separate category is established.

authorities they may assume the primary role in managing local disputes, quelling civil disturbances, riots, human rights abuses, destruction of property, and prosecuting those responsible for illegal actions by the local population. When peacekeepers are deployed to failed states, they might have to be in charge of the security of the innocent civilians including minority groups, refugees and displaced persons. This task is usually assigned to peacekeepers deployed to an intra-state conflict where there is no effective government capable of assuming such a task by itself, or while a referendum or election is held to determine the legitimate government. UNAMIR was expected to carry out some of these functions in a failed state.¹⁰⁷

6. *Preventive Deployment* (pd) is the stationing of impartial unarmed military observers or lightly armed troops as a buffer between two (actual or potential) combatants to deter the outbreak of direct armed-confrontation or to prevent the spread of war. Because of the nature of the task, deployment of peacekeepers does not follow a cease-fire agreement, but it is usually put into place at the invitation of either or both sides of the threatened border. ONUC was deployed to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo. UNPREDEP has been deployed in Macedonia to deter the spread of war fought in other Republics of the former state of Yugoslavia.

The *Transition Assistance* functions seek to change the *status quo* by assisting a state or group of states in executing an agreed political solution to a conflict. Some of these functions require UN peacekeepers to act as an interface between peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, including both third party consultancy and socio-economic processes.¹⁰⁸ While acting as an interposition force between adversaries, many recent UN peacekeeping operations have also been assigned to supervise national elections as a step towards independence or as a reconciliation process. In short, 'transition assistance' peacekeeping is expected to provide a linkage between conflict settlement and conflict resolution. In order to achieve these 'non-military' functions the mission needs to have a substantial or predominantly civilian composition and expertise. The *Transition Assistance* functions involve the following eight categories:

1. *Institutional Reinforcement* (ir) includes a variety of tasks that are intended to restore or repair the statehood in the absence of an effective governmental authority but when a viable government does exist in the area of deployment. UN peacekeepers' responsibility is to assist the existing or newly established government in the formation, reconstruction or strengthening of its civil institutions including local administration. It also includes constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms. To fulfil these assignments UN peacekeepers require a wide range of expertise that ranges from the purely military to the entirely civilian. Military personnel in UN peacekeeping operations sometimes assist in the re-training and re-forming of the national military, whereas civilian police and other civilian experts carry out similar tasks with law enforcement officers (police, judges, etc.). Some of the tasks undertaken

¹⁰⁷ This task is an equivalent for *Pacification* in Diehl's typology and for *Assisting in the maintenance of law and order* in Mackinlay's typology.

¹⁰⁸ A. B. Fetherston, 'Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice', *International Peacekeeping*, 1(1994), p. 13

by UNTAC are consistent with this purpose.

2. *Nation Building* (nb) includes similar tasks to the previous category, but they differ in the degree of UN peacekeepers' responsibility. While *Institutional Reinforcement* seeks to improve the existing structure, *Nation Building* is needed when no viable government exists. In the complete absence of a civil framework, UN peacekeeping operations take on the primary role, instead of a supporting role, in the restoration of statehood. In such a circumstance UN peacekeepers rebuild basic infrastructure, assume temporary governmental authority and administration, and establish a new law enforcement mechanism. By so doing, the United Nations ensures the territorial integrity and political independence of the state. ONUC fits this profile.
3. *Election Assistance* (ea) includes variety of similar and related activities in post-conflict elections such as technical assistance, support for national election observers, co-ordination and support for international observers, verification, supervision, and organization and conduct of elections or referendum. The degree of responsibility assumed by UN peacekeeping operations depends on the availability of a mechanical capacity to help in the area of deployment as well as the necessity of the situation. Civilian personnel carry out these tasks normally, but civilian police and military personnel perform supporting roles such as providing security, transportation, communication and other logistics for civilian personnel in the field. Post-conflict elections usually follow a peace agreement among previously warring internal groups. *Election Assistance* was one of central tasks of UNTAG.
4. *Demobilisation and Regrouping* (dr) involve the disarming of warring factions, supervision of cantonment and repatriation of combatants, and verification of the regrouping of warring forces. It also includes the collection, storage and destruction of abandoned weapons. In some cases, UN peacekeepers give out money or farming equipment to ex-combatants in exchange for surrendered weapons. These tasks are usually undertaken as a part of an overall peace process and involve both military and civilian personnel. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) carried out some of these tasks.
5. *De-mining* (dm) is a narrowly defined task that involves mine clearance and training for mine clearance. UN peacekeepers may conduct de-mining operations by themselves or assist in forming local organizations for de-mining and train their staff in the absence of a viable organization. Since de-mining requires military knowledge and skills, military personnel or civilian personnel with a military background perform this task. UNTAC supervised de-mining.
6. *Refugee Assistance* (ra) includes monitoring and regulation of the flow of refugees, assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and other related efforts. UN peacekeeping operations have initiated a number of programmes that facilitate the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, in which refugees are conferred a benefit when they decide to go home. Civilian personnel in co-operation with UNHCR carry out these tasks. UNTAG and UNTAC are examples of UN peacekeeping operations that facilitated the repatriation of refugees and displace persons.

7. *Human Rights Verification* (hr) consists of investigating situations concerning human rights violations against the civilian population in the area of deployment and verifying compliance of the parties with agreements relating to human rights abuses. Some UN peacekeeping operations have been given tasks such as to collect information from individuals and to make recommendations to the parties regarding their observance of human rights. Mainly civilian personnel undertake these tasks. ONUSAL was initially set up to verify that the compliance of the parties with the human rights accord that they signed at San Jose in July 1990.
8. *Socio-economic Rehabilitation* (sr) includes reconstruction of the war-torn economy, re-integration of ex-combatants into civilian life, provision of security for the re-establishment of economic life of local populations in the post-conflict situation. It is primarily a civilian task. UNTAC and UNCRO, for example, sought to contribute to such an aim.

The primary concern of the *Humanitarian Intervention* functions is to ease human suffering. It is concerned with the immediate needs of victims of natural or political disasters.¹⁰⁹ To achieve such an end, the use of force has been authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter to some UN peacekeeping operations. Unlike peace-enforcement forces, however, UN peacekeepers seek to remain impartial between the warring parties and they do not aim to challenge the overall political situation that might have caused such human suffering. Instead, they seek to defend victims of the conflict such as innocent civilians, refugees and displaced persons from devastation by protecting humanitarian relief operations or creating UN-protected areas. In other words, by fulfilling these functions, UN peacekeeping operations aim for neither conflict settlement nor conflict resolution. Thus, these functions are not specifically linked to the outcome of the conflict. The *Humanitarian Intervention* functions consist of the following two categories:

1. *Securing Humanitarian Assistance* (ha) involves protection of the delivery of humanitarian aid carried out by unarmed civilian organizations and the provision of humanitarian aid to a threatened population in co-ordination with them. These tasks require armed troops to establish corridors for the passage of aid or a protected area, and to escort convoys of humanitarian aid. Provision of such services by UN peacekeepers is called for when combatants block relief supplies to reach a particular population or divert them for their own. Hence, they may have to operate without the consent and co-operation from the parties. UNPROFOR and UNOSOM II are typical examples.
2. *Protective Services* (ps) include the establishment and protection of 'security zones' or 'safe-areas,' enforcing 'no-fly zones,' guaranteeing the rights of passage for the purpose of protecting or denying hostile access to threatened civilian populations or areas of a state. UN peacekeepers are also assigned to protect UN and NGO personnel and equipment. These tasks are often undertaken without the permission of the host(s). UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina is illustrative of such activities.

¹⁰⁹ Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict*, p. 12

	Mission	Interposition						Transition Assistance								HI	
		cs	df	fw	ac	lo	pd	ir	nb	ea	dr	dm	ra	hr	sr	ha	ps
1	UNTSO	o															
2	UNMOGIP	o	o														
3	UNEF I	o	o	o													
4	UNOGIL				o												
5	ONUC			o		o	o	o	o								
6	UNSF	o				o			o								
7	UNYOM	o	o	o	o												
8	UNFICYP	o	o			o	o								o	o	
9	DOMREP	o															
10	UNIPOM	o	o		o												
11	UNEF 2	o	o		o												
12	UNDOF	o	o														
13	UNIFIL	o		o	o	o		o							o		
14	UNGOMAP			o													
15	UNIIMOG	o	o														
16	UNAVEM I			o													
17	UNTAG	o		o		o				o	o		o				
18	ONUCA	o			o		o			o	o						
19	UNIKOM	o			o		o										
20	UNAVEM 2	o						o		o							
21	ONUSAL	o				o		o		o	o		o	o			
22	MINURSO			o	o	o				o							
23	UNAMIC	o									o						
24	UNPROFOR	o	o					o		o		o			o	o	
25	UNTAC	o		o		o		o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	
26	UNOSOM I	o													o		
27	ONUMOZ	o		o				o	o	o	o	o	o		o	o	
28	UNOSOM 2	o						o		o	o	o		o	o	o	
29	UNOMUR	o			o												
30	UNOMIG	o		o	o												
31	UNOMIL	o			o					o			o		o		
32	UNMIH					o		o		o							
33	UNAMIR	o				o					o	o	o		o	o	
34	UNASOG			o													
35	UNMOT	o								o	o			o			
36	UNAVEM 3	o			o			o		o	o	o			o		
37	UNPREDEP						o										
38	UNCRO	o			o					o			o	o			
39	UNMIBH							o		o		o	o	o	o	o	
40	UNTAES							o		o	o		o	o	o		
41	UNMOP	o															
42	UNSMIH							o	o					o			
43	MINUGUA	o								o							
44	MONUA	o								o				o			
45	UNTMIH							o						o			
46	MIPONUH							o	o					o			
47	UNPSG							o				o					
48	MINURCA					o		o								o	
49	UNOMSIL					o		o		o			o				
50	UNMIK					o		o	o			o	o	o	o	o	
51	UNAMSIL	o				o		o	o	o			o	o	o	o	
52	UNTAET					o		o						o			
53	MONUC	o	o	o	o					o	o				o	o	
54	UNMEE	o	o							o			o				
55	UNMISSET					o		o									

Table 2: Functions of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Table 2 is an attempt to recapitulate the functions assigned to fifty-five UN peacekeeping operations, in which all missions are listed according to their dates of emplacement; and O (shaded area) indicates that a mission is assigned the task concerned. It reveals a general evolution of UN peacekeeping functions. Thus, the majority of the tasks assigned to the first sixteen UN peacekeeping operations that were launched during the Cold War era, between UNTSO and the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), fell under the rubric of the *Interposition* function.¹¹⁰ These operations are often referred to as 'traditional' peacekeeping. On the other hand, the first half of post-Cold War missions, between UNTAG and UNAMIR, were given a wide range of functions and often identified as 'multi-functional' or 'second-generation' peacekeeping. Some of these missions carried out tasks classified as *Interposition*, *Transition Assistance* and *Humanitarian Intervention*. Although the range and number of tasks assigned to the missions between the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) has reduced significantly, the latest operations began to assume a much wider range of functions. *Interposition* no longer seems to be the core mandate of the recent UN peacekeeping operations. Although it is often argued that the 'post-Mogadishu' UN peacekeeping operations are characterised as "back to basic," Table 2 illuminates otherwise.¹¹¹ The primary function of the recent UN peacekeeping operations shifted to *Transition Assistance*.

4. Summary

The above analysis underlined the difficulty in finding an absolute definition of UN peacekeeping, which is largely due to its nature and historical roots. The concept of UN peacekeeping has been empirically developed and a general theoretical framework of UN peacekeeping has emerged after repeated trial and error in the field. To overcome these challenges, this Chapter sought to define the concept of UN peacekeeping by pointing up its differences from other related UN endeavours. What makes peacekeeping fundamentally different from other UN endeavours is its overriding responsibility in controlling the exchange of physical violence among the combatants. While peacemaking brings a wider political agreement and peacebuilding consolidates what has been implemented, peacekeeping is there to help defuse and stabilise the situation, and implement the pacific intentions of the parties involved.

Such a classification of UN endeavours can provide clear theoretical thresholds between peacekeeping and other UN activities, and thus they help us to imagine distinct conceptual features of UN peacekeeping operations, but it no longer reflects the reality on the ground. Indeed, recent examples of UN peacekeeping reveal the fact that it assumes much wider responsibility and undertakes more extensive tasks such that its activity overlaps with that of other UN endeavours. UN peacekeeping has been essentially a holding action, but its functions have expanded well beyond its original mandate. As UN peacekeeping operations began

¹¹⁰ Among these operations, ONUC, UNSF and UNIFIL included a task that can be defined as *Transitional Assistance*. In addition, UNFICYP and UNIFIL have fulfilled *Humanitarian Intervention* functions.

¹¹¹ Tharoor Shashi, 'Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?', *Survival*, 37, 4 (1995-6), pp. 52-64

to assume *Transition Assistance* functions, the overlap between peacemaking and peacekeeping became enormous, and some of peacebuilding tasks are carried out under the rubric of UN peacekeeping. Since several recent UN peacekeeping operations were given *Humanitarian Intervention* functions, the grey area between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping has also expanded.

This Chapter presented an analysis of the characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations by using the three peacekeeping principles such as (1) consent of the parties to the conflict, (2) impartiality by the peacekeepers between the parties, and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence by the peacekeepers. In the analysis above, these peacekeeping principles served as helpful yardsticks for categorisation and comparison of various types of UN peacekeeping operations. The consent of the warring parties to a United Nations' presence is one of the most fundamental factors in the establishment and sustenance of UN peacekeeping operations. The validity of impartiality of a UN peacekeeping operation is determined not by the objective criteria but by each parties' independent perception and assessment of its activity at a particular point in time. The principle regarding the use of force has two interpretations: minimum use of force and use of force for self-defence only. As greater use of force runs the risk of transforming a UN mission from peacekeeping to enforcement, UN peacekeeping operations have to find and remain within the acceptable limit in regard with their use of force.

This Chapter also argued that in order to appreciate the actual effects of each operation upon the peace process, a specific set of functions that a UN peacekeeping operation sought to fulfil in the overall peace process needed to be examined. Various peacekeeping tasks can be classified into the three main clusters, which is recapitulated as follows: (1) *Interposition* (Cease-fire Supervision, Disengagement of Forces, Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops, Arms Transfer Control, Maintenance of Law and Order, and Preventive Deployment); (2) *Transition Assistance* (Institutional Reinforcement, Nation Building, Election Assistance, Demobilisation and Regrouping, De-mining, Refugee Assistance, Human Rights Verification, and Socio-economic Rehabilitation); and (3) *Humanitarian Intervention* (Securing Humanitarian Assistance, and Protective Services). By fulfilling *Interposition* functions UN peacekeeping operations would provide physical, political and moral barriers to the escalation of the conflict, by undertaking *Transition Assistance* functions, UN peacekeeping would act as an interface between peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, and by carrying out *Humanitarian Intervention* functions, UN peacekeepers would seek simply to alleviate the suffering of the people.

The academic studies and the practice of UN peacekeeping have been reviewed and a basic typology for defining UN peacekeeping operations has been identified in this Chapter. By shedding light on the different attributes and various functions of UN peacekeeping, this Chapter also outlined the three principles and the three functional categories of UN peacekeeping, which will play a significant part in the subsequent attempt to develop a theoretical framework of this study. The next step is, therefore, to explore the academic field of conflict analysis and to highlight the two major approaches to conflict analysis so that the theoretical underpinning of this study can be clarified.

Chapter Two

A FOCUSED SURVEY OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT ANALYSIS

1. Introduction

The goal of this Chapter is twofold: (1) to provide an overview of the debates surrounding conflict analysis in order to outline the scope of the field, and (2) to present several key theoretical models in order to serve as a basis for the theoretical framework developed later. By so doing, it presents a focused survey of conflict theories that are particularly relevant to answering the main research question of this study: when does UN peacekeeping facilitate conflict resolution and when does it impede it? To do that, we must first examine the philosophy of conflict analysis that exists in the political consciousness of the members of the United Nations. According to the Charter of the United Nations, one of the primary purposes of the United Nations is:

“to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the *suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace*, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or *settlement* of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace...”¹

This suggests assumptions of the United Nations about the ways conflicts emerge and should be handled. It implies that a conflict emerges when a breach of the peace occurs through acts of aggression in which case members of the international community will act collectively to suppress such acts of the aggressor. When this is successful, the conflict is considered to be settled.

However, critical limitations inherent to this logic were exposed by the impracticality of ‘collective security’ since the United Nations was established, particularly during the Cold War era. To fill the vacuum of effective security mechanisms and to meet the pressing security needs on the ground, the United Nations created substitute measures called UN peacekeeping. Even though UN peacekeeping operations are far less powerful than the enforcement measures envisaged in the UN Charter, the similar logic of conflict management has been applied to these missions. While UN peacekeeping operations have not been authorised to remove the threat or suppress acts of aggression or breaches of the peace forcefully, they have been expected to contain these negative elements to the minimum level possible often with the co-operation from the parties. In other words, UN peacekeeping operations have been employed to minimise the threat and to control the violent behaviour of the warring parties. But is the theoretical

¹ *The United Nations Charter*, Chapter 1, Article 1 (emphasis added).

underpinning of this logic supported by any theory of conflict analysis? Instead of jumping to a conclusion, let us turn to a review of conflict theories.

2. Key Concepts in Conflict Analysis

2.1. The Nature of Conflict

First of all, several key concepts need to be defined and explained in order to avoid unnecessary confusion over usage of terms. Having said that, it must be admitted that even the most fundamental term for our analysis, the term 'conflict,' lacks a universally accepted definition. This is because several different definitions of conflict and understandings of the nature of conflict exist among conflict theorists depending on their paradigmatic theoretical stance.

The most fundamental diversion in defining conflicts begins in our understanding of their functions in our society. Some scholars recognise the productive and positive functions of conflict despite the fact that in everyday use it is often associated with negative images such as violence and destruction. For example, Georg Simmel who pointed out the positive aspects of conflict argued that, "Conflict is ... designed to resolve divergent dualism; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity."² By reformulating Simmel's proposition, Lewis Coser maintained:

"Conflict acts as a stimulus for establishing new rules, norms, and institutions, this serving as an agent of socialization for both contending parties. Furthermore, conflict reaffirms dormant norms and thus intensifies participation in social life. As a stimulus for the creation and modification of norms, conflict makes the readjustment of relationships to changed conditions possible."³

Simmel's and Coser's viewpoints which acknowledged that conflict contains both positive and negative aspects shed light on the functional approach to conflict analysis. The functional approach seeks to de-emphasise the dysfunctional aspects of conflict while enhancing its functional aspects. Such an approach sounds reasonable and appealing theoretically, but not empirically in international conflict analysis due to the following reasons. It is very difficult to distinguish the functional aspects of conflict from the dysfunctional ones. Besides, to argue which aspects of conflict are functional, it is essential that we ask, functional for whom and over what time period?⁴ In other words, the functionality of the conflict has to be examined from at least three angles: the parties engaged in the conflict, various factions or individuals within each party, and the overall social system within which the conflict occurs.⁵ But such a requirement further complicates the task of differentiating between the productive and destructive functions of conflict.

Not only is it conceptually difficult to classify the two aspects of conflict, it is equally difficult to treat them separately in practice. For these reasons, the functional approach to conflict analysis, despite its potential, has not been the

² Georg Simmel, *Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations*, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (New York: the Free Press, 1955) pp. 13-14

³ Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1956) p. 128

⁴ C. R. Mitchell, 'Evaluating Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, 17 (1980), p. 61

⁵ Mitchell, 'Evaluating Conflict', p. 61

preferred choice for either the parties engaged in the conflict or for third parties called in to mediate the conflict. Instead, many attempts have been made to contain the negative and destructive aspects of conflict by freezing the conflict situation altogether at the expense of suppressing its positive aspects.

Despite such hurdles existing in practice, we must explore ways to address both the negative and positive aspects of conflict, if we wish to improve our approaches to handling conflicts. This is because resolution of the conflict becomes more and more difficult as a result of these very methods that are typically employed to handle conflicts.

2.2. Defining Conflict

Before one can examine the ways to cope with conflicts, it is essential that we share the definition of conflict. Thus, in the following, steps are taken to consider various contentious issues in defining conflict. First, some classic definitions of conflict are presented to serve as a point of departure. Kenneth Boulding, one of the founding fathers of this discipline, wrote that, "Conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are *aware* of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party *wishes* to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other."⁶ This definition emphasises that a situation which an outside observer assesses as conflicting, but is not so regarded by the parties involved, does not constitute a conflict.

In contrast, some conflict theorists consider certain situations as conflicting even though the parties involved are not aware of it. For example, Tatsumi Okabe argued if such situations were excluded from the definition of conflict, then it was as if arguing that no conflict existed in a stable colonial system.⁷ In this study, the position taken by Louis Kriesberg will be followed on this point, that is, those conflict situations will be referred to as "objective, latent, underlying, or potential conflicts."⁸

John Burton, another influential pioneer in the field, defined conflict as follows: "Conflicts are struggles between opposing forces ... that involve inherent human needs in respect of which there can be limited or no compliance."⁹ He drew a clear conceptual line between 'conflicts' and 'disputes' by arguing that 'disputes' can be settled by compromise whereas 'conflicts' involve issues on which there can be no compromise.¹⁰ A corollary of this argument is that an effective tool for settling disputes may not necessarily be the desired remedy for resolving conflicts. Misdiagnosis may lead to the application of wrong approaches, with poor results.¹¹ Hence, it may be useful to distinguish conceptually negotiable disputes from non-negotiable conflicts and analyse them separately when scholars diagnose a conflict.

However, simply structured single-issue problems are rare in real-world

⁶ Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962) p. 5 (emphasis original)

⁷ Tatsumi Okabe, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* [Kokusaiseiji no Bunsekiwakugumi (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992) p. 117

⁸ Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998) p. 3

⁹ John W. Burton, *Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes* (Lanham and London: the Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1996) p. 21

¹⁰ Burton, *Conflict Resolution*, p. 8

¹¹ Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), *Resolving Public Disputes: Introduction to Negotiation and Conflict Resolution* (Fairfax: George Mason University, 1995) p. 13

conflict. In fact, many manifest conflicts cannot be categorised as either negotiable disputes or non-negotiable conflicts because they are more complex, multidimensional and dynamic. It is often the case that issues both amenable and not amenable to compromise are tightly interconnected with each other in complex ways in a single conflict. Moreover, because conflict is a dynamic phenomenon, interlocked with other events and involves the psychological processes of the people concerned, issues at stake can change overtime. An issue that is originally amenable to compromise can transform itself to one that cannot be compromised when high levels of mutual hatred and destruction continue and the conscious goals of the parties change to include those of defeating, punishing or humiliating the adversary.

Although it seems logical to treat 'disputes' and 'conflicts' separately, it is very difficult to do so empirically. Given the complexity of many manifest conflicts in which UN peacekeeping operates, attempts to analyse and resolve them have to be equally comprehensive. Hence, in this study, no clear conceptual distinction is made between disputes and conflicts. The term conflict is used to describe struggles that include issues both non-malleable and malleable through compromise.

It is apparent from the brief description above that one of the most fundamental concepts of this academic discipline, conflict itself, is still controversial. Hence, in order to avoid this Chapter becoming a tyranny of divergent definitions, key concepts are defined stipulatively so that they can lay the groundwork necessary to enter the extensive review of conflict theories and development of the conceptual framework of this study.¹²

2.3. A Stipulated Definition of Conflict

In this study, conflict can be defined as a situation in which the parties perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals and others are barriers or threats to obtaining such goals, and they therefore attempt to gain advantage over others. In other words, the parties believe that they cannot achieve their aspirations simultaneously without foreclosing those of others and that they need to seize the opportunity forcefully before their aspirations are blocked by others. This stipulated definition of conflict suggests that conflict can be viewed to have three inter-related components: (1) mutually incompatible goals, (2) perceived hostility towards each other, and (3) unilateral and competing means used to achieve such goals.

These components can be best recapitulated by the conflict triangle first proposed by Johan Galtung in 1969 and then adapted by Christopher Mitchell in 1981.¹³ In this model, the structure of conflict is analysed from three aspects: (1) conflict situation (contextual variable), (2) conflict attitudes (unobservable psychological/mental variable), and (3) conflict behaviour (observable action variable). Conflict situation refers to any situation in which parties perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals.¹⁴ Conflict attitudes include those psychological states (including perceptions and misperceptions of each other and

¹² For a detailed analysis concerning the definition of conflict, see C. R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981) pp. 15-34.

¹³ Johan Galtung, 'Conflict as a Way of Life', in H. Freeman (ed.), *Progress in Mental Health* (London: Churchill, 1969); and Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, pp. 15-34. See also, Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) pp. 6-7.

¹⁴ Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 17

themselves) that frequently accompany and arise from involvement in a situation of conflict.¹⁵ Conflict behaviour can be identified as actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals.¹⁶ Mitchell argued that efforts to analyse conflicts must take account of the existence of these three components and their inter-relationships.¹⁷

2.4. Conflict Dynamics

While the above definition of conflict directs our attention to the static nature (structure) of conflict, one should not overlook the dynamic nature of conflict. In fact, it has been one of the most popular themes of research among conflict theorists to capture and diagnose the conflict dynamics. Mitchell wrote in 1981 that, "Insisting upon the importance of the dynamic aspects of conflict is splendid in principle, but advancing knowledge of such dynamic processes has proved difficult."¹⁸ Since then several conflict theorists have tackled this difficult task and produced a number of models that aimed to capture this dynamic nature of conflict. For example, Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin presented the aggressor-defender model, the conflict spiral model and the structural change model, Louis Kriesberg produced the de-escalation steps model, the conflict cycle model and the conflict spiral model, and Mitchell himself developed the conflict cycle model and the dynamic protraction model.¹⁹

In his dynamic protraction model, Mitchell assumes that all conflicts go through a number of stages, although the progression is not linear but interactive in the sense that previous stages might circle back and forth in the course of conflict development. He identified ten developmental stages (emergence, confrontation, escalation, contention, impasse, de-escalation, pre-negotiation, negotiation, implementation, consolidation) and three end stages (imposition, settlement, resolution).²⁰ This model suggests that 'imposition' and 'settlement' will never lead to 'resolution.' However, Kriesberg criticised the model saying that the metaphor of a conflict going through a cycle is misleading, insofar as it suggests coming back to the starting place, despite the fact that conflict never returns to the circumstances before the struggle began.²¹ Then he presented the conflict spiral model in which, he argued, the termination of a struggle becomes the basis for a renewed struggle, with each linked sweep varying in the degree of escalation and occurring in a

¹⁵ Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 27; and Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) p. 14. At the same time, it must be underlined that these psychological states often constitute one of the causes of conflicts. This point is particularly acute if the conflict is fought between different cultural groups.

¹⁶ Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 29

¹⁷ Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 33

¹⁸ Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 47

¹⁹ Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: Random House, 1986) pp. 89-96; Louis Kriesberg, *International Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992) pp. 4-5; Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*, pp. 339-350; Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, pp. 66-68; and Christopher R. Mitchell, 'Problem-solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution', in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 87-88.

²⁰ Mitchell, 'Problem-solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution', pp. 87-88

²¹ Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*, p. 349

different historical setting.²² In essence, Kriesberg's conflict spiral model argues that residues of hostility and mistrust remain from previous conflicts and help to exacerbate relationships between the parties when a new conflict emerges.²³ When this model is combined with Mitchell's dynamic protraction model, it implies that a conflict ending with an 'imposition' or 'settlement' is more likely to re-emerge as a new conflict. In other words, these models are based on the assumption that unless the underlying sources of the conflict are removed or transformed, the conflict would not be resolved. It may re-emerge or circle back. Indeed, several conceptual models and frameworks such as the contingency model and the concept of a ripe moment were developed based on the assumption that conflict is a dynamic process and that it proceeds through several identifiable stages. These models will be explored briefly next.²⁴

2.5. Contingency Model

The essential argument of the contingency model is that if third party activities are matched to the conflict escalation level, or initiated contingent upon the stage of conflict development, they can be more conducive to de-escalation, and contribute to the resolution of the conflict; therefore, a series of intermediary activities has to be designed and co-ordinated in order to realise the desired effect. Underlying such an argument are two assumptions. First, conflicts, as well as their resolution, are dynamic processes that go through a number of distinguishable stages. Secondly, conflicts consist of both subjective and objective elements; therefore, both elements must be addressed successfully for the conflict to be resolved.

These two views are closely interrelated. Since conflict is a dynamic process that consists of objective and subjective elements, sequences of intervention strategies should be considered in relation to the stages of escalation and de-escalation of a conflict.²⁵ A single intervention strategy could not deal fully with all aspects and stages of a complex situation like a protracted, interlocked social conflict. Thus, intervention should be envisaged as a co-ordinated series of concurrent and consecutive strategies conducted by a wide variety of intermediaries. In other words, resolution of a conflict requires different intervention strategies at different points in the conflict, each undertaken by an appropriate intermediary.²⁶ The contingency model assumes that objective elements of conflict can be dealt with more efficiently at particular stages in the development of the conflict by certain types of intervention, and subjective aspects of conflict can be addressed more appropriately at other stages by other types of intervention.²⁷

Ronald Fisher has argued that, "In developing a contingency model, a critical question is what aspects of conflict might serve as cues for the application of the different interventions."²⁸ In order to answer the question and to operationalise the

²² Kriesburg, *Constructive Conflicts*, p. 349

²³ Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, p. 66

²⁴ These models will be explored thoroughly in the next Chapter.

²⁵ Loreleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict: A Cyprus Illustration', *International Journal*, xlv, spring (1990), pp. 424-428

²⁶ Keashly and Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict', p. 453

²⁷ A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 116

²⁸ Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997) p. 165

fundamental logic of this theoretical model, two preparatory steps must be taken. These steps include identification of several recognisable conflict stages and functional classification of a variety of third party activities into some categories.

Using communicational, perceptual and behavioural features as indicators of each stage of escalation, Fisher and Keashly identified four stages of conflict escalation consisting of discussion, polarisation, segregation and destruction.²⁹ The essential feature of their contingency model is that it relates these four stages of conflict escalation to six broad categories of third party interventions, arguing that different forms of third party intervention are more effective in initiating the de-escalation process in different stages of conflict escalation.³⁰ These six forms of third party intervention include conciliation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration, consultation and peacekeeping.³¹

Fisher later refined this concise typology of third party intervention to consist of peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacepushing.³² In this typology peacemaking includes third party forms such as conciliation and pure mediation, whereas peacebuilding is defined as a combination of consultation and the traditional means of social development. The definition of peacekeeping remains essentially the same: the interposition of an outside military force to supervise a cease-fire between the antagonists. Peacepushing includes functions that can be fulfilled by power mediation and arbitration.

The model implies that when the conflict has deteriorated to reach stage four (destruction), peacekeeping may be attempted as the lead intervention form to control violence so that the destructive atmosphere does not jeopardise the other endeavours.³³ Once the overt exchange of hostility is controlled by peacekeeping and the conflict reaches stage three (segregation), peacepushing can be initiated to obtain partial agreements to control hostility between the parties, and if necessary to impose a settlement on the recalcitrant parties. Then, at stage two (polarisation) or a pre-negotiation phase, peacebuilding becomes effective in paving the way for mediation, laying the table for face-to-face negotiation by improving the relationship between the parties and addressing the frustrated basic human needs of the parties which caused the conflict in the first place. At the same time, however, peacebuilding can also be used at any time in conflict development in combination with peacekeeping or peacepushing to facilitate de-escalation and improve relationship between the parties. Finally, once the conflict reaches the stage one (discussion) in which the parties realise that mutually acceptable outcomes are possible, peacemaking can settle the conflict over interests.

This is a brief summary of the basic features of the contingency model.

²⁹ R. J. Fisher and L. Keashly, 'Third Party Interventions in Intergroup Conflict: Consultation Is *Not* Mediation', *Negotiation Journal*, 4 (1988), p. 35. See Appendix I for the summary of the four stages.

³⁰ R. J. Fisher, 'The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking', *Peace and Change*, 18 (1993), p. 255

³¹ See Appendix I for the summary of the six forms of third party intervention.

³² Fisher, 'The Potential for Peacebuilding', pp. 256-258; and Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, pp. 168-169. See Chapter One for a review of these forms of peace endeavours.

³³ Stephen Ryan criticised Fisher's approach in two ways: (1) it ends in limiting the application of peacekeeping to a particular conflict stage only and overlooks the potential of multi-stage application; and (2) the right time to deploy a peacekeeping force is not at the destruction phase, but at the segregation phase in which the parties agree to end the overt violence through a negotiated cease-fire (Stephen Ryan, 'The Theory of Conflict Resolution and the Practice of Peacekeeping', in Edward Moxon-Browne (ed.), *A Future for Peacekeeping?* (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 33).

While the main argument of the contingency model is helpful for articulating the complementary relationship between the various intermediary functions, the model is too mechanical to be useful for the analysis of the complex and dynamic peace process. Thus, the contingency model will be revised when the study begins to develop its conceptual framework.

2.6. Conflict Ripeness

Another relevant concept revolves around the notion of 'conflict ripeness' and a ripe moment. Conflict ripeness can be represented by a set of conditions that are thought to be most conducive to launching a peace initiative or beginning a de-escalation process, whereas a ripe moment is a metaphorical way to refer to the right time or circumstances to launch an effort to make a desired change.³⁴ There is no settled academic perspective on the concept of 'conflict ripeness' despite the fact that a great deal of work has centred on the problem of identifying a ripe moment.³⁵ There are two approaches to seeking an answer to questions of whether conditions are appropriate for a successful de-escalation initiative, and what such conditions might be, thereby identifying ripe moments for conflict resolution.

The first approach comes from the pioneering work of William Zartman.³⁶ By applying expected utility theory, this approach assumes that strategies (or policies) are determined by rational calculations by the leaders with complete information of the situation. Its focus is geared towards identifying structural conditions of conflicts (objective aspects) that can be seen in adversarial relationships. In short, it is a rational definition of the concept of conflict ripeness.

The other approach, on the other hand, undertakes the analysis of the appropriate set of conditions, which arises from the domestic circumstances of the adversaries, their existing relationships, and conditions in international contexts.³⁷ By emphasising the process through which conflict conditions affect decisions of the leaders, it concludes that under a crisis situation leaders might not always act rationally (often their decisions seem irrational from an outsider's perspective). Moreover, it assumes that ripe moments for conflict resolution depend not only on the 'objective' conflict conditions but also on the interests, values and preferences of those who make the assessments of the situation.³⁸

³⁴ Louis Kriesberg, 'Introduction: Timing, Conditions, Strategies, and Errors', in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Timing: the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 4

³⁵ Keith Webb, 'Third-Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars: A Preliminary Approach', *Paradigms*, 9, 2 (1995), note 31 and 34

³⁶ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, updated edition, a Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Stephen J. Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-80* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).

³⁷ Among others, Christopher Mitchell can be identified as an advocate of the second approach. See for example, Christopher Mitchell, 'The Right Moment: Notes on Four Models of "Ripeness"', *Paradigm*, 9, 2 (1995), pp. 38-52.

³⁸ Kriesberg, 'Introduction', p. 2. For example, Marieke Kleiboer emphasised willingness or the subjective aspect of necessary conditions. She argued that the subjective dimension of ripeness could play a crucial role in identifying ripe moments because the concept of ripe moments assumes that all parties regard the conflict as ready for settlement equally and simultaneously (Marieke Kleiboer, 'Review Essay: Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, 1 (1994), pp. 110-111).

Four Models of Ripe Moments

A careful examination of the current literature shows that there are, at least, four models of ripe moments (Imminent Mutual Catastrophe, Mutually Hurting Stalemate, Enticing Opportunity, and Entrapment).³⁹ These models aim to enhance our understanding of when decision-makers in a conflict begin to consider pursuing a conciliatory-bilateral solution as a viable strategy, and how a third party intervention can transform the parties from competing attempts to impose unilateral solutions into a joint search for a bilateral solution.⁴⁰ In short, these models are based on the assumption that a psychological shift from a “winning mentality to a conciliatory mentality” on the part of all adversaries is crucial to conflict resolution.⁴¹

The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe (IMC) model assumes that the parties in conflict will consider that the time is ripe for de-escalation only when all of them face an imminent major catastrophe. Either experiencing an imminent mutual catastrophe or having barely avoided one would reinforce the realisation on the part of parties that matters will get worse if they continue imposing coercive solutions. The assumption of this model has some analogy with nuclear deterrence theory. An imminent catastrophe includes a huge increase in costs or a major decline in the perceived probability of success and victory through continuing the struggle or imposing unilateral solutions. The perception that they are all on the brink of a precipice will provoke a shift of parties’ mentality from winning to conciliating. Parties in conflict become more willing to pursue bilateral solutions, and thus are more likely to undertake a de-escalation move. This is the IMC’s definition of a ripe moment.

The Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) model assumes that for the parties to shift from a winning mentality to a conciliatory one they must feel uncomfortable with the *status quo* in which a costly deadlock continues, and must perceive that escalation to break out of this deadlock is impossible.⁴² According to Zartman, the mediator is out of a job when one party’s coercive or unilateral solution becomes decisive in the conflict.⁴³ It is, therefore, crucial that all parties involved perceive that they are in a mutually hurting stalemate so that any third party intervention will ensure a desirable outcome.⁴⁴

This model also implies that the existence of a rough parity between adversaries is a necessary condition for successful de-escalation initiatives. Other theorists of conflict termination share this claim. For example, Richard Haass argued that agreements could be reached when all parties concluded that conciliatory strategies would not prevent them from rectifying shortcomings and would not prevent them from exploring possible avenues of advantage.⁴⁵ Disparity in the relevant forces in contesting parties hinders them from concluding thus. This is because weaker parties refuse to sign an agreement that codifies their inferiority

³⁹ Mitchell, ‘The Right Moment’, pp. 38-52

⁴⁰ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 233

⁴¹ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1985), p. 232

⁴² Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1985), p. 233

⁴³ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1985), p. 236

⁴⁴ Zartman also suggests that the parties’ perception that deadlock will be inevitable if they continue to impose unilateral solutions must be reinforced with a deadline or a shared perception that they are all on the edge of a precipice (Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1985), p. 240).

⁴⁵ Richard N. Haass, ‘Ripeness, De-escalation, and Arms Control: The Case of the INF’, in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Timing: the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 93

while stronger parties resist signing an agreement that undermines their advantage.⁴⁶

The Enticing Opportunity (ENO) model emphasises the view that leaders make decisions rationally. In other words, ripe moments occur when decision-makers perceive better alternative ways of achieving their goals than continuing a costly struggle. Unlike other models, the ENO focuses on positive inducements newly discovered or introduced as alternative options. It argues that an enticing opportunity can be more effective in changing parties' behaviour than anticipated costs or negative sanctions when all parties can see major benefits as a result of conflict resolution. Parties in the conflict are driven by the possibility of forcefully obtaining a win-lose outcome in which their side would be better off and the other side worse off. In terms of basic choices faced by warring parties (to continue to fight or to opt for a peaceful settlement) decision-makers need to perceive that the latter choice is more attractive than the former.

This model also implies that the crucial issues in starting de-escalation moves are anticipation and learning. If alternative ways to a policy of achieving goals through coercion can be visualised by sharpening parties' awareness of likely longer term outcomes and consequences, and by envisaging and creating options for the parties to include in their choice process, then a third party intervention might be appropriate at any stage of the conflict. Therefore, intermediaries can play major roles in the creation of new options that cost less and promise more gains more certainly than continuing coercion.⁴⁷ By so doing, intermediaries can create ripe moments for conflict resolution.

Unlike others, *the Entrapment* (ENT) model shifts the focus to the domestic circumstances of the parties involved. It puts more stress on decision-makers' perceptions about the possibility of getting out from the entrapment rather than their assessment of the adversarial relationships. Entrapment refers to a situation where the party is so procedurally or emotionally attached to a unilateral solution (winning mentality) to the conflict that it cannot shift to bilateral solutions (conciliatory mentality).⁴⁸ The ENT model emphasises an irrational process that decision-makers become entrapped into a continued pursuit of winning, even after they conclude that costs of continuation have exceeded the rational limit. Mitchell explains how this heuristic process can occur, saying that 'costs' or 'commitment' become transformed into 'investments' in a victory and that the party cannot be given up for less than a complete victory.⁴⁹

The ENT model also suggests that decision-makers can be entrapped rationally as well as heuristically. In a conflict situation, the benefits of success can be obtained and past sacrifices become rewarding only at the point of complete victory. Thus, the marginal costs of continuing coercion may appear relatively trivial and bearable, when they are compared with the past sacrifices. The anticipated marginal costs might not be enough to turn decision-makers' minds towards conciliation, so long as their vision remains fixed on achieving the benefits that alone will justify the sunk costs.⁵⁰ In short, entrapment is both a matter of subjective psychology and objective circumstances. In other words, over-commitment hinders

⁴⁶ Haass, 'Ripeness, De-escalation, and Arms Control', p. 93

⁴⁷ Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood* (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc., 1992) pp. 468-482

⁴⁸ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1985), p. 235

⁴⁹ Christopher R. Mitchell, *Cutting Losses: Reflection on Appropriate Timing*, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper 9 (Fairfax: George Mason University, 1995) p. 4

⁵⁰ Mitchell, *Cutting Losses*, p. 5

psychological shifts and, hence, policy switches no matter how attractive potential reconciliation is and no matter what substantive bridging of differences might have been accomplished.⁵¹ Thus, the ENT model implies that ripe moments for resolution occur when some salient event or other trigger forces decision-makers to make a major reassessment of their situation, so that their major objective changes from justifying past sacrifices to salvaging what can be salvaged of remaining resources by a significant policy shift.⁵²

Table 3 summarises the diversity that characterises the four models presented above. Each model has a slightly different focus and perspective. Since any of the four models alone cannot fully explain the complex dynamics of peace processes, it is necessary to develop a conceptual framework from four different perspectives.

Model	For circumstances to be ripe for resolution...
IMC Model	All decision-makers need to perceive that they are approaching a mutually unavoidable catastrophe with a low probability of unilateral success.
MHS Model	No party can envisage a successful outcome through continuing current strategies, nor an end to increasingly painful costs. These circumstances can be more conceivable when a rough parity exists between adversaries.
ENO Model	All parties can foresee new possibilities of major gain for themselves from pursuing a negotiated solution.
ENT Model	Parties must be able to overcome psychological and political burdens caused by past sacrifices, commitments, and hostilities. Changes in the situation might be able to assist this to occur.

Table 3: Summary of Four Models of Ripe Moments

3. *Fundamental Debate: Conflict Settlement or Conflict Resolution*

3.1. Two Approaches to Conflict Analysis

Having outlined several key concepts and theoretical models in the field, we can now turn to the fundamental debate surrounding conflict analysis. A 'generic theory' of conflict and its development, which can be applicable to understanding and dealing with all kinds of conflict, does not exist.⁵³ Yet, scholars have presented a number of theories in an effort to explain how conflicts emerge, develop and end. Moreover, several lessons have been drawn from past experiences and have been accumulated as compendia by practitioners. Some of these attempts have been partially successful by limiting the scope of the theory to explaining either certain aspects of conflict dynamics or some episodes about the development of a specific conflict. These efforts helped to form the academic discipline of conflict analysis—sometimes referred to as conflict studies. Nonetheless, contradictory

⁵¹ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1985), p. 235

⁵² Mitchell, *Cutting Losses*, p. 5

⁵³ One assumption underlying the search for a generic theory of conflict and its development is that there are significant similarities between conflicts occurring at various levels such as at the levels of decision-making, societal and trans-societal problem-solving, and that by capturing these similarities it is possible to develop a generic theory that can enhance our understanding of all kinds of conflict. For such an approach, see Dennis J. D. Sandole, *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era* (London and New York: Pinter, 1999) pp. 109-133.

statements, different explanations and opposing predictions are often found among these idiosyncratic theories since the form of our theories mirrors our perceptions and beliefs about the nature of conflict.

Several conflict theorists have identified two basic understandings of the nature of conflict as the objective and the subjective approaches.⁵⁴ Those who take the objective approach ('objectivist') believe that conflicts are based on substantive, tangible and 'negotiable' issues such as land, power and other scarce resources. For them, conflict arises from shortages of such resources and positions, which exist irrespective of the subjective feelings and perceptions of the people involved.⁵⁵ Because 'objectivists' frequently define conflict in competing zero-sum terms, they inherently pursue one-sided solutions or arrange distributive solutions among contestants.

On the other hand, 'subjectivists' stress the importance of addressing the perceived realities of the conflict. It is argued that the development of the 'objective' situation of the conflict depends very much upon the 'subjective' values of the people involved.⁵⁶ The subjectivists also claim that some conflicts are 'non-negotiable' as they arise from the failure to meet basic human needs such as the need for security, identity and recognition. They believe that a positive-sum solution is possible for any type of conflict and insist that the parties and intermediaries should aim for an integrative 'win-win' solution with which all sides can be satisfied.

Two distinct perspectives rooted in this objectivist/subjectivist differentiation can best be explicated by a dichotomy apparent in the literature on conflict analysis. The dichotomy consists of the 'conflict settlement' and 'conflict resolution' approaches.⁵⁷ The diversity in philosophy and methodology of conflict analysis that exists between proponents of the two approaches has led to much debate in the field. It is true that many conflict theorists hold views that involve a combination of both perspectives. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, the main recurrent arguments are presented under two polarised headings in the subsequent analysis. To delineate this fundamental debate, major differences between the two approaches can be recapitulated as follows using the *conflict triangle* model that envisages three fundamental components of conflict (conflict situation, conflict attitudes and conflict behaviour):

- *Conflict settlement* is a situation in which disruptive conflict behaviour on the part of an adversary has ceased as a result of either imposition (by one party or third parties) or compromise to abandon some goals and undesirable forms of behaviour in pursuit of others. However, cessation of disruptive conflict behaviour does not necessarily affect the mutually antagonistic feelings and attitudes towards each other. The parties still hold the feelings of hostility, fear, and suspicion towards the other side; therefore, their relationship

⁵⁴ See for example, C. R. Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role* (New York: Nichols Publishing Company; and Franborough: Gower Publishing Company, 1981) pp. 3-42; Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties Strategies of Conflict Resolution*, p. 5; and Keashly and Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict', pp. 425-456.

⁵⁵ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 6

⁵⁶ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 11 (note 8)

⁵⁷ For a thorough analysis of the two approaches, see John W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1969); and John Burton and Frank Dukes, *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

remains at odds. At the same time, in conflict settlement some or all of the parties have either agreed (in the case of a compromised settlement) or been forced (in the case of an imposition settlement) to cease their pursuit of disputed goals. Although it is theoretically possible that a compromised settlement brings a mutually satisfying solution to all parties and removes all the incompatibility, it is more likely that the situation of mutually incompatible goals still exists when conflict is simply settled.

- *Conflict resolution*, on the other hand, is a situation in which disruptive conflict behaviour on the part of adversaries has been terminated and hostile attitudes and perceptions towards the other side have been at least ameliorated as a result of the elimination of the situation of mutually incompatible goals which gave rise to such behaviours and attitudes in the first place.⁵⁸

In the literature, these approaches are thought to be based on opposing assumptions about the nature of conflict and to hold mutually exclusive goals and techniques. For example, it is often argued that the conflict settlement approach is based on a power-based political realism, while the conflict resolution has its roots in the needs-based functionalism.⁵⁹ Thus, the two approaches envisage quite different outcomes and suggest seemingly contradicting solutions. This is natural as the kinds of solutions seen as possible depend on the kinds of assumptions made about conflict, and the range of potential outcomes is partly predetermined by one's understanding about the nature of conflict.⁶⁰ Hence, those who believe that conflicts are about the disagreement over negotiable interests and those who see conflicts as the consequence of the frustration of non-negotiable human needs would define the same conflict situation in a completely different manner. Consequently, they may envisage a totally different range of possible outcomes. As a result of such divergent views about the nature of conflict, contradicting remedies are prescribed, different objectives are set and various approaches are employed to handle conflict.⁶¹

It seems reasonable to argue that the viewpoint of each conflict theorist often

⁵⁸ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, pp. 8-9. Some scholars in the field prefer using the term 'conflict transformation' to 'conflict resolution' because the term 'resolution' unintentionally carries the connotation that conflict is undesirable and can be ultimately resolved. On the other hand, the term 'transformation' has the advantage of being both descriptive of the conflict dynamics and prescriptive of the overall objective of peacebuilding, that is, to change disruptive social structure and relationships to more just, non-violent and peaceful ones (John Paul Lederach, 'Conflict Transformation in Protracted International Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework', in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), *Conflict Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 201). Although this point is well taken, the term conflict resolution will be used in this study. This is because when many theorists and practitioners use the term 'conflict resolution', they often envisage peaceful transformation of the problematic social structures and the adversarial relationships. Thus, in this study, the term 'conflict transformation' is used to refer to a transition process (or a developmental stage) that moves towards resolution.

⁵⁹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 35

⁶⁰ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 6

⁶¹ See, for example, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); and C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), *New Approaches to International Mediation* (New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1988).

hinges upon their initial 'paradigmatic approach' such as the conceptual framework of 'realist,' 'structuralist,' and 'pluralist.'⁶² These typical approaches make different assumptions about the way the world is structured and works. Those who belong to the realist school seem to constitute the majority of the proponents of the 'conflict settlement' approach, whereas those who have either the structuralist or the pluralist background tend to favour the 'conflict resolution' approach. Indeed, the conflict resolution approach emerged as a reactive and innovative alternative to the conflict settlement approach in the sense that it was established by those who were critical of the 'traditional' ways of settling conflicts. Hence, most of the criticisms have been directed at the conflict settlement approach from the proponents of the conflict resolution approach. Indeed, many conflict theorists from both schools tend to adhere strongly to their own approach and argue that the difference exists between the two approaches cannot be reconciled. For example, Mitchell and Banks who advocate the conflict resolution approach maintained that settlement "is both unlikely to achieve stability in the long run, *and* is undesirable."⁶³ In contrast, Jacob Bercovitch finds the conflict resolution approach to be impractical for the very reason that it retains certain theoretical purities which are belied by practice, and he argues that such an approach is based on unrealistic expectations, thus, it cannot help us to deal with real conflict situations.⁶⁴

On the other hand, several scholars suggested that these possibly opposed approaches could be treated as complementary to one another.⁶⁵ For example, David Bloomfield argues that "this dichotomisation of the two theoretical approaches is exaggerated, and that both approaches have a validity and salience which should be employed in a complementary, rather than an oppositional, way."⁶⁶ He has developed a model of complementarity in conflict management, which embraces both approaches concurrently.

Andrew Williams presents another excellent example. By referring to intermediary efforts in Moldova, he argues that the functional results of conflict settlement activity and conflict resolution activity are the same and that all third parties in the Moldovan conflict were trying to complement, or even to constitute the basis for, the negotiation process.⁶⁷ Others argued elsewhere that a carefully designed and co-ordinated application of the two approaches is necessary for taking advantage of their complementary. But, are these approaches really complementary to each other? If so, how can the differences that exist between these approaches be reconciled or bridged? Although, in theory, the third approach is possible and may be preferable in practice, if feasible, there is not enough empirical evidence to

⁶² Andrew Williams, 'Conflict Resolution After the Cold War: The Case of Moldova', *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1999), p. 83. For a detailed analysis of the three conceptual frameworks, see A.J.R. Groom, 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher', *Review of International Studies*, 14 (1988), pp. 97-115.

⁶³ Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-solving Approach* (London and New York: Pinter, 1996) p. 3 (emphasis original)

⁶⁴ Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties Strategies of Conflict Resolution*, p. 116

⁶⁵ See, for example, Harold H. Saunders, 'Pre-negotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process', in Chester A Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 419-432; David Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland: Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997); and A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994).

⁶⁶ Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland*, p. 2

⁶⁷ Williams, 'Conflict Resolution After the Cold War', p. 83

support such a proposition.⁶⁸

As the first step towards examining the prospect of the complementarity, therefore, these two theoretical approaches to conflict analysis will be analysed next. Their philosophical and methodological differences will be identified so that possibilities and ways to mediate their differences can be examined. First, two different sets of assumptions regarding the nature of conflict itself, the role of third parties, and the range of possible outcomes will be compared.⁶⁹ Then, the comparison of the fundamental objectives and methodology of the two approaches will follow.

3.2. Conflict Settlement

Conflict settlement occurs when the problem of violent conflict is no longer manifest (it remains latent), but a problematic relationship between the adversaries remains.⁷⁰ It often involves a loss for one side and an equivalent gain for the other, or a compromise in which all or some parties are to some degree losers, and for that reason none is wholly satisfied.⁷¹ Hence, if the power of an intervening party that suppresses overt violence (such as a UN peacekeeping force, economic aid or other outside guarantees) is taken away, the goals and interests of the conflicting parties are likely to be re-asserted immediately, and violent conflict is likely to resume.⁷² Then, why do the proponents of this approach content themselves with such a fragile, superficial and impermanent solution that may drag intermediaries into a costly and lengthy 'settlement-keeping' operation?

The answer to this question lies in their basic assumption about *the nature of conflict*. They believe that conflicts can never be resolved fully and that a compromise settlement is the best solution we can hope for. The conceptions of scarcity and power are central to this perspective. In this view there is a fixed amount of satisfaction to be shared, and power relationships between the adversaries determine the division of the spoils.⁷³ They consider that conflict is generated over objective, power-related issues.⁷⁴ The balance of power between the adversaries is the key to a successful settlement of conflict. It is often underlined by the defenders of this approach that the existence of a rough parity between the adversaries is a necessary condition for successful de-escalation initiatives. The process of handling a conflict is thus one of power-bargaining, in which various forms of leverage (persuasion, inducement, normative pressure, implied threat or outright coercion) may be employed in order to produce or force concessions from each

⁶⁸ Rare empirical cases that support the potential of complementarity (or contingency model) can be seen in Williams, 'Conflict Resolution After the Cold War', pp. 71-86; and Harold H. Saunders, 'The Multilevel Peace Process in Tajikistan', in Chester A Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (eds.), *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 161-179.

⁶⁹ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. xii

⁷⁰ A.J.R. Groom, *Peacekeeping*, Department of International Relations Research Monograph No. 4 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University, 1973) p. 13; Mitchell and Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, p. 4; and John W. Burton, *Global Conflict: the Domestic Sources of International Crisis* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1984) p. 144.

⁷¹ Burton, *Global Conflict*, p. 143

⁷² Groom, *Peacekeeping*, pp. 13-14; and Mitchell and Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, p. 4.

⁷³ John Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979) pp. 94-95

⁷⁴ Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland*, p. 70

party.⁷⁵

The role of a third party is, therefore, to assist the parties to find a solution to the conflict by striking a bargain based on compromise and, hence, upon concessions from at least one, but probably from both adversaries.⁷⁶ Third party tactics are directed towards the achievement of some compromise solution through the use of negotiation and mediation in which the leverage and resources of the third party play a major role in reaching a certain outcome.⁷⁷ For that reason, proponents of the conflict settlement approach consider that the most appropriate ways to handle conflict are through the effective usage of leverage. The efficacy of the mediators is determined by their ability to add resources to the outcomes and to withhold resources from one side or to shift them to the other.⁷⁸ One that has the most resources is likely to be the most effective third party.⁷⁹ For example, an effective third party can widen the range of possible outcomes by bringing in economic aids, a UN peacekeeping force and others. The third party can also guarantee settlement by reassuring the other parties that it will impose negative sanctions on them if they violate the agreed upon terms of settlement. Furthermore, by empowering the weaker party (underdogs), the third party can create the power parity between the contestants that is thought to be a necessary condition to start a successful de-escalation initiative.

The range of possible outcomes of conflict envisaged by proponents of the conflict settlement approach can be classified into two basic categories: withdrawal and distributive outcomes. Withdrawal includes two situations: the parties are no longer in a position to pursue their original goals due to a new situation, and the parties abandon their efforts to achieve their own goals and break off relations with each other, so that no form of contact remains, at least regarding the issue under contention.⁸⁰ Distributive outcomes can be divided into two sub-categories (victory-defeat outcomes and compromise outcomes) depending on the degree of relative gains and losses among the adversaries.⁸¹ In other words, when one party wins and the other loses, in the sense that the winner achieves its own goals at the expense of the loser, it is regarded as a victory-defeat outcome.⁸² Conquest, annexation and enforced submission fall into this category. On the other hand, in a compromise outcome mutual concessions are explicitly made by both adversaries, in the sense that both of them abandon some of their goals in the interest of certitude in achieving other goals and in avoiding the continued costs of attempting to coerce the

⁷⁵ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. xii

⁷⁶ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. xii

⁷⁷ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 7

⁷⁸ I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, 'International Mediation in the Post-Cold War', in Chester A Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 455-457

⁷⁹ Keith Webb characterises such a view of mediation as a power politics perspective and points out that it is an untested proposition. See Webb, 'Third-Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars', note 6 and 33.

⁸⁰ Louis Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973) p. 206; and Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 5.

⁸¹ Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*, p. 256

⁸² In this outcome, there is always the likelihood that the loser regards the setback as merely temporary and the settlement as only a temporary one accepted because of superior coercion. The conflict remains latent as long as mutually incompatible goals exist (Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 11).

adversary and of being the continued target of the opponent's coercive ripostes.⁸³ The gap between the adversaries is bridged in two ways: splitting the difference and reciprocal concessions.⁸⁴

This zero-sum view of conflict is widely taken by proponents of the conflict settlement approach. Hence, distributive outcomes are often envisaged as the most probable outcomes of conflicts. Since it is rare in practice that one party completely dominates the others in the negotiation process of protracted conflicts, compromise settlements are seen to be the most frequent and the best outcome in this approach.

In summary, the conflict settlement approach aims to establish 'negative peace' (absence of direct armed confrontation), promotes compromise, and often focuses on the substantive aspects of conflict.⁸⁵ Thus, the handing of conflict becomes a matter of minimising the destructive effects of the parties' conflict behaviour.⁸⁶

3.3. Conflict Resolution

The conflict resolution approach, in contrast, seeks to find a durable, long-term and self-supporting outcome that is based on the joint discovery of means whereby the parties can fulfil their goals satisfactorily without making the sacrifices demanded in a compromised settlement.⁸⁷ Conflict resolution is a process of facilitating a solution where the parties no longer feel the need to indulge in conflict activity and feel that the distribution of benefits and costs in the social system is acceptable.⁸⁸ Through the conflict resolution process, the dysfunctional aspects of the relationship between the parties are eliminated, while the functional aspects of their relationship are enhanced.⁸⁹ Or, through the conflict resolution process, the sources of negative relationship are transformed, at least, to non-dysfunctional ones, while the minimum level of courtesy is maintained between the parties so that the 'amicable divorce' can be concluded. In other words, through a conflict resolution process, the parties are able to remove underlying causes (frustration of basic human needs that are non-negotiable) and to establish a new relationship of mutual collaboration (or non-interference), often involving the setting up of mutually acceptable means for managing future conflict situations.⁹⁰ That is, the parties no longer feel the pursuance of their conflict to be functional, even when no constraints are put upon them.⁹¹ In short, conflict resolution implies the satisfaction of all non-negotiable values and needs, leading to an outcome that does not require enforcement.⁹²

The underlying assumption about *the nature of conflict* peculiar to this approach is that the roots of conflict lie in the subjective relationships between the

⁸³ Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflict*, p. 207; and Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 12

⁸⁴ Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflict*, p. 207

⁸⁵ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 105

⁸⁶ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 7

⁸⁷ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. xiv

⁸⁸ Michael Nicholson, 'Negotiation, Agreement and Conflict Resolution: The Role of Rational Approaches and their Criticism', in Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, International Social Science Council (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991) p. 59

⁸⁹ Groom, *Peacekeeping*, p. 5

⁹⁰ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. xii

⁹¹ Groom, *Peacekeeping*, p. 14. For a detailed analysis of the functionality of the conflict, see C. R. Mitchell, 'Evaluating Conflict', pp. 61-75

⁹² Burton, *Conflict Resolution*, p. 58

parties. For example, Burton stated clearly that “conflict resolution is an intervention into social relationships.”⁹³ This implies that a resolution of the conflict is possible through the transformation of the parties’ perceptions of the conflict, each other, and the range of possible outcomes. The conflict resolution approach is based on the theory that common or universal needs of both sides can be met, and that a ‘win-win’ outcome is possible.⁹⁴

For the proponents of the conflict resolution approach, human needs theory plays a fundamental role both in understanding the causation of conflict, as well as in developing a basis for solving it.⁹⁵ Underlying such a view is the one that conflicts are due to two sources: denial of basic human needs and the shortcomings of the conflict handling processes traditionally employed.⁹⁶ For example, Burton stated that conflict is likely to be caused by the denial of human and societal values such as the need for identity, recognition and security of the identity group, and thus conflict resolution must aim at first determining such human needs, and then assisting parties to deduce what alternatives in structures, institutions and policies are required to enable the fulfilment of those needs.⁹⁷ Underlying such a view is a hypothesis that “once relationships have been analysed satisfactorily, once each side is accurately informed of the perceptions of the other, of the alternative values and goals, of the alternative means and costs of attaining them, the possible outcomes acceptable to the parties are revealed.”⁹⁸

In order to satisfy those needs of the parties that are being frustrated by existing conditions and relationships, the parties must engage in a process of joint analysis of the underlying sources of the conflict situation, explore the transformation of hostile relationships, and search for mutually satisfactory solutions. Thus, *the role of third parties* is not to mediate in the sense of suggesting seemingly reasonable compromises, but rather it is to assist the parties to see their relationships as posing a problem to be solved and to establish a condition in which all the parties join in defining, identifying and solving the problem.⁹⁹ By referring to the analytical problem-solving approach that represents one attempt to resolve conflicts, Mitchell and Banks defined the essential role and task of the third party as follows:

“A major task for the third party is not to use leverage nor to search for a bargained compromise, but the provision of a safe venue in which productive discussions might take place, maximizing the chances of a genuine exchange of ideas, of free-ranging analysis and of the non-committing exploration of options.”¹⁰⁰

In short, the conflict resolution approach is designed to address the subjective (not substantive) aspect of conflict through the third party engaging in supportive and

⁹³ John Burton, ‘Appendix: Facilitated Conflict Resolution Procedures’, in John Burton and Frank Duker (eds.), *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990) p. 190

⁹⁴ Burton, ‘Appendix’, p. 192

⁹⁵ For an excellent analysis of the relationship between human needs theory and conflict resolution, see John Burton (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).

⁹⁶ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 31

⁹⁷ John Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts: A Handbook* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987) p. 23

⁹⁸ John Burton, *Dear Survivors* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) p. 122

⁹⁹ Burton, *Conflict and Communication*, p. 62

¹⁰⁰ Mitchell and Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, p. 5

facilitative functions. The conflict resolution approach assumes that those issues that are at the basis of conflict (issues concerning human needs) do not involve scarce resources, but they involve resources that increase with consumption.¹⁰¹ In a secessionist conflict, for instance, it is often the case that the security need of a central government can be met by ensuring a sense of identity, security, recognition and participation to minority ethnic groups by allowing them to form autonomous local governments. Hence, the most important attribute of the third party is not that it has many material resources and has leverage over the parties, but rather that it is and is seen to be impartial and to remain so during the whole process of conflict resolution.¹⁰²

In the conflict resolution approach, a compromise outcome is not regarded as the best possible outcome to any conflict and, thus, it is usually avoided. This approach seeks to achieve a mutually satisfactory win-win solution. *The range of possible outcomes of conflict* can be classified into two (transformation and resolution outcomes) depending on the degree of development of a mutually agreeable mechanism to cope with disruptive behaviour, the degree of reconciliation and integration (or agreed separation) between adversaries, the degree of rehabilitation and development of society, and the degree of elimination of structural violence. The transformation outcome is characterised as a developmental stage towards conflict resolution. In this stage, control of disruptive conflict behaviour by the parties does not depend upon the continued coercion of both parties by some more powerful third party. The relationship between adversaries is changing from a contentious one to a conciliatory one. In other words, it implies a situation in which the parties have agreed to cease their pursuit of incompatible goals through fighting (disruptive conflict behaviour), reduce some of their antagonistic feelings and attitudes towards the other side, and work collaboratively with each other to find a mutually satisfactory solution to the elimination of the incompatible goal situation. The process of conflict transformation is completed when conflicts reach resolution outcomes. Resolution is a situation in which disruptive conflict behaviour on the part of adversaries has been terminated, and hostile attitudes and perceptions have been at least ameliorated as a result of the elimination of underlying sources of conflict (that is, of mutually incompatible goals). A new relationship has been established between the adversaries. All parties have agreed on a mutually satisfactory process to deal with their potential incompatible goals (future conflicts); therefore, a state of peace will be sustainable without the presence of outside guarantors.

In summary, the conflict resolution approach seeks to establish 'positive peace' (that is the presence of a self-sustaining conflict resolution mechanism), promotes mutually satisfactory solutions, and focuses more often on the subjective aspects of conflict. Thus, the handing of conflict does not stop at addressing the manifestation of destructive conflict behaviour of the parties, but seeks to eradicate the very causes of a conflict.

3.4. Debate

The above review of the two major theoretical approaches to conflict analysis indicates that these approaches have their theoretical bases in divergent views on the nature of conflict. The conflict settlement approach emphasises the objective

¹⁰¹ Burton, *Conflict Resolution*, p. 58

¹⁰² Burton, 'Appendix', p. 192

elements of conflict, while the conflict resolution approach focuses on the subjective elements. This fundamental difference has a significant impact upon one's definition of the third party role and the range of possible outcomes.

The conflict triangle model indicates that conflict settlement can be characterised as a behaviour-based approach, that is, its primary objective is to reduce, or contain if possible, the disruptive conflict behaviour of the parties. Thus, the conflict settlement approach enters the conflict at the point of conflict behaviour and works on the behavioural aspects of the conflict, but it hardly goes beyond that entry-point. The conflict settlement approach can give a first-aid treatment to the conflict because it tackles the manifest level of conflict first and foremost. When it is successful, it can actually stop the fighting and prevent people from being killed; therefore, it is often considered to be a more practical approach than its counterpart.

Nevertheless, criticism of the conflict settlement approach usually centres on claims of superficiality. It is often argued that the conflict settlement approach seeks to address manifest conflict behaviour only. It puts treatment of the other components of conflict outside its expertise and hesitates to attempt the fundamental cure of the conflict. In other words, this approach deals solely or primarily with surface interests and positions, and does not address directly the underlying needs and values in conflict. It is undeniable that a settlement can provide an effective and immediate solution to a difficult and possibly violent situation, but it is also true that its efficacy is temporary and it fails to deal with the negative elements of the underlying adversarial relationship.¹⁰³ Thus, although the overt hostilities between the parties might be controlled through the mediation of a cease-fire and the intervention of a peacekeeping force, the conflict itself moves no closer to resolution and, in fact, becomes more intractable.¹⁰⁴

Solutions, where they are not victories or defeats, are regarded inevitably as compromise settlements in the conflict settlement approach. This conception of how conflicts end becomes a major obstacle to introducing a problem-solving attempt in a peacemaking activity.¹⁰⁵ This is because the assumption of the parties and intermediaries that only a limited number of outcomes are possible circumscribes their search for a solution.¹⁰⁶ For that reason, Burton claimed that "conflicts must be *resolved*, rather than *settled*."¹⁰⁷ Despite such a criticism, proponents of the conflict settlement approach often suggest that time heals conflict attitudes and the situation because "[o]nly time resolves conflicts."¹⁰⁸

Another tendency in the conflict settlement approach is that the more powerful parties who are inclined to deal first with the issues that are relevant to them are likely to be brought into a settlement procedure.¹⁰⁹ For example, the United Nations is often called in as a guarantor of the settlement. The United Nations peacemaking efforts are often directed at reaching agreements on a cease-fire or truce because its major concerns are to prevent the conflict from spreading outside and to reduce the number of people suffering from the fighting. Proponents of the conflict resolution approach, however, criticise such an approach by saying that it frequently pushes aside the central sources of the conflict, and they argue that conflict

¹⁰³ Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland*, p. 70

¹⁰⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 32

¹⁰⁵ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. xii

¹⁰⁶ Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role*, p. 7

¹⁰⁷ Burton, *Conflict Resolution*, p. 8

¹⁰⁸ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (1989), p. 273

¹⁰⁹ Burton, *Conflict Resolution*, p. 53

resolution must seek to begin with the core issues and the parties directly concerned with them.¹¹⁰ Critics of the conflict settlement approach also point out that the post-settlement relationship inevitably remains a fragile one, liable to be overturned at the earliest opportunity because settlements tend to be arranged (or imposed) in situations characterised by successful coercion, either by one of the adversaries or by powerful third parties.¹¹¹

In contrast to the focused treatment undertaken by the conflict settlement approach, the conflict resolution approach seeks to provide a more comprehensive and thorough treatment of the conflict because it holds the view that conflicts can be resolved fully. Its initial access to a conflict scene starts from the point of conflict attitudes, although its primary goal is to alter the conflict situation. It assumes that disruptive conflict behaviour on the part of the parties will be terminated (automatically) when the conflict situation is corrected and the hostile attitudes of the parties towards each other are transformed.

However, criticism of the conflict resolution approach usually hinges around claims of impracticality. It is frequently stated by the defenders of the conflict settlement approach that the conflict resolution approach fails to translate into realistic practice in the face of a less coherent reality of complex and sometimes contradictory conflict behaviour, whereas the conflict settlement approach can actually produce results in real conflict situations.¹¹² For example, the Dayton peace agreement which was signed among the contestants in the Bosnian conflict was severely criticised by the proponents of the conflict resolution approach for not addressing the fundamental causes of the conflict. They also argued that because the agreement was reached largely due to pressure from a powerful third party and guaranteed by its massive military presence it was doomed to collapse. However, the agreement seems to have been successful in achieving a temporary cessation of hostilities. On the other hand, the conflict resolution endeavours in Cyprus, for example, have not been able to achieve a major breakthrough in the impasse. Their contributions to the overall peace process seem to have been limited such that any substantial progress towards the resolution of the conflict has not been made during the last decade.

Faced with such a reality, can the proponents of the conflict resolution approach refute the criticism of their approach? It is not easy to provide ample evidence either against such a claim or for it. This is because the resolution of conflict usually requires a long-term commitment from all sides, including some third parties, and it is very difficult to assess the long-term impact of the intervention on the outcome of a conflict. Another difficulty lies in the problem of measuring and proving the impact of the intervention itself on the process and outcome of the conflict. This is because the process of conflict resolution is highly complex and can be affected by a number of both external and internal factors. In conflict dynamics there are no single causes for either the emergence or cessation of conflict. In addition, third party attempts frequently involve contradictory or counter-effective measures. Thus, it is almost impossible to identify and verify direct causation between a particular intervention strategy and an outcome.

Nonetheless, some conflicts are resolved, or at least go beyond the stage of

¹¹⁰ Burton, *Conflict Resolution*, p. 53

¹¹¹ Christopher Mitchell, 'Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory', in John Burton (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) p. 150

¹¹² Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland*, p. 75

settlement. Hence, the conflict resolution approach deserves more than a passing notice. In fact, it is very important to be able to identify the circumstances in which the conflict settlement approach can be an aid to or a hindrance of the conflict resolution approach. Effective ways to co-ordinate the two approaches must be searched for rigorously.

4. Summary

Two major theoretical approaches to conflict analysis have been examined in this Chapter. These approaches have their theoretical bases in divergent views on the nature of conflict. The conflict settlement approach seeks to tackle violent and disruptive conflict behaviour, while the conflict resolution approach focuses on dealing with conflict attitudes and the conflict situation by which the conflict emerged in the first place. The definition of conflict resolution can be recapitulated, from a perspective of peacekeeping, as follows. Conflict resolution is different from conflict settlement in the sense that it does not depend upon the continued coercion of one party by another, or both by some more powerful third party, and that the relationship between the parties involved is fundamentally changed. The objective of the conflict resolution approach is to remove or transform the underlying issues in contention while the conflict settlement approach is to deal with behavioural manifestations arising from such issues.¹¹³

Nevertheless, as Bloomfield pointed out in his efforts to categorise the theoretical approaches to conflict analysis, it is merely a conceptual exercise to polarise the arguments to this extent.¹¹⁴ Still, if we are to hypothesise that the two seemingly opposed approaches to conflict analysis can be treated as complementary to one another, we must demonstrate the ways in which these differences identified above can be reconciled or bridged. This Chapter is aimed at providing us with a basis for examining the potentiality of treating the two approaches as complementary to one another and for exploring the ways to bridge their fundamental differences by highlighting the main themes of the opposing propositions. If this third approach is accepted, the possibilities would open to us to imagine that UN peacekeeping, originally developed as a conflict settlement strategy, can provide an overriding framework that links the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach. This potential has been demonstrated by some of the 'expanded' or 'multi-functional' UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the post-agreement (post-settlement) phase to help parties implement their agreements and consolidate the foundation for further conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the function of UN peacekeeping as an overarching umbrella framework that co-ordinates various third parties on the ground has not been explored fully. Such a lack of analysis exists because the development of a sound conceptual framework for assessing the efficacy of UN peacekeeping in such a manner has been overlooked in the literature. One way of developing such a framework is to turn to the insights provided by the conflict theorists.

It is true that the discipline of conflict analysis has been divided along the bipolar differentiation in approaches to conflict, and scholars and practitioners have been unable to identify the generic theory of conflict analysis. But insights from some of the conflict theories can enhance, or at least are relevant to, our

¹¹³ Mitchell, 'Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution', p. 152

¹¹⁴ Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland*, p. 79

understanding of the effect of UN peacekeeping upon peace processes. Among these insights, implications gained from a scholarly debate drawn from the 'settlement-resolution' dichotomy are most useful. The debate over whether the parties and the third parties should aim for conflict settlement or conflict resolution reveals each author's fundamental views about the nature of conflict. The underlying assumptions about the nature of conflict define a range of realistic objectives and possible outcomes of third party intervention. Thus, it reveals our understanding of what constitutes the best approach to conflict analysis; in particular, it stipulates two guidelines for effective third party intervention—an appropriate set of conditions that is most conducive to launching intervention and a list of third party functions that needs to be undertaken in the peace process. In effect, it affects our assessment of the significance of a particular third party intervention. As a result, a number of related debates are derived from this disunity on the fundamental assumption about the nature of conflict.

The next step, therefore, is to develop a conceptual framework within which the two approaches can be co-ordinated and become complementary to each other. With this point in mind, a conceptual framework that can be used to demonstrate the potential of UN peacekeeping to be complementary to other intermediary endeavours and also to analyse the likely determinants of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping will be explored in the next Chapter by referring to the contingency model of third party intervention, the concept of ripe moment, and a typology of UN peacekeeping functions.

Chapter Three

DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

This study aims to demonstrate that under similar circumstances UN peacekeeping (a conflict settlement approach) has been complementary to other intermediary endeavours and, thus, facilitated the resolution of the conflict. In other words, it argues that there is a way in which the differences that exist between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach can be reconciled or bridged. Two theoretical approaches to conflict analysis were examined and the differences that exist between them were identified in the previous Chapter. But what conflict resolution theories can provide the conceptual footing necessary to examine ways to link the conflict settlement approach to the conflict resolution approach? The following aims to provide a tentative answer to such a difficult question. It seeks to demonstrate how the differences existing between the two approaches can be mediated by developing a theoretical framework within which such a complicated and difficult task can be comprehended.

To that goal, several steps need to be taken. "The contingency model of third party intervention" which was suggested by Fisher and Keashly provides a good starting point.¹ Their model sets out a general direction for a model building and offers a conceptual lens through which the complex process of conflict resolution can be outlined. In other words, it is a good descriptive framework or a guideline for categorisation.²

However, it must be noted that considering their model does not necessarily mean that it is adopted as the conceptual framework for this study. In contrast, their model will be reviewed and then refined in order to serve as a point of departure for the search for an appropriate conceptual framework of this study. By linking the notion of conflict ripeness and the functional category of UN peacekeeping, an alternative framework will be developed. In the alternative approach, the essential

¹ Ronald J. Fisher and Loreleigh Keashly, 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention', *Journal of Peace Research*, 28, 1 (1991), pp. 29-42. See also, Loreleigh Keashly and Ronald Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict: A Cyprus Illustration', *International Journal*, 43, 2 (1990), pp. 424-453; Ronald J. Fisher, 'The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking', *Peace & Change*, 18, 3 (1993), pp. 247-266; Loreleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher, 'A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and Practical Considerations', in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 235-261; and Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997) pp. 163-184.

² The corollary of this argument is that other dimensions need to be added for the contingency model to serve as an explanatory theory. There are at least two types of theory: one aims at describing the nature and activities of the action/phenomena, and the other seeks to explain (or predict) the outcome of the action/phenomena. The contingency model provides us with an excellent guideline to categorise the variety of intermediary activities, while it needs to be modified if it is to be used to explain the success or failure of a particular intervention.

logic of the contingency model is used to relate UN peacekeeping with other third party endeavours, as well as to locate UN peacekeeping within the overall peace process.

A. B. Fetherston supports the application of the contingency model to such purposes when she argued that the contingency framework could provide:

“first, a more concrete and accurate understanding of the processes of conflict and conflict resolution; second, a more complete understanding of how peacekeeping fits into such processes; and third, grounded in this knowledge, a more specific and coherent methodology for application of peacekeeping; finally, improved understanding and implementation increase the potential for long-term and durable resolution of conflict.”³

While Fetherston’s approach is highly appreciated by scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict studies and peacekeeping, only a limited number of them have analysed UN peacekeeping as a third party intervention in the light of conflict theories.⁴ In this study particular facts and examples to support the theoretical proposition will be collected from the empirical records of UN peacekeeping. Thus, it begins to fill the theoretical gap that exists in the literature.

2. *Linking Two Approaches to Conflict Analysis*

2.1. **Timing Contingency and Function Contingency**

As described in the previous Chapter, the basic argument of the contingency model is that if intervention strategies are matched to the stage of conflict development, they can be more conducive to conflict resolution. In other words, the contingency model argues that appropriate strategies exist for certain stages (sets of conditions and circumstances) of the conflict, and appropriate timings exist for particular strategies of third party intervention. Thus, the contingency model implies that success or failure of certain intervention efforts can be accounted for, at least partially, by the notion of timing. Timing in this context means recognising the most propitious point(s) in the cycle of conflict development for the parties and third parties to initiate de-escalation.⁵ In short, the model implies that inappropriate initiatives are ineffectual, and can even be counter-productive under certain circumstances.⁶ Hence, it can be interpreted that the contingency model urges us to identify the cues for the timing of the appropriate intervention for each intermediary.

Closely related to this strand of thought about appropriate timing is the concept of co-ordination of various third party activities. The model emphasises the importance of co-ordination among different third parties on the ground and calls for

³ A.B. Fetherston, ‘Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice’, *International Peacekeeping*, 1 (1994), p. 14

⁴ For the rare examples of the study of UN peacekeeping conducted in the light of conflict theories, see A.J.R. Groom, *Peacekeeping*, Research Monograph No.4 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University, 1973); and A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994).

⁵ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 177

⁶ Keith Webb with Vassiliki Koutrakou and Mike Walters, ‘The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model: A Critical Perspective’, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflict: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 173

a carefully designed, finely orchestrated series of interventions so that the third parties can take advantage of their complementarity. Since one of the major arguments of the contingency model is that different interventions would be appropriate at different stages of the conflict, proponents of this model often prescribe sequential application of co-ordinated interventions.⁷ According to Fisher, for example, third party interventions are considered to be co-ordinated and sequenced to deal effectively with a complex interplay of objective and subjective factors.⁸ In other words, the model indicates a possible way to make the conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches complementary to each other. It implies that the conflict settlement approach can be used to settle objective elements of the conflict (such as a disagreement over substantive issues), while the conflict resolution approach can attempt to address the subjective aspects of the conflict (such as the psychological and relational problems of the parties involved). In short, the contingency model illuminates the two key words in seeking the complementarity between two theoretical approaches to conflict analysis: '*timing*' contingency (different activities are initiated at the different phases of the conflict) and '*function*' contingency (different activities are employed to address different aspect of the conflict).

In other words, the contingency model suggests the possibility not only of sequential (*timing contingency*) but also simultaneous application of different strategies (*function contingency*). Christopher Mitchell made this point quite strongly, claiming that some of the "consultation," "mediation," or "coercive intervention" functions might well be carried out concurrently by different third parties, thus contributing to an overall process and leading towards a resolution of the conflict.⁹ Hence, an overriding framework within which UN peacekeeping (a conflict settlement approach) and other conflict resolution approaches work collaboratively and effectively towards the resolution of the conflict needs to be established from the standpoint of timing (entry-point) and functions of each intervention.

2.2. Refining the Contingency Model

In general, the contingency model offers a useful prototype for future research into the development of a theoretical framework within which the performance of third party intervention might be prescribed and evaluated. For example, the contingency model suggested by Fisher and Keashly has far-reaching implications for generalisation and produces a clear prescription for potential intermediaries. The strengths of their model are derived largely from its clear logic. Because the model operates under the clear logic and offers a simple conceptual scheme, it is theoretically appealing.

However, the main shortcoming of the model is that it oversimplifies the complex practice of conflict resolution. In other words, while the simplicity of the model enhances its logical appeal, the same feature makes its prescription seem too mechanical to be applicable to real-world situations. In addition, the model involves several inherent weaknesses in design and some areas of shadow over

⁷ Fisher and Keashly, 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention', pp. 29-42

⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 164

⁹ C.R. Mitchell, 'The Process and Stages of Mediation', in David R. Smock (ed.), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 140

which the model fails to present a persuasive argument or neglects entirely. Thus, the contingency model proposed by Fisher and Keashly needs several refinements in order to overcome such shortcomings. Keith Webb et al. echo this point when they criticised the contingency model saying that the model would require considerable modification of its conclusion in such a way as to encompass the complexity of real-world situations.¹⁰ They cast doubt on several assumptions of the model, among which the following three points will be examined in this study. The points include: (1) sequencing and co-ordinating intervention are politically unattainable; (2) the functional differentiation of intervention strategies is not as clear-cut as suggested; and (3) complex situations cannot be adequately characterised by the four stages.¹¹

2.2.1. Political Feasibility of Designed Interventions

Is Co-ordination Possible?

Keith Webb maintains that it does not seem politically feasible to control various kinds of intervention that occur spontaneously given the nature of the anarchic international system and the different interests of external players.¹² We have witnessed repeatedly that not only the conflict situations but also the domestic situations of third parties have had a significant influence on the forms, strategies and timing of possible intervention. Moreover, the United Nations has neither independent decision-making authority nor sufficient resources to supervise a comprehensive peace process. For those reasons, the contribution by UN peacekeepers to the peace process are often criticised for being 'too little too late.' The United Nations has been accused of ineffectiveness in its decision-making procedure. For example, while pointing out that states differ in their views on and interests in specific conflicts, Adam Roberts argued that, "The collective character of UN decision-making is not necessarily appropriate to the management of complex and fast-moving situations."¹³ This organizational defect was re-emphasised by the UN Secretary-General in his report on 31 May 1994 when the United Nations failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda:

"The delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict."¹⁴

¹⁰ Webb et al., 'The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model', p. 171

¹¹ Webb et al., 'The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model', p. 173

¹² Keith Webb, 'Third-Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars: A Preliminary Approach', *Paradigms*, 9, 2 (1995), p. 28

¹³ Adam Roberts, 'Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia', in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (Lanham, New York, Boulder and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 50

¹⁴ Quoted in Anthony Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995* (London: Penguin Books, 1995) p. 261. Despite the fact that the organised genocide was taking place in Rwanda in April 1994, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw most of its peacekeepers from Rwanda. However, due to the scale of the massacre and the growing criticism against the United Nations' decision to withdraw, the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and authorised a strength of 5,500 on 17 May 1994, nearly six weeks after the genocide had begun. Because no countries offered their troops and equipment that were adequate for the mission, it took another six weeks before any of the supplementary troops appeared on the ground (Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace*, p. 261).

Considering these constraints, it can be assumed that the United Nations is very seldom capable of providing sufficient resources for an ideal peace process. In addition, many actors in a conflict including the potential intermediaries are pursuing their own interests in their own ways whenever they think they can be effective or can make themselves available.

Despite the harsh reality surrounding UN peacekeeping, the contingency model examined above assumes that it is possible for a variety of third parties to perform different functions at different stages in a conflict and that it is preferable that their intervention be carefully sequenced and co-ordinated. However, given the fact that the harsh reality that existed at the time of the Rwandan conflict has hardly changed, is it still meaningful to advocate the notion of sequencing and co-ordinating intervention? Is the contingency model based on a false assumption that a series of third party interventions can be designed and orchestrated? Is it possible to refute the argument that sequencing and co-ordinating intervention are politically unfeasible?

Positive Experiences of Co-ordination

While it is extremely difficult both to regulate the practice of third party intervention on the ground and to improve the decision-making system of the United Nations, it is still possible to present an argument that supports the utility of the contingency model for the following reasons. First of all, it is theoretically possible to envisage some improvements in these areas. In fact, some remarkable progress can be found in some empirical cases. One attempt to improve the effectiveness of intervention through co-ordinating the multiple UN agencies at the strategic level can be seen in the establishment of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in April 1992, which was later replaced by the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in January 1998. Thomas Weiss argued that the creation of the DHA was an explicit recognition of the crying needs to co-ordinate various aspects of humanitarian diplomacy in New York.¹⁵ Furthermore, UNHCR set up the Partner in Action (PARinAC) with an aim to improve co-ordination with NGOs working in refugee assistance and protection.¹⁶ In addition to these developments, the evolution of multi-functional UN peacekeeping as well as the formation of the Civilian-Military Liaison Centre (or Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre, Civil-Military Operations Centre) within a UN peacekeeping operation is an important step forward towards enhancing co-ordination in the field. By integrating the tasks and encompassing several different roles into a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations has improved in its ability to co-ordinate effective interaction among various third parties on the ground.

Another good example can be drawn from the work of Harold Saunders in which he identified empirical evidence that four different arenas of intervention (official process, quasi-official process, public dialogue and civil society) could work collaboratively and that these efforts could be co-ordinated.¹⁷ He drew upon the

¹⁵ Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999) p. 23

¹⁶ The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 'About PARinAC', *NGO-UNHCR Partnership in Action* (<http://www.icva.ch/parinac/>; ICVA and UNHCR cooperation, 2001)

¹⁷ Harold H. Saunders, 'Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process', in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.; United States Institute of Peace Press), pp. 419-432

experiences in Tajikistan and the Middle East (Israelis and Palestinians) and underscored the importance of a comprehensive strategy developed around the complementarity in different forms of intervention carried out separately in these arenas.¹⁸ By examining carefully the peace process in Northern Ireland, David Bloomfield provided another example for the utility of the contingency approach and the possibility of launching co-ordinated third party efforts.¹⁹

Furthermore, it is important that all third parties are aware of a theoretical framework that defines their ideal intervention strategy.²⁰ It is true that even a carefully designed series of interventions will rarely be carried out exactly as planned. This does not, however, mean that planning is unimportant. Rather, it indicates that the intervention design must remain flexible to respond to reiterative feedback on the ground as well as to adjust itself to new information and constantly changing situations. While it might be impossible to orchestrate different kinds of third party efforts rigidly, it may be possible to ask each player to act in such a way as to harmonise loosely its efforts with the overall performance. Voluntary adjustment of the activity by the intermediaries can be encouraged for the sake of achieving collective goals, not in the interest of achieving the individual objectives of each intermediary. In such an adjustment process, each intermediary should seek to avoid becoming an impediment to the overall process by calculating the impact of its involvement upon the overall performance and inquiring what mix of involvement is most appropriate at a particular time.

Several hopeful signs towards complementarity and co-ordination of multiple conflict resolution efforts began to be identified. Indeed, some intermediaries have succeeded in sharing information and resources, building trust among them, and developing a joint intervention strategy to work towards common goals.²¹ In order to support such a positive development on the ground, conflict theorists must advance our understanding over an efficient way to co-ordinate various strategies of third party intervention by exploring theoretical models to facilitate such an endeavour. This is because for potential third parties to be able to intervene appropriately, it is beneficial for them to have a general guideline indicating under what circumstances they can be most conducive to facilitation of the overall peace process. For the same reason, it is also useful to identify when their particular involvement jeopardises the overall performance.

2.2.2. *Typology of Third Party Intervention*

Can the Intervention Strategies be Divided Clearly into the Four Categories?

In order to maximise the chances of success in settling or resolving conflict, a series of tasks needs to be carried out, some of which are best undertaken by a third party. The four forms of third party intervention (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacepushing) suggested by Fisher are not sufficient to describe such a wide range of third party activities on the ground. For example, the suggested typology does not include preventive diplomacy and peace-enforcement

¹⁸ Saunders, 'Pre-negotiation and Circum-negotiation', pp. 423-425

¹⁹ David Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland: Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997)

²⁰ In developing such a framework, several key questions need to be answered. For example, who should provide this framework? Should all the third parties jointly develop it? What would be the role of the adversaries in this 'framework design' process?

²¹ Susan Allen Nan, 'Complementarity and Coordination in Conflict Resolution', *ICAR Newsletter*, 9, 4 (1998), p. 16

that are used occasionally as strategies of third party intervention nowadays.²² Moreover, it is difficult to draw a clear borderline between the suggested forms of third party intervention because they are, in a sense, artificial categories. These categories of third party activity sometimes overlap with one another, while, at other times, two operations that are both labelled as peacekeeping may be fulfilling quite different functions.

For example, the roles and mandates assigned to multi-functional peacekeeping operations—e.g., the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC)—are quite different from those of basic peacekeeping operations—e.g., the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights—as discussed in Chapter One. The functional border between peacekeeping and the other three endeavours become blurred in multi-functional peacekeeping. Quasi-enforcement actions were undertaken by the peacekeepers in the Congo, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some peacebuilding activities were carried out under the heading of UN peacekeeping in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. At other times, the head of UN peacekeeping operations played a facilitator role when the parties wished to re-negotiate agreements in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Functional Categories of UN Peacekeeping

It must be admitted that it is impossible to develop a typology that can exactly match the complex reality of third party interventions and that Fisher's approach retains the advantage of turning such a puzzling reality into some simple broad categories. Nonetheless, a more sophisticated typology of third party interventions needs to be developed in order to make the contingency approach more responsive to the purpose of this study. Indeed, the process of third party intervention can best be appreciated as a complex process and it might be more effective if it were to be understood as the orchestra with multiple functions.²³ Saunders supported this approach by saying that, "The most creative thinking about third-party involvement focuses not on the role of a single actor but on the process through which a complex of functions is performed."²⁴

One way to refine the model in this direction is to conduct the analysis of third party intervention at one level deeper. Thus, an alternative typology of third party intervention needs to be based on the actual tasks and functions fulfilled by third parties. Laying out the tasks and functions of third parties, and then identifying when these tasks and functions are most needed and more likely to be effective might be the best way to start model building. Nevertheless, instead of identifying the whole range of third party functions, the following attempt will be tailored to cover the functions that UN peacekeepers carry out normally, thereby building a typology of peacekeeping functions as the primary purpose of this Chapter is to develop a conceptual framework that can be used to demonstrate the potential of UN peacekeeping to be complementary to other conflict resolution endeavours.²⁵

A set of functional categories of UN peacekeeping was developed in Chapter

²² The term "preventive diplomacy" includes an early warning system and other activities aimed at conflict prevention.

²³ Mitchell, 'The Process and Stages of Mediation', p. 140

²⁴ Saunders, 'Pre-negotiation and Circum-negotiation', p. 425

²⁵ For an excellent typology of third party intervention, see James Laue and Gerald Cormick, 'The Ethics of Intervention in Community Disputes', in Gordon Bermant, Herbert C. Kelman and Donald P. Warwick (eds.), *The Ethics of Social Intervention* (Washington, D.C.: Halsted Press, 1978), pp. 212-215; and Mitchell, 'The Process and Stages of Mediation', pp. 142-147.

One using a variety of existing typologies as references. To avoid redundancy, the typology of UN peacekeeping functions will not be recapitulated extensively, but only a list of tasks will be re-produced below. The variety of tasks assigned to UN peacekeepers falls broadly into three main clusters: (1) *Interposition*, (2) *Transition Assistance*, and (3) *Humanitarian Intervention*.²⁶

2.2.3. *Typology of Conflict Stages*

Can Complex Conflict Situations be Adequately Characterised by the Four Stages?

The fundamental argument of the contingency model is that all intermediary activities need to be matched to the escalation level of the conflict in which they intervene. Such an approach could offer an overriding perspective that helps us to understand how all the different forms of third party intervention fit together in the dynamic peace process. It does not, however, explain under what circumstances a particular third party intervention is more likely to facilitate or impede a peace process. It merely implies that success or failure of a particular intervention can be accounted for by the timing of its application, and calls for a search for cues for appropriate intervention timing or a 'ripe moment.'

In relation to the matter of identifying such cues, the contingency model portrays the conflict dynamic as a simple four-step linear progression (discussion, polarisation, segregation and destruction), but it seems almost impossible to cover and represent the diversity of the highly complicated dynamic process of conflict and its resolution with only four stages.²⁷ While classifying a normally complex and elusive process of conflict development (escalation and de-escalation) into a four-step linear model helps us to grasp the essential feature of conflict dynamics, it is impossible to capture the complexity of the real conflict with such a simple linear framework. Mitchell supports this point when he stated that a simple linear framework would never be able to represent the complex dynamics of protracted conflicts.²⁸ As was identified in the dynamic protraction model of conflict (see Chapter Two), the progression of conflict is not linear but interactive in the sense that previous stages might circle back and forth in the course of conflict development. Moreover, the contingency model does not explain why in some conflicts violence recurs after several years of 'successful' peacekeeping, nor does the simple linear model even describe such a dynamic. Hence, the model will be more useful and practical if it is refined to look at conflict in a less linear manner.²⁹

²⁶ The *Interposition* functions can be classified into the following six categories: (1) *Cease-fire Supervision*, (2) *Disengagement of Forces*, (3) *Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops*, (4) *Arms Transfer Control*, (5) *Maintenance of Law and Order*, and (6) *Preventive Deployment*. The *Transition Assistance* functions involve the following eight categories: (1) *Institutional Reinforcement*, (2) *Nation Building*, (3) *Election Assistance*, (4) *Demobilisation and Regrouping*, (5) *De-mining*, (6) *Refugee Assistance*, (7) *Human Rights Verification*, and (8) *Socio-economic Rehabilitation*. The *Humanitarian Intervention* functions consist of the following two categories: (1) *Securing Humanitarian Assistance* and (2) *Protective Services*. Hence, these sixteen labels will be used to represent various strategies of UN peacekeeping that are employed in the peace process.

²⁷ The implied assumption that the de-escalation process takes the reverse path of escalation (from destruction to discussion) is also challenged by other scholars. For example, recall Kriesberg's de-escalation steps model (see Chapter Two) in which the de-escalation process is examined in four phases: initiating de-escalation, undertaking negotiations, reaching agreements, and sustaining agreements (Louis Kriesberg, *International Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992) p. 5).

²⁸ Christopher R. Mitchell, *Cutting Losses: Reflections On Appropriate Timing*, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper 9 (Fairfax: George Mason University, 1995) p. 9

²⁹ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 122

Webb et al. claimed that by arguing there should be an appropriate strategy for certain stages of conflict, the contingency model assumed a degree of stasis that was rarely found in real-world conflicts.³⁰ Furthermore, they even stated that diagnosing a conflict as being at a particular stage or level could force the observer to overlook intra-party dynamics.³¹ A lack of sufficient knowledge of intra-party dynamics poses a serious problem for third parties and often makes their intervention unfruitful. This problem becomes particularly acute when third parties are unfamiliar with the context and culture of the combatants.

Moreover, as Webb et al. pointed out, the four stages were induced from psychological or socio-psychological perspectives with their substantive roots in industrial and organizational conflict resolution, and, thus these stages do not reflect the complex dynamics of international and interethnic conflicts in which UN peacekeeping operations are more likely to be deployed.³² Nevertheless, instead of discarding the notion of 'conflict stages' entirely as implied by Webb et al., the best way to refine the model seems to be to create more detailed and context-based stages (which include intra-party dynamics) so that the model can reflect the complex dynamics of peace processes more adequately. While maintaining that the notion of conflict stages is useful, they will not be treated as rigidly bounded and sequenced in this study.³³ Thus, in the following the term 'stage' is used to suggest a set of conditions and circumstances.

The Context-based Conflict Stages

The essence of the alternative typology is based on the "contingency model of mediation" which was developed by Jacob Bercovitch et al.³⁴ This model was intended to act as a framework for describing the practice of mediation and examining its outcomes, but it offers a useful direction for refining the contingency model. Unlike Fisher and Keashly's contingency model which categorises a process of conflict development into four general stages, this model regards the outcomes of mediation efforts as contingent upon a number of contextual and process factors.³⁵ The context variables identified by Bercovitch et al. include the nature of the parties, the nature of the conflict and the nature of the mediation whereas the process variables incorporate various mediation strategies.³⁶ By

³⁰ Webb et al., 'The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model', p. 172

³¹ Webb et al., 'The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model', p. 172

³² Webb et al., 'The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model', p. 171

³³ Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998) p. 339

³⁴ Jacob J. Bercovitch, Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille, 'Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations', *Journal of Peace Research*, 28 (1991), pp. 7-17

³⁵ Bercovitch et al., 'Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations', pp. 7-17. See also, Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, 'The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37, 4 (1993), pp. 670-691; Jacob Bercovitch, 'The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations', in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 1-29; and Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, 'The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence', in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 11-35.

³⁶ It seems that Bercovitch et al. drew on the work done by Hizkias Assefa when they developed the criteria. Assefa, while not explicitly articulating the usage of the contingency model in his analysis, summarised the essential conditions for the success of mediation in civil wars by organising them into three groups, that is, conditions concerning the nature and the characteristics of (1) the conflict parties,

introducing these identifiers, the model developed by Bercovitch et al. becomes more responsive to the complex and multiple realities of conflict. By adding 'international context' to the list, Marieke Kleiboer expands this model further. She summarises the key contextual and process factors that are thought to explain international mediation outcomes as follows: (1) characteristics of the conflict, (2) the parties and their interrelationships, (3) characteristics of the mediator(s), (4) international context, and (5) mediator activities.³⁷

Therefore, the analytical typology of the conflict stages will be built on these frameworks of mediation although some modifications are required to suit the needs of this study. For example, while Kleiboer conducted her analyses of the parties and their interrelationship under a single heading, it might be more fruitful to create two separate categories: one specifically articulating the adversarial relationships and another focusing on the intra-party dynamics. This is because the internal political dynamics of the parties in conflict often affect their willingness to give consent to the United Nations' presence in their territory, which plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. According to Jo Husbands, "An understanding of the relative power of various pressure groups in a society would provide a useful measure of the likelihood and prospects for any de-escalation initiative."³⁸ In fact, this point is echoed by a number of scholars who sought to understand the timing of de-escalation efforts.³⁹ This point is particularly acute as the success of a UN peacekeeping operation is partially dependent on the consent and co-operation of the parties to its activities; thus, intra-party dynamics deserve a category of their own.

Hence, the context-based typology of conflict stages (sets of structural conditions and contextual circumstances) includes the characteristics of the *Adversarial Relationships*, of *Intra-party Dynamics* and of the *External Situations*. But what specific indicators do we look for or what particular questioners do we ask to identify the context-based stages of conflict? The academic literature that is most relevant to our quest for developing a typology of context-based conflict stages revolves around the study of a 'ripe moment', which was discussed at some length in Chapter Two.⁴⁰ This approach has its greatest utility in setting up benchmarks and signposts that help us recognise distinguishable features of various conflict stages.

(2) the conflict itself, and (3) the mediator (Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies—The Sudan Conflict* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987) pp. 29-30).

³⁷ Marieke Kleiboer, 'Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40, 2 (1996), pp. 360-389

³⁸ Jo L. Husbands, 'Domestic Factors and De-escalation Initiatives: Boundaries, Process, and Timing', in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991) p. 111

³⁹ See, for example, the importance of domestic factors are examined empirically by Louis Kriesberg in his study of de-escalation attempts in conflict (Louis Kriesberg, *International Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992); by Christopher Mitchell in his study of the settlement process of the Sudanese civil war (Christopher R. Mitchell, *Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972*, Working Paper 3 (Fairfax: George Mason University, 1989); and by John Stedman in his study of international mediation in Zimbabwe (Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).

⁴⁰ This ripe moment approach seeks to identify a set of conditions and circumstances that are most conducive to launching a peace initiative or beginning a de-escalation process. A ripe moment is a metaphorical way to refer to the right time or circumstances to launch an effort to make a desired change. See, for example, Louis Kriesberg, 'Introduction: Timing, Conditions, Strategies, and Errors', in Lois Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Timing: the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 4

It offers a useful theoretical guideline that allows us to focus on a certain group of contextual valuables amongst thousands of others that exist in complex and dynamic real-world conflicts. Hence, in the following, the ripe moment approach is reviewed as a step towards developing a conceptual framework of this study.⁴¹

Four models of ripe moments were reviewed briefly in Chapter Two. Clearly, the IMC and MHS models provide useful frameworks for identifying objective conditions ('sufficient' conflict conditions in relation to the cycle of conflicts), while the ENT model reveals psychological and political obstruction to conflict resolution, and the ENO model provides guidelines for third party intermediaries. The most important implication of these four models is that for conflict conditions (variables) to have any effect on parties' behaviour, they must be first filtered through subjective perceptions of the parties and be interpreted as ripe. In other words, they first have to bring about a change in the 'mentality' of the decision-makers.⁴² Identification of ripe moments thus involves both the leaders' perceptions of conflict conditions and their decision-making processes that interpret whether the time is ripe for resolution. This implies that a simple enumeration of objective conditions alone cannot be taken as sufficient indication of a ripe moment, and also that an analysis of the subjective dimensions of ripeness needs to be undertaken.⁴³ In short, the focus should not be limited to adversarial relationships, but rather it should be extended to internal dynamics of the parties and external contexts that might affect adversarial relationships, as has been advocated in the section above.

Three categories of the context-based conflict stages were developed in the previous section of this Chapter: (1) *Adversarial Relationship*, (2) *Intra-party Dynamics*, and (3) *External Situations*. For the first category, the IMC, MHS and ENO models of ripeness provide a useful set of indicators. According to these models, 'willingness to talk' on the part of parties is especially likely to evolve under following circumstances: (1) when the shift of policy occurs from coercive (unilateral) to conciliatory (bilateral) one; (2) when all parties perceive that they are approaching a mutually unavoidable catastrophe with a low probability of unilateral success; (3) when a rough parity of relative strength exists between the adversaries who perceive that a conflict has become stalemated and keeping the *status quo* demands painful costs; and (4) when the parties conceive the prospect of positive benefits through resolving the conflict peacefully.

For the second category, *Intra-party Dynamics*, the ENT model offers a different set of indicators that are thoroughly grounded in the internal political dynamics of the parties in conflict. The domestic circumstances of the conflict can be seen as ripe for resolution: (1) when the leaders of each party are able to overcome the burdens of psychological and political commitments they have made to

⁴¹ While it is possible to refine the model in such a way as to represent reality more adequately, no theoretical model can represent the complex reality of conflict dynamics and third party intervention perfectly. Hence, the following is an attempt to enhance the contingency model by re-examining the contents of the conflict stages, while maintaining the strengths of the original contingency model.

⁴² Mitchell, *Cutting Losses*, p. 10

⁴³ Mitchell, *Cutting Losses*, p. 10. Marieke Kleiboer suggested, for example, that researchers in conflict termination should focus more on the willingness of parties than objective conflict conditions—in her term "ripeness." She argued that ripe moments should be referred to as the moment when all important parties are willing to search for a peaceful settlement. The concept of ripeness is based on the values, preferences, and conventional beliefs about when de-escalation efforts are likely to be effective; thus it depends on the perceptions of those who make the assessments (Marieke Kleiboer, 'Review Essay: Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, 1 (1994), pp. 109-115).

engage in or continue the conflict; (2) the domestic factors, such as the political system and its processes, public opinion, the activities of elite and interest groups and other influential pressure groups, in each hosting party are favourable for the acceptance of the presence of intermediaries and co-operating with them; and (3) the leaders of each party are domestically strong enough to make foreign concessions so that their conciliatory initiatives or 'willingness to talk' would not be blocked by their domestic opposition groups.

On the other hand, none of the four ripeness models seem to suggest explicitly the indicators for the third criterion, *External Situations*, as the conditions that would fall into this category are treated, in these models, as factors that would affect the parties' assessment of their inter-party and intra-party situations. In other words, favourable changes in the conditions around each adversary are thought to lead the decision-makers to interpret the conflict situation as ripe for a negotiated solution. Nevertheless, this study assumes that External Situations would require a distinctive category of their own. A close examination of the empirical records of conflict resolution would indicate that conflicts are more amenable to de-escalation at least under the following external circumstances: (1) when the external parties who have direct interests in the outcome of the conflict are willing to support and co-operate with the peacemaking initiatives; and (2) when the members of the international community are willing to support the efforts towards a peace settlement.

For the comprehensive understanding of the conflict stage in which each UN peacekeeping operation is deployed, therefore, it is required that the above-mentioned nine indicators selected from the three categories of the context-based conflict stages should be examined.

3. *The Conceptual Framework of this Study*

The above analysis is an attempt to offer a concrete step towards developing an exploratory framework for linking two theoretical approaches to conflict analysis. By referring to the modified contingency model, the possible link between the conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches was outlined. Through this exercise, two points were illuminated. First, the contingency model suggests a fundamental attitude towards conflict analysis, that is, the resolution of a conflict would require different intervention strategies at different points in the conflict by different kinds of third party. At the same time, however, a close review of the ripe moment approach shows that instead of arguing whether timing is ripe for all intermediary de-escalation efforts, it would be more meaningful to analyse whether the conditions are ripe for certain kinds of third party strategies. "Ripeness for what?"⁴⁴ This question leads us to the second point. It is important to know the basic functions of UN peacekeeping, and to understand when, where and how these fit into an overall peace process.

In short, this Chapter proposed a way to modify the contingency model so as to reflect more adequately the real-world situations in which UN peacekeeping is most likely to be introduced. Thus, the next step is to articulate explicitly the key conceptual framework that guides this study. Under what circumstances and by fulfilling what particular functions does UN peacekeeping facilitate or impede the overall peace process? This is the main research question of this study, and the interactions of multiple intermediary efforts will be explored to judge the efficacy of

⁴⁴ Mitchell, *Cutting Losses*, p. 14

the UN peacekeeping operation as a complementary mechanism that would bridge the conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches.

As a preparatory step towards examining the interactive relationships between peacekeeping and other intermediary efforts, two issues need to be considered using the modified contingency model as a guideline. These are the context-based conflict stages and the functional categories of UN peacekeeping. Thus, the subsequent case studies begin by being based on the modified contingency model, and involve a review of *timing contingency* (conflict stage) and *function contingency* (peacekeeping functions). In the subsequent case studies, therefore, the contextual factor (conflict stage) is used to analyse the characteristics of the conflict situation, whereas three intermediary-centred factors (the peacekeeper's attributes, functions and relationships with other intermediaries) are used to examine the characteristics of the operation. Once the circumstances in which a particular UN peacekeeping operation is deployed and the functions that the operation is fulfilling are illuminated, co-ordination and complementarity of multiple efforts will be examined by looking at the interactive effects between peacekeeping and the other peace initiatives (peacemaking and peacebuilding) in the subsequent case studies. In other words, the study explores how these factors affected the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping within the overall peace processes in Cyprus and Cambodia by inquiring the operational questions listed below.

The Three Context-based Factors Determining Conflict Stages

(1) Adversarial Relationships

- Did the parties shift their policy from a coercive to a conciliatory one?
- Did the parties perceive that they were approaching an imminent mutual catastrophe?
- Did the parties face a mutually hurting stalemate with a rough parity of relative strength?
- Did the parties conceive the prospect of positive benefit through resolving the conflict peacefully?

(2) Intra-party Dynamics

- Were the leaders of each party able to overcome the burdens of the psychological and political commitments they had made to engage in or continue the conflict?
- Were the domestic factors in each party favourable to accepting the presence of intermediaries (particularly that of the UN peacekeeping operation) and co-operating with them?
- Were the leaders of each party domestically strong enough to make foreign concessions so that their domestic opposition groups would not block their conciliatory initiatives or 'willingness to talk'?

(3) External Situations

- Were the external parties who have direct interests in the outcome of the conflict willing to support and co-operate with the peacemaking initiatives?
- Were the members of the international community willing to support the efforts towards a peace settlement (such as a UN peacekeeping operation)?

The Three Attributes of UN Peacekeeping

(1) Consent

(2) Impartiality

(3) Non-use of Force

The Three Functional Categories of UN Peacekeeping

(1) Interposition Functions

- Cease-fire Supervision
- Disengagement of Forces
- Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops
- Arms Transfer Control
- Maintenance of Law and Order
- Preventive Deployment

(2) Transition Assistance Functions

- Institutional Reinforcement
- Nation Building
- Election Assistance
- Demobilisation and Regrouping
- De-mining
- Refugee Assistance
- Human Rights Verification
- Socio-economic Rehabilitation

(3) Humanitarian Intervention Functions

- Securing Humanitarian Assistance
- Protective Services

The Interactive Effects of Three Peace Initiatives

(1) Co-ordination and Complementarity between Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

(2) Co-ordination and Complementarity between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Chapter Four

AN IMPEDIMENT TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

*"By helping to protect and thus consolidate the abnormal status quo and by reducing the sense of urgency felt by both sides, the Force [UNFICYP] may actually be making a negative contribution to what in the long run is the most important requirement, a viable political order."*¹

1. Introduction

The primary purpose of this Chapter is to examine the effects of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) upon the peace process in Cyprus. By examining the interaction among a series of third party interventions in the Cyprus conflict, the study seeks to reveal what contextual conditions may have prevented UNFICYP from performing effectively and by performing what functions UNFICYP may have jeopardised the overall peace process. By shedding the light on the opposing effects of UNFICYP to peacemaking and peacebuilding, the interactive effects between peacekeeping and other intermediary efforts in Cyprus will be illuminated in this Chapter.

It can be argued that the Cyprus conflict has not been resolved fully as the parties to the conflict have not been able to find a solution that can satisfy the basic needs of all parties.² Although major physical violence between the two primary parties has been kept, in general, to a minimum level for many years, the continuing presence of UNFICYP would indicate that the parties are still at odds with one another and the situation remains potentially volatile. James Stegenga argued as early as 1968 that it would be a misplaced criticism to blame UNFICYP for not having resolved the Cyprus conflict since the lack of progress in the search for a political solution in Cyprus should not be attributed blindly and entirely to the performance of UNFICYP.³ Nevertheless, the mere fact that UNFICYP has been deployed in Cyprus since 1964 with few achievements in the search for a solution to the conflict would cast doubt on whether UNFICYP has been efficient in bringing about an environment that is conducive to peacemaking or peaceful resolution of the

¹ James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968) p. 186

² As for the terminology that indicates the struggle in Cyprus, 'the Cyprus conflict' is used in this study to maintain the impartiality between the two major parties to the conflict since Greek-Cypriots (as well as most of the outside observers) often use the term 'the Cyprus problem' whereas Turkish-Cypriots choose to call it 'the Cyprus question'. For example, M. Necati Munir Ertekun, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and Co-ordinating Ambassador and Special Adviser on Political Affairs to the President of the TRNC, declares that, "I don't say the Cyprus problem because for the Turkish-Cypriots the problem was resolved in 1974 after Turkey came and saved us. It is no longer a problem, it is a question of how the two communities, how the two people on the island, can live together and co-exist together on this small island" (Personal interview conducted 4 October 2000 in Nicosia).

³ Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, p. 184

conflict.⁴

In fact, UN Secretary-General U Thant expressed such dissatisfaction with UNFICYP's achievement as early as 1967, when he warned that excessive confidence in the presence of UNFICYP had reduced the parties' willingness to negotiate a settlement.⁵ More recently, in 1993, one of his successors Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that, "It is often asked whether UNFICYP is not part of the problem in Cyprus, rather than part of the solution."⁶

This study seeks to demonstrate, therefore, that the presence and activities of UNFICYP have not only positive but also negative effects on the overall peace process in Cyprus, and that along with many other factors some functions of UNFICYP might have unwittingly impeded the resolution of the conflict. It can be argued, for example, that the fact that UNFICYP was deployed to suppress overt violence between the contestants in the island allowed it to become one of the necessary props of an enduring stalemate. In other words, because UNFICYP helped to reduce the urgency of the situation, most of the players in the conflict opted for the continuation of the relatively comfortable impasse rather than an uncertain 'solution' that might require of them a series of concessions. Instead of taking full advantage of the cessation of the hostilities created by UNFICYP for the purpose of generating a genuine agreement, the parties exploited it for their own interest by holding out continuously during the peacemaking process for more favourable terms. In addition, some external players were concerned primarily on preventing the Cyprus conflict from becoming a source of tension between Greece and Turkey. Thus, while the presence of UNFICYP has prevented people from being killed in the crossfire and numerous minor incidents from escalating to a widespread war, some by-products of its activities have been counter-productive for the purpose of peacemaking and peacebuilding. As a result, one could argue ironically that UNFICYP which aims to keep 'peace' also helped to prolong the conflict in Cyprus.

In fact, UNFICYP is often referred to as a good example of the counter-productive effect of peacekeeping, and underlines the importance of combining peacekeeping with other efforts to achieve a durable solution to the conflict.⁷ In Cyprus, a peacekeeping success, whatever that means, has undermined

⁴ The notable achievements of United Nations peace efforts in Cyprus, besides the prevention of further large-scale bloodshed, are the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, which provided a framework for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. However, after a lengthy process of inter-communal talks, the two communities still seem far apart on issues regarding sovereignty, equality, freedom of movement and settlement, security arrangements and other basic concerns. The lack of progress in the official peacemaking process has increased the awareness of the important role of unofficial bi-communal contacts and has led to greater co-ordination among Track One missions to support Track Two activities (Benjamin J. Broome, 'Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus: Their Contribution to the Peace Process', *The Cyprus Review*, 10, 1 (Spring 1998), p. 62).

⁵ *UN Document (S/7969)*, 1967, quoted in N. D. White, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993) p. 242.

⁶ *UN Document (S/26777)*, 22 November 1993, para. 101

⁷ On this point, see Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) p. 103; Karl Th. Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 234; Oliver Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', *The Cyprus Review*, 6, 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 7-42; Nicholas Sambanis, 'The United Nations Operations in Cyprus: A New Look at the Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Relationship', *International Peacekeeping*, 6, 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 79-108; Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998); and Farid Mirbagheri, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: An Accommodation of Functions* (unpublished conference paper

a chance of success in peacemaking. While agreeing on the undermining effect of peacekeeping, Nicholas Sambanis, on the other hand, presents a rather different assessment of UNFICYP's contribution. His critical view on UNFICYP's effect upon the peacemaking process in Cyprus is best expressed in the following statement:

“UNFICYP has been a peacekeeping failure, as it has not been able to implement the most important aspects of its mandate. ... Thus UNFICYP's negative influence on peacemaking was due to its peacekeeping failure, not its success as is commonly argued in the literature.”⁸

The point about the impeding side-effect of UNFICYP is well taken, however, it does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that peacekeeping is counter-productive for conflict resolution, and that UNFICYP should therefore be withdrawn immediately. Such an over-simplified argument is rather misleading. By the same token, it is not so important to determine whether UNFICYP was a peacekeeping success or failure since different conclusions would be arrived at depending on the definition of success that each observer applied. What is more important, however, is to identify what functions of UNFICYP have become impediments to conflict resolution in Cyprus under what contextual conditions. It would be much more useful to identify specific circumstances in which UNFICYP operates and particular functions which UNFICYP undertakes that might be undermining the work of other intermediaries than to argue that all of the functions fulfilled by UNFICYP have always been an inhibiting factor in the achievement of a resolution of the conflict in Cyprus.

Hence the conflict situation and the interactive effects between UNFICYP and other intermediary efforts in Cyprus will be examined extensively below so that the above assessment about the negative contributions of UNFICYP to the overall peace process can be verified. Michael Harbottle once put forward an argument that: “Cyprus provides a patchwork of scenarios involving different degrees and types of third party action ranging from the good offices of the United Nations secretary-general to the conciliatory initiatives at the grass roots level of a subordinate or low profile character.”⁹ A wide variety of intermediaries, which range from various agencies of the United Nations to different types of non-official facilitators, have intervened in the Cyprus conflict over a long period of time. Thus, a close analysis of the Cyprus conflict would provide an appropriate and useful case in which the interactive effects of various third party interventions can be assessed and the potential complementarity and sequencing of such interventions can be speculated.¹⁰ A.J.R. Groom endorses such an attempt when he states that,

“... the case of Cyprus holds many lessons for the relationship between peace-keeping and peace-making and for the interaction between conflict settlement and conflict resolution. While peace-keeping may help in the

presented at the ACUNS, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 1998).

⁸ Sambanis, 'The United Nations Operation in Cyprus', p. 80

⁹ Michael Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', *International Journal*, 35, 1 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 124

¹⁰ Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict: A Cyprus Illustration', *International Journal*, 45 (Spring 1990), p. 440

settlement of the conflict, whereby violence is held at bay but the causes of the conflict remain so that in essence the situation is one of truce, this peace-keeping process may act as an inhibiting factor in the achievement of a resolution of conflict, that is peace-making."¹¹

In order to achieve this objective, the following steps are taken. First, a synopsis of the Cyprus conflict is presented together with some essential historical background, then, the characteristics of the Cyprus conflict and those of UNFICYP are examined by applying the analytical framework developed in the previous Chapters. Finally, a detailed analysis of the relationships between UNFICYP and other intermediary efforts is carried out to identify these functions of UNFICYP that might have hampered the activities of other intermediaries and under what conditions.

2. *Synopsis of the Cyprus Conflict*

Before attempting to analyse the interactive effects between UNFICYP and other initiatives, it is helpful to outline the main features and background of the Cyprus conflict. The purpose of this brief sketch is to shed some light on factors that seem important for understanding the nature of the conflict in which UNFICYP has been involved since 1964.

2.1. **Brief History of the Cyprus Conflict and its Parties**

The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state from the British colonial rule on 16 August 1960 as a result of the Zürich-London Agreements. The Agreements were embodied in three international treaties (the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance) and the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.¹² Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as signatories of the treaty, were given a status as guarantor powers and accorded the right to intervene in Cyprus with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs (preferably as a co-ordinated joint action of the three guarantor powers, but if this proved to be impossible, each of them reserved the right to take action unilaterally).¹³ On the other hand, under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey were allowed to station their armed contingents on Cyprus, numbering 950 and 650, respectively.

The constitution together with the rest of the treaties recognised a distinction between the two communities in the island (that is, the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities).¹⁴ It sought to maintain a balance of power between

¹¹ A.J.R. Groom, 'The Process of Negotiation, 1974-1993', in C. H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political Social and Economic Development in Northern Cyprus* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1993), p. 16

¹² Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee. The Treaty of Alliance was signed between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

¹³ This point is particularly important in the analysis of the legal perspectives on one of the highlights of the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish military intervention in 1974.

¹⁴ Greek-Cypriots believed themselves to be part of the Hellenic civilisation, spoke Greek, and most of them belonged to Greek-Orthodox Church, whereas Turkish-Cypriots had Turkish ancestry, spoke Turkish, and most of them were secularist Muslims. President Makarios led the Greek-Cypriot community and Vice-President Fazil Kuchuk led the Turkish-Cypriot community. According to the 1960 census there were 442,521 Greek-Cypriots (making up 78 per cent of the total population of 574,000), 104,350 Turkish-Cypriots (18 per cent of the total), and 31,000 Maronites, Armenians, and

the two communities by safeguarding the rights of the smaller one, assuring the participation of each community in the exercise of the functions of the government as well as partial administrative autonomy to each community.¹⁵

Contrary to the objective of the Zürich-London Agreements, these provisions stipulated in the constitution failed to prevent further division between the two communities, and the newly independent Republic soon reached functional deadlock. The Greek-Cypriots accused the Turkish-Cypriot leadership of abusing the constitutional safeguards of their interests by holding up the passage of the income tax and custom laws.¹⁶ On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots were not at all convinced that the Greek-Cypriot had given up their national aspiration of *enosis* (union with Greece) due to repeated remarks by the Greek-Cypriot leadership, which seemed to advocate *enosis*.

In order to break the deadlock, President Makarios attempted a constitutional change by submitting his 13 points proposal on 30 November 1963, which would have eliminated the special status of Turkish-Cypriots.¹⁷ This move by Makarios was interpreted by the Turkish-Cypriots as a firm step towards *enosis*, and provoked a series of inter-communal fights throughout the island. Turkey deployed its national military contingents stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance to various strategic positions to aid Turkish-Cypriots, and its military aircraft flew over the island in a show of strength.¹⁸

On 24 December 1963, three days after the outbreak of inter-communal fighting, the three guarantor powers were able to broker a truce between the warring factions, and a cease-fire 'Green-line' was drawn through Nicosia and the British 'peacekeeping' troops started patrolling on 26 December 1963. Since exacerbation of the inter-communal strife might well have led to a major conflict between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies in the southern flank, the United Kingdom (with the strong endorsement of the United States) proposed the idea of a NATO peacekeeping force to suppress the inter-communal strife at the London Conference in which the five parties met on 15 January 1964. However, the idea of a NATO peacekeeping force was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot delegation. The delegation insisted that such a force should be placed under the control of the United Nations.

Upon a rapid and grave deterioration of the situation, involving scattered inter-communal fighting with heavy casualties, kidnapping and the taking of hostages, unbridled activities by irregular forces, separation of the members of the

Europeans (4 per cent of the total). Both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were distributed throughout the island. 63 per cent of Cyprus's towns and villages were purely Greek, 19 per cent were purely Turkish, and 18 per cent were mixed in 1960. Half the population lived in purely Greek communities, 7 per cent lived in purely Turkish towns and villages, and 43 per cent lived in mixed communities (quoted in Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, p. 15).

¹⁵ The UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficy.org/>, accessed on 4 December 2000). Several safeguarding mechanisms were indeed stipulated in the constitution. For example, the Greek-Cypriot community would elect the president (a Greek-Cypriot) and the Turkish-Cypriot community would elect the vice-president (a Turkish-Cypriot), and each of them would have a veto power over decisions of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence or security. A Turkish-Cypriot would hold one of the key ministries, Defence, Finance or Foreign Affairs. The House of Representatives and civil servants would be composed of 70 per cent Greek-Cypriots and 30 per cent Turkish-Cypriots and the army would be in the ratio of 60 per cent Greek-Cypriots to 40 per cent Turkish-Cypriots.

¹⁶ Oliver P. Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations* (London: Frank Cass, 1998) p. 77

¹⁷ Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', p. 220

¹⁸ Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', p. 221

two communities, and disintegration of the machinery of government, as well as fears of military intervention by Turkey or Greece, the matter was brought to the United Nations.¹⁹ Eventually, on 4 March 1964, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 by which it recommended the creation of UNFICYP, and recommended its function should be, “in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”

Upon the further deterioration of the situation in Cyprus and the gap between the legal and operational establishment of UNFICYP surfaced, the government of Turkey sent messages to President Makarios on 12 March 1964, and to the Secretary-General on the following day, stating that unless assaults on the Turkish-Cypriots ceased, Turkey would act unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee to send a Turkish force to Cyprus until the UNFICYP effectively performed its functions. While Turkish military intervention was, in the event, prevented by the presence of UNFICYP and diplomatic pressure from the United States, a series of negotiations took place between the leaders of the two communities for almost ten years. Nevertheless, the two communities were not able to come up with a mutually satisfactory solution that could settle their difference without resorting to force.

On 15 July 1974, the Cyprus National Guard (the Greek-Cypriot paramilitary force), under the direction of Greek officers, staged a *coup d'état* against ‘the Government of Cyprus’ headed by President Makarios, which was followed by the first Turkish military intervention on 20 July 1974.²⁰ After the breakdown of negotiations at the Geneva Conference, the second round of the Turkish military campaign was launched on 14 August 1974, which eventually resulted in the occupation of the northern part of the island. This series of events significantly affected the adversarial relationship between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots. In fact, the 1974 Turkish military intervention altered the military power balance between the communities completely and gave the Turkish-Cypriots the upper hand. Thus, a new situation emerged in which a *de facto* partition of the island was created. Having been unable to prevent intervention from both Greece and Turkey and having failed to prevent a recurrence of fighting between protagonists, UNFICYP received virtually a new mandate that is still effective today.²¹ For instance, UNFICYP began to assume primal responsibility for the maintenance of ‘peace’ within the UN Buffer Zone, whereas it had to be accountable for the maintenance of ‘peace’ in the whole island when it was established in 1964.²²

¹⁹ The UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficyp.org/>, accessed on 4 December 2000)

²⁰ Since the 1963-64 inter-communal strife ‘the Government of Cyprus’ only represented the Greek-Cypriot community because in the midst of the inter-communal strife the Turkish-Cypriot members were given no choice but to leave the government if they did not wish to compromise their own security. While some Turkish-Cypriot members were forced to leave the government due to a certain Greek-Cypriots’ policy, the others were compelled to do so due to pressure from their own community.

²¹ The Secretary-General requested reinforcements from contributing countries to meet the new demand, which resulted in the increase of UNFICYP’s strength from 2,078 to 4,444 by 14 August 1974.

²² According to N. D. White, between 1964 and 1974, UNFICYP did not act as a buffer force between the two communities, but rather as a police force since there were not, as such, definable cease-fire lines; in short, the nature of the UNFICYP operation was changed from that for

Several other symbolic developments followed the 1974 incident in Cyprus, such as the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. In addition, a few operational and organizational adjustments of UNFICYP were carried out, most of which were due to the deteriorating financial situation of the Force and frustration felt by a number of troop-contributing countries over the lack of progress towards a lasting political solution to the Cyprus problem.²³ Nevertheless, neither these external developments nor UNFICYP's internal circumstances have seemed to create a new situation that required any fundamental change in UNFICYP's mandate since 1974.

2.2. Main Features of the Cyprus Conflict

While everyone seems to agree that the Cyprus conflict has proved to be one of the most protracted conflicts in the world, its definition is highly contested. For example, quite a few Greek-Cypriots argue that the British colonial policy of 'divide and rule' created hostilities between the two communities, and this division was exploited by external powers such as Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States to advance their interests in the island or the region.²⁴ Thus, they tend to portray the Cyprus conflict as an international dispute, particularly one between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriots often maintain that one of the major sources of the Cyprus conflict has been the policy of *enosis* that was pursued by Greek-Cypriots. Being a numerical minority in the island Turkish-Cypriots have a tendency to characterise their struggle as a war of liberation from Greek-Cypriot domination. On the other hand, in the analysis of outside observers, the inability of both communities to come up with a mutually agreeable solution is usually highlighted as the primary reason for prolonging conflict.

This disagreement over the definition of the conflict is due to the fact that the

inter-communal to inter-state conflict after the 1974 crisis (White, *Keeping the Peace*, pp. 241-242). However, White argues elsewhere that the fact that there were only two parties enabled UNFICYP to function similarly to an inter-state peacekeeping force by separating the two communities (Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, *The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) p. 27).

²³ Until 1993, UNFICYP was the only UN peacekeeping operation that was not financed from assessed contributions by the member states of the United Nations. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), the costs of the Force were met by the governments providing the military contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations. For example, the reduction of the force was carried out when the Finnish battalion withdrew in October 1977 (no replacement of the battalion was undertaken). The withdrawal of the Swedish battalion in 1987 not only reduced the strength of the force but it also resulted in a major adjustment in the deployment of the force. Furthermore, in December 1992, the size of the force was significantly reduced by the withdrawal of the Danish battalion and the reduction of the British, Austrian and Canadian contingents (the UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficy.org/>, accessed on 4 December 2000)).

²⁴ See, for example, Joseph S. Joseph, 'The International Power Broker: A Critical View of the Foreign Policy of Archbishop Makarios', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 3, 2 (1992), p. 20. In its official publication, the Greek-Cypriot government writes: "The British Government, in its attempt to thwart the Cyprus people's aspirations for self-determination, exploited the presence in Cyprus of the Turkish Cypriot minority, and sought assistance from Turkey in obstructing the natural trend of events in Cyprus. After some hesitation the Turkish Government accepted the invitation to intervene in Cyprus, in defiance of its solemn undertaking under the Treaty of Lausanne, and a section of the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus became the instrument both of British colonialism and of a new expansionist tendency on Turkey" (Republic of Cyprus, *The Cyprus Problem: Historical Review and the Latest Developments* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, 1999) p. 6).

two primary parties to the conflict hold diametrically opposing positions that are based on two completely different views of the historical developments. While it is clear that the 1963-64 inter-communal strife led directly to the establishment of UNFICYP, a wide diversity of opinions exists about the origin of the conflict, i.e., when it started. When the Turkish-Cypriots' nightmare was terminated by the Turkish military intervention in 1974, the Greek-Cypriots' nightmare began. For Turkish-Cypriots the problem was resolved thanks to the Turkish 'peace operation' in 1974, whereas for Greek-Cypriots the problem was created as a result of the same Turkish 'invasion' in 1974. The problem of disagreement over the origin of the conflict cannot be overemphasised because any starting point tends to influence the subsequent analysis:

"Should we accept our starting point as 1960 with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state, or 1963 with the breakdown of that Republic? For others, the events of 1974, with a *coup d'état* against Archbishop Makarios which was supported actively by Greece, the subsequent Turkish military intervention, and the division of the island into two separate zones are the causes of the present complaint. Or perhaps we should consider 1983, when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was created. Where you stand on the question of Cyprus depends not a little on what date you choose as your starting point."²⁵

Furthermore, in protracted conflicts parties have a tendency to see themselves as victims (mutual sense of victimisation) and experience mutual fear of destruction.²⁶ Likewise, each community in Cyprus separately hold the view that they are the sole victims of the conflict who have suffered tremendously from atrocities committed by the other side or interference by external powers. As a result, both sides fell into a selective perception of historical accounts. In other words, there is a general tendency for both sides to refer to a particular period in the history of the conflict. For instance, Greek-Cypriots have a tendency to avoid addressing the period between 1963 and 1974 as if they are fearful that accepting responsibility for atrocities committed during this period might justify the post-1974 *status quo*. Thus, they focus mainly on the post-1974 period.²⁷ On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots almost always stress the atrocities committed by Greek-Cypriots against them during the 1963-1974 phase as if they believe such traumatic experiences would justify the continuation of the post-1974 *status quo*, which in effect allows the physical and mental suffering of some victims of the conflict to continue.

While examining such inter-communal aspects is fundamental to the study, a close analysis of the literature would delineate the fact that the conflict is indeed

²⁵ A.J.R. Groom, 'An End to Protracted Conflict?: Cyprus, the UN and Europe', *Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations* (1992)

²⁶ Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 'Little Confidence in Confidence Building? Conflict Resolution in the Context of the United Nations', in Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey (eds.), *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving Old Conflict?* (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997), p. 37

²⁷ Costas Melakopides, *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative* (Kingston: Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, 1996) pp. 3-4. Some of the most conciliatory elements in the Greek-Cypriot community would acknowledge the mistakes made by them between 1963 and 1974. However, even such people share the inclination for paying more attention to the post-1974 events.

composed of at least three other elements. Thus, the four dimensions of the conflict have to be taken into consideration. It is obvious that the analysis of the inter-communal dimension highlights intermittent fighting that took place between the two communities in the island. In other words, the first dimension shows the characteristic of a secessionist struggle through demands by a large minority community of 18 per cent for a separate sovereignty from the majority of about 80 per cent.²⁸ The second dimension would focus on the 'inter-state' aspect of the conflict, which involves two major players in the region, i.e., Greece and Turkey. The third dimension revolves around the strategic significance of Cyprus in the region. Cyprus can serve as a keystone for launching military operations to the Middle East, and therefore the United Kingdom has retained military bases under sovereign control some use of which is also made by US forces.²⁹ This 'regional' element indicates a key role played by the United Kingdom in the Cyprus conflict. In addition, the Cyprus conflict should be understood in the context of the Cold War. The 'global' dimension cannot be overlooked since the Cold War confrontation was brought to Cyprus as a result of intervention by the United States and the Soviet Union.

In short, the Cyprus conflict contains some elements of civil war, some features of a wider Greek-Turkish rivalry, and British interests in the Middle East, as well as important characteristics of the Superpower confrontation. While acknowledging the need for maintaining a comprehensive view of the conflict, this study focuses on the inter-communal dimension; therefore, the outbreak of the 1963-64 inter-communal strife will be chosen as the starting point for the subsequent analysis.

2.3. Review of the Cyprus Peacemaking Process

The United Nations assumed the prime responsibility for providing a framework for the search for a solution in the official peacemaking process in Cyprus. At the same time, however, a number of other peacemaking efforts were carried out by intermediaries other than the United Nations, sometimes to break a deadlock in the UN-sponsored talks, and sometimes in parallel with the United Nations effort, bringing both complementary and contradictory consequences to UN peacemaking. Very little interaction has been recorded, however, between non-UN peacemaking attempts and UNFICYP. Hence, UN peacemaking efforts will be concentrated upon below although a minimum account of other intermediary initiatives will also be provided whenever that is proved to be necessary.

Brief Summary of UN Peacemaking in the Pre-1974 Period

United Nations' contributions to the pre-1974 phase of the Cyprus peace process can be summarised as follows. The effects of UN peacemaking upon the overall peace process in Cyprus were at best limited, if not negative, in the pre-1974 phase. During the inter-communal talks (1968-1974), the United Nations intermediary efforts were dormant, except for the periodic passage of UN Security Council resolutions to renew UNFICYP's mandate and the periodic submission of the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council.

²⁸ The Turkish-Cypriot's demand seems to have changed from the quest for autonomy to the quest for independence over the course of negotiation.

²⁹ A.J.R. Groom, 'Cyprus, Greece and Turkey: A Treadmill for Diplomacy', in John T.A. Koumoulides (ed.), *Cyprus in Transition: 1960-1985* (London: Trigraph, 1986), pp. 126-127

In this phase, the United Nations not only failed to broker any agreement between the parties, but it also failed to perform effectively as an intermediary in the process, especially after the submission of the Galo Plaza Report.³⁰ In addition, the effectiveness and credibility of the United Nations were seriously undermined by the parallel mediation efforts of the United States, which sought a solution that was diametrically opposed to the one that the United Nations was trying to secure.³¹ The failure of UN peacemaking also resulted from the perceived partiality of UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) and the subsequent Galo Plaza Report as well as the ineffectiveness of UNFICYP to protect Turkish-Cypriots from the attacks of the Greek-Cypriot forces. These defects made the Turkish-Cypriots believe that the involvement of the United Nations in the peacemaking process would do more harm than good.

In sum, the United Nations involvement in Cyprus in this phase exposed the limit of its peacemaking capability at a time of minimum co-operation from one of the primary parties, and a relative divergence in the goals pursued by the United Nations and the United States in the search for a solution. Meanwhile, the 1974 crisis brought the peacemaking process right back to the beginning as it overturned the military balance in the island.

Brief Summary of UN Peacemaking in the Post-1974 Period

Since the failure of the Galo Plaza Report at the outset of UN peacemaking in Cyprus, UN Mediation had been dormant and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was undertaking a less active mission by arranging and facilitating the inter-communal talks in the pre-1974 phase. Such a characteristic of UN peacemaking, however, seemed to have changed gradually in the post-1974 phase. The mission of Good Offices began to assume more and more active role in the search for a negotiated solution in Cyprus and different Secretaries-General produced various *de facto* proposals for a long-term solution such as 'Interim Agreement' of 1981 (Kurt Waldheim), 'Aide-Mémoires' of 1983 (Pérez de Cuéllar), 'Vienna Working Points' of 1984 (Pérez de Cuéllar), 'Draft Framework Agreements' of 1986 (Pérez de Cuéllar) and 'Set of Ideas' of 1992 (Boutros Boutros-Ghali).³² In fact, the mission of Good Offices of the Secretary-General represented almost the entire UN peacemaking efforts in the post-1974 period.³³ With a view to encourage the parties to make a final critical compromise for reaching agreement, the mediation style of the Secretary-General, with a firm backing of the UN Security Council, shifted from non-forceful consultation to more coercive and directive approach, especially after the Cold War ended. However, even such a coercive mediation by the Secretary-General did not bear fruit. Hence, UN peacemaking failed to secure a

³⁰ On 26 March 1965 Galo Plaza submitted a highly controversial, if not totally one-sided, report on his mediation effort, in which he made a number of recommendations (*UN Documents (S/6253)*, 26 March 1965). In essence, the report sought a unitary solution to the Cyprus conflict. As a result, the Galo Plaza Report was very critically received by Turkey, and the Turkish-Cypriot side immediately called for Galo Plaza's resignation on the grounds that he had overstepped his mandate by acting as an arbitrator rather than a mediator and that he had put forward his own suggestions without the consent of the parties concerned.

³¹ Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, p. 81

³² Indeed, the two sides came very close to signing at least two of the United Nations proposals in the post-1974 phase: one is the 1986 Draft Framework Agreement and the other is the 1992 Set of Ideas.

³³ Particularly during the immediate aftermath of the 1974 crisis, UN peacemaking not only envisaged facilitating a long-term political solution but also sought to broker practical agreements to alleviate the suffering of the people in the island.

peace agreement between the two communities, and its limited achievements on the negotiation table were seldom implemented on the ground.

Despite the considerable peacemaking efforts by the Secretary-General and active support from the Security Council, the lack of a negotiated solution in Cyprus would appear to indicate that neither community is particularly desperate for a resolution of the conflict. It is true that few Greek-Cypriots are satisfied with the *status quo* in which they believe that the Turkish-Cypriots unjustly took a disproportionate piece of the island.³⁴ The Greek-Cypriots are also frustrated and feel threatened by the presence of the Turkish military forces, but they enjoy astonishing economic success, still control more than 60 per cent of the territory, and most importantly do not want to offer equal political status to the Turkish-Cypriots. Having their own 'state,' on the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots also feel little urgency to reach a compromise settlement. This point is particularly true for the Turkish-Cypriot leaders who together with their patrons in Ankara are masters of their own territory, regardless of how small, isolated and poor it might be.³⁵

Of course, neither Greek-Cypriots nor Turkish-Cypriots consider the present stalemate to be ideal, both of them can surely live with it. But what they are not sure is whether a negotiated settlement would create a better situation than the continuing tolerable stalemate. Under such a circumstance, for the parties to opt for a negotiated settlement, they must be convinced that the process of negotiation would lead to an outcome that is clearly better, from their point of view, than the present situation.³⁶ Thus, it can be argued that none of the UN proposals was perceived to promise a considerable improvement of the situation in view of the risks involved.

3. Conflict Ripeness

As examined in Chapter Two, much of the literature on third-party intervention suggests that a conflict is most likely to be resolved or de-escalated under similar circumstances.³⁷ Using a set of questions that was developed through the review of the literature, the three dimensions of the conflict situation in which UNFICYP operated will be analysed below.

3.1. Adversarial Relationship

Did the parties shift their policy from a coercive to a conciliatory one?

In the pre-1974 period, the Turkish-Cypriots' policy was conciliatory because they were at the mercy of the Greek-Cypriots in circumstances in which Turkish military intervention was blocked. However, as UNFICYP failed to protect many Turkish-Cypriots from the Greek-Cypriot's offensive and the Greek-Cypriot

³⁴ Richard N. Haass, *Conflict Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990) p. 66

³⁵ Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 67

³⁶ Groom, 'An End to Protracted Conflict?', p. 41

³⁷ For example, see Haass, *Conflict Unending*; Marieke Kleiboer, 'Review Essay: Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, 1 (1994), pp. 109-116; Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Timing: the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991); Christopher R. Mitchell, *Cutting Losses: Reflections on Appropriate Timing*, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper 9 (Fairfax: George Mason University, 1995); Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-80* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); and I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

leadership showed no willingness to make compromises during the negotiations, the 'hawks' in the Turkish-Cypriot community became more and more influential, and thus their negotiation policy began more and more coercive. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriots were not prepared to make any conciliatory move at the outset. They did not hesitate to suppress the Turkish-Cypriots' resistance even before UNFICYP's very eyes when their interests were at stake. It was only after they nearly experienced a full-scale Turkish military intervention in Cyprus that the Greek-Cypriots shifted their policy from a coercive one to a more conciliatory one.

The crisis in 1974 forced the Greek-Cypriot side to abandon some of their most coercive policies towards a resolution of the conflict, i.e., *enosis*. The massive Turkish military intervention eliminated the Greek-Cypriots' chance to win their conflict on the battlefield. At the same time, however, the Greek-Cypriot side still operated with a winning mentality and felt they still have a good chance of winning at the negotiation table. It is true that the Greek-Cypriot community was exposed to a constant threat from the Turkish troops deployed alongside the UN Buffer Zone as a result of the Turkish intervention in 1974, and it lost nearly 40 per cent of its territory, which forced almost one third of its entire population to abandon their houses.³⁸ Nevertheless, the Greek-Cypriot side still had some important advantages over the Turkish-Cypriot side on many aspects of their adversarial relationship. For example, the Greek-Cypriot side continued to enjoy the status of the only legitimate government in Cyprus, which provided it with numerous opportunities to make itself heard in international fora. The Greek-Cypriot side also succeeded in obtaining co-operation from many parts of the world to place an economic and political embargo on the territory controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot administration.³⁹ In short, the Turkish military victory in 1974, while changing the military situation and redrawing the territorial demarcation, did not reverse the political situation in the favour of the Turkish-Cypriots, and the Greek-Cypriots maintained its enormous leverage in the negotiation process.

With their military victory in the 1974 war, the Turkish-Cypriots' strategies became more and more coercive at the negotiation table. As the Turkish-Cypriot side gained more than it had demanded in the UN Mediation process before the war, it was very difficult for it to find enough incentive to settle for less than it had already achieved through their military victory. Indeed, under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish-Cypriots have been enjoying the fruit of 1974: *de facto* independence and self-determination.⁴⁰ Any efforts that might undermine these achievements were not pursued seriously by the Turkish-Cypriot side. Instead, the Turkish-Cypriots were seeking to consolidate their achievements by the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in 1975 as well as the unilateral declaration of independence as the TRNC in 1983. In short, the policy of the Turkish-Cypriots has not changed to a conciliatory one. Indeed, the basic aim of the Turkish-Cypriot side was to avoid any critical loss at the negotiation table, whereas the Greek-Cypriot leadership was seeking to win.⁴¹

³⁸ As a result of the Turkish military intervention in 1974, quite a few Turkish-Cypriots were also had to abandon their houses and to seek refuge in the North.

³⁹ In fact, the success of the Greek-Cypriot community in gaining international support for their case continually undermined the negotiations by fortifying the Turkish-Cypriots' position and was in that sense, counter-productive for their victory, let alone reaching a resolution (Groom, 'Cyprus, Greece and Turkey', p. 133; and Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', p. 17).

⁴⁰ Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 66

⁴¹ Groom, 'Cyprus, Greece and Turkey', pp. 130-131

Did the parties perceive that they were approaching an imminent mutual catastrophe?

Before the Turkish military intervention in 1974, the Turkish-Cypriots perceived that their community was approaching a total annihilation if the inter-communal strife continued. This is one of the reasons why the Turkish-Cypriots accepted the intervention of the United Nations when a full-scale Turkish military intervention had been excluded as a result of the US diplomacy. Although the presence of UNFICYP surely saved the lives of many vulnerable Turkish-Cypriots from the Greek-Cypriot attacks, its role as a shield against possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus had far-reaching implications on the equation of the military balance within the island. In short, the presence of UNFICYP, which was the embodiment of the will of the international community, checked any chance of the introduction of a considerable counter-balance into the island. Thus, in the pre-1974 period, the balance of military power between the two communities of the island was favouring only one side. Had both sides perceived that the continuation of the inter-communal fighting would certainly lead to mutual disaster, they might have been able to reach a negotiated settlement. However, because the situation was catastrophic only for the Turkish-Cypriot side, it did not bring about an atmosphere that was conducive to peacemaking.

Although the 1974 war changed the balance of power between the Greek-Cypriot side and the Turkish-Cypriot side and forced the former to be conciliatory, it failed to stimulate political compromises from both sides that were necessary to reach a negotiated settlement. Hence, there is no reason to suppose a new outbreak of fighting would have a different result.⁴² At the same time, however, it can be argued that because the consequences of the 1974 war were catastrophic largely for the Greek-Cypriot side, if both sides perceive that the recurrent of fighting would be mutually disastrous, then they should have the greatest incentive to promote a negotiated settlement.⁴³ Nonetheless, the military balance between Greece and the Greek-Cypriots on the one side and Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots on the other has not changed since 1974. Moreover, as the end of the Cold War did not degrade the strategic importance of Turkey for NATO, it is very unlikely that the United States, the only country with the potential to forestall another Turkish military operation in Cyprus, would act differently from the last time. Therefore, it can be concluded that neither party perceived that it was approaching an imminent mutual catastrophe in 1974 and such a view has not changed since then.

Did the parties face a mutually hurting stalemate with a rough parity of relative strength?

Although the situation was relatively calm and the Greek-Cypriots' aspiration for *enosis* was somewhat dampened by the presence of UNFICYP except of sporadic and isolated incidents, the conflict situation during the pre-1974 period has never reached a stage of a mutually hurting stalemate. One of the main reasons for the absence of a hurting stalemate in this period was that the Greek-Cypriot side was superior to the Turkish-Cypriot side in many aspects, if not all. The Greek-Cypriot community was three times larger than the Turkish-Cypriot community, it placed the

⁴² Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 75

⁴³ Of course, the situation also forced many Turkish-Cypriots who had lived in the South to seek refuge in the North. Nevertheless, if the damage that each community suffered from the 1974 war is compared between the two communities in the island, it is obvious that the Greek-Cypriot side suffered more serious damage although both were able to avoid a fatal blow.

entire island under its control (except for a few Turkish-Cypriot enclaves which consisted of only three per cent of the whole island), it successfully removed all the Turkish-Cypriot members from the government, and its administration alone enjoyed international recognition as the only legitimate government of Cyprus. Their only notable concern was possible Turkish intervention, which they believed to have been effectively prevented due to the presence of UNFICYP. Hence, the Greek-Cypriots had no incentive to make any concession when they were able to get what they wanted by force with only negligible resistance. They were not inclined to reach a compromise settlement that could bring an end to the monopoly of all the benefits that they had obtained since 1963.

The military situation reached a rough parity between the two communities as a result of the 1974 Turkish military intervention, and the peace talks between the two communities faced a deadlock, but the *status quo* was far from being characterised as a mutually hurting stalemate. Indeed, the both parties seem to have been enjoying the *status quo*. The Greek-Cypriot side enjoys international recognition, the capacity to develop its economy and the opportunity to be integrated into the rest of the world. On the other hand, Turkey's support provides the Turkish-Cypriot community with the sense of being protected and a way to communicate with the rest of the world. For the Turkish-Cypriots, the *status quo* is seen as a situation in which one of the parties to the conflict, the one who attacked and upset the foundation for the Republic of Cyprus that was established in 1960, is recognised as the Government of Cyprus.⁴⁴ Hence, the *status quo* is not satisfactory for the Turkish-Cypriot administration, but it is not hurting enough for the Turkish-Cypriot administration to reconsider its current policy and seek for a negotiated solution to the Cyprus conflict.

Did the parties conceive the prospect of positive benefit through resolving the conflict peacefully?

As for the Greek-Cypriots, they accepted the intervention by the United Nations mainly to exploit it as a safeguard against a possible Turkish intervention while pursuing complete independence. Hence, they found some benefit in the continuation of UN Mediation, but with regard to the outcomes of UN Mediation they were not prepared to accept anything less than a complete independence. When UN Mediator Galo Plaza submitted his report on the mediation effort in March 1965 which contained a number of recommendations for a negotiated settlement, the Greek-Cypriot side was able to conceive the prospect of positive benefit by resolving the conflict through UN Mediation since most of Plaza's suggestions were in line with the Greek-Cypriot's positions (although the Greek-Cypriots disagreed with Plaza's proposal on voluntarily limiting their right to self-determination), and most importantly the Turkish-Cypriot's demand for a federation was rejected. Accordingly, the Turkish-Cypriot side could not find any prospect of positive benefit through UN Mediation under the framework put forward by the Mediator since all of its fundamental demands were discarded by his recommendations. Nonetheless, the Turkish-Cypriots could not afford to settle the conflict on the battlefield without the direct and massive support from its motherland since they were militarily far inferior to their opponent.

However, as a result of the 1974 Turkish military intervention, the

⁴⁴ For example, Necati Munir Ertekun stated that by the wrong recognition of the Greek-Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus, the international community allowed it to 'occupy' the joint government (personal interview conducted on 4 October 2000 in Nicosia).

Turkish-Cypriots got what they wanted, that is, the *de facto* partition of the island, although they failed to obtain international recognition. According to Anthony Parsons, "The forty-five thousand Turkish Cypriots displaced from Greek areas by the 1974 upheaval have joined their compatriots and the whole community feels safe, and reasonably prosperous, behind the protective wall of the Turkish army."⁴⁵ In other words, obtaining international recognition for the TRNC is the only remaining major target of political and diplomatic activities of the Turkish-Cypriot administration. This is at least one of many reasons why most of the Turkish-Cypriot officials almost always highlight the issue of recognition. While the absence of international recognition prevents the Turkish-Cypriot community from prospering economically, it does not seem to be a serious handicap for the TRNC. Instead, the issue of recognition is the one of few unresolved inconveniences (other inconveniences include the trade embargo). Then, one question comes into the mind of many readers, that is, why should the Turkish-Cypriots, who have achieved their objective, launch themselves into the unknown, and not be very reluctant to see their mainland protectors sail away?⁴⁶ In short, a mutually enticing opportunity did not exist in Cyprus.

3.2. Intra-party Dynamics

Were the leaders of each party able to overcome the burdens of the psychological and political commitments they had made to engage in or continue the conflict?

It was both politically and psychologically difficult for President Makarios to renounce *enosis* as an ultimate goal for the struggle although he seemed to have recognised that such a goal would be unrealistic. Hence, he promoted the idea of an independent Cyprus during the inter-communal talks, but he advocated *enosis* to his audiences in his community. He made a number of public statements to support the aspiration for *enosis* that the Turkish-Cypriot side was determined to prevent at any cost. For examples, he stated that:

"Independence was not the aim and purpose of the EOKA struggle ... Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of the national goal, but this should not be a cause for sorrow ... New bastions have been conquered and from these bastions the Greek Cypriots will march on to complete the final victory."

"The Union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a Republic."

"What is our desire? We have proclaimed it many times: our union with the Motherland, eternal Greece. What will our reply be if such a solution is made difficult, and if some think compromises are required or that something be given in return? 'No' is the reply, and the struggle will continue until complete fulfilment."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Anthony Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995* (London: Penguin Books, 1995) pp. 178-179

⁴⁶ Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace*, pp. 178-179

⁴⁷ Quoted in Andrew Faulds (ed.), *Excerpta Cypria for Today: a Source Book on the Cyprus Problem* (Nicosia, Istanbul and London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988) pp. 27-28.

It is often argued that Archbishop Makarios was the only leader in the Greek-Cypriot community who could persuade the national and extreme elements in its community to give up their ambition to achieve *enosis*. While it is true that no other person would have been in a better position than Makarios to succeed in such a difficult job, he was eventually thrown out by the 1974 *coup d'état* that was staged by the pro-*enosis* forces in Cyprus and Greece. In comparison with the Greek-Cypriot side, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was not entrapped by its previous commitments, but there was one position that they could not abandon. The Turkish-Cypriot side had to secure an agreement on the issue of local government as a safeguard against the most feared consequence of the Greek-Cypriot domination, that is, *enosis*.

The 1974 upheaval did not change this intra-party situation drastically although the Greek-Cypriot's aspiration for *enosis* was blocked effectively by the presence of the Turkish army as well as by the wishes of external players. With the *de facto* partition of the island, the Greek-Cypriot leaders seemed to have been able to abandon their political commitment for achieving *enosis*. Nevertheless, they were still bound by some psychological commitments. While identifying themselves as the majority, the Greek-Cypriots regarded the Turkish-Cypriot community as a minority group, and could not grant it an equal political status with them. On the other hand, it was psychologically difficult for the Turkish-Cypriot side to throw away what they have once gained through the events in 1974. Moreover, the new circumstances such as the issue of settlers from Turkey or the declaration of the TRNC made the Turkish-Cypriot administration less and less flexible.

Were the domestic factors in each party favourable for the acceptance of the presence of intermediaries (particularly that of UNFICYP) and co-operating with them?

During the pre-1974 period, the Greek-Cypriot community had two leaders: Archbishop Makarios and General George Grivas, the former on the political aspects was the public leader, whereas the latter was in charge of military operations including many atrocities committed against innocent Turkish-Cypriots. The military wing of the Greek-Cypriot community such as the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA) and the Cyprus National Guard did not seem to welcome the presence of UNFICYP and refused to co-operate with it whenever its interests were blocked by the presence of UNFICYP. While the Turkish-Cypriot community also had its hard-liners within its leadership and its paramilitary force called the Turk Mukavemet Teshkilati (TMT) was not particularly happy with the United Nations involvement, its weaker military strength *vis-à-vis* the Greek-Cypriot armed forces required the hard-liners to accept the presence of intermediaries, particularly that of UNFICYP to prevent them from losing everything. However, they too were not willing to co-operate with UNFICYP when their interests were jeopardised by the activities of UNFICYP. In short, the domestic factors in each community were not entirely in favour of accepting the United Nations intervention and UNFICYP enjoyed full co-operation from neither side.

However, as soon as the Turkish military intervention was launched successfully, the presence of intermediaries including that of UNFICYP became well received in the Greek-Cypriot community. In particular, UNFICYP was regarded as an indispensable safeguard against another large scale Turkish military operation although minor but deliberate violations of the cease-fire agreement continue to

occur almost daily, most of which are aimed at harassing UNFICYP troops. Occasionally, the Greek-Cypriot media became critical of the United Nations' involvement, especially when the leaders failed to produce a fruitful outcome at the inter-communal talks or when a UN official makes a statement that undermines the position of the Greek-Cypriots. On the contrary, neither the presence of UNFICYP nor other intermediaries has been welcomed by the Turkish-Cypriot administration, although some elements of the Turkish-Cypriot community feel the presence of UNFICYP as a necessary and welcome intervention by other third parties.⁴⁸ In any case, interaction between UNFICYP troops (or any other intermediaries for that matter) and local Turkish-Cypriots has been extremely limited since the movement of UNFICYP troops was restricted in the area under the control of the Turkish-Cypriot administration.

Were the leaders of each party domestically strong enough to make foreign concessions so that conciliatory initiatives or their 'willingness to talk' would not be blocked by their domestic opposition groups?

Until the Greek-Cypriot leadership was forced to make important concessions (such as the dropping of *enosis* from the agenda), President Makarios seemed to be unchallengeable. But the 1974 *coup d'état* demonstrated crudely that he was after all not powerful enough to deter any intervention and objection from Greece to his willingness to talk against the interests of his motherland. Similarly, Vice-President Fazil Kuchuk was not in a position to act against the interests of Turkey although his views were hardly challenged within his community. This indicates that the difficulties for the two primary parties to eliminate the influence of their respective motherlands on the inter-communal negotiations. Thus, at the early stage of the Cyprus peacemaking process, the intention of the motherlands decided the fate of the negotiations rather than the leaders' ability to control their domestic opposition groups.

On the other hand, after the situation consolidated as a result of the intervention of the two motherlands, the absence of strong and accountable leadership on both sides *vis-à-vis* their domestic constituencies impeded a negotiated settlement.⁴⁹ For example, in the post-Makarios era, the Greek-Cypriot leadership has faced an enormous difficulty in signing an agreement that appeared, in the eyes of national and extreme elements in its community, to have compromised more than necessary. Indeed, in the domestic politics of the Greek-Cypriot community, leaders whose uncompromising attitude at the negotiation table led to a negotiation failure have often been rewarded, while leaders who made necessary concessions to reach an agreement have been penalised.⁵⁰ Hence, all Greek-Cypriot leaders had to find a middle ground proposal in which some substantive concessions were included so that it could encourage reciprocity from the Turkish-Cypriot side, but not too many to avoid offending two powerful groups in the Greek-Cypriot community:

⁴⁸ Indeed, a large number of Turkish-Cypriots had crossed the Green-line to participate in the bi-communal meetings whenever permission was granted by their leadership.

⁴⁹ The leaders of each community have not been compelled to reflect the divergent points of view expressed within their respective legislature since neither president is accountable to parliament under the constitutions of both the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC (Brian Mandell, 'The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution', in Norma Salem (ed.), *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (Ottawa: St. Martin's Press in association with the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992), p. 220).

⁵⁰ Personal telephone interview with Daniel Russel, the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Cyprus, conducted on 4 October 2000 in Nicosia.

organizations representing various 'refugee' groups and the Greek-Orthodox Church.⁵¹ Considering the fact that nearly 200,000 people (over one third of its population) had been displaced as a result of the Turkish military intervention in 1974, it is understandable that the Greek-Cypriot leaders have not been able to discount the opinions of these refugee groups which opposed any formulation of an overall agreement that did not permit refugees to return to their former homes.⁵² On the other hand, the Greek-Orthodox Church in Cyprus, which is still politically and socially influential and maintains the right to nominate the Minister of Education and Culture, opposed giving away territory and political power simply to see the country reunified.⁵³ In fact, those groups of people who are usually categorised as 'nationalists' would prefer undiluted authority in the 60 per cent of the island that they now hold to a substantially reduced authority in a nominal republic covering the entire island and all its inhabitants.⁵⁴

On the other hand, Rauf Denktash, who has led the Turkish-Cypriot community throughout, first as the interlocutor and then as President of the TRNC, also has various domestic problems on his hands. For example, a friction exists between Turkish-Cypriots who had been in the island before 1974 and so-called Turkish 'settlers' who came to Cyprus after 1974. Although most of the Turkish-Cypriots recognise the presence of the Turkish army on the island as an indispensable guarantor for their security, at the same time, they are frustrated by the fact that their fate is at the mercy of Turkey. Some elements in the Turkish-Cypriot community emphasise the 'Cypriot' aspect of their identity rather than their Turkish identity, and prefer a united and independent Cyprus to the TRNC whose survival is totally depended on Turkey. In short, the leaders of each community have not endeavoured vigorously to identify and co-ordinate all the stakeholders within each community on such issues as demilitarisation and the Turkish military presence, and to reconcile various intra-communal positions before they engaged in the inter-communal talks. The lack of groundwork aimed at reaching an intra-community consensus in both communities has reduced the chance of a compromise settlement being ratified at the domestic front even when it is agreed upon at the inter-communal front.

3.3. External Situations

Were the external parties who have direct interests in the outcome of the conflict

⁵¹ The Turkish-Cypriot administration sees that all conservative elements in the Greek-Cypriot community, led by the Greek-Orthodox Church and nationalist elements including most of the party leaders, are opposing change. For the Turkish-Cypriots' eyes, they are only interested in preserving the monopoly of power by the Greek-Cypriot side (M. Ergun Olgun, 'Turkish Cypriot view: A Confederation for the "Island of Cyprus"?', *The Need for New Perspectives on Cyprus* (Brussels: Center for the Study of International Relations and Strategic Studies (CERIS), Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2000), p. 28). Not only does Ergun Olgun criticise the Greek-Cypriots' policy of clinging to the *status quo*, but he also reproached the international community for still refusing stubbornly to accept the 'two people and two states' reality of the island (Ergun Olgun, 'Cyprus: A New and Realistic Approach', *Perceptions (Journal of International Affairs, Special Issue of Cyprus)*, 4, 3 (1999), p. 107).

⁵² Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 72. For example, the Pan-Cyprian Anti-occupation Movement (PAK) distributes bills that condemn continuing Turkish occupation in the North and Adouloti Kyrenia. The Greek-Cypriot Refugee Association recently published a book that refers to "the evolution of the racist solution of Bizonal Bicomunal Federation" and explains why the Greek-Cypriots are justified in rejecting it.

⁵³ Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 71

⁵⁴ Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 71

willing to support and co-operate with the peacemaking initiatives?

Amongst major stakeholders, the intentions and movements of Greece and Turkey had a significant impact on the peacemaking process in Cyprus.⁵⁵ It appeared that the bottom line of the government of Greece was not to allow the partition of Cyprus, and as long as this premise was respected it supported the peacemaking efforts. However, when the military junta took over the control of the government, Greece decided not to support the UN Mediation process because it excluded *enosis* from the blue print of the solution. On the other hand, Turkey was not only determined to prevent Cyprus from becoming a Greek island, but also was not prepared to allow Cyprus to reunite as a unitary state under Greek-Cypriot control. Therefore, Turkey buried UN Mediation (that advocated a unitary state solution) in 1965 and was very reluctant to support the subsequent UN peacemaking efforts. In short, at the earlier stage, neither of the motherlands was willing to support and co-operate with the UN peacemaking initiatives in which they were treated as external parties rather than primary parties.

Furthermore, given the relative stability that has come to Cyprus since 1974, a return to the *status quo ante* makes little sense to Turkey, thus it has difficulty understanding why anyone would suggest that reunification would be more stable and peaceful than separate development.⁵⁶ Moreover, the Turkish military, remembering the difficulties it encountered in its landings in 1974, has little appetite for withdrawing its troops and raising the prospect of another forced entry.⁵⁷ Turkey has little incentive to weaken its position unilaterally *vis-à-vis* Greece by discontinuing its military presence on Cyprus and it is in a good position to resist pressure from the United States (or NATO) due to its strategic significance in the region.⁵⁸ Greece, on the other hand, seems to have had a strategic interest in the continuation of the Cyprus conflict to divert Turkey's attention from the Aegean. Indeed, Greece has undermined the peacemaking process by rejecting some crucial United Nations proposals although in general, in comparison with Turkey, it has maintained more successfully the appearance of support and co-operation for the search for a solution in Cyprus.⁵⁹ When the parties came close to reaching an agreement, the motherlands persuaded the parties to be cautious instead of encouraging them to make one more critical step, thus a number of initiatives fell by the wayside.

Were the members of the international community willing to support the efforts towards a peace settlement such as UNFICYP's mission?

The prime motivation for the establishment of UNFICYP stemmed from the interests of NATO in preventing a damaging Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus,

⁵⁵ Indeed, Zaim Necatigil confessed with a sigh that the relations between Greece and Turkey have to be improved and all problems that exist between them need to be solved before the Cyprus conflict can be solved (personal interview conducted on 20 September 2000 in Nicosia).

⁵⁶ Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 71

⁵⁷ Haass, *Conflict Unending*, p. 70

⁵⁸ Mandell, 'The Cyprus Conflict', p. 222

⁵⁹ On 29 March 1986, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar presented the Draft Framework Agreement to the two communities, and a copy was also sent to Greece and Turkey. Greece and the Greek-Cypriot side rejected this proposal although Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side accepted it. On this occasion, Greek Prime Minister Papandreu announced the unacceptability of the plan, even before Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus, had given a formal response.

rather than dealing with the difficulties of the two Cypriot communities.⁶⁰ According to this logic, all that was therefore needed in Cyprus was an effective peacekeeping operation that would dampen the conflict. The establishment of UN Mediation was very much peripheral and as a result, little attention was paid to the necessities of successful mediation between two sides of intra-state conflict, or to the international level of the conflict with respect to Turkey's objective.⁶¹ Regarding a genuine resolution of the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus as a long-term objective, the influential members of the international community supported the peacekeeping efforts by UNFICYP since their preferred choice of a NATO peacekeeping force was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. On the contrary, their support for other intermediary efforts that did not aim at reducing the Greek-Turkish tension was considerably limited.

Nevertheless, the international community, meaning bigger powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom, did not want to see the *status quo* continue indefinitely. Thus, it supported and financed not only UNFICYP's mission but also a series of the UN peacemaking efforts by the Secretary-General's Good Offices Mission. The international community also attempted, in parallel with the United Nations endeavours, several separate initiatives in the form of a US unilateral effort (the Clifford Mission) or a concerted effort by the concerned countries (the ABC Plan).⁶² While some of these independent undertakings had opposing effects on the UN peacemaking process, the general support for the UN efforts was maintained throughout. However, as time passed with no sign of a final resolution, some members of the international community (particularly countries that had contributed their battalions to UNFICYP) seemed to have lost their enthusiasm for supporting the efforts towards a peace settlement in Cyprus.

3.4. Summary of Conflict Ripeness

It is apparent that there was a lack of urgency on the part of both parties to reach agreement since both felt that, by maintaining a *status quo*, they could secure some of the gains they had achieved since 1963 (for the Greek-Cypriot side, total control of the government machinery; for the Turkish-Cypriot side, local autonomy).⁶³ Holding the upper-hand in the adversarial relationship, the Greek-Cypriot side did not perceive any real incentive to make concessions. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots realised, in the face of the Greek-Cypriots' unwillingness to compromise, that even a plethora of concessions on their part would not make the Greek-Cypriots change their mind on the issue of local government. Hence, the *status quo* seemed to be better than any conceivable compromise solution. Besides, due to highly politicised intra-party situations, both community leaders found it extremely difficult to launch conciliatory initiative that may have led to a compromise settlement.

⁶⁰ Oliver Richmond, 'Negotiating out of Fear and Fearing to Negotiate: Theoretical Approaches to the Ending of the Cyprus Conflict', *The Cyprus Review*, 8, 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 101-102

⁶¹ Richmond, 'Negotiating out of Fear and Fearing to Negotiate', pp. 101-102

⁶² In February 1977, the newly inaugurated US President Jimmy Carter sent Clark Clifford to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia to assess prospects for movement towards a negotiated settlement on Cyprus and the possible role of the United States in assisting the process. The tactics employed by the Clifford Mission were based on the assumption that neither side in Cyprus would make major concessions unless they were forced to, and that the United States would be the only outside power with enough leverage to maintain momentum in the negotiations (Mandell, 'The Cyprus Conflict', p. 213).

⁶³ Mandell, 'The Cyprus Conflict', p. 212

The intervention of the two motherlands in 1974 led to a new conflict settlement, effectively not of the two communities' doing, which has been monitored successfully by UNFICYP.⁶⁴ Thus, the story of peacemaking since 1974 is essentially one of the failures to turn a forcefully coerced settlement into a self-sustaining, non-coercive resolution.⁶⁵ If one seeks a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, the terms of the settlement need to be written freely by the two communities themselves. Nevertheless, it seems that the concerns of the external players and the United Nations have taken priority over the interests of the two communities.

In sum, it can be said that the contextual factors were not particularly favourable for conflict resolution in Cyprus although occasionally UN peacemaking efforts drove the parties to the brink of a negotiated settlement. Under such a circumstance, what sort of tasks was assigned to UNFICYP, and what kind of attributes was authorised to UNFICYP to fulfil such tasks? Was the capacity of UNFICYP adequate to meet the demand of the peace process? In the next section, these points will be examined by shedding light on the attributes and functions of UNFICYP as well as its relationship with other intermediaries on the ground.

4. *Review of UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus*

As a way to illuminate the characteristics of UNFICYP, the three important attributes and the major functions of UNFICYP will be examined below. With regard to the attributes of UNFICYP, the following three principal categories will be used: (1) *consent* of the major players in the Cyprus conflict to the establishment of UNFICYP, (2) views of the major players in Cyprus on UNFICYP's *impartiality*, and (3) degree of tolerance of the major players in Cyprus for the *use of force* by UNFICYP. As for the functions of UNFICYP, the functional categories developed in the previous Chapter will be used to examine them.

4.1. Three Attributes of UNFICYP

Consent

Initially, the Greek-Cypriot side did not seem to have welcomed the intervention of any foreign forces in Cyprus although it preferred involvement of the United Nations to that of NATO.⁶⁶ President Makarios sought to use the United Nations involvement as leverage against a possible Turkish intervention so that he could gain time for pursuing complete independence. Nevertheless, Makarios insisted all along that no United Nations force was necessary.⁶⁷ Furthermore, General George Grivas, Supreme Commander of the Cyprus Armed Forces, continued to regard UNFICYP as an impediment to his military success. Despite the presence of UNFICYP, the National Guard was determined to accomplish its military objective on a number of occasions. In fact, the National Guard fired upon

⁶⁴ Groom, 'The Process of Negotiation, 1974-1993', p. 16

⁶⁵ Groom, 'The Process of Negotiation, 1974-1993', p. 17

⁶⁶ The main concern of the Greek-Cypriot leadership was Turkey's intention to invade Cyprus and a pro-Turkish attitude of the United Kingdom and the United States (Joseph S. Joseph, 'The International Power Broker: A Critical View of the Foreign Policy of Archbishop Makarios', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 3, 2 (1992), p. 23).

⁶⁷ Makarios was reported to have commented to *Le Monde* with regard to the reason for consenting to UNFICYP deployment that, "Their leaders [leaders of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom] took the decision, and they asked us to invite them to intervene. We had no choice" (*Le Monde*, 10 January 1964, quoted in Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, pp. 66-67).

UNFICYP troops at the battle of Kokkina on 16 April 1967.⁶⁸ Its hostility towards UNFICYP implies that the National Guard ignored a UNFICYP function as a buffer between the two communities while taking the advantage of another function as a shield against possible Turkish military intervention.

Such an unenthusiastic attitude on the Greek-Cypriot side towards UNFICYP seemed to have changed over the course of events, especially after the crisis in 1967, which almost led to Turkey's intervention and direct conflict between Greece and Turkey over the issue of Cyprus. With the expulsion of General George Grivas after the 1967 crisis, the Greek-Cypriot side began to see that it was to its advantage to regard the United Nations as an ally in their cause because the 1967 crisis demonstrated the value of the United Nations in bolstering international pressure against possible Turkish intervention.⁶⁹ At this point, the reluctant consent of the Greek-Cypriot side seemed to have turned into a more sincere one. Since that day, the Greek-Cypriot side has maintained genuine consent to the presence of UNFICYP. In fact, the Greek-Cypriot side has supported the renewal of the UNFICYP's mandate for many years, and has provided areas for the headquarters, camps and other premises of UNFICYP. Moreover, since June 1993 the Greek-Cypriot side has been paying one third of UNFICYP's cost and the government of Greece has been paying \$US 6.5 million annually.⁷⁰

In stark contrast to the case of Greek-Cypriots' consent, the genuine consent from the Turkish-Cypriot side was never forthcoming at least in the official form. From the outset, the Turkish-Cypriot side was not fully satisfied with the involvement of the United Nations since the United Nations did not seek the formal consent from the Turkish-Cypriot side. Although it is not a normal procedure for the United Nations to obtain the formal consent from a non-state actor for the deployment of a peacekeeping force, from the Turkish-Cypriots' point of view, such an unbalanced approach helped the Greek-Cypriot side to obtain 'false' recognition as the Government of Cyprus.

While the negative effects of the presence of UNFICYP for the Turkish-Cypriots should be acknowledged, positive functions fulfilled by UNFICYP should have overwhelmed these drawbacks. As the Turkish-Cypriots were militarily weaker and vastly outnumbered by the Greek-Cypriots, naturally they were in a position to appreciate the intervention of a UN peacekeeping force that could serve, in theory, as a safeguard for a weaker party against the dominant one. Unlike other Turkish-Cypriot commentators, M. Necati Munir Ertekun holds a positive view towards the role of UNFICYP, thus supports the above hypothesis. He states that:

"The presence of UN peacekeepers has been very useful, in fact, it was necessary. After all, it was the Turkish-Cypriot side that needed UNFICYP more than anybody else. ... On the whole, we [the Turkish-Cypriot side] welcomed their presence in Cyprus. To the extent of its mandate and to the extent of its limitation, UNFICYP has done a good job."⁷¹

Hence, it can be concluded that due to the pressing need to save its people, the Turkish-Cypriot side gave a tacit consent to the dispatch of UNFICYP to Cyprus

⁶⁸ UN Document (S/7969), Report of the Secretary-General, 13 June 1967

⁶⁹ Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, p. 108

⁷⁰ The UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficyp.org/>, accessed on 4 December 2000)

⁷¹ Personal interview with M. Necati Munir Ertekun conducted on 4 October 2000 in Nicosia.



although it never expressed full consent or promised full co-operation.

However, UNFICYP soon found out that it was difficult to maintain the tacit consent of the Turkish-Cypriot side as it failed to meet many of its expectations.⁷² There were a number of cases in which UNFICYP was unable to provide security for Turkish-Cypriots during the inter-communal strife of 1963-74 because UNFICYP was not authorised to intervene between the two sides without the consent from the two. In fact, Vice-President Fazil Kuchuk claimed that UNFICYP appeared to be powerless almost in all the incidents.⁷³ He stated that, "UNFICYP is rendered totally ineffective by the Greek leadership on protecting the Turks against an organised Greek onslaught."⁷⁴ This sceptical evaluation of UNFICYP's role in keeping 'peace' on the island is widespread among the Turkish-Cypriots mainly due to their traumatic memory during the period 1964-74 when UNFICYP was unable to prevent many Turkish-Cypriots from being killed by some Greek-Cypriots. The duty of UNFICYP during the inter-communal violence was merely to report incidents and giving information about casualties.⁷⁵ In short, the inability of UNFICYP to save Turkish-Cypriots from Greek-Cypriot atrocities made the Turkish-Cypriot side come rapidly to the conclusion that the United Nations was an obstacle to its cause, thereby enhancing its tendency to look upon Turkey as its saviour.⁷⁶ This perception seriously undermined their consent towards the presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus and subsequently led to the Turkish military intervention of 1974.

The Turkish-Cypriot side felt that the Turkish 'peace operation' had made UNFICYP obsolete in the area controlled by the Turkish force because "the peace has already been kept by the presence of the Turkish 'peacekeeping' force."⁷⁷ The relative calm of the situation since 1974 was attributed to the presence and military superiority of the Turkish force stationed in Cyprus since 1974.⁷⁸

⁷² In addition to extending protection to vulnerable Turkish-Cypriot population, the Turkish-Cypriots expected UNFICYP to undertake the containment of the conflict, support for the self-determination right of the parties, promotion of the principle of the rule of law and human rights, removal of tangible and intangible obstacles of constructing resolution and institutional building for co-operation. Instead of achieving any of these tasks, UNFICYP empowered one of the parties at the expense of the other and made one side the Government of the island at the expense of the other (personal interview conducted with M. Ergun Olgun, Under-secretary to the President of TRNC, on 4 October 2000 in Nicosia).

⁷³ *UN Document (S/5706), Enclosure to Letter from Representative of Turkey to Secretary-General*, 16 May 1964 (quoted in Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) pp. 243-244).

⁷⁴ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 248

⁷⁵ Personal interview with Sedar Denktash, Chairman of the Democrat Party, conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia. Also, he argues that UN peacekeepers have never been and are not at all useful for the Turkish-Cypriots.

⁷⁶ Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, p.108

⁷⁷ Personal interview with Zaim M. Necatigil, a former Attorney General and Legal Adviser to the President of TRNC, conducted on 20 September 2000 in Nicosia. In contrast to these Turkish-Cypriot official positions, Ferdi Sabit Soyer, General Secretary of the Republican Turkish Party, opposes the Turkish-Cypriot administration's position that Turkish-Cypriots do not need UNFICYP. He also accuses of some Turkish-Cypriot politicians who argue that UNFICYP is merely a tool of the Greek-Cypriots because he believes that both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides have a great need for UNFICYP to stay in Cyprus (personal interview conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia).

⁷⁸ For instance, Sedar Denktash maintains that, "As long as the Greek-Cypriots hold a view that they are militarily inferior to the Turkish army in Cyprus, they will give up their idea of challenging militarily to the Turkish-Cypriot side; therefore, the escalation of the conflict is hampered in Cyprus"

As a result of Turkish intervention, UNFICYP effectively lost the consent of the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey to move freely in the Turkish-controlled part of the island. The deprivation of the consent of one primary party and its strongest ally put UNFICYP into a difficult situation under which, technically speaking, UNFICYP had to be withdrawn. To withdraw UNFICYP under such a circumstance would have provided the Turkish-Cypriot side with the implied recognition that it alone had authority over UNFICYP in the north Cyprus, which both the Greek-Cypriot side and most of the international community desperately wanted to avoid.⁷⁹ In any case, even the tacit consent of the Turkish-Cypriots has decayed significantly as a result of the Turkish military intervention in 1974.

Impartiality

According to its guiding principles, UNFICYP must act with complete impartiality towards the members of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.⁸⁰ However, the United Nations, especially the Security Council and the General Assembly, did not treat the two communities equally. For example, the United Nations sought the consent of the 'Government of Cyprus' for the deployment of UNFICYP in 1964 and since then it has been referring to the Greek-Cypriot administration as the 'Government of Cyprus' despite the fact that the bi-communal 'Government of Cyprus' (which was supposed to be formed by both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities according to the 1960 constitutional framework) no longer existed in 1964.⁸¹ By emphasising this point, Zaim M. Necatigil, a high profile Turkish-Cypriot official, maintains that such a biased introduction of UNFICYP to Cyprus was in fact a problem that exacerbated the situation considerably.⁸² To borrow Salahi R. Sonyel's phrase "It is remarkable that the United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the Constitution by force, but actually rewarded it by, in effect, recognising the Greek Cypriot administration, which had usurped the Constitution, as the 'Government of the whole island'."⁸³ Accordingly, the operation of UNFICYP often had to reflect this United Nations position although by so doing UNFICYP effectively violated its guiding principle of impartiality.⁸⁴ In fact, the United Nations' position in the Cyprus

(personal interview conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia).

⁷⁹ Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, pp. 117-119

⁸⁰ UN Document (S/5653), *Note by Secretary-General*, 10 April 1964 (quoted in Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 132)

⁸¹ Personal interview with Sedat Denktash conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia. M. Necati Munir Ertekin argues that the Turkish-Cypriot's complaint about UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) is not so much that the 'Government of Cyprus' appears, it is not the wording, but that the implementation and interpretation of the wording are wrong. The Turkish-Cypriot side accepted the presence of UNFICYP on the understanding that the term 'Government of Cyprus' meant the lawful, joint 1960 government. However, the Greek-Cypriot side was treated as the Government of Cyprus afterwards (personal interview conducted on 4 October 2000).

⁸² Personal interview with Zaim M. Necatigil conducted on 20 September 2000 in Nicosia. This point was also confirmed by Ergun Olgun, when he stated that the failure of the UN Security Council to uphold the 1960 rule of law resulted in the destruction of the essential political balance of powers between the two constituent peoples of the island and made a future compromise based on equal power sharing impossible, thus, it turned Cyprus into a protracted conflict (personal interview conducted on 4 October 2000 in Nicosia).

⁸³ Salahi R. Sonyel, *Cyprus: the Destruction of a Republic—British Documents, 1960-1965* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1997) p. 86

⁸⁴ For example, when UNFICYP intended to interpose itself between the two forces that engaged in a battle, it had to negotiate with both side equally and to seek co-operation from both sides because UNFICYP was not empowered to force its views on either party. This gave rise to allegations that

conflict, which is represented by numerous resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, almost always seems to be in line with the Greek-Cypriot's position and interests.

Consequently, the Greek-Cypriot side seemed to have regarded UNFICYP as 'impartial' throughout its operation. The following statement of President Makarios expresses Greek-Cypriots' expectation of UNFICYP's impartiality: "We want them [UNFICYP] to be impartial, and not take sides. But by being impartial, I do not mean they should just remain between the two sides to prevent clashes, but they should restore law and order and separatist activities should be stopped."⁸⁵ Thus, to be more exact, the Greek-Cypriot side must have recognised that UNFICYP was acting in its favour, first as a shield against possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, and after the Turkish military intervention in 1974, as a counter-balance against the Turkish troops in the island.

On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriots did not consider UNFICYP to be impartial. Nor they did not have much faith in the ability of UNFICYP to protect them from Greek-Cypriot extremists or to help them to return to the 1960 constitutional order.⁸⁶ Since UNFICYP was created and its actions were guided by the United Nations whose impartiality and credibility as an intermediary were severely jeopardised in the eyes of Turkish-Cypriots, it could not win the trust of the Turkish-Cypriot side although its actions were not necessarily partial. Because UNFICYP was deployed with the consent of the Government of Cyprus with the aim of helping the Government of Cyprus that referred to the Greek-Cypriot administration only, UNFICYP was seen to have become a tool of the Government of Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots. For example, Vice-President Fazil Kuchuk pointed out that the Greek-Cypriots and Greece felt free to continue to increase their insidious activities, trying to use UNFICYP as a shield and to justify such activities by showing them as the legitimate effort of a government towards protecting itself against foreign invasion.⁸⁷ Moreover, a Turkish-Cypriot political leader, Sedar Denktash (Chairman of the Democrat Party) states that since its establishment in 1964, the Turkish-Cypriot side has been considering UNFICYP to be "armed forces of the Greek side."⁸⁸

Actions of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as well as those of Turkey were condemned by the United Nations on a number of occasions. Such moves were not advisable for an impartial intermediary as they not only jeopardised the impartiality and thus the credibility of the United Nations as an intermediary but they also were exploited by the Turkish-Cypriots as justifications for not co-operating with UNFICYP.⁸⁹ Thus, the Turkish-Cypriots objected to the extension of UNFICYP's mandate on the grounds of UN non-impartiality, and UNFICYP was forced to come

UNFICYP treated the Turkish-Cypriot community as a separate state (*UN Document (S/6228), Report of Secretary-General*, 11 March 1965).

⁸⁵ Interview reported in *Cyprus Mail*, 1 April 1964, p. 1 (quoted in Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, p. 114)

⁸⁶ Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, p. 95

⁸⁷ *UN Document (S/5828)*, 23 July 1964

⁸⁸ Personal interview with Sedar Denktash conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia.

⁸⁹ "The need for impartiality of the peacekeeping forces can easily be compromised when the UN mediator reports back to the Secretary General, blaming one side or the other for an impasse. If this leads to a resolution against one side, as we have seen on the Cyprus problem, the accused side can then plead UN non-impartiality as justification for non-cooperation" (Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', p. 8).

to an unofficial agreement with the Turkish-Cypriot administration.⁹⁰

Use of Force

With regard to use of force, UNFICYP has maintained the guidelines outlined in the Secretary-General's *aide-mémoire* of 29 April 1964. No fundamental change in UNFICYP's application of force has occurred throughout its operation. In the *aide-mémoire*, Secretary-General U Thant clarified that

“Troops of UNFICYP shall not take the initiative in the use of armed force. The use of armed force is permissible only in self-defence. When acting in self-defence, the principle of minimum force shall always be applied, and armed force will be used only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed.”⁹¹

In theory, UNFICYP could use force for protecting the lives of its personnel (self-defence in narrow sense) as well as for defending its mandate.⁹² Moreover, UNFICYP troops were apparently allowed to use force with a view to preventing the recurrence of fighting or endangering of law and order.⁹³ However, there was not much that UNFICYP could do once the exchange of fire started between the two belligerents; all UNFICYP could do was to observe and report the shooting.⁹⁴ Furthermore, it was reported that when the Cyprus National Guard advanced through the UNFICYP position, its Company Commander ignored the UNFICYP request that the advance be halted.⁹⁵ Likewise, when the UNFICYP Chief of Staff tried to inspect the controversial positions at Agios Theodoros he was stopped and turned back by Turkish-Cypriot fighters.⁹⁶ It was reported that UNFICYP's freedom of movement had been restricted on a number of occasions (in 1967, UNFICYP troops were restricted on more than 93 occasions and on 34 occasions the use of force was threatened by the parties), but on none of these occasions did UNFICYP troops use

⁹⁰ Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', p. 20

⁹¹ *UN Document (S/5671), Report of the Secretary-General, 29 April 1964, Annex I: Objective and Interim Aims of a Comprehensive Programme of Action for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)*

⁹² The term 'self-defence' was specified to include the use of force under following circumstances: the defence of the United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack; the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack; where members of the Force are compelled to act in self-defence; where the safety of the Force or of members of it is in jeopardy; where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have been, or in the opinion of the commander on the spot are about to be, violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering law and order; attempts by force to compel them [UNFICYP troops] to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardising their safety; attempts by force to disarm them [UNFICYP troops]; attempts by force to prevent them [UNFICYP troops] from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders; and violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to arrest or abduct United Nations personnel, civil or military (Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, p. 125).

⁹³ Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, p. 125

⁹⁴ Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjørn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974) p. 106

⁹⁵ *UN Document (S/5992)*, 29 September 1964 (quoted in Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 234)

⁹⁶ *UN Document (S/7969)*, 13 June 1967, para. 60 (quoted in Sambanis, 'The United Nations Operation in Cyprus', p. 95)

force to carry out their responsibilities.⁹⁷ The inability of UNFICYP to serve as an effective deterrent to inter-communal violence was exposed during the 1967 crisis. According to United Nations records, during the fighting in 1967, there were incidents of deliberate damage to UNFICYP equipment and manhandling of UNFICYP personnel by the Cyprus National Guard.⁹⁸

With regard to the use of force by UNFICYP, the 1974 war did not seem to affect the nature of UNFICYP's attribute. In other words, UNFICYP still maintains the guidelines outlining in the Secretary-General's *aide-mémoire* of 29 April 1964.

4.2. Functions of UNFICYP

UNFICYP was established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964. The same resolution stated the objective of UNFICYP should be "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions." This mandate can be divided essentially into three tasks. The first task was to prevent a recurrence of fighting, the second task involved the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and the third task aimed at a return to normal conditions.⁹⁹

These fundamental objectives of the operation and the functions attached to UNFICYP to accomplish such objectives were envisaged in accordance with the conditions that prevailed in Cyprus at that time, that is, sporadic inter-communal fighting and a gradual disintegration of normal government functions.¹⁰⁰ Although a series of events in 1974 changed various aspects of the Cyprus conflict drastically, the three principal mission objectives of UNFICYP remained as they were first expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 186 on 4 March 1964. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the 1974 crisis, UNFICYP faced with a situation that had not been foreseen in its mandate in which the duties of UNFICYP were conceived in relation to the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus, not to large-scale hostilities arising from action by the armed forces of the guarantor powers.¹⁰¹ Hence, following the hostilities of 1974, the UN Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which endorsed essentially the expansion of UNFICYP's functions to include supervising a *de facto* cease-fire, which came into effect on 16 August 1974, and maintaining a buffer zone between the front-lines of the Cyprus National Guard on the one hand and of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot forces on the other.¹⁰² Therefore, it seems reasonable to make a distinction between UNFICYP's tasks in the pre-1974 period and those in the post 1974 period. Thus, the pre-1974 tasks will be examined first below.

4.2.1. Pre-1974 Period

A basic function of UNFICYP in the peace process in Cyprus was to keep a transitory order in the island where one of the two major communities no longer wished to be governed by the antecedent framework of law and order. As Indar Jit

⁹⁷ Sambanis, 'The United Nations Operation in Cyprus', p. 95

⁹⁸ *UN Annual Records*, 1967, p. 278 (quoted in Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, p. 81)

⁹⁹ Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, pp. 111-112

¹⁰⁰ Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', p. 224

¹⁰¹ The UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficy.org/histcoup+intervent.htm>, accessed on 4 December 2000)

¹⁰² <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unficy/unficyB.html>, accessed on 4 December 2000

Rikhye et al. acutely pointed out,

“In a situation like Cyprus, where civil as well as human rights are not always respected, where a reign of terror is a recent memory, and where intercommunal murders, abductions, and victimization are still common occurrences, the presence of an impartial police unit can reduce the sense of insecurity that obstructs any degree of reconciliation.”¹⁰³

Secretary-General U Thant identified, in his progress report published on 29 April 1964, a wide range of specific tasks that were derived from the three principal ends of UNFICYP operation.¹⁰⁴ The report shows that UNFICYP had to engage in a broad array of activities in pursuit of the three principal mandates. Despite their diversity, none of them seemed to have been incompatible with the broader aims of UN peacemaking. Nonetheless, the level of accomplishment of such goals varied. These tasks can be classified in the following eight categories: Cease-fire Supervision, Maintenance of Law and Order, Arms Transfer Control, Institutional Reinforcement, Demobilisation and Regrouping, Refugee Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Protective Service.

Interposition Functions

Among the eight tasks assigned originally to UNFICYP, three (Cease-fire Supervision, Maintenance of Law and Order, Arms Transfer Control) fell into the category of the *interposition function*. These tasks needed to be carried out successfully if UNFICYP sought to accomplish the first and the second mandates: prevention of recurrence of fighting and maintenance of law and order. With regard to the specific tasks identified under the rubric of *Cease-fire Supervision*, UNFICYP was able to achieve very little, and it also failed to prevent the outbreak of major inter-communal fighting in 1967 as well as the fatal blow of the Turkish military intervention in 1974 although in more general terms it was fairly successful in managing to calm the situation. As for the specific items listed under the heading of *Maintenance of Law and Order*, UNFICYP worked very hard and was able to carry through some of them. For example, the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) was created within the UNFICYP organization to undertake this task. UNCIVPOL contributed to the maintenance of law and order in a general sense. On the other hand, the task directly related to *Arms Transfer Controls* merely scored a limited success.

Transition Assistance Functions

UNFICYP was expected to undertake three tasks (Institutional Reinforcement, Demobilisation and Regrouping, Refugee Assistance) to fulfil its *transition assistance function*. The successful completion of these essential tasks would have contributed to progress in the UN peacemaking efforts that advocated the re-integration of the two communities. However, UNFICYP accomplished none of them. In particular, UNFICYP did not succeed in the activities that would fall into the category of Institutional Reinforcement. For example, UNFICYP failed to assist the re-integration of Turkish-Cypriot policemen into the Cyprus police force. Likewise, its activity did not facilitate the return of Turkish-Cypriot civil servants and Government officials to their duties. Furthermore, UNFICYP did not complete

¹⁰³ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 109

¹⁰⁴ UN Document (S/5671), *Report of the Secretary-General*, 29 April 1964

the tasks of *Demobilisation and Regrouping*. Activities aimed at *Refugee Assistance* would have also contributed to progress in the UN peacemaking efforts, nevertheless, the record of UNFICYP's achievement of these tasks was not outstanding, and in some occasion UNFICYP failed to provide sufficient protection for refugees (mainly Turkish-Cypriots).

Humanitarian Intervention Functions

With regard to those tasks that can be categorised as the *humanitarian intervention function* (Securing Humanitarian Assistance and Protection Service), UNFICYP achieved mixed results. Although UNFICYP certainly contributed to easing the suffering of many innocent individuals, it was ineffective in protecting civilians from the determined attacks by armed elements as its troops were only allowed to use force in self-defence.

These results lead to the conclusion that in the pre-1974 phase UNFICYP failed to create a situation that was conducive to peacemaking. At the same time, however, none of the functions performed successfully by UNFICYP actually impeded the UN peacemaking efforts. Hence, it can be concluded that UNFICYP failed to become a stepping-stone for conflict resolution in Cyprus, not because some of its functions were counter-productive, but because it failed to execute successfully some of the important tasks such as *Cease-fire Supervision*, *Institutional Reinforcement* and *Demobilisation and Regrouping*. Had UNFICYP successfully fulfilled these tasks, it would have created the environment that was conducive to peacemaking and thus could facilitate conflict resolution in Cyprus. Even though UNFICYP was already facing some difficulties in carrying out its tasks, the number of its troops was reduced gradually and it became further difficult to perform effectively as an aid to UN peacekeeping towards the end of the pre-1974 phase.

4.2.2. Post-1974 Period

In the 1974 crisis, UNFICYP demonstrated that it could not fulfil one of the most important mandates, namely preventing the recurrence of the fighting, with the authority and power given to it. The credibility and effectiveness of UNFICYP's role as a peacekeeping force was undermined by the intervention of the Turkish force. As UNFICYP was not given adequate power and resources to maintain the military *status quo* against a military operation of one of the guarantor powers, it became a more of a 'war observing force' during the 1974 crisis. UNFICYP's inability to use force other than in self-defence made it no deterrent to the Turkish military intervention or to the Greek-led *coup d'état*.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, UNFICYP engaged in a number of valuable emergency tasks in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and took up further tasks to cope with the new situation which emerged as a result of the crisis.

Emergency Makeshift Functions

Several 'emergency' functions were temporarily added to the list of UNFICYP duties so that UNFICYP could cope with the pressing situation that emerged as a result of the 1974 crisis, which led to a *de facto* partition of the island. Immediately after the first Turkish military intervention, the 'Geneva Declaration' of 30 July 1974 was reached among the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom,

¹⁰⁵ Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, p. 114

in which the emergency tasks of UNFICYP were stipulated. Although the declaration was never authorised officially by the UN Security Council, it provided the direction and authority UNFICYP needed to take up new tasks and responsibilities.¹⁰⁶ For example, following the transfer of Turkish-Cypriots from the south to the north in 1975, UNFICYP, which had been stationed in sensitive areas throughout the island, was re-deployed along the cease-fire lines.¹⁰⁷ As a result, UNFICYP began to keep the cease-fire lines and the UN Buffer Zone under its constant surveillance through a system of observation posts and patrols.¹⁰⁸

Various important emergency humanitarian functions were also assigned to UNFICYP and a special humanitarian and economic branch was set up at UNFICYP headquarters during the events of July and August 1974 in order to protect the civilian population caught up in the hostilities.¹⁰⁹ It declared a United Nations protected area at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia in order to protect tourists trapped in the fighting (subsequently, UNFICYP assisted in the evacuation of those tourists).¹¹⁰ It also assisted in the establishment of essential liaison between a newly arrived team from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations.¹¹¹ In addition, a wide range of relief operations were carried out by UNFICYP in co-operation with the ICRC, and when this arrangement proved insufficient, the Secretary-General designated UNHCR as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus.¹¹² When the ICRC withdrew from Cyprus on 30 June 1977, UNFICYP took on some

¹⁰⁶ A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994) p. 57. These additional 'emergency' activities that were to be carried out by UNFICYP in the midst of the crisis, included: (1) a security zone of a size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, in consultation with UNFICYP, was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces. This zone was to be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which was to supervise the prohibition of entry. Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces was not to be entered by any forces; (2) all the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek-Cypriot forces were to be immediately evacuated and would continue to be protected by UNFICYP. Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish armed forces would continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and could, as before, maintain their own police and security forces; (3) in mixed villages, the functions of security and police were to be carried out by UNFICYP; and (4) military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities were to be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) within the shortest time possible (the UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficy.org/histcoup+intervent.htm>, accessed on 4 December 2000)).

¹⁰⁷ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985) p. 290

¹⁰⁸ Before the island was partitioned, the cease-fire line or the 'Green-line' existed only within the vicinity of Nicosia. When a *de facto* partition of the island was completed, however, the line extended approximately 180 kilometres from Kato Pyrgos on the northwest coast to the east coast at Deryneia, and the UN Buffer Zone was created along the cease-fire line. There are 152 UN observation posts in and near the Buffer Zone, which are used for surveillance. In addition, UNFICYP conducts patrols by helicopters and other vehicles as well as on foot (<http://www.unficy.org/facts.htm>, accessed on 4 December 2000).

¹⁰⁹ Initially, UNFICYP made arrangements with the United Kingdom authorities to assist in evacuating foreign nationals to the British Sovereign Base Area at Dhekelia (the UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficy.org/histcoup+intervent.htm>, accessed on 4 December 2000)).

¹¹⁰ *UN Document (S/11353)*, 21 July 1974, *Report of Secretary-General*, Add. 2, 22 July 1974, para

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¹¹¹ *UN Document (S/11353)*, 21 July 1974, *Report of Secretary-General*, Add. 6, 24 July 1974, para 3

¹¹² *UN Document (S/11488)*, 20 August 1974

tasks that had been carried out by the ICRC.¹¹³ These humanitarian tasks were incorporated into the new functions of UNFICYP.

Of course, UNFICYP continued to carry out some of its original functions in the post-1974 phase. For example, UNFICYP continued to serve in a valuable role as a channel of communication between the two sides.¹¹⁴ Indeed, the importance of this function increased since the creation of a *de facto* separation and the UN Buffer Zone cut the two communities apart.¹¹⁵ By fulfilling such a function, however, UNFICYP unwittingly prevents direct communication and co-operation between the parties. Because the communication channel is provided by UNFICYP and it is often much easier for the two sides to communicate each other through UNFICYP, both parties do not feel the necessity of communicating directly. In other words, the lack of efforts in establishing a direct communication between the two has not caused any major inconvenience among them, and thus, both parties have a good excuse for not communicating directly. Indeed, the fact that UNFICYP has kept the two sides completely apart since 1974 may have obstructed the peacemaking process.¹¹⁶

In any case, UNFICYP prepared itself to perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire and the military *status quo*. Thus, UNFICYP's tasks which were assigned after 1974 can be recapitulated in the following way: Cease-fire Supervision, Maintenance of Law and Order, Refugee Assistance, Securing Humanitarian Assistance, and Protective Service.¹¹⁷

Interposition Functions

Two tasks, Cease-fire Supervision and Maintenance of Law and Order, are identified under the *interposition* function. With regard to the specific tasks identified under the rubric of *Cease-fire Supervision*, UNFICYP has been fairly successful in maintaining the cease-fire between the two combatants since the installation of the UN Buffer Zone in 1974. Likewise, UNFICYP has been generally successful in the *Maintenance of Law and Order* in the UN Buffer Zone (note that in the pre-1974 phase UNFICYP carried out this function throughout the island).

Transition Assistance Functions

It must be noted that some of UNFICYP's tasks that were undertaken in the pre-1974 phase were not included in the mandate of the post-1974 phase operation. For example, tasks which came under the heading of *Institutional Reinforcement* and *Demobilisation and Regrouping* disappeared. In particular, removal of the tasks related to *Institutional Reinforcement* deserves more than a passing mention as these tasks were geared directly towards the peacemaking goal of re-integration. This

¹¹³ UN Document (S/12343), 7 June 1977, para. 12; and UN Document (S/12723), 31 May 1978, para. 11.

¹¹⁴ By pointing out this particular function of UNFICYP, Sedar Denktash reveals that some Turkish-Cypriots call UNFICYP a "post man" meaning UNFICYP's sole function in the UN Buffer Zone is to deliver messages from the Turkish-Cypriot side to the United Nations and to the Greek-Cypriot side (personal interview conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia).

¹¹⁵ However, such a valuable function of UNFICYP does not seem to be appreciated fully by the Turkish-Cypriot side. For example, Sedar Denktash argues that, "If UNFICYP were not here to assume such a function, someone else will take that job." He even points out that by fulfilling such a function, UNFICYP unwittingly prevents direct communication and co-operation between the parties (personal interview conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia).

¹¹⁶ Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', p. 30

¹¹⁷ See Appendix II for a more detailed description of the mandate.

change indicates that the re-integration of the two communities was no longer an objective of UNFICYP even when the majority of UN peacemaking efforts were still aiming for such an end. This point is particularly significant as it clarifies the mechanism through which a UN peacekeeping operation becomes an impediment to conflict resolution, and illuminates a key factor for turning UN peacekeeping into the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution. For a UN peacekeeping operation to serve as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution, the ultimate goal of peacemaking and that of peacekeeping have to be identical. When the peacemaking goal is fixed on the re-integration of the separated communities, a peacekeeping operation that does not fulfil critical *Transition Assistance* functions is more likely to become an impediment rather than an aid to peacemaking activities.

Another important change can be found in the nature of tasks assigned under *Refugee Assistance*. Although this function remained in a list, unlike the pre-1974 phase, this time UNFICYP did not facilitate the repatriation of the refugees, instead it assisted in a peaceful 'ethnic cleansing' between the North and the South under the exchange of population agreement, and helped to complete the creation of the two geographically separated communities in Cyprus.

Humanitarian Intervention Functions

After the second Turkish military intervention was completed and a new military *status quo* emerged, UNFICYP began to assume new functions that were compatible to the new situation on the ground, that is, a *de facto* partition of the island. Most notable new requirement of UNFICYP after 1974 revolves around the fulfilment of *humanitarian intervention* functions. UNFICYP began to perform some tasks that could be categorised as *Securing Humanitarian Assistance*, and UNFICYP has been fairly successful in fulfilling the tasks such as facilitating visits south of the UN Buffer Zone for Greek-Cypriots living in the northern part of the island, support for the refugee assistance efforts of UNHCR, including delivery of foodstuffs, and co-operation with the World Health Organization (WHO), UNDP and other agencies working on Cyprus.¹¹⁸

For instance, UNFICYP routinely delivers humanitarian aid to "left-behind minorities," as every Tuesday it delivers supplies to the Maronites living in the three villages in the north, and every Thursday it delivers supplies provided by the Greek-Cypriot administration and the Cyprus Red Cross Society as well as pension and welfare payments to the Greek-Cypriots living in the Karpas peninsula (area

¹¹⁸ *UN Document (S/18491), Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, 2 December 1986 (quoted in Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', p. 236). However, according to Sara Russell, UNFICYP spokesperson, UNFICYP no longer co-operates with the UNHCR office in Cyprus regarding the issue of internally displaced persons in Cyprus, since the UNHCR office in Cyprus now deals specifically with the problems relating to the refugees from other countries (mainly Lebanon) to Cyprus. She also argues that UNFICYP is capable of tackling the issue of internally displaced persons in Cyprus by itself and thus UNFICYP does not need to co-operate with UNHCR on this issue (personal interview conducted on 21 September 2000 in the UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia). In addition, co-operation between UNFICYP and UNDP and WHO has also ceased. While the United Nations Organization for Project Services (UNOPS) took on the responsibility of the leading humanitarian role in Cyprus and it facilitates projects involving the two communities, no co-ordination exist between its activities and UNFICYP activities. In fact, Miran Rechter, a Programme Manager of UNOPS in Cyprus, emphasises that the work of UNOPS is independent from that of UNFICYP and UNOPS does not need UNFICYP to fulfil its mission in Cyprus (personal interview conducted on 26 September 2000 in Nicosia).

controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot administration).¹¹⁹ Similarly, UNFICYP makes a routine visit to Turkish-Cypriots living in the south (mainly in the Larnaka and Limassol districts) and helps them to maintain contact with their relatives in the north.¹²⁰

In order to deal with vast humanitarian task, UNFICYP established a special humanitarian section at Headquarters, an office to help with the problem of missing persons, and humanitarian liaison with the ICRC, the British High Commission and the US Embassy in Cyprus.¹²¹ Because the two communities now live separately behind the UN Buffer Zone, UNFICYP merely provides a *Protection Service* within the UN Buffer Zone, with frequent success.

These results imply that if any functions of UNFICYP had been undermining the progress in peacemaking it would have to be either *Cease-fire Supervision, Maintenance of Law and Order, Refugee Assistance, Securing Humanitarian Assistance, Protection Service* or all of the above since all the current functions of UNFICYP have been fulfilled successfully. Judging from these tasks, it can be concluded that the primary roles of UNFICYP in the post-1974 era is to maintain peace and stability in the UN Buffer Zone, and to ensure that there is no alteration of the *status quo* along the two cease-fire lines drawn on 16 August 1974. In carrying out its revised mandate successfully, UNFICYP has helped to entrench the post-1974 position on the island, with the cease-fire line becoming more and more an international frontier.¹²² Nevertheless, abandonment of the *Institutional Reinforcement* tasks may be the most decisive factor that made UNFICYP become an impediment to the re-integration of the two communities in Cyprus.

5. Interactive Effects of Intermediary Functions

Having outlined the characteristics of UNFICYP and the conflict situation in which UNFICYP operated, it is now appropriate to address the history of conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus with a view to describing the interactive effects between UNFICYP and other intermediary efforts in Cyprus, and identifying the reasons for the failure of UN peacemaking.

5.1. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

The position of the United Nations with regard to the relationship between its peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in Cyprus is expressed best in the following statement appeared in the *aide-mémoire* of 10 April 1964, a basic document on UNFICYP:

“The operation of the Force and the activities of the United Nations Mediator are separate and distinct undertakings and shall be kept so. Nevertheless, in

¹¹⁹ Personal interview with Major Siegfried Perr, UNFICYP Civil Affairs Military Liaison Officer, conducted on 29 September 2000 in Nicosia. See also, the UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (http://www.unficyp.org/hisops_since_74.htm, accessed on 4 December 2000).

¹²⁰ Personal interview with Sara Russell conducted on 21 September 2000 in Nicosia

¹²¹ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, pp. 140-141

¹²² White, *Keeping the Peace*, pp. 242-243

the nature of the case, the activities are complementary in the sense that the extent to which the Force shall be able to ensure quiet in Cyprus will help the task of the Mediator, while on the other hand any progress effected by the Mediator will facilitate the functioning of the Force.”¹²³

Although the Mediator’s function became inactive as early as March 1965 and UN Mediation was soon succeeded by the Good Offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (since 1975 UN peacemaking has been upgraded to the mission of Good Offices of the Secretary-General), this basic strategy of a dual approach was maintained rigidly throughout the United Nations intervention in Cyprus.

Despite the Secretary-General’s intention to keep the two activities apart and restrict the involvement of UNFICYP in peacemaking endeavours, these two programmes interacted in practice. For example, Clive Milner, the Force Commander (1989-1992), organised a series of high level meetings with not only the commanders of the two contending armies but also with senior political leaders of the two communities including the two Presidents.¹²⁴ With regard to the actual influence of UNFICYP upon UN peacemaking, there are two opposing schools of thought. One of them argues that UNFICYP has been successful in improving the environment for negotiation and reconciliation between the two communities by limiting direct armed confrontations between them. For example, Anthony Parsons made the following statement,

“As early as 1969, when I was in the Security Council, I remember delegations grumbling that UNFICYP was becoming part of the problem, not part of the solution. I could never understand the meaning of this natty little epigram. If the idea is that, without a buffer between them, the parties would have to face reality and come to their senses, it is nonsense. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots have comprehensively demonstrated that, if left alone, they will enthusiastically fall on each other, regardless of the consequences. There can surely be no doubt that UNFICYP’s presence from the beginning until the present day has defused dangerous local frictions, damped down outbreaks of fighting, negotiated local cease-fires and withdrawals—in short, saved lives and property within the limitations of a ‘non-threatening’ mandate.”¹²⁵

The other argues the opposite: UNFICYP actually inhibited negotiations and led to stagnation.¹²⁶ This school argues that by maintaining a cease-fire and the *status quo*, UNFICYP had removed much of the immediacy from the situation and thereby took away some of the incentives for the parties to make concessions. Because it entails no bloodshed, the *status quo* became an acceptable alternative to serious negotiation, which might require concessions that affect their fundamental interests or are

¹²³ UN Document (S/5653). *Aide-mémoire dated 10 April 1964 concerning some questions relating to the function and operation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus*, 10 April 1964

¹²⁴ In these meetings, political negotiations were undertaken and various confidence-building measures were discussed (personal interview with Clive Milner, the UNFICYP Force Commander (1989-1992), conducted on 23 May 2002 in Pattaya).

¹²⁵ Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace*, p. 178

¹²⁶ For example, see Richmond, ‘Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994’, pp. 7-42; Birgisson, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus’, pp. 219-236; Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*; and Sambanis, ‘The United Nations Operation in Cyprus’, pp. 79-108

difficult to sell to a domestic political audience.¹²⁷ Instead of hastily judging which school is right, a close examination of the interaction of the two endeavours is in order.

5.1.1. Pre-1974 Period

Two Programmes for Two Tasks and the Principle of Non-Interference

The UN Security Council actually called for the designation of a mediator when it authorised the establishment of UNFICYP in March 1964. This simultaneous appointment of UNFICYP and the UN Mediator would indicate that the UN Security Council had recognised the complementary relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking. It knew very well that UNFICYP alone could not bring a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. The logic behind this 'twin-engine' approach is that the Mediator endeavours to promote a search for a solution while UNFICYP creates and maintains a circumstance that is conducive to such an effort. This point is acknowledged by Van Coufoudakis when he argued that, "Resolution 186 therefore tacitly recognised the dissatisfaction expressed by many states about UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force], that without an active mediation effort UNEF had contributed mainly to the pacific perpetuation of the dispute."¹²⁸

In reality, however, the failure of Plaza's attempt to persuade the parties to accept a UN version of the solution not only resulted in the first standstill between the two sides, but it also made the UN peacemaking process suffer from long-lasting serious after-effects.¹²⁹ From the outset of UN peacemaking, the Turkish-Cypriot side became suspicious of the intention of the United Nations and of the credibility of the United Nations as an honest broker. Their lack of trust in the United Nations initiatives has been damaging the effectiveness of both UN peacemaking and peacekeeping in Cyprus considerably. This initial failure in UN Mediation spilled over and caused problems for UNFICYP's mandate to act as an impartial peacekeeping force. Indeed, the Turkish-Cypriot side only deepened its suspicion towards UNFICYP and withdrew its support for UNFICYP's actions whenever they perceive it to be counter-productive to their interests.¹³⁰

The United Nations, therefore, deliberately set up two different programmes for two seemingly contradictory but closely inter-connected tasks, and the two programmes were designed not to interfere with one another; while, in theory, it acknowledged the mutually complementary relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking. The Secretary-General's interpretation of UNFICYP's mandate made it clear that UNFICYP would avoid any action "designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus except through creating an improved climate in which political

¹²⁷ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 102

¹²⁸ Van Coufoudakis, 'United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question', *Western Political Quarterly*, 29, 3 (1976), p. 465 (quoted in Mirbageri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, p. 82)

¹²⁹ It is true that the Plaza Report provided a number of important observations and recommendations that were based on the 'objective' analysis of the situation. In fact, many of the Report's recommendations served as a basis of negotiation in the subsequent inter-communal talks (1968-1974). However, no matter how 'objective' Plaza thought they were, and how accurately they reflected the realities on the ground, it was obvious that Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side would not accept Plaza's recommendations. It can also be assumed that the US policy-makers were also not keen on the Report either, since his recommendations were clearly different from, if not actually opposed to, those of Acheson (Mirbageri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, p. 79).

¹³⁰ Peacekeeping and peacemaking are inter-related and that failure in the latter will jeopardise success in the former (Van Coufoudakis, 'United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question', pp. 457-473).

solutions may be sought.”¹³¹ This is because it was thought that excessive interaction between UNFICYP and UN Mediation would undermine the effectiveness of peacekeeping and vice versa. Relevant to this point is Jean-Pierre Cot’s remark:

“The distinction between crisis control and conflict resolution is at the basis of the separation of the authorities invested with peacekeeping functions and those asked to help solve the conflict. During the first Palestinian war, Count Bernadotte realized the difficulty of being simultaneously responsible for both functions. Maintaining the truce and calling to order the violators could hinder the mediation. His successor, Dr. Bunche, asked to have both functions joined, but later accepted Bernadotte’s opinion and recommended the creation of distinct authorities.”¹³²

In fact, on a number of occasions, UNFICYP’s lack of responsibility for the progress in the search for a political solution was emphasised by underlining the separateness of UNFICYP’s peacekeeping role from the UN peacemaking efforts.

Two-Headed System of UNFICYP

At the same time, however, the United Nations sought to overcome the operational difficulties and to achieve some kind of coherence between its peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts by appointing the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as one of the two heads of UNFICYP. In the pre-1974 phase, therefore, the Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General headed UNFICYP, both responsible in their separate right to the Security Council through the Secretary-General’s office (although the two leaders were very much inter-linked in day-to-day decisions).¹³³ Judging from an organizational chart of UNFICYP Headquarters, the Force Commander was in command of the military component through the Chief of Staff, whereas the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was in charge of the civilian component through the Senior Legal and Political Adviser.¹³⁴ With regard to his roles in the UN operation in Cyprus, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was intended to negotiate on behalf of the Secretary-General, but it was explained that his work would not impinge upon the efforts of the UN Mediator to find a long-term solution, nor upon the functions of the Force Commander of UNFICYP.¹³⁵ In other words, the division of labour initially envisaged among the three United Nations top-level officers was that the Mediator would lead high-level political negotiations for the settlement (political); the Force Commander, besides commanding UNFICYP, would negotiate on behalf of the Secretary-General on military matters (military);

¹³¹ *UN Document (S/5653), Note by the Secretary-General*, 10 April 1964. Also, at the outset of its operation, the basic document on UNFICYP stipulated that, “In carrying out its function, the United Nations Force shall avoid any action designed to influence the political situation in Cyprus...” (*UN Document (S/5653)*, 10 April 1964, Aide-mémoire dated 10 April 1964 concerning some questions relating to the function and operation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus).

¹³² Jean-Pierre Cot, ‘Critical Remarks on John Burton’s Paper on Resolution of Conflict with Special Reference to the Cyprus Conflict’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 16 (1972), p. 35

¹³³ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, pp. 103-104. In the pre-1974 phase, there were five Force Commanders and four Special Representatives.

¹³⁴ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 105

¹³⁵ *UN Documents (S/5691), Report of Secretary-General*, 11 May 1964 (quoted in Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 146)

whereas the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would negotiate on behalf of the Secretary-General on practical problems on the ground which require immediate solutions (practical, emergency, humanitarian), although his duty shifted to include some political negotiations particularly after the resignation of UN Mediator Galo Plaza.

In fact, UNFICYP was the first UN peacekeeping operation in which the principle of dual control had been applied.¹³⁶ Indarjit Rikhye et al. described the relationships between the two heads of UNFICYP as follows:

“Not only does the operational management devolve upon these two men, but also the smooth running and the working effectiveness of the force. It is therefore of fundamental importance to both that they be compatible and share each other’s thinking as much as possible. ... In Cyprus it has been rare for a military initiative not to have political overtones and vice versa; this therefore required the closest collaboration at the decision-making level. Although each had direct access to the Secretary-General in respect to his own particular responsibilities, most communications regarding action taken, action advised, or action requested were jointly drafted and transmitted.”¹³⁷

Even though such a co-ordination at the decision-making level was essential for the effective operation of UNFICYP, no formal mechanism of the co-ordination between the Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was institutionalised. Instead, co-operation and co-ordination of the two fundamental components of UNFICYP was made possible through the juxtaposition of these two senior professionals. The close working relationship between them ensured that action, military or political, would be co-ordinated.¹³⁸ Moreover, conceivable gaps between the functions of peacekeeping and peacemaking at the strategic planning level were also filled by institutionalisation of a co-ordinating body at the operational level. A Political Liaison Committee that consisted of the Deputy Chief of Staff (chairman of the committee), the Senior Political and Legal Adviser with his staff, the Police Adviser and the Chief Economics Officer was set up in the UNFICYP structure to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the two communities.¹³⁹

Local Peacemaking by UNFICYP

UNFICYP carried out its own local ‘peacemaking’ activities in order to assume its operational responsibility for reactivating the socio-economic services and utilities essential to the daily life of any community (postal, medical, educational, etc.). To meet this requirement, UNFICYP included in its organization a civilian component called ‘Political Department’ that was headed by the Senior Legal and Political Adviser.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, UNFICYP had a military economics branch known as ‘Operations Economics’ for dealing with economic problems arising in the battle

¹³⁶ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 104

¹³⁷ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, pp. 103-104

¹³⁸ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 292

¹³⁹ The Political Liaison Committee met regularly, albeit separately, with Liaison Officers representing the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turkish-Cypriot community (Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 138).

¹⁴⁰ Michael Harbottle, ‘The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution’, *International Journal*, 35, 1 (Winter 1979-80), p. 128

zone such as the day-to-day social-economic problems affecting the lives and livelihoods of the Turkish-Cypriot community.¹⁴¹ Although it was the responsibility of each national contingent participating in UNFICYP to assist economic and social freedom of the people of both communities, it was the duty of the Operation Economics staff to co-ordinate and direct its efforts to the best advantage of both communities.¹⁴² As mentioned, UNFICYP set up the Political Liaison Committee and held meetings with Liaison Officers from the two sides.

These sections of UNFICYP carried out one of the most appreciable roles played by UNFICYP, that is, the provision of a channel of communication between the two communities through local peacemaking. For instance, when immediate problems arose on the ground, the two heads of UNFICYP and its Political Liaison Committee often offered to mediate limited but appropriate agreements between the two communities, and UNFICYP troops provided a military presence to ensure that there was no increased risk to the security of either community while the negotiations were undertaken. In fact, while deliberately avoiding getting involved in the 'political' peacemaking activities, UNFICYP undertook various 'practical' peacemaking initiatives at the local level, seeking local solutions, often with success.¹⁴³ This local peacemaking by UNFICYP was recognised in the Report of the Secretary-General:

"Throughout the development ... the Special Representative and the Force Commander made available the good offices of UNFICYP to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot community, and in this manner succeeded in keeping channels of communication open between them at all times. The United Nations Force also made the necessary practical agreements for such direct contacts as took place."¹⁴⁴

Michael Harbottle illustrates an example of local peacemaking activity that was undertaken by UNFICYP peacekeepers in Paphos District in 1967 when a series of inter-communal murders and abductions halted the economic life and the free movement for the people in the region. According to him, as a result of a number of bi-communal meetings each of which a United Nations officer assumed the role of the chair, UNFICYP was able to broker a local deal between the mukhtars (mayors) of the two communities in the Paphos District, which helped a new sense of security to emerge in the region.¹⁴⁵ This local peacemaking role of UNFICYP became known as "reconciliation through communication."¹⁴⁶

This example illustrates the fact that UNFICYP's local peacemaking provided immediate and practical solutions to limited but urgent problems on the ground. Indeed, for some peacekeepers it is required that they should master not only combat skills but also what David Last calls contact skills.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', p. 128; and Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 103.

¹⁴² Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 108

¹⁴³ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 381

¹⁴⁴ *UN Document (S/6569), Report of the Secretary-General on Recent Developments, 29 July 1965*

¹⁴⁵ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', pp. 118-119

¹⁴⁶ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 112

¹⁴⁷ David M. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Clementsport; the Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997) pp. 55-62

Two Programmes Not Working Together

Despite all these efforts at the operational level, the strategy of non-interference employed at the top-level seems to suggest that the United Nations believed that the minimum interaction between peacemaking and peacekeeping would bring a favourable outcome although it recognised the complementary nature of the two programmes. That is why it maintained the strategy of non-interference throughout its involvement in Cyprus despite the fact that a series of successful local peacemaking attempts by UNFICYP might have led to a significant political agreement. In other words, the United Nations failed to appreciate the necessity for the two endeavours to interact closely and harmonise their strategies to produce the best result. Seeing the relationship of the two programmes from a different angle, it can be described that the United Nations did co-ordinate its peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, but as a result of the co-ordination it came to an accommodation that the two programmes would co-operate not to interfere with one another. In other words, the two endeavours were designed to run parallel with one another and never intended to cross the other's path. They were designed to work side by side, but not to work together.

Because of the policy of non-interference and the lack of harmonisation between the two programmes, a range of practical and military agreements that were brokered through UNFICYP's local peacemaking efforts hardly paved the way for a comprehensive political settlement. In fact, there were occasions on which the leaders of the two communities avoided negotiations of the political solutions by engaging themselves in negotiations on practical and humanitarian matters such as measures to end or prevent outbreaks of violence.¹⁴⁸ By underlining such problems caused by the lack of interaction between practical mediations carried out by UNFICYP and political mediations undertaken by the UN Mediator, John Burton argues that, "The separation of the peacekeeping and mediation functions in Cyprus has probably been a mistake."¹⁴⁹

However, with the resignation of the UN Mediator and the subsequent upgrading of the responsibility of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to include political peacemaking, some of the peacemaking function was incorporated into the umbrella of UNFICYP, thus, co-ordination between the two programmes was accidentally made possible.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was not involved actively and substantively in the peacemaking process during the early stage of the peacemaking process, a potentially positive interaction of peacemaking and peacekeeping was never fully sought in the pre-1974 phase.

5.1.2. Post-1974 Period

First Major Restructuring of UNFICYP

In the post-1974 phase, there have been some slight changes in the relationship between the two programmes. In fact, UNFICYP underwent at least two structural changes in its organization: first in March 1975 and the other in August 1994. The

¹⁴⁸ In the abstract context, Paul Diehl argues, "If all efforts are spent on keeping the peace and related concerns, little attention may be left over for peacemaking" (Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 102).

¹⁴⁹ Burton, 'Resolution of Conflict', p. 17

¹⁵⁰ With this modification, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was given enlarged powers to use his Good Offices to encourage talks between the leaders of the two communities although he was not given the powers of a Mediator (Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 147).

UN Security Council adopted Resolution 367 on 12 March 1975 in which it asked the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of Good Offices. Accordingly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General began in earnest to assume the mediation function of the United Nations, which had been vacant since the resignation of the UN Mediator in March 1965. With this adjustment the division of labour between the two heads of UNFICYP became clearer. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was in charge of political mediation, while he was not responsible for the day-to-day operation of UNFICYP. Thus, the Force Commander assumed prime responsibility for the bulk of the local negotiation on the ground, in addition to the daily management of UNFICYP's operation.

This shift of duties was illuminated by the change of UNFICYP's organizational structure. While the Special Representative of the Secretary-General remained as one of the two heads of UNFICYP with only two subordinates (the Senior Political Adviser and the UNFICYP Spokesperson) who were directly responsible to him, the rest of UNFICYP's body was responsible to the other head, the Force Commander. Furthermore, on 31 October 1977, the UNFICYP headquarters post of Police Adviser was abolished and the commanders of the two remaining UNCIVPOL units became responsible to the Force Commander through the normal chain of command.¹⁵¹ Thus, these changes literally allowed both military and civilian components including the civilian police to be placed under the direct supervision of the Force Commander, in effect making him the Chief of Mission.¹⁵²

Liaison between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander at the UNFICYP Headquarters was maintained in the new structure and both heads were responsible to the Secretary-General through the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. Nevertheless, no considerable interaction between UN peacemaking and UNFICYP was detected, except that the possible withdrawal of UNFICYP was occasionally mentioned in UN Security Council resolutions to draw concessions from the parties, and the potential utility of UNFICYP was acknowledged in the implementation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and an awaited settlement. While a number of different peacemaking initiatives were attempted by the Good Offices of the Secretary-General, no significant adjustment in the mandate of UNFICYP was carried out.

Second Major Restructuring of UNFICYP

Until July 1994, the Force Commander was assuming a role of the Chief of Mission, while the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was in charge of the Good Offices Mission. As described above, there has been a clear division of labour between the Secretary-General's Good Offices Mission (peacemaking) and UNFICYP (peacekeeping) and communication and co-ordination between the two programmes were limited until 1994.¹⁵³ UNFICYP is used to maintain a division of the island, whilst any progress towards re-integration must come about through

¹⁵¹ *UN Document (S/12463)*, 1 December 1977, para. 4

¹⁵² Under the Force Commander, two separate senior officials were assigned, one for the military component and the other for the civilian component. The Chief of Staff was responsible for the 'Operations Branch' and the 'Logistic and Personnel Branch,' and the Chief Administrative Officer led the 'Civilian Administrative Branch,' while military contingents and UNCIVPOL fell under direct command of the Force Commander.

¹⁵³ Since the offices of the two senior executive officers were located in the same hall at the UNFICYP Headquarter, they were able to exchange their views on daily basis.

separate peacemaking attempts by the Good Offices Mission.¹⁵⁴

However, with the aim of improving communication and co-ordination between the two programmes under the United Nations auspices, the functions of peacekeeping and peacemaking were integrated under the supervision of the Chief of Mission in August 1994. The function of the Chief of Mission reflects a unified arrangement of the United Nations operations in Cyprus, in which UNFICYP and the Good Offices Mission fall under a single command. With this decision, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed as the Chief of Mission and became not only responsible for a high-level political negotiation but also the whole United Nations operations in Cyprus (the Good Offices Mission and UNFICYP). However, not all Special Representatives have been stationed at UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia, some of them were based at the United Nations headquarters in New York. In the absence of the Special Representative, the Deputy Special Representative assumed this function.¹⁵⁵ Under the new structure, the function of the Good Offices Mission is included within UNFICYP's hierarchy. Thus, since August 1994 the Good Offices Mission has been carried out by UNFICYP, particularly by the Chief of Mission and his Senior Adviser.

When UNFICYP underwent major restructuring in August 1994, the Civil Affairs Branch and the Public Information Office were created under the direct command of the Senior Adviser to support the Good Offices Mission as well as local peacebuilding activities. Perhaps, one of the most notable developments in the recent re-organization of the UNFICYP structure is the creation of this Civil Affairs Branch that consists of 28 personnel from military, civilian police and civilian streams. The Branch is responsible for the day-to-day interaction of both communities, and provides humanitarian support to residents in the UN Buffer Zone and to "left-behind minorities" in each community. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer oversees the operation of the Branch together with his three key subordinates: Civil Affairs Military Liaison Officer, Civil Affairs Police Liaison Officer, and Civil Affairs Political Liaison Officer. The mandate of these three officers is two fold: to maintain good relationships and co-ordination among the three components of UNFICYP, and to liaise closely with their counter-part of the two Cypriot communities.¹⁵⁶ The three officers play a very important role in developing a coherent strategy among the three components of UNFICYP and ensuring co-ordination among them. They are also important because they serve as a point of contact for the local parties and maintain contacts with them regularly. On the other hand, the Public Information Office consists of the Spokesperson and five officers (both civilian and military). The Office not only liaises with local and foreign media but also organises cross-buffer visits and co-ordinates special events such as bi-communal festivals and the UNFICYP open day. While the Civil Affairs Branch and the Public Information Office are small compared with the rest of UNFICYP units, they have the potential to become a foundation for a United Nations *peacebuilding* operation in Cyprus.

In addition to the Good Offices Mission, UNFICYP carries out the

¹⁵⁴ White, *Keeping the Peace*, p. 243

¹⁵⁵ The UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficy.org/>, accessed on 4 December 2000). For example, Gustave Feissel acted as the Chief of Mission from August 1994 to July 1998, while Joe Clark (1993-1996), Han Sung-Joo (1996-1997) and Diego Cordovez (1997-1999) served as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on a non-resident basis.

¹⁵⁶ Personal interview with Major Siegfried Perr conducted on 29 September 2000 in Nicosia.

peacekeeping function through its three major components: the military component (three Sectors, UN Flight, Mobile Force Reserve, Military Police and Medical Centre) led by the Force Commander, the civilian police component led by the UNCIVPOL Commander, and the civilian component led by the Chief Administration Officer. The heads of each component are directly responsible to the Chief of Mission. Hence, the role of the Force Commander in the mission has been degraded from the Chief of Mission to the head of the military component in UNFICYP. These changes reflect the trend that more and more tasks which used to be carried out by military personnel but did not necessarily require military expertise to carry them out successfully are handed over to civilians.

Despite these developments, no significantly positive interaction has been identified between peacekeeping and peacemaking activities in Cyprus. This is partly because a great deal of interaction will normally occur during the implementation of agreements ('re-negotiation' or 'post-agreement negotiation' phase) and the Cyprus peace process has not yet reached that stage, and mainly because the two programmes of UNFICYP have been pursuing the mutually incompatible, if not fundamentally opposing, goals: separation and re-integration.

In any case, conflict resolution is not all about peacemaking. Decisions at the top-level need to be endorsed and followed by the constituents who would be affected by such decisions. For an agreement to stick and to be implemented successfully, the bulk of people have to turn into 'constituents for peace,' and various peacebuilding activities are essential to increase such supporters at the grassroots. Thus, the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Cyprus peace process will be examined extensively below.

5.2. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

5.2.1. Pre-1974 Period

During 1964-1974 at least three different peacebuilding attempts were undertaken: the Cyprus Resettlement Project, John Burton's Workshop and the Rome Seminar. No marks of co-operation or co-ordination can be traced between these peacebuilding initiatives and UNFICYP, except that Michael Harbottle, a former UNFICYP Chief of Staff, knew about the Cyprus Resettlement Project to such a degree that he could make a positive remark on the project: "Had the fighting in 1974 not occurred ... the project would have made a positive contribution to the reconciliation process which is essential to the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute."¹⁵⁷ Although his personal interest in the grass-root third party intervention might have led him to be sympathetic to such an 'unofficial' endeavour, his professionalism made him to comment that "it was not a part of UNFICYP's mandate to develop or implement such an initiative; nor could it co-operate in a project set up by a body outside the United Nations."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', p. 128. A small group of Quakers and members of the Shanti Sena (the Gandhi peace movement) set up 'the Cyprus Resettlement Project' in 1973. The project sought to assist in the repatriation of the internally displaced persons (mostly Turkish-Cypriots) who fled as a result of inter-communal fighting since 1963. The project was able to facilitate the repatriation of internally displaced persons in three villages, and in one of them there was clear evidence that inter-communal life had returned to a normalcy comparable to that existing before 1963. The project lasted for about six months until the *coup d'état* and the subsequent Turkish military intervention occurred in July 1974 (Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', pp. 126-128).

¹⁵⁸ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', p. 128

There was no involvement of UNFICYP or other United Nations officials in John Burton's 'controlled communication' workshops that took place in London.¹⁵⁹ According to Burton, he broached his ideas with the Secretary-General's office before he began to arrange the workshop with the local parties by himself, but the UN officials did not take his attempt seriously.¹⁶⁰ Besides, such a new process was invented partly out of dissatisfaction with traditional methods of third party intervention in peacemaking, which dominated the United Nations' approach to the Cyprus conflict as Burton once put it in the following way:

"The United Nations can maintain a 'peacekeeping' operation; but it does not seem to be able to bring a conflict to the point of resolution. It has no analytical and noncoercive processes by which this can be done. There are some initiatives allowed to the Secretary General. His interventions tend, however, to be the traditional mediation ones, in which the mediator makes proposals which are then bargained over, rather than an analytical process through which new and acceptable options can be discovered. ... As a result the conflicts handled by the United Nations, such as Cyprus, are protracted to a large degree by reason of the means employed to deal with them."¹⁶¹

The Center for Mediterranean Studies of the American Universities Field Staff organised a five-day seminar called 'an Inquiry into the Resolution of the Cyprus Problem' in Rome from 19 to 24 November 1973 in which two interlocutors of the official inter-communal talks, Glafkos Clerides (the parliamentary leader of the Greek-Cypriot community and president of the Cypriot House of Representative) and Rauf Denktash (leader of Turkish-Cypriot community) took part.¹⁶² A momentum towards a comprehensive accord was developed and the two interlocutors subsequently reached a virtual agreement in the next round of official inter-communal talks.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, the *coup d'état* on 15 July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish military intervention in Cyprus ruined the achievements of the Rome seminar and precluded the potential contribution of another innovative peacebuilding initiative, a problem-solving workshop organised by Leonard W. Doob and his colleagues which had to be aborted at the last moment.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Following the constitutional crisis in 1963, John W. Burton and his colleagues at the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict (CAC) organised a series of interactive problem-solving workshops (then they were called "controlled communication" seminars) at University College London, in which two 'private' representatives from each community who were selected by top decision-makers in the two communities were included (Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 'Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative Study of Four Societies', *The Cyprus Review*, 1, 2 (Spring 1989), p. 83; for a fuller account see Herbert C. Kelman, 'The Problem-solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution', in M. E. Berman and J. E. Johnson (eds.), *Unofficial Diplomats* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 168-200).

¹⁶⁰ Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997) pp. 24-25

¹⁶¹ John W. Burton, 'The Facilitation of International Conflict Resolution', *Conflict and Change*, 8 (1985), p. 44

¹⁶² Keashly and Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict', p. 447; for a fuller account of the Rome seminar see Phillips Talbot, 'The Cyprus Seminar', in M. E. Berman and J. E. Johnson (eds.), *Unofficial Diplomats* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 159-167.

¹⁶³ Talbot, 'The Cyprus Seminar', p. 165; and see also, Keashly and Fisher, 'Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict', p. 448.

¹⁶⁴ Leonard Doob was a participant of the Talbot seminar in Rome. Doob's workshop was planned to commence in the late July 1974. For more information about Doob's aborted workshop, see

Low Level Initiatives by UNFICYP

Instead of collaborating or co-ordinating efforts with peacebuilding approaches, UNFICYP carried out its own low-level 'peacebuilding' activities. UNFICYP assumed the responsibility of facilitating the return to normal conditions, and in doing so it engaged in peacebuilding activities. By pointing to such a function of UNFICYP, A. B. Fetherston argues that the UNFICYP operation highlights the importance of peacebuilding tasks within a peacekeeping framework and how they can be organised creatively and it invites the dismissal of notions that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are necessarily mutually exclusive endeavours.¹⁶⁵ Although her point is well taken, such a potential was not demonstrated fully in the early stage of the UNFICYP operation. Michael Harbottle argues that not a few promising third party initiatives have been negated by the inflexibility of the institutional procedures and political differences within the United Nations.¹⁶⁶ In other words, while low profile, technical and *ad hoc* co-ordination between different intermediaries on the ground might have happened under the UNFICYP umbrella, no strategic, political and institutionalised co-ordination took place between UNFICYP and other small NGOs.

Harbottle also maintains that the reluctance of the UN Security Council to adjust UNFICYP's mandate to changing circumstances squandered the advantages gained from the earlier achievements of the UNFICYP operation. According to his observation, by 1968 UNFICYP had fulfilled the role for which it had been created, and thus a peacebuilding initiative was required to succeed a peacekeeping function of UNFICYP.¹⁶⁷ The unwillingness of the UN Security Council to consider reviewing and revising the original mandate to suit the changed needs of the situation, however, did a disservice to the whole structure of peacekeeping, for it disenchanting those contributing states who saw their contingents employed year after year in keeping the peace in the island where the fighting stopped years ago.¹⁶⁸ Harbottle even stated, "Had a civilian peacebuilding 'operation' been mounted in 1968, the events of 1974 might never have taken place."¹⁶⁹

In sum, what Harbottle calls "low-level initiative" never succeeded in becoming a high-level initiative, nor the idea of turning UNFICYP to a more peacebuilding-oriented operation was not explored seriously by the decision-makers in New York although the significance of local peacemaking and peacebuilding activities by UNFICYP peacekeepers, and a benefit of co-operation among various intermediaries on the ground were recognised by UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia.

5.2.2. Post-1974 Period

UNFICYP and Humanitarian Agencies

During the 1974 crisis, arrangements were made between UNFICYP and the ICRC for a demarcation of humanitarian activities:

Leonard W. Doob, 'A Cyprus Workshop: An Exercise in Intervention Methodology', *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 94 (1974), pp. 161-178; and Leonard W. Doob, 'A Cyprus Workshop: Intervention Methodology During a Continuing Crisis', *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 98 (1976), pp. 143-154.

¹⁶⁵ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 53-54

¹⁶⁶ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', p. 129

¹⁶⁷ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', p. 129

¹⁶⁸ Rikhye et al., *The Thin Blue Line*, p. 114

¹⁶⁹ Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', p. 130

“With regard to humanitarian activities, a meeting was held at UNFICYP headquarters in the evening of 30 July with representatives of ICRC, and it was agreed that the Red Cross would assume primary responsibility for providing relief and taking care of refugees, prisoners, missing persons, allegations of atrocities and similar problems that are traditionally within the terms of reference of the ICRC. UNFICYP will continue to play an active role, which will include carrying out investigations and local negotiation, and will fully assist and co-operate in carrying out humanitarian operations.”¹⁷⁰

UNFICYP was actively co-operating not only with the ICRC, but also with the UNHCR and UNDP, especially through its section of Operation Economics and UNCIVPOL. UNFICYP (particularly its UNCIVPOL staff) provided escorts and visited prisons and refugee camps. As a result of active co-operation between UNFICYP and humanitarian agencies, a large number of humanitarian operations were carried out smoothly and they were able to alleviate the suffering of many innocent individuals at the time of crisis. This example shows the potential of good co-ordination between a United Nations peacekeeping operation and humanitarian agencies. While the possible contribution of humanitarian relief operations to the peace process should not be neglected, at the same time, one must remember that these operations are normally launched to accomplish specific objectives for a very limited period of time. Therefore, their long-term effects on the overall peace process can be fairly circumscribed.

UNFICYP and Interactive Conflict Resolution

With regard to the relationships between UNFICYP and peacebuilding initiatives in the post-1974 phase, it can be argued that the potential of their positive interaction was not fully explored. UNFICYP's contribution to the Yale project, for example, was limited in the sense that it was engaged only in marginal and procedural matters and its engagement did not go beyond the realm of formality.¹⁷¹ Unfortunately, the Yale project had to be terminated in October 1985 due to a sudden withdrawal of support for the project by the Turkish-Cypriot administration.¹⁷² As a result, no substantive and tangible contribution to UN peacemaking seemed to have materialised through the Yale project. Nevertheless, the case served as a good example for a positive interaction between a peacebuilding initiative and UNFICYP. By allowing the Yale project to use its facility in the Ledra Palace Hotel in the name of contributing to a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP provided a neutral and secure as well as convenient environment that was necessary for such a bi-communal

¹⁷⁰ *UN Document (S11353)*, Add. 12, 31 July 1974 (quoted in Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV Europe 1946-1979*, p. 141)

¹⁷¹ In 1985, Leonard W. Doob was able to organise a three-month long conflict resolution workshop in Nicosia. The workshop was officially called ‘the Yale Project on Community Relations Facilitated by the United Nations,’ and involved eight Cypriot intellectuals from each community with an observer from the United Nations who met almost twice a week for three months at the Ledra Palace Hotel which is located in the UN Buffer Zone (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, ‘Conflict Resolution Mechanisms’, p. 84). The Yale group (Leonard Doob and William Foltz) was planning to organise a ten-day workshop on Cyprus conflict in July 1974, but this endeavour was abandoned due to the *coup d'état* and the subsequent Turkish intervention (Barbara J. Hill, ‘An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: from Problem-solving Workshop to Theory’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26, 1 (March 1982), pp. 124-125).

¹⁷² Among the reasons eventually proffered was that the workshop was becoming a ‘political establishment’ that could interfere with official interactions (Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 51).

workshop to take place in Cyprus.

Such positive interactions were also observed when Ronald J. Fisher (a Canadian) undertook two series of conflict resolution workshops.¹⁷³ During the preparatory stage of the first series, Fisher visited Cyprus three times to elicit support and seek guidance on workshop design. With the support of UNFICYP, and particularly that of the Canadian Contingent, Fisher flew into Cyprus with a military aircraft and stayed at the Canadian Barracks in the Ledra Palace Hotel during his stay in Cyprus.¹⁷⁴ Fisher argues that because the Ledra Palace Hotel was located in the UN Buffer Zone between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides, this manner of entry and accommodation reinforced strongly the perception of his impartiality between the two sides, which was advantageous to a potential intermediary.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, he acknowledged several times, in his report of the first series of workshops, the assistance and consultation provided by the United Nations personnel, both in the Office of Secretary-General in New York and in UNFICYP. For instance, he states that, "The continuing advice and assistance of UNFICYP personnel, particularly the Force Commander and the Humanitarian Branch, was essential to the logistics of the visit and the progress of the project."¹⁷⁶

The second series of workshops were held in a conference room in the Ledra Palace Hotel with the support and co-operation of UNFICYP. Once again, Fisher acknowledged the assistance of UNFICYP on a number of occasions in his report of these workshops, but this time he also included a page-long description of the relationship between his venture and UNFICYP. The following quotation is excerpted from his report:

"With the support of UNFICYP Headquarters and the Humanitarian Branch, the Humanitarian Cell of 2RCHA [the Second Regiment of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery] provided the logistical, transportation and catering arrangements necessary for the two workshops. ... The location of the Ledra Palace in the Buffer Zone makes it possible for members of the two communities to enter the area and the hotel without having to pass through the check point of the other side, thus simplifying the procedure of coming together. With escort provided by UNFICYP soldiers, the participants made their way to the conference room.... The discussions were held around a large circular table which allowed every participant to see every other one and which was conducive to not forming 'sides.'... The lunches and closing dinner were arranged in one of the mess dining rooms of the barracks. Thus in total, the Ledra Palace with the support of UNFICYP provided a uniquely appropriate and effective venue for the holding of intercommunal sessions on the island of Cyprus."¹⁷⁷

UNFICYP and the Bi-communal Movement

Non-official bi-communal activities began to involve a wider range of people

¹⁷³ Fisher's reports of these projects seem to be the only documentation on peacebuilding activities in the Cyprus conflict, which acknowledge explicitly the role of UNFICYP in preparing and conducting its endeavour.

¹⁷⁴ Ronald J. Fisher, *Peacebuilding for Cyprus: Report on a Conflict Analysis Workshop, June 17-21, 1991* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992), p. 7

¹⁷⁵ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, p. 154

¹⁷⁶ Fisher, *Peacebuilding for Cyprus*, p. 9

¹⁷⁷ Ronald J. Fisher, *Education and Peacebuilding in Cyprus: A Report on Two Conflict Analysis Workshops* (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1994), p. 8

and be initiated by local actors in the early 1990s. For example, a group of individuals from both communities formed a steering committee and approached UNFICYP requesting its assistance in arranging bi-communal meetings.¹⁷⁸ In mid-1990 these unofficial bi-communal meetings held in the Ledra Palace Hotel were institutionalised into the first Bi-communal Movement called 'The Citizens Joint Movement for a Federal and Democratic Cyprus.'¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Conflict Resolution Trainers from the two communities in Cyprus identified 29 specific objectives of their efforts, and developed a chart which shows the possible supportive relationships among these proposed goals in the joint statement called the 'Collective Vision Statement for Peace-building Efforts in Cyprus.' While the joint statement is a quite remarkable achievement in itself, it does not address the need for co-operation and co-ordination with official initiatives such as the UN Secretary-General's Good Offices Mission and UNFICYP.¹⁸⁰ The term 'co-ordination' used in the context of Bi-communal Movement focused only on co-ordination among various bi-communal groups existed at the grassroots level. None of the organizations that were assigned or designed to perform as a co-ordinating centre envisaged planning a coherent conflict resolution strategy with official peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Judging from the list of the proposed objectives of their efforts, it seems that the drafters of the statement were pre-occupied with issues involving peacebuilding either between the two communities or within each community, and did not seem to consider their activities in association with efforts by UNFICYP. Although bi-communal groups often sought procedural and logistical assistance (provision of facility, space and secure environment) from UNFICYP, they did not consider collaborating fully with peacekeepers in order to promote peacebuilding since they perceived the role of peacekeepers as to keep the parties apart so that peacebuilders could work between the separated entities. UNFICYP was regarded as an agent for separation and conflict settlement, while they identified themselves as catalysts for integration and conflict resolution. In short, the Bi-communal Movement that is embodied by the Collective Vision Statement lacks a comprehensive and strategic vision towards conflict resolution. It did not appreciate the complementary relationship between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach. It lacks a proper appreciation of the interaction and dynamics of not only between official and unofficial approaches, but also among three principal agents of

¹⁷⁸ The first meeting attracted sixty-five local participants and positive media coverage, and numerous follow-up meetings were organised both in a bi-communal setting and in separate community groups (Broome, 'Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus', p. 50).

¹⁷⁹ Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 'Different Relationships to the Land: Personal Narratives, Political Implications and Future Possibilities in Cyprus', in Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and its People: Nation Identity and Experience in a Unimaginable Community, 1953-1997* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), p. 259. A great deal of local bi-communal activities which aimed at fostering interaction among citizens across the Green-line in Cyprus were initiated by the local elite, not by outside third parties (Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, personal interview conducted on 18 September 2000 in Nicosia).

¹⁸⁰ Among the 29 joint objectives, only one is related to UN peacemaking activity, which indicates that one of the goals of the Bi-communal Movement is "to build bridges of mutual empowerment and understanding with people involving Track One activity." *The Collective Vision Statement for Peace-building Efforts in Cyprus* can be found in Benjamin J. Broome and Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, *Crossing Boundaries in Cyprus: Building a Collective Vision for the Future, Analysis of Interactive Design and Problem-solving Workshops with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots* (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Jerusalem, 19-24 July 1998).

conflict resolution: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

What seems to have been missing, therefore, was a United Nations agent primarily responsible for promoting official peacebuilding and for co-operating with its counterpart in unofficial peacebuilding initiatives and with its partners in the field of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Of course, the UNHCR Mission in Cyprus has been designated as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus, but it has devoted its effort to non-political bi-communal activities, and by the late 1990s it has ceased to function as Co-ordinator and mainly dealt with issues regarding refugees coming to Cyprus from its neighbourhood.¹⁸¹ Moreover, such a peacebuilding operation would have been complementary to the work of diplomats and politicians whose primary objective was to find a peaceful solution although it would not be a direct means of resolving conflict.

UNFICYP and Non-political Bi-communal Approach

It is often argued that the non-political nature of the approach allowed the Nicosia Sewerage Project and the Nicosia Master Plan to be implemented despite the political and physical division of the island.¹⁸² These projects were deliberately kept away from both political and military battlefields and detached themselves as much as possible from the United Nations efforts in peacemaking and peacekeeping. Therefore, the only traceable link between these projects and UNFICYP was the protective service provided by UNFICYP for these projects. UNFICYP transported equipment through the UN Buffer Zone and escorted work crews in or along the UN Buffer Zone to ensure that contact in the field between crews and the military of each side did not result in misunderstanding or conflict.¹⁸³

5.3. Brief Summary of Interactions

The intermediary efforts in Cyprus that had interacted with UNFICYP can be classified into three categories: practical peacemaking, political peacemaking and peacebuilding. In the pre-1974 phase, especially at the early stage, the relationship between UNFICYP and practical peacemaking on the ground can be characterised as close and positive. This is because the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, while being one of the two heads of UNFICYP, led a number of practical peacemaking efforts in consultation with the Force Commander since most of these efforts aimed at solving humanitarian problems which required active support from the two belligerents. This trend seems to have marginalised when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General began to undertake political peacemaking in the post-1974 phase.

In contrast to practical peacemaking, substantive interaction between UNFICYP and political peacemaking can be characterised as almost non-existent throughout the UN operation in Cyprus.¹⁸⁴ Similarly, no conceivable interaction

¹⁸¹ Personal interview with Sara Russell conducted on 21 September 2000 in Nicosia

¹⁸² UNHCR, *The Nicosia Sewerage Project: A Plan for Nicosia A Strategy or the World* (Nicosia: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1995), p. 4

¹⁸³ UNHCR, *The Nicosia Sewerage Project*, p. 19

¹⁸⁴ Of course, there were few exceptions. The withdrawal (or the significant reduction) of UNFICYP was called for in a number of UN Security Council resolutions to urge the parties to make necessary compromises in the UN-sponsored inter-communal talks. Some of political peacemaking efforts were undertaken in the conference room where UNFICYP assumed the administrative control. UNFICYP served as an alternative channel of communication, and relative calm of the situation was kept by the presence of UNFICYP while negotiations took place.

existed between UNFICYP and peacebuilding endeavours in the pre-1974 phase since only a handful unofficial peace initiatives were undertaken initially. However, as peacebuilding activities expanded, the two programmes began to interact more and more closely although the nature of interaction have been limited to administrative and logistical aspects. While UNFICYP has been a mainly military organization both in terms of its nature and its tasks, during the post-1974 phase it began to include more and more civilians in the organization and to assume much wider responsibilities. The most interesting development is that since 1994 UNFICYP's Civil Affairs Branch and Public Information Office were created under the direct command of the Senior Adviser to the Chief of Mission to support local peacebuilding activities.

6. *Case Study Summaries and Conclusion*

Having outlined the relationship between peacekeeping and the other major endeavours for conflict resolution in two distinctive phases, it is time to come back to the issue raised before: under what conditions and by performing what functions has UNFICYP impeded the peace process in Cyprus? The above analysis indicates that none of the three dimensions of the conflict situation in Cyprus was ripe for a resolution throughout the period. Of course, the presence of a peacekeeping force alone would not retard the 'ripening' process of the conflict in all the three dimensions, and there are plenty of other undermining factors some of which are inherent to the United Nations while many others are attributable to the situations between, within and surrounding the parties. Nevertheless, some critics of UNFICYP articulate that the presence of UNFICYP has prevented the conflict from becoming ripe, and thus contributing to the continuation of the lengthy stalemate.¹⁸⁵ Such a side-effect of peacekeeping which helps to institutionalise a conflict is acknowledged by John Reddaway as follows:

The trouble with such peacekeeping forces ... is that, as time goes by and there is no settlement to the underlying political problem, their presence tends to freeze the state of affairs as it existed at the time of their intervention, and this may then operate unfairly to the advantages of whichever of the contending parties happened to have the upper hand at the time. As the years go by, a temporary truce thus acquires the character of a permanent settlement. A side-effect is that whichever party gains from a prolongation of the existing state of affairs then has a diminishing incentive to reach a real and lasting solution.¹⁸⁶

Even though this opposing effect of peacekeeping was apparent in the Cyprus peace process, the repeated failure of reaching a mutually acceptable solution should not be attributed to the presence of UNFICYP. This is because, first of all, there is no concrete ground for suggesting that the conflict situation would have become more conducive to peacemaking if UNFICYP had not been deployed and the parties were allowed to resort to violence. Moreover, it follows from what has been examined above that any activity of UNFICYP did not inhibit a successful

¹⁸⁵ Mandell, 'The Cyprus Conflict', p. 221

¹⁸⁶ John Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp. 154-155 (quoted in Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, p. 45)

application of peacemaking in the pre-1974 phase, although successful fulfilment of UNFICYP's functions might have impeded a healthy progress of the UN peacemaking process in the post-1974 phase due to the opposing goals pursued by UNFICYP and UN peacemaking. This conclusion suggests that the impediments that were present in the pre-1974 phase might have been different from those apparent in the post-1974 phase.

Impediments to Conflict Resolution in Cyprus (pre-1974)

The above analysis indicates that in the pre-1974 phase the majority of the impediments to conflict resolution in Cyprus can be attributed to the factors that are inherent to the United Nations, but not to the presence of UNFICYP. These factors can be summarised as follows. First of all, for purely political reasons and political expediencies, the United Nations recognised the Greek-Cypriot administrations as the only legitimate Government of Cyprus in UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) and in the subsequent resolutions adopted by the Security Council as well as the General Assembly, thus the scene for a protracted conflict was set. According to the majority of Turkish-Cypriot commentators, this one-sided approach by the United Nations undermined its credibility and impartiality as a mediator as well as a peacekeeper.¹⁸⁷ Of course the UN Security Council is controlled by big powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and they influenced the international community to recognise one of the two parties of the 'joint Republic' as the 'Government of Cyprus.'¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the fact that the Turkish-Cypriots had still not been accorded any recognition was a major obstacle.¹⁸⁹ Ergun Olgun also echoes this point saying that,

"Third parties have a responsibility to uphold the equal sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriot people and help to level the political playing field in Cyprus. Peaceful co-existence in Cyprus is both desirable and feasible. The obstacle is the continuing political asymmetry and the unyielding culture of domination in the South."¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ The Turkish-Cypriot administration seeks to obtain the recognition from both the Greek-Cypriot side and the international community that Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are politically equal. According to Zaim Necatigil, the legal Government of Cyprus, which was based on the 1960's constitution, ceased to exist when the Turkish-Cypriot representatives were excluded from the government in 1963. It has been replaced by the two *de facto* and illegal administrations, that is, the 'Republic of Cyprus' (the Greek-Cypriot administration) and the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (the Turkish-Cypriot administration). Both administrations are illegal in a sense that they are not in conformity with the 1960's constitution. One of the major differences between these illegal states is that the former is recognised and the latter is not recognised by the international community. Necatigil points out that "the legal position does not comply with the *de facto* situation in Cyprus." He goes on and argues that the title (Republic of Cyprus), which is now exploited only by the Greek-Cypriot administration, must be shared with the Turkish-Cypriot administration. Although the Greek-Cypriot administration is just as illegal as the Turkish-Cypriot administration when the 1960's constitution is considered to be the legal basis of the Republic of Cyprus, the international community granted their recognition only to the Greek-Cypriot side. Hence, the Greek-Cypriot administration is in a position to enjoy all the benefits of the diplomatic recognition (personal interview with Zaim M. Necatigil conducted on 20 September 2000 in Nicosia).

¹⁸⁸ Personal interview with M. Necati Munir Ertekun conducted on 4 October 2000 in Nicosia. He also stresses that the political expediencies of the big powers have influenced negatively the peace process in Cyprus.

¹⁸⁹ Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', p. 23

¹⁹⁰ Ergun Olgun, 'Recognising Two States in Cyprus Would Facilitate Co-existence and Stability',

Secondly, when the United Nations envisaged intervening in the Cyprus conflict, it obtained the formal consent only from the Greek-Cypriot administration (representing the only legitimate government of Cyprus). The United Nations did not obtain the formal consent from the Turkish-Cypriot community because, as a rule of thumb, it usually seeks consent for a mission from the 'states' directly concerned. To establish a peacekeeping mission, the formal consent of a legitimate government is sufficient, and thus the United Nations does not normally obtain the formal consent of non-state actors in a conflict. This practice was particularly problematic in the Cyprus conflict where at least one of the primary parties is a non-state actor.

Thirdly, as a matter of principle, the United Nations cannot allow the forceful change of international borders. This principle has confined the range of options that the United Nations can accept as a solution to the Cyprus conflict. As pointed out above, the Turkish-Cypriots felt that their needs for security and identity could be best safeguarded by the formal recognition of TRNC that was established as a result of the Turkish military intervention. Hence, by promoting a solution that falls within the parameters set out by the United Nations' principle, the United Nations again undermined its credibility as an impartial mediator and peacekeeper. With regard to a possible approach towards a resolution, it is worthwhile to quote a Turkish-Cypriot political leader,

"The name [of the framework of a solution] does not matter whether it is a 'confederation' or 'federation.' What is most important is that two equal sovereign states make a new start. The two sovereign states will sign an agreement to come together, to start acting together and living together, living side by side or mixed doesn't matter, and eventually a 'Cypriot identity' will be created and a 'Cypriot movement' for unification will be formed."¹⁹¹

On the other hand, an impeding factor particularly relevant to the activity of UNFICYP was UNFICYP's failure to perform as an effective guarantor for vulnerable people against organised attack by either side. Because UNFICYP failed to prevent the recurrence of inter-communal violence in the period between 1964-74 and the external intervention in 1974, the Turkish-Cypriots lost their face in UNFICYP's ability to perform as a peacekeeping force. These limitations of the United Nations damaged the perception of Turkish-Cypriots' towards the United Nations, and the United Nations failed to be seen as a trustworthy intermediary.

In other words, if UNFICYP had ever impeded the peacemaking process in Cyprus, it would have been the inability of UNFICYP to perform some of the key functions that were necessary to create the environment conducive to peacemaking, but not because of the functions successfully undertaken by UNFICYP. Thus, the failure of the conflict resolution attempt in pre-1974 era can be attributed to the fact that the United Nations' capacity to conduct a peacemaking operation was not only inadequate but also inappropriate since it employed traditional diplomatic negotiation and bargaining to 'impose' a settlement without equipping UNFICYP with adequate power and resources to assume the responsibility of the guarantor of a settlement. Moreover, the great shortage of peacebuilding initiatives that were based on the philosophy and the methodology of conflict resolution hindered the peaceful transformation of the conflict, and led to the 1974 crisis which resulted in the

Survival, 40, 3 (1998), p. 42

¹⁹¹ Personal interview with Sedar Denktash conducted on 22 September 2000 in Nicosia.

imposition of military solution.

Major Impediments to Conflict Resolution in Cyprus (post-1974): Diversion of Peacekeeping Goal and Peacemaking Goal

Throughout the post-1974 phase of the Cyprus peace process, both parties were able to rely on the successful peacekeeping operation to provide a buffer for them when negotiations failed. Thus neither side displayed a sense of urgency about finding a viable solution.¹⁹² In other words, because the worst consequence of failed peacemaking has been effectively blocked by the presence of UNFICYP, the parties as well as the intermediaries were not given a chance to face up to the reality that their goals and strategies may be, in fact, self-defeating. In this way, the presence of UNFICYP had eliminated some of the incentives for the parties to opt for a negotiated settlement and such a negative effect has slowed down the peacemaking process, but this is because UNFICYP and the UN peacemaking operation were seeking mutually incompatible goals since 1974. To make the matter worse, the UN peacemaking operation continued to be bound by the obsolete game plan that did not reflect the developments on the ground, and thus strayed from the logic of the situation.

Upon the introduction of UNFICYP and the UN peacemaking operation to the Cyprus conflict scene in 1964, the ultimate objectives of the two programmes were indeed identical. They both aimed at re-integrating the two communities that were politically disintegrated as a result of the 1963 inter-communal strife. In the pre-1974 phase, UNFICYP did not serve as a permanent buffer force; instead it was basically a mobile interpositioning force that intervened between the two belligerents whenever and wherever required. Fetherston points out that, "UNFICYP's function was aimed not to provide a 'barrier' ... between the two combatants or to mount a border patrol, but to work within each community. Such an integrated approach placed UNFICYP in a much better position to facilitate the 'restoration of law and order' and a 'return to normal conditions'."¹⁹³ In other words, UNFICYP sought a temporary cessation of the armed confrontation through the disengagement of the armed elements of both sides, and therefore it did not aim at or facilitate a total physical separation of the two communities.

On the other hand, with the establishment of the UN Buffer Zone in 1974, two geographically separated communities emerged for the first time in Cyprus. As a result of a *de facto* separation of the two communities, the primary objective of UNFICYP changed drastically from maintaining order with an aim of re-integrating the two communities to contributing to the maintenance of the *status quo*, which was the total segregation of the two communities with upholding the UN Buffer Zone.

Theoretically speaking, if the United Nations wished to pursue the re-integration of the two communities, UNFICYP should not have created the UN Buffer Zone, and for that matter, it should not have allowed foreign intervention from Greece and Turkey in 1974 in the first place. In reality, however, the United Nations chose otherwise. UNFICYP was not allowed to take initiatives that could forestall the geographical separation of the two communities; instead it assisted in the establishment the UN Buffer Zone, while the Secretary-General maintained firmly his political aspiration of achieving reunification.

Hence, at this point, the objectives of UNFICYP and UN peacemaking began to diverge; while the former assists in maintaining the separation of the two

¹⁹² Richmond, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus 1974-1994', p. 17

¹⁹³ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 48

communities, the latter continues to find a way to bring them together. As each community formed its own autonomous area on the island, enjoyed the monopoly of power within each section and preferred the current situation to reaching a power-sharing agreement, the ultimate goal of UN peacemaking became incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to attain at least in the near future. Thus, a number of peacebuilding initiatives that aimed at the re-integration of the separated communities failed to bear fruit.

In fact, the gap that was created between the two communities by the UN Buffer Zone seems to be too wide to cross by the bridge that the peacebuilders have been able to build so far. Now the UN Buffer Zone appears to exist almost indefinitely until such time as the two parties are able to find an alternative way to co-exist. But why should the two communities re-integrate when either or both would be better off living separately? It is simply assumed that the solution must be some form of co-existence.¹⁹⁴ Keith Webb identifies a fundamental problem of UN peacemaking in Cyprus as follows:

“... to attempt to mediate between the Greek [Greek-Cypriots] and Turkish-Cypriots over the re-unification of Cyprus pre-supposes the normative value that unity is desirable, while it is at least conceivable that in the long run division and separation may lead to greater peace than unsuccessful attempts at integration.”¹⁹⁵

In other words, had the UN peacemaking operation sought, for example, the creation of the two legitimate states in Cyprus (and the reunification of the two in the form of a confederation), the ‘impeding’ effects of UNFICYP identified by its critics would have turned into ‘accelerating’ factors for such an end. After all, the parties, except for most extraordinary protracted cases, will always be open for an irresistibly enticing solution that can improve the situation significantly and enhance their interests extensively.

The above analysis of the interactions between the peacekeeping function and other intermediary functions indicates that it was not so much the functions successfully performed by UNFICYP that impeded the peace process in Cyprus, but rather it was the inability of UNFICYP to perform some of the key functions that were desperately in need of the conflict situation that impeded the peace process in Cyprus. The conflict situation in Cyprus required an impartial and trustworthy intermediary powerful enough to carry out the difficult task of guaranteeing the settlement, if not enforcing it, so that the parties who were in a deep mutual mistrust could make up their mind and could take necessary steps towards resolving their differences. Despite such a necessity on the ground, the UN Security Council did not authorise UNFICYP to act as an effective guarantor, instead UNFICYP was given power merely sufficient to perform as a monitor or observer.

Furthermore, the above analysis also implies that the impeding effect of a UN peacekeeping operation is more likely to be demonstrated when it fails to fulfil certain *transition assistance* functions under the circumstance where other peace initiatives seek to re-integrate the separated communities. In other words, it is not

¹⁹⁴ Eric Neisser, ‘A Federalism Process for Cyprus: An American Constitutional Perspective on the Cyprus Problem’, *The Cyprus Review*, 6, 2 (Fall 1994), p. 7

¹⁹⁵ K. Webb, ‘The Morality of Mediation’, in C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), *New Approaches to International Mediation* (New York, Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 17

the presence of a peacekeeping force *per se*, but it can undermine the process of conflict resolution when the goals of the peacekeeping and peacemaking are diametrically opposed and when peacemaking efforts are pursuing an inappropriate end with a wrong method. Under such a circumstance, peacebuilding initiatives cannot demonstrate their full potential, and a close co-ordination among the various intermediary efforts cannot generate positive trends towards conflict resolution. Thus for a UN peacekeeping operation to serve as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution, the ultimate goal of peacemaking and that of peacekeeping must remain identical, and a close co-ordination between the three agents of conflict resolution must be maintained so that the complementarity among them can be preserved. One of the most significant finding of this case study is that UN peacekeeping must undertake not only the *interposition* functions but also the vital *transition assistance* functions successfully so that it can act as the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and the conditions surrounding the peace process can become conducive to peacebuilding.

Chapter Five

A STEPPING-STONE TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

"To a large extent than in previous operations in UN history, UNTAC thus combines within itself elements of peacekeeping, peace-making, economic and social maintenance and nation-building."¹

1. Introduction

The primary purpose of this Chapter is to examine the effects of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) upon the peace process in Cambodia. Unlike the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that was sent basically to buy time for the parties to reach a negotiated settlement, UNTAC was deployed after the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (the Paris Peace Accords) was signed. In short, UNTAC was a post-agreement implementation force aimed at monitoring and supervising the execution of the agreements. In the following, therefore, special attention will be paid to the process through which UNTAC was assigned to supervise the implementation of a negotiated settlement that had been agreed upon by the four Cambodian factions: Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) that is often referred to as the State of Cambodia (SOC) in various United Nations documents.

By focusing on the transition process from conflict settlement to conflict resolution in Cambodia, the study attempts to clarify two groups of indicators: the contextual conditions and the functions of UNTAC that have facilitated the peace process, and those that have impeded it. By exploring the interactive effects among the three key elements of conflict resolution (peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding), the study seeks to reveal what contextual conditions have allowed UNTAC to perform effectively and by performing what functions UNTAC has facilitated the overall peace process in Cambodia. As a wide range of intermediaries intervened in the long-standing Cambodian conflict, some of them under the rubric of UNTAC while others were outside of the UN framework, the Cambodian peace process would serve as an appropriate and meaningful case through which the interactions of various third parties can be reviewed and the complementary effects and sequencing of such interventions can be identified. Hence, the conflict situation and the interactive effects between peacekeeping and other intermediary efforts in Cambodia will be examined thoroughly below.

Clearly, UNTAC had by no means brought a complete end to the long-standing Cambodian conflict nor did it fulfil satisfactorily all the important tasks that had been

¹ Yasushi Akashi, 'To Build a New Country: The Task of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia', *Harvard International Review*, 15 (Winter 1993/4), p. 68

mandated by the Paris Peace Accords. In fact, UNTAC had both remarkable accomplishments and critical shortcomings.² For example, UNTAC had to abandon the disarmament and demobilisation of the four factions, which were thought to be critical steps towards “ensuring a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections.”³ When UNTAC failed to incorporate the PDK into the election process, the implementation plan designated in the Paris Peace Accords became no longer workable. Moreover, when the unexpected results of the election became known to the leaders of the SOC and when those leaders refused to accept the results, a clear danger emerged that they would wreck the implementation process. Despite these serious challenges that UNTAC faced during the implementation phase, the presence and activities of UNTAC helped the UN-supervised settlement to achieve its principal aims.

First of all, UNTAC facilitated the disengagement of the external stakeholders of the Cambodian conflict, which helped de-internationalise the Cambodian conflict and removed a source of regional tension. Under the supervision of UNTAC, for example, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Cambodia was completed successfully. China was given a face-saving way to terminate its material support to the PDK, one of the major parties to the Cambodian conflict that had a notorious international reputation. This divorce allowed China to withdraw its commitment to the continuation of the Cambodian conflict. Furthermore, over 365,000 Cambodian refugees and internally displaced persons on the Thai-Cambodia border have been repatriated as a result of the UNTAC operation.

Furthermore, as a result of the UNTAC operation, an internationally recognised government that not only controlled most of the country but also could claim popular legitimacy was finally formed.⁴ In retrospect, the Hun Sen regime had already controlled practically over 80 per cent of the country when the Paris Peace Accords were signed, but the West had not been able to recognise the Hun Sen regime as the legitimate government of Cambodia since it was established as a consequence of the 1978-79 Vietnamese military intervention. The West needed a trick that would create an ‘internationally’ recognisable government in which Hun Sen could still play a dominant role. The UN-settlement provided a solution. While Cambodia’s neighbouring countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and China may have continued to exercise their influence over the internal affairs of Cambodia, UNTAC contributed to a removal of the Cambodian conflict from the United Nations agenda by resolving peacefully an international aspect of the Cambodian conflict.⁵

Another principal objective of the UN-supervised settlement was to marginalise the PDK to the extent that the prospect of its second military takeover was eliminated.⁶ As a result of the UNTAC operation, the PDK was isolated both internationally and domestically. Apart from a limited illegal link between the PDK

² Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) p. 190

³ *Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict*, which can be found in *UN Document (A/46/608-S/23177)*, 30 October 1991.

⁴ David Ashley, ‘Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991-1998’, in Dylan Hendrickson (ed.), *Accord, Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’s Constitutional Challenge*, Issue 5 (London: Conciliation Resources, November 1998) P. 24

⁵ Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, SIPRI Research Report No. 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 106

⁶ The decline of the PDK was the most dramatic change in the post-UNTAC Cambodia. In the face of the disastrous decline, the PDK leadership fought among itself, which led to the collapse of the PDK as a movement.

and some elements in the Thai military that remained even after the departure of UNTAC from Cambodia, the PDK lost its connections with the rest of the world. The most fatal blow for the PDK was its failure to maintain a strong tie with China that had been its single largest external supporter throughout the conflict. The PDK also lost the captive population of the Thai border camps, the cover of the 'united front' with Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, its international recognition and its third of a UN seat.⁷ Moreover, the PDK's decision not to participate in the UN-sponsored election took away its legitimacy as a viable political party in Cambodia as well as its domestic popular support.

Apart from achieving these principal goals of the Paris Peace Accords, UNTAC had indeed contributed to the transformation of the war-prone society into a more peaceful one. Trevor Findlay argues, "UNTAC set in place the rudiments of a civil society, leaving Cambodia with a more open political process, a freer press and a more politically aware populace than when it arrived."⁸ In fact, UNTAC is often referred to as a shining example of a successful UN peacekeeping. For example, in its resolution 880 the UN Security Council pays tribute to the work of UNTAC whose success "constitutes a major achievement for the United Nations."⁹ The head of UNTAC also concludes, "UNTAC has been able to accomplish an essential and historic task of aiding Cambodia in its rebirth as an independent nation, based on democracy, pluralism, human rights and the spirit of reconciliation."¹⁰

Therefore, this study concludes that the presence and activities of UNTAC had contributed positively to the overall peace process in Cambodia, and along with many other factors certain functions that were performed successfully by UNTAC were particularly helpful in promoting the transformation from conflict settlement to somewhat closer to conflict resolution in Cambodia. The study also argues that UNTAC was able to become a stepping-stone for conflict resolution in Cambodia since the external situation was conducive to such an endeavour. Since some important exterior factors of the Cambodian conflict were ripe for a negotiated settlement, the external parties were able to agree on the terms of the settlement and 'impose' the Paris Peace Accords upon the two major recalcitrant parties. UNTAC has played a significant role in implementing the externally expedient agreements by fulfilling multilateral peacekeeping functions although it fell short of accomplishing some key elements of the Paris Peace Accords.

On the other hand, it seems that some fundamental interior factors of the conflict might have not been fully ripe for resolution. It is doubtful that the fundamental strategy of the SOC and the PDK shifted from a coercive to a conciliatory one. They did not seem to be ready for sharing power with the other side. Furthermore, UNTAC did not manage to cultivate a spirit of national reconciliation among the major Cambodian political leaders despite the fact that it undertook a wide range of tasks including those related to peacebuilding.

To verify the above-stated observation and working conclusion, the following steps are taken. First, the background of the Cambodian conflict is presented together with a brief summary of the peacemaking process through which the Paris Peace Accords were agreed. A detailed analysis of the conflict situation is

⁷ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 105

⁸ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 104

⁹ *UN Document (S/RES/880), Security Council resolution on transitional period in Cambodia following the withdrawal of UNTAC*, 4 November 1993

¹⁰ Yasushi Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', *International Peacekeeping*, 1, 2 (Summer 1994), p. 215

conducted using the concept of conflict ripeness that is developed in the previous Chapters. Then, the characteristics of UNTAC are reviewed by employing the three attributes and the relevant functional categories of UN peacekeeping as guidelines. Finally, the relationship between various intermediary efforts both within and outside the rubric of UNTAC is examined to identify the patterns of interactions among various actors in the process.

2. *Synopsis of the Cambodian Conflict*

Before examining the interactive effects between UNTAC and other intermediary efforts, a brief introduction to the nature of the Cambodian conflict is in order. A comprehensive knowledge of the complex history of a conflict is useful in understanding the nature of the conflict. However, it is impossible to cover the complexities, the shifts of policies and tactics, and the changes in alignments and attitudes that made up a period of violent civil war over the course of twenty years in a country as diverse and complicated as Cambodia. Thus, the following is an attempt to draw out a number of key events that had important effects upon the development of the Cambodian conflict.

2.1. **Brief History of the Cambodian Conflict and its Parties**

Although the regional hostilities can be traced back to the age of the Angkor Empire, the modern tragedy of Cambodia began in March 1970 when Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Head of State and head of the government, was overthrown in a military *coup d'état* led by General Lon Nol, a pro-American politician.¹¹ Lon Nol established the Khmer Republic, while Sihanouk took up resistance in Beijing where he set up a government-in-exile, the Government Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK). The GRUNK included Sihanouk (and his supporters), the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and a Vietnam-backed communist party called the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRK). The GRUNK gained support from China and Vietnam.

Over the next five years, Lon Nol's power declined in the face of the continuing US-Vietnam war, internal corruption and the external threat from Sihanouk's supporters allied with the CPK guerrillas.¹² Consequently, the Khmer Republic failed to deliver 'democracy' and to meet the security and economic needs of the people. Instead, its failure created the conditions for the success of the CPK, often known as the Khmer Rouge in the West.

On 17 April 1975, the CPK captured Phnom Penh and overthrew the Lon Nol regime. As soon as the GRUNK seized power, the gap surfaced between the CPK and the KPRK, as well as among CPK's leadership itself, and they were divided along pro-Vietnamese and anti-Vietnamese lines.¹³ Pol Pot, an anti-Vietnamese CPK leader, established Democratic Kampuchea, in which he became the Prime Minister. Sihanouk returned as the Head of State, but when the brutality of Pol

¹¹ Shirley Lithgow, 'Cambodia', in Kevin Clements and Robin Ward (eds.), *Building International Community: Cooperating for Peace, Case Studies* (Canberra: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd., 1994), p. 28

¹² Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 28

¹³ Nayan Chanda, 'Indochina', in Valeriana Kallab and Richard E. Feinberg (eds.), *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, South Africa, and Horn of Africa* (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp. 79-80

Pot's Democratic Kampuchea and the very limited power of his role became obvious, he resigned in April 1976, and was placed under house arrest in the palace.

Under the Pol Pot regime, foreigners were expelled and the country was isolated from the rest of the world. Cities and towns were evacuated. Cambodian people were sent to the countryside and laboured under harsh conditions. A severe refugee problem developed as people tried to escape the social dislocation and economic breakdown.¹⁴ A commonly accepted figure is that at least one million (out of an estimated population of about seven million in 1975) died as a result of policies of the Pol Pot regime. Many died from starvation, but many others, including most of Cambodia's intelligentsia, perished from execution, torture or mistreatment.¹⁵

The virulent anti-Vietnamese attitude of Democratic Kampuchea led to serious border clashes with Vietnam and incursions into Vietnamese territory by CPK forces.¹⁶ Michael Doyle argued that the conflict entered a new stage on 25 December 1978 when, responding to repeated provocation from Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnam launched a military operation against Cambodia.¹⁷ On 7 January 1979, Vietnam captured Phnom Penh, and few days later the PRK was proclaimed.¹⁸ The new government comprised pro-Vietnam communists who had previously defected from the GRUNK, such as Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and Hun Sen. The CPK fled westwards to the mountains and jungles along the Thai border where they were sustained by Chinese arms shipments via Thailand.¹⁹ This military assistance happened as a part of China's and Thailand's strategy either to remove Vietnamese forces from Cambodia or at least to render them incapable of aggression elsewhere.²⁰

This Vietnamese military intervention gave rise to a guerrilla movement of the three major resistance groups: FUNCINPEC, the KPNLF and the PDK (which was called the CPK in the past). FUNCINPEC was a royalist faction loyal to King Norodom Sihanouk, while the KPNLF was a pro-Western force led by Son Sann, a former prime minister in the Lon Nol government. Both parties received support from the United States, China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). At a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1982, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was formed bringing the two non-Communist parties (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) together with the Communist party (PDK).²¹ The three factions of the CGDK were united only in their opposition to the pro-Vietnamese PRK and fought a guerrilla war against their common enemy with the backing of China, the United States and ASEAN. The three factions of the CGDK believed that a CGDK alliance was essential for effective resistance. Without the alliance, the PDK was politically powerless, FUNCINPEC was militarily vulnerable, and the KPNLF was economically fragile. Thus, when they had no better alternative, the alliance remained a practicable strategy despite their

¹⁴ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 28

¹⁵ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 28

¹⁶ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 28

¹⁷ Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995) p. 16

¹⁸ The PRK that renamed itself as the State of Cambodia (SOC) in April 1989 was a socialist party led by Hun Sen with the backing of Vietnam and the former Soviet Union.

¹⁹ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 28

²⁰ Stephen Solarz, 'Cambodia and the International Community', *Foreign Affairs*, 69 (Spring 1990), p. 102

²¹ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 29

ideological differences.

This coalition was formed also because the three factions and their supporters perceived a need to prevent the pro-Soviet PRK from replacing for the 'internationally' unpopular PDK as the occupant of Cambodia's seat in the United Nations or to prevent the United Nations from declaring the seat vacant.²² A US official argued that the US policy was aimed to "block recognition of the Vietnamese-installed government of Hun Sen".²³ Thus, the seat that had been reserved for Cambodia at the United Nations was given to the CGDK, a guerrilla organization that did not assume the control of the country, to suit the needs of the anti-Soviet countries.

In response to Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 and the subsequent struggle between the PRK and the CGDK, the United Nations was prevented from taking any concrete action except that the General Assembly condemned the intervention and called for an immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia. In general, international reactions to the Vietnamese military intervention were negative, apart from the pro-Soviet countries. For example, ASEAN was unanimous in its condemnation. China, Japan and the United States also condemned the action.

Despite the 'international' condemnation and the continuing resistance of the CGDK, the PRK held power in Phnom Penh throughout the 1980s and was fairly successful in consolidating itself within the country and in meeting the basic needs of the population after a severe food shortage in the early years of its existence.²⁴ Even so, it failed to get international recognition outside the group of pro-Soviet countries, which meant that the PRK was technically denied various sorts of humanitarian and development assistance from the United Nations and the Breton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank).²⁵ The PRK, having been reinforced by Vietnamese forces, assumed control over most of the countryside, but Vietnam and the PRK were unable to overcome fully the resistance of the CGDK, especially that of the PDK forces.²⁶ Thus, each of the four Cambodian factions claimed to be the legitimate authority in Cambodia.

During the Cold War, the United Nations was not able to be instrumental in the negotiation of a peace settlement in Cambodia due to the lack of unanimity among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5)—China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.²⁷ In fact, there was a sharp polarisation of positions among local, regional and global players with regard to the situation in Cambodia during the first half of the 1980s. In other words, the Cambodian conflict was fought between the two camps: the CGDK, China and the United States on the one side, and the PRK, Vietnam and the Soviet Union on the

²² Solarz, 'Cambodia and the International Community', p. 103

²³ Richard H. Solomon, *Exiting Indochina: U.S. Leadership of the Cambodia Settlement & Normalization with Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) p. 20

²⁴ Ramses Amer, *Peacekeeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia* (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University, 1995) p. 12

²⁵ David Chandler, 'Cambodia's Historical Legacy', in Dylan Hendrickson (ed.), *Accord, Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge*, Issue 5 (London: Conciliation Resources, November 1998), p. 17. The CGDK occupied the Cambodia's seat in the United Nations from 1982 until the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991.

²⁶ The PDK was believed to have controlled at least 400,000 people—about 15 per cent of the total population (Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 4).

²⁷ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume II* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995) p. 5

other. Since three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council were involved deeply in the Cambodian conflict, and each of them supported different Cambodian factions, no signs of compromise or rapprochement were found in the UN arena. As the parties polarised locally and were locked into the regional competition as well as the global Cold War confrontation, the situation deteriorated. The civil war in Cambodia did not seem to cease and the United Nations was unable to play a mediator's role because of the Cold War rivalry and regional confrontations.

2.2. Main Features of the Cambodian Conflict

The main features of the Cambodian conflict, which made the conflict intractable, can be summarised in three points. First, there existed three layers of confrontation in the Cambodian conflict: its domestic roots, regional rivalries and international involvement.²⁸ The most fundamental confrontation revolved around a deep-rooted socio-economic and political conflict among several Cambodian factions. Historical divisions between Cambodian and Vietnamese, and anti-Vietnamese and pro-Vietnamese among the Cambodians were fundamental elements of the first layer of the Cambodian conflict. Such divisions were exacerbated by regional rivalries and ambitions among Vietnamese, Thai and Cambodian, and the ancient conflict between Vietnamese and Chinese.²⁹ This regional confrontation constituted the second layer. To make matters worse, these local and regional hostilities were built into the global confrontations between China and the Soviet Union, and between the United States and the Soviet Union, which did not allow any sort of development towards rapprochement among the parties to the conflict. Thus, the third layer of the Cambodian conflict can be described as an ideological confrontation or the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry.

The second feature is related closely to the first one. In the development of the Cambodian conflict, the effects of the continuous involvement of external parties into internal affairs of Cambodia due to its delicate geographical location were significant. In particular, Cambodia was used as a buffer zone between the Capitalist world and the Communist world during the Cold War, and became a chessboard of hegemony contest between regional and global powers. Michael Haas described the nature of the Cambodian conflict as the "proxy war" and argued that "deproxification" or an uncoupling of Cambodian factions from sources of outside support was the only way to proceed from the killing fields to the tilling fields of a peaceful Cambodia.³⁰ Under such a circumstance, there existed very little room for honest intermediaries to manoeuvre the parties into negotiation, let alone, to broker a peace agreement. Caught between the United States and the Soviet Union, options left for the United Nations were also extremely limited.

Thirdly, the relative instability of the five regimes in Cambodia following one another in rapid succession after its independence in 1953 has led the conflict into a serious protraction. Due to a 'balance-of-power politics' adopted by the parties involved, no regimes were strong enough to bring a decisive victory over its opponents even when they were able to overthrow their predecessor. Hence, all the regimes were put under constant threat of overthrow and have been too busy trying

²⁸ Chanda, 'Indochina', p. 79

²⁹ Anthony Lake, 'After the Wars--What Kind of Peace?', in Valeriana Kallab and Richard E. Feinberg (eds.), *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, South Africa, and Horn of Africa* (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 3

³⁰ Michael Haas, *Genocide by Proxy: Cambodia Pawn a Superpower Chessboard* (New York, Westport and London: Praeger Publishers, 1991) p. 3

to consolidate their victory to engage in peacemaking, let alone peacebuilding. Indeed, not a single peaceful succession of these regimes occurred in the modern history of Cambodia, and this hindered the conflict resolution process in Cambodia.

For example, when the PRK assumed power in Phnom Penh, the other three factions, despite their fundamental differences, established the CGDK to outnumber the PRK regime. Although the PRK regime controlled more than 80 per cent of the country and was backed up by Vietnam and the Soviet Union through military assistance and economic aid, it fell short of destroying the resistance forces decisively. It could not prevent the CGDK from gaining popular support in the rural area as well as in the international scene. Indeed, it was the CGDK that was enjoying international recognition and the UN seat when the new arrangement was envisaged at the Paris Conference among the major parties in late 1980's.

2.3. Review of the Cambodian Peacemaking Process

The process of arriving at a comprehensive agreement and its implementation was the result of constant negotiation and mediation efforts by a number of external individuals, organizations and governments. These factors helped in a variety of ways to bring about the Paris Peace Accords, the national elections and the temporary settlement. In fact, the negotiation process of the Paris Peace Accords is a story in itself and the purpose of this study is not to provide an extensive review of such a negotiation process. Nevertheless, it is worth reviewing the key developments and the relevant undertakings in the process through which the Paris Peace Accords were negotiated and signed. This is because the process reflects the international political environment and dynamics in which UNTAC sought to implement the peace settlement in Cambodia, and thus a concise summary of the process may be a great aid to an understanding of the UNTAC operation.

As the foundation of the Cold War began to crumble, it became apparent that arriving at a mutually acceptable political settlement of the Cambodian conflict would suit the needs of the external parties. Rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the Soviet Union and China, and between China and Vietnam made it possible for the major stakeholders to broker fundamental political deals over the Cambodian settlement. The end of Cold War allowed the Soviets and the Chinese to work together to withdraw their commitment in Indochina, and the Soviets and the Americans to co-ordinate their policy on Indochina with their former enemies.³¹ In fact, one of the new features seen in the Cambodian peacemaking process was that all members of the P5 supported the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. For example, P5 countries were not only involved proactively in the peacemaking process but they also contributed their military personnel to UNTAC to oversee the implementation of the outcome of such peacemaking efforts in Cambodia. China contributed 444 soldiers, France 1350, Russia 52, United Kingdom 130 and United States 49 to the Military Component of UNTAC.

As early signs of the end of Cold War began to be seen, Sihanouk set a peace process in motion. In December 1987, after Sihanouk had stepped down from his post as President of the CGDK, he met, in France, with Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the PRK. It was the first high-level face-to-face meeting between representatives of the two Cambodian 'governments.' This epoch-making summit meeting paved the way for a series of complex negotiations lasting more than two years and leading to

³¹ Solomon, *Exiting Indochina*, p. 76

the signing of the Paris Peace Accords.³² Then, the regional dialogue brought about an unprecedented informal meeting in Indonesia in July 1988, known as the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM I), in which the four Cambodian factions had their first face-to-face talks. Indonesia hosted a second informal meeting, often known as JIM II, in February 1989.

By the time the change of international context became apparent, Cambodia was considered to be a burden on Vietnam. It became an obstacle to Vietnam's economic development, a drain on Soviet supplied resources, and, above all, a liability in Vietnam's efforts to achieve better international standing and support. Vietnam announced in January 1989 that it would withdraw its forces from Cambodia by September 1989. At the same time, seeking desperately to improve its international image that had been seriously damaged by its violent response at Tiananmen Square, China began to be increasingly interested in a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict in a way that would distance it from the notorious PDK.³³

Thus, pre-negotiation started at the international level. For example, the Paris Conference was convened from 30 July to 30 August 1989. Despite these peacemaking efforts, however, neither parties nor the international community was able to come up with ideas that could break the impasse they were facing. The parties were not able to agree on the formula for power-sharing among the four factions during a transitional period as well as the future participation of the PDK in an interim government.³⁴

During 1990, the focus of attention shifted from regional initiatives to the work of the P5. In January 1990, the P5 began a series of high-level consultations in New York and Paris, and produced a document that set out principles in working for a resolution of the Cambodian conflict.³⁵ On 28 August 1990, the P5 reached a breakthrough agreement on a framework for a comprehensive political settlement, in which the responsibility of the United Nations in supervising and controlling the activities of the existing administrative structure during a transitional period was stipulated as a way to overcome the two primary stumbling blocks in the peacemaking process.³⁶

As for the power-sharing arrangement among the Cambodian factions, it was envisaged in the P5 framework agreement that the Supreme National Council (SNC) that would embody the sovereignty of Cambodia during the transitional period was going to be created. The SNC was to be formed by the twelve representatives of the four Cambodian factions (six representatives from the SOC and the two each from three factions of the CGDK) with Sihanouk being its President.³⁷ On the other hand,

³² Eva L. Mysliwiec, *Cambodia: NGO in Transition* (unpublished paper written for the workshop on 'the Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia', Geneva, 29-30 April 1993), p. 10

³³ Solomon, *Exiting Indochina*, p. 21

³⁴ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 7

³⁵ *UN Document (S/21087)*, 18 January 1990

³⁶ *UN Document (A/45/472-S/21689)*, 31 August 1990

³⁷ Members of the SNC included Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Head of State and President of the SNC), Hun Sen (SOC), Hor Namhong (SOC), Tea Banh (SOC), Dith Muntty (SOC), Im Chun Lim (SOC), Sin Sen (SOC), Prince Norodom Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC), Sam Rainsy (FUNCINPEC), Son Sann (KPNLF), Ing Mouly (KPNLF), Khieu Samphan (PDK) and Son Sen (PDK). While the establishment of the SNC was one of the most important devices for bringing the parties to the table, the issue of how to constitute the SNC was, at the same time, highly controversial in the initial stage of the negotiation. For example, at the early stage of the negotiation, China, not to mention the PDK, insisted on the equal representation of the four Cambodian factions in the SNC, i.e., they argued that each faction should hold the same number of the representatives in the SNC (Tadashi Ikeda, *The Road to Peace in Cambodia: A Testimony, Five Years of Difficulties for the Japanese Diplomacy* [Kanbojia

as the PDK was granted a formal standing in the SNC, its fate in an interim government was to be decided through UN-managed elections.

As a result of a series of negotiation efforts by various intermediaries and heightened pressure from the P5 on all the Cambodian factions to accede to the P5 framework, all factions responded positively to the framework and accepted it as a basis for a comprehensive settlement of their conflict.³⁸ Hence, the UN Security Council endorsed the framework in its resolution 668 on 20 September 1990.³⁹

Even though the P5 and the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference were able to agree on a text for the peace agreement, the process did not progress further since the negotiation among the Cambodian factions remained deadlocked with the only notable progress being that of a cease-fire implementation in June 1991.⁴⁰ This would imply that the Cambodian conflict was ripe for resolution both at the regional and global levels, but not in local adversarial relations.

Before the Paris Peace Accords were signed, the representatives of the four Cambodian factions formed the SNC and used it not only as an embodiment of the sovereignty of Cambodia during the transitional period but also as a forum to negotiate the terms of agreement among themselves before the transitional period. Serving as a medium for face-to-face negotiation, the SNC played an important role in moving the negotiation forward. In fact, after a series of SNC meetings from June to September 1991, the Cambodian parties at last yielded to pressure from their patrons and reached agreements on the major sticking points: the degree of demobilisation by the armed forces and the nature of the electoral system.⁴¹

Once the Vietnamese had reconciled with the Chinese, both the PRK (Hun Sen) and the PDK (Pol Pot) were under irresistible pressure from their patrons to accept a compromise that would facilitate the peace process.⁴² With the help of these pressures on the two most recalcitrant parties, Sihanouk played a crucial role in drawing compromise from them on these sticking points. Before this breakthrough was achieved, Sihanouk, who had already stepped down from being President of the CGDK, also resigned as the head of FUNCINPEC and was seen as a neutral broker.⁴³

The Paris Conference on Cambodia was re-convened on 23 October 1991. At the final meeting of the Conference, the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed by the United Nations as a witness and 19 signatory states: Cambodia (represented by the SNC), the P5, ASEAN 6, Vietnam, Laos, Australia, Canada, India, Japan and Yugoslavia (in its capacity as Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries).⁴⁴

Thus, all the four factions involved in the Cambodian conflict together with all the key external stakeholders reached an agreement to terminate the Cambodian conflict. Despite the irresistible temptation on the part of the PRK, Vietnam and the United States to eliminate the internationally notorious PDK from the 'legitimate' peace process, the drafters of the Paris Peace Accords arrived at a conclusion that

Wahei heno Michi: Shougen, Nippon Gaikou Shiren no Gonenkan (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan, 1996) p. 79).

³⁸ *UN Document (A/45/490-S/21732)*, 17 September 1990

³⁹ *UN Document (S/RES/668)*, 20 September 1990

⁴⁰ The draft agreements can be found in *UN Document (A/46/61-S/22059)*, 11 January 1991, Annex II.

⁴¹ See, for example, *UN Document (A/46/271-S/22740)*, 26 June 1991; and *UN Document (A/46/494-S/23066)*, 24 September 1991.

⁴² Solomon, *Exiting Indochina*, p. 78

⁴³ *UN Document (A/46/310-S/22808)*, 18 July 1991

⁴⁴ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 8

unless the PDK was included in the peace process as a legitimate party, it would act as a spoiler.⁴⁵ Indeed, it was understood that the PDK was too militarily powerful to be left out.⁴⁶ Thus, the four-party formula was put forward in the Paris Peace Accords.

Although the PDK dropped out from the peace process at the implementation phase, the Paris Peace Accords, at least initially, brought a halt to a protracted civil war between the 'pro-Vietnamese' PRK (SOC) and the 'anti-Vietnamese' CGDK. At the negotiation table, all parties agreed not only to the terms of a cease-fire and the disarming of the factions but also to the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation of refugees, the supervision and control of certain aspects of the administrative machinery by a United Nations body, and, most significantly, the organising, conducting and monitoring of elections by the United Nations.⁴⁷ They also created two institutions that played a crucial role in implementing the terms of the agreements: the SNC and UNTAC, the former was formed to embody the sovereign of Cambodia during the transitional period, whereas the latter was established to supervise the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords.

3. *Conflict Ripeness*

Now that a brief background of the Cambodian conflict including a summary of the peacemaking process has been presented, a detailed analysis of the contextual situation in which UNTAC was deployed can be made. To examine whether the conflict situation was indeed favourable to the settlement that the United Nations had promoted, important contextual conditions need to be explored in three dimensions, using a set of questions that was developed in previous Chapters as a guideline. Such an analysis will provide us with a detailed insight into the conflict situation in which the UNTAC operation was conducted.

3.1. **Adversarial Relationship**

Did the parties shift their policy from a coercive to a conciliatory one?

It is not clear whether a genuine shift of policy and strategies occurred amongst the Cambodian factions. It would be more accurate to say that a winning mentality and a conciliatory mentality coexisted in the leadership of some Cambodian factions. What was apparent was that a coercive strategy became less practical, while a negotiated settlement became a more conceivable option for most of the Cambodian factions. In particular, the KPNLF, FUNCINPEC and Sihanouk regarded a negotiated settlement as a viable alternative to continued civil war. With the smallest and weakest armies, they had a vested interest in promoting a settlement of the Cambodian conflict through negotiation.⁴⁸ After all, they had no alternative but to return to the civil war, which would have been a fatal blow to their country, and for that matter, their own existence.

On the other hand, it would be doubtful to say that the SOC and the PDK signed the Paris Peace Accords in search of a mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict. They, or at least their hard-liners, had very little willingness to

⁴⁵ Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: the Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994) p. 43

⁴⁶ Chandler, 'Cambodia's Historical Legacy', p. 19

⁴⁷ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 25

⁴⁸ Ashley, 'Between War and Peace', p. 21

co-operate with the other side. Although the PDK had agreed with the cantonment and disarmament at the Paris Conference, participating in such activities without incurring a critical damage to the apparatus of the Phnom Penh government was framed as a concession to the other side by the PDK. Hence, the PDK accepted such terms in exchange for dismantling the SOC's administrative structure. The SOC, on the other hand, bartered away some of its administrative control in order to eliminate its most serious threat: the PDK guerrillas. For the SOC, yielding control over its civil administration without disarming the PDK guerrillas was perceived as a unilateral concession on its part.

In other words, laying down its arms without dismantling the Phnom Penh regime was regarded as defeat by the PDK, while handing over the crucial functions of its administration to UNTAC without disarming the PDK forces was believed by the SOC to endanger its dominance. Thus, it is safe to conclude that they signed the Paris Peace Accords partly because they were under great pressure from their big-power patrons and partly because they sought to use the Accords as a tool to weaken the other side. Through demobilisation, the SOC expected to eliminate the PDK's primary source of influence—Khmer Rouge combatants—while the PDK anticipated a dismantling of the existing regime by creating the SNC and UNTAC. This explains why the PDK kept insisting that UNTAC should take over completely the administrative functions of the SOC.

Moreover, the SOC was not at all willing to welcome the truly 'free and fair' elections. Its sole intention was to create the conditions that its victory would be unshakable, but this time by victory through elections. The SOC enjoyed unfair advantages with its ownership of the Cambodian media and mobilisation of public officials. Not only did it exploit such advantages in gaining support of the population, but also it used them to harass and attack members and supporters of the opposition political parties. Considering these facts, the conditions necessary to hold a 'free and fair' election did not exist.

However, several factors had contributed to saving the process. First, the strong determination of Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC), Son Sann (KPNLF) and Sihanouk to carry out the election had rescued the process. Second, the fact that the SOC did not deny the electoral system itself as the mechanism to carry on the conflict also prevented the process from falling apart completely. Nonetheless, the PDK and the SOC were still working under a winning mentality. That is, they decided to support the UN-supervised settlement as long as it worked for their own benefit and advantage. Both the SOC and the PDK still hoped to monopolise power in the long-term.⁴⁹

Did the parties perceive that they were approaching an imminent mutual catastrophe?

In the case of the Cambodian peace process, this factor was not particularly crucial. Nonetheless, a major offensive by Vietnam and the PRK in 1984-85 resulted in heavy fighting and many refugees crossed the border into Thailand.⁵⁰ This might have urged all leaders to re-evaluate the situation and reconsider their strategies, which eventually led to the first face-to-face summit between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in 1987. For example, Sihanouk stated that it was the fear of two civil wars, one against the PDK and the other against the SOC, which enabled him to

⁴⁹ Ashley, 'Between War and Peace', p. 20

⁵⁰ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', p. 29

make concessions to the SOC, when Hun Sen rejected the outcome of the election.⁵¹

Did the parties face a mutually hurting stalemate with a rough parity of relative strength?

One of the first essential clues found in the Cambodian case that might lead to this general principle is that by 1981 the struggle had clearly reached a stage of a hurting stalemate. Furthermore, it was mutually perceived to be one of long duration. This does not mean that the balance of power between the Phnom Penh regime and the CGDK was anywhere near equal. The regime controlled more than 80 per cent of the country and was backed up from Hanoi and Moscow both through military assistance and economic aid. In essence, the SOC was practically in charge of the country. However, it was not able to anticipate 'international' (Western) recognition as long as the United States supported the CGDK. This meant that the SOC would not receive material aid and diplomatic support from the West, unless political reconciliation was achieved between the SOC and the CGDK.

In addition, it was also true that the CGDK had a wide measure of popular support from the rural area. Indeed, the CGDK was able to attract recruits into its ranks and to obtain arms from its patrons and external supporters. Christopher Mitchell quotes J. Howell when he explains the existence of the balance of power in the Sudanese civil war, saying that:

"In guerrilla war, parity is reached not necessarily by equality of armed strength, but at a point where the superior conventional force of the counter-insurgent is unable either to eradicate the insurgent, or prevent his continued recruitment of men and continued access to weaponry; and the insurgent is unable to wrest control in areas which the counter-insurgent is determined to hold and is unable to destroy the political will of the counter-insurgent to defend..."⁵²

Hence, it seems reasonable to state that the civil war in Cambodia had reached an equivalent situation to what is called 'power parity.'

Did the parties conceive the prospect of positive benefit through resolving the conflict peacefully?

Although a genuine shift of policy and strategies among the parties did not occur, they conceived the prospect of positive benefit through a negotiated settlement of the conflict. For example, Sihanouk's announcement that he would step down from the head of the CGDK forced the PDK and the KPNLF to consider a negotiated settlement to be one of the viable options, or at least a better alternative to continuing struggle without international backing. This is partly because they realised that the presence of Sihanouk was essential for them to gain international recognition and support from the West, and partly because they were afraid of being marginalised. Particularly, this point was critical for Son Sann and his KPNLF, who were only

⁵¹ William Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, Contemporary Issues Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994) p. 29

⁵² J. Howell, 'Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict', *International Affairs*, 54, 3 (July 1978), p. 426 (quoted in Christopher R. Mitchell, *Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972*, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper 3 (Fairfax: George Mason University, 1989) p. 11)

capable of generating lukewarm international support.⁵³ Under such a circumstance plus the pressure from China, the leaders of the PDK perceived that the UN-supervised settlement was the best option available for them to dismantle the Hun Sen regime and to replace it with an administration made up of all four factions, thus returning a share of state power and legitimacy back to the PDK.⁵⁴ By putting itself under the Paris Peace Accords (an internationally recognised framework), the PDK sought to gain international recognition and support, which otherwise was impossible to get due to the 'genocide' which was committed during the Pol Pot regime. During the Cold War era, for Sihanouk and his FUNCINPEC, the alliance with the PDK was the only way to gain access to the United Nations and material aid from China.⁵⁵ However, the settlement under the United Nations' supervision provided them with an alternative way to achieve those objectives.

The same thing can be said of the other side. The SOC leaders, who perceived themselves as possessing much of the control over the country, found that the UN-supervised settlement (namely elections) would provide them with international recognition, allow the flow of international aid (from Western countries), and marginalise the PDK legitimately. At the same time, facing the withdrawal of economic and military support from Vietnam and the Soviet Union (partial withdrawal of Vietnam troops began from 1982 and a considerable reduction started in October 1987), who were indispensable sources for the SOC to continue its coercive strategy, the SOC leaders appeared to have concluded that a negotiated settlement was their preferred choice. Since they expected that the result of the election would provide them with international recognition and a vast amount of aid, the SOC supported the peace process and ensured UNTAC's access throughout most of the country.

3.2. Intra-party Dynamics

Were the leaders of each party able to overcome the burdens of the psychological and political commitments they had made to engage in or continue the conflict?

'Heuristic' evaluation (or psycho-social reflection) of sacrifices already made in pursuit of the parties' goals rendered it more difficult to abandon the struggle and to sacrifice previous 'investments' of effort, resources and casualties. As often is the case with intra-state conflicts, for example, the SOC (the political incumbents) avoided conferring any recognition on the rebel movements. Since the SOC was entrapped both psychologically and politically, it could not initiate any de-escalation move when the costs of continuing the struggle became unbearable for the SOC in the face of a significant reduction of military and economic aid from Vietnam. Since the legitimacy of the Phnom Penh government stemmed from the liberation of Cambodia from the PDK, it was impossible for Hun Sen to negotiate with the PDK. Thus, Sihanouk's decision to step down from his post as the head of the CGDK helped Hun Sen to recognise him as a leader of the country and symbol of national reconciliation, not the leader of the rebel movement. As a result, Hun Sen was able to separate him from the CGDK in which the PDK was the largest member, and to engage in the epoch-making negotiation with Sihanouk. Still, some elements of the SOC always felt uneasy about accepting the PDK as a legitimate adversary and

⁵³ Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994) p. 254

⁵⁴ Ashley, 'Between War and Peace', p. 20

⁵⁵ Osborne, *Sihanouk*, p. 251

refused to incorporate the PDK into the Paris framework.

On the other hand, the CGDK side was also entrapped both psychologically and politically. As has mentioned before, the CGDK was a coalition of anti-SOC factions, and the coalition remained effective as long as it served as the only available way for the members to obtain what they wanted. For each member of the coalition, making individual contact with the enemy was considered to be treason as it might cause disarray among the coalition members. Without securing an alternative mechanism to the CGDK, any action that would cause dangerous cracks in the coalition was regarded as suicidal. Thus, under the rubric of the CGDK it was difficult for FUNCINPEC and KPNFL that were inclined to negotiate with SOC to send any conciliatory message or gesture. In this sense, the introduction of the UN settlement, which offered the factions in the CDGK an alternative way to supplement their shortcomings, contributed positively to the Cambodian peace process. In short, the SNC and UNTAC served as extricating mechanisms.

Withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia also helped the peace process significantly in two ways. First, withdrawal of Vietnamese troops allowed the hard-liners in the CGDK, who insisted that withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was the precondition for any kind of negotiation, to participate in negotiations. Second, this development forced the SOC to conduct a major reassessment of the situation, which eventually drew conciliatory policies from the SOC.

Were the domestic factors in each party favourable to accepting the presence of intermediaries (particularly that of UNTAC) and co-operating with them?

In general, the Cambodian people, who were fed up with the war, were looking forward to receiving UNTAC. Indeed, people expected that UNTAC could bring an end to the long-lasting war. The clearest evidence of such anticipation can be seen in the high election turnout. Nearly 90 per cent of the registered voters cast their votes.⁵⁶ It may be right that the education and assurance provided by UNTAC that voting would be kept secret, fostered their participation in the election. Nevertheless, the most essential ingredient of electoral success was the Cambodian electorate's dedicated will to support and participate in the election despite all the threats.

Among the four Cambodian factions, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were more co-operative towards UNTAC than the other two. It was foreseen in the UN-supervised peace process that the election would determine the power-sharing arrangements among the parties to the Cambodian conflict. Since FUNCINPEC and KPNLF did not have sufficient force of their own to continue the armed struggle, the UN-supervised peace process would provide them with a better alternative. Nevertheless, they did not even have an effective administrative structure indispensable for conducting a successful election. Thus, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF were willing to co-operate with UNTAC and resolve the conflict peacefully since they expected to get administrative assistance from UNTAC for the forthcoming election.

Were the leaders of each party domestically strong enough to make foreign concessions so that conciliatory initiatives or their 'willingness to talk' would not be blocked by their domestic opposition groups?

⁵⁶ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 44

There is a consensus among theorists that a successful negotiation or compromise must rest on the unquestioned ability of the leadership of all adversaries to conclude an agreement that can be sold to their constituencies.⁵⁷ In other words, successful implementation, especially the function of ratification of the agreement, depends largely upon a party's firm control of its organizations and on an unchallenged position of predominance by both leaderships. This did not seem entirely applicable to the Cambodian case. In the CGDK, Sihanouk hardly had unified command and control over his armed forces that mainly consisted of the PDK guerrilla forces. The CGDK members lacked a common policy except to fight against the existing 'Vietnamese-installed' government. Similarly, in the SOC (or the former PRK which is often referred to as the Phnom Penh regime), Hun Sen also suffered heavy pressure from hard-liners, although he was in a much better situation than Sihanouk in terms of unified command and control.

According to Michael Doyle, however, the presence of Sihanouk, who at the last minute decided to return to Cambodia and was still the 'papa' of the country to many, appeared to have steered the people's commitment to vote, and thus saving the process.⁵⁸ Prince Ranariddh, a son of Sihanouk, also saved the peace process. Although most of his power originated from his father's charisma and popularity, if Ranariddh had yielded to the pressure from hard-line leaders of his party and withdrawn from the election, that would have destroyed the entire peace process, let alone the election. In fact, Ranariddh came under great pressure from his own party as well as from the PDK to withdraw from the election, when the SOC embarked on a policy of harassing and attacking its political opponents (FUNCINPEC and KPRLF) and more than 100 FUNCINPEC officials were either killed or wounded. This indicated that it had a hard task in convincing many of the former CGDK hard-line leaders that the negotiated settlement (in particular, holding a national election) was the best alternative to returning to civil war at a time with existing levels of sacrifice. The same thing can be said to the other side. When the SOC faced losing in the election, Hun Sen received great pressure from his internal opposition. With help of Sihanouk and the concession offered by Ranariddh, he was able to manage to control his internal opposition. This also saved the peace process.

3.3. External Situations

Were the external parties who have direct interests in the outcome of the conflict willing to support and co-operate with the peacemaking initiatives?

Several key changes in international relations, especially the end of Cold War between the superpowers, the appeasement of confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, and reconciliation between China and Vietnam made it possible to establish the Paris framework. These fundamental changes in international relations allowed the external parties to select different policies towards the Cambodian conflict, and in essence their efforts created the peacemaking process. Persuasion and threats by China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Thailand were effective in drawing a compromise from their clients or friends. Nayan Chanda, for example, argued that the Paris Peace Accords were reached because the Soviet Union, beset by troubles at home and eager to co-operate with the United States in resolving regional conflicts as well as to improve its relationships with China, was willing to pressure

⁵⁷ Mitchell, *Conflict Resolution and Civil War*, p. 2

⁵⁸ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 64

its allies in Phnom Penh to make concessions.⁵⁹ The Soviet Union began to perceive that the existing conflict in Cambodia was a continuing hindrance to a rapprochement with China, and that the conflict had enhanced the influence of both China and the United States in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, Vietnam, another patron of the SOC regime, seems to have become eager to shed its Cambodian burden and to pursue economic and social reform. The occupation of Cambodia imposed heavy costs, both financial and human. Since Vietnam was heavily depended on the Soviet Union both politically and economically, it was inevitable for its government to explore an alternative policy when the Soviet Union reduced its aid. Moreover, with its rapidly growing population, Vietnam desperately needed to normalise its relationships with ASEAN and other members of the international community and to achieve access to international investment and markets. As argued above, the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the conflict increased when Vietnamese troops actually completed their withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. It was pressure from the Soviet Union, where Mikhail Gorbachev was attempting to improve relations with both China and the United States, which caused Vietnam to declare the beginning of its unilateral withdrawal of military forces from Cambodia.⁶⁰

The situation in China was somewhat similar to that in Vietnam. With the end of Cold War and China's determination to achieve rapid economic development, the PDK began to appear to be an unwelcome burden.⁶¹ Seeking access to the world market, and appreciating the emergence of a less threatening and exhausted Vietnam, China was also prepared to settle for peace.⁶² While China's efforts to convince the PDK to stay in the electoral process failed, its pressure contributed to the PDK's decision not to destroy the election entirely.

In the Cambodian peace process, constant support and commitment of the major external parties have been absolutely vital for the Paris Peace Accords to be implemented. Indeed, without their involvement, the Paris Peace Accords could never have been reached in the first place. Therefore, in the case of a 'proxy' war, it seems that the change of goals and policies of important 'patrons' is a key factor in starting a peace process; whereas, their willingness to support the peace process is indispensable for its completion.

Were the members of the international community willing to support the efforts towards a peace settlement such as UNTAC's mission?

The existence of a prior political framework had contributed to the success of UNTAC's mission. A series of negotiations that took place prior to the agreement demonstrated the interests and the commitment of the international community. Above all, the existence of the Paris Peace Accords, blueprints for a comprehensive political settlement, served as a crucial step in keeping the peace process moving towards a short-term goal: the national election. UNTAC enjoyed constant support from the members of the UN Security Council and the signatories of the Paris Peace Accords. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi claimed that the UN Security Council took appropriate action, taking into account the changing

⁵⁹ Chanda, 'Indochina', p. 81

⁶⁰ Gerardo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar, 'Civil Conflicts and the Conditions for Successful International Intervention: a Comparative Study of Cambodia and El Salvador', *Review of International Studies* (1995), p. 167

⁶¹ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 23

⁶² Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 24

situations on the ground.⁶³ Judging from the successive resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1992, the international community (represented by the members of the UN Security Council and signatories of the Paris Peace Accords) was willing to commit itself to the peace process in Cambodia. This political will was also supported by a significant regional input of the ASEAN states and other Asian countries.

3.4. Summary of Conflict Ripeness

Reflection on the analysis of the situation in which UNTAC sought to implement the Paris Peace Accords makes it clear that the contextual conditions were relatively conducive to effective UN peacekeeping operations, particularly external factors were ripe for conflict settlement. What made the peace process possible and assisted UNTAC in carrying out its roles in the UN-settlement was a major switch of goals and policies of important patrons and their willingness to support the peace process. In particular, the decision of China and Vietnam to terminate their support for their proxies had a significant effect. Change in international relations allowed these favourable shifts to occur.

On the other hand, a genuine shift of policy and strategies among the Cambodian factions was not recognised. The factions were still seeking to use the UN-settlement to advance their positions in an adversarial relationship. In fact, as David Ashley pointed out, the vehicle behind the Cambodian peace process was international pressure rather than national reconciliation.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, a coercive strategy was becoming less and less practical, while a negotiated settlement was perceived to have become a more conceivable option for the Cambodian factions. Furthermore, they were able to conceive the prospect of positive benefits through a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In particular, having realised the limitation of the CGDK alliance, FUNCINPEC and KPNFL were given an enticing opportunity to gain power through the UN-supervised settlement. At the same time, having been faced with the unilateral withdrawal of Vietnam's support, the SOC also welcomed the UN-supervised settlement that would deliver it international recognition legitimately. Nevertheless, the PDK failed to maintain such a positive view when it found out that the SNC and UNTAC were not replacing the SOC regime.

All the Cambodian factions were entrapped in the conflict one way or another, but the United Nations involvement in the peace process facilitated the de-entrapment. Other domestic factors were also favourable to the peace process. For instance, the Cambodian electorates dedicated will to support and participate in the election, despite all threats, saved the peace process. Even though the Cambodian factions were vulnerable to intra-party pressure, mediation efforts by Sihanouk contributed to holding the parties to the peace process.

4. *Review of UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*

Now that the environment in which UNTAC was deployed has been examined, it is time to turn our attention to the characteristics of UNTAC. Was UNTAC capable of supplying what was needed to implement and sustain the Paris Peace Accords? Was UNTAC able to seize and make the most of a ripe moment? What

⁶³ Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 209

⁶⁴ Ashley, 'Between War and Peace', p. 21

tasks were assigned to UNTAC and what were UNTAC's successes and failures in fulfilling its assignment? To clarify these questions, UNTAC's attributes and functions will be reviewed carefully.

First of all, UNTAC was established by UN Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992 in accordance with the Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia containing his proposed implementation plan for UNTAC (S/23613) of 19 February 1992. The United Nations was given "all powers necessary" to ensure the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords.⁶⁵ According to the implementation plan, UNTAC aimed primarily at assisting Cambodians in executing the comprehensive political solution to their conflict. The UNTAC operation was not limited to an exclusively military mandate but had a substantial or predominantly non-military mandate and composition. UNTAC was expected to act not only as a conventional peacekeeping force but also as an interface between peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. For example, while the SNC was set up by the representatives of the four factions to serve as the "unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined," UNTAC was to run the country for a period of eighteen months through controlling and supervising crucial aspects of Cambodia's civil administration.⁶⁶

4.1. Three Attributes of UNTAC

Consent

The UN Security Council faced a difficult decision concerning the PDK's lack of compliance with the Paris Peace Accords, especially its lack of co-operation with UNTAC. Debate on whether UNTAC, a consent-based peacekeeping operation, should at some point become something more assertive, i.e., a peace-enforcement operation, remained controversial throughout its operation. The Paris Peace Accords did not specifically provide for enforcement or any kind of sanction in the event of non-compliance except for Article 29, which specifies that "in the event of a violation or threat of violation, the two Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference could undertake consultations with a view to taking appropriate steps to ensure respect for commitments made under the Agreements." International commitment to a strict interpretation and implementation of the Paris Peace Accords did not exist although support was expressed for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The peacekeeping operation acceptable to its international supporters was consent-based; therefore, UNTAC's success in this respect was largely dependent on the willingness of the parties involved. In fact, the Accords were premised on the "good faith" of the factions in carrying out their obligations. UNTAC was not intended to be an enforcement mechanism, but it was an implementation mechanism, which was ultimately dependent of the consent, if not the goodwill, of the parties.⁶⁷ In short, UNTAC was a peacekeeping operation that could not engage in peace-enforcement.

However, UNTAC faced a core dilemma. That is, it was sent into a situation where the full consent of the parties seemed to decay, but no commitment was made by the member states to contribute the forces necessary to conduct a peace-enforcement action. At the same time, UNTAC was unable to withdraw from

⁶⁵ *UN Document (S/23613)*, 19 February 1992

⁶⁶ Five spheres of civil administration, such as foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information were specified as areas of strict UNTAC control (*UN Document (S/23613)*, 19 February 1992).

⁶⁷ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 128

the conflict because of what it was able to achieve. Although UNTAC faced numerous violations of the Paris Peace Accords, it was not allowed to take initiatives to protect its mandate. This illustrates the difficulty and confusion in categorising the characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations as UNTAC was forced to work in the grey zone in which the consent of the parties was decaying. What is clear, however, is that UNTAC initially obtained the consent from all the factions (both 'legitimate' government and the 'rebels') although it soon failed to sustain the co-operation of the two recalcitrant parties, namely the SOC and the PDK.

Impartiality

Initially, the parties depended on UNTAC, an impartial outsider's organization, to fill in the deep gap of mistrust that had been created by more than two decades of civil war. However, when it became apparent that UNTAC was unable to fulfil the task of controlling crucial aspects of the civil administration in general and provision of security, in particular the SOC structure, then the PDK began to perceive that UNTAC was merely helping its opponent, Hun Sen's SOC. There was escalating violence in the months leading up to the May 1993 election. PDK forces even fired on UNTAC helicopters and detained UNTAC personnel.

Furthermore, when UNTAC found that it could not incorporate the PDK into the election, the issue became how to prevent the election from being wrecked by the threats and attacks from the PDK, i.e., how to isolate the PDK. This made some UNTAC officials feel that the Paris Peace Accords' precondition for the election, that is a "neutral political environment," did not exist, and that the election should be postponed or even cancelled.⁶⁸

It seems in general that UNTAC was able to walk a thin line of impartiality throughout its operation, although it had been threatened in a number of ways. At the same time, UNTAC faced a similar dilemma that other peacekeepers had faced elsewhere: if it relied heavily upon 'the Chapter VI non-enforcement activities' (such as mediation, negotiation, and etc.) to resolve implementation conflicts, the parties could have regarded it as weak and wreck the peace process, while if it attempted to proceed with its executive function (as a peace enforcer) based on the Chapter VII, the recalcitrant party could see it as biased or even as another party to the conflict. Under such circumstances, it was extremely difficult for UNTAC to fulfil entirely the United Nations' mandate in Cambodia, and particularly after the PDK made it clear that it would not take part in the election, the UNTAC operation confronted a continuous challenge to its impartiality and credibility.

Use of Force

Traditionally, in most cases, peacekeepers are not allowed to use force except in self-defence, which means that they are entitled to use force to protect themselves only when they are fired upon. Such a strategy, however, presented a problem in Cambodia where one of the key parties (the PDK) refused to co-operate with UNTAC, and the leaders of the faction were unable or unwilling to control their forces. The problem was particularly acute because UNTAC was expected to maintain a stable and a neutral environment for free and fair elections. It faced the non-compliance by the PDK and growing reluctance by the SOC's existing administrative structures to accept the various controls and supervision functions entrusted to UNTAC.

⁶⁸ Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, p. 19

Despite such unfavourable developments on the ground, its strategies remained within 'patient diplomacy' throughout the operation. UNTAC did not engage in enforcement action, nor did it undertake any punitive action against the violators of the Paris Peace Accords. As a result, the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation process were suspended in effect when the PDK refused to co-operate. Moreover, UNTAC could not use coercion to prevent cease-fire violations, the killing of ethnic Vietnamese civilians, and the harassment of political opponents from happening, and it was even unable to obtain freedom of movement and to establish checkpoints and polling stations in some PDK-controlled areas. Indeed, during the UNTAC operation, Vietnamese nationals living in Cambodia or ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians were attacked and more than 100 were murdered.

From the recalcitrant parties' perspective, allowing a force to take positive action in defence of its mandate is not different from allowing it to enforce them.⁶⁹ Thus, once the force loses its operational impartiality, it is no better than being deployed without its basis of credibility as a third party intermediary. In Cyprus, the inability of UNFICYP to protect the Turkish-Cypriots from the Greek-Cypriot offensives damaged seriously the United Nations' credibility as a trustworthy third party. On the other hand, UNTAC's decision not to prevent the killing of ethnic Vietnamese by all means necessary did not undermine its trustworthiness. It is true that UNTAC could not fulfil its entire mandate, but it is also true that UNTAC effectively remained within the acceptable parameters of use of force by peacekeepers. Otherwise, it would have been regarded as an enemy. Hence, it could have been mired in a conflict, as in the cases of Somalia and the former state of Yugoslavia.

4.2. Functions of UNTAC

Since the above analysis outlined the characteristics of UNTAC, the next step is to review the functions that were fulfilled by UNTAC. Faced with the limitation in its capacity, how did UNTAC seek to accomplish its difficult mandate? What critical roles did UNTAC assume in the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords? What was UNTAC's record of achievement in fulfilling these roles?

On 19 February 1992, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in which his implementation plan for UNTAC was contained (S/23613). In the UN Secretary-General's implementation plan, UNTAC was designed to consist of seven distinct components: the Human Rights Component, the Electoral Component, the Military Component, the Civil Administration Component, the Police Component, the Repatriation Component and the Rehabilitation Component. A range of different tasks was assigned to the seven components of UNTAC so that their combined efforts could produce a "just and durable settlement to the Cambodian conflict."⁷⁰

The level of accomplishment varied among the different components of UNTAC. The repatriation and the electoral components, for example, accomplished most of their primary objectives, while the other components had mixed results. Nevertheless, it seems more appropriate to evaluate the performance of UNTAC with its achievements in each 'functional category' developed in the previous Chapters rather than evaluating the performance of each component

⁶⁹ N.D. White, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993) p. 240

⁷⁰ UN Document (S/RES/745), 28 February 1992

individually as some tasks were carried out by two or more components of UNTAC. Hence, the various tasks that were carried out by each component of UNTAC can be classified in the following thirteen categories: Cease-fire Supervision, Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops, Arms Transfer Control, Maintenance of Law and Order, Institutional Reinforcement, Election Assistance, Demobilisation and Regrouping, De-mining, Refugee Assistance, Human Rights Verification, Socio-economic Rehabilitation, Securing Humanitarian Assistance, and Protective Service.

Interposition Functions

Among the thirteen clusters of tasks that were assigned to UNTAC, four (Cease-fire Supervision, Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops, Arms Transfer Control and Maintenance of Law and Order) fell into the category of the *interposition* functions. It was essential that the interposition functions should be carried out successfully for a neutral political environment to be created. Nevertheless, UNTAC's record of achievement in this area was far from impressive.

With regard to the task identified under the rubric of *Cease-fire Supervision*, UNTAC could not meet up with the level of expectation that had been anticipated in the Paris Peace Accords. On matters relating to the cease-fire, the Paris Peace Accords stipulate as follows: "All forces shall immediately disengage and refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or action which would extend the territory they control or which might lead to renewed fighting." The four warring factions in Cambodia seemed to have been ready to comply with the cease-fire agreement when they brokered the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991. Unfortunately, it took more than four months for UNTAC to become operational after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. By the time UNTAC was deployed fully and became ready to supervise the cease-fire, the momentum seemed to have been lost. Hence, UNTAC did not enjoy the full co-operation of the two major protagonists in the conflict: the PDK and the SOC. In fact, UNTAC had to face numerous cease-fire violations by these parties. The frequent exchanges of shelling that took place between the forces of PDK and SOC in the Bavel area of Battambang Province in December 1992 forced about 15,000 civilians to flee from their homes.⁷¹ In February 1993, the worst fighting since the signing of the Paris Peace Accords erupted between them when the SOC forces launched a series of major attacks on the armed forces of the PDK in an attempt to regain territory.⁷² Furthermore, PDK forces attacked ethnic Vietnamese's villages in Cambodia, and UNTAC personnel and vehicles were also under attack in areas where PDK forces were known to be present.⁷³

UNTAC's military observers (UNMOs) were responsible for the tasks listed under the heading of *Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Arms Transfer Controls*. UNMOs were stationed at 24 fixed locations where foreign forces would be likely to enter Cambodia, as well as deploying mobile monitoring teams of military observers to investigate allegations of the presence of foreign forces.⁷⁴ The question of foreign forces became a major point of contention since the PDK used such charges to justify its non-compliance with some important agreements of the

⁷¹ UN Document (S/25154), *Third progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, 25 January 1993

⁷² Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 70

⁷³ United Nations, *The United Nations in Cambodia*, p. 26

⁷⁴ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 29

Paris Peace Accords such as the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation.⁷⁵ Under such a circumstance, UNTAC's efforts in verifying that the PDK's continuing concerns over the Vietnamese presence were groundless proved effective. In short, UNTAC fulfilled an important role in investigating reports of the presence of foreign troops. Those UNMOs who were posted at the 24 checkpoints were also monitoring the flow of military supplies, and an UNTAC naval unit supervised the patrolling of coastal areas and inland waterways. Mobile monitoring teams of engineers were also deployed to investigate reports of caches of weapons and military supplies inside Cambodia. However, as their freedom of movement was not often granted, particularly in the area controlled by the PDK, UNTAC could not monitor the cessation of outside military assistance to the PDK nor could it locate and confiscate caches of weapons and military supplies in the area controlled by the PDK.

With regard to the tasks that fell into the category of *Maintenance of Law and Order*, the Civil Police Component (CIVPOL) had the primary responsibility. CIVPOL was in charge of not only maintaining law and order but also protecting human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the Cambodian people. UNTAC attempted to ensure this by supervising the existing local police forces. Thus, in the Secretary-General's implementation plan, the Police Component was referred to the UNTAC civilian police "monitors."⁷⁶ In the plan it was also argued that a total of 3,600 UNTAC civilian police monitors would be required to carry out the tasks assigned to CIVPOL. Nevertheless, only 200 police monitors were deployed to Cambodia in April 1992 and they were still not fully in the field in December 1992.⁷⁷ Due to slow deployment and other deficiencies, CIVPOL was not capable of undertaking its mandate successfully.⁷⁸ It soon became apparent that it was impossible for the unarmed and understaffed CIVPOL to maintain law and order in an environment where disarmament of the factions was halted and their co-operation was not forthcoming. Since UNTAC was neither able nor willing to take charge of enforcement action against policing violations of the Paris Peace Accords, the SOC that assumed the control over the local police forces embarked on a policy of harassing and attacking its political opponents, jeopardising seriously UNTAC's efforts to maintain law and order through existing local police forces.

Transition Assistance Functions

UNTAC undertook seven sets of tasks (Institutional Reinforcement, Election Assistance, Demobilisation and Regrouping, De-mining, Refugee Assistance, Human Rights Verification and Socio-economic Rehabilitation) that can be identified as the *transition assistance* functions. The fact that UNTAC was charged with a number of transition assistance functions proved that UNTAC indeed contained some elements of a peacebuilding operation. It was anticipated that all these measures would transform Cambodia's socio-cultural environment into a more conducive one

⁷⁵ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 69

⁷⁶ *UN Document (S/23613)*, 19 February 1992

⁷⁷ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 79. As of 25 January 1993, 3,550 UNTAC police monitors (representing 98.6 per cent of the planned force of 3,600) had been deployed to Cambodia (*UN Document (S/25154)*, 25 January 1993).

⁷⁸ CIVPOL was criticised for insufficient staff, the uneven calibre of its personnel, questions about the extent of their authority, the lack of a common frame of reference to guide investigation of human rights abuses, and deficiencies in equipment.

for the attainment of peace.⁷⁹ UNTAC's ability to address successfully a number of major unanticipated issues that emerged during the implementation phase also contributed to peacebuilding in Cambodia although its record of achievement for transition assistance included some critical failures.

The PDK refused to comply with the terms of the Paris Peace Accords such as disarmament and the cease-fire, and eventually it was forced to withdraw from the peace process. Such a negative consequence could be attributed to the inability of UNTAC to establish direct control over crucial aspects of the SOC administrative structure. As the PDK repeatedly claimed, unless the SOC's sources of power (government administrative organization including police and military) were either entirely dismantled or under the strict supervision and control of UNTAC, a trustworthy third party, demobilisation could not become their practical alternative. Michael Doyle supported this idea when he speculated that the PDK might have demobilised itself if it had been assured that the administrative structures of the SOC would be controlled from above by the SNC and from below by UNTAC.⁸⁰ In this sense, UNTAC's failure to fulfil the task of civil administration control jeopardised the peace process.

Of course, one should not forget the fact that putting the major functions of the civil administration of a country under the supervision of a UN peacekeeping operation is a massive undertaking that requires enormous resources and a significant number of qualified staff. UNTAC was not equipped adequately for such an immense endeavour. Besides, the SOC would not have allowed UNTAC to assume the control of its civil administration even if UNTAC had been provided with sufficient resources and political support of the major players. Still, it might be reasonable to assume that an outcome of the peace process would have changed dramatically if adequate funding and personnel had been allocated to UNTAC so that it could have accomplished the tasks that belong to the criterion of *Institutional Reinforcement*. Nonetheless, the creation of the transitional institutional mechanisms such as the SNC and UNTAC helped significantly to supervise the fragile transition process.

Although UNTAC failed to achieve a truly neutral political environment, its achievement in *Election Assistance* was remarkable. Trevor Findlay argues that credit for such an achievement goes to the Electoral Component of UNTAC, especially the Advanced Electoral Planning Unit that drew lessons from previous electoral experiences in Namibia and elsewhere.⁸¹ On 5 October 1992, voter registration began, and by the time it was closed on 31 January 1993, 4.6 million Cambodians had enrolled.⁸² Twenty political parties registered and their six-week election campaign passed in a peaceful atmosphere.⁸³ In the end, 89.56 per cent of the registered voters had cast their ballots. Election observers from the Interparliamentary Union and others considered these elections were free and fair, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi made a formal declaration to the same effect to the SNC on 29 May 1993.⁸⁴ Although the PDK boycotted the elections, some of its supporters were reported to have voted, and the

⁷⁹ Pierre Lizée, 'Peacekeeping, Peace-building and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia', in David A. Charters (ed.), *Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution* (University of New Brunswick, Center for Conflict Studies 1994), p. 136

⁸⁰ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 69

⁸¹ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 55

⁸² *Phnom Penh Post*, 29 January-11 February 1993, p. 16 (quoted in Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 55)

⁸³ Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 206

⁸⁴ Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 206

elections were carried out in an atmosphere remarkably free of violence.⁸⁵

On the other hand, UNTAC did not succeed in the tasks of *Demobilisation and Regrouping*. Without an effective disarmament of the PDK combatants, it was psychologically and politically too risky for the SOC to remain in the peace process. Since retaining arms was a form of insurance against the worst-case scenario, whether or not to lay down the arms was a sensitive and risky decision for all parties in the Cambodian conflict. This was especially true for the PDK whose single most vital asset was its disciplined army of 10,000. In other words, even though disarmament took the form of a bilateral commitment, it would have destroyed the power parity existing between the parties. This was because the functioning administration over almost the entire country was the great advantage that the SOC possessed over the other factions.⁸⁶ Under such a condition, disarmament of combatants raised issues of how to motivate them to release their weapons and return to civilian life. In other words, the issue was how to make them perceive real benefits from returning to civilians. The plan sought to form a unified national army under the supervision of UNTAC's military component. As the PDK failed to remain in the peace process, the plan enabled the armies of the three new partners (SOC, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) to take part in the process of amalgamation (later Ranariddh invited the PDK soldiers to join and be integrated into the national army). Still, it was apparent that not enough incentives were visualised.

In the Cambodian peace process, *Refugee Assistance* was considered to be an inter-agency effort and undertaken jointly under the auspices of UNTAC and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNTAC director for repatriation was appointed by the UN Secretary-General on the recommendation of the High Commissioner, and reported both to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner.⁸⁷ This arrangement contributed significantly to the successful completion of UNTAC's refugee assistance task as the participation of UNHCR in the repatriation process helped to lubricate the cross-border flow thanks to its long-standing relationship with the region as well as with the refugees in the border camps.⁸⁸ Although the PDK and other factions did not co-operate fully with UNTAC in carrying out its other tasks, each one co-operated fully on the repatriation of refugees to Cambodia that was undertaken by UNHCR.⁸⁹

While the contribution of UNHCR to the refugee repatriation process was outstanding, UNTAC's inability of successfully completing its *De-mining* task hindered its activities, particularly those aimed at refugee repatriation. In the Paris Peace Accords, the Repatriation Component of UNTAC was primarily responsible for refugee repatriation, but the Military Component was assigned to provide assistance necessary for the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons. In particular, the Military Component was expected to help the repatriation process by clearing mines from the repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas. Due to the slow start and limited progress on mine clearance by UNTAC, UNHCR, which was designated as the lead agency in the

⁸⁵ Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) p. 199

⁸⁶ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 69

⁸⁷ *UN Document, Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia containing his proposed implementation plan for UNTAC, including administrative and financial aspects (S/23613)*, 19 February 1992

⁸⁸ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 49

⁸⁹ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 39

refugee repatriation effort in Cambodia, channelled money to a NGO (Handicap International) to clear mines along repatriation routes.⁹⁰

From the very beginning, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia had a realistic expectation of what could be accomplished during UNTAC's tenure with regard to the tasks that are categorised as *Human Rights Verification*. Although UNTAC's activities fell short of "fostering an environment in which respect for human rights is ensured" and received numerous criticisms from human rights advocacy organizations, it has a number of important accomplishments. For example, Cambodia has adopted all the major human rights instruments, and released all known political prisoners thanks to the combined efforts of UNTAC and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).⁹¹ As the Special Representative of the Secretary-General argued, UNTAC was able to plant the seeds of democracy, the growth of which would be dependent on the efforts of the Cambodian people.⁹²

Similarly, UNTAC could not fulfil its *Socio-economic Rehabilitation* function successfully although its activities laid the groundwork for Cambodia's subsequent reconstruction and development. UNTAC's primary task in this function was to co-ordinate various rehabilitation efforts, and a formal structure was installed to facilitate such co-ordination. However, UNTAC was not capable of urging prompt disbursement of donor funds and supervising foreign investment, nor was it possible to prevent donors from directing their aid to support their political clients.⁹³

Humanitarian Intervention Function

With regard to initial tasks that can be categorised as *Securing Humanitarian Assistance* UNTAC's achievements were considerable. On the other hand, after the mandate was expanded to include the *Protection Service* (the provision of security for the UNTAC's personnel and facilities as well as political party's offices and candidates) its performance became less outstanding. Although a number of UNTAC staff and Cambodian political candidates were attacked and killed during the UNTAC operation, UNTAC's presence rescued the overall electoral process.

Despite the fact that the UNTAC operation fell short of accomplishing *interposition* functions such as *Cease-fire Supervision* and *Maintenance of Law and Order* and some *transition assistance* functions such as *Institutional Reinforcement*, *Demobilisation and Regrouping*, and *De-mining*, on the whole, it has made a positive impact upon the peace process in Cambodia. The results of the above analysis indicate that the inclusion of some key *transition assistance* functions in its mandate, though not all of them were implemented successfully, helped UNTAC to prepare important infrastructures for conflict transformation, and thus allowing it to serve as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution. While UNTAC's success in *Election Assistance* and *Refugee Assistance* contributed constructively to the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, its failure to fulfil some of the key *transition assistance* functions such as *Institutional Reinforcement*, *Demobilisation and Regrouping* and others circumscribed its efficacy as the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution.

This implies that even an imperfect peacekeeping operation could become a

⁹⁰ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 72

⁹¹ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 99

⁹² Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 206

⁹³ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 64

stepping-stone to conflict resolution if it includes comprehensive efforts to support the transformation of a war-prone society into a more peaceful one. The nascent transition process is very fragile and there is a need to maintain some kind of order so that the delicate peace process can be protected from the social turmoil associated with peacebuilding.⁹⁴ In the case of the Cambodian peace process, three complementary frameworks, the Paris Peace Accords, the SNC and UNTAC's relevant components, maintained such a complex transition process. In particular, the transition assistance functions of UNTAC provided the peace process with a limited but nifty service that tied the achievement of peacemaking to a bridgehead for further peacebuilding. Thus, the overall performance of UNTAC can be understood that it provided a framework through which the minimum sense of order was maintained and the fragile peace process was prevented from breaking into pieces.

Having outlined the attributes and functions of UNTAC, the next step is to examine closely the relationship between UNTAC and the other initiatives in the Cambodian peace process. The next section seeks to illuminate the functions of UNTAC that were particularly conducive to post-settlement peacemaking and peacebuilding, and to look at the performance of UNTAC from a perspective of co-ordination of various intermediary efforts.

5. Interactive Effects of Intermediary Functions

5.1. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

UNTAC was established as a result of the lengthy peacemaking process that began in the early 1980s. In other words, in the Cambodian peace process, peacemaking and peacekeeping did not take place simultaneously. Instead, the relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia could be described as sequential. UNTAC succeeded diplomatic efforts to implement the negotiated peace agreements. At the same time, however, the lack of interaction between UNTAC and peacemaking efforts in the agreement-making phase does not mean that no relationship existed between the two activities.

Arrangements during the Transitional Period

At least two aspects of the relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking need to be considered. The first aspect relates to the period in which the terms of an agreement were being negotiated. A promise that a UN peacekeeping operation would be formed to supervise the implementation of the agreement served as an effective tool to overcome various challenges in the Cambodian peacemaking process. At the critical point in the negotiation, the proposal that the United Nations would take over the key areas of the civil administration of Cambodia during the transitional period played a crucial role in breaking the impasse over the composition of the interim administration.⁹⁵ To be sure, the parties had to find ways to breakthrough a number of deadlocks they faced during the negotiation before they reached the final agreement, and this accommodation was just one of them. Nevertheless, the international commitment

⁹⁴ Lizée, 'Peacekeeping, Peace-building and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia', p. 136

⁹⁵ On November 24, Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans proposed that the United Nations be directly involved in the civil administration of Cambodia during the transition period.

for an enhanced United Nations' involvement in the transitional period set the peacemaking on the right track.⁹⁶ For all Cambodian factions who had been engaged in the civil war among each other for over twenty years, it was necessary that some trustworthy third party assume the responsibility for running the country during the transitional period. Hence, it was inevitable for the UN peacekeeping operation that it would follow the peacemaking process to be mandated with not only *interposition* functions but also some key *transition assistance* functions. In this sense, the structure and functions of UNTAC were designed to reflect the needs of peacemaking.

Post-agreement Negotiation by UNTAC

The second aspect of the interaction between peacekeeping and peacemaking in the Cambodian peace process that was worth examining revolved around the divergences among the Cambodian factions that surfaced during the implementation phase. In fact, after reaching the Paris Peace Accords, the parties discovered that a number of issues required re-negotiation, and both in and out of the SNC post-agreement negotiations were undertaken by the four factions with the active involvement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as a mediator. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi argued that continued mediation efforts by the United Nations and key member states were essential in keeping the peace process on the track.⁹⁷ As is often the case with implementation of a negotiated agreement, implementation of the Paris Peace Accords was not a rote process of putting into action what had been decided at the negotiation table.⁹⁸ In fact, UNTAC faced enormous challenges in the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords from the outset. Fen Osler Hampson identified several serious problems that posed major obstacles to the implementations of key provisions of the Paris Peace Accords, as follows:

- The presence of a large number of Vietnamese immigrants;
- The urgent need for the mine-clearance process before the deployment of UNTAC, so as to facilitate the repatriation of refugees to areas free from danger;
- The urgent need for infrastructural improvements to support the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation provisions of the Paris Peace Accords;
- The need for presidential elections to provide some measure of stability in a post-settlement Cambodia in light of the failure of the military component of UNTAC to guarantee stability;
- The lack of adequate financial support and commitment for implementation; and
- The failure of the civilian administration component of UNTAC to supervise the SOC structures adequately.⁹⁹

The negotiators of the Paris Peace Accords had anticipated such a thorny path;

⁹⁶ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 16

⁹⁷ Yasushi Akashi, 'The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation', *Survival*, 37, 4 (Winter 1995-96), p. 89

⁹⁸ For the study of post-agreement negotiation, see Bertram I Spector, Gunnar Sjöstedt and I. William Zartman and associates, *Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes* (Final Report submitted to the United States Institute of Peace, 1994).

⁹⁹ Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, pp. 189-190

therefore, executive power was vested in UNTAC rather than the SNC.¹⁰⁰ The Paris Peace Accords stipulated that the SNC would delegate to UNTAC “all powers necessary to ensure the implementation” of the agreement. While the SNC was envisaged offering advice to UNTAC, it was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the head of UNTAC, who would determine whether such advice was consistent with the comprehensive political settlement. Despite an unprecedented authority allocated to him, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General preferred engaging in re-negotiation with the parties concerned at the SNC to enforcing the implementation of the agreements upon the recalcitrant parties. He intended to place the Cambodian factions before their full responsibilities for the final outcome of the peace process.¹⁰¹ For example, he spent four months over the consideration and adoption of the electoral law in the SNC although he could have adopted the law without referring it to the SNC. He did so because he was convinced that it was vital to promote dialogue and give-and-take among Cambodians.¹⁰² Steven R. Ratner described the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as follows: he was “less of an administrator and more of a mediator, attempting to carry out UNTAC’s mandate by persuading and working with the SNC and its factional representatives, rather than merely consulting them and making decisions when consensus was lacking.”¹⁰³

During UNTAC’s tenure, the SNC held a total of 30 meetings to continue the dialogue among the parties to push forward the implementation.¹⁰⁴ The Special Representative of the Secretary-General not only participated in all plenary meetings but also chaired four working sessions in the absence of Sihanouk.¹⁰⁵ In the implementation phase, there were dozens of unresolved issues from the time of civil war, as well as those of newly emerged issues, that still remained in the field. Under such a circumstance, UNTAC seems to have involved in two types of re-negotiation: *implementation negotiation* and *expansion negotiation*. While the former is characterised by assisting in the implementation, the handling of misinterpretation and dealing with the day-to-day governance of the agreements, the latter aims at dealing with issues that were not explored in sufficient detail in an initiating agreement.¹⁰⁶ It is clearly impossible to follow all the post-agreement negotiations that took place in the course of implementation; only a few examples of post-agreement bargaining will be reviewed in the following.

Post-agreement Manoeuvring

A series of *implementation negotiations* over the interpretation of UNTAC’s role in the transitional civil administration took place in the SNC meetings. The SOC interpreted the agreement to mean that its administration would continue to

¹⁰⁰ Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 57-58

¹⁰¹ Akashi, ‘The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation’, p. 89

¹⁰² Despite such efforts, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had to promulgate the electoral law on his own in the end since the SNC could not reach a consensus (Akashi, ‘The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia’, p. 213).

¹⁰³ Steven R. Ratner, ‘The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution of Internal Conflicts?’, in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 255-256

¹⁰⁴ *UN Document (S/23870)*, 1 May 1992; *UN Document (S/24578)*, 28 September 1992; *UN Document (S/25124)*, 25 January 1993; *UN Document (S/25719)*, 3 May 1993; and Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁵ *UN Document (S/25719)*, 3 May 1992

¹⁰⁶ Spector et al., *Getting It Done*, p. 13

exercise control over the country until the formation of an elected government. On the other hand, the PDK argued that continuation of the SOC structure in any form would be prejudicial to a free and fair election, and thus UNTAC should take over and run the country. It seems that the PDK's unspoken objective of holding an election and inviting UNTAC as a transitional administrative agency was to dismantle the SOC or the Phnom Penh regime. Their disagreement over this issue became quite acute when it became apparent that UNTAC was unable to control even the five key areas of the civil administration, as Article 6 of the Paris Peace Accords demanded. As a result, the PDK changed its position. It refused to take part in demobilisation and cantonment, claiming that the situation was far from being what the Paris Peace Accords prescribed. Faced with the PDK's continued lack of co-operation and compliance, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali confessed that "full implementation of the Paris Agreement was impossible under the existing conditions."¹⁰⁷ By referring to a series of UN Security Council resolutions, William Shawcross concluded that by the end of 1992 UNTAC had in effect ceased to pursue the comprehensive political settlement outlined in the Paris Peace Accords.¹⁰⁸

A number of *expansion negotiations* emerged after the election was conducted. The first issue arising after the election was a rejection of the election outcome by the SOC. As a result of the election, Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC gained 58 of the 120 seats, Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP), the political party of the SOC, won 51 seats, Son Sann's Buddhists Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), a political party of the KPNLF, got ten and another party got one. As soon as the election result became clear, the SOC did not hesitate to refuse it. In fact, the SOC initiated a series of crafty manoeuvres to overturn the election result. Thus, new rounds of negotiations over power-sharing arrangements were undertaken immediately after the election. Rumours began to circulate that some army generals and hard-line communists in the administration were organising a *coup d'état*. Chea Sim, a SOC leader, visited Sihanouk and asked him to negotiate a compromise with Ranariddh. Sihanouk responded to the request (blackmail) from Chea Sim by announcing the formation of a 'National Government of Cambodia.' In that government, Sihanouk was to be head of state, prime minister, supreme commander of the armed forces and police, and Ranariddh and Hun Sen were to be deputy premiers.¹⁰⁹

Before such an appeasement was put into effect, another series of *expansion negotiations* were initiated as Prince Cahkrapong (a half-brother of Ranariddh) and Sin Song, both members of the SOC, left Phnom Penh to establish an 'autonomous zone' in the eastern provinces of Prey Veng, Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham. This incident was used by the SOC further to blackmail both FUNCINPEC and UNTAC in an attempt to reverse the election result. In fact, this 'secession' attempt forced FUNCINPEC to realise that it would have to compromise with the SOC if it were to gain any part of power by peaceful means. Ranariddh agreed to accept the conceit that the election had produced no winners and no losers, and accepted parity with the SOC in the provisional administration.

In addition to this critical concession by Ranariddh, international pressure played an important part in convincing the SOC that it had no alternative but to respect the election result. For example, Jean David Levitte, on behalf of the 'Core Group' (or the Extended P5), made it clear that unless the SOC abided by the Paris Peace Accords, and thus accepted the election result, the world would not give any

¹⁰⁷ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 24

¹⁰⁸ Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, p. 15

¹⁰⁹ Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, p. 25

further aid to assist the recovery of Cambodia.¹¹⁰ A series of concessions made by Ranariddh together with such a threat, in effect, moved the SOC towards accepting the election result, though not the logic of its defeat.¹¹¹ Eventually, the SOC accepted the election outcome, but this post-agreement bargaining revealed that it was the SOC that would have the casting vote in the transitional power-sharing government. In the subsequent negotiation, therefore, FUNCINPEC, which had the largest number of votes in the election, was asked to exercise self-restraint, whereas the SOC was offered attractive concessions.¹¹²

Through the post-election negotiations among Sihanouk, Ranariddh and Hun Sen, an interim coalition government or a 'provisional national government' emerged. In this power-sharing arrangement, Ranariddh and Hun Sen were elected as co-prime ministers, and Sihanouk returned to the throne to re-create the Kingdom of Cambodia. This coalition of two prime ministers may have been formed against the wishes of the United States and the United Nations, but a coalition was necessary in order to approve a constitution, which required a two-thirds vote in the Assembly.¹¹³

The treatment of the PDK in the new regime was another difficult issue. The Cambodian parties did not agree with the PDK leaders' roles in the new government and its combatants' roles in civil society. Since the United States opposed strongly the idea of including the PDK in any form in the new government, choices were limited. Ranariddh asked all PDK soldiers to lay down their arms and promised that they would be integrated into the new national army. Many of them responded to that appeal and some of them faced the difficult process of amalgamation with the soldiers of both former allies (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) and enemy (SOC).

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was involved closely and actively in the negotiations that aimed at settling these post-agreement manoeuvres. The presence of the head of UNTAC at the SNC meetings in which these post-agreement negotiations were undertaken was beneficial to the Cambodian peace process, especially in the implementation phase. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi was given important opportunities to bring the challenges that UNTAC was facing in the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords before the leaders of the four factions. Through this channel, he was able to address the needs on the ground. As a result, the discussions at the SNC were based on the reality on the ground and reflected the needs of the situation although not all the needs were met. Nevertheless, such a mechanism that connected the efforts in peacekeeping and those in (post-agreement) peacemaking helped to maintain a coherent approach towards conflict resolution in Cambodia.

Consolidating External Support through the Core Group

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General maintained a close contact not only with the four factions through the SNC but also with the external players concerned whenever a crisis in implementation of the Paris Peace Accords occurred.¹¹⁴ These external players such as P5 (China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR), Australia, Indonesia, Japan and other states concerned formed the 'Core Group' or the Extended P5.¹¹⁵ The Core Group

¹¹⁰ Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, p. 28

¹¹¹ Shawcross, *Cambodia's New Deal*, p. 28

¹¹² Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 207

¹¹³ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 98

¹¹⁴ Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 212

¹¹⁵ The Extended P5 lacked a fixed composition except that the members of the P5 were always

provided key support to UNTAC both politically and financially, but more importantly it served as a back channel through which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General could communicate directly with the UN Security Council.¹¹⁶ Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi met frequently with the Core Group's ambassadors in Phnom Penh to inform them about the progress and obstacles for UNTAC and to exchange views.¹¹⁷ This mechanism contributed to keeping the external players informed about the challenges with which UNTAC was faced, and thus, helped them to provide timely support for UNTAC's activities. Indeed, Akashi argued that the Core Group "turned out to be a crucial link between the peacekeepers on the ground and the Security Council in New York."¹¹⁸

The Core Group also enhanced the possibilities for co-ordination among the interested external players, ensuring that all were working for the same purposes and allowing them to pursue a division of labour that facilitated their concerted efforts.¹¹⁹ Indeed, these alternative communication channels worked well when the post-agreement negotiations led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General seemed to have deadlocked. As the P5 participated in SNC meetings, while other members of the Core Group attending as observers, they were able to initiate timely alternative diplomacy. On a number of occasions, China used its influence to induce the necessary compromise from the PDK by the back door. Japan and Thailand also attempted several times to persuade the PDK to rejoin the implementation process of the Paris Peace Accords.¹²⁰ Vietnam and the Soviet Union assumed responsibility for urging the SOC to find an arrangement that would break the impasse.

Redirecting UNTAC Efforts to Meet the Changing Situation on the Ground

According to the Paris Peace Accords, the most fundamental task of UNTAC was "the organization and conduct of free and fair elections". Since it was expected that a neutral political environment was essential for free and fair elections, several components of UNTAC were structured to contribute to creating such an environment. Indeed, as reviewed in the previous section of this Chapter, the Paris Peace Accords had laid out a set of definable tasks. For example, the Civil Administration Component was envisaged supervising the four factions' administrative structures. The Police Component was to provide law enforcement and public security by overseeing all local police in Cambodia so that politically motivated violence and intimidation were checked fairly. On the other hand, the Military Component was to disarm and demobilise the four factions' forces, and to put their arms under its supervision. The tasks assigned to the Military Component were considered essential to ensuring a neutral political environment, since fighting was expected to continue without disarmament, confiscation of weapons and cantonment of the factions' forces.¹²¹ In fact, the tasks fall into the category of Demobilisation and Regrouping were the key to everything else.¹²²

Nevertheless, the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords did not follow the

included. Others were selected on *ad hoc* basis, depending on the issues and topic covered and the message the Group wished to convey (Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, pp. 80-81).

¹¹⁶ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 81

¹¹⁷ Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 212

¹¹⁸ Akashi, 'The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation', p. 89

¹¹⁹ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 81

¹²⁰ Amer, *Peace-keeping in a Peace Process*, p. 29; and Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 80.

¹²¹ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 65

¹²² Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 38

route that the drafters of the Accords had envisaged. Due to unanticipated developments and challenges on the ground, UNTAC was forced to review its initial mandate, and eventually some of its activities were restructured to reflect the change of plan. In November 1992, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General together with the Force Commander restructured UNTAC's military tasks to ensure conditions that would allow the elections to take place.¹²³ Having encountered the PDK's unwillingness to comply with demobilisation, UNTAC had to abandon the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation process despite the fact that the other factions had expressed their readiness to begin the regrouping and cantonment process.¹²⁴

Faced with the continued non-compliance of the PDK, UNTAC was forced to consider whether it should postpone or abandon elections altogether, as demobilisation of the warring factions was considered to be essential for creating a neutral political environment that was regarded, in the Paris Peace Accords, as the precondition for holding 'free and fair' elections. Instead, UNTAC decided to proceed with the scheduled elections. Janet Heininger argued that this decision was a critical juncture for UNTAC since it implied a major diversion from the basic four-party structure of the Paris Peace Accords.¹²⁵ By December 1992, UNTAC realised that its multi-functional mandate had to be reduced effectively to the single task of holding 'free and fair' elections.¹²⁶ In May 1993, the Secretary-General admitted in his fourth progress report on UNTAC that UNTAC would seek to create and maintain "acceptable conditions for a free and fair election" rather than to pursue its original mandate of creating a neutral political environment.¹²⁷ Moreover, on the eve of the election, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi was reported to have commented, "What we are trying to achieve now is the minimum acceptable condition for free and fair elections in Cambodia."¹²⁸

The failure of the cantonment and demobilisation of the factions meant that the election would have to take place while a substantial part of the forces of the factions remained under arms. Under conditions of instability and insecurity, the scheduled reduction of the strength of the UNTAC Military Component, as envisaged in the Secretary-General's implementation plan of 19 February 1992 (S/23613), became no longer feasible.¹²⁹ Moreover, in order to meet with the changing demands on the ground, UNTAC redirected its efforts to ensuring the security of the electoral process and the safety of the Cambodian political parties and of UNTAC staff. Accordingly, it adjusted the deployment of its Military Component, "with a view to fostering a general sense of security among the Cambodian people and enhancing its ability to protect the voter registration and, subsequently, the polling process, particularly in remote or insecure areas."¹³⁰ UNMOs started accompanying the electoral teams to

¹²³ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 38

¹²⁴ *UN Document (S/24800)*, 15 November 1992

¹²⁵ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 105

¹²⁶ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 52

¹²⁷ *UN Document (S/25719)*, 3 May 1993

¹²⁸ Philip Shenon, 'U.N. Vows to Hold Vote in Cambodia', *New York Times*, 19 May 1993, p. A5 (quoted in Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 112)

¹²⁹ *UN Document (S/24800)*, 15 November 1992

¹³⁰ *UN Document (S/24800)*, 15 November 1992. The original deployment pattern of the Military Component of UNTAC was based on the requirements of regrouping and cantonment. To accomplish the new task assigned to the Military Component, it had been realigned to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces, which would conform with the deployment of the electoral teams (*UN Document (S/25152)*, 25 January 1993).

negotiate with local authorities or forces that were trying to hinder registration.¹³¹ Similarly, the mandate of CIVPOL was also modified to enable them to protect electoral staff.¹³²

Furthermore, in order to limit the exposure of the UNTAC electoral units to attacks, the number of the polling stations was reduced from 1,900 to 1,400, and UNTAC allowed SOC forces to pursue PDK forces to keep them away from the polling station.¹³³ Moreover, UNTAC concluded agreements for providing security for the polling period with the armed forces of the three factions that remained in the peace process, and returned some of the weapons that had been under UNTAC's custody as part of the disarmament process to them.¹³⁴

Civilian-Military Co-ordination in UNTAC

The Paris Peace Accords stipulate that UNTAC's Civilian and Military Components will be put "under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General" who will designate a Special Representative to act on his behalf. Yasushi Akashi was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, i.e., the head of UNTAC, and he reported directly to the Secretary-General and to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. Under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNTAC was divided largely into two: the Civilian Component and the Military Component. The deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General headed the civilian side, while the Force Commander headed the military side. The UN Field Administration (provided service and support to the rest of UNTAC) and UNTAC's six civilian components such as the Electoral, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Human Rights, Civilian Police, and Government Administrative Supervision (Civil Administration) were placed under the supervision of the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. On the other hand, the Force Commander supervised the Military Component, including a military observer groups, a force headquarters and sector headquarters staff, twelve enlarged infantry battalions, an engineer element, an air support group, a signal unit, a medical unit, a military police company, a logistic battalion, and a naval element.¹³⁵

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had authority over both civilian and military subordinates and was authorised to act as the overall co-ordinator of the peace process in Cambodia.¹³⁶ Thus, the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on their respected areas of responsibility. In other words, the Military Component and the Civilian Component fell under a single command structure. In addition, the executive staff from each component met three times a week (five times a week just before the election) during

¹³¹ UN Document (S/25154), 25 January 1993

¹³² UN Document (S/25154), 25 January 1993. CIVPOL mounted strategic guard and mobile patrols around political party offices considered to be at risk (UN Document (S/25669), 27 April 1993).

¹³³ Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 209

¹³⁴ The central feature of these agreements was that the security of the polling stations and their vicinity would be provided by UNTAC alone, while the armed forces of the three factions would be responsible for assisting UNTAC, conveying information on possible or actual threats to the election and ensuring security in the zone under their control (UN Document (S/25719), 3 May 1993; and Akashi, 'The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia', p. 209).

¹³⁵ UN Document (S/23613), 19 February 1992

¹³⁶ Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 42

its operation to co-ordinate their activities on the ground.¹³⁷

According to Heininger, however, the military's work was not co-ordinated fully with that of other civilian components despite these efforts.¹³⁸ She pointed out that there was no joint civilian-military officer available to help to co-ordinate the activities of the two, and the co-ordination meetings were at the policy level and did not include working staff.¹³⁹ In other words, UNTAC lacked an important branch such as the Civil Affairs Branch in UNFICYP, which aimed at maintaining good relationships and co-ordination among the seven components of UNTAC; therefore, various components of UNTAC might have been co-ordinated at the strategic level, but such efforts did not reflect on the management of their day-to-day activities on the ground.

Furthermore, serious problems in civilian-military co-ordination emerged as a result of the different deployment patterns of the two sides. The original deployment pattern of the Military Component of UNTAC was based on the requirements of regrouping and cantonment, whereas that of the other Civilian Components was designed to correspond with the borders of the Cambodian provinces. Therefore, in each province, no one was assigned as the top provincial director who would be in charge of overseeing all the civilian and military activities of UNTAC within the province. It would have enhanced the efficiency of the UNTAC operation, if liaison offices responsible for civilian-military co-ordination were allocated within the UNTAC structure and each province had a single head of operations in the chain of command.

In short, it can be said that while the need for conducting a top-level strategic co-ordination between peacekeeping and peacemaking activities was recognised and reflected on the planning and implementation of UNTAC, the grass-root operational co-ordination among the various components, particularly between the Civilian Components and the Military Component of UNTAC did not receive sufficient attention when the Secretary-General developed his implementation plan for UNTAC.

As mentioned above, the sheer necessity of the situation forced UNTAC to redefine its mission and to focus its efforts on a successful completion of the elections. The new focus affected the activities of many components of UNTAC. The Military Component in particular underwent a major redeployment of forces in support of the electoral process (the boundary of each battalion was realigned to coincide with the boundary of each province).¹⁴⁰ Beginning in December 1992, infantry battalions that had been stationed around cantonments were reassigned to establish a protective presence in medium and high-risk areas where electoral preparations were underway.¹⁴¹

In addition, UNTAC set up an Electoral Co-ordination Centre at its headquarters in Phnom Penh and joint co-ordination centres in each province to provide twenty-four-hour combined military and civilian command posts during registration and the elections.¹⁴² While these measures towards greater co-ordination between the Military and Electoral components of UNTAC were not

¹³⁷ Yasushi Akashi's comment, quoted in Keiko Chino, *Yasushi Akashi Lives in the UN* [Akashi Yasushi Kokuren ni Ikiru (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Shincho Sha, 1994) p. 98

¹³⁸ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 74

¹³⁹ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 74

¹⁴⁰ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 77

¹⁴¹ James A. Shear, 'Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia', in Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (eds.), *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 256-257

¹⁴² Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 77

envisaged in the initial implementation plan, such positive developments were necessary for the Military Component to undertake successfully a newly assigned task of providing confidence in the electoral process and security for UNTAC's electoral units as well as political party offices and candidates. If the Military Components had not responded to the necessity of the local situation through the redeployment of forces and the creation of civil-military co-ordination bodies, the elections would have faced enormous challenges to successful completion.

5.2. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Legacy of Co-operation and Co-ordination for Humanitarian Assistance

The term 'peacebuilding' became widely used after Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali published his report called 'An Agenda for Peace' in January 1992. Before that, terms such as emergency relief, humanitarian assistance and development aid were used to represent efforts towards peacebuilding and several international agencies and NGOs assumed the primary responsibility for such undertakings. These organizations had a fairly good record of achievements in Cambodia in the area of co-operation and co-ordination. Although no foreign agencies were present in Cambodia and the country was virtually closed off from the rest of the world during the period of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), a sudden influx of international agencies and NGOs occurred and a large-scale emergency relief operation was carried out in Cambodia when the People's Republic of Kampuchea overthrew the Pol Pot regime in 1979 and the devastating consequences of the Pol Pot regime was uncovered.¹⁴³ The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the ICRC undertook this emergency operation jointly and delivered humanitarian assistance both inside the country and at the border resistance camps.¹⁴⁴ These two organizations also assumed the role of lead agencies and co-ordinated the efforts by various NGOs.¹⁴⁵ Under their leadership, international agencies and NGOs met in Phnom Penh on a weekly basis in a spirit of openness for information sharing, co-ordination and working towards a common goal.¹⁴⁶

Nevertheless, when the three major resistance movements formed the CGDK in 1982, and the West and China determined to take the side of the CGDK, Cambodia faced a harsh economic embargo and isolation.¹⁴⁷ A large number of international agencies and NGOs withdrew from Cambodia and only three international agencies such as the ICRC, UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP) together with a dozen NGOs remained during this time. Accordingly, in 1982 and thereafter the focus of international assistance shifted to the refugee camps at the Thai-Cambodian border, and the WFP was designated to take over as the lead agency operating in the refugee camps at the border. To continue the relief operation in the refugee camps at the border, the WFP created the United Nations

¹⁴³ Mysliwec, *Cambodia*, p. 20

¹⁴⁴ This joint operation lasted until December 1980, when the ICRC withdrew, after assessing that the situation was no longer to be regarded as an emergency. UNICEF continued to act as the lead agency for humanitarian assistance within Cambodia and along the Thai-Cambodia border until the end of 1981 (Amer. *Peace-keeping in a Peace Process*, p. 25).

¹⁴⁵ In September 1979, the UN Secretary-General designated UNICEF to lead and co-ordinate the relief efforts (Amer. *Peace-keeping in a Peace Process*, p. 25).

¹⁴⁶ Mysliwec, *Cambodia*, p. 21

¹⁴⁷ Chanda, 'Indochina', p. 98

Border Relief Operation (UNBRO).¹⁴⁸ UNBRO co-ordinated all humanitarian activities at the border and most NGOs working for the refugee camps were contracted by UNBRO to provide essential services in the camps.¹⁴⁹ For example, UNBRO provided primary schooling and adult literacy programs as well as some vocational training such as knitting, mat making, blacksmithing, and pottery in the refugee camps it ran in Thailand.¹⁵⁰

The weekly inter-agency co-ordination meetings were held under the leadership of UNBRO. Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, the tasks and responsibilities assumed by UNBRO from 1982 were transferred to UNHCR. Hence, from that day until the arrival of UNTAC, UNHCR played the role of co-ordinator among the already well-established circle of international agencies and NGOs. In short, a fundamental infrastructure and prior experience of co-operation and co-ordination among various actors already existed in Cambodia, and UNTAC made the most of such assets, particularly in the work of refugee repatriation.

Refugee Repatriation and Quick-Impact Projects

Among various peacebuilding tasks that UNTAC carried out during its tenure, the first step was to repatriate the 36,000 refugees from the Thai-Cambodia border.¹⁵¹ One of the major goals of the UNTAC operation was to complete the repatriation process before the electoral process began so that the returnees could register to vote and participate fully in the electoral campaign.¹⁵² In addition to their participation in the 'democratic' elections, their participation in the subsequent reconstruction was desperately needed for the future of Cambodia; therefore, the repatriation of these refugees was given top priority over the other tasks of UNTAC.

Although the Repatriation Component of UNTAC was given a mandate to work with UNHCR in repatriation of the refugees and their resettlement, it was UNHCR that took the lead in the repatriation process under the auspices of UNTAC. This arrangement was extremely helpful for the UNTAC operation in at least three ways. First, UNHCR was able to plan the repatriation process well in advance and was familiar with the political process through which the repatriation of refugees was agreed as it had participated in the Paris Conference in 1989 and the subsequent meetings. Secondly, since UNHCR had inherited the assets that UNBRO had established through a long-standing relationship with the refugees and the Cambodian factions, UNTAC did not have to be bothered with establishing working relationships with its clients from scratch. For example, the PDK had placed no obstacles in the way of the repatriation and resettlement efforts undertaken by UNHCR, while it refused to co-operate with other UNTAC activities.¹⁵³ Thirdly, because UNHCR had taken over from UNBRO the basic infrastructure necessary to carry on its duties and had already worked for sometime in the region, it was far less hampered by procurement and logistics difficulties that bedevilled all the other components of UNTAC.¹⁵⁴ In fact, UNHCR established a field operation office in

¹⁴⁸ In January 1988, administrative support for UNBRO was transferred from WFP to UNDP (Amer, *Peace-keeping in a Peace Process*, p. 25).

¹⁴⁹ Mysliwiec, *Cambodia*, p. 21

¹⁵⁰ Chanda, 'Indochina', p. 92

¹⁵¹ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 47

¹⁵² United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 19

¹⁵³ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 52

¹⁵⁴ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 49

Phnom Penh as early as 1990.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, UNHCR decided to delegate extensive authority in decision-making and financial arrangements to the field operation office in Phnom Penh. Such an arrangement was made the first time in the history of UNHCR, which allowed UNHCR to respond to changing situations on the ground more flexibly and timely than ever before.¹⁵⁶

While waiting for a peace settlement, training of technical and administrative cadres began in the camps and inside the country. UNHCR also provided workshops for training in car repairs, electrical services, and welding so that the people coming out of these programmes could in turn train others when they returned home.¹⁵⁷ To facilitate the resettlement process further, UNHCR, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and several NGOs, initiated more than sixty quick-impact projects to help communities absorb the returning refugees.¹⁵⁸ The quick-impact projects included road and bridge repairs, mine clearance, agricultural development, the digging of wells and water ponds and the improvement and construction of sanitation, health and education facilities.¹⁵⁹ Project funds were also allocated for the provision of vegetable seeds, fishing equipment, mosquito nets and water jars as start-up loans.¹⁶⁰ Through these projects, support for UNTAC was consolidated among the Cambodian people and information about its mission was transferred to them, particularly those who lived in remote areas.¹⁶¹ Quick-impact projects also served to fill the gap between humanitarian relief aid and long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.¹⁶²

Co-ordination in Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

With the prospect of a negotiated settlement of the Cambodian conflict in sight at the end of the 1980s, a rapid increase in the number of NGOs working within Cambodia took place. Thus, in August 1990 these NGOs founded the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) whose membership represented the majority of NGOs stationed in Phnom Penh to facilitate information sharing and improve overall inter-NGO co-operation.¹⁶³ During the UNTAC era, over seventy NGOs were involved in the CCC, through which they provided basic services for the local population.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, a co-ordination mechanism between the aid community and the Phnom Penh government called the Co-ordinating Committee was established, although its area of activity was limited to the health sector.¹⁶⁵ In short, a wide range of actors had already been active in Cambodia and several co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms had already been installed when UNTAC first appeared on the scene.

Unlike other components of UNTAC that were designed to carry out the

¹⁵⁵ Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectation: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), p. 138

¹⁵⁶ Lithgow, 'Cambodia', pp. 49-50

¹⁵⁷ Chanda, 'Indochina', p. 92

¹⁵⁸ *UN Document (S/25719)*, *Forth progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, 3 May 1993

¹⁵⁹ *UN Document (S/25719)*, *Forth progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, 3 May 1993

¹⁶⁰ Heining, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 53

¹⁶¹ Heining, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 53

¹⁶² Heining, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 53

¹⁶³ Mysliwicz, *Cambodia*, p. 22

¹⁶⁴ Hideki Ogawa, *You can Become a Leading Actor in International Co-operation* [Anatomo Kokusaikouken no Shuyakuni Nareru (in Japanese)] (Tokyo: Nippon Keizai Shinbun Sha, 2001) p.

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¹⁶⁵ Mysliwicz, *Cambodia*, p. 22

implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, the Rehabilitation Component was not provided with an implementation capability.¹⁶⁶ Instead, the most important aspect of its mandate was that it would catalyse the commitment to Cambodia's reconstruction that had been made in the Paris Peace Accords by the member states of the United Nations and the international financial community such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.¹⁶⁷ For instance, on 20 and 22 June 1992, the Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia was held in Tokyo to appeal for financial assistance for Cambodia. At the conference, thirty-three countries, the European Community and twelve international organizations pledged a total of \$880 million for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia.¹⁶⁸ While UNTAC did not organise the conference, it was held in response to the UN Secretary-General's Appeal for Cambodia.

According to the Paris Peace Accords, another important task given to UNTAC was planning and co-ordinating various international efforts towards the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-torn country.¹⁶⁹ UNTAC sought to co-ordinate rehabilitation activities that were undertaken directly by international financial organizations, each state on bilateral bases and NGOs, often through existing Cambodian institutions.¹⁷⁰ For example, to co-ordinate the bilateral aid activities of the donor countries, the Donor Consultative Group (DCG) was established.¹⁷¹ The DCG was an informal consultation mechanism, which was composed of UNTAC Rehabilitation Component staff, representatives of the international financial community, diplomats from the major donor countries, three NGO representatives who were selected by the CCC and Cambodian representatives of the SNC.¹⁷² The DCG was held monthly in Phnom Penh for renewals of the general aid situation and their specific aid programmes.¹⁷³ Furthermore, under the chairmanship of the director of UNTAC Rehabilitation Component, a SNC-UNTAC Technical Advisory Committee on Rehabilitation was formed to review, with all four factions, all proposals and programmes for rehabilitation projects.¹⁷⁴ With this arrangement, UNTAC became responsible for co-ordinating the delivery of aid, but UNTAC's efforts in co-ordinating rehabilitation activities encountered a number of obstacles. For example, rehabilitation and development efforts were concentrated on areas in and around Phnom Penh (areas controlled by the SOC) as it was logistically and administratively easiest to carry out projects there, but to do so would have fed the PDK's accusations on UNTAC bias.¹⁷⁵ As the PDK often blocked approval of rehabilitation projects in the SNC, donors began to circumvent the formal procedures, appealing directly to Sihanouk for project approval.¹⁷⁶ In fact, most of the multilateral and bilateral assistance for rehabilitation and

¹⁶⁶ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 54

¹⁶⁷ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 55

¹⁶⁸ Akashi, 'The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation', p. 88

¹⁶⁹ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 47

¹⁷⁰ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 55

¹⁷¹ Prior to the establishment of the DCG, UNDP and UNHCR created the 'Joint Support Unit' to co-ordinate repatriation related efforts. The Joint Support Unit was expanded and evolved into the DCG (Mysliwiec, *Cambodia*, pp. 22-23).

¹⁷² Mysliwiec, *Cambodia*, p. 23

¹⁷³ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 57

¹⁷⁴ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 57

¹⁷⁵ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 71

¹⁷⁶ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 58

reconstruction of Cambodia was negotiated by donor agencies directly and exclusively with the SOC administration, leaving out the other three factions.¹⁷⁷

The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)

According to the Paris Peace Accords, UNTAC's de-mining task was to assist with clearing mines and undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cambodian people. UNTAC organised mine clearance training programmes for Cambodians so that they would undertake the mine clearance operations by themselves. In fact, UNTAC initially planned to train 5,000 Cambodian mine clearers by the end of 1992, but it was not sure whether UNTAC personnel should engage in the actual conduct of de-mining by themselves.¹⁷⁸ Those Cambodian de-miners who had completed UNTAC's mine clearance programmes worked under the auspices of five NGOs: McGrath's Mine Advisory Group, HALO Trust, Mine Action Group, Handicap International and Norwegian People's Aid.¹⁷⁹ These five NGOs carried out most of the de-mining operations in the early part of UNTAC's tenure.

On 20 April 1992, the SNC agreed to establish the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the vice-presidency of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi.¹⁸⁰ With this agreement, UNTAC created a base for long-term programmes in mine awareness and mine clearance, provided a channel for international donations towards de-mining, and handed over its responsibility for the co-ordination of information about mine location to the CMAC in which the director of UNTAC's Repatriation Component was serving as the interim director.¹⁸¹

However, the CMAC did not become fully operational until mid 1993. Faced with the slow pace of training of Cambodian mine clearers and indeed the de-mining process itself, UNTAC personnel, including the Mine Clearance Training Unit of the UNTAC engineering branch, began to carry out actual de-mining in mid 1992. Since the establishment of UNTAC, with joint efforts of UNTAC, CMAC and NGOs, more than four million square metres have been cleared of mines, about 37,000 mines and other unexploded ordnance destroyed, and about 2,330 Cambodians have been trained in mine-clearance techniques.¹⁸² Upon UNTAC's withdrawal from Cambodia on 26 September 1993, the CMAC began to transform itself from an international organization to a Cambodian organization, and by March 1994 it had become a purely Cambodian organization with a continuing relationship with UNDP.¹⁸³

Since the CMAC was established towards the end of UNTAC's tenure, it did not contribute much to the actual de-mining process during the UNTAC operation. Nevertheless, it bridged the gap between UNTAC's 'interim' peacekeeping mandate and the Cambodians' long-term responsibility for peacebuilding. The CMAC was institutionalised and nurtured by UNTAC, and then it was empowered to act as an independent local organization to supervise mine clearance in the post-UNTAC period. Such an endeavour needs to be highly appreciated as it can serve as a step

¹⁷⁷ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 59

¹⁷⁸ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 72

¹⁷⁹ *UN Document (S26360)*, 26 August 1993; and John Ryle, 'The Invisible Enemy', *New Yorker*, 29 November 1993, p. 126 (quoted in Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 72).

¹⁸⁰ *UN Document (S23870)*, *First progress report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, 1 May 1992

¹⁸¹ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 73

¹⁸² *UN Document (S26360)*, 26 August 1993

¹⁸³ Heinger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 73

towards sustainable peacebuilding, and thus conflict resolution. The case of the CMAC discards the notion that a peacekeeping operation precedes peacebuilding; rather it underlines the importance of the fact that the two must be initiated concurrently.

5.3. Belief Summary of Interactions

To sum up the relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking in the Cambodian peace process, it can be said that the Paris Peace Accords provided UNTAC with a rough framework and the legal footing, while UNTAC fed the re-negotiation process with the needed information about developments on the ground. Indeed, UNTAC did not follow rigidly what was stipulated in the Paris Peace Accords, and engaged in a number of re-negotiation and post-agreement talks, which in effect tailored the Accords to meet with the needs on the ground. In other words, those who were familiar with peacekeeping requirements as well as the most recent developments on the ground adjusted the initial peacemaking plans and objectives during the implementation phase. Such positive and flexible interactions between peacekeeping and peacemaking made possible the realistic fine-tuning of conflict resolution in Cambodia and prevented the two activities from seeking unrealistic and contradictory goals. Through participating in the SNC meetings UNTAC was able to communicate with the primary parties concerned and appreciated the changing needs on the ground. On the other hand, using the channel provided through the Core Group contact, UNTAC was able to get in touch with the sponsor of the Cambodian peace process in New York, that is, the UN Security Council.

During the UNTAC operation, interactive effects between peacekeeping and peacebuilding can be regarded as positive and constructive. Effective use of existing support structures such as UNHCR, UNBRO and the CCC was particularly helpful in enhancing the UNTAC's capacity for effective communication with local population and among other intermediaries. In particular, the role of UNHCR in co-ordinating between peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions and among various agencies of peacebuilding in the Cambodian peace process was extremely important for the success in refugee repatriation. Heininger echoed this point when she analysed the relationship between UNTAC and UNHCR:

UNHCR's activities were well co-ordinated with the overall objective of UNTAC's mission. Repatriation of the refugees was included as an important component of the Paris Peace Accords, and it was not handled in isolation from other components of UNTAC. Co-operation between UNHCR and the Military and CIVPOL components of UNTAC in particular helped to make repatriation a success. UNHCR served as an important link between UNTAC, UNDP and WFP, which had responsibilities in the demobilisation and cantonment process. It was also a link to other intermediaries working in the field, such as UNICEF and NGOs, whose work cut across UNTAC mandate.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 54

6. *Case Study Summary and Conclusion*

Having reviewed the relationship between peacekeeping and other important intermediary efforts in Cambodia, it is time to outline the answer to the research question that was identified at the beginning of this Chapter: Under what conditions and by performing what functions has UNTAC facilitated the peace process in Cambodia? First of all, let us recapitulate what has been presented as a general overview of the development of the conflict. As has already implied, during the Cold War era, both the PDK and the PRK (SOC), backed by their external actors, anticipated a possible victory.¹⁸⁵ As long as they had secured sources of outside support, the fighting continued. Thailand and China needed the PDK to restrain Vietnam's influence in the region. The Soviet Union and Vietnam, on the other hand, maintained their support for the PRK to consolidate their influence in the region. Under such conditions, no peaceful resolution of the conflict appeared feasible.

Over time, however, a series of domestic as well as external factors led to a change in the conflict situation. Perhaps the most significant change in the international environment was the end of the Cold War, which caused the external stakeholders to reconsider their strategy towards the Cambodian conflict. Many developments in global and regional relationships allowed the P5 to construct a framework for a negotiated settlement of the Cambodian conflict. These changes in the external factors affected the adversarial relationship as well as the internal dynamics of each faction. In particular, with the end of the Cold War, all four factions that had been deprived of external military support were weary of armed confrontation and in need of international legitimacy.¹⁸⁶ The fact that the Paris Peace Accords were signed by the four Cambodian factions as well as their patrons, and UNTAC was sent to Cambodia to oversee the implementation of the Accords indicated that the conflict situation surrounding the Cambodian conflict had become more conducive to a negotiated settlement than that during the Cold War era.

Has UNTAC been a Stepping-stone to Conflict Resolution in Cambodia?

The above analysis would lead to a conclusion that none of the functions performed by UNTAC actually impeded the post-agreement negotiations nor did they jeopardise the peacebuilding endeavours in Cambodia. Instead, a number of tasks that were carried out by UNTAC contributed to the peace process in Cambodia. Since it is often difficult to terminate successfully protracted internal struggles, the Paris Peace Accords as well as the subsequent UNTAC operation is a relative rarity, representing a negotiated settlement of a major case of 'civil strife.' Even though the two largest antagonists in Cambodia (the SOC and the PDK) signed the Paris Peace Accords mainly under heavy pressure from their big-power patrons and did not co-operate fully with the United Nations, it can be argued that UNTAC's achievements in the implementation phase were remarkable.¹⁸⁷

Although local aspects of the conflict remained intractable, the Paris Peace Accords represented the end of the ideological struggle. It was the consequence of the change in climate of internal, regional and superpower rivalries. The end of the Cold War enabled co-operation between Washington and Moscow in resolving a

¹⁸⁵ Munck and Kumar, 'Civil Conflicts and the Conditions for Successful International Intervention', p. 167

¹⁸⁶ Chandler, 'Cambodia's Historical Legacy', p. 19

¹⁸⁷ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 32

regional conflict. Thus, it was possible for the United Nations to make a strong commitment to the peace process in Cambodia. Indeed, the above analysis shows clearly that the external dimension of the conflict situation in Cambodia was ripe for resolution. Under such circumstances, UNTAC was deployed to supervise the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, and carried out a number of tasks rather successfully. Moreover, the presence and activities of UNTAC contributed to transforming both inter and intra-party conditions into riper ones.

Stepping-stones to Conflict Resolution in Cambodia

At least three stepping-stones existed in the conflict resolution process in Cambodia: the Paris Peace Accords, SNC and UNTAC. What is true for many civil wars was to a considerable extent true for the Cambodian civil war as well. For example, resistance to compromise and the pursuit of all-or-nothing solutions were prevalent in the early stage of the Cambodian conflict. The Paris Peace Accords provided a successful solution to a conflict in which the primary issue seemed to be the survival of an existing political regime or a complete take-over by the challenger. The creation of the SNC as well as the negotiation process through which the agreement over the composition and mandate of the SNC were arrived at made a power-sharing solution realistic, and laid the foundation for the coalition government that was manoeuvred into after the May 1993 elections. Finally, UNTAC served as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution in the Cambodian peace process in various ways.

As is often the case with protracted internal conflicts, Cambodia lacked the infrastructure and resources necessary to make a peace process durable. For example, the Cambodian parties were bound to distrust one another due to the memory of about twenty years of coercive exchange. No domestic actor was in a position to serve as an impartial intermediary carrying out the Paris Peace Accords. Clearly, the parties needed a trustworthy third party who could legitimise and guarantee the implementation of the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords. In the agreement-making stage, the international community played a crucial role as a mediator by reassuring the parties that the other side was not wholly bent on victory, whereas UNTAC aimed to oversee the implementation process by reassuring the parties that the other side was carrying out the agreements. In short, the parties depended on UNTAC, an impartial outsider, to fill in the deep gap of mistrust created by the lengthy civil war.

Acting as an impartial monitor, UNTAC was able to fill in the gap and assist in carrying out the agreement by undertaking verifying functions. When the agreement or the relationship between parties became fragile, UNTAC had to prevent non-fulfilment of the term by acting as guarantor, by means of 'patient diplomacy.' UNTAC sought to assist the parties to reach or sustain their agreements by providing logistical, administrative and security support to the process. Through its prestige and signs of commitment, UNTAC's involvement legitimised the peace process, especially the election outcome. This legitimisation of the process was crucial in implementing and sustaining the agreement in the early stage of conflict transformation. Carlyle Thayer echoes this point saying that the technical integrity of the electoral process was guaranteed by the United Nations' presence.¹⁸⁸ The presence of UNTAC alone, through the function of reassurance, helped the parties and their constituencies to believe that the electoral results would be implemented,

¹⁸⁸ Thayer, 'The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia', p. 136

i.e., the mere presence of UNTAC that embodied the international commitment to follow through encouraged the electorate to take the risk and vote.

Moreover, by providing a physical and psychological sense of security to the parties and by filling the vacuum of security measures, UNTAC initially could perform as a de-entrapping (face-saving) mechanism for the PDK and the SOC. Furthermore, UNTAC was perceived initially as a trustworthy intermediary by the parties and gained popular support throughout the country.

However, UNTAC depended too much on the co-operation of the SOC for its operational success. In other words, UNTAC's capacity to supply what was needed to implement and sustain the Paris Peace Accords was not sufficient. Hence, when it revealed that UNTAC was unable to fulfil the task of controlling crucial aspects of the civil administration in general, provision of security in particular, the PDK began to perceive that UNTAC was merely helping the Hun Sen regime.

Two issues concerning the establishment of strict control over the civil administration and the disarmament of combatants were closely linked in the Cambodian conflict. That is, the failure to take firm control over the civil administration (provision of security) hindered UNTAC from conducting demobilisation, while the failure of demobilising the combatants made the situation significantly harder for UNTAC to provide public security. In other words, the incapability of UNTAC to take control of crucial aspects of the civil administration, and its inability to provide alternative sources of power and means of security to arms hindered the successful cantonment and demobilisation of the Cambodian armed forces.

At the same time, thorough commitment to these tasks might have led the orientation of UNTAC more towards peace-enforcement, but the troop-contributing countries were not ready to force 'peace' on the recalcitrant combatants. Besides, the United Nations experience in Cambodia demonstrated that peacebuilding may be more realistic and perhaps more important than peace-enforcement in the post-Cold War world.¹⁸⁹

Peacekeepers Updated the Peacemaking Plan

As a way of maintaining an overriding political framework, UNTAC as a whole provided a forum in which the parties could negotiate newly emerging problems or, when necessary, re-negotiate terms already agreed upon. A series of continued negotiation efforts among the parties as well as between them and UNTAC during the implementation phase created a favourable political environment in which the overall performance of the peacekeeping force were not jeopardised critically by the recalcitrant parties.

Through participating in the SNC meetings, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi was given important opportunities to bring the challenges that UNTAC was facing in the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords before the leaders of the four Cambodian factions. As a result, the discussions at the SNC were based on the reality on the ground and reflected the needs of the situation. Through this channel, he was also able to sound out the Cambodian factions about UNTAC's intended moves before they were actually carried out. In essence, such a mechanism that connected the efforts in peacekeeping and those in (post-agreement) peacemaking helped to maintain a coherent approach towards conflict resolution in Cambodia.

¹⁸⁹ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 7

By the same token, the Core Group provided a back channel through which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General could communicate directly with the UN Security Council.¹⁹⁰ This mechanism contributed to keeping the external players informed about the challenges with which UNTAC was faced, and thus, helped them to provide timely support for UNTAC's activities.

In sum, UNTAC did not follow rigidly the initial plan that was stipulated in the Paris Peace Accords; rather, UNTAC was fairly flexible and able to take the initiative in adjusting the plan to reflect the changing needs on the ground. When UNTAC re-directed its effort, it did not forget to conduct careful consultations with both local parties through SNC meetings and external parties through the Core Group. That was one of many secrets of its success.

Multi-functional Peacekeeping Operation

A pre-designed, sequential and concurrent application of several different activities was sought in UNTAC. UNTAC consisted of seven distinct components such as Military, Human Rights, Electoral, Civil Administration, Police, Repatriation and Rehabilitation, and each component of UNTAC helped the parties to implement the terms of the Paris Peace Accords in its area of responsibility. While the military component of UNTAC was overseeing the cease-fire between the factions, several civilian agencies facilitated the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons.¹⁹¹ Then, the UNTAC electoral unit conducted voter registration, civic education for the electorate and training for locally hired electoral staff, emphasising the secrecy and integrity of the ballot. A close collaboration among military, diplomatic and other civilian components (i.e., the electoral unit and the refugee repatriation section) in UNTAC made a successful supervision of the election possible. UNTAC's military presence facilitated a successful repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and this was accompanied by effective voter education ensured a high turnout at the voting. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that UNTAC proved that a multi-functional peacekeeping operation could provide a framework within which classic peacekeeping roles, peacemaking functions and peacebuilding tasks could be co-ordinated and become mutually reinforcing.

While communication difficulties and the dispute over the area of responsibility existed between different components of the United Nations system (such as between the Department of Peacekeeping Operation, Department of Political Affairs, UNHCR, etc.), UNTAC demonstrated that co-ordination of various tasks was more easily undertaken under a single umbrella. Indeed, the UNTAC operation was comprised of the three principal agents of conflict resolution (peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding), and highlighted the utility of an umbrella structure of the United Nations endeavours towards peace.

¹⁹⁰ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 81

¹⁹¹ UNHCR was designated as the lead agency in fulfilling the function of repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. Besides UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) took part in this endeavour (United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 14).

Conclusion

1. *Summaries of the Study*

1.1. The Scope of the Study

This study began with a very simple question about the role of UN peacekeeping in complex peace processes: Why in some cases can it become a stepping-stone to conflict resolution, while in other occasions it acts unwittingly as an impediment? The impetus for this study was a very practical question: Under what conditions and by fulfilling what specific functions does UN peacekeeping facilitate or impede the efforts towards conflict resolution? Underlying such a practical question on UN peacekeeping, on the other hand, was a highly theoretical quest for developing a conceptual framework that can improve our understanding of the relationships between the two major theoretical approaches in the field of conflict analysis: the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach. It has been recognised that under certain circumstances UN peacekeeping has served as an overriding umbrella framework within which the complementary relationships between conflict settlement activities and conflict resolution initiatives can be administered effectively. Such recognition led to the research design described below.

As a step towards seeking an answer to the research question, a conceptual analysis of UN peacekeeping was undertaken in Chapter One, by reviewing the empirical records and the academic studies of UN peacekeeping. Then, in Chapter Two, recent developments in the field of conflict analysis were summarised. A close examination of the disagreements over the philosophy and methodology of conflict analysis between the two theoretical approaches led to the search for an appropriate theoretical framework for appreciating the interactions of the two approaches. Accordingly, based on a revised contingency model that was built upon the related debates apparent in the current literature, the theoretical framework of this study was developed in Chapter Three. The framework helps to grasp the mechanism in which the two seemingly contradictory approaches to conflict analysis may be mediated or bridged so that their complementary effects can be demonstrated fully on the ground. Thus, the study focussed on the interaction amongst the three major agents in peace processes: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Then, using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Three, two exemplifying case studies were carried out in Chapters Four and Five. In Chapter Four, the case study of the Cyprus conflict highlighted an impeding effect leading towards conflict settlement. As a result of the 1974 settlement the conflict situation in Cyprus in the context of external situations became relatively calm, which served the primary interest of the major external players. Such an improvement in the security situation allowed a number of conflict resolution attempts to take place in Cyprus, at the same time, however, it circumscribed serious and sincere peace talks as well as external support and commitment for a sustainable peace. Indeed, the *transition assistance* functions that were essential for facilitating the transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution were not even attempted once the UN Buffer Zone was established between the two contending parties in Cyprus.

On the contrary, as described in Chapter Five, the enduring civil war in Cambodia prevented effective conflict resolution efforts from being rooted in the warring society, but because such a devastating situation caused neighbouring countries a nuisance, the major external players initiated rigorously the search for a peaceful solution of the Cambodian conflict. What facilitated the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords was the fact that key players in the international community committed themselves to extending their support beyond the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. In other words, through the creation of the SNC and UNTAC the external players provided mechanisms that supported the transition from settlement to resolution to occur before the local parties began to feel comfortable (or learn to live) with the settlement that had been achieved through the peacemaking efforts.

This concluding Chapter outlines the major findings of this study as well as its research implications. Section One reviews the scope and the limit of the study to avoid any misinterpretation of its findings. Section Two summarises the major theoretical contributions of the study, which include an explanation of the transformation process from settlement to resolution, an identification of the impediments to such a transformation, and a proposal for a theoretical framework. Section Three outlines the theoretical implications for improved complementarity and co-ordination between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach. Finally, Section Four highlights areas for further research in complementarity and concludes the dissertation.

Although the findings of the two exemplifying case studies may not advance automatically the theory and practice of conflict resolution and UN peacekeeping, the study presents a series of interesting analyses and puts forward a number of noteworthy insights. For example, the research implications for the theory and practice of UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution relate largely to interactive effects between UN peacekeeping and other intermediary endeavours in complex peace processes, which may contribute to the academic debates on complementarity and co-ordination of multiple interventions. The research implications include areas for further research on the transformation process from conflict settlement to conflict resolution that could complement the research employed here.

The originality of this study lies in its unique viewpoint in that it explores the potential of UN peacekeeping as a linking mechanism between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach. It is true that a number of similar attempts exist in the literature, but most of them seek to identify positive links between the track one and two approaches or between official and unofficial endeavours. This study, on the other hand, focuses on the functions of UN peacekeeping in peace processes and examines both positive and negative effects of each peacekeeping function upon the overall peace process.

1.2. The Limits of the Study

Before highlighting the major findings of this study, several provisos must be reminded. First, the conclusion and the implications described below should be read in the context of the limitations of this study: the study offers a detailed analysis of the two exemplifying cases of UN peacekeeping, and thus the implications should not be generalised blindly. However, as the study presented three useful frameworks that were used to examine the characteristics of the conflict situation and the intervention strategies (ripeness of conflict situations, attributes and functions of UN peacekeeping operations, and interactive effects among peacekeeping,

peacemaking and peacebuilding), the research findings offer working conclusions that may be applicable beyond the two exemplifying case studies.

The two major approaches of conflict analysis are identified in this study as conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and examined separately as if there exist two distinctive schools of thought. It must be emphasised that this dichotomy is not intended to argue that the theory and practice of conflict analysis are also polarised or divided clearly in reality. In fact, the reality is rather messy and fuzzy. Such a contrastive method of presentation was employed in order to aid the reader to grasp the distinctive features of the two approaches vividly and easily, believing that one of the important roles of theoretical undertakings is to reframe a messy situation into a simple picture to facilitate better understanding of the situation. With such an aim in mind, the study used the dichotomy as a customary manner of intellectual presentation, but it cannot be overemphasised that, in the real world, diverse arguments on the contending philosophy and methodology of conflict analysis are better understood as spectrum. In fact, interesting ideas about conflict analysis lie between the two extremes.

Thirdly, in the case studies, the activities of UN peacekeeping in general and its classic *interposition* functions in particular were labelled as the conflict settlement efforts, whereas peacemaking and peacebuilding activities were often treated as if they employed the conflict resolution approach. Nevertheless, in the literature, most of the traditional peacemaking efforts (that is, diplomatic negotiations) have been regarded as the conflict settlement approach rather than the conflict resolution approach although some innovative peacemaking endeavours (such as pre-negotiations) have been regarded as forms of conflict resolution. For this reason, it may not be appropriate to regard categorically the co-ordination between peacekeeping and peacemaking as the positive interaction between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach. Some of them may be better understood as the co-ordination amongst the various conflict settlement endeavours.

Likewise, problem-solving workshops, capacity-building workshops and conflict resolution training are usually characterised as efforts towards conflict resolution, and are treated differently from the activities normally referred to as peacebuilding in the literature. In the case studies, however, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, two similar but not identical terms, are used interchangeably. This is because these typical conflict resolution efforts, while detected in Cyprus, did not seem to have taken place either prior to or during the UNTAC operation in Cambodia although several peacebuilding tasks were included in the mandate of UNTAC. Hence, peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts such as establishing a local de-mining centre and facilitating refugee repatriation were regarded as the conflict resolution efforts in the case study of the Cambodian conflict.

Clearly, the two terms have overlapping meanings that can be defined as intervention into a social system and social relationship of the contending parties, or simply as the transition assistance from conflict to peace. Hence, it was recognised that success in the peacebuilding tasks such as de-mining and refugee repatriation could be regarded as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution, and thus, included in the category of conflict resolution endeavours in this study. The conflict resolution activities began to grow in Cambodia once the settlement was achieved as a result of the UNTAC operation in 1992-93. The situation was similar in Cyprus. Although UNFICYP undertook 'local and practical peacemaking' which included some elements of conflict resolution, other conflict resolution activities rarely existed in

Cyprus before the 1974 settlement was consolidated, and in fact the mushrooming of conflict resolution activities did not start until early 1990's.

2. *Theoretical Contributions*

2.1. Transformation Process from Settlement to Resolution

Very fragile and complex processes of conflict transformation from settlement to resolution have not yet been clarified crystal clear by the literature. The gap that exists between settlement and resolution needs to be identified and specific measures to fill such a gap must be developed. In order to do so, the transition processes from settlement to resolution need to be explored seriously, and some concrete steps from settlement to resolution need to be identified. This study seeks to contribute to the academic endeavours towards such ends by demonstrating that multi-functional peacekeeping operations that are fulfilling *transition assistance* functions successfully can provide an official link between the achievements of the short-term settlement and the goals of the long-term resolution.

Three Transitional Steps in the Conflict Transformation Process

The findings of this study that may somewhat clarify the complex and puzzling process of conflict transformation are recapitulated below. The study identified three steps in the conflict transformation process. These steps relate very closely to the notion of conflict ripeness. The study puts forward an argument that each intermediary function has a unique intervention point or a ripe moment in the development of the conflict. The above analysis sought merely to uncover ripe moments for certain functions that UN peacekeeping assumes normally, and therefore, identifying ripe moments for other intermediary functions were beyond the scope of this study.

The first step towards conflict resolution begins to emerge when the conflict situation becomes ripe for *interposition* functions. Judging from the 'ripeness' analysis offered in the case studies, intermediary efforts to terminate a conflict are more likely to go as far as the settlement when particular external conditions are in favour of putting an end to the deadly exchange of violence. The two exemplifying case studies indicated that the presence of the three vital external parties is a key to successful attainment of conflict settlement: resourceful third parties that can expand the limit of realistic options, credible third parties that can guarantee the implementation of the agreement, and influential patrons that can apply effective sanctions against recalcitrant parties. In particular, the 'external ripeness' seems to emerge when some powerful external parties that have fed the conflict wish to withdraw their commitment to the continuation of the conflict. In other words, when these external parties are convinced that it is better for them to terminate the conflict once and for all and willing to support the termination of the conflict, violent exchanges of conflict behaviour between the parties are most likely to come to a halt, at least, for the time being.

At the same time, however, the case studies indicated that the presence of external ripeness alone could not guarantee a sufficient drive for a transition from settlement to resolution. For a conflict to make a positive step towards resolution, other conditions need to be present in addition to external ripeness. The next step requires the 'internal ripeness' to be present. Internal ripeness requires the principal internal parties concerned to be willing to resolve their conflict peacefully. In other

words, they must be willing to seek not only the settlement but also the resolution of their conflict. It may be more appropriate to call such a window of opportunities as a ripe 'phase' rather than a ripe moment because the 'internal ripeness' requires a long-term commitment from both the local parties and the external players. As the study focussed on the roles of UN peacekeeping upon the overall peace process, the above case studies examined mainly the process between step one and step two.

The final and the most important step involves the creation of a new socio-political system in which the contending issues can be addressed in a mutually acceptable way and future conflicts can be handled in a non-violent, self-sustainable way. In order to find a stepping-stone on the path to the final stage, a wide range of tasks must be carried out, and sensitive psychological and relationship issues need to be dealt with in the complex process of conflict resolution. In order to facilitate such a follow-through in conflict transformation, further efforts are required in the area of co-operation and co-ordination among various actors in the field. Thus, for a conflict to be transformed from settlement to resolution, a series of concerted efforts must be undertaken so that both internal and external conditions can remain ripe.

Factors that Facilitate Conflict Resolution

What factors, then, are likely to nurture internal ripeness and facilitate the transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution? A review of the research concerning ripe moments implies that the parties begin to consider seriously the ways to move up the ladder towards resolution when they are convinced that efforts towards resolution bring greater benefits to them than the current stalemate.

This explains why various intermediary efforts have not been able to generate a sufficient drive for breaking the impasse in the Cyprus conflict. The conflict situation has been framed by the leaders of both communities in Cyprus that they would lose significantly if the conflict is resolved in such a way as to foster re-integration of the two separated 'states' to form a United States of Cyprus. The United Nations and others have put forward a number of compromise solutions, but none of them seems to have been successful in addressing the problem of the power-sharing arrangement in which both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders would lose the monopoly of their power and control over their people, territory and other resources. Under such a circumstance, it would be very difficult to facilitate the transition from settlement to resolution in the form of re-integration.

On the contrary, if the potential spoilers of the peace process can envisage for themselves some important role in the post-settlement arrangement, an enticing opportunity is more likely to come into sight. The Cambodian peace process offers an excellent evidence for such an observation. It implies that for a peace agreement to be implemented successfully some satisfactory roles in the post-conflict 'peaceful' society should be given to the leaders of the 'conflict' era (such as hardliners and warlords) rather than ignoring or refusing their needs and interests in the post-settlement phase. In order to allow the hard-line leaders to turn into the pillars of peace, some ploys are needed that would give them a legitimate reason or acceptable excuse for an about-turn in their policy.

At the same time, for these new pillars of peace to put into practice their conciliatory intention together with the hard-line elements both within their party and in their former enemy, the presence of some safety-net (guaranteeing mechanism) is helpful, which can prevent the hardliners from taking the advantage of their new roles in the post-settlement power-sharing arrangement to advance their previous

efforts to fulfil its *transition assistance* functions helped the conflict to move beyond the settlement. On the other hand, in comparison with its *interposition* functions, the *transition assistance* functions of UNFICYP were considerably weak so that they failed to generate a necessary drive for nurturing the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution. Under such a circumstance, any dynamic towards re-integration of the two separated communities was prevented unwittingly from spreading across the UN Buffer Zone.

2.2. Factors that Impede Conflict Resolution

Another important finding relates to initiatives that aim at eliminating or at least minimising impeding effects of conflict settlement upon the overall peace process. In the transition process from conflict settlement to conflict resolution, the presence of internal ripeness plays a significant part. For a conflict to turn ripe for resolution internally, it is essential that the local parties wish sincerely to terminate their struggle. In other words, the parties must recognise that conflict resolution is a practical and attainable option. A close examination of the transition process not only identified three steps towards resolution but also illuminated a number of obstacles that existed between each step. There are two types of obstacles that could hamper the transition process: the first includes ideological and philosophical hurdles that can be understood in abstract terms; and the other includes more tangible and specific obstacles.

The former relate very closely to the different assumptions of the two approaches about the nature of conflict. In fact, one of the most dominant impeding effects of the conflict settlement approach seems to come from the fundamental difference between the two approaches. The basic assumption about the nature of conflict and the fundamental views on the limits of conflict analysis that are held by the proponents of the conflict settlement approach may have impeded seriously many attempts by the proponents of conflict resolution approach. Their limited assumptions often confine the scope of conflict analysis and thus the options conceivable for coping with the conflict. As long as the major stakeholders of the conflict believe that their conflict can only be managed and never be resolved fully, any serious attempts to turn the settlement into a self-sustainable resolution cannot be expected to emerge on the scene. Since the proponents of the conflict settlement approach do not believe in conflict resolution, they stress the need for constant vigilance. Such a presumption is an obstacle to conflict resolution. In other words, it is the limited assumption about and the sceptical attitude towards conflict transformation, not so much the methods and activities of the conflict settlement approach that impede the conflict resolution process.

The latter includes a group of more tangible impediments. When the parties are in the state of a mutually hurting stalemate, they can foresee quite easily that a settlement would be far better than the continuing costly conflict, but when the parties feel comfortable with the current situation, it would be very difficult for them to be convinced that the resolution would bring a far better outcome than the existing settlement. For example, when the conflict is settled the number of people being killed in the crossfire would be reduced significantly and the situation would become certainly better than before. Despite the fact that the settlement is merely a transitory stage in the overall conflict transformation process, people learn to live with the limited achievement when the process comes to a standstill for a while. As the time goes on, people get used to the 'negative peace' and become unable to risk

what they have achieved for something less certain than the current settlement. This may be one of the impeding side effects of the conflict settlement approach.

Since it is very difficult to go against such a psychological trend once the settlement becomes consolidated, it is important to foster the transition from settlement to resolution as quickly as possible so that the positive momentum is not lost. At the same time, a specific mechanism must be established to ensure such a transition occurs and is sustained. Having said that it must also be underlined that the impeding side effect of conflict settlement cannot be eradicated entirely although its negative impact can be lessened considerably if the two approaches to conflict analysis harmonise their activities. Hence, in order to minimise such an impeding effect of the settlement-oriented view of conflict, it is essential for the intermediaries to maintain the belief that conflict resolution is possible, and to continue seeking ways to achieve conflict resolution.

The above list of impediments can be understood as the list of side-effects that the conflict settlement approach may have on the work of the conflict resolution catalysts. The study also identified several factors the absence of which can prevent the prompt introduction of transition assistance. These impediments include the lack of adequate resources for expanding the options for conflict resolution, the lack of sufficient confidence in each other and in the peace process, and the lack of reliable insurance (safeguard) against possible non-compliance by the other side. Hence, catalysts for conflict resolution need to bring in creative and innovative thinking as well as to offer material support to deal with the first problem of the lack of resources. Moreover, intermediaries need to reduce the risk of failed transition by creating a safer environment in which conflict resolution initiatives can demonstrate their full potential and help to generate more enticing solutions in order to overcome the lack of confidence and the lack of insurance. This observation implies that when these essential elements are missing and such a gap cannot be filled by the functions performed by a UN peacekeeping operation, then the UN peacekeeping operation is more likely to become an impediment rather than a stepping-stone to conflict resolution. On the other hand, when these factors are available, a UN peacekeeping operation can serve as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution, and thus the transition process may well be accelerated.

A Rationale for Co-ordination

Despite the potential benefit of the co-operation between the conflict settlement activities and the conflict resolution initiatives, various actors on the ground have hardly sought to realise the complementary relationship between them. So long as the advocates of each school hold a narrow and negative view of the other side, effective co-operation and co-ordination of multiple interventions cannot be expected. Rather than regarding the diversity in their methodology as always posing challenges to successful conflict resolution, a happy combination of different approaches needs to be explored rigorously.

In the above analysis, various related arguments about the co-ordination between conflict settlement and resolution were interpreted as the co-ordination amongst the three major agents of conflict resolution: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The study also underlined the importance of the co-ordination between civilian components and military units within a peacekeeping structure. Some would argue that civilian-military relationship does not correlate with the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. By the same token, the improvement of civilian-military co-ordination within a UN peacekeeping operation

does not lead necessarily to a large increase in the capacity of the operation as a mechanism that links the activities of conflict settlement and conflict resolution. Nevertheless, it will surely facilitate the positive interaction among various components of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Due to the nature of the tasks, the *interposition* functions of UN peacekeeping are conducted primarily by the military component, whereas some *transition assistance* functions require predominantly civilian tasks and expertise. As the former seeks a temporary solution, it needs to be accompanied by the latter that aims at addressing the basic human needs of the parties, and creating an alternative socio-political structure. The study implied that a civilian-military co-ordination centre presents a concrete way to reduce the inconsistency and contradiction between the two sets of peacekeeping functions. Moreover, the study presented a theoretical framework that ties the conflict settlement approach to the conflict resolution approach as well as the philosophy that operates behind each approach. This theoretical framework would be most useful in establishing civilian-military co-ordination centre. Although such a centre may not have been established specifically for that purpose, it can surely articulate such needs to harmonise the seemingly opposing forces of tearing apart and mending. In short, a successful civilian-military co-ordination centre has a potential for turning UN peacekeeping into an effective vehicle for driving the two endeavours into the realms of complementarities, and thus nurturing the constructive engagement of the three major agents of conflict resolution.

In addition to the division of labour between the civilian and military components within a UN peacekeeping operation, at least three types of intermediaries play distinctive roles outside the framework of UN peacekeeping in the complex process of conflict resolution. The first type deals with the adversarial relationship, the second type intervenes in the internal political dynamics of each party, and the third type engages in the exterior factors. Conflict settlement experts can focus on the interests of the outside stakeholders and direct their efforts towards fostering the external ripeness, while the conflict resolution catalysts can focus on the needs of the local parties concerned. Some conflict resolution initiatives can aim at facilitating diplomatic negotiations, while others can devote themselves to some activities that would empower a single party.

Furthermore, for a conflict to be resolved, three different aspects of the conflict structure (conflict situation, conflict attitude and conflict behaviour) need to be addressed. Conflict resolution initiatives often tackle the problem of the conflict situation and hostile conflict attitudes assuming that once the conflicting situation is fixed and the negative attitude of the parties towards each other is ameliorated, violent behaviour will stop automatically. This is why the conflict resolution approach does not have any direct remedy for suppressing the conflict behaviour. Because such an indirect approach does not provide immediate counter-measures against immanent genocide, ethnic cleansing and other human tragedies, the conflict settlement approach has an important role to play.

The Conflict Settlement Approach and its Contribution to the Overall Process

Empirical facts indicate that many activities that fall into the category of conflict settlement often play certain important roles in complex peace processes, and their tangible contributions to the management of the devastating behaviour are sometimes indispensable for some violent conflict situations to transform themselves into somewhat less destructive ones. The positive contributions of the conflict

settlement approach include, for example, its ability to serve as a safeguard, guarantor and risk manager of the peace process. Furthermore, when it is successful, it can ease human suffering and save many innocent people from becoming the victims of violent conflicts.

In fact, conflict resolution initiatives are prevented occasionally from demonstrating their full potential on the ground when the violent exchanges of the warring parties are not controlled effectively by the conflict settlement approach. By maintaining a halt to armed confrontation, it provides, together with the conflict resolution initiatives, a window of opportunity for easier access and smoother intervention. Moreover, if all the conflict resolution attempts fail to help the parties to discover better alternatives to the current settlement, then the settlement is all that can be hoped for under the existing conditions. Thus, it is not wise to rule out the entire gamut of the other school of thought. Any attempts that seek to overturn the positive achievements of the other side should be avoided.

A Need for a Dialogue between the Two Approaches to Conflict Analysis

It is important to recognise that in most cases what is really an impediment to conflict resolution is that many proponents of the two approaches do not pay sufficient respect and attention to the work of the other side. Ironically, the attitude of intermediaries towards each other are sometimes highly contentious so that creative and innovative approaches to mediate between the two are, in effect, prevented. For instance, various supporters of the conflict resolution approach hold a view that the very method that is employed by some conflict settlement advocates exacerbates the conflict and complicates the work of catalysts for conflict resolution. Such a negative perception precludes creative thinking and impedes positive interactions between the two approaches.

What is necessary, however, is a dialogue that would foster collaboration between the two approaches, not a debate that seeks to confute the other approach. Besides, it would be highly unrealistic to assume that the conflict settlement approach will disappear from the practice of third party intervention all of a sudden. Conflict resolution catalysts need to consider their intervention strategy on the premises that they would take over both the positive and negative legacies of the conflict settlement approach, whereas the advocates of conflict settlement must plan their intervention keeping in mind that their efforts would be handed over to the conflict resolution experts. In short, the two approaches need to learn the way to demonstrate their complementary potential and be co-ordinated to maintain the merit of consistency. There is no doubt about the utility of a determined effort to transform the existing circumstances that preclude ideal remedies for deadly conflicts. Nevertheless, the most serious effort towards conflict resolution, indeed, aims at discovering or creating the best solution within the limits of a given situation.

This study has sought to contribute to the theory and practice of UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution in this regard. It described how the two exemplifying cases of UN peacekeeping interacted with their respective intermediary efforts under the given circumstances (adversarial relationship, internal dynamics and external situations). It also presented a theoretical framework with which complementary interaction of multiple interventions can be envisaged. Using this framework, the above analysis examined the potential of UN peacekeeping to act as a mechanism through which the transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution can be facilitated. In the following, such a framework is recapitulated.

2.3. The Concepts of Timing and Function Contingency

Both accelerating and impeding effects of conflict settlement activities upon conflict resolution activities are identified in this study. One useful attempt to minimise such impeding effects, and thus prevent the consolidation of a settlement outcome, was suggested in the above analysis of the transition process from conflict settlement to conflict resolution. The key lies in seeking a happy combination of the two approaches in which they operate complementarily to each another. The study illustrated the possibility that the two seemingly opposed approaches can be complementary to each other in two ways: *timing contingency* (sequential application of multiple intervention efforts) and *function contingency* (simultaneous application of multiple intervention efforts).

The logic of *timing contingency* underscores the necessity of passing the baton between the agents of conflict settlement and conflict resolution as soon as the conflict behaviour of the parties is forestalled or reduced considerably. In other words, in the pre-settlement phase, the conflict settlement approach would normally be considered to be the leading intervention methodology, whereas in the post-settlement phase, the conflict resolution approach should take the lead in the multiple interventions. For example, it is critical that, for a conflict to move beyond settlement, a wide range of highly effective and interactive conflict resolution attempts should be undertaken, while a UN peacekeeping force is maintaining the calm in the situation.

On the other hand, the notion of *function contingency* emphasises the importance of allowing conflict resolution endeavours to remain in the process even in situations where the conflict settlement approach has not yet been successful in controlling the destructive behaviour of the warring parties involved. Under such a circumstance, the conflict settlement approach should assume prime responsibility in trying to control the violent conflict behaviour of the contending parties, while the conflict resolution efforts can ameliorate the hostile conflict attitude of the parties towards each other or offer an alternative channel of communication between them.

In other words, the above analysis suggests a division of labour between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach in tackling the three key aspects of the conflict structure. Thus, the former aims at controlling conflict behaviour, while the latter directs its efforts towards addressing the problems of conflict attitude and conflict situation. This indicates that if we were able to draw out the complementary effects of the two approaches, it would enhance significantly the collective performance of various third party interventions on the ground. The Oslo peace agreement and the subsequent developments in the Middle East peace process proved very clearly that without an effective implementation mechanism to deter destructive violent behaviour of the recalcitrant parties, precious achievements towards conflict resolution could easily be spoiled. The case studies illuminated that a multi-function UN peacekeeping operation in the implementation phase has a great potential for serving as an effective process manager if it is equipped adequately and blessed with the continuing support of the major external parties. Hence, instead of regarding UN peacekeeping operations as impediments to efforts towards conflict resolution, their latent abilities to fill the gap that exists between the two methodologies need to be recognised. In this way, this study points out the clear potential of UN peacekeeping operations to act as good partners in conflict resolution.

A review of UNTAC's experience in the Cambodian peace process highlighted a potential for a multi-functional peacekeeping operation to serve as a managing

body for *timing contingency* and a co-ordinating body for *function contingency*. Indeed, UNTAC has functioned relatively well as a nexus between the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach in the Cambodian peace process. UNTAC's attempt in the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords presented a good model for using a peacekeeping operation to oversee the fragile transition from war to settlement, and from settlement to somewhat closer to resolution. UNTAC provided an interim but an effective framework that connected the achievements of the short-term conflict settlement efforts to various long-term conflict resolution efforts in the field. Through facilitating close co-ordination among different components of its organization, UNTAC also increased the functional complementarity between the conflict settlement activities and the conflict resolution activities. In essence, UNTAC provided an overriding framework in which a mutually reinforcing arrangement of the conflict settlement approach and the conflict resolution approach has been pursued.

The case study of the Cyprus conflict, on the other hand, delineated at least several explanations for the protracted stalemate. First of all, the conflict has not been ripe for resolution. The major external players of the Cyprus conflict seem to have satisfied with the current stalemate through which the expansion of the conflict into a major regional conflict between Greece and Turkey has been managed effectively. A series of conflict resolution initiatives has not been able to produce a better alternative to the continuing stalemate. Most importantly, the United Nations created two programmes to deal with the Cyprus conflict, which pursued conflict settlement and conflict resolution separately without adequate co-ordination of their strategies. Thus, some goals and consequences of the conflict settlement approach became impediments to the work of conflict resolution initiatives. In short, neither *timing contingency* nor *function contingency* was sought adequately in the multiple interventions in the Cyprus conflict. For these reasons and others, the conflict resolution attempts failed to deliver significant changes in the overriding situation and the conflict resolution process in Cyprus although peacekeepers had attempted to facilitate conflict resolution through 'local and practical' peacemaking.

3. *Summaries of the Implications*

It is imperative that a credible and trustworthy guarantor of the peace process is available for a conflict to be transformed from an externally imposed settlement to a self-sustainable resolution. This point is particularly important for both conflicts examined in this study in which the local parties were unable to trust the other side due to their history of antagonistic relationships and violent exchange. The case studies illuminated that such a guarantor must be capable of preventing violation and cheating of the agreed upon terms and conditions in the interest of salvaging the entire peace process. At the same time, for the guarantor to be trusted by the parties it must respect the needs of the parties and remain within an acceptable parameter of its impartiality. Maintaining a happy balance between the safeguarding function and operational impartiality is essential for any UN peacekeeping operation if it is to serve as a stepping-stone to conflict resolution although necessary ingredients in an appropriate amount to generate such a balance will depend on the adversarial relationships of the parties involved, their internal dynamics and other external situations that are unique to each conflict.

By pointing out the United Nations' experience in the Cambodian peace process, the study maintains that a multi-functional peacekeeping operation can be an interface between conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and indeed sustain positive progress towards conflict resolution. Such a complementary effect is more likely to be demonstrated when a UN peacekeeping operation can guarantee the settlement so that others can pursue conflict resolution efforts freely to achieve realistic goals, and when it can serve as a forum that bridges the gap between the political reality in New York and the practical needs on the ground as well as a forum for the various actors in the field to co-ordinate their efforts at the field office level.

The case of Cyprus demonstrated that when conflict settlement endeavours and conflict resolution attempts were envisaged as separate undertakings, their interaction tends to be limited and not co-ordinated positively. Under such a circumstance, any efforts towards conflict resolution are likely to fail to deliver significant change in the overall conflict situation and its resolution process.

Furthermore, in order to assist the transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution, adequate infrastructures for conflict resolution and a sustainable peace need to be established. Such infrastructures are essential for addressing the conflicting relationship problems between the parties, ameliorating hostile attitudes, and tackling and eliminating the underlying causes of the conflict. Hence, at some point in peace processes, particularly at the peace implementation phase, peacebuilding becomes one of the most important activities for utilising the achievements of conflict settlement for the transformation into conflict resolution.

Although the number of organizations that carry out a broad range of peacebuilding tasks often surpasses the number of organizations that undertake peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, an organization that is established specifically for managing the interactive effects of various peacebuilding endeavours as well as their relationships with the other intermediary efforts on the ground has rarely been included within the structure of UN peacekeeping. The lack of carefully harmonised peacebuilding tasks (that is, the lack of effective measures to assist the transition from settlement to resolution) in the functions of UN peacekeeping may have been one of the major factors that had impeded conflict resolution in many conflicts around the world.

One positive development in this regard is the creation of a civilian-military co-ordination centre within the structure of UN peacekeeping. While better co-ordination between military units and civilian components of a mission does not enhance necessarily the capacity of UN peacekeeping as a co-ordinating body for peacebuilding activities nor does it make UN peacekeeping automatically an interface between conflict settlement and conflict resolution, nevertheless the civilian-military co-ordination centre has a potential to turn into a forum in which various functions fulfilled by different components of a multi-function peacekeeping operation can be co-ordinated for conflict resolution.

The two case studies also underlined the importance of co-ordination between peacemaking and peacekeeping. Hence, if the civilian-military co-ordination centre can offer a link not only between peacekeeping and peacebuilding but also among the three fundamental agents of conflict resolution (peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding), indeed such a co-ordinating body would become one of the most important elements of multi-function peacekeeping operations, thus, catalysing the difficult transition from conflict settlement to conflict resolution.

UN Peace Support Operation

It seems that a close examination of the two peace processes in Cyprus and Cambodia would illuminate the utility of an umbrella structure of the United Nations endeavours towards conflict resolution. For the sake of discussion, the umbrella structure is labelled as 'UN Peace Support Operation' which comprises of the three principle agents of conflict resolution: UN Peacemaking Operation (diplomatic), UN Peacekeeping Operation (military) and UN Peacebuilding Operation (humanitarian). In this system, UN Peacemaking Operation is primarily responsible for undertaking a search for political solutions between the leaders of the two contestants and harmonising its efforts with other intermediaries, official and unofficial alike, which seek to assist the peacemaking process. At the same time, the UN Peacekeeping Operation assumes the responsibility in creating and maintaining environment which is conducive to peacemaking and peacebuilding through interposing its troops between the combatants, overseeing the implementation of agreements to assist in the transition to a peaceful society, and providing humanitarian assistance and protection services to the people at risk. It also engages in the task of co-ordination and liaison between the opposing forces. UN Peacebuilding Operations, on the other hand, carry out and support activities directly relevant to rapprochement, reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-torn society by undertaking a leading role in harmonising various peacebuilding efforts on the ground. Coherent strategies of the three programmes will be developed at the top of the umbrella (unified command section), and, under the authority of the UN Peace Support Operation, harmonisation of various efforts will be envisaged to facilitate a complementary interaction of the three enterprises.

In short, the analysis of the peace processes in Cyprus and Cambodia underlines the importance of accommodating the activities of the three conflict resolution agents in a manner that contributions of each agent will enhance the effectiveness of the others. The three important components of conflict resolution should be seen as indivisible in their application. For a conflict settlement to turn into a successful resolution, therefore, there has to be a constant positive inter-relationship between the agencies performing this three-dimensional role.¹ To ensure such a continuing interaction, some sort of mechanism needs to be developed. Of course, one way to seek such an end is the establishment of a unified headquarters in which entire activities on the ground would be controlled and co-ordinated at the top. Setting up such a rigid system, however, is not always possible and does not always guarantee that a happy combination of the three functions will be found. At the same time, such a rigid system might undermine the flexibility of many small organizations and negate improvisations and innovative attempts by non-traditional actors. Nevertheless, some kind of direction and guidance will surely be helpful to obtain a complementary interaction among various functions in the ocean of multiple intermediary efforts.

4. Concluding Remarks

Let us return to the initial set of research questions about the role of UN peacekeeping in complex peace processes. Why in some cases can it become a stepping-stone to conflict resolution, while in other occasions it acts unwittingly as

¹ Michael Harbottle, 'The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution', *International Journal*, 35, 1 (Winter 1979-80), p. 120

an impediment? How can the conflict settlement approach and conflict resolution approach become complementary to each other so that their interactions can create a happy combination of the two different methodologies? Under what similar conditions and by performing what specific functions can UN peacekeeping, which was originally a conflict settlement tool, serve as a link between the conflict settlement approach and conflict resolution approach in practice?

While the findings of the study allude to general answers to many of the research questions, additional research could provide more conclusive results to assist the practice of conflict resolution. Among many other intermediaries working in the field, the study focused largely on the activities of UN peacekeeping. Accordingly, the above analyses were devoted to the earlier phase of transition from settlement to resolution (implementation phase of the peace process) in which UN peacekeeping would normally play a significant role. Thus, the research findings reported here are by no means comprehensive, and further research is needed in various areas. For example, examination of other phases of conflict transformation such as the final stage of the long-term transition would be most helpful.

The study also suggested that seeking complementarity between the two approaches to conflict analysis would enhance the collective performance of third party intervention in overall peace processes, and that co-ordination between the two approaches to conflict analysis affects complementarity. Except for the establishment of the civilian-military centre in multi-function UN peacekeeping, the study did not offer specific ways to improve co-ordination for maximum efficacy. A detailed analysis that can identify some mechanism to improve co-ordination amongst the various intermediary functions is awaited. More evidences of positive interactions between the two approaches to conflict analysis also need to be collected before the main findings of this study can be strengthened.

While details of complex transition processes from settlement to resolution still remain elusive at this stage, the present research has led to a framework for investigating the transition process from conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and the roles of UN peacekeeping therein. It is clear that conflict transformation occurs in a context of complex transition processes in which multiple intermediary functions are being fulfilled both sequentially and simultaneously. In order to facilitate the transition process and move conflicts beyond settlement, complementary combinations of various intermediary functions need to be sought by the practitioners in the field. Likewise, academics are encouraged to elucidate vigorously a delicate transition process from settlement to resolution in order better to inform the practice on the ground. Thus, conflict analysis should include the analysis of the transition process and the interactive effects of various functions in such a process.

A.J.R. Groom stated over thirty years ago that while peacekeeping was a technique which was firmly fixed in the minds of practitioner as a practical means of conflict settlement, nevertheless it had the potential to become a tool for conflict resolution if it was firmly fashioned to the goals of conflict resolution.² The study demonstrated the accuracy of the above statement, and argued further that, by performing an appropriate set of functions, UN peacekeeping can indeed serve as the nexus between conflict settlement and conflict resolution.

² A.J.R. Groom, *Peacekeeping*, Research Monograph No.4 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University, 1973) p.

APPENDIX I

The Contingency Model

The Four Stages of the Conflict Development

- Stage 1 (discussion): the parties remain in direct communication in existing forums of discussion and debate, and their mutual images are predominantly accurate within a relationship involving trust, respect, and commitment;
- Stage 2 (polarisation): communication becomes less direct, with more emphasis on interpreting actions than accepting words; while perceptual selectivity and distortion create reciprocal negative and simplified stereotypes. Relationship issues such as trustworthiness, legitimacy, and differing ideologies of the other party are being questioned;
- Stage 3 (segregation): direct communication becomes rare or lost, and unilateral, contentious tactics such as threats and ultimatums dominate the interaction. Images have crystallised into the good in-group and the evil enemy, and the relationship is fraught with hostility, mistrust, and the lack of respect;
- Stage 4 (destruction): communication is non-existent, except perhaps for propaganda, and the parties engage in direct coercion and violence towards each other. The image of the other becomes non-human, and the relationship is seen as hopeless, in that it is impossible to engage the other constructively.¹

The Six Forms of Third Party Intervention

- *Conciliation*: A trusted third party provides a communication link between the antagonists to assist in identifying major issues, lowering tension, and moving them towards direct interaction, typically negotiation;
- *Pure Mediation*: A skilled intermediary attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement on a set of specific substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, control of information and suggestion of alternatives;
- *Power Mediation*: An intermediary provides the functions of pure mediation and adds the use of leverage in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments to move the parties towards a settlement;
- *Arbitration*: A legitimate and authoritative third party provides a binding judgement through considering the merits of the opposing positions and imposing a settlement deemed to be fair and just;
- *Consultation* (problem-solving): A knowledgeable and skilled third party attempts to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis using social-scientific understanding of conflict process;
- *Peacekeeping*: An outside third party (typically the United Nations) provides military personnel to supervise and monitor a cease-fire between antagonists.²

¹ R. J. Fisher, 'The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking', *Peace and Change*, 18 (1993), pp. 254-255; and R. J. Fisher and L. Keashly, 'Third Party Interventions in Intergroup Conflict: Consultation Is *Not* Mediation', *Negotiation Journal*, 4 (1988), pp. 35-36.

² Fisher and Keashly, 'Third Party Interventions in Intergroup Conflict', pp.33-34; and Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997) pp. 164-165.

APPENDIX II

Functions of UNFICYP (pre-1974 Period)

Cease-fire Supervision

- Progressive evacuation and removal of all fortified positions held by Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, with priority given to Nicosia (the removal of emplacements, fortifications and trenches in selected areas of Nicosia with a view to repeating this measure subsequently in other areas);
- The institution of procedures for inquiry into every serious instance of shooting;
- The formulation of appropriate general amnesty arrangements;
- An appraisal of the possibility of establishing in certain areas Greek-Cypriot-Turkish-Cypriot-UNFICYP joint patrols as a means of restoring confidence and promoting a return to normality;

Maintenance of Law and Order

- Achievement of freedom of movement on all roads in Cyprus, and for all communities within the whole town of Nicosia and other cities under conditions of security;
- The control of extremists on both sides;
- A careful formulation of ways in which UNFICYP might be helpful in meeting the problem of the excesses by individual policemen in the course of searching and seizing civilians which at present causes much tension (investigating incidents where Greek-Cypriots or Turkish-Cypriots are involved with the opposite community, including searches for persons reported as missing);
- The arrangement of security measures and other necessary conditions to facilitate return to normal conditions and particularly normal economic activity;
- The normal functioning of the judiciary;
- The establishment of liaison with the Cypriot police (accompanying Cypriot police patrols which were to check vehicles on the roads for various traffic and other offences, and observing searches of vehicles by local police at roads blocks);
- The establishment of manning United Nations police posts in certain sensitive areas, namely, areas where tension existed and might be alleviated by the presence of UNFICYP police elements;

Arms Transfer Control

- Controlling of the influx of arms and military equipment by conducting periodic inspections and by the presence of UNFICYP at the unloading of military equipment at Famagusta and Limassol;

Institutional Reinforcement

- Examination of the problems arising from the division that has taken place in the Cyprus police between the Turkish-Cypriot and the Greek-Cypriot members and the negotiation of necessary measures for their progressive re-integration (the elaboration of a plan for the re-integration, with UNFICYP assistance and guarantee, of the Turkish-Cypriots policemen into the Cyprus police force);

- The facilitation of the return of Turkish-Cypriot civil servants and Government officials to their duties, including the public services, such as postal, telecommunications, public works, etc.;
- The use of UNFICYP Good Offices with both sides to improve the existing unacceptable living conditions though resuming public utilities and services;

Demobilisation and Regrouping

- The progressive disarming of all civilians other than the regular police “gendarmerie” and the Cyprus army by the Cypriot Government and the Turkish community. UNFICYP, if requested, would assist in facilitating and verifying the disarming and the storage of arms under conditions of security;
- The supervision of the disarmament in Cyprus of forces constituted after 1963 (this mandate was added by Security Council Resolution 244 of 22 December 1967 after the Secretary-General made an appeal to expand UNFICYP’s mandate);

Refugee Assistance

- A determined effort in selected areas of Nicosia to re-establish normality by returning refugees who would not carry arms to their homes, under United Nations security guarantee, and attention to the development of a programme for the rehabilitation of their dwellings;
- The establishment of co-operation with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission in providing relief assistance for displaced persons (mainly Turkish-Cypriots);

Securing Humanitarian Assistance

- The establishment of harvest arrangements, including escorts and patrols, to enable farmers to till their lands in the vicinity of positions held by members of the other community (agricultural arrangements, including grain deliveries by the Turkish-Cypriots to the Cyprus Grain Commission, maintenance of abandoned citrus orchards, etc.);
- The establishment of arrangements for government property in Turkish-Cypriot-controlled areas; water and electricity supplies to the Turkish-Cypriot sectors; postal services, payment of social insurance benefits; efforts to normalise the public services, including arrangements to re-employ Turkish-Cypriot civil servants, etc.;

Protective Service

- Efforts, with UNFICYP if necessary providing security, to revive meetings of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, both official and non-official, and at all levels;
- The provision of escorts for essential civilian movements, including people, food and essential merchandise, on the roads of Cyprus, especially for members of the Turkish-Cypriot community who feared abduction.³

³ Quoted in James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968) pp. 120-122; and the UNFICYP Public Information Office (ed.), *The History of UNFICYP* (<http://www.unficyp.org/>, accessed on 4 December 2000).

APPENDIX III

Functions of UNIFCYP (post-1974 Period)

Cease-fire Supervision

- Provision of constant surveillance of the cease-fire lines and the UN Buffer Zone through a system of observation posts and patrols;
- Maintenance of the military *status quo* in the UN Buffer Zone to ensure that there is no alteration of the *status quo* along the two cease-fire lines drawn on 16 August 1974;

Maintenance of Law and Order

- Maintenance of close co-operation and liaison with the Greek-Cypriot police and the Turkish-Cypriot police by UNCIVPOL, which would serve as the first point of contact between civilians and UNIFCYP inside the UN Buffer Zone, on matters having inter-communal aspects;
- Contributing to law and order in the UN Buffer Zone and assisting in investigations of the Greek-Cypriot police and the Turkish-Cypriot police;
- Maintenance of seven United Nations police stations located in and near the UN Buffer Zone;

Refugee Assistance

- The provision of support to the relief operations co-ordinated by the UNHCR;
- The establishment of co-operation with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission in providing relief assistance for displaced persons;

Securing Humanitarian Assistance

- The provision of transport and medical facilities across the cease-fire lines, including assistance in evacuation of civilian patients in need of medical care by road transport or by helicopter;
- The provision of assistance in fire-fighting and in eradication of contagious diseases;
- The arrangement of security measures for the performance of religious services in militarily sensitive areas;
- The provision of humanitarian assistance to Greek-Cypriots and Maronites in the north and Turkish-Cypriots in the south;
- The provision of assistance in the maintenance and improvement of water and power lines and sewage services that cross the area between the cease-fire lines;

Protective Service

- Efforts, with UNIFCYP if necessary providing security, to revive meetings of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, both official and non-official, and at all levels;
- The provision of security coverage for agriculture and other civilian activities within the UN Buffer Zone.⁴

⁴ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United

APPENDIX IV

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1. Enosis should be excluded from any settlement since it cannot obtain the agreement of all the parties directly involved. This exclusion, however, should not be an imposition on the Greek-Cypriots. Rather it should be a voluntary move on the part of the Greek-Cypriots in order to bring a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem (para. 146).
2. Cyprus should be demilitarised and refrain from aligning itself with any grouping of nations for military purposes (para. 147).
3. Partition should be excluded (para. 147).
4. Federation should be excluded as there is no territorial basis for federation in Cyprus (para. 150).
5. There should be no return to the pre-1963 conditions in terms of the political partnership of the Turkish-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriots cannot and should not expect the same privileges as those granted to them by the 1960 Agreements (para. 161).
6. There should be additional and exceptional protection for the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots. Those of the Turkish-Cypriots wishing to resettle in Turkey should be assisted and compensated (paras. 158, 159, 160, 161).
7. There should be autonomy for the Turkish-Cypriots in 'national' traditions, religion, education and personal status (paras. 162, 163).
8. The United Nations should take the responsibility of being the guarantor of any agreed settlement in Cyprus (para. 168).
9. The people of Cyprus should either vote for or against any settlement in total and not accept or reject the settlement partially. Any partial acceptance or rejection would disrupt the likely delicate balance of any such settlement (para. 172).⁵

Nations Department of Public Information, 1985) p. 290

⁵ Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking* (London: Hurst & Company, 1998) pp. 42-43

APPENDIX V

Functions of UNTAC

Cease-fire Supervision

- Supervision, monitoring and verification of the cease-fire;

Verification of Withdrawal of Foreign Troops

- Verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia all categories of foreign forces, advisers and military personnel and their weapons, ammunition and equipment, and their non-return to Cambodia;

Arms Transfer Control

- Monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties;
- Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia;

Maintenance of Law and Order

- Supervision or control of all civil police in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected;
- Supervision of all law enforcement and judicial processes throughout Cambodia (it would entail the provision of codes of conduct, directives and training, although an UNTAC liaison presence is also envisaged);

Institutional Reinforcement

- Ensuring a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections;
- The establishment of direct control of crucial aspects such as foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information of the existing civil administrations;

Election Assistance

- Organising and conducting free and fair general elections;
- The establishment of a system of laws, procedures and administrative measures necessary for the holding of a free and fair election in Cambodia, including the adoption of an electoral law and of a code of conduct regulating participation in the election in a manner consistent with respect for human rights and prohibiting coercion or financial inducement in order to influence voter preference;
- The design and implementation of a voter education programme, a system of voter registration, a system of registration of political parties and list of candidates, and a system of balloting and polling;
- Ensuring fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all political parties contesting in the election;
- The adoption and implementation of measures to monitor and facilitate the participation of Cambodians in the election, the political campaign, and the balloting procedures;
- The establishment of co-ordinated arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers wishing to observe the campaign and voting;

- Overall direction of polling and the vote count;
- The identification and investigation of complaints of electoral irregularities, and the taking of appropriate corrective action;
- Determining whether or not the election was free and fair and, if so, certification of the list of persons duly elected;
- The establishment of a system of safeguards which ensures the absence of fraud during the electoral process, including arrangements for Cambodian representatives to observe the registration and polling procedures and the provision of a mechanism for hearing and deciding complaints;

Demobilisation and Regrouping

- Supervision of the regrouping and relocation of all forces to designated cantonment areas;
- Supervision of the disarming and demobilisation of 70 per cent of each Party's military forces;
- Storing of the arms, ammunition and equipment of the cantoned and the demobilised military forces;

De-mining

- Assisting with clearing mines and undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cambodian people;

Refugee Assistance

- Co-ordinating with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the repatriation of more than 370,000 refugees living in camps on the Thai side of the border;
- The identification and provision of agricultural and settlement land, installation assistance, food and limited reintegration assistance;

Human Rights Verification

- The development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights;
- General human rights oversight during the transitional period;
- The investigation of human rights complaints and corrective action;

Socio-economic Rehabilitation

- Helping the parties to plan and raise funds for the social and economic rehabilitation of Cambodia;
- Co-ordinating rehabilitation efforts;

Securing Humanitarian Assistance

- Assisting with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees;

Protective Services

- Helping with the repatriation effort by escorting refugee convoys or providing security at reception centres.⁶

⁶ UN Document (S/23870), 1 May 1992; and UN Document (S/23613), 19 February 1992.

List of Abbreviations

2RCHA	Second Regiment of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CAC	Centre for the Analysis of Conflict
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CCC	Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CIVPOL	Civil Police Component
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
DCG	Donor Consultative Group
DHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENO	Enticing Opportunity
ENT	Entrapment
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Combatants
FUNCINPEC	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif
GRUNK	Government Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea
ICAR	Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMC	Imminent Mutual Catastrophe
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
KPRK	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MINUGUA	United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONUC	United Nations Operations in Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PARinAC	Partner In Action
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POW	Prisoner of War
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNC	Supreme National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
TFSC	Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TMT	Turk Mukavemet Teshkilati
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM I	First United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNAVEM II	Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNAVEM III	Third United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Operation
UNCI	United Nations Commission for Indonesia
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNMEE	United Nations Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIST	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observation in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNMOs	United Nations Military Observers
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOPS	United Nations Organization for Project Services
UNOSOM I	First United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II	Second United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNPSG	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group
UNSCOB	United Nations Special Committee on Balkans
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
UNTEA	United Nations Executive Authority
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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