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BRUSSELS SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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On the Role of the Afghan Police in Statebuilding

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2022

Abstract

This thesis examines the role police played in facilitating statebuilding and more specifically how the disposition of the Afghan police came to challenge the success of statebuilding during the US occupation of the country between 2001 and 2021. I argue that, like the unresolved nature of state-society relations typically found under conflict conditions, the disposition of the Afghan police also remained unresolved rendering the policeman torn between his preexisting identification with local society and his evolving identification with the state. For Bourdieu, the policeman experienced split habitus or habitus clivé because his ‘conditions of existence’ shifted in such a way that his disposition loses coherence. Indeed, he remained in a state of flux – an unreconciled disposition. As a result, a foundational element of state legitimacy and a component of its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (and enforcement) is frustrated, thereby limiting the success of statebuilding.

Following the procedures outlined in existing studies that have applied Bourdieu’s approach to examining political space, I conduct three distinct operations for this study. First, the relationship between the field (society) and the ‘field of power’ (state) is examined. Here I highlight both the history and composition of state-society relations, as well as present day perspectives of this relationship as provided through interviews with state representatives and members of society, including government and local leaders, Afghan security personnel, former mujahidin fighters, and local day laborers. Second, by mapping the social topology of the positions that comprise these fields and their relation to each other – namely that of the competition and negotiation that exists between the state and society. Finally, the disposition of the police, including their strategies, trajectories, and interaction within the constraints and opportunities of the field, is examined with the use of a survey of 1,360 Afghan policemen.

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American troops cannot and should not be fighting in a war and dying in a war that Afghan forces are not willing to fight for themselves. We spent over a trillion dollars. We trained and equipped an Afghan military force of some 300,000 strong...a force larger in size than the militaries of many of our NATO allies. We gave them every tool they could need. We paid their salaries, provided for the maintenance of their air force...we provided close air support. We gave them every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide them was the will to fight for that future.¹

¹ BIDEN, J. 2021. Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan. The White House.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In April of 2021, the United States formally announced that it would withdraw its forces from Afghanistan by September of that same year, marking the end to nearly twenty years of conflict and steadfast attempts at statebuilding. It was now up to the Taliban and the government in Kabul to negotiate a settlement. However, in the months following the announcement much of the Afghan security force, including the police, simply evaporated. Some were coerced by Taliban fighters in parts of the country, while others acted out of fear and a sense of uncertainty. Despite the billions spent on developing a security and law enforcement apparatus that could maintain order and protect the legitimacy of the state, the speed at which the police fell apart brings into question their will to do so.

Some twenty years earlier, following its invasion of the country in 2001, the United States sought to implement a “new Marshall Plan”.² What had initially started out as a military campaign quickly transitioned into a statebuilding operation amid ongoing conflict and violence. According to Lake, this was *statebuilding 3.0*, a new approach that was founded on social contract theory guided by the assumption that through the provision of basic needs, the state can gain legitimacy.³ Afghanistan was its test bed, one that came to see billions in aid dollars flow into the country over the course of some twenty years. This included billions toward propping up the police force as a source and tool for empowering the legitimacy of the state. By the time of the US withdrawal, however, Afghanistan had yet to achieve peace and it remained highly questionable that the state had accomplished the sort of legitimacy capable of being enforced or restored.

Under ideal conditions, peacetime policing is often associated with maintaining social order and stability, enforcing the law of the land, and protecting communities. Inherent to this is the enforcement of accepted social, moral, and legal codes of behavior. In conflict conditions the role of the police is altogether different, however. Under such conditions, the police may contribute to protecting national sovereignty by frustrating and defeating belligerents and assisting with the

² CHOLLET, D. & GOLDGEIER, J. M. 2005. The Faulty Premises of the New Marshall Plan. *The Washington Quarterly*, 29, 5-19.

³ LAKE, D. A. 2010. The Practice and Theory of US Statebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4, 257-284.

cessation of fighting.⁴ Much of wartime policing remain largely disconnected from the enforcement of societal codes of behavior. Hence, in a hybrid and unsettled environment defined by both an ongoing insurgency and statebuilding, such as Afghanistan, the role of the police can be problematic. Moreover, while modern statebuilding practices are often and largely focused on infrastructure and the material artifacts of statehood, insurgencies are a manifestation of a response and resistance by some parts of society against existing authorities and their social, moral, and legal codes. It is more about identity and their unique and often differentiated conceptualization of justice than about territory.⁵ Often statebuilding is about institution building while insurgencies are seemingly more in line with ideals of nation building. It is within this context that this study attempts to understand the role of the police.

1.0 Research Question

In general, this study aims to investigate the role police play in facilitating statebuilding. More specifically, I try to understand how the disposition of the Afghan police came to challenge the success of statebuilding during the US occupation of the country? I argue that, like the unresolved nature of state-society relations typically found under conflict conditions, the disposition of the Afghan police also remained unresolved during this period. As a result, a foundational element of state legitimacy and component of its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (and enforcement) is frustrated thereby limiting the success of statebuilding.

This research question is significant in that it redirects attention away from exhausted examinations and arguments that use institution building as measurements of successful statebuilding and refocuses attention on all too often ignored symbolic nature and construction of the state. Indeed, this study advances a rethinking around the role of the police in statebuilding by framing success according to Bourdieu's notion of state legitimacy, namely that a monopoly on symbolic violence is indeed a precondition for the legitimate exercise of physical violence.⁶ By examining the disposition of the police within the frame and concepts of Bourdieu, this study

⁴ MURRAY, T. 2011. Police-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Reform. *International Peacekeeping*, 14, 108-126.

⁵ METZ, S. 2012. Rethinking Insurgency. In: RICH, P. B. & DUYVESTEYN, I. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*. New York: Routledge.

⁶ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

contributes to existing studies that discover and demonstrate the limitations of the common institution based approaches to statebuilding.

1.0.1 Locating my Research Question

It is widely known that statebuilding is difficult, if not impossible, without security. For those components of statebuilding that are also part and parcel of this security portfolio, this is a particularly problematic declaration. On one hand, without successful statebuilding, the police will likely lack a sufficiently qualified foundation of rules and laws for which to enforce and subsequently forfeit the legitimacy that their enforcement role would generate. On the other, because of this position by the police, the state lacks the precursory security necessary for reaching the level of success in statebuilding that would give birth to and shape this foundation of rules and laws that could effectively drive legitimacy in the first place.

In fact, under conflict conditions the rules of the state may remain unreconciled for some time as various parties compete for ideological dominance, limiting or altogether denying a clear enforcement role by the police. In such cases, the role of the police is more technical and instrumental, including calls for the provision of physical protection, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and creating a protective environment through supporting the development of police capacity and of community-oriented policing activities in camps for the internally displaced. This sort of wartime policing involves limited civic responsibilities and accountability to state legislative and judiciary systems.

On the other hand, at the center of most theories of peacetime policing is the generalized assumption that policing contributes to enforcing the rules and laws of the land. In fact, the role of the police is said to “be the expression of social consensus...[with] accountability to communities being policed...and to the legal order governing their authority”.⁷ Bentham observed that it is this enforcement of the rules and promotion of the overall good that gains the police public trust and

⁷ MULLICK, R. & NUSRAT, R. 2006. Policing and Institution Building in Iraq. *In*: PINO, N. W. & WIATROWSKI, M. D. (eds.) *Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

the people's willingness to support the police and state.⁸ From defusing disputes among individuals or groups of people to administrative means of maintaining order, the peacetime posture of the police arguably reproduces legitimacy for the state.⁹

Examining the conditions in Afghanistan, however, Giustozzi points out that while “policing is clearly about the management of violence and rules imposed by a particular government,” there remained strong doubt there was ever an appropriate demarcation between policing and a military/counterinsurgency role among the police force.¹⁰

The recent history of the Afghan Police force is not one that speaks well for its role in addressing either the insurgency or statebuilding efforts. During the twenty years of statebuilding intervention in the country, the police were often described as incompetent, corrupt, and likely to turn on foreign trainers and/or desert their posts. When much of the police force evaporated following the US announcement of its withdrawal, this partly demonstrated their limited commitment to ongoing statebuilding efforts.¹¹ Since the Taliban returned to power, ranks of the Islamic Emirate's police force have increasingly been filled by these same members, further highlighting this point.

Several studies argue that successful statebuilding (and policebuilding) are contingent on state and society reconciling, including the competition that exists between the centrifugal sociopolitical nature of informal systems and the centripetal orientation of the state. It's worth noting that it was only in the last century that police officers in the United States were working and negotiating with local communities. In fact, according to one study, local communities controlled the behavior of officers, shaping their decisions to conform with the prevailing ideology in the area. What's more, much of the population favored local supervision over the police, rather

⁸ JACOBS, J. 2021. Bentham on the Complex Role of Police. In: JACQUES, S. & SCHOFIELD, P. (eds.) *Jeremy Bentham on Police: The Unknown Story of What it Means for Criminology*. London: University College London.

⁹ CALDERO, M. A., DAILEY, J. D. & WITHROW, B. L. 2018. *Police ethics : the corruption of noble cause*, New York ; London, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

¹⁰ GIUSTOZZI, A. & ISAQZADEH, M. 2013. *Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

¹¹ SIGAR 2022b. Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

than the central government. As a result, American police departments were largely decentralized and seemingly serving the will of local communities rather than that of the state.¹²

Pulling things back in, the state implemented increased bureaucracy within the police to block such local control. Regional offices and larger station houses were erected with increased administrative and oversight. In time, the bureaucratization of the police increasingly centralized and isolated the police from the communities while highlighting the authority and legitimacy of the state.

Implementing security sector reform (SSR) and standing up a security apparatus are indispensable for successful statebuilding. Indeed, failure to consolidate security, including law enforcement, are associated with the breakdown of society and inevitably state failure. Partly aimed at limiting such a conclusion, in the early 1990s there was a shift in security assistance from merely training and equipping to a new liberal and holistic approach that placed people at the center.¹³ However, this new approach was not so easily implemented for three reasons.

First, while security assistance practitioners boasted about their people centric approach, on the ground reform models often tended to “eschew traditional security structures and mechanisms as anachronistic and uncongenial to international norms and best practices for security sector operations”.¹⁴ As a result, these models tended to ignore realities on the ground while insisting on the material buildup of institutions in the image of the West. Second, in his investigation of SSR in conflict-affected countries, Sedra notes and suggests that Afghanistan “was never able to effectively foster an esprit de corps or professional ethos in the military [let along the police] to assure its cohesiveness and commitment to the state”.¹⁵ Third, the “imperative of professionalizing security forces has overshadowed the need to reform and strengthen the country’s legal system”.¹⁶ In response and as a means for filling this gap, informal systems

¹² JESILOW, P. & PARSONS, D. 2000. Community Policing as Peacemaking. *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 10, 163-182.

¹³ SEDRA, M. 2007. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: An Instrument of the State-Building Project. In: ANDERSEN, L., MOLLER, B. & STEPPUTAT, F. (eds.) *Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ SEDRA, M. 2017. *Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Evolution of a Model*, London, Routledge.

¹⁶ SEDRA, M. 2006. Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency. *International Peacekeeping*, 13, 94-110.

continued to adjudicate local disputes and legal concerns.¹⁷ Traditional systems of justice (*shura*, *maraca*, and *jirga*) continued to dominate throughout statebuilding efforts. Even when the police arrested suspects, they found themselves without sufficient state resources to prosecute/adjudicate. While there have been discussions and recommendations for state-society collaboration on judicial responsibilities, in most instances, this decision-point to turn to the state or society for support is often left to the discretion of the police.

In Afghanistan, SSR advanced a “set of reform efforts of security-related sectors designed to maintain order and stability in a post-conflict or fragile country”.¹⁸ However, right from its introduction in 2002 it was met with weak local support and political will.¹⁹ This was partly because of the divisions that remained on the ground, including among existing informal security actors. Politicization and/or ethnicization of reform efforts reflected local factionalism that was based on variations in allegiances (tribal, ethnic, etc.), spilling over and arguably affecting policebuilding and the shape of the role of police. As standing up the police heavily relied on existing infrastructure, including recruiting (former) mujahidin fighters and others from local communities who remained closely aligned and loyal to local leaders, these conditions were reproduced and persisted.

Martin in his study of Helmand province captures some of this. During his research he found that land and other disputes have for decades defined the extent of socio-political cohesion among individuals, families, and groups.²⁰ By uncovering the nuance of local relations, Martin highlights how intervention, statebuilding efforts, and the introduction of police to local communities have fueled violence and conflict.

Interestingly, some studies suggest a “hybridization of the security sphere” as a first step toward an “acculturation intended to mold structures that are both appropriate to the local culture

¹⁷ COBURN, N. & DEMPSEY, J. 2010. *Informal Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. See also: COBURN, N. 2013. *Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace.

¹⁸ STANEKZAI, M. & KUDO, M. 2008. *Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: Insights from the Field*. Kabul: Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

¹⁹ SEDRA, M. 2010. Diagnosing the Failings of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan. *Security and Peace*, 28, 233-238.

²⁰ MARTIN, M. 2014. *An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helman Clinflict 1978-2012*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

milieu and consistent with the state's legal norms".²¹ However, as this hybrid space lacks a settled and agreed upon set of legal codes, little less achieved legal norms, the dominant party – here historical local norms – is likely to prevail, allowing the periphery to capture the state enforcement mechanisms.

This very dynamic was realized in May 2006 when the government began to recruit local 'community police' to assist with security in the south and east. Over 2,000 self-armed individuals loosely came under the leadership of local leaders who had taken up positions as governors and police chiefs – some self-appointed. This too contributed to obvious challenges in raising a formal state security sector and generated ambiguity around the role of the police force.

1.0.2 Outline of the Argument

The introductory summary above has helped to set the stage for how I will proceed with my argument. Following a brief discussion in the next section on my research design and methodology, I conduct a literature review on standard/benchmark theories of statebuilding and identify their use in existing studies. The aim here is to highlight the limits of these accounts in framing and explaining the role of the police in statebuilding. As a starting point, however, as this study is grounded in constructivist assumptions, I differentiate and highlight the divergent pathways taken by positivist and constructivist accounts of statebuilding and focus on the later.

Building on this, I introduce Pierre Bourdieu, his concepts, and most importantly, his theoretical argument that a monopoly on symbolic violence must first be achieved before a monopoly on the use of physical force will be accepted and legitimized by the masses. As this philosophical frame rests within dynamic practice, lived experience, and forms of capital that occupy symbolic space, this assumption can most properly be appreciated within a constructivist paradigm. I argue that the approach of studying statebuilding from within an institution building framework is vastly insufficient. Bricks are merely bricks, and nothing more – that is until they are buttressed with meaning and symbolism. I will later argue this point about the police and their uniform.

²¹ SEDRA, M. 2006. Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency. *International Peacekeeping*, 13, 94-110.

First, however, I conduct a background examination of my case with the aim of mapping the “field” as understood within a Bourdieusian frame. In this chapter, I aim to provide some practical sense of the unique history and conditions in Afghanistan that make it a special case for examining statebuilding and policebuilding. In the first section, I provide an overview of the geography of the country, emphasizing how Afghanistan’s unique physical terrain has historically contributed to shaping the relationship between state and society and in particular the state’s ability to extend its monopoly on the use of force, both physical and symbolic, into the periphery. In the second section, I provide an overview of the composition of Afghan society with an emphasis on local governance and the accompanying competition that historically existed between state and society. In the third section, surveying the journals, diplomatic correspondence, and speeches of key actors during the various episodes of intervention, I provide a brief history of intervention in Afghanistan.

In chapter 4, I advance my case study with an examination of policebuilding in Afghanistan during this most recent intervention in the country – between 2001 and 2021. In the first section, I explore policebuilding as a component of the statebuilding effort, mapping the various actions that have been taken to institute the Afghan national police. In so doing, I make the distinction between the institutional and legitimacy approach to policebuilding – the distinction and frame advanced by Lemay-Hébert. In the second section, I conduct a survey of the Afghan National Police with the aim of uncovering their disposition toward the state, local leaders, and the Taliban as a tool for finding out the extent of their role in statebuilding. I map participant responses, ranging from their sense of being part of the instrumental apparatus of the state to their being a force for and contribution to state legitimacy. Empirical findings from my survey are presented in this chapter.

In chapter 5, I discuss and explain my findings, results, and observations within the theoretical frame and concepts of Pierre Bourdieu, including examining the habitus/disposition of the Afghan police as a means for explaining their role in statebuilding. In chapter 6, I provide my conclusions, including a recapitulation of my argument, key findings, and implications these findings have for scholarship on statebuilding in general and policebuilding more specifically. I close this chapter with considerations for future research.

1.1 Research Design and Methodology

Before advancing my discussion around theories of statebuilding and the police, it's worth reflecting a bit on my research design and methodology. In general, this next section aims to elaborate on the relationship between my research question, chosen methodology, and paradigm. In so doing, I provide an explanation of how and why I used this strategy (a constructivist approach that examines my survey responses within the theoretical frame of Pierre Bourdieu) for answering my research question.

In the first section, I explain my research design, including justification for taking a constructivist perspective, the selection of the Afghan police as a single case study, and my strategy for data collection and analysis. I point out why this chosen case is a special case worthy of an in-depth analysis and how the constructivist paradigm is well suited for this research. The discussion around my data collections and analysis reveals how my coding strategy wires my empirical evidence with the assumptions of my theoretical frame.

As this research posed unique demands and a difficult research environment, the second part of this section elaborates a bit on the trustworthiness of my collected data, ethics for conducting research on human subjects in conflict environments, and a discussion on the limitation of such research – including reflections on my position in the field, that of my subjects, and how this relationship influences the research project itself.

1.1.1 Research Design

This study is grounded in a case study methodology that includes blended research with observations, interviews, and survey data contributing to my aim of incorporating “quality and breath of information that reflects the complexity of the setting under study”.²² The research is exploratory in nature, seeking to expound on the phenomenon of policebuilding and examining the relationship and association of the role of police in statebuilding under hybrid conditions characterized by both statebuilding and insurgency.²³

²² MILLS, A. J., EUREPOS, G. & WIEBE, E. 2010. *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, Inc.

²³ MARSHALL, C. & ROSSMAN, G. B. 2016. *Designing Qualitative Research*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, Inc.

1.1.1.1 Inquiry Paradigm: Constructivism

Given that the perspectives and disposition of the police play a significant part in determining the role they would play and their level of participation in statebuilding, this thesis adopts a constructivist paradigm. Rather than fixing on a single understanding and way of knowing, constructivism is interested in understanding how the police see and experience reality and how this shapes their conception of statebuilding and state legitimacy. Indeed, rather than imposing or accepting a rigid single dimension definition of the role of the police, constructivism allows the practices and perspectives that reside among the group to shape interpretations of their role. As the disposition of the policeman is the socially constructed sum of his history and experience, so too is the state a social construct of its experience – with each informing the construction of the other.²⁴

This position contrasts with the positivist (realist) perspective which argues that reality exists independent of our perceptions and beliefs, and that we must observe and study this world as it is. It is this paradigm that finds the state as the principal actor and the summation of economic, military, and technological capacities. For realists, causality and structure underline the functioning of this world.

Constructivists challenge this proposition and argue that the “causal power attributed to ‘structure’...are in fact not ‘given’ but rest on the way in which structure is constructed in social practice”.²⁵ In contrast to realist perspective, constructivists do not see politics purely as an objective and material reality, but rather one that is socially constituted and shaped by intersubjectivity – legitimacy is not merely by material, rather it is socially constructed and transformed through practice.²⁶ As such, changes in the nature of interactions produce changes in social realities. It is social relations and its accompanying exchange of knowledge that brings about mutually constructed realities. Onuf points out that taking facts as ‘things’ takes for “granted the

²⁴ RICHMOND, O. P. & VISOKA, G. 2021. Introduction: International, State, and Local Dynamics of Peace in the Twenty-First Century. In: RICHMOND, O. P. & VISOKA, G. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁵ WENDT, A. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It. *International Organization*, 46, 391-425.

²⁶ Ibid.

argument for their facticity”.²⁷ Indeed, to truly understand a ‘thing’, you must follow its history of deeds and navigate through its experiences. Likewise, our knowledge and the context in which ideas, history, and language is understood help determine how we observe and come to interpret the world.

As this study makes use of a survey, there are two points that need fleshing out. First, surveys are primarily associated with a positivist position that is focused on understanding causality and correlations among variables. As such, reality is understood as an external observable and measurable thing. This is contrary to the constructivist position which sees experience and interaction as tying the subject to his world in a co-constitutive meaning-making relationship.

Second, although surveys are more “at home” within a positivist paradigm, they can be used alongside other sources relied on during qualitative analysis.²⁸ This practice of “using an approach from one particular paradigm, but operating under the direction of a different paradigm, is referred to as ‘oblique’ use”.²⁹ Therefore, while survey responses allow for analysts to conduct statistical analysis and test for relationship between variables, they also “offer a window into...biographical information,...social positioning,...behavior (as [participants] recall it), and... opinions/attitudes/views” that can be appreciated by the interpretively oriented researcher.³⁰ For this research, the assumptions developed while conducting exploratory interviews and observations are further teased out through the use of a survey with the Afghan police.³¹

1.1.1.2 Single Case Study

For this study, I take the Afghan police as a single case study and a hard case of policebuilding under hybrid conditions (insurgency and statebuilding), a special case positioned among the wider police/statebuilding literature. Concerned with the role of the policeman in

²⁷ ONUF, N. G. 1989. *World of our making : rules and rule in social theory and international relations*, Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press.

²⁸ DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. 2011. *The Sage handbook of qualitative research*, Thousand Oaks, Sage.

²⁹ FLOOD, R. & ROMM, N. R. A. 1997. From Metatheory to “Multimethodology”. In: MINGERS, J. & GILL, A. (eds.) *Multimethodology: The Theory and Practice of Combining Management Science Methodologies*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

³⁰ ROMM, N. R. A. 2013. Employing Questionnaires in terms of a Constructivist Epistemological Stance: Reconsidering Researchers’ Involvement in the Unfolding of Social Life. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 12, 652-669.

³¹ Ibid.

statebuilding, such a strategy comes with both advantages as well as shortcomings. First the advantages.

The use of a single case approach allows for in-depth analysis that is often overlooked by generalizing methods.³² It allows me to examine the nuances of the phenomenon of policebuilding/statebuilding and test key theoretical assumptions within a unique context.³³ Single case studies are often spatially and/or temporally bounded, supporting the inclusion of depth as an added dimension. Indeed, a single case strategy that employs a holistic approach that incorporates varying combinations of surveys, interviews, observations, and literature review is particularly useful for testing theoretical propositions.³⁴ In ethnography, this sort of detailed analysis is referred to as ‘thick description’, an approach that allows researchers the opportunity to conduct analysis of the complex and particularistic nature of distinct phenomena.³⁵ In short, while this approach limits the ability to generalize, the characteristic boundedness, specificity, and uniqueness that is found with a single case study strategy helps with uncovering the particularity of this special case.³⁶

There are several criticisms for the use of a single case study approach, including “causal determinism, non-replicability, subjective conclusions, absence of generalizable conclusions, biased case selection and lack of empirical clout”.³⁷ Maoz goes as far as claiming that the “use of the case study absolves the author from any kind of methodological considerations,” and that “case studies have become in many cases a synonym for freedom research where anything goes”.³⁸ In response, I take some steps to both limit these shortcomings as well as remain transparent about those weaknesses that I cannot overcome.

³² WILLIS, B. 2014. The Advantages and Limitations of Single Case Study Analysis. *E-International Relations*.

³³ RUFFA, C. 2020. Case Study Methods: Case Selection and Case Analysis. In: CURINI, L. & FRANZESE, R. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

³⁴ WILLIS, B. 2014. The Advantages and Limitations of Single Case Study Analysis. *E-International Relations*.

³⁵ GEERTZ, C. 2017. *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books.

³⁶ STAKE, R. E. 2008. Qualitative Case Studies. In: DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (eds.) *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*. 3rd ed. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

³⁷ IDOWU, O. E. 2016. Criticisms, Constraints and Constructions of Case Study Research Strategy. *Asian Journal of Business and Management*, 4, 184-188.

³⁸ MAOZ, Z. 2002. Case Study Methodology in International Studies: From Storytelling to Hypothesis Testing. In: BRECHER, M. & HARVEY, F. (eds.) *Millennium Reflections on International Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Whereas strategies such as Eckstein's *crucial-case* approach to analysis leads to (and expects) decisive confirmation/disconfirmation of a given theory, a most/least-likely approach to within-case level of analysis are "based on the assumption that some cases are more important than others for the purpose of testing a theory".³⁹ This provides room for the more "looser interpretations" common to most single-case analysis that relax this riskiness and assign single case studies a "less epic role".⁴⁰ While the logic between the two approaches (crucial versus least/most-likely) is the same, the "degree of certainty invested in the conclusion is vitiated".⁴¹ Findings, in short, will fall somewhere on a continuum expressing *how likely* a theory supports it.

The selection of either a 'least-likely' or 'most-likely' approach is based on aims of evaluating the extent to which theoretical assumptions hold. Least-likely case studies demonstrate how an outcome is other than what is predicted by the theory being tested, while most-likely cases show how and to what extent findings agree with the assumptions and expectations of a theory. According to Eckstein, most-likely cases are "considered likely to provide a good explanation if it is to have any application at all, whereas least-likely cases are 'tough test,' ones in which the posited theory is unlikely to provide a good explanation".⁴²

A common strategy for the least-likely approach is to purposely select a case where there exists a strong possibility that a *countervailing condition* exists. In fact, the *countervailing condition* "logic is often invoked by researchers in security studies whose theories stress the importance of values, norms, and ideas, rather than a states' material capacities, to explain case outcomes".⁴³

For this study, I argue that theories of statebuilding that rely on institution building as measures of success fall short in capturing realities on the ground and are least likely to properly explain the extent of successful statebuilding in Afghanistan. Indeed, where the role of the police

³⁹ LEVY, J. S. 2008. Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25, 1-18.

⁴⁰ GERRING, J. 2007. Is there a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method? *Comparative Political Studies*, 40, 231-253.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² BENNETT, A. & ELMAN, C. 2008. Case Study Methods. In: REUS-SMIT, C. & SNIDAL, D. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴³ RAPPORT, A. 2015. Hard Thinking about Hard and Easy Cases in Security Studies. *Security Studies*, 24, 431-465. See also: GORDON, S. 2002. *Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today*, Boston, Harvard University Press.

is measured against the raising of institutions and enforcement of the state's monopoly on physical violence, these explanations will also fall short in explaining the realities of statebuilding efforts and outcomes. This study will demonstrate how the assumptions of theories of statebuilding and its over reliance on institution building fail to fully explain my findings while the concepts of Pierre Bourdieu provide explanatory power to fill these gaps.

1.1.1.3 Data Collection Strategy

This study relies on field observations, literature and document review, semi-structured interviews, and a survey of the Afghan police. Initial exploratory work facilitated my mapping of the historical context from which my subjects (the Afghan police) evolved and laid the foundation for the construction of my questionnaire. This included analysis of the journals, diplomatic correspondence, and speeches of key actors of the Anglo-Afghan wars and the Soviet invasion with the aim of constructing the background of state-society relations and how the role of the police/policing was shaped across the various episodes of intervention in Afghanistan.

I conducted several field visits to Afghanistan between 2012 and 2019, including living and working in the country for extended periods of time. During these visits, and in addition to field observations, I conducted hundreds of unstructured interviews and fifty-two semi-structured interviews. Unstructured interviews and observations served as a starting point for my exploration of primary source evidence and an appreciation of the research environment. Once I had gained some understanding of the terrain, I designed and conducted semi-structured interviews arranged around the use of key concepts as units of measurement for understanding perceptions of state-society relations, statebuilding, and legitimacy. Armed with approximately ten open-ended questions (depending on the participant), I conduct interviews with a cross section of the Afghan population, including political elites, local leaders, laborers, former mujahidin fighters, Afghan and international security personnel, non-governmental organizations, academics, and United Nations representatives.

Open-ended questions allowed respondents to free form with limited interference in the direction they chose for their response. During these conversations, informants often became increasingly confident in sharing their first-hand accounts and experiences with conflict, state-society relations, and statebuilding across the country. As many participants did not speak English,

interpreters were used on several occasions. Where participants consented, interviews were recorded. In total fifty-two interviews were conducted, and manually transcribed and analyzed using NVivo.

Between June and August 2015, I oversaw the survey of 1,360 randomly selected Afghan police across ten provinces throughout the country. The survey questionnaire was constructed with the aim of discovering the relative level of confidence the police maintained in local leaders and the central government, and their disposition toward the Taliban. As an enforcement mechanism and foundational element of state legitimacy, understanding the disposition of the police toward local leaders, the central government, and the Taliban reveals a bit about the nature of their role in statebuilding in Afghanistan.

There were some difficulties in administering the surveys, however. First, as many of the police could not read, I turned to a pool of field researchers from among local Afghan graduate students of the social sciences to administer surveys onsite and verbally to participants. These researchers received two days of formal training on the administration of surveys and guidance on proper field research ethics, including how to conduct research with human subjects. Second, in some areas where attacks occurred or were ongoing, there were delays in administering surveys. In fact, the study was to include several additional provinces but because of security concerns they were dropped. Finally, and as a follow-up to this second obstacle, commanders of several police posts declined my request to conduct surveys with their officers. Even where they agreed, it was often problematic scheduling individuals to participate in surveys. In the next section, I go into more details on conducting field research in conflict zones.

1.1.2 Accessing Objective Truth in the Field

Under the most normal of conditions there exists constraints to accessing objective truth, however approximated this remains. Conflict conditions produce additional concerns that further complicate this access. As a foreigner, both in the immediate sense and more broadly by way of my cultural and historical experiences, my access to truth remains blurred by my differentiated socialization, while the subjects' truth is buried beneath layers of trauma characterized by suspicion, fear, and desperation that is consequential to his experience. As a result of the distance between our experiences, we conjure up mutually nebulous portfolios of interpretations that limit access to a common understanding of objective truth. Still, we both carry about with our own

perceptions and interpretations believing that they are one in the same – that we understand each other. However, my analysis continues to be constrained by the limits of what my subject can offer and is held hostage by my own interpretation.

In the following sections, I highlight the difficulties of conducting fieldwork in a conflict zone. In the first section, I demonstrate how the relationship between researcher and subject evolves, sometimes opening and other times closing the distance between the two. In the second section, I reflect on my position in the field and how my role as a Western academic and researcher may disturb the field. In the third section, I briefly discuss how, regardless of adherence to ethical guidelines for conducting field research, self-interest by both the researcher and subject drive each to harmful behavior that further amplifies difficulties in accessing objective truth.

1.1.2.1 On the Relationship between Researcher and Subject

There is a distance that is maintained between the researcher and subject, one that was historically preserved by perceptions of hierarchy between the two. How do I begin to close this distance and uncover objective truth; how do I demonstrate that I sincerely appreciate the experiences of my subject, convince him to look past the crimes of previous researchers, and convince him that I will do right by his story?

Approximately 2,100 years ago, the Romans believed that the hot climates of Africa caused the Carthaginians to have little blood in their bodies.⁴⁴ Because of this, they argued, they feared losing what little blood they did have, and so avoided wounds and were rendered “cowards”.⁴⁵ Early colonial framing, including ‘the folk’⁴⁶, ‘savages’⁴⁷, and ‘primitive’⁴⁸, resembles and

⁴⁴ SIDEBOTTOM, H. 2004. *Ancient Warfare: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ FOX, C. L., STOELTJE, B. & OLBRYNS, S. 1999. The Self in ‘Fieldwork’: A Methodological Concern. *Journal of American Folklore*, 112, 158.

⁴⁷ According to Malinowski, savage or savagery “is still synonymous with absurd, cruel, and eccentric customs, with quaint superstitions, and revolting practices” while ‘folk’ or ‘folklore’ refers to the simple and traditional and ‘primitive’ refers to the early stages of development, unsophisticated, and to some extent, backwards. MALINOWSKI, B. 1926. *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & company.

⁴⁸ LEE, R. B. 1990. Primitive Communism and the Origin of Social Inequality. In: UPHAM, S. (ed.) *The Evolution of Political Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale Sedentary Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

communicated similar hierarchical understanding where the white man stood privileged above the researched. More recently, turn of the century Yale Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski submitted that field research provided “considerable practical value, in that it can help the white man to govern, exploit, and ‘improve’ the native”.⁴⁹ Some of his colleagues kept with this language, describing rural tribal communities of the world as “simple societies [where] the savage...[has] a deep reverence for tradition and custom, [and] obeys them ‘slavishly’, ‘unwittingly’, [and] ‘spontaneously’”.⁵⁰ It is this sort of arrogance that has resulted in misleading assumptions by the scientific community and encouraged continued reluctance, skepticism, and suspicion on the part of the subject.

In general, although approaches to fieldwork have improved over the years with the introduction of ethical standards, the memories and shadows of early anthropological field research that were characterized by orientalism and colonial framing still haunt the field. Indeed, early colonial thought and orientalism arguably stigmatized the modern academic in his pursuit to conducting field research, causing research subjects in Afghanistan and elsewhere to be hesitant and skeptical of participating in studies.

Still, while surface level analysis limits the risk of contaminating and upsetting the field, it is only by penetrating society that researchers can capture relevant and useful ground truth. Inevitably, it seems, researchers may have to run the risk of “implying an intrinsic power relationship,” like that of colonial legacy.⁵¹ Malejacq and Mukhopadhyay add to the debate and submit that field research must “be recognized as a form of foreign intervention”.⁵² They add that in conflict environments researchers cannot avoid partiality as they form and join “different social micro-systems to collect data”.⁵³

⁴⁹ MALINOWSKI, B. 1926. *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & company.

⁵⁰ FORTES, M. & EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. 1940. *African Political Systems*, London, Oxford Univeristy Press.

⁵¹ KOVATS-BERNAT, J. C. 2002. Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies for Fieldwork amid Violence and Terror. *American Anthropologist*, 104, 208-222.

⁵² MALEJACQ, R. & MUKHOPADHYAY, D. 2016. The 'Tribal Politics' of Field Research: A Reflection on Power and Partiality in 21st-Century Warzones. *American Political Science Association*, 14, 1011-1028.

⁵³ Ibid.

In fact, field research today, especially those involved with cultural studies and anthropology, are increasingly seen by Western powers as tools for early detection and intervention in potential or emerging conflict because they provide both depth of analysis and an approach that may uncover nuances of local life that other studies and disciplines, such as macro-level international relations, may overlook.⁵⁴

A recent example of this is the Human Terrain System (HTS). For this project, the United States Army outfitted academics in military fatigue and deployed them throughout various conflict zones, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Charged with mapping the sociocultural terrain of these conflict zones, the groups mission statement claims that it “functions as the primary and enduring social science-based human domain research, analysis, and training capability, focused on enabling leaders to remain adaptive when shaping current and future complex strategic and operational environments”.⁵⁵ This mixed approach that includes both research and assistance in “shaping” the environment are problematic and effectively circumvent ethical guidelines for conducting field research. This sort of research intervention can only lead to a poor perception and continued stigmatization of researchers, thereby frustrating attempts by others to conduct field research in the future. In fact, the HTS project was criticized by several anthropologists for its failure to adhere to ethical standards of research and ultimately shut down.

Regardless of some of the insensitive language and arguments advanced in their work, Bronislaw Malinowski and Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard came to be credited with the development of cultural translation, a tool for self-reflection and nuanced contemplation of societies. According to Evans-Pritchard, sociological research “is not content merely to observe and describe the social life of a primitive people but seeks to reveal its underlying structural order, the patterns which, once established, enable him to see it as a whole, as a set of interrelated abstractions...and the literary skill necessary to translate a foreign culture into the language of one’s own”.⁵⁶

There are obvious difficulties with achieving this, however, including the divide that exists between the subject and the researcher. A greater depth of analysis and a vocabulary that is

⁵⁴ WOLFE, A. W. & YANG, H. 1996. *Anthropological Contributions to Conflict Resolution*, Athens, University of Georgia Press.

⁵⁵ ARMY, U. 2014. *Mission Statement, Human Terrain System* [Online]. Washington, DC: United States Army. [Accessed 6/7/2014 2014].

⁵⁶ EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. 2013. *Social Anthropology*, London, Routledge.

appropriately informed and suited for explaining findings are needed. Indeed, this vocabulary must transcend mere lived experience and verbal articulation and touch on the symbolic and cultural expectations of alien societies. Much of this can only be achieved through immersive experience with the people and their culture, one that is uncorrupted by biases and prejudice.

Malinowski, the first anthropologist to spend an extended period living with and engaging his subject population in their native language, and the man who coined the term ‘participatory observation’, argued for cultural relativism or the suspension of one’s own moral judgment while conducting field research.⁵⁷ According to this position, each society is said to have its own unique social and cultural institutions that provides for basic needs and as a result demonstrates the uniqueness of that society. Field researchers must transcend the limits of their own experiences and understanding if they are to properly comprehend the uniqueness of their subject, his environment, and his practices. But how does one come to terms with the complexities and competition found between one’s own lived history and comprehending the other? More importantly, how can either escape the images appointed to their identity and inherited from the past?

Intersubjective knowledge production is a dialogic process and consequence of social relations⁵⁸ where the researcher and subject move beyond the “methodological hegemony of neopositivist empiricism...and academic neo-imperialism”⁵⁹ to find common ground. This includes refusing to accept the text at face value and searching for and negotiating mutually acceptable interpretations of ground truth. With this dynamic comes a closing of the distance between the two and the tearing down of historical hierarchies embedded in the research and research processes. This process does not produce absolute objectivity and value-free truths, however. Rather, we can consider this as postmodern thought that challenges the strict dichotomy advanced by positivists and argues for a reciprocity where interaction allows for the recognition of multiple voices and perspectives.

George Simmel contributed to reforming sociology from mere examination of the concrete to inquiries into the shape and patterns of interaction. He argued that “society” is merely the name

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ VAN STAPELE, N. Intersubjectivity, Self-Reflexivity and Agency: Narrating about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in Feminist Research. Women's Studies International Forum, 2013. Elsevier.

⁵⁹ ENGLAND, K. V. 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research*. *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 80-89.

given for individuals connected by interaction.⁶⁰ He further argued that conflict is a type of “social relations between individuals and collectivities”.⁶¹ Taking a functionalist view, he emphasized that conflict events are momentary expressions of social relations that are aimed at certain ends for individuals or groups.⁶² Studying the mere existence of either the individual or group is insufficient, however; true sociological inquiry rests on the study of social interaction.⁶³ Examination into an individual as an independent body provides little insight into the sociology of man. For Simmel, the superordinate and subordinate interact with reciprocal action in a system.⁶⁴ It is this interaction that yields information on how society unfolds. Indeed, one can argue that this continued reciprocal interaction inevitably results in a diluted effect where ‘super’ and ‘sub’ negotiate a median and consensus.

1.1.2.2 Self-Reflection

The day I arrived in Afghanistan a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in the east of the country marking the first combat casualty of the year,⁶⁵ while another bomber detonated his device at the entrance of the very military base that I expected to visit some twelve hours later.⁶⁶ Over the course of my six-week field visit similar suicide attacks would come to take the lives of some thirty-two people and injure another sixty-five,⁶⁷ all within ears reach. However disturbing

⁶⁰ SIMMEL, G. 1910. How is Society Possible? *American Journal of Sociology*, 16, 372.

⁶¹ SIMMEL, G. 1908. *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die formen der vergesellschaftung*, Leipzig,, Duncker & Humblot.

⁶² SCHMIDT, B. E. & SCHRODER, I. W. 2001. Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices. In: SCHMIDT, B. E. & SCHRODER, I. W. (eds.) *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*. London: Routledge.

⁶³ COSER, L. A. 1977. *Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ ROGGIO, B. 2014. 4 ISAF Soldiers Killed in Suicide, Green-on-Blue Attacks. Washington: The Long War Journal.

⁶⁶ AHMED, A. & ROSENBERG, M. 2014. Deadly Attack at Kabul Restaurant Hints at Changing Climate for Foreigners. *The New York Times*, p.A8.

⁶⁷ AHMED, A. 2014. Afghanistan on edge as Taliban take back ground; Rapid advance in north tests a military that soon won't have U.S. *International New York Times*, October 24, 2014. See also NORDLAND, R. & KAKAR, H. 2014. Two Contractors for NATO Die in Kabul Bombing. *The New York Times*. and ROSENBERG, M. Ibid. Blast Hits Kabul Military Base, and Eastern Afghanistan Bombing Kills American. 1/5/2014, p.A10.

this was to me, life seemed to carry on as locals went about with their business and the markets and streets remained animated with trade and haggle. I was observing a population desensitized by their experience with over thirty years of conflict. This was a way of life – a normalcy that remained very foreign to me.

During my fieldwork in Afghanistan, I took note of my daily activities and the events I experienced in a journal. In comparing these notes against the testimonies of my informants, I found striking similarities in our experiences. My descriptions of the sound of suicide bombs exploding in the distance and some of my immediate thoughts matched those of my informants, and increasingly our stories became intertwined in some level of a shared consciousness. Indeed, differentiating my stories from his became problematic, with both objective and subjective distance increasingly closing. Both our experience and interpretation of this experience became one in the same.

It's here that aspirations for a differentiated self, one positioned in contrast to my informant, moved me to self-reflection as a means for finding objectivity in my research. According to Malterud, reflexivity is an “attitude of attending systematically to the context of knowledge construction, especially to the effect of the researcher, at every step of the research process”.⁶⁸ It is the “ability to notice our responses to the world around us, other people and events, and to use that knowledge to inform our actions, communications, and understandings”.⁶⁹ Throughout the 1980s, accounting for the role of researchers became more prominent with the introduction of new methods such as analysis of context, performance, and interaction.⁷⁰ Reflexivity requires that first, we are able to “reflect on ourselves, which in turn requires an awareness of ourselves as active agents in our process...second, we also need to know what we feel, think, imagine and what is

⁶⁸ MALTERUD, K. 2001. Qualitative Research: Standards, Challenges, and Guidelines. *The Lancet*, 358, 483-488.

⁶⁹ ETHERINGTON, K. 2004. *Becoming a Reflexive Researcher: Using Our Selves in Research*, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

⁷⁰ FOX, C. L., STOELTJE, B. & OLBRY, S. 1999. The Self in ‘Fieldwork’: A Methodological Concern. *Journal of American Folklore*, 112, 158. See also BAUMAN, R. & ABRAHAMS, R. D. 2011. *And Other Neighborly Names: Social Process and Cultural Image in Texas Folklore*, Austin, University of Texas Press.

happening in our heart, mind, and body; we need to know the inner story that we tell ourselves as we listen to our clients' stories".⁷¹

For me, reflection began with short written notes of the people I met and diary entries of the events that occurred during my fieldwork. In trying to understand how I view myself in the field and against the subject, I begin to wonder how our perceptions of each other may influence interpretations of our identities. How am I perceived by the subject - am I an enemy or friend, a Westerner, American, halfie⁷², or brother?

As a foreigner, I am likely perceived as privileged with my ability to quickly escape the trauma and turbulence that invaded the lives of my subjects. It's an unsettling identity, one that is reminiscent of early contact between researcher and subject – an identity and relationship defined within a hierarchical structure between the two. My overseas origin, my profession, and my language award an authority that is met with both envy and suspicion.⁷³ Indeed, as an English-speaking foreigner and male western academic, my presence and identity, and the selection of my informants plays a role in shifting the perception of relative power within local communities. As a result, I cannot avoid being an intimate participant in the very phenomenon I aim to investigate.

Self-reflection/reflexivity tools researchers with the sensitivity needed to discover these often-hidden power relations at play in fieldwork.⁷⁴ According to existing studies, the "relationship between informant and field-worker is speckled with mutual misunderstandings, clientelistic interests, power games, and cultural proselytizing".⁷⁵ Self-reflection allows the researcher to "unpack how their own subjectivities impinge on [the] framing of a narrative...[and to] examine and debunk [their] reproduction of self-evident 'truths' and thus makes room for alternative

⁷¹ ETHERINGTON, K. 2004. *Becoming a Reflexive Researcher: Using Our Selves in Research*, London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers.

⁷² People between cultures; indigenous anthropologists. RYANG, S. 2005. Dilemma of a Native: On Location, Authenticity, and Reflexivity. *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, 6, 143-157.

⁷³ VAN STAPELE, N. Intersubjectivity, Self-Reflexivity and Agency: Narrating about 'Self' and 'Other' in Feminist Research. Women's Studies International Forum, 2013. Elsevier.

⁷⁴ ENGLAND, K. V. 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research*. *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 80-89.

⁷⁵ ROBBEN, A. C. G. M. 1995. The Politics of Truth and Emotion among Victims and Perpetrators of Violence. In: NORDSTROM, C. & ROBBEN, A. C. G. M. (eds.) *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

readings and brings into focus polyvocality”.⁷⁶ Reflexivity, in short, allows the researcher to transcend his own established impressions and stereotyping.⁷⁷

It is through this self-critical introspection and self-discovery that we come to understand and accept the intersubjectivity of the researcher and his subject, as well as the internal *us – them* frame which keeps them at arms’ length and often in opposition. As the “sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals,” intersubjectivity operates between two subjective interpretations of reality and a divergence of meaning.⁷⁸ Intersubjectivity and its epistemological view is postulated as playing a role in establishing the truth of propositions and constituting the so called “objectivity of objects”.⁷⁹ However, as this relationship is “reciprocal, asymmetrical, or potentially exploitative...the researcher can [come to] adopt a stance of intimidation, ingratiation, self-promotion, or supplication”.⁸⁰ Inevitably, competition over agency, voice, and intension forms between the researcher and his subject. However, the research subject also maintains some power over the production of knowledge. Motivated by his own interests, he decides what to share, when to share, and how to share information.⁸¹

According to Dauphinee, the researcher’s “very existence is an unavoidable violence despite [his] best attempts at innocence. That form, which is prior to and beyond knowledge and being, takes the shape of the desire for the Other, which is transcendence, and the extreme, inescapable exposure of the Other to the violence of [his] existence”.⁸² She adds that, finding ourselves caught in an inevitable hierarchical relationship, we cannot pretend to truly represent the

⁷⁶ VAN STAPELE, N. Intersubjectivity, Self-Reflexivity and Agency: Narrating about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in Feminist Research. Women's Studies International Forum, 2013. Elsevier.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ SCHEFF, T. J. 2006. *Goffman unbound! : a new paradigm for social science*, Boulder, Colo., Paradigm Publishers. See also ENGLAND, K. V. 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research*. *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 80-89.

⁷⁹ BAUM, M. 2011. Objects and Objectivity in Kant’s First Critique. In: SCHULTING, D. & VERBURGT, J. (eds.) *Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine*. London: Springer.

⁸⁰ ENGLAND, K. V. 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research*. *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 80-89. See also SMITH, S. 1988. Constructing local knowledge: The analysis of self in everyday life.

⁸¹ VAN STAPELE, N. Intersubjectivity, Self-Reflexivity and Agency: Narrating about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in Feminist Research. Women's Studies International Forum, 2013. Elsevier.

⁸² DAUPHINEE, E. 2007. *The ethics of researching war: Looking for Bosnia*, Manchester University Press.

informant's voice. Any research project is never truly complete unless it accepts and includes an understanding of this dynamic and the active role researchers exercise throughout the research process.⁸³

With sufficient time in country, the implications of conducting research in a conflict zone may begin to take hold and increasingly I begin to resemble my subject. We both experience the many random stops and checkpoints on the roads and at the entrance of the supermarkets where security personnel search for bombs, weapons, and other paraphernalia among our fruits. High in the sky, the 'all seeing blimp' monitors our movement across the city and province. Just like you, it's suggested that I leave my passport and identification cards at home; any association to the central government or the West may come with more than a search of my bags. I must remain sufficiently vigilante, suspicious, fearful, and desperate – escaping to my safe room at the slightest sign that things are off. Indeed, this has now become all too familiar and commonplace to me – and the distance between us (between researcher and subject) has closed.

1.1.2.3 Ethical Guidelines and Accessing Objective Truth

Guidelines for conducting ethical fieldwork, including ensuring voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality, and adherence to the 'do no harm' principle, are especially important in conflict zones where the subject may be particularly vulnerable.⁸⁴ In many cases, subjects are inflicted by varying levels of trauma and have grown suspicious, fearful, and desperate. Even with the adoption of ethical guidelines for conducting fieldwork, working with such a population is often problematic. Indeed, even my decisions on how to conduct research on my subject forces a hierarchical structure that becomes the founding principle of a power relationship between myself and the subject.⁸⁵

Hugman, et.al., argue that standard guidelines for conducting ethical research are limited in their ability to address the unique vulnerabilities found under conflict conditions, such as

⁸³ ENGLAND, K. V. 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research*. *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 80-89. See also SMITH, S. 1988. Constructing local knowledge: The analysis of self in everyday life.

⁸⁴ FORD, N., MILLS, E. J., ZACHARIAH, R. & UPSHUR, R. 2009. Ethics of Conducting Research in Conflict Settings. *Conflict and Health*, 3.

⁸⁵ BICKMAN, L. & ROG, D. J. 1998. *Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods*, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications.

psychological stress.⁸⁶ Wood adds that the need to adhere to “ethical imperative of research (“*do no harm*”) is intensified in conflict zones by political polarization, the presence of armed actors, the precarious security of most residents, the general unpredictability of events, and traumatization through violence of combatants and civilians alike”.⁸⁷

Given these conditions, can I honestly call my interaction with the subject ‘voluntary participation’ or ‘informed consent’? Does either truly stand free of coercion?⁸⁸ I’m not convinced that either can truly ever be met in a conflict zone. As researchers, how do we navigate such terrain and find the right balance between an ethical approach to research and the need to access objective truth? Moreover, how does my consideration of these standards influence my access to objective truth? Regardless of these considerations, a hierarchical relationship seems to persist and the distance between researcher and subject preserved.

Several studies suggest that the willingness of subjects to interact with a foreign researcher rest on their sense of the predictability of this interaction. Among the chaos associated with conflict conditions, predictability is just that much more important. However, according to Duronto, et.al., the very difference in cultural background between researcher and subject may instigate anxiety over this uncertainty.⁸⁹

During an interview with a local Afghan cook, a sense of this anxiety was discovered. He explained that “life was comfortable in the time before the communist,” and that “people earned a good living, spent time with family, and enjoyed the beautiful lands of Afghanistan”.⁹⁰ He explained that when the *foreigners* came, “neighbors became enemies,” and that the *foreigners* “burned [his] home and crops...killed [his] neighbors and shamed the elders”.⁹¹ He fled to Iran, believing that he would find some relief there. However, he explained that in Iran he was “*Afghani*

⁸⁶ HUGMAN, R., PITTAWAY, E. & BARTOLOMEI, L. 2011. When 'Do No Harm' is Not Enough: The Ethics of Research with Refugees and Other Vulnerable Groups. *British Journal of Social Work*, 41, 1271-1287.

⁸⁷ WOOD, E. J. 2006. The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones. *Qualitative Sociology*, 29, 373-386.

⁸⁸ SEIDMAN, I. 2006. *Interviewing as qualitative research : a guide for researchers in education and the social sciences*, New York, Teachers College Press.

⁸⁹ DURONTO, P. M., NISHIDA, T. & NAKAYAMA, S.-I. 2005. Uncertainty, anxiety, and avoidance in communication with strangers. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 29, 549-560.

⁹⁰ ALIZADA, R. M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁹¹ Ibid.

Kaseeb,” a dirty Afghan to those neighbors.⁹² His family became nomads – displaced and without a permanent home and forced to adopt new foreign tongues. He further explained that when the Taliban came, he returned home, and life was much safer than during the time of the mujahidin. However, this also was short lived. New *foreigners* came and neighbors again became enemies.

He remained imprisoned in the trauma associated with his years of experience in conflict. A variety of emotions surfaced, as I charge him with recalling these experiences. He chooses his words carefully, fearful of retaliation against his truth, either by me or those who disagree with his decision to sit with me. They remained skeptical and concerned over my foreignness. He too became increasingly suspicious of my motives. I am *foreigner* – struggling to earn his trust.

Norman argues that there are three dimensions of trust that should be addressed if one is to have a chance at gaining access in a conflict environment.⁹³ First there is cognitive trust. This is based on one’s qualifications, credentials, and technical abilities. By demonstrating the appropriate set of skills or showcasing qualifications, trust between the researcher and subject is informed and shaped by the subject’s confidence in the researcher. Unlike cognitive trust, emotional trust is “based not so much on reason or rationale, but rather on personal relationships”.⁹⁴ Emotional trust refers to an “affective...emotional bond among all those who participate in a relationship”.⁹⁵ With repeated field visits to the same location, researchers may develop sufficient levels of emotional trust to disarm subjects. Behavioral trust yields from the combination of emotional and cognitive trust. Over time, emotional and cognitive trust reinforce each other until effectively they work in tandem to help shape and inform behavioral trust.

Field research at its essence is a social relationship between researcher and subject. In conflict zones, this relationship is likely to be confronted with miscommunications,

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ NORMAN, J. M. 2009. Got trust? The Challenge of Gaining Access in Conflict Zones. In: SRIRAM, C. L., KING, J. C., MERTUS, J. A., MARTIN-ORTEGA, O. & HERMAN, J. (eds.) *Surviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult Situations*. London: Routledge.

⁹⁴ DOLNIK, A. 2011. Conducting Field Research on Terrorism: A Brief Primer. *Perspective on Terrorism*, 5, 3-35.

⁹⁵ NORMAN, J. M. 2009. Got trust? The Challenge of Gaining Access in Conflict Zones. In: SRIRAM, C. L., KING, J. C., MERTUS, J. A., MARTIN-ORTEGA, O. & HERMAN, J. (eds.) *Surviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult Situations*. London: Routledge.

misinterpretations, and self-interest – each of which challenge trust.⁹⁶ Informants often recognize researchers as a medium and tool through which their version of the truth could become history – where memories of their past inform narratives of the present and motivate prospects for their future. During an interview with an Afghan who worked as an interpreter for NATO forces, I sensed how personal interests could motivate one’s testimony. According to the informant, the whitebeards, including the elders and mullahs, are uneducated – “their minds are of yesterday...they haven’t extended their minds for this life”.⁹⁷ He explained that in the past, communities use to turn to the whitebeards for guidance, but things have changed: “before we use to ask them [whitebeards] about politics, [but] today they don’t even understand the word”.⁹⁸ He submitted that he is educated and works with the West, and because of this, he cannot go back. He suggested that his future is in the West.

During my field research, I interviewed several International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) interpreters who were local Afghans recruited from across the country. Together, their backgrounds, experiences, and good command of the English language proved very useful for my research. However, as their working with international forces against the Taliban makes them vulnerable to targeted assassination, they have a particular interest in having their stories heard as a means of increasing the likelihood of getting asylum. If truth is to be discovered in the testimonies of subjects, field researchers must consider how self-interests, shaped by experiences of the past and present and motivated by prospects of the future, may inform testimonies.

Indeed, where personal interests are strong, exaggeration, lies, and deceit may figure into the narratives of informants. In her exposition on the ethical dilemmas of research in Southern Kivu, Damme points out that researchers are “subjects of seduction because our informants have a stake in making us adopt their truths. They perceive us as the harbingers of history. We will retell their stories and through our investiture as scientists provide these with the halo of objectivity that our academic stature entails...the weight to be the arbitrators of an absolute truth in which we have

⁹⁶ CURRAN, S. R. 2006. Ethical Considerations for Research in Cross-Cultural Settings. *In*: CURRAN, S. R. & PERECMAN, E. (eds.) *A Handbook for Social Science Field Research*. London: Sage.

⁹⁷ INFORMANT#014. 2014. *RE: Interview with Informant no.014*.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

lost faith ourselves...their truth is not the truth of their opponents”.⁹⁹ As a result, self-interest confuses the truth.

Robben also points out that researchers of “violence and political conflict may become encapsulated in the web of seduction spun by his or her informants and interlocutors”.¹⁰⁰ He argues that while researchers must develop good rapport with subjects, in the process informants weaponize their charisma and disarm the researcher. It is under such disarmed condition that the informant, driven by competition, takes aim at their opponents using researchers as the mouthpiece for their rhetoric. Indeed, because of social and cultural differences, it may be difficult for researchers to see beyond this seduction. Still, Robben suggest that while the researcher is focused on his interest of accessing objective truth and the subject prioritizes his interests of protecting himself, neither will fully succeed.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ DAMME, J. V. 2013. From Scientific Research to Action in Southern Kivu: Ethical Dilemmas and Practical Challenges. In: THOMSON, S., ANSOMS, A. & MURISON, J. (eds.) *Emotional and Ethical Challenges for Field Research in Africa: The Story Behind the Findings*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

¹⁰⁰ ROBBEN, A. C. G. M. 1995. The Politics of Truth and Emotion among Victims and Perpetrators of Violence. In: NORDSTROM, C. & ROBBEN, A. C. G. M. (eds.) *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Chapter 2: Theories of Statebuilding

This study makes use of the concepts and theoretical architecture of Pierre Bourdieu for understanding state-society relations, statebuilding, and the role the police play in statebuilding. In the first section of this chapter, I survey several theoretical interpretations of the state and statebuilding with an emphasis on Lemay-Hébert's differentiation between an institution and legitimacy approach to statebuilding. A review of various theories on state-society relations follows this discussion, with the aim of understanding how the varied composition of this relationship influences statebuilding. I close out this section with a discussion on security sector reform and policebuilding. In the second section, I explore Bourdieu's theoretical framing of the state, including how and why a monopoly on symbolic violence is a necessary precondition before a monopoly on physical violence can be legitimized. I first discuss capital accumulation and concentration and how they affect state legitimacy. I follow this with a review of three of the key concepts of Bourdieu's theoretical frame: field, habitus, and practice. I argue that, under ideal conditions, it is the interplay between these concepts that inform and shape the disposition of individuals/agents and determines their role and position in society and the state. Finally, I explore how symbolic violence is a necessary component for the successful achievement of state formation and policebuilding.

2.0 Locating Statebuilding

Tilly posits that any explanatory theory that aims to elaborate on the success of statebuilding must trace the path leading away from traditional kinship toward prospects of centralized governance.¹⁰² It is a movement toward homogenization and the process of shaping a unifying national identity that is an indicator of success.¹⁰³ Yet, statebuilding efforts have historically remained disproportionately focused on the raising of institutions and the development of infrastructure. It

¹⁰² TILLY, C. 1975b. Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation. *In*: TILLY, C. (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁰³ TILLY, C. 1975a. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. *In*: TILLY, C. (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. See also: BRUBAKER, R. 2010. Charles Tilly as a Theorist of Nationalism. *American Sociological Association*, 41, 375-381.

is because of this focus that the social and political elements that help cement the relationship and cohesion between state and society, both on a material and symbolic level, are often neglected.

State formation, which includes both statebuilding and nation building, refers to the birth and evolution of statehood. It is a long-term social process that includes identity formation, the development of sovereignty, and the erecting of the institutions necessary to gain and maintain order. With state formation, the state "starts its life as an implicit construct; it is then reified as the *res publica*, the public reification, no less – and acquires an overt symbolic identity progressively divorced from practice as an illusory account of practice".¹⁰⁴ This is a process that evolves over time and one that is increasingly difficult to negotiate away with each new experience.

2.0.1 Between Institution and Legitimacy Approach to Statebuilding

Lemay-Hébert investigates the idea of statebuilding without nation building and, "drawing on a sociological understanding of the modern nation-state, contends that it is impossible to conceive of statebuilding as a process separate from nation-building".¹⁰⁵ He points to Holsti and Buzan, who both stand behind an interpretation of the state that includes not only a physical basis and institutional expression, but also ideas of the state.¹⁰⁶ For Buzan, "the state exists primarily on the socio-political rather than on the physical plane: in some important senses, the state is more an idea held in common by a group of people than it is a physical organism".¹⁰⁷ He adds, "without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions

¹⁰⁴ ABRAMS, P. 1988. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977). *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1, 58-89.

¹⁰⁵ LEMAY-HEBERT, N. 2009. Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3, 21-45.

¹⁰⁶ LEMAY-HÉBERT 2010. Trying to Make Sense of the Contemporary Debate on Statebuilding: The Legitimacy and the Institutional Approaches on State, State Collapse and State-building. *Political Studies Association Annual Conference, 60th*. Edinburgh: University of Birmingham.

¹⁰⁷ BUZAN, B. 2016. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Colchester, ECPR Press.

themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving”.¹⁰⁸ Holsti agrees, claiming that “it is the realm of ideas and sentiment that the fate of states is primarily determined”.¹⁰⁹

Following the assumptions of Holsti and Buzan, Lemay-Hébert argues that the state is more than mere expressions of its institutions and that state collapse is often attributed to more than just the failure of these institutions.¹¹⁰ Referring to neo-Weberian conceptions of statebuilding as the institutional approach, he argues that this largely administrative view is fixed in functionalist expectations of the state – namely the ability and capacity of the state to deliver public goods. This institutional perspective includes measuring the state’s capacity to execute its policies and enforce laws,¹¹¹ and the extent of state effectiveness in delivering political goods.¹¹² He argues that there is an inherent assumption with the neo-Weberian logic in that *more is better*. The more institution, the stronger the state.

By defining state failure in such narrow terms – failure measured in terms of institutions and their presumed strength – social aspects of the state and statebuilding are altogether neglected. According to Lemay-Hébert, it is “possible to target the institutions of a given state, [and] to reconstruct state capabilities, without engaging in the realm of socio-political cohesion of ‘society’”.¹¹³ However, this approach does not sufficiently penetrate the socio-political space, leaving much unaccomplished at the local or societal level. Indeed, disproportionate emphasis on the institutional aspects of statebuilding runs the risk of underappreciating and disregarding the political, social, and historical context of spaces and may in fact dismiss the entire conversation

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ HOLSTI, K. J. 1996. *The state, war, and the state of war*, Cambridge ; New York, N.Y., USA, Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁰ LEMAY-HEBERT, N. 2009. Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3, 21-45.

¹¹¹ FUKUYAMA, F. 2004. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press.

¹¹² ROTBERG, R. I. 2004. The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair. In: ROTBERG, R. I. (ed.) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹¹³ LEMAY-HEBERT, N. 2009. Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3, 21-45.

regarding identity.¹¹⁴ Lemay-Hébert argues that socio-political cohesion may be a more reliable unit of measurement for determining the extent of success in statebuilding.

Turning to Durkheim's interpretation of the "state [as] the very organ of social thought,"¹¹⁵ Lemay-Hébert notes that statebuilding is more about understanding solidarity and social cohesion in and about society, rather than about government and state capacity. In contrast to the institutional approach, this legitimacy approach relies more on the symbolic, with belief and culture underlining this approach. According to Durkheim, the state comprises the "sentiments, ideals, [and] beliefs that the society has worked out collectively and with time".¹¹⁶ Even the division of labor, according to Durkheim, has a "moral element that is more important than the technical one...it is a social fact" that shapes society and lends to the relationship between state and society.¹¹⁷

Borrowing from Giddens, Lemay-Hébert argues that the distinction in the two approaches rests on whether the state is seen as an apparatus of government power or the overall social system that is subject to the government.¹¹⁸ Depending on one's perspective, state strength and weakness is observed as either grounded in institutions or ideation of the state. Choosing one perspective or the other determines the approach taken for statebuilding. Lemay-Hébert reminds us, however, that the legitimacy approach builds on (rather than replaces) the institutional approach. It is this logic that has him question whether statebuilding can ever truly be accomplished without nation building.

Implementing a legitimacy approach to statebuilding in conflict conditions is particularly problematic, especially where the concepts of peacebuilding, statebuilding, and even military intervention are often considered interchangeable. Conflating military intervention with statebuilding is particularly true in cases of regime change and counterinsurgencies. However, the sort of military ground operations (e.g., heart and minds) that finds soldiers engaging with locals should be considered for what they are – military operations. In this same sense, components of

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ DURKHEIM, E. & GIDDENS, A. 1986. *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

¹¹⁶ DURKHEIM, E. 1992. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, New York, Routledge.

¹¹⁷ PALUMBO, A. & SCOTT, A. 2003. Weber, Durkheim, and the Sociology of the Modern State. In: BALL, T. & BELLAMY, R. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹⁸ GIDDENS, A. 1985. *The Nation-State and Violence*, Oxford, Polity Press.

nation building could be part and parcel of statebuilding operations. The erecting of religious infrastructure, for example, demonstrates both state capacity as well as encourages a particular identity. Again, while peacebuilding measures may fold into statebuilding operations, they are not the same. Statebuilding involves constructing the institutions that may support and/or enforce peace, while peacebuilding attempts to address the root of violence and division, and to integrate society. This involves creating rule of law mechanisms, facilitating negotiations among groups, and even helping to broker power-sharing agreements. Of note, several studies find that peacebuilding operations that result in a durable peace are usually those that involve local participation and contributions.¹¹⁹

Examining statebuilding efforts in Timor Lest and Kosovo, Lemay-Hébert found that challenges to direct governance by states in post-conflict reconstruction is partly because of this failure to address the social aspect of statebuilding. He points out that while the United Nations erected institutions, they soon collapse for failure to gain legitimacy from across society and the local population. While the political sphere, that which falls under the Weberian and institution building perspective, received attention, social disunion and alienation grew or persisted. Indeed, he suggests that this Weberian focus produces a gap between the international and local, further encouraging this alienation. Lottholz, et.al submits that the “impasse and failures faced by the stalemate version of orthodox statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction interventions” arguably are because of “over-reliance on...perception of power and physical coercion as means for establishing social order which lies at the heart of this impasse”.¹²⁰

2.0.2 Statebuilding and State-Society Relations

Migdal argues that while it is commonplace in the developed West for the state to occupy a privileged position from which it remains the force behind the rules and minutiae of daily life, this is not so readily the case for other parts of the world and conditions. Indeed, it was only within recent centuries that social and political spaces took on and adopted the concept of statehood as a

¹¹⁹ BROWN, M. A. 2013. Anthropology and Peacebuilding. In: GINTY, R. M. (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge.

¹²⁰ LOTTHOLZ, P. & LEMAY-HEBERT, N. 2016. Re-reading Weber, Re-Conceptualizing State-building: From Weberian to Post-Weberian approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-building. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29, 1467-1485.

means for organizing daily life. He submits that, prior to the notion of nation-state, other concepts existed that characterized the order of society and the state. However, Migdal goes a bit further and argues that some states cannot deliver on the Western normative expectations of statehood because they are obstructed from accumulating legitimacy by social authorities. Moreover, rather than the state having a priori position in the development of society, it is the state that is part and parcel of society – and today, as an ongoing struggle, society continuously shapes the state as does the state to society. Today, the relationship between state and society ranges from outright resistance to the state and the state’s ability to penetrate deep into the far-off periphery.

For this study, the idealized state-society relationship transcends the physical and exists on a symbolic level with the two converged. This process and state-society dynamic is arguably a long-term process of codification and secularization, one that is not characteristically linear and rather involves several variables and influences.¹²¹ Rather than “seeing society as it is, one must view it “as it becomes – have become in the past, is becoming in the present, and may become in the future”.¹²² Indeed, assumptions of state legitimacy based on a monopoly on physical violence¹²³ and notions of the state as a “criminal enterprise of war-making elites who use their power and status to penetrate society”¹²⁴ are only a sliver of the story. In this section, I survey existing literature about state-society relationship with the aim of understanding how and to what extent the interaction between the two comes to provide for social order and legitimacy.¹²⁵

In the post-World War II era, several of the once destitute subjects of Western powers found themselves free to devise their own political community. For many, the state became the

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² ELIAS, N. & SCOTSON, J. L. 1994. *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems Theory, Culture and Society*, London, Sage Publications.

¹²³ LOTTHOLZ, P. & LEMAY-HEBERT, N. 2016. Re-reading Weber, Re-Conceptualizing State-building: From Weberian to Post-Weberian approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-building. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29, 1467-1485.

¹²⁴ TILLY, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D. & SKOCPOL, T. (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹²⁵ LOTTHOLZ, P. & LEMAY-HEBERT, N. 2016. Re-reading Weber, Re-Conceptualizing State-building: From Weberian to Post-Weberian approaches to State, Legitimacy and State-building. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29, 1467-1485.

mold to shape their political space. In the words of Migdal, “the state was to be the chisel in the hands of new sculptors”.¹²⁶

Throughout the 50s and 60s integrated centers were depicted as swallowing hapless peripheries and overriding tradition with modernity. However, this was not necessarily the case. Local communities did not bow in submission and accept the laws, programs, and organization that policy makers in the center had hoped to institute. Indeed, Migdal questioned the power of the state in the Third World. There were still the questions of who is trusted to make the rules and “whose system of meaning people will adopt to explain to themselves their place on this earth”.¹²⁷

In the 1990s, John Paul Lederach introduced his notion of *local turn*, a call for approaches that encouraged increased engagement by society in peacebuilding processes and inevitably, statebuilding.¹²⁸ Prompted by the failures of statebuilding attempts marked by outside intervention in places like Somalia, Rwanda, and elsewhere, Lederach suggested an approach of "empowering local people as the primary authors of peacebuilding" instead of entrusting outside/foreign intervention to build state and society. Whereas historically delegations would gather in New York, London, and Washington to determine the fate of foreign states and their communities without local input, Lederach's proposal calls for a bottom-up approach. This approach, however, has been criticized by some as anti-democratic and anti-developmental. This same group claims that leaving peace and statebuilding to local communities runs the risk of consenting to, or at a minimum tolerating, abuses to women and human rights.¹²⁹

Migdal argues that scholars often fail to sufficiently appreciate the periphery, placing too much emphasis on top-down analysis. He adds that the state is “not the exclusive rule maker” with conclusive outcomes and that the state is only one organization among many. Society itself plays a durable role in this, with the people negotiating their relationship with the everyday, calling on commonly accepted and value rich rules. Indeed, the state-in-society proposition he advances places weight on process and group interaction, one that is dynamic with the state being

¹²⁶ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ LEDERACH, J. P. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press.

¹²⁹ MAC GINTY, R. & RICHMOND, O. P. 2013. The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace. *Third World Quarterly*, 34, 763-783.

constructed and reconstructed from a sort of inverted relationship where society shapes the development of the state. In fact, Migdal points out that even where European expansion saw existing patterns of social control shift to adapt to a changing/changed environment, it was “striking how much existing social structures endure”.¹³⁰

In their study of the South Pacific, Clements, et.al. argue that *political hybridity*, wherein customary forms of political order coexist with modern forms of governance, may be a more appropriate form of political organization than any of them alone. They found that society in the South Pacific was "not giving way to 'modernity' and that there was in fact a resurgence of tradition[al] society".¹³¹ They pointed out that Melanesian and Polynesian society were rediscovering "the ways in which custom enables the development of resilient communities, strong social relationships, and indigenous modes of dealing with conflict and restoring social harmony".¹³²

The authors point to Fukuyama who framed the problem as “can informal institutions embedded within social norms [or 'hybrid institutions'] be made to work more effectively for development outcomes in the absence of a functioning Weberian state system?”¹³³ At a minimum, informal institutions should be able to properly plan and execute policies, enforce laws, and reign in society.¹³⁴ They point out that while state may have some capacity to resist challenges to their legitimacy (largely based on their ability to provide basic services), the resilience of custom and tradition is often underestimated. To help qualify this, they highlight that neither under colonial rule nor post-colonial governance has there been state monopoly on the legitimate use of force in Melanesia. They forecast that "building new forms of state and citizenship that are based on a positive mutual accommodation between the Weberian state and customary order will transform

¹³⁰ MIGDAL, J. S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

¹³¹ CLEMENTS, K. P., BOEGE, V., BROWN, A., FOLEY, W. & NOLAN, A. 2007. State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order. *Political Science* 59, 45-56.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ FUKUYAMA, F. 2006. Lecture to USAID.

¹³⁴ FUKUYAMA, F. 2004. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press.

hybrid political orders into emerging states that – in the long run – will generate new forms of governance beyond the model Western state."¹³⁵

In a separate study, Clements advances his notion of *grounded legitimacy*, an assumption that builds on Weber's interpretation and typology of legitimacy. Grounded legitimacy "combines sources and forms of the sources that are rooted in the sphere of the indigenous customs and procedures of local communities on the one hand and sources and forms of legitimacy that stem from the legal-rational sphere of the other".¹³⁶ With this combination, not only would there be a fusion of legal (customary and state courts), precedence would be set to "build on existing sources of legitimacy anchored in the reality of people's behavior and beliefs which ultimately enhances state legitimacy".¹³⁷ According to grounded legitimacy, the people would have the opportunity to engage with the "collective sense of their own needs and their shared sources of meaning".¹³⁸ Clements argues that "legitimacy that depends almost solely on instrumental performance (such as around service delivery or economic growth) is not grounded legitimacy".¹³⁹

Mann highlights ways in which states have approached consolidation, including *despotic* and *infrastructural power*. While a despot can employ forceful and even violent means for consolidating society, its social control over society remains largely limited. According to Mann, the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society, or *infrastructural power*, allows the state to apply its political decision-making generously and with the cooperation of society.¹⁴⁰ Rather than power over society, *infrastructural power* finds states working with society. In fact, with such

¹³⁵ CLEMENTS, K. P., BOEGE, V., BROWN, A., FOLEY, W. & NOLAN, A. 2007. State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order. *Political Science* 59, 45-56.

¹³⁶ BOEGE, V., BROWN, A. M., CLEMENTS, K. P. & NOLAN, A. 2008. States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders – Pacific Experiences. Brisbane: The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.

¹³⁷ CLEMENTS, K. P., BOEGE, V., BROWN, A., FOLEY, W. & NOLAN, A. 2007. State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order. *Political Science* 59, 45-56.

¹³⁸ OECD 2010. The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, Unpacking Complexity. *Conflict and Fragility*. Online: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

¹³⁹ CLEMENTS, K. P. 2014. What is Legitimacy and Why does it Matter for Peace? In: RAMSBOTHAM, A. & WENNMANN, A. (eds.) *Legitimacy and Peace Processes: From Coercion to Consent*. London: Conciliation Resources.

¹⁴⁰ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

cooperation, the moral and legal codes between state and society may merge. Mann submits that, with growth in *infrastructural power* comes a decline in *despotic power*. With this increase in *infrastructural power*, he submits, comes the capacity for the state to reach and maintain centralized control over violence.

Interestingly, densely institutionalized spaces, such as urban centers maintain high *infrastructural power* while frontier spaces receive little-to-no cooperation between state and society, forcing state leaders to turn to despotic means to deal with spaces in the periphery.

Migdal's assumptions challenge Mann's ideas of social control (or *infrastructural power*) where states are seen as successful in their aims at subordinating people. For Mann, social control based on *infrastructural power* rests on increased contact between the state and people.¹⁴¹ This, however, is not uniformly possible across all political spaces. Migdal argues that the everyday that is negotiated by the people are usually centered on societal norms, including those of tribe, clans, the church, and businesses.

Solidarity is about the cohesion that exists in society, and the thing that holds people together. For Durkheim, in the pre-modern it was mechanical solidarity, or solidarity by similarities that brought/kept people together. Comparing this to the modern era, Durkheim argues that dissimilarities also bring and keep people together through interdependence or what he called organic solidarity. The way Durkheim came to organize solidarity was a response to what others (including him) saw as a shift away from communities founded on common values and increasingly communities based on interdependency.¹⁴² In several ways, it was legitimacy-based way of structuring society versus the institution based.

Migdal questions the extent to which traditional understanding of dependency holds. He claims that societies are composed of a "mélange of social organizations," and not simply based on a center-periphery relationship.¹⁴³ The state is only one of several other forms of organization including ethnic and religious groups, economic institutions, and even families. As such, the state must compete with such groups for social control. In places where it cannot attain social control, it is considered weak. This, according to Migdal, does not mean that society is also weak. Indeed,

¹⁴¹ MANN, M. 1993. *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation State, 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

¹⁴² DURKHEIM, E. 1984. *The Division of Labour in Society*, London, MacMillan Press Ltd.

¹⁴³ MIGDAL, J. S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

a strong society may exist within/alongside weak states. There can exist societies that maintain strong social control while that state is rendered impotent.

To “enhance their strength and autonomy, states must increase their social control. But without the ability to mobilize human and material resources into specialized, task-oriented frameworks that come with already existing social control, states encounter grave difficulties in offering viable strategies of social survival to individuals throughout the country. Using a potpourri of sanctions and rewards, other social formations may organize resources into selective incentives constituting alternative strategies. In brief, leaders may find that despite all the seeming riches at their disposal, their organization, the state, lacks the wherewithal to dislodge people from existing strategies offered by organizations with rules different from the state’s”.¹⁴⁴

In his *Strong Societies and Weak States*, Migdal points out and challenges the assumption that statebuilding and its emphasis on institution building leads to state social control; developments in infrastructure and military capacity does not guarantee social control over society. Rather, Migdal suggests, legitimacy is about *who makes the rules that are heeded*. The assumption that “only the state does, or should, create rules and that only it does, or should, maintain the violent means to bend people to obey those rules minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiations, interaction, and resistance that occur in every human society among multiple systems of rules”.¹⁴⁵ For Migdal, it is the “interaction between the state and society – the relational component – that comes to constitute the state as phenomenon”.¹⁴⁶

Migdal points to a handful of cases where strong societies existed alongside weak states. He argued, for example, that because of British recruitment of local leaders in Sierra Leone in the 1800s and their subsequent empowerment, Sierra Leone remained a weak state into the 20th century. On the other hand, the creation of Israel saw aims of consolidation right from the start

¹⁴⁴ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴⁵ MIGDAL, J. S. 2001. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴⁶ MIGDAL, J. S. & SCHLICHT, K. 2005. Rethinking the State. *The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination*, 1-40.

take hold, and today the state maintains good social control except for the Arab society. Similar conditions arose in Northern Ireland.

Migdal takes early British policy to Palestine and Northern Ireland as examples for demonstrating his state-in-society model. In both cases, the British aimed to quell disorder among the groups that resided in its foreign territories. To compensate for its limited knowledge of these local groups, the British formed coalitions with local agents. However, these relationships instigated further disorder.

Migdal claims that it's difficult for Third World countries especially where state leaders remain involved in "politics of survival" and set out to limit and suppress threats to their control. This sort of behavior undermines progress and development and often keep local leaders skeptical of cooperating with the state.

In response, state leaders engage in *politics of survival* as a means for obstructing the emergence and development of centrifugal forces. This strategy includes limiting the capacity of state institutions, such as the army, or capturing the authority and social power of local leaders through cooptation. On the ground are *implementors* who are tasked to enact state policy; however, challenged by local policies and rules, these individuals often sidestep confrontation and try to maintain a neutral stance. As [ideally] enforcers, what is the role of the police in such cases? This likely translates to influence on state level policy that will likely affect enactment of policies at the local level. This competition for social control affects shifts in alliance formation and the administering of policies, with various groups coalescing and the state itself challenging some of its own institutions. Similarly, Migdal explains that the state, in working with local leaders, supports the undermining of its own authority and legitimacy.

Following Migdal, we should expect that individuals and communities would employ "strategies of survival – blueprints for action and belief" as a means for making their role determination.¹⁴⁷ However, in an unsettled space such as that which defines Afghanistan during this period, strategies must remain flexible in navigating changing and competing incentives and sanctions before submitting to the social control of an authority. Under conflict conditions, can a policeman properly execute his characteristically expected enforcement role? Migdal suggests that it is not simply about compliance, but rather belief – the sort of belief that drives legitimacy.

¹⁴⁷ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

In her exploration of state formation and the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century, Barkey investigates why the “traditional opponents of centralization” are largely not present and when present why they fail in challenging the state. Starting with the assumption that state formation is often met with societal resistance, Barkey looks at elites, peasants, and bandits. In response to challenges from these groups, the state can deflect challenge by “co-optation, incorporation, or bargaining”. Barkey points out that the Ottoman empire was able to limit rebellion by frequently rotating and reassigning officers, thereby limiting their chances of building relations and alliances. Moreover, by providing peasants the means to negotiate with the state, it limited their reliance on each other, thereby limiting protest and rebellion.

Barkey examined and compared state-society relations during the 1700s in France and the Ottoman Empire and concluded that the crucial determinant for sustained large-scale peasant rebellion against the state is their ability to find and foster allies from among other societal groups.¹⁴⁸ The conditions that make this possible, she claims, include long-term state policies that affect peasants as well as others within close proximity of their society, such as landlords and nobility, thereby creating a common and unifying cause. For example, long-term strategies by the state often included removing centuries-old privileges from some local leaders.

When examining the Ottoman case, she found that the empire did not enact long-term policies with society. In fact, much of state policy was short-term and dynamic. As a result, patron-client relations and other alliances were shorten and weakened. In general, state policies encouraged disunity and competition, rendering it difficult for peasants to ally. In fact, “at its extreme, the state could render a dangerous rebel legitimate overnight by striking a bargain that ensured new sources of revenue for the rebel and momentary relief from internal warfare and, perhaps, an army or two for the state”.¹⁴⁹ As a strategy, this allowed the state to maneuver itself to be the “best way to gain access to resources and privileges”.¹⁵⁰

Barkey concluded that it is the character of “interaction between state policies and the types of provincial social structure” that explain the differentiated experience between France and the Ottoman Empire. Styles of “centralization vary”, she adds, “[and they] rest on the nature of state

¹⁴⁸ BARKEY, K. 1991. Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire. *American Sociological Association*, 56, 699-715.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

resources and state-society relations, but they influence society because decisions made by central states and implemented at the local level influence provincial arrangements by shaping and reshaping political alliances”.¹⁵¹

According to Barkey, for medieval European society “state-makers who were ultimately successful at building centralized, differentiated organizations with a monopoly of coercion over a defined territory were those who undid and then redid the structure of society according to their own agendas”.¹⁵² There were obvious resistance along the way, however, from both the people as well as existing organizations.

In Barkey’s exploration of state-society relations, she found that by keeping locals dependent on the state, Ottoman rulers were able to manipulate things on the ground. Barkey explores the theoretical (re)modeling of state formation in the Ottoman Empire, arguing that the state coopted and manipulated the role and disposition of bandits as a means for maintaining its position. The Ottoman Empire was able to maintain local dependence through careful manipulation of patronage systems. It was a generally unconflictual strategy that kept locals divided as they all vied for state resources.¹⁵³ On one hand, deal-making between the state and bandits had these non-state actors materialize as near legitimate state elements tasked with collecting taxes and enforcing state policy. On the other hand, when these same elements were released and they found themselves pillaging local communities, it was the state response to these same groups that brought about greater consolidation and legitimacy for the state.

Tadjbakhsh writes that the “critical literature on liberal peace laments that an ideology based on experiences in the Western world became the backbone of international assistance, and was imposed, outside in, through a range of instruments – conditionalities, policy advice, operational projects, elite cooption, and increasingly, military intervention – often negligent of the local context, the capacity of indigenous institutions, and legitimate buy-in by local population”.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² BARKEY, K. & PARIKH, S. 1991. Comparative Perspectives on the State. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 17, 523-549.

¹⁵³ BARKEY, K. 1991. Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire. *American Sociological Association*, 56, 699-715.

¹⁵⁴ TADJBAKHSH, S. 2011. Open Societies, Open Markets: Assumptions and Illusions. In: TADJBAKHSH, S. (ed.) *Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives*. New York: Routledge.

Pointing to the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, Tadjbakhsh demonstrates the disparities between the ideals and expectations of the liberal peace approach and realities on the ground.¹⁵⁵ For Afghanistan, she submits that the “transformation was not only supposed to happen as post-conflict peacebuilding, but also as an experiment with value change, to supposedly bring Afghans out of the dark ages of Taliban mentality and into liberal values of progress, democracy, and competition”.¹⁵⁶

Not only does her argument call into question the nature of intervention and the extent of equity in the distribution of control over political and economic decision-making in local communities, but it also brings considerations of values and culture front and center. Tadjbakhsh reminds us that “local populations may have different cultural and value systems that form their understandings of normative concepts, be they peace, well-being, or ideologies such as liberalism”.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, the worldview of local populations are informed by traditional values, shaping their decisions and reactions to foreign intervention.¹⁵⁸ Values, Tadjbakhsh submits, “determine how the liberal peace is understood, while outcomes impact how the [intervention] project is accepted”.¹⁵⁹

Tadjbakhsh reminds us that the “efficiency/utilitarian logic has long been based on the contention that the reason peacebuilding does not work is that local context, including culture and informal institutions, is insufficiently incorporated into institutions to give them local meaning. Ultimately, utilitarianism proposes local participation as the key to improving the outcomes of interventions, and at the very least to avoiding local inertia and resentment”.¹⁶⁰

Shils argues that many states in Asia and Africa have failed to “become societies in the modern sense because they do not yet have effective centers”.¹⁶¹ He adds that the primary components that constitute the center, including agreed upon values and beliefs, institutions, and

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ TADJBAKHSH, S. 2009. Conflicted Outcomes and Values: (Neo)Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 16, 635-651.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ SHILS, E. 1961. Center and Periphery. In: POLANYI FESTSCHRIFT COMMITTEE (ed.) *The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on his Seventieth Birthday, 11th March 1961*. London: Routledge.

elites, are often missing or ineffective. Values and beliefs are the “ordered symbols” that are sacred for a community and make up its core; institutions “express the order inherent in the value system” and are “used to diffuse cultural symbols”; and elites serve as the “custodians of the cultural value system”.¹⁶² In combination, the three attempt to shape the periphery. In these places, according to Shils, the population has not yet formed into society but merely consisted of several proto societies. It is social control that the center and various elements in the periphery compete for. Compliance, participation, and legitimacy, serve as the currency for this social control.

Can we possibly move beyond Weber and his ideal of “conceptualizing the state as an autonomous organization with extraordinary means to dominate”?

Parson subsumed both state and society in his ‘social system’, bound by overarching and unified sets of values. According to Parson, the social system is the package of values that takes center stage in the analysis of power, structure, and change. He argues that “the core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through which the life of a population is collectively organized”.¹⁶³ He reasons that “no society can maintain stability in the face of varying exigencies and strains unless interest constellations of its members are grounded in solidarity and internalized loyalties and obligations”.¹⁶⁴

Thus far I discussed two key considerations of statebuilding. First, I discussed the need to move beyond the institutionalist (Weberian) approach to statebuilding and to consider the legitimacy approach as a means for more effectively penetrating society. Second, I examined various theories of state-society relations and how this relationship is problematic and may influence the successful execution of statebuilding. In the next section, I review two specific elements of statebuilding – security sector reform and policebuilding. In this section I try to understand how the role of the police evolves during statebuilding, given the problematic state-society relations.

2.0.3 Security Sector Reform and Policebuilding

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ PARSONS, T. 1966. *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

¹⁶⁴ PARSONS, T., SHILS, E., NAEGELE, K. D. & PITTS, J. R. 1965. *Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory*, Glencoe, Free Press.

Security is a fundamental condition for effective statebuilding, with the police playing a key role in enforcing the law, maintaining order, and contributing to legitimizing the state. In post-conflict/conflict conditions, security sector reform is one of the first steps toward achieving this. Achieving security is problematic, to say the least, however. In fact, even where security is achieved during ongoing conflict, too often the security apparatus is used inappropriately.¹⁶⁵ Further complicating things, emphasis is often misplaced with a priority on arming and training personnel rather than supporting social and political cohesion and consolidation.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, all sorts of reform and reconstruction took hold throughout Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Policebuilding, too, became described as a goal toward democratic policing.¹⁶⁶ With governance gaining prominence among development professionals increasingly throughout the 1990s, these same spaces came to see collaboration between security and development.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, the *human security* agenda took hold around the same time, with development professionals turning to security personnel for assistance in foundational security work that would be conducive of economic and social development.

Still, there seems an inherent conflict between security and development. In the early 1990s (and in the post-Soviet space), “both East and West had no interest in using security and development assistance to promote democratic governance...rather, their assistance was intended solely to foster strategic relationships”.¹⁶⁸ This often came at a cost with rulers and strategic partners using their security apparatus to coerce and/or oppress their population. As a result, security was for the elite and at the expense of citizens and local society. In fact, the US Congress would come to abolish the USAID’s Office of Public Security for its role in developing and providing repressive regimes with the security apparatus they would turn around and use on their people.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ DFID 2004. Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform. London: Department for International Development.

¹⁶⁶ BAYLEY, D. H. 2006. *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

¹⁶⁷ It was under the leadership of Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for Development, that the concept of SSR was championed.

¹⁶⁸ BALL, N. 2010. The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda. In: SEDRA, M. (ed.) *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

¹⁶⁹ GREITENS, S. C. 2016. *Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

In fact, the liberal agenda was introduced with aims of reducing such concentration of power in the hands of elites and authoritarians, and to redistribute power among the people. As discussed in the previous section, in general liberal peace theory claims that domestic peace is increasingly likely when a vast majority of society has control over their political and economic decision-making. Still, the implementation of a liberal peace must consider, however, that where the people have historically relied on the leadership of powerful states, "expectations of justice, provision and control can supersede the value place on individual wealth and political freedoms, especially during political and economic turmoil".¹⁷⁰ This competition remains, however subdued.

In the interplay between the aims of liberalist approach to statebuilding and gaining state legitimacy, policebuilding may be the sort of coercive and enforcement mechanism needed to negotiate the power and legitimacy of the state. Where the armed forces negotiate the power of a state among the international community of states, the police force arguable negotiates the power of the state among its domestic community. However, because of the fierce competition that often exists in post-conflict/conflict conditions, state leaders and other actors are likely to use the police in despotic rather than infrastructural ways. It is only where development and security reconcile competing objectives and their efforts become mutually reinforcing that any progress toward peace and equity can be achieved.¹⁷¹

Since the *war on terror* began in 2001, however, security sector reform and assistance has been largely defined by arming and training society to fight against elements that resist change. The overwhelming use of military might over law enforcement seemingly undermine and contradict the ideals of democratic governance and the liberalist agenda and often seem to reinforce repressive behavior by leaders. What's more, most often this behavior materializes in the form of denunciations and physical threats. The OECD *Handbook on Security System Reform* makes note of these consequences and argues that the "priorities of foreign intelligence and security agencies on issues such as counterterrorism are inherently in conflict with reform".¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ TADJBAKSH, S. 2009. Conflicted Outcomes and Values: (Neo)Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 16, 635-651.

¹⁷¹ BALL, N. 2010. The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda. In: SEDRA, M. (ed.) *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

¹⁷² SHERMAN, J. Ibid. The "Global War on Terrorism" and its Implications for US Security Sector Reform Support

Several studies point to the historically inadequate and often altogether missing local ownership in SSR as the underlying reason for statebuilding failures. These same studies call for the recognition and increased participation of non-state actors in security and security reform.¹⁷³ This includes police reform that would see local communities manage their own security.¹⁷⁴ In fact, SSR policy tends to agree and side with the diffusion of power among the local population. This argument is often supported by evidence that non-state security structures already exist and predate the institution and/or reform of state security.¹⁷⁵

Interestingly, early British domestic “policy, in contrast, openly challenged the autonomy of the village and its right and ability to maintain its own rules of policing. From passage of the Police Act of 1861 into the period following independence, the state sought to appropriate for itself the spelling out of police structures and functions”.¹⁷⁶

Other studies, however, point out that this is often at the expense of the state who is left to compete with locally managed security elements.¹⁷⁷ These same studies argue that the reality is that external and foreign intervention often find themselves working with small select groups of elites who have their own interests in mind. As a result, both political order and security remains fractured.¹⁷⁸

For example, Baker posits that, especially in post-conflict/conflict situations, including non-state actors in the delivery of policing services may be a good option.¹⁷⁹ He defines non-state

¹⁷³ ISMAIL, O. 2008. Enabling Local Ownership: Participation and Capacity Building in SSR. *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

¹⁷⁴ MOBEKK, E. 2010. Security Sector Reform and Challenges of Ownership. In: SEDRA, M. (ed.) *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

¹⁷⁵ GOLDSTEIN, J. 1960. Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice. *The Yale Law Journal*, 69, 543-594.

¹⁷⁶ MIGDAL, J. S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

¹⁷⁷ STEPPUTAT, F., ANDERSEN, L. & MOLLER, B. 2007. Introduction: Security Arrangements in Fragile States. In: STEPPUTAT, F., ANDERSEN, L. & MOLLER, B. (eds.) *Fragile States and insecure People? Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁷⁸ BALL, N. 2010. The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda. In: SEDRA, M. (ed.) *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. Waterloo, Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

¹⁷⁹ BAKER, B. Ibid. The Future is Non-State.

actors as including traditional customary leaders, ethnic and religious associations and organizations, youth groups, community police, NGOs, and other informal forms of governance. According to his logic, these non-state actors generate legitimacy through a wide array of sources, including religion, local value systems, and general prestige. He reminds us that these non-state actors are often already linked to the police, making this a preexisting reality. In fact, he points out that the "breadth of links often goes unrecognized".¹⁸⁰

In particular, he notes that in post-conflict/conflict states you can find state police bringing offenders to non-state traditional courts. One UNDP report makes note that these sorts of courts are the "cornerstone of dispute resolution and access to justice for a majority of populations, especially the poor and disadvantaged in many countries".¹⁸¹ In some cases, the police themselves may seek to support and enforce a different moral and social order than that intended by the state. Familiarity with local traditional forms of policing, security, and justice should be a priority when policebuilding – without this knowledge, both internal and external “intervention are likely to be ineffectual and counterproductive”.¹⁸²

On Policebuilding

Policebuilding falls within the scope of security sector reform and the greater statebuilding project. This includes the legislative and judiciary, the lawmakers, and the adjudicators. States struggling in a post-conflict environment may find it difficult to gather the resources necessary to standup and maintain an efficient policing service. In addition to the military, paramilitary, intelligence, and security services, the police are a 'core security actor'.¹⁸³

According to one study, “police work is a tainted occupation [rooted in a past where] medieval watchmen, recruited from among the ranks of the destitute and subject to satirical portrayals, were perceived to belong to the world of shadows they were supposed to contain. During the period of the absolute monarchy the police came to represent the underground aspects

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ WOJKOWSKA, E. 2006. Doing Justice:How Informal Justice Systems Can Contribute. *In*: CENTRE, O. G. (ed.). Oslo, Norway: United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁸² OECD 2007. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

¹⁸³ DFID 2004. Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform. London: Department for International Development.

of tyranny and political repression, and they were despised and feared even by those who ostensibly benefited from their services”.¹⁸⁴ Today, while the police are charged with enforcing rules, some may have the tendency to “express social prejudices based on their own social origins”.¹⁸⁵

Policing is an instrument of social control and a means for enforcing the social contract between and among men.¹⁸⁶ As an instrument of social control, the police conduct surveillance and apply sanctions where rules are broken.¹⁸⁷ Tasked with administering and bringing routine behavior in line with the principals and ideologies of the state, police force personnel are confronted with achieving voluntary public compliance and cultivating state legitimacy.¹⁸⁸

The underlining rationale behind voluntary compliance include the people finding instrumentality in the law, belief in its moral righteousness, and a perception of legitimacy in its making¹⁸⁹. The people expect and find some level of comfort knowing that perpetrators of criminal activities will be held accountable for their actions. This same instrumental position also helps to shape behavior, reducing the likelihood that people will break with the law themselves.

In fact, when prescribed law is aligned and consistent with personal values, people are more likely to be self-regulating.¹⁹⁰ While moral norms may begin as an external imposition, over time it is internalized, becoming an obligation rather than mere responsibility to maintain self-control. However, attaining the legitimacy necessary for self-regulating behavior is impossible if the procedures of making, exercising, and enforcing law are perceived as illegitimate by the public,

¹⁸⁴ BITTNER, E. 1970. *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models*, Chevy Chase, Maryland, National Institute of Mental Health.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ TYLER, T. R. 2004. Enhancing Police Legitimacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 593, 84-99.

¹⁸⁷ ROMERO, A. 2016. *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, New York, Nova Science Publishers.

¹⁸⁸ PRESSE, A. F. 2001. Alliance commander Dostam's troops enter Kunduz. *Agence France Presse*, November 25, 2001.

¹⁸⁹ TILLY, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D. & SKOCPOL, T. (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

and even more profoundly by the police force itself.¹⁹¹ Confidence in the state among the police force is a necessary precondition for state legitimacy.

In medieval England, constables were elected by and limited to the jurisdiction of their local communities. However, with implementation of the king's peace¹⁹² the consolidation of policing efforts extended royal reach over communities in the far-off periphery, undermining the authority of local constables.¹⁹³ With the advent of industrialization and an accompanying increase in urbanization and crime, the first centralized law enforcement system was established when in 1829 Sir Robert Peel officially formalized the police system in England. He found the old system overly decentralized and lacking coordination and "the broader vision necessary for efficiency",¹⁹⁴ an efficiency in spreading and enforcing the rules and acceptable social norms of the center into the distant peripheries.

In the colonies, police could be found laboring to maintain social control against local resistance, including resistance from within the local police force itself. Thoughtless and myopic in its ambitions and interests, colonial masters remained deaf and blind to the resentment and internal conflict it was provoking as historic local institutions of authority and the social contracts that held them together became undone.

In Malawi, local resistance was so intense that colonial leaders had to turn to recruiting Nigerians to police its streets.¹⁹⁵ These Nigerian forces would take to pillaging the very same communities they were sent to police, while back in their native land locals relentlessly harassed those who joined the Armed Hausa Police Force. In British Guyana, troops were sent in from England when it was realized that "every policeman is bound to have some friends or relatives in any crowd causing trouble".¹⁹⁶ In Cyprus, when the English found they could not rely on the Greek Cypriots to police Cyprus, they recruited a disproportionate number of Turkish Cypriots to the

¹⁹¹ STINCHCOMBE, A. L. 1968. *Constructing Social Theories*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

¹⁹² LAFOLLETTE, H. 2013. *The international encyclopedia of ethics*, Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell.

¹⁹³ CHADWICK, R. F. 2001. *The concise encyclopedia of ethics in politics and the media*, San Diego, Academic Press.

¹⁹⁴ ROMERO, A. 2016. *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, New York, Nova Science Publishers.

¹⁹⁵ DEFLEM, M. 1994. Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya. *Police Studies*, 17, 45-68.

¹⁹⁶ PRESS, A. I. 2013a. Residents Accuse Security Forces of Looting Houses during Operations. *Afghan Islamic Press*, September 17, 2013.

police force.¹⁹⁷ Ethnic tension would escalate between the Greeks and Turks. Colonial masters not only had a tough time establishing centralized monopoly on the use of force in these areas, they also left an enduring image of their neglect and mismanagement.

Recruiting from the indigenous population to police colonized territory, where law and order were found to be most vital to the economic ambitions of European entrepreneurs, placed police force personnel in direct confrontation with their community and way of life. In Nigeria, the Armed Hausa Police Force was founded at the request of British merchants looking for protection of their commercial activities¹⁹⁸ against indigenous resistance and opposition. In fact, in response to resistance or even the mere capacity to resist, steps were taken to weaken and divide the indigenous political system¹⁹⁹, including embedding “native police...charged with maintaining law and order in the countryside”.²⁰⁰ Consequently, tension over jurisdiction developed among local chiefs as well as between locals and foreign leaders. In Nigeria, the local Government Police Act of 1955 resulted in deep division between native and state police force²⁰¹, resulting in a duality of leadership where, despite general influence from the center, the daily routine and operations of the community remain at the discretion of local chiefs.²⁰²

Although the departure of colonial masters was largely welcomed by the indigenous populace, decolonization came with its own set of problems. The colonial strategy which encouraged infighting as a means for weakening indigenous political cohesion²⁰³ now embroiled communities into even more fierce rivalry and violence as they each fend for the spoils brought on by independence. Natives who once volunteered for their colonial masters now found themselves as subjects to the very same people that they once surveilled and policed. Recruits who were

¹⁹⁷ KRIEGER, L. 1965. *The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

¹⁹⁸ BRIAND, S. 2001a. Alliance gives civilians time to flee surrounded Taliban city. *Agence France Presse*, November 15, 2001.

¹⁹⁹ HASHMI, A. M. 2011. Tribal Elder among 4 Injured in Nangarhar Blast. *Pajhwok Afghan News*, April 25, 2011.

²⁰⁰ OPOLOT, J. S. E. 2008. *Police administration in Africa : toward theory and practice in the English-speaking countries*, Lanham, United Press of America.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² BARBER, N. 2002. *Encyclopedia of ethics in science and technology*, New York, Facts on File.

²⁰³ BRIAND, S. 2001a. Alliance gives civilians time to flee surrounded Taliban city. *Agence France Presse*, November 15, 2001.

brought in from areas peripheral to the spaces they policed as ‘trustworthy stranger to police other strangers’²⁰⁴ were now marked for death by locals and now struggling to find their place in their communities.

In another study, Greener confronts the issue of intervention and the imposition of formal centralized policing where there exist informal sites of policing already. He submits that this dismissive and “narrow emphasis on statebuilding as represented by a focus on the institutional rebuilding of police needs to be reoriented toward a focus on peacebuilding”.²⁰⁵

The logic behind his argument is grounded in the notion that peacebuilding transcends the mere institution focused aims of statebuilding. Referencing Boege, et.al, Greener cites that “peacebuilding has to be pursued beyond the notions of the liberal peace and liberal state”.²⁰⁶ Taking state and policebuilding in the Solomon Islands as his case, he argues that the highly formalized approach of statebuilding measures “helped obscure the role that more informal sites of policing authority could have played in better embedding peacebuilding in the Solomon Islands”.²⁰⁷

Though “it is probably true that persons who are characterologically inclined to see moral and legal problems in black and white tend to choose police work as a vocation more often than others, it is important to emphasize that the need to disregard complexity is structurally built into the occupation. Only after a suspect is arrested, or after an untoward course of events is stopped, is there time to reflect on the merits of the decision and, typically, that reflective judgment is assigned to other public officials”.²⁰⁸

Migdal emphasizes process and the struggle that arises among shifting coalition who wrestle with instituting and maintaining rules that best characterize their day-to-day behavior. He

²⁰⁴ (AIP), A. I. P. 2013. Analysts warn of anarchy in northern provinces. *Afghan Islamic Press (AIP)*.

²⁰⁵ GREENER, B. K. 2011. Statebuilding, Peacebuilding, Police and Policing in Solomon Islands. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 6, 30-42.

²⁰⁶ CLEMENTS, K. P., BOEGE, V., BROWN, A., FOLEY, W. & NOLAN, A. 2007. State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order. *Political Science* 59, 45-56.

²⁰⁷ GREENER, B. K. 2011. Statebuilding, Peacebuilding, Police and Policing in Solomon Islands. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 6, 30-42.

²⁰⁸ BITTNER, E. 1970. *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models*, Chevy Chase, Maryland, National Institute of Mental Health.

submits that it is an ongoing relationship, both reinforcing and undermining, between image and practice, that help to resolve these struggles, however temporarily. This notion of image advanced by Migdal implies the perception held by both those inside and outside territory (contributing to this back and forth of reinforcing and undermining). It encourages people to see the state (and political space, in general) as integrated social and political boundaries. There is, however, an understanding that the social boundary is demarcated along the lines of the state as public actors and the subject as private actors. As part and parcel of this image, the people that reside within these lines are taken as embodying the state and the state in return embodying the people.

In addition to image, there is considerations of practice. The key aspect of practice is its ability to strengthen or undermine image. According to Migdal, practice is the “routine performance of state actors and agencies...[that] may bolster the notion of the territorial and public-private boundaries or neutralize them”.²⁰⁹ Practice reinforces the social distinction between the public and private. Public practices such as the use of courthouses and coronation separate the private (and competitive) elements from those of the public. Some of these practices include the use of visas, maps, schoolbooks, and even barbed wire as tools for demarcating and differentiating. Inherent in many of these is some sort of violence. The practices of external sources can also help to reinforce or undermine states. Migdal points to the obvious influences of the United Nations.

Practices that “have neutralized...boundaries have done more than destroy the image; they have created their own new spatial configurations of meaning”.²¹⁰ Care must be taken in labeling the practices found in the wild; what is understood as corruption in the west may be some subtle form of nepotism and kinship. Under such an. Instance, western image may be at conflict with the eastern practices observed. The practices of other fragmented groups, both within and outside the state, have often been distinct to the expectations of state image.

2.1 Bourdieu, the State, and Statebuilding

Bourdieu provides the concepts and theoretical assumptions that helps to frame and capture the relationship between state and society, statebuilding, and the role of the police. He suggests that

²⁰⁹ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

under idealized conditions, a doxic and reproductive relationship takes hold between society and its political space such that a collective disposition characterized by a sense of associative obligation emerges.²¹¹ This is a doxic relationship, a primary experience with the social world that is inherently based on underlying and fundamental beliefs – socialized, embodied and pre-reflexive regularities. It is a social world recognized and accepted as self-evident, one that is more a sense of association than of consent and voluntarism.

I argue that the doxic relationship that is found between agents and their political space facilitates the framing of the associative nature of political obligation, a necessary condition for shaping and reinforcing legitimacy. Indeed, for the successful consolidation of political space and the achievement of legitimacy, a sense of obligation that is rooted in the embodiment of social and cultural norms, values, and expectations, and founded in an ascribed position and membership that is a non-voluntary association to the particular rather than the general must be met.²¹²

For Bourdieu, in such an idealized world the state comes to achieve symbolic power such that it is sanctioned to define, attribute, and withdraw that which is considered ‘right’ and impose “legitimate readings and classifications of the social world”.²¹³ Indeed, performing the ideological, as well as the economic, political, and military functions that distinguish a community and political space, hinges on a monopoly on the exercise of this symbolic power.²¹⁴

This power is relational, generated, and accumulated through the interaction between the dominant and the dominated.²¹⁵ According to Bourdieu, it is a violent relationship in that both the dominant and dominated take their positions for granted, remaining unaware of the inherent hierarchies that exist. In time reproduction takes hold, with hierarchies and privileging becoming embedded and embodied. With a combination of both administrative capacity and embodied

²¹¹ Note, for this study, the concept of political space is used interchangeably with and refers to the concepts of *state*, *tribe*, and *field*.

²¹² HORTON, J. 1992. *Political obligation*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press International.

²¹³ OLSSON, C. 2013. “legitimate Violence” in the Prose of Counterinsurgency: An Impossible Necessity? *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 38, 155-171.

²¹⁴ LOVEMAN, M. 2005. The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 1651-1683.

²¹⁵ BOURDIEU, P. 1990a. *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

ideology, the state takes on a primary role in the production and reproduction of the symbolic power and violence necessary for shaping and reinforcing legitimacy.

Bourdieu advances concepts and a formula to help map these assumptions: [(habitus)(capital) + field] = practice]. In the following sections, I unpack these assumptions within his theoretical frame and formulation. In the first section, I explore capital with an emphasis on understanding the influence of its accumulation and concentration. In the second section, I expand the relationship between the concepts of field, habitus, and practice. In the final section, I investigate the role of symbolic violence and misrecognition.

2.1.1 On the Accumulation and Concentration of Capital

Bourdieu postulates that the state is constituted through the accumulation and concentration of capital, processes that are fraught with struggle and negotiations that come to inform the exchange rate and interconvertibility among the various species of capital. As a sociogenetic process, the accumulation of capital is a meaning-making interaction between the internalized self and the history of social and political space, one that dissolves away the actor-society duality.²¹⁶ Like nation-states who are both a part of and influence on the identity of the global society, so too are individuals who are expressions of and effect on the shape and identity of their social and political space. They are bound together in a mutually constitutive relationship that becomes a process of autonomization, one that motivates a reproductive cycle for the accumulation and concentration of capital as both consequence and reflection.²¹⁷

Accumulation and concentration of capital defines the perimeter of social and political space, with relative and differentiated economic strength, collective and distinct beliefs, and network dynamics and exclusivity distinguishing one space from another. That is to say, the like-minded and similarly endowed fall into distinct communities, and as a result, generate an in and out group dynamic. Indeed, capital is realized and embodied through the practices of these communities.²¹⁸ What is more, within these communities there are further distinctions, with the

²¹⁶ GRAAF, W. D. & MAIER, R. 1994. *Sociogenesis Reexamined*, New York, Springer-Verlag.

²¹⁷ VAN DER VEER, R. & VALSINER, J. 1988. Lev Vygotsky and Pierre Janet: On the Origin of the Concept of Sociogenesis. *Developmental Review*, 8, 52-65.

²¹⁸ YANG, Y. 2013. Bourdieu, Practice and Change: Beyond the Criticism of Determinism. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 46, 1522-1540.

relative endowment and distribution of the various species of capital determining an individual's position relative to other members.²¹⁹ From the relative position of individuals to the differentiated power of political space, the accumulation and concentration of capital is epitomized by struggle, with economic capital endlessly negotiating the exchange rate with cultural capital and competing notions of social constructs struggling for opportunities to reproduce. Indeed, transferring capital from one society to another must account for structural factors of the receiving community. As a social inheritance, capital is absorbed within the filter of traditional modes of thought.²²⁰

For Bourdieu, the accumulation and concentration of economic capital is not merely about following general economic theory, rather it is about the capacity for economic resources to shape and continuously inform the distinction both among agents' positions and the spaces they occupy.²²¹ As the most liquid and readily convertible species, economic capital underlies most other forms of capital.²²² In fact, Bourdieu goes so far as to claim that all other forms of capital are merely "disguised" forms of economic capital.²²³ This ability to convert into and/or reproduce social and/or cultural capital, Bourdieu suggests, is the most profound characteristic of the economic species.²²⁴

Bourdieu argues that the birth of the state is inseparable from the accumulation of cultural capital.²²⁵ Cultural capital refers to the knowledge, tastes, and disposition that defines and distinguishes one individual, group, or community from another, informing the way things are done and the characteristics attributed to the positions individuals occupy. The norms and values

²¹⁹ YOUNG JR., A. A. 1999. The (Non) Accumulation of Capital: Explicating the Relationship of Structure and Agency in the Lives of Poor Black Men. *Sociological Theory*, 17, 201-227.

²²⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 2013. *Algerian Sketches*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²²¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In: RICHARDSON, J. (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood. See also: SMART, A. 1993. Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital. *Cultural Anthropology*, 8, 388-408.

²²² ANHEIER, H. K., GERHARDS, J. & ROMO, F. P. 1995. Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu's Social Topography. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100, 859-903.

²²³ BOURDIEU, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In: RICHARDSON, J. (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

²²⁴ YUKSEK, D. A. 2018. Evaluating the Importance of Social Capital for the Conversion of the Forms of Capital: A Critical Approach to the Bourdieusian Model. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, 17, 1090-1106.

²²⁵ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

that become embodied through long standing dispositions accumulate as cultural capital, which in turn serves as the currency that enhances one's position.²²⁶ The concentration of cultural capital informs and shapes tradition, cultivating familiarity with legitimate culture and encouraging a disposition of appreciation.²²⁷ Moreover, cultural capital is produced and reproduced through social practices, with dominant meanings and symbolism penetrating and persisting. Accordingly, cultural capital confers advantages to those agents who have the greatest amount of capital, while subordinating others.²²⁸

Bourdieu takes language as an example of cultural capital, demonstrating how a particular dialect is distinguished from a "bad accent," giving way to a dominant accent that may identify as proper and attributed with a certain group.²²⁹ This sort of dominance creates group and place specific identities, reinforcing autonomization.

Bourdieu suggests that "those assuming power must capture the accumulated cultural productivity of society" as a first step toward legitimating their exercise of power.²³⁰ Failure to do so, we can extrapolate, inevitably results in internal fragmentation. Without a force for effective capital concentration and reproduction, tension brought on by internal differences could find smaller pockets of capital accumulation and concentration challenging state consolidation.

Cultural capital remains symbolically and materially active, with its appropriation, implementation, and investment serving as a "weapon and a stake in the struggles which go on in the fields of cultural production."²³¹ It is the conclusion of this struggle and interconvertibility among the various species of capital that determine the final shape and definition of social and political space.

In the context of state formation, shared cultural beliefs frame social capital, allowing for coherence of national culture and collective identity. The very survival of social and political space

²²⁶ THROSBY, D. 1999. Cultural Capital. *Journal of Cultural Economics*, 23, 3-12.

²²⁷ BOURDIEU, P. 1993. *Sociology in Question*, London, Sage.

²²⁸ BENNETT, T. & SILVA, E. 2011. Introduction: Cultural capital—Histories, Limits, Prospects. *Poetics*, 39, 427-443.

²²⁹ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²³⁰ GRAHAM, B. 2002. Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture? *Urban Studies*, 39, 1003-1017.

²³¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In: RICHARDSON, J. (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

rests on shared beliefs serving as the glue that binds groups and communities together. Generally characterized by durable networks of mutual acquaintance and institutionalized relations, social capital is shaped and endures through reciprocating dispositions of trust and solidarity.²³² This is the sort of disposition that reinforces social cohesion, drives civic engagement, including the circulation of economic capital, provides for collective security, and administers governance.²³³

While economic capital provides the means for access to goods and services through sales and purchases, social capital serves as a “master capital” and key that opens the door for the “right people” to enter capital markets of all sorts. Indeed, one’s social position may maintain a greater exchange rate than economic capital under some circumstances.²³⁴ While individual endowment of social capital is often determined by the strength of preexisting relationships, with accumulation and concentration benefiting from affiliations with social and political networks, this same process serves to (re)produce socio-economic differentiation and intergenerational (dis)advantages.²³⁵

The accumulation and concentration of capital is both encouraged by and a byproduct of the interconvertibility among various species of capital.²³⁶ Bourdieu argues that all forms of capital are interconvertible, from the material and interested such as economic capital, to the metaphysical and disinterested such as social and cultural capital.²³⁷ The process by which one converts into the other, however unequal in their exchange, contributes to and shapes the extent of accumulation and concentration. Interconvertibility finds the sort of dress one wears, and the level of competency and familiarity with a distinct culture one has, determining acceptance into a social group and the shape of the social and political space this group occupies. In turn, membership (or social capital)

²³² LIN, N. 2004. *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

²³³ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press. See also: PUTNAM, R. D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

²³⁴ YUKSEK, D. A. 2018. Evaluating the Importance of Social Capital for the Conversion of the Forms of Capital: A Critical Approach to the Bourdieusian Model. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, 17, 1090-1106.

²³⁵ HOLT, L. 2008. Embodied Social Capital and Geographic Perspective: Performing the Habitus. *Progress in Human Geography*, 32, 227-246.

²³⁶ LOLLO, E. 2016. Social Capital Accumulation and the Exercise of Power: The Case of P2 in Italy. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 50, 59-71.

²³⁷ CASEY, K. L. 2008. Defining Political Capital: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Interconvertibility Theory. Lab for Integrated Learning and Technology, University of Missouri, St. Louis.

provides opportunities to accumulate cultural capital with the sharing of distinct knowledge. Membership to an opera group, a philosophy club, or a Pashtun tribe each have their own distinct knowledge that demarcates the contours of their respective communities.

For some agents, their individual endowment of social capital is often determined by the strength of their preexisting relationship with social and political networks. Being born into a wealthy family in the first world, for example, provides a very different social network and outlook compared to being born into a poor family in the third world. With changes in the volume and composition of capital, however, individuals and communities could experience determined shifts in their position and the field. In fact, as social capital may generate through inheritance, historic and recognized heroism in one's family or local community may pass along through lineage and name recognition²³⁸, elevating the stature of family members and/or local communities. From a state perspective, it is a shared cultural framework and assumptions that makes social capital possible thereby allowing for a coherent and shared national culture and collective identity.²³⁹ The very survival of social capital, and more generally, political space, rests on such ties serving as the glue that links and keeps these networks together.²⁴⁰

Social capital may be interconvertible with and lead to gains in economic capital, with membership in social networks opening the door to opportunities that are otherwise difficult for out of network individuals to attain.²⁴¹ In fact, association with reputable individuals or groups may likely result in spill-over effect generating capital for those in mere proximity. Then again, association (or even a perception of association) with nefarious individuals or groups can damage one's reputation.²⁴² This concept of *reputation* suggests a different level of capital accumulation, that of symbolic capital. I will elaborate more on this in later sections.

²³⁸ BOURDIEU, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

²³⁹ RENSHON, S. A. 2000. Political Leadership as Social Capital: Governing in a Divided National Culture. *Political Psychology*, 21, 199-226.

²⁴⁰ TEILMANN, K. 2012. Measuring Social Capital Accumulation in Rural Development. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 28, 458-465.

²⁴¹ PRET, T., SHAW, E. & DODD, S. D. 2016. Painting the Full Picture: The Conversion of Economic, Cultural, Social and Symbolic Capital. *International Small Business Journal*, 34, 1004-1027.

²⁴² REUBER, A. R. & FISCHER, E. 2005. The Company You Keep: How Young Firms in Different Competitive Contexts Signal Reputation through Their Customers. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 29, 57-78.

Bourdieu warns that the interconvertibility among the various species of capital may be problematic, however. Overnight wealth does not translate well into cultural capital. Without a certain preliminary level of cultural capital, regardless of the amount of newfound wealth, individuals may find it difficult to fit in.²⁴³ This failure to meet normative expectations in turn restricts the ability to access social networks thereby constraining their ability to enhance status. In short, while wealth (economic capital) may buy you into the “right group” (social capital), transforming social capital into cultural capital is more difficult than vice versa, reducing the likelihood of social mobility for such individuals.

Demonstrating the nature and effect of the interconvertibility of economic capital, one study examines the experiences of north African holy men. As a result of their symbolic capital, a capital that is realized with the confidence and trust of the people, the holy men can accumulate economic resources. For their spiritual guidance, they receive alms as well as other economic benefits, such as tax exemptions and land. However, with increases in their accumulation of economic capital, symbolic capital begins to suffer, as the institutions employed to manage their economic profits increasingly come to resemble bureaucratic systems that effectively undermine popular perceptions of their spiritual nature.

Tilly contributes to this notion of capital accumulation and concentration in his *Coercion, Capital, and European States*. Taking the rise of urban centers as his subject of analysis, he demonstrates how the concentration of capital is necessary for the formation of political space.²⁴⁴ Framing his theory of state consolidation in terms of competition between urban centers and the state, he points out how cities can be understood as containers and distribution points for capital while the state is a container and deployer of coercive power and means.²⁴⁵ The thesis here is that states “emerge when the means of coercion accumulate and concentrate while cities emerge when capital accumulates and concentrations”.²⁴⁶ Tilly’s overarching argument is that where

²⁴³ YUKSEK, D. A. 2018. Evaluating the Importance of Social Capital for the Conversion of the Forms of Capital: A Critical Approach to the Bourdieusian Model. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, 17, 1090-1106.

²⁴⁴ TILLY, C. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell.

²⁴⁵ TILLY, C. 1989. Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800. *Theory and Society*, 18, 563-584.

²⁴⁶ TESCHKE, B. 2017. After the Tilly Thesis: Social Conflict, Differential State-Formation and Geopolitics in the Construction of the European System of States. In: KASPERSEN, L. B. &

accumulation occurs but fails to concentrate, a fragmented political landscape will likely evolve with multiple political centers materializing.²⁴⁷ For Tilly, “behind the changing geography of cities...operate[s] the dynamics of capital”²⁴⁸. In combination, he explains, uneven distribution of capital, fragmented sovereignty, and tension among neighbors are the unique dynamics that explain the shape of formation and consolidation.²⁴⁹

According to Tilly, “various combinations of capital and coercion produced very different kinds of states...with cities respond[ing] especially [well] to changes in capital”.²⁵⁰ The “position of cities within market hierarchies...[determine] the extent of their capital accumulation and their ability to build up and control an extended sphere of influence”.²⁵¹ Tilly highlights and compares the relative accumulation and concentration of capital with “path dependency as a key explanatory factor in the comparative study of cities and urban centers”.²⁵² He reminds us that running in parallel with shifts in capital accumulation and concentration, state coercive strength also evolved. In the 1500s, when an average of one city with a population over 10,000 existed for every three states, coercive strength was realized with militias financed through rents.²⁵³ In the 1800s, with an increase to 2-3 cities per state, leaders employed mercenaries, turning to independently rich capitalists as a source of financing. Today, with an average of 180 cities per state, states raise and finance armies and navies with their own fiscal system.²⁵⁴

In their application of Tilly’s model, Kloosterman and Lambregts compare the history of capital accumulation and concentration between England and the Netherlands throughout the 18th

STRANDSBJERG, J. (eds.) *Does War Make States? Investigations of Charles Tilly's Historical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴⁷ TILLY, C. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ ERTMAN, T. 2017. Otto Hintze, Stein Rokkan and Charles Tilly's Theory of European State-Building. In: KASPERSEN, L. B. & STRANDSBJERG, J. (eds.) *Does War Make State? Investigations of Charles Tilly's Historical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁵⁰ TILLY, C. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell.

²⁵¹ TILLY, C. 1989. Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800. *Theory and Society*, 18, 563-584.

²⁵² KLOOSTERMAN, R. & LAMBREGTS, B. 2007. Between Accumulation and Concentration of Capital: Toward a Framework for Comparing Long-Term Trajectories of Urban Systems. *Urban Geography*, 28, 54-73.

²⁵³ TILLY, C. 1989. Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800. *Theory and Society*, 18, 563-584.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

and 19th century and found that, while England experienced steady and centralized accumulation and concentration of capital in London, in the Netherlands shifts in capital accumulation saw a downward trend in concentration in Amsterdam while Rotterdam and other cities in the southern and eastern part of the Netherlands experienced an uptick in concentration.²⁵⁵ As a result, during the first stages of industrialization the Netherlands became increasingly fragmented. Tilly classified such spaces, those with a combination of low concentration and high accumulation, as “scattered centers”.²⁵⁶

Tilly posits that the instigation of change in the accumulation and concentration of capital, and effectively the (re)shaping of political space, is primarily a result and consequence of the activities of the manipulators of capital.²⁵⁷ In general, anyone who has a hand in manipulating economic, social, and cultural capital may be a manipulator of capital.²⁵⁸ In economic terms, these are the interventionists who manipulate supply and demand, instigate capital flight, and control the general flow of financial capital. Domestically, these are the financiers and merchants; internationally, they are state agencies and armies.

However, the process of accumulating and concentrating capital involves interaction and exchange, much of which is defined by struggle over the social reproduction and the qualification of social positions – elements that inform the shape of social, political, and physical boundaries.²⁵⁹ For agents, their position depends on the form and amount of capital they possess. Those that dominate are more likely to reinforce their position, thereby leading the way in shaping social and political space. It provides an outcome which “gives rise to social structure...a social topology, positioning actors relative to each other according to the overall amount and relative combination

²⁵⁵ KLOOSTERMAN, R. & LAMBREGTS, B. 2007. Between Accumulation and Concentration of Capital: Toward a Framework for Comparing Long-Term Trajectories of Urban Systems. *Urban Geography*, 28, 54-73.

²⁵⁶ TILLY, C. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ CHECKLAND, S. G. 1966. *The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885*, New York, St. Martin's Press. See also: KIRCHHEIMER, O. 1941. Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise. *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 9, 264-289.

²⁵⁹ ROURKE, B. 2003. Cultural Capital Accumulation on a World Scale: The Role of Imperialist Theodicies within Metropolitan Literary Fields. *Space and Culture*, 6, 35-51.

of capital available to them”.²⁶⁰ It is a competition for legitimate representation, where dominant groups regulate access to membership.²⁶¹

Throughout his writings, Bourdieu used several concepts interchangeably when attempting to describe the state. These included field of power, field of fields, meta-field, and space. Regardless of the nomenclature used, however, these concepts similarly referred to the location where capital is produced, preserved, and reproduced, providing these spaces power over other species of capital and fields. As a result, the state according to Bourdieu is the “legitimate representation of the social world”.²⁶² From one perspective, fields are an appropriation of physical space where the terrain places checks and limits on reach and influence of the social. From another perspective, fields are a result and consequence of competition over the composition and volume of capital, a competition that sees the social (re)shaping physical and social space.

Common across these concepts is the shared idea of struggle both among the fields that comprise the state and between fields and the state itself. On one hand, fields are relational with agents united in a struggle to define and accumulate particular forms of capital.²⁶³ Those who hold power unique to the field struggle to maintain their legitimacy.²⁶⁴ On the other hand, there is a struggle within the field of power, testing the state and its ability to act on and influence the different fields.²⁶⁵ The state, as an ensemble of fields (including cultural, social, economic fields), struggles to maintain the characteristics and legitimate definition of these fields.²⁶⁶ There is a struggle over specific resources and access to them.

²⁶⁰ ANHEIER, H. K., GERHARDS, J. & ROMO, F. P. 1995. Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu's Social Topography. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100, 859-903.

²⁶¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In: RICHARDSON, J. (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

²⁶² BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁶³ HARRITS, G. S. 2013. Class, Culture and Politics: On the Relevance of a Bourdieusian Concept of Class in Political Sociology. *The Sociological Review*, 61, 172-202.

²⁶⁴ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

Categories of Perception and Symbolic Capital

The various species of capital, such as economic, social, and cultural capital, take on a symbolic form when they are understood through the appropriate categories of perception.²⁶⁷ If having money, a certain group of friends, or some bit of knowledge is held to have some perceived value, these largely material species of capital are elevated to the symbolic level. This is not unidirectional, however. Symbolic-ness is activated when and where popular disposition is properly lined up with the rules of political space.²⁶⁸ On one hand, the historical practices and experiences of individuals and groups are a constitutive force. On the other, the space itself becomes the 'social texts' that formulate and encode doctrinal authority with symbolic capital mutable and readily exchangeable into other forms of capital.²⁶⁹ Like the accumulation of material capital, the accumulation of symbolic capital "rests on a work of mobilization...of construction of adherence, acknowledgment, legitimacy".²⁷⁰ In its symbolic state, capital has the capacity to define standards and legitimize culture.²⁷¹ According to Bourdieu, "everything points to the concentration of a symbolic capital of recognized authority...as the condition or, at a minimum, the correlate of all the other forms of concentration, insofar as they endure at all".²⁷²

²⁶⁷ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁶⁸ APTER, D. E. 2010. Political Violence and Discourse Theory. In: COUTO, R. A. (ed.) *Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.

²⁶⁹ PRET, T., SHAW, E. & DODD, S. D. 2016. Painting the Full Picture: The Conversion of Economic, Cultural, Social and Symbolic Capital. *International Small Business Journal*, 34, 1004-1027.

²⁷⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁷¹ ANHEIER, H. K., GERHARDS, J. & ROMO, F. P. 1995. Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu's Social Topography. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100, 859-903.

²⁷² BOURDIEU, P. 1998a. *Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Bourdieu argues that, in developed countries, the state serves as a sort of “central bank of symbolic capital,”²⁷³ one that imposes a sense of legitimacy in certain ways of doing things.²⁷⁴ Bourdieu adds that symbolic capital is the most genuine means and expression of state power.²⁷⁵ Its bureaucratic systems maintain “written documents and registries that...enable [it to] ‘contain’...; ‘embrace’...and ‘penetrate’ individual lives...enabling the state to define more effectively the parameters of individual identities and existence”.²⁷⁶ According to this argument, the state is the “site where all the fiduciary currency circulating in the social world is produced and guaranteed...legitimate culture, the nation, the notion of state borders, or even spelling”.²⁷⁷

Extending its administrative reach, the state gains control over the very reproduction and dissemination of knowledge itself across space and time. According to Bourdieu this reproductive capacity is central to symbolic power, with routine exercise regulating, codifying, and socializing, producing a naturalization of categories and social practice.²⁷⁸ It is a continuous process that shapes political communities and their social structures, inscribing shared fundamental beliefs that accumulate as historical categories of perception that come to organize and classify, providing words and names that structure and express social realities.²⁷⁹ It is a history of struggle, linguistic and otherwise, that shape individual character and group identity.

These categories of perception are at once mental as well as social, with agents internalizing and distorting general perception of resources, as they negotiate the ‘exchange rate’

²⁷³ BOURDIEU, P. 2009. Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. In: SCOTT, A., NASH, K. & SMITH, A. M. (eds.) *New Critical Writings in Political Sociology Volume One: Power, State and Inequality*. London: Routledge. ; See also: ANHEIER, H. K., GERHARDS, J. & ROMO, F. P. 1995. Forms of Capital and Social Structure in Cultural Fields: Examining Bourdieu's Social Topography. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100, 859-903.

²⁷⁴ ADLER-NISSEN, R. 2013. Sovereignty: The State's Symbolic Power and Transnational Fields. In: ADLER-NISSEN, R. (ed.) *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*. London: Routledge.

²⁷⁵ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁷⁶ LOVEMAN, M. 2005. The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 1651-1683.

²⁷⁷ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁷⁸ LOVEMAN, M. 2005. The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 1651-1683.

²⁷⁹ HAUGAARD, M. & RYAN, K. 2012. *Political power : the development of the field*, Opladen, Barbara Budrich.

among the varied forms of capital, allowing for varied interpretations of the world. Where the people fail to speak on behalf of their political space and to give names and categories to their realities, Bourdieu questions the very existence of these spaces.²⁸⁰ By speaking of the 'state', the people impart categories that allow them and the things around them to be a product of both social conditioning as well as their own recognition and appreciation of these things.²⁸¹ The particularity of naming conventions, and the sounds that help articulate them, shape political space, allowing for logical integration and consistency of "categories of thought, of perceptions, of the construction of reality and of the moral integration of the social world".²⁸²

With recognition and appreciation, the cognitive and the evaluative categories of perception which produces acceptance and an embodiment of the social order,²⁸³ bring meaning to political spaces and value to the species of capital that constitute such space.²⁸⁴ Over time, the state and the resultant shape of political space becomes increasingly less challenged, as practices are embodied and become taken for granted with the origins of their evolution slipping away into the recesses of the collective subconscious.

We are bound to others through "implicit collusion fostered by shared categories of perception, appreciation, and action".²⁸⁵ According to Migdal, "image[s] of the state induces people to perceive its agencies as generically integrated" and that "image implies perception" and in the case of the state as the "chief and appropriate rule maker within its territorial boundaries," it

²⁸⁰ ARNHOLTZ, J. & HAMMERSLEV, O. 2013. Transcended Power of the State: The Role of Actors in Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of the State. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, 14, 42-64.

²⁸¹ BOURDIEU, P. 2009. Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. In: SCOTT, A., NASH, K. & SMITH, A. M. (eds.) *New Critical Writings in Political Sociology Volume One: Power, State and Inequality*. London: Routledge.

²⁸² BANOS, F. V. 2017. The Field of Fields. The State According to Pierre Bourdieu. *Culture and History Digital Journal*, 6.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ BOURDIEU, P. 1998b. *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

²⁸⁵ WACQUANT, L. J. D. 2016. A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus. *The Sociological Review*, 64, 64-72. See also: BOURDIEU, P. 2000a. *Pascalian Meditations*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

is the perception of those both inside and outside of its claimed territory that hold these images and perception.²⁸⁶

Categories of perception are underscored by historic beliefs, assumptions, values, and prejudices, contributing to shaping habitus.²⁸⁷ Categories of perception are internalized by individuals and communities and serves as a mediating force based on a collective history, regulating (self) perception and aspirations.²⁸⁸ Categories of perception are taught, mediated, and appreciated through interaction, shaping how one comes to see herself, or a community comes to understand its position.

This perceptual schema, or structured internal representation, is acquired through perceptions of history and the day-to-day. The “schemata of perception and appreciation which are at the root of our construction of the social world are produced by a collective historical labor but on the basis of the very structures of that world: as structures, historically constructed, our categories of thought contribute to producing the world, but only within the limits of their correspondence with pre-existing structures”.²⁸⁹

In developed states, this symbolic component sees the constitution of the state as “inseparable from the construction of the national cultural capital that is at the same time a national symbolic capital”.²⁹⁰ The state comes to signify a “sort of common historical transcendental immanence to all its subjects. Through the framing it imposes upon practice, the state establishes and inculcates common forms and categories of perception and appreciation, and social frameworks of perception, of understanding or of memory, in short *state forms of classification*. It thereby creates the conditions for a kind of immediate orchestration of habitus which is the foundation of a consensus over this set of shared evidence constitutive of (national) common

²⁸⁶ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

²⁸⁷ ARNHOLTZ, J. & HAMMERSLEV, O. 2013. Transcended Power of the State: The Role of Actors in Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of the State. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, 14, 42-64.

²⁸⁸ STAHL, G. 2015. Egalitarian Habitus: Narratives of Reconstruction in Discourses of Aspiration and Change. In: COSTA, C. & MURPHY, M. (eds.) *Bourdieu, Habitus and Social Research: The Art of Application*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁸⁹ BOURDIEU, P. 1987. The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field. *The Hastings Law Journal*, 38, 805-853.

²⁹⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

sense”.²⁹¹ The nation comprises a set of people who maintain these categories of state perception that are imposed on their very being by the state itself, subsequently generating commonly accepted principles.²⁹² Endowed as an ‘instrument of constitution’ and an “indispensable foundation for the existence of a symbolic order” the state creates the universally “taken for granted”.²⁹³

Symbolic capital provides the “power for constructing reality to guide people in understanding their place in the organizational hierarchy”.²⁹⁴ It is through symbolic capital that agents are granted authority and legitimacy.²⁹⁵ From an individual perspective, the accumulation and concentration of symbolic capital is recognized in reputation, prestige, and status.²⁹⁶ Indeed, it is after some struggle over competing viewpoints that these dominant actors take the lead in reproducing and imposing social order.²⁹⁷ For Bourdieu, this involves recognition of the prestige of certain families or more generally, family names.²⁹⁸

2.1.2 Shaping Legitimacy: On the Relationship between Field, Habitus, and Practice

Bourdieu’s theory of the state stems from his early work on the relationship between his concepts of field, habitus, and practice where he attempts to move beyond rigid interpretations of the relationship between structure and agency. With his simple, yet profound practice generating formula [(Habitus)(Capital)+Field=Practice], Bourdieu tries to “escape from under the philosophy

²⁹¹ CHOPRA, R. 2003. Neoliberalism as Doxa: Bourdieu's Theory of the State and the Contemporary Indian Discourse on Globalization and Liberalization. *Cultural Studies*, 17, 419-444.

²⁹² BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ WILLIAMS, M. C. 2007. *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*, Abingdon, Routledge.

²⁹⁵ LOYAL, S. 2017. *Bourdieu's Theory of the State: A Critical Introduction*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁹⁶ LEUNG, M. W. H. 2013. Read Ten Thousand Books, Walk Ten Thousand Miles: Geographical Mobility and Capital Accumulation among Chinese Scholars. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 38, 311-324.

²⁹⁷ LOYAL, S. 2017. *Bourdieu's Theory of the State: A Critical Introduction*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

²⁹⁸ BOURDIEU, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

of the subject without doing away with the agent, as well as from under the philosophy of the structure but without forgetting to take into account the effects it wields upon and through the agent”.²⁹⁹ In so doing, he demonstrates how “the subjective consciousness is structured by its relationship to phenomena and the conceptualization of knowledge”.³⁰⁰ This escape from the realism of the structure demonstrates a “return to practice, the site of the dialectic of the *opus operatum* and the *modus operandi*”.³⁰¹

Whereas sociologists often focus on agency and structure in their explanatory discourse, Bourdieu suggests a structure-disposition-practice scheme as a means for explaining construction of the social world. Disposition is the link between structure and behavior, he argues, demonstrating public and observable performances and the enactment of preferences. An agents’ disposition “translates structural principles of culture into live practice, with sufficient autonomy to allow observed social transformations to take place, but sufficiently conditioned as to effect the actual reproduction of social institutions”.³⁰² On one hand, enabled by competence in performing social practices, the repeated performance of disposition formulates a “range of preferences and allegiances, points and vectors” that behavior becomes so routinized it cannot be considered as part of agency.³⁰³ On the other, transformation remains possible, however constrained by preexisting institutions and the limits of capital accumulation and concentration.

Pointing to the double realities of a social world constructed by both structuralists’ and constructivists’ interpretations, Bourdieu suggests that we first put aside mundane representations to make room for the construction of objective structures, before introducing the “immediate lived experience of agents” as a means for revealing and explicating the categories of perception and appreciation (disposition) that structure their action from inside.³⁰⁴

²⁹⁹ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

³⁰⁰ GARRATT, L. 2016. Using Bourdieusian Scholarship to Understand the Body: Habitus, Hexis and Embodied Cultural Capital. In: THATCHER, J., INGRAM, N., BURKE, C. & ABRAHAMS, J. (eds.) *Bourdieu: The Next Generation*. New York: Routledge.

³⁰¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³⁰² NASH, R. 2003. Social Explanation and Socialization: On Bourdieu and the Structure, Disposition, Practice Scheme. *The Sociological Review*, 51, 43-62.

³⁰³ BOURDIEU, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

³⁰⁴ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Bourdieu makes an epistemological break and moves beyond the contradictions that exists between the objective and subjective and unites social phenomenology and structuralism. In effect, it is a process of “transposition of objective structures of the field into the subjective structures of action and thought of the agent”.³⁰⁵ It is a process that is both structuralist and constructivist at the same time, with the state comprising of procedures of systemic subjectivation of its normative content while paralleling the “incorporation of the subjective into the state objective”.³⁰⁶

By structuralist, Bourdieu submits that “there exists, within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.), objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representation”.³⁰⁷ Constructivism, he adds, “is a twofold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought, and action which are constitutive of...habitus, and on the other hand, of social structures, and particularly of...fields and of groups”.³⁰⁸

While we inherit our common understanding of the world from the past, for Bourdieu, “time is an act of construction,” with our practices and dispositions “reproduced in the present rather than the thinking consciousness”.³⁰⁹ It is pre-reflexive, unfolding in time as temporally structured and irreversible, with its rhythm, tempo, and directionality bringing about the constituting meaning.³¹⁰

Yet, there is an urgency and forward momentum, a ‘scene of action’ where anticipation gives “disproportionate weight to early experiences”.³¹¹ Regimes of action, those that carry some association, come together developing into legitimate configurations with empowering and symbolic effect. It is a “world of already realized ends – procedures to follow, paths to take – and of objects endowed with a permanent teleological character”.³¹² It is a system of embodied cognition where agents do not necessarily and consciously adjust to follow these realized ends but

³⁰⁵ YILMAZ, K. 2014. *Disengaging from terrorism : lessons from the Turkish penitents*, New York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

³⁰⁶ BANOS, F. V. 2017. The Field of Fields. The State According to Pierre Bourdieu. *Culture and History Digital Journal*, 6.

³⁰⁷ BOURDIEU, P. 1989. Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory*, 7, 14-25.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ MUELLER, J. C. 2016. *The Temporality of Political Obligation*, New York, Routledge.

³¹⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

rather maintain “dispositions durably inculcated by the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions inscribed in the objective conditions”.³¹³

Fields and Doxic Relationship

Bourdieu’s concept of field is one of stratification and domination, with fields serving as spaces for competition over the appropriation, circulation, and reproduction of knowledge and status. It is a space defined by negotiations over the form, value, and exchange rate of capital brought on by shifting social and empirical realities. These spaces are indeed typified by struggle over the distinctions that underpin competing notions and visions of the world. Organized around unique combinations of capital, fields are represented as groups, institutions, and communities, and provide the context in which individuals take on positions differentiated by their habitus and the logic that defines their diverse fields.³¹⁴

Taken as a system of social positions, Bourdieu explains that fields are determined by agent’s habitus, capital, and their interactions with the rules that constitute fields. At times, Bourdieu refers to the field as the context or setting in which habitus and capital interact, arguing that positions are organized in the interior of these spaces in terms of their relative power, a distinction that demarcates and differentiates legitimacy of both individual positions and the field itself.³¹⁵

In his later writings, Bourdieu would use the concepts of field, field of power, field of fields, and meta-field interchangeably with the concept of state, pointing out that the state – like his understanding of the field – is a space of struggle, negotiations, and surrender with competition within and among fields. Both are autonomous spheres of social life characterized by struggle over

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ GARRATT, L. 2016. Using Bourdieusian Scholarship to Understand the Body: Habitus, Hexis and Embodied Cultural Capital. In: THATCHER, J., INGRAM, N., BURKE, C. & ABRAHAM, J. (eds.) *Bourdieu: The Next Generation*. New York: Routledge.

³¹⁵ RILEY, D. 2015. The New Durkheim: Bourdieu and the State. *Critical Historical Studies*, 2, 261-279.

the definition, value, and distribution of social and cultural capital.³¹⁶ They both are understood similarly as the space where struggle materializes into a system of practices and social positions.³¹⁷

The relationship between agent and the field is seemingly a process of mutual constitution, one that plays out within existing social conventions.³¹⁸ On one hand, the field subtly informs the habitus,³¹⁹ similarly to that of a magnetic field. It is far reaching, yet not readily apparent.³²⁰ From economic, social, and cultural history that are “linked to displays of authority and the recognition of competence, to conventions of courtesy and etiquette,”³²¹ the field orients, while the agent accepts without contest.³²² Indeed, agents buy into the *illusio* without reservation, pursuing ways of life and practice that are preapproved of by other insiders.³²³ It is seemingly a space of practical sense, one that follows and adheres to notions of historic order, the same ones that continuously structure both the real and thought world.³²⁴

On the other hand, fields exist only to the extent that agents possess the constitutive dispositions and perceptual schemata that come to imbue and give meaning to it. For Bourdieu, without agents to bring life to fields, there would be no field. It is the agents’ interaction with the field that negotiates, shapes, and defines both its interior and perimeter. From one perspective,

³¹⁶ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³¹⁷ BURKE, C. 2016. Bourdieu's Theory of Practice: Maintaining the Role of Capital. In: THATCHER, J., INGRAM, N., BURKE, C. & ABRAHAM, J. (eds.) *Bourdieu: The Next Generation*. New York: Routledge.

³¹⁸ BEN-ARI, N. 2014. Political Dissidents as Translators, Editors and Publishers. In: ANGELELLI, C. V. (ed.) *The Sociological Turn in Translation and Interpreting Studies*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

³¹⁹ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

³²⁰ SWARTZ, D. L. 2016. Bourdieu's Concept of Field. *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

³²¹ CANFIELD, R. L. 2011. Efficacy and Hierarchy: Practices in Afghanistan as an Example. In: CANFIELD, R. L. & RASULY-PALECZEK, G. (eds.) *Ethnicity, Authority and Power in Central Asia: New Games Great and Small*. New York: Routledge.

³²² BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

³²³ MARTIN, J. L. & GREGG, F. 2015. Was Bourdieu a Field Theorist? In: HILGERS, M. & MANGEZ, E. (eds.) *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*. London: Routledge.

³²⁴ FERGUSON, K. 1999. *The Politics of Judgment: Aesthetics, Identity, and Political Theory*, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books.

habitus and the accompanying dispositions of social agents generate and accumulate through a history of the everyday, manifesting the field.

According to Bourdieu, this interaction between agent and field is a doxic relationship, a primary experience with the social world that is inherently based on underlying and fundamental beliefs – socialized, embodied and pre-reflexive regularities. It is a social world recognized and accepted as self-evident and more a sense of association than of consent and voluntarism.³²⁵ He continues that this is an experience of doxic adhesion, “the most absolute adhesion that a social order can obtain, since it is situated beyond even the constitution of the possibility of doing otherwise”.³²⁶ It is the durable and taken-for-granted, the “pre-conscious dispositions which generate and shape people’s attitudes, perceptions, and practices”³²⁷ inclining individuals, organizations, and communities to act and react in distinct ways.³²⁸

Bourdieu theorizes this social world as comprising of multiple fields, however; each of which is founded and functioning according to its own internal logic, rules, and regularities, binding its inhabitants in doxic relations. He stresses that in each case there is a unique doxa that underpins strategy, while *illusio* retains commitment to belief and “the game”.³²⁹

From one perspective, the state, as meta-field, comprise these fields and serves as an “all-encompassing viewpoint of all viewpoints,” relying on the collective logic, rules, and regularities within these fields.³³⁰ We may go so far as to say that, as meta-field, the state is inhabited and informed by this rich and diverse collective of fields. From another perspective, however, each of these field acts to triumph over one other and to act on and affect the state as meta-field.³³¹ Bourdieu submits that “it is no mixed metaphor to consider a field both a field of forces and a field

³²⁵ BOURDIEU, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

³²⁶ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

³²⁷ LOADER, I. 1997. Policing and the Social: Questions of Symbolic Power. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 48, 1-18.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ ATKINSON, W. 2020. Fields and Individuals: From Bourdieu to Lahire and Back Again. *European Journal of Social Theory* 1-16.

³³⁰ BANOS, F. V. 2017. The Field of Fields. The State According to Pierre Bourdieu. *Culture and History Digital Journal*, 6.

³³¹ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

of struggle,”³³² with both involving the appropriation of physical space and the accumulation of capital.³³³

While Bourdieu’s sociological outlook prioritizes social space over the physical, he does emphasize that the relationship between the two are reciprocal and reinforcing.³³⁴ Social structures are partly a result of their inscriptions in physical space, with reified physical space playing a role in determining the extent of the reproduction of social space.³³⁵ In fact, interaction between the social and the physical help determine the perimeter of social spaces.

In the context of the state, fields may be understood as appropriating physical space, with terrain placing checks on the reach and influence of authority, thereby moderating legitimacy. In this sense, rules and practices remain a local phenomenon, shaping and encouraging the institutionalization of unique local social and political order.

Reminding us that physical space is shaped through mutual externalities of part while social space is formed by mutual distinction of position, Bourdieu suggests that social order appropriates physical space by bestowing meaning and symbolism through spatial and social opposition.³³⁶ He explains, social “space tends to retranslate itself, in a more or less direct manner, into physical space in the form of a definite distributional arrangement of agents and properties”.³³⁷ Everyday life reinforces these distinctions, creating the inner and outer circle. What is thought to be right and proper for one community is not necessarily the same for another. In turn, the fundamentally distinct aspects of these social spaces inhabit and continuously (re)create divisions, classifications, and hierarchies that both shape and inform the composition of social positions, with capital accumulation driving legitimacy.

³³² MARTIN, J. L. & GREGG, F. 2015. Was Bourdieu a Field Theorist? In: HILGERS, M. & MANGEZ, E. (eds.) *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*. London: Routledge.

³³³ SWARTZ, D. L. 2016. Bourdieu's Concept of Field. *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

³³⁴ MAROM, N. 2014. Relating a City's History and Geography with Bourdieu: One Hundred Years of Spatial Distinction in Tel Aviv. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38, 1344-1362.

³³⁵ MARON, N. Ibid.

³³⁶ BOURDIEU, P. 2017. Social Space and the Genesis of Appropriated Physical Space. Ibid.42, 106-114.

³³⁷ Ibid.

Bourdieu submits that the representations that are imposed by a “point of view associated with a position held in local social space (such as the village) can prevent one from becoming aware of the position simultaneously occupied in national social space”.³³⁸ The “spatial distribution of power,” he argues “records the balance of social struggles over the profits of space”.³³⁹

When Marom applies Bourdieu’s framework to his study of cities, he found that the spatial dimension provides a means for interpreting and thinking about “the socially constructed, historically contingent and continuously changing divisions and segregations in cities”.³⁴⁰ The rise of urban centers, he argues, brought about a distinction that contrasts with rural communities, one that differs socially, economically, and politically. In his study, he points to gates, distance, and fences as demarcating a space and the creation of community arguing that these are indications “of how spatial dynamics are inseparable from social construction.

Practice, Beyond Structure and Agency

Bourdieu stresses that habitus is born of practice and so cannot be reduced to notions of structure and agency. Taking measures to distance himself from the models advanced by Levi-Strauss and Merleau-Ponty which maintained a structuralist and agency perspective, respectively,³⁴¹ he develops the concept of habitus with the aim of incorporating “the objective structures of society and the subjective role of agents within it”.³⁴² In so doing, he introduces a middle ground between the structuralist and phenomenologists with a turn to the concept of disposition as a tool of sociological analysis. As a structured structuring structure, habitus removes duality between the individual and society by capturing the “internalization of externalities and the externalization of internalities”.³⁴³ As the social embodiment of dispositions, habitus captures the

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ MAROM, N. 2014. Relating a City's History and Geography with Bourdieu: One Hundred Years of Spatial Distinction in Tel Aviv. Ibid.38, 1344-1362.

³⁴¹ BURKE, C. 2015. Habitus and Graduate Employment: A Re/Structured Structure and the Role of Biographical Research. In: COSTA, C. & MURPHY, M. (eds.) *Bourdieu, Habitus and Social Research: The Art of Application*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

³⁴² BOURDIEU, P. 2000b. The Politics of Protest. In: OVENDEN, K. (ed.). London: The Social Review.

³⁴³ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

performative nature of social structures as well as the generative and orienting mechanisms of history, all of which contribute to shaping the conditions of existence and bring meaning to practice. Indeed, the dialect that exists between habitus and structure rests on the 'everyday', with habitus, at times, thought of as analogous or even identical to embodied cultural capital.³⁴⁴

Practice is the "effect of actions and interactions which are shaped, simultaneously and in equal measure, by the habitus and capital of agents, as well as the context and dynamism constituted by their shared participation in a common game".³⁴⁵ It is the "result of the co-influence of objective structures as manifested in the forms of prevailing alternatives at a certain moment in history and the subjective structures inside the habitus manifested as dispositions directing the choices of the actor toward alternatives at a certain moment in history. The habitus, in turn, is "developed through the internalization of the objective structures of the environment in the form of practices".³⁴⁶

Migdal adds that "endless numbers of practices have fortified the image that the territorial markers on maps are real and effective".³⁴⁷ According to Migdal, there are a variety of practices and when they don't match with the state, they are not simply deviations from state codes (the normative good), but rather "moral codes in their own right, contending with that expressed in the state's image for predominance in recruitment of officials into state offices, distribution of state resources, discretion in the application of regulations, and much, much more".³⁴⁸

Habitus and Practice

Disposition, according to Bourdieu, is having a 'sense of the game' based partly on both rational response (limited, of course, to the universe of response associated with the field) and intuitive comprehension, a comprehension that is shaped by past experiences and "adjusted to

³⁴⁴ MOORE, R. 2008. Capital. In: GRENFELL, M. (ed.) *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited.

³⁴⁵ CROSSLEY, N. 2003. From Reproduction to Transformation: Social Movement Fields and the Radical Habitus. *Theory Culture Society*, 20, 43-68.

³⁴⁶ SIISIÄINEN, M. 2000. Two Concepts of Social Capital: Bourdieu vs. Putnam. *International Society for Third-Sector Research*. Dublin, Ireland: University of Jyväskylä.

³⁴⁷ MIGDAL, J. S. 2004. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

ongoing experiences in the field”.³⁴⁹ However, it “works below the level of consciousness, beyond control of the will, orienting our practices and perceptions, providing us...a sense of how to act and respond in the course of everyday life”.³⁵⁰ It is a “mediating link between actors and structures...inculcating dispositions that incline actors towards specific ways of being in the world and making sense of the world”.³⁵¹

Habitus is a collection of dispositions, each geared toward situations and conditions that constitute and typifies the individual and his community. Disposition is characterized by schemes of perception, thought, and action.³⁵² Habitus “vary not only between individuals...but between societies, educations, proprieties and fashion, and prestige”. Everything an individual or community does is mediated by habitus.³⁵³ Indeed, it is this sort of ingrained acknowledgement that legitimizes and reproduces both the individual and community, rendering alternative ways of seeing and doing things unimaginable. Society, it is argued, becomes “deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions...and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determined ways”.³⁵⁴

As a product of history, habitus (re)produces the individual as collections of practices that lay out a scheme.³⁵⁵ Indeed, the constitution and durability of political space is dependent on the perceptual schemata and resident constitutive disposition of agents, a disposition that is an accumulation of this history and the varying levels and differentiated character of the species of capital.

³⁴⁹ ATKINSON, W. 2020. Fields and Individuals: From Bourdieu to Lahire and Back Again. *European Journal of Social Theory* 1-16.

³⁵⁰ LI, H. 2015. Moving to the City: Educational Trajectories of Rural Chinese Students in an Elite University. In: COSTA, C. & MURPHY, M. (eds.) *Bourdieu, Habitus and Social Research: The Art of Application*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

³⁵¹ STOKKE, K. 2013. Conceptualizing the Politics of Citizenship. *Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia*. Oslo: University of Oslo.

³⁵² BOURDIEU, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

³⁵³ CROSSLEY, N. 2013. Habit and Habitus. *Body and Society*, 19, 136-161.

³⁵⁴ WACQUANT, L. J. D. 2005a. Habitus. *International encyclopedia of economic sociology*, 316.

³⁵⁵ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Habitus is not the same as habit, however. In short form, the distinction between habit and habitus is a distinction between the body and belief.³⁵⁶ Habit is mechanical, rigid, and reflexive to stimulus.³⁵⁷ Habit confines agents to instinct, denying them any agency in controlling their impulses.³⁵⁸ It is largely Pavlovian. Habitus, on the other hand, is pre-reflexive. Because of this, Bourdieu suggests that “in order to locate the habitus, we must look for constant repetition of both actions and *attitudes*.”³⁵⁹

Habitus is defined as “durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practice”.³⁶⁰ On a fundamental level, habitus represents the norms, values, and dispositions of individuals, institutions, and communities.³⁶¹ It acts “as a reservoir of meanings and recipes for action assigned by, produced by, and synchronized with the fields that provided them...in the first place, and which in turn habitus tends to reproduce through its action”.³⁶² As such, habitus makes possible the ability to “move within an environment and simply fit without conscious effort”.³⁶³ Habitus “supplies at once a principle of sociation and individuation: *sociation* because our categories of judgment, sensibility, and conduct, coming from society, are shared by all those who were subjected to similar social conditions and conditionings (thus one can speak of a masculine habitus, a bourgeois

³⁵⁶ KAUPPI, N. 2020. *The Politics of Embodiment Habits, Power, and Pierre Bourdieu's Theory*, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, GmbH.

³⁵⁷ CROSSLEY, N. 2013. Habit and Habitus. *Body and Society*, 19, 136-161.

³⁵⁸ MOZUMDER, M. G. N. 2020. Aristotelian Habitus and the Power of the Embodied Self: Reflections on the Insights Gained from the Fakirs in Bangladesh. *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*, 17, 23-39.

³⁵⁹ BURKE, C. 2015. Habitus and Graduate Employment: A Re/Structured Structure and the Role of Biographical Research. In: COSTA, C. & MURPHY, M. (eds.) *Bourdieu, Habitus and Social Research: The Art of Application*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

³⁶⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³⁶¹ BURKE, C. 2016. Bourdieu's Theory of Practice: Maintaining the Role of Capital. In: THATCHER, J., INGRAM, N., BURKE, C. & ABRAHAM, J. (eds.) *Bourdieu: The Next Generation*. New York: Routledge.

³⁶² WIDICK, R. 2004. Flesh and the Free Market: (On taking Bourdieu to the Options Exchange). In: SWARTZ, D. L. & ZOLBERG, V. L. (eds.) *After Bourdieu: Influence, Critique, Elaboration*. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

³⁶³ GARRATT, L. 2016. Using Bourdieusian Scholarship to Understand the Body: Habitus, Hexis and Embodied Cultural Capital. In: THATCHER, J., INGRAM, N., BURKE, C. & ABRAHAM, J. (eds.) *Bourdieu: The Next Generation*. New York: Routledge.

habitus, a national habitus, etc., corresponding to the major social principles of vision and division, but also of an artistic habitus, a juridical habitus, etc., corresponding to specific institutions”.³⁶⁴

Habitus is “not a knowing consciousness, but a ‘practical sense...inhabited by the world it inhabits, pre-occupied by the world in which it actively intervenes, in an immediate relationship of involvement, tension and attention, which constructs the world and gives it meaning”.³⁶⁵ Habitus provides the ‘rules of engagement’ and a sense of how one is to react in certain situations.³⁶⁶ It is the “unchosen principle of all choices”.³⁶⁷ Powerfully constraining, habitus constitutes a “universe beyond which it is almost impossible to think”, with classificatory schemes derived from tradition and historic conditions of existence that demarcate social worlds, shaping perceptions and dispositions.³⁶⁸

Habitus as Structured Structure

Habitus is both structured (“by past social milieus”) as well as structuring structure (“of present perceptions, emotions, and actions”); it is both product and producer of social worlds.³⁶⁹ Bourdieu takes the individual, family, and community as both objective and subjective social categories.³⁷⁰ In the objective sense, community, for example, is a structuring structure which generates and structures practices and representations which “can be objectively regulated and regular without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations

³⁶⁴ WACQUANT, L. J. D. 2016. A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus. *The Sociological Review*, 64, 64-72.

³⁶⁵ BOURDIEU, P. 2000a. *Pascalian Meditations*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³⁶⁶ PRET, T., SHAW, E. & DODD, S. D. 2016. Painting the Full Picture: The Conversion of Economic, Cultural, Social and Symbolic Capital. *International Small Business Journal*, 34, 1004-1027.

³⁶⁷ WACQUANT, L. J. D. 2016. A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus. *The Sociological Review*, 64, 64-72.

³⁶⁸ GOODMAN, J. E. 2009. The Proverbial Bourdieu: Habitus and the Politics of Representation in the Ethnography of Kabylia. In: GOODMAN, J. E. & SILVERSTEIN, P. A. (eds.) *Bourdieu in Algeria: Colonial Politics, Ethnographic Practices, Theoretical Development*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

³⁶⁹ IBRAHIM, J. 2015. *Bourdieu and Social Movements: Ideological Struggles in the British Anti-Capitalist Movement*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

³⁷⁰ REED-DANAHAY, D. 2005. *Locating Bourdieu*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor”.³⁷¹

Habitus is a “system in as much as it expresses the coherence of a set of dispositions that can be traced back to a single locus: early socialization”.³⁷² It is shaped by the conditioning process of early socialization and the enduring dispositions which continue to inform habitus throughout the history of a people.³⁷³ It is a “system of internalized dispositions that mediate between social structures and practical activity, being shaped by the former and regulating the later”.³⁷⁴ Ascription “of meaning to the experiences of the world is an important operation, beginning early through socialization, when the schemes of perception, judgment, and action of the habitus are generated”.³⁷⁵ This “early socialization takes precedence, upon which is superimposed secondary socialization. Internalization proceeds without resistance, and, for the most part, gives rise to an integrated, singular self”.³⁷⁶ In response, habitus reinforces predetermined courses of thought and action, reifying the regularities that exist among individuals, groups, and institutions.³⁷⁷

According to some interpretations, early socialization endures and are “not subject to change by later socialization or by external circumstances”.³⁷⁸ Habitus is “not something one can have temporarily; instead, it is the quality that one must ingrain deep into one’s core self that

³⁷¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

³⁷² FABIANI, J.-L. 2018. Theory and Practice in French Sociology after Pierre Bourdieu. In: HALLEY, J. A. & SONOLET, D. (eds.) *Bourdieu in Question: New Directions in French Sociology of Art*. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

³⁷³ SALIMI-KOUCHI, E. & REZAEIAN, M. 2015. Dashed Hopes and Good Intentions: A Bourdieuan Reading of Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* *Lublin Studies in Modern Languages and Literature*, 39, 50-64.

³⁷⁴ BOURDIEU, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

³⁷⁵ SCHAFER, H. W. 2015. *Habitus Analysis 1: Epistemology and Language*, Wiesbaden, Springer.

³⁷⁶ BURAWOY, M. 2018. Making Sense of Bourdieu. *Catalyst*, 2.

³⁷⁷ SWARTZ, D. L. 2016. Bourdieu's Concept of Field. *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

³⁷⁸ FABIANI, J.-L. 2018. Theory and Practice in French Sociology after Pierre Bourdieu. In: HALLEY, J. A. & SONOLET, D. (eds.) *Bourdieu in Question: New Directions in French Sociology of Art*. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

cannot be altered easily”.³⁷⁹ Habitus generates and perpetuates particular regularities of reason and common sense behaviors “which are possible within the limits of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of a particular field, whose objective future they anticipate”.³⁸⁰ In fact, part of the role of habitus is to “synthesize binaries and overcome ontological contradictions”.³⁸¹

Habitus as Structuring Structure

As a structured structure, habitus is a system of classifications, dispositions, and schemata of perceptions that is constituted through interaction with the field (structure). As structured structure, taste is not personal but rather social, imposed by the ideology of the dominant class. Structured is that “embodied dispositions are rooted in social conditions and generated through contextual habituation”.³⁸² Inherently shared and perpetuating, habitus is both individual and collective, defining individual experience within fields of practice and collective association within social spaces.³⁸³

Bourdieu explains, however, that habitus “is not the fate that some people read into it. Being the product of history, it is an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. It’s durable but not eternal”.³⁸⁴ Embodied dispositions formed throughout the life of an individual or the history of a community inform habitus in shaping social action, rather than rendering habitus deterministic. In fact, experience “will usually confirm the habitus because most people are statistically bound to encounter circumstances that tend to agree with those that

³⁷⁹ MOZUMDER, M. G. N. 2020. Aristotelian Habitus and the Power of the Embodied Self: Reflections on the Insights Gained from the Fakirs in Bangladesh. *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*, 17, 23-39.

³⁸⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³⁸¹ STEINMETZ, G. 2006. Bourdieu's Disavowal of Lacan: Psychoanalytic Theory and the Concepts of "Habitus" and "Symbolic Capital". *Constellations*, 13, 445-464.

³⁸² STOKKE, K. 2013. Conceptualizing the Politics of Citizenship. *Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia*. Oslo: University of Oslo.

³⁸³ STOKKE, K. 2017. Politics of Citizenship: Towards an Analytical Framework. *Norwegian Journal of Geography*, 71, 193-207.

³⁸⁴ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

originally fashioned their habitus”.³⁸⁵ This makes sense as it is the day-to-day activities and interaction (practice) that are embodied and reproduced as culture and the everyday.

The “accumulation of capital within a defined habitus creates a vantage point for assessing how people make sense of the social world as well as their capability to act within it”.³⁸⁶ Possession of “certain amounts and types of capital structure the space of possible and conceivable ‘moves’ within a field: what appears doable for each individual in the quest for capital”.³⁸⁷

This idea of practical knowledge is “drawn upon when negotiating unfamiliar social contexts or fields”.³⁸⁸ In times of crisis and uncertainty, people often fall back on these practical foundations of knowledge, the traditional rules and principles that have weathered the test of time and troubled histories. Bourdieu adds, “supposed contradictions between interest and emotion could be dissolved with the concept of the habitus”.³⁸⁹

While “mobility is an under-theorized area of Bourdieu’s analysis – his focus being on a fairly stable and durable habitus formed during the primary socialization of childhood – he did at time acknowledge that one’s habitus can and must adapt to new circumstances such as an upward class trajectory”.³⁹⁰ Being the product of history, it is an “open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. It is durable but not eternal! Having said this, I must immediately add that there is a probability, inscribed in the social destiny associated with definite social conditions, that experiences will confirm habitus, because most people are statistically

³⁸⁵ COCKERHAM, W. C. & HINOTE, B. P. 2009. Quantifying Habitus: Future Directions. In: ROBSON, K. & SANDERS, C. (eds.) *Quantifying Theory: Pierre Bourdieu*. Ontario: Springer.

³⁸⁶ YOUNG JR., A. A. 1999. The (Non) Accumulation of Capital: Explicating the Relationship of Structure and Agency in the Lives of Poor Black Men. *Sociological Theory*, 17, 201-227.

³⁸⁷ ATKINSON, W. 2020. Fields and Individuals: From Bourdieu to Lahire and Back Again. *European Journal of Social Theory* 1-16.

³⁸⁸ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

³⁸⁹ BOURDIEU, P. 1996. On the Family as a Realized Category. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 13, 19-26.

³⁹⁰ DEERY, J. 2019. Class Hybridity and the Habitus Clive on American Reality Television. In: POLSON, E., CLARK, L. S. & GAJJALA, R. (eds.) *The Routledge Companion to Media and Class Routledge*. New York: Routledge.

bound to encounter circumstances that tend to agree with those that originally fashioned their habitus”.³⁹¹

Studying the relationship between practice and habitus involves understanding the role and effect of time, the dialectic that exists between structure and habitus and how the foundation of it all rests on the everyday. First, as things take on a different sense when time separates practice from analysis, a proper understanding of the relationship between practice and habitus is best served when examinations are conducted from the point of action. Indeed, the “antinomy between the time of science and time of action...tends to destroy practice by imposing on it the intemporal time of science”.³⁹²

Habitus Clivé and Double Consciousness

Habitus Clivé is a state of double consciousness involving contradictions and misalignments between habitus and the field.³⁹³ It is a tension that is sometimes brought on by an agents’ attempt to simultaneously accept transformation and mobility while holding onto the past and the dispositions that were informed and shaped by the habitus of origin.³⁹⁴ As a result, objective conditions contradict embodied habitus. Indeed, it is a “rift within one’s sense of self, an internalized conflict, resulting from what can be thought of as ‘out of field’ experience”.³⁹⁵

Some of this disjuncture could be blamed on sudden and/or sustained change, as in the case of colonialism or interventions characterized by immediacy. In fact, Bourdieu’s theory of habitus emerged from his reflections on the disjuncture inaugurated during the colonial era. These sorts of

³⁹¹ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

³⁹² BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

³⁹³ AARSETH, H., LAYTON, L. & NIELSEN, H. B. Conflicts in the Habitus: The Emotional Work of Becoming Modern. *The Sociological Review*, 64, 148-165.

³⁹⁴ STAHL, G. 2018. Putting Habitus to Work: Habitus Clivé, Negotiated Aspirations and a Counter-Habitus? In: STAHL, G., WALLACE, D., BURKE, C. & THREADGOLD, S. (eds.) *International Perspectives on Theorizing Aspirations: Applying Bourdieu's Tools*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

³⁹⁵ MALLMAN, M. 2018. Disruption in the Working-Class Family: The Early Origins of Social Mobility and Habitus Clivé. In: LAWLER, S. & PAYNE, G. (eds.) *Social Mobility for the 21st Century: Everyone a Winner?* Melbourne: Routledge.

interaction bring about and indeed impose disruptive change. In cases of sustained intervention, such as colonialism, continued disjuncture renders the habitus unable to synthesize.

As is discerned from my explanation thus far, the durableness that Bourdieu presupposes of the habitus is not without some labor. While Bourdieu suggests several times throughout his writings that habitus is a system of dispositions that are “permanent manners of being, seeing, acting, and thinking,” he notes elsewhere that habitus is “long-standing” rather than permanent “schemes or schemata or structures of perception, conception, and action”.³⁹⁶ Rooted in original knowledge, at times habitus may come ‘out of sync’ with the dynamism of social and political space. People can find that their “expectations and ways of living are suddenly out of step with the new social position they find themselves in”.³⁹⁷ Bourdieu explains his own experience of split habitus or habitus clivé (or cleft habitus), as a sense of “in-betweenness when trying to approach a new social context...which [in his case] resulted from his elevated social position in academia and his low social origins”.³⁹⁸ Cleft habitus comes about when habitus encounters a new and often contradictory field, causing an internalization of divided structures. For Bourdieu, this feeling of in-betweenness was a result of experiencing a social space and processes that one was not born into and was now swayed to learn and adapt.

In such cases, agents’ mental structures are ‘out of sync’ with the field, producing a “heightened consciousness associated with an effort of transformation”.³⁹⁹ We can compare this to moving across fields where it may “well require a ‘genuine qualitative leap’ for both social agents and those who seek to investigate and understand it”.⁴⁰⁰ Indeed, there is a sense of ontological insecurity and a continued feeling of disconnectedness between the original self and

³⁹⁶ INGRAM, N. & ABRAHAMS, J. 2016. Stepping Outside of Oneself: How a Cleft-Habitus can Lead to Greater Reflexivity through Occupying “The Third Space”. In: THATCHER, J., INGRAM, N., BURKE, C. & ABRAHAMS, J. (eds.) *Bourdieu: The Next Generation*. New York: Routledge.

³⁹⁷ BOURDIEU, P. 2000b. The Politics of Protest. In: OVENDEN, K. (ed.). London: The Social Review.

³⁹⁸ ZACHRISON, M. 2014. *Invisible Voices: Understanding the Sociocultural Influences on Adult Migrants' Second Language Learning and Communicative Interaction*. PhD, Linköping University.

³⁹⁹ AARSETH, H., LAYTON, L. & NIELSEN, H. B. Conflicts in the Habitus: The Emotional Work of Becoming Modern. *The Sociological Review*, 64, 148-165.

⁴⁰⁰ THOMSON, P. 2008. Field. In: GRENFELL, M. (ed.) *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*. Stocksfield: Acument.

the modified potential. As in Bourdieu's case, social mobility instigates this divided habitus "creating a source of ambiguity, paralysis, and discomfort".⁴⁰¹ In response, agents may consider a modified counter-habitus, one that allows for moving past the dialectic confrontation that exists between habitus and field, and return things to a state of equilibrium, renewing meaning and legitimacy to both their position and the field.⁴⁰²

In his review and critique of Bourdieu's use of the concept of habitus, Mozumder calls on the concept of *hysteresis* to help explain this experience of split habitus. Hysteresis, in general, is understood as represented by a sort of structural lag "between the exertion of a social force and the deployment of its effect".⁴⁰³ In practical terms, an agent moves up the social ranks, but fails to prepare for all that accompanies their new position and is thereby confronted with anxiety.

Comparing Bourdieu's understanding of the concept of habitus against Aristotle's, Mozumder argues that Bourdieu fails to account for the power of purposeful action and change. He claims that Bourdieu purges habitus of its classical meaning of 'virtuous disposition' and explains that Aristotle's model highlights the capacity for change through "training the self...to embody virtuous dispositions...to cultivate an ethical subjectivity".⁴⁰⁴ People and communities, according to these assumptions, have the power to learn, cultivate, and embody heterodox subjectivities and socialities. According to Mozumder, the ability to "radically transform [] the self at will".⁴⁰⁵

Still, Mozumder points out that Aristotle argues that habitus is "not something one can have temporarily; instead, it is the quality that one must ingrain deep into one's core self that cannot be altered easily".⁴⁰⁶ Quoting from Aristotle's *Categories*, "a hexis is constitutive of the person, insofar as it has 'become through length of time part of a man's nature and irremediable

⁴⁰¹ AARSETH, H., LAYTON, L. & NIELSEN, H. B. Conflicts in the Habitus: The Emotional Work of Becoming Modern. *The Sociological Review*, 64, 148-165.

⁴⁰² STAHL, G. 2015. Egalitarian Habitus: Narratives of Reconstruction in Discourses of Aspiration and Change. In: COSTA, C. & MURPHY, M. (eds.) *Bourdieu, Habitus and Social Research: The Art of Application*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁰³ MOZUMDER, M. G. N. 2020. Aristotelian Habitus and the Power of the Embodied Self: Reflections on the Insights Gained from the Fakirs in Bangladesh. *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*, 17, 23-39.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

or exceedingly hard to change”.⁴⁰⁷ He points to the corroboration of Nederman who submits that habitus is “human’s ‘second nature’ which is...difficult to achieve and alter”.⁴⁰⁸

Depending on the “degree of commitment to the inherent logic of the field,” the interaction of social agents with the rules that constitute a political space either conserve or transform the structure and “relations of forces that is constitutive of the field”.⁴⁰⁹ Think here of the difference between associative and voluntary commitments and the indifferent position to the actual content.⁴¹⁰ Differentiated perceptual schemata move beyond universal rules and assumptions that capture broad consensus of understanding about social and political life; they transcend boundaries and borders constituted through international law. Differentiated perceptual schemata materialize in the fields and through the rules that comprise localized phenomenon.⁴¹¹

2.1.3 Symbolic Violence, Misrecognition, and Constitution of the State

Thus far, I demonstrated how Bourdieu’s key concepts provide for a good interpretation of state-society relations, the role society plays in state consolidation, and statebuilding. In particular, the previous sections explored the relational nature between field, habitus, and capital, and how the non-independence and regularities among these concepts negotiate the shape of social and political space. In this section, I will explain how Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic violence and misrecognition are indicative of the challenging final stages of state formation.

Bourdieu contests Weber’s assumption that legitimacy and the successful consolidation of state rests on its coercive ability. For Weber, the state is defined by its capacity and demonstrated ability to exercise a monopoly on the use of *physical* force within its territory. Ideally, according to his theory, state policing apparatus and defense force mechanisms maintain sufficient

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ MARTIN, J. L. & GREGG, F. 2015. Was Bourdieu a Field Theorist? In: HILGERS, M. & MANGEZ, E. (eds.) *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields: Concepts and Applications*. London: Routledge.

⁴¹⁰ CASSIRER, E. 1923. *Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company.

⁴¹¹ SWARTZ, D. L. 2016. Bourdieu's Concept of Field. *Oxford Bibliographies*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

effectiveness in enforcing domestic order and repelling foreign threats such that the state maintains its autonomy and supreme authority over social and political space.

According to Bourdieu, this physical capacity to keep the domestic population and territorial integrity in check is insufficient for meeting and maintaining legitimacy, however. Rather, he submits that the state is constituted and functions on a symbolic level, and is not purely the consequence of the physical capacity and accomplishments advanced by Weber.⁴¹² Bourdieu logics that a monopoly on symbolic violence is indeed a precondition for the legitimate exercise of physical violence.⁴¹³ It is a violence that derives from recognition and appreciation of shared categories of perception, an appreciation that is embedded and “exercised with the acquiescence of those who suffer it”.⁴¹⁴ Indeed, without need for coercion or consent, the state is enabled to standardize codes, such as citizenship, calendars, and language, thereby becoming, “the main agent and primary instrument of the social construction of reality”.⁴¹⁵ The state’s monopoly on symbolic violence allows it to “create logical conformity (shared views) and moral conformity (shared values) in the population or society that it governs”.⁴¹⁶

The state is a social and political space founded on the historic accumulation of the common beliefs that contribute to giving shape to the disposition of people. Indeed, where norms and similar values are widely shared, leaders more easily wield influence, with accumulated symbolic capital serving as an instrument for maintaining the status quo.⁴¹⁷ Regardless of the orientation or species (economic, social, political, etc.), administrative practices result in informational capital that come to “facilitate the state’s exercise of symbolic power by helping to constitute (what is then taken to be) the natural order of things”.⁴¹⁸ However, where the political

⁴¹² ELIAS, N. 1994. *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford, Blackwell.

⁴¹³ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

⁴¹⁴ JESSOP, B. 2012. The Central Bank of Symbolic Capital. *Radical Philosophy*, 193, 33-41.

⁴¹⁵ ARNHOLTZ, J. & HAMMERSLEV, O. 2013. Transcended Power of the State: The Role of Actors in Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of the State. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, 14, 42-64.

⁴¹⁶ JESSOP, B. 2012. The Central Bank of Symbolic Capital. *Radical Philosophy*, 193, 33-41.

⁴¹⁷ BIRNER, R. & WITTMER, H. 2000. Converting Social Capital into Political Capital: How do local communities gain political influence? A Theoretical approach and empirical evidence from Thailand and Columbia. *The 8th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP)*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.

⁴¹⁸ LOVEMAN, M. 2005. The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 1651-1683.

system fails to meet the believe structure of the people, symbolic capital will be short lived and degrade over time.

Thus, legitimate statehood is not founded merely on its monopoly on the use of force or on the recognition of territory by the international community. Rather, the people that occupy a political space must embody a sense of association to the space they occupy. It is a space of agreement over the categories of thought and perception, a space of concentrated culture and the foundation of both a logical and moral conformity that shapes and reproduces a unified cultural habitus of the people and the realities of their social world.

The “state is able to exert symbolic violence...because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought”.⁴¹⁹ It is the acceptance, prioritization, and privileging of the various species of capital that shape and encode the symbolic nature of capital in the first place.

Together, state and society contribute to maintaining mutual recognition and a relatively fixed exchange rate among various capital, without which social and/or political crisis is likely to emerge. Moreover, with a monopoly on both physical and symbolic violence, the state sets out to maintain guarantees on mutual recognition of the relative value among different forms of capital.⁴²⁰

Misrecognition and the Transformation of Capital

Bourdieu takes this idea of a *sense of association* by the people further with his concepts of *doxa* and *doxic adhesion*. For Bourdieu, there is “no more absolute recognition than the recognition of *doxa* since it is not even perceived as recognition”.⁴²¹ It follows a logic that “the state is not recognized as historical but recognized with [such] an absolute recognition – that is the

⁴¹⁹ BOURDIEU, P. 2009. Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. In: SCOTT, A., NASH, K. & SMITH, A. M. (eds.) *New Critical Writings in Political Sociology Volume One: Power, State and Inequality*. London: Routledge.

⁴²⁰ RILEY, D. 2015. The New Durkheim: Bourdieu and the State. *Critical Historical Studies*, 2, 261-279.

⁴²¹ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

recognition of misrecognition”.⁴²² Displacing reality, this misrecognition serves as the principal source of symbolic violence. It is a “bodily inculcation of social structures and the formation of deep unconscious habitus,” forging a recognition of “violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such”.⁴²³

Culture is the principal site of misrecognition, taken as second nature where individuals understand themselves as “perfectly disinterested and unblemished by any cynical or mercenary use of culture”.⁴²⁴ It is a foundational principle that shapes and defines human interaction and serves as a ‘special’ terrain for domination. Indeed, “all symbolic systems are anchored in culture and thus determine our understanding of reality”.⁴²⁵ This process of misrecognition bears a genetic relationship wherein meaning is generated through give and take over time, with behavior engendering behavior. It is a history and correspondence between social and mental structures, one that “has to establish the specific logic of the genesis of bureaucratic logic and simultaneously to describe the specific nature of the logic”.⁴²⁶

In explaining doxic adhesion and misrecognition, Bourdieu takes the example of the types of punishment that is handed down by the courts. Under most circumstance, he points out, caging or executing people would be considered a crime in itself, a very serious crime indeed. Yet, because of the acknowledgement and recognized legitimacy of the state and its courts, much of this reasoning is discounted, overlooked, and arguably forgotten on several levels. According to this logic, he posits that accumulation of the physical capacity needed to enact such punishment cannot proceed without either “simultaneous or prior accumulation of symbolic capital”.⁴²⁷ This is not to say that the symbolic must come before the physical. Rather, even in the prior instance the symbolic and the physical are co-constituted – interdependent and socially constructed.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

⁴²⁴ BOURDIEU, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

⁴²⁵ NAVARRO, Z. 2006. In Search of a Cultural Interpretation of Power: The Contribution of Pierre Bourdieu. *IDS Bulletin*, 37, 11-22.

⁴²⁶ BOURDIEU, P. 2014. *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

One of the main purposes of Bourdieu's work was to "explicate the specificity and potency of symbolic power, that is, the capacity that systems of meaning and signification have of shielding, and thereby strengthening, relations of oppression and exploitation by hiding them under the cloak of nature, benevolence, and meritocracy".⁴²⁸ Under such circumstance, the dominant group monopolizes privileges, imposing its world view as legitimate and superior, marking cultural distance, proximity, and perimeter.⁴²⁹ Indeed, with respect to the state, symbolic power makes its largely incomprehensible to act 'outside the state'.⁴³⁰ The dominant is indeed often embodied with sufficient symbolic capital to impose that which is to be (mis)recognized. Indeed, symbolic power is relational – generating through the interaction of those who hold power and those who submit. This is observable where leaders speak for the group and its codes and practices (e.g., moral code, legislation).⁴³¹

This exchange is less about direct coercion and more about when the dominated stop questioning existing social order and take their world as given, natural, and unchangeable. Like fish in water, they become oblivious to and misrecognize the meaning of the conditions and practices that envelop them. It is misrecognition that generates a domination such that agents remain unaware of our own subordination.⁴³² It is a process "whereby power relations are perceived 'not for what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder'".⁴³³

The symbolic power of the dominant is constituted and shaped through this misrecognition, resulting in, and reinforcing, unwitting imposition of limits on the dominated. Misrecognition, as such, is not merely influence; it is more 'powerful and insidious' than mere propaganda and

⁴²⁸ BANOS, F. V. 2017. The Field of Fields. The State According to Pierre Bourdieu. *Culture and History Digital Journal*, 6. See also : WACQUANT, L. J. D. 2005b. Tras has Huellas del Poder Simbolico. In: LOIC, W. (ed.) *El Misterio del Ministerio. Pierre Bourdieu y la Politica Democratica*. Barcelona: Gedisa.

⁴²⁹ BOURDIEU, P. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

⁴³⁰ LOVEMAN, M. 2005. The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 1651-1683.

⁴³¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1990a. *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

⁴³² NAVARRO, Z. 2006. In Search of a Cultural Interpretation of Power: The Contribution of Pierre Bourdieu. *IDS Bulletin*, 37, 11-22.

⁴³³ BOURDIEU, P. & PASSERON, J.-C. 1990. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, London, Sage Publications.

communicative interaction. It is that hidden persuasion, embedded in the order of things such as a judge's verdict, a birth certificate, or state identification⁴³⁴ – in a sense, blind legitimization.

It is a violence that inhabits the unconscious regions of structures, perpetuating hierarchy, and dominance. Acting on the habitus, it manipulates the field and the rules that characterize the social and political space. It becomes embedded in the “very mode of action and structure of cognition”.⁴³⁵ Indeed, with the cognitive (perception) deriving from the “very structures of the world,” the social world itself becomes as a result of agents taking their social and political space for granted.⁴³⁶ Indeed, individuals are complicit in their own submission through an understanding of his domination as legitimate, an ignorance to its arbitrariness, and his internalization of this domination. Individuals “contribute to producing the efficacy of that which determines them insofar as they structure what determines them”.⁴³⁷ It is a state of self-imposition, reinforcement, and perpetuation where domination arises and takes hold with a “fit between determinants and the categories of perception”.⁴³⁸ The dominated, in fact, are likely to maintain a sense of indebtedness, dependency, and gratitude⁴³⁹ – a sense that motivates the social order to reproduce through the inculcation of habitus and necessary misrecognition, the primary cognition which falls back on “recognition of an order which is also established in the mind.”⁴⁴⁰ Bourdieu “emphasized that a plausible theory of practice had to have a component in which we become the sort-of-beast that

⁴³⁴ BLACKLEDGE, A. 2008. The Magical Frontier between the Dominant and the Dominated: Sociolinguistics and Social Justice in a Multilingual World. *Multilingual Multicultural Development*, 27, 22-41.

⁴³⁵ WACQUANT, L. J. D. 2008. Pierre Bourdieu. In: STONE, R. (ed.) *Key Contemporary Thinkers*. Berkeley: University of Berkeley.

⁴³⁶ THAPAR-BJORKERT, S., SAMELIUS, L. & SANGHERA, G. S. 2016. Exploring Symbolic Violence in the Everyday: Misrecognition, Condescension, Consent and Complicity. *Feminist Review*, 112, 144-162.

⁴³⁷ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ THAPAR-BJORKERT, S., SAMELIUS, L. & SANGHERA, G. S. 2016. Exploring Symbolic Violence in the Everyday: Misrecognition, Condescension, Consent and Complicity. *Feminist Review*, 112, 144-162.

⁴⁴⁰ BOURDIEU, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

we are. That is, that we develop that particular set of responses and dispositions to the world that allow the world's properties to be meaningful to *us*".⁴⁴¹

Symbolic Violence and the Double Consciousness

Jung proposes a rethinking of Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence, arguing that Bourdieu's assumption of unanimity of *doxa* (that which is taken for granted) is incorrect. Whereas Bourdieu believes that *doxic* relationship is experienced equally by both the dominant and the dominated, Jung suggests *doxic asymmetry* wherein the dominated understands his position, yet the dominant continues to take it for granted. Borrowing from Du Bois's concept of *double consciousness*, Jung reconceptualizes the *doxic* experience. Although Jung admits that he does "not dispute that there is a large realm of the established order that goes unquestioned by the dominant and dominated alike," he does question the assumption that there are only two realms – that of the undiscussed/undisputed and that of the discourse/argument. He claims that Bourdieu's "theoretical model leaves no room for disagreement over what is implicit,"⁴⁴² and that it is suggested that the dominated take things as the natural order just as much as the dominant. Jung suggests "that there is a certain asymmetry of doxa that accords with, if imperfectly, the asymmetry of relations of domination".⁴⁴³

Borrowing from Du Bois, Jung compares the position of the dominated as "gifted with second-sight, able and indeed compelled to see the world through the eyes of the dominant as well as through their own".⁴⁴⁴ Articulated in the idiom of Bourdieu, "the dominated recognize, if only partially, the cultural arbitrary of the relation of domination that the dominant misrecognize as natural".⁴⁴⁵ Indeed, Jung suggests Bourdieu himself alludes to this 'second-sight' when comparing his provincial social background against that of French society:

⁴⁴¹ BOURDIEU, P. 1969. Intellectual Field and Creative Project. *Social Science Information*, 8, 89-119.

⁴⁴² JUNG, M.-K. 2004. Symbolic and Physical Violence: Legitimate State Coercion of Filipino Workers in Prewar Hawai'i. *American Studies*, 45, 107-137.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

*“It gives you a sort of objective and subjective externality and puts you in a particular relation to the central institutions of French society and therefore to the intellectual institutions. There are subtle (and not so subtle) forms of social racism that cannot but make you perceptive; being constantly reminded of your otherness stimulates a sort of permanent sociological vigilance. It helps you perceive things that others cannot see or feel”.*⁴⁴⁶

Jung believes that Bourdieu was touching on a third realm and suggests “that symbolic violence should be rethought of as...*tacit nonrecognition*” wherein there is a symbolic order “in which subaltern consciousness, or heterodox discourses, is not consciously recognized, or even recognizable, by the dominant”.⁴⁴⁷ Yet, the dominated are aware, however subtly. Here, symbolic violence is a ‘matter of course’ for the dominant while the dominated do not take things for granted and are conscious of and question the way things are.

For Jung, “the effect of symbolic violence is to render its victims – whose discourses are so illegitimate as to be below conscious recognition and engagement by the dominant – susceptible to various forms of discrimination, including physical violence”.⁴⁴⁸ Indeed, if there is some level of conscious recognition of subaltern discourse by the dominant, the legitimacy of physical violence may come under scrutiny.

As advanced in the previous section, political obligation is concerned with the relationship between people and their political community (the political field), and the moral requirements necessary for the former to accept and conform to the principles of the latter. However, such conformity is not always met. Bourdieu references a ‘*crisis*’ in his work, a situation where habitus and field are ‘*out of sync*’, “creating a situation in which ‘*belief in the game*’ (or *illusio*) is temporarily suspended and doxic assumptions are raised to the level of discourse where they can be discussed.”⁴⁴⁹ This condition evolves out of structural lag or gap, Bourdieu argues, where habitus

⁴⁴⁶ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

⁴⁴⁷ JUNG, M.-K. 2004. Symbolic and Physical Violence: Legitimate State Coercion of Filipino Workers in Prewar Hawai'i. *American Studies*, 45, 107-137.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁹ CROSSLEY, N. 2003. From Reproduction to Transformation: Social Movement Fields and the Radical Habitus. *Theory Culture Society*, 20, 43-68.

is unable to keep up with changes in the field with some of the people resigned to their ways, beliefs, and expectations.⁴⁵⁰

As elaborated on earlier, as a structuring structure the field continues to organize practices and perceptions, shaping a reality of predetermined courses of thought and action. Indeed, “every field has a set of beliefs or categories which each participant must accept and master in order to qualify as a legitimate participant...[and] to exist at a particular time and place is to relate to the doxa that the field holds out as input and reliant”.⁴⁵¹ With each field imbued and conditioned by a history of meaning that has shaped the identity of the people, attempts to reshape the social and political space inevitable will be confronted with tension.

According to Butler, while Bourdieu’s “practical mimeticism works almost always to produce a conformity or congruence between the field and habitus,” the question of ambivalence and the very *formation* of the subject is seemingly unaddressed.⁴⁵² She adds that “where there is discrepancy or ‘misrecognition’ in Bourdieu, it is a function of an ‘encounter’ between an already formed subject in an epistemological confrontation with an external and countervailing field”.⁴⁵³

Where the people move along with changes in the field, there is a ‘raising of consciousness’ where social agents check themselves for ‘inappropriate behavior’ while maneuvering through several phases of change before acquiring a new form of habitus, one that matches with the new field. Failure to welcome this relationship, on the other hand, threatens to marginalize the social agent, while acceptance is transformative in that the outcome of such change could see some lose their position, power and/or wealth, while others gain in capital and opportunity, effectively shifting and rearranging balance of power.

Bourdieu argues that reflexivity (and the ability to examine our circumstance) is a regularly occurring mental exercise which allows us to remain aware of our environment. To practice this reflexivity, however, we must objectify our position in the general social space, in the field where

⁴⁵⁰ YANG, Y. 2013. Bourdieu, Practice and Change: Beyond the Criticism of Determinism. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 46, 1522-1540.

⁴⁵¹ HEIDEGREN, C.-G. & LUNDBERG, H. 2010. Towards a Sociology of Philosophy. *Acta Sociologica*, 53, 3-18.

⁴⁵² BUTLER, J. 1996. Performativity’s Social Magic. In: SCHATZKI, T. R. & NATTER, W. (eds.) *The Social and Political Body*. New York: Guilford Press.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

there is commonality, and demonstrate how everything is linked to membership. Once mapped and objectified, reflexivity effectively converts to disposition.⁴⁵⁴

According to Yang, there are three conditions under which such change is possible. First, where there is a mismatch between habitus and field, there will likely be a raising of consciousness. Indeed, the wider the gap between the two, the larger the raised consciousness. Second, explicit pedagogy may serve to either train or retrain individuals. However, as this is highly artificial, it cannot compete with “lengthy path of familiarization” that comes to develop the habitus.⁴⁵⁵ Finally, recalling the reflexive projects of Giddens, Beck, and Lash, in addition to Bourdieu, Yang claims that “reflexivity entails a growing freedom from constraints”.⁴⁵⁶ He challenges Bourdieu’s claim that reflexivity “as a critical epistemology [is] exclusive to scientists and social scientists” and submits that reflexivity can extend beyond this population.⁴⁵⁷ Indeed, it is reflexivity that aids agents in their confrontation with contradictions to habitus.

⁴⁵⁴ YANG, Y. 2013. Bourdieu, Practice and Change: Beyond the Criticism of Determinism. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 46, 1522-1540.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ BOURDIEU, P. & WACQUANT, L. J. D. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Chapter 3: Background to Case Study

In this chapter, I aim to provide some practical sense of the unique history and composition of state-society relations in Afghanistan that make it a special case for understanding the role society plays in state consolidation and statebuilding. In the first section, I provide an overview of the geography of the country, emphasizing how Afghanistan's unique physical terrain has contributed to shaping the relationship between state and society and in particular the state's ability to extend its monopoly on both physical and symbolic violence. In the second section, I provide an overview of the composition of Afghan society with an emphasis on how various local practices have come to shape the field and habitus. In the third section, I conduct a brief review of the contentious relationship between state and society. Here I underscore how experience with violence has contributed to reproducing the legitimacy of local authority. In the fourth section, I survey the journals, diplomatic correspondence, and speeches of key actors during the various episodes of intervention in Afghanistan. The aim of this third section is to demonstrate how intervention influences and disturbs the field and habitus.

3.1 Geography and the Limits of State Consolidation

The geography of Afghanistan places checks on the reach of the state and its relationship with society, limiting its ability to consolidate social and political space with physical barriers obstructing its attempts to appropriate space and accomplish a monopoly on violence. In the following pages, I demonstrate how the geography of Afghanistan limits the reach of the state with an examination of the role of various characteristics of its physical terrain.

While the volume and composition of capital determines the shape and perimeter of social and political space, geography provides physical constraints and limitations. Rough terrain complicates and amplifies distance, becoming a natural barrier that generates fragmented communities with limited capacity to reach outward and access resources. Similarly, it is physical characteristics such as road density which regulates accessibility and limit the transfer of influence from the center to the periphery. Under such circumstance, local communities develop practices of self-reliance and self-sufficiency with the provision of goods and security achieved by local institutions and leadership. As a result, these geographically induced limits to accessing resources from the center weakens popular confidence in the capacity of the central government in places

like Afghanistan. It is indeed such geographical constraints which test the extent of state effectiveness in projecting its capabilities and protecting local communities. In places like Afghanistan, where in recent history the state has failed to meet such expectations, local leaders fill in and provide security for their communities, generating and reproducing localized social and political capital that subsequently brings about local legitimacy as the periphery challenges and overtakes the center.

Road density across Afghanistan varies with terrain and is limited by the level of development in each area. Road density, as the ratio of total road network to the total land area, is a good indicator of the level of accessibility and the potential capacity to project power, logistically and militarily. With a total land area of 652,230 square kilometers, Afghanistan is estimated to only have approximately 12,000 kilometers of paved roads. That is a road density of approximately 0.018 which is significantly lower than regional neighbors Pakistan (0.33) and Iran (.131). In the east and southeast where it is particularly underdeveloped, road density is much less than in the north. Of the provinces examined, those in the north average .275 kilometers of road per square kilometer of territory while in the east there is an average of .086 kilometers of road per square kilometer of territory. Similarly, the west (.095) and south (.055) have relatively low road density. It is important to note that while these figures do not account for secondary and tertiary roads, such roads accommodate largely local travel and are difficult or impossible for modern government vehicles to use. As a result, they are not counted as means for central government access into local communities.

Road systems are vital for central government influence and accessibility into the rural periphery and are particularly important during conflict when local communities need government support most. On one hand, roads multiply the mobility and reach of the central government, integrating isolated and at-risk communities.⁴⁵⁸ They provide the government the means for swift reaction and the capacity to replenish local communities with necessary resources. On the other hand, roads shape the spread of violence, with violence much more contagious in developed areas where the infrastructure provides for relatively easier transit.⁴⁵⁹ For example, some studies find that groups actively seek out and target government supply routes which often consist of paved

⁴⁵⁸ ZHUKOV, Y. M. 2012. Roads and the diffusion of insurgent violence: The logistics of conflict in Russia's North Caucasus. *Political Geography*, 31, 144-156.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

roads.⁴⁶⁰ As a result, not only do resources fail to reach local communities, but the defeat and/or successful obstruction of state operations undermine its legitimacy. Then again, paved roads are disproportionately beneficial to those who have the technology to use them, such as the state and modern interventionist forces. Local groups, who often do not have the resources to travel long distances, are forced to keep close to their community and support base for fear of spreading their limited resources too thin.⁴⁶¹

While national road construction aims to bring the people closer to their government, roads may also provide the opportunity for alternative sources of legitimate leadership. One informant suggests this was the case during the late 1970s when new road construction allowed greater access to areas across the border and into Pakistan. He informed me that, “before the coup of 1979...we were isolated with no connection with neighboring provinces...but after the coup things changed...we even had increased relations with neighboring Pakistan districts...there were roads where there were no paved roads before”.⁴⁶² Today, some of these same roads continue to provide ease of access to state, non-state, and foreign elements.

In fact, the borders with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in the north, Pakistan in the south and east, China in its far northeast, and Iran in the west, are all porous and inhabited by populations who largely do not recognize the legal status of modern sovereign borders.⁴⁶³ As a result, the people move freely, seeking out and finding resources and security across the border. This is most evident in times of conflict when, for lack of confidence in the central government’s ability to provide resources and security, the people take refuge in neighboring countries.

Other factors that may have an influence on the reach of government resources include distance, altitude, and terrain (desert and mountain). In Afghanistan, the capital city of Kabul rests at an altitude of 1,800 meters above sea level, one of the highest in the world,⁴⁶⁴ while the Hindu

⁴⁶⁰ RALEIGH, C. & HEGRE, H. 2009. Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War. A Geographically Disaggregated Analysis. Ibid.28, 224-238.

⁴⁶¹ TSE-TUNG, M. 1961. *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Quantico, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

⁴⁶² SAFY, A. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁴⁶³ AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AFGHANISTAN STUDIES 2008. *Afghanistan's Other Neighbors: Iran, Central Asia and China*. Istanbul, Turkey: American Institute of Afghanistan Studies.

⁴⁶⁴ Note that those who take to and reside in the mountains may do so to avoid falling under the jurisdiction of central authority. CARTOGRAPHIC, E. V. 2003. *Terrain Analysis of Afghanistan*, Minneapolis, East West Cartographic.

Kush Mountain range travels 800 kilometers north to south, splitting the country east to west with heights up to 7,315 meters. On average, the east (56%) and west (65%) of Afghanistan are more mountainous than the south (18%) and north (30%). For example, Kunduz in the north is largely flat with only 12% mountainous terrain, while more than half of Paktia (65%), and Paktika (50%) in the east is mountainous. In fact, deserts cover most of the southern regions, spanning much of Qandahar and Helmand province.

Arguably, distance from the state capital, *ceteris paribus*, is correlated with the level of influence central authority has over local communities.⁴⁶⁵ Indeed, according to one study, rebellion characterized as secessionist often develop and remain farther from the capital compared to those groups that aim to capture power.⁴⁶⁶ Suggestively, the former group has alternative means for its resources while the latter aims to supplement its resources by seizing and taking control of existing state resources. Whereas the state has little-to-no alternative but to engage in direct confrontation with this second group, in response to obvious challenge to its influence in the periphery the state must seek out and adopt means for projecting its influence into the distance. In Afghanistan, several military installations were erected with the help of the international community. Across the ten provinces surveyed there are listed 139 security posts: 6 in the west, 95 in the south, 4 in the north, 24 in the east, and 10 in the capital city. Note however, by erecting these forward bases and security posts the government creates the conditions for encountering and engaging opposition forces on their own territory, bringing violence to the doorsteps of the people in the periphery. This experience is not likely to have a positive effect on local popular support for the government, especially in places where the people have good confidence in their local leaders. However, as the geography of Afghanistan is diverse, the state is likely to experience differentiated responses from across the country.

When comparing three provinces in Afghanistan (Paktia, Paktika, and Kunduz), we find some interesting differences. For example, with slightly more roadways⁴⁶⁷ than Paktika and the

⁴⁶⁵ BRINKERHOFF, D. W., WETTERBERG, A. & WIBBELS, E. 2016. Distance, Services, and Citizen Perceptions of the State in Rural Africa. *Governance*, 31, 1-22.

⁴⁶⁶ BUHAUG, H. & GATES, S. 2002. The geography of civil war. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39, 417-433.

⁴⁶⁷ Road Density: Kunduz - .32, Paktia - .09, Paktika - .06

shortest distance⁴⁶⁸ between its provincial capital and Kabul,⁴⁶⁹ Paktia is much more accessible compared to the other two provinces. In fact, the Kabul-Gardez highway provides a seven-meter-wide paved roadway with good access to Kabul in less than three hours.⁴⁷⁰ Also, as the smallest⁴⁷¹ of the three provinces, central influence could spread to all corners of the province in a relatively brief time. However, this is not true for the entirety of the province. Paktia province is one of the few places in Afghanistan where forest grow,⁴⁷² and with approximately 65% mountainous terrain, forested mountains reach up to 3,990 meters.⁴⁷³ Consequently, the relative inaccessibility of some villages has allowed for the maintenance of local autonomy,⁴⁷⁴ limiting the reach and influence of the state. Here, the terrain amplifies distance.

In the other direction, Pakistan is accessible through the Khost-Gardez pass, otherwise known as the K-G pass or Seti-Kandow Pass. Improvements to the roadway began in 2011 with the assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The 101-kilometer Gardez-Khost National Highway reduces travel time between Gardez and Khost by more than three hours for passenger vehicles and up to five hours for trucks.⁴⁷⁵ In addition to providing economic benefits with more efficient trade routes, the project intends to increase security with greater access for the national security forces to reach the Pakistan border. Historically difficult to travel and vulnerable to attacks from the ridges above, the K-G pass was the scene of several intense battles, including those between the mujahidin and the Soviets, and the US and the Taliban. Connecting Pakistan to the rest of Afghanistan, the pass ascends 610 meters from the Gardez river valley and down 1,200 meters into Khost, pointing travelers toward Pakistan and the infamous Haqqani Network safe havens of Miranshah and North Waziristan – the

⁴⁶⁸ Distance to Kabul: Kunduz – 337 km, Gardez, Paktia – 128km, Sharana, Paktika – 201 km

⁴⁶⁹ The distance between Kabul and the provincial capital of Gardez is 128 kilometers.

⁴⁷⁰ CARTOGRAPHIC, E. V. 2003. *Terrain Analysis of Afghanistan*, Minneapolis, East West Cartographic.

⁴⁷¹ Paktia province covers an area 6,432 square kilometers.

⁴⁷² DUPREE, L. 2012. *Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁴⁷³ Percentage of mountainous area: Kunduz - .119, Paktia - .651, Paktika - .500; The total areas of mountainous territory across provinces: Kunduz (931 km²), Paktika (9,668 km²), and Paktia (4,187 km²).

⁴⁷⁴ DUPREE, L. 2012. *Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁴⁷⁵ TIMES, N. Y. 2011. The Government's Guide to Assessing Prisoners. *New York Times*, April 23, 2011.

supposed headquarters of several chief challengers to the Afghan state throughout the 70s, 80s, and 2000s.

In addition to the routine annual visit by hundreds of thousands of nomads, the relative ease of accessibility of Kunduz has historically seen distant travelers come through and leave their mark. It is the site of the ancient city of Drapsaka from which Alexander the Great maneuvered into conquering Central Asia.⁴⁷⁶ It is also on the crossroads of many religions, including Buddhism⁴⁷⁷ which left the remains of its monasteries and stupas. In fact, Kunduz is considered one of the wealthiest provinces in Afghanistan as the crossroads between Pakistan, China, and Central Asia. Today, the level of accessible roads continues to provide for good rural-urban trade and communications, and as a result Kunduz is much more urbanized than Paktia and Paktika province. Situated in the north of Afghanistan and along the border with Tajikistan, Kunduz is slightly larger than Paktia at 7,827 square kilometers. The distance between the capital cities of Kunduz and Kabul is 337 kilometers, nearly twice that of Paktika and three times than of Paktia. However, Kunduz has nearly four⁴⁷⁸ times the expanse of accessible roads compared to Paktia, and five times as much compared to Paktika province. Developing regional accessibility, the Tajik-Afghan bridge at Panji-Poyon was completed in 2007 providing greater trade potential between Afghanistan and neighboring Tajikistan. Although some argue that the bridge was the “missing link of the ancient silk road”, others fear that the increased accessibility will only allow for increased drug trade and instability.⁴⁷⁹

Compared to Paktia and Paktika province which are both more than 95% rural, Kunduz is much more urbanized. In fact, it is the fifth most urbanized province in Afghanistan with more than thirty percent of its inhabitants residing in urban areas.⁴⁸⁰ Still, more than 66% of provincial income is based on agriculture, more than Paktia and Paktika. Existing literature in political geography suggests that the geography and location of Kunduz province should reflect much

⁴⁷⁶ PAKISTAN, O. O. T. S. R. F. A. A. 2010. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. *Strategy Summary*. Washington, DC: US State Department.

⁴⁷⁷ COMMISSION, A. N. I. P. A. R. 2010. Programme Tahkim Sulh. Kabul: Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

⁴⁷⁸ The road density of Kunduz is .32, compared with Paktia (.09) and Paktika (.06).

⁴⁷⁹ JONES, S. G. & FAIR, C. C. 2010. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan. Arlington: RAND: National Security Research Division.

⁴⁸⁰ DEVELOPMENT, M. O. R. R. A. 2012. Kunduz Provincial Profile. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

stronger central government influence than local authority with its territorial accessibility and long history of commerce and trade. However, with nearly 90% flatlands⁴⁸¹ and bordering Tajikistan, the province has been historically vulnerable to outside influences which have challenged both the state and local authority.

Paktika is the largest of the three provinces. At 19,336 square kilometers, it is more than 5,000 square kilometers greater in size than Paktia and Kunduz province combined. Considering that it has the smallest population (434,742) of the three provinces it is the least densely populated of the three, consequently allowing for vast uninhabited territories between settlements. In fact, more than 98% of the population reside in these largely remote rural areas. With more than 50% mountainous terrain, Paktika has the least road accessibility of the three provinces. In fact, although the distance between the provincial capital of Sharan and Kabul is approximately 201 kilometers, those villages and districts that are even slightly deeper into the interior of the province have much greater difficulty making their way through the terrain to the capital city and onto Kabul. What's more, access into Pakistan and North Waziristan may in fact prove easier. As a result, movement across the border into Pakistan is likely more common than travels to Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan.

While these roadways connect Kabul to the provincial capital and provide access into Pakistan, they fail to sufficiently penetrate areas further south and southeast in the province and into the heart of the rural areas. For example, while roads connect Kabul with the cities of Ghazni and Sharan, the capital cities of Ghazni and Paktika province, respectively, there are limited-to-no roads to potentially troubled areas such as Angoor Ada, a village which straddles both sides of the border and provides easy access into South Waziristan in Pakistan. In such disconnected spaces, the people are likely to turn to resources from across the border, especially from fellow Pashtun who share a common and familiar history and practices – a topic the next section will further investigate.

In this section, I examined how the diverse geography of Afghanistan acts as constraints on the reach of the state and its ability to accumulate and concentrate capital and maintain a monopoly on physical and symbolic violence. In assessing the geography of three diverse provinces, I demonstrated how the differentiated aspects of this geography pose a challenge to

⁴⁸¹ The percentage of flat area for these select provinces are: Kunduz (79%), Paktika (42%), and Paktia (32%).

centralized rule, providing opportunity for local communities to maintain their autonomy to generate and reproduce local social and political space (field) and habitus. In the next section, I will demonstrate how local practices and rules shape and reproduce local social and political space, effectively generating and concentrating localized social and political capital and further enhancing the legitimacy and durability of local leaders.

3.2 Local Practices of Governance and Authority in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, local solidarity communities of *manteqa*, function-based networks of *qawms*, local decision-making councils of *tribal shura* and *jirga*, and law enforcement units of *arbakai* all maintain historic practices that demarcate the social and political perimeter of local order and space, generating both symbolic capital and violence at the local level.⁴⁸² By speaking of, recognizing, and appreciating these local institutions, the people impart legitimacy in their existence and function. Recalling that, as fields, social and political spaces exist “only insofar as social agents possess the disposition and set of perceptual schemata that are necessary to constitute the field and imbue it with meaning,”⁴⁸³ this section examines how, through practices, rules evolve and institutionalize in support of unique local social and political order and space, reinforcing and reproducing the disposition of Afghan society. As noted previously, this is a doxic relationship between individuals and their social and political space that is reproduced by unique beliefs and categories of perception that are accepted without question.

For centuries intervening forces have failed to fully appreciate the extent to which local Afghan communities were socially and politically organized. In truth, these communities maintain very complex and durable social and political structures founded on recognized and very localized historic rules and practices. Like the modern state, local communities in Afghanistan maintain institutions for legal deliberations and law enforcement, inter-tribal dispute resolution, and general governance. These historic local practices and existing institutions maintain social and political order, and in so doing, reinforce and reproduce the legitimacy of local authority. Despite the

⁴⁸² COBURN, N. 2011. *Bazaar Politics: Power & Pottery in an Afghanistan Market Town*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

⁴⁸³ BOURDIEU, P. 1990a. *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

territorial demarcations that define village and province, arguably it is these local governance structures such as solidarity communities of *manteqa*, function-based networks of *qawms*, local decision-making councils of tribal *shura* and *jirga*, and law enforcement units of *arbakai* that truly mark out the perimeter of legitimacy at the local level in Afghanistan. Indeed, these local governance structures have evolved to function largely independent of the state with good result in meeting the resource and security needs of local communities, rendering the state as a source of governance at the local level all but obsolete.

Manteqa is an unmarked space of local solidarity which spans across several villages, largely ignoring district and provincial lines. Local bazaars, schools, and mosques occupy this space and invite people to come together and share in trade, learning, and prayer, forging and strengthening an interdependency that is the backbone of this solidarity. In maintaining order within this shared space, local leaders come together as a committee or *shura-e-mateqa* to address concerns that may extend beyond their individual village boundaries yet have some direct or indirect influence on the people of their community. Such committees extend the reach of local leaders by effectively reinforcing their local legitimacy, while diluting their influence with compromise and deal making as part of a *manteqa*. On one hand, history has proven how the solidarity found in a *manteqa* sufficiently expands accessibility to the resources necessary to sustain the needs of a collection of local communities, including the provision of resources for mobilization against threats. Indeed, in every episode of conflict in Afghanistan there is evidence of temporary alliances pooled together from these very collections of local communities. One informant advised that “when a couple (of) villages come together to make a *manteqa*...the government was never able to control [the people] in these districts [and area]”.⁴⁸⁴

During the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, Russian military commanders encouraged the formation of *manteqa* as a strategy for limiting the likelihood that any one village would risk standing in opposition to their forces. Their logic being that negotiating with a collection of villages was far easier than having to deal with each individually, and most importantly, that negotiated compromise between the Russians and Afghans was much more likely to hold. This was particularly important as they relied on local communities for food, shelter, and intelligence as they transited across Afghan territory. However, as these coalitions were a result of Soviet

⁴⁸⁴ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

statecraft and coercion and not based on a history of cooperation among these local communities, these artificial *manteqa* were short lived. Conflict of interests and a lack of historic and deep-rooted ties resulted in infighting and inevitable split among the groups. Their sense of obligation was not sufficiently embedded within these coerced roles, and as a result they felt no particular responsibility to maintain solidarity with fellow communities and their leadership.⁴⁸⁵

Whereas the *manteqa* is physically bounded by territory which could be directly confronted by the state, *qawms* are dispersed networks that share common interests. *Qawms* can penetrate deep into the state and its institutions.⁴⁸⁶ In fact, members of *qawms* may secure positions throughout the ranks of the security force, serve as members of the legislature, or even take up positions among the executive branch leadership – all the while, maintaining their allegiances to the interests of their local communities and network. Indeed, it is from such a position that the social capital generated from networking with central government institutions may provide means for economic capital to these local communities. Emerging initially from one-off interactions of opportunism, over time such interaction become routinized and “inevitably emerge as the basis for identity and governance”.⁴⁸⁷

In fact, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was not a collective sense of nationalism that dominated but rather this networked manifestation of solidarity.⁴⁸⁸ Recent studies of the region continue to argue that “rural residents do not think and act in terms of clearly (territorially) delimited spaces in their everyday interaction. Rather, their frame of reference seems to be a socio-economic space in which they are active for their daily routine and which is structured by face-to-face social network relationship”.⁴⁸⁹ Increasingly the perimeter of such solidarity network is shaped by the exclusion of those who are found not necessary to the networks’ interest or too different from the character of the group. However, despite often (and incorrectly) being referred to as tribe, and sharing a common ethnolinguistic identity, *qawm* is a more protean term

⁴⁸⁵ RENZO, M. 2012. Associative Responsibilities and Political Obligations. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 62, 106-127.

⁴⁸⁶ ROY, O. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁸⁷ GOODSON, L. P. 2001. *Afghanistan's endless war : state failure, regional politics, and the rise of the Taliban*, Seattle, University of Washington Press.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ MIELKE, K. 2007. On the concept of 'village' in Northeastern Afghanistan: Explorations from Kunduz Province. *ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 70*. Bonn: University of Bonn.

that transcends fixed notions of decent, kin, and ethnicity. Rather, *qawm* is a broader concept of solidarity or *asabiyya* which includes kinship, residence, and occupation.⁴⁹⁰ It is from this broad scope understanding that *qawm* comes to define ones' identity and position in the social and political world in Afghanistan.⁴⁹¹

Indeed, we can consider that every individual is a member of a *qawm*, receiving support, security, and protection from encroachment by those who are outside their network.⁴⁹² For example, occupation groups organize around a function that transcend village lines and district boundaries and operate across kin group and ethnicity.⁴⁹³ Although these functional groups can be found across institutions of governance, security, and markets, they remain a relatively closed network. *Qawm* militias for example are such a functional group that transcends fixed locations and identities.⁴⁹⁴ Interestingly, several claim that local disputes and feud are often along lines of *qawm* militia and not necessarily ethnic affiliation.⁴⁹⁵

The network nature of *qawm* spoils attempts by the state to consolidate local fragmented communities on two levels. First, differences among *qawms* limit opportunities for building cooperation. Second, the very network nature of *qawms* suggests that it has already coopted the state in some way. Roy describes this best: at the "very moment when the state institutions were attempting to establish themselves, to rationalize and integrate the village communities, they themselves became the object of a strategy on the part of the *qawm* which involved the infiltration of those institutions".⁴⁹⁶ In working with local leaders and providing them with recognition and positions of authority, *qawm* networks gain access and the ability to expand within the institutions of the central government. In so doing, the state effectively enhances the perceived capacities and effectiveness of *qawm* affiliated local leaders to provide for their community.

⁴⁹⁰ RUBIN, B. R. 2002. *The fragmentation of Afghanistan : state formation and collapse in the international system*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

⁴⁹¹ BLOOD, P. R. 2001. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, Washington, DC, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ RUBIN, B. R. 2002. *The fragmentation of Afghanistan : state formation and collapse in the international system*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

⁴⁹⁴ GATES, S. & ROY, K. 2015. *War and State-Building in Afghanistan: Historical and Modern Perspectives*, London, Bloomsbury.

⁴⁹⁵ ROY, O. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

Finding that *qawm* networks had the capacity to infiltrate the government, state leaders sought to maintain the membership of rural Afghan *qawms* as controllable small units with the aim of preventing the formation of large-scale coalitions and networks that could further threaten its authority. Among “tribal peoples it tried to break large units into smaller ones; among nontribal peoples it tried to reinforce limited kinship or residence based political identities”.⁴⁹⁷ More recently, *qawm* networks have expanded deep into the central government structure, allowing local warlords to function as politicians and state administrators.

The *jirga* comprise of a temporary body of local elders, also known as white-beards or *reshafeedan*, who come together to build consensus and make decisions regarding disputes, local tribal affairs, and other local legal and security concerns. With aims of maintaining peace and order in local communities, they base their decisions on ‘restorative justice’ challenging the state’s application of ‘retributive justice’.⁴⁹⁸ In contrast to the Afghan state (and general western practice) of imprisonment, with ‘restorative justice’ offenders must compensate victims and ask for forgiveness, or *nanawati*. As a supplement to *jirga*, in the late 1970s the *shura*, or gathering of religious mullahs and ulemas, was adapted by the mujahidin as a more permanent body of decision-makers.⁴⁹⁹ This form of local governance continued for decades. Today the grand and consultative *jirga* has limited power. However, they “can make political statements or send signals to those in Parliament or the country’s government about what is acceptable to the people”.⁵⁰⁰

In addition to its local governance shaping mechanisms, local Afghan communities have also historically maintained enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, local village militiamen (*kotwali deh bashis*) were necessary for enforcing good order at the direction of local governance institutions. Limited to the aims of maintaining order and responsible for protecting the immediate interest of the local community, *arbakai* volunteers are tasked with enforcing the decisions of *jirga* and patrolling the perimeters of their communities. At times, they may serve as a rapid-reaction force to meet external threats to the security of the community.

⁴⁹⁷ RUBIN, B. R. 2002. *The fragmentation of Afghanistan : state formation and collapse in the international system*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

⁴⁹⁸ O’NEILL, B. E. 2001. *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Dulles, Brassey’s Inc.

⁴⁹⁹ BBC. 2001. Fear and Defiance inside Afghanistan. *BBC*, October 12, 2001.

⁵⁰⁰ WORDEN, S. 2011. The Law and Politics Behind Afghanistan’s ‘Traditional’ Loya Jirga. *Foreign Policy*.

These local militiamen or *arbakai* may in fact be as old as the institution of *jirga* itself. However, like the use of *jirga*, the use of *arbakai* in Afghanistan is not evenly distributed across Afghan society. *Arbakai*, or ‘guardian’ in Pashto and ‘army’ in Arabic, have largely existed in the Pashtun dominated areas of Afghanistan as “community-based policing that is authorized and provided by the community...and for the community”.⁵⁰¹

The success of local policing forces is likely attributed to the prominent level of homogeneity and cohesion found among Pashtun tribal communities and a historical trust in the decisions of the local tribal council. They are a relatively small and tightly knitted communities. Although multiple communities may come together to form an *arbakai* unit, individual members remain loyal to their local leaders and continue to work in the interest of their native communities. Indeed, there is an understanding when such units are formed that their actions as an organization of communities must avoid impeding on the autonomy of any individual community.⁵⁰²

Occasionally, traditional systems of justice and policing have been coopted by the state as a means for meeting and dealing with internal opposition as well as external threats.⁵⁰³ Recalling the old Afghan adage, “you cannot buy an Afghan...you can (only) rent one,”⁵⁰⁴ state leaders remained cautious of the limits of their influence and authority when prospecting for security assistance. On the one hand, coopting locals as a policing force has the benefit of an intuitive familiarity and knowledge of the local which may prove useful in meeting and addressing local concerns and threats. On the other hand, it is this very familiarity with the local which runs the risk of rendering enforcement ineffective. In the case of competing interests between state and society, both *qawm* and local *jirga* affiliation by state employees could pose a threat. Depending on who they trusted, these public servants could influence the direction and extent of legitimacy.

According to legal philosopher Joseph Raz, the “normal and primary way of justifying the legitimacy of an authority is that it is more likely to act successfully on the reasons which apply to

⁵⁰¹ GUNARATNA, R., JERARD, J. & NASIR, S. M. 2013. *Countering extremism : building social resilience through community engagement*, London Hackensack, NJ, Imperial College Press ; Distributed by World Scientific Publishing Co.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ AHMED, A. 2014. Afghanistan on edge as Taliban take back ground; Rapid advance in north tests a military that soon won't have U.S. *International New York Times*, October 24, 2014.

its subjects”.⁵⁰⁵ It was during my earliest visits to Afghanistan that I was first introduced to the concepts that would help me measure this justification - *agahe* and *rowshanfeker*. These borrowed Persian terms which translate as ‘knowledge’ and ‘enlightenment’, respectively, were recalled time and again during my interviews and discussions with locals when they referred to local leaders.

The concept of *agahe* refers to a strong level of knowledge, religious or otherwise. One informant explained that “in different context you define *agahe* differently...in religious debates, whoever has a strong argument about the way he believes is understood to have *agahe* or strong information and understanding of religion...similarly in the physical sciences, when your understanding is in harmony with the natural laws, your *agahe* is strong”.⁵⁰⁶ A religious scholar of particularly deep understanding for example is referred to as ‘*agahe amor dini*’ or ‘learned in religious affairs’, while a politician may be referred to as ‘*agahe amor siasy*’, ‘learned in political affairs’.

In its component parts, *rowshan* translates into bright, clear, or obvious, and *feker* translates into thought, thinking, or assumption. According to some interpretations, *rowshanfeker* refers to someone who is inherently critical in thought or someone who has an extraordinary consciousness of reality; a pragmatist who examines the social from both a philosophical and rational perspective. Comparable to the western understanding of enlightenment, *rowshanfeker* refers to a transition to logical and practical reasoning and a parting from supernatural beliefs. It emphasizes critique of social norms and values, or even in some cases opposition to the dominant social norms and values which exist in society and are now perceived as obsolete.

It is this aspect, however, that some have concerns with. One informant argued that the concept *rowshanfeker* is an “antiquated elitist term meant to identify someone who is forward-thinking...so long as that thought is western-like”.⁵⁰⁷ Most suggested, however, that these concepts refer to local leaders and their localized knowledge which has relevance and practical application. This is compared to leaders who do not have sufficient local and relevant knowledge. Indeed, I came to understand these terms as measurement of perceived legitimacy. Depending on its use and emphasis, they suggested the level of confidence locals held in their leaders.

⁵⁰⁵ RAZ, J. 1985. Authority and Justification. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 14, 3-29.

⁵⁰⁶ MOHAMMADI, A. A. February 7, 2014 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author*.

⁵⁰⁷ LATIFI, A. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

It was this disagreement and even hostility over these concepts and how they applied to understanding knowledge and rationality in present day Afghanistan that led me to follow-up my interviews questions with an inquiry around perceptions of local leaders' capacity in a rapidly modernizing Afghanistan. From one side, some informants agree that the roll of tribal leaders "will increase in the future as they are gaining more legitimacy and power in the village because they are more honest and sympathetic,"⁵⁰⁸ compared to those in the central government. Another informant added that in "all villages there is one head of the village and one mullah...and it is very difficult to change this. If someone in the village has a problem, they will still turn to the village leaders...and this will continue".⁵⁰⁹ Those that agree with this position argue that even today "if you meet an elder, you must greet him and show your respect".⁵¹⁰ Indeed, "when traveling to a village, we must ask permission from elders [from that village] out of respect".⁵¹¹

From the other side of the aisle, one informant argued that although "tribal elders get respect...it depends on the area...and if the people have knowledge and went to school,"⁵¹² suggesting that the undereducated and those without formal education would find the localized knowledge of their leaders sufficient to meet their needs. Those that agree with this position speculate and argue that local leaders "may not exist in twenty years because they have no real education".⁵¹³ Although most of my informants continued to believe that local leaders deserve respect, slightly more of those from urban areas find that local leaders may not have the capacity to compete with a modernizing Afghanistan.

In this section, I provided an overview of the composition of Afghan society and how local practices reproduce local capital and legitimacy that shape the contour of social and political space. The rules that define these communities do not necessary lend to modern ideals of state consolidation, but rather are constructed based on that which is deemed appropriate and largely acceptable to local Afghan society. In the next section, I expand on the historic contentious relationship between state and society in Afghanistan.

⁵⁰⁸ MOHAMMADI, A. A. February 7, 2014 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author.*

⁵⁰⁹ ALIAS, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵¹⁰ SIKANDER, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵¹¹ NAJAFIZADA, L. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵¹² AZIZI, J. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵¹³ FAIZI, S. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

3.3 Violence, Capital Accumulation, and the Fragmentation of Afghanistan

In the previous sections, I detailed the historic composition of governance structures in local Afghan society and demonstrated how these communities functioned largely independent of state influence. I also provided a brief review of how geographical constraints force local leaders to take the lead in protecting their communities because of limited central government access to communities in the periphery. In this next section, I will build on the historic autonomous nature of local communities in Afghanistan and examine how violence provides local leaders opportunity to mobilize their communities and showcase their prowess, thereby reinforcing division and distinction while enhancing their legitimacy and durability.

Identity is a social construct based on common history and shared rules, norms, and values – all of which are organized around local and unique categories of perception. It is a process which shapes and determines where the boundaries of one community ends, and another begins. In other words, the process of codifying the rules that distinguish communities is one of segregation, it differentiates and distances. Identity is also a consciousness, a reflection, and a mode of mobilization. In creating one's self, the *other* is created (and the resistance that exists between the two). Ethnicity for example is constructed not only by the characteristics of the group, but also by their relationship with other groups and the field they occupy – it is a doxic relationship. For each, experiences continue to shape and harden identity along its exterior, while local rules reinforce identity from within.

Afghanistan is fragmented along multiple dimensions, with each fragment maintain distinct norms and values which have been naturalized over time and reproduced through practice and local categories of perception. On one level, Afghanistan is demarcated by a great fault line that divides the people of the Hazarajat, Khorasan, and Pashtunistan according to regional rules and identity. On another level, Afghanistan is divided along religious lines, namely that of sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia beliefs. On yet another level, local ethnic differences draw the distinction between communities. And finally, tribal division. For each, local rules and practices have come to define their way of life and identity.

One informant explains, “ideas are taken from the origin of the tribes...revolutionary ideas...it is not sharia law...it is an implementation of their own [localized] customs”.⁵¹⁴ With nearly seventy-five percent of the population residing in rural areas⁵¹⁵ across an estimated 30,000⁵¹⁶ local communities, the people have historically turned to and trusted in the authority of their local leaders to preserve, enforce, and protect their local rules and institutions.

The regionalist perspective includes varying combinations of ethnicity and religion. For example, the Hazarajat is made up of a religious and ethnic minority⁵¹⁷ who mostly inhabited central and western Afghanistan. Early historians to the area pointed out that the people are mainly Shia Muslims who speak a “corrupt dialect of Persian, with an admixture of Mongol words”.⁵¹⁸ In 1961, the anthropologist and diplomat Louis Dupree captured audio recordings of this hybrid tongue; he went on to explain how the elders “deplored the fact that younger men become more Persianized with each generation, and most...speak Farsi, even at home”.⁵¹⁹ The origin of the people of Hazarajat is also contested. Some believe that the people of Hazarajat are direct descendants of the Mongols who were settled in Afghanistan by the son and grandsons of Jinghis Khan.⁵²⁰ Some challenge this explanation, including one of my informants of Hazara origin who insists that “Hazara are a native people of Afghanistan who maintain an independent racial identity, but were *influenced* over time...by Mongolians, Turks, and Iranians”.⁵²¹

Khorasan, on the other hand, comprise largely of Persian speaking people spread across the then “two great divisions of the Asiatic world, Iran and Turan”.⁵²² From the cities of Nishapur

⁵¹⁴ PIQUEMAL, J. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵¹⁵ MIELKE, K. 2007. On the concept of 'village' in Northeastern Afghanistan: Explorations from Kunduz Province. *ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 70*. Bonn: University of Bonn.

⁵¹⁶ BEAUCHAMP, T. L. 2010. Autonomy and Consent. In: MILLER, F. G. & WERTHEIMER, A. (eds.) *The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵¹⁷ MONSUTTI, A. 2014. The Impact of War on Social, Political, and Economic Organization in Southern Hazarajat. In: CANFIELD, R. L. & RASULY-PALECZEK, G. (eds.) *Ethnicity, Authority, and Power in Central Asia: New Games Great and Small*. London: Routledge.

⁵¹⁸ THESIGER, W. 1956. The Hazarajat of Afghanistan. *Geographical*, 29, 87-94.

⁵¹⁹ DUPREE, L. 2012. *Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁵²⁰ THESIGER, W. 1955. The Hazaras of Central Afghanistan. *The Geographical Journal*, 121, 312-319.

⁵²¹ MOHAMMADI, A. A. February 7, 2014 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author.*

⁵²² FRASER, J. B. 1825. *Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan, in the Years 1821 and 1822*, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green.

in Iran, Merv in Turkmenistan, and Balkh and Herat in Afghanistan,⁵²³ the monarchs of these empires would battle over and confiscate control over this territory. In fact, the influence from Iran and the modern Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan continue to shape the identity of the people in northern and western Afghanistan.

Unlike the people of Hazarajat and Khorasan, the people of Pashtunistan are considered by many as the original inhabitants of ancient Afghanistan or ‘Aryana’.⁵²⁴ They are largely a Pashto speaking Sunni Muslim population that inhabits the territories south and east of the country that occupy both sides of the present-day border that separates Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, Afghans from this region contest the legitimacy of the 1893 agreement and Durand line which separates their people and families.⁵²⁵ In demonstration of their resistance, Pashtun on both sides of the border celebrate Pashtunistan Day on the same day that marks Pakistan independence.

In addition to and among the great division of Hazarajat, Khorasan, and Pashtunistan, the people are further divided along local ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, or tribal lines. According to one estimate, there are over 54 ethnic groups settled across the country.⁵²⁶ Herat for example is inhabited by more than ten different ethnic groups⁵²⁷ speaking a Persia common to Iran. In fact, only a handful of Pashtun in the region maintain their native Pashto language. Just east in the neighboring province of Ghor most of the people speak Dari, a more Afghanized version of Farsi.⁵²⁸ In the north, a porous border with the Central Asia states invites ethnic and linguistic colonization of bordering provinces. Balkh province for example is the home of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomen, and Arabs, in addition to Hazara and Pashtuns. Even among the southern and eastern Pashtuns there are subtle differences. The Pashtun tribes that live along the border with

⁵²³ RANTE, R. 2015. *Greater Khorasan : history, geography, archaeology and material culture*, Berlin, de Gruyter.

⁵²⁴ DUPREE, L. & PAZHWAK, A. R. 2003. *Pashtunistan*, Kabul, Shah M. Book Co.

⁵²⁵ BEZHAN, F. 2014. The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947-1952. *The Middle East Journal*, 68, 197-209.

⁵²⁶ SCHETTER, C. 2005. *Ethnicity and the Political Reconstruction in Afghanistan*. Bonn: Center for Development Studies, University of Bonn.

⁵²⁷ According to the Central Statistics Office, “Dari is spoken by 1,663 villages out of the 2,170” accounting for nearly 79% of the population of Herat. OFFICE, C. S. 2003b. *Herat: A Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile*. Kabul: Central Statistics Office and the United Nations Population Fund.

⁵²⁸ OFFICE, C. S. 2003a. *Ghor: A Socio-Economic and Demographic Profile*. Kabul: Central Statistics Office and the United Nations Population Fund.

northwestern Pakistan share similarities with their Qandahari cousins in the south, however there are slight differences in their linguistic dialect; Qandahari Pashtuns, according to Dupree, speak a 'softer' Pashto.⁵²⁹

Although Afghanistan remains predominantly Muslim today, the Sunni-Shia distinction remains a source of division. Approximately 80% of the people are Sunni, with a minority 20% Shia; less than 1% of the population is Christian, Jewish, or other.⁵³⁰ Interestingly, pre-Islamic Afghanistan was a mix of Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Paganism, demonstrating the historical regional influences of religion on Afghanistan. The area of present day Ghor province, for example, was once a largely Buddhist community. However, with the rise of Islam beginning in the 7th century AD, many people were converted (forcefully or otherwise), including those in Ghor province when the Ghaznavid conquered the area around 1000 AD. In the 15th century, many Sikhs and Hindus families migrated approximately 500 miles into present day Kabul, Ghazni, Jalalabad, and Qandahar. Then again in the early 19th century, the British introduced more Sikhs to Afghanistan as part of their campaign and operation along the frontier. By the 1970s, it was estimated that around 10,000 Pashto speaking Sikhs and Hindus lived in Afghanistan. However, with the 1990s civil war and Taliban takeover, the Sikh population in Kabul dropped to approximately 100 families. Since 2001, this number increased to over 360 families.⁵³¹

The most intimate and cohesive of local communities in Afghanistan is the tribe, sharing common ethnicity, religious sect, linguistics, and often political affiliation. One informant reminds me that the "first thing you need to know about tribes is that in Afghanistan 'tribe' does not mean community...tribe is ancestry...the people are all sons and daughters of one person...Pashtun was one person...so in the end, we are all cousins".⁵³² As a result, the people have a long history of agreement and submission to localized rules and values. And, as a kinship group hereditary transfer of power ensures that local tribal leaders are appointed from among the people to carry on and enforce these local rules.⁵³³

⁵²⁹ DUPREE, L. 2012. *Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁵³⁰ RIAZ, A. 2010. *Religion and politics in South Asia*, London ; New York, Routledge.

⁵³¹ MAJUMDER, S. 2003. Sikhs Struggle in Afghanistan. *BBC News*, September 25, 2003.

⁵³² AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁵³³ GUEST, K. & EDWARDS, L. M. 2010. The Tribal Path - A Better Alternative? Washington, DC: Small Wars Journal.

The ethnic composition of Afghanistan remains a highly contentious issue, as I would come to understand during my attempts to make sense of the abundance of contradictory data. Census data, it seems, is employed as a weapon to deprive groups of their proper recognition, consequently affecting a disproportionate distribution of political power and social benefits. One informant of Hazara origin argued pointedly that the Central Statistics Office (CSO) employs “very conservative Pashtuns...who try to show Pashtuns in the majority...because political power distribution among ethnicity...and public facilities are done based on such statistic”.⁵³⁴ This same informant claims that each successive government installed in the capital takes it upon himself to deliberately adjust the numbers in favor of his constituency. Another informant, this time of Pashtun origin, wrote of an ‘anti-Pashtun conspiracy’⁵³⁵, claiming that in the post-Soviet invasion era the Massoud-Rabbani leadership intentionally fabricated demographic statistics toward political ends, both domestic and international. He reasoned that the Massoud-Rabbani leadership borrowed from the Soviet approach, writing-off the majority Pashtun who were unified in their resistance. By reporting relatively lower numbers of Pashtun, international aid and support was disproportionately distributed across the country. Dr. Izady, a cartographer at Columbia University who specializes in mapping ethnic groups, confirmed that some of these statistics are “clearly made up by those collecting them” who have their own agenda in mind.⁵³⁶

Episodes of Local Violence, Mobilization, and the Reproduction of Legitimacy

Opportunity to mobilize local communities against either external or internal threats is an opportunity to reproduce local legitimacy. However, division at the society level also has the effect of strengthening the position of the state. In fact, the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman instigated division at the society level for this very purpose. By resettling some Qandahari Pashtun leaders and their communities to the north province of Kunduz and among non-Pashtun people, he engineered a weakened state for the remaining southern Pashtun while instigating greater division in the north. First, by relocating these communities and their leaders to the north with promise of land, potential threats to the throne by a unified coalition of southern Pashtuns was slightly

⁵³⁴ Email correspondence with Hazara informant in country, Afghanistan.

⁵³⁵ ZIRAKYAR, R. R. 2013. Analysis of ‘CIA World Factbook’ (1981-2012): Dimensions of Anti-Pashtun Conspiracy. California: Independent Report.

⁵³⁶ Email correspondence with Dr. Michael Izady, 12-February-2016.

diffused. Second, confrontation with the newly relocated Pashtun distracted the native northern Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen who also posed a threat to the throne. The state even developed relations with resettled Pashtun leaders further frustrating attempts by native northern people to challenge the state. Much of this was seemingly based on ethnic solidarity. By all accounts, this tension persisted and was a source of confrontation and division during the Soviet invasion, civil war, the 1990s Taliban rule, and during the US invasion.

In the 1940s, political affiliation began to draw new lines of ideology which crossed village, district, and provincial lines. For example, the first political party was founded in part on Pashtun autonomy, irrespective of local boundaries. Established in 1947, the *Wish Zalmayan* (Awakening Youth) was comprised of intellectuals from Pashtun communities in the south and east of Afghanistan who fought for an independent Pashtun state.⁵³⁷ In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the mujahidin came to also organize along party lines. Those who identified with Sunni beliefs were affiliated with one of seven parties collectively known as the Peshawar Seven, while the Shia associated themselves with one of the Tehran Eight. Each party shared territorial control, as well as personnel networks throughout the region.

During the rule of King Zahir Shah, local communities remained largely independent because of historic deals brokered between the state and society. However, when in the 1970s the Soviets partnered with the government and subsequently increased their presence at the provincial, district, and village level, local communities grew divided. Although some supported the increased presence of the state in local communities, several others resisted. Some local leaders were selected or even volunteered to liaise between local communities and the government, causing existing tensions between supporters and the opposition to multiply until the relationship between local leaders and their communities started to become undone. Several of my informants submitted that these local leaders were forced to relocate to the capital where they took up positions alongside communist party leaders. Some were even sent to Moscow for training.

The Afghan experience throughout the Soviet invasion further demonstrates how mobilization along lines of identity help to reproduce the perimeter of local communities. From one perspective, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reflected a great ideological confrontation between religion and anti-religion – Islam, and Communism, respectively. From another

⁵³⁷ BEZHAN, F. 2014. The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947-1952. *The Middle East Journal*, 68, 197-209.

perspective, two great powers (the US and USSR) choose Afghan soil to confront each other at a cost to the Afghan people. The Soviets, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia each were convinced that they had ideological partners in the people of Afghanistan; this was hardly the case. In reality the master cleavage that initially defined the 1980s conflict was quickly overtaken by secondary cleavages based on local differences and a desire to protect local communities.

A close examination finds that every group that participated in the conflict could be mapped to his identity group and underlying loyalties. The alliances of the Peshawar Eight and the Tehran Seven were in fact organized along political as well as ethnic lines. Demonstrating the extent to which this argument of secondary cleavages holds, although alliances among the fifteen groups were reconfigured several times throughout the 1980s and 1990s, individual group solidarity remained largely intact.⁵³⁸ Roy agrees and, from his observation, claims that no matter the side, tribal leaders and commanders “were careful to do nothing that might be harmful to the interests of their tribal group”.⁵³⁹

Mobilization along lines of identity was also evident in refugee camps throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During the years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the number of refugees in Iran and Pakistan increased considerably, and by 1989 there were more than three million refugees in each country.⁵⁴⁰ One report noted that “clan allegiance determined where people fled...[for example,] ethnic Tajiks returned to their mountainous ancestral village,”⁵⁴¹ while the Pashtun communities crossed the border and joined their cousins in the autonomous tribal areas of Pakistan.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, three times as much of the population from Paktia sought refuge in Pakistan compared to Paktika⁵⁴², a province which shared a long border with Pakistan. Because of its closer proximity to the capital, Paktia experienced much greater

⁵³⁸ CHRISTIA, F. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁵³⁹ ROY, O. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁴⁰ UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1999. Afghanistan 10 Years after Soviet Pull-Out. Washington, DC: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

⁵⁴¹ ERLICH, A. 2006. Tajikistan: From Refugee Sender to Labor Exporter. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁵⁴² Percentage of population sought refuge in Pakistan during Soviet invasion: Kunduz - .43, Paktia - .89, Paktika - .31

conflict intensity, causing mass evacuation with greater haste. Paktika, on the other hand, experienced much less violence – partly because the people were relatively disassociated with the fighting in Kabul – and so did not find it an urgent matter to evacuate. Kunduz was a different story altogether. With its highly heterogeneous population, refuge was sought in the north in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; in the west in Iran; and a small number travelled south or into Pakistan. The violence they experienced was one of both an ideological struggle for and against communism, as well as one of intercommunal conflict. The priority of these were left to individual contemplation.

One of my informants described his experience in a refugee community in Quetta, Pakistan: “...in a village called Hazara town...[although] it was mixed with all ethnicities...divisions remained...[and] people organized around their own camps according to their ethnicity”.⁵⁴³ Because of concerns over interethnic rivalry and security concerns, some Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara families had to be relocated from some refugee camps in Pakistan. These same concerns remained following the US invasion. The Human Rights Watch reported that these groups were “concerned that locating the camps in the [Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan] FATA would make them vulnerable to revenge killings or hostage swaps by Pashtun tribal leaders in Pakistan in exchange for Pashto-speaking Pakistani prisoners of war in Afghanistan”.⁵⁴⁴

Over time, camps came to mirror local Afghan society, with local leaders representing their *qawm* to outsiders and the central government⁵⁴⁵. As liaison for their community, local leaders were recognized by camp administrators, including NGO workers and UN officials. These organizations coordinated the distribution of aid and supplies, and provided refugee program funds, directly with local leaders.⁵⁴⁶ These same leaders coordinate recruiting activities with foreign military representatives. Indeed, desperation in the camps placed them in a good position to assist in selecting and deploying able young men to fight. By the end of the Soviet invasion,

⁵⁴³ Sahar, 2014. (AREU)

⁵⁴⁴ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002a. Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Closed Door Policy: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch.

⁵⁴⁵ SCHMEIDL, S. & MALEY, W. 2008. The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population: Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions. In: ADELMAN, H. (ed.) *Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

⁵⁴⁶ BAITENMANN, H. 1990. NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid. *Third World Quarterly*, 12, 62-85.

several local leaders had emerged as powerful commanders who were recognized for their role in supporting the communities (in refugee camps or otherwise) and their heroism during conflict.

In the mid-1990s, the Taliban were “hailed as the answer to Afghanistan’s divisive ethnic landscape and the chaotic period that proceeded the withdrawal of Soviet forces”.⁵⁴⁷ One of my informants claims that when the “Taliban [first] arrived, people were happy...claiming that they were the sons of Zahir Shah”.⁵⁴⁸ Another informant explained that “one unarmed Talib could control an entire district, patrolling [only] with a stick”.⁵⁴⁹

However, local resistance remained a viable threat to the Taliban government largely for the very same reasons it did for previous leaders. First, historic hostilities among ethnic groups provoked resistance from much of the northern minority ethnic groups against the southern Pashtun dominant government. One informant explained that “you must remember that [some] communities were all Hazara and [that] the Taliban knew that if they organized, they would be really strong...and a threat to the Taliban. So, the whitebeards...[and] the elders...were killed off right from the start...because the Taliban knew that they would be able to mobilize the people”.⁵⁵⁰ Second, differences among local communities, irrespective of their common ethnic identity, caused divisions among Pashtun communities, including resistance to the Taliban government. One informant speculated that conflict between local Pashtun leaders and the Taliban became largely one of legal jurisdiction. It was the Taliban courts “that brought them into conflict...because tribes have a different kind of system, the *jirga* system...which basically undermines the Taliban’s [religious system]”⁵⁵¹. One informant pointed out that Pashtun tribes along the east of Afghanistan, including the Mangal tribe, strongly resisted the Taliban for such reasons.⁵⁵²

Several informants explain that, following the US invasion, although the Taliban continued to maintain a presence in local communities, they had less control. In fact, local leaders often settled disputes between local Taliban and other groups. One informant described the situation:

⁵⁴⁷ SNOW, S. 2015. Why a Fractured Taliban is Endangering the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. *The Washington Post*, December 21, 2015.

⁵⁴⁸ Afzal, 2014.

⁵⁴⁹ WALI, A. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵⁵⁰ ALIZADA, R. M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵⁵¹ HUSSAIN, Z. 2013. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵⁵² AFZAL, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

“...the elders gather to mediate between [members of] Hizb-e-Islami and the Taliban...[and] it was not that the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami went to the elders and asked for mediation, rather the elders just intervened and questioned why should they fight each other”.⁵⁵³

In the years prior to the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, another informant explained that the exiled Taliban government “sent commissions from Pakistan to sit and speak with elders from the southeast about the upcoming transition and, what they should do and how they should move forward. [They] wanted to get an idea of [what] the communities expected the group to do moving forward”.⁵⁵⁴ Interestingly, this same informant believes that “in the south, no such thing happened...they never asked [those] communities. In the south, they only ask the communities for help...for food, money, and other stuff”.⁵⁵⁵ Apparently, the Taliban government in exile was confident of its southern partners, felt a need to negotiate with local leaders in the southeast, and altogether wrote off negotiating with the northern minority groups.

In these first three sections, I provided a background on factors of influence on the accumulation and concentration of capital and legitimacy at the local societal level. First, I briefly discussed how geography constraints and limits the reach and authority of the state. Concerns, such as terrain, roads, and elevation, define the physical contours and limits of communities, allowing for localized concentration of capital. Second, I examine how existing historic local practices generate and reproduce the rules and institutions that shape local social and political order. Finally, I examine how local identity-based conflict and the episodes of violence and community level mobilization further reproduce capital and social and political fragmentation at the local level.

⁵⁵³ SABAHOON, S. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵⁵⁴ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

3.4 The History of Intervention in Afghanistan

For nearly two hundred years, beginning in 1839, state formation in Afghanistan has been interrupted several times by foreign intervention – six times in total. In fact, it was only during the longest uninterrupted stretch, from 1919 to 1970, did Afghanistan resemble anything close to a state. Introducing and persuading new modes and models of political institutions while colonizing and modernizing over existing social order, the modern practices of intervention unravel and ravel, testing the durability of existing authority. Indeed, with each episode, the rate, distribution, and concentration of capital shifted, state-society relationship was altered, and the disposition of the people was challenged. With each episode of intervention, there came opportunity to reshape local perception of the distribution of power and legitimacy between state and society and to interrupt reproduction of the habitus and symbolic violence that were foundation of the status quo. In this section, I will investigate how the history of foreign intervention in Afghanistan has encouraged such dynamics.

3.4.1 Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-1919)

The Anglo-Afghan Wars are often referred to as the great game – a competition for power amongst foreign nations on Afghan soil. Military historian and army officer, Sir John William Kaye explained that, for fear of the Afghan leader Shah Zaman invading British India, “it was the ostensible object of the mission to instigate the Shah of Persia to move an army upon Herat”.⁵⁵⁶ Such distraction was meant to both train and redirect the attention of Shah Zaman toward the west, while weakening his defenses in the east, creating the opportunity for the British to gain leverage in their negotiations. The Russians attempted similar statecraft when their diplomats in Tehran, at the direction of Russian Tsar Nicholas, went about compelling “Persia to laying siege of Herat on the one hand, and on the other, to dispatch an envoy to Kabul with a letter from the Tsar Nicholas himself in order to persuade Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to join forces with the Russians and the Persians against the British”.⁵⁵⁷ Each of these maneuvers contributed to (re)shaping the social and political space and the relationship between the state and society in Afghanistan.

⁵⁵⁶ KAYE, J. W. 1874. *History of the war in Afghanistan*, London,, W. H. Allen & co.

⁵⁵⁷ Khalid, Mohammad. "Russia's Influence over Afghanistan—Story of British Follies" *Pakistan Horizon* 33, no. 1/2 (1980): 49-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393621>.

First Anglo-Afghan War

The First Anglo-Afghan war centered around the British dethroning of Dost Mohammad Khan for turning to the Russians for support and the installation of Shah Shuja to the throne, an Emir found friendlier to British interests at the time. Directly impacting the relationship between state and society, the decisions and actions of the British came to underscore fractures in society that identified with supporters of one or the other leader, and those that took to the fence and remained neutral. Recruiting and placing their 'Army of the Indus' under the charge of Prince Timur, eldest son of Shah Shuja, a band of irregulars marched into Kabul from the east, dethroned Dost Mohammad, and secured the capital for the new Amir. Shah Shuja marched to his victory, accompanied by "many chiefs and people" who had joined his party as they transited from the south.⁵⁵⁸ Dost Mohammad would find support in the north where he recruited over 6,000 Uzbeks and an unknown number of Kohistani and Qizilbash, before training his attention back toward Kabul. He took on and defeated the forces of Sir Robert Sale in Kohistan, but suffering overwhelming losses, ultimately was forced to surrender at Kabul. For their support in capturing the throne, the new Amir agreed to negotiate with foreign powers only with the consent of both the British and Sikh governments, to not interfere with his nephew and the leadership in Herat, and to renounce claims to any territory in the Sind.⁵⁵⁹

With their attention locked on affairs in the capital, the British failed to fully appreciate developments unfolding across the country. Local excitement over the installation of Shah Shuja was short lived even by those who supported his rise to the throne, as there were concerns over the encroachment of 'infidels' on Afghan soil. Major General Rawlinson explains in his memoirs that the Durrani tribe were "relieved from the tyranny of the Barakzai oppressors [Dost Mohammad Khan], and at first hailed the restoration of a Sadozai monarch [Shah Shuja] with something that might almost be called enthusiasm...they had expected to return to the dominant position from

⁵⁵⁸ HAY, C. B. 1911. The First Afghan War, 1838-1842. *Royal United Services Institution*, 55, 195-218.

⁵⁵⁹ During the Siege of Herat (1838), Political Officer Eldred Pottinger would secure the independence of Herat from a potential takeover by the Persians and place the province under the rule of Shah Kamran and Yar Mohammad.

which the Barakzai had deposed them”.⁵⁶⁰ In the east of Qandahar, the Ghilzai tribes who were ‘notoriously disaffected’ had also waited for such an “opportunity to strike a fresh blow for freedom”.⁵⁶¹ As with several other tribal communities who remained divorced from high politics, these tribes found their confidence exaggerated and eventually outweighed by uncertainty. In little time, they would revert to a largely autonomous existence and out of the sphere of state control.

Increasing unpopularity and a loitering threat of armed resistance convinced the British leadership to negotiate with local leaders and their communities, including paying for protection and safe transit. Indeed, the relative tranquility experienced up to 1841 was owed in part to subsidies provided to tribal chiefs. For example, to maintain their supply lines and communications between British India and the Afghan capital, British military commanders paid subsidies to the chiefs of the Ghilzai tribe who controlled the western access to the Khyber.⁵⁶² Securing safe passage through the Khyber meant that additional subsidies were also negotiated and paid to the Afridi tribes who lived inside the Khyber.

Other security concerns during this period included the establishment and maintenance of garrisons across the country. English officers negotiated the terms of their stay with local leaders, contracted local suppliers for provisions, and recruited security personnel from among local communities. In the distant periphery, Afghan central leaders could not hope to compete with local provision of supplies and security and so were excluded from these decisions. The British paid such attractive wages that field workers even abandoned their plough and went to work in British cantonments. In fact, the Amir could not readily find workers willing to accept the wages offered to tend to his property, and as a result, had to force laborers “to work in the garden...and accept the regular wages of the country”.⁵⁶³

Tensions increased in late 1840, however, with the enforcement of taxation, attempts to disarm communities, and the reduction of foreign subsidies. Across the country, people grew increasingly dissatisfied with the state and its relationship with the British. Major Rawlinson,

⁵⁶⁰ RAWLINSON, G. 1898. *A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson*, London, Longmans, Green, and Company.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² FREMONT-BARNES, G. 2009. *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing.

⁵⁶³ LAL, M. 1846. *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammad Khan of Kabul: With his Political Proceedings towards the English, Russian, and Persian Governments Vol. I*, London, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.

attempting to execute orders to disarm and collect taxes in areas along the Helmand River in northeast Qandahar, met with 'strenuous resistance' when the tribes stood up against the Shah's men and "drove the royal troops from the field".⁵⁶⁴

Hostilities continued to escalate, and in 1841 several British officers were assassinated. The tribesmen by now thoroughly "disliked Shah Shuja and hated the British"; in October 1841 they would attack Colonel Monteath and his men in the Khyber Pass, and in so doing mobilize local uprising from Kabul to Jalalabad.⁵⁶⁵ The journal of one British officer recalls, "on the sides and summits of the mountains...were posted in every quarter...bodies of the insurgents, whilst another portion of their force, consisting of foot led on by Sirdars on horse-back and their mounted followers, showed a determination to dispute the possession of a conical hill".⁵⁶⁶ By the end of the year, several British were killed, including British diplomat William Hay Macnaghten.

The day following Macnaghten's death, the sons of the exiled leader Dost Mohammad issued a letter to the British granting them safe passage to Peshawar. This would not be the case, however. On January 6, 1842, the British retreat from Kabul would end with over 4,500 troops and 12,000 civilians killed by tribesmen.

Rawlinson describes the events in his memoirs: as the "fate of the envoy and of the force under Elphinstone became generally known to the wild tribes in the neighborhood, their patriotism received a vast accession of fervor. Disaffection to British rule blazed out on every side. Kabuli chiefs who came down from the north were instructed to use their best efforts to stir up open rebellion. Durrani, Barakzai, Qizilbash, stood expectant, like vultures watching an occasion to swoop upon a destined prey".⁵⁶⁷ The Durrani tribes under the leadership of Aktur Khan and Akrum Khan, the Heratis rallied by Yar Mohammed, and the Ghilzai between Qandahar and Kabul under the leadership of their local rulers all stood independent, but in common cause against the rule of Shah Shuja and the British. Across the country, local leaders went about recruiting "where their

⁵⁶⁴ RAWLINSON, G. 1898. *A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson*, London, Longmans, Green, and Company.

⁵⁶⁵ MOLESWORTH, G. N. 1962. *Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War*, New York, Asia Publishing House.

⁵⁶⁶ MACGREGOR, C. M. 1871. *Central Asia Part II: A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources, and History of Afghanistan*, Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing.

⁵⁶⁷ RAWLINSON, G. 1898. *A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson*, London, Longmans, Green, and Company.

influence prevailed,” raising revenue to stand up and mobile local security apparatus to support the fight.⁵⁶⁸

In retaliation, General Pollock pushed through the Khyber Pass from the east, while General Nott advanced toward Kabul from Qandahar in the south. They destroyed several bazaars along their way, before rescuing hostages taken earlier in the year and withdrawing through the Khyber Pass, abandoning their objectives in Afghanistan. Released, Dost Mohammad returned to Kabul to see his son Akbar Khan take the throne. For the next thirty years the throne would rotate between Dost Mohammad and his sons, breaking from the historic Durrani rule. From across the border in India, the British remained concerned of Russian expansion into the area and the possibility that Afghans would support their endeavor.

During the First Anglo-Afghan War, British focus on repelling Russian advances in the area arguably clouded its judgement and decision-making in dealing with local Afghan society. As a result, British forces and families experienced increased hostility throughout the country.

Aiming to circumvent this hostility, the British began paying for protection and safe passage throughout the country. In his memoirs, Sir Ian Scott wrote, “subsidies are given to help the tribal elders control the whole tribe”.⁵⁶⁹ While this may have been true, it was not necessarily wise for the British or Shah Shuja. Where local leaders received subsidies, they gained economic capital (wealth) and in some places, status (symbolic capital), enhancing their position against the legitimacy of the state and further encouraging resistance to Shah Shuja. Molesworth would correctly add and inevitably submit later in his analysis of the Third Anglo-Afghan War that such subsidies increased “gradually to some extent the prestige and authority” of local leaders.⁵⁷⁰ As a result, they were able to mobilize local communities against both Shah Shuja and the British.

Moreover, where the British reduced or ended their subsidies, local communities and their leaders grew frustrated and ultimately mobilized against the British. Lieutenant Colonel MacGregor’s massive three volume compilation of the military and political events in Afghanistan recalls that “many of the subsidies which had been granted to certain Afghan Sirdars...is

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ SCOTT, I. & JUDD, D. 1999. *A British tale of Indian and foreign service : the memoirs of Sir Ian Scott*, London ; New York, NY, Radcliffe Press.

⁵⁷⁰ FLETCHER, R. 2015. *British imperialism and 'the tribal question' : desert administration and nomadic societies in the Middle East, 1919-1936*, Oxford, U.K. New York, NY, Oxford University Press.

considered to have been the main cause of the subsequent disaffection...(when)...in October 1841, a reduction of forty thousand rupees was made in the subsidy to the Ghilzai”.⁵⁷¹

As evident, subsidies were only a temporary fix and means for pacifying the tribes. Often, ongoing disagreements left local communities divided and unlikely to be trusted. For example, with hopes of preventing potential attempts to overthrow Shah Shuja, Sir William Hay Macnaghten struggled to negotiate with Mohammad Akbar Khan and other Ghilzai tribal leaders. He remained uneasy, however. Even during negotiations, it seemed Akbar Khan had little control over the tribes.

An even more pressing concern was losing tribal support while under duress. This was of particular concern where subsidies were reduced or cut. Sir William Nott had “concerns about the lack of cash he possessed, which he claimed he needed for the irregular cavalry, presumably because he believed they would desert his force”.⁵⁷² Rawlinson agreed that “among the professed adherents of the British cause there was wavering and treachery...the native levies serving on the British side...were of doubtful fidelity”.⁵⁷³

In the years between the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars, Major General Frederick Roberts recalled that “the constant trouble all along our frontier were in a great measure due to the Amir’s hostility, and that such troubles would increase rather than diminish unless we could succeed in establishing an *entente cordiale* with Dost Mohammad”.⁵⁷⁴ Local leaders who supported Dost Mohammad throughout his overthrow and return continued to demonstrate their support, harassing the British at every opportunity. Along the frontier and through the passes from British India into Afghanistan remained extremely hostile territory, forcing British political and military officer to continue paying subsidies to local leaders to keep their communications and supply lines safe.

⁵⁷¹ MACGREGOR, C. M. 1871. *Central Asia Part II: A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources, and History of Afghanistan*, Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing.

⁵⁷² JOHNSON, R. 2012. *The Afghan Way of War: How and Why they Fight*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁵⁷³ RAWLINSON, G. 1898. *A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson*, London, Longmans, Green, and Company.

⁵⁷⁴ ROBERTS, F. M. L. F. 1901. *Forty-One Years in India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief*, London, Macmillan and Company.

The history to this point demonstrates that, although Dost Mohammad was back on the throne, he lacked control and sovereignty over the vast Afghan territory. Indeed, “towards the end of 1855 Dost Mohammad found himself in considerable difficulties...a revolt had occurred in Herat, and a Persian army was preparing to besiege that fortress; the chiefs and people of Kandahar were disaffected; and the province of Balkh was threatened with invasion both by the King of Bokhara and by Turkoman hordes”.⁵⁷⁵

Even those who once fiercely stood behind him became disenchanted. Roberts writes, his “own people could not understand his attitude...they frequently came to him...throwing their turbans at his feet and praying him as a Mahomedan to seize that opportunity for destroying the ‘infidels’...hear the news from Delhi, they urged...see the difficulties the *Feringhis* are in”.⁵⁷⁶ Unsatisfied by the response they received, local leaders went on to fight the British with their own private militias, reinforcing the division between state and society and challenging the legitimacy of the state.

Second Anglo-Afghan War

Although in 1873 the Russians and British had come to an understanding to respect the position of one another in Central Asia⁵⁷⁷, by the late 1870s British leaders were thoroughly fed up with the treatment they were receiving from the Afghan leadership. On November 21, 1878, the Viceroy of India addressed a letter to Amir Sher Ali Khan, outlining his concerns:

“for all these gracious acts the Amir Sher Ali Khan has rendered no return, on the contrary he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy...forbid passage...maltreated British subjects...permitted British traders to be plundered...repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the British Government and himself...received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul an embassy from Russia...this he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance...he has done it well knowing that the Russian Government stands

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Dowling, Timothy C., ed. *Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond* [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO, 2014.

*pledged by engagements with England...[and] while this Russian embassy is still at his capital, the Amir has forcibly repulsed at his outpost an English envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy...nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan”.*⁵⁷⁸

Indeed, the Russians had established their presences in Kabul. However, it was an unwelcomed presence only granted by the Amir out of fear of confrontation with the Russians. It was this same concern which encouraged the Amir to deny the British envoy and mission to Kabul. However, this dismissal of the British would not be tolerated for long. When Field Marshal Neville Bowles Chamberlain was refused passage, and blocked from setting up a diplomatic mission, the British forced their way through the Khyber Pass and in late November 1878, provoked the second Anglo-Afghan War. The invasion of Afghanistan by the British forced the Amir to retreat to Mazar-i-Sharif where he later died in February 1879. His son, Yakub Khan claimed the throne and in May 1879, signed the Treaty of Gandamak allowing a British mission to Kabul, and surrendering Afghan foreign affairs to the British.

Local Afghans were not pleased, and in September 1879 protests culminated in an uprising that left Military Administrator Sir Louis Cavagnari dead. Mohammad Yakub Khan was forced to abdicate and ultimately turned to the British for protection. However, local security forces, at the direction of their local leaders, remained in place and continued to block British troops from entering Kabul.⁵⁷⁹

During and immediately after the Second Anglo-Afghan War, British commanders formalized their relations with local leaders with the execution of treaties aimed at securing the peace, while English diplomats took a more serious look at dividing the country into more manageable statelets governed by independent leaders with whom they could directly negotiate the safety of their missions and organize resistance against Russian expansion. It was during this period that the personal correspondence and wires of military officers, journalists, and diplomats

⁵⁷⁸ VICEROY. November 21, 1878 1878. *RE: Proclamation issued by the Viceroy*. Type to AMIR SHER ALI KHAN.

⁵⁷⁹ MOLESWORTH, G. N. 1962. *Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War*, New York, Asia Publishing House.

increasingly emphasized an active role in installing and empowering local leaders who were believed friendly to British interests. Experiences during the first war had proven the importance of securing transit routes throughout the country and negotiating settlement in or near local communities with local leaders. Encouraging division between state and society, General Primrose during a public conference submitted that the “subdivision of the country, and its being handed over in separate governments to different *walis*, would...be a course more acceptable to the majority of the well-disposed population...than the complete cession of Afghanistan to one ruler...who would be certain to meet determined opposition from his rivals”.⁵⁸⁰

In February 1881, over 300 local leaders gathered in Peshawar at the request of British representatives to discuss and negotiate keeping the Khyber Pass free and safe for transit to and from Kabul.⁵⁸¹ The terms included British recognition of the independence and legal jurisdiction of the Afridi in and around the Khyber Pass. It also outlined an agreement that not only are the Afridi to desist from attacking the British, but also provide *jazailchis*⁵⁸² for the security of the area – of whom the British would pay a salary. These riflemen were the sole responsibility of local leaders who would appoint, dismiss, and manage the execution of their jobs. In return for their agreement, the British would provide an annual subsidy to each community and a ‘special’ allowance to tribal leaders.⁵⁸³

In the south, Lord Napier, submitted a memorandum to the British Parliament advocating for the annexation of Qandahar to British India.⁵⁸⁴ He argued that for “the security of British India, and the welfare of the district of Kandahar, the permanent annexation to India of the fortress and its surrounding territory appears...the best course we could adopt”.⁵⁸⁵ Napier believed that the

⁵⁸⁰ ASHE, M. W. 1881. *Personal Records of the Kandahar Campaign by Officers Engaged Therein*, London, David Bogue.

⁵⁸¹ INTELLIGENCE BRANCH ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS INDIA 1908. North-West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers. *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*. Simla: Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters.

⁵⁸² *Jazailchis* are skilled riflemen with the Afghan *Jazail* rifle.

⁵⁸³ INTELLIGENCE BRANCH ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS INDIA 1908. North-West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers. *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*. Simla: Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters.

⁵⁸⁴ LOW, C. R. 1883. *Major-General Sir Frederick S. Roberts*, London, W.H. Allen and Company.

⁵⁸⁵ BUCK, C. 1881. *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series: Commencing with the Accession of William IV*, London, Office for Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.

Russians could easily take Herat and benefit from a position in its fortress. He argued that England should take Qandahar and its fortress as a balancing strategy.

Increased direct dealings with local leaders and attempts to redraw the perimeters of local communities was met with swift resistance by tribesmen. Splits among these groups added to the complexity, causing tension and conflict to mount unrestrained within and among communities across the country. Traditional systems of mediation, weakened by these splits, had negligible effect. Special correspondent Howard Hensman described 'tribal uneasiness' throughout the country with British policy: "attempts have been made to carry out the spirit of the proclamation, to make 'permanent arrangements for the good government of the people' by consultation with such Sirdars as have deemed it wise to join us. However much they may represent us, they are rejected of the people; [those who] 'joined their appointments,' have had a very rough time of it...these are the results of the first experiments of governing provinces through chiefs selected by us as representing the interests and wishes of the people...our governors report that they are looked upon with disfavor, and even hated, by many maliks".⁵⁸⁶

Hensman followed up his report with several accounts of tit-for-tat retaliation between local leaders and British commanders. In one report, he describes the events surrounding the hostilities between British General Baker and Mir Bacha, a Kohistani Chief who reportedly had played a prominent part in recent disturbances: "...Mir Bacha...owned several villages and forts at this place, and it was thought that if a rapid visit was made to his stronghold it would convince the other Kohistanis that our helplessness had only been temporary, and that we were still able to punish them if we chose".⁵⁸⁷ And so, General Baker directed his men to "demolish his forts, burn his villages, and cut down all the vineyards and orchards belonging to him...those owned by other Maliks were spared".⁵⁸⁸

Like the First Anglo-Afghan War, British intervention in the country resulted in direct dealings with local leaders wherein they received economic benefits and a certain recognition that accompanies new wealth (economic capital) and status (cultural and social capital). Formalizing patron-client relations with the English only further enhanced their opportunities, while circumventing central authority influence and input on local community affairs. Indeed, local

⁵⁸⁶ HENSMAN, H. 1882. *The Afghan War of 1879-80*, London, W.H. Allen & Company.

⁵⁸⁷ MORLEY, J. 1880. *The Fortnightly Review Vol. XXVII*, London, Chapman and Hall.

⁵⁸⁸ HENSMAN, H. 1882. *The Afghan War of 1879-80*, London, W.H. Allen & Company.

leaders grew accustomed to their newfound relationship. So much so, that they grew overly confident in their right to economic handouts and when Amir Ayub Khan sought assistance from some tribal communities to assist with an uprising in Kushk district, they refused to assist, demanding that he should pay.

Furthering the divide between the state and society, in the space between the Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, the policies of Abdur Rahman Khan and his son Habibullah Khan provoked the alienation of local leaders and their communities. Amir Abdur Rahman, otherwise known as the *Iron Amir*, ended *Waqf*, religious trusts where Muslims donate land, property, and other assets, and the income derived from them to religious organizations. Exempt from tax, such assets reduced the income stream to the state. He also forced entire communities to migrate to other areas as a means for distributing his influence and diluting the potential of alliances building against him. He banished anyone believed opposed to him, including tribal leaders and their families.⁵⁸⁹

In addition to withdrawing the autonomy and independence of local leaders, Abdur Rahman Khan also made attempts to expand policing and judicial system, with the *Kotwali* charged with silencing those in the periphery who challenged him. Various government offices and institutions were also empowered to police and oversee judicial processes at the local level. *Khassadars* were used on occasion to enforce the authority of government appointees charge with these roles at the district level.

Still, Habibullah Khan inherited the difficulties of maintaining control of and order among the tribes who continued to resist the policies of his father. Adding to local grievances, his own attempts at reforms were unevenly welcomed across the country, causing not only resistance to his policies but also infighting and division at the local level. He went as far as to "block requests for action against the British...[and] bar tribal leaders from operating against British possessions along the frontier".⁵⁹⁰ Opposition to his reform were so strong that a chief advisor to Habibullah, Abdul Latif, was stoned to death for apostasy and his role in trying to promote state reforms.

In February of 1919, Habibullah was assassinated and his son, Amanullah, inherited the throne. Promising to promote democratic ideals, he went about strengthening his position,

⁵⁸⁹ DUPREE, L. 2012. *Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁵⁹⁰ FREMONT-BARNES, G. 2009. *The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing.

including imprisoning his uncle Nasrullah, a conservative who some believed was responsible for the murder of his father. In a move to further shore up his position and build support from the conservatives who remained loyal to Nasrullah, in May 1919 Amanullah invaded British India and instigated the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

Third Anglo-Afghan War

On May 3, 1919, Afghan troops crossed the frontier and captured the town of Bagh, marking the beginning of the third war between the British and Afghans. In the years and months leading up to the invasion, Amir Habibullah Khan had gained confidence to make a move. First, the Amir broke with his agreement to leave foreign affairs to the British and went about developing relations with the Germans and Turks.⁵⁹¹ Second, he believed that World War I had sufficiently depleted and weakened British forces in India for Afghan forces to advance. And third, the Amir believed that mounting unrest between the British and Indians provided good opportunity for capturing support on the other side of the Durand Line. Locally the Amir gathered and ensured his loyalist that they would be paid well for their support when the time came. He would endow local leaders with recognition, economic profit, and the opportunity to further amplify their prestige and symbolic capital.

The war lasted only three months and conclude with the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919. Up to this point, Afghan leaders had largely accepted that the country merely served as a buffer between the Russian and British empires, and that their powers were limited to managing domestic affairs. The treaty of 1919 recognized Afghan independence, including in its foreign affairs; it reaffirmed the Durand Line, the demarcation of the border separating Afghanistan from British-India as determined by British leaders; and most importantly, it offered the Amir an opportunity for political gains domestically in the face of disaffected tribesmen who felt their freedoms were sold to the English for far too many years. Indeed, it was from this point that the British terminated all subsidies to local communities and their leaders. The

⁵⁹¹ RUTTIG, T. 2014. Afghanistan in World War I: Afghans in the Kaiser's Jihad. Berlin: Afghanistan Analysts Network.

agreement was reaffirmed again on November 22, 1921, when representatives from London and Kabul met to sign the treaty between the British and Afghan Governments.⁵⁹²

The primary driver that convinced the Amir to move forward with confronting the British was mounting anti-British sentiments on both sides of the Durand Line. Unrest and rebellion against the British and their supporters in British-India caused concern over his ability to maintain power in Afghanistan in the case of similar uprising in the country. In India, the Office of the Viceroy reported on April 27, 1919, the people in the “Punjab and in Peshawar have risen in rebellion against the British Government on account of certain new laws passed by the Government”.⁵⁹³ Indeed, if similar uprising followed in Afghanistan, it would have been a difficult confrontation. Compared to the 50,000 soldiers who staffed the Afghan army, there were an estimated 80,000 trained tribesmen along the border.⁵⁹⁴ Moreover, the conservative groups who maintained a presence on both sides of the border were already actively engaged in resisting continued British presence in the region.

The British had already experienced several resignations and desertions and were now worried about contagion. Since 1901, the British had replaced much of its own with locally recruited *Khassadar* to monitor the border as a strategy to reduce the number of potential young men otherwise free to raid their garrisons and establishments. When the Khyber Rifle deserted en masse, the remaining men were disarmed to avoid spreading similar ideas across the regiments. In another example, approximately 700 men at Landi Kotal requested to be discharged, causing similar concerns that the entire Afridi tribe would follow suite. The Office of the Viceroy cautioned that the trained young men now “sit on the fence with steadying influence of elder men”.⁵⁹⁵ Not far from the truth, reportedly the Afghan Postmaster stationed in Peshawar, Ghulam Haider, mustered over 10,000 local men⁵⁹⁶, many of whom had deserted the British. A worried and

⁵⁹² PARLIAMENT 1922. Treaty between the British and Afghan Governments. In: PARLIAMENT (ed.). London: His Majesty's Stationary Office.

⁵⁹³ VICEROY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA. 1919. RE: *Telegraphic April 27, 1919*. Type to AFGHANISTAN, O. O. T. F. A.

⁵⁹⁴ BARTHORP, M. 2002. *Afghan wars and the North-West Frontier, 1839-1947*, London, Cassell.

⁵⁹⁵ VICEROY. May 18, 1919 1919b. RE: *Telegraph from Viceroy No.20*. Type to INDIA, S. O. S. F.

⁵⁹⁶ AMIR AMANULLA. May 10, 1919 1919. RE: *Letter between Amanullah and Haji Turangzai*. Type to HAJI TURANGZAI.

desperate Viceroy transmitted a warning: “if besieged and you must, therefore, not hang on too long, thereby, perhaps, giving enemy success in capture of garrison. Political Officer, Wano, has authority to tell all men of South Waziristan Militia who remain loyal, if retreat becomes necessary, that their loyalty will be handsomely rewarded and that they will find lucrative work here”.⁵⁹⁷

The Viceroy reported intercepting a message from the Amir calling for similar action against the British in Afghanistan: “Indians, in rising and creating disturbances are right...but these rising and disturbances are not confined to India...in Afghanistan also their bad effects are seen...casting aside all pride, distinctions and differences in such time of disorder...help one another”.⁵⁹⁸ Even prior to the war, tribes straddling the Durand Line were furnished weapons and encouraged to harass the British, while Afghan troops took up positions along the border and constructed fortifications. The Amir had the support of the clans of Nangarhar and other eastern provinces, and the Afridi and Mohmand on the British side of the Durand. In his telegraphed message, the office of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India wrote on the 4th of May 1919, “party of Khyber Rifles escorting caravan to Landi Khana was met this morning in disputed area between Tor Kham and Landi Khana by armed Afghan pickets, who threatened to fire if party advanced...so far as can be ascertained there were no Afghan troops or military force among Afghan pickets, who were apparently acting in concert with tribesmen under notorious Zar Shah”.⁵⁹⁹ Zar Shah was indeed one of several local leaders who led resistance against the British in previous years.

While several tribes mobilized in response to the Amir’s call, there were still others who remained either neutral or held out for payment. In Mohmand, several clans remained unwilling to assist the Amir, and decided to take a neutral position in the whole affair. The Office of the Viceroy noted that, “Afridi jirga is reported to have decided to take no steps till Amir supplies them with food and arms and ammunition, and the Chief Commissioner expects that the result of the operations round Dakka, which are being watched with close attention, will be decisive factor

⁵⁹⁷ VICEROY. May 21, 1919 1919d. *RE: Telegraph from Viceroy No. 26.* Type to INDIA, S. O. S. F.

⁵⁹⁸ VICEROY. May 19, 2017 1919c. *RE: Telegraph from Viceroy No.23.* Type to INDIA, S. O. S. F.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid.

in their behavior”.⁶⁰⁰ Apparently, this group went unfunded and without supplies because of past aggressions against the Afghan Amir while they were under the leadership of the British. The Office of the Viceroy reports: "Afridi deputation under Mullah Said Akbar met Kahi Commandant on their way to Jalalabad, and in reply to demand for money, food, arms and ammunition were told that Afghans could put no trust in Afridis after their treachery in last war".⁶⁰¹

Lobbying for the support of local commanders and their communities, Amanullah openly condemned his father's relationship with the British, engaged directly with local leaders, and promised to compensate them for their support. Although his uncle Nasrullah initially had the support of several conservative local leaders, Amanullah turned to bribes and promises of firm resistance to British influence in the country as a means for winning support.

In its aftermath, the Third Anglo-Afghan War left the tribes in the east along the borders and the North-West Frontier in a state of unrest, especially in the areas in and around Waziristan.⁶⁰² Tribes who once fought on opposing sides continued to maintain hostilities toward one another. One intelligence report around the same period had warned that the “higher standard of skill and knowledge now demanded...[were] being naturally disseminated to a greater extent than formerly amongst the tribesmen...on their return to their own country on the conclusion of their military service”.⁶⁰³ Fighters were returning home more prepared than ever to protect their local communities. In another personal reflection of operations in the Third Anglo-Afghan War, Lieutenant General George Noble Molesworth of the British Army explains that the “tribes were allowed to maintain tribal rifle factories in the Kohat Pass, in British India where very workable copies of British army rifles are turned out. Thus, in recent years the Afghan tribesman has become very well armed and, although the supply of ammunition is still a problem, he never seems to be short of it”.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰⁰ VICEROY. May 18, 1919 1919a. *RE: Telegraph from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India*. Type to INDIA, S. O. S. F.

⁶⁰¹ VICEROY. May 18, 1919 1919b. *RE: Telegraph from Viceroy No.20*. Type to INDIA, S. O. S. F.

⁶⁰² MOLESWORTH, G. N. 1962. *Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War*, New York, Asia Publishing House.

⁶⁰³ INTELLIGENCE BRANCH ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS INDIA 1908. North-West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers. *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*. Simla: Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters.

⁶⁰⁴ MOLESWORTH, G. N. 1962. *Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War*, New York, Asia Publishing House.

Over the course of eighty-one years, British intervention during the Anglo-Afghan Wars had come to alter state-society relations and the disposition of local Afghans. Direct economic assistance and the arming of local communities reduced local reliance on central government support. Indeed, local leaders were incentivized to cooperate directly with imperial powers as the patronage they received afforded them some level of autonomy while providing them the opportunity to accumulate capital and consolidate their authority. This would, in turn, help to bring about local symbolic capital that would challenge the state in a deep-rooted manner.⁶⁰⁵

Agreeing, former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani wrote of the period: “twice, it is to be emphasized, in 1839 and in 1879, the British Army in India invaded the country. Both times, the Afghan State had just become powerful enough to check internal centrifugal force. Both times, however, the Afghan State simply melted under the attack. The dismantling of the central government gave the alternative sources of power the opportunity to take over the lead and wage a successful struggle against the invaders, hence emerging ever stronger. In both cases the tribal aristocracy and the religious establishment had led the national revolt, and whoever came to the throne thereafter had to take into account their accrued power”.⁶⁰⁶

During the Anglo-Afghan Wars and the period that followed, several key developments in law and policing are noteworthy. The country saw its first constitution under Amanullah, the forming of the Ministry of Interior in 1920, and the establishment of the Office of the Attorney General in 1953. Guided by decisions to merge Sharia and constitutional law under a centralized system, policing in Afghanistan increasingly began to resemble that of Europe.

However, with the end of British protectorate status and the subsequent loss of subsidies in the early 1900s, progress was difficult. Afghan leaders found it difficult to properly finance, employ, and train sufficient state policing staff to offset and replace the historic civilian and *kotwali* forces. In fact, it would be some years later, in 1929 and under the leadership of Nadir Shah, that Afghanistan would be in a position to call on international support in developing its domestic security apparatus. With the support of German and Turkish trainers and advisors, the first police training center was erected in 1936 followed by the creation of a gendarmerie to meet the growing

⁶⁰⁵ ARJOMAND, N. 2015. *The Folly of Double Government*. Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.

⁶⁰⁶ GHANI, A. 1978. Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan 1880-1901. *Modern Asian Studies*, 12, 269-284.

threat of armed smugglers. In 1957, the United States also began providing training and support for Afghan's police force. This was short lived, however, and ended only two years later.

Turkey remained until the 1960s, providing translations of its policing manuals and helping with the curriculum at Afghanistan's military and police academies.⁶⁰⁷ Germany, on the other hand, removed its team during World War II and returned in the mid-1950s, only to be replaced by the Soviets. With Soviet support, in 1973 Afghanistan saw its first career police officers. Prior to this, military officers had filled these roles.

By the mid-1970s, the Afghan police force was 30,000 strong with many recruited locally and remaining under the supervision of local leaders who were appointed by the state. During this time, only 5 of the 34 provinces maintained a criminal investigation department with much of the police force working without radios and relying on horses to get around. Under resourced, the government continued to depend on local tribal militia to police rural areas, with local leaders adjudicating local disputes.

3.4.2 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979 – 1992)

Soviet encroachment on Afghan politics began more than a decade prior to its invasion, introducing an ideology that conflicted with the historic culture of most of its people, ultimately resulted in division and violence. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965 only to split a couple years later in 1967. Two groups emerged – the Khalkis and the Parchimists. The Khalqis were largely made up of middle-to-lower class non-elites who advocated for a regime that more closely resembled Soviet style governance, while the Parchimists comprised of moderate urban middle-to-upper class members. This second group supported Mohammad Daoud Khan, who renounced his royal title in favor of a republic.

In 1973, Mohammad Daoud Khan staged a coupe with the support of the PDPA, deposed his cousin King Zahir Shah, and took over as head of state. However, increasing differences between Daoud and the PDPA would five year later, on April 28, 1978⁶⁰⁸, lead to his assassination.

⁶⁰⁷ SIGAR 2022b. Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁶⁰⁸ On April 17, 1978, Mir Akbar Khyber, a prominent member of the Parcham Party was assassinated. Tensions between rival parties of the PDPA had been building throughout the 1970s and on April 28, 1978, for fear that they were next to be arrested or assassinated, leaders of the Parcham party coordinated an attack on the palace.

Khalq member Nur Mohammad Taraki replaced Daoud as head of state, establish the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and invited increased Soviet intervention and influence in the country. Throughout the revolution the Soviets had continued their 'disinterested assistance'.⁶⁰⁹ However, by the mid-1970s more than one-third of Afghan army officers had received training on Soviet soil. As internal division among Afghan communists grew, so did Soviet involvement.

To reduce tensions and unify the party, Parcham member Babrak Karmal was made Deputy Prime Minister. However, the mixed Khalq-Parcham leadership did not last long and was inevitably purged, forcing Karmal into exile in 1978. The following year, on the orders of Hafizullah Amin, Taraki was assassinated on September 14, 1979. Amin took over as head of state, however his reign was also short lived. Only three months later, on December 27, 1979, the Soviets would have him assassinated. Babrak Karmal came out of exile and was installed as Prime Minister for the next seven years. The Soviets had preferred Taraki over Amin who "did not favor the idea of Afghanistan being pushed into the Soviet bloc," and so they encouraged Taraki to "put Amin in his place".⁶¹⁰ The tension between the two and those who supported them was evident in the capital and elsewhere. In a personal memorandum Brezhnev explained that with the coupe and murder of Taraki which placed Amin in power, came a competition that increased hostilities and division in the country. Moreover, when word got around that Amin would possibly shift his allegiance to the West and that he had already promised tribal leaders that he would adopt a 'policy of neutrality'⁶¹¹, the Kremlin was compelled to take steps.

Serial defection among the ranks of the Afghan security force and heightened uncertainty and resistance by Afghans accompanied each change or threat of change in the political order, testing the people's sense of obligation. Agreeing to criticism levelled against Hafizullah Amin, approximately thirteen thousand soldiers under the leadership of Jafar Sartairay stood in protest and postured for an attack on the capital. Their anger was not confined to Amin, however. When Amin was assassinated, commander of the presidential guard, Jahandad, ordered his men to take

⁶⁰⁹ RO'I, Y. 1974. *From encroachment to involvement : a documentary study of Soviet policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973*, New York, Wiley.

⁶¹⁰ KAKAR, M. H. 1995. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

⁶¹¹ ANDROPOV, Y. V. 1979. *RE: Personal Memorandum, early December 1979*. Type to BREZHNEV, L. I.

up arms against the Soviets and their native Afghan comrades. Jahandad was later caught, imprisoned, and executed.

Concerned over maintaining a stable and loyal state security apparatus in Afghanistan, the Kremlin ordered an additional 85,000 soldiers to patrol and provide security in the cities.⁶¹² Allegedly, additional numbers of plain clothe assets were dispatched to the countryside as well.

Infighting at the top, defections among the ranks of the state security apparatus, and the Soviet response created martyrs and a cult of personality for those who continued to fight. One Soviet officer complained, “due to the massive disaffection and desertions of Afghan brigade officers and men to the mujahidin, the Afghan concept of the operation was almost immediately known to the enemy”.⁶¹³ Indeed, local leaders and their networks communicated Soviet movement much faster than the Russians could make course corrections. This was partially attributed to the defection of some thousands of army officers who were trained in the Soviet Union and now joined the resistance bringing with them learned tradecraft and strategies. In fact, one report claimed that because of mass defections, Afghan officers still serving under Soviet supervision were most certainly outnumbered by those who abandoned their posts and joined the resistance.⁶¹⁴

Infighting and resistance among the ranks of the military and political elite was mirrored in the countryside. In the northeast region of Nuristan, the central region of Hazarajat, and northern Tajik regions resistance was partly out of concern over continued Pashtun dominance and governance over the country. Along the southeast and southern areas of the country, the traditional short-term military functions of the *arbakai* were restored while local leaders rallied for support and assistance from among their local communities. Interestingly, in its strategy for transforming the country into a modern socialist state, the Taraki government anticipated little resistance to its plans, except from the locals of these very areas.

⁶¹² HYMAN, A. 1984. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London, Macmillan Press.

⁶¹³ GRAU, L. W. 1996. *The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press.

⁶¹⁴ HYMAN, A. 1984. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London, Macmillan Press.

The first of several uprisings across the country began in the summer of 1978 in Nuristan⁶¹⁵ where local leaders led an uprising against the newly installed Soviet backed regime, partly for its “purging and execution of senior military and police officers from the community who had prominently benefited from political patronage under Daoud”.⁶¹⁶ Newly appointed officers loyal to the new regime were targeted during attacks on police outposts and local army bases⁶¹⁷, catching the attention of Soviet advisors. Commander Anvar Amin recalls, “someone must have made a report to the Russians’ servant government that a mullah...were doing destructive work...[so] they sent a few infantrymen from the provincial capital to capture them...[and] the next day government soldiers were sent to...seize and bring back whichever elders there were from the nearby villages”.⁶¹⁸ In response, the Kabul leadership reportedly provided cash incentives and weapons to the Gujar tribe, historic enemies of the Nuristani, encouraging infighting among the two, thereby distracting and diverting the resistance.⁶¹⁹ Although the divide and conquer scheme proved a temporary remedy for the authorities in Kabul, the practice of organizing, mobilizing, and leading their communities yet again into battle only further enhanced the visibility and prestige of local leaders.

Up to 1978, the Nuristani had increasingly grown accustomed to a level of independence granted to them by the royal family.⁶²⁰ Faced with an encroaching Soviet backed government, they now sought to reassert their autonomy. In 1979, the local leaders asserted their independence from the Afghan government and two years later in 1981 established the Dawlet-i-Islami (Islamic Government), naming Mawlawi Afzal of Nik Mur its Amir.⁶²¹

⁶¹⁵ Following the establishment of the Durand Line, the people of Nuristan (land of the light) were forced to convert to Islam by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan; the areas was previously known as Kafiristan (land of the pagans).

⁶¹⁶ NEWELL, R. S. 1986. The Prospects for State Building in Afghanistan. In: WEINER, M. & BANUAZIZI, A. (eds.) *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

⁶¹⁷ PARSONS, M. D. 1995. Ramgal Valley, Western Nuristan: Regional Development Report. Peshawar: SERVE.

⁶¹⁸ AMIN, M. A. 1997. A True Story of our Jihad. In: STRAND, R. F. (ed.). Online.

⁶¹⁹ ROY, O. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁶²⁰ RUBIN, B. R. 2002. *The fragmentation of Afghanistan : state formation and collapse in the international system*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

⁶²¹ CITA, K. 1987. Regional Report: Nuristan. Peshawar: United Nations.

However, although the Nuristani region remained relatively neutral and quiet for most of the 1980s, it continued to be a source of passive resistance.⁶²² Rebels often transited through the region, reportedly receiving a warm reception by local leaders who would stress their neutrality in the matter.⁶²³ Kathleen Cita, a medical doctor who was administering vaccines in the area during this period reported that “Dawlet has been on good terms with the Jamiat-i-Islami, and...large numbers of mujahidin...[and are] currently passing through the area”.⁶²⁴

Although a sense of a common cause encouraged uprisings across the country, local differences and divisions often surfaced, complicating efforts to coordinate resistance activities. In June 1979, rebel commander Ahmad Shah Massoud led an insurrection that forced government officials out of the Panjshir Valley, where he went on to establish and maintain a rebel stronghold for more than twenty years. During this period, his largely Tajik fighters confronted the Soviets as well as the Pashtun opposition on several occasions. Indeed, for most of the conflict tension between the two persisted with each competing for resources and territorial control. Recall, for the northern minority groups, fear of continued Pashtun dominance was a primary motivator. Indeed, some even claim that northern resistance was “prompted more by the heavy-handed Pashtun than the Marxist nature of the new government”.⁶²⁵

Further complicating the matter and adding to an already very divided and fractured Afghanistan, Roy submits that the northern Uzbek ethnic groups were “receptive to the attractions of modernism...even though the number of [their] people who joined the PDPA was very limited”.⁶²⁶ While some were firmly in favor of a socialist system backed by the Soviets, others were not thoroughly convinced. As a result, in addition to an ethnic split, among the Uzbeks themselves there were disagreements as to how to respond to Soviet presence in the country. Author of one of the first authoritative Soviet military study of the war, Colonel V.G. Safronov,

⁶²² PARSONS, M. D. 1995. Ramgal Valley, Western Nuristan: Regional Development Report. Peshawar: SERVE.

⁶²³ Leadership in Nuristan during the 1980s: In the north, Mawlawi Afzal (Dawlat-i- Inqilabi-yi Islami-yi Nuristan, Islamic Revolutionary State of Nuristan); and in the south, Sarwar Nuristani, former military officer and potential government (KGB) agent. (See Rubin, 2002).

⁶²⁴ CITA, K. 1987. Regional Report: Nuristan. Peshawar: United Nations.

⁶²⁵ TANNER, S. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, Cambridge, Da Capo Press.

⁶²⁶ ROY, O. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

concur that “the presence of Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen in the [Soviet] intervention forces usually worsened the situation due to a long heritage of tribal and ethnic disputes”.⁶²⁷

On March 15, 1979, Captain Ismael Khan led the defection of the entire Afghan 17th Division of the anti-aircraft battalion. Taking control of the city for three days, they attacked government sites killing approximately one hundred Soviet advisors and their families.⁶²⁸ Five months later in August 1979, Khan and his commanders proclaimed victory and declared an 'Independent Islamic Hazarajat'.⁶²⁹ It was a return to the great historical division.

The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Gromyko, pointed out that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan was now centered in Herat⁶³⁰, and that the Kabul government responded with a bombing campaign that left more than 5,000 dead, most of whom were civilians.⁶³¹ During his meeting with Taraki, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin, compared it to the 'bravery' of the Vietnamese in defending their homeland, arguing that “there are enough forces in your country to stand up to (these) counter-revolutionary raids...one only needs to unify them and create new military formations”.⁶³² This was, of course, easier said than done.

In the east and south, similar defections were reported, and resistance mounted. In Paktia and Kunar, several soldiers from the army defected and joined the rebels.⁶³³ In spring 1979, the Ghilzai tribes, becoming increasingly disaffected with the policies of the government in Logar province, rebelled against government officials. The attacks left the Census Commissioner dead.

⁶²⁷ GALEOTTI, M. 1995. *Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's last war*, London, England ; Portland, Ore., Frank Cass.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

⁶²⁹ GRAU, L. W. & GRESS, M. A. 2002. *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, Kansas, University Press of Kansas.

⁶³⁰ CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 1979a. Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In: POLITBURO (ed.). Moscow: Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow.

⁶³¹ YOUSAF, M. & ADKIN, M. 1992. *Afghanistan -The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower*, Havertown, Casemate Publishers and Book Distributors.

⁶³² CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 1979b. Record of Meeting of A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov and B.N. Ponomarev with N.M. Taraki. In: POLITBURO (ed.). Moscow: Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow.

⁶³³ TANNER, S. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, Cambridge, Da Capo Press.

In April 1979, forces from Jalalabad also mutinied, taking up arms and protesting the government and its policies.

Despite evidence of resistance in these areas, Roy points out that the “Pashtun regions were less troubled by conflict than the Persian speaking regions...[because] the new Khalq power was Pashtun and thus retained a certain 'national' legitimacy which in the eyes of the other ethnic groups it did not possess”.⁶³⁴ Indeed, he continues “many Khalq officers were natives of Paktia and were careful to do nothing that might be harmful to the interests of their tribal groups”.⁶³⁵

Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, head of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence from 1983 to 1987, recalls the rampant desertion as a ‘revolving door’ where it was “common for whole units to defect to the mujahidin...as fast as the Kabul government rounded up recruits, even greater numbers deserted...wires and mines were laid to keep defenders in as much as attackers out”.⁶³⁶ By July 1980, because of mass desertion the Afghan army was reduced to approximately 30,000 men.⁶³⁷

Organized resistance from the various corners of the country and under the leadership of local leaders created opportunities and experiences that would serve to enhance the prestige of local leaders and their fighters. They became the pride of local communities, attaining wealth and recognition that culminated into a symbolic capital that would sustain their image and positions in local communities for years to follow – indeed decades for some.

In response to infighting, defections, and local resistance, Soviet forces and the communist back Afghan government were forced to negotiate with local leaders on several occasions. By the summer of 1981, the Kabul government was already negotiating the autonomy of several tribal leaders and their communities.⁶³⁸ Cutting deals with local leaders and mujahidin forces were sometimes short-term agreements aimed at avoiding immediate hostilities, while at other times they were much more involved, even with former mujahidin agreeing to work with the

⁶³⁴ ROY, O. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ YOUSAF, M. & ADKIN, M. 1992. *Afghanistan -The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower*, Havertown, Casemate Publishers and Book Distributors.

⁶³⁷ HYMAN, A. 1984. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London, Macmillan Press.

⁶³⁸ Ibid.

government.⁶³⁹ Army officers managed the former, while the Soviet Committee for State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* or KGB) and the Afghan State Intelligence Agency (*Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati* or KhAD) agents oversaw the later. Negotiating his role in the matter, then Afghan President Babrak Karmal even submitted when he was accused of “handing over Afghanistan” to the Soviets that he would change the red national flag to include green, and pledged to uphold freedom for all religions, sects, national customs and traditions.⁶⁴⁰ He also changed the name of his ‘People’s Democratic Party’ to the ‘Homeland Party’.⁶⁴¹ He was not alone in this; other leaders in the capital also worked toward appeasing the tribes. Many, such as the Parchami Frontier Affairs Minister Faiz Mohammad, used bribes to negotiate with and appease the tribes. Again, as in previous episodes of intervention, recognition of local leaders and the economic profit they gained served to enhance their position and legitimacy.

Failing to fully appreciate the limits to rural support for the Kabul government, Soviet supported programs were not only “insensitive” to the desires and needs of the local populace, they were also overreaching of the authority of the government they supported. Russian instigated violations of “religious laws, traditional customs and the very balance of power between the center and the localities,”⁶⁴² intensified hostility and resistance.

In truth, the Kremlin had feared a spillover effect with local and religious leaders mobilizing their communities across the border into Soviet territory. This fear led to their targeted elimination of several local leaders across the country. One informant from a well-respected and prominent religious family recalls: “I heard from my father that my grandfather was killed by the communist...[and] our houses and gardens were levelled by the communist government... and given our family background...they took children five and six years old to prison. [From then] we were afraid of the communist government”.⁶⁴³

⁶³⁹ OLIKER, O. 2011. *Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience*, Arlington, RAND Corporation.

⁶⁴⁰ THE GLOBE AND MAIL. 1980. Karmal uses Propaganda Blitz in Bid to Soften Moslem Resentment. *The Globe and Mail*, January 30, 1980.

⁶⁴¹ TANNER, S. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, Cambridge, Da Capo Press.

⁶⁴² GALEOTTI, M. 1995. *Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's last war*, London, England ; Portland, Ore., Frank Cass.

⁶⁴³ MUJADIDI, J. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

The Soviets were seemingly overly preoccupied with its belief that it was protecting a socialist revolution to realize that its actions were in fact unsettling existing, however dormant, cleavages along ethnic and tribal lines that skirted across its borders, increasing the potential for mobilizing groups on its territory.

When the Soviet installed Babrak Karmal as President of Afghanistan, formal training and assistance of Afghan security and its domestic security apparatus followed. West German trainers and advisors were replaced with a Soviet staff, including members of the KGB who assisted with the development and standing up of the Afghan security police or KhAD (State Information Agency) and the Sarandoy. The Sarandoy local police would grow to approximately 30,000 by 1981.

US Influence on State-Society Relations during the Soviet Invasion

During this period, the United States maintained a primary foreign policy objective of countering Soviet expansion and preserving the dominance of democratic ideals around the globe. However, rather than meeting the Soviet threat with support for the installation of a pro-democratic centralized government, its propaganda campaign and material support aimed to empower local leaders and their communities. In response to the Soviet presence and influence in Afghanistan, US policy and decision-makers planned and implemented a strategy for reviving and mobilizing local historic tradition and religion as a counter to the spread of ‘godless communism’.

One informant submits that, “when the Soviets came in and argued against Islam, the people organized around the community because such talk and action was against the culture, religion, and people...[in fact] every habit is culture and to say something against their habits is to say something against their culture”.⁶⁴⁴ It was this very sort of resistance and local uprising that the US wanted to channel. At the same time, however, the US approach of mobilizing local customs and traditions as a counter to Soviet expansion encouraged a regression that would shift capital accumulation in favor of the local and at the expense of the state. One of my informants made an observation that Afghanistan “continuously seemed to have been going backwards since the time of the Soviet invasion...once upon a time we had radios and television”.⁶⁴⁵ Indeed, with

⁶⁴⁴ AFZAL, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁶⁴⁵ Sahar, 2014. (AREU)

the amplification of propaganda around conservative religious beliefs was accompanied by increasingly rigid rules and religious practices. In hindsight, it may not have been the Soviet presence that influenced this regression in Afghan society but rather the US response.

In the days and years following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US leaders continued to frame Soviet presence and interests in such terms – godless communism versus Islam. US Defense Secretary Harold Burn denounced the Russian military intervention as “clearly engaged in helping to suppress national and Islamic feelings”.⁶⁴⁶ Former US President Ronald Reagan, in his speech at a convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, referred to the Soviet Union as a Godless ‘evil empire’.⁶⁴⁷ Referring to the resistance as ‘freedom fighters,’ he continued, “...the struggle of the Afghan people represents man’s highest aspiration for freedom”.⁶⁴⁸ This framing and imagery of a ‘God fearing’ Afghan people resisting a godless ‘evil empire’ appealed to the congregation, and more broadly the conservative minded people of the world who saw in themselves a common cause with the resistance. For Reagan, the “communist of the Soviet Union represents the end-point, the logical culmination of dangerous currents – big government, atheism, and relaxed moral standards”.⁶⁴⁹ His predecessor and former US President Jimmy Carter boasted that the Russians “underestimated the courage and tenacity of the freedom fighters...they did not anticipate the world’s quick and forceful response”.⁶⁵⁰ Acknowledging the consequences of US involvement in Afghanistan, Carter would admit some years later that “...at the time it was the right thing to do”.⁶⁵¹ Similar rhetoric against Soviet interference in Afghanistan appeared in headlines and on news reels across international borders, framing and emphasizing the *struggles of the mujahideen* for international consumption.

⁶⁴⁶ ABC NEWS 1979. Dec. 27, 1979: Soviets Invade Afghanistan. *In: ABC NEWS* (ed.). New York: ABC News,.

⁶⁴⁷ REAGAN, R. Ronald Reagan, 'Evil Empire Speech'. Address to the National Association of Evangelicals, 1983 Washington, DC. Voices of Democracy: The US Oratory Project.

⁶⁴⁸ EHRLICH, R. S. 1982. Afghan Rebels: Send Guns, Not Words. *United Press International*, March 21, 1982.

⁶⁴⁹ DALLEK, R. 1984. *Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

⁶⁵⁰ GERSTENZANG, J. 1980. Carter Asks Veterans' Support for His Afghan Policy. *The Associated Press*, February 19, 1980.

⁶⁵¹ CARTER, J. 2014. Carter 'I Armed The Freedom Fighters In Afghanistan'. *In: BURNETT, E. (ed.) CNN*. Washington, DC: CNN.

Within the region and in places like Pakistan, billboards transmitted similar headlines and messages. These anti-Soviet/pro-Islam posters, as well as propaganda pamphlets and radio broadcastings, contributed to building up the reputation of local warriors. One scholar noted that throughout the “streets of the old frontier town of Peshawar...turbaned guerrillas stare out at passerby from posters plastered up on mosque walls” memorializing their religious belief and heroism.⁶⁵² One poster depicts a mujahidin fighter facing an onslaught of missiles and bullets, each bouncing off his chest as they are launched at him from Soviet helicopters and tanks. Broad shouldered and armed reached out, he is depicted as standing in between and protecting the towering mosque and Afghan mountains illustrated behind him. In another illustration, three Afghans plant “the green flag of jihad on top of a mountain,” obviously inspired by the photo of US Marines planting the US flag at Iwo Jima.⁶⁵³ The intended message was clear: Afghans’ “courage is fortified by traditional Islamic beliefs...if he kills an enemy in the jihad...he is revered as a *ghazi*...and if he falls in battle, he becomes a *Shaheed*”.⁶⁵⁴ For a largely illiterate population, these illustrations help to sell the message and mobilize communities behind their local leaders and casting these same men in the best of light.

In addition to its influence and framing operations, the United States and its partners also provided substantial material support, placing advanced weapons, money, and other technologies in the hands of local groups and their leaders. Although US material support for Afghanistan began prior to the Soviet invasion, it was not until some weeks after on January 11, 1980, that US President Ronald Reagan acknowledged and made public that weapons should be ‘funneled’ through Pakistan.⁶⁵⁵ A couple years later in September 1982, the Tsogas-Ritter Resolution officially called for “material assistance, as the United States considers appropriate, to help the Afghan people to fight effectively for their freedom”.⁶⁵⁶ Annual financial support increased over

⁶⁵² TARZI, S. M. 1991. Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity, and Fragmentation. *Asian Survey*, 31, 479-495.

⁶⁵³ TREVITHICK, M. 2012. *The Not-So-Funny Papers* [Online]. New York: Foreign Policy. Available: <http://foreignpolicy.com/slideshow/the-not-so-funny-papers/> [Accessed June 26, 2016 20116].

⁶⁵⁴ PHILLIPS, J. A. 1982. Afghanistan Three Years Later: More US Help Needed. *Backgrounders*. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation Report.

⁶⁵⁵ REAGAN, R. 1980. ABC News Transcript. In: LAURENCE, J. (ed.) *ABC News*. Washington, DC: ABC News.

⁶⁵⁶ CORDOVEZ, D. & HARRISON, S. S. 1995. *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

the years from \$75 million in 1983, to \$470 million in 1986.⁶⁵⁷ In total, the US provided over \$2 billion in support to the mujahidin fighters, much of which went toward their campaigns against the Soviets, with residual contributions providing for their personal wealth.

While material support came from all directions, distribution was disproportionate and unbalanced, resulting in some groups having the advantage over other groups. Much of the weapons were provided by the US, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, and funneled through Pakistan with Pakistani General Zia ul-Haq overseeing the distribution of weapons to Afghan fighters. From the west, Iran supplied weapons directly from across its border, while the Chinese transferred weapons shipments across the Karakoram highway.⁶⁵⁸ Early on, much of the weapons and aid coming in from Pakistan meet groups in the south and south-east, effectively provisioning the Pashtun groups, while minority Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbeks received limited support.⁶⁵⁹

Reports suggests that Pakistani ‘oversight’ in the matter was largely accepted as responsible for the disproportionate and unequal distribution of weapons, money, and technologies to the fighters and their local leaders. Other analysis of the situation found that maintaining division among local groups in the country was a tactic Zia ul-Haq purposely employed as a means for limiting the opportunity for an alliance to form and threaten Pakistani interests. He had learned from his experiences in Jordan and the events of Black September in 1970.⁶⁶⁰

In addition to financial support, several countries took on and trained Afghan fighters and officers. In fact, in the twenty years leading up to the Soviet invasion, the United States had trained 487 Afghan officers in US military academies while the Soviet Union had trained roughly 3,725 during the same period.⁶⁶¹ Along the border with Pakistan, over thirty ‘guerrilla training establishments’ were staffed by Chinese, Pakistani, American, British, West German and Israeli agents and military instructors.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁷ THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 1986. Afghanistan Seven Years Later. *National Security Record*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.

⁶⁵⁸ HYMAN, A. 1984. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London, Macmillan Press.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ RIEDEL, B. 2020. Fifty Years after “Black September” in Jordan. *Studies in Intelligence*, 64.

⁶⁶¹ AMSTUTZ, J. B. 1986. *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, Washington, DC, National Defense University.

⁶⁶² HYMAN, A. 1984. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London, Macmillan Press.

With aims of supporting the image of the mujahideen fighters as local heroes and universal examples of morality⁶⁶³, supplementing support in money, training, and weapons with propaganda campaigns had the effect of translating these material elements into the symbolic. With each successful engagement between the mujahideen and Soviets and the propaganda campaign that followed, the peoples' perceptions of legitimacy shifted and reproduced in favor in local authority.

3.4.3 Civil War, Local Strongmen, and Taliban Rule (1992 – 2001)

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, came the closing of the police academy in Kabul, the dissolution of the Sarandoy (gendarmierie force), and the disbanding of KhAD and the Afghan Army. Taking advantage of the situation, in the months immediately following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghan fighters and local leaders went about consolidating their hard-won authority in their local communities. Throughout the 1980s, and with the help of international patrons, their personal wealth had accumulated in concert with their prestige. Bolstering the legitimacy of these local leaders, more than 3.7 million refugees in Pakistan and similar numbers in Iran now looked toward these men for leadership, developing a 'strong power base' of support behind them.⁶⁶⁴ As a result, it was relatively easy for each to establish his own statelet of loyal supporters.

In no time, however, competition developed among these men as each tried to cultivate his influence and reach. Malejacq explains that these *warlords* came to negotiate their way through various challenges and an ever-changing environment in a “game of survival”.⁶⁶⁵ Decisions around alliance formation and whether to support a particular group were largely based on maintaining the hard-earned wins of the nearly two decades. More importantly, there was still a fight to gain power and influence in the capital.

After the Soviets withdrew, the US dropped its insistence that the Soviet installed regime step down, suggesting that its commitments to Afghanistan had waned. However, the Soviets continued to provide over \$300 million in military support every month to the Kabul

⁶⁶³ CARPENTER, T. G. 1986. Cato Institute Policy Analysis No.74: U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The Reagan Doctrine and its Pitfalls. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

⁶⁶⁴ PHILLIPS, J. A. 1990. Consolidating Victory in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.

⁶⁶⁵ MALEJACQ, R. 2019. *Warlord Survival: The Delusion of State Building in Afghanistan*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

government⁶⁶⁶, fueling continued fighting between the central government and the resistance, albeit from a loosely structured opposition. The Najibullah government maintained an approximately 100,000 fighting force comprised of some 40,000 lightly armed uniformed personnel, 25,000 tribal militia, and 35,000 Ministry of Interior troops. General Abdul Rashid Dostum also maintained an army of over 40,000 Uzbeks who reported directly to Najibullah, bypassing the Ministry of Defense. At times, Ahmad Shah Massoud would also contribute toward securing the Kabul regime. The resistance however could muster and mobilize a force of up to 300,000 men, according to one Pentagon report.⁶⁶⁷ Najibullah attempted to remedy this imbalance by exploiting cleavages among the resistance by offering bribes of money, weapons, and fuel to local commanders in return for their promise of neutrality. This led to tension and regular infighting among the various groups.⁶⁶⁸ At the same time, Najibullah to discredit local leaders, regularly denounced the “lavish” lifestyles of the opposition, especially those exiled in Peshawar.⁶⁶⁹

Najibullah continued to experience opposition to his presidency, including an attempted coup d'état by his Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai who recruited some air force pilots to bomb Najibullah's office.⁶⁷⁰ Suffering regular attacks in the capital and increasing territorial losses to resistance force, Najibullah resigned and accepted the UN plan to install an interim government and begin work on a power-sharing agreement. Granted amnesty by the UN, Najibullah attempted to flee but was apprehended by General Dostum and his men. He took refuge at the UN compound in Kabul until 1996 when the Taliban “stormed the capital, beat Najibullah to death, and hung his body in the streets.”⁶⁷¹

In addition to concentrating their forces against the Kabul government, local leaders also regularly challenged each other. In the north, Ahmad Shah Massoud unified fighters from across

⁶⁶⁶ PHILLIPS, J. A. 1990. *Consolidating Victory in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁸ CHRISTIA, F. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁶⁹ PHILLIPS, J. A. 1990. *Consolidating Victory in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.

⁶⁷⁰ COLL, S. 2012. In Afghanistan, Dinner and then a Coup. *The New Yorker*.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

eight provinces.⁶⁷² He had earned their respect and recognition as their leader early on in the 1980s when after twenty-five days of fighting he forced the retreat of Russian forces from the Panjshir Valley. These very same people and their families had stood alongside Massoud and his men in opposition to invaders for many years.⁶⁷³ At various stages, Burhanuddin Rabbani also worked alongside Massoud, and throughout the northeastern province of Badakhshan. In the west, Ismail Khan and his lieutenants took to governing the areas they had previously claimed in and around Herat. And, in the east Jalaluddin Haqqani set up several small-scale bases and gained control of much of the Khost-Gardez Highway.⁶⁷⁴ Haqqani had earned recognition locally as an effective combat commander, and internationally for his successful lobbying for financial support for the resistance. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar continued, with the support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, to operate across Nangarhar and other provinces both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the north, Abdul Rashid Dostum maintain his following along the Uzbek border in the provinces of Jowzjan and Balkh. Dostum had fought against the mujahidin alongside troops and commanders from these areas. Although most of these local leaders maintained a common objective of defeating and replacing the Najibullah government⁶⁷⁵, infighting would encumber meeting their objectives. By the mid-1990s, infighting among these groups produced some of the worse domestic violence Afghans had ever experienced. Young boys were found hanging on trees; girls were repeatedly raped; and extortion overwhelmed the people. Afghanistan was lawless and in grave moral decline.

In response and with the support of the Pakistan intelligence services, young Afghan madrassa students formed what came to be known as the Taliban. They returned to Afghanistan and quickly, however brutally, went about restoring order. In fact, their rule came to resemble the closest example of a consolidated Afghanistan state in decades. One of their first objectives was to neutralize and eliminate warlords and local leaders who disturbed the livelihood and morality of Afghans. They issued death sentences for Dostum, Massoud, and Rabbani, and sought out other less known local leaders who abused the power and prestige they earned in the previous decade.

⁶⁷² THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 1986. Afghanistan Seven Years Later. *National Security Record*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.

⁶⁷³ SERVICE, X. G. N. 1980. Russian Troops Fail in Offensive in Panjshir Valley, North of Kabul. *Xinhua General News Service*, September 21, 1980.

⁶⁷⁴ SERVICE, X. G. N. 1988. Khost Still Under Siege, Says Afghan Guerrilla Commander. *Xinhua General News Service*, January 18, 1988.

⁶⁷⁵ General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud supported the Najibullah regime sporadically.

Under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban consolidated most of Afghanistan by 1995, and in September 1996 they took Kabul. During their rule, much of the bureaucratic procedures of the 1970 were abandoned altogether, allowing local governance structures to endure, this time with Taliban supervision and oversight.

It is possible that the Taliban leadership had accepted the recommendations of Jalaluddin Haqqani, who in May 1988 proposed a mobile government as a means for consolidating rule over the country. He advised, that "the government of the mujahidin shouldn't be confined to one particular area...it should move across the country...this strengthens unity".⁶⁷⁶ Local Taliban leadership acted near autonomously throughout Afghanistan, grounding themselves in local tribal politics and participating in local policing and enforcement mechanisms. They became very intimate with communities and their needs. Indeed, "even the most bitter adversaries of the Taliban, seems to agree that they were successful in maintaining security in the areas under their control, and crime almost disappeared...the real strength of the system was the ability of the system to apprehend most criminals and to enlist and coerce the population for that purpose".⁶⁷⁷ Between 1996 and 2001, Massoud and other northern minority ethnic groups continued to resist Taliban rule, allegedly with some assistance from western governments. During this time, much of the fighting was concentrated in the northern areas, while the southern areas remained relatively calm. On September 9, 2001, Massoud was assassinated, and two days later the US was attacked, instigated the US invasion of Afghanistan.

According to Barfield, with the Taliban in power, the police were largely tasked with enforcing Islam in urban areas.⁶⁷⁸ This force included the Vice and Virtue Police who were stationed more broadly and in each province. However, like those who came before them, the Taliban also elected to keep local leaders in place and have them continue to lead and police their communities. Here again, local leaders continued to accumulate capital and were seen as legitimate leadership by their communities. However, unlike previous episodes, Taliban members were also

⁶⁷⁶ XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE. 1988. Afghan Resistance Commander Suggests Mobile Interim Government in Afghanistan. *Xinhua General Overseas News Services*, May 1, 1988.

⁶⁷⁷ PRESS, A. I. 2013c. Taliban Say 326 Security Personnel Jointed their Ranks in June. *Afghan Islamic Press*, July 1, 2013.

⁶⁷⁸ BARFIELD, T. J. 2010. *Afghanistan : a cultural and political history*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

installed in each community to conduct oversight and assist with local decision-making. As a result, capital accumulation was not fully vested in local leaders, but rather distributed between the Taliban and local leaders. Indeed, in many areas, locals would turn to the Taliban to adjudicate local disputes.

3.4.4 US Intervention of Afghanistan (2001 – 2020)

On October 7, 2001, the US responded to attacks on its homeland and invaded Afghanistan with the assistance of local leaders and their militia. Providing air support, US forces cleared the way for the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of northern minority ethnic groups, to defeat the Taliban and capture the capital. According to one report, anti-Taliban warlords from the north moved in on Bagram and the capital with the assistance of US commandos who provided intelligence and targeting information.⁶⁷⁹ After a two-week siege, Dostum's forces took Kunduz when several Taliban foot soldiers surrendered. At the same time, forces loyal to Rabbani also closed in on Kunduz. Although they were both party to the anti-Taliban alliance, subtle tension developed between Dostum and his ethnic Uzbeks and Rabbani and his Tajik forces.⁶⁸⁰ Neither felt comfortable with the other's control of Kunduz, largely out of fear of losing their legitimacy and status.⁶⁸¹ Arguably, countless other local leaders felt similarly as the forces of intervention began to shift the relative distribution of capital and power within and among local communities as well as between local communities and a newly installed interim central government.

In fact, since statebuilding efforts began in early 2002, several of these same strongmen have come to occupy positions in government either in local communities or in the capital.⁶⁸² Dipali found that the *warlords* of Afghanistan are effectively the “strongman” governors who can be very effective as representatives or in place of the state.⁶⁸³ She argues that contrary to popular

⁶⁷⁹ CNN NEWS. 2001. Unfinished Business in Afghanistan from 2001 High on Agenda for 2002. *CNN News*, December 31, 2001.

⁶⁸⁰ PRESSE, A. F. 2001. Alliance commander Dostam's troops enter Kunduz. *Agence France Presse*, November 25, 2001.

⁶⁸¹ HIRANO, K. 2001. Attacks on Kunduz Continue. *Japan Economic Newswire*, November 23, 2001.

⁶⁸² INSKEEP, S. & MONTAGNE, R. 2004. Ismail Khan. *NPR Morning Edition*, May 18, 2004.

⁶⁸³ MUKHOPADHYAY, D. 2014. *Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

accounts that warlords undermine the state, there are tactics and strategies that they employ that support statebuilding. In fact, in some cases warlord work with the state to shape state-society relations and state power. This was the case with Atta Mohammed Noor, a warlord who was absorbed into the state as a means for limiting local armed competition against the state.⁶⁸⁴

Mukhopadhyay notes, however, that the decision for these non-state actors to align with the state is largely dependent on their strength. Those that are weak serve no benefit to the state, while those that are "just strong enough" may partner with the state to administer security and services. On the other hand, those that wield high levels of power and control are often "too strong" and find little-to-no incentive in negotiating with the state. Where they do, however, these men build relationships with the state to provide services, including tax collection and security. In fact, Dipali claims that these warlords may contribute to enhancing state legitimacy.

Interestingly, however, while these men are expected to support the central government, leaders in the capital have for the most part tacitly agreed to not disturb these same leaders' control over their local areas.⁶⁸⁵ From one perspective, awarding positions to these men is part of a negotiated power-sharing deal which aims to bring together once warring parties into a stable and hierarchical political order. On the other hand, however, this course of action seems to have resulted in a disproportionate distribution of authority with strongmen gaining the political capacity to not only influence from the center, but also to retain and rule over their private fiefdoms in the periphery. Indeed, the concentration of power found in local communities penetrate the very core of state institutions and place them at the disposal of local elites through their *qawm* networks that now extend into the highest levels of government. As a result of their affiliations with such networks, local leaders gain social capital and legitimacy through a triple threat of foreign support and recognition, local government empowerment, and prestige found in their accumulated history of leadership and glory in battle.

Ismail Khan, the Tajik warlord and politician who was previously the governor of Herat and then the Minister of Water and Energy, is best known by his local followers as 'His Excellency, Amir Sahib'.⁶⁸⁶ Like many of his peers, Khan earned this recognition during the Soviet invasion

⁶⁸⁴ MUKHOPADHYAY, D. 2009. Disguised Warlordism and Combatanthood in Balkh: The Persistence of Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State. *Conflict, Security, and Development*, 9, 535-564.

⁶⁸⁵ PECENY, M. & BOSIN, Y. 2011. Winning with Warlords in Afghanistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 22, 603-618.

⁶⁸⁶ INSKEEP, S. & MONTAGNE, R. 2004. Ismail Khan. *NPR Morning Edition*, May 18, 2004.

where he participated in several successful campaigns against the Russians. In the initial stages of the US invasion and subsequent reconstruction, Khan offered to send as many of his troops as needed to work for the central government.⁶⁸⁷ However, there were concerns over his tactics, and in 2002 the Human Rights Watch reported that under his command there were “widespread political intimidation, arrests, beatings and torture by police and security forces”.⁶⁸⁸ The National Security Council soon after made the decision that Khan could not retain both his position as commander of a military post and as governor of Herat province.⁶⁸⁹ In 2003, then Afghan President Hamid Karzai, stripped Khan of his military post. However, this act was in vain. In that same year, militiamen loyal to Khan opened fire on US troops in Western Afghanistan; they would later claim that they mistook the force for a rival warlord and his group.⁶⁹⁰ Some years later, Khan was rumored to control the “largest private army in Afghanistan”.⁶⁹¹ Indeed, in 2012 Khan called to arms his followers and reportedly began distributing weapons among his private militias in Herat, causing grave concern for statebuilding efforts. He warned, it was “just the start of a new remobilization of former mujahidin”.⁶⁹² Khan continued to maintain a strong and loyal following from among his political party, Jamiat-e-Islami, as well as from former members of his United National Front Party. In support of Khan, many of them participated in demonstrations alongside other community members when he was accused by the central government of withholding taxes.⁶⁹³

Abdul Rashid Dostum first earned his recognition as legitimate leader of the northern minority groups during the Soviet invasion when he sided with the Russians against the Afghan mujahidin. In 2001, he built on this recognition when he and his Uzbek militia supported the US

⁶⁸⁷ OTTON, C. 2002. Afghan President Gets Full Support from Herat Boss Ismail Khan. *Agence France Presse*, August 28, 2002.

⁶⁸⁸ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2002b. All our Hopes are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan. New York: Human Rights Watch.

⁶⁸⁹ AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE. 2003a. Afghan Warlord Ismail Khan Stripped of Military Post in Major Reshuffle. *Agence France Presse*, August 13, 2003.

⁶⁹⁰ PRESSE, A. F. Ibid. US Troops in Mistaken Clash with Afghan Warlord Ismail Khan. June 24, 2003.

⁶⁹¹ OTTON, C. 2002. Afghan President Gets Full Support from Herat Boss Ismail Khan. Ibid., August 28, 2002.

⁶⁹² BEZHAN, F. 2012. What's Behind Former Afghan Warlord Ismail Khan's Public Call to Arms? *Atlantic Online*.

⁶⁹³ AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE. 2003b. Afghans Rally in Support of Herat Governor Ismail Khan. *Agence France Presse*, May 27, 2003.

invasion and provided targeting information to US special forces. Although he too is remembered for his brutality during both episodes, including “allowing hundreds of Taliban prisoners to suffocate in a shipping container”⁶⁹⁴ while in transit, he retains a strong and loyal following. He continued to control large swaths of territory in northern Afghanistan, printed his own money at one point, and commanded tens of thousands of militiamen. Indeed, his actions continued to highlight his sense of autonomy from the central government.

In 2004, Dostum led his troops into Faryab province, seized the capital, and ousted the state appointed police chief and governor.⁶⁹⁵ He again returned with 20,000 of his private militia when Faryab province came under threat of an insurgent takeover. Both incidents reportedly were well received by the local public, as thousands came out to voice their support.⁶⁹⁶ As recently as September 2016, when disagreements over the reburial of King Habibullah turned into violence in the Kokola Pushta neighborhood of Kabul, Dostum reportedly did not turn to government security forces but rather called on his own private militia to handle the disturbance.⁶⁹⁷ Several organizations point to the lengthy list of criminal activities and ongoing corruption when describing Dostum. In fact, the US State Department denied Dostum a visa, and in one report went on to describe him as the ‘quintessential warlord’.⁶⁹⁸

Arguably it is this sort of critical international attention to the undemocratic tactics of Dostum and those that followed in his mold that encouraged then Afghan president Hamid Karzai to actively work toward weakening militia control and governance throughout the periphery; much of his efforts however were seemingly in vain. Dostum would work his way through the ranks, and strikingly becoming Vice President, and later Marshall. At one point, there remain serious

⁶⁹⁴ RASMUSSEN, S. E. 2015. General Dostum has Mustered his Own Militia to Defend Northern Province but is Waiting to Get Green Light from President. *The Guardian*, August 14, 2015.

⁶⁹⁵ 2014. Partlow, Joshua. Former Warlord Back at Center of Afghan Politics. *The Washington Post*, April 24, 2014.

⁶⁹⁶ BBC MONITORING SOUTH ASIA - POLITICAL. 2013. Afghan Northern Residents Support Leader General Dostum. *BBC News*, December 18, 2013.

⁶⁹⁷ RUTTIG, T. 2016. Who was King Habibullah II? A Query from the Literature. Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.

⁶⁹⁸ THE NATION. 2016. US Denies Visa to Afghan VP Dostum. *The Nation*, April 27, 2016.

concerns that Dostum would incorporate enough of his own militia into the Afghan security force to shift the balance of state security in his favor.⁶⁹⁹

In 2016, the Afghan government secured a peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hizb-i-Islami. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hekmatyar fought against the Soviets and at times other mujahidin. He also declined to cooperate in power sharing deals that could have brought an end to the 1990s civil war, taking up armed resistance against the coalitions that emerged from those deals. He led such violent resistance that he came to be known as the ‘butcher of Kabul’.⁷⁰⁰ Then President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi is recalled as concluding, after attempting to negotiate with Hekmatyar, that the main sticking point with Hekmatyar was the withdrawal from the capital of northern minority groups and their militias.⁷⁰¹ During the US occupation, Hekmatyar regularly coordinated attacks against US and allied forces in Afghanistan and against the Kabul government itself. In several interviews throughout this same period, he “vowed to kill as many western soldiers as possible,” and repeatedly argued that “the [Afghan] government has failed”.⁷⁰²

With the second largest militia group in the country, the armed wing of Hizb-i-Islami, his threats were taken very seriously, and so the United Nations and US responded by placing Hekmatyar and his group on their respective list of terrorists.⁷⁰³ However, in September 2016 Hekmatyar signed a peace deal⁷⁰⁴ with President Ashraf Ghani, and in February 2017, the United Nations removed Hekmatyar from their terrorist list and lifted sanctions against him and his group.⁷⁰⁵ Irrespective of this newfound agreement, Hekmatyar continued to have a loyal following who shared in his ideals and vision, placing his reasoning and legitimacy above that of the state.

⁶⁹⁹ RASMUSSEN, S. E. 2015. General Dostum has Mustered his Own Militia to Defend Northern Province but is Waiting to Get Green Light from President. *The Guardian*, August 14, 2015.

⁷⁰⁰ BBC. 2017. Afghan Warlord Hekmatyar Returns to Kabul after Peace Deal. *BBC*, May 4, 2017.

⁷⁰¹ KELLIHER, A. 1992. Hekmatyar Steps Near to Power. *The Times*, May 18, 1992.

⁷⁰² RIGHT VISION NEWS. 2013. Pakistan: Hekmatyar Vows Fresh Attacks on NATO Troops. *Right Vision News*, January 4, 2013.

⁷⁰³ QAZIZAI, F. & SUBRAMANIAN, S. 2017. What Role Now for Afghan Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar? *State News Service*, February 11, 2017.

⁷⁰⁴ OSMAN, B. 2016. Peace with Hekmatyar: What does it mean for battlefield and politics? Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.

⁷⁰⁵ SMITH, J. & HOLMES, S. 2016. U.N. lifts sanctions on notorious Afghan warlord. *Reuters*, February 4, 2017.

If history is any indicator of their motivation, maintaining their identity, values, and way of life against the encroaching northern ‘guests’ remained a priority.

These are just a few of whose names we are familiar; there are countless others, unnamed and unknown, who continued to have a loyal local following thereby challenging the state-society relationship. In the next section, I examine how the US intervention and occupation contributed to shaping state-society relationship and how practices of the state itself worked in contradiction to aims of consolidating the state.

US Occupation and Influence on State-Society Relations in Afghanistan

The US intervention in Afghanistan included a conflated approach of its *global war on terrorism* campaigns, counter-insurgency operations, and statebuilding goals. As a result, conflicting and at times contradictory objectives often worked against aims of stabilizing and consolidating the state. With much of its efforts unfolding on pre-existing fault lines of disparate groups where the people remained largely bounded in local social and political communities forged in an accumulated history of local codes and beliefs, aims of statebuilding was difficult at best. Moreover, in the immediate post-US invasion period, leaders in the capital went about instituting limited and indirect administration of local communities thereby reproducing these very conditions. Indeed, rather than penetrating and governing local communities directly, state leaders surrendered certain state functions. In fact, the state, with the assistance of interventionists, formalized this handover with programs such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP). In this section, I will examine how US occupation and influence help shape state-society relations in Afghanistan.

Outside my compound walls and alongside the perimeter of the Pakistan embassy, the neighborhood boys would gather to kick about a partially deflated soccer ball. The dull thump often caught my attention, as I hurried pass to my meetings and interviews. I thought of gifting a soccer ball to them but wondered who exactly among the boys should I hand it over to; I thought of gifting an air pump, but again questioned who exactly should be the owner of this pump. Regardless of my good intentions, my actions perhaps would cause some hostility among the boys; it would most certainly have some influence on the social order of the group. And what about

my position; would I assume some level of authority and jurisdiction from this new-found hierarchical relationship produced with the act of handing over a soccer ball to the group? I left the matter alone, conceding that I was not yet wise enough to intervene in such matters.

Over the course of the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, local political order has evolved with some local leaders losing their followers to the promise of state rule and its accompanying benefits, while in other communities the people remain fiercely loyal to traditional institutions of governance. On one hand, one informant explains that “if you go to Qandahar, you will see hundreds of elders have left because the people do not support them anymore...they are no longer influential there”.⁷⁰⁶ On the other hand, however, another informant argues that locals continue to demand that village governance remain a local affair, submitting that “it is very difficult for the central government to install a district or village level governor without the consent of the local people because the people have many preconditions of who the [local] leadership should be”.⁷⁰⁷ Yet, another informant recounts that “during the Soviet occupation, [Afghanistan] use to have...representatives all the way down to the village level...to act [on behalf of] the central government...[but] whatever happened at the local level...[we] use to [still] go to the elders for help”.⁷⁰⁸ The seemingly remained the case during the US invasion and occupation.

The transition from what some characterize as *informal* to formal institutions of justice, for example, failed to meet with the expectations of local communities on several levels.⁷⁰⁹ In fact, a 2014 Gallup poll found that only approximately 25 percent of the Afghan population was confident in the state judicial system.⁷¹⁰ One year later, in 2015 it was estimated that “as much as 80 percent of disputes...[were] still resolved outside the formal justice system”, with local *shuras* and *jirgas* headed up by local leaders adjudicating local disputes.⁷¹¹ One informant confirmed this, explaining that the “farther you go from the city, the more you will face the informal justice system...in every

⁷⁰⁶ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁷⁰⁷ OSMAN, B. February 25, 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author.*

⁷⁰⁸ MUJADIDI, J. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁷⁰⁹ MURTAZASHVILI, J. B. 2016. *Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁷¹⁰ ROCHELLE, S. & LOSCHKY, J. 2014. Confidence in Judicial Systems Varies Worldwide. *Gallup*. Washington, DC: Gallup.

⁷¹¹ DOMINGUEZ, G. 2015. Why Many Afghans Distrust their Judicial System. *DW*, May 2, 2015.

village throughout Afghanistan most of the cases are controlled by the people...local leaders, mullahs and the whitebeards. They handle the water problems, the land disputes...and other conflicts".⁷¹² While the "people understand the central government as technical entity that has a lot of power that can provide modernization" explains one informant, "the central government cannot bring what the *pirs* and local leaders can provide".⁷¹³ Another informant adds, "the elders know who you are, how much money you make, and how best to address your case".⁷¹⁴ In fact, according to another informant, "If [you] did something wrong, the government would want to speak with the elders first to find out about [you]".⁷¹⁵

Like those who came before them, both international interventionist forces as well as domestic leadership continued to negotiate a state-society relationship that would effectively surrender some state authority to local leaders. In fact, during the US occupation some programs would further encourage and formalize this state-society relationship, including the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the National Solidarity Program (NSP), and the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

US and allied forces in Afghanistan supported the accumulation and concentration of social and economic capital at the local level with recognition, engagement, and material provision and support to local communities and their leaders. Like the interventionists who came before them, these forces maintained direct relations with local leaders, effectively positioning society to challenge the authority of the state. Indeed, much of their efforts centered on supporting local councils and their capacity to manage their own local affairs, funding local projects aimed at strengthening local governance and security apparatus and empowered local leaders to oversee all stages of operations at the local level. The approach taken by interventionist forces served, yet again, to reinforce the primacy of local systems of governance and the legitimacy of local leaders and their militias, while weakening chances for the state to obtain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.⁷¹⁶ Indeed, relatively large infusions of cash and other assets added economic capital and opportunity for local leaders to build on their existing patron-client relationships and further

⁷¹² Sahar, 2014.

⁷¹³ ROEHRS, C.-F. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁷¹⁴ SIKANDER, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ AHMED, A., KHAPALWAK, R. & SHAH, T. 2015. Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Official Afghan Courts Fail. *The New York Times*, February 1, 2015.

undermine aims to successfully institute central governance. One informant blamed the international community without hesitation, submitting that the "international community flowed money to the elders and made them corrupt".⁷¹⁷ He argued that while military commanders in the field effectively bought seats at local *jirgas* where it was hoped that they could have some influence in these communities, this client-patron relationship seemed to flow only in one direction, empowering and legitimizing local leaders while proving of little-to-no benefit to the central government.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

One mechanism that arguably perpetuated this relationship and dynamic is the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Authorizing field commanders to sign-off and release up to \$2 million in financial support to local projects, CERP aimed to win hearts and minds and earn goodwill toward coalition forces by "promoting the growth of local institutions" through near immediate financial support to local communities.⁷¹⁸ A handful of US Department of Defense manuals and directives outline program procedures, including the *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System* and the US Department of the Army manual *The Commanders' Emergency Response Program*, formalizing this method and means of empowering local leaders through economic capital distribution and manipulation across the country.⁷¹⁹

In documenting their justification for handing over thousands of dollars directly to local leaders, some requests included language such as "to mitigate the effects of military operations on the local population and better enable the Commander...to respond to urgent humanitarian needs in his battle space,"⁷²⁰ or to "provide safety and security for approximately 30,000 local nationals

⁷¹⁷ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁷¹⁸ US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. See also: MARTINS, M. L. C. 2004. No Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan. *The Army Lawyer*, 2004 and BOWEN JR., S. W. & COLLIER, C. 2012. Reconstruction Leaders' Perceptions of CERP in Iraq: Report Overview. *Prism*, 4, 118-125.

⁷¹⁹ COMBINED ARMS CENTER 2009. *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*. Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Center.

⁷²⁰ RC SOUTHWEST, A. 2011. CERP Advance Bulk Funds Draw in Support of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operations. Helmand: United States Central Command Afghanistan.

and employ 105 civilians for 30 days”⁷²¹, and to “allow the villagers...to travel by foot and vehicle throughout the area [and]...assist with security and the economy in the area”.⁷²² In this last example, the local Afghan leaders involved “refused to accept [the] winning contractor, [and] negotiations failed to come to a mutual agreement”.⁷²³ They would only accept those appointed by them – usually local relations. In general, in each of these cases local leaders take on lead positions of responsibility, often with poor oversight and unhealthy outcomes.

Corruption linked to such programs is well documented. A Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report published in 2011 found that of the 69 projects examined in Laghman province, 27 were “at risk or have resulted in questionable outcomes”.⁷²⁴ Shotty workmanship, poor planning and irresponsible spending placed \$49 million at risk just in this province and particular year under investigation. In another case, \$140,000 was paid out to construct a perimeter wall around a school and after two months only \$100.00 remained with the wall left largely incomplete.⁷²⁵ In another case, although the project was successfully completed with \$1,921,525 paid out to complete a road project in Kandahar province, CERP reports claim that US project leaders “had significant problems with an ‘undeclared’ subcontractor”.⁷²⁶ Although there are no follow-up notes to this disclosure, it seems evident that the project was commandeered by elements who likely profited financially. There are several similar reports that demonstrate how CERP funds have come to enrich and empower local leaders through their accumulation of economic capital. In an article penned by a member of the US Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corp, it's argued that “CERP is inconsistent with...efforts” by the

⁷²¹ RC NORTH, A. 2011. Duke Protective Measures. Jowzjan: United States Central Command, Afghanistan.

⁷²² RC EAST, A. 2011. Dahani-Ghara Bridge. Wardak: United States Central Command Afghanistan.

⁷²³ Ibid.

⁷²⁴ SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 2011. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁷²⁵ RC EAST, A. 2010. Onei Saydan School Perimeter Wall & Refurbishment. Logar: United States Central Command Afghanistan.

⁷²⁶ RC SOUTH, A. 2011. Rolling Rock Road Project. Kandahar: United States Central Command Afghanistan.

international community to fight corruption and fraud in Afghanistan.⁷²⁷ Rather, CERP further fueled corruption while at the same time challenging state legitimacy.

Another indirect and negative consequence of introducing economic incentives into spaces engulfed in ongoing conflict is the encouragement of competition, one that arguably may undermine existing social order and stability through a rebalancing of economic and social capital. In one study, it was found that where CERP funds were distributed in small amounts (<USD\$50,000), communities experienced relatively less violence than where larger amounts were disbursed.⁷²⁸ The study argued that an underlining difference in administrative modalities, namely the ‘flexibility’ of expenditure and timeliness of disbursement, may be a determining factor. The study logics that where field commanders used ‘on hand’ CERP funds that could be delivered near immediately, violence seemed comparatively less than when a bureaucratic process needed to be engaged in order to receive funding. While the study did not delve into reasoning beyond this, it seems logical that bureaucratic processes would be accompanied by bidding and competition, especially as military leaders attempt to negotiate contracts, leading to tension, competition and inevitably violence. Relatively smaller sums of money handed directly to local leaders, albeit adding to their accumulation of wealth and capital, leaves less room for competitive bidding and violent. Regardless, the inflow of CERP funds saw dramatic shifts in wealth among locals with a handful of lower income families becoming ‘spectacularly rich’⁷²⁹, while well-connected upper-class families continued to win over lucrative contracts.⁷³⁰

National Solidarity Program (NSP)

The Afghan central government itself surrendered some of its authority through the implementation of a handful of programs that effectively handed over power to local communities and their leaders. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) was one such program. Following similar programs, such as the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia, the NSP

⁷²⁷ OSTERHOUT, H. L. 2011. No More 'Mad Money': Salvaging the Commander's Emergency Response Program. *Public Contract Law Journal*, 40, 935-989.

⁷²⁸ ADAMS, G. 2015. Honing the Proper Edge: CERP and the Two-Sided Potential of Military Led Development in Afghanistan. *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, 10, 53-60.

⁷²⁹ AIKINS, M. 2016. The Bidding War: How a Young Afghan Military Contractor became Spectacularly Rich. *The New Yorker*.

⁷³⁰ AHMAD, J. 2012. Afghanistan Needs Less Foreign Aid. *World Politics Review*.

aims to employ "community-driven development, delivered through a collaborative partnership encompassing central government, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the communities – represented by specially devised Community Development Councils (CDCs)".⁷³¹ Managed by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the NSP empowers local leaders through its CDCs to function as middlemen in the soliciting, coordinating, and managing of government financed development projects in local communities. In fact, local communities participate in electing CDC members. Once elected, these same members appoint their president, deputy, secretary, and treasurer.⁷³² Together, CDC members and their appointees construct the Community Development Plan (CDP), a list of prospective projects that is collectively decided on.

As is seemingly obvious, even where communities are not suffering from the desperation brought on by internal conflict, these sorts of programs run the risk of corruption and abuse. Under conflict conditions, even more so. In Indonesia, for example, 5% of the KDP staff were let go for complicity in acts of corruption while at least a dozen government officials incurred fines or were imprisoned for the misuse of funds.⁷³³

In Afghanistan, it is often the wealthy landowning *maliks* of the south and the *arbobs* of the north who are elected by the people to run these programs. Barfield reminds us that the role of the *arbob* has always been both local governor and intermediary between the people and the state.⁷³⁴ Their recognized history of successful 'entrepreneurship' and evident prosperity easily convinces most in the village. They are, of course, the same men and heroes who brought them victory and earned their freedom on the battlefield. With the state continuing to solicit their assistance, they are destined to maintain these roles and continue to benefit from elite capture.

In early 2017, the MRRD concluded that the NSP spent over \$1.5 billion on an estimated 86,000 development projects, reaching over 35,000 communities throughout Afghanistan during

⁷³¹ BARAKAT, S. 2006. Mid-Term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Afghanistan. York: Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit, The University of York.

⁷³² UNITAR 2011. Community Development Councils in Afghanistan: A Social Capital. Abu-Dhabi: United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

⁷³³ MAJEED, R. & FRIEDMAN, J. 2014. For the People, By the People in Indonesia. *Foreign Policy*.

⁷³⁴ BARFIELD, T. J. 1981. *The central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan : pastoral nomadism in transition*. Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph D, Harvard, 1980).

its 14-year life.⁷³⁵ During its first funding phase alone, over \$100 million was spend on water, roads, and other welfare projects. By its second funding phase, over 21,600 communities had ongoing or completed projects. By mid-2012, the development of over 27,200 communities were under the direction of elected Community Development Council members⁷³⁶ who had become intimately involved in most aspects of managing these projects.

Despite its successes, program implementation and day-to-day practices were often far from ideal, with local communities and their leaders challenging the approach and value structure of the program. Several facilitating partners, “who were responsible for initiating the NSP and providing technical and capacity building support to the communities”, reported that they were confronted with resistance at every level.⁷³⁷ Some communities claim that they already had councils and saw no need to participate in the NSP program. Others found that the program crossed a line regarding community values, such as mandating the inclusion of women. Then there were those who either asserted their position as the local CDC representative or were appointed to such positions by local leaders without proper election proceedings. These same local strongmen co-opted projects for their own personal gains, appointing inexperienced relatives and friends to manage their operations and collected taxes and bribes before allowing the implementation of new projects.

Project managers and partners also pointed out the tension that was observed between appointed CDC members and local leaders. At times, local leaders had declined to take on the position as CDC representative or had outright resisted CDC presence in their communities. As a result, when other members of their community stepped up to take on the role, conflict over jurisdiction followed. Attempting to address and deconflict tensions, CDC officials highlight the differences in functions and roles: CDC representatives are assigned management of projects and responsible for its successful delivery to communities, while local elites retain their general management roles and overall jurisdiction over local communities. Despite attempts at making public this division of labor, representatives from the Agha Khan Development Network note that

⁷³⁵ BBC MONITORING SOUTH ASIA - POLITICAL. 2017. Programme Summary of National Afghanistan TV News 1530GMT 25FEB17. *BBC*, February 25, 2017.

⁷³⁶ DISCH, A., BYE, V., REITE, T., DALE, E. & CRASTO, S. 2012. ARTF at a Cross-Roads: History and the Future. *Review of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund*. Oslo: Scanteam.

⁷³⁷ KAKAR, P. 2005. Fine-Tuning the NSP: Discussions of Problems and Solutions with Facilitating Partners. *Working Paper Series*. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

there remained a strong perception among local elites that CDC representatives were overstepping their place.

Audits found countless examples of other forms of corruption and mishandling throughout the life of the program. One audit found that a bath house constructed at a cost of \$60,000 was being used to store hay.⁷³⁸ In another, Integrity Watch Afghanistan found that the son of a local commander “who was an imposed CDC member had forcefully seized the grant money”.⁷³⁹ This same report claimed that up to two percent of grant money was lost because of such corruption. Representatives at the MRRD blame the “local people for not taking care of projects under NSP...[and] accuse[d] them of not feeling a sense of ownership about government projects”.⁷⁴⁰ Locals, including one of my informants, suggested that it is both government misunderstanding of the needs and desires of local communities, as well as its failure to implement sufficient oversight. He pointed out that for community leaders, “having a brilliant mosque provides social power...[so] it is preferred over having a road and other projects”.⁷⁴¹ Since its implementation, 464 CDCs across 27 districts had to halt operations because of concerns involving the “interference from [such] powerful individuals”.⁷⁴²

US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

In February 2020, the Trump administration negotiated an agreement with the Taliban for a US withdrawal by May 2021.⁷⁴³ The agreement included the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters, and the Taliban’s pledge not to attack U.S. troops and coalition forces who were preparing to depart. This later part did not extend to the Afghan security and police force, however. Moreover, although the US and Taliban had come to an agreement, the Afghan government remained

⁷³⁸ THE KILLID GROUP. 2015. NSP: Differences in Perceptions. *The Killid Group*, September 27, 2015.

⁷³⁹ TORABI, Y. 2007. Assessing the NSP: The Role of Accountability in Reconstruction. Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan.

⁷⁴⁰ THE KILLID GROUP. 2015. NSP: Differences in Perceptions. *The Killid Group*, September 27, 2015.

⁷⁴¹ MOHAMMADI, A. A. February 7, 2014 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author*.

⁷⁴² THE KILLID GROUP. 2015. NSP: Differences in Perceptions. *The Killid Group*, September 27, 2015.

⁷⁴³ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2020. Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. Doha: Department of State.

reluctant to meet and speak with the Taliban. In response, rather than dealing with the Afghan President and his representatives in the capital, the Taliban turned to sending letters to Afghan politicians stationed in the districts and across the country. They aimed to work directly with these representatives as a means for circumventing President Ghani and his administration.⁷⁴⁴ In combination, these acts and turn of events placed the Afghan security force in a complicated position. The Taliban would continue attacking them, while casually and uninterestingly walking past US and allied security forces and working with local Afghan government officials. When the Biden administration extended the withdrawal date to August 2021, the Taliban intensified its attacks, largely to enhance its position if and when at the negotiations table with the Afghan state leadership.

With the announcement of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan came a realization of the true and limited extent of state control. Within three months' time, from May to August, the Taliban was able to seize control of 32 of the 34 provinces.⁷⁴⁵ According to several studies, a mix of persuasion, intimidation, and coercion won over local leaders who in turn convinces other groups, including security force personnel.⁷⁴⁶

It's important to note, however, that the trajectory of government control was on decline for some time before the US announcement. The Afghan government reportedly controlled only 217 of the 407 districts in Afghanistan in 2017, and by April 2021, this number was down to only 129.⁷⁴⁷ At this time, the Taliban had control of 77 districts, while 194 were contested.⁷⁴⁸ By mid-June, the Taliban controlled 104 districts, and a month later in mid-July, the Taliban had 216 districts.⁷⁴⁹ Although several capital cities were still left to be captures, 15 of the 35 provinces were surrounded by Taliban controlled territory.

The US pullout of Afghanistan had obvious consequences. During the first part of 2021, the US had already reduced its presence in the country to 10 bases and approximately 2,500 troops,

⁷⁴⁴ AMIRY, S. Taliban Sends Letter to Afghan Leaders Calling for Direct Talks. *Tolo News*.

⁷⁴⁵ ROGGIO, B. & TOBIN, A. 2021. Taliban Completes Conquest of Afghanistan after Seizing Panjshir. *Long War Journal*.

⁷⁴⁶ GEORGE, S. & MEHRDAD, E. 2021. Taliban Fighters overrun an Afghan Provincial Capital for the First Time Since withdrawal of Foreign Forces. *The Washington Post*.

⁷⁴⁷ ROGGIO, B. 2021. Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan. *Long War Journal*.

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁹ SALEHI, N. Heratis March Against Taliban, Support Afghan Forces. *Tolo News*.

and by the first week of July, according to CENTCOM, over 90% of US troops had withdrawn.⁷⁵⁰ This cleared the way for the Taliban to navigate Afghanistan largely unobstructed.

According to one police lieutenant who oversaw 30 police outposts, “one [outpost] had sold out to the Taliban, another had been overrun, and at least 30 of his officers had deserted”.⁷⁵¹ In a similar case, “at least 120 soldiers and policer were given safe passage to the government-held provincial center in return for handing over weapons and equipment”.⁷⁵² In fact, there were several accounts of the Taliban merely collecting weapons from security personnel and then sending them on their way. Police units throughout the country surrendered or retreated.⁷⁵³ With several districts over run by the Taliban, in June 2021, President Ghani was forced to call on locals (like his predecessors) to take up arms in support of his administration and rule.⁷⁵⁴ However, while the security force was yielding to Taliban pressures and district governors were surrendering their offices, local leaders were negotiating a truce with the Taliban across the country.

Both the failure of the central government to provide supplies and reinforcement and the US reduction in intelligence support added to frustration and the demoralization of the police. Reports from some districts and provinces are telling. After almost two months, the district of Zurmat in Paktia province fell; eleven others would follow. For those security force personnel who remained committed to the fight, they were increasingly demoralized. Where there were once a hundred police, now there were only thirty. In fact, some report that those who departed their posts were allowed by the Taliban to keep one light weapon each, suggesting that the Taliban were interested in working with locals.

In the space of a few months, there was a marked change from indiscriminate violence to targeted assassination, suggesting that most of the population had already, either actively or passively, reconciled themselves to the idea of Taliban rule, leaving a handful of individuals for elimination by the group. By April 2021, sixteen people have been assassinated in Paktia province, including some tribal elders, district governors, and members of the security force. Still, locals

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⁷⁵¹ GIBBONS-NEFF, T., RAHIM, N. & CHIVERS, C. J. How Long Can the Afghan Security Forces Last on Their Own? *The New York Times*.

⁷⁵² ZUCCHINO, D. & RAHIM, N. A Wave of Afghan Surrenders to the Taliban Picks Up Speed. *Ibid*.

⁷⁵³ SHAHEED, A. Fighting Reported in Multiple Areas, 19 Soldiers Killed. *Tolo News*.

⁷⁵⁴ SHAHEED, A. Citizens in Various Provinces take up Arms to Fight Taliban. *Tolo News*.

have described "the Taliban's behavior vis-à-vis the local population as 'quite soft'", suggesting that both spoken and unspoken agreements existed on some level between the Taliban, government security force, and local leaders.⁷⁵⁵

In this chapter, I provided a background to my case study of Afghanistan. In the first section, I examined the composition of state-society relations, highlight the historic division and contention relationship between the two. This included a summary of how geography and the unique terrain help to shape this relationship; a review of local governance and authority; and the history of contentious relations between state and society. In the second section, I demonstrated how the history of foreign intervention in Afghanistan further encouraged contention between state and society. First, I highlighted how over the course of three wars, British practices reproduced and enhance the legitimacy and symbolic power of local leaders through recognition and direct negotiations, economic capital, and opportunities for these leaders to develop their reputation and accumulate prestige. Second, I revealed how practices of appeasement, empowerment and framing help shape perceptions of the authority and legitimacy of local leaders during the Soviet invasion. Third, I demonstrated how former mujahidin fighters, benefiting from capital gains during the Soviet invasion, returned to local communities and took up positions as legitimate local leaders. Finally, I briefly highlighted how the approach to the US invasion of Afghanistan served to further reproduce and enhance the legitimacy of these leaders, exacerbating tensions between state and society.

⁷⁵⁵ RUTTIG, T. 2021. The Domino Effect in Paktia and the Fall of Zurmat: A Case Study of the Taliban Surrounding Afghan Cities. *The Afghan Analysts Network*.

Chapter 4: Case Study of Policebuilding in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

In the days following the US invasion, much of the policing responsibility fell on locally raised forces. Local elders informally took up the role of police chief and went about serving the needs of their home districts and villages, while former militia group leaders supported or were recruited into the police force. Some were even appointed to leadership positions within the Ministry of Interior. Regardless of their position or support, however, these leaders were not particularly committed to these roles. Indeed, there is evidence that some kept their local “command structures intact... (and were) able to integrate or reinvent themselves into state security forces”.⁷⁵⁶ With kin and clan filling its ranks, it became more a local “government of uncles and nephews” based on personal loyalties and informal ties.⁷⁵⁷ Autonomous and empowered, lines were drawn, and sides were chosen⁷⁵⁸, leaving the legitimacy of the state in question. In Helmand province, it was estimated that of the 1,700 policemen assigned, only an estimated 250 were considered loyal to the state.⁷⁵⁹

In this chapter, I examine policebuilding in Afghanistan during the US invasion and occupation of the country from 2001 to 2021. In the first section, I explore policebuilding as a component of statebuilding efforts, mapping the various actions that have been taken to institute the Afghan national police. In doing so, I make the distinction between the institutional and legitimacy approach to policebuilding. In the second section, I conduct a survey of the Afghan National Police with the aim of uncovering their disposition and role in statebuilding. I map participant responses, ranging from their sense of being part of the instrumental apparatus of the state to their being a force for and contribution to state legitimacy. Empirical findings are presented in this chapter, followed by discussions around results and observations taken up in chapter 5.

⁷⁵⁶ GUNARATNA, R., JERARD, J. & NASIR, S. M. 2013. *Countering extremism : building social resilience through community engagement*, London

Hackensack, NJ, Imperial College Press ;

Distributed by World Scientific Publishing Co. See also: PRESS, A. I. 2012a. 23 Opponents Held in Kunduz, Baghlan. *Afghan Islamic Press*, April 15, 2012.

⁷⁵⁷ PRESS, A. I. 2013c. Taliban Say 326 Security Personnel Jointed their Ranks in June. *Ibid.*, July 1, 2013.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁹ SEIDLER, M. 2015. Pufendorf's Moral and Political Philosophy. *In*: ZALTA, E. N., NODELMAN, U. & ALLEN, C. (eds.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford: Stanford University.

4.0 A Recent History of Policebuilding in Afghanistan

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling of the Taliban government, growing fear that the country would experience protracted internal conflict and even civil war motivated the international community to move fast to state build and create a security apparatus that could limit violence across the country. Lessons from the 1800s and the 1980s lent to a belief that intrastate and community level violence could quickly manifest in the post-invasion period.

In April 2002, the Group of 8 (G8) gathered in Geneva for an international conference on Afghanistan. On the agenda was the task of developing a plan and strategy for implementing security in a post-Taliban Afghanistan.⁷⁶⁰ Organized according to a five-pillar concept (including Army, Police, Justice, Drugs, and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)), assignments were distributed among donor countries.⁷⁶¹ Initially, the US was responsible for reforming and standing up the military with Japan taking over demilitarization. Germany took over responsibility for the police, with the United Kingdom taking lead of counternarcotics and the Italians tasked with judiciary reform.

The initial goals for the Afghan national police included approximately 45,000 uniformed police, 12,000 border police, 3,400 highway police, and 2,300 counternarcotics police. However, meeting and maintaining these numbers proved difficult and a high turnover rate remained a constant concern, especially regarding the loss of skilled personnel. To boost recruitment and retention numbers, incentives were introduced, including increased salaries. In some years, there were positive responses to such incentives; for example, a salary increase implemented in 2009 saw attrition rates drop eight points, with a reduction from a 25% attrition rate in 2009 dropping to 17% in 2010.⁷⁶² In total, however, standing up the national police was expected to cost approximately \$235 million. By 2021, this would balloon to over \$21 billion spent on policebuilding by the international community.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶⁰ UN NEWS 2002. Donor Meeting on Reform of Afghanistan Security Sector Successful, Brahimi Says. New York: United Nations.

⁷⁶¹ SEDRA, M. 2004. Security Sector Transformation in Afghanistan. *Working Paper*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

⁷⁶² GIUSTOZZI, A. & ISAQZADEH, M. 2013. *Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

⁷⁶³ SIGAR 2022b. Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

Yet, from the moment the United States announced its intent to pull its troops out of the country, the police force rapidly began to disintegrate. In the days following the initial withdrawal, US President Joseph Biden submitted that the United States had done “more than enough to empower the Afghan police...to secure the future of [the Afghan] people,” suggesting that resistance to the Taliban overrunning and taking over the country now rested on the political will of the Afghan police force and security apparatus.⁷⁶⁴ However, this did not seem to materialize.

There are some studies that argue that the government’s ability to maintain control over the police has always been questionable.⁷⁶⁵ Many in this group point to the difficulty inherent in even standing up a civilian police force amid such an enduring history of conflict and militarism. This group points to the effects of war, arguing that under conflict conditions it becomes difficult to differentiate between the competing roles of a national police force, including their role in internal security and law enforcement and that of national defense.⁷⁶⁶ A study from the RAND corporation adds that raising an indigenous police force in the aftermath of (or even worse, ongoing) intrastate conflict is likely to be confronted by familiar obstacles, including difficulty generating trust among the population, and earning legitimacy uniformly across the country.⁷⁶⁷ Others remind us that Afghanistan has never truly had anything that resembled an effective national police force that was committed to protecting its territorial citizenship.⁷⁶⁸ This group reminds us that the Taliban contributed to this difficulty in consolidating and controlling the police force by extending decades of poor domestic policing through neglect and administrative mismanagement throughout the mid and late 1990s.⁷⁶⁹ There are still yet others who shift the

⁷⁶⁴ GOLDBAUM, C., RAHIM, N., HASSAN, S. & GIBBONS-NEFF, T. 2021. Taliban Seize 3 Afghan Capital Cities in a Day. *The New York Times*.

⁷⁶⁵ RUBIN, B. R. 2002. *The fragmentation of Afghanistan : state formation and collapse in the international system*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

⁷⁶⁶ DEFLEM, M. 2011. Policing Afghanistan: Civilian Police Reform and the Resurgence of the Taliban. In: CARLTON-FORD, S. & ENDER, M. G. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of War and Society: Iraq and Afghanistan*. London: Routledge.

⁷⁶⁷ DOBBINS, J., WATTS, S., CHANDLER, N., EATON, D. & PEZARD, S. 2020. Seizing the Golden Hour: Tasks, Organization, and Capabilities Required for the Earliest Phase of Stability Operations. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

⁷⁶⁸ SIGAR 2022b. Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁷⁶⁹ DEFLEM, M. 2011. Policing Afghanistan: Civilian Police Reform and the Resurgence of the Taliban. In: CARLTON-FORD, S. & ENDER, M. G. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of War and Society: Iraq and Afghanistan*. London: Routledge.

blame and argue that international coordination, including conflicting training methods and philosophy, and difficulties with properly distributing adequate resource provision, remained unresolved throughout policebuilding efforts, rendering the police force weak and ill prepared.⁷⁷⁰

4.0.1 On Instituting the Afghan National Police

In early 2003, when Afghan American Ali Ahmad Jalali was appointed as the Minister of Interior, he immediately took up the task of creating an all-volunteer police force.⁷⁷¹ That same year, the Afghan National Police (ANP) was established. It included the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), the Counter Narcotics Police of AF (CNPA), and the Fire and Disaster Police (FDP). In combination, it was projected that these units would provide law enforcement and security across most areas of the country. However, there were readily observable difficulties in reaching and effectively administering state directed law enforcement in local communities.

In response and at the direction of US Commander General David Petraeus, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established as a means for maintaining an “autonomous approach to security,” one that could reach into the periphery and provide coverage over local communities.⁷⁷² Resembling the auxiliary defense initiative and militia that the US recruited for operations against the Taliban in late 2001,⁷⁷³ this approach would come to “reinvigorate traditional governance structures” and employ them to oversee policing in their areas.⁷⁷⁴ In both cases, however, corruption ran rampant with local leaders taking advantage of their position. As a result, the ALP was later dissolved and its rank and file incorporated into the national security apparatus with one

⁷⁷⁰ GROSS, E. 2009. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU’s Contribution. *Occasional Paper*. Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

⁷⁷¹ MURRAY, T. 2011. Police-Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Reform. *International Peacekeeping*, 14, 108-126.

⁷⁷² PATIENCE, M. 2009. Drug Abuse Hampers Afghan Police. *BBC*, February 18, 2009.

⁷⁷³ STEVENS, M. 2013. Afghan Local Police in Helmand. *The RUSI Journal*, 158, 64-70.

⁷⁷⁴ HULSLANDER, R. & SPIVEY, J. 2012. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. *Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, 3, 125-138.

third disarmed and retired, another one third transferred to the Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANA-TF), and the remaining one third joining the national police.⁷⁷⁵

Several studies point out that right from its launch, however, the national police program was also plagued with problems, including dysfunctional recruitment methods, poor vetting processes, and limited oversight. This partly stemmed from the rush that followed the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 by local strongmen to take control of policing by “unilaterally seizing titles of police commander, general, or colonel,” and the government’s attempt to circumvent this and consolidate security.⁷⁷⁶ The rank and file followed, filing up with locals who likely had a history of participating in local private militia and, although skilled with using weapons, did not have any of the soft skills necessary to successfully conduct community policing.

Recruiting for the national police was troubled right from the start, with the involvement of local leaders in the recommendation and selection process of police personnel partly to blame.⁷⁷⁷ According to a handful of studies, “in most of the country’s districts, policemen are on the force because they were friends with the right people”.⁷⁷⁸ Collectively, these studies suggest that this dynamic supported ethnic imbalance across the police force, disproportionate number of illiterate police among the ranks, and clientelist relations among local leaders and the police.

On one hand, local recruitment reduced the likelihood of tension and conflict between communities and the police that patrolled them. A common ground derived by their shared history, identity, and beliefs supported a level of peaceful coexistence, regardless of the peoples’ feelings about the role and association of these individuals serving as state police. On the other hand, it is this same response that placed candidate police in a compromising position and created the opportunity for corruption. In fact, these same individuals may have found themselves indebted to those who recommended and supported their application to the police force in the first place. As a result, the requisite autonomy of policing was likely challenged or altogether circumvented.

⁷⁷⁵ CLARK, K. 2020. Disbanding the ALP: A Dangerous Final Chapter for a Force with a Chequered History. Kabul: Afghan Analyst Network.

⁷⁷⁶ RUSI Reforming the Afghan National Police. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies.

⁷⁷⁷ SINGH, D. 2020. *Investigating Corruption in the Afghan Police Force: Instability and Insecurity in Post-Conflict Societies*, Bristol, Policy Press.

⁷⁷⁸ CRITSER, R. 2008. Growing Afghan Police Force Needs More Help. *American Forces Press Service*.

Moreover, the ethnic imbalance caused by such recruitment practices seemingly promoted “a culture of impunity and illegitimacy among the population”.⁷⁷⁹ Some of this animosity originated and followed a general overrepresentation of Tajik recruits in the police force from the beginning. In response, segments of the population generally distrusted the very idea of the national police while others sought to rebalance the force in their favor. For example, Ghulam Mohammad, a local strongman, reportedly circumvented the vetting process and pushed the recruitment of approximately 500 Pashtun police candidates as a means for evening the numbers against the disproportionate Tajik representation in the police force.⁷⁸⁰⁷⁸¹

The concern here remains the potential that police personnel could be co-opted by local communities and their leaders to support local interests at the expense of the state. Under idealized democratic governance characterized by adherence to and support of the rule of law, the police maintain a degree of autonomy that allow them to properly enforce legal code such that no individual stands above the law. Without such autonomy and distance between law enforcement and local leaders, the police may find themselves merely supporting and enforcing the will of individuals and not necessarily the code of the law and the state.

Often, local leaders are familiar with the men they recommend and choose them intentionally for their loyalty to adhere to the expectations of local communities, as well as the personal wishes of local leaders.⁷⁸² According to the *Small War Journal*, local leaders co-opt “the force as local employment schemes for their followers and a tool to assert their control over the population”.⁷⁸³ Given these conditions and expectations, there existed a strong likelihood that recruits remained exposed to the influence and decisions of local leaders.⁷⁸⁴ Moreover, although recruits participated in a three-week program where they received training on the rule of law,

⁷⁷⁹ RUSI Reforming the Afghan National Police. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies.

⁷⁸⁰ HRW 2011. Just Don’t Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police”. New York: Human Rights Watch.

⁷⁸¹ SIGAR 2022b. Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁷⁸² HULSLANDER, R. & SPIVEY, J. 2012. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. *Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, 3, 125-138.

⁷⁸³ TANZEEM, A. 2017. Afghan Local Police: The Controversial Force that Fills a Security Gap. *Voice of America*, November 20, 2017.

⁷⁸⁴ KLEINIG, J. 2001. Consent. In: BECKER, L. C. & BECKER, C. B. (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Ethics Volume 1*. London: Rutledge.

human rights, police policy, and the Afghan constitution, the historic and traditional world view championed by locals and their leaders likely continued to shape and influence the decisions of the police. Where Taliban leaders or local strongmen (drug lords, etc.) have taken over local governance or collude with local leaders this became increasingly challenging to the state.⁷⁸⁵⁷⁸⁶

Interestingly, empowering local leaders through the institution of a locally controlled police force was a primary objective of NATO Special Operations Component Command's (NSOCC) Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. In fact, one of the objectives of the VSO was to "reinforce the willingness" of villages to "contribute to its own defense," a step toward mobilizing local communities.⁷⁸⁷ Supporters of the program argued that empowering "local leaders is intended to reinforce the practice of good governance...[where] villagers have a say in their own destiny, and relationships with the district center and regional center are fostered, connecting the local level to the state from the bottom-up".⁷⁸⁸ Agreeing with this premise, advocates of the program argued that it provided the central government the opportunity to "strengthen valuable connections with the populace and expand influence in areas where it was previously impossible".⁷⁸⁹

Still, those that stood opposed to this view argue that installing locally controlled police merely "means an increased number of armed men who respond to local agendas and are not in close cooperation with Afghan institutions".⁷⁹⁰ For example, it was common to find local strongmen, accompanied by supposed police, taxing those who transited through their territory. The opportunity to use the police in this way only helped to reinforce a sense of legitimacy for this practice. In most cases, these men collect both a government salary as well as extorted profits.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁵ PATIENCE, M. 2009. Drug Abuse Hampers Afghan Police. *BBC*, February 18, 2009.

⁷⁸⁶ LOCKE, D. & FRANKFURT, H. G. 1975. Three Concepts of Free Action. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 49, 95-125.

⁷⁸⁷ MOYAR, M. 2014. Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police. MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University.

⁷⁸⁸ HULSLANDER, R. & SPIVEY, J. 2012. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. *Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, 3, 125-138.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁰ KLEINIG, J. 2001. Consent. In: BECKER, L. C. & BECKER, C. B. (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Ethics Volume 1*. London: Rutledge.

⁷⁹¹ MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 2010. Warlord, Inc: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives.

As they were seemingly supporting counterinsurgency operations with their checkpoints, these same men received appreciation for their efforts by both domestic and international observers.⁷⁹²

In addition to recruitment from the general population, there was also the reintegration and recruitment of former Taliban members into the police force. As part of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, up to 20% of reintegrated fighters were permitted to join the Afghan security force.⁷⁹³⁷⁹⁴ This, too, was cause for concern over the extent to which recruitment was filling the ranks with individuals who were predisposed to not supporting and enforcing the legitimacy of the state.

One attempt to remedy the situation included the establishment of the Recruitment Command within the Ministry of Interior in 2010.⁷⁹⁵ The command aimed to relieve local leaders, chiefs of police, and others from the responsibility of recruitment, and to centralize this work under the Ministry of Interior. According to official guidance, members of the ANP (as well as ALP) are recruited by Provincial Recruiting Officers (PRO), then vetted, before participating in an eight-week training program.⁷⁹⁶ Also, rather than keeping recruits at their home/local stations, a lottery was used to determine where newly recruited police would be assigned.⁷⁹⁷ With the installation of the Recruitment Command and for some time after, police chiefs had less a role in determining candidacy to the police force. Reportedly, however, in short time these systems failed to keep track of selection, recruitment, and assignment, rendering the Recruitment Command seemingly impotent. Local leaders would, again, continue to influence these processes.

⁷⁹² CRILLY, R. & FARMER, B. 2011. Pakistan Permanently Closes Border to NATO after Air Strike. *The Telegraph*, November 28, 2011. See also: KOZHEVNIKOV, R. 2012. Tajikistan Seals Afghan Border, NATO Trucks can Pass. *Reuters*, July 27, 2012.

⁷⁹³ FELBAB-BROWN, V. 2012. Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: “It’s Local, So it Must be Good” - Or Is It? Washington, DC: Brookings Institute

⁷⁹⁴ ROSSI, S. & GIUSTOZZI, A. 2006. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities. *Working Paper*. London: Crisis States Research Center.

⁷⁹⁵ ASEY, T., ERFANI, M., AHMADI, E., JAHESH, S., RIZWAN, A. & TAIEB, R. 2021. Security Sector Reform for Peace: A Roadmap to Economization, Fiscal Sustainability and Restructuring of the Afghan Security Forces Post Peace Settlement. Kabul: The Institute of War and Peace Studies.

⁷⁹⁶ OIG US DOD 2012. Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police. *Special Plans and Operations*. Alexandria, VA: Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense.

⁷⁹⁷ SINGH, D. 2014. Corruption and Clientelism in the Lower Levels of the Afghan Police. *Conflict, Security, and Development*, 14, 621-650.

Training and Professionalizing the Afghan Police

Several training facilities were established between 2003 and 2021, including in Wardak, Gardez, Qandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Khost, with the main training facility located in Kabul. However, police training and professional development programs were problematic, with the international community, including its public servants, military, and contractors all ill prepared to conduct training with Afghan police units. This included participation by Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to a handful of studies, differing approaches and philosophies to policebuilding among these participants resulted in problems with coordination and the successful fulfillment of tasks.⁷⁹⁸ While Germany, for example, focused on 'community policing', the United States largely absorbed the police into its counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and model. In addition to the obvious disconnect between these aims and approaches, emphasis on COIN left the community and crime-solving capabilities of the police relatively under resourced both in training and equipment.

The US and German state-run training programs initially ran from July 2003 to 2005. During this time, the US trained approximately 50,000 police in Kabul while Germany spent approximately \$70 million in renovating and running a police academy in the capital.⁷⁹⁹ The academy would support the training of senior personnel with a 2 ½ year training pipeline for officers and a 90-day training program for non-commissioned officers), while the US provided training for junior officers at its Central Training Centers (CTC) in Kabul and other similar facilities (Regional Training Centers) throughout the country.

In 2005, finding that both the US State Department and Germany had not met expectations for training and equipping the police force, US Secretary of Defense pushed for the US military to take over training. In that same year, the US military found that, of the 34,000 'trained' police

⁷⁹⁸ GROSS, E. 2009. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU's Contribution. *Occasional Paper*. Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

⁷⁹⁹ USIP 2004. Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

officers, only 3,900 had attended the required 9-week basics course.⁸⁰⁰ Most had only attended a 2-week transition course. The expectation was that field training officers (FTOs) would continue to develop and reinforce training once recruits were in the field. This did not materialize as expected, however, and in 2011 there was a push to keep candidate police in training for at least eight weeks.

US government defense contractors, such as DynCorp, also participated in training police personnel. In fact, over the years they increasingly took the lead in training. However, the experience and awareness of their personnel was brought into question often. According to one study, the company needed to recruit “personnel with wider skill sets (for example, institution building and change management), experience of conflict reform, and higher ranks. Cultural, linguistic, and area expertise is imperative”.⁸⁰¹ In fact, in 2004, the Interior Minister Ali Jalal “rejected 100 of the 150 trainers proposed by DynCorp for police training.”⁸⁰²

It’s noteworthy to compare this training regimen and general attempt at policebuilding against the Western models. In the United States, police recruits usually undergo on average 21 weeks of basic training followed by several weeks of field mentoring. In Germany, police recruit training includes approximately 80 weeks of theory studies at local universities along with 30 weeks of internship and 21 weeks of practical training.⁸⁰³ In the United Kingdom, similar format exists with recruits required to complete 18 weeks of college courses, 10 weeks of local area policing under supervision, and another 18 weeks of investigations training.⁸⁰⁴

Comparing the Afghan model to the West, it is interesting to find that, although these Western states have established and stable governments, they continue to emphasize theory in their

⁸⁰⁰ SIGAR 2022a. Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise. Arlington, Virginia: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁸⁰¹ US GAO 2012. Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps. Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office.

⁸⁰² SEDRA, M. & HODES, C. 2013. *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, New York, Routledge.

⁸⁰³ STALLER, M. S., KOERNER, S., HEIL, V., ABRAHAM, A. & POOLTON, J. 2022. Police recruits’ wants and needs in police training in Germany. *Security Journal*.

⁸⁰⁴ ANTROBUS, E., THOMPSON, I. & ARIEL, B. 2019. Procedural Justice Training for Police Recruits: Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 15, 29-53.

police training regimen. Yet, there is little-to-no evidence of this in the Afghan programming. Arguably, for policebuilding, it is this sort of training that helps to translate the instrumental role of policing to something more grounded in righteousness and legitimacy.

The US envisioned end state of police training included having an "effective, well-organized, professional, multiethnic national police...to provide a safe and secure environment for the people of Afghanistan and a force committed to the rule of law".⁸⁰⁵ In 2006, to meet these expectations, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a multinational partnership that included NATO members and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, was formed and charged with reforming the Afghan security force, including the Afghan National Police.⁸⁰⁶ Assisting with this reform was the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). With over 8,000 trainers assigned to the Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) program, various curriculum was developed to help professionalize the police force, including literacy, weapons training, and rule of law.

However, with the US maintaining counterinsurgency as a priority and with limited experience and competency in police and policebuilding, military trainers took to shaping the Afghan police force in the likeness of a military/counterinsurgency force. It would be some years later that it would be recognized that soldiers did not have the sort of requisite background you would expect of such trainers, including criminal investigation background and training, law enforcement and rule of law backgrounds, and general policing knowhow.

Police units across the country were trained to patrol communities not as enforcement mechanisms but rather as militarized units conducting counterinsurgency operations. This had the effect of deemphasizing state legitimacy concerns and amplifying the technical capacity of these units. Some researchers have argued that a "demilitarization must begin with the rhetorical, conceptual, and operational separation of the police from the Army".⁸⁰⁷ In this way, police force

⁸⁰⁵ DEFENSE, U. D. O. & STATE, U. D. O. 2006. Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness. Washington, DC: Inspector General, US Department of State Inspector General, US Department of Defense.

⁸⁰⁶ SIGAR 2021. Conditions on Afghanistan Security Forces Funding: The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Rarely Assessed Compliance With or Enforced Funding Conditions, Then Used an Undocumented Approach. Arlington: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁸⁰⁷ RUSI Reforming the Afghan National Police. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies.

personnel can refocus on working closely with communities and the enforcement of law and order. In other words, to ‘re-civilianize’ the police.

Although initial policy changes did not require patrolmen (*satunkai*) to have completed formal schooling, non-commissioned officers (*satanman*) were expected to have completed nine years of education. However, these requirements were often circumvented during recruitment or overlooked during vetting. As a result, much of the police force remained unable and incapable of drafting basic documents such as citation, fines, and reports. Recruitment based on favor over merit had the effect of continuing to fill the ranks with these un/under qualified personnel.

In fact, the result was the maintenance of an over 70 percent illiteracy rate among the ranks of the police force, according to a report published by Reliefweb in 2011.⁸⁰⁸ Although there was a mandatory 64 hours of literacy training for the police, it was not until after 2011 that literacy improvement programs started to have any impact on the police force.⁸⁰⁹⁸¹⁰ The goal of the 64-hour literacy training program was to achieve the equivalent of a third grade reading level across the police force.⁸¹¹ Between 2009 and 2011, over 28,000 security personnel (including police) completed coursework in this program, with another 100,000 enrolled just in 2011. In addition to the military specific initiatives, other programs such as the UNESCO Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) and Literacy for Empowerment Afghan Police (LEAP) programs also provided opportunity for capacity building among the police force.⁸¹²

Judiciary and the Legitimacy Side of Policebuilding

One approach to shaping the police more in the likeness of a community policing force rather than a tool for counterinsurgency is to expand on the relationship between police and the justice system. In fact, according to one study, the national police primacy includes “indigenous police forces having the main responsibility for internal security and the maintenance of the rule

⁸⁰⁸ UNESCO 2011a. Arming the Afghan Police with Literacy. *Reliefweb*.

⁸⁰⁹ CALDWELL, W. B. & FINNEY, N. K. 2010. Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach. *Prism*, 2, 121-130.

⁸¹⁰ PERITO, R. M. 2012. Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police: Victims of its Own Success. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

⁸¹¹ CALDWELL, W. B. & FINNEY, N. K. 2011. Security, Capacity, and Literacy. *Military Review*, January-February 2011, 23-27.

⁸¹² UNESCO 2011b. Life Afghanistan: Literacy Initiative for Empowerment Kabul: UNESCO.

of law”.⁸¹³ This suggests that policebuilding should include development or reform of the judiciary and penal systems, as well as policing as they are all interdependent and essential to maintaining order and the legitimacy. This sort of reform – one that targets the installation of a “sense of duty and dedication to the rule of law amongst the police” would seem a priority for policebuilding, yet it was deemphasized in many areas.⁸¹⁴ In fact, in many ways this is about the comparison and competition that exists between the institution and legitimacy approach to policebuilding and statebuilding.

Between 2004 and 2014, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US State Department, and the US Department of Defense engaged in the installation of a rule-of-law program in Afghanistan. From 2004 to 2009, the USAID oversaw the creation of the Afghanistan Rule of Law Program (AROLP). The program sought to strengthen the court, educate legal professionals, reform the legislature, and improve access to justice.⁸¹⁵ Focused on capacity building, the program trained over 1,000 judges, 60 law professors, and 100 university administrators. The program also made some, albeit weak, attempts to bridge formal and informal justice, pointing out to local non-state adjudicators (local jirga leaders) their rights and responsibilities under the Constitution of Afghanistan.

Still, several studies found that the US and international community failed to sufficiently advance the rule of law and encourage a general sense and support for the constitution among the police.⁸¹⁶ As part of the policebuilding process, aligning police with the expectations of the constitution seems a first step toward their enforcement of it. However, these programs maintained a top-down perspective and failed to properly include the police force.

Although the US Department of Justice (DOJ) specifically identified police training as within the scope of rule of law programming, limited resources and training were allocated for this

⁸¹³ WITHER, J. K. 2012. Challenges of Developing Host Nation Police Capacity. *Prism*, 3.

⁸¹⁴ SKINNER, M. 2008. Counterinsurgency and State Building: An Assessment of the Role of the Afghan National Police. *Democracy and Security*, 4, 290-311.

⁸¹⁵ SWENSON, G. & SUGARMAN, E. 2011. Building the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Importance of Legal Education. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 3, 130-146.

⁸¹⁶ SWENSON, G. 2017. Why U.S. Efforts to Promote the Rule of Law in Afghanistan Failed. *International Security*, 42, 114-151.

by the United States.⁸¹⁷ The US Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provided some advisory and training on corrections management and operations and provided equipment and infrastructure support to justice and corrections facilities.⁸¹⁸ However, it was in 2007, when the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) took the lead in policebuilding and sent over 400 international staff consisting of police officers and rule of law specialists that any real momentum kicked in.⁸¹⁹ Still, although the aim of the EUPOL mission centered on developing an effective police force that would work more closely with the Afghan justice system, here again there was disproportionate emphasis on training members of the Ministry of Justice with little attention given to the police force.

In fact, in the early stages of security sector reform (SSR) (2002-2005), judiciary reform was poorly funded, receiving only approximately 3% of SSR funding. As a result, there were limits to physical infrastructure, such as courthouses, law libraries, and correction facilities. For those who worked in the judiciary, salaries were small, lending to corruption and the accompanying alternative means for supplementing one's income. According to a handful of assessments, AROLP did "next to nothing to advance the rule of law".⁸²⁰ Predicated on the belief that the more informed the people were, the more improved the rule of law would be, the course toward realization was problematic. Courts remained under-resourced, expensive, and often corrupt and predatory. All of which discouraged the people and arguably even the police.

Similarly, the USAID oversaw the Rule of Law Stability (RLS) program which independently addressed both formal and informal components. Running from 2010 to 2014, the program was very similar to the AROLP and emphasized capacity building and public awareness as priorities. Like AROLP, several studies found that RLS did not improve the rule of law. While institutions were raised and capacity was built, legitimacy remained stunted. Of primary issue and concern was the lack of consent by institutional actors. Both the judiciary and executive had little-

⁸¹⁷ SIGAR 2015. Rule of Law in Afghanistan: U.S. Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More than \$1 Billion. Arlington, VA: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

⁸¹⁸ INL 2008. Civilian Police and Rule of Law Programs Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

⁸¹⁹ CHIVVIS, C. S. 2010. *EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record so Far*, Arlington, VA, National Defense Research Institute, RAND.

⁸²⁰ SWENSON, G. 2017. Why U.S. Efforts to Promote the Rule of Law in Afghanistan Failed. *International Security*, 42, 114-151.

to-no incentive to change. In fact, attempts to link state and nonstate justice saw increases in the use of non-state resources with insignificant increases in referrals to state courts. This was partly instigated by US attempts to position RLS informal programs to undermine and undercut the Taliban's justice system.⁸²¹

Other programs that were fixed on capacity building over legitimacy building, such as the State Department's Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and the US Department of Defense's Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan (ROLFF-A), ran their course and often ended with limited results. The competition between state and society for ownership over the adjudication of the people remained largely unresolved.

In time, however, more than two thirds of the population had little-to-no faith in the system, with reportedly less than 10% of the population using formal state legal systems to adjudicate their concerns. Part of the blame rested on the recruitment, training, and mode of operations of the police, most of which included seemed disproportionate focus on institution building and general neglect for the legitimacy components of such efforts. The role of the police in statebuilding becomes ambiguous with the question becoming how effective has this episode of intervention been regarding policebuilding, and to what extent does the role of the police support statebuilding?

4.0.2 Tracing the Disposition of the Afghan National Police

Despite efforts to train and school the police force to effectively support statebuilding, the Afghan police exhibited varying levels of resistance, including attacking trainers and coalition members. According to the Long War Journal, there were 96 green-on-blue attacks since the US intervention in Afghanistan began in 2001.⁸²² The first attacks occurred in 2007, followed by a surge in frequency throughout 2011 and 2012, before declining in 2013.⁸²³ Between 2007 and 2013 alone, there were 140 coalition killed and 180 injured because of these attacks. Some analysts argue that insider threats such as these are to be expected; they are a consequence of long and

⁸²¹ Ibid.

⁸²² ROGGIO, B. & LUNDQUIST, L. 2015. Green on Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data. *The Long War Journal*. April 8, 2015 ed.: Public Multimedia Inc.

⁸²³ SHORTLAND, N., NADER, E., SARI, H., PALASINSKI, M. & HILLAND, C. 2019. Murder on Maneuver: Exploring Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan. *Armed Forces and Society*, 45, 368-388.

drawn-out military operations where competition and tension inevitably develop. Some of these same analysts claim that attacks are motivated by a sort of “clash of cultures” between Afghan security and their Western trainers.⁸²⁴ According to another study, the triggers for these attacks include retaliation for threats or insults, general stress, and a sense that coalition forces are the enemy, both physically and culturally.⁸²⁵

A handful of studies conclude that a sense of cultural difference and the endurance of an *us-them* perception among the Afghan security force remained a primary motivator for insider attacks.⁸²⁶ Major Hasanzada of the Afghan security force agreed, submitting that American forces behaved poorly toward Afghan soldiers, the people, and their religion and culture. He added that “too many of them are racist, arrogant, and simply don’t respect” Afghans.⁸²⁷ As examples, he pointed out that troops used terms such as “sand nigger”, “dune coon” and “raghead”.⁸²⁸ This and other incidents, such as US forces urinating on dead Taliban and burning the Koran, have all contributed to maintaining this disposition and perception of *us and them*. In fact, some studies found a correlation between increases in the number of coalition forces at training sites and insider attacks. They logic that with increases in troop numbers came increases in “*out-group*” presence. As a result, the sense of “*us*” and “*them*” was strengthened, “facilitating the ease with which a green-on-blue perpetrator views members of ISAF as a member of the out-group”.⁸²⁹

Changes were made and policies were implemented to address green-on-blue attacks from both sides of the equation. Allied forces, for example, implemented advanced cultural sensitivity training for its coalition soldiers.⁸³⁰ A range of curriculum and tools were developed, including

⁸²⁴ ALLEN, L. M. 2012. The Surge in “Green-on-Blue” Attacks in Afghanistan. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, 4, 7-9.

⁸²⁵ SHORTLAND, N., NADER, E., SARI, H., PALASINSKI, M. & HILLAND, C. 2019. Murder on Maneuver: Exploring Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan. *Armed Forces and Society*, 45, 368-388.

⁸²⁶ BROOKE-HOLLAND, L. 2012. In Brief: Afghanistan - Insider Attacks. London: International Affairs and Defense, House of Commons Library.

⁸²⁷ YOUSAFZAI, S. 2012. Afghanistan: ‘Green on Blue’ Killings Explained. *Newsweek*.

⁸²⁸ WADHAM, B. 2012. Friend or Foe: Green on Blue Killings in Afghanistan. *The Conversation*.

⁸²⁹ SHORTLAND, N., NADER, E., SARI, H., PALASINSKI, M. & HILLAND, C. 2019. Murder on Maneuver: Exploring Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan. *Armed Forces and Society*, 45, 368-388.

⁸³⁰ THORNE, J. G. 2013. *No Green-on-Blue against the Reds?: Organizational Strategies Behind Insider Attacks in Afghanistan*. Master’s Degree, Air University.

electronic simulations and role-playing games to help soldiers understand cultural nuances with engaging and communicating with Afghans.⁸³¹ In addition to pre-deployment cultural sensitivity training, refresher and ongoing training made use of portable devices and software, including virtual scenario driven etiquette training around entering and engaging villages and their leaders.⁸³²

From the other side, with the help of foreign advisors, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense implemented enhanced vetting processes of those who wanted to join the security and police force. This included re-vetting all 16,000 of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) using a new eight-step process.⁸³³

Still, with the Afghan government supported by and representative of foreign interventionists (the “other”), these insider attacks generated concern over the extent to which Afghan security force personnel can be trusted to not attack the government itself, little less properly support it.⁸³⁴

Like the practices of statebuilding in Afghanistan, policebuilding was disproportionately in favor of institutional approaches over the advancement of a legitimacy approach that could have seen greater support by the police for the state. The institutional approach saw policebuilding in terms of technical inputs and outputs, framing success in terms of numbers (recruitment, retention, and the stockpiling of weapons and equipment). Raising another police station in or near a village ticked the box as successful policebuilding.

The legitimacy approach, if enacted, would have given precedence to the relationship between state and society – and the disposition of the people, including the police, to statebuilding efforts. Such approach would have considered maintaining close watch on the changing socio-political cohesion between the state and police rather than relying on quantitative metrics that mask the true nature and status of policebuilding.⁸³⁵

⁸³¹ ABBE, A. & GOUGE, M. 2012. Cultural Training for Military Personnel: Revisiting the Vietnam Era. *Military Review*.

⁸³² PRASOLOVA-FØRLAND, E., FOMINYKH, M., DARISIRO, R. & MØRCH, A. I. 2013. Training Cultural Awareness in Military Operations in a Virtual Afghan Village: A Methodology for Scenario Development. *46th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*. Wailea, Hawaii: Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

⁸³³ BANUSIEWICZ, J. D. 2012. ISAF ‘Absolutely Driven’ to Reduce Insider Threat in Afghanistan. Kabul: American Forces Press Service.

⁸³⁴ LONG, A. 2013. ‘Green on Blue’: Insider Attacks in Afghanistan. *Survival*, 55, 167-182.

⁸³⁵ RUSI Reforming the Afghan National Police. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies.

In the next section, I conduct a survey of the Afghan police with the aim of uncovering their disposition, perception, and role in statebuilding.

4.1 A Survey of the Afghan National Police

The previous sections explored the history and composition of state-society relations in Afghanistan that make it a special case for understanding the role society plays in state consolidation and statebuilding. This included an examination of the role foreign intervention has played in affecting this relationship. In this chapter, I reviewed the recent history of policebuilding in Afghanistan with the aim of understanding how members of societies come to serve as enforcement mechanisms for the state and its will.

In this chapter, I take this assessment further and present the findings of my survey of 1,360 Afghan National Police. My survey questionnaire aimed to understand the disposition of the police regarding their relationship to the state, society, and the Taliban. It is through such understanding that this study can discover the role (extent and character) the police played in statebuilding in Afghanistan.

The enforcement ends of policing is a requisite element for any society. However, it is not merely monopolization on the physical aspects of enforcement and the use of force, but also a monopoly on the symbolic. In Afghanistan, the installation of a police force is largely one of institution building and does not necessarily meet things at the symbolic level. In western countries, democratic policing is the ideal. Defined by transparency and having the consensus of the population, democratic policing stands in stark contrast to the police state which functions with zero popular consensus. [more on the idealized state of policing]

A survey of several studies on policebuilding in Afghanistan suggest that the approach to security and law enforcement taken by the Afghan government was doomed to fail right from the start. By relying on local leaders to provide security, bodies for the security force, or recommendations to the police force, the Afghan government arguably shifts the balance of power and effectively surrenders some of its own legitimacy. [a bit about how the government turns to local leaders for recruits and support in policing.]

The composition of the sample population is as follows:

EDUCATION LEVEL

ILLITERATE	29%
PRIMARY SCHOOL	34%
RELIGIOUS SCHOOL	3%
HIGH SCHOOL	27%
BACHELORS	7%
MASTERS	0.07%

AGE

18 – 30	82%
31 – 49	17%
50 +	1%

ETHNICITY

HAZARA	11%
PASHTUN	48%
TAJIK	26%
TURKMEN	1%
UZBEK	4%
OTHER	10%

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OFFICERS	9%
RANK AND FILE	90%
RELIGIOUS LEADERS	1%

4.1.1 State-Police Relations and the Role of the Police in Statebuilding

The following questions were used to discover the character and disposition of the national police toward the state.

Which leadership do you find the most respected and legitimate – state politicians or local leaders?

State Politicians	12%
Local Leaders	88%

After your service with the police force, will you return to your local community or continue working with the state?

Return to Local Community	49%
Continue working w/State	47% (45% want to join the academy)
Other	4%

Is centralized democratic governance compatible with Afghan society?

No	48%
Yes	37%
Uncertain	15%

Armed resistance by locals against the state is justified when officials disregard local traditional codes.

Agree or Strongly Agree	57%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree	28%
Uncertain	15%

4.1.2 Society-Police Relations and the Role of the Police in Statebuilding

The following questions were used to discover the character and disposition of the national police toward society and local community governance.

Local leaders have jurisdiction and final authority over local affairs.

Agree or Strongly Agree	37%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree	56%
Uncertain	7%

Local traditional authority has the right to hold jirga, make judgment, and administer punitive measures.

Agree or Strongly Agree	24%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree	70%
Uncertain	6%

4.1.3 Taliban-Police Relations and the Role of the Police in Statebuilding

The following questions were used to discover the character and disposition of the national police toward the Taliban.

I joined the state police primarily to fight against the Taliban.

Agree or Strongly Agree	22%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree	36%
Uncertain	42%

Do you approve of having a negotiated power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the state?

Approve of power-sharing	88%
Disapprove of power-sharing	11%
Undecided	1%

The Taliban are still a legitimate source of authority in Afghanistan?

Agree or Strongly Agree	34%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree	54%
Uncertain	12%

In your opinion, what is the main reason that police personnel defect to the Taliban?

Dissatisfaction with the State	34%
Taliban Influence and Coercion	23%
Economic Reasons	18%
Don't Know	15%
Local Leaders ask them to join Taliban	6%
Believe it's un-Islamic to join the state security force	4%

General Disposition

In your opinion, is there ethnic inequality in the police force?

Yes	74%
No	20%
Maybe	6%

I joined the state police primarily for economic benefits.

Agree or Strongly Agree	47%
Disagree or Strongly Disagree	21%
Undecided	32%

Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings, Results, and Observations

In this chapter, I discuss the findings, results, and observations from my survey of the Afghan police with the aim of locating the role the police played in statebuilding and more specifically, how the disposition of the Afghan police comes to challenge the success of statebuilding during the US occupation of the country. Tallying my survey findings and observations against the theoretical frame, concepts, and assumptions of Pierre Bourdieu, I find that the policeman is torn with his disposition reflective of a split habitus or habitus clivé.

On one hand, he is an expected source of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. By donning the police uniform he is seemingly a representative and enforcer of the state and its rules. Indeed, as part of the state's enforcement mechanism, he is expected to maintain categories of perception that reflect these rules and bring life and legitimacy to the state and its institutions. In short, the policeman is expected to contribute to the very symbolic-ness of the state.

On the other, a lingering doxic relationship with his local community and its traditional way of life encourages him to remain in the past. His historic interaction with his community is a primary experience with the social and political world that came to underly his fundamental beliefs. These are the beliefs that allowed him to recognize and accept things as self-evident (a misrecognition, according to Bourdieu) bestowing on him more a sense of association rather than of consent and voluntarism.

He settles, however, in a middle ground, committed neither to society and its local leaders nor sufficiently aligned with the state to allow it the monopoly on violence (both physical and symbolic) necessary to attain legitimacy. Indeed, the very dynamics of statebuilding becomes (according to Bourdieu) the abrupt disjuncture that throw habitus and the field out of alignment generating a split habitus that in turn encourages this disposition that comes to undermine the success of statebuilding.

5.0.1 Symbolic Capital and the Disposition of the Police

Bourdieu postulates that the state is constituted through the accumulation and concentration of capital, but that symbolic capital, the most genuine means and expression of the state, is only fully realized with the confidence and trust of society. The true nature of this confidence and trust materializes only after the various species of capital have been appreciated through the appropriate categories of perception. That is, symbolic-ness is activated when popular disposition is properly lined up with the rules of the social and political space or field. It is then, and only then, according to Bourdieu that the state gains the capacity to define standards and legitimize culture – arguably the essence of successful statebuilding. According to Bourdieu, with respect to the state, symbolic capital makes its largely incomprehensible to act ‘outside the state’.

With a good number of the police agreeing or strongly agreeing that local leaders (90%) and the Taliban (34%) remain legitimate sources of authority, and with 88% of this same group approving of a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the state, it seems that the state did not achieve during this period the necessary symbolic-ness required of legitimacy and successful statebuilding.

Following Bourdieu’s logic and assumptions, the relative accumulation and concentration of capital among these parties (state, society, and the Taliban) and their accompanying disposition likely contributed to shaping the disposition of the police. However, the state and statebuilding efforts seemingly failed to sufficiently encourage receptivity by the police to the appropriate and necessary categories of perception. As a result, the police continued to maintain favor in local leadership and the potential for cooperation between the Taliban and state.

The Perception of Society, Capital Accumulation, and Statebuilding

In general, during my interviews I found that much of society remained dissatisfied with the state and statebuilding and believed that the institution of a police force was an immediate source of violence rather than safety. Several informants pointed to the number of complaints by local communities as evidence. In Imam Sahib district in Kunduz province for example, two elderly residences explained to reporters that during a night raid on several houses, “thirteen

innocent civilians were arrested”.⁸³⁶ They pointed out that those arrested were not militants but rather regular people, religious leaders, and teachers. In another incident, residents claim that “their houses were looted, and heavy losses were inflicted on them” during police operations; one resident argued that the threat was not from militants, the “Taliban haven’t cause as much damage as caused by the government forces...[they] entered the houses and stole women’s jewelry, arrested innocent people, and caused loss of lived in wayward firing”.⁸³⁷ One local explained that villagers were little concerned about the security in their area as it had been relatively safe for years, however they felt that proposed security checkpoints “would cause them to be targeted”.⁸³⁸ Their safety he suggests rest in their being left alone. Others point to conditions prior to the invasion and claim that violence and the need for policing were relatively low then. One informant adds that the “people are very confused today...while the Taliban [was able to] bring security, the people also want development...the problem is that in Afghanistan development and security fight one another...if there is development then there is no security,” he concluded that “rural communities prioritize security over development”.⁸³⁹ Indeed, one informant suggests that local community animosity is so fierce in some areas that it becomes “hard to distinguish the Taliban in the villages because the farmers also fight with the police...the civilians fight and if they are killed then it is reported that civilian casualties were part of a battle”.⁸⁴⁰

For the Taliban, the uniform is a symbol of the very rule and order they oppose, and in response to an increased visibility of police force personnel in local communities, they adjusted their strategy. All of which had a profound affect in undermining state legitimacy (demonstration of corruption, incompetence, and so on). First, they employ intimidation to pressure individuals against joining or remaining with the police force and state government. Second, they assert parallel and competing roles as security apparatus in local communities. And third, they strategized to reposition the narrative, projecting the state and its police as the main source of violence and conflict in local communities.

⁸³⁶ PRESS, A. I. 2013b. Residents say 13 Civilians Held in Night Time Operation. *Afghan Islamic Press*, August 5, 2013.

⁸³⁷ AFGHAN ISLAMIC PRESS. 2013. Residents Accuse Security Forces of Looting Houses during Operations. *Afghan Islamic Press*,.

⁸³⁸ NEWS, U. F. 2010. Afghan Police Making Mark in Arghandab. *US Fed News*, September 1, 2010.

⁸³⁹ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁸⁴⁰ GHAFUORI, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

According to one report, the Taliban perceived increases in the number of recruits and police patrolling communities as a growing threat where the people are “turning against them and restricting their freedom of movement in their own backyard”.⁸⁴¹ Since the downsizing of international forces in the country, the Ministry of Interior has noted a marked increase in the number of targeted killings of police force personnel.⁸⁴² In one of several similar incidents throughout the country, a bomb was placed under a motor bike and remotely detonated as policemen were dismounted their vehicles.⁸⁴³ In another incident, a police chief was targeted and killed when a suicide bomber approached him on the street and detonated his device.⁸⁴⁴ Throughout the country, similar incidents occurred with policemen targeted in their security compounds⁸⁴⁵, while on patrol in their vehicles⁸⁴⁶, and along highways while in transit.⁸⁴⁷ In fact, fatalities among the police force more than doubled between 2010 and 2012, and continued to rise steeply thereafter.⁸⁴⁸ Although these trends run parallel with increases in size of the domestic police force, the militant response was not a linear one. Rather, militant groups intensified their efforts more generally and in several areas since local forces took over security responsibilities.

In addition to individual targets, they also attempt to destroy, at a symbolic level, the reach and presence of the central government by targeting checkpoints, police stations, and government compounds, regardless of whether they are occupied by police force personnel. In Kunduz, militants targeted and killed the district governor, leaving his body guard and ten civilians dead⁸⁴⁹; in Imam Sahib, the district chief was killed when the Statistics Office was attacked, leaving thirty-

⁸⁴¹ UK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 2011. MOD Personnel Move Afghan Police Development Forward. London: UK Ministry of Defense.

⁸⁴² MOUNT, M. 2012. Internal Reports Highlight Threats to Afghan Police Force. *CNN Wire*.

⁸⁴³ PRESSE-AGENTUR, D. 2010. 1st Lead: Afghan Official Seven Killed in Kunduz Motorbike Bombing. *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, September 4, 2010.

⁸⁴⁴ AHMED, A. 2015. Powerful Afghan Police Chief Killed in Kabul. *The New York Times*, March 19, 2015.

⁸⁴⁵ SERVICE, X. G. N. 2010. 4th Taliban storm U.S. compound in northern Afghan city, aircrafts pound attackers. *Xinhua General News Service*, July 2, 2010.

⁸⁴⁶ PRESS, A. I. 2012b. Two cops killed, an officer injured in Kunduz suicide blast (Updated). *Afghan Islamic Press*, April 12, 2012.

⁸⁴⁷ IRANIAN GOVERNMENT NEWS. 2014. Afghanistan: Attacks on Police Checkpoints Kill 3. *Iranian Government News*, May 21, 2014.

⁸⁴⁸ LIVINGSTON, I. S. & O'HANLON, M. 2015. Afghanistan Index. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

⁸⁴⁹ HAMDARD, F. 2013. 12 Die in Suicide Attack on Governor at Mosque. *The Herald*, August 13, 2013.

three civilians dead⁸⁵⁰; and militants continue to target government representative of the High Peace Council (HPC) with roadside bombs.⁸⁵¹

Indeed, they have attempted altogether to circumvent government influence and reach in local communities. According to one informant, in “Janikhel district, the National Solidarity Program was working there, and one Friday during prayer armed groups went to the mullah and said ‘wait’...they then turned to the people who were implementing NSP and told them that they need the money from the NSP. The elders responded, saying let us pray first and then you can talk. However, the armed group members said that they need the money now. For the armed groups, it’s not extortion...for them, you have no right to take money from the government...because the armed groups believe they are the government and do not recognize the central government. They do not want the other people to recognize the government either”.⁸⁵²

Indeed, if anyone is believed to be working for the government, according to one informant, “they are subject to be killed...unless they received prior permission from the Taliban...(or) if the government forced them...then the militants may have leniency”.⁸⁵³ One informant claims that, “most of the people from my village moved to the center...including the whitebeards...especially if their sons or family works for the government, then he is in danger. For his security, he will move the village to the center or Kabul”.⁸⁵⁴ In fact, one informant advises that if you live in a community that is “under the control of militants and you want to go see the government...they will be hesitant about allowing you...of course, the government may demand that you go to their offices, in such cases you have to explain that to the militants”.⁸⁵⁵ A third informant continued, “sometimes there are people who stop you on your way to Ghazni...so I have to leave my identity card here in Kabul. Also, my mobile phone...we all have another mobile phone for the trip...you cannot have numbers to any NGO or government offices”.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁵⁰ WAHIDULLAH. 2011. Taliban Shift War Tactics in Kunduz. *Pajhwok Afghan News*, March 24, 2011.

⁸⁵¹ POST, T. F. 2011. High Peace Council Member among 2 Killed; 16 Injured Four Civilians Perish in Separate Explosions. *The Frontier Post*, December 11, 2011.

⁸⁵² AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ GHAFUORI, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁸⁵⁵ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁸⁵⁶ Sahar, 2014. (AREU)

Although the collateral of attacks often leaves the impression of an indiscriminate strategy⁸⁵⁷, the evidence of most incidents often suggests that the target and objective of militants remains that of destroying symbols of state presence in the periphery. In Qandahar, a car bomb took the life of seven people and wounded nineteen others when it exploded near police headquarters⁸⁵⁸. In Jalalabad, eleven people were killed and another twenty-two wounded when a suicide bomber attacked a police station.⁸⁵⁹ And, three civilians were killed and eight wounded when a police checkpoint was attacked.⁸⁶⁰ According to UN statistics, during the first six months alone in 2010 civilian casualties increased by 31% compared with 2009; this was a 55% increase in children, and a 6% increase in women casualties.⁸⁶¹ Again, in the first half of 2014, the UN reported a 24% jump in civilian casualties over the previous year.⁸⁶² Increases in violence, and the accompanying increasing in collateral civilian casualties, has left doubt in the minds of many over the capacity of the police to mount effective operations to reduce the violence and improve security in general.⁸⁶³ From the militant's perspective, it is exactly this capacity (or increases in such capacity) that reflects an increased presence of the order and rule that it opposes, and so they respond in-kind and intensify their operations, creating a vicious cycle. Indeed, it seems the presence of police invite the very violence they are meant to protect the people against.

The leadership among militant groups have repositioned and adopted their narrative to take advantage of the perception that police personnel contribute to constructing violence in local communities. First, they reject reports that claim they have been responsible for civilian casualties, such as one UN report that claims they were responsible for over 75% of these incidents. They respond that, the “soldiers, police and paramilitaries of the Kabul administration also deliberately

⁸⁵⁷ KALYVAS, S. N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁸⁵⁸ SAFI, A. 2012. Car Bomb Kills Seven in Southern Afghanistan. *McClatchy Washington Bureau*, February 5, 2012.

⁸⁵⁹ THE HERALD. 2014. Suicide Attack on Police Station. *The Herald*, March 21, 2014.

⁸⁶⁰ MANGAL, S. 2016. Paktia Explosion Claims Lives of 3 Civilians. *Pajhwok Afghan News*, September 21, 2016.

⁸⁶¹ UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN 2010. Afghan Civilian Death Toll Jumps 31 Per Cent due to Insurgent Attacks. Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,.

⁸⁶² AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE. 2014. Afghan Civilian Casualties Jump as Fighting Spreads: UN. *Agence France Presse*, July 9, 2014.

⁸⁶³ AHMED, A. 2014. Afghanistan on edge as Taliban take back ground; Rapid advance in north tests a military that soon won't have U.S. *International New York Times*, October 24, 2014.

kill the general public. Houses are fired at, and people are targeted in farms and villages. They martyr civilians after they arrest them for their information and confessions”.⁸⁶⁴ They qualify such statements claiming that all their “bases are far away from the areas where these operations are conducted”.⁸⁶⁵ Second, they attempt to rewrite this narrative. Although it has been reported that groups seem to have increased efforts to protect civilians during operations, it is their strategically placed communications of their intent to pursue a strategy that prioritizes the safety of civilians in the face of unchecked state aggression in local communities that more strongly undermines the authority of the police and state influence in the periphery. According to one report, they claim to have improved their ‘code of conduct’.⁸⁶⁶

Finally, even the general disposition of the police as a member of society taxed the state’s ability to accumulate and concentrate capital, little less symbolic capital. The coercive nature of modern practices of warfare and statebuilding shaped the ‘tacitness’ of consent, while failing to acknowledge the true will and resistance of recruits, creating a false sense of confidence of central authority of its legitimacy. With every brick and stretch of pavement laid, the process of statebuilding constructs ‘tacitness’ under and around society, enveloping and engulfing them. Roads and bridges, and the very soil that inhabits the ground below their feet, come to demonstrate tacit consent to the authority and jurisdiction of the central government. In the aftermath of war, vulnerability materializes as inability to migrate beyond the jurisdiction and hardened sovereign borders of this new leadership. The ideals of ‘informed consent’ are merely a luxury in the face of immediate needs in dire circumstance. Consideration and contemplation over future consequences of present decisions are put on hold as the war anxious reach out through the fog of war to grab hold of any source of immediate relief. On the one hand, these vulnerabilities welcome the utility and benefits offered, given their circumstance. On the other hand, this very same utility is merely a forced replacement and substitute for what they once had. In conflict and the experience of trauma, the idealized form of consent is less likely to exist as hunger, thirst, and pain force this

⁸⁶⁴ BBC MONITORING SOUTH ASIA - POLITICAL. 2014b. Afghan Taleban Reject UN Report on Civilian Casualties as One-Sided. *BBC*, December 20, 2014.

⁸⁶⁵ PRESS, A. I. 2013a. Residents Accuse Security Forces of Looting Houses during Operations. *Afghan Islamic Press*, September 17, 2013.

⁸⁶⁶ THE FRONTIER STAR. 2014. UN, Afghan Taliban Dialogue to Reduce Civilian Casualties. *The Frontier Star*, December 21, 2014.

surrender; a surrender all too often misunderstood as consent. It is a surrender looking for some semblance of relief.

The position of police force personnel is one of violent consent in a struggle to find relief amidst dire circumstance of poverty. A position of forced decisions, imposed within the confines and constraints of an abruptly changing world advancing around him. His decisions are not his own, but rather constructed by the very constraints and prison he is now made to inhabit. This foundation of authority derived by way of conquest rather than authentic consent, fails to pause and appreciate preexisting order and hierarchies of society, or the disposition of the people toward their conquest. It is merely a governing body violently “superimposed on a society already ordered by rules of ownership, transfer of property by consent and promise-keeping”.⁸⁶⁷

5.0.2 Symbolic Violence and the Disposition of the Police

Findings from my surveys with the Afghan police found that nearly half of the police believe that centralized democratic government is incompatible with Afghan society. In fact, nearly 60% believe that armed resistance by society is justified if traditional codes of governance were disrespected. From this same group, nearly 40% believe that local leaders continue to have jurisdiction and final authority over local affairs, with nearly a quarter believe that legislative and judiciary service (including holding jirga, making judgements, and administering punitive measures) should be handled by local leaders.

This disposition suggests that the police did not maintain a doxic relationship with the state. Such a relationship is not only characterized by a sense of association that is primarily based and underlined by shared fundamental beliefs, it is also embodied and taken for granted – a condition in itself that contributes to producing and reproductive the legitimacy of the state. It is a hidden persuasion that is embedded in the order of things. According to Bourdieu, the policeman should misrecognize his domination and become unaware of his subordination if the state is to achieve legitimacy.

Further problematizing this notion of symbolic violence, for the state to achieve legitimacy and as a precondition for its monopoly on the legitimacy exercise of physical violence, it must first achieve a monopoly on symbolic violence.

⁸⁶⁷ COHON, R. 2001. *Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy*, Sydney, Ashgate.

In these less-than-ideal conditions donning a police uniform suggests a notion of tacit consent, however overlooking and failing to account for the conditions in which this supposed consent is given. Like the general populace who adjust their daily routine per the mandates of a newly installed regime, police force personnel are also casualties of war who adjust their attire as necessity. They are limited in options and opportunity. They are forced into accepting and submitting as a means of relief; it is a relationship of utility and convenience. In societies that associate the uniform as a source of authority, it is an extension of the arms of government. It is a means for reaching out into the periphery, shaping conformity, and enforcing legitimacy. It is a means for shaping accepted behavior, and in doing so, marking the distinction between one society and another. The uniform itself symbolizes the reach of this conformity and legitimacy, bringing confidence to central leaders.

Modern interpretations of the concept of consent are stripped down versions of its original meaning. As modern practice, it often rests somewhere between voluntary surrender and agreement, however rationed. Although it calls for competent, informed, and non-coerced submission, none of these qualities are ever fully appreciated. Rather, the modern practice of consent is more commonly an answer to desperation – one that forces parties into hierarchical contracts of utility, altogether dismissing any semblance of its idealized form. In fact, in its idealized form consent is not merely of agreements and compliance, but one which must also authorize⁸⁶⁸ and bring about legitimacy and acknowledgement of jurisdiction in this hierarchical structure. Under ideal conditions of autonomy, consent suggests a space where common beliefs and expectations dissolve away boundaries. It serves as the foundation of expected, and unreservedly, accepted behavior and exchange.⁸⁶⁹ In this idealized space, donning a police uniform symbolizes both consent to, and enforcement of, the rule of leadership, and thus, the legitimacy of authority. The people, the security establishment, and the defense force each must come to acknowledge this jurisdiction as a first step toward legitimizing authority. Bourdieu takes this notion one step further with his concept of symbolic violence.

⁸⁶⁸ BEAUCHAMP, T. L. 2010. Autonomy and Consent. In: MILLER, F. G. & WERTHEIMER, A. (eds.) *The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁸⁶⁹ MILLER, F. G. & WERTHEIMER, A. 2010. *The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bourdieu defines symbolic violence as the state's ability to shape and maintain conformity to shared views and values among society. This power is at the same time objectivity (structure and mechanisms) and subjectivity realized through mental structures and the categories of perception shaped in early social and political space.

On the Symbolic Violence of the Police Uniform

The uniform operates on a “symbolic level within society, allowing individuals to position themselves either in connection with or opposition to any number”⁸⁷⁰ of groups. Indeed, the symbolic violence of the uniform is meant to evoke reactions to what it represents, rather than what it is. For the state, the uniform signifies enforcement of its rules, and a capacity for meeting and maintaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It demonstrates conformity to the state, political allegiance to its governance, and commitment to its national identity. It symbolizes qualification and adherence to norms and standards.⁸⁷¹ Indeed, it obliges the wearer to “express the values and project the character of the state”.⁸⁷² States have used varied “forms of material culture, including dress codes, to create powerful appearances of state control, nationality, and group solidarity. In doing so, they have built their esprit de corps on the backs of their citizens through dress”.⁸⁷³ For the individual, the uniform distinguishes him from the masses and communicates a message of authority. Dressed in the uniform, he is a legitimate source of protection for the people. In developed states, the uniform signifies honesty, helpfulness, competence and good⁸⁷⁴, regardless of the individual character of the person; in this way, the uniform has an overriding effect. It “acts as a totem, reveals and conceals statuses, certifies

⁸⁷⁰ HERTZ, C. 2007. The Uniform: As Material, As Symbol, As Negotiated Object. *Midwestern Folklore*, 43-58.

⁸⁷¹ JOSEPH, N. & ALEX, N. 1972. The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective. *American Journal of Sociology*, 77, 719-730.

⁸⁷² HERTZ, C. 2007. The Uniform: As Material, As Symbol, As Negotiated Object. *Midwestern Folklore*, 43-58.

⁸⁷³ ARTHUR, L. B. 2000. School Uniforms as a Symbolic Metaphor for Competing Ideologies in Indonesia. In: ARTHUR, L. B. (ed.) *Undressing Religion: Commitment and Conversion from a Cross-Cultural Perspective*. New York: Berg.

⁸⁷⁴ MAURO, R. 1984. The Constable's New Clothe: Effects of Uniforms on Perceptions and Problems of Police Officers. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 14, 42-56.

legitimacy, and suppresses individuality”.⁸⁷⁵ Children are thought to trust and respect policemen, when in reality it is the uniform that they honor. Indeed, for the uniform to “function as a certificate of legitimacy...the public must learn to recognize it as an indicator of a special status”.⁸⁷⁶ For leaders in the center, the uniformed police force is a means for communicating and projecting its authority, intentions, and rule into the periphery. In doing so, it directly contributes to shaping and constructing the identity of national institution in the periphery. And, with increasing numbers of uniformed personnel present in local communities across the country, there are local perceptions of the growing reach of the central government.

One primary concern for the state regarding extending the reach of the center includes developing its policing capacities. The central government’s strategy to formalize the presence of the state in the periphery includes several institutions. Right from the start, there were upwards of 580 international advisors providing training to meet the needs for daily tactical operations and other soft skills.⁸⁷⁷ First, the number of police posts across the country increased, bringing a primary institution and source of state legitimacy to most districts. Second, tactical training facilities were erected in several locations, demonstrating state capacity to expand the fighting capabilities of its police units. Third, academy programming was developed with an emphasis on delivering the national message and ideology to all new recruits⁸⁷⁸, including indoctrinating police personnel on the rule of law, human rights, and governance. Follow-up training, such as the Focused District Development (FDD) program, which provides two months of in-service training to police, contributed toward further enhancing the capabilities of the force. One report claims that the police force has adopted “more conventional policing skills...and had discipline instilled in them” with the help of such programs.⁸⁷⁹

⁸⁷⁵ JOSEPH, N. & ALEX, N. 1972. The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective. *American Journal of Sociology*, 77, 719-730.

⁸⁷⁶ BRUNER, J. S. & POSTMAN, L. 1948. Symbolic Value as an Organizing Factor in Perception. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 27, 203-208.

⁸⁷⁷ PLANTY, D. J. & PERITO, R. M. 2013. Police Transition in Afghanistan. *Special Report*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

⁸⁷⁸ TARGETED NEWS SERVICE. 2011a. Afghan Police Training Center on Track for Future Success in Afghanistan. *Targeted News Service*.

⁸⁷⁹ TARGETED NEWS SERVICE. 2010. British Forces Train Afghan Police in Finer Points of Policing. *Targeted News Service*, March 16, 2010.

Protective services are a signal of the state's authority in action. In addition to patrolling communities and protecting the people from predators, the state has made it a priority to protect local trade with foot patrol and check points around local shopping areas, reportedly resulting in increases in the level of trade activities and profits in some areas.⁸⁸⁰ Indeed, a UN-backed survey found that since the government took steps to navigate, determine, and address the immediate security concerns of the people, local perspectives of the police have improved and there is growing confidence in other areas.⁸⁸¹

Community engagement programs such as the Democratic Policing Activities (*Police e Mardumi*) aims to strengthen state-society relations by developing an understanding between state institutions and communities. These programs set out to construct this understanding using the police as a 'catalyst for the change process' in the dissemination of the values of the center to the periphery, while developing the capacity of local leaders to understand the state, its institutions, and their roles and responsibilities.⁸⁸² With the intention of facilitating and nurturing the idea of the police as a symbol of state authority in the periphery, regular meetings are held twice a month with police and civil society organizations, lawyers, and local leaders. In addition to being an agent for projecting the values of the state, the forum also aims to help police develop trust between the local communities and state institutions. According to one report, by participating in these local community engagement functions, police are made more accessible to locals and their families.⁸⁸³ These and other one-off *shura* or councils between the police and local leaders keep the channels of communications open between local communities and the central government, and in doing so help in the consolidation of centralized governance over the country.⁸⁸⁴ As a political tool, the uniform comes to symbolize enduring communications and practices of consolidation.

⁸⁸⁰ TARGETED NEWS SERVICE. 2011a. Afghan Police Training Center on Track for Future Success in Afghanistan. *Targeted News Service*.

⁸⁸¹ STATES NEWS SERVICE. 2012c. UN-Backed Survey Shows Improving Public Perception of Afghan Police. *States News Service*, February 1, 2012.

⁸⁸² MUKERJEE, D. & RAHIM, M. 2013. Afghanistan: Police e Mardumi, Indigenous Civilian Policing at District Level. In: NALLA, M. K. & NEWMAN, G. R. (eds.) *Community Policing in Indigeneous Communities*. London: CRC Press.

⁸⁸³ STATES NEWS SERVICE. 2012a. Afghan Police Engage with Youngsters in Helmand. *States News Service*, August 17, 2012.

⁸⁸⁴ TARGETED NEWS SERVICE. 2011b. Shura Unites Afghan Police Chiefs, Village Elders in Wardak. *Targeted News Service*, January 16, 2011.

Since the downsizing and departure of international forces in the country, police force personnel have taken the lead in security operations. As part of the process, they started conducting operations independent of international forces early, and replaced the US and its partners in manning check points and security facilities.⁸⁸⁵ Where once the US and allied forces conducted the brunt of operations, increasingly local police personnel now monitor the frontlines of local communities.⁸⁸⁶

This was not merely a transfer of jurisdiction, however; it was also a symbolic transfer of status. The status of international forces as ‘resistance’ transferred to the police, inviting often unwelcome violence to local communities. In an alternate history and in the absence of this perception of association, it is likely local community violence may have fared differently.

Still, with statebuilding, a new set of violence emerges – that of poverty and despair. In this space, the people experience limited options and prospects which force them to surrender and accept whatever they can get. Easily misunderstood as voluntary or tacit consent, it is rather a demonstration of the vulnerable being consumed by an involuntary relationship of desperation and necessity. Their circumstance is a consequence of competing authorities between state and society rushing in and unsettling the foundation of historic social order, ripping apart existing interdependent and hierarchical structures, and introducing unfamiliar subordination. In its wake, there is a false sense of consent and legitimacy. For those who accept this change, voluntary or not, the universe of options and offers are at the discretion of the new leadership. For those who accept the offer to join the police force, this is particularly problematic. Whereas donning a security uniform has symbolic values associated with enforcement of the rule of authority and its legitimacy, from a position of desperation and scarcity common to conflict trauma, wearing the uniform is more so a means to an end – one of financial and physical security. This seems the case for much of the Afghan police with nearly half of those surveyed claiming to have joined the ranks of the Afghan National Police force primarily for its economic benefits and not necessarily out of any interest in the jurisdiction of central authority. For them, their role in the police force is a means for making ends meet and for providing for their family.

⁸⁸⁵ NEWS, W. M. 2012. Marines Training Pays Off for Afghan Police. *Western Morning News*, December 19, 2012. See also: STATES NEWS SERVICE. 2012b. Afghan Police take Control of New Checkpoint. *States News Service*, April 24, 2012.

⁸⁸⁶ TELEGRAPH, B. 2013. Afghan Police 'Becoming Credible'. *Belfast Telegraph*, March 3, 2013.

The practices common to foreign intervention contributes to shaping the limits of choice and opportunity, displacing traditional means of income and denying admittance to a way of life now largely reserved for an inner circle of the rich and corrupt. Those outside this circle are forced to settle with what they are offered, as the practices of intervention have upturned and destroyed familiar economic and cultural structures that once proved a source of livelihood. The violence associated with war destroys, while statebuilding purges remaining remnants of the old with substitutions subpoenaed by calls for modernity and development. Both limit the immediate choices and opportunities of the people, forcing them to settle with that which they would not under normal circumstance.

Donning a uniform does not constitute consent. Rather it is a response to violence and a means of survival in an aggressively changing landscape. It is a means of economic survival in the face of contradictions, with war destroying traditional means of income while statebuilding erects foreign technologies far out of reach of the level of literacy and the competency of the people. Indeed, donning the uniform is tyrannical, contradicting very nature of the thing locals aim to preserve. It is administrator and enforcer of the very violence that destroys a traditional way of life. It is a tool for constructing and perpetuating a fundamental opposition and violence between the state and militants. For the state, the uniform symbolizes its presence and influence in local communities – a symbolic legitimacy. For those who don the uniform, they find themselves instigating the very violence they mean to protect themselves and their people against. They understand that the state, in collaboration with foreign powers, as the reason for ongoing violence against their family and neighbors – yet, to protect them, they must become an intimate component of the very process.

The ambiguous position of the state and international community in its dealings and compromise with militants causes uncertainty, misrecognition, and hesitation among police force personnel. The on-again, off-again engagement with militant groups by the central government and international community legitimizes militants one day and delegitimizes them the next. In such a state of perpetual disequilibrium, police force personnel are forced to take an uncommitted stance. If they continue to balance with the state against armed groups, their communities run the risk of being attacked; if they bandwagon with militants, they most assuredly will be arrested or

even worse, targeted by government and/or international forces.⁸⁸⁷ Indeed, for police force personnel, taking the middle ground alongside their local leaders seem the most sensible position for the safety of themselves and their communities.

In the context of an immediate post-invasion Afghanistan, the police uniform is both a source of symbolic value and violence, concepts that are contentious, contradictory, and mutually constitutive. From one perspective, the policeman takes the uniform as a source of economic relief, while the central government finds it a source for projecting its authority into the periphery. From another perspective, militants find the uniform a demonstration of resistance, while the policeman finds it a source of unwelcomed violence, in the face of such perception. In combination, the contention between the state and militant is obvious: they are independent parties in an adversarial relation. This perspective suggests that the policemen perceive their very employer as the source of violence they are employed to extinguish. Adding to this, of those surveyed, 57% believe that despite the presence of security personnel (such as themselves), locals communities continue to have an obligation to take up arms and protect themselves, and act against those who interfere or break with local traditional code. This perspective suggests that policemen do not commit to the idea that they are the government's source of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and as a result the legitimacy of central authority remains unstable. In this section, I demonstrate how the value/violence relationship is constructed at the intersection of competing perceptions of the role of the policeman in local communities.

5.0.3 Constructing Habitus Clivé and the Role of the Police in Statebuilding

In general, my survey findings suggest that the Afghan police conflict. Recall that Bourdieu defines the notion of habitus clivé as the experience someone undergoes when their 'conditions of existence' shifts in such a way that their disposition loses coherence. They become torn, divided,

⁸⁸⁷ Balancing, bandwagoning, and riding the fence are taken from theories of alliance formation. First introduced as a model for framing interstate relations, the concepts have since been appropriated for intrastate analysis – in particular the analysis of alliance formation between rebels, insurgents, and other non-state actors. QUIRK, P. W. 2017. *Great Powers, Weak States, and Insurgency: Explaining Internal Threat Alliances*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, WALT, S. M. 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security*, 9, 3-43. CHRISTIA, F. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

and unreconciled. For the Afghan police, while he is expected to have a role in statebuilding, the very practices involved in statebuilding seemingly undermines these expectations by inducing him into an unreconciled disposition – a split habitus or habitus clivé. Some of this is generated by uncertain, others by fear – both of which compel the policeman to take a middle group suitable for his unreconciled disposition. Indeed, he is confronted by a state in the making and the society he is familiar with. One urges the destruction of an historic way of life; the other pulls him back in.

Statebuilding, especially amid conflict, is defined by uncertainty characterized by incomplete information, inaccurate forecasts, and contradictory perceptions making even distinguishing friends from enemies difficult.⁸⁸⁸ This also holds true for the policemen who must patrol the sites of conflict and statebuilding. For some, taking a middle ground seems the sensible option. It is a position that affords some neutrality in a time of indecisiveness over the status of armed groups and a means for reducing the potential for retaliatory violence in the future. In fact, of those police surveyed, 88% approved of having a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the state while more than one-third believed that the Taliban remained a legitimate source of authority.

This disposition of uncertainty might have been encouraged right from the start, when domestic leaders and the international community took to negotiating with local Afghan strongmen and invited warlords to the Bonn Conference as part of a ‘big tent’ strategy.⁸⁸⁹ Although the aim was to limit the likelihood that local strongmen would interfere in the statebuilding process,⁸⁹⁰ there remained uncertainty and confusion over the role these strongmen would maintain at the local level. True, these same warlords controlled approximately 75 percent of Afghanistan at the time of the Bonn Conference, justifying the intent of their inclusion.⁸⁹¹ However, the effects were incomplete to say the least. The United Nations had backed negotiations among the various groups

⁸⁸⁸ CONNABLE, B. 2012. *Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: RAND National Defense Research Institute.

⁸⁸⁹ MUKHOPADHYAY, D. 2014. *Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

⁸⁹⁰ WILDER, A. & LISTER, S. 2007. Statebuilding at the Subnational Level in Afghanistan: A Missed Opportunity. In: DANSPECKGRUBER, W. & FINN, R. P. (eds.) *Building State and Security in Afghanistan*. Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

⁸⁹¹ FIELDS, M. & AHMED, R. 2011. *A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies.

in hopes of forming a broad-based, multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan.⁸⁹² What resulted bared a striking resemblance to the 1980s rise of independent militia and strongmen; each would come to create his own statelet across the country.

Since then, the on-again off-again engagement with the Taliban by the state and international community legitimizes them one day and delegitimizes the next, respectively. Amidst uncertainty over the status of the Taliban, locals must decide how best to cope, survive, and maintain the peace in their community.

Still, if they side with the state against the Taliban, communities run the risk of being attacked by Taliban fighters. If they side with the Taliban, they run the risk of being arrested or even targeted by the government or international forces during night raids and other operations.⁸⁹³ It is this uncertainty and the potential of retaliatory violence which encourages local leaders to take a middle ground on behalf of their communities, a space of neither genuine loyalty to the state, nor of collaboration with the Taliban. For the policeman, turning to local traditional leaders proves a small sense of emancipation and semblance of relief in something familiar. They are the ones who provided comfort and guidance in the camps across the border. They were the ones who greet and welcome returning refugees and reintegratees, indoctrinate them back into the community, and help them on their way to becoming productive agents of the community. They are the ones who have the influence; the one who can provide services such as justice and water, and in doing so maintain the support of the community.⁸⁹⁴

Adding to the confusion, following the US invasion, several warlords took control of local communities while others were given positions with the state. This included Uzbek warlord, General Rashid Dostum who had “threatened to deny the government access to his fief in the north”.⁸⁹⁵ He would hold the role of Deputy Defense Minister under President Hamid Karzai; Vice

⁸⁹² BRIAND, S. 2001b. Alliance Moves into Taliban Bastion. *Agence France Presse*, November 25, 2001.

⁸⁹³ QUIRK, P. W. 2017. *Great Powers, Weak States, and Insurgency: Explaining Internal Threat Alliances*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁸⁹⁴ WANDI, A. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁸⁹⁵ MOORE, O. 2001. Security Council Approves Bonn Deal. *Globe and Mail*, December 6, 2001.

President of Afghanistan in the Ashraf Ghani Administration; and Marshall.⁸⁹⁶ Notably, he was also exiled from the country on charges of torture and other allegations.

Another warlord and former mujahidin leader Ismail Khan also returned from exile, protested for a position with the government, and was officially made governor of Herat.⁸⁹⁷ Mohammad Qasim Fahim, considered a ‘shadowy’ warlord who supposedly plotted to assassinate⁸⁹⁸ Hamid Karzai was selected as his vice president because “many recognized that plucking Mr. Fahim from power would do more harm than good, potentially upsetting a delicate ethnic balance”.⁸⁹⁹

In fact, then interim President Hamid Karzai had suggested that the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, be included in the amnesty that was provided to low-rank foot soldiers.⁹⁰⁰ Some speculated that the Karzai government continued to strike deals with warlords, guaranteeing them control over their areas if they would cooperate with the government.⁹⁰¹ The Ghani government would similarly also deal with some groups.⁹⁰² A senior Afghan Special Forces commander claimed that “it’s a game...the tactics of war: sometimes a friend, and sometime a foe”.⁹⁰³ He explains further that his unit was once sent in to support and rescue a favored faction of Taliban fighters when two groups were found fighting.⁹⁰⁴

Following the revelation that Taliban leader Mullah Omar was dead, the group fractured on multiple levels. At the upper levels, disagreement over who to select to lead the groups encouraged division. At the lower level, foot soldiers considered joining other groups, including

⁸⁹⁶ AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE. 2001. New Afghan Government backs US Claims, Gives Warlord Key Post. *Agence France Presse*, December 24, 2001.

⁸⁹⁷ WATSON, I., SIEGEL, R. & NEARY, L. 2002. Return to Power of Ismail Khan in Herat, Afghanistan. *NPR*, July 17, 2002.

⁸⁹⁸ ROSENBERG, M. 2014b. Warlord who Tamped Conflicts as Afghan Vice President Dies. *The New York Times*, March 9, 2014.

⁸⁹⁹ SIEFF, K. & SALAHUDDIN, S. 2014. Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Afghanistan's First Vice President, Dies at 57. *Washington Post*, March 9, 2014.

⁹⁰⁰ WOODCOCK, A. 2001. Kandahar Falls, Bin Laden Hides. *Daily Post*, December 8, 2001.

⁹⁰¹ MOORE, O. 2001. Security Council Approves Bonn Deal. *Globe and Mail*, December 6, 2001.

⁹⁰² SNOW, S. 2016. Spoilers and Peace in Afghanistan: Negotiating with the Taliban. *The Diplomat*, October 18, 2016.

⁹⁰³ DONATI, J. & TOTAKHIL, H. K. 2016a. Afghan Government Secretly Fosters Taliban Splinter Groups. *Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 2016.

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid.

the then newly formed Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K). While the state (and international community) was able to exploit this division and reintegrate some fighters,⁹⁰⁵ competition and division among the Taliban made it difficult to negotiate a successful settlement.⁹⁰⁶

Both the general population as well as the police remained in a state of uncertainty because of the continued ambiguous position of the state when dealing with the Taliban and local warlords. In fact, according to one informant, Taliban fighters and other groups “collect taxes in these local communities, not by consent but rather through force...and the tribal leaders give in as a means for staying alive”.⁹⁰⁷

When a newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani called on Pakistan to assist with bringing the Taliban to the table to discuss negotiations,⁹⁰⁸ there was an expectation that Pakistan would host renewed peace talks. Unfortunately, Taliban leaders declined.⁹⁰⁹ Still, representatives from the United States, Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan met in Kabul to discuss a peace deal. In a show of faith, “a day before the talks began, the government withdrew security forces from the strategic Musa Qala district in Helmand province, effectively handing over control to the Taliban”.⁹¹⁰ Still, the group’s leaders declined to participate.

Sometime later, the state signed a peace deal with insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder and leader of the country’s second largest militant group, Hizb-i-Islami.⁹¹¹ Like the others, Hekmatyar was a key figure in the fight against the Soviets, and in the 1990s civil war his group was one of the many who fought for control of Kabul. Interestingly, up to the signing of the peace deal, he was considered one of the strongest opponents of the state.⁹¹²

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁶ CRAIG, T. 2016. Afghan Government, Taliban Set to Resume Direct Peace Talks Next Week. *The Washington Post*, February 23, 2016.

⁹⁰⁷ MOHAMMADI, A. A. February 7, 2014 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author*.

⁹⁰⁸ INTERNATIONAL, A. N. 2014. Afghanistan Urges Pak to Play 'Visible' Role in Initiating Peace Talks with Taliban. *Asian News International*, December 15, 2014.

⁹⁰⁹ POLITICAL, B. M. S. A.-. 2016. Taliban Conflict: Militants Refuse Fresh Afghan Peace Talks. *BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political*, March 5, 2016.

⁹¹⁰ MOSLIH, H. 2016. The Taliban and Obstacles to Afghanistan Peace Talks. *Al Jazeera*, February 25, 2016.

⁹¹¹ BBC NEWS. 2016. Afghanistan Signs Deal with Militant Hekmatyar. *BBC News*, September 22, 2016.

⁹¹² BEZHAN, F. 2016. Hard-Line Militant Group Wants 'Power-Sharing' with Kabul in Exchange for Peace. *Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty*, March 23, 2016.

The international community continued to make overtures to the Taliban in an attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement.⁹¹³ Hillary Clinton, the then US Secretary of State, made her case in 2011 for negotiating with the Haqqani network,⁹¹⁴ reportedly held talks with the group in late 2011, to only later the following year officially list the group as a terrorist organization.⁹¹⁵ She went on to claim that “we do not see any contradiction between fighting and talking”.⁹¹⁶ Similarly, US President Obama in preparation for peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar in 2013, described it as “a parallel process to the transition that is taking place militarily in Afghanistan”.⁹¹⁷ From the top looking down it may seem non-contradictory and a parallel process, however on the ground it was perceived differently. After all, the fight did not start at the local level. The international community and warlords from the north instigated the overthrow of the Taliban and the fight with local militant groups, and then asked local communities to follow-suite. With parallel processes and non-contradiction between fighting and talking, there develops an uncertainty of the role of local communities and the police force.

The relationship between international aid organizations and the Taliban also left some ambiguity and uncertain. In Kunduz, for example, when the Taliban took over two districts, international aid organizations continued to work with them.⁹¹⁸ In fact, one of my informants explained that when “some elders [had] resist[ed] on some issues, [one organization] went to the Taliban and complained”.⁹¹⁹ The Taliban latter issued a letter advising that the elders either cooperate organization or the Taliban would have to visit them. Still, in other areas Taliban members demanded that international organizations leave them with full oversight over projects,

⁹¹³ KAZEM, H. 2014. Shaky Afghan-Taliban Peace Talks Run into Pakistani Obstruction. *The Christian Science Monitor*. See also: SEMPLE, M. 2013. Talking to the Taliban. *Foreign Policy*, RUBIN, A. J. 2013. U.S. Scrambles to Save Taliban Talks after Afghan Backlash. *National Herald Tribune*, June 21, 2013.

⁹¹⁴ BENNETT, J. T. 2011. Hillary Clinton Pressed on Negotiating with Islamic Militants in Afghanistan. *The Hill*, October 27, 2011.

⁹¹⁵ STEWART, P. & QUINN, A. 2012. U.S. Designates Haqqani Network a Terrorist Group. *Reuters*, September 8, 2012.

⁹¹⁶ SPILLIUS, A. 2011. Hillary Clinton admits US Held Meeting with Haqqani Network. *The Telegraph*.

⁹¹⁷ DEYOUNG, K. 2013. U.S. to Launch Peace Talks with Taliban. *Washington Post*, June 18, 2013.

⁹¹⁸ HUME, D. & SELBY-BIGGE 1902. *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

⁹¹⁹ DAWOODZAI, K. A. 2/8/2014 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

including the distribution of salaries.⁹²⁰ Interestingly, one informant and international organization represented admitted that “sometimes [they] use community leaders to put pressure on the Taliban representatives and sometimes the Taliban representative to put pressure on the community leaders”.⁹²¹

Negotiating with the Taliban and other groups in Afghanistan is not new for many of the aid organizations in country. Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations, USAID, and others had a presence in Afghanistan. Although their initial reception was one of distrust, the Taliban and other groups came to see the usefulness of having them around. In fact, outside of a few short years of reduced access, aid organizations continued to communicate and work with these groups. Many kept quiet about their relations and because of concerns over counter-terrorism legislation and policies.⁹²²

Afghans have seen their heroes of the 1980s relabeled warlords in the 1990s, and then again relabeled as terrorists in the 2000s, and even again relabeled as governors. The stand uncertain and torn. The potential that the armed groups who occupied their villages throughout the US occupation could one day become an internationally recognized and legitimate leader left some ambiguity as to how to engage and deal with them. During this period, the people contemplated the possibility that the Taliban would reach a peace deal, integrated into the security force, and become part of the government. Yet, the police force continued to have standing orders to take up arms against the Taliban.

For society, the potential that the state would attempt to negotiate and hold peace talks with the Taliban suggest some level of legitimacy for the group. It is this very attempt by the state and the international community that encourages locals to give militants the benefit of the doubt and negotiate co-existence with them in local communities.

In addition to uncertainty, a disposition motivated by fear also has the capacity to induce the police into a state of split habitus. Caught between government deployed night raids and threatening language of Taliban night letters, local leaders are confronted with the task of devising a middle ground with the aim of protecting his community. One informant explains, the “problem

⁹²⁰ CUNNINGHAM, E. 2016. The U.S. Spent Billions Building Roads in Afghanistan. Now Many of them are Beyond Repair. *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2016.

⁹²¹ DAWOODZAI, K. A. 2/8/2014 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹²² DYKE, J. 2014. Talking to the Taliban, Again. *IRIN News*, November 20, 2014.

is that if the elder talk with the government, then the Taliban threatens him; and if he goes to the Taliban, then the government threatens him. Ultimately, he losses the respect of the people because he becomes so confused. The elders between fire and water”.⁹²³ Another informant adds, most “of the leaders will try to provide security for themselves...so this is why they were playing both sides...for the safety of the village they do not want to get either the government or the militants upset. Indeed, they do not want to follow the militants...they know that they are following the wrong path”.⁹²⁴ It is in this space that the policeman is called to action – to take on Taliban members loitering local communities. In fact, when asked if they joined the police to fight the Taliban, less than a quarter of those polled agreed. Nearly twice as much (or 36%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed. An additional datapoint that seems relevant to this includes that approximately half of the police stated that they would return home to their local communities following their service with the police, rather than continuing to work for the state.

In November 2008, a suicide bomber who was targeting some local anti-Taliban leaders killed ten people.⁹²⁵ In another incident, after elders of the Shinwari tribe pledged to confront militants and punish anyone affiliated with them, internal fighting broke out, leading to 13 dead and 35 injured. In yet another incident, when a tribal elder was found to have collaborated with government officials in the removal of landmines, he was shot dead by Taliban fighters.⁹²⁶ One informant explained that while people may not respect the Taliban, they cannot openly say so. He added that “when some elders spoke against the Taliban [and] claim[ed] that they were agents of Pakistan, they were killed...during the night, they came and killed the elders...nowadays, the Taliban are killing elders”.⁹²⁷

In addition to assassinations, the Taliban also delivered night letters demanding that locals discontinue collaborating with the government and international forces. One elder explains, “you walk here during the day...but at night they come...bringing night letters threatening against those who collaborate with the foreign soldiers”.⁹²⁸ Another added that “I am a tribal leader and it’s so

⁹²³ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹²⁴ NAWABI, A. H. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹²⁵ SIDDIQUE, A. 2008. Enlisting Tribes against Militants in Afghanistan Carries Risks. *Radio Free Europe*, November 23, 2008.

⁹²⁶ TAPAN, D. 2011. Tribal Elder Shot Dead in Paktia. *Pajhwok*, September 8, 2011.

⁹²⁷ AFZAL, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹²⁸ TALUKAN, P. B. 2010. In Focus: In One Village, the US Fights Three Parallel Afghan Wars. *The Observer*, November 14, 2010.

bad for me to walk with the [US] Army”.⁹²⁹ Posted on buildings and delivered to private residence, night letters range from setting curfews to threatening those who turn to the government for support and setting limits on using government provided facilities. In setting these rules, the Taliban obstructs the state’s ability to ‘win hearts and minds’ and successfully statebuild.⁹³⁰

“Choosing between Americans and the Taliban isn’t hard for Afghans who hear U.S. officials touting the virtues of democracy and freedom, and then receive ‘night letters’ threatening death to those who collaborate with foreigners. The people talk to us and say, ‘yeah, that’s all well and good, but see that guy across the room? He’s Taliban and someday you’ll be gone, and he’ll still be here, and they’re taking names’”.⁹³¹

Because of night letters and other coercive methods, anti-Taliban patrol by tribesmen all but ended allowing the Taliban to freely occupy and function within communities⁹³², leaving the impression that locals are collaborating with militants. Even the policeman is left to think twice before acting on his duties.

In most areas, it was not very difficult for the Taliban to gain support from communities throughout Afghanistan. This is largely because in most areas hospitality is taken very seriously. In fact, in Pashtun areas the practice of *nanwatai* (hospitality) includes protection of wounded combatants. However, although this practice parallels that conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the state and international community considered such acts as material support of terrorists.

In such cases, military and police response and operations are violent on many levels – especially night raids, and so are often poorly received or outright resisted by locals. First, there is physical violence and the loss of life. Second, there is a sense of assault on dignity by entering private homes in the middle of the night where women are sleeping. Finally, there is violence in

⁹²⁹ BOWMAN, T. 2010. Progress in Kandahar a Matter of Whom to Trust. Washington, DC: NPR.

⁹³⁰ MCPHEDRAN, I. 2010. Securing a Solution. *The Courier Mail*, January 6, 2010.

⁹³¹ GRANT, G. 2007. Tribal War. *Government Executive*, March 1, 2007.

⁹³² MOTLAGH, J. 2010. A Sunni Awakening: Not so Easy in Afghanistan. *Time*, May 18, 2010.

the anxiety itself as people remain apprehensive over the potential of night raids on their homes. Indeed, the history of night raids has seemingly substantial capacity to induce fear and motivate split habitus.

When local communities experience casualties, regardless of whether Taliban fighters were in the area, fingers are pointed at the state and international community. When eight children were killed during a night raid by international forces, although locals admitted that Taliban fighters were in the village, a local school headmaster argued that this “does not justify executing eight children”.⁹³³ In another joint raid conducted by US and Afghan forces where twelve civilians, including three children, were killed. Here again, although Taliban fighters occupied territory in the area, it was the casualties at the hand of the state and the international community that was remembered.⁹³⁴ One informant explained that increases in the number of sympathizers of the Taliban were because the people were angry at the Americans, foreign troops, and the state because of these crimes.⁹³⁵

Habitus Clive and Finding a Middle Ground

Between a fear and uncertainty motivated contradiction and misalignment between habitus and field, local leaders were forced to find a balance to keep the peace in their communities. Even a National Directorate of Security (NDS) official believed that although “tribal leaders would play games...[having] relations with both the Taliban and the government...[this was] in order to bring favor for the community and its people”.⁹³⁶ Several other informants agreed that the double game that tribal leaders would play was merely a means for keeping the village and people safe.

Partly motivated by the perceived indecisiveness of the state and international community to decide on the role of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the police too held this disposition in common. It is this shared uncertainty and fear which led the policeman to take the middle ground alongside local leaders. In so doing, however, he undermined his role in statebuilding and the legitimacy of

⁹³³ STARKEY, J. 2010. Karzai Demands that US Hands over Raiders Accused of Village Atrocity. *The Times*, January 1, 2010.

⁹³⁴ DONATI, J. & TOTAKHIL, H. K. 2016b. Twelve Die in Coalition Raid in Afghanistan. *Wall Street Journal*, April 16, 2016.

⁹³⁵ NAJAFIZADA, L. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹³⁶ NAWABI, A. H. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

the state. In fact, nearly 40% of the police who were polled either agree or strongly agreed that local leaders continue to maintain jurisdiction and final authority over local affairs.

This middle ground was both a simultaneous acceptance of the transformation that was in play all around them, yet they were holding onto the past and the dispositions that were informed and shaped by the habitus of origin. Habitus remained ‘out of sync’ with the dynamism of their social and political space. This sense of in-betweenness encouraged society (local leaders, the people, and even the police) to seek the shelter of a middle ground. They went on to declare their intention time and again to both the Taliban and the state:

“...most of the elders left their villages and went to Kabul or Ghazni to have a jirga aimed at an agreement to keep both the Taliban and government out of their villages...this is similar [to a] call they made during the mujahidin time where the mujahidin were not allowed to fight within the village and the government neither”.⁹³⁷

One informant submits that the alternative forms of leadership “can co-exist...[local leaders] provide personal advice, local conflict resolution, and spiritual guidance while the central government provides the materials”.⁹³⁸ Another informant further elaborated. There “was a guy who was captured by the Taliban. When his brother tried to pay for his release, he was rejected. However, when the elders went and spoke with the Taliban, they released the guy without [having to pay] financial compensation”.⁹³⁹ In another example, tribal elders attempted to negotiate their autonomy with the state by agreeing to evict foreign fighters from their area in return for the release of a local prisoner, government support in development efforts in the area, and the chance to raise their own local security force.⁹⁴⁰ In this instance, while foreign fighters were asked to leave, local Taliban were able to remain – a prospect that resembled something closer to normal.

One of my informants added that local leaders would “extend dinner invitations [to Taliban fighters]...[with the purpose] to request that they move a bit further down because the people are

⁹³⁷ AFZAL, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹³⁸ ROEHRS, C.-F. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹³⁹ SEKANDER, F. 1/14/2014 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁴⁰ CHANDRASEKARAN, R. 2011. Tribe's Deal Offers Chance of Peace in Troubled Area. *Canberra Times*, January 8, 2011.

likely to be shot; they do not stop their fighting, nor directly support them...rather, they try to administer mutual accommodation...sometimes they agree, sometimes they do not”.⁹⁴¹

One informant told of Hashim Khan, an elder who had to deal with both Taliban militants and elements of the socialist government, such as Herati leader Shinkai. He explains that Shinkai would enter the village with approximately 200 of his men and force the village to feed them. Although Khan did not accept or agree with the Taliban, he turned to them to resolve the issue. The people were not forced to feed the Taliban, nor did they have to pay fees for the advice and services.

On informant explains:

There “were two elders...one joined the Taliban while the other joined the Afghan government...this is how it started. The one who joined the Taliban did not take up arms alongside them...he [merely] became pro-Taliban. [In his village of] Shahid Hassa, every family suffered at least one casualty...the Americans burned houses...they killed people. Here all kinds of criminal activities took place by the Americans, the central government, and the local people. After suffering so many losses, they had to fight the Americans. However...[the elder] cut his relations with the [Taliban]. He spoke with them and told them that they should not operate in the area anymore...[since then] they became so much more secured”.⁹⁴² The other elder lived in a village where “the armed groups [were allowed to] shoot from these villages into the checkpoints. One day there was an explosion, and all the [other] tribes came with machetes and said that if a single person from their tribes dies, ‘we will kill one person in your community...if two, then two’,...and so on. ‘Even if it’s not your fault, the fact that you let them operate from your community is enough’...it is very complicated...the life of a civilian living in these places is very hard”.⁹⁴³

⁹⁴¹ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁴² Ibid.

⁹⁴³ Ibid.

Former Afghan president Hamid Karzai explained that without the cooperation of tribal elders, “peace cannot be established”.⁹⁴⁴ When you visit a village, you “do not go straight to the militants...not at first...(you) first go through the community elders in the area who in turn facilitates the meeting”.⁹⁴⁵ The “people still had their loyalties to the tribes...they also had the loyalties to the state...but the Taliban asserted themselves and tried to reinforce their authority...but this does not mean that they were very popular to the people. They had created this sense of fear. In many parts, they were resisted by the tribesmen”.⁹⁴⁶

Several trends among the ranks of the police force suggest questionable loyalty. In one instance, reportedly two dozen police officers defected to the Taliban, taking a stockpile of heavy weaponry.⁹⁴⁷ In another incident, an entire police unit reportedly defected to the Taliban, leaving the police station on fire.⁹⁴⁸ An “Afghan army special forces commander has defected to an insurgent group allied with the Taliban in a Humvee truck packed with his team's guns and high-tech equipment, officials in the eastern Kunar province said on Sunday”.⁹⁴⁹ Surprise inspections would at times find ‘ghost’ personnel, personnel listed as on active duty yet never physically present.⁹⁵⁰ In one case, only five percent of the reported numbers were on duty.⁹⁵¹

Reportedly, the Taliban had also established a 24-hour hotline and email address for government employees interested in defecting, advising that “they are welcome to come to us and we will protect them”.⁹⁵² Militants claimed that 326 Afghan security force personnel joined their ranks in June 2013 alone. According to Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, “the Islamic

⁹⁴⁴ BBC MONITORING SOUTH ASIA - POLITICAL. 2014a. Afghan Paper Says Peace Deal Must be Sustainable. *BBC*, December 21, 2014.

⁹⁴⁵ WANDI, A. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁹⁴⁶ HUSSAIN, Z. 2013. *RE: Personal interview with author*.

⁹⁴⁷ NORDLAND, R., CHIVERS, C. J., WAFI, A. W. & SHAH, T. 2010. Officials Fear 2 Dozen Afghan Police Officers Defected to Taliban. *The New York Times*, February 19, 2010.

⁹⁴⁸ FILKINS, D. & SAHAK, S. Ibid. Afghan Police Unit Defects to Taliban, Leaving Burning Station Behind. November 2, 2010.

⁹⁴⁹ NATION, T. 2013. Top Afghan commander defects to Taliban. *The Nation*, October 21, 2013.

⁹⁵⁰ KHOSHAL, R. K. 2016. Paktika Police Ranks thinned by 'Ghost Personnel'. *Pajhwok Services*, January 27, 2016.

⁹⁵¹ PRESS, A. I. 2013c. Taliban Say 326 Security Personnel Joined their Ranks in June. *Afghan Islamic Press*, July 1, 2013.

⁹⁵² AFP. 2015. Afghan Taliban offer Government Workers 'Hotline' Number to Defect. *Dawn*, June 21, 2015.

Emirate has a special commission which contacts police, army, and other security personnel to motivate them to join the Taliban ranks. They hold contacts with elderly people and religious clerics. Some of them want to live a normal life. The mujahideen assure them that they will not be attacked. A second group of people have concern about their protection. The mujahideen pay utmost attention to provide them with security...those joining the Taliban had to give guarantees of tribal elders, elderly people, influential and relatives" He maintained they had never forced anyone to leave the ranks of security forces in exchange for money. "Firstly, we don't have the facility of money and secondly those joining in exchange for money are unreliable," he added. "The real problem is that the police, army and intelligence personnel are not satisfied about their future. Most of them want to run free businesses and quit the ranks of security force. Threats to their families, bad treatment of foreign forces during training and non-availability of favorable political scenario are the reasons because of which thousands of people have quit the ranks of security forces this year," he suggested.⁹⁵³

Armed groups who can identify with the grievances of communities are likely to be tolerated or even accepted to the detriment of state authority. From the perspective of the population, "unless the government can guarantee the health and safety of its people, they must accommodate themselves to the demands of the guerrillas who have the immediate power in the region they live in. These people become acutely aware of the importance of ending up on the right side...in short, the passive sympathy of which Lawrence wrote is often produced, not so much by conviction as by a desire to play it safe and to build a little credit with the resistance in case it comes out on top".⁹⁵⁴ In short, militants take on a duality of roles, both as savior and captor⁹⁵⁵, and usually the narrative that develops and constructs such identities continue to persist.

"These local Taliban shadow governments they never go away, they just go quiet...absent the Afghan security force, these shadow governments would come back to life tomorrow. There are multiple competing real sovereignties. We think of Jalaluddin Haqqani as a terrorist...the point is that Jalaluddin Haqqani is a

⁹⁵³ PRESS, A. I. 2013c. Taliban Say 326 Security Personnel Jointed their Ranks in June. *Afghan Islamic Press*, July 1, 2013.

⁹⁵⁴ CROSS, J. E. 1963. *Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War*, Garden City, Doubleday.

⁹⁵⁵ Ibid.

*prince...he runs what is in effect a form of state let....and he is thinking diplomatically in terms of statehood”.*⁹⁵⁶

The Taliban reportedly overran numerous police checkpoints and easily advance with the support of local communities, especially those who have been abused by state representatives or international forces.⁹⁵⁷ Reportedly, it should take approximately 250,000 men to hold off and defeat militant groups in country after the withdrawal of international forces. However, Afghan troop size seems to never break 100,000 because more than 42 percent of personnel desert their positions every year.⁹⁵⁸ Of those surveyed, 34% believe that such defections among the ranks of the police to the Taliban are due in part to a dissatisfaction with the state. One informant noted that there “are many groups in Afghanistan that use the name Taliban, however they are not Taliban...the rest are just those that are angry with the government and join the Taliban as a means of gaining protection and to take revenge”.⁹⁵⁹

*In “our village there are two checkpoints...so they (police force personnel) have control over some part of the place...they are local from the village and represent the village more than the government...they hire staff soldiers and police from their own village”.*⁹⁶⁰

Some locals also claim that “Even the local police, the *arbakai*, we cannot trust them...during the day, they work for the government...in the evening they work for the Taliban”.⁹⁶¹ They are taking the middle ground also. “When the first VSP⁹⁶² was established...local nationals fled the area anticipating an attack by local insurgents. However,

⁹⁵⁶ LIEVEN, A. 11/14/2013 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author.*

⁹⁵⁷ AHMED, A. 2014. Afghanistan on edge as Taliban take back ground; Rapid advance in north tests a military that soon won't have U.S. *International New York Times*, October 24, 2014.

⁹⁵⁸ LAFOLLETTE, H. 2013. *The international encyclopedia of ethics*, Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell.

⁹⁵⁹ NAJAFIZADA, L. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶⁰ AZIZI, J. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶¹ GHAFORI, M. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶² Village Stability Operations

within four months, the village elder's informed that almost all of the local nationals have returned because of the improved security".⁹⁶³

However, not much is said of what happens when populations neither balance nor bandwagon, but rather take a middle ground and place their confidence in historic local traditional authority – in this case, local tribal leadership. In fact, the history of conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates time and again the independence of its tribal communities, who although unify and mobilize against common foreign threats, habitually return to their independent fiefdoms once these threats are removed. Even the modern history of Taliban rule demonstrates the independence of traditional local leaders as attempts to centralize governance over them was met with resistance in many districts, subsequently forcing Taliban accommodation of traditional leadership.⁹⁶⁴

Undoubtedly, the choice to balance, bandwagon, or ride the fence at parity is a function of the level of confidence in the capacity of either source of authority to provide security. However, although the utilitarian approach is evident in most all conflicts, this study suggests a more complex dynamic wherein popular support treads along a middle ground torn between the capacity of central authority to provide security (utility), against local authority's capacity to identify with and meet negotiated settlement with occupying militant groups (reasoning). Deliberately engaging the Afghan National Police (ANP) force as my informer, this study not only assesses the comparative level of confidence toward central and local authority, it also further problematizes the central authority's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and tensions between utility and reasoning.

Militant groups adjust their strategy based on their understanding of the political order and capacities of local communities, with aims of engineering authority for their benefit. Taking advantage of the diplomatic capacities of local leaders, militants may promise a brokered peace with communities in return for the opportunity to gain from the position of local leaders, thereby gaining leverage against the state. According to one informant, while such deals "can bring security, the people also want development...the problem is that in Afghanistan development and security fight one another...if there is development then there is no security...(often) rural

⁹⁶³ HULSLANDER, R. & SPIVEY, J. 2012. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police. *Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, 3, 125-138.

⁹⁶⁴ BERGEN, P. & TIEDEMANN, K. 2012. *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

communities prioritize security over development”.⁹⁶⁵ In other words, recognition of the authority of local leaders may led to their authority being co-opted and engineered by militant groups as a tool to enhance their position of resistance against the state.

A representative from the National Directorate of Security (NDS) explains that “tribal leaders would play games...they had relations with both the Taliban and the central government...in order to bring favor for the community and its people”.⁹⁶⁶ More than a game, and rather a means of survival, one informant compares and describes, when in the 1990s “the Taliban captured Afghanistan...Pashtuns were elevated in power...we wanted to be friends with Pashtuns in order to survive...we invited them to dinner”.⁹⁶⁷ Another informer claims that the “people still had their loyalties to their tribes...they also had the loyalties to the state...but the Taliban asserted themselves and tried to reinforce their authority...but this does not mean that they were very popular to the people. They had created a sense of fear. In many parts, they were resisted by the tribesmen”.⁹⁶⁸ When “ISAF (and the central government) fails a community, it justifies the presence of the Taliban...however, in other places where they tried to come back it is more complicated for them because there is no justification for them to be there”.⁹⁶⁹

With the symbolic transfer of control of night raid operations, a US military officer involved in the deal stated that “if the Afghans don’t want to go to do something, we are not going to force them to do it. They are going to decide who to go after”.⁹⁷⁰

The son of a local tribal leader confesses, “most people in the village trusted the village leaders’ decisions over those of the mujahidin or the central government because they believed that the village leaders were thinking on their wellbeing more...for this, my father held a very prestigious position in the village, trusted with loyalty”.⁹⁷¹ Another informer follows, “Legitimacy

⁹⁶⁵ AMIRI, R. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶⁶ NAWABI, A. H. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶⁷ NAJAFIZADA, L. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶⁸ HUSSAIN, Z. 2013. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁶⁹ PIQUEMAL, J. 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

⁹⁷⁰ GRAHAM-HARRISON, E. 2012. Afghanistan takes Control of Night Raids from US. *The Guardian*, April 8, 2012.

⁹⁷¹ MATIN, A. February 25, 2014 2014. *RE: Personal interview with author.*

in the end depends on local people; the extent which the state confers legitimacy is questionable”.⁹⁷²

In the previous sections, I demonstrated how the Afghan police submitted to putting on the uniform out of a lack of opportunities in the transitory state between conflict and statebuilding, how their disposition situated between state and society is at the intersection of negotiated perceptions of the symbolic value/violence associated with the uniform, and how uncertainty and fear had manifested as split habitus (*habitus clivé*) for the policeman, encouraging him to take a middle-ground.

As a component part of the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the enforcement of its rule, the disposition of the police toward the state and statebuilding is of profound importance. I argue that the disposition of police is shaped by the violence, fears, and uncertainties found in unreconciled state-society relations.

Donning a police uniform neither constitute voluntary consent nor the legitimacy of the state. Rather it is merely a response to the violence and a means of survival in an aggressively changing landscape. It is a means of economic survival in the face of conflict which destroys traditional means of income and statebuilding which erects foreign technologies far out of reach of the level of literacy and the competency of the people. In this way, the uniform is tyrannical, destroying exactly that which the wearer aims to preserve.

In Afghanistan, the role and disposition of the police was constructed by a history of war and conflict, its violence, and fears. For them, a history of uncertainty has imprisoned and committed their very existence to a life of anxiety and desperation. The poverties and violence that accompany this violence overpowers and coerces them to accept what they can, however half-heartedly. It may be gone tomorrow. Yet, the familiar reason and utility of local authority remains a comfort. It is the middle ground between two foreign spaces, the state and militancy.

For the Afghan police, local leaders are more intimately familiar with the needs and fears of local communities and its people, including that of the police. More than 88% of the police who were polled believed that these were legitimate leaders who were owed respect, with nearly 40% agreeing that local leaders have jurisdiction and final authority over local affairs.

⁹⁷² LIEVEN, A. 11/14/2013 2014. *RE: Personal Interview with author.*

They only join the ranks of the police force for its economic benefits and not out of any interest in the jurisdiction of central authority. Indeed, the statebuilding project is seen as further distancing the state from realities on the ground and in local communities. In the transitory state of authority found between war and statebuilding, violence and poverties which limit the options and prospects for the people, force them to surrender and accept only those offered by the victor. Intervention shapes the very tacitness of this consent around the people, violently employing them in its idealized expectations.

While the opinions of policemen are not representative of the local population, their position on the legitimacy of authority (and the durability of local traditional authority) is profound. First, survey responses provide individual self-reflection on their role as security apparatus to the state which hints at an identity conflict, torn between the state and society. Second, responses help to understand more broadly the social contract and in particular, failure to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Finally, it is a point of departure for explaining how (conflicted) positions of police force personnel problematize the dynamics of local political order.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This study set out to understand the role the Afghan police played in statebuilding, a question that became even more concerning following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan which saw the police simply evaporate. In the aftermath, it became questionable whether the police ever had the will to fight for the state and statebuilding efforts. Following some preliminary field work in the country, this study went beyond examining the role police played in facilitating statebuilding and conducted a survey with the Afghan National Police to understand how the disposition of the Afghan police came to challenge the success of statebuilding during the US occupation of the country. There are four key findings from this study:

First, the survey found that the policeman was torn between his preexisting identification with local society and his evolving identification with the state. Like the unresolved nature of state-society relations typically found under conflict conditions, the disposition of the Afghan police also remains very much unreconciled during this period. As a result, a foundational element of state legitimacy and component of its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (and enforcement) was frustrated thereby rendering the role the police played in statebuilding not likely to contribute to successful statebuilding.

Second, the disposition of the policeman suggests that he did not maintain a doxic relationship with the state. Such a relationship is not only characterized by a sense of association that is primarily based and underlined by shared fundamental beliefs, it is also embodied and taken for granted – a condition in itself that contributes to producing and reproducing the legitimacy of the state. It is a hidden persuasion that is embedded in the order of things. The policeman should misrecognize his domination and become unaware of his subordination if the state is to achieve legitimacy.

Third, the state and statebuilding efforts seemingly failed to sufficiently encourage receptivity by the police to the appropriate and necessary categories of perception that would convince the police of their symbolic link to the state. As a result, the police continued to maintain favor toward local leadership and the potential for cooperation between the Taliban and state. From a practical perspective, much of this was attributed to the perception that local leaders were better suited to address their immediate concerns and were especially skilled at negotiating a relatively safe middle ground between the state and Taliban.

Fourth, according to Bourdieu, achievement of a monopoly on symbolic violence is a precondition for the monopoly on the legitimate exercise of physical violence. By remaining unreconciled in their disposition toward the state, the policeman as a component of the state apparatus for physical violence, undermines the state at a very fundamental level.

Implications of Findings for Literature

First, police and policebuilding is a largely underappreciated area of study, one that is theoretically limited. Studies of the role of the police in statebuilding, ones that are focused on the social construction of this role and the influence on state-society relations is far too limited. It is hoped that this study is accepted and placed alongside this relatively small volume of literature that currently exists and that it persuades further similar research agenda.

Second, to date, there are countless volumes on Afghanistan that assess units of measurements deriving from institutional factors. Most of these studies missed particularly relevant details advanced in this study. I believe that these findings, especially within the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu, shed light on how the literature could evolve to include similar research into other areas and elements of statebuilding – not from an institutional perspective, but rather notions of state, the nature of statehood, and varying dimensions of state-society relations on this level of analysis.

Implications for Possible Wider Relevance and Generalizability

I believe the findings from this study has wider relevance to approaches and studies of statebuilding. The practices of intervention have manipulatory influence on capital accumulation and concentration, so much so that it can shape and/or reinforce the disposition of society. Where statebuilding efforts fail, it is all too often written off as merely a consequence of the nature of the people. Placing blame for such conditions squarely on the people has, in fact, diverted attention away from how intervention grounded in largely an institutional approach influences local political order and state-society relations. This study can contribute to motivating more nuanced examinations of statebuilding from varied levels of analysis, including the symbolic.

Consideration of Future Research

In the beginning of this thesis, I provided a quote by the US President, Joe Biden, wherein he suggested that no amount of money or statebuilding effort could instill the will of the Afghan people to fight to maintain a central democratic government. This included the Afghan National Police. Future research should consider expanding on this study through both methodological and theoretical replication with an aim of conducting cross case comparisons that could help highlight how the two streams and approaches to statebuilding – institution building and legitimacy-oriented approach – coexist and/or compete, and subsequently inform the disposition of the police. This could include studies of similar hybrid conditions defined by both ongoing conflict and statebuilding efforts as well as those free of such violence. Additionally, the notion of a *soft* role in statebuilding should be explored further and from additional theoretical perspectives to better understand the evolution of the role of police throughout the course of statebuilding.

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