Conflict Analysis Research Centre

The University of Kent

Let's Talk About Peace: Mediation in Civil Conflict

By

Govinda Clayton

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in International Conflict Analysis

Supervisors

Dr Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (The University of Essex)

Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (The University of Essex)

When we can no longer even engage in a civil conversation with each other over the things that truly matter –at that point we don't merely lose our capacity to solve big challenges. We lose something essential about ourselves.

Barack Obama (2010)

Abstract

This dissertation contributes to the growing literature centered on civil war mediation. Relying on a rationalist framework of conflict and actors, and employing quantitative methods, the research uncovers a number of findings relating to the features that assist and impede civil conflict peace brokers. Paper one demonstrates the importance of the relative belligerent strength. Using disaggregated dyadic data, the analysis shows that insurgents whose capacity more closely matches the state are more likely to see mediation in the first place, and ultimately end their conflict through a settlement. This argument is developed in the second paper, which shows how belligerent capacity is affected by natural resources. The presence of oil is shown to increase the relative position of the incumbent, lowering the likelihood of mediation and agreement. Paper three focuses on the interaction between the characteristics of the mediator and the belligerents. It demonstrates that mediation is more likely to be accepted when the incumbent and third party share institutional similarities. Notably, non-democratic states are shown to have a significantly higher demand for mediation led by non-democratic third parties. In paper four, which is co-authored with Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, we extend previous research on mediation by assessing the predictive powers of features highlighted as important determinants for mediation. Our results suggest that a two stage model of mediation and success does relatively well in out-of-sample predictions. In total the dissertation makes a number of important contributions, including: using disaggregated data to facilitate assessments of competing mechanisms; adopting an innovative modelling procedure to better capture the selection effects underpinning mediation; and proposing a new means of result validation that offers a more comprehensive assessment of statistical results. In

this way the dissertation bridges the gap between studies of civil war mediation, and theoretical and methodological innovations within the broader civil war literature.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all those who have been invaluable during the writing of this dissertation. Firstly, I would like to convey my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisors, Ismene Gizelis and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. I will always be grateful for the wonderful opportunities, continued support and excellent suggestions that Kristian and Ismene have provided. I only wish that everybody could be blessed with such inspirational supervisors.

I must also thank my parents, Michael and Bernadette. They have always encouraged me to study, and for almost thirty years offered flawless support in all aspects of my life. I am particularly grateful for the priceless support over the past twelve months.

I would like to thank a range of friends, associates and discussants that have offered helpful comments at a wide range of workshops and conferences. These include, but are not limited to, Tobias Böhmelt, Vincenzo Bove, Halvard Buhaug, Renato Corbetta, Karl DeRouen, Belen Gonzalez, Michael Greig, Kaisa Hinkkainen, Shanna Kirschner, Jule Krüger, Nils Metternich, Ulrich Pilster, Sara Polo, Mauricio Rivera Celestino, Andrea Ruggeri, Isak Svensson, Reed Wood, Julian Wucherpfennig and Sebastian Ziaja. I would also like to thanks a range of organisations that invited me to present work at annual conferences, in particular the International Studies Association, the British International Studies Association, The European Consortium of Political Research, and the British Conflict Research Society.

Special thanks must also go to the friends that have helped to maintain my sanity throughout the making of this thesis. In particular at University of Kent I must thank Andrew Thomson, Matthew Loveless, Phil Cunliffe, Suzie Robinson, Gemma Chapman, Nicola Huxtable, Roxanne Devine, Sara Witchell and Jessica Shepheard.

Additional thanks go to Charles Devellennes for proof reading the thesis in its various stages and providing additional emotional support throughout this summer. Last but by no means least; away from university life special thanks must go to Victoria Mullen and Gary Shackleford.

Notifications

Paper one is under review at the Journal of Peace Research. Prior to submission this paper was presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) annual conference 2011, the British International Studies Association (BISA) annual conference 2011, and a workshop sponsored by the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) in 2010.

Paper two is under review at International Studies Quarterly. Prior to submission this paper was presented at the ISA annual conference 2011, the ECPR international relations standing group conference 2010, and the conference of the Civil War journal 2011.

Paper three has been presented at the ISA annual conference 2012, the British Conflict Research Society annual conference 2012, and the Civil Wars Journal Conference 2012.

Paper four is under review at Conflict Management and Peace Science. Prior to submission the paper was presented at the ECPR bi-annual conference 2011, British Conflict Research Society Annual Conference 2011, and a workshop at the Centre for the Study of Civil War PRIO in 2012.

Table of Contents

Setting the Scene: Introduction to the Research Project

Govinda Clayton

Conflict Analysis Research Center

The University of Kent

Introduction

Mediation is a form of conflict management in which a third-party controls some aspects of the peace process, but belligerents retain control of the eventual outcome (Moore, 1986). Mediators attempt to terminate violent conflict by reshaping disputant's perceptions or behaviour, without using physical force, or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992). Intermediaries have proven to be very effective at helping actors locate the area in which their preference orderings overlap. This increases the likelihood of an agreement that satisfies both actors' lowest acceptable terms (Fisher, 1982). Third parties can also help disputants to overcome the fears of future defection that often prevent the conclusion of an agreement (Walter, 2002). Therefore with the help of a skilled mediator, adversaries can often agree solutions that they would have been incapable of producing alone (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999).

The mediation process is voluntary, meaning belligerents must seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an intermediary (Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992). The non-binding nature of the process makes it appealing to disputants, as it allows them to retain decisional control throughout negotiations, and veto the conclusion of any unfavourable agreement (Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Willie, 1991). Mediation is also a favoured method of intervention for international actors. While the provision of mediatory services can be costly, in comparison to more robust forms of action, mediation is a relatively cheap mechanism through which interested parties can exert an influence on a conflict (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). Mediation is as a result the most frequently adopted form of third-party conflict management (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001). From conflicts in Sudan to Syria, Colombia and Chad, third parties now regularly assume the role of peace broker.

Yet in many cases mediators are not used by belligerents, and when utilised often fail to produce an agreement. Between 1946 and 2003, only 29% of civil conflict episodes were mediated, of which just 41% produced a sustainable settlement[1] (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). A bourgeoning collection of theoretical and empirical literature has attempted to explain this variance. Systematically exploring the determinants of effective mediation, this work has strengthened our understanding of how mediation is effected by a range of factors, including: disputant characteristics (e.g. the political regime), conflict contexts (e.g. duration and intensity of war), and mediator actions (e.g. mediator leverage) (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993; Kleiboer, 1996; Jackson, 2000; Kydd, 2003; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Böhmelt, 2010; Beardsley, 2011). Yet a number of key questions surrounding mediation remain unanswered. In particular our knowledge of the forces that shape the onset and outcome of civil war mediation remains limited. This is regrettable, given that for the past six decades intra-state conflict has been the most common form of organised violence (Gleditsch et al. 2002).[2]

The prevalence of civil conflict is in part attributable to difficulties associated with its resolution (Licklider, 1995; Toft, 2009). Fears of defection are intensified within intrastate conflict, as in the aftermath of an agreement the belligerents must reside in close proximity to their former opponent (Walter, 2002). Civil war also more commonly involves greater asymmetries in power and legitimacy, which often complicates the resolution process (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). This suggests that the tasks facing peace brokers are not homogenous, and that studies of mediation should consider civil conflict independently from peace-making attempts within inter-state war.

Appreciating the more acute bargaining challenges that face civil war peace brokers, studies of mediation now increasingly focus solely upon civil conflict management (e.g. Svensson, 2007, 2009; Aydin & Regan, 2011; Nilsson, 2010). Aided by advancements in theory and data, this research has begun to uncover the individual determinants of civil war mediation. This dissertation contributes to this literature, uncovering features that assist and impede civil conflict managers. Together the four essays make a number of important contributions, including: using disaggregated data to facilitate assessments of competing mechanisms; adopting an innovative modelling procedure to better capture the selection effects underpinning mediation; and proposing a new means of result validation that offers a more comprehensive assessment of statistical results. In this way the dissertation bridges the gap between studies of civil war mediation, and theoretical and methodological innovations within the broader civil war literature (e.g. Buhaug et al. 2011; Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011; Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Ward & Weidmann, 2010). In doing so it is hoped that a more comprehensive understanding of the features that assist and impede resolution will emerge.

Unpicking the causal mechanisms that shape the management of civil conflicts is of pressing concern. Civil war is now the most common form of organised violence, arguably producing more human suffering than any other social phenomenon (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Since 1946 over half of the states in the international system have suffered some type of internal violence.[3] Directly, these violent encounters have been responsible for more than 16 million battle-related deaths (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). Indirectly, the conflicts have created refugees, spread disease and exacerbated malnutrition (Ghobarah, Huth & Russett, 2003). The destruction of human resources and physical infrastructure has also reduced economic

growth in what were already some of the world's poorest countries (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

The practical relevance of this research is therefore quite clear. By generating a stronger understanding of the features that make mediated settlement unattractive, costly, or infeasible, practitioners can better channel their efforts into the most productive approaches. (Beardsley & Greig, 2009). Similarly, by identifying those cases in which mediation has not been adopted, but would likely prove successful, peace brokers can be guided towards those cases in which their efforts are likely to have the greatest effect (Melin & Svensson, 2009). As well as preserving precious resources, this knowledge would also reduce the likelihood of unsuccessful conflict management attempts, which can often sour relations and hinder future conflict management efforts (Beardsley & Greig, 2009).

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: the first section discusses the bargaining approach, illustrating the utility of mediation from a bargaining perspective. The second section discusses mediation onset, highlighting the forces that shape the selection of mediation. Finally, the third section introduces each of the forthcoming papers individually.

Theoretical Framework: A Bargaining Approach

Mediation research is a broad interdisciplinary field, including literature drawn from psychology (e.g. Crush, 2007), labour relations (e.g. Kriesberg, 2001; Rome, 2003), legal practice (e.g. Kloppenberg, 2001), business management (e.g. Witkin, 2008), and international relations (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Savun, 2008). Regular reviews of the literature provide strong accounts of the approaches, achievements and limitations of the field as a whole (Pruitt & Kressel, 1989; Wall &

Lynn, 1993; Wall, Stark & Standifer, 2001; Wall & Dunne, 2012). Despite the wide scope of mediation research, early studies centred on violent conflict were constrained by a lack of theoretical sophistication (Svensson, 2006). Case studies offered detailed and practical insights on a number of eminent examples of mediation, but the emphasis on the uniqueness of the cases restricted any attempts to uncover regular patterns of behaviour (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Similarly, early systematic work was restrained by the lack of theoretical accounts convincingly linking diplomatic intervention to peace (Svensson, 2006; Gilady & Russett, 2002). Despite uncovering a wealth of correlations, facts, and effects, the results were undermined by a limited understanding of the theoretical micro-foundations of mediation (Svensson, 2006; Kleiboer, 1996).

In response to this limitation, work based upon belligerent bargaining has begun to supplement traditional mediation research. The bargaining framework is a theoretical approach, which seeks to explain the onset, continuation and termination of violent conflict, by considering the effects of rational competition on disputant behavior (Schelling, 1967; Pillar, 1983; Powell, 2004; Wagner, 2000; Slantchev, 2003). By placing mediation within this coherent framework, the theoretical deficit of traditional mediation studies has been overcome. Each of the papers included within this dissertation contributes to this developing branch of mediation literature. This first section therefore clarifies the bargaining framework, before illustrating the differing manners in which mediation can help to overcome bargaining failure.

The Rationalist Explanation of War

Since violent conflict is costly, and at least ex post inefficient, there should then always be at least one solution that provides both actors with a payoff more

favorable than the onset of war (Fearon, 1995; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Yet even when peace is the optimal solution, actors often fail to prevent the outbreak of war (Cetinyan, 2002; Fearon, 1998; Lake, 2003).[4] The literature points to three dominant justifications to explain why bargaining can fail to resolve conflict peacefully. Firstly, emotional impulses, or a failure to correctly calculate the true costs and gains of conflict (bounded rationality), can motivate a leader to behave in a non-rational manner. Secondly, leaders might act in a rational manner, but on account of problems of political agency fail to fully internalize the costs of conflict. Finally, leaders might act rationally, and internalize the costs of conflict, but nevertheless find war cannot be avoided. Almost all work, including this study, focuses upon this third rationalist account of war (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). According to this position, the failure in belligerent bargaining is born from the problems associated with asymmetric information and credible commitment. [5] These bargaining impediments increase the level of strategic uncertainty, making it harder for actors to peacefully resolve their dispute.[6]

Asymmetric information

All armed actors have private information about their capabilities and resolve. Belligerents can gain a strong indication of their opponent's position by communicating bi-laterally, monitoring domestic political behavior, and observing their performance on the battlefield. But the asymmetric nature of this information means disputants can never be certain of their opponent's reservation point (the lowest acceptable terms that an actor will accept before resorting to violence). Therefore even when an agreement exists that both sides prefer to war, if belligerents

incorrectly infer the position of an opponent, they might push for an agreement that falls below their reservation point.

Alone the problem of asymmetric information is surmountable. Actors should be capable of overcoming information asymmetries by sharing information on their reservation levels (Fearon, 1995). With open channels of communication, parties should be capable of locating an ex ante solution that falls within the zone of agreement (the range of outcomes that satisfy both actors' demands). Yet credible communication between actors is constrained by the strategic incentives that both belligerents have to mislead their opponent. All bargaining actors desire an agreement that provides them with the most significant improvement on what they expect to gain from conflict (minus the predicted costs of violence). The uncertainty surrounding private information gives actors a strong incentive to deceive their opponent. If a belligerent can convince other disputants that their capabilities and/or resolve are significantly higher than the reality, they are likely to generate additional concessions and a more favorable agreement. But this incentive to deceive also makes genuine transfers of information more challenging. For example, in an attempt to prevent the onset of violence, Party A and Party B might negotiate an agreement. If the agreement fails to fully account for the capabilities of Party A, we would expect them to communicate their dissatisfaction to Party B. Party B might accept the revised terms and concede to more equitable agreement. However, given that Party B can only base their decisions on information provided by Party A, they might also view this as a bargaining tactic, or bluff, and reject the claim for additional concessions. In this second account, a war would take place on account of Party A's failure to credibly communicate their private information. As this example illustrates, information

asymmetry, combined with the strategic incentives to exaggerate and misrepresent information, can lead to a rational miscalculation that produces war (Fearon, 1995).

When strategic uncertainty is increased, there is a higher likelihood that at least one belligerent will make demands below their opponent's reservation point, or reject a legitimate claim of dissatisfaction. Put differently, when conditions facilitate differing perceptions on the actor's strength, resolve and likelihood of victory, the probability of settlement is reduced (Kriesberg, 1996). Resolution is more challenging when a conflict involves more than two belligerents, as the problem of private information is increased (Esteban & Ray, 2001).

On the other hand, when conditions reduce uncertainty, the probability of an agreement is increased. For example, violent inter-state conflicts can reduce asymmetric information, as the violent contest publicly reveals information on the military capacity, tactics and resolve of belligerents (Fearon, 2004; Powell, 1999; Slantchev, 2003; Wagner, 2000). In civil war this process of information revelation is less common, as the guerilla-style tactics often adopted by belligerents limits the level of private information that is revealed (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 79). This means that uncertainty can continue after civil war has begun, and is not necessarily reduced overtime (Walter, 1997; Mattes & Savun, 2008).

Commitment Problems

The second impediment to strategic bargaining is problem of credible commitment (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 1997, 2002). Commitment problems occur when the incentives for belligerents to abide by the terms of an agreement are expected to shift over time, or when the items in dispute are expected to reshape future bargaining power (Powell, 2006). It is challenging for an actor to convincingly convey their

commitment to a peace process, when it is expected that they will later have an incentive to renege on the agreement. In this way, future incentives for exploitation can prevent the conclusion of an agreement (Beardsley et al. 2006).

Commitment problems are more likely when there is a high likelihood of a post settlement shift in the distribution of power (Powell, 2006). Future incentives to renege emerge when one actor is expected to grow in strength following an agreement. For example, a peace agreement is most favorable to an incumbent when they are weakened by the costs of continuing conflict. In this weakened position the state might be tempted to offer the insurgents a settlement that provides a sizeable redistribution of the contested resource. In the post-settlement period, once they have returned to their position of relative strength, the state will have a significant incentive to renege on the earlier agreement and retract some of the resources that were promised to the rebels (Walter, 2002). Prior to the agreement both belligerents can foresee the post-agreement power shift, therefore in the pre-settlement phase the government must convince the rebels of their honest intentions. No actor can pledge to abide by the terms of an agreement once it becomes unfavorable. Therefore even on occasions in which the belligerents can conceive of a mutually acceptable agreement, they can often fail to resolve a dispute on account of the perceived opportunities for future exploitation (Svensson, 2007).

The problem of credible commitment is intensified when a conflict is fought within a state. Without a neutral force or dividing line (in the absence of third party intervention), any form of agreement and disarmament will involve a period of intense vulnerability for at least one party (Licklider, 1993). It is challenging for a stronger actor to commit to honouring an agreement once the weaker actor is

disarmed (Walter, 1997; Svensson, 2009). This risk of future exploitation can provide a strong motivation for weaker actors to continue fighting rather than seek settlement.

International actors can help belligerents to overcome commitment problems, by enforcing the terms of an agreement (Fearon, 1998; Powell, 2006; Walter, 1997). This can involve strengthening institutions, providing peacekeepers, or offering formal security guarantees. External actors can also offer economic and political incentives for agreement compliance, counterbalancing the future incentives for exploitation that prevent the creation of an agreement (Beardsley, 2011: 172). By serving as trustees or by providing 'bridges to more self-enforcing arrangements', as Beardsley (2011: 172) has suggested, third parties can reduce the problem of credible commitment.

The Contribution of Mediation to the Bargaining Process

If conflict is caused by bargaining impediments, then it should end when the barriers preventing efficient bargaining outcomes are reduced (Beardsley & Greig, 2009). The effectiveness of a peace broker is therefore shaped by their ability to improve the flow of credible information, and reduce fears of future defection (Beardsley et al. 2006). There is a wide range of techniques through which mediators can achieve these tasks (Wall, Stark & Standifer, 2001). For both descriptive and analytical purposes it is common for studies to conceptualize the range of mediatory actions according to three broad strategies: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Beardsley et al. 2006) The strategies divide mediatory actions according to their overarching strategic purposes, as well as the manner in which they seek to contribute to the bargaining process (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005; Höglund & Svensson, 2011).[7]

Facilitative mediation is the most passive form of intervention (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Hopmann, 1996; Touval & Zartman, 1985). In this role a mediator acts as a two-way conduit of information, channelling information between the parties. A facilitative peace broker exhibits little control over the process or substance of negotiations (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Actions are limited to less active forms of mediation, such as the provision of good offices, transferring information, or revealing new knowledge to the disputants (Beardsley et al. 2006).

Facilitative mediation is closely aligned with the integrative principles of conflict management. Mediators attempt to create a larger amount of 'value' to be shared amongst belligerents, by uncovering opportunities for mutual gain. Rather than redefine the zone of agreement, facilitation helps parties to locate a solution from a pre-existing set of acceptable agreements (Carnevale, 1986; Kressel, 1972). A mutually acceptable deal is crafted by ensuring that the parties have access to full information (Beardsley et al. 2006; Princen, 1992; Moore, 1986).

The effectiveness of facilitative mediators is largely premised on their ability to reduce information asymmetries (Savun, 2008). The mediator's utility depends upon their ability to persuade belligerents to share information on their reservation point. By controlling information extracted from belligerents, and on occasions supplementing this with information gathered independently (e.g. The U.S mediation in Kashmir), mediators can help to reduce the distortion, ignorance, and misperception, which often prevents the signing of an agreement (Fisher, 1972; Dixon, 1996; Kydd, 2003; Savun, 2008; Beardsley et al. 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006).

Formulation is a more active form of peace making, which involves the mediator controlling key aspects of the peace process. By manipulating elements of negotiations, a mediator creates a more positive environment (Bercovitch & Gartner,

2006). This commonly involves the mediator controlling structural aspects of the negotiation, including the location, timing and pace of discussions. Mediators can also control the distribution of information, redefining contested issues, and strategically introducing innovative alternatives (Hopmann, 1996). This can be particularly useful within stalemated negotiations, in which mediators can help to create new focal points around which resolutions to the dispute may be found (Beardsley et al. 2006; Svensson, 2007). More generally mediators can also signal the necessity of concessions to domestic audiences, and take responsibly for unpopular actions (Beardsley, 2010). In this way mediators increase the likelihood of peace by 'running interference against domestic backlash' (Beardsley, 2010).

Manipulative mediation is the most robust form of mediator involvement, in which third parties exert a strong influence on both the content and substance of the bargaining process (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006).[8] Rather than locate existing solution points, a manipulative mediator uses positive and negative inducements to increase the zone of agreement. Techniques can include financial assistance, diplomatic concessions, economic sanctions and direct military action (Beardsley et al. 2006). By maximising the costs of non-agreement, these methods each seek to stretch the reservation point of the target belligerent(s) (Touval & Zartman, 1985). This can increase the number of acceptable alternatives to war, by creating solution points that would not be possible in the absence of mediation (Hopmann, 2001). This makes active forms of mediation an effective means of terminating violent conflict (Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006)[9].

The Selection of Mediation

The bargaining approach clarifies the main causal processes through which mediation effects dialogue between belligerents. Building on this framework, early empirical work uncovered a number of mechanisms through which the outcome of mediation was determined (Bercovitch, 1986; Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille, 1991; Bercovitch & Houston, 1996; Leng & Regan, 2003; Greig, 2001; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001). Yet the validity of these studies was undermined by a failure to account for the determinants of mediation occurrence. Mediation does not take place within a randomly selected sample of cases. Without first accounting for the process of selection, it is unlikely that valid empirical results can be uncovered (Regan & Stam, 2000; Greig, 2005; Gartner, Melin & Bercovitch, 2004; Terris & Maoz, 2005; Schmidt, 2004; Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006; Schneider, Bercovitch & Selck, 2006; Böhmelt, 2010).

Mediation can only occur when a third party is willing to offer their services as a mediator, and the disputants are receptive to an offer of assistance. The incidence of mediation is therefore determined by the incentives (and disincentives) that the belligerents (demand side) and mediators (supply side) have to enter a dialogue process. While often treated independently, the demand and supply of mediation are closely connected. For example, belligerents and would-be-mediators are likely to be in contact with each other. The receptiveness that disputants display towards the potential mediation might then be one factor that influences supply. As a result the supply and demand are best considered as two distinct but inter-related factors (Svensson, 2007).

Supply Side Determinants of Mediation Selection

Prior to offering their services, potential mediators must determine if offering assistance is in their best interests. The provision of mediation can be costly for a peace broker, involving lost face, adverse publicity, and a share of the blame if the process collapses (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Beardsley, 2009). The mediator is also burdened with administrative duties and the costs associated with inducements and sanctions (Carnevale, 1986; Schrodt & Gerner, 2004). Mediators will only intervene when their expected payoffs exceed the expected costs. If the fixed price of mediation is high, or the costs in the absence of mediation are low, it is unlikely mediation will occur (Beber, 2012). Even on occasions in which mediation is desirable for a third party, the existence of other potential mediators can motivate inaction. For the provision of peace is a public good, meaning peace brokers have incentives to free ride on the actions of other intermediaries. This creates a problem of collective action, in which despite the presence of multiple mediators, intervention might not occur (Beardsley, 2010). Given the costs associated with mediation, and the incentives to free ride, we might only expect to observe mediation in the easiest of cases, those in which the mediator perceives there to be a high probability of success (Melin, 2011; Regan & Stam, 2000; Young, 1967; Zartman, 2000).

However, durable and high intensity conflicts pose the greatest threat to international actors, and are more likely to provoke the interest of the global media (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Beardsley et al. 2006). Challenging conflicts are also more likely to produce a protracted and multidimensional context, in which the assistance of international actors is required. It is therefore better to think of mediation supply in terms of a continuum of interests, that each shapes the probability of intervention (Touval & Zartman, 1985).

Research investigating these dynamics has firmly replaced perceptions of moral mediators driven by normative concerns, with the view of interest driven actors whose preferences form the critical element in shaping their willingness to offer assistance. For example, the propensity of actors to supply mediation is strongly shaped by the location of the conflict. (Maundi et al. 2006; Elgström, Bercovitch & Skau, 2003; Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Greig & Regan, 2008). Neighbouring states are most likely to offer mediation, as they suffer the most significant costs when a conflict continues (e.g. spill over, regional instability, reduction in trade) (Collier et al. 2003; Gleditsch, 2007). Similarly, dyadic studies have shown that mediation offers are strongly shaped by historical, economic and 'indirect' links between belligerents and potential mediators (Crescenzi et al. 2007; Greig & Regan, 2008; Greig, 2005; Mitchell, 2002; Bohmelt, 2009, 2011; Dorussen & Ward, 2008; Melin, 2011).

Demand Side Determinants of Mediation Selection

The demand for mediation is shaped by the utility that each belligerent expects to gain from the onset of dialogue. An intermediary will only be accepted on those occasions in which both belligerents believe that payoffs associated with accepting mediation exceed the expected costs. Mediation can be costly for combatants, reducing the control they have over the peace process. As a result disputants are only likely to accept peace brokers when the costs of conflict become intolerable, or they foresee no possibility of resolving the dispute alone (Greig & Diehl, 2006; Grieg, 2005; Beardsley, 2010; Greig & Regan, 2008). This might suggest that mediators are only likely to be invited into the most challenging, complex and intense conflicts, those in which the likelihood of resolution is relatively low (Gartner, 2011; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006; Svensson, 2007). On the

other hand, the acceptance of mediation could be viewed as evidence of the disputants' newfound desire to seek peace. In this sense, mediation onset might be viewed as an indicator of conflict 'ripeness'. This would imply that mediation takes place in cases with a relatively high expectation of success (Rubin, 1991; Terris & Maoz, 2005).

Research has provided conditional support for both positions. Taken together the evidence suggests that mediation is most likely to occur within long and intense conflict, but only when willingness to compromise has emerged from the escalating costs of battle (Grieg, 2005; Greig & Diehl, 2006; Beardsley, 2010). While mediation often occurs in the most challenging of cases, its onset provides a notable indication that actors are beginning to consider peace.[10]

There are important distinctions between the 'demand side' of mediation in civil and inter-state war. These differences relate to the propensity of belligerents to welcome a peace broker (Svensson, 2009; Greig & Regan, 2008). The costs associated with inter-state mediation are evenly spread between belligerents. Both actors are sovereign powers and afforded the privileges and legitimacy of an international actor (Melin and Svensson, 2009). In comparison civil conflicts involve an asymmetric distribution of power and legitimacy that creates differing incentives for the belligerents. Non-state groups gain significant rewards when entering a dialogue process. The onset of mediation confers a level of political legitimacy upon a rebel group, which they are unlikely to achieve solely through military force (Mitchell, 1993). States commonly reject the legality of rebel movements, instead dismissing them as illegal actors not deserving of political voice. The onset of a negotiation process therefore legitimises the rebels, and demonstrates their ability to force concessions from the state (Svensson, 2009; Greig & Regan, 2008). This effect

is intensified when an international actor who confers an increased level of domestic and international recognition upon insurgents leads the process.

Unlike the insurgent force, a state endures a number of costs when accepting mediation. The state automatically enjoys a level of legitimacy far greater than their non-state opponent, and is therefore often reluctant to open a process that raises the legitimacy of the insurgents. In addition to enhancing the prestige of the rebels, the onset of dialogue signals the states inability to control their own territory, and a lack of resolve to resist insurgent demands (Melin & Svensson, 2009). This can motivate groups to bargain harder, or fight longer, in search of additional concessions.

What mediation can offer a state is the potential to resolve their violent conflict. Of course most states hope violence will end through the military defeat of the rebels. However, as military victory becomes increasingly unlikely, mediation often offers the most effective method to end a war. This is not always the intention of a state, which may agree to mediation on account of more devious intentions (Richmond, 1998; Beardsley, 2010). Yet given the significant costs that the state suffers when agreeing to mediation, in most cases the onset of mediation implies some form of tacit admission that state is ready to begin discussing a settlement (Grieg, 2005; Greig & Diehl, 2006). The sum of this analysis is that while rebels are expected to exhibit a high demand for mediation, a state will only accept an intermediary when the costs of dialogue are outweighed by costs of continued conflict. This effectively elevates the state to the role of sole veto player, being as it is largely their cost benefit analysis that shapes the demand for civil war mediation.

Modeling Selection

Previous studies have modeled mediation selection effects using a two-stage Heckman model (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006; Schneider, Bercovitch & Selck, 2006;

Böhmelt, 2010). This efficiently captures an element of the selection bias, and represents a significant improvement on previous studies that ignored the process of selection. However, the Heckman model requires identifying assumptions, and is appropriate only when at least one additional explanatory factor influences selection but not the outcome. Sartori (2003:112) shows that the Heckman model estimates otherwise are 'based only upon the distributional assumptions about the residuals, rather than the variation in the explanatory variables.'

The Heckman model is well suited to capture the selection bias that is introduced by 'supply side' features. Factors that determine a potential mediator's propensity to intervene are unlikely to be the same factors that shape the outcome of the process. For example, the location of the mediator in relation to the conflict, and the level of trade that a third party conducts with an incumbent, are both likely to shape an actor's desire to mediate. However, these same features are unlikely to have a strong effect upon the eventual outcome of the process (Greig & Regan, 2008).

The Heckman model is less appropriate when attempting to account for the 'demand side' of mediation bias. Features that shape belligerents' propensity to accept mediation, are also those factors most commonly assumed to affect the outcome of mediation. For example, the intensity, duration and incompatibility that a conflict is based upon, all influence the likelihood of mediation occurring and ending in settlement. This makes the Heckman model an inappropriate choice when assessing features that determine the onset or outcome of mediation.

To better account for the demand side bias that defines mediation, each of the papers in this dissertation instead rely upon Sartori's alternative selection estimator. The Sartori model is based upon the additional identifying assumption that the error term for an observation is the same in the selection and outcome equations. There are

good theoretical reasons to believe that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both selection and outcome of mediation would be the same. Research has shown that civil war mediation is only likely to occur when the state suffers significantly. Mediation is costly, and is therefore likely to be resisted by the incumbent. Mediation should only then occur when the resolve of the state has been diminished. A reduction in the incumbents' resolve (unobserved) should be strongly correlated with an increase in the likelihood of mediation and settlement. As a result there are good theoretical reasons to assume that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both the onset and outcome of mediation would be the same. This approach has not commonly been applied to studies of mediation, and therefore represents one of the original contributions of this research.

Introducing the Papers

This final section of this introductory chapter presents a brief account of the four research papers that make up this dissertation. Each of these essays builds upon the bargaining framework, and develops a theory that has implications for both the onset and outcome of mediation. For each paper I comment upon the broader debate within which the research is based, discuss the core elements of the theoretical argument, and touch upon the data and methods used to empirically assess the theoretical claims. I also highlight the main findings of the studies, but reserve discussion of the implications of this research, in particular the potential for future development, for the concluding chapter.

Paper 1: Relative Rebel Strength

The extent to which power asymmetries influence conflict management is widely disputed. One branch of scholarship suggests that power disparity is the most

conducive to negotiated settlement. Conditions of asymmetry are thought to *lower* the complexity of the bargaining environment, making it clearer which actor should make concessions (Deutsch, 1973; Rubin, 1995; Organski, 1960; Wright, 1965).[11] A competing collection of studies instead highlights the benefits of power parity. According to this position, conditions of asymmetry *increase* the complexity of the bargaining environment, on account of the stronger actor's reluctance to concede ground to a weaker opponent (Touval & Zartman, 1985; Kriesberg, 1996; Ott, 1972; Young, 1967). Studies of conflict management have therefore proved unable to conclusively determine the most favorable conditions for a peace broker (Svensson, 2009).

The distribution of power in conflict is related to a wide variety of factors, including the size, location and leadership structure of both armed forces (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). Yet the absolute strength of an actor is of less importance than their strength in relation to their opponent. Conflicts are extreme dyadic interactions, in case of civil war, between a state and a rebel movement. Capturing this dyadic component is necessary to accurately assess the dynamics underpinning civil war (Lujala, 2010; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). Previous studies of conflict management have failed to capture the dyadic power relations within civil war, and have therefore failed to uncover a relationship between belligerent strength and mediation (Svensson, 2009).

Utilizing a bargaining framework, this paper develops a theory that relates relative disputant strength to the onset and outcome of civil war mediation. The focus on civil war is in itself a significant development, as previous research has focused almost exclusively upon inter-state conflict. The paper argues that relatively stronger

rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problem that can prevent the resolution of war. A relatively strong rebel group is better equipped to inflict notable damage upon the states forces (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Gent, 2011). The capabilities of these groups more quickly become public knowledge, reducing the problem of asymmetric information. Relatively stronger insurgencies are also more challenging to defeat, and have a capacity to more credibly communicate the threat that they pose to government interests. This should make incumbents more open to the entrance of an intermediary. Stronger groups also hold more bargaining power. Once within mediation they are more likely to force concessions on issues that protect against government defection (e.g. third party monitoring, security sector reform and territorial autonomy) Mediation is therefore more likely to prove successful when the rebel group is stronger relative to the state.

In an important break from previous studies of mediation, this paper relies upon disaggregated data, which indicates the relative strength of belligerents. This dyadic data is combined with the Civil War Mediation dataset, which includes information on mediation attempts within all conflict episodes from 1946 to 2004 (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). Previous studies of mediation onset have often failed to account for the duration of the conflict episode. For example, the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict is often coded as being mediated, despite only one mediation process occurring in the conflicts thirty-two year history. To take better account of the conflict duration, as well as multiple mediation attempts over a conflicts lifespan, I separate each of the conflict episodes into individual years. This data specification produces a population of 1520 observations (conflict years).

The results generated using a Sartori selection model, suggest that relatively

stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process, and eventually concede some form of settlement. I also find that while the relative military strength of the rebels is an important driver of mediation, other elements of rebel strength are equally important (e.g. command structure, territorial control etc.).

Paper 2: Greedy Conflict Management

Civil conflicts tend to last longer when fought within resource-rich territory (Lujala, 2010). In principle, the longer duration of resource-funded war should provide an increased opportunity for external actors to provide conflict management. Yet mediation is less common within resource rich states, and frequently fails to find a solution when it is undertaken (e.g. Myanmar, Colombia & Democratic Republic of Congo). This suggests that despite offering a greater opportunity for intervention, resource-funded conflict is less likely to result in a mediated settlement. Motivated by this puzzle, the second paper assesses whether conflicts within resource-dependent countries respond differently to mediation.

Building on the argument in the first paper, I argue that natural resources influence mediation by reshaping the distribution of belligerent power. Hydrocarbons provide the state with a significant source of revenue (Reno, 1998; Le Billon, 2001; Basedau & Lay, 2009). This is shown to increase the capacity of incumbents to resist insurgent demands, lowering the likelihood of mediation. Oil wealth also reduces the transparency and accountability of institutions, increasing issues of information failure and making it harder for the incumbent to credibly commit to an agreement (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). Lootable resources are also argued to increase the relative position of the state, by facilitating the creation of weak

rebel 'consumers' who lack the capacity to extract concessions (Le Billion, 2001; Weinstein, 2005). I suggest that when rebellions rely upon lootable resources they are unlikely to force the state into a mediated settlement.

To assess these claims empirically, I draw upon disaggregated resource data that codes the spatial and temporal overlap of oil reserves, diamond deposits and civil conflict (Lujala, 2010). By adopting this spatially coded data, in conjunction with conventional aggregate measures, the competing mechanisms through which natural resources might impact mediation are assessed. Relying upon data from the Civil War Mediation dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011), I assess the relationship between natural resources and conflict terminations using Sartori's selection estimator.

The results suggest that non-lootable natural resources play an important role in shaping the scale of the strategic bargaining problem in civil war. The power asymmetry that arises when a state has access to oil revenue significantly lowers the likelihood of a conflict being mediated. The reduction in the quality of governance also reduces the probability of a mediated settlement. These findings complement other studies that have illustrated the increased duration of conflicts fought within oil producing states (Lujala, 2010). This research shows that a reduction in the frequency and effectiveness of mediation is an additional mechanism through which the duration of oil-funded conflict is increased. Lootable resources are not shown to have any significant effect on mediation. This appears to be the result of the weak relationship observed between lootable resources and relative rebel strength. Rather than facilitate the creation of weak rebel groups, access to secondary diamonds or valuable gemstones produced no significant change in the strength of insurgents.

This study represents the first empirical assessment of the impact of resources on conflict resolution. A robust collection of work now exists, detailing multiple mechanisms through which resources shape the dynamics of civil war (e.g. Ross, 2004; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005; Lujala, Rød & Thieme, 2007). Regrettably researchers have previously overlooked the effects of resources on conflict management. This paper therefore provides an important contribution to this body of work, illustrating the role of resources in the initiation and outcome of mediation.

Paper Three: Institutional Affinity

Which states are the most effective mediators? Evidence from studies of international conflict has shown democratic states to be the most capable track-one mediators. The systemic rise in the frequency and strength of democratic norms has lead to an increase in both the supply and effectiveness of inter-state conflict mediation (Mitchell, Kadera & Crescenzi, 2008; Crescenzi et al. 2011). Yet the expansion of democratic regimes has occurred in tandem with the growth of civil conflict in autocratic and semi-democratic states. This suggests that despite increased numbers of democratic mediators, many civil conflicts within non-democratic states remain resistant to mediation. Regrettably previous research has largely overlooked the influence of a mediator's regime on civil war management attempts, and failed to account for the interaction between the mediator and the incumbent's regime type. This paper investigates the manner in which the mediator's regime type influences to the onset and outcome of civil war mediation.

I argue that democratic characteristics can sometimes hinder a civil war mediator. Civil war settlements almost always require the reconfiguration of the

power structures within a state (Svensson, 2006). This raises the stakes within civil war mediation, and makes the incumbent more sensitive to the preferences of the mediator. A mediator's regime type (democratic or non-democratic) represents one of the primary means through which incumbents can assess the preferences of a peace broker. Institutional similarities suggest common interests, and denote mediators that are more likely to protect a system of governance. States involved in civil conflict are therefore more likely to accept or request mediation from a state that shares a similar institutional design. Institutional homogeneity is also argued to increase the likelihood of settlement. Mediators are more likely to be biased towards the leadership of a similar regime. This form of mediator bias should increase the credibility of information and security guarantees provided by the peace broker.

These arguments are assessed empirically using the diplomatic interventions dataset (Greig & Regan, 2008). Focusing on all offers of mediation from 1946 to 2003, I code the regime type of both the incumbent and the mediator using the democracy-dictatorship dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010). I then generate regime dyad dummy variables, which capture each dyadic configuration of regime type.

The results, generated using logit models and Sartori's selection estimator, show that contrary to the prevalent views within the mediation literature, democratic actors are not always the most efficient track one mediators. Non-democratic states have a significantly higher demand for mediation led by non-democratic third parties. A non-democratic incumbent is 23% more likely to accept mediation from a state that is governed by a similar regime. However, third party regime type is also shown to have little effect upon democracies demand for mediation. Mediation is less

threatening for democratic states, which can better incorporate rebel interests into the existing institutions. Therefore while democratic leaders can seek out a mediator based on merit, non-democratic incumbents appear to favour peace brokers who offer some form of political protection. Surprisingly institutional bias produced only a minor, and insignificant, effect on mediation outcomes. This finding is itself an important empirical discovery, given that no notable difference is uncovered between the two types of mediator. This suggests that when a conflict is fought in a non-democratic state, a non-democratic mediator is more likely to be accepted, and no less likely to be successful. Given that the majority of contemporary conflict occurs within non-democratic states, this is an important finding that poses counterintuitive policy guidance.

Paper 4: Helping Hands: Predicting the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation

A great deal of research has focused on when mediation is most likely to occur, and succeed in terminating violent conflict (Svensson, 2006, 2009; Regan, 2010; Beardsley 2008, 2009, 2010). However, most research on mediation has so far looked exclusively at evaluating hypotheses on observed (in-sample) data, and not considered to what extent existing research provides us with a basis for predicting the likelihood or outcome of third-party conflict management attempts out-of-sample.

The neglect of out-of-sample forecasting in studies of mediation is unfortunate for many reasons. In terms of advancing insights about mediation, hypothesis testing on observed data runs the risk of over-fitting, or fitting to idiosyncrasies of the specific sample, rather than stable structural relationships between a response and

predictors. Out-of-sample forecasting provides a complementary way to test hypotheses, using new data, independent of the data used to develop the original hypotheses.

With respect to policy, existing scholarly research on mediation (implicitly or explicitly) offers some form of policy guidance. But policy advice is generally grounded in significance tests on the observed data, rather than out-of-sample validation. In the context of civil war studies, Ward et al. (2010) have recently warned of the perils of policy advice by p–values, with little regard for the implied effects of the estimates and model uncertainty. By contrast, the ability to effectively forecast key aspects of conflict resolution could be of real relevance to conflict management efforts, and help identify the specific cases where conflict management is more likely to yield success and how to best invest resources.

In the fourth paper, which is co-authored with Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, we attempt to extend previous research on mediation by assessing the predictive powers of features highlighted as important determinants of mediation onset and outcome. Building on this literature we examine whether *ex ante* information about the conflicting dyads characteristics, and some knowledge of conflict history can improve our ability to predict when mediation will occur, and succeed in managing violent conflict.

Using the Civil War Mediation data set, we train our model using observations from the years 1946-1992 (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). We then generate predictions for observations from 1993-2003 using the coefficient estimates for the training data. This is not a true out-of-sample analysis, since the out-of-sample data is observed prior to the in-sample training, and we use the observed data on the right-hand side predictors in generating the estimates. But the coefficients used to

calculate the predictions are derived independently of the out-of-sample data, and the covariates are all features that are observable prior to mediation taking place. This therefore represents a valid approach to assess the forecasting capacity of the model.

Our results suggest that a two stage model of mediation and success does relatively well in out-of-sample prediction. This provides important support for a number of previous in-sample studies of mediation, and based on existing theory suggests that our ability to forecast conflict management onset and outcome is relatively well developed.

Bibliography

Aydin, Aysegul & Patrick Regan. 2011. 'Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration' *European Journal of International Relations.* Published Online. 10.06.2011.

Basedau, Matthias & Jann Lay. 2009. 'Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 46(6): 757-76.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. *The Mediation Dilemma.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2010. 'Pain, Pressure, and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation Incidence' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 395-406.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2009. 'Intervention without leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators' *International Interactions* 35(3): 272-297.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. 'Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems' *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 723-740.

Beardsley, Kyle. David Quinn., Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2006. 'Mediation style and crisis outcomes' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 58-86.

Beardsley, Kyle & Michael. J. Greig. 2009. 'Disaggregating the Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction' *International Interactions* 35(3): 243-248.

Beber, Bernd. 2012. 'International Mediation, Selection Effects and Question of Bias' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Forthcoming. Available at: https://files.nyu.edu/bb89/public/research.htm accessed 25.05.12.

Bercovitch, Jacob. 1986. 'International Mediation: A Study of Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes' *Cooperation and Conflict* 21(3): 155-168.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Alison Houston, 1996. 'The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence'. In *Resolving international conflicts: The theory and practice of mediation*, ed. Bercovitch, Jacob. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Gerard Schneider. 2000. 'Who mediates? The political economy of international conflict management' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 145-165.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Jeffrey Langley. 1993. 'The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(4): 670-691.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Jeffrey Z. Rubin. 1992. *Mediation in international relations: multiple approaches to conflict management.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Richard Jackson. 2001. 'Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict *Negotiation Journal* 17(1): 59-77.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Scott S. Gartner. 2006. 'Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation' *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

Bercovitch, Jacob., Theodore Anagnoson & Donnette L. Wille. 1991. 'Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations' *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 7-17.

Blattman, Christopher & Edward Miguel. 2010. 'Civil War' *The Journal of Economic Literature 48(1): 3-57.*

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2011. 'Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation' *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (4): 859-881.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2010. 'The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third–Party Interventions' *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 167–178.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2009. 'International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties' *International Interactions* 35 (3): 298–319.

Buhaug Halvard., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch., Helge Holtermann., Gudrun Østby, & Andreas Forø Tollefsen. 2011 'It's the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict Outbreak Location' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(5): 814-840.

Buhaug, Halvard., Scott Gates & Päivi Lujala. 2009. 'Geography, rebel capability, and the duration of civil conflict' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 544-569.

Carnevale, Peter J. 1986. 'Strategic choice in mediation' *Negotiation Journal* 2(1): 41-56.

Cederman, Lars-Erik., Nils B. Weidmann & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 478-95.

Cetinyan, Rupen. 2002. 'Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention' *International Organization* 56(03): 645-677.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi & James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited' *Public Choice* 143(1): 67-101.

Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler. 2004. 'The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War' *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper.* Available

at www.uib.es/depart/deaweb/smed/pdf/collier.pdf *accessed 12.06.12.*

Collier, Paul., Lance Elliot., Håvard Hegre., Anke Hoeffler., Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development Policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crescenzi, Mark J.C., Kelly M. Kadera., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Clayton L. Thyne. 2011. 'The Supply Side Theory of Mediation' *International Studies Quarterly* 55(4): 1069-1094.

Crocker, Chester A., Fen O. Hampson & Pamela Aall. 1999. *Herding Cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Crush, Linda. 2007. 'When mediation fails child protection: Lessons for the future' *Canadian Journal of Family Law* 23(1): 55–92.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan. 2009. 'It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570-597.

DeRouen, Karl, Jnr. & Jacob Bercovitch. 2012. 'Trends in Civil War Mediation' in Joseph J. Hewitt., Jonathan Wilkenfeld., Ted R. Gurr & Birger Heldt. *Peace and Conflict 2012.* Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/. Accessed 30.05.12.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr., Jacob Bercovitch & Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. 'Introducing the new Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.

De Rouen, Karl R, Jnr & David Sobek. 2004. 'The dynamics of civil war duration and Outcome' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 303-320.

Deutsch, Morton, 1973. *The resolution of conflict: constructive and destructive processes.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dixon, William J, 1996. 'Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement' *International Organization* 50(4): 653-681.

Dixon, William. 1993. 'Democracy and the Management of International Conflict' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1): 42-68.

Dorussen, Han & Hugh Ward. 2008. 'Inter Governmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 189-212.

Elgström, Ole., Jacob Bercovitch & Carl Skau. 2003. 'Regional Organizations and International Mediation: The Effectiveness of Insider Mediators' *African Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3(1): 111-127.

Esteban, Joan & Debraj Ray. 2001. 'Social Decision Rules are Not Immune to

Conflict' *Economics and Goverance* 2(1) 59-67.

Fearon, James D. 2005. 'Primary commodity exports and civil war' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 483-507.

Fearon, James D. 2004. 'Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275-301.

Fearon, James D. 1998. 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict' in David Lake and Donald Rothchild eds., *The international spread of ethnic conflict : fear, diffusion, and escalation.* Chichester: Princeton University Press, 107-126.

Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War' *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Fearon, James D & David Laitin. 2003. 'Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war' *The American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Fisher, Roger. D. 1972. 'Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16(1): 67-94.

Fisher, Roger. D., William L. Ury & Bruce Patton. 1982. *Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in.* London: Hutchinson.

Gartner, Scott. S. 2011. 'Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability' *The Journal of Politics* 73(2): 380-390.

Gartner, Scott. S. & Jacob Bercovitch. 2006. 'Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contributions of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements' *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4): 819-840.

Gartner, Scott. S., Molly Melin & Jacob Bercovitch. 2004. 'The Opposing Effects of Mediation on Conflict Settlement Durability' Paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Gent, Stephen R. 2011. 'Relative rebel strength and power sharing in intrastate conflict' *International Interactions* 37(2): 215-228.

Ghobarah, Adam H., Paul Huth & Bruce Russett. 2003. 'Civil wars kill and maim people - Long after the shooting stops' *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 189-202..

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2007. 'Transnational Dimensions of Civil War' *Journal of Peace Research* 44(3): 293-309.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 2002. 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–637.

Greig, Michael J. 2005. 'Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?'

American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 249-266.

Greig, Michael J. 2001. 'Moments of Opportunity: Sources of Ripeness Among Enduring Rivals' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 691-718.

Greig, Michael J & Patrick Regan. 2008. 'When do they say yes? An analysis of the willingness to offer and accept mediation in civil wars' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 759-781.

Greig, Michael J & Paul Diehl. 2006. 'Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy' *International Interactions* 32(4): 355-384.

Höglund, Kristine & Isak Svensson. 2011. 'Schizophrenic Soothers: The International Community and contrast strategies for peace-making in Sri Lanka' *Cooperation and Conflict* 46(2): 166-184.

Hopmann, Terrence P. 2001. 'Bargaining and Problem solving: Two Perspectives on International Negotiation.' In Chester A. Crocker., Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall. *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict* Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace.

Hopmann, Terrance P. 1996. *The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Jackson, Richard. 2000. 'Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(3): 323-343.

Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. 'Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(2): 360-389.

Kloppenberg, Lisa A. 2001. 'Implementation of court-annexed environmental mediation: The district of Oregon pilot project' *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution* 17(3): 559–596.

Kressel, Kenneth. 1972. *Labour mediation : an exploratory survey* New York: Association of Labour Agencies.

Kriesberg, Louis. 2001. 'Mediation and transformation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 38(2): 373–392.

Kriesberg, Louis. 1996. 'Varieties of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International Relations'. In Jacob Bercovitch ed. *Resolving international conflicts : the theory and practice of mediation.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kydd, Andrew. 2006. 'When can mediators build trust?' *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 449-462.

Kydd, Andrew. 2003. 'Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.

Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2005. 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths' *European Journal of Population* 21(2): 145-166.

Lake, David A. 2010. 'Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War' *International Security* 35(3): 7-52.

Lake, David A. 2003. 'International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices' *International Studies Review* 5(4): 81-90.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2012. *Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources.* London: Hurst and Co.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. 'The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts' *Political Geography* 20(5): 561–584.

Leng, Russell J. & Patrick Regan. 2003. 'Culture and Negotiation in Militarized Interstate Disputes' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20(2): 111-132.

Licklider, Roy E. 1995. 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993' *The American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681-690.

Licklider, Roy E. 1993. *Stopping the killing : how civil wars end.* London: New York University Press.

Lujala, Päivi. 2010. 'The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural Resources' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(1): 15-28.

Lujala, Päivi., Jan Ketil Rød & Nadja Thieme. 2007. 'Fighting over oil: Introducing a new Dataset' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(3): 239-256.

Lujala, Päivi., Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Elisabeth Gilmore. 2005. 'A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 538-562.

Mareschal, Patrice M. 2005. 'What makes mediation work? Mediators' perspectives on resolving disputes' *Industrial Relations* 44(3): 509–517.

Mattes, Michaela & Burcu Savun. 2010. 'Information, Agreement Design and the Durability of Civil War Settlements' *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 511-524.

Mattes, Michaela & Burcu Savun. 2009. 'Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design' *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3) 737-759.

Maundi, Mohammed O., William I Zartman., Gilbert Khadiagala & Kwaku Nuamah. 2006. *Getting in: Mediators' entry into the settlement of African conflicts.* Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Melin, Molly. 2011. 'The Impact of State Relationships on If, When and How

Conflict Management Occurs' *International Studies Quarterly* 55(3): 691-715.

Melin, Molly M & Isak Svensson. 2009. 'Incentives for talking: Accepting mediation in international and civil wars' *International Interactions* 35(3): 249-271.

Miall, Hugh A. *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945* London: Palgrave.

Mitchell, Christopher. 1993. The processes and stages of mediation: The Sudanese case. In David Sobek ed. *Making war and waging peace : foreign intervention in Africa.* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 749-759.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Kelly M. Kadera, and Mark J.C. Crescenzi. 2008. 'Practicing Democratic Community Norms: Third Party Conflict Management and Successful Settlements'. In Jacob Bercovitch and Scott S. Gartner eds. *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings.* London: Routledge.

Moore, Christopher. W. 1986. *The mediation process: practical strategies for resolving conflict.* London: Jossey-Bass.

Nilsson, Desirée. 2010. 'Turning Weakness into Strength: Military Capabilities, Multiple Rebel Groups and Negotiated Settlements' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(3): 253-271.

Organski, Abramo F. K. 1960. *World Politics.* New York: Knopf.

Ott, Marvin C. 1972. 'Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases' *International Organization* 26(4): 595-618.

Pillar, Paul R. 1983. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Powell, Robert. 2006. 'War as a Commitment Problem' *International Organization* 60(1): 169-203.

Powell, Robert. 2004. 'The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Incomplete Information' *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 231-241.

Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Princen, Thomas. 1992. *Intermediaries in international conflict.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pruitt, Dean G & Kenneth Kressel. 1989. 'Introduction: An Overview of Mediation Research'. In by Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt eds. *Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention.* London: Jossey-

Bass.

Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management' *World Politics* 58(2): 207-41.

Regan, Patrick. 2010. 'Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Study with Prospective Ideas' *Civil Wars* 12(4): 456-476.

Regan, Patrick & Allan C. Stam. 2000. 'In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes' *International Studies Quarterly* 44(2): 239-260.

Reno, William. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Richmond, Oliver. 1998. 'Devious objectives and the disputants' view of international mediation: A theoretical framework' *Journal of Peace Research* 35(6): 707-722.

Rome, Dunitru L. 2003. 'A guide to business to business mediation' *Dispute Resolution Journal* 57(4): 51–59.

Ross, Michael L. 2004. 'What do we know about natural resources and civil war?' *Journal of Peace Research,* 41(3): 337-356.

Rubin, Jeffrey Z. 1995. 'Asymmetrical Negotiations: Some Survey Results that may Surprize' *Negotiation Journal* 11(4): 349-64.

Rubin, Jeffrey Z. 1991. *The Dynamics of Third-Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East.* New York: Praeger.

Sartori, Anne E. 2003. 'An Estimator for Some Binary Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions' *Political Analysis* 11(2): 111–138.

Savun, Barcu. 2008. 'Information Bias, and Mediation Success' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(1): 25-47.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1967. *Arms and Influence.* New Haven: Yale University.

Schmidt, Holger. 2004. 'Biased for Peace? Commitment Problems, Impartiality, and the Effectiveness of Third Party Guarantees' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago.

Schneider, Gerald., Jacob Bercovitch & Torsten J. Selck. 2006. 'The Dispute or the Mediator? Structural and Personal Factors in Mediation' Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego.

Schrodt, Philip A. & Deborah. J. Gerner. 2004. 'An Event Data Analysis of Third-Party Mediation' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(3): 310-330.

Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. 'The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States' *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 123-135.

Snyder, Richard & Ravi Bhavnani. 2005. 'Diamonds, blood and taxes: A revenue-centered framework for explaining political order' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 563-597.

Svensson, Isak. 2009. 'Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 446–469.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. 'Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 114-163.

Svensson, Isak. 2006. *Elusive Peacemakers: A Bargaining Perspective on Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts*, Dissertation thesis, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Report no 75.

Terris, Lesley G. & Zeev Maoz. 2005. 'Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test' *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5): 563-583.

Toft, Monica D. 2009. *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Touval. Saadia & William I. Zartman. 1985. *International mediation in theory and practice.* New York: Westview Press.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2011. *Database* www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

Wagner, Harrison R. 2000. 'Bargaining and War' *American Journal of Political Science*. 44(3): 469-484.

Wall, James A. 1981. 'Mediation: An analysis, review and proposed research' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25(1): 157–180.

Wall, James A. & Timothy C. Dunne. 2012. 'Mediation Research: A Current Review' *Negotiation Journal* 28(2): 217-244.

Wall, James A. John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer. 2001. 'Mediation: A current review and theory development' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 370–391.

Wall, James A. & Ann Lynn. 1993. 'Mediation: A current review' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1): 160–194.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to peace: the successful settlement of civil wars* Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. 'The critical barrier to civil war settlement' *International Organization* 51(3): 335-364.

Ward, Michael D., Brian D. Greenhill & Kristin M. Bakke. 2010. 'The Perils of Policy by p-value: Predicting Civil Conflicts' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 363-375.

Ward, Michael D & Nils B. Weidmann. 2010. 'Predicting Conflict in Space and Time' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(6): 883-901.

Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. 'Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598-624.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan., Kathleen Young., David Quinn & Victor Asal. 2005. *Mediating International Crises*. London: Routledge.

Witkin, Nathan. 2008. 'Interest group mediation: A mechanism for controlling and improving congressional lobbying practices' *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution* 23(2): 373–420.

Wright, Quincy. 1965. *A Study of War.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Young, Oran R, 1967. *The intermediaries: third parties in international crises.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman. William I. 2000. 'Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond'. In Paul Stern & Daniel Druckman eds. *International Conflict Resolution: After the Cold War.* Washington DC: National Academy.

Notes

[1] In total, mediation occurred in 94 of the 324 episodes included within the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Termination Dataset. 39 of the 94 mediated cases achieved either a ceasefire or formal settlement (which remained in force for at least 12 months) (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011).

[2] For example, at the end of 2011 only one inter-state conflict remained active (the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia). In comparison there were 27 active internal armed conflict fought between an incumbent and one or more internal opposition group(s), and 9 active internationalized internal armed conflicts fought between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides (UCDP, 2012).

[3] According to conventional measures in this period almost one third of all states have fallen into civil war (1000+ battlefield deaths), while over half have suffered some form of civil violence (+25 battlefield deaths) (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).

[4] The rationalist account does not always assume that violence has already broken out, only that it is the expected result of bargaining failure (Fearon, 1995).

[5] Issue indivisibilities have been raised as a third mechanism that can prevent efficient bargaining. However, in theory side payments and issue linkage should make most issues divisible. Further, on those occasions in which this situation occurs it is not created by the bargaining dynamics (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).

[6] The bargaining framework is the dominant approach in conflict studies, which provides the foundation for many of the theories in civil and inter-state war, negotiation and mediation. As such it offers a solid framework for this research project to build upon. However, it is not without limitations. For a good account of a number of the inadequacies of the bargaining approach, see Lake (2010).

[7] For a more comprehensive account of the actions that fall into the differing mediation strategies, see studies by Wilkenfeld et al. (2005); Beardsley et al. (2006) and Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006).

[8] Manipulative mediation is also referred to as directive mediation (Kressel, 1972; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006) and power mediation (Keashly & Fisher, 1996; Princen, 1992).

[9] Research has shown the strengths and limitations of the differing approaches, which have differing effects upon the short-term and long-term bargaining environment (Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Beardsley, 2008).

[10] This is not always the case, mediation can also take place with more devious intentions. For example, belligerents might use mediaiton to gain an advantage by stalling the conflict to rearm, recruit or regroup (Beardsley, 2009; Richmond, 1998).

[11] A number of authors have also found no significant relationship between negotiation and the relative power of belligerents (Miall, 1992; Terris & Maoz, 2005; Dixon, 1993).

Paper One:

Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation

Govinda Clayton

The Conflict Analysis Research Centre

The University of Kent

Abstract

To what extent does the relative strength of a rebel movement impact upon the likelihood of a peace settlement in civil conflict? This paper argues that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problem that can prevent the resolution of war. Relatively strong insurgents can more credibly communicate the threat against government interests. This should make incumbents more open to the entrance of an intermediary. Stronger groups are also the most likely to gain guarantees against government defection, increasing the probability of settlement. This argument is tested using dyadic data that captures the relative position of insurgents in civil war from 1946 to 2004. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has previously relied upon aggregate country-level data. The results suggest that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and eventually concede some form of settlement. This is further evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data.

Introduction

In 1994 a ceasefire was agreed between the defense force of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the Azerbaijani army. This agreement was the result of the tenth mediation process in the two-year episode of violence. In the same period Thailand failed in an attempt to mediate the conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Burmese military regime. Despite over five decades of fighting the creation of a constructive dialogue remained elusive.[1] The rebels involved in these two conflicts held quite different levels of capacity. The NKR army is a well-equipped and professionally trained fighting unit, while the KNU are a weak lightly armed insurgent force. This paper investigates the extent to which this variance in belligerent capabilities effects mediation.

Studies of civil war mediation are yet to uncover a relationship between belligerent capabilities and conflict management outcomes (Svensson, 2009). Using state based indicators to account for the distribution of capabilities (e.g. per capita income), existing work has been guilty of an over-reliance upon aggregate data. When considering the impact of capabilities upon conflict dynamics, it is more likely that the dyadic relationship between the state and non-state group is of greatest importance (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). Building upon this assumption, this paper investigates the following question: to what extent does the strength of a rebel movement, relative to the state, impact upon the likelihood of a mediation process occurring and ultimately securing an agreement?

I argue that an unequal distribution of capabilities intensifies the scale of the strategic bargaining problem. This lowers the probability of (i) a mediation process being initiated and (ii) a settlement being produced. The *initiation* of mediation provides legitimacy and recognition to a non-state force. A state is likely to resist

intermediaries until the cost of mediation is outweighed by the anticipated price of continued conflict. I put forward that a significant power asymmetry prevents rebels from significantly threatening state interests and credibly communicating their resolve. Weak rebels should therefore have more difficulty convincing the state that the costs of mediation are worth enduring. Mediation should then be less likely when the state is faced with relatively weak rebels. The *outcome* of a mediation process is largely dependent upon the belligerents overcoming the commitment problem. For this to be achieved incumbents must often make concessions on key issues of security. The state is less likely to make these concessions to weak rebels who pose a smaller threat to their interests. Settlements are therefore less likely when a conflict involves a weak insurgent force.

To examine these ideas empirically I use a Sartori selection model to analyze 319 civil conflicts drawn from the Civil War Mediation dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). This data includes 1520 conflict years between 1946 and 2004, 236 of which involved a mediation event. Recently released dyadic data is used to capture the relative position of insurgents (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). This data draws upon a variety of factors including military capacity, political leadership and territorial control. All analysis suggests that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to enter into mediation and eventually force some form of settlement.

Mediation Onset

The Incentives for Dialogue in Civil War

Rebel groups have strong incentives to open any form of dialogue with the government (Greig & Regan, 2008; Melin & Svensson, 2009). One of the defining characteristics of civil conflict is the power asymmetry between disputants (Zartman,

1995). Insurgents are more likely to lack the military capabilities and political legitimacy held by the state. A dialogue process can help to overcome this asymmetry by raising the status of rebels. Gaining a seat at the negotiating table elevates actors from insurgents to political figures, a difficult transition to achieve solely through military means. The onset of a dialogue process is also an important concession achieved by the rebels, which moves them closer to their political demands and a peaceful conclusion to the conflict.

The government has far fewer incentives to enter into dialogue with insurgents. At the onset of a civil conflict the government should possess a larger army, more military allies and greater access to resources than their non-state opponent (Gent, 2011). This structural advantage should lead the state to reject the legitimacy of the rebels and seek a military rather than diplomatic solution. Rebel movements are often dismissed as terrorists, criminals or some other form of group not deserving of a political voice. Instead, incumbents are often content to endure the costs of conflict provided that they can be kept to a low manageable level (Walter, 1997). Only when a rebel movement has proven its ability to challenge the state militarily will they be willing to enter negotiation.

This divergence in incentives is particular to civil war, for within inter-state conflict both belligerents are afforded international legitimacy as sovereign powers. Therefore while states engaged in inter-state conflict can open dialogue without serious cost, a government embezzled within civil war will only enter into negotiation when the costs associated with a process are outweighed by potential benefits of conflict resolution (Melin & Svensson, 2009).

The Incentives for Mediation in Civil War

Mediation is a form of conflict management in which a third party controls some aspect(s) of the dialogue process. Mediation is always a voluntary and can only occur when both belligerents accept (or request) assistance from an intermediary.

Mediation accentuates the costs associated with bilateral negotiation. The introduction of an international actor confers a more significant level of domestic and international recognition upon the rebels. It clearly signals that the government has lost the capacity required to effectively control its territory (Melin & Svensson, 2009). This demonstration of state weakness can harm the government's reputation for resisting insurgent demands, resulting in both increased support for the rebel movement and motivation for other challengers to take up arms (Walter, 2006; Toft, 2003). Unlike bilateral negotiation, the onset of mediation also signals a loss of decisional autonomy for the belligerents. This is particularly challenging for the incumbent who stands to give up political, economic or territorial control. In this way mediation increases the likelihood that the dialogue process will produce a suboptimal agreement for the state. These costs act as powerful incentives for the state to resist mediation.

What mediation can provide the government is a mechanism to escape from violent conflict. A large body of research has shown mediation to be very effective in fulfilling this role (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Beardsley et al. 2006; Beardsley, 2011). When the costs associated with mediation are superseded by the desire to end violent conflict, mediation is more likely. The onset of mediation is therefore determined by the state's desire for peace, weighed against the expected costs of accepting an intermediary. In this way it is the state's preferences that define when and where mediation will occur. This effectively elevates the status of the incumbent to sole veto power in the initiation of civil war mediation.

Relative Rebel Strength

Civil wars are extreme dyadic interactions between the state and a rebel movement. Capturing this dyadic component is necessary to accurately assess the dynamics underpinning civil war (Lujala, 2010; Buhaug et al. 2009; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). This is of particular importance when studying the influence of relative power within conflict. The strength of belligerents is related to a wide variety of factors, including the size, equipment, location and leadership structure of an armed force (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004). However, the absolute strength of a belligerent is less important than their strength in relation to their opponent. For example, the Taliban are currently ill matched in fight against the Afghan state. With US-lead coalition forces fighting on the government's side, the Taliban is at a great military disadvantage. Yet when the coalition forces eventually withdraws from Afghanistan, the Taliban forces (having remained constant) will quickly enjoy a more favorable distribution of power within the state.

Most rebel movements are relatively weak in relation to the incumbent. Groups such as the KNU in Myanmar and the Chechens in Russia lack the mobilization capacity and technological development required to fundamentally challenge the state. However groups such as the NKR force in Azerbaijan have grown to a level that matches state forces. This requires a significant mobilization potential and a formulized leadership structure. On rare occasions, most commonly in the presence of a weak state, rebels can grow to a point that their capacity supersedes the government. To achieve this, groups must be able to amass significant military force, control significant portions of territory outside the capital, and often offer alternate forms of governance (e.g. NPFL in Liberia).

Existing studies of mediation have failed to capture the dyadic power relations within civil conflict, and have therefore failed to uncover a relationship between belligerent strength and mediation (Svensson, 2009). This paper builds upon recent innovations in the civil war literature, developing a theoretical argument that is based upon the relative rather than absolute power of belligerents.

Relative Rebel Strength and the Incentives for Mediation

When a state has a high probability of military victory the incentives to initiate any form of dialogue (least of all mediation) are small. Given the opportunity to defeat a weaker opponent upon the battlefield, most actors prefer some form of imposed rather than negotiated solution (Modelski, 1964). A mediator is likely to hinder the state's ability to comprehensively defeat their opponent. (Wehr, 1979; Greig, 2001; Princen, 1992). Thus when the state believes military victory is achievable, the demand for mediation should be low.

If a rebel movement can overcome the collective action problem and survive the weaker more vulnerable phases of existence, the state's probability of victory should be reduced (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). When a group mobilizes a sizeable force and demonstrates its ability to endure the costs of conflict, government victory is less likely. In addition to being harder to defeat, stronger rebel movements can more credibly threaten key government interests. This increases the costs associated with continued conflict and raises the state's incentives to accept mediation. As a result the introduction of a mediator in situations closer to power parity is less likely to be resisted by the state.

Relative Rebel Strength and the Asymmetric Information Problem

The relative strength of a rebel force can also shape the scale of the asymmetric information problem. Intra-state war has been shown to be a rational pursuit resulting from the incentives to misrepresent information, and the challenges associated with credibly committing to an agreement (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 1997; Walter, 2002). To peacefully resolve a dispute this strategic bargaining problem must be overcome. Government actors are unlikely to endure the costs associated with dialogue when rebel forces lack the ability to credibly communicate a sufficient level of capacity and resolve.

A relatively stronger rebel group is better equipped to inflict notable military damage upon the states forces (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Gent, 2011). In this sense the capabilities of the group more quickly become public knowledge. Being better equipped to communicate their strength, stronger rebel movements should be less prone to issues of asymmetric information. State rulers should therefore be more inclined to make concessions and enter mediation with such groups.

The response of the Liberian state to the rise of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) is an example of this process. The NPFL, with support from mercenaries and neighboring states, quickly demonstrated their ability to threaten state security. Threatened by the credible demonstration of strength, the Government quickly conceded and agreed to mediation. After only tens months of violence the NPFL were invited into dialogue with a number of actors including the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative (Wei, 2007). This state concession provided significant legitimacy to the NPFL (and other warlords in the conflict), and was no doubt a response to the force that the rebels had quickly communicated (Wei, 2007).

There are two potential issues that could be raised against this argument. Firstly, when rebels have grown to the extent that they can challenge the state on a military basis, what incentive do they have to engage in dialogue? As much as we might expect the state to be resistant to opening dialogue with weak rebels, strong rebels could adopt a similar stance when the governments strength and resolve is in doubt. Yet this understanding ignores one of the key distinctions between government and rebel actors. While the state automatically enjoys the legitimacy associated with central control, rebel groups are consistently attempting to generate both domestic and international recognition. Engaging in a mediation process provides both recognition and legitimacy, and elevates rebels' status as a political actor. It therefore seems highly unlikely that a rebel movement would ever veto the initiation of mediation. For example in the Liberian civil war (1989-1997) mentioned above, while Charles Taylor (the leader of the NPFL) held a military advantage over the state for a number of years, he often engaged in some form of mediation. Thus while a settlement eluded the actors, the leader of the non-state force was still willing to continue the dialogue process.

Secondly, if a strong rebel group can dispel informational asymmetries and get the government to talk, why does the state not opt for less costly bilateral negotiations? Given the reduction in uncertainty surrounding a rebel group's strength, the need for a mediator to alleviate informational asymmetries might be reduced. However, while the core information problem regarding the basic resolve and capacity of a rebel movement is reduced when a group is relatively strong, fundamentally solving the issue of asymmetric information and dividing the contested utility remains a significant challenge. At the same time strong rebel movements pose the most significant threat to the population and property of the state, creating a more

serious and challenging context that is more likely to require a mediator (Greig & Regan, 2008; Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006). Therefore, the difficulties associated with dividing utility in line with capabilities, coupled with the shadow of serious violence, make mediation more likely to be undertaken in the high-stakes conflicts between states and strong rebels.

From the above discussion a first hypothesis can be derived.

Hypothesis 1: Mediation is more likely the stronger a rebel group is relative to the state.

Mediation Outcome

Bargaining Failure in Civil War

In theory all belligerents should favor the peaceful resolution of violence. Conflict produces significant costs for all actors that would be prevented in the absence of war. Therefore were all belligerents to have full and accurate knowledge of their opponent, a settlement that divides the contended utility in line with the distribution of capabilities should be achievable (Kydd, 2003; Kydd, 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006).

However, parties within conflict often have incentives to misrepresent information (Filson & Werner, 2007; Fearon, 1995; Smith & Stam, 2004). For example, actors seeking to secure a more favorable arrangement might exaggerate their military strength and political resolve. This undermines the credibility of information that is provided, and often leads belligerents to question the point at which their opponent will be willing to resolve the war (Svensson, 2007).

The problem of asymmetric information is compounded by a climate of mutual mistrust. Belligerents can struggle to credibility communicate peaceful intentions, in particular regarding commitment to agreements (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 1997). When the incentives for cooperation are expected to change over time, it is challenging for the potential beneficiary to guarantee that they will not renege in the future (Beardsley, 2008). The incentives that each actor may have to later renege on any agreement can, in a same way as they can lead to the onset of conflict, also prevent the resolution of war (Beardsley et al. 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005).

This problem is intensified within civil conflict, as unlike international war in which the opponents can retreat to their own territories, actors must live together in the wake of an agreement (Walter, 1997). Any form of disarmament will therefore involve a period of intense vulnerability for at least one actor.

Mediation in Civil War

Mediation has proven an effective means through which disputants can resolve their incompatibilities (Beardsley et al. 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005). The onset of a mediation process can often help belligerents to overcome the common bargaining challenges.

The introduction of a mediator who can obtain private information about the disputant's capabilities or resolve (reservation point), can help overcome the problems associated with asymmetric information and strategic interaction (Kydd, 2006; Kydd, 2003; Rauchhaus, 2006). By insuring a more credible flow of information the mediator can foster a more accurate conception of both parties' positions, allowing them to set reservation points more in keeping with reality. In this sense a mediator

can help to reveal information that might only otherwise become available on the battlefield.

Mediators can also help to overcome commitment problems. Third parties can provide economic and political incentives that deter parties from defection until the security situation has stabilized and actor vulnerability is reduced (Beardsley, 2011: 172). Having located a mutually acceptable agreement a mediator can provide positive inducements to sweeten a deal, counterbalancing future incentives for exploitation that might prevent the creation of an agreement. Mediation also increases the likelihood of third-party security guarantees (i.e. monitoring or enforcement), which can reduce the belligerent's fears of exploitation (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). In this way mediators reduce the credible commitment problem by serving as trustees, or as Beardsley (2011: 172) has suggested, provide 'bridges to more self-enforcing arrangements'.

Relative Rebel Strength and Strategic Uncertainty in Mediation

The success of a mediator is closely connected to the scale of the task with which they are faced. In those cases in which there is a high level of strategic uncertainty, mediation has a lower likelihood of producing an agreement. For example, if disputants have radically different perceptions of their relative capabilities, the potential for a mediator to resolve the information failure is likely to be diminished.

The relative strength of an insurgent group is an important determinant of the level of strategic uncertainty. Relatively strong rebels are better equipped to demonstrate their capabilities on the battlefield, and reduce issues of asymmetric information surrounding their strength. Conversely, weaker rebels are often based in

the state's periphery upon inaccessible terrain, or some other location that limits the state's ability to project force against the group (Buhaug, 2010). For these actors survival is often based upon avoiding direct confrontation with the state's military. This makes it far more challenging for the state to observe the true strength of the movement, increasing the problem of asymmetric information. It should then be easier for a mediator to overcome the problem of private information when the rebels are more closely matched with the state.

Relatively strong rebels are also more likely to reduce the problem of commitment. In the early phases of disarmament relatively strong rebel forces should remain capable of self-defense in the event of government defection. Whereas weak rebel movements that have survived on account of their clandestine operations, are more exposed and vulnerable if the government quickly reneges on the deal. Weak groups should therefore require additional guarantees before they agree to disarm.

But weak groups are also less likely to force concessions on issues such as third party monitoring, security sector reform and territorial autonomy, which are often required to protect against government defection (Gent, 2011). Relatively weak movements have few options away from the negotiation, and cannot credibly threaten to escalate the violence. Being in a position of great disparity weak rebels are not designed for the militarily destruction the state, but focused on the continued existence of their movement (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004; Collier et al. 2004). Their goals are centered upon inflicting accumulated costs that undermine the level of popular support in the government. The onset of mediation suggests that this has occurred, but once within the process the insurgents have few additional options to trade for commitment-enhancing concessions.

On the other hand, relatively strong rebels can credibly threaten to abandon a mediation process and continue a conflict that is presumably hurting the state. The mediator can exploit this bargaining position to generate *time pressure* and the perception of an *imminent catastrophe* for both disputants (Ott, 1972; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Zartman 1985). With more leverage, a mediator should be better equipped to stretch evenly matched actors to their reservation points, increasing the probability of settlement.

One example of this process is the continuing conflict in the Middle East. The Palestinian insurgents have certainly demonstrated their ability to continue their resistance in the face of the strongest forms of Israeli repression. This credible commitment to continue their struggle eventually forced Israel to open meaningful dialogue with the Palestinians. Mediation has now become a relatively common feature within the conflict. However as the Palestinians lack the ability to seriously escalate the status quo costs, they cannot provide powerful enough incentives for Israel to concede ground in negotiations. This significantly lowers the likelihood of a positive outcome.

On the other hand the agreement signed in 1999 between President Kabbah of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) shows the impact of rebel strength. The deal was made possible by the RUF's continued siege of Freetown, which eventually wore down Kabbah's resolve and resulted in concessions. The relative strength of the rebels was clearly demonstrated through military actions, and ensured that the agreement offered by the incumbent satisfied the insurgent's demands.

From the preceding discussion a second hypothesis can be derived.

Hypothesis 2: A mediation is more likely to be successful the stronger a rebel group is

relative to the state.

Method

Data

In order to test the hypotheses, I analyze the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). Building on Uppsala's Armed Conflict Termination data (ACT) (Kreutz, 2010), the CWM dataset includes information on all 317 civil war episodes[2] that meet the UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war (UCDP, 2011). The temporal span is 1946 to 2003.

The CWM dataset defines mediation as

> ...a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law (Bercovitch et al. 1991).

To better account for multiple mediation attempts over a conflicts life span, I separate the conflict episodes into individual years. An individual observation is created for each year that a conflict produced more than 25 battlefield deaths. This results in a population of 1520 observations (conflict years). This data specification corrects for a bias common within previous studies of mediation, in which the presence or absence of mediation has been coded in relation to the whole conflict with no consideration for the conflicts duration.[3]

Model

The factors that shape the initiation of mediation are also likely to be the causal forces that shape the outcome of the process (Svensson, 2007; Greig & Regan, 2008). Belligerents' decision to accept (or reject) mediation should be closely connected to their behavior once mediation has begun. Mediation might then only take place when actors are predisposed towards a certain outcome. When the two phases (initiation and outcome) are modeled independently this important selection effect is omitted.

Previous studies have used the Heckman selection model to capture this effect. But the Heckman model is only appropriate when at least one 'extra' explanatory factor influences the selection but not the outcome. This 'exclusion restriction' helps the model to differentiate the impact of explanatory variables on the two phases. In the case of mediation, an appropriate exclusion would be a variable that is correlated with the initiation of the process, but not with the outcome. It is hard to locate any distinct predictors for the selection of mediation. This largely undermines the accuracy of results generated using this approach (Sartori, 2003).

Instead I opt for Sartori's selection estimator, based upon the identifying assumption that the error term for an observation is the same in the two equations. This model is appropriate when there are good theoretical reasons to believe that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both selection and outcome would be the same. I have argued that the costs imposed on a state when accepting mediation provide a strong incentive for the incumbent to resist mediation. Only when the resolve of the state is diminished (i.e. reduction in probability of victory / increase in conflict cost) will mediation occur. This reduction in the unobservable 'resolve' is also likely to be strongly correlated with an increase in the probability of settlement. This suggests that the Sartori model is an appropriate choice, as the unmeasured /

unobserved variables that encourage states to accept mediation also increase the likelihood of success.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable for the selection analysis is a dichotomous variable coding whether mediation occurred in each conflict year. Following literature based upon conflict onset if a mediation process continues into the following calendar year mediation onset is coded as missing to prevent the same mediation being counted for subsequent years. Despite being the most common form of intra-state conflict management, mediation is still a relatively rare event. Of the 1520 conflict years included in the dataset, only 236 witnessed the onset of mediation (15%). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict had the highest number of years involving the initiation of mediation (22).

The dependent variable in the outcome analysis draws upon the CWM data's coding of a mediation process as either unsuccessful, a ceasefire, process settlement, partial settlement or full settlement. From this I construct a binary success measure based on whether mediation is classified as achieving a partial or a full settlement.[4] This method does not provide a comprehensive evaluation as to the effectiveness of mediation. Agreements do not always bring an end to the violence, nor guarantee that the conflict will not recur. However, given the inherent difficulties in locating terminal points in dynamic processes, the signing of a political agreement represents an important first step in the search for a comprehensive resolution of the conflict (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011: 666; Touval & Zartman, 1985). In this way both partial and more complete agreements are breakthroughs that signify a noteworthy achievement for the mediator (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011;

Jackson 2000). Therefore despite the limitations, the likelihood of a settlement does represent a valid indicator of one important element of mediator effectiveness (Bercovitch, 2007).

Of the 180 conflict years in which mediation was initiated, 78 produced some notable form of agreement (43%). The Sudanese civil war enjoyed the highest number of successful events, while the conflicts within India (Nagaland) and Indonesia (East Timor) suffered the most failures. This reflects of the main argument of this paper, that weak rebels are less likely to produce successful conflict management outcomes.

Independent Variables

Relative rebel strength is assessed using three sources of data that capture the dyadic relations between disputants. From the non-state actor dataset (NSA) I adopt an ordinal variable that measures the relative strength of the rebels in relation to the state (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). Based on a three-point scale this measure codes the existence of weaker, evenly matched or stronger rebel movements.[5] I also adopt a dichotomous measure coded 1 if a rebel movement was at least in parity with the state. The NSA dataset was created using qualitative assessments of a number of key areas in which the rebel's strength could be weighed against the state. These included the rebels command structure, mobilization capacity, ability to procure arms, fighting capacity and level of territorial control. This is the most comprehensive measure of relative rebel capacity currently available.

In addition to the NSA data I draw upon a measure of relative rebel capacity taken from the UCDP database (UCDP, 2011). The variable is constructed by calculating the scaled value of the state forces divided by the number of troops in a rebel movement.[6] Scaling the state force accounts for multiple insurgencies within the

same state, which we would expect to require a division of government forces (Wood, 2010). The scaled value of the state force is calculated by multiplying the total number of government forces by the proportion of troops. As the UCDP data focuses solely upon troop numbers, it fails to capture a number of important elements of fighting capacity (e.g. artillery and aircraft) (Wood, 2010). It also has temporal restrictions only covering the period from 1989 to 2002. Therefore the analysis of the UCDP data will utilize a smaller subset of the CWM dataset that focuses solely on the post-cold war era.

In addition to the direct measures of relative rebel strength, I also include a measure of conflict location. This indicator records the distance from the states capital city to the first recorded site of violence (Buhaug, 2010). Distances from the capital range from 0 km (normally coup d'état) to 3360 km (the separatist conflict in Indonesian West Papua). Incumbent's power is generally centered in the capital city, if the government is forced to fight over long distances its strength and strategic advantage is mitigated (Boulding, 1963; Buhaug et al. 2009). Relatively weak rebels are therefore more likely to be based in the periphery of the state, in a location that limits the ability of the government to project its force effectively (Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug et al. 2009; DeRouen & Sobek, 2004). Whereas relatively strong rebels are more likely to be located close to the capital, in an area that facilitates an attack on the center of government power.[7]

All three data sources highlight the prevalence of weak rebel movements. Only 13% of conflict years involved rebels that were at least in parity with the state; over 50% of conflicts were fought more than 300kms for the capital; and the average rebel force has a capacity of only 0.37 of the state army. These findings are in keeping

with the argument that strong rebels should be more capable of forcing concessions and securing a quicker conclusion to the violence.

Controls

I control for a number of factors previously shown to affect the onset and outcome of mediation. Recent work highlighted an adverse selection effect, in which a number of features shown to increase the probability of mediation occurring also reduce the likelihood of a successful outcome. To account for this I include a measure of incompatibility type, conflict intensity and conflict duration. The incompatibility variable is coded 1 if a conflict is fought over territorial issues (UCDP, 2011). The intensity variable is also a dummy variable coded 1 if a conflict crosses the 1000 deaths per year threshold (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). The duration variable records the years since conflict onset. I also include a duration-squared variable to account for the diminishing effect of duration over time.

Parallel conflicts within a state are likely to require a division of state forces that might improve the relative position of the rebel forces. However, the recognition costs associated with agreeing to mediation in a multi-conflict context may reduce the likelihood of mediation. To account for both occurrences I include a variable recording the presence of another ongoing conflict within a state.

Finally I include a variable that records if mediation occurred the previous year and an indicator if the process was successful. Having opened a dialogue process with insurgents the state is more likely to agree to future mediation attempts. Having suffered the recognition costs associated with opening a dialogue process the costs associated with entering subsequent mediations should be reduced.[8]

Full descriptive details of all variables are included in appendix A. The next section will present and discuss the statistical results.

Results

The statistical results are reported on table I. Model 1 tests the effect of the three-point ordinal measure of rebel strength on the onset and outcome of mediation. Model 2 replaces to ordinal measure of relative rebel strength with the dichotomous indicator recording if rebels were at least in parity with the state. Model 3 draws on the UCDP rebel capacity data, using only observations for the post-cold war period. Finally model 4 tests the impact of a conflicts location. In each case the selection (mediation onset) results are displayed in the left-hand column, and the outcome results in the right-hand column. All results were generated using STATA 10.

Mediation Onset

The first hypothesis predicted a higher likelihood of mediation when states are faced with relatively strong rebels. This was built on the theory that strong rebel forces are better equipped to communicate the scale and immediacy of the threat against the state. The descriptive statistics support this position. Only 13% of conflict years involving weak rebels witnessed a mediation process. In comparison mediation was observed within 31% of conflict years involving evenly matched rebels, and 43% of years involving rebels who were stronger than the state.

This descriptive finding is supported in the statistical analysis. The ordinal measure of relative rebel strength produces a positive and highly significant effect on mediation onset (model 1). This result is replicated in model 2 using the dichotomous strength variable. Both variables are significant at the $p<0.01$ level. However, in its raw form the coefficient of a selection model cannot be directly interpreted.

Table I: Sartori selection estimator analysis, mediation onset and outcome

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome
Relative Rebel Strength (Cunningham et al.)	0.347*** (0.100)	0.459*** (0.118)						
Rebels at least in parity (Cunningham et al.)			0.387** (0.137)	0.582*** (0.169)				
Rebel Capacity (UCDP)					0.112 (0.0841)	0.437** (0.188)		
Log Conflict-Capital							-0.036 (0.0410)	-0.168** (0.0592)
Conflict Intensity	0.139	0.214	0.126	0.188	0.304**	0.175	0.125	0.180
	(0.116)	(0.172)	(0.115)	(0.169)	(0.157)	(0.219)	(0.115)	(0.170)
Duration (years)	-0.034**	0.005	-0.045**	0.009	-0.057***	0.004	-0.042**	0.0131
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.0160)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Duration squared	0.001**	-0.000	0.001**	-0.000	0.001***	-0.000	0.001*	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Parallel Conflict	-0.546***	-0.376**	-0.586***	-0.303	-0.447***	-0.237	-0.645***	-0.272
	(0.118)	(0.153)	(0.121)	(0.163)	(0.151)	(0.177)	(0.122)	(0.165)
Territorial conflict	0.482***	0.296**	0.519***	0.236	0.494***	0.332*	0.546***	0.343*
	(0.106)	(0.144)	(0.107)	(0.148)	(0.141)	(0.170)	(0.113)	(0.157)
Post Cold War	0.667***	0.854***	0.639***	0.894***			0.657***	0.986***
	(0.100)	(0.155)	(0.100)	(0.152)			(0.0996)	(0.154)
LY Mediation	1.188***	0.132	1.150***	0.172	0.476	-0.305	1.179***	0.273
	(0.254)	(0.330)	(0.252)	(0.323)	(0.360)	(0.385)	(0.253)	(0.324)
LY Outcome	0.218*	0.432***	0.251*	0.399**	0.570***	0.669***	0.250*	0.391**
	(0.122)	(0.141)	(0.121)	(0.140)	(0.167)	(0.159)	(0.120)	(0.139)
Constant	-2.215***	-3.230***	-1.820***	-2.755***	-1.173***	-1.989***	-1.559***	-2.828***
	(0.295)	(0.276)	(0.140)	(0.216)	(0.163)	(0.229)	(0.243)	(0.340)
Log Liklihood	-522.387		-574.648		340.499		-578.137	
Wald Chi-Squared	306.10 (9)		303.24 (9)		162.19		304.40 (9)	
Significance	0.0000		0.0000		0.000		0.0000	
Observations	1520		1520		619		1520	

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Therefore, in addition to the standard model, the marginal effects of the relative strength measures were also calculated. Marginal effects measure the expected change in the dependent variable, as a function of a change in the independent variable (holding all other covariates constant).

The marginal effects show stronger rebel movements to be four times more likely to initiate a dialogue process than a group that is weaker than the state. Relatively weak rebels have only a 3% probability of entering mediation, while insurgents that match state capacity have a 12% chance of initiating mediation.

The effect is most clearly visible in relation to specific cases. In 1992 the Bosnian Serb irregulars were at a military advantage in relation to Bosnian forces. Given this strong rebel position the model predicted a 55% probability of mediation occurring. Mediation did occur, in fact a prolonged period of international mediation took place. However, had the Serbian irregulars been weaker than the Bosnian military the probability of mediation occurring would have been reduced to 31%.

To check the robustness of these findings model 3 replaces the NSA measure of rebel strength with the UCDP measure of relative capacity, and model 4 includes the conflict-capital distance measure. Recall that the UCDP measure of strength is based solely upon numbers of armed belligerents. Higher numbers denote relatively stronger rebel forces. The distance variable records the number of kilometers from the location of conflict onset to the capital. Stronger rebel movements are more likely to be located closer to capital. Therefore according to hypothesis one the UCDP strength variable should produce a positive effect, while the distance measure should show a negative sign.

Like the NSA data, both indicators produce effects in the hypothesized direction. A closer match between state and rebel forces increases the probability of

mediation, and conflicts located further from the capital (in the periphery) are less likely to be mediated. However unlike the NSA data both variables fail to find significance at the conventional levels, producing results within the margin of error.[9]

One plausible explanation for this finding relates to the elements of rebel strength captured within the different variables. The UCDP data looks only at active forces involved in a conflict, while the distance variable more generally captures the military threat and ambition of the rebels. In comparison the NSA data takes account of a comprehensive range of factors, perhaps most notably the rebels' leadership structure and political development. This suggests that while the relative military strength of the rebels is an important driver of mediation onset (the effect was positive in all models), other elements of rebel strength are also important in bringing about mediation. For example a hierarchical leadership structure and developed political wing should improve the ability of rebels to initiate and undertake negotiations.

Taken together the results therefore support the mechanism represented in hypothesis one, but raise questions regarding the most important elements of rebel capacity. We will return to this point in the conclusion.

Mediation Outcome

The second hypothesis suggested that conflicts involving relatively stronger rebels have a higher probability of resulting in a mediated settlement. I argued that weak rebels are less likely to extract the concessions required to overcome issues associated with strategic bargaining failure. The descriptive statistics support this argument. 70% of mediation episodes involving relatively strong rebels produced an agreement. By contrast only 50 percent of cases resulted in a positive outcome when rebels were weaker than the state. The right-hand columns of model 1 and 2 present

the results of the outcome analysis using the NSA dataset. In both models the relative strength of the rebel movement produces a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of settlement. The marginal effects show that rebel groups who are at least in parity with the state have more than double the likelihood of reaching an agreement. Relatively weak rebel movements have only an 18% probability of achieving a settlement though mediation, but when an insurgent movement matches the state this is increased to 44%.

The influence of rebel strength on mediation outcome is also observable when the UCDP (model 3) and distance measures (model 4) are assessed. In both cases the influence is in the hypothesized direction and statistically significant. The marginal effects suggest that an increase of one standard deviation from the mean in the relative rebel capacity (0.37 to 1.19) increases the probability of a mediated settlement by 34%. Similarly an increase of one standard deviation (538kms) from the mean conflict distance (530kms) decreased the probability of a mediated settlement by 25%. This is strong evidence that relative rebel strength plays an important role in the outcome of mediation.

To illustrate this effect we can consider the conflict in Sierra Leone. In 1999 the RUF and government officials signed the Lomé Peace Accord. The model suggests that the strong position of the RUF in relation to the state was a crucial factor in the creation of this agreement. Given the dominant position that the RUF held at this time, the model forecasts a 79% percent chance of mediation bringing about a settlement. However, had the RUF's capacity only matched the model suggests a notable reduction in the likelihood of a settlement (-17%). Further had the RUF been in a position of inferiority (as they were earlier in the conflict) the probability of the Lomé agreement occurring would have dropped to 45%.

These results provide strong support for the second hypothesis. Mediators seem far better-equipped to overcome issues of bargaining failure when the rebels pose a more significant threat to the state. The results also suggest that the impact of rebel strength is more prominent upon the outcome rather than the onset of mediation. This finding is logical if we consider the more devious incentives that can drive mediation onset. For agreeing to a peaceful termination to violence is not always the intention of the belligerents entering mediation. Instead actors might agree to mediation in an attempt to rearm, regroup or appease political opponents (Richmond, 1998). The non-binding nature of mediation dictates that the actors are under no obligation to agree to a settlement, and thus once a more favorable distribution of power occurs the state can return to violence. A settlement represents a more notable commitment by the state. Therefore while on rare occasions weaker groups might force the onset of mediation, as long as they remain in a position of disparity the likelihood of settlement remains low.

Additional Findings

The control variables uncover additional findings that broadly support the rebel strength argument. In each of the four models the measure of intensity produces a positive coefficient. As predicted an increase in conflict costs raises the propensity of the state to incur the costs associated with mediation/settlement. Strong insurgencies are more likely to engage the state in traditional forms of conflict, while weaker groups more commonly adopt less costly terrorist-style tactics. Therefore, stronger insurgents are more likely to have the capacity to sustain high intensity civil war which has been shown to increase the demand for mediation and settlement.

However, while the effect of conflict intensity is consistently positive, in models 1, 2 and 4 the effect is not significant.

As predicted, longer conflicts appear less likely to be mediated. Previous research has shown the relationship between weak rebel movements and increased conflict duration (Collier et al. 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). In keeping with the rebel strength argument the long intractable conflicts involving small weak insurgencies seem responsible for negative impact of duration.[10]

Previous mediation attempts increase the probability of future mediation onset. Having suffered the costs associated with opening mediation, subsequent efforts should be less costly for the state. Interestingly previous mediation attempts do not in and of themselves raise the probability of a settlement. Only if a process results in a successful outcome are subsequent efforts more likely to succeed. It therefore seems that mediation attempts build upon previous achievements, with success more likely to breed future success.

The presence of a parallel conflict seriously decreases the likelihood of mediation and settlement. The presence of multiple challengers increases the costs of mediation. Rewarding one insurgency is likely to motivate other challengers to intensify their efforts. This increases the costs associated with mediation and make states more hesitant to provide concessions to the rebels.

Finally the analysis suggests that territorial incompatibilities are both more likely to be mediated and to produce some form of agreement. Territorial conflicts contain a disproportionally high number of weak rebel movements, in fact governmental incompatibilities are three times more likely to involve a rebel group that matches the state. On this basis the result seems surprising, as all other evidence suggests that weaker rebel movements should have a reduced likelihood of entering

mediation. However, territorial conflicts are a particular form of civil conflict in which the non-state group only needs to challenge the state in one particular area. While a group might hold a position of severe inferiority when compared to the state's complete force, in some peripheral area the state might be unable to project this force efficiently against the rebels. Therefore, within territorial conflicts, weaker rebel movements seem to hold a greater probability of overcoming their inferiority. This is an interesting avenue for future research.

Robustness Checks

In order to ensure the robustness of my findings I changed a variety of model specifications and re-run the estimates. First, the inclusion of control variables can on occasions increase the bias within a model (Clark, 2005). Therefore I rerun all models excluding all controls. All indicators of relative rebel strength retain strong and significant coefficients. Secondly, by translating the conflict episodes into conflict years there is an increased potential for a small selection of rebel groups to bias the results. To protect against this issue I first excluded all observations involving the relatively strongest rebel groups (individually and collectively).[11] As expected this reduces the size of the strength coefficient. Yet even when all of the strongest rebel groups are excluded the results remain robust. As an additional check I excluded the ten conflicts that produced the highest frequency of conflict years (individually and collectively). These were the conflicts involving some of weakest rebel movements.[12] Once again the results remained strong and significant. Thirdly, the use of partial and full settlements as an indicator of mediation success might be considered too high or low a threshold. I therefore reran the analysis using only full settlement as the dependent variable, and then subsequently including ceasefire and/or process

settlement. In each case the results remained consistent. Finally, I reran the analysis using the Heckman selection model.[13] The model produces a positive sign for rho, indicating that the assumption upon which I selected the Sartori model is valid. There are a few minor changes in the control variables, which are likely to be caused by the inappropriateness of the estimator in this context. However, once again, relative strength is shown to produce a strong positive effect in both sides of the model. The consistency of the results across a variety of model specification increases confidence in the validity of the results.

Conclusions

This paper contributes to the growing body of mediation literature centered on civil war. Robust evidence has been produced in support of both hypotheses. Relatively stronger rebels are more likely to enter into mediation and eventually agree some form of settlement. This finding supports previous work that has linked the dyadic relations between actors to a variety of aspects of civil conflict (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Gent, 2011). The study also complements previous research on the mediation of inter-state conflict, which has shown mediation to be more effective when belligerents have similar capabilities (Young, 1967; Deutsch, 1973; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Ott, 1972; Dixon, 1996).

The results also have important policy relevance. The timing of a diplomatic intervention is often a key determinant of its success (Greig, 2001). If a mediation process occurs when the conflict is lacking 'ripeness' the probability of resolution is reduced (Zartman, 1985). The relative strength of insurgents appears to be an important indicator of 'ripeness'. When insurgents' capacity meets (or exceeds) the capacity of the incumbent, there is a greater likelihood of resolution. Yet unlike other subjective indicators of ripeness, the relative strength of rebels can be observed and

affected by outside actors. Think for example of the Yugoslavian conflict in which throughout the war the relative distribution of belligerent power was widely understood and shaped by third parties. In this way it appears that the support and development of rebel forces is a viable approach to speed the resolution of civil war. This might not always be a feasible, or indeed desirable, but the results suggest it would be effective. External support does not necessarily mean military assistance, for rebel capacity can be improved through a variety of non-military approaches (e.g. the development of a political wing).

Gaining a fuller understanding of the determinants of rebel strength is one important avenue for future research. It is not simply the number of rebel troops that shapes their capacity. The level of political development, territorial control, access to natural resources and links with foreign allies, all contribute the relative position of a rebel movement. By further disaggregating the component parts of rebel strength a better comprehension of the relationship between mediation and relative capacity would be produced.

More generally the effect of shifts in the relative power balance is another area that requires greater attention. In this study the indicators used to measure capacity were static and failed to capture the speed and direction of changes in power. In reality the timing and scale of power shifts are likely to be of importance and should therefore be empirically assessed. Finally our understanding of the long-term impact of relative rebel strength is an area that requires development. While strong rebel groups are most likely to produce an agreement, they are also perhaps those with the greatest incentives to renege. Assessing the impact of relative capacity upon the stability of peace settlements is an important question that this paper does not address.

Given the prominent place that mediation has now assumed in the toolbox of conflict managers, generating a more complete understanding of the dynamics shaping the process is of real importance. This study has provided more evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has previously relied upon aggregate country level data. In this way the study represents an attempt to forge a better connection between recent innovations in the study of civil war and existing literature on mediation. This is a productive approach that future research would do well to continue.

Bibliography

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. *The Mediation Dilemma.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. 'Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems' *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 723-740.

Beardsley, Kyle., David Quinn., Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2006. 'Mediation style and crisis outcomes' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 58-86.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Scott S. Gartner. 2006. 'Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation' *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

Bercovitch, Jacob. 2007. 'Mediation Success or Failure: The Search for the elusive criteria' *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7(2): 289-302.

Bercovitch, Jacob., Theodore Anagnoson & Donnette L. Wille. 1991. 'Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations' *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 7-17.

Boulding, Kenneth E. 1963. *Conflict and defense: a general theory.* New York: Harper & Row.

Buhaug, Halvard. 2010. 'Dude, where's my conflict? LSG, relative strength and the location of civil war' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(2): 107-128.

Buhaug, Halvard., Scott Gates & Päivi Lujala. 2009. 'Geography, rebel capability, and the duration of civil conflict' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 544-569.

Clark, Kevin. A. 2005. 'The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 341-352

Collier, Paul., Anke Hoeffler, & Måns Söderbom. 2004. 'On the duration of civil war' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 253-273.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan. 2009. 'It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570-597.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr, & David Sobek. 2004. 'The dynamics of civil war duration and outcome' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 303-320.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr., Jacob Bercovitch & Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. 'Introducing the new Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.

Deutsch, Morton. 1973. *The resolution of conflict: constructive and destructive processes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dixon, William J. 1996. 'Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement' *International Organization* 50(4): 653-681.

Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist explanations for war' *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Filson, Darren & Suzanne Werner. 2007. 'The Dynamics of Bargaining and War' *International Interactions* 33(1): 31-50.

Gartner, Scott & Jacob Bercovitch. 2006. 'Overcoming obstacles to peace: The contribution of mediation to short-lived conflict settlements' *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4): 819-840.

Gent, Stephen R. 2011. 'Relative rebel strength and power sharing in intrastate conflict' *International Interactions* 37(2) 215-228.

Greig, Michael J. & Patrick Regan. 2008. 'When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 759-781.

Greig, Michael J. 2001. 'Moments of opportunity: Recognizing conditions of ripeness for international mediation between enduring rivals' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 691-718.

Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control*. Chichester: Princeton University Press.

Jackson, Richard. 2000. 'Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(3): 323-343.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.

Kydd, Andrew. 2006. 'When can mediators build trust?' *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 449-462.

Kydd, Andrew. 2003. 'Which side are you on? bias, credibility, and mediation' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.

Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2005. 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths' *European Journal of Population* 21(2): 145-166.

Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild. 1996. 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict' *International Security* 21(2): 41-75.

Lujala, Päivi. 2010. 'The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(1): 15-28.

Melin, Molly M, & Isak Svensson. 2009. 'Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars' *International Interactions* 35(3): 249-271.

Modelski, George. 1964. International Settlement of Internal Wars. In *International aspects of civil strife*. Ed. Rosenau, James N. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ott, Marvin C. 1972. 'Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases' *International Organization* 26(4): 595-618.

Princen, Thomas. 1992. *Intermediaries in international conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management' *World Politics* 58(2): 207-241.

Richmond, Oliver. 1998. 'Devious objectives and the disputants' view of international mediation: A theoretical framework' *Journal of Peace Research* 35(6): 707-722.

Sartori, Anne E. 2003. 'An Estimator for Some Binary Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions' *Political Analysis* 11(2): 111–138.

Smith, Alastair & Allan Stam. 2004. 'Bargaining and the Nature of War' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6): 783-813.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. 'Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 114-163.

Svensson, Isak. 2009 'Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 446 – 469.

Toft, Monica D. 2003. *The geography of ethnic violence : identity, interests, and the indivisibility of territory*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Touval, Saadia & William I Zartman. 1985. *International mediation in theory and practice*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2011. *Database* www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

Walter, Barbara F. 2006. 'Information, uncertainty, and the decision to secede' *International Organization* 60(01):105-135.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to peace: the successful settlement of civil wars* Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. 'The critical barrier to civil war settlement' *International Organization* 51(3): 335-364.

Wehr, Paul. 1979. *Conflict regulation*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Wei, Jun, 2007. Liberia (1989-1997). In *Civil wars of the world : major conflicts since World War II,* eds DeRouen, Karl Jnr, and UK Heo. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan., Kathleen Young., David Quinn & Victor Asal. 2005. *Mediating International Crises*. London: Routledge.

Wood, Reid. 2010. 'Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5): 601–614.

Young, Oran R. 1967. *The intermediaries: third parties in international crises.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, William I. 1995. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,* Washington DC: Brookings.

Zartman, William I. 1985. *Ripe for resolution: conflict and intervention in Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Notes

[1] This is according to the civil war mediation data set (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011).

[2] A conflict episode is a continuous period of active conflict-years. An episode starts when a conflict becomes active according to the UCDP-PRIO definition. An episode ends when an active year is followed by a year in which there are fewer than 25 battle-related deaths. (Kreutz, 2010).

[3] For example the Iraqi state's dispute with its Kurdish population is generally coded as including mediation, despite the fact that only a single mediation event occurred within the conflicts thirty-two year history.

[4] In those years in which more than one process occurred the most successful outcome is selected.

[5] The original measure within the NSA dataset is a five point ordinal measure. However when combined with the CWM data there are a very small number of observations involving rebels classed at the top of the scale. Also given the qualitative decision making process used to code the original measure the distinction between 1-2 and 4-5 is not always clear. Simplifying the measure reduces the measurement error associated with the variable. As an additional robustness check all results were run with the original measure, no inconsistencies were discovered.

[6] It is obviously challenging to collect data on the number of rebel forces therefore measurement error should be expected.

[7] Relatively strong rebel groups on average initiate civil conflicts 416kms closer to the capital than relatively weak rebel groups.

[8] Mediation episodes extending for more than one year are excluded, so previous mediation does not simply predict the same mediation effort. Further in the event that a mediation process crosses into the next calendar year I also code the previous conflict management outcome as missing. This is necessary, as the eventual outcome of the process might not be known until a number of years after the event begun.

[9] One possible cause of this finding is the more limited temporal focus of the UCDP data (1989-2003). To test for this I reran the NSA data using only data from 1989 to 2003. The NSA variables remained positive and statistically significant

[10] A small curvilinear effect is uncovered, suggesting that the probability of mediation occurring declines to a certain point at which point the conflict becomes protracted and the probability again rises. However the very small effect size reduces the relevance of this finding.

[11] States that included the strongest rebels were Liberia, Lebanon, Croatia, Bosnia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Ghana, Yemen. Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Romania, Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guiana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Comoros, Syria, Afghanistan.

[12] The states included most frequently were Myanmar, India, Ethiopia, Chad, Philippines, Israel, Iraq, Indonesia, Columbia and Somalia.

[13] In line with previous studies I use the duration of the conflict and presence of a mediation process in previous years to identify the model.

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*N*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Mediation Onset	1545	0.15	0.36	0	1
Outcome - Partial/Full Settlement	274	0.39	0.49	0	1
Rebel Strength (NSA)	1590	1.16	0.45	0	1
Rebels Parity (NSA)	1590	0.13	0.33	0	1
Rebel Capacity (UCDP)	670	0.37	0.82	0.0006	7.5
Conflict-Capital Distance (ln)	1577	5.71	1.26	0	8.12
Duration	1590	8.67	10.02	0	53
Duration squared	1590	176.67	358.75	0	2809
Conflict Intensity	1590	0.70	0.46	0	1
Parallel Conflict	1590	0.361	0.48	0	1
Territorial conflict	1590	0.52	0.50	0	1
Post Cold War Dummy	1590	0.40	0.49	0	1
Last Year Mediation	1590	0.13	0.33	0	1
Outcome Mediation LY	1590	0.24	0.70	0	1

Paper Two:

Greedy Conflict Management: Natural Resources, Relative Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Civil War Mediation

Govinda Clayton

The Conflict Analysis Research Centre

The University of Kent

Abstract

Civil conflicts tend to last longer when fought within resource-dependent countries. This should offer an increased opportunity for external actors to provide conflict management. Yet mediation is less common within resource rich states, and frequently fails to find a solution when it is undertaken. This suggests that despite offering a greater opportunity for intervention, resource funded conflict is less likely to result in a mediated settlement. I argue that the presence of resources produce an increased power asymmetry that reduces the frequency and effectiveness of mediation. Oil, diamonds and gemstones increase the relative position of the incumbent, exacerbating the problems associated with strategic bargaining. Hydrocarbons provide the state with a significant source of revenue that reduces the transparency and accountability of institutions, while raising their capacity to resist insurgent demands. This increases issues of information failure and makes it harder for the state to credibly commit to an agreement. On the other hand lootable resources facilitate the creation of weak rebel 'consumers', who lack the capacity to extract concessions from the state. This argument is assessed empirically on all conflict episodes from 1946-2004, using data that controls for the spatial and temporal overlap of resources and conflict. The results generated using a Sartori selection model show that oil production exerts a strong negative affect on both the onset and outcome of mediation, regardless of whether the resource is related to the conflict. Surprisingly, lootable resources are shown have little effect on conflict management attempts.

Introduction

This article assesses whether conflicts within resource dependent countries respond differently to mediation. Civil conflicts tend to last longer when fought within resource-rich territory (Lujala, 2010). In principle, the longer duration of resource funded war should offer an increased opportunity for external actors to provide conflict management. Yet mediation is less common within resource rich states, and frequently fails to find a solution when it is undertaken (e.g. Burma, Colombia & Democratic Republic of Congo). This suggests that despite offering a greater opportunity for intervention, resource funded conflict is less likely to result in a mediated settlement. Building on this puzzle the manuscript investigates the following question: to what extent do the presence of lootable and non-lootable natural resources impact upon the onset and outcome of mediation?

I argue that the presence of natural resources produce an increased power asymmetry that reduces the frequency and effectiveness of mediation. In previous work I have shown that relatively weak insurgents are poorly equipped to communicate a threat against government interests, and are therefore unlikely to force the incumbent to accept the entrance of an intermediary (Clayton, 2011). Greater power asymmetries also lower the likelihood of peaceful resolution, as relatively weak insurgents are less likely to gain guarantees against government defection (Clayton, 2011; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). Building on this work I suggest that the presence of oil and diamonds increase the relative position of the incumbent, exacerbating the problems associated with strategic bargaining. This occurs through differing mechanisms depending upon the nature of the resource. Non-lootable resources (e.g. oil and gas) provide the state with a significant source of revenue that reduces the transparency and accountability of institutions, while raising

their capacity to resist insurgent demands. This increases issues of information failure and makes it harder for the state to credibly commit to an agreement. Lootable resources (e.g. alluvial diamonds) influence the power balance through their effect on insurgents. Easily extractable resources facilitate the creation of weak rebel 'consumers', who would otherwise have been unlikely to overcome the problem of collective action. Resource-dependent rebels struggle to communicate their strength making it harder to overcome issues of asymmetric information.

This argument is assessed empirically on conflicts drawn from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). This dataset includes information on 322 civil war episodes between 1946 and 2004. The CWM data is combined with resource variables that control for the spatial and temporal overlap of resources and conflict. By adopting this spatial data in conjunction with conventional aggregate measures, a more robust assessment is undertaken of the mechanisms through which natural resources might impact mediation. The results generated using a Sartori selection model show that oil production exerts a strong negative affect on both the onset and outcome of mediation, regardless of whether the resource is related to the conflict. This suggests that the conflict prolonging effect of hydrocarbons is not related to its influence on insurgents, but a result of the strong impact that oil has on the economy, political institutions and capacity of the state. Surprisingly, lootable resources are shown have little effect on conflict management attempts.

The manuscript is structured as follows: I first discuss the forces that shape the onset and outcome of mediation in civil conflict. I develop a theory and propositions linking both lootable and non-lootable resources to this process. I then discuss the method of empirical evaluation before I present the results in the final section.

Literature

Mediation Onset

The onset of negotiation is determined by the incentives that the belligerents have to request or accept a dialogue process. Negotiation is a voluntary pursuit that can only occur when both disputants agree to enter into discussions. The incumbent has strong incentives to resist the onset of negotiation (Greig & Regan, 2008; Melin & Svensson, 2009). The state benefits from an asymmetry in legitimacy that is reduced when they enter into dialogue with a non-state group (Zartman, 1995). States generally classify rebels as illegal or criminal movements, the onset of dialogue legitimizes the group, elevating the insurgent's political stature and demonstrating their ability to force concessions from the state.

Mediation is an extension of negotiation in which decision-making power remains with the disputants, but some aspects of the process are controlled by a third-party (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). The costs and benefits associated with negotiation are intensified by the presence of a mediator who confers additional recognition upon the rebels (Carnevale, 1986). The introduction of a mediator also represents a significant decrease in the decision-making autonomy of the state (Mitchell, 1993). Most incumbents are accustomed to controlling the political decisions within their territory, including the terms of any bilateral negotiations. The acceptance of a mediator means that a state must concede control of (at least) some elements of the peace process. This increases the probability of an unfavorable outcome, but more significantly signals a loss of decisional control. This indicator of weakness can potentially motivate new and existing challengers. A mediated settlement also requires that the state concede to a redistribution of some political,

economic or territorial resource. As a result mediated agreements normally provide insurgents with significant gains at the expense of the incumbent (Svensson, 2006).

What the state stands to gain from mediation is the potential to escape civil war. Mediation is often an effective means of resolving violent conflict. (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Beardsley et al. 2006). As military victory becomes increasingly unlikely for the incumbent, and/or the costs of conflict become unbearable, mediation offers a competent means to bring about a peaceful conclusion to the violence. This effectively elevates the state to the role of sole veto player in the onset of mediation, being as it is largely the incumbents' cost-benefit analysis that defines when mediation occurs (Clayton, 2011; Greig & Regan, 2008).

Consequently, mediation is most common when rebels pose a credible challenge to key state interests. The state will only suffer the costs of mediation when insurgents demonstrate their capacity and resolve on the battlefield. The relative strength of a rebel force plays a central role in this process (Clayton, 2011). Relatively stronger rebels are better equipped to convince the state of the need to initiate mediation. Stronger groups can use the battlefield to overcome issues of information failure, and illustrate the threat they pose to state interests. This has been illustrated empirically in studies showing the positive relationship between incumbent's conflict costs and probability of mediation onset. For example, increased casualties, longer conflict duration and relatively stronger rebel groups have each been shown to increase the likelihood of mediation (Grieg & Regan, 2008; Melin & Svensson, 2009; Clayton, 2011).

Mediation Outcome

Conflict produces significant costs that can be avoided in the absence of war (Fearon, 1995; Filson & Werner, 2007; Walter, 2002). A settlement that removes the costs of conflict should therefore be an optimum outcome for all disputants. However, belligerents have significant incentives to exaggerate their strength and resolve in order to elicit concessions from their opponent. This creates a problem of asymmetric information in which both parties question the credibility of the information provided by their opponent. In many cases this bargaining obstacle prevents belligerents locating a mutually acceptable solution (Kydd, 2003, 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006; Svensson, 2007).

In addition to issues of asymmetric information, civil wars suffer from an intensified problem of credible commitment (Walter, 2002; Kirschner, 2010). For any conflict to be peacefully resolved the belligerents must credibly communicate their intention to abide by the terms of an agreement. It is challenging for disputants to commit to an agreement on those occasions in which they might later have an incentive to renege. In this way future incentives to abandon a settlement can prevent the resolution of the conflict (Beardsley et al. 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005; Beardsley, 2011). In civil war the close proximity of belligerents in the aftermath of a settlement further complicates this issue.

The entrance of a mediator can help disputants to overcome these bargaining challenges. Belligerents are often more willing to provide credible information to an intermediary (Kydd, 2006; Kydd, 2003). By acting as a conduit of information mediators can help the disputants gain a more accurate appreciation of the conflict. This can help to uncover a zone of agreement by reducing the issues associated with asymmetric information. A mediator can also help generate innovative and creative solutions to conflict that were not considered or available to the belligerents. For

example, a mediator can help to develop exit options that prevent the belligerents from losing face (Gurses, Rost & McLeod, 2008).

Intermediaries can also help the parties to overcome the climate of mistrust that can prevent a settlement. By providing positive and negative inducements mediators can offer strong incentives to counterbalance future benefits belligerents might have to renege (Beardsley, 2011: 172). This often involves economic and political support in the most challenging post-settlement period. On occasions this can also include the provision of security guarantees to enforce the terms of an agreement (Lake & Rothchild, 1996).

Mediators are more effective when the capabilities of the belligerents are closely matched (Clayton, 2011)[1]. It is easier for stronger rebel groups to demonstrate their capabilities and resolve in combat. This reduces the scale of the information asymmetry that the mediator must overcome. Stronger groups are also more likely to pose a serious challenge against state interests, and can more credibly threaten to escalate the violence. States are therefore more likely to make the concessions required for an agreement, in particular on issues that protect insurgents from the threat of government defection.

Natural Resources

The distribution of power within a civil conflict has a strong influence on the likelihood of a mediated agreement. As the previous sections suggested, relatively weak insurgents are less likely to force the state into a mediated settlement (Clayton, 2011; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). The relative capacity of the belligerents is strongly shaped by the presence of natural resources. The revenue

generated from the sale and trade of valuable commodities helps to define the distribution of power within a conflict. The following sections will consider non-lootable and lootable resources independently. I will first illustrate the influence that resources have upon disputant capabilities, and then relate this effect to the onset and outcome of civil war mediation.

Non-Lootable Natural Resources and Relative Belligerent Strength

Non-lootable resources are valuable minerals, like oil and gas, which can only be extracted with mechanised equipment and a large coordinated labour force (Humphreys, 2005). Extracting and transporting hydrocarbons is a technical process that requires a combination of strong organisational structures, hierarchical leadership and formalised links to international markets (Le Billion, 2001, 2012). These requirements allow incumbents to monopolise the resource revenue (Thies, 2010).

On some occasions insurgents can profit from sale of hydrocarbons. Yet the nature of the extraction process means that the revenue generated will always be minimal in comparison to the state. For example, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) were funded by the sale of oil that was looted from pipelines in the Delta area of Nigeria. The profits generated from oil bunkering provided significant revenue for the armed insurgency. Yet even at its peak, MEND was only capable of generating a small fraction of the oil wealth controlled by the central Nigerian state. Similarly, while rebels can profit from the sale of 'booty futures' (the promise to provide future access to oil in return for immediate financial reward), incumbents can legally sell access to post-conflict oil rights (Ross, 2004; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009). As a result the sale of oil 'futures' is also weighted in favour of the state (Humphreys, 2005).

The impact of oil wealth on state capacity is contested amongst conflict scholars. Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that oil production weakens the strength of the state and reduces the government's ability to tackle insurgencies. Smith (2004), Morrison (2009) and Thies (2010) instead argue that oil wealth improves the incumbent's capacity. What is clear is that in comparison to other forms of revenue generation (i.e. taxes), oil rents carry a reduced political cost. This allows profits to be more easily channelled towards the military (Thies, 2010). The result is often a disproportionate investment in the security forces of oil rich states (Reno, 1998; Le Billon, 2001; Basedau & Lay, 2009; Smith, 2004). This is often justified by the need to protect oil producing infrastructure, or the desire to deter external actors. But most commonly the oil-funded force is used to protect the regime from internal challengers (Le Billon, 2012; Basedau & Lay, 2009; Smith, 2004). The strong military capacity of oil producing states like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Nigeria illustrate the significant force that can be accumulated.

Non-Lootable Resources and Mediation Onset

The increased military capacity of oil producing states raises the power asymmetry when conflict takes place. This makes it more challenging for a non-state group to pose a credible threat against the state. The stronger security forces raise the capacity of the state to resist the insurgents (Reno, 1998; Le Billon, 2001). The rebels that face oil rich states must therefore amass a stronger military force than would normally be required to trigger mediation.

Resource revenue can also be used to mitigate the financial costs of war that often provide incentives for resolution. When belligerents can no longer tolerate the

costs of conflict the probability of mediation onset is increased (Greig & Regan, 2008). Oil rents can counterbalance this effect, reducing the financial pressures upon the state. This insulates the regime from the costs of war, and makes it less likely they will be compelled to seek mediation.

Recent studies have shown the onset of civil violence causes the production of oil to decline (Mitchell & Thies, 2012). The state's monopolisation of the oil industry can lead rebels to target oil and gas facilities, disrupting the production process, and leading to the evacuation of oil company employees (Mitchell & Thies, 2012). In theory, this should increase the incumbent's conflicts costs, and act as an incentive for the state to enter into mediation. Yet while the reduction in resource revenue is no doubt troubling for the state, the rebels are unlikely to fundamentally remove the state's ability to profit from the resource. As long as the state can retain a production capacity that sustains a military advantage, they are unlikely to endure the costs of mediation.

As the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) has shown, even with a sizable reduction in oil revenue the state can still maintain the capacity to resist conflict management. Despite fighting a hugely destructive conflict that cost over three million lives, the federal government of Nigeria consistently resisted the entrance of an intermediary. The conflict eventually ended when the rebel force (and supporting population) could no longer survive the financial and physical costs of war (Uche, 2002). While the state temporarily lost control of the oil rich territory in the Southern region, the stronger state military remained funded by oil from the remaining territory and was better equipped to endure the costs of war (Nixon, 1972).

From this argument the following hypothesis can be derived.

Hypothesis 1a: Mediation is less likely in a state that contains non-lootable resources.

Non-Lootable Resources and Mediation Outcome

The state's monopolisation of oil revenue also lowers the likelihood of settlement when mediation occurs. Non-lootable resources increase the power asymmetry that intensifies strategic uncertainty in civil conflict. Being at a military disadvantage insurgents are more likely to avoid direct confrontations with the stronger state, making it harder for the government to observe the strength and resolve of insurgents. This increases the problem of private information and lowers the probability of settlement. Resource rents also increase the ability of the state to endure the costs of conflict. This lowers the likelihood of incumbent concessions on vital issues of security that might be offered to insurgents to protect against defection (Gent, 2011).

The indirect effects of oil production further exacerbate the problem of asymmetric information. Oil wealth lowers state reliance on taxation, which commonly leads to a reduction the size and effectiveness of bureaucracies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). By removing one of the core structures through which civilians observe state practice, this process reduces the transparency of the state (Moore, 2001; Sørli, 2002). A reduction in state transparency makes it harder for insurgents to observe the true motivations of other actors, which increases the problem of private information and makes it harder to produce an agreement (Mitchell, 2002).

Taxes are also one of the primary mechanisms through which civilians can sanction the state (Humphreys, 2005). Resource rents reduce states reliance on taxation, making it harder for the population to hold the state accountable. This

process bypasses the popular legitimacy normally required to rule, and often results in poor economic growth, corruption, patronage and nepotism (Auty, 1998; Auty & Gleb, 2001; Moore, 2009, Sachs & Warner, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2004; Fearon, 2005, De Rouen & Sobek, 2004; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). Predatory governments serving sectional interests are unlikely to desire a settlement that redistributes resource wealth more equally (Le Billion, 2001: 567). Their power is not based upon wider constituent approval, but on the support of a small network of patronage. This creates a commitment problem that makes producing an agreement more challenging.

Corruption within oil producing states offers incumbents greater resources with which to buy off insurgents. This can often prevent to onset of violence (Fjelde, 2009). Yet once conflict is underway it is more challenging for the state to purchase peace. Rewarding violent insurrection is a more costly concession for the incumbent. Rebels are also more likely to fear government defection once conflict is underway.

For example, the Sudan Liberation Army and central Sudanese government engaged in two civil conflicts that lasted almost forty years and cost around two and a half million lives. In this time mediation repeatedly proved an ineffective method of resolving the conflict. The first mediation process did not officially take place until a decade after the violence started; it then took a further thirty-six separate mediation episodes (spanning two decades) to eventually produce the 2004 agreement. In this time oil revenue insulated the state from the costs of war and sustained a closed autocratic system of rule. The lack of government transparency lowered the credibility of peaceful gestures and undermined attempts to buy off the insurgents.

From this discussion we can derive the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b - Mediation is less likely to terminate a conflict in a state that contains non-lootable resources.

Lootable Natural Resources and Relative Belligerent Strength

Lootable natural resources are valuable products that can be easily obtained and transported by small groups of unskilled workers using primitive tools such as spades, pitchforks and baskets (Keller, 1990; Luajla, 2010). For example, alluvial diamonds are lootable being as a small group with limited resources can extract, transport and smuggle the product onto foreign markets (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005).

Lootable resources facilitate the creation and survival of groups who would not have been viable in the absence of resources. The lower opportunity costs in resource rich states allow insurgents to bypass the problem of collective action (Fearon, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Weinstein, 2005). Using wealth generated from the sale of resources, rebels can purchase arms, equipment and provide immediate financial rewards to recruits (Addison, Le Billion & Murshed, 2002; Ross, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Buhaug, Gates, Lujala, 2009).

Yet the recruitment of rebel 'consumers' is limited by the access to resources. These groups can only recruit as widely as the revenue generated from resources (Weinstein, 2005, 2006). Driven by material rather than ideological concerns, 'consumers' are also more likely to engage in attacks on civilians, which further reduces the recruiting potential of the movement (Weinstein, 2005).

The mode of production required to profit from lootable resources also contributes to the weak nature of rebels who rely on them. The production of

resources like diamonds and gems requires little coordinated group effort. Temporary control of the resource rich territory is all often all that is required to generate revenue (Ross, 2004; Le Billion, 2001). This incentivizes the emergence of loose leadership structures that are prone to infighting and splintering. Any division of force size lowers the strength of the rebels (Gent, 2011). The lack of hierarchical leadership also reduces the military effectiveness of a movement (Humphreys, 2005). These problems are common amongst all groups that profit from resources, including quasi-criminal rebellions for who resources are a 'permissive' rather than 'root' cause of the conflict (Humphreys, 2005). Some groups can overcome these challenges and grow to become strong organized rebellions (e.g. RUF in Sierra Leone). But field research has suggested that even the stronger movements lack the level of loyalty and commitment associated with non-consumer rebellions (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004). As a result resources like diamonds and gemstones are commonly associated with relatively weak insurgent groups (Le Billion, 2010).

Lootable Natural Resources and Mediation Onset

Rebels whose creation and continued existence is dependent upon resource wealth are less likely to force mediation. When insurgents rely upon resource revenue their military focus is not based around challenging the state, but maintaining or expanding access to resource rich territory (Weinstein, 2006). They are therefore more likely to be located in the periphery that facilitates increased resource excavation (Mitchell & Thies, 2012). This limits the ability of the state to observe the true strength of the rebels, and increases the problem of private information. While the loss of resource rich territory is costly for the incumbent, alone this is unlikely to convince the state of the need to accept mediation. When the rebel's military threat

remains low the state is unlikely to endure the costs of mediation. The lower opportunity costs act as an additional impediment to mediation. The more conducive conditions for the emergence other potential challengers should make incumbents more hesitant to risk any sign of weakness that might motivate other groups (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005).

The presence of lootable resources could potentially create conditions in which rebels have an incentive to resist mediation. For example the personal enrichment of rebel leadership might provide a strong motivation to reject intervention (Buhaug, Gates, Lujala, 2009; Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005; Lujala, 2010). But mediation is a non-binding process, rebels can therefore enjoy the significant benefits attached to mediation whilst providing no binding commitment to the peace process. This explains why strong rebel groups have always been willing to accept mediation, even when they have significant incentives to avoid comprehensive resolution.

The case of Burma, one of the leading global exporters of precious stones, is illustrative of the difficulties associated with initiating mediation in a resource rich state. Lootable resources have funded more than ten of the rebel movements in Burma over the past fifty years. Despite the resource abundance, no group has yet proved capable of launching an assault that seriously threatened the survival of the state. Weak leadership structures and the emergence of splinter groups have contributed to the low intensity nature of the rebel challenge. As a result no significant mediation attempts have taken place in any of the multiple conflicts occurring within the state.

From the preceding discussion the following hypothesis can be derived.

Hypothesis 2a: Mediation is less likely in a state that contains lootable resources.

Lootable Natural Resources and Mediation Outcome

Resource dependent rebels are poorly equipped to overcome the strategic uncertainly that prevents the resolution of civil war. These groups rarely hold the capacity to pose a significant threat to the security of the state. This reduces the ability of the rebels to threaten an escalation of the status quo, which limits the bargaining strategies available in mediation. Without an imminent threat of increased violence, the state is under little pressure to make concessions required to overcome rebel fears of defection (i.e. security guarantees).

The lower opportunity costs, combined with increased group fragmentation, make multiple rebellions more common in resource rich states. This increases the number of the veto players who must be satisfied. Each subgroup has incentives to renegotiate resource distribution ex-post. This intensifies the problem of credible commitment by increasing incumbent fears of rebel defection (Cunningham, 2006). Loose vertical leadership structures, more common in 'consumerist' rebellions, can also prevent the formation of a coherent ideology and set of demands (Le Billion, 2001). A settlement is obviously more challenging when insurgents lack clear goals and common aspirations.

Civil war also provides an environment conducive to the illegal mining of resources. This provides rebels with economic opportunities that are not present in the absence of war (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Buhaug, Gates, Lujala, 2009; Addison, Le Billion & Murshed, 2002). This creates an incentive for rebels to sustain the conflict, complicating the task of the mediator (Gurses, Rost & McLeod, 2008; De Rouen & Sobek, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Keen,

1998; Collier et al. 2003). In theory this obstacle should not prevent the resolution of war, as rebel access to resource revenue can be included within an agreement. This should be an optimum solution for both belligerents, given that the costs of conflict are avoided. However the rebel fear of government defection, coupled with incumbent concerns of subgroup renegotiation, often prevent an agreement from occurring.

The conflict in the Angolan enclave Cambina is illustrative of these effects. Since 1991 insurgents (FLEC) have fought a low level-armed conflict with the state. The revenue generated from lootable diamonds has been used to fund the rebellion. However, rather than creating strong rebels who are capable of forcing concessions, the resource wealth has led to personal rivalries and divergent goals. As a result the insurgency has suffered multiple fractures, increasing the number of veto players with an interest in sustaining the violence (UCDP, 2012). Unsurprisingly, multiple mediation attempts have failed to terminate the conflict.

From this discussion a final hypothesis can be derived.

Hypothesis 2b: Mediation is less likely to terminate a conflict in a state that contains lootable resources.

Research Design

Data

To test the hypothesis I draw upon the Civil War Mediation (CWM) data set (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). This is the first conflict management dataset to provide information on all mediation attempts within conflict episodes at the lower 25 battle-related death threshold. A conflict episode is a continuous period

of active conflict-years. Episodes begin when the conflict first crosses the threshold provided in the UCDP/PRIO definition of conflict[2], and terminate when an active conflict year is followed by a year in which there are fewer than 25 battle-related deaths. If conflict reignites in later years this is coded as a different conflict episode. Building upon the UCDP armed conflict termination data, the CWM dataset includes information on 322 civil war episodes between 1946 and 2003 (Kreutz, 2010). As the focus of this paper is on the ability of mediation to terminate conflict events, the 32 episodes that remained active at the end of 2003 were excluded from the analysis. The population of conflict episodes is therefore 290.

Model

Belligerents decision to initiate mediation is very unlikely to be made independently from their assessments of the likelihood of success. The onset and outcome of mediation should not then be considered as independent forces (Svennson, 2007). Factors that shape the outcome of a mediation process are also likely to be features that impact upon the likelihood of onset (Greig, 2005). This suggests that mediation is more likely to occur when belligerents are predisposed towards a certain outcome. Failing to model the onset and outcome of mediation simultaneously therefore misses important selection effects that are inherent within the mediation process.

To account for the selection effects I use Sartori's selection estimator (Sartori, 2003). This model is based upon the identifying assumption that the error term for the observations is the same in the two equations. I previously argued that mediation is most likely to occur on those occasions in which the conflict costs are significant for the state. Mediation is costly (even more so than bilateral negotiation) and should

therefore be resisted resolutely by the incumbent. Only on those occasions in which the resolve of the state has been diminished is mediation likely to occur. The reduction in (unobserved) resolve for resisting mediation should be strongly correlated with an increase in the likelihood of settlement. As a result there are good theoretical reasons to assume that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both the onset and outcome of mediation would be the same.

This model is more appropriate than the commonly adopted Heckman model. The Heckman model requires at least one additional explanatory factor that affects the selection side of the model but not the outcome. There are no strong theoretical reasons to suggest that any indicators affect only on the onset of mediation, therefore the Sartori model is a more appropriate choice.[3]

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable in the onset analysis is a dichotomous variable coding whether mediation occurred within a conflict episode. The CWM data defines mediation as:

> a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. (Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille, 1991: 8)

Mediation takes place in 79 of the 290 conflict episodes included within the CWM data. Despite being the most commonly adopted method of conflict

management, many conflicts still appear to resist the entrance of an intermediary. This is likely a result of the states' reluctance to accept mediation.

The dependent variable in the outcome analysis is another dichotomous variable recording the type of termination within each conflict episode. This variable included within the CWM data is taken from the UCDP armed conflict termination dataset (Kreutz, 2010). All mediated conflicts that were terminated with a peace settlement or ceasefire are coded as success. While mediated conflicts that terminate through military victory, the merging of rebel groups, or low activity, are considered unsuccessful. According to this method of operationalization 39 conflict episodes that welcomed a mediator resulted in a positive outcome (49%). By measuring mediation success in this manner better account is taken of the long-term effects of mediation. A process is only considered a success when a mediator produces an outcome that stops the fighting for at least one year. Agreements that fail to produce this significant achievement are not considered successful. This is a high criterion for success as it excludes short-lived mediated agreements that might represent important developments in the search for a more comprehensive settlement. Further it fails to capture those cases in which agreements are broken after more than one year.[4] However, given that conflict management ultimately aims to terminate violence, this method offers the most valid means of capturing the effects of mediation on the short-to-medium term outcome of conflict episodes. A number of robustness checks using lower thresholds and differing data specifications are also undertaken, these are discussed within the analysis below.

Independent Variables

The theoretical section drew important distinctions between the effects of different resources. I therefore draw upon new disaggregated resource data that charts the presence or absence of specific resources. To account for lootable resources I include a dummy variable coding the presence of secondary diamonds. To test the effect of non-lootable resources I include a dummy variable recording the presence of onshore oil production. [5]

The theoretical section also argued that lootable resources were more likely to benefit the insurgents, while non-lootable resources would more commonly be of an advantage to the incumbent. Aggregate country-level data is poorly equipped to assess this assumption, as the knowledge that a resource is present within a state tells us little about the actors who have access to the resource. For example, in Burma more than ten separate insurgencies have been fought in various localities over the past five decades. Burma is also a resource rich state, containing both lootable and non-lootable resources. To determine the impact that resources had on the various insurgencies, we must capture the temporal and spatial overlap of the conflicts and resources (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005; Rustad et al. 2008; Buhaug, Gates, Lujala, 2009; Buhaug, 2010; Lujala, 2010). Using GIS technology, conflict researchers have produced datasets that assign geographic coordinates to all regions that contain hydrocarbons (PETRODATA) and valuable gemstones (DIADATA) (Lujala, Rød & Thieme, 2007; Flöter, Lujala & Rød, 2007). The datasets also include temporal information on when the resources were discovered, and the year in which production began. The huge number of global resource sites makes conventional analysis of point data impossible. As a result PETRODATA and DIADATA are based around polygons, which represent one or several point locations. A buffer of 30 kilometres was generated around each resource

site, and merged with intersecting buffers. For example, figure 1 displays each of the hydrocarbon sites in Burma. Each of the dark grey polygons represents the location of a hydrocarbon field. The year in which the resource was discovered, and the year in which production began are also indicated on the map. When combined with the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), we can assess the temporal and spatial overlap of resources and conflict. This is indicated graphically on Figure 1, in which the shaded area to the west of Burma indicates the location of the Arkan insurgency. In those cases in which the conflict zone and resource zone intersect, we can assume that the insurgents had the opportunity to profit from the resource. Alternatively, when the areas do not intersect it is unlikely that the rebel group generated revenue from resources. By adopting this spatially coded data, in conjunction with conventional aggregate measures, a more robust assessment is undertaken of the mechanisms through which natural resources might impact mediation.

Figure 1.
Spread of territorial conflict in Arkan, Burma 1948-1994.
Map taken from, Lujala, Rød & Thieme (2007).



Controls

I include a number of control variables to account for other factors that might influence belligerent's incentives to talk and eventually agree a peace settlement. First I include a dummy variable coded 1 for post-cold war conflict. Mediation has been shown to be more frequent and more successful in the post-cold war era. Secondly I control for a number of factors that help to define the conflict costs. This is based on the assumption that an increase in conflict costs increases the probability of mediation onset and success. I include a measure of battle deaths (logged), conflict duration (in months) and incompatibility (Kreutz, 2010). Thirdly, I include a number of variables that are likely to shape the incumbents propensity for dialogue/settlement. I include a measure of life expectancy as an indicator of development, and a three-point measure of relative rebel strength taken from the Non-state Actors (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009)[6]. This variable is based on qualitative assessments of the relative strength of rebel groups (in relation to the state). Stronger states should be less inclined to make concessions to insurgents (Clayton, 2011). I also include a measure of regime type at the point of conflict termination (Gleditsch, 2008). This is based on the belief that democratic states should be more likely to accept mediation, and perform more effectively once within the process (Mitchell & Cameron, 2012). Finally I include a dummy variable coding the existence of another conflict within the state. Parallel conflicts should make states less likely to agree to a mediated settlement. For full descriptive statistics on all variables see appendix A.

The next section will now present and discuss the statistical results.

Results

The statistical results are reported on table I. Models 1 & 2 assess the impact of oil production (hypothesis 1a and 1b). Model 3 tests the effect of lootable resource excavation (hypothesis 2a and 2b). Model 4 includes both spatially coded resource variables, and model 5 includes all aggregate resource variables. In each of the models the selection results (mediation onset) are displayed in the left hand column, and the outcome results in the right hand column. All results were generated using STATA 10.

Non-Lootable Resources

Mediation Onset

Hypothesis 1a predicted that the presence of non-lootable resources would reduce the likelihood of mediation. It was argued that hydrocarbons increase the power asymmetry in civil conflict by improving the relative position of the state. This was based on the assumption that the production of oil is biased towards state exploitation, on account of the sophisticated level of organisation and infrastructure required to extract the resource (Humphreys, 2005). The data supports this argument. Within oil-producing states only 8% of conflict episodes involved rebels that were rated at least in parity. In comparison 26% of other episodes included rebels that were evenly matched with the incumbent.

It was predicted that the stronger position of oil-producing states would increase their capacity to resist mediation. Again the data supports this position. While mediation occurred in only 23% of conflict episodes within oil producing states, 36% of all other conflict episodes were mediated. This is all the more striking given that on average oil production increased the duration of conflict episodes by 23

months. Hence despite the increased opportunity for third party assistance, mediation is less common when oil production occurs within the state.

To test the significance of this finding, model 1 includes a variable recording the presence of hydrocarbons. The resource indicator shows a strong negative coefficient, suggesting that as predicted oil production significantly lowers the likelihood of mediation ($p<0.01$). The coefficients generated by the Sartori selection model cannot be directly interpreted. I therefore calculate the marginal effects to assess the strength of this effect. Marginal effects report the expected change in the dependent variable as a function of a change in the independent variable (when all other covariates are held at the mean or modal values). Given that each of the resource variables are dichotomous, the marginal effect in this case records the change in the likelihood of mediation occurring when resources are present. The results show that oil production reduces the likelihood of mediation by 25%. This effect remains consistent when lootable resources are added as a control (Model 5).

To illustrate this effect we can consider the case of the Nigerian civil war. Oil played a pivotal role in this conflict providing funding to both belligerents. Given the ongoing oil production within the Nigerian state, model 1 predicted a 0.61 probability of mediation onset. Had oil production not taken place at the time of the secessionist effort, the model suggests that the probability of mediation occurring would have risen to 0.83, a significant increase in the likelihood of dialogue. Therefore the failure of the Biafran insurgents to pressure the federal state into accepting an intermediary can be considered in part a result of the strong power asymmetry resulting from oil.

Table I : Sartori Selection Analysis : Natural Resources and Mediation Onset/Outcome

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome
Oil Production in State	-0.659***	-0.733***							-0.655***	-0.630**
	(0.207)	(0.263)							(0.216)	(0.280)
Oil Production in Conflict Zone			-0.245	-0.496*			-0.244	-0.538**		
			(0.205)	(0.269)			(0.196)	(0.244)		
Secondary Diamonds in Conflict Zone					-0.188	-0.044	-0.214	0.057		
					(0.264)	(0.336)	(0.223)	(0.279)		
Secondary Diamonds in State									-0.043	-0.247
									(0.199)	(0.262)
Incompatibility	-0.872***	-0.641**	-0.697***	-0.491*	-0.652***	-0.453	-0.691***	-0.532**	-0.877***	-0.570**
	(0.223)	(0.285)	(0.210)	(0.271)	(0.207)	(0.277)	(0.209)	(0.268)	(0.226)	(0.293)
Conflict Duration	0.002*	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.002*	-0.000	0.002*	-0.000	0.002*	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.229***	0.322***	0.228***	0.309***	0.219***	0.297***	0.216***	0.306***	0.233***	0.299***
	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.069)
Post-Cold War	0.955***	1.533***	0.964***	1.538***	0.959***	1.435***	0.984***	1.555***	0.964***	1.517***
	(0.217)	(0.313)	(0.216)	(0.315)	(0.211)	(0.284)	(0.174)	(0.247)	(0.210)	(0.294)
Parallel Conflict	-0.918***	-0.823***	-0.887***	-0.830***	-0.882***	-0.775***	-0.887***	-0.833***	-0.929***	-0.800***
	(0.227)	(0.286)	(0.220)	(0.295)	(0.220)	(0.273)	(0.216)	(0.286)	(0.206)	(0.250)
Life Expectancy	-0.003	0.019	-0.004	-0.011	-0.006	-0.009	-0.000	0.015	-0.001	0.015
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Rebel Strength	0.466***	0.208	0.501***	0.248	0.502***	0.285	0.486***	0.256	0.463***	0.176
	(0.168)	(0.198)	(0.164)	(0.194)	(0.164)	(0.192)	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.169)	(0.198)
Polity	0.030*	0.020	0.035**	0.021	0.034**	0.028	0.034**	0.027	0.036**	0.031*
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	-1.648*	-4.122**	-1.893**	-4.153***	-1.821**	-4.102***	-2.050**	-4.297***	-1.591*	-3.772***
	(0.769)	(1.162)	(0.812)	(1.171)	(0.811)	(1.111)	(0.744)	(0.999)	(0.804)	(1.070)
N	283		283		283		283		283	
Log Pseudo-Likelihood	-167.190		-171.275		-173.156		-173.098		-166.724	
Ward Chi2	63.43		57.90		60.11		333.12		65.57	
Prob>Chi2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The preceding analysis was based upon the assumption that oil production impacts mediation by increasing the relative position of the state. To assess the validity of this assumption model 2 replaces the state level aggregate measure of oil production with a spatially coded variable that record the presence of oil in the conflict zone. When rebels are located close to oil reserves there is a greater probability that they can profit from oil bunkering or the sale of 'booty futures'. Therefore if oil production influenced mediation onset through its effect on insurgents, we would expect this variable to have a stronger effect than the aggregate measure. As with the state-level variable the oil indicator again shows a negative sign, but the effect is much smaller (8% marginal effect) and fails to find significance at the conventional levels. This effect is reduced further when we control for the presence of lootable resources (Model 4). This suggests that oil production impacts mediation onset through its effect on state rather than rebel capacity.

Mediation Outcome

Hypothesis 2a predicted that mediation would be less effective within oil producing states. I argued that the stronger relative position of the incumbent increased the level of strategic uncertainty that prevents the resolution of war. The increased propensity for corruption and autocracy were also raised as additional obstacles to settlement. The data is broadly supportive of these arguments. Mediation peacefully terminated 44% of conflict episodes within oil producing states. In comparison, mediation within non-oil producers achieved an agreement in 54% of episodes.

The statistical analysis is reported in the right hand column of model 1. As expected the presence of oil production produces a negative effect on the likelihood of

settlement. The hydrocarbon variable shows a negative sign and is statistically significant ($p<0.01$). The marginal effects suggest that oil production within a state lowers the likelihood of settlement (conditional on mediation occurring) by 16%. Once again this result remains consistent when we control for lootable resources (model 5).

The strong influence that oil wealth can exert on mediation is visible in the well-publicized conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Sudanese regime displays many of the characteristics commonly associated with oil wealth. The central government is based upon strongly autocratic features and suffers from widespread corruption. The state also commands a strong and well-equipped military, which has in the past been funded from the sale of oil. The large conflict costs and significant international pressure lead to the acceptance of a number of intermediaries, yet for long periods the mediators failed to terminate the violence. The results suggest that oil production played a large role in this failure. The significant oil supplies led model 1 to predict a 0.76 chance of mediation producing an agreement (conditional on acceptance). Were oil production to have ceased in the Sudanese state the likelihood of a peaceful settlement would have increased to 0.92. This might explain the occurrence of the 2011 peace agreement, which took place in the shadow of the secession of South Sudan. The division of the Sudanese state reduced state oil reserves, significantly reducing the power asymmetry in the Darfur conflict.

Recall that Models 2 & 4 included an indicator of oil production within the conflict zone to test the assumption that oil impacts mediation through its effect on the state. The results displayed in the right hand columns show that the presence of oil within the conflict zone significantly lowers the likelihood of peaceful termination ($p<0.10$). This suggests and important addition to our understanding of how oil

influences mediation outcomes. An analysis of the non-state actors data shows that oil within the conflict zone does not have a notable effect on the strength of rebel groups. Therefore the additional impediment to mediation does not appear to result from a changing power asymmetry brought about by rebel looting. Instead this suggests that when conflicts are fought in the presence of oil reserves the promise of future revenue flows can motivate rebels to bargain harder (or fight longer) for a share of the valuable resource. The additional effort and investment of resources is justified by the chance of winning control of the lucrative resource. This finding is in accordance with previous studies that have illustrated the conflict enhancing effect of oil reserves in the conflict zone (Lujala, 2010).

Lootable Resources

Mediation Onset

Hypothesis 1b predicted that the presence of lootable resources would lower the likelihood of mediation. I argued that lootable resources facilitate the creation of weak rebel movements who are less equipped to communicate a threat against the state. Descriptive statistics provide limited support for this argument. The presence of diamonds with the conflict zone is associated with a minor increase (2%) in the number of rebels who match the relative strength of the state. This suggests that diamond production might not have the negative effect on rebel capacity that is normally assumed in the literature. Similarly, rebel access to diamond reserves is associated with a reduction in the number of cases that receive mediation, but the difference is minimal.

To explore this relationship further, model 3 includes a variable recording the presence of secondary diamonds in the conflict zone. Model 4 retains the spatially

coded variable but includes an additional control for oil production. Finally model 5 tests the effect of the aggregate state level indicator of diamond production. Hypothesis 1b suggests that all variables should have a negative impact, but the underlying theory would imply a stronger effect for the spatially coded variables. As predicted all lootable resource variables report a negative sign, and the spatially coded conflict variables produce the stronger effect. The marginal effects show that diamonds in the zone of hostilities reduce the likelihood of mediation by 8% (Model 4). In comparison the state level variable produces a more minimal effect (1% reduction). However both of the indicators of lootable resources fall comfortably outside the conventional margins of error.

It appears that contrary to expectations the presence of lootable resources produce only a minimal effect on the likelihood of mediation. The result appears to be the result of an unexpected influence of diamonds on rebel strength. This might suggest that diamonds can have a positive effect on the strength of rebel movements. However, given the small number of observations in which resource rich rebels grew to match the state (8), more research is required before any firm opinion can be formed.

Mediation Outcome

The final hypothesis (2b) predicted a lower likelihood of mediated settlement within conflict episodes that contain lootable natural resources. The lower threshold for initiating a rebellion, coupled with increased rebel fragmentation, was argued to increase the problem of credible commitment. The descriptive statistics provide some support for this argument. When diamonds are produced within the zone of hostilities, fewer cases are successfully mediated. However, when this effect is considered in

conjunction with other forces that shape mediation the effect disappears. The results, which are displayed in the right hand column of Model 3 and 4, show a mixed effect. In Model 3 the resource variable shows the predicted negative sign, yet in model 4 a positive effect is suggested. In both cases the marginal effects suggest only a modest effect, and the variables fall comfortably within the margins of error. The aggregate variable (model 5) performs marginally better, but is still well short of statistical significance.

Conflict Outcomes

One advantage of the CWM dataset being built upon the UCDP Conflict Termination data is that we can also assess the impact of resources in relation to other conflict outcomes. This is particularly useful in this case, as it facilitates a more complete exploration of the effects of mediation and natural resources on all types of outcomes. Using the UCDP data I generate a new dependent variable that has three discreet categories of outcome: peace agreements (agreement, ceasefire with conflict regulation, ceasefire), low intensity violence (the violence dropped below the 25 death threshold) and military victory.[7] Since the dependent variable has three outcomes without an inherent ordering, I use a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of each outcome given the covariates.

Multinomial logit models derive the probabilities for each outcome *j* among unordered alternative outcomes, by estimating *j*-1 equations for the odds of each alternative in relation to the baseline outcome. I examine the probabilities of military victory and low intensity termination in relation to the baseline peace agreement. Model 6 includes the aggregate measures of both resource variables; Model 7 instead includes the spatially coded variables. In both models I adopt the same controls

variables that were used in the previous analysis. The results are presented on table II.

Table II : Multi-Nomial Logit Analysis : Natural Resources and Civil War Outcome

	(6)		(7)	
	Military Victory	Low Intensity	Military Victory	Low Intensity
Mediation	-1.070**	-1.112**	-1.160**	-1.209***
	(0.535)	(0.450)	(0.523)	(0.455)
Oil Production in State	0.687	0.757*		
	(0.502)	(0.446)		
Secondary Diamonds in State	-0.453	0.004		
	(0.497)	(0.411)		
Oil Production in Conflict Zone			0.774	0.937*
			(0.602)	(0.559)
Secondary Diamonds in Conflict Zone			-1.142*	0.227
			(0.596)	(0.473)
Incompatibility	1.315**	0.345	1.359**	0.202
	(0.536)	(0.490)	(0.541)	(0.494)
Conflict Duration	-0.020	-0.000	-0.020	-0.000
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.003)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.132	-0.119*	-0.119	-0.207*
	(0.136)	(0.101)	(0.140)	(0.108)
Post-Cold War	-2.493***	-1.150***	-2.421***	-1.208***
	(0.459)	(0.426)	(0.468)	(0.441)
Parallel Conflict	0.523	0.970**	0.595	0.969*
	(0.516)	(0.299)	(0.595)	(0.516)
Life Expectancy	-0.033	-0.012	-0.031	0.005
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Rebel Strength	0.273	-1.115***	0.267	-1.180***
	(0.357)	(0.430)	(0.368)	(0.444)
Polity	-0.069*	-0.079**	-0.067*	-0.079**
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Constant	2.648	3.860**	2.532	4.101**
	(1.865)	(0.033)	(1.900)	(1.643)
N	281 (149 clusters)		281 (149 clusters)	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-210.223		-206.599	
Wald Chi2	98.99		103.64	
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000	

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The analysis clearly illustrates the positive utility of mediation. By generating predicted probabilities we can assess the impact that mediation produces on the likelihood of different types of conflict termination. The results show that mediation onset increases the probability of a conflict terminating through a peace agreement by 27% ($p<0.01$). At the same time the likelihood of military victory by is reduced by 8% and low intensity termination by 19%. It is clear that mediation significantly increases the likelihood of a peaceful termination.

The previous analysis showed that oil production reduced the likelihood of a mediated settlement. Model 6 suggests that the 19% reduction in the likelihood of settlement within oil producing states ($p>0.10$), produces a 14% increase in the probability of low intensity termination ($p>0.10$), and a 5% increase in the chance of military victory.

The most interesting results occur when the effects of oil are considered in conjunction with mediation. If no mediation takes place, all conflict episodes most commonly terminate by dropping under the 25 battle-death threshold. This reflects the high frequency of weak rebels groups that are often contained rather than defeated by the incumbent. Yet within those conflicts in which the violence continues, oil producers are far more likely to terminate the violence militarily, while non-oil producers more often look towards a peace agreement.

This pattern becomes more striking when mediation occurs. The onset of mediation within non-oil producers makes a peace agreement more than two times as likely as any other outcome. Mediation also increases the likelihood of peaceful resolution within oil producers, but even with the introduction of an intermediary a low intensity termination is the most likely outcome. The negative effect of oil production on the likelihood of settlement largely occurs through its reduction in the

likelihood of mediation. Likelihood ratio and Wald tests show that the strength and significance of the oil variable is greatly reduced when the mediation variable is added. Oil producers are therefore more likely to militarily defeat the rebels before mediation can take place, and less likely produce a settlement when mediation is adopted.

Diamond production exerts a far smaller effect on conflict outcomes. States that contain diamonds (either in or outside of the conflict zone) are marginally less likely to peacefully terminate conflict. Yet this difference falls within the margin of error. The one striking feature that diamond production produces is a notable reduction in the likelihood of military victory. This is particularly notable when the diamonds are located within the conflict zone, in which case military victory becomes four times less likely. This supports the argument that resource-dependent insurgents avoid direct contact with the state. As a result incumbents more commonly contain rather than defeat or negotiate with the rebels.

Additional Findings

Control variables each perform as expected, and produce results that are broadly consistent with the theoretical argument. In all models conflict intensity (battle deaths) produced a strong and significant effect on mediation. As predicted costly conflicts do appear more likely to be mediated and produce an agreement. An increase in conflict duration increased the propensity for mediation, through the size of the effect was minimal. The effect of duration upon mediation outcome was consistently negative, but small and not significant in any model. Post-Cold War conflicts are shown to be more likely to be mediated and end through a settlement. Democratic characteristics produce a consistently positive and significant effect on

the likelihood of mediation and settlement. The existence of multiple conflicts significantly reduces the likelihood of mediation being accepted, and producing an agreement. Unexpectedly, life expectancy does not produce a significant effect on either the onset or outcome of mediation. However the disaggregated conflict specific indicator of relative strength did show that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to force mediation and ultimately agree some form of agreement. Finally, territorial incompatibilities are shown to be more likely to be mediated and to terminate through a peace agreement. This result is perhaps surprising given that resource-funded rebellions should be more likely to be located in the state periphery, and often desire some form of secession. However, while rebellions might be in a position of weakness in relation to the state force, in the small peripheral area they are more likely to match the armed potential of the state. Therefore groups fighting over a territorial incompatibility appear to have a greater ability to project sufficient force against states that they opt to accept and mediator and eventually agree some solution.

Robustness Checks

To ensure the validity of the results I changed a number of the model specifications and re-ran the estimates. Firstly, operationalizing mediation as successful when any form of agreement (or ceasefire) terminates the violence might be considered a low threshold. I therefore reran the results using only peace agreement as the measure of success in the outcome side of the model. The results remained consistent with the previous analysis.

Secondly, while the theoretical section discussed non-lootable and lootable resources in a general sense, the analysis focused solely on oil and diamonds. I therefore reran the model estimates using variables that indicated the presence of

onshore gas production, offshore oil and gas production, and a more general gemstone variable. In each case the resource variables produced results in accordance with the previous analysis. This is further evidence of the small effect produced by lootable resources, and the strong negative effect that all non-lootable reduces have on mediation. This also provides additional support for the first series of hypothesized mechanisms. Both gas and offshore oil reserves are far harder for insurgents to control. Therefore the strong effect of these variables can only be attributed to the effect on the incumbent.

Thirdly, recent research has shown that the inclusion of too many controls can influence the statistical results (Clark, 2005). I therefore reran all models without controls. No significant changes occurred in the results.

Fourthly, the Sartori selection model is a relatively recent innovation that has not been commonly used in conflict research. To ensure consistency within previous literature I reran the estimates using the more commonly adopted Heckman selection model. The selection results perform consistently with the previous analysis. All resource variables retain the same directions, though in some cases suffer a minor reduction in the level of significance. This is likely to have been produced by the inappropriateness of estimator and therefore we can remain confident in the findings.

To ensure that the results were not biased by the data structure adopted I also reran the estimates using a number of different specifications. To take better account of multiple mediation attempts within the same conflict episode I divide each conflict episode in conflict years. This produces a population of 1520 observations. I then coded the presence or absence of mediation within each conflict year, as well as the outcome of any mediation attempt that occurred. All results remain consistent with the previous analysis.

Finally, previous studies have shown that like belligerents a would-be-mediator must also make an *ex ante* determination of the utility they stand to gain as a result of mediating a conflict. Mediators do not enter into a random selection of conflicts, but self-select into those cases in which the expected payoffs exceed the expected costs (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Beardsley, 2009). Failing to account for the selection effects could bias the results. For example, the effect of natural resources upon the onset of mediation might instead result from a lower propensity of actors to offer mediation within resource-funded war. I therefore reran the analysis again using the data compiled by Greig and Regan (2008). This data includes all states as potential providers of mediation, pairing civil war states with every state within the international system for every year that the conflict continued. By making the unit of analysis the civil war state-third party-year, rather than the conflict episode, better account is taken of supply bias that can impact mediation. By merging this data with the resource variables, a dataset is produced that includes 183,120 observations. For this analysis the Heckman selection model is appropriate, as number of features exist that influence the supply but not outcome of mediation.[8] The results once again show oil has a significant negative effect upon the outcome of mediation.[9] Despite showing a negative effect diamonds again fail to produce a significant effect on mediated outcomes. In addition to supporting the original analysis the results uncover an additional point of interest. The presence of hydrocarbon production appears to produce a strong negative effect upon the likelihood of mediation supply. This is an interesting avenue for future research.

Conclusions

The civil war literature is rich in accounts linking the presence of natural resources to the duration of civil conflict. A robust collection of work now exists detailing the multiple mechanisms through which resources can shape the dynamics of civil war (Ross, 2004; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2005; Lujala, Rød & Thieme, 2007). Regrettably researchers had previously overlooked the effects of resources on conflict management. This paper therefore provides an important contribution to this body of work, illustrating the role of resources in the initiation and outcome of mediation.

The results suggest that non-lootable natural resources play an important role in shaping the scale of the strategic bargaining problem in civil war. The power asymmetry that arises when a state has access to oil revenue significantly lowers the likelihood of a conflict being mediated. The lower quality of governance often associated with oil wealth also reduces the probability of a mediated settlement. These findings complement recent work that has stressed the increased duration of conflicts fought within oil producing states (Lujala, 2010). Previously this has been attributed to the effect that oil has on rebel movements, yet the results generated in this study suggest that the impact of oil occurs predominately through its influence on the institutions and capacity of the central state.

This finding has important relevance to the policy community. To increase the frequency of mediation external actors should focus their attention on reducing the power asymmetry in conflict. This could potentially be achieved through trade embargos, which lower the revenue generated from the sale of hydrocarbons. In principle this should raise the pressure upon the state and increase the likelihood of mediation. Third parties should also focus their efforts on the promotion of good

governance in oil-producing states. An increase in the accountability and transparency of incumbents would reduce issues of asymmetric information and lower rebel fears of defection. This would lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of mediation, and most likely reduce the duration of civil conflicts.

The analysis of lootable resources produced less significant results. Rebel access to secondary diamonds produced a small reduction in the likelihood of mediation, but had no notable effect on the outcome. This may have been the result of the weak relationship observed between lootable resources and relative rebel strength. Insurgents may therefore be overcoming the challenges associated with lootable resources more commonly than previously thought. A better understanding of the underlying conditions that allow some rebels to transform lootable resources into stronger rebellions might therefore facilitate a more robust assessment of the effect of resources on mediation.

Future research should also strive to develop a stronger understanding of the relationship between natural resources and other types of conflict management. This study focused on mediation as the most common form of conflict resolution. However bilateral negotiations still frequently occur within both intra- and inter-state conflict. Assessing the role of natural resources in this context would represent an interesting development of this work. Similarly other resources such as narcotics, palm oil and timber were not assessed in this study. An empirical evaluation of these assets would lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of resources. Finally, in assessing the robustness of the results a significant negative relationship between the presence of oil and the supply of mediation was uncovered. This suggests that potential mediators shy away from offering their services when a state is an oil producer. On the one hand this might reflect third parties reluctance to take sides

when economic interests are at stake (Grieg & Regan, 2008), or alternatively it might be that those with strong preferences regarding the outcome of a conflict are more likely to use robust forms of intervention. This is certainly an interesting area that future research could explore.

Understanding the obstacles that commonly block the resolution of civil war is essential. Effective conflict management can only be undertaken when we understand the dynamics shaping the resolution process. This study represents the first empirical assessment of the impact of resources on conflict resolution. The use of disaggregated resource data facilitated the assessment of a number of competing mechanisms. In this way the study represents an important attempt to forge a better connection between research centered on civil war and growing literature on conflict management. The results suggest that this is an effective approach to improve our knowledge of mediation.

Bibliography

Addison, Tony., Philippe Le Billion & Mansoob Murshed. 2002. 'Conflict in Africa: The cost of peaceful behaviour' *Journal of African Economies* 11(3): 365-386.

Auty, Richard M. 1998. 'Resource abundance and economic development: Improving the performance of resource-rich countries' *Research for Action 44.* World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER), Helsinki.

Auty, Richard M & Alan Gleb. 2001. Political Economy of resource abundant states. In: Richard M Auty (ed.) *Resource Abundant and Economic Development.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 126-144.

Basedau, Matthias & Jann Lay. 2009. 'Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 46(6): 757-776.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. *The Mediation Dilemma.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2009. 'Intervention without leverage: Explaining the prevalence of weak mediators' *International Interactions* 35(3): 272-297.

Beardsley, Kyle., David Quinn., Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2006. 'Mediation style and crisis outcomes' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 58-86.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Scott S. Gartner. 2006. 'Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation' *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Gerard Schneider. 2000. 'Who mediates? The political economy of international conflict management' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 145-165.

Bercovitch, Jacob., Theodore Anagnoson & Donnette L. Wille. 1991. 'Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations' *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 7-17.

Buhaug, Halvard. 2010. 'Dude, where's my conflict? LSG, relative strength and the location of civil war' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(2): 107-128.

Buhaug, Halvard., Scott Gates & Päivi Lujala. 2009. 'Geography, rebel capability, and the duration of civil conflict' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 544-569.

Buhaug, Halvard & Päivi Lujala. 2005. 'Accounting for scale: Measuring geography in quantitative studies of civil war' *Political Geography* 24(4): 399-418.

Carnevale, Peter J. 1986. 'Strategic choice in mediation' *Negotiation Journal* 2(1): 41-56.

Clark, Kevin. A. 2005. 'The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric

Research' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 341-352.

Clayton, Govinda. 2011. 'Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Mediation in Civil War' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, 18 March.

Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler. 2005. 'Resource rents, governance, and conflict' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 625-633.

Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler. 2004. 'Greed and grievance in civil war' *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.

Collier, Paul., Anke Hoeffler & Måns Söderbom. 2004. 'On the duration of civil war' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 253-273.

Collier, Paul., Lance Elliot., Håvard Hegre., Anke Hoeffler., Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cunningham, David E. 2010. 'Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong Civil Wars' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 115-127.

Cunningham, David E. 2006. 'Veto Players and Civil War Duration' *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 875-892.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan. 2009. 'It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570-597.

De Rouen, Karl R, Jnr & David Sobek. 2004. 'The dynamics of civil war duration and Outcome' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 303-320.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr., Jacob Bercovitch & Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. 'Introducing the new Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.

De Soysa, Indra & Eric Neumayer. 2007. 'Resource Wealth and the risk of civil war onset: Results from a new dataset on natural resource rents, 1970-1999' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(3): 201-218.

Fearon, James D. 2005. 'Primary commodity exports and civil war' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 483-507.

Fearon, James D. 2004. 'Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275-301.

Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War' *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Fearon, James D & David Laitin. 2003. 'Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war' *The American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Filson, Darren & Suzanne Werner. 2007. 'The Dynamics of Bargaining and War'

International Interactions 33(1): 31-50.

Flöter, Annegret; Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rød. 2007. 'The Gemstone Dataset Codebook' Mimeo, Department of Geography. Trodheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

Gent, Stephen R. 2011. 'Relative rebel strength and power sharing in intrastate conflict' *International Interactions* 37(2) 215-228.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 2002. 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–637.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2008. Modified Polity P4 and P4D Data, Version 3.0., URL: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/Polity.html accessed 30.12.11.

Greig, Michael J & Patrick Regan. 2008. 'When do they say yes? An analysis of the willingness to offer and accept mediation in civil wars' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 759-781.

Greig, Michael J. 2005. 'Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?' *American Journal of Political Science,* 49(2): 249-266.

Gurses, Mehmet., Nicolas Rost & Patrick McLeod. 2008. 'Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace' *International Interactions* 34(2): 129-155.

Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508-537.

Humphreys, Macartan & Jeremy Weinstein. 2004. 'What the Fighters Say' Centre for Globalization and Sustainable Development Working Paper no.20, Columbia University, New York.

Keen, David. 1998. 'The economic functions of violence in civil wars' *Adelphi Paper 320.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Keller, Peter C. 1990. *Gemstones and their Origins.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Kirschner, Shanna A. 2010. 'Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars' *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* 54(5): 745-770.

Klare, Michael T. 2001. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict.* New York: Holt Paperbacks.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.

Kydd, Andrew. 2006. 'When can mediators build trust?' *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 449-462.

Kydd, Andrew. 2003. 'Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.

Lake, David A & Donald Rothchild. 1996. 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict' *International Security* 21(2): 41-75.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2012. *Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources.* London: Hurst and Co.

Le Billon, Philippe 2001. 'The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts' *Political Geography* 20(5): 561–584

Lujala, Päivi. 2010. 'The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources' *Journal of Peace Research,* 47(1): 15-28.

Lujala, Päivi., Jan Ketil Rød & Nadja Thieme. 2007. 'Fighting over oil: Introducing a New Dataset' *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 24(3): 239-256.

Lujala, Päivi., Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Elisabeth Gilmore. 2005. 'A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 538-562.

Melin, Molly M & Isak Svensson. 2009. 'Incentives for talking: Accepting mediation in international and civil wars' *International Interactions* 35(3): 249-271.

Mitchell, Christopher. 1993. The processes and stages of mediation: The Sudanese case. In *Making war and waging peace : foreign intervention in Africa,* ed. David Sobek Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Mitchell, Sara. McLaughlin & Thies G Cameron. 2012. 'Resource Curse in Reverse: How Civil Wars Influence Natural Resource Production' *International Interactions* 38(2): 218-242.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. 'Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution' *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 749-759.

Moore, Mick. 2009. 'How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?' *IDS Policy Briefing* 34, Brighton: IDS.

Moore, Mick. 2001. 'Political Underdevelopment: What causes 'bad governance'' *Working paper*, Institute for Development Studies Sussex.

Morrison, M. Kevin. 2009. 'Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability *International Organization* 63(1): 107-138.

Nixon, Charles. 1972. 'Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra case' *World Politics,* 24(4): 473-497.

Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management' *World Politics* 58(2): 207-241.

Reno, William. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Ross, Michael L. 2012. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations.* Woodstock: Princeton University Press.

Ross, Michael L. 2004. 'What do we know about natural resources and civil war?' *Journal of Peace Research,* 41(3): 337-356.

Rustad, Siri C. A., Jan Rød K., Wenche Larsen & Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2008. 'Foliage and fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and location of civil war' *Political Geography* 27(7): 761-782.

Sachs, Jeffrey D & Andrew Warner. 2001. 'The curse of natural resources' *European Economic Review* 45(4): 827-838.

Sartori, Anne E. 2003. 'An Estimator for Some Binary Ooutcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions' *Political Analysis* 11(2): 111–138.

Smith, Benjamin. 2004. 'Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, 1960–1999' *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 232–246.

Snyder, Richard. 2006. 'Does lootable wealth breed disorder? A political economy of extraction framework' *Comparative Political Studies* 39(8): 943–968.

Snyder, Richard & Ravi Bhavnani. 2005. 'Diamonds, blood and taxes: A revenue centered framework for explaining political order' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 563-597.

Sørli, Mirjam E. 2002. 'Resources, Regimes and Rebellion' Paper presented at the 43rd Annual International Studies Association Convention March 22-27 New Orleans, Louisiana.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. 'Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 114-163.

Svensson, Isak. 2006. *Elusive Peacemakers: A Bargaining Perspective on Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts*, Dissertation thesis, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Report no 75.

Thies, Cameron G. 2010. 'Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State Capacity, civil war onset and primary commodities' *Journal of Peace Research.* 47(3): 321-332.

Touval, Saadia & William I Zartman. 1985. *International mediation in theory and practice.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Uche, Chibuike. 2008. 'Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War' *The Journal of African History* 49(1): 111-135.

Uche, Chibuike. 2002. 'Money Matters in a War Economy: The Biafran Experience' *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8(1): 29-54.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2011. *Database* www.ucdp.uu.se/database.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to peace: the successful settlement of civil wars*

Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy. 2006. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. 'Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598-624.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan., Kathleen Young., David Quinn & Victor Asal. 2005. *Mediating International Crises*. London: Routledge.

Young, Oran R. 1967. *The intermediaries: third parties in international crises.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, William I. 1995. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,* Washington DC: Brookings.

Notes

[1] There is also evidence of this in the mediation of interstate conflict (Young, 1967; Touval & Zartman, 1985)

[2] A contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.' UCDP definitions available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/definitions_all.htm.

[3] The Heckman model is used in robustness checks.

[4] In this case a new conflict episode would be included in the dataset.

[5] In addition I use a measure of gemstones and gas production in robustness checks.

[6] The original measure within the NSA dataset is a five point ordinal measure. However when combined with the CWM data there are a very small number of observations involving rebels classed at the top of the scale. Also given the qualitative decision making process used to code the original measure the distinction between 1-2 and 4-5 is not always clear. Simplifying the measure reduces the measurement error associated with the variable. As an additional robustness check all results were run with the original measure, no inconsistencies were discovered.

[7] Undertaking a likelihood ratio test shows that there is no significant difference between these categories.

[8] I use a the distance from the potential mediator to the state in conflict; the percentage of the potential mediators trade with the state in conflict; duration and duration squared. For a justification of these variables see the original source (Greig and Regan, 2008).

[9] The Results are available in Appendix B

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*N*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Mediation Onset	290	0.272	0.445	0	1
Outcome - Agreement	290	0.134	0.341	0	1
Oil Production in State	290	0.593	0.492	0	1
Oil Production in Conflict Zone	290	0.283	0.451	0	1
Secondary Diamonds in State	290	0.379	0.486	0	1
Secondary Diamonds in Conflict Zone	290	0.152	0.359	0	1
Gemstones in State	290	0.479	0.500	0	1
Gemstones in Conflict Zone	290	0.245	0.431	0	1
Incompatibility	290	0.562	0.497	0	1
Duration	290	49.92	88.74	0.32	576.39
Battle deaths (ln)	290	7.448	2.206	3.17	13.864
Post-Cold war Dummy	290	0.420	0.495	0	1
Parallel Conflict	290	0.317	0.466	0	1
Life Expectancy	290	55.70	10.37	23.59	78.27
Relative Rebel Strength	283	1.251	0.593	1	3
Polity Conflict End	290	-1.448	6.094	-10	10

Appendix B.

Heckman Model: The Offer and Outcome of Civil War Mediation

	(1) Selection	(2) Outcome	(1) Selection	(1) Outcome
Oil Production in State	-0.324***	-0.427*		
	(0.058)	(0.233)		
Secondary Diamonds in Conflict Zone			-0.124	-0.059
			(0.333)	(0.780)
Incompatibility	-0.001	-0.017	-0.081**	-0.170
	(0.058)	(0.237)	(0.058)	(0.239)
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.067***	0.025	0.058**	0.021
	(0.015)	(0.065)	(0.014)	(0.065)
Post-Cold War	0.381***	1.066***	0.334***	0.955***
	(0.056)	(0.253)	(0.055)	(0.242)
Parallel Conflict	-0.404***	-0.173	-0.393***	-0.042
	(0.087)	(0.373)	(0.085)	(0.363)
Polity	-0.002	-0.014	-0.005	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.021)
Conflict Duration	-0.014*		-0.019**	
	(0.008)		(0.009)	
Conflict Duration Squared	0.0004*		0.001	
	(0.002)		(0.000)	
Mediator Distance	-0.127***		-0.124***	
	(0.008)		(0.011)	
Mediator Trade Interest	-1.963		-2.550*	
	(1.444)		(1.541)	
Constant	-2.537***	-2.175**	-2.551***	-2.150*
	(0.140)	(0.902)	(0.210)	(0.928)
N	163137 (125 Clusters)		162077 (125 Clusters)	
Uncensored Obs	162981		161921	
Log Likelihood	-1165.819		-1182.037	
chi2	22.35		20.14	
Prob>chi2	0.000		0.002	
Rho	0.396*		0.406*	

Paper Three:

Can I Get By With A Little Help From My Friends?

Institutional Affinity and Civil War Mediation

Govinda Clayton

The Conflict Analysis Research Centre

The University of Kent

Abstract

Which states are the most effective mediators? Evidence from studies of international conflict has shown democratic states to be the most capable track-one mediators. A strong community of democratic states is thought to increase the supply and success of mediation. Yet despite an increasing supply of capable democratic mediators, there remains a low demand for their assistance within some of the most challenging civil conflicts. This paper argues that the demand for civil war mediation is often influenced by the incumbent's perceptions of the mediator's preferences. Governing belligerents are reluctant to accept a mediator that might threaten the survival of their regime. Political institutions help the incumbent to discriminate between friends and foes, denoting third parties who are more likely to protect their system of rule. Consequently, states are more likely to accept offers of mediation from actors that share their core democratic or non-democratic features. Institutional homogeneity is also argued to increase the likelihood of settlement, by improving the credibility of the information and guarantees offered by a mediator. These arguments are assessed empirically on mediation attempts between 1946 and 2003. The results generated using logit models, in conjunction with Sartori's selection estimator, show that non-democratic states are more likely to accept assistance from non-democratic peace brokers. Regime affinity is also shown to have a small but insignificant effect on the outcome of mediation.

Introduction

Which states are the most effective peace brokers? Evidence from the study of international conflict has shown that the representatives of democratic states are often the most capable track-one mediators (Sullivan & Gartner, 2006; Lipson, 2003; Grigorescu, 2003; Kadera, Crescenzi & Shannon, 2003). The increasingly vibrant community of democratic actors is commonly associated with the rising frequency and effectiveness of mediation (Mitchell, Kadera & Crescenzi, 2009). Yet many civil conflicts remain resistant to the entrance of democratic mediators. For example, during the El Salvadorian civil conflict, the belligerents rejected offers of mediation made by the United States of America, Canada, Germany and Colombia. This suggests that despite an increasing supply of capable democratic mediators, there remains a low demand for their assistance within some of the most challenging civil conflicts. Building on this puzzle, the manuscript investigates the following question: to what extent does the regime type of a mediator impact upon the onset and outcome of civil war mediation?

I argue that the process of civil war resolution makes belligerents sensitive to the institutional preferences of the mediator. Unlike inter-state conflict settlement, civil war agreements require the redistribution of political power within a state. This makes incumbents reluctant to accept a mediator that might threaten the survival of their regime. Political institutions help the governing belligerent to discriminate between friends and foes, denoting third parties who are more likely to protect their system of rule. Common governing systems indicate shared normative and ideological focus, in particular surrounding how states should be structured. Consequently, incumbents are more likely to accept offers of mediation when they are made by states that share their democratic or non-democratic features. The demand for democratic and non-democratic mediators is therefore conditional upon the regime type of the governing belligerent.

Regime affinity is also argued to improve the effectiveness of intermediaries. Mediators are likely to be biased towards incumbents who are part of their democratic or non-democratic community, as institutional homogeneity indicates that a third party has an interest in the preservation of the common system of rule. This form of mediator bias improves the credibility of information and security guarantees provided by the mediator. This should reduce the bargaining obstacles that commonly prevent resolution, increasing the likelihood of a settlement.

These arguments are assessed empirically on mediation attempts drawn from the diplomatic interventions dataset (Greig & Regan, 2008). This dataset includes information on 198 offers of mediation between 1946 and 2003. The diplomatic interventions data is combined with regime dyad variables, which capture each dyadic configuration of democratic and non-democratic regimes (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010). The results generated using logit models, and Sartori's selection estimator, shows that non-democratic states are more likely to accept assistance from non-democratic peace brokers. Regime affinity is also shown to have a small, but insignificant effect on the outcome of mediation.

The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows: The first two sections discuss the onset and outcome of mediation independently, developing a theoretical argument about how the mediation process is influenced by the regime type of the incumbent and the mediator. I then discuss the method of empirical evaluation, before I present the results in the final section.

Mediation Onset

Before mediation can occur, civil war belligerents must calculate the payoffs they expect to gain from the entrance of an intermediary. A peace broker will only be requested (or accepted) on those occasions in which both disputants believe the payoffs associated

with mediation exceed the expected costs. The unequal distribution of power and legitimacy creates variance in belligerents' demand for civil war mediation. The state benefits from an asymmetry in legitimacy, which is reduced when they enter into dialogue with a non-state group (Zartman, 1995). Ceding control of the peace process to a mediator highlights the regime's inability to control their own territory, and suggests a lack of resolve to resist insurgent demands (Svensson, 2009; Greig & Regan, 2008). Consequently, while insurgents exhibit a consistently high demand for peace brokers, incumbents are more reluctant to cede control of the process to an outsider.

The unequal distribution of costs and benefits often make the state the sole veto power in the onset of civil war mediation.[1] The state will only sanction the introduction of a mediator when the price of dialogue is outweighed by costs of continued conflict.[2] This has been illustrated empirically by studies showing the positive relationship between incumbents' conflict costs and probability of mediation onset. For example, increased casualties, longer conflict duration, and relatively stronger rebel groups all increase the likelihood of civil war mediation (Grieg & Regan, 2008; Melin & Svensson, 2009, Clayton, 2011).

The State Selection of Mediators

As dominant veto power in the onset of mediation, the state has greater control over the choice of mediator. The state is unlikely to accept a peace broker whose preferences are not compatible with their goals. By ensuring that the intermediary shares common views on the most challenging aspects of the resolution process, the incumbent can reduce the likelihood of concessions in the most threatening areas. In other words, controlling the identity of the mediator allows the state to insulate itself from the most ominous aspects of the peace process.

The preferences of a mediator are of particular importance to incumbents within intra-state conflict, as settlements attempt to redefine core state functions, including: the structure of governance, management of territory, and the distribution of power within a state (Svensson, 2009). This is not the case within inter-state settlement processes, which rarely requires a change in either belligerents' system of governance.[3] Melin and Svensson (2009: 261) have previously found evidence to suggest that incumbents are particularly sensitive to the potential biases of a civil war mediator. This suggests that incumbents are unlikely to welcome mediation from third parties whose preferences are not clearly compatible with their own.

The rebels' acceptance of a state-biased mediator is premised on the international legitimacy and recognition they gain from entering negotiations (Greig & Regan, 2008). Mediation is a voluntary pursuit, which entails no binding commitment to an agreement. Rebels can therefore enter mediation with little fear of being compelled to accept unfavorable terms. At the same time, entering mediation, even with little intention to secure an agreement, demonstrates to their constituents that they are capable of forcing concessions from the state.

Insurgents' acceptance of a state-biased mediator is commonly justified with reference to the leverage that a mediator provides over the incumbent. This argument is based upon the assumption that a biased mediator will 'deliver' their preferred belligerent. (Touval & Zartman, 2001; Touval, 1982; Stephens, 1988; Jönsson, 2002; Bercovitch, 1991; Kleiboer, 1996; Touval & Zartman, 2001; Stevens, 1988). For example, the Palestinian acceptance of the United States as a mediator is largely premised upon the ability of the US to force concessions from the Israelis (Carnevale & Arad, 1996; Touval, 1975; Slim, 1992; Sick, 1985). However, it is counterintuitive to expect that a biased mediator would use their leverage to influence their ally (Svensson, 2007). Instead it would seem more rational to

expect a biased mediator to use their resources to develop a more favourable agreement for their associate. This suggests that while the leverage of a mediator might help to explain the concessions made within a bargaining process, it is not well-equipped to explain the onset of mediation (Svensson, 2007, 2009). The unequal distribution of costs and benefits is therefore a stronger justification for the rebels' acceptance of a state-biased mediator.

Regime Affinity and Mediation Demand

Political institutions offer one way in which state leaders can discriminate between friends and foes. Regime affinity indicates a shared normative and ideological focus, in particular surrounding how states and the international environment should be structured (Denzau & North, 1994: 4). International relations literature is rich in accounts highlighting the shared norms and preferences within the democratic community of states. The most prominent evidence of this effect is the widely discussed observation that two democracies rarely (if ever) fight wars against each other (Maoz & Russett, 1992; Maoz & Abdolali, 1989; Doyle, 1986). Democratic states are also more likely to share foreign policy goals, military alliances and economic trade (Huth & Allee, 2002; Gowa, 1999; Werner, 2000; Peceny, Beer & Sanchez-Terry, 2002; Peceny & Butler, 2004; Souva, 2004; Bennett, 2006).

In addition to the shared union between democracies, there is also some evidence of a non-democratic community of states. These actors operate using a range of non-democratic systems of governance, including monarchies, dictatorships, military regimes and single party systems. Like the democratic community, non-democratic states are also connected by common preferences and goals. For example, non-democratic states are often united in their support for the norm of non-intervention (e.g. China, Russia, Syria, Cuba, North Korea etc.). Members of the non-democratic community of states are also more

likely to share military alliances, economic support and generally cooperative interactions (Emmons & Siverson, 1991; Lai & Reiter, 2000; Leeds, 1999; Simon & Gartzke, 1996; Cronin, 1999; Huth, 1998; Kaw, 1990; Kegley & Hermann, 1997; Mousseau & Shi, 1997; Raknerud & Hegre, 1997; Werner & Lemke, 1997). The shared preferences within the non-democratic community are also likely to shape members' demand for mediation. Non-democratic incumbents are less likely to treat offers of mediation with suspicion when they originate from non-democratic third party (Hermann & Kegley, 1995: 517). On the other hand, as Werner and Lemke (1997: 532) suggest, 'states with different institutions should be particularly threatening, because they can increase the costs of enforcing the state's particular set of institutions'.

For example, the Tanzanian mediation of the civil conflict in Burundi was largely premised upon the non-democratic nature of the mediator. The Tanzanian mediators, who later supported the efforts of Nelson Mandela, helped to reassure the Burundian leadership that the process would help to protect their non-democratic tendencies. At the same time, the United States' offers to mediate were rejected by the incumbent, largely on account of their competing policy preferences that threatened the ruling regime.

From this discussion I derive the following hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: States are more likely to accept offers of mediation from states that share similar systems of governance.

Mediation Outcome

Rational Conflict Resolution

Violent conflict is costly, and at least ex post inefficient. There should then always be at least one solution that provides both actors with a payoff greater than they expect to achieve through violent conflict (Fearon, 1995; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Yet problems associated with asymmetric information, combined with the strategic incentives to exaggerate and misrepresent information, can lead to a rational miscalculation that produces war. If conflict is caused by bargaining impediments, then it should end when the barriers preventing efficient bargaining outcomes are reduced (Beardsley & Greig, 2009). Peace brokers can help belligerents to overcome bargaining challenges, by improving the flow of credible information, and reducing fears of future exploitation (Beardsley et al. 2006).

Third Party Regimes and Mediation Outcome

Democratic representatives are widely viewed as the most efficient suppliers of information, and the best equipped to resolve the problem of commitment (e.g. Gilady & Russett, 2002: 404; Crescenzi et al. 2011). Democracies' domestic experience in peaceful dispute resolution cultivates the skills required in a mediator. Institutional transparency, free press and participation within international organizations, all improve the credibility of information and guarantees offered by democratic states (Sullivan & Gartner, 2006; Lipson, 2003; Grigorescu, 2003; Mitchell, Kadera & Crescenzi, 2009; Kadera, Crescenzi & Shannon, 2003). The promotion of peaceful methods of conflict resolution also forms a core aspect of many democracies foreign policy, increasing their propensity to offer peace-making assistance (Crescenzi et al. 2011; Mitchell et al. 2009: 246; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This suggests that a 'strong democratic community ensures that when states need third parties, there is a ready supply of them, they are reliable and trustworthy, and their use is seen as legitimate.' (Mitchell, Kadera & Crescenzi, 2009: 247). In contrast, the

representatives of non-democratic states are thought to lack the credibility and reliability required by a peace broker (Jervis, 1970: 80; Sartori, 2002: 122).

Yet disputants' perceptions of state peace brokers are unlikely to be homogenous. Instead the credibility of a mediator is more likely to be based upon their relationship with the disputants. Existing mediation research has explored the role of mediator bias, and shown it to have a strong influence on third parties ability to resolve bargaining challenges.

Mediator Bias and the Credible Flow of Information

A mediator can reduce the distortion, ignorance, and misperception that often prevent belligerents from producing an agreement (Savun, 2008; Fisher, 1972; Dixon, 1996; Kydd, 2003; Savun, 2008; Beardsley et al. 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006). When a mediator fosters an environment in which both belligerents feel comfortable sharing information on their reservation point (the lowest acceptable terms), the area in which their preference orderings overlap (zone of agreement) is revealed.

The credibility of information shared by international actors is colored by their biases. Actors are more likely to view information as credible when an ally provides it.[4] Andrew Kydd (2003, 2006, 2010), assessed this argument formally, and illustrated the manner in which bias assists belligerents assess the credibility of new information. Building on the 'cheap talk' and 'credible signals' framework (Austen-Smith & Banks, 2000; Calvert, 1985), Kydd argued that information provided by an unbiased mediator would lack credibility in the eyes of disputants. Unbiased actors, who were motivated only be the desire to bring about peace, would be expected to provide whatever information is required to maximize the probability of an agreement.[5] Therefore only a biased mediator would be trusted to provide credible information on the concessions that are often required to resolve conflict (Kydd, 2003: 598).

Commitment Problem and Mediator Bias

Biased third parties can also help to resolve the problem of asymmetric commitment (Schmidt, 2005; Svensson, 2007, 2009). Prior to an agreement, disputants must credibly signal their commitment to abide by the terms of an arrangement. This is necessary due to the acute vulnerability each party suffers during the period of settlement implementation. Rebels find it harder to credibly commit to an agreement. Having proved their capacity on the battlefield, insurgents stand to make gains in territory, representation, and legitimacy. By contrast the incumbent, who has proven unable to control its territory, is expected to make concessions on some aspect of political control. Given that rebels are required to amass a significant force prior to the state accepting a mediator, the incumbent suffers a more significant threat of defection. The state is fearful that the rebels will renege during agreement implementation, and demand more territory, representation, or access to resources (Svensson, 2009).

Biased third parties can help to mitigate the commitment problems, by serving as guarantors for the weaker side (Fearon, 1998; Gilady & Russett, 2002; Schmidt, 2005; Walter, 2002). In the case of civil war, government-biased mediators can reassure the incumbent, by providing assurances against rebel defection, thereby reducing fears of future exploitation (Svensson, 2009). The presence of a government-biased mediator signals the external actors commitment to the conflict, and a desire to ensure the sustainability of an agreement. This can help to reduce the scale of the commitment problem, and increase the likelihood of an agreement (Fearon, 1998; Gilady & Russett, 2002; Schmidt, 2005; Walter, 2002).

Third Party Regime Type and Mediation Outcomes

Common political institutions often indicate a form of mediator bias. Regime affinity suggests a convergence in political interests, and shared views on a range of issues that shape actors satisfaction with the status quo. Political leaders are more likely to form group identities with leaders from similar states, and have stronger incentives to favor their preferences within a peace process (Huth & Allee, 2002).

Democratic or non-democratic similarities should therefore increase the effectiveness of a peace broker. Information is more likely to be viewed as credible when it is provide by an actor that shares the same core system of rule. Alternatively, peace brokers from competing systems of governance are less likely to be trusted, restricting their ability to reduce information asymmetries. Even democratic mediators, who are generally considered to be less partial, are unlikely to be considered credible by non-democratic incumbents. Liberal democracies promote an ideology that includes individual freedoms, the separation of power, and free and fair elections. This bias leads to the promotion of specific forms of agreement. For example, it is unlikely that a democratic mediator would sanction a settlement that failed to promote widespread elections. This makes democratic mediators biased in favor of democratic principles, which reduces their ability to convincingly convey information to non-democratic rulers.

Common institutions should also increase the ability of a mediator to resolve problems of commitment. Institutional affinity is likely to increase the credibility of security guarantees. Both democratic and non-democratic states more frequently intervene to support similar regimes. The overthrow of a common government can harm the legitimacy and stability of kindred states. Members of the democratic and non-democratic community are therefore more likely to protect a similar state from internal and external challengers (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Bueno. de Mesquita, Siverson & Woller, 1992). For example, research has shown that the breakdown of democracy is far

more likely to occur within regions containing lower levels of democratic governance (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Whereas stable and long term transitions to democracy are more likely in areas with a high concentration of democratic states (Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski et al. 1996; Huntington, 1991). The support and protection provided by democratic neighbors helps fertilize the maturing democracies, ensuring that they are relatively well insulated from potential threats.

Third party security guarantees are therefore more credible when made by an institutional ally. Institutional affinity reassures the regime that the mediator will act to preserve terms of any agreed settlement. In contrast, rebel-biased and neutral mediators, have a lower interest in the maintenance of the current regime, and cannot provide a credible guarantee to protect the terms of an agreement.

Institutional affinity helped a number of mediators to effectively mediate the Sudanese civil conflict. Mediators working on behalf of non-democratic states like Libya, Egypt, Uganda and Kenya, each helped the Sudanese regime to overcome fears of rebel defection, and commit to (partial) agreements with the SPLM. [6]

From this discussion I derive a second testable implication.

Hypothesis Two: Mediation is more likely to result in an agreement when the incumbent and mediator share similar systems of governance.

Research Design

Data

To test the hypothesized mechanisms I draw on Greig and Regan's (2008) diplomatic interventions dataset. This dataset includes information of all civil conflicts

between 1946 and 2003, which exceed 200 battle related deaths. To account for multiple mediation attempts by different actors within the same conflict, each conflict is separated into conflict years, and paired with every state within the international system. As the hypotheses are based on the acceptance and outcome of mediation, I exclude all conflict years that do not feature an offer of mediation. I also exclude cases in which international organisations offered conflict management services, being as the hypothesized arguments apply only to cases in which states offered peace-making services. This results in a dataset of 198 observations (offers of mediation), from 52 separate conflicts.

Dependent Variables

Hypothesis 1 is centred upon belligerents' willingness to accept mediation from a third party. Grieg and Regan's conflict data includes the variable 'accepted', which records belligerents' response to mediation offers. The variable is coded 0 when an offer is declined, and 1 when an offer is accepted. This is adopted as the dependent variable in the analysis of mediation demand. Of the 198 mediation offers included within the intrastate conflict management dataset, 172 were accepted (86%).

Hypothesis 2 focuses on the outcome of mediation. The dependent variable in the outcome analysis is a dichotomous variable coded 0 when mediation fails to reach an agreement, and 1 when a partial or full settlement is produced. This variable is taken from a study authored by Regan, Frank and Aydin (2009). Of the 172 cases of mediation included within the dataset, 70 resulted in an agreement (41%). There are limitations with this method of capturing mediation success. To consider mediation unsuccessful when it fails to reach an agreement, irrespective of the nature of the conflict, represents a failure to appreciate the full complexity of conflict, and the decision process that underlies the entrance and exit of a mediator (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). However, the signing of a

political agreement often signifies an important step towards peace (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011:666; Touval & Zartman, 1985). Partial and full settlements therefore represent significant achievements, which provide a valid means of assessing mediation effectiveness (Jackson, 2000).

Independent Variables

To capture the effect of regime affinity I combine the diplomatic interventions data with Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's (2010) Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) data. Each state involved in civil conflict, and third party offering mediation, is coded as either a democracy or non-democracy. To be classified as a democracy a state must contain (a) an executive that is directly elected or indirectly elected via the legislature, (b) a legislature that is directly elected, (c) more than one political party, and (d) an executive that alternates power between different parties under the same electoral rule. If a state fails to meet any of these criteria, it is coded as a non-democratic regime. [7] The democratic community of states is a relatively clear collection of actors, who largely identify each other according the criteria set out in the DD data. Non-democratic states are a more diverse collection of states, which are largely united by their non-democratic tendencies. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's regime data is therefore preferred to the Polity data, on account of the precise coding procedure and clearer definition of democracy (Cheibub et al. 2010).

Having coded the regime type of all incumbents and third parties, I generate dyadic regime variables for each dyadic configuration of regime. This produces four independent variables: (1) Incumbent Democracy - Mediator Democracy, (2) Incumbent Non-democracy - Mediator Democracy, (3) Incumbent Non-democracy - Mediator Non-democracy, (4) Incumbent Democracy - Mediator Non-democracy.[8]

Controls

To isolate the effect of institutional affinity, I control for a number of factors that help to define the conflict costs. This is based on the assumption that higher conflict costs increase the probability of mediation onset and success. I include a measure of battle deaths (logged), conflict duration (in years), conflict duration squared, incompatibility, and ethnic conflict (Kreutz, 2010). I also include a number of variables to account for the leverage a third party has over an incumbent. I use a dichotomous variable recording if a third party is a major power, a measure that indicates the percentage of the incumbents trade conducted with the mediator, and a measure of the mediator's reputation (percentage of previous cases successfully mediated) (Greig & Regan, 2008).

Model

I use a simple logit model to assess hypothesis 1. The categorical nature of the dependent variable makes this an appropriate model choice. In the analysis of mediation outcomes, only those cases in which mediation was accepted are included. Selection bias can result if the models fail account for the non-random assignment of mediation. Previous studies of conflict management have attempted to overcome this challenge using a two-stage Heckman model (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006; Schneider, Bercovitch & Selck, 2006; Boehmelt, 2010). However, the Heckman model requires identifying assumptions, and is appropriate only when at least one additional explanatory factor influences the selection but not the outcome (Sartori, 2003). Features that shape belligerents' propensity to accept mediation, are also those factors most commonly assumed to affect the outcome of mediation. This makes the Heckman model an inappropriate choice when assessing features that determine the outcome of mediation.

To better account for the selection bias underpinning mediation, the outcome analysis utilizes Sartori's alternative selection estimator. The Sartori model is based on the additional identifying assumption that the error term for an observation is the same in the selection and outcome equations. There are good theoretical reasons to believe that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both selection and outcome of mediation would be the same. Recent research has suggested that civil war mediation is only likely to occur when the state suffers significantly. Given the costs associated with mediation, incumbents resist the onset of the process in all but the most challenging conflicts, those in which the (unobserved) resolve of the state is reduced. This reduction in resolve is likely to be strongly correlated with an increase in the likelihood of settlement. As a result there are good theoretical reasons to assume that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both the onset and outcome of mediation would be the same.

Results

Mediation Onset

Hypothesis 1 predicted that the incumbents are more likely to accept mediation offers from similar regimes. I argued that institutional affinity reassures the incumbent that the process will not challenge core aspects of the regime. The data partially supports this argument. Non-democratic incumbents more commonly accept mediation when a representative of a non-democratic state offers assistance. In this case 88 of the 94 mediation offers (94%) were accepted. In contrast, non-democratic incumbents accepted 68 of the 85 offers made by democratic mediators (80%). A lower prevalence of conflict within democratic states, coupled with their greater ability to resolve conflict bilaterally, means mediation was not required as regularly. In total, mediation was offered on only 28

occasions to democratic incumbents, 18 offers originating from fellow democracies, and 10 from non-democratic actors. Both forms of mediator were accepted in close to 70% of cases.

Table I presents the results of a number of logit regression models. Model one includes only the regime dyad variables.[9] Model two includes controls to account for the conflict context. Model three also includes variables that account for the third parties characteristics. In statistical analysis of categorical data, a reference category must be excluded from the analysis. The reference category is the category against which the other results are compared. In all models "non-democratic state - democratic third party" was used as the reference category. As all cases of mediation within a single conflict are clearly not independent of each other, I cluster on the conflict using the robust cluster option in STATA 10. While this does not address the consequences of the cases not being independent of the coefficient, it does adjust the standard errors accordingly.

As the coefficients generated by a logit model cannot be directly interpreted, I use the CLARIFY software package to produce predicted probabilities (Tomz, Wittenberg & King, 2003). Holding all control variables at the mean or modal value, I calculate the likelihood of mediation being accepted in each third party-incumbent dyad. For ease of interpretation the results are presented on a box plot (figure 1). The line in the center of each box represents the point estimate for each dyadic variable (the predicted probability of acceptance). The outer edges of the box illustrate the 90% confidence interval, and the whiskers the 95% confidence interval. On those occasions in which the confidence boundaries cross the point estimates of another variable, this indicates that the differences between the categories fall within the margin of error. When the confidence boundaries do not intersect with the point estimate of another category, this implies a statistically significant difference.

Table I: Logistic Regression: Mediation Acceptance

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Democratic Mediator	-0.899*	-0.766	-0.714
Democratic Incumbent	(0.445)	(0.666)	(0.646)
Non-democratic Mediator	1.102**	1.074**	1.360**
Non-democratic Incumbent	(0.524)	(0.524)	(0.574)
Non-democratic Mediator	-0.372	-0.796	-1.008
Democratic Incumbent	(0.793)	(0.855)	(0.814)
Ethnic		1.149**	1.346**
		(0.549)	(0.558)
Territorial Conflict		-0.003	-0.309
		(0.604)	(0.669)
Timing (years)		0.188***	0.248***
		(0.073)	(0.080)
Timing Squared		-0.006***	-0.007***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Conflict Intensity		-0.015	0.043
		(0.197)	(0.204)
Trade Leverage			1.548
			(1.597)
Major power			0.361
			(0.574)
Third Party Reputation			23.274
			(15.758)
Military Alliance			0.574
			(0.645)
Constant	1.593***	0.575	-0.797
	(0.377)	(1.674)	(1.766)
Log Likelihood	-73.482	-66.982	-61.687
Wald Chi-Squared	12.77	20.43	33.67
Significance	0.005	0.001	0.000
Observations	198	198	198

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In all three models the non-democratic dyad variable (i.e. non-democratic third party & non-democratic incumbent) is positive and significant. This indicates that offers of mediation made by a non-democratic state are more likely to be accepted by non-democratic incumbents. This is illustrated on the box plot, in which the top box (non-

democratic dyads) is shown to have a 0.86 probability of mediation acceptance. Democratic representatives (second box from the top) have a lower likelihood of acceptance within nondemocratic states (0.63). The whiskers of the second box do not intersect with the point estimate in the top box, indicating that this difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Figure 1: Regime Affinity - Predicted Probability of Mediation Acceptance



An example of regime affinity shaping the demand for mediation can be observed with reference to the civil conflict in El Salvador. This violent civil war was fought for over a decade between the military-led government of El Salvador, and the FMLN insurgents. Prior to UN involvement in the early 1990s, a number of democratic mediators offered assistance. In each case these offers were rejected. The model suggests that this rejection should have been expected, given the relatively low predicted probability of acceptance (e.g. Germany 0.57, Canada 0.59). If a non-democratic state had instead offered assistance to the belligerents, the probability of acceptance would have been significantly higher. For example, Guatemala (0.84), Nicaragua (0.78) and Argentina (0.93) each generate a significantly higher likelihood of acceptance.

Broadly speaking the results also highlight non-democratic states' greater receptively to mediation. The two white boxes representing non-democratic states are closer to the right hand side of the graph than the grey boxes representing democratic incumbents. This suggests that non-democratic states more commonly accept the assistance of a third party.

Democratic states are also shown to favor democratic mediators. Within a democracy, non-democratic third parties have a 0.42 probability of being accepted, while democratic representatives have 0.48 probability of acceptance. The elongated nature of the two grey boxes at the bottom of figure 1 illustrate the greater error associated with this result. Democratic states receive far fewer offers of mediation, and also accept help less frequently. Established democracies are less likely to experience violent conflict, and are better equipped to resolve their disputes alone. The low number of observations involving democratic incumbents reduces the confidence that can be placed in the results, and limits our ability to draw inferences from the data.

Finally, the control variables perform largely in line with expectations. Conflict duration is positively associated with the acceptance of mediation, though the significance of the squared variable suggests that this effect diminishes over time. Complex ethnic conflicts are more likely to require mediation, as are intense conflicts fought over control of the state. Surprisingly the type of incompatibility is not significant at conventional levels, and the intensity of a conflict has an inconsistent and insignificant effect. As expected, all features that improve the status and leverage of the mediator increase the likelihood of acceptance.

Mediation Outcome

The data illustrates the greater ability of democratic states to resolve civil conflicts occurring within their territory. Of the 18 mediation attempts that occurred within

democratic states, 10 resulted in at least a partial peace settlement (56%). In comparison, 60 of the 153 mediation attempts within non-democratic states ended in a settlement (39%). Surprisingly, this pattern is not replicated amongst peacemakers. Both democratic and non-democratic mediators produced an agreement in around 40% of cases.[10]

Hypothesis two predicted that institutional affinity would improve the effectiveness of civil war mediation. The bias born from shared systems of rule was argued to improve the credibility of guarantees and information provided by a peace broker. The data suggests that both democratic and non-democratic mediators are more effective within similar regimes. Within nondemocratic states, nondemocratic mediators were successful in 36 of 88 mediation attempts (41%), while democratic mediators produced an agreement in 24 of the 65 attempts (37%). In the relatively rare event that mediation took place within a democracy, democratic mediators proved successful in 7 of the 12 mediation attempts (58%), while non-democratic mediators effectively resolved 3 of the 6 cases they attempted (50%).

To assess the regime affinity argument more rigorously, I ran a number of models using Sartori's alternative selection estimator. This model accounts for the non-random nature of mediation selection, which was highlighted in the prior analysis. The independent variables are included alone in Model 4. Controls that account for the characteristics of the conflict are included in Model 5, and indicators of the mediator's characteristics in Model 6. Once again 'non-democratic incumbent-democratic mediator' is used as the reference category. The selection results are displayed in the left hand columns, and the outcome results in the right hand columns.

Table II: Sartori Selection Model: Mediation Acceptance & Mediation Outcome

	(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome
Mediator Democracy	-0.529	0.195	-0.386	0.562	-0.362	0.633**
Incumbent Democracy	(0.348)	(0.334)	(0.421)	(0.453)	(0.307)	(0.269)
Mediator Autocracy	-0.245	-0.075	-0.371	-0.105	-0.647	0.155
Incumbent Democracy	(0.482)	(0.433)	(0.511)	(0.472)	(0.594)	(0.244)
Mediator Autocracy	0.572**	0.181	0.522**	0.087	0.928***	0.093
Incumbent Autocracy	(0.259)	(0.195)	(0.271)	(0.205)	(0.328)	(0.486)
Ethnic Conflict			0.532**	0.086	0.460*	0.136
			(0.268)	(0.207)	(0.248)	(0.202)
Territorial Conflict			0.011	0.192	-0.086	0.075
			(0.271)	(0.211)	(0.281)	(0.216)
Conflict Duration			0.091**	0.170**	0.101**	0.184***
			(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Conflict Duration Squared			-0.003**	-0.006**	-0.003*	0.001***
			(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.031)
Battle Deaths (ln)			-0.005	0.005	0.032	-0.001
			(0.081)	(0.061)	(0.040)	(0.031)
Trade Leverage					1.359	-1.388
					(1.775)	(1.316)
Major Power					0.350	0.208
					(0.330)	(0.255)
Third Party Reputation					11.096	0.776
					(11.171)	(0.534)
Constant	0.960***	-0.477***	0.467	-1.185**	-0.301	-1.303
	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.731)	(0.574)	(0.352)	(0.274)
N	198		198		198	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-188.291		-175.303		-167.844	
Wald Chi2	10.37		19.65		240.04	
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.001		0.000	

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The selection results complement the prior analysis. In models 4, 5 and 6, non-democratic incumbents are shown to have a greater propensity to accept offers of mediation from non-democracies. The other dyadic variables, along with all statistical controls, also perform consistently with the previous analysis.

Turning to the outcome results, regime affinity is shown to have a positive effect on mediation effectiveness. In all models the coefficient of the non-democratic dyad is positive, indicating that when a conflict takes place in a non-democratic state, non-democratic mediators are more successful than their democratic counterparts. To assess the strength of this effect, I generate marginal effects using the sartpred function in STATA. As

with the previous analysis, I display the results along with confidence boundaries in a box plot format (figure 2).

Figure 2 illustrates the minimal effect of regime affinity on mediation outcomes. The top box on figure two shows that nondemocratic mediators have a 0.33 probability of successfully mediating a conflict within a non-democratic state. Democratic mediators, depicted on the second box down, have a lower 0.28 probability. On the surface this result provides marginal support for hypothesis 2, nondemocratic states do appear more likely to produce an agreement when assisted by a nondemocratic mediator. Yet despite a relatively low level of possible error, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that if regime affinity does have an effect on mediation outcome, the influence is minor.

This result is replicated within democratic states. Democratic mediators have a 0.55 probability of resolving a conflict with the help of a democratic mediator. This probability is reduced to 0.34 when a nondemocratic actor provides assistance. The intersecting nature of the grey boxes on figure 2 illustrate that this difference falls within the margin of error. As with the onset analysis, the low number of observations involving democratic incumbents lowers the confidence that can be placed in this result.

The control variables again perform largely in accordance with expectations. Conflict duration is shown to have a positive effect on the likelihood of success. The squared variable is significant, but produces only a minor effect, suggesting that duration has a more linear influence on the outcome of mediation. Ethnic conflicts are more likely to result in agreements, but as with the onset analysis, the intensity of the conflict has surprisingly little influence on the outcome of mediation. Major powers and states with reputations as peace brokers are more likely to produce a settlement. Unexpectedly, trade leverage has a negative effect on mediation success, but the effect is not significant.

Figure 2: Regime affinity: Predicted Probabilities of Mediation Success



Robustness Checks

To ensure the validity of the results, I changed a number of the model specifications and re-ran the estimates. Firstly, I reran the results using the Polity data (Gleditsch, 2008), to ensure that the results are not the result of the coding procedure used to define regime types. States are considered a democracy when they achieve a score of 6 or higher on the polity scale, and non-democratic when they fail to reach this threshold. The results are consistent with the prior analysis (see Appendix A & B). Nondemocratic states are again shown to hold a greater demand for nondemocratic mediators. The strength and the significance of the effect on mediation demand is mildly reduced, which is likely to be a result of the less stringent method used to classify democracies in the Polity data. The outcome results are again insignificant, and deviate slightly from the prior analysis. This further undermines hypothesis two.

Secondly, by focusing upon mediation attempts rather than conflict episodes, there is a potential for a small selection of dyads to bias the results. To protect against this issue I reran the estimates excluding the five conflicts that produced the highest number of mediation attempts.[11] As an additional check I excluded offers of mediation made by the United States, Great Britain and Russia (the three most frequent suppliers of mediation). In both cases the results remained consistent with the prior analysis.

Finally, the preceding analysis failed to account for supply-side selection bias that effects mediation. Potential mediators do not act in isolation from the belligerents, or offer their services without concern for the likelihood of acceptance. Third parties do not want to invest time and resources engaging disputants that have no desire to seek peace, nor suffer the embarrassment of having their diplomatic assistance rejected. Research has shown that mediators are more likely to offer assistance when the disputants are open to the entrance of a mediator. This could potentially bias the previous results, which do not account for the self-selecting properties of mediators.

To account for supply side bias more effectively, I reran the results using a censored probit model. By modeling the offer and acceptance of mediation in the same model, the supply and demand of mediation are considered as two distinct but inter-related factors (Svensson, 2007). In each year in which a conflict was active I include all states in the international system as potential supplier of mediation (Greig & Regan, 2008). This results in a population of 171,509 observations. Such depth is required to avoid the selection bias that would result if only those most likely to mediate were included within the analysis. Of course most potential mediators will never act as mediators, but this over sampling is necessary to avoid case selection issues (Greig & Regan, 2008).

To account for the determinants of mediation supply, I include a number of variables that indicate links between a third party and the incumbent. Previous research has

shown states with interests at stake in a conflict to be more likely to offer assistance. To capture this effect, I include indicators of a military alliance, history of intervention (military and economic), trade interests and contiguity. I also include indicators of the third parties polity score, and an indicator of the systemic level of democracy. This accounts for the increased mediation supply associated with democracies. Finally, the control variables used in the acceptance analysis are also included in the selection side of the model, based on the assumption that states are more likely to offer assistance in complex, intractable conflicts.

The results show that even controlling for selection, non-democratic states retain a higher demand for mediation from nondemocratic mediators (appendix C). The marginal effects show non-democratic states are 23% more likely to accept an offer of mediation from a nondemocratic mediator. This finding is significant in all model specifications.

Discussion

This study investigated the influence of regime affinity upon the onset and outcome of civil war mediation. I find that non-democratic states have a significantly higher demand for mediation led by non-democratic third parties. A non-democratic incumbent is 23% more likely to accept mediation from a state that is governed by a similar regime. Democratic incumbents are shown to be less concerned about the governing characteristics of the mediator. Third party regime type had little effect upon democracies demand for mediation. This variance reflects the more threatening nature of mediation for non-democratic incumbents. Democratic systems can more easily assimilate rebel interests into the governing institutions, and are therefore less likely to be fundamentally challenged within a peace process. On the other hand, non-democratic governments are poorly equipped to redistribute governing power, which increases the likelihood of a settlement

requiring institutional upheaval. The result is that while democratic rulers can seek out mediators that bring some additional utility to the peace process (i.e. problem solving skills, leverage over the non-state force etc.), non-democratic leaders favor a mediator that is expected to protect the ruling elite.

Institutional affinity was also shown to increase likelihood of a settlement in both democratic and non-democratic states. However, in both cases the differences were insignificant. I therefore find only partial support for Kydd (2003) and Svensson's (2007) arguments that mediator bias increases the credibility of information and commitments. Counter to previous findings, the small and insignificant results suggest that political biases have only a small impact upon the outcome of mediation.

Also in contradiction to existing literature, I have shown that democratic actors are not always the most efficient track one mediators. When a civil conflict occurs within a non-democratic state, a non-democratic mediator is more likely to be accepted, and no less likely to be successful. This finding is itself an important empirical discovery, given that the majority of contemporary conflict occurs within states that lack a fully functioning democratic apparatus. From a policy perspective, this suggests that non-democratic states should be encouraged to provide peacemaking assistance to their affiliates. Alternatively, the creation of democratic and non-democratic mediatory teams might offer a means through which to improve the frequency of civil war mediation. In this case the non-democratic component would reassure leaders that their interests are represented in the process, while the democratic representatives can bring mediatory skills and experience. The 'contact group', which laid the foundations for the Dayton agreement in Bosnia, could be considered an example of such a team. In this case the Russian component ensured Serbian participation in the process, while the European and American actors performed the more conventional mediatory role. Multi-party mediation has recently begun to attract

notable scholarly attention (e.g. Böhmelt, 2011; Beber, 2012). One extension of this study would be to investigate the influence of regime affinity in context with multiple mediators.

Assessing the influence of more specific systems of governance offers another avenue for future research to explore. Different forms of non-democratic regime may feel a stronger affinity towards each other. For example, civilian, military and royal autocracies might be more willing to cede control of a peace process to a mediator that is governed by similar form of dictatorship.[12]

Generating a fuller understanding of the forces that shape the onset and outcome of mediation is essential. The positive utility of civil war mediation can only be maximized when we appreciate the factors that determine mediation effectiveness. This paper makes an important contribution to mediation research, illustrating the influence of regime affinity upon the demand and outcome of civil war mediation. Regrettably, previous research had largely overlooked the influence of a mediator's regime on civil war management attempts, and failed to account for the interaction between the mediator and the incumbents' regime type. The results illustrate the utility of studying mediation from a dyadic perspective, which accounts for the relationship between the incumbent and the mediator.

Bibliography

Austen-Smith, David & Jeffrey S. Banks. 2000. 'Cheap Talk and Burned Money' *Journal of Economic Theory* 91(1): 1–16.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2010. 'Pain, Pressure, and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation Incidence' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 395-406.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2009. 'Intervention without leverage: Explaining the prevalence of weak mediators' *International Interactions* 35(3): 272-297.

Beardsley, Kyle & Michael. J. Greig. 2009. 'Disaggregating the Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction' *International Interactions* 35(3): 243-248.

Beardsley, Kyle., David Quinn., Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2006. 'Mediation style and crisis outcomes' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 58-86.

Beber, Bernd. 2012. 'International Mediation, Selection Effects and Question of Bias' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Forthcoming. Available at: https://files.nyu.edu/bb89/public/research.htm accessed 25.05.12.

Bennett, Scott D. 2006. 'Towards a Continuous Specification of the Democracy-Autocracy Connection' *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2): 313-338.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Scott S. Gartner. 2006. 'Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation' *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Gerard Schneider. 2000. 'Who mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 145-165.

Bercovitch, Jacob., Theodore Anagnoson & Donnette L. Wille. 1991. 'Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations' *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 7-17.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2011. 'Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation' *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (4): 859-881.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2010. 'The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third–Party Interventions' *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 167–178.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2009. 'International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties' *International Interactions* 35 (3): 298–319.

Brewer, Marlynn & Norman Miller. 1996. *Intergroup Relations*. New York: Brooks.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruno & Randolph Siverson. 1997. 'Nasty or Nice? Political Systems, Endogenous Norms, and the Treatment of Adversaries' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 175-199.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruno. 1995. 'War and the Survival of Political Leaders' *American*

Political Science Review 89(4): 841-855.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruno, Randolph Siverson & Gary Woller. 1992. 'War and the Fate of Regimes' *American Political Science Review* 86(3): 638-646.

Calvert, Peter. 1985. *A Study of Revolution.* Oxford : Clarendon Press.

Carnevale, Peter & Sharon Arad. 1996. 'Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation' In Jacob Bercovitch ed. *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation.* Boulder: Lynne Reinner.

Carnevale, Peter J & Dean G. Pruitt. 1992. 'Negotiation and Mediation' *Annual Review of Psychology* 43(3): 531-582.

Cetinyan, Rupen. 2002. 'Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third Party Intervention' *International Organization* 56(3): 645-678.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi & James Raymond Vreeland. 2010 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited' *Public Choice* 143(1): 67-101.

Clark, Kevin. A. 2005. 'The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 341-352.

Clayton, Govinda. 2011. 'Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Mediation in Civil War' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, 18 March.

Crescenzi, Mark J.C,. Kelly M, Kadera,. Sara McLaughlin, Mitchell & Clayton L, Thyne. 2011. 'The Supply Side Theory of Mediation' *International Studies Quarterly.* 55(4): 1069-1094.

Cronin, Bruce. 1999. *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the evolution of cooperation.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Denzau, Arthur & Douglas North. 1994. 'Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions' *Kyklos*. 47(1): 3:31.

DeRouen, Karl, Jnr., Jacob Bercovitch & Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. 'Introducing the new Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.

Dixon, William J, 1996. 'Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement' *International Organization* 50(4): 653-681.

Dixon, William. 1994. 'Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict' *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 1-17.

Dixon, William. 1993. 'Democracy and the Management of International Conflict' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1): 42-68.

Doyle, Michael. 1986. 'Liberalism and World Politics' *American Political Science Review* 80(4): 1151-1170.

Emmons, Juliann & Randolph Siverson. 1991. 'Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century' *Journal of Conflict*

Resolution. 35(2): 285-306.

Fearon, James D. 2004. 'Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275-301.

Fearon, James D. 1998. 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict' in David Lake & Donald Rothchild eds. *The international spread of ethnic conflict : fear, diffusion, and escalation.* Chichester: Princeton University Press.

Fearon, James D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War' *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Finnemore, Martha & Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.

Fisher, Ronald J. 1995. 'Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: A Review and an Analysis' in John A. Vasquez., James T. Johnson., Sandord Jaffe & Linda Stamato. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Fisher, Roger. D. 1972. 'Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16(1): 67-94.

Gartner, Scott. S. & Jacob Bercovitch. 2006. 'Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contributions of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements' *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4): 819-840.

Gasiorowski, Mark. 1995. 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis' *American Political Science Review* 89(4): 882-897.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gilady, Lilach, & Bruce Russett. 2002. 'Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution' in Walter Calsnaes., Thomas Risse & Beth Simmons *Handbook of International Relations.* London: Sage.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2008. Modified Polity P4 and P4D Data, Version 3.0., URL: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/Polity.html. Accessed 12.02.12.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede & Michael D. Ward. 2006. 'The Diffusion of Democracy and the International Context of Democratization' *International Organization* 60(4): 911-933.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede & Michael D. Ward. 1997. 'Double Take: A Re-examination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3): 361-382

Gowa, Joanne. 1999. *Ballots and Bullets* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Greig, Michael J. 2005. 'Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?' *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 249-266.

Greig, Michael J & Patrick Regan. 2008. 'When do they say yes? An analysis of the

willingness to offer and accept mediation in civil wars' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 759-781.

Greig, Michael J & Paul Diehl. 2006. 'Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy' *International Interactions* 32(4): 355-384.

Grigorescu, Alexandru. 2003. 'International Organizations and Government Transparancy: Linking the International and Domestic Realms' *International Studies Quarterly* 47(4): 643-667.

Hermann, Margaret & Charles Kegley. 1995. 'Rethinking Democracy and International Peace' *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4): 511-534.

Hogg, Michael. 1992. *The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity.* New York: Harvester.

Hogg, Michael & Dominic Abrams. 1988. *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Process.* New York: Routledge.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huth, Paul. 1998. 'Major Power Intervention in International Crisis, 1918-1988' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(6): 744-770.

Huth, Paul & Todd Allee. 2002. *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, Richard. 2000. 'Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(3): 323-343.

Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jönsson, Christer. 2002. 'Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation' in Walter Calsnaes., Thomas Risse & Beth Simmons. *Handbook of International Relations.* London: Sage.

Kadera, Kelly, Mark Crescenzi, & Megan Shannon. 2003. 'Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 234-247.

Kaw, Marita. 1990. 'Choosing Sides: Testing a Political Proximity Model' *American Journal of Political Science* 34(2): 441-470.

Kegley, Charles & Margaret Hermann. 1997. 'Putting Military Intervention into the Democratic Peace' *Comparative Political Studies* 30(1): 78-107.

Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. 'Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation'

Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(2): 360-389.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.

Kydd, Andrew. 2010. 'Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution' *Annual Review of Political Science.* 13(1): 101-121.

Kydd, Andrew. 2006. 'When can mediators build trust?' *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 449-462.

Kydd, Andrew. 2003. 'Which side are you on? bias, credibility, and mediation' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.

Lai, Brian & Dan Reiter. 2000. 'Democracy, Political Similarity and International Alliances, 1816-1992' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(2): 203-227.

Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild. 1996. 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict' *International Security* 21(2): 41-75.

Leeds, Brett. 1999. 'Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation' *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 979:1002.

Lipson, Charles. 2003. *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Maoz, Zeev & Bruce Russett. 1992. 'Alliance, Contiguity Wealth, and Political Equality' *International Interactions* 17(3): 245-267.

Maoz, Zeev & Nasrin Abdolali. 1989. 'Regimes Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33(1): 3-35.

Mattes, Michaela & Burcu Savun. 2009. 'Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design' *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3) 737-759.

McGillicuddy, Neil., Gary Welton, & Dean Pruitt. 1987. 'Third-party intervention: A field experiment comparing three different models' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53(1): 104-112.

Melin, Molly. 2011. 'The Impact of State Relationships on If, When and How Conflict Management Occurs' *International Studies Quarterly* 55(3): 691-715.

Melin, Molly M, & Isak Svensson. 2009. 'Incentives for talking: Accepting mediation in international and civil wars' *International Interactions* 35(3): 249-271.

Mercer, Jonathan. 1995. 'Anarchy and Identity' *International Organization* 49(2): 229-252.

Mitchell, Christopher. 1993. 'The processes and stages of mediation: The Sudanese case' in David Sobek ed. *Making war and waging peace : foreign intervention in Africa.* Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Mitchell, Sara Mclaughlin., Kelly M, Kadera & Mark J C, Crescenzi. 2009. Practicing Democratic Community Norms: Third Party Conflict Management and Successful Settlements. In Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner. *International Conflict*

Mediation: New approaches and findings. Oxon: Routledge.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Scott Gates, & Harvard Hegre. 1999. 'Evolution in Democracy War Dynamics' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(6): 771-792.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. 'Kantian System? Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution' *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 749-759.

Mousseau, Michael & Yuchang Shi. 1997. 'Democracy and Militarized Interstate Collaboration' *Journal of Peace Research* 34(1): 73-87.

Peceny, Mark, & Christopher Butler. 2004. 'The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes' *International Politics* 41(4): 565-581.

Peceny, Mark, Caroline Beer, & Shannon Sanchez-Terry. 2002. 'Dictatorial Peace?' *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 15-26.

Polity Country Reports: Sudan http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/sud2.htm accessed 22.09.12.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi. 1996. 'What Makes Democracies Endure?' *Journal of Democracy* 7(1): 39-55.

Raknerud, Arvid & Havard Hegre. 1997. 'The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 34(4): 385-404.

Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management' *World Politics* 58(2): 207-241.

Regan, Patrick M., Richard Frank & Aysegul Aydin. 2009. 'Diplomatic Interventions and Civil Wars: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 135-146.

Ross, Marc. 1986. 'The Limits to Social Structure: Social Structure and Psychocultural Explanations for Political Conflict and Violence' *Anthropological Quarterly* 59(4): 171-176.

Sartori, Anne E. 2003. 'An Estimator for Some Binary Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions' *Political Analysis* 11(2): 111–138.

Sartori, Anne E. 2002. 'The Might of the Pen; A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes' *International Organization* 56(1): 123-151.

Savun, Barcu. 2008. 'Information Bias, and Mediation Success' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(1): 25-47.

Schneider, Gerald., Jacob Bercovitch & Torsten J. Selck. 2006. 'The Dispute or the Mediator? Structural and Personal Factors in Mediation' Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego.

Schmidt, Holger. 2005. 'When (and why) do brokers have to be honest? Impartiality and the effectiveness of third-party support for negotiated settlements, 1945-1999' Paper prepared for the 63rd Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 7-10.

Sick, Gary. 1985. 'The Partial Negotiator: Algeria and the U.S. Hostages in Iran' in Saadia Touval & William I Zartman eds. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* New York: Westview Press.

Simmel, Georg. 1955. *Conflict*. Glencoe: Free Press.

Simon, Michael & Erik Gartzke. 1996. 'Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together or Do Opposites Attract?' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(4): 617-635.

Slim, Robert. 1992. 'Small State Mediation in International Relations' in Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Rubin eds. *Mediation in International Relations*. New York: St Martin's.

Smith, Alastair, & Allan Stam. 2003. 'Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War' *International Studies Review* 5(4): 115-135.

Souva, Mark. 2004. 'Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict' *International Interactions* 30(3): 263-280.

Stephens, John. 1988. 'Acceptance of Mediation Initiatives: A Preliminary Framework' in Christopher R. Mitchell & Keith Webb eds. *New Approaches to International Mediation*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Stulberg, Joseph B. 1987. *Taking Charge: Managing Conflict*. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Sullivan, Patricia & Scott Sigmund Gartner. 2006. 'Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes' *International Interactions* 32(1): 1-26.

Svensson, Isak. 2009. 'Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 446–469.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. 'Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 114-163.

Tajfel, Henri. 1982. *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, Henri & John Turner. 1979. 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict' in William Austin & Stephen Worchel eds. *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Montery: Brooks.

Tomz, Michael., Jason Wittenberg & Gary King ' CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results' *Journal of Statistical Software* 8. Copy at http://j.mp/k3korx

Touval, Saadia, & William I Zartman. 2001. 'International Mediation in the post-Cold War Era' in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict.* Chester Crocker., Fen Osler Hampton, & Pamela Aall eds. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Touval. Saadia & William I. Zartman. 1985. *International mediation in theory and*

practice. New York: Westview Press.

Touval, Saadia. 1982. *The Peace Brokers: Mediation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Touval, Saadia. 1975. 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and historical considerations' *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1(1): 51-69.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to peace: the successful settlement of civil wars* Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. 'The critical barrier to civil war settlement' *International Organization* 51(3): 335-364.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Werner, Suzanne. 2000. 'The Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816-1985' *Political Research Quarterly* 53(2): 343-374.

Werner, Suzanne & Douglas Lemke. 1997. 'Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices' *International Studies Quarterly* 41(3): 529-546.

Young, Orlan R. 1967. *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, William I. 1995. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars,* Washington DC: Brookings.

Notes

[1] This is not the case within inter-state conflict, in which the costs associated with mediation are distributed more evenly (Melin & Svensson, 2009).

[2] This does not necessarily imply that the state is seeking a settlement when they accept mediation. Often mediation can be undertaken with more devious intentions (Richmond, 1998; Beardsley, 2009, 2010). Yet given the significant costs that the state suffers when agreeing to mediation, in most cases the mediation onset implies some form of tacit admission that state is ready to begin discussing a settlement (Grieg, 2005; Greig & Diehl, 2006).

[3] For example, the Camp David accords signed between Egypt and Israel resulted in no institutional change for either actor. In comparison, the 2005 Sudanese peace agreement transferred territorial control from the North to the South, and improved the democratic credentials of the Sudanese state. This change produced a two point democratic shift in the polity data. See Polity Country Reports: Sudan http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/sud2.htm, accessed 22.09.12.

[4] A diverse range of literature exists detailing the impact of actors perceptions of information revealed by in-group members, see: Brewer & Miller, 1996; Cronin, 1999; Gellner, 1983; Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 1996; Ross, 1986; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wendt, 1999.

[5] This has subsequently been disputed by Rauchhaus (2006), yet the contradictory findings seem largely a result of differing conceptions of bias and variance in modeling assumptions (Kydd, 2010).

[6] The eventual settlement occurred as a result of a number of actors including the UN and US. However prior to this a number of noteworthy achievements were produced by non-democratic mediators.

[7] This approach develops and expands earlier the work of Prezworski et al. (2000).

[8] This method of analysis does not account for different forms of nondemocratic governance (i.e. military, personalist and single party systems). Previous research has shown differences between groups are likely to become less important when an actor is under threat (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Simmel, 1955; Mercer, 1995). When a similar regime is under threat difference in leadership structures are therefore of less importance. For example despite strong differences in their autocratic government, North Korea often favors China as a mediator.

[9] Including a model without controls ensures that the results are not biased by the inclusion of the control variables (Clark, 2005).

[10] Democratic mediator were successful in 31 of 77 cases = 40%, while nondemocratic mediators were successful in 60 of 153 = 41%).

[11] The five most mediated cases that were excluded from the analysis are: Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

[12] This analysis is challenging given the limited number of observations available for many of the dyadic configurations of regime type.

Appendix A - Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*N*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min.*	*Max.*
Mediation Acceptance	201	0.856	0.352	0	1
Outcome - Agreement	172	0.407	0.493	0	1
Mediator Democracy - Incumbent Democracy	201	0.094	0.293	0	1
Mediator Democracy - Incumbent Non-Democracy	201	0.420	0.495	0	1
Mediator Non-Democracy - Incumbent Non-Democracy	201	0.470	0.500	0	1
Mediator Non-Democracy - Incumbent Democracy	201	0.054	0.226	0	1
Ethnic Conflict	201	0.551	0.499	0	1
Territorial Conflict	201	0.332	0.472	0	1
Conflict Duration	201	7.478	8.431	1	48
Conflict Duration Squared	201	128.05	296.13	1	2304
Battle Deaths (ln)	201	7.451	1.725	2.303	12.206
Trade Leverage	201	0.055	0.091	0	0.590
Major Power	201	0.371	0.484	0	1
Third Party Reputation	201	0.063	0.181	0	1

Appendix B - Acceptance Analysis (Polity Data)

Logistic Regression:	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democratic Mediator	-0.413	-0.211	-0.757
Democratic Incumbent	(0.854)	(0.884)	(0.951)
Nondemocratic Mediator	-0.412	-0.621	-0.618
Democratic Incumbent	(0.611)	(1.029)	(1.016)
Nondemocratic Mediator	0.863*	0.825*	0.987
Nondemocratic Incumbent	(0.497)	(0.492)	(0.658)
Ethnic		1.223**	1.478***
		(0.511)	(0.548)
Territorial Conflict		-0.008	-0.102
		(0.569)	(0.582)
Timing (years)		0.169**	0.216**
		(0.081)	(0.084)
Timing Squared		-0.006**	-0.007***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Conflict Intensity		-0.068	0.059
		(0.191)	(0.192)
Trade Leverage			0.326
			(2.694)
Major power			0.546
			(0.709)
Third Party Reputation			26.565
			(19.293)
Military Alliance			0.733
			(0.687)
Constant	1.511***	1.016	0.257
	(0.350)	(1.702)	(1.810)
Log Likelihood	-80.073	-71.997	-70.964
Wald Chi-Squared	5.05	17.11	21.53
Significance	0.03	0.03	0.03
Observations	201	201	201

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix C: Acceptance / Outcome Analysis (Polity Data)

Sartori Selection Model

	(10)		(11)		(12)	
	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome
Mediator Democracy	-0.238	0.288	-0.104	-0.220	-0.087	0.169
Incumbent Democracy	(0.425)	(0.418)	(0.452)	(0.464)	(0.477)	(0.467)
Mediator Nondemocratic	-0.238	-0.288	-0.384	-0.431	-0.390	0.361
Incumbent Democracy	(0.425)	(0.418)	(0.457)	(0.454)	(0.518)	(0.244)
Mediator Nondemocratic	0.459*	0.061	0.445*	0.033	0.563*	0.075
Incumbent Nondemocratic	(0.245)	(0.193)	(0.260)	(0.203)	(0.310)	(0.240)
Ethnic Conflict			0.648**	0.073	0.558**	0.116
			(0.255)	(0.203)	(0.271)	(0.208)
Territorial Conflict			0.046	0.205	-0.033	0.116
			(0.267)	(0.209)	(0.280)	(0.208)
Conflict Duration			0.087*	0.148***	0.091*	0.156***
			(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Conflict Duration Squared			-0.003**	-0.005***	-0.003**	0.005***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Battle Deaths (ln)			-0.036	0.040	0.019	-0.048
			(0.077)	(0.583)	(0.080)	(0.062)
Trade Leverage					0.089	-1.349
					(1.501)	(1.292)
Major Power					0.062	0.020
					(0.337)	(0.259)
Third Party Reputation					11.238	0.814
					(10.993)	(0.530)
Constant	0.913***	-0.386***	0.642	-0.682	-0.357	-0.601
	(0.161)	(0.141)	(0.719)	(0.583)	(0.776)	(0.637)
N	201		201		201	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-196.040		-181.184		-175.890	
Wald Chi2	5.58		19.23		18.86	
Prob > chi2	0.13		0.014		0.06	

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix D: Mediation Offer and Acceptance

Heckman Selection Model

	(13)		(14)		(15)	
	Mediation Offer	Mediation Acceptance	Mediation Offer	Mediation Acceptance	Mediation Offer	Mediation Acceptance
Mediator Democracy Incumbent Democracy		0.217 (0.260)		-0.256 (0.319)		-0.249 (0.283)
Mediator Autocracy Incumbent Democracy		-0.094 (0.325)		-0.233 (0.319)		-0.312 (0.328)
Mediator Autocracy Incumbent Autocracy		0.624*** (0.222)		0.565*** (0.204)		0.468*** (0.252)
Ethnic Conflict	0.089 (0.144)		0.079 (0.143)	0.454* (0.240)	0.078 (0.143)	0.373 (0.253)
Territorial Conflict	-0.106 (0.148)		-0.105 (0.147)	-0.025 (0.247)	-0.105 (0.147)	-0.047 (0.245)
Conflict Duration	-0.021 (0.014)		-0.023 (0.014)	0.130*** (0.030)	-0.023 (0.014)	0.131*** (0.030)
Conflict Duration Squared	0.000 (0.001)		0.001 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.054*** (0.019)		0.053*** (0.019)	0.017 (0.074)	0.053*** (0.019)	0.018 (0.075)
Trade Leverage						0.464 (1.119)
Third Party Reputation						7.988 (5.365)
Major Power	0.865*** (0.106)		0.863*** (0.105)		0.867*** (0.106)	-0.306 (0.302)
Trade Interest	-2.765 (1.878)		-2.778 (1.875)		-2.762 (1.877)	
Military Alliance	0.324** (0.155)		0.334** (0.154)		0.334** (0.154)	
Previous Military Intervention	0.491*** (0.170)		0.488*** (0.170)		0.485*** (0.170)	
Previous Economic Intervention	-0.409 (0.321)		-0.417 (0.325)		-0.425 (0.330)	
Distance	-0.111*** (0.013)		-0.111*** (0.013)		-0.110*** (0.013)	
Third Party Polity IV	0.010** (0.005)		0.010** (0.005)		0.010** (0.005)	
Global Level of Democracy	0.156** (0.065)		0.157** (0.064)		0.157** (0.063)	
Constant	-3.306*** (0.288)	2.337*** (0.392)	-3.289 (0.283)	1.907*** (0.730)	-3.293*** (0.282)	2.064** (0.989)
Uncensored Obs	198		198		198	
Censored Obs.	171,509		171,509		171,509	
Log Pseudolikelihood	-1328.678		1320.259		1317.177	
Wald Chi2	0.010		0.000		0.000	
Prob > chi2	9.90		28.00		35.71	
rho	-0.547***		-0.706***		-0.739***	

Paper Four:

Helping Hands? Predicting the Initiation and Outcome of Civil War Mediation*

Govinda Clayton

The Conflict Analysis Research Center

University of Kent

Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

University of Essex &

Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO

* We are grateful to Kyle Beardsley, Han Dorussen, Sara M. T. Polo, Mauricio Rivera, and Michael D. Ward for helpful discussions. Gleditsch is grateful for financial support from the Research Council of Norway (180441/V10).

Abstract

We examine whether the features highlighted as important determinants for mediation in existing research allow us to predict when we will see mediation and likely success out-of-sample. We assess to what extent information about the conflicting dyads characteristics and conflict history can be assessed *ex ante* and improve our ability to predict when conflicts will see mediation, and when peaceful solutions are more likely to follow from mediation. Our results suggest that a two stage model of mediation and success does relatively well in out-of-sample prediction. To justify that all the information used to identify the model is available ex ante we consider an application to the ongoing conflict in Syria. We conclude by suggesting future directions for mediation research that would improve our ability to forecast, and broadly discuss the usefulness of out-of-sample evaluation in studying conflict management.

Introduction

Mediation is the most common form of intra-state conflict management (Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997), and by many accounts the most successful (Rauchhaus, 2006; Dixon, 1996; Walter, 1997). A great deal of research has focused on when mediation is most likely to occur, and succeed in decreasing the risk of further violence or escalation (Svensson, 2007, 2009; Regan, 2008, 2010; Beardsley, 2008, 2009, 2010). However, most research on mediation so far has looked exclusively at evaluating hypotheses on mediation on observed (in-sample) data, and not considered to what extent existing research provides us with a basis for predicting the likelihood or outcome of mediation out-of-sample.

The neglect of out-of-sample forecasting in studies of mediation is unfortunate for many reasons. In terms of advancing insights about mediation, hypothesis testing on observed data runs the risk of overfitting, or fitting to idiosyncracies of the specific sample rather than stable structural relationships between a response and predictors. Out-of-sample forecasting provides a complementary way to test hypotheses, using new data, independent of the data used to develop the original hypotheses. Out-of-sample forecasting furthermore forces us to consider what suggested explanatory factors can be considered *ex ante* by decision makers, as opposed to features that are available to the research only *ex post*, and the possibility that factors stressed in existing research may be endogenous to conflict outcomes.

We also believe that conflict management can play an important role in advancing efforts to forecast conflict, by highlighting how third party efforts can increase or decrease the risk of escalation to violence over specific incompatibilities and help foster alternative outcomes. With respect to policy, existing scholarly research on mediation (implicitly or explicitly) offers some form of policy guidance, but these are generally grounded in significance tests on the observed data rather than out-of-sample validation. In the context

of civil war studies, Ward et al. (2010) have recently warned of the perils of policy advice by p–values, with little regard for the implied effects of the estimates and model uncertainty. By contrast, the ability to effectively forecast key aspects of conflict resolution could be of real relevance to conflict management efforts, and help identify the specific cases where conflict management is more likely to yield success and how to best invest resources.

We extend previous research on mediation by assessing the predictive powers of features highlighted as important determinants for mediation. Existing studies of civil war have shown mediation more commonly takes place when there is a significant threat to incumbent interests (Clayton, 2011). High stakes contexts are more likely to communicate the credibility of the insurgent threat, increasing incumbent desire for mediation. We expect high intensity conflict involving relatively strong and well-armed rebels to have a higher probability of being mediated and producing an agreement (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Clayton, 2011). A history of conflict management has also been shown to shape the likelihood of mediation onset and success. Having endured the costs associated with rebel recognition, incumbent costs for subsequent mediation attempts should be reduced. Past interventions should then increase the likelihood of future mediation (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). Building on this literature we examine whether *ex ante* information about the conflicting dyads characteristics and some knowledge of conflict history can improve our ability to predict when mediation will occur, and succeed in managing violent conflict.

We start with a brief review of the state of forecasting in the field of conflict analysis, before highlighting some of the key recent findings in the study of mediation. We then propose a statistical method of mediation and examine its predictive ability. We conclude by discussing how conflict management could be best incorporated into future

research on prediction and the usefulness of out-of-sample evaluation in studying conflict management.

Prediction and the Analysis of Conflict

Prediction has always been an important aspiration for conflict research (Choucri & Robinson, 1978; Singer & Wallace, 1979). The ability to reliably predict when interactions are likely to turn violent has obvious theoretical and practical interest. This is demonstrated in the considerable funding awarded to recent forecasting projects such as the Political Instability Task Force (Goldstone et al. 2010), and the widespread interest in a multitude of academic forecasting models devised for a variety of political events (see for example Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; O'Brien, 2010).

A new wave of prediction-based studies has recently emerged, building upon some of the data advancements in civil war studies, and incorporating a number of methodological innovations (Schneider, 2011). Key factors such as geography, ethnicity and location have all begun to be better incorporated within predictive studies (Weidmann, 2010; Rustad et al., 2011). These studies often take advantage of new technologies such as geographic information systems (GIS) software and data (Weidmann, 2010; Rustad et al. 2011) as well automated coding procedures for event data (Brandt, 2011). Predictive studies have begun to mature, and it is increasingly common to incorporate *ex post* and *ex ante* predictions in conflict research (Schneider, 2011).

However, despite the expanding body of work focusing on the prediction of conflict onset or escalation in violent conflicts, there has been little attention to predicting conflict termination or settlements. The ability of existing studies to forecast conflict management and the eventual outcome of conflict out-of-sample remains untested. This poses two

significant problems. The development of methods of prediction offers one of the most stringent methods though which researchers can cross-validate findings (Efron, 1983; Weidmann, 2010). Most large-n studies are generated on the back of observational data often limited by availability and issues of selection bias. Prediction offers a way to evaluate the power and validity of models in an external context. Such analysis can provide additional support for the model when producing positive results, and suggest areas in need of improvement when a model fails or is less successful (Weidmann, 2010; Ward et al. 2010).

The importance of model validation through prediction was recently well highlighted by Ward et al. (2010), who showed that the statistical significance for individual terms in statistical models of civil war was a poor indicator of the improvement in predictive power out-of-sample. Only two variables (GDP per capita and population size) produced any improvements in forecasting conflict onset. Schneider et al. (2011: 6) emphasize how this should 'alert the research community to the need to assess whether their theoretically favored explanations really contribute to our understanding of why certain events have occurred and to the accurate prediction of a particular event in the future'. Aside from the merits of specific forecasts produced from a project, the use of out-of-sample assessment is essential to test the validity of existing theoretical accounts.

In addition to these motivations in terms of theory development and evaluation, developing forecasts for the prospects for conflict termination can also offer significant benefits for policy and practice. The ability to forecast what cases are most likely to be ripe for resolution can help practitioners effectively allocate resources and prepare peace-building projects in anticipation of a settlement.

Modeling Mediation and the Effects of Mediation on Conflicts

Research on civil war mediation has recently witnessed a notable growth in theory development and data projects.[1] Much of the work in this area has built upon a bargaining framework. This approach suggests belligerents engage in civil conflict as a way to credibly communicate private information about their capabilities and resolve (Fearon, 1995; Slantchev, 2003). Mediation is viewed as a method to assist disputants in overcoming information asymmetries peacefully and enhance the possibility to make credible commitments (Beardsley et al. 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005; Walter, 1997). This line of research has helped us better understand how, when and why mediation works, but empirical evaluations have generally been based upon observed, in-sample data. Research has not yet considered the extent to which these insights allow us to effectively forecast the likelihood or outcome of mediation. In this paper we assess to what extent existing mediation research improves our ability to predict out-of-sample. In this section we will briefly review the existing theory that forms the basis for our forecasting approach. We discuss the rationale underpinning core theories on mediation, but refer to the original research for a more complete description of the postulated mechanisms.

The onset of mediation is conditional on the existence of a third party willing to offer their services, and the belligerent's openness to outside intervention. Since mediation is a less costly form of involvement than economic or military action, outside parties are often open to mediate in a wide range of disputes (Beardsley, 2009; Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000; Touval & Zartman, 1985). Supplying mediation can, however, incur significant costs for the intermediary. These can include administrative burdens, economic investment and reputational damage if the process collapses. Third parties are only therefore likely to offer mediation on occasions in which they (a) have some interest at stake in the resolution of war, and (b) believe that mediation will produce a positive effect.

Potential mediators are unlikely to invest scarce resources in contexts in which they have no interest in the outcome, or perceive there to be a low probability of mediation contributing to a favorable result.

Two countervailing forces have been shown to shape the demand side of mediation onset. On one hand incumbents are more likely to resist mediation, as the entrance of a third party signals the inability of the state to control it territory and reduces participant control of the outcome (Greig & Regan, 2008; Melin & Svennson, 2009). Conversely, rebels can gain legitimacy and status as a result of international engagement, and are thus seen as more open to mediation (Svennson, 2007; Skjelsbæk, 1991; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001). Working from this perspective, scholars such as Svensson (2007), Regan and Greig (2008) have developed a number of theoretical propositions on mediation incidence and outcome. At its core, this line of research argues that given the costs endured by a state when accepting an intermediary, we should only expect mediation to occur in costly and challenging contexts in which the price of mediation is outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. To demonstrate this effect scholars have shown that high conflict intensity and long conflict duration both increase the probability of mediation occurring by raising the price of continued conflict.

We believe that the dyadic relationship between the belligerents is also likely to be a key indicator of the prospects for mediation. A relatively strong rebel movement notably increases the government's costs of the status quo, and makes it harder for the government to continue fighting. The rebels do not necessarily need to be able to win the conflict, but pose a credible threat to inflict sufficient costs upon the state to force them to opt for opening discussions (Greig & Regan, 2008).

Once in a dialogue process a strong rebel group can credibly commit to walk away from the negotiation. Furthermore, when a rebel movement can challenge the government,

military engagements should help overcome asymmetric information problems as the capabilities of the rebels become apparent on the battlefield. We therefore expect to see that factors that strengthen the position of the rebels relative to the state increase the likelihood of a successful outcome as well as mediation occurring (Clayton, 2011). On the other hand, research that simultaneously model the selection and outcome of mediation has shown that while increased intensity and duration increase the likelihood of mediation, the increased complexity that they bring to a peace process can decrease the probability of settlement (Svensson, 2007).

In addition to the recent wave of literature using selection models for empirical assessments, there is also an established and long-standing body of work detailing those variables consistently shown to produce a significant impact upon the mediation process. Conflict management history is one often-cited example, for numerous studies have demonstrated the positive effect of previous mediation attempts (in particular a history of successful outcomes) in helping to bring about future mediation episodes (Regan & Grieg, 2008; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). In a similar sense the time period within which a conflict occurs has also proven to be an important consideration in the mediation literature. Conflicts within the post-cold war period have been shown to be both more amenable to mediation and settlement.

Importantly, each of the mechanisms discussed above are features that are observable *ex ante*. For example a decision maker should be able to observe what incompatibility a conflict is being fought over, approximately how strong the rebels are relative to the state and whether a conflict has enjoyed previous mediation attempts, before assessing the likelihood of mediation onset and outcome. We have focused exclusively on *ex ante* observable characteristics rather other possible features held to be important, such as the characteristics of the mediator, that are only observable *ex post*. We do not argue that

characteristics of the mediator are unimportant, but unless likely mediators can be assessed in advance, these are unlikely to be helpful for out of sample forecasting. We focus on theories and key variables that are relatively simple to observe *ex ante*, and can be coded in a manner that minimizes conflictive assessments.

Empirical Model and Analysis

In order to perform our out-of-sample assessment of the predictive ability of the current mediation theory, we train our model on one observed subset of the historical data and then generate predictions for a different body of data based on the coefficient estimates for the training data. This is not a true out-of-sample analysis since the out of sample data is observed prior to the in-sample training, and we use the observed data on the right hand side predictors in generating the estimates. However, the coefficients used to calculate the predictions are derived independently of the out-of-sample data, and the covariates are all features that are observable prior to mediation taking place. As such, we feel that this is a valid approach to test the forecasting capacity of the model.

We use the new Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011) for information on mediation attempts and the outcome of mediation within civil wars. Many datasets exist on mediation in interstate conflicts, but the CWM data is the first to focus on mediation within intra-state conflict. Based on the Uppsala Armed Conflict Termination data (ACT, Kreutz, 2009), the CWM data details civil war mediation in 317 civil war episodes from 1946-2003 that meet the UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war, i.e. at least 25 battle deaths per year. Since there can be multiple mediation attempts over a conflicts life span, we separate conflict episodes into years. This results in a population of 1152 conflict years.

For the selection analysis we code whether a mediation process occurred within each of the individual conflict episode years. Following literature based upon conflict onset, if a mediation process continues into the following calendar year mediation onset is coded as missing to prevent the same mediation being counted for subsequent years. In the outcome analysis we use the CWM data's coding of a mediation process as either unsuccessful, a ceasefire, process settlement, partial settlement or full settlement. We construct a binary successful outcome indicator based on whether mediation is classified as achieving a process, partial or a full settlement. For the training data, we use observations for the years 1946-1992. This spans 1112 conflict years, of which 120 included a mediation onset. To assess the forecast, we use observations for 1993-2003, which includes 412 conflict years with 106 instances of mediation.

We highlighted in the previous section how recent mediation research has argued that 'the occurrence of mediation, and the settlement should be modeled as two separate, but interlinked, questions' (Svensson, 2007: 253). Previous work has used varieties of the two-stage Heckman selection model. However, selection models require identifying assumptions, and the Heckman model is appropriate only when at least one additional explanatory factor influences selection but not the outcome. Sartori (2003:112) shows that the Heckman model estimates otherwise are 'based only upon the assumptions about the distributional assumptions about the residuals rather than the variation in the explanatory variables.' It is difficult to find good distinct predictors for initial mediation selection and the eventual outcome of mediation, especially when focusing only on plausibly *ex ante* observable characteristics that actors may take into account before offering to mediate or accept mediation. We therefore adopt Sartori's alternative selection model estimator, based upon the identifying assumption that the error term for an observation is the same in the selection and outcome equations. This model is appropriate when there are good theoretical

reasons to believe that the sign of the unmeasured factors influencing both selection and outcome would be the same. Incumbents should be expected to resist mediation onset given significant costs suffered when accepting an intermediary. Only when the resolve of the state is diminished (i.e. reduction in probability of victory / increase in conflict cost) will mediation occur. This reduction in the unobservable 'resolve' is also likely to be strongly correlated with an increase in the probability of settlement. This suggests that the Sartori model is an appropriate choice, as the unmeasured / unobserved variables that encourage states to accept mediation also increase the likelihood of success.

We include a variety of measures shown to impact the strategic uncertainty within both the selection and outcome sides of the model. We include measure of incompatibility (government/territorial), intensity (1000 death threshold), and conflict duration (years). In addition we also include a measure of parallel conflicts, which codes the presence or absence of another conflict within the state. For we believe that the increased uncertainly brought about by additional conflict should also produce an effect on selection and outcome.

To capture those features commonly shown to exert an impact upon mediation we include a binary variable to code if a conflict occurred within the post-cold war period. We also include an ordinal level variable to account for our belief that relative rebel strength will have a positive effect on the selection and outcome of mediation. This is a three-point scale coded 1 when the rebels are weaker than the state, 2 when rebels are in parity with the state, and 3 when rebels are stronger than the state.[2]

Finally we include a binary variable to code the presence or absence of a mediation process in the previous year. Again, note that mediation episode extending for more than one year are excluded, so previous mediation does not simply predict the same mediation effort. To account for the effect of previous mediation results we include an ordinal level

variable coded 0 for no previous mediation, 1 if the process was unsuccessful, 2 for a ceasefire or process settlement, and 3 for a partial or full settlement. In the event that a mediation process crosses into the next calendar year we also code the previous conflict management outcome as missing. This is necessary, as the eventual outcome of the process might not be known until a number of years after the event begun.

In-Sample Results

We first briefly discuss the in-sample estimates before turning to the out of sample analysis. Table 1 reports the selection and outcome estimates generated using all observations from 1946-1992 within the CWM dataset. As expected territorial, high intensity and post-cold war conflicts are shown to be more susceptible to mediation. An increase in the relative strength of rebels produced the positive relationship that was predicted. A history of conflict management, in particular previous successes seem more likely to produce later mediation attempts. While the presence of another conflict within a state and an increase in conflict duration both produced a negative effect on the likelihood of mediation onset.

On the outcome side of the model the results were less conclusive. Territorial incompatibilities and high intensity conflict increase the probability of positive outcomes, but both effects are insignificant. Parallel conflict maintains the negative sign and remains highly significant. The only factor changing direction in the outcome phase of analysis is conflict duration. For while an increase in duration seems to decrease the likelihood of mediation, this same effect increases the chances of settlement. As expected rebel strength and conflict management history maintain their positive effect upon mediation outcome. Interestingly the previous mediation result does not produce a significant effect on future outcomes.

How effective then is the model at predicting mediation onset and outcome in sample? To assess this we compare in Table 2 the predicted probabilities of mediation from the model above and below 0.5 with the observed outcomes. The results are quite encouraging. We correctly identify 998 cases without mediation and 39 cases in which mediation did occur, and the predictions generate a total of 81 false negatives and 24 false positives. In total this threshold results in 1037 correct (91%) and 105 incorrect predictions (9%).

Table 1: Sartori selection estimator analysis, mediation onset and outcome

	(1)	
	Selection	Outcome
Territorial incompatibility	0.444*** (0.136)	0.077 (0.190)
Conflict intensity	0.136 (0.148)	0.293 (0.238)
Post-Cold War	0.714*** (0.141)	1.063*** (0.187)
Another conflict ongoing in state/year	-0.530*** (0.153)	-0.516*** (0.227)
Conflict duration	-0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.009)
Relative rebel strength	0.372*** (0.125)	0.457*** (0.161)
Mediation previous year	1.224***(0.339)	1.216*** (0.358)
Outcome of mediation in previous year	0.207 (0.176)	0.231 (0.170)
Constant	-2.324 ***(0.243)	-3.118*** (0.338)
Observations	1112	
Uncensored Observations	110	
Wald chi2	152.54 (8)	
Log psedolikelihood	296.7049	
prob > chi2	0.00	

Significant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2: In-Sample Predictions of Mediation Incidence

	P<0.5	P>0.5
No Mediation	998	24
Mediation	81	39

Table 3: In-Sample Predictions of Mediation Outcome

Table 2	P<0.5	P>0.5
Mediation Unsuccessful	1046	35
Mediation Successful	31	25

On the outcome side the precision of the predictions is a little weaker, but still generally strong. 1046 actual negatives and 25 positives are correctly predicted, while we have 31 false negatives and 35 false positives. In total the p<0.5 threshold results in 94% of cases correctly identified.

Out-of Sample Results

We now turn to the predictions of the model out of sample, using the 1946-1992 estimates and the information on the right hand side terms for the 1993-2003 data. In Table 2, we compare the observed outcomes (rows) with the predictions of the model for mediation (P1), dichotomized based on whether the predicted probabilities are above or below 0.5, i.e. whether mediation is predicted to be more likely to occur than not to occur. As can be seen, at this threshold we correctly identify 287 conflict years where we do not see mediation, as well as 63 of the cases where mediation did occur. We miss 51 actual instances of mediation and incorrectly predict 19 cases where mediation did not occur. Overall, about 83% of the observations are correctly classified in terms of whether we see mediation or not.

Table 4: Out-of-Sample Predictions of Mediation Incidence

	P1<0.5	P1>0.5
No Mediation	287	19
Mediation	51	63

To evaluate the predictions about mediation success we need to take into account the two-stage nature of the selection model. A natural way to consider predictions about mediation success is to consider the predictions where we expect mediation to occur (i.e., P1>0.5) and then consider whether the predicted success for these cases exceed 0.5 conditional on mediation occurring (P2). Table 5 reports predicted values for P2 against the observed outcomes. At this threshold we correctly identify 36 cases of successful mediation, and 287 cases where mediation was not attempted and deemed unlikely to be successful. We incorrectly predict 41 cases of successful mediation (16 cases where mediation did not occur and 25 where mediation failed), and we miss 23 successful cases of mediation where we did not expect mediation to occur. Overall, in terms of just predicted versus observed success, 84% of the observations are correctly predicted based on the model.

Table 5: Out-of-Sample Predictions of Mediation Outcome

	P2<0.5	P2>0.5
No Mediation	287	16
Mediation Unsuccessful	20	25
Mediation Successful	23	36

To consider the value of the selection based approach we can compare the prediction to those of a one equation model predicting success, using the same predictors. The single equation model correctly predicts fewer actual successful mediations (30) and incorrectly predicts a larger number of false negatives (39). However, the two-equation model has a larger number of false positives, predicting mediation success in 16 more cases where mediation does not actually occur in the first place. Overall, however, the two-stage equation approach has a higher share of correctly predicted cases, providing some support for the added value of a two equation model.

Instead of focusing on a single binary threshold for a prediction, we can compare the discriminatory ability of the model across a range of thresholds by a receiver operating characteristic or ROC plot. This method compares the share of correctly predicted 0s and 1's for each possible threshold as a curve. A model with complete predictive power (no false predictions) would fall entirely in the top left corner, while a 50-50 guess would produce a line with a 45-degree angle. The ROC curve for the out-of-sample results is shown below. Figure 1 displays the ROC plot for mediation incidence, and indicates that the covariates provide a great deal of information to predict mediation incidence over a random guess based on the population proportion. Evaluating the predictions for mediation success is more complex, since we now need to consider two different prediction thresholds. In Figure 2 we display the ROC plot at different thresholds for P2, conditional on mediation for cases with P1>0.5. Again, the ROC curve for the model is well above the 50 degree line, and appears to pick up on structural factors that are informative out-of-sample and not just the idiosyncracies of the in-sample observations.



Figure 1: ROC plot, predicted mediation, 1993-2003 data, based on Table 1 estimates



Figure 2: ROC plot, predicted mediation success (conditional on mediation, if p1>0.05), 1993-2003 data, based on Table 1 estimates.

Can We Assess the Model Covariates Ex Ante? An Application to Syria

Our discussion so far builds on knowledge of the covariates for the out of sample period. Hence, our predictions assume that observers and decision makers can identify and evaluate these issues when they make decisions. To justify that this information is available *ex ante*, or can be identified in advance, we consider an application to the ongoing conflict in Syria.[3]

The wave of unrest that quickly spread from Tunisia to Egypt and Libya struck Syria on March 15 2011. Around 150 people took to the streets to protest against the autocratic regime that has governed the state since 1970. The security forces responded in a

heavy-handed manner that led to an escalation in both the scale and type of dissent. In May 2011, in response to the increasing threat against the state, the army deployed heavy artillery against the protestors who were demanding significant reforms within the regime. This quickly increased the casualties and escalated the conflict into low intensity civil war. The intensity of the conflict continued to increase over the following months, to the point that in early 2012 the conflict was officially classified as a full scale civil war (BBC, 2012). As of October 2012, media sources suggest the death toll has risen to around 32,000, the majority of which are civilians and non-military defectors who have taken up arms against the state. In addition to non-military casualties, government forces have suffered over 8,000 fatalities and military defectors close to 1,500 (Reuters, 2012). We can therefore confidently consider the conflict as a full civil war.

The Syrian conflict has been largely motivated by the insurgents desire to replace the ruling regime with a more democratic and accountable government. Although the conflict originated outside the capital, and to some extent may coincide with sectarian cleavages, the classification of the conflict as being fought around a government incompatibility is open to little dispute. Similarly, the conflict duration is relatively simple to determine at the point of predicting mediation, given that the point of onset was widely covered by the global media. It is more challenging to determine if we are dealing with a single or multiple conflicts. The rebel movement in Syria is made up of a variety of different tribal and religious groups often operating within different regions. Early in the conflict these groups lacked a common command structure, and therefore violence might perhaps have been more accurately coded as a number of smaller parallel conflicts. However, as the conflict has progressed a central leadership has emerged that is now seeking to form a ruling body and establish connections with other states (International Business Times, 2012). As a result we code no parallel conflicts.

The relative strength of the rebel movement is obviously something that can change with battlefield events. At the time of writing the state forces are increasingly struggling to contain the insurgents challenge, but remain in control of all major population centers. Hence despite a significant growth in the threat posed by the 'Free Syria Army', the weaker military arsenal and minimal external support leaves the insurgents in a position of power disparity. Therefore despite acknowledging the increasingly strong position that the rebels are developing, we code the rebels as weaker in relation to the incumbent.

Finally at the start of 2012 the Syrian state had rejected all offers of mediation. Hence we can simply code previous mediation attempts as 0. Feeding this information into our model we can generate predicted probabilities for the likelihood of mediation initiation and success in the Syrian conflict at the start of 2012. The results are presented on table 6.

Table 6: Predicted Probabilities: Syria Conflict 2012

	Probability of Mediation Onset	Probability of Successful Outcome
Start of 2012: Prior to Annan mediation	0.13	0.71
March 2012: Following the onset of Annan process	0.55	0.85
April 2012: Following Annan ceasefire agreement	0.70	0.91
Following Annan failure & Brahimi's appointment	0.63	0.88

At the start of 2012 our model predicted a rather low likelihood of mediation (p=0.13), slightly lower than the mean of all post-cold war cases (p=0.26). The low probability of resolution was largely born form the weak nature of the rebel movement and lack of any previous conflict management attempts. However, despite the pessimistic outlook at the start of 2012, in March the belligerents agreed a ceasefire with the help of United Nations Special Representative Kofi Annan. Updating our model with this information produces a more promising forecast. The model suggests that with the onset of

the Annan mediation the prospects of future mediation rose by 42% (p=0.55), the resulting ceasefire raised this further to p=0.70. The likelihood of mediation securing a successful outcome has also significantly increased as a result of the Annan process, rising by 20 % to p=0.91. Yet shortly after its creation the Annan mediated ceasefire broke down, and subsequent mediation attempts failed to produce any further agreement. In the wake of the unsuccessful process, Kofi Annan resigned as UN envoy, and was replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi. Our model suggests that Brahimi has a good chance of initiating a mediation process, and potentially producing an agreement. Despite the slight decline in the likelihood of mediated settlement that followed the unsuccessful Annan process, the likelihood of a mediated settlement remains high (p=0.88).

In addition to assessing the propensity for mediation within the current conflict, our model also allows us to consider the impact of possible changes in the conflict context. We can therefore explore the probable effect that changes in the Syrian conflict might have upon mediation. Table 7 illustrates a number of the most interesting findings.

Table 7: Predicted Probabilities: The Future of the Syria Conflict

	Probability of Mediation Onset	Probability of Successful Outcome
October 2012	0.63	0.88
Rebel group Splinters	0.42	0.84
Rebel Group achieves military parity	0.76	0.95
Rebel Group achieves military advantage	0.86	0.99

The diverse religious character of Syria entails an increased potential for insurgent splintering. If a parallel conflict were to emerge in Syria, we would assign a significantly lower probability of mediation onset (p=0.42) and lower the prospects of success (p=0.84).

This suggests that if the international community aspires to produce a peaceful conclusion to the current conflict, they should ensure the rebel actors remain united.

As noted above the power balance within a conflict can quickly shift with battlefield events. According to our model an increase in rebel strength, perhaps through additional international support for the insurgents, would increase the likelihood of mediation by 13% (p=0.76) and the probability of success by 7% (p=0.95). If the rebels were to grow to stronger than the state, either through significant internal support or some form of external military intervention, the probability of mediation occurring would increase by a further 10% (p=0.86) and being successful by an additional 4% (p=0.99). This demonstrates the importance of external support for insurgents prospects within mediation, in particular the pivotal role that international community can play in shaping the incentives that the state has to open a dialogue process.

Taken together our model therefore produces a number of policy recommendations. We have shown the importance of a cohesive rebel movement, suggesting that all efforts must be taken to maintain a single central leadership governing the opposition. We also demonstrated that increased rebel strength would increase the likelihood of mediation. Despite the costs associated with strengthening of the rebels, most notable the likely escalation in violence this would likely produce, the model suggests that this would increase the probability of successful peace making attempts. Finally above all efforts should be made to continue the dialogue process that was originally initiated by Kofi Annan. Despite the failure of the previous process to terminate the violence, our model suggests that the foundations provided by this attempt should facilitate the onset of future processes that should eventually help the belligerents escape the violent conflict.

Discussion and Extensions

At this point we have shown that a model trained on data for conflicts in 1946-1992 predicts mediation and likely success well when applied data on conflicts in 1993-2003, assuming that the covariates can be classified by observers. In addition to evaluating the current model performance, it is also useful to look at the classification of the individual observations. This helps us assess whether there are certain types of cases that the model does relatively better at identifying, and more importantly, if the incorrect predictions share common features that we might be able to capture in the model, or ultimately involve issues that we cannot realistically expect to apply across many cases or be able to classify *ex ante*. A full list of observations (conflict years) split according to the P1 and P2 thresholds are included as an appendix

We first turn to cases correctly predicted by the model. Studying the similarities within the correctly predicted cases two strong features emerge. First, a rebel group's relative strength is a notable predictor of mediation onset and success. Over 90% of the correctly predicted negative cases of mediation onset and outcome involved a rebel movement weaker than the state. On the other hand over 30% of the correctly predicted positive cases included rebel groups that were at least in parity with their opponent. This supports our argument that very weak rebel movements such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) (India) and the Karen National Union (Myanmar) are less equipped to force the state to accept mediation and eventually conclude an agreement. While stronger rebel movements such as the NPFL in Liberia can increase the costs of continued violence to the point that the state opts agree to a peaceful solution. Given that this effect holds in an out-of-sample analysis it therefore seems that knowledge of the power distribution within a civil conflict can significantly increase our ability to predict mediation onset and outcome.

The second area of importance that arises from a study of the cases is strong effect of conflict management history. In the vast majority of conflict years in which we correctly predicted mediation onset, the outcome replicated the result from the previous year. The outcome of previous efforts also seems to exert an important impact upon the accuracy of our predictions. Agreements (in particular partial or full settlements) are very likely to be followed by future mediation successes. This provides important out-of-sample support for previous literature that has demonstrated the iterative nature of mediation. Once mediation has begun the costs associated with future efforts are reduced, therefore the probability of future efforts should increase. Further mediation attempts often lay the foundations for future talks, allowing subsequent processes to build upon previous achievements. For example the 2002 mediation between the SPLM and government of Sudan produced a partial settlement, this process laid the foundations for the 2003 agreement that was correctly predicted by our model.

Yet rebel strength and conflict management history also generates a high share of our incorrect predictions. For the strong effects that they produce in our model on occasions leads us to incorrectly predict a number of observations. For example, based on the strong capacity of the FPR in Rwanda we incorrectly predict the onset of mediation in 1993. Similarly based on the agreement in Guatemala between the state and the rebel forces (URNG. DIP & MLN) in 1992 we expected a successful outcome in 1993. This may be a result of the operationalization of complex and multi-dimensional concepts into simple binary/ordinal measures, and a more disaggregated method of measuring these concepts is a possible avenue to improving predictive power. We consider a number of methods through which this might be undertaken. We limit our discussion to features that could be observed ex ante, for the same reasons that motivated the selection of the variables within our model.

One key issue that arises from the strong association between our predictions and previous mediation efforts is accurately predicting a first mediation event. Our model performs very well in predicting cases with no mediation. The correct predictions in Algeria between the state and GSPC, and a variety of low-intensity conflicts within India are clear examples of this achievement. However in cases such as Northern Ireland and Indonesia in which the conflict continued for a notable period before dialogue began, it is very hard to quantitatively capture the 'hurting stalemate' or tipping point in which an often-weaker rebel movement eventually compels the state to seek mediation. Being as weaker insurgents are more likely to use conflict duration as a function of their strategy, it is hard to predict the point at which the state will lose its resolve *ex ante*. In a similar sense the point at which agreement will be reached is often hard to predict. For example after a number of processes the Good Friday Agreement was the result of a wide variety of reasons that are challenging to capture in a model before the event.

One manner in which we might capture this effect is through better account of mediation supply. For in addition to belligerent openness to dialogue, mediation requires a third party willing to offer their services. By accounting for factors such the variation in economic activity (trade, foreign direct investment, economic sanctions) that impact upon potential mediators interest within a conflict and therefore the propensity to supply mediation, future studies might be able to better capture why seemingly intractable conflicts turn to mediation and eventually result in success.

An alternative manner in which this issue might be circumvented is through an improvement in the measure of rebel strength. The measure of relative rebel strength that we adopt in this analysis simply measures whether rebels are weaker, equal or stronger relative to the state. However as a number of authors have suggested rebel strength can assume a variety of different forms (Zartman, 1993; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan,

2009). Future works might therefore seek to disaggregate this measure to capture feature such as the form of leadership, troop numbers and location of rebel forces. Cases such as the Kashmiri insurgency within India and Turkey's conflict with the PKK suggest that rebels located a large distance from the centre might be less likely to challenge the states resolve than a likeminded force in a more favorable position. For example the close proximity of the PLO to urban Israeli centers might help to explain why the relatively weak rebel force has provide better equipped to bring about negotiations than other weak rebel groups such as the OPM in Indonesia who are located a great distance from the centre.

The generally poor ability of our model to predict mediation incidence within the Sri Lankan civil war raises a further issue with some of our tools of measurement. Within this conflict successful outcomes were produced in 1995, 2000 and 2002 that lead our model to predict success in each of the subsequent years (1996, 2001 and 2003). However in each of these cases previously gains were not built upon, rendering each of these predictions incorrect. These results might reflect the changing nature of the Sri Lankan conflict, in particular the changing levels of violence witnessed from year to year. A more fine grain analysis of conflict intensity that better captures the changing levels of violence throughout the course of the conflict might better capture escalation and de-escalation in violence that shifts the incentives for third party lead dialogue.

In addition to Sri Lanka other cases such as the Bosnian, Northern Ireland and Columbian conflict also produced false positive prediction as a result of previous conflict management success. Common to these cases was a failure to sustain or implement the terms of the previous agreement. For while the signing of a ceasefire might improve the chances of a more substantial settlement occurring at some later point, if the ceasefire quickly collapses (as did in the above stated cases) this might actually decrease the probability of future efforts. Therefore more comprehensive measure of the durability of

previous agreements, in addition to other factors that might act against mediation re-occurrence should offer improvements in predictive power.

More generally there are likely to be a number of features that act against the onset and outcome of mediation that might improve the specification of our model. Our false positives on the onset analysis include a number of conflicts fought in or around valuable resource wealth. These include Angola, Sudan and Columbia. In each of the cases the presence of valuable resources might act as strong incentives to continue the conflict. For the profits associated with ongoing war act against the acceptance of a mediator. By better capturing such features we may improve our ability to predict cases where mediation will not occur.

Finally the role of the international community is an area deserving deeper investigation. The onset of the Annan process in the Syrian conflict discussed above was no doubt a result of the significant international attention that the conflict had received. Capturing international focus, in particular United Nations Security Council discussion, might offer an additional approach through which predictions of mediation onset might be improved.

Conclusions

This study represents the first attempt to assess the extent that features that have been highlighted as important determinants for mediation in existing research allow us to predict when we will see mediation and likely success out-of-sample. Our results demonstrated that a two stage model of mediation and success does relatively well in out-of-sample prediction. This provides important support for a number of previous in-sample studies of mediation, whose results largely stand up to out-of-sample evaluation (Svensson, 2007; Clayton, 2011; Greig & Regan, 2008; etc.) This suggests that a basic knowledge of

the conflict context (i.e. intensity of the violence, type of incompatibility and existence of parallel conflicts), conflicting dyads characteristics, and conflict management history, provide us with a reasonable ability to forecast conflict management onset and outcome.

With respect to policy, our results highlight a number of the key indicators that policymakers can observe to assess the likelihood of mediation onset and success. Using the Syrian case we illustrated how our model could be used by practitioners to determine the opportune moment for mediation. In principle by highlighting the moments in which belligerents are most prone to accept a peace broker, this approach could help intermediaries effectively allocate mediation resources, and prepare peace-building initiatives in contexts in which a settlement appears imminent. We also illustrated how the model can be used to assess the impact of possible changes in the conflict context. This demonstrated how our model can be used to explore the probable effect that changes (either internally or externally produced) can have on the mediation.

Incorporating the characteristics of a mediator is one way in which this project could be developed. In this paper we exclude features relating to the mediator, as these are often only observable *ex post*. However, developing this model to incorporate mediator characteristics could potentially provide researchers with the ability to forecast the likely effectiveness of different mediators *ex ante*. This would have obvious practical uses. Developing the analysis to capture the durability of mediated settlements is another interesting manner in which this project could be extended. Given the generally unstable nature of civil war peace settlements, the ability accurately forecast the likely duration of a mediated agreement *ex ante* could help peace brokers avoid unsuccessful settlements that can often sour relations between belligerents. More generally we hope that future work will build upon the methods laid out in this study, and make out-of-sample analysis a more regular feature in studies focused upon the resolution of violent conflict.

Bibliography

BBC World News. 2012. 'Syria in Civil War: Red Cross Says' available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18849362, accessed 21.09.12.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2010. 'Pain, Pressure, and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation Incidence' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 395-406.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. 'Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time-Inconsistency Problems' *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 723-740.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2009. 'Intervention without leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators' *International Interactions* 35(3): 272-297.

Beardsley, Kyle., David Quinn., Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2006. 'Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 58-86.

Bercovitch, Jacob., Scott S. Gartner. 2006. 'Is there Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation' *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

Bercovitch, Jacob., and Gerald Schneider. 2000. 'Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 145-165.

Bercovitch, Jacob., Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz. 1997. 'The Management and Termination of Protracted Interstate Conflicts: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations' *Millennium* 26(3): 751-769.

Bercovitch, Jacob., and Richard Jackson. 2001. 'Negotiation or Mediation? An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict' *Negotiation Journal* 17(1): 59-77.

Brandt, Patrick T., John R. Freeman and Philip A. Schrodt. 2011. 'Real Time, Time Series Forecasting of Inter- and Intra-state Political Conflict' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(1): 40–63.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2002. *Predicting Politics*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Choucri, Nazli and Thomas W. Robinson, eds. 1978. *Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects*. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman.

Clayton, Govinda. 2011. 'Relative Rebel Strength and the Onset and Outcome of Mediation in Civil War' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, 18 March.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. 'It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome' *Journal of Conflict*

Resolution 53(4): 570-597.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr., Jacob Bercovitch & Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. 'Introducing the new Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.

Dixon, William J. 1996. 'Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement' *International Organization* 50(4): 653-681.

Efron, Bradley. 1983. 'Estimating the Error Rate of a Prediction Rule: Improvement on Cross-Validation' *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 78(382): 316-331.

Fearon, James .D. 1995. 'Rationalist Explanations for War' *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.

Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder and Mark Woodward. 2010. 'A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability' *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1):190–208.

Greig, Michael J, and Patrick Regan. 2008. 'When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 759-781.

International Business Times. 2012. 'UK Recognizes Syrian Opposition Leadership' available at http://www.ibtimes.com/uk-recognizes-syrian-opposition-415952, accessed 21.09.12.

Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.

Melin, Molly M, and Isak Svensson. 2009. 'Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars' *International Interactions* 35(3): 249-271.

O'Brien, Sean P. 2010. 'Crisis Early Warning and Decision Support: Contemporary Approaches and Thoughts on Future Research' *International Studies Review* 12(1):87–104.

Pruitt, Dean G., and Kenneth Kressel. 1989. Introduction: An Overview of Mediation Research In *Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention*, edited by Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt, London: Jossey-Bass.

Rauchhaus, Robert W. 2006. 'Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management' *World Politics* 58(2): 207-41.

Regan Patrick M., Richard Frank, and Aysegul Aydin. 2009. 'Diplomatic Interventions and Civil Wars: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 135-146.

Regan Patrick M. 2010. 'Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Survey with

Prospective Ideas' *Civil Wars* 12(4): 456-476.

Reuters. 2012. 'Syrian Death Toll now Tops 30,000: Syrian Activist Group' available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-syria-crisis-toll-idUSBRE88P12Y20120926, accessed 11.10.12.

Rustad, Siri C. Å., Halvard Buhaug, Åshild Falch and Scott Gates. 2011. 'All Conflict is Local: Modeling Sub-National Variation in Civil Conflict Risk' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(1): 15-40.

Sartori, Anne E. 2003. 'An Estimator for Some Binary Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions' *Political Analysis* 11(2): 111–138.

Schneider, Gerald; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Sabine C. Carey. 2011. ‚Forecasting in International Relations: One Quest, Three Approaches' Co*nflict Management and Peace Science* 28(1): 5–14.

Singer, J. David and Michael David Wallace. 1979. *To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Skjelsbæk, Kjell. 1991. 'The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes' *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 99–115.

Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. 'The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations' *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 621-632.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. 'Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace' *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 114-163.

Svensson, Isak. 2009. 'Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53:3: 446 – 469.

Touval, Saadia., and William Zartman I. 1985. *International Mediation in Theory and Practice.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ward, Michael D., Brian D. Greenhill and Kristin M. Bakke. 2010. 'The Perils of Policy by *p*-value: Predicting Civil Conflicts' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 363–375.

Wall, James A., John B. Stark, and Retta L. Standifer. 2001. 'Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 370-391.

Wall, James A., and Ann Lynn. 1993. 'Mediation: A Current Review' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1): 160-194.

Walter, Barbara. 1997. 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement' *International Organization* 51(3): 335-364.

Weidmann, Nils, Jan Ketil Rød and Lars-Erik Cederman. 2010. 'Representing Ethnic

Groups in Space: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 491–499.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan., Kathleen Young., David Quinn and Victor Asal. 2005. *Mediating International Crises*. London: Routledge.

Zartman, William I., 1993. The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts. In: Roy Licklider, ed, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End.* New York, London: New York University Press.

Notes

[1] For reviews of the developing study of mediation see Pruitt & Kressel (1989), Wall & Lynn (1993), Wall et al. (2001).

[2] The original measure within the NSA dataset is a five point ordinal measure. However when combined with the CWM data there are a very small number of observations involving rebels classed at the top of the scale. Also given the qualitative decision making process used to code the original measure the distinction between 1-2 and 4-5 is not always clear. Simplifying the measure reduces the measurement error associated with the variable.

[3] The conflict is on-going at the time of writing.

Appendix A

P1>0.5 & Mediation Onset = 1

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1995, 1996	Angola	UNITA, MLLP-LP
1993, 1994	Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
1993, 1994,	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1993, 1994, 1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1993	Cambodia	Khmer Rouges
2003	Central African Republic	Military faction
1999, 2000	Congo/Zaire	MLC, RCD, AFDL
1993, 1994, 1995	Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina
1993, 1994	Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia
1993, 1994	Guatemala	URNG. DIP, MLN
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998	Indonesia	Fretilin
2003	Indonesia	GAM
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Israel	PLO and non-PLO
1994	Mali	MPA
1993	Moldova	Dniestr Republic
1995	Papua New Guinea	BRA
1995, 1996	Philippines	MNLF, MILF
2002, 2003	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
2000	Senegal	MFDC
1993, 1994,	Somalia	SNA, SPM
1996	Somalia	USC-faction
1998	Somalia	SNA, SPM
2001, 2002, 2003	Sri Lanka	LTTE
1993,1994, 1999, 2003	Sudan	SPLM
1995, 1996, 1997	Tajikistan	UTO
1995, 1997	UK	INLA, IRA
1996, 1998	UK	PIRA
1994	Yemen	Dem. Rep. of Yemen

Appendix B

P1<0.5 & Mediation Onset = 0

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001	Afghanistan	UIFSA, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Algeria	GSPC
1994, 1998, 2002	Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001	Angola	UNITA
1993	Azerbaijan	Husseinov military faction
1995	Azerbaijan	OPON forces
1993, 1994, 1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Burundi	Palipehutu-FNL
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Cambodia	Khmer Rouges
2001	Central African Republic	Military faction
1993, 1994	Chad	CSNPD, CNR, FNT
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001	Chad	MDJT
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Colombia	FARC , ELN, EPL
1993, 1994, 1997, 1998	Congo-Brazzaville	Ninjas
2002, 2003	Congo-Brazzaville	Ntsiloulous
1996, 1997	Congo/Zaire	MLC, RCD, AFDL
1993, 1994, 1999	Djibouti	FRUD
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997	Egypt	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya
1997, 1999, 2003	Eritrea	EIJM
1996, 1997, 1999	Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami
1996	Ethiopia	ARDUF
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Ethiopia	OLF
1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Ethiopia	ONLF
1993	Georgia	Zviadists
2000, 2001	Guinea	RDFG
1993	India	ATTF
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	Kashmir Insurgents
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	NDFB
1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	NLFT
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000	India	NSCN(I-M)

1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000	India	PLA
1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	PWG, MCC
1993	India	Sikh Insurgents
2003	India	UNLF, PLA
1993	Iran	KDPI
1993, 1999, 2000, 2001	Iran	Mujahideen Khalq
1993	Iraq	DPK, PUK
1996	Iraq	PUK
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996	Iraq	SCIRI
2002, 2003	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PNA, PIJ, PFLP, PFLP-GC
1993, 1994, 1995	Israel	Hezbollah
1998	Lesotho	military faction
2000, 2001, 2002	Liberia	LURD
1994	Myanmar	ABSDF
1996	Myanmar	BMA
1996	Myanmar	KNPP
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,	Myanmar	KNU
2003	Myanmar	RSO
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Myanmar	SSA/s
1997	Myanmar	UWSA
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF
1995, 1996	Pakistan	MQM
1993	Papua New Guinea	BRA
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999	Peru	Sendero Luminoso
1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Philippines	CPP
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003	Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)
1999	Russia	Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district
1994	Rwanda	FPR
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Rwanda	PALIR
1995, 1997, 1998, 2003	Senegal	MFDC
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Sierra Leone	RUF
1996	Somalia	SNA, SPM
1994, 1995	Somalia	USC-faction
1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999	Sri Lanka	LTTE
2001	Sudan	SPLM
1998	Tajikistan	Movement for Peace in Tajikistan

1993	Tajikistan	UTO
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Turkey	PKK/Kadek/KONGRA-GEL
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Uganda	UDCA/LRA
1999	UK	RIRA
2000	Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan	IMU

Appendix C

P1>0.5 & Mediation Onset =0

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1997	Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R
1994	Cambodia	Khmer Rouges
2003	Colombia	FARC , ELN, EPL
2001	Indonesia	GAM
1996	Iran	KDPI
2001	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PNA, PIJ, PFLP, PFLP-GC
1993	Mali	MPA
1996	Mexico	EPR
1996	Papua New Guinea	BRA
1998	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
2000	Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)
1993	Rwanda	FPR
1995	Somalia	SNA, SPM
1993	Somalia	USC-faction
1996	Sri Lanka	LTTE
1996, 2000	Sudan	SPLM
2003	Thailand	Patani insurgents
1993	UK	PIRA

Appendix D

P1<0.5 & Mediation Onset =1

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1996	Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R
2002	Angola	UNITA
2001	Central African Republic	Forces of Francois Bozize
2002	Chad	MDJT
1999	Colombia	FARC , ELN, EPL
1999	Congo-Brazzaville	Ninjas, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous
1998	Congo/Zaire	MLC, RCD, AFDL
1997	Comoros	MPA
1998	Egypt	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya
1995	Guatemala	URNG
1998	Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice
1996, 1997, 1999	Indonesia	Fretilin
2000, 2002	Indonesia	GAM
1996, 2000	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PNA, PIJ, PFLP, PFLP-GC
2002	Ivory Coast	Forces Nouvelles
2003	Liberia	LURD
2001	Macedonia	UCK
1994	Mali	FIAA
1994	Mexico	EZLN
1997	Moldova	Dniestr Republic
1995, 2003	Myanmar	KNU
1994	Niger	CRA
1996	Niger	FARS
1997	Niger	UFRA
1994, 1997	Papua New Guinea	BRA
1997, 2001	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
1994	Philippines	MNLF, MILF
1999	Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)
1999	Senegal	MFDC
1999	Sierra Leone	RUF
1997	Somalia	SNA, SPM
2001	Somalia	SRRC
1995, 2000	Sri Lanka	LTTE
2003	Sudan	SLM/A, JEM
1995, 1997	Sudan	SPLA, DUP
1998, 2002	Sudan	SPLM
1998	Tajikistan	IRP, TDP
1994	Tajikistan	UTO
2003	Uganda	UDCA/LRA
1994	UK	PIRA
1993	Yemen	Dem. Rep. of Yemen

Appendix E

P2>0.5 & Mediation Success

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1995, 1996	Angola	UNITA
1993, 1994	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian irregulars
1994, 1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars
1993	Cambodia	Khmer Rouges
2003	Central African Republic	Military faction
2002	Colombia	FARC , ELN, EPL
2001, 2003	Comoros	MPA/Republic of Anjouan
1999	Congo/Zaire	MLC, RCD, AFDL
1995	Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina
1993, 1994	Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia
1994	Guatemala	URNG. DIP, MLN
1998	Indonesia	Fretilin
1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001	Israel	PLO and non-PLO
1994	Mali	MPA
1993	Moldova	Dniestr Republic
2002	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
1995, 1996	Philippines	MNLF, MILF
1993, 1994	Somalia	SNA, SPM
2002	Sri Lanka	LTTE
1993, 1994, 1999, 2003	Sudan	SPLM
1996, 1997	Tajikistan	UTO
1997	UK	INLA, IRA
1998	UK	PIRA

Appendix F

P2>0.5 & Mediation Failure

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1997	Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R
1993, 1994	Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
1993	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars
1994	Cambodia	Khmer Rouges
2003	Colombia	FARC , ELN, EPL
1993, 1994	Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina
1993	Guatemala	URNG. DIP, MLN
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,	Indonesia	Fretilin
2001, 2003	Indonesia	GAM
1996	Iran	KDPI
1995, 1998, 2002, 2003	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PNA, PIJ, PFLP, PFLP-GC
2001	Israel	Hezbollah
1993	Mali	MPA
1997	Niger	FARS
1995, 1996	Papua New Guinea	BRA
1998, 2003	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
2000	Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)
1993	Rwanda	FPR
1993, 2001	Senegal	MFDC
2000	Sierra Leone	RUF
1995, 1998	Somalia	SNA, SPM
1993, 1996	Somalia	USC-faction
1996, 2001, 2003	Sri Lanka	LTTE
1996, 2000	Sudan	SPLM
1995	Tajikistan	UTO
1995	UK	INLA, IRA
1993, 1996	UK	PIRA
1994	Yemen	Dem. Rep. of Yemen

Appendix G

P2<0.5 Mediation Success

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1996	Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R
2002	Angola	UNITA
1997	Comoros	MPA/Republic of Anjouan
1999	Congo-Brazzaville	Ninjas, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous
1995	Guatemala	URNG
2003	Liberia	LURD
2001	Macedonia	UCK
1997	Moldova	Dniestr Republic
1995, 2003	Myanmar	KNU
1994	Niger	CRA
1997	Papua New Guinea	BRA
2001	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
1994	Philippines	MNLF, MILF
1997	Somalia	SNA, SPM
1995, 2000	Sri Lanka	LTTE
1995, 1997	Sudan	SPLA, DUP
1998, 2002	Sudan	SPLM
1998	Tajikistan	IRP, TDP
1994	UK	PIRA

Appendix H

P2<0.5 & Mediation Unsuccessful

Year of Prediction	Side A (State)	Side B (Non-State)
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001	Afghanistan	UIFSA, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Algeria	GSPC
1994, 1998, 2002	Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001	Angola	UNITA
1993	Azerbaijan	Husseinov military faction
1995	Azerbaijan	OPON forces
1993, 1994, 1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Burundi	Palipehutu-FNL
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Cambodia	Khmer Rouges
2001	Central African Republic	Military faction
1993, 1994, 1997	Chad	CSNPD, CNR, FNT
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Chad	MDJT
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Colombia	FARC , ELN, EPL
1993, 1994, 1997, 1998	Congo-Brazzaville	Ninjas
2002, 2003	Congo-Brazzaville	Ntsiloulous
1996, 1997, 1998	Congo/Zaire	MLC, RCD, AFDL
1993, 1994, 1999	Djibouti	FRUD
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Egypt	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya
1997, 1999, 2003	Eritrea	EIJM
1996, 1997, 1999	Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami
1996	Ethiopia	ARDUF
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Ethiopia	OLF
1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Ethiopia	ONLF
1993	Georgia	Zviadists
2000, 2001	Guinea	RDFG
1993	India	ATTF
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	Kashmir Insurgents
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	NDFB
1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	NLFT
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000	India	NSCN(I-M)
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,	India	PLA

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000		
1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	India	PWG
1993	India	Sikh Insurgents
2003	India	UNLF, PLA
1996, 1997, 1999	Indonesia	Fretilin
2000, 2002	Indonesia	GAM
1993	Iran	KDPI
1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001	Iran	Mujahideen Khalq
1993	Iraq	DPK, PUK
1996	Iraq	PUK
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996	Iraq	SCIRI
2000, 2002, 2003	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PNA, PIJ, PFLP, PFLP-GC
1993, 1994, 1995	Israel	Hezbollah
1998	Lesotho	military faction
2000, 2001, 2002	Liberia	LURD
1994	Mali	FIAA
1994	Mexico	EZLN
1994	Myanmar	ABSDF
1996	Myanmar	BMA
1996	Myanmar	KNPP
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Myanmar	KNU
2003	Myanmar	RSO
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Myanmar	SSA/s
1997	Myanmar	UWSA
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF
1997	Niger	UFRA
1995, 1996	Pakistan	MQM
1993, 1994	Papua New Guinea	BRA
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999	Peru	Sendero Luminoso
1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Philippines	CPP
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000	Philippines	MILF, Abu Sayyaf
1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003	Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)
1999	Russia	Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district
1994	Rwanda	FPR
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002	Rwanda	PALIR
1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003	Senegal	MFDC
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998	Sierra Leone	RUF
1996	Somalia	SNA, SPM

1994, 1995	Somalia	USC-faction
1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999	Sri Lanka	LTTE
2003	Sudan	SLM/A, JEM
2001	Sudan	SPLM
1998	Tajikistan	Movement for Peace in Tajikistan
1993, 1994	Tajikistan	UTO
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Turkey	PKK/Kadek/KONGRA-GEL
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003	Uganda	UDCA/LRA
1999	UK	RIRA
2000	Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan	IMU
1993	Yemen	Dem. Rep. of Yemen

Looking Forward: Avenues for Future Mediation Research

Govinda Clayton

Conflict Analysis Research Centre

The University of Kent

Introduction

Mediation research has developed considerably over the past decade. Improvements in theoretical and methodological sophistication have expanded our knowledge of many aspects of the mediation process. We now have a better understanding of the factors that influence mediation supply, the determinants of mediation acceptance, and the different conditions that are more likely to produce successful outcomes (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993; Kleiboer, 1996; Jackson, 2000; Kydd, 2003; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Böhmelt, 2010; Beardsley, 2011; Greig & Regan, 2008). This dissertation has contributed to knowledge in each of these areas. Yet despite an increased appreciation of the dynamics that shape mediation processes, there still remains much for us to learn. This final chapter focuses on areas in which our knowledge of mediation can be improved. The first short section raises a number of issues and question that have emerged from this research project. I revisit the key findings within the dissertation, and make a number of suggestions for how this research can be developed. The second part of this chapter then looks more broadly at a number of areas that remain unexplored or underdeveloped in mediation research. I focus specifically on the need for greater disaggregation in data and theory, and the challenges associated with conceptualising mediation success.

Part I: Conclusions and Extensions

This dissertation has theoretically argued, and empirically demonstrated, that domestic dynamics have a strong influence on civil war mediation. Belligerent strength, resource wealth, and governing institutions, all help to define when mediation will occur and ultimately produce an agreement.

Relative Belligerent Strength

The distribution of belligerent capabilities has been shown to exert a strong influence on the onset and outcome of mediation. Relatively strong rebel groups are more likely to enter mediation, and eventually agree some form of settlement. This finding is robust in all model specifications, including out-of-sample assessment. The results support previous work that has linked the dyadic relations between belligerents to civil conflict duration (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). This also complements research on the mediation of inter-state conflict, which has shown mediation to be more effective when belligerents have similar capabilities (Young, 1967; Touval & Zartman, 1985).

This research has also highlighted the importance of capturing a well-rounded measure of belligerent strength. The capacity of a disputant is not determined solely by their number of troops, but is conditional on a range of features including technological development, economic strength, political institutions, territorial control, access to natural resources, and links with foreign allies. Future research should continue to disaggregate the component elements of belligerent strength, and assess these factors in a manner that accounts for the dyadic nature of civil conflict.

The long-term impact of relative strength is another area that requires development. Each of the essays included within this project focus only on the onset and outcome of mediation, leaving the sustainability of mediated settlements unexplored. While relatively strong rebel groups are most likely to produce an agreement, they are also perhaps those with the greatest incentives to renege. Therefore one logical extension of this work is to assess the impact of relative capacity upon the stability of mediated peace settlements.

Resource Wealth

This dissertation offered one of the first accounts linking natural resources to conflict resolution. Using disaggregated resource data, the empirical analysis assessed a

number of competing mechanisms. The results suggest that non-lootable natural resources play an important role in shaping the scale of the strategic bargaining problem in civil war. A power asymmetry arises when a state has access to oil revenue, which significantly lowers the likelihood of a conflict being mediated. The lower quality of governance often associated with oil wealth also reduces the probability of a mediated settlement. These findings complement work that has stressed the increased duration of conflicts fought within oil producing states (Lujala, 2010). However, previous studies have largely assumed that the conflict-enhancing effect of oil occurs through its effect on rebel movements. This project has instead suggested that the negative effect of oil occurs predominately through its influence on the institutions and capacity of the central state. Future mediation research should do more to explore how natural resources influence the bargaining behaviour of rebel movements. Despite previous studies highlighting the conflict-enhancing effects of revenue generated from lootable resources and 'oil bunkering' (Lujala, 2010), my analysis found very little evidence of natural resources influencing the actions of rebel actors. This suggests that perhaps the influence of lootable resources has been exaggerated in previous work, or the data used in this study failed to capture the influence of resources on non-state groups.

Future research should also strive to develop a stronger understanding of the relationship between conflict management and a wider range of resources. This project highlighted the clear variance in the effects of lootable and non-lootable products. An empirical evaluation of other resources such as narcotics, palm oil and timber, would no doubt lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the way in which resources impact belligerent strength and mediation.

Finally, this project only briefly touched upon the role that natural resources have on the supply of mediation. However, the analysis uncovered a tendency for potential

mediators to shy away from offering their services when a state is an oil producer. On the one hand this might reflect third parties' reluctance to take sides when economic interests are at stake, or alternatively it might be that those with strong preferences regarding the outcome of a conflict are more likely to use robust forms of intervention. Future research could explore this occurrence, and assess how peace brokers' supply of mediation is influenced by the presence of natural resources.

Mediator and Belligerent Interactions

In addition to highlighting the importance of the dyadic domestic interactions between belligerents, this project also demonstrated the importance of the interaction between the characteristics of the mediator and the disputants. I showed that political institutions help the incumbent to discriminate between friends and foes, denoting third parties who are more likely to protect their system of rule. The results suggest that when the incumbent and third party share institutional similarities, mediation is more likely to be accepted. Notably, non-democratic states were shown to have a significantly higher demand for mediation led by non-democratic third parties.

Assessing the influence of more specific systems of governance offers an interesting avenue for future research. Different forms of non-democratic regime may feel a stronger affinity towards each other, which might increase their propensity to accept mediation. For example, civilian, military and royal autocracies might be more willing to cede control of a peace process to a mediator that is governed by similar form of government.

Expanding the analysis to incorporate a wider range of mediator-incumbent connections is an additional option for future studies. For example, shared religious beliefs might make a mediator more appealing to a governing party. Alternatively broadening the analysis to explore the influence of dyadic connections between (potential) mediators and

insurgents groups would offer a new and potentially very interesting insight into the dynamics that shape civil war mediation.

Part II: New Avenues for Mediation Research

Having discussed direct extensions of the research undertaken within this dissertation, this final section will now look more broadly at a number of related areas that that remain unexplored or underdeveloped in mediation research. I focus specifically on the need for greater disaggregation in data and theory, and the challenges associated with conceptualising mediation success.

Disaggregating Civil War Mediation

The empirical analysis within this dissertation drew on a combination of disaggregated and dyadic data sources. Competing mechanisms were assessed using relative insurgent strength data, spatially and temporally coded resource indicators, and dyadic regime variables. This approach sought to develop our knowledge of mediation, by building upon the methodological advancements within the broader civil war literature (e.g. Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Buhaug et al. 2011; Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011; Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 2010; Ward & Weidmann, 2010; Lujala, 2010). This proved to be a fruitful undertaking, which produced new insights into the dynamics that shape civil war mediation. Yet the lack of fine-grain data still restricts researchers, and prevents the assessment of many of the long held assumptions on conflict management. To better understand the micro-level processes that shape civil war peace making attempts, researchers must strive to expand upon the traditional focus of mediation research.

Track III Mediation

The exclusion of track three mediation efforts is one notable limitation within existing accounts of mediation. Civil war mediation datasets are largely comprised of episodes including track one and track two mediators, and almost exclusively focused on high-level political negotiations. Yet unofficial third parties regularly promote peaceful dialogue in almost all violent conflict settings (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Chufrin & Saunders, 1993). Track three mediators work on rebuilding the relationships between actors at the grassroots level, attempting to build peace using a "bottom up" rather than a "top down" approach (Lederach, 1997). These peace brokers often play a fundamental role within communities, promoting dialogue, psychosocial recovery, and mechanisms to resolve local level incompatibilities (Lederach & Thapa, 2010). For example, in Nepal the Asia Foundation pioneered a mediation programme that provided a number of communities with a platform to respond to local conflict. Mediators helped resolve issues including the resettlement of displaced people, local outbursts of violence, and disputes over private property. This method simultaneously prevented, contained, and resolved violent conflict (Lederach & Thapa, 2010). These local-level initiatives can often have a national level impact, as has been seen in positive effects of community level work in South Africa and Northern Ireland (Dixon, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2010; Brewer, 2010).

Despite case literature pointing to the strong causal effect of local-level mediation, systematic mediation research has largely overlooked this important form of peace brokering. The lack of empirical evidence means that the causal influence of track-three mediation is unclear. There are undoubtedly challenges associated with uncovering the visible causal effects of local-level actions. Collecting data on this form of mediation is not without difficulty, and is often likely to require in-depth analysis of individual conflicts.

However, over the last decade conflict researchers have convincing illustrated the local-level causes of civil conflict (Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug et al. 2011; Raleigh & Hegre, 2009). We now appreciate that civil wars rarely encompasses entire states, and that local processes, including the relations between specific groups in limited locales, can often have a fundamental impact on the national-level dynamics within a state (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009). We will only be able to determine if local-level mediation has such a significant effect, by collecting fine grain data, and developing theoretical arguments that account for local-level peace processes.

Low Level Conflict and Conflict Prevention

A related problem associated with current mediation research, is the failure to account for pre-civil conflict mediation. This dissertation is indicative of the broader mediation research program, focusing solely on a specific subset of the most deadly cases of conflict. For example, the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data includes only cases of conflicts that cross the 1000 battle-related death threshold (Hensel et al. 2008), the diplomatic interventions data requires more than 200 battle related deaths before a conflict warrants inclusion (Grieg & Regan, 2008), and the Civil War Mediation dataset (CWM) is restricted to cases with at least 25 battle related deaths (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). Much of what we understand about the conditions that facilitate successful mediation is based upon the analysis of these (and similarly coded) data sources. Of course these events are the most destructive cases of conflict, and therefore deserve significant focus. But limiting our analysis to cases in which violent conflict is already underway prevents researchers from assessing the preventative functions that mediators can often undertake.

International organisations have now moved conflict prevention to the forefront of their peace-making agendas. Following the violent conflict in places from Rwanda to Somalia and Bosnia, peace brokers are now increasingly seeking effective means to prevent conflicts from escalating. The early intervention of a mediator can help belligerents to peacefully overcome bargaining challenges. This is often a more efficient method of conflict management, as it reduces the costs suffered by the belligerents. Early intervention can also be more beneficial for a peace broker, as conflict resolution is generally less challenging within the early phases of a dispute. A more timely intervention can therefore save the mediator the time and resources that are often required to manage complex and intractable violent events. As United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated at the opening of a high-level meeting on the role of Member States in mediation: 'An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of remedy' (Ki-Moon, 2012).

The important role that mediators can play in pre-conflict situations is visible through the work of the OSCE in the Baltic Region. Throughout the 1990s the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was pivotal in preventing violence in a number of former Soviet States (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine). Acting as an independent mediator, the OSCE employed a range of cooperative and non-coercive approaches that helped the actors address the underlying sources of ethnic tensions (Zaagman, 1999; van der Stoel, 1996, 1999). Yet given the non-violent nature of the conflicts, these positive examples of preventative mediation are commonly excluded from assessments of mediator performance. This restricts the ability of scholars attempting to determine the conditions under which mediation is most effective at preventing violent conflict, and biases existing studies of mediation effectiveness.

However, a number of advances in data collection suggest that a more comprehensive assessment of mediators preventative functions should soon be feasible.

Increasingly disaggregated conflict data is now providing the opportunity for scholars to assess the role of mediation in the lowest forms of violent struggle. For example, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) provides detailed information of pre-civil conflict events, including: protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict not systematically tracked in other conflict datasets (Salehyan et al. 2012). SCAD currently includes information on over 7,900 social conflict events from 1990 to 2011. At present the data lacks detailed specification of conflict management initiatives, but provides a wonderful platform upon which such data could be built. Similarly, the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset includes information on both protests and rebellions (Stephan & Chenowth, 2008). This has already been used to assess the impact of mediation in conflict between the state and unarmed insurrections (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011).

More specifically focused upon conflict management attempts, the Managing Intrastate Low-Level Conflict (MILC) dataset has collated information on third-party management attempts within low-level armed conflicts (1993 to 2004) (Melander, Möller & Öberg, 2009). Building upon the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), the MILC data is limited to cases that cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold. Therefore like previous data resources the MILC data fails to capture non-violent (or very low intensity) cases of conflict which do not eventually escalate to full conflict status. However, this event-based data resource does provide information on mediation attempts that occurred in the year prior to the conflict reaching the threshold of war, and therefore facilitates analysis of the low-level phase of the conflict dyad.

Focusing on crisis is another method to assess a mediator's ability to prevent violent conflict. The onset of a crisis event does not necessarily imply the use of violence. Instead, crisis can result from verbal threats and actions that demonstrate a willingness to use

physical force (Öberg, Möller & Wallensteen, 2009). The Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises dataset (ECPEC) is the first source focused entirely on conflict prevention activities in civil conflict (Öberg, Möller & Wallensteen, 2009). At present the data is limited to 67 ethnic crises in the period 1990—98, but offers researcher the opportunity to assess a range preventive actions (including mediation) in non-violent context.

Though not yet publically available, the Mediating Intrastate crisis (MISC) dataset promises to offer a more comprehensive collection of crisis cases (Quinn et al. 2009). In addition to those events captured in the ECPEC project, the MISC data will also include crisis on account of additional actions, including: threats to basic values of the state, the use of time pressure by disputants, and both the state and insurgents' perceptions of the likelihood of hostilities. Building upon the foundations of the International Crisis Behaviour data, the MISC project will include a variety of variables that capture different elements of mediator behaviour. This will provide researchers with the opportunity to more systematically assess a number of different theories surrounding non-violent conflict mediation.

Mediation and Conflict Management Methods

In addition to focusing upon the more micro-level impact of peace brokers, future research should also seek to take better account of alternative methods of conflict management that regularly accompany mediation. At present conflict management research remains overly compartmentalised. Existing studies often assess the efforts of mediators in isolation, failing to consider the broad range of conflict management techniques that often occur in unison (Beardsley & Grieg, 2009). Third party conflict managers often have a broad palate of options available to them prior to intervention. Mediators are therefore deployed instead of, or as well as, a range of other methods. For example, peacekeeping

troops and/or economic sanctions are often deployed prior to, during, or after mediation. Failing to model the range of conflict management activities misses the interactive and sequencing effects of different conflict management methods. Existing studies of mediation supply are therefore weakened by the failure to control for the substitutive nature of conflict mediation, while investigations into the conditions that favour mediation are potentially missing important interactions between methods. Researchers should therefore seek to theoretically model the substitutive, additive and interactive nature of conflict management methods, and develop data sources that facilitate the assessment of multiple methods simultaneously.

What is Successful Mediation?

How do we capture the effects of mediation, and what are the most appropriate indicators of success? Despite the growth in mediation literature, there remains relatively little conceptual clarity on the issue of effectiveness (Hoffman & Svensson, 2012: 4; Bercovitch, 2007). The lack of clear criteria against which mediation can be evaluated, hampers practitioners' attempts to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of their work, and undermines empirical research attempting to isolate the determinants of successful mediation (Lindgren, Wallensteen & Grusell, 2010).

Outcome Based Assessment

This dissertation, like most large N studies, defines mediation as successful on those occasions in which the mediator produced a formal agreement (e.g. Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2004; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Ott, 1972; Schneider, Bercovitch & Selck, 2006).[2] This approach provides a good indication of the mediator's ability to reshape the violent preferences of the disputants, and suggests a commitment by the actors to modify

their interactions (DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011; Bercovitch, 2007; Touval & Zartman, 1985) However, the signing of an agreement does not always signify the termination of a conflict, settlements are notoriously unstable, and frequently collapse during implementation (Walter, 2002). In an attempt to capture a broader range of mediation effects, researchers have also assessed mediator's ability to bring about conflict de-escalation (DeRouen & Möller, 2011; Regan & Stam, 2000), tension reduction (Wilkenfeld et al. 2005; Fortna, 2004; Beardsley et al. 2006; Greig 2001) and changes to political institutions (Nathan, 1999; Toft, 2009; Svensson, 2009). The on-going challenge for researchers is to delineate the collection of interrelated indicators of success, and derive a useful set of factors to assess mediation outcomes (Gartner & Melin, 2009: 576; Hoffman & Svensson, 2012: 4).

The validity of outcome-based methods of assessment can also be improved by taking greater account of the context within which mediation attempts occur. For to suggest that mediation is unsuccessful where it fails to produce a certain outcome, irrespective of the nature of the conflict, represents a failure to appreciate the huge variance in the challenges facing conflict mediators (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006). For example, the onset of a dialogue process can often represent a significant achievement within an intractable conflict setting (i.e. Colombia). In this case, a successful intervention might be indicated by the belligerent's presence at the negotiating table, or the creation of a short-term ceasefire. On the other hand, within a less complicated conflict setting, a full settlement might be the only outcome considered to be a success. We can only accurately assess the abilities of a mediator when we account for the aspirations underlying the entrance and exit of an intermediary, and the differing contexts within which mediation occurs.

Assessing peace brokers in relation to their prior objectives is one method to account for the variance in mediator aspirations (Touval & Zartman, 1985; Smith, 1985).

Evaluating mediators in relation to their prior goals increases the level of contextual sensitivity, as cases are only judged in relation to their own targets (Weiss, 1972). This method of evaluation also offers a means through which to assess 'negative criteria', or what actions did not follow the onset of mediation. For example, a mediator might be tasked with preventing the escalation of violence, or limiting the geographical spread of the conflict. In this case, despite the conflict situation remaining unchanged, the mediator might still prove effective in a number of areas. International mediators often have a clearly documented mandate, which provides guidance on the objectives underlying the entrance of the mediator. This offers researchers the potential to assess a clearly codified series of objectives, rather than vague, symbolic or fluctuating aspirations (Kleiboer, 1996). Unfortunately this still leaves the researcher with the task of separating real goals from purely positional statements (Bercovitch, 2007). But as a means of accounting for the contextual constraints that shape mediation outcomes, a goal-centered method of evaluation offers a previously under explored method of systematically assessing mediator performance.

Process Based Assessment

At present the vast majority of mediation research centres its assessments upon some form of outcome based analysis. This form of assessment fails to account for the important impact that mediators often produce during negotiations. Peace brokers commonly have a positive effect on the disputant's interactions, improving the quality of their communications, and increasing the empathy that belligerents have for the opposing party (Karim & Pegnetter, 1983). Mediators can also help disputants to reorder preferences, promoting and embedding new conflict systems with different norms of behaviour (Mandell & Tomlin, 1991). This can often provide a foundation for future negotiations, and

suggests that while there 'may be no successful outcome... the parties may still feel they have achieved success in the process.' (Bercovitch, 2007). These positive effects might not be visible for months or years after the immediate event, and are therefore not captured by traditional forms of outcome-based assessment.

It is of course very challenging to uncover observable indicators of improvements within the negotiation process. Discussions generally take place behind closed doors, and public information is often limited. It is also not clear whose satisfaction should be measured, conceivably there could large variance in the level of satisfaction reported by the different actors involved within the process (Bercovitch, 2007; Wall & Lynn, 1993; Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992). The domestic pressure imposed upon peacemakers is also likely to produce significant response bias, as actors are less likely to publically report positive experiences that were shared with the opposing side. Despite these challenges, it is important that studies strive to develop innovative means of capturing the process effects of mediation. Only by capturing the full range of positive (and negative) effects produced by a peace broker, can the utility of mediation be accurately assessed.

Mediation Success

The difficulties associated with measuring mediation success were pertinently illustrated by the late Richard Holbrooke, who when questioned on the measure used to gauge the effectiveness of his work in Afghanistan, suggested, 'we'll know success when we see it' (Tiedemann, 2009: 2). The Justice Potter Stewart method[3] is appropriate when success is defined on a case-by-case basis, but not well suited to research seeking generalized inferences. Much of what we now know about mediation is the result of large N systematic research. This collection of work has generally focused on uncovering the conditions under which formal settlements are most likely to occur. As the research within

this dissertation has illustrated, this approach is an effective means of evaluating the efforts of mediators.

However, peace processes are very rarely linear events. Mediators commonly experience multiple successes and setbacks in the course of a negotiation (Hoffman and Svennson, 2012). In order to better account for the dynamic nature of mediation, future research must therefore strive to develop a more holistic approach to understanding success. Synthesizing a greater range of outcome and process based measures, promises to improve the validity of insights produced by mediation researchers.

Conclusion

This final chapter has highlighted a number of potential avenues for future mediation research. This discussion is by no means exhaustive, and touches upon only a small selection of the most interesting areas for future research. Conflict mediation literature has only recently entered its adolescence, and studies of civil war mediation remain in their infancy. There remain large gaps in our knowledge that scholars and practitioners must strive to address. The research has real practical relevance. Civil war remains the most common form of organised violence, producing more human suffering than any other social phenomenon (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Only by generating a fuller comprehension of the features that make peace settlements unattractive, can researchers can help peace brokers to focus their efforts in the most productive areas. Hopefully this project will play a role in advancing practitioners' understanding of intra-state mediation, and help strengthen the knowledge of peace brokers attempting to resolve destructive civil wars.

Bibliography

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. *The Mediation Dilemma.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Beardsley, Kyle & Michael. J. Greig. 2009. 'Disaggregating the Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction' *International Interactions* 35(3): 243-248.

Beardsley, Kyle., David Quinn., Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2006. 'Mediation style and crisis outcomes' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1): 58-86.

Beber, Bernd. 2012. 'International Mediation, Selection Effects and Question of Bias' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Forthcoming. Available at: https://files.nyu.edu/bb89/public/research.htm accessed 25.05.12.

Bercovitch, Jacob. 2007. 'Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for the Elusive Criteria' *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7(2): 289-302.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Jeffrey Langley. 1993. 'The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(4): 670-691.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Jeffrey Z. Rubin. 1992. *Mediation in international relations: multiple approaches to conflict management.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Karl DeRouen. 2004. 'Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflict: Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process' *Armed Forces and Society* 30(2): 147-170.

Bercovitch, Jacob & Scott S. Gartner. 2006. 'Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation' *International Interactions* 32(4): 329-354.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2011. 'Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation' *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (4): 859-881.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2010. 'The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third–Party Interventions' *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 167–178.

Brewer, John D. 2010. *Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach.* Basingstoke: Polity.

Buhaug, Halvard. 2010. 'Dude Where's My Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength, and the Location of Civil War' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(2): 107-128.

Buhaug Halvard., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch., Helge Holtermann., Gudrun Østby, & Andreas Forø Tollefsen. 2011 'It's the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict Outbreak Location' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(5): 814-840.

Cederman, Lars-Erik & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2009. 'Introduction to Special Issue on

"Disaggregating Civil War"' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 487-495.

Cederman, Lars-Erik., Nils B. Weidmann, & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. 'Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison' *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 478-95.

Stephan, Maria & Erica Chenoweth. 2008. 'Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict' *International Security* 33(1): 7-44.

Chufrin, Gennady I & Harold Saunders. 1993. 'A Public Peace Process' *Negotiation Journal* 9(3): 155-177.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan. 2009. 'It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570-597.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr., Jacob Bercovitch & Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. 'Introducing the new Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.

De Rouen, Karl, Jnr & Frida Möller. 2011. 'Diplomacy and Civil War De-escalation' Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 16-19, 2011.

Dixon, Paul. 1997. 'Paths to peace in Northern Ireland: Civil Society and Consociational Approaches' *Democratization* 4(2): 1-27.

Fisher, Ronald J. & Loraleigh Keashley. 1991. 'A contingency approach to Third Party Intervention'. In Ronald J. Fisher (ed) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution.* New York: Springe-Verlag.

Fortna, Virgina Page. 2004. *Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gartner, Scott S. & Molly Melin. 2009. 'Assessing Outcomes: Conflict Management and the Durability of Peace. In Jacob Bercovitch., Victor Kremenyuk & William I. Zartman (eds) *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution.* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand. 2002. 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–637

Greig, Michael J. 2005. 'Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?' *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 249-266.

Greig, Michael J. 2001. 'Moments of Opportunity: Sources of Ripeness Among Enduring Rivals' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 691-718.

Greig, Michael J. & Patrick Regan. 2008. 'When do they say yes? An analysis of the

willingness to offer and accept mediation in civil wars' *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 759-781.

Greig, Michael J. & Paul F. Diehl. 2012. *International Mediation.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Greig, Michael J & Paul Diehl. 2006. 'Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy' *International Interactions* 32(4): 355-384.

Hansel, Paul R., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers II & Clayton L. Thyne. 2008. 'Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1): 117-143.

Hoffman, Evan A. & Isak Svensson. 2012. 'Pinning Down Peace: Towards a Multi-Dimensional, Clustered Measure of Mediation Success' Report by the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago, available at http://www.otago.ac.nz/ncpacs/resources/, accessed 12.09.12.

Jackson, Richard. 2000. 'Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(3): 323-343.

Karim, Ahmad & Richard Pegnetter. 1983. 'Mediator Strategies and Qualities and Mediation Effectiveness' *Industrial Relations* 22(1): 105-114.

Ki-Moon, Ban. 2012. Speech given at the High Level Meeting of International State Mediators. Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11242.doc.htm, accessed 02.09.12.

Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. 'Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(2): 360-389

Kydd, Andrew. 2003. 'Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 597-611.

Lederach, John Paul. 1997. *Building Sustainable Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lederach, John Paul & Preeti Thapa. 2010. 'Local Mediation: A Transformative Approach to Conflict in Nepal' available online at http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2010/06/25/local-mediation-a-transformative-approach-to-conflict-in-nepal/ accessed 02.09.12.

Lindgren, Mathilda., Peter Wallensteen & Helena Grusell. 2010. *Meeting the new challenges to international mediation.* UCDP Paper No. 6. Report from an International symposium, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala June 14-16, 2010.

Lujala, Päivi. 2010. 'The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural Resources' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(1): 15-28.

Mac Ginty, Roger. 2010. ' Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between top down and bottom up peace' *Security Dialogue* 41(4): 391-412.

Mandell, Brian S. & Brian W. Tomlin. 1991. 'Mediation in the Development of Norms to Manage Conflict: Kissinger in the Middle East' *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 43-55.

Melander, Erik., Frida Möller & Magnus Öberg. 2009. 'Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Armed Conflict 1993-2004: A New Dataset' *International Interactions* 35(1): 58-85.

Nathan, Laurie. 1999. 'When Push Comes to Shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil Wars' *Track Two* 8(2): 1-34.

Öberg, Magnus, Frida Möller & Peter Wallensteen. 2009. 'Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises, 1990-98: A New Dataset' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(1): 67-91.

Ott, Marvin C. 1972. 'Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases' *International Organization* 26(4): 595-618.

Quinn, David., Pelin Eralp., Jonathan Wilkenfeld., Victor Asal., Theodore D. McLauchlin & Michael Brecher. 2009. 'Overcoming Barriers to Peace : Mediating Violent, Ethnic, Intra-State Crisis in Africa' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto Canada, September 3-6, 2009.

Raleigh, Clionadh & Håvard Hegre. 2009. 'Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War: A Geographically Disaggregated Analysis' *Political Geography* 28(4): 224–238.

Regan, Patrick., Richard Frank & Aysegul Aydin. 2009. 'Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 46(1): 135-146.

Regan, Patrick & Allan C. Stam. 2000. 'In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes' *International Studies Quarterly* 44(2): 239-260.

Idean Salehyan., Cullen S. Hendrix., Christina Case., Christopher Linebarger., Emily Stull & Jennifer Williams. 2012. 'The Social Conflict in Africa Database: New Data and Applications' *International Interactions* Forthcoming.

Schneider, Gerald., Jacob Bercovitch & Torsten J. Selck. 2006. 'The Dispute or the Mediator? Structural and Personal Factors in Mediation' Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego.

Smith, William. 1985. 'Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator' *Negotiation Journal* 1(4): 363 - 371.

Svensson, Isak. 2009. 'Who Brings Which Peace: Biased versus Neutral Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

53(3): 446–469.

Svensson, Isak & Mathilda Lindgren. 2011. 'Community and Consent? Exploring Unarmed Insurgencies in Non-democracies' *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (1): 97-120.

Toft, Monica D. 2009. *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tiedemann, Katherine. 2009. 'Holbrooke on Success "We'll know it when we see it"' *Foreign Policy* available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/12/holbrooke_on_success_we_ll_know_it_when_we_see_it, accessed 12.09.10.

Touval. Saadia & William I. Zartman. 1985. *International mediation in theory and practice.* New York: Westview Press.

van der Stoel, Max. 1996. 'The Role of the OSCE in Conflict Prevention' Address by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/36482, accessed 08.08.12.

van der Stoel, Max. 1999. 'The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner in Conflict Prevention' in Crocker, Chester A., Fen O. Hampson & Pamela Aall. (eds) *Herding Cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Wall, James A. & Ann Lynn. 1993. 'Mediation: A current review' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1): 160–194.

Ward, Michael D., Brian D. Greenhill & Kristin M. Bakke. 2010. 'The Perils of Policy by p-value: Predicting Civil Conflicts' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4): 363-375.

Ward, Michael D & Nils B. Weidmann. 2010. 'Predicting Conflict in Space and Time' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(6): 883-901.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan., Kathleen Young., David Quinn & Victor Asal. 2005. *Mediating International Crises*. London: Routledge.

Weiss, Carol. 1972. *Evaluation Research: Methods of Assessing Program Effectiveness.* Prentice-Hall.

Young, Oran R, 1967. *The intermediaries: third parties in international crises.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zaagman, Rob. 1999. *Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.* Flensburg, Germany: European Centre for Minority Issues Press.

Notes

[1] There are already a small number of data sources that include a range of methods, see for example, Regan, Frank & Aydin (2009).

[2] The requirements of the agreements vary from study to study. On some occasions success is only associated with cases in which the mediator is responsible for a complete settlement. In other less stringent studies, success is also associated with partial, process or ceasefire agreements.

[3] This refers the Justice Potter Stewart, an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who famously ruled that while hardcore pornography is hard to define, "I'll know it when I see it".