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"STUDY OF THOMAS HARDY"

D. H. LAWRENCE'S "ART-SPEECH"

IN THE LIGHT OF POLANYI'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

by

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Department of English and American Literature
University of Kent at Canterbury

Date: _____

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of English and American Literature
at the University of Kent at Canterbury

1974

ABSTRACT

D. H. Lawrence's "Study of Thomas Hardy" has often been dismissed as a repetitive, idiosyncratic work, full of endless digressions and the cryptic terminology of Lawrence's metaphysic, a work which is not very much about Thomas Hardy at all and which is good evidence for the contention that Lawrence was "incapable of what we ordinarily call thinking" (T. S. Eliot).

However, careful reading of the "Study" indicates that revaluation is in order, that the "Study" is an organic whole, that it has its own significant order of construction which succeeds not only in illumining the problems and the achievement of Hardy's work but in revising our concept of "what we ordinarily call thinking".

To reveal the true organisation of the "Study", this dissertation follows the development of Lawrence's thought from chapter to chapter. Lawrence's close reading of Hardy led him into several different areas of enquiry which were necessary to the understanding of important problems in Hardy's fiction - 1. love, marriage and relationships; 2. the teachings of the Judeo-Christian biblical tradition and religious and philosophical problems of unity and duality; 3. the aims and methods of art, particularly as they shed light on the nature of perception; and finally 4. the theory of knowledge of empirical philosophy which affected Hardy.

There are three separate discussions of Hardy in the "Study" and I try to show how each is different and how Lawrence penetrates more deeply into the roots of Hardy's success and failure in each. Lawrence leaves direct discussion of Hardy's novels only to further explore the above four areas and then return to Hardy with more force.

In the course of the "Study" he sees more and more clearly the limiting effect of a false theory of knowledge on Hardy's art, the ideal of scientific "objectivity", detachment and empiricism; and Lawrence challenges this epistemology and tries to discover a truer one. To help in understanding the value of the new theory of knowledge which Lawrence develops in the "Study", I have relied on the work of Michael Polanyi, a twentieth century scientist and philosopher whose Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy has criticised the underlying assumptions and inconsistencies of empirical and positivist ideas on how scientists think and learn. To help in showing the limiting effect of these false theories of knowledge on modern writers and modern literary criticism, I have returned repeatedly to the work of Frank Kermode with particular attention to his response to Lawrence.

Throughout, in following the development of the "Study of Thomas Hardy", I have tried to direct attention to 1. the range and the quality of the thought expressed; 2. the complex significance and force of the central images used and the way the meanings of words are extended and made more precise in the context of the "Study" and 3. the thoughts on the nature of perception and on a new theory of knowledge which organise the "Study".

My central conclusions are 1. the "Study" belongs to Lawrence's best work and thought; the theology, the art criticism and the literary criticism in its pages can stand on their own as work of high quality in their respective disciplines; 2. Lawrence's original use of language in the "Study" should be recognised as an unusual achievement, bringing the intellectual powers of "art-speech" into non-fiction prose; 3. the "Study" is an important early work challenging post-Descartes theories of knowledge and re-examining the roles of religion and art in our search for truth about the nature of reality.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My first thanks must go to the Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission whose generous scholarship made this undertaking possible, financing my three years of study in England.

My debts to the stimulation and encouragement of teachers and fellow students at the University of Kent at Canterbury are also great, particularly to Morris Shapira who first had me read the "Study of Thomas Hardy" and had a sixth sense for asking the very questions that would help a student to read more sensitively and alertly. For his supervision of this dissertation over a period of more than three years, for discussion sessions at his home, chapters promptly read and criticised, honest objections and disagreements mixed with faithful encouragement and belief in my work, new directions of thought suggested, and most of all for friendship, he knows I thank him. I am also grateful to Mark Kinkead-Weekes who read chapters, gave encouragement and criticism and solid guidance during the year Morris Shapira was in Australia on exchange. Wesley Kort of Duke University, who first sparked my interest in Lawrence as an undergraduate, was a great help in reading and commenting on the early drafts of several chapters while he was on sabbatical in England for a few months in 1972.

Particular thanks go to friend and typist Dorothy Johnson who has dealt with more than a typist's share of work on this dissertation, managing all aspects of its final shaping in England during the past year while I have been back in the U.S. Her reliability and perseverance have meant a great deal to me and my peace of mind at such long distance.

Finally, of course, there are the debts one can never adequately express, let alone repay. The first is to my husband, who not only read and criticised every page that follows but who cooked, cleaned, shopped, did laundry, changed diapers and babysat for many months uncomplainingly while I wrote and complained. The last is to my one year old daughter Hannah who arrived while the thesis was in progress. Her happy presence refreshed me at innumerable weary times and gave a calming sense of perspective to the pressured final year of work. Also I want to thank her for putting off learning to walk until I was able to finish completely and put my signature to this page.

15th May, 1974 Mary Elizabeth Wallace.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The following short titles and abbreviations are used frequently in the text and in footnotes.

"Study" - "Study of Thomas Hardy" by D. H. Lawrence

L.M. - The Collected Letters of D. H. Lawrence edited by Harry T. Moore

P.K. - Personal Knowledge by Michael Polanyi

T.D. - The Tacit Dimension by Michael Polanyi

S.M. - The Study of Man by Michael Polanyi

I.P. - Italian Painters of the Renaissance by Bernard Berenson

Return - The Return of the Native by Thomas Hardy

Crowd - Far from the Madding Crowd by Thomas Hardy

Tess - Tess of the D'Urbervilles by Thomas Hardy

Jude - Jude the Obscure by Thomas Hardy

Mayor - The Mayor of Casterbridge by Thomas Hardy

Page numbers given in the text are from the "Study of Thomas Hardy" unless it is mentioned in a particular chapter that page references for another work will be given in the text also.

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"STUDY OF THOMAS HARDY"

D. H. LAWRENCE'S "ART-SPEECH"

IN THE LIGHT OF POLANYI'S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

"Study of Thomas Hardy", 1914 - "for which the critics will plainly beat me".

If we are to judge from the critical use to which it has been put, the consensus is that D. H. Lawrence's "Study of Thomas Hardy" is a kind of doctrinal grab bag, useful as a source of quotations to support one's pet theory or interest but not a complex and compelling work in its own right. It is my belief that the "Study of Thomas Hardy" is a solid piece of thinking as a whole, an achievement of a unique kind which repays rereading for its own sake and not only for an understanding of Lawrence's view of Hardy or of Christianity or for the light it sheds on the growth of The Rainbow, which was rewritten for the fourth and final time immediately after the "Study" was completed.[1] However, considered as an esoteric work of the order of Blake's Prophetic Books or Yeats' Vision, an expression of an obscure, personal philosophy or mythology, the "Study" has repeatedly been seen from these and other partial perspectives. With the exception of J. V. Davies in his recent introduction to the paperback edition of the "Study"[2], critics have on the whole turned to it for support for their various theses, taking sentences out of context and thus distorting or limiting their meaning.

In a sense, the "Study" invites this sort of treatment because of the many passages of great beauty it contains which can function as set pieces when they stand alone:

> I wish we were all like kindled bonfires on the edge of space, marking out the advance-posts. What is the aim of self-preservation, but to carry us right out to the firing-line; there, what is is in contact with what is not . . .

> Every step I move forward into being brings a newer, juster proportion into the world, gives me less need of storehouse and barn, allows me to leave all, and to take what I want by the way, sure that it will always be there; allows me in the end to fly the flag of myself, at the extreme tip of life. [3]

The prose is impressive. Yet it is much richer in context where echoes of Hardy's Eustacia Vye and her signal bonfires across Egdon Heath, of Lawrence's reflections on World War I and on the New Testament, of poppies and phoenixes, are all present and operative.

More often than not, however, excerpts are taken from the second half of the "Study" where Lawrence uses a terminology which has been gradually developed and given complex definition by the whole body of the essay and which gives him a richer and more precise language, almost a suggestive shorthand, with which to approach and discuss Hardy's art. When critics draw on this carefully chosen and qualified terminology for their own purposes, the result is disastrous. Their partial truths become more devilish and insidious than direct falsehoods. Frank Kermode, in his recent book on Lawrence for the Fontana Modern Masters series [4], insists on using Lawrence's terms, "Law" and "Love", to express the central thesis of his criticism, that Lawrence's metaphysic (Law) struggled continually with his art (Love); he gives a full page of quotations from the Hardy "Study" in an attempt to convince us that Lawrence himself called this struggle between doctrine and tale "the antinomy between Law and Love". Yet a look at the full quotation, at the four pages (pp. 476-479) from which Kermode selected odd sentences and paragraphs to support this contention, makes it immediately obvious that Lawrence said nothing quite so schematic or simple and that several omitted passages directly contradict Kermode's statement. [5]

Even more peculiar, however, is the fact that Kermode does quote a sentence which challenges his handy generalisation - "If Aeschylus had a metaphysic to his art, this metaphysic is that Love and Law are Two, eternally in conflict, and eternally being reconciled" (p.477) - and he hardly seems to notice the contradiction. It is significant that Lawrence does not reduce Aeschylus' "metaphysic" to a simple, one-sided statement; he is trying to suggest that an artist's metaphysic itself consists in a certain balance and tension between "Law" and "Love". A great artist's thought, as well as his art, recognises tensions and complexities, multiple ways of seeing things in life. How could it be otherwise? His art, as a further discipline of thought, might challenge, extend and enrich aspects of his "metaphysic", might indeed contain insights or meanings of which he himself was never to be fully aware. Lawrence expressed his understanding of this possibility when he wrote in 1921 that his psychology books were "deduced from the novels and poems, not the reverse".[6] Yet this was not the whole truth. The Lawrence who felt it important to write the "Study" before trying to rewrite The Rainbow one last time obviously felt that the thinking it demanded of him would help him approach the problems of The Rainbow with heightened powers, from fresh perspectives. In the "Study", Lawrence makes it clear that Hardy's art, although much greater than his "metaphysic", still owes its major flaws to the weakness of his thought.

> If it were not that man is much stronger in feeling than in thought, the Wessex novels would be sheer rubbish, as they are already in parts. The Well-Beloved is sheer rubbish, fatuity, as is a good deal of The Dynasts conception.

> But it is not as a metaphysician that one must consider Hardy. He makes a poor show there. For nothing in his work is so pitiable as his clumsy efforts to push events into line with his theory of being, and to make calamity fall on those who represent the principle of Love. He does it exceedingly badly, and owing to this effort his form is execrable in the extreme. (p.480)

The strength and breadth of an artist's thought, his vision, has a direct effect on the strength and breadth of his art. Kermode, however, by assuming Lawrence's thought to be much more simple and readily paraphrasable than it in fact is, leaves the reader of his Lawrence with an odd impression: Lawrence's thought was rigid, obscure, idiosyncratic and limited, while his art was subtle, complex, compelling and suggestive. It is difficult for the reader to make the jump. The unfortunate result is that Kermode's criticism reduces the fiction as well as the non-fiction and none of it sounds worth reading, the "Study" least of all. Kermode makes the crucial mistake of isolating prose fiction narrative from other forms of perception and thought when in fact it exists in a continuum with the processes of scientific discovery, learning a skill or a language, or coming upon philosophic insights about the nature of existence.[7]

Kermode is certainly not the only one to use the terms of the "Study" in this simplistic way. R. E. Pritchard, in his D. H. Lawrence: Body of Darkness gets into a terrible muddle trying to square the "Male" and "Female" principles in the "Study" with his Freudian analysis of Lawrence's relations with his parents and with Frieda.[8] Intent upon seeing the powerful phallic principle triumphant, what he calls at one point "unconscious male power in the amoral dark body",[9] he finally hits upon Lawrence's description of Raphael's Madonna degli Ansidei as a "dark, strong shaft or column leaping up into, and almost transgressing a faint, radiant inclusive ellipse". (p. 460). The dark shaft is, of course, a phallic symbol, even though Lawrence has carefully weighted it in his comments on

Raphael to suggest the qualities of light, spirit, consciousness, movement, knowledge - qualities which can hardly be claimed by Pritchard's unconscious phallic power "in the amoral dark body". Furthermore, although Lawrence sees in the Raphael painting a perfect balance, almost too perfect, Pritchard insists that "the dark shaft has more power",[10] not only in the description of the painting, but in the "Study" as a whole. This insistence that the dualities explored in the "Study" are really weighted to favour the male phallic principle neatly contrasts with the opinions of others that "there is little doubt that Lawrence's sympathies are with the qualities ranged under the female" [11] - unless, of course, Pritchard realises that the unconscious physical power he is talking about is actually "ranged under the female" in the "Study". He does not seem to, however, as this discovery would complicate his Freudian analysis.

What I am trying to show is that the "Study", like the Bible, can be made to prove almost anything. Unfortunately, the terminology Lawrence develops and uses so carefully has been used repeatedly against him. The ultimate insult is the chart of opposing qualities which H. M. Daleski uses to describe the "Study" in his book <u>The Forked Flame</u>; the chart has the effect of turning almost every word Lawrence uses into an abstract philosophical category - "Full Life in the Body", "Service of Some Idea", "Occupied in Self-Feeling", "Registers Relationships" are listed along with "Law" and "Love", "Male" and "Female" and about fifty others.[12] Daleski has his own special problems working with these rigidly schematised dualities to make them fit properly into his particular psychological theory. As with Kermode and Pritchard, the use of these abstract terms apart from the concrete,

complex work of definition done by the "Study" can only serve to make his discussion more confusing and difficult to read, as indeed their presence here in the preceding few pages must be annoying to any reader unfamiliar with the "Study". Yet I think it is important to see the dead-end to which such a desire to get "handles" on Lawrence's (or indeed, anyone's) thought by the use of catchwords or phrases finally leads us.

It is a desire fundamentally antithetical to Lawrence's method in the "Study", which attempts to further self-knowledge and understanding of life, art, history and religion by the discipline of "art-speech", insofar as this is possible in non-fiction. "Art-speech is the only truth." [13] "All vital truth contains the memory of all that for which it is not true."[14] It is this memory which seems to have been lost by those who subject the "Study" to the scrutiny of their partial purposes. Such scrutiny cannot be called reading, however; any sensitive, alert reading involves the ability to perceive wholes which go beyond although depend upon and include all of the words, sentences, paragraphs and chapters, the setting, characters, incidents and plots which go into them. It requires greater mental energy than the mere recognition and manipulation of parts, the kind of energy which enables one scientist to look at the results of many experiments or observations and suddenly make the leap to see what had been missed by others, although the same information was available to all - a leap not the result of any logical progression but of an ability to perceive as a whole what had formerly been unrelated particulars, to make a creative discovery about the nature of reality.[15]

The best criticism of Lawrence's novels has, of course, grown out of the more strenuous and perceptive reading of this sort. The criticism of his non-fiction, such as it is, has not. However, if a study of Lawrence's writings should teach us anything, it should teach us that true thought is both more creative and more difficult than what what we had imagined, that all vital thought shares in processes similar to that of novel-writing and novel-reading - "Art-speech is the only truth"-and a man's thinking in non-fiction prose as well as in poems, stories and novels should be read, weighed and judged as a complex, largely unparaphrasable whole.

Nevertheless, there have been those who failed to recognise this aspect of Lawrence's achievement. T. S. Eliot in <u>After Strange Gods</u> criticised Lawrence for "a lack not so much of information as of the critical faculties which education should give, and an incapacity for what we ordinarily call thinking". "Of this side of Lawrence", Eliot continues, "the brilliant exposure by Mr. Wyndham Lewis in <u>Paleface</u> is by far the most conclusive criticism that has been made".[16] F. R. Leavis' retort is well-known.

> It may perhaps be suggested that, if Mr. Wyndham Lewis's brilliance illustrates a capacity for "what we ordinarily call thinking", then Lawrence's strength is to lack that capacity. But perhaps the conclusion should rather be that we ought to revise our notion of "thinking". 17

However, even F. R. Leavis, ready though he is to defend Lawrence's intelligence, is hesitant to do so by pointing to the Hardy "Study".

> This long "Study of Thomas Hardy", perhaps, represents the kind of thing that Mr. Eliot has especially in mind when he charges Lawrence with "an incapacity for what we ordinarily call thinking". It is an early work, and hasn't much to do with Hardy.[18] Lawrence frankly admits that he is using Hardy as an occasion and a means, and that his real purpose is to explore, refine and develop certain ideas and intuitions of his own. I found the

> study difficult to read through; it is diffuse and repetitive, and Lawrence has dealt with the same matters better elsewhere. Yet in the persistent integrity of this exploration the genius is manifest . . . [19]

The word "genius" is tricky, however. As Lawrence once remarked, "they were always telling me I had got genius, as if to console me for not having their own incomparable advantages".[20] When T. S. Eliot later commented on Lawrence as "a man of fitful and profound insights, rather than of ratiocinative powers",[21] Leavis was quick to attack this familiar stereotype of Lawrence as a man of great intuition but not of intelligence.

> If "ratiocinative powers" means anything worth having, then Lawrence's seem to me superlative; in logical stamina, the power to pursue an organising process of thought through a wide and difficult tract, with a sustained consistency that is at the same time a delicate fidelity to the complexities of the full concrete experience, Lawrence seems to me to be superior to Mr. Eliot (yes, to the author of Four Quartets). [22]

It is this "sustained consistency that is at the same time a delicate fidelity to the complexities of the full concrete experience" that I find so remarkable in the "Study of Thomas Hardy"; and unlike F. R. Leavis, I feel that this consistency has a great deal to do with Hardy.[23] Thirteen years after the "Study" was written Lawrence, in an introduction to his translation of Verga's Cavalleria Rusticana, described the action of the mind "thinking emotionally or passionately" in a passage which aptly suggests the movement of the "Study".

> . . . the mind makes curious swoops and circles. It touches the point of pain or interest, then sweeps away again in a cycle, coils round and approaches again the point of pain or interest. There is a curious spiral rhythm, and the mind approaches again and again the point of concern, repeats itself, goes back, destroys the time-sequence entirely,

> so that time ceases to exist, as the mind stoops to the quarry, then leaves it without striking, soars, hovers, turns, swoops, stoops again, still does not strike, yet is nearer, nearer, reels away again, wheels off into the air, even forgets, quite forgets, yet again turns, bends, circles slowly, swoops and stoops again, until at last there is the closing-in, and the clutch of a decision or a resolve. 24

The "point of pain or interest" in the "Study" is Hardy, and although at times Lawrence seems to digress, "even forgets, quite forgets", his thought about Hardy is building continually throughout the essay. The chapters which discuss Hardy explicitly (Chapters III, V and IX) require the work done by the preceding chapters for their success. Hardy is not simply the "occasion" for Lawrence to develop ideas of his own; his novels are a central concern for Lawrence. As Raymond Williams points out in The English Novel, "it's significant that Lawrence, in effect deciding the future direction of his life, should try to get his thoughts and feelings clear in relation and in response to the writer who is obviously . . . his direct and most important English predecessor. To go from The Woodlanders and Tess and Jude to The Rainbow and Women in Love and Lady Chatterly's Lover is to know this, directly, in feeling".[25] Of course, the two authors are also very different, as Williams acknowledges; and the recognition that in the "Study" Lawrence was "in effect deciding the future direction of his life" accounts for and partially justifies the widespread opinion that Thomas Hardy himself was only peripheral to the main interests of the essay. Lawrence in the "Study" does do some serious thinking, learning and discovering which takes him beyond Hardy, and he tests and expands the possible use of language in searching for ways to embody this process. The "Study of Thomas Hardy", as does every creative utterance, challenges and

enriches our language, helps to keep it alive, sensitive to new experience and capable of responding articulately to it.

- How did Lawrence himself understand the importance of the "Study" and his own necessity to write it?

A simple answer is that he was badly in need of money in the summer and autumn of 1914 and a publisher had offered him £15 plus royalties for "an interpretive essay on Hardy", to be about 15,000 words long.[26] According to Catherine Carswell, Lawrence "thought he might throw this off without difficulty".[27] On July 15th, 1914, Lawrence, still in London after his marriage to Frieda two days before, wrote to Edward Marsh asking to borrow Lascelles Abercrombie's book on Hardy and any Hardy novels he might have; "I am going to write a little book on Hardy's people. I think it will interest me." July 17th, 1914 found Lawrence writing an exuberant thank-you note for Marsh's generous gift of all the books he had asked for.

> I rushed around the room almost cracked, between shame of having made it possible, and horror at your spending so much money on me, and joy of having the books. Frieda was getting in my way crying: 'Never mind - never mind - take them - how lovely - oh, how I shall revel - let him give them you - ! I still feel shaken. I've never had such a lot of books in my life. [28]

Lawrence and Frieda moved to a cottage in Chesham, Buckinghamshire, by the end of August and from there Lawrence wrote to Catherine Carswell that "the Hardy book was turning out as 'rum' unsaleable stuff that would not fetch even the promised £15".[29] However, he had not abandoned completely the hope that he could earn some money from it; in early December (Harry T. Moore suggests 4th December), 1914, he wrote to S. S. Koteliansky, to whom he had entrusted the typing of the "Study", "Do please get my typing

done. If I can send it in, I may get a little money for it". In this same letter he says, "I am working frightfully hard - rewriting my novel".[30] Thus, by early December 1914 Lawrence had finished the "Study" and had started his final draft of The Rainbow.[31]

What made Lawrence abandon the project of a straightforward critical essay on Hardy which would have brought him a welcome £15, for the wide-ranging piece of thinking, approximately four times the suggested length, which the "Study" finally became?

Certainly one factor was the outbreak of war in August 1914. The "Study" was Lawrence's first response to the "idiocy" of World War I. "What a miserable world," he wrote to J. B. Pinker on September 5th, 1914. "What colossal idiocy, this war. Out of sheer rage I've begun my book about Thomas Hardy. It will be about anything but Thomas Hardy, I am afraid - queer stuff - but not bad."[32] His chief concern was not for the war's dead, but for "those who, being sensitive, will receive such a blow from the ghastliness and mechanical, obsolete, hideous stupidity of war, that they will be crippled beings further burdening our sick society".[33] Lawrence saw his writing as his way of fighting and even suggested calling a collection of his stories at this time The Fighting Line; "after all, this is the real fighting line, not where soldiers pull triggers".[34] The "Study of Thomas Hardy" is an affirmation of creativity in the midst of destruction; "something is which was not".

> What is the aim of self-preservation, but to carry us right out to the firing line; there, what is is in contact with what is not . . . (p. 409)

The "Study" was also a record of Lawrence's struggle into relationship with Frieda and of his final belief in its outcome, but it was

a record of a very different sort than his poems, Look! We have Come Through. Two days before Lawrence wrote to Edward Marsh for the Hardy books, he and Frieda were married; the marriage marked not the beginning of their partnership but rather the end of a particular phase of it. They had come through doubts, delays, divorce problems and reportedly full-scale battles to a decision for responsible, long-term commitment to each other.

Lawrence's letters show his growing realisation, from the time of his flight with Frieda in May 1912, of the whole new world his life with her opened to him. To Ernest Collings, 17th January 1913, he wrote, "A woman that I love sort of keeps me in direct communication with the unknown, in which otherwise I am a bit lost".[35] To A. W. McLeod on 2nd June 1914, he wrote:

> I think the only re-sourcing of art, revivifying it, is to make it more the joint work of man and woman. I think the one thing to do, is for men to have courage to draw nearer to women, expose themselves to them, and be altered by them: and for women to accept and admit men. That is the start - by bringing themselves together, men and women - revealing themselves each to the other, gaining great blind knowledge and suffering and joy, which it will take a big further lapse of civilisation to exploit and work out. Because the source of all life and knowledge is in man and woman, and the source of all living is in the interchange and the meeting and mingling of these two: man-life and woman-life, man-knowledge and woman-knowledge, man-being and woman-being.
>
> Which is a sermon on a stool . . .[36]

One month later, only six days before his own marriage on the thirteenth of July, Lawrence wrote a letter of marital advice to Sir Thomas Dacre Dunlop, the British Consul at Spezia, who had helped to type one of the early drafts of The Rainbow in Italy. Lawrence was to explore more thoroughly in the "Study" his belief in love("I'll do my life work, sticking up for the love between man and woman"[37]) and its relation to

Christianity, stated earlier here.

> One must learn to love, and go through a good deal of suffering to get to it, like any knight of the grail, and the journey is always towards the other soul, not away from it. Do you think love is an accomplished thing, the day it is recognised? It isn't. To love, you have to learn to understand the other, more than she understands herself, and to submit to her understanding of you. It is damnably difficult and painful, but it is the only thing which endures. You musn't think that your desire or your fundamental need is to make a good career, or to fill your life with activity, or even to provide for your family materially. It isn't. Your most vital necessity in this life is that you shall love your wife completely and implicitly and in entire nakedness of body and spirit. Then you will have peace and inner security, no matter how many things go wrong. And this peace and security will leave you free to act and to produce your own work, a real independent workman.
>
> You asked me once what my message was. I haven't got any general message, because I believe a general message is a general means of side-tracking one's own personal difficulties: like Christ's - thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself - has given room for all the modern filthy system of society. But this that I tell you is my message as far as I've got any. 38

In September 1914, Lawrence wrote to Gordon Campbell, touching on beliefs that he was simultaneously groping towards in the "Study".

> I believe there is no getting of a vision, as you call it, before we get our sex right: before we get our souls fertilized by the female . . . Because life tends to take two streams, male and female, and only some female influence (not necessarily woman, but most obviously woman) can fertilize the soul of man to vision or being. Then the vision we're after, I don't know what it is -- but it is something that contains awe and dread and submission, not pride or sensuous egotism and assertion . . . We want to realise the tremendous non-human quality of life . . . Behind in all are the tremendous unknown forces of life, coming unseen and unperceived as out of the desert to the Egyptians, and driving us, forcing us, destroying us, if we do not submit to be swept away. 39

The impact of the war and of Lawrence's marriage are both registered in the "Study"; and here we can see a third thing struggling for expression, the "getting of a vision", perceiving "the unknown forces of life". Lawrence, after a period of youthful scepticism (which he rendered sensitively in Sons and Lovers) came to see himself as a religious writer, though not a Christian. On February 24th 1913 he wrote, "I often think one ought to be able to pray, before one works - and then leave it to the Lord. Isn't it hard, hard work to come to real grips with one's imagination - throw everything overboard. I always feel as if I stood naked for the fire of Almighty God to go through me - and it's rather an awful feeling. One has to be so terribly religious, to be an artist. I often think of my dear Saint Lawrence on his gridiron, when he said, 'Turn me over, brothers, I am done enough on this side.'".[40] In the spring of 1914 he wrote to John Middleton Murry of his belief in "helping people to have faith. I am rather great on faith just now. I do believe in it".[41] In a letter to Edward Garnett (22nd April 1914) he spoke of the "something deep evolving itself out in me . . . primarily I am a passionately religious man, and my novels must be written from the depth of my religious experience".[42] The Hardy "Study" also was written from the depth of Lawrence's religious experience. As he wrote to Amy Lowell on 18th December 1914:

> My wife and I we type away at my book on Thomas Hardy, which has turned out as a sort of Story of My Heart, or a Confessio Fidei: which I must write again, still another time: and for which the critics will plainly beat me. 43

Lawrence called the "Study" a Confessio Fidei, a confession of faith. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, a confession of faith has always held a place of central importance in the worship of the community. It is

a spoken rehearsal of the history of God's relation to the people, as in the last words of Joshua to Israel at the great assembly at Shechem (Joshua 24:2-13; cf. Deuteronomy 26:5-10), recalling God's delivery of the Israelites out of Egypt into the land of Canaan, or in the Nicene or the Apostles' Creeds, summarising the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, the presence of God incarnate among men. Lawrence's tentative credal statement in the "Study" is, of course, not part of the life of a religious community in this way. Yet the elements of repetition, of almost incantation in it, and even more significantly, the sense of the necessity to rehearse a kind of sacred history, show that Lawrence was not unaware of parallels to this ancient credal form.

The implication of community which the phrase Confessio Fidei carries is not irrelevant, however. The "Study" is a work of a very different order from Blake's Milton or Yeats' Vision; Lawrence does not people it with Urizens, Enitharmons, and Rintrahs, or with spheres, cones and gyres. He does not want to create a private, personal mythology but to understand his own place in an older, broader tradition which he shares with many other men. He expressed this feeling in a letter to Gordon Campbell written only a few weeks after the "Study" was completed.

> I think there is the dual way of looking at things: our way, which is to say 'I am all. All other things are but radiation out from me.' - The other way is to try to conceive the whole, to build up a whole by means of symbolism, because symbolism avoids the I and puts aside the egotist; and, in the whole, to take our decent place. That was how man built the cathedrals. He didn't say 'out of my breast springs this cathedral.' ' But 'in this vast whole I am a small part, I move and live and have my being' . . . We are such egoistic fools. We see only the symbol as a subjective expression: as an expression of ourselves. That makes us so sickly when we deal with the old symbols: like Yeats.

> The old symbols were each a word in a great attempt at formulating the whole history of the soul of Man. They <u>are unintelligible</u> except in their whole context . . .
>
> The Crucifix, and Christ, are only symbols. They do not mean a man who suffered his life out as I suffer mine. They mean a moment in the history of my soul, if I must be personal. But it is a moment fixed in context and having its being only according to context. Unless I have the Father, and the hierarchies of Angels, I have no Christ, no Crucifixion.
>
> It is necessary to grasp the whole.[44]

Lawrence acknowledged the Western Christian tradition in which he grew up and tried to understand its influence upon him and upon our human past. Late in life he wrote a sketch called "Hymns in a Man's Life" in which he expressed his gratitude for the Christian community he had shared in as a boy.

> I think it was good to be brought up a Protestant: and among Protestants, a Nonconformist, and among Nonconformists, a Congregationalist. Which sounds pharisaic. But I should have missed bitterly a direct knowledge of the Bible, and a direct relation to Galilee and Canaan, Moab and Kedron, those places that never existed on earth . . . the miracle of the loaves and fishes is just as good to me now as when I was a child. I don't care whether it is historically a fact or not. What does it matter? It is part of the genuine wonder. The same with all the religious teaching I had as a child, <u>apart</u> from the didacticism and sentimentalism. I am eternally grateful for the wonder with which it filled my childhood. 45

The "direct knowledge of the Bible" is in evidence throughout the "Study"; and although Lawrence did not consider himself a Christian, he felt it important to come to terms with the impact of Christianity upon himself and upon the society in which he lived. He used the language, symbolism and stories of the Christian faith, trying to understand their deepest meaning, challenging in some cases what they had been assumed to mean and adding further meanings of his own. One example of the way in which Lawrence thought about

the teachings of his Congregational upbringing in an attempt to broaden and extend them is his use of the words 'law' and 'love' in relation to Judaism and Christianity in the "Study". The standard Protestant Sunday School line on the subject is that Judaism consisted of a rigid code of laws which were impossible to keep (thus resulting in a hypocritical self-righteousness or total despair) and that Christianity brought grace and God's love to free men from this dreadful dead-end state of affairs. The "Study" goes beyond such a simplistic interpretation and gives the terms 'law' and 'love' a different, more complex definition. Christian love especially has a crucial significance for Lawrence, one which does not rest in sentimentalism or salvationism and which was given greater force by his full facing of the reality of another person in his relationship with Frieda. Love meant accepting the existence of that which was not oneself, the irreducible reality of another human being. It involved the stern and sometimes uncomfortable recognition that "the law of another man's nature is different from the law of his own nature, that it may be even hostile to him, and yet is part of the great Law of God, to be admitted," (p. 515).[46]

This acceptance of the other and this participation in the Judeo-Christian tradition - for Lawrence's intense engagement with Christianity is surely an example of what it means to help keep a tradition alive by challenging and enriching it - also coincide in Lawrence's life with a period of hopefulness about the possibilities for human society which was soon to end. The completion of the"Study", the note of hope on which it ended, perhaps influenced his enthusiasm for joining with Bertrand Russell in some sort of social action (an enthusiasm which started in February 1915 and had begun to wane considerably by September the same year)[47] and Lawrence's beginning plans for Rananim which took shape in the winter of 1914-15. He wanted twenty souls or

so to join with him in forming a communistic colony somewhere away from the world of the war. As he wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell on February 1st 1915, it would be

> . . . A life in which the only riches is integrity of character. So that each one may fulfil his own nature and deep desires to the utmost, but wherein tho', the ultimate satisfaction and joy is in the completeness of us all as one. Let us be good all together, instead of just in the privacy of our chambers, let us know that the intrinsic part of all of us is the best part, the believing part, the passionate, generous part . . . I hold this the most sacred duty - the gathering together of a number of people who shall so agree to live by the best they know . . . The ideal, the religion, must now be lived, practised. We will have no more churches. We will bring church and house and shop together. I do believe that there are enough decent people to make a start with. Let us get the people. Curse the Strachey who asks for a new religion - the greedy dog. He wants another juicy bone for his soul, does he? Let him start to fulfil what religion we have. 48

The experience of the war years in England and the suppression of Lawrence's Rainbow which he had hoped to set in the sky over his war torn country as a reminder of God's promise, "a pledge of unbroken faith, between the universe and the innermost",[49] considerably weakened all of this believing. Lawrence tried especially to cling to the belief that there were "enough decent people to make a start with", although it became more and more difficult; and hopes of affecting the greater human community in any immediate way virtually disappeared, regardless of Lawrence's brief imaginative crisis over political activity in Kangaroo. Yet when Lawrence wrote the "Study" the possibilities for human society - that which is, "in its deepest, the human compact by which we live together, to form a community", (p. 440) - were still open; and although he was very critical of society in the "Study" and The Rainbow, Lawrence tried to approach it with hope and acceptance in both works.

The "Study" must have had a great effect on the final form The Rainbow was to take; Lawrence rewrote the latter immediately after completing the former. Perhaps the note of optimism on which The Rainbow ends - which Leavis suggests is an incongruous one, tagged on as an attempted though unsuccessful resolution of societal tensions discovered and examined in the second half of the novel [50] - was a carry-over from the statement of hope and belief in creative life which the "Study" had become. Also, as Kinkead-Weekes suggests in his essay "The Marble and the Statue: The Exploratory Imagination of D. H. Lawrence", the "Study of Thomas Hardy" may have helped give Lawrence, from his attention to Hardy's novels and especially to the "great background" aspect of them, a language "in which to conceive the impersonal forces he saw operating within and between human beings".[51] If Kinkead-Weakes' conclusion that the early chapters of The Rainbow were the last to be conceived and written is correct - and his examination of the changes in the manuscripts, from The Sisters to The Wedding Ring to the decision to break the work into two novels and name the first The Rainbow, is very convincing - then the influence of Hardy's novels is marked indeed. The opening pages of The Rainbow, the life at Marsh Farm and the character of Tom Brangwen, all remind us strongly of Hardy's world; but they are given us with a mastery and certainty of touch which was beyond him. The Rainbow is related to the Hardy "Study" in other ways as well; Lawrence's thoughts on Christianity, on cathedral architecture and Renaissance painting, on relationships between men and women, on work, art and society all helped him to write The Rainbow as he did,and his writing of The Rainbow helped him to test, examine and develop these

thoughts further. In a sense, as Kinkead-Weekes observes, the "Study" is the 'structural skeleton' of The Rainbow; but he also warns, "it is not a skeleton key and must not be misused as one". [52]

I have tried to suggest the many major decisions, new tasks, challenges and relationships which were facing Lawrence at the time he wrote the "Study of Thomas Hardy". There are doubtless others. He was a newly-married man who had already written one long and difficult novel of major stature, Sons and Lovers, and was trying to write another, who was attempting to come to terms with a just-declared world war and maintain some hope for human community in spite of it, and struggling to understand his own deepest beliefs in relation to the Judeo-Christian tradition in which he was raised. He had also lived in Italy for almost two years, having left England for the first time in his life with Frieda in 1912, and this time away from his homeland must have enabled him to see certain aspects of it more clearly, from a distance, to perceive problems, inter-relationships, lines of degeneration or of development. One feels that the time in Italy also must have intensified his desire to look at the past, especially our religious past, and at art, especially Renaissance art, more closely, to understand his own place as an artist and as a man in the rich civilisation of the western world. Perhaps the summer of 1914 until the autumn of 1915 (ending with suppression of The Rainbow) marked the most hopeful, most potentially fruitful, time of Lawrence's life. He had enough behind him, accomplished, to give him confidence - Sons and Lovers, an established commitment with Frieda, the third draft of The Rainbow. And in spite of the war, the full impact of which had not yet been felt, everything else seemed to be just beginning.

It is impossible to know all that goes into even one year of one man's life, and thus impossible to enumerate all the different experiences, thoughts and influences that might have affected a particular work he completed during that time. The essential thing is to convey the sense that the "Study", although a youthful work, belongs to the central, best Lawrence and gives expression to his thought during an especially exciting and challenging period in his life.

Lawrence thought that the "Study" was a work "for which the critics will plainly beat me".[53] In fact, they did nothing of the kind. For a long time, of course, they weren't even given the opportunity since, according to Catherine Carswell, the "Study" was "everywhere rejected at the time". It was never published in its entirety until the appearance of Phoenix in 1936; only the third chapter containing criticism of Hardy's early novels and Return of the Native had been published earlier.[55] Not a word of it was in print during Lawrence's lifetime. He obviously never earned his £15.

When it was printed in full in Phoenix, it still received little attention. David Garnett in a review of Phoenix published in The New Statesman and Nation on 21st November 1936, had something to say about almost everything except the "Study" - "The long study of Thomas Hardy I haven't read." [56] F. R. Leavis"found the study difficult to read through" and felt that Lawrence had "dealt with the same matters better elsewhere". [57] Only recently have critics begun to recognise its importance for any full understanding of Lawrence's work, but they have done this frequently in a way which makes one wish the "Study" had remained unknown. Eugene Goodheart was one of the first to turn to the "Study" (1963) to shed light on Lawrence's relation to Blake, Nietzche, Rilke and other "tablet-breakers". His comments

on it in The Utopian Vision of D. H. Lawrence stress its special nature as a religious document [58]; but in his attempt to place Lawrence in this "tablet-breaker" tradition, he seems frequently to overlook Lawrence's special gifts as a novelist and the particular qualities these gifts bring to his best thought. Goodheart says that we can see in the work of both Hardy and Lawrence "the imagination reducing character or personality to its natural element, impatient with the social forms and facts with which the novel has been traditionally concerned".[59] For writers "impatient with social forms and facts," Hardy and Lawrence have certainly managed to render these compellingly [60]; and as novelists they were both aware that one can only perceive, understand and write about reality in terms of particular, concrete individuals, places and events. Goodheart is aware that "the success of Lawrence's art depends on his fidelity to this reality; the failure occurs when the imagination in its desire to achieve transcendence wilfully ignores the resistances of the world in which it has its life". [61] However, Goodheart himself seems a bit too eager to "transcend" the "resistances" of Lawrence's fiction in order to draw the parallels he sees, especially between Lawrence and Nietzsche.[62] Goodheart's emphasis on the Dionysian in Lawrence, on Lawrence's "concern with the cosmic energy out of which individual character is created at the moment, so to speak, before individuation",[63] his insistence that in spite of Lawrence's mention of the necessary harmony between `love' and `law' in the "Study", Lawrence really "means to give us 'senses, sensation, sensuousness, these things which are incontrovertibly Me', the law, the way of the body",[64] - these emphases indicate a blindness to qualities central to Lawrence's fiction, a blindness which limits Goodheart's understanding of Lawrence's non-fiction as well.

H. M. Daleski in his book The Forked Flame (1965) speaks at greater length of the importance of the "Study". He finds it significant because it sets forth the male/female dualism which he feels was a deep-seated problem for Lawrence all his life. He claims "that this conflict was the psychological motive force of his 'struggle into articulation'," [65] the reason why he wrote, and traces the progress of this conflict through the novels. There is some justification for such an approach, especially as it is a passage from the "Study" which suggests it.

> A man who is well balanced between male and female, in his own nature, is, as a rule, happy, easy to mate, easy to satisfy, and content to exist. It is only a disproportion, or a dissatisfaction, which makes the man struggle into articulation. (p.460)

Lawrence himself seems to approach various artists, for instance Michelangelo and Raphael, in a similar way, trying to understand the tension between male and female in their own natures and in their work. As G. Wilson Knight in his book Christ and Nietzsche writes,

> That the creative artist should be pre-eminently bisexual is, of course, natural enough, since such creation demands continually a kind of sexual intercourse within the personality . . . I suggest a certain blend, a synthesis of the masculine and feminine principles, to be recorded and announced by poetry, as such . . . the hermaphroditic state (is) pre-eminently the creative state. 66

It would seem that Daleski's approach is one well-suited for the understanding of Lawrence's work.

However, the problem is that the words male and female seem to have a much narrower meaning for Daleski than they do for Lawrence and thus Daleski's criticism cannot help being reductive. We realise that Lawrence intends us to take much greater significance from his thought about the important part male and female differences play in all life

than Daleski ever suggests, and this realisation makes us rebel when Daleski states that Lawrence constructs the world on the model of male-female duality. "The male-female opposition is not merely an instance of a dual reality but its underlying principle." [67] In a sense the statement is true, but we feel that Lawrence and Daleski would not have meant the same thing by it. I have described earlier the chart of the "Study"'s dualities which Daleski provides. His attempt to schematise all of the qualities discussed in Lawrence's essay involves him in various muddles, for the simple reason that the polarities that arise in the "Study" cannot be listed in two straight, opposing columns in that way. Part of the fascination of the "Study" is that the paradoxes Lawrence explores all interpenetrate and involve one another, so much so that they elude all attempts at rigid analysis. In fact, the entire movement of the "Study" is meant to sensitise us to the idea that these dualities are "for the purpose of thought" (p.448) named and defined only for the sake of speaking about and drawing closer to a reality which in the end evades precise language. Lawrence's view of life in the "Study" is not dualistic in any simple sense at all, and Daleski repeatedly seems to ignore this central quality of the language, the way it works for wholeness. Lawrence's constant returning to the image of the poppy given us in Chapter One is one of the ways in which he keeps trying to remind us that

> the division into male and female is arbitrary, for the purpose of thought. The rapid motion of the rim of a wheel is the same as the perfect rest at the centre of the wheel. How can one divide them? Motion and rest are the same, when seen completely. (p.448)

Daleski's chart loses some of its magic power over the reader (the power

of claiming to summarise and state "objectively" the essential elements in a non-fiction piece of writing) when the reader realises that several of Daleski's pairs of opposites could easily - and with good reason - be reversed.[68]

A good instance of the violation which Daleski's rigid approach necessarily works on the "Study" is his impatience with Lawrence's term "Singleness", which he would like to be able to place straightforwardly on his chart on the "male" side. Witness the confusion of the several pages in which he registers his disquiet over the fact that in Chapter IX of the "Study" Lawrence ascribes this male attribute to Tess and denies it to Alec D'Urberville. In fact, Lawrence not only denies it to Alec, but finds that Alec's view of Tess as an extension of himself "is very natural and common in men, this attitude to the world". (p.483) Daleski cannot understand what seems to him an obvious inconsistency and finally concludes that the qualities of Distinct Identity and Singleness "cannot usefully be classified under either the male or female principles because they in fact belong to both".[69]

The confusion arises, first of all, out of Daleski's forgetting to make adequate distinction between the Male and man, the Female and woman. In the "Study" they are not equated; in fact, it is insisted that each human being, man or woman, must have both Male and Female elements in their natures in order to live a full life. Daleski himself makes the distinction elsewhere, but here he fails to maintain it, especially when not just one man, but many men, are cited as having a Female quality. Daleski concentrates so hard on finding new terms to play with that although he lists many suggestive words and phrases under "Male" and "Female" in his chart,

he seems to remain oblivious to the real weight of meaning Lawrence attached to the Male and Female principles in the "Study" and the kind of thinking he was trying to do by defining and using them. Daleski's bewilderment in these few pages (pp. 28-30) is almost ludicrous, it so clearly arises out of his utilitarian attitude toward the "Study". Because of his thesis about Lawrence's struggle for sexual identity and the effect it had on his novels, Daleski is guilty of a certain psychological predisposition in his analysis of Lawrence's dualities; looking for evidence of this sexual identity crisis, Daleski treats the "Study" as a kind of sub-philosophy or pseudo-science in which Lawrence rambled more or less mindlessly, creating confusion which he, Daleski, can clear up for the reader by summarising straightforwardly. However, it is most inconvenient for Lawrence to complicate Daleski's chart of the "Study"'s dualities by letting a discussion of Christianity and Judaism "actually lead Lawrence to ascribe a quality to man which is as properly attributable to woman".[70] The convoluted argument on this quality, "Singleness", is the result of trying to make the "Study" lie down and submit to this sort of vivisection, a critical approach that kills it by restricting all the suggestive and lively qualities of Lawrence's language in an attempt to pin his words down like so many non-functioning organs on a wax dissecting tray.

Daleski's contention "that Lawrence, though believing intensely in himself as a male, was fundamentally identified with the female principle as he himself defines it in the essay on Hardy"[71] leads him to misrepresent the "Study" still further, this time through a simple, central image - the poppy. He states that Lawrence was mainly in sympathy with female "being" rather than male "doing" and quotes a long passage on the poppy coming into full being, "disclosing its red". Then he contrasts this with the male principle

"that Lawrence spent most of his life fighting against: abstraction, idealism . . . the 'mental consciousness'".[72] This argument ignores the central force of the poppy image; the poppy bursts into flower precisely because the male and the female have met for a moment in wholeness. The flower of the poppy is like the moment in the life of an individual when he suddenly moves further into wholeness of being. It is not female; its burst into blossom is impossible without the movement of male ("doing") upon the female ("being").

> And this is happiness: that my poppy gather his material and build his tissue till he has led the stream of life in him on and on to the end, to the whirlpool at the summit, where the male seethes and whirls in incredible speed upon the pivot of the female, where the two are one, as axle and wheel are one, and the motions travel out to infinity. (p.442)

Daleski's blindness to the mysterious wholeness of the poppy is symptomatic of his blindness to the whole which is the "Study of Thomas Hardy".

Daleski is no exception in his failure to treat the "Study" as a whole, but his analysis of it is more insidious than most in that he seems to think he does. One of the next critics to deal with the "Study" in depth is D. J. Gordon. In his excellent book D. H. Lawrence as a Literary Critic, Gordon obviously is interested in the "Study" mainly for its criticism of Hardy and its comments on literature. However, his excellent chapter on "The Quarrel with Tragedy" (pp. 75-95) deals sensitively with Lawrence's reluctance to give into a tragic view of life (a reluctance expressed very strongly in chapters III and V on Hardy in the "Study") and shows how his criticism of tragedy was related to an insistence on accepting life and reality, human responsibility. Although Gordon makes no pretence of summarising everything in the "Study" or going beyond its treatment of Hardy

(he speaks of "the three chapters which keep to the subject in Lawrence's long "Study of Thomas Hardy"[73]), he manages to suggest a great deal about its central concerns, its hopefulness, its method and its scope in the context of his own perceptive study of Lawrence's criticism.[74]

Perhaps directing one's attention to Lawrence's discussion of Hardy's novels is the approach least likely to distort or misrepresent the "Study of Thomas Hardy". Certainly any criticism of chapter nine, the longest chapter in the "Study", which concentrates on Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure and so depends on everything that has gone before, would involve a critic deeply in all the various strands of Lawrence's thought just by the very language he would be forced to use. Richard Swigg's Lawrence, Hardy and American Literature is a more recent work attempting to deal with the Hardy "Study" (1972); and although Swigg emphasises Hardy's limitations almost to the exclusion of any suggestion of positive things Lawrence might have learned from him, his interpretation of Lawrence's criticism of Return of the Native, Tess and Jude is closely argued and suggestive. He perhaps makes the "Study" sound as if it is more single-mindedly concerned with Hardy than it is; or rather, he takes away from the autonomy of the discussions of art, religion and history by implying that they are all merely offshoots of the Hardy discussion, with no separate independent value of their own. He, like D. J. Gordon, finds Lawrence's quarrel with tragedy especially interesting; and I was particularly grateful for his stressing the importance of full consciousness in Lawrence's conception of tragedy. After quoting from Lawrence's Preface to Touch and Go in Phoenix II, Swigg comments that for Lawrence "unless there is the struggle into consciousness, unless the soul 'goes through' with things in active awareness, there is mere contingency, the meaninglessness of accident,

instrumentality - the process of passive fatalism, not of tragedy".[75] His criticism of Hardy's "tragedies" by this standard, his suggestion that Hardy failed to bring his characters fully into consciousness, has probably affected in important ways the development of my own thoughts about Hardy.

Mark Kinkead-Weekes, although primarily interested in the relation between the "Study" and The Rainbow [76] is more sensitive than most to the special nature of the "Study". He writes,

> The "Study" is not a philosophical work, nor a work of literary criticism, since Hardy is only what started it off. It is primarily a work of "religious" imagination, and secondarily an essential stage in the discovery of what he had been trying to write about since Sons and Lovers - the creativity of marriage . . . It is a sustained attempt to work out the meaning of his earlier intuitions into what could be called, not improperly, a 'theology' of marriage - a study of creativity embarked on under the first impact of war. Only then was he able to write The Rainbow, the History, or even 'Bible', in which that theology is embodied, tested and further explored imaginatively, in terms of human relationships.[77]

However, I would like to establish greater autonomy for the "Study", apart from The Rainbow, than Kinkead-Weekes seems to as the essay progresses. He tells us that the "Study"

> is the greatest of commentaries on what the novel is fundamentally about, but it is a treatise, and The Rainbow is not. When its 'ideas' come to be embodied in human relationships, the basic insight is tested out, explored, and extended, with an enormous increase in subtlety and complexity. Lawrence was a novelist, not a philosopher, and the "Study" turned out to be only a stage, if a very important one, in the growth of a novel . . . when the imagination of Lawrence the novelist is liberated in its proper medium, he creates people and situations whose density extends far beyond the categories of his 'thinking'. [78]

By placing the words "ideas" and "thinking" in inverted commas, Kinkead-Weekes is, I think, suggesting that The Rainbow is a finer form of thinking than the "Study", a suggestion with which I would agree. However, the difference between the treatise and the novels which he mentions here must not be over-emphasised.

George H. Ford has a similar concept in mind of the relation between Lawrence's non-fiction and fiction (see his Double Measure: A Study of the Novels and Stories of D. H. Lawrence). Drawing on Kermode's distinctions between the mode of "discourse" and of "image", Ford speaks of Lawrence's "discourse, with its direct advocacy of a position" which is a feature of Lawrence's novels as well as a description of his non-fiction essays. However, "his best fiction portrays conflicts, one force pitted against another, in which a dramatic testing is more significant than a simplified evaluation".[79] I agree, but would maintain that his best thought - in both the novels and the non-fiction - does the same.

"A simplified evaluation" certainly does not describe what Lawrence gives us in the "Study". The distinction between an artist's discourse, his "ideas", and his "fiction" or "images" is not so simple and easy to get hold of as Kermode would like to think. The artist does not have an "idea" which he expresses in a declarative sentence, clings to doggedly, and then plonks down in the middle of a novel only to watch the characters, relationships and complexities of the novel demolish it. Such an aesthetic is foolish. An artist who says "Art-speech is the only truth" is not saying "don't read anything but my novels - everything else I write is lies"; he is saying something important about the nature of thought and of truth.

The "conflicts, one force pitted against another", the "dramatic testing" which Ford observes in the novels is also a description of the method of thought Lawrence follows in the "Study". It is, I think, one of the reasons why the sexual metaphor, the repeated use of male and female, is so important in the development of the ideas in it. Lawrence explores human relationships in his novels, showing characters in conflict and types of union, syntheses, that are possible between them. Such syntheses may or may not come from time to time in the course of a vital, ever-changing relation in which neither person ever abandons his or her independence or separateness. Thus, when he wants an image for continuing conflict and tension which is at the same time vital interchange witnessing to a kind of unity, a mature and lively marriage is the image he uses. In the "Study", Lawrence develops and explores an idea along one line as far as he can, then puts it up against another which he has examined in the same way, letting them meet in the full force of opposition, strength and integrity - never merging into each other any more than two mature human beings can merge into each other - to see what possible, tentative syntheses may take place in their continually changing and adjusting relation. Yet the very relation itself is the evidence of wholeness, reconciliation present in life.

> The novel is the highest example of subtle inter-relatedness that man has discovered. Everything is true in its own time, place, circumstance, and untrue outside of its own place, time, circumstance. If you try to nail anything down, in the novel, either it kills the novel, or the novel gets up and walks away with the nail. 80

Novel-reading should train one to read everything else more carefully, to follow complexities in a man's thought, changes of tone and emphasis, qualifications, further implications. Especially should this be true of one's reading of Lawrence's many non-fiction works, the "travel" books,

the psychology essays, the book reviews, the articles on religion, education, sex and painting. One work needs to be read in relation to another; the tone of one piece suggests Lawrence's awareness of its limitations, its response to a particular "time, place and circumstance"; the tone of another, such as the "Study", shows a more serious attempt to think through a problem in all of its aspects and ramifications, or at least in as many as he can uncover.

Unfortunately, however, something in the current climate of opinion has had the opposite effect. Perhaps because the literary critic has felt that the onus was on him to prove that novel-reading was not a useless (because anyone could read a novel) and pointless (because imprecise, "subjective", and "unscientific") occupation, he has announced an extreme position. He has cut poetry and novels off from any vital relation with ordinary discourse - novels are complex patterns of images which speak to us in an entirely different way from works of philosophy, history, criticism, psychology, biology - and he has declared criticism to be as precise, "objective" and "scientific" as any other mental discipline. (The limited view of other mental disciplines which this attitude involves I shall try to make clear later.) This turns the critic into a kind of initiate into an esoteric science, one of the few capable of explicating to the layman what <u>really</u> goes on in the obscure world between the two covers of a book. This peculiar description of the critic's business seems to have encouraged a spate of complicated patterns, technically tricky and difficult but drearily dull (especially the second time through), now called "novels" and of what Lawrence called "critical twiddle-twaddle about style and form . . . pseudo-scientific classifying and analysing of books in an imitation

botanical fashion" which was "mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon".[81] When thought ceases to have any vital relation to literature and the most difficult lessons of literature cease to have any impact on the complexity of our thought, we are brought to such a pass.

This division between Lawrence's doctrine and his art is the central interest of Frank Kermode's book on Lawrence (1973). The simplistic statements about what Lawrence's thought ("doctrine") involved are most in evidence in the various summaries he gives us of Lawrence's non-fiction; he has sections on "Study of Thomas Hardy",on "The Crown", on "The Reality of Peace", "The Education of the People", Fantasia and Studies in Classic American Literature and on "Pornography and Obscenity".[82] The blithe confidence with which Kermode explicates and paraphrases Lawrence is only a little less upsetting than the way in which he makes all the essays sound obscure, eccentric and boring. Kermode's summary of the "Study" is certainly no improvement on Daleski's chart.

Anyone who has read Kermode's analysis of the "Study" might benefit from reading J. V. Davies' introduction to Lawrence, Hardy and Painting (a recent publication of the "Study" and of "Introduction to These Paintings") as a brief corrective. In short space Davies manages to touch on many aspects of the "Study" and insists that it is "an important piece of sustained exploratory thinking in its own right". Davies touches on Lawrence's indebtedness to Nietzsche in the "Study" (and ways in which he differs from Nietzsche), the "Study's" relation to the Rainbow, World War I, the Italian experience; most important, however, he notes the way in which the "Study" expresses and develops Lawrence's thoughts on the nature of perception.

Although Lawrence insists on dichotomy as "a mode of apprehending new realities", perceives a dualism "which is at once the condition and the very nature of life",[83] Davies points out that Lawrence's perception of this dichotomy is very different from Cartesian dualism. Lawrence's insistence on human wholeness in the "Study" is stated more succinctly in a much later essay, "Why the Novel Matters", and it makes this difference immediately clear.

> We have curious ideas of ourselves. We think of ourselves as a body with a spirit in it, or a body with a soul in it, or a body with a mind in it . . . The years drink up the wine, and at last throw the bottle away, the body, of course, being the bottle . . . Now I absolutely flatly deny that I am a soul, or a body, or a mind, or an intelligence, or a brain, or a nervous system, or a bunch of glands, or any of the rest of these bits of me. The whole is greater than the part. 84

"The whole is greater than the part". The essential value of Davies' introduction is his sensitivity to the "whole" of the "Study"; and in trying to suggest the thought about the nature of perception which is given us in this "whole", Davies corroborates my own findings by invoking the name of a man whose work has been of central importance in my understanding of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" - Michael Polanyi.

The "pursuit of discovery" - towards a revised notion of thinking

> Physiologists long ago established that the way we see an object is determined by our awareness of certain efforts inside our body, efforts which we cannot feel in themselves. We are aware of these things going on inside our body in terms of the position, size, shape and motion of an object, to which we are attending. In other words we are attending <u>from</u> these internal processes <u>to</u> the qualities of things outside . . .
>
> We start the pursuit of discovery by pouring ourselves into the subsidiary elements of a problem and we continue

> to spill ourselves into further clues as we advance further, so that we arrive at discovery fully committed to it as an aspect of reality. These choices create in us a new existence, which challenges others to transform themselves in its image. To this extent, then, 'existence precedes essence', that is, it comes before the truth that we establish and make our own.
>
> Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension [85]

> But the bringing of life into human consciousness is not an aim in itself, it is only a necessary condition of the progress of life itself. Man is himself the vivid body of life, rolling glimmering against the void. In his fullest living he does not know what he does, his mind, his consciousness, unacquaint, hovers behind, full of extraneous gleams and glances, and altogether devoid of knowledge. Altogether devoid of knowledge and conscious motive is he when he is heaving into uncreated space, when he is actually living, becoming himself.
>
> And yet, that he may go on, may proceed with his living, it is necessary that his mind, his consciousness, should extend behind him . . . And this knowing is now an inevitable habit of life's, developed late; it is a force active in the immediate rear of life, and the greater its activity, the greater the forward, unknown movement ahead of it.
>
> "The Study of Thomas Hardy" (p.431)

Having read the critics on Lawrence's "Study", we need to ask why it is that we have been able to neglect or casually to misuse this attractive piece of writing. What is it in us that makes us suspect a work because it is written in all the varied tones of the human voice rather than in the single tone of scholarly detachment? in a tone which calls us to share in the investigation as fellow human beings on the alert rather than accept what we are told as dull and ignorant inferiors ? why is it that because Lawrence's search engages our attention so immediately and completely, we assume the search is easy or unimportant, the discoveries to which it leads obvious and simplistic?

Leavis suggested that reading Lawrence might require us to revise our notion of "thinking".[86] It is Michael Polanyi who has helped give me a more concrete idea of what such a revision might mean. Starting from a different perspective than Lawrence's, a study of the way in which scientists work, and working from largely different evidence, Polanyi has come to conclusions very similar to those Lawrence arrived at thirty or forty years before him. Polanyi's writings are invaluable as a careful and systematic presentation of the grounds for these conclusions, but I must declare at the outset that I believe it impossible to adequately summarise or paraphrase his argument. He proceeds carefully, building one thing on another, approaching from different angles at different points in the discussion, with so few extraneous examples, sentences or even words, and such a subtle change is being wrought in the reader all the while, that at the close one dwells in a coherent vision of reality which seems so radiant and obvious that it is hard to understand how one ever saw things otherwise, let alone how - step by step - one finally got there. Part of the problem, I suppose, is that "step by step" does not really describe the experience Polanyi's readers go through, and Polanyi himself does not believe that real discoveries are made in that way.

In a book entitled Intellect and Hope: Essays in the thought of Michael Polanyi, philosophers, scientists, psychologists, theologians and sociologists from France, Germany, England, America, Belgium and Poland - including such people as philosopher Marjorie Grene, neurologist Sir Francis Walshe and the late Lord Bishop of Durham, Ian Ramsey - try to begin the task of assessing the kind of impact Polonyi's work will have on their various disciplines. One lone and relatively unknown artist,

Donald L. Weismann, contributes an essay in which he describes the process of artistic discovery and creation as he began to write and paint one winter in Mexico; he offers this description for comparison with Polanyi's comments on "the pursuit of discovery". He tells us that he had been brooding on "the very generalised problem of meaning in my life . . . and I felt I had to do something about the tensions it had built up".

> For me it meant doing more than producing something which merely described or presented those tensions. It meant doing something more subtle than just 'getting rid of the emotion' . . . For me it meant that I must recognise and value these tensions as positive aids to perception . . . 87

By the end of the first full day of work he had written a great deal and had thrown most of it out, but he kept eight hundred words which seemed right to him. Reading them over before he went to sleep, he "felt some comfort in believing that at least I had begun - that whatever the eight hundred words were moving toward lay in a circle all around them, and that I would find my way of extending them".[88]

Such a description of an artist's way of working is perhaps commonplace. We expect artists to proceed by rather indefinite, illogical, almost "mystical" means.[89] However, Weismann does not encourage any mystique about his attempt to think about reality.

> Although I know that a creation is best when form, feeling and idea fuse to one end, I do not favor the feeling of contrivance in a finished work. This does not necessarily mean that I rely on some mystic intercession of forces or even accidents to reveal the nature of my work to me. It may mean, instead, that I give generous place to the possibility of an idea or feeling having within itself clues for its own development, and that only by dwelling in those ideas and feelings and by responding to the askings of their particular qualities will they point me toward a larger thing such as a concept or a work of art. 90

This process of discovery, according to Polanyi, takes place not only among artists but also among scientists. Michael Polanyi is a scientist as well as a philosopher; his formal training was in medicine and chemistry and he holds doctoral degrees in both fields. He began his philosophical enquiries in 1939 by reviewing The Social Functions of Science by J. D. Bernal, with which he disagreed. Bernal expressed the view, derived from Soviet Marxism, that scientific study should be supervised by public authorities to serve the welfare of society; Polanyi maintained "that the power of thought to seek the truth must be accepted as our guide" and then suddenly realised that

> a defence of intellectual freedom on such metaphysical grounds was no more acceptable to the dominant schools of Western philosophy than to the Marxists. Believing it to be both right and important, I set out in search of its justification. 91

Pol nyi's forthright statement of belief is characteristic, for he has tried to show "that into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge".[92] The search which began in 1939 has led him to challenge all positivistic, empiricistic theories of science and all of the assumptions about the nature of thinking and knowledge which have developed since the time of Descartes. His own preface to Personal Knowledge expresses his purpose more clearly than I can.

> This is primarily an enquiry into the nature and justification of scientific knowledge . . .
>
> I start by rejecting the ideal of scientific detachment. In the exact sciences, this false ideal is perhaps harmless, for it is in fact disregarded there by scientists. But we shall see that it exercises a destructive influence in biology,

> psychology and sociology, and falsified our whole outlook far beyond the domain of science. I want to establish an alternative ideal of knowledge, quite generally . . .
>
> I have used the findings of Gestalt psychology as my first clues to this conceptual reform. Scientists have run away from the philosophic implications of gestalt; I want to countenance them uncompromisingly. I regard knowing as an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires skill. Skilful knowing and doing is performed by subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skilful achievement, whether practical or theoretical. We may then be said to become 'subsidiarily aware' of these particulars within our 'focal awareness' of the coherent entity that we achieve. Clues and tools are things used as such and not observed in themselves. They are made to function as extensions of our bodily equipment and this involves a certain change of our own being. Acts of comprehension are to this extent irreversible, and also non-critical. For we cannot possess any fixed framework within which the re-shaping of our hitherto fixed framework could be critically tested.
>
> Such is the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding. But this does not make our understanding subjective. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality . . . 93

Polanyi is aware that his work has significant implications for many fields beside that of science, although most of the examples he uses to support his theory of personal knowledge come from the history of science or from scientific experiments. For my own purposes, I have found particularly helpful the long chapter which he devotes to a discussion of language; he stresses the fact that learning and using a language involves adopting a whole conception about the nature of the universe, most of the elements of which we never question, many of which we are not even fully aware of. The very use of a noun such as "book" or "chair" implies a certain assumption, a belief in the existence of objects which are real and

separate from ourselves. If we insisted on testing and proving every one of these assumptions to our satisfaction before learning a language, we would never speak a word. Therefore, all of our articulate knowledge rests on such an acceptance in faith early in childhood of a conceptual framework which makes our articulation possible. We can of course challenge, change and add to elements of this framework, but most of it we could not even state explicitly.

Polanyi also shows that any determination to make language completely precise would end by destroying it. Even if we could "replace each different sentence ever printed in the English language by a different printed word . . . this million fold enrichment of the English language would completely destroy it". Why? "Not only because nobody could remember so many words, but for the more important reason that they would be meaningless. For the meaning of a word is formed and manifested by its repeated usage . . . It follows that a language must be poor enough to allow the same words to be used a sufficient number of times".[94] For a similar reason a word with a completely precise definition covering all of the ways in which it had been used in the past would be rendered incapable of applying to future experience; no new experience is ever exactly the same as ones preceding it and a language is kept alive by being gradually extended and changed to describe and relate to new situations, new things and new ideas. Thus a word means something slightly different each time it is used.[95]

Polanyi not only discusses language and the processes involved in scientific discovery; he tries to follow the implications of his argument into philosophy, biology, government, history, art and religion. Some of these lines of enquiry are more satisfactory than others, but his interest

in them is evidence of his awareness of his place in a broader picture of human endeavour and accomplishment. He stresses the importance of human community in the search for the truth about reality, describing specifically the way in which "conviviality" and consensus function in the scientific community, setting standards and yet permitting and recognising original thought which challenges and changes these. It is part of Polanyi's theory that true discoveries compel recognition eventually.[96] One of the ways in which an objective discovery - one making contact with a "hidden reality" - can be recognised is by the way in which it seems to hold infinite implications, suggestions of further paths to be explored in the future. Certainly this criteria - a sense of "fruitfulness" - cannot be empirically tested, and yet, as Polanyi shows, it is one used by scientists continually in assessing the validity of hypotheses or of experimental findings.[97]

This emphasis on the importance of the scientific community for the proper working of science, and the wider emphasis on the importance of human community in our search for all truth is related to Polanyi's critique of solipsism. He believes that we <u>can</u> know another person's mind; the mind of another person is the whole on which we focus our attention while being subsidiarily aware of its manifestations.[98] Our whole search for truth is a continuation of a drive we can observe in animals, the drive to learn to live successfully in their environment; and our search is guided and disciplined by the contact we make with reality - the reality of other human beings, the reality of the material universe, the reality witnessed to by the worship of God.

I cannot hope to convey the scope or depth of Polanyi's achievement in this introduction; and even if it were possible for me to do so, such an

exposition would not necessarily convince the reader of the rightness of Polanyi's views. There is no way of arguing logically from another theory of knowledge to his; there exists what he calls a "logical gap".[99] Just as in scientific controversies where opposing factions can reach totally different conclusions from the same body of information because they are working within different conceptual frameworks, the opposition must first be willing to believe that the new framework has meaning and thus make it possible for themselves to learn a new language with which to understand it.[100] Polanyi sees great insight for the problems of such scientific controversies in the words of St. Augustine; "unless ye believe, ye shall not understand."[101]

Of course, such language raises the hackles of positivists both within the sciences and without; yet perceptive scholars in many different fields are beginning to see the far-reaching implications which the insights of Personal Knowledge have for their own work, the alternative it offers to the various dead ends and impasses created by the adherence to a Cartesian epistemology in many disciplines.[102] It is not Polanyi's quarrel with Descartes which is new; it is the thoroughgoingness of it. Others have attacked elements of Cartesian dualism in our thought and language;[103] but only Polanyi, in approaching the problem, has fully confronted the necessity to revise completely all his assumptions about the nature of perception, of knowledge, of language, of scientific method, of personal commitment in order even to begin to deal with the matter adequately. His great advantage is that being a scientist himself he has been able to tackle the scientific mystique head-on, rather than ignoring or even running away from it. He has painstakingly presented the case, as completely as it has yet been done, for the acknowledgment of a humanly created and discovered

knowledge which can still claim to be objective in the deepest sense. For this we owe him homage.

The Discipline of Reality: Science, Language and Religion

I hope in the course of this study to give more substance to this brief summary of Polanyi's thought and to explore further the difference as well as the similarities between his work and Lawrence's. At present I want to suggest how an examination of the relationship between Lawrence and Polanyi sheds light on the "Study", on Lawrence's thinking and on his use of language.

Lawrence is often caricatured as the enemy of civilisation and mental consciousness. Polanyi's effort to challenge the inadequate ideas of mental consciousness and knowledge that have prevailed in our culture since Descartes makes clearer Lawrence's own sense of the necessity to refute these inadequate ideas and act by others which to him seemed truer to reality. The over-urgent tone present in many of Lawrence's writings when he attacks this false ideal of knowledge can perhaps be better understood when we recognise what a threat it involved to his belief in his creative task. This was a threat not only sensed by Lawrence but registered in the work of many artists, especially after the mid-nineteenth century when the work of Darwin, Spencer and Huxley began to make itself felt. An unfounded belief that science only dealt in empirical, readily observable and provable facts, led many to regard the theories of these men as indisputable truth. I hope to show the unfortunate impact such a belief had on Hardy's novels and how it undercut his essential trust in his own powers to make creative discoveries about life in his art.

The growing belief that only science was "objective", based on indisputable facts about the world, while humanistic endeavours, especially art, were "subjective" and therefore suspect, led, I think, to two different kinds of reaction. Either, like Hardy, an artist tried to persist in his work, plagued by doubts about its worth, and tried to embody the current "scientific truths" in it in one form or another; or artists intent on survival renounced any significant connection with life and thought, especially scientific thought, altogether. Hence Wilde's insistence that all art is useless and the claim "art for art's sake". This reaction is very clearly at work in the repeated use of the word "facts" in Wilde's "The Decay of Lying" - "if something cannot be done to check, or at least to modify, our monstrous worship of facts, Art will become sterile and beauty will pass away from the land . . . Certainly we are a degraded race, and have sold our birthright for a mess of facts".[104] Obviously, any belief that only empirical facts spoke the truth about existence would make the artist's task meaningless and irrelevant. Wilde's witty rebellion against such a state of affairs was really a cry of defeat.

> Life and Nature may sometimes be used as part of art's rough material, but before they are of any real service to art they must be translated into artistic conventions . . . Art never expresses anything but itself . . . As a method Realism is a complete failure, and the two things that every artist should avoid are modernity of form and modernity of subject matter. To us, who live in the nineteenth century, any century is a suitable subject for art except our own. The only beautiful things are the things that do not concern us. 105

To say that Art is for Art's sake is to say nothing so much as that art is not really very important.[106] Luckily, many people felt that this simply was not so and refused to follow their unfounded faith in the

empirical facts of science to its logical conclusions. However, the impact of this faith still made itself felt into the early twentieth century. Artists either formulated their very aesthetic in terms of a scientific precision of language, a Flaubertian obsession with the mot juste and the total elimination of the author from the work for the sake of impersonality (Eliot, Pound); or else they almost completely abandoned the attempt to speak clearly to others and withdrew into their own private languages, creating whole mythologies or complex configurations of symbols which were simply not comprehensible to the reader without elaborate explication (Yeats, Joyce). Another alternative was to openly admit that one could know nothing about anything except oneself - one's own perceptions, feelings, needs and beliefs - and then to proceed to write endlessly about the workings of one's own mind, describing the thoughts and images that flitted in and out, and the faint clashes with other people on the rim of consciousness, making small events or problems seem big by the amount of careful attention lavished upon them and thus losing all sense of true proportion (Woolf, Proust).[107]

Of course, these various types of response to - or rather, retreat from - the problem are stated too rigidly here. They are only meant to suggest ways in which the conflict between a false idea of science and an art under siege manifested itself. Most likely all three reactions (and more) were involved to some extent in the work of each writer I have mentioned.[108]

Understood in this context, against this sad spectacle of wasted effort and frustration - and the marvellous works these artists have given us, in spite of the obstacle of disbelief in their entire creative venture

which confronted them, can only further convince us of the great creative powers of the human spirit - Lawrence's achievement seems remarkable indeed. He was up against the same obstacles and his work bears the marks of the struggle; but he faced the problem more fully and consciously, struggled until he won his way through to a further vision, a clearer understanding. His central insights about the nature of knowledge and perception seem to me to be at the root of his difference from most other writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

It is not a solipsistic world he portrays, nor a private language that he uses. Lawrence has been described as the champion of solipsism, of rabid individuality. One need only read Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man directly after reading Sons and Lovers to put such a description of Lawrence in perspective. In the latter other people really exist besides Paul Morel - Paul's mother, his father, Miriam, the life of the mining community, all are made vividly real to us. We feel that the author took other human beings very seriously, found the reality of their lives and problems compelling and tried to enter into them imaginatively in order to better understand them. (Surely this is the kind of attitude and effort involved in any attempt to live at all successfully with other people.) In Portrait of the Artist, however, we have the constant sensation of being restricted within Stephen's narrow line of vision. People hover insubstantially around him and we uneasily suspect that when a character moves behind Stephen or away from him, that character ceases to exist. The most obvious example of this is Stephen's conversation with Lynch in Chapter V in which Lynch is no more than a foil for the statement of Stephen's aesthetic. The reader, rather than feeling that his eyes have

been opened by the author's clearer, fuller vision of life, resents being limited to Stephen's perception; the reader feels that if he had been there, Lynch would have been much more real and interesting to him, that no human being is so completely a cardboard figure.

Lawrence's own clearest statement of the rewards of solipsism is "The Man Who Loved Islands"; and his insistence on the recognition of the other, on the importance of relationships with other human beings is central not only to the "Study" but to all of his work from Sons and Lovers to Lady Chatterley's Lover. Like Polanyi, Lawrence feels that none of us can completely create or choose the world we live in.[109] We must rely on a language, on a whole conceptual framework shaped by the past and upheld by the present communities in which we live, in order to do even the most basic thinking and articulating. We must accept not only a language but the reality of the human community in which it has its meaning.

However, Lawrence does not therefore devote himself to the impossible ideal of absolute precision in language. Although it was a matter of great concern to him, how he used words and how he was most clearly to make his meaning understood, he never shared in the obsessional search for the mot juste. Carried to its furthest extreme, it is a search which paralyses the author; like Joseph Grand in Camus' La Peste, who can never get beyond the first sentence of his novel for rewriting it, one could never write anything. Our acceptance and use of language is one of the major "tacit components" of our thought; even the process by which we relate a word to an object cannot be formalised or explicitly explained. If absolute precision would destroy a language, if rigid definitions of words would make them incapable of responding to new experience, if the very use

of a language involves beliefs about the nature of reality of which we are not consciously aware, then a word will mean something slightly different each time it is spoken, written, heard or read. The ideal of writing a sentence which, like a mathematical equation, will result in exactly the same experience of feeling or thought in the reader as the one hopefully embodied in the sentence by the writer, is logically unattainable.

Such an attention to words in themselves can deprive them of meaning; as Polanyi suggests, we usually attend <u>from</u> words <u>to</u> their meaning, are aware of them subsidiarily as we focus upon their joint significance.

> It is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their joint meaning . . . We can see now how an unbridled lucidity can destroy our understanding of complex matters. Scrutinize closely the particulars of a comprehensive entity and their meaning is effaced, our conception of the entity is destroyed . . . Repeat a word several times, attending carefully to the motion of your tongue and lips, and to the sound you make, and soon the word will sound hollow and eventually lose its meaning. [110]

This necessary active comprehension is what is involved when we say we read a text rather than merely observe it[111]; and Polanyi writes, "this shaping or integrating I hold to be the great and indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered and, once discovered, is held to be true". [112]

The search for the perfect "objective correlative" is related to the attempt to eliminate an author completely from his own work. As Polanyi shows, this is logically impossible even in scientific statements.

> I can say nothing precisely. The words I have spoken and am yet to speak mean nothing: it is only <u>I</u> who mean something by <u>them</u> . . . and though I could explore my meaning up to a point, I believe that my words (descriptive words) must mean more than I shall ever know, if they are to mean anything at all. [113]

Lawrence's insights into the nature of knowledge and perception have a crucial relation to his stance as a religious writer. A central element in both Lawrence's and Polanyi's thought is the insistence on the rootedness of all our activity in a specific body and in a specific environment and society.

> Each person can know directly very little of truth and must trust others for the rest. Indeed to insure this process of mutual reliance is one of the main functions of society. It follows that such freedom of the mind as can be possessed by men is due to the services of social institutions, which set narrow limits to man's freedom and tend to threaten it even within these limits. The relation is analogous to that between mind and body: to the way in which the performance of mental acts is restricted by limitations and distortions due to the medium which makes these performances possible . . .
>
> What then is our answer to those who would doubt that man made of matter, man driven by appetites and subject to social commands, can sustain purely mental purposes? The answer is that he can. He can do this under his own responsibility, precisely by submitting to restrictive and stultifying circumstances which lie beyond his responsibility. These circumstances offer us opportunities for pure thought - limited opportunities and full of pitfalls - but all the same, they <u>are</u> opportunities, and they <u>are</u> ours: <u>we</u> are responsible for using or neglecting them. 114

This strong sense of human possibility and human responsibility involves the realisation and acceptance of one's calling. One's specific limitations are, in fact, one's peculiar opportunities. Whether we use or neglect them can be determined by something as intangible as the nature of our stance towards reality.

Donald Weismann, trying to describe his own involvement in the process of creative discovery, quotes Saint Augustine (from the tenth chapter of the seventh book of his <u>Confessions</u>).

> "Divine things are the more clearly manifested to him who withdraws into the recesses of his heart. And being thence warned to return to myself, I entered into my inward self, Thou leading me on . . . And I entered . . . and Thou didst beat back the infirmity of my sight, pouring forth upon me most strongly Thy beams of light . . . and I heard . . . as things are heard in the heart, nor was there room for doubt . . ."
> It may not be pure coincidence, indeed, that certain of these same elements of humbleness and submission have proved to be components of what I have discovered the most fruitful attitude in which to approach a creative task. 115

Lawrence said, "I often think one ought to be able to pray, before one works - and then leave it to the Lord". [116]

Polanyi feels that the fruitfulness of such an attitude is not mere coincidence. The aspect of reality which a scientist is groping to uncover, pouring himself into the many particulars of hypotheses, experiments, observations, long hours in a laboratory or over a desk, generates certain tensions which draw him gradually towards it until he makes the leap, crosses a logical gap, to perceive a new whole. Polanyi feels that this is also "how a Christian is placed when worshipping God".[117] Religious ritual is "potentially the highest degree of indwelling that is conceivable. For ritual comprises a sequence of things to be said and gestures to be made which involve the whole body and alert our whole existence". [118]

> The indwelling of the Christian worshipper is therefore a continued attempt at breaking out, at casting off the condition of man, even while humbly acknowledging its inescapability. Such indwelling is fulfilled most completely when it increases this effort to the utmost. It resembles not the dwelling within a great theory of which we enjoy the complete understanding, nor an immersion in the pattern of a musical masterpiece, but the heuristic upsurge which strives to break through the accepted frameworks of thought, guided by the intimations of discoveries still beyond our

> horizon. Christian worship sustains, as it were, an eternal, never to be consummated hunch: a heuristic vision which is accepted for the sake of its unresolvable tension. It is like an obsession with a problem known to be insoluble, which yet follows, against reason, unswervingly, the heuristic command 'Look at the unknown'.'[119]

'Look at the unknown'.' It is the cry of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" as well. Lawrence's attempt to understand the nature of creative discovery - by dwelling in Hardy's novels, in paintings, in the Judeo-Christian religious tradition - ends in affirmation, as does Polanyi's. But it is not an affirmation of sheer, willed human creative power. As G. Wilson Knight's observation on the hermaphrodite nature of the creative state might suggest, a certain receptivity (female) is necessary as well as the activity (male) of shaping one's findings into articulate knowledge or art. There remains always an element in the coming together of these two forces where that which is revealed meets man's creative powers - which we cannot fully explain or get hold of, a "logical gap".

> The irreversible character of discovery suggests that no solution of a problem can be accredited as a discovery if it is achieved by a procedure following definite rules. For such a procedure would be reversible in the sense that it could be traced back stepwise to its beginning and repeated at will any number of times, like any arithmetical computation. Accordingly, any strictly formalised procedure would also be excluded as a means of achieving discovery.
>
> It follows that true discovery is not a strictly logical performance, and accordingly, we may describe the obstacle to be overcome in solving a problem as a 'logical gap', and speak of the width of the logical gap as the measure of the ingenuity required for solving the problem. 'Illumination' is then the leap by which the logical gap is crossed. It is the plunge by which we gain a foothold at another shore of reality. On such plunges the scientist has to stake bit by bit his entire professional life. 120

On such plunges, we might add, philosophers and artists also stake their entire professional lives. We have seen the kind of reception

the "Study" received. The value of Polanyi's work has been questioned for similar reasons, I think. "It is all very interesting", someone might say, "but it is so 'subjective'". Such a person uses the word "subjective" to mean that something is personal, seems too obviously to have been written by a specific individual, a human being. But every book on this earth has been written by a human being or two. There is nothing one can say to such a person to prove conclusively that Personal Knowledge or the "Study of Thomas Hardy" are true and great works. The very language Polanyi and Lawrence use is often incomprehensible to those operating within a different conceptual framework - "personal knowledge"[121], "intellectual passions"[122], "thinking emotionally or passionately"[123] - these phrases are contradictions in terms. Even the form which Polanyi's work has taken, that of a personal statement of belief, has made it suspect in an age which worships "objectivity". By Polanyi's definition, his work, although confessional in form, is not subjective because it claims to make some meaningful contact with reality and therefore to have universal validity. Similarly, Lawrence's "Study", his confessio fidei, was written not only to help him grow more fully into his true self in his particular place and time but to share his discoveries with others.

In their introduction to Intellect and Hope: Essays in the thought of Michael Polanyi, Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat attempt to analyse the reasons for the suspicion with which the modern reader greets the confessional form of Personal Knowledge; their comments bear interestingly on the reception of the "Study" as well.

> (Descartes') program of methodological doubt developed an ethos in which mathematical rigor became paradigmatic for all thought. Thus our intellect was uprooted from

> its grounding in the past of our bodies . . .
> The consequence of Cartesian method, therefore, was the notorious 'bifurcation of nature', a dichotomy which carried with it the insistence on the utterly detached character of rational thinking. Such an insistence, however, entailed a rhetoric that eschewed the first-person in favor of a third-person form for transacting our serious business with one another about what is the case. This has meant, therefore, that the first-person form has become either a mere means to reveal the idiosyncratic uniqueness of the 'interesting' individual (singular) or alternatively the form in which a historically conditioned (pejorative sense) community, somewhat nervously, declared its corporate faith (plural).
>
> But if one returns to or recovers an ancient, pre-Cartesian model - Augustine's Confessions - then one begins to realize that as a rhetorical device the confession - whether in the first person singular or plural - has a very different force. For it then ceases to be a soliloquy by an individual through which is revealed his merely personal and idiosyncratic uniqueness. Instead, it can be seen as a disclosure to oneself of one's basic beliefs, grounded, first, in one's own personal history, with its roots in a pre-personal somatic appearance in the world, bearing its genetic inheritance; and secondly, in a native language upon the insinuations of a larger coherence of which one has trustingly and acritically relied as the conditio sine qua non of one's coming ever more fully to possess one's human being . . .
>
> This recovery of the prepersonal and personal historical roots of one's own knowledge leads, not, as for the Cartesian, to subjectivism or relativism, but to the recognition of the inescapable, because necessary, universal intent of all our affirmation. 124

The analysis of the "Study" which follows will attempt to show more fully in what this "universal intent" might consist. I hope in the process to keep Polanyi's words in mind - "The meticulous dismembering of a text, which can kill its appreciation, can also supply material for a much deeper understanding of it". [125] The "Study" cannot be paraphrased successfully, nor can Lawrence's own straightforward statements in Chapter X function as substitutes for the experience of reading chapters one through

nine as well. Lawrence does try in Chapter X to state some of his ideas as clearly as possible, but I think it is significant that he does not do this until the closing pages. By the time we read these, we have ourselves shared with him in a process of intensive thought, of looking at particular aspects of a problem and coming to some conclusion. The training in thinking and in using language which the "Study" was for Lawrence, a training which helped change the author of Sons and Lovers to the author of The Rainbow, led him to a greater understanding of what true discovery, vital thought, involved. Lawrence's clearest statements on the nature of perception and of thinking come after the "Study"; the experience of the "Study" had to come first.

The question "What is real thinking?" was central to Lawrence all his life. Attempts to deal with it, to suggest answers and examples, can be found in almost everything he wrote including his last major work, Apocalypse; and these many attempts amount to a comprehensive presentation of an alternative conception of knowledge, one very similar to that of Michael Polanyi. Taken together, the achievement of the artist and the scientist - each one peculiarly sensitive to the work of the other, like two discoverers in a common venture[126] - offer us the possibility of creatively meeting the unknown future with hope, faith and full humanity.

It is more difficult to show the fullness of Lawrence's achievement in this respect than it is to show Polanyi's. One can point to The Study of Man, Personal Knowledge and The Tacit Dimension; the bulk of the task is accomplished there. Lawrence's epistemology is embodied in novels, stories, poems, book reviews, art criticism, books on psychology and countless essays in which it is continually being tested, reformulated,

enriched and examined. I shall try to suggest the scope and complexity and development of Lawrence's thoughts on how man thinks and knows and discovers by quoting from later works, but my attention will centre on the "Study" where I feel they had their true beginning. The 'intensive method of thought' embodied there was described aptly by Lawrence himself fifteen years later, in Apocalypse. To men in the past, Lawrence says,

> . . . A thought was a completed state of feeling-awareness, a cumulative thing, a deepening thing, in which feeling deepened into feeling in consciousness till there was a sense of fulness. A completed thought was the plumbing of a depth like a whirlpool, of emotional awareness, and at the depth of this whirlpool of emotion the resolve formed. But it was no stage in a journey. There was no logical chain to be dragged further.
>
> This should help us to appreciate that the oracles were not supposed to say something that fitted plainly in the whole chain of circumstance. They were supposed to deliver a set of images or symbols of the real dynamic value, which should set the emotional consciousness of the enquirer, as he pondered them, revolving more and more rapidly, till out of a state of intense emotional absorption the resolve at last formed; or, as we say, the decision was arrived at. As a matter of fact, we do very much the same in a crisis. When anything very important is to be decided we withdraw and ponder and ponder until the deep emotions are set working and revolving together, revolving, revolving, till a centre is formed and we "know what to do". 127

It is the rendering of this process of thought, of dwelling in the particulars of a problem until one is suddenly able to comprehend the whole, to come to some resolve, that I think is the real achievement of the "Study". The decision arrived at? I do not think it can be stated very simply. It had something to do with continuing to establish and participate in vital relationships with other human beings and with facing the difficult option of marriage in the modern world. It had something to do with continuing to study and learn from the great works of art given us by the past. And it had

something to do with continuing to write, to work towards the creative discoveries to be made in the future. It involved an affirmation of man's capacity to make contact with reality and of the faith which made this contact possible.

One further word. As I have been pouring myself into the particulars of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" over the past few years, I've become more and more committed to my belief in it as a complex whole, as a work which bears importantly on the nature of reality. As a critic is with any piece of writing which has come to mean a great deal to him, I am perhaps too ready to forgive or overlook its errors; yet I will try to point these out as I understand them in order better to illuminate the nature of the "Study's" success. However, it seems virtually impossible to retrace my steps and reverse the process to enable me to see it as I did the very first time I read it, as an odd collection of some wonderful, some confusing and irritating particulars. This inability to undo my comprehension of it is occasionally bothersome, especially when someone reads it, finds it puzzling, and asks me to tell them what I see in it - and I cannot think of a word to say, where on earth to begin.

"The whole is greater than the part." It is not much of an answer, but it is at least a starting point. It might also be the last word. What follows is an attempt to suggest as much as is possible in between.

Footnotes - Introduction

[1] cf. Mark Kinkead-Weekes, "The Marble and the Statue: the Exploratory Imagination of D. H. Lawrence", Imagined Worlds: Essays on some English Novels and Novelists in Honour of John Butt, ed. Maynard Mack and Ian Gregor (London, 1968), pp. 371-380. Kinkead-Weekes carefully examines the growth of The Rainbow and the relation of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" to it.

[2] J. V. Davies, "Introduction", Lawrence on Hardy and Painting (London, 1973), pp. 1-9. I will be following the pagination of the "Study" in the Phoenix edition; but since the paperback edition reproduces the Phoenix text in all but minor changes, a reader using it need only subtract 388 from my page references to find the corresponding page in Davies' edition.

Other critics who have made suggestive comments about the nature of the "Study" as a whole include John Remsbury in his article "Real Thinking: Lawrence and Cezanne" in The Cambridge Quarterly II (Spring 1967), 117-147 and Mark Kinkead-Weekes (see note 1 above).

[3] Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence, ed. Edward D. McDonald (London, 1936), 1970 reprint, p.409. From this point on, all page references for the "Study of Thomas Hardy" in Phoenix will be included in the text.

[4] Frank Kermode, Lawrence (London, 1973), see pp. 25-27.

[5] For example, almost an entire page (p. 478) is given to a discussion of Shelley's "Ode to a Skylark" where Lawrence observes that Shelley wants to say that "the skylark is pure, untrammelled spirit, a pure motion", that his song is "poured out of heaven, 'or near it'". In the context of the "Study" this "metaphysic" of Shelley's (insofar as he has one) is related to "Love", the spirit, movement and rebellion against the law of self-preservation. "The very adherence to rhyme and regular rhythm, the poetry itself, is a concession to the Law, a concession to the body, to the being and requirements of the body. They are an admission of the living, positive inertia which is the other half of life, other than the pure will to motion." It would seem that here, at least, is one example of an artist whose conscious statement was related to the force of "Love" as defined in the "Study" and whose embodiment of this statement in poetry involved a struggle and reconciliation with the force of "Law" (again, as defined by the body of the "Study"). This obviously contradicts Kermode's neat assertion that for Lawrence art equals "Love", and doctrine equals "Law", so he omits it.

[6] Fantasia of the Unconscious (London, 1961), p.9, (first published in 1923).

[7] See the discussion of the work of Michael Polanyi below, pp. 34-56.

[8] R. E. Pritchard, D. H. Lawrence: Body of Darkness (London, 1971), see pp. 52-55. In the context of the "Study", the "Male" principle would seem to describe Lawrence's mother, the "Female" principle his father. This odd state of affairs upsets Pritchard, and because he is reading the "Study" from the partial perspective of his own theory, he overlooks an important qualification - "But it must first be seen that the division into male and female is arbitrary, for the purpose of thought" (p.448) . . . There is female apart from Woman, as we know, and male apart from Man" (p.443). Therefore, he claims the "Study" almost the only exception among Lawrence's writings in this respect, saying that usually "the male body contains the unknown,while woman is intellectually active", (p.53). According to this statement, the Foreward to Sons and Lovers, Twilight in Italy and The Man Who Died must also be exceptions, along with many others.

[9] Ibid., p.55.

[10] Ibid.

[11] H. M. Daleski, The Forked Flame (London, 1965), p. 35. cf. Stephen J. Miko, Toward Women In Love: The Emergence of a Lawrentian Aesthetic (New Haven and London, 1971), pp. 197-198. "We can make more definite sense of Lawrence's need for, as well as his problems with, his dualities if we notice that he tends to favor one side - the female - more than the other" p. 197. Miko supports this observation more interestingly and cogently than most others of his opinion, although I still do not agree with him.

[12] Daleski, p.30.

[13] Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature (London, 1924), Penguin ed. 1971, p.8.

[14] The Collected Letters of D. H. Lawrence, ed. Harry T. Moore (London, 1962), reprinted 1970, p. 300. In following references, Moore's Collected Letters will be abbreviated to L.M.

[15] See the discussion of the work of Michael Polanyi below, pp. 34-56.

[16] T. S. Eliot, After Strange Gods (London, 1934), p.58.

This assumption about Lawrence is still taken for granted in many quarters. cf. Elisee Vivas, D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art (Evanston, Illinois, 1960). p. ix. "Unfortunately Lawrence had ideas - mere opinions, that is - on anything and everything. Modifying for our purposes what Eliot said about Chesterton, Lawrence's head teemed with ideas but it did not always give evidence that it could think."

[17] F. R. Leavis, D. H. Lawrence: Novelist (London, 1955), 1971 Penguin edition, p. 23 n.

[18] However, Leavis' case against Eliot might have been strengthened by noting that Lawrence's essay had a great deal more to do with Hardy than did Eliot's comments on Hardy in After Strange Gods (pp. 54-58) which were intent on adducing Hardy as an example of "the intrusion of the diabolic into modern literature in consequence of . . . a separation from tradition and orthodoxy", (p. 56). Katherine Anne Porter's essay, "Notes on a Criticism of Thomas Hardy, The Southern Review, VI (Summer 1940), pp. 150-161 (Thomas Hardy Centennial Issue; The Southern Review was published by the Louisiana State University Press and has been discontinued), is an excellent response to Eliot's odd appraisal of Hardy.

[19] Leavis, "The Wild, Untutored Phoenix", 1937 from The Common Pursuit (London, 1952), Penguin ed. 1969, p. 237.

[20] "Autobiographical Sketch", Phoenix II, ed. Warren Roberts and Harry T. Moore (London, 1968), p. 594.

[21] In his Foreword to D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence by Martin Jarrett-Kerr (Fr. William Tiverton) (London, 1951), p. 9.

[22] Leavis, D. H. Lawrence: Novelist, p. 324.

[23] However, Leavis has recently commented, in referring to the "Study of Thomas Hardy" that it "deserves more attention than it gets". Nor Shall My Sword (London, 1972), p. 80.

[24] Phoenix, pp. 249-250.

[25] Raymond Williams, The English Novel: From Dickens to Lawrence (London, 1970), p. 171.

[26] Catherine Carswell, The Savage Pilgrimage: A Narrative of D. H. Lawrence (London, 1932), p.22.

[27] Ibid.

[28] L.M., p. 287.

[29] Carswell, p. 30.

[30] L.M., p. 295.

[31] It was a month later that Lawrence wrote to J. B. Pinker about The Rainbow (7th January, 1915; L.M., p. 306), "I am going to split the book into two volumes: it was so unwieldy. It needs to be in two volumes".

[32] L.M., p. 290.

33 L.M., p. 290-291. Letter to Gordon Campbell, 21st September, 1914.

34 L.M., p. 292. Letter to Edward Garnett, 13th October, 1914.

35 L.M., p. 179.

36 L.M., p. 280.

37 L.M., p. 172; to Mrs. S. A. Hopkin, Christmas Day, 1912.

38 L.M., p. 285.

39 L.M., p. 291; 21st September, 1914.

40 L.M., p. 189.

41 L.M., pp. 268-269; 3rd April, 1914.

42 L.M., p. 273.

43 L.M., p. 298.

44 L.M., p. 302; Harry T. Moore suggests 19th December, 1914.

45 Phoenix II, pp. 600, 599.

46 This insistence on the recognition of separateness, of the reality of the other, is so central not only to the "Study" but to The Rainbow and Women in Love that it cannot be dismissed with the comment "Love as the recognition of the limitations of the self, of the presence of deity in the other and of the consequent need to submit to the other, was never very congenial to Lawrence", as it is by Eugene Goodheart, in his book, The Utopian Vision of D. H. Lawrence (Chicago, 1963), p. 127. Goodheart continues, "Though he speaks in his "Study of Hardy" of the necessary harmony of love and law, Lawrence means to give us 'senses, sensation, sensuousness, these things which are incontrovertibly me', the law, the way of the body", (pp. 127-128). Set beside a passage in the concluding chapter of the "Study" - that "this Christianity would teach them to recognise and to admit the law of the other person, outside and different from the law of one's own being. It is the hardest lesson of love . . . Christianity ends in submission, in recognising and submitting to the law of the other person. 'Thou shalt love thy enemy'" - Goodheart's comments seem another example of seeing in the "Study" that which one wants to see, in this case evidence for Lawrence's emphasis on the body and Dionysian power.

47 L.M., see the letters to Russell from 12th February, 1915 to 14th September, 1915, pp. 316-367 passim.

48 L.M., p. 311.

49 Kangaroo (London, 1923), Penguin ed. 1968, p. 173.

50 D. H. Lawrence: Novelist, p. 101.

51 Kinkead-Weekes, p. 380 (see note 1, above).

52 Ibid., pp. 385-386.

53 L.M., p. 298.

54 Carswell, p. 70.

55 Phoenix, p. 841 - in Book Collector's Quarterly, Jan-March 1932 and John O'London's Weekly, March 12th and 19th, 1932.

56 Critics on D. H. Lawrence, ed. W. T. Andrews (London, 1971), pp. 46-47.

57 "The Wild, Untutored Phoenix", p. 237 (see note 19, above).

58 Eugene Goodheart, The Utopian Vision of D. H. Lawrence (Chicago, 1963), p. 92. See also note 46, above.

59 Ibid., p. 81.

60 cf. Arnold Kettle's chapters on Tess of the D'Urbervilles and The Rainbow in An Introduction to the English Novel (London, 1953), reprinted 1962, Vol. II.

61 Goodheart, p. 88.

62 Goodheart seems to take Lawrence's gifts as a writer for granted, and thus ignores them, in instances where they are perhaps so convincing that they draw no attention to themselves. Compare Goodheart on the characters in Women in Love, p. 36, to F. R. Leavis on Women in Love in D. H. Lawrence: Novelist, especially pp. 152-155, 190-200. Leavis admits at the beginning of his discussion the failure involved in the scenes of Ursula and Birkin's sexual consummations which Goodheart also mentions, but he goes on from there to point out the extraordinary complexity and richness of individual life in the novel.

63 Goodheart, p. 79.

64 Ibid., pp. 127-128.

65 Daleski, p. 14.

66 G. Wilson Knight, Christ and Nietzsche: An Essay in Poetic Wisdom (London, 1948), pp. 124-5, 151. Virginia Woolf makes a similar statement in A Room of One's Own; "Some collaboration has to take place in the mind between the woman and the man before the art of creation can be accomplished. Some marriage of opposites has to be consummated." (London, 1928), Penguin ed. 1970, p. 103.

67 Daleski, p. 31.

68 For instance, Mark Spilka, in his Love Ethic of D. H. Lawrence (London, 1955), would seem to disagree with Daleski's categories of the Male and Time arranged in opposition to the Female and Eternality. Spilka argues that the "Christian infinity" (involving the concepts of "timelessness" and "eternality") belongs with the Male, Light, Knowledge, Spirit aspect of life conflicting with the Female, Dark, Natural and Sensual "Primitive Indefinite", the sense of a vital God in which man participates in time. (see p. 233, n. 4). However, one can certainly see what is meant by the way Daleski has ranged these qualities, Time and Eternality. (It is Daleski who capitalises all of these terms).

69 Daleski, pp. 29-30.

70 Ibid., p. 28. Daleski's psychological predisposition leads him to ignore many important aspects of the "Study" which do not seem to have much to do with Lawrence's struggle for sexual identity. For instance, he deals very briefly with the element of theological and biblical language in the "Study" by telling us that

"The Hebraic-Christian tradition provides him with a rich source of imagery for his private religion, and he exploits the emotional power of the tradition while using it for his own purposes . . . In the quoted passage (several paragraphs on the dualism of the Trinity from Twilight in Italy, pp. 80-82) Lawrence is really concerned with the relation between the opposing forces within the individual psyche."

The Forked Flame, pp. 22-23.

Such a quick dismissal and reduction of the religious element in the "Study" cannot be justified by any careful reading of the "Study" itself or in the light of Lawrence's letter to Gordon Campbell on 19th December, 1914 (partially quoted above in the text, pp. 15-16; see the entire letter in L.M., pp. 300-304).

71 Ibid., p. 13.

72 Ibid., p. 35. It is interesting that whenever a critic is intent on using the "Study" to support the cliche that Lawrence opposed civilisation and mental consciousness, he omits any serious reference to the criticism of the visual arts which plays such a major part in the "Study". This is true not only of Daleski but of Eugene Goodheart and R. E. Pritchard, to name a few. Pritchard, in attempting to paraphrase the "Study", writes "out of the dark unconscious mass springs, in the characteristic Lawrentian

pattern, bright single being, that each individual must fulfil and that 'civilisation' and mental consciousness would hinder". The simple inability to read which that statement exposes is breath-taking. If Lawrence's art criticism does not give evidence of a sensitive and mature participation in Western "civilisation", if his reading of Tolstoy, Shakespeare, Sophocles, Shelley and Hardy does not witness to a capable and alert "mental consciousness", it is hard to understand what the terms mean.

73 D. J. Gordon, D. H. Lawrence as a Literary Critic (New Haven and London, 1966), p. 84.

74 Ibid., especially pp. 82-90.

75 Richard Swigg, Lawrence, Hardy and American Literature (London, 1972), p. ix.

76 Another critic who examines the "Study" in order to help understand the writing of The Rainbow and Women in Love is Stephen J. Miko in his book Toward Women in Love: The Emergence of a Lawrentian Aesthetic (New Haven and London, 1971). His analysis of the "Study" (pp. 186-203) deals more with its whole conceptual framework - of a dualism which also insists on vital unity, of never-ending conflict and struggle which is yet a dialectic headed towards synthesis - than with specific aspects of its criticism of Hardy or painting or of its discussion of history and religion. It tends, therefore, to be a bit abstract, but it is refreshing to see someone taking the thought of the "Study" seriously in philosophical terms. Miko's philosophical approach leads him to look for a systematic consistency of a kind which I do not think the "Study" offers, which Miko in fact does not find throughout. However, the final impact of his comments on the "Study" is to make Kinkead-Weekes's statements that "the "Study" is not a philosophical work" and "Lawrence was a novelist, not a philosopher" seem a little more debatable. Critics seem quicker to concede what the "Study" is not than to insist on what it is. My own tendency has been to agree with Kinkead-Weekes, but I am beginning to think that I have had too narrow a view of what is involved in doing philosophy.

77 Kinkead-Weekes, pp. 381, 374.

78 Ibid., pp. 385-386.

79 George H. Ford, Double Measure: A Study of the Novels and Stories of D. H. Lawrence (New York, 1965), p. 24. Ford takes Kermode's terms from The Romantic Image.

80 "Morality and the Novel", Phoenix, p. 529.

81 "John Galsworthy", Phoenix, p. 539.

82 Kermode, Lawrence, pp. 38-42, pp. 50-53, pp. 82-96, and pp. 132-136 respectively.

83 Davies, pp. 8, 5.

84 "Why the Novel Matters", Phoenix, pp. 533, 535. cf. John Remsbury in "'Real Thinking': Lawrence and Cezanne" (see note 2, above), pp. 142-147. Remsbury compares this passage of Lawrence's to similar arguments of Professor Gilbert Ryle against "the residue of Cartesian dualism in our language and thought" (p. 142) in The Concept of Mind and concludes that Lawrence is much the finer thinker of the two.

85 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (London, 1967), pp. 12-14, 80.

86 See above, p. 7.

87 Donald L. Weismann, "In Pursuit of Discovery", Intellect and Hope: Essays in the thought of Michael Polanyi, ed. Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C., 1968), pp. 399-400.

88 Ibid., p. 401.

89 cf. Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Criticism", Poems, Epistles and Satires, introduction by Ernest Rhys (London, 1924). I, ll. 141-157

> Some beauties yet no precepts can declare,
> For there's a happiness as well as care.
> Music resembles poetry, in each
> Are nameless graces which no methods teach,
> And which a master-hand alone can reach.
> If, where the rules not far enough extend,
> (Since rules were made but to promote their end)
> Some lucky licence answer to the full
> The intent proposed, that licence is a rule.
> Thus Pegasus, a nearer way to take,
> May boldly deviate from the common track.
> Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend,
> And rise to faults true critics dare not mend;
> From vulgar bounds with brave disorder part,
> And snatch a grace beyond the reach of art,
> Which, without passing through the judgment, gains
> The heart, and all its end at once attains.

90 Weismann, p. 389.

91 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York, 1964), p. ix. Personal Knowledge was first published in 1958.

92 Ibid., p. xiv. In the Tacit Dimension Polanyi gives a particularly convincing example of the necessity of this passionate personal contribution. "Courts of law employ two separate lawyers to argue opposite pleas , because it is only by a passionate commitment to a particular view that the imagination can discover the evidence that supports it." (p. 79).

93 Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.

94 Ibid., p. 78.

95 Ibid.; see Polanyi's entire chapter on "articulation", pp. 69-131.

96 cf. Lawrence in "Morality and the Novel", Phoenix, p. 531. "Obviously, to read a really new novel will always hurt, to some extent. There will always be resistance. The same with new pictures, new music. You may judge of their reality by the fact that they do arouse a certain resistance, and compel, at length, a certain acquiescence."

97 Personal Knowledge, pp. 216-219, pp. 147-8.

98 Ibid., p. 263.

99 Ibid., p. 123. The idea is similar to that of Wittgenstein's "perceptual shift", the effecting of which he saw as the aim of philosophy. See C. B. Daly, "Polanyi and Wittgenstein", Intellect and Hope, p. 162.

100 As in the controversy between the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories or the one on the nature of alcoholic fermentation in which Pasteur was involved in the nineteenth century. For a more detailed description of these and other scientific controversies see Personal Knowledge, pp. 150-160.

101 Personal Knowledge, p. 266 n. from St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, Book I, par. 4.

102 For example, see Marjorie Grene's "Tacit Knowing and the Pre-Reflective Cogito", Helmut Kuhn's "Personal Knowledge and the Crisis of the Philosophical Tradition", Sir Francis Walshe's "Personal Knowledge and Concepts in the Biological Sciences" and Harold G. McCurdy's "Personal Knowing and Making" in Intellect and Hope. The implications for future discoveries which Polanyi's work seems to hold for these writers and for many others suggest that his own work meets the criteria of "fruitfulness" by which he feels we can judge the truth of a discovery.

103 For instance, Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind. See John Remsbury's comments (note 2), pp. 142-147.

104 Oscar Wilde, "The Decay of Lying" quoted in The Modern Tradition, ed. Richard Ellman and Charles Feidelson, Jr. (New York, 1965), pp. 18-19.

105 Ibid., p. 23.

106 This is almost word for word a statement made in class by a teacher of mine, the late Dr. William Blackburn, at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. I have never forgotten it, but have no memory of whether the words were his own or quoted from someone else.

107 See Lawrence's criticism of the particular dead-end for the novel which such extreme self-consciousness involves in "Surgery for the Novel - or a Bomb", Phoenix, pp. 517-520 (first published in 1923).

108 I do not for a moment want to suggest that this brief analysis sums up and dismisses the fiction or the poetry of these writers. It is only meant to indicate some of the problems they were up against; and although it might shed light on less satisfactory elements in their work, it cannot even begin to account for their successes.

109 See again Lawrence's letter to Gordon Campbell, 19th December 1914, L.M., pp. 300-304.

110 Tacit Dimension, p. 18.

111 Personal Knowledge, p. 92.

112 Tacit Dimension, p. 6.

113 P.K., p. 252. I don't want to imply that T. S. Eliot, as an artist, was unaware of this quality of language, for he certainly was not.

> . . . Words, after speech, reach
> Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
> Can words or music reach
> The Stillness, as a Chinese jar still
> Moves perpetually in its stillness.
>
> "Burnt Norton" V. ll. 140-143, The Four Quartets (London, 1959), sixth impression, p. 19.

The sense of the limitations of language is strong in Eliot, as it is in any writer.

> . . . Words strain
> Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
> Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
> Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
> Will not stay still.
>
> "Burnt Norton" V, ll. 149-153.

Flaubert expresses the same sense of the imperfection of language in Part II, Chapter 12 of Madame Bovary (Penguin ed., 1968), translated by Alan Russell, p. 203.

> High-flown language concealing tepid affection must be discounted, thought he: As though the full heart may not sometimes overflow in the emptiest metaphors, since no one can ever give the exact measure of his needs, his thoughts or his sorrows, and human speech is like a cracked kettle on which we strum out tunes to make a bear dance, when we would move the stars to pity.

Lawrence certainly understands this feeling. In Women in Love (New York, 1969), p. 178, Chapter XIV, "Water Party", he comments on a conversation between Birkin and Ursula.

> She knew, as well as he knew, that words themselves do not convey meaning, that they are but a gesture we make, a dumb show like any other . . . There was always confusion in speech. Yet it must be spoken. Whichever way one moved, if one were to move forwards, one must break a way through. And to know, to give utterance, was to break a way through the walls of the prison as the infant in labour strives through the walls of the womb.

Yet Lawrence's awareness of the imprecision of language is expressed more as an acceptance of the situation and a belief in the real discoveries we can make in our attempts to "give utterance" than is Eliot's or Flaubert's. Lawrence's work so often gives a sense of the riches, the suggestiveness of language, the power of words to persuade one even to false beliefs, let alone true ones (I am using the words "false" and "true" in the way in which Polanyi suggests is the only possible one - see P.K., pp. 71, 254-255) as recognised by Ursula in Chapter XXIX of Women in Love (pp. 428-429).

> She was always frightened of words, because she knew that mere word-force could always make her believe what she did not believe.

Eliot, however, often expresses a sense of the frustration of working with language, its limitations, while simultaneously his poetry, contradicting him (as Flaubert's Madame Bovary contradicts him), witnesses to its remarkable powers.

114 Polanyi, The Study of Man (London, 1959), pp. 68-69. (This passage can be interestingly compared to Lawrence's impatience with Hardy's characters in Chapter III of the "Study".) Polanyi often remarks that the way we live in our bodies, the way we attend from our bodies to the world outside, is the basic pattern for all thought. See T.D., pp. 15-16. There are interesting parallels here with Lawrence's comments on the danger of self-consciousness about our bodies.

115 Weismann, p. 394. It is interesting how similar to St. Augustine's description of the moment of vision is to that of Kepler, quoted in P.K., p. 7.

116 See the letter written to Ernest Collings, 24th February, 1913, L.M. p. 189; quoted from above, p. 14.

117 P.K., p. 405.

118 Ibid., p. 198.

119 Ibid., p. 199.

120 Ibid., p. 123. Stephen Miko's observation about Lawrence's seeming uncertainty over how to value "consciousness", "knowledge" and the "word" in the "Study" might, I think, benefit from an understanding of the ideal of knowledge Lawrence was trying to challenge and the one he was trying to substitute for it, very neatly formulated here by Polanyi. See Miko, pp. 190-194. One could interestingly compare Polanyi's use of language in this passage to a similar one of Lawrence's in Chapter II of the "Study".

> He who would save his life must lose it. But why should he go on and waste it? Certainly let him cast it upon the waters. Whence and how and whither it will return is no matter, in terms of values. But like a poppy that has come to bud, when he reaches the shore, when he has traversed his known and come to the beach to meet the unknown, he must strip himself naked and plunge in, and pass out: if he dare. And the rest of his life he will be a stirring at the unknown, cast out upon the waters.

Lawrence's image of man "stirring at the unknown, cast out upon the waters" gives a greater sense of the risk, the uncertainty, the excitement of the commitment involved. To speak of plunging to "gain a foothold at another shore of reality" implies that we can see the shore ahead of us and have only to jump. Polanyi, however, is really trying to convey something much more precarious and risky than that.

I have quoted from Polanyi at some length in order to make it possible for the reader to compare his use of language with Lawrence's "art-speech". In a sense, any comparision is unfair, as English is not Polanyi's native language and as the very audience he hopes to address and convince is suspicious of any human, living tones of voice involved in "transacting our serious business". See pages 52 and 53 below on how Polanyi's own use of language has affected the reception of Personal Knowledge.

121 Used by Lawrence in Chapter V of the "Study" (Phoenix, p. 433) as well as by Polanyi.

122 Used by Polanyi in P.K., Chapter VI.

123 Used by Lawrence, Phoenix, p. 249.

124 "Upon First Sitting Down to Read Personal Knowledge", Intellect and Hope, pp. 17-18.

125 T.D., p. 19.

126 The accepted view is that Lawrence had no feeling for science whatever. See John Remsbury (note 84 above), pp. 135-137; J. V. Davies (note 83 above), pp. 165-6 n. 16 and pp. 166-7 n. 20; and my own discussion on Chapter V of the "Study" below. Lawrence's comments on science in

Introduction to These Paintings find corroboration in Polanyi's writings and prove Lawrence more appreciative than most artists of how scientists really work.

> Any creative act occupies the whole consciousness of a man. This is true of the great discoveries of science as well as of art. The truly great discoveries of science and real works of art are made by the whole consciousness of man working together in unison and oneness: instinct, intuition, mind, intellect all fused into one complete consciousness, and grasping what we may call a complete truth, or a complete vision . . .
>
> Phoenix, pp. 573-574.

127 Apocalypse (New York, 1967), pp. 80-82.

CHAPTER ONE

"Look at the Unknown!" - Chapters I and II of the "Study"

"Of Poppies and Phoenixes and the Beginning of the Argument"

Polanyi, writing about the way in which one solves a mathematical problem, is trying to suggest that the processes a mathematician follows are similar to those of any discoverer.

> . . . the intensity of our preoccupation with a problem generates our power for reorganizing our thoughts successfully, both during the hours of search and afterwards, during a period of rest. But what is the object of this intensive preoccupation? How can we concentrate our attention on something we don't know? Yet this is precisely what we are told to do: 'Look at the unknown!' - says Polya [1] - 'Look at the end. Remember your aim. Do not lose sight of what is required. Keep in mind what you are working for. Look at the unknown. Look at the conclusion.' No advice could be more emphatic. [2]

The advice is not quite as impossible as it sounds. "The admonition to look at the unknown really means that we should look at the known data, but not in themselves, rather as clues to the unknown; as pointers to it and parts of it." [3] Also, when we have started to work on the solution to a problem, we are helped by "the fact that the tension set up by the unfinished task continues to make progress towards its fulfilment." [4] This tension is similar to the one generated in its most extreme form in religious ritual.

> Christian worship sustains, as it were, an eternal, never to be consummated hunch: a heuristic vision which is accepted for the sake of its unresolvable tension. It is like an obsession with a problem known to be insoluble, which yet follows, against reason, unswervingly, the heuristic command: 'Look at the unknown!' [5]

For Polanyi, the discoveries and creations of art lie somewhere in between science and religion. The finished work of art is not a solution to a problem in any simple way; it cannot be clearly stated or ever completely analysed and understood. "The work of art is more akin to an act of religious devotion in remaining, even in its finished form, an instrument of more active and comprehensive contemplation." [6] Yet, to the artist as he at last perfects a symphony, a painting or a poem, and to the one who hears the closing note, studies the finished canvas or shuts the covers of a book after reading the final chapter, is possible a certain resolution of tension, a sense of completion which is beyond the reach of the worshipper.

It is hard to know how to classify the "Study of Thomas Hardy" in terms of Polanyi's distinctions. Although Lawrence writes it in an attempt to deal with a problem - the problem of understanding the nature of Hardy's failure and of his success - it certainly offers no clear, straightforward solution. Reading the "Study" requires continuing "active and comprehensive contemplation"; like any work of art,

> Its appreciation has universal intent, and bears witness beyond that to the presence of an inexhaustible fund of meaning in it which future centuries may yet elicit. [7]

However, the movement of the "Study", the very working of its language, seems intent upon generating in the reader unresolvable tensions of the kind which Polanyi describes in the worship of God.

Chapter I - "Of Poppies and Phoenixes and the Beginning of the Argument" - for all its light-heartedness, the absence of any tone of pseudo-scientific seriousness, is an invitation to an adventure that will demand all the faculties of an alert reader. Just because Lawrence is capable of sounding the note of adventure so convincingly, of drawing us

after him, is no reason to assume that a difficult and sustained effort of attention will not be required of us - for it certainly is.

> The phoenix goes gadding off into flame and leaves the future behind, unprovided for, in its ashes. There is no prodigal poppy left to return home in repentance, after the red is squandered in a day. Vanity, and vanity, and pathetic transience of mortality. All that is left us to call eternal is the tick-tack of birth and death, monotonous as time. The vain blaze flapped away into space and is gone, and what is left but the tick-tack of time, of birth and death?
>
> But I will chase that flamy phoenix that gadded off into nothingness. Whoop and halloo and away we go into nothingness, in hot pursuit. Say, where are the flowers of yester-year? Ou sont les neiges d'antan? Where's Hippolyta, where's Thais, each one loveliest among women? Who knows? Where are the snows of yester-year?
>
> That is all very well, but they must be somewhere . . . (p.401)

The chase may sound like mere high spirits, a rather disorganised overflow of vitality, excess energy. Yet the whole of Chapter I is an attempt to suggest that such excess "is the thing itself at its maximum of being" (p. 402). The extraordinary energy which Lawrence is bringing to the task before him - that of creatively reading Hardy's novels - is perhaps the one thing most necessary for its success. "The intensity of our preoccupation with a problem generates . . . our power for reorganising our thoughts successfully." [8] That Lawrence's "intensity of preoccupation" with Hardy's work contributed to a masterly and significant organisation of his thoughts in the "Study" can best be seen by a close examination of the first four paragraphs in Chapter I in relation not only to their development in the rest of the chapter but to the central issues of the "Study" as well.

> Man has made such a mighty struggle to feel at home on the face of the earth, without even yet succeeding. Ever since he first discovered himself exposed naked betwixt sky and land, belonging to neither, he has gone on fighting for more

> food, more clothing, more shelter; and though he has roofed-in the world with houses and though the ground has heaved up massive abundance and excess of nutriment to his hand, still he cannot be appeased, satisfied. He goes on and on. In his anxiety he has evolved nations and tremendous governments to protect his person and his property; his strenuous purpose, unremitting, has brought to pass the whole frantic turmoil of modern industry, that he may have enough, enough to eat and wear, that he may be safe. Even his religion has for the systole of its heart beat, propitiation of the Unknown God who controls death and the sources of nourishment.
>
> But for the diastole of the heart beat, there is something more, something else, thank heaven, than this unappeased rage of self-preservation . . .
>
> Working in contradiction to the will of self-preservation, from the very first man wasted himself begetting children, colouring himself and dancing and howling and sticking feathers in his hair, in scratching pictures on the walls of his cave, and making graven images of his unutterable feelings. So he went on wildly and with gorgeousness taking no thought for the morrow, but, at evening, considering the ruddy lily.
>
> In his sleep, however, it must have come to him early that the lily is a wise and housewifely flower, considerate of herself, laying up secretly her little storehouse and barn, well under the ground, well tucked with supplies. And this providence on the part of the lily, man laid to heart. He went out anxiously at dawn to kill the largest mammoth, so that he should have a huge hill of meat, that he could never eat his way through. (pp. 398-399)

Nice enough, you might say. You can see why I feel that the various critical responses which treat it as doctrine or which subject it to a heavy-handed philosophical analysis don't quite do it justice. However, it has the appearance of too much ease, of effortless, relaxed reflection, not of vigorous intelligence - and there is no mention of Hardy, who is supposed to be the subject of this "Study". You feel you are in for a long and characteristic Lawrentian digression.

Look again. All the lines of enquiry that are to be followed through the "Study" are sketched in these first four paragraphs. Lawrence's analyses of the creative conflict between self-preservation and self-expression, body and spirit, of our religious heritage and the relations between the Old and New Testaments, of the paintings of Botticelli, Raphael, Turner and others, and of the Wessex novels all begin here.

The figure of man "exposed naked betwixt sky and land" is facing in isolation the question, "What does it mean to be alive?". He finds himself involved from the start in a conflict. He must preserve his life and he must waste it; both needs are real and inescapable, each need works against the other. It is a conflict in a peculiar sense, because he can never resolve it without bringing life to an end, any more than he could resolve the systole and diastole of his own heart beat without causing its proper work to cease.

The force of the law of self-preservation, the stark sense of man's need and vulnerability in the face of the elements, continues to manifest itself throughout the "Study" even as Lawrence goes on to examine man under the "tremendous governments" (Chapter II), in the "frantic turmoil of modern industry" (Chapter IV), which he evolved to ensure his own safety and security. Even twentieth century man must acknowledge the demands of Mother Earth, the inescapable reality of the physical dimension of life(in Chapter I).

To make the roots of this situation clear, Lawrence turns to the pre-historic past, remote from the complications of contemporary industrial society, and strips man down to the bare essentials - cave, mammoth meat and the "something more, something else, thank heaven, than this unappeased rage

of self-preservation". "Afraid of the coming winter with its scant supplies", an old man tells a fable about "the gaudy, fleeting poppy".

> "Don't, my dear children", continued the ancient paleolithic man as he sat at the door of his cave, "don't behave like that reckless, shameless scarlet flower. Ah, my dears, you little know the amount of labour, the careful architecture, all the chemistry, the weaving and the casting of energy, the business of day after day and night after night, yon gaudy wreck has squandered. Pfff!- and it is gone, and the place thereof shall know it no more. Now, my dear children, don't be like that."
>
> Nevertheless, the old man watched the last poppy coming out, the red flame licking into sight; watched the blaze at the top clinging around a little tender dust, and he wept, thinking of his youth. (p. 399)

The poppy makes the old man a little less certain that a good stock of supplies for the winter is enough to make a life, so he tells the children a story about a phoenix. "I have seen the eternal phoenix escape away into flame, leaving life behind in her ashes", (p. 399). The life rose from her ashes, grew and burst into flame - it happened again and again.

> And the flame was all the story and all triumph. The old man knew this. It was this he praised, in his innermost heart, the red outburst at the top of the poppy that had no fear of winter. (p. 399)

The flame of the phoenix, the red flag of the poppy are taunts to the "rage of self-preservation". The movement of life they represent is present in the opening paragraphs as well.

> . . . from the very first man wasted himself begetting children, colouring himself and dancing and howling and sticking feathers in his hair . . .

This inexplicable movement of the spirit away from practical realities is an attempt at self-expression, understanding and discovery, involving at times complete rebellion and recklessness. Lawrence traces its presence

from the dancing of primitive man to the plays of Aeschylus, the paintings of Botticelli, Raphael, Rembrandt and Turner, and Hardy's novels. They are all evidence of the struggle into articulation, the attempt to grow into distinct individuality, separate from the body of mankind. They are part of the "thought-adventure",[9] what Lawrence calls, later in the "Study", a "will-to-motion" contrasting it to the drive towards security, safety, the maintenance of the status quo, the "will-to-inertia".

We know already where Lawrence's sympathies lie. "But I will chase that flamy phoenix that gadded off into nothingness. Whoop and halloo and away we go into nothingness, in hot pursuit." Yet this wild reach and dance of the spirit away from the worry of self-preservation cannot be drawn as a development in a straight line from one phase of life to another. Rather, they participate in a recurring conflict. Man cannot go on "with gorgeousness" forever to the denial of the laws of existence. The rhythm establishes itself. We must consider the lily.

We must consider it, however, not only by the words of Jesus, the teacher of love - "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin; and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these" [10] - but by the realities of God the Father, Creator, giver of the law - "the lily is a wise and housewifely flower". We have learned from Christianity that the glory of the lily is its heedless burst into flower; that is its act of faith. Yet we know the other thing is true as well; the lily <u>is</u> "laying up secretly her little storehouse and barn". [11] Lawrence is here preparing us for the unorthodox way in which he will use Bible stories and biblical language throughout the "Study", reinterpreting them and seeing them from

fresh perspectives while simultaneously drawing on the richness of their traditional force and meaning as well.

"The ruddy lily" and the red poppy are, for Lawrence, the sign that life springs from this vital conflict. The poppy not only discloses its red, achieving its "complete poppy-self, unquestionable"; it is also life-rooted and like the lily, under the ground, "well tucked with supplies". The movement, rising from the root in a green stream to the red splash of the blossom, is a natural whole. From the dark earth the poppy grows until it uncovers its red. "Its light, its self, has risen and shone out, has run on the winds for a moment", (pp. 403-404); and the dark does not deny the light, nor the open air the earth, nor the blossom the root.

Yet the poppy is called a vanity and "we write it down a weed", (p. 403). The echoes of Ecclesiastes are not accidental, nor is the New Testament ring of "considering the ruddy lily". In one sense, the "Study" is Lawrence's response to Ecclesiastes - or, more accurately, to the use Hardy makes of Ecclesiastes in his novels - and to the "Unknown God who controls death and the sources of nourishment",[12] the God he is later to associate with the Old Testament in Chapters VII and VIII. The use of flowers to point a moral was not unusual in the Bible; it is the moral pointed in the New Testament which is different. In the Old Testament, a flower is the type of fading beauty, "vanity and flaunting vanity".

> All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof
> is as the flower of the field . . .
> The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: but
> the word of our God shall stand for ever.
>
> Isaiah 40: 6, 8.

> Man that is born of a woman is of few days,
> and full of trouble.
> He cometh forth like a flower, and is cut down.
>
> Job 14: 1-2.

This note is also struck in the New Testament (see James 1: 10-11; also I Peter 1:24 which is simply a repeat of Isiah 40: 6,8); but the exhortation for man to be like the lily in its carefree, trusting faith is totally original, unprecedented, as Lawrence perceives.[13]

> If then God so clothe the grass, which is today in
> the field and tomorrow is cast into the oven; how
> much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith?
> And seek not ye what ye shall eat, or what ye shall
> drink, neither be ye of doubtful mind.
> For all these things do the nations of the world seek
> after: and your Father knoweth that ye have need of
> these things.
> But rather seek ye the kingdom of God: and all these
> things shall be added unto you.
>
> Luke 12: 28-31
> (cf. Matthew 6:28-34)

Without the poppy's [14] wasteful burst into blossom, without this further movement in life, what would be left us? If such transience can only be called vanity, should we then "linger into inactivity at the vegetable, self-preserving stage . . . like the regulation cabbage, hide-bound . . . tight shut, a bunch of leaves, full of greenness and substance"? (pp. 402-403).

> Vanity, and vanity, and pathetic transience of mortality.
> All that is left us to call eternal is the tick-tack of
> birth and death, monotonous as time. The vain blaze
> flapped away into space and is gone, and what is left
> but the tick-tack of time, of birth and death? (p. 401)

Lawrence's answer to this question is to take off after the "vain blaze" and see where it leads him.

> . . . where are the flowers of yester-year? . . . they are
> not lost for ever. (p. 401-402)

The entire page that follows seems like a direct answer to the world-weary tone of the Preacher, Ecclesiastes, who is world-weary precisely because all he can call eternal is "the tick-tack of birth and death".

> Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities;
> All is vanity . . .
> The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be;
> and that which is done is that which shall be done:
> and there is no new thing under the sun.
> Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See,
> this is new? it hath been already of old time, which
> was before us.
> There is no remembrance of former things; neither shall
> there be any remembrance of things that are to come
> with those that shall come after.
>
> Ecclesiastes 1: 2, 9-11.

> . . . the dead know not anything, neither have they any
> more a reward; for the memory of them is forgotten.
> Also their love, and their hatred and their envy, is
> now perished; neither have they any more a portion
> for ever in any thing that is done under the sun.
> Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy
> wine with a merry heart . . .
> Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might;
> for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge,
> nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest.
>
> Eccles. 9: 5-7, 10.

Lawrence admits that the dead are gone in the sense that "I cannot walk up and say, 'How do you do, Dido?' as Aeneas did in the shades" (p. 402). However, he insists, in a way characteristic of a great novelist, on the uniqueness of every individual and the immortality it involves.

> She is something, I declare, even if she were utterly
> forgotten . . . What was Dido was new, absolutely new.
> It had never been before, and in Dido it <u>was</u>. In its
> own degree, the prickly sow-thistle I have just pulled
> up <u>is</u>, for the first time in all time. It is itself, a
> new thing. And most vividly it is itself in its yellow
> little disc of a flower: most vividly. In its flower,
> it is. In its flower it issues something to the world
> that never was issued before. Its like has been before,
> its exact equivalent never. (p. 402)

In the "full achievement of itself" (p. 403), each being achieves a kind of immortality, the immortality of the ruddy lily or the poppy which is physical and spiritual at once, as whole as life itself.

> The world is a world because of the poppy's red. Otherwise it would be a lump of clay. And I am I as well, since the disclosure. What it is, I breathe it and snuff it up, it is about me and upon me and of me. And I can tell that I do not know it all yet. There is more to disclose. (p. 404)

The writer of Ecclesiastes, realising that when he dies all of his labour and his wealth may pass into the hands of those who are not worthy of it, declares that all is vanity. He cannot take the fruits of his labour with him to the grave. Therefore, all that remains is "for one to eat and to drink, and to enjoy the good of all his labour that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life, which God giveth him" (Eccl. 5:18).[15] Lawrence maintains that life is more than eating, drinking and providing ourselves with something to eat and drink on the morrow; and what really matters, our achievement of wholeness in life, does not pass away. The flowers, the snows of yester-year, Dido, the phoenix are still with us, although "they may not be in any bank or deposit . . . they are not lost for ever", (pp. 401-2). For Lawrence,

> The aim, the culmination of all is the red of the poppy, this flame of the phoenix, this extravagant being of Dido, even her so-called waste. (p. 402)

Lawrence's perception of a tension in man's religion is stated on the first page of the "Study".

> Even his religion has for the systole of its heart-beat, propitiation of the Unknown God who controls death and the sources of nourishment.

> But for the diastole of the heart-beat, there is something more . . . (man) went on wildly and with gorgeousness taking no thought for the morrow, but, at evening, considering the ruddy lily. (p. 398)

He develops and extends this perception not only in Chapter I, as we have seen, but throughout the "Study", examining the Judeo-Christian tradition, the differences between the Old and New Testaments, between what have been stereotyped the faiths of rigid, Judaic law and gracious Christian love.

However, he continually returns to the flower, the poppy, setting its irreducible natural wholeness against the dichotomies he discusses. It is as if he wants to keep before him at all times the larger whole whose meaning he is trying to grasp. In the world of the "Study", contradictions, polarities, are sustained and explored in a way that reminds us of Keats' injunction for poetry: a poet should be "capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason". In fact, Lawrence's exploring of these polarities becomes a discipline of perception, dwelling in the disparate and frequently opposing particulars of life and experience, trying to see things one had missed before, in the hope that these particulars might function as tentative clues to some larger whole. Instead of surveying art, religion, society and history from only one vantage point, Lawrence's adopts a dual mode of vision; and this dual way of looking at things becomes not a rigid pattern but a method of training his eye, as a painter might, to attend more closely, to see further aspects of reality, and to see them not only in greater detail but in greater scope.

The suggestion of a painter has a certain appropriateness because the visual arts play an important part in the "Study". Again, Lawrence's

first four paragraphs should have prepared us; very early in the struggle into articulation, man is "scratching pictures on the walls of his cave and making graven images of his unutterable feelings". Immediately one's memories of ancient cave drawings are evoked - hunts, fishing expeditions, ritual dances - drawings in which the basic conflict between self-preservation and self-expending constantly reappears.[16] Lawrence's art criticism in Chapters VII and VIII continues to trace the presence of these and other opposing forces in the works of Botticelli, Raphael, Correggio, Michelangelo, Dürer, Rembrandt and Turner.

Thus, on the opening page of Chapter I, Lawrence has begun his examination of self-preservation and self-expression, the body and the spirit, Judaism and Christianity and the visual arts. Still, the "Study" is supposed to be about Hardy and Hardy is not mentioned.

Look again. The world of the Wessex novels is inescapably present in Lawrence's first few lines. When one reads later, in Chapter III, of the "constant revelation in Hardy's novels: that there exists a great background, vital and vivid, which matters more than the people who move upon it", (p. 419), the lonely figure of the first page "exposed naked betwixt sky and land, belonging to neither" again takes his place on the reader's mental horizon. When one reads that none of Hardy's "heroes and heroines care very much for money, or immediate self-preservation, and all of them are struggling hard to come into being", (p. 410), one is thrown at once back into the basic dialectic stated in the first four paragraphs.

In fact, it is Hardy's novels which have impressed upon Lawrence the reality of this dialectic or conflict for modern man and which force him to come to terms with it, to try to discover its roots and its

significance in man's experience, before approaching Hardy's art directly. In Jude the Obscure, Hardy gives us a tragedy of two individuals, trying to reach, through love, the full achievement of their special beings and defeated, as Hardy's epigraph suggests, by the letter of the law. Society is not yet ready for Jude and Sue, as Hardy is fond of telling us. In Tess of the D'Urbervilles, society is not yet prepared to accept Tess as a "pure" woman. What is it that defeats Hardy's outstanding characters? Is it only a tight social framework, which sees such outbursts of sheer individuality as a threat to its calm continued existence, the status quo? If so, isn't it only an extension of the "rage for self-preservation"?

> In his anxiety he has evolved nations and tremendous governments to protect his person and his property; his strenuous purpose, unremitting, has brought to pass the whole frantic turmoil of modern industry, that he may have enough, enough to eat and wear, that he may be safe. (p. 398)

Or is it a deeper failure, internal to the characters themselves? After all, even the carefree poppy is not free from the laws of self-preservation, yet it manages to burst into blossom. In fact, the bloom is unthinkable without the root. Do Hardy's characters simply lack the necessary life strength to break free from the mass, to become themselves, distinct? What is it in Hardy himself that leads him to disown his own finest creations and, in the end, turn them over to the enemy?

Lawrence has managed to capture the tone of Hardy's novels skilfully in this beginning chapter. The resigned tone of an Ecclesiastes is a note Hardy often strikes, although he strikes it more complacently and more readily than the Preacher, who at least makes a concerted effort to find meaningful that which other men have variously recommended - the search for wisdom, for beauty, pleasure, wealth or for righteousness. References

to Ecclesiastes are frequent in his novels. For instance, Mrs. Yeobright in The Return of the Native sadly says, "And yet we say 'a time to laugh!'" (Return, p. 256; Book III, Ch. VII), echoing Ecclesiastes 3:4. Gabriel Oak, when Bathsheba first refuses to marry him, has "the bearing of one who was going to give his days and nights to Ecclesiastes for ever" (Crowd, p. 36; Ch. IV).

In Tess of the D'Urbervilles, Hardy finds that not even Ecclesiastes is melancholy enough for his purposes. Tess is on her way to Flintcomb Ash and lies down for the night on a pile of leaves to rest from her journey.

> Was there another such a wretched being as she in the world? Tess asked herself; and, thinking of her wasted life, said, 'All is vanity.' She repeated the words mechanically, till she reflected that this was a most inadequate thought for modern days. Solomon had thought as far as that more than two thousand years ago; she herself, though not in the van of thinkers, had got much further. If all were only vanity, who would mind it? All was, alas, worse than vanity - injustice, punishment, exaction, death. (Chapter XLI) [17]

In Jude the Obscure Hardy turns to Job rather than Ecclesiastes, for in Job he finds the image of virtue and innocence mercilessly tormented which he needs. However, as Lawrence rightly observes (see p. 481 of the "Study"), the Book of Job does not end in bitterness and defeat. It is the tone of Ecclesiastes which is more characteristic of Hardy, for Ecclesiastes is a Book of Job with the final faith, wonder and submission left out. It is all despair, the Job Jude quotes as he dies.

> Why died I not from the womb? Why did I not give up the ghost when I came out of the belly?
>
> Job 3:11 [18]

> Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive.
> Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun.
>
> Eccles. 4:2-3

Lawrence conveys in Chapter I the central ambivalence of the Wessex novels, Hardy's uncertainty in the valuing of his strongest, most compelling characters when they try to "burst suddenly out of bud" and take "a wild flight into flower", (p. 410).

> Why, when we are away for our holidays, do we exclaim with rapture, "What a splendid field of poppies!." - or "Isn't the poppy sweet, a red dot among the camomile flowers!" - only to go back on it all, and when the troubles come in, and we walk forth in heaviness, taking ourselves seriously, later on, to cry, in a harsh and bitter voice: "Ah, the gaudy treason of those red weeds in the corn!" . . . or when we see the scarlet flutter in the wind: "Vanity and flaunting vanity", and with gusto watch the red bits disappear into nothingness, saying: "It is well such scarlet vanity is cast to nought". (p. 401)

The passage carries echoes from Hardy. In Far from the Madding Crowd, (Ch. I), Bathsheba Everdene sits in her spring waggon by Norcombe Hill, her scarlet jacket glowing in the sunlight, and she holds up a mirror to study herself, little suspecting Gabriel Oak's proximity or his rapidly forming opinion of her vanity. Sergeant Troy comes "haymaking for pleasure" in Bathsheba's field, and his soldier's uniform stands out as a "bright scarlet spot" against the more sober colours of his fellow labourers.[19] More significantly, the flaunting vanity and pride of this scarlet pair both attract and repel Hardy in the fluctuating manner Lawrence describes and criticises in our valuing of the poppy.

Why does Hardy do this? Why does he let himself be persuaded that what he treasures most has no permanent reality?

Is it the pressure of modern pseudo-scientific seriousness and rationalism that somehow scotches the full play of his imagination? It was, after all, a death-dealing blow to Lawrence's paleolithic man, who loved the red flag of the poppy.

> When his educated grandson told him that the red was there to bring the bees and the flies, he knew well enough that more bees and flies and wasps would come to a sticky smear round his grandson's mouth, than to yards of poppy-red.
>
> Therefore his grandson began to talk about the excess which always accompanies reproduction. And the old man died during this talk, and was put away. (pp. 399-400)

We may assume that the old man died because his grandson's view of reality was intolerably boring or perhaps merely because he was old and it was time for him to die. But he returned to have the last word, to insist that the excess was "the thing itself at its maximum of being" (p. 402), and it turned out that he had the last laugh as well; for "he had seen the heart of his grandson, with the wasteful red peeping out, like a poppy-bud", (p. 400). Even the grandson could not really manage to live by a conception of life which denied him the inevitable, full flowering of his truest self.

Nor could Hardy. It is the "wasteful red peeping out" in the Wessex novels which Lawrence sees, which betrays what Hardy really valued. However, as Lawrence tries to concentrate on what gives Hardy's novels their life, he is also faced with the question, what so often diminishes it? Why is it that what Hardy gives us with one hand he takes away with the other? Why does he repeatedly need to call in "Fate" or "the President of the Immortals" or society, some external force to account for the defeat of his men and women?

> As if any external power could give us the right to ourselves. That we have within ourselves. And if we have it not, then the remainder that we do possess will be taken away from us. (p. 404)

Hardy's calling in this external power to account for his tragedies also allows him to call in pity, to excuse the failures of his characters, to relieve them of responsibility. To Lawrence, such excuses only cloud the real issue. He Closes Chapter I with a saying which Christ's more pitying, excusing, compassionate followers have always found unpleasant. It comes at the end of the Parable of the Talents (or Pounds), a parable which puts the responsibility for doing something with our lives squarely on our own shoulders and which challenges the idea that we preserve ourselves "merely for the sake of remaining as we are", (p. 403). To the foolish man who returns his master's money, saying, "Lord, behold, here is thy pound which I have kept laid up in a napkin", there is a harsh answer.

> To them that have shall be given, and from them that have not shall be taken away even that which they have. (p.404)
>
> Luke 19:26, Matt. 25:29

The argument has begun.

Still Instoductory: About Women's Suffrage, and Laws, and the War, and the Poor, with Some Fanciful Moralizing

The Old Testament book of Ecclesiastes, with its injunction "to eat, and to drink, and to be merry" (8:15), was the ground bass of Lawrence's argument in Chapter I. In Chapter II, Lawrence does an original bit of New Testament exegesis, working with four verses from the Synoptic Gospels, Matthew, Mark and Luke (see page 92 below), showing how our distortion of one of them - "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" -

has caused us to avoid the full implications of the others, and the effect this limitation in thinking has had upon modern "Christian" society. However, Lawrence's method of exegesis is quite different from that which Nietzsche, as a philologist, once criticised.

> How little Christianity educates the sense of honesty and justice can be seen pretty well from the writings of its scholars: they advance their conjectures as blandly as dogmas and are hardly ever honestly perplexed by the exegesis of a Biblical verse. Again and again they say, "I am right, for it is written", and the interpretation that follows is of such impudent arbitrariness that a philologist is stopped in his tracks, torn between anger and laughter, and keeps asking himself: Is it possible? Is this honest? Is it even decent?
>
> What dishonesties of this sort are still perpetrated from Protestant pulpits today, how crudely the preachers exploit the advantage that nobody can interrupt them, how the Bible is pricked and pulled and the art of reading badly formally inculcated upon the people - all this will be underestimated only by those who go to church either never or always. 20

The difference between Lawrence's approach to biblical passages and the usual one of a biblical scholar can best be seen, I think, by comparing his use of the New Testament quotation at the end of Chapter I with the exegesis of it in a reputable, standard commentary, Peake's Commentary on the Bible. Explicating the Parable of the Pounds in the light of the verse preceding it, which says that Jesus told a parable "because they thought that the kingdom of God should immediately appear" (Luke 19:11), G. W. H. Lampe writes,

> The chief points are: (1) Christ's kingdom is not to appear now, as some expected; he must depart in order to receive it. (2) This will involve his rejection by Israel and the consequent destruction of the nation. (3) The Kingdom will be administered by his disciples. (4) This will involve its continual expansion, in contrast to the narrow and self-complacent attitude of the Jewish leaders . . . The task of the disciples is to

> extend the possessions of Jesus which have been entrusted to them, that is, to promote the coming world-wide mission. (Verse 26) - a narrow adhesion to present privileges and possessions, in the spirit of Judaism, means their forfeiture. 21

I do not wish to discount Lampe's interpretation, for I find it an interesting account of how the parable related specifically to the time in which it was spoken. It must be admitted that Lawrence does not do the work of a biblical scholar in the way Lampe does, trying to ascertain by historical study the particular situation, Sitz in Leben, in which the words were probably spoken. Such scholarship is a valuable part of the attempt to see the past less completely distorted through the eyes of the present than it invariably is.

However, an indispensable part of this attempt is the effort to understand what "through the eyes of the present" might mean, to admit to the limitations of our own perspective in the twentieth century and thus to allow for it in our interpretations of the past. It is important that we confront the literature of the tradition fully in each age, trying to make our own bias clear but also trying to come to some essential understanding of what is written. Only then can what is essential, permanent and unique to the works of the past begin to come clear over the years.

It is precisely this ongoing individual confrontation with the scriptural tradition which the tone of Lampe's commentary legislates against. "The chief points are", he tells us - in other words, this is what the parable means and this only. "I am the expert and I am telling you." The correct interpretation is found, and the uncomfortable verse twenty-six fortunately applies only to those who, like the early Jewish Christians, rest complacently in their religion without trying to spread it to the

Gentiles.

The historical meaning of the passage is discovered and fixed, and the reader is now excused from doing any independent thinking of his own. He has been told what the significance of the parable is, and the matter is settled. Thus, Lampe's comments are not only an example of, but also encourage in others, "the art of reading badly". Are Jesus' parables so easily understood? Can the varied and compelling impact they have had on Western civilisation since they were written be accounted for if they are seen as straightforward messages thinly disguised?

In Lawrence's use of New Testament passages in the "Study" we find the kind of honest perplexity Nietzsche saw as desirable; it grows out of Lawrence's awareness (an awareness which would be peculiarly strong in a novelist) that the force of Jesus' parables on Christians through the ages must have been at least partly a result of the fact that they are compact stories, open to multiple interpretations, bearing innumerable implications (in ways as yet unknown to us) for the future.

In his dealing with the final verse in the Parable of the Pounds, he carries G. W. H. Lampe's analysis - "a narrow adhesion to present privileges and possessions, in the spirit of Judaism, means their forfeiture" - beyond its restricted application to Jewish Christians in the first century A.D. It applies to all men, and this is why it is an uncomfortable saying. Rather than trying to paraphrase or analyse the passage in any way which might oversimplify or dismiss Jesus' teaching, Lawrence sets it down in a context which he has created both to attempt a definition and to extend the significance of the parable. The context of Chapter I in which Lawrence criticises living only for the sake of self-

preservation and also criticises the idea that we can excuse ourselves from the responsibility of achieving fulness of being by blaming some external power - this context in which Lawrence places the Bible verse Luke 19:26 challenges us to see it in relation to these two ideas. However, by placing it in his text seemingly without comment or a summary of its meaning, Lawrence sets the passage working on its own in the mind of the alert reader. It is the verse itself - not Lawrence's analysis of it - that he wants the reader to confront, to consider and re-examine, to carry with him as he reads on. He is trying to engage each of his readers in the ongoing effort to creatively confront and assimilate the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The method which Lawrence follows in Chapter II is to set different passages working in relation to each other in the context of his discussion of twentieth century society and World War I. It is a method which challenges the reader to read sensitively and not only take in Lawrence's suggestions in relation to the different verses but to think further about one's own understanding of them as well.

Lawrence knew the Bible thoroughly, much more thoroughly than most of those who read him today. I shall support this statement more fully in this and following chapters and show how Lawrence's art of reading <u>well</u> gave him a remarkable grasp of essential differences between the Old and the New Testaments. Although a lack of familiarity with the Bible would certainly limit any reader's appreciation of not only the "Study" but most of Lawrence's other writings (non-fiction and fiction) as well, the "Study" could to a certain extent create its own readers in this respect, and could also educate them to read Lawrence's other work more fully.

With a few qualifications, I would suggest that the "Study" could serve as well as - or perhaps better than - any other book or essay of comparable length as a sensitive and competent introduction to a study of the Bible and of the theology of the Old and New Testaments.

In Chapter II he works with the following verses.

> And he said unto them, Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, Physician, heal thyself: whatsoever we have heard done in Capernaum, do also here in thy country.
> And he said, Verily I say unto you, No prophet is accepted in his own country.
>
> Luke 4:23-24

> Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it giveth light unto all that are in the house.
> Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.
>
> Matthew 5: 15-16
> (Luke 11:33)

> Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it;
> And whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it.
>
> Luke 17:33
> (Mark 8:35, Matthew 10:39)

> Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.
>
> Mark 12:31
> (Matthew 22:39, Luke 10:27)

Lawrence is setting these passages, along with the one at the end of Chapter I, over against the world-view of Ecclesiastes. They call man to participate in a reality beyond that of mere continued (and finally discontinued) material existence. However, he feels that we have distorted Christ's command to love, have limited its meaning to apply, in the final analysis, only to the self-preserving side of life, and have thus made it possible for ourselves to avoid other more difficult implications of Christ's teachings. In the following passage Lawrence's criticism of Hardy is

implicit, most clearly in the line "And I am very sorry for myself, held in the grip of some stronger force".

> How do we love our neighbour? By taking to heart his poverty, his small wage, and the attendant evils thereof. And is that how we love our neighbour as ourselves? Do I, then, think of myself as a moneyed thing enjoying advantages, or a non-moneyed thing suffering from disadvantages? Evidently I do. Then why the tears? They must rise from the inborn knowledge that neither money or non-money, advantages or disadvantages matter supremely: what matters is the light under the bushel, the flower fighting under the safeguard of the leaves. I am weeping over my denied self. And I am very sorry for myself, held in the grip of some stronger force. Where can I find an image of myself? Ah, in the poor, in my poor neighbour labouring in the grip of an unjust system of capitalism. Let me look at him, let my heart be wrung, let me give myself to his service. Poor fellow, poor image, he is so badly off. Alas and alas, I do love my neighbour as myself: I am as anxious about his pecuniary welfare as I am about myself. I am so sorry for him, the poor X. He is a man like me. So I lie to myself and to him. For I do not care about him and his poverty: I care about my own unsatisfied soul. But I sidetrack to him, my poor neighbour, to vent on him my self-pity. (p. 408)

The passage has obvious similarities to Nietzsche's criticism of Christian pity in The Antichrist, which Lawrence might be assumed to be merely echoing. (The word Nietzsche uses is mitleid, literally "Suffering with"; it could be translated by "compassion", but Walter Kaufmann feels that "pity" alone "suggests the strong possibility of obtrusiveness and condescension apart from which Nietzsche's repugnance cannot be understood".)[22]

> Christianity is called the religion of pity. Pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality: it has a depressing effect. We are deprived of strength when we feel pity. That loss of strength which suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by pity. Pity makes suffering contagious. Under certain circumstances, it may engender a total loss of life and vitality out of all proportion to the magnitude of the cause (as in the case of the death of the Nazarene).

> That is the first consideration, but there is a more important one . . .
>
> Quite in general, pity crosses the law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction; it defends those who have been disinherited and condemned by life; and by the abundance of the failures of all kinds which it keeps alive, it gives life itself a gloomy and questionable aspect.
>
> Some have dared to call pity a virtue (in every noble ethic it is considered a weakness); and as if this were not enough, it has been made the virtue, the basis and source of all virtues . . .
>
> Pity is the practice of nihilism. To repeat: this depressive and contagious instinct crosses those instincts which aim at the preservation of life and at the enhancement of its value. It multiplies misery and conserves all that is miserable, and is thus a prime instrument of the advancement of decadence: pity persuades men to nothingness! Of course, one does not say "nothingness" but "beyond" or "God", or "true life", or Nirvana, salvation, blessedness.
>
> This innocent rhetoric from the realm of the religious - moral idiosyncrasy appears much less innocent as soon as we realise which tendency it is that here shrouds itself in sublime words: hostility against life . . .
>
> In our whole unhealthy modernity there is nothing more unhealthy than Christian pity. To be physicians here, to be inexorable here, to wield the scalpel here - that is our part, that is our love of man, that is how we are philosophers . . . 23

Nietzsche's tone here, however, is quite different from Lawrence's. Nietzsche the physician is going to cut pity, the "pathological and dangerous condition"[24] from the body of life; he is going to heal others, free them from their misconceptions. Lawrence not only calls us to examine our lives; he is trying to think more clearly about his own as well.

> Have we achieved to true individuality and to a sufficient completeness in ourselves? Because, if not - then, physician, heal thyself.

> That is no taunt, but the finest and most damning criticism ever passed: "Physician, heal thyself". No amount of pity can blind us to the inexorable reality of the challenge. (p. 405)

The self-righteousness which Nietzsche permits himself also leads him to dispense rather easily with "those who have been disinherited and condemned by life"; such failures are simply meant to die and should be left alone to do so. In other words, they really do deserve pity, whether they get it or not. Lawrence is not so condescending, nor so ready to dispense with the lives of others. He asks more thoughtfully, why is it some of us are failures? Can the sickness in the body politic be rooted out by the deaths of some or the imprisonment of others? What part does pity play in the problem?

> Whence does the degradation or perversion arise? . . . what is the sickness of the body politic ? Is it that some men are sex-mad or sex-degraded, and that some, or many, employers are money-degraded? And if so, will you, by making laws for putting in prison the sex-degraded, and putting out of power the money-degraded, thereby make whole and clean the State? Wherever you put them, will not the degradation exist, and continue? And is the State, then, merely an instrument for weeding the public of destructive members? And is this, then, the crying necessity for more thorough weeding? (p. 405)

Lawrence is also aware that some of those we choose to pity might well pity us instead, might achieve fulness of being in their own measure while we were sidetracking from the difficult business of achieving ours. The following passage not only shows us Lawrence's perception of this possibility (a possibility Nietzsche seems unaware of in his statement that those we pity are "ripe for destruction"); but it also is an example of the way Lawrence tries to <u>show</u> us the effects of pity in a parable - the method of a novelist - rather than <u>tell</u> us what they are, as Nietzsche does - the method of a philosopher.

> It is as if a poppy, when he is grown taller than his neighbours, but has not come to flower, should look down, and, because he can get no further, say: "Alas, for those poor dwindlers down there: they don't get half as much rain as I do." He grows no more, and his non-growing makes him sad, and he tries to crouch down so as not to be any taller than his neighbour, thinking his sorrow is for his neighbour; and his neighbour struggles weakly into flower, after his fight for the sunshine. But the rich young poppy crouches, gazing down, nor even once lifts up his head to blossom. He is so afraid of giving himself forth, he cannot move on to expose his new nakedness, up there to confront the horrific space of the void, he is afraid of giving himself away to the unknown. He stays within his shell.
>
> Which is the parable of the rich poppy. The <u>truth</u> about him is, he grows as fast as he can, though he devours no man's substance, because he has neither storehouse nor barn to devour them with, and neither a poppy nor a man can devour much through his own mouth. He grows as fast as he can, and from his innermost self he shuttles the red fire out, bit by bit, a little further, till he has brought it together and up to bud. There he hangs his head, hesitates, halts, reflects a moment, shrinking from the great climax when he lets off his fire . . . But his fire breaks out of him, and he lifts his head slowly, subtly, tense in an ecstasy of fear overwhelmed by joy, submits to the issuing of his flame and his fire, and there it hangs at the brink of the void, scarlet and radiant for a little while, immanent on the unknown, a signal, an outpost, an advance-guard, a forlorn, splendid flag quivering from the brink of the unfathomed void, into which it flutters silently, satisfied, whilst a little ash, a little dusty seed remains behind on the solid ledge of earth.
>
> And the day is richer for a poppy, the flame of another phoenix is filled in to the universe, something is, which was not. (p. 408-409)

The echoes of "consider the lily" and of the story of the rich young ruler (Luke 18:18-30, Matthew 19:16-30, Mark 10:17-31) are, of course, not accidental. (The passage is, by the way, a marvelous commentary on the story of the rich young ruler who held back in one thing, could not surrender completely to the new way of life Jesus opened to him[25].) The essential difference between Lawrence and Nietzche in their treatment of the effects

of pity is that Nietzsche equates Christianity and pity while Lawrence uses insights central to Christianity itself to show how pity permits us to sidetrack from our serious business in living and to avoid the most difficult teachings of the Christian faith. Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity, scathing and impressive as it is, seems rather glib when set beside Lawrence's in the "Study".

> What is more harmful than any vice? Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity. [26]

Lawrence phrases the begining of his attack on pity quite differently.

> Nothing will matter so long as life shall sprout up again strong after this winter of cowardice and well-being, sprout into the unknown. Let us only have had enough of pity: pity that stands before the glass and weeps for ever over the sight of its own tears. This is what we have made of Christ's Commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" - a mirror for the tears of self-pity. (p. 408)

"What we have made of Christ's Commandment" permits us to evade its real demands on us, also permits us to ignore other more strenuous teachings in the New Testament and "remain secure under the bushel" rather than "risk ourselves in a forward venture of life", (pp. 406, 408). Nietzsche's all-out condemnation of Christianity in the final section of The Antichrist is too easy; it excludes, ignores, too much that is central to Christianity and that the Christian faith has given to Western civilisation. Lawrence's comment in a letter to Gordon Campbell (December 1914) is an apt description of Nietzsche's Antichrist; "in making any passionate exclusion, one has already put one's right hand in the hand of the lie." [27]

> I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means is poisonous, stealthy, subterranean, small enough - I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind. [28]

How different the tone is here from that of the "Study" and from that of a letter Lawrence wrote two years after the "Study" was written.

> I have been reading St. Bernard's Letters, and I realise that the greatest thing the world has seen is Christianity, and one must be endlessly thankful for it, and weep that the world has learned the lesson so badly.
>
> But I count Christianity as one of the great historical factors, the has-been . . . I am not a Christian . . . There is something beyond the past. The past is no justification. Unless from us the future takes place, we are death only. That is why I am not a conscientious objector. The great Christian tenet must be surpassed, there must be something new: neither the war, nor the turning the other cheek. 29

One can only "weep that the world has learned the lesson so badly". In his attempt to suggest in the "Study" what might be the possible "something new" surpassing Christianity, Lawrence first tries to confront fully - and to make his reader confront fully - the hardest lessons of the Christian faith. For Lawrence, these lessons seem to have something to do with a willingness to risk oneself, to submit to the deepest demands of life upon us. "He who would save his life must lose it." It is the great riddle for those intent only on self-preservation. However, Lawrence adds, "Why should he go on and waste it?" (p. 409). World War I involves senseless waste of human life; this is the only good that can result from "world disaster : that we realize that we can still squander life and property and inflict suffering wholesale", (p. 407). Lawrence sees the war's rebellion against self-preserving cowardice as merely an inverted form of cowardice; what is needed is "some new courage to let go the securities, and to be, to risk ourselves in a forward venture of life, as we are willing to risk ourselves in a rush of death", (p. 408).

As it does for the poppy who "tense in an ecstasy of fear overwhelmed by joy, submits to the issuing of his flame and his fire" (p. 409), this"forward venture of life" involves a certain submission. This emphasis on submission, on receiving greater life as a gift from a reality greater than oneself, is characteristic of the man who criticised "the sense of power, of dominating life", saying that Nietzsche's "Wille zur Macht is a spurious feeling", ("Study", p. 491). Yet this submission to a power beyond ourselves does not relieve us of self-responsibility. Although when we fail to burst into blossom (like the rich young poppy who "is afraid of giving himself away to the unknown", p. 408), we either direct our self-pity onto others or try to blame our own failure on a certain insufficiency in the world external to us, Lawrence objects

> Could you make any law in the land, empowering the poppy to flower? You might make a law refusing it liberty to bloom. But that is another thing. Could any law put into being something which did not before exist? It could not. Law can only modify the conditions, for better or worse, of that which already exists.
>
> But law is a very, very clumsy and mechanical instrument,[30] and we people are very, very delicate and subtle beings. (p. 405)

The entire force of the chapter is directed to stripping us of our defences, the various "bushels" we cower under in order to avoid facing the unknown future into which we are called. Laws, society, women's suffrage (even though woman-suffragists are "certainly the bravest, and, in the old sense, most heroic party amongst us", p. 404), the war and the poor - we hide behind them all in an attempt to avoid the challenge Christianity offers.

Lawrence's closing paragraph returns to Ecclesiastes to contradict its wise investment policy idea of adventure ("Cast bread upon the waters:

for thou shalt find it after many days", Eccles. 11:1). It also suggests Lawrence's idea of hell in contrast to his idea of immortality in Chapter I; a reading of Canto III of Dante's Inferno would help suggest the full judgment on those who "prowl in rotten safety" on the shore. The final page of Chapter II in the "Study" and the following lines of the Inferno are very similar in spirit.

> Ed elli a me: "Questo misero modo
> tengon l'anime triste di coloro
> che visser sanza infamia e sanza lodo.
> Mischiate sono a quel cattivo coro
> de li angeli che non furon ribelli
> ne fur fedeli a Dio, ma per se fuoro . . .
> Fama di loro il mondo esser non lassa;
> misericordia e giustizia li sdegna:
> non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa." [31]

Living only for ourselves, for our own safety and comfort, is an abdication of a profound responsibility. Lawrence's closing paragraph tries to lead us to accept responsibility for our own lives, to respond fully to the demands of life upon us. It also tries to lure us to look at the unknown, to create the tension and the sense of adventure in us that we will need to struggle creatively with the problem ahead - that of reading Hardy's fiction and reading it well.

That the language he uses is religious, that he calls on teachings of the Christian faith, would seem very wise to Michael Polanyi, who sees the stance of man worshipping god as the highest form of mental dissatisfaction, a continued attempt at breaking out of established frameworks of thought. All discoveries, even the solution of a puzzle or a riddle, depend on man's capacity to sustain mental tension, to strive for a solution in the belief that an answer can be found, that some whole which relates meaningfully the particular clues before him is there to be comprehended. Religious faith is

a discipline, the severest training for the ability to sustain such tension, to break out of old habits of mind to further vision.[32]

> He who would save his life must lose it. But why should he go on and waste it? Certainly let him cast it upon the waters. Whence and how and whither it will return is no matter, in terms of values. But like a poppy that has come to bud, when he reaches the shore, when he has traversed his known and come to the beach to meet the unknown, he must strip himself naked and plunge in, and pass out: if he dare. And the rest of his life he will be a striving at the unknown, cast out upon the waters. But if he dare not plunge in, if he dare not take off his clothes and give himself naked to the flood, then let him prowl in rotten safety, weeping for pity of those he imagines worse off than himself. He dare not weep aloud for his own cowardice. And weep he must. So he will find him objects of pity. (pp. 409-410)

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Footnotes - Chapter I

[1] I shall give Polanyi's note on G. Polya from Personal Knowledge, p. 125 n. "A distinguished effort to lay down heuristic maxims has been made in our time by the mathematician G. Polya (How to Solve It, Princeton, 1945, and Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, 2 vols., London, 1954), mainly with a view to giving quidance for the teaching of mathematics. Penetrating observations on problem solving have also been contributed by the psychologists, mainly by Duncker and by Wertheimer." This particular quotation is from How to Solve It, p. 112, italics in the original.

[2] Personal Knowledge, p. 127.

[3] P.K., pp. 127-128.

[4] P.K., p. 129. Polanyi supports this idea with findings from Gestalt psychology. "Mrs. Zaigarnik has shown that unfinished tasks continue . . . to preoccupy us unconsciously; their memory persists after finished tasks are forgotten", from W. D. Ellis, A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology (London and New York, 1938), pp. 300-14.
cf. Polya, "Only such problems come back improved after a rest whose solution we passionately desire and for which we have worked with great tension", How to Solve It, p. 172, (from P.K., p. 127 n.).

[5] P.K., p. 199.

[6] P.K., p. 200.

[7] P.K., p. 201.

[8] P.K., p. 127.

[9] A phrase taken from a later Lawrence essay, "Books", Phoenix pp. 731-734 (written early in 1924, according to Keith Sagar, The Art of D. H. Lawrence, Cambridge, England, 1966, p. 143).

[10] Matthew 6:28-29 (cf. Luke 12:27); all quotations from the Bible will be from the King James' Version.

[11] cf. Lawrence's passage on the lily (Lilly?) in Chapter 13 of Aaron's Rod. "The lily toils and spins hard enough, in her own way. But without strain and that anxiety with which we try to weave ourselves a life. The lily is life-rooted, life-central. She cannot worry. She is life itself, a little, delicate fountain playing creatively, for as long or as short a time as may be, and unable to be anxious . . . She is perfectly herself, whatever befall; even if frosts cut her off.

Happy lily, never to be saddled with an idée fixe, never to be in the grip of a monomania for happiness or love or fulfilment. It is not laisser aller. It is life-rootedness. It is being by oneself, life-living, like the much-mooted lily. One toils, one spins, one strives: just as the lily does. But like her, taking one's own life-way amidst everything, and taking one's own life-way alone." Lawrence's words here are a good comment on his use of the poppy image throughout the "Study". (London, 1922), Penguin ed., 1968, p. 201.

12 Jane Harrison's little book, Ancient Art and Ritual (London, 1913), which Lawrence read before he wrote the "Study", sees the purpose of primitive ritual completely in terms of self-preservation. "The two great interests of primitive man are food and children . . . if man the individual is to live he must have food; if his race is to persist he must have children", (p. 50). Thus man focuses his attention on the food supply, the animals or plants on which he depends and the seasons which bring them, and all of his periodic religious festivals and rites are performed in order to ensure their arrival (cf. pp. 74, 81, 83, 118, 139). One of the main distinctions she draws between art and ritual is that the latter always is done with a practical end, whereas art is cut off from immediate action, is impractical (p. 135).

We can see how Lawrence modified her simple picture of the interests of primitive man. For her, art did not develop until fairly late after ritual had lost its magic power, its seeming practicality.

> . . . ritual makes, as it were, a bridge between real life and art, a bridge over which in primitive times it would seem man must pass. In his actual life he hunts and fishes and ploughs and sows, being utterly intent on the practical end of gaining his food . . . though his (ritual) acts are unpractical, being mere singing and dancing and mimicry, his intent is practical, to induce the return of his food-supply. In the drama . . . the intent is altered: man has come out from action . . . The drama is an end in itself . . .
>
> The leap from real life to the emotional contemplation of life cut loose from action would otherwise be too wide. Nature abhors a leap, she prefers to crawl over the ritual bridge. (pp. 135-136)

Lawrence seems intent on proving that Nature need do nothing of the kind. "From the very first man wasted himself begetting children, colouring himself and dancing and howling and sticking feathers in his hair" (underlines mine). Although he most likely drew on Miss Harrison's book for his perception of the "Unknown God who controls death and the sources of nourishment", he contradicts her in two ways. He refuses to believe that man ever, even in prehistoric times, lived only to eat and to preserve himself. "As if we preserved ourselves merely for the sake of remaining as we are", (p. 403). Miss Harrison's view of primitive man seems to him

a limited and stereotyped one, full of the condescension of twentieth-century civilisation. Second, he finds religion and ritual, also from the very beginning, more complex than Miss Harrison does. Ritual does not always have a practical end, but is sometimes an expression of sheer worship and wonder. Years later, in Apocalypse, Lawrence emphasised again the wonder which primitive man felt about the world in which he lived (Apocalypse, pp. 84-85). Miss Harrison does not seem to allow for this possibility, though how she plans to substantiate the following statement is not clear. It is too bold and easy a simplification. "It cannot too often be remembered that primitive man has but little, if any, interest in sun and moon and heavenly bodies for their inherent beauty or wonder; he cares for them, he holds them sacred, he performs rites in relation to them mainly when he notes that they bring the seasons, and he cares for the seasons mainly because they bring him food." (p. 67). Lawrence contradicts this idea in Apocalypse (pp. 41-47), talking of early man's relating to the sun and moon, a relation we have lost. He is interestingly supported by the observations of C. G. Jung of the Elgonyi tribe in Africa, see Modern Man in Search of a Soul (New York, 1933), translated by W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes, pp. 150-151. See all of Jung's Chapter 7, on "Archaic Man".

I will be referring to Jane Harrison's book throughout in order to point to its possible relation to or influence on the "Study". A. W. McLeod sent a copy of it to Lawrence in Italy in late October, 1913. To McLeod, thanking him, Lawrence wrote (H. T. Moore guesses the date to be 26th October, 1913), "the book on Art and Ritual pleases me most just now. I am just in the mood for it. It just fascinates me to see art coming out of religious yearning - one's presentation of what one wants to feel again, deeply". (L.M., p. 234). On 2nd December, 1913, he wrote to McLeod again, "You have no idea how much I got out of that Ritual and Art book - it is a good idea - but a school marmy woman who writes it", (L.M., p. 249). On the same day to Henry Savage he wrote," . . . when you can lend me books about Greek religions and rise of Greek Drama, or Egyptian influences - or things like that - I love them. I got a fearful lot out of a scrubby book Art and Ritual - one of the Universal Knowledge Shilling series. It is stupidly put, but it lets one in for an idea that helps one immensely," (L.M., p. 250).

13 Lawrence's emphasis on the risk and openness required in the venturing faith of the lily in the New Testament has echoes in Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London, 1966), p. 151: "The cistern contains: the fountain overflows."

14 A minor, but interesting point, is that Lawrence is probably quite accurate in speaking of the "ruddy lily" and thus associating it with his poppy. The Hebrew word for lily (Shushan) in the Old Testament is "a general term for lily-like flowers, as the lily, iris, gladiolus, etc., and may include the poppy-anemone, which in spring paints with bright scarlet the plains of Palestine". The Oxford Cyclopedic Concordance (London), p. 176.

15 The writer of Ecclesiastes also exhorts the reader to "Fear God, and keep his commandments" (Eccl. 12:13) but his belief in God does not seem to help him in his depression. His faith "does not give its possessor the power to overcome the experiences which oppress him and the outlooks which confuse him, but remains there - as it has been expressed - like the remnant of childhood faith which has survived into adult manhood - still of some value, but without dynamic. If we want to measure the difference between a genuine and living certainty of God and a faith in God which has been pushed right to the fringe of a philosophy of life, then we must place (Ecclesiastes) side by side with Job", Otto Eissfeldt, The Old Testament (New York, 1965), translated by Peter R. Ackroyd, p. 495. Interestingly enough, this is what Lawrence does. He leaves his concern with Ecclesiastes in Chapters I and II to look at Job in Chapter IX (see pp. 480-1 of the "Study").

It is interesting to note that Nietzsche was also impatient with the "All is vanity" tone of the wisdom writings in the Bible.

> "Why live? All is vanity!" . . . Such antiquarian babbling is still considered "wisdom"; it is honoured all the more for being old and musty. Mustiness too ennobles . . . There is much childishness in the old books of wisdom . . . Such men sit down to table and bring nothing along, not even a good appetite; and then they blaspheme: "All is vanity." But eating and drinking well, O my brothers, is verily no vain art. Break, break the old tablets of the never gay!
>
> From Thus Spoke Zarathustra III, 13 in The Portable Nietzche (New York, 1954), edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, p. 316.

16 Again, Lawrence is both drawing on Jane Harrison's Ancient Art and Ritual and contradicting her. She mentions the portrayal of ritual in ancient painting. "Countless bas-reliefs that decorate Egyptian tombs and temples are but ritual practices translated into stone", (p. 18). However, she sees this ritual itself as concerned solely with self-preservation and the paintings as having a practical intent of increasing the food supply.

> It is now held by some and good authorities that the prehistoric paintings of cave-dwelling man had also a ritual origin; that is, that the representations of animals were intended to act magically, to increase the "supply of the animal or help the hunter to catch him".
>
> (p. 192 n.)

Lawrence does not seem to want to explain away the mystery of these cave-paintings of primitive man by asserting that they were merely done to help ensure a successful hunt. He is like the ancient paleolithic man in Chapter I of the "Study" who will not be convinced that the poppy's red blossom is merely "the excess which always accompanies reproduction" (pp. 399--400). He fights the "conceit of self-preservation and of race-preservation"

(p. 400) of modern scientific rationalism which would account for all life in material terms. Such an accounting leaves too many questions unanswered, as it does in the theory of survival of the fittest and of the evolving of more complex forms of life by random mutation and selective adaptation. See my discussion of Lawrence's alternative theory of evolution in Chapter V of the "Study" (Ch. III of this thesis) and of the questions Michael Polanyi raises about evolutionary theory in Personal Knowledge and The Tacit Dimension (P.K., pp. 382-397; T.D., Chapter II, especially pp. 47-52, pp. 87-92).

17 Tess of the D'Urbervilles (London, 1910), p. 358.

18 T. Hardy, Jude the Obscure (London, 1966), Pocket Papermac 1971, p. 418, Part VI, Ch. XI.

19 Hardy, Far From the Madding Crowd (London, 1927), p. 195, Ch. XXV.

20 Nietzsche, The Dawn, 84 from The Portable Nietzsche (New York, 1954), edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, p. 80. Italics in the original.

21 G. W. H. Lampe, "Luke", Peake's Commentary on the Bible, edited by Matthew Black and H. H. Rowley (London, 1962), p. 838.

22 Walter Kaufmann, ed. The Portable Nietzsche, p. 4.

23 The Antichrist: Attempt at a Critique of Christianity from The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 572-574.

24 Ibid., p. 574.

25 Lawrence's comparison of the poppy to the rich young ruler goes to the heart of the New Testament story. The episode is not meant to be taken as a straightforward statement that everyone must give up all their possessions in order to be a Christian, although certainly a strong comment on excessive wealth is intended. However, the problem goes deeper. cf. R. McL Wilson, "Mark", Peake's Commentary, p. 811. "The 'counsel of perfection' (Mark 10:21) should not be generalised; this was the crucial test in this particular case, but the barrier in other cases may be different." Also see G. W. H. Lampe, "Luke", p. 838, "Reception of the Kingdom means total self-surrender . . .".

26 The Antichrist, p. 570.

27 L.M., p. 300.

28 The Antichrist, p. 656.

29 L.M., pp. 466-467; to Catherine Carswell, 16th July 1916.

30 The comments on law and society in Chapter II should be read in relation to Lawrence's early correspondance with Bertrand Russell. Lawrence is not arguing in favour of extreme individuality or a kind of Social Darwinism; he is merely stating his life-long belief that political action can only take us so far and that it is not far enough. However, Lawrence was sympathetic with the aims of Socialism, starting from his relation with socialist friends in Eastwood, and in his letters to Russell he seems to take the rightness of these aims for granted. The political solutions seemed to him so obvious that he wasted little energy on expounding or defending them; as the following excerpt from a letter to Russell shows (written a few months after the "Study" was completed; 12th February 1915), Lawrence was eager to get bothersome political questions out of the way in order to move on to more serious considerations.

> I write to say to you that we must start a solid basis of freedom of actual living - not only of thinking. We must provide another standard than the pecuniary standard, to measure all daily life by. We must be free of the economic question. Economic life must be the means to actual life. We must make it so at once.
>
> There must be a revolution in the state. It shall begin by the nationalising of all industries and means of communication, and of the land - in one fell blow. Then a man shall have his wages whether he is sick or well or old - if anything prevents his working, he shall have his wages just the same. So we shall not live in fear of the wolf - no man amongst us, and no woman, shall have any fear of the wolf at the door, for all wolves are dead.
>
> Which practically solves the whole economic question for the present . . . Something like this must be done. It is no use saying a man's soul should be free, if his boots hurt him so much he can't walk. All our ideals are cant and hypocrisy till we have burst the fetters of this money.
>
> (L.M., pp. 316-317)

This breezy approach to the problem simply shows Lawrence's deeper interest in the human problems that would remain after the economic ones were solved. Although he never really came close to seriously involving himself in any political action, his friendship with Russell in 1915 was the time of his life when he came closest to doing so. (I do not find Kangaroo at all convincing as an account of Lawrence's temptation to enter the political arena. There is never the slightest real suspicion that Somers will commit himself to the cause of either Kangaroo or Willie Struthers.)

Yet, as he wrote in "The State of Funk" (Phoenix II, p. 567; Sagar suggests it was written in late 1928, see Sagar, p. 202), "As a novelist, I feel it is the change inside the individual which is my real concern. The great social change interests me and troubles me, but it is not my field. I know a change is coming - and I know we must have a more generous, more human system based on the life values and not on the money values. That I know. But what steps to take I don't know. Other men know better".

31 La Divina Commedia (Florence, 1954), pp. 24-25, ll. 34-39, 49-51.

> And he to me: "This miserable mode the dreary souls of those sustain, who lived without blame, and without praise. They are mixed with that caitiff choir of the angels, who were not rebellious, nor were faithful to God; but were for themselves . . . Report of them the world permits not to exist; Mercy and Justice disdains them: let us not speak of them; but look, and pass."
>
> Translation by J. A. Carlyle (1867) revised by H. Oelsner, The Inferno of Dante Alighieri (London, 1970), p. 29.

32 P.K., see pp. 195-202, pp. 279-286.

CHAPTER TWO

"The greater unwritten morality"

In Chapter III of the "Study" - "Containing Six Novels and the Real Tragedy" - we plunge into the world of Hardy's novels. Lawrence brings three questions with him from Chapters I and II. Why is the poppy called "vanity and flaunting vanity" when it is really "the thing itself at its maximum of being" (p. 402) ?. Why do we so often blame our own failure to achieve our real selves on some greater, external power? And why do we so often sidetrack from the difficult business of producing ourselves to feeling pity for others, a pity that we mistakenly equate with Christian love?

These questions all have a serious relation to the Wessex novels and the "tragedies" enacted in them. Lawrence feels that the answer to all three lies, at least in part, in the problem of "the greater unwritten morality" which Hardy tries to suggest in his fiction and to which his characters are, in Lawrence's opinion, unfaithful.

> This is the wonder of Hardy's novels, and gives them their beauty. The vast, unexplored morality of life itself, what we call the immorality of nature, surrounds us in its eternal incomprehensibility, and in its midst goes on the little human morality play, with its queer frame of morality and its mechanized movement; seriously, portentously, till some one of the protagonists chances to look out of the charmed circle, weary of the stage, to look into the wilderness raging round. Then he is lost, his little drama falls to pieces, or becomes mere repetition, but the stupendous theatre outside goes on enacting its own incomprehensible drama, untouched. (p. 419)

Lawrence asks what happens to Hardy's characters when they "look into the wilderness raging round", break out of the established patterns of their lives to look at the unknown? The glimpse they catch of something greater,

beyond what they have known, makes their "little dramas" seem empty; yet so often in Hardy's world, this glimpse of a further reality brings destruction, unhappiness, defeat, rather than discovery, a finer knowledge and extended being. In Chapter III Lawrence discusses Hardy's novels in such a way as to suggest that exploration of this "greater unwritten morality" might lead us (1) to change our notions of what was vain and what was not, (2) to understand more fully the nature of whatever external forces we were up against and to discriminate between them, and (3) to learn the difference between pity and "the hardest lesson of love" (p. 512).

It is Hardy's art which helps clarify these issues for Lawrence, and the tone of his criticism - in spite of those moments when he takes issue with Hardy - is one of respect and gratitude for the "thought-adventure" which the Wessex novels have provoked for him. Henry James may have been in a position (as few of us are) to speak of "the good little Thomas Hardy"[1]; what is remarkable is that Lawrence was also in such a position and he did not. It is important to realise how seriously, at this time in his life, Lawrence takes Hardy's work. He certainly quarrels with Hardy extensively in the "Study", even rewrites him occasionally; but Lawrence seldom took much time to quarrel with authors he felt to be trivial and unimportant. The extent of his engagement with Hardy's novels is a measure of his admiration for them.

Chapter III - only eleven pages long - not only begins the development of Lawrence's major questions about Hardy, questions he continues to ask and tentatively answer throughout the "Study"; it also shows important characteristics of Lawrence's literary criticism as it was to develop over the years. I will discuss these briefly here,

before going on to consider Lawrence's comments on the Wessex novels themselves.

The Critical Task

W. H. Auden's opinion of Lawrence's literary criticism, is, I think, a fairly common one. Auden enjoys reading it but has reservations about its intellectual worth.

> Lawrence's literary criticism Studies in Classical American Literature, the essay on 'Galsworthy', the reviews of novels - are wonderful in a very odd way . . . He is often quite dotty, he does not make the faintest pretence at being objective . . . 2

Or, as R. E. Pritchard says of Studies in Classic American Literature, "the essays display Lawrence's attempt to analyse and solve his personal problems".[3] Theodore Spencer, writing about Phoenix, tells us that

> . . . Lawrence, with all his wordiness, his longueurs, his digressions, is worth listening to. Even when he is off the track, as in the long essay on Hardy in the present volume, he is worth listening to. 4

All of these critics enjoy reading Lawrence's work, but they seem to be a little ashamed of their admiration for it. They feel it is somehow suspect, too subjective, and they want to make it clear to the scholarly world that they are aware of its limitations.

Why is Lawrence's criticism so often labelled "subjective"? It appears at times that the word applies to any non-fiction work which seems too obviously to have been written by a human being, an individual "subject". Of course, this is a situation we can hardly avoid. It is just that Lawrence was more honest about it than most. D. J. Gordon in his excellent book, D. H. Lawrence as a Literary Critic, points to the dangers of dishonesty in this matter and suggests that distrust of Lawrence's criticism because of the admitted presence of his individual bias and vision may be

dwindling because of another dawning realisation.

> A good deal of modern formal criticism is, we are beginning to realize, more ideological than it pretends to be . . . the authority of Eliot's antagonism is considerably weakened when we realize - as many are now coming to do - that he and critics of his school are also, but covertly, ideological. 5

There is an easy way of trying to appear objective by simply removing all human tones from one's voice and one's writing and seeming very distant and detached from the work one is criticising. I suggest that we adopt instead Michael Polanyi's definition of true objectivity which would clear away some of the confusion. It would permit us to admit that an individual person is behind all criticism and all knowledge, that one's individual personhood is, in fact, an indispensable part of all knowledge, without forsaking all our hopes that we could make discoveries that had objective life and truth beyond ourselves. Here is the attack on the false ideal of objectivity with which Personal Knowledge opens.

> In the Ptolemaic system, as in the cosmogony of the Bible, man was assigned a central position in the universe, from which position he was ousted by Copernicus. Ever since, writers eager to drive the lesson home have urged us, resolutely and repeatedly, to abandon all sentimental egoism, and to see ourselves objectively in the true perspective of time and space. What precisely does this mean? In a full 'main feature' film, recapitulating faithfully the complete history of the universe, the rise of human beings from the first beginnings of man to the achievements of the twentieth century would flash by in a single second. Alternatively, if we decided to examine the universe objectively in the sense of paying equal attention to portions of equal mass, this would result in a lifelong preoccupation with interstellar dust, relieved only at brief intervals by a survey of incandescent masses of hydrogen - not in a thousand million lifetimes would the turn come to give man even a second's notice. It goes without saying that no-one - scientists included - looks at the universe this way,

> whatever lip-service is given to 'objectivity'. Nor should this surprise us. For, as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity. [6]

Polanyi goes on to substantiate his perception of this absurdity with examples from the history of science. The definition of true objectivity at which he arrives after this survey of the way in which scientists work cannot be a popular one. It is too difficult. It involves real discipline and great energy and cannot be achieved by a trick of sounding distant and manipulating scholarly terms. It requires creative discovery which makes contact with reality and which sooner or later compels its own recognition as truth by right of this contact.

> Such is the <u>personal participation</u> of the knower in all acts of understanding. But this does not make our understanding <u>subjective</u>. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed <u>objective</u> in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality; a contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps yet inconceivable) true implications. It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of the personal and the objective as Personal Knowledge. 7

Lawrence's own definition of a subjective critic is "the critic who gives us the impression that he is looking in a mirror".[8] It is no description of the atmosphere of the "Study". Lawrence's criticism of Hardy bears the marks of tough intellectual work as well as of a highly individual, creative vision; and Lawrence certainly was attempting to see Hardy's work truly, objectively (I shall use the word "objective" from this point on in the way in which Polanyi decides to use it, unless it is within inverted commas). Lawrence had not only read fourteen Hardy novels[9],

managing to keep the story and characters of each alive and yet distinct in his mind - certainly no small feat; he was also aware of Hardy criticism current at the time, and a great deal of his argument is concerned with carefully examining and re-defining the terms previously used almost unthinkingly in relation to Hardy's art.

What was the opinion of Hardy current in the early twentieth century? As Q. D. Leavis points out in her article "Hardy and Criticism", Hardy's immediate contemporaries considered him fairly ordinary as a novelist.[10] "They were not deep enough in the machine age to ecstasize over the glimpses of pastoral England his novels afford, and they had enough good models current in fiction to recognize how awkward his style was, how limited his conception of characterization, and . . . the imperfect relation between the moral feeling and the fable he found for embodying it."[11] However, as the standard of comparison came to be George Meredith rather than George Eliot, Hardy's standing improved. "It was Hardy himself who claimed for his novels an Aeschylean intention and a Sophoclean unity and grandeur"; by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, his claim was being taken quite seriously.[12]

Lascelles Abercrombie's book, Thomas Hardy: A Critical Study, which came out in 1912, was one of the better books to express this "very solemn acceptance of Hardy's novels".[13] He describes the humour and function of Hardy's rustics as Shakespearean and refers to the influence of his "loving study of Sophocles" on Hardy; and although he can't quite accept Hardy's statement in The Woodlanders that Sophoclean dramas are enacted "in the real" in Wessex, he allows that "'dramas of a grandeur and unity truly Sophoclean' may be credibly imagined" in the world Hardy describes.

He then goes on to discuss the "unity and grandeur" involved in Hardy's creation of tragedy out of his Wessex material.[14]

A third phase of Hardy criticism has involved a more deliberately tempered view of the novels, especially as they came to be compared with the finer art of Henry James and Joseph Conrad, with the occasional more extreme voice of abrupt dismissal or debunking making itself heard in the wings.[15] It is important to see both how Lawrence was influenced by current critical opinion in 1914 and how he was ahead of his time in the ways he fought against it. The "Study" especially shows how Lawrence responded to and quarrelled with Lascelles Abercrombie's study of Hardy.

Lawrence asked Edward Marsh on 15th July, 1914, if he could borrow Abercrombie's book and scribble notes in it.[16] Evidently Marsh simply gave him a copy along with several of Hardy's novels.[17] Within a month and a half Lawrence had started writing the "Study"; in that short space of time he had done a great deal of reading and original thinking and his criticism of Hardy is quite unlike that of anyone else at the time.

Like Abercrombie, Lawrence took Hardy's art seriously. Also like Abercrombie, Lawrence found Hardy's rendering of Egdon Heath in The Return of the Native impressive, the "great background" against which the story was enacted.[18] But there the similarity ends. Lawrence does not rhapsodise over Hardy's rustics or find their humour Shakespearean, nor does he praise Hardy for embodying a certain philosophy then current (Abercrombie refers to it as "our ultimate conception"[19]) in his work. Lawrence's major challenge to the accepted estimate of the Wessex novels, however, was his refusal to grant them the status of Shakespearean or Greek tragedy without some serious qualification. Terms which were frequently

used in relation to Hardy's art, the appropriateness of which was taken for granted, Lawrence insisted on re-examining. He was unwilling to perpetuate the unthinking reliance of Hardy critics on such heavily weighted words as "destiny", "tragedy", "fate", "metaphysic" or even "the great background".[20] Many of these words, plus the suggested comparisons with Aeschylean or Sophoclean tragedy, came from Hardy's novels, but no one had stopped to ask if they should be taken at face value. Lawrence insists on paying close attention to the terms themselves, thinking over the assumptions that lay behind them, and using them only after re-defining them carefully in a specific context. He also points out that there is another series of words at work in the Wessex novels besides the fate-destiny-tragedy complex, one which, taken with the other, involves Hardy in certain contradictions. This is the society-morality-law-convention terminology which is at its strongest in Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure.[21]

Lawrence correctly perceived that before thinking about Hardy could move any further it would have to reconsider and revise the very language in which it was written. This careful attention to the words one uses, the ground and limits of one's argument, is characteristic of Lawrence's best criticism. It involves a recognition not only of the limitations of one's own perspective but also of one's ability to transcend these and achieve objectivity by clearly understanding and making clear to others what these limitations and particular viewpoints are. As Lawrence himself said,

> To be honest in writing one has to write from some point of view, and leave all other aspects, from all remaining points of view, to be conjectured. One can't write without feeling - and feeling is bias. 22

The criteria which Lawrence himself set for a good critic (in an essay on John Galsworthy written in 1927) call not for an impossible "objectivity", but for a strenuous effort of self-knowledge in order to be able to state one's own standards of judgment truly, plus the difficult intellectual work of defining the terms of the discussion, using language carefully, and attending honestly to the art under analysis.

> A critic must be emotionally alive in every fibre, intellectually capable and skilful in essential logic, and then morally very honest.
>
> Then it seems to me a good critic should give his reader a few standards to go by. He can change the standards for every new critical attempt, so long as he keeps good faith. But it is just as well to say: This and this is the standard we judge by. 23

D. J. Gordon finds Lawrence's openness and directness in setting forth his point of view and his standards so characteristic of all his literary criticism that it almost amounts to a methodology - "the establishing of limits for the sake of analysis is Lawrence's habitual procedure".[24] Such a procedure is the one Michael Polanyi suggests as necessary for any intellectual work.

> . . . the process of examining any topic is both an exploration of the topic, and an exegesis of our fundamental beliefs in the light of which we approach it; a dialectical combination of exploration and exegesis. Our fundamental beliefs are continuously reconsidered in the course of such a process . . . 25

As a part of this critical groundwork, Lawrence charges certain words with complex meaning in the context of the "Study". This "terminology" extends his exploratory powers by enabling him to call up rich associations,

suggest various relationships and levels of meaning in short space. However, it is not an end in itself; Lawrence does not intend us to separate sentences using these "terms" from their situation in the "Study" and regard them as abstract statements of fact. The language he creates is only useful as a tool for the exploration of Hardy's art and serves its true purpose only in the whole context of that exploration. Michael Polanyi sees this use of tools, in both doing and knowing, as the basic structure of all creative discovery and all learning.

> When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in a different way. We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield the hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively. When we bring down the hammer we do not feel that its handle has struck our palm but that its head has struck the nail . . . I have a subsidiary awareness of the feeling in the palm of my hand which is merged into my focal awareness of my driving in the nail.
>
> We may think of the hammer replaced by a probe, used for exploring the interior of a hidden cavity. Think how a blind man feels his way by the use of a stick, which involves transposing the shocks transmitted to his hand and the muscles holding the stick into an awareness of the things touched by the point of the stick . . .
>
> Subsidiary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive. If a pianist shifts his attention from the piece he is playing to the observation of what he is doing with his fingers while playing it, he gets confused and may have to stop . . .
>
> All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly constitute . . .
>
> Our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes can be regarded as the act of making them form a part of our own body . . . While we rely on a tool or a probe, these are not handled as external objects . . . We pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them . . . Hammers and probes can be replaced by intellectual tools;

> think of any interpretative framework and particularly of the formalism of the exact sciences . . . 26

Our use of tools, material or intellectual ones, thus extends our bodily being in the world. Before we can achieve or discover anything with them, we need to believe in their usefulness and commit ourselves by actively using them. Only by attending to the whole task we would complete or the whole truth we would comprehend can we finally judge if our tools have been helpful or not.

Although we do not attend to the hammer itself while we are pounding the nail, the attempt to drive the nail would fail if our hammer had a broken handle or the wrong shape of head. Lawrence, like any good workman, checks his equipment carefully as he begins his critical task. He is wise enough to know that each new piece of work requires new and special tools. His remarkably creative use of language in the "Study", his discovering and shaping intellectual tools to his purpose, extends the powers of his thinking and enables him to see further and to see more clearly. As he pours himself into these tools in the course of the "Study", as a blind man pours himself into the probe in order to register the discoveries at the tip of it, he not only widens his own reach but he widens ours. The unusual thing about Lawrence's exploration in the "Study" is how he takes us with him; we acquire a new language almost imperceptibly as the argument develops. None of the words he uses are abstract, difficult, erudite or esoteric; they are words we use frequently, and although he gives them both a richer and more precise definition in context, they still carry a resonance for us from their everyday use in our own lives. Further, Lawrence does not stop us in our tracks every so often for the dull delivery

of a definition of this or that term. Such a procedure is needed only for a dull reader. The alert one is busy learning as he reads to enlarge his idea of what certain words can mean. He realises that at each point in the "Study" the understanding of a particular word depends on all that has gone before and that each time the word is used it acquires an added dimension, means something slightly different.

This tremendously skilful use of language is carried off with such ease and good humour that it seldom calls attention to itself. The total absence of any superior academic tone is both disarming and unsettling - unsettling because the reader is challenged to join fully in the thought-adventure before him, as he is gradually equipped with the intellectual tools of the "Study" and is drawn into the world of the Wessex novels. No incomprehensible set of academic cross-references, no private and obscure terminology permits him to feel he has been put out of the running as far as any serious participation in the discussion goes. He is not allowed to be a mere observer, for if he refuses to share in the work at hand, to use the tools Lawrence has prepared, the "Study" becomes virtually meaningless. As Polanyi observes, a tool has no meaning in and of itself; it only acquires meaning in the process of our using it to achieve or discover something else.

It should be clear now why the treatment Daleski, Kermode and many others give the "Study" so misrepresents it. Yet, even though they have overlooked the peculiarly creative and efficient use of language in the "Study", one would think they would have at least remarked on the very obvious qualities of Lawrence's criticism of Hardy. No special information or insight is needed. As D. J. Gordon comments, "Lawrence's critical

intelligence is manifest in the way any good critical intelligence is manifest: in the penetration of the questions asked, in the subtlety and flexibility with which discriminations are made, and in the skill with which arguments are sustained".[27]

Vanity or vitality?

W. H. Auden, commenting on Lawrence's literary criticism, wrote,

> He is so passionately interested in the work he is talking about and so little interested in his reputation as a critic that even when he is violently and quite unfairly attacking an author, he makes him sound far more exciting and worth reading than most critics make one sound whom they are professing to praise. I shall never forget my disappointment when, having just finished Lawrence's essay on him, I rushed off to read the novels of Fenimore Cooper. 28

I was similarly disappointed when I read Under the Greenwood Tree and Jude the Obscure. Yet I do not feel that Lawrence simply has a problem of seeing things that aren't there; rather he sees things many readers might miss and has an uncanny ability to sense the life, the unique qualities of characters or situations which often seem dull or stereotyped to others. This ability leads him, I think, to see vitality in Hardy's people, especially Hardy's women, where Hardy himself describes vanity. In seeing Bathsheba Everdene in this way in Far from the Madding Crowd, Lawrence permits himself to emphasise her position in the story at the expense of Gabriel Oak. Yet this "misreading" of Hardy's novels manages to convey their essential life and interest more successfully than many more detached and perhaps more accurate readings.

For instance, one critic discusses the similarity of Hardy's stories to old ballads and folk literature. His characters are all traditional types from folk songs and stories: Gabriel Oak is the faithful

lover, a male "patient Griselda"; Troy is the faithless soldier or sailor; Tess is the typical deserted maiden, seduced milkmaid. Like many characters in ballads, Hardy's characters are "non-developing", "changeless characters".[29] Evidently all of these observations are meant to be complimentary; yet how much time can one spend in fruitful contemplation of a simple ballad story? The suggested similarities imply that Hardy's novels are more or less predictable and insignificant.

Or, listen to Q. D. Leavis on Under the Greenwood Tree and compare it to Lawrence's paragraph on it in Chapter III.

> . . . the facetious tone of the book and its being made entirely out of Hardy's comic-relief material without anything to be relieved, anything (that is) which comes from the deeper and more vital sources of his experiences and interests, must strike any critical reader, I should have thought, and mark it as the novel in the canon (excluding the hopeless failures such as The Well-Beloved) least likely ever to be noted for re-reading. 30

Speaking of love as it is given us in the Wessex novels, Mrs. Leavis continues,

> . . . it is a mere counter and convention in all Hardy's (novels), being one of three stock varieties - either the grand-passion convention, or the faithful love of the worthy man or woman, or the philandering motions executed by the other sort. 31

There may be a certain amount of truth in both comments, but how much more lively is Lawrence's interest in the novels, how more worth reading does he make them sound. Where others see stereotypes, he sees unique individuals. Perhaps Lawrence simply insists on seeing people who give off any flashes of life whatsoever as each a quick and complex centre of infinite possibility, no matter what other voices (including Hardy's) tell him differently. This is certainly the way in which he tells us he sees Hardy's people.

> It is urged against Thomas Hardy's characters that they do unreasonable things - quite, quite unreasonable things. They are always going off unexpectedly and doing something that nobody would do. That is quite true, and the charge is amusing. These people of Wessex are always bursting suddenly out of bud and taking a wild flight into flower, always shooting suddenly out of a tight convention, a tight, hide-bound cabbage state into something quite madly personal . . . They are people each with a real, vital, potential self, even the apparently wishy-washy heroines of the earlier books. (p. 410)

Fancy Day of Under the Greenwood Tree qualifies as one of the "apparently wishy-washy heroines of the earlier books", and Lawrence's insistence that we look at her more carefully is a wise one. Although Hardy portrays her as a vain, rather light-headed though good-natured girl, as flighty as her name might suggest, Lawrence maintains that "Fancy will carry in her heart all her life many unopened buds that will die unflowered", (p. 412). Hardy makes it quite clear that Fancy is usually more concerned about the dress she is going to wear than the man she is going to marry, Dick Dewy. However, she is the local schoolteacher (although Hardy never creates the school or her pupils for us in any real sense and fails to suggest in any way what her teaching might be like or what it might mean to her), and the reader cannot very easily dismiss the reasons her father gives Dick when he at first refuses to accept him as a son-in-law.

> " . . . d'ye think Fancy picked up her good manners, the smooth turn of her tongue, her musical notes, and her knowledge of books, in a homely hole like this?"
>
> "No."
>
> "D'ye know where?"
>
> "No."

"Well, when I went a-wandering after her mother's death she lived with her aunt, who kept a boarding-school, till her aunt married Lawyer Green - a man as sharp as a needle - and the school was broke up. Did ye know that then she went to the training-school, and that her name stood first among the Queen's scholars of her year?"

"I've heard so."

"And that when she sat for her certificate as Government teacher, she had the highest of the first class?"

"Yes."

"Well, and do ye know what I live in such a miserly way for when I've got enough to do without it, and why I make her work as a schoolmistress instead of living here?"

"No."

"That if any gentleman, who sees her to be his equal in polish, should want to marry her, and she want to marry him, he shan't be superior to her in pocket. Now do ye think after this that you be good enough for her?"

"No." [32]

Our answer is almost as ready and as negative as Dick's, especially since all of this information is news to us - it is given here, for the first time, three quarters of the way through the book. Although Dick is basically a good fellow and superior to Fancy in many ways - in steadiness, honesty, faithfulness and depth of feeling - we must admit that he is also rather dull and unambitious. Hardy makes a slapdash attempt at one point to convince us that Dick is almost Fancy's intellectual equal by referring briefly to the scraping, sacrificing and careful marshalling of financial resources Dick's parents went through in order to send him to a better school than his brothers and sisters. However, we are given no further evidence of Dick's mental exertions beyond his plans to start a further branch of his father's business, toward which end he had "cards prented" reading

Dewy and Son
Tranters and Hauliers,
Mellstock.

N.B. - Furniture, Coals, Potatoes, Live and Dead Stock, removed to any distance on the shortest notice. 33

Of course, Fancy's intellectual capabilities or conscious aspirations are not very fully created either; but her behaviour in varying incidents - no matter how clumsily it is handled or how incompletely her real motives are suggested - gives evidence of a quickness and a dissatisfaction with life in Mellstock which Dick will never be able to understand or share, let alone respond to in any creative way. In Part II, Chapter Seven, we are given an unsettling impression of Fancy's impatience with Dick's unchanging good temper and agreeable nature. "How very dull it is when people are so friendly", she sighs.[34] Later, after Dick and Fancy are engaged, Fancy lets her hair down (literally) and wears a hat and feather to shock the congregation when she first plays the organ at church; and she does it not at all for Dick's benefit, since he is to be away at a funeral. We cannot help feeling that the splash of colour she makes has more meaning for her than mere gratification of her vanity, although her vanity would seem to be the main motive Hardy wants us to accept. Her action is a kind of protest against the dullness of Mellstock church, Mellstock village, the Mellstock Quire, Dick Dewy, even the vicar, and a last bright bid for escape (see Part IV, Chapter Five).

The escape that offers, however, is - as Hardy makes very clear to us - nothing worth working oneself up about. The tone of Lawrence's comments also implies that Fancy's acceptance of the vicar's proposal offers no adequate answer to her dissatisfaction. It is only "a brief

excursion from the beaten track in the pursuit of social ambition and satisfaction of the imagination, figured by the Clergyman", (p. 412). Mr. Maybold's proposal of marriage is a study in condescension.

> "Don't refuse; don't . . . It would be foolish of you - I mean cruel!" 35

What he offers her, essentially, is the life of "the mistress of a quiet parsonage-house" in Yorkshire, complete with piano, pony-carriage, flowers, birds, pleasant society -

> "Yes, you have enough in you for any society, after a few months of travel with me!" 36

These things could hardly satisfy Fancy in any real sense; she would only be exchanging the stifling atmosphere of one parish for another. We are forced to concede in the end, in spite of Fancy's many disturbing qualities, that as Hardy has presented her choices, Fancy made the best one available in marrying Dick Dewy. He's not much, but he does more or less treat her as an equal, and he has a basic energy that is denied the wooden vicar. No one, least of all Hardy, would begin to assert that Dick and Fancy will be perfectly happy. As they ride away from the wedding, Dick rhapsodises on their joy, a result, he maintains, of their complete openness and honesty with each other. Fancy, of course, has never told him of the vicar's proposal or of her transitory acceptance. She promises to keep no secrets from that day on; but as she hears the nightingale call "Come hither, come hither, come hither" (do nightingales really call "come hither"?) she thinks "of a secret she would never tell". [37]

It is a "come hither" call she will always hear but never follow and adds a sombre note to the close of an otherwise light-hearted, even facetious, novel.[38] It seems to justify Lawrence's quick and sharp analysis.

> Fancy, the little schoolmistress, returns to Dick, renounces imagination, and settles down to steady, solid, physically satisfactory married life, and all is as it should be. But Fancy will carry in her heart all her life many unopened buds that will die unflowered; and Dick will probably have a bad time of it. (p. 412)

Lawrence's few sentences capture the essential movement of the story, but insofar as he implies that there were further possibilities, other alternatives open to Fancy he misrepresents the atmosphere of the novel. Fancy made the best possible choice under the circumstances, and it is characteristic of Hardy that he did not make many choices available. Hardy is always very aware of the limits placed on human action and possibility; between Dick Dewy, Parson Maybold, Mr. Shiner and her own failings and inadequate ideas of what a "higher" form of life could be, Fancy could not go very far. The elusive life of "satisfaction of the imagination" may be figured by the vicar, but it is figured very poorly.

I will discuss this sense of human limitation in Hardy's novels in the section that follows. At present, what I want to emphasise is Lawrence's perception of vitality and potential in Fancy Day where Hardy sees only vanity. Lawrence interprets Fancy's flaunting of colour to the Mellstock Church as "the thing itself at its maximum of being", not as the result of a usual feminine failing. The different value which Lawrence and Hardy put on Fancy's behaviour is, I think, a result of the different attitudes they have towards women.

Hardy seems to always see women in a very limited way. He has a certain tolerant, condescending affection for the silly things; after all, they are loveable in spite of their inability to think very clearly or carefully, their general lack of heads for money or practical matters, their

tendency to act foolishly and impulsively and make themselves troublesome, their ambition for all the wrong things, their wavering natures and faithlessness and - their vanity. Fancy Day, Bathsheba Everdene, Eustacia Vye, Sue Bridehead, Lucetta Farfrae all have several of these qualities in varying combinations and all share one of them - vanity. Tess is an unusual Hardy heroine in that she is not overly concerned with her appearance or the impression she makes on others. However, Tess is weak at the crucial moments (that of her seduction by Alec and her rejection by Angel especially) and she is portrayed as having no real thoughts of her own; she can only mouth without understanding all of Angel's ideas (see Chapter XLVI) which she accepts unquestioningly as true.

Hardy's restricted view of women makes itself felt even in the creation of his most attractive, energetic and compelling heroines. However, Lawrence, in his assessment of Under the Greenwood Tree, Far from the Madding Crowd and The Return of the Native, sees Fancy, Bathsheba and Eustacia as essentially more interesting and forceful than Hardy sees them. Lawrence feels they are striving for a life of imagination or some form of self-realisation, rather than merely for social prestige, pretty clothes, flattery or the illusion of a grand passion. He interprets Hardy's clumsy hints at a woman's dissatisfaction with life as it is as signs of her rebellion and her desire for a finer existence which she cannot fully achieve or even conceive. She might engage in flirtations or play games with fancy dresses or bonfires to keep herself occupied and express her boredom and frustration, but Lawrence discerns a more important struggle going on than the relatively trivial one Hardy sees and describes on the surface.

Lawrence simply does not see women in the stereotyped way that Hardy does. His treatment of Mrs. Morel, Miriam, Clara and Annie in Sons and Lovers shows that to him women were distinct and different individuals, with varying ambitions, fears, emotional and intellectual needs and capabilities. His insistence on taking Hardy's female characters more seriously than Hardy does himself leads him to misread the novels in a certain sense.

The Return of the Native is a case in point. Although Eustacia Vye is, admittedly, one of Hardy's most vital characters, Hardy is much more insistent on her immaturities and limitations than Lawrence is. We are told about her childhood in the seaside resort of Budmouth and its powerful influence on her, being her only image - and a very limited and superficial one - of real life and movement beyond Egdon. "There was no middle distance in her perspective: romantic recollections of sunny afternoons on an esplanade, with military bands, officers and gallants around, stood like gilded letters upon the dark tablet of surrounding Egdon. Every bizarre effect that could result from the random intertwining of watering-place glitter with the grand solemnity of a heath was to be found in her" (Part I, Chapter VII "Queen of Night" from The Return of the Native).[39] Eustacia, no matter how compelling and memorable she may be, is in some ways - as Hardy draws her - very much the impatient, selfish child who does not know what she wants, occasionally decides she wants something in particular and then doesn't like it when she gets it, and who most often is so driven and possessed by her own petulant desires that she can't even begin to realise the very different natures and needs of other people around her.[40] For Lawrence, however, she has a greater significance and he gives her a greater stature.

> Eustacia, dark, wild, passionate, quite conscious of her desires and inheriting no tradition which would make her ashamed of them, since she is of a novelistic Italian birth, loves, first, the unstable Wildeve, who does not satisfy her, then casts him aside for the newly returned Clym, whom she marries. What does she want? She does not know, but it is evidently some form of self-realization; she wants to be herself, to attain herself. But she does not know how, by what means, so romantic imagination says, Paris and the beau monde. As if that would have stayed her unsatisfaction. (p. 414)

Lawrence's perceptions here are canny. After reading them, one wants to retract angry dismissals of Eustacia as a sublimely spoiled brat and try to understand her unhappiness in a less flippant, more thoughtful way. It is true that Budmouth and Paris are mere ciphers of her desire and that a flashy social life in either place would probably disillusion her, very quickly leaving her as unsatisfied as she was on Egdon Heath. But it is also difficult to imagine any form of self-realisation that would "stay her unsatisfaction" for any length of time. Her dissatisfaction with life as she knows it is her main characteristic, besides her physical beauty, and we cannot picture her without it. Can we see Eustacia writing poetry, painting pictures, continuing her education, studying to be a concert pianist - can we see her as a great and driven artist in any medium? Can we see her entering politics, leading a revolution, caring very much about any philanthropic enterprise - can we see her thinking for very long about anyone's needs but her own? Can we envision her graciously and wittily entertaining sophisticated, intelligent people in a type of 18th century Paris salon, or gaily accepting a life of elegant parties, dances and nights at the opera? Can we see her entering any profession - law, medicine, education, government? She seems too selfish, immature and undisciplined for any of these things, but also too supremely dissatisfied. Lawrence's

suggestion is the only one that does not sound ludicrous.

> Where was her imagined Paris, the place where her powerful nature could come to blossom? Beside some strong-passioned, unconfined man, her mate. (p. 416)

But although Eustacia's desires do focus themselves on the idea of love and "the grand passion" - "To be loved to madness - such was her great desire . . . she seemed to long for the abstraction called passionate love more than for any particular lover"[41] - this idea, in such an abstract form, is also difficult to imagine really materialising. Perhaps Hardy himself could not think of any possible embodiment or realisation for Eustacia's yearnings. Perhaps he had no other choice but to kill her off when he realised his predicament.

Again, the point to be emphasised here is that where Hardy suggests the folly of a wilful, self-centred, vain woman, Lawrence discovers vitality and the desire for a further, finer form of existence. A look at Sons and Lovers, completed before the "Study" was even thought of, should help us understand why Eustacia's pride in her physical beauty was valued differently by Lawrence. For him, such pride was less a sign of vanity than a sign of life and energy in both his male and female characters. The attraction Gertrude Coppard first feels for Walter Morel is based essentially on the same things which first draw Jude to Arabella, but how differently it is rendered. Contrast this passage from Chapter I in Sons and Lovers with the more distrustful evocation of Arabella's sexuality in Jude the Obscure (see Part I, Chapters VI and IX).

> He was well set-up, erect, and very smart. He had wavy black hair that shone again, and a vigorous black beard that had never been shaved. His cheeks were ruddy, and his red, moist mouth was noticeable because he laughed so often and so heartily. He had that rare thing, a rich,

> ringing laugh. Gertrude Coppard had watched him, fascinated. He was so full of colour and animation . . . He danced well, as if it were natural and joyous in him to dance . . . Gertrude Coppard watched the young miner as he danced, a certain subtle exultation like glamour in his movement, and his face the flower of his body, ruddy, with tumbled black hair, and laughing alike whatever partner he bowed above. She thought him rather wonderful, never having met anyone like him . . . the dusky, golden softness of this man's sensuous flame of life, that flowed off his flesh like the flame from a candle, not baffled and gripped into incandescence by thought and spirit as her life was, seemed to her something wonderful, beyond her. 42

Later in their relationship when all is not well, Walter Morel's pride in his appearance irritates his wife precisely because it is a sign of his lively independence from her.

> There seemed so much gusto in the way he puffed and swilled as he washed himself, so much alacrity with which he hurried to the mirror in the kitchen, and, bending because it was too low for him, scrupulously parted his wet black hair, that it irritated Mrs. Morel. He put on a turn-down collar, a black bow, and wore his Sunday tail-coat. As such, he looked spruce, and what his clothes would not do, his instinct for making the most of his good looks would. (Chapter I) 43

When Mrs. Morel finally gets the upper hand and Walter is cast off insofar as any significant relation to her is concerned, he begins to go slack, to narrow and reduce his existence rather than move to extend it.

> As he grew older Morel fell into a slow ruin. His body, which had been beautiful in movement and in being, shrank, did not seem to ripen with the years, but to get mean and rather despicable. There came over him a look of meanness and of paltriness. And when the mean-looking elderly man bullied or ordered the boy about, Arthur was furious. Moreover, Morel's manners got worse and worse, his habits somewhat disgusting. (Chapter VI) 44

In the same chapter in which we observe Morel's physical degeneration we are shown his wife in contrast still taking real pride in looking neat, clean and trim. In the following scene she has just finished making ready

to visit the Leivers' farm with Paul.

> Suddenly she appeared in the inner doorway rather shyly. She had got a new cotton blouse on. Paul jumped up and went forward. "Oh, my stars!" he exclaimed. "What a bobby-dazzler!" She sniffed in a little haughty way, and put her head up. "It's not a bobby-dazzler at all!" she replied. "It's very quiet."
> She walked forward, whilst he hovered round her.
> "Well," she asked, quite shy, but pretending to be high and mighty, "do you like it?"
> "Awfully! You <u>are</u> a fine little woman to go jaunting out with!"
> He went and surveyed her from the back.
> "Well," he said, "if I was walking down the street behind you, I should say: "Doesn't <u>that</u> little person fancy herself!"
> "Well, she doesn't", replied Mrs. Morel. "She's not sure it suits her."
> "Oh no! she wants to be in dirty black, looking as if she was wrapped in burnt paper. It <u>does</u> suit you, and <u>I</u> say you look nice."
> She sniffed in her little way, pleased, but pretending to know better. 45

If this is vanity, it certainly should be considered a natural part of life, one of the things that help to make life colourful and gay. Lawrence, however, does have a conception of another kind of vanity which is much more selfish, limited and unattractive. His portrait of Miss Lily Western - Gyp, William's sweetheart - could not be called unsympathetic, but Lawrence is quick to point out the ugliness of some of her behaviour. She treats the sister of her fiancé like a servant, and her nervousness leads her to act condescendingly and inconsiderately while she is with the Morels. William tries to make allowances but at times breaks out in violent attacks on her, pointing out to his family her inability to read or criticising her shallowness. He tells his mother, when they are alone together, about Gyp's unhappy childhood, how she has had no love.

"When she seems shallow, you have to remember
she's never had anybody to bring her deeper side out.
And she's fearfully fond of me." (Ch. VI) 46

Lawrence is perceptive about the causes of Gyp's vanity and selfishness; he is also alive to her beauty and the force of her attraction for William. In spite of her superficiality, she finds a keen admirer in her fiancé's younger brother Paul, an admiration for which Mrs. Morel finds it hard to forgive him. The essential thing to note about Gyp's brand of vanity, however, is that it grows out of human weakness, not out of strength and vitality. During one of William's most violent outbreaks, Gyp bursts into tears. "She was not strong."[47] Most of her bad behaviour is caused by her feelings of nervousness, uncertainty and inadequacy.

Lawrence quite rightly does not feel that Eustacia Vye's or Bathsheba Everdene's vanity is of this weaker, unpleasant kind. Yet especially in Far from the Madding Crowd Hardy emphasises his heroine's vanity, criticises her for it and makes her do most of her foolish things because of it, even though it is her pride, her beauty and her spirited independence which draw Gabriel to her in the first place.[48] Lawrence's perception of vitality and human potential in Bathsheba where Hardy sees simply susceptibility to flattery and selfishness leads him, I think, to overlook one of Hardy's finest creations, Gabriel Oak. The way in which Lawrence misreads Far from the Madding Crowd is instructive in relation both to his own interests as an artist and to his criticism of Hardy as it develops in Chapters V and IX of the "Study"; and Lawrence's misreading, as usual, succeeds in awakening our interest in the novel more than most other, more "accurate", interpretations. Compare Henry James' analysis of Far from the Madding Crowd to Lawrence's.

Mr. Hardy describes nature with a great deal of felicity, and is evidently very much at home among rural phenomena. The most genuine thing in his book, to our sense, is a certain aroma of the meadows and lanes - a natural relish for harvestings and sheep-washings. He has laid his scene in an agricultural county, and his characters are children of the soil - unsophisticated countryfolk. Bathsheba Everdene is a rural heiress, left alone in the world, in possession of a substantial farm. Gabriel Oak is her shepherd, Farmer Boldwood is her neighbour, and Sergeant Troy is a loose young soldier who comes a-courting her. They are all in love with her, and the young lady is a flirt and encourages them all. Finally she marries the Sergeant, who has just seduced her maid-servant. The maid-servant dies in the work-house, the Sergeant repents, leaves his wife, and is given up for drowned. But he re-appears and is shot by Farmer Boldwood, who delivers himself up to justice. Bathsheba then marries Gabriel Oak, who has loved and waited in silence, and is, in our opinion, much too good for her. The chief purpose of the book is, we suppose, to represent Gabriel's dumb, devoted passion, his biding his time, his rendering unsuspected services to the woman who has scorned him, his integrity and simplicity and sturdy patience. In all this the tale is very fairly successful, and Gabriel has a certain vividness of expression. But we cannot say that we either understand or like Bathsheba. She is a young lady of the inconsequential, wilful, mettlesome type which has lately become so much the fashion for heroines, and of which Mr. Charles Reade is in a manner the inventor - the type which aims at giving one a very intimate sense of a young lady's womanishness. But Mr. Hardy's embodiment of it seems to us to lack reality; he puts her through the Charles Reade paces, but she remains alternately vague and coarse, and seems always artificial. This is Mr. Hardy's trouble; he rarely gets beyond ambitious artifice - the mechanical simulation of heat and depth and wisdom that are absent. Farmer Boldwood is a shadow, and Sergeant Troy an elaborate stage-figure. Everything human in the book strikes us as factitious and insubstantial; the only things we believe in are the sheep and the dogs. But, as we say, Mr. Hardy has gone astray very cleverly, and his superficial novel is really a curious imitation of something better. 49

The unruly Bathsheba, though almost pledged to Farmer Boldwood, a ravingly passionate, middle-aged bachelor pretendant, who has suddenly started in mad pursuit of some unreal conception of woman, personified in Bathsheba, lightly runs off and marries Sergeant Troy, an illegitimate aristocrat, unscrupulous and yet

> sensitive in taking his pleasures. She loves Troy, he does not love her. All the time she is loved faithfully and persistently by the good Gabriel, who is like a dog that watches the bone and bides the time. Sergeant Troy treats Bathsheba badly, never loves her, though he is the only man in the book who knows anything about her. Her pride helps her to recover. Troy is killed by Boldwood; exit the unscrupulous, but discriminative, almost cynical young soldier and the mad, middle-aged pursuer of the Fata Morgana; enter the good, steady Gabriel, who marries Bathsheba because he will make her a good husband, and the flower of imaginative first love is dead for her with Troy's scorn of her.
>
> ("The Study", pp. 412-413)

James certainly seems to accept more unhesitatingly Hardy's own ideas on what the book was about. The novel begins and ends with the story of Gabriel Oak; and we are made to feel that he <u>is</u> too good for Bathsheba, who is a headstrong, thoughtless, wilful yet indecisive young lady. Hardy makes it very clear that each major mistake Bathsheba makes is caused by her vanity and typical feminine weaknesses in one way or another. The reason she even considers sending Boldwood a Valentine is because he wounded her pride by not even glancing at her in the Casterbridge corn market or on the road as he passed or even in church. She cannot endure the idea that a man might be oblivious to her charms. She dismisses Gabriel from her service because he gives her only straightforward answers unmixed with flattery or protestations of love (see Chapter XX). She becomes infatuated with Troy mainly because he frequently tells her she is beautiful, a practice which Boldwood unfortunately neglected; and she finally marries Troy in a distraction of jealousy when he hints that his affection may turn elsewhere because he has seen another woman more handsome than she.

The real break in Bathsheba's pride comes when Troy bends to kiss Fanny in her coffin and claims her as his true wife in the sight of God.

There is no wilfulness or vanity in her cry at that point, "Kiss me too, Frank - kiss me!" Bathsheba has suddenly swung to the opposite extreme and become totally dependent on Troy, a reversal not entirely desirable.[50]

> There was something so abnormal and startling in the childlike pain and simplicity of this appeal from a woman of Bathsheba's calibre and independence, that Troy, loosening her tightly clasped arms from his neck, looked at her in bewilderment. It was such an unexpected revelation of all women being alike at heart, even those so different in their accessories as Fanny and this one beside him, that Troy could hardly seem to believe her to be his proud wife Bathsheba. 51

(The characteristic Hardy comment about "all women being alike at heart" will have been noted.) However, since Troy does not answer Bathsheba's cry, she is not allowed to indulge these feelings of dependence for long. A few hours earlier she had begun to reconsider the worth of Gabriel's love and good opinion, to wish that she could be like him in strength and in patience. After Troy's disappearance, she learns to face existence alone again and, looking to Gabriel's example, to replace her childish vanity with something more mature, something less selfish - a renewed energy and vigour for life combined with a kindness and directness of love, a type of which Gabriel embodies. Very early in their relationship Gabriel had expressed his opinion on how love ought to reveal itself, in a manner distinct from flirtation, flattery or thoughtless prank-playing. Criticising Bathsheba for toying with Boldwood's feelings, Gabriel told her, "If you seriously inclined towards him, you might have let him find it out in some way of true loving kindness, and not by sending him a valentine's letter".[52]

Lawrence, by interpreting Bathsheba's vanity in a very different way from that presented to us by Hardy, is able to overlook this whole process of maturation and growth in her in Far from the Madding Crowd.

It is by thus emphasising Bathsheba's weaknesses, however, that Hardy manages to set off Gabriel's strengths so fully in contrast; and almost our entire sense of Bathsheba's deeper worth is sustained by Gabriel's unreasoning constancy to her - a devotion which is never adequately accounted for in the novel - for Hardy's steadfast Oak is convincing, though neither flashy nor exciting.

In concentrating on "the unruly Bathsheba", Lawrence is able to dismiss Oak as "the good Gabriel, who is like a dog that watches the bone and bides the time" (p. 413). In so doing, he slights one of Hardy's fullest and finest creations. The very quality of persistence in Gabriel which Lawrence finds dog-like is one of the most compelling and fascinating things about him. Gabriel's close relation to the natural world, his understanding of animals, the weather, the heavens, all contribute to the reader's feeling that he is sensitive and responsive to forces greater than himself, although perhaps in a not quite fully conscious way. He seems not to understand completely how he finds his way into employment on Bathsheba's farm or why he stays there; Hardy manages to convey a sense of blind obedience to a will not Gabriel's own (an unusual achievement for Hardy, as most of his many attempts at portraying a great, external will at work in the world are irritating, unbelievable failures).

In fact, this is perhaps the closest Hardy ever comes to rendering the unrelenting, often harsh forces at work underneath and within human life for growth and change, in rendering which Lawrence was later to excel. Gabriel Oak's blind obedience of these forces in standing by Bathsheba reminds us of Tom Brangwen's blind movement towards Lydia Lensky in the opening chapters of <u>The Rainbow</u>. Tom never fully understands why he wants

to marry Lydia, but he knows that he will and he must. It is ordered so. The way Lawrence describes Tom's sense of this "greater ordering" is remarkably similar to the way Hardy portrays Gabriel's relation to it.[53]

> . . . during the long February nights with the ewes in labour, looking out from the shelter into the flashing stars, he knew he did not belong to himself. He must admit that he was only fragmentary, something incomplete and subject. There were the stars in the dark heaven travelling, the whole host passing by on some eternal voyage. So he sat small and submissive to the greater ordering.
>
> (The Rainbow, Ch. I) [54]

Chapter II of Far from the Madding Crowd begins with a laboured, yet effective, description of the wind over Norcombe Hill on a December night and the sensation of movement one has while standing alone under the clear stars. The passage begins the development of a "great background", the natural world, against which the story of Gabriel and Bathsheba is enacted. Gabriel is deeply responsive to the movements of the earth and sky and their creatures in a way that shapes his character and influences his behaviour.

> To persons standing alone on a hill during a clear midnight such as this, the roll of the world eastward is almost a palpable movement. The sensation may be caused by the panoramic glide of the stars past earthly objects, which is perceptible in a few minutes of stillness, or by the better outlook upon space that a hill affords, or by the wind or by the solitude; but whatever be its origin, the impression of riding along is vivid and abiding . . . After such a nocturnal reconnoitre it is hard to get back to earth, and to believe that the consciousness of such majestic speeding is derived from a tiny human frame. 55

On this same evening Gabriel ventures out to restore a lamb to its mother, looks at the stars to ascertain the time, and then continues to contemplate them.

> For a moment he seemed impressed with the speaking loneliness of the scene, or rather with the complete abstraction from all its compass of the sights and sounds of man. 56

Gabriel is always able to see himself in this perspective, as part of a greater whole. It is this quality in him that Bathsheba suddenly comes to appreciate and covet when she is in an agony of doubt about Troy's relationship to Fanny (Ch. XLIII).

> Might she but go to Gabriel Oak! . . . What a way Oak had, she thought, of enduring things. Boldwood, who seemed so much deeper and higher and stronger in feeling than Gabriel, had not yet learnt, any more than she herself, the simple lesson which Oak showed a mastery of by every turn and look he gave - that among the multitude of interests by which he was surrounded, those which affected his personal well-being were not the most absorbing and important in his eyes. Oak meditatively looked upon the horizon of circumstances without any special regard to his own standpoint in the midst. That was how she would wish to be. 57

Oak, like Egdon Heath, is static and enduring. Whereas Lawrence emphasises the creative, growing movements that Tom Brangwen discovers within himself and obeys (just as Lawrence also emphasises the creative aspect of Egdon Heath over against Hardy's insistence on its qualities of resistance and endurance), Hardy stresses the strength of Gabriel Oak's very passivity, his ability to wait, watch and wear well.

> Oak's motions, though they had a quiet energy, were slow, and their deliberateness accorded well with his occupation . .. although if occasion demanded he could do or think a thing with as mercurial a dash as can the men of towns who are more to the manner born, his special power, morally, physically, and mentally, was static, owing little or nothing to momentum as a rule. (Chapter II) 58

However, the energy and movement, the response in growth and activity to the forces of "the greater ordering", are also present in Gabriel Oak; and although Hardy wants us to remember his "way of enduring things" as his special power, we probably are as much or more impressed by those moments when Gabriel is showing his strength in more vivid ways. His quick action in putting out the fire in Bathsheba's wheat-ricks (Chapter VI),

his skill in curing the sheep that had got into a field of young clover (Chapter XXI), his refusal to let Bathsheba dismiss him a second time - when he makes it clear to us that already he is the true master of the farm, in spite of his being only the shepherd, and not the bailiff or Bathsheba's husband (Chapter XXIX) - all these things help form our opinion of his vigour and independence.

Especially revealing of Gabriel's true individuality is the chapter where he perceives the coming storm and ignores the opinion and judgment of other men in order to act as nature instructs him (Chapter XXXVI). He stands observing the strange signs of the weather and recalls that "the same evening the sheep had trailed homeward head to tail, the behaviour of the rooks had been confused, and the horses had moved with timidity and caution".[59] He tries to warn Troy of the danger to his produce - eight unprotected wheat and barley ricks outside the barn - but Troy refuses to let his plans for the harvest supper and dance be upset by something as disagreeable and unpredictable as the weather. The rest of the farm workers stay on with Troy to drink themselves into a sound sleep, while Gabriel walks home struggling between everyone else's irresponsible optimism, their quick dismissal of his warning, and his own deepest conviction. Nature persists in throwing signs across his path - a large toad, a garden slug which has crawled indoors, two black spiders. Finally, Oak goes out to observe the sheep, the creatures he knows best of all. They are all gathered together, facing away from the coming storm in terror.

> He knew now that he was right, and that Troy was wrong. Every voice in nature was unanimous in bespeaking change . . . Apparently there was to be a thunder-storm, and afterwards a cold, continuous rain. The creeping things seemed to know all about the later rain, but little of the interpolated

> thunder-storm; whilst the sheep knew all about the thunder-storm and nothing of the later rain. 60

Gabriel proceeds to protect the ricks as best one man can in the limited time nature has given; his persistence and ingenuity, his bravery in the face of the lightning and also his keen appreciation of its eerie beauty and utter magnificence, are all things which distinguish him from Troy who is safely sheltered deep in a drunken sleep in the barn and completely unresponsive to the havoc being wrought outside in the natural world. From this moment on, we know to whom the real husbandry of the farm is entrusted, in spite of Troy's being Bathsheba's lawful husband. Gabriel's service is even more remarkable when we recall that he has absolutely no hope of marrying Bathsheba now; he is prompted to action for many reasons - the habits of a good farmer, simple calculations about the financial risks involved, a dislike of waste, especially in the form of human nourishment and sustinence, and a love for Bathsheba. However, the overall impact of these two chapters (XXXVI, XXXVII) is that nature (or whatever great forces move behind her) ordered Gabriel to heed the approaching storm and he obeyed.

This incident with the wheat and barley ricks not only offers a clear contrast between Gabriel Oak and Sergeant Troy, but also a contrast between Gabriel and Farmer Boldwood. Gabriel saves ricks not his own; Boldwood neglects the produce of his farm entirely - yet his disappointment over Bathsheba is no greater than Gabriel's. We have seen that a quality typical of Gabriel is his ability to see himself in a broader perspective, against a greater background, in which other interests continue to live and play a part in spite of his personal disappointments. Thus Gabriel is able to see another man's sorrow as equal to or even greater than his own, while Boldwood cannot.

At the close of Chapter XXXV when the people of Weatherbury have just heard of Bathsheba's marriage to Troy, Gabriel can look past his own grief to that of Boldwood riding silently by on his horse. At the close of Chapter XXXVIII, Oak learns about Boldwood's neglect of his own corn-ricks and sees instantly what it means.

> A few months earlier Boldwood's forgetting his husbandry would have been as preposterous an idea as a sailor forgetting he was in a ship. Oak was just thinking that whatever he himself might have suffered from Bathsheba's marriage, here was a man who had suffered more . . . 61

In Chapter LII (section VI) Boldwood begins to realise that Gabriel also loved Bathsheba, but this does not prevent him from discussing with Oak his own prospect of happiness in marrying her. He offers to increase Gabriel's share in his farm, by way of recompense - as if that would be an adequate consolation. Gabriel's only comment in response to Boldwood's sympathy is "I must get used to such as that; other men have, and so shall I".[62]

What a contrast that brief statement is to Boldwood's self-indulgent outpourings of sorrow earlier, to both Bathsheba and Gabriel. This quality in Oak, of being able to realise the other person and respect him or her as someone distinct from himself, is one Lawrence is later to praise in Tess - Oak is an aristocrat (in the sense in which Lawrence uses the term) in a way that Bathsheba and Boldwood are not. How differently Boldwood and Oak make their proposals to Bathsheba - Gabriel asks once, does his best to convince her and finally says "Then I'll ask you no more".[63] He is true to his word; he never again asks her to marry him until she comes willingly to him (Chapter LVI) and makes it clear that she wants him to.[64] Boldwood, however, repeatedly pressures her, unfairly stressing her obligation to him because of the Valentine; and we see how tortured and confused Bathsheba is by such

pressure, and how it manages to distort the real issue involved in her consent or refusal. This real issue Gabriel sees quite clearly.

> The real sin, ma'am, in my mind, lies in thinking of ever wedding wi' a man you don't love honest and true.[65]
>
> (Ch. LI)

Even the content of the proposals of the two men is very different. Boldwood offers Bathsheba a life of ease, absolved of all household or farming cares (Chapter XIX); Gabriel, on the other hand, sees her not as a goddess but as a woman with both faults and capabilities. He thoroughly respects her ability to do farm work, to manage her uncle's estate, and the marriage he envisions is simply one of sharing life and work. Gabriel may not be the most eloquent or impassioned of lovers, but his love of Bathsheba is based on a full acceptance of her as she is, plus a deep belief in her better self and the person she could be, a belief which she only begins to value when it seems to have disappeared.[66]

It is Gabriel who finally teaches Bathsheba something about the necessity to realise and respect the other, not to play with people but to deal with them honestly and openly. She learns this only gradually by working with him, watching his actions and listening to (although not usually heeding or thanking him for) his advice. She must accept the fact that Gabriel is not to be played with - he will not respond to an <u>order</u> to cure the sheep, only to a request made from an equal; he will not allow her to dismiss him a second time, again insisting on his equality; he is not prodded by her frequent requests for advice on matters of love and marriage into flattering her by proposing or protesting his love himself (a response, one feels, for which she is always hoping, if only to have the pleasure of graciously refusing him). Her final discovery involves not only a recognition

of the depth and worth of Gabriel's love, but also a painful realisation that Gabriel is independent of her, although she has always assumed that he was not and has taken his presence and service for granted.[67]

This lesson is both an affront to her vanity, on one level and, on another, a basic challenge to the attitude towards love that she seems to have held throughout the novel. Although her instincts for independence have been strong right from the beginning, her response to Gabriel's proposal shows that her conscious idea of what love and marriage involves is something quite different. "I hate to be thought men's property in that way, though possibly I shall be had someday."[68] It doesn't seem to occur to her that marriage might not necessarily involve being "men's property", and certainly neither Troy nor Boldwood present her with such an option. If Troy had managed to return to his position as Bathsheba's husband, she would have constituted only a part of the estate he came to reclaim. The reason Gabriel is such an enigma to her is because he is a living example of both deep love and a sturdy independence from the beloved at work in one human being, a possibility of which she never seems to have been aware. Gabriel is not only solid in his individuality, his separateness from Bathsheba, but he respects her when she is solid in hers - and he expects her to remain so even when they are married.[69]

I have tried to give evidence for my belief that Gabriel Oak is one of Hardy's strongest characters and that to neglect him in any complete study of Hardy's novels would involve a certain misrepresentation of the nature of Hardy's achievement. It is puzzling that Lawrence should pass over Gabriel so easily. He criticises Hardy's novels because the great background, the greater morality, "is only passively, negatively transgressed, it is

represented merely as being present in background, in scenery, not taking any active part, having no direct connexion with the protagonist" (p. 420). I have tried to show that this comment does not apply to Gabriel, that he was deeply responsive to the force of "what we call the immorality of nature" (p. 419). Lawrence discusses the true individuals, the aristocrats in Hardy's novels in Chapter V of the "Study" and in Chapter IX praises Tess for her aristocratic recognition of the other, her refusal to pressure or force other people. Yet although Gabriel is certainly an aristocrat in this sense, Lawrence shows little interest in him.

Why is this? Lawrence deals at length with three later Hardy novels which I find much more irritating in their faults and limits than Far from the Madding Crowd. In this early novel (1874), Hardy avoids making the major mistake of The Return of the Native, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure. He does not try to convince us of the presence and activity and power of a great - and usually malevolent - "Will" in the universe by direct statements of his sombre "philosophy" to which he then tries to shape the story to fit. As Lawrence remarks in Chapter IX of the "Study",

> . . . it is not as a metaphysician that one must consider Hardy. He makes a poor show there. For nothing in his work is so pitiable as his clumsy efforts to push events into line with his theory of being, and to make calamity fall on those who represent the principle of love. He does it exceedingly badly, and owing to this effort his form is execrable in the extreme. (p. 480)

Lawrence's comments seem particularly apt in relation to The Return of the Native where Hardy's "efforts to push events into line with his theory of being" results in a long, impossible chain of coincidences which succeeds in convincing us that the only great "Will" working the characters' destruction is Hardy's own.

In Far from the Madding Crowd Hardy manages to embody in the simple story of Gabriel Oak's persistence the suggestion of a deeper power at work in human lives, a power which he fails to render in those works where he tries more openly to force our belief in it by boldfaced pronouncements. He does not tell us that fate is responsible for his characters' misfortunes but shows us Gabriel Oak submitting to what Lawrence would call "the greater ordering" and lets us call it what we will- whether we name it or not, we feel its presence and power at work in the book.

Lawrence showed the understanding he had for characters like Gabriel by his portrayal of Tom Brangwen in The Rainbow. However, his treatment of Tom can perhaps shed light on Lawrence's relative lack of interest in Gabriel in relation to Clym Yeobright, Angel Clare, Jude Fawley and especially in relation to Bathsheba. For Tom Brangwen, although a sympathetic character, is to Lawrence a limited one; he grew as far as he was able and then stopped, at which point Lawrence turns his attention onto the more complex lives of Will and Anna and finally Ursula. Tom dies, significantly, in a flood at Marsh Farm caused by the bursting of the nearby colliery canal. He never goes out to meet the modern world of industrialisation and change; rather, it comes to him, invades the peaceful isolation of his home and destroys him. His is an attractive way of life, but it belongs to the past. His ease and his restricted consciousness cannot cope with the future, let alone the harsh reality of the present. It is Ursula to whom Lawrence must look for the intelligence and energy to face the threatening life outside Marsh Farm and Yew Cottage, to struggle against and come to terms with it.

However, there is a poignancy in Tom's story that is lacking in Gabriel's. Tom wanted much more from life than he finally gets; he is puzzled by his dissatisfaction and cannot fully accept or understand it.

> What was missing in his life, that, in his ravening soul, he was not satisfied? He had had that friend at school, his mother, his wife, and Anna? What had he done? He had failed with his friend, he had been a poor son; but he had known satisfaction with his wife, let it be enough; he loathed himself for the state he was in over Anna. Yet he was not satisfied. It was agony to know it.
>
> (The Rainbow, Chapter IV, p. 129)

His inability to let go of Anna, to give his whole-hearted approval to her marriage with Will when he is first asked for it, is a sign of his dissatisfaction. "It was the further, the creative life with the girl, he wanted" (Rainbow, p. 129). Long after Anna's marriage, shortly before Tom's death, we are told

> Things had puzzled him very much, so he had taken the line of easy, good-humoured acceptance. He was not responsible for the frame of things. Yet he was afraid of the unknown in life . . . It was all adventurous and puzzling . . . So, handsome and puzzled, he laughed and stuck to himself as the only thing he could stick to. His youngness and the wonder remained almost the same in him. He became indolent, he developed a luxuriant ease.
>
> (The Rainbow, Chapter IX, p. 242)

Perhaps it is a similar sense of limitation, but mixed with a dissimilar, more placid acceptance of it, which makes Gabriel Oak less interesting to Lawrence. He is like Thomasin and Venn in The Return of the Native. They

> have nothing in them turbulent enough to push them to the bounds of the convention. There is always room for them inside. They are genuine people, and they get the prize within the walls. (p. 414)

In Chapter V, Lawrence classes Gabriel as the "bourgeois or average hero, whose purpose is to live and have his being in the community" (p. 438).

It is Bathsheba who might conceivably have something in her "turbulent enough" to push her to the bounds of the convention, to move beyond the established framework of society and thought to new life discoveries of her own. Gabriel speaks of her at one point as "the only venturesome woman in the parish",[70] and she certainly seems less satisfied than Gabriel at the conclusion of the novel. Lawrence senses in her a need for further growth which Hardy leaves undeveloped and unprovided for. Yet, although Lawrence's paragraph on Far from the Madding Crowd in Chapter III stresses Bathsheba's energy, unconventionality and potential for further life, by Chapter V she is set beside Gabriel as a bourgeois or average heroine.

We (and Hardy) may not have seen the possibilities for Bathsheba in the same way that Lawrence did - "and the flower of imaginative first love is dead for her with Troy's scorn of her" (p. 413). The kind of immaturity and vanity which led her to marry Troy does not strike us as particularly imaginative or remarkable. Her lack of self-knowledge in the matter and lack of perception about Troy, her failure to discover and follow her better judgment, lead us to feel that she learned more about herself and about other people in her learning to understand and appreciate Gabriel's good qualities than she ever would have done in a continued relationship with Troy. However, the novel does give an unsettling sense of Bathsheba's rebellious and spirited nature, and we feel she has been diminished in important ways by the time of her marriage with Gabriel in spite of her growth in self-understanding. She, like Fancy Day, will settle down to "steady, solid, physically satisfactory married life", running a prosperous farm. Hardy has given her no further choices, she abandons the struggle into flower and settles comfortably into the community. She and Gabriel, like Thomasin and Venn, "are genuine people,

and they get the prize within the walls" (p. 414).

However, it is not a prize in which Lawrence is terribly interested. He is aware that it is the very rare individual who looks out from the walled city into "the wilderness raging round" and leaves the security of the established community behind "to live outside in the precarious open" (p. 411). It is these adventurers who claim his attention most fully, the life and thought adventurers; it is the prizes they struggle for that seem to him truly valuable, the discoveries which help us to move more fully into being. Unfortunately, Hardy's "thinkers" in the later novels - Clym, Angel, Sue and Jude - are not very compelling or convincing. Hardy's limits in describing thoughtful men seem to have been set in Gabriel Oak and Michael Henchard, down-to-earth, capable, not at all intellectual but with a certain wisdom, honesty and alert understanding of their own. Yet, it is the novels in which Hardy's "intellectuals" figure that Lawrence considers most carefully, perhaps because their thinking shows up most clearly the essential problems of Hardy's art and thought.

Let us look again at Lawrence's analysis of Far from the Madding Crowd in relation to that of Henry James (see pp. 135-136). I have said that Hardy, in praising Gabriel, emphasised his static qualities, that the ideal quality to have in life as Hardy saw it was the capacity to endure, as Gabriel Oak and Egdon Heath endured. It is about as un-Lawrentian an ideal as one can imagine. Lawrence looks for change, movement, vitality, exploration, renewal. I have said that Hardy emphasised Bathsheba's vanity, her typically feminine headstrong nature and foolishness; Lawrence refused to see women in this stereotyped way and interpreted what Hardy called vanity as a sign of vitality, as "the thing itself at its maximum of being". I have

said that Bathsheba's story is, in the end, the story of a venturesome young woman whose life is chastened and diminished, who settles down to an unadventurous existence as a farmer's wife; however, Lawrence's deepest interests lay with those who carry the struggle further on into consciousness, who "look at the unknown".

In other words, it would seem that Far from the Madding Crowd was a book most uncongenial to Lawrence's temper, one with which he might be thoroughly impatient if he managed to sustain his interest long enough to read through it at all. Yet look at Lawrence's account of the novel. He had clearly read it attentively, and he pays the author the supreme compliment of speaking of his characters as if they were real people. "The unruly Bathsheba", the "ravingly passionate" Farmer Boldwood, the "unscrupulous, but discriminative, almost cynical young soldier" - the entire world of the novel is alive for Lawrence. He has the ability of committing himself, of dwelling fully in the work of art before him, living in it and thus sensing its essential life. Although James' account may be more accurate in relation to Hardy's own intentions as they make themselves felt in the unfolding story, he never lets us forget for a moment that he is discussing characters in a book. Bathsheba is a Charles Reade type, Boldwood is a "shadow" and Troy "an elaborate stage-figure". Of course, this is part of James' criticism; "everything human in the book strikes us as factitious and insubstantial". Gabriel "has a certain vividness of expression", James will allow; but although he sees him as one of the best things in the novel, his description of Oak's "dumb, devoted passion" sounds relatively bland next to the suggestion of alert, canny, canine watchfulness in Lawrence's Gabriel - "like a dog that watches the bone and bides the time".

The note of superiority in James' analysis, while understandable, is completely absent in Lawrence's; and James' detachment and disbelief in the novel are catching. The story as he tells it seems dull, and there appears to be no good reason for reading it oneself. Lawrence takes all the relationships seriously, sets them working dramatically before the reader and makes it all sound like a virtual cauldron of emotion. He draws the reader irresistibly towards the novel itself. And is not the aim of all good criticism to turn the reader back to the work itself with renewed interest and more disciplined perception?

Thus Lawrence in misreading Hardy - in seeing more life in the novels than Hardy perhaps put there, in taking Hardy's frequently stereotyped women seriously as individuals, in concentrating on Bathsheba's energy and movement rather than on Gabriel's patient endurance - has managed to read him supremely well. Lawrence is not fooled by Hardy's discourses on "vanity; all is vanity", his grafting of a sober philosophy onto the life of Wessex. He has seen the heart in the novels, "with the wasteful red peeping out, like a poppy bud" (p. 400) - Hardy's sheer pleasure in the wasteful but bright manifestations of life: Henchard's personal welcome for the Royal Personage in Casterbridge, Bathsheba's antics on horseback, Eustacia's bonfires on the heath and her mumming in the guise of a Turkish Knight, Fancy Day's bold appearance in Mellstock Church with long curls, a hat and feather. These things belong uniquely to Hardy, they are his own delighted discoveries and his own peculiar knowledge. It is not an extraneous philosophy which is central to Hardy's thought, but the vivid life perceived and rendered by the artist in each novel. It is to the artist in Hardy that Lawrence wishes to do justice.

Convention or Carking Fate?

Lawrence brings another question from Chapters I and II to bear on Hardy's novels. He not only challenges our view of the poppy's flowering as vanity and excess; he also asks why, when we fail to burst into blossom, do we so often blame our failure on some external force? Why are we so eager to find excuses for ourselves?

We have seen the limits which Hardy sets on the activity of his characters. In the context of The Return of the Native, Hardy does not suggest any concrete ways in which Eustacia Vye can move forward into life and action. In Under the Greenwood Tree, Fancy Day is given only a few choices, none of them very imaginative, in the shaping of her future; she makes the best choice available and then resigns herself to it. Bathsheba Everdene's high spirits exist only to be chastened and curbed by banging into the walls of circumstance Hardy builds around her (and within her); if we accept these walls and limits - and it is certainly a novelist's prerogative to construct them as he will - we must admit that Bathsheba, like Fancy, makes the best of an unpromising situation. Yet the picture of Bathsheba standing by Gabriel's side in the doorway as the farm workers congratulate them on their marriage at the close of the novel - "Oak laughed, and Bathsheba smiled (for she never laughed readily now)" - is a disturbing one and makes us rebel. Why must these rigid walls be built around every Hardy character without exception? Why does no one ever break through?

Certainly they try. Jude struggles to reach Christminster, but he fails - partly, we feel, because his thirst for knowledge and his yen for academia aren't fully convincing. They seem extraneous, only an inadequate figuring of some real and deeper desire. Sue and Jude try to sustain their

unconventional relationship but are defeated by society's disapproval and by, Hardy tries to persuade us, a kind of cosmic attack like the one which killed Job's sons and daughters. Tess fights for love and happiness but conventional ideas, coincidence and the "president of the Immortals" conspire against her.

Why? Why does not even one of the real adventurers break through and stand firm?

Richard Swigg, in his book Lawrence, Hardy and American Literature, criticises Hardy for a failure in consciousness and supports his criticism by turning to The Return of the Native and Egdon Heath. He says that Egdon is "as much an outer mental barrier as it is a place".[72] Eustacia and Wildeve are "abortive creations, hesitantly venturing beyond the protective shell of Egdon, but unable to survive as stable, larger figures in an atmosphere where there is no further consciousness to support them";[73] and Eustacia dies because Hardy "cannot develop her beyond his own gaunt mental consciousness, and so she must be absorbed by Egdon, the grim expression of that consciousness".[74] There is no "middle distance" (the phrase is Hardy's, used to describe Eustacia[75]) in that Hardy deals with either highflown fantasies and dreams impossible of fulfilment or the disappointments of "reality", contingency, circumstance. He does not move his characters forward into the very real realm of struggling, growing individuality in between; he does not give us human beings which "go through with things in active awareness".[76] Lawrence makes a similar observation about Hardy's characters, partially excepting Jude.

> Nowhere, except perhaps in Jude, is there the slightest development of personal action in the characters: it is all explosive. Jude, however, does see more or less what he is doing, and acts from choice. He is more consecutive. (p. 410)

This seeming inability on Hardy's part to adequately embody the struggle towards extended consciousness and further forms of being in his characters, to create the "middle distance" - which leads Lawrence to find his heroines all essentially stunted and dissatisfied: Fancy, Elfride, Bathsheba, Ethelberta, Eustacia - can also be interpreted as a profound sense of the limitations of human life. Lascelles Abercrombie feels that Hardy's unrelenting "tragedy", resulting from either external circumstance or internal flaws in character or from a mixture of the two, is tempered in its severity somewhat by another quality: "Hardy always knows how to mitigate it by an exquisite tenderness, a justice of mercy towards his own creations".[77] It is this quality in Hardy which perhaps made Lawrence uneasy. What elements in our nature is he appealing to? How close is this "tenderness" for his failing, limited characters to self-indulgent feelings of pity, mere sentimentality? How completely is his kind tolerance of their failings an abdication of human responsibility? To what extent is it merely a way of sidetracking from his own necessary development, a way of finding excuses for a sense of personal failure?

Lawrence makes a striking comment about one of Hardy's novels. "It is the hard, resistant, ironical announcement of personal failure, resistant and half-grinning" (p. 413). When Lawrence implies a criticism of Fancy's marriage to Dick or Bathsheba's to Gabriel, therefore also implying a further possibility of life for both of these women, he is not really seeing such other possibilities before them as they are created and limited in the novels. Instead, he seems to be wondering over elements of personal failure in Thomas Hardy himself, that he should so circumscribe the lives of his characters repeatedly and make human potential and possibility seem such a little thing.

One could object that Lawrence's image of the blossoming poppy is just a bit too free from life's limitations to give a realistic picture of the way human beings grow and develop. Yet, although Lawrence may insist more strongly on human responsibility and on human possibility than Hardy, it would be hard to imagine a finer rendering of the many obstacles to human growth than the first part of Sons and Lovers, an achievement Lawrence already had behind him by the time he wrote the "Study". The tender and yet stern realisation of the nature of his parents' marriage, of the total deadlock it had become and how it had come to be that way, does not, however, offer any excuse to Gertrude or Walter Morel to abandon their individual growing. Lawrence's portrayal of his father is frequently sympathetic - in spite of himself, it seems - but is simultaneously harsh and unforgiving when the man shows signs of giving up his own separate struggle into being, of falling into "a slow ruin" (see Chapter VI, the first few pages). Yet, when Lawrence describes Walter Morel mending or making things, quietly working in the kitchen with the children gathered around him, or greeting William's London sweetheart in his bluff way and offering her his seat by the fire, Morel seems attractive, even charming. Lawrence's sympathy is fully roused by these moments when his father still shows signs of life and creativity, no matter in how limited a form.

There is nothing in Hardy's fiction that can compare with Lawrence's creation of Gertrude Morel, although all the characteristic Hardy limits surround her. She is constantly beset with financial worries, very basic ones involving feeding, clothing and sheltering the family.[78] She is caught in an unhappy marriage to a collier who has no appreciation any longer of the fact that she once was a schoolteacher. She lives in a small mining community

with neighbours who seem beneath her and with few opportunities for growth available - although she seems to make good use of the few that are, and Lawrence has a clear sense of what these might be and of the benefits and possible dangers they might involve.

She develops a friendship with the young minister in Bestwood, a friendship which Walter Morel clearly resents. Morel feels that there should be nothing so superior in the clergyman's cleanliness, education and sophistication to the miner's own hard labour, sweat and pit filth that he, rather than Morel, should deserve the best cloth and cups to be laid for tea. He has a point, of course. Yet we cannot grudge Mrs. Morel this small attempt at an exchange of ideas; and Lawrence makes it clear that the clergyman depends on Mrs. Morel's judgment and strength almost more than she depends on him with his Cambridge B.A. for any challenging thoughts or contact with the outside world. "Mrs. Morel was fond of him, and he depended on her . . . His ideas were quaint and fantastic. She brought him judiciously to earth."[79]

She also joins the Women's Guild in Bestwood, a group which meets to discuss various social questions.

> Sometimes Mrs. Morel read a paper. It seemed queer to the children to see their mother, who was always busy about the house, sitting writing in her rapid fashion, thinking, referring to books, and writing again. They felt for her on such occasions the deepest respect. 80

The Guild is a source of material benefits, local news, dissatisfaction with one's own home and living conditions, besides being an occasion for Mrs. Morel to think, write and speak. But it is certainly not a sufficient outlet for her needs as a growing human being - and she <u>is</u> growing, in spite of the fact that her marriage is a failure. She does not waste much time in self-pity. As she tells William, "<u>Nothing</u> is as bad as a marriage that's a

hopeless failure. Mine was bad enough, God knows, and ought to teach you something; but it might have been worse by a long chalk".[81]

Gertrude Morel is on the alert for any widening movement that offers. Even the worry and inconvenience of Walter's injury and his lengthy stay in the Nottingham hospital became a chance to broaden her life and experience and that of her children.

> Soon the folk in the picture-shop knew her, and knew about Paul. The girl in the book-shop took a keen interest in her. Mrs. Morel was full of information when she got home from Nottingham. The three (Paul, Annie and Arthur) sat round till bed-time, listening, putting in, arguing. 82

None of these attempts at growth, wider vision and capability, are an adequate substitute for the continual testing, nurture and exchange of a committed human relationship, the lack of which Gertrude Morel feels so keenly in the very limited relationship her marriage has become. Nothing can quite replace it, but it is to her credit that she never gives up. The main alternative open to her, of course, is the establishment of such relationships with her children, especially with her sons. In casting off her husband, she was "turning now for love and life to the children"[83], and the way is fraught with danger, in spite of the many rewards it offers her - and her children. Lawrence's sensitive rendering of her continuing struggle for life and love, her refusal to accept a dead-end or to indulge in self-pity over the opportunities she has missed is unlike anything in Hardy's fiction. The concreteness of her attempts at growth in spite of the many limits upon her, their convincing reality, are accompanied by an equally created realisation of the lasting and possibly destructive effects of thwarted and misdirected desire. Both the creative and destructive effects of his mother's struggle into being begin to tell on Paul at an early age.

He is at home sick one day, watching her doing the ironing by the fire while she thinks he is asleep.

> When she was quiet, so, she looked brave and rich with life, but as if she had been done out of her rights. It hurt the boy keenly, this feeling about her that she had never had her life's fulfilment: and his own incapability to make up to her hurt him with a sense of impotence, yet made him patiently dogged inside. It was his childish aim.
>
> (Chapter IV)

It seems to me impossible to argue that Lawrence was unaware of the very real limits upon human possibility which are constantly presented by environment, personal weaknesses or mistakes, accidents, societal convention, duty, prior commitments, all the concrete circumstances of life; his sensitivity to these things is recorded and embodied with great power in Sons and Lovers. He is just as aware of the limitations on human life as Hardy was, but much less ready to admit defeat. For that reason, he was also much less ready to permit others to admit defeat. It is certainly understandable that a coal miner's son who began his public life by working long hours in a factory which made wooden legs and surgical stockings and finished it by travelling around the world, supporting himself and a wife by his writing, should have a rather generous conception of the possibilities life offers. It is understandable that he should be a little hard on a school mistress with a well-to-do father (Fancy Day) and a young woman with a farm of her own (Bathsheba Everdene) for abandoning their yearnings for independence, imaginative life and self-realisation so easily. It is also understandable that he should rail at Hardy for giving them adequate excuses for doing so and then for pitying them and being fond of them in spite of their failure to fight further into life and consciousness.

Yet, it is not simply a question of economic freedom. Lawrence was no romantic about poverty.

> The only people I ever heard talk about My Lady Poverty
> were rich people, or people who imagined themselves rich.
> Saint Francis himself was a rich and spoiled young man.
>
> Being born among the working people
> I know that poverty is a hard old hag,
> and a monster, when you're pinched for actual necessities.
> And whoever says she isn't, is a liar. 84

He was also no romantic about wealth. His treatment of Egbert in "England, My England" shows how financial security can have quite as destructive an effect as financial necessity. Even more important, Lawrence undermines any illusions about one's ability to live above and apart from the world of business and matters of money. Egbert dislikes "the spirit of the world of business " and decides against any work or profession - "he did not want to give himself into bondage".[85] Yet in his isolation and his dilettantism, his perfect hermitage with Winifred and his children, he is utterly dependent on the world of business through the economic success and sustinence of his father-in-law.

No excuses are made for Egbert. Lawrence is both sympathetic and stern. He sees originality in Egbert, a kind of independence and beauty which is flower-like, a vital, potential self. But Winifred, Egbert's wife, grows impatient with this cut flower of a husband. "Doesn't Jesus say: 'Consider the lilies <u>how they grow</u>.' Good then, she had her growing babies. But as for that other tall, handsome flower of a father of theirs, he was full grown already, so she did not want to spend her life considering him in the flower of his days."[86]

Here is a man seemingly free from outside pressures in any form. Yet he does not grow. How can he when he lacks the self-knowledge to admit

where his roots lie or the strength to send down further ones of his own? As Egbert feels increasingly cut off from his family and from any real part in the world's work, he loses his vital sense of himself, his uniqueness, his rootedness. His once strong instinct for life grows dim and he drifts into war. We are reminded of Lawrence's words in Chapter II of the "Study".

> No wonder there is a war. No wonder there is a great waste and squandering of life. Anything, anything to prove that we are not altogether sealed in our own self-preservation as dying chrysalides. Better the light be blown out, wilfully, recklessly, in the wildest wind, than remain secure under the bushel, saved from every draught.
>
> So we go to war to show that we can throw our lives away.
>
> (p. 406)

Lawrence has drawn Egbert so fully and so sympathetically that his death jolts the reader with an unbearable sense of pointless human waste. Yet part of his respect for Egbert as a human being involves offering no excuses for his failure, and Lawrence does not. Egbert's abnegation of power and responsibility in raising his children was an expression of his abdication of power and responsibility in the life of the broader human community. He wanted to keep his hands clean of the petty world of material things, to live in his own element of beauty above it. Significantly, he was interested in the past, "the old music and dances and customs of old England".[87] The future did not concern him; and, indeed, there could be no future in a world of Egberts. His ideal of pure detachment would bring all life to an end. As Lawrence remarks in the "Study",

> For there does exist, after all, the great self-preservation scheme, and in it we must all live. (p. 411)

There is no Gertrude Morel and no Egbert in Hardy's fiction. The atmosphere of his work is very different from Lawrence's. I feel that if I

took my mistakes and sorrows and wishes to Hardy, he would lend a kind and sympathetic ear, remind me that I am only human and that life is full of disappointments which must be faced and accepted. There is wisdom in such a perspective. However, if I took the same batch of grievances and muddled desires to Lawrence for understanding and advice, Sons and Lovers alone would lead me to expect a much sterner, though still generous, perception at work, forcing me to bring my desires to some clarity and demanding a great deal more from me in the way of energy, self-discipline, determination and intelligence. Lawrence simply seems to expect and ask more from human beings. He is less ready than Hardy to accept excuses, much more insistent on human responsibility. The word "human" means much more to him. Regardless of which is the truer attitude to take towards our fellow beings, one can easily see which would lead to the more comforting, which to the more demanding, fiction.

Hardy's eagerness to give excuses for his characters' failures leads him to call in both society and fate; we're never sure which is really to blame, just that the character himself isn't, at least not in any major sense (with the possible exception of Michael Henchard in The Mayor of Casterbridge). Critics contemporary with the young Lawrence of the "Study" had emphasised Hardy's stress on fate, on malignant or at best indifferent cosmic forces, on the "Immanent Will". Lawrence pointed out that Hardy also said a great deal about the part played by social convention, accepted morality and human community in the defeat of many of his characters. To confuse these two different forces, the one relating to religion or metaphysics, the other to moral, economic, social and political problems, could only cloud the issue.

> This is the theme of novel after novel: remain quite within the convention, and you are good, safe and happy in the long run, though you never have the vivid pang of sympathy on your side: or, on the other hand, be passionate, individual, wilful, you will find the security of the convention a walled prison, you will escape, and you will die, either of your own lack of strength to bear the isolation and the exposure, or by direct revenge from the community, or from both. This is the tragedy, and only this: it is nothing more metaphysical than the division of a man against himself in such a way. (p. 411)

What is striking about Lawrence's analysis of the essential conflict in Hardy's novels here is the phrase "the division of a man <u>against himself</u> in such a way". Lawrence refuses to give "the human compact by which we live together, to form a community" (p. 440) any metaphysical standing. For him, the distinction between society and the individual is an arbitrary one; a society only exists because of and for the benefit of the individuals who make it up. The quality of a society depends on the quality of life of the individuals within it. The two are essentially inseparable; man is necessarily a social being and a society which denies the worth of individual men forfeits its right to exist. To elevate the conflict between man and society to a metaphysical, tragical level is to play with shadows; the real conflict, as Lawrence sees it, takes place within the man himself. If he can say "my desire was real and inevitable" (p. 411), it is for society's good as well as his own that he fulfil it and stand firm. A society which cannot renew itself through adventure and discovery will die. If he cannot bear the burden of society's disapproval as he ventures forth, if he doubts himself too much and has no faith in the community's final acceptance of his findings and its gratitude for the risks he has taken, he invites despair and failure. He lacks the self-knowledge to understand which tasks, which challenges are his own and which are far beyond him.

Lawrence is willing to take this conflict within a man as a genuine and interesting one, but he refuses to elevate it to the level of "real tragedy". By studying it in Hardy's novels he is able to perceive a chronological development in them which few others have been able to find.

> The growth and development of this tragedy, the deeper and deeper realization of this division and this problem, the coming towards some conclusion, is the one theme of the Wessex novels. (p. 412)

However, it is tragedy not in a Shakespearean or Aeschylean, but in a more limited sense.

> . . . whereas in Shakespeare or Sophocles the greater, uncomprehended morality, or fate, is actively transgressed and gives active punishment, in Hardy and Tolstoi the lesser, human morality, the mechanical system is actively transgressed, and holds, and punishes the protagonist, whilst the greater morality is only passively, negatively transgressed, it is represented merely as being present in background, in scenery, not taking any active part, having no direct connexion with the protagonist . . . Which is the weakness of modern tragedy, where transgression against the social code is made to bring destruction, as though the social code worked our irrevocable fate. (pp. 419-420)

The distinction Lawrence is drawing here is essentially a religious one. He says of Eustacia, Tess and Sue

> they were not at war with God, only with Society. Yet they were all cowed by the mere judgment of man upon them, and all the while by their own souls they were right. And the judgment of men killed them, not the judgment of their own souls or the judgment of Eternal God. (p. 420)

Only a man for whom Eternal God was an indisputable reality could criticise Hardy's tragedy in this way; and perhaps the greatest difference between Lawrence and Hardy was that the first was a religious writer and the second was not. Lawrence's comments here on the nature of real tragedy show him quarelling not only with Hardy's work but with Lascelles Abercrombie and

Jane Harrison as well.[88] Granted that "the judgment of their own souls" was a complex part of the stories of Eustacia, Tess and Sue, as Hardy has created them, they all inhabit a world where God no longer exists in any meaningful sense and, to fill the vacuum, "a man-made machine, Society itself"[89] has taken on ominous powers.

In Hardy's novels society is no longer seen in perspective. His characters all have ideal visions of society as it should be - Eustacia's Paris, Jude's Christminster - and are invariably crushed by the harsh reality in which society turns upon them like an enraged deity. The only possible happiness consists in impermanent moments of isolation and complete freedom, moments when Hardy's characters are cut off from any responsible relation to society whatsoever - Clym and Eustacia's first weeks in their cottage at Alderworth, Jude and Sue's glimpse of the roses at the Agricultural Show, Tess and Angel's few days alone before her arrest.

Lawrence's treatment of man in relation to society seems to me much finer and more mature than Hardy's for three main reasons. First, he denies the possibility of man's living in isolation; he does not idealise such fleeting moments of peace, cut off from the rest of the world, as Hardy does. Anna and Will Brangwen's honeymoon is not the fleeting blossom of the flower of love after which all life must be a disappointment; it has its meaning in the natural rhythm of their life and growth together and is certainly no ideal pattern for all of life. In the "Study", human community is simply taken for granted as a necessary condition for life. Whoever doubts this has only to look at Daleski's chart in <u>The Forked Flame</u> to see the difficulty he encounters when he tries to range "Community" under Male or Female. He finally puts it under Male, recalling all that Lawrence says

about Male Christian love, recognition of the other and service of the public good. Yet he cannot find anything to put as its opposite under Female; certainly he cannot put "Individual" under Female because Lawrence speaks of unique individuality and separateness as male. The whole attempt, of course, gets ridiculous. As we see in Chapter III, community is understood as part of the self-preservation side of life (that is, what would be ranged under Female and Law in Daleski's chart). Yet in Chapter V Lawrence gives it a further significance when he speaks of our developing into pure and distinct individuals .

> Then it would be a melody if I walked down the road; if I stood with my neighbour, it would be a pure harmony. (p. 432)

So how are we to categorise "Commumity" in Lawrence's systematic doctrine? We aren't. Man is necessarily a social being. He exists in community both to administer to the flesh, obey the laws of self-preservation, and to administer to the spirit, to share with other individuals different from himself and to participate with them in the adventure of extending human consciousness. If Daleski must make charts, let him at least make them accurately and realise that Community belongs not only under Male but under Female as well.

Second, Lawrence not only does not idealise the extraordinary individual living apart from human society or above it; he also does not form an impossible ideal of society to which real society could never measure up. Society is created by men and has the faults and the merits of men. It is involved in the struggle for survival because men are; it is involved in the adventure into thought and further life because men are. Egbert in "England My England" wants to deny his roots in a social structure which depends on power, money, business, wrangling imperfection. His is a finer life.

Yet without his roots in such soil, where would he be? A society of cut flowers like himself would die within a fortnight's time.

I do not want to suggest that Lawrence was satisfied by human society as it was, but only that his basic understanding of the necessary nature of society was more realistic than Hardy's. How frequently in Jude the Obscure are we told that "the time was not ripe"[90] for Jude and Sue. Yet how could there ever be a time or a society to fit the ideal of a young boy who cannot even scare the birds away from a farmer's field of corn for sympathising with them? The way in which Hardy tells the incident about Farmer Troutham and the rooks shows how fully he endorses Jude's feelings. He sets up obvious, heavy-handed ironies. When the farmer smacks Jude for his negligence, the sound echoes "from the brand-new church tower just behind the mist, towards the building of which structure the farmer had largely subscribed, to testify his love for God and man."[91] Then we are told of Jude's unhappy perception "of the flaw in the terrestrial scheme, by which what was good for God's birds was bad for God's gardner".[92] That Jude understood this ordering of things as a "flaw" points to his characteristic inability to face and accept reality, an inability which is often coupled with sentimentality and squeamishness, as in the scene when he tries to help Arabella butcher the pig. Throughout the novel we feel Hardy's sympathy with Jude's perspectives; society is a flawed thing, Jude and Sue are ahead of their time and could never succeed unless the very nature of society was changed.

But what is this nature of society that must be changed before human beings are freed into life and fruitful action? In The Return of the Native we also feel Hardy's sympathy with Clym's ideals, although Hardy

tries to add a sophisticated, worldly-wise note of cynicism about the probability of their success. "To argue upon the possibility of culture before luxury to the bucolic world may be to argue truly, but it is an attempt to disturb a sequence to which humanity has been long accustomed."[93] Clym's voluntary poverty and his educational scheme are seen as idealistic but are also endorsed by Hardy as signs of what society should be like. Clym's diamond business is clearly vanity. Yet where do we have in The Return of the Native a realisation to match Lawrence's in "England, My England" that the money which enabled Clym to spend all of his time in study preparing for his scheme came from this wicked diamond business itself?

Michael Polanyi expresses a belief about the nature of reality and society which Lawrence embodies and examines more complexly in "England, My England", The Rainbow and elsewhere. Just as all our thinking and living is rooted in our bodies, bodies which are limited in time and space, liable to sickness, exhaustion and failure; just as the operational idea of a machine "can go into action only if embodied in tangible materials which carry in them always the possibility of failure"[94]; so "we must accept the fact that any moral advances must be tainted by the social mechanism which alone can bring them about".[95] The organisation of society is to a large extent based on motives of power and profit; "there does exist, after all, the great self-preservation scheme, and in it we must all live" (p. 411).

> The human mind exists only within an articulate framework provided for it by society; society both fosters thought and is in its turn largely controlled by thought. Hence the responsibility for every major mental decision is in part a social responsibility, and thus both affects and is in turn affected, by the existing structure of power and profit . . . Everywhere the potential operations of a higher level are actualised by their embodiment in lower levels which makes them liable to failure . . .

> Perfectionism, which would transform the whole of thought and the entire society, is a program of destruction, ending up at best in a world of pretense . . . To attempt to enforce absolute morality in society is therefore to indulge in fantasies . . . 96

Thus, we must begin where we are, living and working in an imperfect society. Our perception of this world as a blighted planet (see Tess, Chapter IV) does not relieve us of responsibility until our world is somehow changed into one "splendid and sound".

The third respect in which Lawrence's treatment of man in relation to society is superior to Hardy's lies in his ability to create the "middle distance". We have seen how Lawrence was able to present Gertrude Morel's continuing growth in the face of many obstacles. She is not permitted to abandon her struggle for further life simply because society is not yet perfect; nor does she yearn for a brief, splendid week of happiness cut off from the world of economic necessity, hard work, human greed and moral convention. She accepts the world as it is and fights with it, shaping it, moving forward into it day by day.

Lawrence, as a novelist, was keenly aware of the specific influences of environment, education and relationships on every individual. These influences are at work in some form or another on each human being; they are what make us different from one another, make each one of us unique, an absolutely new thing under the sun. However, these influences do not offer us excuses for failure; although they define our limitations, they also define our peculiar opportunities.

What Lawrence knew as a novelist, Polanyi stated as a philosopher.

> I acknowledge that in childhood I have formed my most fundamental beliefs by exercising my native intelligence within the social milieu of a particular place and time. I shall submit to this fact as defining the conditions within which I am called upon to exercise my responsibility.

> I accept these limits, for it is impossible to hold myself responsible beyond such limits. To ask how I would think if I were brought up outside any particular society, is as meaningless as to ask how I would think if I were born in no particular body . . . it is man's task to strive by the aid of his meagre creaturely faculties and of the resources of his particular environment to achieve results not altogether determined by these opportunities. In this light the historian will see every historical person as necessarily dependent for his effectiveness on accepting a given cultural medium and on grasping accidental opportunities that are never free of degrading temptations.[97]

There are "limitations imposed on men's mental passions by the medium through which they operate . . . the medium of bodily existence and social dependence which lies beyond man's responsibility and thereby defines his calling".[98] Our "material and social rootedness", our particular limitations, must be accepted "as the assignment of our particular problem".[99] Our work on this problem, our fulfilling our unique calling may challenge the accepted intellectual or moral framework of the society in which we were brought up, but our effectiveness depends on accepting a task commensurate with our abilities and with our peculiar "material and social rootedness". A scientist wastes his time and energy if he chooses a problem to work on that is either too difficult or too easy. Playing safe and over-reaching ourselves both involve unfortunate human waste.

The key words in the thought of Lawrence and Polanyi on the nature of man's relation to the broader human community are - acceptance of reality, self-knowledge and self-responsibility. They are not words which describe the conception of man-in-society embodied in the Wessex novels. Hardy creates characters with energy and longing for growth, yet he cannot give their energy scope for concrete action; their longings remain daydreams, vague, stirring dissatisfactions, for Hardy can only create limits around his characters, not limits which are also opportunities (Fancy, Bathsheba,

Eustacia). Instead of placing the responsibility on the shoulders of Clym and Jude for the lack of self-knowledge which permitted them to indulge in schemes inappropriate to their abilities and to their social circumstances, Hardy excuses them; a society in which the diamond trade flourishes and in which poor men are denied a place in university is obviously not yet ready for the idealism of a Clym or a Jude.

What is most clear, however, is that the sense of the religious importance of accepting one's calling in society, one's responsibility to participate as far as one is able in the human life adventure, which is so central to Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow, is almost entirely absent in the Wessex novels. Society usually only makes itself felt when it is infringing on an individual's private life of love and enmity. Clym, Angel and Jude do have a sense of vocation in a way, but in all of them it seems a bit forced and extraneous, and it invariably takes second place to their passionate relation with a woman. Lawrence considers this limit to the scope of the Wessex novels so crucial that it is almost the first thing he says about them.

> What exactly the struggle into being consists in, is the question. But most obviously, from the Wessex novels, the first and chiefest factor is the struggle into love and the struggle with love: by love, meaning the love of a man for a woman and a woman for a man. The via media to being, for man or woman, is love and love alone. Having achieved and accomplished love, then the man passes into the unknown. He has become himself, his tale is told. Of anything that is complete there is no more tale to tell. The tale is about becoming complete, or about the failure to become complete. (p. 410)

Lawrence was certainly willing to take this struggle seriously; no one has treated it more fully or sensitively than he himself in Will and Anna's relationship in The Rainbow and Birkin and Ursula's relationship in

Women in Love. However, that Lawrence felt that love alone was not enough is clear from "England, My England". Winifred and Egbert live in a wonderful glow of physical passion at Crockham Cottage, but as time passes something goes wrong, there is something missing. Lawrence pinpoints it as an abdication of responsibility, Egbert's failure to stand for anything, to take his place in human society. He refuses a human being's religious obligation to discover and accept his own particular calling; it is only through the acceptance of such obligations that society is kept alive.

> In the end, it is only this robust, sap-like faith which keeps man going. He may live on for many generations inside the shelter of the social establishment which he has erected for himself, as pear trees and currant bushes would go on bearing fruit for many seasons, inside a walled garden, even if the race of man were suddenly exterminated. But bit by bit the wall fruit trees would gradually pull down the very walls that sustained them. Bit by bit every establishment collapses, unless it is renewed or restored by living hands, all the while.[100]

By shifting the blame onto the imperfect nature of society or onto the vagaries of fate, coincidence and circumstance (or both, as Hardy frequently seems to invest society with the cosmic powers of kismet), Hardy relieves his people of the responsibility of sharing in this task. Then, when he pities them for their failure, he abdicates responsibility himself.

The Rich Young Poppy - Clym Yeobright

The third question Lawrence brings to the Wessex novels from Chapters I and II of the "Study" is shaped most clearly in the"parable of the rich poppy" in Chapter II. This question has two parts. Why, in mistaking pity for Christian love, do we so often indulge in it as a kind of substitution for the more risky business of becoming our true selves? And what, in mistaking pity for love, is the true nature of love that we fail to comprehend?

In Chapter III Lawrence brings this question to bear on Clym Yeobright of The Return of the Native. Pity seems to be Clym's one most positive emotion. He pities the Egdon natives, hence his educational scheme. His strongest feeling at his mother's death is not love but an overwrought pity for her as an old, lonely woman.[101] Even in the violent argument with Eustacia, after he has discovered the part she played in turning his mother away, he repeatedly offers to pity her if she will only confess all; he does not speak of loving or forgiving her. Eustacia rightly rebels against the condescension involved in Clym's offers of mercy (his very name, Clement, means forbearing, lenient, merciful, mild). Clym says

> "Instead of hating you I could, I think, mourn for and pity you, if you were contrite, and would confess all. Forgive you I never can . . ."
>
> "Say no more. I will do without your pity . . ." [102]

Eustacia finally tells Clym the full story except for the name of the man who was in the house with her when she failed to open the door to Mrs. Yeobright. Clym persists, "Tell all, and I will pity you . . . when you will confess to the man I may pity you".[103]

Clym obviously seems to feel that his pity is a rather valuable commodity. Lawrence is quite insistent on the arrogance of Clym's attitude; it is the arrogance of the tall young poppy that cannot burst into blossom feeling sorry for the shorter flowers around him that can. Clym had returned to Egdon

> "to preach to the Egdon eremites that they might rise to a serene comprehensiveness without going through the process of enriching themselves". As if the Egdon eremites had not already far more serene comprehensiveness than ever he had himself, rooted as they were in the soil of all things, and living from the root! What did it matter how they enriched

> themselves, so long as they kept this strong, deep root in the primal soil, so long as their instincts moved out to action and to expression? The system was big enough for them, and had no power over their instincts. They should have taught him rather than he them. (p. 417)

Clym's arrogance is mixed with cowardice.

> What is Clym's altruism but a deep, very subtle cowardice, that makes him shirk his own being whilst apparently acting nobly; which makes him choose to improve mankind rather than to struggle at the quick of himself into being. He is not able to undertake his own soul, so he will take a commission for society to enlighten the souls of others. It is a subtle equivocation. Thus both Eustacia and he sidetrack from themselves, and each leaves the other unconvinced, unsatisfied, unrealized. (p. 414)

Clym's sidetracking into pity and altruism leads him to ignore entirely what Lawrence feels is the hardest lesson of Christian love- "to recognize and to admit the law of the other person, outside and different from the law of one's own being" (p. 512). Since, as Lawrence perceives, "the struggle into love and the struggle with love" (p. 410) is a central theme of the Wessex novels, Clym's insensitivity to the true nature of love is a crucial element in the whole drama of The Return of the Native. In fact, as Lawrence continues to see this insensitivity manifesting itself in many of the Wessex novels, especially in the two he treats at greatest length, Tess and Jude, the "Study" begins to turn into an enquiry on the nature of love, an enquiry on the order of Plato's Symposium. Lawrence's thoughts on love and their relation to the Symposium will be discussed as they develop in the "Study" (see Chapters III, IV and VI of this thesis). At present, I will simply try to show Clym's limited understanding of what love and marriage involved, a limitation in his character so instrumental to the unfolding of the catastrophe that some appreciation of it and some careful thinking about what the demands of love and marriage are is required for any competent criticism of the novel.

When Clym married Eustacia, he failed to recognise her own special being, separate from his.

> . . . as soon as he got her, she became an idea to him, she had to fit in his system of ideas. According to his way of living, he knew her already, she was labelled and classed and fixed down. . . He did not know that Eustacia had her being beyond his. (p. 418)

Clym ignores Eustacia's longings to go to Paris; he humours her when she asks him to talk about it by giving her lengthy descriptions of the Louvre, but he never once considers that her desire for Paris might express a deeper need in her which he ought to take seriously. No, Clym has it all worked out. As he tells his mother,

> "If I take a school an educated woman would be invaluable as a help to me . . . She is excellently educated, and would make a good matron in a boarding-school." 104

This is all very well, but Eustacia doesn't <u>want</u> to be a matron in a boarding-school. When Clym proposes to her she makes this quite clear.

> "I must think", Eustacia murmured. "At present speak of Paris to me. Is there any place like it on earth? . . . Dear Clym, you'll go back again? . . . If you'll go back again I'll - be something", she said tenderly, putting her head near his breast. "If you'll agree I'll give my promise, without making you wait a minute longer."

Clym repeats that he has vowed not to go back to Paris; he dislikes working in the diamond business. Then he urges Eustacia again to be his wife, and she gives in.

> "You will never adhere to your education plan, I am quite sure; and then it will be all right for me; and so I promise to be yours for ever and ever." 105

A schoolmistress, indeed! After their marriage, when Eustacia brings up the idea of Paris again, Clym acts surprised.

> "Well, there are things which are placed beyond the pale of discussion; and I thought this was specially so, and by mutual agreement." 106

Of course, Eustacia went into the marriage knowing that Clym still clung to his educational scheme, but her belief that someone as unusual as he, a man "of whom something was expected", would not waste himself on desolate Egdon, was based on a more true appreciation of his nature and his potential than was his idea of her.[107] At points in the novel it is hard to take either one of them seriously, they so clearly do not even hear each other speaking or pay any attention to each other's deepest desires.

Lawrence, however, accepts them as real human beings with actual problems. In spite of Clym's sidetracking, Lawrence says "he remained for all that an original, the force of life was in him, however much he frustrated and suppressed its natural movement" (p. 417). Yet in frustrating this movement of life, in giving himself over to pity, Clym not only managed to overlook the unique individuality of Eustacia and of the Egdon natives; his self-knowledge was as superficial as his knowledge of others, and it severely limited the originality and power of his thought.

> His years of pupilage were past, "he was one of whom something original was expected", yet he continued in pupilage. For he produced nothing original in being or in act, and certainly no original thought. None of his ideas were original. Even he himself was not original. He was over-taught, had become an echo. His life had been arrested, and his activity turned into repetition. (p. 417)

Clym is, like Angel Clare and Jude Fawley, one of Hardy's thinking men. It is crucial for the success of <u>The Return of the Native</u> that we believe in Clym's originality, in the force his presence has on Eustacia and in his intellectual capabilities. However, Hardy is able to do little more than tell us that Clym thought a great deal and that he read a great many books - so many, in fact, that he developed acute inflammation of the eyes. We never know beyond the vaguest hints what books Clym read or what

exactly he wanted to teach the Egdon eremites or even what educational theories lay behind Clym's endeavour.

> Mentally he was in a provincial future, that is, he was in many points abreast with the central town thinkers of his date. Much of this development he may have owed to his studious life in Paris, where he had become acquainted with ethical systems popular at the time.
>
> In consequence of this relatively advanced position, Yeobright might have been called unfortunate. The rural world was not ripe for him. 108

In what this "advanced position" consisted exactly we are given no clearer idea than Clym's brief explanation to his mother a few chapters later.

> "There is no chance of getting rich. But with my system of education, which is as new as it is true, I shall do a great deal of good to my fellow-creatures . . . My plan is one for instilling high knowledge into empty minds without first cramming them with what has to be uncrammed again before true study begins." 109

Such an account of his aims and methods does not give us much to go on. However, what is clear is that education from Clym's point of view is basically a matter of putting things into other people's heads. The difference between one theory of education and another lies in <u>what</u> is to be "crammed into empty minds"; simply because Clym uses the more noble-sounding word "instilled" to describe his method of enlightening others, this should not blind us to the fact that it is still the same process at work.

Lawrence is very quick to perceive what is wrong with such an assumption about the nature of thought. He quotes Hardy's own description of Clym.

> Without being thought-worn, he yet had certain marks derived from a perception of his surroundings, such as are not infrequently found on man at the end of the four or five years of endeavour which follow the close of

> placid pupilage. He already showed that thought is a disease of the flesh, and indirectly bore evidence that ideal physical beauty is incompatible with emotional development and a full recognition of the coil of things. Mental luminousness must be fed with the oil of life, even if there is already a physical seed for it; and the pitiful sight of two demands on one supply was just showing itself here. 110

Then Lawrence asks, "But did the face of Clym show that thought is a disease of flesh, or merely that in his case a dis-ease, an un-ease, of flesh produced thought? One does not catch thought like a fever: one produces it" (p. 416). Hardy continues,

> As is usual with bright natures, the deity that lies ignominiously chained within an ephemeral human carcass shone out of him like a ray. 111

Lawrence disagrees.

> But was the deity chained within his ephemeral human carcass, or within his limited human consciousness? Was it his blood, which rose dark and potent out of Egdon, which hampered and confined the deity, or was it his mind, that house built of extraneous knowledge and guarded by his will, which formed the prison? (p. 417)

Lawrence questions the importance of any of Clym's thinking, feeling that all or most of it consisted not of original discovery but simply of repetition and manipulation of already existing ideas. Clym failed to discover and submit with discipline to his own particular calling. Instead he collected his "knowledge" from many external sources and forced it upon himself at the expense of great effort - great effort, because the process was unnatural, going against his deepest feelings for life and his special being which had its own unique discoveries and contributions to make. "To each individuality belongs, by nature, its own knowledge" (p. 433).

Hardy seems to have had little consciousness of the creative nature of thought, the kind of individual risk and growth it involved.

In his novels, knowledge is seen as a kind of external entity which you can get from a school or from books. Most of his heroines have a little bit of it; it functions as a kind of ornament which makes them more valuable on the marriage market. Bathsheba Everdene played the piano and was an "excellent scholar" who "was going to be a governess once, you know, only she was too wild".[112] We are given similar brief references to an earlier education of a superior sort in Hardy's descriptions of Fancy Day, Tess, and Eustacia Vye and, similarly, are given no idea of what this education involved or what it meant to the lives of these young women, beyond making them a bit more unhappy and dissatisfied than most.

Lawrence is able to suggest what real learning involves, much more convincingly than Hardy ever does, in one short scene in Sons and Lovers. On the first day Paul meets Miriam Leivers on her parents' farm, her brothers show Paul how to feed corn to the hen from his hand. Paul tries and succeeds, but Miriam hangs back, afraid. Later, Paul discovers her trying to feed the hen on her own, after everyone else has gone, but she still draws back too soon in fear. Kindly and firmly, Paul encourages her until finally she risks it, and the hen pecks her hand. "She gave a little cry - fear, and pain because of fear - rather pathetic. But she had done it, and she did it again."[113]

The scene masterfully suggests just what Miriam's relationship with Paul is going to mean to her over the next ten years. The sense of adventure, the fear, the risk of one's whole being, the joy of new discoveries - all of these play a part in the story of their growth together. Of course, in Sons and Lovers, the entire struggle of Paul and Miriam into consciousness is fully embodied. We know not only the books they read, the

writing and painting they attempt, the classes they attend, the walks they take to the library and to church and the discussions that arise on the way; we also watch them challenging and responding to each other and opening themselves up to life and to their surroundings. Lawrence describes the way in which Miriam helps Paul to express and clarify his thoughts.

> She alone helped him towards realization. Almost impassive, she submitted to his argument and expounding. And somehow, because of her, he gradually realized where he was wrong . . . as he sat in the arm-chair reading, intent, his voice only thinking, she felt as if he were using her unconsciously as a man uses his tools at some work he is bent on. She loved it . . . the wistfulness of his voice was like a reaching to something. 114

The closest Hardy ever comes to convincingly showing us two people immersed in thought, learning and growing as Paul and Miriam were, is in Jude the Obscure. The limitations of his treatment of Jude will, I hope, be made clear in my discussion of Chapter IX of the "Study". What needs to be emphasised now is the narrow conception of knowledge which shows itself in Hardy's portrayal of Clym Yeobright, and Lawrence's criticism of that conception.

> So he skated over heaven and hell, and having made a map of the surface, thought he knew all. But underneath and among his mapped world, the eternal powerful fecundity worked on heedless of him and his arrogance. His preaching, his superficiality made no difference. What did it matter if he had calculated a moral chart from the surface of life? . . . A little of the static surface he could see, and map out. Then he thought his map was the thing itself . . . His blindness indeed brought on the calamity . . . How blind he was, how utterly blind to the tremendous movement carrying and producing the surface. He did not know that the greater part of every life is underground, like roots in the dark in contact with the beyond. He preached, thinking lives could be moved like hen-houses from here to there. (p. 418)

Clym not only seemed oblivious to the fact of the bodily and cultural rootedness of all our thought and action; he also ignored the

greater movement of life, beyond and underneath his systems and ideas. He took no risks but proceeded methodically, reading one book after another. He failed to do the first thing necessary in any thought-adventure, in the solving of any problem - to look at the unknown.

There is nothing in all of The Return of the Native to equal Miriam's learning to feed the hen from her hand as an expression of the nature of true discovery. We remember that when Miriam finally let the hen peck the corn, she gave a cry; then "she had done it once, and she did it again". Her doing it again is a pleasure to her, it is a repetition of a skill she has suddenly acquired; but it is not at all as fearful or as important a thing as her first attempt. All of Clym's activity, however, consists of such repeated motions, dealing with that which is already known. He has chosen the safe, the cowardly course.

Michael Polanyi evaluates Clym's kind of knowledge in the same way that Lawrence does. He asks us to consider the difference between a traveller with a map and an unguided explorer. The traveller with his map has access to explicit, objective knowledge which the explorer does not; he is, in a way, intellectually superior to the unguided man. Yet, in the end, we judge the explorer's fumbling progress to be a much finer achievement.[115]

Lawrence, by urging us to look at Egdon Heath, the "greater unwritten morality" which Clym ignored, hopes to challenge us to true thought beyond the scope of Clym's limited consciousness.

> Like Clym,the map appears to us more real than the land. Shortsighted almost to blindness, we pore over the chart, map out journeys, and confirm them: and we cannot see life itself giving us the lie the whole time. (pp. 420-21)

The "great background"

Why is Egdon Heath in The Return of the Native so important to Lawrence?

Lascelles Abercrombie in his study of Hardy also concentrates on Egdon Heath as an example of the "great background" present in most of Hardy's novels. Although on the surface his description of "Hardy's effect of a passionate, intricate, complete human event thrown against the simplicity and deliberateness of the earth"[116] resembles Lawrence's, in significant ways it is very different. Abercrombie writes,

> We never feel the characters to be isolated in a purely human world; the conditions of their being, and their being itself, are always engaged . . . with an immense background of measureless fatal processes, a moving, supporting darkness more or less apparent; it may be only hinted at, but it is always to be felt . . . The stock instance of the chemical mingling of human with unhuman stuff in the Wessex novels is the umbergrain of Egdon Heath which runs through The Return of the Native; the potency issuing darkly out of that space of desolation, and staining with inevitable tragedy the persons that move within it . . . the characters seem unable to escape from that queer potency . . . they are strangely grasped by its subtle compulsion . . . Nature, in fact, holds the human action in solution . . . 117

Certain phrases - "an immense background of measureless fatal processes", "staining with inevitable tragedy the persons that move within it . . . unable to escape from that queer potency" - suggest basic assumptions quite distinct from Lawrence's. Lawrence describes Egdon as a creative force, even as a "dark, powerful source whence all things rise into being", "the powerful, eternal origin seething with production" (p. 418). It comes as a shock, if one reads the "Study" before The Return of the Native, to realise that for Hardy the heath is a barren waste, dry and brown most of the year, and not the land of moist black soil and thick vegetation which Lawrence's language conjures up.

> The Heath threw forth its shaggy heather and furze and fern, clean into being . . . The heath heaved with raw instinct. Egdon, whose dark soil was strong and crude and organic as the body of a beast . . . The Heath persists. Its body is strong and fecund, it will bear many more crops beside this. Here is the sombre, latent power that will go on producing, no matter what happens to the product. Here is the deep, black source from whence all these little contents of lives are drawn. And the contents of the small lives are spilled and wasted. There is a savage satisfaction in it: for so much more remains to come, such a black. powerful fecundity is working there that what does it matter? (p. 415)

For Hardy, the primary characteristic of the heath is its static, unchanging nature. The title of the first chapter of The Return of the Native, a chapter entirely devoted to a description of Egdon, makes this clear - "A Face on which Time Makes but Little Impression". The heath is a place "perfectly accordant with man's nature . . . like man, slighted and enduring; and withal singularly colossal and mysterious in its swarthy monotony". "It had a lonely face, suggesting tragical possibilities." This barren tract of land, which had remained unaltered from prehistoric times and had always worn "the same antique brown dress", "gave ballast to the mind adrift on change, and harassed by the irrepressible new".[118]

Richard Swigg states the difference between Lawrence's view of Egdon Heath and Hardy's clearly.

> Hardy's Egdon is stoic, enduring, unchanging; Lawrence's Egdon is also eternal but dynamic. It is inviolate not because it has a hard casing but because it has an indomitable, thrusting creativity. 119

This distinction is interesting in relation to Lawrence's view of nature and evolution[120], his conception of the nature of thought[121], and especially in this Chapter III of the "Study", his idea of the "greater unwritten morality".

Hardy's comments on a "greater morality" in The Return of the Native are an attempt at a kind of sage cynicism.

> Human beings, in their generous endeavour to construct a hypothesis that shall not degrade a First Cause, have always hesitated to conceive a dominant power of lower moral quality than their own; and, even while they sit down and weep by the waters of Babylon, invent excuses for the oppression which prompts their tears. 122

The force of this passage in context is intended to make us pity Clym, who - although "he did sometimes think he had been ill-used by fortune, so far as to say that to be born is a palpable dilemma, and that instead of men aiming to advance in life with glory they should calculate how to retreat out of it without shame" [123] - charitably invents excuses for this oppressive fortune. The implication is that Clym, though refusing to face it, is held in the grip of some greater force which has caused his unhappiness and which has a moral quality inferior to Clym's own. Thus, Clym is relieved of any major responsibility for the unhappy deaths of his mother, Eustacia and Wildeve, and his altruism is endorsed simultaneously.

Perhaps the intention of such a perspective is to give man tragic stature; however, it does exactly the reverse. It asks us to pity a poor creature who is kind and good but crushed under the weight of a greater power that is unkind and bad, or at best indifferent. It is a rather complacent view; man means well but cannot help it when forces beyond his control set catastrophes in motion. It implies that man has nothing to learn from this "greater morality", he is already superior to it.

Lawrence's emphasis on Egdon Heath, the "great background", does not relieve Hardy's characters of responsibility for their part in the drama - far from it. "Their real tragedy is that they are unfaithful to the greater

unwritten morality . . . Not Egdon is futile, sending forth life on the powerful heave of passion. It cannot be futile, for it is eternal. What is futile is the purpose of man. Man has a purpose which he has divorced from the passionate purpose that issued him out of the earth into being" (p. 415).

The tragedy, for Lawrence, is the failure of Hardy's characters to "look into the wilderness raging round" (p. 419), to discover their own unique rootedness and purpose and to faithfully follow it through even if it happens to challenge established frameworks of morality. As he points out, it is the rare human being whose purpose does call him out from the walled city; the majority find that "there is always room for them inside. They are genuine people, and they get the prize within the walls" (p. 414). Lawrence believes, however, that Hardy did create characters with all the originality and energy of true adventurers, but he never let them plunge into the unknown without drowning them soon after. Most of them never manage to escape from within the city walls; they are stopped at the gates and punished merely for wanting to leave.

Why this hatred or fear of the unknown, this blindness to it and yet fascination for it? This may be a common human attitude, but Lawrence insists that Hardy's heroes and heroines are uncommon - "All of them are struggling hard to come into being" (p. 410). Yet for Clym the unknown hardly exists; for Eustacia it is a source of dread - "the unknown always fills my mind with terrible possibilities".[124] Yet, as Lawrence senses from the rendering of the forceful presence of Egdon Heath in The Return of the Native, Hardy was also intrigued by "the vast, uncomprehended and incomprehensible morality of nature or of life itself, surpassing human

consciousness" (p. 419). Lawrence sees Hardy as an artist and therefore as an explorer in uncharted territory, bringing back reports to the rest of us of how the land lies ahead; but to risk oneself in unknown worlds of the imagination requires a faith that something real is there to be discovered. In Hardy, it is this faith that seems uncertain, that wavers often at the crucial moments and keeps him from forging ahead.

Abercrombie's reading of the Wessex novels can help clarify the reasons for this lack of faith. Egdon Heath to him suggests none of the unknown realities to be explored which it does to Lawrence. Instead, Egdon "presides over the story, a vast, careless oppression. In no book of Hardy's is the ceaseless drifting power of material fate so impressively or so directly typified".[125] Abercrombie refers to this "fate" in the Wessex novels as "the unswerving perpetual necessity of the world".

> The general, measureless process of existence, wherein all activity is included, cares nothing, in working itself out, for the needs and desires of individual existence; the only relation between the two (but it is an utterly unavoidable relation) is that in the long run the individual must obey the general . . . It is a state of affairs which is, of course, especially unfortunate for consciously sensitive human creatures who have the additional ill-luck to be firmly persuaded that their desires must have some creative value, some power of modifying the worldly process . . . Human desire must therefore be at best an irony. [126]

In discussing The Mayor of Casterbridge, Abercrombie attributes Henchard's tragedy not to his old sin finding him out (he sold his wife in the first few chapters of the novel), but to "the general sin of personal existence, and personal desire, in a universe of indifferent fate".[127]

To Lawrence our desires did have creative value. Personal existence and personal desire were the possibility of and the clue to one's human responsibility to the greater, unwritten morality. They were not

extraneous, nor signs of imperfection in the order of creation; they were indispensable conditions of all knowledge and all creative human life.

Perhaps Lawrence sounds too optimistic, and Abercrombie and the Hardy of Abercrombie's study have a more mature and sober acceptance of the harsh realities of existence. But if so, there is something very placid and unconcerned about Abercrombie's brand of pessimism. He tells us that all great art should make us accept and even delight in "the tragic ground-bass which keenly civilized consciousness always hears accompanying the tune of the world. This delight in tragedy must, naturally, be of an aesthetic nature".[128] This aesthetic delight in the tragic nature of life sounds oddly secure, serene and unchallenged (and unchallenging), and it corresponds with Abercrombie's continuing emphasis on form in Thomas Hardy: A Critical Study. He praises Hardy's "extraordinary power of artistic form"[129], telling us that great art is important because in it "life has at last been perfectly formed and measured to man's requirements; and in art man knows himself truly the master of his existence. It is this sense of mastery which gives man that raised and delighted consciousness of self which art provokes".[130]

All of these things are present in Hardy to some extent - the consciousness of "the ceaseless drifting power of material fate", a certain complacency, and the need for perfect form and the sense of mastery over life which it gives. Hardy's form is so often that of the storyteller by the fire, telling entertaining, comfortable tales. He seems not to submit his imagination fully to the discipline of reality but to rely on the machinery of ingenious plots, coincidences, O' Henry-type tricks; he usually rounds a story off with a marriage, a catastrophe or a death. How unlike life is the note of finality he gives us at the end of each novel; how different it is

from the sense of openness, of further discoveries to be made, Lawrence gives us in his closing chapters. Paul Morel walks towards the "faintly humming, glowing town, quickly". Ursula Brangwen has a vision of a rainbow promise. Birkin wonders if marriage can ever be enough for him, or if he needs a further relationship in creative purpose with a man. One finishes a Hardy novel and wants to drowse contentedly off to sleep. One finishes a Lawrence novel and wants to talk to someone about it, to take a brisk walk and think it through, to take stock and start moving in a new direction (or move refreshed in an established one). The end of Lawrence's novels read like the beginning of something else.

None of the qualities which Abercrombie discovers in Hardy - a belief in malignant or indifferent fate which renders human endeavour futile, a complacent aesthetic enjoyment of the tragic nature of life, a need for form which consoles and shelters one from reality - would be at all helpful to the work of a scientist, let alone an artist. Polanyi tries to suggest how this is so.

> The assumption that the truth we seek to discover exists by itself, hidden to us only by our misguided approach to it, represents correctly the feeling of an investigator pursuing a discovery which keeps eluding him . . . The only proper comparison between imperfect knowledge and perfect knowledge remains the sense of risk and intimation of achievement in a heuristic endeavour towards knowledge . . . We must now recognize belief once more as the source of all knowledge. 131

A scientist chooses a problem to work on which he believes will lead to significant discoveries. In so doing, "the scientist must strike a balance between the opposite hazards of caution and daring - either of which might waste his gifts - so as to make the best use of these gifts".[132] On the basis of this belief he commits his time and energy to the work ahead;

he constructs hypotheses and then constructs experiments to test them. All the while he is sustained in his task by a tension between the particular data, observations, procedures in which he dwells and the greater whole which he believes will meaningfully relate and explain them. His responsible effort of attention towards an aspect of reality which yet appears chaotic and unclear to him because unknown is the one thing which makes true objectivity possible.

> Scientific intuition is evoked by a strenuous groping towards an unknown achievement, believed to be hidden and yet accessible. Therefore, though every choice in a heuristic process is indeterminate in the sense of being an entirely personal judgment, in those who exercise such judgment competently it is completely determined by their responsibility in respect to the situation confronting them. In so far as they are acting responsibly, their personal participation in drawing their own conclusions is completely compensated for by the fact that they are submitting to the universal status of the hidden reality which they are trying to approach. 133

In making contact with this hidden reality, "the freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act as he must".[134]

Thus, belief in the possibility of a solution to a problem and belief in one's powers to discover it, a sustained tension between what is known and what is unknown, and a disciplined effort of attention towards reality itself are all vital to creative scientific work. Belief in the futility of human endeavour as measured against fate, "a vast, careless oppression"; complacency; and a hiding behind arbitrary, perfectly ordered, art forms or scientific theories (which witness to "the freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases") from the seeming disorder of reality, from "the great stress and attack of the unknown morality" (p. 420) would all make creative discovery impossible.

However, Lawrence's Hardy has greater stature than Abercrombie's Hardy. In spite of all these perhaps conscious beliefs and limitations, Hardy created Egdon Heath; and in it Lawrence senses the presence of a greater reality than that of the limited morality play of the characters upon it. Perhaps the characters refuse to recognise its power, to attend to the unknown in their lives of which it was the sign. This refusal, Lawrence suggests, is their "real tragedy". Hardy himself, however, faced the heath in all its incomprehensibility. Although he tells us that we can turn to unchanging Egdon for solace, to shield ourselves from the attack of "the irrepressible new", Lawrence insists that the created world of the novel shows us Egdon as a mysterious challenge, as a source of continuing life and growth and possibility, as "the irrepressible new" itself. Lawrence sees in Egdon Heath a suggestion of the same elusive force that brings the poppy into blossom, that draws the phoenix into flame, that calls the adventurer to escape the city walls.

To what extent Hardy's mind, like Clym's was a "house built of extraneous knowledge", to what extent his limited consciousness prevented the full flowering of his art is the question Lawrence carries on with him into the rest of the "Study". With it goes necessarily the question, what is this "greater unwritten morality" to which Lawrence would direct our attention? Why should we trust it rather than the established social morality we are familiar with, the established framework of action and thought we already know? What contact with this greater reality can Lawrence claim to have made? What discoveries, if any, has he brought back? And what discoveries does he believe Hardy has made in the Wessex novels?

The rest of the "Study" is an attempt to lead us to belief in the unknown, to generate in us the tension of that belief, and to confront us with various aspects of reality - in Hardy's novels, in the visual arts, in religion - so that we may arrive at responsible answers of our own.

Footnotes - Chapter II

[1] The Letters of Henry James, selected and edited by Percy Lubbock, (London, 1920), I, 194; letter to Robert Louis Stevenson, 19th March, 1892. ". . . The good little Thomas Hardy has scored a great success with Tess of the D'Urbervilles, which is chock-full of faults and falsity and yet has a singular beauty and charm."

[2] W. H. Auden, "Some Notes on D. H. Lawrence", Critics on D. H. Lawrence, edited by W. T. Andrews (London, 1971), p. 48. Auden's essay was first published in The Nation, 26th April, 1947. The continuation of this quotation is given on p. 121 below.

[3] Pritchard, p. 124.

[4] Theodore Spencer, "Is Lawrence neglected?", Critics on D. H. Lawrence, ed. Andrews, p. 44. Spencer's essay was first published in The Saturday Review, 31st October, 1936.

[5] Gordon, pp. 2 - 3, 150.

[6] P.K., p. 3.

[7] Ibid., pp. xiii - xiv.

[8] Quoted in Gordon, p. 24.

[9] Desperate Remedies, Under the Greenwood Tree, A Pair of Blue Eyes, Far from the Madding Crowd, The Hand of Ethelberta, The Trumpet Major, The Return of the Native, The Laodicean, The Mayor of Casterbridge, Two on a Tower, The Woodlanders, The Well-Beloved, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure. From the "Study" it also seems that he read some of Hardy's short stories, perhaps Life's Little Ironies (see p. 419), and some of The Dynasts (see p. 480).

[10] Although Hardy lived until 1928, his last novel to be published in book form was The Well-Beloved in 1897, which had been published serially in 1892. Jude the Obscure came out in book form in 1896 after being published serially in 1894-5.

[11] Q. D. Leavis, "Hardy and Criticism", A Selection from Scrutiny (Cambridge, England, 1968), I, 295. The article was first published in

Scrutiny, Vol. XI, 1943. The "good models current in fiction" refers chiefly to George Eliot. Q. D. Leavis recommends reading Silas Marner after Under the Greenwood Tree as a critical exercise. "She is the finer artist with wider capacities, the sounder thinker in her account of the relation of man to environment, people to the community and personalities to each other, the wiser moralist, the more efficient writer, and gives us a more interesting and sensitive apprehension of character", p. 296. (Perhaps more striking in 1943 before her husband had written anything about George Eliot.)

12 Ibid., p. 296. One instance of Hardy's suggestion of comparison between himself and Sophocles comes in The Woodlanders. "It was one of those sequestered spots outside the gates of the world . . . yet where, from time to time, dramas of a grandeur and unity truly Sophoclean are enacted in the real by virtue of the concentrated passions and closely-knit interdependence of the lives therein." The Woodlanders, (London, 1912), pp. 4 - 5. A similar suggestion is given in the final paragraph of Tess, this time calling in Aeschylus. "'Justice' was done, and the President of the Immortals (in Aeschylean phrase) had ended his sport with Tess!" Tess of the D'Urbervilles (London, 1910), p. 519.

13 Ibid., p. 296.

14 Lascelles Abercrombie, Thomas Hardy: A Critical Study (London, 1912), pp. 106, 97-98 .

15 Q. D. Leavis, p. 296. See Somerset Maugham's Cakes and Ale for an example of the latter. Q. D. Leavis mentions The Southern Review (a discontinued periodical published by Louisiana State University), its Thomas Hardy Centennial Issue, Summer 1940, as a particularly good collection of balanced Hardy criticism.

See also F. R. Leavis' view of Hardy in relation to The Great Tradition (London, 1948), pp. 22-23.

16 L.M., p. 287.

17 Lawrence's thanks are recorded in a letter dated 17th July, 1914. L.M., pp. 287-8.

18 Since then, Hardy's opening description of Egdon in The Return of the Native has fallen from grace. A. J. Guerard, in his Thomas Hardy: The Novels and Stories (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 6, refers to "the pretentious meditation on Egdon Heath". Frank Chapman, in his article "Hardy the Novelist", Scrutiny, III (June, 1934), pp. 26-27, gives a careful analysis of Hardy's use of language in his opening chapter on Egdon from which he concludes that Hardy's style is clumsy, redundant and stilted because of his aiming at impressiveness and trying to be

"literary" by always using the erudite word instead of the simple one. I do find Hardy's first chapter on Egdon slow-moving and unimpressive, but the presence and force of the heath is fully created in the course of the novel and is the most compelling thing about it. Guerard and Chapman, apart from their well-taken criticism about Chapter I, would probably agree.

19 Abercrombie, p. 210. Abercrombie, especially in his comments on The Dynasts, repeatedly remarks on Hardy's awareness of "contemporary notions" (p. 192) or of "man's modern consciousness of the world" (p. 199) and the influence of this awareness on his art. Abercrombie finds this aspect of Hardy's work a cause for further admiration; in my discussion of Chapters V and IX of the "Study" I will show how Lawrence rightly saw this "philosophy" in Hardy as something that would date his work and therefore concentrated on those aspects of the novels which would make them last, if anything would.

20 Abercrombie refers to the "immense background" in Hardy's novels; see p. 27. Also p. 41 for his comments on Egdon Heath which at first glance seem very similar to Lawrence's.

21 See Tess, p. 116, "Most of the misery had been generated by her conventional aspect, and not by her innate sensations" and p. 117, "But now that her moral sorrows were passing away a fresh one arose on the natural side of her which knew no social law". See also p. 125. In Jude, Hardy tells us in the Postscript about "the marriage laws being used in great part as the tragic machinery of the tale"; and in the body of the novel we are repeatedly being informed that Jude and Sue were ahead of the society of the time. See Jude the Obscure (London, 1971), Pocket Papermacs ed., pp. 296, 364, 414.

22 Quoted from a letter to Mabel Luhan in Lorenzo in Taos (New York, 1932), p. 260.

23 Phoenix, p. 539.

24 Gordon, p. 44.

25 P.K., p. 267.

26 P.K., pp. 55, 56, 57, 59.

27 Gordon, p. 9.

28 Auden, op. cit., p. 48.

[29] Donald Davidson, "The Traditional Basis of Thomas Hardy's Fiction", The Southern Review (Summer, 1940), pp. 168-170, 173-174.

[30] Q. D. Leavis, p. 292.

[31] Ibid, pp. 292-293.

[32] Under the Greenwood Tree or The Mellstock Quire (London, 1920), pp. 163-164, Part IV, Ch. 2.

[33] Ibid, p. 187.

[34] Ibid., p. 108.

[35] Ibid., p. 183.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., p. 211.

[38] See Frank Chapman's article, "Hardy the Novelist", for an interesting discussion of this bothersome facetious tone in Under the Greenwood Tree and the conclusions he draws from it about the importance of Hardy's "philosophy" for his work, p. 30.

[39] The Return of the Native (London, 1961), p. 78.

[40] See especially Eustacia's argument with Clym in Book IV, Chapter II, "He Is Set upon by Adversities; but He Sings a Song", in which Clym shows up very well indeed in comparison to Eustacia's histrionics.

[41] Return, p. 79, Book I, Ch. VII.

[42] Sons and Lovers (New York, 1958), pp. 9-10.

[43] Ibid., p. 19.

[44] Ibid., pp. 113-114.

[45] Ibid., pp. 121-122.

[46] Ibid., p. 118.

47 Ibid., p. 133.

48 Several times Gabriel watches her while she is unaware of him - once when she studies herself in a mirror, another time when she rides a horse in a distinctly unladylike fashion. Soon afterwards Gabriel proposes marriage to her for the first time. See Chapters I, III and IV.

49 Henry James, The House of Fiction: Essays on the Novel, edited with an introduction by Leon Edel (London, 1962), pp. 272-273.

50 "She had sighed for her self-completeness then, and now she cried aloud against the severance of the union she had deplored." (see Chapter XLIII) Far from the Madding Crowd (London, 1927), p. 351.

51 Ibid., pp. 351-352.

52 Ibid., p. 155, Ch. XX.

53 If, as Mark Kinkead-Weekes suggests in his article "The Marble and the Statue", this early part of The Rainbow was the last to be conceived and was written after the "Study", Lawrence's recent rereading of Hardy's novels could have influenced elements in it. It is quite possible that Hardy's portrayal of Gabriel Oak and his rough suggestion of Oak's obedience to forces greater than himself could have contributed to Lawrence's finer and surer rendering of Tom Brangwen's life and marriage on Marsh Farm.

54 The Rainbow (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1971), p. 40.

55 Far from the Madding Crowd, pp. 9-10.

56 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

57 Ibid., p. 345.

58 Ibid., p. 11.

59 Ibid., p. 281.

60 Ibid., p. 286. Hardy's careful attention to such details in this chapter, his total control of particulars with which it seems he was quite familiar - the behaviour of sheep, toads, all farm animals and creeping things before a storm, the feeling of the atmosphere and the look of the sky - all help to make this episode utterly convincing. It is the same

sureness of knowledge of his own personal experience which contributes in large measure to the solid success of The Mayor of Casterbridge. See Frank Chapman, "Hardy the Novelist", for a discussion of the Mayor in this regard.

61 Ibid., pp. 301-302.

62 Ibid., p. 431.

63 Ibid., p. 36.

64 Then, when Gabriel wonders out loud if she would ever let him love her and win her, she rightly says, "But you never will know". "Why?" "Because you never ask." Crowd, p. 467.

65 Ibid., p. 419.

66 This deep-seated belief in Bathsheba on Gabriel's part not only gives the reader a more complex sense of her worth; it offers an interesting contrast to Boldwood's unstable worship of her. Although Boldwood sees her as something more than human, he believes very quickly in her dishonour at the first hint of it (as Troy points out to him in Ch. XXXIV). One feels that the intensity of Boldwood's love and idealisation would not last long under the reality and discipline of marriage. However, when Gabriel sees Troy at Bathsheba's window in the morning, he knows instantly that she has married him; he does not entertain another thought. We feel that this trust in her must be based on a firm knowledge of her character that we, the readers, do not have; yet we accept it and share it because of the strength of Gabriel's conviction and our faith in him.

67 When Bathsheba first dismisses Oak (in Ch. XX), Hardy describes Oak's feelings in the following way: "He had been held to her by a beautiful thread which it pained him to spoil by breaking, rather than by a chain he could not break", p. 155. Hardy then writes that Gabriel went away from her with dignity, "as Moses left the presence of Pharoah", p. 155. The implication is that the powers-that-be are on Gabriel's side. We are frequently reminded that Gabriel is independent of Bathsheba; and Hardy tries to give us the feeling that the true reason for Oak's continuing presence by her lies not in his helpless adoration but in his blind obedience to some greater force that commands him to stay.

68 Ibid., p. 32; Ch. IV.

69 We are reminded here of Lawrence's later more complex and highly conscious treatment of the problem of "star-like" singleness within a committed and permanent relationship in Women in Love.

70 Crowd., p. 292, Ch. XXXVII.

71 Ibid., p. 476, Ch. LVII.

72 Swigg, p. 4.

73 Ibid., p. 11.

74 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

75 See p. 129 above. Swigg's first chapter is called "Thomas Hardy and the Problem of the 'Middle Distance'".

76 Swigg, p. ix.

77 Abercrombie, p. 31.

78 Hardy's characters, in spite of Lawrence's protest to the contrary that none of them "care very much for money, or immediate self-preservation", seem much more aware of these pressures than any of Lawrence's later characters. Gabriel Oak is quite conscious of the financial disaster involved when the storm threatens Bathsheba's hayricks; Tess is simply trying to find enough to eat and to keep her warm by her winter's work at Flintcomb Ash. Birkin in Women in Love, however, has a small but adequate income always in the background. Even the farming Brangwens in the opening pages of The Rainbow "came and went without fear of necessity, working hard because of the life that was in them, not for want of the money". The Rainbow, p. 7.

79 Sons and Lovers, p. 33; Ch. II.

80 Ibid., p. 51; Ch. III.

81 Ibid., p. 132; Ch. VI.

82 Ibid., p. 88; Ch. V.

83 Ibid., p. 46; Ch. III.

84 "Poverty", Selected Poems of D. H. Lawrence, ed. James Reeves (London, 1967), reprinted 1970, p. 67.

85 "England, My England", The Complete Short Stories (London, 1955), reprinted 1968, p. 308.

[86] Ibid., p. 311.

[87] Ibid., p. 308.

[88] Jane Harrison's Ancient Art and Ritual (London, 1913)may well have influenced Lawrence's discussion of tragedy and the great background or greater morality. She writes, "the drama of man's life is acted out for us against a tremendous background of natural happenings: a background that preceded man and will outlast him; and this background profoundly affects our imagination and hence our art", p. 199. However, she claims that our awareness of this background is a modern characteristic, taught to us by modern science, an awareness which is totally lacking in individualistic Greek drama and especially in Greek sculpture, the art of a society which saw man as the measure of all things. She sees Greek sculpture as "remote almost to the point of chill abstraction. The statue in the round renounces not only human life itself, but all the natural background and setting of life", p. 202. We can see Lawrence arguing with her on this point several months before he even began the "Study", in the autumn of 1913 (H. T. Moore guesses late October, early November), only a week or two after Lawrence had received and begun reading Ancient Art and Ritual. He wrote to Henry Savage,

> I am still fascinated by the Greek - more, perhaps, by the Greek sculpture than the plays, even, though I love the plays. There is something in the Greek sculpture that any soul is hungry for - something of the eternal stillness that lies under all movement, under all life, like a source, incorruptible and inexhaustible. It is deeper than change, and struggling . . . I begin to feel something of the source, the great impersonal which never changes and out of which all change comes.
>
> (L.M., p. 241)

The conception of a "great background" towards which Lawrence was working involved something not simply external to us but a force present within us as well.

In the "Study" itself it is precisely in the Greek dramas that Lawrence perceives this "great background" magnificently at work; and his discussion of "real tragedy" could have been provoked to some extent by Miss Harrison's final chapter. She concludes her work on an odd note of praise for Arnold Bennett and Galsworthy and of hope for increasing love and unity to be taught by art to mankind (her hope seems to be based largely on Tolstoi's essay "What is Art?"). In the work of Bennett and Galsworthy she sees the intensely individualistic art left behind for a bigger, broader field, a great "social sense", a background against which

we must put the lives of the characters. In such art, "the writer does not 'express' himself, he does not even merely show the pathos of a single human being's destiny, he sets before us a much bigger thing - man tragically caught and torn in the iron hands of a man-made machine, Society itself. Incarnate Law is the protagonist, and, as it happens, the villain of the piece" (pp. 245-246).

Lawrence in the "Study" challenges this idea. Is it indeed a "bigger thing" to see men caught and destroyed by society than to see enacted the true destiny of a single man? We know that even before he read Ancient Art and Ritual he had read and rebelled against Arnold Bennett's Anna of the Five Towns, the book of which Jane Harrison thinks so highly. In a letter to A. W. McLeod dated 6th October, 1912, he wrote, "I hate England and its hopelessness. I hate Bennett's resignation. Tragedy ought really to be a great kick at misery. But Anna of the Five Towns seems like an acceptance . . ." (L.M., p. 150). By the time he wrote the "Study" he had clarified more fully his thoughts on the problem with Bennett's brand of tragedy, the false conception of society which lay behind it.

89 Harrison, p. 246. See note 88 above.

90 Jude the Obscure, p. 414.

91 Ibid., p. 20; Book I, Ch. II.

92 Ibid., p. 21.

93 Return, p. 204; Book III, Ch. II.

94 The Study of Man, p. 67.

95 The Tacit Dimension, p. 86.

96 S.M., pp. 68, 67; T.D., pp. 85-86. Polanyi's full development of his ideas on the nature of society should be seen in his chapter on "Conviviality" in P.K., pp. 203-245.

97 P.K., pp. 322-323; S.M., p. 89.

98 S.M., p. 86.

99 S.M., p. 86; P.K., p. 324.

100 "England, My England", p. 313.

101 Return, pp. 366-367, 369-370; Book V, Ch. I.

102 Ibid., p. 390; Book V, Ch. III.

103 Ibid., pp. 392, 393.

104 Ibid., p. 227; Book III, Ch. III.

105 Ibid., pp. 233-234; Book III, Ch. IV.

106 Ibid., pp. 292-293; Book IV, Ch. II.

107 Ibid., p. 198; Book III, Ch. I.

108 Ibid., pp. 203-204; Book III, Ch. II.

109 Ibid., pp. 238-239; Book III, Ch. V.

110 Ibid., p. 162; Book II, Ch. VI.

111 Ibid. It is characteristic of Lawrence's careful, sensitive reading that he pauses over these descriptions of Clym. Although he is an ideal reader insofar as he enters Hardy's created world fully enough to see his characters as living and real, because of this belief in the life of the novel he takes nothing for granted but continually tests descriptions and actions against his own experience and life's own standards. He not only asks himself if such a view of "the mutually destructive interdependence of spirit and flesh" (Return, p. 162) is true to life. He also sets this passage against the full weight of The Return of the Native to see if it is even the attitude of the novel as a whole. By the tone of his comments Lawrence seems to be giving Hardy credit for seeing Clym's limitations as a thinker (as Hardy saw those of Angel Clare and, to some extent, of Jude).

112 Crowd, p. 30; Ch. IV.

113 Sons and Lovers, p. 127; Part I, Ch. VI.

114 Ibid., pp. 227-228; Ch. IX.

115 S.M., p. 18.

116 Abercrombie, p. 40.

117 Ibid., pp. 27, 41, 51.

118 Return, pp. 6-7.

119 Swigg, p. 60.

120 See my discussion of Ch. V of the "Study" below.

121 Especially as contrasted with Hardy's; see my discussion of Ch. IX of the "Study".

122 The Return of the Native, p. 455; Book VI, Ch. I.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., p. 235; Book III, Ch. IV.

125 Abercrombie, p. 119.

126 Ibid., pp. 28, 26-27.

127 Ibid., p. 128.

128 Ibid., p. 22.

129 Ibid., p. 35. See Lawrence's reasons in Chapter IX, p. 480, for saying that Hardy's "form is execrable in the extreme", a comment that may be a direct rejoinder to Abercrombie's statement.

130 Ibid., p. 18.

131 P.K., pp. 305, 306, 266.

132 P.K., pp. 310-311.

133 P.K., p. 310.

134 P.K., p. 309.

CHAPTER THREE

The Hawk Circles: The "Study", Chapters IV, V and VI

> . . . the mind makes curious swoops and circles. It touches the point of pain or interest, then sweeps away again in a cycle, coils round and approaches again the point of pain or interest. There is a curious spiral rhythm, and the mind approaches again and again the point of concern, repeats itself, goes back, destroys the time-sequence entirely, so that time ceases to exist, as the mind stoops to the quarry, then leaves it without striking, soars, hovers, turns, swoops, stoops again, still does not strike, yet is nearer, nearer, reels away again, wheels off into the air, even forgets, quite forgets, yet again turns, bends, circles slowly, swoops and stoops again, until at last there is the closing-in, and the clutch of a decision or a resolve.[1]

When Lawrence begins Chapter IV of the "Study", the reader prepares himself for another rambling and largely irrelevant digression, wondering when the ostensible subject of the essay, Thomas Hardy's fiction, is going to reappear. Lawrence has turned back to the poppy and to biology.

> There is always excess, the biologists say, a brimming-over. For they have made the measure, and the supply must be made to fit. They have charted the course, and if at the end of it there is a jump beyond the bounds into nothingness: well, there is always excess, for they have charted the journey aright. (p. 421)

Yet, is it a digression? Or is it a wheeling off into the air, a drawing back in order to see things in proper perspective, to ask the right questions and, circling slowly, to consider possible answers? The hawk-like mind in the above passage from Phoenix "even forgets, quite forgets" in its hovering over the "point of pain or interest"; but the seeming "forgetfulness" in the "Study" is not so complete. Those first few lines of Chapter IV are, in fact, a direct continuation of Lawrence's

discussion of Clym's blindness in Chapter III and of the ways in which we, like Clym, mistake the map for the land, "pore over the chart, map out journeys, and confirm them" and "cannot see life itself giving us the lie the whole time" (pp. 420-421). That Clym's shortsightedness should be related to that of biologists is no accident but a significant insight into the Wessex novels and the ideas current at the time Hardy wrote them, as I shall show in the third section of this chapter. Further, the reference to the poppy and the excess which always accompanies reproduction is intended to recall the thoughts of Chapter I - about self-preservation, about the Old and New Testaments, about "the final aim of every living thing . . . the full achievement of itself" (p. 403) - thoughts which Lawrence extends and complicates here.

In these three chapters, then, Lawrence reels away from Hardy's work in preparation for another attack (Chapter IV), "stoops again, still does not strike, yet is nearer, nearer" (Chapter V), and then "wheels off into the air" once again (Chapter VI). His study of The Return of the Native and of Egdon Heath "which matters more than the people who move upon it" (p. 419) leads him to examine further the relation of man to nature and of men to each other, under the general categories of being and knowing. Chapter IV acknowledges our birth in the body, the need for the work of self-preservation, the learning and repeating of motions known in the past, the law of one's own nature - Being. Chapter V stresses our rebirth in the spirit, the need for the work of extending human consciousness, the movement into the future, discovering what is yet unknown and discovering the law of another person's nature, that which is not oneself - Knowing. However, life requires that one both be and know, and the two chapters work together

to come to some conception of the purpose and value of human individuality in nature and in community. This conception necessitates another look at Hardy's people in Chapter V, not as they are dwarfed by the background of the heath, but as they stand out as distinct individuals against a conventional society. Finally, Chapter VI begins a whole new movement of exploration (which is continued in Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study"), enriching Lawrence's language, permitting him to return to Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure in Chapter IX for a closer look at conflicts going on within and between individuals as they stand at a particular moment in space and time.

Man Does Not Live by Bread Alone . . . (Chapter IV of the "Study")

Man may not live by bread alone, but he needs a certain amount of bread all the same. Lawrence gives his first definition of work as "the activity necessary for the production of a sufficient supply of food and shelter: nothing more holy than that" (p. 423). In work, man "becomes one with the old, habitual movement: he is the perfect machine, the perfect instrument" (p. 425). His real living involves escaping from the repeated motions, the "proven, finite experience" of work, in order to venture ahead into the new and unproven experience of the future. "Is not his own soul a fighting-line, where what is and what will be separates itself off from what has been?" (p. 425)

Michael Polanyi states this difference between dwelling in what is known and moving into that which is unknown in the following way.

> At the articulate level of intelligence, heuristic acts fall distinctly apart from mere routine applications of established knowledge. They are the acts of the inventor and discoverer, which require originality and offer scope

> for genius, differing in this both from the performance of engineers who apply known devices and of teachers demonstrating established results of science. Intellectual acts of a heuristic kind make an addition to knowledge and are in this sense irreversible, while the ensuing routine performances operate within an existing framework of knowledge and are to this extent reversible. 2

Lawrence sees the lesser form of work he discusses in Chapter IV as consisting of such routine acts but is able to give a stronger sense than Polanyi can, in his brief mention of engineers and teachers, of the real pleasure of such work.

> The doctor, the teacher, the lawyer, just as much as the farm labourer or the mechanic, when working most perfectly, is working with the utmost of mechanical, scientific precision, along a line calculated from known fact, calculated instantaneously.
>
> In this work, man has a certain definite, keen satisfaction. When he is utterly impersonal, when he is merely the mode where certain mechanical forces meet to find their resultant, then a man is something perfect, the perfect instrument, the perfect machine.
>
> It is a state which, in his own line, every man strives and longs for. It is a state which satisfies his moral craving, almost the deepest craving within him. It is a state when he lies in line with the great force of gravity, partakes perfectly of its subtlest movement and motion, even to psychic vibration.
>
> But it is a state which every man hopes for release from. (p. 424)

Hardy, too, shared something of this understanding of the special nature of routine work. We are reminded of Tess's labour on the threshing machine in Chapters XLVII and XLVIII of Tess of the D'Urbervilles.

> She was the only woman whose place was upon the machine so as to be shaken bodily by its spinning . . . The incessant quivering, in which ever fibre of her frame participated, had thrown her into a stupefied reverie in which her arms worked on independently of her consciousness. 3

Hardy's description of Tess's full day of work in these chapters captures not only the wearying repetition, the exhaustion, and the tension of keeping pace with a demanding machine but also the sense of skill and energy required for the task. Tess is chosen for the job because "she was one of those who best combined strength with quickness in untying, and both with staying power".[4] In Far from the Madding Crowd Hardy renders concretely Gabriel's skill in saving Bathsheba's sheep and in shearing them (Chapters XXI and XXII). This is a sensitivity to the rhythm of physical labour which both he and Lawrence share. Lawrence, however, can not only give us the harvesting work of Cyril and George in The White Peacock or of Paul Morel at the Leivers' farm; he also can render the strange satisfaction of toil in the mines or the strenuous routine of teaching school, day in, day out, as Ursula does in The Rainbow.

His understanding of working people, the very real pleasures they enjoy, the pride they take in their skill and efficiency had nothing of sentimentality or idealisation in it, however. Caleb Garth in Middlemarch, the independent workman, and Gabriel Oak, for whom "the defence and salvation of the body by daily bread is still a study, a religion, and a desire"[5] are both a bit too good to be true. Lawrence, appreciative though he may be of the "definite, keen satisfaction" of work, is also aware of its very real restrictions. If is often easy for artists who are unused to physical labour, to romanticise about it or, because their own work coincides with their deepest desires and their sense of calling, to believe that all men should simply choose work that has significance and meaning for them in such a way. Since such meaning is hard to find in an industrial production line, they recommend a "return to the medieval system of handicrafts . . .

that each man must become a labouring artist, producing a complete article" (p. 423).

Lawrence is quick to see the arrogance of such a proposition. First, it is based on pity for the labourer, a pity Lawrence does not share because he is aware of the real pleasures of quick, skilful, mechanical work. Second, it assumes that everyone wants to be or should be an artist or artisan. Lawrence does not proscribe activity in this manner, thinking that simply because he is an artist, everyone else should be one. When he asks "What do we mean by living?", he throws the question back to the individual. "Let every man answer for himself" (p. 428).[6] Third, it is unrealistic. Most men have a certain amount of routine work to do in order to maintain themselves. There are elements of routine even in an artist's task. Further, the machine and modern industry are here to stay; they are a "means to freedom" (p. 427) if they are used correctly. Using them correctly is the problem before us, not abolishing them.

> . . . the inventor of the labour-saving machine has been hailed as a public benefactor, and we have rejoiced over his discovery. Now there is a railing against the machine, as if it were an evil thing. And the thinkers talk about the return to the medieval system of handicrafts. Which is absurd . . . . I do honour to the machine and to its inventor. It will produce what we want, and save us the necessity of much labour. (p. 426)

F. R. Leavis points to this passage in the "Study" to make it clear that Lawrence was not a Luddite (see Chapter III in his Nor Shall My Sword, "Luddites? or There is Only One Culture") and that he "was no more given to Morrisian archaizing - garden-suburb handicraftiness - than to the Carlylean gospel of Work".[7]

Thus, Lawrence accepted the fact that for the vast majority of people, work could not be "the be-all and the end-all of existence" (p. 423).

> It may be argued that work has a fuller meaning, that man lives most intensely when he works. That may be, for some few men, for some few artists whose lives are otherwise empty. But for the mass, for the 99.9 per cent of mankind, work is a form of non-living, of non-existence, of submergence. (p. 423)

In spite of this, however, we have made work holy and have interpreted leisure as only the rest and preparation for more work.

> Oh, my God, work is the great body of life, and sleep and amusement like two wings, bent only to carry it along. Is this, then, all?
>
> And Carlyle gets up and says, It is all, and mankind goes on in grim, serious approval, more than acquiescent, approving, thinking itself religiously right . . . . My life is to be utilized for work, first and foremost - and this in spite of Mary of Bethany. (p. 422)

The "Protestant ethic" has had great influence; Lawrence's own strong sense of the importance of one's calling was probably influenced by his nonconformist upbringing, a religious tradition which invested every man's daily occupation with the stature of a religious vocation. However, Lawrence rightly pointed to elements of the biblical tradition itself which challenged any simple equation of "calling" with "work".

> Now it came to pass, as they went, that he entered into a certain village: and a certain woman named Martha received him into her house.
>
> And she had a sister called Mary, which also sat at Jesus' feet, and heard his word.
>
> But Martha was cumbered about much serving, and came to him, and said, Lord, dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to serve alone? bid her therefore that she help me.
>
> And Jesus answered and said unto her, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things: But one thing is needful: and Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her.
>
> Luke 10: 38-42

Lawrence is quite aware of the satisfaction possible to Martha in serving efficiently and well. (It should be noted that he could have made his case against the glorification of work much more easily by emphasising only one side of the issue, the long hours, deadening repetitiveness, bad conditions or physically exhausting nature of mechanical work, but his faithful attention to reality does not allow him to do this.) However, Mary is the adventurer, moving into new and unknown territory and making "irreversible" discoveries "which shall not be taken away from her".

Lawrence does not see only great scientists and great artists as the adventurers, although they are the ones who bring back discoveries for all of mankind, not just for themselves or those close to them. It is the law of every man's nature to be growing, to be facing the unknown future every day of his life. In this, man's rhythm is different from that of all other living things.

> With man it is always spring - or it may be; with him every day is a blossoming day, if he will. He is a plant eternally in flower, he is an animal eternally in rut, he is a bird eternally in song. He has his excess constantly on his hands, almost every day. It is not with him a case of seasons, spring and autumn and winter. (p. 421)

It is for the obeying of this distinctive rhythm that man wants to be free.

> He wants to be free to be himself . . . he wearies for his own limitless being, for the unresolved, quivering, infinitely complex and indefinite movement of new living, he wants to be free . . .
>
> It seems to me as if a man, in his normal state, were like a palpitating leading-shoot of life, where the unknown, all unresolved, beats and pulses, containing the quick of all experience, as yet unrevealed, not singled out. (pp. 425, 424)

This sense of the future being unpredictable, new and full of possibility seems to have been with Lawrence all his life. He expressed it even more simply later, in Fantasia of the Unconscious (first published in 1922).

> When you go to sleep at night, you have to say: 'Here dies the man I am and know myself to be.' And when you rise in the morning you have to say: 'Here rises an unknown quantity which is still myself.' 8

This feeling of never being able to know exactly what the new day will bring is, for Lawrence, the chief characteristic of all living things, one's inheritance at one's birth in the flesh. It is a feeling quite different from the I-know-exactly-what-comes-next-it's-always-the-same tone of Hardy's writing, the Hardy for whom "the doubtful honour of a brief transit through a sorry world hardly called for effusiveness", for whom "happiness was but the occasional episode in a general drama of pain", and for whom the secret of life consisted in "making limited opportunities endurable" by "the cunning enlargement, by a species of microscopic treatment, of those minute forms of satisfaction that offer themselves to everybody not in positive pain".[9]

Lawrence sees the law of living beings as the necessity to grow, to be continually on the border-line between what has been and what will be. He also sees that even in the Wessex novels there was more to life than simply enduring the same old sad story. In spite of himself, Hardy had created people who were "always going off unexpectedly . . . always bursting suddenly out of bud and taking a wild flight into flower" (p. 410). Such growing is not easy, even for flowers, but it is a law of one's own nature which Lawrence believes does have the strength to stand against the humanly created laws of the community.

> A plant has strength to burst its pot. The shoots of London trees have force to burst through the London pavements. Is there not life enough in us to break out of this system? . . . Which is greater, the State or myself? Myself, unquestionably, since the State is only an arrangement made for my convenience. (p. 428)

This passage is not arguing for rabid individualism but for the enrichment and extension of community.

> . . . if sufficient people came out of the walled defences, and pitched in the open, then very soon the walled city would be a mere dependent on the free tents of the wilderness. (p. 429)

In The Return of the Native, Hardy describes Clym's own idea of his vocation quite differently.

> He wished to raise the class at the expense of individuals rather than individuals at the expense of the class. What was more, he was ready at once to be the first unit sacrificed. 10

It is characteristic of Clym to approach things in this ineffectual general way, he who cannot hear his own wife when she speaks, although when he gets up in the morning he is able to "see the whole creation groaning and travailing in pain".[11] Even the utilitarians, whom Hardy appears to be echoing here, would hesitate to state the issue so baldly, as if one could raise a class by any other means than by raising individual people in it. Clym, as Egdon's advanced thinker, is probably influenced here by the ideas of Herbert Spencer (the good is "that which increases the totality of life")[12] and J. S. Mill (whose treatise On Liberty Hardy "knew almost by heart")[13] as Hardy was.[14] Yet even Mill would question whether Clym's"sacrifice" was very useful, especially if he was capable of doing something else original and significant; individual initiative and potential, a capacity for challenging thought or action, should - for the sake of society - not be wasted.

Man does not live for the system of self-preservation alone. However, he is sent bodily into the world and must take his rightful place there.

> It is all very well to leave, as Christianity tries to leave, the dinner to be devoured by the glutton, whilst the Christian draws off in disgust, and fasts. But we each have our place at the board, as we well know, and it is indecent to withdraw before the glutton, leaving the earth to be devoured. (p. 428)

Lawrence voices here a criticism of Christianity which he develops as the "Study" progresses. We have a need to <u>be</u> in the flesh as well as the need to <u>know</u>, to live in the spirit and mind. In trying to suggest the nature and necessity of this being Lawrence adds a further meaning to the word "law" which he used before in Chapter II.

> There is no need to break laws. The only need is to be a law unto oneself. (pp. 428-429)

. . . <u>But by Every Word that Proceedeth out of the Mouth of God?</u>
(Chapter V of the "Study")

However, Lawrence immediately challenges this statement in Chapter V; it is not the whole truth. It is not man's only need, "to <u>be</u> a law unto oneself". One also needs to recognise, to <u>know</u> and admit all that is not oneself.

The title of this chapter - "Work and the Angel and the Unbegotten Hero" - suggests its opposition to Chapter IV, "An Attack on Work and the Money Appetite and on the State". In Chapter V Lawrence gives a second definition of work, its "final meaning . . . the extension of human consciousness", a greater necessity from which "man does not struggle to be free" (p. 431). He speaks of the rebirth of the soul, of our becoming "wonderful, distinct individuals, like angels" (p. 432) in addition to our birth in the body, our participation in the system of self-preservation;

and he looks at the heroes of Hardy's novels, those who have gone against social convention in their struggle for further life.

Lawrence's second definition of work leads him into a discussion on the nature of knowledge.

> It seems as if the great aim and purpose in human life were to bring all life into the human consciousness. And this is the final meaning of work: the extension of human consciousness . . .
>
> But the bringing of life into human consciousness is not an aim in itself, it is only a necessary condition of the progress of life itself. Man is himself the vivid body of life, rolling glimmering against the void. In his fullest living he does not know what he does, his mind, his consciousness, unacquaint, hovers behind, full of extraneous gleams and glances, and altogether devoid of knowledge. Altogether devoid of knowledge and conscious motive is he when he is heaving into uncreated space, when he is actually living, becoming himself.
>
> And yet, that he may go on, may proceed with his living it is necessary that his mind, his consciousness, should extend behind him . . . And this knowing is now an inevitable habit of life's, developed late; it is a force active in the immediate rear of life, and the greater its activity, the greater the forward, unknown movement ahead of it. (pp. 430-431)

Michael Polanyi puts the same idea more prosaically in his analysis of the difference between the intellectual powers of a human child and a chimpanzee. A seven and a half month old chimp and a five month old baby boy were raised together and were carefully observed, their comparative development being recorded by identical tests.

> It is true that the child, though the younger, soon took the lead over the chimpanzee and retained this throughout, but the advantage was slight compared with the child's prospective intellectual superiority which was presently to become apparent. At the age of 15 to 18 months the mental development of the chimpanzee is nearing completion; that of the child is only about to start. By responding to people who talk to it, the child soon begins to

> understand speech and to speak itself. By this one single trick in which it surpasses the animal, the child acquires the capacity for sustained thought and enters on the whole cultural heritage of its ancestors. 15

The skill of articulation helped the child outstrip the chimp, not only because of his sudden ability to perform complex symbolic operations for the purpose of thought, but because his capacity to use language suddenly made the thought of the past, what Lawrence calls "the proven, deposited experience" (p. 424), accessible. However, Lawrence and Polanyi are agreed that our articulate knowledge of words already spoken in the past is not the only thing necessary for the extension of our articulate knowledge into the future. In fact, our ability to make new discoveries about reality relies primarily on the same kinds of inarticulate intelligence we share with the animals.

> Man's intellectual superiority is almost entirely due to the use of language . . . . Yet, if linguistic clues are excluded, men are found to be only slightly better at solving the kind of problems we set to animals. From which it follows that the inarticulate faculties - the potentialities - by which man surpasses the animals and which, by producing speech, account for the entire intellectual superiority of man, are in themselves almost imperceptible. Accordingly, we shall have to account for man's acquisition of language by acknowledging in him the same kind of inarticulate powers as we observe already in animals. 16

Polanyi's detailed analysis of these inarticulate powers will not be summarised here.[17] The central point of the argument is "that our articulate utterances can never altogether supersede but must continue to rely on such mute acts of intelligence as we once had in common with chimpanzees of our own age".[18] The intense nature of our personal involvement in the acquiring of articulate knowledge grows out of the similar energy of alert animals in exploring and learning to live successfully

in their environment.[19] All of our explicit knowledge only helps us to carry exploration of our human reality further, an exploration which depends primarily on the kind of tacit, inarticulate intelligence we share with animals; "our mute abilities keep growing in the very exercise of our articulate powers."[20] As Lawrence says,

> . . . this knowing is now an inevitable habit of life's, developed late; it is a force active in the immediate rear of life, and the greater its activity, the greater the forward, unknown movement ahead of it. (p. 431)

As Lawrence continues, the parallels with Polanyi's work become increasingly clear, even to the choice of the term "personal knowledge" to describe the kinds of objective discoveries about life he discusses.

> To each individuality belongs, by nature, its own knowledge. It would seem as if each soul, detaching itself from the mass, the matrix, should achieve its own knowledge. Yet this is not so. Many a soul which we feel should have detached itself and become distinct, remains embedded, and struggles with knowledge that does not pertain to it. It reached a point of distinctness and a degree of personal knowledge, and then became confused, lost itself. (p. 434)

For both Lawrence and Polanyi, this "personal" element in all our knowledge is no mere imperfection but is what makes our contribution to knowledge original, unique, irreplaceable. To "struggle with knowledge which does not pertain" to one is to shirk a responsibility, to hide safely behind an established framework of ideas and fail ever to give to our human body of knowledge what only you can give.

We are reminded of Clym Yeobright, Angel Clare and Jude Fawley, all of whom struggled with knowledge which did not pertain to them. Especially are we reminded of Jude as his obsession with Christminster forms while he is still a boy.

'It is a city of light', he said to himself.
'The tree of knowledge grows there', he added a few steps further on.
'It is a place that teachers of men spring from and go to.'
'It is what you may call a castle, manned by scholarship and religion.'
After this figure he was silent a long while, till he added:
'It would just suit me.' 21

The fact that Hardy fails to ever make us believe that it would "just suit" Jude, even if he had managed to enter Christminster as a scholar, is a significant deficiency in Jude the Obscure. We cannot see Jude's failure to enter university as a tragedy because we have no compelling sense of a wider human loss, only pity for Jude's misguided obsession and the waste in his own life which it involves. We have no faith in Jude's ability to make any significant addition to human knowledge through the medium of university scholarship and academic debate; how then can the refusal to admit him to Christminster be seen as a tragic injustice? Yet this is the weight it is required to bear in the novel.[22] Hardy could have developed the humour, the incongruity, of little Jude's childish dream in the passage above or he could have developed, with more severe criticism of Jude and harsher irony, the unreality and the lack of self-knowledge involved in his aspirations. However, his sympathy with Jude is too great; and he asks us to grow angry over Christminster's imperviousness while never concretely rendering any original development in Jude's thought, any vivid sense of his intellectual ability, which would show this imperviousness to be unjust. We only see Jude ingesting - reading books, studying Greek and Latin texts, listening to Sue's ideas - we never see him discovering, creating, giving ideas out, or significantly challenging or questioning them.

In contrast, in The Rainbow, although we are not asked to picture Ursula as a young intellectual or a future scholar, we believe in her as a

student much more than we do in Jude as a student. Lawrence is able to create convincingly a sense of what learning and thinking, in an alive, original way, are like for her. Her intense attention in the botany laboratory is a result of important personal questions and leads to real discovery. The passage describing Ursula's observation of a living cell under the microscope just before she is to meet Skrebensky for the first time in six years, a meeting she has been eagerly awaiting, is worth quoting in full.

> Several letters, and then he was coming. It was Friday afternoon he appointed. She worked over her microscope with feverish activity, able to give only half her attention, yet working closely and rapidly. She had on her slide some special stuff come up from London that day, and the professor was fussy and excited about it. At the same time, as she focused the light on her field, and saw the plant-animal lying shadowy in a boundless light, she was fretting over a conversation she had had a few days ago with Dr. Frankstone, who was a woman doctor of physics in the college.
>
> 'No, really', Dr. Frankstone had said, 'I don't see why we should attribute some special mystery to life - do you? We don't understand it as we understand electricity, even, but that doesn't warrant our saying it is something special, something different in kind and distinct from everything else in the universe - do you think it does? May it not be that life consists in a complexity of physical and chemical activities, of the same order as the activities we already know in science? I don't see really, why we should imagine there is a special order of life, and life alone -'
>
> The conversation had ended on a note of uncertainty, indefinite, wistful. But the purpose, what was the purpose? Electricity had no soul, light and heat had no soul. Was she herself an impersonal force, or conjunction of forces, like one of these? She looked still at the unicellular shadow that lay within the field of light, under her microscope. It was alive. She saw it move - she saw the bright mist of its ciliary activity, she saw the gleam of its nucleus, as it slid across the plane of light. What then was its will? If it was a conjunction of forces, physical and chemical, what held these forces unified, and for what purpose were they unified?

> For what purpose were the incalculable physical and chemical activities nodalized in this shadowy, moving speck under her microscope? What was the will which nodalized them and created the one thing she saw? What was its intention? To be itself? Was its purpose just mechanical and limited to itself?
>
> It intended to be itself. But what self? Suddenly in her mind the world gleamed strangely, with an intense light, like the nucleus of the creature under the microscope. Suddenly she had passed away into an intensely-gleaming light of knowledge. She could not understand what it all was. She only knew that it was not limited mechanical energy, nor mere purpose of self-preservation and self-assertion. It was a consummation, a being infinite. Self was a oneness with the infinite. To be oneself was a supreme, gleaming triumph of infinity.
>
> Ursula sat abstracted over her microscope, in suspense. Her soul was busy, infinitely busy, in the new world. In the new world, Skrebensky was waiting for her - he would be waiting for her. She could not go yet, because her soul was engaged. Soon she would go.
>
> A stillness, like passing away, took hold of her. Far off, down the corridors, she heard the gong booming five o'clock. She must go. Yet she sat still. 23

Michael Polanyi speaks of "intellectual passions". Here, Lawrence has created them for us in all their intensity and has shown the integral part they play in true learning. Lawrence's special attention to the problem of knowledge in Chapter V of the "Study" grows out of an awareness of a particular problem in the Wessex novels, that of an uncertain conception of the nature of true thinking. There is nothing in Hardy's fiction to compare to this passage in The Rainbow; the Lawrence who could write this passage was the Lawrence who found Hardy "much stronger in feeling than in thought " (p. 480) and who was able to examine the roots of this weakness in thought.

Lawrence's references to biology in the "Study", his own suggested theory of evolution in Chapter V, have a significant bearing on the kind of

thinking that shaped the Wessex novels. It is perhaps worth a slight digression on Ursula's study of botany in this passage of The Rainbow to begin to make the central issues of Lawrence's criticism of Hardy clear, issues which will be further developed in the following section.

For the pertinence of Ursula's questions and the worth of her discovery, perhaps we should let Polanyi, himself a physical chemist, speak. He begins with the analogy of a machine.

> . . . the class of objects which could conceivably represent any particular machine would form, in the light of pure science - which ignores their operational principle - an altogether chaotic ensemble. In other words, the class of things defined by a common operational principle cannot be even approximately specified in terms of physics and chemistry . . . . The true knowledge of a machine which we have on the upper level is the understanding of a purpose and of the rational means for achieving it; while the knowledge of its physical and chemical topography is by itself meaningless, for it lacks any conception of purpose or achievement. 24

The laws of physics and chemistry can account for the breakdown of a machine, the failure of one of its parts; but they cannot in themselves discover the principle by which the machine works. Only an engineer, a man who studies the purposes, uses and principles of operation of machines could explain how the parts of the machine functioned in the whole.

Polanyi's analysis here, based on the findings of Gestalt psychology, is that the comprehension of the whole involves more than the mere recognition and comprehension of its separate parts.

> The first thing to realize is that a knowledge of physics and chemistry would in itself not enable us to recognize a machine. Suppose you are faced with a problematic object and try to explore its nature by a meticulous physical or chemical analysis of all its parts. You may thus obtain a complete physico-chemical map of it. At what point would you discover that it is a machine (if it is one), and if so, how it operates? Never. For you cannot even put this question, let alone answer it, though

> you have all physics and chemistry at your finger-tips, unless you already know how machines work. 25

Leaving for the moment Polanyi's careful examination of the limitations of the machine analogy in relation to living beings (see his Chapter 11, "The Logic of Achievement" in Personal Knowledge), let us consider his suggestion that one not only could not recognise a machine by the above method of investigation - one could not even recognise a human being or a frog. However, many biologists still insist that life can be explained by the laws which govern inanimate matter, the laws of physics and chemistry. Even though physics and chemistry include no concept of sentience, of the independent active centre of a living being, even though they cannot account for the successful functioning of a frog or a man and cannot explain the biotic operations such as organismic regulation, regeneration, procreation, breathing or walking, these biologists insist that the study of life is reducible to a study of physics and chemistry. It is precisely this issue with which Ursula was struggling and which is, incidentally, still the crucial question for biologists in the second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, her refusal to accept Dr. Frankstone's statement that life was probably explainable in terms of chemistry and physics, her insistence on the active centre and purpose of the being before her which went beyond the scope of any physical and chemical laws, are similar to the increasingly conscious realisations of biologists that the way in which they have been working is very different from the way in which they thought they had been working. Their very ability to recognise living specimens - a rat or a bean plant - involved them in knowledge far beyond that of physics or chemistry.

In other words, Ursula not only was asking the right questions. She may very well have come up with some right answers. Yet there remains the belief that Lawrence was ignorant and incompetent when it came to science.

Looking at this passage from The Rainbow in relation to Chapter V of the "Study", in relation to Hardy's rendering of Jude's intellectual endeavours in Jude the Obscure, in relation to the state of the biological sciences and to the work of Michael Polanyi, shows an important characteristic of Lawrence's unique achievement in the Hardy "Study" - his efficient use of language, his capacity to deal coherently and effectively with many inter-related problems at once. In one short chapter Lawrence is simultaneously 1) groping with problems of his art, clarifying thoughts which are later to be developed and embodied in The Rainbow with an added dimension of force and meaning; 2) carefully weighing the strengths and weaknesses of Hardy's thought as it is given us in the body of the Wessex novels and as it related to the ideas current in the second half of the nineteenth century (one wonders how different Hardy's fiction might have been if he had been capable of even asking Ursula's questions, let alone arriving at her conclusions); 3) stating critical problems of epistemology and developing a significant theory of knowledge of his own.

In this section I have concentrated on this third issue and have tried to stress the worth of Lawrence's contribution to the philosophy of knowledge by pointing out similarities between his ideas and those of Michael Polanyi. Of these similarities, the two most important are their emphasis on the personal rootedness of all acts of knowing and their insistence on the uncertain venturing on which all discovery depends.

The term "personal knowledge" as it is used by both Lawrence and Polanyi does not describe a subjective activity. It describes something

involving commitment, responsibility, discipline, sustained attention and a true objectivity.

It also requires further living, what Lawrence suggests in the phrases "rolling glimmering against the void", "heaving into uncreated space" (p. 431). Otherwise, there is no discovery; "all amount of repeating even the most complex motions of life will not produce one new motion" (p. 434). A passage from Polanyi's The Tacit Dimension, already quoted in my introduction, will bear repeating here.

> My account of scientific discovery describes an existential choice. We start the pursuit of discovery by pouring ourselves into the subsidiary elements of a problem and we continue to spill ourselves into further clues as we advance further, so that we arrive at discovery fully committed to it as an aspect of reality. These choices create in us a new existence, which challenges others to transform themselves in its image. To this extent, then, "existence precedes essence", that is, it comes before the truth that we establish and make our own. 26

Thus, since "the shaping of knowledge is achieved by pouring ourselves into new forms of existence, the acquisition of knowledge should be found to be motivated by the deepest forces of our being".[27]

However, in spite of these important similarities, Lawrence and Polanyi are at bottom asking different questions in the "Study" and in Personal Knowledge; and these different questions, acting as the organising principles of each work, both limit the scope and make possible the special achievement of their respective studies. Lawrence is asking "What do I mean by 'living', how does one really live?" Polanyi is asking "What do I mean by 'knowing', how does one really know things?" Lawrence does not give us a philosophically systematic account of the nature of learning and perception; Polanyi does not stray very far from problems of epistemology.

This distinction can perhaps be illuminated by the use both men make of the terms "knowing" and "being". The final section of Personal Knowledge is entitled "Knowing and Being"; in it, Polanyi discusses the more complicated structure of knowing involved in "Knowing Life" (the title of his penultimate chapter), in studying something which has itself an active centre and is also capable of learning and knowing. Thus our study of a living being involves also a study of the knowledge and abilities of that being. Polanyi examines the significance of this more complex structure of knowing for biology, psychology, history and all studies of man in both the arts and sciences. He touches briefly (Chapter 12, section 8, "Human knowledge") on the nature of knowledge of our equals, our fellow human beings.

It is here that Lawrence moves beyond Polanyi, moves from epistemology to a study not of how we know life, but of life itself and of our relationships with others. Lawrence has also been using the terms "being" and "knowing" but always with the purpose of giving meaning to another word - "living". Our bodily being, our mental knowing are both necessary for full, individual life. "Living", Lawrence insists, "is not simply not-dying" (p. 428). In trying to determine how living is different from simply "not-dying", Lawrence turns to the teachings of Christianity and the Christian insistence that birth in the flesh is not enough, that "Ye must be born again" (John 3:7).

> Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God. Matthew 4:4

What does living by "every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God" mean exactly? Lawrence makes it clear that it does not mean living only by written revelation, by words which have already been spoken. He

insists that words are still proceeding "out of the mouth of God" but we forget to listen.

> And yet we believe that only the Uttered Word can come into us and give us the impetus to our second birth. Give us a religion, give us something to believe in, cries the unsatisfied soul embedded in the womb of our times. Speak the quickening word, it cries, that will deliver us into our own being.
>
> So it searches out the Spoken Word, and finds it, or finds it not. Possibly it is not yet uttered. But all that will be uttered lies potent in life. The fools do not know this. They think the fruit of knowledge is found only in shops. They will go anywhere to find it, save to the Tree. For the Tree is so obvious, and seems so played out. (p. 434)

We are reminded of little Jude, dreaming that the Tree of Knowledge grew in Christminster, when in fact he was part of the Tree of Knowledge itself and Christminster only one of the "shops", perhaps selling spurious fruit.

> He is as the leading-shoot which, for the moment, remembers only that which is behind, the fixed wood, the cells conducting towards their undifferentiated tissue of life. He moves as it were in the trunk of the tree, in the channels long since built, where the sap must flow as in a canal. He takes knowledge of all this past experience upon which the new tip rides quivering, he becomes again the old life, which has built itself out in the fixed tissue, he lies in line with the old movement, unconscious of where it breaks, at the growing plasm, into something new, unknown. He is happy, all is known, all is finite, all is established, and knowledge can be perfect here in the trunk of the tree, which life built up and climbed beyond. (p. 424)

The fixed wood is what is known, what has been made articulate and explicit in the past; it supports life, but it is not life. Polanyi shares this perception.

> Even if we admitted that an exact knowledge of the universe is our supreme mental possession it would still follow that

> man's most distinguished act of thought consists in producing such knowledge; the human mind is at its greatest when it brings hitherto unchartered domains under its control. Such operations renew the existing articulate framework. Hence they cannot be performed within this framework but have to rely (to this extent) on the kind of plunging reorientation which we share with the animals. Fundamental novelty can be discovered only by the same tacit powers which rats use in learning a maze. 28

However, Polanyi is interested in this act of "plunging reorientation" because it is the way in which articulate knowledge is discovered and shaped. Lawrence is interested in it because it is the movement of life itself.

On reading Personal Knowledge one begins to feel that the aim of all life is the production of explicit knowledge, that in the world Polanyi describes people who cannot contribute significantly to our body of established knowledge have no place. "Teachers demonstrating established results of science", "engineers who apply known devices" are merely going through "routine performances" (p. 77). Are the lives of those who are not scientific or artistic or in any way intellectual discoverers consigned to mere routine and oblivion?

Lawrence's answer can be gathered from the careful attention he gives to Hardy's people in the "Study" and especially to Jude, people who are not strong in thought but for whom the struggle into being consists in "the struggle into love and the struggle with love" (p. 410). Lawrence is extremely sensitive to the many different ways in which men and women make "plunging reorientations", take risks and make discoveries in the process of becoming themselves. That many of these discoveries will never be made fully explicit or add to the articulate framework of human knowledge does not make them unimportant.

> The bringing of life into human consciousness is not an aim in itself, it is only a necessary condition of the progress of life itself. (p. 431)

It is the act of "plunging reorientation", man's "heaving into uncreated space, when he is actually living, becoming himself" (p. 431), which is the essential movement of life.

A man's life may be made of many such discoveries and plunges forward - into love, into thought or action, into artistic creation or perhaps into the great art and thought and acts of the past. However, Lawrence sees the most crucial risk of all in a human life as that of the second birth, one's struggle into unique, pure individuality, singled out from the mass.

> The glory of mankind has been to produce lives, to produce vivid, independent, individual men, not buildings or engineering works or even art, not even the public good. (p. 436)

"Ye must be born again." Lawrence suggests that this Christian injunction involves being "brought forth to ourselves, distinct" (p. 433). The impetus to this second birth, the quickening seed, must not necessarily be sought in written revelation or in the uttered word, although Lawrence is very careful to insist that this may be so for some and, if so, it constitutes real adventure and real discovery, not mere routine.

> . . . it may be the word, the idea exists which shall bring me forth, give me birth. But it may also be that the word, the idea, has never yet been uttered.
>
> Shall I, then, be able, with all the knowledge in the world, to produce my being, if the knowledge be not extant? I shall not. (p. 434)

This rebirth into pure individuality enables a man to perceive more clearly that which is not himself, to see and accept the law of another man's nature.

> . . . necessarily accompanying this more perfect being of myself is the more extended knowledge of that which is not myself. That is, the finer, more distinct the individual, the more finely and distinctly is he aware of all other individuality. It needs a delicate, pure soul to distinguish between the souls of others; it needs a thing which is purely itself to see other things in their purity or their impurity. (p. 433)

Lawrence even sees all of evolution as progressing towards a future of such perfect individuals,"the individual so thorough that he should have nothing in common with any other individual" (p. 431), an idea that will be discussed more carefully in the following section.

His examination in Chapter V of the greater meaning of work - the extension of human consciousness, knowing - and of the greater meaning of our birth into life - the call of the second birth into distinct individuality - leads him to reconsider Hardy's "unbegotten" heroes and the extent to which they achieved their own "personal knowledge" and their own unique selves. This further assessment of Hardy is discussed in the section after next.

Although in Chapter IV Lawrence criticised living for the sake of work and self-preservation alone, he also closed his discussion with an insistence that we ought not withdraw irresponsibly from this struggle to secure sufficient means for human life. We ought not look down on the fight for physical existence from the lofty vantage point of Christian spirituality and detachment and leave the earth to be devoured by the glutton while we satisfy ourselves with heavenly rather than earthly bread. In Chapter V, after discussing the nature of true knowing and claiming that "the bringing of life into human consciousness is not an aim in itself, it is only a necessary condition of the progress of life itself" (p. 431), Lawrence feels it necessary to re-emphasise that "living is not simply

not-dying" (p. 428). To do this he criticises not the limits of Christian spirituality but the limitation of any rigid application of Judaic law,[29] one law in particular which is a main-stay in a system of self-preservation, in conventional morality - "Thou shalt not kill". The criticisms of Christianity and Judaism expressed in these two chapters are developed more fully later, in Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study".

> The Commandment says: "Thou shalt not kill".
> But doubtless Macbeth had killed many a man who was
> in his way . . . . But when Macbeth killed Duncan,
> he divided himself in twain, into two hostile parts.
> (pp. 439-440)

Mere death does not make a tragedy, as the great dramatists have always known. Conventional morality protects mere continued existence, existence given by our birth in the flesh. In the same way that our living depends upon, yet goes beyond this first birth, the greater morality of the twice-born - of vivid distinct individuals "like angels . . . each one being himself, perfect as a complete melody or a pure colour" (p. 432) - includes and yet transcends the conventional one. Life - that intangible, venturing, unpredictable thing with which Lawrence is trying to come to grips - has a more difficult morality all its own.

A Digression on Lawrence, Hardy, Evolution and Scientific Imagination

The study of life, the life sciences, had an incalculably great effect on men in the nineteenth century. Ian Barbour, writing on the interaction of scientific and religious ideas between 1800-1900 in Chapter IV of his book Issues in Science and Religion, entitles the chapter "Biology and Theology in the Nineteenth Century".

> Limitations of space restrict our discussion to biology, for
> it was in this area that the scientific development occurred

> which undoubtedly had the most far-reaching impact on human thought, constituting one of the major revolutions in intellectual history. 30

Thus, Lawrence's many references to biology in the first half of the "Study", his brief suggestion of an evolutionary theory of his own in Chapter V, are no accident. It is the necessary ground work for understanding the position of Hardy's work in the history of ideas and for escaping from the limited attitudes towards life and thought which oppressed him.

A few hours before he died Thomas Hardy asked his wife to read him the following verse from the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám.

> Oh, Thou, who Man of baser Earth didst make,
> And ev'n with Paradise devise the Snake:
> For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
> Is blacken'd - Man's forgiveness give - and take!

In her critical biography of Thomas Hardy, Evelyn Hardy contrasts Hardy's desire to hear those lines from the Rubáiyát with the last words of William Barnes, friend and mentor of the young Hardy. Barnes had prayed, "I want to say - I thank God - For all the pain - and trials - and all that I have passed through - I thank Thee". Evelyn Hardy writes,

> That prayer and the scourging plea in Fitzgerald's lines are widely divergent in spirit. They express succinctly, and with telling emphasis, more clearly than longer comments may do, the chasm lying between the days before and after the publication of the Origin of Species. 32

What exactly was the impact of Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) and his Essays and Reviews (1860) on Hardy's attitude to life and on his thought in general? We know that he had read works by Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Mill and Spencer as early as his twenties,[33] and the biography of Hardy written by his second wife shows that he was interested in science, occasionally attending the Royal Society's Conversazione when he was in

London or discussing scientific matters with acquaintances.[34] Hardy at one point referred to the central problem of his life as trying "to reconcile a scientific view of life with the emotional and spiritual, so that they may not be inter-destructive".[35]

This scientific view of life seems to have involved two main things for Hardy, one a matter of content, the other of methodology. The first was the idea of the survival of the fittest; the second was the unquestionable empirical procedure, the observation of facts, by which this idea was supposedly proved true. Darwin's theory of evolution and of the survival of the fittest impressed further upon Hardy what had struck him even as a child[36] - the imperfection and cruelty of the natural order. To Hardy, "the initial paradox which confronts us all - that life preys on other life - was incomprehensible, and overpowering in its brutality".[37] Although Hardy was sensitive to this paradox long before he read Darwin, the voice of science corroborating his own perceptions settled the issue. Ours was a "world of defect" in which human emotions and aspirations had no place.[38]

Such a realisation entailed a corollary. If an omnipotent God existed who created this imperfect world, he could not be a good God. T. H. Huxley and J. S. Mill elaborated on this theme, Swinburne raged against the conventional deity in his poetry and, under their influence, Evelyn Hardy suggests, "Hardy capitulated".

> Before he was thirty he had become an agnostic intellectually, and he remained one, never sloughing off disbelief. 39

The use of the qualifying "intellectually" is intentional, Evelyn Hardy maintaining that Hardy "was by nature essentially religious".[40] Certainly he was raised in the Anglican Church; he taught Sunday School at the age of

fifteen or sixteen. At the age of twenty-five he was seriously debating whether or not to enter the Church and be ordained. A love of church music stayed with him all his life, and he even remarked once that he would "prefer to be a cathedral organist to anything in the world".[41] He seemed to have attended divine service throughout his life at least occasionally.

However, these things do not necessarily make a man religious; Hardy himself wished to redefine the word "religion" so that it signified "morality". He wanted it to be used "in its modern sense entirely, as being expressive of nobler feelings towards humanity and emotional goodness and greatness, the old meaning of the word - ceremony, or ritual - having perished, or nearly".[42] Christianity was to be understood as "the religion of emotional morality and altruism that was taught by Jesus Christ".[43] That "emotional morality and altruism" was not a very accurate description of the teachings of Jesus as they are given in the New Testament did not appear to bother Hardy. He wanted to revise Christianity to make it serve his particular perception of conflict between moral man and immoral, or at best amoral, nature.

> We enter church, and we have to say, "We have erred and strayed from Thy ways like lost sheep", when what we want to say is, "Why are we made to err and stray like lost sheep?" Then we have to sing, "My soul doth magnify the Lord", when what we want to sing is, "O that my soul could find some Lord that it could magnify!" Till it can, let us magnify good works, and develop all means of easing mortal's progress through a world not worthy of them. 44

There seem to have been two opposite reactions to the theory of evolution, in the second half of the nineteenth century, if one accepted Darwin's theory as true. Either one could, for the sake of consistency, see natural law - the survival of the fittest - as the law of the entire creation and thus the necessary basis for human morality (Spencer, Nietzsche, for

example) or one could rebel against the law of nature, urging that man should stand alone against it, "should not imitate the brutal ways of the evolutionary past"[45] (T. H. Huxley's view). The second stance was more congenial to Hardy. In fact, he carried it even further than Huxley by insisting that since man was no longer "deemed to be a creation apart from all other creations," an inferior morality towards lower creatures was not maintainable.

> Few people seem to perceive fully as yet that the most far-reaching consequence of the establishment of the common origin of all species is ethical; that it logically involved a readjustment of altruistic morals by enlarging as a necessity of rightness the application of what has been called "The Golden Rule" beyond the area of mere mankind to that of the whole animal kingdom. Possibly Darwin himself did not wholly perceive it, though he alluded to it. 46

Hardy admitted that "I myself do not at present see how the principle of equal justice all round is to be carried out in its entirety"[47], but he maintained that this principle was the necessary moral response to the facts of evolution. He disliked the idea of a hierarchy in nature and refused to take the survival of the fittest as the norm for human behaviour, to scrap Christian morality as Nietzsche did in his Genealogy of Morals, insisting that the good was that which survived and strength therefore the highest virtue.

What did not occur to Hardy was to challenge significant aspects of the theory of evolution itself. Two implications of it seemed most significant to him - the necessity of brutal and cruel competition built into the scheme of things, and the ultimate reliance on chance, the origin of species having resulted from random mutation and natural selection. (The latter may have influenced Hardy's reliance on chance and coincidence

in his novels.) It did not occur to Hardy to challenge the theory of evolution itself because he did not really understand it as a theory but as a proven fact. The belief in the observational accuracy and systematic precision of science prevalent at the time made scientific discoveries seem unquestionable, objective knowledge of a type quite different from the knowledge of literature.[48]

Lawrence's disagreement with Darwin's theory of evolution is usually cited to prove that he had a blind prejudice against science and completely rejected its mode of approaching and explaining reality. On the contrary, Lawrence was unusually alive to scientific problems and certainly had a deeper understanding of the true methods of science than did Hardy, who appears to have accepted the truth of evolution outright.[49] Lawrence understood the imaginative nature of scientific theory and was not taken in by the view that scientists always abandoned a theory the minute it was contradicted by any observable facts, a view which, according to Polanyi, "can be traced back to Locke and Hume, and which in its massive modern absurdity has almost entirely dominated twentieth-century thinking on science".[50]

> Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new positivist philosophy arose, denying to the scientific theories of physics any claim to inherent rationality, a claim which it condemned as metaphysical and mystical . . . . Scientific theory . . . is merely a convenient summary of experience . . . . Accordingly, scientific theory is denied all persuasive power that is intrinsic to itself, as theory. It must not go beyond experience by affirming anything that cannot be tested by experience; and above all, scientists must be prepared immediately to drop a theory the moment an observation turns up which conflicts with it. In so far as a theory cannot be tested by experience - or appears not capable of being so tested - it ought to be revised so that its predictions are restricted to observable magnitudes. 51

Polanyi then goes on to give a delightful account of the discovery of the theory of relativity, showing how it depended primarily on intuition and speculation rather than on experimental findings - although these were, of course, important for testing and confirming the original insight - and how, contrary to its own code of strict empiricism, the scientific community continued - and continues - to uphold the theory of relativity because of its inherent rationality in the face of experimental results which contradict it![52]

Lawrence's ability to understand the essential imaginative force of great scientific theories can be seen in his account of the meaning of the theory of relativity "for the common amateur mind" in Fantasia of the Unconscious.[53] He certainly states Einstein's central insight more compactly and clearly than does the entry on Einstein in Harvey's Oxford Companion to English Literature, to compare one literary man's analysis of the theory with another's. If a person untrained in physics wished to understand why the theory of relativity has had such an effect on the twentieth century mind and on modern art and writing, he would do well to read the passage in Fantasia rather than the wordy attempt to be scientific in the Oxford Companion.[54] Lawrence not only gives a coherent summary of the impact of the theory, he makes it sound exciting and makes science sound like a great adventure. He even speculates on possible further implications of the theory and on its possible limitations. Whether his query about the constancy of Einstein's equation formula, his idea that the simple velocity of light will some day "split up into something complex, and the Relativity formula will fall to bits"[55] is ever shown to have any truth in it or not, it shows the presence of the same alert, questioning

mind which seven or eight years earlier registered Ursula's questions about life in The Rainbow and the challenge to accepted evolutionary theory in the "Study".

On first reading, Lawrence's alternative view of evolution in Chapter V seems merely fanciful.

> It seems as though one of the conditions of life is, that life shall continually and progressively differentiate itself, almost as though this differentiation were a Purpose. Life starts crude and unspecified, a great Mass. And it proceeds to evolve out of that mass ever more distinct and definite particular forms, an ever-multiplying number of separate species and orders, as if it were working always to the production of the infinite number of perfect individuals, the individual so thorough that he should have nothing in common with any other individual. It is as if all coagulation must be loosened, as if the elements must work themselves free and pure from the compound . . .
>
> In the origin, life must have been uniform, a great, unmoved, utterly homogeneous infinity . . . . And yet it can never have been utterly homogeneous: mathematically, yes; actually, no. There must always have been some reaction, infinitesimally faint, stirring somehow through the vast, homogeneous inertia.
>
> And since the beginning, the reaction has become extended and intensified; what was one great mass of individual constituency has stirred and resolved itself into many smaller, characteristic parts; what was an utter, infinite neutrality, has become evolved into still rudimentary, but positive, orders and species. So on and on till we get to naked jelly, and from naked jelly to enclosed and separated jelly, from homogeneous tissue to organic tissue, on and on, from invertebrates to mammals, from mammals to man, from man to tribesman, from tribesman to me: and on and on, till, in the future, wonderful, distinct individuals, like angels, move about, each one being himself, perfect as a complete melody or a pure colour.
>
> (pp. 431-432)

However, his view of evolution challenges the accepted Darwinian view in two ways. First, he senses a directionality in the evolutionary process rather than mere chance. Second, he sees a progress towards the

increased complexity of organisms. Lawrence's sense of the inadequacy of Darwin's theory in these two respects is similar to the central criticisms of evolutionary theory voiced by scientists in this century. Henri Bergson (in Creative Evolution, 1911), Samuel Alexander (in Space, Time and Deity, 1920), C. Lloyd Morgan (in Emergent Evolution, 1923) and Jan Smuts (in Holism and Evolution, 1926) all began to question the reliance of evolution on chance and to see evolution as a continual progress towards higher, more complex forms of life.[56] One of the fullest statements of an alternative theory of evolution was given in the work of the paleontologist and theologian, Teilhard de Chardin. In his The Phenomenon of Man, written during World War II, he challenged the idea of biological evolution as "the chance product of random events" and maintained that the evidence of geology and paleontology (the study of fossils) showed that since the formation of the earth, events have displayed a "unidirectional trend".[57]

Teilhard was able to support his theory with vast amounts of evidence from many scientific fields which Lawrence, of course, not being a scientist, was not. Still, their central ideas on the subject are remarkably similar. Teilhard speaks of events occurring "along a unidirectional axis" in spite of life's various excursions into blind alleys.

> Minor axes have developed at all stages, like branches from a tree. The tree continues to grow and flourish, and its topmost shoot, in the axis of the trunk, is the essential "growing point". 58

Like Lawrence, Teilhard saw this "growing point" as being man (see the "Study", pp. 424-425). The growth of the tree proceeded by what Teilhard called the "Law of Complexity-Consciousness"; this law involved two main points.

1. Throughout time there has been a tendency in evolution for matter to become increasingly complex in its organization.

2. With increase in material complexity there is a corresponding rise in the consciousness of the matter (or organism as it eventually becomes). 59

This process of "complexification" was the result of a kind of energy largely ignored by scientists, although just as prevalent in life as the form of energy recognisable in the tendency of organised matter to disintegrate, to break down into more simple, random states. Teilhard calls this other form of energy "radial energy", that which leads to a build-up of "stored complexity"; the term describes "an internal propensity of matter to unite"[60] into more complex wholes. Teilhard sees a progress towards greater individuation very similar to that which Lawrence suggests.[61]

Of course, the debate over the nature of evolution has by no means ended, but more and more scientists are beginning to criticise the inadequacy of a theory about the development of life which accounts for the formation of higher, more complex organisms merely by chance. Such a hypothesis seems woefully unscientific, a leaving of the problem exactly where one found it. Polanyi describes the inadequacy of the idea of random mutations and natural selection in accounting for the rise of man in the following way.

> The interest of evolution lies in the rise of higher beings from lower ones and, principally, in the rise of man. A theory which recognizes only evolutionary changes due to the selective advantage of random mutations cannot acknowledge this problem . . . the misrepresentation of evolution as a process of continued selective improvement has been assisted by shifting attention from evolution to the origin of species. A preoccupation with the way populations of a new kind come into existence has made us lose sight of the more fundamental question: how any single individual of a higher species ever came into existence. 62

The laws of inanimate matter cannot account for the rise of living things. First of all, they know nothing of the operational principles of living beings (see the machine analogy in the preceeding section). Secondly, the operations of chance affect inanimate matter and living beings in very different ways. Accidental forces can act on inanimate matter to release it to actualise stabler potentialities, reach stabler configurations. However, chance in the course of evolution seems to have released living beings to actualise higher, more complex potentialities, attain to more complex configurations. Polanyi suggests that the process of evolutionary innovations "is evoked by the accessibility of the higher levels of stable meaning which it eventually achieves . . . . The tension generated by such a higher potentiality might then be triggered into action either by accident or by the operation of first causes".[63]

All of these developing ideas about emergence, seeing evolution as a creative process rather than an entirely random one, are similar to Lawrence's in the "Study". I cannot hope to prove Lawrence's theory true, nor is it my intention to do so. As Polanyi makes clear, the controversy between the two beliefs is still a live one.[64] What is important is the realisation that Lawrence was alert to the central problems of evolutionary theory and to the impact some of the inadequacies of Darwin's explanations had on Hardy's art and thought.

Lawrence, by giving his own account of evolution, managed to avoid the extreme reactions of a Nietzsche or a Hardy. Nietzsche rejected pity because it "crosses the law of development, which is the law of <u>selection</u>. It preserves what is ripe for destruction: it defends those who have been disinherited and condemned by life".[65] He accepted the law of survival of

the fittest as a pattern for human morality. Hardy felt pity for just about everyone, human beings as well as animals; his sympathy with the predicament of living creatures caught in a cruel and imperfect world was his endorsement of human altruism, of a human morality which was entirely cut off from, indeed opposed to, the morality of life.

Lawrence insisted that our human morality ought not to divorce itself from the greater morality, "what we call the immorality of nature" (p. 419); but he did not see this greater morality as consisting totally in violent, savage struggles for existence. For Lawrence, life survives not by brute strength but by creative strength. The ideal is neither a spurious Will-to-Power which competes with and defeats others ("the sense of power, of dominating life. The Wille zur Macht is a spurious feeling." p. 491) nor a resigned endurance (the strength of which so impressed Hardy in Egdon Heath) but creativity, a growing into one's unique individuality.

Hardy had no real belief in the ultimate value of individuality and no conscious belief in creativity, it seems. The melancholy turn of his nature, reinforcing itself with the harsh truths of Darwin's Origin of Species, led him to the final statement of what Abercrombie calls "the rigid monism" of The Dynasts. Abercrombie praises Hardy for giving shape in this dramatic poem to the "idea that underlies most of the intellectual life of our time".[66] In The Dynasts,

> The primary, single energy of the monistic universe is conceived as a Will, an Immanent Will. The notion is so obvious nowadays . . . . Every existing thing, in fact, not merely obeys the Will, but is actually part of the Will itself, which exists forever in the sum of its parts, and forever overrides its parts. And as the action proceeds, it becomes evident that the Will has no object except to go on willing. 67

Abercrombie continually refers, as a matter for praise, to the modernity of Hardy's philosophy in The Dynasts. Speaking of "The Ancient Spirit of the Years", a "character" in the poem, Abercrombie writes,

> He has the voicing of the profound essential in man's latter-day conception of the universe; he is the consciousness of monism, of the single urgency driving all the manifold shows of being. To him, too, belongs insistence on the necessary consequence of strict monism; namely, that the huge, boundless turbulence of the world can effect nothing outside itself; it can have no final result, for this would be something that is not the existing world. It would be an addition to existence, and a strictly monistic world can never do anything but simply go on being the world; its turbulence is for nothing but to be turbulent. 68

It is Hardy's acceptance of this "modern" view of the universe which leads him in The Dynasts to speak of "the intolerable antilogy/of making figments feel", [69] figments here meaning human beings. Thus individuality has no ultimate value or reality, true creativity is impossible, and self-responsibility can have no meaning. All living and unliving things are just figments of the imagination of the Immanent Will.

In the "Study" Lawrence, through his insistence on individuality, differences, polarity, offers a criticism of such a monistic view. For him evolution is creative, resulting in ever higher, more complex individuals; it is not an instance of "the single urgency driving all the manifold shows of being". Even at the very beginning, Lawrence maintains, there was more than just one will or one uniform substance.

> In the origin, life must have been uniform, a great, unmoved, utterly homogeneous infinity . . . . And yet it can never have been utterly homogeneous: mathematically, yes; actually, no. There must always have been some reaction, infinitesimally faint, stirring somehow through the vast, homogeneous inertia. (p. 432)

Lawrence's insistence on the ultimate reality of individuals, of distinctions and differences, of the particulars of experience in no way contradicts his insistence that "the whole is greater than the part". To use Polanyian terminology, we may attend from the particulars to the whole which they jointly constitute, but still the question of what the whole is apart from the particulars which make it up is largely irrelevant. A musician may play a tune on the piano; his physical existence, the environment in which he grew up, his years of training, the action of his fingers on the keys, the individual notes on the sheets of music, the piano itself, are all necessary elements of his performance. We attend from all of these things to the whole performance of a piece of music. To imagine that we could really have the tune apart from these things, however, is impossible.

Lawrence's insistence on the reality of distinctions, of individual beings, accounts for his finding Eastern religions, although interesting, essentially uncongenial. Similarly, speculations about an Immanent Will or references to the particularities of experience as merely "the manifold shows of being" struck him as rather beside the point. He shared with Blake and, at least as the following passage from Blake's "Vision of the Last Judgment" would imply, with all great artists, the perception that life consists in its concrete, unique manifestations not in some abstracted universal force or idea.

> General Knowledge is Remote Knowledge; it is in Particulars that Wisdom consists and Happiness too. Both in Art and in Life, General Masses are as much Art as a Pasteboard Man is Human. Every Man has Eyes, Nose and Mouth; this Every Idiot knows, but he who enters into and discriminates most minutely the Manners and Intentions, the Characters in all their branches, is the alone Wise or Sensible Man, and on this discrimination All Art is founded. 70

In fact, Lawrence maintains that Hardy as an artist also witnessed to the truth of this perception. However much Hardy may have consciously succumbed to what seemed to him the scientific and philosophical truths of his age, no matter to what extent he substituted a morality of pity and altruism for the greater morality of creative life itself, in spite of his apparent acceptance of a kind of evolutionary monism and of the idea of human beings as mere figments in the mind of an indifferent Immanent Will, Hardy's novels gave evidence of beliefs entirely opposed to these. The sustained energy it took to write fourteen novels is alone a statement of belief in human creativity worth heeding, and Hardy certainly did not write about his characters as if he felt they were transitory figments in someone else's imagination. He wrote about them as if they were real people, important and unique. As one man wrote after an evening at Hardy's home, "He talked of Tess as if she was someone real who he had known and liked tremendously".[71]

When Hardy wrote in manner more consistent with his ideas, as he did in The Dynasts, the opposite is true; human life shrank in stature and seemed tiny and insignificant. Abercrombie finds this bird's eye perspective in The Dynasts a cause for praise, but from his description one can see why Lawrence would impatiently criticise the conception of the poem as "sheer rubbish, fatuity" (p. 480). Abercrombie tells us that in Hardy's saga of the Napoleonic wars, Maria-Louise's progress from Vienna to Paris seems "a file of ants crawling along a strip of garden matting" and battleships float before the wind "like preened duck-feathers across a pond". The entire story is seen "from our balloon-like height of vision".[72] The reductive effect of such a "balloon-like height of vision" not only on life but on art

was avoided when Hardy forgot the extraneous "objective" knowledge he had gathered from the age in which he lived and immersed himself in the world of his Wessex novels, making his own unique and irreplaceable discoveries about the life and the people he knew. In Hardy's fiction, Lawrence perceives this constant conflict between Hardy's own personal knowledge and his struggle with knowledge that did not pertain to him, knowledge which would keep him, like Clym, from producing any original thought.

It may be argued that Hardy was at least more original in his response to Darwin's Origin of Species than were those who found it cause for blithe Victorian optimism, belief in rugged individualism and historical progress. Certainly, one could not call Hardy optimistic, but he did accept a theory of evolutionary meliorism for many years which he seemed to have abandoned only during World War I. Such a theory is evident in the recurring references to Jude and Sue being ahead of their time ("Our ideas were fifty years too soon to be any good to us.")[73], the implication being that things will eventually get better.[74] In fact, Hardy seems to have tried out, in one form or another, several of the ideas which were current when he was a young man, even though some of them were incompatible with each other. His attitude was consistently melancholy, but he never evolved a consistent, systematic philosophy of life for himself (his letters and personal writings are full of protestations to this effect). Lawrence in Chapter V of the "Study" could be describing Hardy in the following passage, the reason for his preternatural sensitivity to the thought of his time.

> . . . we, who imagine we live by knowledge, imagine that the impetus for our second birth must come from knowledge, that the germ, the sperm impulse, can come out of some utterance only. So, when I am young, at eighteen, twenty, twenty-three, when the anguish of desire comes

> upon me, as I lie in the womb of my times, to receive the quickening, the impetus, I send forth all my calls and call hither and thither, asking for the Word, the Word which is the spermatozoon which shall come and fertilize me and set me free. And it may be the word, the idea exists which shall bring me forth, give me birth. But it may also be that the word, the idea has never yet been uttered.
>
> Shall I, then, be able, with all the knowledge in the world, to produce my being, if the knowledge be not extant? I shall not. (pp. 433-434)

In reading the biography of Thomas Hardy by his wife one has the growing sense of a man uncertain of his own worth and abilities, extremely sensitive to criticism, unsure about his ideas and wary about committing himself to any of them, whether they were his own or ones he had read or heard in conversation. Lawrence's image of a man seeking for the word or the idea which should bring him forth, give him birth, is appropriate. Hardy's lack of belief in his own ability to discover and shape the knowledge necessary for his living and for his writing perhaps contributed to his personal pessimism and certainly affected his art. He felt compelled to accept what seemed to him the proven, objective scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century and to accept what seemed to him their necessary implications for life, morality, religion and art. The ideas which had been prominent when he was a young man he seems to have accepted as factual explanations of the universe; ideas he encountered later were set against these earlier ones and declared fanciful theories, lacking adequate proof.

For instance, he read Bergson and commented on his ideas in a letter in 1915. "I cannot help feeling all the time that his is rather an imaginative and poetical mind than a reasoner's." To Bergson's idea of

creative evolution he objected, "I fail to see how, if it is not mechanism, it can be other than caprice, though he denies it". Then he continues,

> You must not think me a hard-headed rationalist for all this. Half my time - particularly when writing verse - I 'believe' (in the modern sense of the word) not only in the things Bergson believes in, but in spectres, mysterious voices, intuitions, omens, dreams, haunted places, etc., etc. But I do not believe in them in the old sense of the word any more for that . . . 75

It was this schizophrenia of belief - one set of beliefs for writing poetry, another for thinking rationally and scientifically about life - which led Hardy to state the central problem of his life as that of reconciling "a scientific view of life with the emotional and spiritual, so that they may not be inter-destructive".[76] He failed to see that "an imaginative and poetical mind" was as necessary to a good scientist as a reasoning one to the poet.

The Lawrence who wrote the following passage in a very late essay, "Hymns in a Man's Life", is clearly the same man who described Ursula's intense absorption over a microscope in The Rainbow and who, in the "Study", challenged the accepted view of evolution in an attempt to discover and shape the knowledge necessary for his life and his art.

> . . . the real scientist works in the sense of wonder. The pity is, when he comes out of his laboratory he puts aside his wonder along with his apparatus, and tries to make it all perfectly didactic. Science in its true condition of wonder is as religious as any religion. But didactic science is as dead and boring as dogmatic religion. Both are wonderless and productive of boredom, endless boredom. 77

Hardy's belief ("in the old sense of the word") was taken in by scientific didacticism. He could rationally accept only what appeared to be scientifically proven, certain, established, knowledge that was already extant.

The belief that wrote the novels and poems, however,(belief "in the modern sense of the word", according to Hardy, which seems to have been a very emasculated form of belief) ranged more widely and made its own discoveries, although these were weakened and confused by the presence of knowledge which did not pertain to them. One of the most important of these discoveries was that of "wonderful, distinct individuals", the"angels" which Lawrence sees at the end of the long process of evolution.

> The glory of mankind has been to produce lives, to produce vivid, independent, individual men, not buildings or engineering works or even art, not even the public good. The glory of mankind is not in a host of secure, comfortable, law-abiding citizens, but in the few more fine, clear lives, beings, individuals, distinct, detached, single as may be from the public.
>
> And these the artist of all time has chosen. (p. 436)

It is to re-examine the nature of Hardy's individuals - Lawrence calls them Hardy's"aristocrats" - that Lawrence turns again to the Wessex novels.

Hardy's Aristocrats

> Why, then, must the aristocrat always be condemned to death, in Hardy? . . . Certainly in the Wessex novels, all but the average people die. But why? Is there the germ of death in these more single, distinguished people, or has the artist himself a bourgeois taint, a jealous vindictiveness that will now take revenge, now that the community, the average, has gained power over the aristocrat, the exception?
>
> It is evident that both is true. (p. 436)

Lawrence, in his return to Hardy's novels in Chapter V, is continuing to test his perception of the limited human or bourgeois morality of Hardy's novels set against the greater morality of life suggested by Egdon Heath in The Return of the Native. However, his awareness that the

failure of Hardy's characters was not only due to the pressure of community judgment but also to some weakness within themselves led him into the discussion of distinct individuals, the twice-born, in relation to work, the money appetite and the state in Chapters IV and V. This further thinking adds a new dimension to his criticism. Whereas, at the conclusion of Chapter III he was able to say

> . . . Eustacia, Tess or Sue - what was there in their position that was necessarily tragic? Necessarily painful it was, but they were not at war with God, only with Society. Yet they were all cowed by the mere judgment of man upon them, and all the while by their own souls they were right. And the judgment of men killed them, not the judgment of their own souls or the judgment of Eternal God. (p. 420)

in Chapter V he sees another aspect of the problem. Troy, Clym, Tess and Jude

> have naturally distinct individuality but, as it were, a weak life-flow, so that they cannot break away from the old adhesion, they cannot separate themselves from the mass which bore them, they cannot detach themselves from the common. Therefore they are pathetic rather than tragic figures. They have not the necessary strength: the question of their unfortunate end is begged in the beginning . . .
>
> Tess allowed herself to be condemned, and asked for punishment from Angel Clare. Why? She had done nothing particularly, or at least irrevocably, unnatural, were her life young and strong. But she sided with the community's condemnation of her. (pp. 439-440)

In studying the conflict between the greater and the lesser morality in Hardy's novels and the differences between Hardy's heroes - those which are a "distinct individuality, more or less achieved", which are "an unaccomplished potential individuality" and which are "an impure, unindividualized life embedded in the matrix, either achieving its own lower degree of distinction, or not achieving it" (p. 434) - Lawrence discovers the necessity to ask further questions in order to understand

Hardy's art. He needs to examine not only the ideas of the eighty-eight years in which Hardy lived and wrote but the religious and artistic influences at work in the history of the Christian West. For this purpose, he ostensibly leaves Hardy as Chapter V closes and does not return to him until Chapter IX.

The conflict of moralities which Lawrence observes starts in The Laodicean where "there is all the way through a prédilection d'artiste for the aristocrat, and all the way through a moral condemnation of him, a substituting the middle or lower-class personage with bourgeois virtues into his place" (p. 435).

> The prédilection d'artiste - Hardy has it strongly, and it is rooted deeply in every imaginative human being . . . . And this because the aristocrat alone has occupied a position where he could afford to be, to be himself, to create himself, to live as himself. That is his eternal fascination. This is why the preference for him is a prédilection d'artiste. (p. 436)

However, prédilection or no, "starting with the bourgeois morality, Hardy makes every exceptional person a villain, all exceptional or strong individual traits he holds up as weaknesses or wicked faults" (p. 436). Lawrence rightly perceives a shift in sympathy as the Wessex novels progress; the admiration for the steady, respectable Gabriel Oak is displaced by the admiration for Jude who stands against conventional morality. However, Gabriel meets with success and Jude with disaster (as do Michael Henchard and Tess, two others who transgress conventional standards of behaviour and whom Hardy treats with exceptional sympathy).

Lawrence's perception that "Hardy, like Tolstoi, is forced in the issue always to stand with the community in condemnation of the aristocrat" (p. 439), that he had in himself "a bourgeois taint" can be interestingly

compared with some of Hardy's own comments on his novels. A reader of The Return of the Native is apt to feel a great sympathy on the author's part with the rebellious Eustacia and a siding with her against the conventional Clym, the sympathy which Lawrence attributes to the true artist in Hardy. Yet Hardy's conscious sympathies were quite different. In reading over the proofs of The Return, he found that "I got to like the character of Clym before I had done with him. I think he is the nicest of all my heroes, and not a bit like me".[78] Remarking on some reviews of Jude the Obscure, Hardy wrote

> Tragedy may be created by an opposing environment either of things inherent in the universe, or of human institutions. If the former be the means exhibited and deplored, the writer is regarded as impious; if the latter, as subversive and dangerous; when all the while he may never have questioned the necessity or urged the non-necessity of either . . . 79

For Hardy to say that in Jude he never questioned the necessity of certain human institutions having power over individual lives in destructive ways seems incredible. His criticism of the marriage laws in the book was very strong, almost turning the novel into a tract; and in his Postscript to Jude he makes it clear that he endorses this criticism.

> My opinion at that time, if I remember rightly, was what it is now, that a marriage should be dissolvable as soon as it becomes a cruelty to either of the parties - being then essentially and morally no marriage 80

His condemnation of Christminster's rigidity in refusing Jude a place is also a major element in the novel and one of his earliest notes for it (written in April 1888) shows that it was so even at the time when the novel was first conceived.

> A short story of a young man - 'who could not go to Oxford'. His struggles and ultimate failure. Suicide. There is something in this the world ought to be shown

> and I am the one to show it to them - though I was not altogether hindered going, at least to Cambridge, and could have gone up easily at five-and-twenty. 81

Hardy was unusually sensitive to unfavourable reviews of his novels and to public opinion in general. Perhaps this sensitivity accounts for his strange withdrawal of support at times from the indictments against society made by his novels. As Evelyn Hardy observes,

> Since Hardy himself never broke away from the moral code which many of his protagonists transgressed it is worth considering whether he himself was not taken in by that which, in his novels, he affected to despise . . . . It is possible . . . that at heart he was a rebel, who dared not trust those anarchic instincts which he only lived out in his tales of soldiers, smugglers, murderers, and - for him the most dangerous, most sinful of all - adulterers. 82

Hardy defended the morality of his story of adultery, Jude the Obscure - "Jude (though a book quite without a 'purpose' as it is called) makes for morality more than any other book I have written"[83] - but some of the ways in which he did so make us wonder what meaning he attaches to the word "moral". For instance, Hardy's second wife describes in the following manner Hardy's response to news that the Bishop of Wakefield had thrown his copy of Jude into the fire.

> The only sad feature in the matter to Hardy was that if the bishop could have known him as he was, he would have found a man whose personal conduct, views of morality, and of the vital facts of religion, hardly differed from his own. 84

Hardy was clearly hurt by the Bishop's response and by his making his opinion of Jude public in the papers. His suggestion that his views of morality, especially in relation to the marriage laws, as expressed by the novel and that his views on religion (i.e. essentially seeing it not as religion at all but as ethics) as expressed by the novel, were similar to the

Bishop's seems most unlikely - if so, why should the Bishop have burned the book? The arresting aspect of Hardy's response is his plea that in "personal conduct" he was probably quite like the Bishop. He probably was, and it appears that it was very important to him to have people know this. However, it involved dissociating himself from his novel to some extent, making the distinction, "I sympathise with this character, but I don't ever want you to think that I would behave as he did". Clearly this withdrawal of support and belief from Jude had something to do with the "germ of death", the essential weakness which Lawrence senses in Jude's nature from the very start.

Lawrence calls Hardy's heroes and heroines "unbegotten". They failed to find the knowledge or the "uttered word" which would deliver them into their own being. Certainly this is true of Clym who shaped an arbitrary vocation for himself out of an acquaintance "with ethical systems popular at the time".[85] It is also true of Tess who by nature sings the Benedicite as she descends into the valley of the river Var (Chapter XVI) but later destroys Alec's Christian faith by repeating to him from Angel's conversation "merciless polemical syllogisms" which she does not even understand herself and which sound like passages from the Dictionnaire Philosophique or Huxley's Essays (see Chapter XLVI).[86] It is clearest in Jude, his long drawn out struggle with knowledge which had no relation to his particular capabilities or opportunities.

All of these characters think that the idea which will reveal their own calling and true nature to them can be found already written down by men in the past. None of them realise that they might have to "look at the unknown", make new discoveries of their own and additions to human

knowledge which will then be the fertilising word, will enable them to conceive and bring forth their true individuality, distinct. Interestingly, this failure of personal knowledge in Hardy's "unbegotten" heroes and heroines bears remarkable similarities to Hardy's own struggle with ideas of his time, to the insecurity which made him eager for the support of proven, "objective" scientific facts and which led him to disclaim full responsibility for the unique discoveries he did make about life in his art.

Allen Tate, in an article on "Hardy's Philosophic Metaphors", sees in Clym and in Jude elements of a portrait of Hardy himself, a young man educated beyond his rural background. Hardy protested to the contrary, saying that Clym was "not a bit like me" and that "no book he had ever written contained less of his own life" than Jude the Obscure.[87] However, Tate speaks of Clym's education and background as being similar to Hardy's. Hardy, too, was raised on the edge of the heath, read and studied far beyond his neighbours, was influenced by "ethical systems popular at the time". He quotes a passage from William Rutland's Thomas Hardy.

> It is an interesting paradox that Hardy should have placed so high a value upon intellectual reason, while his own mental life was almost entirely governed by emotion . . . . The outlook upon life of his mature manhood was almost wholly due to emotional reactions against suffering and injustice; but he sought for intellectual explanations of the universe in the writing of the philosophers. He went on reading philosophy till he was old, but he never advanced beyond what had been in the forefront of thought during his early manhood. When, in 1915, he read that no modern philosopher subscribes to Herbert Spencer's doctrine of "the Unknowable" (which had greatly influenced him) he declared himself "utterly bewildered".

Tate comments on this paragraph,

> I believe that here, again, we get the image of Clym Yeobright, the young man ill-prepared to digest the learning of the great world, the provincial amateur who

> sees farther than his neighbors but who, if he had seen still farther, might not have accepted, in an act of faith, the Darwinian naturalism of his time. 88

Hardy may have claimed that Jude was very different from himself and certainly in many respects he was; Jude the Obscure is not autobiography in any simple sense. The intense longing for the Church and the University which is Jude's was not shared by Hardy as far as we know.[89] However, a reading of Chapters I, III and IV of Evelyn Hardy's biography alone would impress one with the similarities between Hardy as a youth and Jude Fawley. The applied study of Latin and Greek authors and the Greek New Testament, the early melancholy, the dependence on an older schoolmaster as friend and mentor, the sensitivity to cruelty to animals, the involvement and interest in Church restoration and architecture - all of these things were shared by the young Hardy and Jude. An even more interesting piece of evidence of Hardy's identifying himself with Jude lies in the likeness between a reflection of Hardy's before he was eight years old (recorded in The Early Life, pp. 19-20) and the thoughts Hardy describes Jude as having when a boy. One day Hardy was

> . . . lying on his back in the sun, thinking how useless he was, his face covered with his straw hat. The sun's rays streamed through the interstices of the straw, the lining having disappeared. Reflecting on his experiences of the world so far as he had got, he came to the conclusion that he did not wish to grow up. Other boys were always talking of when they would be men; he did not want at all to be a man, or to possess things, but to remain as he was, in the same spot, and to know no more people than he already knew (about half a dozen).
>
> Jude went out, and, feeling more than ever his existence to be an undemanded one, he lay down upon his back on a heap of litter near the pig-sty. The fog had by this time become more translucent, and the position of the sun could be seen through it. He pulled his straw hat over his face, and peered through the interstices of the plaiting at the white brightness, vaguely reflecting. Growing up brought responsibilities, he found. Events did not rhyme quite

> as he had thought. Nature's logic was too horrid for him to care for. That mercy towards one set of creatures was cruelty towards another sickened his sense of harmony. As you got older, and felt yourself to be at the centre of your time, and not at a point in its circumference, as you had felt when you were little, you were seized with a sort of shuddering, he perceived. All around you there seemed to be something glaring, garish, rattling, and the noises and glares hit upon the little cell called your life, and shook it, and warped it.
>
> If he could only prevent himself growing up! He did not want to be a man. 90

I do not point out these parallels between Jude and Hardy's feeling and experience in order to dismiss or simplify Jude the Obscure as mere autobiography. Rather, they are evidence of Hardy's close personal engagement with the novel, an engagement more complete, I believe, than with any of his other books. The extent of his involvement with Jude's story resulted in the complex sympathy and antipathy Hardy felt towards him, the feeling Lawrence describes when he says that Jude is "hated with intensity, yet still loved" (p. 437) by his author.

Hardy seems to have been working towards a full portrayal of the young man educated beyond his rural neighbours, the man to whom knowledge had brought melancholy rather than joy, awareness of limitations rather than liberation, resignation rather than rebirth. Clym Yeobright, then Angel Clare, learn of nature's imperfection, of the emptiness and impossibility of religion and of the "ethical systems popular at the time". In Jude their struggle becomes central and is most fully embodied. We follow Jude's growth from the time he is a small boy (we only catch glimpses of Clym and Angel's childhood and background) - his intense desire for learning, his obsession with Christminster, his desire to enter the church, his increasing

scepticism under Sue's influence, his final disillusionment with academia, religion, life, society. The development towards this final melancholy outlook is overall (not in particular incidents and relationships, as far as can be told) similar to Hardy's own. His closeness to Jude, his empathy with his problems and desires, resulted in a full-bodied, more life-like character than Angel or Clym. Clym is wooden, too altruistic and controlled. Angel is rigid, self-deceiving and prudish; and our anger (and Hardy's) is too strong against him to let us see him more fully. Jude is flesh and blood, aiming towards a life of scholarship and religion but also giving in to the temptations of sexual desire or strong drink. He obeys convention in marrying Arabella, thinking she is pregnant; he defies convention in living with Sue and fathering her children without marrying her. He never fully loses his desire to enter Christminster, yet he realises that his work as a stonemason and his own personal knowledge are in ways just as valuable as the knowledge to be had within the university walls.

Lawrence perceives a mixed love and hate towards Jude on Hardy's part but emphasises that the strongest feeling is that of love. Hardy's extraordinary sympathy for Jude is felt at times as a flaw in the novel; however, its chief result is the many-sidedness which led Lawrence in classifying Hardy's characters under three headings - aristocratic tragic-flaw heroes, aristocratic romantic heroes, and bourgeois heroes - to include Jude in all three!

Lawrence's comment on Jude at the close of Chapter V points towards his fuller treatment of Jude the Obscure and the problem of personal knowledge in Chapter IX.

> . . . almost the bitterest, most pathetic, deepest part of Jude's misfortune was his failure to obtain admission to Oxford, his failure to gain his place and standing in the world's knowledge, in the world's work. (p. 440)

However, why does Lawrence say "almost"? Jude's fruitless search for the "uttered word" which would beget in him his true nature and bring him forth, his mistaken belief that in Christminster grew the Tree of Knowledge, a belief that kept him from going to the Tree itself (see page 225 above), prevented his second birth into pure, distinct individuality. However, this being an "unbegotten" hero not only affected Jude's difficulty in discovering his calling, his rootlessness and aimlessness. It affected his ability to love.

> . . . the finer, more distinct the individual, the more finely and distinctly is he aware of all other individuality. (p. 433)

The disaster of Jude's relationship with Sue was a result, as Lawrence understands it in Chapter IX of the "Study", of Jude's not recognising and allowing Sue's special nature. He does not distinguish finely enough between himself and what is not himself. Unlike Tess, who "never tries to alter or to change anybody" and "respects utterly the other's right to be" (p. 483), Jude mangles Sue in his attempt to make her fit his idea of a woman. Sue also makes Jude suffer by holding him up against her impossible ideal of a man.

The problem is a frequent one in Hardy's novels. We have seen (in Chapter II above) how Clym and Eustacia failed to face each other as separate, unique individuals, instead, each seeing the other as only an extension and embodiment of their own desires. In Tess of the D'Urbervilles Alec forces Tess physically while Angel tries to force her mentally into his picture of unsophisticated rural innocence.

Yet all of these characters are supposed to be in love in one way or another. Since, as Lawrence observes in Chapter III of the "Study", the struggle into being in Wessex consists mainly in "the struggle into love and the struggle with love" (p. 410), the question of what love means to the men and women of Wessex is an important one for an understanding of the novels. An attempt to think through the full meaning of love thus becomes a central part of the "Study"'s job and Lawrence directs his attention especially to the Christian faith, the religious tradition which has with greatest power defined love in the complex context of a worshipping community over the past two thousand years.

There is further reason for Lawrence to turn to Christianity at this point. Clym, Angel and Jude all have a peculiar relation to the church. They are no longer Christians, at least not in any religious sense, but they have not simply turned their backs on the faith in which they were raised. Angel and Jude both considered taking orders at one point; Clym is left preaching "the first of a series of moral lectures or Sermons on the Mount" on Egdon Heath, the breeze lifting and lowering "his hair, somewhat too thin for a man of his years, these still numbering less than thirty-three".[91]

The portraying of Clym as a kind of Christ-figure is unmistakeable. However, Clym has no belief in God; he is an agnostic. Stricken with grief after his mother's death, he somewhat grandly pours blame on his own head, calling on God to punish him.

> "If there is any justice in God let Him kill me now. He has nearly blinded me, but that is not enough. If He would only strike me with more pain I would believe in Him for ever!" [92]

The implication is, not only with Clym, but with Angel and Jude as well, that they have seen the inadequacies of Christianity and have come out on the other side, having sought out and discovered, however, the basic truths in Jesus' teaching which they continue to accept and preach to others in their pure form, unadulterated with any supernaturalism or superstition. They are shown as having the deepest respect for the essential truths of Christianity even while they separate themselves from it. Angel's following explanation of his views to his father would not sound inappropriate coming from Clym or Jude.

> "I love the church as one loves a parent. I shall always have the warmest affection for her. There is no institution for whose history I have a deeper admiration; but I cannot honestly be ordained her minister . . . while she refuses to liberate her mind from an untenable redemptive theolatry." 93

Clym, Angel and Jude, however, betray in their relations with Eustacia, Tess and Sue an inadequate understanding of the nature of love as Lawrence understands it to be taught by the Christian church. They also seem to have ignored other demands made by Jesus on his followers in the New Testament - "Ye must be born again", "whosoever will save his life shall lose it", "let your light so shine before men", "consider the lilies of the field", "Physician, heal thyself". The strength to undergo the second birth into clarified individuality, a second birth which would involve a sensitive recognition of the individuality of others and an acceptance of one's calling, the responsibility of discovering one's own personal knowledge, seems never to have visited Clym, Angel or Jude. However, they claim to have moved through Christianity and beyond to a truer perspective. In the "Study" Lawrence also speaks of moving beyond Christianity but only by living through it, by submitting oneself to the force of her teachings,

trying to see into the further world they open to the life of man and to dwell in that world. One cannot truly move beyond Christianity by skirting along her edges, trying to bypass her along one side or another; Lawrence insists one must walk straight through in full awareness and with gratitude, coming out as a changed, a twice-born being on the other side.

When Lawrence returns to Hardy's novels in Chapter IX of the "Study", he concentrates his attention on the central characters of Tess and Jude. He tries to see how fully they have responded to the call to rebirth, how fully they have achieved their own distinct individuality. He can study the extent of this achievement - "the final aim of every living thing, creature or being is the full achievement of itself" (p. 403) - by a close examination of two related problems: 1) the way in which a character relates to other people, the attitudes he has towards love and 2) the way in which a character understands himself and fails or succeeds in producing his own personal knowledge.

Before Lawrence does this, however, some further thinking must be done. The chapters of the "Study" which lie between V and IX are Lawrence's attempt to understand Hardy's novels more completely from two different perspectives, one of concentrating on Hardy's characters, the other of concentrating on Hardy himself. The first involves looking closely at the "unbegotten heroes" of Wessex, trying to see how and why they failed to respond to Christianity's call to rebirth - a failure which affects their ability to love, to recognise the law of another person's nature, and their ability to fulfil their own unique calling, to recognise the law of their own nature and produce the knowledge which belongs to it. This approach necessitates some careful thinking about the Christian tradition, its

teachings on love and on the second birth.

The second way in which Lawrence studies Hardy's art is by looking closely at its position in space and time, not only in the century of Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Spencer and J. S. Mill, but in the entire religious and artistic history of the Christian West. He is interested not only in the conflicts between Hardy's characters but also in the inner conflict he senses in Hardy himself; and he wants to see what possible influences were at work in our cultural past which made this conflict possible and which made the work of Hardy (and of Tolstoi) tragedy of a very different order from that of Ancient Greece.

> There is a lack of sternness, there is a hesitating betwixt life and public opinion, which diminishes the Wessex novels from the rank of pure tragedy. It is not so much the eternal, immutable laws of being which are transgressed, it is not that vital life-forces are set in conflict with each other, bringing almost inevitable tragedy - yet not necessarily death, as we see in the most splendid Aeschylus. It is, in Wessex, that the individual succumbs to what is in its shallowest, public opinion, in its deepest, the human compact by which we live together, to form a community. (p. 440)

The Wheel and the Wedding (Chapter VI of the "Study")

So the "Study" becomes in one sense an enquiry into the nature of love. I suggested in Chapter II that the "Study" and Plato's Symposium could be compared to one another in their concern with this question, for the dialogue of the Symposium takes place at a dinner party during which one of the guests, the doctor Eryximachus, proposes "that each of us, going from left to right, should make the best speech he can in praise of love".[94] As each guest speaks, some further quality of love is added to the building conception which is to be given final expression by Socrates. It is the speech of Aristophanes which impresses upon the reader the fact that love

witnesses to a very deep need in human beings; "love is simply the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole".[95] The way in which he sets forth this idea is through a fanciful story.

> . . . you must learn the constitution of man and the modifications which it has undergone, for originally it was different from what it is now. In the first place there were three sexes, not, as with us, two, male and female; the third partook of the nature of both the others and has vanished, though its name survives. The hermaphrodite was a distinct sex in form as well as in name, with the characteristics of both male and female, but now the name alone remains, and that solely as a term of abuse. Secondly, each human being was a whole, with its back and flanks rounded to form a circle; it had four hands and an equal number of legs, and two identically similar faces upon a circular neck, with one head common to both the faces, which were turned in opposite directions. It had four ears and two organs of generation and everything else to correspond. These people could walk upright like us in either direction, backwards or forwards, but when they wanted to run quickly they used all their eight limbs, and turned rapidly over and over in a circle, like tumblers who perform a cart-wheel and return to an upright position . . . Their strength and vigour made them very formidable, and their pride was overweening; they attacked the gods . . .
>
> So Zeus and the other gods debated what was to be done with them . . . . After much painful thought, Zeus had an idea. "I think" he said, "that I have found a way by which we can allow the human race to continue to exist and also put an end to their wickedness by making them weaker. I will cut each of them in two . . . ." As he bisected each, he bade Apollo turn round the face and the half-neck attached to it towards the cut side, so that the victim, having the evidence of bisection before his eyes, might behave better in future.
>
> Man's original body having been thus cut in two, each half yearned for the half from which it had been severed. When they met they threw their arms round one another and embraced, in their longing to grow together again, and they perished of hunger and general neglect of their concerns, because they would not do anything apart . . . . Zeus took pity on them, and hit upon a second plan. He moved their reproductive organs to the front: hitherto

> they had been placed on the outer side of their bodies, and the processes of begetting and birth had been carried on not by the physical union of the sexes, but by emission on to the ground, as is the case with grasshoppers. By moving their genitals to the front, as they are now, Zeus made it possible for reproduction to take place by the intercourse of the male with the female . . . . It is from this distant epoch, then, that we may date the innate love which human beings feel for one another, the love which restores us to our ancient state by attempting to weld two beings into one and to heal the wounds which humanity suffered.
>
> Each of us then is the mere broken tally of a man, the result of a bisection which has reduced us to a condition like that of flat fish, and each of us is perpetually in search of his corresponding tally . . . . this is what everybody wants, and everybody would regard it as the precise expression of the desire which he had long felt but had been unable to formulate, that he should melt into his beloved, and that henceforth they should be one being instead of two. The reason is that this was our primitive condition when we were wholes, and love is simply the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole. 96

Lawrence also speaks of the desire for wholeness and uses the image of sexual love to do so. The story he tells is about a poppy, the hermaphrodite whose blossom wheels triumphantly on the air in much the same way that Aristophanes' mythological beings "turned rapidly over and over in a circle", performing cartwheels.

Lawrence begins his tale by asking the reader a question. What does he want to do with his life once the work of providing himself with food and shelter is done? He wants to be free from the labour of self-preservation. But, "free for what?"

> What does a flower do? It provides itself with the necessities of life, it propagates itself in its seeds, and it has its fling all in one. Out from the crest and summit comes the fiery self, the flower, gorgeously . . . .

> It is so plain in my plant, the poppy. Out of the living river, a fine silver stream detaches itself, and flows through a green bed which it makes for itself. It flows on and on, till it reaches the crest beyond which is ethereal space. Then, in tiny, concentrated pools, a little hangs back, in reservoirs that shall later seal themselves up as quick but silent sources. But the whole, almost the whole, splashes splendidly over, is seen in red just as it drips into darkness, and disappears . . . .
> This is the fall into the future, like a waterfall that tumbles over the edge of the known world into the unknown. (pp. 440-441)

Lawrence clearly sees flowers in a very different way from that in which most people see them. They are not just simple, colourful dots in a field, lessons on how to be, effortlessly, contentedly, without worry or strain, bobbing in the breeze. For him, they are living beings working unceasingly towards their goal; a tremendous energy is involved in their final splash into colour. Further, the growth of the poppy is no straightforward climb from the seed in the earth to the bright bloom in the heavens. Lawrence, in looking more closely at the flower, observes strenuous activity and tension within it.

> Where does my poppy spill over in red, but there where the two streams have flowed and clasped together, where the pollen stream clashes into the pistil stream, where the male clashes into the female, and the two heave out in utterance. There, in the seethe of male and female, seeds are filled as the flood rises to pour out in a red fall. There, only there, where the male seethes against the female, comes the transcendent flame and the filling of seeds . . . .
>
> And this is happiness: that my poppy gather his material and build his tissue till he has led the stream of life in him on and on to the end, to the whirlpool at the summit, where the male seethes and whirls in incredible speed upon the pivot of the female, where the two are one, as axle and wheel are one, and the motions travel out to infinity. (p. 442)

Lawrence's perception of male and female in the blossom of the poppy helps him to begin talking about the tensions and divisions he sees in life. The division of the sexes is our indication of the structure of all reality.

> Why do we consider the male stream and the female stream as being only in the flesh? It is something other than physical. The physical, what we call in its narrowest meaning, the sex, is only a definite indication of the great male and female duality and unity . . . . There is female apart from Woman, as we know, and male apart from Man. There is male and female in my poppy plant, and this is neither man nor woman. It is part of the great twin river, eternally each branch resistant to the other, eternally running each to meet the other.
>
> It may be said that male and female are terms relative only to physical sex. But this is the consistent indication of the greater meaning. (p. 443)

It is too easily overlooked that Lawrence speaks of "the great male and female <u>duality and unity</u>" (underlines mine). He does not want to suggest either dualism or monism in any simple sense. His extending of the poppy image to include the opposition between male and female enables him to express his ideas more fully and to keep certain important aspects of the problem at hand before the reader at all times.

First, the picture of a human relationship kept before the reader's eye reminds him of the kind of polarity Lawrence wants to talk about. A man and a woman in marriage participate in a union which can yet never obliterate their separate natures. They share in a lively balance and tension with each other which is never perfect, never resolved. Nevertheless, their experience of unity and completeness through their relation to each other is very real. Unlike Aristophanes, who suggests that the ideal of every lover is to merge into one being with his beloved, Lawrence insists that the continuing health, vitality and joyousness of the love

relation depends on each individual maintaining his separate identity and singleness. Such a "duality and unity" pervades all nature and also takes place within each individual, accounting for all human creativity.

Second, this creative opposition between and within human beings, expressed through the metaphor of sexual love, continues Lawrence's discussion of conception and rebirth in Chapter V and keeps the command "Ye must be born again", the insistence on spiritual as well as physical birth in the reader's mind.

Third, the image of the sexual relationship carries a suggestion of wonder and mystery, of awe at the unity which is yet duality, which helps Lawrence to approach the mystery of the Trinity and to speak religiously, poetically, as well as analytically when he takes on the task of theologian in Chapters VII and VIII. At the very least, the sexual metaphor enforces a certain awareness of the limitations of language; the wordlessness of the profoundest moments of physical union indicate, as Lawrence keeps the reality and atmosphere of these moments before us in the "Study", the constant strain his language is undergoing in his attempts to approach and express a similarly wordless reality. The full wonder may have gone out of sex for twentieth century man, but part of Lawrence's aim in the "Study" is to rediscover it and open us to it. His insistence that the purpose of sex is not simply procreation is part of this effort and is well-taken, for primitive man had no understanding of the relation between coitus and conception and the birth of children. It was thought that women conceived from the light of the moon and that a man had nothing to do with procreation except perhaps to enlarge the hymen for the moonlight to pass in.[97] A primitive man and woman thus

found their attraction to and desire for each other, as well as their intimate relation with the moon, much more mysterious than modern men and women usually do. There also existed a profound similarity between physical desire and spiritual desire, between the feeling that drew one towards another human being or towards discovery and knowledge or towards a god. Aristophanes touches on the depth of man's desire for wholeness as expressed in sexual love, but Lawrence carries this perception further.

Fourth, the use of the sexual metaphor is one way of keeping the reader constantly aware of the bodily roots of all our thought. Lawrence's references to marriage, desire, passion, consummation and the rhythm of his language, jolt us back into our bodies whenever we are tempted to forget or deny them, to lose ourselves in contemplation of abstract concepts. Lawrence is not only making an epistemological point by doing this, a point similar to Michael Polanyi's when he insists,

> To a disembodied intellect, entirely incapable of lust, pain or comfort, most of our vocabulary would be incomprehensible. For the majority of nouns and verbs refer either to living beings, whose behaviour can be appreciated only from an experience of the drives which actuate them, or to things made by man for his own use, which again can be appreciated only through an understanding of the human needs to which they minister. 98

Lawrence is also making use of an effective heuristic device which other writers of non-fiction prose would do well to imitate. He is presenting his thoughts not as abstract statements which seem to repel the reader's attention no matter how much he tries to press it upon them, but as concrete images which have immediate physical force. In other words, he is writing as a novelist does, appealing to the sensuous, bodily apprehension of the reader as much as to his mental faculties; he is

writing for the whole man. The effectiveness of such writing (compare the experience of reading the "Study of Thomas Hardy" to that of reading Personal Knowledge, keeping in mind that Polanyi is relatively concrete and engaging, as modern philosophers go) should lead us to question why we hold it suspect in the language of our "serious" thinking, reserving it only for poetry and fiction. In any case, the "Study" is written for "embodied intellects" and for these the image of human marriage has immediate impact and rich meaning.

Fifth and finally, Lawrence's examination of the relation between physical love, conception and childbirth and spiritual intercourse, conception and creativity helps him to think more fruitfully about the nature of perception and of human consciousness. He is able to move from a discussion of relations between men and women to a discussion of the relation between male and female (and between other opposing forces) within the individual. His perception of conflict and tension leads him into the realm of psychology, equipped with a sensitive and suggestive language for dealing with the issues he finds there.

These five ramifications of Lawrence's little story of the poppy in Chapter VI of the "Study" can all be interestingly compared to the development of Plato's thought in the Symposium. In fact, the main lines of Lawrence's enquiry into the nature of love, as stated here, touch on the major ideas of the various speakers in Plato's dialogue, in several cases challenging these ideas and carrying them further.

First, Lawrence's perception of the sexual relationship as the indication of a greater duality and unity in all of nature and within the individual bears an interesting relation to the speeches of Pausanias, Erixymachus, Aristophanes and Agathon. Pausanias makes a distinction

between two kinds of love, that of the common Aphrodite and of the heavenly Aphrodite. The first is merely physical and is directed quite as much towards women as towards men (the male homosexual relation was considered the highest possible love relation). The second is spiritual as well as physical and "has no female strain in her, but springs entirely from the male".[99] Pausanias wants to make it clear that love is not limited to physical sexual relations (although for him both kinds of love include these). Lawrence also insists that the love relation is not "only in the flesh" (p. 443), but he does not condemn love restricted to the flesh as thoroughly as Pausanias does.

> The bad man is the common or vulgar lover, who is in love with the body rather than the soul; he is not constant because what he loves is not constant . . . 100

In the "Study" (Chapter VIII, p. 466) Lawrence expresses his awareness of the limitations of bodily love but he is simultaneously much more aware of its beauties, its possibilities and its importance for all of life.

The second kind of love, Pausanias maintains, treats the beloved as an individual, not as a mere instrument for the satisfaction of one's own desires. The importance of love as the recognition of the other for Lawrence, already stated in Chapter V of the "Study" is further emphasised as the "Study" progresses. In Chapters VII and VIII Lawrence also develops his thoughts on "marriage in the spirit" (the heavenly Aphrodite) and "marriage in the body" (the common Aphrodite), seeing the first as more male, the second as more female, as Pausanias does. However, both kinds of love are more complex for Lawrence; he sees a marriage of male and female involved in each. Female forces are allowed a spiritual dimension of which Pausanias seems unaware.

Erixymachus is a doctor, and he contends that his profession has taught him to see love at work in all things, reconciling opposites. Hot and cold elements in the body, wet and dry elements in the weather, treble and bass elements in music all need to be brought into harmony. Erixymachus misquotes Heraclitus - the philosopher who believed that the universe and all things in it were "maintained in existence by the simultaneous operation of contrary tensions" and "not only that opposites are necessarily co-existent and involve one another, but even that they are one and the same"[101] - and is in various other ways made to seem foolish. However, his central idea holds good and helps to build towards Socrates' conception of love; that idea is that love is a cosmic principle active in all of life. There is a heavenly love and a common love, but

> Both kinds of love then must be the object of our vigilant care, in music and in medicine and in all other matters, both human and divine, for both are to be found in them all. 102

Lawrence, too, sees the love relation, the presence of opposing forces, in all of nature and within the individual; "except in infinity, everything of life is male or female, distinct . . . . Every impulse that stirs in life, every single impulse, is either male or female, distinct, except the being of the complete flower, of the complete consciousness, which is two in one . . . " (p. 443-444).

The story of Aristophanes we have already heard. His view of love as the desire for the whole is modified by Lawrence in the sense that two lovers can never and should never be perfectly one and that the wholeness which we experience in life can never be absolute or permanent.

> In eternity, where infinite motion becomes rest, the two may be one. But until eternity man is man. Until eternity, there shall be this separateness, this interaction of man upon woman, male upon female, this suffering, this delight, this imperfection. In eternity, maybe, the action may be perfect. In infinity, the spinning of the wheel upon the hub may be a friction-less whole, complete, an unbroken sleep that is infinite, motion that is sheerly one. (p. 443)

The significance of Aristophanes' mythological, cartwheeling hermaphrodites is not that a woman is deficient somehow if she have no husband or a man if he have no wife. The meaning of the story of the hermaphrodite is that duality is not the final reality. Lawrence also believes this, but only up to a point. Although he believes in the ultimate reality of unity and reconciliation, he refuses to claim that our present life of division and opposition is not real, mere illusion. He is not at all sure that even in eternity the friction of the spinning of the wheel upon the hub will be resolved. "In eternity, maybe, the action may be perfect" (p. 443; underlines mine). His use of the image of the wheel and Aristophanes' reference to his spherical people turning around in circles, cartwheeling, both emphasise the ideal of wholeness, the circle being the oldest symbol for wholeness, completion.

Agathon's speech is chiefly highflown rhetoric, but he does add the idea of the important role of love in all intelligence, skill, poetry, and artistic creation. Lawrence develops his similar perception of the relation of love to the arts, the working of male and female influences together in all creative discovery, especially in his art criticism in Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study". Involved in all true acts of intelligence, skill and artistic creation is a mixture of receptivity, discovery (female) and of activity, formation (male). The further parallel,

however, which Lawrence suggests between the act of love and the act of artistic creation is the moment of consummation itself, the supreme moment of risk, adventure and discovery. The sexual act suggests the need for such moments, both physical and spiritual, as one of the deepest needs in man.

> The clear, full, inevitable need in me is that I, the male, meet the female stream which shall carry mine so that the two run to fullest flood, to furthest motion . . . . It is the arriving at my highest mark of activity, of being; it is her arrival at her intensest self. (p. 443)

It is at such moments of intense absorption, what Lawrence later calls in Fantasia "the discipline of the soul's full attention"[103], that the deepest discoveries of art are made.

Thus, Pausanias' insistence on a higher form of love than mere physical desire, Erixymachus' vision of love as a cosmic principle at work in the universe, Aristophanes' realisation of love as the expression of man's need for wholeness and Agathon's emphasis on love's influence on artistic creation are all included in Lawrence's complex definition of the meaning of the sexual metaphor in Chapter VI. We have yet to examine the speech of Socrates, however. We shall find that Lawrence's further thinking about love - which touches on spiritual birth, on the mystery of the final unity, on the bodily roots of all our thinking and on the nature of perception and of the individual psyche - relates interestingly to that of Socrates and challenges some of his conclusions in significant ways.

In Chapter V of the "Study" Lawrence has spoken of the second birth.

> So, when I am young, at eighteen, twenty, twenty-three, when the anguish of desire comes upon me, as I lie in the womb of my times, to receive the quickening, the

> impetus, I send forth all my calls and call hither and thither, asking for the word, the word which is the spermatozoon which shall come and fertilize me and set me free. And it may be the word, the idea exists which shall bring me forth, give me birth. But it may also be that the word, the idea, has never yet been uttered. (pp. 433-434)

He carries this emphasis with him into Chapter VI, insisting that the image of sexual love which he builds there includes spiritual rebirth quite as much or perhaps even more than the physical birth of children.

> That she bear children is not a woman's significance. But that she bear herself, that is her supreme and risky fate: that she drive on to the edge of the unknown, and beyond . . . . It is so arranged that the very act which carries us out into the unknown shall probably deposit seed for security to be left behind. But the act, called the sexual act, is not for the depositing of the seed. It is for leaping off into the unknown, as from a cliff's edge. (p. 441)

Socrates, whose speech is given in the form of a conversation between himself and a wise woman, Diotima, reports Diotima's statements on physical and spiritual begetting. Procreation, she tells him, is the way in which men must show their intense desire if it is to deserve the name of love.

> " . . . and such procreation can be either physical or spiritual . . . . All men, Socrates, are in a state of pregnancy, both spiritual and physical, and when they come to maturity they feel a natural desire to bring forth . . . . There is something divine about the whole matter; in pregnancy and bringing to birth the mortal creature is endowed with a touch of immortality . . . . The object of love, Socrates, is not, as you think, beauty . . . . Its object is to procreate and bring forth in beauty." "Really?" "It is so, I assure you. Now, why is procreation the object of love? Because procreation is the nearest thing to perpetuity and immortality that a mortal being can attain . . . .
>
> Those whose creative instinct is physical have recourse to women, and show their love in this way, believing that

> by begetting children they can secure for themselves an immortal and blessed memory hereafter for ever; but there are some whose creative desire is of the soul, and who conceive spiritually, not physically, the progeny which it is the nature of the soul to conceive and bring forth. If you ask what that progeny is, it is wisdom and virtue in general; of this all poets and such craftsmen as have found out some new thing may be said to be begetters . . . . " 104

Lawrence not only insists on a woman's capacity for spiritual procreation in a way that Socrates does not - "that she bear children is not a woman's significance" - but his emphasis is on the rebirth of the individual - "that she bear herself, that is her supreme and risky fate" - rather than on the production of wisdom, virtue, knowledge or poetry. Lawrence has made this emphasis quite clear from the first chapter of the "Study".

> The final aim of every living thing, creature or being is the full achievement of itself. This accomplished, it will produce what it will produce, it will bear the fruit of its nature. Not the fruit, however, but the flower is the culmination and climax, the degree to be striven for. Not the work I shall produce, but the real Me I shall achieve, that is the consideration; of the complete Me will come the complete fruit of me, the work, the children. (p. 403)

Diotima's preference for spiritual progeny is closer to Polanyi's preoccupations in Personal Knowledge than it is to the Lawrence of the "Study". Lawrence centres his attention on life as it is lived in the individual and stresses that our immortality grows out of our achievement of our unique selves. Then, we become something timeless, something absolutely new which never was before and never can be repeated. Out of this totally original being will come our original ideas, work, children, as we respond actively to our particular opportunities and limitations, to our individual calling.[105] What we are has its inevitable effect on all that

we do; the quality of a man's thought or work reflects the quality of his being - not in any simple moralistic sense, but in the sense of what makes for life and what works against it, enervates or deadens it.

Lawrence's central concern is with what men are and what they can be. The special unrepeatable nature of every individual was so important to him that he could never say, as Diotima does, that spiritual children "surpass human children by being immortal as well as more beautiful. Everyone would prefer children such as these to children after the flesh".[106] Lawrence doesn't forget that physical children also have the possibility of human immortality before them if they can achieve their complete selves. He does not elevate the production of ideas or poems over the production of human beings. "Of the complete Me will come the complete fruit of me, the work, the children" (p. 403). The work and the children both share in the full flowering of a man or a woman, which flowering is the aim of all life. When he speaks of spiritual birth he means no simple dichotomy between the making of babies and the making of books, the second a higher form of activity than the first. He is interested in a man's labouring to bring himself fully into being, a process which is not completed but only begun at one's birth in the flesh.

Lawrence and Plato (through the mouth of Socrates) not only use the love relation to suggest the possibility of a kind of spiritual procreation. They use it in their attempt to speak about wordless realities, mysteries which are beyond the reach of language. Socrates tells his friends Diotima's conclusion that "love is desire for the perpetual possession of the good"[107] and it is this desire which leads a man to the final contemplation of Absolute Beauty. W. Hamilton, in his introduction to the Symposium, writes,

> Plato's conviction is that it is the same impulse which prompts love between individuals (provided that it is something more than mere physical desire) and the search of the philosopher for truth or, we might add, of the mystic for God . . . . the terms in which Plato speaks of the felicity of the lover of wisdom when he has achieved what we may not unreasonably call the beatific vision is much the same as that which has been found appropriate by mystics of other ages and countries; we have only to think, for example, of the interpretation which Christianity has placed upon the Song of Solomon, and of the countless instances in mystical writings in which the individual soul, no less than the Church, is spoken of as the bride of Christ. 108

However, although human marriage or love may help Plato to speak of his "beatific vision", it does not do so in the full-bodied way of the Song of Solomon or of Lawrence's "Study". The reservations he expresses about human sexual love - suggested by Hamilton's demur, "provided that it is something more than mere physical desire" - weakens the force of the image and thus weakens the force of the vision of final unity and beauty. Lawrence, in stressing the powerful rhythm towards consummation of sexual love, not only strengthens his attempted expression of religious realities; he also manages to put some of the lost wonder of sex back into life, to enrich our daily living as well.

This difference between Plato and Lawrence can be better understood by looking at a passage from the Republic in which Plato speaks of desire, love and spiritual procreation in the ascent of the lover of wisdom from the world of sensible things to the vision of the Form of Beauty.

> Shall we not reasonably plead that the genuine lover of learning has a natural tendency to strive towards true being, and does not remain among the multiplicity of particular things which men believe to be real? On the contrary he goes on his way with unabated desire and unceasing love until he can lay hold of the real nature

> of each thing with that part of the soul which can lay hold of reality because it is akin to it. Then and not till then, when he has approached reality and entered into union with it and begotten intelligence and truth, does he enjoy knowledge and true life and nourishment, and cease from the pangs of travail. 109

Plato too easily loosens his hold on the particulars of human experience; he forsakes them as unreal. Although in the Symposium he is studying the nature of love, he fails to look closely enough at love as it is experienced between human beings. He speaks of love as "desire for the perpetual possession of the good"; however, human love does not involve "possession" of the beloved but a continuing relationship with him and a recognition of his special being. Pausanias stresses this fact at the very beginning of the Symposium, stating that true love did not use the other for mere satisfaction of its desires but cared for the individual nature and growth of the beloved.

The ladder of ascent which Socrates describes treats human love as negligible and disregards the responsibility of equal relationship with specific people. First the man in pursuit of true beauty falls in love "with one particular beautiful person". Then he comes to acknowledge "that the beauty exhibited in all bodies is one and the same; when he has reached this conclusion he will become a lover of all physical beauty, and will relax the intensity of his passion for one particular person, because he will realize that such a passion is beneath him and of small account". From this point he proceeds to love souls more than bodies, but he eventually abandons the love of an individual beautiful soul for a love of all souls in general. This love leads him to a contemplation of beauty in morals, in the sciences and finally in its eternal and absolute form. He spends the rest of his life in "constant union" with it. This is the

progression Diotima urges Socrates to follow, and she says that love will be his best helper in "the acquisition of this blessing".[110]

This is all very inspiring, but we are left wondering about the unfortunate particular body and particular soul which the ascending man once loved and then discarded in his search for ideal beauty. Did those other men or women have no reality, no special being? The question begins to arise, was Plato really trying to understand the nature of love by thinking as clearly as possible about the facts of his own experience? Or was he simply trying to write about the spiritual ascent to the contemplation of absolute beauty once again and decided to make love a servant of this ascent?

The ladder upwards is too simple a conception. It is here that we must look again at Lawrence's fourth reason for using the metaphor of sexual love in the "Study" (see page 267 above). It keeps the reader constantly reminded of the bodily roots of all thought, of the fact that our thought and the language in which we shape it would be totally incomprehensible to a disembodied intellect. Lawrence insists that in studying the nature of love we be true to our human experience, part of which is that two people who love each other never can fully merge into one in life as we know it, like Aristophanes' hermaphrodites. They must always remain two separate beings capable of a certain unity in relationship but constantly aware of the tension, the disunity between them, as well. Also, one can never completely possess another.

Socrates' blitheness in talking of loving all physical beauty rather than just one particular person makes him seem a man for whom particular individuals are not valuable and unique, but interchangeable

and dispensable in the search for true beauty. His discourse is that of a man who has never fully loved another human being and is therefore not qualified to speak of love in universal terms at all. A man who truly understood the ongoing interchange, the fine mingling of union and opposition in any love between two human beings could not speak of love as desire for the "perpetual possession" of anything or of the final love relationship between man and the Form of Beauty as "constant union".

The progression Plato describes is a very male one. The unknown world of another human being, a particular being in space and time, is ignored for the pursuit of generalities, love of an abstract beauty - "absolute beauty in its essence, pure and unalloyed . . . instead of a beauty tainted by human flesh and colour and a mass of perishable rubbish".[111] How are we, "embodied intellects", to perceive or appreciate such a beauty which, we are warned, will not appear to us

> like the beauty of a face or hands or anything else corporeal, or like the beauty of a thought or a science, or like beauty which has its seat in something other than itself, be it a living thing or the earth or the sky or anything else whatever . . . . ? 112

We can't. Neither can Plato. He is reduced to suggesting its nature by the image of human love, by speaking of spiritual procreation - human love and procreation, in which our experience is so supremely physical and particular! Even so, as I have said, he weakens the power of the vision he describes by uncertainly valuing, dismissing as "beneath him", sexual love.

Lawrence, however, does not eliminate the female opposition from his understanding of love, as Plato does. (That Plato was led to disregard the role of women in life and love because of the attitude of his time is

no excuse; he could have at least stressed the full opposing reality of the male beloved in any significant love relation.) Life involves no simple progression from disparate particulars to final unity and beauty. Just as the male and female balance against each other in marriage in a continuing polarity, an individual man retains his separate being in his contact with the greater reality (cf. the "Study", p. 471). His particular, individual nature is not illusion to be seen through and abandoned in the moment of vision. It also is real and exists in a real tension with the pull of the real unknown.

Lawrence's effective use of the sexual metaphor to jolt us into recognition of the bodily roots of all our thinking and of the reality of the particulars of our experience as well as of the wholes in which those particulars have further meaning, also leads him to a perception of polarity. There is a polarity between man and woman in marriage; this gives us an image for the continuing polarity between a man and the unknown which he would discover. Michael Polanyi speaks of this when describing the nature of discovery, the producing of personal knowledge.

> Action and submission are totally blended in a heuristic communion with reality; determinism and spontaneity mutually require each other when embodied in the universal and the personal poles of commitment. 113

Lawrence's awareness of these polarities leads him to examine polarities at work within the individual consciousness. It is here, in his study of the nature of perception and of opposing male and female forces within the human psyche that his discourse on love goes beyond the interests of Socrates' speech. We have seen how Lawrence's complex treatment of human sexual love in Chapter VI has given him a further

language in which to talk about spiritual rebirth and the religious mystery of unity, while yet keeping vividly before the reader the awareness of the bodily roots of all our thought and perception. In his initial thinking about love he examined ideas which Plato also examines through the speeches of Pausanias, Erixymachus, Aristophanes and Agathon. His thoughts about spiritual procreation and the reality of a greater unity beyond the division and opposition of human experience relate interestingly to those in Socrates' discourse, but they challenge Socrates' emphasis on spiritual progeny and on the life-destroying abstraction of Diotima's final vision. Finally, Lawrence's insistence on the bodily roots of all our thinking, on the reality of the particulars of our everyday experience, leads him to a perception of continuing polarity in human love and in the search for knowledge which complicates Socrates' figure of a simple progression - a progression which leaves particulars behind for a final merging into the whole, leaves human sensible beauty for a beauty so abstract that we cannot even conceive of it.

Lawrence admits that in eternity a human being may be able to share in such a complete, absolute whole - maybe. Until then, "Time, and Life, that is our field" and "We know that our view is partial" (p. 443-444). A human being can only see life from his own unique perspective, his position in space and time. Our chief indication of this limitation is our division into male and female; a woman can never know fully what it is to be a man, a man can never know fully what it is to be a woman. Each is an unknown world to the other.

However, a certain wholeness and completion is possible in their relation. Like the wheel of the poppy blossom "where the male seethes and

whirls in incredible speed upon the pivot of the female", the two can move as one.

> . . . it must first be seen that the division into male and female is arbitrary, for the purpose of thought. The rapid motion of the rim of a wheel is the same as the perfect rest at the centre of the wheel. How can one divide them? Motion and rest are the same, when seen completely. (p. 448)

"When seen completely", Lawrence says; but "we know that our view is partial" (p. 443). Is it simply inconsistency which makes him say at one moment that the "rapid motion of the rim of a wheel is the same as the perfect rest at the centre of the wheel", at the next that only in eternity "the spinning of the wheel upon the hub may be a frictionless whole" (p. 443)?

> In eternity, where infinite motion becomes rest, the two may be one. But until eternity man is man. Until eternity, there shall be this separateness, this interaction of man upon woman, male upon female, this suffering, this delight, this imperfection. (p. 443)

Which would Lawrence have us accept as the ultimate reality - dualism or monism?

The answer seems to be: both.[114]

The perfect wholeness of the circle, the wheel, is both a present reality (in the blossom of the poppy, in the consciousness of an individual) and a future possibility. The tense opposition between male and female, the friction of the turning of the wheel upon the hub, the disparate particulars of human existence are both a present reality and an ultimate, future reality.

Any full understanding of the "Study" involves a recognition of Lawrence's insistence on both polarity and unity. Perhaps it is not as impossible a position, philosophically, as it seems. Alan Watts in a little book called The Two Hands of God: The Myths of Polarity studies myths of

polarity in ancient religions. As he begins his discussion, he makes a distinction between the terms "duality" and "polarity".

> What, exactly, is polarity? It is something much more than simple duality or opposition. For to say that opposites are polar is to say much more than that they are far apart: it is to say that they are related and joined - that they are the terms, ends, or extremities of a single whole. Polar opposites are therefore <u>inseparable</u> opposites, like the poles of the earth or of a magnet, or the ends of a stick or the faces of a coin. Though what lies between the poles is more substantial than the poles themselves - since they are abstract "terms" rather than the concrete body - nevertheless man thinks in terms and therefore divides in thought what is undivided in nature. 115

At first glance this seems to describe the movement of the "Study" exactly. We recall Lawrence's protest that "the division into male and female is arbitrary, for the purpose of thought" (p. 448). However, the issue is complicated by the fact that Lawrence frequently uses the word "duality" as well as "polarity", and he seems increasingly insistent on the reality of division, opposition and total separation as the "Study" progresses. It could be argued that it is Watts' "polarity" which is "simple" in relation to Lawrence's "duality".[116] Lawrence's statement at the conclusion of Chapter VI that consciousness "is two in one, fused" (p. 444) while every other "impulse that stirs in life, every single impulse, is either male or female, distinct" might seem to suggest that the human mind, able to perceive wholes by an active comprehension of distinct particulars, unites in thought what is divided in nature (to rewrite Watts' final sentence above).

In using the image of sexual love between man and woman to suggest what the process of creative thinking is like in the individual consciousness, Lawrence is able to allow for both possibilities. The mind breaks

down, takes apart, analyses ("for the purpose of thought"); there is separation, distinction within it. But it also actively comprehends, discovers further wholes which meaningfully relate the particulars of experience; it synthesises. Such creativity requires the intercourse of female receptivity and male formative activity within the individual. Although Lawrence understands and appreciates both the analytical and synthesising powers of the mind, it is the latter to which he ascribes greatest importance. Man's finest discoveries have come from the power to see true relations, connections between disparate entities, events, concepts, and to suddenly recognise the whole which they jointly constitute. These discoveries have placed him in ever truer relation with reality and for this reason man comes to believe that wholeness as well as division tells us something about the true nature of that reality. The perception of wholeness, relation, reconciliation of opposing forces seems to be the greatest truth.

But, as both Michael Polanyi and Lawrence insist, there is no wholeness without the particulars which jointly constitute it. The parts may be seen primarily in their relation to the whole; we may have a "subsidiary awareness" of them while we attend to their joint meaning (of which we have, in Polanyi's terms, a "focal awareness"). However, the whole could not exist, could not be perceived by man apart from the particulars.

"That is the secret of life: it contains the lesser motions in the greater" (p. 441). Both Polanyi and Lawrence's thoughts on the nature of perception are similar to the findings of Gestalt psychology; Polanyi admits that his epistemology grew out of the discoveries of Gestalt.

Lawrence may have read Wolfgang Koehler's Die Physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und in Stationären Zustand (Brunswick, 1920) in the original German at some point [117], but seems to have been working completely on his own at the time he wrote the "Study". Also, Lawrence's use of the image of the wheel, the circle, in Chapter VI of the "Study" relates significantly to Jungian psychology, and Lawrence's exploration of the image predates that of C. G. Jung.

In studying recurring images in the dreams of his patients and in the rituals and teachings of different religions, Jung was impressed by the frequent use of the circle, a very ancient symbol of unity.

> From the very first beginnings of human society onward man's efforts to give his vague intimations a binding form have left their traces. Even in the Rhodesian cliff-drawings of the Old Stone Age there appears, side by side with the most amazingly life-like representations of animals, an abstract pattern - a double cross contained in a circle. This design has turned up in every cultural region, more or less, and we find it today not only in Christian churches, but in Tibetan monasteries as well. It is the so-called sun-wheel, and as it dates from a time when no one had thought of wheels as a mechanical device, it cannot have had its source in any experience of the external world. It is rather a symbol that stands for a psychic happening; it covers an experience of the inner world . . . 118

Such a circular symbol is called a mandala.

> Mandala means a circle, more especially a magic circle, and this form of symbol is not only to be found all through the East, but also among us; mandalas are amply represented in the Middle Ages . . . . For the most part, the mandala form is that of a flower, cross, or wheel . . . . The mandala is an archetypal image whose occurrence is attested throughout the ages. It signifies the wholeness of the self . . . . The conflict between the opposites can strain our psyche to the breaking point, if we take them seriously, or if they take us seriously . . . . If all goes well, the solution, seemingly of its own accord, appears out of nature. Then and then only is it convincing.

> It is felt as "grace" . . . . It represents the result of the joint labors of consciousness and the unconscious, and attains the likeness of the God-image in the form of the mandala, which is probably the simplest model of a concept of wholeness, and one which spontaneously arises in the mind as a representation of the struggle and reconciliation of opposites. The clash, which is at first of a purely personal nature, is soon followed by the insight that the subjective conflict is only a single instance of the universal conflict of opposites. Our psyche is set up in accord with the structure of the universe, and what happens in the macrocosm likewise happens in the infinitesimal and most subjective reaches of the psyche. 119

Interestingly, Jung recalls that during the years 1918 to 1920 he repeatedly sketched little circular drawings, mandalas, in an attempt to portray his varying psychic states and to understand himself more clearly. Only gradually did he realise why he was doing this. "It became increasingly plain to me that the mandala is the center . . . . It is the path to the center, to individuation".[120] Jung drew his first mandala in 1916.[121] Two years earlier Lawrence was drawing a similar exploratory portrait of his own consciousness, a kind of mandala in prose; he called it his "confessio fidei" or "Story of My Heart".[122] At least, the "Study" is such a personal attempt to discover "the path to the center", among many other things. It was a struggle to grow further into distinct individuality through the articulation of deeply felt beliefs and inner conflicts.

Jung, in spite of an emphasis similar to Lawrence's on human wholeness, also shared with Lawrence the perception of real conflicts within the individual and in all of life.

> I see in all happening the play of opposites, and derive from this conception my idea of psychic energy. I hold that psychic energy involves the play of opposites in much the same way as physical energy involves a difference of potential, which is to say, the existence of such opposites as warm and cold, high and low. 123

The parallels with Jung not only underline the psychological insights of the "Study" but also its religious ones, especially as these develop in Chapters VII and VIII. The spinning of the wheel upon the hub which in eternity may be "a frictionless whole, complete, an unbroken sleep that is infinite, motion that is utter rest, a duality that is sheerly one" (p. 443) is a symbol which has been important in many of the world's religions. The ancient Yin-Yang circle is an element of all Chinese religions; and, as Jung writes, "in Lamism and Tantric Yoga the mandala is an instrument of contemplation (yantra), seat and birthplace of the gods".[124] Lawrence sets the puzzle of the wheeling poppy blossom before us for contemplation. How can we have a wheel which spins while its centre remains absolutely at rest? Like the turning of a prayer wheel, whose "motions travel out to infinity" (p. 442), the thought of the "Study" circles out further and further. Like the echoing circles round the spot where a stone was tossed into a pond, the exploring movement widens yet never loses its focus, its centre.

The "circular" movement of the "Study" offers no simple pattern of unity, however. Tensions, divisions, particulars, discovered as the circle widens are insisted upon, not overlooked or treated as easily resolvable, mere illusion. Lawrence uses another image, again one central to many religions, to emphasise the reality of disunity and conflict. Jung neatly defines it in Memories, Dreams, Reflections.

> Hierosgamos. Sacred or spiritual marriage, union of archetypal figures in the rebirth mysteries of antiquity and also in alchemy. Typical examples are the representation of Christ and the Church as bridegroom and bride (sponsus et sponsa) and the alchemical conjunction of sun and moon. 125

Lawrence makes the symbol of the hierosgamos truer to our own experience by stressing the separation and opposition involved in human marriage more than Jung does, although the suggestion of unity is important to him as well. These two ancient religious symbols, that of the circle (unity) and of the hierosgamos, the sacred marriage (male and female, duality), Lawrence carries with him into the discussion of Judaism and Christianity in Chapters VII and VIII.

We have come a long way from Plato's Symposium, it seems. We have moved from philosophy to psychology to religion. Yet we are not so very far from Aristophanes' fanciful story of the spherical hermaphrodites who were split by the gods and longed to return to their whole condition. In that little tale Plato set forth the image of the wheel and of marriage, two symbols of duality and unity (for the wheel suggests polarity between centre and rim, and marriage suggests union as well as opposition), which Lawrence also uses in the "Study". Plato may have wanted his readers to take Socrates' speech more seriously than Aristophanes', to follow Diotima on her ascent towards absolute beauty rather than Aristophanes in his whimsical pursuit of the whole, but the artist in him conquered the philosopher and made Aristophanes' description of love the livelier and the more memorable.

Why such an extended comparison between the "Study of Thomas Hardy" and Plato's Symposium? The answer is that even in the ways in which the Hardy study moves beyond the Symposium it does so simply because of Lawrence's belief in the thinking powers of the artist/philosopher of which Plato is our supreme example. In an essay written in 1923 ("Surgery for the Novel - or a Bomb"), Lawrence stated his ideas about the relation

between the novel and philosophy more clearly than he was yet able to in the "Study". He criticised the feeble condition of the modern novel which was losing itself in self-consciousness and failing to face the future creatively. Lawrence's remedy for the situation required the reunion of art and philosophy.

> If you wish to look into the past for what-next books, you can go back to the Greek philosophers. Plato's Dialogues are queer little novels. It seems to me it was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split. They used to be one, right from the days of myth. Then they went and parted, like a nagging married couple, with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and that beastly Kant. So the novel went sloppy, and philosophy went abstract-dry. The two should come together again - in the novel. 126

Lawrence wants to do his most serious thinking in the novel. However, art and philosophy did "come together again" for a moment in the "Study of Thomas Hardy", which is neither sloppy, nor abstract-dry, but astonishingly compact, closely-argued, vivid and immediate. Lawrence's novelist's interest in Time and Life (p. 444) lead him into a discussion of the history of western civilisation, Judaism, Christianity and painting in Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study". Through close attention to various particulars of our common past Lawrence comes to a fuller understanding of the polarities he has described in Chapter VI, among them the distinction between the common and the heavenly Aphrodite, physical and spiritual marriage. The wheel of the poppy spins, the hawk hovers and circles ever more widely, yet never loses its hold on the centre - the centre being both Lawrence's own integral sense of himself and his interest in the novels of Thomas Hardy. That the widening circle is also the way in which the thought of <u>The Rainbow</u> is to grow and build and is the image

for Ursula's movement into full individuality, broader experience and adventure (two chapters in The Rainbow are called "The Widening Circle" - X and XIV) should come as no surprise. That the discoveries and thought of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" are all embodied in The Rainbow, which immeasurably extends and strengthens them, should not lower our estimation of either work, but should enrich our understanding of them both. After all, "that is the secret of life: it contains the lesser motions in the greater" (p. 441); and every movement bears importantly on the nature of ultimate reality.

Footnotes - Chapter III

1 Phoenix, pp. 249-250.

2 P.K., pp. 76-77.

3 Tess of the D'Urbervilles (London, 1910), p. 432.

4 Ibid., p. 423.

5 Far from the Madding Crowd, p. 166.

6 This statement is no mere evasion on Lawrence's part, but a significant psychological insight into the necessity of self-responsibility, an insight shared by current movements in psychotherapy.
cf. Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy (New York, 1963), 15th impression, pp. 171-173, 122-123.

> What matters . . . is not the meaning of life in general but rather the specific meaning of a person's life at a given moment. To put the question in general terms would be comparable to the question posed to a chess champion, "Tell me, Master, what is the best move in the world?" There simply is no such thing as the best or even a good move apart from a particular situation in a game and the particular personality of one's opponent. The same holds for human existence. One should not search for an abstract meaning of life. Everyone has his own specific vocation or mission in life; everyone must carry out a concrete assignment that demands fulfilment. Therein he cannot be replaced, nor can his life be repeated. Thus, everyone's task is as unique as is his specific opportunity to implement it.
>
> As each situation in life represents a challenge to man and presents a problem for him to solve, the question of the meaning of life may actually be reversed. Ultimately, man should not ask what the meaning of his life is, but rather must recognize that it is he who is asked. In a word, each man is questioned by life; and he can only answer to life by answering for his own life; to life he can only respond by being responsible. Thus, logotherapy sees in responsibleness the very essence of human existence . . .
>
> . . . it is impossible to define the meaning of life in a general way. Questions about the meaning of life can never

> be answered by sweeping statements. "Life" does not mean something vague, but something very real and concrete, just as life's tasks are also very real and concrete. They form man's destiny, which is different and unique for each individual. No man and no destiny can be compared with any other man or any other destiny. No situation repeats itself, and each situation calls for a different response.

Frankl's Man's Search for Meaning, Polanyi's Personal Knowledge and Lawrence's "Study of Thomas Hardy" (as well as the rest of his work, especially the psychology books) are interestingly read in relation to each other.

7 F. R. Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword (London, 1972), p. 80.

8 Fantasia of the Unconscious (London, 1961), p. 180.

9 The Mayor of Casterbridge (London, 1961), pp. 382-383.

10 The Return of the Native, p. 203; Book III, Ch. II.

11 Ibid., p. 207.

12 Quoted in Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (London, 1968), p. 410.

13 Florence Emily Hardy, The Later Years of Thomas Hardy (London, 1930), p. 119.

14 See Evelyn Hardy, Thomas Hardy: A Critical Biography (London, 1954), p. 67.

15 P.K., p. 69. See W. N. and L. A. Kellogg, The Ape and the Child (New York, 1933).

16 P.K., p. 70.

17 See P.K., Chapter 2 on "Inarticulate Intelligence" in Part Two, "The Tacit Component", pp. 71-77, and also p. 82.

18 P.K., p. 70.

19 P.K., p. 96.

20 P.K., p. 70.

21 Jude the Obscure, pp. 30-31; "At Marygreen", Ch. III.

22 To do Hardy justice, it must be mentioned that he was aware of Jude's limitations in this respect and, seemingly, of the fact that Jude's own personal knowledge was to lie in another sphere. In Chapter VI of "At Christminster", when Jude receives a letter from Biblioll College saying "you will have a much better chance of success in life by remaining in your own sphere and sticking to your trade than by adopting any other course", Hardy writes "he knew it was true". After the disappointment of the letter, Jude goes out to drink and then stands at Fourways, realising"that the town life was a book of humanity infinitely more palpitating, varied, and compendious than the gown life" (pp. 125-126). However, the book as a whole and especially the final pages, negates this perception and asks us to see Jude's rejection by "the gown life" as a tragically unfair one and as a major element in his misfortune.

23 The Rainbow (London, 1971), pp. 440-441; Ch. XV.

24 P.K., p. 329; S.M., p. 52.

25 P.K., p. 330.

26 T.D., p. 80.

27 S.M., p. 34.

28 S.M., p. 18.

29 cf. Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", Blake: Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London, 1966), p. 158. "One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression".

30 Barbour, p. 80.

31 The Later Years, p. 266.

32 Evelyn Hardy, p. 321.

33 Ibid., p. 67.

34 See for instance pp. 18, 24-25, 111 of The Later Years.

35 Quoted in Evelyn Hardy, p. 177.

36 See Evelyn Hardy, pp. 15-18.

37 Ibid., p. 18.

38 Florence Emily Hardy, The Early Life of Thomas Hardy (London, 1928), p. 192.

39 Evelyn Hardy, p. 73.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., pp. 39, 79, 78.

42 The Later Years, p. 121. These words are Hardy's; the original meaning of the word religion was "to bind together".

43 Ibid., p. 122.

44 Ibid., pp. 121-122.

45 Barbour, p. 108.

46 The Later Years, pp. 141-142.

47 Ibid., p. 142.

48 cf. P.K., p. 141.

49 Probably the most well-known account of Lawrence's failure to appreciate science is that of Aldous Huxley in his introduction to The Letters of D. H. Lawrence.

> His dislike of science was passionate and expressed itself in the most fantastically unreasonable terms. "All scientists are liars," he would say, when I brought up some experimentally established fact, which he happened to dislike. "Liars, liars!" It was a most convenient theory. I remember in particular one long and violent argument on evolution, in the reality of which Lawrence always passionately disbelieved. "But look at the evidence, Lawrence," I insisted, "look at all the evidence." His answer was characteristic. "But I don't care about evidence. Evidence doesn't mean anything

> to me. I don't feel it here." And he pressed his two hands on his solar plexus. I abandoned the argument . . .
>
> (p. xv of The Letters of D. H. Lawrence, edited by Aldous Huxley, London, 1932. 1937 reprint.)

In what follows in my text I suggest that Lawrence did not unthinkingly reject the theory of evolution but that he perhaps sensed how inadequate the theory was in significant ways to the full explanation of the available evidence. On Lawrence's attitude to science, contrast the passage from "Hymns in a Man's Life" (on page 246 below) to Huxley's account. See also "Introduction to these Paintings", Phoenix, pp. 573-574.

Hardy's acceptance of the theory of evolution along with certain of its implications about the cruel struggle for existence kept him from following through any new ideas. His interest in science was not an alert, growing one; he arrived at certain scientific beliefs early in his life and these did not change. See p. 25 of The Later Years and contrast it with the following comment from Ian Barbour's Issues in Science and Religion, p. 87. " . . . the idea of struggle and the picture of 'nature red in tooth and claw' seem in retrospect to have been carried to excess by Darwin's successors - perhaps in part because of the influence of the reigning social philosophy of competitive individualism. The concept was even extended to the 'internal struggle' among the parts of an organism (for example, T. H. Huxley's references to competition among the molecules of the body, or Weismann's later postulation of natural selection among competing particles in the germ plasm). Today greater attention is given to the sources of coordination and organization within the body and the structures of internal stability and harmony, which were neglected in Darwin's day. Moreover, the cooperative aspects of nature, such as the social behaviour of insects and animals, have been found to be as important as the competitive aspects."

50 P.K., p. 9.

51 Ibid.

52 See P.K., pp. 9-15.

53 See Fantasia, pp. 177-178.

54 The entry in the Oxford Companion shows an inability to rephrase the essential lines of the theory in ordinary language, comprehensible to the layman. The writer seems to have lacked the mental energy to think through the complicated aspects of Einstein's idea and perceive the whole conception; he is lost in the particulars and recounts those in a way which requires the reader to have some training in maths or physics in

order to understand them. For instance, what meaning can an untrained person find in statements such as "the theory so stated is borne out by many optical and electro-magnetic facts of experience" or "under this interpretation, space loses its Euclidean characteristics"? See Sir Paul Harvey, ed., The Oxford Companion to English Literature (Oxford, 1967), pp. 264-265.

55 Fantasia, p. 178.

56 See Barbour, pp. 395-399 on "Emergent Evolution".

57 Bernard Towers, Teilhard de Chardin (London, 1966), pp. 31-32. The Phenomenon of Man, although written during World War II, was not published until after Teilhard de Chardin's death (10th April, 1955) because of Rome's witholding of permission for its publication (Teilhard was a Jesuit).

58 Ibid., p. 32.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., pp. 32-33. These two forms of energy - towards simpler, more random states and towards more complex configurations - could be compared to Lawrence's Will-to-Inertia and Will-to-Motion. One could also compare Teilhard's idea that "everything, in some extremely attenuated version of itself, has existed from the very first" (The Phenomenon of Man, trans. B. Wall, London, 1965, p. 78) to Lawrence's comments in a letter (21st July, 1917; L.M., p. 518) that "the truth of evolution is not true. There is no evolving, only unfolding . . . . Man was man in eternity, has been man since the beginnings of time, and is man in the resultant eternity, no evolution, only unfolding of what is man".

61 Polanyi also believes that "the rise of man includes a continuous intensification of individuality", P.K.,p. 395.

For a criticism of Teilhard's work by Dr. P. B. Medawar, see the January 1961 issue of Mind. For a response to it see Bernard Towers' "Scientific Master versus Pioneer", The Listener, 15th April 1965, pp. 557-558, 563. Medawar's comments on Teilhard's Phenomenon of Man, in their heated, rather than cool, detached tone, are an interesting example of the kind of total personal involvement Polanyi remarks on in any important scientific controversy (see P.K., pp. 150-160).

62 T.D., pp. 46-47.

63 Ibid., pp. 88-90. See Polanyi's further discussion of emergence in the final chapter of Personal Knowledge, "The Rise of Man". Also see his discussion of the findings of embryology and morphogenesis (pp. 347-359 in P.K.) and the conclusions about evolution which he draws from these.

64 P.K., p. 159.

65 The Antichrist, p. 573.

66 Abercrombie, pp. 189, 188.

67 Ibid., pp. 209, 203-204.

68 Ibid., pp. 199-200.

69 Quoted in Abercrombie, p. 212.

70 Blake, Complete Works, p. 611.

71 The Later Years, p. 244.

72 Abercrombie, p. 223.

73 See Jude the Obscure, p. 414. Also pp. 296, 364.

74 See Arthur Mizener, "Jude the Obscure as a Tragedy", The Southern Review (Summer, 1940), pp. 193-213, for a discussion of the limiting effect this idea of evolutionary meliorism had on Jude.

75 The Later Years, pp. 167-168.

76 See p.231 above.

77 Phoenix II, p. 599. For further comments on Lawrence's attitude to science see J. V. Davies' footnote to Chapter V of the "Study", p. 42 in his edition, p. 430 in Phoenix, on the passage beginning, "Still further back, in an unthinkable period long before chaos, life formed the habit we call gravitation. This was almost before any differentiation, before all those later, lesser habits, which we call matter or such a thing as centrifugal force, were formed". Davies refers the reader to Collingwood in "The New Theory of Matter" in The Idea of Nature and Marjorie Grene's last chapter, "Time and Teleology" in The Knower and the Known. See also John Remsbury, "'Real Thinking': Lawrence and Cezanne", p. 136-137.

Lawrence's comments on life being unexplainable in terms of physics and chemistry in Ch. XV of The Rainbow and his comments on consciousness in Ch. VI, "First Glimmerings of Mind" in Fantasia can be discussed more intelligently by reading them in the light of Sir Francis Walshe, "Personal Knowledge and Concepts in the Biological Sciences", Intellect and Hope. cf. especially Walshe's quotation of the neurologist Hughlings Jackson; "Consciousness arises during activity of some of our highest nervous arrangements by which correspondance of the organism with its environment is being affected" (p. 290).

"Consciousness is not an unvarying independent entity." (cont. with quotation above)

78 The Later Years, p. 151.

79 Ibid., p. 44.

80 Jude, p. vii.

81 The Early Life, pp. 272-273.

82 Evelyn Hardy, pp. 254-255.

83 The Later Years, p. 51.

84 Ibid., p. 49.

85 Return, p. 203; Book III, Ch. II.

86 Tess, p. 416.

87 The Later Years, pp. 151, 44.

88 Allen Tate, "Hardy's Philosophic Metaphors", The Southern Review (Summer, 1940), pp. 99-108, pp. 101-103.

89 Although he seems to have felt something of Jude's predicament; see pages 250-251 above.

90 Jude the Obscure, pp. 22-23; Part First, Ch. II. The relationship between these two passages is observed by Evelyn Hardy in her Thomas Hardy, pp. 17-18.

91 Return, p. 484; Book VI, Ch. IV.

92 Ibid., p. 369; Book V, Ch. I.

93 Tess, p. 149; Ch. XVIII.

94 Plato, The Symposium, translated by W. Hamilton (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1951), reprinted 1961, p. 41. John Remsbury mentions the relationship between Lawrence's epistemology and that of Plato and Plotinus; op. cit., pp. 134-135. Similarities between Michael Polanyi's and Plato's thought have been remarked by Helmut Kuhn, "Personal Knowledge and the Crisis of the Philosophical Tradition", Intellect and Hope, pp. 123-126. These relations would, I think, reward further study.

95 Ibid., p. 64.

96 Ibid., pp. 59-64 passim. It should be noted that in Aristophanes' speech the original three sexes account not only for heterosexual relationships but for homosexual ones as well. If the original whole being was female, the two split halves became Lesbians, each desiring its other half. If the whole being had been male, the two halves became male homosexuals. The highest relationship, that with the greatest spiritual possibility, was, as Plato saw it, the male homosexual one.

97 M. Esther Harding, Woman's Mysteries, Ancient and Modern (New York, 1955), pp. 21-23.

98 P.K., p. 99.

99 Symposium, pp. 46-47.

100 Ibid., p. 50.

101 Ibid., p. 119; note 17.

102 Ibid., p. 56.

103 Fantasia, p. 91.

104 Symposium, pp. 86-87, 90.

105 Lawrence's insistence on the absolute uniqueness of every human being reminds me of the advice the painter Robert Henri gave to his students. "Don't worry about your originality. You could not get rid of it even if you wanted to. It will stick to you and show you up for better or worse in spite of all you or anyone else can do." Robert Henri, The Art Spirit (New York, 1960), p. 78.

106 Symposium, p. 91.

107 Ibid., p. 86.

108 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

109 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

110 Ibid., pp. 94-95.

111 Ibid., p. 95.

112 Ibid., pp. 93-94.

113 P.K., p. 396.

114 Stephen J. Miko in his Toward Women in Love honestly states the presence of both duality and unity in Lawrence's thinking in the "Study", but he explains this as a personal problem of Lawrence's. Lawrence had a deep desire for unity, but he had to define this "primal unity" in such a way "as to account not only for divisions between man and society but for the very diversity of a world full of individual objects" (p. 192). Miko explains that Lawrence has a great deal of difficulty in his attempt to "reconcile the two conceptually" (p. 192 - the "two" being duality and primal unity). Further, Lawrence too often, in elaborating his theory of duality, becomes "entranced with the drama of the conflict . . . . In his fondness for the drama we see the literary artist pushing aside the philosopher" (p. 193). I suggest that Lawrence was not quite so muddled about his needs as Miko's account of the "Study" would imply, but that he was very conscious of the concepts with which he was working and that one of the chief aims of the "Study" was to break through the duality/unity impasse in philosophy by showing that you can't have one without the other unless you distort your perception of experience unduly. It could be argued that philosophers who have been "consistent" by adhering to either a theory of duality (or plurality) or a theory of ultimate unity, have in their fondness for abstractions let the philosopher push aside the literary artist. cf. Lawrence's essay in Phoenix, "Why the Novel Matters".

115 Alan Watts, The Two Hands of God: The Myths of Polarity (New York, 1970), p. 45.

116 The way in which this is so will be shown more fully in the following chapter.

117 See John Remsbury, op. cit. pp. 136-137 for a further discussion of the relation of Lawrence's thought to Gestalt psychology.

118 C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (New York, 1933), pp. 163-164. As far as I know a complete study of the relation of Jung's thought to Lawrence's has not yet been done; the similarities are remarkable. One important difference might be noted, however. In Fantasia, Lawrence writes, "Most dreams are purely insignificant, and it is the sign of a weak and paltry nature to pay any attention to them whatever. Only occasionally they matter", p. 162. Dreams are, however, of central importance to Jung's work.

119 C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York, 1965), translated by Richard and Clara Winston, recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffé, pp. 396, 335.

120 Ibid., p. 196.

121 Ibid., p. 195.

122 See L.M., p. 298.

123 Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 120; Jung's suggestion of evidence in physics for his perception of opposing forces in all of life reminds us of Erixymachus, the doctor in the Symposium, arguing similarly from his experience in the field of medicine. If Jung wanted to carry this procedure any further he could look to mathematics which is concerned with "understanding exactly how alternative aspects of a certain set of conceptions are logically connected" (P.K., p. 186). The balancing of an equation in mathematics, the attempt to find alternative expressions of a particular conception, can be compared to the attempt to arrive at some whole view of man by studying him from different aspects (for example, mind and body) and balancing these "opposing" characteristics. cf. Barbour's Issues in Science and Religion, p. 7. "In general, 'either/or' dichotomies turn out to be not mutually exclusive competitors but alternative types of analysis useful in differing contexts." Looked at from this perspective, the "Study" could be seen as a kind of verbal mathematics, a conceptual exercise which has, however, a closer relation to human experience than mathematics does.

124 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 396.

125 Ibid., p. 395.

126 Phoenix, p. 520.

CHAPTER FOUR

Glory Be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost

(Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study")

Lawrence, while teaching school in Croydon, wrote a letter to Blanche Jennings (20th January, 1909) in which he was mulling over what art was and why and how he wanted to write.

> Machen - a writer to the Academy I believe - says that the touchstone of art is ecstasy - whatever that may be. I think he means crying about the mysteries and the possibilities. But 'ecstasy' leads to so much vapour of words, till we are blind with coloured wordiness. But I say, all mysteries and possibilities lie in things and happenings, and try just to show the flush of mystery in them, but don't begin with a mystery and end with a foolish concrete thing 1

Thus, even as a young man who had not yet finished The White Peacock or started Sons and Lovers, Lawrence the artist was committed to particulars, to art-speech. The commitment was to grow, and he expressed it more clearly in later essays, but it was present from the very beginning. To me, it represents the essential Lawrence and characterises his best work and thought.

We have seen in the preceding chapter how he was to suggest, nine years after the "Study" was written, that the proper language for the doing of philosophy was art-speech, that philosophy and the novel ought to come together - in the novel. The "Study" gives evidence that art-speech is also peculiarly appropriate for the doing of theology.

Lawrence ends Chapter VI of the "Study" with a call away from eternal truth, which is "beyond change or motion, beyond time or limit", back to "Time, and Life, that is our field" (p. 444). A man who is a body in space and time cannot establish and fix eternal truth, but can only

approach it, make partial discoveries about it, by a faithful and imaginative attention to the particulars of his own position in history, of his relation to a rich religious, artistic, intellectual and scientific tradition, for the purpose of responsibly taking his place in it, adding to it, challenging it and moving beyond it.

Lawrence criticises Plato in Chapter VII of the "Study" for emphasising eternal truth over the specific realities of Time and Life; his criticism is essentially the artist's of the philosopher.

> . . . the business of art is never to solve, but only to declare.
>
> There is no such thing as solution. Nietzsche talks about the Ewige Wiederkehr. It is like Botticelli singing cycles. But each cycle is different. There is no real recurrance.
>
> And to single out one cycle, one moment, and to exclude from this moment all context, and to make this moment timeless, this is what Raphael does, and what Plato does. So that their absolute Truth, their geometric Truth, is only true in timelessness. (p. 461)

Lawrence speaks of this "Abstraction, the geometric conception of life", this belief that "the fundament of all is the geometry of all", and calls it "the Plato conception" (p. 458). In producing "the geometric conception of the fundamental truth", a man "departs from religion, from any God idea, and becomes philosophic" (p. 458).

> Raphael is the real end of Renaissance in Italy; almost he is the real end of Italy, as Plato was the real end of Greece. When the God-idea passes into the philosophic or geometric idea, then there is a sign that the male impulse has thrown the female impulse, and has recoiled upon itself, has become abstract, asexual. (p. 458)

In the "Study", Lawrence tries to work with the "God-idea", to do theology rather than philosophy, because of its richer thought and

imagery, its comparative sensuousness, and, significantly, because of its recognition and inclusion of the female impulse. It is only later (for example, in "Surgery for the Novel - or a Bomb" in 1923) that he comes to insist that philosophy need not necessarily be "abstract-dry" but could enrich its thinking and increase its power by admitting the female impulse, by expressing itself in art-speech.[2]

In Chapter VII Lawrence describes religion and art as very closely related. The male/female opposition which he began to talk about in Chapter VI, the conflict between the will towards movement and change and the will towards stasis, perfect rest, are vital and necessary in both. However,

> There seems to be a fundamental, insuperable division, difference, between man's artistic effort and his religious effort. The two efforts are mixed with each other, as they are revealed, but all the while they remain two, not one, all the while they are separate, single, never compounded.
>
> The religious effort is to conceive, to symbolize that which the human soul, or the soul of the race, lacks, that which it is not, and which it requires, yearns for . . .
>
> Whereas the artistic effort is the effort of utterance, the supreme effort of expressing knowledge, that which has been for once, that which was enacted, where the two wills met and intersected and left their result, complete for the moment. The artistic effort is the portraying of a moment of union between the two wills, according to knowledge. The religious effort is the portrayal or symbolizing of the eternal union of the two wills, according to aspiration. (p. 447)

Lawrence's distinction here, his belief that religion is ultimately aspiration, unresolvable tension, and that art is a statement of knowledge, of a moment of resolution, is remarkably similar to Michael Polanyi's analysis of the relation between the two.[3] Both men maintain that there are important differences between art and religion and do not suggest

replacing one with the other (i.e., replacing religion with art). Lawrence's carefulness in stating these differences may have grown, at least partially, out of his response to Jane Harrison's little book, Ancient Art and Ritual. On writing his thanks for the book to A. W. McLeod in October, 1913, Lawrence said, "It just fascinates me to see art coming out of religious yearning - one's presentation of what one wants to feel again, deeply".[4] What he liked about Jane Harrison's book seems to have been the serious value which she placed on the position of art in life. Speaking of the contrast between the role of drama in ancient Greek and present day societies in her first chapter, she wrote,

> The theatre at Athens is not open night by night, nor even day by day. Dramatic performances take place only at certain high festivals of Dionysos in winter and spring. It is . . . as though the modern theatre was open only at the festivals of the Epiphany and of Easter. Our modern, at least our Protestant custom is in direct contrast. We tend on great religious festivals rather to close than to open our theatres. Another point of contrast is in the time allotted to their performance. We give to the theatre our after-dinner hours, when work is done, or at best a couple of hours in the afternoon. The theatre is for us a recreation. The Greek theatre opened at sunrise, and the whole day was consecrated to high and strenuous religious attention. 5

However, Jane Harrison's conclusions about the relation between art and religion too easily merged the one into the other. Her final chapter, "Ritual, Art and Life", tells us that ritual is a "transition stage between actual life and that peculiar contemplation of or emotion towards life which we call art" and that "ritual must wane that art may wax".[6]

> But we must never forget that ritual is the bridge by which man passes, the ladder by which he climbs from earth to heaven. The bridge must not be broken till the transit is made. And the time is not yet. We must not pull down the ladder till we are sure the last angel has

> climbed. Only then, at last, we dare not leave it standing. Earth pulls hard, and it may be that the angels who ascended might descend and be for ever fallen. 7

In the context in which this passage is found, heaven represents art. Jane Harrison is saying that the function of ritual and religion will be unnecessary once we have passed into the higher realm of artistic contemplation. Lawrence and Polanyi both insist that the essential purpose of religion is the sustaining of a tension which can never be resolved, that earth's pull will always be present and should always be acknowledged, as well as the pull of the unknown. Religious art especially witnesses to this continuing tension.

> Always the threefold utterance: the declaring of the God seen approaching, the rapture of contact, the anguished joy of remembrance, when the meeting has passed into separation. Such is religion, religious art, and tragic art. (p. 450)

In Chapters VII, VIII and IX of the "Study", Lawrence looks at religion, at the religious art of the Renaissance and at what was called the tragic art of Hardy's novels. For the sake of clarity I will try to follow each line of enquiry separately - first, in this chapter, Lawrence's thoughts on Judaism and Christianity; second, in Chapter V of this thesis, Lawrence's art criticism; and finally (Chapter VI), Lawrence's last and longest look at Hardy's fiction. However, this procedure misrepresents the movement of the "Study", in which all of these discussions inter-penetrate and inform one another, and the following chapters should be read with that reservation in mind.

"Art-speech"and biblical theology

I have said that the "Study" gives evidence that art-speech is peculiarly appropriate for the doing of theology, particularly biblical

theology; I shall explain further why I think this is so.

After the beginnings of historical criticism of the Bible in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the doing of theology became somewhat problematic. Dogmatic theology, although always concerned with themes of biblical writings, had to deal with the Bible in an entirely new way.

> The rich variety of biblical myth and narrative, poetry and apocalyptic, could not be forced into the static categories of the dogmatic theologian without doing violence to what the historian had discovered about the Bible in its setting.[8]

> . . . scholars have begun to order the material of biblical theology differently. Biblical theology formerly set out its subject matter in the order of dogmatic loci (the subject-headings of dogmatic theology) and therefore dealt first with God, his nature, his attributes and his works, and went on to the angels, then to the creation and sustaining in being of the world, and then to man, his original condition, sin, etc. This ordering of the material can properly be objected to on the grounds that the principal object of the study, the living religion, is dealt with inadequately. [9]

True biblical theology in the twentieth century, as the above quotations from Jaroslav Pelikan and Martin Dibelius might suggest, had to take more fully into account than theology had done in the past the biblical writings as literature and as the historical record of a living religion. It had to be sensitive both to literary analysis and to historical findings. Dibelius further emphasises the historical aspect of a modern theologian's work.

> Since the work of Schleiermacher an increasingly clear distinction has been made between 'religion' itself and its scientific and cognitive treatment, that is 'theology'; and in the present case it is quite clear that living religion, springing from the heart, is one of the main concerns of the Old Testament, while intellectual reflection about religion plays a comparatively small part. Neither the characteristics of the Israelite people, nor the period in which they lived were favourable

> to reflective thought. Thus, in order to do justice to the material in the Old Testament, it is necessary to lay all the emphasis on the religion to which it bears witness. 10

Therefore, says Dibelius, biblical theology necessarily becomes "the history of Israel's religion".[11] Lawrence's emphasis on approaching the biblical concept of God by trying to understand that which a people "lacked and yearned for in (their) living" (p. 446), by looking at their religious laws, their scripture and religious art, shows a similar attention to a living religion in space and time as the basis for theology.

The historical aspects of a theologian's job seem to have received more attention that its literary aspects, however. When Jaroslav Pelikan speaks of the role of literary analysis in the study of biblical writings he sees it primarily as textual analysis, similar to that of a Shakespeare scholar who tries to discover variant readings, the most accurate editions, the earliest and latest forms of a work. However, there is another side to literary analysis of which Pelikan seems unaware; he betrays this lack of awareness when he speaks of a certain article in Twentieth Century Theology in the Making which "may seem to be predominantly literary rather than theological and thus to be concerned with form at the expense of content".[12] The literary analysis of which he speaks is actually only a branch of history; the study and criticism of literature as a separate discipline would find the distinction between form and content much more difficult to make, would insist that in attending to one, many discoveries would necessarily be made about the other.

Pelikan, in giving his definition of biblical theology, does not mention the importance of such literary criticism. "Biblical theology

claims to be a way of thinking doctrinally on the basis of Scripture without doing violence to the assured results of historical scholarship."[12] However, this does not ensure that the theologian's doctrinal thinking will not do violence to the very nature of Scripture itself.

What is this nature? The world's great religions have centered themselves around a story or series of stories - Rama waging war to rescue Sita, the Gautama Buddha making a pilgrimage, Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt, Jesus rising from the dead. Lists of rules and dogma, books of commentary, have always been secondary, ideas abstracted from the stories (whoever reads Leviticus?). The story, the myth, the parable, is the original centre of a sacred text, whatever accretions have formed around it. One can see this in the first three chapters of Genesis; the oldest legend, passed down through the oral tradition, is in chapters two and three where God creates man before he creates the plants and animals and where Adam and Eve eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and are expelled from the Garden of Eden. It is a vivid story, full of suspense (will they eat from the tree even though God told them not to? Will their disobedience be discovered? How? What will happen then?) and believable and interesting characters (two humans who archetypically pass the buck, a subtle serpent, a Lord God who walks in the garden and confronts the self-consciously naked Adam and Eve). The later story in Genesis 1 gives a much more orderly, cosmic account of creation in which much of the force and immediacy of the earlier story is lost. Yet it also is still a story, one with a solemn and wonderful magnificence. Both have been powerful myths in the life of Western civilisation, and they persist in power today in a way that abstract discourses on the doctrine of original sin or on the theology of creation cannot.

In other words, they are forms of religious art. Because their meaning is given in art-speech, it is inexhaustible; such a legend or a parable can speak differently to generation after generation while yet maintaining a mysterious continuity. It is this variousness, this richness of implication and possible interpretation which helps to keep a Scriptural tradition alive, which calls people in every age to think theologically about it.

The theologian's task involves, then, not only the historical approach, or that of systematic dogmatics; it also involves a sensitivity to the special nature of Scripture as literature, as stories.

Late in his life, in Apocalypse, Lawrence told how his early nonconformist upbringing almost killed the wonder of the scriptural stories for him.

> From earliest years right into manhood, like any other nonconformist child I had the Bible poured every day into my helpless consciousness, till there came almost a saturation point . . . . Not only was the Bible, in portions, poured into the childish consciousness day in, day out, year in, year out, willy-nilly, whether the consciousness could assimilate it or not, but also it was day in, day out, year in, year out expounded, dogmatically, and always morally expounded, whether it was in day-school or Sunday-school, at home or in Band of Hope or Christian Endeavour. The interpretation was always the same, whether it was a Doctor of Divinity in the pulpit, or the big blacksmith who was my Sunday-school teacher. Not only was the Bible verbally trodden into the consciousness, like innumerable foot-prints treading a surface hard, but the foot-prints were always mechanically alike, the interpretation was fixed, so that all real interest was lost.
>
> The process defeats its own ends. While the Jewish poetry penetrates the emotions and the imagination, and the Jewish morality penetrates the instincts, the mind becomes stubborn, resistant, and at last repudiates the whole Bible authority, and turns with a kind of repugnance away from the Bible altogether. And this is the condition of many men of my generation.

> Now a book lives as long as it is unfathomed. Once it is fathomed, it dies at once . . . . Once a book is fathomed, once it is known, and its meaning is fixed or established, it is dead. A book only lives while it has power to move us, and move us differently; so long as we find it different every time we read it. Owing to the flood of shallow books which really are exhausted in one reading, the modern mind tends to think every book is the same, finished in one reading. But it is not so. And gradually the modern mind will realise it again. The real joy of a book lies in reading it over and over again, and always finding it different, coming upon another meaning, another level of meaning. It is, as usual, a question of values: we are so overwhelmed with quantities of books, that we hardly realise any more that a book can be valuable, valuable like a jewel, or a lovely picture, into which you can look deeper and deeper and get a more profound experience every time. It is far, far better to read one book six times, at intervals, than to read six several books. Because if a certain book can call you to read it six times, it will be a deeper and deeper experience each time, and will enrich the whole soul, emotional and mental. Whereas six books read once only are merely an accumulation of superficial interest, the burdensome accumulation of modern days, quantity without real value.
>
> We shall now see the reading public dividing again into two groups: the vast mass, who read for amusement and for momentary interest, and the small minority, who only want the books which have value to themselves, books which yield experience, and still deeper experience.
>
> The Bible is a book that has been temporarily killed for us, or for some of us, by having its meaning arbitrarily fixed. We know it so thoroughly, in its superficial or popular meaning, that it is dead, it gives us nothing any more. 13

I have quoted from Apocalypse at some length, even though it is a very late work, because this passage is Lawrence's clearest statement of what he believed to be the art of reading well and of his idea of a fruitful approach to the Bible. Either a rigid doctrinal or purely academic historical approach which attempted to fix the meaning of a Biblical story or parable defeated its own ends; it killed any live interest

in the scriptural tradition itself, putting abstract formulae or facts in its place. As early as the "Study" Lawrence was trying to do theology in a way which did justice to the special nature of Scripture itself - Scripture as the religious art, the literature, of a people who, although they lived and worshipped in space and time, recorded in art-speech their moments of aspiration, of vision and of loss in a form which still speaks in new ways to people who live in a different space, a later time.

The work of a theologian who rationally and systematically thinks through doctrinal problems in the light of Biblical texts and the findings of historical scholarship is an important one in the life of a worshipping community. However, this approach involves certain pitfalls. One can become too abstract, too exact and enamoured of the explicit, too removed from the essentially inarticulable realities of religious experience and from the concrete, vivid particulars of Bible stories and of daily life as it is lived in the present. On the other hand, certain dangers confront the theologian who attempts to relate the tradition meaningfully to his own age and to speak imaginatively rather than systematically or academically. He can, in attempting a theological art-speech, lose himself in private, fanciful interpretations of Bible passages, in play with "coloured wordiness" or jargon about "the mysteries and the possibilities" of religious experience, or lose himself in such total relevance to the present that the creative tension with the tradition is lost.[14]

However, there exists a long and solid tradition of imaginative theology which yet was marked by a close attention to the Bible and a willingness to work creatively with the words of the tradition - Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, Kierkegaard, Barth, are just a few who belong to

this tradition. Some of these men lived before the advent of historical form criticism of the Bible, yet their work still has great value.[15] Lawrence, for all his insistence on art-speech, his rebellion against fixed meanings and interpretations, his failure to do systematic dogmatic theology or scholarly historical theology, nevertheless did not invent a private mystical language of his own or play with jargon; in the "Study" he turned to the vocabulary of the Judeo-Christian tradition and to the Bible, and in this respect participates in the central tradition of imaginative biblical theology.

A few weeks after he wrote the "Study", he sent a Christmas letter to Gordon Campbell in which he spoke of the Trinity and of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. He had been reading a book called Christian Symbolism by Mrs. Henry Jenner[16] and explained his interest in the book and the subject of his letter in the following way.

> It is very dangerous to use these old terms lest they sound like cant. But if only one can grasp and know again as a new truth, true for ones own history, the great vision, the great, satisfying conceptions of the world's greatest periods, it is enough. Because so it is made new. 17

The old terms Lawrence used in the "Study" - Love, Law, Father, Son, Holy Ghost, Flesh, Spirit, Bride, Bridegroom, the Son of Man, the Light of the World, the Trinity, the Unforgivable Sin - shape his attempt to "know again as new truth, true for one's own history, the great vision, the great, satisfying conceptions of the world's greatest periods". It is a personal attempt, but in the process Lawrence manages to revitalise some of the old words and old concepts for others beside himself.

In Chapter V of the "Study" Lawrence spoke of the need for rebirth; in Chapter VI he gave an image of that rebirth in the blazing consummation of the poppy, the wheeling of the male on the female. The fertilisation which he described was not the physical act of depositing a seed, ensuring self-reproduction, but the complete moment of discovering one's true being, what you really are and what you can be.

> But the act, called the sexual act, is not for the depositing of the seed. It is for leaping off into the unknown . . . (p. 441)

The moment of consummation, the germ of rebirth in Chapter VI starts the whole movement of widening circles, of discovery, of finding and creating the necessary personal knowledge for the writing of The Rainbow and for the understanding of Hardy's novels, which the rest of the "Study" becomes.

The images of the wheel and of the mystic marriage are extended in the discussion of Judaism and Christianity and in the art criticism. Especially is the concept of the hierosgamos, the ancient religious recognition of sex as a great impersonal force, developed and stressed as we head towards the sexual disasters in which Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure were involved. Lawrence's emphasis on the religious aspect of sex is not new by any means, simply unusual in an age in which, as Lawrence admits, sex has become "only functional, a matter of relief or sensation, equivalent to eating or drinking or passing of excrement" (p. 445).

> In this case, a man must seek elsewhere than in woman for the female to possess his soul, to fertilize him and make him try with increase. And the female exists in much more than his woman. And the finding of it for himself gives a man his vision, his God. (p. 445)

This finding of a vision, such spiritual experiences of union with God, have often been expressed in erotic language. In primitive religions

sexual union was not simply a metaphor for spiritual consummation; it was acted out in reality through the sacred marriage, the hierosgamos. A woman was required once in her lifetime to perform the ritual of sacred prostitution. This giving of herself (it was necessary that the man in the ritual be a complete stranger to her) was not a personal act of love, but a dedication of her instincts to the gods, a statement that her sexuality was not her own but represented the demands of life upon her, the presence of a greater, non-human power which she must acknowledge and serve. The temple ritual symbolised the birth of a new individuality, the death of the woman's old ego, and was marked by a total abandonment to sensuality, the loss of all restraint, customary morality or inhibitions, the sacrifice of all that was personal or possessive in the sexual relationship.[18]

The sense that one's sexuality was not one's own, not a toy to play with but a great power to be accepted with reverence and responsibility, was very strong in Lawrence. It belongs to the kind of acknowledgment made by Tom Brangwen when he watches the stars on a winter's night - "he knew he did not belong to himself"[19], and with the deep sense of personal calling and responsibility which was the centre of Lawrence's religiousness. The concept of vital, committed marriage, both bodily and spiritual, plays a major role in Lawrence's theology and in his criticism of Hardy's novels, especially Jude and Tess. Lawrence's thoughts about Judaism and Christianity and about marriage in the "Study" to a certain extent grew out of his reading of Tess and Jude and were necessary for any complete criticism of those two works, since in both novels problems of sexual relations and of religious belief are central.

The problem of religious belief, for Angel Clare, Tess Durbeyfield, Sue Bridehead, and Jude Fawley, necessarily involved the question of one's relation to the traditions and thought of the past. In looking more closely at the Judeo-Christian heritage which these men and women shared, Lawrence is trying to comprehend the history of thought and belief which lay behind Tess, Angel, Jude and Sue, behind the new adventures and discoveries they were to make in the unknown, uncharted territory of their own precarious present. Since this history is also largely his own, Lawrence is also making a very personal attempt to understand and participate in some of the great gestures of the past. The coming to some meaningful relation with the great movements of the past is thus another major aim of Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study". As Lawrence wrote in Chapter IV,

> "Must I become one with the old, habitual movements?" says man. "I must, to satisfy myself that the new is new and the old is old, that all is one like a tree, though I am no more than the tiniest cell in the tree." So he becomes one with the old, habitual movement . . . . (p.425)

However, this attempt to distinguish between what is new and what is old is not an end in itself; it is for the purpose of making true newness, new living and discovering, possible.

> But, satisfied for the time being of that which has been and remains now finite, he wearies for his own limitless being, for the unresolved, quivering, infinitely complex and indefinite movement of new living, he wants to be free. (p. 425)

It is in order to more fully appreciate the special being, the "new living" of Hardy's characters that Lawrence turns to history, to theology, to the art of the Renaissance and to the problem of marriage. In what follows I try to show how very appropriate Lawrence's commitment to art-speech was for the doing of theology, how he understood the relations

and differences between religion and art, how his thoughts on the Bible and on the living faith of Jews and Christians drew on issues and on language which were central to the biblical tradition, and how he tried honestly to confront and solidly to build on that tradition. His imaginative theology is true to the special nature of Scripture in the same way that his imaginative criticism is true to the special nature of Thomas Hardy's fiction.

Before we begin to participate in the widening circle of these final chapters of the "Study", however, a brief discussion of Lawrence's attitude towards history is necessary, especially as it relates to his historical treatment of Judaism and Christianity.

A Digression on Lawrence and History

Professor Frank Kermode, in the process of discovering the dynamic of apocalypse at work in modern fiction, has levelled some severe criticisms at Lawrence's attitude towards history. In an essay called "D. H. Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types" he wrote, "History was for him a plot devised by the Holy Ghost".[20] In his recent book on Lawrence he says that in writing Etruscan Places, Lawrence had "to invent a history in order to justify a metaphysic or an aesthetic".[21]

Are these thoughtful statements based on careful reading? Are they fair to Lawrence? Admittedly a superficial reading of the "Study" or of Etruscan Places might give an impression of breezy, off-the-top-of-one's-head reflection, or, if one were looking for a systematic metaphysic, of "objective" historical fact bent to serve subjective doctrine. However, behind the imaginative thinking of the "Study" lies a thorough knowledge of the Old and New Testaments, an impressive familiarity with and sensitivity

to Renaissance art and to the paintings of Rembrandt and Turner, and a careful, thorough reading of fourteen Hardy novels. Behind Lawrence's writing on the Etruscans lay first-hand study of the paintings, the tombs and towns, and wide reading in secondary sources, such as Dennis' book on the Etruscans. How justified are we in tossing off Lawrence's work as if it were merely unscholarly fabrication, simply because he does not parade his knowledge in any obvious way and because he expresses himself vividly, with great personal force?

Kermode makes his case against Lawrence's view of history most strongly in a lecture called "Spenser and the Allegorists", given in 1962. He precedes his criticism with an important reservation.

> I ought to explain that I am here concerned with what I consider to be the shabbiest aspect of Lawrence's mind, its dark side; and I hope I may ask you to assume that I have a proper respect for him when, in his true vein, he celebrates life and quickness. 22

The force of the rest of the article seems to be that although Lawrence could not think, he nevertheless had a gift for sensing life and quickness; if we are looking for intelligence, Spenser, not Lawrence, is the one to read.

Kermode's aim in the article is a worthy one.

> My concern is with reductive criticism, which works by the abolition of contexts, by the sacrifice of the poem's presence to its radical myths and types. 23

He quotes from Mircea Eliade's The Myth of the Eternal Return, which speaks of "the conversion of event into myth", a procedure by which "archaic humanity . . . defended itself . . . against all the novelty and irreversibility of history".[24] Kermode sees this as a "retreat from event into fantasies of perpetual renewal which defeat the terrors of history, or provide an escape from history into myth".[25]

He contrasts Spenser's Faerie Queene with Lady Chatterley's Lover in this respect (an interesting comparison!) and the Faerie Queene, of course, comes way out on top. Spenser does not sacrifice "actuality, contemporaneity, to the archetypes"; rather, he uses the archetypes "in the expression of an actual, unique, critical moment of a nation's culture and history".

> He looks backward only to achieve ways of registering the density of the central situation . . . . He does not convert event into myth, but myth into event. His mood is acceptance; he welcomes history, not seeking to lose his own time in some transhistorical pattern. 26

In Spenser we find "a sense of the uniqueness of the moment celebrated; it acquires a timeless and unrepeatable quality, and the event transcends the archetype".[27]

Lawrence, however, fled "from actuality into the primitive".[28] He read Harrison, Frazer, G.R.S. Mead, Mme Blavatsky, James Pryse, Frederick Carter (anthropology, theosophy and the occult) and, says Kermode, "was more susceptible to than critical of ideas".[29] I have shown in my comments on Lawrence's response to Jane Harrison's Ancient Art and Ritual to what extent Lawrence criticised and challenged her ideas; he was far from accepting them in any unquestioning way.[30] Further, his "Introduction" to Carter's Dragon of the Apocalypse certainly does not suggest an uncritical susceptibility to ideas.

> . . . we ought to be grateful for a book like this of the Dragon. What does it matter if it is confused? What does it matter if it repeats itself? What does it matter if in parts it is not very interesting, when in other parts it is intensely so, when it suddenly opens doors and lets out the spirit into a new world, even if it is a very old world! I admit that I cannot see eye to eye with Mr. Carter about the Apocalypse itself . . . . for me the Apocalypse is altogether too full of fierce feeling, fierce and moral, to be a grand disguised star-myth . . . . One of the real

> joys of middle age is in coming back to the Bible, reading a new translation, such as Moffatt's, reading the modern research and modern criticism of some Old Testament books, and of the Gospels, and getting a whole new conception of the Scriptures altogether. Modern research has been able to put the Bible back into its living connexions, and it is splendid . . . .[31]

Lawrence's "Introduction" to Carter's manuscript was written in late 1929 or early 1930 and makes clear that at the time of the "Study" (1914) Lawrence had not yet read a great deal of "modern research and modern criticism" on the Old and New Testaments. However, it also makes clear that Lawrence had the kind of alert mind which could appreciate imaginative scholarship of real value and interest when he came across it and who was capable of intelligently criticising work of less certain value.

Nevertheless, in finding traces of apocalyptic language and images in Lady Chatterley's Lover Kermode concludes that in that novel we are given "despair and flight and unreason", whereas "Spenser is hope, acceptance and intellect". Spenser's work is an affirmation that men can "find in the present moment senses which are enriched, but not absorbed, by the ancient images".[32] The clear implication is that Lawrence's senses were too often "absorbed by the ancient images". Kermode elsewhere (in "Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types") discusses Women in Love in a way which excepts it from the usual "Lawrentian sacrifice of presence to type"[33]; there the particulars of history still dominate over the generalities and the escapism of myth. According to Kermode, in his best art Lawrence celebrated the uniqueness of the moment, but in his non-fiction essays and in novels which were marred by the too strong presence of his metaphysic, his "thinking", he abandoned the "irreversibility of history" for a personal fabrication - history as "a plot devised by the Holy Ghost".

In the Introduction to this thesis I commented on the inadequacies of a literary criticism which sees an artist's thought as something distinct, capable of being abstracted from his best work. However, there is an additional problem with Kermode's comments here. He is attributing to Lawrence attitudes about history, about symbol and myth, which even in his non-fiction Lawrence expressly contradicts. For instance, Kermode writes

> Perhaps there will always be enmity between those who believe symbols and archetypes to have value in themselves, and those who think it obvious that the value of a symbol, however much traditional significance it may accrete, is finally determined by its context. 34

He criticises Lawrence for using apocalyptic symbols in Lady Chatterley as if they had inalienable meanings.

However, Lawrence was very aware of the fact that the value of a symbol was determined by its context, although he may have had a wider understanding of the word "context" than Kermode. Let us give Kermode the benefit of the doubt, however, and assume that by "context" he meant not only the position of a symbol in a poem, play or novel, but its use in life, in specific situations by specific people, both in the past and in the present. Lawrence was almost Wittgensteinian in his insistence on understanding language and symbols not in any abstract, fixed way but in terms of the contexts in life in which they were used and had meaning.

Especially was this true in his approach to religious language. In the "Study" he speaks of man's religious effort

> to conceive, to symbolize that which the human soul, or the soul of the race, lacks, that which it is not, and which it requires, yearns for. It is the portrayal of that complement to the race-life which is known only as a desire: it is the symbolizing of a great desire, the statement of the desire in terms which have no meaning apart from the desire. (p. 447)

In other words, religious language has no real meaning apart from its use in a worshipping community or by an aspiring individual who is trying to express his deepest desire. Religious language and symbols can be used in art, but they are not art in and of themselves until they have been shaped and given meaning by their embodiment in an objective artistic statement.

The importance of grasping religious symbols in their full context was expressed by Lawrence in his letter to Gordon Campbell in December, 1914. An emphasis on giving symbols meaning only in the created world of a novel or poem can also be dangerous; one may be merely subjective and distort, confuse and weaken a symbol which has great force as it is situated in life or in religion. Artists do not use words and images which exist in a vacuum but which have meaning in their use in a language in a particular place and time. Art can do violence to life and religion quite as thoroughly as religion can do violence to art.

> We are such egoistic fools. We see only the symbol as a subjective expression: as an expression of ourselves. That makes us so sickly when we deal with the old symbols: like Yeats.
>
> The old symbols were each a word in a great attempt at formulating the whole history of the soul of man. They are unintelligible except in their whole context . . . .
>
> The crucifix, and Christ, are only symbols . . . . They mean a moment in the history of my soul, if I must be personal. But it is a moment fixed in context and having its being only according to context. Unless I have the Father, and the hierarchies of Angels, I have no Christ, no Crucifixion.
>
> It is necessary to grasp the whole.[35]

We recall Lawrence's criticism of Plato's thought and of Raphael's art, that they singled one moment and excluded "from this moment all context . . so that their absolute Truth . . . is only true in timelessness" (p. 461).

Lawrence concludes Chapter VIII of the "Study" with a criticism of all thought, language or art which forsakes its context, its particular situation in life.

> . . . whenever art or any expression becomes perfect, it becomes a lie. For it is only perfect by reason of abstraction from that context by which and in which it exists as truth. (p. 475)

Kermode mentions Eliade's The Myth of the Eternal Return, "the conversion of event into myth", to strengthen his argument against Lawrence's attitude to history. Yet in the "Study" Lawrence maintains

> There is no such thing as solution. Nietzsche talks about the Ewige Wiederkehr. It is like Botticelli singing cycles. But each cycle is different. There is no real recurrence. (p. 461)

Such a statement would seem to express something quite different from "retreat from event into fantasies of perpetual renewal which defeat the terrors of history". Of course, Lawrence could conceivably say such things occasionally about the unrepeatable nature of historical events or the importance of a particular context for thought, symbols, and art while simultaneously, in essays or novels, failing to practise what he preached. Kermode admits that in Lawrence's best fiction the unique, unrepeatable event transcends the archetype; it is the use of history in the non-fiction which is most suspect.

Let us look, then, at some of Lawrence's non-fiction writings. The history book which Lawrence wrote in 1918-1919, Movements in European History, is an obvious place to start in order to come to some understanding of Lawrence's appreciation of historical study. In his introduction he explains his book as

> . . . an attempt to give some impression of the great surging movements which rose in the hearts of men in

> Europe, sweeping human beings together into one great concerted action, or sweeping them apart for ever on the tides of opposition. These are movements which have no deducible origin. They have no reasonable cause, though they are so great that we must call them impersonal . . . . Logical sequence does not exist until it is abstracted by the human mind . . . there is no more reason for the Renaissance than there is reason for the singing of a blackbird . . . .
>
> All that real history can do is to note with wonder and reverence the tides which have surged out from the innermost heart of man, watch the incalculable flood and ebb of such tides. Afterwards, there is a deducible sequence. Beforehand there is none.
>
> Life makes its own great gestures, of which men are the substance. History repeats the gesture, so we live it once more, and are fulfilled in the past. Whoever misses his education in history misses his fulfilment in the past. 36

In this same introduction, he criticises the tendency of teachers of history to personalise the past to make it interesting to children. Since each age will inevitably interpret another in terms of the current personality, it is impossible to re-create the personal reality of times past. Such an approach is

> an insult to the past, which was not personal as we are personal . . . . It tends to shut out the strange, vast, terrifying reality of the past . . . . We must not make it too personal and familiar. We must leave in the impersonal, terrific element, the sense of the unknown. 37

Lawrence insists on the objective reality of historical events and on their unrepeatable nature. For him, one's "fulfilment in the past" required intense intellectual and spiritual effort on the part of the individual to recognise and to some extent participate in the various movements of discovery, growth and change that have shaped our present culture. Missing one's "fulfilment in the past" thus meant an impoverishment of life, not merely ignorance of certain dates and documents. It meant

missing great, complex and unrepeatable moments in the struggle of mankind, perhaps failing to grow in consciousness even as far as one's ancestors - let alone venturing beyond them - not having shared in, nor even heard of, the "great gestures" of life in the past.

Every culture seems to have felt this need to recall and retell its legends, its stories of great events, its memories of important revelations. Who performs this role of history teller in our modern society? Who can awake this sense of history in us, make it an integral part of our lives? - not the academic historian, it seems, or, at least, not he alone. Perhaps an individual and sensitive study of history, Lawrence, suggested, could begin to put one in living touch with the past, could result in a certain stretching of one's vision, a kind of mental, emotional and spiritual growth.

The commitment expressed in Movements in European History to the particulars of history, to the once-only nature of life's "great gestures" is what we might expect from a man who was committed to art-speech as the only truth, to the concrete experiences of life given us in Sons and Lovers, The Rainbow and Women in Love, rather than abstract generalisations. His aim was to "give us the things and happenings and try just to show the flush of mystery in them", not to "begin with a mystery and end with a foolish concrete thing".[38]

If one wanted to test Lawrence's attitude towards history further, one could examine his historical treatment of Christianity in the "Study" in comparison with the work of a man Kermode mentions, Joseph Campbell, a religious scholar and literary critic. Kermode rightly criticises the reductive impact of any simple relation of the conclusions of Campbell's

book, Hero with a Thousand Faces, to works of literature. He defends Spenser against such reductive criticism, protesting that the Faerie Queene "is not a decorated anteroom through which initiates pass on their way to some inner chamber where they will find the archetypes, or Mr. Joseph Campbell's 'monomyth'".[39] Campbell's careful study of the many different myths of the hero in the world's religions has historical value, helps us to understand the context of various myths and symbols in space and time; but any straightforward attempt to analyse literature in the light of his discovered "monomyth" involves one in the curious attempt to prove that basically all stories - all dramas, novels, poems - are the same.

The service which students of myth and archetype -- like Campbell, Erich Neumann, Esther Harding and, of course, C. G. Jung - can perform for literary criticism as well as for the history of religions is primarily, I think, a historical one, and one for which students of literature should be grateful. From them we can learn something about the specific ways in which myths and symbols have had meaning in the life of man, their actual context in history. The images and words a writer uses necessarily carry with them the resonance of their use in life in particular situations, both past and present. A writer can no more assign or create arbitrary meanings for such symbols in a totally isolated context, a work of art, than a reader can limit his responses to a work solely to what is given in it; he inevitably brings all the experience of his life to bear on his reading. Thus a true understanding of the history of many of man's ancient and recurring symbols as they took shape and found expression in the ritual of one community, the mythology of another, in religion, art and daily life can enrich the power of our writing and the sensitivity of our reading.

However, in the first great burst of enthusiasm when myth critics discovered archetypes everywhere and felt that the future implications of myth criticism for the understanding of literature were boundless, it was not yet apparent how reductive such digging for the archetypes in every poem, play or novel could be. The end result was to either reduce the work of art to a piece of evidence for the existence of the collective unconscious or to discover that essentially all works of literature were the same, or both. As Kermode suggests, such a perception is not helpful. We do not want to conclude that every novel is just another example of the "monomyth". We want to understand what is unique, irreplaceable about each work of art.

The value of such studies of myth, then, is chiefly a historical one. Campbell's Hero with a Thousand Faces is an impressive work in that respect, a wide collection of myths and descriptions of rituals from all over the world. Often, ways in which he includes the stories and practices of Christianity along with those of many other religions help one to step out of the Judeo-Christian tradition for a moment and see something formerly overlooked (because it was too familiar) from a fresh perspective. Yet, at times, Campbell's scholarly, historical approach seems to fade into something else, a wish to fit everything, the stories and symbols and rituals of all religions, into his growing pattern; and this can be seen most clearly in certain aspects of his treatment of Christianity. For instance, he struggles to interpret the Old Testament story of the fall as a "fall into duality", an interpretation which certainly misrepresents the central meaning which the story of Adam and Eve's disobedience has had in the context of Jewish and Christian religious experience. Campbell writes, "the removal of the feminine into another form symbolizes the beginning of the fall from

perfection into duality"[40]; but Genesis 2:18 tells us that "the Lord God said, It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him". In Genesis, the diversity of the Creation has God's blessing; the division into male and female, light and dark, firmament and waters, was not expressed as a fall from perfection but as a great creative act.

Campbell's distortion of a few small matters like this one in the Judeo-Christian tradition makes one wonder just how reliable his work is in other religions, which are unfamiliar to the reader and not so easily tested. To what extent has he misrepresented aspects of mythologies and rituals to make them fit neatly into the pattern of his "monomyth" of the hero's adventure?

I make this point simply to emphasise that a scholarly work cannot be made accurate or true simply by the presence of footnotes and an impressive array of information. It is the lack of these things which, I think, makes it easy for Kermode to say that Lawrence is distorting history for the purposes of a private myth in his non-fiction essays. Yet a comparison of the way Judaism and Christianity are presented in Campbell's "scholarly" work and in Lawrence's "Study" would, I think, show Lawrence's to be the more sensitive and more accurate understanding of certain essential features of these two religions and of their significance in history.

Such a comparison perhaps shows Lawrence's work to advantage too easily. However, it is interesting that Kermode, although he challenges the application of Campbell's conclusions to literary criticism in any easy way, does not think to question the worth or integrity of Campbell's scholarship; but he criticises Lawrence's work in which he says Lawrence shapes history to his own purposes. He does not even appear to take Lawrence's non-fiction

writings seriously as thinking at all, if we are to judge from his latest book on Lawrence. One might be excused for concluding that it is an absence of footnotes, bibliography, such scholarly trappings, which leads Kermode to question Lawrence's scholarship and not Campbell's, to not even think of their work on the same level or to realise that energy of thought and honesty are the essential criteria for determining the lasting value of intellectual work; footnotes can be used to serve the academic in much the same way that Bible verses can be used unscrupulously to prove anything at all by the theologian. A case can be made for believing that Kermode himself is "more susceptible to than critical of ideas", especially in the use he makes of Norman Cohn's Pursuit of the Millenium in his search for traces of apocalyptic in modern literature (I shall show to what extent this is so in the final chapter of this thesis).

However, to test Lawrence's historical honesty further, let us set his study of Judaism and Christianity in the "Study of Thomas Hardy" against a work on the same subject which is regarded respectfully as a vigorous, compelling, scathing account of biblical religion and Judeo-Christian morality - Nietzsche's Antichrist. Nietzsche's Antichrist is valued for its energy of denunciation and its imagination; Lawrence's "Study" remains relatively unknown. A reading of the Antichrist after the "Study", both works of imaginative history rather than painstaking, detailed research, does lead one to compare and judge them by real historical standards, and the Antichrist loses by the comparison.

Perhaps the "Study" is in some respects Lawrence's answer to Nietzsche's Antichrist or to his Genealogy of Morals. A year or so before Lawrence wrote the "Study", he remarked (in a review of Georgian Poetry) that

Nietzsche had demolished for us "the Christian religion as it stood".[41] Lawrence's work in the "Study", however, is the essential criticism of Nietzsche's work of demolition. Lawrence is in the position to challenge Nietzsche's conclusions because he, too, understands himself as a critic of Christianity. However, he forces himself to see much more honestly and fully the impact the Christian faith has had on our civilisation than Nietzsche does.

Nietzsche's pronouncements frequently do not bear up under scrutiny. Christianity, in insisting on faith, he says, discredits "reason, knowledge, and inquiry"; biblical faith teaches a fear of science.[42] Lawrence asks, if this is so why has man made his greatest strides in knowledge and science in the Judeo-Christian West? Nietzsche claims that the good God of the New Testament represents a real retrogression from the strong, powerful God of the Old Testament; "everything strong, brave, masterful, and proud is eliminated from the conception of God".[43] He stated this belief even more clearly in Beyond Good and Evil when he spoke of the relation between the Jewish Old Testament, "the book of divine justice" and the New Testament, "the book of grace which was full of the odor of the real, effeminate, stupid canter and petty soul".[44]

> To have glued this New Testament, a kind of rococo of taste in every respect, to the Old Testament to form one book - the "Bible", the book - that is perhaps the greatest audacity and "sin against the spirit" which literary Europe has on its conscience. 45

Lawrence, in the "Study", asks more thoughtfully why the New Testament has made such an impact on man since it was written, in what ways it contradicted and in what ways extended the thought of the Old Testament. Although he emphasises that a Christianity which denies its roots in Judaism and the

special force of Jewish faith and morality as expressed in the Old Testament is greatly impoverished, he also tries to understand how the writings of the New Testament opened new possibilities to the human spirit, in claiming that the religion of a race had universal validity, was available to all men.

Nietzsche writes

> Christianity has sided with all that is weak and base, with all failures; it has made an ideal of whatever contradicts the instinct of the strong life to preserve itself. 46

Lawrence accepts that Christian teachings have been at various times weakened and shaped to serve the purposes of little men[47], but tries to understand the essential demands of Christianity and concludes that it was very much a religion for the brave and strong in spirit, aristocrats who felt that life involved more than mere self-preservation. Nietzsche's idea of Christ is that of the gentle teacher who taught non-resistance and blessedness, union with God in this life. To support this idea he omits all elements in the Gospels which stress Jesus' rebelliousness, his sense of his own mission, of his coming again, his speaking of life after death, his angry actions and sayings such as

> Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I come not to send peace, but a sword.
>
> Matthew 10:34

Nietzsche explains all of these things away by attributing them to Jesus' followers, words put in his mouth by small men who were disappointed and vengeful after Jesus' death. He covers up this neat piece of manipulation of the texts by protesting about the difficulties involved in reading the Gospels, of picking the false from the true in the words and descriptions of Jesus.[48] In section 45 he lists various Bible verses as "examples of

what these little people put into their heads, what they put into the mouth of their master" and includes the passage on considering the lilies of the field among them.

> "But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you" (Matt. 6:33). All these things: namely, food, clothing, all the necessities of life. An error, to put it modestly. Shortly before this, God appears as a tailor, at least in certain cases. 49

As we have seen (cf. Chapter I of this thesis), Lawrence by no means ignores the force of the injunction to "consider the lilies of the field" as a contradiction to the very real demands of self-preservation. However, he is capable of seeing more sides of an issue than Nietzsche is and appreciates how this insistence on life as something more than obtaining food and clothing was a new and adventurous challenge, a call to a braver, brighter existence. In fact, a comparison between his treatment of this passage in the early chapters of the "Study" and Nietzsche's in the Antichrist epitomises the difference between the two works. Lawrence attempts to see what the best qualities of Christianity are as well as to criticise its limitations and one-sidedness; Nietzsche "despises" the Christian religion, feels that "the critic of Christianity cannot be spared the task of making Christianity look contemptible".[50] Which approach would result in the more objective work? Nietzsche makes a great show of objectivity, even scientific accuracy. He is fond of referring to science, uses terms such as "psychology" and "philology" to describe what he is doing, although, as his editor and translator Walter Kaufman points out, "the two Hebrew words he sticks in for effect do not make sense"[51]; one of these, his etymology in section 48 for "Eve" is backed up with the bold assertion

"every priest knows that"; however, an assertion that something is so cannot make it so if it is not, and Kaufman shows how Nietzsche's etymology is mistaken.[52]

One can appreciate the insights in Nietzsche's Antichrist - his distinction between the life and teachings of Jesus and what has been made of them by the Christian community, his insistence that one cannot "carry around a 'perfect soul' in a cadaver of a body"[53], his criticism of Christianity's teaching of the equality of all souls rather than of differences, inequality of souls, a proper respect for men who are the exceptions, higher, nobler, or stronger - while still objecting to his flippant, biased tone, his reliance on bold-faced pronouncements to do the work of convincing the reader for him, rather than rigorous reasoning, careful intellectual work or the giving of representative examples. He makes a pretence of scholarly objectivity while what he is really doing is manipulating biblical texts to serve his purpose, as unscrupulously as the theologians he denounces. This is especially true in section 45 where he lists verses which he does not believe describe the teachings of the essential Jesus - i.e. the concept of Jesus which Nietzsche can only arrive at by disregarding these particular verses. He gives no support or adequate reasons for eliminating these troublesome passages; he simply does not want to take them into account.

Schweitzer's Quest for the Historical Jesus has shown the pitfalls of such attempts to declare what Jesus actually was like, how easily the Gospels can be played with to support almost any description of his life and teachings; Schweitzer was so depressed by his study of various "Lives of Jesus" that he abandoned the quest and suggested that one could only

discover the true Jesus by making a personal leap of faith and living in Jesus' spiritual presence. However, later biblical scholars have taken up the new quest for the historical Jesus, somewhat chastened, much more wary, but determined not to give up so easily; they consider it necessary and important to study the biblical texts historically to try to arrive at some understanding of Jesus' life, even if only in the barest detail, and of his ipsissima verba, his very words.

It would be interesting to take one of the best of these later "Lives of Jesus", Bornkamm's Jesus of Nazareth and read it in relation to the Hardy "Study" and Nietzsche's Antichrist to see which conception of Jesus was closer to the essential, historical teacher, in the spare and unelaborated way that recent biblical studies have been able to describe him. I think in the comparison Nietzsche's quasi-Buddhistic Jesus would seem rather incongruous, while Lawrence's Jesus of the hard sayings - that one must lose one's life to save it, that to those that have shall be given and from those that have not shall be taken away even that which they have, that whoever loves father or mother more than Jesus is not worthy of him - would be much closer to the man which modern scholarship has been able to uncover.

I have made this extended comparison between the "Study" and the Antichrist not only because I find Lawrence's account and critique of Christianity much more compelling, sensitive, closely argued and substantiated than Nietzsche's and would like the "Study" to receive proper recognition for this aspect of its achievement (Lawrence's criticisms of Christianity carry much more power than Nietzsche's because he does not have to distort or do violence to Christian teachings to make them, because he insists on

Christianity's importance as well as on its limitations), but because I think it makes clear how Lawrence's work can be judged by historical standards and shown to be reputable, honest thinking, even if not faultless. Frank Kermode's criticism that Lawrence's "metaphysic" in his non-fiction writings turned history into a "plot devised by the Holy Ghost" is clearly unfair and could only have been made by a superficial reading of the non-fiction and by the refusal to even examine Lawrence's writings in relation to other historical work.

Kermode's insistence on the unrepeatable nature of historical events is shared by Lawrence. Lawrence examines the scripture, symbols and teachings of Judaism and Christianity in the "Study" precisely because they have been written, used and given meaning in a particular context, in a past which is unrepeatable; to fail to study them or participate in them to some extent is to miss completely some of the "great gestures" and discoveries of our human history.

Of course, Lawrence's attempt in The Rainbow to render a specific, complex, irreversible and unrepeatable moment in history, to show Ursula trying to face the present fully and unflinchingly, is the best possible example of Lawrence's insistence on what Kermode calls the rejection of the archetypes in order "to live in the existential complexity of a hard world"[54] (Kermode is fond of using phrases like "the terrors of history", "the existential complexity of a hard world" which tend to make him sound much braver than Lawrence). Perhaps one of the clearest statements of Lawrence's awareness that the complex present could not be sacrificed to an idealised past, to the comfort of myth, is in his "Introduction" to Memoirs of the Foreign Legion. He looks down from the retreat of a monastery

onto the railway tracks below, the world of "democracy, industrialism, socialism, the red flag of the communists and the red, white and green tricolor of the fascisti"; and the peacefulness of the monastery and the Christian past, the Middle Ages, tempts him profoundly. But he struggles with the temptation and concludes "I think one's got to go through with the life down there - get somewhere beyond it. One can't go back".[55]

This is escapism? retreat from history and actuality into myth? Professor Kermode, in his attention to "the shabbiest aspect of Lawrence's mind" fails to see that the particular qualities he admires in Spenser's attitude towards history are present in all of Lawrence's best writing and thinking. Lawrence was by no means content with the state of twentieth-century civilisation. Yet no words seem to describe his attitude towards history and towards the present less to me than "despair and flight and unreason". No words describe it better than "hope, acceptance and intellect".

God the Father (Chapter VII - "Of Being and Not-Being")

Lawrence begins Chapter VII with a statement which models all human creativity on the creative nature of the sexual act from which all new living creatures arise.

> In life, then, no new thing has ever arisen, or can arise, save out of the impulse of the male upon the female, the female upon the male. The interaction of the male and female spirit begot the wheel, the plough, and the first utterance that was made on the face of the earth. (p. 444)

The movement of the wheel describes human relations, art and religion as Lawrence understands them in this chapter. The image is still the poppy.

> As in my flower, the pistil, female, is the centre and swivel, the stamens, male, are close-clasping the hub, and the blossom is the great motion outwards into the unknown . . . . (p. 444)

The marriage is contained within the circle, but the circle turns and widens; it becomes an image of all human activity and especially of the integrity and growth of the individual. The individual must have a stable centre; "like a wheel, if he turn without an axle, his motion is wandering neutrality" (p. 447). Yet he must also grow and explore, move out from this centre. That this individual growth and integrity is expressed in terms of the relationship between man and woman should not lead one to misread Lawrence in any simple sense. The movement which he describes in the following passage as man's is precisely the movement of Ursula which Lawrence renders so sensitively in The Rainbow.

> . . . in a man's life, the female is the swivel and centre on which he turns closely, producing his movement . . . . The supreme effort each man makes, for himself, is the effort to clasp as a hub the woman who shall be the axle, compelling him to true motion, without aberration . . . . And the vital desire of every woman is that she shall be clasped as axle to the hub of the man, that his motion shall portray her motionlessness, convey her static being into movement, complete and radiating out into infinity, starting from her stable eternality, and reaching eternity again, after having covered the whole of time. (p. 444)

Before exploring these conflicting movements further, Lawrence insists on the mysterious, irreducible wholeness of the individual, a wholeness that goes beyond categories and abstracted polarities.

> But it must first be seen that the division into male and female is arbitrary, for the purpose of thought. The rapid motion of the rim of a wheel is the same as the perfect rest at the centre of the wheel. How can one divide them? Motion and rest are the same when seen completely. (p. 448)

He then follows this dual movement of motion and rest, of movement

around a centre of rest, through a process of progressive differentiation, "almost as though this differentiation were a purpose" (p. 431), which recalls his own idea of evolution in Chapter V. He speaks of a cycle dance of men and women which "becomes ever wider, ever more extended, and the further they get from the source, from the infinity, the more distinct and individual do the dancers become" (p. 449).

In Renaissance art he discovers the interaction of the Will-to-Motion and the Will-to-Inertia.

> The goal of the male impulse is the announcement of motion, endless motion, endless diversity, endless change. The goal of the female impulse is the announcement of infinite oneness, of infinite stability. When the two are working in combination, as they must in life, there is, as it were, a dual motion, centrifugal for the male, fleeing abroad, away from the centre, outward to infinite vibration, and centripetal for the female, fleeing in to the eternal centre of rest. A combination of the two movements produces a sum of motion and stability at once, satisfying. But in life there tends always to be more of one than the other. (p. 457)

The union of male motion and female rest is at the centre of the turning wheel, the widening circle.

> A bird in spring sings with the dawn, ringing out from the moment of consummation, in wider and wider circles. Dürer, Fra Angelico, Botticelli, all sing of the moment of consummation, some of them still marvelling and lost in the wonder of the other being. (p. 460)

Raphael expresses the moment by a geometric symbol, ◐.

> The picture becomes a great ellipse crossed by a dark column. This is the Madonna degli Ansidei. The Madonna herself is almost insignificant. She and the child are contained within the shaft thrust across the ellipse. (p. 460)

Botticelli's statement of the interaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces is not so static.

> To express the same moment Botticelli uses no symbol, but builds up a complicated system of circles, of movements wheeling in their horizontal plane about their fixed centres, the whole builded up dome-shape, and then the dome surpassed by another singing cycle in the open air above.
>
> This is Botticelli always: different cycles of joy, different moments of embrace, different forms of dancing round, all contained in one picture, without solution. He has not solved it yet. (p. 461)

Raphael's geometric symbol expressed a "conception of a long, clinched, timeless embrace . . . timeless consummation" (p. 463) between male and female. It signified the "absolute static combination" of male and female - in the wholeness of the individual; in the union between God and man; in the Old Testament idea of community where men were all children of one father, Adam, and were unified by race, in the flesh; in the monotheistic conception of God himself; in "marriage, inviolable marriage", "utter, interlocked marriage" in which "man and woman cease to be two beings and become one, one and one only, not two in one as with us, but absolute One, a geometric absolute, timeless, the Absolute, the Divine" (p. 463). Although this conception is of the relation of male and female and includes both, it is predominately female, static.

Then suddenly the male begins to withdraw from this static conception of marriage within the circle; it is too fixed, expresses too dead a certainty, no matter how, as Botticelli showed, the circle could widen and turn. Lawrence sees in the work of the Futurist Boccioni a statement of this withdrawal.

> The attitude of the Futurists is the scientific attitude . . . It is the forgetting of the old, perfect Abstraction, it is the departure of the male from the female, it is the act of withdrawal: the denying of consummation and the starting afresh, the learning of the alphabet. (p. 464) 56

The basis of this new alphabet is a new conception which Lawrence explores in Chapter VIII in the attempt to respond to a new kind of painting - the art of Rembrandt, the Impressionists and Turner, in which the balance of movement and stability is displaced by the interaction of light and shadow, pure colour freed from the restrictions of geometry, form and modelling.

> There is now a new conception of life, an utterly new conception, of duality, of two-fold existence, light and darkness, object and spirit two-fold, and almost inimical.
>
> The old desire, for movement about a centre of rest, for stability, is gone, and in its place rises the desire for pure ambience, pure spirit of change, free from all laws and conditions of being.
>
> Henceforward there are two things, and not one. But there is journeying towards the one thing again. There is no longer the One God Who contains us all, and in Whom we live and move and have our being, and to Whom belongs each one of our movements. I am no longer part of the great body of God, as all men are part of it. I am no longer consummate in the body of God, identified with it and divine in the act of marriage.
>
> The conception has utterly changed. There is the Spirit, and there is Myself. I exist in contact with the Spirit, but I am not the Spirit. I am other, I am Myself . . . .
>
> At last man insists upon his own separate Self, insists that he has a distinct, inconquerable being which stands apart even from Spirit, which exists other than the Spirit, and which seeks marriage with the Spirit. (p. 471)

The development Lawrence traces in Chapters VII and VIII from the containment of opposition, dual wills, within the unity of the circle to the building tension, increasing separation, until the old desire "for movement about a centre of rest" is gone and in its place is "pure ambience, pure spirit of change" expresses a new concept of marriage. There is no longer only the marriage in the body, the clinched embrace

described in Genesis 2: 24.


> Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.

There is also a marriage with the spirit for which Christ claimed greater reality since it persisted beyond this life as bodily marriage did not (cf. Matthew 22: 30).[57]

This is all very well, but what does this progression towards greater differentiation, separation, distinction, from monism towards duality, have to do with the history of religions?

In actuality, Lawrence's perception of this movement in time seems a more theoretical account of a historical progression in world religions which Alan Watts describes in some detail in a book called The Two Hands of God: Myths of Polarity. Watts talks about the"ultimate dualism" - the radical separation between God and man, light and darkness, good and evil, heaven and hell - which marks Christianity in the West and traces the development of this situation from the visions of polarity-within-unity of earlier Chinese, Indian and Egyptian traditions.

The ancient Chinese yin/yang symbol - which in many respects Lawrence's poppy wheel resembles - expressed the inner unity of opposites, the idea that the good of the world was "not the victory of good over evil but, on the contrary, the tense polarity of good and evil in perpetual conflict."[58]



YIN		YANG	
female	earth	male	heaven
negative		positive	
quiescence		motion	
darkness		light	
passive		active	

> In Chinese thought the essential goodness of nature and human nature is precisely their good-and-bad. The two do not cancel each other out so as to make action futile: they play eternally in a certain order, and wisdom consists in the discernment of this order and acting in harmony with it. The sage no more seeks to obliterate the negative - darkness, death, etc. - than to get rid of autumn and winter from the cycle of the seasons. There emerges, then, a view of life which sees its worth and point not as a struggle for constant ascent but as a dance. Virtue and harmony consist, not in accentuating the positive, but in maintaining a dynamic balance. 59

In such a world view there can be no serious conflict, the order of the cosmos is never ultimately threatened; all exists in a kind of playfulness. Yin, the female principle, and Yang, the male principle, "generate a world by playful intercourse".[60] Watts quotes a line from the Ch'eng-tzu, "the passionate union of Yin and Yang and the copulation of husband and wife is the eternal rule of the universe. If heaven and earth did not mingle, whence would all the things receive life?"[61] This "mingling" of the opposing principles which is so necessary to life is rendered in the yin/yang symbol by the small circle of the opposite colour included in each side; its meaning is that neither force ever exists alone - there is no pure yang or pure yin, nothing is either purely active or passive, in movement or at rest, light or dark, male or female.

In the myths of Hinduism the image of the Cosmic Dance, of the generative love-play between the dancing partners[62], is part of the central Hindu intuition "that the whole universe of multiplicity is the lila, or play, of a single energy known as Paramatman, the Supreme Self."[63] The statues of the dancing god Shiva, the destroyer, whose hand is yet lifted in the gesture "Fear not", and of Kali, the four-armed Terrible Mother around whose neck is a garland of human heads, but who is also the Good

Mother, nourishing and adding beauty to her creation,[64] force the devotee meditating upon them to accept both life and death, joy and pain, good and evil as part of the divine nature. Although an aspect of a god or one of his incarnations may be horrible and frightening, "the intuition of polarity, of the non-dual principle underlying all oppositions is so deep in the Indian mind that Hindu-Buddhist imagery contains nothing like the Christian Devil, even though it has its full share of monstrous and terrifying beings".[65]

Watts then discusses the myths of "the two Brothers" in the Egyptian and Zoroastrian traditions in which the polarity grows more intense.[66] In the opposition of the two brothers the conflict between good and evil, light and darkness, is carried on.

> The fact that the pair . . . are <u>brothers</u> intimates that there is still some recognition of the basic unity of the opposed forces. But, in general, as we move Westward from the Indus basin, the common ground between the two drops out of sight and the conflict begins to be a struggle to the death, fought in absolute seriousness. 67

The great influence that the mythology of Zoroastrianism had on Judaism and on Christianity[68] - "despite the strongest <u>theoretical</u> opposition of the two latter religions to the dualistic principle"[69] - helped to create what Watts terms the "ultimate dualism" of the Judeo-Christian world view.

> Despite the theoretical opposition of monotheism to dualism, the monotheism of the West became <u>ethical</u> monotheism - and evil is profoundly problematic in a universe governed by a single God both beneficent and omnipotent. If, then, one is to believe that evil is either an illusion or an expedient of the Godhead, there is no motivation for the strenuous effort against it which both Hebrew and Christian moralities demand. In a universe of ethical monotheism evil must then be considered as an effective and highly dangerous rebellion of the creature against the Creator. But the energy with which this rebellion is hated and opposed by those on the side of light can of itself

> endow the rebel with godlike power . . . the Christian concept of the Devil is unique, marking a total break with all polarized ideas of light and darkness, life and death, good and evil, as aspects of a single reality that transcends and yet expresses itself through them. Evil from this point of view has no essential place in the universe . . . . Yet every step that one takes in insisting on the gratuitousness of evil and the sole responsibility of the Devil for bringing it into the universe is a step in the direction of the final metaphysical dualism.[70]

Watts presents this dualism by a study of the Christian images of heaven and hell found in scripture, theological writings and literature. Such a world view is not without benefits to civilisation, as Watts readily admits.

> This absolute separation of good from evil renders our choice between the two an ultimately perilous adventure. While this enriches life with a dimension of earnestness and momentousness hitherto unknown, it deprives the Divinity of all humor and playfulness.[71]

This change, from seeing human life as only part of a great cosmic comedy or game to taking it quite seriously, has had an enormous impact on the Western world - on the value we place on the individual, on the quality of this life, on education, medicine, proper food, clothing and shelter, on art, on politics and on the importance of making moral decisions and ethical choices. However, such an ultimate choice "arouses the same sort of intuitive disquiet as all other forms of metaphysical dualism in that it leaves us with a picture of the world which, because it contains an element which is not integrated, fails to make sense as a whole". This unintegrated element unfortunately tends to include other qualities often associated with the "negative" side of a polarity; darkness, passivity, quiescence, the earth, the body, the female are insufficiently valued.[72]

Watts' response to this situation is very different from Lawrence's, however. He suggests a return to the Hindu idea of lila or play.

. . . the vast metaphysical schism which traditional Christianity proposes is redeemable only if there is a twinkle in the Father's eye comparable to the "fear-not" gesture of Shiva in his dance of world-destroying rage. The melodramatic choice between everlasting delight and everlasting torment, as also between taking it seriously or in play, is a test of nerve. There is ample precedent for this kind of thing in Holy Scripture, as witness the Lord's command to Abraham to offer up his son, Isaac, as a sacrifice. Obviously, the Lord calls it off at the last minute when it has become clear that Abraham is going to go through with it. The game involved is a celestial version of "Chicken".

The whole genius of Christianity is that by requiring its followers to accept impossible challenges it greatly intensifies human consciousness and self-knowledge . . . .

To be an orthodox Christian is therefore to enter into an intense adventure. It is comparable to joining in with a gambling game like Russian roulette, where the stakes are life and death. Only here the stakes are eternal bliss and eternal torture - the issue to be decided irrevocably in one short human life which may end at any minute. Furthermore, one lives in continual uncertainty as to the outcome because salvation depends upon avoiding the opposing sins of presumption and despair. The former is being sure that one is saved, and the latter being sure that one is damned. For once there is certainty, the essential suspense and thrill of the gambling game has been destroyed. What is more, it is of the essence of this game that one does not know that it is a game, that the original conspiracy between the Lord and the Devil be kept secret. But it is also part of the whole mystique of such games that there be occasional cracks in the wall, occasional opportunities to look behind the scenes and become disillusioned. In the traditional Christian world these opportunities were made all the rarer, and thus all the more valuable, because the mystic was in constant danger of being accused of heresy. Just as one must not be certain as to one's eventual salvation or damnation, there must also be doubt as to whether mystical vision is of the Lord or of the Devil . . . . To see through the game, then, requires somewhat more heroism than playing it, than taking quite seriously the stakes of Heaven and Hell. It involves the risk of the most awful blasphemy of saying that the Lord and the Devil are one 73

Lawrence, in his sensitive analysis of this movement from monism to duality taking place in the Old and New Testaments[74], does not accept such a simple solution. He does not say that "the Lord and the Devil are one" or discover a wink in God's eye. His insistence is that we have no answers, but must move into the unknown of "ultimate duality" with some continuing faith in our own wholeness and therefore in that of God's creation, a faith which permits us to live and act in what would otherwise appear to us a world of intolerable tension and division. We are involved not in a "celestial version of 'Chicken'" but in a complex present whose conflicts are real and important.

Watts does not seem to realise that the moment he suggests we play with the oppositions of modern life as if they constituted a huge cosmic game he undoes all that the "genius of Christianity" which "intensifies human consciousness and self-knowledge" has attempted to do - that is, to take life seriously and to struggle with one's whole being against evil. He takes a step backwards, retreats into the primitive conception, opts for play rather than significant struggle.

Lawrence insists that the increased seriousness with which we approach life and value the individual must not be abandoned but faced and accepted. This attitude towards the individual, his distinct, unique nature, is very different from the awareness of most Eastern or primitive cultures where the individual has counted for relatively little and found his meaning primarily in performing the role he was assigned in society. As the impact of our Western belief in the value of the individual is increasingly felt in the East, a confusion grows and a disruption of ancient, accepted patterns of life begins to take place - the most obvious

example of this is the continuing breakdown of the caste system in India. As unsettling and destructive as this process might be at times, it seems as if there is no going back on it. Lawrence, observing it, reflects on this movement of progressive differentiation "almost as though it were a Purpose," and looks for a way to go forward with it.

Lawrence's perception of polarity, his belief that the religious effort of man is to recover the balance whenever one side of the opposition, male or female, Will-to-Motion or Will-to-Inertia, triumphs too completely over the other, seems remarkably similar to the conception embodied in the yin-yang symbol. However, the image Lawrence uses for this idea is different from the ancient Chinese one in a very important way - the poppy is alive, it is rooted in life, a living, changing, growing reality, not an abstract "geometric symbol of the consummation of life". The movement Lawrence discovers in it can express increasing tension, extension, is responsive to change.

In a later essay, "The Crown", begun only a few months after the "Study" was completed, and in ways a reworking of the "Study", Lawrence wrote, "it is the fight of opposites which is holy".[75] The fight is a real struggle, however, no mere dance or game; and the struggle makes for growth and creativity. The idea is very similar to Blake's in "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell".

> Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence.
>
> From these contraries spring what the religious call Good and Evil. Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing from Energy.
>
> Good is Heaven, Evil is Hell.[76]

The concept of the creative interaction of opposites is a very ancient one, present not only in the Chinese yin-yang, but in most primitive religions and in the visions of Christian mystics. The structure of most ancient creation myths expresses this idea. First there is "the framing of the world stage of space" and then comes "the production of life within the frame: life polarized for self-reproduction under the dual form of the male and female".[77] The continuation of life requires these polarities, but our participation in them is understood as removing us from perfection, keeping us from union with the divine. Only mystics or the heroes of myth have been able to see beyond the division.

> The "Wall of Paradise", which conceals God from human sight, is described by Nicholas of Cusa as constituted of the "coincidence of opposites", its gate being guarded by "the highest spirit of reason, who bars the way until he has been overcome". The pairs of opposites (being and not being, life and death, beauty and ugliness, good and evil, and all the other polarities that bind the faculties to hope and fear, and link the organs of action to deeds of defense and acquisition) are the clashing rocks (Symplegades) that crush the traveler, but between which the heroes always pass. This is a motif known throughout the world. 78

Lawrence's belief in the holy "fight of opposites" is very similar to these ancient ones, but he is much more Judeo-Christian in his understanding of and response to evil. He does not see good and evil participating in this struggle between opposites, where both good and evil have a place in creation. Lawrence removes evil entirely from this conception and takes it very seriously indeed. The tension between opposing forces is life itself, it is the maintaining of an honest, alert relation to one's fellows and to one's "circumambient universe".[79] Evil is the denial of this living tension, substituting in its place a neutralised average or a mechanical process; evil is anti-life. Lawrence expresses his feeling strongly against such

denial of life as opposed to the recognition of unique differences, extremes (not only between male and female, movement and stability, but between all things - religions, for instance, the special character of Judaism or of Christianity, and especially individuals, like Sue Bridehead) not only in the "Study" (see the conclusion of Chapter IX) but also in "The Crown" and Twilight in Italy, two other non-fiction works written about the same time. This perception of the nature of evil persisted in his later work; it is present in St. Mawr and in Last Poems, as in the poem "Death is not Evil, Evil is Mechanical".

Evil for Lawrence was something to be taken very seriously indeed as a threat to the health of God's creation; it was to be resisted with one's whole being. Denial of multiplicity, differences, in life and the deadening of live tensions was not merely a matter of ignorance, a lack of wisdom, but something much more dangerous with much greater destructive power. Lawrence makes his deep sense of this danger to life felt in his defense of Sue Bridehead in Jude the Obscure at the end of Chapter IX.

> Sue had a being, special and beautiful. Why must not Jude recognize it in all its speciality? Why must man be so utterly irreverent, that he approaches each being as if it were no-being? Why must it be assumed that Sue is an "ordinary" woman - as if such a thing existed? Why must she feel ashamed if she is specialized? And why must Jude, owing to the conception he is brought up in, force her to act as if she were his "ordinary" abstraction, a woman? 80
>
> She was not a woman. She was Sue Bridehead, something very particular. Why was there no place for her? Cassandra had the Temple of Apollo. Why are we so foul that we have no reverence for that which we are and for that which is amongst us? If we had reverence for our life, our life would take at once religious form. But as it is, in our filthy irreverence, it remains a disgusting slough, where each one of us goes so

> thoroughly disguised in dirt that we are all alike and indistinguishable. (p. 510)

What does this conception of the interaction of opposing forces and of the nature of evil, that which is anti-life, have to do with Lawrence's discussion of God the Father in Chapter VII of the "Study"? The answer can be partly suggested by a passage from Twilight in Italy; the chapter from which the following quotation is taken, "The Lemon Gardens", was first written approximately six months before the "Study" was begun, in late January 1913. It was rewritten for book publication by the autumn of 1915.[81]

> It is past the time to cease seeking one Infinite, ignoring, striving to eliminate the other. The Infinite is twofold, the Father and the Son, the Dark and the Light, the Senses and the Mind, the Soul and the Spirit, the self and the not-self, the Eagle and the Dove, the Tiger and the Lamb. The consummation of man is twofold, in the Self and in Selflessness . . . . They are two Infinites, twofold approach to God. And man must know both.
>
> But he must never confuse them. They are eternally separate. The lion shall never lie down with the lamb. The lion eternally shall devour the lamb, the lamb eternally shall be devoured. Man knows the great consummation in the flesh, the sensual ecstasy, and that is eternal. Also the spiritual ecstasy of unanimity, that is eternal. But the two are separate and never to be confused. To neutralize the one with the other is unthinkable, an abomination. Confusion is horror and nothingness.
>
> The two Infinites, negative and positive, they are always related, but they are never identical. They are always opposite, but there exists a relation between them. This is the Holy Ghost of the Christian Trinity. And it is this, the relation which is established between the two Infinites, the two natures of God, which we have transgressed, forgotten, sinned against. The Father is the Father, and the Son is the Son. I may know the Son and deny the Father, or know the Father and deny the Son. But that which I may never deny, and which I have denied, is the Holy Ghost which relates the dual Infinites into One whole, which relates and keeps distinct the dual natures of God. To say that the two are one, this is

> the inadmissible lie. The two are related, by the intervention of the Third, into a Oneness . . . . And in the Holy Spirit I know the Two Ways, the Two Infinites, the Two Consummations. And knowing the Two, I admit the Whole. But excluding One, I exclude the Whole. And confusing the two, I make nullity, nihil. 82

Lawrence insists on recognising the special qualities in people and things, emphasising differences; this is what makes for vividness, for colour and interest and sensitivity in life, a delicate, clear discrimination and appreciation of how one thing is unlike another. To neutralise or confuse one thing with another, to see as alike things which each have a unique nature, to merge into one that which is distinctly two or more, all lead to an impoverishment of life; it removes or overlooks or does violence to unrepeatable, never before, never again individual qualities.

Lawrence's procedure, then, in understanding Judaism and Christianity in the "Study" is to single out the essential differences between them, to make distinct two things which had been intermingled in his mind before in order to be able to see them in clearer and more fruitful relation. He dislikes muddled, unclear relations, a grey abstracted average, the "twilight" quality he describes in Twilight in Italy. Therefore, he attempts to separate Judaism and Christianity as much as he is able, to distinguish the special qualities of each and then to explore the implications of these qualities by carrying them to their logical extremes. In doing this, he makes clear the necessity for a creative relation between them; his presentation of the unique characteristics of each religion apart from the other, carried to its extreme in isolation, makes the reader so uncomfortable, so aware of the impossibility of choosing one extreme to the exclusion of the other, that he is forced to admit and appreciate both.

Lawrence's rigorous analysis is carried out with this creative, clarified synthesis in mind.[83]

In Chapter VII Lawrence expresses his understanding of the special nature of Judaism, his appreciation of the religious art of the Old Testament and of the peculiar deep satisfaction to be had from Hebrew morality. The title of the chapter, "Of Being and Not-Being", suggests his criticism of Christianity, the Christian extreme of "Not-Being". Lawrence must have been familiar, from his own Nonconformist upbringing, with the usual Protestant stereotype of Judaism as the religion of law. Judaism, young children are told in badly taught Sunday School classes, consisted entirely of a rigid code of laws which it was impossible for man to keep; hence, he was locked in sin either by his total inability to obey the laws or by false self-righteousness because he had succeeded in keeping up the appearance of obeying them. The only release from this prison of the Judaic Law was Jesus Christ, who preached Love and God's grace and forgiveness.

The implication of this attitude was always that Judaism was an incomplete and impossible religion (and <u>still</u> was) and could only be completed by the coming of Christ, the announcement of God's grace and love. Such an attitude made unconverted Jews a great puzzle and irritant to the Christian imagination, which found the persistance of these misguided people beyond understanding; yet this arrogant view could only be maintained by ignoring the ever-present emphasis on God's love and His patience in forgiveness throughout the Old Testament (for instance, see Deut. 6: 4-7 and the whole book of Hosea, esp. 3: 1) and the challenge to the letter of the law present in the prophetic books (as in Isaiah 56: 3-5; cf. Hosea 6: 6).

Lawrence acknowledges that there is an element of truth in the perception of Judaism as a religion of Law, especially in comparison to Christianity. However, he felt that the Protestant stereotype was an inadequate appreciation of Old Testament law which was not just restrictive, but a "physical morality, deep and fundamental . . . wonderful and satisfying in a large measure" (pp. 450-451).

Before he goes on to discuss Judaism, Lawrence makes a few comments about the nature of religion.

> . . . the attributes of God will reveal that which man lacked and yearned for in his living. And these attributes are always, in their essence, Eternality, Infinity, Immutability . . . . each man according to his need must have a God, an idea, that shall compel him to the movement of his own being . . . . And he must at last always call God the unutterable and the inexpressible, the unknowable, because it is his unrealized complement.
>
> But all gods have some attributes in common. They are the unexpressed Absolute: eternal, infinite, unchanging . . . . . . life consists in the dual form of the Will-to-Motion and the Will-to-Inertia, and everything we see and know and are is the resultant of these two Wills. But the One Will, of which they are dual forms, that is as yet unthinkable . . . .
>
> Since there is never to be found a perfect balance or accord of the two Wills, but always one triumphs over the other, in life, according to our knowledge, so must the human effort be always to recover balance, to symbolize and so to possess that which is missing. Which is the religious effort of Man. (pp. 445-447)

Lawrence is not positing a God who is merely the result of wishful thinking or a "God of the gaps"; he sees man's religious effort as a serious struggle to gain wholeness, to open oneself more fully to the demands of life, to see beyond the narrow bounds of one's own qualities or the qualities of one's race to other possibilities. He here makes clear his awareness that <u>all</u> religions involve both male and female characteristics, both wills toward

movement and stability, to some extent. His analysis of one at the expense of the other is a matter of emphasis. There is an element of paradox, of mystery, in any powerful or lasting faith. As we have seen, most ancient religions have insisted on the acceptance of opposing principles in the universe. The Hindu Shiva dances his dance of destruction while holding his hand in the gesture "Fear not". Buddhism, while preaching nirvana and renunciation of the world, gives a place of high honour to the compassionate Bodhisattva who renounces nirvana to help others attain it. Lawrence knows that this kind of richness characterises Judaism and Christianity as well, even when they are held separate from each other. The force of the "Study", however, is to convey how much richer both Judaism and Christianity are when their distinctive features are understood and they are experienced in a creative relation to each other.

Lawrence's perception of the progressive differentiation in life, the movement towards ever more distinct, unique individuals describes the essential development he sees from the Genesis story of creation through the Old Testament to the New. In the Old Testament world, close to the creation, the male and female are not yet clearly separate and individual, "for both he and she have not danced very far from the source and origin where they were both one" (p. 449). For this reason, when the nomadic, unsettled Hebrew race (very mobile and male in relation to stable, agricultural, more female peoples in Palestine) first turns towards a predominantly female god, it can only recognise some likeness of itself. David, in the Psalms, "hails her Father, Almighty, God, Beloved, Strength, hails her in his own image" (p. 450).[84] The God who called to wandering Abraham promised him the land of Canaan; "Unto thy seed will I give this land", Genesis 12: 7. Lawrence's

thought is that the Jews, coming into this inheritance, changing from a male, wandering race to a female, settled one, let the female overbear them, remained locked in a female conception of God rather than struggling to maintain the full balance.

However, their achievement was an important one. Judaism accomplished "the first great movement of man".

> In the creation, Man was driven forth from Paradise to labour for his body and for the woman. All was lost for the knowledge of the flesh. Out of the innocence and Nirvana of Paradise came, with the Fall, the consciousness of the flesh, the body of man and woman came into very being.
>
> This was the first great movement of Man: the movement into the conscious possession of a body. And this consciousness of the body came through woman. (p. 453)

Mother, mater, materia - matter, material things, the flesh, the created world - the Jews came into conscious possession of these things. They were promised earth, the land of Canaan, the mother flowing with milk and honey.

The female characteristics which Lawrence discovers in Judaism - its Monotheism; its Genesis story that we are all "children of one single parent", (Eve also born from Adam's body, "both issuing from one flesh") and therefore not separate, but all united in the flesh; its Ten Commandments, the majority of which identify only "male" sins, "sins of commission, sins of change, of transformation" and which thus witness to the passivity, the inertia, in which the race was caught - are all elements of the Hebrew faith which we are apt to overlook in our emphasis on its male Father God. The fact that this Father God is also Creator ought to make us suspicious, for the earliest creator gods were either female - Mother Nature, Mother Earth, giving birth to all things - or both male and female, one god splitting into two cosmic parents and copulating to produce the world and mankind.[85]

Lawrence sees the Song of Songs as a great expression of religious art, of the rapture and joy of contact with this female God. "Who is the Shulamite but God come close, for a moment, into physical contact?"

> But in the terrible moment when they should break free again, the male in the Jew was too weak, the female overbore him. He remained in the grip of the female. The force of inertia overpowered him, and he remained remembering. But very true had been David's vision, and very real Solomon's contact. So that the living thing was conserved, kept always alive and powerful, but restrained, restricted, partial. (p. 450)

"The female overbore him." Lawrence is describing the religion in which the land, the race, were very important; the religion of the nation which became too settled and complacent and angered God by flirting with the agricultural and fertility gods of their neighbours. The Jews resisted the male voice of protest and change of the prophets, they hardened their hearts; and through the prophets God called his people harlot, whore, adulterous woman.

> Thou hast played the whore also with the Assyrians, because thou was unsatiable; yea, thou hast played the harlot with them, and yet couldst not be satisfied.
>
> Thou hast moreover multiplied thy fornication in the land of Canaan unto Chaldea; and yet thou wast not satisfied herewith.
>
> How weak is thine heart, saith the Lord God, seeing thou doest all these things, the work of an imperious whorish woman.
>
> Ezekiel 16: 28-30
> (see also Ezekiel 23, Hosea 1 and 2, Jeremiah 3)

However, no matter how female the Hebrews may have become, the prophetic tradition was an important part of their history; and the major ommission in Lawrence's comments on Judaism is his failure to take this

tradition fully into account. In the Old Testament, Israel is not merely a closely knit community, bound by her geneology, her past, her laws, liturgy and land into an insular, almost "inert" family. Israel is also her prophets, the voices of protest, transformation and change. A constant dynamic exists, the new and unsettling word from God coming just as Israel appears to be most complacent, established and physically comfortable. The prophets challenge the rigidity of the law and remind men of the finer justice and love of God, his forbearance and forgiveness (especially in Hosea), as well as proclaim God's anger at their wrongdoings, at the turning of their hearts away from him in idolatry or in self-righteousness and the blind observance of traditional forms. This "dialectic of protest and order"[86] is central to Judaism, yet Lawrence overemphasises the female order element at the expense of the transforming male movement of protest.

Lawrence also fails to mention any of the many primitive religions before Judaism which were much more female, more unconsciously and completely so, and in relation to which the appearance of Judaism was an outstandingly male phenomenon. Certainly the worship of Baal, the fertility cults, which Israel's prophets condemned were much more female in their emphasis on the earth and her fruits, on the body and self-preservation, than was Israel with her restless Yahweh.

However, within the limits of his discussion of the differences between Judaism and Christianity, Lawrence's emphasis is justified. Also, in attributing to the Hebrew faith "the first great movement of Man: the movement into the conscious possession of a body" (p. 453), Lawrence begins to associate it with the extension of human consciousness (Chapter V of the "Study") which moves beyond the demands of self-preservation and the female

preoccupation with matter and the flesh.

What Lawrence appreciates most in Judaism, however, is its deeply female acceptance of being, of man's existence in the flesh; in Chapter VII he contrasts this to the "not-being"of Christianity.

"There was, however, Christ's great assertion of Not-Being, of No -Consummation, of life after death, to reckon with" (p. 465). This great assertion was part of the movement towards greater separation, individuality, which Lawrence felt began at creation and continued and intensified in the coming of Christ, in "the cry of anguish of Christianity: that man is separate from his brother, separate, maybe, even in his measure, inimical to him" (p. 452).

> . . . Christ rose from the suppressed male spirit of Judea, and uttered a new commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. He repudiated woman: "Who is my mother?" He lived the male life utterly apart from woman.
>
> "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" - that is the great utterance against Monism, and the compromise with Monism. It does not say, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour because he is thyself", as the ancient Jew would have said. It commands, "Thou shalt recognize thy neighbour's distinction from thyself, and allow his separate being, because he also is of God, even though he be almost a contradiction to thyself . . . ."
>
> This the Jew had to learn. The old Jewish creed of identity, that Eve was identical with Adam, and all men children of one single parent, and therefore, in the absolute, identical, this must be destroyed . . . . the birth of Jesus is the retaliation to this: a child is born, not to the flesh, but to the spirit; and you, Woman, shall conceive, not to the body, but to the Word . . . .
>
> The great assertion of the Male was the New Testament, and, in its beauty, the Union of Male and Female. Christ was born of Woman, begotten by the Holy Spirit. This was why Christ should be called the Son of Man . . . . He was born to the Spirit, the Word, the Man, the Male.
>
> And the assertion entailed the sacrifice of the Son of Woman. The body of Christ must be destroyed, that of

> Him which was Woman must be put to death, to testify that He was Spirit, that He was Male, that He was Man, without any womanly part. (p. 452)

The strong sense of community, the national feeling of the Jews - their inheritance from their birth in the flesh - was challenged and threatened by Jesus' call to rebirth.

> Unto what must man be born again? Unto knowledge of his own separate existence, as in Woman he is conscious of his own incorporate existence . . . . He must be born to the knowledge that other things exist beside himself, and utterly apart from all, and before he can exist himself as a separate identity, he must allow and recognize their distinct existence. (p. 453)

One has only to think of the record of God's dealings with "My people Israel" in the Old Testament and the difficulty the Jewish Christians experience in recognising the possible existence of Gentile Christians (uncircumcised, no less) in the New Testament, in order to see the element of truth in Lawrence's description of the process. A community of the second birth, by water and the spirit, was to replace that of the first, born into a living relation with God by the flesh and circumcision.

Lawrence emphasised the physical nature of Judaism, a Jew's consciousness "of his own incorporate existence" in the race, the laws for ritual cleanliness or for circumcision, Israel's very physical conception of God.

> It was the God of the body, the rudimentary God of physical laws and physical functions. The Jew lived on in physical contact with God. Each of his physical functions he shared with God; he kept his body always like the body of a bride ready to serve the bridegroom. (p. 450)

He spoke of "the Jewish tradition, with its great physical God, source of male and female" (p. 462).

Although Yahweh was unknowable and wholly other, although it was dangerous to draw near to him or look upon him, in relation to the God of Christianity he was very physical. At least it was possible to look upon him, no matter how dangerous; but the Gospel of John tells us "no man hath seen God" (John 1: 18). The Old Testament God was anthropomorphic; in Genesis 3 : 8 he walks in the garden, in Isaiah's vision (Isaiah 6: 1-5) he has a face and feet. He carries on conversations;

> And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend. (Exodus 33: 11)

He can be argued with, persuaded, cajoled. He will reveal his physical presence, at least some of it, on request, as he did when Moses asked, "shew me thy glory" (Exodus 33: 18). God answers,

> Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me and live.
>
> And the Lord said, Behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock:
>
> And it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a clift of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by:
>
> And I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts: but my face shall not be seen.
>
> Exodus 33: 20-23

In the New Testament God the Father is much more distant; Jesus says, "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (John 14: 9) but also that "God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth" (John 4: 24). In the Gospels God has simultaneously come down among men in the form of his Son and drawn further away from them. God the Father no longer has a face, feet and back parts; "no man hath seen God".

Lawrence's association of the "great physical God" of Judaism

with female Monism, an obsession with the oneness of things growing out of woman's awareness that "the whole of flesh is hers . . . that she is the fountain of all flesh, and her pride is that the body of man is of her issue" is appropriate in terms of the Old Testament conception of man. The Old Testament portrays a world in which the idea of a soul as the indestructible part of a man which was imprisoned in his body during life played no part. The word used for "person" was nephesh which meant "breath" or "a living being"; it did not even necessarily mean a human, but could refer to an animal. "There is, in fact, no distinctive word for 'body' in Hebrew; such a word is not needed because there is no separate part of man, distinct from his 'soul', which needs to be so distinguished."[87] To state the point more simply, in the Bible, "Man does not have a body; he is a body . . . . He is flesh-animated-by-soul, the whole conceived as a psychophysical unity".[88]

Lawrence in Chapter VII of the "Study" pays tribute to this Old Testament belief in the body, in the wholeness of man, this affirmation of "Being". It gave us the great religious art of the Song of Songs, that celebration of marriage in the body which the Christian church for so many years insisted on interpreting as a spiritual allegory of the union of Christ with his Church. The unique achievement of Judaism for Lawrence found essential expression in the Song of Songs; Judaism gave God's blessing to and acknowledged the beauty of our life in the flesh.

God the Son (Chapter VIII - "The Light of the World")

> There was, however, Christ's great assertion of Not-Being, of No-Consummation, of life after death, to reckon with. (p. 465)

Part of the strength of Lawrence's treatment of Christianity is that the Christian contradiction to Old Testament belief in the body, which is

designated "Not-Being" in Chapter VII, comes to be appreciated for its own unique qualities as "The Light of the World" in Chapter VIII. Lawrence tries to understand the special nature of Christianity in much the same way that he defends the special nature of Sue Bridehead.

> Why must man be so utterly irreverent, that he approaches each being as if it were no-being? (p. 510)

It is with an essential reverence that Lawrence approaches the world of the New Testament, as he approached the world of the Old; and in Chapter VIII he makes more clear the limitations which an Old Testament faith, carried to the extreme, would place upon man.

The movement of differentiation, of greater separation and individuality, continues. The simple yin/yang symbol, even the poppy and the wheel, can no longer express the extreme tension and division which Christian man and especially post-Renaissance man experience. The image now becomes "the Mystic Marriage" (p. 467), the hierosgamos, where two are not one but are always distinct, always in a sense strangers to each other. This change of movement in the "Study" was later expressed much more beautifully in Lawrence's description of Will and Anna's honeymoon in The Rainbow.

> Inside the room was a great steadiness, a core of living eternity. Only far outside, at the rim, went on the noise and the destruction. Here at the centre the great wheel was motionless, centred upon itself. Here was a poised, unflawed stillness that was beyond time, because it remained the same, inexhaustible, unchanging, unexhausted.
>
> As they lay close together, complete and beyond the touch of time or change, it was as if they were at the very centre of all the slow wheeling of space and the rapid agitation of life, deep, deep inside them all, at the centre where there is utter radiance, and eternal being, and the silence absorbed in praise: the steady core of all movements, the unawakened sleep of all wakefulness. They found themselves there, and they lay still in each other's arms; for their moment they were at the heart of

> eternity, whilst time roared far off, forever far off, towards the rim.
>
> Then gradually they were passed away from the supreme centre, down the circles of praise and joy and gladness, farther and farther out, towards the noise and the friction. 89

The rest of Will and Anna's life is a learning to deal with the reality of marriage, with the friction they discover as they move towards the rim of the wheel. There are occasional returns to the centre, moments of rebirth and renewal, but the continual struggle is to realise their separateness and to accept the different nature of the other. Especially must Will fight his feelings of dependence, his anguish at Anna's separation and freedom from him, in order to stand alone.

Biblical language and imagery are very important to The Rainbow in describing this forward movement. Lydia and Tom Brangwen at Marsh Farm live together in a pre-flood, Genesis world; Anna stands like Moses on the Pisgah mountain (see Deut. 34: 1-4) looking at the promised land but not allowed to enter; Ursula watches a moon "incandescent as a round furnace door" and cries "I want to go"[90], wanting to walk with the three men in the fiery furnace with whom also walked a form like the Son of God (see Daniel 3, especially verse 25). It is Ursula who struggles so hard to integrate the Sunday with the weekday world, who puzzles over a literal or non-literal interpretation of the Scriptures, who wonders over the rhythm of the ritual year, the drama from Christ's birth to his crucifixion and resurrection. Ursula rebels against her mother's rationalism, her insistence that there be nothing extra-human or ultimate, her concern with immediate, daily activities rather than with God or Jesus or Angels.

> But Ursula was all for the ultimate. She was always in revolt against babies and muddled domesticity. To her Jesus was another world, He was not of this world. He did not thrust His hands under her face and, pointing to His wounds, say: 'Look, Ursula Brangwen, I got these for your sake. Now do as you're told.'
>
> To her, Jesus was beautifully remote, shining in the distance, like a white moon at sunset . . . . She was the enemy of those who insisted on the humanity of Christ. If He were just a man, living an ordinary human life, then she was indifferent.
>
> But it was the jealousy of vulgar people which must insist on the humanity of Christ. It was the vulgar mind which would allow nothing extra-human, nothing beyond itself to exist. It was the dirty, desecrating hands of the revivalists which wanted to drag Jesus into this everyday life, to dress Jesus up in trousers and frock coat, to compel Him to a vulgar equality of footing. It was the impudent suburban soul which would ask 'What would Jesus do, if He were in my shoes?' 91

On weekdays, Ursula tried to face the tensions and contradictions of life in modern industrial society. On Sundays, a "visionary world came to pass. She heard the long hush, she knew the marriage of dark and light was taking place".[92] It was the difficulty of understanding how the marriage of dark and light, of the weekday and Sunday worlds could take place, of living her life as a whole individual in spite of the divisions and oppositions she experienced, that confronted Ursula as she moved out from the centre in widening circles into the man's world (see especially the first six pages of Chapter XI in The Rainbow). Her attempt to understand the rational workday world in some meaningful relation to the visionary realm of the Sabbath found expression in a private aspiration, that one of the Sons of God should come down to her, one of the daughters of men, and take her to wife (see Genesis 6: 2-4).

Marriage became much more difficult the further one moved from the centre of the circle, the further one travelled down the road of

individuation. Yet even Tom Brangwen had faced the hierosgamos, in naked contact with the utter strangeness of his wife, and had undergone the new birth required of him. Anna and Will met again and again in moments of conflict and consummation until the final crisis of sensual ecstasy, exploration, which seemed to somehow free Will for work in the outside world.

> Strange his wife was to him. It was as if he were a perfect stranger, as if she were infinitely and essentially strange to him, the other half of the world, the dark half of the moon. She waited for his touch as if he were a marauder who had come in, infinitely unknown and desirable to her. And he began to discover her . . . . There was no tenderness, no love between them any more, only the maddening, sensuous lust for discovery . . . . [94]

It is like the ancient ritual of giving oneself to the stranger, abandoning all that was personal or possessive in the sexual relationship and acknowledging that one's sexuality was not one's own, acknowledging the demands life made upon you and submitting to the birth into new being.

The experience of this rebirth through marriage was much more difficult for Ursula because she was much more divided in herself, unsure of what it meant to be an individual, how to resolve the conflicts within which were so closely tied to the growing conflicts of the world without. Her relation with Anton Skrebensky was not the marriage she needed; "she knew him all round, not on any side did he lead into the unknown".[95] She is left waiting for the extreme stranger, one of the Sons of God who shall come to her from the unknown.

Ursula's attempts to understand Christianity and her desire for the consummation in marriage with one of the Sons of God are closely related and relate significantly to the "Study". Marriage is so difficult for Ursula because she refuses to lapse like her mother from the responsibility of discovering her own individual being. Anna gave up the struggle, became

a door, a threshold for Ursula.

> With satisfaction she relinquished the adventure to the unknown. She was bearing her children. 96

Ursula then inherits the "heavy, numbing responsibility of living an undiscovered life".[97] This responsibility involves her in acknowledging the reality of the man's world, beyond her mother's domesticity, the physical satisfactions of motherhood. The marriage she seeks must somehow include both things, both the male and female elements in herself, both spirit and flesh, both Sunday and weekday.

Christianity, Lawrence suggests in the "Study", makes a different kind of marriage, of consummation, possible for man.

> In Christ I must save my soul through love, I must lose my life, and thereby find it. The Law bids me preserve my life to the Glory of God. But Love bids me lose my life to the Glory of God . . . .
>
> Now in the Law, no man shall know himself, save in the Law . . . . God, Almighty God, is the father, and in fatherhood man draws nearest to him. In the act of love, in the act of begetting, Man is with God and of God. Such is the Law. And there shall be no other God devised. That is the great obstructive commandment . . . .
>
> But through Christ it was at last declared that in the physical act of love, in the begetting of children, man does not necessarily know himself, nor become Godlike, nor satisfy his deep, innate desire to BE. The physical act of love may be a complete disappointment, a nothing, and fatherhood may be the least significant attribute to a man. And physical love may fail utterly, may prove a sterility, a nothingness. Is a man then duped, and is his deepest desire a joke played on him?
>
> There is a law, beyond the known law, there is a new Commandment. 98 There is love. A man shall find his consummation the crucifixion of the body and the resurrection of the spirit . . . .
>
> "This is my Body, take, and eat" says Christ, in the Communion, the ritual representing the Consummation. "Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest". 99

> For each man there is the bride, for each woman the bridegroom, for all, the Mystic Marriage. It is the New Law. (pp. 466-467)

However, in this "mystic embrace of Christ", although men and woman may find fulfilment and relief, they must also experience a confusion, a denial of the value of marriage in the body.

> It is a larger interpretation of the Law, but, also, it is a breach of the Law. For by the Law, Man shall in no wise injure or deny or desecrate his living body of flesh, which is of the Father.

In what ways is the new conception of the Mystic Marriage a breach of the old Law, a denial by the Son of the Father? Lawrence gives several specific examples to show his meaning.

The blessing and joy of motherhood and fatherhood expressed in the Old Testament[100] are lessened by Jesus' preaching in the New.

> "And it came to pass, as He spake these things, a certain woman of the company lifted up her voice and said unto Him: 'Blessed is the womb that bare thee, and the paps thou hast sucked.'
>
> But He said, 'Yea, rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God, and keep it.'" 101
>
> And the woman who heard this knew that she was denied of the honour of her womb, and that the blessing of her breasts was taken away.

The physical wholeness seen not only as a gift from God, part of the goodness of his creation, but as a requirement for full membership in the congregation of His people (Deut. 23: 1, "He whose testicles are crushed or whose male member is cut off shall not enter the assembly of the Lord") instead is seen as something which may be sacrificed in the service of the life of the Spirit - and this sacrifice is spoken of as deserving special praise. Lawrence quotes Matthew 19: 12, which teaching Jesus prefaces by the remark, "Not all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom

it is given" (Matt. 19: 11).

> ". . . there be those that were born eunuchs, and there be those that were made eunuchs by men, and there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it." But before the Father a eunuch is blemished, even a childless man is without honour. (p. 470)

Eunuchs were common among the Gentile peoples at the time of Israel's birth as a nation; they were appointed to serve in royal courts, to guard over the king's harem or to attend the queen. There are many references to them in the Old Testament,[102] most frequently as living in foreign countries, but occasionally they are mentioned as serving in Judah, although the eunuchs themselves were in most, if not in all, cases foreigners.[103] Israel was a conspicuous exception in her condemnation of this practice, although in a passage which Lawrence does not mention, spiritual provision is made for men who have had the misfortune to become eunuchs.

> Let not the foreigner who has joined himself to the Lord say, "The Lord will surely separate me from his people"; and let not the eunuch say, "Behold, I am a dry tree." For thus says the Lord: "To the eunuchs who keep my sabbaths, who choose the things that please me and hold fast my covenant, I will give in my house and within my walls a monument and a name better than sons and daughters; I will give them an everlasting name which shall not be cut off." Isaiah 56: 3-5

Of course, the underlying assumptions of Isaiah's teaching do not contradict Lawrence's argument but rather support it; a eunuch is not to be excluded from the Lord's people, but the implication is that he had every reason to believe he might be, that he would be likely to think of himself as a "dry tree" and therefore unfit for a covenant with Yahweh, and that he needs some sort of special assurance that he is not cut off from

God. There is no insinuation, as in the passage from Matthew, that one should become a eunuch in order to gain particular favour in the sight of God. Also, Isaiah is a prophet and the prophetic tradition is the male element in Judaism. It is a female insistence on wholeness in the flesh which denies eunuchs a place, a male appreciation of spiritual gifts which excuses physical imperfection. It is out of this male prophetic tradition that John the Baptist and Jesus are seen to arise. Thus, this passage from Isaiah illustrates the movement Lawrence describes, provides an example of the transition from one attitude to the other.

This disvaluing of the body of man Lawrence sees most clearly in John's Gospel. He quotes John 6: 63.

> "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh forgetteth[104] nothing; the words I speak unto you, they are the spirit, and they are life."
>
> And though in the Gospel, according to John particularly, Jesus constantly asserts that the Father has sent Him, and that He is of the Father, yet there is always the spirit of antagonism to the Father . . . . And St. John enhances this antagonism. But in St. John there is the constant insistence on the Oneness of Father and Son, and on the Holy Spirit. (p. 470)

His observation here is quite accurate. The Gospel of John is the gospel least rooted in orthodox Pharisaic Judaism. John's dualistic language is unique and shows the influence of Gnostic thought.[105] The opposites of light and dark, above and below, truth and falsehood, the idea of Jesus descending from God and returning to him, are all very different from anything in the Synoptic Gospels.[106]

Yet, although the emphases of John are very contradictory to the conception of the Father God of Judaism, in John also is the strongest announcement that Jesus and the Father are one (John 10: 30); in John,

Jesus is seen less as the prophet or teacher, more as the divine being worthy of worship.

The paradox causes confusion; the people find it hard to understand how Jesus' teachings can also be the teachings of their God. When Jesus speaks of living water, the woman at the well can only think of actual water.

> Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw.
>
> John 4: 14-15

When he speaks of heavenly bread, the people can only imagine real bread, the manna which God sent to the Israelites in the wilderness.

> Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses gave you not that bread from heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven . . . .
> Then said they unto him, Lord, evermore give us this bread.
> And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst . . . .
> The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven.
>
> John 6: 31-35, 41

> Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead . . . .
> I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever . . . .
> Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.
> For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. . . .
> This is that bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever . . . .
> Many therefore of his disciples, when they had heard this, said, This is an hard saying; who can hear it?
>
> John 6: 49, 51, 54-55, 58, 60

Who can hear it? Jesus says he <u>is</u> God, he and the Father are one, yet he preaches a God quite different from the one the people knew.

What is this heavenly bread which a man can eat and never hunger again? The people can only imagine perpetual earthly bread. Yet Jesus insists it is not earthly bread (see John 6: 26, 27) but something much more wonderful and lasting; and then, for the people, the wonder of the earthly bread, of the manna once coming down from heaven, is diminished.

However, although the promises of this man in the New Testament are so different from those given in the Old, although in a sense the Son denies the Father, Lawrence maintains that the teachings of Jesus are only a closer vision of the Judaic Law, as motion is only a closer vision of rest. The Gnostic elements in John carried to an extreme would lead to a total repudiation of the Old Testament God; the Gnostics tried to do away with the Old Testament, they taught that the Creator God was an evil one who entrapped pure sparks of spirit into the prisons of the flesh. Jesus was the saviour who released these spirits once again. However, the establishment of the Christian canon of the Bible, which included the Old Testament, was done to fight this extreme position and to maintain the relation, no matter how paradoxical or precarious, with Israel's Yahweh. Lawrence tries to do justice both to the relation and the contradiction.

> In the Father we are one flesh, in Christ we are crucified, and rise again, and are One with Him in Spirit. It is the difference between Law and Love. Each man shall live according to the Law, which changeth not, says the old religion. Each man shall live according to Love, which shall save us from death and from the Law, says the new religion.
>
> But what is Love? What is the deepest desire Man has yet known? It is always for the consummation, the momentary contact or union of male with female, of spirit with spirit and flesh with flesh, when each is complete in itself and rejoices in its own being, when each is in himself or in herself complete and single and essential. And love is the great aspiration towards

> this complete consummation and this joy; it is the aspiration of each man that all men, that all life, shall know it and rejoice. Since, until all men shall know it, no man shall fully know it. Since, by the Law, we are all one flesh. So that Love is only a closer vision of the Law, a more comprehensive interpretation: "Think not I come to destroy the Law, or the Prophets: I come not to destroy, but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law, till all be fulfilled."107 (pp. 466)

Love is a closer vision of the Law, and yet it denies the Law.[108] It is not merely "Not-Being" but a possibility of further being; it frees man from the bondage of the flesh, from the limits of a great physical God, a physical morality, marriage in the body, the unique qualities of Judaism carried to an extreme, and permits him to say, "I know I am the other thing as well" (p. 475). A marriage with the spirit, a mystic consummation, has become possible for him, but only at the expense of increased separation from God and from his fellow man.

> At last man insists upon his own separate Self, insists that he has a distinct, inconquerable being which stands apart even from Spirit, which exists other than the Spirit, and which seeks marriage with the Spirit. (p. 471)

Lawrence sees this Christian emphasis on the spirit, on love, on increased individuality, on "the desire for pure ambience, pure spirit of change, free from all laws and conditions of being", on light, on rebirth[109], all as male characteristics. Most male of all is the Christian concept of the Trinity as opposed to Jewish Monotheism.

> It were a male conception to see God with a manifold Being, even though He be One God. For man is ever keenly aware of the multiplicity of things and their diversity . . . . With Christ ended the Monism of the Jew, God, the One God, became a Trinity, three-fold. He was the Father, the All-containing; He was the Son, the Word, the Changer, the Separator; and He was the Spirit, the Comforter, the Reconciliator between the Two.

> And according to its conditions, Christianity has, since Christ, worshipped the Father or the Son, the one more than the other. (pp. 451, 453)

This imbalance between female Judaism, the Father, and male Christianity, the Son, is intensified by Lawrence's feeling that each one denies the other and that especially since the Renaissance we have been living under the Son's denial of the Father, mind and spirit denying embodiment in the flesh (denying the bodily roots of all thought). We have reached the extreme of abstraction, instability and separateness, and Lawrence insists,

> It is time that the schism ended, that man ceased to oppose the Father to the Son, the Son to the Father. (p. 468)

He wants each to acknowledge the other.

> Why shall the Father say "Thou shalt have no other God before me"? Why is the Lord our God a jealous God? Why, when the body fails me, must I still adhere to the Law . . . . Why must I be imprisoned within the flesh . . . till I must stop the voice of my crying out, and be satisfied with a little where I wanted completeness?
>
> And why, on the other hand, must I lose my life to save it? Why must I die, before I can be born again . . . ? Why must I deny the Father, to love the Son? Why are they not One God to me, as we always protest they are? (p. 468)

Lawrence attempts both to do justice to the real differences between Judaism and Christianity and to understand some true relation or reconciliation between them. The nature of this "reconciliation", he suggests in the "Study", is analogous to the effort of a man and a woman to sustain the relation of marriage, recognising their strangeness to each other as well as their unity.

> . . . we rejoice in contact perfect and naked and clear, singled out unto ourselves, and given the surpassing freedom . . . . For she is she, and I am I, and, clasped

> together with her, I know how perfectly she is not me, how perfectly I am not her, how utterly we are two, the light and the darkness, and how infinitely and eternally not-to-be-comprehended by either of us is the surpassing One we make. Yet of this One, this incomprehensible, we have an inkling that satisfies us. (p. 468)

To understand the ultimate, mystic hierosgamos between God the Father and God the Son and to find an "inkling" of the surpassing One they make, Lawrence turns to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and, especially, the role within it of the Holy Ghost.

The Holy Ghost

In a youthful letter to Blanche Jennings (13th May, 1908) Lawrence, discussing the name of Mrs. Dax's new daughter, wrote:

> One name is not sufficient for anyone - there is unity and perfection in a Trinity. Do you think the idea of the mystic oneness of three is empty and barren? It is not. I don't like your miserable lonely single 'front name'. It is so limited, so meagre; it has no versatility; it is weighed down with the sense of responsibility; it is worn threadbare with much use; it is as bad as having only one jacket and one hat; it is like having only one relation, one blood relation, in the world. Never set a child afloat on the flat sea of life with only one sail to catch the wind. 110

Six years later Lawrence found himself writing at much greater length about "the mystic oneness of three", finding in the conception of the multiple natures of God a way to set himself afloat on "the flat sea of life" with more than "one sail to catch the wind".

Lawrence has discussed the special nature of Judaism, but yet, in carrying that special nature to its logical extremity, has also suggested its limitations. He has tried to understand the distinctive qualities of Christianity but has presented its extreme form of denial of God the Father

so forcefully that we know we could not accept it. His argument has succeeded in making the extreme or stereotyped form of either faith impossible for us; either one in isolation can exist only by an unacceptable denial of reality.

> How can a man say, "I am this body," when he will desire beyond the body tomorrow? And how can a man say, "I am this spirit," when his own mouth gives lie to the words it forms? (p. 469)

Whether we see the now suggested whole - which includes both Law and Love, Body and Spirit, stability and movement, God the Father and God the Son - as Christianity in all its complexity, or a full Judaism, "wonderful and satisfying in a large measure" (p. 451) or as a unity and balance between the two, the fact remains that the part, the stereotype, has been made unacceptable to us. We are now incapable of believing in or living out a stereotyped idea or extreme form of either Christianity or of Judaism; the greatness of those two faiths, their lasting impact on human civilisation, has depended on their mystery of completeness, fullness. To deny them that mystery, to insist still on a partial view, is a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.

> And it is the Unforgivable Sin to declare that these two are contradictions one of the other, though contradictions they are. Between them is linked the Holy Spirit, as a reconciliation, and whoso shall speak hurtfully against the Holy Spirit shall find no forgiveness. (pp. 467-8)

The "Unforgivable Sin" Lawrence refers to is stated in all three Synoptic Gospels.

> Therefore I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. And whoever says a word against the Son of man will be forgiven; but whoever speaks against

> the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come.
>
> Matt. 12: 31-32 (cf. Mk. 3: 28-29, Lk. 12: 10)

This warning against the "unforgivable sin" is in one sense the real organising principle of the whole "Study"; it is, for Lawrence, the command to do justice to oppositions, differences, to the particularity of reality. It is the command to think and write in art-speech, for "in his art no artist ever could blaspheme the Holy Spirit, the Reconciler. Only a dogmatist could do that" (pp. 472-473). Lawrence is not doing dogmatic theology in the "Study" but a theology which tries to do justice to the peculiar nature of biblical stories and teachings, to the religious art of Judaism and Christianity, and to take their complexity into account.

As we read, however, it seems that the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which unites flesh and spirit, God the Father and God the Son, in a kind of mystic marriage is impossible to avoid. For the Father has blessed marriage in the body at creation (Genesis 2: 18) and the Son has blessed marriage in the spirit as a finer thing than marriage in the body (as in I Cor. 7: 1-9, 32-40; Matt. 22: 30; Mark 12: 25) and Lawrence writes that there can be no marriage between them.

> There is an eternal non-marriage betwixt flesh and spirit. They are two; they are never Two-in-One . . . . Spirit can mate with spirit, and flesh with flesh, and the two matings can take place separately, flesh with flesh, or spirit with spirit. But to try to mate flesh with spirit makes confusion . . . for the flesh is of the flesh, and the Spirit of the Spirit, and they are two, even as the Father and the Son are two, and not One . . . . The effort to mate spirit with body, body with spirit, is the crying confusion and pain of our times. (pp. 473-4)

The words are irritating and unsettling. Where is the unity, the wholeness we have been trying to discover, in the midst of this extreme

fragmentation? Yet Lawrence is here giving substance and power to the concept of the Trinity, the image he has now chosen to complicate and extend the meaning of the poppy. He is accepting the fragmentation through his faith in the living reality of the Holy Ghost.

> . . . the marriage in the spirit is a lie, and the marriage in the body is a lie, each is a lie without the other. Since each excludes the other in these instances, they are both lies. If they were brought together, and reconciled, then there were a jubilee . . . . There must be marriage of body in body, and of spirit in spirit, and Two-in-One. And the marriage in the body must not deny the marriage in the spirit, for that is blasphemy against the Holy Ghost; and the marriage in the spirit shall not deny the marriage in the body, for that is blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. But the two must be forever reconciled, even if they must exist on occasions apart one from the other . . . in some men, in some small men, like bishops, the denial of the marriage in the body is positive and blasphemous, a sin against the Holy Ghost. And in some men, like Prussian army officers, the denial of marriage in the spirit is an equal blasphemy. But which of the two is a greater sinner, working better for the destruction of his fellow-man, that is for the One God to judge. (pp. 475-6)

Lawrence does not know the Holy Ghost or the reconciliation: he only knows that in his living he must not deny them, that because the "Light of the World" has come and changed the intensity and nature of human life, he must yet not deny the darkness. The life of the spirit has opened up to man, yet he must not repudiate the flesh. He reinterprets the Christian doctrine of the unity of the Trinity in order to keep faith in the unity of his own being; the Trinity is so important to him, however, not only because it witnesses to the unity of God but because it expresses divine diversity, tension and multiplicity within the Godhead itself. The particulars of existence, duality, participate in ultimate reality. Similarly, the Holy Ghost is significant to Lawrence not only because it reconciles opposition but

because it sustains it; the Holy Ghost both "relates and keeps distinct the dual natures of God".[111]

Just how fanciful or impossible is the doctrine of the Trinity and especially of the Holy Spirit which Lawrence puts forward? In a sense, he could not have been more fortunate in his choice of a theological issue for the purpose of breaking new ground. As Stanley Romaine Hopper puts it in A Handbook of Christian Theology,

> The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is at once the most central and the most neglected doctrine of the Christian faith. It is the most central in the sense that everything in the Gospels is energized and motivated by and through its agency . . . . It may be put even more dramatically: whereas we may be permitted to sin against Jesus Christ, the sin against the Holy Ghost is unforgivable. Yet while Christianity is thus as firmly pneuma-centric as it is Christo-centric, the doctrine has remained peripheral for the most part in the long history of doctrinal thinking. 112

It would seem that even the full doctrine of the Trinity was in a similar position.

> Since the early centuries of the Church it has been considered the primary and distinctive aspect of the Christian conception of God, and even as the central "mystery" of Christian faith, both as enshrining the deepest truth of Christianity, the root of all others, and as being the most difficult to state adequately. 113

The word "trinity" does not appear in the New Testament, although the idea was thought to be implied in various passages.[114] Early creeds, confessions of faith, and apologetical writings rather haphazardly developed the idea, leaving much room for misunderstanding, so that the doctrine had to be simply and clearly stated at the early councils of Nicaea (AD 325) and Constantinople (AD 381) in order to control incipient heresies. God was declared to be one substance and three Persons, the three being co-equal and co-eternal. The doctrine differs in the Eastern and Western churches,

however, over what is called the filioque clause in the Nicene Creed. In the East, the movement in the Trinity is seen as a straight line - the Father is ungenerated, the Son is generated by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son. In the West, the symbol for the Trinity is not a line, but a triangle, for the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. The teachings of St. Augustine in his De Trinitate and the Athanasian Creed (probably written between AD 381-428) were the main influences on medieval teaching and have shaped the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity in the West. The Athanasian Creed, under the name Quicunque Vult (taken from its opening words) is in the Book of Common Prayer.

> . . . The Father is made of none: neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone: not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding . . . . And in this Trinity none is afore, or after other: none is greater, or less than another; But the whole three Persons are co-eternal together: and co-equal.

The exact place of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity and the description of its special nature, its difference from the Father and the Son, has been a bit more problematic in Christian theology. In the Old Testament, "the word for spirit is ruach, or breath. It is the life-giving breath of God. It is the primal power of God in all things. Without the life-giving spirit of God man is but dust of the earth. At times it is used almost as a synonym for nephesh, the breath-soul in man. At others it is almost interchangeable with leb (lebab), standing for the innermost and deepest sense which the self has of itself. But at the same time it may appear in the divine conjunction, Ruach-Adonai, the spirit of the Lord, the life-giving and energy-declaring power of God as manifested in human life and the world".[115] Powers as different as those given to

Samson and to Isaiah (Judges 14: 6, Isaiah 61: 1) came from the Spirit of God. In the New Testament the Spirit brought Mary to conceive, descended to Jesus at his baptism and to the disciples at Pentecost, was the Comforter promised to Jesus' followers in John (see John 14: 16-18), was the power at work in Jesus' miracles and at work in the various gifts and abilities of the brethren of the early church (I Cor. 12: 4-11).

Yet in spite of all of this vivid activity, the Spirit remains the person of the Trinity about whom we know least, the one we can only seem to describe negatively in terms of the others - He is that of God which is not the Son and not the Father. This inability of the tradition to give us an adequate description of the nature of the Holy Ghost upsets R. P. C. Hanson in an article he wrote on "The Position of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity". At the end of his brief but careful summary of the available doctrine from the Church Fathers and later theologians, he complains, "What is the point of maintaining a doctrine of the Holy Spirit if we can say nothing at all about how his mode of hypostatic existence differs from those of the other two Persons of the Trinity, except that it differs?"[116]

Athanasias, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa can only "express the Holy Spirit's individual characteristic in wholly negative terms: it is, to be neither of those things which individually characterize the other two Persons."[117] Basil has a feeling that the Holy Spirit is "third in rank, though not in nature and . . . third in order" and that he proceeds from the Father; but in his De Spiritu Sancto he declares "we do not know what the Spirit is and we must admit our ignorance".[118] Origen, in discussing the Trinity, taught that the Holy Ghost was eternal, but he was

uncertain about his nature or his relation to the Father and the Son.[119] There are many rich accounts of the Spirit's activity in the world, but on the subject of the Spirit's mode of existence and his position in the Trinity these early writers have little to say.

It is St. Augustine in De Trinitate who adds a new feature to the doctrine with his conception that the Holy Spirit was the bond of union in the Trinity. "The Holy Spirit is consubstantial because he unites the two other Persons of the Trinity."[120] He described the Holy Ghost as "the mutual love of the Father and the Son".[121] Augustine's writings on the subject also became the basis for the West's doctrine of the Filioque. The councils of Lyons (1274) and of Florence (1438/9) in their pronouncements on the nature of the Spirit and his procession from the Father and the Son show the great influence of Augustine's views.[122]

Hanson briefly outlines the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Eastern church, from the Greek Fathers to contemporary orthodox theologians. They continue to object to the Filioque clause, for they feel it detracts from the absolute monarchy of the Father, and beyond that, they insist mainly on the incomprehensibility and the mystery of the Holy Spirit. V. Lossky, in his The Mystical Theology of the Orthodox Church (1957) disagrees with Augustine, saying "that to make the Person of the Holy Spirit the bond of union between Father and Son is to explain or rationalize the mode of procession of the Spirit, no longer to regard it as incomprehensible".[123] Hanson seems to be impatient with this demur and sums up his treatment of the doctrine in the Eastern church in a rather dismissive tone.

> It is obvious therefore that to people who think like this, it is impossible to know what is the mode of the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit. That which the Spirit is

> and the other Persons are not is indescribable and beyond knowledge. 124

When he goes on to try to add to the doctrine himself, he emphasises "the dynamic and eschatological nature of the Holy Spirit"[125] and suggests that it is this special nature that causes the obscurity of our thought about him.

> . . . as an eschatological force, his work is not yet completed. He is sovereign over history and cannot be completely understood by us because we are in history and because, unlike him, we cannot see the end of history, its completion, its consummation. It is not metaphysics that stand in the way of our knowing him, but our involvement in history. We are caught up in his movement which involves the whole human race and the whole of history, and cannot stand outside it. 126

Up to this point, then, Lawrence's understanding of the Holy Spirit seems remarkably orthodox. In speaking of the Holy Spirit as the force of reconciliation, the bond of union, between Father and Son, he follows Augustine. In stressing the dynamic action of the Holy Spirit in history, he's at the very least in full agreement with Bishop Hanson. And in stressing the incomprehensibility of the Holy Spirit, he seems to be in accord with theologians of both East and West, from the time of the early church until the present day. The Holy Ghost is that which moves in us to create life and desire and strength, to fulfil God's purpose in a variety of ways, but which cannot be fully understood. Even the Apostle Paul "does not attempt to define the term, but is content to observe its presence and the manner of its working".[127]

Lawrence's use of the Trinity, however, seems to be rather less orthodox than his use of the Holy Spirit. The conflict or tension he sees between Father and Son gives a very different emphasis to the mystery of God in three Persons than the one traditional Christianity has given. The Son

has been seen by orthodox Christians to be the revelation, the manifestation of the Father in the world. Although Lawrence makes such statements as "Love is only a closer vision of the Law"which might carry the orthodox meaning, he is more interested in pointing out what to him are opposing principles between the nature of the Father in the Old Testament and the different aspect of the nature of God revealed by the Son in the New. In the "Study" the new revelation of God in Christ is not only a fulfillment of our earlier, incomplete knowledge, but also in ways a contradiction of it.

Lawrence seems to follow Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity through to its final conclusions, as theologians of the Eastern Church feared might be the eventual consequence, in denying the absolute monarchy of the Father and seeing him as but one manifestation of God, as the Son was but one manifestation of God, the unmanifested Spirit[128] reconciling the two in the supreme and unknowable deity.[129] This belief that the persons of the Trinity or that various gods were not themselves the ultimate reality but only manifestations of it is, of course, not new to Christian mystics or to the majority of the world's religions; but the persisting Christian conception of a personal, loving Father God as the final reality and power behind the universe has influenced our view of the Trinity and limited its meaning.[130]

Lawrence, in opposing the Son to the Father, is not creating a new tritheistic heresy, but trying to intensify and make more alive for us the deepest purpose the concept of the Trinity has always served. "The doctrine of the Trinity is intended to affirm, not deny, the oneness of God. It refers to an inner richness or complexity, not dividing God into parts, but describing the nature of His oneness as a living and full unity".[131]

It is the force and vividness with which Lawrence has been able to suggest the complexity of God through the doctrine of the Trinity that most distinguishes him from earlier writers on the subject and also from more recent ones.

In discussing recent developments of trinitarian doctrine, Claude Welch outlines two different emphases.

> Some writers suggest that our word "person" or "personality" is better used in relation to the oneness of God. The believer confronts one Thou, the personal being. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are His "ways of Being" the one divine person. God is thus to be understood primarily by analogy with the individual person, though embracing within Himself movement and self-giving, which is the ground of His communion with men. Others insist that the phrase "three Persons" expresses an indispensable truth, the reality of communion or fellowship within the divine life. God is better conceived after the analogy of social existence, though with an intensive unity far exceeding all we know in human life. 132

In the "Study" Lawrence's doctrine of the Trinity is enriched by both of these emphases. The Trinity stands foremost as a suggestion of the nature of individual growth, of tensions and conflicts to be faced, opposing realities - male/female, spirit/flesh, movement/rest, knowing/being - to be accepted in the living mystery, the integrity of one human being. Yet Lawrence also sees it as an image of relationships between men, especially in Chapter X, but throughout in terms of marriage - learning to recognise the total otherness, the separateness, of a wife, husband or friend and yet to believe in the possibility of meaningful relation beyond the reality of our isolation from each other.

His perception of real conflict within the Trinity, in the nature of God himself, carries with it all of the discoveries of unique individuals, qualities, forces, faiths, paintings, novels, flowers, phoenixes made in

the "Study", all of the particulars of human life in alert relation, vital opposition, to each other. All of these things somehow participate in the nature of ultimate reality and, like the natures of God, are both related and held distinct by the working of the Holy Spirit. Most wonderful of all, through the energy of his art-speech, Lawrence has been able to talk meaningfully about something the Judeo-Christian tradition has found very difficult to talk about at all, and he has been able to suggest its power, its significance in human life, the nature of its working, more convincingly and fully than any of the theologians mentioned above who attempted to approach it - the Holy Ghost.

Such a theology of conflict within the nature of God himself has implications for many areas of human experience. First, in his psychology books Lawrence develops the idea further in the realm of human relationships, seeing the essence of a healthy relationship in the maintenance of a "pure, balanced polarity between two vital individuals".[133]

> The essence of morality is the basic desire to preserve the perfect correspondence between the self and the object, to have no trespass and no breach of integrity, nor yet any refaulture in the vitalistic interchange. 134

Second, the perception of conflict has implications for the wider area of social relationships and politics; Reinhold Niebuhr, in his book Moral Man and Immoral Society, suggested the maintenance of health and morality in society by the constant tension of opposing interests, the continuing creation of pressure groups to challenge those in power, to make them see problems or aspects of political issues, the presence of which they might otherwise deny.

Thirdly, such a theology of conflict also, as we have seen, gives a rationale for art-speech, the kind of thinking and writing which does not

blaspheme against the Holy Ghost by refusing to see certain sides of reality or by weighting one side unfairly against another.[135] This appreciation of the complexity of art especially involves a tribute to and deep appreciation of the nature of Scripture as the religious art of a people, an increased sensitivity to the depth and richness of the Bible.

Fourth, Lawrence's doctrine of the Trinity has enabled him to do full justice to the essential paradoxes of the Judeo-Christian tradition. The great strength of this tradition has been the building and the sustaining of these paradoxes over the many centuries since God first called to Abraham. Some of them - the oppositions between light and dark, heaven and earth, male and female - have been present, according to the first chapter of Genesis, right from the creation.

I can only suggest a few of these central paradoxes.

Man is taught of the goodness of creation, yet called to a truer life, one which lasts beyond the body and this world. Man is taught that Jesus is <u>wholly</u> man and <u>wholly</u> God (not half the one, half the other). God is all-powerful, a God who grows angry and who judges; yet he is loving and forgiving. God is omnipotent and omniscient, knows all that any man ever will do; yet man has a free will, is responsible for the outcome of his own life. Good works cannot ensure one's salvation, one is justified by faith; yet good works are the necessary fruit of faith and a man must perform them. The heavenly bread and the living water are more important than earthly bread and water; yet a man is commanded to give food and drink to the hungry. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me", Matthew 25: 40.

One of Lawrence's most important achievements in the theology of

the "Study", in doing justice to these paradoxes, is the way in which he discovers the female element in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It has always been considered an extremely male tradition, except for the sweetness of the Virgin Mary; but, as Lawrence points out in Chapter IX (p. 482), the Virgin has never been the positive female, the Great Mother of earlier religions who nourished and sustained us like the earth; she has always been mild and submissive to the male. However, in emphasising the female aspects of Old Testament religion, Lawrence has enriched our conception of biblical faith. His triumph has been to maintain the extreme tension of religious worship, the striving of man for union with God, with the unknown, while strongly affirming the goodness of creation and the flesh. Lawrence's suggestion of this tension between God and man recalls the poems of George Herbert. In "The Temper (I)" Herbert wrote,

> O rack me not to such a vast extent;
> Those distances belong to thee . . .
> Wilt thou meet arms with man, that thou dost stretch
> A crumme of dust from heav'n to hell?
> Will great God measure with a wretch?
> Shall he thy stature spell?
>
> Yet take thy way; for sure thy way is best:
> Stretch or contract me, thy poore debter:
> This is but tuning of my breast,
> To make the musick better. 136

Yet, in George Herbert, this aspiration of man, the tightening pull of the unknown upon him which is the "tuning of my breast/to make the musick better" always involves some real denial of the value of God's creation, whether it be the beauty in a rose, in a poem, or in the human body (see especially "Jordan I" and "Jordan II", "The Forerunners", "The Pearl", "The Quip"). By his understanding of the Trinity as the expression of both the goodness of the flesh and the goodness of the spirit sharing in the nature of God

himself, Lawrence is able to suggest a way of maintaining the unresolvable tension between man and God while yet acknowledging and deeply valuing man's bodily, earthly existence.

Finally, Lawrence's theology has helped him to examine and think more clearly about problems which were to be central to The Rainbow - the problem of marriage and that of discovering what it really meant to be an individual. Lawrence's doctrine of the trinity, in its resemblance to Augustine's idea of the Holy Ghost as proceeding from "the mutual love of the Father and the Son"[137], also develops his thoughts about marriage. Later, in The Rainbow, one of these is stated very simply by Lydia Lensky to Anna.

> 'Remember, child,' said her mother, 'that everything is not waiting for your hand just to take or leave. You mustn't expect it. Between two people, the love itself is the important thing, and that is neither you nor him. It is a third thing you must create. You mustn't expect it to be just your way.' 138

Yet, not only does the "mystic oneness of three" help him to think more clearly about the relation and the division of marriage; it leads Lawrence to a fuller understanding of the difficulties involved in being an individual. His central question is basic and direct: how can we gain and recognise wholeness? His attempts at an answer can partly be described in a negative form - not by merging with another person, male or female, as in Aristophanes' story in The Symposium; not by over-emphasising one side of a conflict or another, excluding one for the sake of the other; not in reverting to a primitive conception of unity, as in the yin yang symbol; and not in giving up and hoping for some cataclysm in the future. Our separation from others, the complexity of life, and the realities of history and of the present must all be faced and accepted.

However, we can participate in meaningful relations with fellow human beings; there is marriage. Further, there can be a marriage within the individual, where male and female become interpenetrating, opposing and collaborating psychic forces, helping the individual to move forwards into life creatively.

Part of the way in which the "Study" is a sketch book for The Rainbow can be seen in the way Lawrence's characters struggle with both the negative and positive aspects of the answer to the question, "What does it mean to be an individual?" Tom Brangwen finds happiness in alcohol for a while, achieving a "kindled state of oneness with all the world".

> But he had achieved his satisfaction by obliterating his own individuality, that which it depended on his manhood to preserve and develop. 139

Will Brangwen studies the paintings of Fra Angelico and of Raphael, receiving a "gradual fulfilment of delight" which "had to do with the establishment of a whole mystical, architectural conception which used the human figure as a unit".[140] Will also tries to achieve a sense of wholeness through his relation with Anna, but he fails to maintain his own separateness too often, weighs on her with his dependence until she finally turns him away in irritation. At first he can hardly bear it.

> She was everything to him, she was his life and derivation. He depended on her. If she were taken away, he would collapse as a house from which the central pillar is removed . . . . He wanted to leave her, he wanted to be able to leave her. For his soul's sake, for his manhood's sake, he must be able to leave her. 141

At last, during Anna's pregnancy, he learns to face his ultimate separation from her.

> He could be alone now. He had just learned what it was to be able to be alone. It was right and peaceful.

> She had given him a new, deeper freedom. The world might be a welter of uncertainty, but he was himself, now. He had come into his own existence. He was born for a second time, born at last unto himself, out of the vast body of humanity. Now at last he had a separate identity, he existed alone, even if he were not quite alone. Before he had only existed in so far as he had relations with another being. Now he had an absolute self - as well as a relative self.
>
> But it was a very dumb, weak, helpless self, a crawling nursling. 142

For Ursula, facing a more divided, complex world - a man's world in which she is determined to have a part and yet a world in which she wants to understand fully what it means to be a woman - the problem of achieving wholeness is an even more difficult one. Ursula talks with her grandmother about marriage, about Lydia's two husbands. To Lydia, it seems that Tom Brangwen "had made himself immortal in his knowledge with her";[143] and it is part of the strength of the "Study" that so much more is suggested by the idea of "knowledge" in the Old Testament sense. However, Ursula's struggle to achieve some personal knowledge takes her beyond Tom Brangwen's life at Marsh Farm, takes her to teaching school, to university, to the long relationship with Skrebensky; yet she does feel that marriage will have something to do with her final discovery of her true self. Ursula studies the religious pictures which gave her father such delight, but "the representation of the encircled God, surrounded by all the angels on high, suddenly bored her";[144] she cannot receive a sense of wholeness from making herself one with an architectural conception of the nature of the universe, with a symbolic framework which belonged to the past. Yet she senses that religion will have something to do with her coming to second birth and she struggles with Christian beliefs and Bible stories and teachings.

Faith, marriage, relationships - Ursula has to detach herself from all of these things before she finally comes to a realisation of her own inviolable integrity. She repeats to herself, "I have no father nor mother nor lover, I have no allocated place in the world of things, I do not belong to Beldover nor to Nottingham nor to England nor to this world, they none of them exist, I am trammelled and entangled in them, but they are all unreal".[145] Only after separating herself from all these things completely, discovering her own unique being, can she begin to establish true relations with them all again, can she begin to find her own personal knowledge, "to create a new knowledge of Eternity in the flux of time".[146]

The Rainbow closes before we know in any concrete way what Ursula's "new knowledge" will be, how her new found wholeness will reveal itself. The theology of the "Study", Lawrence's doctrine of the "position of the Holy Ghost in the Trinity", as well as the created world of The Rainbow, can give us some idea of the complexity, the reality of conflict in life, to which Ursula's discovery must do justice. The concept of the Trinity which chapters VII and VIII of the "Study" express suggests the deeply religious nature of Ursula's effort to accept the responsibility of her own life, to grow into individuality. The struggle of every man and woman into full being is a unique attempt to face and accept a particular constellation of limitations, opportunities, qualities, conflicts both within oneself and in the world without and to move forwards into life with faith in one's possible integrity and in the ultimate integrity of the universe. This is essentially a religious struggle and is what the theology of the "Study" is essentially about. But, as in another study - written in art-

speech - of a man's individual pilgrimage, the close attention to the struggle of one human being into fuller life opens up a vision of the Divine nature itself.

> In that abyss
> Of radiance, clear and lofty, seem'd, methought,
> Three orbs of triple hue, clipt in one bound:
> And, from another, one reflected seem'd,
> As rainbow is from rainbow: and the third
> Seem'd fire, breathed equally from both. O speech!
> How feeble and how faint art thou, to give
> Conception birth. Yet this to what I saw
> Is less than little. O eternal Light!
> Sole in thyself that dwell'st; and of thyself
> Sole understood, past, present, or to come;
> Thou smiledst, on that circling, which in Thee
> Seem'd as reflected splendour, while I mused . . .
> as one,
> Who versed in geometric lore, would fain
> Measure the circle; and, though pondering long
> And deeply, that beginning, which he needs,
> Finds not: e'en such was I, intent to scan
> The novel wonder, and trace out the form,
> How to the circle fitted, and therein
> How placed: but the flight was not for my wing;
> Had not a flash darted athwart my mind,
> And, in the spleen, unfolded what it sought.
> Here vigour failed the towering fantasy:
> But yet the will roll'd onward, like a wheel
> In even motion, by the Love impell'd,
> That moves the sun in Heaven and all the stars.
>
> Dante's Paradiso, Canto XXX111 [147]

Footnotes - Chapter IV

[1] L.M., p. 47.

[2] Although in Chapter IX of the "Study", speaking of Jude, Lawrence wrote, "He wanted, through familiarity with the true thinkers and poets, particularly with the classic and theological thinkers, because of their comparative sensuousness, to find conscious expression for that which he held in his blood" (pp. 499-500). A side issue here: it might be helpful for those who like to dwell on Lawrence's use of the words "blood" and "blood-consciousness", especially with an emphasis on relations with primitivism, racialism, Nazism or whatever, to reflect on Lawrence's very Biblical use of these words. See Deuteronomy 12: 23, where Jewish law instructs about the killing and eating of animals; "Only be sure that thou eat not the blood: for the blood is the life; and thou mayest not eat the life with the flesh". Thus when God discovers Cain's crime he says, "What hast thou done? the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground" (Genesis 4: 10). "Blood is sacred to God, for it is the seat of life" (Oxford Annotated Bible, New York, 1962, p. 6n). This adds to the force of Jesus' words in the New Testament, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life . . . . For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed", John 6: 53-55. Lawrence's use of the word "blood" as a concrete expression for the essence of life itself is more Biblical than anything else.

[3] See P.K. 199-201; cf. Chapter I of this thesis, pp. 70-71.

[4] L.M., p. 234; Harry T. Moore suggests 26th October, 1913, as the date of the letter. This emphasis on the common origins of art and ritual is present especially in the early chapters of Jane Harrison's book. In ritual, primitive man does what he wants done, leaps high if he wants the corn to grow high, paints a picture of the sun shining on the corn and of raincloudsif he wants sun and rain. He makes "a presentation of his strong inner desire", p. 25, Harrison, op. cit. An "impulse shared by art with ritual" is the desire "to utter, to give out a strongly felt emotion or desire by representing, by making or doing or enriching the object or act desired," p. 26. Again, in ritual, "it is desire and will and longing, not certainty and satisfaction" that a savage utters, although Jane Harrison sees this longing as primarily the desire for food, p. 65. Her conclusion is that "art is in fact but a later and more sublimated, more detached form of ritual". The whole object of her book has been "to show how primitive art grew out of ritual"; the chief difference between the two is that "primitive religion asserts that her imaginations have objective existence; art more happily makes no such claim", pp. 225-226. Lawrence's distinctions between religion and art are different from Jane Harrison's.

5 Harrison, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

6 Ibid., pp. 205, 228.

7 Ibid., p. 228.

8 Jaroslav Pelikan, "Introduction", Twentieth Century Theology in the Making, Volume I: Themes of Biblical Theology (London, 1969), translated by R. A. Wilson, p. 16; (this work is a selection of articles from Die Religionen in Geschischte und Gegenwart, edited by Pelikan).

9 Martin Dibelius, "Biblical Theology and the History of Biblical Religion", Twentieth Century Theology in the Making, Vol. I, pp. 24-25.

10 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

11 Ibid., p. 25.

12 Pelikan, pp. 20, 17.

13 Apocalypse (New York, 1966), reprinted 1967, pp. 3-7.

14 An example of a recent call for such a theological art-speech is Amos N. Wilder's "Theology and Theopoetic", The Christian Century, 23rd May, 1973, pp. 593-596. However, the journalistic, catchy use of language in the article, if any example of the "theopoetic" Wilder is calling for, shows the difficulty of doing imaginative theology without becoming glib and over-relevant to what Wilder calls the "mystiques and mythologies of our age of Aquarius and Apocalypse", p. 593.

15 In spite of its lack of historical information about the biblical writings, it has value as biblical theology. See Jaroslav Pelikan, op. cit., p. 15; "The golden ages of the history of theology have been times of a new and deeper study of Scripture . . . . All these thinkers would deserve to be called 'biblical theologians' and wanted to be known as such."

16 It seems that Mrs. Jenner's Christian Symbolism (London, 1910) was read by Lawrence after the "Study" was written. Its influence on The Rainbow is quite evident, however; Richard Swigg has dealt with this influence in what seems to me a very full way. See his Lawrence, Hardy and American Literature, the chapter on The Rainbow, especially pp. 97-100, 104.

17 L.M., p. 303; Harry T. Moore suggests 19th December, 1914 as the date of the letter.

[18] See Esther Harding, op. cit., pp. 144-154.

[19] The Rainbow, p. 40; Chapter I.

[20] Frank Kermode, "D. H. Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types", Modern Essays (London, 1958), 1970 edition, p. 155.

[21] Frank Kermode, Lawrence (London, 1973), p. 118.

[22] Frank Kermode, "Spenser and the Allegorists," Proceedings of the British Academy (1962), p. 273.

[23] Ibid., p. 262.

[24] Ibid., p. 270.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., p. 272.

[28] Ibid., p. 275.

[29] Ibid., p. 273.

[30] See pp. 305-306 of this chapter, footnotes 12 and 15 of Ch. I, footnote 88 of Ch. II.

[31] Phoenix, pp. 301-302.

[32] "Spenser", pp. 278, 279.

[33] Ibid., p. 278. His analysis of Women in Love in "Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types" is quite interesting; it makes his treatment of Lady Chatterley in "Spenser and the Allegorists" seem an example of exactly the reductive kind of myth criticism which he is challenging.

[34] Ibid., p. 262.

[35] L.M., p. 302.

36 Movements in European History (Oxford, 1925), pp. xi-xiii.

37 Ibid., pp. x-xi.

38 L.M., p. 47.

39 "Spenser", p. 272.

40 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New York, 1949), 1970 edition, p. 153.

41 Phoenix, p. 304.

42 Antichrist, pp. 591, 628; see pp. 627-630 (sections 23, 47 and 48).

43 Ibid.

44 Beyond Good and Evil from The Portable Nietzsche, p. 443; section 52.

45 Ibid.

46 Antichrist, p. 571, section 5.

47 He develops this idea more fully later, in Apocalypse.

48 Antichrist, p. 599; see the entire argument on the psychology of the Redeemer, sections 28 to 35, pp. 599-609.

49 Ibid., pp. 622-624. God as a tailor refers to his clothing the lilies of the field in more glorious array than Solomon's.

50 Ibid., p. 633, p. 643.

51 The Portable Nietzsche, p. 567.

52 Ibid., p. 628.

53 Ibid., p. 633, section 51.

54 "Spenser", p. 271.

55 Phoenix II, p. 325; the "Introduction" was written probably eight years after the "Study", 1922. See Sagar, p. 118.

56 See Michael Polanyi, P.K., p. 9, on the false ideal of "objective" knowledge which has resulted from modern science's "forgetting of the old, perfect abstraction", Pythagorean mathematics. This epistemology, an inaccurate account of how scientists work, which denied the bodily roots of all their thinking and the imaginative power of theory arrived at by intuition rather than by detailed observation, "seems to be the inevitable consequence of separating, in principle, mathematical knowledge from empirical knowledge".

57 Jesus, of course, also repeats the Genesis statement about marriage in Mark 10: 7 and Matthew 19: 5 but in Matthew he follows it with a distinctly un-Old Testament hint that being a eunuch is more holy than being a married man. See pp. 367-369, below.

58 Watts, p. 40.

59 Ibid., p. 54.

60 Ibid., p. 57.

61 Ibid., p. 58.

62 See Watts, pp. 80-83. "Notable in the Puranas is the relationship of the gods to their feminine counterparts or shaktis, the feminine symbols of maya, the world-illusion, whereby the male god is alternatingly seduced and disenchanted. Originally the Godhead is hermaphroditic, beyond the opposites, but at the moment of creation the feminine shakti leaps forth spontaneously, as Eve was created from the body of Adam while he slept", p. 80.

63 Ibid., p. 68.

64 Ibid., pp. 84-85.

65 Ibid., p. 91.

66 Remember Watts' definition of polarity given in Chapter III, p. 283 above. "It is something much more than simple duality or opposition. For to say that opposites are polar is to say much more than that they are far apart: it is to say that they are related and joined - that they are the terms, ends, or extremities of a single whole. Polar opposites

are therefore inseparable opposites, like the poles of the earth or of a magnet, or the ends of a stick or the faces of a coin." p. 45.

67 Watts, p. 42.

68 cf. Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces. "Early in the first millennium B.C., Persian belief was reorganized by the prophet Zarathustra (Zoroaster) according to a strict dualism of good and evil principles, light and dark, angels and devils. This crisis profoundly affected not only the Persian, but also the subject Hebrew beliefs, and thereby (centuries later) Christianity. It represents a radical departure from the more usual mythological interpretation of good and evil as effects proceeding from a unique source of being that transcends and reconciles all polarity." p. 348 n.

69 Watts, p. 132.

70 Ibid., pp. 133-135.

71 Ibid., p. 42.

72 Ibid., p. 15. cf. Campbell, Hero, p. 113 n. Campbell refers to J. C. Flügel's The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family; "There exists a very general association on the one hand between the notion of mind, spirit or soul and the idea of the father or of masculinity; and on the other hand between the notion of the body or of matter (materia - that which belongs to the mother) and the idea of the mother or of the feminine principle. The repression of the emotions and feelings relating to the mother (in our Judeo-Christian monotheism) has, in virtue of this association, produced a tendency to adopt an attitude of distrust, contempt, disgust or hostility towards the human body, the Earth, and the whole material Universe, with a corresponding tendency to exalt and overemphasize the spiritual elements, whether in man or in the general scheme of things. It seems very probable that a good many of the more pronouncedly idealistic tendencies in philosophy may owe much of their attractiveness in many minds to a sublimation of this reaction against the mother, while the more dogmatic and narrow forms of materialism may perhaps in their turn represent a return of the repressed feelings originally connected with the mother."

73 Ibid., pp. 169, 164-5.

74 Zoroastrianism influenced both Judaism and Christianity, but Judaism managed to stay clear of the more extreme dualism of Christian mythology, at least until approximately 170 B.C. when certain parts of the Pseudepigraphal Book of Enoch were written which refer to the everlasting punishment of the wicked. According to Watts, "the biblical Satan is far from being the Devil of later Christian doctrine, for in The Book of Job

he appears simply as a sort of counsel for the prosecution in the Court of Heaven, the Lord's attorney general. For in the Hebrew matrix of Christianity, today as yesterday, there is no place for so dangerous a brush with the insanity of ultimate dualism as is involved in the full development of Christian demonology" p. 39. The all powerful, wrathful Father God of the Old Testament, by making such statements as "I am the Lord, and there is no other. I form light and create darkness. I make weal and create woe, I am the Lord, who do all these things" (Isaiah 45: 6-7) helped to discourage such a metaphysical dualism. Also, the Hebrew word for "hell" or "pit", Sheol, contrasted sharply with the Christian images of Heaven and Hell. Sheol was simply the place of departed spirits, all departed spirits, good or bad, and its use reflected a rather vague belief in an after life (although, also see Eccles. 9: 10) but no developed demonology or angelology. (The Greek word Gehenna, used in the New Testament to signify hell, Matt. 5: 29, 10: 28, 18: 9: Jas. 3: 6, was the name given to the Valley of Hinnom, used in the Old Testament as a geographical designation, the rubbish pit outside Jerusalem. Only in the Apocryphal book of 2 Esdras and the Pseudepigraphal Ethiopic Book of Enoch did it begin to be described as a place of punishment for sinners and apostates, and in this form the ideas of Gehenna and its opposite, Paradise, probably influenced New Testament writings.)

75 Phoenix II, p. 374. The Crown seems to me a good example of the dangers involved when Lawrence did his religious thinking in a more private idiom than that of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

76 Blake: Complete Writings, p. 149.

77 Campbell, Hero, p. 273.

78 Hero, p. 89.

79 cf. Lawrence's later essays "Why the Novel Matters", "Morality and the Novel", "Art and Morality" in Phoenix.

80 Lawrence's castigation of Jude here for assuming that Sue was an "'ordinary' woman - as if such a thing existed?" is part of his careful rejection of the archetypal terms "male" and "female" in any easy equation with "man" and "woman". "There is female apart from Woman, as we know, and male apart from Man. There is male and female in my poppy plant, and this is neither man nor woman" (p. 443). He finds the terms fruitful, charged with meaning both from the past and from present experience, but makes it clear that each individual necessarily has both female and male qualities to some degree. According to Lawrence's analysis of these qualities, if a woman was purely female she could never get out of bed in the morning. If a man was purely male, he would never go to bed at night. See also Esther Harding, p. 37, p. 104, where she suggests that a woman who has no male element in her makeup and a man who has no female

qualities are capable only of a primitive, archetypal relationship with each other. A mature relationship involves a further growth in consciousness and more complex and complete individuals. An appreciation of the special nature of each individual involves understanding, as Jude did not, that a woman could have many more male qualities than female ones in her nature, as Sue did.

81 cf. Sagar, p. 39.

82 Twilight in Italy (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1960), reprinted 1969, pp. 53-54.

83 It is a method of analysis which bears resemblances to Blake's dictim "The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom", one of the "Proverbs of Hell" in "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", Complete Writings, p. 150.

84 On Lawrence's comments on David in the "Study", cf. "The Crown", Phoenix II, pp. 379-380.

85 For a detailed study of female creator gods see Erich Neumann, The Great Mother, translated by Ralph Manheim (New York, 1955) and Esther M. Harding, Woman's Mysteries. For a study of myths and folk tales of cosmic parents, see Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, pp. 255-295.

86 Arthur A. Cohen, "Judaism", A Handbook of Christian Theology, edited by Martin Halverson, Arthur A. Cohen (New York, 1958), p. 188. This book referred to henceforward as Handbook.

87 Robert McAfee Brown, "Soul (Body)", Handbook, pp. 354-356.

88 J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, cited by R. M. Brown above.

89 The Rainbow, p. 145. The "utter radiance" and "the silence absorbed in praise" at the centre of space recalls Lawrence's letter to Gordon Campbell in December, 1914.

> I cannot forget that the Cherubim who are nearest God and palpitate with his brightness are absorbed in praise. I don't know why, but the thought of the Great Bright Circle of Cherubim, godly beyond measure, are absorbed for ever in fiery praise.
>
> L.M. p. 304.

In this letter, Lawrence mentions his reading of Mrs. Henry Jenner's book Christian Symbolism. She writes that the Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones "are utterly absorbed in perpetual love and adoration of God, whom they see and love with greater intensity than any other creatures". Christian Symbolism, p. 65. She also talks about the fiery red colour of the seraphim (from the Hebrew word saraph which means to burn), p. 66, and of the thrones which are fiery wheels full of eyes, p. 67. On p. 69 she writes that in religious art one often sees represented the angels whose highest happiness is praise. Lawrence has united all of these aspects in his conception of the "Great, Bright Circle of Cherubim".

90 The Rainbow, p. 479. At the end of Chapter VI, p. 196, Anna had thought to herself, "The child she might hold up, she might toss the child forward into the furnace, the child might walk there, amid the burning coals and the incandescent roar of heat, as the three witnesses walked with the angel in the fire." The child referred to, just born, is, of course, Ursula.

91 The Rainbow, Ch. X, p. 274-275. The last comment on the "impudent suburban soul" asking "What would Jesus do, if He were in my shoes?" is a reference to a book by Charles Sheldon, called In His Steps, a best seller in the late nineteenth century. The book told the story of several people in an American town (very "suburban", especially in soul) who changed their lives and met with enormous success by asking each time before they did anything, "Now what would Jesus do if He were in my shoes?" It was published in book form in Chicago in 1898 and by 1899 had sold 3 million copies and been translated into more than 9 languages.

92 The Rainbow, p. 275.

93 See The Rainbow, pp. 276-277.

94 The Rainbow, pp. 235-236.

95 Ibid., pp. 473-474.

96 Ibid., p. 196.

97 Ibid., p. 283.

98 Lawrence emphasises the newness of the Christian commandment of love, although it is only in John's gospel that it is understood as something new. "A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another", John 13: 34. In Matthew, Mark and Luke the command to love God and to love one's neighbour is seen as the essence of Old Testament law. "In these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets", Matthew 22: 40. (See Matt. 22: 35-40, Mark 12: 28-34, Luke 10: 25-28). Scholars have puzzled over John's reference to a "new"commandment because, on the contrary, it was

a very old one, written in Leviticus 19: 18. "Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou love thy neighbour as thyself." In Peake's Commentary C. K. Barrett tries to explain the contradiction. "The commandment is described as 'new' not because nothing like it had ever been uttered before (cf. Lev. 19: 18), but because it reflects the relations within the Godhead, and, still more, because it belongs to the new age which the work of Jesus introduced (cf. I John 2: 8)." (C. K. Barrett, "John", P.C., p. 860).

Lawrence's comment on the essential newness of Jesus' commandment is more satisfactory. The difference lies in the conception of who the neighbour is, as might be suggested by the question of the lawyer in Luke 10: 29 after Jesus tells him to "love thy neighbour as thyself" - "And who is my neighbour?" The parable of the Good Samaritan directly follows. In Leviticus, Moses is giving the law to the community of Israel; in Luke, Jesus insists that one is neighbour to anyone in need, regardless of race, or nationality. Lawrence remarks,

> "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" - that is the great utterance against Monism, and the compromise with Monism. It does not say "Thou shalt love thy neighbour because he is thyself", as the ancient Jew would have said. It commands, "Thou shalt recognize thy neighbour's distinction from thyself, and allow his separate being, because he also is of God, even though he be almost a contradiction to thyself". (p. 452)

Another attempt to describe the "newness" of the command, given again in Peake's Commentary (R. McL. Wilson, "Mark", p. 812), admits that the injunction to love God was central to Judaism, expressed in the Shema (Deut. 6: 4f) which was repeated daily by the Jews, and that in Leviticus one was told to love one's neighbour. However, the distinctive feature of Jesus' command was putting the two together. "Hillel is recorded to have summed up the Law in the negative form of the 'Golden Rule', and Akiba later called Lev. 19: 18 the greatest principle in the Torah, but there appears to be no evidence for the combination of the two texts by any teacher before the time of Jesus." This explanation is also an unsatisfactory one of what is original in the Christian command because in John the two texts are not combined, but it is only in John that the commandment is called "new".

99 Matthew 26: 26 (Mark 14: 22, Luke 22: 19); Matthew 11: 28.

100 cf. Psalms 127: 3-5. On the sadness and accursedness of a barren woman, see I Samuel 1: 2-11, Genesis 16: 2, 30: 1-2, 22-23.

101 Luke 11: 27-28.

102 e.g. Esther 2: 3, 14; 4: 5.

103 Henry Snyder Gehman, ed., The New Westminster Dictionary of the Bible (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1970), p. 282.

104 The verse in John reads, "the flesh profiteth nothing"; "forgetteth" is perhaps an error in transcription made by Lawrence's typist.

105 John's Gospel was first used by Gnostics. See C. K. Barrett, op. cit., p. 845.

106 Werner Georg Kümmel, ed., Introduction to the New Testament, translated by A. J. Mattill, Jr. (New York, 1966), p. 155. Kümmel examines various possible sources for this dualism in John - Hellenic philosophy, the Qumran sect, pre-Christian Jewish Gnosticism - and feels that the strongest evidence is for the later. He makes clear that there were diverse forms of Jewish thought and life besides mainline Pharisaic Judaism (p. 161) and that John could have its roots in one of these.

107 Matthew 5: 17-18.

108 Lawrence's use of the terms "Law" and "Love" here carries the weight of their usage in the early chapters, especially Chapters I and II, where they were discussed as "laws" and as the form of self-pity occasionally called "love". The sense in which the first six chapters are an integral part of the thought of the "Study" can be seen in the way in which such echoes from them resound and add depth to the discussions in the last four. "Ye must be born again" in Ch. VII, "A man must lose his life to save it" in Ch. VIII, stated as teachings of Christianity which show part of its difference from Judaism, recall the more general and contemporary sense in which they were used in Ch. II and V,urging us to fight free of our obsession with self-preservation and to grow into our true selves.

The first six chapters can be seen to participate in a beginning dialectic between Law and Love. Chapter I states the force of the self-preservation side of life, a restrictive form of Law. Chapter II speaks of Christ's commandment to love, the liberation and adventure, the recognition of the other which it could have meant as opposed to the mockery we have made of it. A tentative synthesis is suggested in Ch. III in the art of Hardy's novels, especially in Egdon Heath where a greater morality of life makes itself felt, including and surpassing both Love and Law. Ch. IV discusses again the necessity of work and self-preservation but suggests a further meaning of Law - the law of one's own being. "The only need is to be a law unto oneself", p. 429. Ch. V. examines the greater meaning of work, the extension of human consciousness, and our progressive differentiation into "wonderful, distinct, individuals, like angels" if we only will be born again (Love). Ch. VI once again points beyond to a greater synthesis in the wheel image where motion and rest, axle and wheel are one, where dualities are held in a greater whole. From then on, as the circle

turns and widens, the dialectic, tension and testing of ideas is carried on not so much between chapters but in the very texture and language of the argument itself.

Of course, this schematising is somewhat arbitrary; the discussions interpenetrate and evolve naturally from one chapter to the next. The poppy, that artifact of indivisible, incomprehensible life, appears again and again throughout, providing that pulse which Ursula sought at the university in The Rainbow - "Had she not gone to hear the echo of learning pulsing back to the source of the mystery?" (p. 436). However, this general outline does describe the way in which each new movement of thought appears and takes its place in, makes its contribution to, the whole. The reading experience of the "Study" forcefully contradicts this attempt at structuring it, but my reason for pointing out this underlying organisation of Lawrence's thought is to emphasise that the "Study" is an organic whole, not a schizophrenic work where the age-old charms of storytelling, a phoenix, a cabbage, and a poppy in the early chapters vie for our attention against the frenzied production of obscure and arbitrary terminologies in Chapters VI to X.

109 cf. Jane Harrison, who writes that the ritual of the second birth is "widespread, universal, over half the savage world. With the savage, to be twice born is the rule, not the exception. By his first birth he comes into the world, by his second he is born into his tribe. At his first birth he belongs to his mother and the women-folk; at his second he becomes a full-fledged man and passes into the society of the warriors of his tribe" (pp. 104-105). The second birth is a movement into the male, after one's initial birth to the female. Above all in this rebirth, a boy "is to cease to be a woman thing and become a man" (p. 106).

110 L.M., p. 11.

111 Twilight in Italy, p. 54.

112 Stanley Romaine Hopper, "Holy Spirit", Handbook, p. 170.

113 Claude Welch, "Trinity", Handbook, p. 366. cf. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. by F. L. Cross (London, 1958 - 1966 reprint), p. 1375. "This doctrine is held to be a mystery in the strict sense, in that it can neither be known by unaided human reason apart from revelation, nor cogently demonstrated by reason after it has been revealed." The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church will be referred to henceforward as ODCC.

114 See Matt. 28: 19, 3: 16; Lk. 1: 35; John 14: 11, 16f & 26; I Peter 1: 2; II Cor. 13: 14.

115 Hopper, Handbook, p. 171.

116 R. P. C. Hanson, "The Position of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity", The Church Quarterly, April 1971, p. 275.

117 Hanson, p. 271. Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of the Holy Spirit "proceeding" from the Father, "proceeding" meaning "neither ingenerateness nor generateness; the Spirit is God between begottenness and unbegottenness", p. 271.

118 Hanson, p. 270, 278 n.

119 ODCC, p. 992.

120 Hanson, p. 272.

121 ODCC, p. 1376.

122 Hanson, p. 272.

123 Ibid., p. 273.

124 Ibid., p. 274.

125 Ibid., p. 276; "eschatological" meaning, having to do with last things.

126 Ibid., p. 277.

127 Hopper, Handbook, p. 172.

128 "The Person of the Holy Spirit remains unmanifested - having no image in another Person." V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Orthodox Church, 1957, p. 85. Cited by Hanson, p. 273.

129 Of course, Lawrence's view is not really very extreme. A heresy called Monarchianism in the 2nd and 3rd centuries was condemned because it failed to do justice to the independent being of the Son in its emphasis on the supremacy of the Father. Also, Lawrence can be seen to be combating a modern Protestant heresy, that of overemphasising the importance of the Son at the expense of the Father, of being too Christocentric. This concern can be seen to be on his mind in the Campbell letter, December, 1914, L.M., p. 302, and also in one of the last things he wrote, a review of Eric Gill's Art Nonsense and Other Essays, Phoenix, p. 396.

130 cf. Joseph Campbell, Hero. Campbell, using Dante's vision of the Light in Canto XXXIII of Paradiso as an example, speaks of the final revelation given to the questing hero. "The Son and the Father alike are annihilated - as personality-masks over the unnamed. For just as the figments of a dream derive from the life-energy of one dreamer, representing only fluid splittings and complications of that single force, so do all the forms of all the worlds, whether terrestrial or divine, reflect the universal force of a single inscrutable mystery: the power that constructs the atom and controls the orbits of the stars", p. 191. "The gods as icons are not ends in themselves. Their entertaining myths transport the mind and spirit, not up to, but past them, into the yonder void; from which perspective the more heavily freighted theological dogmas then appear to have been only pedagogical lures . . . . The gods and goddesses then are to be understood as embodiments and custodians of the elixir of Imperishable Being but not themselves the Ultimate in its primary state. What the hero seeks through his intercourse with them is therefore not finally themselves, but their grace, i.e. the power of their sustaining substance. This miraculous energy-substance and this alone is the Imperishable; the names and forms of the deities who everywhere embody, dispense and represent it come and go." , pp. 180-182.

131 Claude Welch, Handbook, p. 368.

132 Ibid. It seems that at the time Lawrence was writing, if we are to judge from a study of English theology in the years between 1900-1920 (Thomas A. Langford, In Search of Foundations: English Theology 1900-1920, New York, 1969), very little if anything was being done on the doctrine of the Trinity or of the Holy Ghost.

133 Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, p. 225; cf. pp. 244-245; "The amazingly difficult and vital business of human relationship has been almost laughably underestimated in our epoch. All this nonsense about love and unselfishness, more crude and repugnant than savage fetish-worship. Love is a thing to be learned, through centuries of patient effort. It is a difficult, complex maintenance of individual integrity throughout the incalculable processes of interhuman-polarity." "No human being can develop save through the polarized connection with other beings."

134 Ibid., p. 226.

135 cf. Lawrence in a later essay on the immorality of an artist putting his thumb in the scale, "Morality and the Novel", Phoenix, p. 528.

136 The Poems of George Herbert, introduction by Helen Gardner (London, 1961), pp. 47-48. cf. "The Pulley", p. 150-151, "The Collar", pp. 143-144 - "Good cable, to enforce and draw, and be thy law" - "The Flower", pp. 156-157;

These are thy wonders, Lord of power,
Killing and quickening, bringing down to hell
And up to heaven in an houre . . .

and "The Pearl", pp. 79-80;

. . . thy silk twist let down from heav'n to me,
Did both conduct and teach me, how by it
To climb to thee.

137 That Lawrence had this idea in his mind about this time can be seen in his letter to Gordon Campbell, December, 1914. "And, from the mutual love of the Father and the Son, proceeds the Holy Spirit, the Holy Ghost, the Reconciler, the Comforter, the Annunciation." L.M., p. 303.

138 The Rainbow, p. 176.

139 Ibid., p. 28.

140 Ibid., p. 278.

141 Ibid., pp. 186-187.

142 Ibid., p. 190.

143 Ibid., p. 258.

144 Ibid., p. 278.

145 Ibid., p. 493.

146 Ibid.

147 Dante, The Divine Comedy, edited by Edmund Gardner, translated by Henry Francis Cary (London, 1908), reprinted 1961, pp. 442-443.

Ne la profonda e chiara sussistenza
de l'alto lume parvermi tre giri
di tre colori e d'una contenenza;
e l'un da l'altro come iri da iri
parea reflesso, e'l terzo parea foco
che quinci e quindi igualmente si spiri.
O quanto è corto il dire e come fioco
al mio concetto! e questo, a quel ch'i'vidi,
è tanto, che non basta a dicer 'poco'.

O luce eterna che sola in te sidi,
  sola t'intendi, e da te intelletta
  e intendente te ami e arridi!
Quella circulazion che si concetta
  pareva in te come lume reflesso,
  da li occhi mioi alquanto circumspetta,
dentro da sè, del suo colore stesso,
  mi parve pinta de la nostra effige;
  per che'l mio viso in lei tutto era messo.
Qual è'l geometra che tutto s'affige
  per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova,
  pensando, quel principio ond'elli indige,
tal era io a quella vista nova:
  veder volea come si convenne
  l'imago al cerchio e come vi s'indova:
ma non eran da ciò le proprie penne:
  se non che la mia mente fu percossa
  da un fulgore in che sua voglia venne.
A l'alta fantasia qui manco possa;
  ma già volgeva il mio disio e il velle,
  si come rota ch'igualmente è mossa,
l'amor che move il sole e l'altro stelle.


La Divina Commedia (Florence, 1954), Paradis , Vol. III, edited by C. Sansoni, pp. 1065-1067, ll. 115-145. Canto XXXIII.

Dürer, *Grasses* (watercolour)



Leonardo, *Star of Bethlehem* (drawing)






Ascribed to Dürer

The Madonna of the Iris




Sandro Botticelli
(ca. 1445-1510)
Mystic Nativity



Correggio
(active 1514, died 1534)
The Madonna of the Basket




Raphael
(1483-1520)
Altarpiece: Madonna and Child with St. John the Baptist and S. Nicholas of Bari (Ansidei Madonna)



Raphael
Altarpiece: The Crucified Christ with the Virgin Mary, Saints and Angels




Rembrandt
(1606-1669)
Self-portrait at the Age of 34



Rembrandt
An Elderly Man as S. Paul



Rembrandt
The Adoration of the Shepherds




J.M.W. Turner
(1775-1851)
Norham Castle, Sunrise



Botticelli
Our Lady of the Magnificat



Rembrandt
Portrait of the Painter in Old Age



Caravaggio
(1569-1609)
The Calling of St. Matthew

CHAPTER FIVE

The Art Criticism (Chapters VII and VIII of the "Study")

> To define beauty, not in the most abstract but in the most concrete terms possible, to find not its universal formula, but the formula which expresses most adequately this or that special manifestation of it, is the aim of the true student of aesthetics.
>
> "To see the object as in itself it really is" has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realize it distinctly.
>
> Walter Pater, Preface to The Renaissance

The first question one wants to ask about Lawrence's art criticism in the "Study" is: does Lawrence distort the paintings to make them fit into an evolving schema or is he recording a genuine response to the paintings themselves? It is certainly difficult to shake the first, uneasy impression that Lawrence might simply be fitting the pictures into a pattern of his own and not really looking at them at all. Is his analysis arbitrary and the criticism reductive? Is Lawrence going through an empty exercise of categorising, blinding himself to the separate reality and complexity of each painting in an attempt to bolster an uncertain argument with a superficial knowledge of art?

The problem in judging the art criticism is that the art "language" Lawrence builds in order to talk about the paintings is inseparable from the growing thought of the "Study". It is impossible to evaluate the criticism properly without understanding the weight which Lawrence has carefully built up behind the very terms he uses in this particular critical venture. I do not mean to imply that his discussion of Renaissance art or of Turner is written in a private language and is thus

inaccessible to us - it is not - but that the art criticism is an integral part of the "Study" and can only be fully understood and appreciated in that context. We cannot judge Lawrence's comments on art fairly in isolation from the whole work of which they are a part, but we can judge if that work has maintained its own coherence and unity only by great distortion, misrepresenting and twisting beyond recognition the other works of art it tries to include. Our final criteria must be whether or not the overall effect of the criticism is reductive. If it cannot help us to see a painting in some new way, to see in it what we have not seen before, to call us to it with new attention or respect, it also cannot contribute in any meaningful sense to the "Study" as a whole.

Lawrence leads us into his discussion of art by suggesting a difference between the artistic and religious efforts of man.

> The artistic effort is the portraying of a moment of union between the two wills, according to knowledge. The religious effort is the portrayal or symbolizing of the eternal union of the two wills, according to aspiration. (p. 447)

This seems a bit too clear-cut. Does not great art at times express aspiration as well as moments of insight or knowledge? Yes, Lawrence answers; and that is the "joyful utterance of religious art" (p. 449).

> Always the threefold utterance: the declaring of the God seen approaching, the rapture of contact, the anguished joy of remembrance, when the meeting has passed into separation. Such is religion, religious art, and tragic art. (p. 450)

Thus, in a very real way, art is the record of man's spiritual history, of man's continuing religious effort "to recover balance, to symbolize and so to possess that which is missing", (p. 447). But in these attempts to discover or to record a moment of union of the two wills - the Will-to-

Motion and the Will-to-Inertia - "the features of one or the other Will are always salient", (p. 447). Such is our human condition that the balance is rarely, if ever, perfect; we are always readjusting.

So far the developing terminology of the "Study" seems still dominant over the particularity of artists and paintings. Uneasily the reader wonders if Lawrence will now list certain paintings which emphasise "Love" and the "Will-to-Motion" over "Law" and the "Will-to-Inertia" and other paintings which do just the reverse. Over the next twenty pages or so, one feels that this is perhaps what is happening; and it seems that Botticelli, Correggio, Raphael, Boccioni and Turner are even more likely to be over-simplified and abstracted because Lawrence is basing his analysis of them mainly on one work by each artist, usually works that were immediately available to him in England, although he had been in Italy for the preceding two years and had - one assumes - seen many others. He discusses the Mystic Nativity by Botticelli (although he also mentions the Venus of the Uffizi briefly), The Madonna of the Basket by Correggio, The Ansidei Madonna by Raphael (all in the National Gallery, London) and Development of a Bottle through Space by the Futurist Boccioni. Fra Angelico, Andrea del Sarto, and Corot are subjected to few passing general comments; we are not referred to any specific work of theirs. Dürer is mentioned a few times, with only one vague reference to a specific painting (pp. 456-457), perhaps The Madonna of the Iris now in the reserve collection of the National Gallery, London, because it is no longer certain that it was painted by Dürer (it is listed as "School of Dürer" or "ascribed to Dürer").[1] Rembrandt is discussed at greater length; no

specific paintings are mentioned, although Lawrence refers to his many self-portraits. It is Michelangelo whose work is well-represented; the Moses, the David, the Captives, the Creation of Adam on the Sistine Ceiling all figure in Lawrence's argument. Unfortunately, several paragraphs of general theory about Michelangelo precede any specific mention of these works, so their appearance loses much of its possible impact. The effect, upon a first reading, is that Lawrence did not argue from the evidence of Michelangelo's work but presented his concluded opinions first and then listed statues and pictures that seemed to endorse those opinions.

However, in spite of all these limitations, Lawrence's art criticism in the "Study" holds up under repeated rereadings, close scrutiny and comparison with the work of other well-known art critics in a quite unusual way. What persists throughout is Lawrence's wonderful ability to convey the irreducible, whole mystery of a work of art, a sense of its presence and separate life apart from and beyond his presentation of it. His criticism grows out of an extreme attention to and love for the paintings; it is a mark of his serious interest that he feels a need to put them into a kind of historical and religious perspective for himself, to include them in the record of his religious struggle. In that context they take on the importance of milestones in the slow forward movement of the human spirit, both in external history (Historie) and in Lawrence's own "internal" history (Geschichte).[2] Lawrence does try to locate any imperfections or incompleteness he senses in a painting, any lack of balance; but his deepest attitude towards artists and their work he states near the end of Chapter VIII, a reminder at the conclusion of this discussion that we are not to mistake his purpose.

> . . . in his art no artist ever could blaspheme the Holy Spirit, the Reconciler. Only a dogmatist could do that.
>
> (pp. 472-473)

Taken in isolation, the statement is confusing. Understood in the context of the "Study", it is all-important. A work of art is here identified with the poppy, with the man who in his wholeness contains the opposing forces of male and female, Love and Law, movement and stability. It is a condition of creation that these forces are never in perfect balance - at least, never for long - but it is the glory of living things that they find their very being in the repeated struggle, interchange and consummation of these opposites. Lawrence here states his conviction that a great work of art is a kind of living thing, not reducible to simple abstractions. In the life of its own that it leads, unbalance and unequal tension may appear, but the effort towards perfect being, completeness, is never entirely obscured. The great painting is never static or dead; it records its own struggle into life, into creation. Thus, Lawrence's criticism is always trying to understand the nature of the artist's struggle as recorded in the painting he sees before him.

It is interesting to compare with the "Study" Kenneth Clark's Civilisation and Bernard Berenson's Italian Painters of the Renaissance. Clark's Civilisation is the recent attempt of a well-known art critic to understand his own position in relation to a rich tradition - past civilisation in all its aspects - and to a confusing, frightening present which seems ready to jettison its entire cultural heritage in order to travel more swiftly towards its goal of self-destruction. The full title of the book is Civilisation: A Personal View. Kenneth Clark's interest in art, religion, literature, architecture and philosophy in his endeavour to

determine what it is that makes civilisation possible - civilisation is defined in terms of "creative power and the enlargement of human faculties"[3] - immediately suggests parallels with Lawrence's "Study of Thomas Hardy". In spite of their frequently different perspectives, their basic questions are similar. What is full human life and what makes it possible? Where can we find such life expressed in the past? Clark begins with the same opposition that seemed so important to Lawrence, that between the need for self-preservation and the need for expression and fulfilment of the spirit.

> . . . at certain epochs man has felt conscious of something about himself - body and spirit - which was outside the day-to-day struggle for existence and the night-to-night struggle with fear; and he has felt the need to develop these qualities of thought and feeling so that they might approach as nearly as possible to an ideal of perfection 4

Bernard Berenson's book is a standard work on the Renaissance. The four essays which make up the book were originally written and published between 1894 and 1907. Lawrence quite possibly could have read them before he wrote the "Study" (although there is no certain evidence that he did), especially since he was interested in painting and tried his hand at it with some seriousness when he was young, trying to learn at first by copying carefully from reproductions of English water-colour artists.[5] Perhaps he read Berenson's Italian Painters of the Renaissance later, when he was considering writing A History of Italian Painting for Children in the summer of 1921, a project he was asked to undertake by De Gray on behalf of the Medici Society.[6] Unfortunately, the plan was abandoned after a few months; the book would have been an interesting addition to Lawrence's art criticism in the "Study" and would have been perhaps even more fascinating than the "Study" to compare and contrast with Berenson.

At any rate, it is clear that Lawrence had read Berenson by the time he wrote the essay "Art and Morality" in 1925, for he lists in the essay all of the terms Berenson so painstakingly defines in Italian Painters of the Renaissance.

> It's all very well talking about decoration and illustration, significant form, or tactile values, or plastique, or movement, or space-composition, or colour-mass relations, afterwards. You might as well force your guest to eat the menu-card, at the end of the dinner. 7

Lawrence is impatient with art criticism which creates a rigid terminology for talking about pictures and then limits or distorts the pictures to make them fit into pre-established categories. There is a sense of compulsion about such a procedure - art must be this or that - which does not allow for work which is genuinely new and which does not meet the critic's requirements.[8] Lawrence, in his best art criticism, approaches the specific situation of the painter and his specific achievement without a set idea beforehand of what great art should do or should be like. He tries to ask "what was the particular situation for this artist?" "What was he trying to do?" "Why did he do this?" "How did he accomplish it?" This last question, especially, is a question about technique, technique understood as the invention that grows out of a need to say something, the discovery of the effective way to say it.

In posing these questions, however, Lawrence does develop and use a kind of terminology. The words he uses are simple ones - such as male, female, movement, stability, light, darkness; a first step in evaluating Lawrence's criticism is to evaluate and understand these "terms" and the weight he gives them, and Berenson's book is especially helpful in this regard.

Throughout the "Study" Lawrence has slowly been building up a context - based on the real world of politics, work, self-preservation, art, religion, war and poppies, and on the fictional world of Hardy's characters - in which his perception of polarity can have meaning. It is easy to forget that the particulars of his experience and not the abstracted opposites came first. The first clearly stated pair of opposites is in Chapter VI - male and female. Movement and stability are implied there, but not expressly stated until Chapter VII, as the Will-to-Motion and the Will-to-Inertia. Judaism and Christianity, flesh and spirit, are discussed in their male and female aspects in Chapter VII, but the terms Law and Love, the Father and the Son are not used in any carefully defined way until Chapter VIII; the opposition between light and dark is developed in this chapter as well.

Thus, the only "specialised" terms used in the art criticism in Chapter VII are movement and stability, flesh and spirit, male and female. In Chapter VIII the art criticism centres on the light/dark opposition, but the language of the preceding chapter carries resonance as well.

Are these terms useful in talking about paintings?

"Movement about a centre of rest" - "the Object, with its Movement content"

Let us examine the terms of Chapter VII first - movement and stability, flesh and spirit, male and female. Bernard Berenson speaks of art as "life-enhancing" and tries to explain what he means.

> What is this mysterious life-conserving virtue - in what does it consist? The answer is brief - in life itself. If the artist can cunningly seize upon the spirit of life and imprison it in his paintings, his works, barring material accidents, will live for ever. If he contrives to give range to this spirit, to make it leap out, to mingle with and increase the life in

> our veins, then, for as long as we remain humanized beings, he will hold us in his thrall. 9

But how does an artist do this? Is it merely high-flown rhetoric to speak of "imprisoning the spirit of life" in a painting? Berenson anticipates this question.

> This particular life-communicating quality is in the figure arts to be attained by the rendering of form and movement 10

Before trying to define more carefully what Berenson meant by the "rendering of form and movement" - and it was obviously very important to him, as he wrote that "successful grappling with problems of form and movement is at the bottom of all the higher arts"[11] - let us see how Lawrence begins his discussion of the Renaissance. He wrote of the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, the art of architecture "whose essence is in utter stability", and of the imps, gargoyles and little figures carved within the cathedral that mocked at its great stability, in lively movement "declared for multiplicity, polygeny" (p. 454).

> But all medieval art has the static, architectural, absolute quality, in the main, even whilst in detail it is differentiated and distinct. Such is Dürer, for example. When his art succeeds, it conveys the sense of Absolute Movement, movement proper only to the given form, and not relative to other movements. It portrays the Object, with its Movement content, and not the movement which contains in one of its moments the Object. (p. 454) 12

In Renaissance art, however, there was a perfect union of (male) movement and (female) stability for a moment, a balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces finding "its highest utterance perhaps in Botticelli, as in his Nativity of the Saviour, in our National Gallery".

> Still there is the architectural composition, but what an outburst of movement from the source of motion. The

> Infant Christ is a centre, a radiating spark of movement, the Virgin is bowed in Absolute Movement, the earthly father, Joseph, is folded up, like a clod or a boulder, obliterated, whilst the Angels fly round in ecstasy, embracing and linking hands.
>
> The bodily father is almost obliterated. As balance to the Virgin Mother he is there, presented, but silenced, only the movement of his loin conveyed. He is not the male. The male is the radiant infant, over which the mother leans. They two are the ecstatic centre, the complete origin, the force which is both centrifugal and centripetal.
>
> This is the joyous utterance of the Renaissance, to which we listen for ever. (p. 455)

Lawrence centres his discussion here on the change in art from portraying "the Object, with its Movement content" to portraying "the movement which contains in one of its moments the Object". The change becomes more evident in Correggio. "In him the development from gesture to articulate expression was continued, unconsciously, the movement from the symbolic to the representation went on in him, from the object to the animate creature" (p. 455). Correggio paints more from knowledge of the actual world than from aspiration or intuition; he moves from symbolism towards realism, from religious towards secular art.

> . . . Correggio's chief business is to portray the woman of his own experience and knowledge, rather than the woman of his aspiration and fear . . . the woman is henceforth part of a stream of movement, she is herself a stream of movement, carried along with himself. He sees everything as motion, retarded perhaps by the flesh, or by the stable being of this life in the body . . . .
>
> Thus Correggio leads on to the whole of modern art . . . . Ever there is more and more vibration, movement, and less and less stability, centralization. Ever man is more and more occupied with his own experience, with his own overpowering of resistance, ever less and less aware of any resistance in the object, less and less aware of any stability, less and less aware of anything unknown, more and more preoccupied with that which he knows, till his

> knowledge tends to become an abstraction, because it is limited by no unknown. (p. 456)

Lawrence sees art developing in two main directions in the Renaissance, one towards movement and the other towards almost architectural form and stability.

> Botticelli develops to Correggio and to Andrea del Sarto, develops forward to Rembrandt, and Rembrandt to the Impressionists, to the male extreme of motion. But Botticelli, on the other hand, becomes Raphael, Raphael and Michelangelo. In Raphael we see the stable, architectural developing out further, and becoming the geometric: the denial or refusal of all movement . . . . In Botticelli, the architecture remains, but there is the wonderful movement outwards, the joyous, if still clumsy, escape from the centre. (p. 457)

When he uses the terms male and female in relation to the paintings, the terms are intimately connected with his idea of the opposition of movement and stability.

> The goal of the male impulse is the announcement of motion, endless motion, endless diversity, endless change. The goal of the female impulse is the announcement of infinite oneness, of infinite stability. When the two are working in combination, as they must in life, there is, as it were, a dual motion, centrifugal for the male, fleeing abroad, away from the centre, onward to infinite vibration, and centripetal for the female, fleeing in to the eternal centre of rest . A combination of the two movements produces a sum of motion and stability at once, satisfying. But in life there tends always to be more of one than the other. (p. 457)

This interaction of movement and stability, male and female, in a human being helps explain why we like to speak of spirit and flesh in an individual. The body has weight and resistance, the spirit is untrammelled, mobile and free. "The body it is which attaches us directly to the female . . . the pure male is himself almost an abstraction, almost bodiless, like Shelley," (p. 459). Man cannot be "pure male", however; he cannot have

pure spirit or movement apart from the stability of the flesh. Lawrence criticised (and reverenced) Shelley for being "so transcendently male".

> Why should Shelley say of the skylark:
> "Hail to thee, blithe Spirit! - bird thou never wert!" ?
> Why should he insist on the bodilessness of beauty, when we cannot know of any save embodied beauty? Who would wish that the skylark were not a bird, but a spirit? If the whistling skylark were a spirit, then we should all wish to be spirits. Which were impious and flippant . . . it were impious to wish to be like angels. So long as mankind exists it must exist in the body, and so long must each body pertain both to the male and the female. (p. 459)

Human beings, finding that life involves a combination of contrary principles - flesh and spirit, female and male, stability and movement - require an art which also shall be honest to these polarities. Bernard Berenson, in an essay entitled Seeing and Knowing, complained that the abstract nature of modern art was a result of the triumph of knowing over seeing which excluded "the sensible, sensuous, sensual world of the eye" [13] - the triumph of knowledge which "tends to become an abstraction, because it is limited by no unknown" ("Study", p. 456). Such a triumph of mind over matter defeated the entire purpose of the visual arts.

> For many thousands of years visual art has been based on ideated sensations, on a compromise between what one knows and what one sees and between what one sees and what one can reproduce for others. It therefore would seem to correspond to a continuous need or desire or demand of human nature, of man who is matter and spirit, body as well as mind. 14

Berenson believes that we need to realise a painting with our bodies as well as our minds and that the artist makes this possible by the "rendering of form and movement". The word "form" (or "tactile values") "refers to all the more static sources of life - enhancement, such as

volume, bulk, inner substance, and texture. The various communications of energy - as effective, of course, in presentations of repose as of action - are referred to under 'movement'".[15] Berenson, in a judgment remarkably similar to Lawrence's, locates Botticelli's true genius in his "unparalleled power of perfectly combining values of touch with values of movement" and praises Botticelli's functional line which seems almost to convey pure values of movement abstracted.[16] But why does Berenson consider these values of touch and of movement to be so important? "Tactile values" is the term he tries to explain first.

> . . . form in the figure arts gives us pleasure because it has extracted and presented to us the corporeal and structural significance of objects more quickly and more completely than we - unless, indeed, we also be great artists, or see as they see - could have grasped them by ourselves. This intimate realization of an object comes to us only when we unconsciously translate our retinal impressions of it into ideated sensations of touch, pressure and grasp - hence the phrase "tactile values". 17

Why should our more complete realisation of the "corporeal and structural significance of objects" give us any lasting pleasure? Berenson's emphasis on "tactile values" ultimately rests on the nature of perception in human beings, the way we learn to judge and trust reality.

> Psychology has ascertained that sight alone gives us no accurate sense of the third dimension. In our infancy long before we are conscious of the process, the sense of touch, helped on by muscular sensations of movement, teaches us to appreciate depth, the third dimension, both in objects and in space.
>
> In the same unconscious years we learn to make of touch, of the third dimension, the test of reality. The child is still dimly aware of the intimate connexion between touch and the third dimension. He cannot persuade himself of the unreality of Looking-Glass Land until he has touched the back of the mirror. Later, we entirely forget the connexion, although it remains true that

> every time our eyes recognize reality, we are, as a matter of fact, giving tactile values to retinal impressions. 18

In other words, from what we see, we construct the third dimension unconsciously, almost automatically, because we have learned to trust certain retinal impressions as signifying certain real configurations in space. We add to what we see, what we know from past experience. Thus, every act of perception is to some degree creative. It is not a mere passive registering of sense data, but an active selection of details judged from past experience to be important in truthfully realising the object or objects before us as real entities having solidity and weight.

The artist has to construct this depth-dimension consciously, selecting and creating visual patterns in such a way that our eye is convinced of the depth and substance of what we are seeing. A painting should "appeal to our tactile imagination, thereby compelling us, as do all things that stimulate our sense of touch while they present themselves to our eyes, to take their existence for granted . . . and it is only when we can take for granted the existence of the object painted that it can begin to give us pleasure that is genuinely artistic, as separated from the interest we feel in symbols".[19]

Berenson should not be understood here as recommending a kind of precise realism or naturalism[20]; he emphasises the fact that the great artist does much more than paint objects as they really are. "Art . . . must give us not the mere reproductions of things but a quickened sense of capacity for realizing them".[21] Paintings can give us a keener sense of reality than the original objects themselves; the artist, by selecting and

emphasizing those points of a scene or of an object which he feels the observer would need to select and isolate in real life in order to realize the scene or object - or to see it as the artist did - helps us to realize the object much more quickly and completely. By selecting aspects of the reality which we ordinarily would not, he perhaps teaches us to see the reality in a new way. When we realize forms more quickly and intensely or see them in a new way, we have a feeling of increased capacity for seeing.

This process of selectivity in the artist requires what Berenson terms a delicate and sure "sense of the significant", a quality which he felt Giotto possessed to a very great degree.

> With the simplest means, with almost rudimentary light and shade, and functional line, he contrives to render, out of all the possible outlines, out of all the possible variations of light and shade that a given figure may have, only those that we must isolate for special attention when we are actually realizing it.

Giotto's paintings stimulate our tactile imaginations much more rapidly and forcefully than the figures painted could affect us themselves if we ran across them in actuality, thus "confirming in every way our feeling of capacity for coping with things - for life, in short".[22] Giotto's accomplishment was to paint in a way that gave genuinely artistic pleasure, as opposed to literary, philosophical or theological pleasure; he was not merely illustrating a story, painting interesting characters with expressive faces, or presenting us with philosophical or theological symbols. He was rendering "the material and spiritual significance of forms".[23]

Berenson stresses the difference between the "decorative" and "illustrative" elements in art. Decoration consists of all the elements in a painting that appeal to the senses (such as colour or tone) or give us

sensations of form and movement. Illustration consists of all the more literary qualities in a painting, everything in a work of art which appeals to us not for the intrinsic quality of the work itself but for the value which the thing represented has elsewhere, whether in the outside world or in the mind. The illustrative elements will be of transitory value, immediately accessible and meaningful only until the ideals and myths of the age change; the decorative values will endure. They are permanent, as "perdurable as the psychic processes themselves".[24] Berenson does not deny the importance and beauty of the work of our great illustrators - the greatest of these he judges to be Raphael - but he reserves his highest praise for those who concentrate on what is of permanent value in the visual arts, the "grappling with problems of form and of movement". Giotto is the true pioneer in the art of the Renaissance.

> What is it to render the tactile values of an object but to communicate its material significance? A painter who, after generations of mere manufacturers of symbols, illustrations and allegories had the power to render the material significance of the objects he painted, must, as a man, have had a profound sense of the significant. 25

Giotto was not, however, quite so successful in rendering values of movement as he was in rendering values of solidity and form. Painting the material significance of an object is perhaps not so difficult as extracting the significance of its movement and painting that. A moving figure is not stable in reality; the artist cannot freeze it in motion and thus capture the line of movement. Even if he could, that one frozen moment would not necessarily suggest the true continuing motion of the figure. The artist must try so to render "the one particular movement that we shall be able to realize all other movements that the same figure may make".[26]

Once again, out of all the possible outlines or variations of light and shade a figure in movement may have, the artist must select those that we must isolate for special attention when we are actually realising it. Berenson cites Pollaiuolo's Battle of the Nudes as one of the greatest renderings of movement in Western art. What is the special pleasure that it gives us? - "the heightening of vitality which comes to us whenever we keenly realize life, such as the actuality itself would give us, plus the greater effectiveness of the heightening brought about by the clearer, intenser, and less fatiguing realization".[27]

Thus, Berenson felt that form and movement gave the essential value to a work of art. The two - form and movement - needed to be balanced in art in order to convey a true sense of life. It was the fortunate balance between Donatello (who was more interested in rendering movement) and Masaccio (who was more interested in rendering tactile values) which helped to form the Renaissance canon of the human figure. Donatello's influence alone, carried to an extreme, would have ended in a more abstract linear design like Japanese art, attempting to convey pure movement. Masaccio's influence carried to an extreme would have been too solid, static and monumental.[28] However, the influence of the two of them on the visual arts helped to create the human figure as we know it - a form with weight and resistance, shape and substance, but with the breath of life breathed into it - power, vitality, mobility. "Unless it satisfies our tactile imagination, a picture will not exert the fascination of an ever-heightened reality".[29] Unless it awakens our sense of movement and vitality, it will not compel our belief in its separate and inexhaustible life. But if energy animates palpable substance, if movement stirs in the solid mass, a world

is created, one into which we can enter again and again with wonder and delight, our senses heightened, our feet eager to walk in this new-found reality - a reality perhaps totally unlike, in form and in energy, anything we've known or even envisioned before. One can exhaust the ideas, the emotions, even the "beauty" of a painting in time; one cannot exhaust the unknown reality of a living thing. "The real triumphs of art are reserved for those who exploit the elemental, eternal, inexhaustible resources of Form and Movement".[30]

Reading Berenson leads one to reflect how remarkably un-literary Lawrence's comments on painting are, even by Berenson's own strict criteria. The tendency of writers who look at paintings and write about them is to extract a kind of literary pleasure from the experience, analysing the philosophical or religious ideas embodied in a painting, meditating on the story it illustrates or perhaps creating a story from the painting, inspired by the facial expressions, attitudes and situations portrayed. A very clear idea of the nature of this kind of criticism can be obtained by comparing Walter Pater's chapter on Sandro Botticelli in The Renaissance to Lawrence's comments on Botticelli in the "Study". Pater discusses the influence of Hellenic thought on Botticelli; his interest in Dante and Boccaccio and his illustrations of the Inferno; his importance as a "visionary painter", painting his visions so all may share them;[31] and his possible fascination with the heretical ideas of Matteo Palmieri's "La Citta Divina", a poem which "represented the human race as an incarnation of those angels who, in the revolt of Lucifer, were neither for Jehovah nor for His enemies".[32] From this last tentative supposition, Pater goes on to look at some of Botticelli's paintings, creating from the facial expressions and attitudes of the figures

little stories that nicely fit into Palmieri's heresy about the nature of humanity. All of Botticelli's people seem to have "the wistfulness of exiles"; they are "like angels, but with a sense of displacement or loss about them". They seem to be "saddened perpetually by the shadow upon them of the great things from which they shrink".[33] Pater is very interested in the emotions of the figures Botticelli paints, the sadness of the Venus rising from the sea, the troubled gaze of his Madonnas.

> Her trouble is in the very caress of the mysterious child, whose gaze is always far from her, and who has already that sweet look of devotion which men have never been able altogether to love . . . . Once, indeed, he guides her hand to transcribe in a book the words of her exaltation, the Ave, and the Magnificat, the Gaude Maria, and the young angels, glad to rouse her for a moment from her dejection, are eager to hold the inkhorn and to support the book. But the pen almost drops from her hand, and the high cold words have no meaning for her, and her true children are those others, among whom, in her rude home, the intolerable honor came to her, with that look of wistful inquiry on their irregular faces which you see in startled animals - gipsy children, such as those who, in Apennine villages, still hold out their long, brown arms to beg of you, but on Sundays become enfants du choeur, with their thick black hair nicely combed, and fair white linen on their sunburnt throats. 34

(See Botticelli's Our Lady of the Magnificat, on page 420 above)

Pater writes sensitive, evocative prose; his reflections on Botticelli are suggestive. It is a testimony to the life and complexity of Botticelli's work that varied responses can be made to it, a literary response among them. However, except for a few phrases about "the charm of line and color" in Botticelli's work, there is little in Pater's essay to remind us that it is a painter that he is discussing - a philosopher,

a poet, a visionary, yes, but why did he make pictures instead of poems or philosophical discourses? Pater makes intelligent, interesting observations about Botticelli, but he does not go far enough. The omission seems even more glaring when we turn to the opening page of the essay where Pater states his purpose in writing it.

> What is the peculiar sensation, what is the peculiar quality of pleasure, which his work has the property of exciting in us, and which we cannot get elsewhere? For this is always the chief question which a critic has to answer. 35

Surely this "peculiar quality of pleasure" must have something to do with the fact that Botticelli painted, rather than wrote stories, poems or essays in philosophy.

It is most likely the absence of this literary quality in Lawrence's criticism that strikes us as strange and makes his approach seem unfamiliar.[36] He speaks of the paintings in terms of stability and movement, substance and force, weight and gesture, light, shadow, and outline, mass and balance; he does not tell us stories about the pictures or catalogue the philosophical ideas embodied in them. He gives us little information about the life of the artist, except as, in his opinion, it directly involves his struggle to paint. He omits much that would help us understand the paintings more completely, but he goes directly to the centre of the painter's struggle as he perceives it and this is his particular strength.[37]

However, although Lawrence takes an extraordinarily painterly interest in the pictures he discusses (as opposed to a literary interest), he does not lose himself in the jargon of oil painting technique (a look at pages 582-583 in Phoenix, from "Introduction to These Paintings", will show

that Lawrence was thoroughly equipped to do so, had he wished it). His attempt to understand what is distinctive in each artist's way of seeing necessarily involves some questions of technique, but the ability to analyse the necessary skills involved in painting a picture gets no closer to the essential statement of the artist than a literary analysis does. The American painter, Robert Henri, suggests that if the techniques of painting were understood and used by everyone, the emphasis would fall where it should.

> Art after all is but an extension of language to the expression of sensations too subtle for words.
>
> And we will acquire this greater power of revealing ourselves!
>
> All the forms of art are to be a common language, and the artist will no longer distinguish himself by his tricks of painting, but must take rank only by the weight and the beauty of what he expresses with the wise use of the languages of art universally known. 38

What, then, are the essential things one is to look for in a painting? Robert Henri, in the little book The Art Spirit which collects his notes, articles, fragments of letters and talks to students, says "the study of art is the study of the relative value of things". He believes that a truer valuing and appreciation of art in society would mean "a greater living, a greater humanity, a finer sense of relation through all things".[39] Lawrence, in some of his later essays on the novel - "Why the Novel Matters", "Morality and the Novel" - expresses his idea of the purpose of a novel with similar clarity.

> The Novel is the highest example of subtle inter-relatedness that man has discovered. Everything is true in its own time, place, circumstance, and untrue outside of its own place, time, circumstance.

> If you try to nail anything down, in the novel, either it kills the novel, or the novel gets up and walks away with the nail. 40

In the same essay, Lawrence speaks of van Gogh's Sunflowers and insists that the painting is not meant only as a representation of sunflowers or only as an expression of van Gogh.

> The vision of the canvas is a third thing, utterly intangible and inexplicable, the offspring of the sunflower itself and van Gogh himself . . . . It is a revelation of the perfected relation, at a certain moment, between a man and a sunflower . . . .
>
> And this perfected relation between man and his circumambient universe is life itself, for mankind. It has the fourth-dimensional quality of eternity and perfection. Yet it is momentaneous.
>
> Man and the sunflower both pass away from the moment, in the process of forming a new relationship. The relation between all things changes from day to day, in a subtle stealth of change. Hence art, which reveals or attains to another perfect relationship, will be for ever new . . . .
>
> If we think about it, we find that our life consists in this achieving of a pure relationship between ourselves and the living universe about us. 41

In "Art and Morality" Lawrence wrote,

> Design, in art, is a recognition of the relation between various things, various elements in the creative flux. You can't invent a design. You recognize it, in the fourth dimension. That is, with your blood and your bones, as well as with your eyes. 42

Lawrence does not express these ideas so clearly in the "Study" but he obviously is working towards them, trying to understand paintings in terms of the inter-relations of various elements - solid form and movement, light and darkness, what he also calls "the aspiration and the resistant" (p. 478). He also speaks of the interaction of male and female qualities in a work of art, and for many readers the most disturbing

resonance in Lawrence's art-critic vocabulary is this male/female one. Lawrence's conception of male and female principles is of opposing and collaborating psychic forces within the individual. The balance between these forces is never perfect in a human being but the attempt to achieve such a balance may be more or less intense, more or less difficult, more or less creative. It involves relationships with other people, religious aspiration, purposive activity and perhaps further creative work in the arts. A basic assumption of Lawrence's discussion of Botticelli, Raphael, Michelangelo, Correggio, Rembrandt and Turner is that, since all of them struggled to express themselves and to make further discoveries about life in their art, in none of them was the desire for a creative balance between male and female qualities completely satisfied in physical marriage with a woman. Their aspiration, and thus their religious needs, were more extreme.

> In what we call happy natures, in the lazy, contented people, there is a fairly equable balance of sex. There is sufficient of the female in the body of such a man as to leave him fairly free . . . . It is obvious even from the physique of such a man that in him there is a proper proportion between male and female, so that he can be easy, balanced and without excess. . . . A man who is well balanced between male and female, in his own nature, is, as a rule, happy, easy to mate, easy to satisfy, and content to exist. It is only a disproportion, or a dissatisfaction, which makes the man struggle into articulation. (pp. 459-460)

The form which this attention to male and female qualities is apt to take in the art criticism can be seen in the following passage on Raphael's Madonna degli Ansidei.

> What we call the Truth is, in actual experience, that momentary state when in living the union between the male and the female is consummated. This consummation may be also physical, between the male body and the female body. But it may be only spiritual, between the male and female spirit.

> And the symbol by which Raphael expresses this moment of consummation is by a dark, strong shaft or column leaping up into, and almost transgressing a faint, radiant, inclusive ellipse . . . . This column must always stand for the male aspiration, the arch or ellipse for the female completeness containing this aspiration. And the whole picture is a geometric symbol of the consummation of life. (p. 460)

How can Lawrence make statements like this? What do they mean?

Of course, speculation about the relation of the male and female principles to art are not uncommon. Kenneth Clark, although admittedly his conception of "feminine qualities" is more limited and superficial than Lawrence's (in the context of the following quotation they seem to consist mainly in the ability to be a gracious hostess and carry on a polite conversation - as the usual connotations of the word "feminine" might suggest) believed "it absolutely essential to civilisation that the male and female principles be kept in balance".[43] Speaking of the importance of the cult of the Virgin, Clark wrote:

> The stabilising, comprehensive religions of the world, the religions which penetrate to every part of a man's being - in Egypt, India or China - gave the female principle of creation at least as much importance as the male, and wouldn't have taken seriously a philosophy that failed to include them both. These were all what H. G. Wells called communities of obedience. The aggressive, nomadic societies - what he called communities of will - Israel, Islam, the Protestant North, conceived their gods as male. It's a curious fact that the all-male religions have produced no religious imagery - in most cases have positively forbidden it. The great religious art of the world is deeply involved with the female principle. 44

It is a curious fact indeed - and one that Lawrence should have taken into account in his discussion of Judaism's female qualities (e.g. where is Israel's visual art?). However, Kenneth Clark's statement of the close relationship between art and the female principle certainly squares with

Lawrence's view of the female insistence on the body, matter, embodied rather than bodiless, spiritual beauty ("we cannot know of any save embodied beauty", p. 459). The male/female terminology would thus certainly seem to have an appropriate place in the discussion of art.

The acceptance of the female principle involves the acceptance of earth, of matter, of the body - the "resistant". When male aspiration works in combination with the female weight and resistance of matter, whether it be the stone of a sculptor, the oils and canvas of a painter, the verbal rhythms of a poet, a living thing takes shape. Lawrence expresses the importance for art of this acceptance of female form by remarking on the change from the medieval concern with the crucifixion to the Renaissance delight in the annunciation or the Madonna and Child.

> During the medieval times, the God had been Christ on the Cross, the Body Crucified, the flesh destroyed, the Virgin Chastity combating Desire . . . .
>
> But now, with the Renaissance . . . there was a great outburst of joy, and the theme was not Christ Crucified, but Christ born of Woman, the Infant Saviour and the Virgin; or of the Annunciation, the Spirit embracing the flesh in pure embrace.
>
> This was the perfect union of male and female, in this the hands met and clasped, and never was such a manifestation of Joy. (pp. 454-455) 45

"The Spirit embracing the flesh in pure embrace", the artist's aspiration taking definite shape through the resistance of his medium - from such interaction a human being or a work of art is born. For Lawrence, the richness and variety of Renaissance art comes from this creative balance between male and female qualities, expressed most forcefully in the numerous paintings of the Madonna and Child.

> The male is the radiant infant, over which the mother leans. They two are the ecstatic centre, the complete origin, the force which is both centrifugal and centripetal.
>
> This is the joyous utterance of the Renaissance, to which we listen forever . . . . It is the utterance of complete, perfect religious art, unwilling, perhaps, when the true male and the female meet. (p. 455)

Lawrence's suggestion here of the profound reasons for the frequent portrayal of the Madonna and Child in the Renaissance seems to me extraordinarily convincing. It was a time when great spiritual faith coincided with a great awakening faith in the capacities of man and renewed enjoyment of life on earth, life in the flesh; there was a moment of perfect balance between body and spirit in man, between the flesh given him by woman and the further life in the spirit opened to him by Christ.

This perception of the Madonna and Child as "the ecstatic centre, the complete origin", the union between male and female principles, strikes us as peculiarly Lawrence's own, another example of the creative and individual nature of his criticism. A common view is that the critic should abjure such creativity, should simply place himself humbly at the service of the artist he is studying; but even if it were possible to eliminate one's personal perspective and one's moments of creative discovery from critical study, it would not really be desirable. In fact, it would make true study impossible, as the following passage from Robert Henri's The Art Spirit helps make clear.

> The fact is that a picture in any way, in color, form, or in its whole ensemble but sends out agents that stimulate a creation which takes place in the consciousness of the observer.

> That is the reason association with works of art is enjoyable.
>
> It is also the reason they tire some and irritate others . . . .
>
> All manifestations of art are but landmarks in the progress of the human spirit toward a thing but as yet sensed and far from being possessed.
>
> The man who has honesty, integrity, the love of inquiry, the desire to see beyond, is ready to appreciate good art. He needs no one to give him an art education; he is already qualified. He needs but to see pictures with his active mind, look into them for the things that belong to him, and he will find soon enough in himself an art connoisseur and an art lover of the first order. 46

Henri is saying that all study, all perception of works of art is necessarily creative; the value of a man's art criticism depends on the energy, the truthfulness and penetration of this perception, this active comprehension of a work as a unified whole. One should not try to be as pedestrian as possible, to eliminate insofar as one can all traces of individual viewpoint. It is one's particular, individual viewpoint which is valuable and irreplaceable. As long as one is responding to the paintings themselves, not trying to fit them rigidly into a preconceived intellectual framework, but letting them challenge, change or extend one's own attitudes, beliefs and ideas, you should nourish and try carefully to distinguish your original response (see the passage by Pater at the beginning of this chapter).

One of the first questions raised about Lawrence's art criticism in this chapter was whether or not he was distorting the paintings he discussed in order to fit them into a preconceived schema. An attempt to answer this question might be helped by some reflection on the impression of each artist left in one's mind at the conclusion of Chapter VIII of the

"Study". A reader might be surprised at the realisation that each painter has been conveyed to him as distinct and different from every other one. Far from pressing the artists into set categories or making them sound all vaguely alike, a close examination of the discussion of the works of each man reveals how sensitively Lawrence has dealt with each artist on his own terms. Lawrence tries to understand each painter's special quality and to isolate and emphasise it. He lacks the propagandist spirit which tries to praise one artist above all by disparaging the others; instead, Lawrence believes that by appreciating one artist's paintings in relation to those of another, that which is truly distinctive in each will come to light. That which can be understood from one point of view as a painter's limitation can be seen from another as an indispensable element of his particular strength.

For instance, what Lawrence finds most remarkable in Botticelli is the wonderful movement conveyed in his Mystic Nativity.[47] "What an outburst of movement from the source of motion" (p. 455). This marvellous expression of line and movement can be understood more fully if Botticelli's art is set against the medieval art which preceded him and the work of Raphael which came after him. Lawrence sees medieval art on the whole as very similar in character to the medieval expression in architecture, the great cathedrals. "All medieval art has the static, architectural, absolute quality, in the main, even whilst in detail it is differentiated and distinct" (p. 454). Think of the symbolic, diagrammatic quality of illuminated manuscripts and of Berenson's comment on Giotto's remarkable achievement in moving beyond them -"a painter who, after generations of mere manufacturers of symbols, illustrations and allegories had the power to render the material significance of the objects he painted" (see page 438 (above).

In Botticelli, "still there is the architectural composition" (p. 457), but the expression of the significant movement, the life of the scene, is predominant. Most clearly can this mobile quality be sensed if we compare the Mystic Nativity to Raphael's Ansidei Madonna or to his Crucifixion, also in the National Gallery.

> In Raphael we see the stable, architectural developing out further, and becoming the geometric: the denial or refusal of all movement. 48 In the Madonna degli Ansidei the child is drooping, the mother stereotyped, the picture geometric, static, abstract . . . .
>
> In Botticelli, the architecture remains, but there is the wonderful movement outwards, the joyous, if still clumsy, escape from the centre. (p. 457)

The source of this motion is the Infant Christ, "a radiating spark of movement" (p. 455); in the Ansidei Madonna, however, the child is "drooping". Look at Raphael's paintings on pages 414 and 415 above and at Botticelli's Mystic Nativity (page 412). Raphael's denial of movement - of the (male) centrifugal force "fleeing abroad, away from the centre" and the (female) centripetal force "fleeing in to the eternal centre of rest" - results in what Lawrence calls "Raphael's terrible, dead certainty" (p. 472). In the Ansidei Madonna and the Crucifixion the human element is subservient to the architectural or geometric element. The human beings almost become architectural forms themselves; they are perfectly balanced against each other, even the ribbons of the angels on either side of the cross are shaped and evenly weighted with the precision of bent steel wire. Figures are stylised and heavily mannered, each gesture fixed and heavy with meaning. Raphael's Madonna is contained in the greater structure. As Lawrence says, she is ringed "round with pure geometry, till she becomes herself almost of the geometric figure, an abstraction. The picture becomes a great ellipse crossed by a dark column . . . . The Madonna herself is almost insignificant.

She and the child are contained within the shaft thrust across the ellipse" (p. 460). All the figures are contained within the solid repose of the rounded arch above them. Raphael's Crucifixion, it should be noted, may also be described as "a great ellipse crossed by a dark column", "the male aspiration" contained within "the female completeness" (p. 460). The rounded arch of Raphael's Crucifixion is like a dome of heaven containing all things; even the sun and moon are contained within it, again, perfectly balanced against one another.[49]

This static, symbolic quality in Raphael can be sensed more forcefully by comparing him not only with Botticelli but also with Correggio. To express the same moment, the birth of the Christ Child to the Virgin,

> Botticelli uses no symbol, but builds up a complicated system of circles, of movements wheeling in their horizontal plane about their fixed centres, the whole builded up dome-shape, and then the dome surpassed by another singing cycle in the open air above.
>
> This is Botticelli always: different cycles of joy, different moments of embrace, different forms of dancing round, all contained in one picture, without solution. He has not solved it yet. (p. 461)

In Correggio, however, not only is there no dome of heaven containing sun and moon, there is also no "singing cycle in the open air above"; there is simply the open sky as we know it in everyday life, empty of angels or symbolic celestial bodies.

> The movement from the symbolic to the representation went on in him. (p. 455)

Correggio conveys a sense of movement even more extreme than that of Botticelli; the architectural composition is almost non-existent. Correggio paints, in the Madonna of the Basket (see page 413 above), no

timeless religious vision but a moment of daily life. There is little symbolic or particularly spiritual about the restless child or the young wife and mother in Correggio's painting compared to the Virgin and Child in Botticelli's Mystic Nativity.

> . . . the Madonna is most thoroughly a wife, the child is most triumphantly a man's child . . . . There is no Virgin worship . . . . He knows his woman. What he is now concerned with is not her great female mystery, but her individual character. The picture has become almost lyrical - it is the woman as he has experienced her. But still she is also unknown, also she is the mystery. But Correggio's chief business is to portray the woman of his own experience and knowledge, rather than the woman of his aspiration and fear. The artist is now concerned with his own experience rather than with his own desire . . . . The Virgin and Child are no longer symbolic, in Correggio: they no longer belong to religious art, but are distinctly secular. The effort is to render the living person, the individual perceived, and not the great aspiration, or an idea. Art now passes from the naive, intuitive stage to the state of knowledge. 50
>
> (pp. 455-456)

Raphael's stasis and abstraction, his distance from the change and the particularity of actual life, become easily apparent when his Madonna is set beside Correggio's. Raphael's Madonna is idealised, distant; Correggio's Madonna is a specific woman, approachable and vulnerable. For Lawrence, Correggio reveals a new movement towards realism, painting from knowledge and from careful attention to life and nature, which leads into the whole of modern art where "there is more and more vibration, movement, and less and less stability, centralization" (p. 456). Andrea del Sarto, Rembrandt and the Impressionists share in this movement towards "the male extreme of motion" and light (p. 457).

However, the comparison with Correggio also emphasises an aspect

of Raphael's unique vision. Lawrence finds Correggio a man "of less force than those other supreme three" - Botticelli, Raphael and Michelangelo (p. 465) - for in gaining the skill of greater realism, the certainty of painting from knowledge of one's own experience, he lost the force of religious aspiration. Lawrence's careful appraisal and appreciation of Raphael's work finds in the artist's idealising tendency not only a limitation but the source of his special strength. Kenneth Clark, along with others, has criticised the effect of Raphael's later work, work in which only noble forms found expression, on painters who followed him.

> . . . the convention by which the great events in biblical or secular history could be enacted only by magnificent physical specimens, handsome and well-groomed, went on for a long time - till the middle of the nineteenth century. Only a very few artists - perhaps only Rembrandt and Caravaggio in the first rank - were independent enough to stand against it. And I think that this convention, which was an element in the so-called grand manner, became a deadening influence on the European mind. It deadened our sense of truth, even our sense of moral responsibility; and led, as we now see, to a hideous reaction. 51

Lawrence also remarks on the stress on idealised forms and on perfect balance and composition which makes the paintings of Raphael seem removed from life as we know it. There is a feeling of abstraction, philosophy, the expression of an idea (all the province of an illustrator) taking precedence over the mysterious reality of living forms. "Raphael, in reaching the pure symbolic solution, has surpassed art and become almost mathematics" (p. 461). The "almost" is important, however. Raphael has approached mathematics and philosophy, but he has not forsaken art and religion.

> Still he is a seeker, an aspirant, still his art is religious art. (p. 458)

The value of Lawrence's criticism of Raphael's Madonna degli Ansidei is that he manages to make the painting sound alive and interesting to us, more alive and interesting than it probably would be to us if we happened to pass it in the National Gallery ourselves. We would perhaps notice only the drooping child, the stereotyped Virgin, the artificial pose of the saints, and pass on. Lawrence, however, pauses to ask why an artist should paint such a picture. What was he trying to discover, to create or re-create? The suggestion of mathematics and of timeless truth of the sort Plato was interested in gives the correct emphasis; Lawrence sees Raphael almost as a kind of mystic whose desire reached far beyond normal human experience and could not be satisfied by ordinary experience. He was interested in stating a pure relation - between male and female, movement and stability - in the same way that a pure mathematician tries to state a conceptual relation, a relation whose value is not determined by its descriptive accuracy but by its intrinsic rationality and beauty.

Such an expression of aspiration, rather than of knowledge and experience, would necessarily involve symbolisation and abstraction, but Lawrence does not make Raphael's struggle to paint, whether it relied on symbolisation or not, sound easy (see page 458 of the "Study"). Raphael succeeded in painting the essence of utter stability, the essence of the female monistic conception of life in which male and female are not separate opposing forces but one flesh, united and locked in marriage. Raphael's idealised painting captured the essence of the female principle and the female conception of marriage more fully than Correggio's much more realistic

portrayal of the Virgin did. To use Lawrence's image of the wheel, Raphael painted a symbol of the absolute rest, the union between movement and stability at the centre, Botticelli painted both the symbolic centre and the wonderful movement and differentiation radiating out from it and Correggio painted only the movement and differentiation of life at the rim of the turning wheel, almost losing hold on the centre completely.[52]

I have tried to suggest how the method of Lawrence's criticism - that of looking at specific paintings closely in relation to each other - results in a careful distinguishing of the unique qualities (limitations and strengths being inextricably interwoven) of each work and in a celebration of differences, an insistence that each artist requires all the others to make clear in comparison the original vision he gives which no one else can give. In Botticelli it is the sense of energy, line and movement. This quality of movement stands out more clearly when juxtaposed to Raphael's expression of pure, restful balance, of final faith attained in the ultimate stability of life, in a unifying force which holds all things together. Raphael's religious statement of stability and order in the universe is made more compelling by a comparison to Correggio's study of a particular woman as she appears in the changing reality of everyday life; yet Correggio's lyrical portrayal of one woman caught in time makes clear how idealised and timeless, how untrue to actual experience, Raphael's Madonnas are. Correggio's realism also emphasises the symbolic element present in Botticelli's painting.

The reader is impressed by the great sense of difference between each of the artists Lawrence discusses; the work of each painter is distinctive, giving something irreplaceable, not to be found so fully

expressed elsewhere. In his study of these specific Renaissance paintings, Lawrence is struck by an increasing development away from medieval stability towards movement, not simply the movement of gesture and line within an architectural composition, as in Botticelli, but in the escape completely from rigid balanced composition towards the more life-like imbalance of Correggio's Madonna of the Basket. Pattern and symbol are replaced by realism, representation.

It is a development parallel to the breakdown of religious faith in an ultimate order, a holding together, into an insistence on knowledge of particulars, "scientific" observation. Religious belief in the reality of meaning, coherence, in the universe is increasingly abandoned for a belief (never fully justified by scientific proof, although it was thought to be) in empiricism and in experimental science where every hypothesis can be tested by readily observable data and either discarded or proven and accepted as fact.

Since wholes are less easily proved than parts, the breakdown continues; all we can know are many disparate facts, a greater order cannot be tested or proven. Living things are no more than the sum of their various parts, biology is to be explained in terms of physics and chemistry. Matter is not what it appears, it is made of many little particles. In fact, matter is really only a form of energy - or energy is only a form of matter. Light is really made of little particles and the way these particles hit upon an object modifies it, the light particles mingle with the particles of the object, no sharp outline or barrier exists between the two.

Representation in art becomes a study of the way light and colour register themselves on the eye, a study of how we see. The object loses its

mysterious separate existence as an unknown which the artist explores, and becomes only a pattern of impressions on his eye, a part of his knowledge and experience.

Correggio is at the beginning of this line of development, but to him the object, the body of the woman he draws, the other being, still has a whole existence apart from him. Female matter, flesh, holds its own against male spirit, knowledge.

> The artist is now concerned with his own experience rather than with his own desire. The female is now more or less within the power and reach of the male. But still she is there, to centralize and control his movement, still the two react and are not resolved. But for the man, the woman is henceforth part of a stream of movement, she is herself a stream of movement, carried along with himself. He sees everything as motion, retarded perhaps by the flesh, or by the stable being of this life in the body. But still man is held and pivoted by the object, even if he tend to wear down the pivot to a nothingness.
>
> Thus Correggio leads on to the whole of modern art, where the male still wrestles with the female, in unconscious struggle, but where he gains ever gradually over her, reducing her to nothing. Ever there is more and more vibration, movement, and less and less stability, centralization. Ever man is more and more occupied with his own experience, with his own overpowering of resistance, ever less and less aware of any resistance in the object, less and less aware of any stability, less and less aware of anything unknown, more and more preoccupied with that which he knows, till his knowledge tends to become an abstraction, because it is limited by no unknown. (p. 456)

"Ever less and less aware of any resistance in the object" - when the existence of solid objects outside oneself is less and less taken for granted, when the perception which comprehends people or things as unified wholes is no longer trusted as a source of true information about the nature of matter, how can an insistence on the rendering of the solidity of an

object, of "tactile values", in art have any meaning? Life is analysed in terms of physics and chemistry, matter is only a certain momentary configuration of energy in space. There is no longer "the Object with its Movement content" but only "the movement which contains in one of its moments the Object" (p. 454).

> The old desire, for movement about a centre of rest, for stability, is gone, and in its place rises the desire for pure ambience, pure spirit of change, free from all laws and conditions of being. (p. 471)

Yeats, writing in 1921, expressed his sense of our modern age similarly - "Things fall apart: the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world."[53]

The attempt to understand the art of such a time can no longer be expressed in terms of movement and stability, the solidity and mobility of the object or of the human body, "movement about a centre of rest". The new art requires - and creates - a new language in which to talk about it.

"An Utterly new conception" - Light and Darkness, "the movement which contains in one of its moments the Object"

> The appreciation of art should not be considered as merely a pleasurable pastime. To apprehend beauty is to work for it. It is a mighty and an entrancing effort, and the enjoyment of a picture is not only in the pleasure it inspires, but in the comprehension of the new order of construction used in its making . . . . To study art is to study order, relative values, to get at fundamental constructive principles. 54

The work of art criticism in Chapter VIII of the "Study" is to try to understand "the new order of construction" used in the post-Renaissance art of Rembrandt and Turner. A comparison of Botticelli's Mystic Nativity with a nativity scene painted by Rembrandt, The Adoration

of the Shepherds in London's National Gallery, shows clearly an important change in the "order of construction". In Botticelli's painting, the light is gentle and diffuse; what organises the work is the movement which radiates from the Christ Child and emphasises him as the true centre of the picture. In the Rembrandt, it is light which radiates from the infant and establishes the rhythm. Lawrence in his attempt to explore the reasons for this change and its implications also enriches his theological reflections. The form of "not-being" with which Jesus' teachings are equated in Chapter VII becomes sensitively understood and appreciated as "The Light of the World" in Chapter VIII; and one of the chief ways in which this deep appreciation is conveyed is through Lawrence's appraisal of Rembrandt, Turner and the Impressionists.

It is only after the Renaissance that Lawrence believes Christianity's full influence upon Western man's life and consciousness really began to be felt and to be expressed in his art. The attempt to escape the stability of matter altogether began then.

> Since the Renaissance, northern humanity has sought for consummation in the spirit . . . . There has been the ever-developing dissolution of form, the dissolving of the solid body within the spirit. He began to break the clear outline of the object, to seek for further marriage, not only between body and body, not the perfect, stable union of body with body, not the utter completeness and accomplishment of architectural form, with its recurrent cycles, but the marriage between body and spirit, or between spirit and spirit. (p. 469)

This is the Christian annunciation, "Light is come into the world" (p. 470).

> Since the Renaissance there has been the striving for the Light, and the escape from the Flesh, from the Body, the Object . . . . In painting, the Spirit, the Word, the Love, all that was represented by John, has appeared as light. Light is the constant symbol of Christ in the

> New Testament. It is light, actual sunlight or the luminous quality of day, which has infused more and more into the defined body, fusing away the outline, absolving the concrete reality, making a marriage, an embrace between the two things, light and object.
>
> (p. 470)

This breaking down of sharp outlines between one thing and another or between an object and the surrounding atmosphere which Lawrence notices is a specific response to the work of particular artists. The Botticelli Nativity has a wonderful purity and precision of line, while in the Rembrandt one form fades into another in the glow of the light and in the play of shadow. In Rembrandt's work, however, there is still a convincing and sensitive suggestion of human form and solidity, of what Berenson would call "tactile values". But, as the outline of the object became more and more blurred in modern abstract art, "tactile values" became less and less a useful term for the discussion of the liquid, shimmering quality of many Impressionist paintings; Berenson's response was not to work to understand the new vocabulary created and demanded by the paintings, but to decide that since such paintings evaded his terminology, they somehow were not proper art.[55]

Lawrence's attitude is quite different. He conveys no sense of compulsion about what art must be, but lets the works themselves enrich and extend our understanding of what art could be. What he feels Rembrandt and Turner were beginning to challenge was one of the most basic beliefs about art, that painting needed to convincingly render the weight and solidity of objects. Kenneth Clark understood Turner's achievement in terms similar to Lawrence's. Turner's new approach, he wrote,

> consisted of transforming everything into pure colour, light rendered as colour . . . . It's quite difficult

> for us to realize what a revolutionary procedure this was. One must remember that for centuries objects were thought to be real because they were solid. You proved their reality by touching or tapping them . . . . And all respectable art aimed at defining this solidity, either by modelling or by a firm outline . . . . Turner declared the independence of colour and thereby added a new faculty to the human mind. 56

Lawrence, in studying Rembrandt's self-portraits, sees this process developing, although still mixed with Rembrandt's marvellous suggestion of human form, the reality of his figures in space. The breaking down of definite outline and the use of light and shadow in Rembrandt's painting can be understood more fully as the new procedures they were by examining the work of artists who influenced him. Chief among these was Caravaggio, whose influence Rembrandt felt indirectly through his teacher, Pieter Lastman. Among Caravaggio's "most widely imitated innovations was a powerful new use of chiaroscuro, the contrasting of light and shadow, by which he unified his complex compositions and obtained highly dramatic, naturalistic effects".[57] Caravaggio's work had such an impact in the Netherlands that a school of Dutch painters was named after him - the Utrecht Caravaggisti.[58] Although Rembrandt never went to Italy and thus probably never saw an original painting by Caravaggio, his teacher, Lastman, had, and the work of the Caravaggisti, which Rembrandt would have had the opportunity to study, also made Caravaggio's influence felt. Yet a comparison between the paintings of Caravaggio and of two of the Caravaggisti, Hendrick Terbrugghen and Gerrit van Honthorst[59], with the later paintings of Rembrandt shows one clear difference - in Rembrandt, the use of precise outlines has almost totally disappeared.

In Botticelli's Mystic Nativity, the outlines of human figures, of stone, wood, cloth, vegetation, are rendered with all the clarity and

precision given by the bright Italian sunlight. In Caravaggio's paintings, lines are also clearly drawn; light and shade are simply a further means of modelling and emphasis within the outline of a form. Rembrandt's earlier work, for instance, The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp, 1632, also uses this sharpness of outline, but by the time he is painting the later self-portraits and the Conspiracy of Julius Civilis (1661-1662), The Jewish Bride (1665), Bathsheba (1654) and the Return of the Prodigal Son (c. 1669)[60], he is doing something quite different. He is blurring the point at which matter and the atmosphere meet, trying to merge the one imperceptibly into the other. In so doing, he gives a most wonderful sense of the roundness and solidity of his figures, of the continuance of the form round to the other side which we cannot see. In his Bathsheba, the line along her neck and shoulder by its very indistinctness gives the full suggestion of the curve of the flesh away from us. His Portrait of the Painter in Old Age (see page 421 above) expresses depth into the canvas so convincingly that one almost feels he has painted the back of the figure as well; there is no sharp break in our vision, our eye seems to travel over his arm and continue around behind it. Of course, outlines do not exist in real life; they have become part of our visual habit. We think we see a clear line where our arm meets the air, but in fact the surface of our arm continues. The outline is a shorthand way of registering objects; it has been used with great expressive force in art but can also become an opportunity for laziness, inattentive seeing.

Thus, what was unique in Rembrandt's mature art was not only the masterly use of chiaroscuro (a comparison of Rembrandt and Caravaggio's paintings also shows how much more subtly, sparingly and therefore effectively

Rembrandt made use of light and shadow; Caravaggio's paintings are often melodramatic, overstated) but the combination of that technique with the elimination of precise outline. An example of both can be seen in one small innovation of Rembrandt's, that of using radiant light as a substitute for the halo around the head of Christ. The thin gold line or the golden disc were to be replaced by a golden glow.[61] Lawrence expresses this achievement accurately when he writes that "with this Light Rembrandt must seek even the marriage of the body . . . . Rembrandt would have married his own flesh to the Spirit, taken the consummate Kiss of the Light upon his fleshly face" (p. 473).[62] His description of Rembrandt's self-portraits, his analysis of their central statement, goes right to the heart of their original order of construction.

> It is the declaration that light is our medium of existence, that where the light falls upon our darkness, there we <u>are</u>: that I am but the point where light and darkness meet and break upon one another. (p. 471)

This obsession with light and with the unreality of definite outline was much more pronounced in Turner's most original work; and Lawrence, with the economy of essential insight, talks about those works in which Turner made his most unique and individual statement; not his romantic or catastrophic landscapes, his mythological subjects or his scenes of boats and the sea. Light and colour rather than form and outline were used as the order of construction, to organise his paintings.

> Rembrandt made the first effort. But art has developed to a clarity since then. It reached its climax in our own Turner . . . . Ever, he sought the Light, to make the light transfuse the body, till the body was carried away, a mere bloodstain, became a ruddy stain of red sunlight within white sunlight. This was perfect consummation in Turner, when, the body gone, the ruddy light meets the

> crystal light in a perfect fusion, the utter dawn, the utter golden sunset, the extreme of all life, where all is One, One-Being, a perfect glowing Oneness . . . . Turner is perfect. Such a picture as his Norham Castle, Sunrise, where only the faintest shadow of life stains the light, is the last word that can be uttered, before the blazing and timeless silence. (p. 474)

Lawrence is here stating with greater force and more excitement, more grateful appreciation, what later critics of Turner's work have remarked. "Throughout his work, more emphasis is given to the elements in their more fluid and tenuous forms such as water, sky and light than to their more solid aspects . . . . At the end of his life, in fact . . . he became exclusively enamoured, rather as Claude Monet did in France, with the immaterial luminosity of sky and water . . . . Little by little he grew bolder and eliminated the linear element of his drawing, finally attaining a method in which touches of pure colour are placed side by side."[63] In a visit to Venice in 1830, a city "with almost nothing solid" Turner could concentrate on painting water and the sky.

> Meanwhile, he appears to have been disgusted with mankind and with all outward form and material precision. His only remaining passion is for plays of light and melting transparencies. This he felt a violent desire to express in Venice. Turner had, as a matter of fact, always attached a great importance, indeed a positive primacy to light and its logical distribution . . . . his chief interest was atmosphere, and one after the other he sacrificed to it values, volume, and veracity . . . . he adored light almost to madness. 64

This also seems to have been Turner's own idea of what he was about. Once, when a man for whom one of Turner's paintings was purchased (called Staffa. Fingal's Cave, 1832) expressed disappointment because the work was too indistinct, Turner is said to have retorted, "You should tell him that indistinctness is my forte".[65]

Lawrence was expressing his recognition of this fact when he wrote, "I cannot look at a later Turner picture without abstracting myself, without denying that I have limbs, knees and thighs and breast" (p. 475). He seems to feel his own body dissolving in Turner's shimmering light, as other forms have disappeared into it. However, in looking at the picture, is not the effect one of objects slowly emerging and defining themselves the longer or the more often one looks? Yet the progression is certainly one <u>from</u> the light and hazy shifting space towards tentative solidity and form. Matter is seen as a form of energy; the two are not separate or distinct; and the light is seen as primal, the object as its insubstantial, ephemeral child - not as a solid form reflecting or blocking the light. Lawrence's awareness of his own body dissolving is a concrete expression of his response - he feels both a thrilling new freedom to leave the flesh and revel in light and the spirit <u>and</u> he feels a certain falsity and impossibility in the attempt.[66]

Turner's art, like Raphael's, becomes an abstraction, but one of a different sort. It is the final statement of Lawrence's art criticism that the unique achievement of each artist can be best appreciated when it is seen in contrast and relation to the special achievement of another. Such individual differences should be cherished and cultivated, as each expresses to us further possibilities in life, an extended awareness of what life could be for us. An artist's statement can tell us something about ourselves which we may have overlooked, can unsettle any fixed ideas we have about what we are like and what we are capable of. It is such a conviction of further human possibility that Lawrence is grateful for in Turner's work when he compares Turner's paintings to those of Raphael;

"I know I am the other thing as well." Kenneth Clark expressed it similarly when he said that Turner "added a new faculty to the human mind" (see page 462 above).

In the following passage Lawrence is trying to distinguish the different impressions Raphael's and Turner's paintings have on him.

> . . . I cannot look at a later Turner picture without abstracting myself, without denying that I have limbs, knees and thighs and breast. If I look at the Norham Castle, and remember my own knees and my own breast, then the picture is a nothing to me. I must not know. And if I look at Raphael's Madonna degli Ansidei, I am cut off from my future, from aspiration. The gate is shut upon me, I can go no further. The thought of Turner's Sunrise becomes magic and fascinating, it gives the lie to this completed symbol. I know I am the other thing as well.
>
> So that, whenever art or any expression becomes perfect, it becomes a lie. For it is only perfect by reason of abstraction from that context by which and in which it exists as truth.
>
> So Turner is a lie, and Raphael is a lie, and the marriage in the spirit is a lie, and the marriage in the body is a lie, each is a lie without the other. Since each excludes the other in these instances, they are both lies. If they were brought together, and reconciled, then there were a jubilee. But where is the Holy Spirit that shall reconcile Raphael and Turner?
>
> (p. 475)

However, Lawrence cannot rest in this harsh judgment of "Turner is a lie and Raphael is a lie". For they were both great artists "and in all art there is testimony to the wonderful dual marriage, the true consummation" (p. 475). "In his art no artist ever could blaspheme the Holy Spirit, the Reconciler. Only a dogmatist could do that" (pp. 472-3).

> But in Raphael, the marriage in the spirit is left out so much that it is almost denied, so that the picture is almost a lie, almost a blasphemy. And in Turner, the

> marriage in the body is almost denied in the same way, so that his picture is almost a blasphemy. But neither in Raphael nor in Turner is the denial positive; it is only an over-affirmation of the one at the expense of the other. (pp. 475-6)

The resonance of Lawrence's theological language throughout the art criticism - flesh/spirit, Law/Love, Father/Son, the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost - by which the two discussions counterpoint and enrich each other, blending to add to a final complex whole, makes less obvious at times the straightforward aesthetic criteria with which Lawrence is working. Drawing some essential conclusions from the theological reflection and the art criticism of Chapters VII and VIII, he writes in the opening pages of Chapter IX,

> Artistic form is a revelation of the two principles of Love and the Law in a state of conflict and yet reconciled . . . . active force meeting and yet not overcoming inertia. It is the conjunction of the two which makes form. And since the two must always meet under fresh conditions, form must always be different. Each work of art has its own form, which has no relation to any other form. When a young painter studies an old master, he studies, not the form, that is an abstraction which does not exist: he studies maybe the method of the old great artist: but he studies chiefly to understand how the old great artist suffered in himself the conflict of Love and Law, and brought them to a reconciliation. Apart from artistic method, it is not Art that the young man is studying, but the State of Soul of the great old artist, so that he, the young artist, may understand his own soul and gain a reconciliation between the aspiration and the resistant. (pp. 477-478)

Lawrence is here stating what the aim of his art criticism is - to discover the distinct form or "order of construction" of each work of art[67], its own special balance of "tactile values" and "values of movement", of "force meeting and overcoming and yet not overcoming inertia". The terms

Law and Love, weighted with the discussion of Judaism and Christianity in the preceding chapters, seem too complexly defined, too heavy with meaning, to function properly as clear, precise terms in an analysis of the visual arts. Yet Lawrence here reminds the reader of the essential, very simple and very basic thing the conflict between Law and Love is, a conflict he suggested in the opening pages of the "Study" - the conflict between "the aspiration and the resistant".

The aspiration and the resistant - in the visual arts, understanding this conflict in an artist involves understanding what he most profoundly desired to paint, his aspiration or his "State of Soul", and then examining carefully how this aspiration took form, how it was compromised (and enriched) by meeting "the resistance of the medium" (p. 464). Whether the medium of the artist be stone, clay, bronze, watercolour, oils, canvas, brushes, the pen, paper and words of the poet, or the notes, measures and instruments of the composer, it always requires active mental effort to embody a pure conception or desire in the materials one is using so that it can be seen or heard, shared by others. The question of <u>how</u> this is done is a question of technique; but technique always must serve a particular vision or aspiration and this is why technique must be new in every work, why "form" in the sense of preconceived technique or design "is an abstraction which does not exist". Robert Henri states the importance of technique similarly.

> To study technique means to make it, to invent it. To take the raw material each time anew and twist it into shape. It must be made to serve a specific purpose. The same technique must never be used again. Each time it must be made new and fresh. A stock of set phrases won't do. The study is a development of wit . . . . A great artist is one who says as nearly what he means as his powers of invention allow. An ordinary artist

> often uses eloquent phrases, phrases of established authority, and if he is skillful it is surprising to see how he can nearly make them fit his ideas - or how he can make the ideas give way to the phrase . . . .
>
> The real study of technique is not the acquirement of a vast stock of pat phrases, but rather the avoidance of such, and the creation of a phrase special to the idea. To accomplish this, one must first have the idea and then active inventive wit to make the specifying phrase. This places the idea prior to the technique as a cause for the latter, contrary to the academic idea, which is the reverse.[68]

Embodying our ideas in some concrete form always involves some diminishing of their perfection, of the purity with which they first presented themselves to us. Yet they at least come into existence, they are captured in some form, no matter how imperfect, and can be shared with others; they do not escape us completely, remaining bodiless dreams. One of the finest things about Lawrence's art criticism is his determined effort to try to understand the first, pure aspiration of the artists he discusses; he realises that in embodying their visions in paint or stone that compromises have been made. In earthly materials, only so much can be done.

> If Turner had ever painted his last picture, it would have been a white, incandescent surface, the same whiteness when he finished as when he began, proceeding from nullity to nullity, through all the range of colour.
>
> Turner is perfect. Such a picture as his Norham Castle, Sunrise, where only the faintest shadow of life stains the light, is the last word that can be uttered, before the blazing and timeless silence. (p. 474)

However, Lawrence's final note is one of acceptance, even celebration of art, of our possibility of embodying beauty, no matter how incompletely. We belong to life and in life "we cannot know of any save embodied beauty" (p. 459). It is in our art that we "gain a reconciliation between the aspiration and the resistant" (p. 478).

"This sense of conflict contained within a reconciliation", can also be seen in poetry, and the image Lawrence uses to suggest it is marriage. In a poem,

> the very adherence to rhyme and regular rhythm is a concession to the Law, a concession to the body, to the being and requirements of the body. They are an admission of the living, positive inertia which is the other half of life, other than the pure will to motion. In this consummation, they are the resistance and response of the Bride in the arms of the Bridegroom. And according as the Bride and Bridegroom come closer together, so is the response and resistance more fine, indistinguishable, so much the more, in this act of consummation, is the movement that of Two-in-One, indistinguishable each from the other, and not the movement of two brought together clumsily. (p. 478)

The great artist, shaping the medium most truly to his purpose, blurs the distinction between form and content until the two are inseparable, almost one. This is why, as Lawrence suggests, a study of "artistic method" (p. 477) is important. An appreciation of a new technique, an invention of a way to say something, will necessarily shed light on what that something is that the artist wanted to say and why he had to say it in that particular way. An example of such a true unity between form and content is the above passage from the "Study" itself; the idea and Lawrence's expression of it cannot be clearly distinguished; the suggestion of the rhythm and union of sexual consummation forcefully conveys the sense of the moment of artistic creation, the way an artist works.

In so using the terms male and female, bride and bridegroom,

Lawrence has not been rigidly classifying paintings according to this terminology[69]; but by looking thoughtfully at pictures, he has managed to extend our appreciation of what these words - male and female - can mean. Their meaning is wider, more profound, than we had thought; and this whole work of definition has been done with a clear purpose in mind - that of making it possible to use the words male and female, sex, marriage, consummation with greater precision and greater power in Lawrence's final discussion of the human relationships portrayed in Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure.

Footnotes - Chapter V

[1] Such mistakes in art history are not rare. Kenneth Clark, in an article on the distinguished art historian, Bernard Berenson, points out that one of Berenson's main contributions was to painstakingly establish which paintings in the Italian Renaissance were done by which artists. Before this was done, many works of art were wrongly attributed to great masters. Even Walter Pater - "the writer from whom Berenson, to a large extent, derived his critical standards and whom he revered all his life" - in his essay on Leonardo da Vinci dated 1869 (approximately thirty years before Berenson's first list of Florentine Pictures of the Renaissance appeared in 1898) writes at length on a Medusa in the Uffizi that Leonardo did not paint, and actually manages in a paragraph describing several different works, not to mention one painting by Leonardo himself! (see p. 85 in Pater's Renaissance, Modern Library Edition, New York). Certainty about the works belonging to major artists changes as our knowledge, skill and methods of research change and develop. Kenneth Clark, "Bernard Berenson", The Burlington Magazine, CII (Sept. 1960), p. 381.

Further, The Madonna of the Iris, which Lawrence seems to be referring to, certainly resembles closely woodcuts and engravings of the Virgin by Dürer, to which Lawrence's comments might also aptly apply. In the Dürer Exhibit at the British Museum in the autumn and winter of 1971-1972 were several works bearing marked similarities to the oil painting in the National Gallery. Both in overall impact and in specific detail did many of these prints suggest comparison with The Madonna of the Iris. In one of the Virgin seated on a grassy bank the Madonna suckles the Christ Child, her dress is similar to the one in The Madonna of the Iris, her robes fill the picture, and a similar arrangement of wooden poles form a fence or trellis in the background. In The Virgin seated by a tree the same wooden pole formation is present. In The Virgin crowned by an Angel the Madonna's hair is drawn almost exactly as that of the Virgin in the oil painting.

The central point is that the work in the National Gallery could certainly be intelligently attributed to Dürer, but that even if the Madonna of the Iris was found to be painted by someone else in Dürer's style, Lawrence's comments - on the female as "the overwhelming condition of life" (p. 456) to Dürer, the earth which was as a bride to him (p. 472) whose "stable, incontrovertible being" (p. 456) he sought to explore - apply just as forcefully to many other of Dürer's studies of the Virgin. In fact, Lawrence's idea that Dürer "sought out the earth endlessly, as a man seeks to know a bride who surpasses him" (p. 472) bears on almost all of Dürer's work, his unceasing fascination with detail - whether of grasses, rabbits, walruses, the human body or the human face - and his faithful rendering of it. His close treatment of the vegetation in The Madonna of the Iris is very similar to that in his watercolour Grasses (see footnote 12 below). Another painting of Dürer's which Lawrence would have seen by the end of December, 1914 reproduced in Mrs. Henry Jenner's book, Christian Symbolism, is The Holy Trinity, a painting of God the Father supporting the cross which bears God the Son with the Holy Spirit represented as a Dove between. The

great size of the Father, holding the cross in his extended hands, his body forming the stable and sustaining background for the figure of Christ, almost suggests a Virgin and Child, the Child now grown but still resting in the Mother's lap. God the Father is wonderfully maternal in Dürer's painting of the Trinity; the painting relates interestingly not only to Lawrence's specific comments about Dürer but to Lawrence's thoughts on the doctrine of the Trinity as well.

[2] These German words have become almost technical terms in contemporary Protestant theological discussion over the difference between objective historical facts and Christian faith. Historie means "that which is public and verifiable according to generally accepted standards of history writing". Geschichte "refers to the significance of a historical fact and so cannot be made public or verifiable by historical canons". In other words, that a man named Jesus once lived is Historie; that he was the Son of God is Geschichte. "The distinction is required because the one English word 'history' obscures the two meanings; fact and significance". (Van A. Harvey, A Handbook of Theological Terms, London 1964, p. 104). The distinction is not only applicable to the Christian faith or mythologies based on the distant past, but to recent world-observed political events, such as "Bloody Sunday" in Londonderry or the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.

[3] Kenneth Clark, Civilisation: A Personal View (London, 1969), p. 323.

[4] Ibid., p. 3.

[5] See "Making Pictures" in Phoenix II. "I learnt to paint from copying other pictures - usually reproductions, sometimes even photographs. When I was a boy, how I concentrated over it! Copying some perfectly worthless scene reproduction in some magazine . . . I am glad I never had any training but the self-imposed training of copying other men's pictures. As I grew more ambitious, I copied Leader's landscapes and Frank Brangwyn's cartoon-like pictures, then Peter de Wint and Girtin water-colours. I can never be sufficiently grateful for the series of English water-colour painters, published by the Studio in eight parts, when I was a youth. I had only six of the eight parts, but they were invaluable to me. I copied them with the greatest joy, and found some of them extremely difficult." (pp. 604-5). Others he remembers copying later in life are Fra Angelico ("Flight into Egypt"), Lorenzetti, Carpaccio, Van Dyck and Giotto. (p. 606)

[6] See L.M., pp. 654, 657, 659. Lawrence first mentioned the book at the end of a letter to the Brewsters in early May, 1921, and does not refer to it after 7th July, 1921 (in a letter to Curtis Brown).

[7] Phoenix, p. 524.

[8] It is interesting to note that Berenson had little respect for the Impressionists, perhaps because of his emphasis on solidity, on the importance of "tactile values", in his art criticism. These terms were largely inappropriate for a discussion of the qualities central to the paintings of the Impressionists. See the second section of this chapter, "An utterly new conception" - Light and Darkness, "the movement which contains in one of its moments the Object".

[9] Bernard Berenson, Italian Painters of the Renaissance (London, 1952), p. 93. cf. Lawrence's late essay (1929) "Making Pictures", Phoenix II, p. 604. "A picture lives with the life you put into it. If you put no life into it - no thrill, no concentration of delight or exaltation of visual discovery - then the picture is dead, like so many canvases, no matter how much thorough and scientific work is put into it."

[10] Ibid., p. 94.

[11] Ibid., p. 77.

[12] cf. Clark, p. 150-151. Clark provides a fascinating illustration of Lawrence's comment. He compares Dürer's water-colour Grasses with a drawing of a Star of Bethlehem by Leonardo da Vinci and writes "how lacking it is in concentration of purpose and in the sense of organic life . . . . No man has ever described natural objects, flowers and grasses and animals, more minutely; and yet, to my mind something is missing - the inner life". A quick glance at these two drawings shows the aptness of Lawrence's judgment - Dürer did indeed draw "the Object with its Movement content" while Leonardo drew the "movement which contains in one of its moments the Object". See pages 409 and 410 above.

[13] Bernard Berenson, Seeing and Knowing (London, 1953), p. 25.

[14] Ibid., p. 26.

[15] Italian Painters, pp. 199-200. cf. Robert Henri, The Art Spirit, p. 244. "In a canvas there are two orders working together, the dynamic and static."

[16] Ibid., p. 68.

[17] Ibid., p. 94.

[18] Ibid., p. 40. cf. Piaget's findings in his studies of child development. Sight contradicts certain facts about our surroundings, but

in childhood we learn to interpret what our eyes tell us in ways that correspond more truly to reality. For example, when an object comes closer to us, our eyes tell us that it is getting bigger. "Piaget describes the way babies seem to explore the variable appearances of an object at different distances by alternately approaching it to their eyes or moving it away at arm's length." In this way, "he learns that objects continue to exist even while not seen or felt, and learns to see them as having constant sizes and shapes though presented at different distances and from different angles". P.K., p. 75. See Piaget's Psychology of Intelligence (London, 1950), pp. 130 ff.

19 Ibid., p. 41. cf. Robert Henri, The Art Spirit, pp. 52-53. Henri associates this convincing creation of solidity in a painting with capable intelligence in the artist. "If I hold any object up in front of you, you have a very positive sense of its solidity. Your estimate of it as a matter of bulk is, most likely, very exact. You have also a very fair judgment of its weight. You know about how far it is from your eyes and about how far it is from the background, and from any other objects in its vicinity.

If the object happens to be a human head you are highly sensitive to its progressions and regressions of form. Knowing heads so familiarly, you immediately remark any absences of the normal in its shape. If a head were only half thick through you would know it and you would be shocked by it. If it were flat it would horrify you. We are very appreciative of the solid . . . .

I have heard it very often said that an artist does not need intelligence, that his is the province of the soul. All very lovely, but heads painted by such artists are generally very flat and a great medium of expression is lost to them. They recognize and make much of the measures across their flat surfaces, but miss all the wonder of depth . . . .

If a man has the soul of an artist he needs a mastery of all the means of expression so that he may command them, for with his soul in activity he has much to say. If he refuses to use his brain to find the way to signify the meaningful depth of nature on his flat canvas with his colours, he should also refuse to use his hands and his brushes and his colours, and the canvas itself. However, all these, the canvas, paints, brushes, hands and brains are but tools to be guided by the soul of man."

20 He is, in fact, disparaging towards the naturalist, whom he defines as "a man with a native gift for science who has taken to art. His purpose is not to extract the material and spiritual significance of objects, thus communicating them to us more rapidly and intensely than we should perceive them ourselves, and thereby giving us a sense of heightened vitality; his purpose is research, and his communication consists of nothing but facts". Italian Painters, p. 54. The limited view of science implied here should be noted.

21 Italian Painters, p. 54.

22 Ibid., p. 44.

23 Ibid., p. 53.

24 Ibid., pp. 82-87. Kenneth Clark feels Berenson's choice of the word "decorative" here is unfortunate - he should have been able to find a better term for the non-illustrative elements in a work of art. However, he feels that Berenson's basic contention that "the non-illustrative element in art, being dependent on our bodily responses, is far more stable", is still "true and valuable". (Clark, "Bernard Berenson", p. 385).

25 Italian Painters, p. 45.

26 Ibid., p. 59.

27 Ibid., p. 59.

28 Ibid., pp. 106-7.

29 Ibid., p. 43.

30 Ibid., p. 175. Kenneth Clark, in an article written after Berenson's death in 1959, maintains that Berenson's criteria for judging works of art are still valid and helpful. "Where Berenson was strikingly original was in developing the theory that the life-enhancing effect of works of art is due to what he called 'ideated sensations', experienced through an unconscious self-identification. It was the first, and remains the only, de-mysticized aesthetic to command respect . . . compared to it the 'plastic sequences' of Roger Fry and the 'significant form' of Mr. Clive Bell are pure mysticism - not to say incantation." (This comment recalls Lawrence's spoof on "significant form" in Introduction to These Paintings in Phoenix, pp. 565-7). "In three of its applications, tactile values, movement and space composition, I find that the aesthetic of the ideated sensation really works, and is a most valuable basis for criticism." Clark, "Bernard Berenson", p. 385.

31 Berenson maintains that whether a painter is reproducing a story or a beautiful scene from the outside world or a vision from the world inside his own mind, the thing or image reproduced still belongs to the illustrative element in his work. Its value depends primarily on something external to the work itself - the power or beauty of the vision, story or thing represented - until it is rendered in terms of form and movement and thus achieves a genuine artistic value. Until then, form and content remain two distinct things, rather than one inviolable unity. Italian Painters, pp. 82-85.

[32] Walter Pater, The Renaissance (New York: The Modern Library, no date given), p. 44. The essay on Sandro Botticelli was written in 1870.

[33] Pater, p. 45-46.

[34] Pater, pp. 46-47.

[35] Pater, p. 41.

[36] Kenneth Clark, commenting on Berenson's discussion of decoration and illustration, wrote, "if we feel that Berenson underrates the value of illustration . . . we must remember that the popular instinct, especially in England, is to think of art solely in those terms. As he pointed out forty years later, he was writing for 'a public accustomed under the influence of Rio, Ruskin, Lindsay and the pre-Raphaelites, to see little in painting but illustration.'" from "Bernard Berenson", p. 385.

[37] This is true of Lawrence's discussion of Cezanne in Introduction to These Paintings as well. See pp. 567-582 in Phoenix.

[38] Henri, p. 87.

[39] Ibid., pp. 37, 132.

[40] Phoenix, pp. 528.

[41] Ibid., pp. 527-528.

[42] Ibid., p. 525.

[43] Civilisation, p. 251. Lawrence uses the word "feminine" only once in the "Study" and he uses it in a way that makes clear the difference between "feminine" and "female" qualities. "Sue is scarcely a woman at all, though she is feminine enough" (p. 496).

[44] Ibid., p. 177. Again, in this context, Kenneth Clark's concept of female qualities is superficial compared to Lawrence's - "sweet, compassionate, approachable". Also, Lawrence would not agree with Clark that the Virgin Mary contributed any real female balance or tension to Christianity. "In the Christian religion, the Virgin worship is no real Female worship, but worship of the Female as she is passive and subjected to the male. Hence the sadness of Botticelli's Virgins" (p. 482). Thus, when Lawrence talks of male/female balance in a painting, he does not mean there is one Madonna and one Infant

Christ (or an equal number of men and women) in it. The terms refer to the elements - in an individual figure and in the painting as a whole - of stable form and movement, of "active force meeting and overcoming and yet not overcoming inertia" (p. 477). Lawrence's comment on the Virgin is very similar to Pater's description of Botticelli's Virgins. See pp. 441 above.

45 Kenneth Clark corroborates Lawrence's statements here. The symbol of the crucifix appeared with real emotional power in the tenth century (it should be remembered that Lawrence by the term "medieval" probably meant approximately 1000-1500 A.D., the preceding five centuries being called the Dark Ages). The importance of the Virgin, the representations of Madonna and Child, came later and found their greatest expression in the Renaissance. (Civilisation, pp. 29, 175) However, Lawrence writes as if the importance of the Virgin developed suddenly, when in fact the Virgin cult developed over several centuries (Clark says, beginning in the 12th century) before the height of the Renaissance. "The earliest cult figure of the Virgin and Child of any size is a painted wooden statue in St. Denis which must date from about 1130. The great Romanesque churches were dedicated to the saints whose relics they contained . . . none of them to the Virgin. Then, after Chartres (completed in the 13th century) the greatest churches in France were dedicated to her - Paris, Amiens, Laon, Rouen, Rheims!" (Civilisation, p. 58). However, "In the Renaissance, while remaining the Queen of Heaven, she became also the human mother in whom everyone could recognize qualities of warmth and love and approachability" (p. 175).

46 Henri, pp. 65-66.

47 Bernard Berenson also stresses the expression of movement in Botticelli's work, his skilful use of line which gave almost pure values of movement abstracted. Tactile values, colour, background - all were subservient to his "linear symphony". Berenson contrasts Botticelli to Michelangelo, who "seems to have dreamt of presenting nothing but tactile values", while Botticelli seemed to want to present pure movement. See I.P., pp. 68-69, 76.

48 We can see Lawrence beginning to work with this idea of geometry in Raphael's painting and in the Italian people in a letter to A. W. McLeod, 16th April 1914. "A man, Gamba, was saying to me yesterday that the Latin nature is fundamentally geometrical: its deepest aspiration is essential geometry - Form. He says that is the real meaning of the Renaissance - geometrical Form, in contrast to Mediaeval mysticism. In the Renaissance, he says, the Roman spirit appeared again, materialistic, mathematic, individualistic, and overthrew the Germanic mediaeval influence. Does that interest you? I am trying to swallow it, to digest it. It doesn't go down very easily." (L.M., p. 271; Lawrence was writing from Italy) The letter gives interesting evidence of the way in which Lawrence thought. He was not closed to new or contrary ideas, but conflicted one thought with another in

his mind, uncovering further implications or relationships and realising contradictions, inaccuracies or insufficiencies. He did not restrict his thinking but kept himself open to new suggestions or discoveries. The way in which he extends Gamba's idea and tests it against his own observations of Italian art, attitudes, life, marriage, the way in which he creatively explores the thought and makes it his own, can be seen in the following passage from the "Study".

"And it seems as though Italy had ever since the Renaissance been possessed by the Raphaelesque conception of the ultimate geometric basis of life, the geometric essentiality of all things. There is in the Italian, at the very bottom of all, the fundamental, geometric conception of absolute static combination. There is the shaft enclosed in the ellipse, as a permanent symbol. There exists no shaft, no ellipse separately, but only the whole complete thing; there is neither male nor female, but an absolute interlocking of the two in one . . . . There is only the geometric abstraction of the moment of consummation, a moment made timeless. And this conception of a long, clinched, timeless embrace, this overwhelming conception of timeless consummation, of which there is no beginning nor end, from which there is no escape, has arrested the Italian race for three centuries. It is the source of its indifference and its fatalism and its positive abandon . . . . The real conception, for the individual, is marriage, inviolable marriage . . . and the manifestation of divinity is the child . . . . But the Italian is now beginning to withdraw from his clinched and timeless embrace . . . ." (p. 463). This idea of "inviolable marriage" and the child as "manifestation of divinity" is also developed in Lawrence's observations of Italian life in Twilight in Italy.

49 Bernard Berenson refers to this "architectural" element in Raphael's paintings by calling him, besides a great "Illustrator" and master of "space-composition", "the greatest master of composition in the more usual sense of grouping and arrangement" (I.P., p. 132.) Berenson felt that Raphael was not particularly good in rendering either form or movement, but that his chief value lay in being the illustrator for the post-Renaissance age, providing modern man with images for his spiritual ideals and aspirations, giving him an imagery for antiquity. Raphael gave visual form to the beliefs, ideas and stories of the time. Vasari wrote that although Raphael could not hope to equal Leonardo da Vinci or Michelangelo, "he saw that he who could express a thought clearly and compose without confusion may also be reputed an able master". (Vasari, Lives of the Artists, abridged and edited by Betty Burroughs, London, 1960, p. 231. First written between 1550-1568.)

50 Berenson's lengthy response to Correggio in Italian Painters of the Renaissance gives substance to Lawrence's judgment. He finds Correggio's distinguishing trait to be "a sensitiveness to the charm of femininity", complemented by great skill in painting the surface of the human skin and by being "perhaps the greatest Italian master . . . in the domain of light and shade". However, compared to Raphael, he had less feeling for the

"firmness of inner substance", had, in fact, "a distaste for everything static" which was evidenced in his frequent lack of self-restraint and economy. He was, however, a "finer and subtler master of movement" than Raphael, painting soft and flowing contours and natural, fully realised action. Berenson is puzzled by the uneven nature of Correggio's work and in trying to understand what makes certain of the paintings so perfect and others such failures, decides that it has something to do with Correggio's unhappiness with sacred, Christian subjects - his paintings based on Greek mythology seem on the whole much more successful. But Berenson was not completely satisfied with that answer and pondered further. "I was driven finally to conclude that among these pieces it was only those few wherein the female nude was predominant, and where the nude was treated so as to bring to the surface the whole appeal of its femininity, that his exaggeration, his nervousness, his restlessness, disappeared entirely, and left only his finer qualities singing, in most marvelous unison, harmonies seldom sweeter to the human sense". Correggio's Danae, Leda, Antiope and Io are "hymns to the charm of femininity the like of which have never been known before or since in Christian Europe" (I.P., pp. 192-196).

Berenson, like Lawrence, locates Correggio's limitation in the loss of the religious consciousness, the perception of the whole which he lost in gaining the skill of greater physical realism, light and movement. Berenson says he is too sensuous, that the greatest art must have a harmony of the senses and the spirit. Lawrence would seem to suggest that this one-sided sensuousness is a result of painting only one part of the mystery of woman, her physical charm, to the exclusion of others.

51 Civilisation, p. 133.

52 Lawrence's discussion of Michelangelo would seem to suggest that Michelangelo painted each individual figure as if it contained all the tensions of the wheel, of great male movement pressing out from the centre, expanding the female flesh at the centre outwards with it to balance and contain it, making the stable flesh more and more tenuous. "The Adam can scarcely stir into life. That large body of almost transparent, tenuous texture is not established enough for motion. It is not that it is too ponderous: it is too unsubstantial, unreal. It is not motion, life, he craves, but body. Give him but a firm, concentrated physique. That is the cry of all Michelangelo's pictures." (p. 462) It seems that Lawrence may be directing his comments here at Pater's discussion of the Creation of Man in the Sistine Chapel in his essay on Michelangelo in The Renaissance. Lawrence contradicts Pater's passage on the figure of Adam.

"In that languid figure there is something rude and satyr-like, something akin to the rugged hillside on which it lies. His whole form is gathered into an expression of mere expectancy and reception; he has hardly strength enough to lift his finger to touch the finger of the creator; yet a touch of the finger-tips will suffice." (The Renaissance, p. 62)

Lawrence's essay "David" in Pheonix, which also discusses the extraordinary equilibrium of Michelangelo's figures ("The shimmer, the instant of unstable combination, the soul for one moment perfectly embodied", p. 62 of Phoenix), mentions Pater (p. 62), a fact which makes it seem even more likely that Lawrence had Pater's comments on Michelangelo in mind when he wrote about the artist in the "Study".

Lawrence's emphasis on the insubstantial, tenuous flesh of Michelangelo's figures in the artist's attempt to contain the outward pressing male force within the stability of female flesh and form, is, as far as I can tell, totally original, and is a much more convincing description of Michelangelo's most exaggerated nudes (as in The Last Judgment) than the usual comments about their weight and their convincing "tactile values". Donatello's statue of David contrasted to Michelangelo's David would give evidence for Lawrence's perception. The latter does have "too much body for a young figure, the physique exaggerated, the clear, outward-leaping, essential spirit of the young man smothered over, the real maleness cloaked". It is Donatello's David who has "a firm, concentrated physique" and is "established enough for motion" (p. 462).

53 W. B. Yeats, "The Second Coming", The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (London, 1950), reprinted 1969, p. 211, ll. 3-4.

54 Henri, pp. 102, 134. **Op. cit.**

55 Berenson referred to the "epithet" Impressionist, urging that we confine its use to "representations of purely retinal impressions", works which Berenson objected were "dashed off in a frenzy of creation" and the subject matter of which was the "workaday, vulgar, even brutal, even repulsive sides of the human lot". (Seeing and Knowing, p. 6.) Berenson felt that knowing - the abstraction - had triumphed over seeing - the concrete, tactile values of reality - in modern art with the exception of Cézanne's work. Lawrence shared this perception (cf. his later essay, Introduction to These Paintings, written before January 1929 in Phoenix) but was able to see the special quality of the Impressionists' work as well. "Probably the most joyous moment in the whole history of painting was the moment when the incipient impressionists discovered light, and with it, colour. Ah, then they made the grand, grand escape into freedom, into infinity, into light and delight. They escaped from the tyranny of solidity and the menace of mass form" (p. 563, Phoenix).

Berenson was not totally blind to the beauty of the Impressionists by any means; in Italian Painters of the Renaissance he referred to "Monet's communication of the very pulse-beat of the sun's warmth over fields and trees" (p. 122). However, one feels through the phrasing in Seeing and Knowing (p. 6) that perhaps - because of his appreciation of Monet - Berenson would therefore like to free Monet from the "epithet" Impressionist.

It must be noted that Berenson's criteria are quite appropriate for much of our contemporary art. Kenneth Clark, in his essay on Berenson in The Burlington Magazine (p. 385), wrote, "Berenson's theory was . . . a revolutionary doctrine in 1895, and strangely enough it can be applied to the revolutionary art of today which Mr. Berenson himself disliked. For example, Mr. Henry Moore's statements about sculpture are in fact amplifications of the doctrines of tactile values and space composition, although they are related to organic life in general, rather than to the human figure alone".

56 Civilisation, pp. 284-5.

57 Robert Wallace, The World of Rembrandt (New York, 1968), p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 33.

59 See pp. 30-33 of Wallace's book for examples of their work.

60 Reproductions of these can be seen in Wallace, pp. 126-131, 172-173 and 177-179.

61 Wallace, p. 39. Another example of this use of light to express what would usually be expressed by form or outline is Rembrandt's suggestion of the shower of gold in his Danae by a golden light. (Wallace, p. 69, see the reproduction pp. 118-119.)

62 Lawrence's comment that "Rembrandt did not deny the flesh, as so many artists try to do. He went on from her to the fuller knowledge of the Bride, in true progression. Which makes the wonderful beauty of Rembrandt" (p. 473) is not only a statement about the convincing solidity of Rembrandt's forms in spite of his dissolving of outline and his use of light and shadow. It is also a true statement about his personal life. In contrast to Turner who never married, lived with his father until his father died, and then led a wandering and solitary life (of pure movement with no centre of rest), Rembrandt was happily married to Saskia until her death and then lived with a mistress, Hendrickje, until her death, unable to marry her only because of some complications in his wife's will (see Wallace, pp. 94-95). A close relation with a woman was important to him, and he moved out from that "marriage in the flesh" into his work, his attempt to approach and understand "marriage in the Spirit" (see Wallace, p. 90 and Camille Mauclair, Turner, translated from the French by Eveline Byam Shaw, Paris, 1939, pp. 8, 10, 28).

Lawrence's comment on Turner - "He mated his body easily, he did not deny it. But what he sought was the mating of the Spirit" (p. 474) seems also to be based on a knowledge of Turner's life. One critic, Graham Reynolds (in his Turner, New York, 1969, pp. 43-44) wrote about

Turner's relationship with Mrs. Sarah Danby, a young actress and singer, after the death of her husband in 1798. Evidently she bore Turner a child,

> but he did not, so far as is known, live with her, setting up rather, at the beginning of 1800, in lodgings in Harley Street. The arrangement suited him well. He had, as his more licentious sketches show, a normally sensual nature; on the other hand he always successfully evaded any human tie which made too exclusive a demand upon him. Marriage, or a permanent liaison, would have interfered too much with his concentration on his work, and his frequent absence on long sketching tours.

The "licentious sketches" Reynolds refers to are in private sketchbooks "in which Turner made compositions of couples in bed, and other Priapic subjects" (p. 150). In contrast with Lawrence's acceptance of this aspect of Turner's nature, the account Reynolds gives of Ruskin's response to these sketchbooks is amusing.

> It is one of the pleasanter ironies of history that Ruskin, who was not conspicuous for matrimonial success, was obliged to review these frankly lustful scenes amid all the drawings in the Turner Bequest. He inscribed one sketchbook of this kind with the words, "They are kept as evidence of the failure of mind only."
>
> (Reynolds, p. 150)

Ruskin's 5 volume Modern Painters began as a study and defence of Turner's art, yet he seems unwilling to understand certain qualities of the man and his work. As Reynolds points out, the sketches are certainly not negligible in any study of the development of intelligence and originality behind Turner's paintings (p. 151).

63 Mauclair, pp. 13, 17-18.

64 Ibid., pp. 23, 24, 28.

65 Reynolds, pp. 153-156.

66 Lawrence carries the discussion further years later in his Introduction to these Paintings. There he sees the shimmering light of the Impressionists as a glorious escape from matter, the body - an illusion which was bound to be shattered in the end, matter asserting itself incontrovertibly. Lawrence sees the task of the Post-Impressionists as that of learning to deal with the reality of matter, substance, once again. It is in Cézanne's work where Lawrence sees this struggle most clearly.

> The actual fact is that in Cézanne modern French art made its first tiny step back to real substance, to objective substance, if we may call it so . . . . It seems a small thing to do: yet it is the first real sign that man has made for several thousands of years that he is willing to admit that matter actually exists. Strange as it may seem, for thousands of years . . . man has been preoccupied with the constant preoccupation of the denial of the existence of matter, and the proof that matter is only a form of spirit. And then, the moment it is done, and we realize finally that matter **is** only a form of energy, whatever that may be, in the same instant matter rises up and hits us over the head and makes us realize that it exists absolutely, since it is compact energy itself. (Phoenix, pp. 567-568)

67 Lawrence, in a letter written a year after the "Study" (16th December, 1915), expressed the same idea about the distinct form of every novel. "Tell Arnold Bennett that all rules of construction hold good only for novels which are copies of other novels. A book which is not a copy of other books has its own construction, and what he calls faults, he being an old imitator, I call characteristics." L.M., p. 399.

68 Henri, pp. 88-89, 233.

69 His disregard for such precise categorising can be seen in the offhand way he refers to Turner's quest for the Spirit. "His Bride was the Light. Or he was the bride himself, and the Light - the Bridegroom. Be that as it may . . . ." (p. 474). Or, try to decide whether Raphael should be classified under male (abstraction) or female (stasis). Any such approach to the "Study" is not fruitful.

CHAPTER SIX

Tess and Jude - "A Nos Moutons" (Chapter IX of the "Study")

Lawrence takes the title of his final chapter on Hardy from a medieval French farce, La Farce de Maître Pathelin, in which a farmer, brought to court to complain about some stolen sheep, is confused by the presence there of another man who has cheated him. He becomes confused and wanders from one complaint to another, endlessly digressing, and the judge repeatedly must call him back to the matter at hand; "Revenons à ces moutons".[1]

Lawrence is saying, all right, for those of you who think I have been digressing, I am now clearly returning to Hardy, the subject of this "Study". But have the preceding chapters really been a series of digressions?

The discussion of Judaism and Christianity, Law and Love, the art criticism, in fact the entire "Study" up to this point, have been working to define words which Lawrence found to be necessary to the task of talking about the Wessex novels. He has been following his own recommendation for a literary critic as he expressed it in a much later essay, on John Galsworthy.

> Then it seems to one a good critic should give his reader a few standards to go by. He can change the standards for every new critical attempt, so long as he keeps good faith. But it is just as well to say: This and this is the standard we judge by. [2]

Each new work of art calls forth or creates the new terms needed with which to talk about it, the new standards needed with which to judge it. Lawrence, in the first eight chapters of the "Study" has been thinking through, establishing and defining the terms and the standards needed for a particular critical venture, that of studying two of Hardy's major novels, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure.

At this point we can see even more clearly what was stated in Chapter II of this thesis, that Lawrence's terms - Law/Love, male/female, Will-to-Motion/Will-to-Inertia, flesh/spirit, Father/Son - are used as tools for further discovery and understanding in the context of a specific critical task and are given their full meaning only in that context. They are not meant to be understood as ends in themselves; they serve as extensions of the author, of his intellectual powers and his powers of expression, as tools for further seeing into the nature of reality, specifically the reality of Hardy's novels.

Before we concentrate on the way in which Lawrence's language in the "Study" arises naturally out of Tess and Jude, and how he understands both the relationships of the characters to each other in the novels and their own sense of themselves, their struggle into a second birth, their failure or success in producing their own "personal knowledge", one essential characteristic of Lawrence's literary criticism should be made clear. As W. H. Auden's words (quoted in Chapter II of this thesis, p. 121 above) suggest, Lawrence's discussion of a book leads you to read it. His interest in literature is live and contagious. So much so that on first reading Jude the Obscure after reading the "Study" I was disappointed. Jude and Sue's relationship had sounded much more elemental, spare and significant in the "Study" than I found it to be in the novel, where it was cluttered with discourses on the marriage laws which read like so many tracts and with various other immaturities and uncertainties. However, a second reading of Jude has led me to appreciate how surely Lawrence went to what was essential and strong in Hardy's art and made certain it got its due. F. R. Leavis,

in the introduction to his book on Lawrence, expressed the thought that a great writer whose special talent and achievement were not recognised was a force for life wasted. I know of no better statement of the purpose of the critical task; I know of no work of literary criticism which embodies it more completely than the "Study of Thomas Hardy". It is Lawrence's attempt to ensure that Hardy's unique discoveries, his "personal knowledge", would not go to waste.

How should the form be felt? - Monism or duality, metaphysician or artist?

> . . . all rules of construction hold good only for novels which are copies of other novels. A book which is not a copy of other books has its own construction 3

This passage from one of Lawrence's letters has been quoted earlier but bears repeating here. Every truly original work of art involves the discovery and creation of new technique, of new ways to express a particular thing, and therefore cannot be judged by set standards or rules of construction. An important aspect of the "Study", therefore, is the way in which Lawrence examines and clarifies specific words and concepts which Hardy uses frequently in his work, especially in Tess and Jude; and which can tell us something about the unique construction of those two novels. The terms central to the "Study" were by no means arbitrarily chosen and elaborated by Lawrence; Law/Love, male/female, motion/stability, flesh/spirit, Father/Son - all of these words describe conflicts which are important to Hardy's fiction.

The longest and most thorough discussion of a Hardy novel in the "Study" is Lawrence's twenty-two pages on Jude the Obscure in Chapter IX. The way in which Lawrence has let Hardy's novels themselves give rise to the terms of his criticism can perhaps be shown most clearly by examining Hardy's

use of the concepts Law and Love in Jude.

The force of Judaic law is present from the title page which bears the inscription, "The letter killeth". This is what Jude says to Sue in the final section of the book when she returns to Phillotson, her husband, in penitence for the death of her children. "Sue, Sue! we are acting by the letter; and 'the letter killeth'!" (page 402, Part VI, Chapter VIII. Page references to Jude will in this chapter be given in the text.) Jude is quoting here from II Corinthians, 3: 6 - "for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life". The conflict which Lawrence discusses so carefully in ChaptersVII and VIII between Old Testament Law and New Testament Love is central to the story of Jude and Sue's love and the opposition to it of society's laws and religious law. However, Hardy's use of the idea of law in conflict with love raises questions in Lawrence's mind; he feels that Hardy's treatment of both is incomplete in one way or another and tries to understand how and why. In the "Study" he tries to think through carefully what these words really mean and Lawrence's complex definition shows that the inadequacy of Hardy's is closely related to the inadequacy of Hardy's treatment of religion and religious experience in his characters (see the third section of this chapter for further discussion of this issue).

The dichotomy between Law and Love is set forth quite clearly in the scene (Part V, Chapter VI, pp. 310-314) where Sue is helping Jude in relettering the Ten Commandments in a small church near Aldbrickham. By-standers talk none too quietly about the incongruity of the pregnant Sue, who they believe to have married Jude only very recently if at all, painting "You shall not commit adultery" on a church wall. The word spreads to Jude's employers who soon ask him to abandon the job. The incident and the response

of the townspeople lead Jude and Sue to leave Aldbrickham.

The question is, is it God's law which condemns Jude and Sue and defeats them, or is it social law? Hardy characteristically muddles the two, weighting both against Jude and Sue to make their situation seem truly hopeless. The reason he is able to do this is because he denies religion any separate reality; it is subsumed under social law and only serves to make it more oppressive and indestructible. It is Judaic law which Arabella calls on when she encourages Phillotson to stand on his civil rights in reclaiming and taming Sue (Numbers 5: 31).

> " . . . There's nothing like bondage and a stone-deaf taskmaster for taming us women. Besides, you've got the laws on your side. Moses knew . . . . 'Then shall the man be guiltless; but the woman shall bear her iniquity.'" (P. 329, Part V, Chapter VIII)

Sue feels herself condemned by both religious and social law when she overhears the 73rd Psalm being sung after the death of her children (p. 349, Part VI, Chapter II). The Psalm is an attempt to answer the question, why do the wicked prosper? The psalmist realises that God will punish the wicked in the end and bless the good, so he promises to try to be innocent and good. He <u>almost</u> weakened and sinned, but "then I should have condemned the generation of thy children." His conclusion is:

> My flesh and my heart faileth: but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever.
> For lo, they that forsake thee shall perish: thou hast destroyed all them that commit fornication against thee. (verses 25, 26) 4

After listening to the church's condemnation of her in silence, Sue says (in a kind of parody on the Ten Commandments, the implication being that God or some such force is speaking),

> "There is something external to us which says, 'You shan't!' First it said, 'You shan't learn!' Then it said, 'You shan't labour!' Now it says, 'You shan't love!'" (p. 349)

We are reminded of Lawrence's comments on the Ten Commandments in the "Study" (p. 451); this is quite a list of "male" activities, "sins of change, of transformation", denied by what Sue understands as both religious and social law.

Sue goes on to contrast this religious and social law with natural law, and to state her belief that the latter must always fall before the former.

> "I said it was Nature's intention, Nature's law and raison d'être that we should be joyful in what instincts she afforded us - instincts which civilization had taken upon itself to thwart. What dreadful things I said! And now Fate has given us this stab in the back for being such fools as to take Nature at her word!" (p. 350)

This statement of belief in a malevolent Fate is, of course, qualified by Hardy, who makes it clear that Sue is getting superstitious under affliction. She wants to say, "It is no use fighting against God!"; but Jude contradicts her. "It is only against man and senseless circumstance" (p. 354). She agrees for the moment, but later returns to the idea that the death of her children was God's judgment upon her (p. 362). She believes she should return to Phillotson but Jude protests, "Surely we are man and wife, if ever two people were in this world? Nature's own marriage it is, unquestionably!" "But not Heaven's", Sue responds (p. 363). Jude's complete separation from Christianity comes at this point; he hates the church and her teachings for the effect they have had upon Sue.

Two laws are set up; natural law and God's law are opposed, and

religion is completely on the side of a restrictive social law and moral code. As Hardy explained in the Postscript to Jude (p. vii), he wanted the marriage incidents in the novel to suggest that "the civil law should be only the enunciation of the law of nature". But what is this law of nature?

If we are to judge from the statements or reflections of various characters in the novel, a civil law which was the enunciation of the law of nature would not be much different from the way it is now - imperfect. As a child Jude thinks,

> Nature's logic was too horrid for him to care for. That mercy towards one set of creatures was cruelty towards another sickened his sense of harmony. (p. 23)

When Sue releases her pet pigeons from the poulterer's shop, she exclaims, "O why should Nature's law be mutual butchery!" (p. 318). And Phillotson, reflecting on the Mosaic law Arabella repeated to him and on Sue's misfortune, says, "Cruelty is the law pervading all nature and society; and we can't get out of it if we would!" (p. 329).

Thus it seems that Hardy has used the term "Natural Law" unfairly at points to strengthen his condemnation of religious and social law. The laws of God and society are judged as cruel, unjust and unnatural when held up against the ideal of a natural law which intended that we should be joyful in the instincts we were given. This condemnation is unfair, however, if nature's law is in itself cruel and unjust; in this case, civil law is already the enunciation of the laws of nature.

Hardy further undercuts the value of natural law insofar as it involves instinctual, physical feelings. Sue tells Jude that she could have

lived with him in mental communion only and would have been perfectly happy. Then he apologises for forcing her, excusing himself by pleading "human nature can't help being itself" (p. 365). Sue forgives him with the words, "Your wickedness was only the natural man's desire to possess the women". Jude is finally brought to condemn his physical desire for Sue as selfishness. "My God, how selfish I was! Perhaps - perhaps I spoilt one of the highest and purest loves that ever existed between man and woman!" (p. 366).

Jude also, when deliberating whether to keep Father Time or not, condemns any physical, instinctual feeling towards one's own children, a feeling as close to a law of nature throughout the animal kingdom as a feeling can probably be.

> "The beggarly question of parentage - what is it, after all? What does it matter, when you come to think of it, whether a child is yours by blood or not? All the little ones of our time are collectively the children of us adults of the time, and entitled to our general care. That excessive regard of parents for their own children, and their dislike of other people's, is, like class feeling, patriotism, save-your-own-soulism, and other virtues, a mean exclusiveness at bottom." (p. 283, Part V, Chapter III)

The inconsistency and confusion involved here, the uncertainty in the valuing of physical love versus spiritual love, religious or social law versus natural law, led Lawrence to ask several questions in an attempt to clarify the essential conflicts. What is natural law? To what extent <u>is</u> civil law an enunciation of the laws of nature and to what extent is it a limited moral framework which is cut off from nature's greater morality, which obstructs our clear view of it? Isn't our social morality continually being challenged and extended by our contact with, exploration of, and movement into the greater morality of life itself, or at least, couldn't and

shouldn't it be? (see Chapter III of the "Study"). Does the law of our own nature give us strength to move beyond limited social laws, challenge and change them or are the laws of society an impenetrable barrier? How is religious law related to natural law and to social law? In what ways do these various laws support and enrich the life of the individual as well as limit him?

This last question is very important; as we shall see in more detail later, Hardy's condemnation of society in Jude is extreme. His ideal seems to be isolated individual fulfilment, free of the burden of social obligations or social judgment. Lawrence in the "Study" examines Judaic Law and finds it closely related both to the laws of nature, of the body, and to the needs of the human community in a way which offered a deep and fundamental satisfaction to individuals. The laws of physical marriage especially expressed a need for the continuing health of the community; it provided for the birth, care and training of children and for the stability and strength of its men. The law against adultery was not a condemnation of physical love but a statement of its importance. It was so important and involved such a complete union between man and wife, that the violation of a man's wife was a violation of his own flesh; it was a challenge to the indissolubility of the physical bond and could not be tolerated. The stability of the community in the flesh depended on the indestructibility of marriage and of the family as a unit.

When Jude and Sue are trying to get married, Jude quotes a passage from Deuteronomy (20: 7) which emphasises this aspect of the Old Testament law; but the context in which Jude speaks it limits its meaning to that of

legally marrying the woman one is engaged to, rather than lying with her.

> "'For what man is he that hath betrothed a wife and hath not taken her? Let him go and return unto his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man take her.' So said the Jewish law-giver."
>
> (p. 290, Part V, Chapter IV)

In the scene where Sue is helping to letter the Ten Commandments, the juxtaposition is supposed to suggest the rigidity of religious law which condemns the physical relationship of Jude and Sue. What is not made clear is that Old Testament Law would just as thoroughly condemn Sue's witholding of herself in her relationships with men as it would her adultery. The religious law which is supposedly so opposed to our enjoying our natural instincts also includes the dictum,

> When a man is newly married, he shall not go out with the army or be charged with any business; he shall be free at home one year, to be happy with his wife whom he has taken.
>
> Deuteronomy 24: 5

The Old Testament contains the Song of Solomon, the book which Sue defends to Jude at one point (p. 159, Part III, Chapter IV). Yet, although Hardy shows the destructiveness of Sue's lack of physical warmth, he does not show the Law's judgment of it. Instead, the Law is seen as an obstruction to human happiness, to instinct and to natural feeling.

The laws of nature are suggested at various points as the ideal guide for conduct, but they are elsewhere described either as cruel and unjust or as leading to weakness, lack of self-control, indulgence. What, then, is the basis of morality to be if it is neither religion, society or nature?

In Jude, the answer seems to be the ethic of Christian love, that

which is valuable in Christianity once all traces of superstition, irrationality and religious ritual are removed. The ethic of Christianity separated from its faith in God, its worship, its unquestioning acceptance of the teachings of the church, is understood by Hardy as its essential truth. When Sue leaves Jude to return to Phillotson she quotes a line from I Corinthians 13 - "Charity seeketh not her own" - and Jude says that the verses of that chapter "will stand fast when all the rest that you call religion has passed away!" (p. 374, Part VI, Chapter IV).

Social law, religious law and natural law are all opposed to the ethic of love which is seen as a higher form of morality than any of the others. In the little church near Aldbrickham the opposition is suggested; "the tables of the Jewish law towered sternly over the utensils of Christian grace" (p. 310). In a similar way, the letter of the law - both religious and social - towers sternly over the love of Jude and Sue. Their love is considered a purer and finer thing than the Law, but the Law triumphs and defeats their love in the end.

Lawrence's perception of this conflict in the "Study" leads him to criticise an aspect of Hardy's thought. He speaks of "the unfairness of showing Love always violated and suffering, never supreme and triumphant . . . for we have to bring in pity, we must admit that Love is at a fundamental disadvantage before the Law, and cannot therefore ever hold its own. Which is weak philosophy," (p. 477). Hardy's art expresses his deep belief in the Law and in the Creator, "but in conceipt [sic] of his own understanding, which cannot understand the Law, he says that the Law is nothing, a blind confusion".

> And in conceipt [sic] of understanding, he deprecates and destroys both women and men who would represent the old primeval Law, the great Law of the Womb, the primeval Female principle. The Female shall not exist. Where it appears, it is a criminal tendency, to be stamped out.
>
> This in Manston, Troy, Boldwood, Eustacia, Wildeve, Henchard, Tess, Jude . . . . (p. 482)

Lawrence's criticism is that Hardy's conscious understanding of the words Law and Love is confused and unclear. Although he uses the terms frequently to discuss conflicts between society and the individual, between Judaism and Christianity, between flesh and spirit, he has not thought through carefully their implications and thus involves himself in various inconsistencies which weaken the force of his art.

The terms Law and Love are Hardy's; and a clarification of their full meaning in his novels, especially in Jude, was for Lawrence essential to an understanding of Hardy's fiction. In fact, all of the seeming digressions in the "Study" are responses to issues raised by the Wessex novels, issues which Lawrence needed to examine more closely before he could fully appreciate and assess Hardy's achievement.

As is clear from the above discussion, the Old and New Testaments and the Judeo-Christian tradition were centrally important to the story of Jude's growth. The beginning of Jude's separation from the church and his decision not to enter the ministry came after he first kissed Sue. He then saw that "it was glaringly inconsistent for him to pursue the idea of becoming the soldier and servant of a religion in which sexual love was regarded as at its best a frailty, and at its worst damnation" (p. 226, Part IV, Chapter III). Lawrence asks if this evaluation of the Christian attitude towards sexual

love is an accurate one and, if so, to what extent and in what way. He also asks if this is a fair statement about a religious tradition which includes the Old Testament. In fact, Lawrence questions the profundity of Sue and Jude's objections to Christianity as the novel presents them. Have they really understood the full meaning of Old Testament Law and Christian love before rejecting religion? Have Jude and Sue really gleaned the essence from Christianity as Hardy seems to suggest they have (Sue, of course, abandoned her knowledge of "essential" Christianity in her reversion to superstition at the close of the novel)? At the Agricultural Show, Sue tells Jude,

> "I feel that we have returned to Greek joyousness, and have blinded ourselves to sickness and sorrow, and have forgotten what twenty-five centuries have taught the race since their time . . . . "
> (p. 307, Part V, Chapter V)

By the conclusion of Chapter IX of the "Study", Lawrence's judgment is that this attempt at consciously forgetting "what twenty-five centuries have taught the race", while still being profoundly influenced by those centuries, is a major element in Sue and Jude's tragedy. Lawrence wants to see more clearly what the race has been taught by the experience of Judaism and Christianity, wants to understand their religious impact more deeply and consciously than Hardy has done, in order to be able to build solidly upon them, to move forward significantly into new territory. Jude and Sue's problem was not that society, religion and nature conspired to defeat their pure Christian love, but that they did not understand fully what Christian love meant — the acceptance of the unique and separate nature of the other. They knew Christianity not too well but too little. Lawrence's theological

discussion in the "Study" is partly an attempt to show how this is so.

Hardy's treatment of Judaism and Christianity is related to another issue, that of the opposition between flesh and spirit. Certainly, one reason why Lawrence uses these terms is that Hardy persists in using them to describe the conflicts of his characters. Lawrence wrote in an early letter (26th October, 1910, to Rachel Annand Taylor) "why do you persist in separating soul and body? I can't tell, in myself, or in anybody, one from the other".[5] Yet, it is this language of flesh versus spirit which Hardy uses, and in the "Study" Lawrence tries to examine the reasons why human beings speak of themselves in this way, what conflicts such a terminology can powerfully express. In the Preface to Jude Hardy says that his novel is about "a deadly war waged between flesh and spirit" (p. v.). When Jude begins to have doubts about his fitness for the clergy, he thinks that "the utmost he could hope for was that in a life of constant internal warfare between flesh and spirit the former might not always be victorious" (p. 202); we are told, "the human was more powerful in him than the Divine" (p. 215). The same division within human beings is suggested in Tess of the D'Urbervilles, particularly in Tess's reflection on Angel's nature; "she was appalled by the determination revealed in the depths of this gentle being she had married - the will to subdue the grosser to the subtler emotion, the substance to the conception, the flesh to the spirit".[6]

Angel Clare's name suggests another opposition which Hardy often uses to describe conflicts between or within his characters, that of light and darkness. Most frequently, the light is the light of reason, of greater intelligence, shining against the shadow of ignorance and sensuality. Jude

is called "the Obscure" while Sue is constantly compared to a star (pp. 97, 414) or even to lightning at one point - "her intellect played like lambent lightning over conventions and formalities which he at that time respected, though he did not now" (p. 356). In The Return of the Native, Hardy first describes Clym in terms of light and shadow; he appears to Eustacia as a Rembrandt portrait. The "deity that lies ignominiously chained within an emphemeral human carcase shone out of him like a ray"; his appearance suggests "the mutually destructive interdependence of spirit and flesh".[7]

Spirit and flesh, light and shadow - Hardy not only uses these words to describe his characters, he also speaks of his men and women in terms of movement and stability. Gabriel Oak is valued and distinguished primarily by his static qualities. Sue Bridehead is contrasted to the full-figured female Arabella by her alert, active characteristics; "there was nothing statuesque in her; all was nervous motion. She was mobile, living" (pp. 96-7). The apparent restfulness and quiet of comtemplation at Christminster is, according to Jude, "the stillness of infinite motion", of tremendous mental activity, (p. 120); and it is this movement and activity towards which he aspires.

All of these dichotomies lead to a question central to Hardy's fiction - what do "male" and "female" mean and what is involved in love or marriage between them? The Wessex novels are full of speculations on the differences between the sexes; a lot of it is stereotyped in the earlier novels where women are always seen as vain, weak and silly in spite of their many attractions. These stereotyped ideas are still present in Tess and Jude

but they are qualified by more thoughtful reflection. Sue is vain and Jude criticises her at times for being a flirt. She herself speaks of a woman's "inborn craving . . . to attract and captivate, regardless of the injury it may do the man" and of a woman's ability to love forever in mental and spiritual communion with a man with no restless desire for a sexual tie (p. 365). Jude also ponders over woman's failure in intelligence as a general characteristic. He says to Sue,

> " . . . What I can't understand in you is your extraordinary blindness now to your old logic. Is it peculiar to you, or is it common to woman? Is a woman a thinking unit at all, or a fraction always wanting its integer?" (p. 363)

This view of woman appears throughout the novel. Jude tells Sue, "I would argue with you if I didn't know that a woman in your state of feeling is quite beyond all appeals to her brains. Or is it that you are humbugging yourself, as so many women do about these things . . . ?" (p. 403). Jude speaks to Mrs. Edlin of his relationship with Sue,

> "Then bitter affliction came to us, and her intellect broke, and she veered round to darkness. Strange differences of sex, that time and circumstance, which enlarge the views of most men, narrow the views of women almost invariably." (p. 414)

We can see why Lawrence justly criticises Jude for not recognising the special nature of Sue's being.

> Why must it be assumed that Sue is an "ordinary" woman - as if such a thing existed? . . . Why must Jude, owing to the conception he is brought up in, force her to act as if she were his "ordinary" abstraction, a woman?
>
> She was not a woman. She was Sue Bridehead, something very particular. (p. 510)

We can also see why a female critic of <u>Jude</u> told Hardy that, interesting as

his portrayal of the modern woman was in the character of Sue, it was too bad that she had been drawn by a man instead of by "one of her own sex who would never have allowed her to break down at the end" (Postscript to Jude, p. ix).

Tess is also described in stereotyped female terms - she is passive, "a vessel of emotions rather than reasons"[8], she loses herself totally in Angel, imitates him and takes over all his ways of thinking, speaking, believing. She fails to think for herself, especially in matters of religion. However, in Tess and Jude Hardy is trying to understand more carefully what male and female characteristics really are. As he writes various impressions and reflections come to mind. Describing men and women working in a field, he perceives the following difference.

> A field-man is a personality afield; a field-woman is a portion of the field; she has somehow lost her own margin, imbibed the essence of her surrounding, and assimilated herself with it. (Tess, p. 111)

Is that an interesting or true observation? In Jude, one of the unusual things Hardy notices in Sue is that "unlike a woman in ordinary, whose eye is so keen for material things, Sue seemed to see nothing of the room they were in, or any detail of her environment" (p. 376). Are women usually alert to material things, more so than men? If so, why? In describing Mrs. Clare's love of Angel, in spite of his heterodox views, Hardy writes,

> What woman, indeed, among the most faithful adherents of the truth, believes the promises and threats of the Word in the sense in which she believes in her own children, or would not throw her theology to the wind if weighed against their happiness? (Tess, p. 478)

Are women more closely affected by ties of the flesh than by spiritual or intellectual beliefs?

Lawrence in the "Study" has tried to discern what is stereotyped and what is profound in Hardy's thoughts on differences between the sexes. Were Hardy's observations of men and women keen and penetrating or did he narrow his vision by preconceived notions of what men and women were like? One pitfall which Lawrence avoids but which Hardy too often did not is that of equating Male with man, Female with woman. Lawrence insists that every individual is Male and Female to some degree; in Jude, Hardy showed that he understood this possibility by making Sue even more male than Jude. However, she reverted to emotion and superstition and abandoned responsible intelligence in the end and so proved herself a "typical" woman in Hardy's terms.

Clearly, the whole question of what marriage between a man and a woman involves, whether it is a spiritual relationship, a marriage of minds, or a physical one, is central to Tess of the D'Urbervilles and to Jude the Obscure. Hardy's thoughts on marriage are especially prominent in Jude, and Lawrence made a determined effort in the "Study" to establish the extent of his agreement with Hardy in these matters and to point to certain misconceptions about marriage expressed in the novel. This intellectual work is necessary, I think, before the real nature of Sue and Jude's problem can be discussed, for their story is so overlaid with propaganda against marriage and with false ideals for human relationship that it obscures the profundity of their struggle.

Hardy's treatment of marriage will be examined further in the following section of this chapter; the point to be made here is that Lawrence's thoughts on marriage in the "Study" are his intellectual preparation for fully comprehending the nature of Jude and Sue's relationship.

Jude and Sue are frequently described, as if it were a matter for praise, as "the two parts of a single whole" (p. 301). Sue speaks of "our perfect union - our two-in-oneness" (p. 349). Lawrence is concerned with determining if such absolute unity is a healthy ideal for marriage or even a possible one. What does marriage mean, not only for two individuals but for individuals who must live responsibly in a human community? Why did society condemn Jude and Sue? Was it because of the illegality of their union? Or did they cause people to dislike them because of their own uncertainty of each other, their own uneasiness, the travesty which each was working against his or her own true nature? Lawrence suggests that the community stood against them not because they broke social law but because they offended the laws of their own nature, because they were not true to their separate selves.

> How many people, man and woman, live together, in England, and have children, and are never, never asked whether they have been through the marriage ceremony together? Why then should Jude and Sue have been brought to task? Only because of their own uneasy sense of wrong, of sin; which they communicated to other people. And this wrong or sin was not against the community, but against their own being, against life. Which is why they were, the pair of them, instinctively disliked. (p. 506)

The whole question of marriage, how not only male and female but flesh and spirit, light and darkness, Old Testament Law and New Testament Love, are to be united or reconciled, is the question Lawrence begins to see as determining the order of construction in Hardy's novels, particularly in Jude. This concept of the marriage of opposing qualities is, in fact, very similar to Hardy's statement in The Later Years of the way in which he built Jude the Obscure as a pattern of contrasts - between Sue and her heathen Gods

and Jude and his Greek New Testament, between Christminster in the university and Christminster in the slums, between Jude the saint and Jude the sinner and between Sue the pagan and Sue the saint, between marriage and no marriage.[9] Arthur Mizener, quoting this passage, has criticised these oppositions in Jude as inconsistent and superficial. "Hardy's carefully devised contrasts fail of their full purpose because he is writing a novel at whose center there is no final contrast . . . they are but means for contrasting a single view of things, which is true, with all other views of things, which are false. And this is the contrast of melodrama rather than of tragedy."[10]

Mizener's criticism is that Hardy used the novel to express his own viewpoint without testing it fully against particulars of life which might contradict or qualify it. Lawrence expresses the necessity in art for such a tension between one's own moral attitude or conscious metaphysic and the complexities of life.

> For the moralist it is easy. He can insist on that aspect of the Law or Love which is in the immediate line of development for his age, and he can sternly and severely exclude or suppress all the rest.
>
> So that all morality is of temporary value, useful to its times. But art must give a deeper satisfaction. It must give fair play all round.
>
> Yet every work of art adheres to some system of morality. But if it be really a work of art, it must contain the essential criticism on the morality to which it adheres. And hence the antinomy, hence the conflict necessary to every tragic conception.
>
> The degree to which the system of morality, or the metaphysic, of any work of art is submitted to criticism within the work of art makes the lasting value and satisfaction of that work. (p. 476)

However, Lawrence disagrees with Mizener in that he believes Hardy's contrasts

in Jude do work to express a central contrast; Lawrence insists that Hardy is an artist, not a philosopher or metaphysician, and feels that Hardy's art does provide the essential criticism of his own conscious moral attitude in Tess and Jude. The essential oppositions do, however, need to be clarified and distinguished from the more superficial "pattern of contrasts" which Hardy plays with at times. The "Study"'s attempt to explore the dimensions and implications of duality and unity is, at least in part, a response to the dualism expressed in Hardy's art. Lawrence is also challenging the monistic views attributed to Hardy by Lascelles Abercrombie in his Thomas Hardy: A Critical Study, which Lawrence read shortly before beginning his own "Study".

We have seen how the terms and concepts of Lawrence's criticism - Law/Love, flesh/spirit, dark/light, stability/motion, female/male, marriage in the body/marriage in the spirit - grew out of Hardy's novels[11]; it should therefore not be surprising to find Lawrence's terminology recurring in many forms in the work of later students of Hardy. The duality which Lawrence sensed in Hardy's work and which he explored in the "Study" had far-reaching implications; comments Lawrence made in passing could suggest whole new possible investigations. In fact, an examination of much of the Hardy criticism since the "Study" shows how in many articles or books some of the terms which Lawrence used in his essay in a complexly defined way are used in a single sense to speak of specific issues or problems in the novels. Their discussions do not range as broadly as Lawrence's but they go into more detail and substantiate their cases more completely; they are less suggestive but more thorough.

It is remarkable to see how the context Lawrence builds in the

"Study" in a way includes many of these later analyses of Hardy's fiction, simply through the extended ramifications of the terminology he has developed for that particular critical task. We can get a sense of how much territory Lawrence covers and how efficiently he does it by realising that all of these separate arguments can be made in detail on aspects of the Wessex novels which Lawrence merely touches on or refers to. These were no superficial passing comments but doors which opened onto wholly new territory which could be explored fruitfully and at length. The similarity of such "fruitfulness" to that which Michael Polanyi describes as a characteristic of a true scientific theory or discovery is, I think, more close than we might imagine.[12] It would imply that Lawrence's "Study of Thomas Hardy" had established a certain contact with reality, the reality of Hardy's works, had made a good critical contribution on which others could (and can) build, a starting place for further exploration rather than a definitive statement or final say.

What have been the central arguments of these articles or books on Hardy and how can they be seen to relate to the "Study"? One man talks about the difference between Hardy's "changeless" and "changeful" characters[13]; we are reminded of Lawrence's use of the terms Will-to-Inertia and Will-to-Motion and of his comments on Alec and Arabella in Tess and Jude.

> Just like Alec d'Urberville, she [Arabella] had from the outset an antagonism to the submission to any change in herself, to any development. She had the will to remain where she was, static . . . . (p. 493)

Similarly, other critics speak of the opposition between that which is customary, familiar, and the men and women who have been educated beyond their rural background and who thus bring the sense of change and unrest

with them.[14] Such are Clym, Angel and Jude and Sue. This conflict between movement and stability, between a static society and its adventurers, is expressed by one man as the difference between the "knowable" community and an "unknowable" community.[15] The idea is very similar to Lawrence's distinction between the community in the flesh, in the Law in which all people are in a sense a part of one another, and the more extended community (in Love) in which all people are separate individuals, unique and diverse and in which each being must recognise the strange and maybe hostile being of the other, the unknown-ness of the not-me.

This opposition is stated slightly differently by Arthur Mizener in an essay on "Jude the Obscure as a Tragedy" as that between the practical characters and the idealists. The realists, like Arabella, are intent on adjusting to the world as it is and providing for their material needs; the idealists, like Jude, want to change the world, to create the ideal world where love and knowledge prevail.[16] Lawrence expressed this dichotomy at the very beginning of the "Study" as the tension between the need for self-preservation, life in the flesh, and the desire for self-expression, adventure, a further life in the spirit - between stasis and movement.

However, Mizener, as we have seen, feels that Hardy did not present this opposition fully and fairly enough, that it was not centered on any real, vital tension. He cites the pig-killing scene where Jude and Arabella disagree over the method of butchering the pig; Arabella, a butcher's daughter, wants the pig killed slowly so the meat will be well-bled and bring more money on the market. Jude wants the pig killed quickly as a slow death seems cruel. Throughout the incident our sympathies are unequally weighted on Jude's side; Arabella is shown as brutal and unfeeling, interested only

in money. When Jude says "It is a hateful business", she replies "Pigs must be killed". When Jude says "Thank God! He's dead", Arabella retorts,

> "What's God got to do with such a messy job as a pig killing, I should like to know! Poor folks must live." (pp. 71-72)

Mizener's criticism is that Hardy's sympathy with Jude's tender-heartedness in the scene obscures the equal truth of Arabella's statements, in the light of which Jude's feelings are merely sentimental and silly. "Poor folks must live" is not a statement of crass materialism, but of another kind of wisdom which is equal in value and importance to Jude's.[17] One can agree with Mizener that Hardy's obvious sympathy with Jude in the novel is a flaw at times and that this scene is not as striking or as complex in thought as it might be, while yet seeing the implication of Lawrence's judgment of Hardy as an artist first and foremost - a lesser man and artist, Lawrence might say, would not even have included Arabella's statements. The tension might be unevenly weighted, but at least it is there.

The oppositions Lawrence senses in Hardy - self-preservation/forward movement into consciousness, stability/movement, Community under Law/Community in Love, flesh/spirit - do build to a central conflict which he expresses in Chapter IX of the "Study", the conflict between Hardy's conscious "metaphysic" and the greater truth of his art. However, it does not build to this central problem in any simplistic way. The metaphysic is not Law while the art is Love (or vice versa).[18] The metaphysic involves a certain conscious understanding of the balance of Law and Love, an understanding which inevitably bears the imprint of the author's age and accounts for those particular qualities which make an author irreplaceable, unique in all time.

The art tests the metaphysic, unsettles the fixed balance, discovers complexity and new relations, gives fair play all around - this is what gives it its force in every age, its lasting value (see page 476 of the "Study"). If the art and metaphysic can be made parallel in any way to Law and Love, the art sides with Law - with embodied beauty, the weight of rhythm, the "concession to the body, to the being and requirements of the body" to "the living, positive inertia which is the other half of life, other than the pure will to motion" (p. 478). The metaphysic would lie with Love, with knowledge, abstraction, the mind. Yet these distinctions are only a matter of emphasis, for as Lawrence maintains, the special nature of art is that it unites body, rhythm, colour with the reach of the spirit into the unknown, that which is as of yet unembodied. This is the wonderful reconciliation he feels in Shelley's "Ode to a Skylark" (p. 478). Also, a quality of the best thought is its "comparative sensuousness"; this is what in Lawrence's opinion makes the classic and theological thinkers so appealing to Jude (p. 499); and Lawrence insists that the "complete consciousness", truth, is "two in one" - male and female, Law and Love, mobile spirit and stable flesh.

This sense of an opposition between Hardy's conscious ideas and his art has found expression in various forms in Hardy criticism. It is a creative tension present in the work of all artists, that between the aspiration - that which an artist wants to say - and the resistant - the materials of his craft, the concrete form in which his aspiration takes shape and can be shared with others. However, in Hardy's novels and poems, the tension seems to be more extreme than usual, almost to the point of being destructive rather than creative, of marring his art rather than strengthening it. R. P. Blackmur, discussing Hardy's poetry, spoke of him as "the great example of a sensibility

violated by ideas".[19] The great ideas of the nineteenth century were restrictive, limiting and imprisoning to Hardy.

> What Hardy really lacked was the craft of his profession - technique in the wide sense; that craft, which, as a constant, reliable possession, would have taught him the radical necessity as it furnished the means, of endowing every crucial statement with the virtual force of representation . . . . To his ideas as such, then, there is no primary objection. The objection is to his failure to absorb them by craft into the representative effect of his verse. 20

This conflict of artistic form versus formula or preconceived, abstract idea has been stated variously as the opposition between Hardy's attention to particular, concrete feelings and his philosophy or thought[21], his native feeling for words, characters, details, the particulars of life, contrasted with his tendencies towards erudition and big generalisations[22], his instinctive understanding versus his inadequate ideas.[23] The conflict is expressed with admirable clarity by Herbert J. Muller.[24] Speaking of Hardy's "philosophy" as a limitation, he says,

> It tended to cramp his imagination, blunt his perceptions, mechanize his responses, harden his aesthetic arteries generally. It sapped his fictions of some vitality: his characters are at times slighted or manhandled for the sake of wildly improbable events, the relations between character and plot seem at times mechanical and arbitrary rather than organic and inevitable. Yet his obsessions were not fatal . . . . Logically, his philosophy makes all self-assertion futile, leaves no room for self-realization; his characters should be the puppets that in The Dynasts he specifically tells us all men are. Actually, his characters at best have a vigorous life of their own; they have dignity and force, they aspire and assert themselves passionately, their full measure is taken. And his own vigorous creative activity makes nonsense of his philosophy." 25

This is again the same duality between Hardy's conscious "meta-physic" and his art which Lawrence stated in the "Study". It is difficult

to know if these later critics had read Lawrence's "Study" or if they arrived at these terms for the discussion independently. Perhaps the latter alternative is most likely, in which case it shows how these antitheses seem to rise naturally from Hardy's work and suggest the unique vocabulary necessary for talking about the Wessex novels. What is striking in the "Study of Thomas Hardy" is the way in which Lawrence's direct treatment of Tess and Jude in Chapter IX, because of the careful work of definition, of creation and exploration which has gone before, carries the resonance of all of these later analyses, includes them all in a suggestive relation. The duality sensed in Hardy by many critics in one form or another is developed more fully in the "Study"; Lawrence shows how many aspects there are to this dualism, how it is not a simple thing but a complex one in which much is involved. The Hardy "Study", read in relation to Hardy criticism in general, shows the extraordinary scope, suggestiveness and efficiency of Lawrence's method of creating and using "art-speech" for criticism.

This is not, however, the general opinion. In R. G. Cox's Thomas Hardy: The Critical Heritage only a passing comment is given to "Lawrence's highly personal and idiosyncratic study", while the Thomas Hardy Centennial Issue of The Southern Review (Summer 1940) is mentioned as a turning point in Hardy criticism.[26] Yet most of the criticism discussed in these pages has come from that issue of The Southern Review - articles by Arthur Mizener, Donald Davidson, Allen Tate, R. P. Blackmur, Morton Dauwen Zabel, Katherine Anne Porter, Herbert J. Muller - and we have seen how similar their assessment of Hardy and a great many of their central points are to Lawrence's thoghts in the "Study". Lawrence's work seems not to

qualify as serious literary criticism for some reason, or, if it does, not to be recognised for the critical achievement it is. Only two years after Abercrombie's work on Hardy, Lawrence challenged the accepted view of Hardy as a writer of Greek or Shakespearean tragedy, refused to be either taken in or completely repulsed by Hardy's philosophy and went straight to the essential life of his art, its lasting qualities, and studied those. These are what Cox sees as characteristics of modern Hardy criticism: its reaction against "solemn academic adulation" and its "strong sense that Hardy's work is very mixed in quality and that its positive merits require careful disentangling". He says that this "modern sifting process" can be "most conveniently dated from the essays in The Southern Review Hardy Centennial Issue of summer 1940" and "as yet the process can hardly be said to be complete".[27] Lawrence's work, although written in 1914 (however, not published until 1936, in Phoenix) seems contemporary with that of the 1940 Southern Review, if not with current Hardy criticism; it is certainly years beyond Abercrombie in critical spirit and critical sense. To move directly from Abercrombie's Thomas Hardy: A Critical Study to Lawrence's "Study of Thomas Hardy" is to move into a different world. The change is especially significant if we keep in mind that Lawrence read Abercrombie's book shortly before starting his own study, and the "Study" can be seen from one perspective as Lawrence's response to Abercrombie's analysis of Hardy.

Why do I say reading the "Study" is a move into a different world? We can see the difference most clearly, perhaps, by looking at the way in which Abercrombie and Lawrence deal with this question of Hardy's "metaphysic". In April 1913 Lawrence wrote a letter to A. W. McLeod, in which he said,

> Oh, Lord, and if I don't "subdue my art to a metaphysic", as somebody very beautifully said of Hardy, I do write because I want folk - English folk - to alter, and have more sense. 28

The specific phrase - "subdue (his) art to a metaphysic" - does not appear in Abercrombie's book (which was published in 1912) but the idea certainly does.[29] Abercrombie refers throughout to Hardy's "metaphysic" and its shaping influence on his art. However, Abercrombie thinks Hardy's metaphysic a strengthening element, one which contributes both to form and control. Lawrence finds that the success of Hardy's art depends on the extent to which he tests his metaphysic and escapes its limiting influence. Abercrombie writes,

> The highest art must have a metaphysic . . . . only in such art . . . will conscious mastery seem complete. And Thomas Hardy, by deliberately putting the art of his fiction under the control of a metaphysic, has thereby made the novel capable of the highest service to man's consciousness 30

This "highest service" has to do with Hardy's "extraordinary power of artistic form";

> the formative desire - the desire (it has many names) for shapeliness, order, symmetry, completeness, significance, definiteness - is the hungriest lust the spirit possesses, and one whose satisfaction yields the deepest enjoyment. For this reason, its nourishment increases, and adds a sense of delighted mastery to, self-consciousness . . . . self-consciousness is delighted with mastery, with the sense of perfect control achieved . . . . There are no novels like Thomas Hardy's for perfection of form . . . . Life has at last been perfectly formed and measured to man's requirements; and in art man knows himself truly the master of his existence. 31

According to Abercrombie, the important purpose of form in art is to effect "a perfect separation from the surrounding disorder of the world"; the work of art is to be "a detached, completed sphere of artistic command over life".[32]

This line of reasoning leads Abercrombie to define two kinds of creative literature - "that in which a metaphysic is fitted to experience and that in which experience is fitted to a metaphysic" - without making any judgment as to their relative worth or truthfulness. The first kind is that of the poet who judges "instinctively" (his example is Shakespeare); the second is that of the poet who judges "intellectually" (his example is Milton). Hardy is, says Abercrombie, the intellectual kind. "He does not become the life he deals with, but compels it all to become himself, to fit in with a constant manner of intellectual judgment."[33]

Abercrombie tells us, we can't really prefer the one kind of art to the other. However, that is a matter of opinion. To Lawrence, it made a great deal of difference whether one started with life as it was, studying it honestly and trying to be as fully aware as possible of one's biases, preconceptions and limitations, or whether one started with an ideal, a rigid metaphysic and either distorted all experience to make it fit the pattern or ignored any experience which contradicted it. The former meant one was attempting to face reality, to make truthful discoveries about it. The other meant that one turned away from reality, escaped to the consolation of a spurious feeling of control over life. Lawrence's judgment of Hardy is a succinct refutation of Abercrombie's, a statement that the peculiar discoveries, the true knowledge of Hardy's art, came when he looked fully at life, judged "instinctively", and let life itself show up the inadequacies of his metaphysic.

> But it is not as a metaphysician that one must consider Hardy. He makes a poor show there. For nothing in his work is so pitiable as his clumsy efforts to push events into line with his theory of being, and to make Calamity fall on those who represent the principle of Love. He

> does it exceedingly badly, and owing to this effort his form is execrable in the extreme.
>
> His feeling, his instinct, his sensuous understanding is, however, apart from his metaphysic, very great and deep, deeper than that, perhaps, of any other English novelist. (p. 480)

Why do I say that Lawrence's judgment of Hardy here seems a move into a different world? - because Abercrombie writes in an age in which art is seldom discussed as discovery, truth, learning, knowledge, understanding, but as an arbitrary construct, a pleasing pattern, a form of entertainment or escape from the disorder of life. Knowledge belongs to a different, rational realm, the realm of philosophy and primarily of science. It does not matter if Hardy distorted life to fit his metaphysic because art is not understood as responsible knowledge but as consoling lies. Lawrence, however, writes as if artistic form is as important a way of discovering truths about reality as is scientific experiment. Hence, a work of art is not an arbitrary fabrication but something as much discovered as created. Perhaps this accounts for the feeling of inevitability a great novel, poem or play gives us; we feel it could not be otherwise, there is something "given" about it. If this is so, then the special powers of "art-speech" - a speech which can recognise contradictory particulars in life, more than one kind of wisdom, different aspects of reality and hold these in some kind of creative tension while attempting to uncover a further order, a broader truth - would be lost if a novelist or a poet adhered unswervingly to one view of things and cleverly built a world to correspond to that view, rather than paid close attention to the world as it was. Lawrence is criticising Abercrombie's blindness to this special quality of art-speech when he says,

> The adherence to a metaphysic does not necessarily give artistic form. Indeed the over-strong adherence to a metaphysic usually destroys any possibility of artistic form. (p. 477)

The idea is not new. It is what Keats expressed in his definition of Negative Capability, "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason". What is important is Lawrence's insistence that all forms of knowledge, along the full range from science to poetry, depend on such a capability to dwell in doubts, uncertainties, mysteries, to move into the unknown. This negative capability could be translated into the terms of Michael Polanyi as he describes the way in which a scientist works, dwelling expectantly in the particulars of a problem until the moment of sudden comprehension, of the imaginative leap by which he crosses a logical gap and sees a new whole where before were only disparate, unrelated details. The scientist, the student, the artist when extending our human knowledge are discovering new relations. To only (and "irritably") reach for explicit rules, already established facts, logical reasons, makes the venture into knowledge impossible.

Abercrombie, rather than stressing the new relations Hardy discovers as an artist, concentrates on the way he embodied pre-existent "modern" ideas and a particular metaphysic in his work. As already discussed in Chapter III of this thesis, Abercrombie finds Hardy's philosophy of Monism as expressed in The Dynasts one of the most impressive aspects of his achievement because of its affinity to the thought of the time, to our "ultimate conception".[34] He praises the structure of The Dynasts which lets the reader share the phantoms' "balloon-like height of vision" in which "Europe appears as 'a crinkled ground'; armies look like caterpillars; Napoleon an insect on

a leaf. Material and spiritual detail is persistently belittled, in order that the whole may appear greater".[35]

All of this is meant to express "the profound essential in man's latter-day conception of the universe . . . the consciousness of monism, of the single urgency driving all the manifold shows of being".[36] In fact, in praising Hardy like this, Abercrombie misrepresents him; Abercrombie much more complacently expounds this fatalistic idea, this belief in the impossibility of free will or of human behaviour affecting seriously the course of events, than Hardy ever does. As Abercrombie himself remarks, even at one point in The Dynasts Hardy's fatalism slips; the actions of the phantoms have a real influence on "the process of destiny". Abercrombie sees this as a slip in formal control, a danger to the harmony of the poem.[37] Lawrence would see it as a sign of the true artist in Hardy, the man who looked closely at life, not from a "balloon-like height" but from his position as a human being set in the thick of it.

Lawrence's careful attention to individual characters, to the specific life of Hardy's novels, in the "Study" stands in direct contrast to the generalising tendency of Abercrombie's criticism. To Lawrence it is not any Immanent Will or "single urgency" which account for Hardy's power as a writer, but his careful observation and understanding of human beings and their relationships to each other. Even when Abercrombie does deal with the relationships in Hardy's novels, he tends to generalise rather than to see unique characteristics or lively oppositions. For instance, in discussing Tess and Jude he says that they are "epic" rather than "dramatic" in form; that is, unlike Return of the Native or Far From the Madding Crowd which show the dramatic interplay of four or more characters, they simply tell the

history of one character and his or her tragedy of "personal desires asserting themselves against the vast unconcerned current of existence". Rather than studying the triangle of relationships between Tess, Angel and Alec or Jude, Sue and Arabella and the struggle between male and female elements within both Jude and Tess, as Lawrence does, Abercrombie categorises Tess and Jude as female and male respectively. "Without absurdly forcing sexual difference, it seems justifiable to take these two novels as giving a typically feminine and a typically masculine embodiment to the same tragic conflict of personal against impersonal".[38] His classifying Tess and Jude in this way affects the sensitivity of his further analysis of Jude. He says that the whole point in the novel is that

> Jude's marriage with Arabella and his illegal love for Sue were equally ruinous to the achievement of his desire. His disaster is, that he has anything to do with women at all; for the fashion of his nature is such, that no woman can be to him anything but a representative of that great assimilating power of the general world which is his spirit's enemy - since it is all for holding him back from realizing himself. Either of these two women would have been an efficient agent of this; with the pair of them, Jude is simply devoured. 39

Not only does such a summary of the situation disregard the fineness of Hardy's achievement in portraying two women as different as Arabella and Sue - two women who are irreducible to one "great assimilating power" - but it ignores the very real ways in which both Arabella and Sue did help Jude to realise important qualities and capabilities in himself. Jude's nature was not all one way towards male aspiration; as Lawrence emphasises, Arabella and Jude's marriage only revealed to Jude another dimension of himself, the deep female elements in his own nature.

> Really, he had lost nothing by his marriage with Arabella: neither innocence nor belief nor hope. He had indeed gained his manhood. She left him the stronger and completer . . . . Arabella brought him to himself, gave him himself, made him free, sound as a physical male. (pp. 495, 494)

Lawrence sees not only Arabella and Sue, but Jude, as more complex than Abercrombie sees them. Arabella and Sue are not mere representatives of an impersonal female force which has a destructive influence on Jude; they are distinct human beings. Jude is not simply the innocent aspiring hero; in fact, it is a certain clumsiness or lack of perception in him which helps to cause his disaster. He is thoughtless in dealing with both women and seems unable to see their special qualities. He expects them both to meet his conception of an ordinary woman; Arabella should be more understanding of his mental and spiritual desires, Sue of his physical ones. He makes a true relationship impossible with either one of them because he is constantly wishing that they were what they were not and could not be. After he has promised to marry Arabella, thinking she is pregnant, "for his own soothing he kept up a factitious belief in her. His idea of her was the thing of most consequence, not Arabella herself, he sometimes said laconically" (Jude, p. 63, Part I, Chapter IX). Arabella has never encouraged Jude's inaccurate idea of her, yet it is when she fails to measure up to it that Jude's disillusion and discontent grow. Similarly, Jude's idea of any close relationship with a woman is that it involves sexual consummation, so he takes Sue physically even though he must have had a sense that it was deathly and inappropriate. Jude's mistake lay in not realising that the unique woman herself mattered much more than his idea of her (and this seems to be Hardy's point in the above passage from Jude, p. 63);

he demanded that all women be the same. Perhaps the reason Abercrombie does not notice this failing in Jude is that he too sees all women as essentially the same; at least, that is what his comments on Arabella and Sue might suggest.

We seem to have come a long way from the sense of duality between Hardy's metaphysic and his art. How do Abercrombie's comments on Hardy's Monism and on artistic form and the generalising tendency of Abercrombie's criticism have anything to do with the problem of subduing one's art to a metaphysic?

Abercrombie's view of Hardy is extraordinarily single-minded and simple. Hardy's metaphysic is Monism and fatalism, the denial of free will. This metaphysic strengthens Hardy's artistic form, makes it very controlled and harmonious and isolated from life. Also, all individuals, incidents, places can be generalised to fit into this form and this metaphysic harmoniously, especially since in life an individual can never achieve his own movement against the vast movement of impersonal existence.

> . . . through being utterly immersed in the huge onward speed of general existence, (man's) self-will, that seems always to promise the achievement of some movement of his own, is for ever contradicted 40

In analysing Jude, Abercrombie sees Jude's aspiration, his desire to achieve some movement of his own, as the cause of his downfall. He does not distinguish between the real and the extraneous elements of Jude's aspiration as Lawrence does, and try to see how Jude's failure to understand his true abilities and limitations affected the outcome of his story. Abercrombie seems to fault Jude's aspiration itself as out of place in a world such as ours. Jude should have simply maintained his integrity rather

than striving towards some further goal.

To Abercrombie, aspiring and maintaining integrity are two different things. To Lawrence, following one's true desire is the same thing as maintaining integrity. Granted, one may be aiming towards an inappropriate goal, may have a conscious, willed desire which is at odds with one's true nature, but it is not desire itself which is wrong. According to Lawrence, the necessary thing is to carefully determine what one's true desires are, to grow in self-knowledge, and then to submit fully to the discipline and struggle which they involve. Integrity is not standing still, but following one's true direction with the whole of one's being.

However, Abercrombie tells us that Hardy believes that an individual's true direction is always opposed to the direction of the impersonal movement of existence and that the latter always overpowers the former. Lawrence sees something quite different in Hardy; he sees men and women taking glorious flights into flower like the poppy, doing remarkable things, submitting to the movement of life which brings them into unique individuality. Lawrence sees the greater movement of existence manifesting itself in particular human beings as aspiration, as desire. The movement of the Immanent Will and the individual are not necessarily at odds.

The contradictory appraisals of Hardy's work given by Abercrombie and Lawrence involve a wholly different attitude towards faith, human possibility and responsibility. How can two critics look at one author and see such opposite statements about life? Primarily because Abercrombie concentrates on the metaphysic while Lawrence concentrates on the art. The remarkable thing is that Abercrombie, who finds Hardy's conscious metaphysic

and pessimism rather congenial, does less true justice to Hardy's work than Lawrence, who finds Hardy's conscious metaphysic completely contrary to his own beliefs and attitudes.

The "Study" shows how carefully Lawrence read Abercrombie's book and what kinds of questions it led him to ask. What is artistic form? Is it strengthened or weakened by a metaphysic? Is a metaphysic necessary to a work of art? (The answer seems to be yes, since a man's work will necessarily bear the imprint of his age; but the work must also contain the essential criticism of that metaphysic. See page 476 of the "Study".) If a metaphysic is necessary, what is Hardy's? What is my own? Are some metaphysics more dangerous to an artist than others? How does artistic form give us a more complex thought than the straightforward statement of a metaphysic? If I disagree with Hardy's metaphysic, why do I find his works impressive, interesting and moving? What is most important about the people he portrays, their individuality or their function in the expression of a general message? Do I really believe that some great impersonal force prevents all individual movement and discovery? If a kind of fatalistic monism, a belief in people as powerless puppets, is a modern idea, is it a good idea? Is it true? Does life ever contradict it? Is more possible to human beings than Abercrombie suggests? Does Hardy <u>really</u> believe what Abercrombie says he does? Is Hardy really a pessimist? What is Hardy's most complete statement about life, what is his own discovery, the personal knowledge he attained? Was it a true finding or a false one? Is it a complex statement, given in art-speech or a simple one, a "philosophy" which can be abstracted and expressed in a few sentences? If the former, how am

I to suggest it without doing it violence, crudely simplifying it? Why do I so strongly sense a conflict, a duality in Hardy where Abercrombie sees only unity - a metaphysic of monism, unified artistic form, calm mastery over his materials?

These are big questions to grow out of one's simply reading another critic. How many of us pay such close attention to great literature, let alone literary criticism, or take it as seriously as Lawrence does?

The "Study" can be seen partly as Lawrence's response to Abercrombie's analysis of Hardy's work. His essential disagreement with Abercrombie is that Hardy's greatness lay not in simply accepting and expressing the ideas of his age but in embodying them and challenging them in his art. These ideas, tied up with Darwin, Spencer, Locke, Hume, with a "scientific" conception of knowledge, were denying the worth of personal knowledge, especially artistic knowledge, and the possibility of individual free will and significant religious belief. Hardy's integrity lay in aspiring to a movement of his own, believing in the powers of art speech to discover truth, in an age which denied him that belief and increasingly saw both art and religion as only a form of entertainment, consolation and escape. He built his Wessex world on contrasts, on a careful observation of life which challenged and contradicted certain set ideas, ideas which had power over him but which he also resisted.

How should the form of the Wessex novels be felt? Lawrence carefully studies Jude, feeling in it the interplay of contrasts which Hardy himself stated was the order of construction, the technique which he used to express the very particular thing he wanted to say. The entire "Study of

Thomas Hardy" works to suggest the complexity of duality in Hardy's art and the central tension towards which it builds in Jude, Hardy's last novel and the novel Lawrence sees as the fullest statement of Hardy's thought. Thus, when Lawrence speaks in Chapter IX of the oppositions between Jude and Arabella, between Jude and Sue, within Jude himself, and primarily between Jude's own aspiration towards knowledge and the obstacle to it, within Jude and without, of the established ideas of the time - the set rules for "acquiring" knowledge in a few specially sanctioned places - he speaks with the whole weight of the "Study" behind him, its careful intellectual work of definition extending the meaning of the relationships and the struggle into self-knowledge and personal knowledge which he describes.

Lawrence contradicts Abercrombie in insisting on Hardy as an artist, as a man capable of observing and recording complexity rather than simply one view of things. To say that Hardy stated the ideas of the time, that he shaped his art to his monism, is to deny him recognition of the particular fight he fought. He turned to the powers of art-speech to test the current ideas he felt he had to accept and to show through imaginative creation the unpleasant truth of the final consequences to life of those ideas.

> And so Hardy really states his case, which is not his consciously stated metaphysic, by any means, but a statement how man has gone wrong and brought death on himself: how man has violated the Law, how he has supererogated himself, gone so far in his male conceit as to supersede the Creator, and win death as a reward. (p. 488)

This "violation of the Law" Lawrence sees clearly stated in Hardy's portrayal of Angel Clare.

> It is not Angel Clare's fault that he cannot come to Tess when he finds that she has, in his words, been defiled. It is the result of generations of ultra-Christian training, which had left in him an inherent aversion to the female, and to all in himself which pertained to the female. What he, in his Christian sense, conceived of as Woman, was only the servant and attendant and administering spirit to the male. He had no idea that there was such a thing as positive woman, as the Female, another great living Principle counterbalancing his own male principle. He conceived of the world as consisting of the One, the Male Principle . . . .
>
> Which conception reached its fullest in Turner's pictures, which were utterly bodiless; and also in the great scientists or thinkers of the last generation, even Darwin and Spencer and Huxley. For these last conceived of evolution, of one spirit or principle starting at the far end of time, and lonelily traversing Time. But there is not one principle, there are two, travelling always to meet, each step of each one lessening the distance between the two of them. And Space, which so frightened Herbert Spencer, is a Bride to us. And the Cry of Man does not ring out into the Void. It rings out to Woman, whom we know not. (p. 485)

This "violation of the Law" is, among other things, the denial of our roots in the flesh, of the peculiar capacities and limitations of our minds because of our being persons who contain in ourselves both male and female, who are capable of thought but only in a specific time and place, who can establish knowledge but only personal knowledge.

Lawrence, in paying tribute to Hardy as an artist rather than as a metaphysician, simultaneously takes Hardy's thought more seriously than Abercrombie does. For in Abercrombie's book it seems not to matter if a metaphysic is true or not; it needs only to contribute to the formal harmony of a work of art. Lawrence, however, maintains that the work of art is itself a form of thinking, perhaps the highest form of thinking man has yet evolved and there are important, complex ways in which it can be judged true or false.

It is on this matter that Lawrence also differs from the later critics discussed in this section, in spite of their sharing his perception of duality in Hardy's art. They all state the duality in terms of Hardy's thought versus his art. They accept a basic dichotomy between art and thought, between imagination or intuition and intellect. They are still giving in to Descartes and dualism. Lawrence is very careful to discriminate between what he calls Hardy's "consciously stated metaphysic" (p. 488) and the fuller statement of his art. The novels are not some intuitive outpouring, they are Hardy's best thought, his deepest understanding. The duality is not between thought and art but between a more limited form of thought and a more difficult, complex one.

Much has been said about Hardy's philosophy, his pessimism, his ideas, his thought and its inadequacies. I have already quoted part of Blackmur's statement of Hardy's central problem.

> Hardy is the great example of a sensibility violated by ideas; and perhaps the unique example, since Swift, of a sensibility great enough - locked enough in life - to survive the violation. 41

Lawrence shares this judgment, but qualifies it in one very important way. Hardy was "locked enough in life" not only to survive the violation of certain limiting ideas, but to give expression in the whole of his work to truer ones.

Lawrence insists that Hardy's importance is as an artist, not a metaphysician. At his best, he deals in the tensions, mysteries, complexities, dualities of art, not in simplistic statements of monism and fatalism. Lawrence, however, does not dismiss Hardy as a thinker; he merely maintains that it is on his success as an artist that the worth and significance of his thought depends. In Chapter IX of the "Study", after equipping himself

with the necessary vocabulary for the discussion, Lawrence examines the thought in Tess and Jude about the way human beings both attempt to grow in and through relations with each other and to stand apart, producing their own movement and personal knowledge, being brought forth to themselves, distinct.

Attitudes to Love: Marriage, Relationship and Society in Hardy's Novels

> What exactly the struggle into being consists in, is the question. But most obviously, from the Wessex novels, the first and chiefest factor is the struggle into love and the struggle with love: by love, meaning the love of a man for a woman and a woman for a man. The via media to being, for a man or woman, is love, and love alone. Having achieved and accomplished love, then the man passes into the unknown. He has become himself, his tale is told. (p. 410)

In Hardy's fiction, the way characters relate to each other, specifically how they love and marry each other, is the central subject under scrutiny. Under the Greenwood Tree and Far from the Madding Crowd end with marriages; The Return of the Native and Tess of the D'Urbervilles show how particular marriages came about and how they came to an end. Jude the Obscure takes the institution of marriage itself as a major theme.

In the passage above, Lawrence is describing Hardy's novels, not making a general statement about the necessary via media into being. The study of love is both Hardy's strong point and his particular limitation. Clearly, Lawrence himself is very interested in the problem of love and marriage, but his novels show more aspects of a man's struggle into being than Hardy's do. Paul Morel not only tries to understand his relationship to Miriam, Clara and his mother; he also reads and thinks a great deal, tries to understand his ability as a painter and to make an independent

movement of his own through his art. When he turns towards life and the city at the end of the novel, he turns alone. Ursula Brangwen also stands alone at the end of The Rainbow, having freed herself from her relationship to Anton Skrebensky. She can survive on her own, having faced the man's world of work and thought and business and in a measure succeeded; she can support herself, she is qualified to teach and she is intelligent enough to be dissatisfied with the university and to make thoughtful judgments about it and about the society in which she lives. Birkin at the end of Women in Love has married Ursula, but he still craves a further life of thought and action with men, although this aspect of his individuality - his work, his aspirations, his capabilities - are less fully developed than are Paul's in Sons and Lovers and Ursula's in The Rainbow.

Perhaps one of the reasons why Lawrence pays closest attention to Hardy's Jude the Obscure is that Jude's individual aspiration, his desire to enter the University, is almost as important to his story as his relationships to Arabella and Sue, his struggle into love and with love. Of course, the two problems - Jude's struggle for learning and for love - interpenetrate and influence one another and cannot be completely separated; but more weight is given to Jude's independent work of study than Hardy gives to either Clym's scheme of education or Angel's farming. As has been discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, Lawrence's treatment of Paul's learning and thought in Sons and Lovers is much more convincingly rendered than Clym's vague ideas about morality and teaching the Egdon youth. In ChapterIII I have also suggested that Lawrence's portrayal of Ursula's study at the university in The Rainbow is done in greater depth than Hardy's portrayal of Jude's hopeful preparations for Christminster. Still, in Jude Hardy does address

himself to the problem of individual work and achievement much more fully than he does in any of his other novels.

In closely studying Jude's aspiration for knowledge and for the achievement of his complete being through both work (in the second sense, as Lawrence defines it in Chapter V - the extension of the human consciousness) and love, Lawrence clarifies his criticism of the Wessex novels. The ideal of marriage as "two-in-oneness" which is present throughout Hardy's fiction, even in Jude (see p. 349) is a destructive one, one which can only be maintained at the expense of true individuality. In Jude the Obscure, where so much is said about Christianity and about love, Lawrence finds it strange that a fundamental Christian teaching, that the other should be recognised as a distinct, unique, separate reality rather than as merely an extension of oneself, should be ignored, to the peril of both Jude and Sue. In examining the relationships Hardy draws in Tess and Jude, Lawrence discovers that Hardy's lack of more careful attention to individual self-knowledge and independent work, to the necessity for Christianity's second birth into one's separate being, alone before God, and for recognition of one's specific task or calling, has a great deal to do with the disastrous marriages of his men and women.

How is this so? In almost all of the marriages Hardy describes in Far from the Madding Crowd, Return of the Native, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure, his characters nourish illusions about their partners which they have never been given any justification for encouraging. They simply see the other as the embodiment of their own desire, as an extension of themselves, something that belongs to them unquestionably. They never seem to sense the separate, irreducible reality of the other person or to

think of the loved one as an independent agent who may come and go or act and think differently than they do. Their tragedies to a great extent are a result of the inevitable breakdown of this state of oneness, a result of the sudden realisation that the other is not what he or she had been thought to be and is capable of independent movement, perhaps away from them. But, as Lawrence points out, this realisation of the unknown, separate reality of the other person ought to have been the starting point in all of these marriages, not the last crushing blow. It is the ideal of marriage itself which is at fault, an ideal which suggests that you marry what you know and what you judge to be your perfect complement, the other half that will make you a complete, inseparable whole.

In the novels, this false ideal of marriage works the tragedy, tragedies which lose some of their force because they do not strike us as unavoidable. For the intolerable situations to be set up, we have to attribute to the main characters an unacceptable level of dullness, blindness and immaturity or else strain our credulity to the breaking point. We must believe that Bathsheba would persist in thinking that Troy loved her deeply and that he was an honourable man, in spite of Oak's warnings (her vanity helps us accept this). We must believe that Clym still thinks Eustacia will help him out in his educational scheme, although she has told him plainly she will not; we must believe that Eustacia stupidly and without basis continues to expect Clym to take her to Paris when he has repeatedly disavowed any intention of doing so. We must believe that a young man as prudish as Angel Clare would ignore all of Tess's hints as to her lack of respectability before he married her, although he will have nothing to do with

her once her story is fully told. We must believe that Jude sees little of Arabella's coarseness and relative sophistication in the ways of the world before he marries her, but that it all becomes quite apparent afterwards, even though she has never made any pretence of innocent rusticity or of delicacy. Indeed, it is she who takes the lead in all of their early romancing, telling him he may kiss or embrace her, and she makes no bones about knowing good beer from bad. Also, she never hides the fact that she is a pig butcher's daughter; indeed, Jude's first sight of her is by a stream where she is washing pig's innards. How stupid are we then to think Jude when he acts surprised upon learning that she was once a barmaid, that she probably tricked him into marriage and that she wears false hair, or when he seems to disapprove of her practical knowledge of more lucrative, though less merciful, ways to butcher a pig? If Jude is so offended at pig-grease on his precious books - "You might have thrown them aside if you had liked," he tells her, "but as to soiling them like that, it is disgusting!" (p. 75) - he might have thought of the "disgusting" aspects of pig-keeping and butchering in relation to Arabella before he married her. Conversely, if Arabella is so impatient with Jude's learning, she ought to have thought more carefully about his academic ambitions; however, because they have no reality to her she assumes they have no permanent reality to Jude either, that he will abandon them as soon as he discovers they are unprofitable. In Jude we are asked to believe even more - that a girl as intelligent as Sue would not think through what marriage would really mean physically before marrying Phillotson (although Lawrence sees in her failure to do so a deeper significance, see p. 497); that she would, in leaving Phillotson and running to Jude, not expect Jude to demand any sexual return from her; and that Jude,

knowing Sue's nature and history as he did, would assume automatically that they would live together as man and wife.

In all of these relationships, the comment could be made as Lawrence made it about Jude and Sue; their misfortune came about "chiefly by their incapacity to accept the conditions of their own and each other's being" (p. 505). Self-knowledge and knowledge of others - Hardy's characters seemed to be extraordinarily deficient in these two things. Or, if they had one to any degree, as Tess had a recognition of Angel's separateness from her and an understanding of the reasons for his behaviour and his rigidity, they had little of the other. Tess had no sense of her own being or her own thoughts apart from Angel's judgment of her; she saw his predicament and his point of view so clearly that she did not see her own, and she abdicated the responsibility of standing up for her rights, her nature and her deepest beliefs in the matter. In fact, she <u>had</u> no beliefs about her rights other than his. "I have no wish opposed to yours," she tells him.[42] Quite different from Tess was Arabella, who stood up so thoroughly for her own being and desires that she never had any real awareness of Jude apart from these.

How does Lawrence assess the thought expressed in Hardy's portrayal of these relationships, keeping in mind that Lawrence does not evaluate Hardy's thought in the novels in any simple sense? Lawrence finds in the disasters which conclude all of these marriages a complex judgment on them and a deeper understanding of the problems involved in the relationships than Hardy might have realised he had.[43] Also, Lawrence discovers in Hardy a statement of what are the final consequences of a certain attitude

to love and thus, at least a faint suggestion of what a true and life-giving attitude might be.

> There are two attitudes to love. A man in love with a woman says either: "I, the man, the male, am the supreme, I am the one, and the woman is administered unto me, and this is her highest function, to be administered unto me" . . . .
>
> The other attitude of a man in love, besides this of "she is administered unto my maleness," is, "She is the unknown, the undiscovered, into which I plunge to discovery, losing myself."
>
> And what we call real love has always this latter attitude. (p. 490)

Lawrence here uses a man's love of a woman as an example, but a woman's love of a man is similar; it follows one or the other of these two trends. Arabella has the first attitude to love, what Lawrence calls "the selfish instinct for love", while

> Jude himself has the other, the unselfish. She sees in him a male who can gratify her. She takes him, and is gratified by him . . . . The woman knows herself all the while as the primary female receiving administration of the male. (pp. 493, 491)

However, it is the second attitude towards love, the attitude which is always part of real love, which makes true marriage possible and makes marriage a source of life, not of death, deadlocks, or disappointment.

> For a man who dares to look upon and to venture within the unknown of the female, losing himself, like a man who gives himself to the sea, or a man who enters a primeval, virgin forest, feels, when he returns, the utmost gladness of singing. This is certainly the gladness of a male bird in his singing, the amazing joy of return from the adventure into the unknown, rich with addition to his soul, rich with the knowledge of the utterly illimitable depth and breadth of the unknown; the ever-yielding extent of the unacquired, the unattained; the inexhaustible riches lain under unknown skies over unknown seas, all the magnificence that <u>is</u>, and yet which is unknown to any of us. And the knowledge of

> the reality with which it awaits me, the male, the knowledge of the calling and struggling of all the unknown, illimitable Female towards me, unembraced as yet, towards those men who will endlessly follow me, who will endlessly struggle after me, beyond me, further into this calling, unrealized vastness, nearer to the outstretched, eager, advancing uknown in the woman.
>
> It is for this sense of All the magnificence that is unknown to me, of All that which stretches forth arms and breast to the Inexhaustible Embrace of all the ages, towards me, whose arms are outstretched, for this moment's embrace which gives me the inkling of the Inexhaustible Embrace that every man must and does yearn. And whether he be a roué, and vicious, or young and virgin, this is the bottom of every man's desire, for the embrace, for the advancing into the unknown, for the landing on the shore of the undiscovered half of the world, where the wealth of the female lies before us.
>
> What is true of men is so of women. If we turn our faces west, towards nightfall and the unknown within the dark embrace of a wife, they turn their faces east, towards the sunrise and the brilliant, bewildering, active embrace of a husband. And as we are dazed with the unknown in her, so is she dazed with the unknown in us. It is so. And we throw up our joy to heaven like towers and spires and fountains and leaping flowers, so glad we are.
> (pp. 491-492)

The atmosphere of this passage, its wondering celebration of marriage and of the inkling of the "Inexhaustible Embrace", of religious reality, which it gives us, is totally unlike anything in Hardy's fiction. In fact, in Jude, Hardy straightforwardly attacks the institution of marriage itself, and he concentrates his attack on the religious attitude towards marriage as an indissolvable bond. How can such a passage, written in response to Tess and Jude, be called literary criticism if we feel that it has no basis in the novels themselves?

However, are we sure it has no basis in the novels? It is very

easy in reading the "Study" to come to the conclusion that Lawrence is simply stating his own ideas and saying things about Tess and Jude which suit his purposes and serve as illustrations of his thought, rather than paying close attention to the novels themselves. A reader gets the impression that Lawrence is rewriting the novels as he would like to have seen them written, not trying to study them as they are. The reason a reader might think this way is because the prose flows so smoothly, because there is so little sense of disjunction between Lawrence's recounting of a story and his comments on it that it seems to be all of a piece. In fact, with the ease that only a thorough familiarity with the novels and a mastery of their content would make possible, Lawrence has embodied in Chapter IX as accurate an accounting of the central action of the novels, especially of Jude, as any more pedestrian study could give. It is this careful attention to the text of the novels plus his willingness to give Hardy the benefit of the doubt at times, to look for a deeper significance to an element in the novel which might strike the reader at first as a fault, which makes Lawrence's criticism so sensitive, accurate and convincing.

Perhaps a few specific examples will help substantiate this point. Many statements in Chapter IX of the "Study" which seem to be just an invention of Lawrence's or a statement of opinion are actually direct references to points Hardy has made in the novels. They strike the reader as products of Lawrence's imagination only because the reader has not read as closely as Lawrence has or remembered as well. The observations are often so concisely stated that, unless one is as familiar with Hardy's work as Lawrence is, it is easy to fail to realise that many passages, not just one, could be found to support them.

For instance, Lawrence makes what might seem to be a generalising statement that misrepresents individual novels for the sake of his argument. "It is the same cry all through Hardy, this curse upon the birth in the flesh, and this unconscious adherence to the flesh" (p. 481). However, the "curse upon the birth in the flesh" is indeed all through Hardy; it recurs so often that one begins to wonder if Hardy cannot think of another thing for his characters to say when they are really depressed besides "I wish I'd never been born." In The Mayor of Casterbridge, Elizabeth Jane's attitude is that "the doubtful honour of a brief transit through a sorry world hardly called for effusiveness"[44] and Henchard confides to Farfrae that sometimes "like Job, I could curse the day that gave me birth".[45] Tess tells Alec after he has seduced her at Trantridge that "I wish I had never been born"; later, when she has confessed her relation with Alec to Angel and Angel's regard for her has changed, Hardy says that she, like others who have known suffering, could "hear a penal sentence in the fiat, 'You shall be born!'".[46] Clym views life as "a thing to be put up with" and refers to "the horror of my existence".[47] Finally, little Father Time in Jude complains that he has only caused trouble to those who have taken care of him; "I wish I hadn't been born!"

> "I think that whenever children be born that are not wanted they should be killed directly, before their souls come to 'em, and not allowed to grow big and walk about!" 48

Jude, after going in the rain to see Sue in Marygreen when he is ill, hopes that he has helped to"put an end to a feverish life which ought never to have been begun!" In the final chapter of the book, he mutters these words from Job out loud before he dies;

> Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night

in which it was said, There is a man child conceived.[49]
(Job 3: 3)

Such passages are moving only the first few times one runs across them, if at all; then, as Lawrence's comments suggest, they begin to seem perfunctory, a bit too easily made to be convincing, like a threat of suicide that comes once a week. Further, the energy, passion, deep feeling and physical vitality which characterises so many of Hardy's characters make nonsense of these disavowals of life. Lawrence, in concentrating on Hardy's strengths, is right to discount these pat phrases of despair and attend to the life of Wessex which Hardy portrays with such painstaking care and conviction. His real belief lies in his lawless Eustacias, his steady Gabriels, his blooming Tesses, his passionate Judes; these call forth the most original expression, the fullest detail, the greatest energy of language, not the stale, cliché-ridden statements of world-weariness. A careful attention to technique, technique understood as the problem of finding the way to say a thing so that it cannot really be said so well in any other way, makes this clear to Lawrence; for Hardy has worked the hardest to find the most original, unforgettable, unparaphrasable way to say those things which meant the most to him. Those things which were not so important to him he left to stock technique, cliché.

This close reading of the novels, here evidenced in one succinct sentence in the "Study", is characteristic of all of Chapter IX. For instance, when Lawrence says that Angel Clare conceived of woman as "only the servant and attendant and administering spirit to the Male" (p. 485) he is not theorising on his own; he is remarking on a quality in Angel which Hardy stresses in the novel. Thinking over the seriousness of his marriage

(before Tess makes her confession), Angel reflects, "Do I realize solemnly enough how utterly and irretrievably this little womanly thing is the creature of my good or bad faith and fortune? . . . What I am, she is. What I become she must become. What I cannot be she cannot be."[50] Tess has no real individuality in his eyes, no separate reality; perhaps it is only this attitude which permits him to remain unaware for so long of the monstrous nature of his treatment of her.

Lawrence says of Arabella, "Jude could never hate her," (p. 494); this is not Lawrence's imaginative idea about how Jude felt. It is a specific statement of the way Hardy portrays Jude in the novel; Jude always treats Arabella kindly and feels responsible for her whenever she is in need. When she comes to Aldbrickham and appeals to him, Sue tries to prevent his going out to her by saying "she's not your wife any more than I!" He responds, "Well, she is, rather more than you, come to that."[51]

Speaking of Jude's learning, Lawrence writes that Sue

> . . . did for him quickly what he would have done for himself slowly, through study. By patient, diligent study, he would have used up the surplus of that turgid energy in him, and would, by long contact with old truth, have arrived at the form of truth which was in him . . . . Slowly, laboriously, struggling with the Greek and the Latin, he would have burned down his thick blood as fuel, and have come to the true light of himself. (pp. 499-500)

Again, this is not Lawrence's conjecture; it is a straightforward account of the novel. Jude, realising how slowly his study is progressing and wishing for Sue's companionship, despairs of ever preparing himself for Christminster.

> So fatigued was he sometimes after his day's work that he could not maintain the critical attention necessary for thorough application. He felt that he wanted a coach - a friend at his elbow to tell him in a moment

> what sometimes would occupy him a weary month in extracting from unanticipative, clumsy books. (p. 121)

Lawrence says of Sue, "she had climbed and climbed to be near the stars" (p. 503) and he compares her to the constellation Andromeda; he is not rambling fancifully and without purpose, but exploring the meaning of an image - the star - which Hardy uses again and again in relation to Sue. When Lawrence describes Sue's turning to orthodoxy after the death of her children as a refusal of self-responsibility -

> And then Sue ceases to be: she strikes the line through her own existence, cancels herself. There exists no more Sue Fawley. She cancels herself. She wishes to cease to exist, as a person, she wishes to be absorbed away, so that she is no longer self-responsible . . . .
>
> There was no more Sue. Body, soul and spirit, she annihilated herself. (pp. 508-509)

he is not rewriting Hardy but reading him very carefully. He has caught the full force of an extraordinary sentence which Hardy has Sue speak to Jude when they last meet.

> "I've got over myself now," she tells him. (p. 404)

Many more examples could be given to show how accurately Lawrence is recounting the novels he reads.[52] However, the criticism could be made that in one respect he does not represent the novels fairly; he allows to any author he truly respects the same kind of openness he asks for from readers of his own novels. What some people might be quick to call faults, he thinks could be called characteristics; or, at least, he looks as thoughtfully as he can at things which most readers reject as obvious flaws to see what deeper meaning, if any, was intended by them. The most conspicuous instance of this is in Lawrence's treatment of the marriage problem in Jude the Obscure; the "Study" does not prepare a reader for the

tedious commentary on marriage and the marriage laws which he must wade through in following Jude and Sue's relationship. In Chapter IX Lawrence only states what he thinks Hardy's profoundest intention was in writing these passages; he does not dwell on the didacticism or the immaturity of the thoughts expressed by Jude and Sue.

> . . . they were too truthful ever to marry. A man as real and personal as Jude cannot, from his deeper religious sense, marry a woman unless indeed he can marry her, unless with her he can find or approach the real consummation of marriage. And Sue and Jude could not lie to themselves, in their last and deepest feelings. They knew it was no marriage; they knew it was wrong, all along; they knew they were sinning against life, in forcing a physical marriage between themselves. (p. 506)

Lawrence's tendency here to go right to the heart of the matter gives a false impression of the reading experience of the novel. Granted that Hardy did mean something deeper by Sue's hesitation to marry Jude than first meets the eye (in The Later Years we are told that Sue's refusal to marry Jude is based at least in part on her desire to still withold herself physically from him, to feel herself at liberty to yield herself as seldom as she chooses, an aspect of her feelings Hardy thought he could not present fully because of the sensibilities of his reading public[53] and that therefore Lawrence was right to sense more significant reasons for Sue's behaviour than the ostensible ones, still the "Study" could be criticised for not suggesting the weaknesses of Hardy's treatment of this issue.

The problem is not that Hardy deals with the problem of marriage as a critic but that he deals with it superficially. It is clearly a subject that is of central importance to the novel. In the Postscript to Jude (p. vii) he wrote,

> My opinion at that time, if I remember rightly, was what it is now, that a marriage should be dissolvable as soon as it becomes a cruelty to either of the parties - being then essentially and morally no marriage - and it seemed a good foundation for the fable of a tragedy, told for its own sake as a presentation of particulars . . . .

Not many would take issue with Hardy's opinion here; even if one disagreed with him, one would have to admit that there are many understandable reasons why he might feel that way and that his position was both arguable and respectable. No, what is at issue is whether or not he let his own viewpoint have a limiting effect on his vision, his "presentation of particulars". Does it narrow the power of his art and make us feel that he has ignored too much of human experience, experience which we have either shared or seen, for us to trust him; do we feel that Hardy is making life serve and ratify his opinion, rather than truly studying it as it is and making genuine discoveries about it?

I think we do, for Hardy presents only one side of the marriage issue and does not even seem to acknowledge another side, one of which many of his readers probably are aware. In reading parts of Jude, we are apt to feel that our vision is finer and broader than Hardy's, for we can see that successful marriages exist, as well as bad ones, and that at their best they serve a profound purpose for both the individual and society. However, although marriage is a central theme of Jude the Obscure, Hardy does not even face up to this aspect of his subject. In short, he unfairly weights the argument on his side, destroys the balance, so that in the context of the novel he will be sure to win his point. This procedure seriously weakens the thought of the novel, just as such blindness to the other side of a question limits the scope and force of any thought.

The only relatively happy marriage Hardy allows in the book is in the Widow Edlin's memory, and this only by suggesting that she was incapable of thinking reflectively about it. "Why when I and my poor man were married we thought no more o't than of a game o' dibs!" (p. 297). All of the other marriages portrayed are unsatisfactory in one way or another, either contracted on a crass material basis (as Arabella's supposedly are) or entered into with too little forethought (as Sue's to Phillotson).

However, even Hardy's portrayal of a disastrous marriage is superficial; the reason for the failure of the union is apparent even before the ceremony takes place. Sue does not even think through what marriage will mean, Jude does not fully consider what Arabella's opinion of his books will be or what kind of a woman she is. A sense of how much more sensitively and fully Hardy could have rendered the impasse between Arabella's materialism and Jude's idealism could be got from reading Middlemarch and Jude the Obscure consecutively. George Eliot's description of the developing deadlock between Rosamond and Lydgate is more complex, more believable and more interesting than the thoroughly predictable, rather commonplace incompatibility between Jude and Arabella. In Middlemarch we are given an unforgettable and thoroughly convincing experience of what misunderstandings, cross-purposes and deep-seated differences can lead to in a marriage, what a prison and a bondage such a close relationship can become, what a labyrinth of dead ends and closing doors. In Jude's marriage with Arabella we guess the outcome even before we get through the wedding and are merely impatient with Jude's stupidity. Further, in Jude and Arabella's relationship all the sympathy is on one side - Jude's; Arabella more or less tricked him into marriage and

it is her insensitivity and coarseness which make it unbearable. The implication is that Jude has been taken advantage of. However, in Rosamond and Lydgate's story, we see all of the weakness and the ambition in Lydgate's character which led him to marry Rosamond; although he is finally trapped in an unfortunate situation, it is a situation partly of his own making. In Middlemarch, Rosamond and Lydgate are held responsible, but in Jude Hardy makes excuses for his hero.

Hardy makes two comments in the course of Jude and Arabella's courtship, marriage and separation that witness to underlying assumptions that are open to question. First, Hardy describes Jude and Arabella's wedding in the following words.

> And so, standing before the aforesaid officiator (a parson) the two swore that at every other time of their lives till death took them, they would assuredly believe, feel, and desire precisely as they had believed, felt, and desired during the few preceding weeks. What was as remarkable as the undertaking itself was the fact that nobody seemed at all surprised at what they swore. (p. 64)

This passage makes it clear that Hardy has hardly read the vows in the Book of Common Prayer, which say very little indeed about believing, feeling or desiring. The vows are a promise of action, not of emotion, a promise that no matter how you change, or how my belief in you, feelings towards you or desire for you changes, I will stick by you. The parson would read before the service the reasons why matrimony was ordained - for procreation; for those who have not the gift of continency, as a remedy against sin; and "for the mutual society, help and comfort, that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity". The words of the vow are well-known.

I, ... , take thee, ... , to my wedded wife,

> to have and to hold from this day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, till death us do part, according to God's holy ordinance; and thereto I plight thee my troth.

The giving of a ring is accompanied by these words;

> With this ring I thee wed, with my body I thee worship, and with all my worldly goods I thee endow: In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

These vows do not constitute a statement of feeling or a promise to feel a certain way in the future; they are a statement of action, a promise to act in a certain way in spite of all misfortune. To love and to cherish means not "to feel romantic about" but "to care for you when you are sick, poor or worse" (whatever that may mean). Hardy's account of Jude and Arabella's wedding ceremony shows a lack of understanding on his part.

Second, Hardy describes Jude's thoughts about his hasty marriage in the following way.

> There seemed to him, vaguely and dimly, something wrong in a social ritual which made necessary a cancelling of well-formed schemes involving years of thought and labour, of foregoing a man's one opportunity of showing himself superior to the lower animals, and of contributing his units of work to the general progress of his generation, because of a momentary surprise by a new and transitory instinct which had nothing in it of the nature of vice, and could be only at the most called weakness. (p. 68)

Is this a fair assessment of the reasons Jude was drawn to Arabella? There is nothing "transitory" about the instinct which so surprised Jude; it is a strong part of Jude's nature throughout the novel, so strong that it leads him later to demand sexual satisfaction from Sue and to return to Arabella after Sue leaves him. Hardy does not see this instinct as sinful, but he is certainly here implying that it is not very important. Lawrence's comments

on Hardy's attitude are perceptive; instead of accepting Hardy's direct statements about Jude's relation to Arabella, Lawrence looked at the story as a whole in which his first marriage had been very important to Jude.

> Jude Fawley wanted to arrest all his activity in his mind . . . wanted to become an impersonal force working automatically . . . wanted to deny, or escape the responsibility and trouble of living as a complete person, a full individual. (p. 495)

But he was not able to bring it off, because his marriage with Arabella had shown him another side of himself, had forced him further towards wholeness.

> He becomes a grown, independent man in the arms of Arabella, conscious of having met, and satisfied, the female demand in him. This makes a man of any youth. He is proven unto himself as a male being, initiated into the freedom of life. (p. 493)

This female side of himself was not a "transitory instinct", nor was it merely a result of Arabella's influence, because it is strongly present in Jude even when Arabella is gone. What Lawrence is stressing is one of the positive benefits of marriage to the individual; it is a way to help a person grow towards completeness, towards full responsible selfhood. Such growth,in the discipline of continued closeness to and testing by the separate reality of another person, is not always or even usually comfortable. It is easier to escape, to deny certain undeveloped aspects of one's character, to remain in isolation, stagnant and unchallenged - a fact which society realises; and for its own health (that is, the health, intelligence and alertness of its individuals) society advocates the establishment of permanent bonds between its men and women in order to help them keep up this creative, growing intercourse when the going gets rough. The bond perhaps need not be rigidly unbreakable, but society insists it be taken seriously, not lightly made.

Marriage is a social, as well as a personal tie, very important to society as well as to the individual. It is in the marriage bond that the personal and social are so closely blended as to be well-nigh indistinguishable. However, in his portrayal of Jude and Sue's relationship, Hardy seems either to be unaware or severely disapproving of the importance of marriage to the community.

How is this so? First, Hardy sets up a pattern of rather obvious and unconvincing contrasts in order to place the full weight of approval on Jude and Sue's relationship. He means to suggest that the only true marriage in the book is the one which never was one in the accepted legal sense. Although he is aware of the impossibility of Jude and Sue's idealism in a world like ours, he is in full sympathy with it. We never feel that he is aware of the immaturities and the irresponsibility involved in Jude and Sue's behaviour. At the Wessex Agricultural Show, Arabella observes their total absorption in each other and thinks "Silly fools - like two children!" Because this statement is put in Arabella's mouth, we sense its meaning as a sentimental one; it is implied that they are indeed like two lovely, innocent children and that more people ought to be like them. However, on another level, one which we feel Hardy did not intend here beyond the implication that the cruel world would not permit a child-like love like theirs to last, we see the judgment a true one, for in a very real sense Jude and Sue have failed to grow up.

The most obvious contrast Hardy sets up is between Arabella and Cartlett and Jude and Sue at the agricultural show. Arabella and Cartlett are supposed to be the usual example of the jaded, dull emotion of the married state and its quarrelsome, tiresome nature. Right before we are

shown Jude and Sue in rhapsodies before the roses, we see Arabella and her husband in the refreshment tent, bickering.

> And they left the tent together, this pot-bellied man and florid woman, in the antipathetic, recriminatory mood of the average husband and wife of Christendom. (p. 306)

This contrast is, I think, meant to tell us something about which relationship is the truer, more loving one - that of the legally married couple or that of Jude and Sue - but in making his point, Hardy is weighting one side unfairly against the other. The opposition is not profound, but rests on a very commonplace kind of humour and a very superficial, easy kind of irony.

It is the kind of humour shown by Hardy's frequent use of supposedly funny lines like the following:

> "How she sticks to him!" said Arabella. "O no - I fancy they are not married, or they wouldn't be so much to one another as that . . . ." (p. 302)

> The landlord of the lodging, who had heard that they were a queer couple, had doubted if they were married at all, especially as he had seen Arabella kiss Jude one evening when she had taken a little cordial; and he was about to give them notice to quit, till by chance overhearing her one night haranguing Jude in rattling terms, and ultimately flinging a shoe at his head, he recognized the note of genuine wedlock; and concluding that they must be respectable, said no more. (pp. 398-9)

Little Father Time, when he first arrives at Jude and Sue's home, asks if Sue is his real mother and she asks in turn,

> "Do I look like your father's wife?"
>
> "Well, yes; 'cept he seems fond of you, and you of him." (p. 288)

The trouble with such passages is that they are neither very humorous, except in a much worn, feeble way, nor do they constitute any very interesting or thoughtful statement about marriage. They are simply clichés,

a pat formula we can see Hardy using even twenty years earlier in Far from the Madding Crowd, when the story is told about Bathsheba's father having to pretend he wasn't married to his wife in order to still be able to love and desire her.[54]

This particular idea, that of not being able to love someone if you felt you were obligated to do so, is present in a more serious form in Jude. Sue says that she is afraid to marry Jude, because they probably would not love each other any more because they would feel they had to.

> " . . . it is foreign to a man's nature to go on loving a person when he is told that he must and shall be that person's lover. There would be a much likelier chance of his doing it if he were told not to love. If the marriage ceremony consisted in an oath and signed contract between the parties to cease loving from that day forward in consideration of personal possession being given, and to avoid each other's society as much as possible in public, there would be more loving couples than there are now. Fancy the secret meetings between the perjuring husband and wife, the denials of having seen each other, the clambering in at bedroom windows, and the hiding in closets! There'd be little cooling then." (p. 268)

The similarity of this passage to the one describing Bathsheba's father is remarkable, and the thought expressed in both strikes me as rather juvenile. As the passage shows, Sue's entire idea of love seems to rest on exciting sensation, not on faithfulness, commitment, or individual growth and social responsibility. Her ideas on marriage are not only weak in themselves; they further weaken the novel as a whole because we are supposed to believe in Sue as an advanced thinker, a true rebel, but such statements have nothing new, advanced or profound in them.

The above passage is not an isolated instance; this view of marriage as an obligation which destroys all true love is expressed again and again, as if it were a thought of some importance to the discussion of marriage

embodied in the novel. Sue, trying to stop Jude before they try to get married the first time, says,

> "Jude, do you think that when you must have me with you by law, we shall be so happy as we are now? The men and women of our family are very generous when everything depends upon their good will, but they always kick against compulsion. Don't you dread the attitude that insensibly arises out of legal obligation? Don't you think it is destructive to a passion whose essence is its gratuitousness?"
>
> (p. 281; see also pp. 296, 233)

This is a child's argument, to say one no longer wants to do what one has to do. It is comparable to the romantic idea of an artist who is only capable of writing, painting or composing in a flood of inspiration and not able to carry on the more difficult, painstaking aspects of a job when his enthusiasm is temporarily gone. The effect of such an outlook is to trivialise the meaning of our desires; they are not profound suggestions of our true calling, the direction we are to take, to which we then dedicate all our will, energy, belief and intelligence in a discipline of following the call. Instead, our desires are like appetites, immediate feelings of want or surfeit, pleasure or displeasure, which rule our actions, emotions and thoughts while they are strong but are forgotten as soon as the moment passes. They cannot sustain relationships or work because they are too insubstantial and too selfish, in the narrowest sense.

Sue's attitude towards love and marriage are indeed selfish, irresponsibly individualistic. She wants to keep Jude courting her, always uncertain of her, rather than let him be sure of her love and acceptance in a way which would free both of them for more creative activity both within and without the home. She "would much rather go on living always as lovers"

(p. 267). They are still playing at kissing each other behind church pillars (p. 297), holding hands and gazing into each other's eyes (see pp. 301-302) to the exclusion of all other human beings after a year of their life together, a time when most married couples might be expected to begin to move into the community around them, ready to participate in a broader life with others. At the agricultural show, Arabella observes the ingrown nature of their relationship immediately, and her guess that they are not married has a deeper level of significance.

> " . . . As far as they themselves are concerned they are the only two in the show. I should be ashamed of making myself so silly if I were he!" (p. 302)

At this deeper level then, Sue's hesitation to marry is both an expression of her selfishness, her complete isolation from other people except for Jude, and her desire to sustain a state of perpetual courtship and keep Jude at arm's length. It is true that she could not go through with the marriage ceremony, say "with my body I thee worship," with a clear conscience. However, although her criticism of marriage has this further significance, Hardy lets it stand unchallenged on the more literal level and never adequately faces up to the fact that after the catastrophe of the children a legal marriage would have stood Jude and Sue in good stead. Hardy, in fact, tries to discount this possibility by making Sue protest that even if she and Jude had married, she would still feel Phillotson to be her true husband. However, even if she had felt that way, society would honour (and expect her to honour) her second commitment to Jude. Another divorce would be difficult to obtain and in spite of her religious turn of mind after her children's death, she might have found the social pressure (and/or support) helpful in keeping her with Jude until she saw things more clearly. It is,

after all, with such disasters and misfortunes in mind, that society encourages the establishment of a firm marriage bond.

In his treatment of this issue, then, of how relationships ought to be formed and carried on, Hardy is extremely individualistic. Society and its demands are drawn as at best a necessary evil, not maturely accepted as an important part of life. Sue's comments on the social aspects of marriage are all phrased in such a way as to disparage and dismiss such crass, mundane matters before even considering them seriously. For instance, she speaks of the legal side of matrimony as "a sordid contract, based on material convenience in householding, rating, and taxing, and the inheritance of land and money by children, making it necessary that the male parent should be known" (p. 218). Why "sordid"? Such material concerns may not be glamorous or romantic or intellectually stimulating but they are a necessary part of life. But to Sue, the slightest involvement of society in what she thinks should be a strictly private relationship immediately contaminates it; "society" almost seems to be synonymous with "sordidness" in Sue's vocabulary. She tells Jude,

> " . . . I think I should begin to be afraid of you, Jude, the moment you had contracted to cherish me under a Government stamp, and I was licensed to be loved on the premises by you - ugh, how horrible and sordid!"
>
> (pp. 267-8)

That Hardy shares this suspicion and dislike of social forms to some degree is clear from the Postscript to Jude, where he speaks of "the forced adaptation of human instincts to rusty and irksome moulds that do not fit them" (p. viii) as part of the cause of the tragedy in Jude the Obscure. Such a conception of community as chiefly the imposition of arbitrary "moulds" on unsuspecting individuals is neither helpful or interesting.

Hardy perhaps permits himself this extreme emphasis in Jude because of the absence of the rustic chorus, the voice of countryside community which usually balances the picture as a whole in the Wessex novels. In Jude the Obscure society is made into a malignant abstraction; it is a huge, overpowering force against which individual life is helpless and hopeless; it hides behind university walls, divorce courts, registry offices, church hierarchies and the closed doors of neighbours' homes, neighbours whom significantly we never see. In Jude, "man and senseless circumstance" (p. 354) carry all the weight of "fate" or an omnipotent, angry God; and in order to make society do this, Hardy has had to remove it from the lives of his characters, set it at a distance and make it seem impenetrable, unfriendly, impersonal, unfeeling.

Hence, the extreme isolation of Jude and Sue. The only family relationship either one of them still maintains is with their Aunt Drusilla in Marygreen, and she seems to exist in the novel chiefly for the purpose of bringing Jude and Sue together at various times and making doleful comments about unhappy marriages in the family. Sue and Jude seem to have no close friends besides the Widow Edlin; we see very little of Jude's work with other stone masons although he runs into a few of them in pubs by accident every once in a while. We are given a brief description of the Artizan's Mutual Improvement Society in Aldbrickham only in order to see Jude being asked to resign from it because of his unconventional union with Sue.

The almost complete detachment of Jude and Sue's lives from that of the surrounding community can be felt more vividly by a comparison with the lives of Paul Morel or Ursula Brangwen in Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow. The decisions about love and marriage with which Lawrence's characters are

faced have to be made in the context of both family and the wider community. The mining town of Bestwood, the neighbours of the Morels, Paul's friends and the friends of his brothers and sister, the Leivers' farm, the fellow employees at Jordans, as well as Paul's mother and father, all play an important part in his closer relationships with Miriam and Clara. Similarly, Ursula's parents, brothers and sisters, grandfather and grandmother, uncles, neighbours, the church, the university, the school where she taught, and the friends she makes - Winifred, Dorothy, Maggie - all affect what she expects from Anton Skrebensky and from any serious involvement with a man. In both novels, it is understood that decisions about love and marriage, although intensely personal and individual, are also made within a framework of family and community relations. The business of undertaking to live on one's own, to provide for oneself and one's family, of entering into a position of social responsibility is seen as a difficult and important one. Marriage is not merely a matter of emotion between two people, but of maturely taking one's place in a broader community after one's closest ties are firmly established and can be relied on for support.

The difference in Hardy's and Lawrence's treatments of marriage is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in the comparison between Jude and Arabella's brief union and that of Walter and Gertrude Morel. Lawrence convincingly and movingly describes the painful impasse between the Morels, but his sensitive portrayal of the life between them avoids sentimentality by showing us the good as well as the bad aspects of their alliance. Interestingly enough, most of the lasting good qualities of their marriage are a result of their staying with each other in spite of the disappointment and disillusion of their early years together. The element of failure in their

relationship is shown not so much as a loss of romantic feeling but as the cessation of individual and mutual growth. Walter Morel has given up almost entirely any further development into being, and Gertrude Morel continues her growing only in complete separation from him. They have somehow together created a situation which acts to prevent rather than nourish and encourage the full flowering of each other's true self.

Yet a strong tie remains between them and Lawrence renders it perceptively and delicately. It is nothing so trite as Hardy's bickering and jaded married couples; it is something solid, indestructible, and yet intangible, something which glows while it binds and limits, and warms while it chills the hearts of the children who live within it. It comes from many years of shared experiences which blur the distinction between private and public life - the births and deaths of children, the lean weeks of the miners' strikes, the days when there is enough and some to spare, evening meals prepared and pit clothes laid out ready for the morning, pay brought home at the end of the week, holidays, accidents, renewed passion, violent argument, the church, the pub, friends and neighbours. These things as well as feelings of love and tenderness go to make up a marriage, and in Sons and Lovers Lawrence does justice to their full importance much more fully than Hardy does in Jude the Obscure.

The ideal of individualism which pervades Jude, the underlying belief that human happiness would only be possible if society made no demands on those who wanted to isolate themselves as completely as they could and go their own way, makes itself even more evident if we observe the difficulty Hardy has in suggesting what moments of joy and fulfilment must be like in an imperfect world such as ours. It is significant that Hardy's central

characters in The Return of the Native, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure never discover the possibility in any form of continuing growth, continuing and perhaps even cumulative contentment and understanding in work, or in a stable relationship with another person, or in any other dimension of everyday life. Instead, they are allowed a few paradisal moments, moments which cannot last in the real world and cannot be reconciled with responsible life in society. In fact, the very happiness found in these moments seems to depend on their complete separation from the wider community. Clym and Eustacia have their honeymoon weeks in a little cottage on the heath, Tess and Angel have their few days of perfect fulfilment in a deserted house, before Tess is arrested, Jude and Sue have their moment of ecstasy in the roses. But Little Father Time's comment on the roses is a comment also on the chief characteristic of these idyllic experiences.

> " - I can't help it. I should like the flowers very much, if I didn't keep on thinking they'd be all withered in a few days." (p. 307)

All of these moments of happiness are transitory, incapable by their very nature of being sustained in our ordinary day to day experience. Even granted that this is true in life, that our times of greatest joy are fleeting, they still usually occur without our foreknowledge or control in the midst of our daily activities, in situations which only our commitment and faithfulness over long periods of time have helped to create - job, family, friendship, marriage. Perhaps it is again a case of no "middle distance"; Hardy can give us the romantic, isolated moments like honeymoons but cannot render the less glamorous, but more realistic, kinds of joy which occur as we work and love with our fellows in human society. Lawrence, too,

can describe the wonder of absolute separation from the outside world, of complete stillness and undisturbed absorption in love during Anna and Will's honeymoon in The Rainbow, but he also stresses the necessity of leaving the peaceful centre and coming "down the circles of praise and joy and gladness, farther and farther out, towards the noise and the friction."[55] He can render the later times of fulfilment and growth as Anna and Will not only learn more about each other but as they share in the further life of their family, their parents and children, their friends, the church, their work.

The problem with the paradisal moments Hardy gives us in his novels is not that such moments do not exist or that they are unimportant; it is that they are made to bear all of the positive weight in the novels. They are the only truly happy or fulfilling times for the characters involved; if the characters do not die soon after these peak periods (Eustacia, Tess, Jude) they live on unliving, deprived of the loved one (Clym, Angel, Sue). Even though Sue and Jude have their four years together, Lawrence rightly observes, "They never knew happiness, actual, sure-footed happiness, not for a moment" (p. 506). Their one perfect time, when everything was as it should be, was in their real marriage in the roses. If such transitory experiences of happiness, which can only be sustained in isolation from the demands of society, are the ideal Hardy shows us of what love, marriage and life should be like, it is an escapist ideal, one which is incapable of any real or even partial fulfilment because it requires conditions which cannot be obtained in responsible human life. It depends on a perfect correspondence between two people in passion and emotion and on the perfect freedom of the individual to cut himself off from the community, to walk in and out of relationships

as he chooses, to ignore any demands made by society or even better, not even to have such demands.

Lawrence is often described as an author who celebrates, even exalts rabid individuality. It is rarely emphasised how impossible he thought extreme, isolated individuality to be and how much his stress on independence and singleness was made for the sake of the health of a relationship. Lawrence's clearest and briefest statements on the rewards of cutting oneself off from human society are, in fiction, "The Man Who Loved Islands" and, in essay form, "We Need One Another". This last is a very late work and expresses more simply and beautifully ideas about human relationships and marriage which Lawrence was developing as early as the "Study".

> Man or woman, each is a flow, a flowing life. And without one another, we can't flow, just as a river cannot flow without banks. A woman is one bank of the river of my life, and the world is the other. Without the two shores, my life would be a marsh. It is the relationship to woman, and to my fellowmen, which makes me myself a river of life.
>
> And it is this, even, that gives me my soul. A man who has never had a vital relationship to any other human being doesn't really have a soul . . . . A soul is something that forms and fulfils itself in my contacts, my living touch with people I have loved or hated or truly known . . . .
>
> We have our very individuality in relationship. Let us swallow this important and prickly fact. Apart from our connexions with other people, we are barely individuals, we amount, all of us, to next to nothing. It is in the living touch between us and other people, other lives, other phenomena that we move and have our being. 56

These thoughts are present in the "Study", as when Lawrence says of Tess that she was "outwearied from the start, in her spirit, for it is

only by receiving from all our fellows that we are kept fresh and vital" (p. 486); or when he speaks of "the human compact by which we live together, to form a community" (p. 440); or when he tries to determine why Jude and Sue were "instinctively disliked" by their neighbours (p. 506). However, if we are to judge from Return of the Native, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure close relationships are usually destructive and human society is malevolent, creating an "artificial system of things, under which the normal sex-impulses are turned into devilish domestic gins and springes to noose and hold back those who want to progress" (Jude, p. 226). The condemnation of society is so strong in Tess that it led Bruce Hugman in his book on Tess to express in the following way what he saw as a central thought in the novel.

> The conclusion at which we can arrive with some certainty is the unnaturalness of society. It is in conflict with, and has a perverting influence upon simple, innocent human nature. It is alien to an existence in which human happiness is of first importance. 57

But this is an impossible conclusion. If human happiness depends on the abolition of society and of the demands of society on the individual, there is no hope. Lives must be lived in the real world, not in an ideal dream world in which a person exists in perfect freedom to fulfil himself and follow his wishes. We only grow and fulfil ourselves in real, specific situations which give both limits and opportunities. Of course, Hardy's fiction impresses upon us the fact that we cannot escape convention or social pressure, but the only positive moments, the only ideal of happiness he gives us, involve a complete renunciation of and isolation from these things.

Hardy's treatment of marriage in Jude the Obscure is inadequate in four respects. First, it shows no appreciation of the deeper social reasons for marriage. In Jude, all of these social reasons are seen only as senseless convention. Second, because of this, it is assumed that marriage is primarily, even only, an individual matter involving feelings of love and passion. This romantic concept results in a sentimental treatment of the entire issue, chiefly evident in Jude and Sue's childish fears that binding themselves to one another will destroy their love. Third, the ideal relationship is repeatedly suggested in such phrases as "two parts of a single whole" (p. 301). Phillotson with real admiration tells his friend Gillingham that Jude and Sue "seem to be one person split in two!" (p. 239). Throughout the novel the implication is that Jude and Sue are more "a single whole" than any other legally married couple they know, and this is supposed to be a compliment. In the "Study", Lawrence feels that such "two-in-oneness" needs qualifying, that it can result in a total blindness to the fact that each partner in a marriage is a separate reality, an unknown to the other, not mere extensions or possessions of each other. Lawrence was to treat this problem more fully a few years after the "Study" in his discussion of star-like singleness within a committed marriage relationship in Women in Love.

The fourth respect in which Hardy's treatment of marriage in Jude is unsatisfactory is in his unfair comparison of spiritual or mental compatibility and union to physical union. This kind of comparison is most obvious in the contrast he sets up between Arabella and Jude's "marriages" at the Wessex Agricultural Show. Arabella and Cartlett are shown as a coarse, insensitive, argumentative couple who tend to eat and drink too much; they have no true spiritual marriage but simply a physical one - physical

meaning not only for the purpose of sexual satisfaction but also for convenient financial arrangements. Jude and Sue are superior because they have a spiritual communion; even though their sexual relations are a bit uneasy, a spiritual relationship is of higher value and makes their "marriage" a truer one than the Cartletts' overall.

Lawrence, however, is able to accept and see the value of both kinds of marriage without insisting that one is inferior to the other or that they should both be other than what they are. He does not disparage Jude and Sue's marriage in the roses (see p. 506 in the "Study") but feels their misfortune lay in not accepting the special, elusive quality of their relationship rather than forcing sexual consummation on themselves. Conversely, Lawrence does not criticise Jude's marriage to Arabella for being primarily a physical one; as a physical marriage, it was important to both of them. Also, he stresses that sexual desire for a specific being, as opposed to indiscriminate lust, is a rare and precious thing. Hardy does not seem to realise this when he draws Arabella Donn and Alec D'Urberville as such shady, crude characters; in actual life, Lawrence says, it is neither common nor easy to recognise one's deep attraction for a person of such quality as Jude or Tess and follow it through. If we compare the following passage to Hardy's treatment of Arabella in Jude, which author would we think had looked most closely at life, paid most attention to particulars, knew women - even so-called "common" women - more throughly and appreciated more carefully individual differences between them?

> The pig-sticking and so forth are not so important in the real picture. As for the false tail of hair; few women dared have been so open and natural about it. Few women, indeed, dared have made Jude marry them.

> It may have been a case with Arabella of "fools rush in". But she was not such a fool. And her motives are explained in the book. Life is not, in the actual, such a simple affair of getting a fellow and getting married. It is, even for Arabella, an affair on which she places her all. No barmaid marries anybody, the first man she can lay hands on. She cannot. It must be a personal thing to her. And no ordinary woman would want Jude. Moreover, no ordinary woman could have laid her hands on Jude. (p. 489)

Lawrence's insistence on the special nature of both physical and spiritual marriage is expressed in his statement that, "Spirit can mate with spirit, and flesh with flesh, or spirit with spirit. But to try to mate flesh with spirit makes confusion" (p. 473). Whatever else Lawrence meant by this passage, part of its significance is made clear when in Chapter IX he criticises Jude for forcing Sue sexually.

> . . . he had the strong, purist idea that a man's body should follow and be subordinate to his spirit, his senses should be subordinate to and subsequent to his mind. Which idea is utterly false. (p. 505)

It is a sense of compulsion about relationships which Lawrence sees as destructive. Clym wants to force Eustacia, a physically passionate woman, to be his mate mentally and spiritually as well by having her share in his educational scheme. Jude forces Sue, an almost bodiless, sexless creature, to be his wife in the flesh and the mother of his children. Both acts of compulsion lead to misfortune. Thus, any rigid ideal of the perfect mate who must meet both one's physical and spiritual needs can not only prevent the full flowering of whatever kind of relationship is possible between two particular people, it can also be disastrous to the individuals involved.

Lawrence's criticism of Jude the Obscure passes over the inadequacies of Hardy's treatment of marriage and stresses what he feels is

its further level of significance; Jude and Sue discuss marriage and resist it because they are true to their deepest feelings - "they knew they were sinning against life, in forcing a physical marriage between themselves" (p. 506). Lawrence could be censured for not discussing fully enough the element of failure in Hardy's thought about marriage in the novel; yet Chapter IX of the "Study" does provide the essential criticism of this failure while yet strengthening the power of Jude for the reader, for Lawrence supplies the other view to which Hardy does not do justice. In insisting on the full significance of marriage, Lawrence's criticism adds a dimension to Jude which it sorely needs; the constructive nature of Lawrence's criticism can be understood more fully if we realise that a reading of both Jude the Obscure and the "Study" enriches and makes more complex the thought of the former. Without drawing attention directly to the insufficiencies in Jude, Lawrence has quietly added what was necessary to make Hardy's novel both a moving criticism and a full appreciation of the meaning of marriage.

The passage on pages 490-493 of the "Study" on the unknown of the other in marriage can now be seen not only as a true response to Hardy's novels but as a singularly sensitive and appropriate one. In it Lawrence provides the needed criticism of Hardy's romantic view of matrimony; marriage is not a commitment to feel a certain emotion about someone for the rest of one's life. We do not marry a person because he or she is completely known and the knowledge pleases us and makes us love them. Marriage is a commitment to an unknown entity, a discipline in learning how little one can know about one person even after living with them for many years and thus a lesson in how complex and beyond summary or generality

every human being must be. It is also perhaps a lesson on how much in all of life is unknown to us and how much commitment, patience, time, energy and faith (in another person, in further realities) is necessary for even the smallest discoveries. Finally, it can become a revelation of the unknown possibilities inside oneself, can give a less restricted sense of what you are and what you could be.

In "We Need One Another" Lawrence states the importance of marriage for the individual with the clarity and simplicity that comes from many attempts at thinking through and expressing what seems to be an important truth. "The long course of marriage is a long event of perpetual change, in which a man and a woman mutually build up their souls and make themselves whole. It is like rivers flowing on, through new country, always unknown." [58] In the "Study of Thomas Hardy" we can see Lawrence developing his ideas on marriage in response to the Wessex novels, particularly Jude the Obscure. The questions, "What is the importance of marriage? Should we try to make the institution of marriage work in our lives or should we abolish it?" interested Lawrence all his life; and perhaps he still had Hardy's Jude in mind when he wrote in "A Propos of Lady Chatterley's Lover" (written between 1928 and 1930),

> We are just in the throes of a great revolt against marriage, a passionate revolt against its ties and restrictions. In fact, at least three-quarters of the unhappiness of modern life could be laid at the door of marriage. There are few married people today, and few unmarried, who have not felt an intense and vivid hatred against marriage itself, marriage as an institution and an imposition upon human life. 59

Lawrence defends marriage, saying that it provides "for the complex development of the man's soul and the woman's soul in unison, throughout

a life-time".[60] All of these thoughts can be seen beginning to come to some clarity in the argument of the "Study" as Lawrence examines the thought in Hardy's novels on human relationship, love and marriage.

* * * *

One serious criticism that could be made about the "Study of Thomas Hardy" is that Lawrence does not talk at any length about The Mayor of Casterbridge, the novel which many (myself among them) feel to be Hardy's best. The omission seems even more unusual in the light of Lawrence's comments on the treatment of love, marriage and an individual's relation to human society in The Return of the Native, Tess and Jude, for The Mayor of Casterbridge seems to me to express Hardy's finest thought on these matters.

The essential movement of the novel can be seen in one way as a man's progress towards an understanding of love. We feel nothing forced or arbitrary about Henchard's fall from power or his death ; it is thoroughly believable and does not depend on an impossible chain of coincidences or the machinations of "fate". There is a kind of inevitability about it because we feel it is caused by real forces - Henchard's own character, unavoidable changes in agricultural methods, in society's expectations or sympathies, or in life in general over the period of twenty years or so which the novel covers. However, the main factor in Henchard's misfortune is his habitual disregard for the separate reality and independence of other people, his repeated transgressions of the laws of other peoples' natures.

Henchard's action in the opening chapter shows his lack of understanding in his relationships to other people. He sells his wife and contravenes a basic natural law, that another human being is never a possession which is yours to sell. He thinks he wants complete freedom to

work and make a financial success of himself, and the auction of his wife seems to give this freedom to him. However, once he has it and he has climbed as high as he can, to the mayoralty of Casterbridge, he realises he is lonely and he wants some human ties. It soon becomes apparent, though, that he seems not to know how to deal with others beyond the kind of control and possessiveness he showed in selling his wife.

His affection is oppressive to Farfrae, too strong and sudden and involving too great an assumption of authority. He fires Farfrae at the least assertion of independence, although it is natural for Farfrae to want to have some life and success apart from Henchard. He interferes with Farfrae's attentions to Elizabeth-Jane and tries to keep the two of them apart. Yet always after he does these things, he regrets his anger and his interference, and he is always surprised and sad to realise he is being taken at his word. He is amazed that his wife really goes off with the sailor who buys her, that Farfrae really leaves his employ, and he writes a letter telling Farfrae he may again court his daughter (although this last is again an attempt to control Elizabeth's life, to get rid of her after he discovers she is not his own child). Further, he tries to prevent Lucetta from marrying Farfrae, tries to force her to marry himself. He hides the truth of Elizabeth's parentage from her and tells her true father, Richard Newson, that she is dead in order to keep her with him in his loneliness.

Henchard is always forcing other people and then feeling unsure, thinking better of it. His struggle is to recognise the other human being as truly other, not as an extension of himself or as a possession. In the "Study" Lawrence sees Henchard as a "physical individual" or physical aristocrat (p. 438), not as a "spiritual individualist" like Tess, who is more aware of

the separate being of other people. He is wonderfully true to the law of his own nature, so much so that public opinion affects him very little, in spite of his high position as mayor. What upsets him deeply is his loss of power and competence.

The fascination of Henchard's character is the major element of interest in the novel; he has real moments of glory, of bursting into flower when he is absolutely oblivious of what other people think of him - when he greets the Royal Personage (Chapter XXXVII), when he reads Lucetta's letters to Farfrae late into the night (Chapter XXXIV), when he fights with Farfrae but insists on tying one hand behind his own back because he is the bigger man (Chapter XXXVIII). These actions are strange but strike us as completely true revelations of Henchard's character, thoroughly consistent with all we know of him.

Henchard is true to himself, but not sensitive to the different and true nature of others. It is this sensitivity that he slowly and painfully learns. He decides not to interfere with Elizabeth-Jane and Farfrae's courtship a second time and after their marriage faces complete loneliness. He is left abandoned by everyone as a natural result of his mistake in thinking he could hold on to other human beings by force; Farfrae is successful without him, his wife Susan is dead, Lucetta loves another and then dies, Elizabeth discovers her true father and marries Henchard's rival.

The final statement against Henchard's attempt to control the lives of others is made in the death of the neglected goldfinch he brought as a present to Elizabeth Jane's wedding; caged life dies. The will Henchard wrote before his death is the evidence of the difficult knowledge he has attained; he has learned the release of others, the acceptance of their

individuality as well as his own. The laws of life, of growth and change, made it impossible for him to cage and keep any living thing, taught him that one cannot possess another human being or that human being's love, that one cannot prevent even one's own, let alone another's, growth and change by clinging to old ways of doing things or past relationships. One's relations with others are constantly adjusting themselves, must be open to new dimensions, possibilities, alterations.

This story of Henchard's movement into his own personal knowledge about his relationships with others is superbly and convincingly told by Hardy. It is not free of Hardy's usual references to fate and to the misfortune of having ever been born, but these clichés and faults are much less offensive or obvious because of the strength and certainty of the novel as a whole. Why should Lawrence pay so little attention to a work which is not only one of Hardy's best but which seems to describe the kind of progression towards rebirth, towards a deeper understanding of one's unique individuality and a recognition of the distinct individuality of others, which Lawrence discusses in the "Study"?

The suggestion might be made that The Mayor of Casterbridge, as Hardy's fullest treatment of the demands and forces of society on the individual, of the inseparable interaction between man and the community in which he lives, did not interest Lawrence as much as Hardy's narrower concentration on the marriages of Tess and Angel or Jude and Sue. The implication would be that Lawrence was more interested in the sexual problems of relationships, problems which figure hardly at all in Henchard's story. However, this explanation is inadequate, since we can see from Sons and Lovers, The Rainbow and Women in Love that Lawrence was deeply interested in the

problems of modern society and he attended to them closely.

In fact, one sign of change in working conditions which Hardy describes, that from the personal closeness and authority of employer over employee to the more distant, business-like arrangement of modern labour and management, Lawrence treats at greater length in Women in Love in his discussion of the difference in the ways Gerald Crich and his father ran the mines. Hardy shows us the change through the person of poor Abel Whittle, who is terrified of Henchard as an employer but is grateful for the coal and potatoes Henchard always remembered to give to Whittle's mother. When Farfrae becomes independently successful and Henchard fails, Whittle goes to work for the former and tells Elizabeth-Jane that his mind is easier now since he does not have to put up with Henchard's temper.

> "No busting out, no slamming of doors, no meddling with yer eternal soul and all that; and though 'tis a shilling a week less I'm the richer man; for what's all the world if yer mind is always in a larry, Miss Henchet?" 61

Farfrae is more distant and business-like, pays his men less but does not interfere in their personal lives. The effect of Hardy's treatment of the issue is to sentimentalise Henchard's old way of doing things, for it is Abel Whittle alone who sticks by Henchard in his time of need, saying over and over again, "He was kind-like to mother when she wer here below, though 'a was rough to me".[62] Lawrence, however, in his discussion of old Mr. Crich and Gerald is much more aware of the insidious effects of the paternalism practised by the father as well as of the destructive nature of the mechanical and impersonal work relations set up by the son. Both Gerald's machine-like efficiency and old Mr. Crich's giving of coal and entertainment and personal

benefits to his men had good and bad aspects, just as did Farfrae's more modern methods and Henchard's older way of still maintaining personal contact with his men, even though he could be harsh with them. Lawrence, however, seems to have looked more carefully into the complexity of the situation, to have seen the full significance of such a change more clearly than Hardy did.[63]

In The Mayor of Casterbridge Hardy gives both a strong sense of the passage of time, of the past embodied in the Roman ruins and remains of Casterbridge, and a strong sense of the influence of environment on a man's life. Henchard's story is given in its full context of society and history. However, if we look more closely at Henchard and his closest relationships with other people, we perhaps see a reason why Lawrence spent less time discussing this novel than he did Tess and Jude. Henchard actually stands a very isolated figure at the centre of the book. As Hardy himself says in the Preface, "the story is more particularly a study of one man's deeds and character than, perhaps, any other of those included in my Exhibition of Wessex life".[64] Clym and Eustacia, Tess and Angel, Jude and Sue - these are convincing relationships in that each character is fully given, we know something of the thoughts, feelings, deepest aspirations and history of each of them. However, in The Mayor of Casterbridge no one stands equal to Michael Henchard. Susan is shadowy, the early years of Elizabeth-Jane's life are not described, nor do we understand anything of Farfrae's past, Newson is just a stereotype of a genial sailor, Lucetta's motives and deepest feelings, as well as her background, are suggested only vaguely.

Henchard has no continuing or lasting relationships of any depth with anyone, and this is part of the power of the book. We are shown the

full fact of Henchard's total loneliness. Donald Farfrae is made to carry the burden of opposition to Henchard, to give the necessary human tension to the story; but Farfrae does not have Henchard's richness of character. In business and politics he might be Henchard's match, but not in depth of feeling. Farfrae has only a middle range of feelings and a limited experience; he knows no extremes but is an odd mixture of romantic melancholy and of mercantile canniness. Is he meant to be the typical Scotsman? In any case, he is shallow next to Henchard, and we know too little about him to feel the same sympathy with or interest in him as we do Henchard.

In fact, in a novel which has such a sense of history and of society, conveyed through the town of Casterbridge, we have little given us of the specific history of individuals or of particular human relationships. For the characters, life almost stops and starts with their exit from or entrance into Casterbridge. This is true of Henchard as well, excepting the scene of the sale of his wife which takes place before he goes to Casterbridge to make his name; but we know nothing of Henchard's youth or his family and almost nothing of the years he spends in Casterbridge before the arrival of Susan and Elizabeth-Jane. It is not so much this lack of personal history, which makes The Mayor of Casterbridge less interesting to Lawrence than Jude and Tess (although Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow would be ample evidence for the importance Lawrence attached to a character's past in terms of family, friends, education, work and environment), but the way this lack of personal history helps to weaken the vital tension in the human relationships in the novel. The characters are all so cut off from their particular pasts that all of our sympathy with them depends on the force of character they display in Casterbridge during a limited period of time. Since Henchard

has been in Casterbridge longest, since his achievements and his power and even his downfall are witnessed to by the people and the business of the town, are woven inextricably into the town's life, since he has the greatest energy, is the most unpredictable, least stereotyped character in the book, he towers over everyone else and has the greatest claim on our sympathy.

In Lawrence's best novels, such a complete sympathy with and emphasis on one character is foreign to his vision. He never draws a major character in such profound isolation as Henchard, but sees human beings growing into their true selves only through the testing and the support of their relationships with others. Gertrude and Walter Morel, Paul and Miriam, Tom and Lydia, Anna and Will, Ursula and Birkin - if we study their stories carefully, we see that our interest and sympathy is not directed to one character at the expense of the other. Lawrence has done a remarkable job of attempting to understand these relationships as fully as possible from both points of view. We see Gertrude Morel's destructive effect on her husband's pride and spirit, as well as his incompatibility and insensitivity with her. We see the arrogance and thoughtlessness of youth in Paul's behaviour towards Miriam as well as Miriam's hesitancy and coldness. We have Ursula's wonderful tirades against Birkin's preachiness and his inability to stand free of Hermione and her way of life, but we also have Birkin's criticism of Ursula's romantic view of marriage and of her arbitrariness. These last two oppositions seem an even greater achievement if we understand what an effort of self-criticism and self-knowledge went into Lawrence's portrayal of Paul and of Birkin.

Lawrence's practice in a novel is to balance and tense his characters against each other with equal weight, to show the real movement

of a relationship itself, not to fix our attention only on one side of it or the other. Even Hardy's extraordinary sympathy for Tess and Jude, though balanced to some extent by his interest in Angel and Sue, is foreign to Sons and Lovers, The Rainbow and Women in Love. The greater isolation which makes Henchard's story so moving is totally unlike anything in Lawrence's fiction. There is always at least one character of equal force and stature to any seemingly "central" character, with an equal claim on our attention and this person continually tests and challenges the other - Somers has Harriet, the Mexican pantheon has Kate Leslie, Lilly has Tanny and Aaron has Lilly, Mellors has Connie. At times the result is far from perfect, but the attempt is genuinely made. Lawrence's method of revealing character is chiefly through a man or a woman's closest relationships. Henchard's character is revealed chiefly by his inability to enter into such relationships,[65] by his relative isolation.

This concentration of interest, attention, sympathy on Michael Henchard rather than on the complex growth of at least two characters, equally poised one against the other, is not, perhaps, the only reason why Lawrence wrote at length about Tess, Jude and The Return of the Native and hardly at all about The Mayor of Casterbridge. There seems to be another possible explanation; in The Mayor of Casterbridge there is no Clym, Angel or Sue. There is no character who embodies what Lawrence thought to be a major problem of our age and which he is working to understand more fully in his discussion of Judaism, Christianity, Renaissance art and the history of Western civilisation - the overemphasis on love which finally becomes a denial of, or a tendency to be upset and confused by, the force of Law, the overemphasis on the mind at the expense of the body, or the spirit at the

expense of the flesh.

Michael Henchard is a physically vigorous man, a physical aristocrat who feels sure and strong in his marriage with Susan and his early intimacy with Lucetta. He is not, however, a spiritual aristocrat, recognising the distinct, independent being of others; this he learns to be by a painful education in releasing those he wanted to keep and control. He experiences a deep kind of learning from experience and achieves a personal discovery and knowledge of the reality of other individuals.

This is an important problem always and makes a significant story. However, Lawrence feels that it is in his portrayal of Clym, Angel and Sue that Hardy has touched on the human development peculiar to our age and our society. Listen to Lawrence's comments on Angel and Sue.

> It is not Angel Clare's fault that he cannot come to Tess when he finds that she has, in his words, been defiled. It is the result of generations of ultra-Christian training, which had left in him an inherent aversion to the female, and to all in himself which pertained to the female. What he, in his Christian sense, conceived of as Woman, was only the servant and attendant and administering spirit to the male. He had no idea that there was such a thing as positive Woman, as the Female, another great living Principle counterbalancing his own male principle. (p. 485)

> Sue is the production of the long selection by man of the woman in whom the female is subordinated to the male principle . . . . One of the supremest products of our civilisation is Sue, and a product that well frightens us . . . . So Sue lived sustained and nourished by the rarefied life of books and art, and by the inflow from the man. But, owing to centuries and centuries of weaning away from the body of life, centuries of insisting upon the supremacy and bodilessness of Love, centuries of striving to escape the conditions of being and of striving to attain the condition of Knowledge, centuries of pure Christianity, she had gone too far. (pp. 496, 497, 503)

Lawrence feels that in Angel and Sue Hardy's achievement has been to show most vividly in two particular individuals the final result, the extreme product of our modern civilisation. His achievement in the portrayals of Jude and Tess is to show a man and a woman who are both spiritual and physical aristocrats, who consciously acknowledge the supremacy of love but in their passionate natures and vital physical being feel also the demands and the beauties of the Law. Henchard is a Jude without Jude's spiritual aspirations towards university and church and without Jude's assent in the moral condemnation of his physical relationship with Arabella; Henchard is a Tess without Tess's acceptance of Angel's judgment on her impurity. In fact, Henchard seems a romantic figure from an earlier age, the robust king whose fault is assuming power too completely over others, underestimating their independence or separate strength, but to whom it never occurs to think twice about his physical needs or his virility.

In his portrayal of Angel and Sue and of their influence on Tess and Jude, Hardy is dealing with what Lawrence sees to be a profound social problem of our age. It is Angel and Sue, not Michael Henchard, who show the impact of modern civilisation most fully; thus, from Lawrence's perspective, it is Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure which are more sensitive to the wider contemporary social problems than is the cut-off world of The Mayor of Casterbridge. However, the fact remains that in a full study of Hardy's novels, the omission of any extended commentary on one of his finest must be regarded as an incompleteness or inadequacy of the criticism.

In Chapter X of the "Study" Lawrence speaks of man's struggle into "completeness of being", saying that no man has attained it perfectly;

however, we can try to "approximate to it, and every generation can get a little nearer".

> But it needs that a man shall first know in reverence and submit to the Natural Law of his own individual being: that he shall also know that he is but contained within the great Natural Law, that he is but a Child of God, and not God himself: that he shall then poignantly and personally recognise that the law of another man's nature is different from the law of his own nature, that it may be even hostile to him, and yet is part of the great Law of God, to be admitted: this is the Christian action of "loving thy neighbour", and of dying to be born again: lastly, that a man shall know that between his law and the law of his neighbour there is an affinity, that all is contained in one, through the Holy Spirit. (p. 515)

Lawrence feels in the "Study" that the problem of our generation is to learn to accept the law of our own being again, to work towards a reconciliation between what we now tend to call "selfishness" (see Lawrence's re-examination of this word, pp. 432-433, 438-439) and Christian love. We have stopped in the Christian action of recognising the law of the other person and are out of balance, for "Christianity ends in submission, in recognising and submitting to the law of the other person. 'Thou shalt love they enemy'" (p. 512).

Henchard undergoes a Christian education in The Mayor of Casterbridge; but it is Clym, Angel and Sue who have already been immersed in the Christian lesson, in the emphasis on the other, on the spirit, the mind, knowledge, and who want to move beyond Christianity. Yet all of them fail. Lawrence feels that they fail because they leave one whole side of life out of count - the Female, the Law - and in so doing they simultaneously weaken and sentimentalise the force of Love. The characters which Hardy gives us who

include both male and female, love and law, in themselves most completely - Tess and Jude - can effect no balance or reconciliation and must die. Jude in the struggle even forgets the Christian lesson and violates Sue's special being.

But if we must move beyond the Christian lesson or even attack Christianity as Hardy does, must we renounce religion and the quest for religious knowledge altogether? Do we destroy the Christian faith or should we include it, as wholly and profoundly as we can, in our growth?

In examining the relationships in Hardy's novels, the characters' attitudes towards love, marriage and each other, their frequent failure to see the other as an unknown to explore, a separate reality, instead of as an extension of themselves, Lawrence's thought is that the lesson of love was not learnt fully enough. A weak form of love, yet held as the ideal, falls before "the blind, stupid, but overwhelming power of the Law" (p. 480). The Christian action of dying to be born again has not been completely performed by Hardy's "unbegotten heroes".

> . . . why, in casting off one or another form of religion, has man ceased to be religious altogether? . . . Why are we so foul that we have no reverence for that which we are and for that which is amongst us? If we had reverence for our life, our life would take at once religious form. But as it is, in our filthy irreverence, it remains a disgusting slough, where each one of us goes so thoroughly disguised in dirt that we are all alike and indistinguishable. (p. 510)

Religion and Personal Knowledge in "Tess" and "Jude"

The failure of relationship in Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure has its roots in the failure of the characters to achieve pure individuality and to produce their own personal knowledge. This failure to produce one's personal knowledge in turn has its roots in, at least partially, careless and unintelligent thought about the nature of religion. The problems of love and marriage, of being born again, of producing one's personal knowledge, of religious belief and practice are all closely related. In Chapter V Lawrence describes their relations in the following way.

> . . . accompanying this more perfect being of myself is the more extended knowledge of that which is not myself. That is, the finer, more distinct the individual, the more finely and distinctly is he aware of all other individuality. It needs a delicate, pure soul to distinguish between the souls of others; it needs a thing which is purely itself to see other things in their purity or their impurity.
>
> Yet in life, so often, one feels that a man who is, by nature, intrinsically an individual, is by practice and knowledge an impurity, almost a nonentity. To each individuality belongs, by nature, its own knowledge. It would seem as if each soul, detaching itself from the mass, the matrix, should achieve its own knowledge. Yet this is not so. Many a soul which we feel should have detached itself and become distinct, remains embedded, and struggles with knowledge that does not pertain to it. It reached a point of distinctness and a degree of personal knowledge, and then became confused, lost itself . . . .
>
> "Ye must be born again", it is said to us. Once we are born, detached from the flesh and blood of our parents, issued separate, as distinct creatures. And later on, the incomplete germ which is a young soul must be fertilised, the parent womb which encloses the incomplete individuality must conceive, and we must be brought forth to ourselves, distinct . . . .
>
> And we, who imagine we live by knowledge, imagine that the impetus for our second birth must come from knowledge,

> that the germ, the sperm impulse, can come out of some utterance only. So, when I am young, at eighteen, twenty, twenty-three, when the anguish of desire comes upon me, as I lie in the womb of my times, to receive the quickening, the impetus, I send forth all my calls and call hither and thither, asking for the Word, the Word which is the spermatozoon which shall come and fertilise me and set me free. And it may be the Word, the idea exists which shall bring me forth, give me birth. But it may also be that the word, the idea, has never yet been uttered . . . .
>
> And yet we believe that only the uttered Word can come into us and give us the impetus to our second birth. Give us a religion, give us something to believe in, cries the unsatisfied soul embedded in the womb of our times. Speak the quickening word, it cries, that will deliver us into our own being.
>
> So it searches out the Spoken Word, and finds it, or finds it not. Possibly it is not yet uttered. But all that will be uttered lies potent in life. The fools do not know this. They think the fruit of knowledge is found only in shops. They will go anywhere to find it, save to the Tree. For the Tree is so obvious, and seems so played out . . . .
>
> . . . we struggle mechanically, unformed, unbegotten, unborn, repeating some old process of life, unable to become ourselves, unable to produce anything new.
>
> (pp. 433-434)

I quote this passage at length because I think it is the foundation of Lawrence's criticism of Jude the Obscure in Chapter IX of the "Study" and of Lawrence's assessment of Hardy as a writer. Jude fails to recognise Sue's special being because he is not a "delicate, pure soul", a fine, distinct individual. He is "unbegotten, unborn", struggling with knowledge which does not pertain to him. Part of this struggle involves the criticism and rejection of the Christian religion, a criticism and rejection which carries the full weight of Hardy's sympathy. Lawrence closes his criticism of Jude's blindness to Sue's unique nature with a question;

"why, in casting off one or another form of religion, has man ceased to be religious altogether?" (p. 510).

What the "Study" suggests is that such an analysis applies not only to Jude, but to Hardy himself. Hardy, too, fails to recognise the special nature of many of his characters - for instance, Arabella and Alec and even Sue, for his final judgment against her is extraordinarily harsh - because he himself has not been fully brought forth to himself, distinct. He struggles with knowledge which does not pertain to him and which denies him the central, irreplaceable discoveries of his particular calling. His personal knowledge, the findings of his art, cannot stand against the ideas of the age, especially those which discredit religion as superstition. Thus in Tess and Jude he launches a full-scale attack on the Christian church and its belief in an unknown, greater power which orders the universe. Hardy wants to turn towards the unknown in faith, yet he rejects from Christianity all those things which cannot be known or proven - miracles, strict doctrine, worship of God, prayer. He wants to attend to the unknown and make discovery, and yet he feels it to be unscientific. Religious knowledge, whatever that might be, is to Hardy incompatible with scientific knowledge.

This is the problem in Hardy's novels which Lawrence sees as central. Hardy tried to achieve the flowering of his own real, whole, imaginative self in spite of the crippling influence of the ideas of the time - ideas about the way we think and learn, about science, philosophy, art, religion and education. Lawrence tries to distinguish that which is peculiarly Hardy's voice in the Wessex novels and that which is extraneous, forced upon him. Hardy's true imaginative self Lawrence perceives with great insight and care, labouring that the essential work and special nature

of this man should not be lost. Hardy's place in history helped to shape his particular "metaphysic", and this mark of his time is simultaneously both a limitation and the source of his unique importance and meaning for us. It is both a narrowing of his powers and a defining of them, a shaping of his individual calling.

Hardy entered into this calling with integrity. In the "Study" Lawrence locates both a central weakness and a central strength in Hardy's attempt to discover and express his personal knowledge in the Wessex novels. The weakness lay in Hardy's conscious attitude towards religion; the carelessness and superficiality of his criticism of Christianity suggest that he did not think through thoroughly enough himself the problems he was dealing with but instead accepted the opinions of other thinkers and let reference to them do all the work. Further, this conscious attitude of disbelief in and distrust of the unknown would make all discovery impossible, and Hardy's own work contradicts it.

Hardy's strength Lawrence locates in his treatment of Jude and Jude's struggle into personal knowledge; in Jude the Obscure Hardy was testing himself and trying to see beyond barriers which had been set in his own mind. Hardy gave expression in Jude to something which concerned him deeply - the attempt to believe in one's own powers of discovery and in the worth of one's own findings when the accepted centres of thought disregard or discredit them.

Lawrence, in his treatment of Hardy's religious attitude, decides to disregard Hardy's pretensions to a critique of the Judeo-Christian tradition and to go to what is essential and apparent from Hardy's writing - a deep reverence for the Creator whose power and ways are unknown to him.

> Always he must start from the earth, from the great source of the Law, and his people move in his landscape almost insignificantly, somewhat like tame animals wandering in the wild. The earth is the manifestation of the Father, of the Creator, who made us in the Law. God still speaks aloud in His Works, as to Job, so to Hardy, surpassing human conception and the human law. "Dost thou know the balancings of the clouds, the wondrous works of him which is perfect in knowledge? How they garments are warm, when he quieteth the earth by the south wind? Hast thou with him spread out the sky, which is strong?"
>
> This is the true attitude of Hardy - "With God is terrible majesty." The theory of knowledge, the metaphysic of the man, is much smaller than the man himself . . . .
>
> "Knowest thou the time when the wild goats of the rock bring forth? Or canst thou mark when the hinds do calve? Canst thou number the months that they fulfil? Or knowest thou the time when they bring forth? They bow themselves, they bring forth their young ones, they cast out their sorrows. Their young ones are good in liking, they grow up with corn; they go forth, and return not unto them."
>
> There is a good deal of this in Hardy. But in Hardy there is more than the concept of Job, protesting his integrity. Job says in the end: "Therefore have I uttered that I understood not; things too wonderful for me, which I knew not.
>
> "I have heard of thee by hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee.
>
> "Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes."
>
> But Jude ends where Job began, cursing the day and the services of his birth, and in so much cursing the act of the Lord, "Who made him in the womb". (pp. 480-481) [66]

Lawrence says that Hardy's true attitude, despite his disclaimers of all supernatural, miraculous, unproveable realities, is "with God is terrible majesty" and that it is this attitude which accounts for the force and beauty of his art. If we return to Michael Polanyi's study of the theory of knowledge, we can see why this might be so. (Note that in the

above passage Lawrence speaks of Hardy's "theory of knowledge" or "metaphysic" being smaller than the man himself.) Polanyi acknowledges the importance of human responsibility and commitment in all areas of science; it is only firm commitment which makes possible the energy of attention to the unknown and the sustaining of work over a long period of time with an unknown goal in mind that leads to true discovery. Religious worship is the highest and most strenuous form of this disciplined attention to the unknown. It is a discipline which trains and extends the powers of the mind rather than limiting them.

> Within its commitments the mind is warranted to exercise much ampler powers than those by which it is supposed to operate under objectivism; but by the very fact of assuming this new freedom, it submits to a higher power to which it had hitherto refused recognition. Objectivism seeks to relieve us from all responsibility for the holding of our beliefs. That is why it can be logically expanded to systems of thought in which the responsibility of the human person is eliminated from the life and society of man . . . . Our subjective condition may be taken to include the historical setting in which we have grown up. We accept these as the assignment of our particular problem . . . . While it then lies beyond our responsibility, it is yet transformed by our sense of responsibility into part of our calling . . . . We undertake the task of attaining the universal (affirming personal convictions with universal intent) in spite of our admitted infirmity, which should render the task hopeless, because we hope to be visited by powers for which we cannot account in terms of our specifiable capabilities. [67]

This passage touches on many elements in Hardy's fiction - the ostensible distrust of religious experience and of the unknown contradicted by the creativity of the artist which knows itself to be half creation and half gift; the excusing of characters from individual responsibility because nature, society and the powers that be are all ranged against them and because in Jude even human knowledge

excludes them; the difficulty in accepting limitations which are also our particular opportunities, our assigned tasks.

However, it particularly touches on the great power for thought which religious worship can be, an aspect of religious faith which Hardy ignored in his fiction. It not only is a training for the mind, teaching us how to sustain attention and how to dwell in the generated tension of an undiscovered whole which will meaningfully relate disparate particulars, what Wordsworth spoke of as "the manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement".[68] It also demands commitment and responsibility to powers and truths beyond oneself, calls us away from narrow subjectivity to true objectivity.

In Jude the Obscure Hardy repeatedly refers to religion and thought as two separate and opposing disciplines. Jude at first wants to combine the two, then finds them contradictory and discovers "the ecclesiastical and altruistic life as distinct from the intellectual and emulative life". He thinks "a man could preach and do good to his fellow-creatures without taking double-firsts in the schools of Christminster, or having anything but ordinary knowledge" (p. 135). Originally, Jude had been "on an intellectual track rather than a theological" (p. 94), but now he decides to prepare to take orders. However, after a few more years he has learned that religion and theology are intellectually disreputable and he abandons his plan. He still reveres the great thinkers of Christminster but excludes from these "the theologians, the apologists, and their kin the metaphysicians, the high-handed statesmen, and others"; these, he tells Arabella, "no longer interest me. All that has been spoilt for me by the grind of stern reality!" (p. 406).

Hardy is able to speak of religion and thought as two separate and contradictory pursuits primarily because he does not do justice to religious faith and practice. For instance, Jude discounts Sue's religious turn of mind at the end of the novel as mere superstition, and the novel as a whole makes it clear that this is Hardy's attitude as well. He gives no reality to Sue's feeling of judgment upon her or to her conversion (as he gives no reality to Alec D'Urberville or Arabella's conversions), although to have done so would have made the final impact of Jude the Obscure much more forceful and complex. Characteristically, Lawrence supplies this deficiency by giving the religious reality to Sue's repentence which Hardy denies.

> . . . she denied and forsook and broke her own real form, her own independent, cool-lighted mind-life. And now her children are not only dead, but self-slain, those pledges of the physical life for which she abandoned the other.
>
> She has a passion to expiate, to expiate, to expiate. Her children should never have been born: her instinct always knew this. Now their dead bodies drive her mad with a sense of blasphemy. And she blasphemed the Holy Spirit, which told her she is guilty of their birth and their death, of the horrible nothing which they are. She is even guilty of their little, palpitating sufferings and joys of mortal life, now made nothing. She cannot bear it - who could?

Lawrence sees Sue's turn to orthodoxy as a response to a genuine religious problem, while Hardy draws it as a confused and inappropriate reaction to chance catastrophe. However, Lawrence does not see Sue's final attitude as a deeply religious one but as the blind and rigid adherence to doctrine, the abdication of responsibility, which Hardy shows it to be.

> . . . she wants to expiate, doubly expiate. Her mind, which she set up in her conceit, and then forswore, she must stamp it out of existence, as one stamps out fire. She would never again think or decide for herself. The world, the past, should have written every decision for her. The last act of her intellect was the utter renunciation of her mind and the embracing of utter orthodoxy, where every belief, every thought, every decision was made ready for her, so that she did not exist self-responsible.
> (pp. 508-509)

Lawrence distinguishes between this kind of orthodoxy and other forms of religious experience and expression, but Hardy does not. In effect, Hardy's criticism of Christianity is a setting up of straw men and knocking them down. He gives us Susan Nonsuch's superstition (in Return of the Native), Tess's simple acceptance of the church's teachings, Alec and Arabella's short-lived conversions and Jude's initial trusting acceptance of church tradition and his passion for the Greek New Testament, Sue's immersion in the church because of a feeling of guilt. Mature, intelligent religious experience does not exist in Hardy's fiction. Religious faith in the Wessex novels involves not attention to the unknown but the belief of certain set doctrines and the following of specific rituals and regulations.

Hardy's portrayal and judgment of Sue's Christianity at the close of Jude the Obscure shows several characteristics of his thought about religion in his work. First, religious faith and knowledge (especially scientific knowledge) are antipathetic. Second, religion is essentially the acceptance of fixed rules and creeds; personal exploration, discovery, growth and individual thought, have no place in it. Third, there is no such thing as true religious or mystical experience; it is all either pretence or misunderstanding.

These aspects of Hardy's thought about religion are also very clear

in his criticism of Christianity in Tess of the D'Urbervilles. This criticism finds clearest expression in Angel's opinions, but is present throughout the novel in both direct statement and underlying assumption. Throughout it is marked by the belief that ignorance is the only excuse for religious faith, that the acceptance of Christianity is the acceptance of a fixed doctrine and moral code, that actual religious experience does not exist. Hardy's arrogance and insensitivity is especially apparent in his expression of this last tenet. Several times in Tess he describes the social aspects of religious practices, but never thinks very carefully about the needs or feelings of the people he is describing. The church seems to be only a social phenomenon, not a religious one; and although, of course, the church is a social phenomenon and serves important purposes in society, Hardy characteristically treats this social reality as something inferior, hypocritical, something which always makes for falseness and unhappiness between people.

Tess is full of passages like the following:

> In the course of a few weeks Tess revived sufficiently to show herself so far as was necessary to get to church one Sunday morning. She liked to hear the chanting - such as it was - and the old Psalms, and to join in the Morning Hymn. That innate love of melody, which she had inherited from her ballad-singing mother, gave the simplest music a power over her which could wellnigh drag her heart out of her bosom at times . . . .
>
> Parishoners dropped in by twos and threes, deposited themselves in rows before her, rested three-quarters of a minute on their foreheads as if they were praying, though they were not; then sat up, and looked around. 69

The arrogance of that "though they were not" will have been noted. Further, it is made clear that Tess attended church simply for emotional

reasons; because of her ballad-singing mother, Tess likes music. She has never thought through what the chants and psalms mean and would not enjoy them so wholeheartedly if she had. This fact is made explicit by the scene in which Tess sings the Benedicite on her way to Talbothays dairy.

> And thus her spirits, and her thankfulness, and her hopes, rose higher and higher. She tried several ballads, but found them inadequate; till, recollecting the psalter that her eyes had so often wandered over of a Sunday morning before she had eaten of the tree of knowledge, she chanted: "O ye Sun and Moon . . . O ye Stars . . . ye Green things upon the Earth . . . ye Fowls of the Air . . . Beasts and Cattle . . . Children of Men . . . bless ye the Lord, praise Him and magnify Him for ever!" She suddenly stopped and murmured: "But perhaps I don't quite know the Lord as yet." 70

Nowhere is the truth of Lawrence's statement that Hardy's true attitude was Job's, "with God is terrible majesty", so evident. Tess's youthful energy and renewed hope and her outburst of gratitude to the Creator ring true to her nature in a way that the introspection of "perhaps I don't quite know the Lord as yet" does not. That last sentence has the unmistakable tone of Hardy's pessimism and world-weariness; it is contrived, extraneous, an intrusion and is unnatural to Tess in the way that all her expounding of Angel's advanced ideas later in the novel is unnatural. Yet it is this moment of hesitancy to which Hardy gives his conscious approval, not the joy and buoyancy of Tess's chant. He tells us that the chief reason Tess used the Benedicite was that it was familiar, something "she had lisped from infancy". It has no real religious significance, but is simply the result of upbringing and a lack of adequate reflection.

This procedure of undercutting all the religious practice he describes by analysing it in a cynical, quasi-scientific way, explaining it in terms of psychology or sociology, is characteristic of Hardy in all

the Wessex novels. In Jude Sue's conversion is seen entirely as a psychological phenomenon; she is unbalanced by the death of her children, she is weak and incapable of clear thinking because she is a woman, and she is selfish as usual, abandoning Jude in order to secure her own salvation. No religious reality is given to the feeling of judgment upon her, the judgment that she sinned against life in having children, in failing to reverence and be true to her special being. In Under the Greenwood Tree, the singing of the choir, the behaviour of the new clergyman, Fancy's playing the organ and showing off her clothes and curls on Sunday - all of these are discussed in their social aspects only. The church has no religious meaning to the people of Mellstock according to Hardy's description. It is primarily a place where people have always gone and therefore continue to go, to hear the music, see their neighbours and to measure up to community expectations. This is true in Far from the Madding Crowd as well. Bathsheba is disappointed when Boldwood does not even look at her in church, since the chief purpose of her going to divine service when she first arrived in Weatherbury was so that everyone could see her. Gabriel Oak might be considered a favourable portrayal of a religious man by Hardy. He sings in the church choir, and Hardy does show him at his devotions one evening at home. However, Gabriel's praying is undercut by Hardy's implication that such faith is all very well, but too simplistic to apply to serious problems. Bathsheba, watching him, reflects in the following way.

> It was not for her to make a truce with trouble by any such means. She must tread her giddy distracting measure to its last note, as she had begun it. 72

If religious faith is seen as a limitation in Far from the Madding Crowd, it is seen as even more of one in Return of the Native, where the Sunday

service is more or less the occasion for superstitious practices such as sticking a pin in Eustacia to see if she is a witch. In all of these novels, the church does have one important function; it is a place where people get married. However, in Jude the Obscure even this office comes under question. In Tess of the D'Urbervilles, Christianity is directly under attack, and it is seen not only as a limitation in thought and maturity - as in old Mr. Clare's simplicity - but also as pretence or as psychological weakness. Alec's conversion is "the mere freak of a careless man in search of a new sensation, and temporarily impressed by his mother's death".[73] Sunday church-going is primarily a chance for Tess and her fellow dairymaids to wear pretty clothes. Hardy speaks of

> . . . this day of vanity, this Sun's day, when flesh went forth to coquet with flesh while hypocritically affecting business with spiritual things. 74

Three instances in Tess of the D'Urbervilles show very clearly the inadequacy of Hardy's criticism of religion. The first is the story of Tess's baptism of her baby. The second is Hardy's analysis of the theological differences between old Mr. Clare and Angel. The third is Hardy's description of Tess's arguing Alec out of his Christianity when she herself does not fully understand what she is saying.

When Tess realises that her baby is going to die, her father prevents her calling the parson to baptise it because he does not want any further attention drawn to Tess and her illegitimate child. In the middle of the night, Tess decides to baptise the child herself. The scene is moving and impressive, but not in any sense religious. Hardy has made quite clear the psychological pressure which makes Tess act as she does.

> She thought of the child consigned to the nethermost corner of hell, as its double doom for lack of baptism

> and lack of legitimacy; saw the arch-fiend tossing it with his three-pronged fork, like the one they used for heating the oven on baking days; to which picture she added many other quaint and curious details of torment taught the young in this Christian country.

Tess utters the thanksgiving in an "ecstasy of faith" after she has administered the sacrament, but this intensity is drawn only as the result of great relief, that the baptising had been done in time and that Tess's "confidence in the efficacy of the sacrament" had grown greatly in the process of giving it. We know that through the awed eyes of her younger brothers and sisters, Tess appears "a divine personage", but the reader is meant to see her differently, as a young woman terrified of the doctrines of the church which she has been taught since childhood. In the morning light even Tess thinks of herself in this way, wondering if perhaps her terrors about the child's soul were not "somewhat exaggerated".[76]

However, she is still worried enough to go to the parson and ask if what she did before her baby's death will suffice and if he can be given a Christian burial. It is here, in the description of the clergyman's response, that Hardy shows his understanding of the church to be very superficial indeed. He portrays the parson (not a deeply religious man by any means, but one who has spent the past ten years of his life trying "to graft technical belief on actual scepticism") primarily as a tradesman who is miffed that someone else, an amateur, has been doing his job and making a mess of it. Tess asks if the baptism is adequate, and he struggles before answering and then says yes. Hardy tells us, "The man and the ecclesiastic fought within him, and the victory fell to the man".[77] However, then Tess asks for a Christian burial for the child, and the Vicar - who "felt himself cornered" according to Hardy - denies it.

The reasons Hardy gives for this denial is that the Vicar had gone to the Durbeyfield home the previous evening to baptise the child, having heard that it was ill, and had been refused entry. Since he did not realise that the refusal came from Tess's father, against Tess's will, "he could not or would not allow the plea of necessity" for the irregular administration of the baptism.

However, by canon law, the vicar's opinion has nothing to do with the case. By canon law, it is not the determination of true necessity which decides whether a lay baptism is valid or not, but the determination of its manner of administration. The use of water, the invocation of the Trinity and the saying of the Lord's Prayer - these are the essential things and have been since Augustine's time.[78] All these things Tess did. It is the parson's responsibility as a clergyman of the Church of England to carefully question Tess, as the parent of the child, about her procedure in baptising. If, as was the case, water and the proper words were used, it is church law that the baptism cannot be repeated, even had the child lived.

> Lay baptism being thus allowed to be valid in case of necessity, it is yet clear that its validity depends upon the manner of its administration, not upon the reality of the necessity; and hence even if there is no such necessity, it must still be accounted valid, provided the proper matter and form are used. 79

It is stressed, in The Book of Church Law, that lay baptism is only to be used in great extremity; it is a very serious matter. However, even if the necessity is shown not to have existed and the layman to have acted hastily, "his act cannot be undone", although "it ought not have been done".[80]

Thus, the parson's struggle in answering Tess's question is not at all a struggle between his innate human kindliness and rigid church law,

as Hardy would have us believe. It is rather between his own petty nature (which resents a layman doing what he is trained to do) and the wisdom of the church, which places the efficacy of this sacrament in the matter and liturgy used and not in the qualifications of the person using them. The Vicar, in failing to question Tess about the method of baptism and in hesitating in assuring her of the efficacy of the sacrament, is at fault as an ecclesiastic. Hardy tells us that the Vicar held strict notions on these subjects, but the Vicar actually shows himself ignorant of church law in the way he behaves.

His refusal of Christian burial to Tess's child is an outright contradiction of Canon Law. It is true that burial is denied to any that die unbaptised, but "the exception of 'any that die unbaptised' must be taken in its strictest sense: that is, for those of whom it is not only believed, but of whom it is certain, that they have died unbaptised".

> . . . it is an ancient rule of the Church . . . in the case of deceased persons, in a Christian country, their baptism is to be taken for granted unless there is proof to the contrary . . . . he (the clergyman) may also ordinarily assume that an infant under the usual age when infants are brought to baptism has not been baptised, and is fully justified in making careful inquiry on the subject. It need hardly be added, that lay-baptism . . . entitles a person to the use of the Burial Office as much as baptism by a clergyman. 81

This close examination of Anglican Church Law should make clear Hardy's carelessness in treating the matter; he shows a lack of understanding in trying to blame the church here for what is only an individual, human failing. Hardy is in this scene levelling a criticism at Christianity for its rigid doctrine, its inability to face sensitively Tess's particular predicament; however, the fact is that the church has thought carefully

about possible difficult situations, such as the one Tess was in, and has provided wisely for them. The man is indeed victorious over the ecclesiastic in the vicar, but not as Hardy suggests, in the kindness that assures Tess her baby is not damned.[82] As a responsible ecclesiastic, the vicar should have followed Church Law, ascertained the manner of baptism, and given little Sorrow a Christian burial. Hardy's criticism of the Christian religion in this incident is indeed superficial.[83]

One clergyman whom Hardy does represent favourably is Angel Clare's father.

> He was a man not merely religious, but devout;
> a firm believer - not as the phrase is now
> elusively construed by theological thimble-riggers
> in the Church and out of it, but in the old and
> ardent sense of the Evangelical school. 84

However, the real reason Hardy likes Mr. Clare is that he is sincere and he is kind; his religious belief is judged by the novel as simple, old-fashioned, intellectually "untenable". It is his practice of the Christian ethic that gives him stature; again, Hardy gives his religious experience no reality. He is admired "for the remarkable power he showed in dismissing all question as to principles in his energy for applying them".[85]

Angel's disagreement with his father is not over ethical matters, but over matters of doctrine. He tells his father he cannot accept Article Four (the Resurrection) in the required "literal and grammatical sense", and therefore cannot be a parson.[86] He also says that he can never be ordained a minister of the church while "She refuses to liberate her mind from an untenable redemptive theolatry".[87] It's hard to say whether this last pretentious phrase tells us more about Angel or about Hardy; in context, at least, it does not seem to be used to poke fun at Angel's affectation of

forward thinking. Rather, in context, Mr. Clare's stance as a "true believer" is made to mean one who accepts literally the story of Jesus' life in the Bible and who is thus blind to the truth of his son's thought.

The phrase itself - "an untenable redemptive theolatry" - is not an accepted theological one. Hardy may have coined it himself, and it is unclear what it means, although Hardy has succeeded in making it sound dreadful. It is certainly not something anyone would like to be caught believing in. Literally, it would mean being redeemed, freed from bondage or punishment, by worshipping God. Bruce Hugman in his analysis of Tess thinks it refers to "the idea of God the Father demanding a blood sacrifice of his son".[88] This may be, although the usual (and just as pretentious) phrase for that would be "substitutionary atonement". The point is that it is unclear what Hardy means by Angel's statement, but he is letting the word "untenable" do all the work for him. It is a strong word, and we are led to accept its judgment without even knowing what Angel is really saying or what issues are at stake. Further, the interchange makes evident Hardy's equation of religious belief with the acceptance of set creeds; Hardy shows no sense of the difference between religious faith as a way of living, a whole orientation towards life, and belief in certain fixed tenets - two very different things.

In describing Angel's attitude towards his parents, Hardy is making another attack on the inhumane nature of Christianity. Angel feels that the only thing which saves his mother and father from total rigidity is their human inconsistency. One day they are late for Sunday dinner because

> the self-denying pair had been occupied in coaxing the appetites of some of their sick parishioners, whom they, somewhat inconsistently, tried to keep imprisoned in the flesh. 89

The implication, of course, is that strict adherence to Christian belief would lead one to hasten from this life to a heavenly one, but the deep humanity of Mr. and Mrs. Clare contradicts this attitude of the church. This is, however, a superficial dichotomy to set up and is not a profound criticism of Christianity at all. Hardy fails to see that one of the very strengths of the Judeo-Christian tradition is that it contains this paradox; it insists on a further form of life beyond material comfort, beyond food and shelter and earthly treasure (and this gives the human spirit a great freedom from what can be the restricting bondage of the flesh) but it simultaneously insists that Christians minister unceasingly to the sick, the hungry, the prisoners, all their less fortunate brethren. The Christian faith has never succeeded in making the two emphases really consistent with each other; it has simply insisted on both. When it has not, when it has stressed one to the exclusion of the other, it has either become corrupt or lost its spiritual power.

The sustaining of such paradoxes in religious faith is another instance of dwelling in the tension of opposing, unresolved particulars in hopes of discovering a greater whole which meaningfully integrates them, the attention to the unknown of which Polanyi speaks. It is similar to the powers of art-speech which Lawrence discusses and to Keats' "negative capability" (a religious as well as an æsthetic necessity) - "being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason". Hardy at times seems to be blind to this tension of paradox or at least to distrust its worth, while simultaneously relying on it as an artist. Arthur Mizener describes this blindness in Hardy as his commitment "to the truth of abstract reason rather than the truth of imagination".[90]

This statement is too strong; in writing fourteen novels Hardy was at least as committed to the "truth of imagination" as to the "truth of abstract reason", if one can speak of the two separately in such a way. But it does accurately describe a conflict one feels in reading the Wessex novels, that Hardy felt these two forms of truth to be different, even opposed to each other, rather than each necessary to the other, either of them impossible in isolation.

Mizener's comment is especially misleading if it encourages us to think that Hardy's powers of abstract reasoning were very strong in relation to his supposedly weaker powers as an artist. In the two chapters in Tess where Alec D'Urberville confronts Angel Clare's views on religion through Clare's mouthpiece, Tess, Hardy's ability to reason abstractly is certainly not adequate to the task at hand. These two scenes will serve as my third and last example of Hardy's thought on religion in Tess.

In Chapter XLVI of Tess of the D'Urbervilles, the converted Alec comes to see Tess at Flintcomb Ash, and he asks her about her religious convictions. By now, she has lost her "automatic orthodoxy"[91], the unthinking acceptance of the church's teachings, and has taken over all of Angel's ideas, which basically involve an acceptance of the Christian ethic without any deeply religious element. When Alec says to Tess that she seems to have no religion, she says,

> "But I have. Though I don't believe in anything supernatural . . . . I believe in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, and so did my dear husband . . . But I don't believe --" Here she gave her negations. 92

Alec asks her to state as many of Angel's views as she can remember, although he criticises her for her feminine characteristic of simply accepting her

husband's opinions without question.[93] Tess tries to recall what Angel used to tell her.

> . . . with her acute memory for the letter of Angel Clare's remarks, even when she did not comprehend their spirit, she recalled a merciless polemical syllogism that she had heard him use . . . .
> "Say that again", asked D'Urberville, who had listened with the greatest attention. She repeated the argument, and D'Urberville thoughtfully murmured the words after her.
> "Anything else?" he presently asked.
> "He said at another time something like this;" and she gave another, which might possibly have been paralleled in many a work of the pedigree ranging from the Dictionnaire Philosophique to Huxley's Essays.
> "Ah-ha! How do you remember them?"
> "I wanted to believe what he believed, though he didn't wish me to; and I managed to coax him to tell me a few of his thoughts. I can't say I quite understand that one; but I know it is right".
> "H'm. Fancy your being able to teach me what you don't know yourself!" 94

Surely this sort of thing is unsatisfactory as any serious pretence to profound thought on religious questions. The reader is put in an intellectual position even below that of the unthinking Tess; we don't even get to hear the "merciless polemical syllogism" and thus are given no chance to see if we understand it or not, much less to question or challenge it. Hardy perhaps fails to state Clare's ideas for one (or more) of three possible reasons. Either (1) he is being condescending to the reader who, Hardy thinks, can't understand or isn't interested in such things; or (2) he is assuming that such views are currently accepted everywhere as fact, that it is so obvious that science has settled the matter that no argument is needed, but simply the mere invoking of Huxley's name; or (3) he just cannot embody convincingly or state clearly those views which are supposed to have such an immediate and radical effect on Alec.

This is sloppy work for a novelist, to let a few vague statements and a description of the ideas' effect on Alec do all the work, leaving the key phrases blank. Again, the word "untenable" is called in at the last minute, to supply the feeling of true conviction which the scene as a whole fails to generate. As Alec leaves Tess, he considers for the first time the "possibility that his position was untenable".[95] Why "untenable"? How have we been shown that Alec's beliefs are impossible to hold? We hardly know what these beliefs are, let alone the contradicting beliefs which supposedly refute them. Hardy is being lazy as an artist to rely on the convincing power of one strong word, a word whose strength he has not earned the right to use by what has gone before.

Although the chapter is not free of criticisms of Angel Clare himself, Angel's ideas remain unchallenged; in fact, they are clearly endorsed by the scene as a whole. The reader, in spite of the fact that he himself does not get to hear what these ideas are, is meant to feel their unanswerable truth by their power of persuasion over Alec. In the following chapter (XLVII) the same weight of endorsement is given to Angel's thoughts, as expressed by Tess, with the difference that this time we get a more direct suggestion of what some of these thoughts might be. The problem in which this attempt to state his case in more detail involves Hardy perhaps helps us to understand why he is hesitant to state Angel's views any more thoroughly or explicitly.

Alec is telling Tess that he has seen the light, that he doesn't know how he ever believed so many things which contradicted his own common-sense. However, he can't accept Angel's version of Christianity either.

> " . . . As for what you said last time, on the strength of your wonderful husband's intelligence . . . about having what they call an ethical system without any

dogma, I don't see my way to that at all.

"Why, you can have the religion of loving - kindness and purity at least, if you can't have - what do you call it - dogma."

"Oh no! I'm a different sort of fellow from that! If there's nobody to say, "Do this, and it will be a good thing for you after you are dead; do that, and it will be a bad thing for you", I can't warm up. Hang it, I am not going to feel responsible for my deeds and passions if there's nobody to be responsible to; and if I were you, my dear, I wouldn't either!"

She tried to argue, and tell him that he had mixed in his dull brain two matters, theology and morals, which in the primitive days of mankind had been quite distinct. But owing to Angel Clare's reticence, to her absolute want of training, and to her being a vessel of emotions rather than reasons, she could not get on. 96

Perhaps there is a better reason why Tess cannot "get on" - because she is wrong and Alec is right. It is not true that theology and morals were in primitive times quite distinct. Joachim Wach in his book <u>The Comparative Study of Religions</u> writes, "In no other religion except those of the modern West is there a genuine discrepancy between religion and ethics, between devotion and service".[97] Why is the relationship between theology and morals so important?

It is a profound religious conviction that God's command can only be expressive of his nature, and it is in the light of the eternal order that man can understand what he is called to be and what he is capable of becoming. In other words, there is a close relationship between theology, anthropology, and ethics. "Religion, according to the savage, is essentially something you do." To recognize an order in the universe (as profound religious experience would prompt man to do) means that in his every act man would strive to sustain that order. Where this order is interpreted as an expression of a divine will, the divine commands will have to be obeyed. They may be obeyed because they are commands, because they promise rewards, because they are

> believed to be conducive to well-being, success, or happiness, and finally because they are deemed to be expressive of the nature of Supreme Reality. 98

Wach further makes his point by quoting from a comparative study of Christianity and Hinduism by John McKenzie, entitled Two Religions. "The ethical problem is inseparable from the more general problem of the nature of reality and of the relation of the individual to what is ultimate in the universe."[99]

If we look at Chapter XLVII in Tess, we see how Hardy has written the conversation between Alec and Tess in such a way as to make Alec seem self-seeking, dull-brained, unable to do any good to his fellows unless reward is promised, unable to refrain from doing harm unless punishment is threatened. Tess, who has no convictions at all about the nature of ultimate reality, is yet able to cling to the Christian ethic of loving kindness; Alec cannot. "I am not going to feel responsible for my deeds and passions if there's nobody to be responsible to." Alec's objections to Angel's views are not even taken seriously, yet Alec has stated a central religious problem.

Hardy does not present the weaknesses of Angel's views fully enough, if at all; he does not do justice to Alec's beliefs. He unfairly weights his and our sympathy on the side of Angel's attitudes without even presenting them fully so that we could judge for ourselves. When he does attempt to express Angel's thoughts more completely, it usually seems a good thing that he does not develop them any further, since they are often careless, superficial or simply wrong.

This weakness in thought seriously limits the force of the novel. The criticism is not that Hardy should have held a different view about

religious matters, but that he should have tested more fully the views he did hold. Not only should the essential criticism of his own beliefs be presented or faced as honestly as possible, but his own beliefs should have been stated more strongly and convincingly. It is not only Alec's attitudes which are weakly given; Angel's are as well. What seems to be the case is that Hardy was not in Tess thinking through carefully various religious problems; rather, he was mouthing certain current, accepted ideas about Christianity, about the relationship between religion and knowledge, and he did not take the time to examine these ideas or test them, believing them to be argued, proven, settled once and for all elsewhere. Nowhere is the close relation between "abstract reason" and "imagination", between thought and art, so apparent as in these unsatisfactory episodes in Tess. Hardy's laxness, his failure to do thorough, honest and independent intellectual work, had a marked effect on his art, limiting its scope and force. His failure to submit to the demands of art-speech, to discover opposing points of view and attempt to understand each one as fully as possible, to give them equal weight, affected the thought of his novel.

It is important to understand that the criticism of Hardy's treatment of Christianity in the Wessex novels is not meant to suggest a moral or religious deficiency in him but a deficiency in thought. His work shows a set habit of mind, a reliance on fixed attitudes and clichés, a failure to study experience afresh and think through carefully what he saw. His unchanging and rather commonplace thoughts about religion - that it is opposed to intellectual knowledge, that it involves the acceptance of rigid creeds and codes of behaviour, and that there is no such thing as genuine religious experience - are still present in Jude, his last novel, and are

still present under the guise of profound and irrefutable criticisms of Christianity. Hardy's attitude is apparent not only in major incidents of the novel, such as Jude's disenchantment with the church or Arabella and Sue's religious conversions, but in countless passing comments, unquestioned assumptions. The rector of Marygreen is not present at Phillotson's departure, "being a man who disliked the sight of changes".[100] Religion is usually "only a luxury of the emotional and leisured classes".[101] Little Jude debates if he should pray to see Christminster because "people said that, if you prayed, things sometimes came to you, even thought they sometimes did not".

> He had read in a tract that a man who had begun to build a church, and had no money to finish it, knelt down and prayed, and the money came in by the next post. Another man tried the same experiment, and the money did not come; but he found afterwards that the breeches he knelt in were made by a wicked Jew. 102

The objection is not that such passages are present in the novel, but that they in context masquerade as serious thought about and irrefutable dismissal of religion and religious practice. If the comments on prayer above were matched by intelligent understanding of what prayer in a deeper sense has meant to Christianity (and the attitude Hardy is ridiculing is ridiculed just as much within the church as without it), perhaps a truer criticism and appreciation of the human need for something like prayer might have been attained. However, Hardy leaves us instead with flippancy and unexamined assumptions. Religion is rigid, opposes change. It is unneccessary and irrelevant to the bulk of poor, suffering humanity. It rests on pretense, trickery, ignorance, the self-deception and self-seeking of prayers which are really only lists of requests. The

only things Christianity has to recommend it are the ethic of love which Tess and Jude still honour in the midst of their disillusion and unhappiness, and a certain poetry. Even Sue, while still a rebel, appreciates this poetry when she and Jude attempt to marry in a registrar's office. The form they are to sign is so business-like that Sue comments,

> "It seems making a more sordid business of it even than signing the contract in a vestry. There is a little poetry in a church." 103

Poetry and ethics - it is a very emasculated form of Christianity which Hardy permits his characters. Hardy's refusal to credit the reality of any religious experience in Wessex stands in marked contrast to Lawrence's attempt to understand and express such experiences. The meaning of the church to Mrs. Morel and to the mining community in Sons and Lovers, Miriam's religious sensibility in Sons and Lovers, in The Rainbow Tom Brangwen's sense of submission to a greater ordering, Will Brangwen's experience of ecstasy in Lincoln Cathedral, Ursula's struggle with the church and the Sunday world, the importance of the liturgy of the Christian year to the Brangwen children - there is nothing like any of these things in all of Hardy's fiction.

Yet, all of Hardy's serious fiction is directed towards the examination of a central religious problem - why do the innocent suffer? Judaism and Christianity's deepest probing of this question is still the book of Job, and Lawrence is quite right to point us to it. It is even more natural to turn to Job because Hardy himself refers to it repeatedly in Jude the Obscure, especially to Job's first statement of doubt, despair and perplexity at his undeserved misery - "Let the day perish wherein I was born" (Job 3.3, spoken by Jude in the final chapter of the novel and also

in "At Aldbrickham and Elsewhere", Chapter III, p. 284, when Jude fears that his and Arabella's son will one day utter Job's words). However, the book of Job does not stop here, as Lawrence correctly points out. It has never given an easy answer to Job's bitterness and bewilderment at being punished without cause, but it has examined the problem from every angle, presenting as cogently as it could every possible response, finding that all of them were inadequate or palpably false to experience. Its final statement is that God, because he is God, need not answer and refuses to answer. We are not told that all things turn out for the best or that the wicked will be punished, the good blest, in heaven if not on earth. No, we are told that God is more powerful than Job, and he will not answer. His ways remain a mystery. Job can accept and face the unknown or not. His wisdom is to accept, worship and live; and this decision does move life beyond the paralysis of mere bitterness and wishing not to have been born.

Hardy in the Wessex novels has, in a sense, got no further than presenting the question - what's the point of living in a world where the innocent suffer and the wicked prosper? The criticism is not that he arrives at a different conclusion from the writer of Job, but that he does not examine the problem with similar thoroughness and sensitivity. The book of Job even states Hardy's own attitude more powerfully than Hardy does himself, although this is not its final attitude. Its thought about the question of suffering is much more complex than Hardy's, presents with their fullest weight all the various responses men have made in order to make sense out of senseless suffering.

Hardy does not. Hardy, in his treatment of religious problems and religious experience in the Wessex novels presents fairly only one side

of a question. He often writes with inaccurate or inadequate information, as when he attacks the marriage vows in Jude or describes the baptism and burial of Tess's baby and the distinction between theology and morals in Tess. He manipulates the readers' sympathy by using strong words such as "untenable" without adequate justification, by excluding viewpoints which would contradict or broaden his own or by misrepresenting them while relying on unexamined assumptions. Hardy's superficial and careless criticism of religion and the church, his failure to understand the full power of either Christian love or Judaic law, the profound importance of them in our Western heritage, is a major flaw in his work, mainly because he deals with these things so often with such a pretence of complete understanding and dismissal.

Yet Lawrence perceives in Hardy's novels a deeper expression of religious feeling which balances and complicates the simple statement that Hardy's art seems to be making on the obvious level.

> If it were not that man is much stronger in feeling than in thought, the Wessex novels would be sheer rubbish, as they are already in parts. (p. 480)

What Lawrence senses in Hardy beyond the explicit statements of bitterness, despair and defeat which would lead to paralysis (where Job begins) is a more profound attitude of acceptance, worship and life (where Job ends). Hardy's great creative activity makes nonsense of his pessimism, his repeated references to wishing not to have been born. In his art he does move forward into life in a way which his stated metaphysic, if followed to its logical conclusions, would make impossible. The sense of the wonder of creation, of "with God is terrible majesty," is all through Hardy's work - in Gabriel's and Bathsheba's awe at the storm and the lightning which they watch from the hayrick, in the majestic desolation and endurance of Egdon

Heath, in Tess's singing of the Benedicite as she descends into the lush Froom Valley.

> Always he must start from the earth, from the great source of the Law . . . . The earth is the manifestation of the Father, of the Creator, who made us in the Law. God still speaks aloud in His works, as to Job, so to Hardy, surpassing human conception and the human law. (p. 480)

Lawrence senses in Hardy's work, beyond the superficial criticism of religion, a deep religious belief in the Law, "but in conceipt (sic) of his own understanding, which cannot understand the Law, he says that the Law is nothing, a blind confusion", (p. 482). It is a failure of thought, of understanding, of which Lawrence accuses Hardy. The discussion of Christianity and Judaism in the "Study" created a context from which we could more adequately perceive and judge the inadequacies of Hardy's treatment of these two faiths; the discussion was necessary for a full criticism of the Wessex novels since the criticism of religion is central to them, especially to Tess and Jude.

However, this failure in thought grew out of a deeper conflict, one between what Lawrence thought to be Hardy's true attitude and what was extraneous, forced upon him by the "scientific" ideas of the age which Hardy felt he had to accept as truth. Which was Hardy's true attitude - his sceptism and denial of religious experience to the people of Wessex or Job's acceptance and worship, "with God is terrible majesty"? If this conflict was a real one, if Hardy found himself unable to trust and follow his profoundest beliefs about life, his commitment to the truth of imagination, his responsible attention and submission to the unknown, if he felt his work as an artist made unimportant by the prevalent assumption that the imagination and the unknown were unscientific, not true knowledge

but ornament, not significant discovery but entertainment - then Hardy would have had taken away from him by his age the very attitude which would have extended his powers as an artist, made his search more fruitful, his thought finer and more complex, his exploration of our human reality a more compelling statement of truth.

Perhaps this difficult conflict accounts for a recurring feeling one has in reading the Wessex novels of someone not believing fully in all he is doing or saying, of someone not always attending very closely to his work. Perhaps this conflict accounts for the uncertain commitment which could allow in a preface to one of Hardy's novels a comment, after making response to various critics, about "the infinite unimportance of both their say and mine".[104]

Yet Hardy struggled bravely for the production of his own personal knowledge in a time which denied its value. On a foundation of unsteady attention and wavering belief he made his discoveries and expressed them; in writing novel after novel and poem after poem he accepted his assigned task, his calling. It is in Jude the Obscure that Lawrence finds Hardy's clearest statement of his particular conflict and of the knowledge which grew out of it - the tension between accepted, established knowledge and the new personal knowledge and discovery which challenges, contradicts, and extends it. When is the former too rigid, fixed, stagnant, exclusive? When is the latter inadequate, whimsical, not tested thoroughly enough, arbitrarily constructed rather than responsibly discovered (i.e. not objective), giving the excitement of pleasant novelty rather than the discomfort and inevitability of new truth? These are questions raised by Jude's struggle and failure to enter Christminster in Jude the Obscure.

In the first section of this chapter, I showed how many critics have seen a conflict between Hardy's ideas and his art as central to his work. It is stated variously as an opposition between abstract reason and imagination, intellect and instinct or emotion, philosophy and literature. Most of these ways of expressing the problem rest on the assumption of a basic dichotomy between art and thought, between imagination and intellect, which Lawrence in the "Study" does not accept. He never expressed his idea of the relation between intelligence, imagination and religion more clearly or briefly than in his "Introduction to these Paintings", written less than two years before his death.

> . . . the imagination is a more powerful and more comprehensive flow of consciousness than our ordinary flow. In the flow of true imagination we know in full, mentally and physically at once, in a greater, enkindled awareness. At the maximum of our imagination we are religious. 105

It is this conception of the religious imagination as the highest, most difficult and most complete form of thought which Lawrence can be seen working towards in the "Study". The way he expresses the struggle he senses in Hardy's work is less between art and thought than between a limited form of thought and a finer one, between the mere repetition of already accepted knowledge and the difficult work of discovery and exploration. Arthur Mizener stated the problem very clearly on the first page of his essay on Hardy; "the courage of Hardy's profoundest conviction failed him . . . under the pressure of the reasoning of his age".[106] Allen Tate touched on another aspect of this opposition. He wrote of Hardy,

> his 'philosophy' is always a little outside the range of his feeling: his abstractions are thus somewhat irresponsible, since he can never quite show us the experience that ought to justify them, that would give them substance, visibility, meaning.

Tate feels that when Hardy records a direct impression he is convincing,

> but when he begins to think, when he begins to say what the impression, the observation, the incident means, he can only bring in his ill-digested philosophy - a mélange of Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Spencer, against a cosmological background of eighteenth century Deism that he could not project imaginatively into his immediate experience. 107

Tate says that this failure of imagination occurs when Hardy "begins to think", but isn't it rather that he is thinking less carefully, substituting general statements of an "ill-digested philosophy" for the detailed observation and study of the life he knew?

Morton D. Zabel in an article on Hardy spoke of the "incongruity" or the paradox characteristic of his art.

> In his thought it appears in his leaning toward cosmic simplifications so large and unwieldy that their grandeur becomes inflexible (and thus an impediment to critical thinking and an oppression to art) and in his humble loyalty to the claims of life in all its elusive and stubborn deviations - its vital struggles and appeals that protest and so make bearable the mindless negation of the universe. 108

More simply, there is a conflict in Hardy between the general and the particular. His "philosophy" accounts for most of his grandiose simplifications, his "irresponsible" abstractions and generalisations - irresponsible because they did not grow out of close attention to the particulars of his experience but were accepted too easily from other sources. Hardy's generalised conclusions do not strike us as inevitable because they were grafted on to the stories he tells, did not grow naturally out of the people and events he describes. All that is strongest in the Wessex novels grew out of Hardy's careful study and statement of the specific life he knew;[109] all that is weakest resulted from his reliance on generalisations, simplifications, abstractions which he had not

adequately tested or examined and which were extraneous to the true thought of his art.

However this conflict has been suggested - by speaking of art versus thought, of the ideas of the age versus Hardy's own deepest convictions, of the general versus the particular - it has appeared again and again in recent Hardy criticism and is always mentioned as a central problem in Hardy's work. But all of these critics have referred to this issue without expressing what Lawrence saw in 1914 - that this conflict is the essence of Jude's struggle in Jude the Obscure and that in his portrayals of Clym, Angel and Jude Hardy was trying to face this problem and work it through, to come to some understanding of the worth of his own personal knowledge in spite of the dominant ideas of the time.[110] Hardy was repeatedly testing and criticising the highminded, educated young man, very similar to himself, who could not arrive at knowledge from his own experience, the particulars of life around him, but is constricted by current ideas, his education, contemporary philosophy and "scientific" thought. Hardy's condemnation falls more strongly on Clym and on Angel than it does on Jude, but there is simultaneously a deep sympathy for them; they are rare and sensitive individuals who tried to grow beyond their background.

Hardy's deepest sympathy and understanding, his most direct treatment of this problem, is to be found in his story of Jude Fawley's desire to enter Christminster. This is the story to which Lawrence attended most carefully in the "Study", although he also discussed Clym's thought (see Chapter II of this thesis) and Angel's personal education. Lawrence sees Clym, Angel and Jude as very different people with individual, specific problems and qualities, but he does suggest relations between them. Angel

Clare, at the close of Tess of the D'Urbervilles, "though still apparently alive, is in reality no more than a mouth, a piece of paper, like Clym left preaching" (p. 488). (We shall see in the discussion which follows in what ways this statement of Lawrence's is not completely fair to Angel). Jude's desire for knowledge and his inability to integrate Arabella and academics, revealed certain parallels between his own nature and Angel's.

> . . . there was danger at the outset that he should never become a man, but that he should remain incorporeal, smothered out under his idea of learning. He was somewhat in Angel Clare's position. Not that generations of particular training had made him almost rigid and paralyzed to the female: but that his whole passion was concentrated away from woman to reinforce in him the male impulse towards extending the consciousness. (p. 494)

In Hardy's portrayal of the conflict between Clym's advanced ideas and his ignorance of those things which were closest to him, Eustacia, the heath, the Egdon natives; the conflict between Angel's adherence to the general and his slow learning of attention to particulars; and the conflict between Jude's desire for traditional knowledge and his wavering belief in his own personal knowledge - in Hardy's treatment of these conflicts, Lawrence sees a profound attempt to come to some new and individual discovery. The whole "Study" builds to give force to Lawrence's discussion of Jude the Obscure; but before examining the analysis of Jude, let us look more closely at the development of Angel Clare in Tess of the D'Urbervilles, a development which Lawrence does not discuss at length in the "Study", although he suggests its basic movement.

First, it must be stated that in relation to Lascelles Abercrombie's judgment of Angel Clare, Lawrence's brief analysis of Angel is already much more discriminating and just. Abercrombie simply dismisses Angel as

thoroughly odious. He is "theoretical high-mindedness; and than this there is nothing more disgusting, let alone its cruelty when it gets any actual life into its power".[111] The tone of Lawrence's remarks are quite different. He is very aware that part of the great force of Tess of the D'Urbervilles for the reader is the paradox of both intensely loving and bitterly hating Angel Clare at the same time. Angel is attractive, intelligent, refined, sensitive, and we long for him to return to Tess and claim her for his mate. The book would not work at all if we did not have this strong feeling for Angel. As Lawrence wrote in Chapter V of the "Study", "the virgin knight is hated with intensity, yet still loved" (p. 437). Further, Angel Clare is not a static character; he undergoes a very painful education.

> To Angel Clare, the female in himself is detestable, the body, the senses, that which he will share with a woman, is held degraded. What he wants really is to receive the female impulse other than through the body. But his thinking has made him criticize Christianity, his deeper instinct has forbidden him to deny his body any further, a deadlock in his own being, which denies him any purpose, so that he must take to hand, labour out of sheer impotence to resolve himself, drives him unwillingly to woman. But he must see her only as the Female Principle, he cannot bear to see her as the Woman in the Body . . . .
>
> Who is he, that he shall be pure male, and deny the existence of the female? This is the question the Creator asks of him. Is then the male the exclusive whole of life? - is he even the higher or supreme part of life? Angel Clare thinks so: as Christ thought.
>
> Yet it is not so, as even Angel Clare must find out. Life, that is Two-in-One, Male and Female. Nor is either part greater than the other.
>
> It is not Angel Clare's fault that he cannot come to Tess when he finds that she has, in his words, been defiled. It is the result of generations of ultra-Christian training, which had left in him an inherent aversion to the female . . . . He conceived of the world as consisting of the One, the Male Principle . . . . Which conception reached its

> fullest in Turner's pictures, which were utterly bodiless; and also in the great scientists or thinkers of the last generation, even Darwin and Spencer and Huxley. (pp. 484-485)

Perhaps because of the title of the novel, Tess's story, her struggle and misfortune, is always emphasised. Yet Angel Clare is present early in the book, even before Alec D'Urberville, at the dance at Marlott, with signs of his inner conflict already apparent - that between the high-mindedness and traditional learning of his brothers and his own need for life and individual movement as figured in the dance. It is Angel Clare who is left alive at the end of the book, left with the responsibility of going on. The pain of learning from experience which Angel feels is shown by Hardy to be almost as deep as the sorrow Tess experiences. The book is not the story of Tess's tragedy alone, but also the story of Angel Clare's true education.[112]

In the first description of Angel given in the novel, Hardy points to his characteristic failing, "that he was a desultory tentative student of something and everything".[113] Angel may have decided against the Cambridge education enjoyed by his brothers, but his independent reading was no more genuine a learning experience than the university was for Felix and Cuthbert. Angel had no thorough, penetrating knowledge in any one thing, until his pupilage at Talbothays, his relationship with Tess and his travels in Brazil.

What does Angel learn? Hardy shows us clearly. Angel has a tendency to see the general rather than the particular; at Talbothays he begins to see differently. For instance, he had always stereotyped farm workers in his mind.

> The conventional farm-folk of his imagination - personified by the pitiable dummy known as Hodge - were obliterated after a few days' residence. At close quarters no Hodge was to be seen . . . . The typical and unvarying Hodge ceased to exist. He had been disintegrated into a number of varied fellow-creatures - beings of many minds, beings infinite in difference . . . 114

This is not an isolated example but, according to Hardy, a continuing characteristic.

> For several days after Tess's arrival Clare, sitting abstractedly reading from some book, periodical, or piece of music just come by post, hardly noticed that she was present at table. She talked so little, and the other maids talked so much, that the babble did not strike him as possessing a new note, and he was ever in the habit of neglecting the particulars of an outward scene for the general impression. 115

However, he soon notices her as an individual, as someone different and set apart from the rest; but his misfortune lies in not seeing her individually enough. Regardless of his reflections on the non-existance of Hodge at Talbothays, Angel idealises Tess as a virginal milkmaid. He tells his mother and father that, "she's brim full of poetry - actualized poetry, if I may use the expression. She <u>lives</u> what paper-poets only write . . . ."[116] When Tess tries to confess her past experience with Alec, Angel makes fun of her "pretension" to a personal, unique history; he assumes that all rural girls live uneventful lives essentially the same. Tess resists Angel's proposal of marriage.

> "But my history. I want you to know it - you must let me tell you - you will not like me so well!"
> "Tell it if you wish to, dearest. This precious history then. Yes, I was born at so and so, Anno Domini - "
> " . . . But there was trouble in my family; father was not very industrious, and he drank a little."
> "Yes, yes. Poor child! Nothing new." 117

Angel's certainty that Tess can have nothing unusual to tell makes her task nearly impossible, for she senses the truth of the matter,

that he is in love with a general idea of rustic innocence and purity and not with her at all. She is not a total and individual reality to him, a woman with her own particular life story. She is simply a prettier than usual milkmaid. This fact is made crystal clear by Angel's response to Tess's confession on their wedding night. Why is he so upset?

> "You were one person; now you are another . . . .
> I repeat, the woman I have been loving is not you."
> "But who?"
> "Another woman in your shape." 118

This new turn of events, Tess's revelation of her past misfortune, requires a great effort of attention on Clare's part; "he could not, by any contrivance, think closely enough" after her disclosure.[119] Tess's unhappiness and inner agony is usually stressed in this wedding night scene, but Hardy also gives Angel's struggle very sensitively and fully. Many pages are devoted to Angel's inner conflict and his process of decision; we see his bitter sarcasm which has its roots in love and affection, his anger and confusion at finding his new knowledge of Tess mocked by appearances, by her look of absolute purity.[120] After speaking cruelly to Tess, a tear rolls down his cheek unobserved by her.[121]

Angel has reason to be puzzled and upset, and he does need the time away from Tess in Brazil to think through this new experience in his life. He has always thought himself to be so much more open to life than his brothers or his parents and has disagreed with them on so many points of doctrine. Yet he has always done so in a very abstract, general way, dealing with books and schools of thought, with theologies and ethics. Suddenly a specific situation requires his attention, and he must discover in reality what beliefs and principles he shares with his family and which ones he denies.

Clare has always been very critical of his brothers, yet Hardy makes clear that Angel shares with them, though in a less extreme form, their tendency to sacrifice the particular to the general, the personal opinion or individual stand to current custom and accepted thought. His brothers are

> such unimpeachable models as are turned out yearly by the lathe of a systematic tuition. They were both somewhat short-sighted, and when it was the custom to wear a single eyeglass and string they wore a single eyeglass and string; when it was the custom to wear a double glass they wore a double glass; when it was the custom to wear spectacles they wore spectacles straightway, all without reference to the particular variety of defect in their own vision. When Wordsworth was enthroned they carried pocket copies; and when Shelley was belittled they allowed him to grow dusty on their shelves. When Correggio's Holy Families were admired, they admired Correggio's Holy Families; when he was decried in favour of Velasquez, they sedulously followed suit without any personal objection.
>
> If these two noticed Angel's growing social ineptness, he noticed their growing mental limitations. Felix seemed to him all Church; Cuthbert all College . . . . Each brother candidly recognized that there were a few unimportant scores of millions of outsiders in civilized society, persons who were neither University men nor churchmen; but they were to be tolerated rather than reckoned with and respected . . . . As they walked along the hillside Angel's former feeling revived in him - that whatever their advantages by comparison with himself, neither saw or set forth life as it really was lived. Perhaps, as with many men, their opportunities of observation were not so good as their opportunities of expression. 122

Angel thinks of himself as quite different from his brothers, but in his moral judgment of Tess how different is he from Felix and Cuthbert?

Angel also thinks himself far advanced beyond his parents' simple faith. Yet when his father reads from Proverbs 31 about the value of a virtuous wife, we realise how deeply Angel's upbringing, his religious

training, his parents' beliefs, have influenced him.[123] His own ideals for a wife, for the wife he thought he had found in Tess, were essentially the same as theirs, and for this reason he is profoundly moved and saddened by the reading of the passage and by his mother's comments upon it. Angel lies to his mother and tells her Tess is "spotless"; yet this deception might have been unnecessary. What Angel does not realise is that his parents' faith involves more than moral principles; it also involves a trust in the unreasonable grace and forgiveness of God and an obedience to the injunction to forgive others as God forgives man. Angel's father and mother would probably have been more ready to accept Tess in spite of her imperfection than Angel was, for his version of Christianity was severely limited. It included only moral principles to the exclusion of all other irrational religious elements such as redemption and grace. Forgiveness, acceptance of one's fellows in spite of their failings - this does not make logical sense. Yet Clare only trusts decisions made on the basis of "pure reason", and it is by the light of such "pure reason" that he decides to separate from Tess.[124]

Yet is this decision even the result of pure reason or objective judgment, as Clare supposes? Hardy thinks not. Hardy very carefully shows us the problem of various unackowledged influences on Angel - his parents' beliefs, his brothers' highmindedness, all of his upbringing, the ideas of the age which make up most of his advanced opinions. Hardy is sensitive to this problem because he knows personally the power of such influences over one. Angel thinks that a shadow hangs over him and Tess - the shadow of Tess's past life - but Hardy says that a deeper shade obscures their way,

> . . . namely, the shade of his own limitations.
> With all his attempted independence of judgment

> this advanced and well-meaning young man, a sample product of the last five-and-twenty years, was yet the slave to custom and conventionality when surprised back into his early teachings. 125

Angel thought he knew more of life than his parents did, but one wonders if they had not seen more of human experience and penetrated it more deeply, and would thus forgive human failings more readily, than he. Angel underestimates them and the degree to which he shares some of their values while remaining blind to others. However, after his disastrous marriage to Tess, he is aware of a painful demand on him to change and to think further.

> The picture of life had changed for him. Before this time he had known it but speculatively; now he thought he knew it as a practical man; though perhaps he did not, even yet. 126

His education requires a complete break from home, family, country, all familiar surroundings. It is in the strangeness of Brazil, after a severe illness and a conversation with a brief acquaintance, that Angel is able to think further about his situation and to see rightly.

> Having long discredited the old systems of mysticism, he now began to discredit the old appraisements of morality. He thought they wanted readjusting. Who was the moral man? Still more pertinently, who was the moral woman? . . . . How, then, about Tess? . . . . Cynical things he had uttered to himself about her; but no man can be a cynic and live; and he withdrew them. The mistake of expressing them had arisen from his allowing himself to be influenced by general principles to the disregard of the particular instance. 127

Angel's uncomfortable re-examination of his principles and beliefs in the light of his relationship to Tess is carefully given by Hardy in the novel. Hardy questions Angel's characteristic approach to knowledge throughout the book, contrasting Angel's superficial education to his true one - his true one growing out of his marriage to Tess, his

separation from her, his escape to Brazil and return. Angel begins to learn from experience rather than to act and think by too easily-accepted rigid principles or set ideas. He comes to understand that he cannot learn or grow as a detached, superficial observer, knowing a little bit of everything and nothing in depth; his only valuable discoveries come from personal, particular involvement and commitment.

What Angel undergoes is, in one sense, an artist's education in learning to attend to the particular rather than the general and in discovering that true comprehension arises out of the meaningful relation of particulars rather than out of overall pronouncements which ignore specific instances. One could say that Angel was learning the value of thinking in "art-speech" rather than in the abstract categories of modern philosophy (a Lawrentian formulation) or learning the value and way of true vision (according to Blake).

> . . . he who wishes to see a Vision, a perfect Whole,
> Must see it in its Minute Particulars, Organized, and
> not as thou,
> O Fiend of Righteousness, pretendest; thine is a Disorganized
> And snowy, cloud, brooder of tempests and destructive War . . .
> You accumulate Particulars and murder by analyzing, that you
> May take the aggregate, and you call the aggregate Moral Law,
> And you call that swell'd and bloated Form a Minute Particular;
> But General Forms have their vitality in Particulars, and every
> Particular is a Man, a Divine Member of the Divine Jesus. 128

Angel, in learning this way of seeing and studying life in Tess of the D'Urbervilles, is affirming the true value of Hardy's art, of his close study of Wessex life, against the opposing voice of the abstractions, generalisations, summations of contemporary philosophical and scientific ideas, formulations of experience in the Wessex novels.

The passage from Jerusalem above, however, suggests that the conflict between attending to the general or attending to particulars is not

a simple one. One can get lost in accumulating unrelated particulars to no purpose as well as in the contemplation of a disorganised, "swell'd and bloated Form", a rigid generalisation which has little true relation to reality. The purpose in attending to the particulars of experience is to discover further relations, a "perfect whole", a hitherto unknown aspect of reality. An arbitrary generalisation should not be confused with this discovered whole relation, however. As Blake states, the discovered whole is the discovery of a significant organisation or relation in all its minute particulars; the generalisation is not an uncovering of a beautiful and complex relation, but a confused, disorganised statement or form which is not a true statement about reality. The generalisation gets in the way of attention to particulars and thus prevents any real discovery of further wholes. This is true for the scientist as well as for the artist. As Polanyi stresses in Personal Knowledge, a rigid empiricism in science would result in a telephone-book concept of science, science as merely descriptive, listing one minute particular fact or observation after another. True scientific work, however, is creative. It involves a close attention to particulars in the light of some yet unknown whole which may show their meaningful relation - hence, the importance of the hunch or the hypothesis in science.

However, the ideas Hardy got from 19th century science and philosophy led him into generalities. He too often neglected the specific situation of observation, theory, intuition, experiment, out of which certain ideas arose for the belief that "science has proven thus and so". He too often lost the concept of philosophy as a continuing, speculative venture whose theories he himself could challenge and question for a feeling that certain philosophical ideas, because they were modern and sceptical and

indebted to recent scientific thought, were the final truth about the nature of man and the universe.

Thus it is that in spite of Angel Clare's painful education in attending to the particular instance rather than to general principles in Tess of the D'Urbervilles, another part of his education is never begun, let alone completed. He is forced to re-evaluate his indebtedness to his own upbringing, his parents' moral principles, the conventional ideas of his society, but never to the new, advanced thought to which he gives in so easily. The chief inadequacy in Hardy's treatment of Angel is that he never examines, never even fully states Angel's modern thoughts. They are too similar to Hardy's own views and are not tested thoroughly enough.

It is this weakness in the novel which perhaps partially justifies Lawrence's harsh judgment that Angel, although alive at the end of the novel, "is in reality no more than a mouth, a piece of paper, like Clym left preaching" (p. 488). This statement does not seem to fairly describe the process of learning Angel undergoes (a process Lawrence himself suggests in the "Study", pp. 484-485), yet Lawrence's expression of impatience with Angel and Clym's preachiness points to a major limitation in both The Return of the Native and Tess of the D'Urbervilles. The modern sceptical ideas of both Clym and Angel, especially their ideas about religion and morals, are never even fully presented, let alone challenged. In Tess, these modern thoughts of Angel's stand as unquestioned at the close of the novel as they did at the beginning. They lend great force to Tess's tragedy as she awaits arrest at Stonehenge.

> "This reminds me, dear", she said. "You remember you never would interfere with any belief o' mine before we were married? But I knew your mind all the same, and I thought as you thought - not from reasons o' my own, but because you thought so.

> Tell me now, Angel, do you think we shall meet again after we are dead? I want to know."
>
> He kissed her to avoid a reply at such a time.
>
> "O Angel - I fear that means no!" said she, with a suppressed sob. "And I wanted so to see you again - so much, so much! What - not even you and I, Angel, who love each other so well?" 129

We feel Tess's complete isolation and her lack even of the comfort of illusion or of religious belief. Hardy has used Angel's scepticism here with a sensitive understanding of the uncertainty and sadness it necessarily brings to human life. Yet, at most other points in the novel where Angel's advanced ideas are meant to carry great weight - as in the scene where Alec forsakes his evangelistic mission - they are unconvincing or not fully enough given. In this final scene with Tess we are shown a specific belief of Angel's, his denial of an after life, and its effect on Tess. The fact that Hardy shares Angel's view here does not seriously mar the scene because the rightness or wrongness of Angel's belief is not under question; we accept that Tess thinks what Angel thinks without challenging him, and we feel strongly the effect of Angel's scepticism on her. However, when Hardy presents Angel's beliefs as unanswerable truths, as when they "convert" Alec D'Urberville, Hardy's failure to examine them more closely is a major flaw.

Although Angel undergoes a severe testing and learning experience in Tess of the D'Urbervilles, he never perceives the whole relation; that is, he never sees that the inappropriate rigidity with which he approached life before, the general principles which obscured his full attention to particular instances, could be operating in another dimension beside his relationship with Tess. He never sees that his devotion to contemporary

sceptical ideas, especially about religion, could also involve him in a rigid adherence to general principles which obscured a full and careful view of reality. The objection is not that Angel held these views, but that they were not more forcefully presented or challenged by the novel as a whole. It is in Jude the Obscure that this limitation in Hardy's art is both more obvious as well as more thoroughly faced and struggled against.

Lawrence in Chapter V of the "Study" wrote,

> . . . almost the bitterest, most pathetic, deepest part of Jude's misfortune was his failure to obtain admission to Oxford, his failure to gain his place and standing in the world's knowledge, in the world's work.

As Lawrence examines this aspect of Jude's story further in Chapter IX of the "Study", he finds both serious limitations and profound insights in Hardy's treatment of Jude's desire for knowledge.

What strikes him as wrong or false in Jude's struggle to enter Christminster? First, his wish to "gain his place and standing in the world's knowledge" by going to university and joining the ranks of academia does not seem a real desire, does not seem to be Jude's true calling.

> . . . his purpose of becoming an Oxford don was a cut-and-dried purpose which had no connexion with his living body, and for which probably no woman could have united with him.
>
> No doubt Arabella hated his books, and hated his whole attitude to study. What had he, a passionate, emotional nature, to do with learning for learning's sake, with mere academics? Any woman must know it was ridiculous. But he persisted with the tenacity of all perverseness . . . . he would concentrate all on his male idea, of arresting himself, of becoming himself a non-developing quality, an academic mechanism. That was his obsession. That was his craving: to have nothing to do with his own life . . . . Jude Fawley wanted to arrest all his activity in his mind . . . . wanted to become an impersonal force working automatically . . . . wanted to deny, or escape the responsibility and trouble of living

as a complete person, a full individual. (p. 494-495)

Surely this is a just analysis, for Hardy himself shows us the arbitrary nature of young Jude's obsession for learning and for Christminster. In the very first chapter of the novel the essence of Jude's university dream is stated.

> "You know what a university is, and a university degree? It is the necessary hallmark of a man who wants to do anything in teaching. My scheme, or dream, is to be a university graduate, and then to be ordained. By going to live at Christminster, or near it, I shall be at headquarters, so to speak, and if my scheme is practicable at all, I consider that being on the spot will afford me a better chance of carrying it out than I should have elsewhere." (Jude, p. 14)

However, it is Phillotson who is speaking. Jude takes his desire over ready-made from Phillotson, without changing it in the least. In his loneliness, he directs all his longing to the glowing city of Christminster which he sees from the Brown House near Marygreen.

> It had been the yearning of his heart to find something to anchor on, to cling to - for some place which he could call admirable. Should he find that place in this city if he could get there? Would it be a spot in which, without fear of farmers, or hindrance, or ridicule, he could watch and wait, and set himself to some mighty undertaking like the men of old of whom he had heard? As the halo had been to his eyes when gazing at it a quarter of an hour earlier, so was the spot mentally to him as he pursued his dark way.

Such thought is characteristic and believable in a child, especially the child Jude is when the book opens. But when this idealisation persists into manhood and Jude clings obstinately to someone else's dream rather than dealing with the reality of his own talents, his own situation and limitations, we can only begin to call it, as Lawrence does, an obsession and a perversity.

It seems an unreal obsession because Jude is very different from Phillotson, and Phillotson's ideal is not enough for Jude. Jude is capable of being a complete, whole individual, "creating life in a new form" (p. 501 - as the Widow Edlin did in her own way), while Phillotson is not.

> He [Phillotson] could not create a single new movement or thought or expression. Everything he did was a repetition of what had been. All his study was a study of what had been. It was a mechanical, functional process. He was a true, if small, form of the Savant . . . . it is a cruel thing for a complete, or a spiritual, individuality to be submitted to a functional organism. (p. 501)

Lawrence's second objection to Jude's desire to enter Christminster is not only that it has no relation to Jude's real calling, but that it involves a mechanical, fixed ideal of learning, "study of what had been", mere repetition, no true exploration or new discovery. This judgment is also accurate. Jude's whole idea of what it means to study and teach is one of acquiring knowledge, rather than producing or discovering it, and then handing it out again. We have run across this concept of education before, in Clym's plans for a school in The Return of the Native. In Jude, Hardy makes fun of this attitude in its more obvious manifestations, as when the young Jude supposes that learning a language is simply the acquiring of a secret code of transforming one language into another, a set rule. When he opens his first Latin grammar, he is dismayed.

> He learnt for the first time that there was no law of transmutation, as in his innocence he had supposed . . . but that every word in both Latin and Greek was to be individually committed to memory at the cost of years of plodding. (p. 35)

However, in less transparently foolish instances, Hardy seems to share Jude's concept of the nature of education, to take it for granted. He repeatedly refers to knowledge as an acquisition, as when he has Jude

say that Christminster "hates all men like me - the so-called Self-taught, - how it scorns our laboured acquisitions" (p. 331) or when Sue tells Jude, "You struggled nobly to acquire knowledge" (p. 337). No criticism is implied by the context of the word "acquire" as used by Jude and Sue. Jude's imagined picture of what life within the university must be like does not include adventure, risk, discovery, but only what Lawrence called "indrawing, ingestion" (p. 499). Jude thinks,

> Only a wall divided him from those happy young contemporaries of his with whom he shared a common mental life; men who had nothing to do from morning till night but to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest. (p. 92)

Jude wants to share that life because "I felt I could do one thing if I had the opportunity. I could accumulate ideas, and impart them to others" (p. 413).

"Accumulate ideas" - this is what Jude understands as the true nature of thought and education. He imagines a set body of knowledge which one finally manages to memorise, at which point one can begin imparting knowledge to others. When he returns to Christminster near the close of the novel, Jude has become more critical of the university and its dons and their narrow vision. Yet how is Jude himself any different than they are? As he stands to watch the Remembrance Day procession, he explains a Latin inscription over a doorway to the crowd and discourses on details of architecture and masonry (p. 335). The crowd is amazed and impressed by Jude's knowledge; but if this scene is meant to serve as an example of Jude's intelligence and of the waste involved in not admitting him to the university, we are forced to admit that this performance is no more unusual than any display of mental acquisitions made by the more self-seeking and uninspired men of Christminster.

Perhaps we might think that Jude's thinking during his life with Sue, his criticism of the church and of academia and of social convention, represents genuine exploration and discovery on his part. However, as Arthur Mizener pointed out in his article on "Jude the Obscure as a tragedy", the story of Jude's developing thought is from the beginning presented through the view of one who has already accepted the ideas and attitudes which will be the end-product of Jude's education. Before Jude reaches this final point, his "mistaken" ideas are dramatised by irony; Hardy makes gentle fun of Jude's enthusiasm or idealism or ignorance by contrasting them with his (Hardy's) own more sceptical view of things. When Jude finally decides that his desire for learning was a fraud, that it depended too greatly on social ambition, he still clings to the church. Yet Hardy, primarily through Sue, lets us know that Jude will also see through the church in time. Hardy's own code for the ideal life seems to be a secular Sermon on the Mount, and Mizener contends that "the real subject of Jude is the evolution of this code in Jude's mind".[130] Although Jude the Obscure is not autobiographical in any simple, specific sense, Mizener, after examining Hardy's letters and pointing to those instances where Hardy seems to identify with Jude's thoughts and feelings (see the fourth section of Chapter III of this thesis, "Hardy's aristocrats", for examples of these), concludes that Jude's history is essentially a history of the development of Hardy's own mind.[131] The criticism of the novel to which this realisation leads Mizener is that incidents in Jude the Obscure do not "have in them implications of contrasted views of experience; they are merely poetic projections of the hero's view of things".[132]

In other words, Jude's changing outlook embodies no real exploration or discovery on his part or on the part of his author. Hardy's

ideas are fixed in the beginning and do not change, and this one view of things is the one Jude finally comes to accept. Hardy never seriously challenges this view in the novel.

This aspect of Jude the Obscure tells us something important about the theory of knowledge expressed in the book. Mizener's perception that the course of Jude's education is set from the beginning is fully supported by the novel. Jude follows a set progression, one that Sue has already gone through. When Sue watches him gaze at the devotional pictures in a gallery,

> It was evident that her cousin deeply interested her, as one might be interested in a man puzzling out his way along a labyrinth from which one had one's self escaped. (p. 144)

When Sue mocks Jude's continuing reverence for the church, she says.

> "You are in the Tractarian stage just now, are you not? . . . Let me see - when was I there? - In the year eighteen hundred and - " (p. 158)

This is not merely Sue's opinion, however. It is shared by Hardy himself and is stated by direct comment in the novel. He says of Jude when he first arrives in Christminster,

> He did not at that time see that medievalism was as dead as a fern-leaf in a lump of coal . . . . The deadly animosity of contemporary logic and vision towards so much of what he held in reverence was not yet revealed to him. (p. 91)

In fact, the entire progression Jude is to follow is stated in the chapter which describes his first night in Christminster and his encountering spectres of the university's history in the empty streets of the town. Foremost among these are "the founders of the religious school called Tractarian" and various prelates, who all seem to start in alarm at the sight of Locke and Gibbon. Hardy tells us plainly that some of these sons

of the university, "by the accidents of his (Jude's) reading, loomed out in his fancy disproportionately large by comparison with the rest" (p. 86). By the close of the novel, Jude will have abandoned his intense interest in the Tractarians for Sue's interest in the sceptics. Newman, Pusey, Ward and Keble might loom large in Christminster's history but not, Sue tells him, in the history of the world (p. 110).

So, Jude begins by aiming towards learning and religion. Then he abandons his academic plans, thinking they were based too much on personal ambition and seeing through to the narrower aspects of Christminster life. He decides to serve the church. Finally, because of his love for Sue, Jude comes to protest, "I'll never care about my doctrines or my religion any more!" (p. 224). Jude loses all hope of entering the university or of taking orders, but his dream of being a part of Christminster academic life continues right up to the time of his death. He is never quite as thoroughly disillusioned with the university as he is with the church, but the main problem is that the process of disillusionment he undergoes is fixed from the beginning. Hardy does not render a process of true individual, unique exploration and discovery but gives us instead a more routine procedure of acquiring certain pre-existent facts, ideas or insights, moving from one standard stage to the next. The only concept of mature, enlightened intelligence allowed the novel is given in Sue's attitudes before her reversion to superstition under stress; Jude supposedly becomes maturely intelligent and enlightened when he has passed through identical phases of opinion or knowledge to Sue's. And both of these progressions of disillusionment are similar to Hardy's own.

Jude's final critical attitude towards both university and church also, it must have been noted, corresponds to Angel's modern ideas in Tess.

As in Tess, in Jude Hardy never seriously questions these ideas but he does show another part of his character's education which strikes the reader as individual, immediate and genuine. Angel is forced to do some difficult thinking and changing because of his relation to Tess; similarly, Jude has a great deal of growing and learning from experience to do because of his relationships to Arabella and to Sue.

Lawrence's perception of the mechanical nature of Jude's progression from belief to scepticism in the novel and of the true learning involved in Jude's marriage to Arabella and his life with Sue leads him to value these two sides of Jude's life differently from Hardy. Hardy sees Jude's failure to enter Christminster or to take orders as a "tragedy of unfulfilled aims" which is only one example of "the fret and fever, derision and disaster, that may press in the wake of the strongest passion known to humanity" (p. v, the Preface to Jude). Jude's sexual ties with Arabella and Sue are seen to be somehow the cause of his failure. But is sex "the strongest passion known to humanity", always leaving the destruction of finer aims, such as Jude's desire for knowledge, in its wake? Lawrence stated his "no" to this question most clearly in 1921 when he wrote Fantasia of the Unconscious.

> . . . the essentially religious or creative motive is the first motive for all human activity. The sexual motive comes second. 133

However, this belief is already present throughout the "Study"; it is the full flowering of the poppy, of each man's true individual self, which is "the strongest passion known to humanity", not sex. Some form of union between the male and female sides of life is always a part of this flowering, but this does not necessarily involve physical union between one man and one

woman. Certainly sometimes - as usually happens in Hardy's novels - this final achievement of one's true self may come primarily through love and through one's sexual relationships; but sex is not the same thing as or more powerful than the religious passion in man to create life in a new way through his unique, individual being. Rather than agreeing with Hardy's belief that sexual passion may destroy the individual creative act, Lawrence sees that a failure to be one's true self, to flower into being, can sometimes destroy any possibility of true sex experience.

> It needs a delicate, pure soul to distinguish between the souls of others; it needs a thing which is purely itself to see other things in their purity or their impurity. (p. 433, "Study")

Perhaps one of the reasons Lawrence is so interested in Jude the Obscure is that Jude is one of the few Hardy characters (if not the only one) who has an individual creative desire - figured however poorly in his desire for Christminster - which Hardy takes as seriously and creates almost as fully as Jude's desire to find a woman to love. Jude does not succeed in escaping the responsibility of being a whole human being. He has too much of both male and female within him; he wants to share in the world's knowledge and work and he wants to mate with a woman and father children. Both drives are strong and equal in him. Yet Hardy insists that the second is invariably stronger and invariably destructive; the first is higher and purer but weaker. Lawrence's suggestion is that Jude's aim of entering the church or Christminster fails not because of Jude's sexual passions, but because Jude's aim for academia is not a true or appropriate one to his own nature and abilities. Lawrence sees Jude's deepest passion as one to flower as a whole being. On the surface, his desire manifests itself as the wish to

have his marriage with a woman be at once spiritual, mental and physical, but Arabella is incapable of the first, Sue of the second. Profoundly, Jude wishes to balance or unite within himself both male and female, flesh and spirit, rather than be the site of what Hardy calls "a deadly war" waged between them (p. v).

This is why Lawrence finds Jude's ambition to be an Oxford don an arbitrary, inappropriate one.

> What had he, a passionate, emotional nature, to do with learning for learning's sake, with mere academics? (p. 494)

Lawrence carefully distinguishes between this unreal desire and Jude's strongest passion, that of achieving his fullest self. In criticising Jude's taking on of an inappropriate extraneous aspiration (Phillotson's aspiration, in short) and in criticising the attitude towards knowledge as an acquisition of past thoughts, of learning as a mechanical process of plodding along a fixed course, which is held by the novel as a whole, Lawrence is primarily trying to eliminate what is weak or false in Hardy's study of Jude's education in order to see more clearly what is strong and true.

What is it, then, in Jude the Obscure which Lawrence finds compelling and worthy of careful attention? First, he tries to discern what the real meaning is behind Jude's obsession to enter Christminster. The particular form Jude's ambition takes may seem false or impossible to the reader, but the great force behind it is perhaps evidence of some strong and important feeling and desire.

> What he contained in himself, of male and female impulse, he wanted to bring forth, to draw into his mind, to resolve into understanding, as a plant resolves that which it contains into flower . . . . His whole life had been till now an indrawing, ingestion . . . . and he could not perform his male

> function of transmitting this into expression, or action. The particular form his flowering should take, he could not find. So he hunted and studied, to find the call, the appeal which should call out of him that which was in him.
>
> And great was his transport when the appeal came from Sue . . . . She did for him quickly what he would have done for himself slowly, through study. By patient, diligent study, he would have used up the surplus of that turgid energy in him, and would, by long contact with old truth, have arrived at the form of truth which was in him. What he indeed wanted to get from study was, not a store of learning, nor the vanity of education, a sort of superiority of educational wealth, though this also gave him pleasure. He wanted, through familiarity with the true thinkers and poets, particularly with the classic and theological thinkers, because of their comparative sensuousness, to find conscious expression for that which he held in his blood . . . . Slowly, laboriously, struggling with the Greek and the Latin, he would have burned down his thick blood as fuel, and have come to the true light of himself. (pp. 498-500, "Study")

Jude as a boy feels that true knowledge is something which will claim and illumine his whole being; he feels a desire which can only be called in Polanyi's terms, an "intellectual passion". Anticipating Latin and Greek grammar books from Physician Vilbert,

> through the intervening fortnight he ran about and smiled outwardly at his inward thoughts, as if they were people meeting and nodding to him - smiled with that singularly beautiful irradiation which is seen to spread on young faces at the inception of some glorious idea. (Jude, p. 33)

It is this same force of "intellectual passion" which Jude finds at first so compelling in Sue.

> . . . Jude was surprised to find what a revelation of women his cousin was to him. She was so vibrant that everything she did seemed to have its source in feeling. An exciting thought would make her walk ahead so fast that he could hardly keep up with her . . . . (Jude, p. 110)

It is this vital unity of mind and body which Jude desires and which he thinks Sue possesses. A thought is not a mere additional coin in a mound of scholarly treasure; it is something which makes one walk more quickly, which brings colour to one's cheeks and animation to one's voice. It is light uncovered, glowing discovery, not routine memorisation or acquisition.

However, Jude begins to perceive that Sue is a being of extreme disunity rather than the rare compound of thought and feeling he had imagined her to be. Her advanced ideas frequently do not find expression in her hesitant, conventional behaviour; she tells him in one case, "Assume that I haven't the courage of my opinions" (p. 250). In another situation, she is described as thinking that "things which were right in theory were wrong in practice" (p. 227). After the death of their children, Sue's feelings rule entirely and eclipse all intelligent thought until finally and necessarily even all individual feeling is destroyed. Sue says that she has got over herself; she has abandoned the responsibility of personal existence. Hardy's condemnation falls more strongly on Sue than it does on any other character in Wessex; she has given up the struggle for personal knowledge and turned to orthodoxy, has accepted a general doctrine which overlooks particular instances. She refuses to learn from experience.

Jude, still fighting for understanding, for knowledge and for wholeness, cannot comprehend Sue's action; for in spite of all his wrong-headed ideas about Christminster, education and his own task in life, he has managed to grow and learn in more important ways than those offered by ordained lines of study or by Greek and Latin grammars. In first facing the conflict between time spent on his studies and time spent with Arabella - a conflict which leads him at one point to think "he was just living for the

first time: not wasting life. It was better to love a woman than to be a graduate, or a parson; ay, or a pope!" (p. 54); in first admitting that the judgment of the rejection letter from the Master of Biblioll College was accurate and that possibly "there was more to be learnt outside a book than in" (pp. 125, 128-129);in acknowledging that an impossible contradiction was involved in holding the moral and religious views he did and yet persisting in his love for a married woman (pp. 224-226) - in thinking through all of these situations and conflicts, Jude shows capable logic, integrity, and an honest and growing intelligence. He is able to set one thing against another in his mind and see that he must choose between them - Arabella or books, Christminster or stonemasonry, Sue or Christianity; but he is noticeably unable to discover any new possible meaningful relation between them. He thinks his decisions must be either/or, that the elements in the question are rigidly fixed in intolerable and ultimate opposition; yet he never does make either/or decisions between them, except perhaps in his choice between Sue and Christianity, a conflict which Hardy's own animosity towards religion weights unevenly. Jude strives continuously to live with these opposing elements, to find some whole which will meaningfully relate the particulars of his experience - mind/body, books/Arabella, faith in the unknown/Sue's scepticism and knowledge.

Jude never resolves these conflicts with any full mental clarity in the novel, although he holds some conscious opinions about them. He thinks that mind should be superior to the flesh, that his books are or should be more important than Arabella, that religion must be abandoned because of the light of reason and because of his illegal love for Sue. Yet he is never able to live fully by these opinions, and that fact puzzles and dissatisfies him. However, the opposition which is most painful to him

throughout the novel and which he seems least able to resolve is that between the knowledge of Christminster and the truth of his own being, the knowledge he discovers and creates on his own.

Jude may have many false concepts of what education is and of what actually goes on in Christminster. But Sue, in one conversation with Arabella, expresses Jude's deepest ideal about the intellectual life.

> "Of course, Christminster is a sort of fixed vision with him, which I suppose he'll never be cured of believing in. He still thinks it a great centre of high and fearless thought, instead of what it is, a nest of commonplace schoolmasters whose characteristic is timid obsequiousness to tradition." (p. 323)

"High and fearless thought". Jude certainly had enough elements within himself of "timid obsequiousness to tradition", especially in many of his notions about how one went about "accumulating ideas and imparting them to others" (a notion he still clings to at the close of the novel, p. 413). However, his strength was not to cry sour grapes when he was rejected by Christminster but to still appreciate its value as a centre of true thought and discovery, in spite of its many narrownesses and limitations. The book as a whole pokes gentle fun at Jude's continuing belief in Christminster, but it permits it, perhaps because any judgment of the university as a complete fraud would make Jude's exclusion from it no tragedy at all.

While Jude still believes in Christminster as a place of "high and fearless thought", he also fights to believe in the worth of his own thought, his own discoveries, in his life outside the university. After reading the letter from the Master of Biblioll College, Jude walks to Four-ways and tries to think through the implications of the Master's letter.

> He began to see that the town life was a book of humanity infinitely more palpitating, varied, and compendious than the gown life. These struggling men and women before him were the reality of

> Christminster, though they knew little of Christ or Minster. That was one of the humours of things. The floating population of students and teachers, who did know both in a way, were not Christminster in a local sense at all. (p. 126)

Yet immediately after presenting this thought to us, Hardy challenges it and prevents our accepting it in any sentimental, unthinking way. He takes us with Jude to a public hall where "shop youths and girls, soldiers, apprentices, boys of eleven smoking cigarettes, and light women of the more respectable and amateur class" are attending a promenade concert. Hardy cynically adds, "He had tapped the real Christminster life" (p. 126). Town life, Jude discovers, is as small an affair, if not smaller, than that of the gown.

His attempt to believe in the worth of his life and his work and his knowledge apart from Christminster's acceptance and approval continues throughout the novel. Shortly after his arrival at Christminster, he wonders over the meaning of his work as a stone mason.

> For a moment there fell on Jude a true illumination; that here in the stone yard was a centre of effort as worthy as that dignified by the name of scholarly study within the noblest of the colleges. But he lost it under stress of his old idea. (p. 91)

When he leads Sue and his children back to Christminster on Remembrance Day in the last part of the book, Jude is still trying to somehow get approval, a statement of his worth, on Christminster's terms. He discourses to the people in the crowd, criticises the university, yet tries to impress his learning on his listeners by acting knowledgeable in precisely the way an insecure don of the university would (pp. 336-338).

Always Jude loses this belief in his own worth and in his own individual discoveries "under the stress of his old idea". Yet in his isolation from the university and in the integrity of his essential growth,

he does produce his own personal knowledge even if in a somewhat restricted and not fully conscious form. The central vital tension in Jude the Obscure is that between this tentative personal knowledge of Jude's and the knowledge represented by Christminster - tradition, established fields of study, accepted thought. Both are valued, both are challenged. Christminster can exclude, can be rigid, stagnant, as well as fearless and difficult, "a castle, manned by scholarship and religion" (p. 31). Jude's kind of insight can be vague, sentimental, undisciplined, cut off from tradition or from contemporary thought, as well as courageous, individual, irreplaceable, responsible discovery.

But Jude's belief in his own ability - in anyone's ability - to make true discovery is uncertain. Are not all ideas already written or spoken? Is not education merely acquiring or memorising them? Is there any unknown which we can really face, enter into, explore and return from with findings to share with others? Or does all knowledge lie, established and available to the elect, within Christminster's sanctioned walls? Jude is never quite sure, but in one moment of despair he scrawls by the Biblioll College the answer he wants to believe with all his heart.

> I have understanding as well as you; I am not inferior to you: yea, who knoweth not such things as these?
>
> (Job 12: 3; Jude, p. 127)

It is Lawrence's criticism of Jude the Obscure in his "Study of Thomas Hardy" which has made this one of the most moving sentences, one of the most impressive actions in all of Hardy's work to me. He has shown how sensitively Hardy has given expression in Jude to a crucial problem for the artist in the late nineteenth century, a problem which Allen Tate in his Reactionary Essays on Poetry and Ideas described in the following way.

> There is the assumption that Truth is indifferent or hostile to the desires of men; that these desires were formerly nurtured on legend, myth, all kinds of insufficient experiment; that, Truth being known at last in the form of experimental science, it is intellectually impossible to maintain illusion any longer, at the same time that it is morally impossible to assimilate Truth. 134

The artist's work belongs to the category of illusion, of legend and myth, not to the Truth of experimental science. The Truth is fixed and established by "objective" means, by specially qualified individuals who have undergone severe training and maintain rigorous detachment. Personal judgment, feeling, belief are irrelevant to the task of discovering truth.

Can we not see figured by Jude's bold writing of the words of Job on the college wall, Hardy himself, trying to affirm an artist's belief in his work as a statement of objective truth, bearing importantly on the nature of reality? - Hardy not knowing whether to trust his imaginative work, his own study of life, of people, nature and experience, his own perceptions, or to trust the truth of scientific experiment and sceptical reason? Should he look to life in its specific manifestations or to a general idea about the nature of human existence, a pessimism growing out of his awareness that it was increasingly "morally impossible to assimilate Truth"? Although Hardy's pessimistic "philosophy" is obtrusive in his work, his work itself, the very writing of it, denies his apparent disbelief in the ultimate value of human creativity or discovery. He chose, along with the finally educated Angel Clare, the particular over the general, the varied life of Wessex over a metaphysic which would deny it meaning; he clung to his own knowledge over against the current ideas about religion, about the way people think and learn, about scientific detachment and "objectivity".

Lawrence aptly pointed out the difference between Job's admitting

of the unknown, of the wonder of creation, his acceptance and worship, and Jude's despair over the known - the known imperfection of the world, the known lack of justice which bars him from Christminster while the less worthy enter, the known limitations of his own intelligence and belief. Jude curses God's creation and his own birth in the flesh. However, Lawrence suggests Hardy's prose in the Wessex novels itself accepts and worships, attending to all the details of human life, from shearing sheep to kissing a woman, and to the details of the world of nature, from the approach and attack of a storm to the soft sound of insects and of wind in grass on the heath.

Lawrence's special gift as a critic is the fresh, constructive, receptive atmosphere he creates when studying an author in whom he is deeply interested. This atmosphere is the result of one central tenet, that a writer's peculiar limitations are also his peculiar opportunities. Thus, Lawrence's attempt to define limitations becomes not bad-tempered fault-finding or dismissal but simultaneously, inseparably, a way of defining an artist's special gifts. Hardy's metaphysic, a limitation, the mark of his struggle with the ideas of the time, is also the occasion for a sensitive statement on the final consequences to man of an "objective" Truth which disowns him, of an experimental science which disavows any of the limitations of bodily individuals in its results, of a rigid empiricism which makes learning mechanical, discovery impossible, human responsibility irrelevant and religious belief an enemy of truth. This is man going "so far in his male conceit as to supersede the Creator, and win death as a reward" ("Study", p. 488).

Hardy's consciously stated pessimism denies the possibility of any true discovery or human creativity. But Lawrence insists on the

profound trust in the human capacity for discovery and creativity of a man who could write Tess and Jude. "His sensuous understanding is, however, apart from his metaphysic, very great and deep, deeper than that, perhaps, of any other English novelist" (p. 480). This man could also write a short poem, "To Meet or Otherwise" which includes the following lines.

> By briefest meeting something sure is won;
> It will have been:
> Nor God nor Demon can undo the done,
> Unsight the seen,
> Make muted music be as unbegun . . .
> 135

In spite of a conscious lack of belief or uncertainty of belief in his powers to face the unknown and make discovery, Thomas Hardy maintained an artist's faithfulness to the as yet unseen, the unbegun, the unknown. He created novel after novel, poem after poem, in a direct denial of disbelief; they cannot be unwritten. He refused the escape into a world of private mythology or aestheticism which would mean turning his back on the threat of science and contemporary thought. He submitted to the discipline of reality which included both the life of Wessex he knew and the dominant scepticism, materialism and positivism of the time, and he struggled to see what possible true relation there might be between them. In his work he embodied observations, thoughts, feelings, complex discoveries which, in spite of their many inadequacies, uncertainties and imperfections, cannot now be disembodied. He fought for his own personal knowledge in an age whose ideas taught him he had no right to it, and he fought bravely. It is to this struggle that Lawrence pays tribute in the "Study of Thomas Hardy".

Footnotes - Chapter VI

[1] The farce, also known as the story of Maître Pierre, is of unknown authorship, written in the 15th century.

[2] Phoenix, p. 539.

[3] L.M., p. 399; letter to J. B. Pinker, 16th December 1915.

[4] Taken from the Book of Common Prayer.

[5] L.M., p. 67.

[6] Tess, p. 318.

[7] Return, pp. 161-2.

[8] Tess, p. 427.

[9] The Later Years, p. 42.

[10] Arthur Mizener, "Jude the Obscure as a Tragedy", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, 198.

[11] There are many other elements in the "Study" which may have their roots in Hardy's art. The tone of Ecclesiastes, of "all is vanity", which Lawrence deals with in Chapter I, is present throughout Jude (see pp. 94, 135, 338) either by direct quotation or by association, as when Jude reflects that "the sensual hind who ate, drank, and lived carelessly with his wife through the days of his vanity was a more likable being than he" (p. 135). Lawrence's use of the doctrine of the Trinity echoes Jude's enchantment with the Greek words of I Corinthians 8:6 (Jude, p. 103) and his recital of the doctrine from the Nicene Creed (referring to the Holy Ghost who proceeds from the Father and the Son) in a pub when he is drunk (p. 130). Lawrence's historical discussion has many parallels in Jude where Sue, in her "paganism" and "classicism" is constantly criticising the medievalism of Jude and Christminster and the inferiority of Gothic architecture (see pp. 157, 141, 143, 317, 200). Sue also criticises Jerusalem, claiming that there was nothing first-rate about the Jews or their central city (p. 114). Her criticism here corresponds to her pleasure in thinking she and Jude had forgotten what twenty-five centuries had taught the race since the time of the Greeks. Lawrence in the "Study" attempts to deal with that history more thoroughly than Hardy did in Jude.

The art criticism is appropriate in a study of a man who frequently referred to paintings and architecture in his novels. Jude is obviously interested in different forms of architecture because of his trade; he is also, while still interested in taking orders, deeply affected by devotional pictures of Virgins, Holy Families and Saints (pp. 143-144). Clym is described in terms of a Rembrandt portrait. Hardy's references to the visual arts in his novels strike the reader much more forcefully and with greater significance after a reading of the "Study".

Lawrence's comments on Shelley as such a male poet strengthen the impact of Sue's desire for Jude to think of her in terms of Shelley's "Epipsychidion" (pp. 255-256). Lawrence's thoughts on what the word "aristocrat" can mean add a further dimension to Tess's relation to her ancestors and to her insistence that she is not a peasant by nature (Tess, p. 301). Hardy describes her as "instinctively refined" (p. 237); Lawrence tries to think through the full nature of this refinement and her aristocratic nature as she is portrayed in the novel.

Many other parallels can be found of a similar nature. What they signify is that Lawrence has entered fully into Hardy's world, made its language, its vision, voices, feelings and atmosphere his own in the process of trying to understand and criticise it. The extent of his engagement with the Wessex novels is extraordinary, and he judges them fairly on their own terms, not with arbitrary standards or rules of construction of his own making which do not fit them.

12 See P.K., pp. 147-148.

13 Donald Davidson, "The Traditional Basis of Thomas Hardy's Fiction", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, pp. 162-178.

14 Allen Tate, "Hardy's Philosophic Metaphors", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, pp. 99-108 and Raymond Williams, The English Novel: From Dickens to Lawrence (London, 1970), pp. 95-118.

15 Raymond Williams, pp. 14-16. Williams also talks in terms of personal/social, private/public, individual/community in relation to Hardy (p. 97) as Lawrence does in Chapters III and V of the "Study", but like Lawrence he refuses to attribute any ultimate reality to these conflicts. "As in all major realist fiction the quality and destiny of persons and the quality and destiny of a whole way of life are seen in the same dimension and not as separable issues" (p. 103). In his discussion of Sons and Lovers Williams comments that the relationship between mother and son cannot be abstracted or separated from the wider life of the community to which it is so closely linked. The relationship is "lived through as a whole and continuing experience, in which what can easily be separated as personal and social are in fact, in a life, known as a single complicated process . . . . Lawrence writes of this with a closeness and a continuity that are still

unsurpassed" (pp. 174-175). Williams thus sees man as inextricably involved in human community, a community which was once small, insular, familiar ("knowable") but which is now increasingly huge, expanding, strange and overwhelming ("unknowable") in which the individual is a more distinct, isolated and lonely part. This is very similar to Lawrence's distinction between the community under Law and the present community in the age of Love. Man is part of community no matter what, but the nature of his relation to the community can change, can become less unconscious and accepted.

16 Mizener, pp. 201-206.

17 Ibid., pp. 202-206.

18 Although Frank Kermode in his book on Lawrence tries to analyse it in this simplistic way.

19 R. P. Blackmur, "The Shorter Poems of Thomas Hardy", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, p. 48.

20 Ibid., pp. 22-23, 28-29.

21 Tate, pp. 99-108.

22 Morton Dauwen Zabel, "Hardy in Defense of his Art: the Aesthetic of Incongruity", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, pp. 125-149.

23 Arnold Kettle, An Introduction to the English Novel II (London, 1953) 1962 printing, pp. 60-61. Also see Katherine Anne Porter, "Notes on a Criticism of Thomas Hardy", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, pp. 150-161; she writes, "Hardy was interested most in that hairline dividing the rational from the instinctive, the opposition, we might call it, between nature and second nature; that is, between instinct and the habits of thought fixed upon the individual by his education and his environment", p. 159.

24 H. J. Muller, "The Novels of Hardy Today", The Southern Review (Summer 1940), VI, p. 222.

25 David Cecil is, I think, trying to express this same duality in his book Hardy the Novelist: An Essay in Criticism (London, 1943), 1969 printing, when he speaks of the odd mixture of realism and poetry in Hardy's art. These terms miss the mark, however. When he says that "this duality is the central, most important fact about Hardy's work considered in its purely aesthetic aspect . . . . He aimed consciously, so his wife tells us, at keeping his narratives at once as close to natural life and as close to

poetry as conditions would allow" (p. 45), it is like saying nothing. Cecil says this mix is oddest in The Dynasts where real history joins with allegory. But isn't this true of any novel or poem or play, isn't it almost a definition of what all literary art must be? If an author writes about a love affair, to move us, to convince and engage us, mustn't it seem like a real happening, something that could take place in life and something so specific, unique and interesting that it seems unrepeatable, like a moment in history? Yet, if it is only a description of a real love affair, if the artist hasn't shaped it in some way to his own purposes, if he has not presented it so that we sense what is truly significant in it, that which gives it lasting value and tells us something essential about all love affairs, it is only a transcription of everyday reality and not art at all. Isn't this delicate balance of naturalism with symbolism a part of all art? Mustn't a character in a novel convince us both of his everyday reality and of his deeper, universal reality in order to move us? Aren't Rembrandt's portraits statements both about particular men and about all men? Isn't this why we call them art when we don't call either a mere photographic portrait or a stick-figure symbol of a human being, art?

So what has David Cecil said when he tells us Hardy's work consists in a duality between history and allegory, between "hard truth" and "wild Gothic poetry"? (p. 56) - everything and nothing. He has said nothing about what makes Hardy unique or irreplaceable but only what is true of every artist. He might have suggested a special emphasis in Hardy. For instance, Theodore Dreiser's Sister Carrie is more naturalistic than symbolic or poetic (even though Sister Carrie does say something compelling about man's continuing struggle to survive, to attain some kind of physical security, especially in modern society, and about the painful compromises this struggle can involve). T. S. Eliot's Wasteland is more symbolic and poetic than it is historical or naturalistic (although it does express certain real feelings, conditions, ideas of a particular time in history). Or he could have remarked on any remarkably perfect unity of the two, as in Shakespeare. He does none of these, but only says that Hardy's art consists of a duality between realism and poetry and he even calls this Hardy's individual quality.

Perhaps what he is trying to express can be seen by the other ways in which he refers to this duality - as a delicate balance between fact and imagination, as the need for integration between reality and personal vision (p. 119, 117). Later he says of Hardy, "Though his intellect accepted rationalism and materialism his imagination never did" (p. 152). These distinctions are confusing, as if we are to accept that imagination is never needed in attempts to discover and establish fact, that personal vision never succeeds in revealing further aspects of reality, that intellect and imagination are opposed, rather than the latter simply a finer and more complete form of the former. Does he mean that there was a conflict between what Hardy thought was established fact and the fact discovered through his own imagination, between what the age claimed was reality and what his personal vision revealed of reality in his art? Cecil speaks of "the scientific and rationalist view of the universe which Hardy found himself

reluctantly forced to accept"; and he found Hardy's pessimism which resulted from this world-view compelling only because it was coupled with a real zest for life (pp. 149, 150), a deep sensitivity to the beauties of nature and the dignity of man, a thorough enjoyment of small daily pleasures and therefore a keen eye for country custom, for the details of a man's work or of a woman's dress and appearance, for the vagaries of weather and the lay of land and sky. Cecil seems to be saying that the richness, the vivid life of Hardy's art contradict what people call his pessimism or his philosophy, that there is a discrepancy between what he apparently thought he thought and what his works of imagination expressed.

Mizener also seems to confuse his discussion of the duality in Hardy in a way similar to Cecil's at times and confuses his article because of it, although his examination of the problem is more specific and interesting than Cecil's. He opens his essay by stating that "the courage of Hardy's profoundest conviction failed him . . . under the pressure of the reasoning of his age" (p. 193). He talks of how Hardy had a set idea in writing Jude, of trying to show a tragedy "of the WORTHY encompassed by the INEVITABLE" (from The Later Years, see pp. 41 and 14), and thus limited the force of the novel in trying to express a preconceived notion. This all seems accurate, but somehow this problem evolves into that of Hardy's attempt to write a naturalistic novel while yet using symbolic devices, such as coincidence, contrasts or symbolic incidents, which seem out of place. Mizener explains this situation by saying that "Hardy never really faced the possibility that a great work of art aims at a kind of truth superior (but not necessarily contradictory) to a scientific and historical verisimilitude. For Hardy, therefore, the true narrative was one which conformed to a historical conception of the truth" (p. 199).

First of all, this statement is a remarkable one to make about a man who argued "that fiction must share with poetry the task of relieving the oppression of life's fact and commonplace" and who opposed the naturalists because he saw them making "an unbearable oppression of the actual". Long after he had stopped writing novels, "he felt a weight on his conscience that he had led the novel too much toward positive realism, and had by that means aided in stultifying the suggestive and poetic force of modern novel-writing" (see Zabel, pp. 131-133). Second, this conflict between naturalism and symbolism does not grow out of the first conflict Mizener describes, that of Hardy's deepest conviction as an artist committed to the particulars of art and his uneasy acceptance of the ideas of the age. As an artist, Hardy is involved both in naturalism and symbolism; a close and thoughtful attention to the particular reveals the essential, the universal. In poetry, body and spirit, Law and Love (to use the terms of the "Study") are reconciled. The inappropriateness of using the naturalism/symbolism polarity to describe the art/ideas of the age conflict can be understood by realising that "art" and the "ideas of the age" can be logically placed on either side of the polarity. Naturalism, seen as a commitment to the particulars of life, can be equated with the concrete detail, the sensuousness, embodied-ness of art while the abstracting tendency of symbolism can be related to the generalisations, the abstract ideas Hardy tried to express. Conversely, naturalism seen as a

belief in science, rational truth, could be equated with the ideas of the age while symbolism could be understood as signifying the more complex, "superior" truth of art.

The problem is that Mizener did not think through his terms carefully enough before using them or in the process of using them. The "Study" and Mizener's article on Jude can usefully be compared to show up the clarity, the thorough intellectual consistency, of the former.

It should be noted that Mizener's criticism of Hardy's use of symbolic devices rests on his belief that they are out of place because Jude is not a symbolic novel, that it does not build to a central tension or symbolic expression of truth but to a historical one. As we have seen, Lawrence does feel that Jude has a vital tension at its centre and would thus disagree with Mizener on that basis. However, even if Mizener were right and Hardy had rendered no true conflict in Jude the Obscure, it seems to me impossible to speak of either a completely naturalistic novel or a completely symbolic one. Once you designate a work as a novel, it seems you may only talk in terms of degree or emphasis since a novel necessarily involves both realism and symbolism. Mizener's censure of Jude for not being either more completely naturalistic or more completely symbolic seems unreasonable and irrelevant; if he is criticising Hardy's"symbolic devices" in Jude for not being convincing enough, for being too obvious, his criticism is well-taken, but he has not expressed himself clearly enough.

26 R. G. Cox, Thomas Hardy: The Critical Heritage (New York, 1970), p. xlvi.

27 Ibid., pp. xlv-xlvi.

28 L.M., p. 204.

29 We cannot be certain that Lawrence had read Abercrombie's book before July 1914 when he asked Edward Marsh if he could borrow his copy; however, from the way he phrases his request, we could assume that he was already familiar with the work. He did not meet Abercrombie until late November or early December 1913, so the April 1913 letter could not have been quoting Abercrombie in conversation. In a letter to Edward Marsh in October 1913, Lawrence expresses an interest in meeting Abercrombie, so perhaps he had read Thomas Hardy: A Critical Study by that time, maybe even Marsh's copy, therefore knowing that Marsh had one when Lawrence later needed to borrow it.

30 Abercrombie, p. 19.

31 Ibid., pp. 35, 21, 18.

32 Ibid., pp. 36, 39.

33 Ibid., pp. 168, 169.

34 Ibid., p. 210.

35 Ibid., pp. 223, 207.

36 Ibid., p. 199.

37 Ibid., pp. 216-218.

38 Ibid., pp. 129-135, 135, 154.

39 Ibid., p. 160.

40 Ibid., p. 136.

41 Blackmur, p. 48.

42 Tess, p. 310.

43 Hardy himself was aware of the powers of art-speech which went beyond the author's own explicit ideas and conclusions. In the Postscript to Jude he wrote, "no doubt there can be more in a book than the author consciously puts there, which will help either to its profit or to its disadvantage as the case may be", p. ix.

44 Mayor, p. 382.

45 Ibid., p. 90.

46 Tess, pp. 95, 316. In Tess, Hardy also speaks of "the plight of being alive", p. 107. And after Tess accepts Angel's proposal, she cries and says (again), "I sometimes wish I never had been born". (p. 248)

47 Return, pp. 197, 449.

48 Jude, p. 344.

49 Ibid., p. 406, 418. This passage from Job is also quoted in relation to Father Time, p. 284. When debating whether to get married or not, Jude and Sue think "that they ought never to have been born", let alone contemplated matrimony (p. 295).

50 Tess, p. 283.

51 Jude, p. 273.

52 For instance, he says, "Arabella was never so jealous of Sue as Sue of Arabella" (p. 504). This is substantiated fully by the novel. Sue is terribly upset when she discovers that she and Jude are spending their first night together in a hotel which Jude and Arabella stayed in together once. She is beside herself when Arabella calls at their house at Aldbrickham, but the next day Arabella laughs at Sue's uneasiness and tells her, "But I don't want to get him away from you" (Jude, p, 278). Even when Arabella does begin to think of winning Jude back, she goes about it with a gusto and good humour that are quite foreign to Sue's frantic jealousy.

Lawrence speaks of Sue's "fatality" in demanding a man to give vitality to her and not ask any physical return and says "One man had died. She knew it well enough" (p. 498). The reference is to the Christminster undergraduate she lived with for fifteen months before he dies, according to him, of a broken heart caused by Sue's"holding out against him so long at such close quarters" (Jude, p. 155). When Lawrence says that Jude violated Sue's special being when he forced her sexually (see pp. 504, 505, 510) he is thinking through a judgment that Jude makes of himself. He tells Sue, "I seduced you . . . you were a distinct type - a refined creature, intended by Nature to be left intact. But I couldn't leave you alone!" (Jude, pp. 354-355).

53 The Later Years, p. 42.

54 Crowd, pp. 69-70.

55 The Rainbow, p. 145.

56 Phoenix, pp. 192, 190.

57 Bruce Hugman, Hardy: Tess of the D'Urbervilles (London, 1970), p. 39.

58 Phoenix, p. 193. cf. Lawrence's "Apropros of Lady Chatterley's Lover" for another late essay on the importance of marriage, especially pp. 502-503 Phoenix II. " . . . supposing that I see the soul as something which must be developed and fulfilled throughout a life-time, sustained and nourished, developed and further fulfilled, to the very end; what then? Then I realize that marriage, or something like it, is essential . . . .

perhaps the greatest contribution to the social life of man made by Christianity is - Marriage."

59 Phoenix II, pp. 500-501.

60 Ibid., p. 501.

61 Mayor, p. 253.

62 Ibid., p. 380.

63 It should be mentioned that Lawrence is quoted as a source by social historians on the effects of modern industrialism quite as frequently as Hardy is on the breakdown of the rural way of life in 19th century England. One such example is in E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963), revised edition 1970; he straightforwardly refers the reader to Lawrence in a footnote as further evidence of his argument of how the factory transforms the man to fit the machine (the passage he cites is in Chapter XII of The Rainbow, "They believe that they must alter themselves to fit the pits and the place, rather than alter the pits and the place to fit themselves. It is easier", p. 347.) Thompson also points to Lawrence's essay, "Nottingham and the Mining Country" in Phoenix to reinforce comments on the serious human effects of factory labour on the English working classes (see p. 488 of Thompson).

For discussions of Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow in terms of the depth and breadth of the social reality embodied in them see Raymond Williams, The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence (London, 1970), Chapter VIII and Arnold Kettle, Introduction to the English Novel, II (London, 1953), 1962 printing, pp. 111-134.

64 Mayor, p. vi.

65 Various critics might claim that in not attending to Hardy's fiction as social novels, Lawrence is denying what is best in Hardy's work, his very subject. Arnold Kettle seems to hold this view in his chapter on Tess of the D'Urbervilles in his Introduction to the English Novel, II. He feels there are too many flaws in Tess if we study it as a serious psychological novel about individuals and their relationships, a story of personal tragedy. The special strengths of Tess and Hardy's strengths as an artist become apparent only if we see Tess as a social novel, a study of changes in England in the 19th century, a record of social and economic pressures, old structures breaking down and new ones growing. If read as a personal tragedy, the insistence on unlucky chances and coincidences (Kettle thinks that the characters are either unluckier than common or they have "less than normal human resilience in the situation in which they find themselves"; Tess is

" a good deal less shrewd and worldly-wise than a peasant girl of her age might naturally be assumed to be", p. 54), the portrayal of Alec as the stock villain of Victorian melodrama, the inadequate treatment of Christianity and the oppressive "philosophy" or pessimism are all major criticisms which can be levelled at the book (see Kettle, pp. 53-58). However, Kettle says these flaws become largely unimportant or irrelevant if we see Tess as a social novel and accept that it is not like Emma or Middlemarch - "It does not illuminate within a detailed framework particular problems of human conduct and feeling. It's sphere is the more generalized movement of human destiny", p. 53.

I would like to suggest that this distinction might not be very helpful. Certainly the force of the thought about social pressures and changes in a particular time and place depends in a novel on the portrayal of "particular problems" of individuals within a "detailed framework"? There may be obvious weaknesses if Tess is considered a study of character and individual relationships, but my discussion of the marriage issue in Jude, of the attitude towards society in general in Hardy's work and his tendency to abstract it and see it as the omnipotent villain, has, I hope, pointed out some of the serious flaws that must be acknowledged if we study the Wessex novels as social novels.

Lawrence, in looking at the novels as stories of individuals flowering into being, struggling into love and with love, is taking Hardy more seriously as an artist than Kettle is. First, if Hardy's novels are primarily records of social change, couldn't they become simply historical artifacts, read for purposes of research rather than as living art for future ages? Second, doesn't the power of the novel as a social record, as a statement of the complex problem of man-in-society in a certain time and place depend on the specific embodiment of the social problems in the story of particular people, relationships and events? Nothing very convincing can be said about a "generalized movement of human destiny" without close attention paid to particular instances. Hardy gives us a truer and more unforgettable statement about Victorian attitudes towards sex and chastity through his portrayal of Tess and Angel's relationship and the pain we feel at Angel's behaviour than he could through any more "generalized" method. Although Hardy's novels may not be perfect if seen as studies of "particular problems of human conduct and feeling . . . within a detailed framework", Lawrence does greater justice to Hardy as an artist in taking his novels seriously in that way and in refusing to draw an artificial distinction between a man's relation to other men and a man's relation to "society" as a great abstraction.

66 Lawrence is quoting Job 37: 16-18; 39: 1-4; 42: 3, 5-6. On a literal level, Lawrence is accurate to say that Jude ends where Job began; in the final chapter of Jude the Obscure the passages from Job which Jude speaks are from Chapter III of Job, verses 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 18-20. Lawrence's passages all come from the last six chapters.

67 P.K., pp. 323-324. See also pp. 198-199. See also Chapter I of this thesis.

68 William Wordsworth, "Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads, 1800", William Wordsworth, Selected Poetry, edited with introduction by Mark Van Doren (New York, 1950), p. 677.

69 Tess, pp. 105-106.

70 Ibid., p. 134.

71 Ibid., p. 135.

72 Far from the Madding Crowd, pp. 346-7, Chapter XLIII.

73 Tess, p. 419.

74 Ibid., p. 183.

75 Ibid., p. 118.

76 Ibid., pp. 120-121.

77 Ibid., p. 122.

78 It was St. Augustine who "made the essence of the sacrament to consist in the application of the water with the proper words of invocation by whomsoever this was done". John Henry Blunt, The Book of Church Law, Being an Exposition of the Legal Rights and Duties of the Parochial Clergy and the Laity of the Church of England (London, 1921), p. 42.

79 Ibid., p. 47. In 1603, the Book of Common Prayer Rubric was changed in order to please the Puritans. The Puritans had earlier (1584) asked Archbishop Whitgift to make baptising by women and midwives void (midwives had often baptised the newborn in case of necessity) but the Archbishop refused, saying that such lay baptisms were necessary and good. However, in 1603 the rubric was changed to read "lawful minister" in place

of "one of them" (one of those assembled) as the person qualified to administer baptism. Blunt writes that although this revision was meant to lessen the number of lay baptisms, it did not reverse "the long-established tenet of the church of England, that lay baptisms are in some cases necessary, and not to be repeated", p. 46. The essential things to the efficacy of the sacrament are the water and the words, not the sex, age, or qualifications of the person using them.

80 Ibid., p. 48.

81 Ibid., pp. 178-179.

82 Hardy implies that Tess has been taught since childhood by the church that a child would be damned for its illegitimacy. Tess is made to worry over her baby's "double doom for lack of baptism and lack of legitimacy" (Tess, p. 118), yet there is no such doctrine in the Christian church.

83 Hardy also characteristically makes the sad outcome of the scene hang on impossible coincidence. Even if it were necessary for the Vicar to determine actual necessity, he is remiss as a clergyman not to question Tess more closely about the reasons she did not call him to baptise the baby. That Tess, in telling her story, should not mention the one reason she did not fetch the parson - her father's refusal to let him be called - is also unacceptable. Hardy is unfairly manipulating circumstances to weight his criticism all on one side. That he does this shows that he realises that to make the church look bad in this situation he has to manoeuvre a bit, that if Tess's full necessity were known, Christian burial would be permitted. However, as I have shown, this is not even the real question involved.

84 Tess, p. 149.

85 Ibid., p. 205.

86 Ibid., p. 149.

87 Ibid., Ch. XVIII.

88 Hugman, p. 41.

89 Tess, p. 209.

90 Mizener, p. 200.

91 Tess, p. 214.

92 Ibid., p. 415.

93 "The fact is", said D'Urberville drily, "whatever your dear husband believed you accept, and whatever he rejected you reject, without the least inquiry or reasoning on your own part. That's just like you women. Your mind is enslaved to his." Tess, p. 415. Although Hardy is here suggesting a weakness in Tess, he nowhere challenges the weaknesses of Angel's ideas which she accepts. The weight of the whole novel supports them as Tess does, unquestioningly.

94 Tess, pp. 415-416.

95 Ibid., p. 419.

96 Tess, p. 427.

97 Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions (New York and London, 1958), p. 114.

98 Ibid., p. 115. The quotation within this passage came from Robert Ranulph Marett, Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion (New York, 1932), p. 11.

99 Ibid., p. 114. Taken from John McKenzie, Two Religions (London, 1950), p. 57.

100 Jude, p. 13.

101 Ibid., p. 98.

102 Ibid., p. 25.

103 Ibid., p. 290.

104 Tess, p. xi.

105 Phoenix, p. 559.

106 Mizener, p. 193.

107 Tate, p. 107.

108 Zabel, p. 126.

109 See Frank Chapman's discussion of The Mayor of Casterbridge as Hardy's greatest novel because of the sureness of personal knowledge and felt experience, of familiarity with the town, the business, the people Hardy describes, embodied in it. "Hardy the Novelist", pp. 30-33. However, although Chapman sees Hardy's best work as a result of this kind of specificity rather than of his "philosophy", he does not dismiss the "philosophy" as unnecessary and irrelevant. When it is not present in the background of a novel, he feels that Hardy's work takes on a facetious tone and seems to lack seriousness. Donald Davidson, in his article on "The Traditional Basis of Thomas Hardy's Fiction", is one of the few critics to attach no importance whatever to Hardy's "philosophizing"; he dismisses it as the equivalent of ballad tags like "Better they'd never been born" or "Young man, take warning from me" (this is part of his extended comparison of Hardy's novels to traditional ballads), p. 173.

110 Allen Tate suggests a similarity between Clym Yeobright, Jude Fawley and Hardy himself, but sees this similarity as just a further expression of Hardy's short-sightedness and limitations. Discussing some of the thoughts expressed in Hardy's letters, Tate writes, "I believe that here, again, we get the image of Clym Yeobright, the young man ill-prepared to digest the learning of the great world, the provincial amateur who sees farther than his neighbours but who, if he had seen still farther, might not have accepted, in an act of faith, the Darwinian naturalism of his time." (Tate, p. 103). To Allen Tate, Hardy's portrayals of Clym and Jude were just further evidence of his own problem and of his inability to solve it or move beyond it. The "Study" seems to suggest that this is just the point. Hardy was bound to draw characters like Clym, Angel and Jude whose problems resembled his own if he was ever to understand those problems fully and come to terms with them. Lawrence finds Clym, Angel and Jude (three characters with whome Hardy was very closely engaged) interesting and takes their struggles seriously precisely because they show him what struggles were of major interest to Hardy himself. It is not surprising that Clym, Angel and Jude seem like Hardy or share his intellectual weaknesses, because in drawing them, Hardy was trying to face and get beyond these weaknesses; he was giving expression to the complexity of the problems and limitations he knew best - his own.

111 Abercrombie, pp. 148-149.

112 I am indebted to Bruce Hugman's book on Tess for his perception of the importance of Angel's struggle to the novel as a whole. However, he draws Angel's conflict over Tess's revelation of her experience with Alec more as one between his head and his heart, his mind and his instinct, while I see it primarily as a conflict between a false and rigid ideal of of life and knowledge and a true learning from both tradition and experience, or as Hardy draws it, between the general and the particular. See Hugman, pp. 29-34.

113 Tess, pp. 15-16; Ch. II.

114 Ibid., p. 152; Ch. XVIII.

115 Ibid., p. 154.

116 Ibid., p. 213.

117 Ibid., p. 245.

118 Ibid., p. 297.

119 Ibid., p. 296.

120 Ibid., pp. 298-299, 308, 313.

121 Ibid., p. 299.

122 Ibid., pp. 206-207.

123 Ibid., pp. 340-343.

124 Ibid., p. 324.

125 Ibid., p. 343.

126 Ibid., p. 336.

127 Ibid., pp. 440, 441, 443.

128 William Blake, "The Worship of God" from "Jerusalem", A Choice of Blake's Verse, edited by Kathleen Raine (London, 1970), p. 132. cf. the passage from Blake's "Vision of the Last Judgment" quoted in the third section of Ch. III of this thesis, p. 242.

129 Tess, pp. 514-515.

130 Mizener, p. 195. See pp. 203-208, especially p. 203 and p. 208.

131 Ibid., p. 197.

132 Ibid., p. 198.

133 Fantasia, p. 12.

134 Quoted in Mizener, 195.

135 The Collected Poems of Thomas Hardy (London, 1965), p. 292.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Last Things (Chapter X of the "Study")

Lawrence wants to do justice to the struggle described in Hardy's novels. However, in the final chapter of the "Study", he states a major criticism of Hardy's work. The struggle embodied in Hardy's art does not issue in the statement of a true relation, a discovered whole vision, because Hardy has weighted one side of the conflict unfairly against the other. Hardy gives us only a partial truth. Rather than presenting and accepting the full opposition in Jude between individual discovery and traditional, established knowledge as a potentially fruitful, creative tension as well as a destructive one, Hardy shows individual aspiration as always weak and insufficient against pre-existent attitudes and institutions. Convention in Hardy's novels always wins. The rebel or explorer fails.

In the following passage from Chapter X of the "Study", Lawrence expresses his dissatisfaction with Hardy's work as well as his deep appreciation of it.

> . . . there have been Dostoievsky, Hardy, Flaubert. These have shown Love in conflict with the Law, and only Death the resultant, no Reconcilation. So that humanity does not continue for long to accept the conclusions of these writers, nor even of Euripedes and Shakespeare always. These great tragic writers endure by reason of the truth of the conflict they describe, because of its completeness, Law, Love, and Reconciliation, all active. But with regard to their conclusions, they leave the soul finally unsatisfied, unbelieving . . . .
>
> And so it has always been, always: either a wrong conclusion, or one forced by the artist, as if he put his thumb in the scale to equalize a balance which he could not make level. Now it remains for us to seek the true balance, to give each party, Apollo and the Furies,

> Love and the Law, his due, and so to seek the Reconciler. (pp. 513-514)

Lawrence finds the conflict Hardy describes a true one, but he feels Hardy's conclusions, the final relation stated in his novels, to be false, arbitrarily constructed rather than discovered. It is this quality in Hardy's conclusions - the sense of fabrication rather than revelation - which leaves "the soul finally unsatisfied, unbelieving".

Lawrence challenges Hardy's view of the nature of reality. The reason Hardy's judgment on life does not carry conviction is, Lawrence maintains, simply because it is inaccurate, one-sided. Hardy does not do justice to the possibility in life of human creativity, even though his own novels witness to this possibility. He does not do justice to the role of our past knowledge and society's accepted attitudes as building blocks, clues to further exploration and discovery, as well as dead-weight and obstruction. He does not do justice to the real ways in which we think and learn about reality, even though he convincingly shows us some of these ways in his novels. The fact that these things find expression in his art in spite of his conscious disbelief in their ultimate worth is evidence, Lawrence suggests, of their inescapable presence and importance in our human reality.

Underlying Lawrence's conclusions at the close of the "Study" is an openly admitted religious belief in a greater reality, one which we now see and understand only in part and which involves order, reconciliation, wholeness. Lawrence offers no easy pattern which reconciles the disparities and incongruities of life. He does, however, state his faith that the search for order and meaning is not a futile one because ultimately, he believes, these things do exist. We receive signs and inklings of the presence of

this greater reality in specific situations in life, in moments of finer courage, vision, action, discovery - not enough to constitute proof but enough to draw us on.

There is another implied statement of belief in Lawrence's final chapter, a belief which has been expressed throughout the "Study" by Lawrence's tone of voice, a tone of profound conviction in the worth of what he was saying. Lawrence does not consider the "Study" to be merely a whimsical, idiosyncratic view of life which should just amuse or console its readers. In it he has been trying to think more carefully about the nature of reality, and he believes the central thoughts of the "Study" to be true. He is making an admittedly personal, individual statement, but he is making it responsibly, attending strenuously to that which he would discover and objectively describe. He thus claims a certain universal validity for the personal knowledge stated in the "Study".

These two beliefs expressed in the "Study" - the religious belief in a greater reality and Lawrence's belief in the truth and value of what he was saying - perhaps account for some of the difficulty people have with this work or with others by Lawrence, particularly his non-fiction. In the first section of this final chapter, I show in some detail how Lawrence's religious sense of calling, his sense of order and meaning in reality, and his claim for the essential truth of his work pose some difficulties for Frank Kermode's discussion and assessment of Lawrence's work. Kermode deals with these difficulties by dismissing the religious qualities of Lawrence's writing as apocalyptic or archaic typologising and by categorising Lawrence's truth claims as those of the over-zealous, self-deluding prophet. Kermode's treatment of Lawrence is important because it is representative,

even though in an extreme form, of a common response to Lawrence which has its roots in a common misconception about how knowledge is produced and expressed.

In my summary and conclusions I try to make clear two statements of belief of my own - that Lawrence's ideas on the ways in which we learn and know organise the thought of the "Study" and that the "Study" can be dismissed neither as an instance of escapist reversion to myth or mere subjective rambling, but should be accepted for what it is, an important contribution to the thought and knowledge of our time.

Lawrence and Apocalypse

As he draws towards the close of his "Study", Lawrence finds himself asking "where do we go from here?". Will these thoughts on Hardy, on sex, on art, on religion, on the nature of perception, have any implications for the way we read, think, work, see, live, love, believe? Lawrence offers no simple solutions or precise prescriptions, but he does state what to him are clear and important conclusions of his reflections in the "Study".

> But it needs that a man shall first know in reverence and submit to the Natural Law of his own individual being: that he shall also know that he is but contained within the great Natural Law, that he is but a Child of God, and not God himself: that he shall then poignantly and personally recognize that the law of another man's nature is different from the law of his own nature, that it may be even hostile to him, and yet is part of the great Law of God, to be admitted: this is the Christian action of "loving thy neighbour", and of dying to be born again: lastly, that a man shall know that between his law and the law of his neighbour there is an affinity, that all is contained in one, through the Holy Spirit. (p. 515)

The statement is lucid and succinct and could certainly stand on its own. With the weight of the entire "Study" behind it, we see many disparate arguments being drawn together, those on Judaism and Christianity,

on the Trinity, on the dichotomies in Hardy's art, on the tensions of marriage. Above all, this passage shows Lawrence's perception of the value of what can only be called religious knowledge, knowledge discovered by mankind through many centuries of wandering, wishing, believing, doubting, fighting, theologising, worshipping, living together - knowledge won at great cost, precious life knowledge which must not be lost.

It is, however, a kind of knowledge which cannot be justified or explained in terms of scientific "objectivity", empirical detachment or observation; it was established by human beings committed to religious truths they could never prove and responsible to a greater reality they could never fully observe. Frank Kermode is right to express his uneasiness with Lawrence's belief in the value of this kind of religious knowledge (as he does repeatedly in Sense of An Ending, "D. H. Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types"[1], "Spenser and the Allegorists"[2] and Lawrence) because he himself does not believe in the value or the possibility of such knowledge. This major difference between Lawrence and Kermode - which also accounts for Kermode's chief blind spot in his dealing with Lawrence as an artist - can be made more clear by looking at the peculiarities of Kermode's evaluation of Lawrence as an apocalyptic writer, an evaluation which attempts to dismiss much of Lawrence's thought as wish-fulfilment cut off from reality.

One of Kermode's main sources for apocalyptic statements made by Lawrence is the "Study of Thomas Hardy", particularly Chapter X. The above passage, describing a process of individual growth, states directly what is suggested in the opening paragraph of Chapter X.

> It seems as if the history of humanity were divided into two epochs: the Epoch of Law and the Epoch of Love. It seems as though humanity, during the time of its activity on earth, has made two great efforts:

> the effort to appreciate the Law and the effort to overcome the Law in Love. And in both efforts it has succeeded. It has reached and proved the Two Complementary Absolutes, the Absolute of the Father, of the Law, of Nature, and the Absolute of the Son, of Love, of Knowledge. What remains is to reconcile the two. (p. 510)

I stress the word "suggested" because Lawrence himself is very careful to say "it seems" twice in this passage. He is aware that he is making a broad, summarising statement, but he makes it anyway, believing that it does express a certain truth. When he uses the words of Judaism and Christianity to state this idea, suggesting that it is time "that man ceased to oppose the Father to the Son, the Son to the Father" (p. 468) within these two religions, he does so for two clear reasons. The Judeo-Christian tradition was the one in which he was born and raised and whose language, concepts and symbols he knows best; and the Judeo-Christian tradition has in fact had a great influence on mankind in its discovery and teaching of this religious knowledge of Law and Love. However, he uses words which could apply to other cultures equally well - the Law, Nature, Love, Knowledge. We are reminded of the tension between self-preservation and self-expression or discovery stated in the "Study"'s opening pages. Lawrence makes it quite clear elsewhere in the "Study" that the struggling with the conflict between Law and Love, the experience of these two "epochs", is not simply a question of B.C. or A.D. Euripedes and Aeschylus showed in their art some experience of these two "epochs"; they are not fixed rigidly in historical time but are suggestions of oppositions central to human life in every age (see pp. 476-477 of the "Study"). Particularly, they are elements of life which need to be faced and accepted in each individual's growth into wholeness.

The reconciliation which Lawrence believes possible in life, his faith in our potential for human wholeness, is expressed through the Christian figure of the Trinity.

> Now the aim of man remains to recognize and seek out the Holy Spirit, the Reconciler, the Originator, He who drives the twin principles of Law and Love across the ages.
>
> Now it remains for us to know the Law and to know the Love, and further to seek out the Reconciliation. It is time for us to build our temples to the Holy Spirit, and to raise our altars to the Holy Ghost, the Supreme, Who is beyond us but is with us.
>
> We know of the Law, and we know of Love, and to that little we know of each of these we have given our full expression. But we have not completed one perfect utterance, not one. Small as is the circle of our knowledge, we are not able to cast it complete. (p. 514)

At the risk of oversimplifying the above (since Lawrence has so charged his language by all that has preceded this passage in the "Study"), one could paraphrase it thus: in accepting our place in nature as God's creatures, we have learned something of the laws of his creation and of our own natures; in living with our fellows, in growing more conscious of our separation and distinctness from them, we have learned something of the law of other men's natures which might be quite different from our own, and which we must allow; however, in loving another human being and accepting his special nature, we must not lose sight of our own. We must be responsible to the demands and desires of our own being, strenuously trying to recognise and be faithful to them; if they contradict the law of our neighbour's nature we must not give in to the extreme actions of either submitting entirely to him or making him submit completely to us. We must face the opposition head-on, live with it, explore it and let it be a source of creative growth and discovery to us.[3]

I have tried to make quite clear my own reading of these passages and my understanding of how they relate to the rest of the "Study" because it is precisely these passages in "Study of Thomas Hardy" which Frank Kermode draws on for further evidence of Lawrence's apocalypticism. Lawrence's reference to three ages, his relating of these ages to the three persons of the trinity, his interest in sex, and his earnestness about the question "how are we to live in these difficult times?" - all seem to Kermode ample substantiation of his theory of the presence of Joachite apocalyptic in modern fiction.

First, one might justly ask, what is Joachite apocalyptic? Briefly, Joachim de Fiore was an Italian abbot who lived from 1132-1202. He left incomplete at his death a long "Treatise on the Four Gospels" which set forth the idea that history unfolded in three stages, patterned on the trinity, the first being the Age of the Father (Judaism), the second the Age of the Son (Christianity) and the third (to come about the year 1260, although Joachim himself was very tentative about specific predictions) the Age of the Holy Ghost. After Joachim's death, as his ideas disseminated among many different sects and types of people, being recast in more contemporary and controversial forms, his teachings were declared heritical.

Kermode seems to have been interested in such apocalyptic ideas at least since the writing of "D. H. Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types" in 1958.[4] This interest also shaped the writing of <u>The Sense of An Ending</u> (originally a series of lectures given in 1965), a book on modern fiction, and is still thriving in Kermode's recent book on Lawrence in the Modern Masters Series (1973). Although he has clearly looked at several different sources for his information, Professor Kermode seems to rely to a great extent on Norman Cohn's <u>Pursuit of the Millenium</u> (1957) [5], a work which tries

to show how various forms of apocalyptic, Joachim's among them, have influenced ideas of history and history itself since the 13th century, right up to Hitler's Third Reich.

Kermode's study of apocalypse leads him to say of Chapter X of the "Study" (in Lawrence), "the notion of personal and historical regeneration working in parallel gives rise to a tripartite apocalyptic world-history, which in turn endows the moment of writing - the early war years - with cosmic significance".[6] Kermode then continues, about fifteen pages later, "Lawrence still extended and deepened his trinitarian version of the world crisis".[7]

> These ideas of Lawrence's are shaped by his own life and mind, but they conform to type. Apocalyptic notions common to all who feel that upon them the ends of the earth have come, do tend so to conform. The medieval prophet formed his elect group and set out for the city of God, at the same time urging new modes of sexual conduct on his flock. His guidebook was the Book of Revelation, as it was Lawrence's, from his youth to his last book, called Apocalypse. All his important novels are in a sense allusions to Revelation. The crisis of one's times, and the rules for conduct in it, are properly sought there.
>
> The Joachite interpretation of history, a thirteenth-century triadic division founded on Revelation, has proved very persistent . . . . The Joachite pattern had its adherents in the self-conscious Decadence of the late nineteenth-century, a period in which many also exhibited an interest in occultism similar to Lawrence's. 8

The way in which Kermode "types" Lawrence in this passage contrasts interestingly with Kermode's criticism of Lawrence in "Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types", an earlier essay in which Kermode discusses the "ancient struggle" of the mythic type with history, explaining two different ways of considering the use of "types".

> One is to assume that, with varying and acceptable degrees of 'displacement', histories and fictions cannot avoid conforming with types, so that the most useful thing that can be done is to demonstrate this conformity. However sophisticated and cautious the exponent of this doctrine may be, his thinking is likely, in the last analysis, to be sentimentally ritualistic and circular. He is nowadays much more likely to be a critic of fiction than a historian. Historians and modern theologians nowadays employ typology in a much more empirical way, a way consistent with a more linear notion of history . . . . Forms are systematized typological insights; they are, or should be, always under very critical scrutiny, because they can tempt us into unjustified archaism. 9

This passage lays the foundation for Kermode's disapproval of Lawrence's typologising tendencies.

> Lawrence never in fact allowed history to lose altogether, even in The Plumed Serpent, even in the narrowly schematic Lady Chatterley's Lover. He headed dangerously towards a typological predominance, and paid the price; the more he asserted the fulfillment of preordained types, the less he could depend on that randomness which leaves room for quickness and special grace . . . . Women in Love is the last novel in which he kept the balance . . . . Its radical type is apocalypse . . . . Women in Love studies crisis without unforgivably insulting reality. 10

For a man who is so wary of typology, who wants to keep "types" constantly "under very critical scrutiny", Kermode has a remarkable weakness for "typing" novels, authors, and thoughts. He admits that without some use of "types", we would find it impossible to communicate, but says that we should realise as we use them that the actual event (novel, author, thought) may not really be so classifiable.[11] The reader may want to keep this demur in mind during the following discussion, if it comforts him to think that Kermode perhaps did not really think Lawrence or his novels could be accurately classified as apocalyptic.

In the passage quoted above from Kermode's Lawrence, Kermode not only makes two astounding and inadequately supported generalisations - about Revelation being Lawrence's lifelong guidebook and about Lawrence's interest in the occult.[12] He also tells us that Lawrence's ideas "conform to type", his novels are all "allusions to Revelation". In short, he types Lawrence and his work as apocalyptic, a classification I believe to be minimally helpful if at all. Kermode's tendency to typologise, which leads him into circular thinking, does not seem totally at odds with his reliance on Cohn's Pursuit of the Millenium, a work which some scholars of religious and social history have criticised for its occasional simplifying of complexity for the sake of over-arching theory.[13]

However, to do justice to Norman Cohn, he pays much closer attention to different manifestations of apocalyptic and typologises much less easily than does Kermode. Kermode tells us, "with his own variations, Lawrence is conforming to prophetic typology"[14], but he concentrates not on the variations, those things which make Lawrence unique, but on his conformity to a "type". Yet, if a "prophetic type" emerges from Pursuit of the Millenium, it is only after continued attention to specific instances of apocalyptic upheaval, all of which had marked individual characteristics, none of which were exactly alike. Cohn shows how many different forms the Joachite idea of the three ages took in history; for instance, an outbreak of millenarianism in Münster in the 16th century taught of a First Age of sin (ending with the flood), a Second Age of persecution (ending with the 16th century), and a Third Age of the vengeance and triumph of the Saints (to come soon).[15] The tone of this teaching is very different from that of Joachim de Fiore and bears little if any

resemblance to Lawrence's thought in the "Study".

Cohn does, of course, try to outline overall characteristics of apocalyptic movements which suggest themselves after a long study of many different, particular events, situations, teachings and documents. When we look closely at these characteristics as Cohn discovers them, we start to wonder what millenarian prophecies really have to do with Lawrence's work and, further, what, if anything, the word "apocalyptic" means when Kermode is finished using it.

To speak of apocalyptic is, after all, to speak of something specific, of a particular revelation of what the last days will be like and what order of events will usher them in. Eschatology is a word Kermode also uses, and more appropriately; it is the branch of theology dealing with the last things, such as death, resurrection, judgment, immortality. It is an area of enquiry of perennial importance, it seems, for the simple reason that every human being must eventually come to an end, at least, an end to the mode of existence to which he is accustomed, and must try to come to terms with this approaching ending. Kermode too frequently confuses these words in his argument; one can have genuine, profound questions and beliefs about eschatology, especially on an individual level, without being in the least apocalyptic, proclaiming a revelation of exactly what the end will be like for everyone. (As Cohn points out, apocalyptic is always collective.)

Let us look at the main characteristics of apocalyptic as they are shown in Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millenium and in Gordon Leff's Heresy in the Later Middle Ages and see how similar they are to aspects of Lawrence's thought. One of the most immediately apparent qualities of

millenarian movements is that they believe the end to be coming soon. They often set a date. They may change it, when the designated day passes uneventfully; but they usually set it all the same. Kermode rightly expresses this aspect of apocalypticism when he says in The Sense of an Ending that apocalypse "projects its neat, naive patterns on to history".[16] Apocalyptic writers "manipulate data in order to achieve the desired consonance . . . can of course arrange for the End to occur at pretty well any desired date".[17] Apocalyptic within the Bible - in Daniel, in Revelation - is on the whole read symbolically by the Church. It suggests the strangeness of the last days, a complete cataclysm totally unlike anything we have ever experienced, but does not tell us exactly when these things will occur. The feeling is strong within the established church that only God knows.

> But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father. Take heed, watch; for you do not know when the time will come. (Mark 13: 32, 33)

Apocalyptic as proclaimed by millenarian sects claims that God has revealed the date to them or to their leaders.[18] However, both kinds of apocalypse share the belief that a perfect world will some day be brought to pass, a world which is not an outgrowth of this one but something completely new, a world in which the wicked will be judged and the righteous will prosper and God, not Satan, will rule. It will be the end of time as we know it, an utterly new dispensation.

Is this the way Lawrence deals with history? In an essay published in The English Review in June 1919, "The Two Principles", Lawrence wrote,

> When we postulate a beginning, we only do so to fix a starting-point for our thought. There never was a beginning, and there never will be an end of the universe. The creative mystery, which is life itself, always was and always will be. It unfolds itself in pure living creatures. 19

Or we can look elsewhere, at an essay on education written in November and December 1918.[20]

> Is it any good having revolutions and cataclysms? . . . What do we want? We want to produce the new society of the future, gradually, livingly. It will be a slow job, but why not? . . . Life can go on just the same. It is not a cataclysmic revolution. It is a forming of new buds upon the tree, under the harsh old foliage. 21

Some concept of a final cataclysm or at least of an end to time would seem to be essential to apocalyptic. Kermode does not mention these passages; he supports his case with the trinitarian theology in the "Study" and with Lawrence's reference to Joachim in Movements in European History. But let us look at Kermode's treatment of these sources; does he really see any concept of an end-time in them?

In the "Study" it might seem that he does, but in fact he does so only by a manipulation of phrases and a distortion of Lawrence's meaning. Summarising Lawrence's "Study", Kermode paraphrases,

> at present we have only that apocalyptic pause, 'the pause of finality' which is 'not the end'; the end is the reign of the Holy Ghost. 22

These phrases are indeed present in the "Study", but let us look at them in context.

> . . . there comes over us now, over England and Russia and France, the pause of finality, now we have seen the purity of Knowledge, the great, white, uninterrupted light, infinite and eternal.
>
> But that is not the end. The two great conceptions, of Law and of Knowledge or Love, are not diverse and accidental, but complementary. They are, in a way,

> contradictions each of the other. But they are complementary. They are the Fixed Absolute, the Geometric Absolute, and they are the radiant Absolute, the Unthinkable Absolute of pure, free motion. They are the perfect Stability, and they are the perfect Mobility. They are the fixed condition of our being, and they are the transcendent condition of knowledge in us. They are our Soul, and our Spirit, they are our Feelings, and our Mind. They are our Body and our Brain. They are Two-in-One.
>
> And everything that has ever been produced has been produced by the combined activity of the two, in humanity . . . . (p. 513)

Lawrence is saying that although we may think we have reached a dead end, we really haven't. We must simply look again more carefully at life, life which involves the combined activity of Law and Love and always has. This "combined activity", this creative relation between Love and Law, is the activity of the Holy Ghost, which accounts for everything that ever has been produced in life. The "pause of finality" we feel because we have over-emphasized Love, but life will continue and we will continue to try to right the balance.

Where does Lawrence talk about an end to time as we know it? "But that is not the end" does not imply Kermode's ready-made assumption that "the end is the reign of the Holy Ghost". In context it implies there is no end. A next step, perhaps. An end, no.

In Movements in European History Lawrence, according to Kermode, "thought it proper to tell the children (Movements was commissioned by Oxford University Press as a school history book) about the work of the Abbot Joachim of Fiora, whose Everlasting Gospel - published posthumously in 1254 - divided history into three epochs - Father, Son, and Holy Ghost - and spoke of the imminence of the Third Age".[23] The way Kermode phrases this statement makes us feel that we are dealing with a fact of great

importance. Yet Kermode himself thinks it proper to tell students of literature about Joachite ideas, even though he would not like to be thought of as an apocalyptic. Why should Lawrence not mention Joachim in a book on European history?

Lawrence's comments on Joachim in his history book are, first of all, very brief in relation to the book as a whole; it should be noted that in Movements Lawrence does not organise European history to fit into the schema of Joachim's three ages. Second, the tone of Lawrence's discussion of Joachim is an even, balanced one.[24] He wants to do credit to the power Joachim's ideas had over men, to try to understand it, and he is clearly interested in Joachim's writings because of his own interest in the Holy Ghost of the Trinity, but Lawrence is also sceptical of the hysterical responses to Joachim's ideas and is very clear on the historical reasons which made such beliefs about a third age appealing to many people at that time. Third, Movements in European History as a whole argues against any idea of pre-ordained pattern or logical sequence in human history. In the introduction to the book, Lawrence wrote,

> All that real history can do is to note with wonder and reverence the tides which have surged out from the innermost heart of man, watch the incalculable flood and ebb of such tides. Afterwards, there is a deducible sequence. Beforehand there is none. 25

Thus, neither in Movements in European History nor in the "Study" does Lawrence show any apocalyptic tendency to speak of an end to time or to manipulate the data of history to fit a preconceived pattern. Yet Kermode uses these two works as major sources of evidence for Lawrence's Joachite, apocalyptic leanings. Lawrence may at times be interested in eschatological problems in a personal way, as any artist must be if he is

to face the problem of death. But this does not necessarily involve apocalypse. One of the other characteristics of apocalyptic, millenarian movements which Norman Cohn points out, is that their dream of life under the thousand year reign of Christ is always seen in collective terms; all the faithful are saved and glorified together.[26] Thought about eschatology, however, can be either in collective or individual terms, can involve questions about the Judgment Day for all mankind or about the day of death for one man. Any serious writer would be faced with some eschatological considerations, by reason of the fact that we all die; but these considerations do not necessarily involve him in apocalypse.

Thus we see that one essential characteristic of apocalypse - the belief in an end to history - is absent in Lawrence's thought. The related tendency, to predict the end as coming "soon and suddenly", imminent,[27] is also absent. What about another characteristic of particularly Joachite apocalypse - its close relation to the Franciscan ideal of poverty? Gordon Leff maintains that Joachism would never have been very important but for the stress on poverty it came to take on as it was read and reshaped by the Franciscan spirituals. There was a long struggle from c. 1280 until c. 1318 within the Franciscan order between those who had eased up on the rule of absolute poverty in practice and those who wanted to live out St. Francis' ideal. The latter were the Spirituals, and as they suffered in the struggle they came to link Joachim's teachings about the coming of a new age with their own troubles; they would be persecuted now but would be blessed and triumphant in the Age of the Holy Ghost which was just around the corner.[28] Rewritings of Joachim's ideas appeared in which St. Francis was compared with Christ

and the persecutions of the Spirituals were implied to be the work of the anti-Christ. There came to be a very close relation between beliefs in a new age and beliefs in the sanctity of poverty;[29] and this close relation continued in many different millenarian movements throughout Europe. The third age was often pictured as a time when all would live in voluntary, absolute poverty; asceticism seemed to be a sign of one's spiritual readiness for the coming of the Millenium.[30] Lawrence certainly did not share this belief in the sanctity of poverty, as is clear in Chapter IV of the "Study".

> Neither poverty nor riches obsesses me. I would not be like a begging friar to forswear all owing and having. For I would not admit myself so weak that either I must abstain totally from wealth or succumb to the passion for possessions.
>
> Have I not a normal money appetite, as I have a normal appetite for food? . . . It is no honour to be a pauper. It is only decent that every man should have enough and a little to spare, and every self-respecting man will see he gets it.
> (pp. 427-428)

Of course, various millenarian groups went to the other extreme, promising riches and luxuries,[31] and the above passage tells us Lawrence's view of this alternative as well.

As Kermode mentioned in his Lawrence, unusual modes of sexual behaviour were often encouraged by millenarian groups;[32] but precisely how were these modes of behaviour new or unusual? Norman Cohn describes one prophet who insisted that all his followers be married; in fact, Cohn tells us, this man's concern with adultery was obsessive.[33] Most frequently, however, if the movement was not one enjoining complete chastity upon its followers (as did the Franciscan Joachites), it went to the opposite extreme, proclaiming that because its members were perfectly

at one with the Holy Spirit, they were capable of no sin. Thus they could and did indulge in all forms of sexual license. Adherents to the doctrine of the Free Spirit even claimed that one had to practise promiscuity on principle as a sign of one's total freedom from sin and one's union with the Holy Spirit.[34] Cohn tells us that according to one adept of the Free Spirit,

> just as cattle were created for the use of human beings, so women were created to be used by the Brethren of the Free Spirit. Indeed, by such intimacy a woman became chaster than before 35

We know what Lawrence's opinion of this attitude towards sexual love is from Chapter IX of the "Study". He fought the idea of "using" another person for one's own purposes in a sexual relationship; rather, sex must be a true encounter between two separate beings, each an unknown reality to the other. The Free Spirit injunction to promiscuity on principle, as a sign of spiritual liberation, would be anathema to Lawrence. People who believed that they were spiritually superior to others and beyond all censure were no longer capable of true relatedness with other men and women; they could not grow or change through contact with the other. Many of the apocalyptic ideals of sexual freedom were irresponsible, romantic, selfish; the Free Spirit millenarians especially taught an ideal of sexual behaviour which involved no awareness of the independence of the other human being, of the possibility of creative conflict, of the necessity for commitment, ties, responsibilities.

Millenarian movements certainly had ideas about sexual behaviour, but they bordered either on absolute abstinence or total promiscuity. As in the question of poverty versus riches, Lawrence charted a realistic, balanced middle course; he was neither obsessed with sexual purity nor

taken in by romantic notions of total physical freedom. Sexual relationships for Lawrence involved delicacy, discrimination, discipline, commitment, surrender to the other for the sake of discovery, yet the maintenance of individual integrity. They involved what any true relationship with another human being involved - a recognition of wholeness in oneself and in the other. Kermode can only manage to relate Lawrence to apocalyptic types on the question of sexual behaviour by relying on the reader's familiarity with the stereotyped idea of Lawrence's work as sex-obsessed; if he were really to examine attitudes towards sex of apocalyptic movements through the centuries and of Lawrence's writings, he would be forced to see how completely opposed they were.

Another characteristic of apocalyptic movements, which plays a very great part in Kermode's The Sense of an Ending, is the concept of a time of crisis or of transition from one age into another. The days of transition belong neither to the Millenium nor to the secular age preceding it; they close the latter and usher in the former. It is a traumatic time when the Antichrist fights against the leader of the faithful, conquers, and reigns for a while. There are terrors and persecutions to test the faithful who will be reinstated or resurrected when the Antichrist is finally overthrown.

Kermode discusses this idea of transition[36] and then suggests that this is the operative "type" when people speak of a sense of living in a transitional age, at "a turning-point of time".[37] We think of ourselves as living in an "age of perpetual crisis" because of underlying "paradigms of apocalypse".[38] This may be so. However, it seems that on these terms it would be extraordinarily easy to classify every writer, of

fiction or non-fiction, as apocalyptic, in which case the word "apocalyptic" would have very little specific meaning left. If it is apocalyptic to believe that one is living at a turning point in time, at a moment of transition, then we are all apocalyptic, for each of us is living at a very individual turning point in history - the years of our own lives. It is the short time in which we must get acquainted with the past and the present and make decisions which will influence the future. If we are to take the events during those years seriously and our own responsibility as creative beings seriously, it will be a time of crisis, because it is the only time we have. Just about everything will fit into Kermode's apocalyptic transitional pattern, a fact which, I would suggest, makes it minimally helpful as a way of learning to distinguish what makes one writer of fiction different from another. Kermode himself has frequently criticised myth critics for the reductive tendency of their literary criticism, its tendency to prove that all works of literature are essentially the same.

Finally, we must examine one other very important aspect of apocalyptic - the nature of the ideal world which it imagines. It is here that Lawrence's differences from apocalyptic thought are most readily apparent. As Norman Cohn states, millenarian movements picture the establishment of this ideal world as a terrestrial one; it takes place on this earth, not in heaven.[39] There the similarity with Lawrence's ideas about a finer form of life ends. In every apocalyptic vision Cohn describes, the millenium is a time of perfect harmony, total absence of conflict. Anything less Lawrentian can scarcely be imagined.

For instance, let us look more closely at Joachim's predicted Age of the Holy Ghost.[40] It was to be a supremely spiritual age, one where

chastity was the ideal, where "the world would be one vast monastery"[41] and where men would leave earthly things for those of the spirit. In other words, the idea so central to Lawrence's "Study", of the Holy Ghost as the lively relation and tension between Flesh and Spirit, Love and Law, is not Joachite at all. Compare Lawrence's thought of continuing balance and conflict with the following analysis of Joachim's doctrines given in Gordon Leff's Heresy in the Later Middle Ages.

> . . . the first age was that of married men; the second of clerics; the third of spiritual monks of whom the Benedictines were the precursors . . . . Whereas the first age had been the age of the flesh, the second comprised both flesh and spirit, leading in the third age to the triumph of the spirit. Thus the spiritual monks, who were to be its harbingers, originated in the second age with St. Benedict's order; they were the agents by which the dualism between flesh and spirit would be finally resolved in the third age. This could only happen by struggle, after which calm and peace would reign. 42

The difference is so obvious. For Lawrence, fullness of life means acceptance of tension, complexity, opposition. For Joachim it meant the absence of these things. Joachim's Age of the Holy Spirit belongs, in fact, to what Lawrence called the "Epoch of Love" and is, in fact, an excellent example of Christian Love, in its extreme form, the form Lawrence criticised for its failure to appreciate the full importance of its Judaic heritage and the riches of the Old Testament. Lawrence's "reign" of the Holy Spirit is unlike anything Joachim ever imagined or hoped for.

Of course, Joachim's writings were a very pure form of apocalyptic; there were later, more popular forms which were much more appealing to the masses. Still, in all of these more popular forms, the ideal of no conflict persisted. The millenium was preceded by the most terrible conflict of all, that between the forces of evil and the forces

of good. That direct confrontation was the conflict to end all conflicts, and that is precisely what it was meant to do.[43] One can see how escapist apocalyptic visions really were; they involved turning one's back on all that was life - differences, struggles, relationships, complexity, change - for all that was not life - perfect peace, selflessness, the absence of pain, sorrow or sickness. The bliss of contemplation will replace action.[44] Wild and dangerous beasts will become tame and harmless;[45] the lion will lie down with the lamb (see Isaiah 11: 6-9). Lawrence repeatedly challenges this idea in his work, refusing to wish for a state of affairs in which lions were not ferocious and lambs were not meek and helpless.[46] Such a state of perfect accord would not be life but a form of death.[47] There is a particularly interesting sequence of arguments against such universal harmony in Lawrence's letters to Earl Brewster; Lawrence was trying to express what he found uncongenial in the Buddhism Brewster had espoused.

> More and more I feel that meditation and the inner life are not my aim, but some sort of action, and strenuousness and pain and frustration and struggling through. All the things you don't believe in I do. And the goal is not that men should become serene as Buddha or as gods, but that the unfleshed gods should become men in battle. God made man is the goal. The gods are uneasy till they can become men. And men have to fight a way for the new incarnation. And the fight and the sorrow and the loss of blood, and even the influenzas and the headache are part of the fight and the fulfillment. Let nobody try to filch from me even my influenza - I've got influenza at the moment, but it only makes me more unbuddhing. 47

Criticizing the idea of Nirvana, Lawrence wrote,

> Give me <u>differences</u>. . . . I consider the tiger is a <u>being</u>, a created being . . . . I don't <u>want</u> the tiger superseded. Oh, may each she-tigress have seventy-seven whelps, and may they all grow in strength and shine in stripes like day and night, and may each one eat at least seventy miserable featherless human birds, and lick red chops of gusto after it.

> Leave me my tigers, leave me spangled leopards, leave me bright cobra snakes, and I wish I had poison fangs and talons as good. I believe in wrath and gnashing of teeth and crunching of cowards' bones. I believe in fear and in pain and in oh, such a lot of sorrow. As for your white Nirvana, my boy: paint stripes on it, and see how it looks. I'll bet it has a tiger's hungry sides and buzzing, disagreeable tail. 48

"Give me differences", Lawrence insists. He is quite aware of the hidden violence, animosity, and vengefulness behind so many dreams of perfect harmony and unity - because such total harmony can only be achieved by eliminating completely a side of life one dislikes or does not want to face. One cannot say that all millenarian groups were made up of poor people who wanted to overthrow the rich; but as Lawrence saw in Apocalypse and as Cohn's book amply substantiates, apocalyptic visions often became vehicles for such hatred, a way of justifying the destruction or elimination of those who thought or lived differently from you. Most frequently, millenarian movements became the hope of the dispossessed who wanted to destroy the wealthy and powerful.[49]

Frank Kermode pinpointed the danger involved in irrationally submitting to an apocalyptic schema. "Its ideological expression is fascism; its practical consequence the Final Solution."[50] However, as we have seen, Lawrence was fully aware of the hidden, less desirable aspects of milleniarian hopes of a perfect world; he, too, was thoroughly sceptical of any suggested "Final Solution". The letters I have quoted from make this point explicitly, but they only state directly and succinctly what is part of the whole message of the "Study", its organising principle - we must not blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, against the tension, complexity and vivid relation which is life itself. A reason for pointing to these

letters, however, is that they were written in 1921 and 1922; Lawrence had completed Women in Love long before, the novel which Kermode sees as the last one in which Lawrence kept the balance between the apocalyptic types and the reality of history.[51] Kermode is certainly justified in criticising, say, The Plumed Serpent, in relation to Women in Love for its relative displacement of history by myth, but he is not justified in suggesting that Lawrence ever gave over to apocalyptic in his thought. The insistence on the tension and balance of reality was always with him. Indeed, while The Plumed Serpent was in progress, Lawrence wrote to a friend (10th February, 1924),

> The great sin is the trying to destroy the living balance. The Holy Ghost is the Balancer. And the sin against him is unpardonable, because once finally destroy the balance, and your soul is broken, your being is inchoate. 52

We have already seen how different Lawrence's belief in the Holy Spirit as the "balancer" is not only from Joachim's idea of the Holy Ghost but from every other apocalyptic vision of the millenium. Apocalyptic envisions the resolution of all conflict; Lawrence insists on its lively continuance.

"Give me differences", Lawrence said. It is a demand which can perhaps suggest to us why Lawrence is so much a better literary critic than Frank Kermode. Kermode does not even do justice to some of the unique qualities of Joachim's form of apocalypticism, let alone to what he sees as Lawrence's. He takes over only the barest pattern, that which is useful to him, and then proceeds to distort and cut down various works of literature to make them conform to this pattern. By a neat trick, Kermode then places himself above criticism by telling us that he knows this analysis is not really true, but is just a useful fiction.

In fact, at the close of his book on Lawrence, Kermode admits that Lawrence is not really apocalyptic in his view of history - which leaves us with the question, why has Kermode spent so much time since 1958 showing us how Lawrence was an apocalyptic writer?

> Eternity inheres in the productions of time; it is achieved in the life of the individual consciousness. All Lawrence's temporal projections - his Third Age - are therefore, in the last analysis, allegories of personal regeneration, rather than historical prophecies. That is why he is not disconfirmed by the obstinate continuance of the last days, the accelerated ruin of his countryside, the stubborn non-appearance of his Holy Ghost. The 'bad time' prophesied by Mellors came, and stayed. Lawrence's remedy - that men should die into a new life - is no easier now than in his own day, and it is evident that he did not really expect it to be. And at this level alone he is a failed prophet: the lesson, even if it is right, is too hard. 53

The "even if it is right" is the characteristic note of Kermodian detachment. Kermode's practice of thinking with the help of useful fictions[54] involves him in some very circular thinking indeed, such as hunting for all the superficial similarities between Lawrence's writing and apocalyptic types while ignoring deeper levels of significance where apocalyptic parallels were minimally helpful if at all, only to finally admit that Lawrentian and apocalyptic thought are, in fact, very different. Not only does Lawrence not believe in a millenial perfect world or an end-time, but even his idea of fullness of life is completely unlike any apocalyptic idea of absolute peace and unity. The hallmark of the "Study" is acceptance of this world with its imperfections, conflicts, challenges, its destructive and creative possibilities, and a determination to live as fully as possible in it. The way to seek the Reconciler, wholeness in life, is not to dream of an abstract goal of harmony and union, but to give each

particular its due, to let contradictory, disparate elements in our lives exist in true relation to each other. There is no apocalypse; each of us must discover and create the unique balance of oppositions in his own life. Each of us must bring in the third epoch of the Holy Spirit in our own lives; that is our human responsibility.

However, this action requires a faith in the ultimate possibility of meaningful relation, coherence, even though it may be beyond our understanding. We can see the major difference between Frank Kermode and Lawrence even more clearly by examining their disagreement over the valuing of this faith and its role in the process of our learning about reality. One believes that such faith helps us to make true discoveries, the other that it only helps us to avoid facing things as they are. In his study of Jude the Obscure Lawrence tried to show the effects of a lack of such faith. Jude did achieve in his life a measure of true balance, fullness; his two marriages together made one complete marriage. However, in his eyes the two marriages contradicted each other. He had followed an honest need in establishing both of them, but he could not accept that ultimately these two opposing marriages could be reconciled. Instead, he felt they should be forced to fit a smaller pattern he had in his own mind, the pattern or idea which said that one marriage must be both physical and spiritual. We know that this is an idea Lawrence takes very seriously, but he saw that in Jude's case, it involved forcing another human being to be what she was not. In forcing Sue to be his physical as well as spiritual wife, Jude destroyed the possibility of true relation, because Sue - a very

particular, special being - no longer existed after Jude violated her.

Jude failed to accept the fact that life could have coherence beyond his limited understanding, so he forced life to fit a smaller pattern (though a false, restricting one) which he could understand. This same dynamic is at work in Kermode's criticism; and I believe it is important to understand how this is so because of the light it sheds on difficulties many critics seem to share in dealing with Lawrence's work. Like Jude, Kermode fails to believe that any coherence can exist beyond the limits of his understanding, so instead he concentrates on a pattern which is both complex enough to interest him and simple enough for him to master. Kermode is, however, more sophisticated than Jude, for he readily admits that his pattern is false to reality while Jude believed his pattern to be true.

Reality, Kermode believes, is chaos, contingency, contradiction, meaninglessness, for this is what he sees. He seems to give art a simultaneously very high and very unimportant function in this reality. Art helps us to make sense out of our lives, but it does so by creating consciously false fictions. Fictions console or amuse us, help time pass, make life tolerable. We make objects where all is in concord, where ends are consonant with beginnings; these objects are untrue but comforting.[55] In turning to such objects, "we are only asserting a permanent need to live by the pattern rather than the fact, as indeed we must".[56] Fact, reality, is meaningless contingency, disorder. We must invent, not discover, meaning for our lives.[57] Our literature reflects this situation; we now have to accept, Kermode tells us, a transition

> from a literature which assumed that it was imitating an order to a literature which assumes

> that it has to create an order, unique and self-dependent. 58

What Kermode finds offensive in Lawrence and tries to mock or undercut whenever possible is Lawrence's underlying claim that, "what I say is true - it is not merely interesting or entertaining, nor a useful fiction. I believe it to be true - I claim for it a universal validity". Lawrence wrote to Bertrand Russell a few months after completing the "Study" (26th February, 1915),

> I wrote a book about these things - I used to call it Le Gai Savaire. I want now to rewrite this stuff, and make it as good as I can, and publish it in pamphlets, weekly or fortnightly, and so start a campaign for this freer life . . . . My world is real, it is a true world, and it is a world I have in my measure understood. 59

Lawrence had at one time called the "Study" Le Gai Savaire, the gay, the lively knowledge.[60] It was an attempt at discovery, at true knowledge, not merely useful fiction or an entertaining view of life. A study of Lawrence's novels shows that he saw them in the same way - they were attempts to discover truth, order, not to invent it.

The difference between Lawrence and Kermode seems to be essentially that between a religious man and an irreligious one, a man who believed that ultimately there was an order to the universe about which we could make at least partial discoveries and a man who believed there was not. This difference perhaps explains why Kermode cannot read Lawrence sensitively or fully (although Lawrence would have had no trouble understanding what Kermode had to say). Kermode can only approach Lawrence as an interesting writer; questions of "true" or "false" he does not consider important. He can write a book on Lawrence for a series which tries to provide for the interested layman introductions to the work and thought of major twentieth-

century figures(the Modern Masters series) and spend his valuable limited space on areas not at all central to Lawrence's thought, such as apocalyptic and the occult. He seems to have read many different books and sources, but nothing in depth. We are reminded of Lawrence's injunction in Apocalypse,

> It is far, far better to read one book six times, at intervals, than to read six several books. Because if a certain book can call you to read it six times, it will be a deeper and deeper experience each time, and will enrich the whole soul, emotional and mental. Whereas six books read once only are merely an accumulation of superficial interest, the burdensome accumulation of modern days, quantity without real value. 61

"An accumulation of superficial interest" accurately describes Kermode's Lawrence, and all his comments on apocalypse are only a part of that accumulation. He leaves the major questions about Lawrence unasked, let alone unanswered. Not only does he not try to understand whether Lawrence's "lesson" is right or wrong, he fails to understand what that "lesson" (if one can call it that) really is. We know what Lawrence's response is to that kind of an attitude towards his work. He stated it in a letter to Lady Cynthia Asquith, 16th August 1915, describing his impatience with Bertrand Russell and Lady Ottoline Morrell.

> . . . they are traitors. They betray the real truth. They come to me, and they make me talk, and they enjoy it, it gives them a profoundly gratifying sensation. And that is all. As if what I say were meant only to give them gratification, because of the flavour of personality, as if I were a cake or a wine or a pudding. Then they say I, D.H.L., am wonderful, I am an exceedingly valuable personality, and that the things I say are extravaganzas, illusions. They say I cannot think. 62

The overall implication of Kermode's Lawrence is that Lawrence cannot think. The overall implication of The Sense of an Ending is that no one can think meaningfully (that is, attempt to discover or ponder the

truth); we can only attempt to make sense of our lives in ways that are, of course, false to reality. Kermode is sophisticated, sceptical, existential; you won't catch him believing in anything, even in what he says himself. Everything is a useful fiction, no more. At least one must give Kermode credit for showing us the results of the ideal of scientific "objectivity" carried to its logical extreme in literary criticism. Any commitment to an idea of order involves 'bad faith', as Sartre called it. Michael Polanyi's comment on this particular outgrowth of empiricism is especially forceful if read after Kermode's chapter on Sartre's La Nausée in The Sense of an Ending (Chapter V).

> . . . the negation of familiar meaning . . . may usher us into the presence of nothingness. Sartre's Nausée contains the classic description of this process. It is a generalization of the technique for rendering a word incomprehensible by repeating it a number of times. You say 'table, table, table . . .' until the word becomes a mere meaningless sound. You can destroy meaning wholesale by reducing everything to its uninterpreted particulars. By paralyzing our urge to subordinate one thing to another, we can eliminate all subsidiary awareness of things in terms of others and create an atomized, totally depersonalized universe. In it the pebble in your hand, the saliva in your mouth and the word in your ear all become external, absurd and hostile items. This universe is the counterpart of the cosmic vision, with despair taking the place of hope. It is the logical outcome of utterly distrusting our participation in holding our beliefs. Left strictly to itself, this is what the world is like.
>
> Modern art has moved along with existentialist philosophy towards the exploration of increasingly radical negations. Surrealism distrusts all meaning and so does modern poetry. It regards easiness as vulgar and intelligibility as dishonest. Fragmentation alone can be trusted 63

The reduction of life to its unrelated particulars produces meaninglessness; and since the perception of wholes which meaningfully

relate disparate particulars involves a leap of imaginative faith towards reality and discovery, a lack of such faith leaves one locked in contingency. Kermode's definition of imagination is indeed different from Lawrence's and Polanyi's; imagination "is a form-giving power" and "these forms console".[64] It is not, as Lawrence and Polanyi believe, the power to make discoveries about the nature of reality. "Form", "order", "concord" in Kermode's work are all more or less synonymous with Sartre's "bad faith". Polanyi suggests that a beautiful order discovered carries conviction, from a scientific theory to a work of art; its beauty and its coherence tell us something further about a reality we are trying to explore and understand. Lawrence is very clear on the differences between arbitrary patterns, forms easily invented into which life is made to fit, and true form, an order which is discovered.

The peculiar thing is that Kermode elevates art to a very high position; it is beautiful and coherent, while life is ugly and disordered. We desperately need art if we are to make life tolerable. Lawrence constantly places art second to life; books may serve life but they are not essential to it. Simultaneously, however, Kermode renders art meaningless, a form of escapism or entertainment, while Lawrence takes it very seriously as a form of truth, of vital knowledge. The difference is, in fact, one with a well-known precedent, that between Plato and Aristotle. Plato may have disparaged art as a copy of a copy of reality, but it <u>did</u> have a true relation, however distant, to reality. Aristotle, on the other hand, elevated the role of art but severed its connection with reality. Erich Auerbach expresses this change in the following way.

> Aristotle did not try to fathom the part of actuality which resists rational formulation, but dropped it as

> having neither law nor purpose. To his mind what could not be explained was mere contingency . . . . To his mind the disorder and disunity of actual happening do not stem from the inadequacy of the eyes that look upon it, but are present in happening itself, so that the poet must create a happening superior to actual happening and tragedy must present a correction of actual events. Thus he opposes the universality of poetry to the particularity of history 65

Aristotle stressed the poet's powers of creation, his mastery over the chaotic disorder of life. Plato stressed the poet's submission, discovery; he knew the process of "losing oneself in reality and finding oneself again".[66] Polanyi and Lawrence, in this analysis, stand clearly with Plato while Kermode stands with Aristotle.[67] In Polanyi's terms, what is missing in Kermode's work (its absence disguised by a seemingly strict devotion to empiricism and detached "objectivity") is a true objectivity - that sense of profound responsibility before an uncovered reality to state it as it is and no other way. There is no impersonal submission to the truth but a reduction of the concept of truth to that which is readily apparent to the human mind, the disjointedness of everyday experience. Truth becomes a matter of individual taste, that which is personally useful, a fiction. Man is completely free to choose or to invent his "truths".[68] Kermode, in discussing the truth or falseness of ideas of order, especially in time, ideas of beginnings, middles and ends which are consonant with each other, tells us "the matter is entirely in our own hands, of course".[69]

Kermode mouths the horrors of nothingness of the existentialists without, one feels, having earned the right - through experience, feeling, or imaginative work - to do so. The language of Sartre adds a note of despair and sophistication to his work which simultaneously pleases him and impresses the reader. He is detached enough from existentialism to be calm about it

because it, too, after all, is a fiction. Life itself is a fiction, as becomes clear when Kermode comments on Sartre's formula about "the final aim of art".

> 'the final aim of art is to reclaim the world by revealing it as it is, but as if it had its source in human liberty'. This statement does two things. First, it links the fictions of art with those of living and choosing. Secondly, it means that the humanizing of the world's contingency cannot be achieved without a representation of that contingency. This representation must be such that it induces the proper sense of horror at the utter difference, the utter shapelessness, and the utter inhumanity of what must be humanized. And it has to occur simultaneously with the as if, the act of form, of humanization, which assuages the horror. 70

The easy use of the word "horror" is characteristic of Kermode. What he expresses rather better than existential horror in his chapter on Sartre in The Sense of an Ending is the dismay of existentialist writers when they realise that in authoring a novel they cannot escape, no matter how hard they try, some degree of order, causality, the meaningful relation of ends to beginnings, a consonant whole. The novelist is not absolutely free to choose at every moment; he can no longer be a being with no relevant past.[71] In writing,

> every choice will limit the next. He has to collaborate with his novel; he grows in bad faith. He is a world in which past, present and future are related inextricably. 72

Even if the novelist could write something utterly unrelated, chaotic, Kermode observes that its "readers would constantly attempt to supply the very connections that the writer's programme suppresses".[73] In fact, Kermode gives a marvellous account of the impossibility of escaping coherence, even of the most tenuous sort, in the writing or reading of novels. If only he had followed through on the implications of this

discovery! Instead, he accounts for it by a peculiar definition of freedom.

> The power which goes to its making - the imagination - is a function of man's inescapable freedom. This freedom, in Mary Warnock's words, "expresses itself in his ability to see things which are not". It is by his fiction that we know he is free. 74

Kermode is busy proving his freedom, making as many fictions as he can. Plato, Lawrence, Polanyi are interested in accepting responsibility, finding their freedom in the service of some greater reality which calls them to seek out and state what they can of the truth. One of the fictions which interests Kermode the most is that of apocalypse, the belief that an end will come to time which will be consonant with time's beginning, a belief he sees as paradigmatic not only for the novel form, but for the belief that a man's life will have an order, a fate which will bear some true relation to his nature and desires rather than an arbitrary one closing with a senseless death. Because Lawrence believes in some ultimate reconciliation possible beyond the tensions and apparent contingency of existence, Lawrence is therefore "apocalyptic". Because he has a profound sense of calling, a belief that his desires and abilities somehow define both the limits and the scope of his fate rather than being ignored or even made nothing by an arbitrary destiny,[75] Kermode dismisses him as a "prophetic type". Such naive ideas of order are outmoded, not mature enough for modern man, according to Kermode; the word "order" in Kermode's work is synonymous with "false".

Kermode has lost the ability to distinguish between true and false orders, accurate and inacurrate ones. If we follow Polanyi's account of how a scientist works, we realise that a scientific theory or discovery involves a suggestion or recognition of order and that the coherence of a

theory often leads scientists to accept it as true long before it is actually proven by repeated experiments to be so. In science, a beautiful order which simultaneously takes into account previously unrelated or even apparently contradictory facts or observations is a possible sign of its rightness. Further, the ability to discover such orders, state such theories, involves a faith that the order does exist, even if it is not at all evident that it does. A mathematician does not sit down to solve a problem unless he believes it will have a solution. A scientist does not struggle to account for his puzzling observations by a hypothesis unless he thinks they indeed may be meaningfully related in some way.

We see now why Polanyi feels that religious worship is the highest form of mental attention and discipline, why it could help train someone in the necessary stance required for original scientific work. It involves a belief in an order beyond our recognition, one which we continually strain our eyes to see and our minds to understand but which we will never know in full; and such a belief in an order which exists beyond our knowledge is the impetus for all discovery about the nature of reality.

Kermode's tone of empiricism, of detached "objectivity" is not in the least scientific. In fact, it permits him to think he is dealing with subjects dispassionately and fairly when he is really misrepresenting or distorting them. His fiction of analysing Lawrence as an apocalyptic is a case in point. Lawrence's deep religious sense of "life-concord"[76] not just in spite of but somehow through, because of, life's diversity, tension, contradiction, apparent contingency, is essential to his art and thought, but Kermode does not do it justice. He dismisses it out of hand as "archaic typologizing" or reversion to myth. Yet Lawrence has definite opinions on myths or forms which involve escape, going backward rather than forward

into reality; he can reject comfortable falsehoods or past truths for new, uncomfortable ones. Lawrence's religious belief may offend Kermode or merely, as it sometimes seems, make him patronising (Kermode frequently seems to adopt a very condescending tone towards writers he discusses), but it is not simplistic, nor reductive, nor escapist. Lawrence's religious belief involves his deep sense of responsibility, the seriousness with which he approaches art, and the energy of attention which results in works like The Rainbow, Women in Love and the "Study of Thomas Hardy". It also accounts for his insistence that his novels are not meant to be consoling, but true.

Kermode's opinion of such naiveté is clear. He comments that some people believe the form of a novel to echo some form or coherence in the world,

> that having found it (the form of a novel) you have a right to be consoled by it, for the good reason that it is authentic, and reflects, however imperfectly, a universal plot, an enchanting order of beginning, middle, and end, concords so apt and unexpected that you laugh or weep when you stumble on them . . . . This is not, after all, quite the world of those who seek 'the courage to be' and to strip reality of the protection of myth. 77

Kermode certainly manages to make the "believers" sound cowardly, yet is this implication entirely fair? Many who believe in the possibility of a greater reality or coherence in life (which Kermode dismisses as "a universal plot") struggle to uncover truth, fight to face and accept it if it is uncomfortable, agree with Kermode that in the adventure into knowledge we must increasingly divest ourselves of the comforting protection of limiting myths. Yet these believers are not quite so afraid of the powers of myth as Kermode seems to be; they can be grateful for some of them as

beginning statements of truth which must now be set aside or investigated more carefully and made more complex, or they can attend to others as clues to further discovery, a suggestion through symbol and story of a coherence the mind has not yet been able to understand.

Kermode may make the believers sound cowardly but he certainly manages to make himself sound very brave. However, he lacks what is so important to Lawrence and Polanyi - the courage of his convictions - and this not because he has no courage but because he seems to have no convictions. And in life convictions do have a way of sometimes being just the opposite of consoling; they can be painful, inconvenient, uncomfortable, unpopular in a way fictions rarely can. Lawrence in his life knew a great deal about such inconvenience; Kermode's work betrays an almost total ignorance of the possibility of it. The fiction of existential horror is, after all, much more comfortable; it leaves one free of obligations, responsibilities, absolutely "a free agent . . . referred nowhere and to nothing . . . secure from question" [78] in front of a rather complacently accepted void.

Summary and Conclusions

What whole vision, then, is given us by the "Study of Thomas Hardy"? It is a religious vision of potential wholeness and reconciliation in life, yet it must be stressed that it is not simplistic, or particularly consoling or ignorant of the daily discord we experience. Rather, it is Lawrence's attempt"to look into the wilderness raging round" ("Study", p. 419), to break free of the fixed pattern of thought and action we have established for our lives, a pattern which has blinded us to the presence of a greater reality. This exploration is carried on in the belief that the smaller

orders we build for ourselves should continually be tested against and renewed by contact with a further, finer order - an order which is still largely unknown to us and therefore is a frightening chaos to us, one which it takes courage and religious faith in its ultimate coherence to enter and explore.

Frank Kermode dismisses religious beliefs in the unity and order of life as fictions which are too comfortable for modern man. He has a point, certainly. Which of us today can honestly and wholeheartedly agree with Pope's seemingly complacent view in "An Essay on Man"?

> What if the Foot, ordain'd the dust to tread,
> Or Hand to toil, aspir'd to be the Head?
> What if the Head, the eye or ear, repin'd
> To serve mere Engines to the ruling Mind?
> Just as absurd, for any Part to claim
> To be another, in this gen'ral Frame:
> Just as absurd, to mourn the tasks or pains,
> The great directing Mind of All ordains.
> All are but parts of one stupendous whole:
> Whose Body Nature is, and God the Soul . . . .
> Cease then, nor ORDER "Imperfection" name:
> Our proper bliss depends on what we blame.
> Know thy own Point. This kind, this due degree
> Of blindness, weakness, Heav'n bestows on thee.
> Submit - in this, or any other sphere,
> Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear.
> Safe in the hand of one disposing Pow'r,
> Or in the natal, or the mortal Hour.
> All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
> All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see;
> All Discord, Harmony not understood;
> All partial Evil, universal Good:
> And spight of Pride, in erring Reason's spight,
> One truth is clear; "Whatever Is, is RIGHT". 79

I quote this long passage because I want to make quite clear the great difference between the tone of Lawrence's work and that of Pope's in "An Essay on Man". The note of urgency so characteristic of Lawrence, the sharpness with which he diagnosed the ills of modern society, the seriousness with which he took them, the earnestness with which he tried to fight them

and to discover alternatives or new possibilities are all quite different from any "Whatever Is, is RIGHT" attitude. In fact, if we want to find expression in the twentieth century of the tone of this passage from "An Essay on Man", one place we could look is to the work of various myth critics and students of Eastern religions such as Joseph Campbell or Alan Watts. Frank Kermode is justified in criticising the simplicity of the world-views implied in their analyses of art and religion, beliefs that all is as it should be, divinely ordered, with what seems to us as evil or as contingency merely a part of the plan. Kermode is wrong, however, to link Lawrence's thought so closely with such attitudes. As I have shown in Chapter IV of this thesis, Lawrence is much more insistent on the ultimate reality of oppositions, differences, disunity in life than Campbell and Watts are; and he definitely parts company with them in his strong sense of evil and his strenuousness in fighting it.

Kermode is wrong in another way. He fails to see that his own denial of order involves a certain extreme complacency. His view could almost be parodied as, "Whatever Is, is WRONG", the conclusion being that we must simply put up with it, entertaining ourselves with fictions, playing with smaller arbitrarily-created, self-contained orders, which will help us to tolerate existence.

Where does Lawrence lie between these two extremes? It should first be noted that both of these alternatives involve a passive stance towards reality. In one view, the divine order lies behind all things, static and finished; we simply relax and accept it and try to flow with it. In the other, total chaos lies behind all seeming order, there is nothing we can do but accept and try to ignore it. In this second view, there is

a place for activity, but it is entirely arbitrary activity and also finally futile.

In Lawrence's view, a greater reality and coherence is present to be discovered by man but it must also be created. It requires human collaboration. In other words, his stance towards reality is an active, shaping one. Man's knowledge and action, if it is to be true, cannot be arbitrary, for it must reveal what is there. But it can also not be static or passive, for revelation comes only to those who seek, order is found only by those who work and build. The world of perfect coherence is never, according to Lawrence, going to arrive complete; but insofar as human life is to take on wholeness through the reality of differences, opposition, separateness, brokenness, it is a wholeness which must be sought, struggled for, discovered and created. This final religious vision grows out of Lawrence's thought about the nature of perception in the "Study", thought which is very similar to the findings of Gestalt psychology and the work of Michael Polanyi - that the act of perception involves active comprehension, active bringing together into a whole relation many disparate particulars. Yet the relation is discovered, not arbitrarily created. The discovered whole is a greater truth than the unrelated particulars, but does not supersede them. As Lawrence put it in the "Study", "That is the secret of life: it contains the lesser motions in the greater" (p. 441).

I have spent a great deal of time in this thesis examining the ideas of Frank Kermode because his criticism of Lawrence is an excellent example of the final paralysing consequences of the thought about thought in this century which Lawrence and Polanyi have been challenging. It is a literary criticism built on an ideal of "objectivity", detachment and lack of commitment which is, as Polanyi has shown, not at all truly scientific.

Duke Maskell, in an article entitled "Frank Kermode's Lack of Prejudice" aptly described Kermode's work in the following way.

> He's without prejudices even on topics on which, both as a man and as a teacher, it's his business, his very life, to have them. His kind of fairness is achieved not by being fair to the evidence while remaining true to one's own sense of things but by not having a sense of things of one's own, by purging oneself of all decent prejudice and by removing from one's tone all trace of tone - all trace, that is, of any tone of the human voice but one, and that the academic, in this case the social science academic made polite - that tone, his tone, Professor Kermode has abundantly.
>
> It's a cool tone, full of doubts and drawbacks. It's an empiricist, positivistic, scientific sort of a tone. A tone epitomised by a splendid periphrasis: for 'literature', 'what we call literature'. Now there's mildness of conviction for you. There's temperate. Now, that is empirical, that is. 80

Michael Polanyi has attempted to show the inconsistencies of this ideal of empiricism in his work, most completely in Personal Knowledge. The reasons he sees for the widespread appeal of empiricist theory about the nature of knowledge apply directly to the problem of Kermode's high reputation as a scholar.

> I agree that the process of understanding leads beyond - indeed far beyond - what a strict empiricism regards as the domain of legitimate knowledge; but I reject such an empiricism. If consistently applied, it would discredit any knowledge whatever and it can be upheld only by allowing it to remain inconsistent. It is permitted this inconsistency because its ruthless mutilation of human experience lends it such a high reputation for scientific severity, that its prestige overrides the defectiveness of its own foundations. 81

What is needed, Polanyi urges, is "a decisive change in our ideal of knowledge".

> The participation of the knower in shaping his knowledge, which had hitherto been tolerated only as a flaw - a shortcoming to be eliminated from

> perfect knowledge - is now recognized as the true guide and master of our cognitive powers. We acknowledge now that our powers of knowing operate widely without causing us to utter any explicit statements; and that even when they do issue in an utterance, this is used merely as an instrument for enlarging the range of the tacit powers that originated it. The ideal of a knowledge embodied in strictly impersonal statements now appears self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject for ridicule. We must learn to accept as our ideal a knowledge that is manifestly personal. 82

However, our acknowledging the importance of the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding

> does not make our understanding subjective. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality. 83

Thomas Langford and William Poteat, in their introduction to Intellect and Hope: Essays in the Thought of Michael Polanyi, suggest that one of the reasons readers are so suspicious of Personal Knowledge is that it combines an open personal tone, even a confessional first-person rhetoric at times, with a claim to truth, to universal validity.[84] This is a combination which we have gradually come to see as incongruous, as an almost impossible contradiction in terms, a violation of proper scholarly detachment and "objectivity". Langford and Poteat note, however, that unlike simple subjective revelation, Polanyi's work shows an easy, natural movement, almost like a dialectic, between not only first person singular and first person plural but between the first person and the third. Polanyi's writing, they suggest, "unlike the mere confession, finds the singular and plural form almost equally congenial, for it is a confession having a universal intent". Personal Knowledge's "claim to a reader's

attention lies, not in the individual root of the confession, but in its universal intent".[85]

The same could be said of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" and of the best of Lawrence's essays. What many readers find offensive is not the personal, conversational tone; that could be tolerated, even enjoyed, if it were clear that one was dealing with a story, a poem or a merely subjective expression of feeling of some sort. What is offensive is the combination of this personal tone with a claim to objectivity, to a statement of truth about reality. Professor Kermode's response to Lawrence is not a special case, but rather a representative one. The literary arts are necessarily personal; Kermode acknowledges and accepts this by simultaneously defining the literary arts as the creating of something "consciously false"[86] - interesting, consoling, entertaining, they may be, but they are false. Such fictions would thus arouse neither profound resistance nor fervent belief in us; they primarily pass the time by ordering it and making sense of it in ways which divert and comfort us. The serious business of intelligent thought, of science, of facts, is carried on in a detached, impersonal tone, preferably in the third person.

Lawrence's work, especially his non-fiction because it can less easily be classified as "consciously false", rejects this neat formulation. If we are to be honest, we have all at some point or another felt ourselves stiffening in resistance to a particular piece of Lawrentian non-fiction prose - not because we had some information or certain facts which contradicted what he had said (although this could certainly be the case with some of his work) but because we felt that something said so conversationally, vividly, lightly, interestingly, <u>personally</u>, could not be trusted as an

objective statement of truth and could not even be judged in relation to other more scholarly-seeming works. It belonged in a different category entirely. Yet Lawrence was claiming that he was committed to what he wrote and that he believed it to be important and true. The easiest way to deal with this contradiction was to dismiss Lawrence's thought as that of a self-proclaimed and self-deluding prophet.

The stereotyped idea of Lawrence is still thriving, the idea that he cannot think.[87] This stereotyped idea is so completely accepted in Kermode's work on Lawrence that it is hardly even stated directly; rather, it is taken for granted and is assumed as a given in each critical argument. I have suggested reasons. There is the open personal tone combined with a claim to truth and universal validity which seems to offend our sense of propriety. There is also a profound religious belief in ultimate unity and coherence which can be dismissed as archaic, a reversion to myth. However, these characteristics of Lawrence's thought are only aspects of a more basic reason for the accusation that Lawrence cannot think, this primary reason being that Lawrence is working under a completely different conception of what thought and knowledge are, a conception which early in his life he attempted to begin to define by writing the "Study of Thomas Hardy". The "Study" can be cited as evidence for the contention that Lawrence was "incapable of what we ordinarily call thinking" - and even F. R. Leavis admitted that T. S. Eliot might have had a work like the "Study" in mind when Eliot made the preceding comment about Lawrence - or it can be appreciated for what it is, a study of the nature of perception and an attempt to revise our notion of "what we ordinarily call thinking".

Lawrence at one time thought to name the "Study" "Le Gai Savaire"[88],

and certainly his examination of the problem of knowledge itself was central to it. Several of his main statements about the ways in which we think and establish knowledge set off almost Pavlovian responses of resistance and distrust in us, his twentieth century readers. First, like Michael Polanyi after him, Lawrence insisted on the bodily rootedness of all our thought, on the primacy of tacit, inarticulate modes of life and discovery over explicit statements of knowledge; the word was secondary to the forward movement of life itself. Second, this tenet led him to affirm his own rootedness in a particular time and place, the individuality which was both limit and opportunity and which was, most of all, responsibility to accept a particular calling or task. Thus, like Polanyi after him, Lawrence insisted that his knowledge was personal knowledge while simultaneously claiming for it universal validity. Finally, and again with Polanyi, Lawrence stated that true originality originated nothing but merely revealed what was there; yet, paradoxically, in so revealing reality, "something is which was not" ("Study", p. 409).[89]

Our automatic response is to point to all of these statements as evidence that Lawrence could not think, especially to the final dangerously metaphysical belief in a hidden reality. Polanyi, on the other hand, would have no difficulty in maintaining that such ideas about the nature of perception would help to suggest why Lawrence's thought was so fine, vigorous and complex; and Polanyi might especially point to Lawrence's profoundly religious sense of responsibility to the truth, his admission that decisions were not entirely in his own hands, his tremendous energy of attention to the unknown, as elements of what could be a particularly fruitful stance towards reality for the purpose of significant thought and discovery.

Summary

In the preceding chapters, I have been analytic, attending to parts of the "Study" in detail. In Polanyian terms, I have hazarded a focal awareness of subsidiary elements of a whole, and such a procedure can be dangerous.[90] One could conceivably lose sight of the whole one was hoping to further understand. For this reason, I would now like to attempt a brief summary and suggest a way to view the whole of the "Study" again.

I do not mean to imply that the "Study" can now be seen to form a perfect pattern of some sort, but rather that it is a coherent whole which has been closely argued, powerfully and significantly organised. As Lawrence suggests in the "Study", the way to discover a true unity is not by creating a false consonant pattern but by giving each particular its due, its full place, and trying to perceive the whole which grows out of the relation of all of these different particulars. Frank Kermode, just as he sees only contingency, unrelated particulars in life, sees only unrelated particulars in the Hardy "Study". He concludes his analysis of it in this way:

> Such is the mixture of art-history, heterodox trinitarian theology and literary criticism, that Lawrence produces in Thomas Hardy. 91

The disparaging tone of Kermode's comment shows that he did not see any profound organising imagination at work in the "Study"; there is no obvious pattern and Kermode does not take Lawrence's thought seriously enough to see that it is the thought itself which builds to express and discover coherence.

Lawrence's thought on the nature of perception organises the

"Study of Thomas Hardy". Lawrence, in his attempt to understand Hardy's work, is also trying to understand that very force which is capable of seeking out, expressing and creating true order, the force of the whole human consciousness. Samuel Johnson described this force in its highest form as "genius" -

> a mind active, ambitious, and adventurous, always investigating, always aspiring; in its widest searches still longing to go forward, in its highest flights still wishing to be higher; always imagining something greater than it knows, always endeavouring more than it can do . . . genius, that power which constitutes a poet; that quality without which judgment is cold and knowledge is inert; that energy which collects, combines, amplifies, and animates 92

What is most remarkable about the Hardy "Study" is the extraordinary energy of attention Lawrence brings to bear on issues in human relationships, theology, philosophy, literary criticism, and art criticism, an "energy which collects, combines, amplifies and animates" but which primarily discovers and creates true relations. I have tried in the body of this thesis to show the range, depth and interest of Lawrence's thought on all of these various subjects and will make only a few summarising comments here.

1. Theology. From one perspective, the "Study" could be seen as a major religious document of the twentieth century, a thoughtful attempt to re-examine what religion has meant to us in the past and could mean to us in the present. Further, Lawrence's study of the trinity bears interesting comparison with Augustine's De Trinitate or with more recent works. He gives close attention to the person of the Holy Ghost in the Trinity, the one aspect of the Christian deity about which theologians have said least, primarily because of the difficulties involved in speaking about something

so insubstantial and unknown. He does so without falling into the trap of apocalyptic fantasy to which the theology of the Holy Ghost has, since Joachim de Fiore, seemed so congenial. Lawrence's Holy Ghost brings in no Golden Age, no Millenium or Final Solution. Rather, He teaches a new conception of possible wholeness within life by His very place and function in the Trinity. Lawrence's conception of this unity as expressed in the "Study" finds corroboration in a standard modern historical and systematic treatment of the doctrine of the trinity, the Croall Lectures delivered by Leonard Hodgson in Edinburgh in January 1943. Hodgson discusses inadequacies in the classical expositions of trinitarian doctrine by Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin, inadequacies resulting primarily from a mistaken mathematical notion of unity, defined by absence of multiplicity, rather than the idea of an organic unity. Hodgson's conclusions in The Doctrine of the Trinity echo Lawrence's in the "Study", written almost thirty years earlier (although it seems Hodgson had no knowledge of the "Study of Thomas Hardy").

> . . . the essence of the doctrine of the Trinity is the doctrine that true unity is what I have called "internally constitutive unity", that is to say, a unity which by the intensity of its unifying power unifies distinct elements in the whole. A unity can be deficient as unity, it can fail to exhibit perfection of unity in either or both of two ways: either by failing to maintain its elements in their distinctness, or by failing in its power to unify them, or both. 93

Lawrence's belief in the importance of a unity which both brings wholeness and yet "maintains its elements in their distinctness" is very different from the escapism of apocalyptic visions of a totally harmonious world where all discord and division are eliminated. What Lawrence appreciates most in the Judeo-Christian heritage is not such extreme ideals of final resolution of all tension, but rather the full tension of the

Biblical tradition. Lawrence values the Jewish and Christian scriptures for the diversity of human life they describe[94], the many possibilities for human life which they open to us, from the most extreme bodiless, other-worldly spirituality to the most detailed earthbound laws about marriage, procreation and scrupulous ritual physical cleanliness. Lawrence's full appreciation of the unique quality of the Judeo-Christian scriptural tradition gives him an interesting vantage point from which to criticise the inadequacies or imbalance of a present day Christianity which has too often lost touch, real and vivifying contact, with this tradition. The artist's understanding of the Bible has much of profound religious importance to teach the Jew or the Christian.[95]

Lawrence's insistence on a unity which yet maintains differences raises questions about the nature of the dualism he describes in the "Study". It is clearly not an extreme Gnostic form of dualism which sees two things, body and spirit, and declares the latter good, the former evil. Nor is it the ancient Yin-Yang sort which is really more like monism, seeing duality as ultimately illusion, all being contained in one perfectly balanced whole. All people, places, things, thoughts, happenings, sights, sounds are not to Lawrence mere emanations of one immutable substance. Lawrence is no materialist, denying a division between mind and matter by explaining everything in terms of the second; he is no Bishop Berkeley, resolving the body/mind split by explaining all of life's phenomena in terms of the contents of someone's mind. Lawrence's religious concern for the wholeness of man coupled with his recognition of these frequently opposing elements within an individual leads him to affirm both elements, to affirm their very differences as the way to wholeness; the possibility of human

integrity lies in giving both body and spirit - in all their conflict and contradiction - their due.

2. Art Criticism. The theological considerations of the "Study" have a direct relation to the art criticism and the discussion of Hardy's novels. In problems of aesthetics, the dualism Lawrence is examining appears in one form as the conflict between the aspiration and the resistant (p. 478) and the artist's attempt to effect a reconciliation between the two, between the purity of what he wants to say and the limits of the material through which his statement is to find expression. Again, the way to a unified work lies not in any arbitrary, abstracted pattern but in giving both the pure desire and the concrete material their full weight and full possibility and discovering, working out, the true relation between the two. Such work involves the kind of mental energy, the effort of attention and of creative imagination which Samuel Johnson called "genius" and which the "Study" referred to as the artistic effort of portraying "a moment of union between the two Wills", aspiration and resistant, movement and inertia (p. 447).

It is this attempt to distinguish the pure statement an artist wanted to make and the way in which his chosen mode of expression both limited and enriched his pure conception which Lawrence sees as the proper way to study the work of great painters.

> Each work of art has its own form, which has no relation to any other form. When a young painter studies an old master, he studies, not the form, that is an abstraction which does not exist: he studies maybe the method of the old great artist: but he studies chiefly to understand how the old great artist suffered in himself the conflict of Love and Law, and brought them to a reconciliation. Apart from artistic method, it is not art that the young man is studying, but the State of Soul of the

> great old artist, so that he, the young artist,
> may understand his own soul and gain a reconciliation
> between the aspiration and the resistant. (pp. 477-478)

Lawrence sees each painting as the recording of a true and lively struggle between an aspiration, a beginning thought, and its testing and growth through the process of embodiment in colour, line and form; for this reason, his criticism of pictures is itself alive and inquiring. What and why did Turner most profoundly want to paint? If he wanted to paint all form and line as shifting light and colour, dissolve all solid bodies, what kept him from painting that final all-white canvas? Did his struggle with the inescapable laws of his material temper his extreme vision? Did it teach him - or us - something about the nature of reality? Was the final statement of his painting more complex and more truthful than his initial visions not yet embodied?

What Lawrence also succeeds in conveying in his art criticism is the great effort of sustained attention to a particular artistic problem which each painter brought to bear on his work. How was Turner to create a unified painting out of the conflict of his vision - of light on reflected light - with the actual substance of the pigment with which he worked? How does a painter discover and create a whole, complete work of art out of an inescapable conflict? The artist Robert Henri gave a partial answer to this question in a way which sheds light on the development of Lawrence's thought in the "Study".

> The habit of digression - lack of continued interest -
> want of fixed purpose, is an almost general failing.
> It is too easy to drift and the habit of letting
> oneself drift begets drifting. The power of
> concentration is rare and must be sought and
> cultivated, and prolonged work on one subject
> must not be mistaken for concentration. Prolonged
> work on one subject may be simply prolonged
> digression, which is a useless effort, as it is to
> no end . . . .

> A good painting is a remarkable feat of organisation. Every part of it is wonderful in itself because it seems so alive in its share in the making of the unity of the whole, and the whole is so definitely one thing.
>
> You can look at a good painting in but one way. That is, the way it is made. Whether you will or not you must follow its sequences.
>
> There are some paintings, very remarkable for the skill they display, which are, however, a mere welding together of factors . . . unrelated factors nevertheless cunningly interwoven - there is not in them that surge of life, that unity which is the mark of true organisation.
>
> If you wish your work to have organisation your concept of the motive which is the incentive to your flight must be as certain and you must hold as well to it as you would have your organisation certain and true to itself in all of its parts.
>
> No vacillating or uncertain interest can produce a unity. 96

What the young artist attempts to understand in the great master is the power of training one's whole self so strenuously on the truest possible expression of an idea, simultaneously holding both the pure conception and the minute detail of execution fully and distinctly in the imagination, that a whole relation is stated, a true unity is achieved, a full thought is produced. In Polanyian terms, this is the sustained dwelling in the particulars of a problem while attending to the unknown whole you would discover; and this final discovered and stated whole contains within it both the aspiration - the scientist's hunch or hypothesis, the artist's first vision - and the resistant - the obstinate, puzzling contradictory facts, the unwieldy results of experiment and observation, or the unwieldy brushes, paints, words or stone. The initial thought, through the process of being tested against life and embodied in it, has led to a finer, more complete thought.

3. Literary Criticism. Lawrence's study of Hardy's art in these terms - examining the dualism between his aspiration or metaphysic and the resistant, his material, the observation of Wessex life - is, I would suggest, classic and should be recognised as such. Only recently has the "Study" begun to be read and taken seriously as literary criticism of Hardy's novels. R. G. Cox's Thomas Hardy: The Critical Heritage (1970) mentions the "Study" only briefly as an eccentric, idiosyncratic work. Evelyn Hardy's Critical Biography of Hardy, published in 1954, refers to Lawrence's "Study" as an unfinished essay, almost twenty years after the "Study" was published in full in Phoenix. That such a mistake was possible is a sorry comment on the state of Hardy studies.

The dualism which Lawrence describes in Hardy's work has been noted in one form or another by many later students of Hardy. In this thesis I have shown how it may be argued that Lawrence's reflections on the problem of unity in duality in other areas of life - in marriage, in religious thought, in philosophy and aesthetics - grew primarily out of his attempt to understand the conflict he sensed in Hardy's art and to determine in what ways it was a creative, in what ways a destructive or limiting, conflict. A close examination of this conflict also necessarily involved Lawrence in an attempt to examine and challenge contemporary theories of knowledge and to state alternatives of his own, for that which was most debilitating in Hardy's dualism was the seemingly irreconcilable split between his own belief in the knowledge he expressed in his art and the epistemological implications of the scientific thought and philosophy of the time which denied the value of that artistic knowledge. The influence on Hardy of the work of Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Locke, Hume and Gibbon was a major one; the growing aura of reverence around science and around

what was thought to be a scientific stance towards reality - a detached, positivistic, empirical approach - relegated art to a relatively unimportant status. Art was no longer intelligent knowledge; it belonged primarily to the emotions and the senses and was reduced to what Polanyi referred to as a mere "emollient of nerves".[97] Hardy's work shows the despair he felt over this state of affairs, the hopelessness of an artist who feels that his personal vision is a flaw, an imperfection, at best a superfluity, in a world of vast impersonal forces and who simultaneously clings to this individual vision and feeling as the only thing worth having. Like Jude in Jude the Obscure, Hardy was uncertain of the value of his own personal knowledge as measured against the world's established knowledge; yet, like Jude, he protested in the words of Job, "I have understanding as well as you" and he trusted his feelings even against the dictates of what he thought to be the highest form of reason.

Yet why the paralysing division? Wordsworth, accepting the necessary interdependence of thought and feeling in the discovery of truth, had written in 1800,

> . . . for his own (a poet's) feelings are his stay and support; and, if he set them aside in one instance, he may be induced to repeat this act till his mind shall lose all confidence in itself, and become utterly debilitated. 98

The passage recalls Polanyi's phrase "intellectual passions" or Lawrence's lifelong insistence, "I know that no knowledge is knowledge unless it has its direct emotional-passional reference".[99] But Hardy did not share their certainty, and his work shows it. When the individual person and his emotions are eliminated, or at least, supposed to be eliminated, from the serious knowledge of mankind in the name of "objectivity", the emotions become at once both valueless in terms of responsible thought and

sentimentalised, idealised in isolation as the seat of all true life. Scientific knowledge is then worshipped as truth but also hated for its severe, lifeless impersonality. Too often in his work, Hardy succumbs to these extremes. At times the discipline of responsible thought is abandoned for mere comfortable story-telling, the sensation of the unusual anecdote or coincidence. Too frequently the individual and his emotions are idealised or sentimentalised while society - in the form of church, academia, aristocracy, law or simply ancient custom and morality - is too completely condemned. The division is seen clearly in the lives of Clym and Jude, two men in whom feeling and passion are shown to obstruct the working of the mind, to prevent any further growth in consciousness, rather than supporting it. Clym's marriage to Eustacia, Jude's marriage to Arabella, ruin their academic ambitions; yet, on a deeper level where Hardy is attending carefully to both his initial idea and to the lives of his characters in which the idea is to be embodied, he shows us that the further growth in consciousness which both Jude and Clym experience because of their marriages is more significant than any of their playing with books and modern ideas.

Hardy, although he bravely clung to his personal vision and attempted to test it and fully state it in his novels and poems, often failed to sustain the strenuous attention necessary to come to true discovery and conclusion. The mental energy required to hold the aspiration, the "metaphysic" or beginning thought, and the resistant material, the life of Wessex, together in his mind as he worked until some true relation was found and recorded - this essential concentration was too often lacking. Instead, Hardy frequently gave in too easily, making a

false conclusion either by letting the material itself run away with him or else by manipulating the material unfairly in order to support his initial idea, rather than struggling with it honestly so that it could challenge, complicate and extend his thought.

For this reason, Lawrence charges Hardy with a failure of intelligence. The vigorous mind, able to hold contradiction, "uncertainties, mysteries, doubts" in solution while it ponders, explores relations, examines and re-examines, makes tentative hypotheses, abandoning some, developing others, seeking order, until the moment when the sudden flash of insight makes the leap from meaningless disorder to discovered coherence possible - this strength of mind and wholeness of attention did not show itself in most of Hardy's work. One reason that this mental energy was lacking was that it could only be generated by a belief that some true relation between the aspiration and the resistant was there to be found, and Hardy did not believe this. He saw only an insuperable conflict between individual desire and some vast, bungling, careless and uncaring, all-powerful force, a conflict between his own mode of studying reality and the "objective" method of renowned scientists and thinkers.

This failure of belief showed itself most clearly in a failure of creative imagination in Hardy's last novel, Jude the Obscure, where the reader is presented with the unconvincing figure of Little Father Time. Hardy seems to be abandoning his task as a novelist, that of testing his ideas against life itself; he has decided just to state his ideas as they come, directly, without any scrutiny or tempering. Father Time is a mere cipher, a statement of Hardy's despair openly without any shaping by the resistance of his artistic material, the human life he knew. Hardy hasn't taken Father Time's existence seriously at all, hasn't tried to enter

imaginatively into his childish life and mind beyond the barest formalities. Little Father Time is unconvincing as a human child because Hardy hasn't invested the necessary time and energy into creating him fully. He cannot live in true relation to the other characters in Jude because he does not even live within his author's mind, let alone within the pages of the book.

Hardy's treatment of Father Time can tell us something not only about the limits of Hardy's imaginative intelligence, about his lack of belief in the possibility of making contact with a hidden reality and embodying this moment of contact and discovery in his art. It can also tell us something about certain developments in twentieth-century fiction. Hardy himself never completely abandoned the idea that the other person existed beyond himself, a separate reality which he could describe and try to understand; but he was wise enough to see what the implications were of Father Time's unreal presence in Jude, and he never wrote another novel. Like Father Time, Hardy's other characters were wanting to die before they had ever lived (the "I-wish-I-had-never-been-born" syndrome); if truth was impersonal, ultimately the establishment of truth meant a world in which persons had no reason to exist.

The failure of creative imagination which begins in Father Time has continued and increased in the work of some later novelists. These novelists seem to feel that no reality exists beyond themselves or, at least, if it does, they can make no meaningful contact with it. As artists, all they can know is the world built within their own minds. By no leap of the imagination can they try to explore and know the mind and being of another individual. A scientist can list impersonal facts; but artists, intensely personal, find that the only thing they can write about with any certainty is themselves. Thus, we get a stream of consciousness, all the

glimmers and shadows and voices and sensations which go through the narrator's or a central character's mind; other people exist only when the narrator or the central character is thinking of them. Or we have merely confessional literature in which all experience is filtered through the vision of the "I", an "I" who is rarely challenged by an equal within the novel and who seldom has any convincing or vital relationships.[100] How can one have any real human relations, if one has difficulty in believing in the real and separate existence of other individuals? In such confessional fiction the "attention is focused on the self as a center of authority and meaning which provides unity and significance for events, objects and people standing otherwise in no significant relationship with one another".[101]

Such a focus on the self as "center of authority and meaning" is the kind of irresponsible idealisation of the individual, the retreat from true science, from objective thought, from a sense of obligation to approach and reveal a greater reality - a shared human reality - which Lawrence rejects in the "Study". Hardy never gave into it completely; he tried to hold on both to the impersonality of science and of empirical philosophy and to the value of the life and thought of individuals. He could not believe in the possibility of some creative relation between the two, could not attend strenuously enough to discover any, but he held on nevertheless. When he felt his grip loosening on life itself, in the shadowy figure of Father Time, he abandoned the novel form; if he lost the faith necessary to create his characters fully, he was like a painter who had lost his paints and had to leave the broad, colourful canvases for finer, smaller work. The Dynasts is perhaps a sign of what post-Jude the Obscure novels might have been like,

all characters mere emanations of some Immanent Will.

Lawrence's perception of Hardy's brave struggle to keep his hold both on the life of Wessex he knew and on the advanced thought of the time he felt he had to accept led him to ask many different kinds of questions. In fact, the "Study of Thomas Hardy" impresses upon us the fact that reading novels for Lawrence surely involved a lot more thinking and growing than it usually does for most of us.

4. Human Relationships. Lawrence follows and develops the many different thoughts to which Hardy's novels give rise. The central one is the problem of knowledge itself, but closely related to this, or more accurately, one aspect of this issue, is the question "can we know another human being, do other people really have an objective existence, a reality, apart from ourselves?". Lawrence's conclusion is yes, that this is the reality which Christianity ought to have taught us.

> This Christianity would teach them: to recognize and admit the law of the other person, outside and different from the law of one's own being. It is the hardest lesson of love. (p. 512)

Yet, as Lawrence observes, it is a lesson that even Jude in all of his early religiosity, seems never to have learnt, if we are to judge from his treatment of Sue. It is this strange blindness to the reality of the other which seems to mark all of the sexual relationships in Hardy's novels in one way or another and which Lawrence reflects on throughout the "Study", most extensively in Chapters VI and IX (see pp. 440-444 and pp. 490-493) where he writes of the sexual act as the exploration of an unknown reality.

But Lawrence does not leave us only with the extreme sense of separateness, unknownness between human beings. He believes that there is possible a true relation between individuals.

> And the lesson of love learnt, there must be learned the next lesson, of reconciliation between different, maybe hostile, things . . . . We start from one side or the other, from the female side or the male, but what we want is always the perfect union of the two. That is the Law of the Holy Spirit, the law of Consummate Marriage. That every living thing seeks, individually and collectively. Every man starts with his deepest desire, a desire for consummation of marriage between himself and the female, a desire for completeness, that completeness of being which will give completeness of satisfaction and completeness of utterance. No man can as yet find perfect consummation of marriage between himself and the Bride, be the bride either Woman or an Idea, but he can approximate to it, and every generation can get a little nearer. (p. 515)

It is clear from this passage and many others that Lawrence is speaking of a marriage within the individual himself, a wholeness between "the fixed condition of our being" and "the transcendent condition of knowledge in us" (p. 513), as much as he is of a marriage between a man and a woman or a close relationship between any two individuals. Yet, Hardy's novels about the struggle into love of his Wessex men and women; the paintings of Madonna and Child, of the human body or of bodiless light shimmering away outline and form which Lawrence discusses; and the religious tradition which has included both the Song of Solomon and the concept of the mystic marriage of Christ with his church - all of these different but related areas reflected upon in the "Study", religion, painting, Hardy's art, lead naturally to a careful consideration of the problem of human marriage and the nature and significance of the sexual act.

It is this aspect of the "Study" more than any other, perhaps, which convinces readers that the "Study" cannot be taken seriously as knowledge or thought, that it is merely another example of a Lawrentian obsession, a ranting on cosmic sexuality of the most trivial sort. However,

several answers can be made to such criticism. First, that sexual problems are important to Hardy's novels and thus require some examination and understanding in any criticism of those novels and that the sense of Lawrence's comments on marriage in the "Study" is balanced, wise, mature, and humane. Second, that many of the finest thinkers in the church and many of Christianity's most compelling mystics found it necessary to use sexual imagery to speak their deepest religious discoveries; and that Lawrence, far from being idiosyncratic or obsessive, is simply taking his place in a very ancient tradition. Third, that sex, in our age of impersonal "objective" knowledge which tries to escape the fact of its rootedness in a particular human life and body, is too often ignored as an important, central area of human experience which can teach us a great deal about ourselves and lead to further discovery about the nature of reality. Sex is so central to our lives that we tend to overlook it, take it for granted, set it to one side, when we are doing our thinking or research. Examples can be given of the mistakes, omissions, or blindnesses to which such an attitude can lead. For instance, Mendel's great insight into the nature of hereditary characteristics - their "all or nothing" behaviour that accounted for the child of a blue-eyed mother and a brown-eyed father having not bluey-brown eyes but either brown or blue - this insight came from attending more closely to a fact everyone took for granted, that the mating of a man and a woman led to the birth of not a half man/half woman, but either a male or a female. Biologists, in fact, pay very close attention to sexuality in all species and see it as a very central issue indeed; the development of sexual reproduction, in which two organisms continued to exist separately from their progeny, coincided with the

beginning of death. No longer did a cell merely split in two in order to reproduce, thus living on in its "children"; it had to face individual death while its offspring lived on, apart from it.

The implications of sexuality in all areas of life have yet to be fully understood. Why are we divided in this way? What are the real, what only the imaginary or socially conditioned differences between men and women? Why should a female cardinal be one colour and the male another? Why was life polarised for reproduction? Why did death have to come into existence in this frightening, final form? Why are we individuals each with his own beginning and own end, rather than organisms undergoing an eternal, gradual process of multiplication and change?

Lawrence doesn't attempt to answer all of these questions. He does, however, take the problem of human sexuality seriously and explores it, particularly as it relates to art, religion, psychology or wholeness within the self, and human relationships. At the close of the "Study" he turns again to the flowering of the poppy as an expression of all of these things - the life of a work of art, the religious consciousness of wholeness, but primarily the wondrous meeting of two separate beings in the inexplicable union of true relation.

> But when the two clasp hands, a moment, male and female, clasp hands and are one, the poppy, the gay poppy flies into flower again; and when the two fling their arms about each other, the moonlight runs and clashes against the shadow; and when the two toss back their hair, all the larks break out singing; and when they kiss on the mouth, a lovely human utterance is heard again - and so it is. (p. 516)

All of the images converge here in the last paragraph of the "Study"; motion/stability, Law/Love, Father/Son, Dark/Light, Body/Spirit are all brought together in this union of male and female, yet with a heightened

awareness of the separate, special complex nature and value of each opposition as Lawrence has studied it on its own in the "Study".

However, although religion, art, Hardy and the individual man or woman are all somehow present in the brave flowering of the poppy or the brave burning of the phoenix Lawrence described in Chapter I, this passage and others like it in the "Study" can also stand alone as a celebration of human love which compares with Donne's love poetry in its vitality and beauty. How similar is the note of joy and adventure they share, the belief in the possible wholeness of love, its body and spirit, and in the union of thought and feeling. Lawrence's words on the venture into the unknown of the other in love, "the inexhaustible riches lain under unknown skies over unknown seas" (see p. 492), recall Donne's gladness.

> License my roving hands, and let them go
> Before, behind, between, above, below.
> O my America, my new-found-land!
> My kingdom, safeliest when with one man manned,
> My mine of precious stones, my empery,
> How blest am I in this discovering thee!
> To enter in these bonds is to be free 102

Donne's exploration of the problem of the unity and separateness of two in marriage is done in "A Valediction Forbidding Mourning" through the same image of the circle which Lawrence uses in Chapters VI and VII of the "Study". Lawrence writes,

> The supreme effort each man makes, for himself, is the effort to clasp as hub the woman who shall be the axle, compelling him to true motion, without aberration . . . . In eternity, where infinite motion becomes rest, the two may be one. But until eternity man is man. Until eternity, there shall be this separateness, this interaction of man upon woman, male upon female, this suffering, this delight, this imperfection . . . . In infinity, the spinning of the wheel upon the hub may be a frictionless whole, complete, an unbroken sleep that is infinite, motion that is utter rest, a duality that is sheerly one. (pp. 444-445)

Donne uses the conceit of the drawing compass instead of that of the wheel. If his soul and the soul of his beloved be separate, two,

> . . . they are two so
> As stiff twin compasses are two;
> Thy soul, the fixed foot, makes no show
> To move, but doth if the other do.
>
> And though it in the center sit,
> Yet, when the other far doth roam,
> It leans, and hearkens after it,
> And grows erect as that comes home.
>
> Such wilt thou be to me, who must
> Like the other foot obliquely run;
> Thy firmness draws my circle just,
> And makes me end where I begun. 103

The celebration of the mystery of love - which finds life and rebirth through death, through submission to the unknown other, which finds unity beyond, even through, opposition - is present throughout the "Study" from the very first chapter where Lawrence insists that Dido's intensest life, her immortality, like that of the phoenix, was in the very flames which destroyed her. Like the phoenix and like the blazing scarlet poppy, "the flame was all the story and all triumph" (p. 399). One can only point to the similarity in spirit to Donne, to the profound belief that fullness of life came not from mere continued existence or material success and security but from the forward adventure into the unknown - the unknown of one's own possibility, of another person, of a hidden greater reality. In "The Canonization", Donne makes clear to a questioner that a ruined fortune or failed worldly ambition have little effect on his essential life, his discovery of the beloved.

> . . . we in us find the eagle and the dove.
> The phoenix riddle hath more wit
> By us; we two being one, are it.
> So, to one neutral thing both sexes fit.
> We die and rise the same, and prove
> Mysterious by this love. 104

5. Epistemology. Lawrence's exploration of this mystery of human love is an important part of his whole thought about the nature of perception in the "Study". Just as, if we are to know another human being at all, we must first believe that the other person exists as a reality distinct from ourselves and that we are capable of making contact with that reality, we must also believe that beyond us exists an unknown which we can enter and explore if we are ever to make discoveries about it. Like a scientist who must be committed to the existence of a solution to his problem before he will ever devote time to the search for it, let alone find it, we must believe that coherence exists to be found before we can ever make the imaginative leap to uncover it. Further, just as human love is rooted in individual bodies - as Donne said, "Love's mysteries in souls do grow, But yet the body is his book"[105] - so does all of our knowledge have its roots in the whole consciousness of different individuals, this whole consciousness necessarily including mind and body.

Lawrence and Michael Polanyi not only share in this insistence on the bodily rootedness of all our knowledge. They also agree that extreme self-consciousness about our bodies can prevent any true thought or creative action or genuine relationship entirely. Lawrence expresses this in terms of the sexual act in Chapter IX of the "Study" when he differentiates between the two attitudes to love. The true attitude believes in the loved one as the unknown other; the alternative conception is to see the lover as an extension of oneself, something existing for one's own pleasure and gratification. The sensationalism of this second attitude is a result of self-consciousness, attending to the body in itself, and it leads nowhere.

> Shall I not enjoy the strange motion of the stranger,
> like a pleasant sensation of silk and warmth against me,

> stirring unknown fibres? Shall I not take this enjoyment without venturing out in dangerous waters, losing myself, perhaps destroying myself seeking the unknown? (p. 492)

Lawrence feels that if a man persists in this self-conscious stance, the "constant reaction upon himself at length dulls his senses and his sensibility, and makes him mechanical, automatic" (p. 491). Polanyi states a similar belief about the dead-end we face if we attend to the body in itself.

> Our body is always in use as the basic instrument of our intellectual and practical control over our surroundings. Hence in all our waking hours we are subsidiarily aware of our body within our focal awareness of our surroundings. And, of course, our body is more than a mere instrument. To be aware of our body in terms of the things we know and do, is to feel alive. This awareness is an essential part of our existence as sensuous active persons. 106

Polanyi does not have Lawrence's force of expression, but the essential thought is very similar. To attend to the senses, the body, in themselves rather than to be aware of them subsidiarily as we attend to the discovery of another human being or the world around us, is to lose oneself in a circle of isolation and sensationalism. Yet this making the gratification of the senses a conscious aim in itself seems to be what happens when we have a false ideal of knowledge in which the senses and the body have no place. They assert themselves independently if they cannot have their full place.

Lawrence is often referred to as a prophet of blood consciousness and an early letter of his to Ernest Collings is frequently quoted (17th January, 1913).

> My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We

> can go wrong in our minds. But what our blood
> feels and believes and says, is always true. 107

Yet this is only the beginning of a thought, a first strong reversion from a false ideal of knowledge, the inconsistency and impossibility of which Lawrence sensed right from the start of his writing career. It is an over-reaction in the other direction, and even by the writing of the "Study" approximately two years later, Lawrence has developed and qualified his response, complicated and strengthened his thought on the nature of thought itself. His belief in the supremacy of the flesh over mind has become a belief in their necessary opposition, interaction, for the discovery of all knowledge. The body is still very important and, he feels, this importance needs special emphasis because it has been so long denied; but it is man in his wholeness, flesh and spirit, which Lawrence seeks to understand in the "Study". This insistence on the wholeness of man is the mainstay of his argument for "personal knowledge".

Conclusions

Lawrence's reading of Hardy's novels involved him in some major questions not only about the thought of the novels themselves, but also about the aims and methods of art, about the nature of religious belief, about the limits and possibilities of human relationship, particularly marriage. But the question which underlies and organises all these is this: how does man live with an ideal of knowledge which, when carried to its logical conclusion, denies him life? How can we get a better idea, one which acknowledges that a man's finest thought is achieved when he is being most completely and intensely himself, rather than when he is trying to eliminate his own being most carefully from his own ideas? Is there not a truer conception of human intelligence which would recognise the worth of Hardy's personal knowledge, the complex thought of a

painting or of a poem, the discipline of religious conviction rather than its comfort or escape? The "Study" may have started as an examination of Hardy, leading towards the long Chapter IX; but by the time Lawrence finished his analysis of Jude, his thought had developed further and opened out beyond Hardy's fiction, as Lawrence was to try to establish conditions in which Hardy's particular achievement could be truly recognised.

The"Study of Thomas Hardy" is a study of the active nature of human perception, our ability both to shape and to discover reality. I suggest that, although it is an early work, it belongs to the central Lawrence and stands with his best work and thought; the theology, the art criticism and the literary criticism found in its pages can stand on their own as work of high quality in their respective disciplines. Leavis in his book D. H. Lawrence: Novelist repeatedly refers to the psychology books, Fantasia of the Unconscious and Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, as the major Lawrentian non-fiction which should be read in relation to the novels. I would like to see the "Study" recommended in their place. In comparison to it, the psychology books are flippant. They use a scientific terminology which does not seem thoroughly under the control of Lawrence's understanding and which is frequently an obstacle to the reader. However, the language of the Judeo-Christian tradition which is found in the "Study" was familiar to Lawrence since childhood and strengthened his powers of expression. Although during the year after the "Study" was written, Lawrence, responding to Bertrand Russell's suggestion, decided that he had been "much too Christian, in my philosophy" and that the early Greeks he had been reading would help him change the

"muddiness . . . of all my Christian religiousity"[108], he never really eliminated the biblical resonances in his prose and he returned overtly to this reliance on the Christian tradition, even for purposes of criticising Christianity, in later works such as The Man who Died, Apocalypse and "Apropos of Lady Chatterley's Lover". "The Crown" is a good example of the kind of tediousness Lawrence could lose himself in when he tried to take on an unfamiliar terminology, as are the psychology books, to a lesser extent.

While the psychology books bear marks of the uncertainty of the years in which Aaron's Rod was written, the "Study" is very closely related to The Rainbow, one of Lawrence's finest works. The "Study" also sheds light on Lawrence's thought in Women in Love, Lady Chatterley's Lover and The Man Who Died, and it seems to have had some direct influence on Lawrence's later essays on art and on the novel - "Art and Morality", "Why the Novel Matters", "Morality and the Novel". The central insistence on the artistic effort to discover and state true realtion, a lively balance, and not a conclusion arbitrarily arrived at by the artist, is the voice of the essential Lawrence, the responsible thought-adventurer, not the part-time prophet of blood-consciousness, dark gods or solar plexuses and lumbar ganglia.

Not only do I think the "Study" ought to be recognised as one of Lawrence's finest non-fiction writings[109] and recommended as helpful reading in relation to The Rainbow and Women in Love; I also think that the originality of Lawrence's use of language in the "Study" should be acknowledged. The "Study" challenges any simple distinctions we should like to make between the kind of language one uses for novels, poems and

short stories and the kind of language one uses for the straightforward expression of thought in non-fiction prose. The first kind we expect to be imaginative, impassioned, perhaps innovative; we expect the phrasing to have some beauty of its own, to be written with particular care. The more pedestrian prose in which we state, challenge or develop our knowledge is supposed to be dispassionate, clear, following all the necessary rules of grammar and diction without ever taking advantage of what we call "poetic license"; it is expected that such prose be largely paraphrasable, the exact form of expression having little intrinsic value. The trouble with such a division, however, is that it too often excuses poetry and fiction from the necessity to be clear and intelligible as well as difficult, and it condemns our everyday prose to boredom.

How does the "Study" fit into these categories? The use of language is personal, impassioned, poetic, precise; but the "Study" is not a novel, play or poem. Nor can it be classed merely as a personal essay because the tone and intention of it is not mere self-revelation but a statement of true knowledge. The writing has clearly been done with great care and attention; it cannot be satisfactorily paraphrased. Yet it does not encourage us to regard it merely as a thing of beauty to be contemplated and enjoyed without needing to take its thought seriously. Is it art, then, or is it discursive prose?

It seems to be a form of what Lawrence, in Studies in Classic American Literature, was later to call "art-speech". Lawrence is testing one thought against another, metaphysic against life experience, direct statement against image, all in an attempt to discover true relations and coherence, much in the same way he tenses one character against another, challenges his own ideas in the midst of the actual life he records and

creates, alternates his thinking logically with his thinking symbolically within a novel. His use of language is innovative; he shows us how much more some of the words we use could mean, like "male" and "female" or "Love" and "Law". Because such an enrichment of the significance of the words we use involves an enrichment of the whole articulate framework with which we talk and think about reality, Lawrence has also wrought a subtle change in us. As Polanyi puts it, "to modify our idiom is to modify the frame of reference within which we shall henceforth interpret our experience; it is to modify ourselves".[110]

Lawrence's use of language is by no means self-indulgently poetic, merely high-flown rhetoric. It is, in fact, the unusual precision with which he defines and weights the words he uses which is one of the most striking characteristics of the "Study". A strict linguistic ideal of rigorous exactitude in our use of words, words which have set meanings and are to be used according to fixed rules, is impossible since each time we use a word to apply to a new experience, to an ever-changing world, we change it slightly, we modify its meaning. But Lawrence strikes a balance between such an ideal of linguistic strictness and its opposite, irritating looseness and inconsistency of expression, by his procedure in the "Study". Within the context of the "Study", while his thought is building and coming to expression, he is simultaneously working to define the meaning of the words he uses, as he uses them. He carefully establishes the important weight of their past usage, in human experience, in the life of a particular tradition, ways they have been misused or had their meanings distorted or limited as well as extended - such as the dimension added by Christianity to the word "love", but the small thing made of it by current usage. Then he begins the process of complex definition, showing what a word can mean

when used to discuss a particular painting, or a problem in a novel, or a religious doctrine. As his thought progresses, Lawrence continually re-examines the central words and concepts he is using, complicating, enriching and also limiting their meaning, creating the necessary tools for his intellectual task. By the time he reaches his conclusion, these words have taken on a full, specific meaning in the context of the "Study"; and Lawrence's work of complex definition has also shown us a new, possible range of significance for some of these words - love, law, marriage, Holy Spirit, male, female - even apart from that context. He has strengthened and broadened our powers of articulation, our means of interpreting experience, and has thus succeeded, however slightly, in changing us, in expanding our mode of being in the world.

Finally, the "Study" should not only be placed with Lawrence's best work and thought, should not only be recognised as a remarkable experiment in the use of language, as an attempt to bring the intellectual power of art-speech into non-fiction prose; it should also - and primarily - be acknowledged as an important early study of the false ideal of knowledge which we have been labouring under too long. The "Study" attempts to replace this impossible ideal with a true conception of the way in which we think and learn and establish knowledge and to re-examine the role of religion and of art in our search for truth. In Lawrence's concept, religion is a discipline of aspiration and attention and art is a complex form of thought and discovery.

The great importance of Hardy's struggle for Lawrence was that it showed the deadlock an artist must encounter if he wants both to be an artist and to accept the theory of knowledge of empirical philosophy.

In studying Hardy's work, Lawrence realised that he would have to develop his own theory of knowledge before he could realise his full powers, before he could proceed with full energy and consciousness as an artist, a whole man, who attended with both mind and body to the unknown greater reality he would discover.

Lawrence's insistence in the "Study" on thought as an activity of the whole man is echoed in a short poem he wrote much later.

> Thought, I love thought.
> But not the jaggling and twisting of already existent ideas.
> I despise that self-important game.
> Thought is the welling up of unknown life into consciousness.
> Thought is the testing of statements on the touchstone of
> the conscience.
> Thought is gazing on to the face of life, and reading what
> can be read,
> Thought is pondering over experience, and coming to
> conclusion.
> Thought is not a trick, or an exercise, or a set of dodges
> Thought is a man in his wholeness wholly attending. 111

This conception of thought - "man in his wholeness wholly attending" - meant the re-evaluation of art, art as the work of the whole man, a unity of thought and feeling, as a serious mode of establishing human knowledge.

Art is no longer seen as simply an activity of making patterns, of ordering in one's mind what is disordered in reality, for the purpose of consoling men or diverting their attention from the painful fact of chaos. Such an aesthetic is inadequate for two reasons. First, the form-giving power is not a power belonging exclusively to artists. We all attend selectively to reality; we all select or organise experience in some way. A paranoid man organises all of his experience to fit a particular pattern and this pattern is not usually even very comforting; how is his created order any different from that of a great artist's? Certainly the answer must be that his pattern is false, a sheer fabrication, while the artist's

statement attempts to be more truthful to reality.[112] The artist significantly organises experience because he is attending to reality and making discovery; the paranoid's organisation of experience is not significant to other men, for it only expresses a private fantasy, not a truth about reality. The artist's attention also differs from the ordinary man's selective attention to experience in that he both sees more particulars, minute but important detail to which the ordinary man might be oblivious, and he simultaneously has a greater power of seeing wholes. He has a more vigorous intelligence, able to sustain his attention to these details as he dwells in them, hoping to discover an important relation between them. The artist has a greater power of seeing a whole relation or the possibility of it in what to everyone else seems only disparate, disconnected events, people, or things of little importance. We cannot define an artist as someone who simply makes false orders like the rest of us; what makes his work valuable is that the orders he discovers are true, they are orders which we would probably never have had the intellectual energy to uncover, and they are orders which take in more aspects of human experience than our more limited patterns would have been able to include.

The second reason why art cannot very helpfully be defined as consoling form which helps us to bear the chaos of existence is that the assumption that existence is all mere contingency or chaos misrepresents our own experience. In fact, a certain measure of order and coherence is such a basic part of our lives that we take it for granted, and we tend to over-emphasise the moments of disorder because they stand out so clearly. When we rise in the morning from a bed which has supported us in a prone

position all night, put on a piece of clothing which fits us, turn on the water for a shower which runs full and hot, cook an egg in a pan and sit in a chair at a table to eat it and then run to catch the eight o'clock bus, we hardly notice all the forces which are responding in an ordered way to fill our needs. We are upset if the bed collapses, if the clothes are too tight or the shower cold, if the pan melts or the bus delays until 8.30 because these are exceptions. I am not trying to argue that all experience is nicely ordered to our expectations and desires, only that some moments of coherence do exist in our lives in the midst of chaos and contingency and we must acknowledge their presence if we are not to distort the facts. Even during times of the most gratuitous suffering, war, famine, earthquake, monsoon, the sun has continued to rise and set.[113] <u>It is as much an act of faith</u> to believe that life is ultimately chaotic disorder in the face of the evidence as it is to believe that life expresses, ultimately, a meaningful order.

Thus the task of the artist is not to make false and beautiful orders in the midst of total disorder. The artist is a student of reality and his task is to attend with his whole being to the unknown he would discover. The "Study of Thomas Hardy" is an attempt to generate in us the heuristic tension and belief necessary to the true thought-adventure, to call forth in us the necessary energy of attention - "look at the unknown"!

Lawrence once wrote that he wished philosophy and the novel could join forces.

> Plato's Dialogues are queer little novels. It seems to me it was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split. They used to be one, right from the days of myth. Then they went and parted, like a nagging married couple, with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and that beastly Kant.

> So the novel went sloppy, and philosophy went abstract-dry. The two should come together again - in the novel. 114

This wish is especially interesting in the light of the relationship between Lawrence's thought and that of Michael Polanyi. They are a novelist and a philosopher working on the same problem, the problem of knowledge, but in our century, unfortunately, their tasks are divided. Lawrence stated his case first in the "Study" in 1914 and developed it further during his life. "What is real thinking?" is a question he asked himself many times. But we were not alert enough to read his language, and he was dismissed as a prophet of blood-consciousness and the dark gods. Michael Polanyi's more abstract, systematic work seems to have been necessary in order for these ideas on the true nature of knowledge to be taken seriously; we can only be grateful that he devoted himself to this laborious task, argued faithfully and in painstaking detail, never losing sight of his true aim and bringing his work to completion. The dismaying fact is that even Polanyi's work has not yet received the attention it requires and the recognition it deserves.

Lawrence wanted to bring the novel and philosophy together again. Perhaps this desire accounts for the philosophical quality of his best novels and for the fact that his philosophical writings seem at times to be partly novels. The art-speech of the "Study of Thomas Hardy" is one example of Lawrence's attempt to reunite art and philosophy.

I am aware that this thesis is not written in art-speech, a fact which seems to contradict the whole force of my argument. I could protest that, had I written it in art-speech, it would have been dismissed as unscholarly work, something which was perhaps imaginative but probably too easy to write and certainly not a document giving evidence of a capable

intelligence. However, to be honest, the real reason that I foreswore any attempt to write in art-speech is that it would have been too difficult; it would have required greater organising power, more sustained energy of thought, more skilful and more economical use of language than I felt myself capable of.

Our academic mind-set is such that we tend to see analytic language as truly intelligent, while imaginative or "synthetic" language is simply more beautiful or more interesting. Our evaluation should be changed. In fact, we do treat imaginative literature as if it were a higher form than discursive prose, but we surround it with a mystique which disparages while it elevates. We treat great novelists, poets, dramatists, all artists, with much more reverence than we do analytic, scholarly writers, but we insist on separating the imagination and reason, feeling and thought. We almost worship our great artists, but we say they cannot think.

Lawrence until the end of his life argued otherwise.

> . . . the imagination is a more powerful and more comprehensive flow of consciousness than our ordinary flow. In the flow of true imagination we know in full, mentally and physically at once, in a greater enkindled awareness. At the maximum of our imagination we are religious. 115

As early as the "Study" he was saying this, that art was simply our highest form of thinking. Or, as Ursula was to put it bluntly to Loerke in Women in Love, "The world of art is only the truth about the real world, that's all - but you are too far gone to see it".[116]

Footnotes - Chapter VII

[1] Found in Kermode's Modern Essays (London, 1958), pp. 153-181.

[2] Found in Proceedings of the British Academy (London, 1962).

[3] Lawrence's essential criticism of Christianity as stated in the "Study" is that it too often irresponsibly retreats from this creative and difficult conflict. "Christianity ends in submission, in recognizing and submitting to the law of the other person. 'Thou shalt love thy enemy'" (p. 512). It is not primarily about Christian views on sex and marriage, as Martin Jarret-Kerr seems to think in his book D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence (London, 1961). Jarrett-Kerr spends most of his time trying to prove that Lawrence's criticisms of Christianity mainly show Lawrence's ignorance of true Christianity, especially as it relates to sex, because Lawrence and Christians essentially agree. At times Jarrett-Kerr's point is well-taken; at others one feels he misrepresents either the church or Lawrence in his attempts to make them say the same thing. On the whole, he concentrates too much on Lawrence's attitudes towards sex as they relate to Christian ones and feels he has dealt with Lawrence's critique of Christianity quite adequately once he has shown how much Lawrence misunderstood the church's view of sex. (One should read "Apropos of Lady Chatterley's Lover" in Phoenix II before trying to show how Lawrence failed to appreciate Christian attitudes towards sex and marriage.) However, Jarrett-Kerr deals hardly at all with Lawrence's criticism of the church's frequent over-emphasis on love and its possible effects; when he does he simply directs us to a few theologians and to "true" Christianity (whatever that may be) and protests that Lawrence's analysis is one-sided. Jarrett-Kerr makes a major mistake here; he fails to see that Lawrence is fully aware of the rich tradition "true" Christianity has, a tradition which includes the Old Testament and therefore includes within it the full tension of Love and Law. He also fails to see that Lawrence's criticism is not aimed at the Judeo-Christian tradition in its fulness; Lawrence is challenging a particular emphasis at a particular point in time, a challenge which I feel he is justified in making. In the "Study", Lawrence shows how the Judeo-Christian tradition has within itself resources upon which to draw to redress serious imbalance - one of these resources being the doctrine of the trinity, particularly of the Holy Ghost.

The point to be made here is that Jarrett-Kerr's book is not the adequate treatment of Lawrence's critique of Christianity which it might be thought to be. A great deal remains to be done on this subject.

[4] It is perhaps worth noting that Norman Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millenium had first come out the preceding year, 1957. Cohn's book was a detailed study of the influence of apocalyptic ideas on Western culture since Joachim's time.

[5] Other sources Kermode cites in Lawrence are Frank E. Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History (1965) and A. L. Morton, The Everlasting Gospel (1958). In The Sense of an Ending he mentions many others.

[6] Kermode, Lawrence (London, 1973), pp. 41-42.

[7] Ibid., p. 56.

[8] Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[9] "Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types", pp. 153-154.

[10] Ibid., p. 166. Kermode's criticism of Lawrence is essentially the same in "Spenser and the Allegorists", 1962.

[11] Ibid., p. 154.

[12] The implication of the sentence, "His guidebook was the Book of Revelation, as it was Lawrence's, from his youth to his last book, called Apocalypse" is inaccurate and seems to me unfairly weighted to support Kermode's argument. Lawrence certainly knew Revelation well, as he did the whole Bible, but anyone who had read Apocalypse closely, with Lawrence's statements of aversion to the Book of Revelation, would doubt very much if Lawrence would have ever acknowledged it as his guidebook through life.

Kermode's reference to Lawrence's interest in the occult deserves brief mention because Kermode refers to it so often, as if it were an accepted fact. Perhaps it goes along with the kind of assumption present in a statement of T. S. Eliot's that Lawrence wanted a "religion of power and magic, of control rather than propitiation" (quoted in Jarrett-Kerr, D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence, p. 136). If we let Lawrence speak for himself, however, we find in his letters (L.M., p. 519; 27th July 1917), "I hate the exoteric forms. Magic also has interested me a good deal. But it is all part of the past, and part of a past self in us: and it is no good going back, even to the wonderful things. They are ultimately vieux jeux." Or, in Studies in Classic American Literature, Lawrence speaks of true reverence which is not "impudent and materialistic, like spiritualism and magic and all that range of pretentious materialism . . . the first part of reverence is the acceptance of the fact that the Holy Ghost will never materialize: will never be anything but a ghost . . . they take to psychic tricks. It is a certain sign of the disintegration of the psyche in a man, a much more so in a woman, when she takes to spiritualism, and table-rapping, and occult messages, or witchcraft and supernatural powers of that sort. When men want to be supernatural, be sure that something has gone wrong in their natural stuff". (Studies in Classic American Literature, pp. 117-118.) No matter how much Lawrence knew about the occult, he also knew his own judgment of it, a fact Kermode never acknowledges in his Lawrence.

[13] See Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages, Vol. I: The Relation of Heterodoxy to Dissent c. 1250 - c. 1450 (Manchester, 1967), the opening pages in which Leff states part of his aim in writing his history of heresy as that of counteracting certain trends in the treatment of heresy started by Cohn's work. See Claus-Peter Closen, Anabaptism: A Social History, 1525 - 1618 (London, 1972), p. xvi. "Psychological and sociological theories in the manner of Karl Mannheim and Norman Cohn are fascinating, but when the historian investigates the evolution of actual Anabaptist groups in specific towns, these speculations turn out to be highly simplistic and of little help . . . brilliant theories are based on insufficient knowledge and persistently contradict the documentary evidence."

[14] Lawrence, p. 59. It should be noted that a great deal of Kermode's evidence for this statement is suspect. He draws tenuous relations between Lawrence and Houston Chamberlain, John Noyes, and Edward Carpenter, none of which are convincingly substantiated by Lawrence's letters or writings and which certainly do not seem centrally important to his work. An example of the way Kermode tries to build these connections is his attempt to relate Noyes and Lawrence by saying that Lawrence occasionally argued for polygamy in the letters and in The Boy in the Bush. Only one or two letters and a novel which Lawrence co-authored can be pointed to as evidence of Lawrence's interest in this subject; it was certainly not a pressing concern in the way that, say, marriage itself was to him. Lawrence and Noyes on the subject of marriage and sex are much more different than they are alike.

[15] Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (London, 1957), 1970 reprint, p. 274.

[16] The Sense of an Ending, p. 14.

[17] Ibid., p. 9.

[18] Gordon Leff points out that this was in fact the distinction between the original ideas of Joachim de Fiore - which were mainly symbolic and poetic - and the form they took in the writings of others who reshaped them for their own purposes, making definite predictions. Joachite ideas were declared heretical only when they were recast after Joachim's death to describe recognisable people, places, events. See Leff, pp. 70-78.

[19] Phoenix II, p. 227.

[20] Sagar, p. 99.

[21] "Education of the People", Phoenix, p. 612.

[22] Lawrence, p. 41.

23 Ibid., p. 77.

24 I give Lawrence's comments in full. "Out of the ruin and chaos which followed the death of Innocent III and Frederick II, strange thoughts arose. Men came forward declaring themselves prophets. They told curious and terrible things, and people were filled with dread. In 1254 a book was published called Introduction to the Everlasting Gospel, supposed to contain the teaching of a famous seer or prophet, the Abbot Joachim, who had died at Naples in 1202. In this book it said that Judaism was the revelation of the Father: Christianity was the revelation of the Son: now men must prepare for the revelation of the Holy Ghost.

Wild ideas spread everywhere. Men began to expect the reign of the Holy Ghost. They said that before Jesus was born the Father had reigned: after this, until their own day, the Son had reigned; now the Holy Ghost would reign. In the Everlasting Gospel it was stated that when the Holy Ghost began to reign the papacy and the priesthood would cease to exist. There would be no more church to govern the souls of men. So the popes condemned the Everlasting Gospel as wicked, heretical, false doctrine. None the less it had a great power over the minds of men." Movements in European History (Oxford, 1921), 1925edition, pp. 193-194. This passage is simply a straightforward statement of the facts, (kept brief for a short, introductory history book) as we know them today.

25 Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

26 Cohn, p. 13.

27 Ibid.

28 Leff, pp. 52, 64.

29 Ibid., pp. 159-161.

30 See Cohn pp. 110-112, 84, 283. In an extreme form, asceticism became self-punishment, hatred of the body, as in the Flagellants. See Cohn, pp. 143, 129, 137.

31 See Cohn, pp. 271, 276.

32 "The medieval prophet formed his elect group and set out for the city of God, at the same time urging new modes of sexual conduct on his flock." Lawrence, p. 56.

33 Cohn, pp. 119-120.

[34] See Cohn, pp. 151, 156, 174-180, 269-270. Also see Leff, pp. 328, 397, 399. Such ideas about one's perfection no matter what one did could also lead to the justification of murder or violence in a mass way which Lawrence hated. See Cohn 122-124, 213.

[35] Ibid., p. 179.

[36] The Sense of an Ending, pp. 12-13.

[37] Ibid., p. 14.

[38] Ibid., p. 28.

[39] Cohn, p. 13.

[40] We could also examine the great differences between Joachite evaluations of the Age of the Father or of the Old Testament. While Lawrence stressed the important religious discoveries of that era, all too often Christian apocalyptics dismissed it entirely as an age of sin or of fear and servitude. Some saw the Old Testament as valueless (see Cohn, pp. 108, 123). Certainly Joachim's idea of a straight progression from the first age to the third implies a judgment on the limitation and bondage of the first age, rather than an appreciation of the life it opened to us.

[41] Cohn, p. 108.

[42] Leff, p. 71. See also pp. 74-75. Leff summarises the progression from one age to the next in Joachim's doctrine. The first age was one of: law, knowledge, servile servitude, suffering, fear. Second age: grace, partial wisdom, filial servitude, action, faith. Third age: greater grace, full understanding, liberty, contemplation, charity. Again, the third age is not at all similar to Lawrence's hope for the activity of the Holy Spirit.

[43] Cohn, pp. 84-85, 285-286.

[44] Cohn, p. 129; Leff, p. 74.

[45] Cohn, pp. 20, 26-27, 29, 213-214.

[46] See, for instance, "The Crown" in Phoenix II or Twilight in Italy, particularly "The Lemon Gardens".

[47] L.M., p. 681; 2nd January 1922.

48 L.M., pp. 651-652; H. T. Moore suggests the date of this letter as 8th May, 1921. Lawrence expressed a very similar feeling in a letter to Rolf Gardiner, 4th July, 1924. "I am essentially a fighter - to wish me peace is bad luck - except the fighter's peace. And I have known many things, that may never be unified: Ceylon, the Buddha, temples, Australian bush, Mexico and Testihuacan, Sicily, London, New York, Paris, Munich - don't talk to me of unison. No more unison among man than among the wild animals - coyotes and chipmunks and porcupines and deer and rattlesnakes. They all live in these hills - in the unison of avoiding one another. As for willing the world into shape - better chaos a thousand times than any 'perfect world'." L.M., p. 796.

49 See Cohn, pp. 15, 27-28, 30, 60, 98-102, 122, 201-202.

50 The Sense of an Ending, p. 103.

51 "Lawrence and the Apocalyptic Types", p. 166.

52 L.M., p. 779.

53 Lawrence, pp. 138-139.

54 See The Sense of an Ending, p. 103.

55 Ibid., pp. 3-4, 166, 173.

56 Ibid., p. 11.

57 Ibid., p. 164

58 Ibid., p. 167.

59 L.M., p. 324.

60 It seems it probably is the "Study" Lawrence is referring to in the 26th February, 1915 letter to Russell (L.M., p. 324). See also Sagar, p. 40, on the "Study" and "The Crown". There is no such word as le savaire in the French language. Harry T. Moore suggests it may possibly be a mistake for le savoir. It could also, I think, be an invention of Lawrence's combining le savoir with le savoir-faire, implying a combination of practical and theoretical knowledge.

61 Apocalypse, p. 6.

62 L.M., p. 362.

63 P.K., pp. 199-200.

64 The Sense of an Ending, p. 144.

65 Erich Auerbach, "The Idea of Man in Literature", Literature and Religion, ed. Giles Gunn (London, 1971), p. 112. An early essay of Lawrence's on this view of art as beautiful order against the disorder of reality is "German Books: Thomas Mann" in Phoenix.

66 Ibid., p. 112.

67 This analysis is, of course, over simplified; the differences between Lawrence and Plato's views of art, philosophy and ultimate reality are discussed in Chapter III of this thesis, particularly their different emphases on the ideal or general and the particular. However, their disagreement is over a matter of emphasis more than anything else. As Auerbach observes, "Plato's love of the particular was his way to wisdom, the way described in Diotima's monologue", p. 110.

68 The Sense of an Ending, p. 137, 149.

69 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

70 The Sense of an Ending, p. 145.

71 Ibid., p. 137.

72 Ibid., p. 141.

73 Ibid., p. 139.

74 Ibid., p. 135.

75 This is a belief shared by both Polanyi and Plato, stated in the following way by Auerbach (p. 110): "Plato's love of the particular was his way to wisdom, the way described in Diotima's monologue. He achieved such unique expression because for him man's universal τέλος, or end, did not conflict with the individual nature and destiny of men, but was shaped and expressed in them".

76 L.M., p. 652; 8th May, 1921.

77 The Sense of an Ending, pp. 132-133.

78 Said by Lawrence of Russell in a letter, 16th August, 1915 (L.M., p. 360), commenting on Russell's seeming to treat Lawrence and his thought as simply a new taste or interesting sensation.

> He wants to be ultimately a free agent. That is what they all want, ultimately . . . that in their own souls they can be independent little gods, referred nowhere and to nothing, little mortal absolutes, secure from question.

79 Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Man", (Epistle I), ll. 259-268, 281-294, Eighteenth-Century English Literature, ed. Fussell, Tillotson, Waingrow (New York, 1969), p. 639.

80 Duke Maskell, "Frank Kermode's Lack of Prejudice", The Haltwhistle Quarterly, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), p. 54.

81 S.M., p. 21.

82 S.M., pp. 26-27.

83 P.K., p. xiii.

84 See Langford and Poteat, "Upon First Sitting Down to Read Personal Knowledge", Intellect and Hope (Durham, N.C., 1968), pp. 13-17.

85 Ibid., pp. 15, 17.

86 The Sense of an Ending, p. 40.

87 People making this criticism seem to feel they are only echoing Lawrence's own attitude anyway and that he would readily agree with them because he was all for blood-consciousness and sexuality and very opposed to mental consciousness. However, such critics have not read closely enough to see that Lawrence distinguished between a finer and a more limited and limiting form of mental consciousness and attacked only the latter. He did not appreciate being told he could not think (see L.M., p. 362), and he felt that a life without a further form of mental consciousness was restricted and therefore sad. Visiting his family in the Derbyshire mining country a year after the "Study" had been written, Lawrence wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell (27th December, 1915), "Altogether the life here is so dark and violent; it all happens in the senses, powerful and rather destructive: no mind nor mental consciousness, unintellectual. These men are passionate enough, sensuous, dark - God, how all my boyhood comes back - so violent, so dark, the mind always dark and without understanding, the senses violently active. It makes me sad beyond words.

These men, whom I love so much - and the life has such a power over me - they understand mentally so horribly: only industrialism, only wages and money and machinery. They can't think anything else . . . . The strange, dark, sensual life, so violent and hopeless at the bottom, combined with this horrible paucity and materialism of mental consciousness, makes me so sad, I could scream". (L.M., pp. 404-405).

88 L.M., p. 324. See footnote 60 above in this chapter.

89 See P.K., p. 130.

90 "To take cognizance focally of a subsidiary element of a comprehension is a new experience, and an act which is usually hazardous. The conclusion thus reached is in the nature of an explanation", P.K., p. 115.

91 Lawrence, p. 41.

92 Samuel Johnson, "Life of Pope", Eighteenth-Century English Literature, ed. Fussell, Tillotson, Waingrow (New York, 1969), pp. 1100, 1101.

93 Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the Trinity (Welwyn, Herts., 1943), seventh impression 1964, p. 183.* It should be stressed again how different Lawrence is (and, indeed, Hodgson is, in his orthodox Christianity) from Joseph Campbell in his treatment of the trinity. In The Hero with a Thousand Faces, Campbell writes,

* cf. the passage from Twilight in Italy quoted on pg. 350 of this thesis.

> Hence the personality or personalities of God - whether represented in trinitarian, dualistic, or unitarian terms, in polytheistic, monotheistic, or henotheistic terms, pictorially or verbally, as documented fact or as apocalyptic vision - no one should attempt to read or interpret as the final thing. The problem of the theologian is to keep his symbol translucent, so that it may not block out the very light it is supposed to convey . . . . The forms of sensibility and the categories of human thought, which are themselves manifestations of this power, so confine the mind that it is normally impossible not only to see, but even to conceive, beyond the colorful, fluid, infinitely various and bewildering phenomenal spectacle. The function of ritual and myth is to make possible, and then to facilitate, the jump-by-analogy. Forms and conceptions that the mind and its senses can comprehend are presented and arranged in such a way as to suggest a truth or openness beyond. And then, the conditions for meditation having been provided, the individual is left alone. Myth is but the penultimate; the ultimate is openness - that void,

> or being, beyond the categories - into which the mind must plunge alone and be dissolved. Therefore, God and the gods are only convenient means - themselves of the nature of the world of names and forms, though eloquent of, and ultimately conducive to, the ineffable. They are mere symbols to move and awaken the mind, and to call it past themselves. (pp. 236, 258)

Lawrence in the "Study" is certainly striving to see a "truth or openness beyond" but he is much less ready to let go of the particular, to dismiss it as mere symbol, than Campbell is. Like Polanyi, Lawrence insists that without the particular there is no wholeness, no "beyond"; the wholeness lies in a relation of the particulars, not in superseding them.

94 In addition to the "Study", see the later essays "The Novel" (Phoenix II) and "Why the Novel Matters" (Phoenix).

95 See also Erich Auerbach's interesting suggestion of the implications for Christian belief of the unparalleled naturalism of the story of Christ as told in the Bible. "What presumption to strive for theoretical serenity when Christ himself lived in continuous conflict! Inner tension was insuperable, and, like acceptance of earthly destiny, a necessary consequence of the story of Christ", p. 118. See pp. 116-119.

96 Henri, pp. 81, 29.

97 P.K., p. 380.

98 "Preface", p. 695. cf. p. 678, "For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: and though this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached were never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply. For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings . . . ."

99 L.M., pp. 748-749.

100 Chief examples of this trend would be Virginia Woolf and James Joyce, particularly Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (New York, 1964), first published 1916. See Chapter V, pp. 204-209, where Cranly is no more than a foil for the expression of Stephen's aesthetic theories. Throughout the novel we are limited to Stephen's consciousness; other characters exist insubstantially only as they flit across his field of vision. There is no one to challenge Stephen as Ursula challenges Birkin in Women in Love.

101 Wesley A. Kort, Shriven Selves: Religious Problems in Recent American Fiction (Philadelphia, 1972), p. 5; see also pp. 7-10. Kort discusses examples of confessional novels, works by De Vries, Malamud, Powers, Updike and Styron. Incidentally, Kort's discussion of the inconsistencies of Kermode's book The Sense of an Ending is particularly interesting. He points out that Kermode, in judging myths as naive, over-simplified, unsophisticated and out-dated, simultaneously develops an entire aesthetic which is deeply mythical. In The Sense of an Ending (p. 136) he speaks of the relation between the fiction-maker and chaos as a sexual one. An examination of this conception of the role of the artist in subduing the "female" dragon of chaos, leads Kort to comment, "Kermode has behind him an unrecognized plethora of myths" (Kort, p. 147). Further, Kermode's conception is limited; " . . . the interaction between potential and formative power is more extended than he suggests . . . . One creative act may be to tear down those forms which have become self-protective or self-sufficient, to reduce everything to the 'nauseous and viscous' once again. The religious man is not so afraid of chaos as Kermode seems to be, and he does not always take chaos as the natural situation, as Kermode seems to do. Getting down to potential and undifferentiatedness requires discipline, and the religious man had included for him in his calendar times when such work or discipline had to be taken on." (Kort, p. 147)

102 Donne, "Elegy XIX (To His Mistress Going to Bed)", ll. 25-31, Seventeenth-Century Prose and Poetry, Second Edition, ed. by A. M. Witherspoon and F. J. Warnke (New York, 1963), p. 753.

103 Donne, "A Valediction Forbidding Mourning", ll. 25-36, p. 747.

104 Donne, "The Canonization", ll. 22-27, p. 739.

105 Donne, "The Ecstasy", ll. 71-72, p. 748.

106 S.M., p. 31.

107 L.M., p. 180.

108 L.M., p. 352; H. T. Moore suggests the date 7th July, 1915, for this letter to Russell.

109 More work should also be done on "Apropos of Lady Chatterley's Lover" and "Introduction to Memoirs of the Foreign Legion" in Phoenix II, and "Introduction to These Paintings" in Phoenix (and in J. V. Davies, Lawrence on Hardy and Painting).

110 P.K., p. 105.

111 Last Poems, edited by Richard Aldington and Guiseppe Orioli (New York, 1933), p. 278; the poems were written in the autumn and winter of 1929 according to Sagar, p. 229.

112 See Harold G. McCurdy, "Personal Knowing and Making", Intellect and Hope, p. 324, 331. McCurdy is a psychologist, reflecting in this article on some aspects of his work in the light of Polanyi's thought.

113 Ibid., pp. 323-326. McCurdy discusses the many ways in which the world lets us shape it daily, ways we take for granted as well as more extraordinary coincidences, and concludes, "If we can tolerate neither the hypothesis of mere chance nor the hypothesis of supernatural intervention, we find ourselves being led to the conclusion that the tendency of the mind to organize is met by a corresponding tendency of the world to be organized . . . .", p. 330.

114 "Surgery for the Novel - or a Bomb", Phoenix, p. 520; first published in 1923.

115 "Introduction to these Paintings", Phoenix, p. 559; first published 1929. This essay deserves further attention as a statement of the late Lawrence on the possibilities of art and human consciousness, written without the earlier "ecstatic metaphysical language" of the "Study", making a "new effort of sense" (quotations from an unpublished essay by Morris Shapira, "D. H. Lawrence: Art Critic", p. 9; to be published as the introduction to a forthcoming collection of D. H. Lawrence's art criticism).

116 Women in Love, p. 422; Ch. XXIX, "Continental".

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