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School of Social Policy, Sociology, and Social Research

University of Kent

**‘Islam is the Solution’ as a Master Frame:
Reflections on Political Culture and Values in
Egypt**

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Abstract

In Egypt's political life, Islamist movements play a central role. There is a rich accumulation of scholarship on their politics, history, structure, and influence on social and religious culture; however, there is a gap in understanding their impact on political culture. This is so particularly that the core ideological message that Islamist movements advocated – despite differences between various movements – is that Islam is a comprehensive system that provides the solution to all problems spiritually, socially and politically as a guiding frame in private and public life, as *Din w Dawla* (religion and state). The thesis focuses on this core ideological message and, using framing theory; it tracks historically how it grew into a master frame since the 1967 defeat and analyses the main ideas advocated within it over the following decades. Further, through fifty interviews conducted in Cairo, the thesis explores the resonance of the ideas disseminated under the master frame, its impact on values conducive to democratisation, such as tolerance, equality, autonomy, and self-expression freedoms and its implications on political culture. The analysis of the data suggests that the resonance of the master frame results in re-ordering the individuals' priorities leading them to exclude the values deemed incompatible with the master frame, even if initially accepted. The master frame is prioritised over personal preferences and individual experiences, and this prioritisation points towards the critical role played by the mobilising actors in the political culture by placing their messages under the legitimacy of the master frame to include and exclude views and values through claims of their conformity or contradiction with the master frame. The analysis also reflects on the views and experiences of the interviewees who rejected the master frame, suggesting that the master frame's lack of resonance partly emanates from contradictions between the interviewees' grievances and experiences and the master frame ideas. The thesis offers new insights on the meaning of the values for the individuals, the processes of justifications they engaged in regarding the adoption and rejection of values, the meaning of Islam for them, and the light in which they see religious figures. Finally, the thesis reflects on the implications of the master frame as a form of power by application on examples post-2011 and in the current political scene in Egypt.

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To the martyrs of the January 2011 revolution.

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Introduction

One cannot comprehensively reflect on Egypt's political life in the past decades or contemporarily without engaging with Islamist movements, not only because of their significant role in politics but, more importantly, because of their profound impact on the Egyptian society and culture. Their central place prompted extensive research about their history, organisational structures, expansive networks, ideologies, and rise and fall from power after the 2011 revolution. However, a focus on their politics and mobilisation or the transition between 2011 to 2013 may not necessarily offer a complete picture of their role and impact, particularly if we take into consideration that the primary goal of Islamist movements has been advocating change to society and individual values. There is a need to change the focus from studying Islamist movements' internal views, positions and structures to studying the effects of their advocacy efforts.

While there has been research which addresses the influence of Islamisation and Islamic revival on changing practices and values, the cultural impact is not limited to social and religious transformation; it also aimed to influence the political imagination of the ideal form of governance and how public life should be organised. There is a gap in understanding how the Islamist advocacy efforts impacted political culture in Egypt. This is so particularly that the core ideological message that Islamist movements advocated – despite differences between various movements – is that Islam is a comprehensive system that provides the solution to all problems spiritually, socially and politically as a guiding frame in private and public life, as *Din w Dawla* (religion and state).

The thesis focuses on this core ideological message and, using framing theory, it tracks historically how it grew into a master frame in Egypt's social and political life and how different movements and the state tapped into this master frame and advocated guidance regarding personal visions of piety, and limits on the public order and governance. Informed by 50 in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo, the thesis explores the impact of the master frame and the various ideas disseminated under it on political culture and individual values. Political culture is understood to refer to 'a "mind set" which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible' (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 128). The values under study are tolerance, equality, autonomy and self-expression freedoms.

The significance of the study stems from the importance of political culture and values such as tolerance and autonomy and beliefs in equality and freedoms to democratic survival and

consolidation. The thesis offers a new lens through which to understand the Islamist movements' advocacy efforts under a unified master frame that aimed to create consensus mobilisation that any problem can be solved by reference to Islam, and it presents an analysis of individuals' voices and experiences in how they view this message, its resonance, and how it interacts with their values and vision of how public life should be organised in Egypt.

The thesis is designed in two parts. The first part uses the tools of social movements analysis, particularly framing theory, to follow how this core message evolved since 1967 into a master frame not only through the Islamist movements' efforts but also through the support of the state in offering various crucial political opportunities, and it analyses the main messages advocated under the master frame in terms of being a better Muslim in one's private life and pursuing Islamic governance in public life. The second part, through 50 interviews, explores the resonance of the ideas disseminated under the master frame, how individuals respond to and interact with the master frame, and its impact – if any – on their values and vision of political governance.

Thesis Structure

The thesis starts by contextualising the research within the literature on Islamist movements and Islamisation in Egypt and an overview of the tools of social movements analysis, framing theory, and the concept of a master frame as a theoretical framework. It also reflects on the distinction of this research from studies on the compatibility between Islam and democracy and the rationale for choosing the values that constitute the focus of this study. The second chapter elaborates on the methodology of the interviews by clarifying the sampling, conduct, and ethics of the interviews.

The third chapter discusses the 1967 defeat as a fundamental event that marked the beginning of the creation of the master frame. Although advocacy of 'Islam is the solution' has a longer history, the 1967 defeat was a cornerstone in the framing efforts of the Islamist movements at the beginning of the Islamic revival. The chapter argues that, in the diagnostic frame, the defeat was identified as the problem requiring change, and a problem blamed on the lack of religiosity. The strength of the frame only crystallised later in the 1973 war when Islam was depicted, in the prognostic frame, as the solution to the defeat and the reason for victory.

The fourth chapter analyses the resource mobilisation and political opportunities that allowed this collective action frame to grow into a master frame that dominated social and political life in Egypt throughout the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak. The chapter argues that in addition to the

massive networks and resource mobilisation that Islamist movements invested in, the state also played an essential role in the growth of the master frame.

The fifth chapter moves from the reasons for and structure of the growth of the master frame to exploring the ideas, discourses and values that various actors disseminated under the master frame. The chapter proposes that the core idea that Islam is the solution to every individual and collective problem remained constant across different actors and movements. At the same time, particular topics tended to occupy the discussion concerning the role of religion in individual and collective lives. Within these topics, there was diversity to some extent in the ideas and religious interpretations advocated. At times, the state's approved discourse was more conservative than some Islamist movements and actors. The diversity remained one of degree rather than of kind.

The sixth and seventh chapters analyse the resonance of the ideas disseminated under the master frame and its impact on individuals' views and values following the categorisation of the interviews between those who accept the master frame and those who reject it. The sixth chapter explores the experiences and views of the interviewees who accept the core idea that Islam is the solution. It analyses their views on various ideas advocated as part of the master frame, and how it shapes the limits they propose on the values. The interviews show a manifested priority in the interviewees' answers to place the master frame as an outer limit on any value with particular emphasis on avoiding any contradiction with it as the guide to how private and public life should be organised. This prioritisation points towards the critical role played by the mobilising actors in the political culture.

The seventh chapter analyses the experiences and views of the interviewees who disagreed with the idea that Islam is the solution. The chapter explores their reasons for rejecting the master frame, their views on the ideas advocated under the master frame and their reflections on earlier periods in their lives when they accepted the master frame and how their views would have differed. The interviews show a lack of resonance of the master frame ideas, potentially grounded in the contradiction between the frames advocated and the interviewees' grievances and experiences.

Finally, the eighth chapter contrasts the views of the interviewees who accept and reject the master frame concerning what they mean by Islam, their views on the authority of religious figures and what that informs us about the master frame as a form of power. The interviews show that Islam is given a broad definition by the interviewees; however, its broad nature and the authority of religious figures are seen in a different light by the interviewees who accept and reject the master frame. Further, the master frame in such a broad nature becomes a form of power acquired by the

mobilising actors who place their messages under the legitimacy of the master frame to include and exclude views and values for their audience through claims of their conformity or contradiction with the master frame. The chapter reflects on some of the implications of this power post-2011 and the new form it has taken in the current political scene.

I. Research Scope and Theoretical Framework

Rock-Singer (2020) helpfully categorises research on Islamist movements into three approaches. One approach focuses on the ‘organizational structures as the central analytical framework’ in understanding the movement, a second approach focuses on the internal ideology within the movement, and a third approach ‘more broadly notes the importance of both formal and informal grassroots efforts to spread particular movements’ religious visions’ (Rock-Singer, 2020, p. 521). Indeed, these different approaches intersect in various studies.

The first and second approaches intersect in works such as Kandil’s (2014) and al-Anani’s (2016), which focus on the Muslim Brotherhood. Kandil (2014) probes into the structure and membership of the Muslim Brotherhood and its internal ideology and teachings, and Al-Anani (2016) analyses the Brotherhood’s identity through its membership structure, recruitment, socialisation processes and internal dynamics. The second and third approaches intersect in works such as Wickham’s (2002) on Islamic activism in the first 12 years of Mubarak’s presidency between 1981 and 1993, which examines the outreach efforts of Islamic mobilisation through informal networks and the role of the Islamic ideology in responding to graduates’ grievances and its impact on incentivising mobilisation. The third approach also includes studies such as Clark’s work (2004) on the role of Islamic medical clinics in the 1990s as informal networks in the recruitment and mobilisation of the middle class. Al-Arian’s study (2014) on Islamic activism in universities in Egypt between 1968 and 1981 is a good example of how the three approaches complement each other well; through the use of social movement tools and historical analysis, Al-Arian examines the structure, networks, and resource mobilisation of the Islamic student movement in Egyptian universities, their ideological vision, and relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.

However, these different approaches take the movement and processes of mobilisation as the central unit of analysis. While this is essential in understanding various Islamist movements and their structures and ideologies, the impact of Islamist movements goes beyond successful recruitment and mobilisation. The contextualisation of Islamist movements in Egypt within the extensive and rich period of the Islamic revival, the supportive political opportunities offered by al-Sadat’s regime and tolerated by Mubarak’s for two consecutive decades at least, their widespread networks and mobilisation, and the waves of migration and return of Egyptians to and from the Gulf in a period where regional politics supported and invested in the expansion of

Islamisation, suggest that the reach and impact of their advocacy efforts extend far beyond successfully recruiting or mobilising individuals to join the movements and toward significant cultural changes.

Wickham (2002, p. 164) refers to such an impact in her research, arguing that ‘Islamic outreach on the periphery fostered the development of a “supportive public” broadly sympathetic to the aims of the Islamic movement’ while not necessarily forming part of any specific Islamist movement. Wickham (2002, p. 165) further argues that ‘the most fundamental change produced by Islamic mobilization on the periphery is what we might call a “transvaluation of values,” that is, a reordering of the priorities that guide individual action’. Arguably, the broadest impact of Islamist movements advocacy efforts is on the supportive public, that is, on Egyptian citizens who did not join the Islamist movements nor contributed to Islamic activism, but remained exposed to the influence of thousands of Islamic publications sold at cheap prices, hundreds of religious shows, extensive social networks at mosques and charities, in private lessons, and medical clinics. A gradual change that lasted long enough to impact the culture of the society and the values of individuals maybe even beyond what the Islamist movements imagined they would achieve.

This gradual change and the impact of Islamisation and Islamic revival on the culture and values in Egypt have been examined in some studies, which one might group as the fourth research approach. This approach includes Ahmed’s work (2011) which examines the expansion of the veil in Egypt through historical analysis and interviews exploring women’s experiences, and Abdo’s work (2000, p. 10) on ‘the religious transformation’ of the Egyptian society following the Islamic revival, the role played by different institutions in the revival, and the receptivity of the religious vision by various audiences. It also includes Van Nieuwkerk’s research (2013) on actresses’ and singers’ repentance in the Islamic revival in the context of analysing the changing discourse on art and religion. Rock-Singer’s research (2016, 2019, 2020) also falls within this approach with a particular focus on social practices as the primary unit of analysis, such as time and manners of praying, growing beards, and practices of gender segregation.

However, these studies remain focused on social and religious transformations and practices. While equally important, the extensive advocacy of Islamist movements and Islamisation must have also impacted the political culture, its underlying values, and the vision of governance and how public life should be organised in Egypt. The thesis contributes to the fourth research approach by combining historical analysis and interviews to examine the impact of the core ideological message that Islam is the solution to every personal and public problem on the supportive public,

particularly in relation to political culture and values conducive to democratisation such as tolerance, equality, autonomy, and self-expression freedoms.

The following section offers an overview of social movements and framing theory as the theoretical framework of the study. The second section contextualises how this study differs from the research on the compatibility between Islam or Islamist movements and democracy. The final section elaborates on the rationale for choosing the values under study.

Social Movements & Framing Theory

This study uses the theoretical tools of social movements analysis, particularly framing theory, to understand the core message of *Islam is the solution*, its underlying ideas, and how it evolved historically. For some time up to and including the 1960s, social and political movements were often analysed from a ‘psychofunctional perspective’ where political sociologists generally focused on the collective behaviour of individuals in response to grievances, ‘based on the assumption that participation in a social movement, like other forms of collective behavior, is an unconventional, irrational type of behavior’, and ‘the process of mobilization, if acknowledged at all, was usually an afterthought’ (Snow et al., 1986, p. 465; Walder, 2009, p. 394). However, in and since the 1970s and over the following decades, the study of social and political movements went through a series of conceptual developments that emphasised the agency of movement actors, their goal-oriented purposes, the necessary awareness of the contexts in which they operate, and the movements’ involvement in the construction of meanings.

The first development was the Resource Mobilisation theory which emerged as a replacement for grievance-based approaches by conceptualising social movements as organised collective rational actors seeking to achieve specific goals by using the available resources, whether material such as incomes, savings and services, or non-material, such as social networks, friendship and trust (Mecham, 2017). The focus shifted towards studying the ‘*mobilization processes* and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes’ (McAdam, 1996, p. 3).

The second development was born out of the need to widen the scope from the internal structures of the movements to account for the context in which the movements start and operate. This produced the Political Opportunities approach, which focuses on analysing the institutional context surrounding the movement, its adversaries and allies, its relationship with elites, the ability and propensity of the state to repress the movement, and other factors related to the political context which shape the choices of the movement and the use of its resources (McAdam, 1996).

The third development came as scholars started to question the neglect of the role of grievances, interpretations, and meaning-making in the mobilisation of movements; therefore, Snow et al. (1986) proposed the framing theory. The basic concept of a frame is that it is ‘an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment’ (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 137). The concept finds its origins in Goffman’s work (1974), who argued that there are social frameworks that guide our understanding and perception of events and experiences and signify meaning. Snow and Benford (1988, p. 198) developed this idea in the context of social movements, arguing that movement actors engage in signifying processes of giving interpretations to relevant events and grievances ‘to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’ (Snow and Benford, 1988, p. 198). Lindekilde (2014, p. 201) advances that Snow and Benford ‘[I]ike Goffman, they argued that what they called “collective actions frames” function by focusing attention, combining events, situations, and social facts, and transforming the understanding of aspects of social reality, but they put more emphasis on the agentic and innovative side of “framing”—the conscious signifying work carried out by social movement actors’.

The collective action frames constitute ‘a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they [movement actors] define as in need of change’, ‘attributions regarding who or what is to blame’, and propositions of ‘an alternative set of arrangements, [that they] urge others to act in concert to affect change’ (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 615). These different tasks of constructing meaning and the call to mobilisation are referred to as the core framing tasks; diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. *Diagnostic* is where the movement actors identify ‘some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration’ and who is to blame for this problem or the chain of causation (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.199). *Prognostic* is where a solution is suggested for this problem, and specific tactics and strategies are identified (Snow and Benford, 1988). Together, both tasks form ‘consensus mobilization’, a shared understanding of the problem and its solution (Lindekilde, 2014, p. 207). The final task is *motivational*, which is a ‘*rationale for action*’ and a call to join the movement, thereby achieving thus action mobilisation, which is the mobilisation of the shared understanding and consensus achieved (Snow and Benford, 1988, p. 202; Lindekilde, 2014).

More importantly for this research, in specific contexts and building on historical and political opportunities, some collective action frames turn into master frames. Master frames are similar to

movements' frames but are broader in terms of interpretive inclusivity, flexibility and resonance with the public to the extent that they 'may color and constrain' the frames of individual movements (Snow & Benford 1992, p. 138). Master frames create an understanding of a situation(s) as problematic or unjust, assign blame and suggest a solution on a broad scale. Their importance comes from their function as 'broad themes which bring together and cluster different collective actors within a movement', and the massive scale of resonance with the public (Benford and Snow, 2000; Fadaee, 2018, p. 124).

The Islamist movements in Egypt have different collective action frames regarding their specific goals and aspirations and whether their focus is on piety and religiosity that would lead to an Islamic society or whether they believe in a top-down creation of an Islamic state. Further, they differ regarding the call to mobilisation and the different forms it may take. However, they all tap into and share one core idea and a broad theme that forms their consensus mobilisation: *Islam is the solution* as a comprehensive system. In the different range of problems identified, who's to blame for it, or what precisely is to be done, there is consensus that the solution is to be found by reference to Islam, and that is the main characteristic that makes all these movements Islamist in the first place. The thesis proposes that this core idea developed into a master frame that coloured social and political life in Egypt, particularly after the Islamic revival.

The importance of using framing theory in this study emanates from its essential premise that meanings are not automatically or naturally created or attached to objects or events; rather, they are created by the movement actors who are 'signifying agents' engaged in producing meaning (Snow, 2009). Therefore, framing as a tool of analysis brings to focus the roles played by movement actors who 'are not just carriers of ideas/ideology' and allows one to highlight how '[c]ollective grievances and demands do not flow automatically from social structures and strain, but come into existence partly through processes of interpretation, discursive practices, and active meaning making' (Lindekilde, 2014, p. 203). This is particularly important in enabling the analysis to focus on how Islamist movements' actors and state institutions engaged in creating, contesting, and altering the ways in which events and grievances are understood and justified, such as the 1967 defeat, the demands following the defeat, the 1973 war, and the socio-economic grievances in al-Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes. It also provides a valuable tool in examining how the state and the movements produced different ideas and frames regarding what *Islam is the solution* means as a guide for individuals.

Further, although some have used the concept of a frame as a static descriptive idea of what interpretations are included within a frame, the power of the analytical tool lies in regarding framing as a process (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018). It is a continuous interactive process where the analysis should extend from the creation of the frame through its articulation to its effects and resonance with the target group. Thus, the study tracks the development of the frame since what it identifies as the point at which it re-emerged in 1967, through its growth in the 1970s to the 1990s and analyses its resonance with the audience through fifty interviews conducted in Cairo in 2019.

Though, with regard to the resonance of the frame, it is important to note that framing theory is primarily concerned with mobilisation as the most important outcome. The purpose of analysing collective action frames and the core framing tasks is to understand how grievances are used to mobilise people and why some movements succeed while others fail. The test against which a movement's framing efforts are assessed depends on whether or not its frames resonate with the individuals, and 'the resonation of a social movement frame within an individual is regarded as equivalent to that individual becoming mobilized' (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018, p. 115).

However, there has been recent criticism of resonance and effectiveness as the analytical end point of studying the framing activities of a movement (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018). Björnehed and Erikson (2018, p. 115) argue that

this fusion of the concepts of effectiveness and effect hinders analysis because it constructs an analytical endpoint, so to speak, concerning how we should study the effects of particular frames. Viewing effects as effectiveness does not challenge, but rather enforces an analytical focus on whether or not a specific frame succeeds in producing a predefined effect in the target audience.

Instead, one should widen the scope of the analytical tool and look not only at the success of the frame in garnering mobilisation but as well at the broader effects that the frame produced in the context and upon other players, given that 'once an idea is formulated and propagated, it acquires a life of its own and can produce effects outside any specific segment of the population' (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018, p. 116). Further, such a development would allow 'a theoretical expansion of the investigation that not only includes actors other than the specific audience but also raises questions about possible effects that cannot be foreseen, such as the unintended consequences of framing' (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018, p. 115).

Such a theoretical expansion is what this study aims to build upon. To understand the effects of the master frame, *Islam is the solution*, one should move beyond the focus on the mobilisation

potential of the master frame and consider its broader effects on political culture and individuals' values. The audience of the master frame was not necessarily mobilised to join any of the Islamist movements; however, potentially, many of them remained supportive of the ideas advocated as part of it.


Arguably, the effects of a master frame on political culture and individual values happen in the phase of building consensus mobilisation. This is when consensus is formed in the diagnostic and prognostic steps of the frame; that is, an agreement is formed over what is the problem, who or what to blame and what is the solution.¹ As clarified earlier, political culture is defined as 'a "mind set" which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible' (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 128). The consensus over the solution indicated by the master frame creates a disposition in favour of the master frame and, in turn, limits 'attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible' (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 128).

One can categorise the effects of a master frame into three stages according to their relevance to the framing tasks. The first stage is consensus mobilisation, when an individual adopts the master frame's shared understanding of the problem, who or what to blame and the general solution; however, they do not necessarily adopt the tactics or strategies of a specific movement, and they do not belong and are not mobilised by a particular movement. The second stage, which one can term pre-active, is closer to mobilisation when the individual has a clear idea of the tactics or strategies to be followed to achieve the proposed solution. For example, fundamentalists believe in violence as a tactic or a strategy; they argue for a top-down creation of an Islamic state, while the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, focuses more on tactics and strategies of building social networks, the infusion of society with religious values and in a bottom-up creation of an Islamic society that will lead to an Islamic state. In this phase, should an individual articulate a preference for one of these approaches, they can be said to be closer to mobilisation, in a pre-active state, and if a relevant opportunity arises, the likelihood of mobilisation to join the relevant movement becomes higher. The final third stage is active mobilisation, when an individual responds to the motivational call of the frame and contributes to one or more of the mobilisation activities of a movement. The below model indicates the three stages of a frame's effects.

¹ The prognostic step arguably also includes an agreement on the tactics and strategies to be followed in the identified solution. However, because of the broad, inclusive nature of master frames, a consensus is formed over identifying the solution. At the same time, tactics and strategies are adapted in organisational frames following each movement's purposes and goals.

This study aims to understand the resonance of the master frame in the phase of consensus mobilisation. Therefore, the aim is to explore the views of individuals who have not been part of the Islamist movements and have not been mobilised by their calls for action while nevertheless adopted the master frame's shared understanding that Islam is the solution as a comprehensive system to all problems. The purpose is to explore how the master frame interacts with their views of how social and political life in Egypt should be governed and whether it affects particular values that carry importance in democratic survival and consolidation. The following section explains how this study differs from the research on compatibility between Islam and democracy. The final section elaborates on which values are the focus of this study and why.

Figure 1. The Effects of the Frame



Islam & Democracy

With the emergence of the third wave of democratisation internationally at the same time as the Islamic revival reached its peak in Egypt and in many other countries with a majority Muslim population, questions started to emerge regarding the democratisation of Muslim societies, or more accurately, the lack thereof. Huntington and other scholars argued for the exceptionalism of Muslims' culture and Islamic religion, emphasising its incompatibility with democracy (Huntington 1991). Some analysed the texts of the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence to prove such incompatibility, while others rightly responded that the Islamic religion is inherently pluralistic and has different possibilities of interpretation of the same text (Driessen 2014). With the development of the social movement theories and the use of its tools in exploring Islamist movements and Islamist activism, the focus changed,

Increasingly, this debate over the compatibility of Islam as a religion and democracy as a political regime has shifted away from a general discussion about the theological predispositions of Islam and focused on a case-by-case analysis of the democratic potential of Islamist political parties (Driessen 2014, p. 6-7).

A debate developed on whether these movements believe in democracy as the best system of governance or adopt democratic principles as a means to governance, and in such exploration, much dependency was placed on the texts, speeches and announced programs of these movements (Wickham 2011).

In this context, a recurring theme that was discussed before the Arab Spring and resurfaced in several studies following the failed transitions is empirical testing of the support for democracy among Muslims using the data of the world values survey and the data of the Arab Barometer (Tessler 2002, Jamal and Tessler 2008, Farooq and Aktaruzzaman 2018). The main argument of the studies that found no contradiction between religiosity and democracy in Muslim countries is that

to the extent that religious orientations and attachments do discourage democracy, support for democracy should be lower among more religious men and women. This is not the case, however. In fact, more religious Muslims are as likely as less religious Muslims to believe that democracy, despite its drawbacks, is the best political system (Jamal and Tessler, 2008, p.101).

Other studies argue that approval for democracy at face value 'is not necessarily an accurate indicator of how deeply democracy has taken root in a given country' as participants would be

expressing their support for whatever they believe democracy means (Inglehart 2003, p. 51; Abbott, Teti and Sapsford, 2018). Further, in comparative perspective to other areas of the world, ‘individuals living in Arab countries do have a lower preference for democracy compared to otherwise similar individuals living in other countries at similar levels of development [...] and it is only explained in small part by the higher extent of religiosity’ (Al-Ississ and Diwan 2016, p. 17). More importantly, support for democracy should be measured by the extent of the support for values conducive to democracy (Inglehart 2003).

Compared to this literature, this research does not examine Islam as a religion and whether it has unified or plural theological conceptions of acceptance or rejection of democracy. Nor does it examine the possibilities of democratisation in Muslim countries or unpacking the Muslim culture and its compatibility with democracy. Instead, this research attempts to unpack the elements of the Egyptian culture that was affected by the ideological frame disseminated by social and political movements claiming Islam as their main reference. Whether this ideological frame accurately reflects the Islamic religion or not is not the topic of this research.

Further, the examination of the impact of the master frame on the chosen values is not a test for the support for democracy among Egyptians in correlation to their religiosity. Rather, it explores how the master frame interacts with values that underpin political culture and carry importance in democratic survival. The following section discusses the democratic values that will be subject to research and how they fit within processes of democratisation.

Political Culture and Values

This research focuses on assessing the interaction between the master frame and the values conducive to democratisation and democratic survival. To clarify these values, the section offers a brief review of democratisation processes, the role played by political culture and values, and a reflection on the choice of values to be addressed in this study.

Democratisation is a complex process of transitioning to and attaining democracy. It is composed of several stages that might start with the liberalisation of the state and loosening of the repressive grip of authority, moving to the collapse of the undemocratic regime, thereby beginning the transitional phase towards the central point of choosing government in free and fair elections, to start thereafter the continuing process of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996). As Huntington (1991, p. 9) expresses it,

the critical point in the process of democratization is the replacement of a government that was not chosen this way by one that is selected in a free, open, and

fair election. The overall process of democratization before and after that election, however, is usually complex and prolonged.

It is noticeable that although democracy is generally a contested concept with hundreds of thin and thick definitions, in the context of democratisation literature, it appears that what is meant by democracy as the central, critical and defining moment is the first free and fair elections for the choice of a government (Huntington, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Therefore, even though, afterwards, the definition of democracy may become thicker, what is aimed at in the first instance is the minimum procedural democracy. Such a minimum definition of democracy can be found in the well-known requirements proposed by Dahl (1971, pp. 1-2), suggesting that a democratic system guarantees all citizens the opportunity to

1. formulate their preferences
2. to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
3. to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference.

To achieve these three conditions, Dahl (1971) identified minimum requirements which pool under two essential dimensions for meaningful free and fair elections. The two dimensions are contestation and participation. Contestation is related to the permissibility of opposition which is embedded in the competitive nature of the elections in presenting different programs and views. Participation is associated with the function of the elections as a choice mechanism of the government, requiring, thus, the inclusiveness of the members of the public in expressing their choices and using their right to participate.

In understanding how regimes transition to democracy and what encourages or impedes democratisation, different theories can be grouped under four schools (Teorell 2010). The first school is *the structural approach*, which emphasises the importance of the structural factors in explaining and shaping the possibilities of democratisation, such as the nature of the regime, colonial heritage, experience with political pluralism, the extent of modernisation and industrialisation in the country, levels of education, and the size of the country as some of the proposed determinants of democratisation (Teorell, 2010; Miller et al., 2012). The second school is *the strategic approach*, which, although considering the importance of the structural factors, places more emphasis on ‘the analysis of the choices and strategic interactions of contending elites

in an authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition' (Diamond, 1999, p.172; Teorell, 2010). The third school is the *social forces*' approach which envisions the democratisation process as the result of vivid interactions between the social classes, finding its roots in linking 'the rise and survival of democracy' to two factors: 'the strengthening in size and density of the organization of the working class, and the weakening in size and power of the large landowners [...] this pattern also explains the correlations between indicators of socioeconomic development and democracy' (Teorell, 2010, p. 23). The fourth and final school is the *economic approach* which uses the tools of economic theories to understand regime change and the transitions to democracy (Teorell, 2010).

Among these different approaches, political culture has been emphasised as one of the important determinants of democratisation. Huntington (1991, p. 107) argues that 'a democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people. Democracies are created not by causes but by causers'. The existence of values conducive to democracy among the elites and the masses is mentioned repeatedly as one of the determinants of democratisation. Thus, it is claimed that 'the fate of democracy depends on ordinary people's intrinsic commitment to democratic principles', although there is contestation as to whether the existence of such values is a condition for the rise of democracy or a requirement for its consolidation (Welzel and Inglehart, 2009).

In determining the specific values that support democratisation, it was first argued that a significant value is citizens' support for democracy as the best system of governance. However, later studies rejected this view arguing that 'democracy means different things to different people [...] Because of these divergent interpretations, asking people whether they support democracy is, in effect, asking them whether they support whatever democracy means to them' (Norris, 1999, Coppedge, 2012, p. 245). Furthermore, empirical testing showed that 'at the abstract level, there is consensual support for democratic values. When these values are applied to difficult cases, however, there is far less consensus' (Sullivan and Transue, 1999, p 635). Therefore, it was suggested that support for democracy as a system is not an indicator of the roots of democracy in society; rather, what is needed is an analysis of the values underpinning a democratic system (Inglehart, 2003).

In this regard, a variety of values are often mentioned, foremost among which is tolerance for opposing views and for the people who are most disliked, as one of the fundamental values required for democracy to function (Lipset, 1994, Gibson, 1996). Tolerance evolved originally as 'a way to live with one's ideological and political enemies. Political opponents need not be

eliminated physically or even politically. One need not like or support one's opponents and their ideas, but one ought at least to put up with, or tolerate, them' (Sullivan and Transue, 1999, p. 630); 'the very essence of democracy is that the government tolerates the opposition and allows it to advocate its views; and the crucial test of democracy is when one tolerates views one heartily dislikes' (Inglehart, 2003, p. 54).

Other values include equality (whether equality in political rights or gender equality), trust in fellow citizens, autonomy, individuality, flexibility as opposed to rigidity, willingness to compromise, moderation, respect for the rule of law, participatory orientations, post-materialist values which place a higher emphasis on freedoms of expression and speech (Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1999; Feng and Zak, 1999; Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Tessler, 2002; Inglehart, 2003; Norris, 1999; Welzel and Inglehart, 2009; Coppedge, 2012; Freund and Jaud, 2013; Kostenko, Kuzmichev and Ponarin, 2016; Farooq and Aktaruzzaman, 2018). The most consistent and clearly articulated grouping of values is the one proposed by Inglehart (2003, p. 51) as the self-expression values, which include 'a mass culture of tolerance, trust, participatory orientations, an emphasis on self-expression'.

This research focuses on four core values: tolerance, equality, autonomy and self-expression freedoms. These values are linked to Dahl's two dimensions of contestation and participation. Tolerance, autonomy and support for self-expression freedoms are essential values to support the possibilities for contestation. Equality in political rights, gender equality, and self-expression freedoms are linked to the inclusiveness required to achieve and maintain participation.

II. Methodology

I conducted 50 in-depth interviews in Cairo between January and September 2019. Conducting interviews was the most suitable methodology to gain in-depth insights into the interviewees' interpretations of the master frame, the resonance of its ideas, and how these ideas interact with the individuals' beliefs in the proposed values and their limits.


The sampling strategy of the study is purposive criterion sampling, where '[t]he key idea ... is to select instances that are *information rich* with a view to answering the research question', and the objective of criterion sampling is to include participants who 'match a predefined profile' (Schreier, 2018, pp. 88 and 93). The predefined profile is that of an individual committed to the master frame and its disseminated ideas and values, however, without translating such commitment into membership or mobilisation as part of an Islamist movement. Such an individual would be committed to the notion that *Islam is the solution* as the first step of the prognostic phase without necessarily adopting any of the strategies or tactics of a specific movement or being involved in any of its mobilisation activities. They would be an individual who is in consensus mobilisation with the master frame in the general solution it offers; that of finding answers to individual or collective grievances and problems by returning to Islam as the reference frame.

Reaching interviewees who match the criterion sampling was not a straightforward task because determining whether an individual is committed to the master frame or not could only be discovered in the interviewing process itself, given that such commitment is not manifested in membership or mobilisation activities for any Islamist movement. However, given the pervasiveness of the master frame and its ideas in Egypt, it was still a practicable task. The focus of the sample is on individuals aged between 25 to 35 years old. The choice of this age group was driven by the focus of the study on values conducive to democratisation and the impact on political culture in Egypt with implications for the transitional phase post 2011 and the current political scene. This age group were at the heart of the young people who contributed to or witnessed the 2011 revolution, and are frequently cited as 'key to social and political change'; their experiences and values carry weight in understanding social and political culture and future change towards democratisation (Abbott, Teti and Sapsford, 2018, p.5). They are also the age group who lived their adolescence or youth in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s when the strength of master frame was established in Egypt's cultural life. They engaged in socio-religious activities that touched with the movements' networks and platforms of framing activities but were not

necessarily members of any of the movements nor did they consider themselves to be part of a movement. The interviews revealed diversity in the answers of this age group between acceptance and rejection of the master frame. This led me in the fieldwork to expand the interviews further with this age group as a theoretical sampling strategy, where the data collection informed the selection of further interviewees from certain age groups ‘on the basis of the emerging theoretical focus’ (Bryman 2008, p. 418; Schreier, 2018).

I also approached older and younger age groups in the sample to contrast whether there are differences in their views and values. I approached individuals aged between 40 and 65 years old who had lived their adolescence or youth during the Islamic revival. Therefore, they were part of the generation of the population most exposed to the historical influence of political Islamism in Egypt and were expected to have been affected by the master frame. The interviews with this age group covered their experiences about the period of the Islamic revival and their current views and positions on the master frame and the values. All the interviewees in this group accepted the master frame, and saturation was reached more quickly than with other categories. I also approached individuals aged between 20-25 years who, given their young age, were not subject to the framing activities of Islamist movements before 2011 and whose exposure to the master frame is linked mostly to online preachers. The purpose of this was to explore whether there are any differences in their adoption or interpretation of the master frame and their positions on the different values. The figure below show the different age groups among the interviewees.

Figure 2. The age groups of the interviewees



In the interviewing process, a number of interviewees, particularly between 25 and 35 years old expressed their rejection of the master frame and hence did not fall within the targeted criterion sampling. However, all of them expressed that they once supported the master frame at an earlier time in their lives. These interviews proved very useful in two respects. First, the comparison between the interviews with those who support the master frame and those who do not and their different reflections on the values and examples were illuminating and prompted me later to divide my analysis into two chapters; the sixth chapter addresses findings regarding support for the master frame, and the seventh chapter addresses findings regarding the rejection of the master frame. Second, the interviewees who rejected the master frame shared valuable reflections and experiences about the time they previously adopted the frame, why they abandoned it, and how their positions on the values changed over time. Overall, all the interviews were with individuals who either currently adopt the master frame or who have previously adopted the master frame at some point in their lives, even if rejecting it at the time of the interview.


Selection Process

In selecting and approaching interviewees to participate in this study, there were two limitations. First, there is the limitation of the authoritarian context, which prevents open recruitment for the research; I will reflect in more detail at the end on the ethics of conducting research in oppressive contexts. Secondly, and due to the first limitation, there was a risk of recruiting interviewees from among close circles, which might affect the rigour of the research and impact its outcome. To guard against this risk and taking into account the necessity of caution in recruiting for an academic study in a political environment that is hostile to academic research, my aim was to select a diverse sample from wide-ranging circles. I selected several starting contacts across Cairo and snowballed through each starting point to broaden the circles through which I recruited the participants to avoid selecting interviewees from among one circle of people. I approached individuals from a variety of professions, different areas in Cairo, and diverse educational backgrounds.

The resulting sample is balanced between male and female interviewees. In terms of education, few interviewees received only school education in the higher age group, while a majority of the interviewees were university graduates. Such levels of education were expected given the focus of the sample on the age group 25-35 years old who grew up following the expansion in university education both in terms of the expansion in the infrastructure for university education such as opening new universities since the mid 1970s – as will be discussed in the fourth chapter – and in


terms of growing societal expectation of progression from school education to university education.² The below figure shows the levels of education among the interviewees.

Figure 3. Levels of Education



There is also diversity in the professional background of the interviewees, the appendix to the study contains information on the diverse professions held by the interviewees, in addition to information about age, gender, and education. Further, the red dots in the figure below show the spread of the interviewees across different residential neighbourhoods in Cairo from the centre to the peripheries.

Figure 4. Residential Neighbourhoods



² The growing numbers and culture of university education is discussed in Wickham (2002). *Mobilizing Islam: religion, activism, and political change in Egypt*. (Columbia University Press).

More importantly, '[p]olitical cultures consist largely of unconscious assumptions, so taken for granted that, except for a few rare and sensitive individuals, members of a culture seldom have occasion to question them' (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p. 137). Therefore, the interviewees' positions on the values are not known political positions that might run the risk of picking and choosing; instead, they are embedded interpretations of social and cultural situations and contexts that reflect the values tested. Many interviewees remarked that they had not thought about the questions asked before the interview, and positioned themselves from various values during the interview by reflecting on the examples presented and questions asked. Some changed their positions when faced with inconsistencies, and some amended their earlier answers at the end of the interview.

The final point with regards to sampling is that of generalisation. 'Qualitative research with its holistic and in-depth approach, typically limits itself to a few instances or units only, ranging from the single case study [...] to a sample size of around 20 to 40' (Schreier, 2018, p. 84). Further,

When quantitative researchers argue that qualitative research does not allow for generalization, this criticism is typically based on an understanding of generalizability in the sense of statistical generalizability. Indeed, samples in qualitative research are mostly not representative of a population, and using statistics as a warrant underlying the conclusion from sample to population is then not an option (Schreier, 2018, p. 85).

Therefore, in qualitative research, the focus is not on the relationship between the sample and the population. Instead, it is on the relationship between the sample and the theory in what is called *theoretical generalisation*. 'With theoretical generalization, the purpose of the research is not to generalize to a population or to other instances, but to build a theory or to identify a causal mechanism' (Schreier, 2018, p. 87). Thus, the sample of interviewees analysed in this research is not representative of the Egyptian population and it does not aim to make general representative claims concerning the extent of the approval of the ideas of the master frame in the Egyptian population. Rather, the research aims to offer theoretical insights based on a diverse sample from those who received the ideas of the master frame into the resonance and effects of the master frame on the values under study and political culture as a mindset and a disposition in favour of particular positions. Such theoretical insights are only possible through in-depth engagement with the interviewees' views, reasons, and justifications concerning their adoption or rejection of the master frame, their beliefs and values, and whether these are connected to the master frame ideas.

In analysing the interviewees' answers, I have anonymised the data for reasons primarily grounded in preventing harm as explained later in discussing the ethics of conducting fieldwork in oppressive contexts. This was in tension with offering a more detailed picture about the social background and context of the interviewees to avoid writing information that might lead to their identification; however, the analysis still offered contextual information when citing the interviewees' answers such as their age, gender and occupation when appropriate.

Interview Questions

The interviews were semi-structured to ensure that the same values were covered in every interview and to bring as much consistency as possible across all interviews by asking similar questions. At the same time, the semi-structured nature allows for flexibility and space for the interviewees to discuss their experiences and elaborate on their views. The 'structure of a semi structured interview is usually organized around an aide memoire or interview guide. This contains topics, themes, or areas to be covered during the course of the interview, rather than a sequenced script of standardized questions' (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, and Liao, 2004, p. 1020). Further, the 'assumptions about the political world are generally taken for granted by their carriers, one cannot ask directly about them as though they were consciously held opinions on political issues' (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, pp. 137-138). Therefore, to unpack and unravel the values and elements of the culture of the interviewees, I asked about general topics of discussion in the Egyptian society such as women's work, inheritance, dress code, opinions about people of other religions or sexual orientations, reflecting with examples on the values under study: tolerance, autonomy, self-expression freedoms, and equality.

The interviews lasted typically between 40 minutes and an hour, with some interviews in the range of 20 to 30 minutes when the interviewees were quick to position themselves on the values or had a clear idea about their opinions from the examples presented. Some interviews lasted around an hour and a half when the interviewees took time to position themselves or were faced with contradictions or inconsistencies in their positions. I started every interview with an open question asking the interviewee about their opinion on what happened in Tunisia in giving women the right to inherit equally as men, which is contrary to current Islamic interpretations of giving women half of that is given to men when in equivalent relationships to the deceased. This example reflected broadly on the value of equality and whether the interviewee adopted the master frame in interpreting what happened in Tunisia and consequently prioritised the master frame.

This initial open-ended question gave the interviewees a chance to talk for some time and ease into the conversation and gave me a chance to form an initial impression of the interviewee's position in relation to the master frame. Depending on the answer, I would move to the next question or ask for further elaboration. For example, if the interviewee answered briefly or if they seemed not yet encouraged to talk, I would ask for elaboration or ask another open question, such as what they think of the question itself, to give them the space to think, take their time, and express their thoughts, which encourages them and helps develop the interview into an engaging conversation.

I would ask next whether they support the second article of the Egyptian constitution, which dictates that Islamic Shari'a is the primary source of legislation. The question reflects directly on whether they think Islam should be the governing frame in Egypt. Through the discussion, I would move slowly towards more direct questions concerning whether they adopt the master frame, such as whether they believe that Islam is *din w dawla* (religion and state), whether they favour or reject secularism, and sometimes ask for further clarification on what they mean by Islam, secularism, democracy, or Shari'a.

I asked questions that aim to identify whether they accept or reject the master frame, such as what they think are the main problems that Egypt faces or their main concerns socially or politically, and then ask what could be the solution to the problems they identified and if they think Islam is relevant as a solution to these problems. Whether they answer affirmatively in support of the master frame or negatively in opposition to the master frame, I ask for their reasons for acceptance or refusal, what they mean by Islam, and how their view of Islam relates to that of political Islamist movements.

I proceeded to ask about particular examples that reflect on the values under study to understand the extent of the interviewee's commitment to or rejection of the ideas of the master frame. I used similar examples in every interview. I asked about tolerance of people who believe in other religions or from different sects within the same religion, tolerance of LGBTQ members, atheists and women's presence in public spaces. I asked about autonomy in terms of sexual freedoms, such as marriage without a family's consent or engaging in consensual relationships without marriage, as well as about autonomy in terms of financial independence, and sometimes I asked about women's right to abortion. When interviewees opposed or imposed restrictions on the values proposed, I would ask about the extent to which they would go to prevent what they see as objectionable.

I asked about positions from self-expression freedoms and their limits, such as freedom of practising different religions, leaving one's religion, public advocacy for other religions, LGBTQ rights or atheism. I asked about equality in political rights regarding running for and holding public offices by women, members of religious minorities, members of the LGBTQ community, and atheists. I asked the interviewees, when they objected, whether their objection is against these individuals running for office or whether they would accept them running for public office but would not vote for them. I asked about gender equality in jobs and holding public offices. If the interviewee's answer to the examples contradicted their previous opinion in response to an earlier question, I tried to clarify their opinion further and reflect on their previous answers. In some interviews, the interviewees amended their answers, reflecting a more consistent position.

When the interviewees adopted the interpretations of the master frame, I would ask about the sources of these interpretations to understand whether these come from Islamist movements actors or figures. At the end of each interview, after discussing the different topics and examples that reflect on the application of the values in the society, I asked the interviewees about their positions on said values directly. The assumption to be tested with these end questions relates to whether they will support these values when asked about them in abstract terms compared to their responses to the examples.

Finally, given that the fieldwork was conducted in Egypt during one of the most oppressive political periods with significant threats against researchers and academic freedom, the final section explores the ethics of conducting fieldwork in oppressive contexts.

Conducting Fieldwork in Oppressive Contexts: Egypt 2019

It is challenging to conduct fieldwork in Egypt. Since 2015, the political environment has started becoming more hostile to academic research, and researchers are currently more than ever before at risk of loss of freedom or even life. In 2016, Giulio Regeni, an Italian doctoral candidate at the University of Cambridge, was conducting research in Egypt; 'his body was discovered, half-naked and "with evident signs of torture," in a ditch on the city limits' (Walsh, 2016). In May 2018, Walid Salem, an Egyptian doctoral candidate in the United States, was arrested in Egypt while conducting fieldwork for his degree (Committee for Concerned Scientists, 2018). In June 2019, 'Ibrahim Ezz El-Din, a housing rights researcher with an Egyptian NGO, was arrested by security forces [...] and forcibly disappeared' (Amnesty International, 2019). In September 2019, security forces arrested prominent academics and political science professors Hazem Hosny and Hassan Nafaa.

In this context, in November 2018, and before the threats escalated more towards the end of 2019, I applied for the University of Kent ethics committee's approval to conduct fieldwork in Egypt from January 2019 to September 2019 as part of my doctoral degree. The questions of harm, autonomy and privacy gain additional importance in oppressive contexts. Their impact and amplifications are dynamic and prone to change over time within the research project, necessitating caution and flexibility. The harm in oppressive contexts amplifies with the continuous risk posed by the security forces and threats of arrest or worse to the researcher, the interviewees and any gatekeepers. The autonomy of the interviewees should be respected in gaining their consent to participate in the research while being aware of the risk inherent in keeping any recorded forms of consent or evidence of participation in a research project in a context that is very threatening to academic research. Finally, the data emanating from the interviews must be managed ethically in a way that ensures respect for the interviewees' privacy and security.

Before the fieldwork, researchers typically focus on satisfying the formal process of applying for and obtaining the ethics committee's approval and are generally concerned about passing this phase to gain access to the field. However, this should not distract one from the fact that this is the phase where a researcher should invest time and energy in carefully planning their fieldwork and, more importantly, planning the risk management for the whole project. In this research, I did not start with the specific questions asked in the ethics application. Instead, I approached the fieldwork as a project that requires a risk assessment, and following models of risk assessment, I attempted to answer three main questions. What are the risks identified? Who might be harmed and how? And what is the evaluation of these risks, and how might it be possible to control or mitigate them?

When considering the risks in the fieldwork, it was not very helpful to consider general or abstract risks since they are not usefully detailed to draft a realistic plan for managing risks. Instead, the better starting point was to ask who are the people at risk from the research. This starts with the people directly at risk, such as the researcher and the interviewees. However, in oppressive contexts, the list is not exclusive to those directly related to the research; it should also include the people related to the researcher and the interviewees. For example, if the researcher is a national of the country in which they are conducting research, the list should include their close family and friends. They might potentially be subject to security risks during or after the fieldwork. The list should also include the gatekeepers – if any – and consider the interviewees' social circles if, for example, they all come from the same organisation or movement.

It might seem a stretch to consider the potential risks these broad circles of persons might face; however, in planning the fieldwork, I found it important to draft the list as wide as possible by including every person that comes to mind as potentially affected by the research, no matter how remote they are and even if such reflection will not be part of the ethics application. The reason is that preparation for the most extreme or unlikely events might at some point protect the researcher and others from harm, particularly since oppressive contexts sometimes change rapidly or unexpectedly.

The next step was to identify the risks that each person on the list might face. One common theme that underlies the different risks identified in oppressive contexts is the risk of exposure to security forces who constitute the primary source of threat. If one starts from the researcher as one of the persons directly at risk, there are different elements that one should consider, such as whether the researcher is a foreigner or a national, familiar with the social norms in the local community, a native speaker, and whether they have lived in this country and community before. These considerations affect whether the local community sees the researcher as an outsider or part of the society. In this research, I was a national, speaking the native language and dialect, and had lived for an extended time in Cairo before undertaking the research, which means that blending into the community is comparatively safer in the sense that travelling for fieldwork does not attract attention and presence in the country and the local community does not call for justification. The importance of such considerations comes from the potential exposure to security forces which might start from questioning or suspicion by the local community in which the researcher lives about the researcher's reasons for their stay or the reasons for conducting this research if their research project is known.

The risk of exposure is also a threat to the interviewees and gatekeepers. The level of risk depends on whether they are politically active, known public figures, and more generally, whether they are likely placed under security surveillance in a way that would alert the authorities if they were interviewed for a research project. If they are not politically active, the risk of exposure might potentially start from discussing the research project openly with others without awareness of the potential risk this creates for the researcher, other interviewees or the gatekeeper(s). This kind of risk depends on the nature of the research project, whether it is considered problematic socially or politically, and the level of oppression targeted to the discussion of the topic. The risk emanating from the nature of the research is a very contextual question that differs from time to time within the same country. In this research, the questions were primarily concerning social issues which

have political significance, so the risk emanating from the nature of the research was not very high given that the topics discussed in the interviews were primarily about personal opinions regarding social scenarios. Overall, for each of the risks identified, I considered the likelihood of the occurrence of these risks, giving it a degree between low, medium and high, and drafted a list of measures to eliminate and mitigate the risks identified. I found that readiness, caution, and flexibility in the fieldwork were essential in conducting the interviews.

During the fieldwork, I aimed to avoid seeking written consent from the interviewees, in order to mitigate any risk to them, and instead opted for recorded verbal consent and avoiding mentioning their names in the recording. I was also very conscious to explain clearly to the interviewees that they have the right to refuse to answer any question, particularly since citizens living in oppressive contexts might not have come across the experience of participating in a research project before. In this research, I repeatedly emphasised that they have the right to withdraw at any time or not to answer any question, and whenever I sensed any unease or struggle in answering a question, I would pass it to another question. In some interviews, I might return to the same question again if they have become more comfortable in the discussion with a note that they do not have to answer. The rationale was to try not to put the interviewees on the spot so they would not feel that the statement that they are free not to answer is a response to their struggles which for some people might lead to an opposite result where they would try to answer even if they do not want to, or at least might make them feel uncomfortable.

Finally, in managing the data of the interviews and writing the analysis, there is a question of whether to anonymise the data, particularly if the interviewees were politically active and did not mind the mentioning of their names in the research findings. In oppressive contexts, when some interviewees are fine with mentioning their names while others are not, I found that one should choose anonymity for all interviewees. The reason is that mentioning some names might risk enabling the security forces to draw a network of potential interviewees and gatekeepers, which might then subject all related to the research to equal risk. Further, I think anonymity in oppressive contexts is essential because of the volatile nature of the political context, which might change quickly and unexpectedly. This means that although it might appear safe to mention the interviewees' names at the time of the interview or when publishing the research findings, one cannot predict how this data might in the future be used to harm those connected to the research project. One must take into consideration the changing nature and extent of harm in oppressive contexts.

III. Re-emergence of the Frame: The 1967 Defeat

Islam is the solution emerged with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the twentieth century. It dimmed with the severe repression of the movement during Nasser's presidency. However, it re-emerged with several competing frames in response to one of the major grievances experienced in modern Egyptian history: the 1967 defeat of Egypt by Israel. The defeat has 'become the significant event cited as the moment of change, the crisis point in the personal and collective memory' in Egypt and the Arab world (Haddad, 1992, p. 267).

The purpose of this chapter is to trace back what happened in 1967 and the heated political events that followed until the 1973 war. It demonstrates how the defeat was a crisis for Egyptians in dire need of a justification and explores the competing justificatory frames that emerged in response. The focus is on the diagnostic and prognostic aspects of the framing process, namely, what is the problem, who or what to blame, and what is the solution. The chapter also reflects on Björnehed and Erikson's (2018) process of frame institutionalisation to demonstrate how the Islamist frame reached the highest form of influence through the political opportunities offered by al-Sadat's regime—opening the door for the transformation of the frame into a master frame in the following decades.

Frame institutionalisation refers to a 'process in which a frame gradually gains influence and regulative functions' (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018, p. 112). The ladder of institutionalisation is composed of four steps. First, the frame reaches the political agenda and is expressly discussed in different venues. Second, a coalition of actors or a few key actors start discussing the frame. Third, the frame begins to be officially acknowledged in government reports and documents. Finally, the frame is formally institutionalised when it is 'expressed in formal institutions, which often involves legislation' (Björnehed and Erikson, 2018, p. 113). The chapter argues that the students' movement frame that erupted with the 1968 protests pressured the government until it reached the third step with the issuance of the 30th of March Statement. However, while the state systematically curtailed this frame, it adopted the Islamist frame and gave it a valuable political opportunity to start from the fourth step directly by including Islamic Shari'a as a primary source of legislation in the constitution in 1971.

The first section of the chapter provides background about the political atmosphere preceding the war in May 1967 and until the defeat on the 5th of June 1967. The second section reflects on the public response following the defeat and the justificatory frames that emerged in society. The

third section analyses how Nasser's regime dealt with the defeat, exploring what frame it offered officially and through Heikal's lens and how the public and the 1968 protests received it. Finally, the last section analyses the political opportunities created by al-Sadat's regime for the prevalence of the Islamists' frame and how *Islam is the solution* became an evidenced successful frame through a binary comparison with the 1973 war.

The Defeat

To understand the significance and effect of the 1967 defeat on Egyptian society, it is essential to understand the heated political atmosphere in May 1967. The Egyptian authorities' political declarations, the Egyptian army's moves, and Nasser's speeches gave an appearance of confidence in an assured victory that aggravated the effect of the defeat as an unexpected shock and a traumatising event for Egyptians.

The tensions leading to the war started between the end of April 1967 and mid-May 1967. Multiple reports began to reach Egypt that Israel had mobilised forces to the Syrian Borders and was planning to attack Syria in response to Palestinian operations that came through the borders. The first reports from the Syrian authorities were not taken seriously until Soviet sources started to confirm similar information. On the 14th of May 1967, the commander in chief Abdel-Hakim Amer ordered the Egyptian army to move to Sinai, despite internal reports from the army's chief of staff Mohamed Fawzy confirming the absence of any evidence of Israeli presence on the borders with Syria (Mansour, 2017, p. 18). Within days, Nasser requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) troops from the borders with Israel, signalling an intention or preparations for a war with Israel. In an attempt to halt the rising tensions between Egypt and Israel, the United States demanded expressly from the Israelis not to start an attack (Mansour, 2017, p. 25). The Israelis agreed on the condition that Egypt would not close the Straits of Tiran. Nonetheless, on the 22nd of May 1967, Nasser announced the closure of the straits (Brooks, 2008, p. 64).

On the 26th of May 1967, in a speech to the Egyptian Labour Union that was reported in Al Ahram newspaper, Nasser declared that should there be a war, that war would be a long-awaited moment to 'wipe Israel off the face of earth' (Gat, 2005, p. 629). On the 28th of May, Nasser held a press conference in which he declared that there would be no retreat and that any attack would be faced with war (Guhar, 1975, pp. 254-255). On the 2nd of June, Nasser held a meeting in which he anticipated that Israel would start its attack with a major airstrike within the next two days. Amer excitedly commented at the end of the meeting that he 'would not wish to be in Moshi

Dayan's [Israeli Minister of Defence] situation, as he must now be confused about what to do regarding the strength of the Egyptian preparations' (Heikal, 1990, p. 820).

This confidence extended to the streets and peaked on the 3rd and 4th of June as Egyptians cheered with Nasser's name and microphones played enthusiastic songs welcoming the fight (Neke, 2020). Newspapers' headlines reflected news of preparedness and even enthusiasm about going to war with Israel (Fahmy, 2017). On the morning of the 5th of June, the newspaper headline was 'Inana Nantazer al-Ma'raka 'la Ahar min al-Gamr' (We are waiting for the battle eagerly) (Guhar, 1975, p. 258). In later reflections on the public mood, Tawfik al-Hakim, a well-known writer and novelist, described a festive mood when the war broke on the morning of the 5th of June 1967. The streets were filled with signs by the ruling party, the Arab Socialist Union, that said 'On to Tel Aviv' (Gerges 2018, p 294). In al-Hakim's words, 'the whole atmosphere around us almost convinced us that the entry of our armies into Tel Aviv would not take longer than nine o'clock in the evening of the same day, the 5th of June, 1967' (Gerges, 2018, pp. 294, 295).

What happened on the battlefield was an entirely different and devastating story. From 8:45 in the morning until 6:00 in the evening on the 5th of June, Israel launched waves of airstrikes that destroyed 85% of the Egyptian air forces and left a hundred thousand soldiers with no air coverage in Sinai (Fahmy, 2017, p. 189). The shocking defeat surprised the army leadership, leading to a total loss of nerve and imbalance. Heikal (1990, p. 820) describes the state of the commander in chief Amer as being in an 'extreme condition of hysteria'. Amer started to blame everyone for not allowing him to have the first strike against Israel and condemning the Soviets for denying him similar support to what the United States gave Israel (Heikal, 1990, p. 820). In the early hours of the 6th of June, Amer decided to withdraw the troops. The army's retreat should have taken three days and two nights; instead, the retreat was chaotic, with the field commanders leaving the battlefield and their troops behind (Fahmy, 2017, p. 189). The army was in a difficult position, exposed in the open desert without air cover; it was a situation that 'no bravery of men could handle' (Heikal, 1990, p. 711).

At the same time, the public was waiting for the glorious victory they were promised. On the morning of the 5th of June, the media minister informed the head of the Egyptian broadcast that all radio channels would be combined in one transmission. Egyptians gathered eagerly around the radios in the streets, cafes, and homes (Abu al-Nasr, 2019; Neke, 2020). Al-Gadban, a broadcaster working that day, described the situation inside the radio station as being 'isolated from the world, taking turns reading military statements, bulletins and victory calls. We were competing over who

will read the new statement' (Abu al-Nasr, 2019). As the international news agencies started to report, the excitement began to fade until 'the head of the news department Isaac Hanna came with the news in his hand bursting into tears', 'Israel is approaching the Canal' (Abu al-Nasr, 2019). Communication with the political leadership was severed, and it was suggested that the tone of the broadcast reports must change. Instead of using words like 'we will win', the broadcasters started saying we will 'persist' (Abu al-Nasr 2019). Al-Ghadban continues his testimony, 'we were reading the victory reports knowing we are defeated, it was a huge psychological struggle' (Abu al-Nasr, 2019).

The media continued broadcasting the news of victory for the next four days. With a lack of access to foreign media, the public did not even know about the pre-emptive airstrikes and the destruction of the Egyptian air forces (Nowaira, 2010). On the 9th of June, it was declared that Nasser would appear in a televised speech to the public. In her memory of these days, Nowaira, currently a professor of English at Alexandria University and a high school student in 1967, recalls that 'the announcement of a speech by Nasser kept everyone guessing. With wishful thinking more than reasoned thought, we were hoping he would declare the all-out victory once and for all' (Nowaira, 2010). However, when Nasser finally spoke to the public, it was an utter defeat, a resignation and a claim to take full responsibility for what happened. Al-Baghdadi, one of the free officers, in his testimony of the 9th of June, describes the situation of the public as utter pain and humiliation, 'men were crying like babies in the streets, no one wants to believe that we were defeated [...] what happened and why the defeat were questions on every mind' (Guhar, 1975, p. 308). Protests erupted following Nasser's speech, demanding that he stay in position as president. This was not so much a vote of confidence in the leadership following the defeat but a call for Nasser to bear the burden of responsibility for the mess he and his fellow officers caused.

The Public and Emerging Frames

After the defeat, images of soldiers returning from Sinai 'looking haggard and scruffy, became a familiar sight' (Nowaira, 2010). Feelings of anger, devastation and frustration dominated the public. The defeat was heavy on the hearts and minds of the people who – a few days earlier – were chanting with excitement about the assured victory coming their way. It was described as a 'nightmare', an 'earth-shattering experience', and a 'psychological trauma' (Abu-Rabi, 2003, p. 58; Gerges, 2018, pp. 285, 294). Naguib Mahfouz, the prominent novelist and winner of the 1988 Nobel prize in literature, wrote about the defeat, '[n]ever before or after in my life had I ever experienced such a shattering of consciousness and shock as I felt at that moment' (quoted in

Gerges, 2018, p. 285). These feelings were translated in his novel *al-Karnak* in a reflection by one of the characters, saying

Our entire world had gone through the trauma of the June war; now it was emerging from the initial daze of defeat. I found the entire social arena abuzz with phantoms, tales, stories, rumors, and jokes. The general consensus was that we had been living through the biggest lie in our entire lives. [...] My beliefs in everything were completely shattered. I had the feeling that I'd lost everything (quoted in Geer, 2009, p. 653).

What went wrong and what was to be done were collective questions and grievances that demanded answers and justifications. Three main frames of explanation surfaced in that period. Nasser's primary constituency of Arab socialists claimed the problem was Nasser's centrist position and compromise with the religious identity and affiliation (Haddad, 1992; Gerges, 2018). The solution should be going towards a radical left, 'to renounce Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism as failed experiments and to initiate a thorough-going revolutionary Marxist, secularist program' (Haddad, 1992, p. 267). Liberal secular thinkers claimed the problem was the backwardness of the society, its traditions, and its lack of scientific and civilisational advancement. The solution is a modernisation process, freedoms and democratisation (Haddad, 1992). Finally, Islamists approached the defeat differently; the defeat happened because of the society's deviance and lack of faith (Haddad, 1992). The solution is a return to Islam; *Islam is the solution*.

The Islamists' framing of the 1967 defeat is clearer in their later writings in the 1970s, such as the *al Da'wa* issue in June 1977, which was dedicated to discussing the 1967 defeat. *Al Da'wa* claimed the defeat was caused by the lack of faith rampant in the nation. Umar Al-Tilmisani – Brotherhood's Supreme Guide at the time – wrote that part of the reasons for the defeat was the media efforts in combating faith and corrupting the youth who formed the army, and hence 'the army was defeated in June ... because they fought unarmed by faith' (Tilmisani, 1977, p. 2). Mohamed al-Khayal, in the same issue, wrote that the reason behind all the elements that lead to the defeat is 'the sickness of the Arab society and [the Arab] human [...] resulting from the loss of faith', concluding that 'the Islamic Da'wa – alone – owns the cure to our sick societies', and wondering whether the defeat would be 'the labour to the birth of a faithful society?' (Al-Khayal, 1977, pp. 18-19).

In the heat of the defeat, the Islamists' explanation of the lack of faith and the solution in Islam was not the dominant frame; rather, it was one explanation among a plurality of voices. Gerges (2018, p. 307) suggests that '[i]nitially, only a very few critics explained the 1967 defeat in

religious terms'; understandably so, given the severe repression of Islamists under Nasser's regime and the dominance of secular socialist ideas in the society at the time. Nevertheless, among the youth who were searching for answers following the defeat, some began to find 'solace in his [Qutb's] writings, which had presciently condemned the nation to misery and defeat until it turned toward God [...] Stories of young people huddling together to read handwritten copies of *Milestones* were as widespread as the government's efforts to crack down on them' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 52). Ahmed (2011, p. 88) reports one of her interviewees' feelings about the defeat, saying 'the war showed that we had been lied to; nothing was the way it had been represented. I started to question everything we were told. I wanted to do something and to find my own way. I prayed more and I tried to see what was expected of me as a Muslim woman'.

It was not until later, with the rise of the Islamic revival and the political opportunities offered by al-Sadat's regimes, that the Islamist frame became widespread and gained prominence and dominance. However, before moving to al-Sadat's regime, the next section discusses the justificatory frame offered by Nasser's regime in response to the defeat.

Nasser's State Frame

One can argue that the political frame offered by Nasser's regime, with the aid of Heikal, focused on narrowing the scope from which one looks at the defeat, both in terms of the problem and the solution. Heikal is one of the most influential journalists in Egyptian history. He was a close confidant of Nasser, accompanied the latter in his office during the defeat, and wrote Nasser's resignation speech on the 9th of June. Heikal reframed the war of 1967 as *Naksa*, a setback and not a defeat (Qeset Wasf "Heikal" L Hazimat 1967 B "al-Naksa" Fi "Ahadith Brqash", 2017). The *Naksa* became an expression that lasted and became imprinted in the Egyptian collective memory. Heikal justified the expression in later reflections by saying that 'expressions have a strong effect on the motion of the events, when you say a defeat, then everything is over, and you have to admit what happened and submit to it, while the expression of *Naksa* helped us in healing our wounds' (Qeset Wasf "Heikal" L Hazimat 1967 B "al-Naksa" Fi "Ahadith Brqash", 2017). Such a choice of words helped reframe the problem in a narrower focus as a setback to the army in a diversion from the more substantial effect of the defeat as a crisis to the regime and failure by the political leadership.

The reframing of the problem led to a reframing of the solution. The solution offered by Nasser was to dismiss the defeated army leaders, including the commander-in-chief Amer, and appoint new leaders. Several months later, in September 1967, after a failed attempted coup led by Amer,

it was declared that Amer had committed suicide. The rest of the army leaders were tried and received verdicts ranging from dismissal from the army to life imprisonment (Fahmy, 2017, p. 231). Further, Nasser ordered a military investigation that led to the trial of the air force leaders for their failures in what became known as the air force trials (Abu Bakr, 2012; Fahmy, 2017, p. 233). The solution became accountability of the defeated army leaders and rebuilding the army in preparation for taking back the occupied lands.

Arguably, this frame and these trials were the only way out for Nasser's regime. Not only because Nasser wanted to continue in authority and salvage his falling legitimacy, but also exposing the real problems, levels of corruption, and systematic incompetence that led to the defeat would not have been tolerated by the public. Therefore, Nasser decided to cover up the structural and political problems that caused the defeat and portrayed it as the result of technical causes, which he was keen to address by rebuilding the army and preparing for war. However, compared to the competing frames that surfaced in the society, which saw the problem of the defeat as a revelation of more significant issues with the political system that requires radicalisation, modernisation, and democratisation, the frame offered by the state was highly unsatisfactory. The frame was narrower than would have been required to accommodate people's grievances.

The rejection of the state's frame and its failure to accommodate Egyptians' grievances was apparent in the protests that erupted in February 1968 following the verdicts of the courts-martial of the air force commanders. The sentences ranged from 10 to 15 years of imprisonment for some defendants and acquittal for others (Abu Bakr, 2012). No sooner had the verdicts been announced than protests erupted in the streets against what was considered very lenient sentences. Factory workers in Helwan initiated the protests, which were quickly joined by university students creating a momentum that became the spark of the 1960s and 1970s student movement (Al-Arian, 2014). The protests erupted in the streets and the university campuses, resulting in clashes with the police and mass arrests. The students' cry during the protests was '*La Sidqi wala al-Ghul, Abdel Nasser howa al-mas'ul*' (Not Sidqi, nor al-Ghul, Abdel Nasser is the one responsible), in reference to Sidqi, the air forces commander and al-Ghul the commander of the 4th Armored Division who were on trial (Salah al-Din, 2018). The cry of the protest was a clear indication of the rejection of the state's frame of placing blame on the air force leaders. The public refused the framing of the problem, who is to blame, and the solution offered by the state. Mansour (2017, p. 69) further claims that the protests' demands showed a clear link between the defeat and the absence of democracy and accountability, which was manifested in demands for freedom of the press and

repealing the laws that restrict freedoms, calls against 'Heikal's lying press', and cries that the cause is not about the air force but freedoms.

It was the first spark of mobilisation following years of silence and repression. The students marched to the parliament building, and a student delegation delivered the movement's demands. The demands of the students 'united around a comprehensive program that called for liberalisation of the political system and the restoration of rights and freedoms'(Al-Arian, 2014, p. 45). The state, in response, defended its frame, focusing the problem on the army and reframing the protests as anger towards the leniency of the judgments handed down in the air force trial. Al-Arian (2014, p. 44) describes the events in that period stating that al-Sadat, then parliament speaker,

attempted to narrow student demands to the issues of the perceived leniency of the military sentences and the abuses committed by the university guard. Complicit in the effort to trivialise student concerns and discredit their leaders, the press portrayed the students as spoiled children of the old elite who called for the execution of Egyptian military generals following the national defeat.

The regime feared these protests would harness the power of the anger and frustration from the 1967 defeat into building momentum of a broader movement demanding political reform and democratisation. Therefore, 'in attempting to isolate the students and their message from reaching the wider public [...] Cairo police rerouted city traffic from passing the university gates in order to prevent Egyptians from reading the signs and banners hanging from the walls' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 44).

Despite the attempts to repress the movement, Nasser was forced to offer concessions and issued the 30 March statement promising broad political reforms (Salah al-Din, 2018). The students' movement frame of blaming the defeat on the political leadership and seeking a solution in liberalisation and democratisation reached the third step in the frame institutionalisation process, which is gaining expression in government documents. The February protests had a long-lasting impact on the legitimacy of Nasser's regime and voiced frustration with the political arrangements (Al-Arian, 2014). The 1967 defeat created a political opportunity for mobilisation towards democratisation. Nasser died in 1970, and his successor, al-Sadat, inherited the regime's problems. However, before moving to al-Sadat's period of governance, it is helpful to explore how Heikal, the voice of Nasser's regime, attempted later to offer a broader complex frame to accommodate the inherited grievances of the defeat.

Heikal's Frame

Heikal, in his book on the defeat, narrated a very long story that sought to drown the problems of the defeat using two main approaches. First, Heikal extended the story and overstretched it historically, so it looks like a small event in a bigger chain of events. Heikal (1990, back cover) advocated for his book on the 1967 defeat by writing on the back cover that the 1967 war is not about the six days in which the fight erupted, 'but the story is much before this and much after'. After 700 pages dedicated to the regional and international contexts throughout the 1960s, Heikal (1990, p. 708) finally reaches the morning of the war, the 5th of June, and starts his reflections on the defeat by situating it in a context that extends to the second world war, as he puts it

in fact, whoever follows the conflict in the Middle East and since Israel started to play a primary role in it, to the purpose of draining the energy of Egypt and the Arab Nation and subjugating their will – [one] cannot help but notice that it was a renewed battle that imposes itself throughout the four decades that followed the end of the second world war.

Second, Heikal blurred the focus from Nasser's regime and framed the defeat as the result of complex regional and international dynamics. He 'blamed the defeat on a conspiracy by the United States and Saudi Arabia against Nasser in the Yemen war', and framed Nasser as 'the victim of a huge conspiracy' (Mansour, 2017, p. 21; Gerges 2018, p. 294). These two approaches formed the best suitable story for Nasser's authoritarian regime. Heikal framed the defeat as an international, regional, historical, inevitable course of events that could not have changed unless the context was different. Hence, the defeat was not to be blamed, at least directly, on the political regime.

Heikal went to lengths to avoid blaming the regime. One of the clear examples of this matter is his reflection on the grievances related to media deception in the broadcasted military statements of victory. Heikal argued that the United States provided the Israelis with extra fuel tanks for their planes. The Israeli planes dropped these fuel tanks on their way back, which suggested to those watching that these were Israeli plane wreckage, causing 'great damage in spirits to the masses who observed the battle with enthusiasm' (Heikal, 1990, p. 824). Therefore, according to Heikal, the damage to the spirits of the public was caused by a mere misunderstanding caused by the American-supplied fuel tanks falling from the sky, which was interpreted as a sign of victory and reported as such in the broadcasts. Such framing of events ignores the broader context of the reasons behind the enthusiasm of the masses presented in the confidence with which Nasser

announced his preparedness to defeat Israel and the political moves taken by the leadership when in fact, the army was highly unprepared for such a war.

Further, such reframing of events contradicts other testimonials such as that of al-Baghdadi, one of the *Free Officers* and Nasser's fellow, about the situation on the morning of the 5th of June from the military operation room. According to al-Baghdadi, Nasser asked Amer to send a report to the media about the battle to be drafted by Heikal (Guhar, 1975, p. 270). Amer, at that point, knew about the air forces' losses and yet suggested sending to the media that 200 Israeli planes were shot down by the Egyptian forces (Guhar, 1975, p. 270). Nasser objected, saying only half that is enough (Guhar, 1975, p. 270). That day, the broadcasted military statements – drafted by Heikal himself – stated that 23, then 42, Israeli planes were shot by the Egyptian forces (Guhar, 1975, p. 272). Eventually, on the morning of the 6th of June, the newspaper headlines reported the downing of 86 Israeli planes (Guhar, 1975, p. 270).

Finally, even in the parts where Heikal blamed Nasser and Amer in his books, he did so with an abundance of irrelevant details that left the reader without sufficient answers. In accusing Amer, Heikal focused on attacking Amer's personality as shaken and unsettled, reflecting on his second marriage and personal failures (Heikal, 1990, pp. 818-821). In blaming Nasser, Heikal asserted that Nasser nonetheless took full responsibility for these mistakes in the speech on the 9th of June, which Heikal wrote himself (Heikal, 1990, pp. 715). This blame is then lost within descriptions of Nasser's sadness that affected his health, drawing a romantic image of a leader suffering for the people and standing tall for an inevitable historical burden (Heikal, 1990, pp. 863-867). One can say, in conclusion, that Heikal's framing of the 1967 defeat dodged providing answers to the inherited grievances by relying on historically overstretched conspiracy theories of regional and international politics, coupled with a very narrow scope when placing the problem internally by depending on lengthy personal details and stories.

Al-Sadat and the Islamist Frame

When al-Sadat came to power, he faced many problems inherited from Nasser's regime. These included the land occupied by the Israelis, the grievances from the 1967 defeat, the growing pressure from Nasser's constituency of Arab socialists, the student movement in university campuses demanding more freedoms and liberalisation of the political system, and a dire need to build the legitimacy of his regime.

Al-Sadat's strategy was to break free from Nasser's regime and its problems. He started by dismissing Nasser's supporters and members of his close circles from positions of authority in

ministries and institutions. In May 1971, he ordered the arrest of prominent figures in Nasser's regime, such as Vice President Ali Sabri, minister of interior Sha'rawi Gomaa, and the president's chief of staff, Sami Sharaf. He put them on trial for conspiracy against the state in what was termed a corrective revolution (Cooper, 1982).

These arrests were only the beginning of a series of transformations in the new regime. Compared to the secular socialist image of the state in Nasser's era, al-Sadat rebuilt the state image with Islamic symbols and discourses. He called himself the pious president and announced his intention to build a state based on faith and science. Sheikh of al-Azhar, the highest Muslim religious authority in Egypt, would 'issue fatwas (religious rulings) endorsing his [Sadat's] various policies as being in accordance with the Shari'a' (Ryan, 2001, p. 30). Al-Sadat frequently used verses of the Quran in his speeches and broadcasted an image of piety and devotion. In the media, '[s]cenes of Sadat listening intently to the Friday sermon and praying in many of Egypt's mosques became commonplace on television screens across the country' (Al-Aryan, 2014, p. 86). The call to prayer was given prominence sacredness to the extent that the president's speeches were interrupted if they coincided with a call to prayer. The image of Islam and the importance of faith started to dominate public life in Egypt.

In the political arena, one of the main movements pushing for change and placing pressure on the regime was the student movement that was born out of the February 1968 protests. Despite its ideological diversity, the student movement was 'united in many of its activities and shared largely the same feelings with regard to the issue of the defeat', their demands centred around 'the call for freedom' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 48). The movement pressured the system for political liberalisation.³

Al-Sadat saw the threat of the movement coming from the Nasserists and the leftists, who were – at the time – leading the movement. Therefore, in congruence with the new state image, al-Sadat decided to re-orient the state from left to right by reviving the Islamist movement, which was severely repressed under Nasser, to combat the Nasserists and leftists and control university campuses (Gerges, 2018, p. 317). Al-Sadat started by ordering the release of Islamist movement figures and activists from prisons and allowing those in exile to return to Egypt (Ryan, 2001). He gave free rein to the Islamist movement to 'move freely, to organise themselves, and to publish and distribute their publications' (Gerges, 2018, p. 322). The student movement was divided 'according to rigid ideological lines' between leftists and Islamists (Al-Aryan, 2014, p. 48).

³ For a throughout documentation of the student movement at the time, see Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt* (Al Sagi 1985).

The state openly supported Islamist students. Thabet (2013, p. 86) claims that the state did not only support them but also, in a meeting with members of parliament in the headquarters of the state's Socialist Union, it was decided to establish and fund an Islamist student organisation, Shabab al-Islam, to combat the Nasserist and leftist students. Further, this organisation had 'express support from the security [forces] and was used to confront and end the leftist powers' (Thabet, 2013, p. 86). Al-Arian (2014, p. 61), on the other hand, argues that Shabab al-Islam was an individual initiative from a group of Islamist students who claim declining the state's offer of support and financial aid. However, al-Arian's (2014, p. 62) analysis of that period also suggests that these individual founders 'struggled to control the name of their organisation'. The broader movement sprouting in several faculties under the name of Shabab al-Islam was supported by the state and the security forces in attacking the leftist students. For example, 'a group within the College of Law calling itself Shabab al-Islam disrupted a meeting of leftist students, using knives to attack the other students' (al-Arian 2014, p. 62). Gervasio (2010, p. 72) cites an interview with Fouad Allam, who was the vice head of security at the time, confirming that the state provided Islamist students with cold weapons.

Generally, the state restricted, harassed and prevented leftists' activities while encouraging and supporting the activities and publications of the Islamist student movement (Al-Arian, 2014; Gerges, 2018). The activities of Islamists on campus included changing the curriculum, separating males from females in lecture halls, inviting students to Quran lessons, banning lectures and activities during prayer times, and banning parties or any forms of '*lahw*' (fun activities) on campus (Thabet, 2013, p. 87; Gerges, 2018, p. 324). The state also funded some of the activities of Islamist students, such as summer camps and pilgrimages (Thabet, 2013, p. 86).

Whenever dissent between leftists and Islamists would evolve into direct clashes, the state authorities turned a blind eye as long as the clashes were not against al-Sadat (Gerges, 2018, p. 324). Moreover, the state helped the Islamist students attack leftist students on campus. In 1972, leftist students staged a sit-in on the Cairo University campus, protesting the delay of the war with Israel. Sha'ban, a former leftist student leader, recalls the Islamist students attacking the sit-in with 'sticks and tracks' while accusing the leftists of atheism (BBC News Araby, 2016, 9:33). Za'frany, a former Islamist student leader, reflects on the same events, recalling that 'state authorities sent cars' to the Islamist students to transport them to the Cairo University campus to attack the sit-in (BBC News Araby, 2016, 9:46). At the same time, according to Sha'ban, the state security forces were present on campus and watched as Islamists clashed and beat the leftist students without

interfering (BBC News Araby, 2016, 10:00). In the period following these clashes, al-Sadat 'ordered the closure of the university in January 1973 and the arrest of almost 150 of those belonging to the left' (Gervasio, 2010, p. 72).

These changes were not exclusive to the campus; instead, the struggle of the student movement was a representative image of the greater shifts in society. According to Gervasio (2010, p. 72-73), the early 1970s was a period of political fluidity, with the leftists breaking free from Nasserism and towards greater awareness of the need for democratic reform. In response to the arrests of early 1973, Egyptian writers and intellectuals, with the aid of Tawfik al-Hakim and Naguib Mahfouz, attempted to establish an independent writers' union to have the ability to freely voice their support for the student movement. The union wrote to al-Sadat in January 1973, demanding 'the transfer of the responsibility of the country's choices to the people' (Gervasio, 2010, p. 73). Al-Sadat was so furious with the letter that he expelled 111 writers and journalists from the Socialist Union, which effectively meant banning them from publishing in Egypt (Gervasio, 2010, p. 73). At the same time,

the cultural framing activities that the Islamic movement engaged in were unlike anything the country had witnessed since before the revolution of 1952. During the course of Sadat's presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood and religious student groups published books, periodicals, and wall magazines, and produced pamphlets, cassette tapes, and banners, all of which reflected the group's mission and ideological outlook.

(Al-Arian, 2014, p. 8)

The question now is how all these changes and al-Sadat's policies affected the competing frames in response to the 1967 grievances. As clarified earlier, in the direct aftermath of the defeat, the Islamist interpretation of the 1967 defeat as a lack of faith was one frame among many. This meant that the Islamist frame had to compete fiercely with the existing frames of liberal seculars, radical socialists, and the leftist segments in the student movement and the society, particularly since the student movement frame had already gained recognition by the state in the 30th March statement.

However, in a political opportunity offered by al-Sadat's regime in 1971 – even before the state support for Islamists yielded its results in Islamic dominance in the society – al-Sadat gave the movement a start from the fourth step of frame institutionalisation, which is recognition in formal institutions and legislation. The Islamist frame of solving the society's problems by reference to Islam and a return to God was institutionalised in the highest form of legislative force; the constitution. In 1971, Sadat turned a blind eye to the previous promises made in the 30th March

statement. Further, he passed the constitution stating in its second article that Islamic Shari'a is a principal source of legislation. A top-down political opportunity was presented to the movement. Instead of building and mobilising for the adoption and the institutionalisation of their frame over the years, the movement re-emerged in a context that acknowledges their frame in the constituting document of the society. At the same time, the state was systematically oppressing the competing frames of secularists, leftists, and socialists, whether in the student movement or the press (Gervasio, 2010). The Islamist frame did not have to compete. The state offered a rare political opportunity of exclusive dominance to the Islamist frame in a context characterised by Islamic images and symbols invading the public sphere and the media and governed by a constitution that limits all future legislations by the principles of Islamic Shari'a.

Furthermore, in addition to al-Sadat's support and openness of the system exclusively to Islamists at the expense of other movements, two further political opportunities served the expansion of the movement in the society. One is the extensive financial support of the Saudis in aid to the Islamist movement in Egypt. Islamist activism had unlimited financial resources at its disposal, in addition to the finance of regular publication of free religious texts and free pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia (Gerges, 2018, p. 332). The aid was institutionalised, and '[o]fficial bodies in the Saudi kingdom, such as the association of religious scholars and the Ministry of Endowments, financed the spread of conservative Salafist ideas to Egypt' openly (Gerges, 2018, p. 315).

Second is the return of Egyptians who migrated to the Gulf in the 1950s and the 1960s, influenced by the conservative Salafist ideas dominating these countries (Abdelhalim, 2017). The travel to the Gulf and the return of Egyptians will continue over the next decades with more profound implications that will solidify the prevalence of religious values in popular culture. According to many who lived through these times, '[r]esistance was futile'; the tide was strong and extensive from every side of the political and social arenas (Gerges, 2018, p. 330).

These transformations between Nasser's and al-Sadat's eras had a strong effect on strengthening the Islamists' frame. With the repression of secular, leftist, and socialist frames, the 1967 defeat began to be seen as a religious failure, the problem was the lack of faith in the society, and now the problem is being fixed by Islamising the state and the society. However, one can argue that what enforced this idea deeper and decisively ended the conflict between the frames in favour of the Islamist frame is the framing process of the 1973 war.

The 1973 war represented a moment of victory for Egyptians, in which the army succeeded in gaining back part of the lands that the Israelis occupied. From the start, the war was immersed in

Islamic symbols and infused with popular tales of Islamic victory. Al-Sadat gave the operation code, Badr, in reference to a famous Islamic battle led by the prophet. The same reference was used by Al-Ahram newspaper, the state's mouthpiece, in describing the war. According to Menshawy (2018, p. 41), '[t]he dominant frame in the Al-Ahram issues spanning the eight years of Sadat's rule is the statement that the Egyptian victory is predetermined because ordained by God'. During the war, the soldiers' war cry was Allah Akbar; '[t]he ritual pronouncement of this phrase in Islam is called the Tekbir and is of central importance in the faith: it is used in various contexts, including in formal prayers, the call for prayer, and declarations of faith' (Menshawy, 2018, p. 44).

The media repeatedly reported that "'God and his angels" fought on the side of advancing Egyptian soldiers and helped them' (Gerges, 2018, p. 326). After the war broke out, a pamphlet issued by the army asserted that the prophet was accompanying the soldiers in battle (Lippman, 2016). The war was portrayed as an Islamic victory with divine aid for a pious president, and '[t]he analogies with the "Islamic" past were further made to seem relevant as the war of October 1973 occurred on the tenth day of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar. It was called both "the 6 October War" and "the 10 Ramadan War"' (Menshawy, 2018, p. 43).

After the war, al-Sadat marginalised the role of Nasser in rebuilding the army. Therefore, even the state's previous narrow frame of the defeat as a result of the incompetence of the army leadership was displaced in favour of the Islamist frame. Clearly and directly, the frame became; 'in 1967 God had punished Egypt because it had given up the faith, while in 1973 God rewarded it for re-embracing Islam' (Gerges, 2018, p. 328).

Conclusion

The 1967 defeat was one of the significant events that had long-lasting impacts on Egyptians and Egyptian political culture. The different frames that surfaced in the society were attempts to make sense of the crisis, reflect on the problems of the political regime, and demand fundamental changes and freedoms for the people. The defeat created a political opportunity to demand political liberalisation and democratisation. Nevertheless, these demands and frames were short-lived because of the changing political arena during al-Sadat's presidency. The Islamisation of the state and society following Nasser's death significantly changed the context surrounding the 1967 defeat. Compared to the heated demands for freedoms, accountability, and the frames competing over what went wrong and how to fix it, al-Sadat re-created the political arena, dodging answers to the inherited grievances and reinforcing a religious interpretation of the defeat. *Islam is the*

solution became an institutionalised frame in the state constitution, its media, and Islamist activism and has proven to work in framing the 1973 war.

IV. Building the Master Frame

Following 1973, Egypt stepped into a new era. The 1967 grievances slowly faded within the frame of the 1973 war as the ‘Egyptian victory ... ordained by God’ (Menshawy, 2018, p. 41). Different social, economic and political grievances moved to the forefront in the aftermath, requiring accommodation and answers. In this context, ‘political Islam’s popular image was changed, virtually overnight, from a public menace that posed a threat to the regime [in Nasser’s time], to offering a foundation for a new social contract’ (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 135).

In the formative years of the Islamic revival, *Islam is the solution* grew steadily from a collective action frame into a master frame. Master frames operate in a similar way to collective action frames but ‘on a larger scale’ (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 138). They create an understanding of a situation(s) as problematic or unjust, assign blame and suggest a solution on a wide scale; they are characterised by broad ‘interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility, and cultural resonance’ (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 619). The importance of master frames lies in how they function as ‘broad themes which bring together and cluster different collective actors within a movement’ and the massive scale of resonance with the public (Fadaee, 2018, p. 124).

It can be argued that in the 1970s, *al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya* –the student Islamist movement– together with the Muslim Brotherhood, led the way for transforming *Islam is the solution* from a collective action frame into a master frame through vast mobilisation of resources and building on unique political opportunities of state’s openness and support. By the time al-Sadat was assassinated in 1981, the frame had outgrown al-Sadat and the individual actors. During the 1980s and 1990s, *Islam is the solution* became a master frame which the diverse collective actors within the broad Islamist movement drew upon in their frames, and it coloured and constrained the cultural milieu and dominated the public sphere and state institutions.

This chapter traces the networks, venues, political opportunities, and resource mobilisation through which *Islam is the solution* grew into a master frame throughout Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes. This context is vital for appreciating the significance of the impact of the master frame on the values and political culture of individual Egyptians who were at the centre of this massive political culture transformation.

Al-Sadat's regime

Two major formative factors shaped al-Sadat's regime from 1973 until his assassination in 1981. The first factor was the economic liberalisation policy known as *Infitah*, which had significant economic and social implications on the distribution of wealth in Egyptian society and the lifestyle of Egyptians. These implications were amplified due to domestic and regional circumstances, including expansion of university education, growth in population, and the oil boom, which led to the growing influence of Saudi Arabia whether directly in the form of financial aid to spread the Islamists' frame, or indirectly by affecting thousands of emigrants who transferred Wahhabism's values back to Egypt. The second factor was Sadat's changing political policies domestically, regionally and internationally. These were apparent, domestically, in a brief period of political liberalisation, which enhanced the freedoms available to Islamist movements at a time when the state was institutionally sponsoring their frame, and later in al-Sadat's irritation with Islamists and repression of all opposition. Regionally, they were manifested in al-Sadat's opposition to the Islamic revolution in Iran and his welcoming of the Shah in Egypt. Finally, internationally, they were evidenced in his allying Egypt with the US and the Camp David peace treaty with Israel amidst the Arab boycott.

In 1974, after two wars in 1967 and 1973, the country was in dire need of an economic boost and infrastructure (Brownlee, 2011, p. 648). Sadat changed course from Nasser's socialism towards opening up to foreign investment and liberalising the economy in what became known as the open economic policy or *al Infitah al Iqtisadi*. The policy's intended goals were 'Arab capital + Western technology + abundant Egyptian resources = development and progress' (Cooper, 2012, p. 91). However, what happened as a result of the policy was an entirely different story.

Arab capital amounted to less than expected and was primarily directed towards luxury housing and tourism instead of industrialisation (Brownlee, 2011, p. 649). The expansion of western brands was abundant in consumer goods, hotels, and restaurants rather than in any technological industries. Egyptians moved their activities to the free zones to escape the restrictions of socialist laws. Exports declined, and imports increased 'almost four-fold' between 1973 and 1975 (Cooper, 2012, p. 106).

There was a massive increase in demand, '[m]ore cars, televisions and refrigerators were imported into Egypt in 1974/5 than in the previous four years. Commerce had truly become the focal point of liberalisation' (Cooper, 2012, p. 115). Along with these rapid transformations was a worsening economic situation for Egyptians. Inflation soared with estimates of an inflation rate

between 20 and 35%, some food items increased by 40%, and the cost of living overall increased by 20% (Cooper, 2012, p. 118; Brownlee, 2011, p. 651).

While Egyptians felt the daily burden of the policy in the increased cost of living compared to the luxury imported goods and western entertainment brands, which were ‘beyond the means of most Egyptians’, they followed the stories of government and elite corruption circulating in the media (Ahmed, 2011, p. 76). Osman Ahmed Osman, the owner of the Arab Contractors company and Sadat’s friend and father-in-law of Sadat’s daughter, constantly got the ‘fattest’ government construction contracts (Lippman, 2016, p. 232). ‘Scandals and stories of corruption, greed, and profiteering at the upper levels of society were rife’, with only a small percentage of the population benefiting from the economic policy who were ‘dubbed "fat cats"' by the press (Ahmed, 2011, p. 76; Abdo, 2000, p. 83). Gervasio (2010, p. 83) argues that ‘the love of consumption and the showing off of the wealthy who were open [in reference to the open economic policy] and liberalised from the socialist austerity that Nasser wanted led to hatred of this class from the side of the classes who were less able’.

At the same time, migration was circulating in the background of the changing social and economic landscape. On the one hand, migration from the rural to the urban, particularly to Cairo, where the new opportunities created by the private sector as a result of *al Infitah* centred, led to ‘an urban population explosion’ and a crisis in overcrowded transportation (Abdo, 2000, p. 81). On the other hand, the oil boom in 1973 led to waves of migration from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, where Egyptians received salaries that were ‘as much as ten times greater than those available back home’ (Abdo, 2000, p. 81). In the following years, ‘nearly 50 percent of all Egyptian migrants went to Saudi Arabia’ (Abdelhalim, 2017, p. 55).

The migration from the rural to the urban carried conservative and traditional values to the cities, and the migration from Egypt to the Gulf and particularly Saudi Arabia brought back the ultra-conservative values of Wahhabism. The returned emigrants carried with them the styles of dress and the lifestyle they experienced abroad, in addition to funds that enabled them to buy properties and goods that were out of reach for most Egyptians (Ahmed, 2011, p. 101). With time, ‘dress and practices in the style of Saudi Arabia [...] were the signs of wealth, chic, and prestige’ (Ahmed, 2011, p. 101). Further, the oil boom itself was framed in a way similar to the 1973 war; the Saudi Arabian wealth was ‘a sign of God’s favor to Muslims, and in particular to Muslims who followed the strictest forms of Islam’ (Ahmed, 2011, p. 101).

These socio-economic transformations in society were amplified on universities' campuses with a massive expansion in university education. Al-Sadat declared a policy that 'all secondary school graduates [to] be admitted to university' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 109). The number of university students reached over four million by 1976 (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 148). In addition to Cairo, Alexandria, Ein Shams and Asyut universities, al-Sadat opened seven new universities in provincial towns, and '[f]or the first time in history, these institutions offered an outlet of higher education for rural Egyptians' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 110).

Al-Arian (2014, p. 110) argues that al-Sadat's purpose was 'infusing the university environment with rural and working class students in greater numbers, [so] the ensuing political movement within the universities would reflect more conservative and traditional cultural trends'. This, in al-Sadat's opinion, would counter elitist Nasserist socialist tendencies within universities. However, what al-Sadat missed in his calculations is that battling leftists and Nasserists in universities did not mean the disappearance of the economic, social and political grievances that the student movement was addressing. Instead, with the massive expansion in higher education, the society's socio-economic problems were mirrored on campuses where a strong and growing Islamist student movement was dominating and mobilising by framing Islam as *the* solution.

The Islamist Movement: the 1970s

Since 1968, the student movement in universities played an essential role in framing and mobilising for Egyptians' grievances which focused initially on the 1967 defeat and the need for political reform. As elaborated in the previous chapter, during the first years of al-Sadat's presidency, the state invested heavily in combating leftists and Nasserists in universities while supporting and sponsoring the Islamists' presence on campuses. Following the war in October 1973, the leftist segment of the student movement started to be marginalised on campuses. Gervasio (2010, p. 266) argues that the broad support of al-Sadat's regime to the Islamist movement partly explains the decline of the leftist movement. Another part of the explanation could be the focus of the left on giving priority to national slogans and causes at the expense of socioeconomic grievances and the class struggle resulting from the *al-Infitah* policy (Gervasio, 2010, p. 266).

At that time, Shabab al-Islam, the main body representing the Islamist student movement, 'had reached the limits of its influence' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 106). The Islamist presence on campus was limited to al-Gam'iyya al-Diniyya (the religious association), which focused on religious activities related to prayers, Qur'an study lessons, and organising breakfasts during Ramadan (Al-Arian,

2014, p. 106). A different Islamist student movement was budding in the medical college at Cairo University. In the summer of 1971, a group of religiously oriented medical students wanted to mobilise in favour of expanding religious activities on campus. They started by acting from within the confines of the student union through the committee for religious awareness, which forms part of the union's cultural committee (Tamam, 2012, p. 33). However, the union continuously frustrated their efforts by refusing to allocate funds to the proposed activities (Tamam, 2012, p. 33). Therefore, they switched their organisational structure to al-Gam'iyya al-Diniyya as an independent association that is not restricted by the union.

In 1973, the student leadership of this group decided to compete in the medical college union elections, believing that their goal of 'calling on their fellow students to reassert the place of Islam in their lives, could not be accomplished without the institutional support provided by the Student Union' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 118). They won five out of six seats, and a few months later, renamed themselves *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Group) (Tamam, 2012, p. 42; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 120).

Over the following years, 'the building of the student union at al-Qasr al-'iny medical college (which was a huge building with squares and playing fields) transformed into the general centre for Islamic activism for all Egyptian universities' (Tamam, 2012, p. 43). Students who wanted to engage in Islamic activism in other colleges or universities went there to gain experience and asked for help (Tamam, 2012, p. 43). The movement spread to all other colleges at Cairo university and later to every university in Egypt. Mobilising from Cairo to Alexandria to Upper Egypt, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya competed in student union elections. They contested the social events, and mixed parties organised by student unions under the leadership of leftists and called for the infusion of Islam in every aspect of student life and politics. In 1976, al-Sadat passed a law declaring that 'the purpose of student unions was to "deepen religious values among the students."' (Guirguis, 2012, p. 200). By 1977, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya competed in every union election in every major university and won 'leadership posts in all of them'; they became 'the face of Islamic activism in Egypt' (Al-Arian, 2014, pp. 124, 150).

Leaders and supporters of the Islamist student movement *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* continually deny being aided by the state in their efforts and describe the rise of the movement as spontaneous 'from some youth who were religious by instinct' (Tamam, 2012, p. 52; Bakr, 2013, p. 17; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 127). Abu al-Futuh, leader of the student Islamist movement, assertively denies any agreement with al-Sadat or his regime and argues that any violent confrontations with the

‘communists in the university’ were ‘spontaneous’ between a religiously conservative movement and a movement that always mocked Islamic core values (Tamam, 2012, pp. 52-53).

One of the arguments commonly advanced as well is that if al-Sadat supported the Islamist student movement, he would have obstructed other movements (Tamam, 2012, p. 56; Bakr, 2013, p. 21; Al-Arian, 2014, pp. 127-128). However, as elaborated in the previous chapter, the state openly restricted leftist activities on campus during the first years of al-Sadat’s presidency. Further, according to an interview with Za‘frany in 2016, who was one of the founders and leaders of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya in Alexandria, he recalls that in 1972, the ‘state authorities sent cars’ to Islamist students to transfer them to the Cairo University campus to attack the leftists’ sit-in (BBC News Araby, 2016, 9:46). This was followed by ‘the arrest of almost 150 of those belonging to the left’ in January 1973 (Gervasio, 2010, p. 72). While, on the other hand, during the period 1973-1977,

Abul Futuh emphasised that at no time during its rise did the student movement feel threatened by the regime. They met in the open, held meetings that brought thousands of students from across the country, marched through the streets of different cities in protest, distributed books of varying political viewpoints, and invited Islamic scholars of all ideological stripes. According to student leaders, at no time did the regime attempt to block these activities (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 128).

Even if one ignores the role played by the open political structure to Islamism that Sadat was sponsoring and which facilitated the mobilisation of the Islamist student movement, there were signs of indirect support from the state to the leadership of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya through figures such as Sufi Abu Taleb.

Sufi Abu Taleb is a well-known jurist and academic at Cairo University who was close to al-Sadat’s regime and vice president of Cairo University in 1973. He later became the Speaker of parliament in 1978. He is described as ‘the architect’ of the inclusion of Islamic Shari‘a in Egyptian legal codes and was arguably entrusted with creating a ‘political philosophy’ for al-Sadat’s regime (Gervasio, 2010, p. 106; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 127). Abu Taleb fulfilled this mission with writings that provided Islamic references for democracy and socialism, which essentially offered the needed justification for the inclusion of Islamic Shari‘a as a source of legislation in the 1971 constitution (Gervasio, 2010, p. 106). Al-Arian (2014, p. 127) reports from the leaders of the Islamist student movement that they were continuously in close contact with Abu-Taleb, who provided ‘moral and logistical support for their activities’. Abu Taleb’s support as a representative of state support

becomes more apparent when one compares his unconditional support to the Islamist movement activities since 1973 with his changed position in 1977 when the Islamist movement started to attack al-Sadat and condemn him. Abu Taleb changed his tone with the students after a relationship in which ‘he never refused ... [them] a request’; he began to restrict and obstruct their activities in a withdrawal of support (Tamam, 2012, p. 110).

During this same period, Islamic activism was growing outside the walls of universities. The Muslim Brotherhood had taken a decision to resume activism under the leadership of Umar al-Tilmisani in 1974 and started publishing its magazine *al-Da‘wa* in 1976. Encounters between the elders of the Muslim Brotherhood and the leadership of the Islamist student movement began as early as 1971-1972 when al-Tilmisani was still imprisoned and moved to the hospital where the medical students (leaders of the movement) were training (Tamam, 2012, p. 39). For weeks, students discussed their activism with the elders and were exposed for the first time to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 156).

These encounters remained unofficial until 1974, when an official meeting was organised between Abu al-Futuh and Sananiri, one of the elders of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 160). This first meeting was followed by many, and ‘[t]he process that followed featured the steady and methodical indoctrination of large segments of the student population in the curriculum of the Muslim Brotherhood’ without including any mention of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 159). The intention was for the indoctrination to appear as general advice for Islamic activism. By 1975, a significant number of the leaders of the Islamist student movement joined the Brotherhood, although they kept it secret from the ranks of the movement (Bakr, 2013, p. 53).

Building the Master Frame: Islam is *the* Solution

The growth of *Islam is the solution* to a master frame was underlined by a continuous mobilisation of resources, in universities and society, on various fronts in response to the socio-economic grievances that were pervasive at the time. By winning and controlling student unions, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya gained access to the unions’ resources ‘funded by the state’s Supreme Council of Youth and Sports’ (Abdo, 2000, p. 124). According to Abu al-Futuh, access to those resources ‘doubled our [their] ability to offer services because of the large budget of the student union, and it facilitated for us [the movement] to spread the veil between female students by selling it to them’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 45).

The first services offered by the Islamist student movement targeted relieving the economic hardships faced by students. They provided textbooks that were usually out of reach for the average

students at much cheaper rates (Badr, 1989, p. 27). They printed lecture notes and ‘offered cheap tutorials, a necessity for passing many courses in which poor classroom instruction was common’ (Abdo 2000, p 125). They also organised markets for cheap food and clothing (Meijer, 2014, p. 191).

In addition to academic texts, there was a massive increase in the provision of printed Islamic content. Islamic wall magazines, pamphlets, booklets, and books were abundant on campuses. Some of these printed materials were issued directly by al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya to introduce students to figures such as Hassan al-Banna –the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood– and Sayyid Qutb –a prominent historical Brotherhood figure–; others were small pamphlets on contemporary issues such as ‘the rule of Islam concerning music and singing’ (Badr, 1989, p. 29; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 132). Most were Islamic books representing different Islamic schools sold at discounted prices. Students could borrow the books from the library of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya or buy them from weekly book fairs in universities, which ‘quickly became one of the most successful programs sponsored by the Islamic movement’ (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 133). Study circles were organised to engage with and discuss the content of these books, sometimes with opportunities to meet their famous authors (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 130).

Further, there were thousands of books sent free of charge from Saudi Arabia and distributed to students (Tamam, 2012, p. 67). These books introduced Wahhabism to Egyptian students with its ‘totalitarian approach to absolute truth’, ‘total rejection of pluralism’, and emphasis on Islam as a new identity transcending languages and nationalities by belonging to a broader religious Umma (community) (Ahmed, 2011, p. 97; Abdelhalim, 2017, p. 56).

Wahhabism was further enforced on campuses by subsidising student trips to Mecca and Medina for Umrah visits and pilgrimage, ‘allowing up to 100,000 students, male and female, to visit Saudi Arabia during the mid-to-late 1970s, according to one estimate’ (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 132). Some students stayed longer to learn at the hands of Saudi scholars and returned to campuses eager to spread what they learned, which mainly focused on their personal appearance, differences in ritual practices, and ‘hostility toward music, film, and other cultural forms for which Egypt had been known’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 68; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 133).

The university atmosphere was buzzing with Islamic discussions with regularly organised public lectures, seminars, and conferences by leading Islamist figures. Campaigns were organised around specific themes, each lasting for a week in which all the activities, talks, and printed material would revolve around a particular issue (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 132). These included topics

such as ‘the status of women in Islam [...] the Islamic position on Palestine, the status of Muslim minorities around the world, and secularism and Islam’ (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 137). According to Badr (1989, p. 34), who was a leader in al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya in the Mass Communication Faculty and later a Brotherhood member, ‘it was not long before al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya was able to control the intellectual and political movement in different universities’.

Outside the academic year, the activities of the student Islamist movement did not stop. Starting in 1973, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya organised summer camps funded by the student union and offered to students at heavily subsidised prices. A student would pay one Egyptian pound to participate in an all-inclusive two-weeks camp (Bakr, 2013, p. 38). By 1977, every major university in Egypt organised an Islamic summer camp, and some were organised during the winter holiday as well (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 130).

The camps were one of the major forums for recruitment and reinforcement of the movement frame. According to Bakr (2013, p. 37), a Salafist thinker who attended one of the summer camps in Alexandria as a student, ‘hundreds of students participated in a camp, and most of them would join al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya afterwards and adopt its ideas and become committed to the rules of Islam’. The camps were intended as a process of disciplined religious education, they ‘taught students how to lead a proper Islamic lifestyle, how to eat, sleep, and pray in accordance with the Koran and the hadiths. The regimen was strict, much like military training’ (Abdo, 2000, p. 111). Also, leading Islamist figures from the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafism and Wahhabism gave lectures and participated in the camp’s activities with students (Tamam, 2012, p. 82; Bakr, 2013, p. 39; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 130). Further, ‘the emphasis on discipline, which was at the heart of these activities, translated into a solid organisational foundation for the remainder of the year’, the schedule and activities of the summer camp evolved into programs applied in dormitories during the academic year (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 131).

In addition to these activities, one of the main areas in which al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya extensively mobilised its resources was in response to the particular socio-economic hardships faced by female students. If the dire economic situation coupled with the spread of lavish consumption was a problem for everyone, it was of particular weight for female students who struggled to buy clothing and keep up with fashion (Ahmed, 2011, p. 77). Therefore, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya introduced the Islamic dress at low prices, which came in a variety of styles, and ‘typically corresponded to different degrees of religious understanding and commitment’ (Ahmed

2011, p. 82). It ranged from ‘maxi-length skirts’, ‘long-sleeved shirt’, headscarves for covering the hair, and ‘khimar’, a long veil covering the hair, neck, and chest (Ahmed, 2011, p. 82).

Esam al-‘Eryan, who was the leader of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya at Cairo University and ‘effectively managed the mission and activities of the entire organisation’ reflects on the spread of the veil in universities at the time he was a student (Al-Aryan, 2014, p. 121). In a video, al-‘Eryan recalls how after distributing books concerning the religious obligation of veiling for women, the movement noticed that there were no stores for selling the veil (Al-‘Eryan, 2019). Therefore, they went to the free zones in Port-Said after 1973, bought fabric, went to tailors and factories to tailor them, and then sold veils at cost price to female students (Al-‘Eryan, 2019). Further, Ahmed (1992, p. 218; 2011, p. 88) reports on the direct investment of money in spreading the veil; ‘one student at Cairo University stated that she received a “small sum of money to hand out head-kerchiefs to her classmates and more money for every woman she converted to the wearing of shar‘i dress; money that came from a Saudi source”’.

Another problem facing female students was the ‘culturally uncomfortable and inappropriate’ experience of being close to their male colleagues in lecture halls and transportation (Ahmed, 2011, p. 77). Therefore, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya mobilised human and material resources to enforce gender segregation as the solution to these problems. They started by enforcing gender segregation in lecture halls by requiring males and females to sit in different rows (Ahmed, 2011, p. 133). They provided gender-segregated buses for female students between Cairo University and key city areas (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 142). At first, they rented the buses, then raised enough resources to buy them (Abdo, 2000, p. 124). As the service grew, it became increasingly popular among female students as it saved them the daily hassle of crowded public transportation, ‘the Islamists made Islamic dress a requirement for women who wanted to use the service’ (Ahmed, 2011, p. 132). In other instances, some al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya activists at ‘Ain Shams University ‘patrolled public buses to prevent inappropriate male-female interaction’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 143).

The mobilisation of resources towards providing services highlighted to thousands of students across Egypt how Islam or those representing it offer a solution(s). Further, these services helped reinforce the frames circulated and the meanings disseminated, such as the correct forms of appearance, the boundaries of public morality, norms of gender segregation, and belonging to an Islamic identity that transcends nationalities and languages. For the generations who witnessed the Islamic revival on campuses, ‘[t]he appeal of the Islamist message, in sharp contrast to the callous,

uncaring state, was clear to all, even the sons and daughters of the Egyptian elite' (Abdo, 2000, p. 125).

In parallel to campus activities and in collaboration with al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the broader Islamist movement was also heavily investing in spreading its message to the widest possible audiences. The prime venue for reaching audiences was print publications, in addition to '[t]he spread of mass and small media alike [which] opened up new opportunities [...] to reach both literate and illiterate segments of the population' (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 76).

The Muslim Brotherhood started issuing its magazine *al-Da'wa* in 1967. The first issue distributed 'nearly 60,000 copies'; that number rose later to 78,000 copies, then to 100,000 copies, with some issues sold out entirely (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 182). In addition to *al-Da'wa*, there was *al-Mokhtar al-Islami* (The Chosen) which focused on complex 'long scholarly pieces' directed to a more educated audience. Also, *al-I'tisam* (Adherence), which combined Salafist tendencies with discussions about state and social reform, and '[l]ess prominent yet no less significant were [...] the Quietist Salafis of Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyah, who published *al-Tawhid* (Monolatry) in close conversation with Salafi scholars in Syria and Saudi Arabia' (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 4). Other prominent Islamic magazines were issued by al-Azhar, which 'generated substantial followings within the Islamic movement' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 181). By the decade's end, 'there were over a dozen regularly appearing Islamic publications throughout Egypt, an industry that had not even existed only a decade earlier' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 180).

Besides these magazines, there was a boom in Islamic book production. Hundreds of thousands of copies were issued and sold at the Cairo Book Fair held in January each year (Bakr, 2013, p. 47). The books avoided formal Arabic rules and opted for a more colloquial language in 'inexpensive, attractively printed texts' to reach wider audiences (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 178). This was accompanied by financial resources from Saudi Arabia directed to 'the distribution of texts and teachings promoting Wahhabi Islam' (Ahmed, 2011, p. 97).

The Muslim Brotherhood also contributed with al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya to the projects of gender segregation in buses. It sought to extend it to 'securing gender segregated seating on a set number of train routes, particularly between Cairo and Alexandria' (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 143). In contrast, Salafism focused on initiatives that sought to overcome the challenge of separating or regulating male-female interactions in public spaces by calling on women to stay and study at home (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 143).

Further, activism and mobilisation extended to mosques across Egypt. In mosques and smaller prayer buildings (Zaweya), Islamist figures and al-Gama'a activists regularly organised events and gave sermons and lectures in Cairo and provincial towns (Bakr, 2013, pp. 44-45). Under al-Sadat's presidency, the state no longer controlled mosques; private mosques were permitted all over Egypt. Saudi Arabia also invested heavily through the Muslim World League in building mosques and supporting their religious staff (Ahmed, 2011, p. 94). The number of private mosques was steadily increasing; by '1979, only 5,600 of Egypt's 34,000 mosques were subject to state supervision' (Lippman, 2016, p. 232).

Further, starting in 1975/76, al-Gama'a organised Eid prayers in stadiums and public squares, which were attended by hundreds of thousands of individuals (Bakr, 2013, p. 46). The last permitted Eid prayer in 1981 gathered over half a million people in Cairo and Alexandria (Al-Aryan, 2014, p. 134). The sermons were given by 'star preachers of the Islamist movement, such as Yusef al-Qaradawi and Muhammad al-Ghazali, who flew in for those events from their prestigious positions in Arab Gulf states' (Ahmed, 2011, p. 135). In addition, activists engaged in social, charitable work such as 'providing volunteer medical care, handing out toys to children during the holidays, and organising athletic clubs and tournaments' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 134). This extensive and joint mobilisation of resources on campuses and in society spread the Islamists' message to the broadest possible audiences, paving the path for the growth in the spread of the master frame.

Clash with the Islamist Movement

The second half of the 1970s witnessed major international and regional events that impacted Egyptian politics and al-Sadat's relation with the Islamist Movement. From al-Sadat's peace treaty with Israel to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Islamist movement stressed its position as part of the larger struggle of Muslims around the world and adopted positions that were completely opposite to that of al-Sadat.

The heated political atmosphere started around January 1977 when the government decided to cut subsidies on essential food items, which 'threatened 15 percent increase in the cost of living' (Bronwlee, 2011, p. 651). Egyptians, already suffering from the al-Infitah policy took to the streets in one of the 'worst riots in a quarter of a century' in what became known as the bread riots. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya decided to participate in the riot (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 137). The riots lasted two days during which police stations were attacked, casinos and alcohol supplies destroyed, eighty people died, hundreds were wounded, and over a thousand were arrested. Al-Sadat became

furious with what happened, '[t]he previously bullish president, hero of 1973, became defensive, isolated, and erratic' (Bronwlee, 2011, p. 651).

In February, Sadat convened a meeting live on state television to discuss the political situation and reassure the public. Abu al-Futuh attended the meeting and had a fiery live exchange with the president. Abu al-Futuh accused al-Sadat of gathering hypocrites around him and reflected on the state's failure to live up to its slogan of Science and Faith. Al-Sadat was furious and lectured Abu al-Futuh on how he should talk to the elders and the president of the republic (Al-Arian 2014, pp. 105-106). That same year, a radical Islamist group known as al-Takfir wal-Higra kidnapped and murdered Awqaf Minister Muhammad al-Dhahabi in an incident that alarmed al-Sadat, shocked the public and was condemned by the Islamist movement (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 143). At the end of the year, al-Sadat went to Jerusalem to initiate Egypt's peace talks with Israel.

The visit and the peace talks faced strong opposition in Egypt and the Arab states, who threatened in 1978 that if Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt would be expelled from the Arab League (Bronwlee, 2011, p. 659). Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyaa, al-Da'wa and other Islamist print publications strongly opposed the peace talks with Israel. The movement called for protection of the rights of Muslims in Palestine. It framed the issue as part of 'the broader struggle of Muslims against colonialism, imperialism, and Zionism', and the peace process as a 'desertion of the greater cause of the Ummah' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 207). Further, al-Gama'a declared that 'there is no way to reclaim the usurped Palestinian lands and all the Muslim lands except by returning to God and implementing his rules on earth' (Bakr, 1989, p. 59).

Al-Sadat began in 1978 to change course with the Islamist movement from permissibility to repression. The first signs began with the interference of the state security forces in the student unions elections and striking the names of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya candidates from the election rolls in several universities (Abdo, 2000, p. 128). In 1979, al-Sadat announced that *there should be no religion in politics and no politics in religion*, a statement received with anger and condemnation from al-Gama'a (Bakr, 1989, p. 53).

The year 1979 also witnessed the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion stimulated a broad mobilisation of resources to support the Afghani cause and many campaigns, lectures and conferences that framed it in similar terms to the Palestinian cause as an Islamic land occupied by foreign forces which called for the help and support of Muslims in Egypt and worldwide (Tamam, 2012, p. 106).

The Iranian revolution significantly boosted the morale of the Islamist movement; al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya depicted it as ‘a volcano’ fired by the Islamic faith (Badr, 1989, p. 75). In a statement on the lessons learned from the Iranian revolution, al-Gama‘a highlighted how the revolution proved that Islam is ‘a comprehensive religion [...] organising the whole life’, and secularism is a fake call that contradicts Islam (Badr, 1989, p. 76). The Brotherhood framed it as ‘an “Islamic wave” (al-mudd al-islāmi) that had swept Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Chad among others’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 47). In opposition to the Islamist position, al-Sadat offered refuge to the Shah of Iran, which was faced with massive mobilisation, fiery statements against al-Sadat’s position, and protests in universities (Badr, 1989, p. 79). That same year, al-Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel, and ‘the mood in Egypt was tense, “more like a country in a state of siege [...] than one rejoicing for the coming of peace”’ (Brownlee, 2011, p. 660). The rift between al-Sadat and the Islamist movement was growing, and al-Da‘wa and al-I‘tisam magazines could not publish their issues in the summer of 1979 due to their growing criticism of the treaty. At the beginning of the academic year 1979/1980, Sadat issued decree 265, which abolished the general union of Egyptian students and froze its assets (Badr, 1989, p. 37). The decree also prevented any student gathering that is sectarian, political or religious and gave the deans of faculties the right to object to or stop any decision issued by a student union (Badr, 1989, p. 36). Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya was furious with the decree and mobilised against it, however, with no success.

In 1981, al-Sadat was ‘[i]ncreasingly frustrated and suspicious’; he ordered mass arrests of individuals from all sectors and positions (Lippman, 2016, p. 272). He arrested Islamists, leftists, journalists, including Heikal, professional syndicate members, political parties’ leaders, and the Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church. On the 6th of October 1981, during a parade commemorating the 1973 war, al-Sadat was shot dead by a group of Islamist Jihadists dressed in military uniforms.

Mubarak’s Regime

The 1970s started with al-Sadat mobilising for Islamism as a new political ground of legitimacy to overcome the legacy of Nasser, reframing the 1973 war as the victory of those who followed Islam after the defeat in the 1967 war that they attributed to decadence. Al-Sadat hoped thereby to avoid questions of corruption and political accountability, and to silence the dissenting voices under the frame of Islam and religiosity. The decade ended with al-Sadat assassinated under the same frame when he started to think of overcoming it. According to Mellor (2017, p. 151), ‘Ali Grisha, a senior Brotherhood figure, published a statement that was supposed to have been submitted to the Supreme Military Courts in Cairo, justifying the killing of al-Sadat because he

refused to apply Shari'a. This statement stands in stark contrast to the fact that it was al-Sadat who led the constitutional amendment by which Islamic Shari'a became the primary source of legislation instead of one of the sources of legislation.

Now that the frame grew to the extent of justifying the assassination of the *Believer President* when he started to consider retreating from it, it was a challenging mission for the new head of state to face al-Sadat's political heritage. Unlike al-Sadat's problems with the left and Nasserists in the early 1970s, Mubarak was dealing with a movement much bigger than the 1968 students' movement and the workers of Helwan, which was very difficult for him to contain or limit. Mubarak had to negotiate and reconcile with the new political reality by tolerating the groups within the Islamist movement who were willing to participate in a supposedly multi-party system 'in exchange for the rejection of violence and open anti-regime agitation' while selectively targeting violent Islamist groups, at least for the first decade (Wickham, 2002, p. 103; Rock, 2010, p. 17). This strategy favoured the groups within the Islamist movement who chose to renounce violence, as well as the Muslim Brothers and the individual and collective actors and preachers who focused on the aspects of the master frame that dealt with social problems and avoided political questions.

Further, Mubarak not only tolerated the frames of the broad Islamist movement but also tapped into the master frame. Mubarak 'injected more religion into Egyptian public life while trying to uproot religious fanaticism' with two aims: first, to boost the regime's Islamic image and legitimacy in the face of the opposing Islamist movements; and second, 'to disseminate the preferred "good" interpretation of Islam' as supported by the state (Guirguis, 2012, p. 203; van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 142). The leading institution through which this role was carried out was al-Azhar, Egypt's leading Islamic jurisprudential institution. A new head of al-Azhar was appointed, new state Islamic publications were circulated, and al-Azhar sheikhs appeared regularly on TV shows and the radio (Wickham, 2002, p. 211; Scott, 2010, p. 58; van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 142). More powers were granted to the institution to censor books, films, and all sorts of cultural productions, and 'the more the battle between militant Islamists and the state intensified, the more space was allowed to al-Azhar for political leverage and freedom of speech' (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 143).

To the opposite of what Mubarak possibly intended, this freedom of speech was used by al-Azhar to disseminate conservative opinions and, sometimes, it was even 'more critical of the pluralism of values and lifestyles in contemporary Egyptian society, than many of the Islamists in

organized opposition groups' (Wickham, 2002, p. 211). Further, the encroachment of al-Azhar on every aspect of social life by issuing 'edicts, or fatwas, on virtually every conceivable issue from smoking the hookah to watching bullfights' (Guirguis, 2012, p. 203), coupled with the legitimacy that the institution enjoyed among the public due to its historical role in the development of Islamic jurisprudence and as the representative of the state gave more credibility, resonance and spread to the master frame. It cemented the consensus mobilisation and created a shared public imagination that for every problem, the solution should be sought in Islam.

This role continued throughout the first two decades of Mubarak's regime; however, Mubarak's toleration of the Islamist movement did not last as long. In the early 1990s, Mubarak started to realise the extent of the networks and influence of the Islamist movement with its diverse actors and considerable resources. Further, the movement's success in providing services and benefits through the professional syndicates and the charity sector began to highlight the failures of the state, therefore, threatening the regime's legitimacy. Thus, Mubarak pulled back from the accommodating position and started to oppress the active Islamist members with military trials, imprisonment, and censorship of the movement's activities. By the final decade and through the 2000s, the regime kept the threat of repression always on the table while allowing – at times – for relative accommodation in the political sphere.

Arguably, in the face of the realistic political questions following al-Sadat's assassination, Mubarak tried to do what Sadat did before him: strategically avoiding the political questions of democracy, accountability, and pluralism by diverting attention to social and religious issues instead. In their attempts to avoid dealing with the political questions, both al-Sadat and Mubarak, with the aid of the Islamist movement, created a very complex political reality, where everything was suppressed in the political realm and pushed to the social. To avoid critical political engagement and reinforce authoritarianism, Islamism seemed at the beginning to offer an easy answer to the complicated questions of politics that dictators do not want to be answered. Kandil (2011, p. 49) suggests that '[a]s a matter of fact, al-Ikhwan's prioritization of culture over politics was music to the rulers' ears. Encouraging Egyptians to direct all efforts towards cultural revival and personal piety diverted them, at least temporarily, from defying political authority in any meaningful way'. However, as happened with al-Sadat before, the political always finds its way back through the social; the only difference is that the political questions become entangled in religious rhetoric that is harder to unpack.

The following sections address the evolution of the Islamist movement – in its different branches – throughout Mubarak’s regime, and their role in expanding the master frame through networks, resource mobilisation, and building upon the political opportunities allowed by the occasional openness of the system. Further, it explores how the master frame coloured and constrained the cultural milieu and the negotiation of public policies.

The Islamist Movement

At the end of the 1970s, the vibrant Islamist student movement dispersed in four directions, forming the core of the Islamist movement in Egypt (Bakr, 2013, p. 68). First, the largest part of the movement joined the Brotherhood from 1975 onwards, particularly in Cairo and Delta (northern Egypt) (Bakr, 2013, p. 68; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 162). The second movement was Salafism, which started as ‘a reaction to those in al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya who joined the Muslim Brotherhood’ asserting that the original ideology of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya was Salafist (Bakr, 2013, p. 60). The Alexandria Salafist school headed this movement (Bakr 2013, p 60). The third movement sprouted in Upper Egypt; they kept the name of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and adopted violence and a militant component in their activism (Bakr, 2013, p. 69; Al-Arian, 2014, p. 144). Finally, there was the general charitable and missionary current who focused on Da‘wa or the call to Islam, which included organisations such as Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhamediyya, al-Tableegh w al-Da‘wa, and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya (Bakr, 2013, p. 69).

There were significant differences between and within these movements regarding their Islamic jurisprudential opinions, the adoption of different tactics and strategies, and their calls for mobilisation. However, they all shaped and expanded the master frame in calling for the general inclusive idea of Islam as the solution to Egypt’s problems, whether on an individual level in bringing up and educating better individual Muslims or on the collective level of Islam as a way of governance.

The charitable and missionary current was the largest and the most decentralised. Islamist charitable organisations increased by 100% between 1975 and 1990, with ‘[o]ver 4,000 Islamic associations ... in the early 1990s’ (Bayat, 1998, p. 155). Al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya had ‘branches in all twenty-six governorates and 123 branches in Cairo’, with over 3000 branches, more than 7000 mosques and over 75 institutes (Wickham, 2002, p. 100; Bakr, 2013, p. 204). Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhamediyya had over a hundred branches and almost a thousand mosques (Bakr, 2013, p. 173). Arguably, these organisations played the most significant role in expanding the reach and resonance of the master frame due to the extent of their networks, the variety of services they

offered, and the resources they mobilised. Further, they succeeded in filling the absence of the state and providing social welfare services that alleviated the social and economic grievances under the banner of the Islamic cause, which solidified the support for other organised Islamist movements and enhanced the credibility of its actors.

These organisations built Islamic and private schools, offered free or subsidised healthcare services through Islamic clinics, and established women's organisations, libraries, book clubs, kindergartens, and day-care facilities (Wickham, 2002, p. 92; Clark, 2004, p. 949; Sika, 2012, p. 67; van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 72). Most of these services would usually be centred around a mosque which offered religious lessons, competitions on memorising and reciting the Qur'an, and celebrations in Ramadan and Eid (Wickham, 2002, p. 92). Wickham (2002, p. 98) further argues that in low-income neighbourhoods, particularly those deprived of government services, 'the local mosque and its satellite institutions often became the focal points of community social life'. In addition to mobilising resources, these organisations 'propagated the Islamist frames through "lectures, lessons, the media, books, newspapers, magazines and tapes"' (Wickham, 2002, p. 131).

The outreach of the master frame was 'a decentralized process' and 'typically a personal, even intimate process, rooted in face-to-face human relationships' (Wickham, 2002, pp. 134, 163). The communication of meanings and values within the master frame became as widespread as the number of private mosques, which reached '91,000 mosques in Egypt in 1991, including 45,000 private mosques and 10,000 *zawiyas*' – in one of the moderate estimates – in which 'popular sheikhs, free of government control, are making decisions on matters ranging from divorce to land ownership and the role of women in society' (Abdo, 2000, p. 26; Wickham, 2002, p. 98). This was in addition to the centrality of these efforts within a public sphere dominated by the religious discourse through tv shows, radio programs, cassette tapes of popular preachers, massive productions of Islamic publications, and study circles in mosques and private homes, which all contributed to 'placing religion at the center of moral consciousness and action' (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 18).

Besides the efforts of the charity organisations, there were a variety of individual figures who were highly influential in shaping and spreading the master frame that *Islam is the solution*. The state supported some of these figures, such as Muhammad Mitwalli al-Sha'rawi and Mustafa Mahmoud. Mahmoud was a doctor and Marxist in his youth, then published several written works on his spiritual journey back to Islam and hosted a famous TV show, 'Science and Faith', in imitation of the slogan adopted by Sadat (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 82). Muhammad Mitwalli al-Sha'rawi

was promoted by Sadat and endorsed by Mubarak as a moderate figure focusing on rituals and religiosity while avoiding any rhetoric against the state (Rock, 2010, p. 17). Over the following decades and until his death, with his prime-time show on Egyptian television, Sha‘rawi became one of the highly influential figures in popular religion. Many of those interviewed in the course of this research reported him as their primary source of religious information, whether in their childhood or youth.

There were also popular figures who opposed the political regime, including Ahmed al-Mahallāwī and Abdel Hamid Kishk; the latter ‘amassed such a following from the early 1975 that a Saudi-funded magazine dubbed him “the star of Islamic preaching”,’ and both sold thousands of cassette tapes (Abdo, 2000, p. 65). In addition, other popular figures who were tied to the Islamist movement included al-Ghazali, a graduate of al-Azhar and connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaradawi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the early 1990s, new names started to emerge, the top of which was ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Kafi, who was dubbed ‘the “sheikh of the stars”’ due to his role in convincing many female celebrities to adopt the veil and leave their careers in tv and cinema, ‘[h]e was also called the “women’s sheikh” for the large female following he had cultivated among upper-class professionals and housewives who transformed their lives after attending his religious lessons’ (Abdo, 2000, p. 143). Al-Kafi’s role was vital in spreading the master frame to the upper classes of the society. After he was banned from preaching in mosques and on tv, he started preaching in study circles at elite homes. The practice of study circles, particularly for women, later spread to many homes, especially in the homes of the former celebrities who followed a religiously committed path, and some of them turned into preachers themselves (van Nieuwkerk, 2013).

Within this religion-dominated cultural sphere and Islamic charity-infused socio-economic field, the organised Islamist movements worked to expand their reach and influence in the society throughout Egypt. In Upper Egypt, a strong militant (Jihadist) movement was growing, which included al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyaa and Tanzim al-Jihad (Rock-Singer, 2017, p. 442). The Jihadists believed in establishing an Islamic state and enforcing what they considered to be Islamic morals through the use of violence against the state, communities, and individuals.

In universities, they aimed to enforce gender segregation by breaking up mixed parties, ‘disrupting music performances, intervening in the showing of Western films [...] and mixed gender trips of students’ (Meijer, 2014, p. 195). In neighbourhoods, they had ‘vigilante squads’ charged with enforcing Islamic teaching, and they acted as ‘power-brokers in neighbourhood

conflicts, establishing a kind of militia for this purpose' (Abdo, 2000, p. 21; Meijer, 2014, p. 200). They banned belly dancers from wedding parties, burned video and liquor stores and hair salons, imposed the Hijab on women, and terrorised Christian residents, fuelling incidents of sectarian violence (Abdo, 2000, p. 21). Their main areas of dominance were in Upper Egypt, where they controlled entire regions, some of which consisted of 52 villages; they also had a strong presence within particular neighbourhoods in Cairo, such as Imbaba (Abdo, 2000, p. 21; Meijer, 2014, p. 200).

At the beginning of the 1980s, Mubarak's regime turned a blind eye to the dominance of the Jihadists with an understanding that Jihadists were 'allowed to apply its [their] own laws, and in return it [they] secured the area' (Scott, 2010, p. 47). However, by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, their violence was growing beyond government control, intensifying in frequency and expanding in targets (Ahmed, 2011, p. 142). Not only were they bombing video stores and entertainment venues, but their attacks also included 'government buildings, banks, and government officials. Similarly, Coptic (Egyptian Christian) churches and businesses' (Ahmed, 2011, p. 142). Throughout the 1990s, their attacks resulted in hundreds of casualties, they attempted to assassinate Mubarak on a visit to Ethiopia, and they targeted touristic venues, including one of the most widely known incidents in 1997 where they attacked tourists in Luxor, 'killing sixty- six people, of whom fifty- seven were foreigners' (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 118).

Arguably, the effect of the Jihadist movement on the master frame is not in directly increasing the frame's resonance or appeal, given that the 'militant trend was by far less influential and pervasive than the gradualist and non-violent trend' (Bayat, 1998, p. 155). Rather, their actual effect, one would argue, could be seen in two things. First, the imposition of radical religious practices within universities, neighbourhoods, and communities starting from 1975 and until – at least – the first half of the 1990s must have left a trace in the culture of the dominated regions, which would mean that if and when individuals and communities retreated from these radical practices, they would typically return to a lesser degree of religiosity but still largely within the confines of the master frame as advanced by other Islamist movements and actors about what constitutes the practices of good Muslims. Second, the Jihadists' presence and actions increased the appeal of the movements that rejected violence. Jihadists put the other movements in a moderate centrist position by being at the extreme end of using violence to impose morals and establish an Islamic state. The public sphere was shifting slowly to a place where Islamists

represent the left, right and centre. At the same time, secular tendencies faded into the background, and the master frame dominated the public discourse.

While Jihadism dominated Upper Egypt, Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast was heavily influenced by Salafism. An equally conservative movement which calls for ‘returning to the purest roots of Islam and the strict emulation of its prophet and his companions’ (Awad, 2014, p. 7), but with a rejection of violence. The group started from the students who were part of the Islamist student movement but refused to join the Muslim Brotherhood and focused their efforts on preaching for the Salafi da‘wa and expanding their mobilisation through networks of charity and educational institutions. They founded ‘a Zakat Committee’, which offered services and provided monetary help to families in need, established local branches across Alexandria and an educational institution ‘to prepare new preachers who follow their Salafi creed’, and published a monthly magazine (Awad, 2014, p. 9).

Moving towards the centre of the Islamist movement and geographically to the capital of the country, in Cairo and the surrounding Delta, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was by far the most organised and politically active movement. They participated in parliamentary elections, syndicate elections, student unions, and faculty clubs. They helped in the growth of the outreach activities, the provision of socio-economic services, and the solidification of the master frame. Further, although the bigger context of charity associations, socio-economic Islamic services and Islamic mobilisation was not under the MB’s control or even necessarily their coordination, however, Wickham (2002, p. 202) argues that ‘the Muslim Brotherhood was the main beneficiary of decentralized outreach efforts, because it was able to aggregate citizens’ newfound Islamist sympathies and channel them into electoral campaigns in national-level organizations closer to the political centre’.

The first political opportunity came with the 1984 parliamentary elections. Although the MB initially opposed elections and multiparty democratic systems as ideas in al-Banna’s time, they embraced electoral political participation under al-Tilmisani’s guidance and leadership (Mellor, 2017, p. 163). They won seven seats through an alliance with the al-Wafd party (Mellor, 2017, p. 179). Three years later, in 1987, they won thirty-five seats through a coalition with the Socialist Labour party and the Liberal party (Mellor, 2017, p. 179). During the later elections, the MB’s campaign ‘hung up banners declaring “Islam is the solution” and “Give your vote to Allah, give it to the Muslim Brotherhood”’, and ‘[i]n both elections, the coalition encompassing the Brotherhood received more votes than any other opposition party’ (Wickham, 2002, p. 90). In parliament, MB

members focused on the application of Islamic Shari‘a, whether in opposing proposed bills that contradict Shari‘a in their opinion or in questioning the government in demand for complete application of Shari‘a (Mellor, 2017, p. 163).

In parallel, the MBs ran candidates in syndicate elections across the country. They won most seats and controlled the boards of the five most important and ‘politically active’ associations: the doctors, engineers, scientists, pharmacists, and lawyers (Fahmy, 1998, p. 552). To put that into perspective, there were ‘22 professional syndicates in Egypt with a total of 3.5 million members’, and the syndicates which the MBs did not control were still influenced ‘through the activities of the syndicates’ Liberty and Islamic Law committees’ (Fahmy, 1998, p. 552). The campaigns for syndicate elections focused similarly on Islam as the solution to social and economic problems, on serving members’ needs and on causes such as ‘boosting the national economy and opposing the normalization of relations with Israel’ (Gerges, 2018, p. 370).

Interestingly, the electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood were the fruits of the labour of the same generation who were at the heart of the Islamist student movement. The leaders of the Islamist student movement were at the forefront of the parliamentary and syndicate elections, building on their successful experience in the student unions. They mobilised to gain seats and control the professional bodies, then tapped into its resources to promote Islam as the solution. In the same way that the student union resources were used for book fairs, cheap goods markets, textbooks, and subsidised student trips, under the MBs leadership, syndicates were an influential player in the provision of socio-economic services under the banner of the Islamic cause. Their services included housing opportunities, health care services, pensions, affordable holidays, pilgrimage trips to Mecca and Islamic loans (Abdo, 2000, p. 72).

It is important to note that while the MBs and the Islamist movement gained massively from the organisational networks and infrastructure that expanded and consolidated the master frame and mobilised individuals to join – or at least to sympathise with – the movement, this big success would not have been equally possible without the continuous failures of the state’s socio-economic policies and its passive shrinking role in providing welfare services. The state’s failures gave the MBs political opportunities to offer an alternative answer, an alternative vision to the regime, one that emphasises Islam as not only the solution to the social and economic problems but also as a spiritual justification that accommodates individual and collective grievances.

The generation of Egyptians who were part of the students’ cohorts in the 1970s witnessed successive major events, from the 1967 defeat, the war ordained by God in 1973, the al-Infatih

policy, the peace treaty with Israel and the assassination of Sadat, to name a few. These events posed and – one could argue still pose – unanswered political questions related to the accountability of the political leadership, the oversight of government policies and the citizenry's participation in voicing their demands. These questions were answered in religious terms. For the state, this was an opportunity to avoid accountability. For the Islamists, this was an opportunity to promote the master frame and solidify its presence in the social sphere, so when the political questions are asked later, they became questions about the extent of the application of Islamic Shari'a and the degree of religiosity.

This generation was surrounded by Islamist activism from every corner, from the time they were students in the university to their professional life in the syndicates, the only available answer to their continuing grievances was an Islamist one. As Abdo (2000, pp. 85-86) put it

As children, this new generation had experienced the wrenching defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, which ordinary Egyptians saw as a warning from God that the country had strayed from its faith. When the young professionals of the mid-1980s entered universities, they found themselves surrounded by active Islamic student unions working to integrate religion into every aspect of public and private life. By the time they joined the workforce and began raising children, they had developed a shared vision of a correct "Islamic" lifestyle. And many aspects of contemporary Egyptian society fell far short of those expectations.

Clash with the Islamist Movement

By the beginning of the 1990s, Mubarak's regime started to grow hostile toward the Islamist movement in its four core groups. With the intensifying violence of Jihadists, the threats they posed, incidents of sectarian violence and the increasing demands that the state should address the terroristic incidents, they were naturally the first to face the state hostility. Confrontations between the security forces and the Jihadists continued throughout the 1990s. Towards the end of the decade, splits and factions in the movement leadership started to appear, and they called for a ceasefire (Scott, 2010, p. 47). By the early 2000s, the Jihadist groups issued books calling for the rejection of extremism, correction of their methods, and renouncing the use of violence (Scott, 2010, p. 47).

The state clampdown did not stop at the Jihadists. In Alexandria, the broad appeal of Salafism attracted state attention. The movement's leaders were arrested, their educational institution closed its doors, and their assets were frozen (Awad, 2014, p. 9). The outreach activities that remained of

the movement focused on da'wa or religious teaching while being under the close watch of the security forces, who threatened violence and detention whenever the movement's reach exceeded what the state deemed acceptable.

The clash with the Muslim Brotherhood started with the 1992 earthquake. When the earthquake hit Egypt, it caused overwhelming damage to lives and property. The state response was slow and inefficient, and the associations led by the MB, in cooperation with the network of Islamic charity organisations, were quick to offer organised help. They provided food and shelter, the doctors set up camps to treat the injured, the engineers volunteered to inspect the unstable buildings, and the resources of the syndicates were used to offer compensation to the families of those who died or were injured (Abdo, 2000, pp. 96-97).

The failures of the state were on display, and the success of the Islamist movement was obvious; this was not an image that Mubarak's regime would tolerate. The regime arrested the movement's leaders, including Abu al-Futuh, 'Esam al-Aryan and many active members. They were tried in military courts, and some received maximum sentences (Wickham, 2002, p. 215). The media adopted a rhetoric branding the MB an illegal organisation (Wickham, 2002, p. 201). Further, in a bid to control the outreach activities of the Islamic charitable organisations, the state issued laws to place private mosques under the control of the Ministry of Religious Endowments, criminalise receiving foreign funds to control the flow from the Gulf countries, and placed NGOs under the censorship of the state (Wickham, 2002, p. 217).

Yet, despite the repression of the state, the appeal, resonance, and strength of the master frame were not curtailed. The state clamped down on the organised entities, but as clarified earlier, the reach of the master frame was a decentralised process. A look at the figures for 1990s show over one quarter of books published were religious [...] About 85 percent of books sold during the 1995 Cairo book fair were Islamic. The tapes of figures such as Shaikh Kishk, numbering over a thousand, were on sale in their millions. Dozens of Islamic newspapers, weeklies, and monthlies had high circulation rates. Radio Quran, a channel devoted entirely to religious matters, maintained its highest popularity in this period, while in contrast, movie viewers and production of domestic films declined. Self-censorship emerged in the production of television programs in response to pressure on the state by popular sentiment [...] Islamic sentiment was particularly expressed in a marked decline of alcohol consumption, bars, liquor stores, and night clubs for Egyptians (Bayat, 1998, pp. 155-156).

Further, the 1990s witnessed several public debates over the limits of the master frame and the limits of applying Islamic principles and morals. Litigation was used to enforce the Islamisation of society which was received with strong support in the judicial reasoning, particularly with the constitutional cover that declares Islamic Shari'a as the primary source of legislation. Those who stood against the master frame sometimes faced severe personal consequences, and, in their failures, the hold of the frame was cemented in its place above criticism. A look at examples of these debates demonstrates how the master frame coloured and constrained not only individual and collective actors but also state institutions.

A well-known example of the interplay of the master frame with state institutions happened with the Ministry of Education. In the 1980s, while Mubarak's regime was still following al-Sadat's policy of investing in the frame and showing that the state is 'no less religiously committed than the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups', the schools were infused with religious curriculums and appointed many religious education teachers (Ahmed, 2011, p. 126). In the 1990s, with the changing policy towards Islamists and the changing mood of the state, the Ministry of Education sought to limit the veil in schools. The peak of the crisis was in 1994 when the Minister of Education issued a decree banning the veiling of girls in primary schools following media reports of teachers 'forcing or scaring young girls into wearing the hijab' (Abdo, 2000, p. 143; Ahmed, 2011, p. 146). Parents objected vehemently, clashes between parents and teachers who tried to enforce the decision erupted in many schools, and the Ministry dismissed teachers who encouraged veiling (Abdo, 2000, p. 150). The Islamist movement naturally criticised the Ministry but also al-Azhar 'publicly confronted the minister, arguing that covering everything except a girl's hands and the feet was necessary after puberty, according to the Islamic texts' (Abdo, 2000, p. 150). The Ministry eventually succumbed to the pressures and changed its decree to allow schoolgirls to wear the veil provided written parental consent was obtained, yet practically, the requirement of consent was not enforced (Abdo, 2000, p. 150).

A second arena of debate erupted when 'the legal system was used by Islamist lawyers to, in effect, harass and persecute people who did not share the views of Islamists' (Ahmed, 2011, p. 143). The targets of cases varied between censorship over artistic works and the imposition of Islamic morals over individuals accused of violating Islamic principles. The first type of cases included a successful case against the well-known director Yussef Chahine to ban his film inspired by the story of Joseph the prophet, the imprisonment of Ala Hamid for eight years for writing a 'blasphemous' book and several lawsuits by the Muslim Brotherhood to ban tv shows,

advertisements and films (Abdo, 2000, p. 6; Ahmed, 2011, p. 143). The second type of cases included a case against the actress Yusra who was charged with ‘offending public morals. Her crime was appearing on the cover of a film magazine in skimpy clothes’, an unsuccessful case against the prominent feminist Nawal al-Sa’dawi to forcibly divorce her from her husband based on claims of her apostasy and a successful lawsuit against Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, who was forcibly divorced from his wife after being declared an apostate by the appellate court following his writing on Islamic jurisprudence which forced him into exile (Abu-Lughod, 1998, p. 250; Ahmed, 2011, p. 144).

In addition to this was the general violent atmosphere in which assassination and assassination attempts were carried out against intellectuals, including Farag Fouda, who lost his life and Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz, who survived the attack. Although assassinations are particularly attributed to Jihadists, it is essential to note that other Islamist figures and al-Azhar supported the killing of Farag Fouda. Al-Azhar committee declared Fouda’s writings to be against Islam, a declaration which was used by Jihadists to justify his killing (Abdo, 2000, p. 68). Al-Azhar’s Academy of Islamic Research declared him an apostate; a verdict of apostasy in Islam is arguably punished by death (Abdo, 2000, p. 68). This was later confirmed in Fouda’s murder trial, in which al-Ghazali – who is usually cited as a moderate figure who rejects violence and is a member of the Academy of Islamic Research – appeared in defence of the killers, arguing that ‘anyone who resisted the full imposition of Islamic law was an apostate who should be killed either by the government or by devout individuals’ (Ahmed, 2011, p. 143).

What is particularly distinctive about the phenomenon of litigation for the imposition of Islamisation is the extent to which the judicial system incorporated reasoning derived from the master frame in its rulings. In the case against Yussef Chahine, the court called the parliament to issue a law to ban the personification of prophets on-screen, asserting that ‘Islam remains above all else’ (Abdo, 2000, p. 182). In Abu Zaid’s case, despite the absence of apostasy laws, ‘the Appellate court decided that the Abu Zeid case should be considered in accordance with sharia rules’ (Abdo, 2000, p. 167).

It is clear that the power of the master frame was not the exclusive work of Islamist actors. Not only judicial institutions, but more importantly, al-Azhar was a central player in this atmosphere of backing the censorship efforts and seeking to legitimise their role in imposing censorship over artistic works. In 1994, al-Azhar sought a ruling to confirm their right to censor works that conflict with Islamic principles; the court ruled in their favour declaring that ‘al- Azhar’s opinion was

“binding” on the Ministry of Culture’ (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 144). Further, Sheikh al-Azhar was very vocal in condemning the government’s policies that he saw as contradicting Islam. This did not only include his clash with the Minister of Education, but other ministers, most notably his criticism of ‘the government’s decision to sponsor an international population conference in Cairo’ (Wickham, 2002, p. 110).

Conclusion: The 2000s & the New Normal

One could argue that by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the process of building the master frame could be deemed complete. Different groups within the Islamist movement complemented each other’s mobilisation. The charity sector expanded the arms of the networks and built a robust infrastructure that is decentralised in control and administration but harmonised in working under the banner of the Islamic cause and tapping into and expanding the resonance of the master frame. The Jihadists planted conservatism and radicalism, of which people rejected the violent component. Still, traces of the conservative ideology remained, which was then picked up by Salafists who adopted a similar project but with a rejection of violence, therefore, expanding the reach of the conservative interpretations within the frame, which was strengthened further by the Wahhabi ideology transferred from across the Red Sea through migration to the Gulf and specifically Saudi Arabia. Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood tapped into all these frameworks and contributed to Islamic outreach activities while mobilising it to achieve political gains in elections.

The 2000s and what followed was a new normal in which the master frame became the governing frame in Egypt’s political culture, and the different causes which emerged had to be negotiated from within the frame. Notable examples include any developments in the personal status laws which had to be negotiated from within the Islamic Shari‘a and the criminalisation of FGM, which necessitated an engagement from the Islamic institutions to declare the act non-religious.

In the 2000s, the master frame was no longer contested; it was negotiated. New forms of religiosity emerged; new preachers dominated the media. These included modern-looking figures such as Amr Khaled, Mustafa Hosni, Mo‘ez Masoud and traditional Salafist figures such as Mohammad Hassan and Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub. The Islamist movement saw the decline of Jihadism and the rise of al-Wasatiyya, a centrist movement which sought to offer new interpretations that would accommodate democracy, citizenship and equality within the master

frame of Islam as the solution and governing state reference. Mubarak's policy regarding different groups within the Islamist movement waxed and waned between repression and accommodation.

The millennials were raised by the generation who were at the heart of the religious transformation and were brought up in a context with settled boundaries about what is acceptable socially and politically, at least until the 2011 revolution. However, before examining in detail the interplay of the master frame with the political culture and values of the interviewees, it is essential first to consider what values were discussed in the multiple rhetoric within the master frame. That is the topic of the next chapter.

V. Master Frame & Values: Islam as Life & Governance

The previous chapter engaged with the venues and networks through which the frame was disseminated and the political opportunities that helped build the resonance and prevalence of the master frame in Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes. It also clarified the history and structure of the movements and actors who contributed to shaping the master frame. These included the Islamist movement in its different manifestations and the state's efforts to control and present an official state-approved version of piety. The state's version of piety was expressed by al-Azhar and popular figures who were not always part of the official state institutions but were seen as state-sponsored, such as Sheikh Muhammad Metwali al-Sha'rawi.

Nevertheless, so far, not much has been said about the multiple discourses and ideas that emerged within the master frame and their interplay with values such as tolerance, equality, autonomy, and freedoms of expression. This chapter advances the argument that the consensus mobilisation was built around the idea that Islam is a comprehensive system of life and governance, that it ought to govern every aspect of one's private life through becoming a better pious Muslim, and it ought to govern public life through the implementation of Islamic rule and Islamic Shari'a. The interpretations of what being a better Muslim entails and how Islamic Shari'a ought to be implemented differed between actors across the Islamist movement, between the Islamist movement and the state, and evolved over time.

While the core idea of the master frame – that Islam is the solution to every individual and collective problem – remained constant across different actors, the ideas and interpretations that emerged within the frame diversified to accommodate different audiences and different degrees of piety. Further, the disseminated messages differed according to one's level of piety, so when one undertakes a step towards commitment to the frame ideas, one would find different detailed guides on becoming more committed. Therefore, the framing efforts were no longer, as in the 1970s, directed only towards a general audience to convince them to join the Islamist self-reform and governance projects. Rather, over the following decades, the framing efforts also offered detailed guides to those who already followed the ideas of the master frame on how one becomes more committed to Islamist self-reform and governance.

The expansion in the target audiences and diversity of interpretations grew continuously across the 1980s and 1990s, with the 2000s witnessing the emergence of a new wave of preachers. They dressed in modern styles without claiming the traditional religious outfits of Sheiks and adopted a

colloquial language that drew on young peoples' everyday experiences with a reformist message that is open to different lifestyles. Their TV shows, religious lessons and recordings proved very successful in garnering massive support and following from youth in the millennial generation. The 2000s also witnessed the emergence of many Salafist tv channels, which reached millions of homes, and massive popularity for some Salafist preachers who advocated more traditional jurisprudential views.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section analyses the core idea of the master frame that Islam is the solution to every problem, in private life on the individual level by one becoming a better pious Muslim, and on the collective level by adopting Islamic rule and Islamic Shari'a in governance. The second and third sections explore the various ideas and interpretations disseminated by Islamist movements and figures on how one becomes a better pious Muslim and the vision of an Islamic rule governed by Shari'a.

Islam as Life & Governance

The late 1970s marked the beginning of the growth of the Islamist message from a collective action frame competing with leftists and Nasserists in universities towards becoming a master frame that 'conditioned an entire generation in working through existing institutions, making precise claims, and doing so while framing them in an Islamic tone' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 145). According to Abu al-Futuh,

this period [the 1970s] witnessed a massive educational work done by al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and impacting generations of students in all Egyptian universities [...] it raised thousands of thousands of youth across Egypt and left them with an impact that cannot be erased even for those who joined other Islamic movements or [for those who] left the Islamic work entirely (Tamam, 2012, p. 94).

The Islamist movement, in its different segments, advocated a broad and inclusive frame; *Islam is the solution* [to any individual or collective problem] as a system of *life and governance*. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya declared that '[t]he da'wa of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya is simple and clear [...] to establish society on an Islamic foundation' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 129). The rest of the statement refers to how such a society is to be established by reference to Hassan al-Banna's twenty principles which focus on '*Islam as a system to govern all aspects of life*', where Islam constitutes 'the state [...] the government [...] justice [...] culture [...] law [...] judiciary [...] jihad [...] idea [...] and a sincere faith' (Badr, 1989, p. 19). The statement also emphasised 'the centrality of holy scripture, [and] implementing divine law' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 129). In another statement to

students titled ‘Islamic concepts’, al-Gama‘a commented on how Islam is not only rituals, but it also constitutes ‘homeland, nationality, ethics [...] culture and law [...] [as] *a comprehensive system imposing itself on all aspects of life*’ (Badr, 1989, p. 20).

Al-Da‘wa, the Muslim Brotherhood magazine, ‘revolved in its entirety around the idea that Islam is a comprehensive system of life and talked about the obligation of Islamic work and the inevitability of the Islamic solution’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 100). In speaking to broader audiences beyond students, through al-Da‘wa, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed to expand the infusion of ‘Islamic culture and values in the everyday lives of Egyptians’, towards

everything from Islamic practice, cultural interactions, and family life, to urban development, education, professional careers, and rural life—in other words, all the features of Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood writers infused an Islamic ethos in their discussion of all of these topics in an attempt to spread the organisation’s mission and to lay the groundwork for the ideal Islamic society to which they aspired (Al-Arian, 2014, pp. 209-210).

In analysing the content of al-Da‘wa’s pamphlets and books, Wickham (2002, pp. 139-141) found that al-Da‘wa advocated the idea that ‘Islam is more than a set of codes applicable to private conduct; it is complete and comprehensive (*kamil wa-shamil*), with a program (*Minhaj*) for organizing society at large’, and ‘an unqualified panacea for all the problems of the *umma* and the world at large, hastening a utopia in which all human needs will be met’. This view is best expressed in Mustafa Mashhur’s words – one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s guides – advocating that ‘Islam is a collective religion; it is a system of life and government and legislation and state and struggle and *umma* in one’ (Wickham, 2002, p. 139).

Wickham (2002, p. 140) further contends that the frame called for individuals, especially the young people, to assume responsibility for achieving this vision of Islam as a comprehensive system to govern every aspect of life. As Mashhur elaborates, the ‘correct understanding of Islam fills us with public responsibilities and obligations that we must perform according to the command of God in order to ensure that society is established according to Islamic principles in all spheres, political and economic and legal and social, and so on’ (Wickham, 2002, p. 139). One can classify the nature of these responsibilities under the master frame of Islam as a comprehensive system and an all-encompassing solution into individual and collective levels.

On the individual level, Islam as a way of life means one should become a better pious Muslim where Islam governs every aspect of one’s life, whether in appearance, practices, or values.

Wickham (2002, p. 142) advances that ‘the pamphlets stress that the path to Islamic reform begins with self-reform and proceeds in ever expanding circles to embrace the *umma* and eventually humanity as a whole. The young Muslim who seeks to transform society must therefore begin with himself’. Rock-Singer (2019, p. 140) also argues that ‘[d]uring the second half of the 1970s Egyptian religious elites sought to shape society [...] through an emphasis on the embodied practices of individual believers’. Over the following decades, in identifying how one becomes a better pious Muslim, certain topics gained attention and were at the centre of emphasis. First and foremost was the regulation of gender relations and what it entailed concerning the disciplining of sexuality, which started in the 1970s with calls for gender segregation. According to Abu al-Futuh, ‘our generation fought [...] fierce battles over the relationship between a man and a woman and the necessity of segregation’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 68). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these calls evolved towards accepting limited and disciplined gender relations, which differed in their boundaries following diverse interpretations from multiple actors but generally leaning towards conservatism. Rock-Singer (2019, p. 160) advances that

In the absence of viable structural solutions to gender mixing, and the continued growth and necessity of female employment, Muslim Brothers and Salafis doubled down on a call for embodied Islamic norms of comportment (*al-aḍāb al-islāmiyya*), which enlisted individual discipline of men and women alike in the service of conservative gender relations.

The limits of gender relations included reflections on women’s proper role in the society and the family; Abdo (2000, p. 147) advances that ‘Egypt’s Islamists have focused much of their attention on women in the struggle to create an Islamic society’. These topics and their associated framing efforts touched upon and interacted with values such as gender equality and individual autonomy.

On the collective level, Islam as a comprehensive system of governance means one must seek to establish Islamic rule and implement Islamic Shari‘a in law, politics, and state institutions. In shaping the vision for Islam as governance, multiple topics were at the centre of the master frame, on the top of which was the emphasis on Islamic Shari‘a as the main source of legislation and the governing reference in every state matter. In the early issues of *al-Da‘wa*, the call for Islamic governance was placed within a rhetoric of democracy and the rule of law, similar to the frame advocated by al-Sadat’s regime and Sufi Abu Taleb’s writings. Towards the end of the 1970s, the call for the implementation of Shari‘a, Islamic judicial codes, and Islamisation of the Egyptian constitution ‘at the time of its revision under Sadat was of vital concern to Tilmisani and others’

(Al-Arian, 2014, p. 192). Al-Da‘wa magazine was ‘one of the most important platforms’ in calling for the implementation of Shari‘a and developing the cause to be ‘the centre of attention and discussion in Egypt’s cultural and political life (Tamam, 2012, p. 102). It was proposed as a matter of ‘public interest’ and as the alternative solution to the failures of the state (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 202). Abu al-Futuh recalls that when, in 1976, several prominent Islamic figures and Brotherhood members competed in parliamentary elections that ‘all the publicity focused on the application of Shari‘a as the beginning of every reform’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 51). Some of the banners put by al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya at the time contained slogans such as ‘Egypt towards God [...] Together for Shari‘a’, in addition to Koran verses that stipulated ‘Governance is to God’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 51).

Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya adopted a similar position advocating that ‘rooting out corruption, promoting social justice, and enacting political reforms [...] could be accomplished through adherence to Islamic judicial codes’ (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 136). Further, al-Gama‘a adopted a hard-line position that the implementation of Shari‘a is not a matter open to parliamentary discussion, and in 1976 issued a statement refusing ‘the mere presentation of a project for the codification of Shari‘a in the parliament because that includes acknowledgement of the parliament’s right to refuse it’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 102). This also led to al-Gama‘a’s rejection of political parties as an idea, arguing in a statement that ‘approving of parties [...] is an implicit acknowledgement of the right of humans to legislate for themselves or others [...] which contradicts one of the roots of Islam, that legislation is a pure right of God alone’ (Badr, 1989, p. 51). This position was echoed in Salafism; as Bakr (2013, p. 102) argues that ‘legislation in Islam is a right of God alone [...] and it is not for any person whomsoever to legislate for people’. In 1981, the Egyptian constitution was amended to include in its second article Islamic Shari‘a as the primary source of legislation instead of one of the sources of legislation thereby limiting the issuance of laws that would contradict Shari‘a, although such limitation was eventually governed by the interpretations of the Egyptian Constitutional Court.

Over the subsequent decades, the discussions surrounding the Islamisation of laws and implementation of Islamic Shari‘a were tightly connected to preserving and giving effect to the second article of the constitution. The discussion also evolved into more elaboration from different actors in the Islamist movement over their positions from democracy, equality in political rights, the limits of the extent of freedoms of expression and freedom of religion.

Before discussing how different actors within the Islamist movement and the state framed their positions on the individual and collective levels, there are important preliminary points worth

considering. First, the framing efforts under the master frame were not only about generating interpretations to what it means to be a better pious Muslim and the application of Shari‘a; they also included a process of diagnosing prevalent social practices as faulty compared to the frames advocated by the movement actors. Ahmed (2011, p. 100) argues that the Islamist movement had a ‘double task of persuading people both that Islam as they, their parents, and grandparents had practised it was flawed, faulty, inadequate, and incorrect, and that only Islamic beliefs and practice as taught by Islamists represented those of “true” Islam’. This meant, second, that the primary audience targeted by the framing efforts became

the “ordinary” Muslims among whom they lived: people who, in the eighties and early nineties, still made up the mainstream Muslim majority. These “ordinary” Muslims regarded themselves as already observant Muslims. But to Islamist eyes they were people who had “grown up with a mistaken understanding of Islam” and who observed and practiced their religion in “faulty or incomplete” ways (Ahmed, 2011, p. 150).

Third, and more importantly, the rejection of many practices and ideas as faulty included framing the separation of religion in private life from religion in public governance as a faulty understanding of Islam. The new interpretations emphasised the merger of the individual and the collective as part of a comprehensive system in which the solution cannot be one without the other. This arguably resulted in the restriction of the idea of private religion, in which one cannot follow religious guidelines only as a matter of private faith. The frame advocated that following religious guidelines in one’s private life is an individual responsibility to enable the realisation of the vision of Islamic governance. Wickham (2002, p. 126) contends that ‘Islamist mobilizers [...] [in] [r]ejecting the confinement of religion to matters of private faith and ritual, they emphasized that Islam was both *din wa-dawla*: both a system of individual faith and conduct and a comprehensive guide for the organization of society and state’.

The rejection of private faith as faulty and framing Islam as *din wa-dawla* (religion and state) was key to politicising many practices which were not necessarily viewed as political or public matters before the framing efforts, such as, for example, women’s dress codes or the boundaries of gender relations. Rock-Singer (2019, p. 155) advances that ‘shifting Brotherhood or Salafi visions of women’s public presence [...] came to highlight women’s presence as a barometer of public morality’. Individual religious practices became public matters, vital for the advancement of the umma, and individual believers bore the responsibility of conforming with religious

guidelines to enable Islam's comprehensive nature to be realised in the society on the individual and collective levels.

It is arguable that the Egyptian regime, whether under Sadat or Mubarak, did not object initially to the extensive mobilisation and framing efforts targeting individual practices because, in some sense, it enabled the containment of grievances by shifting the burden of responsibility from the state for its socio-economic failures to the individuals for their lack of religiosity. One of the most notable examples in this regard is the famous slogan used by the Islamist movement in pamphlets and labels glued on walls and distributed in public transportations: *Yantahi al-Ghalaa' Indama Tatahagab al-Nisaa'* (the soaring prices will end when women wear the veil). Al-Azhar disseminated similar rhetoric of individual blame due to lack of piety; Sika (2012, p. 70) reports that

between 2000 and 2004 Majallat al-Azhar (Al-Azhar Institutions' Magazine) devoted a great deal of space to the Islamization of society in general [...] The magazine emphasized the role of religion in an individual's life, through prayer, fasting, and justice writ large. The concept of justice, however, was addressed only as a matter between individuals— how people act toward one another— never in the deeper, societal sense of justice by the ruler or ruling class. And the cure it advocated for all the ills facing Egyptian society was that people should become more pious.

However, the regime's problems with the master frame intensified when the second part of the master frame was activated; the idea that integral to one's religious practices is to demand the application of Islamic Shari'a in state governance. Wickham's analysis (2002, p. 170) of the impact of Islamist framing mobilisation efforts in Sha'abi neighbourhoods on how young Egyptians dealt with socio-economic frustrations found that

In sum, the Islamist reordering or "transvaluation of values" lessened the graduates' frustration not by providing the means to satisfy their aspirations for middle-class status, jobs, and lifestyles but by promoting life goals more readily fulfilled within existing resource constraints. By redefining what should be valued, the Islamist movement offered many young Egyptians a "solution" to the problems they faced in everyday life.

The Islamist actors emphasised that what should be valued is conformity to religious practices in marriage, education, and employment (Wickham, 2002, pp. 165-170). This framing accommodated socio-economic grievances and implicitly obscured diagnosing the problems

emanating from the state's failures in providing good educational systems, employment opportunities, or housing. This does not mean that the Islamist movement did not call for active political participation or criticism of the government. Instead, part of the mobilisation efforts, as Wickham (2002, p. 171) noted, was a call 'that every Muslim must contribute to the task of Islamic social and political reform' without fear of the authoritarian regime. However, the nature of participation changed from demanding accountability for the state's socio-economic failures toward blaming the state for its failure to live up to an Islamic ideal, apply Islamic Shari'a, and nurture an Islamic community.

The following sections explore how such an ideal of a comprehensive Islamic system was formulated and framed by different actors in the Islamist movement and the state on the individual and collective levels by multiple actors and across different periods. The sections explore the ideas advocated – under the master frame – from Islamist actors pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, and by figures who had previous ties with the Muslim Brotherhood but were presenting their views as independent, such as al-Ghazali, who was called the “sheikh of the Muslim Brothers” by ‘al-Qaradawi’ – a well-known figure with very close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood – even though al-Ghazali throughout most of his life was no longer part of the Brotherhood. The sections also explore the ideas advocated by the state through al-Azhar institution and well-known popular figures such as al-Sha'rawi, who had state-sponsored prime time tv shows from 1973 and continued to impact and shape the ideas within the master frame in popular culture through various media outlets until his death in 1998, and Umar ‘Abd al-Kafi who started from very popular religious lessons in al-Dokki mosque, elitist social clubs and on cassettes tapes, moved later – following state security constraints – to popular home study circles, particularly women's study circles in upper-class homes and neighbourhoods, and eventually to become a television preacher. Abdo (2000) advances that Sha'rawi and ‘Abd al-Kafi's impact has been mainly in topics related to women's work, their public presence, and dress codes. Therefore, their impact is more related to how one becomes a better pious Muslim on the individual level rather than shaping a vision of an Islamic rule on the collective level. Abdo (2000, p. 146) argues that

Sheikhs Sharawi and Abd al-Kafi have been largely responsible for shaping the new image of the ideal Islamist woman in Egypt. Their religious lessons, Friday sermons, television programs, and widely distributed literature serve as guides, particularly for

urban middle-class women, who, over the last twenty years, have turned toward Islam to redefine their duties in the family and their status in society.

In reflection on how the interpretations and ideas evolved in the 2000s, the views of well-known figures in the new wave of preachers such as Amr Khaled are explored. Khaled started preaching in the 1990s and gained fame to the extent of being ‘crowned as the ‘richest Islamic preacher’ by Forbes Arabia, with an estimated income of 2.5 million dollars in 2007’ (Rock-Singer, 2010, p. 21). Khaled presented a ‘reformist message’ (Rock-Singer, 2010, p. 30), and his impact has been well described by Sobhy (2009, p. 416):

Amr Khaled’s words and ideas are quickly circulated and repeated among youth, as well as adults, in Friday sermons, e-mails, articles, cassette sermons, cell phone text messages, and Facebook groups. Khaled has influenced and inspired a number of young Muslim preachers, who have adopted his style to propagate a similar message to audiences across the Muslim world.

The sections also reflect the views of popular Salafist preachers who started in the late 1980s and gained fame in the 2000s, such as ‘Muhammad Hassan and Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub [...] two of the most prominent and successful sheikhs [...] Both boast sophisticated Internet sites. Just as importantly, both host extremely popular satellite television programmes’ (Rock-Singer, 2010, p. 20). Finally, in discussing Islam as governance, the third section discusses the ideas of al-Wasatiyya movement and al-Wasat party, whose ideas impacted many Islamists on issues of governance, democracy, equality and political rights.

A Better Pious Muslim: Gender Relations & Women’s Public Presence

In advocating how one should become a better pious Muslim, the framing efforts under the master frame focused on two related issues. First, the limits of relations between men and women which started from the idea that gender segregation is the ideal towards which one should strive if possible. Second, as the efforts for gender segregation in the 1970s proved unable to surmount the practical difficulties of such a project, attention shifted to the limits on women’s presence in the public sphere, dress code, role in society, and limits of interaction with men. The discourses generated around these topics were not necessarily unified across actors or time periods. As the master frame grew, to enable its extension to different audiences, it accommodated diverse views that differed in their degree of conservatism.

The 1970s witnessed calls for gender segregation and mobilisation of resources to enforce segregation in universities and modes of transportation, as discussed in the previous chapter.

However, the enforcement of segregation did not have a lasting impact, and the framing efforts shifted towards calling for individual believers to follow segregation in their everyday practices. The Islamist movement advocated that men and women should be disciplined in their ‘dress, speech, and gaze’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 160). Sexual relations are only allowed within marriage, masturbation is absolutely forbidden as expressed by writers in al-Da‘wa, al-I‘tisam and Kishk’s sermons, and interaction between men and women is unpermitted except in cases of necessity (Rock-Singer, 2019, pp. 145-146). On al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya’s position, Abu al-Futuh claims that the ‘conservative Salafist spirit’ was the reason behind their radical position regarding women, where ‘just being a woman makes her role subordinate to that of a man’ (Tamam, 2012, pp. 71-72). In al-Da‘wa magazine, one writer framed gender mixing as a “[w]estern weapon of corruption designed to make us abandon our Islamic personality” (Ahmed, 2011, pp. 133). In response to this weapon and danger, ‘the Brotherhood, Jam‘iyya Shar‘iyya, and Ansar al-Sunna had all valorised a domestically rooted woman, and, in the case of Ansar al-Sunna and Jam‘iyya Shar‘iyya, had explored proposals for domestic confinement’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 159). Al-Azhar’s position on gender relations was not substantially different, ‘[t]he State Mufti, Jadd alHaqq, forbade friendship but permitted sitting together during lectures as a necessity of educational progress’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 148).

The efforts for gender segregation did not materialise in a segregated system. Instead, Rock-Singer (2019, p. 143) argues – based on analysis of readers’ letters and questions to Islamist magazines in the 1970s – that ‘as Egyptian men and women [...] sought to adopt this call for self-regulating separation, they struggled in the face of a model of piety that placed the burden of compliance almost entirely on practitioners’. As a result of this struggle, the failure to enforce segregation, the new economic realities of al-Infatih policies and rising costs of living, along with the inability of families to live on only one income, the framing efforts changed throughout the 1980s and 1990s to respond to the increasing untenability of domestic confinement and the persistent reality of women’s existence in the public sphere.

The alternative became conditioning women’s public presence as *pious individuals* on conformity with proper limits of gender mixing, emphasising women’s proper dress codes, within a broader discussion on the conditions for the permissibility of women’s work and their role in society and the family. This change also meant that the targeted audience shifted from individual believers generally towards a ‘focus on women alone’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 160). Discussion of

the conditions of women's pious presence was not an exclusive approach of the Muslim Brothers or Salafists, rather,

The battle among Statist scholars, Liberal intellectuals, and Brotherhood and Salafi thinkers was not a conflict between a vision of domestically centered modesty and a call for women's further integration into public space, but about how pious women would traverse public space in the absence of formal gender segregation. (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 163).

The burden of segregation became an obligation on women to stay at home if possible, and if not, then to be covered and limited in their public presence and the types of work they undertake as feasible alternative solutions. Some authors attempted to formulate lists of 'do's and don'ts' in governing women's presence outside their homes. For example, Booth's analysis (2013, p. 612) of some booklets sold in street stalls reflect on how one author warned women against going out for shopping unless absolutely essential and warned of falling for deceitful words when answering the phone, and that 'illicit sexual relationships [...] [are] the inevitable result of shopping trips and telephone conversations'. Booth (2013, p. 599) also reflects on how Arab women were portrayed in literature in the 1990s:

Unlike the biographies of one hundred years before, these 1990s texts presented the peripatetic and vocal women of the earliest Muslim community bounded by a modern notion of domesticity. Khadija, portrayed in 1901 as a businesswoman who asked the younger Prophet to marry her, becomes in the 1990s a woman who waits at home for her beloved to arrive, peering down the lane, her heart beating.

Women's confinement to their homes was framed as the ideal towards which a woman must strive, and acting as a wife and a mother was framed as a woman's sacred mission. Zaynab al-Ghazali – one of the prominent Brotherhood members and mentor of female students in al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in the 1970s – 'viewed the notion of a woman working outside the home as a "disgraceful betrayal of the trust for which she was created"' (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 214). She framed women's participation in society and the Islamic cause through their 'natural roles as mothers and wives of the male fighters' and encouraged women to return home and obey their husbands (Lewis, 2007, p. 4). Al-Qaradawi advocated that the home is women's "great kingdom". Anyone attempting to remove women from their kingdom in the name of freedom, work, or art is the "enemy of women" and is rejected by Islam' (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 168).

Umar al-Tilmisani – the Muslim Brotherhood’s guide until 1986 – in his book *Islam and its Elevated View of the Woman* (1985, p. 20), advances that there are three scholarly views on women’s work, of which he prefers the third, ‘a group that does not permit women’s work, and a group that permits it without constraint or condition, and a group that took the middle ground, permitting women’s work with constraints’. Al-Tilmisani (1985, p. 20) elaborates that a woman can be ‘a women’s doctor, or girls’ teacher, or a social worker, or a nurse [...] and in general, a Muslim woman can do any work that accords with her female nature and her physical and psychological natural formation’. The view on women’s work as limited to certain professions – provided her role in the family is prioritised – continued to shape the Brotherhood’s position. Gerges (2018, p. 364) reports that Akef – the Muslim Brotherhood’s guide from 2004 to 2010 – held the view that ‘women do not have the right to serve as judges or as heads of state’ within a ‘view of women’s role as being exclusively limited to the private sphere’. Further, that Mustafa Mashhur – the Muslim Brotherhood’s guide from 1996 until 2002 – ‘had expressed similar sentiments regarding the role of women’ (Gerges, 2018, p. 364). The Muslim Brotherhood’s manifesto published in 2005 ‘emphasized conservative values such as gender segregation at schools and the introduction of subjects specifically targeting girls such as home economics’ (Mellor, 2017, p. 181). Gerges (2018, p. 366) argues, based on ‘extensive interviews with a great many members of the Ikhwan over the past two decades’, that ‘Ikhwan members of all persuasions hold deeply illiberal views on women as a result of patriarchal socialization. While there are important differences in the views held by the old guard and the younger reformists in this regard, ultimately these are a matter of degree rather than fundamentally opposing outlooks’.

Towards the centre of the Islamist spectrum, Muhammad al-Ghazali, who is ‘a central figure in the Islamic Awakening’ with previous ties to the Brotherhood, advocated ‘that the Qur’an specifies the right of women to work’, nonetheless, ‘the most important role for a woman in life is motherhood and the upbringing of children’ (van Nieuwkerk 2013, p. 166; al-Ghazali, 1990, p. 117). According to Ahmed (2011, p. 114), ‘Al-Ghazali’s view on a woman’s right to work provided she fulfils her duties as wife and mother represented the common Islamist position on the subject in the 1980s and beyond’. In al-Ghazali’s book, *The Causes of Women Between Stagnant and Recent Traditions*, al-Ghazali (1990, p. 116) elaborates that there are differences between men and women, and although there is equality between both, it is limited by women’s physical and psychological abilities. Thus, al-Ghazali (1990, pp. 38-40) advances that specific careers are not suitable for women such as working as ‘a police officer, or a mechanic’, ‘driver’ or

‘air hostess’, concluding that ‘women should better stop at their natural boundaries and despair from seeking absolute equality with men in this strenuous toil’.

Al-Sha‘rawi, the famous state-sponsored television preacher, called for similar and sometimes slightly stringent views regarding equality, women’s work, and necessity. Al-Sha‘rawi (1990, pp. 17-18) advanced that men and women are like day and night: they complete each other; however, they have different missions. A man’s mission is to work and care for his wife and children, while a woman’s mission is to give birth and care for the home and the husband, and neither of them can replace the other in his or her mission (Al-Sha‘rawi, 1990, pp. 17-18). Al-Sha‘rawi (1990, p. 123) further adds that there are conditions for a women’s work, which are necessity and avoiding gender mixing. Necessity is interpreted as the condition in which a woman has no male relative capable of working and providing for her (Al-Sha‘rawi, 1990, p. 123). In another book which includes an extended interview with al-Sha‘rawi, he reflects on the work of women who are not married and do not care for children that in such a case, a woman’s family should provide for her (Al-Sa‘id, 1997, p. 53) . As to women who have children, al-Sha‘rawi (1997, p. 54) advances that ‘going out to work is an escape from her original mission [...] and when the Egyptian women declared that we should go out to build the society ... they forgot that this is a false statement because the opposite is true. Women go out to destroy the society, not to build it’. Finally, in reflecting on equality, he advanced that ‘if a woman was [...] just to herself, she would have seen in those who hold the call for equality as her enemies’ because they ask her to do two missions at the same time: a wife and mother, and an employee (Al-Sa‘id, 1997, p. 54).

Abdo (2000, p.147) argues that ‘[m]any of Egypt’s Islamists believe women should have the right to education and employment. But they also believe the priority must lie with the family’. This was also advocated by ‘Abd al-Kafi, who ‘[I]ike al-Sha‘arawi, his view is that the best place for women is to be protected at home. Women should work only if necessary and should preferably limit themselves to work as a physician, nurse, or teacher’ (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 163).

The confinement of women to their homes was also accompanied by an assertion that men are the guides of the family who have al-Kawama (guardianship) over women; they bear the responsibility of work and providing for the family, and they have authority over members of the family, including granting permission to women to pursue work. Al-Sha‘rawi, for example, shames a man who allows a female relative to go out for work and advises women to refuse as husbands those who ask their prospective wives to work (Al-Sa‘id, 1997, pp. 53-54, 77). Further, al-Sha‘rawi (1990, p. 97) asserts that a woman must obey her husband due to the efforts that a man

must make outside the home. Al-Ghazali (1990, pp. 35-36) advances that ‘a man’s kawama (guardianship) does not mean the loss of original equality, just as the people’s obedience to the government does not mean tyranny and humiliation because the social organisation has its natural requirements’.

If the ideal of a woman’s confinement to her home as wife and mother is untenable, her presence in the public sphere as a pious individual becomes conditioned on adopting the veil as a religious obligation. The advocacy for this obligation was consistent across different actors and the state, with the only element of contestation regarding its extent being ‘whether it was merely the hijab, or also the niqab, that women must wear’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 142). The Muslim Brotherhood advocated for the veil and ‘fought battles against the attack on the veil from some leftist writers’ (Tamam, 2012, p. 101). Al-Azhar defended the obligation of the veil when the ministry of education attempted to ban it in schools (Abdo, 2000, p. 150). Popular preachers such as al-Sha’rawi, al-Ghazali, and ‘Abd al-Kafi strongly advocated the obligation of the veil and played a major role in influencing many actresses and singers to leave their careers and veil in search for piety. Van Nieuwkerk (2013, p. 156) argues that ‘the first group of “repentant” artists was initially influenced by Sheikh al-Sha’arawi, Muhammad al-Ghazali, and Zeinab al-Ghazali. [...] In the early 1990s, the retired artists were particularly influenced by ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Kafi, and from the mid-1990s onward, al-Qaradawi and ‘Amr Khalid became sources of inspiration’. Salafists, on the other hand, argued for the necessity of covering the face with a niqab (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 142).

The obligation of the veil was advocated in the 1970s and before. However, over the following decades, there were three interrelated shifts in the framing efforts concerning the veil, which demonstrate the growing strength of the master frame. First, in the 1970s, the framing efforts were directed to the primary audience of unveiled women in a call to adopt the veil. In contrast, the following decades witnessed a change in the audience towards veiled women in a call to conform with detailed guides on proper veiling and proper Islamic dress codes (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 162). Second, unlike the 1970s where Islamist writers were complaining of the minority position of veiled women; in the 1980s and 1990s, ‘religious scholars and thinkers across the ideological spectrum increasingly premised their calls for modesty on the assumption that veiling was a common, rather than a countercultural, practice’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p.162). As the dominance of the frame grew, it started to reformulate the perception of unveiled women as different from the common image; Ahmed (2011, p. 126) contends that ‘[w]hereas in the seventies it had been veiled

women who had been seen as different and who might find themselves [...] the targets of hostility, by the late eighties it was unveiled women who could find themselves in this situation’.

Third, while the veil might have started in the late 1970s and early 1980s as ‘a women-initiated movement controlled and driven forward by women’s own needs, choices, and volition [...] by the late eighties it was increasingly becoming co-opted by men’ (Ahmed, 2011, p. 126). The master frame and the different interpretations around regulating women’s behaviour resulted in more control over women’s conduct and autonomy. Some voices asserted that the state and family have a role in enforcing the veil, ‘Salafi scholars reiterated the authority of men, particularly those with access to state power, to regulate women’s behavior’ (Rock-Singer, 2019, p. 165). For those voices, asserting the state’s role was only a theoretical point at the time, given the absence of access to state powers. However, the interpretation of the veil as a shared obligation that extends beyond a woman’s choice to include her family and male relatives had an impact in providing a religious cover for legitimising and consolidating the family’s authority over women’s autonomy. Ahmed (2011, p. 126) reports on Macleod’s study in the late 1980s that

the pressure for women to wear hijab was distinctly growing. There was evidence, Macleod found, that women were being pressured not only by the men in their families but also by male religious authorities. Several women now mentioned that they had decided to wear hijab because of their local religious leaders. Others mentioned that male relatives would cite the authority of religious men in their ‘attempts to persuade fiancés, wives or sisters to veil’.

The following decades witnessed continuous growth of the strength of the master frame on the individual level. In the 2000s, a new wave of preachers swept the media, focusing on the importance of conformity with piety on the individual level, advocating similar ideas and discourses as those in the 1980s and 1990s. Sika (2012, p. 73) comments that the new preachers were

a driving force in inspiring Egyptian youth to develop a religious identity. The preachers addressed them in colloquial language, and in their speeches they gave examples from their youthful, middle-class audience’s everyday life. This tactic attracted many young people; in fact, these preachers had mass followings. They addressed social issues by focusing on individual, not collective, behavior; they were mainly concerned with young people’s adherence to religion, and with criticizing youth behavior.

The focus on individual practices included continuity of the frames targeting women's behaviour, dress code and work. There was also a prevalence of emphasis on ritual performance. Sobhy (2009, p. 428) argues that

The most powerful manifestation of the dominant piety in Egypt has been the increase in ritual performance. The upper-middle and upper classes have seen a dramatic increase in the performance of rituals such as the five daily prayers and the annual fast, additional prayers and fasting throughout the year, attendance of congregational prayers at the mosque, and minor or major pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina.

Sobhy (2009, p. 429) adds that '[t]he emphasis on rituals has been so intense that even "desirable" rituals becomes compulsory in people's minds and integral to defining a person's piety and caliber'. The new preachers also asserted the obligation of the veil and pious Islamic dress codes. The difference between preachers' rhetoric was in the degree of requirements rather than the kind of requirements; they largely echoed the difference between those who advocated the veil and the niqab in the earlier decades. The frames continued being addressed to both unveiled women, in a call for them to adopt the veil, and veiled or niqabi women with detailed guidance on how to better conform with the Islamic requirements for a piety dress code.

Preachers who are labelled as modern reformists, such as Amr Khaled and Mustafa Husni, focused in their lessons on the obligation of the veil, sometimes offered detailed guides on covering the body and emphasised the importance of this individual practice for public morality. Khaled, in one of his lessons, links 'the integrity of society in the integrity of women and the latter on their *hijab*, because one woman can easily tempt one hundred men but one hundred men cannot tempt a single woman' (Sobhy, 2009, p. 439). Husni has a famous TV episode in which he brings mannequins of veiled women dressed in different styles, and with a stick in his hand, points at different parts of the mannequins bodies and clothes which are not deemed to be appropriately covered according to the Islamic code, despite wearing the veil (Taleb, 2013).

Salafist preachers were also part of the new wave, many of them outspokenly opposed Khaled and his colleagues. As one of them put it, 'they neither look Islamic—being unbearded or insufficiently bearded—nor draw exclusively on the Qur'an and the Sunnah in their homiletics, marshaling instead references from popular culture to philosophy to poetry' (Moll 2018, p. 252). Salafist preachers advocated similar rhetoric on the obligation of pious dress codes and its detailed requirements, although farther in degree in terms of conservatism and emphasis on the niqab, which includes a covering of the face and the rest of the body. Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub, for instance,

preaches in a well-known video recording that if a niqabi woman complains of sexual harassment, then it must be because of her ‘beige socks’, ‘golden bag’, not wearing gloves, or using eyeliner on her eyes; therefore, a woman must beware of making such mistakes in her choice of outfit (Wa‘y, 2020). Salafi preachers were also distinct in urging their followers to ‘abandon and declare their enmity to non-Muslim ways, evinced, for example, in their dress, comportment, and cultural references’ (Moll 2018, p. 252).

The rhetoric on women’s work and confinement to their homes also differed in degree between preachers. Khaled, for instance, portrayed women ‘as mothers or future mothers who have a critical role in the upbringing of future generations of Muslims, and they are encouraged to be positive and proactive and to seek knowledge and develop their skills, such as tailoring, writing, and the arts of conversation, home decoration, and cooking’ (Sobhi, 2009, p. 439). Salafi preachers adopted more stringent views with Hassan preaching that Islam did not forbid a woman’s work provided there is a necessity for such work and subject to wearing the Islamic dress code and adherence to avoiding gender mixing (Labib, 2011). While Yaqoub preached that the husband should be the master who has guardianship over a woman while a woman’s role is that of being the home for a man’s sexual needs (VEgyptShow, 2013). One of the indications on the extent of resonance of the ideas on a woman’s role in the family and society can be seen in a study conducted in 2017, which

showed that 86.8 percent of Egyptian men and 76.7 percent of women believe that a woman’s most basic role is to take care of the home and cook for the family, while 90.3 percent of men and 58.5 percent of women reported that the man should have the final decision in his home (El-Behary, 2017).

Islam as Governance

The master frame of Islam as a comprehensive system of governance centred around a call for the establishment of an Islamic state and application of Shari‘a. The establishment of an Islamic state or Islamic rule necessitated a discussion of the features of such a system and how this form of governance is similar or different from democratic means of governance and any possible limits on the public will. The discourses generated under this aspect of the master frame included reflections on equality in political rights between Muslims and non-Muslims and how different elements of public life should be organised, such as freedoms of expression and religion. The application of Shari‘a mainly emphasised the importance of the second article of the constitution, which establishes Islamic Shari‘a as the main source of legislation, and how the rules and

principles of Shari‘a constitute a public order which limits rights or freedoms. This section explores the vision of Islamic rule proposed by different actors in the Islamist movement, the positions of the Islamist movement from democratic governance and its limits, moving to equality in political rights and citizenship, and limits on freedoms of expression and religion.

The stance from democratic governance varied between Islamist actors. Some Islamist groups and figures rejected democracy as an un-Islamic form of governance. In contrast, other groups rejected the *western* style of democracy and promoted an Islamist view of democracy that would be compatible with Shari‘a and would function under the guardianship of the master frame. For both sides, there were necessary reflections on equality, freedom of religion and political pluralism, whether in express rejection of these values or in imposing limits on their extent.

Jihad and Salafism rejected and condemned democracy. Jihad claimed that ‘democracy usurps God’s right of legislation and is therefore equal to shirk (associating something with God, the worst sin for a Muslim)’ (Scott, 2010, p. 107). Salafists ‘deemed democracy an apostate form of government’ (Awad, 2014, p. 11). The alternative vision of Islamic rule would be a council of consultation, composed of a group of individuals selected based on their religious virtue who should rule according to Shari‘a.

Al-Sha‘rawi’s views on democracy are similar to that of Salafists and Jihadists despite his place in the popular culture as a state-sponsored centrist. He advocated that ‘democracy, which means the people should govern themselves by themselves, is inconsistent with the reality in Islam. According to Islam, people do not govern themselves by themselves because everyone is governed by one creator, which is God’ (Al-Sa‘id, 1997, pp. 21-22). The alternative Islamic vision would be selecting a ruler based on his religion and justice, and any council of consultants would have an advisory role only without any obligation on the ruler to abide by the council’s advice (Al-Sa‘id, 1997, pp. 22-23). Further, al-Sha‘rawi elaborates that ‘the people do not participate in governance’, because their role is only executing orders because orders from authority are not originating from the ruler but from God (Al-Sa‘id, 1997, p. 27).

For Jihad, the rejection of democracy was grounded in a rejection of ‘equality between a Muslim and an unbeliever [and] because it [democracy] [...] gives individuals the right to convert from Islam to another religion’ (Scott, 2010, p. 106). The 1990s, with the spread of sectarian and terrorist violence, represented the height of Jihad’s rejection of non-Muslims and claims such as that ‘it is not possible for Muslims to live amicably with Christians and [...] that Christians must be fought because they are the enemies of Islam’ (Scott, 2010, p. 117). In a later period, Jihadist

figures issued revisions of their previous opinions in this regard and renounced the use of violence against Christians.

However, the rejection of violence did not necessarily denote an adoption of equality or tolerance, not only for Jihadists but also for other actors in the Islamist movement. Salafism, for instance, calls for the adoption of ‘‘alwala’ wal-bara’, loyalty and disavowal, a standard topic of Salafi television sermonizing’, which calls on Muslims to show loyalty to Muslims and disavow those who follow other religions (Moll, 2018, p. 252). ‘Abd al-Kafi, the popular preacher, was known in the early 1990s for his fatwas that Muslims should limit their interactions with non-Muslims and that ‘one must not greet a Coptic neighbor with the peace greeting [and] [...] that one cannot congratulate a Christian at Easter’ (Scott, 2010, p. 105). Al-Sha‘rawi advocated a similar view that ‘a Muslim cannot go to the funeral of a kāfir, in this case a Christian, and that a Muslim should not give alms to a non-Muslim at the end of Ramadan’ (Scott, 2010, p. 105).

However, some Islamist groups and figures argue that democracy should not be strictly refused. Al-Ghazali, for instance, accepts democracy as simply the rule of the majority and given the majority in Egypt are Muslims, then ‘democracy is the right of the majority to choose Islamic rule’ (Scott, 2010, p. 107). Other Islamist figures rejected what they termed as the western democracy and argued instead that there are elements of freedoms and Shura (consultation) within an Islamic system that would make it democratic in essence, although with limitations derived from Shari’a (Scott, 2010, p. 107). But Scott (2010, p. 108) notes: ‘[t]he majority of Islamists argue that democracy must be constrained by the Islamic framework’.

The Muslim Brotherhood adopted the view of placing democratic governance under the frame of Shari’a which would set a group of limitations that constitute the public order within which the state operates, and which the people cannot infringe. The Muslims Brothers have regularly participated in elections, whether for the parliament or syndicates since the 1970s. However, the theoretical framework of their views on Islamic rule and democracy was formulated more clearly in the 2000s, such as the draft party platform published in 2007. The draft ‘was divided into sections that dealt with the movement’s principles, the state and the political system, education, economic policy and development, religion and society, and cultural revival. It reaffirmed Article 2 and called for reform with shurā (consultation) as the essence of democracy’, and it stated that there should be a body of religious scholars entrusted with interpreting Shari’a (Scott, 2010, p. 61). Scott (2010, p. 61) argues that some of the members of the Brotherhood were sceptical of the extensive power that such council would have, and this requirement proved controversial as it

prompted intense criticism in the media ‘which accused the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking to establish an Iranian-style clerical state’.

Other Islamist figures who called for an Islamic form of democracy include al-Wasatiyya, which is a centrist movement similar to other Islamists in emphasising ‘the application of Islamic law and are firmly opposed to secularism [...] [and] see Islam as a universal ideology for state, society, and government’, however, they distinguish themselves by re-interpreting Islamic jurisprudence in a way that allows for concepts of equality and citizenship (Scott, 2010, p. 126). Many al-Wasatiyya figures and al-Wasat Party – which was formed by former Brotherhood members who disagreed with the Brotherhood on key issues – accept ‘a multiparty democratic system’, some accept that ‘citizens would have the right to participate on an equal basis’, while others accept equality subject to certain conditions (Scott, 2010, p. 149).

The tension between an Islamist form of governance and concepts of equality and citizenship find its roots in how traditional jurisprudence and history approach the status of non-Muslims. It is assumed in many contexts that Muslims and non-Muslims do not stand on equal ground. For instance, non-Muslims should not be in positions of authority over Muslims; they should pay money (jizya) in submission to the authority of Muslims, their testimony in courts are not treated equally, and their value as victims of crimes is not the same as Muslim victims. Jihadists and Salafists adopt these opinions, reject equality, and reject democracy. Other groups and figures developed different views in approaching issues of citizenship and equality over time, which generally centred around questions such as whether Copts in Egypt can be president or serve in the army, whether they should pay Jizya, and whether they can participate politically as equal citizens under an Islamic rule.

The position of the Muslim Brotherhood differed across time, starting from a few clear statements that echoed those of Salafists towards an ambiguous position regarding some of these issues and some clarity concerning others given the sensitivity of the subject and how it became a barometer of Islamists’ commitment to democracy. Scott (2010, p. 101) reports that al-Da‘wa magazine adopted the position that ‘the tolerance of Islam does not include putting Muslims and non-Muslims on an equal footing’. Al-Qaradawi once advanced that ‘non-Muslims should not serve in the army and should pay the jizya on the basis that the Islamic state is best protected by those who believe in it’, and Mustafa Mashhur – Brotherhood guide between 1996 to 2002 – made a statement in the late 1990s that ‘Copts could not serve in the military, since their loyalty could

not be trusted' and was pressured to retract such a statement after criticism, although there are Islamists who defended his position (Scott, 2010, p. 101).

Al-Wasatiyya figures, on the other hand, called for the abandonment of differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims and the adoption of citizenship as the defining feature for all individuals living under the Islamic rule where non-Muslims are seen as 'part of the umma' (Scott, 2010, p. 135). With the spread of al-Wasatiyya ideas, the Muslim Brotherhood position was influenced towards more flexibility (Scott, 2010, p. 139). In the early 2000s, al-Hudaybi – Brotherhood guide between 2002 to 2004 – 'said that it would be inappropriate to ask non-Muslims to defend Islam. However, if they choose to defend the land out of nationalism, then that is all well and good' (Scott, 2010, p. 101).

With regard to political rights, representation, and positions of authority, the Brotherhood and al-Wasatiyya movement impose limits on the political role of non-Muslims. Only, the al-Wasat party declared its commitment to complete equality and acceptance that non-Muslims can serve as president (Scott, 2010, p. 151). While the Muslims Brotherhood's position, as expressed by al-Hudaybi, is that although 'every Egyptian citizen (man or woman) has the right to take part in parliamentary elections and the right to become a member of parliament through elections, every citizen does not have equality in political terms' (Scott, 2010, p. 111). The Brotherhood accepts that there should be some form of representation for Copts under Islamic rule, however, on the assumption that the majority are Muslims. Al-Qaradawi 'argues that non-Muslims may run for elections but that the overwhelming majority must be Muslims. The same applies to women who are allowed to serve in parliament, but again the majority must be men' (Scott, 2010, p. 110). Al-Wasatiyya intellectual 'Imara advocates a similar position that Copts can be represented in parliament 'as long as the majority of the members are Muslim. It is also possible, he argues, for a Christian to lead the army and take part in all legal and legislative institutions as long as the majority of the members that make up those institutions are Muslim' (Scott, 2010, p. 154).

There is also another requirement for political participation, whether for Muslims or non-Muslims, which is not opposing the application of Shari'a. Al-Hudaybi advanced that 'the Muslim Brotherhood would not reject having Copts as members in a political system "as long as these Copts do what they are required to do," which is to acknowledge the right of the Muslim majority to apply the shari'a' (Scott, 2010, p. 111). Fahmi Huwaydi, one of the prominent intellectuals of al-Wasatiyya movement, argues that while citizens may privately be non-believers in religion, they

would nevertheless 'have no right to change the system, since that would be against the constitution and the public order' (Scott, 2010, p. 154).

Belief in the rules of Shari'a is also a condition for positions of authority. Al-Qaradawi and al-Hudaybi argue that Copts would be allowed access to government positions only if it does not include an application of Shari'a rules which would contradict their beliefs (Scott, 2010, p. 110). On this view, it seems difficult to imagine the scope of government positions open to non-Muslims given the governing system would be so designed as an application of Shari'a in every social, political and economic sphere. Further, it excludes the idea that a non-Muslim can have a right to preside over such a state, as Scott (2010, p. 152) advances, the Brotherhood's 2007 draft

affirmed that it was the function of the prime minister or president to protect and preserve Islam and to allow Muslims to practice their religion [...] [therefore] The Muslim Brotherhood argues that the duty of the prime minister would go against the belief of non-Muslims and that therefore they should be exempt from this position.

This is also clear from the comments of Mahmud 'Ezzat – a prominent member of the Brotherhood guidance bureau – that 'he would rather be ruled by a non-Egyptian Muslim than a Copt. This was in line with his statement that the ruler's job is to lead people in prayer and command them to pay the zakāt, which a non-Muslim cannot do' (Scott, 2010, p. 112). Some al-Wasatiyya intellectuals adopt a similar view, 'Imāra thinks the head of state should be a Muslim', and 'Fahmī Huwaydī agrees, saying, "It is not logical to have a leader or head of state who does not believe in the sharī'a"' (Scott, 2010, p. 151).

It is worth noting that most of the discussion on the rights of non-Muslims centres around Abrahamic religions, i.e. Christianity and Judaism. Scott (2010, pp. 157-158) argues that [t]he prioritization of the concept of the heavenly revealed religions results in some antipathy, for example, toward non-Muslims who are not Jews or Christians'. The issue bears relevance to whether the proposed Islamic rule would allow for freedom of religion other than for the heavenly ones or protect the rights of those who adopt other religions or no religions. The Muslim Brotherhood, al-Wasat party and many al-Wasatiyya figures agree on refusing to grant official recognition to the rights of those who belong to non-heavenly religions or atheists. The general logic is that these individuals can have private lives in which they pursue their beliefs, provided that it never comes to the eye of the public; otherwise 'it would "harm the feelings and creed of the general public." [...] [and] This is the same as with homosexuality, which, though practiced, cannot be officially recognized' (Scott, 2010, p. 159).

The issue of recognising the status and rights of individuals who belong to other, non-Abrahamic religions is best reflected in the positions of Islamists toward the Baha'is in Egypt, who sought to include their religion in their identity cards. Baha'is went through a lengthy judicial process that did not secure the desired change, although it ruled that the ministry of interior (the issuing authority) should allow them to have identity cards with a vacant box for religion. During the judicial process, in 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary members dedicated a debate to this issue and took a position that 'Baha'i as apostates [...] should be killed, and even suggested drafting a law making Baha'ism a crime' (Mellor, 2017, p. 180). Abu al-'Ila Madi, head of al-Wasat party 'argues against official recognition of Bahā'īs and says that they should have their own personal status law provisions determined by sharī'a' (Scott, 2010, p. 159). Only Fahmi Huwaydi accepts that Baha'is should have their rights recognised and be allowed to practice their religion, although he admits it would be a complex issue (Scott, 2010, p. 158).

In assessing the extent of the freedom of religion, a related and important issue is whether Muslims would be able to change their religion or adopt no religion given that traditional jurisprudence bans apostasy – the conversion of Muslims to other religions or no religion – and many jurists advance that an apostate's punishment is death. Al-Ghazali once argued that 'any Muslim arguing for the suspension of the Shari'a is an apostate and could be killed. If the state did not do so, it was the duty of any Muslim to execute the punishment', and 'Qaradawi identified "true apostates" to include those who publicly pronounced their faith, such as the communists, secular rulers, and those belonging to sects such as Ismaili, Druze, and Nusayrism' (van Nieuwkerk, 2013, p. 144; Mellor, 2017, p. 190). Al-Wasatiyya rejects death as a punishment for apostates; however, they argue that some form of punishment must be imposed for apostasy, usually in the form of non-recognition or 'restriction of their rights under personal status laws', as apostasy would be a violation of the public order of an Islamic state (Scott, 2010, p. 160).

In relation to freedom of expression, political pluralism, and contestation of the majority's rule, most Islamists agree that these should be limited by the public order, which is defined by reference to the fundamentals of Islam and Shari'a. Scott (2010, p. 154) argues that '[t]he concept of public order is used as a mechanism for conceptualizing limits to the democratic system. For example, while non-Muslims would have the right to criticize the formulation of sharī'a, that right would obtain only on condition that respect be shown'. Al-Hudaybi contends that 'difference of opinion is tolerated only if it is [...] "far from the agreed upon fundamentals (of Islam) and falls into the circle of the individuals' actions, then there can be a difference of opinion"' (Scott, 2010, p. 108).

The fundamentals of Islam are expected to be determined by the council of Muslim scholars entrusted with determining Shari‘a as envisaged in the 2007 draft. Al-Qaradawi advances that ‘[n]on-Muslims are not [...] allowed to publicly abuse Islam and should consider the “feelings of Muslims”’ (Scott, 2010, p. 110). Al-Wasatiyya’s position on this issue is close to that of the Brotherhood, arguing that such a limit would be enforced on Muslims and non-Muslims; therefore, all should show respect for religion. Al-‘Awa, for instance, advances that ‘while non-Muslims must abide by the values of Islam and respect its provisions, Muslims would also not be able to attack any other religion. Neither Muslims nor non-Muslims would be able to defend atheism, because it is anti–public order’ (Scott, 2010, p. 154). Fahmi Huywadi, in a similar line of argument, contends that

all parties “must accept and acknowledge Islam, both ideologically and legally and not oppose it or deny it.” It is therefore not possible “to establish a party that calls for apostasy, freethinking, or atheism, or that discredits the heavenly revealed religions in general or Islam in particular, or makes light of the sacred things of Islam: its creed, its law, its Qur’an and its Prophet” (Scott, 2010, p. 154).

The preceding analysis shows an underlying assumption in any vision of Islamic rule that Islamists would be the leading majority of the political process, and the public would necessarily choose Shari‘a. Abu al Futuh, for instance, argued that ‘the question of whether people wanted to apply Sharia was rather “an illogical assumption” because “not even a novice in sociology or public psychology can imagine that the Egyptian people would reject sharia under any circumstances”’ (Mellor, 2017, p. 180). Such an assumption is not only expressed or implied in Islamists’ views, but also protected by the interpretations advocated under the master frame itself in restricting or excluding Non-Muslims from holding the presidency or the parliamentary majority, unbelievers or atheists from forming parties or associations or expressing their beliefs publicly, and challenging any attempt to change or contest the system whenever it is deemed a violation of the public order, where the boundaries of public order are determined by the Islamists themselves.

Further, the discussion of non-Muslims’ political rights under Islamic rule, other than its limitation to the rights of only those who belong to a heavenly religion, reflect a view of communal rather than individual equality. The underlying assumption is that a minority group must have some form of representation, and while they would have no choice in the application of Shari‘a to all state matters, they would still – as a group – have protection to apply their religious laws in personal matters. Therefore, non-Muslims will be able to apply their own marriage, divorce and

inheritance rules and will not be prevented from ‘anything that is lawful in their religion, such as drinking wine and eating pork’ (Scott, 2010, p. 104). Such communal equality would risk subjecting individuals’ agency to their inevitable religious communal identity and increase the power of their religious authority – the Church – as the group’s sole representative. Al-Wasatiyya intellectual, Rafiq Habib – a Coptic intellectual who joined the Brotherhood – justifies why a Copt cannot be president under an Islamic rule on the reasoning that an Islamic state would have a similar role to that of the Church in Christianity (Scott, 2010, p. 152). He argues that the protection of Islam would be the state’s duty, and given the Islamic religion does not have a body or an institution like the Church in Christianity that would carry the mission of protecting religion, then the state should be headed by a Muslim to carry out this mission (Scott, 2010, p. 152).

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the core ideas advocated by the master frame that Islam is a comprehensive system that should guide one’s private life and govern the state’s public life. The chapter also explored the interpretations advocated by different Islamist movements and figures in formulating how one should be a better pious Muslim on the individual level and how would Islam govern the state and public life at the collective level. It is noticeable that despite the differences and growing flexibility of the master frame as it expanded to new audiences, the interpretations seemed to differ in degree of limits and restrictions rather than in kind. It is also noticeable that the ideas articulated by state-sponsored figures such as al-Sha‘rawi, for instance, were sometimes equally as or more stringent than those advocated by some of the Islamist movements, at least in relation to ideas of individual piety. The next chapter aims to analyse how individuals interacted with the ideas advocated under the master frame and the values underlying it.

VI. Accepting the Master Frame: Individual Commitment in Life & Governance

The focus of the thesis, so far, has been on the history and contexts in which the core idea of *Islam is the solution* emerged, how it prevailed as a master frame over Egypt's social and political life, and the different themes and ideas generated under the two branches of being a better Muslim and establishing Islamic governance. At the heart of this continuously evolving and significant context are Egyptian citizens who received the message from the radio, tv, cassette tapes, brochures, books, social circles, schoolteachers, and preachers in Friday sermons and religious lessons, from members of the Islamist movement and the official institutions of the state. One can think about the audience at the receiving end of the framing efforts as forming part of two generations. One generation included university students who received their education at the height of the Islamic awakening and the prevalence of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya on campuses. They joined the workforce when the Islamists were presiding over syndicates and witnessed the continuous growth of religious discourses and rituals, expansion of the veil in the public sphere, and the judicial battles over the public order that should be governed by Shari'a. The second generation lived their adolescence and youth in the 1990s and 2000s, grew up in the new normal when the master frame became woven into the fabric of the social and political culture, and listened to and followed the new preachers' advice about how one can be modern and pious.⁴ They were similarly encouraged to pursue personal projects of religious self-reform and regard the establishment of Islamic governance in a favourable light.

This chapter and the following one seek to understand the individual experiences of receiving the message of the master frame and its interplay with different values. The chapters are based on fifty in-depth interviews conducted in Cairo in 2019, which explored individuals' experiences regarding the reception and resonance of the master frame and its interplay with values such as tolerance, equality, autonomy, and self-expression freedoms. The interviews were conducted with interviewees from both generations, and there appear to be different shades of commitment to the ideas of the master frame. On one end, some individuals are committed to the core idea that Islam

⁴ Chapter VIII includes more details on the preachers and scholars who figured prominently in the interviewees' answers as sources of knowledge and how they were seen by the interviewees who accept and reject the master frame.

is the solution to problems of life and governance, and hence Shari‘a as the embodiment of Islam should shape the limits of any proposed value. On the other end, some individuals reject the master frame and its underlying ideas. Between both ends, there are different shades of struggle, either with accepting the master frame entirely or accepting one or more of the ideas disseminated as part of the frame and its compatibility with different values. It is to be emphasised, though, that all the interviewees, including those who at the time of the interviews rejected the master frame, reflected on being committed to the master frame and its ideas for some time in their lives.

This chapter focuses on the experiences of the interviewees who positioned themselves clearly in support of the master frame *Islam is the solution*. These include more than half the interviewees. The common ground between these interviewees is their support for the core idea that problems of life and governance should be guided and governed by Islam as advocated by the master frame. However, the resonance of different ideas advocated under the master frame differs between them.

The chapter explores the resonance of the ideas of the master frame through the interviewees’ views in relation to the main topics advocated as part of being a better Muslim and establishing Islamic governance under the master frame. It also analyses the interplay between the master frame and the values under study, and how the interviewees’ answers inform our understanding of the impact of the master frame on their values and political culture.

The following chapter focuses on the interviewees who reject the master frame, their reflections on their earlier commitment to the frame, their views regarding different ideas advocated under the master frame and the underlying values, and their reasons for rejecting the master frame

Being a Better Muslim: Women’s Role, Work, and Rights

The previous chapter explored how the framing efforts concerning being a better Muslim and projects of self-reform became focused entirely on women’s role, work, rights, and obligations in society. The framing efforts started in the mid-1970s with calls for disciplined sexuality and gender segregation. It then moved to primarily focusing on women’s issues, such as women’s role in society, staying at home, prioritisation of being wife and mother, men and family guardianship over women, right to work and its limits, and the obligation to wear the veil. The interview questions reflect on various examples to explore the resonance of these ideas and their interaction with values such as equality and autonomy.

The first example in the interview would usually be about the then-contemporary news that Tunisia was legislating for equality in inheritance between men and women, in contradiction to Shari‘a rules which dictate that a man should receive twice the woman’s share in inheritance. I

asked the interviewees about their opinions regarding such news and whether they think this legislation should be adopted in Egypt. In exploring a commitment to the master frame, inheritance is a topic that stands at the intersection of public and private life. In terms of personal piety, it explores the individual's commitment to following the religious division of inheritance in one's private life. In its public aspect, it explores the commitment to governance through Shari'a. The discussion usually gave way to wider reflections on the role of men and women in society and a broader conversation on women's right to work and any possible limits on the types of jobs that women may occupy, such as in the judiciary or the presidency. The interview also explored topics such as guardianship over women's relations with men and the obligation to wear the veil.

When asked about equality in inheritance, the interviewees who supported the master frame expressed that one should not only follow the religious division of inheritance in one's personal life or support public regulation of the matter by Shari'a, but also any legal amendment that contradicts religion must be rejected. Many asserted that 'inheritance is a boundary, one of the boundaries of God', that these are rules where 'there should be no talk', 'basics in Islamic religion', and 'there is no place for interpretations, not in this subject', 'rules in religion that do not accept change [...] because they are clear and fixed' and a 'sacred' matter that should not be debated (Interviews 2, 6, 17, 20, 30, 36, 37, 41, 42, 47). These opinions were expressed by male and female interviewees, with one female interviewee commenting that 'as long as God had set it in a very precise manner, then it cannot be contradicted, regardless of whether it is in my interest or not' (Interview 17).

The tension between the master frame and gender equality prompted the interviewees to reflect on the justification of the inheritance rules and how it avoids contradiction with equality. There were generally three approaches to justifying the inheritance rules. First, some interviewees denied any contradiction with equality referencing how women sometimes inherit more than men when a woman is more closely related to the deceased, and women inherit half as much as men only when men and women stand in a similar degree of kinships, such as brothers and sisters, a justification echoed in many Islamist writings on the topic.

The second approach was to justify the rule's rationale by reflecting on women's role in society as defined by being at home and raising children. Given that the financial burden then falls on men, men receive twice the inheritance to face the greater burden. It is worth noting that the interviewees who chose this interpretation were primarily women over 45 years old. A 65-year-old female interviewee straightforwardly expressed that 'a man is not like a woman [...] a woman,

for example, sits at home and sometimes does not work, unlike a man who has many responsibilities in his work and his home, so a man is not like a woman in any respect [...] [and] women should not inherit equal to men, a man is double a woman' (Interview 4). Another 47-year-old female interviewee said, 'a man is the one who bears the responsibility, and a woman should not inherit equal to a man, for example as a man spends more than a woman' (Interview 10). A female interviewee in her fifties expressed the justification that 'a man generally is the one who supports [financially], while a woman does not support', and when asked about the situation where a woman works and supports herself financially, she thought about it for a moment and then replied, 'no it's difficult, this is God's Shari'a, God is the one who put this in Shari'a', therefore, it cannot be changed (Interview 15).

One can understand the ideas of these interviewees about gender roles in the context of potentially receiving and remaining committed to the first versions of the framing messages, which were advocated in their youth in the 1980s and early 1990s, and which continued to be advocated by Salafists in the 2000s. That version was explicit in linking piety to the traditional division of labour where the woman stays at home, and the man is employed outside the home. This view was expressed across the spectrum by famous figures such as Sha'rawi and 'Abdel Kafi and Islamist writers from the Brotherhood and Salafists at the time. This stands in contrast to the current messages advocated by modern preachers – except for Salafists – who either stay silent on the matter or do not dispute women's right to work while imposing conditions or highlighting particular jobs as more suitable. Further, these women's economic reality in their youth might have seen fewer women entering the workforce and many more committed to the pious vision of prioritising their roles as wives and mothers.

For other interviewees, the currently increased presence of women in the workforce was a challenge to the rationale of giving men twice the share of women in inheritance. However, such a challenge did not lead to accepting equality in inheritance; the priority remained to avoid overstepping the limit of what is considered to be clearly defined in Islam. A 45-year-old female working as a lawyer started by prioritising the rule of Islam and commenting that 'there are things that I do and I am not convinced of, but I do it for God' (Interview 8). She then proceeded to reflect, without prompting, on the challenge of working women: 'the problem now is that everyone is saying that the laws of inheritance are not suitable to the current situation because a woman now is the one bearing the responsibility'; she discussed the idea and then eventually rejected equality in inheritance expressing that she feels changing the rules of inheritance would be 'shaking

fundamental things bit by bit' (Interview 8). Instead, she proposed that if the rule's rationale is that male relatives ought to support women, then the legal system should allow women to ask for an allowance from male relatives when they inherit more. A similar proposition was advanced by another female interviewee who prioritised the Islamic rules on inheritance, arguing that if the rationale is for men to support women, then the state should oblige men to perform such a duty (Interview 22).

The third approach in reflecting on the tension between the inheritance rules and equality was to accept the rule of Islam without justification and assert that there is divine wisdom for the rule; as a 32-year-old female said, 'if the rules of religion provided, in a definite way, a specific rule, then I will respect it, even if this rule is against equality because it indeed has a wisdom [...], but it should be an evident rule' (Interview 17). Some interviewees expressed fear, worry and sadness concerning introducing laws that would overstep the limit of Islam. A 25-year-old female interviewee commented on the new law establishing equality of inheritance in Tunisia, saying,

I don't know. What I know is that in religion this is haram, so, my opinion is why to choose this [equality in inheritance], it's like you attack something that you know is haram, this is something big, so I was sad [...] it is something obvious, so I was afraid of what is coming, they will start attacking other things after that' (Interview 26).

Two female interviewees in their fifties expressed similar sentiments of fear about changing the rules in Egypt; 'I am afraid of it, I am afraid to agree with it and then it turns out to be haram', and 'I cannot say this [accepting equality], I am afraid to make God angry in this way' (Interviews 22, 50).

The struggle between the desirability of equality in inheritance and overstepping the limits of religious rules was manifested noticeably in the interview of a 28-year-old female who expressed feelings of confusion regarding the Tunisian legislation. She commented, 'part of me envies them, and part of me does not know how to feel about this' (Interview 13). When asked about the reason for the confusion, she attributed this to the contradiction of such legislation with Islam, elaborating that 'part of me always says that things should be in accordance with religion and part of me says, No, we should advance, we are in a different era, in a modern era, and the two parts always struggle with each other' (Interview 13). After discussing the issue at length, she concluded by saying, 'I would love to have full equality, but, if I was the one to choose, if I am the president, I think I would be afraid. I would follow Shari'a because I would be afraid to do something wrong' (Interview 13).

The strong rejection of any change to the inheritance rules stemmed from what the interviewees considered a matter clearly defined in Islam and Shari‘a. The commitment to Islam as the guide and solution excluded the legal change that clearly violates Islamic rules. However, in the topics which allow diverse guidance under the master frame depending on the adopted Islamic jurisprudential opinion, such as gender equality in the right to work, the limits placed by the interviewees varied. Most interviewees accepted gender equality in employment as a general idea, including those who rejected equality in inheritance based on a particular conception of gender roles. The 65-year-old female interviewee who expressed that men and women are not equal adopted a rather different position about work, saying that ‘now a woman is working everywhere, she is an officer, an engineer, and a lawyer’ (Interview 4). The other female interviewees who adopted similar positions in inheritance defended women’s equality in work, saying that ‘as long as a woman works exactly like a man and with the same capabilities, then it is her right’ to work in any job (Interview 15).

With regard to the limits of this equality, the interviewees were asked about women’s right to work in particular professions, such as being judges and running for the presidency. At the time of the interviews in Egypt, women could not be criminal judges or public prosecutors and were prevented from joining the State Council as judges. However, there were few women judges in civil and commercial courts.⁵ There seemed to be three approaches concerning these professions.

First, few interviewees aligned with particular Islamic jurisprudential opinions that prohibit women from acting as criminal judges or being in a position of authority such as the presidency, although they can be judges in civil matters (Interview 9, 37). One interviewee, a 27 years-old male interviewee started by saying that women can join the judiciary ‘but within limits’, these limits echoed Islamic opinions which allow women’s work in the judiciary, except for criminal divisions (Interview 6). He said, ‘there are circuits in the judiciary and places in the judiciary that women should not enter. For example, public prosecution, crimes, accidents, and the like’ (Interview 6). However, he later concluded that preventing women from working in the state council and all judiciary circuits is unconstitutional and ‘the law should not prevent them’ (Interview 6).

⁵ The State Council represents the administrative courts entrusted with judicial review functions and oversight of the executive’s decision. A decree was issued in 2021, after the interviews were conducted, which allowed a number of women to transfer from the Administrative Prosecution body to the State Council. In 2022, the State Council and the Public Prosecution announced that they would accept applications from women for the first time.

Second, other interviewees from the older and younger generations refused to accept that women could act as judges or as president. However, their reasons were not necessarily grounded in a possible contradiction with Islam; they instead expressed doubts over women's abilities to meet the requirements of the job.⁶ A 29-year-old male interviewee working in the legal profession said, 'my guess and my knowledge about women is that they are persons who are heavily affected by their feelings, so possibly if a woman [defendant] cried in front of her [the judge], she [the judge] will disregard the evidence in the papers and rule for her [the defendant]' (Interview 19). A 25-year-old female interviewee said, 'I am with the theory that we - as women- are emotional and many things are judged in this way, and of course, there are things where we are right, and there are people who are mature and rational among us, but this is one side of us' (Interview 25).

Third, there were interviewees who accepted women's right to work as judges or heads of state while defending the position that this does not contradict Islam. When asked if, in a hypothetical scenario, there was a prohibition in Islam regarding women's right to work as judges or heads of state, many took the position that in such a case, Islam would be prioritised as the limit on women's work. A 28-year-old male interviewee said, 'Shari'a principles should prevail; for me, Shari'a principles will govern me first, anything that Shari'a says I will support it, for me these are things that I cannot debate, for me this is sacred' (Interview 36).

Some interviewees opposed the hypothetical scenario, defending the position that Islam accepts complete equality concerning women's right to work in all professions, including the judiciary and the presidency. This was clear in an interview with a 40-year-old male interviewee who vigorously defended the non-contradiction of Islam with women's right to work as president or as a judge, citing examples of women who work in economic courts and judge in multi-million-pound cases and many excellent women whom he worked with (Interview 20). However, despite his opposition to the hypothetical question as incorrect, saying that 'no one ever hinted or suggested that Shari'a refuses a woman to be president', he still accepted that if Islam hypothetically refused women's work as judges or as president, he would prioritise Islam as the limit. He commented that

⁶ Accepting women's right to work but confining it to specific professions that are more suitable to their capabilities was similarly advocated by al-Ghazali, the centrist figure, and al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood Supreme Guide until 1986 (as explored in the previous chapter). More recently, Gerges (2018, p. 364) reports on an interview with Mahdi Akef, Brotherhood Supreme Guide between 2004 to 2010, in which Akef took the position that women should never act as judges or as president, and elaborated that "'Women could easily be exploited by unscrupulous men who play on their emotions and lead them astray'". According to Gerges (2018, p. 364), 'in my interviews with Akef and his cohorts, they were adamant that women do not have the right to serve as judges or as heads of state'.

if such a rule exists, [...] [then] it will be exactly like a woman's inheritance equal to a man. I refused women's inheritance like men without thinking about it, if you remember. I told you this is Shari'a, a man double a woman, [then] we will not talk about it anymore, that is it (Interview 20).

Avoiding the contradiction with Islam as the guiding frame was also present in questions that reflect on the limits of relations between men and women, family guardianship over women, and women's autonomy. The interviewees were presented with a scenario between a parent and a daughter over 21 years old. The daughter wants to leave the family home to live independently with a boyfriend. The interviewees were asked about the parent's position in such a situation. The scenario opened the door for a conversation over women's autonomy, its meaning, and any possible limits.

Most of the interviewees who were committed to the master frame answered the scenario by asserting that a parent would have a right to prevent the daughter from executing such a decision. A 29-year-old male interviewee said that a parent must 'do anything to prevent her', and a 44-year-old female interviewee asserted, 'like any mother [...] I will do the impossible to prevent her from such a thing' (Interview 2, 27). A 65-year-old female interviewee said, 'it is not acceptable for a girl to say I will take a boyfriend or anything like this without marriage; this is not in our religion or Islam' (Interview 4). A 33-year-old male interviewee asserted that 'a father has authority over her of course', and a 32-year-old male said that in such a difficult situation, a father's right to prevent her should prevail over the daughter's personal freedom (Interviews 16, 42).

The justifications were rooted in refusing such a relationship as religiously sinful and social traditions which strictly condemns the loss of virginity in a non-married relationship.⁷ The strength of refusal and willingness to prevent such a relationship differed among interviewees. Some interviewees favoured going to any extent to prevent the daughter's decision, particularly by preventing her from going out of the family home or locking her in her room. Few interviewees expressed willingness to prevent the daughter by force or beating, such as a female interviewee in her fifties who said, 'she is violating God's Shari'a, how can she live with a man like this!' and commented that in such a situation, locking her up or beating her if it became necessary would be a parent's right, stating that 'it is fine, it is enough that she is living, eating, drinking and sleeping and that's it, like when a woman is an adulterer, and they did not bring four to testify, so her

⁷ The last section in the chapter reflects more on the interplay between the master frame and social traditions.

husband forgave her, but he would lock her up' (Interview 15). She was reflecting on a religious principle that necessitates four witnesses to the sexual act to convict a woman of adultery.

Many interviewees considered the matter a crisis and a dilemma that parents would not wish to find themselves in because even though it would be a parent's right to prevent her, they were not sure as to how that could be achieved, given that they would not want to subject the daughter to any harm. A 27 year-old male expressed feeling conflicted about the matter between believing that it is not right for the daughter to move in with a boyfriend but at the same time not knowing how a parent can respond to this given the interviewee's objection to any method of prevention, eventually saying 'I do not know, I do not have a clear answer for this' (Interview 6).

Some interviewees also questioned how matters reached this point in the first place and referenced good upbringing and religious morals as an early antidote to such a situation. A 32-year-old female interviewee said, 'I cannot imagine this hypothesis happening because supposedly I am raising her now' (Interview 17). Some added that if the daughter insists, she should marry the boyfriend rather than move in with him. A 29-year-old male interviewee said

you raised her for 20 years in a certain way, and you affect her in a certain way. So, I think [using] words would lead to a result because, for example, there is no absolute freedom [such as saying] I want to sleep with him, lose my virginity, and that's it! Of course, there is a reason. I love him, for example, then marry him; we can find a middle solution (Interview 19).

Another 33-year-old male interviewee said

I have a daughter, and if she is willing to move in with her boyfriend, that means she will have a sexual relationship with him, so she will commit adultery, and that is [how it is] in our religion, traditions, and customs. As for traditions, I think the tradition would be to kill her, and I think I can reach a solution with her, but as they say, you will be between difficult choices, [...] you have the religion of which I am convinced, and I think if you love him, marry him, it is easy (Interview 33).

Finally, if all efforts to prevent such a situation failed, some interviewees expressed that they would have recourse to a form of social punishment such as being angry with the daughter or disowning her. A 28-year-old female interviewee said, 'if she is my daughter, I will let her go, she decided, but I will not have any business with her anymore' (Interview 13).

In the conversation surrounding the scenario, I asked the interviewees what they thought about autonomy as a value and whether it should be with or without limits. Some interviewees briefly

reflected on the daughter's scenario and expressed that such situations constitute the limit where autonomy should be governed by religious morals, social traditions, and Shari'a. Other interviewees referred to parental authority as a limit; a 27-year-old male interviewee refused 'the western understanding that at a certain age, there is no parental authority over anyone; therefore, I do what I want, and this is my personal life, and I do whatever I want to do with it', asserting that this would be wrong (Interview 9). Other interviewees defended a notion of autonomy that excludes sexual relations particularly. Instead, they accepted autonomy in supporting women's right to live independently but without a boyfriend, have financial independence, or travel abroad for education.

Two interviewees, however, responded to the scenario by arguing from within the master frame, proposing that Shari'a principles do not necessarily impose guardianship over women and do not contradict women's autonomy even if such a relationship would be religiously sinful. A 29-year-old male interviewee insisted that a woman over the age of 21 should have complete sexual freedom as part of one's right to 'do wrong and repent, so even if it was wrong from a religious perspective, then this will only be between her and God' (Interview 33). A female interviewee in her thirties argued that

no one should have the right to forbid someone else from their freedom. Even if her family prevented her from going, will that end the idea in her head? Absolutely not. When they lock the door, will they wake up the next [day] to find that she changed her mind? No. (Interview 37).

She reflected on how religion does not impose guardianship over women's autonomy; however, when asked what would be her position if religion gave parents a right to prevent the daughter, she responded,

I agree if religion said that they should prevent her from going out, okay, I would agree that they should prevent her but still, I can see there is harm for her [...] she might kill herself, she might find a way to escape, there might be greater harm (Interview 37).

I asked her further about the reason for prioritising religion over her opinion of refusing guardianship and parental prevention. She responded that if religion stipulated a rule that parents should prevent the daughter, then it must be for a reason and that her 'rationale as a person will never reach the degree of perfection that will allow [...] [her] to be 100% correct, so I think that the sources of legislation, Quran and Sunnah are issued from an authority higher than rationality' (Interview 37).

The interplay of the role of the family, educational institutions, and broader social circles' authority over women's autonomy also extended to discussing the extent of a woman's freedom to adopt or take off the veil. The previous chapters reflected on the centrality of the advocacy of the veil under the master frame as part of calls for personal piety and the framing of the veil as a shared obligation that should be pursued by male relatives and the family, and for some by the society and the state, towards women.⁸ Several female interviewees reflected on their experiences in adopting or taking off the veil, which varied in form and extent between express pressures and implied encouragement from schoolteachers or family members to wear the veil, or express pressure from family members against taking off the veil after wearing it for some time.

A 28-year-old veiled interviewee reflects on her experience of being pressured by a schoolteacher into wearing the veil despite an environment at home that did not necessarily encourage wearing the veil (Interview 13). She said

the teacher was a Salafist who acted like he knew everything. He used to tell us if you do not wear Hijab, you will go to hell [...], and whoever will not wear Hijab, I will expel her from class. We were around 20 or 25 students. Of course, they started wearing Hijab, and almost half of the class wore Hijab. Well, you are a young student, second or third elementary, and you are telling them that if you do not do this, I will expel you like a dog, so you are not really giving them an option not to wear it. It is not an option, it is imperative to wear Hijab, and he was a very popular teacher, so being expelled from his class was a big deal, such a shame! But I insisted I would not do it. [...] the first time he entered the class, he made me stand up with half the class. Each time, we were fewer and fewer, and I was one of the top students in my cohort [in school], [so] it was an insult, but I resisted and told myself it was not his right. After that, he expelled me from the class altogether (Interview 13).

When asked about the stand of other teachers toward expelling her for not wearing the veil despite being one of the top students, she replied

it was natural [for them], no kidding! So, I wore it, but I thought I would take it off after that, but then everyone in my class was wearing it, so it was done. It was peer pressure, but I will never forget this.

Many interviewees did not express incidents of pressure but rather a general environment of naturalisation of the veil as an obligation. One interviewee reflects on her veiling in 1989 that 'it

⁸ See pages 93-96.

was my choice, but my choice based on influences around me that this is the right thing, that this is what should be done' (Interview 8). She also reflected on an incident in her neighbourhood in the 1980s where a woman who suffered from financial struggles was pressured by religious people who distributed charitable income and goods, and 'they imposed on the woman that if you want us to support you, you and your daughters should wear the veil' (Interview 8).

Another interviewee reflects on her veiling in the early 2000s that 'it was [...] the influence of the period. Before that, we were listening to many tapes, such as Amr Khaled and I was really convinced that one should wear a veil, so after that, with some time, I found that I cannot wear that [shorts and sleeveless shirts]' (Interview 17). Sobhy (2009, p. 440) advances that Amr Khaled's discourse on veiling advocated that

Muslims should not analyze or question the original purpose, relative importance, universal applicability, and compulsory nature of veiling as defined by Muslim orthodoxy. According to Khaled, unveiled women are promoters of sin and a "complete, head to toe hijab is an obligation in Islam." The unconvinced Muslim women are not really Muslim because Islam, in literal terms, means simply submission to the words of God. "even if you do not understand, you must obey," says Khaled.

The female interviewees who rejected the master frame at the time of the interviews also shared their experiences concerning the veil in the context of reflecting on an earlier period in their lives when the master frame resonated with them. Their views and answers to the interview questions are explored more fully in the following chapter, however, in this context, it is illuminating to consider how their experiences were similar to those who accept the master frame at the time of the interviews. A non-veiled 30-year-old interviewee reflected similarly on the impact of Amr Khaled on her decision to wear the veil, 'I remember that I got two or three tapes and we used to circle them between each other, between friends I mean, and it affected me very very very much [...] it [wearing the veil] was a result of listening to Amr Khaled, I remember very clearly that Amr Khaled was a big reason' (Interview 39). Another non-veiled 30-year-old interviewee reflects on the family environment surrounding her, where her parents did not encourage wearing the veil; however, she felt that

probably, if they asked me then "don't you want to wear the veil?" like what happened with my cousins [who are veiled]. If they offered me – and these girls, it was not imposed on them; they were just told I would buy you new clothes and Hijab clothes,

you know it comes with a package – I would have been prepared [to wear the veil] (Interview 11).

Other interviewees expressed that wearing the veil was encouraged or unobjectionable while taking it off was difficult. Some interviewees reflected on taking the veil off without their families knowing for a period of time and gradually breaking the news to them to ease the objections (Interviews 21, 39). One interviewee reflects that she wore the veil out of religiosity, that ‘all girls used to wear it at the time and I was religious then [...] so I liked to try it’; however, months later when she felt ‘rushed into it’ and wanted to take it off, her parents refused (Interview 24). She said

I talked with them, and they told me that if I do so, I would not go out of the house, [...], but they never locked me one day, and [...] I am sure they would not have done it, this was just a threat, and they played on the emotions a bit like mum is tired, and dad is tired, and we will go to the hospital tomorrow, and why are you doing this to us and similar things, and I really did not like to see them hurting because of me (Interview 24).

Her interpretation of her parents’ objection to taking off the veil was related to social stigma rather than religiosity, ‘I understood that this is because how people saw them, not more. They went for pilgrimage before and umrah a lot, so their daughter cannot be the one who wore it and then took it off’ (Interview 24).

In addition to exploring topics such as the veil, women’s inheritance, work, equality, and autonomy, the interview also reflected on the ideas advocated under the master frame as part of ideal Islamic governance. The views of the interviewees who accept the master frame concerning these topics are discussed in the following section. The final section discusses the relationship overall between the master frame and the values.

Islamic Governance: Political Rights and Freedoms

One of the main messages advocated under the master frame is that commitment to Islam as the solution and guide cannot be achieved by only following religious guidelines in one’s private life. One should also aspire and work towards the establishment of Islamic governance. However, in contrast to the detailed guidance advocated for commitment on the individual level, the vision of Islamic governance disseminated to the public focused more on the broad idea of applying Islamic Shari‘a in all state affairs. Many Islamist figures, particularly popular ones such as al-Sha‘rawi, ‘Abd al-Kafi, and the new preachers, dedicated most of their time to issues of private commitment. The focus of the master frame on a general message of Islamic governance with lesser detailed

guidance than religious self-reform can be explained by reference to the state's position from the master frame. The state tolerated messages of personal piety, which constituted a project that the state itself tapped into and proposed its own ideas on how it should be shaped. Personal piety did not seem to pose a threat to the regime and instead answered some of the socio-political failures of the state by reference to self-blame and lack of religiosity. However, an alternative and detailed vision of governance would naturally constitute a challenge to the regime, hence carrying more risk and would find fewer platforms. One can imagine that ideas of personal piety and projects of self-reform reached Egyptian citizens from every medium, such as the radio, TV and print, from the state and movement actors, as explored in previous chapters. At the same time, the general restrictions in the public sphere and oppression of the authoritarian regime curtailed discussion of ideas for an alternative Islamic vision of governance as widely and as detailed.

The details of how Islamic governance would operate and positions on various issues such as democracy, equality and political rights for non-Muslims, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and tolerance of atheists or LGBTQ individuals differed between Islamist groups. They were discussed in their writings and occasionally in interviews or statements. Some issues which bear on tolerance of different groups found their way through messages of individual commitment, such as how one should treat non-Muslims, the sinfulness of the sexual orientations of the LGBTQ individuals, or antipathy towards atheism.

The interviews explored the resonance of the broad idea of Islamic governance and the application of Shari'a by discussing the desirability of the second article in the constitution, which indicates Shari'a as the primary source of legislation. The interviewees who supported the core idea that Islam is the solution favoured the application of Shari'a and the second article. The interview also explored the resonance of some ideas about political rights and freedoms through various examples. These examples included asking about the political rights of non-Muslims, atheists, or LGBTQ individuals, such as running for the presidency, whether the interviewee would support such a candidate and their reasons for acceptance or refusal. This led to a broader discussion regarding the rights and equality of different individuals and groups in society and their self-expression freedoms, such as publicly advocating their ideas and protesting for their rights. Other discussed examples included reflections on freedom of religion and apostasy within an Islamic state.

Notably, several interviewees said they had not thought about these matters before. Some changed their opinions throughout the interview between acceptance and refusal as they thought

through the issues and revised their answers at a later stage. Many responded with sarcasm to the question about who has the right to run for the presidency in Egypt due to Egypt's successive authoritarian regimes. The question was eventually discussed as a hypothetical for an imagined ideal Egyptian state.

Many held the view that in an Islamic state as an ideal Egyptian state, non-Muslims, atheists, and LGBTQ individuals should not have the right to run for office, and the state should prevent them from being candidates (Interviews 2, 12, 15, 20, 22, 26, 27, 36, 37, 49). One interviewee started by arguing against allowing them to run for the presidency, objecting that it would not be acceptable for one of these individuals to represent the state as its head. However, later in the discussion, she commented 'I did not think about this before, but I think, no, we should let him practice his political right, and we see what the society wants, but I do not think in this society, one like him can win' (Interview 17). The doubts over the ability of non-Muslims, atheists, or LGBTQ individuals to win a hypothetical election in Egypt were expressed by the interviewees who accepted, in theory, such candidates' right to run for the presidency but said it is highly unlikely that they would win (Interviews 13, 19, 31, 33, 44). Some interviewees said they would not vote for such a candidate (Interviews 31, 33, 44), while others said they might vote for them depending on their proposed programme and expertise (19, 42). The priority of the master frame was also present for some interviewees, such as a 32 years-old male interviewee who indicated that he supports the equal right of every individual to run for office and that his vote would depend on the candidate's programme, yet when asked what would be his response if Shari'a hypothetically prevented Christians or gays from running for the presidency, he responded 'I would go with my religion', explaining 'if there was something clear in Quran or Hadith, or anything [...] and it is confirmed then I am with it' (Interview 42).

The discussion surrounding the presidency question led to a broader discussion about the rights of different groups in an ideal Egyptian state, such as atheists and LGBTQ individuals, in terms of their rights, freedom of expression, forming associations, or protesting for their rights. Although some interviewees accepted that atheists and LGBTQ individuals would have the political right to run for office, the position regarding their existence in the public space was more stringent. Examples of sharing the public space included raising a rainbow flag, meeting in public, forming associations to advocate for their ideas and rights, and protesting. A majority of the interviewees who were committed to the frame rejected entirely that atheists or LGBTQ individuals would have the right to protest or advocate for their rights (Interviews 2, 12, 15, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 36, 37,

42, 49). The reasons for rejection were sometimes expressly grounded in the unacceptability of these groups in an Islamic state. A female interviewee in her fifties said, ‘this is completely rejected in Islamic states’, and a 56-year-old female interviewee expressed that this would be against Islam (Interview 15, 22). A 29-year-old male interviewee said this constitutes a violation of heavenly religions, and a 28-year-old male interviewee commented on the tension with the freedom of expression by saying that freedom should be governed by the Islamic frame (Interviews 2, 36). One interviewee, 27 years-old male, struggled with the political freedoms and freedom of expression for LGBTQ individuals as he agreed that they should have the right to run for elections, although he would not vote for them; however, he objected to their freedom to protest or establish organisations, as he said, ‘no interest groups, no establishing organisations and parties calling for their ideas, no’ (Interview 6). For other interviewees, the reasons of rejection were grounded in social traditions and community values

For some interviewees, the rejection of the right to protest extended to a complete rejection of the existence of atheists or LGBTQ individuals in society. In contrast, for others, the rejection was limited to their participation in the public sphere. Many Islamist groups and actors voice their antipathy to atheists and LGBTQ individuals. Al-Wasatiyya movement – as explored in the previous chapter – advocated that these groups would not have the right to form parties or advocate for their ideas publicly as this would offend the Islamic public order; however, whatever is done or expressed in the privacy of one’s home would be permitted. This was the view taken by several interviewees. A 32-year-old female interviewee said that LGBTQ individuals are accepted as ‘an individual behaviour that is not announced, between him and God he is free to do what he wants’; however, they should not have the right to get married; she added, ‘I am of course against this. I think there should be, of course, an Islamic reference, as long as in the end, all of our life, its reference is that we want to progress towards pleasing God’ (Interview 17). A 27-year-old male interviewee said that their existence in the public space would be an imposition on society, and they are allowed to practice their freedoms privately; a 57-year-old female interviewee said, ‘I am objecting to the overtness; however, he is free in his own life’, and a 32-year-old male interviewee said, ‘sitting in the house, you are free, but don’t go to the street advocating for your ideas’ (Interview 9, 42, 47).

A few interviewees prioritised freedom of expression and indicated that they would object to the state preventing atheists or LGBTQ protests even if it violates Shari’a; as a 34-year-old male interviewee said, ‘even though they violate Shari’a [...] no one has the right to stop anyone, you

can only give advice no more or less, if they choose to follow the advice or not they are free' (Interview 44). A 28-year-old female interviewee expressed her objection to any form of restriction on LGBTQ rights and commented on the struggle with the master frame, saying, 'part of me is very sympathetic, but another part [of me] is the kid who was raised like Astaghfer Allah [Repentance to God], but I think they should have their full rights, it is not acceptable what is being done to them' (Interview 13).

The discussion regarding freedom of expression extended to discussing freedom of belief and one's right to change religion. The example used in the interview focused on the right of Muslims to change religion, given the framing of the issue by Islamist actors as apostasy, which is arguably punished by death. Al-Wasatiyaa rejects death as punishment for apostasy, although they argue for some form of punishment due to the violation of apostasy to the Islamic public order.

Few interviewees refused the right of Muslims to change religion and few indicated that the punishment of death should be applied, although they accepted the right of non-Muslims to join Islam (Interviews 2, 20, 37, 41). A 40-year-old male interviewee said, 'in Islamic Shari'a, the apostate is punished by death, so, apostasy is not allowed', and a 33-year-old male interviewee said, 'apostasy does not exist [is not allowed] in our religion'; however, non-Muslims can join Islam (Interview 20, 41). A female interviewee in her thirties explained that when an ideal Islamic state is established, 'the Islamic state initially granted him [the right] to live in an Islamic society and provided him with many necessities, after that, it will hold him accountable for this point [changing religion from Islam]' (Interview 37).

Some interviewees struggled between the notion of apostasy and freedom of belief. A 33-year-old male interviewee indicated that a Muslim has a right to change religion, 'but still, I have a problem if I see a Muslim converted to Christianity, and I feel happy if a Christian became a Muslim' (Interview 30). He further contended that he would hate to see the state applying death as punishment, and at a later point in the interview, he revisited the statement saying that it is not technically a right and the state should prevent the change of religion (Interview 30). Another interviewee, a 34 year-old male, opined that changing one's religion should be a matter of personal freedom, and at a later point in the interview, indicated that if he was '100% sure that the [Islamic] jurisprudence' declares apostasy as forbidden and its punishment is death, then he 'will apply Shari'a' (Interview 49). A 28-year-old indicated that changing religion is a right, 'however, still, there is a certain frame from a religious perspective regarding that point', which he confirmed it should be imposed (Interview 36).

The majority of the interviewees expressed a preference for freedom of belief and the right of Muslims to change religion. Most of them questioned the validity of capital punishment for apostasy and whether this indeed constitutes part of religion, therefore, rejecting that it falls within the boundaries of the master frame. Further, some argued that it is evident that various Quran verses indicate people's freedom to choose a religion (Interviews 12, 22, 33, 47). Some interviewees did not cite verses, and their reasoning was grounded in the nature of faith as a personal belief which cannot be forced by punishment (10, 15, 16, 31). A female interviewee in her fifties said, 'the state cannot prevent such a thing [changing religion] [...] because it is God who is holding people accountable in religion, [...] [and] there is nothing that comes by force' (Interview 15). A 47 years-old female interviewee expressed that every individual should be free to change religion and the state should not interfere, and a 34 years-old male interviewee identified the freedom of belief as the first freedom (Interview 10, 44). The tension between atheism and the exercise of rights in public spaces was present in the discussion for some interviewees. A 32-year-old female interviewee indicated that changing religion is individual freedom and expressed fear of sectarian strife if converting religion was exercised by a large number of individuals saying, 'if the issue took the form of destabilising the society, then the state should interfere, if it was a person on his own who will change his religion, then he is free, [that is] between him and God' (Interview 17).

Discussion: The Master Frame, Values, and Political Culture

Benford and Snow describe master frames as 'a kind of master algorithm that colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other movements' (2000, p. 168). In the Egyptian context, the master frame of *Islam is the solution* has not only coloured and constrained the public discourse, culture, and activities of movements and the state, as seen in previous chapters.⁹ It also colours and constrains individuals' views and values, proposing an outer limit that should not be contradicted. The interviewees excluded the views and values they judged to be incompatible with Islam as the guiding frame, expressing many times that opposing this frame is unacceptable, whether in personal or public life.

⁹ This includes colouring and constraining the institutions of the state and public policies as explored in the fourth chapter such as in relation to the Ministry of Education or the Judiciary. This also includes constraining other movements such as the mobilisation for the prohibition of female genital mutilation FGM, or the introduction of new rules for divorce such as al-Khol' system, which necessitated first proving that the demands of the movements do not contradict the Islamic discourse and Shari'a.

Wickham argued, based on her research, that ‘the most fundamental change produced by Islamic mobilization on the periphery is what we might call a “transvaluation of values,” that is, a reordering of the priorities that guide individual action’ (2002, p. 165). The transvaluation of values in Wickham’s research was related to particular manifestations such as diminishing the value of secular knowledge as opposed to religious knowledge and ‘the devaluation of a university education and white-collar employment as appropriate goals’ (Wickham 2002, pp. 165-166).

However, the previous chapters showed that the framing efforts were not always solely a product of Islamic mobilisation, i.e. mobilisation by the Islamist movement in the broadest sense, although they were the main actors in shaping it. Rather, the state also tapped into the master frame and contributed to shaping its vision of piety. This happened overtly and extensively in al-Sadat’s regime and continued during Mubarak’s time, openly, at least in the first decade, through institutions such as al-Azhar and state-sponsored figures such as al-Sha‘rawi. Rock-Singer (2019, p. 5), in his study of the Islamic revival in Egypt, similarly advances that ‘Islamist projects of mobilization emerged within and were deeply shaped by state institutions’.

Further, the transvaluation of values or reordering of priorities is not necessarily manifested in the interviews by devaluing some practices and attributing value to others. Instead, the reordering centred around giving priority to the master frame and avoiding any contradiction with it, and the master frame itself governed the devaluation and attribution of value. The manifested priority in the interviewees’ answers is to be guided by the master frame, which rests on the core idea that Islam is a comprehensive system that should govern every aspect of life and governance, including the adoption, rejection, or limits on any view or value. The function of the master frame as an outer limit was clearly expressed in the words of some interviewees, who interestingly and tellingly used the word frame (*Itar*) in Arabic to describe how one’s actions should be guided and constrained. A 32 year-old female interviewee said, ‘God has put a frame for you, left some things for you to freely organise as you want while other things are specified for you’ (Interview 17), and a 28 year-old male interviewee said,

I think that any frame that I should move within should initially be the frame of the religion that I believe in; that is how it should be in order to have things correctly and in the proper scope, I think so. I move within my religion’s scope first and then submit everything to such scope. I can draft legislation or do something to regulate my life, but within the frame that does not exceed the fundamental orders that my religion has ordered me to follow (Interview 36).

The critical question then becomes what falls within the acceptable boundaries of Islam as the guiding frame and what constitutes an overstepping or a contradiction that should be rejected. One of the topics that the interviewees considered to be clearly defined in Islam was the inheritance rules. Therefore, there was a consistent strong rejection of gender equality in inheritance due to its contradiction with the frame. For some interviewees, crossing this clear limit and contradicting Shari‘a was accompanied by feelings of fear, confusion, sadness, or worry, as analysed earlier.

Gender equality has usually been referenced as ‘a good indicator of the growth of the emancipatory values which [...] are prerequisite for a stable democracy’, and quantitative studies typically refer to low levels of support for gender equality in Arab countries, including Egypt (Abbott, Teti and Sapsford, 2018, p. 16; Inglehart, 2017). However, quantitative studies are informative and

strong on representation when properly carried out – it can tell us how many out of the population say they have experienced a given phenomenon or that they support a given position and how groups compare, across and within countries. It cannot tell us what they mean by it and what discourses or frames of analysis are being taken for granted as the obvious and right way to approach the nature of social and political life (Abbott, Teti and Sapsford, 2018, p. 19).

Qualitative engagement reveals how the interviewees approach the value, what it means for them and how they justify their adoption or rejection of it. The interviewees who support the master frame consistently rejected the application of gender equality in relation to the inheritance rules. However, while some denied any contradiction with equality and some alluded to the traditional division of labour between men and women in their justifications for the rule, it is notable that several interviewees showed a preference for gender equality yet rejected it only on the basis that the religious text forbids it. This shows that equality is not rejected as a value in principle; rather, its importance is devalued compared to the higher priority of compatibility with the master frame and avoiding any contradiction with it.

In contrast to the inheritance rules, most of the ideas disseminated under the master frame and explored in the interviews enjoy a degree of flexibility in their limits. This flexibility offered a space where the interviewees expressed their preferences regarding the values and their limits. Beliefs in gender equality in terms of women’s equal right to work were expressed clearly by many interviewees. The limits of this equality, such as women’s right to work as judges or president, were governed for some by the master frame and for others by ideas about women’s abilities to

work in particular professions. Similar views were advocated by religious actors under the master frame. Notably, several interviewees believed in women's equal right to work in all professions without limits and clearly claimed the personal authority to determine the boundaries of the master frame, insisting that it does not contradict the value. However, when faced with a hypothetical scenario of contradiction with the master frame, they expressed that they would prioritise the master frame and exclude gender equality.

With regard to beliefs in women's autonomy, almost all the interviewees rejected notions of sexual autonomy, grounding their refusal in its contradiction with the master frame and social traditions. However, some also accepted autonomy as a value that excludes sexual relations and includes women's right to travel and financial independence. Few interviewees favoured autonomy without limits, including sexual relations, similarly claiming its compatibility with the master frame. However, when faced with a contradictory hypothetical scenario, they prioritised the master frame and excluded the value.

In the context of governance, while some interviewees accepted equality in political rights for all groups and individuals, many interviewees showed a lack of tolerance and rejected freedoms of expression for atheists and LGBTQ individuals, claiming that their ideas and sometimes their presence would be unacceptable in an Islamic state. Few interviewees prioritised freedom of expression even if the ideas advocated violate the master frame. On the other hand, freedom of belief and freedom to change one's religion were supported by most interviewees, claiming its compatibility with the master frame, and only a few accepted the master frame's ideas about punishment for apostasy. However, the freedom to change one's religion seems to be conditioned on moving between the Abrahamic religions and not the absence of a belief in religion, given the earlier expressed antipathy towards atheists.

The master frame, of course, does not operate in a vacuum; as much as it shaped the culture, it was also shaped by social traditions. In placing limits on a value, many interviewees usually refer to social traditions and religion in the same sentence. This was clear in discussing the scenario of the parent and daughter; many interviewees referred to conservative traditions and honour killings as a traditional response to such a scenario and reflected on how this is also sinful and contrary to religion. They also grounded a traditional parent's right to prevent the daughter from leaving home in religious principles. The master frame, which started with a strong advocacy of gender segregation and continued with very restrictive conceptions of relations between men and women – some of which called for family guardianship over women – gave religious legitimacy to the

social traditions and cemented its place in culture. Further, the antipathy expressed by many framing messages toward LGBTQ individuals gave religious legitimacy to the potentially already-rooted social intolerance of these individuals and groups.

Two critical issues are notable. First, the interviewees were careful and placed importance on the justification of their views as compatible with the master frame. This process of justification highlights the weight of the master frame in legitimating their beliefs and values. Second, the prioritisation of the master frame was consistently maintained at the expense of one's financial interest served by the rule, such as the inheritance rules for female interviewees, at other times at the expense of one's personal experiences in life, such as the interviewee who strongly supported women's equal right to work partly because of his previous experience of working with women but who gave priority to the frame if it hypothetically prohibited women's work in particular professions (Interview 20). Sometimes, it was at the expense of one's personal beliefs, such as the female interviewee who strongly opposed guardianship over women but eventually gave priority to the frame in contradiction to her personal opinion under the justification of divine wisdom and the male interviewee who supported equal political rights for all citizens, yet changed his opinion to reject the value if it was proved that the master frame hypothetically prohibited it (Interviews 37, 42).

The interviewees' readiness to prioritise the master frame and change their views and values if the frame excluded them is significant. This readiness points towards the critical role played by the mobilising actors who place their framing messages under the legitimacy of the master frame. It enables them to include and exclude views and values for their audience by claiming their conformity or contradiction with the master frame. The impact of such mobilisation indeed differs between individuals depending on whom they regard as a credible authority in determining the boundaries of the frame, the individual's degree of commitment to the frame, and whether the individual claims for themselves the authority to decide what falls within and outside the frame.

A keyword with regard to the mobilisation potential of an idea under the master frame is proof or evidence that the matter is settled within the master frame. For many interviewees, giving priority to the frame depended on proving that the issue is definitely fixed in religion to give effect to the priority of the master frame. For some interviewees, the master frame enjoys the flexibility that enables them to tap into it and decide what should be included and excluded. This was the case for those who argued for the value they believed in while claiming the legitimacy of compatibility with the master frame. This includes the interviewees who defended women's

equality in work and women's sexual freedom within the master frame or those who doubted capital punishment for apostasy as part of the master frame. Tapping into the master frame also allowed individuals to reject framing messages which they deemed not to reflect the true nature of Islam and which opposed their personal values. For instance, one of the female interviewees, 44 years old, reflected on how she stopped attending a religious lesson in a local mosque because the Sheikh said that a son should obey a father's order to divorce his (the son's) wife, even if the wife is a good woman, an opinion which she rejected vehemently (Interview 27). Another female interviewee, 25 years old, reflected on how sometimes she chooses not to follow what is said in the religious lessons she attends, such as opinions which forbid women to work or insist on gender segregation; she said, 'the idea is that these are religious lessons and they are very religious and everything, but still when you listen you don't take everything from them' (Interview 25).

Nevertheless, for many, the boundaries of the master frame are shaped by jurisprudential religious views, and knowledge of the religious opinion is vital before one can express one's views; as a 29-year-old male interviewee said in response to a question, 'I don't know, I am afraid my opinion would violate Shari'a, I don't know what is the rule of religion in this [matter]' (Interview 2). This is where religious state figures and Islamist actors play an essential role in shaping individual values by claiming authority to determine what falls within or contradicts the master frame. The power to change or re-order individuals' views and values by tapping into the master frame helps in understanding how the framing efforts of the Islamist movement and the state were able to shape the Egyptian political culture. Elkins and Simeon (1979, p 128) advance that

Political culture [...] is a short-hand expression for a "mind set" which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible. Since it represents a "disposition" in favor of a range of alternatives by corollary another range of alternatives receives little or no attention within a particular culture.

The extensive framing efforts which dominated the Egyptian context since the late 1970s through vast mobilisation of resources and building on many favourable political opportunities, including the extensive support of al-Sadat's regime in a critical period of building the master frame, resulted in a slow reordering of the mindset over the course of decades towards particular dispositions as those that enjoy the legitimacy of the master frame and excluding others which contradict the frame. By the 2000s, this mindset became woven into the fabric of the culture. The interviews show that

for the interviewees who support the master frame, the contradiction with the frame results in excluding alternatives even if one initially adopted a different view.

Finally, two points are worth highlighting. First, it must be emphasised that commitment to the master frame is not itself static, so its effect on reordering values and priorities is not. Rejecting or modifying one's position from the master frame is always possible, as evidenced by the interviewees' experiences discussed in the following chapter, who were once committed to the master frame; however, for various reasons, they came to change their view of it. What this research suggests is that for the interviewees who are committed to the master frame at a particular point in time, the master frame is likely to have an impact on reordering their values and priorities, while keeping in mind that '[a]s of early 2011 [...] roughly 85% believed that Islam had a positive influence on Egyptian politics', indicating different shades of preference for the master frame (Hoyle, 2016, p. 200).

Second, the impact of the master frame on the reordering of values is not inevitably definite. The interviewee's commitment to the master frame and prioritisation of avoiding any contradiction with it does not inevitably translate into changing one's orientations or values. This was present for a few interviewees who insisted on women's equality in all professions, even against the hypothetical scenario of contradicting Islam. This was also present in some of the interviews, which included a discussion of abortion. The female interviewees who refused women's autonomy to engage in sexual relations and defined women's role in a traditional division of labour considered that even though abortion is haram (religiously forbidden), it should be permissible for women who become pregnant from non-married relationships to save the woman's reputation. The social cost that a woman would suffer in such a situation triumphed over the master frame despite a clear commitment to many of its ideas.

The main impact of the master frame seems to be conditioning the value on its justification within the master frame and excluding ones *proven* to be contradictory to the frame. In a similar way to al-Arian's (2014, p. 145) observation of Islamic mobilisation in universities that it 'conditioned an entire generation in working through existing institutions, making precise claims, and doing so *while framing them in an Islamic tone*', the master frame resulted in conditioning values on their compatibility with the master frame.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the resonance and impact of the master frame for the interviewees who support the core idea of the master frame that Islam is the solution to every problem and a

comprehensive guide in life and governance. It analysed their views regarding the main topics advocated as part of personal piety projects, which focused on women's rights, work, obligations, and role in society. It also explored their views on various issues raised as part of the vision for Islamic governance, such as political rights, freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Finally, the chapter discussed how the master frame influences values underlying political culture, by creating a disposition towards the views and values legitimated by the master frame and excluding alternatives which contradict the frame, signalling the critical role played by the mobilising actors who tap into the master frame. The following chapter explores the experiences of the interviewees who rejected the master frame.

VII. Rejecting the Master Frame

In exploring the resonance of the master frame, less than half the interviewees disagreed with the idea that *Islam is the solution* as a comprehensive system to every problem in life and governance. Their answers to the interview questions consistently differed from those of the interviewees committed to the master frame. Their experiences in previously adopting the master frame and currently rejecting it enrich the analysis of the resonance and rejection of the master frame and its interaction with individual values.

The first section explores the reasons the interviewees offered for rejecting the master frame. The second and third sections analyse their responses to the questions related to personal piety, such as the inheritance rules, women's role in society, equality in the right to work, and autonomy in personal relations, and questions of governance, such as the second article of the Egyptian constitution, equality in political rights, freedom of expression and freedom of religion. The final section highlights the experiences of the interviewees in previously adopting the master frame and why the master frame lost its resonance for them despite its earlier prioritisation.

Rejecting the Master Frame

The interviewees who rejected the core idea that Islam is the solution as a comprehensive system offered diverse reasons for their positions, which can be grouped under three main reasons. The first reason is objecting to the idea that Islam is a comprehensive system or can act as a solution to personal and public problems. Within this group, some considered that the idea of *Islam is the solution* is too broad to be given a meaningful definition that can work as a guide in problems, while others considered Islam to be a matter of personal faith and morality that does not necessarily offer solutions to problems of life and governance (Interviews 3, 11, 14, 32, 40). Some interviewees also expressed that religion, as it was 1400 years ago, is unsuitable to face modern problems. A 34 years-old male interviewee said, 'you cannot bring me a historical text that is 1400 years old and tell me that I should apply what was happening from 1400 years today; this is not logical', a 33-year-old male interviewee also said, 'the text is rigid with no flexibility [...] as the text is 1500 years old, I should not follow it now as it is not applicable on many things and does not take into account the [current] circumstances and that will lead us always to a place where we cannot answer many questions' (Interviews 14, 45). Further, a 24 year-old female interviewee also commented that 'we should not be fixating on a certain point, [...] the way people think have

changed from the time of Islam until now’, and a 28-year-old male interviewee said the ‘Islamic era was an era and it ended, or the time of the Islamic state was a phase with its diversity and prosperity and decay and all of that, it is a time in history, and it has ended, like Christianity in Europe for example’ (Interviews 3, 35).

Other interviewees expressed doubts about the idea of moderate Islam in Egypt as assumed within the master frame. A 36 year-old male interviewee said, ‘we say it [Islam] is moderate but in fact, it is not moderate at all [...] other sides get revealed, sides that do not recognise equality’, and a 30 year-old female interviewee said, ‘I have a problem with its [Shari‘a] provisions, and especially that there are many provisions that are illogical, there are things that have inequality and discrimination in many things, and that is why I refuse it’ (Interview 21). Another 30-year-old female interviewee said,

The beautiful moderate form does not exist for anyone, people only brag about it, but it actually does not exist. Everyone will tell you about moderate Islam, but if you give him anything like, for example, this person is gay, can you deal with him? He will say Astaghfer Allah (may god forgive) and so on. They are not moderate or anything [...] if one said your daughter will take off her Hijab, they will make it a disaster for her. Everyone, all of them, say that there is a moderate image, that Islam accepts everything, but in reality, no one accepts anything. On the contrary, all people are strict one way or another, but they say the opposite or claim other things. (Interview 39)

She also reflected on how it is possible individually to follow Islam and tolerate different groups and individuals in society, but, in her opinion, that is not the case for the majority; she said,

I was very religious at a certain point in my life, and I used to pray and all [...] I was the person who prays all the time and prays Qiam al-Leil (optional devoted prayers in the late night) and reads Quran, and I did not have a problem with any sexual orientation or someone who chose to be atheist, etc. It is possible that between me and myself, I felt like, what is this? But I would deal with them very nicely, and I would not mind them working with me, sitting beside me, or whatever. But, no, not all people are like that, not at all, everyone claims so, but no one does it. So no, I don’t see Islam as the solution; to the contrary (Interview 39).

The second reason for rejecting the master frame emanated from a rejection of the role of religion in politics. Some interviewees in this group reflected on how the Egyptian regimes used religion as a tool of governance; a 27 year-old male interviewee expressed that the culture in Egypt which

prioritises religion has been formed as a result of the ‘political regime’s view at the time that this would serve its interests [...] and they shape the consciousness and culture of the people according to what is best for them’, reflecting particularly on al-Sadat’s regime (Interview 5). A 36 year-old male interviewee also commented on the role of the state in supporting figures such as al-Sha‘rawi and Mustafa Mahmoud to spread religiosity and set limits to public debate by diverting people away from discussing politics; he said they wanted people to ‘talk only about women and men and what is correct and what is not’ (Interview 34). Two other male interviewees, 28 and 26 years old, grounded their rejections of the master frame on the relationship between Islamists and the state, referencing an earlier period concerning the cooperation between the Brotherhood and the military since 1952 and earlier than that (Interviews 3, 48). The 26 year-old interviewee said that his rejection is grounded in how movements other than Islamists face more obstacles with the governing regimes in Egypt,

They [the political regime] think that they [the Islamists] can work as an alternative at some point when they need a political coalition to happen. The king was trying to ally with them when the Wafd party was controlling the parliament at the time. After that, Nasser and the known story about him being a member here [in the Muslim Brotherhood] and a member in a communist organisation, and his attempts several times to reconcile with them and then his personal dealings with Sayed Qutb [...] and after that when he turned against them and executed them and imprisoned them. Sadat after that was, for me, the head that gave them the opening, he is the one who opened the door for them, with the reconciliation that happened between them when he got the Islamists out of prisons to face the socialists’ students in the university at that time, and calling them the infidel communists and so on, and there has always been political balancing that is happening, as you [Islamists] [...] will get 10% in parliament and so on. There is always a process of giving and taking between them [Islamists] and the state (Interview 48).

Other interviewees mentioned examples of religious states in the Middle East and North Africa to support their point of rejecting Islamic governance. A 34-year-old male interviewee reflected on how Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran declare themselves to be Islamic states, yet each governs differently, which, in his opinion, shows that Islamic governance is ‘a very conflictual matter’ and governance is related to geo-political circumstances and how to best achieve ‘the welfare and prosperity of the people’ (Interview 14). Another interviewee, a 27-year-old male, said, ‘the

examples that can be called Islamic states are extremely bad examples; look at Saudi Arabia or Sudan' (Interview 40).

Finally, the third reason for rejecting the master frame was personal encounters with religious figures.¹⁰ A 26 years-old male interviewee reflected on how he was very religious until he engaged in a loving relationship with a girl in the university, and she started to question Islam as a religion, facing family pressures in taking off her veil and discussing with him that she does not believe in God's existence (Interview 48). In response to her doubts, he suggested that she should meet with a Sheikh from al-Azhar, and after months of meetings with Sheikhs who teach Islamic philosophy, 'she told me that she was not going again and that she was not going on with the relationship as well, and we left each other' (Interview 48). Following the end of his relationship, he says,

after I woke up from the shock of leaving each other and after being together for almost two years, I started to go and discuss with them [Sheikhs] ideas like how the universe was created and so on. I began to feel like her, I am talking about something, and they are saying religion is saying this and that [...] After that, I went through discussions with them for almost six months [...] until I reached a point that I was not convinced after many readings. I became agnostic for a while, not convinced at all that there is something called Islam, and if there is Islam, then it is not like that, and it is misrepresented (Interview 48).

Another personal experience was expressed by a 25 years-old male interviewee who reflected on a Salafist relative who affected his relationship with religion. He said,

I used to see things as a kid, like when my aunt was getting married, and he [a Salafist relative] came and told her not to play music but to play some CD he brought. So, we stopped the music we were playing and started to play stuff that did not have drums or anything, only someone singing, and you see this way of living and feel that you are not in the world. Those people are absent, absent in a certain zone that they cannot get out of, and their thinking is close-minded in an awful way. You come to a wedding with all the happy, cheerful people to annoy everyone and put your songs, and impose it on everyone; that is why I wished not to follow this mindset; I do not want to be one of them (Interview 29).

¹⁰ While the first and second reasons for rejecting the master frame relate to why the interviewees think it is unsuitable as a guide, the third reason combines a rejection of the master frame as unsuitable with personal experiences of why the frame lost its resonance. The last section in this chapter elaborates more on how personal experiences and grievances shape the lack of resonance of the master frame.

He also reflected on another incident that involved a disagreement with his father, who wanted him to become a professional football player while the interviewee wished to pursue higher education (Interview 29). The disagreement became intense to the extent that

he [the father] was convinced that I was possessed by a demon, so what could he do? He called my aunt's husband, the Salafist one, and told him to come and see me, so he came and sat with me, and I was around 20 years old; I was not young, but anyway, that was my father and my aunt's husband so I should wait out of respect, what can I do. So my aunt's husband came and put his hand on my head and started to read Quran and so, and I was very annoyed, and I wanted to set someone on fire because I was so angry with them, and after he finished, he advised me to take care of my prayers, and he kept talking a lot. Anyway, he quit and left, and I told my father that I swear not to play football ever again in my life; I told him I swear to god that I would never play football in my whole life, [...] my relationship with my father was ruined ever since (Interview 29).

He added that his Salafist relative solved the problem by reading the Quran over his head, and he cannot trust people who solve their problems in this way with the country where he lives (Interview 29). The personal experience through which the interviewees received the framing messages and ideas seems to affect the frame's resonance. For these interviewees (29, 48), their experiences with religious figures who were unconvincing or unappealing in personal interactions led them to reject the master frame entirely. Similarly, for some interviewees who adopted the master frame, their personal experiences with religious figures whom they respected or family interactions with loved religious figures represented in a father or a grandfather led them to adopt and remain committed to the ideas of the master frame (Interview 22, 50).

Overall, the interviewees who rejected the master frame challenged its meaning, limits, its application in personal interactions they witnessed, and its ability to act as a solution to problems of life and governance. Further, they contextualised the master frame within their views on Egypt's social and political life to support their opinions on its unsuitability as a solution. However, the more accurate indication of their rejection of the master frame is the extent to which they adopt or reject the ideas advocated as part of the master frame. The next sections explore their views regarding messages of personal piety and Islamic governance.

Being a Better Muslim: Women's Role, Work, and Rights

Rejecting the master frame in opposing the idea that Islam is the solution to problems of life and governance did not mean that all the interviewees in this group rejected the role of Islam in every question or were not concerned with the contradiction with Shari'a posed by some topics and examples. Many interviewees considered the contradiction with Shari'a to be irrelevant to the question, while some still considered Shari'a to be a guiding frame on a personal level and sometimes offered justifications for why they think the rule of Shari'a should not be followed. The interviewees in this group were asked similar questions in a similar order to those who adopted the master frame. Hence, the first example concerned the then-contemporary legislation in Tunisia, which gave men and women equal inheritance in contradiction to Shari'a. They were asked about their opinion on such news and whether they think such legislation should be adopted in Egypt.

Several male and female interviewees straightforwardly agreed with Tunisia's legislation in short approving answers. When asked about the reasons for their approval, they referred to gender equality and expressed that it should take priority over Shari'a (Interviews 3, 21, 34, 35, 48). Some of them elaborated such as a 33-year-old male who said,

I think that [inequality] does not make sense at all. On the contrary, it should have been that men would take half, given that the Islamic environment was a masculine society and women did not work, so they should have the priority of being more secure. So, at least equality, I see this [the Tunisian legislation] as a good step (Interview 45).

One interviewee, a 34-year-old male, expressed that the rules of inheritance should follow whatever is democratically decided; in Tunisia, the inheritance legislation was the result of a 'long time of their [women] struggle to gain their rights, I personally stand with them in taking their rights as far as there is voting that happened and the ballot box said that women should be treated as men' (Interview 14). He added further that if some people considered this to be against their religion or traditions, they should be free not to follow it individually, saying

if there were traditions or anything religious that prevented that [equality] in some of the groups existing there, so [...] the women in those groups have the right to refrain from executing this rule as they wish according to their ways. For example, if there is a Muslim family there, and Islam forbids women to inherit as men [equally], then they are free (Interview 14).

While a female interviewee, 30 years old, preferred that the matter should be left to individual wills rather than being organised by the state, she said

it is very logical that in an era like the one we are living in, that in front of the state, there is a [male] citizen and a [female] citizen, the female letter in the name [al-Ta' al-Marbouta] should not make a difference in the treatment at all, and that includes inheritance [...] [and] I do not understand why the state should be applying the rules of inheritance from Shari'a, why not leave these rules to wills; the father decides that the son will have double the daughter, then he can write him extra, so why is the state interfering in such a thing? (Interview 11)

Some interviewees argued that equality is also warranted by the changing times and increased responsibilities on women in a way that seemed to respond to the rationale offered as part of the master frame about the different responsibilities between men and women and women's role in society. A 27 year-old male interviewee said,

When we think about it, no brother spends as the Sheikhs say. They say that the aim of the text is that the brother should spend on his sister until she gets married, and after her marriage, the husband should spend on her and so on. This aim is not achieved 100% now (Interview 40).

Another 25 year-old male interviewee said,

I believe that there should not be any discrimination between the two [men and women]. I think such discrimination came from the nature of life itself in the old times. In the old times, there was nothing of the current achievements of women; women could not do all that they can do nowadays, she was not able to contribute to life, so typically [...] everything was for the man as he was the one doing everything, he was the one going to war and going out and doing difficult things, but now, I don't think so. I think the whole thing should be regulated again, as there are many people suffering injustices, and sometimes, the inheritance goes to a man who does not carry any responsibility [...], so what happened in Tunisia, I am not really against it, even if it was religiously Haram (Interview 29).

The reflections on the passage of time were also clear in the response of a 27 year-old male interviewee who said, 'I think that times change and develop, and it is not useful to be ruled by tools or rules that are over a 1000 years old' (Interview 5), and a 25 year-old female interviewee who argued for equality and said that Shari'a offered a progressive rule in its time, but this is no longer the case,

Islamic Shari'a, as far as I understand, was talking about a context in which women do not inherit anything at all, so it gave men the double because women were not getting anything at all. So, women got half what men got after not getting anything at all as a minimum; however, now women carry the responsibility of the house, including financial responsibilities (Interview 32).

Notably, some interviewees conditioned their support for equality in inheritance on its compatibility with Shari'a from a personal perspective. Thereby claiming for themselves the authority to interpret the master frame and preferring personal guidance by the frame in a similar way to the interviewees who adopt the master frame. However, the difference is that they did not insist on regulating the matter legally based on Shari'a, nor did they object to the legal amendment with the same rigour as the interviewees who considered the matter above discussion. An example of a personal preference to be guided by the frame is seen in the interview of a 28 year-old female who reflected on how she sought a religious justification that responds to her personal concerns in adopting equality while not opposing Shari'a. She said,

The first time I read about it, I did not have a clear position, and I can confess, not that I had a problem, but I was looking for an interpretation. I felt that it makes sense that men and women should inherit equally, and I already had an opinion that the rest of the inheritance always goes to the father's family [in the absence of a male son] that this is not fair. But, I did not have an interpretation for men and women to inherit equally. Then I read the opinions that the interpretation of the Quran is that women [inherit] half the men as the minimum and, therefore, we can increase the upper limit. I was convinced, so I supported it (Interview 18).

When asked further what would be her opinion if, hypothetically, there were no interpretations and Shari'a would not allow equality in inheritance, she responded,

a party receives half, and a party receives double; therefore, equality says we should inherit equally, especially in the current political situation, no one depends on anyone. The justification they provide is that the man takes more because he spends on his sisters; this is nonsense. Women realistically do not even receive their half, so if the law came and said we would inherit equally, I believe it should be applied. You tell me if there was no solution other than this, I think there is no determinism. Religion is what you see. I believe God is fair and would definitely support justice, and I think there is a historical context that governs Quran. At that time, women themselves were

inherited as objects, so when the Quran says they should take half, this is such progress for that time, but it does not conform to the current era. And I think, anyway, judging what is religion is a subjective matter (Interview 18).

The discussion of equality in inheritance revealed a general and clear preference for gender equality, which was reflected in discussing the following questions about the right of women to work in the judiciary as an example. The example was discussed as a hypothetical contradiction with Shari'a, and the interviewees were asked whether they would give priority to the hypothetical rule if it existed. Some interviewees were short in their answers, approving the right of women to work in any job, including the judiciary, even if it contradicted Shari'a (Interviews 1, 3, 7, 34, 35). Other interviewees were clear in expressing that the reference to Shari'a is irrelevant. A 31 years-old male interviewee said,

I am not an expert in Shari'a [or] jurisprudence; I am talking within the limits of what I know with my mind. I am not saying let's disagree with Shari'a; I am saying [if] a man fits certain criteria for him to be appointed in the judiciary and a woman fits certain criteria to be appointed, then they are both equal. I do not think gender [...] makes a difference in whether they should work in the judiciary (Interview 23).

Similarly, a 30 years-old female interviewee said,

Shari'a is not a written book; we all have it in pdf and read it. Shari'a was formed over the years and was formed in different ways depending on the place where it was and the context it was in. Meaning, we have the four schools which are very narrow, [they] disagree with each other all the time in all types of rules, so how about we go out of the four schools and look at broader contexts. So, [...] for me, it is not religiosity vs no religiosity [...] religiosity is something personal and something that a person should practice inside [their] home. Equality is related to [...] the relationship between citizens and the state (Interview 11).

Some interviewees similarly grounded equality in citizenship, such as a 34 years-old male interviewee who said, 'there is no job that a woman cannot do. She is a citizen [...] Women are citizens, as are Christians and gays and atheists [...] She is an Egyptian citizen, then it is her right to do anything as an Egyptian citizen' (Interview 14).

Some interviewees changed their answers, starting from a position where they were hesitant to contradict Shari'a in the hypothetical scenario, then changed their opinions to supporting equality, such as a 25 year-old female interviewee who questioned the hypothetical rule that Shari'a would

prohibit women's work in the judiciary, saying, 'scholars' interpretations [...] vary every era or generation, so if the scholars said no, that does not matter for me' (Interview 32). When asked if it was an explicit text in Quran, she said, 'if Quran said no, then maybe. But then, I don't think Quran says so'; however, she concluded by saying that if religion contradicts equality, she will choose equality (Interview 32).

Finally, the discussion of women's rights in society led to questions about the limits of the relationship between men and women and women's autonomy in the parent and daughter example. In summary, the example concerned a daughter over 21 years old, who wanted to move in with her boyfriend, and the question asked how a parent should respond to the daughter's decision. Many interviewees in this group expressed that it is the daughter's right to engage in a relationship and move in with a boyfriend as long as she is an adult, and a parent does not have a right to prevent her (Interviews 1, 3, 5, 7, 21, 29, 32, 35, 38, 39, 43, 45). A 28 years-old male interviewee said, 'they don't have the right to lock her up [...] she is responsible for her actions', another 28 year-old male interviewee said, 'she is eventually responsible for her own life, and that is an important part of her life', a 25 year-old male interviewee said, 'whatever she is doing she is responsible for her own decisions, whether it is right or wrong', a 30 year-old female interviewee said, 'she is an adult, and it is her right to go out and do what she wants', and a 24 year-old female interviewee said, 'no one has the right to prevent anyone from doing anything' (Interviews 1, 3, 29, 11, 35).

Numerous interviewees as well reflected on how society typically responds to such situations, such as female interviewees in their mid-twenties and early thirties who said parents 'will prevent her but it is not their right', 'will prevent her, but this does not mean that they have a right to prevent her', that the society will side with a mother if she prevented her daughter, 'according to the ideas of the society in which we live, everyone will be with her [the mother], and everyone will see that she has the right to do this' (Interviews 7, 11, 24). A 36 year-old male interviewee also said,

This is a big discussion; traditions and customs control this discussion. I think, eventually, what I want is that it should be her right to have such a relationship, to be virgin or not, that is her right in the end, like exactly how boys in Egypt can have a relationship even if he is younger than 20 years old (Interview 34).

One interviewee, a 25 year-old male, elaborated on what he thinks about living independently from one's parents, saying, 'I think this should be a basic right for everyone and no one should object to it' (Interview 29). He added,

I saw people who committed suicide because of this, mostly girls, who might commit suicide just because she wanted to travel and could not do so because her father thought that if she did so [...] she would bring them shame, and this is probably [the case] in most of Egypt. I think anyone, male or female over 21 years old, should be free in their life and do whatever they want with it as far as they do not harm anyone. If you want to be independent, then you can (Interview 29).

Some of them reflected on what they think would be a better response from a parent, such as a 31 year-old male interviewee who said,

Let's assume that I have a closed mind, and I think that a girl should not go out unless I agree or she is getting married and is going to her husband's home. Let's assume that prevention in itself is not a working method because, in the end, I will prevent you physically, but you will still have what you have in your mind. So, what works is that I should teach this girl to go out to the world with a balanced character, and she would be capable of being responsible. This would be much better than prevention just by prevention.

Some interviewees agreed that it would be the daughter's right but expressed sentiments of sadness or unease with the scenario as problematic, such as a 28 year-old female interviewee who said,

I thought about it a lot [the example] because I thought, what if I lived abroad and had a daughter there? What can I do? I think the most I can do is talk to her repeatedly, but can I prevent her physically? No, I should not; even if I feel that this is morally wrong, I think it is her right to do wrong. I won't be judged in her place, and it is not my right to impose on her how she will live her life, especially if she is an adult (Interview 18).

A 27 year-old male said, 'for me personally, it is a sad thing' (Interview 40). For him, the sadness emanated from how society would respond to the situation, saying,

even if [my] ideas is that everyone can do whatever they want and so on [...]. Still, our society is very pressuring, meaning that if you act according to what you believe in, in public and in an obvious way, like if someone is gay and says that he is gay, or someone is in a relationship and having a relationship without marriage. They say that they are not married [...] you will find a problem to integrate into society if you announced

such things unless you are saying this to people like you or who understand you and have the same mentality (Interview 40).

Similar sentiments about society's pressures were expressed by a 30 year-old female interviewee who reflected on her own experience of being independent of her family,

Of course, I did not tell them I was moving in with my boyfriend or would ever dare to. Not only would I have been locked in, I might even have been killed [...], but I am a person who left the family home. I told them I wanted to work and live away from home. So, yes, of course, I believe it is her right [the daughter], and for sure I think [...] that it is best for her to do so [but] if we said that I have a baby girl who did that at some point, I would be very scared for her as we live in a society that is neither good nor open about this. So, let's say I am living outside Egypt, and she said so, then I will be cool with it, and I think it is her right completely. In Egypt, I will be scared for her. I will talk a lot with her. I will go to see the boy she is seeing as I must know who this person is, and I must speak with him a lot. I always have to contact her and go to her all the time (Interview 39).

Overall, the interviewees clearly prioritised gender equality in inheritance, women's right to work, and women's autonomy in all aspects, including sexual relations. They expressed their rejection of the justifications offered by the master frame regarding the absence of equality and prioritised their personal values over the master frame. They also reflected on the problems facing women who claim autonomy in sexual relations, whether by their families or society.

In reflecting on the reasons behind their views, some interviewees considered Shari'a irrelevant to the question asked and framed the matters in terms of equal citizenship. Others responded to the traditional justifications under the master frame concerning women's roles and responsibilities in society and engaged with why the rules of Shari'a should not apply. Few interviewees showed concern in justifying their preference for equality from within the master frame as a matter of personal faith, and when asked what would be their views if Shari'a hypothetically contradicted their views, they consistently chose equality. Similarly, few interviewees expressed unease with sexual freedoms due to society's pressures in their opinion; however, they concluded with prioritising autonomy as a woman's right.

Islamic Governance: Political Rights and Freedoms

The master frame *Islam is the solution* is characterised by its emphasis on the wholistic nature of the frame as a guide in personal and state matters and idealisation of Islamic governance through

the application of Shari'a. The interviewees who did not consider the master frame to be the guiding frame in deciding issues such as inheritance, women's work, role in society and autonomy also expressed their disapproval of Islamic governance. The discussion developed towards discussing their opinions regarding the second article of the constitution, which concerns Shari'a as the primary source of legislation and whether they prefer secularism.

Secularism (*'Almaniya*) has been subject to negative framing messages by Islamists in Egypt, equating it with decay and moral corruption. The word *'Almaniya* (secularism) has grown to attract a negative meaning in popular culture, leading to the growth of an alternative expression of referring to non-religious governance as civil (*Madaniya*). The alternative expression was subject to similar negative framing messages by Islamist figures, the most-known of which is a speech by Hazem Shuman, a well-known Salafist preacher, who said, 'Madaniya means your mother will take off her veil', referring to what he considered to be moral corruption (Abdelalim, 2012). This cultural background impacted by the Islamist framing messages was present in some interviews when I asked about secularism.

A 34 year-old male interviewee expressed a clear preference for the separation of religion from the state but said, 'I would prefer calling it a civil state (*Madania*) not a secular state (*'Almania*)' (Interview 14). When asked whether this choice of words is influenced by the reputation of secularism in popular culture, he replied

civil state is a clearer concept for the people; when you introduce it to the public, it is not an annoying word like the word secularism. The clearer concept for the people is a civil state, given that we do not want a state ruled by religious factions or even the military (Interview 14).

Another interviewee, 30 year-old female, identified the civil state as one that does not have any religious reference and reflected, 'I do not have any problems with the secular state, but I feel that Egypt does not admit that it is a secular state, because it is not secular, but it admits that it is a civil state [...] I hope we would claim we are secular' (Interview 11). A 28 year-old male interviewee defined the civil state by saying,

A civil state means that democracy is present for political representation; it has freedom of expression and free media. It does not have a religious background in making decisions, prejudice based on religion or gender, or marginalisation of minorities like Nubians or Bedouins, whether in the east or the west; this is the civil state. This is the state that raises the individual values of rights and freedoms and

equality and brotherhood; that is my conception of the civil state. Some people might see this and think that I am talking about a secular or a liberal state; I think the civil state is more inclusive than a liberal or secular state [...]. Still, when you say a liberal or a secular state, then it will be a problem (Interview 3).

When asked why this would constitute a problem, he replied

One has to be realistic in the solution [offered], so when I tell people the idea of a civil state (Madnia), they will be able to accept it with time, but if we tell people, and some of the religious people thinking that a secular or civil state is an infidel state, they will say no, this is a secular state [...] [and] I will not be able to achieve any middle grounds (Interview 3).

Some interviewees did not have a clear idea of what secularism means. When I referred alternatively to the separation of religion from the state, they agreed with the concept (Interview 32, 35). Others referred to the civil state as the opposite of a religious state without reflecting on secularism.

The discussion developed from asking about their preference concerning the separation of religion from the state to their views on the second article of the constitution concerning Shari'a as the primary source of legislation. Some interviewees were short in their answers in rejecting the second article (Interviews 14, 34, 35, 45). Others grounded their views, saying that laws should not be governed by Islamic Shari'a or religions more generally by reflecting on equal citizenship. A 30 year-old female interviewee reflected on personal status laws in Egypt, which are based on Shari'a for Muslims and other religions' rules for non-Muslims, saying,

Supposedly, we are all equal before the law; one law governs us all. Inheritance, we should all be governed by the same law. Marriage, we should all be governed by the same law. In divorce, we should all be governed by the same law [...] We should all, as citizens, be equal in front of the law [...] Civil law should be unified, the laws of divorce should be unified. In my opinion, this is the definition of the civil state (Interview 11).

Another 30 year-old female interviewee said, 'we are not in an Islamic state, we are not in a Khalifa time. We are supposedly in a civil state. I am an Egyptian citizen as well as a Christian is an Egyptian citizen, and an atheist is an Egyptian citizen, so accordingly I cannot choose a certain Shari'a to be applied on all of us' (Interview 21). Also, a 28 year-old male interviewee said the second article 'should not exist as we are not only Muslims in the country. There are different

religions, different people with different beliefs, and the constitution is a human work, not a religious, spiritual work to put such an article in it' (Interview 3).

The questions concerning the master frame in governance also included topics such as political rights for non-Muslims or LGBTQ individuals by reflecting on who has the right to run for elections, the limits on freedom of expression for different groups in society, and freedom of religion, particularly in relation to Muslims changing their religion and its possible contradiction with Shari'a. Their answers to the questions concerning political rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion were broadly consistent with their previous views concerning equality and citizenship.

All interviewees in this group expressed that any individual, regardless of their religion or sexual orientation, should have the political right to run for the presidency, and voting for such a candidate would depend on their proposed political programme. A male interviewee in his late twenties said, 'I will not look at if he is gay or atheist or whatever, the only thing I am concerned with is if he will be capable of doing something or not', another 27 year-old male interviewee said, 'eventually, if they have a good programme, that is what will determine [their chances]', a 30 years-old female interviewee said, 'if he is an Egyptian citizen and [...] the conditions apply to him, his religion or sexual or political orientations or where does his mother or father come from, this should not govern whether he will run or not', and a 27 year-old male interviewee said, 'I do not see any relation between sexual orientation and this [running for office]' (Interview 1, 5, 11, 38).

Some interviewees reflected on the difficulties that would face these candidates in Egypt, such as a 30 year-old female interviewee who said,

of course, the state should let him run [for office], he has the right to run, but who will elect him, that's the point. No one will elect him, of course, never, and I think even if it were imposed on society, that would not be a good thing as the society will not accept it. There will be a big war about it as you talk about a society where religious doctrines are very well established.

The interviewees were also asked about the limits of self-expression freedoms, such as protests raising the rainbow flags or forming organisations that defend the rights of LGBTQ people or atheists. Most interviewees expressed in short answers that all individuals should have the right to express their ideas in any peaceful manner, including protests. Some interviewees agreed that it would be their right, but they personally would not be happy with LGBTQ protests; as a 31 years-

old male interviewee said, ‘Me personally, I might not be happy, but I will not prevent them’ (Interview 23).

Finally, the interviewees were asked about the freedom to change religion, particularly for Muslims, in light of the condemnation of apostasy in Shari‘a. All interviewees agreed that everyone, including Muslims, should have the right to change religion without intervention from the state. A male interviewee in his late twenties commented, ‘whoever wants to be a Muslim, should be a Muslim, whoever thinks he is convinced that there is no God and want to be an atheist, they should do so’, ‘the state should not intervene by any means’ (Interview 1). Another male interviewee, 25 year-old, said, ‘you are doing something for God, why should me as a human intervene? It is not my business, even if you worshipped a cockroach, it is not my business at all’, a female interviewee expressed that freedom of religion ‘is at the core of personal freedoms’, and a 27 year-old male interviewee said, ‘the state, in my opinion, should be on the fence generally, everyone [is free] to adopt or convert from religion’ (Interview 29, 39, 40).

Some interviewees also questioned whether the punishment of apostasy truly forms part of Shari‘a in a similar sentiment to the group of interviewees who adopted the master frame as a guide but rejected the punishment of apostasy as forming part of the master frame. A 25 year-old male interviewee said, ‘there are many things in religion that do not apply anymore [...] so the ideas and concepts are very dynamic and you can interpret it as you wish’ (Interview 43). Another male interviewee, 33 years old, said, ‘I think Islam is conflicted a lot about the matter of *whoever converts should be killed*, as there is a rightful text in Quran [...] stating ‘no coercion in religion’, and many stories about people who converted [...] and lived in the time of the prophet [...] and they were not killed’ (Interview 45).

Overall, the interviewees were clear in rejecting Islamic governance; however, that did not lead to an automatic preference for secularism. Instead, the discussion revealed concern for how secularism is typically understood negatively in popular culture. The preference that emerged from the interviewees’ answers was for what they termed a civil state. A civil state, in their opinion, would not only separate religion from the state but also the military power from the political life. Such preference reflects the political history in Egypt, which witnessed successive regimes led by presidents from the military and where the military institutions play a significant role in politics.

Further, the interviewees objected to the second article in the constitution and the application of Islamic Shari‘a, expressing their concern about the potential problems with equality before the law between Muslims and non-Muslims. In terms of tolerance, equality in political rights, freedom

of belief, and self-expression freedoms, there was consistent preference for these values, opining that non-Muslims, including atheists and LGBTQ individuals, should have equal rights as citizens and that changing one's religion should be a right for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Discussion: The Master Frame's Lack of Resonance

In reflecting on the various topics that were discussed in the interviews, the interviewees did not consider the master frame to be the determining lens in how private and public life should be organised in Egypt. Instead, they challenged the justifications and ideas advocated under the master frame whether in relation to women's roles, responsibilities, autonomy, and equality, or the limits proposed by the master frame on governance, freedoms, and public life.

However, the interviewees also expressed that they did not always reject the ideas of the master frame. Rather, the master frame previously resonated with them at an earlier point in their lives, and many reflected that their answers would have been different in the past. In asking whether they would have believed that Islam is the solution, one of the interviewees, 30 year-old female, responded,

I had a problem with the slogan 'Islam is the solution'. I had a problem with that slogan and used to make fun of it. But at the same time, I believed that religion is the solution to many problems generally, and being close to God is the solution to many problems (Interview 21).

Another interviewee, 27 year-old male, responded 'if you asked me this when I was younger, I would have answered this without thinking about it for a second. Honestly, previously, I would say, of course, Islam is a state and a religion, without thinking' (Interview 40). In reflecting on equality in inheritance, some interviewees reflected in short answers that they would not have supported equality, and some of the female interviewees said, 'probably, I would have wanted that, but I would have needed first to prove that it is acceptable religiously', 'men should have twice as much as women as religion says so because I was someone who believed that a man should lead, and eventually no matter how equal we are, he is still responsible', and

I was not satisfied with this, but at the same time, I would say no; if it is haram, then that is it. But inside me, I was not satisfied with the idea that there is differentiation in this way, but at that time, I would have accepted that the man would inherit double the woman. I would not have been comfortable, but I would have accepted (Interviews 18, 21, 24).

Concerning the daughter-parent example, some interviewees said that for a woman to lose her virginity, 'I would have been totally against it', and regarding the parent's response, 'I would have been hesitant, I would disagree with beating for example, but I would have been understandable if they imposed restrictions such as preventing her from going out at night or monitoring her calls', and 'I would have thought that the mother is looking after her daughter and she [the daughter] does not understand what she is doing and that she [the mother] has a right to prevent her' (Interviews 5, 18, 24). More generally, many said their answers would have been grounded in and dependent on what is stated in Shari'a.

The reflections of the interviewees concerning how they would have answered previously is consistent with the analysis about the impact of the master frame on re-ordering values. Similar to the interviewees' views discussed in the previous chapter, those who currently reject the master frame would have prioritised it earlier in their lives over their personal preferences when it resonated with them.

The question that presents itself then is what led to the lack of resonance of the master frame despite its earlier prioritisation by the interviewees. The interviews show that, other than the changing preferences with age, the lack of resonance of the master frame for a number of interviewees was driven by experiences of contradiction between the master frame ideas and their life experiences. A 28 year-old female interviewee reflected on how she faced a personal experience with her parents refusing her marriage to a person she was in a relationship with and how she rejected the framing of relationships between men and women advocated by religious shows. She said,

I started feeling that they are advertising false morals; for example, they always say that relationships and love are Haram and that there should be gender segregation, while none have ever discussed the idea that marriage should be easier. Why people who love each other cannot get engaged and get married, and if it does not work, they get divorced again and again if relationships outside marriage are forbidden? But what happens is that they forbid it, and then they do not talk about the social difficulty of marriage (Interview 18).

She reflects further on how such an experience led her to appreciate the importance of autonomy as a value; she said, 'it brought me face to face with the importance of autonomy, who has the right to take a decision even if it is wrong and this made me realise that I am not fighting to marry this specific person, as much as I am fighting for my right to choose' (Interview 18).

A female interviewee, 30 year-old, reflected on how her experience as an undergraduate student, engaging in an internship which included knowing about torture cases in Egypt led her to reject the master frame ideas, particularly those advocated by Amr Khaled (Interview 11). She reflected on an earlier period in her life when she followed Amr Khaled's shows, and she 'felt that if we became better Muslims, our situation would have been better', and 'if you became a better Muslim and you looked at your Muslim ancestors and what they did, and al-Sahaba and what they did, if you followed these things, we as a society, will be better' (Interview 11). However, when she worked on issues related to torture cases, she said,

I was getting to know a new world that I had never seen. I entered in a time where there were cases of torture, and [...] my internship was six months to work only on torture, I was seeing things and feeling the injustice [...], and I return to watch Amr Khaled, and I find that he is living in Lala land. So, sir, the country is collapsing underneath; kids are being killed every day [...]. Where are you living? This was, I will not watch [...] you are not relevant, sit aside, and I will not watch you [...] I felt at the moment really that the show really shifts a lot of responsibilities to the citizen. It shifts many things on us, and it is like, no, come here, this is not my fault; why are you not talking about what the state can do? (Interview 11).

Another 30 year-old female interviewee also reflected on rejecting the ideas advocated by Amr Khaled when she previously worked in his organisation, Sona' al-Hayah. During her work, she recalls the imposition of discipline rules between males and females by superiors in Amr Khaled's organisation, such as occasionally imposing dress codes on women or preventing gender-mixing; she said, '[they] held meetings and sent emails saying that this is not acceptable, and what is happening is against their rules and so on' (Interview 21). However, as the leader of her group at work, she saw a contradiction between these rules and her team-building initiatives, which led her to reject these ideas; she said, 'I was replying that we are old enough and able to make our own decisions, and we built friendships between people' (Interview 21).

For some interviewees, the 2011 revolution was the reason for changing their positions from the master frame. The open public sphere that followed the revolution for a short period allowed the interviewees to practice and experiment with different ideas and values that led them to question the master frame and the ideas advocated within it. A 24 year-old female interviewee said,

there is no particular thing that I can touch and tell you that this is the point [...] but, with time, and after the revolution specifically, there are many concepts that were broken, there were taboos that one had and now I returned to think about everything from the start. I started to learn to accept people's differences, so bit by bit, these things began to break, and they were not easy. It was not easy, you would have to sit with someone, and you know that he is very different from you, and before, you would have refused this person, but now you are sitting in front of him, and there is nothing between you other than respect because you are dealing with him as a human. All of this, the university, dealing with many who are different, reading a lot, I began to see things I did not notice before. I was revising everything between me and myself. Like, if I am rejecting this person because he changed his religion, what did I benefit when he was Muslim [...] or if this person is homosexual, for example, what is my concern, why am I upset, as long as this person did not harass me, so I am not harmed, then, this is his own thing (Interview 24).

Another interviewee, 26 year-old male, said, 'there are things that I started to realise in the time of the revolution. Before the revolution, [...] I did not have any activity except for the normal activities of anyone in this age, going out and staying up late and so on, but it was very conservative, of course' (Interview 48). He reflected on his Salafist upbringing and then on how he changed his previous ideas, 'I started step by step. You start to believe in things like men are equal to women, but I still had a huge masculine tendency, and I believed that there should be a religion and so on' (Interview 48). He later joined the al-Wassat party, saying,

I felt when I was reading their stuff in the beginning that it was a nice thing as it achieves all the things that I wanted; to have Madania (civil state) and the military will be distanced, and we will have an Islamic reference so that we will keep our morals and we will not be like Europe and so on. At the same time, I was seeing the socialists, and I could not understand how a friend of mine could meet a girl that he did not know and kiss her (on the cheek), so I saw that as something out of the norm, to shake hands and kiss (Interview 48).

Later on, in the clashes with Islamists in the streets between 2012 and 2013, he departed from his support for Islamist movements, 'I saw, of course, the position of the Muslim Brothers and al-Wassat party at that point and that they betrayed the square (Tahrir Square – the protests) and they betrayed everything because they were chasing the chair (power), and that was the beginning of

my ideological formation' (Interview 48). He reflects on how his experience in interacting with different ideologies and contribution to political events changed his ideas, particularly in relation to gender equality, he says,

during that time, I was turned totally to the idea of liberation and equality between men and women. There is no problem if a woman smokes, dresses or undresses or does whatever she wants. She is equal and free [...] in 2013, I did not mind anything; everything considered a core value was knocked down (Interview 48).

The interviews with those who accept and reject the master frame seem to suggest that practicing and witnessing the practices of the values might have a role in fostering the adoption and acceptance of the values. The interviewees who reject the master frame, as seen in the analysis, have reflected frequently on re-thinking their earlier dispositions and questioning the limits they believed in, in light of their experiences. Similarly, many interviewees who adopt the master frame contextualised their beliefs in gender equality regarding women's right to work, for example, by referencing either their experiences of working with or under the leadership of women or witnessing women in various professions in the society.

In contrast, if one looks at a value such as sexual autonomy, one would find absence of practices of this value in the society, the significant social pressures against it and the consistent advocacy under the master frame for gender segregation and prohibition of sexual relations, makes it difficult to see sexual autonomy as a valuable or a positive value to adopt if one adopts the master frame. Not to mention also the conservative social traditions that places such a value in a negative light. The interviewees who reject the master frame, on the other hand, shared experiences, either of seeking their autonomy as women or witnessing the problems experienced by female friends who sought their autonomy, which might have contributed to shaping their support for autonomy as a value.

Overall, the master frame is flexible regarding its ability to adopt and foster emancipatory or restrictive interpretations and values, but its rigidity emanates from its authority to exclude alternative views and values in a way that overrides individual experiences and personal priorities for those who support the master frame. The next chapter engages with the authority of the master frame by contrasting the views of the two groups of interviewees regarding what is meant by Islam, how religious figures are seen by each group, and what this means in terms of political power and authority.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the resonance and impact of the master frame for the interviewees who reject the master frame that Islam is the solution to every problem and a comprehensive guide in life and governance. First, it explored their reasons for rejecting the master frame. Second, it analysed their views regarding the main topics advocated as part of personal piety projects, which focused on women's rights, work, obligations, and role in society. It also explored their views on various issues raised as part of the vision for Islamic governance, such as political rights, freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Finally, the chapter analysed how the interviewees' answers would have differed earlier in their lives when they adopted the master frame and how their experiences that contradicted the master frame ideas led to its lack of resonance.

VIII. “True Islam” A Question of Power & Authority

The previous chapters analysed the resonance of the ideas advocated under the master frame in relation to being a better Muslim and visions of Islamic governance, and the interplay of these ideas and the master frame with values of tolerance, equality, autonomy, and self-expression freedoms. One group of interviewees accepted and supported the core idea that Islam is the solution to Egypt’s problems and that Islamic Shari’a should govern one’s personal life and state governance (Group 1). In contrast, another group of interviewees opposed this core idea and objected to the authority of the master frame, which they experienced in different forms in their lives (Group 2). Within these two groups, there were different levels of commitment to and rejection of the ideas of the master frame concerning various topics; however, both groups consistently engaged with the idea of what true Islam is. This chapter explores how the individuals in each group engaged with the idea of true Islam, how its broad nature was interpreted in a different light by each group, and it analyses the implications of the broad nature of the master frame in terms of the political power acquired by the mobilising actors whether from the state or Islamist movements.

True Islam and Political Islam

One of the interesting themes that emerged consistently in the interviews is a rejection of Islamist movements and political Islamism, even by those interviewees who agreed that Islam is the solution to problems of life and governance. One can attribute such antipathy towards political Islam, at least partly, to the polarising political atmosphere following the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood from power and the government’s hostility toward and repression of them. However, both groups engaged with what they meant by Islam beyond the politics of Islamist movements and what Islam is as a reference in life and governance.

Among the interviewees who believed that Islam should play a central role in guiding one’s life and the governance of the state (group 1), many insisted that there is a version of true Islam that political Islamism does not represent; hence, only true Islam can be the solution. When asked what true Islam is, there was less consistency in the definitions offered.

Some interviewees were inclined to identify Islam in terms of rituals, ethics, and how people should treat one another. A 28-year-old female interviewee said, ‘it is the five pillars: prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, monotheism and to keep God in front of your eyes’ (Interview 13, group 1).

A 25-year-old male interviewee identified Islam by referencing the prophet's hadith, indicating that a true Muslim does not harm others by hand or words; he expressed his frustration about the absence of such a form of Islam in Egypt (Interview 31, group 1). Another male interviewee, 34 years old, identified Islam by referencing a Quranic verse indicating that the prophet was sent as a mercy to the world (Interview 44, group 1). A 65-year-old female interviewee reflected similarly on how true Islam is about religiosity and ethics,

True Islam is to be religiously committed (Multazim), to be good, honest, to have religion, to stand by each other, to love one another, to be good to each other, to ask about each other and to fear for one another; this is our Islam. But what one sees in life is that there is no such thing, every person is for himself. No one is considering what others are going through. If our Islam led people to care about each other and fear for one another, this would be good (Interview 4, group 1).

It is worth noting that defining true Islam in terms of personal ethics did not necessarily mean that the interviewees rejected the encompassing nature of the master frame as a guide for life and governance. When later asked about various ideas concerning the role of Islam in governance, the interviewees showed equal commitment to limiting laws and public policies by reference to Shari'a.

Other interviewees identified true Islam as a vision of governance. A 57-year-old female interviewee explained that 'its reality is justice between people, fair distribution of wealth, everyone should have rights to education, health, and a decent life' (Interview 47, group 1). Another interviewee, 29 years old male, identified true Islam as the application of Shari'a. He expressed his certainty that Islam is the solution to all problems and defined it as 'the application of the rules in God's book and the Sunnah of his prophet and whatever was agreed upon by the companions (Sahaba) of the prophet' (Interview 2, group 1). Others referred to a particular historical period of Islamic governance – that of al-Kholafa' al-Rashidun – as representing the true form of Islam (Interviews 9, 17, group 1). This was the earliest period of Islamic governance that followed the prophet's death, and power was in the hands of notable figures in Islamic history who accompanied the prophet.

In the definitions offered, other than references to rituals and the application of Shari'a, one finds that the interviewees express personal aspirations to a better life and better governance, equating Islam with justice, fairness, morals and mercy. The interviewees in the second group, who rejected the master frame, reflected similar ideas and aspirations; however, they were doubtful

that these ideas represent a meaningful definition of what Islam is. Frequently, when I asked the interviewees in the second group whether they believe Islam is the solution, they replied, ‘the problem is what is true Islam’, ‘what does true Islam mean? There is no such thing’, and ‘what is Islamic Shari‘a? that is the problem’ (Interviews 11, 14, 32, group 2). A 30-year-old female interviewee elaborated that

we can all dispute what is true Islam and then decide that there is justice and equality in true Islam. After that comes a ruler who brings new sources to you and decides that this is true Islam and true Islam, for example, encourages commerce and profit and the like and the free market, so he tells us what we are doing is true Islam. So, for me, the idea of true Islam is a slippery slope (Interview 11, group 2).

A 25-year-old female interviewee said, ‘if we talk about Islamic Shari‘a, everyone will interpret it as they wish. Every generation or every group of scholars will interpret Shari‘a as they wish, according to the era they live in, so there is a manipulation in this concept’ (Interview 32, group 2). Both interviewees rejected the master frame and the notion of an Islamic state, preferring to be governed by principles such as ‘human rights’ or ‘better life for the greatest number of Egyptians or more equality for the greatest number of Egyptians’ (Interviews 11, 32, group 2). However, they also emphasised that such notions do not contradict Islam but are also not exclusively grounded in Islam, explaining that ‘not that this would be un-Islamic, but the reference is not necessarily that we do this for Islam or because the prophet did this. We do this for humanity, for whatever’ (Interview 11, group 2). Also,

Islam has a group of values that, if adopted, might be a solution for everything, like if everyone did their jobs well, for example, or if everyone minded their own business, [...] so would Islam offer a solution to Egypt’s problems? Yes, but such values can be in anything, in every religion; even non-heavenly religions say everyone should do their jobs well (Interviews 32, group 2).

Other interviewees opined that Islam should be approached in a similar way to other religions as a matter of personal faith and morality. A 34-year-old male interviewee said, ‘Islam is like any other religion, in the end, if I believe in this religion I will follow it [...] [and] Islam was never about religion and state’, adding that Islamic governance is not ‘a real project’ (Interview 14, group 2). Further, a 28 year-old male interviewee said that Islam is ‘a personal part of our life’, and a 27 year-old male interviewee said, ‘I would say Islam is a religion, and if all people follow it as morals I mean, then this is great like any other religion. We have morals in the Christian religion as well,

and in the Jewish as well' (Interview 3, 40, group 2). Some interviewees considered that the critical aspect of approaching Islam as a personal choice is the freedom to follow it and the freedom from religious enforcement by the state or the community on individuals. A 24-year-old female interviewee said, 'religion is your own relationship with God, it should not [...] make you do certain things or control your behaviour in a certain way', and added that it should not be imposed on people (Interview 35). A 27 year-old male interviewee also said that religion is a 'personal reference that varies from one person to another and there should be freedom for the people to choose their personal reference for themselves and it is not up to the state to determine it for them'.

In both groups, there were interviewees who reflected on the complexity of capturing Islam in a precise definition, particularly concerning its role in governance, such as a 33-year-old male interviewee who accepted that Islam is the solution but said,

for us, this is our religion, and we draw from it on the basis that this is what we believe in and we believe it is coming from God, so this is obligatory in its application in your life. However, concerning the state, this is an issue in which it is hard to say [...] now, the topics are more complex, and the interpretations are becoming more contradictory, and in many directions [...] everyone interprets it [Shari'a] as he wants (Interview 16, group 1).

Another interviewee, a 28-year-old female, who rejected that Islam is the solution, still reflected that Islam is 'a continuous question, it is a question which you can answer at a certain point in time, but eventually, it is not a definite answer nor a final answer, and it should continue to evolve' (Interview 18, group 2). The fluidity of identifying what Islam is and the complexity of clarifying its boundaries reflect the fluidity of the central message of the master frame, which advocates that Islam is a comprehensive system that encompasses every aspect of one's life and should govern all state affairs.

Despite the apparent antipathy towards political Islam and Islamist movements, the interviewees' definitions were consistent with the definitions advocated by Islamist movements under the master frame. The broad nature of the master frame referred to Islam in very general terms as a comprehensive system and 'an unqualified panacea for all the problems of the *umma* and the world at large, hastening a utopia in which all human needs will be met' (Wickham, 2002, p. 141). Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, wrote that Islam is a 'state, country, government, *umma*, ethics, strength, mercy, justice, and it is culture, law, science, judiciary, material, wealth, jihad (a fight), da'wa (a call), an army, an idea and sincere faith' (quoted in Saleh,

2011, p. 74).¹¹ Saleh (2011, p. 78), in commenting on the call of political Islam, argues that Al-Banna's definition and other similar definitions represent the problem of the 'master with no form', explaining that these descriptions refer to Islam as a master or an authority but do not offer a form or a definition to that authority, and the descriptions advocated are added without an apparent logic to the extent that one can add further that 'Islam is Qur'an and Sultan [authority], a book and metal, a group and faith, sports, identity, existence etc. [and] there would be nothing wrong in that'.

This undefined general nature of the master frame was seen in a different light by the two groups. It represented an opportunity for the interviewees who adopt the master frame (group 1) to define it in a way that reflects their aspirations for better life and governance. While it presented a problem and a reason to reject the master frame for the interviewees in the second group because it meant that, as much as Islam can be defined in terms of similar aspirations to justice, equality, and morals, it can also be re-interpreted to mean other things that would not necessarily reflect their priorities or that might contradict their earlier aspirations.

Saleh (2011, pp. 80) argues that due to the lack of form and broad nature of the definitions, the meaning of Islam cannot take a form without the authority of those who speak in its name. The data signifies a similar argument. The interviewees who adopt the master frame reject political Islam but accept the authority of Sheikhs and religious figures in offering a true version of Islam that can be a solution. The question for them turns on who has the authority and credibility to claim the legitimacy of representing Islam and hence give meaning to the master frame. The interviewees who reject the master frame, on the other hand, equate the master frame with the authority of Sheikhs, religious figures, and Islamist actors, so they challenge both. The following section expands this line of analysis by showing how religious figures are seen differently by both groups.

The Authority of Religious Figures

In contrast to the diversity of expressions in identifying true Islam for the group who accepted the master frame (group 1), there was consistency in referring to particular actors as the primary sources of the interviewees' knowledge about Islam. Foremost of these was al-Sha'rawi, who was mentioned consistently by most interviewees as a source of religious knowledge. A 54-year-old female interviewee said, 'al-Sha'rawi, he is the one I often listen to, he is the one I listened to most of my life' (Interview 50, group 1). A 27 year-old male interviewee said, 'Sheikh Sha'rawi is considered to be the ideal model for a moderate religious scholar', and a 32 year-old interviewee,

¹¹ The fifth chapter include detailed analysis of how the core idea of the master frame that Islam is the solution was expressed in such very general terms by the mobilising actors.

when asked whether he listened to al-Sha‘rawi, replied, ‘absolutely yes, who didn’t!’ (Interview 9, 42, group 1). Many interviewees also referred to watching al-Sha‘rawi’s TV programme as part of a family tradition every Friday after prayers. Second to al-Sha‘rawi was Amr Khaled, particularly among female interviewees. A 45-year-old female interviewee reflected, ‘I was fascinated by him [...] because he was talking like us’, and a 28-year-old interviewee said she listened to Amr Khaled ‘like any original Egyptian citizen’, reflecting on his widespread popularity (Interviews 8, 13, group 1). A number of interviewees as well shared that they volunteered in Amr Khaled’s charitable organisation, Sona‘ al-Hayah (Life Makers); many of them also reflected that they worked with members of the Muslim Brotherhood as part of their voluntary work in Khaled’s organisation.

The reference to Amr Khaled was also usually contextualised within a reflection on ‘that period’, which refers to the early 2000s that witnessed the wave of new and young preachers such as Mustafa Husni and Mo‘ez Mas‘oud, as well as Salafist preachers such as Mohammed Hassan, and Mohamed Hussein Ya‘koub. A 32-year-old female interviewee said, ‘I was very influenced in the period at the beginning of the 2000s, the one of the new Do‘aa and all of this. I was following them a lot’ (Interview 17, group 1). A 27-year-old male interviewee also said

In that period, everyone was listening to them, Mohammed Hassan and Mohamed Hussein Ya‘koub and the ideas of prayers and women’s clothes and the prayers and the fasting and the short clothes and we were influenced by their words. For me personally, I was influenced [by their words] (Interview 6, group 1).

Further, some interviewees referred to Abdel Kafi, with one interviewee mentioning that she attended his Dokki lessons for two years; these were the lessons that started his later popularity. Others mentioned Sheikh al-Azhar, the head of the al-Azhar institution and seen by many as the highest religious authority. Some also reflected on reading for al-Qaradawi and al-Hudaybi and listening to Kishk and al-Mahalawi, as well as generally listening to tapes, attending religious lessons in local mosques and attending women’s religious lessons at home. Some interviewees specified that local MB members or Salafist Sheikhs organised the religious lessons they attended. Others just mentioned that the local Imam gave the lessons in the mosque. The interviewees were also asked whether they had come across any material mentioning *Islam is the solution*. Many referred to seeing “Islam is the Solution” frequently on posters on walls, houses, or distributed in public transportation. A 27 year-old male interviewee said, ‘they would distribute it sometimes in front of the metro [station] [and] sometimes they would distribute small papers on which was

written "Al Islam huwa Al Hal" [Islam is the solution] and elect a specific person' (Interview 6, group 1).

The interviewees in the second group spoke similarly about an earlier period in their lives when they listened to and accepted the opinions of the same range of religious figures. They listened to religious tapes, attended lessons, and watched religious television shows. However, at the time of the interviews, the interviewees expressed different positions from the religious figures and the interpretations they advocated. The interviewees (group 2) did not necessarily reject religions or Islam, and some of them reflected on being devout Muslims. However, they expressed their rejection of the authority of the interpretations of religious figures and Islamist actors in personal matters and state governance. This was particularly clear in some interviews where the discussion included reflections on refusing the dominance of the master frame ideas on society and the authority of Islamist figures. A 28 year-old female interviewee expressed her frustration with the extent to which religious actors, in her opinion, seek to impose morals on the public, saying,

Mo'ez Mas'oud and Mustafa Hosni's shows are all broadcasts on tv. These shows air during Ramadan on channels such as MBC, CBC, and the like. In addition to this, there are other channels which are specialised only in religious shows day and night, and there are regular channels which have a religious show daily or weekly, where people call to ask about every small and big thing in their lives to the smallest detail from the point view of religion. You feel like every detail in your life should be asked about as if you are not a rational person anymore (Interview 18, group 2).

She added that certain ideas, particularly about women, have gained a firm hold on the public to the extent that even Al-Azhar, as the highest state religious authority in Egypt, cannot change them. She said that

even when a religious institution tries to change its opinion regarding certain matters, the people who received the prior message are the ones standing in its face. For example, when Al Azhar said that taking off Hijab is not a big sin, or when Al Azhar said that the original rule should be to have one wife and that polygamy should be prohibited, the people were furious! They insulted Al Azhar, which is the religious institution, the religious authority, but also notice that all these examples include a common element, which is women. In relation to women, religious authority is intertwined with patriarchal authority, and it becomes complex and develops into multiple coercion systems (Interview 18, group 2).

Another female interviewee, 30 years old, had a similar opinion about the strength of the religious opinions over the public but believed that a change of opinion from religious institutions such as al-Azhar makes a difference in people's views. She reflected on a personal experience with her father, saying,

my father, a person who is not related to political Islam at all, an Egyptian person who is religious in the cute way of the middle class [...] For him, a tattoo is haram; he has a problem that my fiancé has many tattoos on his body. My brother [...] showed him a video that al-Azhar issued a fatwa [...] saying that the tattoo of the eyebrows and the tattoo of the body, if it does not include blood, then it is not Haram and that the origin of making the tattoo of the body haram is that the blood is getting out, not that it changes the form of God's creation. This was the argument always in his mind that God has given you a fine body, why change God's creation, so my father listened to this, and in a moment, his opinion was transformed, that "oh the issue is related to blood, the change [in creation] is not the problem", and [...] in a second, he started asking, which tattoo brings out blood and which does not and can there be a tattoo that does not [...] he just heard al-Azhar say it, done, fine (Interview 11, group 2).

She continued her reflections, returning to the question of equality in inheritance, saying, 'in the issue of the inheritance, if al-Azhar said, by the way, equality in inheritance from the state is OK [...] I think most Egyptians would have shut up, and possibly they would have been shocked, but al-Azhar said so, so it's fine' (Interview 11, group 2).¹² For another 30 year-old female interviewee, the impact of the religious authority on society is a result of the natural infusion of religious rituals in everyday practices and the authority of the Sheiks, saying,

we are people with no knowledge of religious teachings, but there are things that we do in a very common-sense way and normally. We fast and pray without knowing why we are doing this, or without knowing why we are moving this way, we listen to the ruler who uses us in the name of religion as this is the rightful thing, [and] the Sheikh is to be respected whatever is coming out of his mouth as he knows better than we do (Interview 21, group 2).

¹² It is to be noted that the impact of al-Azhar on people's opinions would largely depend on whether it is seen as a credible authority for the receiving audience. Therefore, for many segments of the public who give more credibility to the messages disseminated by state institutions, a change of opinion from al-Azhar would probably lead to a change in public opinion. While, for example, for an audience who gives more credibility to Salafist Sheiks and consider state institutions to have compromised autonomy from the ruler, a change of opinion from al-Azhar might be regarded in a negative perspective.

Other interviewees as well expressed their rejection of the authority acquired by the religious figures in the name of religion. A 34-year-old male interviewee said that when ‘the people with religious authority are ruling, whether in Christianity or priests in the time of Pharaohs, or Sheikhs on the pulpits (Manabir) in this time of Islam for example, that does not mean that religion is ruling by the way, but it means that those with authority are using religion’ (Interview 14, group 2). A male interviewee, 25 years old, commented similarly that ‘anyone who rules according to religion, he is not ruling for religion, it is very obvious that they are not doing this for religious reasons, they are only using this as an entrance for the goals that they want to achieve, so they are using religion’, and a 30-year-old female interviewee said, ‘the aim is not to apply Shari‘a [...] but [...] this being an authority above the authority, it is convincing people that they are governed in the name of religion’ (Interview 29, 21, group 2). A 27 year-old male interviewee also said

some people appear to only care about sitting on the chair, and people would say that the Sheikh did this and that, and he is the ruler in the name of God. Then no, if you are giving me a choice, then no. Let’s keep it [authority] without any labels in order not to have anyone that claims to have religious authority, and then enter politics and ruin everything [...] under religious claims (Interview 40, group 2).

The difference between the two groups in the light in which they see religious figures and the importance they attach to their opinions is clear. The interviewees who reject the master frame (group 2) are doubtful that there is a form of true Islam that can be given a clear definition; hence, they challenge the authority with which religious figures claim to represent Islam and see their views and interpretations through a critical lens. While the interviewees who accept the master frame (group 1) place an emphasis on religious knowledge and appreciate the interpretations advocated by religious figures. Further, because they believe Islam is the solution to problems of life and governance (group 1), the interpretations of what Islam is and how Shari‘a answers different questions and places limits on values become of the utmost importance. The question for them becomes who has the authority and legitimacy to represent the true form of Islam. At the same time, the broad nature of the master frame allows different religious and political actors in Egypt to tap into it, each claiming legitimacy to represent the true form of Islam, aiming to gain credibility as the one authority that should be followed. The next section takes the analysis further and discusses how the master frame translates into political power acquired by the mobilising actors.

Discussion: The Master Frame as Political Power

The analysis in the previous chapters shows that in accepting the master frame that Islam is the solution and guide in life and governance, the master frame acts as an outer limit that takes priority over individuals' personal experiences, preferences and opinions if it resonates with them. The master frame becomes accepted as the determining authority for personal, political, and public policy questions, which must pass the test of compatibility with Islam as the guiding frame. However, what Islam is and how Shari'a answers different personal and public questions becomes a question of who has the authority and credibility to represent the true form of Islam.

The power acquired by the mobilising actors who tap into the master frame, whether from Islamist movements or state institutions, is the power to decide what is included in and excluded from the master frame, thereby claiming the power to clarify the rules that govern the society. Beetham (2013, p. 50, 55), in his analysis of power, places particular emphasis on 'rules (whether conventional or legal in form), and in particular upon rules of exclusion, as both the source of social power and the means of maintaining it', arguing further that '[i]f [...] the social organisation of dominance and subordination in its different dimensions is effected through rules of exclusion and access, then the ability to shape or determine such rules is a particularly important power'.¹³

The power to determine the rules of inclusion and exclusion under the master frame rests with those who claim the religious knowledge to clarify the rule in question, and determining the rules that govern Egyptians' personal and public lives is an important form of social and political capital sought by Islamist movements, religious figures, and the state. Hence, arguably, the question of the role of Islam in Egypt's political culture and public life is not necessarily about Islam as a religion or its compatibility with democracy, liberalism, or any specific value or ideology; rather, it is a question of power. The actors who tap into the master frame have a form of social power to

¹³ The power of the master frame can also be approached in a way similar to Lukes' (2005) three dimensional view of power. The one-dimensional view represents power as observable conflict in decision-making processes in public policies. The two-dimensional view 'incorporates into the analysis of power relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process' (2005, p. 25), which was inspired by Schattschneider's work on the mobilisation of bias, resting on the idea that '[s]ome issues are organized into politics while others are organized out' (Lukes, 2005, p. 20). Finally, the three-dimensional view is the power to shape the desires and preferences of individuals in a way that contradicts their real interests. However, the concept of the real interests of individuals is controversial, and as Lukes himself commented later (2005, p.145), it assumes 'the claim to have some sort of privileged access, external to the actors, to a "true" account of what is "real"'. The argument here does not necessarily assume that individuals contradict their real interests, rather, it discusses how power affects individuals in a way that shapes their values and subjective preferences. Although, there are indications for some interviewees of a contradiction between the master frame and their interests as they view them, such as the female interviewees who expressed that they wish to inherit equally, however, they excluded gender equality because of its contradiction with the master frame.

shape the rules that govern the society, whether in the form of social rules or in impacting public policies by conditioning them on their compatibility with the master frame as defined by the relevant actors.

Such power is particularly manifest in messages emphasising personal piety, which aimed to exclude women from particular professions, confine them to specific roles, and define their financial rights. It is also manifested in defining the boundaries of an Islamic public order that governs the rights of non-Sunni Muslims, non-Muslims, atheists, and LGBTQ individuals.

To overcome such a power, there must be an open public sphere with guaranteed freedoms of expression that would allow consistent challenge to the power of these actors. However, when such an open sphere was available following the 2011 revolution, the social and political capital of the master frame was mobilised in the transitional phase to subject the public sphere to the guardianship and authority of the religious figures and exclude legal and even constitutional changes under the claim of contradicting Shari‘a. A clear example of such an instance can be seen in the constitutional referendum in 2011, which was the first time citizens cast their votes following the revolution.

The constitutional amendments were proposed by the Security Council of Armed Forces as an alternative to drafting a new constitution and towards a transitional phase that prioritises parliamentary elections before presidential elections. In such a critical moment in the transitional phase, unelected actors who deny involvement in politics acquired considerable power to shape political questions by transforming the public discourse towards a discussion of its compatibility with the master frame instead of the issue at hand.

The discussion of the referendum transformed into a dividing issue between Islamists and other movements and figures. The Islamist movements framed voting to accept the constitutional amendments as a vote for Islam and a religious obligation (Létourneau, 2016). The underlying rationale was to avoid drafting a new constitution in which the second article concerning the role of Shari‘a would be debated and to enable speedy parliamentary elections in which the organised Islamist movements would have better chances to succeed, given their organisational strength. The amendments were approved with a 77% vote in favour (Létourneau, 2016). A few months later, parliamentary elections were held and saw an overwhelming victory,

with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party gaining 47 percent of seats in the People’s Assembly and the Salafi Nour Party winning 24 percent. Liberal and secular parties all together took slightly less than 30% percent of People’s Assembly

seats. Islamist parties also won nearly 90 percent of contested seats in the Shura Council (upper house), resulting in an Islamist majority in both houses (2012 Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, n.d.).

After the approval of the constitutional amendments, popular Salafist figure Mohamad Hussein Ya'koub made a famous statement in which he said, 'the public said yes to religion', 'the cause was not that of the constitution', rather,

the people were divided into two groups: the religious group, which included all the people of religion and Sheikhs, all the people of religion without exception were saying yes [to the amendments], al-Ikhwan, al-Tabligh, al-Gam'ia al-Shar'ia, Ansar al-Sunna, and Salafists, and in front of them on the other side, other people (Al-Hadi, 2011).

Further, in emphasising his non-political nature, Ya'koub said 'we are not politicians, and we do not want anything from it [politics], and this is a promise in front of God that I will not join any party and will not run [for office] for anything' (Al-Hadi, 2011). The power of the master frame translated into a solid mobilising political capital in the hands of religious figures and Sheikhs, which was used to divert and steer political trends in times of political openness.

It is worth emphasising that the impact of such power will differ depending on the audience's receptivity to the framing efforts as emanating from credible figures who enjoy religious legitimacy. However, even for the individuals who claim the personal authority to determine what is included in and excluded from the master frame and argue for their views and values from within the master frame, the problem of re-framing the political questions remains. The discussion of laws, public policies and politics would centre around whose opinion represents the true form of Islam, and compatibility with the master frame potentially shadows the political issue involved.

Another example of an attempt to solidify the power of the master frame was present in propositions of new articles in the 2012 constitution to give more authority to religious scholars and al-Azhar to interpret Shari'a as the primary source of legislation, a role traditionally undertaken by the constitutional court (Zinind, 2012). If such an article were to be present in the Egyptian constitution, the public sphere would only grow more restrictive of freedoms under the banner of ensuring compatibility with the master frame. In contrast, secular governance would offer better conditions for the sustainability of public debate and the challenge of authority. However, it would be neither supported by the Islamist movements nor the state because of the threat it would pose to their authorities over the culture and public opinion in Egypt.

The research also indicates that the impact of the master frame is not necessarily its ability to garner support for Islamist movements, given that many interviewees rejected political Islamism but supported the proposition that Islam is the solution. Instead, the strongest impact of the master frame is its ability to demobilise alternative ideas and ideologies by claiming that they are in contradiction with Islam, which becomes ultimately identifiable by religious actors, whether from the state or Islamist movements. The interviewees consistently indicated that they would change their views regarding issues that concern tolerance of other groups, gender equality, equality in political rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion if it was evident to them that Shari'a prohibits it.¹⁴ While it is arguable whether the values of tolerance, equality, autonomy and self-expression are necessary to ignite a democratisation process, they are nonetheless essential for democratic sustainability and contestation and participation as bases for meaningful democracy. Inglehart (2017, p. 17) argues, based on his research on culture and democracy, that '[t]he extent to which a society emphasizes these self-expression values has a surprisingly strong bearing on the emergence and survival of democratic institutions'.

In the current political scene, after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 and the state's hostility towards political Islam, a new conflict emerged within the state between al-Sisi and al-Azhar over who represents the true form of Islam. In 2016, al-Sisi called for 'the importance of renewing religious discourse based on the *true understanding of Islam*' (State Information Service, 2016). Brown and Dunne (2021, p. 102) report that 'Sisi became president in 2014 and started taking on the religious establishment in January 2015 with the call for renewal of religious discourse noted above. He and al-Tayeb disagreed publicly about several religious and practical issues in 2016 and 2017'. Further, Brown and Dunne (2021, p. 100) argue that at the heart of this conflict 'is really whose position should prevail when there are differences on religious issues', and 'Sisi [...] does not call for secularism or individual freedom of conscience [...] Instead, Sisi directs the ahl al-din (men of religion) to abandon obscurantist fixation on texts and instead put themselves at the service of state priorities'.

In response to al-Sisi's challenges to the religious establishment, calling for a religious revolution and reform, Sheikh al-Azhar has made several statements that challenge traditional understandings on a number of key topics – discussed in the interviews and this research – such as the dress code, women's autonomy, financial rights and role in society, and the status of non-

¹⁴ Of course, such an impact differs between individuals depending on the extent to which they think the authority to interpret Shari'a is personal or dependent on sheikhs and religious scholars.

Muslims as citizens. Sheikh Al-Azhar supported notions of citizenship by declaring that Christians are not Ahl Zima who submit to Islamic governance but are citizens who have equal rights and duties (Al-Arabi, 2022). He also declared that taking off the veil is a minor sin that is less than lying, which is a signal very different from the traditional framing messages that placed greater emphasis and invested in great detail in the importance of an Islamic dress code (Toulan, 2021). He also said that it is permissible for women to be appointed to the judiciary and to act as religious scholars in giving fatwas (Fath al-Bab, 2021). In addition, women can travel without a male relative, no parent should prevent a daughter's marriage to whomever she chooses without an acceptable reason, and there have been ongoing discussions about giving women a share in their husbands' wealth following divorce or the husband's death (Fath al-Bab, 2021).¹⁵ At the same time, some of al-Sisi's advances were resisted by Sheikh al-Azhar, such as al-Sisi's calls for the abolition of verbal divorce (Brown and Dunne, 2021, p. 103).

The future impact of the master frame is, however, unclear. Al-Sisi has taken many measures to prevent the informal networks through which religious actors and the Islamist movements traditionally disseminate their framing messages. Brown and Dunne (2021, pp. 107-108) report that

The changes imposed by the regime have affected daily lives, for example by denying Egyptians access to thousands of independent mosques, now shuttered, and cutting off services from hundreds of Islamic charitable institutions accused of connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. Zakat, one of Islam's five pillars, has also come under tighter official oversight than before as the regime tries to redirect giving toward the state and donors become allergic to politicized giving. The shift is not absolute—some autonomous spaces for religious inquiry and practice remain in Egypt—but the levels of monitoring and control have increased markedly, with constricting effects on religious activity in Egyptian society.

In addition, the state has imposed a unified Khutba (religious lecture given traditionally in Friday's prayers) distributed every Friday from the Ministry of Awqaf to mosques around Egypt (al-Shark al-Awsat, 2021). The new generations in Egypt experience a different social and political reality than the one experienced by their parents and grandparents. According to the Arab Youth Survey, only 24% of young Egyptians regard religion as central to their identity, and 'the share of Arabs

¹⁵ Traditionally, a wife only receives alimony following the divorce and one-quarter of her husband's estate when he dies, or one-eighth if they have children.

describing themselves as “not religious” is up to 13%, from 8% in 2013. That includes [...] a fifth of young Egyptians’ (Arab Youth Survey 2021, p. 45; The Economist, 2019).

However, it remains to be seen whether the restrictions on the mediums through which the master frame is formulated and disseminated to the public will have an impact on its stronghold in the political culture in Egypt. The master frame developed over the course of almost five decades, and some of the ideas advocated as part of the master frame became integrated with social traditions and popular culture. Further, while the younger generations are now emerging in a different cultural climate than their parents and grandparents, the impact of the older generations on the political culture in Egypt is still significant, and without an open atmosphere in which ideas can be freely exchanged and debated without prior imposed limits emanating from the master frame itself, there is doubt over whether any efforts to foster pluralistic values will yield its results.

Conclusion

This chapter explored what Islam means to the interviewees who accept and reject the master frame. It highlights how the broad nature of the master frame is seen as an opportunity by those who accept the master frame to voice their aspirations for a better life and governance while it is seen as a problem of definition by those who reject the master frame. The meaning of true Islam is connected to the religious figures who speak in the name of Islam, and the chapter analysed how religious figures are seen differently by each group. Those who accept the frame place particular emphasis on the sources of religious knowledge and those who represent Islam, while those who reject the master frame challenge the authority of Sheikhs and religious figures. Finally, the chapter argues that the master frame represents a form of social power acquired by the mobilising actors from the movements and the state and analyses how this power is manifested post-2011 and the new form it has taken in the current political scene.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to understand how the core idea of *Islam is the solution* became a master frame in Egypt's social and political life and what its impact was on values conducive to democracy and political culture. The conclusion of the thesis summarises the key arguments and findings of the thesis, the significance of the study, its challenges and limitations, and implications for future research.

Key Arguments & Findings

The thesis argued that the starting point in the growth of *Islam is the solution* from a collective action frame into a master frame was the 1967 defeat, a transformative event in Egyptian history that resulted in collective grievances and questions as to what the problems were, who was to blame, and what the solution could be. Nasser and Sadat avoided problems of oppression and corruption, any blame on their regimes, and solutions of democracy and accountability by oppressing the 1968 students' movements that called for regime accountability and political liberation. The governing regimes framed the defeat as either the result of limited military incompetency that was solved by a change in army leadership, or as a result of deviance from religion that was solved by the victory in 1973 where "God and his angels" fought on the side of advancing Egyptian soldiers' (Gerges, 2018, p. 326). The solution in God and Islam was sponsored by Sadat and supported by a constitutional change whereby Shari'a became a primary source of legislation and was extensively mobilised throughout Egypt. The thesis explored the expansive infrastructure and resource mobilisation which allowed the frame to grow into a master frame. It argued that, although such growth was led by the mobilisation of Islamist movements, it was also shaped and tapped into by state institutions and state-sponsored religious figures, within the frameworks of various supportive national and regional political opportunities.

After establishing the growth and extensive presence of the master frame, there was a need to clarify the ideas, discourses and values advocated under the master frame in order to explore their impact on individuals' values and political culture. The thesis referred to the statements, writings, and preaching of diverse Islamist movements and various influential figures from those identifying as independent, as well as those seen as supported by the state across different periods of time. The thesis argued that the master frame advocated a core idea that Islam is a comprehensive system that offers a solution to every problem in life and governance. This core idea was given meaning

on the individual and collective levels by calling for personal piety and Islamic governance. The thesis analysed the main topics that occupied the discussion concerning personal piety, which focused primarily on the limits of gender relations and women's roles and responsibilities in society, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Islamic governance, which focused on how an Islamic public order would shape the limits of freedoms and political rights.

Through fifty in-depth interviews, the thesis analysed the resonance of the ideas disseminated under the master frame and their impact on the values of tolerance, equality, autonomy, and self-expression freedoms. More than half the interviewees accepted that Islam is the solution as a comprehensive system for life and governance, while less than half the interviewees rejected the master frame. Each group's responses were analysed in a separate chapter.

The data analysis showed different degrees of resonance of the ideas of the master frame for those who accept it, and initially, different degrees of acceptance, rejection, and limits to the values under study. However, the impact of the master frame seems to be on re-ordering the priorities of the individuals by acting as an outer limit that excludes views and values deemed incompatible with the master frame as a priority over one's personal preferences and individual experiences. This prioritisation signals the critical role of mobilising actors who tap into the master frame to include and exclude views and values for their audience by claiming their compatibility with or contradiction of the master frame.

In contrast, the interviewees who rejected the master frame challenged the ideas and justifications advocated under the master frame and grounded their views and values in their personal experiences and preferences. The lack of resonance of the master frame seems to be driven, for many, by contradictions between the master frame ideas and personal grievances and experiences. Overall, in both groups, the data suggest that practising and witnessing the practices of a value might have an impact on a value's adoption.

Finally, the thesis contrasted the views of both groups concerning the meaning of Islam and the light in which religious figures are seen by each group. The data suggest that Islam is given broad definitions that are consistent with the broad nature of the master frame. However, while this broad nature is seen positively by those who adopt the master frame, it is doubted by those who reject it as not meaningful. Further, religious figures play an important role in giving form to the broad nature of the master frame. This role is appreciated by those who accept the master frame as source of religious knowledge and challenged by those who reject the master frame as concealing practices of authority over society. The thesis argued that the master frame represents social and

political power in the hands of the religious figures and the mobilising actors, discussed its implications in examples post 2011, and reflected on its future in the current political scene under al-Sisi's regime.

Significance

The significance of this study stands at the intersection of two fields of scholarship: studies on Islamist movements in Egypt, and studies about political culture and values conducive to democracy. On the one hand, studies about Islamist movements typically focus on the structure, organisation, and internal ideology of the movements and their impact on mobilisation and religious practices. However, there is a gap in addressing the impact of Islamist movements' advocacy efforts on political culture, particularly in placing emphasis on the role of Islam in Egyptians' personal lives and Egypt's public life. The thesis addresses this gap and aims to offer a new lens in studying the role of Islamism in Egypt's political culture by looking not at singular Islamist organisations or differences between movements but at the shared ideological message advocated to the public and which became infused in, and at times, supported by, state institutions.

The choice of social movement theory, particularly framing theory and the concept of a master frame as a theoretical lens was advantageous in its ability to transcend approaching Islam either as a sacred religion or as an authentic traditional part of the culture in Egypt. The presumption from which the framing theory starts is that meanings are not created naturally or are pre-existing in the social milieu. Instead, meanings are created by signifying agents who frame events and ideas by advocating particular meanings to the exclusion of others. The use of framing theory, thus, enabled the thesis to trace the emergence of the core ideological message through the work of the signifying agents, and analyse the progress and evolution of its ideas through different phases across the past decades. The theoretical tools of resource mobilisation and political opportunities gave theoretical precision in tracing the expansion and growth of the core ideological message into a master frame through extensive mobilisation of resources and networks and the impact of the changing phases of the political system between openness and restraint.

Further, the focus on the shared ideological message as a master frame enabled the analysis to go beyond considering the Islamist movements in isolation from the role of the state. In addressing the signifying agents who contributed to building the master frame and tapped into its ideas, the thesis emphasised the role played by the state in shaping and using the master frame. Rock-Singer (2019, p. 180-181) argues that, contrary to common views, the Islamic revival is not 'an exclusive story of the Islamist movement' and the religious thoughts and practices that emerged were the

product of ‘intellectual cross-pollination, competition, and even cooperation among Statist and Islamist religious elites, and their local constituencies, between 1976 and 1981’. This thesis argues similarly that the state played a central role in building and shaping the ideas disseminated under the master frame. It traces the role of the state since 1967 and beyond 1981 to show how Statist scholars and state institutions contributed to building and shaping the ideas of the master frame. Statist scholars enjoyed legitimacy among the public gained through their association with the state and sometimes offered more conservative views than their Islamist counterparts. State institutions also engaged in shaping the boundaries of the master frame, sometimes through supporting the implementation of its ideas such as in the judiciary and other times through contesting its authority and processes of conflict between institutions such as the ministry of education’s conflict over the veil in schools, and Al-Azhar criticism of state policies such as those aimed at reducing the growth of the population. The focus on the shared ideological message and its manifestations, thus, offers a novel perspective for future research. Through tracing the narratives and ideas disseminated, and the actors involved in shaping these ideas, one can reach a better balanced view that acknowledges the intertwined nature of the evolution of the idea of Islam in Egypt’s public life between the state and Islamists.

On the other hand, studies on political culture and values conducive to democracy and democratisation typically adopt quantitative methodologies and the ones focused on Egypt, usually draw comparative analysis with other Arab and Muslim countries. While these studies offer generalisable findings regarding the extent of the adoption or rejection of a given value, they fall short in three respects. First, quantitative studies do not offer answers regarding the meanings of the values presented to the participants or the reasons behind the adoption or rejection of values. Second, the correlation usually drawn in quantitative studies on Muslim countries focuses on the relation between Islam as a religion or religiosity in terms of mosque attendance and religious rituals and support for democracy or some of the values conducive to democracy. However, this obscures the roles played by different figures and institutions in giving and signifying meaning to what is meant by Islam and personal piety or religiosity. Third, while the comparative analysis is helpful in understanding the regional image and how countries compare with one another, it risks simplifying the historical and political circumstances that differentiate Muslim countries from one another and the ways in which political culture was locally shaped by key critical events and signifying agents.

This study aimed to overcome these shortfalls by engaging qualitatively with what the values mean for the interviewees, what Islam means for them, and the processes of justification they engaged in regarding the rejection and adoption of various values. Thus, the study was able to offer novel insights concerning the ways in which values conducive to democracy were constructed or constrained in personal narratives combined with awareness of the ways in which these narratives are grounded in social and historical contexts. It is hoped that this approach would encourage more qualitative engagement with political culture that takes into consideration that ‘political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system; and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences’ (Pye, 1965, p. 8). Such a rich engagement would not necessarily be possible using quantitative methodologies.

Further, the use of the framing theory combined with a historical analysis offered tools to trace the origins of the consolidated ideas in the culture and enabled the formulation of targeted interview questions that explored the tension between examples grounded in the country’s culture and values conducive to democracy. Such an approach might be beneficial in studying political culture in other Muslim states by encouraging researchers to engage with identifying the interpretive frameworks and the signifying agents which were key in a country’s cultural context to be able to formulate more focused questions and offer nuanced analysis that goes beyond artificial correlation between religious practices and democratic tendencies.

Overall, democratisation is a complex process, particularly in a country like Egypt, which did not yet witness a successful democratic regime, and unfortunately reverted to repressive authoritarianism a couple of years after the 2011 revolution. However, while political culture and values conducive to democratisation are not necessarily the decisive factors in igniting a democratisation process in Egypt, they are important in shaping the chances for democratic survival and consolidation. This study sheds light on how the past has shaped these values, and it helps not only in interpreting some of the events that followed 2011 in a different light, but it might also help in approaching mobilisation and the building of democratic practices and institutions differently in the future, should an opportunity arise.

Challenges, Limitations, and Future Research

The challenges and limitations of this study, other than the security risks which I discussed in the methodology chapter, can be summarised in two issues: the sampling of the interviewees and the translation from Arabic to English. On the one hand, the study aimed to engage qualitatively

with the impact of Islamists' framing messages on what Wickham (2002, p. 165) termed 'the supportive public'. The supportive public is a broad category that includes the audience of the framing messages who received it through various mediums and networks, including mosques, religious lessons, radio and television shows, books, and other venues, but who are not mobilised to join an Islamist movement. In light of the historical analysis offered in this study, this category can be extended to include most of the public in Egypt. In contrast to other studies, research on particular organisations within the Islamist movements does not face challenges of broad categories because they typically focus on leaders and members of those movements who should be easily identifiable, although not necessarily easily accessible. Quantitative research on values among the public does not face this challenge because they typically aim for representativity and reflect on large representative samples.

To respond to this challenge, the study aimed to restrict the scope of the sample by focusing on the age group between 25 to 35 years old who live in Cairo. Older and younger age groups were considered in the sample to enrich the understanding of possible differences between age groups. Overall, the older age groups showed stronger support for the master frame than did younger age groups, as seen in the chapters, while younger age groups reflected similar variations between those who accept and reject the master frame. Further, the concerns for generalisation to the population were not paramount in this study, given its qualitative aims, which focus on theorising about the impact and meaning of the master frame and its interplay with the values under study.

However, responding to this challenge also meant that one of the limitations of this study is that it offers findings that are mostly shaped by the experiences of educated young people living in Cairo. More extensive research is needed on the differences not only between age groups but also between Cairo and other governorates in Egypt. As seen in the thesis, the Islamist movements historically spread geographically in Egypt, with more radical movements having a stronger presence in upper Egypt, Salafism in Alexandria and the Muslim Brotherhood along the Delta. More research is needed on whether variations in the advocated messages under the master frame result in variations in the political culture and values of Egyptians residents outside Cairo compared to those of Cairo residents.

The second challenge this study faced was translating the material and the data from Arabic to English. The fourth chapter, which analyses the various ideas disseminated under the master frame, depends on statements, writings, and preaching videos in Arabic. The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters rely on the interviews, which were conducted in Arabic. The researcher undertook the

translation of all the materials, and the translated parts from the materials and the interviews were placed between quotation marks to distinguish them. However, this also leads to a limitation in that the translation is influenced by the researcher's choice of words, which aimed for literal translation as much as possible; however, the meaning is inevitably shaped by the translation. It is hoped that this work can be translated into Arabic, and the interviewees' words can be expressed as they said them in their original language.

It is hoped that this study can lead to further qualitative research on political culture in Egypt. Not only in relation to the impact of Islamist movements' advocacy efforts as one of the central players in Egypt's history and politics, but also with regard to the impact of other elements that shape the culture in Egypt, such as social traditions and the state's authoritarian practices. In addition, more research is needed to further our understanding not only of the processes that inform the adoption and rejection of values conducive to democratisation and democratic survival, but also of what fosters the growth of pluralistic values in the pursuit of democratisation in Egypt.

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Appendix I


Participant number	Gender	Age	Education
1.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
2.	"Male"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
3.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
4.	"Female"	"Over 60"	No Education
5.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
6.	"Male"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
7.	"Female"	"20-25"	University graduate
8.	"Female"	"45-60"	University graduate
9.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
10.	"Female"	"45-60"	School graduate (Primary School)
11.	"Female"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
12.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
13.	"Female"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
14.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
15.	"Female"	"45-60"	University graduate
16.	"Male"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
17.	"Female"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
18.	"Female"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
19.	"Male"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
20.	"Male"	"35-45"	University graduate
21.	"Female"	"25-35"	University graduate
22.	"Female"	"45-60"	School graduate (High School)
23.	"Male"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
24.	"Female"	"20-25"	University graduate
25.	"Female"	"25-35"	University graduate
26.	"Female"	"20-25"	University graduate
27.	"Female"	"35-45"	Intermediate education (Two years Diploma after high school)
28.	"Female"	"20-25"	University graduate
29.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
30.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
31.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
32.	"Female"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
33.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
34.	"Male"	"35-45"	University graduate
35.	"Female"	"20-25"	University graduate

36.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
37.	"Female"	"25-35"	School graduate (High school)
38.	"Male"	"25-35"	School graduate (High school)
39.	"Female"	"25-35"	University graduate
40.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
41.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
42.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
43.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
44.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
45.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
46.	"Female"	"25-35"	University post-graduate
47.	"Female"	"45-60"	University graduate
48.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
49.	"Male"	"25-35"	University graduate
50.	"Female"	"45-60"	University post-graduate


Interviewees' Professions

Technical support engineer
E Commerce digital supervisor
Researcher
Legal professions
Product manager
Administrative office assistant
Postgraduate Researcher
Accountant
Academic
Work in telecommunication company
Electrical appliances trader
Content manger
Engineer
Work at a tourism company
Work at a dentist clinic
Digital developer
Veterinarian
Graphic designer
Real estate agent
Work in a charity
Interior designer
Tourist guide
Musician
Pharmacist
Work in a bank
Animator
Air traffic controller
Work in Media
No work/other

Appendix II




Gender	Number of interviewees
Female	23
Male	27



Age	Number of interviewees
20-25	5
25-35	36
40-65	9


Level of education



■ No Education ■ School Graduate ■ Intermediate education
■ University Graduate ■ Post-graduate

Level of Education	Number of interviewees
No Education	1
School Graduate	4
Intermediate education	1
University Graduate	32
Post-Graduate	12

Frame resonance



■ Interviewees accepting the Master Frame ■ Interviewees rejecting the Master Frame

Interviewees accepting the Master Frame	28
Interviewees rejecting the Master Frame	22