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**RADICAL EXPERIMENTATION:
YUGOSLAVIA, THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT AND THE ARCHIVE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW**

By

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Doctor of Philosophy in Law

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July 2022

Wordcount: 98490

Acknowledgements

No research work of this kind is wholly the effort of one person. While I remain grateful to many people involved, to all who directly or indirectly participated and contributed in one way or another to making this project possible, to pursue it and complete it, I would nevertheless want to express particular gratitude to certain individuals.

There are those *'Aligned'*...

My principal tribute and utmost gratitude goes to my supervisor Luis Eslava. I cannot imagine moving my PhD journey forward without generosity, support, motivation, and commitment of Luis. His example of scholarly stamina, engaging intellect and profound insight is an inspiration that goes beyond academic space. An invaluable mentor.

My gratitude goes to my second supervisor Sara Kendall, the most eloquent interlocutor who was generous with offering a listening ear, support and advice when needed in supervising my work.

My acknowledgement goes to the Kent Law School (KLS), for the stimulating scholarly time-space that never failed to disappoint with debates of critique across myriad engaging topics with or by world-class speakers. The stimulating environment composed of scholarly seminars, events, conferences, or workshops - nationally and internationally - is something to be desired. I am privileged to have been a part of it.

I express my utmost appreciation to all my academic colleagues at KLS for their collegiality, affability, guidance, recommendations, patience, support, and kindness in sharing their ideas and experiences. I am grateful to many scholars for their assistance and commentary at various stages of my research and writing. Further gratitude goes also to fellow comrades active in the critical legal historical international scholarship tradition who inspired and moulded me over these years as well. My Thank You is due to fellow colleagues

beyond KLS for influences, inspiration, and motivation. I am appreciative also of various archivists and librarians that came to my aid when I needed it.

I choose not to name names, for I would agonise too much if I was to leave someone out after my typing hands and wearied mind leave this page. All deserving are included in my recollection of moments of fullness I experienced over the last few year.

I look forward to all those conversations I regrettably missed out on - in (near) future, when my paralysing shyness will be no more, or will at least be accepted, embraced and more freeing.

A special thanks I give to the administrative staff at KLS, and especially its Postgraduate Office. Their kindness, approachability, prompt response, knowledge of all things procedural was always accessible. Many thanks to the School for the generous financial assistance, without which I would not be writing these acknowledgements.

Any fault or error that might occur in the script are wholly my own.

And there are those '*Nonaligned*'...

Finally, my devotion goes to those closest. To my 'oma', who went beyond our known in the middle of my PhD journey – you are dearly missed.

Above all, my deepest thanks are reserved for B. The most impressive human, whose affection gave me vital equanimity and joy in all stages of my labours. Your love, care, warmth, encouragement, patience, understanding, companionship, and sense of humour merged to sustain and move me when everything seemed just empty signifiers. I dedicate this thesis to you B.

Abstract

The Cold War has conventionally been viewed through the lenses of the Great powers; a coercive standstill, with most nation-states placed on the margins of that bi-polar legal, economic, political and cultural international arrangement. Recent scholarship has shown, however, that peripheral sovereignties functioned during this period as a tool for state-based resistance and as sites for the creation of alternative visions of the international legal order. My thesis builds on this scholarship on the plural histories of the international legal order, in particular regarding how domestic policies can serve as prisms to examine alternative international pasts and futures. To this end, the thesis explores, in particular, the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) as an example of radical experimentalism through the experience of Yugoslavia. As such, the thesis engages with the international and national faces of NAM, the critical geopolitical project that was comprised of a heterogeneous group of nation-states aspiring to create an alternative model of global organisation through peaceful coexistence and solidarity.

At the core of my examination is the dialectical relationship between ‘nonalignment’ – NAM’s organisational concept and Yugoslavia’s foreign policy central pillar – and Yugoslavia’s domestic policy of ‘self-management’. Building on the existing historiography of Yugoslav foreign policy, I argue that Yugoslavia’s use of soft power and its promotion of self-management abroad in the form of nonalignment affected in a profound way the international legal and political order during the Cold War era. Self-management’s vision of a direct democracy through decentralisation was showcased abroad as a way of affirming national sovereignty and as means for international cooperation irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state. My analysis shows, however, the limits of this model of state-based resistance by problematising how the principle and right of self-determination was a contested and fragile concept in the post-imperial world order. I argue that, while the Cold War was a space-moment that permitted forms of national and international experimentation, it generated simultaneously a geopolitical context that stifled radical change. Self-

management at the national level and nonalignment at the international level proved unsuccessful in advancing, in the long run, a new version of global governance. Regardless of their openness and promoting of solidarity at home, and despite the initial success of advancing diversity globally, their vision of self-determination as a legal concept for independence and the generation of an egalitarian world order proved contingent on the two power-blocs' specific understanding of it and a vehicle for advancing their own interests, and as such undermined the horizons of self-management and nonalignment within Yugoslavia and abroad. NAM's shortcomings and achievements invite us, however, to reassess the value and significance of local-global interactions in the creation of alternative modalities of governance.

My analysis is based also on archival work conducted in the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, Serbia. Engaging with this archive as a place of struggle, I argue that it is a site to engage critically with global orders and hierarchies underpinned by international law. My findings demonstrate, in particular, the dual function of the archive: it functions as a register of both domestic and international (hi)stories, and the container of radical forms of experimentation of world formation. The archive, then, as a register of national and international struggles, helps us to approach NAM as an intrinsic part of the Yugoslav domestic story of emancipation and as the outcome of Yugoslavia's attempt to transform the world. The way the archive is constructed and organised performs, as a result, the critical work of my thesis; it makes my critical reading possible. By bringing the national and the international together, the archive becomes a source of an alternative analysis of history as it recognises an emancipatory potential to peripheral actors, in particular to break the supposed coherence, linearity and simplicity of the global order. The archive is a space for reaction, resistance and redefinition of fixed, imposed or controlled representations of the domestic and the international order. Such approach disrupts assumed understandings of the local and the international, and of self-management and nonalignment, and invites us to problematise a proclivity to historical closures in the study of international law.

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INTRODUCTION

Alternatives and Experimentation in the International Legal Order

*Every record has been destroyed or falsified, every book rewritten, every picture has been repainted, every statue and street building has been renamed, every date has been altered. And the process is continuing day by day and minute by minute. History has stopped. Nothing exists except an endless present in which the Party is always right.*¹

*'Information' is there – in abundance. It depends on what kinds of things we imagine such an archive could allow us to know.*²

*...archives as sites... about dreams of comforting futures and foreboding of future failures.*³

1. The Aim: Radicality in Particularity

The aim of this thesis is to explore the idea of radicality and the potential of experimentation in the international legal order. It represents an attempt to engage with particular modalities of national and international governance that act against standard views of international law and the exercise of sovereignty. I engage here with forms of experimentation with a particular radical expression of sovereignty, embedded and possible within a particular historical local and global geo-political context. In order to do this, I focus on one peripheral actor in the Cold War - the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1918/45-1991) in order to examine how it advanced two distinct yet connected forms of experimentation in state-identity formation and

¹ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (London: Penguin 1987) 162.

² Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (2009) 278.

³ Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press 2009) 1.

alternative form of world ordering: the socialist workers' self-management and the movement of nonalignment.

The focus of my historical, socio-economic and political analysis enables me to explore the complexity and interrelatedness of these two radical expressions of sovereignty in the post-Second World War (WWII) context and its division of the world between two power-blocs. My argument is that there was a causal and dialectical relationship between Yugoslav self-management and nonalignment, one moulding as an extension of the other. To analyse such a link, I examine their historical roots, conceptually and in practice, and consider their development across space-time in Yugoslavia and beyond. I shed light on their radical character, emergence, existence, and eventual collapse during Yugoslavia's forty years of existence. Resembling a piece in a collage of a wider and more complex portrait of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), I assess what the two experiments meant then and their importance today.

In this introduction, I first set out the object of my analysis. Then, I present my case study that is Yugoslavia and its socialist workers' self-management and nonalignment, as well as its role in NAM, and outline their contribution to the thesis. Next, I frame my project through historiography as a conceptual framework and archive as a critical method and encapsulate their contribution to the thesis. Finally, I outline the thesis' chapters.

2. The Object of Analysis: National and International Self-determination

Third Worldism offers histories of mentalities of self-determination and self-governance, based on the insistence of the recognition of radical cultural and civilisational plurality and diversity.⁴

⁴ Upendra Baxi, 'What May the 'Third World' Expect from International Law?' in Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens (eds), *International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice* (New York, Abingdon: Routledge 2008) 10.

One of the purposes of this thesis is to examine the use of the international law's principle of self-determination in the process of formation of state identity. Self-determination, presented often in the form of a linear narrative, is generally understood as a political principle about the right of people to determine their own destiny (state identity, form of government and autonomous development).⁵ It emerged as a result of two world wars and its recognition as a legal right began with the 1945 UN Charter and the 1960 UNGA Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.⁶ However, self-determination's ideological roots and its legal emergence have a complex (narrowly conceived) pre-history of ideas, such as understanding of nation, state or people, that emerged in the geopolitical struggles of the 19th and 20th century and that influenced the development of international law. It initially found expression in the conflicting statements advanced by two statesmen during WWI: the US President Woodrow Wilson's vision of self-government by (limited) trusteeship and the Russian revolutionary V I Lenin's vision of independence through revolution.⁷

⁵ See for instance, Gerry Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004); Martti Koskenniemi, 'Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism' 2011 (19) *Journal of the Max-Planck-Institute for European Legal History [Zeitschrift des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte]* 151-176, 152, 155; Bill Bowring, 'Positivism versus Self-Determination: The Contradictions of Soviet International Law' in Susan Marks (ed), *International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) 140-142, 144-145; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007); Alexander Anievas, *Capital, the State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty-Years Crisis, 1914-1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2014) 107-138.

⁶ Accordingly, self-determination in the 1960s became applicable to both, non-self-governing territories and trust territories, and reached its set ideal at the height of decolonization as a 'super-norm' of a *jus cogens* character applicable *erga omnes*. See United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (24 October 1945); UNGA Res 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (14 December 1960).

⁷ Lenin was the first to openly proclaim the principle of self-determination: the 'colonial policy of the capitalist countries [the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal and Spain] has completed the seizure of unoccupied territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision is possible'. Accordingly, it cannot be a coincidence that decolonization resulted in the collapse of these empires, just as the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, Prussian, and Russian empires collapsed following WWI. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of*

During the Cold War, these different and diametrically opposed visions were repeatedly in competition, if not in conflict, producing sharply contrasting views regarding self-determination.⁸ This meant that, and as alternative to a linear narrative of the concept of self-determination promoted by US President Woodrow Wilson, the concept was shaped, emerged and (re)defined in a complicated political and ideological historical milieu.⁹ The Wilsonian idea, applied by the League of Nations to the mandates in the inter-war years and by the UN to trust territories and non-self-governing territories during the Cold War, was to some extent embraced by the Afro-Asian states at the 1955 Bandung Conference.¹⁰ It was Lenin's vision that eventually came

Capitalism, A Popular Outline ([International Publishers 1939] Moscow: Progress 1966) 76-77.

⁸ There are numerous works on the topic by critical legal scholars, such as Martti Koskenniemi. 'National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice' 1994 (43) *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 241-269; Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); James R Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press 2006); Susan Marks (ed), *International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008); Umozurike Oji Umozurike, *Self-Determination in International Law* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books 1972); Issa G Shivji, 'The Right of Peoples to Self-determination: An African Perspective' in William Twining (ed), *Issues of Self-Determination* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1991); James Summers, *Peoples and International Law* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2014); Jörg Fisch, *The Right of Self-determination of Peoples: Domestication of an Illustration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015); Brad R Roth, *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000); Scott Newton, *Law and the Making of the Soviet World: The Red Demiurge* (New York: Routledge 2014).

⁹ For exposition on 'types' of self-determination (Lenin's and Wilson's visions included), see Victor Kattan, 'Self-determination as Ideology: The Cold War, the End of Empire, and the Making of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (14 December 1960)' in Klara Polackova Van der Ploeg, Luca Pasquet and León Castellanos-Jankiewicz (eds), *International Law and Time: Narratives and Techniques* (New York: Springer 2022) chapter 21. See also Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment* (2007).

¹⁰ In many respects, the Bandung Conference was conservative in its understanding of international law, particularly in terms of embracing a vision of independence as revolution. They saw themselves as respecting international law and called on the superpowers to do the same. Furthermore, some in the colonial world took to alternative paths out of colonialism beyond Wilsonian internationalism or international socialism. For instance, the early-1900s pan-African movement would play a powerful role in African and Caribbean affairs in the interwar period and beyond. See Mark Philip Bradley, 'Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962' in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad

to be expressed in the 1966 Declaration on the Granting of Independence and remained a dominant form of self-determination until the Perestroika.¹¹ It stood in contrast to Wilson's vision where independence was granted to Europeans but denied to Africans and Asians. Lenin proclaimed national liberation via self-determination as a revolutionary necessity due to a perceived need for dismantling of the old multi-ethnic European empires in favour of more modern Western nation-state structures.¹² Lenin's vision was fully applicable to those under colonial rule and asserted a radical rejection of the division between 'civilised' and 'uncivilised' peoples.¹³ This challenges perception in international law that newly sovereign nation-states took up the Wilsonian principle of self-determination by trusteeship in decolonisation process.¹⁴ And while the Wilsonian vision came back to the fore at the end of the Cold War, this is not to suggest that Lenin's vision was gone. It indicates, rather, that Lenin's vision sits next to the Wilsonian concept in an uneasy and somewhat antagonistic relationship.

(eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012).

¹¹ After giving a convincing account of how the legal principle of self-determination was only developed and effectively applied to all with the adoption of the 1966 UNGA human rights covenants, Kaplan concluded that the concept is better understood as a 'contest of competing ideologies that was intimately linked to the rise and fall of empires, rather than a legal principle of general applicability, let alone a super norm of international law. Seen from this view, it was Lenin's revolutionary vision of self-determination that triumphed during decolonization'. Kattan, 'Self-determination as ideology' in Van der Ploeg and others, *International Law and Time* (2022) 2-3.

¹² Bowring, 'Positivism versus Self-Determination' in Marks, *International Law on the Left* (2008) 140-142, 144-145.

¹³ Lenin's (Bolshevik) Revolution was seen a more appealing path to political independence and social transformation. See Bowring, 'Positivism versus Self-Determination' in Marks, *International Law on the Left* (2008) 143-144; Alexander Anievas, *Capital, the State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty-Years Crisis, 1914-1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2014) 107-138.

¹⁴ With 80 colonies attaining independence and UN membership (increasing from 55 in 1945 to 147 members by 1975) between the late-1950s and most of the 1970s, the colonial powers conceded that Lenin's idea triumphed during decolonisation. The GA passed The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (UNGA Resolution 2625 (24 October 1970) and its detailed elaboration of self-determination subsequently entered the corpus of international law through Namibia and Western Sahara advisory opinions. Kattan, 'Self-determination as ideology' in Van der Ploeg and others, *International Law and Time* (2022) 2-3.

Despite the differences, it must be recognised that these competing visions of self-determination contributed to decolonization and sovereignty of many nation-states.¹⁵ Indeed, it is exactly because of the tensions between them that the concept can be cited by ‘liberal statesmen, anarchists, communists, socialists, Third World nationalists, the feminist movement [as well as by] advocates of apartheid and racial discrimination... even by former colonial powers’.¹⁶ Its fluidity enables self-determination to mean ‘all things to all men’.¹⁷ It also implies that the possibility for self-determination is dependent at any given moment upon balance of geopolitical power, be it power exercised on the battlefield, in the corridors of the UN, or in the chambers of the Hague’s Peace Palace.¹⁸ As such, the principle can be emancipatory but can easily prove controversial and volatile.

It is in this remit of contestation about the understanding and enactment of self-governance, both locally and globally, that this thesis finds its place. I explore the origins, development and practice of Yugoslavia’s self-management and nonalignment and analyse the characterisation and link between the two. As such, the project serves as a tool for critique of the dynamics of self-determination during the Cold War and its import for today. It asks: what are the lessons of the Yugoslav socialist experiment and its potential today?

¹⁵ Bradley, ‘Decolonization’ in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (2012).

¹⁶ Kattan, ‘Self-determination as Ideology’ in Van der Ploeg and others, *International Law and Time* (2022) 4.

¹⁷ Writing just before the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, Strydom cynically and provocatively observed: ‘Few other political or legal concepts have fallen prey to this kind of prostitution’. H A Strydom, ‘Self-Determination: Its Use and Abuse’ 1991-1992 (17) *South African Yearbook of International Law* 90.

¹⁸ For instance, the changing power balance in the ICJ during the South West Africa Cases between 1962 and 1966 (Ethiopia and Liberia v South Africa), where arguably the decision was politically and not legally motivated. Julius Stone, ‘Reflections on Apartheid after the South West Africa Cases’ 1967 (42) 4 *Washington Law Review* 1069-1082; Staff Study and Rosalyn Higgins, *South West Africa, The Court’s Judgment: Two Studies* (Geneva: The International Commission of Jurists 1966); Keith Highet, ‘The South West Africa Cases’ March 1967 (52) 307 *Current History* 154-161.

3. Case Study: Yugoslavia, Self-management, and Nonalignment

The examination is focused on Yugoslavia's formation and practice of self-determination through the dialectical relationship between its domestic policy of self-management and its foreign policy's central pillar, nonalignment. I argue that the former was, as vision of a direct democracy through (radical) decentralisation, showcased abroad as a way of affirming national sovereignty and as a means for international cooperation irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state.¹⁹

3.1. Yugoslavia and Socialist Workers' Self-management

Due to its geostrategic position on the Balkan peninsula, its diverse ethnic composition, and its history of foreign aggression and domination throughout its history, after WWII Yugoslavia again found itself in the mainstream of global historical developments as it pursued its (radical) independence in the form of a Leninist vision of self-determination. This was rooted in the WWII struggle against its oppressors, in particular Nazi and Fascist forces but also against other forces present in Yugoslav territory, including the political authorities of the old Yugoslavia, the collaborators, Ustasha, Chetniks, Bela Garda ['White Guard'] Domobranci ['Home Guards']. War struggles united its divided nations and lead to its liberation and a successful communist revolution. Yugoslavia emerged as a federation in 1945. Its national independence and interdependence that formed the state became visible in its emancipatory outlook, both in its domestic and foreign policy in the form of self-management and nonalignment, respectively.

Yugoslav socialist workers' self-management [*samoupravljanje*] was abolished thirty years ago and became a somewhat forgotten notion following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. It was, however, reawakened intermittently in relation to contemporary economic and financial crises

¹⁹ There is a personal link to the focus of the study: I was born in January 1980 in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and in particular, in the same hospital a few corridors down from where Josip Broz Tito was treated and died in May that year.

through various alternative political, extra-parliamentary movements and scholarly initiatives.²⁰ Nevertheless, as I show in this thesis, Yugoslavia remains an important case of integrity of the modern nation-state as it dealt successfully (at least at first) with issues of legitimacy and governance in highly complex and disputed settings. Namely, in pursuit of an independent path Yugoslavia, as a state composed of small but diverse nations and located in a peculiar geostrategic position in the Balkans, sought to assert a radical degree of independence amidst Cold War struggles.²¹ It did this by developing and implementing the governance concept of self-management, a case of direct democracy through the decentralisation that united its nations under the motto ‘brotherhood and unity’ [*bratstvo i jedinstvo*]. It was a unique social experiment which empowered its citizens in the move to social ownership under the slogan ‘factories to the workers’ [*tvornice radnicima*] that affirmed national sovereignty through genuine cooperation. In other words, despite being ‘caught’ in its struggles, Yugoslavia played an important part in Cold War’s formative years at home and abroad. Namely, a multi-national country that united its nationalities in direct democracy extrapolated the same *modus operandi* in NAM. A heteronomy of states was able to operate as a proactive, if not always united, force in pursuit of their own governance in the bipolar intranational legal order, irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state.

Regarding the Yugoslav form of socialist workers’ self-management, scholars have generated a wealth of authoritative analysis on its historical, geopolitical, economic and social setting over the years.²² The historicization

²⁰ With the end of the Cold War, its discourse moved from international policymaking forums to alternatives such as academic roundtables and publications, museums or art exhibitions worldwide (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Austria, UK, Argentina).

²¹ Svetozar Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956’ in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010) 198-220, 198.

²² See George Walter Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1962); Bernard Newman, *Unknown Yugoslavia* (London: Herbert Jenkins 1960); Committee on the Judiciary United State Senate, *Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1961); Alan W Palmer, *Yugoslavia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1964).

and analysis of specific circumstances behind the decision to implement such political and economic model in Yugoslavia, and considerations of various aspects of its development, were of interest to many, least of all Yugoslav political analysts, economists and sociologists throughout the 1970s and 1980s.²³ Crucial to these analyses were writings on self-management by President Tito himself, by later ousted and renounced Milovan Đilas/Djilas, Croatian scientist Branko Horvat, Moša Pijade, Boris Kidrič, and most importantly those by Edvard Kardelj who generated a theory of it and shaped its execution most systematically.²⁴ There is also a great amount of in-depth literature about the interruption of self-management's implementation or the reasons for its failure prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.²⁵

²³ See Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan and Nawal A El Tataway, *Yugoslavia: Self-Management, Socialism and the Challenges of Development* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press 1979); Harold Lydall, *Yugoslav Socialism, Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); Miloš Nikolić, 'The Theoretical Bases of Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia' 1981 (23) *Socialism in the World* 22-59; Miloš Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse samoupravljanja [Development of Theory and Practice of Self-management]* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1989); Branko Pribičević, *Socijalizam: Svetski proces [Socialism: The World Process]* (Beograd: Monos 1979); Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (London: MacMillan 1976); Rudi Supek, *Participacija, Radnička Kontrola i Samoupravljanje: Prilog Povijesnom Kontinuitetu Jedne Ideje [Participation, Workers' Control and Self-management: Contribution to the Continuity of an Idea]* (Zagreb: Naprijed 1974). Works of (Slovenian) economists include Janez Prašnikar, *Delavska participacija in samoupravljanje v deželah v razvoju [Workers' Participation and Self-management in Developing Countries]* (Beograd: Komunist 1989); and by sociologists Veljko Rus and Frane Adam, *Moć i nemoć samoupravljanja [Power and Powerlessness of Self-management]* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba 1986).

²⁴ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt and Brace 1962); Branko Horvat, *Ogled o Jugoslavenskom Društvu [An Essay on Yugoslav Society]* (Belgrade: Jugoslavenski Institut za Ekonomska Istraživanja 1967 [New York: International Arts and Sciences Press 1969]); Moša Pijade, *About the Legend that the Yugoslav Uprising Owed Its Existence to Soviet Assistance* (London: publisher not identified 1950); Boris Kidrič, *On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the FPRY* (Belgrade: Office of Information 1948); Edvard Kardelj, 'Evolution in Yugoslavia' 1956 (34) *Foreign Affairs* 580-602; Edvard Kardelj, *Tito and Socialist Revolution of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1981). Valuable are also biographies and testimonies from high-ranking officials and ambassadors such as Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953* (New York: Viking Press 1971); Veljko Mičunović, *Moscow Diary* (New York: Doubleday 1980).

²⁵ For instance, Branko Pribičević, *Socijalizam: Uspon i Pad [Socialism: Rise and Fall]* (Beograd: Naučna Knjiga 1991); James H Gapinski, *The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia* (Westport: Praeger 1993); Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiša S Adamovich (eds), *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community* (Boulder: Westview Press 1995).

In this thesis, I will call upon these contributions, together with the material from the Archives of Yugoslavia (AY), in order to explore this radical experiment.

Self-governance made Yugoslavia stand out in the divided geopolitical Cold War atmosphere which sought alignment to either the capitalist West or the socialist East. Its decentralised approach to domestic governance was in stark contrast to other socialist countries of the East. Indeed, its refusal to submit to the dictates of Moscow resulted in breaking away from the Soviet bloc in 1948, whereupon it did not simply defer to the West but insisted on the pursuit of its own path.²⁶ The West therefore perceived Yugoslavia, as a ‘neutral and benign socialist alternative’, reflected also in Western scholarship.²⁷ Its insistence also marked its foreign policy where Yugoslavia became ‘a prism for discerning fine-grained structures of engagement between local and global that, to an extent, escape strong ideological divisions’.²⁸ This national independence of emancipation mirrored in international independence of coexistence and cooperation makes Yugoslavia a particularly valuable case to study.

²⁶ Works on Yugoslavia's ideological conflict with the Soviet Union and other communist countries include Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath* (New York: Macmillan 1951); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1960); Alexander Dallin, *Diversity in International Communism* (New York, London: Columbia University Press 1963); Robert B Farrell (ed), *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1948-1956* (New York: Shoe String Press 1956); Ernst Halperin, *The Triumphant Heretic: Tito's struggle against Stalin* (London: Heinemann 1958); Thomas Taylor Hammond, *Yugoslavia Between East and West* (Foreign Policy Association 1954); Harry Hodgkinson, *West and East of Tito* (London: Gollancz 1952); Josef Korbel, *Tito's Communism* (Denver: University of Denver Press 1951); Charles P McVicker, *Titoism: Pattern for international communism* (London: Macmillan 1957); Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1948); Hugh Seton-Watson, *East European Revolution* (London: Methuen 1950); Adam B Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Harvard: Harvard University Press 1952).

²⁷ See Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (1960); John C Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper Row 1967); Lorraine M Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PN: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997).

²⁸ Branislav Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects: Performance and Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1945-91* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2016) 5.

3.2. Yugoslavia, Nonalignment, and the Non-Aligned Movement

While Yugoslav self-management is no longer in operation today, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held its latest, 18th Summit, on 25-26 October 2019 in Baku, under the chairmanship of Azerbaijan.²⁹ It was almost six decades after the Heads of State and Government from twenty-five states worldwide first came together to voice their concerns for a peaceful future, conditions for development, and how to resist the powerful (economic, political, and cultural) forces already weighing heavily on them. They became a voice for preserving authenticity in a world without armaments and reckoned this would be possible only if their newly gained sovereignty was protected. A reasonable sentiment, seeing that the majority of member states were involved in WWII, part of the colonial world and the ensuing decolonisation process, and directly affected by the Cold War rivalries. As will be seen in chapter 4, the feeling of having no say on issues discussed at the global stage created the fundamental reason for their shared mood of dissatisfaction with the prevailing unequal international system. Discussions therefore aimed to create a flourishing space where democratisation of international relations was possible - despite, or exactly because of, the presence of the major powers.

Following the rising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment at the time, NAM leaders markedly and unambiguously began vocalising their common experience of exploitation and a desire for economic, political, cultural, and technical cooperation based on their sovereignty, rather being subsumed through a forceful alliance with either the communist East or capitalist West. The concept of nonalignment came to encapsulate their ambition for peaceful coexistence between nation-states, irrespective of their size, political

²⁹ Next is Uganda, endorsed to chair NAM for the 2022-2025 period and to host the 19th Summit in 2022 in Kampala. Marking the 60th anniversary of the first Conference held in 1961 in Belgrade, former Yugoslavia, delegations from more than 105 countries attended a special commemorative NAM Summit in 11-12 October 2021 also in Belgrade, Serbia. Underscored was the role of multilateralism and solidarity, required more than ever when responding to current and future global crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, threats of terrorism, and their consequences to global peace and development.

arrangement, or stage of economic development. The validity and longevity of NAM's founding principles was evident in Baku despite, or exactly because of, the changing geopolitical and socioeconomic global landscape.

At the 18th Summit, the nonaligned member states reaffirmed their commitment to human security in the international system, and grounded their present role in advocacy for the 'respect for the political, economic, social and cultural diversity of countries and peoples... respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including the effective implementation of the right of peoples to peace and development'.³⁰ To ensure human security, the nonaligned stressed the significance of national ownership and leadership and emphasized enhanced international cooperation as an essential element of development strategies. This ought to include 'commitments of internationally agreed official development assistance, debt relief, market access, capacity building and technical support, including technology transfer'.³¹ The 2019 event was therefore a landmark multilateral political action for the changing global landscape with emerging centres of gravity. In their final summit document, leaders reaffirmed the 'validity and relevance of the Movement's principled positions concerning the promotion and preservation of multilateralism and the multilateral process' and underscored the 'importance of strengthening the current institutional mechanisms for South-South Cooperation' and collaboration.³² NAM expressed their firm beliefs that the new interregional alliances context bears the blessings of the 'spirits of Bandung and Belgrade' and can as such represent a way forward in political, economic, and geopolitical terms.

The formation of NAM in Belgrade (1961) was a pinnacle moment in Yugoslavia's foreign policy and a demonstration of President Tito's vision, charisma and personal diplomacy. As this thesis shows, the success was a

³⁰ NAM, The Final Document of the 18th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Baku, the Republic of Azerbaijan (25-26 October 2019) 249.

³¹ NAM, Final Document of the 18th Summit (2019) 19, 166.

³² NAM, Final Document of the 18th Summit (2019) 18-19, 181.

result of promoting the principles of the governance concept of self-management as the central pillar of country's foreign policy of nonalignment.³³ Just as Yugoslavia had united its different nationalities under the motto 'brotherhood and unity', so did NAM emerge as a heteronomy of states united against the Cold War division, encapsulating the notion of peaceful coexistence. Local emancipation gave shape to the economic and political emancipation of peoples on a world scale.³⁴ This makes NAM and Yugoslavia's role in its formation an important case study, still for purpose at present to explore nonalignment's viability in the development of foreign relations. In particular, to understand practices of peripheral international legal subjects and their equitable 'fit' into more powerful international constellations - with the goal to maintain the principle of self-determination in peaceful coexistence and close cooperation between nations of different internal systems.³⁵

It is important to note that much of historiography about the Cold War has focused on bilateral dynamics between the United States and the Soviet Union. Writings on significant influence of states attempting to escape the division into blocs and voicing concerns about its threat to peace has been somewhat pushed aside for decades. Thus, debates on NAM lie on the fringes, or at least seem to be. Perhaps this has been in part due to the fact that most outputs on the topic have been produced after WWII and subsumed or at least distorted by the end of the Cold War.³⁶ Furthermore, a lot of the studies were

³³ Stavrou, *Edvard Kardelj* (1985) 56; Lazar Mojsov, *Dimensions of Non-Alignment* (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost 1981) 147.

³⁴ Like Kardelj, Grlickov spoke of the 'interdependent aims' of nonaligned foreign policy and socialism. Aleksandar Grlickov, *Non-Alignment and Socialism as a World Process* (Beograd: STP 1979).

³⁵ For insightful discussions on the issue of legitimacy within Yugoslavia's larger history see Sabina P Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2006); Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948-1974* (London: C Hurst & Company 1977); Robert Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia* (Leiden, Boston: Brill 2018).

³⁶ Invaluable standard works on NAM remain John W Burton (ed), *Nonalignment* (London: Andre Deutsch 1966); Cecil V Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment* (New York: Praeger 1965); Godfrey H Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (London: Faber 1966) or *Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States* (New York: Praeger

state-specific and thus, while yielding insight into nonalignment, also highlighted the differences in framing the subject. For instance, the accounts published in India tended to accentuate the role of India and Jawaharlal Nehru in NAM, while the volumes from the former Yugoslavia did the same, only with Tito. Yet, there has been a renewed interest in the topic outside the Cold War context or perspective and furthering the understanding of NAM,³⁷ in particular about the meaning of nonalignment and its change over time, the evolution of NAM, and its relationship to the famous 1955 Bandung Conference and the concurrent (ultimately antagonistic) Afro-Asian movement.³⁸ This thesis then adds an important element in examination of

1966)]; Peter Lyon, *Neutrality* (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1963); Leo Mates, *Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy* (Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics and Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana Publications 1972); Alvin Z Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970); Yuri Alimov, *The Rise and Growth of the Non-aligned Movement* (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1987); Richard L Jackson, *The Non-aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger 1983); Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P Sauvart (eds), *The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries* (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana [now OUP] 1978); A W Singham and Shirley Hune, *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (Westport: Lawrence Hill 1986); Peter Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter 1978).

³⁷ Important contributions include Itty Abraham, 'From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65' 2008 (46) 2 *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 195-219; Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boškovića (eds), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade* (Abingdon: Routledge 2014); Rinna Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London: I.B. Tauris 2012); Mark Atwood Lawrence, 'The Limits of Peacemaking: India and the Vietnam War, 1962-1967' 2002 (1) 3 *India Review* 39-72; Svetozar Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment' 2014 (16) 1 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 146-179; Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York, London: The New Press 2007); Jeffrey Byrne, 'Algiers between Bandung and Belgrade: Guerrilla Diplomacy and the Evolution of the Third World Movement, 1954-1962' in Massimiliano Trentin and Matteo Gerlini (eds), *The Middle East and the Cold War: Between Security and Development* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2012); Amit Das Gupta, 'The Non-Aligned and the German Question' in Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 143-160; Jovan Čavoški, 'Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961' in Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 184-206.

³⁸ See especially Robert Vitalis, 'The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)' 2013 (4) 2 *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 261-288; Itty Abraham, 'From Bandung to NAM' (2008) 195-219.

the idea of nonalignment and its particular constituent elements as reflected in the international Movement's radical character during the Cold War.

3.3. Thesis Contribution

Describing... archival space is not an attempt to define its outer limits, all that it includes and excludes and all that I have left out... interest is not in the finite boundaries of the official state archives but in their surplus production, what defines their porous seams and what closures are transgressed by unanticipated exposition and writerly forms.³⁹

My project seeks to add to the existing conversations about the interrelated goals of independence and sovereignty, autonomous development and international coexistence and cooperation. I explore the potential of a historical experimentation to allow the 'past' to speak to contemporary crises, and to the 'future'. The thesis speaks about the value of peripheral subjects in the international legal order and of the importance of inclusion of such subjects in mainstream debates.

I undertake this contribution to existing debates on experimentation in the international legal order by exploring NAM through the lens and as an intrinsic part of a local setting, Yugoslav domestic policy of emancipation and its outcome as part of Yugoslavia's attempt to transform the world order through international cooperation. Although much research has been devoted to the analysis of self-management, nonalignment and Yugoslavia during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the intellectual space since 1990s has understandably focused on the dissolution of the Yugoslav state and subsequent wars, with topics of nationalism, nations, war and peace studies, crisis management, peacekeeping, and migrations among others, or turning away from examination of Yugoslavia as a state in favour of more focused topics and alternatives.⁴⁰ Indeed, there has been a sort of revival of studies on

³⁹ Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (2009) 8.

⁴⁰ See Bridget L Coggins, *Secession, Recognition and the International Politics of Statehood* (PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University 2006); Sabrina P Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debate about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and*

pre-1990s Yugoslavia, and a few studies have flourished recently about the past regime.⁴¹ Yet, studies about pillars of the Yugoslav socialist regime have fallen outside the research interests of most scholars,⁴² and despite works on Yugoslavia and its role in NAM, there is no current comprehensive literature on the relationship between Yugoslav socialist self-management and nonalignment.⁴³ This thesis seeks to fill that gap as a comprehensive treatment of experimentation in the international legal order based on and observed through the lens of Yugoslavia's domestic and international policies.

Yugoslavia remains a valuable case study as its significant developments in the 20th century are still inadequately known, understood or presented. Despite and along with some excellent monographs, articles, and theses, the intricate Yugoslav system is not always easy to understand, perhaps especially for those unfamiliar with Yugoslav socialist theory and practice, and even more so if one did not live through the system itself. Life in

Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005). Sociological issues gained popularity to enrich knowledge about life in that particular socialist system. See Ana Antić, 'The Pedagogy of Workers' Self-Management: Terror, Therapy, and Reform Communism in Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin Split' 2016 (50) 1 *Journal of Social History* 179-203; Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor (eds), *Yugoslavia's Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism 1950s-1980s* (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press 2010); Patrick Hyder Patterson, *Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2011); Breda Luthar and Marusa Pusnik (eds), *Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Washington DC: New Academia Publishing 2010).

⁴¹ Hilde Katrine Haug, *Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia: Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris 2012).

⁴² With exceptions, for instance Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise* (London: Routledge 1999); Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija: Država koja je Odumrla [Yugoslavia: State that Died]* (Zagreb: Prometej, Beograd: Samizdat B92 2003).

⁴³ Although some Yugoslav theorists and government officials did outline their theory about the relationship between nonaligned foreign policy and socialism. See Grličkov, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1979) 31-32, 42-43; Dimče Belovski, 'Non-alignment and the Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia' in A W Singham (ed), *The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics* (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co 1977) 11; Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 137; Vladimir Bakarić, *Self-Management, the Wellspring of Development and of Higher Quality of Life* (Belgrade: STP 1979) 24-25. Others contended the relationship or correlation between nonalignment and self-management was only artificial. Gregory Otha Hall, *Non-alignment and socialism: The relationship between foreign policy and domestic reform in socialist Yugoslavia* (PhD Thesis, Washington DC: Howard University 1993); William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987).

Yugoslavia certainly was different from the experience of people in the Soviet-style communism and dissimilar to life in East European communist satellites. The difference was grounded in Yugoslavia's unique nation-building process at home and the world(order)-building project globally. Building on this important distinction, the thesis explores how Yugoslav domestic and international policies can serve as prisms to examine alternative global pasts – such as NAM – and futures. More specifically, it examines how the alternative vision of self-determination as a legal concept for independence enables the pursuit and generation of an egalitarian world order. It thus reassesses nation-states' aspirations and their significance to the local-global interactions in the creation of alternative modalities of governance.

This sort of close investigation of the relationship between the local/domestic and its global/international elements forces us to rethink conceptions and ways of change at home and abroad, not least to move outside the bipolar East-West order.⁴⁴ The story of standard accounts (in international relations theory) of bipolarity is not incorrect, but it is incomplete. While the competition between the two superpowers can be understood in terms of the need for centres of power, the conflict over the Third World has not been usually explicable in this framework.⁴⁵ Rather, as Hobsbawm argued, it could

⁴⁴ For an insightful example see Luis Eslava, *Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015). See also Luis Eslava and Sundja Pahuja, 'Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law' 2012 (45) 2 *Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America* 195-221; Luis Eslava, 'Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International Law' 2014 (2) 1 *London Review of International Law* 3-47; Luis Eslava, 'Decentralization of Development and Nation-Building Today: Reconstructing Colombia from the Margins of Bogotá' 2009 (2) 1 *The Law and Development Review* 282-366; Robert Rhodes, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader* (US: Monthly Review Press, 1970), Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Julia Eckert (eds), *Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling: On the Governance of Law* (Burlington: Ashgate 2009); Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Anne Griffiths (eds), *Spatializing Law: An Anthropological Geography of Law in Society* (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate 2009); Walter D Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000).

⁴⁵ For a great survey on Soviet-American competition in the Third World see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2006);

only be understood within a specific historical context – in my case, the Yugoslav state in the second half of the 20th century.⁴⁶ By examining their radical potential, my project serves as a tool for critique and stretches our understanding of the dynamics of self-determination during the Cold War, and arguably beyond. It disturbs a clear pattern of division of the Cold War world between the East and the West and overcomes its inherent divides and presuppositions, including East/West, North/South, First World/Third World, and developed/undeveloped. The approach thereby escapes the hegemonic, Eurocentric frame which defines nonalignment as ‘strategy of certain Third world states to counter the bipolarity of the Cold War’.⁴⁷ It instead acknowledges ‘agency of peripherals’, the subaltern, the decolonised predominantly from the Global South, and those on the fringes of Europe.⁴⁸ It emphasises the exercise of sovereignty of each according to their own ‘local’ circumstance as a principle and one that has the power to impact, influence, and effect change and development domestically and internationally. My interrogation in this thesis of the Yugoslav socialist experiment addresses, at the same time, a gap in English language literature, by offering insights for left projects and democratic socialist discussions today, as well as historians of Yugoslavia and revolutionary movements.

I demonstrate how Yugoslavia’s domestic policy of self-management and its foreign policy in NAM validated a possibility of radical forms of (inter)national expression of and experimentation with sovereignty. Yugoslav promotion of self-management abroad in the form of nonalignment profoundly affected the international legal and political order during the Cold

Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press 1994); Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington: Brookings Institution 1986).

⁴⁶ And cautioned that the binary opposition between two exclusive worlds of Western capitalism and Soviet communism was an artificial construction. Eric J Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London: Abacus 1995) 4, 9.

⁴⁷ Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 13.

War era.⁴⁹ As such, the thesis exemplifies how experimentation with the two projects in the context of Yugoslavia, and NAM's efforts more widely, signifies a productive alternative to hegemonic forms (normative presumptions) and (streamlined) histories in a global (bi- or multi-polar) system. As such, the study enriches the underdeveloped research field of nonalignment and NAM, by assessing principles contravening and traversing from national to international.

To re-think such radical politics from a specific part of the world also invites a re-investigation of its past for valuable lessons on alternatives in the international legal order. Over the years, the two phenomena of Yugoslav self-management and nonalignment were evaluated in a broad, and often contradictory, spectrum of political and academic discourse, ranging from praise to condemnations. As a result, it seems problematic to define, historicize, and theorize them. Perhaps this is also due to the monochrome understanding of Yugoslavia's past from a post-socialist era which resulted in the abandonment of socialism as concept and practice and instead resulted in, what two of the best-known leftist intellectuals in the Balkan region today call, 'a lost cause for progressive forces, prone only to right-wing politics and extremism, to support the pro-US and pro-NATO policies, and to unconditional surrender to neoliberalism'.⁵⁰ The thesis therefore contributes to a re-evaluation of its potential for contemporary challenges. As such, it contributes to a critical discourse on radical interventions that subvert the accepted framework of linear progression. It does not seek to abstract or simplify a very complex country and its history but refuses to understand anything pertaining to its socialist past as simply an element of a compromised or authoritarian regime and therefore to be dismissed. My sole aim is to contribute to an informed scholarly exchange and thus to the interests of the attentive public.

⁴⁹ For instance, in the 1970s some of the principles of the Yugoslav self-management were adopted in Tanzania and Algeria. See Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 137; Zimmerman, *Open Borders* (1987).

⁵⁰ Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks (eds), *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia* (London: Verso 2015) 3.

The objective is therefore not to rewrite history but to set self-management and nonalignment in their historical context, taking into account the theoretical and practical debates, while being fully aware of their almost ‘accidental’ nature of ascent. Namely, it is only possible to observe how the two evolved in any particular direction in retrospect. The theoreticians, diplomats, and statesmen at the time had no special foresight, only (political and diplomatic) skills and determination. However, I add, their inspiring theory transcended the events that produced it and therefore underwrite the importance of this study. The challenges that they spoke into are as profound today as they were when they first upset the Cold War ‘status quo’. Given the continued existence of NAM and despite its changed role in the international legal order, the policy of nonalignment arguably still has potential for the present and future. The potential to experiment with ideas and materialities of emancipatory governance locally or globally ought to remain a continuous possibility in the international legal order. Rather than relegating self-management and nonalignment to the ‘graveyard of history’, this thesis will thus explore Tito’s state-building emancipatory project and Yugoslav pursuit of international cooperation in order to gain a fuller understanding of Cold War historiography but also of contemporary challenges. The preservation of sovereignty was a crucial issue during the Cold War and remains significant in the context of current crises worldwide.

4. Framing: Historiography and Critical Archives

...different research methods carve out different versions of reality, and all fail to capture in total the messy contingency of everyday life.⁵¹

Archives, therefore, are ‘not simply accounts of actions or records of what people thought happened’ or materialisation of official decrees as to what needs to be documented and preserved.⁵²

⁵¹ John Law, *After Method: Mess in social science research* (London, New York: Routledge 2004) 103, 148.

⁵² Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (2009) 4.

4.1. History: A Critical Approach

In this thesis I bring together two distinct though interrelated embodiments of the principle of self-governance, one national and one international, in a particular historical context. As seen above, this context is complex and disputed (not too dissimilar to the heterogeneity of NAM's members and their understanding of the Movement, or to the Yugoslav federal arrangement). It highlights the two converging in a particular space and time, each asserting an alternative in an already entrenched and established geopolitical order. However, that context, while allowing them to think and act outside its box, at the same time boxes the narratives in a particular preconceived and - to an extent - improvised parcel.⁵³ This requires a further note on the question of historiography or, more precisely, the dialectical relationship between the sources and their understanding and where the radical potential emerges.

It has to be stated that any historical records are vulnerable to historical revisionism and commodification of memory or nostalgia.⁵⁴ As such, the study of sources and documents in relation to events in former Yugoslavia, while 'in the domain' of scholars, is still in the hands of politics. Historiography can be problematic when politics imposes its understanding of historical events as the only expert one or historical truth, convincing the public that remembrance is the only true history of a particular time. Having one-sided, politically, ideologically constructed or highlighted memories divides citizens, rekindles old conflicts, is exclusive and stifled. It deliberately

⁵³ Here, I think of Rose Parfitt's ingenious description of a 'box'. See Rose Parfitt, *The Process of International Legal Reproduction: Inequality, Historiography, Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019).

⁵⁴ See, for instance, Horvat and Štiks, *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism* (2015); Božo Repe, *Between Myths and Ideology: Some Views on Slovene Contemporary Historiography* (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts 2009) 33-35; Michael Antolović, 'Writing History Under the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat': Yugoslav Historiography 1945-1991' 2021 (39) 2 *Revista de História das Ideias* 49-73; Janko Pleterski, 'Različna pisanja zgodovine [Different Writings of History]' and 'Zgodovina je zgodovina zmagovalcev [History is History of the Victors]' *Delo* (21 and 28 February 1987); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press 2015).

overlooks the needs of the present generation to connect and advance social relations. This study wishes to do the opposite: to challenge and subvert simple historiographical remembrance by pointing out its tensions and inconsistencies. Considering the possibility of a plurality of memory is not about unifying views on a particular side of history. It is about pointing out the complexity, recognising the discrepancies and thus gaining a fuller understanding in order to investigate or challenge the present. It resists the denomination of a definitive cognition or identification as a ‘connoisseur’ or salvific interpreter.

It is interesting to observe Yugoslav attempts to guide the narrative about the historical events, foremost the figure of Tito. The official biographer Vladimir Dedijer was one of the first to deconstruct the myth of Tito and that, in turn, encouraged attempts to protect his name and work.⁵⁵ In this way, the deconstruction of a myth turned into its enforced construction.⁵⁶ Yet, one of the leading Slovene historians Božo Repe is quick to point out that a unified Yugoslav historiography never really existed as it was too heterogeneous, small and underdeveloped to be able to create its own ‘historical school’.⁵⁷ Indeed, the first generation of Marxism-oriented historians consisted mostly of trained or educated partisan staff and hastily translated Soviet textbooks for various levels of education. Around the time of the conflict with the Information Bureau in 1948, however, ideological surveillance was imposed on any reconceptualization on the Marxist-Leninist grounds.⁵⁸ Its goal was

⁵⁵ Dedijer published a mixture of documents, memories and unverified stories regarding Tito's personal life, the question of revolutionary measures and international relations. See Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju [Josip Broz Tito: Contributions towards a biography]* (Belgrade: Kultura 1953); Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New Contributions towards biography of Josip Broz Tito]* (Zagreb: Mladost 1980).

⁵⁶ As Repe wrote, authorities founded a special committee to safeguard the names of various (dead) revolutionaries and the Slovene historian Dušan Biber even proposed a committee for the protection of the revolution itself. See Repe, *Between Myths and Ideology* (2009) 33-35.

⁵⁷ Repe, *Between Myths and Ideology* (2009) 33-35.

⁵⁸ Antolović, ‘Writing History’ (2021) 49-73.

clear: unanimity to prove the correctness of the Yugoslav viewpoint.⁵⁹ However, due to a gradual weakening of ideological surveillance from the 1960s onwards, Yugoslav historiography became emancipated from Marxist dogmatism.⁶⁰ Following various forms of social history, its directions were not uniform and instead greatly fragmented (with circumstances in individual Yugoslav republics differing greatly). Despite existence of the common institution uniting historians of the federation, Yugoslav historiography was constituted by a set of six national ones with their research programs focused on the history of their own republic or province.⁶¹ With rather fragile connections between these historical societies, many joint historiographical projects were either left unfinished, due to methodological discrepancies, or incited controversies between historians over various phenomena from the Yugoslav history.⁶² Its modernization was carried out partially due to growing social crises and political conflicts that eventually led to Yugoslav dissolution.⁶³

4.2. Archives: A Critical Approach

The thesis explores the history of Yugoslav self-determination in the form of its domestic policy of self-management and foreign policy of nonalignment

⁵⁹ Pleterski, 'Different Writings of History' and 'History is History of the Victors' *Delo* (21 and 28 February 1987); Repe, *Between Myths and Ideology* (2009) 37-43.

⁶⁰ Historiography ranged from Marxism being only one possible methodological procedures (not as the absolute and only truth) to being in direct service of politics and ideology. Despite paradoxes, or precisely because of them, Yugoslav historiography was distinguished by relatively great pluralism and openness to the world in contrast to the historiography in the East European countries.

⁶¹ Historians of *Zveza zgodovinarjev Jugoslavije* [Association of Yugoslav Historians] met at a congress held roughly every four years (nine times between 1954 and 1987). Božo Repe, 'Razpad historiografije, ki nikoli ni obstajala: institucionalne povezave jugoslovanskih zgodovinarjev in skupni projekti [Collapse of Historiography that Never Existed: Institutional Connections of Yugoslav Historians and Joint Projects]' 1996 (3) 1 *Zgodovina za vse* 69-78, 69; Božo Repe, 'Jugoslovanska historiografija po drugi svetovni vojni [Yugoslav Historiography after the Second World War]' 1999 (1-4) *Tokovi istorije/Currents of history: Journal of the Institute for recent history Serbia* 312-325; Repe, *Between Myths and Ideology* (2009).

⁶² Repe, 'Yugoslav Historiography' (1999) 315-316; Antolović, 'Writing History' (2021) 49-73.

⁶³ Antolović, 'Writing History' (2021) 49-73.

with a focus on concepts of sovereignty, independence and cooperation. I carry out this study in two ways: with the help of historical sources and documents on Yugoslav policies and of the works of Yugoslav politicians and ideologues such as the leading ideologue of self-managed socialism, Edvard Kardelj among others.⁶⁴ I position my analysis into broader conversations in scholarship of cold war studies, international history, and postcolonial studies, whose focus lies outside bi-polar framework. I also examine achievements and failures of NAM to demonstrate the active role of ‘agency of the subaltern’ - decolonized states predominantly from Global South and from the fringes of Europe.⁶⁵

I adopted a pluralist and interdisciplinary approach, and critical archival analysis as methods in service of critical reading of the long-term development of Yugoslavia’s ideologies, policies, directions, and events. Indeed, to enrich the account of the role of Yugoslav policies in development of NAM, my entry point was the national archive – a national entry point to examine its international impact.⁶⁶ In other words, my legal research highlighted a dialectical process and a link between the international and national on two levels, conceptually and methodologically. And while there are many archives across the world that are relevant for research on NAM, my analysis is based mainly on archival work conducted in the Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije, AY) in Belgrade, Serbia.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ For deliberations of the national and its import for the international, see especially works of the leading ideologue Edvard Kardelj, *Zgodovinske Korenine Neuvrščenosti [Historical Roots of Nonalignment]* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1978); Edvard Kardelj, *Yugoslavia in International Relations and in the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1979).

⁶⁵ Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 13.

⁶⁶ I received formal training at the Institute of Historical Research in London (titled *Methods and Sources for Historical Research*). By visiting various types of primary sources’ depositories around London, I familiarised myself with knowledge of standards and best practices associated with archival material, of the process of critically appraising, acquiring, or rejecting material for special collections and archives, and gained knowledge of good practice in information governance.

⁶⁷ The (inexhaustive) list of relevant archives includes: In Belgrade, Serbia: Arhiv Jugoslaviie (The Archives of Yugoslavia, AY); Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Archives of Josip Broz Tito, AJBT); Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (Diplomatic archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, DAMSP RS); Arhiv

Fonds I consulted include: AY FSCC, 320 49 and 61: The Federal Science and Culture Committee (1971-1978); AY CPY, 507: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1919-1990); The LCY Central Committee Collection, Transcripts of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; AY IIPE, 748: The Institute of International Politics and Economics [Institut za medunarodno politiku i privredu] (1947-1990); AY KMJ, 836: Marshall of Yugoslavia's Office [Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije] (1943-1953); AY KPR, 837: Office of the President of the Republic [Kabinet Predsednika Republike] (14.I.1953 – 4.V.1980); AY KPR, 837-I-1-a to KPR-II-5-c: Yugoslav Interactions with the Nonaligned States; AY JBTPF, 838: Josip Broz Tito's Personal Fond [Lični fond Josipa Broza Tita] (1937-1980).⁶⁸

The grandiose three-storey AY building in the style of academicism was built as an endowment of King Alexander I Karadjordjević in the 1930s.⁶⁹ Walking up to it through a wide elongated boulevard lined with tall trees, it already felt like a pleasant inviting step back into something already lived. At the small gate-building, typically used as a reception back in the days, identity details would be handwritten in the A4 notebook, and a pass was given to me for the day. As I entered the large hall, the big exhibition room revealed itself before what would be the 8000 square metres holding facility. On the right, there was the Big Conference Room shaped like an amphitheatre and able take up

Saveznog ministarstva za Inostrane poslove (The Archive of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASMIP); Archives of Internal Affairs; Archive of Serbia and Montenegro. In Slovenia: Arhiv Republike Slovenije (The Archive of the Republic of Slovenia); Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino Slovenije (The Institute of Contemporary History of Slovenia); the regional archives such as Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana; Celje; Ptuj (Historical Archive Ljubljana; Celje; Ptuj). In New Delhi, India: The National Archives of India (for example, Ministry of External Affairs Files 1947-1964); Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; Ministry of External Affairs Archives (MEA). In USA: The National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, NARA); Central Intelligence Agency, Electronic Reading Room (CIA-ERR, available at <www.foia.cia.gov>); John F Kennedy Library (Boston). In the UK: The National Archives: Public Records Office, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966 (PRO FO) in London, United Kingdom.

⁶⁸ After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the material became property of the Republic of Serbia. Most documents are accessible after 30 years.

⁶⁹ The decision to grant the building to the Archives was made by the Federal Executive Council at its 1969 session. Before that, the Archives were housed in different buildings around Belgrade.

to 240 visitors. It felt like an adventure treading into the past as my steps echoed along the corridor on the distinctively red carpet, approaching the library rich with relevant resources and the Reading Room with wardrobe lockers on the outside. The space where the archival holdings and library sources were brought in for consultation was a pleasant bright room with lots of natural light, extraordinary tall white ceilings, massive brown tables and huge windows – the king style. Situated on the other side of the corridor, the Restaurant equipped synonymously for the era gone by invited nostalgia yet again, with its (Parisienne style) small tables covered with checker tablecloths and serving coffee 1980s style.

The Archives of Yugoslavia houses and protects the material relating to activities between 1914/18 to 2006 of the Yugoslav central government, state authorities, bodies, and organisations in the areas of domestic and foreign policy, economy, finance and banking, education, healthcare, culture, social policy and justice, among others.⁷⁰ It was established by the General Law on State Archives in 1950 as the State Archives of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and renamed the Archives of Yugoslavia after the Law on the Archives of Yugoslavia was passed in 1964. The Archives of Yugoslavia opened its fonds to the public in 1958 and currently exists as a cultural institution, museum and library. It remains an invaluable historic documentation treasury for scholars or curious individuals, with sources used for qualitative appraisal and categorization of history of the state that ceased to exist, its social, economic and political systems, as well as for research of the 20th century more broadly beyond its borders.⁷¹

⁷⁰ According to archivist Branka Doknić, the Archives of Yugoslavia has in its depots around 25 kilometres of archival material, comprising 847 fonds, of which some 630 belong to the socialist period. Its storage capacity was sufficient until takeover of large quantity of holdings in the 1990s when the added material was deposited in various Ministries and still awaits processing, organisation and unification. Branka Doknić, 'Using of Archives in Scientific Purposes: The Archives of Yugoslavia' 2016 (26) 2 *ATLANTI* 255-262, 257; Tonka Župančić, 'National Archival Systems and Structures in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' Summer 1990 (53) *American Archivist* 476-482, 480.

⁷¹ Data base on research topics is kept in the Archives of Yugoslavia's Reading Room: *Arhiv Jugoslavije: 1950-1995; Korisnici, teme istraživanja i korisćeni fondovi - edition: 1995-1998; 1999-2003; 2003-2008.*

Admittedly nostalgic browsing the archive, the thesis became a sculptured collage found in fonds, exhibitions' objects, and scholarly writings. It is then a product of 'conversations' with scholars in the field in addition to a comprehensive use of primary documents, including archival material, newspapers articles (including the newspaper *Borba*, the official publication of CPY since 1922, and other governmentally overseen periodicals), interviews, memoirs, and documents of various institutions.

The archive functioned in my research and my analysis as a space of critique, as it helped me think conceptually when writing history.⁷² For one, the archive provided me with a framework, within which to consider the development of the Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies, and ideas as I looked for material that portrayed the evolution in political, economic, and social life, and evidence about the technology of power in socialist Yugoslavia and beyond.⁷³ I should also like to note that examining sources in AY or re-reading of pertinent events from my primary and secondary school history textbooks revived my own memories and engaged a critical reflection on my own lived experience of Yugoslavia. It affirmed the importance of the way a generation is educated of its history, and of history's purpose for the present and future.

Conceptually, I position the archive as an active research and instructional agency rather than static warehouse, a valuable source not only for scholars

⁷² Trouillot, *Silencing the Past* (2015); Ann L Stoler, 'Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance' 2002 (2) *Archival Science* 87-202; Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press 2009); Renisa Mawani, 'Law's Archive' 2012 (8) *Annual Review of Law and Society Science* 337-651.

⁷³ Where an English translation was not available, I have provided a translation. I have, occasionally, given preference to the Serb-Croat or Slovene edition of works to emphasise a particular feature of the original text. It is important to note, that the research project faced the expected challenges that emerge with translation. Besides understanding languages (Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian), it was also important to consider a matter of the translation process as well as the underlying meaning of 'language' in debates and documents. To put it differently, when writing on Yugoslavia, and on any NAM state for that matter, appreciation of the way of thinking of those in past particular space-time is crucial. A challenging and complex task as no text can reveal in entirety where leaders were forming or getting their information from and how they were interpreting it. See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone 2007) 35; Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (2009).

but also for governmental authorities in assessing or planning.⁷⁴ I perceive archives also as cultural assets to be preserved, utilised and safeguarded as they can be used for state's soft power.⁷⁵

Of course, these are things to consider when approaching and analysing historical documents in order to discover their import for today. I was aware of the limitations of archival work, both those related to the present or inherited from the past. That is, the importance of having access to an archive (the present) and of the limits that stem from dependency on which archival documents are preserved and recognized (the past). Constraints involve those associated with the role of an archivist and that of a scholar or user of an archive. For instance, lack of accessibility to archival material is one of the reasons research projects, particularly those of sensitive matters, fall behind, are obscured or even non-existent. The reasons why sources are unavailable or inaccessible are varied, and may be reflecting the political and socio-economic reality, or are a result of (lacking) legal regulation or other.⁷⁶ It could thus be argued that documentation and archiving was, and is, not a passive activity but a manifestation of epistemic habits of a given time and space. For instance, the Yugoslav institutions of political parties were not legally obliged to hand over their archives to the Archives of Yugoslavia. Also, AY records reflected the appraisal list devised or approved by the federal authorities whose work already was there. They were also obliged to

⁷⁴ The insightful accounts on the (un)usual 'archive of the (inter)national' are portrayed in the works of Gal Kirn, *The Partisan Counter-Archive: Retracing the Ruptures of Art and Memory in the Yugoslav People's Liberation Struggle* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter 2020); Mawani, 'Law's Archive' (2012) 337-651; Stewart Motha and Honni van Rijswijk (eds), *Law, Memory, Violence: Uncovering the Counter-Archive* (London and New York: Routledge 2016); Stoler, 'Colonial Archives' (2002) 87-202; Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (2009); Christopher Tomlins and John Comaroff, 'Law as': Theory and Practice in Legal History' 2011 (1) 3 *UCI Law Review* 1039-1079; Trouillot, *Silencing the Past* (2015).

⁷⁵ Here I have in mind my report, *The Relationship between the British Library's International Purpose and the UK's Soft Power*, written upon my research in the British Library (London 2019/2020).

⁷⁶ A good example is Tito's comrade and biographer Vladimir Dedijer, a great admirer of archival document who was keen to hand over his private records to the Memorial Centre Josip Broz Tito, but which unfortunately never transpired. Similarly, it remains unknown what happened to Anton Vratuša's personal archive upon his passing in 2017. See also Doknić, 'Using of Archives' (2016) 258-259.

dispose records with no ongoing value within one year from the date indicated on the appraisal list (with records listed for disposal reviewed by AY).⁷⁷ All these potentially create uneasiness as to how much was preserved only partially, hidden, or discarded. In other words, although I had access to the Archives of Yugoslavia, I was ‘confined’ by the material that was (already) publicly available or processed (with included limitation of time at my disposal to conduct research in AY).⁷⁸ Indeed, the (in)accessibility of archives is a sign of the *Zeitgeist* of an era – be it through simplification of historical events, decontextualization, or historical revisionism.⁷⁹ Almost poetically Paul Valéry described history as a:

*...dangerous product evolved from the chemistry of intellect...
to provoke dreams, intoxicate nations, accumulate false
memories, exaggerate their complexes, keep old wounds
open, make nations bitter, arrogant and vain, justifying those
things they want... History will justify anything. It teaches
precisely nothing, for it contains everything.*⁸⁰

Scholar and AY archivist Branka Doknić highlighted another cause of the (in)accessibility of archival material. While it used to be due to ideological and political reasons, it is at present more a consequence of intellectual and

⁷⁷ Thus, it seems significant that in the process of reasoning what records to keep or discard, liaison with various stakeholders should ideally also be involved, including trained archivists, governmental ministries, scholars among others. Župančić, ‘National Archival Systems and Structures’ (1990) 479; Salvatore Carbone and Raoul Guêze, *Draft Model Law on Archives: Description and Text* (Paris: UNESCO 1972) 7-8.

⁷⁸ I think here of Stoler’s deliberations on ‘archive’s margins’ whereby ‘what was written oblique to official prescriptions... opened to a space that extended beyond it’, and can accordingly relate to what Daston and Galison called ‘epistemological worries’. See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone 2007) 35; Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain* (2009).

⁷⁹ In Yugoslavia in particular, this includes the so-called Yugonostalgia. Meaning that on the one hand, historical revisionism and nationalist propaganda in the post-Yugoslav context have tried to eradicate the legacy of partisan and socialist struggles. On the other hand, Yugonostalgia denotes the commodification of the partisan and socialist past, where its accounts turn ‘into escapism and commodification of memory’. See Džeremi Blek and Donald M Makrejld, *Izučavanje Istorije [Learning History]* (Beograd: Clio 2007) 223; Horvat and Štiks, *Welcome to the Desert* (2015) 145.

⁸⁰ Paul Valéry, *The collected works of Paul Valéry: History and politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1956 [1931]) 114.

financial (ir)responsibility.⁸¹ Doknić underscored the importance of efficient organisation of its holdings and a clear methodology which depend on organizational changes and a willingness to modernize such institutions and adapt them to current high standards.⁸² The problem of arrangement of the records registry in the post-WWII period was especially intense, with federal authorities and organizations undergoing transformations and creating enormous quantities of archival records. Consequently, material in AY was in disarray and in poor condition, not well-kept and preserved nor respected.⁸³ The created archival fonds were fragmentary, both physically and by content. There is thus also the role of the archivist in deciding what to keep and what to discard. According to Doknić, while the principles of provenance and respect for original order are generally followed in AY, the arrangement and description of records relies on a method and form determined by the archivist. This - at times rigid - method is then connected to the challenges of valorisation, categorisation and digitisation.⁸⁴ Accordingly, as a legal historian, I was thus mindful that I am only able to illuminate the past as much as the past has prepared for it, but also to the extent that the present allows for it.⁸⁵

With recognitions about the challenges of archival work in general, and specifically the Archives of Yugoslavia, I approached them as a place of struggle, not only in their creation and existence but also as a glimpse into the tension between domestic and international histories within which the critical

⁸¹ Doknić, 'Using of Archives' (2016) 256; Carbone and Raoul, *Draft Model Law on Archives* (1972) 13.

⁸² This includes the need for regular professional education and vocational training of archivists (and scholars). This problem, identified already in the 1980s (and indeed considered by few 19th-century utopian socialists), was treated differently across Yugoslav republics (reflecting country's political decentralisation). Župančić, 'National Archival Systems and Structures' (1990) 481; Doknić, 'Using of Archives' (2016) 257, 261.

⁸³ Župančić, 'National Archival Systems and Structures' (1990) 480.

⁸⁴ Doknić, 'Using of Archives' (2016).

⁸⁵ Despite encountering 'difficulties of finding primary historical sources, [Dedijer] regarded them as a tool for an 'objective researcher to do his job honestly'. Vladimir Dedijer, 'A Guide to Infiltrators' *The New York Review* (25 March 1971) available at <<https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/03/25/a-guide-to-infiltrators/>> accessed 10 February 2022.

task of this thesis is carried out. The archive then acts as a site to engage critically with alternative forms of governance and cooperation underpinned by international law. By enabling the exploration of NAM as an intrinsic part of the Yugoslav domestic story of emancipation and as the outcome of Yugoslavia's attempt to transform the global situation, the archive becomes a source of an alternative analysis of history. It recognises the emancipatory potential of peripheral actors to break the supposed coherence, linearity, and simplicity of the global order. In this way, I argue, the archive acts as a space for reaction, resistance and redefinition of fixed, imposed or controlled representations of the domestic and international order. Such an approach disrupts assumed understandings of self-management and nonalignment, while also inviting us to problematise a proclivity to historical closures in the study of international law on a methodological level.

5. Thesis Contribution to the Literature of International Law

I analyse in this thesis the Yugoslav distinct historical legacy at home that gave way for the country to become a global political force. As such, I add to the critical discussions of the topic by Gal Kirn and his *Partisan Ruptures*, Rinna Kula's *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe*, Svetozar Rajak's *No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest*, Itty Abraham's *From Bandung to NAM*, to authors of Nataša Mišković's edited volume *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (and in particular Jovan Čavoški's *Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists*), and to Dragan Bogetić's collection.⁸⁶ With a specific focus on this Balkan country and the

⁸⁶ Gal Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures: Self-Management, Market Reform and the Spectre of Socialist Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto Press 2019); Rinna Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London: I.B. Tauris 2012); Svetozar Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment' 2014 (16) 1 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 146-179; Itty Abraham, 'From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65' 2008 (46) 2 *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 195-219; Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boškovska (eds), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade* (Abingdon: Routledge 2014); Jovan Čavoški, 'Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961' in Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (2014) 184-

impact of its pursuit of independence on world order, I argue that national and international struggles and stories of the peripheral international legal subjects profoundly influenced and distorted the bi-polar dynamics of the Cold War. According to Branislav Jakovljević, Yugoslavia became ‘a prism for discerning... engagement between local and global that... escape strong ideological divisions’.⁸⁷ As such, and in the presence of eminent efforts such as Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad’s edited volume on the history of the Cold War and Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah’s edited *Bandung, the Global South, and International Law* with its focus on Asia and Africa, their (local) stories become a source of an alternative (global) historical analysis.⁸⁸ Both volumes are great examples of ways that through various geographical and national angles signify a transformation of the field from a national (Soviet or American primarily) to a broader international approach and stand, as does my thesis, in contrast to the mainstream attempts

206; Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju - od ideje do pokreta [Nonalignment throughout history - From idea to movement]* (Beograd: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika 2019); Dragan Bogetić, ‘Jugoslavija i Nesvrstanost: Prilog Prevazilaženju Predrasuda i Stereotipa [Yugoslavia and Non-Alignment: Contribution to Overcoming Prejudice and Stereotype]’ 2014 (24) 4 *ANNALES Ser Hist Sociol* 615-624; Dragan Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement’ in Igor S Novaković (ed), *Neutrality in the 21st Century - Lessons for Serbia* (Beograd: ISAC Fond 2013); Dragan Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement’ in Duško Dimitrijević and Jovan Čavoški (eds), *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics 2021).

Invaluable older works on NAM remain Burton’s *Nonalignment* (1966), Crabb Jr’s, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965), Jansen’s *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment* (1966), Lyon’s *Neutrality* (1963), Mates’ *Nonalignment* (1972), Rubinstein’s *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970), Alimov’s *The Rise and Growth of the Non-aligned Movement* (1987), Jackson’s *The Non-aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (1983), Jankowitsch and Sauvart’s *The Third World without Superpowers* (1978), Singham and Hune’s *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986), and Willetts’ *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978).

⁸⁷ Branislav Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects: Performance and Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1945-91* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2016).

⁸⁸ Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010); Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, the Global South and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017).

of a Cold War understandings of Yugoslavia within the East-West paradigm.⁸⁹

Addressing the question of experimentation and state resistance within or against the established international legal order, my thesis sits alongside debates on the nature of the international law, such as Martti Koskenniemi's *From Apology to Utopia* and *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, Antony Anghie's *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* and Sundhya Pahuja's *Decolonising International Law*. Experiences of peripheral nation-states are brought forth to form a more comprehensive historical knowledge by making the production of legal knowledge more comprehensive (Anghie) or by more inclusive organising economic thought of what 'developing state' is (Pahuja).⁹⁰ I join debates in international legal history,⁹¹ particularly on debates on eurocentrism in writing legal history,⁹²

⁸⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1960); Committee on the Judiciary United State Senate, *Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1961); George Walter Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1962); John C Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper Row 1967); Lorraine M Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PN: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997).

⁹⁰ Martti Koskenniemi, *From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010); Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); Sundhya Pahuja, *Decolonising International Law Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011).

⁹¹ Matthew Craven, 'Theorising the Turn to History in International Law' in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016) 21-37. See also Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York, London: The New Press 2007).

⁹² Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1989); Arnulf Becker Lorca, 'Eurocentrism in the History of International Law' in Fassbender and Peters (eds), *The Oxford Handbook* (2014) 1034-1057; BS Chimni, 'The Past, the Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach' 2007 (8) *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 499-516; Antony Anghie and BS Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts' 2003 (2) *Chinese Journal of International Law* 77-103; Martti Koskenniemi, 'Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism' 2011 (19) *Rechtsgeschichte* 152-176. See also Christopher Tomlins and John Comaroff, 'Law as': Theory and Practice in Legal History' 2011 (1) 3 *UCI Law Review* 1039-1079.

and on the ‘doctrine versus state practice’ conundrum when writing histories of the international law in the absence of consensus on what international law is.⁹³

By addressing dialectical relationship between the national and international through the archive, I also join in debates of legal scholars such as Rose Parfitt who mobilised archival research in pursuit of a legal historiography in her *The Process of International Legal Reproduction*.⁹⁴ Before the reader is a history(ography) of emancipation that is using the archive as a methodological tool (lens) for critique of concepts such as self-determination, sovereignty and cooperation on the national and the international level. As such, the thesis sits alongside, for example, Sara Kendall and Emily Haslam’s archival research in analysing the role of international law in transforming the global order.⁹⁵ The thesis includes an element of a historical overview of Yugoslav policies of self-management and nonalignment by systematically summarising their emergence, development and challenges. At the same time, its account departs from historical narratives that focus on one subtlety, be it politics, diplomacy, economy, education or culture.⁹⁶ Instead, it examines

⁹³ Anthony Carty, ‘Doctrine versus State Practice’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014) 972-996.

⁹⁴ Rose Parfitt, *The Process of International Legal Reproduction: Inequality, Historiography, Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019).

⁹⁵ Sara Kendall, ‘Archiving Victimhood: Practices of Inscription in International Criminal Law’ in Stewart Motha and Honni van Rijswijk (eds), *Law, Memory, Violence: Uncovering the Counter-Archive* (London: Routledge 2016); Emily Haslam, *The Slave Trade, Abolition and the Long History of International Criminal Law: The Recaptive and the Victim* (London, New York: Routledge 2020). See also R Mawani, ‘Law’s Archive’ 2012 (8) *Annual Review of Law and Society Science* 337-651; A L Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press 2009); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press 2015).

⁹⁶ Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan and Nawal A El Tataway, *Yugoslavia: Self-Management, Socialism and the Challenges of Development* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press 1979); Harold Lydall, *Yugoslav Socialism, Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); Miloš Nikolić, ‘The Theoretical Bases of Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia’ 1981 (23) *Socialism in the World* 22-59; Miloš Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse samoupravljanja [Development of Theory and Practice of Self-management]* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1989); Branko Pribičević, *Socijalizam: Svetski proces [Socialism: The World Process]* (Beograd: Monos 1979); Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (London: MacMillan 1976); Rudi Supek, *Participacija, Radnička*

Yugoslavia and its policies of self-management and nonalignment as a single case study where the centre of attention is the interplay between the international, national, and local levels of governance in highly complex and disputed settings. By doing so, it politicises sovereignty and development by pointing out ‘the larger framework within which those conditions are systematically reproduced’.⁹⁷

As it will be seen, such movement between levels of governance is more effective when departing from the positivist straight lines of preconceived legal or political principles and instead exploring how they are shaped by their ideational factors from a constructivist lens.⁹⁸ For instance, while the ‘literature tends to present self-determination in the form a linear narrative’ that began with the UN Charter in 1945, followed by the Decolonization Declaration that in the 1960s ‘crystallised’ into a rule of customary international law, Kattan argued that self-determination ‘mirrors the

Kontrola i Samoupravljanje: Prilog Povijesnom Kontinuitetu Jedne Ideje [Participation, Workers’ Control and Self-management: Contribution to the Continuity of an Idea] (Zagreb: Naprijed 1974). Works of (Slovenian) economists include Janez Prašnikar, *Delavska participacija in samoupravljanje v deželah v razvoju [Workers’ Participation and Self-management in Developing Countries]* (Beograd: Komunist 1989); and by sociologists Veljko Rus and Frane Adam, *Moč i nemoč samoupravljanja [Power and Powerlessness of Self-management]* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba 1986); James H Gapinski, *The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia* (Westport: Praeger 1993); Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiša S Adamovich (eds), *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community* (Boulder: Westview Press 1995).

⁹⁷ Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’ (2011) 74 *Modern Law Review* 57-78, 71.

⁹⁸ Here I think of the Critical Legal Studies literature by, for example, NG Onuf and FV Kratochwill, D Kennedy or M Koskenniemi. See Nicholas G Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (London, New York: Routledge 1989); Friedrich V Kratochvil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989); David Kennedy, *International Legal Structures* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1987); Koskenniemi, *From Apology to Utopia* (2005). On discussions of the state of history in the international law see, for example, Matthew Craven, ‘Introduction: international Law and its Histories’ in Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds), *Time, History and International Law* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2007) 1-25; IJ Hueck, ‘The Discipline of the History of International Law’ 2001 (3) *Journal of the History of International Law* 194-217. Throughout chapters, when outlining how certain emerging ideas of (Yugoslav) identities, interests, and norms shaped Yugoslavia’s policies, I am mindful how they can be thought of, framed in constructivist social theory in International Relations. Insightful potential that can be developed further in my prospective monograph.

ideological system' of a particular state (US or USSR) or group of states (whether capitalist, communist or socialist), which affects the way self-determination is understood by each.⁹⁹ It is therefore to be read alongside attempts to point out international law's indeterminate nature of internal paradoxes, exclusionary forces and systemic blind spots, together with its complexity and contingency of legal argumentation such as Gerry Simpson's *Linear law* or Martti Koskenniemi's *The Politics of International Law*.¹⁰⁰ The thesis instead seeks to advance an understanding of the history of international law in materialist terms, in particular the nature and function of the state in relation to theory and practice.¹⁰¹ An analysis from the perspective of emancipation shows how the struggle for democracy and national liberation in Yugoslavia is integrated with the fight for socialism, both national and international. As such the thesis joins debates on how law can play a role in emancipatory social change.¹⁰² Following Knox, the thesis takes a close look at the structural relationship between law (and constitutional changes) and socialism, while also acknowledging their fragility and subsequent derailment in the service of capitalism and nationalism (in Yugoslavia's case).¹⁰³ The thesis joins conversations to what extent the international law offers a 'protective shield' to all states regardless of

⁹⁹ See Victor Kattan, 'Self-determination as Ideology: The Cold War, the End of Empire, and the Making of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (14 December 1960)' in Klara Polackova Van der Ploeg, Luca Pasquet and Leon Castellanos-Jankiewicz (eds), *International Law and Time: Narratives and Techniques* (Cham: Springer 2022).

¹⁰⁰ Gerry Simpson, 'Linear law: The history of international criminal law' in Christine Schwöbel (ed), *Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction* (Taylor & Francis Group 2014) 159-180; Martti Koskenniemi, *The Politics of International Law* (Hart Publishing 1980). See also David Kennedy, *Of War and Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006).

¹⁰¹ Robert Knox, 'Marxist Approaches to International Law' in Orford and Hoffmann (eds), *The Oxford Handbook* (2016) 306-326; Karl Marx, 'Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' in R C Tucker (ed), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: WW Norton and Company 1978) 3-6; Susan Marks (ed), *International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008).

¹⁰² Knox, 'Marxist Approaches' in Orford and Hoffmann (eds), *The Oxford Handbook* (2016) 325.

¹⁰³ Robert Knox, 'What is to be Done (With Critical Legal Theory)?' (2011) 22 *Finish Yearbook of International Law* 31-50; Robert Knox, 'Strategy and Tactics' (2010) 21 *Finish Yearbook of International Law* 193-229.

possessing different levels of social power as argued by B S Chimni and, as argued by Susan Marks, how the role of ideology is never unidirectional and as such offers an (unstable) promise of law to be fulfilled in reality.¹⁰⁴ It thereby portrays the wider and deeper systems of social relations that underpin the international legal order and the necessity to transform the social order itself in the day-to-day practice on the factory floor. Considering the nature and function of international law, and the state in particular, the two (interrelated and co-constitutive) socialist conceptions in the struggle against imperialism - self-management and nonalignment - illustrate in their socialist groundings of Yugoslavia that they hold a radical potential for alternatives in international legal order's futures.

6. Thesis Outline

I begin in chapter 1 with an assessment of the pre-history of self-management in Yugoslavia that serves as the necessary foreground for understanding its radical character. In the first part I focus on emergence of the Yugoslav state in the historical setting that grounded its alternative socialist order. In the second part, I analyse the variety of conceptual sources and discourses that underpinned, re-informed and reinforced self-management's development, both Marxist and non-Marxist.

In chapter 2 I give a geopolitical account on the conditions in which the distinct Yugoslav model of statehood emerged after WWII. I portray how Yugoslav alternative vision in outworking self-determination stood historically tied not only to a spectrum of ideas (chapter 1) but to experiences during the war and beyond. I analyse how in the context of two Cold War superpowers, Yugoslavia's split with its ideological ally, the Soviet Union, and its paradoxical relationship with the West, led to legal implementation of

¹⁰⁴ B S Chimni, 'An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law' 2004 (17) *Leiden Journal of International Law* 5; B S Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto' 2006 (8) *International Community Law Review* 3-28; Susan Marks, *The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) 10, 57.

self-management in 1950 as its pursuit of a ‘third path’: the Yugoslav distinct governance through the socialist worker’s self-management.

In chapter 3 I introduce the concept of self-management as Yugoslavia’s distinct form of governance: its development, legislation, and implementation, and with the focus on its political reform and economic liberalisation through decentralisation as a radical administrative government mechanism.

In chapter 4 I analyse how principles of Yugoslavia’s domestic policy were mirrored in its foreign policy of nonalignment. I argue that, while pursuing legitimation at home, Yugoslavia attained egalitarian engagement worldwide in the form of nonalignment. I focus on Yugoslavia’s crucial role in the Non-Aligned Movement – a complex political state-based project that became formed in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia – as an alternative in already established global bipolarity. I explore Yugoslavia’s unique and radical vision for the Movement based on pursuit of cooperation not built on identity, geographical, or ideological position, but envisaged as radically inclusive, irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state.

Finally, in chapter 5 I critically analyse the eventual shortfall, defeat and collapse of Yugoslavia’s self-management and the concomitant eclipse of NAM as an influential actor in the international legal order. I examine the political, economic and social shifts at home and internationally that resulted in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and concomitantly in a weakened version of NAM. I conclude that the limits of the two models of ‘resistance’ problematise how the principle and legal right of self-determination proved unsuccessful in advancing, in the long run, a new version of global governance.

To conclude, I seek to learn from their moments of success and decline to explore the viability of alternatives in contemporary situations and for the future.

I trust that I am leaving you with an enjoyable and stimulating read.

CHAPTER 1

Origins of the Yugoslav Socialist Self-management: Theory and Practice

Yugoslavia was never just a country - it was an idea. Like the Balkans itself, it was a project of inter-ethnic co-existence, a trans-ethnic and pluricultural space of many diverse worlds.¹

Yugoslavia was 'not just another communist state: rather, it was a unique socio-political enterprise that incarnated the success of national, social and geopolitical struggles for emancipation' at the time.²

1.1. Introduction

The Yugoslav socialist workers' self-management – *samoupravljanje* – was legally abolished in 1989/1990 ago and has become a somewhat forgotten notion since, reawakened intermittently through alternative political movements or scholarly initiatives. However, such an arguably progressive political concept should not end up on the graveyard of history. Yugoslav state-building project and its socialist self-management as an identity-building domestic policy proved a maverick creation, neither Soviet nor Western inspired.³ It was enshrined in legislation in 1950 as the primary

¹ Zoran Oklopčic, 'The Promises and Failures of Triple Struggle: Non-Alignment, Yugoslav Federalism and the Struggle for National, Social and Geopolitical Emancipation' in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, the Global South and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017) 276.

² Oklopčic, 'The Promises and Failures of Triple Struggle' in Eslava and others, *Bandung* (2017) 276.

³ Robert Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia* (Leiden, Boston: Brill 2018) 18; Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Social Currents in*

framework for Yugoslav socio-political and economic development, becoming in this way a governing principle and a way of exercising sovereignty through a radical version of decentralisation at home and subsequently elevated to the international level in the form of nonalignment and expressed in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Self-management was a unique and influential conception, still to be explored and acknowledged as significant in the larger history of survival and state-building during the Cold War, and arguably beyond, evaluated as a politically significant potential in the context of various contemporary crises worldwide.⁴ Engagement with this particular modality of governance contributes to conversations about understanding the dynamism around national expression of sovereignty and the possibility of radical forms of experimentation with it.

Any attempt to understand self-management, either conceptually or historically, is problematised by the variety of often contradictory perspectives through which it has already been analysed or evaluated. Research into understanding views on its conceptualisation and eventual materialisation ought therefore to be contextualized in its prehistory. This reveals how an idea with emancipatory potential was formed and shaped an alternative vision of self-determination, well before its legal implementation in the 1950s. To appreciate the political-economic-social experimentation represented in the concept of self-management, as it took place after WWII, this chapter examines its emergence and origins in theory and in practice before the war.

The first part of my analysis in this chapter highlights how the Yugoslav state emerged as a response to the historical, ethnic, cultural, and challenging geopolitical realities in the region. It reveals how the Balkan context gave ideological legitimacy to its establishment, beginning with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918-1941). The WWII's popular uprising against the occupation of Fascist forces highlights dialectical relation between

Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning of the Great Transformation (2nd edition, Durham: Duke University Press 1995) 333.

⁴ Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy* (2018) 18.

the National Liberation Movement and the Communist Revolution (that is the civil war between the communists, the loyalists and other fractions in Yugoslav territory, 1941-1945).⁵ It examines the foremost beginnings of the Yugoslav self-management as set in such historical setting, where a powerful resistance movement ultimately prepared the way for the establishment of a new alternative social order. I concentrate on how the vision of self-management as a political idea, as an economic model, and as a radical administrative government mechanism emerged already during WWII.⁶

To do its historicization justice, the second part of the chapter offers an overview of the conceptual sources that underpinned the idea of self-management, and how it was envisaged, understood and articulated by the legal theorists and political leaders who used it to ground the country's legitimacy. It demonstrates how the ethos of self-management was practiced in the Western world way before the 1940s when the Yugoslav intellectual scene appropriated it to lay the ideological foundations for its own form of socialism. By associating it with the Marxist-Leninist thought, or resisting to it, self-management's conceptual origins came to be re-informed and re-enforced. The concept evolved by reading and learning from the non-Marxist conceptualisations, such as from the works and experience of utopian or guild socialist or of pre-WWII Serbian and Slovenian thinkers. Before becoming an official Yugoslav doctrine, the concept of self-management was developed in dialectical tension with a whole spectrum of particular ideas and wartime experiences.

The chapter serves as a foreground for my critical analysis in the following chapters of self-management's practical implementation during the Cold War. As will be portrayed, Yugoslav distinct historical legacy at home lay the

⁵ Names used interchangeably in literature are The National or People's Liberation Movement or War or Struggle, or the Partisan War or Struggle.

⁶ Anton Vratuša, 'The Yugoslav Commune' 1961 (8) 3 *International Social Science Journal* 379-389, 379. Elsewhere Vratuša positioned the origins of Yugoslav socialist self-management even earlier, to CPY's underground activity under the harsh conditions during the Monarchy. Anton Vratuša in K P Mishra (ed), *Non-Alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 1982) 76.

ground for the country to become a global political force that profoundly influenced and challenged the dynamics of the superpower competition.

1.2. On Waves of the Liberation and the Revolution: Emergence of Yugoslavia (1918-1945)

1.2.1. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941)

Scholars inside and outside Yugoslavia largely agree on the historical reasons why self-management took root in Yugoslavia.⁷ They lie mainly in the ‘country's long tradition of opposition to foreign domination and periods of crisis caused by external aggression’.⁸ The region of Yugoslavia was under centuries-long foreign rule under the Hapsburg Empire (1282-1918), which controlled the north-west region, and the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) which occupied the south-east. During its entire era of foreign domination, Yugoslavia was never a centralized state, despite many attempts.⁹ For one, the Habsburg-Ottoman partition gave the ‘Yugoslav’ nation a complex ethnic

⁷ Chen Lanyan, *The Yugoslav Experiment with Self-Governing Market Socialism* (Unpublished MA Thesis, Canada: Simon Fraser University 1986) 5; Svetozar Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956’ in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010) 198-220, 198; Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1976) 2, 32; Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia* (London: Croom Helm Ltd 1982); Eugen Pusić, ‘The Yugoslav System of Self-Management’ 1975 *Events* 112-116, 113; Drago Flego and Miroslav Kutanjac (eds), *The Socialist Republic of Croatia* (Mladost, Zagreb: Grafički Zavod Hrvatske 1982) 26; Anton Vratuša, ‘Some Characteristics of the Development of the Socialist Self-Management’ 1981 (23) *Socialism in the World* 97-104, 98; Miloš Nikolić, ‘The Theoretical Bases of Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia’ 1981 (23) *Socialism in the World* 22-59, 37.

⁸ Lanyan, *The Yugoslav Experiment* (1986) 5.

⁹ For example, the Vidovdan Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 28 June 1921 was critiqued as essentially Serbian imperialist regime, and which idea of the centralist government Croats never really accepted. Interestingly, and fast forward to 1974, when the new Constitution was heavily criticized especially in Serbia, for its unjust and unequal political and territorial organization in the process of re-centralising the federation.

composition.¹⁰ The cultural variants mirrored other differences between regions, all of them eventually contributing to Yugoslavia's collapse in 1990.

There were significant differences in levels of economic development in Yugoslavia during the 20th century. When the Yugoslav State was created at the end of WWI (1918), industries were primarily located in Slovenia and Croatia, making them the country's most economically developed regions. As such, the north was integrated into the European market, while the south remained dependent on an isolated subsistence agrarian economy.¹¹ Differences between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and various minorities continued throughout the Balkan troubled history. Furthermore, foreign control encouraged centrifugal tendencies among the Yugoslav peoples, and created the 'relatively relaxed central administrative controls [that] allowed for a relatively wide area of local discretion. Centuries of such dispersal of power created a tradition of and preference for local self-reliance and mistrust of any kind of central government, especially an alien one'.¹² A product of its mass popular participation in resistance was 'widespread communal violence', the intensity of which left a deep imprint on the Balkan history.¹³ This decentralized, diverse and heavily localised character was mirrored also in the eventual emergence as a state.

Yugoslavia – colloquial name for the 'land of South Slavs' – became a nation state in December 1918.¹⁴ This twentieth century phenomenon (1918-

¹⁰ The north-west incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Slovenia, Croatia) was thus closely tied to Western European traditions and Catholic culture, while the central region (Serbia and Vojvodina) and parts of the south (Montenegro) had a predominantly Eastern European Orthodox culture. Macedonia and Kosovo in the south with majority of Albanians and parts of Bosnia in the mid-west embraced a Near-Eastern Muslim culture.

¹¹ Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution* (1976) 32; Flego and Kutanjac, *The Socialist Republic of Croatia* (1982) 26, 55.

¹² One example would be the relentless fight of the Yugoslav people for independence and unity against Turkish expansion. Pusić, 'The Yugoslav System' (1975) 113.

¹³ Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution* (1976) 32.

¹⁴ Yugoslavia usually refers to the so-called second socialist and federative Yugoslavia, a sovereign nation-state that was formed during WWII in 1943. During its existence, the second Yugoslavia bore three names: Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (1943), Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia [Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija] (1946), and most commonly used reference, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or SFRY [Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija] (1963). Encompassing various differing

1991/92) saw three incarnations under the monarchist and unitarist Yugoslavia. The so-called State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs [Država Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba], including the Bosnians and Montenegrins, was a direct result of the post-WWI settlement concerning the former territories of defeated Austria-Hungary (1867-1918). It was a short-lived political union established in October 1918 under the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty. A good month after its formation, the State joined the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro and became the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca] (1918-1929), changing its name under King Alexander I into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia [Kraljevina Jugoslavija] (1929-1941). A ‘stepchild’ of the Treaty of Versailles, Yugoslavia became a multinational, multiracial and multicultural nation-state with a limited parliamentary democracy.¹⁵ It was, however, not long when Yugoslavia was once again under foreign domination. This time it was the Nazis/Fascist who carved up the nation (April 1941).¹⁶ The region ‘as often before in its history found itself in the mainstream of global historical developments yet again’.¹⁷ Thus, Yugoslavia remains an important example to study due to ‘its geostrategic position and its complex politics’ that led it to play a significant role in the formative years of the current international legal, socio-political and economic order during WWII and in the Cold War period.¹⁸

ethnic nationalities, Yugoslavia comprised of six federal People’s Republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohijan region, both within Serbia). Upon disintegration of the SFRY, the third Yugoslavia emerged: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Savezna Republika Jugoslavija] (1992-2003) which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro.

¹⁵ P H Liotta, *Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugoslavia and why it Matters* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books 2001) 128.

¹⁶ Flego and Kutanjac, *The Socialist Republic of Croatia* (1982) 26, 55.

¹⁷ Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans’ in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198-220, 198.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 198.

1.2.2. The National Liberation and the Formation of the Yugoslav State (1941-1945)

The exact timing of the Yugoslav self-management's utmost beginning is dependent on the source and historical distance from where the phenomenon is considered. Some historians mark its beginnings only after the historic split with the Soviet Union in 1948 and the (successful) process of destalinisation, achieved by continuous and radical criticism of Stalinism.¹⁹ They argue that a truly anti-Stalinist alternative began to be paved after WWII, when the Yugoslav leaders had to legitimise their shift in ideological terms to reassert the power of the local communist elite. Others, however, position its foremost beginnings in the historical context of the 1940s, contending that self-management was born already during WWII. Although legally instituted in 1950, I also argue that the pre-history of self-management originated in the National Liberation Movement and had roots in the Communist Revolution that transpired simultaneously at that time. Regardless of the exact origins, as Franc Šetinc argued, self-management can be seen as a 'necessity in a multinational community with a diverse and difficult history', and the motor that enabled the respect for national diversity and the struggle for even economic equality between constituent communities.²⁰ Thus, to understand the historical reasons why self-management took root in Yugoslavia, it is vital to examine in more detail the two forces or events that transpired simultaneously during WWII, one being the National Liberation Movement and the other the Communist Revolution.

1.2.3. The National or People's Liberation Movement

The National Liberation Movement or the Partisan War was a communist-led resistance movement during WWII ([1939]1941-1945) that took place in the Yugoslav territory. It was a struggle against Axis powers, primarily against the Wehrmacht or the unified armed forces of Nazi Germany or German

¹⁹ Miloš Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse samoupravljanja* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1989) 45.

²⁰ Franc Šetinc, *Misel in delo Edvarda Kardelja* (Ljubljana: Prešernova družba 1979) 145-146.

Reich (1935-1946), Italy, as well as the Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian formations.²¹ After the invasion on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and subsequent unconditional surrender of the Royal Yugoslav Army, the Yugoslav King Petar II escaped into exile.²² Even though still recognised as the King of the state by the Allies and despite his continual resistance to the Axis Occupation through the Četniks, the main resistance and effective power, as well as allied support, soon changed to the communist-led resistance movement under command of the Croat-Slovene Marshal Josip Broz - Tito (1892-1980) who declared an anti-fascist war already in March 1941, three months before the Soviets.

Operating underground since it was banned in 1929, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) organized anti-fascist factions or committees and political forces into a triumphant nationwide uprising.²³ Not only was it successful in liberating a number of regions at an early stage of the war,²⁴ it carried out popular political organisation through its local Anti-Fascist Councils for the

²¹ For a detailed evolution of the Yugoslav army see Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) 18-31.

²² Works depicting policies and events leading to transformation of Yugoslavia from a monarchy to a communist ruled country include Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1953); Alex N Dragnitch, *Tito's Promised Land* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 1954); Constantin Fotitch, *The War We Lost: Yugoslavia's tragedy and the failure of the West* (New York: The Viking Press 1948); Robert Joseph Kerner (ed), *Yugoslavia* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1949); Josef Korbel, *Tito's Communism* (Denver: University of Denver Press 1951); Reuben H Markham, *Tito's Imperial Communism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1947); David Martin, *Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story Of Tito And Mihailovich* (New York: Prentice-Hall 1946); Eric L Pridonoff, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Washington: Public Affairs Press 1956).

²³ The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was founded at the Congress in Vukovar on 20 April 1919. After its short period of its legal activity, the Party continued working underground and abroad. Consequently, little was known about its work and activities until its rise during WWII, when it gained prominent place and legal status again. It renamed itself in 1952 the Communist League of Yugoslavia (LCY). Moša Pijade, *About the Legend that the Yugoslav Uprising Owed Its Existence to Soviet Assistance* (London: The Yugoslav Embassy 1950) 118; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1948) 51.

²⁴ Temporary liberated zones included Foča, Bihać and the Užice Republic, the latter being the first 'free territory' in Europe, liberated by the Partisans already in autumn of 1941.

National Liberation of Yugoslavia or National Liberation Committees.²⁵ A clear initiation of self-governance, their activity spanned from political to civil administration, educational, cultural and economic/industrial organisation. For example, the workers' committees organized production in liberated areas to support the front with necessities.²⁶ Concomitantly, the self-governing local assemblies or the so-called people's committees were created, responsible as organs for dual power for the administration of liberated areas by developing the war economy to support the Partisans.²⁷ This united the various sections of communities – workers, peasants, and intellectuals – in a spirit of brotherhood among diverse nationalities.²⁸ In this way, the CPY began to develop first notions and practice of the system of self-management already during the WWII resistance. Leading communists Edvard Kardelj and Moša Pijade later spoke of these committees as signs of Yugoslav autonomous initiative and independent non-Stalinist path and recognised them as origins of self-management.²⁹

The historical situation forced the Yugoslavs to practice autonomist politics. As centralised communication was impossible, self-management then, in military terms, can arguably be seen in the way the Yugoslav Partisans had to rely on their own capacities.³⁰ The victory was achieved by extensive

²⁵ In theory, electors were to include whole population. In practice the candidates were limited to Partisans' supporters.

²⁶ For example, the Serbian town Krupanj (one of the Užice Republic's centre) where the elected workers' council in the metal production became responsible for organisation and management of the work process and the logistics of supplying the workers with food and housing. Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* (London: Cambridge University Press 2008) 55.

²⁷ Nikolić, 'The Theoretical Bases' (1981) 37.

²⁸ Vratuša in Mishra, *Non-Alignment* (1982) 76.

²⁹ Edvard Kardelj, *Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja* 1979 (27) 3 *Sodobnost* 265-274.

³⁰ Historically, guerrilla resistance was formed and organised in seemingly hopeless situations where the individual acted as an independent freedom fighter (a partisan) against the opposing power. Examples include the Algerian resistance against the French colonialism during the Algerian war (1954-1962) and the Vietnamese resistance against US aggression during the Vietnamese war (1955-1975). See Ukandi G Damachi and Hans D Seibel, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World* (London: Macmillan 1982) 6-7.

indigenous mobilization of proletariat and peasantry, and with only minimal support from the Soviet Union. From poorly armed and attired guerrillas (partisans) with limited resources, Tito's communist military force soon grew into the Partisan Army or the National Liberation Army and fought effectively under the 'Yugoslav state canopy' based on the policy of national equality.³¹ Unlike other communist leaders, the Partisans defeated the Axis occupier without the help of the Soviets.³² When the Red Army entered Belgrade in 1944, they found the Partisans holding military control of the country and having an administrative system already set up.³³ Contrary to other East-European members of the Soviet bloc, the so-called USSR's satellites, where communism was imposed by the Soviet power, the new state with Tito and his cadre gained power, legitimation, and identity from their own strength.³⁴ According to Vratuša, the Yugoslavs were 'proud of their victory... believing that it directly nurtured the growth of socialist self-management'.³⁵

1.2.4. The Communist Revolution

During the war, the occupied Yugoslav territory was partitioned into occupied areas corresponding somewhat to the existing ethnic divisions. As a result, nationality-based conflicts erupted into a civil war where a guerrilla force – the Partisans – led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia fought not only against the Nazi and Fascist occupation but against other forces present in Yugoslav territory. These collaborationist militias included the royalist and Serbian nationalist forces of the exiled King – Chetniks, Croatian fascist

³¹ It was Tito's particular achievement to unite Yugoslavia's historically antagonistic national groups of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosnian-Muslims in the Partisan Army, and include Italian, Hungarian and German partisans too.

³² Committee on the Judiciary United State Senate, *Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1961) v; Roy Moore, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (London: Fabian Society 1970) 2; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 18-31.

³³ The question of Soviet participation in liberation of Yugoslavia became one of the hottest controversies and a 'potent psychological weapon' for the Yugoslav leaders during the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute in 1948. See Moša Pijade, *About the Legend that the Yugoslav Uprising Owed Its Existence to Soviet Assistance* (London: The Yugoslav Embassy 1950).

³⁴ Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Albania.

³⁵ Vratuša, 'Some Characteristics' (1981) 98.

movement – Ustasha, Slovenian anti-communist collaborationist volunteer militia Bela Garda [‘White Guard’], and the Slovene and Croatian anti-partisan Domobranci [‘Home Guard’].³⁶ Naturally, the occupying forces exploited these national differences.

Organising an effective resistance movement, therefore, was only one of Tito's pursuits during WWII. Besides organising people’s armed liberation struggle, the CPY had a programmatic vision which demanded for a social and socialist revolution to take place simultaneously.

Tito concomitantly launched a communist revolution, aimed to overcome the existing political and class structure and subverting the old social and economic order. This has been challenged as violent. Namely, influenced somewhat by the pattern of the October Revolution and on the model of the Soviet state, the Yugoslav idea of the communist revolution included the seizure of power with violence. As opposed to the Moscow’s *Comintern*, Tito wanted Yugoslav communists to take power directly, without the need for two stages of the revolution. Attacking the occupiers and other forces simultaneously resulted in civil war amid occupation. It shattered the Yugoslav ‘union’ along ethnic lines and as Costa Nikolić rightly contended in his writing about the construction of the myth of WWII communist Yugoslavism, ‘anti-Fascism was a sort of justification for that violence’.³⁷ This, part popular uprising and part civil war between nationalities, made the Yugoslav revolution an authentic one, and provoked a sharp reaction by the Soviets. Tito seemingly reembraced the Soviet Bolshevik interpretation of revolution in two phases, the (bourgeois-democratic) people's liberation struggle followed by the social (proletarian) revolution, but as Djilas recalled ‘only seemingly, in words. It was obvious... that we had entered a new phase

³⁶ Formal recognition of Partisans as the sole antifascist force in the Allied coalition came later, in 1943 at the Tehran Conference. The Partisan resistance forces proved so effective fighting the overwhelming occupying power, they arguably prompted Churchill to switch Allied allegiance from the Yugoslav Chetnik resistance. Liotta, *Dismembering the State* (2001) 128.

³⁷ Kosta Nikolić, ‘Mit o komunističkom Jugoslovenstvu [The Myth of Communist Yugoslavism]’ 2011 (1) *Istorija 20. Veka* 9-26, 17, 24.

of national history. None of us knew for sure what forms the future course of history would take... but none [was] worried'.³⁸

Thus, in order to transform the existing social relations, a 'democratic' strategy was pursued based on general mass initiatives,³⁹ with patriotic slogans, appeals to anti-Fascist groups, and insistence on the non-political character of the National Liberation Movement. This overcame national divisions in a united struggle and popular uprising and evolved into their unique way of socialism. The ultimately emerging united federal state was a consequence of the success of the masses in its fight against the occupying forces and their collaborators and in its revolutionary power within the state to change the existing regime.⁴⁰

Tito's government then was the only communist movement in Eastern Europe that came to power by way of popular struggle. The essence of Yugoslav Partisans' revolution was the federation, available by the right of nations to self-determination as enunciated by the Soviets and the United States Congress by President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918. The vital role in Yugoslav state-formation history was played by the legislative body called the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), established by Tito in the city of Bihać in November 1942. The second AVNOJ meeting in Jajce in November 1943 was a momentous event during the uprising.⁴¹ It was here that the revolutionary constitutional convention for the so-called second Yugoslavia was formed (the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia [Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija]) and Tito named the head of the state. Determined to lead his post-war country as an independent communist state, put forth the following organisational principles grounded

³⁸ Milovan Đilas/Djilas, *Uspomene jednog revolucionara [Memoir of a Revolutionary]* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1973) 680-682.

³⁹ Democratic meant for 'democratization' and represented a move away from 'democratic centralism', as will be explored in chapter 2.

⁴⁰ Vratuša in Mishra, *Non-Alignment* (1982) 76. This mass base arguably became an important precondition facilitating the later split from the Soviet camp.

⁴¹ By 1944, the Western allies and the Yugoslav government-in-exile recognised AVNOJ as the lawful Yugoslav legislative body. AVNOJ resumed in Belgrade shortly after the War in 1945.

in the experience of the united struggle and socialist revolution: a union between the workers, peasants and popular intelligentsia; formation and organization of a 'popular' power; the creation of a federal system of government and the acceptance of democratic principles as a foundation of the new state.⁴²

On 16 June 1944, the Tito–Šubašić agreement was signed which merged the *de facto* and the *de jure* government of Yugoslavia. The monarchy was formally abolished in March 1945. With the support from Moscow and London. Elections were held on 11 November and on 29 November 1945 the 'new' state was declared the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),⁴³ espousing a political socialist federal structure in which equality of all main nationalities was recognized by creation of 6 constituent republics and 2 autonomous regions or provinces, and where power of both, the State and the Party, was concentrated in federal authorities. In this, Tito and the communists became endorsed, and ratified by the American, British and Soviet governments as leaders of an anti-monarchist, Soviet-style communist government. Indeed, after its founding, the Soviet influence grew to dominate the new Yugoslav regime, both in terms of theory and in practice. The new constitution of January 1946 closely followed the 1936 USSR Constitution.

⁴² To what extent Tito was determined to lead the post-war country as an independent communist state is arguable. However, judging from Churchill's words, he certainly enjoyed national and international esteem already at the time. Despite dissatisfaction or doubts, Churchill was conscious that a stable and lasting political regime was emerging in Yugoslavia, with Tito as its 'master'. Churchill's son Randolph stated similarly that 'Tito will be the master of Yugoslavia after the war, whether we help him or not'. Public Records Office (PRO) Premier Papers (PREM) 3, 512/11, 82-85. For a detailed account on Churchill's shifting attitude towards Tito, see Dušan Biber, 'Britanci o Titu in Revoluciji [The British od Tito and Revolution]' 1977 (4) *Zgodovinski Časopis* XXXI 449-464.

⁴³ Yugoslavia received international recognition by the Allies after the Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945), and in effect in March 1945. For Yugoslavia, the key result of Yalta was the endorsement and ratification of the Tito–Šubašić agreement (Belgrade, 1 November 1944) recognising Partisans as legitimate armed forces able to formally form the new government. Upon signing of the UN Charter in October 1945, SFRY became one of its founding members. See John R Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) 201-264; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 18-40. See also the writings of the main Tito's biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1954).

1.3. The Conceptual Origins of Yugoslav New Domestic Policy (pre-1918-1945)

1.3.1. Embracing Marxist-Leninist Thought

To recognise and appreciate a turn to self-management in its particular Yugoslav context, the theoretical sources are just as important as the historical circumstances analysed above. This part, therefore, introduces the most vivid conceptual origins of the new Yugoslav domestic policy.⁴⁴ I argue that the idea of the Yugoslav governing principle at home (and later abroad) was a result of debates in Marxist-Leninist circles and evolved with the readings of even earlier Western and Yugoslav conceptualisations. The Yugoslav socialist workers' self-management model was the result of the intellectual scene during WWII, when Party's leading political and legal theorists and ideologues accompanying Tito crystallised their ideas on how to structure the state's legitimacy and its particular version of communism/socialism. The most active among them were the Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj (1910-1979), and high-ranking officials Milovan Djilas/Đilas (1911-1995) and Boris Kidrič (1912-1953). However, with Kidrič's premature death (1953) and Đilas's political downfall (1954), Kardelj continued as the most influential ideologue and champion of Yugoslav self-management. While his reputation as the Slovene inventor of self-management remains,⁴⁵ this is not to say it was entirely his brainchild. Other high officials contributed significantly to its formulation, evolution, and advocacy: the Interior Minister Aleksandar Ranković (1909-1983), Moša Pijade (1890-1957), Croatian economic and political scientist Branko Horvat (1928-2003), Vladimir Dedijer (1914-1990), Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo (1912-2000), Veljko

⁴⁴ Consensus on conceptual origins remains conditional as scholars disagree on who were the thinkers that inspired Yugoslav legal and political theorists nor on to what extent their ideas were implemented. The list, accordingly, remains inexhaustive, incomplete and as such offer inspiration for further research.

⁴⁵ Edvard Kardelj, *Self-management and the Political System* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1980); Edvard Kardelj, 'Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia' 1976 (42) 2 *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 103-110.

Vlahović (1914-1975), Vladimir Vlado Popović (1914-1972), Konstantin ‘Koča’ Popović (1908-1992), and the Yugoslav ambassador Veljko Mićunović (1916-1982).

Given that most were well-educated Marxists, they laid the ideological foundations for the distinct Yugoslav socialism within Marxist-Leninist political and economic framework.⁴⁶ The political writings on which most party cadre had been brought up reveal references to various notions about self-management, participation and workers’ control, all attempting in various ways to institute forms of direct democracy as a substitute for traditional state power. Specifically, the socialist understanding of these themes as presented in Karl Marx’s (1818-1883) *Capital*,⁴⁷ Friedrich Engels’ (1820-1895) work, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov - Lenin’s (1870-1924) *State and Revolution*, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin’s (1878-1953) *History of the Bolshevik Party USSR*. Thus, the historical legacy of self-management goes

⁴⁶ Tito and Kardelj, for example, would be exposed to Marxist-Leninist ideas when receiving their education at Soviet universities, the *International Lenin School* (1926-1938) and the *Communist University of the National Minorities of the West* (1921-1936). See AY YWEU, 790/13: Yugoslavs Working and Educated in the USSR, 1922-1945; AY CPA MLI, 790: Collection of Reproduced Documents USSR Moscow - Central Party Archive of the Marxism-Leninism Institute with the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party, 1909-1945; AY CPA 790/17: Collection of Documents from the CSSR Germany Berlin - The Marxism-Leninism Institute, The Central Party Archive, 1909-1944. See also Constantin Fotitch, *The War We Lost: Yugoslavia's tragedy and the failure of the West* (New York: The Viking Press 1948) 272.

⁴⁷ The works of Karl Marx, especially his *Capital*, had substantial influence on later development of the socialist and communist ideas, and of self-management. In his writings, Marx regarded workers' cooperatives as the ‘first major political victory in the economy of labour over the political economy of capital’ and workers in association as ‘being their own capitalists’. For social production to be transformed into a single ‘coherent system of the free and cooperative labour’ a general change in social conditions would be required, achieved only ‘through transition of organized social forces’: from the state power (the hands of the state, capitalists and landowners) into the hands of producers or workers. According to Marx, as the ‘political tool of enslavement [of the working class] cannot be political tool for its liberation’, the workers’ class government is the only fitting ‘political form in which economic liberation of labour could be effected’. Accordingly, Marx’s thesis presented necessary conditions for introduction of self-management, whereby the working class takes over political authority, changes the political structure, and introduces the economic and social structures accordingly. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol I: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production* (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1974 [1867]) 158, 301, 387, 482; Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole* (Friedrich Engels (ed), London: Lawrence & Wishart 1974 [1894]) 571.

back to the earliest considerations of workers' self-organization in Marx and Engels' vision and scientific elaboration of a socialist and communist society. For example, Engels' notion of the 'state that withers away' in *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (1892), Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune in *Address of the Civil War in France* (1871), or the visions of Lenin, most prominently his *The State and Revolution* (1917), as well as his numerous speeches in which he foretold the need for workers to take part in direct decisions and be prepared for workers' management.

Through his academic experience in Moscow during the 1930s, young Kardelj developed respect for the USSR as the 'first land of socialism'⁴⁸ and aspired to shape the Slovene and Yugoslav society as an orthodox 'Bolshevik'.⁴⁹ According to historian Robert Niebuhr, 'having learned from the Soviets [and their] Revolution, Tito and his closest comrades felt strongly that Marxist-Leninism provided a 'guiding ideological framework for their new state, a conceptual justification for their hold on power, and a 'scientific approach to modernisation that would likely appeal to the masses regardless of ethnicity'.⁵⁰ This, however, changed soon after WWII due to unfavourable wartime negotiations with the Soviets and personal humiliations during interactions with the Soviet diplomats.⁵¹ Unable to veer from Soviet-style communism directly, the Yugoslav ideologues began to re-evaluate Marxist texts and turning to other perspectives. For instance, the Croatian translation of Marx's *Early Writings* in 1953 provided scholars with an insight into his

⁴⁸ John K Cox, *Edvard Kardelj: A Political Biography* (PhD Thesis, Indiana University 1996) xii, 35.

⁴⁹ Their commitment to the Soviets and their ideas was evident in the Archives of Yugoslavia. See AY CI, 790/1: The Communist International, Communist Party of Yugoslavia Section, 1919-1941; AY RI, 790/4: The Peasant International [Krestintern], The Rural Movement in Yugoslavia, 1924-1931; AY RI IRI, 790/5: The Peasant International [Krestintern], The International Rural Institute, 1927-1934; AY YOR, 790/8: The Yugoslavs and the October Revolution, 1917-1921; AY YORSA, 790/15: Yugoslavs and the October Revolution from Soviet Archives, 1929-1936, 1940; AY IAC, 790/11: The International Antifascist Committee, 1929-1930.

⁵⁰ Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy* (2018) 14. For a critique of this rationale, see Milovan Djilas/Đilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London: Thames and Hudson 1957).

⁵¹ Cox, *Edvard Kardelj* (1996) 197.

intellectual development and opened a whole new dimension of his thought.⁵² Thus, steps were taken to ‘free them from any ideological contradictions while also building a legitimate Yugoslav alternative to Stalinism’.⁵³ It was the very desire to steer away from Stalinism and his distortion of Marxist philosophy that enabled a return to the original sources and discover alternative essence of the Marxian conception of socialism.⁵⁴

1.3.1.1. The Otherness of the Soviet Communism

Yugoslavia entered on the path of a two-fold endeavour during the late 1940s: creating an innovative ideological basis for the new state and, at the same time, highlighting the otherness of Soviet communism.⁵⁵ The foremost task for the Yugoslav socialist revolution was to bring into play forces that will grapple with the country's economic, social and political [inherited] backwardness.⁵⁶ A process of socialist transformation of society was needed to establish the most suitable form of governance – particular social and political forms – to revitalise and develop the new nation-state. Development thus depended upon a prolonged internal social evolution, the pace of which would largely be determined by the rate of development of the forces of production. For example, low level of economic development could be improved by economic relations based on social ownership of the means of production. No rigid patterns or shortcuts were possible under the new

⁵² Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Rani Radovi: Izbor [Early Works: The Selection]* (Zagreb: Naprijed 1953).

⁵³ Robert Edward Niebuhr, *The Search for a Communist Legitimacy: Tito's Yugoslavia* (Phd Thesis: Boston College, The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of History 2008) 28.

⁵⁴ For instance, the Soviet rigid interpretation of Marxism made possible the Yugoslav re-evaluation of the market's role in socialist society possible. Simultaneously, of course, scholars debate as to what extent the socialist Yugoslav regime ended up realizing itself in a totalitarian form. See, for instance, Djilas, *The New Class* (1957); Rudolf Bahro, *Socialism and Survival* (London: Heretic Books 1982 [1981]); Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller and Markus György, *Dictatorship over Needs* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1983); Włodzimierz Brus, *The Market in a Socialist Economy* (London, Boston: Routledge, Kegan Paul 1972).

⁵⁵ Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy* (2018) 15; Niebuhr, *The Search for a Communist Legitimacy* (2008) 27.

⁵⁶ For examples of how backward Yugoslavia was, see Edvard Kardelj, ‘Evolution in Yugoslavia’ 1956 (34) *Foreign Affairs* 580-602, 580-582.

conditions as formalistic or dogmatic application of political formulas springing from different economic or social situations would only slow the process. Progress, therefore, depended upon development of the new economic foundations of society and of social consciousness. In this sense, it made the ideology and practice of Yugoslav communism markedly different from the Soviet model of communist rule, including its enforced export of central planning and centralized management to the Eastern bloc countries.⁵⁷ As such, the Yugoslav socialist workers' self-management was presented as a viable alternative to other political and economic systems of its time, arguably more an ideological program than a legal order in its beginnings.

First, to make Tito's revolution unique, a novel ideological basis was anticipated for the new Yugoslavia, one divergent to the Soviet conceptualisation. While in the Soviet Union the need for centralism and merging of the party and the state was clear, the Yugoslavs wanted to avoid such a shift and proposed centralisation (rather than centralism). Rather than consolidating all national power within the Communist Party [orthodox Marxist theory], the Yugoslav leaders posited (direct) democracy as key factor in socialist development and strove to transfer state power directly to workers and their organs.⁵⁸ They measured socialism in terms of the level of decentralization (diffusion) of state and Party power along economic, political, and social lines. By the early 1950s the leading party intellectuals drew up a framework for a different Marxist-Leninist system that called on workers' ownership and participation in the means of production and for a socio-political arrangement that would gradually devolve power away from the centre - the socialist workers' self-management. Power in the hands of

⁵⁷ Gary K Bertsch and Thomas W Ganschow, *Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models* (San Francisco: W H Freeman and Company 1976).

⁵⁸ Despite disagreements about perceptions of democracy existing throughout Yugoslav history. Jože Pirjevec, 'Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom' 2014 (24) 4 *ANNALES Ser. hist. sociol.* 763-778; Cox, *Edvard Kardelj* (1996) vii.

workers (self-management) reflected their envisioned ‘revolutionary discipline’ as opposed to the Soviet-style ‘bureaucratic discipline’.⁵⁹

Second, in forming conceptual foundation of Yugoslav communism/socialism, emphasis was placed on the national situation and conditions, with the premise to ‘build a political structure which corresponds to the country's new social and economic foundations. Such emphasis was a major departure from classic Marxism-Leninism.’⁶⁰ Young orthodox ‘Bolshevik’ that Kardelj was wanted to shape the Yugoslav society according to the Soviet model. However, his experience in Moscow during the Stalinist Great Terror/Purge (1936-1938) prompted him to take a critical stance and influenced his conviction that ‘socialism could also be developed in ways more acceptable to [a particular] domestic situation’.⁶¹

At the very outset a revolutionary political machinery established the need for a design that would secure achievements of the revolution (like all revolutions do). In particular, this involved the socialization of the means of production.⁶² By saying it ought to be implemented according to each country's unique national experience and in this way transcending the national boundaries, the Yugoslavs advanced a new theoretical approach to Marxism and its political horizons. The importance of the national element in socialist development is relevant, the Yugoslavs contended, because of the reality of the ‘uneven’

⁵⁹ Branko Horvat, *Ogled o Jugoslavenskom Društvu [An Essay on Yugoslav Society]* (Belgrade: Jugoslavenski Institut za Ekonomska Istraživanja 1967 [New York: International Arts and Sciences Press 1969]) 196.

⁶⁰ Hoffman and Neal (critiqued by some for their sympathetic treatment of Tito's regime) outlined five main areas where the Yugoslav variant of communism differed from Marx's theory or Marxism: national communism; the role of the state and the Party; ownership of property; the relationship between socialism and democracy; collectivization of agriculture. See George Hoffman and Fred W Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1962) 157-173.

⁶¹ Pirjevec, ‘Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom’ (2014) 763-778. Kardelj expressed the idea of existence of various possible paths to socialism already in 1943 during the National Liberation Movement and elaborated it more systematically around the Tito-Stalin rift in 1948.

⁶² Kardelj, ‘Evolution in Yugoslavia’ (1956) 580.

development of socialism in the world.⁶³ For example, even Russia's socialist revolution reflected the relevance of country's specific conditions, because its political and economic project took place in a 'backward' country and not in an advanced capitalist state, as prescribed and predicted in Marxist theory.⁶⁴ It follows, then, that Russia's socialist experiment reflected its own national conditions, and including its violent nature, the Soviet model could not and should not have universal applicability in a diverse world.⁶⁵

Indeed, the articulation of socialism, and Yugoslav socialist self-management in particular, was a response to a specific national and international situation at the time. Once the communist revolution was completed, some countries managed to distinguish themselves from one another in adhering to the communist regime but according to their different historical and political development and cultural traditions, and their distinct geographical, geopolitical and economic position.⁶⁶ Various 'new' interpretations and adaptations of communism worldwide were not only a reaction to USSR's statism or 'real socialism' where exploitation was the result of the monopoly of political power, but also a response to capitalism where exploitation stemmed from its own economic basis. Like Yugoslavia, states aspired to shape and develop their societies along socialist lines according to and within a Marxist-Leninist framework but in different ways according to their own experiences. Alan Whitehorn therefore is right in concluding that 'such pluralist and decentralist socialist stream, while not always dominant, existed

⁶³ Indeed, there were important differences between socialism as practiced in the USSR, China, Cuba, or Tanzania. See Helen Desfosses (ed), *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger 1975).

⁶⁴ Lazar Mojsov, 'Essential Features of Contemporary Socialist Development in the World' 9 January 1963 *Socialist Thought and Practice* 69-70.

⁶⁵ If pushing this point further, it could then be argued that the Western liberal democracy 'exported' so many times in the 21st century (and always violently to various degrees) cannot be universally applicable in any state. Various examples testify of failed attempts to do so, among others Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria.

⁶⁶ Countries that embraced communism include Russia, Eastern European countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary), Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Africa (Burkina Faso, the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the People's Republics of Angola, Benin, Mozambique, and Congo). Interestingly, in the 1970s some of the principles of particularly Yugoslav self-management were adopted in Tanzania and Algeria.

continuously within the socialist movement and must, therefore, be considered in any important discussion'.⁶⁷

Third, not only did Yugoslavs in their formulation of socialist self-management advocated for workers' ownership and participation in the means of production and emphasized particular national conditions for its implementation, but they also contrasted with the Soviet interpretation of Marxism as a compilation of abstract entities such as state and collectives. In Yugoslavia, the new state governance structure included focus on an individual human being, key but often forgotten element of socialism. This was the so-called 'socialism with a human face', on which Kardelj bet after 1948.⁶⁸

Importantly, the focus was not simply upon power equality and economic well-being but also on the idea to restore a sense of community. As Whitehorn argued, the two distinct traditions emerged within the socialist movement.⁶⁹ One stressed the need for nationalized industries run by central state planning to 'humanise' social order by co-ordinating the potential chaos. Other group of socialists focused on a decentralized mass participatory and pluralist self-managing socialism, rejecting largely a vision of centralized state in a socialist society due to its potential danger to denigrate individual's worth and development (a radical emphasis, arguably bordering on the anarchist position).

From the Yugoslav perspective, people were considered essentially free and creative, and who, in the process of transforming the world through their praxis, manifest their individual and collective potential. Accordingly, the process of changing the world is simultaneously a process of individual and collective self-actualization. In this sense, and as advocated by Kardelj, self-

⁶⁷ Alan Whitehorn, 'Alienation and Workers' Self-Management' Summer 1974 (16) 2 *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 160-186, 162.

⁶⁸ Whitehorn, 'Alienation and Workers' Self-Management' (1974) 162; Emile Durkheim, *Socialism* (New York: Collier Books 1962); G D Garson, 'On the Political Theory of Decentralized Socialism' in Eugen Pusić (ed), *Participation and Self-Management, Volume 2* (Zagreb: Institute for Social Research 1972).

⁶⁹ Whitehorn, 'Alienation and Workers' Self-Management' (1974) 162.

management's ethos was 'not something peculiar to Yugoslavia but... a general rule in the advancement of socialism', diverse only in its form, scope, and character.⁷⁰ According to Kardelj:

*The idea of self-management is as old as the idea of humanism, as old as the international workers' movement, its class struggle and socialist practice. It is the culmination of man's eternal aspirations for freedom and free creativity, for mastery over the objective laws of nature and society, for a better life [in an age of great interdependence of society and mankind]. Such ideas and aspirations have been manifested in a variety of forms in the world, in the many struggles [in all the socialist revolutions]... to achieve freedom of labour and of the individual.*⁷¹

This configuration is effectively a challenge to Niebuhr, who critiqued the transition of power to the people or individuals as preconditioned upon agreement with the official party doctrine and therefore only validating the latter.⁷² Kardelj's elaboration clarifies that it is the individual who, by active involvement in self-management, shapes the particular struggle and thereby shapes the 'struggle'. Lanyan was a lot more precise in his understanding that 'adapting the superstructure to the actual conditions... involved giving people a *particular* voice', envisaging socialist system as an individually and nationally dependent 'network attempting to create equality and autonomy within the functioning of the market'.⁷³

Fourth, the result of the Partisan liberation independently and without help from the Red Army was that Yugoslavia was the only European country after

⁷⁰ Kardelj in David Bošković and Blagoje Dašić (eds), *Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia: 1950-1980, Documents* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1980) 10.

⁷¹ Ibid. 9-10. See also Edvard Kardelj, 'The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment' in Edvard Kardelj, *Yugoslavia in International Relations and in the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1979) 178.

⁷² Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy* (2018) 15.

⁷³ It should be noted that this transfer of power occurred only under the auspices and in accordance with official party doctrine. Giving people a 'particular' voice was superstructure's way to rely on individual voice coinciding with the official Party doctrine. Lanyan, *The Yugoslav Experiment* (1986) 2; Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 204-205.

WWII to remain ‘socialist but independent’. Concomitantly it resisted the Soviet pressure to become its satellite and a member of the Warsaw Pact, and was ultimately, as will be seen in chapter 2, expelled from Cominform.⁷⁴

Fifth, and as it will be seen in chapters 2 and 5, such experimental system needed constant revision. After all, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (or the Communist League of Yugoslavia as it was renamed in 1952) did not have an infallible working formula for socialism right from the beginning. Instead, they needed to ‘constantly revise upon its practical failures to correct, improve and reconstruct’.⁷⁵ Indeed, not only did the Yugoslav vision of communism/socialism differ from the Soviet conceptualisation, but it also changed over the years in Yugoslavia itself. Marked differences between the first generation and second generation of Marxists within Yugoslavia occurred due to different theoretical readings and the practical experience of living the Yugoslav version of communism or socialism. What transpired was the so-called generational gap, exposing differences between generations of Marxists.⁷⁶ Additionally, and as will be analysed in following chapters, in finding ways to strengthen it against various oppositions, the Party endlessly interfered within domestic political debates, or was engaged in sharp polemics with Moscow or in stark disagreements with other NAM members.

⁷⁴ Cominform (1947-1956) or the Communist Information Bureau or the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties) was a supranational alliance of Marxist-Leninist communist parties in the Eastern bloc and beyond. It was an agency and the official forum of the international communist movement under the Soviet direction. Cominform's predecessor was Comintern (1919-1943) or the Communist or Third International. It was a Soviet-controlled international communist organization advocating world communism, committed to overthrow the international bourgeoisie and create an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the state.

⁷⁵ Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society* (1969) 210.

⁷⁶ The first generation of Marxists based their theoretical writings and political doctrines on Marx's mature writings on the economy, primarily *Capital*, and on Friedrich Engels's late works (such as *Anti-Dühring*). The second generation, including Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukács, and Antonio Gramsci, was informed by Marx's earlier, more philosophical reflections (published between the 1910s and 1930s). Marx's critique of Hegel's notion of alienation gave them the tools to depart from the dogmatic Marxism (dominating in the communist parties in the USSR and Europe) while remaining close to Marx. Yugoslav scholars and politicians were ‘in conversation’ with both. See Branislav Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects: Performance and Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1945-91* (United States: University of Michigan Press 2016) 15.

In the process of this new social order being designed and redesigned, its normative system collapsed after four decades as will be explored in later chapters.

1.3.2. Idea of Yugoslavia: Other Influences and Inspirations

Yugoslavia was arguably the first ever nation-state that introduced (through governmental decree) a doctrine of the socialist workers' self-management, adopting it as official state organisation.⁷⁷ However, it seems erroneous to perceive its developments as unique and atypical of not only Marxist but wider socialist streams of thought. Namely, such an orientation would imply that the concept of workers' self-management was relatively novel and would ignore the link that the Yugoslavs freely made between their system and past socialist writings and experiences.⁷⁸ While the focus might be mainly on 1948-1950 as years that mark a profound change in the Yugoslav state-identity-building course, it is vital to look broader to various forms, manifestations and understandings of self-management across the world and across time. Only by doing so, do we recognize the full context within which its distinct understanding and praxis of self-management arose.

As seen above, the authors of self-management policies were partly inspired by their wartime experiences of popularly elected and responsible committees. Partly then, and similar to military strategies, self-management arose as an organisational form of guerrilla resistance according to which an individual was required to act as an independent freedom fighter against superpowers in seemingly hopeless situation - an apt example being WWII Yugoslav resistance against German occupation.⁷⁹ Politically, self-management reflected a system of grassroots democracy in which all society

⁷⁷ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 5.

⁷⁸ Whitehorn, 'Alienation and Workers' Self-Management' (1974) 162; Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 5.

⁷⁹ See for example Ahmet Donlagić, Žarko Atanacković, and Dušan Plenča, *Yugoslavia in the Second World War* (Belgrade: Međunarodna Štampa Interpress 1967).

members participate through their representatives, exemplified by the Paris Commune during the French civil war of 1870.⁸⁰

Ideas were brought also from the early-20th century revolutions in Russia and Central Europe, with examples including Yugoslav communist volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Eventually high Party functionaries would arguably be exposed to anarcho-syndicalist experience or to experiments in workers' self-management carried out by Catalanian anarchists in factory management.⁸¹ After 1948, when standing at the forefront of the battle for a 'socialism with a human face', the Yugoslav political and ideological leaders forged contacts with the western European social democrats and socialists and opened dialogue with the Scandinavians, Germans, British, French, Belgians, and later with 'Eurocommunists'.⁸² These experiences undoubtedly played a role in Tito and his communist comrades' choice to develop an alternative, 'third' path to socialism to provide a legitimizing basis for the new kind of governance and development that would be independent from the West and the East, and especially from their then ally, the Soviet Union.

Yet the genealogy of Yugoslav self-management also reflects the breadth of theoretical sources early Yugoslav theoreticians embraced.⁸³ The future leaders of the Yugoslav communist/socialist state drew theoretical foundations not only from Marxist-Leninist political and economic thought but found inspiration for an alternative socialist approach to the organization of state power in non-Soviet socialist sources too. While the official theorists and ideologues developed their thought foremost by returning to Marxist texts

⁸⁰ Damachi and others, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1982) 6-7.

⁸¹ Eric R. Terzuolo, 'Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Origins of Yugoslavia's Self-Management System' in Wayne S. Vucinich (ed), *At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective* (New York: Brooklyn College Press 1982) 195-218, 216; Pirjevec, 'Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom' (2014) 763-778.

⁸² The Eurocommunism was a 1970s and 1980s revisionist trend within various Western European communist parties for independence from the Soviet Communist Party doctrine. Pirjevec, 'Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom' (2014) 763-778.

⁸³ Ašer Deleon, 'Workers' Self-Management' 1959 (30) 2-3 *Annals of Collective Economy* 145-168.

as a theoretical influence, political progressivism of the time allowed them to depart radically from the ‘classics’ of Marxism. They would take up the works of the 19th century [European] social thinkers, authors and activists, and consider works by the French utopian socialists, the English Guild socialists, Anarchists, and Christian Socialists.

For instance, and according to a Yugoslav trade union official Ašer Deleon, the ‘idea and aspiration of the working class to determine directly their own destiny, have been kept alive since the time of the Utopian socialists’.⁸⁴ The concept of self-management as a project of organization of production and society emerged in the works of, among others, the French anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), the social and political activist Louis August Blanqui (1805-1881), the Christian social theorist Henry de Saint Simon (1760-1825), philosopher Charles Fourier (1772-1837), and the British utopian socialist Robert Owen (1771–1858). In their texts, self-management was in various ways offered as a ‘mechanism for political and economic emancipation’. They were idealists, claiming that society can be adapted based on their personal opinion. In Yugoslav discourse, as the leading 1970s Yugoslav Marxist theorist Miloš Nikolić wrote, the concept of self-management ‘became almost inseparable from the evolution of the self-governing labour movement’, conceptualized as an ‘expression of the proletariat’s efforts to liberate itself from the state and take control over the production and social relations’.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ For instance, during the 1848 German revolution or the 1864 First International, or in the 19th century birth of the European trade union movement. Or in the ‘workers’ Soviets’ committees during the early Soviet rule, or during the 1920s occupation of the factories by Italian workers. Whitehorn, ‘Alienation and Workers’ Self-Management’ (1974) 163; Deleon, ‘Workers’ Self-Management’ (1959) 145-168.

⁸⁵ Thus, the views on conceptualisation and materialisation of Yugoslav self-management ought to be contextualized. Today, for example, such framework seems too narrow. The Yugoslav self-management seems no longer viable in the context of the current labour movement(s) (as its numbers are reduced or being dispersed and alienated). Concomitantly, self-management’s principles remain a relevant discourse considering that utopian socialists conceptualized self-management at a time when the working class had *not yet* consolidated as a political force, and since its reflection continues today when the working class is *no longer* a political force. Not being ‘contaminated’ by its attachment to the workers’ movement, the utopian conceptualisations could therefore still be considered. Especially after neoliberalism and globalization transformed and alienated modern precariat

In addition to the historicist argument of social inequalities that Marx and Engels set out to revolutionise into a classless society, the utopian socialists used real-life social experiments to convince others of their rationality or desirability, and of the possibility to form a utopian society.⁸⁶ Louis Blanc (1811-1882) was noted for his theory of ‘worker-controlled ‘social workshops’⁸⁷ and put forward the idea of ‘companies competing in manner of organisation that would, over time, supersede conventional capitalist companies’.⁸⁸ Under leadership of CPY, Yugoslavs used real-life social experiment too, as the workers' movement began to develop soon after the Soviet revolution (1917-1922/23). And while thinkers on the European left were calling for implementation of particular emancipation, the Yugoslav ideologues were legislating it. However – and perhaps this was one of the reasons for its demise in Yugoslavia too – as socialism was by definition in all its conceptualisations oriented entirely toward the future, capturing a plan for social reconstruction and a ‘program for a collective life which does not exist as yet’ could only remain an utopia.⁸⁹ Not even Marx’s *Capital* – the

workers, disabling them to organise themselves as a coherent politically relevant group. See Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 5; Pirjevec, ‘Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom’ (2014) 763-778, 777; Cirila Toplak and Miro Haček, *Slovenia: Political Insights* (Warszawa: European School of Law and Administration 2012) 126; Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 5.

⁸⁶ Examples include Fourier’s 19th century America phalanxes or companies and workers' associations according to Proudhon’s principles in the 19th century France. See William Bailie, *Josiah Warren: The First American Anarchist. A Sociological Study* (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company 1906).

⁸⁷ Blanc’s ideas of a meritocratic society were realised in creation of workers’ cooperatives to guarantee employment for the urban poor. Designed government-funded factories in France, the so-called *National Workshops* or *ateliers nationaux*, were but short-lived (March-July 1848). See Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 15.

⁸⁸ Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 15.

⁸⁹ The term socialism was arguably coined by Robert Owen in 1835. Utopian socialists were considered contemporaries of the scientific socialism, a socialist doctrine resulting itself from reality, using a scientific method to examine historical trends determined by economic conditions to determine probable future social and political developments. The term scientific socialism was coined by Pierre Joseph Proudhon in his anarchist study *What is Property?* (1840) and was used later by Engels to frame and distinguish Marx’s political economic theory from utopians’. Durkheim, however, argued that no scientific socialism can exist as sciences necessary for implementing such an ideal society are not yet developed. See Emile Durkheim, *Socialism and Saint-Simon* (Abingdon, New York: Routledge [1959] 2011) 30.

‘most systematic’ and the ‘richest in ideas’ – qualified.⁹⁰ Simultaneously, theoreticians of communism - bearing in mind that socialism and communism are on occasions used interchangeably - had their thinking oriented not toward the future but to the past. They demanded, paradoxically, a retrogressive step and sought their models for the future in what was behind them.⁹¹ Communism, in this respect, represented a group of theories that were a precursor of socialism.

Another socialist alternative to Marxian political economy was guild socialism, with origins in the early-20th century United Kingdom.⁹² It was a political movement advocating state ownership and workers' control of industries through delegation of authority to national trade-related guilds organized internally on democratic lines (in an implied contractual relationship with the public). According to their views, the state was to be transformed into a ‘federal body representing the workers’ guilds, consumers’ organizations, local government bodies and other social structures’.⁹³ They foretold of dangers of ‘over-centralization of power and stressed the need to decentralise, democratise the workplaces and return to the more personal and intimate structures of self-regulating guilds’.⁹⁴ Ideas of George D H Cole, Samuel G Hobson, Richard H Tawney and Bertrand Russell were incorporated into the Yugoslav ideology. However, as it turned out, mere

⁹⁰ Ibid. 5-6.

⁹¹ Ibid. 29-30, 44.

⁹² Inspired by guild socialism was a Scandinavian politician and linguist Ernst Wigforss (1881-1977) whose writing contributed to development of industrial democracy and workers' self-management. The foremost theoretician or ideologist of Marxian revision in the Swedish Social Democratic movement, he shifted it from a revolutionary to a reformist organization. Interestingly, Wigforss' ideas were ideologically close to the British socialist organisation Fabian Society (1884-), with overlapping views on progression via ‘gradualist and reformist effort in democracies, rather than by revolutionary overthrow’. The Society had a powerful influence upon British politics, particularly the Labour Party, and founded the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1895. Interestingly, members included Jawaharlal Nehru, who adopted Fabian principles as part of his own political ideologies. See Timothy A Tilton, ‘A Swedish Road to Socialism: Ernst Wigforss and the Ideological Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy’ 1979 (73) 2 *The American Political Science Review* 505-520, 512, 517.

⁹³ Whitehorn, ‘Alienation and Workers' Self-Management’ (1974) 164-165.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 164-165.

nationalization (socialization of private property) and form of state capitalism where property was owned and operated by all the people were no solution to exploitation nor to social alienation.

Due to his philosophy, Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) can be considered an inspiration for theorists of the Yugoslav self-management too. A prominent 19th century French political radical, he is considered by many as the father of anarchism.⁹⁵ He considered anarchy as the basis of a fully developed society and emphasised 'reciprocity, solidarity and morality as solutions to all problems'.⁹⁶ He famously objected to private property or ownership and favoured nationalization of land and workplaces and envisioned social order where all means of production, land and possessions belong to those who produce.⁹⁷ All economic activity is left free to the impact of economic laws, but at the same time all economic decisions are to be left to workers' associations and councils, economic operators or cooperatives to act on the principle of mutual fair exchange of goods. A 'complete sovereignty of the individual' placed against 'society as a harmony of individuality' represented a contradiction that would be hard to overcome.⁹⁸ Furthermore, he believed that social revolution is achievable in a peaceful manner, and initially advocated complete abolition of the state with its

⁹⁵ According to Proudhon, 'as man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy', a slogan considered inspiration for 'anarchy is order, government is civil war' or 'anarchy is order without power', often attributed to Proudhon but arguably coined in 1848 by Anselme Bellegarrigue. Proudhon, *What is Property?* (1994) 209. See Magdalena Modrzejewska, *Josiah Warren: The First American Anarchist, 'The Remarkable American'* (Krakow: Archeobooks 2016) 100-112.

⁹⁶ And hierarchy as the principle of a primitive one. Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 17.

⁹⁷ Although initially favourable, Marx later condemned Proudhon for entangling himself in 'all sorts of fantasies, including about true bourgeois property'. He criticised Proudhon's phrase 'property is theft' (*La propriété, c'est le vol!*), as self-refuting and unnecessarily confusing, saying that 'theft' as a forcible violation of property presupposes the existence of property'. See his ground-breaking anarchist study, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, *What is Property? Or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government [Qu'est-ce que la propriété? Recherche sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement]* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994 [1840]) xxiv, 13, 198-201; Karl Marx, 'Letter to J B Schweizer' in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works: Volume 2* (Moscow: Progress Publishers [1968-1973]) 24.

⁹⁸ Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 17.

political system, envisaging an ideal society without central authority or law of government, where power resides in communes and local associations governed by contractual law.⁹⁹ Instead of seeing a country's birth within commodity production, he regarded the state and the economy as inseparable.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, perceiving a state's dying out or 'withering away' as primarily an 'organizational and technical process' achieved solely by bare elimination of some political functions and bodies was a mistake that Proudhon and many after him made. He later realized his misconceptions in critiquing the state and, resembling Yugoslav self-management, advocated for one where authority is balanced with federalism and where workers are collective owners of an enterprise, operating transparently within the context of a competitive market economy.¹⁰¹

According to the French social theorist and one of the founders of Christian socialism Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), the relationship between the state and the economy was to be based on the assumption that industries' only sensible goal is producing useful products and that governments would intervene only if industries overstepped its directions. As such, he proclaimed scientific organization of industry and society.¹⁰² His view of society accompanied by a brotherhood of man was defined more broadly than the workers' proletariat in Yugoslavia as it encompassed all who produce something. As he advocated for abolition of private and social property and for planned economic policy, Engels declared him anarchist.¹⁰³ With ideas concerning the struggle for workers' and farmers' rights and for social rights in general, the Christian socialist movement influenced the development of

⁹⁹ Proudhon advocated for a society ruled by an 'educated scientific government, whose sovereignty rests upon reason as opposed to sheer will'. See his manifesto, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, *The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century [L'idee generale de la revolution au XIX siècle]* (Independent Publishing Platform 2018 [1851]) 81-136; Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije* (1989) 17.

¹⁰⁰ Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 17.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 17.

¹⁰² Henri de Saint-Simon, *Nouveau Christianisme [The New Christianity]* (London: Routledge [1825] 2020).

¹⁰³ Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 12.

the Yugoslav self-management as will be seen more below, with Dr Janez Evangelist Krek and Andrej Gosar as its prominent advocates.¹⁰⁴

The French philosopher and influential early utopian socialist thinker Charles Fourier (1772-1837) ‘envisioned large-scale self-efficient cooperatives or communes he called *phalanxes*’.¹⁰⁵ Their *phalanstère* or ‘grand hotels’ were to liaise with the world federal government, but did not mean proletarianization of society as its prosperity and social contacts - the two basic human needs according to Fourier – were to be enjoyed equally by producers and consumers alike.¹⁰⁶ As such, Fourier's conceptualisation was a departure from Yugoslav self-management’s revolutionary principle of equality as it focuses on the harmonious coexistence of differences instead.

The British utopian socialist Robert Owen (1771–1858) upturned Fourier’s experimental logic, departing from its purely theoretical foundations and instead moving into concrete social experimentation. Owen reorganised, rationalized and humanized his father in law’s company in New Lanark, leading the Scottish village as a commune where the well-being of workers paid their worth directly benefited the company and community. According to Owen's utopian socialism, the profit motive should not be the primary shaper of society. With businesses giving back, it should be about enhancing the well-being of the community, sharing rather than competing.¹⁰⁷ There was

¹⁰⁴ However only to an extent as the Christian socialists were silenced during WWII.

¹⁰⁵ Phalanxes were political entities (communes) based in buildings called Phalanstères or ‘grand hotels’, expected to liaise with the world federal government. Work in them was to be allotted according to individual's abilities and inclinations and should be a pleasure, with any unpleasant work being paid extra. Fourier inspired creation of four phalanxes in America: Ohio, Trumbull, and Columbian. The most famous, and tragic, ‘communist’ settlement was called Utopia, formed in Clermont (1844) of exactly 1620 followers of his principles (according to his calculations this was the perfect number of different combinations or types of personalities). See Bailie, Josiah Warren (1906) 50-57.

¹⁰⁶ Yolène Dilas-Rocherieux, *L'utopie, ou La mémoire du futur: De Thomas More à Lénine, le rêve éternel d'une autre société [Utopija ali spomin na prihodnost: od Thomasa Mora do Lenina, večne sanje o drugačni družbi, or Utopia or Memory of the Future: From Thomas More to Lenin, Eternal Dreams of Different Society]* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Premiki 2004) 114-123.

¹⁰⁷ Owen established the first village store in 1813. Running for the community’s benefit, it is considered inspiration for the Co-operative movement founded subsequently by the Rochdale Pioneers in 1844.

no place for a state according to his vision of a communitarian utopia for future society. Owen was, however, unsuccessful in repeating this experiment on a larger scale.¹⁰⁸

With his so-called theories of Blanquism, the French socialist and political activist Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881) was distinguished in various ways from socialist currents of his day. The Blanquists differed from other utopian socialists by being concerned more with the revolution itself than with an image of the future (socialist) society resulting from it. Blanqui was one of the non-Marxist socialists who, contrary to Marx, did not believe in popular movements nor in prevalent role of the working class. Simultaneously, however, due to his bet on collective property and belief in a central role of the socialist revolution, he was the most pro-Marxist of the utopians. He was notable for his radical conception of the revolution, whereby a small avant-garde group of revolutionaries or ‘highly organised and secretive conspirators’ would seize the power first and establish temporary dictatorship by force before potentially using the power of the state to introduce socialism.¹⁰⁹ Arguably it resembles the Soviet Stalinist era, where revolution or overturn of the bourgeois social order was a self-sufficient end, and where a new order where the power is handed to people comes only after a transitional period of tyranny.¹¹⁰ According to Blanqui’s theory, then, self-management would enter the sphere of power and government only in the final stage of the social transformation.

¹⁰⁸ Similarity with the Yugoslav self-management can be found in demise of the commune New Harmony Colony in Indiana (1824-1828) that failed economically as it could not survive amidst the American market-economy environment. Due to the insufficient self-sufficiency, lack of skilful craftsmen and bad management, the community soon bankrupted. Its infrastructure worsened by constant influx of new population, cohesiveness stifled and consequently ruined community relations. See Modrzejewska, *Josiah Warren* (2016) 77-86; Dilas-Rocherieux, *Utopia or Memory of the Future* (2004) 100-102.

¹⁰⁹ Most of Blanqui’s writing on political economy and socialism was published posthumously under the title *Critique sociale* (1885). His followers, the Blanquists, played an important role in the history of the workers’ movement even after his death. See Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 13.

¹¹⁰ Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse* (1989) 13.

The future leaders of the Yugoslav state not only drew from the Marxist-Leninist political and economic thought, and from the 19th century French and British utopian socialists and anarchists, but significantly evolved their concept of self-management from ideas present in the Yugoslav intellectual space, in particular as envisioned by the Yugoslav Serbian and Yugoslav Slovenian thinkers.

In the Yugoslav Serbian political space, Svetozar Marković (1846-1875) reasserted the appeal of nonviolent anti-statism movement and gained a new generation of followers among social revolutionaries in agrarian southern and eastern Europe.¹¹¹ Marković was an activist with an anthropological philosophy that advocated for a program of social change. He was arguably the ‘first genuine socialist in the Balkans... founder of the Serbian cooperative movement, social reformer, political activist, socialist philosopher, and literary critic’.¹¹² Despite being lonely pioneer at the time, with many Serbian conservatives regarding him a dangerous modernist and with many Yugoslav communists considering him merely a utopian, his philosophy and writings were influential.¹¹³ Combining ideas inspired by Marxism and Russian revolutionary democracy, he conceived the nation-state as a cooperative and advocated democratic federalism as an alternative to powerful and parasitic bureaucracy that stifled freedom. According to

¹¹¹ Anti-statism opposes intervention by the state into political, personal, social, and economic affairs. In anarchism such philosophical approach is characterized by complete rejection of all hierarchical rulership.

¹¹² Influenced by Marx and a member of the Socialist International, Marković edited the Serbian first socialist newspaper concerned mainly with economics Radenik [The Worker] (founded in 1871, the year of the Paris Commune following the war and revolution of 1870/71). The Serbian National Assembly accused Radenik of ‘striking at the very foundations of the state, faith morals and property’ by propagating communism. Woodford D McClellan, *Svetozar Marković and the Origins of Balkan Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964).

¹¹³ As Proudhon’s protagonist, Marković translated his works and studied socialism intensively. With his socialist beliefs in the political evolution of Serbia, he played a considerable role among his contemporaries. He was arguably the spiritual father of the Serbian Democratic Party. His student Nikola Pašić (1845-1926) became the leading political and diplomatic figure of almost 40 years, founding a new socialist radical party in 1881 (repackaged as a nationalist party soon after the failure of the Timok uprising of 1883/84). His realistic writings (eight volumes, published between 1891 and 1912) were reissued by Tito’s government.

Marković, social revolution presupposes people's intellectual power where the educated minority public becomes aware of its suffering or needs and creates a radical change in their conditions. The state then should merely serve to coordinate the activities of small communities called *opštine* organized on the *zadruga* principle.¹¹⁴ He saw Serbian society divided not so much on religious lines as by class.¹¹⁵ Centuries of Turkish domination, lack of resources and poverty resulted in strident nationalism that was difficult to handle in a country where economic progress was far behind the development of political institutions. Urgency of progress demanded equation of Serbianism with socialism.¹¹⁶

In Slovenian speaking territories, it was Catholicism that influenced Slovene Marxism.¹¹⁷ Diplomatic historian Jože Pirjevec has proposed that Edvard Kardelj encountered the concept of self-management in the monumental work *Socialism*, written by the Catholic priest Dr Janez Evangelist Krek (1865-1917) in 1901.¹¹⁸ As a statesman, Krek was an important figure to consider when thinking about the social, economic, and politics. His commitment to improve people's social position, including ethnic issues, made Krek's contribution to Slovenia invaluable, not only to Slovenes' economic survival

¹¹⁴ *Zadruga* was the old Balkan communal institution or a family structure that he idealised and sought to revitalize.

¹¹⁵ The origins of the 1990s Balkan Wars were also primarily socio-economic rather than religious, pointing to similarity with Marković's argument of Serbian revolt against the Ottomans having social rather than religious character. Religion was to an extent merely a consequence and a powerful additional fuel for conflicts.

¹¹⁶ Marković's hope to avoid capitalist phase in Serbia resembles CPY's aim to abandon Soviet doctrine of two-phase revolution. As Serbia of his lifetime had virtually no capitalism or working class, Marković envisaged direct progress from a primitive to a sophisticated agrarian socialism. He promoted the study of economics, socialism, and involvement in politics but denounced bureaucracy, and professional judges and written laws. His ideas of social reform influenced development of the cooperative movement among the South Slavs. After his death, his followers participated in protests of workers and students in Kragujevac in 1876 under the motto of self-management.

¹¹⁷ On influence of Catholicism on Slovene Marxism see interview with Tine Hribar, available at <<https://www.rtv slo.si/kultura/knjige/hribar-in-kreft-o-vracanju-marxa/473419>> accessed 3 December 2019.

¹¹⁸ See Pirjevec, 'Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom' (2014) 763-778. See also John A Arnež, 'The Economic Thought of Dr Janez Evangelist Krek' 1989 (11) 1-2 *Slovene Studies* 65-74.

but politically as well. He was not an office politician but familiar on terrain, giving thousands of speeches, organising workers and most significantly, established cooperatives and credit unions. His constant interaction enabled him to encourage people to put their ideas into practice, saving many Slovenian farmers and workers and prevented their mass emigration. Indeed, being 'political' was in that period a question of national survival. As one of the instigators of the Majniška Deklaracija [May Declaration, 1917], Krek ensured that the South Slav peoples pronounced themselves for unification in an independent state, albeit under the Empire of Austria-Hungary (1867-1918).

Perhaps more relevant for the Yugoslav self-management was Krek's most prominent successor, the Christian socialist and Catholic theorist Dr Andrej Gosar (1887-1970).¹¹⁹ Elaborating on the aspects of welfare state in his *For a New Social Order* published in 1933/1935, Gosar developed the earliest self-managing ideas emerging in Slovenian-speaking world.¹²⁰ Albeit unknown to other socialist regimes, and considerably more conservative in terms of his economic ideas than the later Yugoslav model, his work lies visible in the uniquely Yugoslav conceptualisation of self-management. It seems that Yugoslav communists took various ideas that Christian Socialists contemplated but were silenced during WWII. Many - Edvard Kocbek, France Bučar, Janez Stanovnik, Boris Kidrič and Josip Vidmar - renounced being Christian Socialist and joined the Liberation Front (*Osvobodilna Fronta*). Gosar, however, refused to act against his beliefs, rejected communism and joined the insignificant and unsuccessful non-communist resistance to the occupation, the United Slovenes [*Združeni Slovenci*]. In autumn 1944 Nazis arrested and sent him to the Dachau concentration camp. After WWII, he was 'silenced' by the Yugoslav authorities, and was allowed to only lecture marginal subjects at the Technical Faculty [*Tehniška fakulteta*]

¹¹⁹ A prolific writer, Gosar further developed Krek's thought, particularly positions on the *Rerum Novarum* encyclical, and wrote a short manifesto with specialist articles on social and educational issues *Nazaj h Kreku* [*Back to Krek*].

¹²⁰ Andrej Gosar, *Za nov družbeni red I in II* [*For a New Social Order I and II*] (Celje: Družba Svetega Mohorja 1994 [1933, 1935]).

in Ljubljana. Excluded from public office, he nevertheless wrote extensively, hiding the notes.¹²¹

Gosar advocated workers' ownership in companies, co-management and cooperatives but rejected communism primarily as an economist but also due to his opposition to a violent revolution.¹²² He warned that communism will not survive economically as it had no lasting perspective without private property nor encouragement for individual initiative and responsibility.¹²³ While supporting association of major industries, he did not see complete nationalization as a solution. Gosar backed keeping of private property and saw self-management in companies only as means to organizing their planned management, headed by self-managing boards and in dialogue with capital owners, trade unions, labour directors and professional chambers. Second, with regards to perceptions of democracy, Gosar wanted to introduce self-management (according to Christian-socialist beliefs) in all key areas of human engagements, in economy, politics, culture and housing, which would be effective only in a harmonious system of equality. This was what the Yugoslavs later did. But, unlike the Yugoslav communists, Gosar saw democracy and self-management as the antithesis of each other and argued

¹²¹ Allegedly, Gosar was 'silenced' by being pushed into obscurity to conceal from whom Kardelj took ideas of self-management directly. This might hold only partly, as self-management eventually practiced in Yugoslavia was not what Gosar had imagined. Cirila Toplak, 'Za nov družbeni red': Genealogija samoupravljanja [For a New Social Order: A Genealogy of Self-Management]' 2014 (8) 1 *Ars and Humanitas* 118-135, 125.

¹²² Gosar, *For a New Social Order* (1994) 34; Andrej Gosar, *Reform of Society, Sociological and Economic Basis* (Belgrade 1933). For a detailed account on Gosar's economic thought see also Marko Zupanc, 'Gosarjeva ekonomska misel' 1999 53 (4) 117 *Zgodovinski Časopis* 553-575. See also Toplak, 'For a New Social Order' (2014) 125.

¹²³ Gosar critiqued Marxism for its inability to 'build a new social order', as its only power lied in directing workers towards overthrowing the existing order (revolution an end in itself). According to Gosar, Marx was unable to recognize the society's complexity (seeing capitalists and proletariat as the only existing classes). Marx's solutions were seizure of capitalists, implementation of dictatorship of the proletariat and collectivization or nationalization of production through abolition of wage relations. While Gosar deemed Marx's teachings revolutionary and communist, he proposed correcting and modernizing them. Namely, Marxism should abandon its socio-economic basis and replace it with one corresponding to a particular socio-economic context (one example being Christian socialism). At the same time, however, Gosar was aware that if Marxism would do so it would cease to be Marxism. Toplak, 'For a New Social Order' (2014) 125.

that the authority of the state as sole power over other levels of government authority and administration (such as self-management) was illegitimate. Namely, while for Gosar ‘state administration... is something alien, hostile to the people, whereas self-management is human and domestic’, Kardelj perceived self-managing socialism as a fusion of economic self-management and direct political democracy.¹²⁴ Moreover, while Gosar envisioned (a creation of) democracy as an expression of political pluralism, Kardelj’s self-management arose from the opposite direction. Gosar advocated bottom-up change and did not see a solution in change from above as opposed to Kardelj, who advocated for an ideal of self-management’s direct democracy to be applied top-down by the Communist Party.¹²⁵ Ultimately, however, Gosar did declare for hierarchy and superiority of a political self-managing authority over economic, cultural, and housing self-management.¹²⁶ He propounded, in this way, for the authority of state power, and for the state to regulate social policy to ensure social justice.¹²⁷

Gosar’s contradictory view on an apparent antithesis between democracy and self-management reflected also contradictions in Kardelj’s own thought. This could then be one of the reasons why Kardelj’s concepts proved irreconcilable in practice. First, due to his ‘inability to envision a socialist Yugoslavia without a one-party system’ despite his theorising self-management as seizing direct democracy. Second, due to his belief in progressive nature of the national idea despite his opposition to regionalism.¹²⁸ Namely, and as will be seen in chapter 5, Kardelj’s search for such social order and eventual design

¹²⁴ Gosar, *For a New Social Order* (1994) 213-214.

¹²⁵ Pirjevec, ‘Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom’ (2014) 763-778.

¹²⁶ Gosar, *For a New Social Order* (1994) 216.

¹²⁷ For instance, he tried to vacate flats for the less wealthy in Ljubljana while working as a commissioner for social welfare issues in the Provincial Government for Slovenia after WWI. He failed to do so due to opposition from the capital-holding Liberals, who accused Gosar of wanting to carry out a social revolution. Toplak, ‘For a New Social Order’ (2014) 125.

¹²⁸ See Pirjevec, ‘Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom’ (2014) 763-778; Cox, *Edvard Kardelj* (1996) vii.

of the new singular normative system proved unrealistic and unsuccessful by the mid-1970s and collapsed a few years later, together with Yugoslavia.

Finally, it is important to note that Gosar's ideas stemmed from a principle that the 'universally valid ideal of self-managing state regulation' cannot exist.¹²⁹ Namely, the best state organization is that which allows the highest possible individual and overall well-being, and therefore each country must politically regulate itself according to its own domestic situation.¹³⁰ As I argue in this thesis, such principle was implemented by the Yugoslav statesmen in their foreign policy principle of nonalignment.

1.4. Conclusions

Despite the prevalent appearance or claims in scholarship that the post-WWII Yugoslav government found precedent for their version of communism/socialism only in the writings of Marx, Lenin or in Stalinist doctrine, I have discussed in this chapter the evolution of self-management in terms of its inspiration, departure from and re-reading thereof Soviet and non-Soviet conceptual sources. Turn to the so-called pre-history of workers' self-management shows how this particular Yugoslav concept stood historically tied to a whole spectrum of political ideas and to practical experiences before it became the official Yugoslav doctrine in 1950s. It portrays its rise way before the 1948 split, directly from the wartime experience when its idea and project of human liberation developed into a particular interpretation of 'socialism with a human face'. Yugoslavs, with Tito and Kardelj at the front, believed that their victory nurtured directly the growth of socialist self-management.

To what extent the Yugoslav theory of workers' self-management resembles each of the various conceptualisations is arguably not as vital as the attentiveness to the seemingly inexhaustive list of potential contributors in

¹²⁹ Gosar, *For a New Social Order* (1994) 220.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* 220.

search for or development of its own concept or understanding, distinctive and grounded in real experience. As the Yugoslav theory evolved in a pragmatic almost eclectic fashion, no single source is sufficient to outline its framework which demonstrates its conceptual complexity.¹³¹ What emerges in attempts to synthesize the prevailing Yugoslav proposition is a portrait of fascinating replication of details which Yugoslav theoreticians adopted and adapted to various degrees. Therein lies the incentive for further research on self-management that could include, for instance, attempts to reconcile' anarchists' condemnation of the state with communists borrowing ideas from anarchists yet upholding the state or a similar endeavour with regards to Christian socialists. Furthermore, these ideas could be deployed in international conversations: to NAM as a state-centric movement. Thus, the key significance of exploring self-management's historical circumstances and its theoretical roots is the ability to understand and to engage further with such experimentation.

Indeed, and as I argue in this thesis, it remains significant to pay attention to Yugoslav experimentation, not only because its radical nature and potential, but because it plays against the standard views of sovereignty at the domestic level and its experience internationally through a top-down version of how a state or how the international order should be organised. This chapter thus serves as the benchmark to reassess the Yugoslav aspiration to create an alternative model of domestic, and later global, organisation. Chapter 2 will consider further the specific circumstances behind the political decision to introduce self-management in Yugoslavia and examine how the Yugoslav domestic policy emerged in a context where two radically different centralising modalities of governance – the Western capitalist and the Soviet communist – were already in place and competing with one another. It will

¹³¹ Valuable sources for analysis of the Yugoslav theory of self-management include Deleon, 'Workers' Self-Management' (1959) 145-168; Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society* (1969); Branko Horvat, *The Economic System and Economic Policy of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Institute of Economic Research 1970); Branko Horvat, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (New York: M E Sharpe 1982); Jože Goričar, 'Workers' Self-Management: Ideal Type - Social Reality' in Pusić, *Participation and Self-Management* (1972); Rudi Supek, 'Two Types of Self-Managing Organizations and Technological Progress' in Pusić, *Participation and Self-Management* (1972) 150-173.

serve to point to reasons why after the successful National Liberation, the Communist Revolution and formation of the Yugoslav Federation during and after WWII, the strengthening of national independence became one of the basic objectives in Yugoslavia's foreign policy too. Accordingly, chapter 3 and 4 will examine how Yugoslav policy of national independence resulted in important aspects of its foreign policy, how it maintained an independent position in relation to bloc politics and fostered the concept of cooperation with nations having different internal systems that led to the development of the concept of peaceful coexistence in the international order – nonalignment.

CHAPTER 2

The Rise of the Yugoslav Project (1945-1961)

Self-management is a revolutionary process of social transformation which can find its true expression only [in] a popular socialist revolution. And the Yugoslav revolution was one such.¹

2.1. Introduction

Following my previous discussion in chapter 1 about self-management through its conceptualisation before and during WWII, I engage in this chapter with the geopolitical conditions in which this distinct Yugoslav concept emerged. I argue in this chapter that the geopolitical conditions for the emergence of self-management [*radničko samoupravljanje*] gave grounds for an alternative form of self-determination at the international level. Self-management came to be expressed and understood by Yugoslavs as the vision of a particular domestic story that offered a mechanism for political and economic emancipation and was perceived as a radical ‘double move’ in state-identity formation processes. First, it became a natural form of organisation and intrinsic to that particular part of the Balkans, legitimising the new multi-ethnic constituency – the Yugoslavs – through recovery of the past and local traditions. Second, it was a way for the Yugoslavs to reject external forces, in particular as they were responding to the one-fits-all Soviet project, resulting in the renowned split in 1948. Yugoslav leaders were looking for a ‘new road to communism’, at home and internationally.² They resolved that ‘respect for national diversity and... economic equality between

¹ Edvard Kardelj in David Bošković and Blagoje Dašić (eds), *Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia: 1950-1980, Documents* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1980) 9-10.

² Committee on the Judiciary United State Senate, *Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1961) 175.

nations' that was in dire need after the devastation of WWII was only able to be 'fully enforced [ensured] under conditions of self-management'.³

I analyse, thus, the path Yugoslav leaders had to navigate through to distinguish and define themselves in light of the already established and dominant ideologies. I therefore demonstrate the emergence of the country's state-building project in a historical context where two radically different centralising modalities of governance – the Western capitalist and the Soviet communist – were already in place and competing with one another. Within this international context, Yugoslav socialism emerged as a viable and legitimate alternative to the two models through political, economic and social reforms, including the role of the state and the Party, a federal form of government, and communist power, and decentralisation.

As such, this chapter contributes to an overall understanding of the complex heritage of the Yugoslav self-management model that encompassed the economic, political and social spheres, ideas of which were reflected in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. I argue, then, that the development of Yugoslavia's self-management policy was a prelude for the conceptualisation of an idea of nonalignment. Therein lies the originality of this project. Namely, while the Yugoslav self-management model has been primarily studied as a domestic affair, and critical international lawyers examined the policy of nonalignment on its own, I propose that there was a causal relationship, an intrinsic link between the Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy.⁴ Not only does such analysis throw light on the political space from which the idea of self-management emerged, and on the particular Yugoslav version of the communist movement. It also shows that its methodology manifested in its domestic as well as in its foreign policy. As such, this analysis serves as a valuable benchmark to reassess aspirations of nation-

³ Cirila Toplak, 'Za nov družbeni red': Genealogija samoupravljanja [For a New Social Order: A Genealogy of Self-Management] 2014 (8) 1 *Ars and Humanitas* 118-135, 126; Franc Šetinc, *Misel in delo Edvarda Kardelja* (Ljubljana: Prešernova družba 1979) 145-146.

⁴ See thesis' Introduction for key works analysing self-management as a domestic policy, and chapter 4 for key works discussing nonalignment as a foreign policy.

states to create an alternative model of domestic and global organisation, and the significance of local-global interactions in the creation of any such alternative modalities of governance.

2.2. ‘Hot and Cold’ with Ideological Ally: The Yugoslav-Soviet Split (1948)

After WWII, the revolutionary struggle to build socialism, and so pave a way to communism as its final stage, continued. A socialist revolution that would modernize the country and secure its independence was a project that required Soviet aid. From its start in the 1920s, the Yugoslav leadership was fully related and loyal to the USSR, the Comintern and to Stalin. According to (or despite) the Yalta principle for all peoples of liberated Europe to choose the form of government under which they would live (if necessary, with broadly representative governmental authorities formed in interim), the aim of Yugoslavs was clear.⁵ As far as Tito and the Partisans were concerned, they were first and foremost communists, (arguably) loyal to the Soviet Union.⁶ The now leaders identified with the Soviet design and were dedicated to its cause of ‘World Revolution’.⁷ Accordingly, they supported the Soviet principles that were to govern communists worldwide: to freely ‘correct the errors’ that do not align to a formation of a bloc based on centralism, the

⁵ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1955) 252.

⁶ It seems imperative to mention the meeting between Tito and Churchill at Naples (12-13 August 1944) discussing, among other things, the future regime in Yugoslavia. Churchill was curious about where Serbian farmers and landowners stand on Stalin's collectivization of agriculture and of their notions on Marx's theory of land ownership. Tito assured Churchill that it was not Yugoslav intention to impose the communist system but to introduce a truly democratic system. See Public Records Office, KEW London (PRO) Cabinet (CAB) 66/49; PRO War Office (WO) 44/234; PRO WO 202/177b in Dušan Biber, ‘Britanci o Titu in Revoluciji’ [The British on Tito and Revolution] 1977 (4) *Zgodovinski Časopis XXXI* 449-464; Dušan Biber, 1056 *Vjesnik u srijedu* (27 July 1972); Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring, V* (London: Cassell & Co Ltd 1952) 456.

⁷ Dinko A Tomasic, *National Communism and Soviet Strategy* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press 1957) 55.

complete submission of the socialist states to Stalinist regime and the suppression of tendencies among the socialist countries that do not correspond to the Soviet socio-realist vision.⁸ The Soviet influence grew to dominate the new regime after the Yugoslav republic was founded in November 1945, both in terms of theory and practice. With the first Yugoslav Constitution of January 1946, the state-controlled and highly centralised administrative system became the norm.⁹

⁸ Under Stalin, the USSR became a highly centralised system of post-revolutionary etatism or Realsocialism with features of state monopoly and despotic bureaucracy. The Realsocialism (*Soviet-type socialism*, often called *state socialism* or *Stalinism*) was the prevalent ideology and political method of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from the early 1930s until state's breakup in 1991. It combined Marxist-Leninist philosophy, deriving from theories, policies and political practice of Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin and Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. It was an ideology of a one-party state with a centralised and planned economy. In all Soviet bloc, claim to office rested on a superior understanding of the governance principles by a 'single' leader. The power of leadership was based on their promise of economic equality and full employment, on commitment to a full welfare state (anti-capitalism) and on proletarian internationalism (subservient to the Soviet Union). However, the workers' councils which Lenin before identified as the basis of communist governance were integrated into centralized state under Stalin. Rapid industrialization and forced agricultural collectivization followed, and purges (1936-1938) killed millions. The state was dedicated to establish communism with the dictatorship of the proletariat at home and to develop socialism in its satellite states. In theory it advocated peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West but was in reality committed to promote the goals of communism, fight imperialism and combat capitalism. However, as the Soviets ruthlessly carved their sphere of influence during WWII negotiations with the Allies, they displayed behaviour of an imperial power too by imposing hegemony on Eastern European states. Thus, Realsocialism could arguably be considered socialism of stagnation (not of social progress towards a stateless society as an association of free producers) with dogmatists, unitarists and bureaucrats as its representatives. Also, Realsocialism was not to be confused with the Soviets' socialist realism (the officially imposed idealised art form, a glorified depiction of socialist values) nor with social realism (a type of art realistically depicting subjects of social concern). Dušan Bilandžić, *Borba za samoupravni socijalizam u Jugoslaviji [The Struggle for Self-managing Socialism in Yugoslavia, 1945-1969] 1945-1969* (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske 1969) 22; Branko Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society* (Belgrade: Jugoslavenski Institut za Ekonomska Istraživanja 1967); Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (eds), *Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Volume One, Tito's Yugoslavia, Stories Untold* (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) ix.

⁹ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 177; Bilandžić, *The Struggle for Self-managing Socialism* (1969) 26. See *Zakon o opštedržavnom privrednom planu i državnim organima za planiranje [Law on the National Economic Plan and State Planning Bodies]* (25 May 1946) published as Law No 302 in SI list FNRJ II 45 (4 June 1946) 517-519. Budgeting was regulated by *Osnovni zakon o budžetu od 26 decembra 1946 [Basic Law on the Budget of 26 December 1946]* published as Law No 737 in SI list FNRJ II 105 (27 Dec 1946) 1396-1399.

Between 1944 and 1950, the Soviet-style centrally planned management of economic affairs was furthered in Yugoslavia through the agrarian reform in 1945 and the nationalisation process in 1946 and 1948, with the aim to ‘end the expropriation of bourgeoisie and establish a state-owned property’.¹⁰ With the 1946 Law on the Federal Economic Plan and State Organs for Planning, the state had the exclusive responsibility for direct management, regulation, and control of the entire economy of Yugoslav People’s Republics, autonomous provinces, regions and administrative-territorial units (municipalities). The Federal Planning Commission prepared a federal economic plan, through which the state utilised and distributed national income and profits and facilitated investments out of the federal budget. Indeed, the constitution closely followed the 1936 USSR Constitution where the power of both, the State and the Party, was concentrated in federal authorities.

However, it is important to note that Tito was determined to lead the country post-war as an independent communist state already in Jajce in 1943, when AVNOJ became the supreme legislative body in the country, representing Yugoslavia’s sovereignty. As noted in chapter 1, contrary to other East-European members of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia was the only country to gain power, legitimacy and identity independently, from its own strength during WWII.¹¹ The war veterans and party members therefore reacted against an authoritarian internal political structure.¹² Rather than subverting the democratic procedures of the resistance during the war through hierarchies and Party politics, they instead urged to participate in the socio-

¹⁰ Exempt from nationalisation, staying in private ownership, were small rural economies, craft shops and residential buildings.

¹¹ British political analysts generally agreed that after WWII all political power would be concentrated in the hands of CPY. They regarded it ‘qualified’ due to its ability to exercise courageous and constructive leadership under fierce occupation. PRO Foreign Office (FO) 371/44273, R 10905/11/92, *The National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia: A Survey of the Partisan Movement April 1941 - March 1944* (Political Intelligence Centre Middle East) paragraphs 118-140.

¹² Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) 51-52.

political realities.¹³ With the constant voices of critical dissidents and (later) radical intellectuals, the Party had to ‘constantly revise, correct, improve, and construct [the Yugoslav] socialist formula’.¹⁴ Indeed, and as will be seen more in chapter 5, self-management was not a ready-made formula for socialism on many fronts. The then partisans, now Yugoslav leaders, were determined to remain autonomous from Moscow and develop its own understanding of communist ideology. What is more, Djilas/Đjilas was determined that the Soviet Union became the chief obstacle on the road to international socialist revolution.¹⁵ Therefore, Yugoslavs began to refute the USSR’s efforts to establish control over its development and fought to protect its independence. As the Five-Year Plan fell behind its realisation, despite being prolonged for a year, and was abandoned altogether in 1950, Kidrič rightly concluded that such an administrative and bureaucratic system could not function in Yugoslavia as its economic method hindered the freedom of economic laws, hampered the development of material forces and resulted in economic stagnation.¹⁶ Tito’s refusal to adhere to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine above its national context in the affiliation of Southern Slavs and insistence upon sovereignty of his young socialist state ‘led to an inevitable collision with the very head of the ideological empire, and Stalin to furore’.¹⁷ Stalin, as the nominal ideological world leader for the Communist movement seeking to hold monopoly on practical experience in socialist economic planning, was not satisfied with Yugoslav performance. For instance, as Soviets wanted to create joint enterprises, imposing their civil and military

¹³ Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988) 229-230; Radovan Radonjić, *Izgubljena orijentacija [Lost Orientation]* (Belgrade: Radnička štampa 1985) 56-61.

¹⁴ Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society* (1967) 210.

¹⁵ Milovan Djilas, *Rise and Fall* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1985) 249-257; Milovan Djilas, *Pad nove klase: Povest o samorazoravanju komunizma [The Fall of a New Class: A Tale of the Self-Destruction of Communism]* (Beograd: Službeni List SRJ 1994) 104.

¹⁶ Boris Kidrič in Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 177-178; Duncan Wilson, *Tito’s Yugoslavia* (Cambridge University Press 1979) 72.

¹⁷ Gary K Bertsch and Thomas W Ganschow, *Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models* (San Francisco: W H Freeman and Company 1976) 131-132.

experts, disagreements arose as this would lead to unequal and unprivileged conditions on the Yugoslav territory. Also, Stalin could not tolerate Yugoslav abandonment of forced agricultural policy of collectivization (that culminated in the first self-managing laws in the 1950s.¹⁸

The CPY was challenged by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as authoritative and rigid interpreters of Marx(ism) criticized their Yugoslav counterpart to be a ‘kulak party’ practicing a degenerate form of socialism.¹⁹ A list of accusations of deviation from the Soviet policy was sent to Tito and his deputy Kardelj, belittling the role of the Party in the Yugoslav society as one that had come under control of class and nationalist elements. The Yugoslav leadership was accused of ‘cultivating an anti-Soviet attitude and, curiously enough, of a lack of democracy within the Yugoslav Party’ and charged with following an ‘incorrect line’ on issues of domestic and foreign policy.²⁰ The Soviet advisors were withdrawn from Yugoslavia and Stalin summoned Yugoslavs to Moscow in March 1948 to reprimand them. He discussed the Yugoslav case of deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism at the Second Cominform conference in Bucharest on 28 June 1948.²¹ Despite refusing to attend, the Yugoslavs were expelled from the international communist movement and its organization, the Communist Information Bureau

¹⁸ Fight was against Western interferences too. Bilandžić, *The Struggle for Self-managing Socialism* (1969) 22.

¹⁹ Criticism of the Yugoslav socialism and their reconsideration of basic Marxist-Leninist principles came from the Chinese camp too, albeit theirs was more theoretically grounded. The Yugoslavs were no longer considered a socialist country accused for ‘negating the Marxist scientific analysis of imperialism’ and due to decentralisation destroying ‘the socialist economic system in industry and agriculture and the restoration of a capitalist one’. See Jen Ku-Ping, ‘The Tito Group: A Detachment of U.S. Imperialism in its Grand Strategy of Counter-Revolution’ 12 October 1962 (5) 41 *Peking Review* 11-16, 12; Editors, ‘The Tito Group's New Constitution: It Can't Cover Up Their True Colours’ 5 July 1963 (6) 27 *Peking Review* 15-16; Editorial Department, ‘Is Yugoslavia A Socialist Country?’ 27 September 1963 (6) 39 *Peking Review* 14-27, 24; Edvard Kardelj, *Socialism and War* (Belgrade: STP 1979); Gregory Otha Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism: The Relationship Between Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Socialist Yugoslavia* (PhD Thesis, Washington DC 1993) 13-14.

²⁰ Robert Goldwin (ed), *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press 1959) 492-93.

²¹ *Ibid.* 498-501.

(Cominform) in absence by way of the signed Cominform Resolution.²² The Yugoslav state leadership realised that a return to the Soviet bloc was ‘neither desirable nor acceptable’.²³ It was a ‘point of no return’ for Tito as he publicly accused the Soviet Union and its allies of ‘amassing troops on the Yugoslav borders’ at the Fourth UNGA session (20 September 1949).²⁴ Instead, Yugoslavia set about developing a different type of socialism, distancing itself ideologically, politically, economically and culturally from the Soviet model of Realsocialism.²⁵

The 1948 split, considerable in development of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy, revolved around contentions of ideology and power.²⁶ With regards to ideology, it is important to recognise that this was not only a disagreement over policy but primarily over theories that provide a basis for governance and development.²⁷ This is observed in Stalin’s analysis that ‘mistakes are not the issue: the issue is conceptions different from our own’.²⁸ According to the Soviet charges, ideological rifts and deviations set Yugoslav leaders in opposition to the true path to communism. Thus, as the Yugoslav

²² The Resolution of the Information Bureau on the situation in the CPY (Bucharest 28 June 1948) 621-627 in *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ: 1945-1950* [Documents on the Foreign Policy of SFRJ: 1945-1950] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane polsove/Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu/Jugoslovenski pregled, 1984).

²³ AY, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, II-7, *Transcript of the Third Plenum of the CPY CC* (29-30 December 1949). See Svetozar Rajak, ‘From Regional Role to Global Undertakings: Yugoslavia in the Early Cold War’ in Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds), *The Balkans and the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 65-86.

²⁴ Fourth session UNGA, Res 288 (IV) ‘Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece’ (246 plenary meeting 18 November 1949).

²⁵ The Yugoslav regime was ruthless with the Soviet sympathisers after 1948. Internal purges followed with pro-Stalin communists sent to the notorious prison camp on Goli Otok, for example.

²⁶ Ana Antić, ‘The Pedagogy of Workers’ Self-Management: Terror, Therapy, and Reform Communism in Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin Split’ 2016 (50) 1 *Journal of Social History* 179-203, 182. On the topic of ideology in Yugoslavia see A Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press 1972).

²⁷ Robert Edward Niebuhr, *The Search for a Communist Legitimacy: Tito's Yugoslavia* (Phd Thesis: Boston College, Department of History 2008).

²⁸ Stalin in Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1954) 327.

leaders needed to find an ideological justification for independence of their system from Moscow's guiding hand, the verbal criticism between Moscow and Belgrade reached a point where no real or lasting reconciliation was possible.²⁹ Tito's response was in accordance dynamic. His advisors sought solutions outside of the traditional Stalinist state-command paradigm and developed a Marxist critique of the Soviet Union's system. The chief CPY ideologues re-evaluated texts and related practices to find a path to free them from any ideological contradictions with communism yet build a legitimate alternative to Stalinism. As seen in chapter 1, the events led Yugoslavs into another reappraisal of the ideological background from which the socialist federal state was constructed after the war. Indeed, the Party turned to patriotism of the wartime liberation movement and emphasized to the war-weary Yugoslavs the otherness of Soviet communism. The 'patriotic and democratic partisan soul' of the WWII resistance, subdued during the Stalinist period following the war, re-emerged.³⁰ The 'Partisan myth' was used well for legitimation of Tito's rule through the concept of 'brotherhood and unity', uniting and unifying a diverse mass of Yugoslav nationalities. To sustain an interethnic harmony, the Yugoslav theorists argued that such 'respect and equality... [could] only be fully enforced under conditions of self-management'.³¹ Which begs the question to what extent Yugoslavia was a devoted follower of Stalin up until the 1948 split and whether Yugoslav thinking, as Jonson concluded, stood on a 'direct collision course with Stalin's conception of ideological unity within his socialist world' already from the beginning of the Liberation War.³²

The other side of the 1948 split represented the equally important power politics that revolved around the Soviet want of control and the Yugoslav

²⁹ Niebuhr, *The Search for a Communist Legitimacy* (2008).

³⁰ Janez Stanovnik, 'Slovenia's Road to Sovereignty' in Jože Pirjevec and Božo Repe (eds), *Resistance, Suffering, Hope: The Slovene Partisan Movement 1941-1945* (Ljubljana: National Committee of Union of Societies of Combatants of the Slovene National Liberation Struggle; Trieste: Založništvo Tržaškega Tiska 2008) 12.

³¹ Šetinc, *Thought and Work of Edvard Kardelj* (1979) 145-146.

³² A Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press 1972) 51.

desire for independence stemming from WWII resistance struggle.³³ The Yugoslav leaders therefore resisted Stalinist totalitarianism and sought to preserve the socialist essence of their revolution. Aiming to escape the Soviet-style ‘bureaucratic discipline’,³⁴ CPY envisaged self-management as a socio-political system that would gradually devolve power away from the centre. In 1949, Kardelj suggested that socialism meant ‘such an organization of a people’s community which would represent a cooperation of equal, free people’ and would eliminate a ‘uniformity imposed from above and hierarchical subordination to the centre’.³⁵ This demonstrated a marked difference in power politics of the two states: one a centrally controlled totalitarianism, the other an aspiration for a gradual devolvement of authority to its citizens through self-management.

The 1948 break was relaxed somewhat with the death of Stalin in March 1953, an event that has had a significant impact on the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, as recently opened East European archives confirmed.³⁶ The lack of legal clarity regarding his succession, coupled with the continuing economic crisis, brought a radical policy shift and wrought new challenges in the Soviet/Eastern bloc’s satellites.³⁷ The new First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971) outlined a fresh outlook on international communism in the Communique of 2 June 1955, declaring that ‘forms of the development of socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the

³³ Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology* (1972) 51-52.

³⁴ See Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society* (1967) 196; Niebuhr, *The Search for a Communist Legitimacy* (2008).

³⁵ Edvard Kardelj in Radovan Radonjić, *Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom i društveni razvoj Jugoslavije: 1948-1950 [CPY’s Conflict with the Cominform and the Social Development of Yugoslavia: 1948-1950]* (Zagreb: Narodno sveučilište grada Zagreba, Centar za aktualni politički studij 1979) 281.

³⁶ Svetozar Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956’ in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010) 198-220, 198.

³⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Staff Study: The Tie that Binds - Soviet Intra-bloc Relations: Feb 1956 to Dec 1957 (Reference titles: CAESAR VI-A and VII-58)* (29 July 1958) 2. Cited hereafter as CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958).

respective countries'.³⁸ Rapprochement initiative was expressed in Khrushchev's letters to Tito in June and September 1954, underlying non-interference, peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and peace between countries with different political and socio-economic systems and based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.³⁹ This meant that while retaining the overall control, the USSR ceased to hold a detailed day-to-day planning in its satellites.

Such novel Soviet formulation of 'administrative socialism' through parliamentary forms was in its own unique manner already a basis of the Yugoslav 'different road' policy. The Yugoslav newspaper and theoretical journal *Politika* reported that the Yugoslav government welcomed Khrushchev's new programme as it represented political, economic and administrative possibilities in a 'new page in Soviet history, a technical and modern, progressive and elastic, and also more humane stage than the previous one'.⁴⁰ To affirm reconciliation, Tito invited Khrushchev to Belgrade. At Khrushchev's visit in Belgrade in July 1955, the two states signed a trade agreement and arranged a new program of economic cooperation in form of 'increased trade, scientific and technical exchanges... and a long-term program of Soviet aid in industrial construction'.⁴¹ Along with the Belgrade Declaration, a declaration of mutual respect and non-interference was signed, granting other socialist countries the right to interpret Marxism in a different way, ensuring equal relationships between the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and to facilitate cooperation with socialist parties of the non-communist world. This effectively ended the *Cominform*, and the

³⁸ CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958) 2-3, 8-12. See also 'Discussion on our relations with the USSR and the Cominform countries at Comrade Kardelj's' (20 October 1953) in AYBT, KPR, SSSR, 1953, 1-5-v / 297; AYCK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-51.

³⁹ See 'Letter from Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia' (22 June and 23 September 1954), available at <<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112971>> and <<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112968>> accessed 30 March 2022.

⁴⁰ CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958) 8-9.

⁴¹ Ibid. 11-12. See also Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (London: Penguin Books 1969) 10-11.

impression was that existing ideological differences were no longer an obstacle.⁴²

Due to their political shift between 1953 and 1956, the Soviets now regarded the Yugoslav model as a respectable example of a 'separate road' to socialism. The 20th Congress the CPSU (14-25 February 1956) not only 'endorsed Tito's heretical brand of Communist ideology' but also 'invited... deviations in [other] countries of the bloc... opening a Pandora's box in Eastern Europe'.⁴³ On 2 June 1956 President Tito, Vice President Kardelj and Foreign Minister Popović arrived in Moscow. This was the first time after 1948 that Tito addressed the Soviets as 'comrades'. Kardelj could not hide his astonishment over Khrushchev's *Secret Speech*, which denounced Stalin's personality cult and dictatorship, and by the 'magnitude and scale of the Soviet indictment of Stalin', by how the negative reaction to 'Stalinism' became accepted as legitimate and by how much the past orthodoxy was now considered a somewhat 'offense to Marxist-Leninism'.⁴⁴ The Soviet-Yugoslav relations appeared (tentatively) normalised or eased.

However, Khrushchev's announcement at the Moscow's Dynamo Stadium on 19 June that Yugoslavia was once again 'within the camp of socialism' was rebuffed. Tito refused to associate with the 'new communist commonwealth' and restated that albeit there are no barriers to cooperation, the ideological differences still existed. According to 20 June 1956 Declaration on LCY and CPSU relations (issued by Tito and Khrushchev), the Soviets refrained from assigning Yugoslavia a place in the bloc.

⁴² Ibid. 11-12.

⁴³ Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin (1895-1975) announced a radical reversal in their so-called 'hard-line communism'. A new doctrine of 'liberal' or the 'soft-line communism' signalled a shift from a dogmatic and extremely centralised to decentralised, 'different roads' policy. Allowing for economic and political relaxation, it was understood as the 'decentralisation of powers' among parties of the bloc. While the 'hard-line' communists were disciplined traditionalists with unwavering faith in, and subordination to, the CPSU in Moscow, the 'soft-line' communists were forward-thinking, ready for the system's reform. They refused to relegate to the Soviet line by advocating more liberal relations among the satellites in which an 'interparty cooperation... [would] be based on complete freedom... [and] friendly criticism'. Ibid. 2-3, 12.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 8-9.

In the end, the renewed relationship between the two ideological rivals was short-lived. As Rajak expounds, the ‘Yugoslav road to socialism’ with its unique socialist identity was rendered incompatible with Marxism-Leninism of the USSR and previous concessions came to be understood as having had ‘destabilised the ideological uniformity’ of the existing Stalinist model.⁴⁵ The schism within the international Communist movement created by the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rift re-materialised and left the European region faced with a strategic re-alignment between the two blocs. Stalin and subsequent USSRs attempt to counter the British and American efforts to consolidate their influence in Western Europe, by ‘creating a Soviet bloc of Balkan and East European countries through his Sovietisation’,⁴⁶ only clarified the chimera status of any independence and sovereignty and furthered the alienation of many communists in East-European satellite states.⁴⁷ The uprising in Poland and Hungary in October and November of 1956 that ended in violent revolts were the most prominent examples. With the Soviet military intervention, the limits of the Belgrade declaration agreement became evident. Not only that, but the Yugoslav government was held responsible for the Hungarian insurrection.⁴⁸ Yugoslav criticism of the violent Soviet response to the

⁴⁵ Rajak, ‘From Regional Role to Global Undertakings’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans* (2017) 81; Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956’ in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198.

⁴⁶ Jeronim Perović, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence’ Spring 2007 (9) 2 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 32-63, 60.

⁴⁷ Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and even the most ideologically rigid Soviet satellites such as Hungary, Romania, Albania and East Germany, embraced the policy of liberalisation, the aim of which was to ‘foster willing cooperation in the building of the Soviet empire’. The Soviet leaders, however, failed to foresee that such independence would give space to criticism of either local regimes or of the Soviet domination. What generally followed demonstrations were ‘armed suppression or economic concessions’ with the ‘aim to present the new Soviet leadership in the best possible light before the world’. Albania remained isolated as the unreformed Stalinist regime until Hoxha’s death in 1985, and Bulgaria a faithful Soviet satellite until 1989. Hailed as the only country within the Soviet bloc with an independent foreign policy, Romania would suffer under Nicolae Ceaușescu’s dictatorship until his bloody overthrow in December 1989. Rajak, ‘From Regional Role to Global Undertakings’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans* (2017) 81; Svetozar Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956’ in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198; CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958) 2-3, 6, 11.

⁴⁸ Rajak rightly wrote that ‘ideological uniformity could best be achieved by rallying members of the bloc against a common enemy’. Just as in 1948, so was in 1956 Yugoslavia assigned as a scapegoat. Belgrade was after all the ‘most prominent promoter of anti-

Hungarian uprising, together with Tito's refusal to attend an international meeting of communist parties that same year left the Soviet leadership politically embarrassed and ideologically compromised. The Soviet-Yugoslav affairs and relations with the Eastern-European satellites were placed into a new phase of the strained relationship.⁴⁹

Despite conversing with Tito at his Brioni villa for eight days in September 1956, Khrushchev refused to find compromise in 'hard-line' and continue with 'soft-line' communism, almost renouncing 20th Congress' doctrine of 'liberal communism' and its 'different roads to socialism' policy. For discussions to continue, Tito returned with Khrushchev to Crimea, but the meeting with the Soviet General Secretary and his Hungarian counterpart Ernő Gerő on 27 September 1956 only widened their differences. On 30 October 1956, Moscow signed a declaration on its new political outlook on and conduct in bloc affairs. With this detailed conservative policy statement, CPSU effectively retracted from its 20th Congress doctrine of liberalisation. The primary task once again became establishment of a tight control over, and regained ideological primacy in, its satellites. According to the CIA report, this was a policy of 'proletarian internationalism', a Stalinist dialectic requiring member states to 'subordinate their national interests to those of the USSR'.⁵⁰

A new Soviet campaign started aimed to discredit the Yugoslav pattern and accentuate its ideological isolation. Through the Soviet leading daily newspaper *Pravda* (1908/12-1991) and the foremost publication covering foreign relations *Izvestia* (1917-1991) the Soviet central committee 'critiqued national communism and praised the unity of the bloc' instead, and warned its satellites 'against imitation of the Yugoslav 'road to socialism''.⁵¹ Tito was

Stalinism and the democratisation in Eastern Europe'. Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, 1953-1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation* (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London 2004) 329.

⁴⁹ The Soviet-Yugoslav relations went through similar cold periods in the 1960s, particularly after violent ending of the Prague Spring (the 1968 Czechoslovak movement known as 'socialism with a human face'). CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958) 16.

⁵⁰ CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958) 19, 22.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 15.

silent to a point, since the Yugoslav economy was closely tied to the Soviet bloc, with thirty percent of Yugoslav foreign trade being conducted with its satellites. He retained enough incentive, though, to distrust Moscow's political course and insisted it should keep hands off Yugoslavia's internal affairs. By the end of January 1957, Yugoslavia stood solitarily as an outspoken critic of the Soviet policy.

That was the exact opposite to what Kremlin needed for its propaganda purposes and for the psychological effect within its bloc: a 'spectacular demonstration of unity [and ideological primacy] in its sphere of influence'.⁵² The Moscow Congress (6-22 November 1957) reasserted Soviet [position] in the communist bloc, with sixty-four communist parties signing the multilateral declaration of their faith in future of Soviet-style communism. Citing the two ideological heresies in the declaration, 'dogmatism' and 'revisionism', effectively named the USSR a 'custodian of true [and narrow] communist doctrine'. However, while all 'agreed not to disagree in public' individual differences remained undiscussed. Nothing was said, for example, about the 'extent of legitimate self-determination permissible' or of 'agricultural collectivisation in the bloc'.⁵³ All in all, Party relations were put to a stop and Yugoslav foreign Minister Popović told the parliament there was no more chance for the USSR to see Yugoslavia in its 'socialist camp'.⁵⁴ The ideological boycott was reinforced with economic reprimand. A moratorium, arguably intended as 'economic blackmail' for Yugoslavs to change their minds, was placed on the aid agreed in 1955.⁵⁵

In response to Soviets' discreditation, the Yugoslav leadership published the correspondence between Tito and Stalin and sent delegations to fellow communist parties in Eastern Europe and beyond to explain their position

⁵² Ibid. 40-43.

⁵³ Ibid. 40-43.

⁵⁴ At the 7th Congress of Bulgarian Communist Party (June 1958), Khrushchev reiterated the 'revisionist charge' of the 1948 Cominform Resolution that labelled the Yugoslav communists 'Trojan horses' of western imperialism. Goldwin, *Readings in Russian Foreign Policy* (1959) 559-561.

⁵⁵ CIA, *Soviet Staff Study* (1958) 30.

over the 1948 split. Their message landed on unsympathetic ears as most feared Soviets' purges if they came too close to the 'Yugoslav way'. What was prevailing was a belief in impossibility to 'develop Marxism outside the USSR... as only in the USSR socialism really existed'.⁵⁶ Kardelj reflected how these European communist leaders 'surrendered to Stalin's dictate' and lamented how '[b]efore long, the communist parties of Italy and France, and then of the whole world, [will be] united against us'.⁵⁷ Indeed, as a result of the conflict, a schism in the region was created, one that destroyed indefinitely any view of the Communist movement as a monolith. However much Khrushchev was eager to support national liberation (wars) and underdeveloped world regions, his real concern was preventing such wars that might, in some way, harm the Soviet Union and, in particular the victory of socialism on a world scale by 'virtue of the laws of history' according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.⁵⁸ While Moscow and Peking cooperated in the Communist offensive against the imperialist West, they were simultaneously engaged in a rivalry for leadership, each taking for granted that all nations would ultimately merge into a single Communist world state. They saw Castros, Nassers, Nkrumahs and Sekou Toures as transient phenomena only, and nationalism and national independence in the colonial world to be controlled and ultimately destroyed or subsumed.⁵⁹

Perceived as a threat to the governance and control of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was left in a position of international isolation amidst a challenging post-war economic situation. Ultimately, this schism transpired

⁵⁶ MIJ: KMJ I-3-b/298, sheet 2f, 4f in Nataša Mišković, 'The Pre-history of the Non-Aligned Movement: India's First Contacts with the Communist Yugoslavia, 1948-50' 2009 (65) 2 *India Quarterly* 185-200, 192.

⁵⁷ Edvard Kardelj, *Reminiscences: The Struggle for Recognition and Independence: The New Yugoslavia, 1944-57* (London: Blond & Briggs 1982) 118; MIJ: KMJ I-3-b/289 in Mišković, 'The Pre-history of the Non-Aligned Movement' (2009) 191-192. See also Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, 'The Yugoslav Communists' Special Relationship with the British Labour Party 1950-1956' 2014 (14) 1 *Cold War History* 23-46.

⁵⁸ Elliot R Goodman, 'East vs. West in Communist Ideology' January 1961 (15) 2 *Journal of International Affairs* 95-107, 95-96. See also Nikita S Khrushchev, 'For New Victories for the World Communist Movement (Speech of 6 January 1961)' January 1961 (4) 1 *World Marxist Review* 5, 6, 15-16.

⁵⁹ Goodman, 'East vs. West' (1961) 107.

bilateral relations of two countries and had immense implications for the Eastern Bloc, the global Communist movement, and the Cold War's global geopolitical forces in general.⁶⁰ While Rajak concluded that reconciliation and schism between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 'encouraged the process of liberalization throughout Europe',⁶¹ I wish to point out that it enabled Yugoslavia to acquire equidistance from both blocs and pursue an independent path outside the bi-polar Cold War parameters through NAM.

2.3. Contradiction and Paradox: Yugoslavia and the West

As Yugoslavia charted its own socialist path and developed its foreign policy, its geographical location in the Balkans proved influential. The region became a fault line of the Cold War ideological struggle and contributed much to its first decade.⁶² The civil war in Greece (1944-1949) between the Greek communists and the Western-backed government (UK and US) became the first major (armed) conflict of the still-undeclared Cold War. While the Soviet Union through their Eastern European proxies (and including Yugoslavia) supported the communist takeover of most country, Stalin was careful not to break the fragile allied unity and thus preferred the war to end. In years 1946/47 Tito went against Stalin's orders and supplied aid to Greek communist rebels.⁶³ Such external activities Stalin did not approve. On top of CPY supporting fellow communists in neighbouring countries - assisting the Greek communists in their efforts to gain power, working in alliance with Albania and Bulgaria – they sought to secure for themselves the north-

⁶⁰ Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198.

⁶¹ Rajak, *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations* (2004) 53-57.

⁶² Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198.

⁶³ The conflict, deprived of Moscow's decisive support, nevertheless ended in total defeat for the communists. The Democratic Army of Greece (the military branch of the Communist Party of Greece) was defeated by the Greek government army, supported by the United Kingdom and the United States. Bilandžić, *The Struggle for Self-managing Socialism* (1969) 22; Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198, 219.

western border territory of Trieste and Carinthia (jointly inhabited by Slavic, Italian and German speaking peoples). Tito openly challenged the Atlantic powers' interference in Europe and threatened war with Italy over the tensely disputed border of the so-called *Free Territory of Trieste*.⁶⁴ The Trieste crisis grew to be a tense disagreement by 1953/54 that forced Tito and his associates to re-evaluate opportunities that normalization with the Soviets after Stalin's death might offer.⁶⁵ Without direct Soviet protection and limited possibilities in the Balkans - as Bulgaria and Romania remained under tight Soviet control, while Greece and Turkey maintained their relations with Western powers - Yugoslavia found itself in a vulnerable position of international isolation.

Excommunication from the Cominform left Tito's country not only amidst a disastrous socio-political and economic situation but also in a position of international isolation. Accordingly, Yugoslavs searched for resources and legitimation outside the communist world. To end this status and seek security against the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia opened to the West. It did so under the auspices of changing the Western perception of it as a 'wild Balkan country'.⁶⁶ The first step was a military connection in the form of the Balkan Pact. Primarily an instrument for common defence, the pact was signed between the conservative monarchy of Greece, the nationalist centralist republic of Turkey and the communist Yugoslavia in Bled, Yugoslavia, in August 1954.⁶⁷ The three parties hailed the agreement as a significant

⁶⁴ Even before the German capitulation in May 1945, an ideologically induced confrontation over control of Trieste threatened to draw the communist Yugoslav Partisan Army and the British and the American forces into an armed conflict. The Trieste crisis further fuelled Churchill's distrust toward Tito, as he hoped 'to save Italy from the Bolshevik plague'. It was in his 'interest to prevent the Russian flood of Central and Western Europe as much as possible... [and] gather enough forces against this Moscow monster, whose arm is Tito'. However, it was clear to him that a very stable and lasting political regime was emerging in Yugoslavia, and that Tito is going to remain its 'master'. PRO, PREM 3 513/6; PRO WO 214/42 in Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198; Bilandžić, *The Struggle for Self-managing Socialism* (1969) 22.

⁶⁵ Rajak, *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations* (2004) 53-57, 59-69.

⁶⁶ Miroslav Perišić, 'Yugoslavia: The 1950 Cultural and Ideological Revolution' in Rajak and others, *The Balkans* (2017) 291-301.

⁶⁷ Rajak, 'From Regional Role to Global Undertakings' in Rajak and others, *The Balkans* (2017) 73. See also Mark Kramer, 'Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet-East

contribution toward the maintenance of world peace but refrained from acknowledging it as an expression of political understanding. The second step was in the form of an economic connection. As the economic blockade by the Cominform in 1948 translated into serious financial problems, the Yugoslavs were deliberating (how) to approach the West. As it turns out, the Yugoslav regime caught the West's attention as it represented an alternative to the Soviet or Chinese communism. Exhibiting a notable measure of independence observed in the Partisan movement and victory in WWII, and defiance against Stalinism and indeed resistance to Cold War pressures in the Balkans, despite domestic national diversity and a weak socio-economic situation, Tito became a respected figure internationally. Indeed, his image landed on various covers of Western magazines, including the American *Time*, *Life*, *Newsweek*, the British *Picture Post* or the French *Paris Match*.⁶⁸ The West seized the opportunity to make an example of Yugoslavia and show it was possible for a communist regime to live outside the Soviet control. Therefore, considerable 'credit and export goods from Britain and the US were received to substitute Moscow's denied funds.'⁶⁹ Three weeks after the Cominform Resolution, the US 'unfroze the gold of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia' and by the end of 1949 the British were selling it crude oil.⁷⁰ The three ideologically inspired features that distinguished Yugoslav enterprise from a Western company – the workers' collectives, socially-owned industrial assets and particular surplus value distribution – remained, while the price and foreign exchange controls gradually relaxed.⁷¹ Even when at

European Efforts to Reassert Control: 1948-53' in Rajak and others, *The Balkans* (2017) 34-63.

⁶⁸ Nikolina Kurtovic, *Communist Stardom in The Cold War: Josip Broz Tito in Western and Yugoslav Photography, 1943-1980* (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto 2010).

⁶⁹ Mišković, 'The Pre-history of the Non-Aligned Movement' (2009) 193-194.

⁷⁰ The gold reserves of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (approximately 47 million US-dollars-worth of Yugoslav gold) were frozen by the Allies in the US after the German occupation in 1941. Ibid. 192-193. See also United States Department of State, 'Mr Frank G Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the United States Special Representative in Europe (Harriman)' (Washington, 22 July 1948) available at <<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v04/d716>> accessed 24 April 2018.

⁷¹ Christopher Prout, *Market Socialism in Yugoslavia* (New York: Oxford University Press 1985) 2.

times the Yugoslav-West relationship worsened – be it due to failed negotiations with the Western powers over Balkan Pact alliance or due to Trieste crisis embodying questions of protecting the Yugoslav territorial integrity, national security and of foreign policy orientation - the relationship between the two was ongoing. However, be it military treaties with the Western powers, political relations or economic ties with the West, Tito was determined that such ‘occidentation’ would not lead either to Western alliance nor to its liberal democracy.⁷²

Therefore, it is important to understand Yugoslavia’s relationship with the West as part of its independent path. Despite the benefits of financial and greater military security, it at no point aligned to or identified with the West. It manoeuvred the delicate balance of benefiting from the external superpower, but in pursuit of its own goals and vision.⁷³ While there was also a clear benefit to the superpower by removing the Soviet power from the Mediterranean, it ‘created an independent sphere of power in Southern Europe (despite socialist in orientation)’.⁷⁴ After failed negotiations in the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus during the 1950s, the Balkan Pact was rendered useless and faded into obscurity by the end of 1955, with Greece and Turkey both joining NATO instead. Yugoslavia looked for ways to withdraw too yet made it clear not to join NATO.⁷⁵ Instead, the Yugoslavs began orientating their foreign policy toward nonalignment where

⁷² Wilson, *Tito’s Yugoslavia* (1979) 75.

⁷³ On the Yugoslav role in the early Cold War see Zbigniew K Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960); John C Campbell, *Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper Row 1967); Lorraine M Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997).

⁷⁴ Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Balkans: A Cold War Mystery’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans* (2017) 357-358. Indeed, Bulgaria and Greece both benefited as their economies advanced significantly: Bulgaria with the Soviet development model and Greece with assistance from the Western Europe and the US.

⁷⁵ Churchill, fascinated by Tito’s break with Stalin, was keen to integrate Yugoslavia into the planned North-Atlantic Pact. Tito’s confidants Velebit and Kardelj were convinced that the ‘West was very interested in the way Yugoslavia was maintaining her independence and was even counting on the possibility that she might join the NATO Pact in time’. Kardelj, *Reminiscences* (1982) 128; Mira Šuvar, *Vladimir Velebit: Svjedok historije [Vladimir Velebit: A Witness to History]* (Zagreb: Razlog d.o.o 2001) 460.

membership in or association with such a military alliance would according to NAM's principles be incompatible anyway.

As I argue in this thesis, Yugoslav sovereignty was realised in both, their domestic and foreign policy. As a result, Yugoslavia stood firmly wedged between the two competing systems by the 1960s – the democratic-capitalist West and the communist East – and could not fully identify with either. Instead, it created a distinct policy of opening in the 1950s not only to the West but to the 'Rest' too, starting by sending representatives to countries further afield, such as India and Burma, to support communist revolutions there.⁷⁶ It has to be repeated that Yugoslavia's transformation of society thus was not only mirrored, but inherently created a correspondent foreign policy that reached out to leaders of the Third World in the same manner of receptiveness and respect, supporting them in their independent path of state and societal understanding, as well as alternative global engagement. As will be seen in the following chapters, Tito as the leader of NAM not only compelled a re-evaluation of the Cold War by the superpowers, but also championed a form of international relations built on openness and independence. Solidarity of the masses at home, based on the experience thereof during the war, was the motor of the solidarity of the masses abroad.

2.4. Conclusions

Overall, the Cold War played a useful role in providing opportunities for all involved, the East, the West and the regional powerholders. As Rajak has mentioned... 'the external superpower threat helped keep alliances and national regimes afloat... local conflicts kept the Cold War in place, while the Cold War kept local conflict, if not frozen, then contained'.⁷⁷ This chapter has demonstrated how Yugoslavia's post WWII endeavour to carve out its own path of statehood (and governance) emerged in distinct local and global

⁷⁶ Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 75.

⁷⁷ Rajak, 'The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History* (2010) 198.

geopolitical conditions. Accordingly, it has shaped its alternative form of self-determination against the pressures of Cold War superpowers and their modalities of governance, and in pursuit of self-management unifying the constituent republics.

Yugoslavia continued in its pursuit of communism as the ultimate goal through socialism and was in that way connected to and relied upon the Soviet Union and its 'World Revolution'. Its initial steps therefore enacted a heavily centralised mode, both in governance and statehood. This was in stark contrast and indeed contrary to the experiences of Yugoslav resistance during WWII as a common democratic struggle and organisation. Its leaders instead started a pursuit of sovereignty and autonomy that led to an increasing tension with the USSR, the Comintern and Stalin – eventually resulting in the 1948 expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. This strengthened the resolve of Yugoslavia to develop a viable and legitimate socialist alternative to the Soviet model. It was based on a distinct understanding of Marxist theory that supported democratic unity and revolving around a socio-political system that devolved power and authority from the centre to its citizens.

Despite a certain ease of tension due to an element of Soviet revisionism after the death of Stalin, the relationship with USSR soon returned to the same non-compatibility due to Soviet totalitarianism. Any declarations and trade deals, such as that in 1955, were short-lived, as ideological uniformity was demanded from the Soviets. The revolts in Soviet satellite countries, such as Hungary in 1956, which was blamed on Yugoslavia, only accentuated the ideological differences, and resulted in Yugoslavia's isolation and outside of the Soviet direct influence. There was no room for an alternative, only control and to be eventually subsumed in the Soviet communist movement as a monolith. To counter this international isolation, Yugoslavia began to chart its own path of statesmanship outside the direct constraints of the Cold War superpower(s).

Rather than merely turning to the West, Yugoslavia maintained in this way a critical distance to both camps. Its relationship with the West was aimed at demonstrating its autonomy, something apparent in its struggle and victory in

WWII and more so by its 1948 split with the Soviets. Despite Yugoslavia's marked socialism, the West perceived the opportunity to show socialism with a human face as existing outside the Soviet Union. Yugoslav cut ties with its ideological ally were of obvious benefit to the West as it unsettled Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. However, the West's financial aid to and subsequent treaties with Yugoslavia were arranged not as part of alignment, but as just that – aid to an independent state pursuing its own path outside the camps of the Cold War. That is also why the Yugoslav's never joined NATO but developed a different foreign policy of openness and independence, eventually leading to NAM.

What was thus observed in this chapter was the emergence of a distinct form of Yugoslav socialism. Its geopolitical situation set out conditions that Yugoslavs used as a viable and legitimate alternative to the Soviet model. Rather than simply reacting to the Soviet (or indeed Western) model of organisation, Yugoslavia enacted a distinct form of self-determination that, as will be discussed in chapter 3, resulted in the self-management mode of governance, but also extended into its foreign policy and eventual turn to nonalignment (chapter 4).

I concentrate in chapter 3 on how Yugoslav ideologues legislated this emancipation by enacting socialist workers' self-management in 1950 as a legal principle and a key constitutional component of Yugoslavia. I will depict this particular model of governance by focusing on questions of Yugoslav self-management as a political idea, as an economic model, and as a radical administrative governance mechanism. In chapter 4, I explore how Yugoslav leaders had an internationalist idea from the very inception of the Yugoslav state project. Indeed, over the course of two decades, the idea of self-management as a way of exercising sovereignty through a radical version of decentralisation at home became 'internationalised' in the form of its foreign policy of nonalignment. This set Yugoslavia out as a (most) influential player within the international geopolitical context through its crucial role in (formation of) the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) inaugurated in 1961.

CHAPTER 3

Tito's Style: The Yugoslav Socialist Workers' Self-management

Self-management is a revolutionary process of social transformation which can find its true expression only [in] a popular socialist revolution. And the Yugoslav revolution was one such.¹

The right to self-management is 'constitutional guaranteed and inalienable right' of every working man.²

3.1. Introduction

After the conceptual prehistory of self-management that I explore in chapter 1, and my discussion on the historical circumstances and conditions that laid the ground for its (legal) implementation through its negative dialectical relationship with the Soviet Union which developed the Yugoslav understanding of self-determination in chapter 2, this chapter turns to the emerging socialist workers' self-management as the motor of Yugoslav socialism. I analyse the political space from which the concept emerged and on how its methodology was manifested in its domestic policy. As such, the chapter prepares the ground for chapter 4 in which I discuss its manifestation in foreign policy. That is, at the heart of the thesis project lies the idea that self-management was a particular expression of the right to self-determination in international law. It was way of exercising sovereignty through a radical version of decentralisation with emphasis placed on the national situation. It was arguably also deployed in Yugoslavia's foreign

¹ Edvard Kardelj, *Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji 1950-1976 [Self-management in Yugoslavia 1950-1976]* (Beograd: Privredni pregled 1977) 9-10.

² Bogdan Trifunović (ed), *A Handbook of Yugoslav Socialist Self-Management* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1980) 245.

policy of nonalignment and incarnated multilaterally on the international level in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

While I evaluated the Yugoslav socialist workers' self-management [radničko samoupravljanje], I concomitantly acknowledged the challenges in doing so. First, the focus of today's investigations on the policy lies mostly on ex-Yugoslavia as the creator of the concept of self-management, rather than its contemporary socio-political potential. Indeed, the word itself became stained, almost offensive, as a symbol of a tainted socialist regime, or an unloved historical-political memory that ought to be suppressed in order to repress the affinity with precisely this regime.³ However, this progressive political concept should not end up on the graveyard of history. As I argue, it can bear insight into alternative responses to contemporary challenges. Indeed, this is why the concept of self-management has been reawakened intermittently in light of contemporary economic and financial crises through some alternative political, extra-parliamentary movements and initiatives over the recent years.⁴

The story of Yugoslavia and its particularism in domestic and foreign policy is important in this sense. Not only because it reveals and reflects the complexity of representations during the Cold War history that tends to

³ Encyclopaedia defines self-management as the 'main principle of social organization of Yugoslavia, is (a) a system of social relations based on social ownership of the means of production; (b) a mode of production in which the means of production and management are given back to the subjects of associated labour, that is, a social relation of production motivated by individual and common interests; (c) a social relation and a system based on man's sense of belonging to the basic values of the society, to qualified and responsible decision-making...; the emergence of a new social organization in which, truth be told, not everyone can decide about everything, but which makes possible responsible decision-making under conditions of interdependency, mutual social responsibility, and solidarity, and which leads to the liberation of man'. Definition lists the withering away of the state, the rights of man, and nonalignment as the main components and outcomes of self-management in Yugoslavia. See *Enciklopedija samoupravljanja [The Encyclopaedia of Self-Management]* (Belgrade: Savremena Administracija and Izdavački Centar Komunist 1979) 876.

⁴ For example, international workshops in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Beograd, under an initiative of the Museum of Modern Art in Ljubljana, the Economic Institute in Zagreb, the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade, with regulars including Tvrko Jakovina, Peter Willetts, Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, Dragan Bogetić, Mila Turajlić, Bojana Piškur, and Paul Stubbs.

characterise post-WWII international history in sharp divisions between two separate blocs, and along the classic geopolitical dichotomy and exclusive networks. It is also because it demonstrates the nuance in the local-international narrative and arguably aids to an understanding of the dynamism of NAM as formed and played out in the Cold War. Unfortunately, the concepts of self-management and non-alignment have been studied in isolation from one another, the earlier as an economical model of domestic policy and the latter as an alternative in multilateral international engagement. I propose a much closer study of the relationship between the two and argue that experimentation with the project of self-management presented a productive radical alternative to hegemonic forms in the global legal order despite being contingent on their specific understanding of self-determination.⁵ As such, the study of no longer existing Tito's Yugoslavia is arguably relevant still, as its story adds an important dimension in the narrative and evaluation of NAM that still exists today.

3.2. From Revolution to State-Building: The 'Yugoslav Road' as the New Direction of Socialist Development

Yugoslav self-management was born already during the WWII, when 'difficulty in communicating made centralized decision-making an impossibility for the resistance fighters' and when intensive mobilisation of human resources was required, that is out of an economic, political, military, and social crisis and against political forces from without and within.⁶ It thus emerged out of resistance against oppression by authoritarian (non)state entities. The exact timing of its utmost beginnings is diverse, and dependent on the source and a historical distance of a particular scholar but has clear

⁵ Scholars that explored the relationship between the two were, for example, Edvard Kardelj, Cecil Crabb Jr, Vladimir Bakarić, Aleksandar Grličkov, Dimče Belovski, William Zimmerman, Gregory Otha Hall (see chapter 4).

⁶ Edvard Kardelj, *Democracy and Socialism* (London: Summerfield Press 1978); Edvard Kardelj, 'Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja [Directions of Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-management]' 1979 (27) 3 *Sodobnost* 265-274.

semblances in the democratic processes of the partisans mentioned in the previous chapter. During the National Liberation War, the partisans formed part of a tradition of resistance to a mistrusted central authority, with self-organized people's liberation committees emerging all over Yugoslavia as new institutions of power. Principally, they were under the political leadership of the National Liberation Army and National Liberation Front but included many non-communists and members of pre-war bourgeois parties. Many peasants joined the movement as CPY promised land reform and education, traditionally seen as a means of their advancement. The very nature of the struggle, consisting largely of dispersed harassing actions on a local basis and poor overall communication, increased the autonomy of small groups, and local leaders emerged. Future Yugoslav leaders saw this organisational model as a good starting point for the development of workers' self-organization and self-management.⁷

Immediately after the war, a period of retrospection, introspection and innovation nurtured the growth of socialist self-management.⁸ A crucial element in this were features of the general social and ethnic background. The portrayal as an undeveloped, poverty-stricken peasant buffer between the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires caused general mistrust of government. Furthermore, the fragmentation by different languages, religious practices, and uneven levels of development, stirred the communists in post-war socialist Yugoslavia to (re)interpret the failure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Empire and the Kingdom were perceived as denying recognition to the existing (weak and exploited) nations. Therefore, what began to grow though already grounded in the pre-war phase of CPY's history and its particular localist understanding was a state identity-defining process that called upon and was empowering

⁷ David S Riddell, 'Social Self-Government: The Background of Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism' March 1968 (19) 1 *The British Journal of Sociology* 47-75, 49-51; Goran Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia: Successes and Failures' 2011 (25) 3 *Socialism and Democracy* 107-129, 108.

⁸ Anton Vratuša, 'Some Characteristics of the Development of the Socialist Self-Management' 1981 (23) *Socialism in the World* 97-104, 98. Cirila Toplak, 'For a New Social Order': A Genealogy of Self-Management in SFRY' 2014 (8) 1 *Ars & Humanitas* 118-135, 126.

various Yugoslav nations to address and resolve national and social issues.⁹ The process was created to recognise that Yugoslavia was to be not only politically but also ethnically cohesive nation-state. That is why, at least in its formative years, the self-managing system was effective in addressing the existing and historical tensions or conflicts between constituent nationalities and ethnic groups under the ideological slogan ‘bratstvo i jedinstvo’ [brotherhood and unity]. By scraping ethnic labels in favour of a singular unifying identity, people identified themselves as Yugoslavs. Rather than simply focusing on the ethnic similarities, it promoted a liberal concept of nationhood as primarily political (civic) and not ethnic, a supranationalism.¹⁰ I will argue in the following chapters that the vision of ‘brotherhood and unity’ at home became internationalised in NAM as a means of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of the political, legal or socio-economic setup of any state. As such, self-management could be perceived as a highly contextualised system holding simultaneously a (radical) potential across time and space.

Finally, it is pertinent to repeat that after WWII, various political-economic experiments came to the fore worldwide, mostly as reaction to both the Soviet and the Western model of production and organisation, and Yugoslavia was

⁹ Tito spoke of this promise in his 1942 article in the Party gazette *Proleter* where he argued that the People’s Liberation Struggle essentially involved a liberation of different nationalities. The text can be found in Josip Broz Tito, *Borba za oslobođenje Jugoslavije I, 1941–1945 [Struggle for the Liberation of Yugoslavia]* (Beograd: Kultura 1947) 130-148. See also Josip Broz Tito, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji: u svjetlosti Narodnooslobodilačke borbe [National question in Yugoslavia: In light of the Liberation War]* (Zagreb: Naprijed 1943) 3-12.

¹⁰ In contrast, throughout East and Southeast Europe where the concept of ‘liberal (democracy)’ was understood as primarily ethnic based, it failed to convince many (and especially ethnic minorities) that they would gain anything in terms of their social and political status. Even after WWII when the concept included the social dimension (as social-liberalism and/or left-libertarianism), liberal democracy arguably offered to minorities less than socialism. Thus, awareness of the historical context is pertinent to understanding the ‘nationhood’ concept in its particularity. In the WWII aftermath, the liberal doctrine had no sense for, or did not concern itself with, the issues of minorities, collective identities, or group rights. Nor did it recognize the importance of the ethnic definition of a nation, reducing the term to the political (civic) nation only. Branko Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society* (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press 1969); Sabina P Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992).

no different. As seen in chapter 1, the post-WWII Yugoslav government found precedent and roots for their version of communism in the form of self-management in theoretical writings, apart from their Soviet interpretations, and in experiences elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, most mark self-management's foremost beginnings in the (successful) process of destalinisation that began slow as a continuous and radical criticism of Stalinism after WWII and resulted in the historic break with the Soviet Union in 1948 (chapter 2).¹¹ Set free to reconsider their previous and future practices in pursuit of a 'new road to communism', that was a stark contrast to the Stalinist practice of bureaucratic domination over society, particularly over the economy. Indian communist Jayaprakash Narayan went even further by saying that Yugoslavia was 'resurrecting communism from its grave in which the Russians have buried it'.¹² Yugoslavs relied heavily on rediscovering the European roots of socialism that became applied in the model of workers' self-management. While the concept was to an extent already known in the workers' movement and in Marxist theory, its seminality was a large-scale historical experiment. It therefore represented a radical critical and applied return to Marx (as noted in chapter 1). These three, the empowering experience of the resistance, the complex cultural, national and ethnical background, as well as the search for a new political-economic organisation, contributed to the development of the 'Yugoslav road' at home that was self-management.

3.3. The Legalisation of Self-management (1945-1950)

Amidst the country's post-WWII restorative project, revolutionaries, diplomats, politicians and theoreticians vocalised a particular sense of what was pertinent for the country's reinvention and protection of its sovereignty, at home and abroad, and crucial especially after the 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet

¹¹ Miloš Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse samoupravljanja [Development of the Theory and Practice of Self-management]* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1989) 45.

¹² See Prabhakar Padhye, *Yugoslavia: The Land of New Horizons* (Bombay: The Popular Book Depot 1953) v.

split. At its fore was (re)establishment of a nation state, its identity and modernization of its society's everyday life. What developed within the particular Yugoslav context between 1941 and 1980 was a unique all-encompassing alternative modality of governance that became a principle for economic, political and social relationships, an ideology and a way of life.

It is thought-provoking to consider the thesis of Ana Antić that one of the earliest experiments of self-management was the prison on Goli Otok [Barren/Naked Island].¹³ From 1949 onward, the small, deserted island in Northern Dalmatia became a notorious prison camp for critical political voices who were accused of being pro-Soviet or 'cominformists'. Ivo Banac who examined the regime's conduct described it as 'both a torture chamber and a 'Red University', where the 'misled' comrades were reinstated to the 'proper ideological path' instead of being written off or executed as in Stalin's Soviet Union'.¹⁴ Antić argued that re-education of prisoners was carried out through a self-managing structure where 'each prisoner was a police investigator and re-educator'.¹⁵ Such perception stands strikingly similar to Edvard Kardelj's 1949 statement that 'attracting the masses to the state' would be completed 'in such a way that each person will for some time be a bureaucrat'.¹⁶ At the same time, it could be argued that the prison's extreme authoritarian brutality marked the experiment of self-management practiced outside prisons and may go some way towards explaining its ultimate failure.

Considering self-management's centrality for the emancipatory politics in socialist Yugoslavia, its ideologues were keen to legislate such governance. These formal steps toward self-management represented the 'Yugoslav road or way to socialism/communism', with Edvard Kardelj as the principal author of the legislation by which it was introduced on 26/27 June 1950. Self-

¹³ Ana Antić, 'The Pedagogy of Workers' Self-Management: Terror, Therapy, and Reform Communism in Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin Split' 2016 (50) 1 *Journal of Social History* 179-203, 185; Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (1989); Liotta, 'Paradigm Lost' (2001).

¹⁴ Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito* (1988) 257.

¹⁵ Antić, 'The Pedagogy of Workers' Self-Management' (2016) 185.

¹⁶ Edvard Kardelj, 'O narodnoj demokratiji u Jugoslaviji [About national democracy in Yugoslavia]' in Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje: Vol. IX [Problems of Our Socialist Construction: Vol IX]* (Belgrade: BIGZ 1974) 431.

management's legal origin/basis came with the Fundamental/Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Workers' Collectives (The Basic Law or The Worker's Self-Management Act or The Law on Workers' Councils), passed by the Yugoslav Federal People's Assembly (or the National Assembly).¹⁷ Coupled with the Law on the Nationalisation of Private Economic Enterprises (5 December 1946), the two laws embodied the working class' slogan 'tvornice radnicima' [factories for/belonging to the workers].¹⁸

Its legal character was solidified throughout the 1950s, with passed laws, decrees and judicial reforms.¹⁹ To formalise the 'Yugoslav road', various constitutional changes took place as well. The Sixth CPY Congress (2-7 November 1952) and the Constitutional Law on the Political and Social Organisation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Federal Organs of Authority (13 January 1953) marked further the new phase in development of the Yugoslav socialist revolution.²⁰ To further legitimise its socialist system, various new/other laws were introduced in the following years, examples including the law for health insurance (1954), special laws

¹⁷ *Osnovni zakon o upravljanju državnim privrednim preduzećima i višim privrednim udruženjima od strane radnih kolektiva od 2 jula 1950* [Basic Law on Management of State-Owned Enterprises and Senior Business Associations by Labor Collectives of July 2, 1950] published as Law No 391, Sl List FNRj, VI, 43 (5 July 1952) 789-793. For the English translation see *The New Yugoslav Law* (Belgrade) I, 2/3 (June/September 1950) 75-82. For an account of how the new Law evolved see Milovan Djilas, *The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class* (London: Methuen 1969). See also Roy Moore, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (London: Fabian Society 1970) 13; Committee on the Judiciary United State Senate, *Yugoslav Communism: A Critical Study* (Washington: US Government Printing Office 1961) 178.

¹⁸ Josip Broz Tito, *Workers Manage Factories in Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Yugoštampa 1950) 4-43, 9; Karim Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model: A Case Against Legal Conformity' 2004 (52) *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 287-319, 289; Branko Horvat, *Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist Social Theory* (Armonk, New York: M E Sharpe 1982).

¹⁹ For instance, the Law on Planned Management of National Economy (29 December 1951), the Law on Budgets, the Law on Social Contribution and Taxation. Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) 72-74. See also Milentije Popović, 'Concerning the Law on Budgets and the Basic Law on Social Contribution and Taxation' 1952 (1-2) *New Yugoslav Law*; Boris Kidrič, 'Concerning the Law on the Planned Management of National Economy' 1952 (1-2) *New Yugoslav Law*.

²⁰ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 176.

for the regulation of pension funds (1957) and invalidity pensions (1958). These laws were implemented in order to exegete the full dimensionality of the emancipatory self-management. At the Seventh LCY Congress, held in Ljubljana between 22-26 April 1958, the LCY adopted a new programme for the extension of self-management, particularly in economy.²¹ The 1958 legislation adjusted the level of control over funds in favour of an enterprise and at the expense of a commune. This was due to rapid yet unselective growth from 1955 onward. Communal authorities and enterprises were not sufficiently checked for shortage of credit from local branches of the National Bank, which resulted in investments in new enterprises or long-term projects being way large, import excessive and resources inadequately used. However, as Wilson wrote, the ‘misuse of such freedom was not regarded as an argument against self-management’ but held to be a ‘new manifestation of ‘bureaucracy’’.²² Further legal relaxations followed in 1961/1962, giving enterprises more independence and freedom over personal income and funds distribution. Based on social rather than state ownership it allowed for a wider participation (of workers) in public matters and was thus regarded a higher stage of socialism/communism than the one Soviets had achieved.²³

Within this context, Yugoslav socialism emerged a viable and legitimate alternative to the Soviet model. Such state-building undertaking and construction of the official identity in post-WWII Yugoslavia was implemented via various approaches or aspects at home and abroad. As it involved every aspect of life in Yugoslav society, self-managing socialism proved a unique experiment.²⁴ It involved (at least) three basic elements that also form the framework used in my research: political decentralisation

²¹ See The League of Yugoslav Communists, *The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists: Adopted by the VII. Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists* (Beograd: Edition Jugoslavija 1958).

²² Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 256.

²³ Svetozar Rajak, ‘From Regional Role to Global Undertakings: Yugoslavia in the Early Cold War’ in Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds), *The Balkans in the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 81.

²⁴ Fred W Neal, *Titoism in Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1958) 8-9.

reforms, economic liberalisation and social reforms, as well as its legitimisation in foreign relations (chapter 4).

3.3.1. Political Reform: Decentralisation of an Essentially Centralist System

It was political reform that reasserted the power of the new communist elite and legitimised the move away from Moscow, at home and abroad. Within CPY, it meant a move away from democratic centralism as practiced elsewhere in Eastern Europe, toward democratisation. The new Yugoslavia was to be based on a radically different concept of the state, with self-management being envisioned as a decentralized approach to socialist development, be it in politics, government, economic planning or in social life. The goal of its experimental empirical method to 'build socialism' and achieve a classless society (the basic goal of Marxist-Leninist doctrine) involved a complex process of adapting the superstructure to the country's specific conditions and necessitated the Yugoslav elite to accept (at least some) concessions.²⁵ The new political organisation thus involved decentralization of CPY's political power and of non-political bodies that ensured a broad political platform, political unity, and unity of action.²⁶ Indeed, the Yugoslavs 'measured' socialism in terms of the level of decentralization of state and Party power along political, economic and social lines - standpoint of the diffusion of state power.

Self-management was introduced with the ultimate aim that it will lead to the 'withering away of the state'. It was thus in opposition to the liberal concept according to which the state would never 'wither away', and in direct opposition to the Soviet strategic management of a bigger, increasingly

²⁵ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 204-205.

²⁶ For example, trade unions, youth organizations, all organised under *The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia* (SAWPY) [*Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije*] that was a mass socio-political organization created in 1953 to replace the *People's (Liberation) Front* (1941, 1945). See Milentije Popović, *Neposredna socijalistička demokratija: Govori i članci* [*Direct Socialist Democracy: Speeches and Articles*] (Belgrade: Kultura 1966); *Statut Socijalističkog saveza radnog naroda Jugoslavije* [*Statute of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia*] (Belgrade: Kultura 1975).

stronger and centralized state.²⁷ According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, centralism and the state were considered an institution of a class-divided society and an instrument of oppression of the exploited majority by the ruling minority, with democracy possible only when those who produce can also decide what to do with the fruits of their labour. Thus, once the majority takes over, the state would become redundant, and the real or proper democracy will be possible.²⁸ The uniqueness, innovation, and creative strategy of the political and economic framework of Yugoslav social experiment laid in the political decentralization of society (including de-bureaucratization) with increased decision-making authority given to the republics and autonomous provinces, and the leading role of the working class in economic management and decision-making.²⁹

Decentralization

To exemplify the legal character of Yugoslav emancipation in practice, CPY pushed for wide-ranging decentralization and economic liberalization (below). The two highpoints in Party's realignment to new (re)forms were the Basic Law of 1950 and the second Federal Constitution of 1953. The new Constitutional Law reorganised the political system and all fields of the state system.³⁰ Article 1 of the amended (second) Federal Constitution (1953) declared Yugoslavia socialist democracy which embodied the country's commitment towards practical and effective self-management and marked the beginning of a second phase of federalism in Yugoslavia characterised by the new mode of governance that self-management was.³¹

²⁷ Fred Warner Neal, 'Yugoslavia at the Crossroads' *Atlantic Unbound* (3 December 1997) [from the original *Atlantic Monthly* (December 1962)].

²⁸ Lenin wrote how Engels suggested that 'the word 'state' should be eliminated from the program and replaced by 'community'. See V I Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers 2011) 69.

²⁹ Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977/78) 68.

³⁰ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 176.

³¹ According to Marxist teachings, socialist democracy is a 'political organisation of class society in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism'. It is a democracy for equal and free individuals in a highly developed socialist society yet retaining certain state institutions and certain means of oppression. According to Lenin, the 'first phase of

Political decentralization became the constitutional principle. Despite being introduced top-down, the process of decentralization began dispersing political power into smaller self-management units.³² Designed to scale down the Party and prevent the rise of the (Soviet-style) centralized federal planning system and state bureaucracy, the control from Belgrade was lessened.³³ It was moved toward federal Republics, provincial government, and local and municipal governments organised in the form of communes.

In the spirit of the state intending to 'wither away', political leadership shifted responsibilities to the worker's commune (opština or općina). The commune replaced 'municipality' - the lowest political, territorial, and non-economic unit - in 1953. It was (at least in principle) a basic autonomous political territorial unit and a socio-economic community. Executing all laws, it assumed responsibility for economic and social planning, deriving funds from the local enterprises and played an integral role in the 'balance of power between the economic and social sectors, and between federal in enterprise level'. This meant raising its own funds, set its own budgets, and provide workers with necessary social services. According to the Yugoslav theorists inspired by Marx's analysis of the 1871 Paris Commune (*The Civil War in France*), the commune was envisaged as an authority and organisational unit for now, in the transitional period toward communism. After no longer needed, it would become the 'free association of free producers'.

communism still cannot produce justice and equality'. In this interim period, the focus of the working class is on building socialism by fighting for 'liquidation of private and state capitalist property, and against other 'alienations of man from his active creative and fully human role in society'. Lenin (1965) 78 in Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 199.

³² Ukandi G Damachi, Hans D Seibel and Jeroen Scheerder, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 1982) 6-7.

³³ The highest federal organ was the *Federal People's Assembly*, composed of two houses, the *Federal Council* and the *Council of Producers*. The organisation in the People's Republics and autonomous units was identical to the federal one, except they had no President. They have their own constitutional laws (in line with the federal one). Edvard Kardelj, *Socijalistička demokratija u jugoslovenskoj praksi [Socialist Democracy in Yugoslav Practice]* (Beograd: Kultura 1955) 31. See also Horvat, *Political Economy of Socialism* (1982); Edvard Kardelj, *Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja [Directions of Development of the Political System of Socialist Self-management]* (Belgrade: Komunist 1977); J M Simmie and D J Hale, 'Urban Self-management in Yugoslavia' 1978 (12) *Regional Studies* 701-712.

Decentralization materialised in an elaborate political structure with the intention to evolve representative structure on all levels, from the working unit to the Republican level.³⁴

Decentralisation policies implemented in the early 1950s with the 1953 Constitution continued with the 1963 and 1974 Constitutions respectively. The theoretical approach to such process was twofold. First, it highlighted the sovereignty of republics as decentralisation was regarded a reflection of the Yugoslav multinational character. Second, it emphasised structural decentralisation of the self-managing bodies (the enterprise and the commune). However, while the two processes might have been simultaneous, they were in fact causing friction between the national and the local, as ‘emphasis on the republics [was] rooted in the specific historical needs of multinational Yugoslavia [while] self-management as a system [was rooted in its structural need to work effectively for an enterprise]’.³⁵ The first was to bring cohesiveness and national integration to highly traditional society with a very unevenly developed economy and the second was to provide the system’s efficiency (in relation to political authority, economic development and overall society’s prosperity).

Yugoslav leadership proposed an experimental de-bureaucratized mode of governance through innovative structure with the overarching goal to limit state bureaucracy and replace the state with a self-governing society. This included thinking creatively about new and independent ways to strategically manage the overall state’s social framework. Democracy was its main tenet, or at least a desirable aspiration.³⁶ Self-management was envisioned as a

³⁴ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 202-206; Sharon Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975) 61.

³⁵ Bogdan Denitch, ‘The Relevance of Yugoslav Self-Management’ in Gary K Bertsch and Thomas W Ganschow, *Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models* (San Francisco: W H Freeman and Company 1976) 273.

³⁶ In political discourse, self-management and democracy are often presented as an antipode, despite being closely linked etymologically (SSKJ [Dictionary of the Slovene Language]). Defining self-management as ‘independent, direct or indirect decision making by members of a working or other community on management of common affairs’ could also define democracy in its most general meaning. That is, if democracy is defined as a ‘political order

system of grassroots democracy in which all society members participate through their representatives.³⁷ As such, democracy (democratization of social life or democratic aspect of socialism) became the key factor and main goal of self-management. The system was imagined ‘to activate human work potential and creativity to the fullest’ with ‘all participants [to] contribute their full potential, for a common cause and accordingly have the same rights and privileges’.³⁸ In short, it was a vision of a direct democracy through decentralisation.

Indeed, Yugoslav socialism claimed to politicize the whole society and invented new political forms of participation in order to ‘wither away’ the state. However, despite aspiration for a peaceful transition to socialist society and regard for any consolidation of power by the state as antithetical to socialism, there was, ironically, no room for political pluralism.³⁹ Kardelj regarded political pluralism as a tool for alienation, writing that a ‘self-managing social system [does not need political parties as] people have direct control over all organs of state power and administration’.⁴⁰ Namely, in self-management all individuals are of the same class and all share political and economic concerns. The people/citizens/members of society, make decisions related to them and in accordance with their interests, and are implemented in a delegate system. Thus, Kardelj argued, ‘any form of party pluralism alienates society from a particular person and citizen, even if it seems to be deciding on behalf of the citizen’.⁴¹ Political pluralism was therefore

with rule of a majority that protects the personal and political rights of all citizens through the principle of equality when making decisions in the life of a collective’.

³⁷ A good example was also the Paris Commune during the French civil war (1870). Damachi and others, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1982) 6-7.

³⁸ Damachi and others, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1982) 6-7. Paradoxically, and as will be seen in chapter 5, recognition of and respect for the rights of the individuals, diverse groups, and Republics formed the basis for the Yugoslav fragile political unity.

³⁹ Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment* (1977/78) 68.

⁴⁰ Edvard Kardelj, *Komunistična partija Jugoslavije v boju za novo Jugoslavijo, za ljudsko oblast in socializem: Samoupravljanje 1. Knjiga [The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for a New Yugoslavia, for People's Power and Socialism: Self-Management 1. Book]* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije 1979) 70.

⁴¹ Edvard Kardelj, *Smeri razvoja političnega sistema socialističnega samoupravljanja: Samoupravljanje 4. Knjiga [Directions of Development of the Political system of Socialist*

radicalized into a ‘system in which every citizen [was] a party’. The implemented legislative measures and reforms, aimed at decentralization, de-bureaucratization and democratization, did ‘de-Bolshevize Yugoslav socialism and helped build a more pluralistic society’ but ‘stopped well short of introducing a multiparty political system and disbanding the political monopoly of CPY’.⁴² Indeed, the government did open up to an extent. To mark this change, CPY decreed in 1952 to name itself the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). According to Wilson, renaming signified the ‘formal break with the policies of ‘democratic centralism’ as practiced elsewhere in Eastern Europe’.⁴³

Furthermore, the politics of Yugoslav socialism was based on Marx’s famous contention in his *Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach* to ‘change’ the world [reality] and not only ‘interpret’ it. The concept of self-management was to resolve one of the key problems of the Marxist proletarian revolution: how to move from the authorities of the communist avant-garde in the name of the proletariat to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat (and as seen in Chapter 1 in this thesis, already discussed by Gosar).

In its quest to counter Soviet ‘revisionism’ and introduce elements of original Marxism, the Party took on a task to develop a political theory distinguished from the hegemonic and bureaucratic practices of the CPSU under Stalin. They wanted to become a ‘persuasive’ and an ‘administrative’ organisation instead. As per the orthodox Marxist theory, the aim was consolidation of all state power within the Party in workers' name and thus the goal for intellectual and political elites to merge into one. Accordingly, the Party cadre, now severed from the state, contended for ideological influence not through its (local) directives but through ‘persuasion’ of ‘politically conscious’ LCY

Self-management: Self-Management 4. Book] (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije 1979) 299-300.

⁴² Ana Antić, ‘The Pedagogy of Workers’ Self-Management: Terror, Therapy, and Reform Communism in Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin Split’ 2016 (50) 1 *Journal of Social History* 179-203, 182.

⁴³ Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 255.

members across various different organs of self-management.⁴⁴ The CPY's political elite perceived itself as an 'enlightened vanguard' in socialism and as such assumed the role of an intellectual elite to represent 'not reality as it is, but a vision of the future as it ought to be'.⁴⁵ In other words, it was to be the 'ultimate interpreter of reality, a visionary of the future and the force changing it in the direction of the vision'.⁴⁶ Communists, hence, had a duty to study (and then to teach) Marxism.⁴⁷ Over decades, the Party increasingly saw itself as a vision-formulator, a 'guiding rather than commanding force' in society.⁴⁸ In accordance with the Marxist framework where neither ethnic similarity nor state's existence could serve as pillars of identity, the Yugoslav ideologues devised a 'clear vision' instead. According to Edvard Kardelj, the primary theorist of self-management and main ideologue who formulated a vision for Yugoslavia, 'the unity of the nation is not possible unless based on a clear platform, on a clear outlook for the future development of society'.⁴⁹ Without the vision, Kardelj said, there would be 'no possibility to construct Yugoslav unity, and thus no prospect of preserving country's socialism nor its independence'.⁵⁰ Or, as Jović put it, 'for Yugoslav Communists the process

⁴⁴ Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (eds), *Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Volume One, Tito's Yugoslavia, Stories Untold* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 6; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 257-258.

⁴⁵ The concept of the enlightened vanguard is explained by J L Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (London: Sphere 1970). See also Dejan Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia and its 'Others'' in John Lampe and Mark Mazower (eds), *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeast Europe* (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press 2004) 296; Franc Šetinc, *Misel in delo Edvarda Kardelja [Thought and Work of Edvard Kardelj]* (Ljubljana 1979) 146.

⁴⁶ Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia' in Lampe and Mazower (eds), *Ideologies and National Identities* (2004) 296.

⁴⁷ More on importance of studying Marxism for young Communists in the USSR see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999).

⁴⁸ This vision was promoted by Croatian party leader Vladimir Bakarić, who took the Italian Communist Party as a role-model. It was subsequently developed in Kardelj's book *Directions of Development* (1977), declared (by the LCY Presidency) the official preparatory document for the Eleventh LCY Congress (1978). See Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia' in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies* (2004) 277.

⁴⁹ Edvard Kardelj, 'Ways of Democracy in a Socialist Society' in Edvard Kardelj, *Self-management and the Political System* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1977) 263.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 263.

of vision formulating performed the same function as election-based institution building in liberal democracies'.⁵¹

The relationship between de- and centralisation, then, seems a dialectical one. Tito's aim to introduce self-management which will lead to the goal of this social experiment, a withering away of the state, was in contradiction to LCY elite's attempt to re-establish its power.⁵² Indeed, despite decentralisation and weakening of the central government, the Yugoslav political arrangement was nevertheless successfully maintained. For instance, in the first elections under the new Constitutional Law (22-24 November 1953), the electoral system was set up in a way that still assured the regime's complete control over the elections. To be nominated candidates had to be backed by the regime's political organisations. Also, agricultural population [still] accounting for more than 60 percent of population made representation highly disproportionate.

The principle of government unity remained intact. All three traditional powers – the executive with the President and the Federal Executive Council/Federal People's Assembly, federal administrative and federal judicial organs – stayed concentrated and subordinated to their representative bodies in the Federal People's Assembly who elected, appointed or dismissed them.⁵³ Likewise, the Constitution (still) required the LCY to have a final say in public policies, with the state and the Party being responsible for 'indirectly managing a dialogue' between the Republics.⁵⁴ Concomitantly, the party still had the decisive role in the policy-making processes. With the (un)changed role of the Party in 1953, the Yugoslav communism arguably became

⁵¹ Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia' in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies* (2004) 299.

⁵² Nikolić, *Development of Self-management* (1989) 45.

⁵³ The 'Đjilas case' clearly demonstrates such limits in political freedom. In January 1954, Milovan Djilas/Đjilas wished to take the Sixth Congress' resolve a step further and abolish the LCY's formal political monopoly. Consequently, he was expelled from the Central Committee and later from the LCY itself. The case illustrates the 'dialectics of 'democratisation' of LCY in relation to ideological 'freedom' of discussion and criticism'. See Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 227-229; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 256.

⁵⁴ Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment* (1977/78); Simmie and Hale, 'Urban Self-management in Yugoslavia' (1978).

‘authoritarian rather than totalitarian’.⁵⁵ But as Kardelj argued, this was because Yugoslavia was (still) in the ‘process of a revolutionary change of her ‘social reality’ and such ‘task of the state is only temporary, to protect the socialist system and regulate legal order in its transitional period toward communism’.⁵⁶

To what extent Tito’s Yugoslavia was socialist or totalitarian state persists as a debate. It depends on the ideological standpoint and historical distance of a scholar. Assessing the Yugoslav regime as totalitarian can be countered with antithesis - country’s socialism as a good system that provided equal opportunities for employment, schooling and a relatively high standard of living. Indeed, it seems important to note that although the Yugoslav system was based on an overall control of its population, the government was more democratic than USSR’s (its organisation as alternating collective leadership, censorship in media and publishing). Tito approved of various associations to function outside his control, such as film clubs, mountain climbing associations, music societies or technical councils. Douglas Durasoff rightly assessed, then, that ‘for self-management to be ‘real’, considerable devolution of central authority [was] necessary [yet] for nations to expect viability, considerable central authority [was] necessary’.⁵⁷ And Yugoslavia did manage to successfully navigate between the two. However, and as will be portrayed in chapter 5, for a limited period only.

⁵⁵ For useful insight see, for example, Ognjenović and Jozelić, *Revolutionary Totalitarianism* (2016) ix; Sergej Flere, ‘Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna? [Was Tito’s Yugoslavia totalitarian?]' 2012 (5) 1 *Političke Prespective: Časopis za Istraživanje Politike* 7-21; Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, *The Rise and Fall of Socialist Yugoslavia: Elite Nationalism and the Collapse of a Federation* (Lanham: Lexington Books 2021); Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press 1968).

⁵⁶ See Kardelj’s *Exposé* at the People’s Assembly in Edvard Kardelj, *Yugoslavia, Constitution, Fundament Law Pertaining to the Bases of the Social and Political Organisation of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Federal Organs of State Authority* (Beograd: Union of Jurists’ Association of Yugoslavia 1953) 9-10.

⁵⁷ Douglas Durasoff, *Self-management and National Integration: The Yugoslav Case in Comparative Perspective* (PhD Thesis, Yale University 1978) i.

3.3.2. Economic Decentralisation or Liberalisation

Grappling with economic backwardness required the most suitable form of governance. Workers' self-management became an experimental empirical method to keep the economy going and a way to move from underdeveloped to developed.⁵⁸ Its beginnings were marked with the new Basic Law or the Law on Workers' Councils (1950) which unfolded the very distinct 'Yugoslav road' to socialism/communism by introducing a market economy aimed at democratisation of the workplace. Decentralized economic management was suggested as the most appropriate solution to the lack of sufficient economic motivation of a centrally controlled economy.⁵⁹ Therefore, self-management was primarily an instrument to break down (the arguably inefficient) centralised federal planning system and establish an economy free from political pressure based on the market.⁶⁰ This process of self-administration and decentralisation started by the Basic Law transferred state power directly to the workers and their organs by increasing the autonomy of production economic units.⁶¹ The federal government granted decision-making autonomy to various enterprises (state enterprises, economic associations or cooperatives),⁶² thereby increasing worker participation and transferring the control over the industry from the Party to the proletariat in the form of reorganised People's Committees.⁶³ At its most basic element, the

⁵⁸ Damachi and others, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1982) 6-7.

⁵⁹ The Basic Law was arguably based on the 1917 Soviet decree that instituted 'workers' control over the production, distribution, and buying and selling of all products and raw materials'. As it turned out, and will be seen in chapter 5, decentralization and direct democracy did not necessarily mean relaxation in Party's control nor entail workers' control. Radoš Smiljković and Milan Petrović, *Samoupravljanje i Socijalizam: Čitanka Samoupravljača [Self-management and Socialism: The Reader]* (Sarajevo: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika 1970) 71-72; Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (1975) 56; Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 108.

⁶⁰ Denitch, 'The Relevance of Yugoslav Self-Management' in Bertsch and Ganschow, *Comparative Communism* (1976) 269.

⁶¹ Šetinc, *Thought and Work of Edvard Kardelj* (1979) 146.

⁶² An enterprise was the legal form of an economic activity and an 'organ of associated labour', involved in direct economic production (a factory, a company).

⁶³ Previously regulated by the Opći zakon o narodnim odborima [General Law on the People's Committee] (21 May 1946) published as Law No 288 Sl list FNRJ II 43 (28 May

factories were handed to the workers to run them through their organisational structure, a system of elected autonomous workers' councils - socialist democracy as a delegate system. Introduced in state companies by the December 1949 Directive, workers' councils were basic operation units in economic organisations through which workers exercised their rights. They consisted of 15 to 120 democratically elected representatives restricted to two one-year terms.⁶⁴

Central powers ceased to run the national and regional economies and state control over investments decreased.⁶⁵ The reasons for creating workers' councils were to extend workers' rights won during the socialist revolution by enabling them to realise the historic right of practicing direct management of the economy by removing dangers rooted in its administrative management to secure better conditions for unhindered development of productive forces, and to realize their social role by making workers' material and moral interests a moving factor of socialism under conditions of the social ownership system. Tito spoke of workers councils as being a 'historic act in the development of our socialist social system... dictated by our social needs at a particular stage [the need being democratisation in the economy]... the establishment of new, socialist relationships in production, based on the wide participation of workers... in the management... development and in distribution. The aim...was for workers to develop their creative abilities and self-initiative... which had been held back by centralised management of production'.⁶⁶

1946); and Opći zakon o narodnim odborima [General Law on the People's Committee] (6 June 1949) published as Law No 410 SI list FRNJ V 49 (9 June 1949).

⁶⁴ After establishing legal position in 1950, they went through many reforms as the Yugoslav system altered itself up to the 1991. Damachi and others, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1982) 6-7; Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 113-114.

⁶⁵ This included autonomy over foreign trade policy. The operation of Yugoslav economy from the perspective of federal government or Party control was examined by Radmila Stojanović (ed), *The Functioning of the Yugoslav Economy* (London: Routledge 1982). See also Boris Kidrič, *Savez Komunističke Jugoslavije, VI Kongres KPJ [Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, VI Congress of the CPY]* (Beograd: Kultura 1952) 175; Moore, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1970) 13-14.

⁶⁶ Tito's Speech at the First Congress of Worker's Councils (25 June 1957) published in Josip Broz Tito, *Selected Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961* (Zagreb: Naprijed 1963) 190-196.

Arguably, transferring management to the workers' councils and unions, independent collectives of civil servants and city officials, and indeed understanding society as 'free association of producers' was closer to Leninist principles, according to which centralism and the state as an instrument of oppression will eventually, in accordance with one's social conditions, 'wither away'.⁶⁷ This aimed-for direct control of society by the workers thus marked the reclamation and beginning of the Marxist trajectory. It was also supposed to mirror the democratic experience of the resistance movement during WW2 and indeed 'protect the interests of the liberation struggle'.⁶⁸ Therefore, it is important to note and explain the oddity that workers' self-management was not part of the original program of CPY. Immediately after WW2 and while still faithful follower of Soviet leadership, the Party envisioned the economy under state control as instigated by nationalization. The bureaucratic control of the economy by the Communist Party Politburo meant the trade unions were under party control and were treated as mere transmission belts. Accordingly, the first workers' councils created in state enterprises by a December 1949 Directive were up until June 1950 'organs of workers' participation and not of workers' self-management'.⁶⁹ Serving only as consultative bodies while decision-making remained in the hands of CEOs imposed by the state, the workers' councils only had an advisory role. This meant that self-management was autonomous only in theory.⁷⁰ Indeed, the directors holding power in companies were state-appointed and as such party-affiliated. The Party directed the economy, set the portion of the profit for general social needs and stimulation of productivity, directly intervened by taxation of extraordinary high profits.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Nikolić, *Development of Self-management* (1989) 45.

⁶⁸ From 'The Law on Workers' Representatives' *Borba* (30 July 1945), reprinted in Smiljković and Petrović, *Self-management and Socialism* (1970) 111. See also Zudin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (1975) 56.

⁶⁹ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 111.

⁷⁰ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 179-184; Simmie and Hale, 'Urban Self-management in Yugoslavia' (1978).

⁷¹ It is important to note that the proportions of contributions to the federal budget varied greatly between the Republics, depending on how developed they were, and will lead to

It was only after the break with Soviet Union and as CPY faced calls to return to the democratic experiences of the struggle, that the Unions became organs of workers' management. Interestingly, the Basic Law of June 1950 adopted by the Federal People's Assembly was introduced not as the result of conscious struggle of the workers' movement but as a by-product of the conflict between the CPY leadership and Stalin. It distanced from the previous arrangement as a mere copy of the Soviet and instead pursued to prove Yugoslavia's legitimacy and at the same time fidelity to (true) Marxism.⁷² It took until 1952 that relevant portions of the Basic Law took hold in the economic transition to allow more independence for enterprises, broader worker rights, and to introduce elements of market practices.⁷³ The reform was a sign that such unique and experimental type of socialism had come to stay in Tito's Yugoslavia.

Only where control over the process and products of work was carried by those who did the work did a sort of direct democracy in the economic sphere appear in practice.⁷⁴ The transfer of decision rested on the principle of the autonomous worker who not only had the right to exercise a fair amount of democratic control on the shop floor and a democratic voice in the daily activity of work, but was essential in the 'intricate system of negotiations and voluntary agreements'.⁷⁵ An enterprise, conceptualised as an autonomous and competitive organization, allowed workers to manage the newly created

frictions few decades later (chapter 5). See Ognjenović and Jozelić, *Revolutionary Totalitarianism* (2016) 6.

⁷² Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 107-108.

⁷³ Ljubo Sirc, *The Yugoslav Economy under Self-Management* (New York: St Martin's Press 1979) 2; Zudin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (1975) 57-58.

⁷⁴ Durasoff, *Self-management and National Integration* (1978), Adela Lovrenović, *Ekonomika [Economics]* (Sarajevo: Zavod za Izdavanje Udžbenika 1972); Aleksandra Djurasovic, *Ideology, Political Transitions and the City: The Case of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina* (London, New York: Routledge 2016) 76.

⁷⁵ Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan and Nawal E El Tatawy, *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism and the Challenges of Development (Report of a Mission Sent to Yugoslavia by the World Bank)* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1979) 375-376; Djurasovic, *Ideology, Political Transitions and the City* (2016) 76.

value, carry out decisions and manage their implications.⁷⁶ To that end, workers between the working units on a factory/enterprise level cooperated with each other. They were free to conclude contracts with working units of other similar enterprises and manage the company's assets. A claim in ownership incentivised the desire to turn a profit.⁷⁷ Thus the desire and responsibility to increase and maximise productivity was in their personal interest, as their work efficiency was reflected in their (higher) income through profit sharing. Kardelj remarked on the rationale behind the social capital of profit-sharing policies in worker owned industries:

...the disposition of the means of production and expanded reproduction in our socialist society not only cannot be exercised by some special class of owners of capital but not even by some technocratic apparatus or stratum to which the state has entrusted this function, or which has arbitrarily seized a monopoly in the performance of that function. This function can be exercised only by associated workers directly, that is on the basis of equal economic and democratic rights and responsibilities in the disposition of their income. They realise this function within and through their basic organisations of associated labour, and also through joint self-managing and state organs which are responsible to them not only politically but also economically. In other words, such a system must consistently guarantee that the past labour [minuli rad] of the associated workers, which in capitalist society flows into private capital, in our society will be... under the control and influence of all workers, and especially those who by their work have directly contributed to its creation.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Harold Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989) 102-105; Schrenk and others, *Yugoslavia: Self-Management Socialism* (1979) 375-376.

⁷⁷ Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (1975) 57.

⁷⁸ Oklopic seemed critical of the idea of voluntary association playing an important role in Kardelj's political thought. He added that 'its relevance for his account of self-determination should not be overstated'. Some contemporaries might see Kardelj as a 'closeted Althusian' due to his emphasis on voluntary associations, and which for Kardelj start locally, grow nationally, and establish global 'frameworks... [of] cooperation and reciprocal responsibility'. However, Kardelj remained a faithful Marxist-Leninist exegete throughout his political career as a theoretician and constitution-maker. Edvard Kardelj in Radovan Radonjić, *Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom i društveni razvoj Jugoslavije: 1948-1950* [*CPY's Conflict with the Cominform and the Social Development of Yugoslavia: 1948-*

Indeed, this autonomy in decisions how best to distribute/(re)allocate profits after taxes and operating costs - free to dispose with own net income - resulted in workers' vested interest in their company's success while participating in a competitive market rewarding efficiency and productivity.⁷⁹ Rather than an intermediary (in the form of the state or shareholders), it was the workers who were in the executive position when deciding not only on the workers' personal income, but the company's net income which contained added value or surplus labour. This sharing of control also meant sharing in the company's wealth.⁸⁰ Or, in the words of its chief architect Kardelj, 'profit in self-management [was] a measure of exploitation of socially owned productive assets managed by workers, and the purpose of sharing surplus value [was] to ensure the development of technology, and for growth of social standard'.⁸¹ Earning income and dividing profit by the workers themselves guaranteed for 'equitable sharing, for equal rights, and mutual obligations and responsibilities'.⁸² Whereas in the capitalist system incentives for the working class were only material, in the self-managing society the sole focus on the material standard was not everything. The search for the so-called 'human relations' and corporate governance (that is, self-management) in the West,

1950] (Zagreb: Narodno sveučilište grada Zagreba, Centar za aktualni politički studij 1979) 281; Zoran Oklopcic, 'The Promises and Failures of Triple Struggle: Non-Alignment, Yugoslav Federalism and the Struggle for National, Social and Geopolitical Emancipation' in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, the Global South and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017) 280. Edvard Kardelj, 'Osnovni uzroci i pravci ustavnih promena [Basic Causes and Directions of Constitutional Change]' in Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje: Vol. IX [Problems of Our Socialist Construction: Vol IX]* (Belgrade: BIGZ 1974) 377.

⁷⁹ Gross income, in contrast, was being subject to decisions on Federal, Republican and local levels. Nevertheless, as such self-management had characteristic of market economy, involving competition between workers and enterprises both in the federation and in foreign markets. Denitch, 'The Relevance of Yugoslav Self-Management' in Bertsch and Ganschow, *Comparative Communism* (1976) 273; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 254-255.

⁸⁰ Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 289, 303; Alojzija Finžgar in Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 205; Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (1975) 57.

⁸¹ Edvard Kardelj, *Sistem socialističnega samoupravljanja v Jugoslaviji: Samoupravljanje 1. Knjiga [The System of Socialist Self-management in Yugoslavia: Self-Management 1. Book]* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije 1979) 413-418.

⁸² *Ibid.* 413-418.

was for Kardelj a sign that the capitalist system was exhausting its last reserves to preserve itself.⁸³ Taken that theoretically and etymologically ‘communism’ means ‘from each according to his abilities and to each according to his needs’, the Yugoslav Marxist trajectory – according to which the real/proper democracy is possible if based on the rights of those who produce and decide of the fruits of their labour - was followed in economy.⁸⁴

Based on the idea of democratisation, self-management had a profound influence on the society as a whole.⁸⁵ According to Denitch, it became ‘not an instrument of the society but the very fabric of the society’.⁸⁶ Indeed, it was the embodiment of a new socio-economic order of social property.⁸⁷ The 1953 Constitution signified a new paradigm in ownership rights too, with Article 4 serving as the legal base for declaring nationalisation of property.⁸⁸ Nationalisation was the foundation of Yugoslav self-management as it declared private property socialist and thus only transferred ownership of enterprises away from the state and to employees.⁸⁹ Socially owned enterprises were legally distinct from the public (state-owned) ones. Restricting the state monopoly of ownership, it was now society that became

⁸³ See Robert F Miller, ‘Theoretical and ideological issues of reform in socialist systems: Some Yugoslav and soviet examples’ 1989 (41) 3 *Soviet Studies* 430-448.

⁸⁴ William N Loucks, ‘Workers’ Self-Government in Yugoslav Industry’ 1958 (11) 1 *World Politics* 68-82, 68; Medjad, ‘The Fate of the Yugoslav Model’ (2004) 289.

⁸⁵ Ognjenović and Jozelić, *Revolutionary Totalitarianism* (2016) ix.

⁸⁶ Denitch, ‘The Relevance of Yugoslav Self-Management’ in Bertsch and Ganschow, *Comparative Communism* (1976) 273.

⁸⁷ Kardelj, ‘Root Causes’ in Kardelj, *Problems of Our Socialist Construction* (1974) 377. However, and as will be seen in chapter 5, the system was fraught with contradictions too.

⁸⁸ Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 199-200.

⁸⁹ Ownership transferred from the state to society was regarded as the higher form of socialist ownership and was subsequently ensured in the 1953 *Constitution*.

the holder and manager of social(ist) property.⁹⁰ In other words, state property was transformed into social property or the property of the entire society.⁹¹

The legal and economic implications of social property proved more complex than ideological. In case of socially-owned enterprise, the two components of ownership - the right to control the company and the right to appropriate its profits – were theoretically vested in the social community as a whole but exercised by and for employees of a particular enterprise. Social ownership did not restore to the individual producers, but to a collective of producers⁹² where property was 'simultaneously everyone's and no one's' and contained certain classical elements of property in an economic sense but not in a legal sense.⁹³ Its appropriation, use and disposition could be exercised by a given work collective to produce goods which may then be sold to provide them with income. However, the exclusive legal right to that property belonged to no one, not even to a government body.⁹⁴ Collective-yet-not-state-owned, it was 'every citizen's indivisible property... not characterized by a lack of owner, but rather by a lack of identifiable owner, for it belonged to the broader social community'.⁹⁵ Accordingly, society was the owner and an individual the user of a social property, rather than its owner, enjoying most of the prerogatives traditionally associated with ownership.⁹⁶ As such, self-

⁹⁰ Private ownership was allowed in the production of various crafts, agriculture, services, transport, catering and tourism, but the contribution of these industries to overall Gross Domestic Product was small. Kardelj, *The System of Socialist Self-management* (1979) 413-418. James H Gapinski, Borislav Škegro and Thomas W Zuehlke, *Modelling the Economic Performance of Yugoslavia* (New York: Praeger 1988) 32; Zukin, *Beyond Marx and Tito* (1975) 61.

⁹¹ Decentralization of agriculture was a more complex matter, whereby the above noted early Soviet style land reform involved collectivization of land and agriculture into cooperatives. This forced collectivisation was abandoned with the self-managing laws in the 1950s. Interestingly, by the 1960s roughly 85 percent of the land was privatised.

⁹² See Committee on the Judiciary, *Yugoslav Communism* (1961) 205.

⁹³ Kardelj, 'Root Causes' in Kardelj, *Problems of Our Socialist Construction* (1974) 377.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 377.

⁹⁵ Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 289. See also Horvat, *Political Economy of Socialism* (1982); Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment* (1977/78); Harold Lydall, *Yugoslav Socialism, Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984).

⁹⁶ See Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 289, 303.

management in the economy was interwoven with the political autonomy of councils, municipalities and constituent republics.⁹⁷

3.3.3. The Socialist Transformation of Society

Indeed, the 1950s and 1960s signified a new paradigm for the ‘new road’ socialism based on self-management. Decentralisation as the constitutional principle became the main feature of the new Yugoslav political and socio-economic system. Based on social ownership of the means of production, emancipation of labour and the working man, state’s system became increasingly cohesive. By creating a ‘new man’, the system enabled workers to manage the(ir) newly created value. With a goal to establish a ‘community of free individuals’, the transformation process included withering away of the state monopoly, its ownership, control and its bureaucratic and technocratic distortions.

Furthermore, and as Lanyan contended, the Yugoslavs developed their so-called ‘humanist understanding of Marx: a socio-economic order as a ‘synthesis of two interrelated communication mechanisms to coordinate their social life’.⁹⁸ One was the market as a ‘horizontal economic communication mechanism’ and the other an institutional framework for self-management and self-government as a ‘vertical political communication mechanism... attempting to create equality and autonomy within the functioning of the market’. A dialectical synthesis/relationship of these two mechanisms, each demanding the other, was what gave the Yugoslav model its particular character and distinguished it fundamentally from the Soviet one.⁹⁹ In fact, the differentiation and even ‘othering’ (of the Soviet governance) occupied a central place in Yugoslav state identity formation. Dejan Jović argued how the ideological battle over the correct understanding of Marx resulted in

⁹⁷ See Paul Underwood, ‘Yugoslav Democracy Shaped to Economic Mould, Not Political’ *The New York Times* (11 February 1961).

⁹⁸ Chen Lanyan, *The Yugoslav Experiment with Self-Governing Market Socialism* (Unpublished MA Thesis, Canada: Simon Fraser University 1986) 2.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 2-3.

accusations of revisionism, also from the side of the Soviets as they claimed Tito was developing a new ideology in his own state, the so-called Titoism.¹⁰⁰

Titoism as a term was picked up by (some) scholars, including Bogetić, to denote internal and foreign policies and practices of Tito's Yugoslavia during the Cold War.¹⁰¹ Originally, Bogetić contended, the term was used by the Soviet Union government to denote a heresy (accusing Yugoslavia of Trotskyism and social democracy), whereas today it encapsulates Yugonostalgia. However, Tito told Dedijer himself that

*Titoism as a separate ideological line does not exist... To put it as an ideology would be stupid... [as] we have added nothing to Marxist-Leninist doctrine... [but] only applied that doctrine in consonance with our situation. Since there is nothing new, there is no new ideology. Should 'Titoism' be an ideological line, we would become revisionists; we would have renounced Marxism. We are Marxists, I am a Marxist and therefore I cannot be a 'Titoist'.*¹⁰²

The identification of 'others', as Jović contended, played an added integral part in formation of Yugoslav identity.¹⁰³ Viable antipodes were the Soviet Union or the pre-war bourgeois statist Yugoslav monarchy, which were not only opponents of Yugoslav socialism but also of Yugoslavia's independence.¹⁰⁴ To support any external ideology would mean to undermine Yugoslav identity, and effectively its sovereignty. Self-management thus involved the process of socialist transformation of society that required a fresh political structure that would correspond to the country's new social and economic foundations. This development and transfer of self-management as

¹⁰⁰ Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia' in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies and National Identities* (2004) 280

¹⁰¹ See Dragan Bogetić, 'Jugoslavija i Nesvrstanost: Prilog Prevazilaženju Predrasuda i Stereotipa [Yugoslavia and Non-Alignment: Contribution to Overcoming Prejudice and Stereotype]' 2014 (24) 4 *ANNALES Ser Hist Sociol* 615-624, 616.

¹⁰² Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1953) 432.

¹⁰³ Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia' in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies and National Identities* (2004) 277-280.

¹⁰⁴ Jović assessed accordingly, how after late-1980s onward the 'others' changed, but the 'glue' for the state identity failed to be reformulated. Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia' in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies and National Identities* (2004) 277.

a concept and practice from political to the economic sphere was achieved through de-politization, decentralization, de-etatization and democratisation in governance. By legislating self-management's Marxist notions of social ownership, freely associated labour, and economic and political democracy, it was incorporated into Yugoslav society. Indeed, it was a constitutional principle, the realization of which was therefore a legal obligation of governance, regulating political, economic and social life. Its reach was not only emancipation of the working classes, as Jakovljević expounded, but emancipation of Yugoslavia from a 'doctrinarian and vulgar understanding of this emancipation'.¹⁰⁵

Indeed, self-management was used as a tool for outworking of the Yugoslav 'new road to communism/socialism'. The result was a (practice of) a specific development of socialism that exemplified a rupture in the international workers' movement. It was an all-encompassing alternative modality of governance that became a principle for economic, political and social relationships, an ideology and a way of life. Changes resulting from the new reforms addressed and involved the entire working population in all spheres of work and life. The socialist transformation of society affected every aspect of the country's domestic policy - political, judicial, economic, social, cultural, and educational. It involved resolving the national question by granting autonomy for ethnic minorities, tolerance and freedom of religions, and over decades extended to include media, film, art, architecture, consumerism, even travel and holidays.¹⁰⁶

This so-called 'socialism with a human face', according to Chen Lanyan, designated a shift away from 'abstract entities such as the state [...] and instead 'the individual human being'.¹⁰⁷ People were seen essentially 'free and creative', manifesting their individual and collective potential (self-actualization) through their work, and as such contribute in the 'process of

¹⁰⁵ Branislav Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects: Performance and Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1945-91* (United States: University of Michigan Press 2016) 15.

¹⁰⁶ However, it also involved eliminating pressures of various dissident comrades by repression of radical intellectuals, by silencing or re-educating them.

¹⁰⁷ Lanyan, *The Yugoslav Experiment* (1986) 2.

transforming the world'.¹⁰⁸ This meant that the idea of self-management was envisaged as being realised through a (subjective) political project of building/forming a particular type of man.¹⁰⁹ Envisaged as an 'alternative man', emerging in and constitutional to a particular kind of reality, this 'new man' was to first resist - as they indeed did during the WWII - and then form as well as hold the Yugoslav socialist society together. The idea behind forming a new Yugoslav self-managed man (family, community) was to achieve Marx's idea of a free association of producers, who will be a source of inspiration, creativity and initiative, and will concomitantly raise the standard of living. While evaluating performance culture, Jakovljević aptly put that self-management furthered the emancipation by including 'all aspects of life'. As such, any activity 'was not free-floating but tied together a variety of human actions'. For instance, education, books, and art ceased to be elitist but an active part of everyday.¹¹⁰ Or, for example, although Partisan based, staff in educational system was independent in deciding on any school's curriculum and hiring of teachers.¹¹¹ It thus became a tool for disposing what Marx called the socioeconomic alienation of man.

As self-management was extended from political to economic and to all areas of work and life from 1950 onward, Yugoslav society became an increasingly integrated social system. Again, in accordance with the process of 'withering away of the state' at the fore, social services too had their own form of self-management. In addition to workers' councils, instituted self-management in communes (local committees), the self-managing bodies were extended via administrative committees to educational, cultural, scientific, health and other social institutions. Namely, as the local community or the commune became the basic unit of a socio-political structure in self-managing system, it became

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 2.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 54, 98, 101. See Jaroslav Vanek (ed), *Self-Management: Economic Liberation of Man* (Baltimore: Penguin Books 1975) 70-71; Miloš Nikolić, 'The Theoretical Bases of the development of Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia' 1981 (23) *Socialism in the World* 22-59, 53; Kardelj, *Self-Management and the Political System* (1980) 36.

¹¹⁰ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 29.

¹¹¹ Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 254-255.

simultaneously a community of producers and a community of consumers.¹¹² The economic and political citizen not only to participated autonomously and with full responsibility in the decision-making processes but was encouraged to act as consumer and a producer of social services.¹¹³ The result was a social management whereby, through a joint venture of experts (the technical services), the sources of finance (local enterprises) and consumers (residents), a minimum level of health and education was guaranteed. Social progress was evident in advancement from physical work towards new interests, aim and needs, such as scientific research, intellectual and cultural work. The idea was that these local ‘communities of interest’ in various social fields - collecting revenue, providing and consuming services - will eventually replace federal, republican or local government.¹¹⁴ Indeed, by embracing all dimensions of the Yugoslav society self-management shaped a particular Yugoslav state identity at home. It became an inalienable right of working people guaranteed by the constitution.

3.4. Conclusions

While its beginnings evolved already during WWII, self-management became the centre of Yugoslavia’s domestic politics and indeed the country’s restorative project after WWII, particularly after the 1948 split. It was developed in pursuit of a (re)establishment of its identity, coupled with the modernization of society’s everyday life. Indeed, this was an endeavour of many countries after the war. However, Yugoslavia still stood out as it embodied as a unique all-encompassing alternative modality of governance through political reforms and economic liberalisation.

¹¹² See Kardelj, *Socialist Democracy in Yugoslav Practice* (1955); Jovan Djordjević and Najdan Pašić, ‘The Communal Self-government System in Yugoslavia’ 1961 (13) 3 *International Social Science Journal* 389-407, 394.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 254-255.

Legislated through a number of laws beginning in 1950, it transferred the management of previously nationalised economic enterprises to workers under the slogan 'factories to the workers'. Accordingly, the construction of Yugoslav identity was based on a worker as a political (civic) and economic subject rather than ethnic, on a man engaged and active rather than passive and alienated. Correspondent constitutional changes and reforms included therefore a transfer of every sphere of social organization to the worker under the slogan 'brotherhood and unity'. It was indeed a unique radical move whereby decentralization diffused state power in the political, economic, and social sphere to the society. Self-management, as the motor and medium of the 'withering away of the state' meant that the decision-making authority was now in the hands of the working class, its councils, municipalities, and constituent republics, evolving the representative structure at all levels and sections of Yugoslav state. Through this claimed politicization of the whole society, the CPY as the government, rather than losing power, solidified its status and legitimacy.¹¹⁵ In this way, the Yugoslav experiment that was arguably a remarkable combination of old and new ideas, of adaptation, trial and error, of theory and practice, pursued in an everchanging interaction between leadership and people, was effective and a success.

Embodiment of the theory, practice, and ideology of Yugoslav socialism, self-management pursued its own path, not only different from Western capitalism but substantially divergent from the centralized (state-planning) model of communist rule in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries. Any attempt to describe it as a social formation that utilised elements of both would seem a pick-n-mix approach, combining elements of both communism (introduction of different social relations, different types of properties, abolition of private land property, domination of labour over capital, establishment of the basic health, social, educational infrastructure and more access to all people) and capitalism (introduction of market elements,

¹¹⁵ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 107-129, 124.

managerial domination over workers), misses its character as radical socialism.¹¹⁶

As Oklopcic has put it, Yugoslavia ‘was a unique socio-political enterprise that incarnated the success of national, social and geopolitical struggles for emancipation’.¹¹⁷ Rather than saying it contained elements of both the western market economy and the centrally planned economies following the Soviet model, as well as elements of a multicultural federal state, self-management was a unique, radical and experimental empirical method with no previous record of success. It decentralized economic management and established a socialist free economy where decisions, including foreign trade policy, were reached and carried out by the workers themselves as the communal subject and through council representation, without political pressure. This was indeed a social ownership of collective producers - a direct democracy based on social capital, whereby enterprises created and managed value, as well as shared in the creation and distribution of profits as participants in a competitive (socially-minded) market.

In the next part of the thesis, I turn to how self-management, as the *modus operandi* of socialist Yugoslavia, was reflected not only at home but in its foreign policy. Kardelj captured this when saying that ‘self-management is not something peculiar to Yugoslavia’ but a response to particular national and international situation at a time.¹¹⁸ It is a rule in the advancement of socialism and diverse only in its form, scope and character. He continued that

...the idea of self-management is as old as the idea of humanism... a culmination of man’s eternal aspirations for freedom and free creativity, for mastery over the objective laws of nature and society, for a better life [in an age of great

¹¹⁶ Macesich described main characteristic of the Yugoslav system as that of ‘heterogeneity’, a system which borrowed freely from eastern, western, and domestic experiences for ideas. George Macesich, ‘Major Trends in the Post-War Economy of Yugoslavia Revisited’ in Wayne S Vucinich (ed), *At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective* (New York: Social Science Monographs Inc. 1982) 13; Damachi and others, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1982) 6-7.

¹¹⁷ Oklopcic, ‘The Promises and Failures of Triple Struggle’ in Eslava and others, *Bandung, the Global South and International Law* (2017) 276.

¹¹⁸ Kardelj, *Self-management in Yugoslavia* (1977) 10.

interdependence of society and mankind]. Such ideas and aspirations have been manifested in a variety of forms in the world, in the many struggles [in all the socialist revolutions]... to achieve freedom of labour and of the individual.¹¹⁹

In the next chapter I explore how principles of self-management became inspiration for the foremost legal concept in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. I look at how Yugoslavia, as it pursued legitimation worldwide, enabled its egalitarian engagement under conditions of peace and independence in world order by way of nonalignment. Indeed, the (re)invention of the nation-state – aiming to affirm and to protect national sovereignty, national security and to seek the state's international standing – was followed by laying out global networks which eventually ensued in Yugoslavia's leading role in NAM. It was a way of advancing co-operation and openness and promoting solidarity at home and abroad. In this sense, self-management was internationalised in nonalignment. It did so by showcasing abroad its vision of self-determination and direct democracy through decentralisation and as means for international cooperation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic setup of any state.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 9-10.

CHAPTER 4

Local and International: Rise of Nonalignment and the Non-Aligned Movement (1960s-1970s)

...since non-alignment belongs to humanity as a whole, the interest for its future should be a universal one. For it is considered not only as an organised political force but also as a 'World Conscience'. It is a moral force which should in every moment of its activities take care of the oppressed ones and of a just and equal regulation of international problems.¹

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter I introduce the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) as a global experiment, characterised as a critical geopolitical project. Comprised of a heterogeneous group of nation-states, NAM aspired to create a fruitful alternative model of international organisation through peaceful coexistence and solidarity. I examine the rise of this radical international political and socio-economic constellation of energies amidst the conditions of the post-WWII international system. International politics in the context of the 1950s and 1960s justifiably opened opportunities for a more egalitarian society without colonialism and favouritisms of one's racial, cultural and governmental model and provided a space for emancipatory politics. Addressing these, NAM became not only one of the most radical state-centric resistance movements to the two superpowers, but the most influential alternative social reality and model of governance. The Movement comprised of 55 percent of the world's population, garnering more than 100 member countries, with most from the Third World or the Global South.² The role and

¹ Tito in Hans Köchler (ed), *The Principles of Non-Alignment: The Non-aligned Countries in the Eighties - Results and Perspectives* (London: International Progress Organisation and Third World Centre 1982) 3.

² Nearly two-thirds of its members were UN members.

drive of NAM was in stark contrast and an effective challenge to the Cold War division into blocs and its threat to global peace.

I analyse NAM's conception and genealogy and examine nonalignment as the Movement's radical conceptual framework through the local lens. I reconstruct NAM's reasons and circumstances within which one such international cooperation was possible to imagine and emerge as well as the aims and objectives in its formative years. I consider NAM's history lying amidst complex events in the international legal order and under the covers of a vast body of texts, images and relationships. Due to the sheer volume of information on NAM, its overall complexity, longevity and geographical vastness, the scope of this doctoral project grants me to focus my research through the small, but by no means insignificant, lens of Yugoslavia. To enrich, (re)build and evaluate NAM's history and relevance, I look beyond its heterogeneity, if only for a brief moment. In order to do this, I zoom in vertically from the 'global' to the particular, the 'local', and then seek to understand its place within the 'global' (in chapter 5). I concentrate on Yugoslavia given its role in NAM and its geopolitical position and ideological uniqueness that played an integral part in shaping the understanding and practice of self-determination. According to Rajak, this is valuable as

positioned on the fault line between two competing Cold War ideological and military alliances, and entangled in ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, the Balkan region offers a particularly interesting case for the study of the global Cold War system [and NAM in particular].³

In preceding chapters I introduced Yugoslavia's post-WWII reconstruction at home in a country on the fringes of Europe, liberated from fascist occupation by its own resistance forces, and emerged a dissident yet sovereign after WWII. Its radical experimentalism of the concept and practice of self-management became the centre of the restorative project at home. Its impact was all-encompassing, affecting every aspect of society (be it political,

³ Svetozar Rajak, 'From Regional Role to Global Undertakings: Yugoslavia in the Early Cold War' in Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds), *The Balkans in the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2017) xix.

judicial, economic, social, cultural or educational policy). Yugoslav revolutionaries, theoreticians, politicians, and diplomats had a particular vision for the country's (re)establishment, modernization and its international standing. After enacting self-determination by (re)inventing state identity at home through the 'new road to communism', their task became to protect the sovereignty of Yugoslavia from external interventions, crucial especially after the break with the Soviets in 1948. I demonstrated the Yugoslav shift toward nonaligned policy, characterised as equidistant between the East and the West and as active engagement globally. Yugoslav understanding of nonalignment was seated in its own vision of independence and sovereignty that resulted from crises with both blocs. As I show in this chapter, the pursuit of its 'own path' at home ultimately led to a substantive cooperation and solidarity with the newly independent African and Asian countries.

I focus in this chapter on the global implication and impact of the Yugoslav model of governance through its concept and practice of self-management. Yugoslavia's use of 'soft power' and its promotion of self-management abroad in the form of nonalignment profoundly affected the international legal and political order during the Cold War era. Namely, self-management's vision of self-determination and direct democracy through decentralisation was showcased abroad as a way of affirming national sovereignty and as means for international cooperation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic setup of any state. What my examination reveals is a dialectical relationship between Yugoslavia's domestic policy of self-management and nonalignment as NAM's organisational concept and Yugoslavia's foreign policy central pillar. Namely, the successful formation of self-management as a concept and its legal beginnings to secure an independent 'third path' at home becomes concomitantly a prelude for the conceptualisation of its foreign policy of nonalignment. Thus, I argue, self-management was (through its principles) internationalised in nonalignment.

4.2. New Approaches and Perspectives: (Third World) Alliance in the Non-Aligned Movement

When considering (reasons for) NAM's emergence, the objective is to capture how the 'spirit of time' (*Zeitgeist*) allowed for such a visionary political project to flourish. To this end, I situate the origins and formation of NAM first, within the wider context of the political, legal, economic and social issues of the mid-twentieth century, second, among extensive travels and diplomatic visits and third, in the context of the long genealogy of radical alternative international conferences from the 1940s onward. Insight into its historical context and relations among states operating within those circumstances seems valuable for two reasons. As Rajak and Rakove observed, despite its 'historical uniqueness and significance, remarkably little has been written about its origins'.⁴ Arguably this comes down also to its heterogenous conceptual character and diverse behaviour of the member-states that makes it complex to analyse the Movement as a whole or indeed, classify the entire ontology of NAM, its varieties of thought and actions in one thesis. Furthermore, NAM as a state-based resistance in the international legal order came into being at a point in history with a new kind of global interconnectedness. As it emerged into an intricate form of internationality of particular intensiveness, encapsulating the constellation of energies and their impact, representing an alternative in the process of change of the (local and) global events before and around the Belgrade meeting is important for a more comprehensive understanding and fuller appreciation of its significance.

⁴ With notable exception being standard accounts by Jansen and Rubinstein, and Vitalis's article on the relationship between Belgrade and the preceding Bandung Conference. Godfrey H Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (London: Faber 1966); Alvin Z Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970); Robert Vitalis, 'The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong)' 2013 (4) 2 *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 261-288; Svetozar Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment' 2014 (16) 1 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 146-179, 146; Robert B Rakove, 'Two roads to Belgrade: The United States, Great Britain, and the First Nonaligned Conference' 2014 (14) 3 *Cold War History* 337-357, 338.

First, many events in the 1950s and the 1960s influenced and had a significant effect on NAM's creation. The two decades were notable for US military interventions, direct or indirect interferences, such as the direct involvement in the Iran coup (1953), in Latin America,⁵ Africa,⁶ and in South-East Asia,⁷ and perhaps the most (in)famous being the US-organised assault against Cuba (April 1961). 1956 was marked by the Suez Canal crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary.⁸ In the late 1950s the Cold War tensions escalated and the nuclear catastrophe threat was renewed. While Khrushchev and Eisenhower did talk on 25 September 1959 at Camp David (Maryland, USA) of a possibility of some concessions regarding the crisis in Berlin and its occupational status (1958-1961), the American U2 CIA spy-plane being shot down over the Soviet air space in May 1960 rendered the planned Paris summit impossible. It was a crushing blow to any possibility of a 'peaceful coexistence' between the two superpowers. It happened only weeks before the 1961 Belgrade Conference and mere days before Khrushchev broke the

⁵ For example, the elected president of Guatemala Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was overthrown by CIA in 1954 and replaced by a dictator Carlos Castillo Armas. Other incidents include coups in El Salvador (1960), in Ecuador (1961), in Brazil (1962), and in Dominican Republic (1963).

⁶ For instance, the Congo Crisis of 1960-1961. For an account of the overthrow and assassination of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba that brought out different responses by Nkrumah, Nasser and Nehru governments respectively, see Jeffrey James Byrne, 'Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment' 2015 (37) 5 *The International History Review* 912-932, 918. See also AY, 837, I-2/12: Record of a discussion between Tito and Nehru concerning the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting and the issue of the Congo (New York, 28 September 1960); 'UAR to Withdraw Troops' *New York Times* (8 December 1960) 4; 'Nehru Calls for a Strong UN' *Christian Science Monitor* (18 February 1961) 2.

⁷ Such as the (armed) interventions in Laos (1954) and Vietnam (1961-1975).

⁸ In support of Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis, Yugoslavs argued that UNSC failed 'to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' and used the 1950 UN Resolution 377 (the Uniting for Peace) prerogative that gives UNGA the ability to take over the SC's responsibilities. As a result, the British and the French vetoes were circumvented, and their troops removed with diplomacy of the UN Emergency Force. See UNGA Res 377 (V), 'Uniting for Peace' (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377(V); Peter Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter 1978) 4.

US-USSR nuclear test moratorium (November 1958-1 September 1961).⁹ All of these testify to the tense and rapidly changing international atmosphere.

Second, international interest in the Third World, be it by the West, the East or indeed, by Yugoslavia, was nothing new in the 1950s. The significance of extensive travels and diplomatic visits exchanged between many the charismatic leaders is acknowledged across literature, testifying to representatives of the highest level travelling to potentially gain partners in the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia. For instance, on his way to the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, the President Abdul Gamal Nasser of the United Arab Republic (1918 - 1970) visited Burma and India in April 1955. The Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India (1889 - 1964) and the Prime Minister of Burma (or the President of the Government of the Burmese Union) U Nu (1907 - 1995) visited Moscow early in 1955. The Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) and the Minister of Defence and Premier of the Soviet Union Nikolai Bulganin (1895-1975) toured South Asia in late November and December of 1955 to visit India, Burma and Afghanistan. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the parliament) Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982) toured Africa in February 1961 (at the same time as Tito). The Premier of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) visited ten states as he travelled across Africa between 13 December 1963 and 5 February 1964, among others UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. American engagement was instigated during the Truman administration.¹⁰ The British approach toward the 'Rest' was motioned afresh with the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' policy.¹¹ This active interest was shared by Yugoslavia also and it did indeed become a focal point for emergence of NAM.

⁹ With the Western armed forces refusing to leave their part of the city, the Communist East German authorities began building the Berlin Wall (13 August 1961 - 9 November 1989). See Rakove, 'Two roads to Belgrade' (2014) 337-357, 339.

¹⁰ See the US President Harry S Truman's inaugural address to the Congress on 20 January 1949.

¹¹ See the UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's 'Wind of Change' speech to the Parliament of South Africa on 3 February 1960.

All this renewed interest for ‘periphery’ proved that empire and imperialism did not end with political independence of that ‘periphery’.¹² In the aftermath of the decolonisation process of the early 1960s a different kind of ‘competition’ for influence in new sovereignties resurged between major Cold War players.¹³ The capitalist US and former Western colonisers, and the communist USSR, China and Cuba, all competed (yet again) for influence and control mostly of Africa.¹⁴ This time, instead of direct colonial

¹² W M Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The imperialism of decolonization’ 1994 (22) 3 *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 462-511.

¹³ See, for instance, Wolfgang Sachs, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed Books 2010); Sundhya Pahuja, *Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011); Luis Eslava, *Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015); Jennifer L Beard, *The Political Economy of Desire: International Law, Development and the Nation State* (London, New York: Routledge-Cavendish 2007).

¹⁴ Needless to say, such ‘competition’ for influence was not a new phenomenon in/after the mid-20th century decolonisation process. It goes as far back as to the 16/18th century Latin America with wars against the French and Spanish empires. During the 19th century [1870-1900] process of ‘scramble for Africa’, almost all continent was divided and put under control of the European states (Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal). In the 20th century interwar period, starting with the 1918 Paris Peace Conference, the territories of the Ottoman Empire and of the German colonies were redivided yet again. All this goes, of course, beyond the scope of the present thesis. See for example, Luis Eslava, ‘The Developmental State: Independence, Dependency and the History of the South’ in Jochen von Bernstorff and Philipp Dann (eds), *The Battle for International Law: South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019); Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘Petitioning the International: A ‘Pre-history’ of Self-determination’ 25 (2) 2014 *The European Journal of International Law* 497-523.

The post-WWII competition between the USSR and China became known as the ‘shadow Cold War’. See Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 2015); Pieter Lessing, *Africa's Red Harvest* (London: Michael Joseph 1962); Emmanuel John Levi, *The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists and Africa* (London: Pall Mall 1967); Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010); Radoslav A Yordanov, *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2017); Christopher Stevens, *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (London: Macmillan 1976). For Cuba’s involvement in Africa see Robert J McMahon (ed), *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013); Odd Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press 2003).

subjugation, this proved an attempt to replace political with economic domination. As Robert and Elizabeth Bass wrote poignantly:

*The colonial powers... had to abandon the application of force, once the classical method of colonialism. Instead, they now pursue[d] an indirect policy intended to enfeeble the national liberation movements... by preventing the formation of truly independent states and by crippling the development of truly viable economies with deceitful offers of economic assistance.*¹⁵

With Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' declaration, self-determination became one of the guiding principles in the post-WWI settlement. However, and as seen in the Introduction of this thesis, not many non-Western states were granted the required 'standard of civilisation' in the decolonisation process. The 19th century legal doctrine to reach the 'standard of statehood' and pursue political independence remained universal and achievable only in theory. It was Leninist vision that was implemented instead.

Thus, formation of alliances outside the two blocs, to the point of personal friendships, was of particular importance. An analysis of the above-mentioned extensive travels by leaders of the world's 'periphery' in the 1950s highlights a valuable element to our understanding on how and why the coalition of the nonaligned came to be formed. Irrespective of the form, their gatherings were in general full of optimism and encouragement and provided an opportunity to highlight the grievances of colonialism, racial discrimination, imperialism and neo-colonialism. They represented a quest for independence and a desire to retain the sovereignty and freedom of decision in domestic and international affairs. It is interesting to observe these travels with a focus on Yugoslavia. Nasser visited Yugoslavia in July 1956, July 1958, June 1960, and in August 1961. The Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India (1889 - 1964) visited Belgrade in July 1955 and in July 1956.

Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to Belgrade in May and in June 1955 to formally re-establish diplomatic relations with Tito. Nehru and U Nu also

¹⁵ Robert and Elizabeth Bass, 'Eastern Europe' in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed), *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1964) 113.

stayed in Belgrade in June 1955, less than a week after Khrushchev left. Tito returned the visit to Moscow on 20 June 1956 with the attempt at reconciliation, already discussed in chapter 3. The visit signalled the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation as the two declared that the conditions of Socialist development are different in different countries and agreed that cooperation can be achieved in complete freedom of will and equality of any individual country.¹⁶ Churchill's foreign Secretary Anthony Eden also visited Yugoslavia to meet with Tito in September 1952.¹⁷ All these show Yugoslavia being very much a part of travels by leaders.

However, and third, if the major influence on NAM's official start in 1961 is being credited to extensive travels and diplomatic visits of states' leaders in the 1950s, how can this account reconcile with those assigning the Movement a much longer history?¹⁸ In their respective struggles for liberation, the 'Asians and Africans as oppressed people, joined forces [already] in the first half of the 20th century by forming several pre-Bandung organizations'.¹⁹ The Belgrade Summit was arguably part of a long genealogy of radical alternative international conferences from as early as 1940s, all already adding to a growing body of diplomatic rules of engagement for the Global

¹⁶ See Rajak's account on extensive talk resulting in signing the Declaration on Relations Between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, 1953-1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation* (PhD Thesis at London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London 2004) 244-246.

¹⁷ John Young, 'Talking to Tito: the Eden visit to Yugoslavia, September 1952' 1986 (12) 1 *Review of International Studies* 31-41.

¹⁸ Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (1966) 115; Carsten Rauch, *Farewell Non-Alignment? Constancy and Change of Foreign Policy in Post-colonial India* (Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 2008) 2-3; N Parameshwaran Nair, 'Nonalignment: History, Ideology, Prospects' in Kotta P Karunakaran (ed), *Outside the Contest: A Study of Non-Alignment and the Foreign Policies of some Non-aligned Countries* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House 1963) 51-52.

¹⁹ N'Dri Therese Assie-Lumumba, 'Behind and beyond Bandung: historical and forward-looking reflections on south-south cooperation' 2015 (2) 11 *Bandung: Journal of the Global South* 1-10.

South.²⁰ In the 1950s, alliances between the most prominent world leaders from the Global South started to form.

For instance, the post-war Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, India (23 March - 2 April 1947) 'signalled emergence of Asia in the world arena'.²¹ At the first Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, Burma (6 - 15 January 1953) was arguably a precursor to the 1955 Bandung Conference. Hope for the foundation of a 'Third Force' was expressed. Yugoslav delegates and Tito's closest aides Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Aleš Bebler and Anotelko Blažović were present. At the Colombo Conference in Sri Lanka (28 April - 2 May 1954) the so-called Colombo Powers (Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, India and Pakistan) met to discuss predominantly regional matters. Pakistan emphasized its constant conflict with India on the Kashmir issue and Ceylon on dangers of communism. Burma was focused on economic issues and India on bringing harmony in its relations with China. Indonesia suggested for an Afro-Asian conference that resulted in the Bandung Conference a year later. Colombo coincided with the Panchheel Treaty of India (29 April 1954). *Pancheel*, meaning Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, was signed by Nehru and the first Premier of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai (1898 – 1976) and formed the basis for the relationship between the two countries.²²

The most prominent meeting at that time was the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia (18 - 24 April 1955). Called on 29 December 1954 by recently independent states that formed Colombo Powers, Bandung brought together 29 representatives of the former colonial territories in April 1955 who, asserting their independence, for the first time without any Western Powers discussed peace, the role of the Third World in the Cold War, decolonisation, and development. Building upon the *Pancheel*, participants

²⁰ For a commendable, detailed account see Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Past and Pending Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017).

²¹ Yuri Alimov, *The Rise and Growth of the Non-aligned Movement* (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1987) 28-29.

²² Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 7.

condemned colonialism and imperialism, and adopted a ten-point ‘declaration on the promotion of world peace and cooperation’.²³

The second Asian Socialist Conference was held in Bombay, India (November 1956). The so-called All-African People’s Conference met three times (5 -13 December 1958, 25 - 30 January 1960, 26 - 31 March 1961). The conference was proposed by Ugandan John Kale (April 1958), to represent positions of ethnic communities, anti-colonial political parties, African organizations and Labour Unions. Delegates of more than 300 political and trade union leaders representing Africans in 28 states met in Accra in December at the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah. They advocated that Africa, grabbed by colonialism, should be returned to its peoples. Nationalist leaders were encouraged to organise political independence movements, a nonviolent revolution and end to economic exploitation. It represented a pursuit for Nkrumah’s Pan-African cause, to unite and to achieve political, cultural, and economic integration at the continental level.

The African Conference on the Rule of Law was held in Lagos, Nigeria (3 - 7 January 1961) to discuss the possibility of African governments adopting an African Convention of Human Rights. Sponsored by the International Commission of Jurists. One of the main conclusions of its Resolution, known as the Law of Lagos, was that dignity of a person is a universal concept. Although ratified only in 1986, it is a testimony to the enthusiasm of judges, practicing lawyers and law teachers to develop the rule of law and establish human rights protection mechanism on the continent.²⁴

Nkrumah’s pursuit for the politics of Pan-Africanism resulted in the formation of two ideological groupings, the Casablanca Group (7 January 1961) and the Monrovia Group (8 - 12 May 1961). Leaders of the more activist, radical and left-oriented Casablanca Group (Guinea, Ghana, Mali) and more conservative Monrovia Group (the entire Brazzaville community

²³ For fascinating accounts on the Conference see Eslava and others, *Bandung* (2017).

²⁴ The conference Report is available at <<https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/1961/06/Africa-African-Conference-Rule-of-Law-conference-report-1961-eng.pdf>> accessed 7 June 2018.

with Ethiopia and Somalia, formed on 19 December 1960, merged again at the Conference in Addis Ababa (25 May 1963). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, with Pan-Africanism (a solidarity among African peoples) as the guiding philosophy. Interestingly, the requirement for its 32 member states was to be nonaligned.²⁵

Indeed, it is inherently a challenging task to trace the evolution of any idea with precision and if complexities of NAM's origins are ignored, too quickly a 'long history' can be assigned to it.²⁶ For instance, Kardelj proposed that NAM was not a simple reaction to Cold War but an 'expression of a long-term sociohistorical tendency of modern humanity' coming to the fore way before WWII.²⁷ The Yugoslav ambassador Dimče Belovski, however, traced the 'historical roots' of nonalignment to lie in the anti-colonial struggles of the new nations during WWII.²⁸

All three points speak to inconclusiveness (in debates) of NAM's roots. The relative lack of writing on NAM, be it due to dependency on the sources in a particular member state or overall diversity of debates within the Movement as a whole contribute to a recognition that rather than a singular point of origin, the movement arose due to a variety of concomitant socio-political and legal factors, occurrences and events. Therefore, its foundation is disputed, contested and authors disagree as to what was or ought to be considered as the founding moment of the coalition of the nonaligned. By some authors, its beginnings are assigned to the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung (1955), Rangoon (1953), and even India's foreign policy of the

²⁵ For a detailed account see Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki and Marco Wyss, 'Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War' 2015 (37) 5 *The International History Review* 901-911.

²⁶ The concept of 'longue durée' comes to mind here: a historical writing or perspective on history that extends deep into the past shaped by human action over extended periods of time and focuses on the long-standing and imperceptibly slowly changing relationships. Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 2.

²⁷ Edvard Kardelj, *Zgodovinske Korenine Neuvrščenosti [Historical Roots of Nonalignment]* (Beograd: ČZP Komunist 1978) 3.

²⁸ Dimče Belovski in A W Singham (ed), *The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics* (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co 1977) 6-7.

1940s.²⁹ For example, Cecil Crabb Jr, Robert Niebuhr, Christopher Waters, Carsten Rauch, Akhil Gupta, Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P Sauvant, assigned/traced origins of NAM to the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955.³⁰ An Indonesian diplomat Soedjatmoko supported such claim by recording in his memoir that Bandung which he had attended as a young man was the ascent for nonalignment.³¹ Furthermore, NAM Declaration of the 17th Summit in Venezuela (17-18 September 2016) also held that its origins were ‘enshrined in Bandung’.³² Keethaponcalan, while pointing out that Bandung Conference was not about nonalignment, nevertheless concluded that the expressed idea of ‘solidarity and the spirit of cooperation’ together with a ‘desire to stay out of the superpower rivalry’ was already present.³³

Others contend that although many of the Bandung ideas seemed present in Belgrade, the two gatherings were very different.³⁴ Thus, it remains

²⁹ Communique of the Asian-African or Bandung Conference (18-24 April 1955) is held in the Archives of Yugoslavia. The folder also holds the Position paper by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru and by the Egyptian Premier Nasser, as well as the Yugoslav appraisal of Bandung, Tito’s statement to Radio Belgrade, and the Yugoslav correspondents’ observations concerning the Conference. See AY, 837, I-4-e/1.

³⁰ Cecil V Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (New York: Praeger 1965) 3; Robert Niebuhr, ‘Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc Politics’ 2011 (13) 1 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 146-179, 164; Christopher Waters, ‘After Decolonization: Australia and the Emergence of the Non-aligned Movement in Asia, 1954–55’ 2001 (12) 2 *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 153-174; Rauch, *Farewell Non-Alignment?* (2008) 3; Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P Sauvant (eds), *The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana 1978) xxxi; Akhil Gupta, ‘The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism’ 1992 (7) 1 *Cultural Anthropology* 63-79; Assie-Lumumba, ‘Behind and beyond Bandung’ (2015) 1-10.

³¹ Soedjatmoko, ‘Non-Alignment and Beyond’ in U S Bajpai (ed), *Non-Alignment: Perspectives and Prospects* (New Delhi: Lancers 1983) 61. For a similar argument see Dragan Bogetić and Ljubodrag Dimić, *Beogradska Konferencija Nesvrstanih Zemalja 1-6 Septembra 1961: Prilog Istoriji Trećeg Sveta [Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries 1-6 September 1961: Addition to the History of the Third World]* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva 2013) 142-148.

³² The Final Document of the 17th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement (17-18 September 2016).

³³ S I Keethaponcalan, ‘Reshaping the Non-Aligned Movement: Challenges and Vision’ 2016 (3) 1 *Bandung: Journal of the Global South* 1-14, 2-3.

³⁴ Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York, London: The New Press 2007) 95-104; David Milne, ‘Ideology, Race and Nonalignment in US Cold War Foreign Relations or How the Cold War Racialized Neutralism Without Neutralizing Race’ in Bevan Sewell and Scott Lucas (eds), *Challenging US Foreign Policy:*

problematic to portray the Belgrade Summit as an expansion or even a direct successor of Bandung. Journalist Godfrey H Jansen was the first to disassociate the two conferences in his excellent account on the topic.³⁵ Scholar Lorenz Lüthi indicated that it is ‘still [a] prevalent misconception’ to equate, even confuse, nonalignment and Afro-Asianism.³⁶ Jeffrey James Byrne identified such impression results from overlapping programs and memberships:

...in reality, Afro-Asianism was based on geography and anti-imperialism, and non-alignment on bloc-free status in the Cold War. Many participants in the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung were aligned - for example the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey - and thus automatically excluded from the sibling movement. The two movements not only emerged from different political and intellectual contexts (even if they both have roots in Nehruvian thinking) but also followed clashing trajectories. ...by the early 1960s, the often conflated siblings had become vicious rivals for allegiance in the emerging global south... [NAM became] a geopolitical project distinct from, and to some degree competitive with, the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.³⁷

Indeed, scholars such as Nataša Mišković, Jeffrey James Byrne, Rinna Kullaa, Fred Singleton, Peter Willetts, Godfrey H Jansen, John R Lampe and Robert Vitalis agreed it is a misconception to assign the Afro-Asian Conference as the start of NAM.³⁸ According to them, nonalignment as a

America and the World in the Long Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2011); Westad, *The Global Cold War* (2011).

³⁵ For a detailed discussion see ‘Chapter XVII: Bandung Versus Belgrade’ in Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (1966). See also Jamie Mackie, *Bandung, 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet 2005).

³⁶ Lorenz M Lüthi, ‘Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism’ 2016 (7) *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 201-223, 201.

³⁷ Byrne, ‘Beyond Continents’ (2015) 914.

³⁸ Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boškovska (eds), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade* (Abingdon: Routledge 2014); Byrne, ‘Beyond Continents’ (2015) 912-932; Rinna Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (I.B. Tauris 2012) 13, 11-17; Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (London: Macmillan 1976) 178; Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 3; Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (1966) chapter IX; John R Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country*

coherent set of ideas was only recognised in 1961 and thus marked Belgrade as NAM's beginning instead. What could arguably be considered Belgrade's predecessor was at most the Brioni (or Brijuni) meeting of 19 July 1956 (see below: Brioni get-together).

What does begin to emerge is a better understanding of the main motivations to form NAM. The two primary reasons igniting its formation were, first, the existence of the Cold War prompting alignment with the (military) blocs and second, the decolonisation process. With regards to the first, NAM's emergence was a result of the aspiration for emancipation of fragile yet ambitious sovereigns.³⁹ The immediate post-WWII era was dominated by the reality, rhetoric and a particular diplomatic philosophy that formed foreign policy of Cold War's two main actors, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The two rival social systems and ideologies emerged as distinct powers, 'converting allies into rivals and then into enemies'.⁴⁰ It was a bipolar world with conflict in power relations operating on two, but parallel levels. On the level of national power, that was the US versus the USSR, and on the level of moral or ideological principles, that was democracy versus communism, and whereby the latter was of value only if it coincided with the former.⁴¹ Akhil Gupta, focused in his research on the anthropology of the state and of development, contended that 'superpower conflict and direct military [or otherwise] intervention were grave external threats to the nationalistic goals of preserving and consolidating their independence'.⁴² As strong interest in 'peripheral' nations (the Third World) during the decolonisation process never entirely receded, these events only highlighted [for them] the fragility of their newly gained sovereignty. It therefore seems natural for

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000) 272; Vitalis, 'The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah' (2013) 261-288.

³⁹ Leo Mates, 'Nonalignment and the Great Powers' 1970 (48) 3 *Foreign Affairs* 525-536, 525.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 525.

⁴¹ Hans Morgenthau and K Thompson (eds), *Principles and Problems of International Politics: Selected Readings* (New York: Alfred A Knopf 1950) 293; Frederick Schuman, *International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill 1969) 63.

⁴² Gupta, 'The Song of the Nonaligned World' (1992) 65.

NAM to emerge as a product of its rising tensions and a reaction to resist the Cold War's formalised alliances or alignments and antagonisms. Yet, to assign motivation for NAM's emergence only to sheer timidity seems unlikely considering NAM as a new element in international relations 'had an important... influence upon the behaviour of the great powers'.⁴³ As a product of the Cold War's rising tensions, it proved a challenge to the imperialist system and domination of both capitalist and communist states in international relations.⁴⁴ Indeed, NAM's emergence was a result of the desire to stay out of this particular conflict and to preserve as much freedom in decisions and behaviour as possible. This coincides with observers who assigned NAM's emergence to self-interest of its respective members, whereby nonalignment was a 'pragmatic necessity', not only to stay out of the bipolar rivalry but to gain from it as well.⁴⁵

With regards to the second, NAM was not just a reaction to or a product of the Cold War rivalry, or indeed a necessity of a 'third set' of states to resist taking sides with the two Great Powers and their respective allies, but also of anticolonial struggles. Namely, the aftermath of post-WWII dissolution of the European and Japanese empires and the natural impulse of the anti-colonial movements in the subject countries prompted anti-colonial and anti-imperialist currents to conflate on a global stage.⁴⁶ Indeed, an explanation of the origins of NAM is impossible without considering the global process of decolonization in the 1950s and the 1960s. The genesis, journey and transformation of colonial territories from being a dependent imperial possession into an independent sovereign nation-state was often marked with wars and accompanied by armed struggle. At the same time, the post-WWII international system, being neither a static nor rigid structure, provided a space for emancipatory politics. The circumstances of the international order

⁴³ Mates, 'Nonalignment and the Great Powers' (1970) 525.

⁴⁴ Ranko Petković, *Non-Alignment: An Independent Factor in the Democratisation of International Relations* (Beograd: Socialist Thought and Practice 1979) 5.

⁴⁵ Jai Nandan Prasad Singh, *Redefining Roles of Non-Aligned Movement in Unipolar World* (Delhi: Academic Excellence 2006).

⁴⁶ See the *Introduction* in Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014).

justifiably gave the impression that opportunities for a more egalitarian society without colonialism and favouritisms of one cultural and governmental model over another are possible. This loomed large in the minds of the first generation of leaders and had a profound influence on their political expression with their overall approach to international affairs testifying to these events and changes.⁴⁷ Therefore, they perceived NAM's emergence as a non-military initiative to safeguard their territorial integrity, affirm autonomy and retain the status of equality and respect that was acknowledged by gaining UN membership. In 1960, following the fifteenth UNGA session, seventeen newly independent states were admitted to the UN: Cameroon, Togo, Mali, Senegal, Malagasy Republic (now Madagascar), Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Republic of Dahomey (now Benin), Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, The Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Mauritania.⁴⁸

Furthermore, and according to Kardelj, nonalignment was an aspiration in states' active fight for 'complete national freedom', including the right to development according to the individual nation's choice.⁴⁹ NAM stood in support of countries' diverse political, historical and cultural heritage at home and influenced their actions when seeking 'another way' at the global stage.⁵⁰ Their desire was to develop their own independent forms of governing, economic and social development and not automatically become involved as a subject in rivalries of the two power blocs. NAM was to protect from the imposition of liberation, advancement, democratization and exploitation from outside. In support of imagining alternative social realities and models of government, NAM was to have an influence in development of postcolonial international relations. NAM differed from other models of international

⁴⁷ Mates, 'Nonalignment and the Great Powers' (1970) 525.

⁴⁸ See the UNGA Res 1514 (XV), 15th sess, 947th plen mtg, 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' (14 December 1960) which, by stating that all peoples have a right to self-determination, sped up the progress of already present decolonization process in Africa, Asia, the Americas and the Pacific.

⁴⁹ Kardelj, *Historical Roots* (1978) 3.

⁵⁰ However, and as will be seen in chapter 5, their particular ways eventually brought disunity and weakness to the Movement as a whole.

cooperation based on emancipatory ideologies for state identity formation and cooperation, such as Négritude, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism emerging from 1950s. Instead, vision (Tito's vision) to form and promote a non-racially defined group of states, made NAM an exemplary case of international cooperation already in its starting point.⁵¹

Indeed, NAM did something novel. It encompassed 'not a place but a political project',⁵² resting on the idea of a 'potentially unbounded membership rather than the expression of a non-Western, non-white identity'.⁵³ Refusing coerced affiliation with any of the two power blocs, NAM became a primary organisational concept for the peripheral countries. And just as Yugoslav identity stemmed from its fight against occupation and was a product of a national liberation struggle during WWII and afterwards of the resistance to the Cold War blocs, so did NAM's identity stem from the fight against colonisation and was a product of various liberation movements for independence and for political, economic, and social sovereignty. This echoes how Yugoslav leaders attributed their choice of nonalignment to factors of the WWII Partisan resistance, the implementation of a federal system and self-management.⁵⁴ Both signalled a particular openness, one at home and the other worldwide, that arguably represents significance and potential still, when thinking about the domestic in relation to international law, politics and order at present.

⁵¹ Messay Kebede, *Africa's Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonization* (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi 2004). See also Walter D. Mignolo, 'Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing: On (De)Coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic Disobedience' 2011 (14) 3 *Postcolonial Studies* 273-283; Gustavo Lins Ribeiro, 'Why (Post)Colonialism and (De)Coloniality are not Enough: A Post-imperialist Perspective' 2011 (14) 3 *Postcolonial Studies* 285-297.

⁵² Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (2007) xv.

⁵³ Byrne, 'Beyond Continents' (2015) 912. For insightful exposition on the Soviet and the American identity shaped by the Cold War see Robert Jervis, 'Identity and the Cold War' in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010) 22-43.

⁵⁴ Nikolaos A Stavrou (ed), *Edvard Kardelj: The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment* (2nd edition, Washington DC: University Press of America 1985) 56; Lazar Mojsov, *Dimensions of Non-Alignment* (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost 1981) 147.

4.3. The Local: National Face of the Non-Aligned Movement

4.3.1. Tito's Trips: Turn to the 'Rest'

*'Is there a man in the moon?' 'No: otherwise Tito would have paid him a visit.'*⁵⁵

After WWII, projects of identity formation at home followed by laying out their global networks as observed in the case of Yugoslavia, were at the fore in many nation-states, with both global and local events influencing and having a significant effect on reasons for NAM's creation in 1961. It was thus in this global drive for identity building and diplomacy that Yugoslavia assumed a pivotal role in the process. A historical overview of pursuit to uphold its independence and maintain its diplomatic freedom discussed in chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated how such a context gave momentum for the intellectual origins of nonalignment (in Yugoslavia) to be formed. I argued that Yugoslav leaders had an internationalist idea from the very inception of the country's state project. Yugoslavia's particular 'communist/socialist' ideology prevented its full alignment with either the East or the West. At the same time, however, a strong sovereign national position shaped Yugoslav relations with countries in the East, the West, and the 'Rest' under conditions of peace and independence. Self-management and nonalignment became an integral part of a country's identity formation domestically and internationally.

In pursuit of international legitimation for its vision of self-determination and egalitarian engagement under conditions of peace and independence, Yugoslavia decided to 'distance itself from Europe and [tie] itself with practically unknown and geographically distant Africa, Asia and Latin America'.⁵⁶ Ambitious and self-assured, with a gift for organisation and

⁵⁵ Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) 124.

⁵⁶ Dragan Bogetić, 'Jugoslavija i Nesvrstanost: Prilog Prevazilaženju Predrasuda i Stereotipa [Yugoslavia and Non-Alignment: Contribution to Overcoming Prejudice and Stereotype]' 2014 (24) 4 *ANNALES Ser hist sociol* 615-624, 616. See also Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips' (2014) 173-174; Robert Niebuhr, 'Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics' 2011 (13) 1 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 146-179, 163, 171, Robert Edward Niebuhr, *The*

leadership, Tito took Yugoslavia under firm control and pursued an active and expansionist foreign policy. Yugoslav representatives were sent to countries further afield, such as India and Burma, to support communist revolutions there.⁵⁷ Tito's conviction to cooperate and discernment about the potential power of the Third World became the chief motivation behind his lengthy tours of Africa and Asia, during which, as Rajak argues, he already lobbied for the creation of NAM.⁵⁸ From 1944 to 1980 - and with the assistance of his close deputies, Vice President Edvard Kardelj, theorist and politician Milovan Đilas/Djilas and Interior Minister and chief of UDBA Aleksandar Ranković - Tito made 169 official visits to 92 countries and hosted 175 heads of state.⁵⁹ Even though considered a long period for the head of state to be away, the extensive travels of Tito proved to be of immense importance.

His itineraries reflect, first, the orientation of the government's foreign policy but also ideological convictions at a particular moment in time. For example, from 1944 to 1948 he travelled 'only' to the East: to the USSR in 1945 and 1946, to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1946, and to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in 1947. In the period between 1948 and 1953, he devoted time and effort to consolidate his political power at home, spending not a single day abroad.

Search for a Communist Legitimacy: Tito's Yugoslavia (Phd Thesis: Boston College, The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of History 2008); Gregory Otha Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism: The Relationship Between Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Socialist Yugoslavia* (PhD Thesis, Washington DC 1993) 27-40; William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987); Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World* (1970) 71-73, 328.

⁵⁷ Nataša Mišković, 'The Pre-history of the Non-Aligned Movement: India's First Contacts with the Communist Yugoslavia, 1948-50' 2009 (65) 2 *India Quarterly* 185-200, 198.

⁵⁸ Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips' (2014) 173-174. For a detailed account on Tito's travels see, for example, Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-1957* (London: Routledge 2011) 98-107; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 124.

⁵⁹ Vladimir Petrović, 'Josip Broz Tito's Summit Diplomacy in the International Relations of Socialist Yugoslavia 1944-1961' 2014 (24) 4 *Annales: Ser Hist Sociol* 578-579.

Nevertheless, close political bonds formed as a result of various consultations. For instance, during the Korean War (1950-1953), common interests and positions between India, Egypt and Yugoslavia were evident in their serving as non-permanent members of the Security Council (1950-1951).⁶⁰ The Yugoslav-Indian friendship began to form already at the third UNGA session in autumn 1948, during which the Yugoslav diplomat Aleš Bebler received an invitation from the leader of Indian delegation, diplomat and politician Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (1900-1990), to talk to Prime Minister Nehru about the possibility to establish diplomatic relations.⁶¹ It was the first time for Nehru to hear details about the political situation in Europe and about the Yugoslav battle for the national independence. Similar experiences of the struggle, national conscience and identity, coupled with aspirations in international relations were enough to prompt close cooperation between the two countries. Despite clashing conceptions on how cooperation between South-East Asian and European communists would work, the two officially declared their intention to establish diplomatic relations on 5 December 1948. In the same month Nehru received the Yugoslav trade delegation to South Asia, headed by M Mermolj and Mirko Sardelić. A bilateral trade agreement was signed, the first ever that India concluded with a foreign country, and despite competition from richer European countries for cooperation. The Yugoslavs signed a similar agreement with Pakistan and Ceylon as well.⁶²

The election of India and Yugoslavia into the UNSC in October 1949 afforded excellent opportunities to develop closer bonds during their concurrent mandate. Yugoslavia began sending some of her best diplomats to India in

⁶⁰ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 33.

⁶¹ See MIJ: KMJ I-3-b/288: Note on a talk of Aleš Bebler with the President of the Indian Government Pandit Nehru (1 November 1948).

⁶² Dragan Bogetić, 'Titovo Putovanje u Indiju i Burmu 1954-1955 i Oblikovanje Jugoslovenske Politike Nesvrstanosti [Tito's Trip to India and Burma 1954-1955 and Shaping of Yugoslav Policy of Nonalignment]' 2001 (2) *Istorija 20 Veka* 65-73; Ljubodrag Dimić, 'Titovo Putovanje u Indiju i Burmu 1954-1955. Prilog za Istoriju Hladnog Rata [Tito's Trip to India and Burma 1954-1955. A Contribution to the History of the Cold War]' 2004 (3-4) *Tokovi Istorije* 27-55; MIJ: KMJ I-3-b/288 and I-3-c/14: Reports of M Mermolj and Mirko Sardelić on the work of the FNRJ commercial delegation in Pakistan, in the Indian Union and Ceylon (3 and 14 March 1949).

1950, among them Josip Đerđa/Djerdja, Joža/i Vilfan and Aleš Bebler. Ambassadors formed personal friendships. For example, Bebler with Pandit and civil servant, jurist, diplomat and statesman Benegal Narsing Rau (1887-1953) or Vilfan with Nehru.⁶³ Numerous letters were sent to Belgrade during 1950-1951, suggesting cooperation with southeast Asia. However, as Yugoslavia was at that time receiving substantial economic and military aid from the West, the idea did not appeal to the Yugoslav government (yet). Đerđa was withdrawn from his post soon after. India too was at the time of Yugoslav-Soviet conflict not enthused to liaise with the 'Cominform rebel'.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, in 1952 Đerđa's efforts came to fruition. Kardelj instructed secretary general and the new ambassador to India Joža/i Vilfan 'to test the conditions' for cooperation with the Third World.⁶⁵ Consequently, a prominent Yugoslav delegation with Milovan Djilas, Aleš Bebler and Anotelko Blažović attended the *Asian Socialist Conference* in Rangoon, Burma, in January 1953. On return they visited India too.⁶⁶

Yugoslav focus on domestic affairs changed in 1953. Tito brought the country out of isolation and made his first trip to the West. He visited the United Kingdom between 16-23 March 1953 and travelled to Turkey and Greece in 1954.⁶⁷ As a result of Yugoslav ambassadors' initiatives in South-East Asia, especially with India and Burma, and due to easement in relations with the Soviets, Tito embarked on his first so-called Third World journey. For two and a half months (30 November 1954 - February 1955), he travelled for the

⁶³ Rajak, 'From Regional Role' in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 75; Jože Pirjevec and Božo Repe (eds), *Resistance, Suffering, Hope: The Slovene Partisan Movement 1941-1945* (Trieste: Založništvo Tržaškega Tiska 2008) 17-18.

⁶⁴ DAMSPS, str. pov., 1957, f-1, 395, Odnosi FNRJ sa Indijom in Bogetić, 'Yugoslavia and Non-Alignment' (2014) 616.

⁶⁵ AY, KPR, I-5-b, Indija, 4-5.

⁶⁶ Rajak, 'From Regional Role' in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 75. See also AY, 837, IV-1-b: Tito's interview with the Editor on Chief of 'Le Peuple' magazine Albert Hosiaux (14 April 1955); *Report of the First Asian Socialist Conference, Rangoon, 1953* (Rangoon: Asian Socialist Publication 1953).

⁶⁷ Petrović, 'Josip Broz Tito's Summit Diplomacy' (2014) 578-582; Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni Rat: Ogledi o Spoljnoj Politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974) [Yugoslavia and the Cold War: Views on the Foreign Policy of Josip Broz Tito (1944-1974)]* (Beograd: Arhipelag 2014) 71.

first time around Asia and Africa, and visited India, Burma, Ethiopia and Egypt.⁶⁸ This Tito's first ever trip to Asia in winter 1954-1955 occurred at the height of preparations for the Bandung conference, which gave him an opportunity to 'familiarise himself with Asian... culture, customs, and philosophy'.⁶⁹ India, with its geo-strategic position and its rich cultural and historical heritage was of utmost interest to Yugoslavs. According to Rajak, Tito was 'particularly eager to recruit Nehru as an ally', convinced that collaborating with a 'country as big and influential as India' would be of benefit to both.⁷⁰ What impressed the Yugoslavs was India's prominent role in the international sphere, exceeding its economic and military strength, and its particular foreign policy similar to the ideas of nonalignment.⁷¹ On return from his Asia tour, Tito passed through the Suez Canal and for the first time met Egypt's President Nasser.⁷² He also spent much time and energy to build relationships with heads of states and leading figures in anti-imperial liberation movements, such as the *African National Congress* (ANC) and the *Southwest Africa People's Organisation* (SWAPO).

In 1958, as a result also of the strained relationship with the Soviet socialist camp, the LCY adopted a new *Program* in April 1958 that stressed the importance of 'dictatorship of the (communist) proletariat' policy and

⁶⁸ The Archives of Yugoslavia hold many documents from the tour. For instance, Tito gave a speech in acceptance of an Honorary Doctorate in Law at the University of Rangoon, Burma (16 January 1955), where he addressed the international role of the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa, their contribution to the maintenance of world peace, politics and to principles of peaceful coexistence. At Suez, Nasser and Tito discussed the situation in the Middle East, the attempted break-up of the Arab League, Tito's trips to India and Burma, and positions on the international situation (5 February 1955). See AY, 837, I-2/4-2; AY, 837, I-2/4-3.

⁶⁹ Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (2011) 101.

⁷⁰ For a lengthy report on their open and trusting friendship between the two leaders see Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips' (2014) 146-179, 173-174, 177-178.

⁷¹ Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (2011) 100.

⁷² Rajak, 'From Regional Role' in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 76; Momir M Stojković, *Tito-Nehru-Naser: Nastanak i Razvoj Politike i Pokreta Nesvrstanosti [Tito-Nehru-Naser: The Origin and Development of Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement]* (Beograd, Zaječar: Radna Organizacija za Grafičko-izdavačku Delatnost Zaječar 1983).

cooperation with the Third World.⁷³ To this end, Tito embarked on his second and longest tour to Asia and Africa in 1958-1959. He travelled to Burma, India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Sudan, Ethiopia and UAR.⁷⁴ This trip confirmed Yugoslavia's already mature foreign policy and its new global role.⁷⁵ Coupled with as a response to a 'general increase in tension' between the two superpowers, it was Tito who in 1959 first suggested to hold a conference on a larger scale.⁷⁶ As many of these states were recipients of the Soviet Union's aid, the aim was to neutralise any restraints on potential allies. His visits were effective in presenting the 'dangers in forming tight relations with any of the superpowers' but was at the time less successful to persuade them to 'form a movement as a counteract to [such] hegemony'.⁷⁷ However, in subsequent years, the Yugoslav foreign policy of cooperation and peaceful coexistence attracted numerous African and Asian countries.

In the year of the first NAM summit in Belgrade (1961), Tito made his lengthiest journey to North and West Africa. By then his purpose to 'promote the idea of a conference of like-minded, radical nationalist states' was already clear.⁷⁸ The tour lasted for 72 days (13 February - 23 April), and included visiting Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and the UAR. Tito was the first communist leader that visited Latin America, touring Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico in 1963.⁷⁹ His travels continued in

⁷³ The League of Yugoslav Communists, *The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists: Adopted by the VII. Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists* (Beograd: Edition Jugoslavija 1958).

⁷⁴ The United Arab Republic (UAR) was a short-lived political union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961. After the coup d'état (28 September 1961), Syria seceded from the union, while Egypt remained known as UAR until 1971.

⁷⁵ For Tito's report before Federal Executive Council (Belgrade, 17 March 1959) on his trip to Asia and Africa see AY, 837, I-2/11.

⁷⁶ D N Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 189; Leo Mates, *Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy* (Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics and Oceana Publications 1972) 228.

⁷⁷ AY, KPR, I-2/11: A brief overview of the discussions held during visits to countries in Asia and Africa; AY, KPR, I-2/11: Report on the trip of the President of the Republic and the Yugoslav delegation to the friendly countries of Asia and Africa submitted at the Session of the Federal Executive Council on 17 March 1959 (shorthand notes).

⁷⁸ Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 12.

⁷⁹ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 92-103.

1964, when he toured India and Middle East. In 1970, on his third major African tour, he visited Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. His last major trip to the African continent was in 1979 when he visited sixteen countries.

Tito's itineraries also illustrate his devotion to personal diplomacy. He was the first non-Asian head of state in the 1960s to visit newly independent countries and the first communist leader that visited Sub-Saharan Africa.⁸⁰ In order to strengthen the Yugoslav image at home and abroad, his personal diplomacy was lavish and expensive. He travelled on his famous vessel *Galeb*,⁸¹ followed by cargo ship *Lovćen*, two destroyers and several airplanes. During his trips, Tito insisted on using luxurious cars - mostly American, including Rolls Royce convertible, Cadillac or armoured Packard. If the host country did not have any (Ghana and Mali), he would ship them from Yugoslavia. Extravagance was exercised on the African side as well. For example, Tito received a hippopotamus weighing more than a tone by the President William Tubman of Liberia. To transport it to Yugoslavia, an improvised swimming pool was built on Lovćen.⁸² The elaborate and strict protocols of international relations comprised the exchange of presents between high officials, that reflected 'national [and cultural] identity or a particular image related to it [and the narrative of economic development]'.⁸³ The official gifts to Tito on his travels are today part of the Museum of Yugoslav History collection in Belgrade, Serbia, and are a window into Tito's

⁸⁰ Ibid. 92-103.

⁸¹ Tito's yacht *Galeb*, a former maritime pride, is today sitting as a derelict in Reka, Croatia. It was to be restored as part of the European capital of culture 2020 initiative and funding. See 'Nekdaj pomorski ponos Jugoslavije ne bo več dolgo rjavel [The former maritime pride of Yugoslavia will not rust for much longer]' at <<https://www.rtvsllo.si/zabava-in-slog/zanimivosti/nekdej-pomorski-ponos-jugoslavije-ne-bo-vec-dolgo-rjavel/504097>> accessed 6 November 2019.

⁸² AY, KPR, I-2/13, K-48, a note, Accra, Organisation of the visit of the Comrade President to Guinea and Mali (1 March 1961). See Miladin Adamović, '*Galeb* Mira i Razdora: 72 Dana oko Afrike [The 'Seagull' of Peace and Discord: 72 Days Around Africa]' (Beograd: Grafoštampa 2001) 7, 35, 123; Radina Vučetić and Paul Betts (eds), *Tito in Africa: Picturing Solidarity* (Belgrade: Museum of Yugoslavia 2017) 27, 36.

⁸³ Ana D Sladojević, 'African Objects' within a Collection: Case Study of the Museum of Yugoslav History' 2016 (1) 1 *Serbian Science Today* 1-7, 3-4; H K Bhabha (ed), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge 1990).

opulent, decadent and luxurious lifestyle. Gifts offer a ‘glimpse into [his] life, freed from the ideological buffer... wrapping it during the years of his rule’.⁸⁴ Among them are gifts of high officials from Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville (PR Congo), Congo-Kinshasa (DR Congo), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, UAR, Upper Volta, and Zambia. Sladojević employed an insightful discursive analysis method to look at the gifts’ purpose, meaning and the message they conveyed. She argued they are a window into past narratives, and particularly the nonalignment narrative. By being marked contextually, the gifts can be understood as potential of cultural memory in the present.⁸⁵

Indeed, the array of political personalities of different backgrounds that met with President Tito, either in Yugoslavia or abroad, remains astonishing.⁸⁶ The exchange of high-level visits by presidents, secretaries of state, and foreign ministers during his several long voyages to Africa and Asia were fundamental in developing closer political cooperation (and socialist brotherhood) and enabled collaboration between protagonists in formulation,

⁸⁴ Smaller gifts were given to other officials and the staff, as it can be seen through detailed lists in AY. See AY, KPR I-2/13-1: Josip Broz Tito's journey to Ghana (28.2.-4.3. and 7-11.3 1961); ‘A Brochure on The Symbolic Significance of Ghana’s State Presents to His Excellency Josip Broz Tito President of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and Madame Jovanka Broz on the Occasion of their State Visit to Ghana 1961’ (11.1.-15.3. 1961).

⁸⁵ For her detailed review of documentation on museum objects see Sladojević, ‘‘African Objects’ within a Collection’ (2016) 1-7.

⁸⁶ To name some from African countries only: Ibrahim Abboud, Ahmadou Ahidjo, Ahmed Ben Bella, Jean-Bédél Bokassa, Omar Bongo, Houari Boumediene, Habib Bourguiba, Kofi Abrefa Busia, Luís Cabral, Muammar al-Gaddafi, Hassan II of Morocco, Kenneth Kaunda, Modibo Keita, Joséph Désiré Mobutu, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Marien Ngouabi, Agostinho Neto, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Sylvanus Olympio, Anwar el-Sadat, Haile Selassie I, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Moussa Traoré, William Tubman and others. Sladojević, ‘‘African Objects’ within a Collection’ (2016) 2.

promotion, and pursuit of advantageous politics of nonalignment principles.⁸⁷ All in all, the Yugoslav national cohesion, ‘sporadic’ appeal to the West and/or the East and successful contacts with the Third World had a critical contribution to NAM’s creation. Its policies contributed to what Rajak calls a ‘paradigm shift affecting the dynamics and structure of the Cold War system’. Such a (paradigm) shift was, as Perišić concurs, a vital component in Yugoslav foreign policy aimed at creating a new position globally.⁸⁸ According to Perišić,

[i]t is no exaggeration to assert that the new... policy conceptualized and inaugurated in Yugoslavia in 1950 was one of the cornerstones that enabled the creation of a socialism that was distinctly more liberal than the existing Soviet model. In the long run, it would help Yugoslavia create for itself a new position within the Cold War international system. This policy shift opened up Yugoslavia... to the West, created links with countries in and beyond Western Europe, and challenged the Soviet-type... heritage of ‘Socialist realism’. The new policy signalled Yugoslavia’s intention to find a way to improve its... life through fostering unlimited cultural, [economic] and political cooperation worldwide... that would change the image of Socialism not only in Yugoslavia but also globally.⁸⁹

Such examination of Yugoslavia as an active international actor that used soft power to advance its particular agenda in the international conduct not only enriches the representation of NAM as the global phenomenon. Its local history in relation with the East, the West and the ‘Rest’ reflects the complexity of the Cold War’s historiography and adds to an arguably forgotten (local) dimension in its narrative. It is through the study of Yugoslavia that we glean about the ways in which the dynamic of the superpower competition was distorted and critically influenced by regional

⁸⁷ Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and Non-Alignment’ (2014) 617; Rajak, ‘From Regional Role’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 76; Stojković, *Tito-Nehru-Naser* (1983).

⁸⁸ Miroslav Perišić, ‘Yugoslavia: The 1950 Cultural and Ideological Revolution’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 285, 292.

⁸⁹ Perišić, ‘Yugoslavia’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 285.

political forces and their historical legacies. Its distinct perspective on nonalignment and leading role in NAM's formation (and maintenance) was thus not only situated within its own context but also drove NAM's rise on the waves of resistance in the Third World and through Third-Worldism as a conceptual framework.

4.3.2. Yugoslav Particularism in Conceptualisation of Nonalignment and Formation of the Non-Aligned Movement

For Yugoslavia, the main impetus for the adoption of nonalignment in foreign affairs was twofold. The policy of nonalignment served the society's integrative role at home and for enhancing the country's international position.⁹⁰ The aim of contacts by prominent ambassadors and of Tito's personal diplomacy and extensive travels to African, Asian and South American countries was, first, to promote the image of Tito and Yugoslavia at home. As Yugoslavs showcased their own particular modernist ethos abroad as an accepted political, social, and cultural form, the country's transition from a hard-line Soviet-style state to a more open humanist socialist state was further legitimised and solidified at home. Extravagance reflected Tito's carefully constructed image, represented his cult of personality and consolidated his power not only at home. Coupled with personal diplomacy and activism of a charismatic leader, it furthered and strengthened mutual acquaintances and diplomatic ties abroad, solidifying the Yugoslav voice on the post-WWII international scene.

The Yugoslav foreign policy of nonalignment reflected the country's various objectives, one of them being primarily symbolic in value. Tito's visits to Africa, Asia and the Americas from 1955 onward were a testament of his awareness what potential these relations entailed. His 'exotic' diplomatic missions and friendships with leaders across the world made an impression on international audiences and he gained a reputation of a respected and powerful socialist and nonaligned leader.⁹¹ His personal charisma was

⁹⁰ See Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World* (1970) 71-73, 328.

⁹¹ Niebuhr, 'Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics' (2011) 171.

fundamental in gaining contacts worldwide. The voyages increased his self-confidence and diplomatic experience. As images of him as a glamorous gentleman flooded newspaper coverages and newsreels, Tito the marshal became, as Radina Vučetić rightly observed, a somewhat ‘political icon of the nonaligned world’.⁹² He enjoyed the status of a ‘friend of Africa’ and a ‘moderniser’ despite being a ‘white man’. Indeed, as Ana Sladojević argued, the colour of the skin was mentioned only for the purpose of reinforcing their ‘similarity and equality, [and] particularly in achieving common (socialist) goals’. Indeed, if the immediate photographs’ image might give an impression of a ‘typical colonial’, then the knowledge about the context in which they were taken reveals the opposite. Instead of portraying a (post)colonial unequal relation, they evoke sameness.⁹³ There was a possibility, as the philosopher and political theorist Achille Mbembe penned, whereby shifts in contexts can contribute to disappearance of implicit meanings that images carried at the point of origin. Consequently, the finalities of the narratives gone by can easily become a ‘pretext for... something else, some other place, some other people’.⁹⁴ Contrary to Mbembe assertion, Tito’s career stemmed from its many dimensions and great achievements as he received extensive publicity as partisan fighter, anti-Soviet rebel and anti-imperial champion. With messages of peace, independence and eventually, nonalignment, Tito was welcomed as an inspiration for many state leaders.

Yugoslavia’s policy to gain contacts therefore differed from that of the power politics of larger players. Its aim was to develop, represent and promote another ‘third way’ in the form of politics of nonalignment.⁹⁵ It was to show that a transition to communism could be accomplished through a variety of ways and forms, of which peace was a necessary condition. In 1952, Yugoslavia was elected to the UN Economic and Social Council. Tito’s pragmatic

⁹² Vučetić and Betts, *Tito in Africa* (2017) 24.

⁹³ See Sladojević, ‘African Objects’ within a Collection’ (2016) 1-7.

⁹⁴ Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press 2001) 3.

⁹⁵ William Griffith, ‘Yugoslavia’ in Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (1964) 116-141; Michael M Milenkovitch, ‘Yugoslavia and the Third World’ in Michael Radu (ed), *Eastern Europe and the Third World: East vs South* (New York: Praeger Publishers 1981) 273-300.

approach was designed to establish relationships regardless of whether the potential partners and allies were pursuing their own independent politics or were inclined towards the West or the East.⁹⁶ For example, after the first visit in Ethiopia in 1954, despite little ideological common ground between the two countries, Yugoslav experts drew up a Five-Year Development Plan for the country. They built a hydropower plant at the Awash River and the port of Assab, and Yugoslav doctors and experts worked on improving Ethiopian medicine and agriculture. To other socialist parties of post-colonial sovereign states and to the Third World revolutionaries, the ideological proximity of Yugoslav socialism appealed as they ‘wanted to be socialist without accepting the full Soviet package of centralisation and rigorous planning’.⁹⁷ The emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie I (1892-1975) acknowledged how such cooperation came ‘without any interest and hidden agenda [on the part of Yugoslavia]’.⁹⁸ As such, the Yugoslav policy was construed ‘progressive and peace-loving’.⁹⁹ Yugoslavia’s international outlook also differed in its objective to justify various peaceful transitions to Marxian final stage communism. In pursuit of their new national identities, leaders embraced the importance of ‘progressive forces’ outside the Soviet bloc and admired the Yugoslav model and theory of their ‘own path to socialism’. For example, Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana formed

⁹⁶ The Yugoslav economic policy toward the new African nations was set forth by the Slovenian economist, politician and scholar Janez Stanovnik (1922-2020). He served as the Yugoslav economic counsellor at the UN headquarters in New York (1952-1962), as a counsellor to the UNCTAD’s Secretary General Raul Prebisch (1965-1967), and as an Executive Secretary at the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (1968-1982). See Janez Stanovnik, ‘The Struggle of Two Opposing Tendencies in the Economy of Underdeveloped Countries’ 1961 (3) *Naša Stvarnost* 271-294. See also his ‘Historical Roots of the Problem of Economic Underdevelopment’ 1960 (5) *Naša Stvarnost* 569-587; ‘International Assistance for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries in the Light of the Evolution of the World Economy’ 1957 (4) *Medjunarodna Politika*; ‘The Uncommitted Countries in the World Economy’ *Borba* (23, 26, 28 June 1961). See also Griffith, ‘Yugoslavia’ in Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (1964) 123, 127-129, 255.

⁹⁷ Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Balkans: A Cold War Mistery’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 358.

⁹⁸ Griffith, ‘Yugoslavia’ in Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (1964) 125; AY, KPR, I-2/11-16: Program of stay in Ethiopia, Tito-Selassie talks (11 February 1959).

⁹⁹ Griffith, ‘Yugoslavia’ in Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (1964) 123-125.

governments similar to that of Yugoslavia: the one-party one-man state with a context specific understanding and plan for socialism. By showing solidarity in the fight against colonialism, by allowing a ‘different way to socialism’ in respective domestic policy, and by encouraging and supporting modernisation without a hidden agenda, Yugoslavia gained success and global political prestige and as such played a special role in global affairs during the Cold War.

Of course, Yugoslavia’s objectives to reach the ‘Rest’ were not merely ideological (advocating for a particular revolutionary socio-political path) but also to reach potential new markets. As the establishment of NAM came at the height of decolonization process, it provided Yugoslavia not only with ever-expanding political alignments but also with economic opportunities. In the geopolitical competition (for international prestige), Tito was perceived a ‘moderniser’ due to Yugoslavia’s companies, such as *Ingra*, *Energoprojekt*, *Energoinvest*, *Crvena Zastava*, *Trudbenik*, *Generaleksport*, *Krušik*, *IMT*, *FAP Famos*, *Rudnap*, *Mašinunion*, *Jugoeksport*, *Pomgrad*, *Agrovojevodina* working on projects abroad.¹⁰⁰ For instance, they were either completely or in part building Africa’s industry, factories and hospitals, and thus modernising the continent.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the economic motivation in expanding its allies was strong as new Yugoslav industries were unable to compete against ‘hard currency’ states.¹⁰² Cooperation with the nonaligned provided new markets for goods and new sources of raw materials. Trade relations, military assistance, humanitarian aid, cultural missions, student exchanges, and

¹⁰⁰ For a great presentation of countries where *Energoprojekt* had projects and mixed enterprises, see Dubravka Sekulić, ‘Constructing the Non-aligned Modernity: The Case of Energoprojekt’ in Maroje Mrduljaš and Vladimir Kulić (eds), *Unfinished Modernisations: Between Utopia and Pragmatism* (Zagreb: Croatian Architects' Association 2012) 122-133.

¹⁰¹ Vučetić and Betts, *Tito in Africa* (2017) 27. See also Marina Smokvina, Mojca Smode Cvitanovi and Branko Kincl, ‘Influence of Croatian Urban Planners in Post-colonial Africa: Urban Development Plan of Conakry, Guinea, 1963’ in Carlos Nunes Silva, *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial and Post-Colonial Planning Cultures* (London: Routledge 2015) 228; Łukasz Stanek, *Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2020) 35-96.

¹⁰² Hard currencies are issued by developed, politically and economically stable countries, including the US dollar (USD), Japanese yen (JPY), British pound (GBP), Swiss franc (CHF), and Canadian dollar (CAD).

training programmes were on the agenda of exchange by all involved. Furthermore, cooperation in NAM enabled small (only in influence) countries to exert significant political and economic impact at the international level. It proved a method of success, at least for the time being, coupled with Yugoslavia's distinctive development model of industrialisation and agricultural efficiency.¹⁰³ Namely, and as I argue in this thesis, it was linked to the Yugoslav domestic policy of self-management whose principles were interpreted into its foreign policy of nonalignment. Its distinctive domestic model for development of politics, industrialisation, and agricultural efficiency, that included renunciation of central planning, commitment to workers' self-management and the system of social ownership, inspired and affected how nonalignment became developed and understood. The aim was to develop, represent and promote another 'third way' in the form of politics of nonalignment.

4.3.3. Dialectics: The Relationship between Yugoslav Self-management and Nonalignment

At the core of my examination in this thesis is the dialectical relationship between nonalignment – NAM's organisational concept and Yugoslavia's foreign policy central pillar – and Yugoslavia's domestic policy of self-management. By analysing the Yugoslav experiment, I argue that experimentation with the project of self-management presented a productive radical alternative to hegemonic forms in the global legal order despite being contingent on the specific understanding of self-determination by either of the two superpowers.

The aim in this section is to make the proposed relationship more explicit. I suggest a closer study of such relationship demonstrates how the principles of the two policies contravened and traversed from national to international, a point that has seldom been explored. The noted exceptions (below) who

¹⁰³ This included renunciation of central planning, commitment to workers' self-management, and to the system of social ownership. However, see chapter 5 for obstacles to its development, including reliance on rapid industrialisation and national or regional competition due to decentralisation.

have examined the link between self-management and nonalignment were various (Yugoslav) government officials (diplomat Dimče Belovski), theorists (Aleksandar Grličkov and the leading CPY theoretician Edvard Kardelj) and scholars (Cecil Crabb and William Zimmerman).¹⁰⁴

Kardelj examined this relationship as applied to Yugoslav conditions. For him the two were interdependent but could not be achieved under the auspices of capitalist development. Relying on its mechanisms would leave the country impoverished, dependent, and open to exploitation.¹⁰⁵ Instead, he proposed that the only appropriate development approach was socialist and concluded that only socialism – with self-management as its particular version – was the foundation and modus operandi of nonalignment, thus linking the two policies. The understanding proposed by Kardelj is that both, self-management in domestic and nonalignment in foreign policy and international cooperation, are the embodiment and working out of socialism. In other words, both experiments have a distinctly socialist grounding and were, according to Kardelj, distinctly socialist experiments.

In particular, for Kardelj self-management and nonalignment were projects directed at achieving national independence.¹⁰⁶ Starting out as a war against imperialism, the events that took place during WWII in Yugoslavia applied to the struggles for independence and emancipation more broadly. The world's colonized peoples had the same goal of emancipation from imperialism. It was in this context that nonalignment took root. It was in this struggle that, according to Kardelj, nonalignment was a phenomenon which predated but acted as a catalyst during WWII, and only increased the desires of the colonized peoples to be free. More than just a policy, nonalignment

¹⁰⁴ Aleksandar Grličkov, *Non-Alignment and Socialism as a World Process* (Beograd: STP 1979); William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Non-Alignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987); Edvard Kardelj, *Zgodovinske Korenine Neuvrščenosti [Historical Roots of Nonalignment]* (Beograd: ČZP Komunist 1978) 3.

¹⁰⁵ Due to reliance on foreign capital and market mechanisms and limited state involvement in the economy management - unfortunately exactly what happened from the mid-1970s onward. Nikolaos A Stavrou (ed), *Edvard Kardelj: The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment* (2nd edition, Washington DC: University Press of America 1985) 87-88.

¹⁰⁶ Stavrou, *Edvard Kardelj: The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment* (1985) 53-54.

was grounded in and stressed the economic and political emancipation of peoples on a world scale.¹⁰⁷ In fact, leaders including Nehru, Nkrumah and Sukarno all called for national sovereignty - more equal international economic relations through political independence and national control over the direction of their countries' socio-economic and political development. Seeds of nonalignment can be observed during and after WWII struggles for independence and then in de-colonisation.

According to Kardelj, it was Yugoslav understanding of socialist self-management that unified nationalities, bringing about termination of the system of exploitation between individuals and nations and victory of a working man, to whom everyone is a 'brother' no matter the language or nationality. What brought about the unification and equality between the nations was every individual's success that enriched the whole community. Yugoslav socialism, Kardelj said, formed something new, the so-called supra-national type of nation unification, that erases all kinds of nationalisms of the world.¹⁰⁸

What is noteworthy in Kardelj's thinking, is the idea that these goals would not be attainable if developing countries followed the capitalist road of development. His view was that reliance on foreign capital and market mechanisms, and limited state involvement in the management of the economy, would leave these societies open to economic exploitation by the developed countries.¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, Kardelj argued that the most appropriate path of development for the new nations was that of socialism. It was the WWII's 'objective' conditions - the anti-imperialist revolution, crises in the capitalist economies and the emergence of two hostile power blocs - that aroused a pro-socialist orientation among countries that would eventually join NAM. This favourable attitude toward socialism, Kardelj argued,

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 53-54.

¹⁰⁸ On the foremost importance of unity in the Yugoslav society see Edvard Kardelj, 'Trdnost in moč socialistične skupnosti jugoslovanskih narodov - Iz govora o nekaterih problemih socialističnega upravljanja na volilnem zborovanju v Ljubljani, 10. novembra 1953' in *Problemi naše socialistične graditve* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije 1974, Book IV) 88-89.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 87-88.

pursued to varying degrees by many members of NAM, proved to be an important source of the Movement and the policy of nonalignment.¹¹⁰ Indeed, that socialism as a development approach was most beneficial to the developing countries was the most important element in Kardelj's conceptual framework. It explained, in theory at least, the link between the two policies whereby national independence was their primary goal.

Kardelj's famous *Socialism and War* was an attempt to justify Yugoslavia's foreign policy in the face of harsh Chinese criticism, condemning the Yugoslavs as revisionists who had betrayed the true essence of Marxism, and accusing them of being capitalist lackeys by taking aid from the West.¹¹¹ Kardelj's response to these remarks was that this type of criticism was not normal nor beneficial among fellow socialist countries, and it was liberty and variety that could make socialism healthy as an international movement.¹¹² Yugoslav foreign policy of nonalignment developed distinctly socialist – in its origin, outlook and (radical) contribution. It was the political lessons of the Cominform dispute era combined with the social goals and optimism of the 1958 Ljubljana LCY program that gave Yugoslavia a new image and a firm direction in world affairs.

Still, some argued that the relationship between self-management and nonalignment was only coincidental and pragmatic, and which changed to suit the world's geopolitical constellation at any given time.¹¹³ Accordingly, charges that the nonaligned were not really nonaligned would stand. A clear example of this is the critique of NAM's, and Yugoslav in particular, voting system in the UN General Assembly. Over decades, it was shifting from

¹¹⁰ Ibid. 90.

¹¹¹ Edvard Kardelj, *Socialism and War: A Survey of Chinese Criticism of the Policy of Coexistence* (London: Methuen 1961).

¹¹² Ibid. 182. According to Cox, Kardelj's book was in many ways still a foreshadowing of a full-blown policy of nonalignment but not yet a complete statement of principles invoking the power of the non-bloc states. Rather, it was devoted largely to the defence of coexistence. J K Cox, *Edvard Kardelj: A Political Biography* (PhD Thesis, Indiana University 1996) 277.

¹¹³ Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter 1978) 2.

supporting the US policies or leaning heavily towards the Soviet Union positions.¹¹⁴ But was it the financial aid that curtailed the autonomy in decisions? Or was Yugoslav voting in the UNGA influenced by the prominence to securing ‘peace’ in the mid-1950s (due to the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis in 1956 that threatened the security of the founding states) as opposed to importance of the national liberation movements that would dominate the NAM’s goals in the 1970s and shift voting accordingly? Perhaps it ought to be concluded that Kardelj’s conceptualisation that socialism was the prevailing idea among the nonaligned should be considered alongside a reminder that the two superpowers came to see the heterogeneity of NAM as composed of different groups within the Movement as a potential benefit.¹¹⁵

Engaging with the themes outlined by Kardelj, Aleksandar Grličkov also linked the Yugoslav socialist self-management and its understanding of nonalignment and argued that nonalignment ‘assists and encourages... socialist change’.¹¹⁶ Like Kardelj, Grličkov spoke of the interdependent aims of nonaligned foreign policy and socialism and agreed with him that capitalist development - emphasising the ‘social, economic, moral and psychological “crises” of capitalism’ that arguably permeated the western societies - will not bring about ‘social and economic emancipation’ in the nonaligned countries.¹¹⁷ In fact, it is here in this dialectical relationship that socialism is not only the ground that enables nonalignment, but the latter also is the aim of the earlier: ‘[s]ocialism is equality. Nonalignment brings it about. The

¹¹⁴ The changing diplomatic ‘alignment’ of NAM members see Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 126.

¹¹⁵ Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-alignment in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) 21, 23, 55; Robert Niebuhr, ‘Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc Politics’ Winter 2011 (13) 1 *Journal of Cold War Studies* 174; B K Shrivastava, ‘The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement’ 1981 (21) 1-2 *International Studies* 442.

¹¹⁶ For instance, discussing the WWII environment, anti-colonial struggle, the emergence of blocs, and national independence as facilitators for conditions to make socialism a ‘world process’. Grličkov, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1979) 21, 35.

¹¹⁷ Grličkov, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1979) 7-12, 13.

policy of nonalignment assists and encourages socialist change'.¹¹⁸ That is also how one is to read the Yugoslav ambassador Dimče Belovski's argument that the foreign policy of nonalignment 'ensured socialist conditions' in Yugoslavia.¹¹⁹ Thus, what Kardelj and Grličkov both expounded was that both experiments worked hand-in-hand to bring about a distinctly socialist independence.

William Zimmerman also observed the relationship between Yugoslav socialist self-management and nonalignment and proposed nonalignment as the cause to self-management in his survey of Yugoslav society from 1945 to 1980 by comparing domestic and external environments, national and international issues.¹²⁰ His hypothesis was that self-management was in the 1950s a 'function of' early nonaligned policy, but as the Yugoslav commitment to self-management changed in the 1980s so did the content of nonalignment. Zimmerman therefore implied correlation, evident in the 1970s Yugoslav internal and external policies, dictated by efforts to distance themselves from the Eastern bloc, and apparent in the 1980s whereby the guiding external policies resulted directly from internal problems. It is interesting to observe that though Zimmerman argues for the primacy of nonalignment, his argument is still for the interrelatedness of the two experiments, though failing to appreciate (enough) their grounding – a socialist pursuit of independence.

In front of analysis that suggest primacy of foreign policy, I would suggest that the proper grounding and perspective of Yugoslav vision of nonalignment was that of the impact or transition of domestic to foreign policy in pursuit of independence. WWII experience of the partisan struggle developed as an idea into the concept of self-management after 1948 and therefore stemmed from practice. Material conditions that influenced domestic policy development included the post-war economic hardships that brought forward political maturity of the working class and instigated a shift

¹¹⁸ Ibid.31-32, 42-43.

¹¹⁹ Dimče Belovski in Singham, *The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics* (1977) 11.

¹²⁰ Zimmerman, *Open Borders* (1987) 9-12, 21-22, 388-340.

in the entire political machinery toward democratisation. As a result, and almost concomitantly, Yugoslav leaders formulated the foreign policy of nonalignment according to new circumstances as consistently socialist and antiimperialist, safeguarding the independence against the two blocs and promoting equality of nations irrespective of their social and political systems.¹²¹ As Oklopčič has argued in relation to Yugoslavia's idea of nonalignment, it 'was a unique socio-political enterprise that incarnated the success of national, social and geopolitical struggles for emancipation'.¹²² It decentralized international cooperation and established the possibility of a socialist free engagement among member states, where decisions were reached and carried out by members as communal subjects, without cancelling political pressure. In this way, it internationalised the vision of 'brotherhood and unity' which was the centre of the Yugoslav domestic policy of socialist self-management. This will become significant in chapter 5 when I turn to abandonment of self-management and 'turn inwards' in 1980's Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, the political scientist Otha Hall who examined Yugoslav nonalignment and self-management from 1950 to 1980 argued against interrelatedness of the two.¹²³ Hall distinguished the path for self-managed socialism as a particular form of Yugoslav socialist development, and nonaligned foreign policy as its 'mirror' abroad. Hall describes such link, or lack of thereof, was visible in three phases: a relatively high commitment to self-management and nonalignment between 1966-1971, a steady commitment to a nonalignment but retrenchment from self-managed socialism between 1972-1979, and a steady decline in dedication to both in the 1980s.¹²⁴ The fact that the country's active commitment to nonalignment seemed to dissipate would not warrant, however, such a harsh conclusion. In

¹²¹ 'Boj za neodvisnost in lastno socialistično pot graditve Jugoslavije' - From authors' testimony in a television show *Teh naših petdeset let*, recorded and aired in the program TV Ljubljana in autumn 1969 (Source: magnetoskopski zapis v arhivu RTV Ljubljana).

¹²² Oklopčič, 'The Promises and Failures of Triple Struggle' in Eslava and others, *Bandung, the Global South and International Law* (2017) 276.

¹²³ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) xxvi-xxviii, 16-18.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* 16-18.

fact, Hall's observation of the 1980s as marked by gradual erosion of self-management with a return to centralisation and by a change of focus away from nonalignment could be used to argue for their interconnectedness. Namely, the malfunction of one signalled the same for the other. What Otha Hall does successfully, is to highlight that both were affected by a variety of internal and external factors - already discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and to be discussed in light of the 1980s development in chapter 5 where I turn to analysis of NAM's and Yugoslav diminishing strength in one same decade. Indeed, it is important to remember that even though the two policies were impacted by internal and external events, that does not mean that they weren't interrelated.

Does this mean there was no direct relation between self-management and nonalignment per se, but more so between socialism, broadly speaking, and the two policies? True, by splitting from its ideological motherland, the Soviet Union, the Yugoslavs fought for the development of socialism in general. They therefore supported various kinds of development according to specific material forces on the ground in any NAM member-state. They insisted on it, even. This was clearly visible in NAM's expansion and flourishing during the 1960s and the 1970s, with the Belgrade, Cairo and Lusaka Summits as examples of (arguably the most) fruitful Third World cooperation. These three Summits highlight member governments' successful response to the pressures of postcolonial existence through their radical vision and active engagement in the international scene through the UN as an avenue and platform.¹²⁵ It is therefore apposite to note that there was feasibly not a direct

¹²⁵ The *Group of Seventy-seven (G-77)* (1964) became a lobbying group in the UN negotiations, a somewhat 'trade union' of the un(der)developed and tasked to argue and bargain for better trade and development assistance from the advanced economies. In the 1970s rising global economic crises, the G-77 reformist agenda came to the fore in the struggle for the New International Economic Order (NIEO, 1975), aiming to restructure the global system based on more equitable inter-state relations. G-77 and NIEO became avenues through which NAM states called for an order 'based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation... irrespective of [particular state's] system'. As Mohammed Bedjaoui put, NIEO truly was a 'radical challenge to the 'old European international law'', opposing its inequalities, domination and universalism. For detailed analysis of NAM and G-77 at international economic conferences see Robert A Mortimer, *The Third World Coalition in International Politics* (Westview Press 1984);

link between self-management and nonalignment in abstraction from their socialist (and material) grounding.

The question of how this (proposed) link between the two Yugoslav policies was worked specifically or directly in international relations might remain unresolved. Namely, to what extent did social ownership, workers' self-management and the renunciation of central planning run deep in the NAM or among members of the NAM? And how did this interact with what were sometimes one-party states with repressive security forces that were becoming sovereign in the process of decolonisation? Similarities or root of a thought about active, participatory and democratic relations can be seen in Kardelj's speech on the Commune in 1973, be it at home through self-managed system or internationally through nonaligned principles.¹²⁶ Namely, he envisioned the Commune not as sum of citizens as subjects of the state but an organic union of the working people. Such democratic and economic integration of self-managed communities was perceived as the core and the content of the Commune to realise desired functions in relation to material sources available. For such genuine inclusive political basis of the system to function (not only of self-management but also of the Republican and Federal state government), high level of independence was needed. The theory and practice of socialist self-management represented a strong means of motivation for citizens and the Party. However, and indeed, the perception that foreign policies are influenced by domestic systems is not something new in international politics nor unique to Yugoslavia. Where Yugoslavia differed, though, is in its thinking that universalism is not feasible and its domestic system of self-management not applicable to all, or any other, nonaligned state. Indeed, peaceful coexistence is possible where nations are able to develop as they see fit and are free of pressures or interference from the outside. This itself is a reminder of its domestic – self-managing –

Mohammed Bedjaoui, *Towards a New International Economic Order* (New York: Holmes and Meier 1979) 50.

¹²⁶ 'Za samoupravno komuno - Iz pogovorov o temeljnih vzrokih in smereh ustavnih sprememb na TV Beograd in TV Ljubljana, osma oddaja, 26. aprila 1973' in *Delo*, priloga (28. aprila 1973), and in *Problemi naše socialistične graditve* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije 1974, Book IX) 390-392.

resistance to centralisation and instead empowering of the local. In this way the Yugoslav call to non-universalism only reinforced a call for self-determination, sovereignty and independence. As the founding and leading member in NAM, Yugoslav promotion of nonalignment in the world affairs surely was a reflection and advocacy of a very specific idea of nonalignment that stemmed from their particular formulation of socialism at home by way of self-management. As such, self-management together with nonalignment acted as powerful (inter)national binding agents. In my view, and in light that this thesis aims to examine the link in Yugoslavia itself, therefore, a dialectical relationship is there – in the way local was part of global and vice versa.

Still, it has to be noted that Yugoslavia's self-management did have a profound impact on other NAM members. To this end, Cecil Crabb Jr observed similarities in characteristics of different political systems.¹²⁷ For instance, in the 1970s some of the principles of the Yugoslav self-management were adopted in Tanzania and Algeria, though that raises questions of how those principles fitted with conservative aspects of these systems. For example, Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Tunisia under Habib Bourguiba both had a one-party political system, strict censorship in means of communication, and a nationalistic expression of communism.¹²⁸

Indeed, the introduction of self-management represented a potential and a challenge.¹²⁹ On the one hand, the Yugoslav experiment of a particular kind of socialism had great appeal for the underdeveloped part of the world. Transferred to other developing countries, it was recognized as 'a reflection of the mode of production and a reflection of the convergence of different socio-economic systems and regulation in the modern world' in the name of profit maximization.¹³⁰ Furthermore, it demonstrated that a socialist (or communist) regime, provided it follows the Yugoslav version of the policy of

¹²⁷ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 137.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 137.

¹²⁹ Janez Prašnikar, *Delavska participacija in samoupravljanje v deželah v razvoju* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1989) 156.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 156.

nonalignment, may obtain vital economic and military help from both the West and the East. The Yugoslav case showed they can remain faithful to the communist cause without incurring any obligation toward either one of the blocs. On the other hand, introduction of self-management represented a challenge too. Similar to post-WWII Yugoslavia, the new post-colonial states were for long part of various colonial dominions, and as such non-cohesive societies with an unevenly developed economy.¹³¹ It was the objective to justify various peaceful transitions to communism that gave the Yugoslav version of socialism an international character and reinforced the country's position in its relations with other nations. Indeed, the elements of traditional social structures and inherited colonial economic structures must therefore also be considered when evaluating the reasons for success or failure of self-management in Yugoslavia or elsewhere.¹³²

Analyses above, while carried out from different perspectives and positions, highlight the dialectical relationship between Yugoslav socialist self-management and nonalignment. In his examination of the interrelated goals of self-management and nonalignment, the chairman of the Croatian League of Communists Vladimir Bakarić placed emphasis on subjects such as equality, sovereignty, and autonomous development.¹³³ It was therefore decentralisation – transfer of power to the local, that proved most influential in development of and became mapped in Yugoslav vision of nonalignment. However, was NAM marked by direct democracy or decentralisation or self-management in any, or lots of, particular ways? As I will explore in the next chapter, cooperation in NAM was (at least partly) linked to the Yugoslav domestic policy of self-management. Empowered by Yugoslav propositions, NAM proved a method of success, at least for the time being. Yugoslavia's distinctive domestic policy for development model of politics, industrialisation, and agricultural efficiency - that included renunciation of central planning, commitment to workers' self-management, the system of

¹³¹ Ibid. 156.

¹³² Ibid. 156.

¹³³ See Vladimir Bakarić, *Self-Management, the Wellspring of Development and of Higher Quality of Life* (Belgrade: STP 1979) 24-25.

social ownership – inspired and affected how nonalignment became understood and developed. Decentralisation at home in self-management became the basis for understanding ‘decentralisation’ in foreign relations (and in NAM as no institutionalisation). As Tito declared:

*The basic principles of Yugoslavia’s internal setup overlap with the principles we pursue in our international relations... And those are the same principles we pursue in our foreign policy. In brief, self-management at home and nonalignment in international relations form the whole of Yugoslav independent politics.*¹³⁴

Like self-management, nonalignment was understood as the ‘path to political and economic freedom [of the individual man, enterprise, nation]’.¹³⁵ The humanist socialism described in the section 3.3.3. was understood as a vertical (domestic) and horizontal (international) ‘emancipation’, with decentralisation constitutionalised as federalism in Yugoslavia and in proposing the operation of NAM without institutionalisation. Be it vertical or horizontal decentralisation, each was a path to political and economic freedom for states and persons. This speaks of the various attempts, this thesis included, to outline a theory about the relationship between self-managing socialism and nonalignment as a foreign policy. Both were rooted in pursuit of independence and sovereignty and later developed as a form of cooperation. This to an extent addresses the thesis’ question of how self-

¹³⁴ Pero Damjanović (ed), *Josip Broz Tito: Autobiografska Kazivanja* (Beograd: Narodna Knjiga 1982) 109.

Tito’s use of the idea of nonalignment was subject of great sensitivity in Yugoslavia. Due to his pride of authorship of the doctrine any attempt to publicly criticise his personal interventions in foreign policy or his extravagant diplomatic travels, and the usefulness or viability of nonalignment, was taken as a personal attack. However, despite seemingly shaky premises and promises, his internationalism was a source of pride for most Yugoslavs and perceived an asset for the country. The policy of nonalignment secured diplomatic and moral support for the state, gave Belgrade space for diplomatic manoeuvring in the East-West relations and made Yugoslavia prominent despite its small size and power. See Central Intelligence Agency, *National Intelligence Survey: Yugoslavia April 1973* (Central Intelligence Agency 1973) 37-38.

¹³⁵ Cirila Toplak, ‘For a New Social Order’: A Genealogy of Self-Management in SFRY’ 2014 (8) 1 *Ars & Humanitas* 118-135, 127.

management was internationalised in nonalignment (chapter 4) and the way the Yugoslav state promote self-management abroad (abstract).

More generally, socialism was considered a driving force of the epoch and strong enough tool for nations' struggle in deciding for themselves their future development according to domestic social forces. This was one of the basic principles of the Yugoslav foreign policy, formulated in the 1965 Constitution - peaceful coexistence coupled with active cooperation of nations no matter the internal social system. In implementing such foreign policy, the Yugoslavs aspired to remain faithful to two basic principles: non-interference into the national system of other states and not allowing the struggle for socialism to become the reason for any kind of worldwide conflict with the capitalist imperialist bloc. Instead, socialism and integration of nation-states had to be internal desire of nations, stemming from the needs and interest of their internal development stage and not something forced from outside. The material and political power of socialism as the world movement was considered influential enough to decisively influence the question of peace.¹³⁶ In summary, both self-management and nonalignment were experimental methods of a distinct vision of socialism. Experimentation when exercising and guarding sovereignty on a particular domestic level (Yugoslavia) and on a global platform, whereby NAM as a global structure was envisioned as a global platform for uniting radically different particular domestic conditions.¹³⁷

That experimental method used by NAM members was 'breaking up' the ideological uniformity of the existing Western and Eastern models of

¹³⁶ 'Odnosi med socialističnimi državami in boj za mir v svetu - Iz predvolilnega govora v Ljubljani 7. junija 1963' in *Problemi naše socialistične graditve* (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije 1974, Book VI) 296-299.

¹³⁷ That is why struggle for coexistence, equality and peace was considered also a struggle for a healthy development of socialism worldwide. Different circumstance and stages of development of various socialist nation-states set on the agenda various new set of issues. But these were considered problems of the dynamic growth of socialism, that in so many different avenues look for ways to better it. Such quest for forms of cooperation required fruitful exchange of experiences and opinions (including education and culture) between nations on socialist path to possibly avoid delusions and issues of those gone before them – all without imposing any forms or ways as the only correct one.

international relations. The ‘method’ of nonalignment enabled the grouping to hold a unique identity at home and internationally - as opposed to the Western and Eastern models, whereby a clear division of categories or approaches that were to be ‘translated’ in a new context identically (transmitted to domestic or foreign policy identity). As a unique radical alternative, NAM challenged and even subverted clear lines and perceived notions, including of sovereignty, cooperation and development, and in a way still does have a potential, at least as a radical theory.

4.4. Lead-up to the Formal Establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement: Brioni and Cairo

As seen above, the burden to search for allies and the ability to transcend his own ideological affiliation made Tito a trusted converser among the Third World leaders. His long tours proved invaluable when developing friendships, of which the most important ones were with Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser and India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Indeed, Egypt, India and Indonesia were the countries Tito travelled to most frequently: sixteen times to Egypt (including in 1962, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1971). He travelled many times to Algeria (1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1979) and Libya (1970, 1977, 1979). The ‘nonaligned leaders’ returned visits. For instance, between 1955 and 1970 Nasser visited Yugoslavia five, Nehru three and Sukarno six times.¹³⁸ Indeed, it is indisputable that meetings of some leaders at conferences or through diplomatic visits before the founding of NAM in 1961 were seminal, exchanging ideas about possibilities to act together on the international level. Some of NAM’s leading personalities already met in Rangoon (1953), in Bandung (1955), at Brioni (1956), reconvened at the Cairo preparatory meeting and reunited finally in Belgrade (1961).

¹³⁸ See AY, 837, IV-1-b; Rajak, ‘From Regional Role’ in Rajak and others, *The Balkans in the Cold War* (2017) 75.

The more particular within the focus of this thesis, less renowned but critical, was the meeting on the island of Brioni, Yugoslavia (18-19 July 1956). An invitation to visit Tito at his summer house marked the beginning of a close relationship with Nasser and Nehru. The meetings between the three statesmen culminated in signing of the so-called Brioni Declaration. The formal communiqué expressed their ‘commitment to the principles of Bandung, including respect for the UN Charter, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, renunciation of the use of force in international relations, peaceful settlement of disputes, and promotion of peaceful cooperation among all nations’.¹³⁹ At the same time, the leaders weighed in on the current global (international) issues with proposed solutions for global conflicts, liberation wars and the pursuit of disarmament, including deliberating acceptance of China into the UN, Algerian liberation war and the significance of the Bandung conference. The signed 12-point Joint Statement was considered an expression of ‘positive neutralism’ and the meeting regarded by some as the beginning of NAM.¹⁴⁰ Namely, by the time the three met in Brioni, the basic precepts of nonalignment were already thought out, at least by Yugoslavs.

Still, it was not straightforward. While the Yugoslav and Egyptian governments already ‘endorsed Belgrade’ in full, the Indian leadership still consistently showed ambivalence about such an endeavour. Scholars generally agree that Nehru initially opposed NAM’s creation.¹⁴¹ Alvin Z Rubinstein recollected:

Nehru did not come [to Brioni] out of conviction [to form NAM], but to return Tito’s State Visit. Nehru, a Brahmin aristocrat reared in the tradition of British parliamentary democracy and conscious of India’s distinctive [powerful]

¹³⁹ For the full document see the Appendix in Mates, *Nonalignment* (1972) 379-381. See also Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 243.

¹⁴⁰ AY, 837, I-3-c/2.

¹⁴¹ Chris Alden, Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira, *The South in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 49-50; Schaufelbuehl and others, ‘Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting’ (2015) 903; Rakove, ‘Two roads to Belgrade’ (2014) 341; Byrne, ‘Beyond Continents’ (2015) 913, 918, 920; G H Jansen, *Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States* (Frederick: Praeger 1966) 278-290.

*position in the world, viewed nonalignment very differently from Tito, the national Communist, and Nasser, the untested thirty-six-year-old military ruler.*¹⁴²

Furthermore, letters were sent in March 1961 by the Indonesian President Sukarno (1901-1970) to heads of governments who supported the end of colonialism and imperialism, 'suggesting a Bandung-type conference'.¹⁴³ The idea was welcomed by many, including the foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Marshal Chen Yi. But this kind of conference formed as an Afro-Asian grouping would automatically exclude Yugoslavia, a European state. The context seemed ripe for Tito to take the forefront position. He used Yugoslavia's diplomatic isolation and prestige and targeted the sentiment and desire of the newly independent states to stand apart from alignment to any of the two blocs.¹⁴⁴ It should be noted here that while Nehru was not enthused about Nasser's and Tito's idea to call for a conference of likeminded states in Belgrade, the especially powerful post-colonial state of India was not keen on a 'Second Bandung' either, arguing that gathering ought to be based on policy rather than territory.¹⁴⁵ Yet Nehru was also not drawn to Tito and Nasser's desire to link nonalignment with the crisis in the Third World. While sympathetic to anti-colonial issues, he wanted to ensure that the Belgrade conference took a more measured approach to avoid antagonising the West through anti-colonial questions or indeed a third bloc, and instead wished to focus on matters of war and peace.

Indeed, Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno to various extents opposed Tito's initiative. They feared the newly formed Movement could become a third

¹⁴² Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 242.

¹⁴³ Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 190-191; Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 12.

¹⁴⁴ See, for example, AY, 837, I-1/145: Letter by Tito inviting the Prime Minister of Burma U NU to take part in the First NAM Conference (Brioni, 20 July 1961); AY, 837, I-1/523: Tito inviting the Prime Minister of Cambodia Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Brioni, 22 July 1961). See Edvard Kardelj's Speech at the 282 Plenary Meeting at the fifth UNGA session (25 September 1950) A/PV.282, para 26, 65; Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 29, 113.

¹⁴⁵ See AY, 837, I-1/372: Message from Nehru to Tito responding to the Tito-Nasser joint message, suggesting questions to be discussed at Cairo (30 April 1961).

bloc, bringing its members into open confrontation with the two Superpowers and gravely complicate their relations with them, and keeping in mind that they were receiving large economic, financial and military aid from the two. Thus, what Bogetić proposed, controversially and contrary to the predominant position in literature, was to disregard the Belgrade Conference (1961) as NAM's founding, due to Tito's initial 'failure' to convince his potential Afro-Asia and Latin America allies of its 'usefulness' – a dilemma that was resolved during the next, Cairo Summit (1964).¹⁴⁶ Rapid increase in the number of countries that opted for a nonaligned policy transformed NAM into a mighty UN's voting machine, reigniting their need for organizing and pursuing continuous joint action in international relations. Thus, by some, the Lusaka Summit (1970) was the founding NAM Summit.

Still, Tito found enough support and as he met with Nasser in April 1961 the two agreed to jointly sponsor and issue a communique with the proposal of such a conference to be held before the next UNGA Sixteenth Session (16 September 1961).¹⁴⁷ Sukarno joined them too as they issued invitations to a group of 17 states for a preparatory meeting in Cairo. Ultimately, Nehru had no choice but to join as a *fait accompli*.

In Cairo (5 - 12 June 1961), suggestions for the agenda of the upcoming Belgrade Summit in September were discussed. As reported in the official communiqué, discussions were held 'in an atmosphere of friendship and understanding' and with the aim to preserve peace, international security and

¹⁴⁶ Dragan Bogetić, 'Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement' in Igor S Novaković (ed), *Neutrality in the 21st Century - Lessons for Serbia* (Beograd: ISAC Fond 2013) 36-37; Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 190-191.

¹⁴⁷ Positive responses to Tito regarding the Tito-Nasser joint message to hold the NAM conference can be found in the Archives of Yugoslavia, including AY, 837 I-1/520: Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Pnom Penh, 26 April 1961); AY, 837, I-1/193: the Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Sellasie (Addis Ababa, 3 May 1961); AY, 837, I-1/447: the Prime Minister of Iraq Abd al-Karim Qasim (Baghdad, 8 May 1961); AY, 837, I-1/144: The Prime Minister of the Union of Burma Maung Nu expressed sympathy for the idea of holding NAM Summit (Rangoon, 8 May 1961); AY, 837, I-1/521: From the Head of State of Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk (Geneva, 23 May 1961); AY, 837, I-1/68: From the Prime Minister of Afghanistan Mohammed Daud Khan (Kabul, 9 August 1961). See also Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 190-191.

cooperation at the forefront.¹⁴⁸ However, certain participants sharply disputed over which countries could be members of the new movement – to strive for Tito’s concept of universalism or Sukarno’s regionalism.¹⁴⁹ Divergence of opinions surfaced among the 20-nation Ambassadors’ Committee also when devising a list of invitees for the Belgrade Conference over how to interpret and apply the so-called five-point definition. According to the definition, the country eligible should be following an independent policy based on nonalignment and peaceful coexistence, be consistently supporting the anti-colonial liberation movements for national independence, not be a member of military pacts nor a member of a bilateral military pact with a big power in the context of the East-West struggle, and it should grant no military bases to foreign powers.¹⁵⁰

As a result, two schools of thought emerged. The militant one was led by Ghana, Indonesia, Guinea, Mali and Cuba, and favoured a narrow conception of nonalignment that would effectively exclude Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Malaya. This group seemed indifferent to more global problems of the Cold War, insisting to focus on regional and mostly colonial matters. Interestingly, their agenda was reduced to condemning the Western colonialist attitude but giving only minute attention to the Communist bloc. By contrast, India, Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia advocated for the more flexible definition of the concept of nonalignment and broader criteria of inclusion. They intended to use the Belgrade conference as a forum

¹⁴⁸ For the full text of the Cairo official communiqué see *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries: Belgrade, September 1 - 6, 1961* (Yugoslavia 1961) 15 (hereafter *The Conference* (1961)). The official communiqué and the final report of the Preparatory Meeting in Cairo, its activities and decisions and Yugoslavia’s obligations resulting from it (12 June 1961) can also be found in AY, 837, I-4-a/1.

¹⁴⁹ Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement’ in Novaković, *Neutrality in the 21st* (2013) 36-37.

¹⁵⁰ Ministry of External Affairs, *Two Decades of Non-alignment: Documents of the Gathering of the Non- Aligned Countries 1961-1982* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs 1983) 2; Mallik, ‘Belgrade: New Phase’ in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 193.

at which 'the major problems confronting the world could be discussed' to make suggestions for easing international tension.¹⁵¹

As scholar Cecil Crabb Jr rightly argued, the decision was of grave importance as it would 'determine the agenda, tone, and results' of the Summit.¹⁵² For example, the attending country was ideally not supposed to be in a military alliance, but such literal application would exclude Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, Libya and Cuba. Thus, a loophole was left. Namely, any existing military agreements should be conducted outside the context of Cold War disputes. For instance, consent for military bases was allowed, but only if they were located outside the context of Great Power conflicts.¹⁵³ After lengthy discussions between 'exclusives' and 'inclusives', the 'inclusives' won. It was only reasonable for the principles to be broad and flexible enough as each state had its own particularities and this avoided excluding too many.¹⁵⁴

As invitations were sent through diplomatic channels, the shift of nonalignment towards expansion became clear by the number of Belgrade participants which was one third larger than of those invited to the Cairo preparatory meeting.¹⁵⁵ It should be mentioned that some potential invitees

¹⁵¹ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 23-24. See also reports by the British ambassador Harold Beeley found at The National Archives: Public Records Office London, United Kingdom. Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966 (henceforth: PRO FO) PRO FO 371/161212 WP 13/37.

¹⁵² Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 23.

¹⁵³ See Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (1966) 285-289; Nair, 'Nonalignment: History, Ideology, Prospects' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 51-52; Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 192-195; Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 19. See also Peter Lyon, *Neutralism* (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1963) 181.

¹⁵⁴ Significant omissions from the list were Israel, due to relentless Arab opposition, and Malaya, believed to be too pro-Western. Nigeria was excluded due to its overt ideological links with the West and opposing militant states like Ghana. So were the states of former French West Africa because of their continuing intimate ties with France. Yugoslavia was the only European state – it was not neutral as in the case of Finland and Sweden, nor a de facto member of a power bloc.

¹⁵⁵ See AY, 837, I-2/13: The joint message by Nasser and Tito with the proposal to hold a conference of nonaligned was sent (from 26 April 1961 onwards) to 21 statesmen. The conference aim was 'improving international relations, abandonment of the politics of force and constructive and peaceful resolution of international problems and conflicts'.

were put forward but excluded after discussion, such as Malaya, Jordan, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica. Others did not accept the invitation: Nigeria, Togo or Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso) and Mexico. Finally, out of twenty-eight countries that agreed to participate in the Conference, three accepted the invitation but preferred only to send observers (Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil).¹⁵⁶

What was unanimous in Cairo though, was an agreement on necessity of a conference to happen in September.¹⁵⁷ To that end, a preparatory document, known as the *Cairo Resolution*, was signed on 12 June 1961. As major concepts were being developed, Tito arguably contributed the most in giving them shape and impetus and was therefore considered a chief architect of NAM in its emergence. According to Rubinstein, 'he infused it with a dynamism and purposefulness that were lacking in the passivity... of Nehru, the erratic emotionalism of Sukarno, and the inexperience of Nasser'.¹⁵⁸ Despite the centrality of Tito, it is important to recognise the Belgrade Conference as a product of a close relations between himself, Nasser and Nehru, and that despite differing in 'outlook, temperament, and aspiration'.¹⁵⁹ The three statesmen formed a prominent triumvirate in international affairs, with the aim to improve international relations, abandon the politics of force and strive for constructive and peaceful resolution of international problems and conflicts. In their respective searches for a multilateral (Third World) alternative to the bipolar Cold War world they eventually designed the Non-Aligned Movement. According to political scientist Alvin Rubinstein,

the fact that the three men had powerful and charismatic public personas, though very different styles, helped strengthen the impression that non-alignment was a rising force. Their alliance typified the appeal of Third World

¹⁵⁶ Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (1966) 287-288; Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 197.

¹⁵⁷ AY, 837, I-2/13: A record of the discussion between the delegations of the FPRY and UAR concerning the Cuban crisis, necessity of holding the nonaligned conference before the UNGA Sixteenth Session, Nehru's stance regarding the assemblage of the Conference, and Tito's visit to the countries of West Africa (Cairo, 20 April 1961).

¹⁵⁸ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 112-113.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 116.

internationalism in a more general sense. On the one hand, there was limited scope for substantive co-operation between three poor countries with separate regional concerns... But at the same time, geographical separation also made it all the easier to form an alliance because the three were not directly competing or clashing with one another. On the contrary, their relationship opened up new opportunities for diplomatic expansion: it lent credibility to the claim that India was a major force in global affairs; it provided a valuable outlet for Yugoslav foreign policy, for which there was little scope in Europe; and it reinforced Nasser's bid for leadership in the wider Arab world.¹⁶⁰

4.5. Fruitful Alliance: Belgrade Summit

As seen above, many events of the late 1950s contributed to the eventual call for the Conference in Belgrade: a sudden increase in the Cold War tensions, consequences of the somewhat failed Fifteenth UNGA Session, travels and diplomacy involved by world's most notable leaders, and the height of decolonisation with the accompanying dramatic impact that newly independent states had on world affairs.¹⁶¹

From 1 - 6 September 1961 more than twenty-five states gathered at the *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries* in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, marking with it the start of the official history of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), a movement that has now existed for six decades.¹⁶² The countries that attended the first NAM Summit were Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Ceylon/Sri Lanka, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Ethiopia, Ghana,

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 242-246.

¹⁶¹ Tito gave a speech at the Fifteenth UNGA Session in New York on 22 September 1960. Interestingly, AY also includes records of Tito's discussion with the US President Dwight Eisenhower concerning the role of nonaligned countries in international problem resolution, normalisation of the US-USSR relations, and the bilateral relations of the USA and Yugoslavia. See records in AY, 837, I-2/12.

¹⁶² To symbolise NAM's 60th anniversary, there was a special gathering in Belgrade in 2021. The next, 19th 'regular' Summit is scheduled for 2022 in Uganda.

Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. These original member countries were represented by their chief executives, the heads of state or government, including Prime Ministers, elected Presidents, hereditary Emperors and Kings.¹⁶³ The gathering was accompanied by three observer states, all from Latin America: Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador, and other observers: leaders of 19 Africa's liberation movements,¹⁶⁴ representatives of 11 labour and socialist parties from Europe, Asia and Latin America,¹⁶⁵ and a number of other organisations.¹⁶⁶

The inauguration was a prominent event, followed worldwide and full of symbolism (that cannot stay unnoticed) as the nonaligned nations wished to portray the weight of their deliberations. First, its date was selected carefully, sharing numbers with the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) scheduled for the 16 September 1961. The NAM Summit

¹⁶³ If chief executives were unable to attend, they would send their personal representatives, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Cuba and Iraq. As it was the President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado who attended the Summit instead of Premier Castro, Cuba's delegation was weakened. Absence of the Iraqi Premier was a result of his unwillingness to face Nasser and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hashim Jawad attended instead. Mallik, 'Belgrade: New Phase' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 199. For a whole list of delegations' biographies see *The Conference* (1961) 273-322.

¹⁶⁴ The 19 Africa's national liberation movements were: the Angolan National Liberation Movement, the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia (UNIP), the National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia (NDP), the Uganda National Congress, the Ruanda-Urundi National Union, the Uganda People's Congress, the African Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, the Democratic National Union of Mozambique, the Permanent Secretariat of the Conference of the Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the United Front of South Africa, the African National Congress (Union of South Africa), the Pan-Africanist Congress, the South African Indian National Congress, the South-West African People's Organisation, the Union of the People of Angola, the Union of the People of Cameroun (UPC), the South-West African People's Organisation, and the All-African People's Conference.

¹⁶⁵ They were the Malta Labour Party, the Socialist Party of Italy, the United Socialist Party of France, the Socialist Party of Japan, the Socialist Party of Ceylon (LANKA SAMA SAMAJA), the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan (DSPJ), the Socialist Party of Uruguay, the Socialist Party of Chile, the National People's Movement of Argentina (MNPA), the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party, and the German Peace Union.

¹⁶⁶ For example, Trade union (Sohyo General Trade Union Federation of Japan), the World Veterans' Federation (FMAC), the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy USA, the Movement for Colonial Freedom, and the Provincial Assembly of Rio de Janeiro.

date (1-6 September 1961) was arguably chosen to portray the weight of deliberations and signify a desire of the nonaligned to act in dialogue on a level playing field with the big power.¹⁶⁷ Second, naming leaders of India, UAR, Indonesia, Ghana, and Yugoslavia as the ‘big five at the conference’, drew an arguably intentional connection with the ‘big five’ of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As such, the Belgrade’s five leading personalities - Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, and Josip Broz Tito - were parallelly portraying their noteworthy political standing in international relations.¹⁶⁸ Third, among the possible venues to host the Conference, Havana, New Delhi, Belgrade, even New York and Stockholm were considered. The city of Belgrade came out on top, symbolising a tribute to Yugoslavia as holder of the ‘genuinely nonaligned character’ of the Movement.¹⁶⁹ Setting up the international gathering was a dramatic undertaking and a huge task for the small and in many ways unknown Balkan city. Organisation involved drastic measures, from controversial ‘emptying’ the Roma settlements in Belgrade suburbs to levelling the floors in the Federal People’s Assembly Building where the Conference took place. The two closed sessions took place in the Federal Executive Council Building at Novi Beograd, also adapted specially for that occasion. Chestnut trees on the Boulevard Vojvode Mišića were cut down so the road could be widened, and the city lights and candelabras were painted in matching silver colour. Finding appropriate accommodation for the heads of states and governments was not easy and was solved eventually with prominent residents in Dedinje villas leaving their homes for the time being. New furniture was bought for the occasion, cooking staff was hired, and security was arranged.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Mallik, ‘Belgrade: New Phase’ in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 196.

¹⁶⁸ The ‘big five’ are known in the international law as the group of five permanent members of the UNSC: the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation or Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Mallik, ‘Belgrade: New Phase’ in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 198.

¹⁶⁹ Mallik, ‘Belgrade: New Phase’ in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 196.

¹⁷⁰ For the first-hand account on the Belgrade Summit’ organisation see an interview with the Slovenian diplomat, Chief of Staff to Edvard Kardelj (1953-1965) and Yugoslav ambassador to the UN (1967-1969) Anton Vratuša (1915-2017) in Peter Štih, Biba Teržan

Generally, the inaugural NAM summit was considered a success. For Yugoslavia in particular, to host such a symbolic Conference confirmed its unquestioned credentials in international affairs. It was a ‘diplomatic triumph’ that strengthened its reputation and stabilised its position worldwide even more. It made Tito a ‘world figure and a force behind nonalignment’ as he sought ‘to give form and life to the expectant, eager political force that was at hand’.¹⁷¹ In the Summit orchestrated by Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Nkrumah of Ghana, Tito was confirmed as having a leading role in NAM’s formation.¹⁷² Common interests and concerns about the international events of that period were articulated. The heads of states and governments’ discussions reflected their common colonial and imperial experience of exploitation and a desire for economic, political, cultural, and technical cooperation, expressing their desire to become a voice for preserving authenticity, possible only if their newly gained sovereignty was protected.¹⁷³ Leaders came together to resist powerful forces in political, economic, cultural, and technical affairs and subsequently expressed their shared desire for cooperation in such matters. Their concern for the peaceful future in a world without armament, for instance, was a reasonable sentiment following that majority of the member states were involved in WWII and were directly affected by the Cold War rivalries soon after. Their goal, according to the Soviet scholar Yuri Alimov, was threefold: a ‘complete liquidation of the colonial world’, ‘peaceful conditions for development’ and

and Slavko Splichal (eds), *Zbornik ob Stoletnici Akad. Antona Vratushe* (Ljubljana: Slovenska Akademija Znanosti in Umetnosti 2015) 13-58; 45-46.

¹⁷¹ Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 112.

¹⁷² Various accolades confirmed this: AY, 837, I-4-a/2: A telegram sent by the Prime Minister of Burma U Nu on his departure from Yugoslavia to President Tito (Sežana, 7 September 1961); AY, 837, I-1/6: Algeria’s President Benkhedda’s expression of gratitude (Tunis, 18 September 1961); AY, 837, I-1/524: A message by the Prime Minister of Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk thanking Tito for hospitality and congratulating him on the successful organisation of the Summit (Rome, 12 September 1961); AY, 837, I-1/1183: A message from the Prime Minister of Ceylon Sirimavo Bandaranaike (Colombo, 19 September 1961); AY, 837, I-1/5: A post-summit Letter from Tito to Benkhedda (18 September 1961).

¹⁷³ See for instance, Speech given by the President of the Provisional Government of Algeria Benyoucef Benkhedda (Belgrade, 4 September 1961) AY, 837, I-4-a/2; by the Prime Minister of Burma U Nu (Belgrade, 1 September 1961) AY, 837, I-4-a/2, by the Prime Minister of Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk (Belgrade, 3 September 1961) AY, 837, I-4-a/2. by the Prime Minister of Ceylon Sirimavo Bandaranaike.

‘equality in the world’.¹⁷⁴ Although the existing international system was declared unequal and based on exploitation, they resolved that their idea of a peaceful coexistence between all nation-states was nonetheless to be realised through the forum of the United Nations (UN). UN was chosen to be the forum for NAM’s discourse and action despite being an embodiment of pre-existing unequal level playing conditions, with the aim to create a flourishing space where democratisation of international relations was possible - despite, or exactly because of, the presence of the major powers.¹⁷⁵

In the following Summit in Cairo (1964) the lack of consensus around organisation within NAM led to several years of postponement of the next Summit. This period of the so-called ‘continuity or nonalignment crisis’ ended only at the Lusaka Conference in September 1970 when NAM acquired its final shape. Namely, suitable conditions to create the first permanent bodies enabled an organized and coordinated activity of the nonaligned. Tito’s idea about the necessity to form a broad international association that would bring together all nonaligned countries was finally realized. After Lusaka, a period often labelled as the ‘golden age’ of nonalignment followed, a time of ‘institutional mechanisms of cooperation between members with their frequent and offensive joint action in international relations’.¹⁷⁶

Thus, NAM’s formal establishment in Belgrade in 1961 was not only a result of Yugoslav foreign policy, active state diplomacy and travels to the developing, post-colonial, Third World countries that allowed Yugoslavia to become a powerful player within the international context. It is important to discern that it was equally the outworking of its pursuit of self-management. The shift towards broad inclusion based on the respect for and support of sovereignty and independence in pursuit of local prosperity and social experiments mirrored the practice and basic tenets of self-management as a radical version of decentralisation with emphasis placed on the situations of

¹⁷⁴ Alimov, *The Rise and Growth* (1987) 114-115.

¹⁷⁵ However, alliance in nonalignment revealed contradictions, differences and disparity too (chapter 5).

¹⁷⁶ Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement’ in Novaković, *Neutrality in the 21st Century* (2013) 36-37.

constituent republics (chapter 3). This shows how nonalignment was but the outworking of self-management. Kardelj captured this when saying that ‘self-management is not something peculiar to Yugoslavia’ but a response to particular national and international situation and represents genuine international cooperation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic setup of any state.¹⁷⁷ Its ‘turn outwards’, within the context of its foreign policy orientation of nonalignment and by way of its state diplomacy, portrays that the very establishment of Yugoslav post-WWII state was never an isolated (domestic) affair, aiming always to go international.

4.6. The International: Conceptual Portrait of Nonalignment in the Non-Aligned Movement

The complexity of classifying varieties of NAM members and the heterogenous character of their conduct leads to a somewhat direct query about its ontology. Such enquiry was aptly expressed in the 1963 editorial of the Indian Express: ‘It would be interesting to know... what exactly is meant by nonalignment. Could somebody enlighten us?’¹⁷⁸

Due to the sheer geographical scale its members represent by its members, NAM remains a difficult phenomenon to assess comprehensively. Over the years, NAM has been portrayed in various ways: as a coherent group, as an instrument and a principle of foreign policy affecting and justifying diplomatic orientation of its member states, and as a ‘collective Movement in world politics’ offering ‘solidarity of the less powerful in global affairs’.¹⁷⁹ It was also labelled a ‘loose and diverse political grouping’,¹⁸⁰ and a

¹⁷⁷ Edvard Kardelj in David Bošković and Blagoje Dašić (eds), *Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia: 1950-1980, Documents* (Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice 1980) 10.

¹⁷⁸ See ‘Editorial’ *Indian Express* (7 March 1963); Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 16.

¹⁷⁹ Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) xiii, 3.

¹⁸⁰ Hennie Strydom, ‘The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations’ 2007 (11) *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* NYB 1-46, 2.

‘moderating force in the cold war and in the post-colonial world’.¹⁸¹ Rakove went even further with his rather tall claim that the nonaligned ‘brought about a dialectical change in the traditional formula that power plus brute force equals effectiveness’.¹⁸² A W Singham and Shirley Hune described it as an ‘unusual phenomenon’ and used various imageries of what NAM is: a ‘coalition of small and middle-sized states’, an international ‘antiimperialist peace movement’.¹⁸³ Others have described it as a project, an ideology, a trend, a vogue, a *mentalité*, and so on.¹⁸⁴ Rikhi Jaipal, portrayed NAM as a ‘conscientious objector’ symbolising the voice of states unwilling to accept the ideology or demands of either of the two blocs.¹⁸⁵ Jackson considered it not a political party but rather a coalition group, an international democratic alliance or better still, an international lobby, supporting issues which its members agree with.¹⁸⁶ Yet, what all of the above agree is that NAM was a direct positive coordinated action, resisting the monopoly of the powerful by actively adopting their own position according to their interests. Its role was therefore dynamic as its position modified itself according to the needs and problems facing the world. In this way, they could lean on and coincide with one or the other power bloc at any given time on a particular issue.¹⁸⁷ What thus becomes evident is that the movement was an example of creative statesmanship, a skill arguably lacking yet desperately needed amidst the present 21st-century populist (social media) showmanship in interstate relations.

¹⁸¹ Robert B Rakove, ‘The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6’ 2015 (37) 5 *The International History Review* 991-1013, 991.

¹⁸² Ranko Petković, ‘Nonaligned in Nineteen Eighties’ March 1981 (20) *The Review* 1-4.

¹⁸³ A W Singham and Shirley Hune, *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (Westport: Lawrence Hill 1986) 1, 3.

¹⁸⁴ Byrne, ‘Beyond Continents’ (2015) 912.

¹⁸⁵ Rikhi Jaipal, *Non-alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers 1983) 175.

¹⁸⁶ Richard L Jackson, *The Non-aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger 1983) xvii.

¹⁸⁷ Singham and Hune, *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 82; Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 8; Cairo preparatory meeting Communiqué.

The enormity of the task to assess NAM's 'identity' becomes apparent by unwrapping the dynamism and variations among its members. Accordingly, scholars disagree on nonalignment's conceptual origins too. Parameswaran Nair traced a reference to the phrase as early as 1947, while Devdutt held it was not commonly used before the late 1950s.¹⁸⁸ The term was arguably coined by the Indian nationalist, diplomat, statesman V K Menon in his speech at the UN in 1953, and his friend Nehru used it in 1954. While Richard Jackson and Yuri Alimov agreed that it was coined by Nehru in his speech in Colombo (28 April 1954), Rajak traced its earliest mention to Tito and Nehru's joint statement a few months later (22 December 1954).¹⁸⁹ Tito's speech in the Indian Parliament the day before demonstrated his already sophisticated ideas about the meaning and definition of nonengagement and peaceful coexistence.¹⁹⁰ However, Kardelj spoke of conceptual underpinnings of nonalignment already in September 1950 at the fifth UNGA session, when he alluded that a position between the two blocs was possible, as only the 'road of democratic struggle for a world in which people are free and equal, for democratic relations between nations... would eliminate outside interference in internal affairs of nations, and... a full peaceful cooperation between nations based on equality'.¹⁹¹ Yet, the conceptually difficult analysis is again a reflection of a genuine radical alternative that does not seek to

¹⁸⁸ Nair, 'Nonalignment: History, Ideology, Prospects' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 43-45; Devdutt, 'India: National Interest' in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 65.

¹⁸⁹ AY, 837, I -2/4-1: Joint Statement between Tito and Nehru, signed during his state visit to India (New Delhi, 22nd December 1954). See also Jackson, *The Non-aligned* (1983) 6; Alimov, *The Rise and Growth* (1987) 22-23; Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips' (2014) 147. For definitions of nonalignment, see also *Times of India* (23 May, 15 June, 26 June, 4 September 1961).

¹⁹⁰ AY, 837, I-2/4-1: Tito's speech in the Indian Parliament (New Delhi, 21 December 1954) touched on the Yugoslav foreign policy, the division into opposing blocs and spheres of interest, peaceful coexistence, global integrations and economic aid to Third World countries. See also Rajak, 'No Bargaining Chips' (2014) 174. On Tito's definition of 'coexistence' see Tito's address to the Federal Assembly on 7 March 1955, in Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 5. See also section II of *Belgrade Declaration* and section V of Cairo preparatory meeting *Communiqué*.

¹⁹¹ Kardelj's speech at the Fifth Annual Session of the UNGA (20-28 September 1950) in Mates, *Nonalignment* (1972) 216; Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 29.

impose uniformity but becomes evident in the differences that emerge. A global experiment of international cooperation whose approach rested on a specific radical worldview and was dynamic – full of creative dialectical tension that propels its constantly changing incarnation.

Therefore, when one of the most prominent writers on NAM, Yugoslav scholar and ambassador to the US Leo Mates labelled nonalignment as a ‘shallow concept and a meaningless category’ and argued that NAM members have not much in common other than a (sensible) decision to stay clear from the disputes between the two superpowers, it is a failure to see the radicality of the movement.¹⁹² This was also the case with the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1961-1969) who made a similar remark that there seem to be ‘many shades of opinion and the only ‘solid’ thing [the nonaligned members] seem to have in common is that they do not wish be aligned to any of the two blocs’.¹⁹³ Both statements fail to recognise the varied and rich, even prolific generation and discussion of phrases such as ‘non-commitment’, ‘active peaceful coexistence’, ‘non-interference in the affairs of others’ and ‘struggle for global peace’ by the press, politicians or scholars toward the end of 1950s.¹⁹⁴ With the 1961 Belgrade Summit these phrases were recognised as a coherent set of ideas and became the revolutionary movement’s conceptual ‘building blocs’, used thereafter to depict the evolving new kind of foreign policy of a group of radical anti-colonial and anti-imperialist states that came together to discuss common interests and articulate a similar outlook on the events of that time.¹⁹⁵ What emerged was nonalignment as a political ‘philosophy of foreign relations’,¹⁹⁶ and the states’ foreign policy choice that resists the East-West pressures in pursuit of their independent path.¹⁹⁷ Some commentators going as far as characterising it as a ‘universal political

¹⁹² Mates, *Nonalignment* (1972) 129.

¹⁹³ Secretary’s Rusk news conference in *The New York Times* (18 November 1961).

¹⁹⁴ See Darryl C Thomas, *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity* (Westport: Praeger 2001) 73.

¹⁹⁵ Rajak, ‘No Bargaining Chips’ (2014) 146-179.

¹⁹⁶ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 3.

¹⁹⁷ M S Rajan, *Nonalignment and Nonaligned Movement: Retrospect and Prospect* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 1990) 70.

doctrine' accredited with status of a 'mainstay of the democratisation of international relations' – and expressed at the Belgrade Summit (1961), at the third Lusaka (1970) and fourth Algiers (1973) Summit.¹⁹⁸

It is important to consider fully the two general conceptual pillars that formed the basis of nonalignment and upon which the main objectives or principles of NAM were built. The first pillar of the right of self-determination demonstrated or extrapolated the essential and cohesive relationship between domestic and foreign policy of independence and its outworking.¹⁹⁹ Crabb Jr rightly assessed that nonalignment is arguably even the hallmark and the prerequisite of independence, as it precludes any permanent or 'automatic' identification with either of the two blocs.²⁰⁰ Namely, NAM did not begin simply as a direct consequence of the existence of blocs *per se* but its emergence and being necessitated opposition to blocs because they stiffened the limitations imposed upon freedom, whether political, economic or cultural.²⁰¹ Therefore, NAM's opposition and resistance to perpetuated domination by any of the two bloc powers, was a natural outworking of its insistence on self-determination and the possibility to decide for themselves in the spirit of diplomatic freedom, irrespectively of size.²⁰²

The second pillar of aversion to blocs is the embodiment of a call for genuine democratisation of international relations that implied – indeed necessitated – rejection of control by the superpowers and solidarity with Third World interests relating to strategic world political and economic issues.²⁰³ And while Kardelj characterised NAM as a 'single action force' created in the Cold War as a resistance to bloc division, the purpose for NAM was not to form another monolithic group and members refused to be labelled as a third

¹⁹⁸ See New Delhi Summit Declaration (1983) paragraph 15; Petković, *Non-Alignment* (1979) 5, 32. See also Tito in Köchler, *The Principles of Non-Alignment* (1982) 3.

¹⁹⁹ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 380.

²⁰⁰ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 12.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.* 12.

²⁰² *The Conference* (1961) 18.

²⁰³ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 380.

bloc.²⁰⁴ Singham and Hune similarly noted that NAM was not yet ‘another regional Third World organisation’ or an extra bloc in world politics but seeking consciously to be identified as an ‘anti-bloc’.²⁰⁵ Crabb Jr concurred that the goal was actually the ‘elimination of tightly cohesive, antagonistic diplomatic blocs’.²⁰⁶ In fact, in his opening statement at 1961 Belgrade Summit, Tito declared that members ought to adopt a ‘negative attitude towards bloc exclusiveness’, reasoning that blocs, and the divisions of the world they bring, give rise to tensions, threaten world peace and prevent participation based on equality.²⁰⁷ Tito’s goal was always to maintain Yugoslavia’s independence in pursuit of diplomatic freedom, without alliance with or reliance upon to the two blocs. Kardelj elaborated accordingly, saying that the nonaligned position does not stem from some sort of *a priori* confrontation or principled opposition to ideology of protagonists but from the realisation that a divided world cannot solve conflicts or pave the way to more democratic international relations and consequently to a more equitable global order.²⁰⁸

Thus, Yugoslav leadership’s choice to ‘distance itself from Europe and tie itself with practically unknown and geographically distant Africa, Asia and Latin America’ was an embodiment of direct democratic international relations and appealing in those countries for two reasons.²⁰⁹ First, the concept of peaceful coexistence and advocacy for self-determination as an instrument of Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy was the most important thesis in Yugoslav foreign relations. Therefore, I argue, the variants of socialist vision can be a testimony to theory about the relationship between

²⁰⁴ Mates, *Nonalignment* (1972) 3.

²⁰⁵ Regional groupings such as OAU, OAS, ASEAN, SAARC, or functional groupings such as EEC, OEECD, Group of 77. Singham and Hune, *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 2. The Yugoslav aversion to the power blocs was evidenced also in the writings of Kardelj, Grlićkov and Mates.

²⁰⁶ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 9; Josip Broz Tito, ‘On Certain Current International Questions’ 1957 (36) 1 *Foreign Affairs* 68-77. See also the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, Article 2.

²⁰⁷ *The Conference* (1961) 18.

²⁰⁸ Kardelj, *Historical Roots* (1978) 5.

²⁰⁹ Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and Non-Alignment’ (2014) 616.

nonaligned foreign policy and socialism, the very idea of which Yugoslavia was a proponent of. Such a link is evidenced in NAM's expansion and flourishing during the 1960s and the 1970s, with Belgrade, Cairo and Lusaka as examples of (arguably the most) fruitful Third World alliance. The three Summits highlight member governments' successful response to the pressures in postcolonial moments through their radical (socialist) vision and active engagement in the international scene through the UN as an avenue and platform: G77 (1964), NIEO (1975). Indeed, the perception that foreign policies are influenced by domestic systems is not something new in international politics nor unique to Yugoslavia.²¹⁰ Where Yugoslavia differed, though, is in its thinking that universalism is not feasible and its domestic system of self-management not applicable to all, or any, nonaligned state.²¹¹ Indeed, peaceful coexistence is possible where nations are able to develop as they see fit and are free of, and without, pressures or interference from the outside.²¹²

Second, not being racially grounded, like Afro-Asianism, Pan-Arabism or Pan-Africanism, NAM enabled a wider, more 'universal' applicability for membership (and as such a stronger grouping in international legal order). True, already at the Bandung conference (1955), the host Indonesian President Sukarno portrayed the Third World as a vital moral force that has

²¹⁰ Much traditional international relations and diplomatic history argues that the 'main determinant of states' foreign policies is their external environments', while others would argue that 'internal characteristics and domestic politics are crucial [and] that different states will behave differently despite similarities in their external situation'. Robert Jervis, 'Identity and the Cold War' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (2010) 27.

²¹¹ As opposed to the Soviets and the Americans who were, as Kenneth Waltz framed, the 'second-image' thinkers. Similarly, Robert Jervis contended that both ideologies implied that 'balance of power might temporarily yield peace and security. But because of the primary role of the nature of the domestic regime, the world could be made safe for democracy (for the United States) or for communism (for the Soviet Union) only if one became dominant if not universal throughout the world'. Consequently, neither side reacted to the Third World as it actually was but as what they perceived it to be through their own lenses. For both sides modernization was crucial, Jervis wrote, but in quite different ways. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press 1959); Jervis, 'Identity and the Cold War' in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (2010) 25, 27, 35.

²¹² Singham and Hune, *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 83-84.

the potential to save the world from the dangers of imperialism and war.²¹³ He projected that the developing nations could transform international life if they would mobilise ‘all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace’.²¹⁴ In this sense, the aim was comparable to that of NAM, labelled ‘global in character’ and as a ‘transnational universal organisation’.²¹⁵ However, when characterizing NAM a ‘social movement’, it is vital to keep a distinction in mind. Namely, NAM as state-based in character functions as a movement only in international relations, allowing the institutional forms within each state to vary (and develop as seen fit). Indeed, as a post-WWII phenomenon NAM did something novel, as it encompassed ‘not a place but a political project’ and rested on the idea of a ‘potentially unbounded membership rather than the expression of a non-Western, non-white identity’.²¹⁶ It became a primary organisational concept for the nonaligned countries and thus arguably substituted and/or superseded Afro-Asianism, and for that matter Nasser’s Pan-Arabism and Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism.

As such, and in addition to embodiment of independence in self-determination and aversion to blocs, it was also included in the members’ commitment to disarmament, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, an enhanced UN’s role in international affairs, anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid (and the abolition of all forms of neo-colonialism and racism in international affairs), and the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). As Sirimavo Bandaranaike stated in her inaugural speech to the Fifth Summit (Colombo 1976), nonalignment ‘stands for unity

²¹³ The *Third World* is a rubric coined arguably in 1952 by the French demographer, anthropologist and historian Alfred Sauvy in his article published in the magazine *L’Observateur*. He was referring with this term to countries that were unaligned with either of the two Cold War blocs. See for example Leslie Wolf-Phillips, ‘Why “Third World”? Origin, Definition and Usage’ 1987 (9) 4 *Third World Quarterly* 1311-1327.

²¹⁴ Sukarno’s speech at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung on 18 April 1955 available at <<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955sukarno-bandong.html>> accessed 15 May 2017.

²¹⁵ Singham and Hune, *Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 1.

²¹⁶ Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (2007) xv; Byrne, ‘Beyond Continents’ (2015) 912.

in diversity and independence in interdependence'.²¹⁷ Yugoslavia's principles and practise of self-management were crucial in directing nonalignment and NAM as a device to achieve a form of moral unity and political solidarity with un(der)developed countries without possessing sufficient military and economic power to play a decisive role in world affairs. Their political strength was felt mostly in the UNGA, where in case of a crisis they could exercise influence. Despite their economic weakness, the Third World nations gained numerical strength and hence, political advantage.²¹⁸ They held the majority in the UNGA despite their political diversity and showed, according to Willetts, a cohesion greater than that of the Western bloc.²¹⁹ Indeed, as they were able to protect their independence through cooperation, NAM opened possibilities for all members, for Yugoslavia and for the newly sovereign Third World countries. The anti-colonial sentiment was used to expose most of the world problems as a direct or indirect consequence of imperialism.²²⁰ By promoting NAM's principles gained in its domestic direct-democratic governance and policy enabling cooperation and peaceful coexistence, Yugoslavs showcased their participation in the anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggle. Yugoslavia's support for liberation movements and its openly anticolonial stance gave it status of a 'friendly 'white' state'.²²¹ The country assumed the role of the 'agency of the subaltern' and acted as the representation of the one 'on the fringes (of Europe)' and a representative for the decolonised.²²² Their mission was to voice among the leaders in the

²¹⁷ Rajan, *Nonalignment and Nonaligned Movement* (1990) 71-72.

²¹⁸ A valuable contribution to this debate could be by Tony Smith as he introduced the analytical framework of pericentrism, pointing to the significant role played by what he called 'junior members in the international system' in blocking, moderating, expanding, or intensifying the conflict' (for example, Israel, Cuba, or movements such as the Sandinistas). See Tony Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War' 2000 (24) 4 *Diplomatic History* 567-591.

²¹⁹ Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 89-112.

²²⁰ Miodrag Georgevich, *An Analysis of Yugoslavia's Policy of Peaceful Coexistence from 1948 to 1960* (PhD Thesis, The University of Michigan 1970).

²²¹ Most notable cases of Yugoslavia's assistance to the efforts of national liberation movements were Algeria against France (1954-1962) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Belgium (1960). Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (1970) 84-91; Vučetić and Betts, *Tito in Africa* (2017) 14.

²²² Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 13.

postcolonial states the possibility of an independent form of governance and the prospect to protect their independence through cooperation.

While initially scholars did link the concept with traditional notions of neutralism, such active engagement only confirmed that nonalignment was not neutrality.²²³ In Cairo preparatory meeting, for instance, the nonaligned were referred to as the *uncommitted* or the *non-committed*. Leo Mates defined nonalignment simply as a ‘policy of non-participation in bloc groupings, military alliances, or political blocs’.²²⁴ Hans J Morgenthau’s also (un)intentionally named it neutrality while deliberating nonalignment may mean ‘escapism, pure and simple; it may mean political non-commitment; it may mean moral indifference, and it may mean surreptitious alignment with the Soviet Bloc’.²²⁵ Richard Jackson observed that ‘to Western ears the word [implied] a sense of balance or equidistance’, but continued that this was not the case for Nehru and his fellow statesmen as for them the concept ‘embodied a separate identity and role for developing states rather than fixed positions defined in relation to outside blocs’.²²⁶ Drawing on Nehru’s speeches, nonalignment was not ‘fence-sitting’ nor ‘middle-of-the-road policy’ in a world split into isolated fragments, but a ‘positive, constructive

²²³ To note, just as nonalignment was referred to in different ways, so was the terminology of neutralism. It was diverse, with the broad ‘neutral’ policy avenues ranging from states coerced to accept the neutral status (Austria, Laos) to those opting freely for a status of official neutrality (Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Finland). See, for instance, Lyon, *Neutralism* (1963); D N Malik, ‘Belgrade: New Phase’ in Karunakaran, *Outside the Contest* (1963) 197; Sayegh in Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1978) 18-21; Joseph Kruzal and Michael L Haltzel (eds), *Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned States* (Cambridge: The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and CUP 1989); Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 5. See also Mikael Nilsson and Marco Wyss, ‘The Armed Neutrality Paradox: Sweden and Switzerland in US Cold War Armaments Policy’ 2016 (51) 2 *Journal of Contemporary History* 335-363; Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland* (New York, London: Routledge 2014).

²²⁴ Mates, *Nonalignment* (1972) 75-76.

²²⁵ Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century: Vol III, The Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962) 335.

²²⁶ Jackson, *The Non-aligned* (1983) 6.

policy' peace-making mission, achieved with other like-minded states.²²⁷

As such, nonalignment then does not connote nonengagement, passivity or isolationism, nor does it imply the absence of foreign policy. It is not neutrality.²²⁸

True, contradictions in interpretation of the concept by the members themselves existed and were reflected in their conduct in the UN. Membership was diverse from its inception onward, and so were the Movement's conceptual and policy interpretations – the heterogeneity apparent already at the Cairo preparatory meeting (June 1961).²²⁹ For instance, while NAM emerged as a non-military initiative, it did not, in principle, object to military pacts, nor was it equated with nonviolence. What members did oppose was a 'permanent diplomatic or military identification with great powers'.²³⁰ They opposed only 'aggressive' military alliances, although this would still leave open the rightful question of who determined them as such.²³¹ Also, other initiatives with the aim to achieve or preserve independence from the East-West rivalry included the Organization of African Unity (OAU), international arrangements including the frameworks of bilateral relations or forms of alternative coalitions (at times including members of the main Cold War alliances) and NAM.²³² Furthermore, too often NAM was associated with a notion of the Third World that connoted (only) un(der)developing countries which, as Kardelj argued, did not hold up for every nonaligned state. In fact, many developed countries joined the Movement as they identified with its (various) goals. By the time of the

²²⁷ See Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961* (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 1961) 14, 24, 28, 79-80, 45-48, 251.

²²⁸ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 6.

²²⁹ Ibid. 24.

²³⁰ Ibid. 13.

²³¹ Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 185.

²³² AOU's founding charter (May 1963) affirmed 'policy of nonalignment regarding all blocs'. However, in mediation efforts by AOU nonaligned members in African conflicts the term nonalignment can arguably be employed expansively as their efforts were to practice a nonaligned foreign policy but not necessarily acting under NAM's auspices. C O C Amate, *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice* (New York, Basingstoke: Macmillan 1986) 25-27, 63.

second Summit in Cairo (1964), NAM comprised of member states that were prosperous European states (Cyprus, with Sweden joining as an observer state at the fourth Summit), former colonies (India, Nigeria) or not (Ethiopia, Yugoslavia), but most were poor African and Asian countries (Burma, Chad). Some members were inclined westward (Bolivia as an observer state) and others eastward (Tanzania, Syria), while some neither way (Burma, Burundi).²³³

However, that nonalignment was a strict middle ground between the East and the West seemed to be prevalent misconception about nonalignment in the West. Yet, ‘neither philosophically nor in the actual conduct of their foreign relations do nonaligned countries accept the obligation of equidistance’.²³⁴ Nasser captured the point when saying that ‘our voice... is not counted as automatic one...’.²³⁵ Accordingly, the politics of nonalignment was not neutrality and meant more than just mere passive opposition to blocs. It aspired more than a ‘pragmatic search of equidistance between blocs’.²³⁶ In fact, and somewhat ironically, it became an ‘effective strategy for maximising economic aid from rival blocs’.²³⁷ The nonaligned aimed to challenge the system of powerful states that was to be accepted as given and where those in power could ‘intervene [as they pleased] ... for purpose of protecting their own interest or order as a whole’, and reform the given dominance and order whereby neutral states were part of the Western or the Eastern social and economic system.²³⁸

²³³ Mates, *Nonalignment* (1972); Jackson, *The Non-aligned* (1983) 5-8.

²³⁴ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 10. See also Aleš Bebler, ‘Role of the Non-Bloc Countries’ 1958 (IX) *Review of International Affairs* 1-2; Aleš Bebler, ‘Non-Alignment and the Theory of Equidistance’ 1961 (XII) *Review of International Affairs* 1-2.

²³⁵ Crabb Jr, *The Elephants and the Grass* (1965) 11-12.

²³⁶ Kardelj, *Historical Roots* (1978) 4.

²³⁷ Jackson, *The Non-aligned* (1983) 6.

²³⁸ Philip Windsor, ‘Neutral states in historical perspective’ in Kruzel and Haltzel, *Between the Blocs* (1989) 3-6.

4.7. Conclusions

In this chapter I introduced NAM as a political state-based project, in the context of its formation in the 1950s and the early 1960s. I explored reasons for its emergence within the wider landscape of the political, legal, economic and social issues of that time and within the context of the long genealogy of radical alternative international conferences from the 1940s onward. I focused on Yugoslavia's emancipatory politics at home and abroad through its internal mechanism of self-management and its outworking through the foreign policy of nonalignment. The crucial role of Yugoslavia in the formation of the Movement made the country not only its founding member, together with Egypt and India, but also assume a leading position among the nonaligned nations. Because the establishment of NAM came at the height of decolonization, it provided Yugoslavia with organic opportunities to influence and promote its vision, as well as expanding economic opportunities and political alignments. This was a convenient way of opening up the country without falling into either one of the two ideological-military blocs. It was also to continue to work out the implications of its domestic model of governance and demonstrate its import.

My analysis showed how pragmatic decisions amidst Cold War crises and a renewed focus on the geo-political peripheries resulted in extensive travels by prominent world leaders. Their search for alternative international alliances actively and effectively contributed to formalisation of NAM in 1961 at the Belgrade Summit. My study also revealed how pragmatism and diplomacy of the nonaligned members was and is reflected in the scholarship accounts, where the history of NAM and the concept of nonalignment was, and remains, understood differently by lawyers, politicians, diplomats, or academics. Indeed, critical examination of the concept of nonalignment reveals inconsistencies between various accounts and highlights contradictions and divergences in understandings of it. Similarly, I encountered disparities in different and competing narratives about NAM's formation. Rather than warranting a dismissal of the concept and NAM, its heterogenous character testifies to its complex origin and speaks of its

radically different characters. It is also due to the intricacy and complexity of the Movement that my analysis process was performed through Yugoslavia's seminal influence in the formation and grounding of the international grouping that enabled such a radical mode of international cooperation.

Correspondingly, the movement's two most prominent markers, resistance to alignment with the blocs and anti-colonialism or decolonisation, were not based on identification with a particular position but rather the implementation of its pursuit of independence. That is, Yugoslavia was never an imperial nor colonial country and might not have had first-hand experience of colonialism that would naturally connect it with the Third World countries. It was Yugoslav conviction arising from its own struggles with national sovereignty, and its own governance apart from external influence, that gave its credence. Such self-perception developed into a type of public discourse, where ideas and values of solidarity, equality, socialism, anticolonialism, anti-racialism and anti-imperialism were shared without having to reflect on its position in a narrative of knowledge production of the former (yet perpetuated) colonial order. I argue, thus, that the case of Yugoslavia uniquely contributes to our understanding of NAM – as a unique movement with socialist conviction of independence rooted outside the Global North and open membership that subverts the idea of an identity or position, be it geographical or even that of non-whiteness.

Tito's extensive travels around Asia, Middle East and Africa proved crucial in promoting Yugoslavia's vision and eventual acceptance of a new solidarity that led to the constitution of NAM, and even later when spreading to South and Central America. Yugoslavia's orientation towards a peaceful solidarity of genuine openness mirrored the direct democracy of self-management at home. By becoming a primary organisational concept for the peripheral countries of the Third World through the Yugoslav vision, this prominent phenomenon signalled a particular openness and represented an alternative to the East-West axis. NAM was a (radical) potential in the bi-polar international legal order that excluded alliance to any of the two monolith structures. Despite disparity of social systems and cultural diversity, Yugoslavia began to offer technical assistance and economic aid to the countries fighting the

anticolonial cause and helping the anticolonial liberation movements. Their means of relating were thus not only ideological and discursive but also political and economic. As Mišković has explained, Yugoslavia assumed the role and acted as a representative of the ‘agency of the subaltern’, the decolonised and one ‘on the fringes (of Europe)’.²³⁹

It is here that socialism, in the form of self-management, and anti-colonialism emerge as not only intertwined but interrelated as an experimental empirical method or a unique radical alternative. This vision was also the one that gained most attraction as opposed to ideas of organisation around a position, geography or identity. This signalled the beginning of a unique experiment and an alternative in international engagement. As NAM was based on broad inclusion, it embodied the respect for and support of sovereignty and independence in pursuit of local prosperity and social experiments. In this way, it mirrored the practice and basic tenets of Yugoslavia’s self-management.

Therefore, I reason, NAM’s significance should not be diminished at the point of its formation or at present. Despite, or alongside, the complexity of the Movement, respective differences in interpreting the concept of nonalignment and heterogenous character of the conduct of its members, a historical review of NAM is of value. As I portrayed in this chapter, nonalignment, as a primary organisational concept for the peripheral countries, signals a particular openness that arguably proves itself to represent a potential when thinking about the international law at present.

In other words, such an experimental movement was, due to its origin and its very being, necessarily heterogenous and varied in its emerging manifestations of peaceful co-existence and self-determination. Reflecting on it through the past actions taken by a particular geopolitical entity such as Yugoslavia – its idiosyncratic forms, such as ideas of NAM, theories of self-management, its particular socialist modernism and cultural forms – provide an insight into a historical period that had a profound impact on political,

²³⁹ Mišković and others, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War* (2014) 13.

legal, economic and cultural developments then, and whose consequences are arguably still shaping the world today. It contributes to an understanding of potential benefits and challenges for any one country's involvement in such phenomena. Yugoslavia's use of 'soft power' and its promotion of self-management abroad in the form of nonalignment profoundly affected the international legal and political order during the Cold War era. Namely, self-management's vision of self-determination and direct democracy through decentralisation was showcased abroad as a way of affirming national sovereignty and as means for international cooperation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic setup of any state. Analysing the context in which policies of Yugoslav nonalignment arose and developed by way of archival research, contributes to, and allows for, a more comprehensive and nuanced critique and evaluation of the Movement as a whole. The Yugoslav history and its particularism in domestic and foreign policy is important indeed, as it reveals and reflects the complexity in representation of the Cold War history which tends to characterise the post-WWII international history in terms of sharp divisions between two separate blocs and along the classic geopolitical dichotomy and its exclusive networks. Accordingly, I argue, the study of this no longer existing entity is relevant still as it adds a dimension in the narrative and evaluation of NAM, the still existing entity at present.

CHAPTER 5

Beginning of an End: Collapse of Self-management and Decline of Nonalignment (1970s and 1980s)

5.1. Introduction: Falling of Self-determination

As seen in previous chapters, post-WWII Yugoslavia was constructed as a cohesive entity under the umbrella or slogan of brotherhood and unity. The country's political repute soared after the 1948 split with Stalin, and more so with implementation of its ideology of self-governance and its manifestation in the domestic policy of self-management. Along with its nonaligned foreign policy, self-management acted as glue of the social fabric and symbolised the high-held reputation of President Tito who stood as a unifying authority at home and abroad. In previous chapters I have argued that self-management's vision of a direct democracy through decentralisation was showcased abroad as a way of affirming national sovereignty and as means for international cooperation, irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state. Furthermore, I maintained that Yugoslavia's use of soft power and its promotion of self-management abroad in the form of nonalignment affected in a profound way the international legal and political order during the Cold War era. Within Yugoslavia the two policies raised living standards and openness to the world. Outside Yugoslavia, the two policies aimed at prosperity and equality of all nations by warranting national sovereignty and equity within and through NAM. This was the radical potential and appeal of self-management and nonalignment. Yugoslav domestic policy of direct-democracy of enterprises stood in contrast to the socialist systems of Eastern European Soviet satellites, and its workers' participation in contrast to the workers' position and role in capitalism. Its foreign policy of nonalignment, and NAM, were considered as the best chance of overcoming the world division into two blocs.

In this chapter I analyse the limits to the initial successes of self-management and nonalignment. I explore their challenges and shortcomings in terms of their dialectical relationship as demonstrated in the preceding two chapters. In particular, I demonstrate how the principle and right of self-determination underpinning self-management and nonalignment were exercised in a contested and fragile environment locally and globally within the wider context of the Cold War and the post-imperial world order. While I argued in previous chapters that the Cold War was a space-moment that permitted forms of national and international experimentation, I argue here that it simultaneously generated a geopolitical context that stifled long-term sustainable radical change. Regardless of Yugoslav openness and promotion of solidarity at home, and despite the initial success of advancing diversity globally, its vision of self-determination as a legal concept for independence and an egalitarian world order proved contingent on the two power-blocs' specific understanding. In the wider global events of emerging multipolarity, the Leninist 'inclusive' vision of self-determination became undermined as difference exacerbated both, within Yugoslavia and in NAM. The Wilsonian 'exclusive' vision of self-determination - albeit this time in economic sense - re-emerged as a vehicle for advancing super-powers' own interests. In summary, I demonstrate in this chapter how the Cold War's geopolitical context, which gave rise to self-management and nonalignment also brought them to their downfall.

In the 1950s and the 1960s, self-management's *modus operandi* was remarkably successful - boosting the economic growth, the political prestige and improving living standards. At the turn of the 1970s, however, self-management began to lose momentum as the democratic form of participation and decision making was traversing between the political and economic spheres. Self-management unravelled in the 1980s, resulting in its abolition, and in the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991/92. Observing the development of self-management and the re-purposing of nonalignment by the Yugoslav theoreticians reveals, therefore, a dichotomy between their principles and practice. Indeed, the process of domestic demise went parallel with the state's lessened engagement and influence in NAM. Nonetheless, I argue, it is in

those very principles and lessons learned from practice that the two experimental methods of national and international governance still represent a potential for the present.

5.2. The Local: Further Domestic Reforms, Crisis of Self-management and the Fall of a Dream of Yugoslavia

As seen in previous chapters, self-management was ratified in 1950. The new legal framework allowed a large-scale implementation in every aspect of domestic affairs including, of course, the national economy. Yugoslavia enjoyed a remarkable growth, standing out from countries in the Soviet system, its Eastern bloc satellites, and comparable countries in the West.¹ In the years following the 1952 6th Congress it seemed as if the directing role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) might indeed gradually wither away. The 1960s reforms further institutionalised self-management as the main operating principle in the political and economic spheres. It was a time of increased openness towards the West. Tourist visas for foreigners were no longer required, and from 1961 it became possible to work abroad.² Liberating politics in issuing passports to all Yugoslavs in 1962 resulted in a large-scale economic emigration of ‘Gastarbeiter’ [German: ‘guest workers’]. The opening of borders helped the country’s public finances and at the same time enabled a free exchange of people and ideas. This openness was a sign of the continuing decentralisation of the spheres in the country.

However, the economic and political crises of 1970s and 1980s derailed the course of Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policy. As will be seen in this chapter, NAM’s development went through similar challenges. It is important

¹ Karim Medjad, ‘The Fate of the Yugoslav Model: A Case Against Legal Conformity’ 2004 (52) *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 287-319, 293. Horvat portrayed this growth using World Bank data. Branko Horvat, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (New York: M E Sharpe 1982).

² Sergej Flere, ‘Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna? [Was Tito’s Yugoslavia totalitarian?]' 2012 (5) 1 *Političke Prespective: Časopis za Istraživanje Politike* 7-21; Roy Moore, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (London: Fabian Society 1970) 1.

to note also the so-called human factor of their demise.³ Namely, since Yugoslavia was based on an idea, death of the key creators of the two concepts - Edvard Kardelj in 1979 and Josip Broz Tito in 1980 - and the ensuing political vacuum arguably played a significant role as well.⁴ Similarly in NAM, as Tito, Nehru and Nasser passed, the cracks within the Movement grew. As (creators of) ideas die, then with them, the empires (usually) perish too.

5.2.1. Negative International (Economic) Trends

First, the impact on the course of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies can be linked to a collateral damage of the general collapse of socialist regimes worldwide. This included the effect of the USSR changes in policy and Soviet leadership but also changes in character of overall East-West relations, and indeed changes in the structure of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity.

Second, the course of the 'Yugoslav way' was influenced directly by the oil crisis in the 1970s. The rising and erratic international oil prices and supply meant that the Yugoslav government had to raise oil prices by as much as 50 percent and introduce measures to stem the rising inflation and trade deficits.⁵ Unfortunately, this only increased Yugoslavia's debt crisis due to increasing reliance on Western (economic) aid (FREQAID) in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, its debt towards international creditors was growing, even more so with Western banks being keen to recover 'petrodollars'.⁶ While attempts at deregulation of the market placed their hope in sharing of the debt by

³ Janko Prunk, *Kratka zgodovina Slovenije [Short History of Slovenia]* (Ljubljana: Grad 2002) 178. See also Raymond Duncan and G Paul Holman, *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict* (Oxford: Westview Press 1994); Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington, 'Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?' Winter 1985-86 (10) 3 *International Security* 112-146; James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter Publishers 1992).

⁴ Prunk, *Short History* (2002) 178.

⁵ See Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 454-456.

⁶ Petrodollars were US dollars paid to an oil producing/exporting country. The so-called petrodollar system emerged in the early 1970s with the agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia to standardize the sale of oil based on the US dollar.

constituent republics and enterprises, Yugoslavia's trade deficit reached an eye-watering six-fold increase in five years, resulting in repeat requests for Western financial aid.⁷

Indeed, borrowing became a constant in Yugoslav foreign policy objectives.⁸ Although the country received considerable economic aid from the West, particularly from the US, already after the USSR-Yugoslav split, foreign economic aid increased considerably from the 1970s onward. During the 1970s Yugoslavia received around 600 million dollars to 'finance regional development programs and to aid domestic consumption needs such as wheat and oil imports' due to their rising costs. Western aid received during the 1980s was one of the largest, at around 10 billion dollars. Most came from banks and major western lending institutions, IMF and IBRD. While the primary purpose was to fund the Yugoslav 20-billion-dollar foreign debt, foreign assistance financed various development projects too, notably, the national rail network improvement. To 'keep Tito afloat' was also the way for the West to tacitly, and tactically, tolerate Yugoslav independent road to socialism and its nonaligned policy while keeping the country dependent. In other words, while aid from international monetary institutions obfuscated internal contradictions and the level of crisis, it at the same time deepened it.

The impact of foreign assistance on the Yugoslav foreign affairs was for a short time masked as the missing data concealed its actual significance on the economy. It obscured the crisis due to the oil prices and inflation in the second half of the 1960s and gave the appearance of relative stability. The high rate of inflation, rising trade deficit and the three-month freeze on prices set by the federal government in 1971 indicated the worsening of economic problems that spoke clearly of increasing problems. As will be demonstrated below, the troubles led to an increasing government involvement in economy

⁷ See Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia* (London: Croom Helm 1982); Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 454-456, 458-459, 467.

⁸ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 21-22, 403, 487-489. For a discussion of the difficulties posed by Yugoslavia's debt, see also Slobodan Stanković, 'Why Is the Economy Failing?' *Radio Free Europe Research* (4 June 1987) 7-9; Slobodan Stankovic, 'Problems With Repaying the Foreign Debt' *Radio Free Europe Research* (16 September 1978).

and politics as the crisis management. During the 1980s, the federal government signed a series of arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented structural reforms as part of the stabilization program to get help from the foreign creditors. Conditioned by the demands of international lenders, the government's industrial restructuring brought about the (widely unpopular) austerity measures in May 1988, with the key features including a 'decreased ceiling on wages, the lifting of price controls for some products, the lowering of import restrictions, the limits on federal spending, and a revaluation of dinar' with its exchange rate adjusted daily.⁹

These external factors all contributed to the destabilisation of Yugoslavia's economy and consequently to the greater involvement of the government through responsive measures, forcing a turn inward and away from its foreign policy.

5.2.2. Internal Systemic Contradictions: Dysfunctional Politics and Economic De-Re-Centralism

The new 1963 and Third Constitution (completed in 1965) was a body of thirty laws aimed at setting the foundations of the so-called market socialism, or socialism guided by market forces, including foreign ones. This transition to market economy was made possible with economic decentralization, encapsulated in the Fundamental/Basic Law on the Management of the Enterprises by the Workers of April 1965. The Law sought 'to adapt the price structure of Yugoslav industry to world conditions and so make it more competitive' by enabling the workers to control and use enterprises' revenues.¹⁰ The legal measures of decentralisation gave autonomy not only to enterprises but also to the republics and were carried in order to attract

⁹ In 1988, 1922 dinars were equivalent to one US dollar, in February 1989, 6384 dinars to one US dollar. Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: glavni procesi: 1918-1985 [History of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Main Processes: 1918-1985]* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga 1985) 486; Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 21-22; IMF, *International Financial Statistics, Volume XLII, 4 April 1989* (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund) 568-569.

¹⁰ Duncan Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) 256, 303.

foreign investment. For instance, the Law on Planning and the Social Plan of Yugoslavia, the Law on Foreign Investment (27 July 1967) and the Law on the Yugoslav Bank of International Economic Cooperation (in 1978). To encourage foreign investment and link national economy with the international market economy, the Law on Joint Enterprises (1967) allowed foreign investors to own up to 49.9 percent of Yugoslav businesses. Interestingly, the decentralization of the economy was accompanied by centralization of the financial sphere. Between 1952 and 1955, the communal banks were abolished, and others merged within the National Bank. Also, on 25 August 1966 Yugoslavia joined GATT, the international trade treaty.¹¹

Thus, the phase between the two constitutions (1963 and 1974) symbolized a beginning of a triumph for the proponents of economic liberalization. The outlook for the Yugoslav future seemed optimistic. The factory manager, politician, and trained economist Miloš Sinđić predicted that by the end of the millennium Yugoslavia would ‘definitely’ join the group of developed countries.¹² His calculations were based on the Yugoslav economic growth in 1950s and 1960s. Sinđić asserted: ‘we are closer to achieving communism in our production forces than to achieving communism in our production relations’, and credited Yugoslavia for its ‘historical achievement’ of resolving ‘this contemporary contradiction’ through its ‘program of socialist self-management’.¹³ Sinđić’s focus on the West in his assessment of humanity’s progression toward what the classics of Marxism considered its

¹¹ See Branko Horvat, ‘Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institutional Developments’ 1971 (61) 3 *American Economic Review* 71-169; Singleton and Carter, *The Economy of Yugoslavia* (1982) 156, 237; Mirodrag Sukijasovic, ‘Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia’ 1972 (37) 3 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 474-484; David D Nagler, ‘Yugoslavia: Law on Foreign Investments’ 1989 (28) 6 *International Legal Materials* 1543-1555; Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 401, 406, 427-428; Medjad, ‘The Fate of the Yugoslav Model’ (2004) 294.

¹² See Miloš M Sinđić, ‘Godine dvehiljadite: efikasnost privređivanja i perspective [The Year 2000: Efficiency of Economy and Perspectives]’ January 1969 (1) 1 *Direktor* 18-23, 23.

¹³ *Ibid.* 23.

final stage' reflected what Jakovljević called a 'shift from scientific to performance management'.¹⁴

However, by the early 1970s self-managed socialism faced the above mentioned external negative trends that had a profound impact on Yugoslav economy and consequently governance. Inflation due to the crude oil crisis and its international debts, left the country with increased unemployment, inflation and social unrests.¹⁵ This instigated a tightening of control by the authorities. As opposed to the third Constitution (1963) and its amendments (1967/68 led) favouring political decentralisation, the aim of the 1974 Constitution was to assert control of the Party through the federal government.¹⁶ Wilson and Medjad argued that the Constitution was a response to a 'series of strikes and rising ethnic tensions caused by a rising level of unemployment and a widening gap between rich and poor republics', aiming to regain original control of the workers in enterprises.¹⁷ According to Jakovljević,

*in many ways, the overhaul of self-management of the mid-1970s represented an attempt to return to a centralized economy, while keeping the appearance of economic and political liberalism that would make Yugoslav economy, and ideology, appear safe and attractive to international moneylenders.*¹⁸

Under pressures from international creditors, the government advocated for a policy of recentralization of the state.¹⁹ Like many 'centralized economies

¹⁴ His survey was grounded on the then latest technological advances in, mostly, Western Europe and the US (in bioscience, information technology). Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 188-189.

¹⁵ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 390; Christopher Prout, *Market Socialism in Yugoslavia* (New York: Oxford University Press 1985) 5-6.

¹⁶ In addition, Tito was elected president for life at the 10th LCY Congress in May 1974, and proclaimed embodiment of the Party and the symbol of the Yugoslav communist/socialist state. The 1974 Constitution, Article 333; Bridget L Coggins, *Secession, Recognition and the International Politics of Statehood* (PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University 2006).

¹⁷ Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 253-263. Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 294.

¹⁸ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 201.

¹⁹ See Chris Martin and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, 'Can Titoism Survive Tito?: Economic Problems and Policy Choices Confronting Tito's Successors' in Pedro Ramet (ed),

that use high levels of investment to stimulate growth', one being the Soviet-style communism, Bajt concluded that Yugoslavia was no exception. Namely, if between 1965 and 1974 investments decreased, they soared again after the new Constitution (1974) was adopted and rose even more from the beginning of a debt service crisis (1980) when levels exceeded the era of centralized planning (1947-1953).²⁰ Yet, despite the increased investments, the move to centralisation only exacerbated the problems inherent in its system and was thus not able to create economic growth. Rather, it hid them under the influx of funding.

The new Constitution disarmed the workers' self-management challenge against the centralized model of socialism. Coupled with the Law on Associated Labour (or Joint/United Labour Act [Serbo-Croatian: *Zakon o udruženom radu*]) in 1976, it codified the country's profound changes in the opposite direction. Its aim, developed by Tito and specifically Kardelj, was to reintroduce 'essential control' through a combination with 'popular participation'.²¹ It was heralded oxymoronically as betterment of self-management and, together with the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan, espoused to address development.²² Unfortunately, the Constitution established the last Yugoslav political framework that 'not only provided the new framework for political and territorial organization of the federation [but] for the reorganization of factories and other institutions of employment' too.²³ Indeed, the small yet significant interventions in the status of republics and autonomous regions made detailed and substantial changes to self-management's very structure.²⁴

Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press 1985) 186-188; Ljubiša Adamović, 'The Foreign Trade System of Yugoslavia' in Radmila Stojanović (ed), *The Functioning of the Yugoslav Economy* (New York: M E Sharpe Inc 1982) 147-155.

²⁰ Aleksander Bajt, *Samoupravni oblik društvene svojine [Self-governing form of social property]* (Zagreb: Globus 1988) 162.

²¹ Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 294.

²² The 1974 Constitution, Basic Principles.

²³ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 197.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 200-201.

The legislation's documents that meant to lay out the processes and outcomes of every stage in development of self-management were complex and often repetitive. To illustrate, the Constitution with 406 and the Law on Associated Labour with 671 permanent articles was deemed excessive by most legal experts. As a result, Jakovljević observed, the presented system of associated labour rapidly declined into hypernormativization.²⁵ Namely, by the early 1980s the 'hyperproduction of legal norms led to the implementation of some 2.5 million 'self-managing general regulations' and almost 2 million 'self-management agreements''.²⁶ As Jovanov rightly assessed, their multiplication meant 'no real social space for any action of self-managing workers' was left.²⁷ Yet, their true forces of change lay in the absurd presentation of centralisation under the auspices of or even as inherently necessary to self-management. Faced with global economic challenges that had an import for domestic affairs during the 1970s, Yugoslavia was foreclosing its revolutionary potential of self-management and took a conservative turn. Yet, not in a re-turn to the Soviet Union, but in further relations with the West and its aid, except that it followed a 'different ideological pattern'.²⁸

5.2.2.1. (In)operative Institutions: De/increasing Strength and (In)dependence

The foundations of the socialist self-managing association according to the Law on Associated Labour were: the power of the working class and all working people, the social property of the means of production, the right to work with social means, the self-managing position of a worker, the social character of labour, democratic self-managing decision-making on work and social reproduction and the conception of assemblies of socio-political

²⁵ Neca Jovanov (1983) 86, 89 in Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 201; *Službeni List SFRJ* (3 December 1976) available at <<http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/B87E07C6FB584B0B9FAD65E4A112A8D9.pdf>> accessed 9 May 2021.

²⁶ Ibid. 201.

²⁷ Ibid. 201.

²⁸ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 200-201.

communities on the system of self-managing democratic organization of united labour.²⁹ However, the directions of the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Law on Associated Labour were contradictory. On the one hand, they sought to restore the original degree of workers' control over enterprises that had been weakened by economic liberalization by them determining the use of profits to enhance productivity. At the same time, the aim of the two legislations was to also exert influence of the government through 'party-appointed managers and technocrats'.³⁰ Such revised policy of self-management pulled between pluralism and centralised control could not endure as it instituted a complex structural web of hierarchy including the workers' councils, the Basic Organizations of Associated Labour (BOAL [Osnovna Organizacija Udruženog Rada]), the Self-managing Communities of Interest (SIZ [Samoupravne interesne zajednice]) and other assemblies.³¹

In other words, self-management operated on the principle of delegation of council created management boards with executive powers that determined operational and strategic matters.³² Such dual structure of management was created to secure the Party's control of the executive processes via top managers. Large enterprises, which included not only factories and retail establishments but also schools, health clinics and other public service institutions, were subdivided into smaller units known as a BOAL.³³ BOALs, numbering 300-400 workers, were divided into smaller units within which they performed their jobs and elected representatives/delegates to workers' councils. This highly specialised fragmentation was simultaneously accompanied by regional, national, and federal coordination through the Complex Organizations of Associated Labour (COAL [Složena Organizacija

²⁹ Štefan Ivanko, *Zgodovina organizacijske misli [History of Organisational Thought]* (Novo mesto: Fakulteta za organizacijske študije 2015) 584.

³⁰ Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 294; Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 454-456.

³¹ Ibid. 294; Parbudyal Singh, Timothy J Bartkiw and Zeljan Suster, 'The Yugoslav Experience with Workers' Councils: A Reexamination' September 2007 (32) 3 *Labor Studies Journal* 280-297.

³² Goran Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia: Successes and Failures' 2011 (25) 3 *Socialism and Democracy* 107-129, 113.

³³ Singh and others, 'The Yugoslav Experience with Workers' Councils' (2007) 280-297.

Udruženog Rada]).³⁴ This meant that while this highly complex and distinctly hierarchical organisational structure of collective management was to further strengthen the worker's self-management, it actually surrendered it to the regional and national control.³⁵ While appearing as 'individual worker's [right to participate] in enterprise management... a veto right on every strategic decision and... effective powers to dismiss management in case of grievance', the reform of organisational units actually stripped them of their independence.³⁶ According to Mencinger, 'this excessive reliance on self-managing 'agreements' and 'regulations' prompted some analysts to proclaim the post-1974 economic system a 'contractual socialism', as opposed to the 'market socialism' of the previous period'.³⁷

It was an 'attempt at further decentralization without really doing so'.³⁸ Despite being stripped of the original level of influence, workers were required to participate in the meetings of workers' councils in addition to their regular employment, despite holding little real power and instead served only to legitimize the decisions made in Party controlled higher levels of organisation. Therefore, the worker was removed from their position as a 'foundational political subject'.³⁹ According to Borovo group, awareness of the 'growing futility of workers' decision-making through self-management within the context of structural federal reforms is probably the reason workers' council meetings in the late-1980s frequently lacked quorum. Members questioned the meaning of their work as they complained about their decisions often being overturned by orders from the top.⁴⁰

³⁴ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 197-198.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 200.

³⁶ Ivanko, *History of Organisational Thought* (2015) 584; Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 294; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 253-263.

³⁷ Jože Mencinger, 'Acceleration of Inflation into Hyperinflation: The Yugoslav Experience in the 1980s' 1987 (21) 4 *Economic Analysis and Workers' Management* 399-418, 401.

³⁸ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 200.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 197.

⁴⁰ The Borovo group, 'Who needs the enterprise? Borovo 1988-1991' available at <<http://borovo1988.radnickaprava.org/?locale=en>> accessed 19 October 2020.

This ‘displacement’ was indicated already in the name of the basic production unit of the Yugoslav self-managing economy itself, and so removed the possibility of political subjectivity and agency already on the level of language.⁴¹ By naming it the Basic Organization of Associated *Labour* (Osnovna organizacija udruženog *rada*) and not the Basic Organization of Associated *Laborers* (Osnovna organizacija udruženih *radnika*). As Jakovljević concluded, this was precisely the point where the ‘poetry of ideology’ stepped in.⁴² Namely, what set apart the 1974 Constitution from other similar legal documents is its authors’ attention to language. He gave an apt example of how the new 1974 Constitution clearly enshrined the company director in charge of each organization of associated labour (Article 103). Namely, the term for the company manager, *inokosni poslovodni organ* [the individual business executive], reflects the linguistic invention and renovation, as it ‘binds a legal document with the larger, largely unspoken ideological fabric that gives the laws their form and power and is at the same time protected by them’. Namely, the ‘word *inokosni* is an archaism that in ethnographic literature designates mostly a form of family organization in rural areas of the southern Slavs’ lands. The late-19th century industrialisation, however, brought the demise of the traditional form of family organization, rural cooperatives (*zadruga*), and the word fell into semi-oblivion. By transferring *inokosni* from the preindustrial economy to a society that aspired to join the post-industrial world, authors of the 1974 Constitution wanted to point to the tradition of cooperative forms of organization. However, with the word *inokosni* designating an uncommon family unit, the discourse of ideology went beyond the speakers’ intention. Namely, in the *Serbian Dictionary* Vuk Karadžić translated the root word *ino* as *aliu* (‘other’), and *inokosan* as ‘single’ and ‘without other related heads of families’ ([1852] 1969, 232). *Inokosnost* thus designated otherness and desolation. By dusting off its ancient expression, the ideology of associated labour enshrined alienation in the very constitution of Yugoslavia. Indeed, alienated from a self-managing structure of governance, company directors

⁴¹ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 197-199.

⁴² *Ibid.* 197-199.

became the Party's main power mechanism for exerting its control over the economy.

As Jakovljević put it, the 'the notion of subjectivity acquired a double valence, whereby the subject was at the same time a revolutionary subject and an economic subject'.⁴³ Or as the Slovene economist Aleksander Bajt expounded, the entire theoretical doctrine of self-management conflated the subject of decision and the subject of work.⁴⁴ Or, clearer still, as Bilandžić and Tonković wrote, workers' rights were reduced with an 'abdication of the idea of the self-managing subject, and a first step back toward traditional notions of subjectivity and sovereignty based on property rather than on labour'.⁴⁵ From political subject to an element in the economic system, from workers to work.

Paradoxically, the same dissolution of power was also true for the personal management in the hands of the director (already in place prior to the 1974 Constitution) who became 'a facilitator rather than decision-maker'.⁴⁶ It is important to note that their facilitating role was one where they ensured the implementation of decisions from above making their authority and freedom dependent upon the central political line. They became managers and technocrats of the Party. A journal dedicated to professional managers, *Direktor*, was launched in 1969. This was arguably an important symbolic moment in the dismantling of centralized planning system. The implementation of a socialist market economy in Yugoslavia went alongside the development of self-management. Unfortunately, emerging liberal democracy in Yugoslavia carried with it the 'false promises'. Namely, a transition from self-managed to market socialism meant, as Horvat and Štikis put it, the 'evolution of thieves into businessmen' and was harmful for the

⁴³ Ibid. 198.

⁴⁴ Bajt, *Self-governing Form of Social Property* (1988) 153.

⁴⁵ Dušan Bilandžić and Stipe Tonković, *Samoupravljanje 1950-1974 [Self-management 1950-1974]* (Zagreb: Globus 1974) 155.

⁴⁶ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 200-201.

working class.⁴⁷ In sum, self-management was severely weakened by an emerging sector of party-appointed managers and technocrats, the so-called 'red bourgeoisie'.⁴⁸ At the same time, their decision-making process appeared to be a mere formality. This meant that the reformed self-management led to creation of bureaucracy as a new 'ruling' class (albeit without real power).⁴⁹ Marković was aware that legal and institutional changes could not challenge basic features of the system: one-party rule or state dominance over the economy.⁵⁰ He argued that bureaucracy used the reformed self-management in its own interest and so contributed to its eventual failure too. Yet of the reasons why Yugoslav workers did not resist the bureaucratic degeneration of self-management was because the state (and its strong leaders) was seen as an organ for taking care of people.⁵¹

The 1970s reforms of hyperregulation were thus an 'expanded self-reproduction' of the state apparatus'.⁵² Nikolić's thesis on the transitional nature of self-management from the communist avant-garde to the dictatorship of the proletariat proved therefore difficult to realize in full.⁵³ Nikolić alluded that self-management is achievable only in its first development phase characterised with the duality of self-management and state.⁵⁴ The state was to decide on the politics and the economic development while self-management was to remain confined to the enterprises and other institutions. Marković argued that self-management might have been able to

⁴⁷ Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks (eds), *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia* (London: Verso 2015) 147.

⁴⁸ Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 294; 'Što smo, kuda idemo - nakon promjena [Who we are, where we are going - after the changes]' 3089 *Borovo* (4 August 1989); 'Tržište ne sputava samoupravljanje [The market does not hamper self-management]' 3101 *Borovo* (7 October 1989).

⁴⁹ See Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (London: Thames and Hudson 1957).

⁵⁰ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 109-110, 128.

⁵¹ Ibid. 109-110, 128; Singh and others, 'The Yugoslav Experience with Workers' Councils' (2007) 280-297.

⁵² Neca Jovanov, *Dijagnoza samoupravljanja 1974-1981 [Diagnosis of Self-management]* (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber 1983) 91.

⁵³ Miloš Nikolić, *Razvoj teorije in prakse samoupravljanja [Development of Self-management Theory and Practice]* (Ljubljana: Komunist 1989) 118.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 118.

evolve stronger if Yugoslavia instead developed political democracy and pluralism.⁵⁵ Horvat ascribed factors missing for successful development of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia to the long industrial tradition, the long tradition of political democracy, the high personal incomes of workers, the short working day, and to the high level of education.⁵⁶ According to Toplak and Haček, in Yugoslavia such introductory phase of self-management lasted until 1974, meeting the expectations regarding the political and economic liberalization.⁵⁷ Yugoslavia had one of the world's highest annual economic growths and became an example of rapid modernization and transformation from the agrarian to the industrial society.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, due to its re-centralisation, it 'never developed the type of democratic political culture... necessary for self-management' and instead appropriated the arguably authoritarian approach that ensured acceptance of its dictates.⁵⁹

5.2.2.2. Decreasing Strength of Party Power – ‘Conservative’ Form of Socialism

As seen above, the 1960s were favourable of younger and more liberal political leadership like Stane Kavčič, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Marko Nikežič, and Latinka Perovič.⁶⁰ However, the 1970s dismantled Yugoslav socialist market economy in an attempt by the centralist 'old guard' to regain power. And while liberal 1960s reforms increased the individualistic tendencies and regional particularities, the 1974 Constitution aimed to recentralise political power by re-establishing its authority and discipline.

⁵⁵ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 110, 129.

⁵⁶ Horvat, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (1982) 218.

⁵⁷ Cirila Toplak and Miro Haček, *Slovenia: Political Insights* (Varšava: European School of Law and Administration 2012) 57.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 57.

⁵⁹ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 110, 129; Horvat, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (1982) 218.

⁶⁰ Toplak, 'For a New Social Order' (2014) 128.

This meant binding decisions of higher bodies upon the lower ones.⁶¹ Various provisions allowed the Federal Executive Council (FEC) to override with government policies other socio-political bodies in the political decision-making process.⁶² LCY was enforced as the ‘prime mover and exponent of political activity’, as opposed to other informal groups such as Praxis that stood in opposition.⁶³

A return to the conservative form of socialism was evidenced in removing the young and intellectually strong leaders and replaced them by ‘yes-men’.⁶⁴ The self-management reforms then functioned as a progressive ‘ideological cover’ for a retrograde conservative turn.⁶⁵ In his survey of the Yugoslav economy, Harold Lydall called it propaganda facade.⁶⁶ True, while orthodox Marxist theory defined the transition to socialism as the consolidation of all national power within the communist party, Yugoslav socialism strove to transfer state power directly to workers and their organs only in theory. True, the reform of the Stalinist system did bring more freedom, more scope for the market, and a continuing competition between the industrial managers and the Party but the various reforms did not bring workers' control, and the one-party political monopoly remained.

Monopolisation and over-decentralisation were methods that enabled the Party to maintain power, but self-management was the medium. According to Stanković, LCY's monopoly of power kept Yugoslav workers on the periphery of decision-making in the factory, while Harold Lydall argued that socialist self-management was merely a convenient propaganda slogan

⁶¹ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 18-21; William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Non-Alignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987) 46-49, 51-52.

⁶² The 1974 Constitution, Articles 301, 302, 362. Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 18-21; Zimmerman, *Open Borders* (1987) 46-49, 51-52.

⁶³ The 1974 Constitution, Basic Principles.

⁶⁴ For instance, Gajo Petrović, Predrag Vranicki, Mihajlo Marković, Milan Kangrga, Zagorka Golubović, Svetozar Stojanović, Rudi Supek, Branko Horvat. For more details see Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures* (2019) 169, 174-175, 182, 200-203.

⁶⁵ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 200-201.

⁶⁶ Harold Lydall, *Yugoslav Socialism, Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984) 111.

chosen by the Yugoslav communists to give the appearance of the democratization of Yugoslav society.⁶⁷ However, this move actually turned out to disperse and erode LCY's authority as the shift of power occurred only from one political level to another, that is from the LCY at the federal level to the national parties. Even though Tito was a lifelong president with a strong cult of personality, his power was contradicted and limited somewhat by the federal character of the state organisation. It became increasingly difficult to develop or carry out any national consensus.⁶⁸

Simultaneously, though, there was another shift from political structures. Two official historians of Yugoslav self-management Dušan Bilandžić and Stipe Tonković wrote that social processes started moving in favour of 'technocrats' and 'managers', seeking their 'legitimization in the very concept of self-management'.⁶⁹ With liberalism on the rise, these managers, while appointed by the Party, exhibited more and more control in economic and parliamentary decisions but also considerably undermined influence of the LCY. They included 'technical experts, directors, bankers, presidents of communal assemblies, representatives of the republics' and all interfered in economic and parliamentary decisions.⁷⁰ In this way, 'self-management socialism, while democratic in form, began to pave the way towards technocratic rule'.⁷¹ As Kirn contended, technocrats began to work with the local state bureaucratic administrations within a decentralizing Yugoslav

⁶⁷ Slobodan Stanković, *The End of the Tito Era: Yugoslavia's Dilemmas* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 1981) 14-15, 106-107; Lydall, *Yugoslav Socialism* (1984) 111-115. See also Franjo Kozul, 'The Specific Traits of The State Under Self-Management Socialism' February 1983 (23) 2 *Socialist Thought and Practice* 17-18; Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 27-40.

⁶⁸ Flere, 'Was Tito's Yugoslavia totalitarian?' (2012) 7-21.

⁶⁹ Bilandžić and Tonković, *Samoupravljanje* (1974) 162; Stipe Šušvar, *Samoupravljanje i alternative [Self-management and alternatives]* (Zagreb: Centar za kulturnu djelatnost SSO 1980).

⁷⁰ Gal Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures: Self-Management, Market Reform and the Spectre of Socialist Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto Press 2019) 16.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 16.

state in finding ways to increase the economy and further decentralize the Federal administration'.⁷²

Thus, whether they were willing to admit or not, the communists' role and ideology was compromised by failure of delivery. Professionalisation of management in self-management and its reforms weakened the Party. The reforms of the 1970s and 1980s attempted to target that through polycentrism or pluralism that came with decentralization of the country's political and economic structure. The result was preserving rather than withering away of the state, albeit with debilitating federal organisation.⁷³

5.2.2.3. Workers' Alienation

This disenfranchising of worker as agent who is responsible and impacts on their socio-political reality took away their autonomy and alienated them from their work, each other and the society.⁷⁴ It became apparent in the 1980s that the masses in this stagnant system did not actually decide anything. The *Borovo* example illustrates well the implications of gradual abolishment of self-management.⁷⁵ Legally, the manager was able to make a decision (for instance, to shift paid vacation amidst religious holidays) but still 'wanted to persuade' the Workers' Council by providing economic justification for his decision (meeting demands of foreign buyers). Amidst the rise of nationalist rhetoric such decisions naturally caused divisions in the company's multi-ethnic and multireligious collective. The Workers' Council as a collective decision-making organ had more power before the arrival of the managerial strata but similar decisions would also be difficult to implement as a collective agreement would be required. Emancipation felt like a distant life experience as various schisms appeared, especially when economic crisis led to

⁷² Ibid. 16.

⁷³ Toplak, 'For a New Social Order' (2014) 127. For an excellent expose on the new class forming in the state structure see Djilas, *The New Class* (1957).

⁷⁴ For more on the relationship of forces in an enterprise between managerial strata and party bureaucracy on one side and workers on the other, see Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 124.

⁷⁵ See 'Izmjene u radnom kalendaru [Shifts in the work calendar]' 3103 *Borovo* (10 November 1989).

deterioration of living standards and perception of society as unjust. Responding to these, political elites of different republics often unsuccessfully trying to find a middle way between market and state intervention. Given that self-management was its basis, people began increasingly accepting the idea of replacing it with some other system.

What emerged was a tension between the spheres of market economy, state and self-management. Self-management lost out to state institutions that held a legal prerogative to decide on or intervene in the economy. Decentralisation only swapped the source of intervention from previous federal now republican.⁷⁶ The additional problem was that the political elite lacked education in self-management processes.⁷⁷ As noted above, the market through the increasingly stronger managers and technocrats 'resolved' these tensions with reference to the autonomy of the market. Therefore, at the macro level worker's councils did not really act as organs of self-management with the ultimate embodiment of the worker as an active agent of society but were instead impotent in affecting social inequalities.⁷⁸ Alienation thus emerged as a central issue outside the political institutions that were firmly in the hands of LCY. Namely, one of the main claims of the Party and its ideologues had always been the superiority of Yugoslav socialism over capitalism and of Yugoslav one-party system over its multiparty one that failed in the interwar period.⁷⁹ Yet, it was now Yugoslav socialism that displayed all signs of alienation.

5.2.2.4. Federation of Conflicting Interests

As indicated above, the transfer to regional or national committees or councils weakened the Federal State, accentuated the differences between them and gave rise to pursuit of national ideas and priorities, as well as the ensuing tensions between them. The weakening strength of the Party was only exacerbated by the persistent domestic economic problems due to ineffective

⁷⁶ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 127.

⁷⁷ Toplak, 'For a New Social Order' (2014) 128.

⁷⁸ Marković, 'Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia' (2011) 126-127.

⁷⁹ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 14, 18.

measures - inflation, bankruptcies, a series of strikes caused by high level of unemployment, and a widening gap between rich and poor republics or regions. According to Hall, there were three most notable social unrests.⁸⁰ First, the 1968 demonstrations by students and faculty at the University of Belgrade for higher salaries, improved university housing, and for the end to police brutality and to the 'communist establishment' amongst faculty and administration. Second, the 1969 strike by Rijeka dock workers over 25 percent wage cuts and reductions in employee benefits. Third, the 1971 strike by Zagreb University students over new laws requiring republics to turn over foreign currency earnings to the federal government. Such incidents signified increasingly severe economic and financial problems of the government and enterprises as well as reflected growing dissatisfaction in various society sectors with the course of domestic social and economic reforms.

Thus, the self-management reforms of the 1970s and 1980s aimed to achieve a preservation of legal equality among the republics. The aim was to achieve a durable balance of the elements of real power and in that way prevent alienation of nations from the federation. This attempt to reassert power through a hybrid of re-centralisation and a sort of devolvement or empowerment meant that self-management as a model of governance became principally focused on the relationship between the federation and national governments within it. Insofar the LCY's structures and organs were refocused on the republics to enable their self-governance, 'republics functioned as autonomous political systems with different interests'.⁸¹ This made it difficult to develop or to carry out any national consensus.⁸² Bilandžić

⁸⁰ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 390.

⁸¹ Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (eds), *Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition: Volume One, Tito's Yugoslavia, Stories Untold* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 6.

⁸² See Viktor Meier, 'Yugoslavia's National Question' March-April 1983 (32) *Problems of Communism* 47-60, 51-53; Wolfgang Hopken, 'Party Monopoly and Political Change: The League of Communists Since Tito's Death' in Ramet, *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (1985) 30-31, 38, 50. For examination of the increased reliance upon informal bargaining and pre-decision consultation among various republican governments in the post-Tito era see Steven L Burg, 'Yugoslavia Without Tito: Prospects for Stability' Summer 1981 (4) 2 *South Slav Journal* 2-4.

and Tonković indicated 1971 as already a turning point when constitutional amendments established republics as centres of sovereignty, with the federation holding only those ‘rights’ that were agreed upon by all republics.⁸³ The 1974 constitution and its two key Amendments (III and VII) meant each republic essentially governed itself.⁸⁴ Schools, police, even territorial armies were organized under local, as opposed to national, authority.

Autonomy only emphasised the republican and regional differences, the gap between rich and poor republics that increased the north-south tension on the ethnic lines of Yugoslav federal structure.⁸⁵ With an incentive to invest in developed northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia, southern republics longed for a stronger central influence in decisions of investment. Nicholas Lang identified the so-called issue of particularism as especially acute for the national economy, as one republic would establish industries already in operation in another republic (for example, seaport-building in Croatia and Slovenia). Such lack of coordination of economic activities led to unprofitability of these ‘duplicate industries’ in one or both republics.⁸⁶ The profit-losing enterprise, in turn, impelled the federal government to provide it with financial assistance, assistance that drained the country's financial resources. In all this, the ‘omnipresence of ‘market rhetoric’ [that] was supposed to unite the supposedly irreconcilable positions of the republican and the federal elites... was instead fuelling republican and regional differences.⁸⁷ Disparities in regional development and diffused governmental structure encouraged internal instability. Internal strife increased with the

⁸³ Bilandžić and Tonković, *Samoupravljanje* (1974) 166, 155.

⁸⁴ See The 1974 Constitution. Bridget Coggins, *Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014) 89; Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 253-263. Medjad, ‘The Fate of the Yugoslav Model’ (2004) 294; Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 509-511.

⁸⁵ Moore, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1970) 2; Ognjenović and Jozelić, *Revolutionary Totalitarianism* (2016) 6; Coggins, *Secession* (2006).

⁸⁶ Nicholas R Lang, ‘The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia’ April 1975 (27) 3 *World Politics* 309-335, 319, 326.

⁸⁷ Moore, *Self-Management in Yugoslavia* (1970) 2.

federal organization along principally ethnic lines that encouraged tensions between the republics.⁸⁸

Perceived as the cause, the legitimacy of the socialist system's *modus operandi* self-management was weakened in favour of nationalism as the dominant ideology. Arguably, solidarity bonds between the republics of the federation were weakened already in late 1950s, especially after the introduction of a new income-sharing system in 1958, where workers gained the right to wages based on their affiliation with a work collective and benefited not according to 'work' but according to 'results of work'.⁸⁹ This caused competition among workers not only within an enterprise but also between workplaces regionally and in other federal republics. Economic policies became regionally contested and rivalries over distribution of state investment accelerated (most so in the 1980s). Workplaces tended to identify their interests with their enterprise management or the republic's regional government rather than with other workplaces or other federal republics.⁹⁰ In short, the reforms of self-management led to the untenability of its federal unity.

Indeed, inaugurated by the 1974 Constitution, such shift to self-governance of the republics in the 1980s from federation to confederation was heavily criticized. It caused tensions for its unjust and unequal political and territorial organization of the federation, favouring local republican leadership. What is more, this legal document was arguably the main cause of political strife that brought Yugoslavia's eventual dissolution and 1990s wars. The 'nationalist pressures became a political factor as 'republics functioned as autonomous political systems with different interests' and the language taught in schools an 'explosive historical issue'.⁹¹ Before his death, Tito confided in

⁸⁸ Ognjenović and Jozelić, *Revolutionary Totalitarianism* (2016) 6; Moore, *Self-management in Yugoslavia* (1970) 2.

⁸⁹ Horvat and Štiks, *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism* (2015) 28-29.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 28-29.

⁹¹ At the Tenth LCY Congress (1974) no kind words were spoken about the Sixth (1952). Ognjenović and Jozelić, *Revolutionary Totalitarianism* (2016) 6; Moore, *Self-management in Yugoslavia* (1970) 2.

his grandson Joško Broz (1947-) on what his biggest mistake was. Joško told *Agence France Presse* (AFP) in May 2020: that he [Tito] allowed for a change in the 1974 Constitution that loosened the Yugoslav federal system. He recalls Tito's words: 'everything fell apart, and instead of one we now have eight smaller countries'.⁹²

Interestingly, in thinking about the economic and political reasons that fuelled Yugoslav regional differences, Renata Salecl proposes a conceptual dimension observed in Edvard Kardelj's 1970 thesis on the concept of 'plurality of self-management interests'.⁹³ Kardelj introduced plurality of opinions, ideas and interests that was never before welcomed in a system where the regime had to be united and without a possibility of dissonant voices from within its elite.⁹⁴ Indeed, the very ideologist of the society of self-managed workers challenged the unity identified as crucial in its public sphere, and as such brought the possibilities of a meaning beyond its empty formulation. Salecl's argument is not simply a superficial inference as observed in nationalist designation of self-management as the cause of injustice. Rather, she points out just how radical the concept of self-management and its intervention was in the geopolitical context or reality of Yugoslavia, its revolutionary potential and fragility or openness for re-appropriation. This raises the necessity of thorough consideration of the socio-political milieu within which it is to take root. Namely, the fragility due to concept's radicality calls for careful planning for eventualities in its development, asking whether the ground is ready for the concept (of plurality of self-management), but also, what happens once it takes root and begins to develop - to it and its milieu? Salecl concludes that the phrase plurality in the specific paradigm of self-management was no longer just a part of the ideological structure but 'now achieved independence and began to function

⁹² Joško Broz interview for *Agence France Presse* (May 2020).

⁹³ Renata Salecl, 'The Crisis of Identity and the Struggle for New Hegemony in the Former Yugoslavia' in Ernesto Laclau (ed), *The Making of Political Identities* (London, New York: Verso 1994) 208.

⁹⁴ Edvard Kardelj, *Democracy and Socialism* (London: The Summerville Press 1978) 115-140.

as 'floating signifiers' awaiting new articulation'.⁹⁵ While its radicality has the potential to subvert the existing foreclosed paradigm, its character as a signifier also enables its re-appropriation and unintended development. In other words, it enables the process from subverting centralist communism of brotherhood and unity to socialist self-management of factories to the workers, and to its eventual dissolution in the form of national autonomy in the beginning of 1990s.

5.2.2.5. Leftist Deviations, (Oppression of) Dissent

We have seen thus far in the thesis the importance of Yugoslav socialist self-management for emancipatory politics. Self-management was central to emancipation of the working class at home, and by extension, elevated worldwide through formulation of, and advocacy for, the concept of nonalignment. Liberation of the Yugoslav state came also in the form away from a 'doctrinarian and vulgar understanding of this emancipation that was ossified in the Stalinist Marxist doctrines of 'diamat' (dialectical materialism) and 'histmat' (historical materialism)'.⁹⁶

Unfortunately, due to the abovementioned dysfunctional politics and economy that resulted in ruptures across society, a number of opposing perspectives or leftist deviations began to appear. The first critical voices of the bureaucratization of self-management system came already in the 1960s from a group of leftist, Hegelian-Marxist philosophers whose platform was the Praxis journal. Praxis school originated in Zagreb and Belgrade during the 1960s as a dissident philosophy of Yugoslav Marxist humanist philosophical

⁹⁵ Salecl, 'The Crisis of Identity' in Laclau, *The Making of Political Identities* (1994) 208.

⁹⁶ In the post-1948 Yugoslavia two distinct critiques of Stalinist Marxism emerged. One line was 'dogmatic and declarative' (version of 'diamat'), and the other was 'creative, humanistic, and inherently Marxist' (deriving inspiration from Marx's early writings). The former denied the importance of alienation (similar to Soviet Marxists whom it formally rejected), while the later used alienation for establishment of Yugoslav critical theory. Further on, some of the political avantgarde emerging in the 1950s and 1960s as a cursor for the system's conceptual and practical, re-emerged in institutional critiques during the 1970s. See Veselin Golubović, *S Marxom protiv Staljina: Jugoslovenska filozofska kritika staljinizma 1950-1960 [With Marx against Stalin: Yugoslav Philosophical Critique of Stalinism, 1950-1960]* (Zagreb: Globus 1987); Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 15, 18.

movement. Its founders and some of the most prominent figures were Gajo Petrović, Milan Kangrga, Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, Rudi Supek. The journal [Praxis], published between 1964 and 1974, was considered as one of the leading journals in Marxist theory, with authors from both the East and the West. Its international editorial board included, among others, Alfred J Ayer, Erich Fromm, Lucien Goldmann, György Lukács, Zygmunt Baumann, Ernst Bloch, Agnes Heller, Jürgen Habermas, Henri Lefebvre, Herbert Marcuse. It represented a ‘brand’ of Yugoslav Marxism evident in, for instance, the (in)famous refusal to publish Louis Althusser’s article in 1965 due to his anti-humanist tendencies, ‘Stalinist positivist theses’.⁹⁷ Together with Korčula Summer School, Praxis group included various dissident intellectuals, those in faculty or among students. The Summer School was organised by Yugoslav philosophers gathered around the Praxis. Between 1963 and 1974 the island of Korčula became a meeting point for critical leftist intellectuals from the East and the West. The local House of Culture was the centre of debates on the position of critical philosophy, sociology and political perspectives, with Lefebvre, Marcuse, Bloch, Habermas, and Bauman being among frequent guests. Lefebvre famously described the Summer School ‘Dionysian socialism’, resembling the so-called ‘champagne socialism’ that is arguably not enough for changing society’s structures.⁹⁸

Young philosophers and theoreticians gathering around Praxis and Korčula were a strong and radical pressure responding to various crises throughout the 1960s and 1970s, critiquing the development and practice of the ideology of self-management. On the one hand, at the Summer School in Korčula, Marcuse, Habermas, Bloch, Bauman and others praised Yugoslavia as an ‘ideal system that liberated man completely, reflected through the energy and creativity of the ordinary people in their struggles’.⁹⁹ On the other hand, the

⁹⁷ See <<https://archives.kpfa.org/data/20190325-Mon1200.mp3>> accessed 23 November 2021.

⁹⁸ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 18-19.

⁹⁹ Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulić and Žiga Testen (eds), *Surfing the Black: Yugoslav Black Wave: Cinema and Its Transgressive Moments* (Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Academie 2011) 71.

opposition 'criticised the establishment in the name of a purified version of the establishment's own ideology'.¹⁰⁰ According to the Praxis group, the main obstacle to successful development of a 'proper' (critical and creative) self-management socialist system was the prevalence of 'statist bureaucratic condition' in Yugoslav society. Accordingly, they advocated for a more effective and less bureaucratized system of self-management and called for a programme that would 'abolish the gulf between the ideal and the real' – referring to the extent the ideas and rhetoric of the classic Marxism stay merely an ideological chatter or are adequate for implementation to (Yugoslav) society.¹⁰¹

Tito's response to excesses and extremes were purges, aiming to re-establish greater central control and discipline. Ironically then, the liberalisation of economy was accompanied by restrictions in all other areas with little regard for criticism of the Party or its diktats and purges.¹⁰² The warning to Yugoslav citizens that they would lose Party membership for reasons of opposition to the government's economic reforms was indeed followed up. For instance, already in December 1967 to January 1968, 400 people were expelled from LCY. Tito spoke of a 'lack of discipline' and of the need for 'increased vigilance', 'political centralization' and purges to resolve the problem.¹⁰³ All forms of public expression fell under the Party's scrutiny, including universities, media, performing arts or religious establishments. One of the most famous political purges was that of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 for opposing decentralization - despite being considered the third most powerful man in Yugoslavia after Tito and Kardelj. Of note was also the purge of the Serb Communist Party under the leadership of the former Foreign Secretary Nikezić in 1972 for being involved in Serb liberalism.

It was the beginning of extreme ideas of nationalism and ethnic unrest that would lead to grave crisis of the Yugoslav federal machinery. There was

¹⁰⁰ Salecl, 'The Crisis of Identity' in Laclau, *The Making of Political Identities* (1994) 207.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 205-232.

¹⁰² See Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 398; Coggins, *Secession* (2006); Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 257.

¹⁰³ Coggins, *Secession* (2006); Wilson, *Tito's Yugoslavia* (1979) 257.

constant talk of uniformity, discipline and the need for vigilance as ‘the enemy is all around us’ [*neprijatelj vreba svuda oko nas*] and close surveillance of all areas of public life, including media, educational, cultural, and religious institutions.¹⁰⁴ The particular (use of) language once again played a role. Worth noting is the 1970s government's media campaign against public dissent, whereby terms such as ‘class enemy’, ‘Stalinist’ ‘nationalist’ and ‘Ustashi’ (a label originally given to Croats supporting the Nazis during WWII) were applied to those questioning leaders or their policies.¹⁰⁵ Such language was reminiscent of the post-WWII period when dissent needed to be repressed in the process of consolidation of the socialist forces or ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. A stage when, according to Marxist theory, aggressive stance against public dissent by the political leadership is to be considered a natural course of action. Overall, a plurality of opinions, ideas and interests was never welcome in the Yugoslav public sphere, as with the introduction of the concept of plurality into society by its very ideologists, the unity of LCY was challenged in the public sphere. The Party had to be united, and there were to be no possible dissonant voices from within its elite that would speak publicly. If they did, the methods of discreditation used and official suppression of dissent against the so-called stray thinkers were all too familiar in (all) socialist regimes.

The state's relation to dissent is best observed in the case involving the country's leading ‘dissident’ Milovan Djilas [Đilas] ousted and renounced due to his criticisms of current affairs and proposals for a multi-party system with a decentralized economy. Once the official Yugoslav party ideologue and together with Kardelj and Ranković, Tito's closest associate since 1940, Djilas was a member of the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee, head of the all-powerful Party propaganda apparatus, the AGITPROP. AGITPROP or ‘AGITation-PROPaganda’ was the Party's propaganda and ideology apparatus, the arbiter on all matters related to culture, education, publishing, media, and propaganda. As a guardian of

¹⁰⁴ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 445-450.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 445-450.

ideological purity, AGITPROP was second in authority only to the Security apparatus. Despite that, Djilas was not out of reach of the state's immediate repercussions when in late 1953 and in the beginning of 1954, he published in the Party organ BORBA and in the new literary journal NOVA MISAO a series of articles highly critical of the leadership and the political system. Consequently, Djilas irrevocably placed himself in opposition to the regime and became a single point agenda at the LCY Central Committee Plenum (16-17 January 1954), condemned and expelled Djilas from the Party.¹⁰⁶ Although stripped of all his functions, there was no legal persecution, nor was he threatened with imprisonment, but was charged again in 1979 and in 1984.¹⁰⁷

Indeed, there have been major disagreements throughout the history of SFRY on how to change reality according to Kardelj's vision of self-management. While some within the Party saw democracy as an expression of political pluralism (a strong current for 'democratization' and move away from 'democratic centralism'), others were advocating for 'direct democracy to be applied top-down by the Communist Party'.¹⁰⁸ Among the latter was, ironically Kardelj, who saw self-managing socialism as a fusion of economic self-management and direct political democracy.¹⁰⁹ Analysing Kardelj's publications and private papers, Cox argued for contradictions in his thought. Due to his 'inability to envision socialist Yugoslavia without a one-party system' and due to his belief in the 'progressive nature of the national idea' despite his opposition to regionalism, Kardelj's conceptualisation of self-management proved irreconcilable in practice.¹¹⁰

The state's repression became more difficult to enforce due to greater autonomy of the republics and divergence from the federal practices in the

¹⁰⁶ AY, ACK SKJ, 507/11/11: Third, Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY, Transcripts (16-17 January 1954).

¹⁰⁷ Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY (30 March 1954) in AY, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/12.

¹⁰⁸ Jože Pirjevec, 'Iskanje socializma s človeškim obrazom' 2014 (24) 4 *ANNALES Ser. hist. sociol.* 763-778.

¹⁰⁹ John K Cox, *Edvard Kardelj: A Political Biography* (PhD Thesis, Indiana University 1996) vii.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* vii.

1980s.¹¹¹ A paradox, whereby increased ‘tolerance’ was not due to LCY’s softening its view on dissent but rather due to the fragmentation of political power and Party’s grave weakness at the centre that no longer allowed for a coherent federal policy. In other words, tolerance was thus not a result of federal governance but rather its failure. The Yugoslav ideology of self-management disintegrated in the beginning of the 1980s as the so-called new social movements grew. Both, the ‘official and oppositional ideology disarticulation delegitimised establishment, disabled homogenous ideological construction and brought forth heterogenous and disassociated elements in the discourse and apoliticism’.¹¹² Furthermore, the critical reformist forces within the Party were growing, with some more radical cadres even leaving its ranks.¹¹³ Political protests and subsequent resignations in late-1980s by key government and Party officials was a sign of the impending political crisis. Concomitantly, and connected to this, the reasons for the failure/downfall of self-management also included unwillingness of the political elite to learn from their mistakes or consider academic analytical insights.¹¹⁴ The aging leaders attempted only to consolidate their grip on power. Lack of education of stakeholders on how to critically advance self-management was an important factor in the failure to enforce the system, perceived already in theories of utopian socialists.¹¹⁵ Indeed, as Gosar would say, ‘particular political and cultural specifics and past experience should be integrated in design of a future political-economic visions’.¹¹⁶ Alongside the above-discussed ‘cumbersome delegate system’ established through the 1974

¹¹¹ Two government actions evidence this. First, Slovenian and Serbian Party leaders allowed for the first time a transmission of Christmas messages in 1986, a remarkable event in a committed Marxist (atheist) country. Second, authorities lifted a travel ban on Djilas in 1987, a restriction imposed twenty years prior. See Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 18-21, 506-507.

¹¹² Salecl, ‘The Crisis of Identity’ in Laclau, *The Making of Political Identities* (1994) 207.

¹¹³ Jović, ‘Communist Yugoslavia and its ‘Others’’ in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies* (2006).

¹¹⁴ Sirc, *Criticism of Self-Management* (1994) 125.

¹¹⁵ Toplak, ‘For a New Social Order’ (2014) 128.

¹¹⁶ Gosar in Toplak, ‘For a New Social Order’ (2014) 128.

Constitution’, that excluded democracy from political life and its discussion, and ultimately sealed the failure of the self-management experiment.¹¹⁷

5.2.3. Fall of a Yugoslav Dream: Dissolution of Self-management

The above depicted economic challenges existed since the late 1960s, with Tito referring to them already at the ninth LCY Congress (March 1969). In the 1980s the country’s challenges increased exponentially.¹¹⁸ The recession worsened with massive recurring strikes, 100(+) percent inflation, 1.3 million unemployed (15 percent), bankruptcies and billions owed in foreign debt proved difficult to repay.¹¹⁹ The Inflation rate increased from 26 to 172 percent between 1974 and 1979. Index of retail prices rose from 255 to over 10 thousand percent between 1980 and 1987. Insolvencies became primarily a means of dealing with surplus employees. Bankruptcy was ‘sold’ as a ‘real chance for the workers and leaders to dedicate themselves to the job’ and was ‘not to be feared’. The problem was that necessary legal conditions for bankruptcy were relatively easy to fabricate by unrealistic devaluation. The Law on Financial Management accelerated the transition to market relations by allowing enterprises unable to ensure liquidity (being insolvent for more than 60 days) to automatically initiate bankruptcy proceedings. Consequently, it became problematic to deal with redundancy.¹²⁰ Indeed, between 1973 and 1975, unemployment increased by around 200 thousand (from 399 to 584 thousand), rose from around 789 thousand to over 1 million between 1980 and 1987. It increased to 1.3 million unemployed by the end of

¹¹⁷ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 200-201.

¹¹⁸ See Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 389.

¹¹⁹ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 434-437, 491-495.

¹²⁰ The complexity was evident as property relations were not (yet) settled, meaning that workers were still ‘owners’ or holders of social property. See ‘POLI - Stečaj izmjenio sliku’ 3176 *Borovo* (21 June 1991) 1, 2 in *Who needs the enterprise? Borovo 1988-1991*. See also ‘Nezadovoljstvo isplatama’ 3146 *Borovo* (12 October 1990) 1; ‘Sedam stečajnih prijava borovskih poduzeća’ 3125 *Borovo* (20 April 1990) 1, 4.

the 1980s. Lack of systematized data made it difficult to determine the exact number of bankruptcies and unemployment.¹²¹

As will be seen below, foreign affairs underwent a transformation too. As also noted above, the loss of Tito had a profound impact on the country's every aspect, not least in having to face the crises of worsening recession, ethnic tensions, external debt, high inflation and unemployment without a leader. The (in)famous Djilas, while opposed to the collapse of Yugoslavia, predicted that a breakup would happen on ethnic and bureaucratic nationalist ground due to the loss of Tito:

*Our system was built only for Tito to manage. Now that Tito is gone and our economic situation becomes critical, there will be a natural tendency for greater centralization of power. But this centralization will not succeed because it will run up against the ethnic-political power bases in the republics. This is not classical nationalism, but a more dangerous, bureaucratic nationalism built on economic self-interest. This is how the Yugoslav system will begin to collapse.*¹²²

The post-Tito era leaders had to make difficult choices as to what path the state was to follow and even considered abandoning self-management altogether and further open their economy to the international market.¹²³ At first, the federal government decided to implement a number of fiscal policies that sought to regain control or re-regulate the market. Perhaps the most unpopular was the policy of the wage freeze (only allowing raises upon surplus productivity) that resulted in soaring consumer prices and severe shortages.¹²⁴ General dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation

¹²¹ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 434-437, 491-495.

¹²² See Robert Kaplan's interview with Djilas in 1981, available at <https://www.krabarchive.com/ralphmag/djilasZA.html> accessed 14 January 2022.

¹²³ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 21-22; Medjad, 'The Fate of the Yugoslav Model' (2004) 295.

¹²⁴ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 491-495.

and the government's policies prompted massive widespread and recurring strikes.¹²⁵

On a larger scale, what started with the Constitution and legal reforms in the 1970s as foreclosure of self-management's political potential was, amidst the deepening economic crisis of the 1980s, fully developed as an attempt to invent a norm of foreclosure for all economic, political and cultural relationships.¹²⁶ The pro-market reforms of the mid-1980s were imposed on workers as the only possible way out of the economic crisis and presented to them as a manner of solving their problems that reached beyond the sphere of economics – an intervention towards recovery of the state.¹²⁷ One of the pro-market laws, the Law on Basic Employment Rights (1989), propagated 'increased efficiency, easier dismissal, easier mobility of workers within the enterprise'.¹²⁸ All of this was carried out in excluding social issues from the sphere of work, emphasizing instead the importance of 'capability, skill and market demand', as the Borovo factory paper singled out.¹²⁹ It was a sign of re-centralisation as the spheres of Yugoslav's socio-political existence were separated and abstracted to pacify and remove their engagement in decision-making. Leaders stated that it is necessary to distinguish effort from idleness, to discourage labour that lacks quality. Their proposed solutions to economic problems were personal responsibility, entrepreneurship, competition, and increased discipline. Resonating with 21st century 'advice', workers were told they can increase their employability if they specialize or develop

¹²⁵ Perhaps foremost among them was in March 1987 as federally implemented wage controls prompted over 20 thousand workers to strike nationwide. Slobodan Stanković, 'Why Is the Economy Failing?' *Radio Free Europe Research* (4 June 1987) 7-9.

¹²⁶ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 197-198.

¹²⁷ This proved untrue already in the first half of 1990. The Yugoslav industrial production fell by 11 percent and the state's purchasing power decreased by 41 percent. World Bank, *Yugoslavia: Industrial restructuring study* (1991) viii, 10.

¹²⁸ See 'Zaoštrena disciplina i odgovornost' 3099 *Borovo* (13 October 1989) 2; 'Pripreme za popis stanovništva 1991' and 'Za dobrog radnika nema zime' 3089 *Borovo* (4 August 1989) 2.

¹²⁹ See 'Novi Zakon o radnim odnosima' 3105 *Borovo* (24 November 1989) 1; 'Zaoštrena disciplina i odgovornost' 3099 *Borovo* (13 October 1989) 2; 'Struka, strani jezici i kompjutori' 12 *Sindikalna javnost* (11 March 1991) 8-9; 'Stručnjaci još uvijek čekaju' 3171 *Borovo* (19 April 1991) 2; 'Dio radnika vraćen u hale' 3171 *Borovo* (19 April 1991) 3.

additional skills. Beside such demand for economic initiative and responsibility, Sirc identified another trend, unfortunately still somewhat present today - setting up of businesses based on political choices instead of economic needs. He labelled the new capitalist social relations, established through political activity via state institutions, as a negative consequence of the self-managing structure.¹³⁰

The once successful factory Borovo is one of the great examples of effects of radical liberal changes in Yugoslavia.¹³¹ Relations within a company were reduced strictly to the market imperative. Productivity increased at the expense of a heavy work increase of the few that came back to work, described by the Borovo Factory paper as the 'western productivity rhythm'. Rigorous discipline was established in insolvent factories. Despite strict disciplinary measures and working for the minimum wage, the remaining workers persisted and said that 'if you lose your job there are no social benefits, and no recommendation for further employment'. Furthermore, they 'have had enough of self-management, their rights, sick leaves and fake solidarity. They want a job, someone who will give them orders and wages'.¹³² This mindset evidenced the already popularised blame on self-management rather than on poor and fragmented state's decisions over the last two decades.

New market relations also deepened the existing divisions between the workers. Thus, the alienation of the worker as a socio-political agent was complete. Instead, disagreements were rising among workers' organizations with regards to the distribution of debt and income. Since the production workers' income depended on productivity, it was not unusual for a semi-skilled worker to get a better premium than an expert, causing many to leave

¹³⁰ Sirc, *Criticism of Self-Management* (1994) 117-118.

¹³¹ The Borovo group, 'Who needs the enterprise? Borovo 1988-1991'. See also Sven Cvek, Snježana Ivčić and Jasna Račić, 'Jugoslavensko radništvo u tranziciji: 'Borovo' 1989' 2015 (52) 2 *Politička misao* 7-34; 'Objavljen rat inflaciji' 3108 *Borovo* (22 December 1989) 1; 'Osam puta produktivniji' and 'Povratiti izgubljeno povjerenje' 3172 *Borovo* (26 April 1991) 1, 4; POLI - Stečaj izmjenio sliku' 3176 *Borovo* (21 June 1991) 1-2; World Bank, *Yugoslavia: Industrial restructuring study* (1991).

¹³² The Borovo group, 'Who needs the enterprise? Borovo 1988-1991'.

(occasionally starting their own companies). At the same time, a shift towards market economy culminated in the decision by LCY to move away from the country's unique form of socialism at its Conference in Belgrade (May 1988). Already at the April 1985 meeting, the LCY Central Committee stressed the need to free prices and move away from administrative intervention in country's economy.¹³³ The new trend was evident in government's policies and actions, with leaders turning against any form of government regulation of the economy, while the newly emergent managerial class was gaining more executive power, including over the Party.¹³⁴ Enterprises ceased to exist as a coherent whole as Kombinati [the Combines] were separated and governed explicitly by market relations through the 1988 Law on Enterprises.¹³⁵

With the passing of the Law on Amendments in July 1989, the move towards privatization of social property a transition to the capitalist model was guaranteed. There was no more common ownership as resources, debts and property were split between them and regulated by the market only. According to Kardelj's prevailing interpretation, social property was simultaneously everyone's and no-ones.¹³⁶ It contained classical elements of property in an economic sense but not in a legal sense. Thus, appropriation and use of property was exercised by a given work collective to produce and sell goods to provide them with income. No one, however, had the exclusive legal right to that property, not even a government body. Introducing mixed, private, and foreign ownership alongside existing social ownership consequently diluted the original meaning of social ownership developed by Kardelj. The concept of social property which underpinned the entire system

¹³³ Stankovic, 'The Central Committee Deplores' (1985) 13; Jackson Diehl, 'Yugoslavia Moves Toward Major Reforms' *Washington Post* (18 June 1988) 17-20; Milan Andrejevich, 'A Preview of the First Conference of the LCY' *Radio Free Europe Research* (7 June 1988) 6.

¹³⁴ Hall, *Non-Alignment and Socialism* (1993) 469.

¹³⁵ See for example, 'Organizacija poslovnog sistema Borovo' 3124 *Borovo* (13 April 1990) 8.

¹³⁶ Edvard Kardelj, 'Osnovni uzroci i pravci ustavnih promena [Basic Causes and Directions of Constitutional Change]' in Edvard Kardelj, *Problemi naše socijalističke izgradnje: Vol. IX [Problems of Our Socialist Construction: Vol IX]* (Belgrade: BIGZ 1974) 377.

became simultaneously fraught with contradictions.¹³⁷ Self-management regulation ceased to exist when Articles 4 and 5 were withdrawn with the 1989 Law, and so removing self-management rights of workers in private and mixed enterprises from legislation. By removing Articles 20 and 24, the right to set up a new social publicly owned enterprise was also eliminated. Publicly owned enterprises were privatised and transformed into stock companies with supervisory boards. As was the case in Borovo, criticism of the ‘socialist wage-levelling’ was substituted by the market speak: ‘a very distinctive trend is emerging. The trend of inequality. Disparity. Survival of the fittest. Sometimes even of the better... But it is what we want, right? Capital relations’.¹³⁸ This encapsulated an unreversible move towards a market economy ruled by the managers and technocrats whose judgments were factual and unquestionable.

The political decision to abolish self-management was thus out of the workers’ reach, and the market logic promoted by the executive management succeeded in prevailing over the social one.¹³⁹ The legislative reforms of the 1970s and 1980s gradually abolished self-management by disarming its every aspect. While the term itself, as noted above, remained to be used to legitimize these exact reforms, it became devoid of meaning. Unable to act towards change in the economic or political sphere by means of self-management organs, the workers turned to strikes to articulate their demands. The clearest example are perhaps the reforms by the president of the Federal Executive Council [Prime Minister] Ante Marković which authorised the Federal Executive Council (federal government authorities) to make such changes to

¹³⁷ Bilandžić and Tonković, *Samoupravljanje* (1974) 155; Aleksander Bajt, ‘Kako iz socijalizma’ 441 *Danas* (31 July 1990) 29. See also D Lazarević, ‘Povratak poduzeću’ 3064 *Borovo* (20 January 1989).

¹³⁸ See ‘Između želja i ograničenja’ 3115 *Borovo* (9 February 1990) 9; ‘Nepopravljivi idealisti’ 3115 *Borovo* (9 February 1990) 4.

¹³⁹ In fact, workers were blamed for being incapable of making decisions, something already discussed by Proudhon - that only a minority has or should have knowledge, experience and up-to-date information required for effective decisions). Surely, this argument cannot hold considering all stakeholders, including government and managers, fell short to productively advance system’s development. Ljubo Sirc, *Criticism of Self-Management Still Relevant?* (London: Centre for Research into Post-Communist Economies 1994) 62.

the Constitution. Originally labelled ‘stabilization measures’ to consolidate the Yugoslav economy, they eventually came to be called ‘shock therapy measures’.¹⁴⁰ Most aggressively implemented in 1980s, they curbed inflation but at a price of bankruptcies and rising unemployment.¹⁴¹

The state was brought into the free-market capitalist world kicking and screaming. A period full of constructive radical or ‘revolutionary’ reforms, with continuous constitution-writing and endless economic and political amendments, it obfuscated the fact that the reforms, this time Marković’s, were actually an announcement of the collapse of Yugoslavia.¹⁴² While presented as a way out of crisis by way of liberalising Yugoslav socialist economy, the reforms marked the demise of Yugoslav socialism and finally abolished self-management in 1989. Party officials in Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Kosovo resigned in 1988. LCY dissolved itself in 1990, and ethnic tensions intensified. Any notion of one united Yugoslavia vanished, beginning the bloody ethnic wars. The authors of *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism* provided an accurate analysis when they said that the ‘Yugoslav [ethnic] wars and the sanctions were exploited to accelerate what lay to the heart of the dissolution of Yugoslavia – the transition from socialism to capitalism’.¹⁴³

5.3. The Global: Yugoslav Foreign Policy and NAM - A Shift in Focus

Yugoslavia’s foreign policy developed during the late-1950s, by reflecting self-management principles in nonalignment. With a strong global outlook

¹⁴⁰ ‘Objavljen rat inflaciji’ 3108 *Borovo* (22 December 1989) 1.

¹⁴¹ The shock-therapy model according to the Harvard economist Jeremy Sachs was accepted as way forward. Rejected was ‘the less radical, but nevertheless all-encompassing’ alternative economic reform proposal drafted by domestic experts Aleksander Bajt, Dragomir Vojnić and Kiro Gligorov (1989). See Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise* (London, New York: Routledge 1999) 105.

¹⁴² Jović, ‘Communist Yugoslavia and its ‘Others’’ in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies* (2006) 13.

¹⁴³ Horvat and Štikis, *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism* (2015) 145.

and its leadership role in NAM, it was built on Tito's charisma, personal diplomacy and travels. However, in face of the mounting challenges in the 1970s, the successful balancing act between domestic and foreign shifted towards Yugoslavia's pressing economic and socio-political challenges at home. If anything, Yugoslavia refocused its energy to regional matters in foreign affairs (particularly due to security concerns) and placed focus and importance on relations with the Balkans, Mediterranean and European communist parties.¹⁴⁴

Yugoslav commitment to NAM manifested itself in number of visits and economic cooperation (chapter 4). Its leaders continued advocating for its imperative as a form of peaceful coexistence.¹⁴⁵ However, as the challenges mounted and Tito's health deteriorated due to a liver disease in 1976, he began to take fewer trips and sent emissaries instead. Due to the government policies to reduce deficit there were also fewer imports. Instead, Yugoslavia became increasingly reliant on western aid that brought a marked element of change into its foreign policy. The country received its second largest amount of western assistance between 1972 and 1979, amounting to over 600 million dollars in grants and loans. In 1978 President Jimmy Carter granted Yugoslavia most-favoured-nation (MFN) status and Tito travelled to the US in that same year to purchase arms. The shift from bi-polar to multilateral global order enabled Yugoslavia to receive aid from China as well - for instance, a loan of 120 million dollars in 1983.¹⁴⁶ In the 1980s, there were altogether only seven trips made, and only two to the West.¹⁴⁷ This was, in part, due to a loss of zeal in Yugoslav foreign policy after Tito's death in 1980. However, it was also due to the overall re-focus or subservience of all forms of governance, domestic or foreign, to the stabilisation policies that signalled a shift to the market economy. While the aid was there, there were

¹⁴⁴ Ronald Linden, 'The Impact of Interdependence: Yugoslavia and International Change' January 1986 (18) 2 *Comparative Politics* 229-230. See also Miloš Minić, 'Yugoslavia and International Political and Economic Relations' February 1986 (26) 2 *Socialist Thought and Practice* 34-36, 41; Laura D'Andrea Tyson, *The Yugoslav Economic System and its Performance in the 1970s* (Berkeley: University of California 1980) 3-4.

¹⁴⁵ See 'Platform for the Preparation of the Thirteenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia' October 1985 (25) 10 *STP* 111-113, 120-121.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 496-502.

¹⁴⁷ Two visits to the Middle East, one to Asia, two to Africa, two to the Western hemisphere, and none to the USSR (Tito's last visit was in 1967). *Ibid.* 496-502.

also constant reminders that the process of servicing debt is not complete and development stale. Thus, while President Mika Špiljak's visit to the US in 1984 netted a long-term trade agreement, Yugoslavia's bid for technical assistance in 1986 from the European Research Executive Agency was rejected, with organization citing the nonexistence of a market economy in Yugoslavia. Despite participation in meetings on global concerns, such as hosting the UNCTAD's sixth session on the international economic relations in June 1983 and the OPEC strategy meeting on oil production and prices in June 1986, it was internal matters that preoccupied Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁸ It became manifested in move away from a leadership role in NAM.¹⁴⁹

It is important to remind again that the challenges faced by Yugoslavia were global. Alongside the economic challenges and amidst (or despite) the emerging multilateralism, the world's tension increased. Not least due to existence of nuclear weapons but also evident in hostility between the East and the West and their military campaigns in Asia, Central America, and the Middle East. Furthermore, regional conflicts among members, such as the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) or being on different sides in conflicts,¹⁵⁰ became complicated as they involved multiple interests and foci. Such complexity had an impact on the superpowers' tolerance of NAM and their nonalignment. Member states were considered as getting too close to either the Soviet Union (Vietnam, Cuba) or the United States (Egypt, Pakistan). Similarly, some aligned states sought to be associated with NAM as observers or guests (Portugal, Romania, Spain, Australia, Philippines). Above all, the challenge of its ethos reappeared again.¹⁵¹ Some members seemingly used the status 'to legitimise their regimes without broad support at home, and to absolve the domestic elites of responsibility for underdevelopment and poverty (Pakistan,

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 496-502.

¹⁴⁹ Robert Pastor, 'Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade' *National Security Council Memorandum* (7 August 1978).

¹⁵⁰ For example, Yugoslavia and Cuba over Angola (1975), Egypt and Libya over the Arab-Israeli conflict (1967).

¹⁵¹ M S Rajan, *Nonalignment and Nonaligned Movement: Retrospect and Prospect* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 1990) 187, 195-196, 241-242.

Bangladesh, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, as written in late-1980s)¹⁵². Could it therefore be argued that NAM's prospect of democratisation in the international sphere was slim as many member states remained 'undemocratic' at home?

Additionally, the Movement was embedded not only outwardly in such a tense multipolar global scene. Its stance and role inwardly were also becoming increasingly complex and clashing in character due to its own diverse membership.¹⁵³ Disputes over identity and over which countries could be members were originally explored at the preparatory meeting in Cairo (1961) and resurfaced again during the second NAM Summit in Cairo (1964). The dilemma was whether to accept Tito's concept of universalism or Sukarno's concept of regionalism. That is, bring together all nonaligned states irrespective of their geographic position or form a movement composed exclusively of countries belonging to the Afro-Asian region (into which Yugoslavia as a European state could not fit). This disagreement led to several years of postponement of the next Summit. A period labelled as the 'continuity or nonalignment crisis' followed, and NAM arguably acquired its final shape only at the third Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-aligned Countries in Lusaka, Zambia (September 1970). Conditions were ripe for agreements, and it was Tito's idea about the necessity to form a broad international association that was realized.¹⁵⁴ Steps to coordinate NAM's future activities included creation of the first permanent bodies that enabled organized, synchronised and coordinated activity of the nonaligned in the international arena.¹⁵⁵ Thus, some authors regard Lusaka as the actual

¹⁵² Ibid. 187; Richard Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger 1982).

¹⁵³ Rajan, *Nonalignment* (1990) 183-184.

¹⁵⁴ See AY, KPR I-4-a/6; AY, KPR I-4-a/9; AY, KPR I-4-a/12.

¹⁵⁵ Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), *Two Decades of Non-Alignment: Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1982* (New Delhi: India Offset Press 1983) 51-54; A W Singham and Shirley Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co 1986) 104-105.

founding Summit of NAM for it formalised an open vision of the Movement.¹⁵⁶

Yet, during the 1970s, the changing composition of NAM significantly weakened the consensus crafted by its inaugural leaders Tito, Nasser and Nehru. It mirrored the radicalism in the developing world, with new members, such as Mozambique, Angola, Libya or the PLO, together with the original members such as Cuba. The so-called radicals were less patient in their dealings with the developed Western nations and adopted a more confrontational style toward the Great Powers that also placed them at odds with other members, such as Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, NAM's expanding and changing membership increased the conflict level in internal debates, including the role of the USSR in evolution of nonalignment and over the NAM's particular foreign policy actions in various regions worldwide.¹⁵⁸ With the loss of Tito, Sukarno, and Nehru in the 1980s, there were new candidates for leading roles with more radical ideas, most prominent being Libya's Muammar Gadhafi and Cuba's Fidel Castro.¹⁵⁹

The loss of its original leaders, as well as the global political and economic crises, contributed significantly to the change in the Movement's character. This was illustrated already at the sixth Summit in Havana, Cuba (1979), marked by confrontation between the Conference host Castro and Tito over the meaning of nonalignment. While Tito maintained that nonalignment should remain 'equidistant' in relation to the two power blocs, Castro argued it should seek closer ties with the Eastern Bloc as socialism and communist countries are 'natural allies'.¹⁶⁰ The differences between the two long-standing nonaligned leaders extended beyond the realm of the definition, evident already in Tito's expressed concern over the Cuban and Soviet

¹⁵⁶ Dragan Bogetić, 'Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement' in Duško Dimitrijević and Jovan Čavoški (eds), *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics 2021) 239-253, 247.

¹⁵⁷ Richard L Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger 1983) 26-27.

¹⁵⁸ See Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ See Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 372.

¹⁶⁰ For a brief but meaningful examination of this important debate, see Ibid. 217-220.

military build-up in Southern Africa when Castro visited Yugoslavia in June 1967.¹⁶¹ At Havana, Tito won convincingly, despite the Western media's reports from heated debates that called the gathering a 'boxing match' between the 'gigantic, bearded Castro and the nailed, barely moving and decrepit Tito'.¹⁶² Sadly, this was his last victory on the international political scene as he died the following year. The grave disagreement between the two comrades highlights the radical challenges arising within the Movement but also the key role of its founding leaders - Tito in particular as Bogetić concluded:

*Tito's death meant the loss of authority and dynamism of the Movement. As no nonaligned state tied its affairs to the intentions of the Movement as much as Yugoslavia, members ceased to consider that NAM can still be significant in realisation of their particular key internal and foreign policy priorities. Conflicts between members became more frequent and sharper and the 'conscience of humanity' grew weaker.*¹⁶³

Concomitantly, there was another shift in NAM's character in the 1970s that took centre stage. Ever since its inception in 1961, economic development of its members was one of its focus points.¹⁶⁴ It was already in Belgrade that a proposal was made to call for an international conference within the UN framework to discuss economic problems of the Third World states. NAM

¹⁶¹ Members also failed to resolve a debate which Cambodia's government should be seated at the Summit, the Pol Pot or Heng Samrin regime. Finally, there was a serious debate over Egypt's future status in NAM considering its separate peace with Israel. See Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden: Brill 2018) 227-252; Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 173-192; *Addresses delivered at the Sixth conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1980); 'Decision regarding Methods of Strengthening Unity, Solidarity and Co-operation among Non-aligned Countries' in *Non-Aligned Movement, VI Summit of Heads of State or Government: Final Document* (Havana, Cuba, 9 September 1979) 216-223.

¹⁶² Bogetić, *Nonalignment throughout history* (2019) 397-400, 501-509; B Tadić, *Osobenosti i dileme nesvrstanosti [Peculiarities and dilemmas of non-alignment]* (Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist 1982) 49-51; AY, KPR, I-4-a/35.

¹⁶³ Bogetić, 'Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement' in Dimitrijević and Čavoški, *The 60th Anniversary* (2021) 247.

¹⁶⁴ Surendra Chopra, 'The emerging trends in the Non-Aligned Movement' 1986 (47) 2 *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 161-177.

recognised the growing debt crisis in the developing world and the existing system of international trade relations as main causes that inhibited socioeconomic development in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therefore, members outlined for a new approach to international economic relations, known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO).¹⁶⁵ They criticised the process of détente as unhelpful towards the Third World development efforts and argued that independence and sovereignty involved combined cultural, political and economic components.¹⁶⁶ Specifically, there was a realisation that political independence did not guarantee economic independence. In other words, that their ‘political independence was not possible fully without economic and financial independence’.¹⁶⁷ NIEO’s overall goal was redistribution of the world's wealth to the developing nations, calling also for the ‘adjustment of commodity prices, sovereignty over natural resources, and the transfer of technology to the developing world’.¹⁶⁸ The radicality of NIEO lay in seeking to redefine the system of international trade relations by granting the developing nations more control over their resources, including better - that is, more equitable - terms for their commodities in international markets. In other words, by the 1970s NAM was no longer merely a forum for critiquing conditions of world order but an initiator and formulator of solutions to specific problems and concerns in the developing world.

The period leading up to the Colombo Summit was highly volatile: Israel fought Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War (October-November 1973), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) instituted an oil

¹⁶⁵ Vijay Prashad, *The poor Nations: A Possible History of the Global South* (London: Verso Publishers 2012).

¹⁶⁶ See Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 126-128; Sean MacBride, *Many Voices. One World* (New York: Kogan Page 1983); Rita Cruise O’Brien (ed), *Information, Economics and Power: The North-South Dimension* (Boulder: Westview Press 1983).

¹⁶⁷ Dragan Bogetić, ‘Jugoslovensko-američke nesuglasice oko koncepta novog međunarodnog ekonomskog poretka [Yugoslav-American disagreements over the concept of a new international economic order]’ 2014 (32) 1 *Istorija XX veka* 165-180; Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju - od ideje do pokreta [Nonalignment throughout history - From idea to movement]* (Beograd: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika 2019) 317-319.

¹⁶⁸ Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 22-24, 128-129.

embargo against western countries and Japan for their support of Israeli policies in the Middle East (November 1973). Fighting intensified in the Lebanese civil war (1975), and communist forces took over South Vietnam (April 1975). The decolonization process in Portuguese Africa was also significant. At the fifth Summit held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (1976) economic matters took centre stage. Particularly as the issue of foreign debt reached crisis proportions in many developing states.¹⁶⁹ As already discussed above in relation to Yugoslavia, severe price increases in crude oil as a result of OPEC actions contributed greatly to the economic and financial crises globally. Although OPEC's actions throughout the 1970s were directed against the developed West and Japan, and indeed West's economic growth declined, they had great(est) impact on economies in oil-dependent developing countries, Yugoslavia included. Also, the newer members gained prominence, such as the socialist and radical nationalist states Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Vietnam. They initiated disputes over Cuba and the USSR's role but also whether capitalist economic development is appropriate for the Third World states.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, alongside struggles for leadership and disagreements on its outlook, economic development became the most important issue to NAM in the 1970s. All in all, crises brought about a radical turn to the original vision of nonalignment and NAM as promoted by Yugoslavia.

Thus, the abovementioned causes contributed to NAM's decline: the Yugoslav domestic situation, the global political and economic trends, and changes in leadership and outlook in the Movement itself. Leadership (particularly in the charismatic figure of Tito), vision, and drive were three characteristics that embodied success in 1950s Yugoslav self-management and its extension into foreign policy of nonalignment. I argue that the lack thereof - of the 'original' ontology and policy cohesiveness in going forward

¹⁶⁹ See Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World* (New York: Monthly Review Press 1974); D R Goyal (ed), *Non-Alignment: Concepts and Concerns* (New Delhi: Ajanta Publications 1986) 117-124.

¹⁷⁰ See Singham and Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (1986) 148. '""who cite this as the single most important development in NAM since the Algiers Summit.

- just as it damaged Yugoslavia to a point of no return, became the cause of NAM's weakening as well. As the group grew in numbers, and members' views at the Summits diversified and differed, various regional groupings within NAM began to outline objectives based on specific regional, ideological, or historical concerns. For example, the Arab grouping consistently sought political and military support for its cause against Israel, the African group (historically) emphasized decolonization and (political and economic) independence for its region, the Latin American group stressed economic development and independence, and the Asian grouping concerned itself primarily with the role of the Great Powers in its region.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, many nonaligned states held full membership in other regional organizations such as the Arab League, the organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁷² Given the realities of various national, political, territorial, ethnic, religious, ideological and international concerns that came to the fore, it was no surprise grave disagreements between members became a regular feature of the 1970s NAM proceedings, amounting even to armed conflicts between nonaligned themselves (Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan).¹⁷³

At the eighth Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe (1986) internal discord only intensified. In his speech, the Iranian President Ayatollah Mohammed Ali Khomeini called for the ousting of Iran's adversary in war, Iraq, from the Movement. Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi called for the dismantling of NAM because, according to him, some of the members (Egypt and Zaire)

¹⁷¹ See Rikhi Jaipal, *Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Ltd 1983) 50-56; Jackson, *The Non-Aligned* (1983) 44-51, 235.

¹⁷² For an examination of the phenomenon of regionalism in NAM, see Dževad Mujezinović, 'Regionalism in the Movement of Non-Alignment' November 1982 (22) 11 *Socialist Thought and Practice*.

¹⁷³ Bojana Tadić, 'The Non-Aligned Movement and Conflicts Among Non-Aligned Countries' in *Review of International Affairs, The Policy and Movement of Non-Alignment: New Tendencies and Options* (International Round Table, Petrovaradin, Yugoslavia, 1-3 November 1985) (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics 1986) 199-202. See also Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2015); Lorenz Lüthi, *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015).

became ‘traitors’ to the Movement’s goals. Ironically, Gadhafi proposed at the same time joining the Warsaw pact. These examples highlight the complex context whereby particular (national) concerns of various nonaligned members became an obstacle to coherence, and power, of NAM as a whole. They also show a valid reason why ‘some leaders openly expressed the view that NAM should be dissolved’.¹⁷⁴

These concerns were carried over into the ninth Summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1989) with careful attention to a long list of regional and national issues.¹⁷⁵ While the discussion and declarations included modernising elements, such as the one-line call for ‘full participation of women in all aspects of development’ (page 114), its section on ‘World Economy and International Economic Relations’ (pages 83-86) makes for an interesting read. The Belgrade declaration noted that despite growing interdependence of markets ‘to an unprecedented degree’, disparities between developing and developed countries have increased (page 83). Yet, only a few lines were devoted to acknowledging that the ‘socialist countries of Eastern Europe are going through a period of profound economic and social transformations oriented towards their integration into the mainstream of the world economy, thus increasing their role in international economic relations’ (page 83). This was a very telling statement that no-doubt reflected the Yugoslav consequences of and perspective on its own transition to the free market. Unfortunately, it failed to logically connect the statement to the above observation how these local and global changes lead only to an increase in disparity rather than to resolving their economic problems. Is what is observed, then, in the shift towards the free market causing profound and detrimental changes in Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy, as well as in NAM’s economic policy and concomitant conceptual disagreements, not what Anne Orford would call the emerging shift from ‘an empire of land

¹⁷⁴ Bogetić, ‘Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement’ in Dimitrijević and Čavoški, *The 60th Anniversary* (2021) 247.

¹⁷⁵ Yugoslavia was excluded from NAM in 1992. *The 9th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement: Belgrade, 4-7 September 1989* (Yugoslavia 1989). Yugoslavia was excluded from NAM in 1992.

appropriation to an empire of economic administration’?¹⁷⁶ As seen in this chapter, both Yugoslavia (on the local level) and NAM (on the global level) were only subjects in the powerful hegemonic struggle.

5.4. Conclusions: Failing Self-determination?

In this chapter I examined the limits and eventual downfall of the Yugoslav distinct political and economic project of self-management and its extension in the foreign policy of nonalignment. I discussed how the principle of self-governance was exercised and problematised in a contested and fragile environment locally and globally that redefined the radical potential of self-management and nonalignment. Difficulties were evidenced in Yugoslav theoreticians’ increased departure from their earlier successes in transferring democracy from the political to the economic sphere. A shift from Yugoslav democracy as a form of participation and decision-making process towards a market economy led eventually to the dissolution of self-management in the 1980s, and Yugoslavia as a nation-state in 1991.

Changes were emerging in a stifling international economic environment that caused Yugoslavia’s ever-increasing trade deficits and inflation, such as the global oil crisis. The state’s reliance on foreign aid, Western in particular, covered its growing financial debts only to a point. In turn, Yugoslavia became conditioned by structural economic reforms in movement towards the free market. In face of these challenges, the Yugoslav government started facing inwards and away from its foreign policy to stabilise its economy through responsive reformist measures.

The government’s measures brought radical political and economic changes. Examination of the 1974 Constitution and its Amendments in comparison to the one from 1963 with a focus on market socialism showed a return to Party control and centralised economy to meet the demands from international

¹⁷⁶ Anne Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011) 56.

creditors and attract further investments. It did so by reorganising the structures of self-management on all levels. It was a move towards significant re-centralisation under the auspices of the model's further development. With the 1974 Law on Associated Labour, workers' councils through which workers exercised their decisions were stripped of their power. Restructures brought highly specialist organisational units, coordinating through regional, national, and federal Organisations of Associated Labour. This turned councils into bodies with meetings that simply legitimised the decisions at higher levels and represented a shift away from the idea of the worker as self-managing, a political and economic subject. Instead, bureaucracy, with managers and technocrats, became the dominating operation in service of Party control over the economy.

This divestment of workers as responsible agents and transfer of power to the state in the name of self-management alienated the workers from their work, each other, and the society. As protests and unrests rose, self-management was perceived as the cause of their plight and social injustices in general, and calls grew for its abolition. Rather than validating its superiority, socialist self-management was displaying signs of alienation. As Jakovljević wrote, the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Law 'steered Yugoslav self-management into its last phase, in which all of political, economic, and theoretical gains made over previous three decades were obliterated'.¹⁷⁷

My analysis then turned to how the centralised form of government eroded the power of LCY as it shifted power from federal to national level. Also, as the power of technocrats and expert managers at the level of local state-appointed bureaucratic administrations soared, the influence of the Party over the economy was challenged and undermined as well. A tense relationship was thus working itself out between the government, the technocrats and the workers. In the process where centralisation was concomitant with a 'withering away' of the state, technocrats were moving up, while workers were moving to the bottom, and the Party was losing out.

¹⁷⁷ Jakovljević, *Alienation Effects* (2016) 200-201.

As the federal state weakened, the focus on ways forward was on constituent republics and their national priorities and ideas. Their growing particularities in self-governance (gained by amendments III and VII to the 1974 Constitution) prevented any consensus on the federal level. As each pursued their own, sometimes conflicting interests disparity between them grew. Inability to resolve growing economic problems without, or exactly because of the diffused central governmental structure, internal instability and strife along ethnic or national lines became evermore prominent, encouraged even. Even more, as self-managed socialism became perceived as the crux of the rising problems, its legitimacy was weakened in favour of nationalism as the dominant ideology.¹⁷⁸ Arguably, then, the 1974 Constitution initiated the break of Yugoslavia as, through perverse development of self-management, the political regime did not ‘relinquish its authority in favour of the direct representation of workers’.¹⁷⁹

Indeed, unable to self-reflect or self-critique, no real progress was made in areas of economic or political nor societal self-management reform.¹⁸⁰ Yugoslavia’s dysfunctional politics resulted in ruptures across its society which Tito and later his successors sought to repress by enforcing uniformity of opinion and ideas. Repression became more difficult to enforce in the 1980s as republics became more autonomous. The surfacing ‘tolerance’ was in fact an effect of the failure of federal governance.

The challenges Yugoslavia was facing in the 1970s grew exponentially in the 1980s. With skyrocketing debt, inflation, unemployment and strikes, the government decided to tighten its grip by adopting pro-market reforms. Such a decision to move towards the emerging global ‘free-market’ was to a great extent a nudge from its international moneylenders. Any form of regulation or intervention in the state market ceased. The harsh fiscal policies proved to

¹⁷⁸ David S Riddell, ‘Social Self-Government: The Background of Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism’ March 1968 (19) 1 *The British Journal of Sociology* 47-75, 69.

¹⁷⁹ Gurwitch, *Workers’ Councils* (1973) 35 in Nikolić, *Development* (1989) 118-120.

¹⁸⁰ As seen in chapter 1, failure to (re)build sufficient knowledge and education of its stakeholders was apparent already in theories of the utopian socialists, with Proudhon himself being aware of this shortcoming.

be temporary measures and failed to deal with the root of the problem or form long-term solutions. The Law of Amendments (1989) initiated the move towards privatisation of all social property. At the same time, the move also brought a capitalist reinterpretation of the worker, resulting in their alienation and abstraction. Self-management faced its demise not solely because of the global crises or incompetence of its segment to effectively face them. It was due also to government's constant reforms in line with credit policies until it could no longer be called by its original name and collapsed in on itself.¹⁸¹ The legislative reforms of the 1970s and 1980s disarmed self-management by portraying it as the cause of the state's crisis, and a primary obstacle to 'liberate' the Yugoslav socialist economy. Crises resulted in the eventual abolishment of self-management in 1989. The already widespread social unrests and nationalistic ideas ultimately brought on the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Finally, I analysed in this chapter how Yugoslavia's shift inwards impacted its foreign policy and affected its role in NAM. I found that as the crisis in Yugoslavia deepened, its foreign policy suffered too. The Yugoslav continued string of activity in NAM at the start of the 1970s changed with Tito's frailty and mounting domestic problems towards the end of the decade and especially during the 1980s. This became apparent in the significant decrease of travels to the nonaligned member states and through increased contacts with the West (its aid). The negative economic trends and the shift from Cold War bipolarity to multilateralism were also reflected in NAM. Various national or regional conflicts and questions of the Movement's identity and right to membership, and acceptable relationship with any of the superpowers complicated member relations. NAM became ever more complex in character due to its growing membership. While Lusaka (1970) seemed to settle the open vision of the movement and Havana (1979) its equidistant relation to the two power blocs, it was the loss of Tito, Nasser and Nehru in the 1980s that gave room for more radical leaders such as Gadhafi and Castro. While a strong case can be made that the loss of original leaders

¹⁸¹ Jović, 'Communist Yugoslavia and its 'Others'' in Lampe and Mazower, *Ideologies* (2006) 5.

signified a loss of authority and dynamism, it is perhaps more apt to say that it resulted in a change of drive and direction.

Even though NAM always held a strong concern for the economic development of the Third World, it also recognised the specific challenges of the disparity and the growing debt crisis in developing countries in the 1970s. There was an ever-stronger realisation of the interrelatedness or even conditionality of political independence and economic independence. A desire to change the system of international trade relations came with the proposal of NIEO. Amidst struggles between leadership on NAM's outlook, the economic crises became the most important issue from the 1970s onward.

My assessment in this chapter showed how the right of self-determination was a contested and fragile concept in the post-imperial world order. While I argued in previous chapters that the Cold War was an emancipatory space-moment that permitted forms of national and international experimentation, I conclude here that it simultaneously generated a geopolitical context and constellation that stifled radical change. It enabled the dual collapse of the Yugoslav project: self-management on the national and nonalignment on the international level. It fostered unfavourable global conditions for NAM as well leading to its loss of cohesion and power to affect any change in or to the international structure. This again affirms not only the relationship between the Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy but also brings forward the similarity as reflected in NAM. Namely, I observed that the internal challenges Yugoslavia faced in the two decades were similar as apparent in NAM. While the local undoubtedly had its specifics, it was still reacting to global challenges, and vice-versa. In fact, the local was mirrored in the global: responding to the mounting debt and parity of development, loss of original leadership and dilemmas of the particular socio-political model and solving the nationalist question due to diverse national and ethnic groups.

Both, self-management and nonalignment, proved unfeasible long-term in the (inter)national system that was conditioned to fragmentation rather than unity and to growing economic interdependence in crisis at the expense of sovereignty. Self-management was dissolved and NAM's purchase power

reduced to a minimum under the guise of (economic) development. Fragmentation intensified with the financial dependency and the neoliberal project manifesting itself both locally (dissolution of Yugoslavia) and globally (making NAM somewhat defunct).

In short, does this mean that the two projects failed the conceptualisation of self-determination itself? I would like to think not. Considering, what I observed in this chapter on the outworking of the dialectical relationship between the local and the global - two projects as subjects within a geopolitical interdependent relationship. While, on the one hand, the global geopolitical conditions gave rise or enabled the local potential, it also stifled it. On the other hand, while the local at first challenged and shaped the global, it also enabled its perpetuation. I contend the two still hold a potential.

CONCLUSION

[Is there something] left from the horizon of a future with its utopian core of neoliberal capitalist mantra and anti-totalitarian memory that equates fascism with communism... and so obscuring the [emancipatory potential]?¹

1. Introduction: Main Findings

In this thesis I set out to explore the idea of radicality and the potential of experimentation in the international legal order. I engaged with particular modalities of national and international governance that act against the standard views of international law and exercising sovereignty. As portrayed throughout my thesis, I built on scholarship of critical international legal history, demonstrating how domestic policies served as prisms to examine alternative international pasts and futures. I focused on a peripheral actor in a particular historical geopolitical context of the Cold War – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Specifically, I examined how Yugoslavia advanced two distinct yet connected forms of experimentation in its state-identity formation (local) and as an alternative form of world ordering (global). The socialist workers’ self-management and policy of nonalignment, respectively, rose and declined in the process of aspiring to create an alternative model of organisation through peaceful coexistence and solidarity – be it at home or abroad in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). I argued for dialectical relationship between the Yugoslav domestic policy of self-management as vision of a direct democracy through (radical) decentralisation, and its foreign policy’s central pillar, nonalignment, showcased abroad as a way of affirming national sovereignty and as a means

¹ Gal Kirn, *The Partisan Counter-Archive: Retracing the Ruptures of Art and Memory in the Yugoslav People's Liberation Struggle* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter 2020).

for international cooperation irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state.

To this end, I analysed in chapter 1 the emergence of Yugoslav state in its Balkan context. Its experience in World War II gave form to its vision of self-management as a political idea and economic model, and as the glue of society. At the same time, I analysed the wider conceptual sources that underpinned the concept's development. I argued how Yugoslav leaders and ideologues learned from non-Marxist conceptualisations and re-read Marxist-Leninist sources to formulate their distinct vision of self-management.

My examination in chapter 2 turned to the specific Cold War geopolitical circumstances within which self-management or the Yugoslav 'third way' emerged. Amidst the two distinct centralising modalities of governance - Western capitalist and Soviet communist - Yugoslav distinct form of statehood and way of governance became established as a viable and legitimate alternative. Legalised in 1950, it rose as a radical mechanism for political and economic emancipation in pursuit of its own path at home and internationally.

In chapter 3 I explored how the Yugoslav socialist worker's self-management was key in post-WWII restoration and domestic policy. Legislated and maturing through various laws in the 1950s and 1960s, the experimental empirical method managed to unite its society. Under the slogan 'brotherhood and unity', citizens were active in the political, economic, and social sphere. Power was transferred from the state to the workers under the slogan 'factories to the workers'. This unique socio-political enterprise stood out from both the Western capitalist market economy and the centralist communist Soviet model.

As seen in the first three chapters, the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management introduced in 1950 was an experimental empirical method to form and develop Yugoslav socialism as a profound counter-position to the Stalinist-communist model of development of political, economic, military and social structures. With its aim and commitment to achieve the basic goal of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, a classless society, the idea of self-management

encompassed a radical conceptualisation of domestic policy (and international) relations. As an undefined, fluctuating and open-ended idea, its 'maturing' to a more advanced form involved continuous reforms, constitutional amendments and new economic laws over decades. This included adapting the superstructure to the actual conditions, aiming to reduce the federal political and economic apparatus to a minimum and prevent the rise of a centralized state bureaucracy. It also introduced the system of social ownership and its detailed organisational structure of enterprises, and renunciation of central planning.

In chapter 4, I demonstrated how principles of self-management became the foremost guiding concept in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. I portrayed how its vision, diplomacy and extensive travels paved way to a founding and leading role in NAM. The first Summit in Belgrade (1961) not only inaugurated this state-based critical project within the Cold War landscape but showcased Yugoslavia's international influence as well. Comprised of a heterogeneous group of nation-states, NAM was formed at the height of decolonisation and aspired to create a fruitful alternative model of international organisation through peaceful coexistence and solidarity. Yugoslavia's vision of wider-than-regional inclusion proved most influential, and so did its ideas in the Movement's two most prominent markers: resistance to alignment with the blocs and anti-colonialism or decolonisation. NAM grew a unique radical model for international cooperation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of political, legal or socio-economic setup of any state. Acting as a proactive unit against the East-West constellation, NAM did, at least for the time being, affect the international legal order.

Finally, in chapter 5, I analysed the limits to the initial successes of this national and international experimentation and established that the Cold War geopolitical context within which they arose also stifled them. While in the first three chapters I concentrated on the successes of Yugoslav self-management as a political idea, as an economic model, as a radical administrative government mechanism, in chapter 5 I depicted how numerous reforms soon led to economic hardship and political crisis. From the late-1970s onward, the emerging multipolar neoliberal geopolitical context

framed those changes as being a necessary development. Ironically, gradual abolishment of self-management was presented as a desirable adjustment to the new national and international conditions, whereby the various political and economic reforms in the process of social reconstruction and innovation were compared in significance to the historical moment of inauguration of self-management. However, reliance on rapid industrialisation and loans, foreign institutional dictates and market mechanisms, constrained centralised federal political forces in execution of economic processes in Republics. Paradoxically, decentralisation that permitted mutually competitive regional plans became an obstacle to development and to long-term success, and evermore strained inter-ethnic relations in a complex system of causes for the experiment's demise and eventual collapse of the nation-state. Furthermore, I examined in chapter 5 how NAM's decline coincided with Yugoslav hardships from the mid-1970s onward and overlapped in reasons for its own weakening. In other words, just as Yugoslavia departed from self-management in face of economic crises, so NAM faced ever-increasing economic disparity – both under the guise of economic development. Just as Yugoslavia struggled with its own discrepancies that gave grounds for national(istic) ideas and preferences, so NAM faced challenges due to its heterogenous complexion and understanding. And just as the loss of Tito marked a loss of vision and drive in Yugoslavia, so did emerging post-Tito-Nasser-Nehru NAM leaders pull the Movement in different directions. Indeed, by problematising how the principle and right of self-determination was a contested and fragile concept in the post-imperial world order, I demonstrated the limits of both projects.

Examining the limits of the two models of experimentation with the principle and right of self-determination portrayed how the Cold War's space-moment permitted both forms yet generated simultaneously a geopolitical context that stifled radical change to form any new version of global governance promoting openness, solidarity and diversity. Thus, I argue, NAM's vision of an alternative and more egalitarian world order proved contingent on the two power-blocs' specific understanding of it and as a vehicle for advancing their own interests. In other words, the two experiments converged in space and

time, and rose and fell in an established order that allowed to think and act outside the 'box', yet at the same time boxed the newly emerging narratives in a particular preconceived notion of sovereignty and development.²

This begs the question about the relations and the processes between international legal subjects, conceptualised by Rose Parfitt as the process of international legal reproduction.³ I presented the 'process through which new subjects of international law are brought into being' in this thesis throughout chapters 1 to 4, and demonstrated the process through which they were 'disciplined by more 'successful' members of the so-called international community' in this chapter.⁴ I argue, thus, that Yugoslavia and NAM certainly were successful in the first place but overrun over decades by those more 'successful'. Regardless of their openness and promoting of solidarity at home, and despite the initial success of advancing diversity globally, their vision of self-determination as a legal concept for independence and the generation of an egalitarian world order proved contingent on the two power-blocs' specific understanding of it. In other words, Yugoslav and NAM's unique historical and geopolitical position became subjected to the project of a particular (Western) architecture in international law created in process underway already during WWII. In a way, NAM just as Yugoslavia, premised their successes on controlling projects that were themselves uncontrollable.

Despite, and precisely because of that structural limitation, the intervention in this thesis enriched the conventional perceptions of the Cold War as being viewed through the lenses of the Great Powers - a coercive standstill, with most nation-states placed on the margins of that bipolar legal, economic, political, and cultural international arrangement. The project engaged experimentation of a particular modality of national administration and international governance that acted against traditional understandings about how domestic and international orders ought to function. By enacting a

² Borrowing here Parfitt's idea of a 'box'. Rose Parfitt, *The Process of International Legal Reproduction: Inequality, Historiography, Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. 12.

different type of administrative ordering at home and abroad, Yugoslavia reversed the existing order and exposed the intricate connection that came to form a broader global political economy to the particular idea - self-management and nonalignment.

I contributed to scholarly engagement with how peripheral sovereignties functioned during the Cold War period as a tool for state-based resistance and as sites for the creation of alternative visions of the international legal order. By analysing the Yugoslav experiment with its principles contravening and traversing from national to international I give an account of a relationship that has seldom been explored. By examining the dynamism of NAM as formed and played out in the Cold War, I highlighted the value and significance of local-global interactions in the creation of any such alternative modalities of governance. The study of such narrative shows the nuance in discourse where the supposed coherence, linearity and simplicity of the global order is broken and where emancipatory potential of peripheral actors is recognised.

The study also exposed methodological questions in legal historical analysis. Utilisation of archival material advanced my overall argument on how national and international struggles perform and become a source for alternative analysis of history. The use of an archive exposed the national archive as a place where perceptions of the domestic and international order are challenged and redefined in relation to the conceptual understanding of a fixed local and global. In that way, the chosen methodology challenged any attempts at historical closures or fixed narratives in the study of international law. In other words, the archive as a space brought together national and international in consideration of its content (the materiality of an archive). I argue, however, that while being a physical place an archive was also a conceptual space. By bringing together the material, conceptual, and methodological, an archive does something more. It becomes a time-place capsule, a form of critique that disrupts and disables proclivities for historical closure. With both Yugoslav policies and NAM emerging in a highly disputed setting and complex historical context of WWII and the Cold War, I

indicated the value of inquiry around historiography more broadly that I will explore in more detail in my prospective monograph.⁵

2. Possibilities: Why this Research Matters

While it might be a challenging task, it is important to write about former Yugoslavia as it remains, as Oklopcic put it, a ‘unique socio-political enterprise that incarnated the success of national, social and geopolitical struggles for emancipation’, rather than a flawed and failed South European socialist country.⁶ The purpose of this enquiry was to discern its endeavour to materialise an idea of inter-ethnic co-existence that merged spaces of many diverse worlds, nationally and internationally. In this sense, it bears similarities to Vijay Prashad’s conceptualisation of the Third World as ‘not a place’ but ‘a project’.⁷ Similarly, NAM also never was just ‘a place’, a collection of states, but ‘a (political) project’. Prashad’s notion reveals also that NAM did something novel and radical by refusing coerced affiliation with any of the two power blocs. A radical rationale that rested on the Yugoslav idea of a ‘potentially unbounded membership [as opposed to being] the expression of a non-Western, non-white identity’.⁸

While Yugoslavia no longer exist, its understanding of governing by self-management, I argue, can still inform and inspire the possibilities of decentralization of control in present society, particularly due to effects of alienation. Self-management’s ‘original’ framework is to be re-envisioned

⁵ Such a project will, for instance, include further analysis on issues around *Zeitgeist* and simplification, decontextualization and historical revisionism when writing about historical events.

⁶ Zoran Oklopcic, ‘The Promises and Failures of Triple Struggle: Non-Alignment, Yugoslav Federalism and the Struggle for National, Social and Geopolitical Emancipation’ in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), *Bandung, the Global South and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017) 276.

⁷ Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York, London: The New Press 2007) xv.

⁸ Prashad, *The Darker Nations* (2007) xv; Jeffrey James Byrne, ‘Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment’ 2015 (37) 5 *The International History Review* 912.

today and should remain a relevant discourse and alternative to the status quo. Indeed, reflection of utopian socialists who conceptualized self-management at a time when the working class had *not yet* consolidated as a political force resembles present circumstance when the working class is *no longer* a political force due to neoliberalisation of the left and (precarious) workers being dispersed and alienated. Self-management's utopian notions not being 'contaminated' by attachment to the workers' movement could therefore be considered still, amidst the challenges of the global, and if I may say so, hyper-neoliberalism.

The Yugoslav case also remains relevant as it sets to examine the modern nation-state's viability of unique experimental expression of the international law's principle of self-determination in any one distinctly multi-ethnic nation-building project. It yields lessons about the importance of emancipation at national but also international level - as observed in NAM and in Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy - preserving local instances while empowering marginalised stakeholders globally. However, the call for unison in struggle for emancipation and liberation in a politically and ideologically divided world, and against fascism, imperialism, colonialism, and exploitation in general, can only be achieved through a comprehensive institutional transformation domestically and internationally. The successes and mistakes, assumptions and hesitation, presumptions and doubts in this project could prove beneficial in challenges to the international legal and socio-political order. The value of such exploration lies where shortcomings of self-management and of NAM invite us to reassess the value and significance of their achievements, and more broadly, reconsider local-global interactions in the creation of alternative modalities of governance.

It is here, I reason, that the 'local' Yugoslav slogan 'brotherhood and unity' could supersede its usual interpretation as one nation, one leader, one country, towards a 'global' emancipation (as observed in NAM). If brotherhood signifies equality and unity denotes a clear understanding of goal, the two are in a dialectical relationship because unity comes from brotherhood, and vice versa, as they develop a clear vision. Furthermore, the two concepts can offer solutions to matters only if they are on the level playing field or equal. That

means that calls to dissolve movements, and NAM in particular, are meaningful - that is if each participant has a voice. Moreover, because everyone is a participant, there can be no grouping based on position of power (NATO) or identity (BRICS, AESEAN, for instance), be it geographical, ideological or otherwise. In fact, merging can go further as claimed in my thesis, irrespective of the political, legal or socio-economic differences of any state.

In other words, to allow for a space where implementation of changes is enabled, the possibility to dissolve the Movement must be there if necessary. That is exactly because such alternative constellations of energies are always revolutionary and have the potential for change. Accordingly, if NAM has become a 'controlling board for self-promotion and self-perpetuation' and in this way a mirror image and the extreme opposite of its core initial moment, it ought to have a choice to suspend itself. In other words, it would be considerate to dissolve NAM when it is no longer an alternative in international law but rather a structural element in pursuit of its (hegemonic) propagation, a companion or even a unit of the 'establishment'. If it no longer exists as a 'brotherhood and unity' in sempiternal (autopoietic) pursuit of change in international cooperation, it is no longer radical nor an alternative in the international legal order.

Furthermore, understanding the Yugoslav state-building project and its continuous struggle for independence and preservation of sovereignty not only adds a new dimension to the Cold War historiography but sheds light on the contemporary political challenges too. It adds, for instance, to the debates on the interethnic clashes in multi-ethnic or one-party states, such as Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Yemen, India (to name but a few). It contributes to critiques that show the futility, in the long run, of dissemination of Western parliamentary democracy to countries with different socio-political experience. The thesis also challenged certain preconceptions that weigh on regions of the Global South and allowed to rethink radical possibilities for states that are currently facing seemingly insurmountable challenges, such as Venezuela and Sri Lanka. Although their understanding of the rule of law, human rights or economic development can be fundamentally different to

Western (which, in fact, is not consistent even in the so-called Global North), these areas are not a lost cause for progressive forces. Neither are they to be designated as prone only to right-wing politics and extremism, or to support of pro- US, Russia or NATO policies, or to unconditional surrender to neoliberalism (but are often compelled to). Fighting the good fight in battles of ideas ought to be universal and ongoing in regions devastated by reactionary ideas of nationalism, neoliberalism, clericalism, autocracy, even democracy. Thus, a solution could lie in multiple ‘centres’ where East meets West meets South (NAM) to facilitate and empower a worldwide dialogue on the foundations of, and despite of, such differences.

True, and as said above, a call to dismantle NAM based on a critique of it being a remnant of the past, or a club, might be legitimate. At the same time, however, insofar NAM continues to meet, it holds much more than a historical local-global significance. It can still inspire from its past to give insights into its current agendas and practices in future pursuit for nonalignment. Critical reflection not only lays foundation for uncovering collective memory (and where, for instance, an archive comes in). It also prevents it from becoming an ‘institutionalised’ element in the international legal order and thus – as shown in chapter 5 - unresponsive to changes and futile.

Having said that, there is still the potential to challenge the standard views of sovereignty at the international level and as experience domestically through a kind of top-down version of how a state or the international order should be organised. Indeed, that was the drive of NAM, Yugoslavia, and remains a challenge for today. In attempting to do so, it is important not to fall into temptation to introduce change such as self-management top-down – from politics to economics, nor externally in the guise of global (neoliberal) development, yet another ideological cover. Similarly, movements or communities ought not to be built from a position of power and its consequent devolvement from one leader to all others but should be constructed according to ‘politics of equals’ – brotherhood and unity.

Another insight emerging from the analysis presented here is the dialectical process in forming movements and policies, ideally from a position of equals. Just as local peculiarities give rise to the emerging unity, the unity itself has to seep down and embed to the local context. To appropriate Rajak, the ‘role the Balkan states played in the early Cold War helps us fully appreciate the ways in which the dynamics of the superpower competition were distorted and were critically influenced by regional political forces and distinct historical legacies’.⁹

Finally, I emphasise in this thesis the importance of historical work as an instrument for critique. My research speaks not only to various topics in the changing global system, centred around key questions of sovereignty and development on individual, national and international level. As reviewed in the introduction of my thesis, my project also demonstrates the role of an archive as a tool in moulding such narrative (see Introduction 4.2. in this thesis). Accordingly, perceptions of past must continually be expanded, not replaced, with complementary thinking. Considering Foucault and Dedijer, the archival work can begin only with ‘loss of life’.¹⁰ Namely, by way of contrast to utopias, Foucault called archives ‘heterotopias, linked to slices in time... [there] for the sake of symmetry, they begin to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time’.¹¹ Dedijer would most likely approve Foucault’s view as he also understood that ‘in history-writing we must obey the theory of distance’.¹² Perhaps, then, a time for critical study of history of Yugoslav socialist period and of NAM is (always) yet to come.

⁹ Svetozar Rajak, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956’ in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010) 198.

¹⁰ In relation to archives, this means passing of certain time, be it 30 or 50 years.

¹¹ Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, ‘Des Espace Autres [Of Other Spaces]’ 1986 (16) 1 *Diacritics* 22-27, 26. See also Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon 1972); Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press 1996).

¹² Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozci za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New Contributions towards biography of Josip Broz Tito]* (Zagreb: Mladost 1980) vi.

As a legal scholar coming from former Yugoslavia and as somebody who understands the languages, the contribution of the archival research undertaken is not to be underestimated. It represents its own unique contribution. Namely, the work of a legal historian is demanding. It takes time and concerns one's view of things and involves readers. The aim is not to prove rationality, because the end goal is not a linear development but a cyclical continuation of reflections. There should therefore be a space for imperfections of theses and an awareness that it is necessary to look at past events from a time-space distance. By that I mean that distant from Yugoslavia (Slovenia), I came in conflict with the historiography there. If 'acceptable' to enter an institution, one finds themselves in a standardized system and under constant scrutiny. I left Slovenia and from a distance observed problems with the political context, which I see as a significant obstacle to academic and professional 'creativity' and experimentation. Nevertheless, and however difficult it might be to dissolve certain political remnants to bring about changes, opportunities for a new beginning, a new ethic, a new way of critical thinking, I remain hopeful that Slovenia has the capacity to rise from crises due to issues that arise when critical ideas get into contact with establishment and institutionalization, broadly speaking.

Indeed, the moment concepts (are given an opportunity to) develop, questions are asked quite differently. I feel lucky to be able to create elsewhere and think this sort of a critical distance yields much necessary insight. I have therefore posed this thesis as a historical counter-archive, highlighting the causes of destructive dynamics, such as undemocratic, authoritarian power relations, the growing dominance of trade principles for profit of only few, unsustainable, wasteful production recklessly destroying nature, call for continuous self-critique in national and international relationships to inform ways to restore dignity to humanity and nature. As such, the thesis is a window into the legacy of ruptures and speaks at and into ever-emerging 'blocs' emerging in power struggles and crises of capitalism, be it historiographical (methodology), political, economic or societal.

3. Pasts and Futures: What is Left to Do

In retrospect, and six decades later, the Yugoslav visionary governance at home and abroad still seems extraordinary and worthy of further exploration. Historically, it was a case of successful war of national liberation and of guerrilla communism legitimised to hold over three decades of power. Politically, it was a multinational state without a dominant nationality and a unique party system coupled with decentralisation in economy. Sociologically, it represented a unique political culture and social sphere based in the form of workers' councils, self-managing bodies in institutions and communes, and in international affairs, sovereignty, independence and in politics of nonalignment.

With the end of Yugoslavia, reflections on self-management and nonalignment were interrupted just as they started tackling the essence of the problem in the project's development and pointed at key reasons for its failure. Yet the two topics are making a comeback at present. The question remains to what extent, with their imperfections, contradictions, successes and failures the two policies can present a potential and possibilities in the present society. I believe it is worth exploring through application to contemporary challenges or moments, particularly for peripheral sovereignties in the present international political and legal scene. Or to carry out comparative studies of how state's identity comes to be formed, is maintained, and deployed as a form of resistance in the international legal order.

The research into these topics would also benefit significantly from research in more archives around the globe. As part of my future projects, I would like to work through archival material available in the United Kingdom (The Kew Garden National Archives), but also in the Archives of Slovenia in Ljubljana.¹³ I would appreciate accessing the archive fond of the League of

¹³ There is more archival material that remains to be analysed and developed further in my prospective monograph. The possible archives to work in are many. In Slovenia: Arhiv Republike Slovenije (The Archive of the Republic of Slovenia); Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino Slovenije (The Institute of Contemporary History of Slovenia); the regional archives such as Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana; Celje; Ptuj (Historical Archive Ljubljana);

Communists of Slovenia, including transcripts of the Presidency of LCY, documents from institutions such as the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Internal affairs, and especially those containing highly confidential information about the state apparatus, its weaknesses, and the threats against it. To enrich my research with the wealth of primary material, I would like to further explore the inexhaustible Archives of Serbia, consulting the documents of the League of Communist of Serbia and the League of Communists of Slovenia, as I expect that the documents of the Slovenian communists differ from those of their Serbian colleagues. Additionally, as Slovenian communists naturally kept the Yugoslav-level documents related mainly to Slovenian issues, I am confident that in those files lies material for new research activities. It would mean a remarkable difference to my previous attempts that were limited by time and will no doubt enrich the national and international Yugoslav and NAM portrait. There is also the question of personal archives of the President of the Executive Council of Slovenia (1987-1980) Anton Vratuša (1915-2017), who was also Chief of Staff to Edvard Kardelj between 1953-1965 and Yugoslavia's ambassador to the United Nations between 1967-1969. Finally, there is archival material relating to the Christian socialists in Slovenia that was neglected by the 1980s but is now ready for processing and research. Indeed, following Dedijer's belief of time distance, and Foucault's conceptualization of an archive as the 'other' - an intense space that mirrors yet disturbs and transforms what is outside - a time for critical archival study is always yet to come. To learn from

Celje; Ptuj). In the UK: The National Archives: Public Records Office, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966 (PRO FO) in London, United Kingdom. In Belgrade, Serbia: Arhiv Jugoslaviie (The Archives of Yugoslavia, AY); Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Archives of Josip Broz Tito, AJBT); Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (Diplomatic archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, DAMSP RS); Arhiv Saveznog ministarastva za Inostrane poslove (The Archive of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASMIP); Archives of Internal Affairs; Archive of Serbia and Montenegro. Furter afield, in New Delhi, India: The National Archives of India (for example, Ministry of External Affairs Files 1947-1964); Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; Ministry of External Affairs Archives (MEA). In the US: The National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, NARA); Central Intelligence Agency, Electronic Reading Room (CIA-ERR, available at <www.foia.cia.gov>); John F Kennedy Library (Boston).

the past moments with critical distance and recover theoretically immortal principles that could again inspire for the future.

A further fascinating inquiry would engage possible continuities between the anticolonial and the anti-imperialist movements of the Cold War period which arguably had roots and took place in Yugoslavia. The inquiry would build on accounts of the two policies in domestic and international relations and would employ archival material to develop a historiographical framework that would map the complex transition between the inter-war anti-colonial anti-imperial constellations and the post-WWII decolonisation. In other words, to research Yugoslav nonalignment policy through the postcolonial lens that ‘refuses a singular master narrative’.¹⁴ I showed awareness of such engaging and relevant topic in my Masters dissertation where I argued how a (bipolar) Eurocentric frame of reference still remains a prominent feature of inquiry. My focus on NAM emerged from my interests in globalization and post-coloniality (and was to an extent ‘parked’ in this thesis). One of NAM’s paradoxes is its rootedness outside Europe and the Global North, but with socialist Yugoslavia as a European state having a leading role from the very beginning. How is this to be reconciled with the assertion of Johanna Bockman that NAM’s very existence challenges the assumption that ‘the modern... and the global are European in origin’?¹⁵ I propose it as a relevant empirical testing ground for postcolonial concerns on the relationship between development and forms of political and social orders.¹⁶ As I argued in this thesis, by emphasizing the inalienable right of self-determination and choice of development paths for new sovereign states, NAM advocated for independence of all colonial states, however small. As seen in the thesis,

¹⁴ Paul Stubbs, ‘Socialist Yugoslavia and the Antinomies of the Non-Aligned Movement’ *Left East* (17 June 2019), available at <<https://lefteast.org/yugoslavia-antinomies-non-aligned-movement/>> accessed 8 June 2022.

¹⁵ According to Bockman, NAM is a kind of ‘globalization otherwise’. Linked to this, NAM is both a product of, and catalyst for, the moment of struggle against colonialism. Johanna Bockman, ‘A Variety of Globalizations’ 2016 *The Sociologist* available at <<http://thesociologistdc.com/all-issues/a-variety-of-globalizations/>> accessed 13 November 2021.

¹⁶ Catherine Baker, *Race and the Yugoslav Region: Postsocialist, Post-conflict, Postcolonial?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2018) 108.

Yugoslavia's support for the Global South derived primarily from the Partisan fighters' affective affinities with guerrilla liberation movements worldwide, rather than from a theoretical stance emphasizing the link between political independence and anti-imperialism.¹⁷ While it might be a stretch to label the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia as a product of anti-colonial struggle, it was certainly accurate to see the intertwining of anticolonial and nonaligned emancipatory practices as having 'opened new horizons and nurtured revolutionary political subjectivity on a global scale'.¹⁸ As such, this element of nonaligned internationalism 'merits a significant afterlife in the rather recent concern with the inter-connections between European and non-European socialist and post-socialist peripheries and postcolonial states'.¹⁹ In this sense, to explore socialist Yugoslavia and NAM through a postcolonial lens further could represent a valid way for the construction of a story that 'refuses a singular master narrative'.²⁰ The two could act as an example for the changing spatial and political contours of resistance by the colonized, including with its own silences and erasures. Insofar as it exemplifies a post-national political and economic configuration, NAM could be a testing ground for analysis of alternatives of forms of community that transgress the spatial order of nation-states.

I have approached my thesis from the perspective of critical history of international law. While the forms that the experiment in socialist self-management and nonalignment have taken in Yugoslavia are not to be simply forced blindly or *ad verbum* into present geopolitical, economic, and social realities, I have argued in this thesis that their principles can still be considered. If, as Slavoj Žižek argued, we live in the 'end times' where the neoliberal project has failed with apocalyptic proportions and resulted in

¹⁷ Edvard Kardelj, *The Historical Roots of Non-Alignment* (Belgrade STP 1979).

¹⁸ Gal Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures: Self-Management, Market Reform and the Spectre of Socialist Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto 2019) 34, 87.

¹⁹ James Mark, Artemy M Kalinovsky and Steffi Marung (eds), *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Indiana: University Press 2020).

²⁰ Stubbs, 'Socialist Yugoslavia' (2019). Among many insightful works that speak of alternatives in international legal history, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000); Balakrishna Rajagopal, *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).

corresponding divisions and despair, could the lessons of the two experiments observed in this thesis not be used in our struggle against the psychopathology of the neoliberal markets?²¹ Not a simple ‘Yugonostalgia’ as an uncritical claim of the past but in terms of a pursuit of genuine autonomous global communities struggling towards and in brotherhood and unity.

To conclude, I hope and trust that this thesis has proved to be a stimulating and a refreshing read that opens a debate and encourages further examinations on alternative ideas to ‘Western capitalist democracy’ or an ‘Eastern communist autocracy’. As we, comrades of critical international legal scholars, explore the political and economic modalities of governance and their potential for future alternatives in the international legal order, it should be our task to feel the pulse of times. Not as detached academics, but as participating intellectuals in public debates. I, for one, look forward to once again step through the silent corridors of archival buildings that, once you open their doors and files, speak volumes.

²¹ Slavoj Žižek, *Living in the End Times* (London: Verso: 2011).

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