With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies?

Intragroup Concomitants of Collective Narcissism



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Declaration

The research presented in this thesis was conducted at the School of Psychology, University of Kent whilst enrolled as a full-time postgraduate student and was supported by a Vice Chancellor's Graduate Teaching Assistantship Award. The theoretical and empirical work was supported by the supervision of Professor Aleksandra Cichocka. With the exception of Study 7 (which was also used for my MSc thesis), the work reported here has not contributed to any other degree or qualifications. For the purposes of the PhD, data from Study 7 have been reanalysed to test novel hypotheses.

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[1] This research was conducted during my PhD but not reported in this thesis.

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Finally, I am compelled to mention the state of the world this thesis was written under. I commenced my PhD in the autumn of 2019, while Trump was still president of the US and Brexit was in a state of total gridlock. It seemed like the world was in disarray. Reading Stefan Zweig's "World of Yesterday" during that period of trembling international relations had a profound influence on me. However, no one foresaw the storm(s) approaching. COVID-19 would soon re-erect borders and fuel nationalism and hate to a hights not seen in decades. Concurrently, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is unfolding, not just as a war on the ground, but a revisionist project in which history is being rewritten. My thesis tackles a tiny part of how psychology can explain some of these processes and documents how toxic national identity fuels animosity and destruction, at home and abroad. The antidote, however, remains to be discovered.

Abstract

Collective narcissism is a defensive belief in ingroup's greatness which is contingent on external validation. A vast literature documents a robust relationship between collective narcissism and outgroup hostility. The goal of this thesis was to explore the intragroup concomitants of collective narcissism, which are less well understood. In the theoretical Chapter 1, national narcissism is reviewed as a predictor of support for illiberal politics, such as support for totalitarian policies and populist political leaders. While national narcissism has similarities with other predictors of illiberalism, such as social dominance orientation, it is unique in its support for costly policies that aim to bolster the nation's image. Subsequent chapters study empirically how national narcissism relates to attitudes (Chapter 2) and decision-making (Chapter 3) aiming to reinforce the ingroup's image at the expense of ingroup members' well-being. Chapter 2 found that national narcissism was related to willingness to sacrifice ingroup members as a form of image management. These relationships were mediated by concerns about the country's reputation. Chapter 3 reports both cross-sectional and experimental evidence that national narcissism (and defensive ingroup identity more broadly) is related to a tendency to maximise the difference in outcomes received by the ingroup versus the outgroup. This economically irrational strategy entails accepting loss of ingroup profit if an outgroup loses even more. Chapter 4 relies on data collected among active partisans and found that partisan narcissism related to using secrecy, deception and political blood-sport in political work, a strategy known as politicking. Cumulatively, the findings suggest that those high in collective narcissism use the ingroup as a source of group-based ego enhancement (Chapters 2-3) and seem to be willing to impose these desires with force (Chapter 4).

Keywords: collective narcissism, illiberalism, ingroup sacrifice, maximising the difference, politicking

General Introduction

Adorno famously argued that weak egos seek compensation in great collectives (Adorno, 1963, p. 94). Indeed, recent theorisation and research has demonstrated that feeling frustrated has the potential to increase individuals' collective narcissism (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018), a defensive belief in one's ingroup greatness that requires external recognition (Cichocka, 2016; Marchlewska et al., 2020). Collective narcissism therefore reflects a superficial and compensatory attachment to the ingroup (Marchlewska et al., 2018) and can be expressed in extreme outgroup hostility (Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). However, theory holds (Cichocka, 2016) and some research has demonstrated (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2021) that collective narcissism may also lead individuals to show a lack of compassion and concern for the welfare of their own ingroup members. This may especially be the case when honour and respect of the group are perceived to be at stake in intergroup relations. Proximate examples come from the COVID-19 pandemic, in which an impeccable image of the nation seemed to be prioritised by some governments over effectively tackling this public health crisis (Lincoln, 2020). For example, then-President Donald Trump of the United States suggested the country should tone down its COVID-19 testing program to improve case numbers compared to other countries (Segers, 2020).

Acceptance and even promotion of such ingroup harm, intended to bolster the ingroup's image, may be a product of the superficial relationship those high in collective narcissism have with their social group (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018). The topic of this thesis is examining how collective narcissism can be associated with such problematic intragroup relations in the contexts of 1) political illiberalism, 2) sacrificial attitudes towards ingroup members, 3) decision-making about ingroup affairs, and 4) behaviour in an applied setting (i.e. political parties). In this general

introduction to the thesis, I will provide an overview of research on collective narcissism and conclude with an outline of the thesis.

What is Collective Narcissism? Key Terms and Definitions

As alluded to earlier, collective narcissism is belief in one's ingroup greatness which is contingent on external validation (Cichocka, 2016; Marchleska et al., 2020). As indicated by its reference to narcissism, this belief entails a preoccupation with an impeccable image of the group, and aggression towards others that somehow threaten this idealised image. A constant crave for external recognition and respect is therefore one of the main characteristics of collective narcissism. However, there are other important elements of collective narcissism to consider, in addition to a great focus on image or respect. Collective narcissism entails a painful feeling that the group's position in the world is fundamentally unfair and that the group has been wronged by others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Cichocka, 2016). Those high in collective narcissism are also resentful that others do not see just how great the group is, and therefore feel its achievements always go unrecognised. Delusions of grandeur, arrogance and group-aggrandising are therefore components of this belief. Entitlement also accompanies collective narcissism in that the group is thought to deserve special treatment for simply being there (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). In sum, collective narcissism is a multifaceted but coherent belief that the ingroup is great, but still it is in a disadvantaged position imposed on it by other's unfairness. All these facets underlie a shallow relationship those high in collective narcissism have with their ingroup and its members (Cichocka, 2016).

A complete understanding of collective narcissism is perhaps best achieved by also gaining an understanding of what it is not. Collective narcissism is most often juxtaposed against others measures of how individuals can relate with their group, such as ingroup identification, that is feeling part of the ingroup and evaluating it positively (Leach et al.,

2008; Tajfel, 1978). Ingroup identification is often measured in terms of positive affect/satisfaction with the ingroup, centrality of group membership for the self, and ties/solidarity with other ingroup members (Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008). Importantly, the collective narcissism scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) does not tap into connection and bonds with the ingroup and its members, but rather how the individual thinks *outsiders* think of the ingroup, hubristic concerns about the ingroup's greatness and anger towards perceived offenders. Further, in the collective narcissisms scale, concern about ingroup members is absent. Meanwhile, ingroup identification asks if one feels commitment to other group members, if one is glad or proud to be a group member, and if one thinks that being of this group is an important part of one's self-concept. None of these constructive intragroup dynamics are present in collective narcissism, and instead it focuses on competitive intergroup processes.

Collective narcissism and ingroup identification both assume a positive evaluation of the ingroup and are thus moderately correlated (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). However, when entered simultaneously into a regression model, a substantial amount of variance remains unique to either and as predictors they usually have more explanatory power than when entered alone (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Therefore, the effects of collective narcissism are best observed once we control for social identification (and also vice versa). For conceptual clarity, these can be referred to as two forms of ingroup identity. Defensive ingroup identity is captured by collective narcissism net of ingroup identification, and what remains of the variance is defensive entitlement and concerns about external recognition of the ingroup in the eyes of others (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska et al., 2020). Contrarywise, when co-varying out the effects of collective narcissism from ingroup identification, we observe the effects of a secure ingroup identity, an unpretentious investment in the ingroup, independent of the recognition of the

group in the eyes of others (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska et al., 2020). The term "identity" is fitting here considering Tajfel's (1978, p. 63) conceptualisation that a social identity is a part of an individual's self-concept that is derived from group membership, together with its value and emotional significance. Further, Ellemers and colleagues (2002, p. 164) emphasised that an "identity" should refer to the given identity's nature or content (here, defensive and secure). For example, secure ingroup identity generally predicts constructive outcomes, such as positive attitudes towards outgroup members (Marchlewska et al., 2020) and greater concern for other ingroup members (Cichocka et al., 2021). All analyses presented in this thesis will adjust for ingroup identification.

Collective narcissism can be measured in relations to virtually any social group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). For sake of brevity, I will also refer to collective narcissism in context-specific terms in the empirical studies of this thesis (i.e., national narcissism or partisan narcissism). Despite collective narcissism sharing the same psychological structure across different reference groups (i.e., a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on external validation, Cichocka 2016; Marchlewska et al., 2020), it is useful to take the nature and background of the group into account. This is especially compelling when considering intergroup relations and intersectionality, as most research on collective narcissism has hitherto been conducted among advantaged groups. Collective "narcissisms" in reference to dominant subgroups of homogenous countries are likely to correlate – such as nation, religion, and male gender – presumably because of the power system intervolved by these groups in society (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiaczonek, 2021). The collective "narcissisms" in relations to these groups is likely to be manifest in resistance to any change challenging the group's advantaged position. However, despite this focus on advantaged groups, collective narcissism is not always expressed as reactionary right-wing resistance to change. An

emerging line of research on disadvantaged groups paints a different picture: Collective narcissism, which entails a call for recognition, can indeed be manifested as pro-egalitarian politics against the status-quo in disadvantaged groups, such as African American support for the Black Lives Matter Movement (Marinthe et al., 2022). Identity content, such as history and societal divides, is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is a compelling topic for future research.

It is important to make a distinction between collective narcissism and individual narcissism. There are parallels between the two, but they operate at separate levels of the individual's self-concept. Collective narcissism captures beliefs about one's social group, while individual narcissism captures beliefs about the self. More specifically, individual narcissism has been conceptualised as "a spectrum of personality characteristics that reflects variation in self-importance and entitlement as a shared phenotype" (Krizan & Herlache, 2018, p. 8). It has roots in personality and is shaped by person-environment interaction (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Individual narcissism is often expressed in self-centredness, vanity, and aggression if personally threatened, and as such, it pertains to the individual's self-evaluation (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Individual narcissism can further be manifested as grandiose or vulnerable (Miller et al., 2011). While grandiose narcissism is reflected in more stereotypical features of narcissists, such as grandiosity, aggression and dominance, vulnerable narcissism reflects a defensive and insecure grandiosity that is inhibited or shame-ridden because of feelings of inadequacy and incompetence.

Meanwhile, collective narcissism should not be approached as a personality trait or characteristic, but a belief about one's ingroup operating at the level of the collective self (i.e., in the Tajfellian sense of the part of the individual's self-concept that is derived from group membership; Tajfel, 1978). This key difference is likely why individual and collective narcissism show only weak to moderate correlations (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019) and

explains why they have different consequences for interpersonal and intergroup relations (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). For example, those high in individual narcissism are aggressive toward individuals who threaten their personal ego, while those high in collective narcissism are aggressive toward members of other groups perceived to threaten or insult the ingroup (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Individual narcissists also have a general tendency to exploit other people (Krizan & Herlache, 2018), while collective narcissists seem to be especially exploitative towards other ingroup members, but not necessary others (Cichocka et al., 2021). To further illustrate the difference, individual narcissists likely exploit ingroup members *despite* them being ingroup members, while collective narcissists rather seem to exploit ingroup members *because* they are ingroup members.

As to its antecedents and causes, collective narcissism is thought to be a compensatory response to frustration of individual needs, such as personal control (Bertin et al., 2022; Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018) and self-worth (Golec de Zavala et al., 2020). Recent findings have demonstrated that collective narcissism is predicted by anxious attachment, the fear of abandonment and rejection by others (Marchlewska, Górska, Green, et al., 2022). Other studies suggest that collective narcissism is more strongly related to vulnerable narcissism than grandiose narcissism (Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020). Since vulnerable narcissism is characterised by frustration and resentment (Krizan & Herlache, 2018), this also supports the notion that collective narcissism is rooted in individual frustration. Seeking comfort in an excessive and hyperbolic positive social identity may promise to alleviate such frustrations (Cichocka, 2016). Therefore, collective narcissism does not entail a genuine motivation to benefit the ingroup, but rather a preoccupation with preserving its positive image, instrumentalised in service to the self (Cichocka et al., 2021). This fixation on image and dismissal of ingroup members may have profound implications

for the ingroup, but research has hitherto not directly addressed how superficial relations with ingroup members can be exploited to provide group-based ego enhancement (cf., Cislak et al., 2018; Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). For example, Cichocka and colleagues (2021) found that those high in collective narcissism objectified their ingroup members, but did not consider image concerns and intergroup comparisons.

A lot is still unknown about the development of collective narcissism. While it likely starts as a subconscious process set off by frustrated individual needs (Cichocka, 2016 & Fromm, 1973), it is unclear which factors influence the "selection" of the reference group. Most humans belong to multiple social groups and may have various identities. Why and how does one develop a "collective narcissism" with one (or perhaps multiple) but not all the others? Intuitively, this process is based on prior knowledge about what people find important to their sense of self, but recent research also suggests people develop collective narcissism with groups in which they get social benefits (Eker et al., 2022). Values, political orientation, socialisation, personal history, and demographic background likely play a role, to name some examples. Important divides in society may also play a role (such as race in the US and class in the UK). Longitudinal models, linking life events such as trauma, stress, or anxiety (i.e., the frustration), group memberships, values, ideology, personality with collective narcissism over time is needed to investigate this process, but that is beyond the scope of this research.

We Demand Respect: Collective Narcissism, Intergroup Hostility and Political Implications

Collective narcissism is a robust predictor of outgroup hostility (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013), even and even support of extreme ethnic violence (Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022). This relationship is especially pronounced when an outgroup is perceived to somehow threaten the ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016) or has a history of difficult relations with the ingroup (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). For example,

American national narcissism has been found to predict negative attitudes towards Arabs, but not Asians and Europeans (Lyons et al., 2010). Those high in collective narcissism furthermore react with disproportionate punitiveness to insults, and perceive even small hints of criticism as an attack (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). This hypervigilance biases perceptions of the social world (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019), making those high in collective narcissism prone to believing in conspiracy beliefs about the malevolent intentions of outgroups (Cichocka et al., 2016). Conspiracy beliefs are thought to satisfy psychological needs associated with collective narcissism in that they provide external reasons for the perceived lack of recognition of the ingroup, and promise reassurance that the ingroup is important enough to be the target of malevolent plots (Golec de Zavala, 2021).

A perceived lack of recognition makes those high in national narcissism inclined to support illiberal political leaders promoting conspiratorial narratives and the sentiment that the nation is not respected in the world (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). In fact, global respect for the United States was one of Donald Trump's main political goals (Benen, 2020). It is no coincidence that Donald Trump's rallying cry to "Make America Great Again" reached monumental popularity in a large section of the American population. National narcissism was a strong predictor of support for Donald Trump (Marchlewska et al., 2018), and other political leaders and movements that empathise a return to a glorious past, such as Brexit in the United Kingdom (Cislak et al., 2020), Law and Justice party in Poland (Marchlewska et al., 2018), and Viktor Orban in Hungary (Lantos & Forgas, 2021). Even in an experimental setting, national narcissism with fictious country predicted support for a leader promising a "renewal of national greatness" (Keenan & Golec de Zavala, 2021). Respect is so important for those high in national narcissism that deny historical accounts that challenge the nation's positive image (Klar & Bilewicz, 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2020) or demand closure regarding the past, such as the Holocaust in Germany (Kazarovytska & Imhoff, 2022). Their

stances are often hypocritical, and those high in collective narcissism have double-standards for what the ingroup is allowed to do and what outgroups are allowed to do (West et al., 2022).

National narcissism predicts exclusionary attitudes and less support for human rights of minorities, and thus seems to fuel political intolerance within the country, not just hostility towards foreigners. In Poland, for example, national narcissism related to homophobia because LGBT individuals were considered a threat to the nation's morality, shared norms and values (Mole et al., 2021). Moreover, Catholic narcissism in Poland related to the endorsement of "gender conspiracy beliefs", the sentiment that LGBT activism and gender studies are a secret plot to undermine traditional values and social arrangements (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2019). Accordingly, gender-based collective narcissism among men predicted less willingness to engage in collective action to support women and LGBT individuals in Poland (Górska et al., 2020). In the context of gender relations, Polish national narcissism predicts support for a near total abortion ban, a relationship that was mediated by hostile sexism (Szczepańska et al., 2022). Furthermore, in Poland, national, religious and male narcissism was associated with toleration of violence against women (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiaczonek, 2021). Overall, national narcissism seems to predict hostility to minorities that are perceived as somehow threatening the majority group.

To even further erode cohesion and harmony in the national group, national narcissism predicts opposition to democracy (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022). In the US, national narcissism predicted support for the storming of the US Capitol January 6th and the sentiment that Trump had to remain president (Federico, Farhart, et al., 2022), even though it had to be achieved via undemocratic means (Keenan & Golec de Zavala, 2021). Those high in national narcissism likely lack a sense of commitment and ties to the group (Cichocka, 2016) necessary to meet the basic democratic assumptions that citizens should

respect differences and put trust in each other (Coppedge et al., 2008). Indeed, social cynicism—a negative view on human nature mediated the effect of national narcissism on opposition to democracy (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022). Those high in national narcissism may therefore be cynical about issues that do not actively promote the respect of the nation. In fact, democracy, minority rights and social justice may be perceived to be in the way of achieving the desired idealised image of the group.

As alluded to earlier, it is not only perceived outsiders that are victims of those high in collective narcissism. Overall, those high in collective narcissism show little concern for the welfare of their fellow ingroup members (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka et al., 2021). Anecdotally, there are numerous instances in history of governmental bodies engaging in persecution of their own citizens. Famous examples include the "Great Terror" in the Soviet Union, in which hundreds of thousands of loyal supporters of the regime were murdered (Radzinski, 1996), and illegal human experiments conducted by the CIA on US citizens (Kinzer, 2019). National narcissism seems to predict agreement with, even willingness to engage in, such human rights violations against ingroup members. Biddlestone and colleagues (2022) found that participants high in national narcissism agreed with statements such as, if they held positions in the government and deemed it necessary, they would engage in wiretapping of citizens, spread false information, support extensive surveillance of citizens (Studies 1 and 4) and readiness to engage in domestic terrorism and biological warfare (Study 3). These findings corroborate research and theorising suggesting that those high in collective narcissism see the group as a tool to further their own agenda, with little concern for the consequences (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka et al., 2021).

Feeding of Your Own: Collective Narcissism, Self-interests, and Ego Enhancement

Self-interests seem to be at the very core of the shallow relationship those high in collective narcissism have with their ingroup. Research in the organisational context has

found that those high in collective narcissism objectify their ingroup members (Cichocka et al., 2021). In other words, workers high in organisational narcissism treated their co-workers as means to an end for personal benefit. Reasons for group membership can even opportunistic. For example, national narcissism predicted readiness to leave one's country were it financially beneficial (Marchlewska et al., 2020). In sports teams, fans high in collective narcissism "bask in glory" when their team is successful but distance themselves from the team following losses, a phenomenon known as "fair-weather fandom" (Larkin et al., 2022). Supporting this view, recent research suggests that collective narcissism is motivated by seeking prestige and self-worth from ingroup membership (Eker et al., 2022). The relationship those high in collective narcissism have with their ingroup is therefore ambivalent, and can fluctuate depending on how well it reflects on the personal ego at even given time, which has been referred to as superficial ingroup love (Marchlewska et al., 2020).

It is important to clarify how ego enhancement in collective narcissism is conceptualised in this thesis. Overall, theorisation in this thesis is inspired by Adorno's (1963, p. 94) notion that individuals idealise their ingroups to compensate for their "weak egos". More specifically referring to collective narcissism, Fromm (1973) theorised that collective narcissism serves to alleviate frustrated individual needs, a process which has received supported from empirical evidence (Cichocka et al., 2016). This can be expressed in a variety of strategies to bolster the ingroup image, for example, by believing in conspiracy theories ("we know better", Cislak, Marchlewska et al., 2021), exploitation of natural resources ("we can do what we want", Cislak et al., 2018), retaliate against offenders ("we will get back at them, Golec de Zavala et al., 2016) and green-washing ("this will make us look great", Cislak, Cichocka et al., 2021). The underlying assumption is that these group-based strategies provide the individual with group-based ego enhancement, which is a temporary compensation derived from ingroup bolstering or assertion of its greatness

(Cichocka, 2016). Group-based ego enhancement is perhaps more obvious in cases such as opportunism for group membership or pursual of prestige or reward (Eker et al., 2022; Marchlewska et al., 2020; Larkin et al., 2022). For example, one might get group-based ego enhancement from supporting a successful sports team, but shy away from it once the team does poorly (Larkin et al., 2022).

Using the ingroup as a source of ego enhancement might also promote willingness to go to great lengths to preserve the group's positive social identity regardless of the outcomes. For example, those high in national narcissism in Poland supported the logging of an ancient, ecologically important forest, a relationship which was seemingly mediated by a need to assert the country as resistant to external pressures (Cislak et al., 2018). Paradoxically, another study showed that those high in national narcissism supported policies indented to promote a pro-environmental image of the nation ("greenwashing"), while opposing genuine pro-environmental actions (Cislak, Cichocka, et al., 2021). Furthermore, national narcissism is related to opposition to mandatory vaccinations, a relationship driven by conspiracy beliefs about powerful outsiders conspiring against the nation (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). However, more research is still needed on why collective narcissism predicts support for such harm to the ingroup. For example, attitudes towards environmental protection and vaccinations may be hard to distinguish from a convoluted political environment and ideology. Studies have also yet to conclude whether this harm is deliberate and conscious, rather than reflecting an inability to see their down-stream consequences. This thesis aims to address this gap by explicitly capturing ingroup harm and ask about acceptance of such measures aimed to improve the ingroup's image. Should this expectation be supported, it would establish that those high in collective narcissism have superficial relationships with other ingroup members that can be exploited for group-based ego enhancement.

Thesis Plan

In this thesis, I seek to explore the intragroup concomitants of collective narcissism. In Chapter 1, I review how national narcissism relates to illiberal political attitudes and make a contrast with social dominance orientation, a preference for group-based hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994), which is another social-psychological predictor thought to give rise to the current popularity of illiberal politics (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). In Chapter 2, I present research examining how national narcissism relates to support for overtly sacrificial attitudes about ingroup members. Chapter 3 substantiates research on attitudes by examining decision making. To this end, I use the "maximising the difference" paradigm from the classic Tajfel matrices (Tajfel et al., 1971) to quantify ingroup harm. Chapter 4 explores empirically how collective narcissism may be expressed in an applied setting (political party organisations). The thesis will conclude with a general discussion of the research presented and future directions.

Chapter 1[2]: Illiberal Politics and Group-based Needs for Recognition and Dominance

1.1 Abstract

The rise of illiberalism may have been fuelled in part by group-based psychological needs for recognition and dominance. The group-based need for recognition can be captured by collective narcissism: a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on external validation. Collective narcissism has consistently been associated with outgroup prejudice and hostility, especially towards groups that are perceived to have insulted or threatened the ingroup. The group-based need for dominance can be captured by social dominance orientation: an ideological attitude characterised by a strong preference for maintaining or enhancing hierarchies in intergroup relations and establishing dominance. While the two needs differ in their psychological antecedents and consequences, the craving for recognition of the ingroup can slide into a demand for dominance. Both collective narcissism and social dominance orientation have been associated with support for illiberal leaders, political movements, and policies. Opposition to democracy, civil liberties, science, and environmental protection can all be used to signal the country's dominance and independence from others. Thus, the needs for recognition and dominance can form a toxic blend, creating a psychological basis for the present popularity of illiberalism.

[2] Chapter 1 is based on the following Chapter: Gronfeldt, B., Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., & Cislak, A. (2021). Illiberal politics and group-based needs for recognition and dominance. In A. Sajo, R. Uitz, & S. Holmes (Eds.), *Handbook of Illiberalism*. Routledge.

"[The] desire for equal recognition can easily slide over into a demand for recognition of the group's superiority."

- Fukuyama (2018, p. 22)

1.2 Introduction

The early twenty-first century has been a turbulent era in world politics. From the 9/11 attacks to the War on Terror, the financial crisis of 2008, the climate emergency, and the COVID-19 pandemic, one calamity seems to follow another. Many nations face severe economic, environmental, and social challenges, and have elected illiberal leaders and parties that promise a return to a glorious past. Multiple factors certainly contributed to support for Trump in the US, Bolsonaro in Brazil (Queiroz et al., 2021), Modi in India (Thiruvengadam, 2021), and Brexit in the UK, but they all seem to share a common theme: the group-based needs for recognition and dominance. In this chapter, we discuss these two psychological needs and propose that they might have been influential in the rise of illiberalism in the past decades. We believe that understanding these group-based needs can complement studies examining the role of other psychological factors underpinning illiberal politics, including authoritarianism, affective polarisation, or emotions such fear, anger, and resentment.

Superficially, the two group-based needs – for recognition and dominance – may appear to develop out of a care and concern for the welfare of one's social group, such as the nation (see Berezin, 2021). Yet, they can backfire with disastrous consequences. Political theorist Fukuyama (2018) argues that much of contemporary politics revolves around the struggle for the nation's or social group's recognition, but that this desire can also easily slide into a quest for superiority and dominance. In this chapter, we will try to address the question of how and why the desire for recognition and dominance can result in illiberalism, and ultimately, be harmful for the nation as a social group. To this end, we will summarise quantitative empirical research that illuminates how these two broad psychological motives

can contribute to: 1) political (in)tolerance; 2) susceptibility to, and the spread of, misinformation; 3) support for public policies (especially in the domains of public health and environment); and 4) broader vote choices.

1.3 Key Terms and Concepts: Group- based Needs for Recognition and Dominance

In social psychology, the need for group-based recognition can be captured by the concept of collective narcissism – a belief in one's group's greatness that is contingent on external validation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; see also Adorno, 1963; Fromm, 1973). Collective narcissism is a form of ingroup identity characterised by a strong – even exaggerated – desire for recognition and respect of the group. It can apply to any social group the individual belongs to, be it one's nationality, ethnicity, or religious denomination. Collective narcissism can have harmful consequences for relations between and within groups (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Marchlewska et al., 2020). In this chapter we will focus on its political concomitants and, in particular, its relations with support for illiberal politics.

The need to defend one's group image can sometimes translate into the need to show superiority and dominance over other groups (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). The need for group-based dominance can be captured by the concept of social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation is an ideological attitude characterised by a strong preference for maintaining or enhancing present hierarchies in intergroup relations and establishing dominance and superiority over other groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Ho et al., 2015). It is often discussed in relation to right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which is more preoccupied with tradition, submission to authorities, and punitiveness towards those who seek to change the status-quo in society (Altemeyer, 1998). Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism are both motivational orientations that dispose individuals to

prejudice as well as right-wing political beliefs (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Both likely can contribute to illiberal politics.

Brexit serves as a useful context to illustrate how social dominance orientation, collective narcissism, and right-wing authoritarianism can each independently predict support for political decisions. Social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and national narcissism (that is, collective narcissism measured in relation to the national group) all contributed to support for the Leave campaign (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). Different motivational goals may underlie each of these three constructs. While right-wing authoritarians may have seen Brexit as an opportunity to return to traditionalism, collective narcissists[3] may have seen it as an assertion of independence from external influence by "taking back control" (see e.g., Hobolt, 2016). Social dominators, however, may have viewed Brexit as a way of maintaining or enhancing Britain's high status in the international community, or in Prime Minister Boris Johnson's words, "unleash[ing] Britain's full potential" (Cockroft, 2020). In this chapter we will focus on collective narcissism and social dominance orientation, while we refer readers interested in right-wing authoritarianism to Feldman and colleagues (2021).

Social dominance orientation and collective narcissism fuel prejudice and hostility within and between groups, though they differ both in their antecedents and consequences. Collective narcissism reflects a grandiose but defensive idealisation of the ingroup, characterised by a specific hostility towards those who are perceived as critical towards the ingroup. Social dominance orientation reflects a desire for dominance of the ingroup, linked to support for policies that maintain social hierarchy and prejudice towards those considered

[3] Although collective narcissism is a scale, those high in the belief are occasionally referred to as "collective narcissists" in this chapter for the sake of brevity.

inferior. As such, social dominance orientation is inherently anti-egalitarian (Pratto et al., 1994), while collective narcissism should not necessarily imply a general preference for inequality (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). What matters to collective narcissists is a grandiose image of the ingroup, which is not constrained to might (power or authority), but can include things such as culture, values, and a glorious history which make the ingroup unique (and even "chosen" for greatness, Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Therefore, intergroup aggression (which both constructs predict) may have different roots. Social dominators are aggressive to maintain the hierarchy between groups, but collective narcissists will want to preserve the ingroup's positive image.

Even though these two group-based needs may have different consequences on their own, they can reinforce each other in a toxic way. As suggested by Fukuyama (2018), the need for recognition can easily slide into a need for dominance. The story of the Weimar Republic and later Nazi Germany is a cautionary tale. Nazism grew and gained influence after Germany's defeat in World War I. The post-war years were characterised by the perception that Germany had been humiliated, and many citizens yearned a return to a glorious past where Germany was respected and recognised. Hitler and the Nazis answered the call by promising a national revival in which Germany's dominance over other countries would not only be restored, but imposed on minorities and undesirables within their own country. In so doing, the Nazis weaved together these two group-based needs so that the recognition of Germany also meant that it could rightfully dominate others. This toxic blend not only resulted in the invasion and occupation of other countries, but the mass-persecution of enemies within Germany who the Nazis considered inferior or standing in their way.

1.4 Group-based Need for Recognition and Illiberal Politics: Collective Narcissism at Work

1.4.1 Compensation through Group Image

Adorno (1963) famously argued that "weak egos… require the compensation of identifying themselves with… great collectives" (p. 94). Accordingly, the preoccupation with ingroup image – a characteristic of collective narcissism – is thought to develop as a compensation for personal shortcomings. Recent experimental studies took inspiration from these psychoanalytic ideas. Compared to participants randomly assigned to a control condition, participants who were assigned to a situation that threatened their self-esteem (Golec de Zavala et al., 2020) or personal control (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018) scored higher on questionnaire measures of collective narcissism (which include items such as "My group deserves special treatment", Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). These findings imply that those high in collective narcissism might be focused on managing their self-interests, rather than group-interests. Consequently, the ingroup may serve as a strong brand for them that compensates for their feelings of low self-worth. This translates into an enhanced need for recognition of the ingroup's worth. The ingroup image is then defended from enemies both within and outside the group.

At the same time, other ingroup members' interests, their well-being, health, or even rights may not be the top priority for individuals high in collective narcissism: their attachment to the group as a brand may be stronger than their attachment to other members of their group. In fact, collective narcissism has been linked to lower ingroup loyalty (Marchlewska et al., 2020). Past work suggested that leaving the group motivated by seeking membership in a higher-status group was more likely in the case of low (rather than high) identifiers (Ellemers et al., 1997). However, as those high in collective narcissism prioritise self-interests over ingroup-interests, they may be prone to leaving the group to look for more attractive personal opportunities, despite their seemingly strong ingroup attachment. Indeed, the higher the level of collective narcissism measured with respect to one's national group, the stronger the willingness to leave the country permanently for personal financial profit

(Marchlewska et al., 2020). Here, we outline how the compensatory nature of collective narcissism may lay the foundations for the support of illiberal politics.

1.4.2 The Need for Recognition Expressed as Political Intolerance

The obsessive focus on how the group is perceived by others means that those scoring high in collective narcissism will go to great lengths to defend the ingroup image from any criticism, real or imagined (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Accordingly, collective narcissism has been related to exaggerated perceptions of threat to the ingroup and an obsessive conviction that others purposefully seek to undermine its worth. Research has shown that both national (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012) and religious (Marchlewska, Górska, Lipowska, et al., 2022) narcissism is strongly linked to a siege mentality – "a belief held by group members stating that the rest of the world has highly negative intentions toward them" (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992, p. 42). This belief also helps explain why collective narcissism goes hand in hand with outgroup derogation (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka & Cislak, 2020).

Collective narcissism was found to be associated with punitive tendencies and aggressiveness, and even with the support for extreme violence – including military aggression – particularly towards those groups that criticise the ingroup (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2020; see also Jasko et al., 2020). Similarly, collective narcissism was positively linked to generalised prejudice, especially towards groups perceived as chronically hostile or those that have a history of conflict with the ingroup (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). In Poland, national narcissism was found to positively predict prejudice towards ethnic minorities in the country (Cichocka et al., 2017; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). In the US, collective narcissism among Whites was related to support for White-supremacist movements, exemplified by the Unite the Right Rally held in Charlottesville (Alexander-Grose, 2018). At

that rally, far-right extremists displaying swastikas and flying the Confederate flag chanted slogans such as “Jews will not replace us,” and violently attacked counter-protesters, leading to the killing of one and leaving many injured (Burke & Sotomayor, 2018).

Those high in collective narcissism are even willing to restrict the civil rights and liberties of their own group members if they do not conform to their group ideal. This has been shown, for example, in research on Catholic narcissism which has been linked to a desire to punish everyone who does not conform to Catholic values (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2019) or research on gender-related narcissism which was related to prejudice towards those who do not conform to traditional gender norms (Marchlewska et al., 2021). Those high in collective narcissism are also prone to accept restrictions to the rights of minority groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community or refugees, as well as women’s reproductive rights (Górska, Stefaniak, et al., 2022; Marchlewska et al., 2021). Recent studies show that they are also willing to accept governmental surveillance (that is, countries spying on their own citizens) in their own country and even to engage in surveillance activities against other ingroup members themselves (Biddlestone et al., 2022). Consequently, collective narcissism is also predictive of decreased overall support for democracy (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022).

1.4.3 The Need for Recognition and the Susceptibility to, and Spread of, Misinformation

The need for ingroup recognition makes those high in collective narcissism susceptible to misinformation (e.g. conspiracy theories, fake news, and anti-science rhetoric). This is especially likely in the case of pseudoscience or pseudohistorical narratives that allow for maintaining a belief in the greatness of the nation (Sternisko et al., 2020). In this section we focus on the relationships between collective narcissism and biased processing of information relevant to the ingroup image (Cichocka, Panayiotou, et al., 2018), as well as conspiracy beliefs (Cichocka et al., 2016; Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2019).

Those high in collective narcissism use many different strategies that help them manage the ingroup image. One of these strategies is related to the way those high in collective narcissism perceive and interpret their ingroup's past actions. This can manifest as biased information processing and distorted collective memory. Illustrative examples come from research on perceptions of morality. Those high in collective narcissism judge actions that favour interests of their group as more moral than similar actions favouring the interests of an outgroup. For instance, Republicans judged the US Senate's decision to confirm Kavanaugh as more moral that Democrats did, but this difference was especially pronounced for those scoring high in partisan narcissism (Bocian et al., 2021). Those scoring high in collective narcissism also tend to overestimate ingroup members' heroic deeds (Bilewicz et al., 2018) and their ingroup's general contribution to world history (Zaromb et al., 2018), as well as deny accounts that challenge the positive image of the ingroup (Klar & Bilewicz, 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2020). For example, Marchlewska and collagues (2020) demonstrated that Polish participants high in national narcissism showed negative reactions to films that reminded people of crimes committed by their nation during and after World War II. Specifically, they perceived these films as malignant anti-Polish propaganda, full of distortions that depict Poles in a bad light.

Memory politics, in the form of historical distortions or revisions, play a central part in many illiberal or autocratic regimes' grip on power. Collective nostalgia can increase ingroup cohesion (Wildschut et al., 2014) and encourage resentment towards outgroups (Wohl et al., 2020). Promoting a narrative about the ingroup's history as once being "great," homogenous, and strong (along with promises of a restoration of these features) certainly appeals to those high in collective narcissism.

The role of national history in a narcissistic craving for recognition has also been analysed in research on beliefs in conspiracy theories, which see secret plots by powerful

actors as the causes of significant social and political events (Douglas et al., 2019). Cichocka and colleagues (2016) examined the context of commemorations of the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. They found that those high in Polish national narcissism perceived the fact that the Berlin Wall is a more renowned symbol of the fall of Communism than the Polish free elections as a result of conspiratorial actions by other nations. These findings suggest that national narcissism is linked not only to distortions in collective memory or biased information processing, but also a tendency to search for potential enemies that could be blamed for the lack of ingroup recognition. The distrust typical of collective narcissism can spiral into conspiracism, where enemies are identified both within and outside of the country (Moore, 2018).

Indeed, previous research showed that collective narcissism is a robust predictor of beliefs in a variety of conspiracy theories (Cichocka et al., 2016; Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2019) as well as a willingness to share such theories online (Sternisko et al., 2021). In the US, national narcissism was related to beliefs in foreign governments engaging in conspiracies (Cichocka et al., 2016; see also Van Prooijen & Song, 2021) and to a general predisposition towards seeing conspiracies in politics (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018). Similarly, in China, it predicted a belief that US institutions and companies were conspiring against Chinese interests (Van Prooijen & Song, 2021). In the Polish context, national narcissism was linked to belief in a Jewish conspiracy (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012) or conspiracy theories surrounding the Smoleńsk plane crash (Cichocka et al., 2016). Similarly, Catholic collective narcissism was found to positively predict gender conspiracy beliefs. According to gender conspiracy theory, scientists and activists who emphasise that gender is not only a biological phenomenon but also a psychological one, together with feminists and the LGBTQ+ movement, represent forces that secretly promote an ideology

designed to harm traditional values and social arrangements (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2019).

For those scoring high in collective narcissism, conspiracy theories might serve as an explanation for group misfortunes. In fact, collective narcissism has been linked to feelings of collective victimhood (Skarżyńska & Przybyła, 2015), which often feature in illiberal identity narratives (Reicher & Ulusahin, 2020). A victimhood-based identity entails the conviction that the ingroup has been treated unfairly and that it has suffered from major atrocities throughout history, the likes of which other groups have not had to endure (Noor et al., 2012). Such feelings of martyrdom can coincide with a rejection of the suffering of other groups. For example, in Poland, victimhood-based identity is interwoven with the sentiment that Jews do not deserve unique status as victims of the Holocaust and that the suffering of Poles during World War II should be stressed to a greater extent (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, 2013). Similarly, the narcissistic belief that one's own group is uniquely victimised by the outside world can facilitate resentment and conspiracy beliefs about outsiders (Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012).

All these examples illustrate how a narcissistic identity can draw people to conspiracy theories which may serve as an explanation for an insufficient recognition of one's ingroup. Furthermore, adopting and disseminating conspiracy beliefs by people high in collective narcissism may be another approach to draw attention to the group as the one knowing the truth behind major world events or political reality (see Lantian et al., 2017).

1.4.4 The Need for Recognition Translated to Support for Public Policies

Collective narcissists' striving for the validation of the ingroup's image in the eyes of others may result in readiness to support policies that may eventually turn against their compatriots – undermining their health, well-being, or by renouncing the benefits which are available to them (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). Those high in collective

narcissism emphasise their independence from experts (e.g. scientists or pharmaceutical companies) to reinforce the ingroup image as strong, powerful, and not gullible (Cislak et al., 2018; Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). This means that collective narcissism can be associated with anti-science attitudes. In the public health domain, collective narcissism was found to be a strong predictor of support for a voluntary vaccination policy (vs. a mandatory one), and this effect was driven by a conviction that pharmaceutical companies, scientists, or governments conspire to cover up the risks associated with vaccines (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). Similarly, national narcissism was a predictor of belief in conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic (Górska, Marchlewska, et al., 2022; Sternisko et al., 2021).

Although health-related conspiracy theories may well be motivated by the need to protect ingroup members from malevolent actors, conspiracy beliefs may eventually undermine public health in the collective narcissists' own country (Jolley & Douglas, 2014). There is evidence that collective narcissism predicts a readiness to sacrifice one's own ingroup members if this helps to promote a strong ingroup image. For example, some preliminary evidence[4] coming from studies conducted in the US in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic shows that collective narcissism predicted a willingness to reduce testing for COVID-19 in order for the country's case numbers to look better compared to other countries. The same line of research found collective narcissism to positively predict a willingness to hasten the country's development of a COVID-19 vaccine, even at the expense of its safety and effectiveness, in order to beat other countries (Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022).

Furthermore, research conducted predominantly in the organisational context suggests that collective narcissism is linked to a willingness to exploit ingroup members for personal

[4] These findings are reported in Chapter 2.

gain (Cichocka et al., 2021). Parallel findings stem from research examining environmental attitudes. Those high in collective narcissism take an exploitative view of national natural resources. In a series of studies conducted in Poland, collective narcissism predicted lower support for introducing pro-environmental policies (Cislak, Cichocka, et al., 2021) but higher support for antienvironmental policies, such as providing governmental subsidy for the coal industry or logging a unique, protected national forest (Cislak et al., 2018). The policy support was at least partially driven by the need to take decisions independently from the international community. Similar stances are visible in other contexts – for example, the Brazilian President Bolsonaro's claimed that "the Amazon is ours" as he called for more exploitation of the ecologically important rainforest (D. Phillips, 2019). Implementing anti-environmental policies may not only undermine national heritage, but also translate to a deterioration of citizens' wellbeing and health (Calderón-Garcidueñas et al., 2008; European Environment Agency, 2016). Overall, prioritising ingroup image over concern for civil liberties, democracy, and citizens' well-being has implications for the decisions made by voters.

1.4.5 The Need for Recognition and Vote Choice

Illiberal political leaders and parties offer great visions of a nation for those who crave recognition. They promote commitment to a group that needs acknowledgment as the only legitimate representation of "the people" (Müller, 2016) and build their positions by priming feelings of injustice, resentment towards outgroups (e.g. immigrants in the UK and US, sexual minority groups in Poland), and anti-elitism (Marchlewska et al., 2018). In other words, illiberal populists seek to convince the public that there is a serious problem caused by its alleged enemies. They then provide a solution as to how they can deal with this issue, usually resorting to outgroup hostility. Indeed, a series of studies conducted in different political contexts demonstrated that national narcissism was positively linked to support for

populist leaders and parties. For example, it predicted support for Donald Trump in the US (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018), Law and Justice in Poland (Marchlewska et al., 2018), and Fidesz in Hungary (Forgas & Lantos, 2019).

A defining feature of many of the world's illiberal leaders and movements that have now risen to power is an opposition to international institutions and a return to traditional notions of national sovereignty. In his 2019 address to the United Nations' General Assembly, President Trump made the remark that "The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots." (The White House, 2019). He is not alone in this stance. Aside from Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organisation, there is the United Kingdom's choice to leave the European Union and a rising Euroscepticism in Poland and Hungary. As we discussed in the introduction, collective narcissism is associated with support for leaving supranational organisations such as the European Union, and thus renouncing the political and financial benefits that are available to ingroup members. For example, collective narcissism was not only predictive of voting for Leave in the Brexit referendum (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018) but also with a readiness to vote Leave in a potential "Polexit" referendum (Cislak et al., 2020). Together, these findings suggest that collective narcissism may be a risk factor in terms of making political choices and shaping readiness to support the illiberal policies that may turn against the citizens (including those who support these policies).

1.5 The Group-based Need for Dominance and Illiberal Politics: Social Dominance Orientation at Work

1.5.1 From Recognition to Superiority: The Need for Dominance

The need to gain recognition can only too easily turn into the need to establish dominance and superiority over other countries. This can further erode the liberal democratic order. As we argued in the introduction, the group-based need for dominance can be captured

by social dominance orientation—a preference for the maintenance or enhancement of a hierarchy between social groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation is thought to stem from low agreeableness and tough-mindedness which contribute to a general conviction that the "social world is a competitive jungle characterised by a ruthless, amoral struggle for resources and power in which might is right and winning everything" (Duckitt et al., 2002, p. 92). Ho and colleagues (2015) differentiate two subdimensions of social dominance orientation: 1) a dominance dimension which constitutes support for more forceful methods to subordinate other groups (such as old-fashioned racism); and 2) an anti-egalitarian dimension characterised by support for more covert, subtle hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and policies aimed at maintaining intergroup inequality. For the sake of simplicity, we discuss social dominance orientation as a single dimension in this chapter.

Nationalism is perhaps one of the most prominent political manifestations of social dominance in politics (Pratto et al., 1994). Nationalism can be described as a belief in national superiority and a longing for dominance over other nations (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Social dominance orientation and nationalism are not synonymous – rather, nationalism can be considered as one of the key legitimising myths that social dominators use to justify inequality and hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994).

1.5.2 The Need for Dominance Expressed as Political Intolerance

The need for national dominance affects politics both home and abroad. In international relations, it fuels support for wars, military spending (Pratto et al., 1998), and nuclear weapons (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Social dominators even blatantly dehumanise others, meaning that they deny outgroups the most basic identity of being human (Kteily et al., 2015). In fact, dehumanisation may be an important mediator of the relationship between social dominance orientation and prejudice (Trounson et al., 2015).

Social dominance orientation and nationalism are also both predictive of support for stricter immigration policies (Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Mummendey et al., 2001; Pehrson et al., 2009) – even in countries that one does not live in (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Much of the anti-immigrant, right-wing rhetoric in Western politics pertains to the idea that immigrants should adjust to their new country. Such rhetoric appeals to people scoring high in right-wing authoritarianism as they stress obedience, submission to ingroup norms, and social conformity (Altemeyer, 1998). However, this is not the case for social dominators (Thomsen et al., 2008). Instead, social dominance orientation predicts a willingness to persecute immigrants who do assimilate to the dominant culture as assimilation blurs the boundaries between the natives and the immigrants (Guimond et al., 2010; Thomsen et al., 2008).

Social dominators' derogation of others is even apparent in their humour. They find jokes about low-status groups (e.g., Mexicans in the US), funnier than do individuals who are low on social dominance orientation (Hodson et al., 2010). There is, however, more to social dominance than bad humour. Hate speech has long been a problem in political discourse in the West. Interestingly, one study suggested that while both social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism predicted prejudice, only social dominance orientation predicted the acceptance of hate speech against minorities (Bilewicz et al., 2017). In fact, right-wing authoritarianism was positively related to support of a prohibition of hate speech, to the extent that it violates societal norms. This somewhat surprising finding may neatly underline the different nature of social dominance and right-wing authoritarianism. Social dominators may be more willing than authoritarians to break societal norms to further their illiberal agenda (Bilewicz et al., 2017). This tendency may be on the rise now that extremist groups are becoming more mainstream and enjoying more influence (Hartzell, 2018). The demonstrations of White supremacists in the US seem to be becoming more openly anti-

Semitic or anti-Black than they have been in decades, exemplified in events such as the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville in 2017 (Atkinson, 2018).

Social dominance is, thus, inconsistent with the democratic ideal in which every citizen has a voice and human rights are respected. For example, social dominance orientation predicts lower support for democracy in general (Marchlewska, Castellanos, et al., 2019) and less support for civil rights (Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation is also related to lower political tolerance, especially towards groups that have political objectives related to making society more equal (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). For example, in the context of the racial unrest in the US in 2020, social dominance orientation predicted justification of police brutality against black people and resistance to the Black Lives Matter movement (Rudman & Saud, 2020). Social dominators are also prejudiced against groups that are considered of low status but do not threaten the system, such as the poor or physically disabled (Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt, 2006).

The need to show dominance over other groups also translates into a lower concern for human rights and civil liberties, likely due to the competitive world beliefs that are characteristic of a social dominance orientation (Crowson, 2009). Indeed, social dominance orientation correlates negatively with the endorsement of human rights but positively with their restriction (Cohrs et al., 2007), especially during times of war (Crowson et al., 2006; see also McFarland & Mathews, 2005). Similarly to collective narcissism, social dominance orientation also predicts support for surveillance measures at home (Cohrs et al., 2005; see also Feldman et al., 2021).

1.5.3 The Need for Dominance and the Susceptibility to, and Spread of, Misinformation

While we know dominance motives are linked to intolerance and the acceptance and spread of hateful messages (Bilewicz et al., 2017), less is known about their links to the processing and spreading of misinformation. Compared to the need for group-based

recognition, the need for dominance may differ in the extent to which it motivates belief in misinformation and a tendency to spread conspiracies. Social dominance orientation does not necessarily entail the mindset that the ingroup is underappreciated in intergroup relations (see e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), likely making social dominators less interested in conspiracy theories about outgroups than collective narcissists.

Still, social dominance orientation does correlate to some extent with conspiracy mentality (Green & Douglas, 2018) – a general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994). The difference between social dominators and most conspiracy theorists is, however, that unlike the latter, social dominators respect powerful groups and think of them as less threatening than low-status groups (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Social dominance orientation is therefore more strongly correlated with belief in pro-establishment conspiracies (for example, that immigration is a conspiracy to change society) rather than anti-establishment conspiracies (such as believing that the government is secretly working on destroying individual freedom; Wood & Gray, 2019). Importantly, social dominance orientation has also been linked to acceptance of politicians deliberately spreading false information (De Keersmaecker & Roets, 2019) and willingness to personally spread such information (Lobato et al., 2020). While these findings seem to echo research on political ideology and the spread of conspiracies and misinformation (Freelon et al., 2020), more research is needed on how group-based dominance influences online mobilisation via misinformation and conspiracy theories.

1.5.4 The Need for Dominance Translated to Support for Public Policies

Social dominators oppose any efforts to make society more equal (Pratto et al., 1998). This includes policies such as affirmative action, that is, policies aimed at reducing discrimination and giving opportunity to members of disadvantage groups that have historically been discriminated against (Haley & Sidanius, 2006). Affirmative action can be

considered controversial, and certain "principled objections" can be made against it (such as individual merit), but studies still suggest that these objections are mediated by dominance motives (Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Social dominance orientation is also associated with a preference towards harsh punishment for criminals, including the death penalty and torture (Sidanius et al., 2006), instead of a more lenient, rehabilitative approach (Capps, 2002). This can be illustrated with the example of the War on Drugs in the US. Disproportionate incarceration of racial minorities, such as Black and Hispanic people for drug offences compared to White people (Golub et al., 2007) as well as police methods, such as racial profiling (Welch, 2007) and stop-and-search (Bowling & Phillips, 2007), can ultimately be seen as hierarchy-enhancing actions perpetrated by the White majority.

Social dominance orientation was originally conceptualised as one's degree of preference for inequality among social groups (Pratto et al., 1994), and this chapter's focus is on dominance as a group-phenomenon. However, research shows that people high in social dominance orientation are also generally dominant, disagreeable, and aggressive towards other individuals (Lippa & Arad, 1999) and desire status, prestige, and power (Pratto et al., 1997). Subsequently, when put in a leadership role, social dominators tend to be exploitative and unsympathetic to subordinates. In a study by Son Hing and colleagues (2007), socially dominant leaders supported maximising the profit of their organisation over ethical concerns. For example, they supported exporting toxic waste to less developed nations, marketing unsafe drugs, and failed to support victims of sexual abuse in order not to alienate business supervisors. Social dominance orientation and collective narcissism therefore overlap in their exploitative approach towards fellow ingroup members (Cichocka et al., 2021), as well as towards the natural environment (Cislak et al., 2018). This overlap is important in light of the current environmental crisis, which leaders preoccupied with image or dominance repeatedly fail to address.

Social dominance orientation, more specifically, does not only pertain to social relations between humans, but also extends to people's attitudes towards nature (Milfont et al., 2013). It is a negative predictor of environmentalism (Milfont et al., 2017) and a positive predictor of support for unsustainable exploitation of the environment (Milfont & Sibley, 2014). Furthermore, social dominators tend to reject that climate change is real and caused by humans (Milfont et al., 2013) and are less likely to engage in behaviours in their private life aimed at environmental protection (Milfont et al., 2017). This mirrors the aforementioned results that have been obtained for collective narcissism in terms of unsustainable exploitation and the disregard of how environmental problems affect the nation (Cislak et al., 2018).

Indeed, both group-based needs for dominance and recognition can result in actions and support for policies that can be harmful for the groups that social dominators and collective narcissists claim to cherish so greatly. Keeping in mind that both social dominators (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) and collective narcissists tend to exhibit nationalism (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016), an intuitive assumption to make would be that these highly devoted members should favour their ingroup and prioritise its welfare. For example, given social dominators' exploitative attitudes toward environmental resources, the profiteering of the environment should, at least in the short term, lead to the economic benefit of their countries as a whole. As the cake gets bigger, everyone in the dominant group gets a bigger slice. However, that appears not to be the case. Instead, social dominators want to have the cake and eat it too. Social dominators are less communal, altruistic, and less interdependent on others (Pratto et al., 1994), making them far from ideal team members. This "lone-wolf" mentality has consequences as to how they behave within their groups.

The callous nature of group-based dominance has been revealed in economic games, which measure actual behaviour (rather than attitudes). In a typical game, participants are

asked to distribute money and tokens between other individuals or groups. In one study by Sidanius and colleagues (2007), participants high in social dominance orientation chose to maximise the difference between groups in allocating resources: they were willing to sacrifice their own group's absolute interests as long as they received more money than an outgroup (despite the fact that they would have made more money out of an equal allocation). A study by Halali and colleagues (2018) revealed that social dominance orientation might also be linked to individual self-interest. Participants were given the choice to allocate tokens to themselves, fellow compatriots, or a group that included both members of their own and other national groups. As was to be expected, social dominance orientation correlated negatively with sharing the tokens with other groups, but it was unrelated to sharing with ingroup members – instead, social dominators allocated the tokens to themselves. On the intergroup level, social dominators desire hierarchy with their group on top, but in relations to other individuals – even members of their own group – they will behave selfishly and ruthlessly.

1.5.5 The Need for Dominance and Vote Choice

Social dominance orientation seems to influence both vote choice in domestic politics and attitudes about international relations and cooperation between countries. Similarly to national narcissism, both social dominance orientation (Peitz et al., 2018) and nationalism (Zmigrod et al., 2018) evoke suspicion of supranationalism and a support for exclusionary and isolationist attitudes. Social dominance orientation has been found to predict extreme right-wing voting, over and above authoritarianism (Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Furthermore, in 2016, Trump voters were unique in their desire to dominate outgroups in an aggressive manner while not necessarily scoring higher on other traditional conservative right-wing values, such as authoritarian submission or conventionalism (Womick et al., 2019). While Trump certainly tried to appeal to the religious right and other traditional conservative

groups, his rhetoric and policies attracted social dominators and extremist groups, for example the so-called “alternative right” or “alt-right.”

The alt-right in the US is a relatively new political phenomenon, but its influence has been elevated by Trump’s rise (Cook, 2016). It can be described as a loosely aligned group of pro-White and reactionary far-right wing supporters whose main goal is to increase pro-White racial consciousness (Hartzell, 2018). Psychological research suggests that one of the main characteristics of alt-right supporters is a high need for group-based dominance, willingness to dehumanise minorities, and sexism (Forscher & Kteily, 2020). However, interestingly, alt-right supporters do not seem to exhibit the anti-establishment attitudes the media often portrays them as having. Racism seems to be their main driver, but as a dominant group in society, consisting mostly of White males, they seem to be content with their current economic situation and feel that the government is not corrupt. This, yet again, underlines how individuals with a high need for group-based dominance may differ from other supporters of far-right or illiberal leaders and movements.

1.6 The Interplay Between Needs for Recognition and Dominance

In this chapter, we have demonstrated that both the need for recognition – characteristic of national narcissism – and the need for dominance – associated with social dominance orientation and nationalism – fuel prejudice and hostility within and between groups. However, feelings such as pride and attachment to one’s country (more typically understood as patriotism), are associated with greater tolerance and support for democracy (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022; Wagner et al., 2012). A strong sense of national identity in and of itself is therefore not inherently illiberal, but national identity that stems from a need for recognition and dominance can be.

Although the needs for recognition and dominance tend to be associated with similar outcomes, there are subtle differences in how they manifest. Collective narcissism and social dominance orientation both assume a positive evaluation of the ingroup and a belief in its greatness, and therefore they are correlated to a moderate degree (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). They do, however, differentially predict prejudice: the group-based need for recognition fuels prejudice against those who do not appreciate the ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016), while the group-based need for dominance fuels prejudice against inferior groups (Duckitt, 2006). It is even possible to imagine collective narcissism manifesting itself as pro-egalitarian in countries or political groups with egalitarian goals (although even in this case, it might be associated with support for radical political activism, Panayiotou, 2020). Furthermore, collective narcissism correlates more strongly with sensitivity to threats and insults than social dominance orientation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Social dominators also seem not to respond to criticism with retaliatory hostility, like collective narcissists do (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013).

Yet, despite their different outcomes, needs for recognition and dominance can overlap. The interplay between the two group-based needs is well illustrated in the discussion on climate change, which is perhaps the most defining issue of our era. As we alluded to earlier, social dominance orientation and collective narcissism may both be important in the environmental policies that illiberal leaders have enforced: exploitation of the natural environment can be utilised to signal both dominance over nature and the nation's sovereign right to exploit it, despite criticism from abroad. Dominant leaders, like President Bolsonaro of Brazil, use legitimising myths to justify human exploitation of nature, such as in the case of the destruction of the Amazon rainforest (see Milfont et al., 2013). According to these myths, all natural phenomena are inherently there to be subjugated by humans and should be used to enhance humankind's welfare in pursuit of its objectives (see also Dhont & Hodson,

2014). Bolsonaro's policies towards the exploitation of the Amazon can also be interpreted as an assertion of independence from outsiders: the Amazon is ours and therefore we can treat it as we please (see also Cislak et al., 2018). A narrative motivated by group-based needs for recognition and dominance can therefore lead to a vicious, self-reinforcing cycle of exploitation in which nature is subjugated not merely for the purpose of utilising its resources, but to send a message to the world that this country will not be controlled.

The developmental trajectory from the need for recognition to the need for dominance should be investigated further. Fukuyama (2018) proposed that the need for recognition slides into dominance after repeated failed attempts to attain recognition. This repeated failure may evoke anger and resentment, perhaps causing some to adopt a more dominating orientation. This is likely to be the case especially when opponents are perceived to be of lower status (Duckitt, 2006). Longitudinal models could investigate whether these group-based needs develop gradually in parallel or in a sequence.

1.7 Conclusion

The mixture of cravings for both recognition and dominance can manifest itself in the illiberal politics that we experience today. The Trump presidency and the MAGA movement present a modern example of how calls for recognition and dominance intertwine. The movement began as a call for recognition and a restoration of America's positive image by "[Making] America Great Again." After the movement ascended to power and in the early years of Trump's presidency, its defensiveness often resulted in retaliatory hostility towards those deemed to have off ended the US or enemies within the nation, such as left-wingers and liberals. As Trump struggled to maintain his power, he and his followers became increasingly dominant. In the first presidential debate for the 2020 election, Trump refused to condemn White-supremacists and instead sent them a message to "stand back and stand by" (Nix, 2020), insinuating that their time might soon come if his vision of America did not receive

sufficient recognition in the elections. This rhetoric culminated in the deadly siege of the US Capitol in January 2021. Needs for recognition can translate into dominance, but so far research has only empirically examined these dynamics to a limited extent. We hope that future studies will examine their trajectories in the development of illiberal politics more closely.

Introduction to Empirical Chapters 2-4

Chapter 1 reviewed the political concomitants of collective (national) narcissism and made a contrast with social dominance orientation. Both likely contribute to the present popularity of illiberal politics, and both predict punitive, even aggressive, attitudes on domestic (i.e., ingroup) affairs. For example, both collective narcissism and social dominance orientation predict opposition to democracy (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022), hostility to minorities within the nation (Bilewicz et al., 2017; Górska, Stefaniak, et al., 2022), and acceptance of violation of human rights domestically (Biddlestone et al., 2022; Sidanius et al., 2006). These issue stances have the potential to erode ingroup harmony. However, collective narcissism is unique in its insecurity and defensiveness, expressed in hypersensitivity to perceived threats and retaliatory hostility against those who do not appreciate the ingroup enough (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Those high in social dominance orientation seem not to be as swayed by such perceived threat from outsiders. This may make those high in collective narcissism prone to endorsing image-centred policies about ingroup affairs, resembling how individual narcissists make short-sighted, egotistical decisions harming social relationships in the long-run (Cichocka et al., 2021; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). Indeed, previous research has established a pattern that those high in national narcissism support policies that may potentially harm public health (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021) and the natural environment (Cislak, Cichocka, et al., 2021; Cislak et al., 2018). An exploitative view on ingroup members may permit those high in collective narcissism to take such reckless and dangerous issue stances (Cichocka et al., 2021)

In the following chapters, I will probe further into how collective narcissism relates to support for ego enhancing policies aimed at improving the ingroup's image. To this end, Chapter 2 focuses on ingroup sacrifice, that is, an overt willingness to put ingroup members'

lives at risk in order to convey a positive image of the ingroup. Chapter 2 therefore investigates the relationship between national narcissism and attitudes about ingroup harm. Chapter 3 expands on findings from Chapter 2 by investigating the preference for maximising the difference between groups – a strategy in a decision-making task entailing harm to the ingroup's interests as long as an outgroup is hurt even more (Sidanius et al., 2007; Tajfel et al., 1971). Chapter 3 also incorporates nationalism with national narcissism in a more overarching framework of defensive national identity. Chapter 3 therefore examines defensive national identity (national narcissism and nationalism) as a predictor of decision-making about ingroup affairs. Finally, Chapter 4 examines collective narcissism in the political party context (i.e., partisan narcissism) and its relations with outcomes related to political work, mostly focusing on politicking—the inclination to engage in secrecy, deception and blood-sport (Silvester et al., 2014). Chapter 4 therefore investigates collective narcissism in an applied setting, in which interpersonal relations between group members are perhaps more tangible and more easily studied than in the national context.

Chapter 2[5]: A Small Price to Pay – National Narcissism Predicts Readiness to Sacrifice Ingroup Members to Defend the Ingroup's Image

2.1 Abstract

Collective narcissism is a belief in one's ingroup greatness that is underappreciated by others. Across three studies conducted in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, we found that collective narcissism, measured with respect to the national group, was related to support of policies that protect the national image at the expense of ingroup members' health. In Study 1, British national narcissism was related to opposing cooperation with the EU on medical equipment. In Study 2, American national narcissism predicted opposition to COVID-19 testing in order to downplay the number of cases. In Study 3, American national narcissism was related to support for releasing an untested COVID-19 vaccine, to beat other countries to the punch. These relationships were mediated by concern about the country's reputation. Our studies shed light on collective narcissism as a group-based ego enhancement strategy in which a strong image of the group is prioritised over members' well-being.

Key words: COVID-19, collective narcissism, national identification, group reputation

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2.2 Introduction

Concern for the welfare of one's fellow citizens and showing the world that one's nation is strong and independent do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes, especially in times of crisis, the two can be pitted against each other, resulting in a dilemma between protecting the people and conveying a positive image of the nation. This may be one factor explaining why governments have differed widely in their approaches to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Although some have successfully contained the virus, others seemed more preoccupied with managing their country's image. Anecdotally, countries with leaders holding exceptionalist views of their nation, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, had some of the worst early responses to this public health crisis (Lincoln, 2020). For example, former U.S. President Donald Trump called for testing to be slowed down, explicitly because more cases would make the United States look bad in comparison to other countries (Segers, 2020). Similarly, the United Kingdom declined to cooperate with the European Union (EU) on medical equipment, explicitly to underline the country's departure from the bloc ('Gove Defends Not Joining EU Ventilator Scheme', 2020). Such excessive focus on displaying a strong ingroup image is a central concern in collective narcissism—a belief in the greatness of one's ingroup that is seemingly undervalued by others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). In this article, we utilise the context of the COVID-19 pandemic to examine whether collective narcissism in relation to one's national ingroup (which can be referred to as national narcissism) may be associated with a preference for promoting a strong image of the nation over protecting one's own fellow citizens.

2.2.1 Collective Narcissism as Superficial Ingroup Love

Collective narcissism entails an excessive emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the ingroup's greatness. Yet, this belief is defensive and linked to a conviction

that others do not appreciate the group enough (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Collective narcissism parallels individual narcissism, but rather than capturing beliefs about the self, it captures beliefs about one's social group. Individual and collective narcissism show only weak to moderate correlations (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019) and have different consequences for interpersonal and intergroup relations (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). For example, those high in individual narcissism are aggressive toward individuals who threaten their personal ego, while those high in collective narcissism are aggressive toward members of other groups perceived to threaten or insult the ingroup (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016).

Research shows that those scoring high in collective narcissism are especially motivated to defend their ingroup image when they are threatened by intergroup comparisons (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013). They tend to be excessively preoccupied with how others see them, and will engage in outgroup derogation to maintain the ingroup's reputation (Cichocka, 2016). This is likely one of the reasons for the relationship between national narcissism and support for populist or nationalist leaders and movements that promote the narrative that their countries have been snubbed in international relations, such as Trump in the United States (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018) or Law and Justice in Poland (Marchlewska et al., 2018).

Even though collective narcissism might superficially look like strong commitment to the ingroup, people high in collective narcissism are more concerned with how the ingroup image reflects on themselves, than with the well-being of other ingroup members. Those high in collective narcissism seem to compensate for their own frustrated individual needs by glorifying their ingroup (Cichocka, 2016), indicating that collective narcissism serves as a group-based ego enhancement strategy (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). For example, collective narcissism tends to increase when individuals feel that they have low personal control of their

lives (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018) or when their feelings of self-worth are threatened (Golec de Zavala et al., 2020). Overall, this suggests that collective narcissism does not develop out of genuine concern about the ingroup. Instead, it emerges from a frustration at the individual level, which manifests as superficial ingroup love (Marchlewska et al., 2020). This explains why people high in national narcissism are willing to leave their country if it benefits them financially (Marchlewska et al., 2020).

2.2.2 Sacrificing the Ingroup to Defend Its Image

Although various theories have attempted to explain *self*-sacrifice for the sake of the ingroup (see Whitehouse, 2018a), acceptance of ingroup suffering has received limited attention. Kahn and colleagues (2017) found that perceiving the national ingroup as a trans-generational entity (comprising of past, present, and future members), rather than consisting merely of contemporary group members, predicted willingness to endure ingroup suffering. In other words, how we think about our ingroup influences our acceptance of sacrificing fellow group members for the perceived benefit of the group at large.

A different process might accompany collective narcissism. It appears that those high in collective narcissism view their fellow ingroup members as dispensable. For example, they tend to objectify their ingroup members and use them as means to an end (Cichocka et al., 2021). This may be a result of the interplay between an instrumental view of the ingroup (Cichocka, 2016) and an obsession with its image (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). This toxic blend may lead those high in collective narcissism to view ingroup members as an acceptable sacrifice for the maintenance of a desirable ingroup image[6]. The COVID-19 pandemic often pits ingroup image concerns against the ingroup's health and wellbeing. For instance, there

[6] Ingroup sacrifice is defined here as disregard for ingroup members and willingness to forgo their health and wellbeing in order to attain or maintain an idealised group image.

may be trade-offs between ingroup members' health and a perceived image of the group as strong and independent (see e.g., Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). In such situations, we expect those high in collective narcissism to view compatriots as acceptable collateral damage.

For those high in collective narcissism, low regard for ingroup members and high concern about the ingroup's image can translate into support for policies that may have harmful implications for the ingroup. For example, in Poland, national narcissism predicted anti-environmental attitudes, such as, support for the coal industry or for logging a unique, ancient forest (Cislak et al., 2018). The underlying motivation seemed to be to demonstrate that "our country" will make independent decisions and resist pressures from outsiders. In other words, collective narcissism seems to be linked to preference for policies that prioritise the ingroup image in the short term over actions promoting health and well-being of ingroup members in the long term (Cislak, Cichocka, et al., 2021). This can also manifest in behaviour in one's personal life. For example, recent research found collective narcissism to be related to short-sighted responses to the pandemic, such as hoarding food and supplies (Nowak et al., 2020).

Collective narcissism has also been associated with negative attitudes toward supranational or international organisations. For example, both British and Polish national narcissism were related to support for leaving the EU (Cislak et al., 2020; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018). This may be due to a desire to assert independence or establish recognition of the ingroup (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). Those high in collective narcissism may also forgo help from outsiders. A study by Mashuri and colleagues (2020) demonstrated that national narcissism in Indonesia was related to refusing humanitarian aid from developed countries. The effect was driven by conspiracy beliefs about malignant intentions behind the offer as well as the perception that accepting humanitarian aid would

damage the ingroup's reputation. This could be because groups that offer help are seen as having higher status than groups requesting or receiving help (Täuber & van Leeuwen, 2017). Indeed, receiving help from outsiders can be painful to some group members and even give rise to defensiveness (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; Nadler & Halabi, 2006). National narcissism has also been associated with anti-science attitudes that would undermine the public health of ingroup members, such as opposition to compulsory vaccinations (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). Resource exploitation, opposition to humanitarian aid, and voluntary vaccinations may serve to maintain a positive or strong ingroup image by asserting independence from external forces, such as powerful pharmaceutical companies, scientists, or malevolent foreign countries. In other words, these counterproductive responses aimed at upholding the country's reputation in the eyes of the world may serve to manage the national image.

2.2.3 Image Management in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Potential problematic consequences of natural exploitation or leaving international organisations might not materialise immediately. However, the COVID-19 pandemic is an imminent threat. Because those high in national narcissism have a strong desire to portray a positive ingroup image, one may predict that they would support drastic measures to do so. However, having an exceptionalistic view about one's nation may sabotage their effectiveness (Lincoln, 2020). Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic often created a dilemma: whether to support fellow citizens, or to reinforce the ingroup image. As the primary concern of those high in national narcissism is an ideal image of the nation (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020), we predict that those high in national narcissism resolve this dilemma in favour of reinforcing the ingroup image rather than prioritising fellow citizens' health. Furthermore, we predict that this relationship should be mediated by national reputation concerns due to the obsession of those high in national narcissism with what outsiders think of the ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016).

2.2.4 Overview of the Present Research

In this project, we examine the relationship between national narcissism and readiness to prioritise image management over ingroup member's welfare. We also examine a possible underlying process of this relationship: concern about the ingroup's reputation. We address three specific instances of when COVID-19 measures led to a dilemma between national image concerns and public health: (a) the United Kingdom's cooperation with the EU on medical equipment early in the pandemic, (b) limiting COVID-19 testing in the United States, and (c) the debate on a premature release of a vaccine for COVID-19 in the United States. In these contexts, we directly ask participants whether they would accept harm to ingroup members to protect the nation's image.

Because national narcissism tends to be positively correlated with national identification (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), we included national identification as covariate in all studies. We also adjusted for support for the country's government in light of past work connecting national narcissism and support for Trump and Brexit (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018). All studies were approved by the University of Kent Ethics Committee. Unless noted otherwise, patterns of results remained similar adjusting for demographics (age, gender, and ethnicity). Please refer to the Appendix A for analyses including measures of ethnicity.

2.3 Study 1: UK cooperation with the EU on COVID-19

Early in the pandemic, the EU invited the United Kingdom to participate in the so-called "ventilator scheme," in which the EU used the economic force of its single market to procure medical equipment that was in high demand (Stone, 2020). However, the U.K. government announced that it would procure medical equipment on its own ('"Mix-up" over EU Ventilator Scheme', 2020). This decision was heavily criticised. Many argued that Prime

Minister Boris Johnson prioritised his "Brexit ideology" over the welfare of his compatriots (Stone, 2020).

In Study 1, we utilised a real news story about the EU ventilator scheme (Stone, 2020). We hypothesised that national narcissism would be positively associated with support for the government's decision to opt out of the scheme. To tap more directly into ingroup sacrifice, we hypothesised that national narcissism would be positively associated with support for the decision to opt out even though it could hurt Britons. Moreover, we predicted that national narcissism would be positively associated with group reputation concern, and that group reputation concern would mediate national narcissism's relationship with willingness to sacrifice ingroup members. This study was not pre-registered.

2.3.1 Method

Participants and Procedure. Study 1 relied on a convenience sample of British people. Participants were recruited on several Facebook groups where politics are frequently discussed (i.e., pro Brexit and pro Remain/Rejoin platforms and several local community pages). In total, 298 participants completed an online survey (61.41% women, *M*age = 54.25, *SD* = 13.65, age range 19–86). Most participants (92.95%) were White and held a university degree (66.45%). Because the topic was prominent in the news cycle in late March 2020, we restricted the sampling period to 3 days and aimed to recruit as many participants as possible (March 28–30, 2020). A G*power sensitivity analysis suggested that this sample size provides 80% power to detect a small or small-medium effect for a single regression coefficient (f^2 = .03), assuming α = .05, two-tailed.[7]

[7] Note also that our exploratory mediation models in all studies had sample sizes large enough to detect small-to-medium (β = .26) effect sizes in α and β mediation paths (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007).

The survey included measures of national narcissism, identification, politics, attitudes toward the EU, and demographic questions. Presentation order of variables was randomised, in that participants either first completed measures of national identification and national narcissism, or first saw a news story about the United Kingdom refusing to join the EU "ventilator scheme" (see more detailed description below). Presentation order did not affect the pattern of results.

All data, codebooks, codes, materials, and preregistrations are available at: https://osf.io/t6qrz/

Measures. In all studies, unless otherwise noted, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with survey items on a scale from 1 = *completely disagree* to 7 = *completely agree*.

***National Narcissism*.** National narcissism was measured with the 9-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with statements such as "Britain deserves special treatment" and "If Britain had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place" ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.33$).

***National Identification*.** National identification was measured with the 12-item Social Identification Scale (Cameron, 2004). The scale measures centrality (e.g., "In general, being a British person is an important part of my self-image"), ties with other ingroup members (e.g., "I feel strong ties with other British people") and ingroup affect (e.g., "Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as a British person") ($\alpha = .86$, $M = 3.94$, $SD = 1.18$).

Support for Opting Out of the EU Ventilator Scheme. Participants read a passage, adapted from a real news story in *The Independent* (Stone, 2020). They learned that the UK had been invited to participate in a scheme initiated by the EU on using the purchasing power of the single market to procure in bulk ventilators and other much-needed medical equipment,

guaranteeing lower prices and faster delivery. The UK government turned this offer down and decided to acquire the medical equipment independently. Participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with this decision (M = 2.11, SD = 1.98).

Sacrifice of Ingroup Members. We measured participants' willingness to sacrifice fellow Britons with one item: "Even if refusing to participate in the EU scheme ends up hurting British people, it would still have been the right decision" (M = 1.78, SD = 1.67).

Group Reputation Concern. We measured participants' perception of their ingroup's reputation being threatened with one item: "The UK's reputation in the world would have been damaged by participating in the EU scheme" (M = 1.83, SD = 1.67).

Political Ideology. Political ideology was measured with a single item. Participants were asked to indicate where on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is *left-wing* and 10 is *right-wing*, they would place their political views (M = 3.69, SD = 2.15).

Satisfaction with Boris Johnson's Leadership. Participants were asked to indicate their satisfaction with Boris Johnson's leadership on a scale from *0=very dissatisfied* to *10=very satisfied* (M = 2.67, SD = 3.56).

2.3.2 Results

Zero-order correlations are presented in Table 2.1. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses (see Table 2.2)[8]. In all models, national narcissism and national identification were entered as predictors in Step 1. In Step 2, we also adjusted for political ideology and support for Johnson.

[8] We used pairwise exclusion in all regression models. Unless noted otherwise, no multicollinearity was detected.

Table 2.1

Zero-order Correlations Among Study Variables (Study 1)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. National narcissism						
2. National identification	.54***					
3. Opting out of EU scheme	.59***	.52***				
4. Sacrifice of ingroup members	.59***	.35***	.60***			
5. Group reputation concern	.53***	.34***	.60***	.61***		
6. Right-wing ideology	.55***	.48***	.49***	.47***	.44***	
7. Satisfaction with Johnson	.62***	.59***	.71***	.56***	.51***	.56***

Note. *p< .05. **p<.01. ***p< .001.

Support for Opting Out of EU Ventilator Scheme. We first examined national narcissism and national identification as predictors of support for opting out of the ventilator scheme (Step 1; Table 2.2). National narcissism (β = .44, p < .001) and national identification (β = .29, p < .001) were both significant, positive predictors of support for opting out of the ventilator scheme. When we adjusted for right-wing ideology and satisfaction with Johnson in Step 2, national narcissism remained a significant predictor (β = .20, p < .001), but national identification was no longer significant (β = .09, p = .08). Further, satisfaction with Johnson

was significantly associated with support of opting out (β = .50, $p < .001$), while the effect of right-wing ideology was not significant (β = .05, $p = .30$)[9].

Sacrifice of Ingroup Members. We then tested a regression model with willingness to sacrifice ingroup members as the dependent variable. In Step 1 (see Table 2.2), national narcissism emerged as a significant, positive predictor (β = .57, $p < .001$), while the effect of national identification was not significant (β = .06, $p = .48$). When we included the adjustment variables in Step 2, the effect of national narcissism remained significant (β = .39, $p < .001$), while that of national identification remained non-significant predictor of willingness to sacrifice ingroup members (β = -.11, $p = .08$). Furthermore, both right-wing ideology ($\beta = .14$, $p = .017$) and satisfaction with Johnson (β = .30, $p < .001$) were significant predictors of willingness to sacrifice ingroup members.

Group Reputation Concern. We tested regression models with group reputation concern as the dependent variable (Table 2.2). In Step 1, national narcissism emerged as a significant, positive predictor (β = .49, $p < .001$), while the effect of national identification was not significant (β = .07, $p = .23$). National narcissism remained significant in Step 2 (β = .31, $p < .001$). Both right-wing ideology ($\beta = .15$, $p = .016$) and satisfaction with Johnson (β = .28, $p < .001$) predicted group reputation concern in Step 2.

[9] Political ideology was a relatively weak or non-significant predictor of the DVs in Study 1. For that reason, we did not include it as a predictor in our pre-registered analyses in Studies 2 and 3.

Table 2.2

Regression Analysis of Support for Opting out of the EU Scheme, Sacrifice of Ingroup Members and Group Reputation Concern (Study 1)

	DV: Opting out of EU scheme						DV: Sacrifice of Ingroup members						DV: Group Reputation Concern					
	Step 1			Step 2			Step 1			Step 2			Step 1			Step 2		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.65***	[0.49, 0.81]	.44	.30***	[0.14, 0.46]	.20	0.71***	[0.54, 0.85]	.57	0.48***	[0.33, 0.64]	.39	0.61***	[0.47, 0.76]	.49	0.39***	[0.23, 0.55]	.31
National identification	0.48***	[0.30, 0.66]	.29	.15	[-0.02, 0.32]	.09	0.06	[-0.10, 0.21]	.04	-0.15	[-0.31, 0.02]	-.11	0.10	[-0.06, 0.27]	.07	-0.09	[-0.26, 0.08]	-.06
Right-wing ideology				.05	[-0.04, 0.14]	.05				0.11*	[0.02, 0.20]	.14				0.12*	[0.02, 0.21]	.15
Satisfaction with Johnson				.28***	[0.22, 0.34]	.50				0.14***	[0.08, 0.20]	.30				0.13***	[0.07 0.19]	.28
F (df)	99.79 (2, 290)***			87.89 (4, 288)***			75.65 (2, 289)***			52.41 (4, 287)***			56.86 (2, 290)***			38.49 (4, 286)***		
R^2	.41			.55			.35			.42			.28			.35		

Note. DV = dependent variable; CI = confidence interval; EU = European Union.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Group Reputation Concern as a Mediator for Opting out and Sacrifice of Ingroup Members. We then tested whether group reputation concern mediates the relationships between national narcissism and support for opting out of the EU scheme and sacrificing ingroup members. We performed a mediation analysis in MPlus8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) using maximum likelihood estimation with 5,000 bootstrap samples. National narcissism was entered as the predictor variable, group reputation concern as the mediator, and support for opting out of the EU scheme and sacrifice of ingroup members as dependent variables (Figure 2.1). National identification, political ideology and satisfaction with Johnson were entered as covariates.[10]

We first examined the path from national narcissism to support for opting out of the EU scheme. After accounting for group reputation concern, the direct effect of national narcissism on support for opting out became non-significant (β = .09, *b* = .13 [-0.09, 0.35], *p* = .252). The indirect effect of national narcissism on support for opting out of the EU scheme via group reputation concern was significant and positive (β = .09, *b* = 0.14 [0.02, 0.25], *SE* = 0.06, *p* = .020).

We next examined the path from national narcissism to sacrifice of ingroup members. The direct effect of national narcissism was significant and positive (*β* = .28, *b* = .36 [0.13, 0.60], *p* = .002). The indirect effect of national narcissism on ingroup sacrifice via group reputation concern was also significant and positive (*β* = .11, *b* = 0.14 [0.02, 0.26], *SE* = 0.06, *p* = .018).

[10] Pattern of results remained similar without these covariates.

Figure 2.1

Group Reputation Concern as a Mediator of the Relationship between National Narcissism and the Dependent Variables (Study 1)



Note. *$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. Entries are standardised coefficients. Covariates in the model are national identification, satisfaction with Johnson, and ideology.

2.3.3 Discussion

In Study 1, we showed that national narcissism is related to support for ingroup harming actions amid a national crisis. Furthermore, we found evidence suggesting that this relationship is mediated by group reputation concerns. Although satisfaction with Johnson was unsurprisingly associated with support for his decision, the effects of national narcissism remained medium to strong after we adjusted for it in the models. Given the competitive context of U.K.–EU relations, in Studies 2 and 3, we sought to replicate these findings in other intergroup settings to examine their generalisability.

2.4 Study 2: Reduced Testing as Image Management

In Study 2, we tested our hypotheses in a different context, namely, attitude toward testing for COVID-19 in the United States. Testing for COVID-19 is one of the most effective strategies to curb the spread of the virus (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2020). Yet, testing became a bone of contention in the United States early on in the pandemic, with President Trump expressing his opposition to a large-scale testing program (Segers, 2020). Trump's argument was that a high number of tests would inevitably result in more reported cases, leading to a poor comparison with other countries. We tested a pre-registered hypothesis that national narcissism would be associated with support for slowing down testing. Our pre-registration included the study design, planned sample size, exclusion criteria, and planned primary analyses.

The defensiveness accompanying national narcissism may increase when an unfavourable comparison with other countries is made salient (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). In the context of COVID-19, this may be associated with a preference for policies that reinforce an idealistic national image, like downplaying or concealing infection rates, despite the obvious risk this brings to fellow citizens. Thus, in Study 2, we expand on Study 1 by testing the pre-registered hypothesis that inducing an outgroup comparison with China's relative success in combatting the virus (vs. no mention of China) would strengthen this relationship. We also adjust for satisfaction with Trump's presidency due to his outspoken scepticism toward COVID-19 testing (Segers, 2020). We further checked whether group reputation concern would mediate the relationship between national narcissism and negative testing attitudes (this hypothesis was not pre-registered).

2.4.1 Method

Participants and Procedure. We determined sample size a-priori based on a G*power analysis for an interaction effect (between national narcissism and experimental

conditions). In Study 1, we observed large correlations, around .50 (f^2 =.33), between national narcissism and image concerns. Because Study 1 was conducted in the context of U.K.–EU relations, we expected a similar effect size in the intergroup comparison condition, yielding a sample of 26 people necessary to obtain 80% power to replicate the effect, assuming $\alpha = .05$, two-tailed. We expected the effect to be weaker in the no-comparison condition. In such cases, where a 50% attenuation is expected rather than a "knock-out" effect, Giner-Sorolla (2018) recommends using a cell *n* seven times that of the original effect (here, from Study 1). This yields a multiplication of 26 × 14 participants, resulting in a required sample size of 364.

We recruited 399 American Prolific workers on August 7, 2020. As pre-registered, 18 participants were excluded for failing attention checks (seven in the comparison condition, 11 in the no-comparison condition), leaving 381 for further analysis (49.87% women, M_{age} = 33.67, *SD* = 11.67, age range 18–74). A majority of participants were White (68.50%), followed by Black or African Americans (13.12%), Asian Americans (7.35%), and Hispanic or Latino Americans (5.00%; see the Appendix A for a full breakdown of ethnicity). Most held a university degree (65.62%) and supported the Democratic Party (49.47%; with 28.95% supporting the Republican Party, the rest supporting other parties or not voting).

Participants first filled out measures of national narcissism and identification. Afterward, they were randomly assigned to read one of two ostensible online news articles entitled "Debate on US testing program continues" (see online materials on OSF). In the no-comparison condition, the article outlined the benefits of extensive COVID-19 testing, such as its importance for contact tracing. Sceptical voices were also addressed, such as that more tests will inevitably lead to more cases being reported. In the intergroup comparison condition, participants read the same passage but with an additional paragraph on China's success in combating the spread of the virus. Participants learned that while Americans' daily lives were still heavily affected by the pandemic, China had mostly opened up again.

Moreover, participants learned that while the United States reported around 60,000 cases on August 1, 2020, China reported only 48. This condition was designed to elicit an unfavourable comparison to a prominent adversary. After having read the passage, participants proceeded to report their attitudes toward testing, and completed other measures related to COVID-19 polices and politics.

Measures.

National Narcissism. National narcissism was measured with the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), $\alpha = .95$, $M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.92$ (e.g., "I will never be satisfied until the US gets all it deserves").

National Identification. National identification was measured with the single-item social identification measure (Postmes et al., 2013): "I identify with being American" ($M = 5.99$, $SD = 1.45$).

Group Reputation Concern. Participants indicated their agreement with a single item: "The US's reputation in the world would be damaged if the COVID-19 economic fallout causes China's economy to exceed that of the US" ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.74$).

Negative Testing Attitudes. Negative testing attitudes were measured with five items reflecting support for more or less testing, secrecy with case numbers, and willingness to test less in order to protect America's image, for example: "I would support conducting less testing if that could make the US look like it is handling the pandemic better.", or "I would support conducting less testing even though it might hurt Americans in the long run". This scale therefore entails sacrifice of ingroup members along with general testing negativity. Two of the items were measured on a 6-point scale and three on a 7-point scale. We produced Z-scores for each item and then used their mean to form a global score of testing negativity ($\alpha = .82$, $M = -.03$, $SD = 0.75$).

Satisfaction with Trump's Presidency. Satisfaction with Trump's presidency was measured on a scale from *0=very dissatisfied* to *10=very satisfied* (*M*=3.34, *SD*=3.44).

2.4.2 Results

Correlations for variables are presented in Table 2.3. National narcissism correlated positively with negative testing attitudes, and group reputation concern.

Table 2.3

Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables (Study 2)

Variable	1	2	3	4
1. National narcissism	-			
2. National identification	.40***	-		
3. Negative testing attitudes	.55***	.22***	-	
4. Satisfaction with Trump	.71***	.33***	.62***	-
5. Group reputation concern	.32***	.13*	.31***	.29***

Note. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

We used multiple regression analyses to test our hypotheses (Table 2.4).[11] Predictors were mean-centered. Experimental condition was effect coded as 1 = comparison and −1 = no comparison. In Step 1, national narcissism was entered as a predictor, and national

[11] When adjusting for age, gender, and ethnicity, the interaction between national narcissism and experimental condition became marginally significant, β = −.07, *b* = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.002], *p* = .068.

identification, satisfaction with Trump's presidency, and condition as adjustment variables.[12] National narcissism was a significant predictor of negative testing attitudes (β = .25, $p < .001$) and so was satisfaction with Trump (β = .46, $p < .001$). The effect of the condition was nonsignificant (β = −.08, $p = .052$). In Step 2, we included the interaction between national narcissism and experimental conditions. The interaction term was significant (β = −.09, $p = .022$, $\Delta R^2 = .01$). However, when we decomposed the interaction it turned out that the effect of national narcissism on testing negativity was positive and significant in both conditions, but contrary to our predictions, it was in fact stronger in the no-comparison condition (β = .36, $b = 0.14$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.20], $p < .001$), than in the intergroup comparison condition (β = .18, $b = 0.07$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.12], $p = .009$). It should be noted that overlapping confidence intervals suggest that this difference is not reliable.

Table 2.4

Regression Analyses of Negative Testing Attitudes (Study 2)

	Step 1			Step 2		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.10***	[0.06,0.15]	.25	0.11***	[0.06,0.15]	.27
National identification	-0.01	[-0.06,0.03]	-.03	-0.02	[-0.06,0.03]	-.03
Satisfaction with Trump	0.10***	[0.08,0.12]	.46	0.10***	[0.08,0.12]	.45
Condition	-0.06	[-0.12,0.001]	-.08	-0.06*	[-0.12,-0.001]	-.08
National narcissism × Condition				-0.04*	[-0.07,-0.01]	-.09
F (df)	66.86(4, 376)***			55.16(5, 375)***		
R^2	.42			.42		

[12] To tap into personal concerns about COVID-19, the analysis was repeated as a robustness check including the item "To what extent are you worried about getting COVID-19 yourself?". The pattern of results remained the same.

Note. CI = confidence interval.
$^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

Group Reputation Concern as a Mediator of Negative Testing Attitudes. We hypothesised that group reputation concern would mediate the relationship between national narcissism and negative testing attitudes. We tested a mediation model in PROCESS 3.5, with 5,000 bootstraps and 95% confidence intervals. National narcissism was specified as the predictor and group reputation was the mediator, and we included national identification, satisfaction with President Trump and experimental condition as covariates.[13] National narcissism predicted group reputation concern (β = .22, b = 0.20, 95% CI [0.07, 0.33], p = .002). Furthermore, group reputation concern predicted support for negative testing attitudes (β = .13, b = 0.06, 95% CI [0.02, 0.09], $p < .001$). The direct effect of national narcissism on negative testing attitudes was significant (β = .23, b = 0.09, 95% CI [−0.04, 0.13], $p < .001$). The indirect effect of national narcissism on negative testing attitudes via group reputation concern was also significant and positive (β = .03, b = 0.01, 95% CI [0.002, 0.02], SE = 0.01).

2.4.3 Discussion

We found support for the hypothesis that national narcissism is positively related to testing negativity. This finding lends further support for our notion that national narcissism is associated with greater concern for the ingroup image than citizen well-being. Concerns about the ingroup's reputation partially accounted for this effect. This suggests that people

[13] Although national identification and satisfaction with Trump were not predictive of group reputation concern, experimental condition was (i.e., group reputation concern was higher in the outgroup comparison condition, β = .12, b = 0.21, 95% CI [0.04, 0.38], p = .016).

high in national narcissism might favour reducing COVID-19 testing as a strategy to bolster a glorious national image. We further found that the effect of national narcissism on testing negativity occurred independently of intergroup comparisons. However, it was slightly weaker in the outgroup comparison condition, than in the no-comparison condition. One reason behind this surprising pattern may be that in the comparison condition, testing was not explicitly mentioned as a pandemic response in China (it was only stated in a general sense that "China had made significant progress"). Depending on the participants' reading, more testing could in fact help compete with China, countering the idea that less testing would make the United States "look better." In Study 3, we accounted for this possibility and clarified in the outgroup-comparison condition exactly which specific strategy could help promote the ingroup image.

2.5 Study 3: Rushing the Vaccine

In Study 3, we sought to replicate the findings from Studies 1 and 2 by testing whether national narcissism predicts support for actions that may endanger ingroup members. Here, we focused on controversies about a premature release of a vaccine for COVID-19 that occurred in late summer of 2020. As scientific understanding of COVID-19 increased and vaccine developers made progress, calls were made for an early release of the vaccine (see Lovelace & Higgins-Dunn, 2020). Some advocated for skipping additional vaccine safety tests to expedite the vaccine roll-out. This posed a dilemma. An early release could help curtailing the pandemic more quickly, be seen as a great scientific achievement, and an opportunity to spite adversaries and competitors. Others advocated for caution as a premature vaccine approval jeopardises people's health and safety.

We pre-registered the hypothesis that national narcissism will positively predict support for rushing the release of a vaccine for COVID-19. Like in Study 2, we sought to induce outgroup comparison (vs. no comparison) by utilising news of the Russian

government releasing its vaccine ahead of others (‘Coronavirus’, 2020). We again pre-registered the hypothesis that the positive relationship between national narcissism and support for rushing to a vaccine will be stronger in the comparison condition than the no-comparison condition. Although the results of Study 2 did not confirm this prediction, we suspected that it could have been due to the somehow ambiguous nature of comparisons we used. Thus, in Study 3, we tested our prediction making the dimension of competition clearer (releasing a pre-mature vaccine like Russia). Finally, we sought to conceptually replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 that group reputation concern mediates the relationship between national narcissism and support for harmful policies (included as exploratory in our pre-registration).

Vaccinations are a politically sensitive subject, as wide-spread conspiratorial beliefs are associated with them (Jolley & Douglas, 2014). There is also evidence suggesting that national narcissism predicts general scepticism toward vaccines (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). Thus, we accounted for people’s general attitudes toward vaccines in our analyses.

2.5.1 Method

Participants and Procedure. We based our sample size on the same power analysis that we used in Study 2 (for the interaction effect between national narcissism and experimental condition). A total of 401 American Prolific workers took part in an online survey on September 28, 2020. As pre-registered, 30 participants were excluded for failing an attention check (17 in the no-comparison condition and 13 in the comparison condition), and one participant was removed for reporting to be under the age of 18, leaving 370 for further analyses (49.46% women, M_{age} = 32.58, *SD* = 11.65, age range 18–75). Most had a university degree (59.89%) and supported the Democratic Party (57.84%; 21.08% Republican; the rest voting for another party or not voting). In terms of ethnicity, 67.84% were White, 12.43%

were Asian, 10.27% were Hispanic or Latino American, and 5.41% were Black or African American (see the Appendix A for more details).

Participants first completed the measures of national narcissism and identification (counterbalanced; see the Appendix A). Then, they were randomly allocated to read one of two passages about the COVID-19 pandemic designed to resemble online newspaper articles (see online materials on OSF). In the no-comparison condition, participants read about the ongoing U.S. vaccine development. The article explained that early trials of the American vaccines showed promising results in terms of the vaccine's effectiveness and safety. However, the crucial "Phase 3," where the vaccine will be evaluated more rigorously, could take many more months. Participants read that some people believed that America did not have that time: The vaccine should be released as soon as possible, even before the conclusion of "Phase 3" and despite the risk associated. This passage was designed not to elicit outgroup comparison. In the comparison condition, participants read the same text as described above but with additional information on Russia's accelerated vaccine development. They read that Russia planned to release the vaccine in October that year, months ahead of Americans, and that the country's vaccine had been labelled "Sputnik-V" as a reference to Soviet success in the space race. Participants then proceeded to report their support for rushing the vaccine development (the dependent variable). Finally, participants answered questions on group reputation concern, satisfaction with President Trump, and other questions on COVID-19 policies and politics.

It is important to note that data collection took place months before the actual rollout of any COVID-19 vaccine and before any of the currently approved vaccines completed Phase 3 of clinical trials. Thus, at the time, releasing the vaccines could have been pre-mature. The scenario presented to participants (dilemma about releasing the vaccine before concluding scientific trials) was purely theoretical and had no base in reality. At the end of

the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed and directed to official information on the vaccine development.

Measures.

National Narcissism. National narcissism was measured as in Study 2 (α = .90, *M* = 2.74, *SD* = 1.38).

National Identification. National identification was measured as in Study 2 (*M* = 5.73, *SD* = 1.45).

Rushing the Vaccine Development. Participants reported their agreement with three items: "The US should do everything in its power to be the first country to have a COVID-19 vaccine", "The US COVID-19 vaccine should be released to the public, even if the vaccine's efficiency and safety have not been sufficiently demonstrated", and "The US should start mass COVID-19 vaccination, even if it might end up endangering the health of some Americans". We used the mean of these three items to produce a single variable capturing attitudes towards rushing the development of the COVID-19 vaccine (α = .77, *M* = 2.36, *SD* = 1.22).

Satisfaction with Trump's Presidency. Satisfaction to President Trump was measured on a scale from 0=*very dissatisfied* to 10=*very satisfied* (*M* = 2.57, *SD* = 3.32).

Group Reputation Concern. Group reputation concern was measured with the item "The US's reputation in the world would be damaged if other countries were quicker in developing and administering a COVID-19 vaccine" (*M* = 2.77, *SD* = 1.56).

General Vaccine Support. General vaccine support was measured with two items: "In general, I think vaccines are safe and effective" and "In general, I am in favour of vaccination" (*r* = .86, *M* = 6.02, *SD* = 1.17).

2.5.2 Results

Zero-order correlations are shown in Table 2.5. In line with our expectations, national narcissism correlated significantly and positively with support for rushing the vaccine development but negatively with general vaccine support.

Table 2.5

Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables (Study 3)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5
1. National narcissism	-				
2. National identification	.44***	-			
3. Support for rushing vaccine	.49***	.18***	-		
4. Satisfaction with Trump	.60***	.34***	.41***	-	
5. Group reputation concern	.40***	.16**	.49***	.30***	-
6. General vaccine support	-.30***	-.08	-.04	-.37***	-.04

Note. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

We predicted that the positive relationship between national narcissism and support for rushing the vaccine development would be stronger in the comparison condition than in the no-comparison condition. National narcissism, national identification, satisfaction with Trump, general vaccine support and condition as predictors of support for rushing the vaccine were entered in Step 1 (see Table 2.6)[14]. Predictors were mean-centered and condition effect

[14] As a robustness check, the analysis was repeated including an item capturing risk perceptions associated with a hastened vaccine development ("How risky do you think it is to hasten the development of a vaccine for COVID-19 and skip the last stages of its scientific development?"). The pattern of results remained the same.

coded (−1 = no comparison, 1 = comparison). National narcissism was a significant and positive predictor of rushing the vaccine development, (β = .44, $p < .001$). Satisfaction with Trump (β = .25, $b = 0.09$, $p < .001$) and general vaccine support (β = .18, $p < .001$) were both significant and positive predictors of rushing the vaccine. Condition was a negative predictor (β = −.18, $p < .001$), meaning that support for rushing the vaccine development was higher in the no-comparison condition than in the comparison condition.[15] The interaction term of national narcissism and condition was entered in Step 2. The interaction term was not significant (β=.06, p=.55, ΔR^2=.001).[16]

Table 2.6

Regression Analyses of Support for a Rushed Vaccine (Study 3)

	Step 1			Step 2		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.39***	[0.29,0.49]	.44	0.39***	[0.29,0.49]	.44
National identification	-0.08	[-0.16,0.01]	-.09	-0.08	[-0.16,0.004]	-.09
Satisfaction with Trump	0.09***	[0.05,0.13]	.25	0.09***	[0.05,0.13]	.25
General vaccine support	0.19***	[0.09,0.29]	.18	0.19***	[0.09,0.28]	.18
Condition	-0.18***	[-0.28,-0.07]	-.15	-0.24*	[-0.48,-0.01]	-.20

[15] When adjusting for age, gender, and ethnicity, the experimental condition became an non-significant predictor, β =-.18, b = -0.22, 95%CI [-0.46, 0.02], p = .067.

[16] In Step 2, we found signs of multicollinearity for condition and the interaction term (tolerance ≈ .20, VIF ≈ 0.50 for both). Because the interaction was non-significant, we refrained from further interpretation and thus this multicollinearity was not issue.

National narcissism × Condition		0.02 [-0.05,0.10]	.06
F (df)	33.32(5, 364)***	27.80(6, 363)***	
R^2	.31	.32	

Note. CI = confidence interval.

*p< .05. **p<.01. ***p< .001.

Group Reputation Concern as a Mediator of the Relationship between National Narcissism and Support for Rushing Vaccine Development. We hypothesised that group reputation concern would mediate the relationship between national narcissism and support for rushing a vaccine for COVID-19. We tested a mediation model in PROCESS 3.5, with 5,000 bootstraps and 95% confidence intervals. National narcissism was specified as the predictor and group reputation concern was the mediator, and we entered national identification, satisfaction with President Trump, general support for vaccinations, and experimental condition as covariates.[17] National narcissism predicted group reputation concern (β = .37, b = 0.41, 95% CI [0.27, 0.55], p < .001). Furthermore, group reputation concern predicted support for rushing the vaccine (β = .32, b = 0.25, 95% CI [0.19, 0.32], p < .001). The direct effect of national narcissism was significant (β = .32, b = 0.28, 95% CI [0.19, 0.38], p < .001). The indirect effect of national narcissism on support for rushing to a

[17] Although national identification and experimental condition did not predict group reputation concern, satisfaction with Trump (β = .13, b = 0.06, 95% CI [0.004, 0.12], p = .038) and general vaccine support significantly predicted group reputation concern (β = .11, b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.01, 0.28], p = .031).

vaccine via group reputation concern was significant (β = .12, *b* = 0.10, 95% CI [0.06, 0.15], *SE* = 0.03).

2.5.3 Discussion

In line with our hypothesis, we found that national narcissism predicted support for an early release of a vaccine for COVID- 19 regardless of its risks for citizens' health and safety. This association was independent of intergroup comparisons—our experimental manipulation did not moderate the effects. These results emerged over and above participants' general opinions of vaccination. In fact, in line with previous research (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021), national narcissism was associated with vaccine scepticism. Reputational concerns can help explain this seemingly conflicting finding. Those high in national narcissism would generally be sceptical or even conspiratorial about vaccinations, but the world's first COVID-19 vaccine would have been something for the nation to boast about and spite rivals. Therefore, national narcissism may differentially fuel pro- or anti-science attitudes depending on how they make the ingroup look in the eyes of others (see also Cislak, Cichocka, et al., 2021 for similar findings in the environmental context).

2.6 Chapter 2 General Discussion

We present evidence that national narcissism is linked to readiness to sacrifice compatriots to maintain a positive ingroup image of the nation on the world stage. Our studies tested these associations in a context where the prioritisation of national image can have deadly consequences. In Study 1, we demonstrated that British national narcissism was associated with support for the decision to opt out of a beneficial EU scheme to procure medical equipment. National narcissism also positively predicted the sentiment that opting out of the scheme is the right decision even though it may harm British people. In Study 2, American national narcissism was related to negativity toward expansive testing for COVID-19, which could highlight unfavourable case numbers for the United States. In Study 3,

American narcissism was related to support for rushing to release a vaccine for COVID-19 without adequate scientific testing. In all studies, these relationships were mediated by concerns about the ingroup's reputation. They were also independent of whether outgroup comparisons were made salient. This adds to a growing literature suggesting that those high in collective narcissism lack concern for their ingroup members (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2021).

2.6.1 National Narcissism and Self-defeating Image Management

Our findings have important theoretical implications for understanding the potential risks associated with overinvestment in the ingroup's image. Here, a grandiose yet defensive national identity, namely national narcissism, was related to a preference for harmful, even sacrificial, policies aimed at image management. Previous studies have alluded to this in the case of environmental protection (Cislak, Cichocka, et al., 2021; Cislak et al., 2018), support for vaccination policies (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021), and international cooperation (Marchlewska et al., 2018). We extend these findings by directly tapping into the renunciation of ingroup members' well-being. In essence, collective narcissists' low regard for ingroup members can translate into support for counterproductive policies aimed to save the group's face.

Our research adds to a growing literature suggesting that those high in collective narcissism lack empathy for their own group members and prioritise their own, personal interests. For example, collective narcissism is associated with the objectification of one's ingroup members (Cichocka et al., 2021) and lower loyalty to the ingroup, such as leaving one's homeland for financial benefits (Marchlewska et al., 2020). Corroborating this view, recent research has linked national narcissism with social cynicism—a negative view on human nature (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022). Those high in national narcissism may simply be cynical about the fate of their fellow ingroup members. Thus, the ingroup becomes a tool for self-enhancement, for instance, when deliberately harming the group serves

reputation or prestige motives. Of course, such behaviours may be short-sighted and harm the ingroup's reputation in the long run, which might ultimately reflect badly on those scoring high in collective narcissism. In this, collective narcissism resembles individual narcissism, which tends to predict engagement in short-term self-aggrandising strategies, which harm social relationships in the long term (Cichocka et al., 2021; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). Indeed, our findings have parallels with interpersonal outcomes of grandiose (as compared with vulnerable) narcissism, such as entitlement, grandiose fantasies, exploitativeness, and a disregard of how these behaviours affect others (Miller et al., 2011).

The main effects observed in our studies were at least partially accounted for by concern about the ingroup's reputation. Similarly, past studies linked national narcissism to refusing aid from others due to suspected ulterior or strategic motives of those offering help (Mashuri et al., 2020). Those high in national narcissism, therefore, seem to be willing to refuse benefits to their ingroup based on unfounded claims (Cislak et al., 2020). In addition to refusing outside help, hypervigilance to how others perceive the ingroup's status and reputation could prevent those scoring high in national narcissism from taking effective measures domestically. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this meant refusal to cooperate with other countries, opposition to testing extensively, or concluding scientific trials before starting mass vaccination. Those high in national narcissism may be especially prone to follow image-centered leadership promoting such initiatives. For example, national narcissism predicted support for President Trump, who emphasised restoring America's image and respect in the world (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018).

Overall, in Western politics, national narcissism tends to be associated with political conservatism (e.g., Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018). In our studies, national narcissism correlated strongly not only with support for conservative leaders

but also with right-wing ideological self-placement (see details in Appendix A). National narcissism also correlated with anti-science attitudes in Study 3 (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). Contemporary conservatism and anti-science attitudes may, in part, appeal to those high in national narcissism because they emphasise a return to national glory and independence from others (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Sternisko et al., 2021). Although, in the national context, collective narcissism tends to be linked to right-wing beliefs, it should not be interpreted as solely a right-wing phenomenon. The associations between collective narcissism and ideology may depend on the identity context in which collective narcissism is examined. For example, research has demonstrated defensive processes associated with partisan collective narcissism measured among members of both liberal and conservative parties (Bocian et al., 2021; Cichocka et al., 2021).

Importantly, we did not find similar effects for national identification as we did for national narcissism. After accounting for their overlap, national identification was either unrelated or negatively related to support for policies that serve image management. This is consistent with research showing that national identification without the narcissistic component is associated with more desirable intra- and intergroup attitudes (Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). For example, after accounting for its overlap with collective narcissism, ingroup identification was associated with lower suspicion of outgroups (Cichocka et al., 2016). Ingroup identification can also have multiple positive consequences for the ingroup, such as increased trust, cooperation, and involvement in ingroup activities (Bilewicz & Wójcik, 2010; Brewer, 1999), and greater loyalty to the group (Abrams et al., 1998; Ellemers et al., 1997; Marchlewska et al., 2020). Thus, national identification that is confidently held and is less preoccupied with outgroup comparison can be related to beneficial outcomes, both in intra- and intergroup relations (Cichocka, 2016).

2.6.2 Limitations and Future Directions

Certain perceptions of the ingroup may give rise to an expectation that individual ingroup members endure suffering for the sake of the entire ingroup (Kahn et al., 2017). However, national ingroups are large and diverse and have complicated dynamics between their subgroups. In our research, national narcissism was measured in relation to British or American nationality, but samples were disproportionately White. This brings up important considerations, not addressed empirically in our studies. First, who is deemed a full member of the ingroup? Subgroups tend to attribute their own characteristics to the whole ingroup (Wenzel et al., 2007). For example, studies suggest that in the United States, White individuals associate the category "American" less with racial or ethnic minorities than themselves (Devos & Banaji, 2005). In turn, they consider themselves the "prototypical" racial group in the United States. Studies further suggest that White individuals' perceived threat stemming from the decline in their numerical superiority facilitates resistance to growing diversity (Danbold & Huo, 2015). Racial or ethnic minorities may, therefore, be considered to be on the periphery of the national ingroup in the mind of the dominant racial or ethnic group.

A subsequent consideration is: Who in the ingroup is deemed an "acceptable loss"?[18] This brings up another limitation of our approach, as our measure of ingroup sacrifice assumed equal risk of citizens being harmed by COVID-19. However, there are striking racial disparities in COVID-19 infection risk and disease severity due to social factors (Shah et al., 2020). Many protection measures, such as working from home, are privileges reserved for individuals of higher status. Therefore, an alternative to our proposition that reputation

[18] Our study materials do not allow for a comparison of *who* within the national in-group should be sacrificed (e.g., Black vs. White individuals), but we do include additional analyses with ethnicity as predictors of the dependent variables in Studies 2 and 3, in Appendix B.

concerns drive sacrificial attitudes is possible. Perhaps, the dominant ethnic group may marginalise ethnic minorities, and then use post hoc rationalisations, such as group-level reputation concerns, to justify discrimination. Future research would do well in applying an intersectional approach in examining specific subgroups within the nation (such as ethnic minorities) as targets of ingroup sacrifice perpetrated by the dominant ethnic group (here, White individuals). It is probable that willingness to sacrifice compatriots depends on *who* of *us* is put on the altar.

Some methodological limitations of our studies should be noted. Study 1 was purely correlational, while the experimental manipulation in Studies 2 and 3 yielded somewhat unclear results. To determine whether the main effect observed in Study 1 depended on a competitive intergroup context, we sought to make outgroup comparisons salient in Studies 2 and 3. National narcissism did have a positive and significant effect on preference for image management strategies in both conditions; however, the effect did not increase in the comparison conditions. This might suggest that for those high in national narcissism, image concerns might be chronic. Another possibility is that intensive media coverage makes intergroup comparisons constantly salient in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Regardless of the intergroup comparison salience, future studies would do well to use longitudinal methods to investigate whether individual changes in collective narcissism over time predict subsequent changes in policy support. It should also be noted that we did rely on single-item measures, most importantly to capture group reputation concern, which may be considered a limitation. These items, however, do show consistent relationships across studies (see the Appendix A for more details). Finally, our samples were not representative of their respective countries in terms of ethnicity and political orientation, which limits the generalisability of our results.

It should also be noted that risk perceptions associated with the image management strategies were not a topic of concern in the analyses presented here. Study 1 did not include any measure that could tap into how risky participants perceived forgoing EU cooperation. However, a measure of personal anxiety about COVID-19 was included in Study 2 and an item capturing risk perceptions associated with a rushed vaccine was included in Study 3. Together, these additional analyses, reported in footnotes in Studies 2 and 3 suggest that personal anxiety about COVID-19 (Study 2) and risk perceptions (Study 3) did not account for the relationships observed between national narcissism and the ingroup sacrifice measures. Ideally, synchronised measures associated with perceptions of personal or societal risks should have been included in all data collections. Measures of remorse or empathy would also be useful as covariates or mediating variables.

Last, some of the theoretical and statistical claims about collective narcissism made in this line of research should also be investigated with different methodological approaches. For example, future research could entail focus groups, qualitative interviews or a discursive psychology analysis of news articles and social media. Such insights into disregard for ingroup wellbeing or extreme competitiveness could further illuminate those high in collective narcissism attain group-based ego enhancement.

2.6.3 Conclusion

Sometimes people claim to love their nation and yet initiate or support decisions that may severely harm their compatriots. The end goal may be to preserve the ingroup's honour or spite an adversary, but all too often the ingroup itself ends up suffering the consequences. Collective narcissists' obsession with the ingroup's image and craving for recognition of its greatness may mean they forgo opportunities to effectively tackle crises. We found robust evidence that those high in national narcissism preferred image management over protecting

fellow citizens in the context of a global pandemic. For people high in collective narcissism, sacrificing ingroup members may be a small price to pay to achieve the desired group image.

Chapter 3[19]: When Less is More – Defensive National Identity Predicts Sacrifice of Ingroup Profit to Maximise the Difference Between Groups

3.1 Abstract

We propose that defensive forms of identity (i.e., nationalism and national narcissism) can harm the nation via a tendency to maximise the difference between own and other groups in resource allocation. We test this hypothesis by adopting a classic social psychological paradigm, the Tajfel's matrices, to real-life scenarios designed in context of the COVID-19 pandemic. We captured maximising the difference as a preference for one's nation being allocated more medical resources relative to other countries, but at the expense of absolute ingroup profit. Across three studies (total *N*=1,795), we found cross-sectional and experimental evidence that defensiveness in national identity predicts this counterproductive strategy which ultimately benefits neither ingroup nor outgroup. No such effects were observed for the mere strength of national identification. The results provide evidence that defensive national identity predisposes individuals to support policies that strive for a positive comparison to outgroups, but simultaneously harm one's own ingroup.

Keywords: collective narcissism, nationalism, COVID-19, maximising the difference, resource allocation

[19] This chapter has been submitted for publication as a research article, co-authored with Aleksandra Cislak, Gaëlle Marinthe, and Aleksandra Cichocka.

3.2 Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic offers a compelling (albeit unfortunate) context to examine the interplay between the way people identify with their nation and their attitudes about resource allocation. Some governments have been guided by a "my country first" dogma to secure most equipment, vaccines or drugs for their own (Bollyky & Bown, 2020; Fidler, 2020). This approach can be seen as an example of parochial altruism—the willingness to help one's own group and reject others (Everett et al., 2015). Although this form of ingroup favouritism might be problematic in its own right, sometimes people might be willing to go even further and not only favour the ingroup over the outgroup, but also be ready to sacrifice ingroup benefits to show advantage over others. For example, in June 2020 President Trump was calling for reducing COVID-19 testing in order to make the country look better in international comparisons (Segers, 2020). Some scholars have argued that the pandemic provides a natural experiment on the public-health effects of such hubristic concerns (Lincoln, 2020). The present work examines national sentiments that predict support for competitive strategies that might harm one's own nation.

In social psychological literature, ingroup favouritism can been captured by the so called Tajfel matrices, which examine different preferences for resource allocation between social groups (Tajfel et al., 1971). One especially striking strategy is the tendency to maximise the difference between groups, that is preferring relative advantage over other groups at the expense of objective gains of one's group (Bourhis et al., 1994; Tajfel et al., 1971). Such positive intergroup differentiation is thought to be linked to a positive group identity (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Yet, surprisingly few studies to date have demonstrated the associations between identifying with one's group and a preference for maximising differentiation between groups (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Sidanius et al., 2007; cf., Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). One reason for this could be that research rooted in the social

identity tradition rarely considers a distinction between more secure and more defensive identities inspired by the psychoanalytic tradition (Adorno et al., 1950; Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Roccas et al., 2006; Schatz et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 2012; cf. Huddy & Khatib, 2007).

We argue that a preference for maximising the difference between groups is not an automatic consequence of ingroup attachment. Rather, it is more likely to result from defensive concerns about one's nation, such as anxieties about the nation's image (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020) or a need to assert national dominance (Wagner et al., 2012; see also Sidanius et al., 2007). We test the idea that defensive identity, rather than the mere strength of ingroup identification, will foster a motivation to support policies aimed to boost the ingroup's perceived position in relation to outgroups, even at the expense of one's ingroup's gain.

We conceptualise defensive national identity by integrating two lines of inquiry on individual differences in national sentiments. We focus on national narcissism, a belief that one's nation is exceptional and deserves recognition from others (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and nationalism, a perception that one's nation should dominate over others (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Wagner et al., 2012). National narcissism has consistently been associated with outgroup derogation (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), particularly when outgroups are seen as having insulted or threatened the ingroup's positive image (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013). A constant search for external validation is thus a characteristic of national narcissism (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020), and those scoring high in this form of identity are more concerned by the ingroup's image and prestige, and less by the fate of other ingroup members (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka et al., 2021; Eker et al., 2022). This is because national narcissism is compensatory, fuelled by the feeling that the nation is chronically

disadvantaged or relatively deprived in intergroup relations (Marchlewska et al., 2018; see also Cichocka, Sengupta, et al., 2022). In the COVID-19 pandemic, national narcissism was related to various harmful outcomes, such as the belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories (Hughes & Machan, 2021), dissemination thereof (Sternisko et al., 2021), and selfish behaviours, like hoarding supplies (Nowak et al., 2020).

Nationalism is another instance of defensive ingroup identity. Nationalism has been described as a belief in national superiority (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) and "chauvinistic arrogance and desire for dominance in international relations" (Li & Brewer, 2004, p. 728). The need for intergroup differentiation is an integral part of nationalism, emphasising differences between national groups (Li & Brewer, 2004) and rejection of outgroups (Mummendey et al., 2001). Nationalism entails the feeling that one's country should be more powerful than others and is thus a robust predictor of support for aggressive foreign policies, armament and war (Feshbach, 1987; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Pratto et al., 1998). Nationalism has also been seen as a way a nation's dominant ethnic group can cope with the negative psychological consequences of perceiving that their group is relatively deprived (Sengupta et al., 2019; see also Lim, 2010; Reyna et al., 2022; Wamsler, 2022). In the COVID-19 pandemic, nationalism was identified as a risk factor for reduced international cooperation and an unwillingness among people in advantaged countries to aid disadvantaged countries in procurement of vaccines and much needed medical supplies (Bieber, 2022; Bollyky & Bown, 2020; Fidler, 2020).

National narcissism and nationalism are theoretically and empirically distinct: while national narcissism is characterised by a quest for recognition, nationalism is better described as a quest for dominance (Cai & Gries, 2013; Federico, Golec De Zavala, et al., 2022; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). For example, while both predict intergroup aggression, nationalism aims to dominate others with force, but national narcissism aims to establish recognition and

respect for the national ingroup (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). However, nationalism and national narcissism share similarities in that both assume a hyperbolic view on ingroup greatness (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; see Gronfeldt et al., 2021 for a review) and that both can be considered a defensive compensation for group relative deprivation (Marchlewska et al., 2018; Sengupta et al., 2019).

Defensive needs for ingroup recognition and dominance might paradoxically lead people to express support for policies that are worse for the ingroup. Research has shown that national narcissism is linked to endorsement of policy proposals that are meant to affirm the ingroup's positive image in contrast to others (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020; Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022). Such actions can be short-sighted. For example, national narcissism predicted support for unsustainable exploitation of nature to demonstrate to outsiders that "this country will not be bossed around" (Cislak et al., 2018) and willingness to release COVID-19 vaccines prematurely to beat other countries to the punch (Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022). Similarly, nationalism has been linked to support for anti-environmentalist policies that are harmful for ingroup members' health (Aydin et al., 2022), especially when an outgroup is perceived to be pushing for environmental protection measures (Bonaiuto et al., 1996). In sum, both the narcissistic need for recognition and the nationalistic need for dominance may be related to a tendency to support counterproductive actions, aimed to bolster the ingroup's status. Maximising the difference between groups, even for vital resources, may therefore be an appealing strategy for those high in defensive national identity because it offers a positive social comparison and a perception of the ingroup being "on top" in intergroup relations (Sidanius et al., 2007; Tajfel et al., 1971).

Importantly, not all forms of identifying with the nation are defensive. Ingroup identification can be secure and confident. Patriotism is a feeling of love and pride for one's country (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) that, compared to nationalism, generally predicts

tolerance and peaceful relations with other nations (Wagner et al., 2012; see also Schatz et al., 1999). When controlling for its overlap with national narcissism, national identification typically predicts greater tolerance (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska et al., 2020) and solidarity with disadvantaged groups (Górska et al., 2020; Marchlewska et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2022). When the defensive components are covaried out, patriotism and national identification predict constructive intragroup outcomes, such as civic engagement, support for democracy, support for pro-environmental policies, volunteering, and positive interpersonal relations within groups (Aydin et al., 2022; Cichocka et al., 2021; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Lai et al., 2013; Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022; Richey, 2011). In this paper, we collectively refer to national identification and patriotism net of defensive forms of identity as secure national identity. As secure national identity does not entail a nationalistic need to dominate (Wagner et al., 2012) or a narcissistic urge to spite others (Cislak et al., 2018), those high in secure national identity are less likely to be attracted by policies aimed solely at bolstering the ingroup's status.

3.2.1 Present Research

In three studies, we tested the hypothesis that defensive national identity would predict the tendency to show competitive advantage over other groups, even at the expense of the ingroup. To this end, we relied on the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and dilemmas around the distribution of medical resources.

We revisited a classic instrument from social psychology: the Tajfel matrices, which include a battery of items measuring intergroup discriminatory behaviour (Tajfel et al., 1971). While originally invented to study minimal groups using symbolic points, research has demonstrated that Tajfel matrices can be applied to real-life social groups and allocation of important resources (e.g., Bornstein et al., 1983; Malkin & Ari, 2013; Navarrete et al., 2010; Sidanius et al., 2007). Following Sidanius and colleages (2007; see also Malkin & Ari, 2013;

Navarrete et al., 2010), we specifically relied on the item capturing maximising the difference between groups and adapt it to the disputes on resource allocation during the COVID-19 pandemic. The high end of the maximum difference item reflects its name: There is maximum difference between the groups in favour of the ingroup. By maximising the difference, participants can hurt the outgroup by reducing the points allocated to it, but the price is that the ingroup also loses points. The ingroup is therefore winning, but only *relative* to the outgroup. Such a competitive choice goes against the interests of the ingroup in *absolute* terms, but the *relative advantage* in the points is in favour of the ingroup: The outgroup is hurt more than the ingroup.

This chapter has a somewhat wider approach than the other empirical chapters, since is does not solely focus on national (or collective) narcissism. In Study 4, we measured national narcissism and national identification as predictors, and we used the maximising-the-difference item score as the dependent variable. However, in Study 5, we had the opportunity to include nationalism and patriotism as additional measures of defensive and secure forms of national identity, respectively. We therefore used structural equation modelling in a more overarching framework of defensive vs secure national identity. Study 6 tested causality by relying on an experimental manipulation of perceived long-term ingroup disadvantage to induce national identity defensiveness. Studies 5 and 6 were pre-registered. In all studies, we report how we determined sample sizes. All materials, data and analyses are available here: https://osf.io/dn64b/?view_only=02348de3c3714a59a96526a7f9fb7604

3.3 Study 4

In Study 4, we examined whether national narcissism would be related to the tendency to maximise the difference between groups when it comes to allocating doses of the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine between the UK and the EU.

3.3.1 Method

We recruited 440 British Prolific workers. After completing the Tajfel matrices (see details below), participants were asked "Do you think you fully understood the previous task?". Most participants said that they fully understood the task (n = 371, 84.32%), some that they were "not sure" (n = 62, 14.09%), and seven (1.59%) said they did not understand the task. We excluded participants reporting they did not understand the task (this did not affect pattern of results), leaving 433 for further analyses (66.74% female, 31.87% men, 1.39% non-binary or third gender, 89.09% White, M_{age} = 34.83, SD_{age} = 12.53). A G*power (Faul et al., 2007) sensitivity analysis suggested that this sample size provided 80% power to detect a small effect for a single regression coefficient (β = .13), assuming α = .05, two-tailed. This study was not pre-registered.

Measures and Procedure. Participants first completed the Tajfel matrices, and then measures of national narcissism and national identification in randomised order (this did not affect pattern of results). Next, participants answered questions on politics, ideology, their background and were debriefed. Participants received compensation in accordance with Prolific payment policy. National narcissism and national identification were measured on a scale from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*.

***National Narcissism*.** National narcissism was measured with the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), α = .92, M = 2.59, SD = 1.41. It includes items such as "Great Britain deserves special treatment" and "I will never be satisfied until Great Britain gets all it deserves".

***National Identification*.** National identification was measured with the 12-item social identification scale by Cameron (2004), α = .87, M = 4.30, SD = 1.01. The scale captures three components of ingroup identification: ingroup ties (e.g., "I have a lot in common with other British people"), centrality (e.g., "I often think about the fact that I am a British person"), and ingroup affect (e.g., "In general, I'm glad to be a British person").

Maximising the Difference. Tajfel matrices were constructed according to the guidelines by Bourhis and colleagues (1994). We designed a scenario in which participants were instructed to allocate doses of the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine between the UK and the EU. The scenario was based on a prominent dispute revolving around AstraZeneca, the vaccine manufacturer, failing to deliver the number of vaccine doses it had promised the EU due to shortfalls in production, while the UK's supply was unaffected (Goenka, 2021). EU leaders reacted strongly and called for supply to the UK to be restricted. Participants were asked to imagine that they could decide on how the vaccine was to be distributed, and to not consider whether the other side would agree. The study took place in early February 2021, around the time in which the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine was about to be released.

We analysed the maximising the difference item in the Tajfel matrices specifically (the remaining five matrices were treated as filler questions). The maximum difference item is on a continuum of 13 scenarios, labelled from A to M, of allocations between the two groups (see Figure 3.1). Each option in the matrices represented millions of vaccine doses. Selecting option A (i.e., UK = 19, EU = 25) indicated maximum joint profit (i.e., greatest possible number of doses for the two parties combined) and maximum ingroup profit (i.e., 19 is the highest possible number for the UK in this scenario, although that option entails the EU getting 25). This scenario is the most economically sensible from the viewpoint of the ingroup, but the outgroup will benefit more than the ingroup in this scenario. Selecting an option closer to the mid-point (e.g., option G, UK = 13, EU = 13) signifies parity, as there is equilibrium between the parties, although both parties would have made more out of earlier options. Selecting the option M (i.e., UK = 7, EU = 1) indicates an extreme preference for maximum difference between the groups: Both groups lose, but the ingroup still gains more than the outgroup. Out of a range from 1 to 13 (i.e., A to M), participants on average chose 5.12 (SD = 3.75).

Figure 3.1

Item Capturing Maximum Difference Between Groups in our Studies



Note. UK is the ingroup and EU the outgroup.

3.3.2 Results and Discussion

We first examined bivariate correlations among variables. National narcissism and national identification correlated significantly and positively, $r(431) = .55$, $p < .001$. National narcissism, $r(431) = .18$, $p < .001$, and national identification, $r(431) = .13$, $p = .008$, both correlated positively with the tendency to maximise the difference.

We conducted structural equation modelling using MPlus (version 8, Muthén & Muthén, 2017) to test our hypothesis (see Figure 3.2 for model details). National narcissism was a significant positive predictor of the tendency to maximise the difference, $\beta = .19$, $b = 0.58$, 95% CI [0.11, 1.05], $p = .016$, while the effect of national identification was non-significant, $\beta = -.004$, $b = -0.02$, 95% CI [-0.67, 0.64], $p = .959$. Controlling for level of understanding of the Tajfel matrices task or for demographics did not affect the results (see Appendix B for details).

Study 4 provided the first evidence for the hypothesis that defensive national identity (in this case, national narcissism) is associated with a preference for maximising the difference between groups.

Figure 3.2

Measurement Model (Study 4)



Note. National narcissism and national identification as predictors of maximising the difference (Study 4). The measurement model includes standardised coefficients. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(128) = 415.83$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.25$, *CFI* = .935, *RMSEA* = 0.072 [.064, .080], *SRMR* = 0.060.

3.4 Study 5

In Study 5, we examined whether defensive national identity more broadly (i.e., a combination of national narcissism and nationalism) would be related to maximising the difference in vaccine allocation.

3.4.1 Method

Participants. A task using the same Tajfel matrices as in Study 4 was included in Wave 1 of a longitudinal study into British national identity. We pre-registered

(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=iz5eq9) a target sample size of 510 participants, recruited via Prolific. The final study included 516 responses. As in Study 4, participants were asked whether they understood the Tajfel matrices task (83.30% said yes, 16.12% were not sure). Although we did not mention exclusions in our pre-registration, three (0.58%) respondents said they did not understand the task. For the sake of consistency with Study 4, we decided to exclude them from the analysis (this did not change the results). Using Prolific IDs, we further excluded 20 participants that participated in Study 4 and therefore had prior knowledge of the Tajfel matrices. This overlap in recruitment was unintentional and thus this exclusion criteria was not pre-registered but including these participants did not alter the pattern of results (see Appendix B). One participant left the Tajfel matrices empty. This left 491 participants for further analyses (62.32% women, 36.05% men, 1.22% other gender, 0.41% preferred not to say, M_{age} = 37.16, SD_{age} = 13.79). With that sample, we should have 80% power to detect a small effect size of β = .11, assuming α = .05, two-tailed.

Measures. Participants first completed measures of national identity (all used a scale from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*) and then the Tajfel matrices.

National narcissism. National narcissism was measured with the 9-item version of the Collective Narcissism Scale by Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009), α = .92, *M* = 2.84, *SD* = 1.13.

Nationalism. Nationalism was measured using Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) 8-item scale, α = .88, *M* = 2.87, *SD* = 1.15. It included items such as "In view of British moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding international policy" and "The first duty of every young Brit is to honour the national British history and heritage".

National identification. National identification was measured with Leach and colleagues' (2008) 10-item group-level self-investment scale, α = .95, *M* = 4.57, *SD* = 1.27.

The scale captures solidarity (e.g., "I feel a bond with British people"), satisfaction (e.g., "I am glad to be British"), and centrality (e.g., "I often think about the fact that I am British").

Patriotism. Patriotism was measured using Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) 12-item scale, α = .93, *M* = 4.26, *SD* = 1.24. It included items such as "I love my country" and "I am proud to be British".

Maximising the Difference. The Tajfel matrices were identical to Study 4, but the introductory text was amended slightly to reflect the COVID-19 situation in the end of April 2021 (see Appendix B for details). Maximising the difference strategy was measured with the same item as Study 4 (*M* = 4.23, *SD* = 3.25).

3.4.2 Results and Discussions

See Table 3.1 for correlations among individual predictors and maximising the difference.

Table 3.1

Bivariate Correlations Among Variables (Study 5)

	1	2	3	4
1. National narcissism				
2. National identification	.62***			
3. Nationalism	.81***	.59***		
4. Patriotism	.66***	.88***	.61***	
5. Maximising the difference	.15***	.10*	.16***	.14**

Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Our original pre-registration (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=iz5eq9pre-registration) assumed focusing on national narcissism and identification only. Our pre-registered hypotheses were confirmed (refer to Appendix B for details of the pre-registered

regression analyses). However, as Study 5 was a part of a larger research project on British identity, we decided to incorporate a broader approach to defensive national identity. Thus, we constructed a structural equation model with two superordinate latent variables: defensive national identity and secure national identity, as predictors of maximising the difference (see Figure 3.3 for model details). Defensive national identity was composed of the respective items of two latent variables: national narcissism and nationalism. Similarly, secure national identity was composed of the respective items of national identification and patriotism as two latent variables. Defensive national identity was a significant, positive predictor of the tendency to maximise the difference, β = .15, *b* = 0.41, 95% CI [0.03, 0.78], *p* = .033, while the effect of secure national identity was non-significant, β = .03, *b* = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.39], *p* = .721.

Like in Study 4, the pattern of results remained the same after controlling for demographics and procedure understanding (see Appendix B for details of these analyses).

Figure 3.3

Measurement Model (Study 5)



Note. Defensive national identity and secure national identity as predictors of maximising the difference (Study 5). The measurement includes standardised coefficients. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(731) = 2512.31$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.53$, $CFI = .899$, $RMSEA = 0.070$ [.067, .073], $SRMR = 0.060$.

Study 5 demonstrated that a preference for maximising the difference between nations is linked not only to national narcissism but also to nationalism, another form of defensive identity. In Study 6, we aimed to corraborate our bivariate findings with experimental evidence.

3.5 Study 6

As Studies 4 and 5 were cross-sectional, in Study 6 we sought to experimentally manipulate identity defensiveness to establish its causal effects on maximising the difference. To this end, we relied on a manipulation of long-term ingroup disadvantage, a factor known to increase national narcissism (Marchlewska et al., 2018) and linked to nationalism (Sengupta et al., 2019). Furthermore, a possible limitation of Studies 4 and 5 was that the Tajfel matrices assumed that the number of vaccine doses were not presented in proportional terms, while the EU has over six-times more citizens than the UK[20]. Therefore, in Study 6 we asked participants allocate resources in proportional terms.

We predicted that compared to a baseline condition, ingroup disadvantage would increase the tendency to maximise the difference, here measured in the context of distribution of anti-viral COVID-19 drugs.

3.5.1 Method

[20] Although note that selecting options such as UK=7/EU=1 represents an even more extreme form of maximum difference than if group sizes were equal.

Participants. According to a G*power analysis, we needed a sample of 788 participants in an experiment with two conditions with 80% power to detect a small effect (Cohen's d = .20). Participants were recruited via Prolific. We pre-registered (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=2FZ_LRB) that we would exclude participants failing comprehension and attention checks. We asked participants whether they fully understood the Tajfel matrices, giving the option "yes" or "no". The attention check asked participants what the article they read was about, giving them three options (one correct, two incorrect). We experienced considerable attrition due to the exclusion criteria, and therefore needed to recruit additional participants (see details in Appendix B). In total, we recruited 1,029 participants and excluded 178. This left 851 participants for further analysis (68.27% women, 30.90% men, 0.71% other gender, 0.12% preferred not to say or missing, M_{age} = 41.68, SD_{age} = 13.44).

Experimental Manipulation. We manipulated perceived long-term ingroup disadvantage by having participants read one of two passages. The text was based on an intervention by Marchlewska and colleagues (2018) designed to increase national narcissism (but decrease national identification). In the experimental condition (n=418), participants read a passage on the UK having been disadvantaged by the EU for a long time. In the baseline condition (n=433), participants read a neutral discussion on the relationship between the UK and the EU. Subsequently, participants filled out the Tajfel matrices items.

Maximising the Difference. We designed a scenario around the emerging dispute between the UK and EU on a new anti-viral drug designed by the medical manufacturer AstraZeneca (*AstraZeneca Says Drug Helps Cut Risk of Severe COVID*, 2021) and administered a shortened Tajfel matrix with just one filler item. Moreover, we instructed participants to think of the numbers of antiviral drug doses as proportional and affecting the

UK and the EU equally. The item capturing maximum difference between groups was the same as in the other studies (M = 6.70, SD = 3.54).

3.5.2 Results and Discussions

To test our pre-registered hypothesis that participants would be more likely to maximise the difference in the ingroup disadvantage condition than in the control condition, we used an independent samples t-test with experimental condition as the grouping variable and maximum difference as the dependent variable. Participants in the ingroup disadvantage condition (M = 6.94, SD = 3.49) reported a significantly higher tendency to maximise the difference than participants in the baseline condition, M = 6.46, SD = 3.57), $t(849) = -1.97$, $p = .0497$, Cohen's $d = .14$. Controlling for the effects of demographics did not change the pattern of results (see Appendix B). Corroborating correlational Studies 4 and 5, Study 6 demonstrated experimentally that a defensive national identity can lead to a preference for maximising the difference.

3.6 Chapter 3 General Discussion

Across three studies, we applied the maximising the difference strategy from the classic Tajfel matrices (Tajfel et al., 1971) to analyse a contemporary social problem: distribution of vital medical resources in the COVID-19 pandemic. We demonstrated that defensive national identity predicts renunciation of absolute ingroup profit in an exchange for relative advantage over other groups. In Study 4, we found a relationship between a preference for maximising the difference in vaccine allocation and national narcissism, a form of defensive national identity characterised by a craving for recognition (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). In Study 5, we replicated the results of Study 4, but additionally demonstrated that it is not merely the need for recognition, but also nationalism—the longing for national dominance (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), that predicts maximising the difference. In Study 6, we demonstrated that manipulating perceived ingroup disadvantage, a

known predictor of defensive national identity (Marchlewska et al., 2018), increased the tendency to maximise the difference (this time, in distribution of anti-viral medicine). In other words, those high in defensive national identity supported strategies inflicting harm on their own nation's capacity to fight the pandemic. Importantly, our findings were both valid for the politically contentious vaccines, and a less controversial anti-viral medicine (Steenhuysen, 2021), generating support for our wider claim that defensiveness can relate with counterproductive decision making.

The COVID-19 vaccines and antiviral drug disputes between the UK and the EU offered a compelling opportunity to study how people's national identity influences their decision making on allocation of social resources. The pursuit of prestige or status in competitive intergroup contexts can sometimes lead to short-sighted decision making (see e.g. Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022). In past work on the negative intragroup consequences of national narcissism, researchers focused on policy proposals that can *potentially* be harmful to the ingroup in the long-run (e.g., anti-science policies; Cislak et al., 2018; Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). In the present research, we directly quantified ingroup harm with an item from the Tajfel matrices (Bourhis et al., 1994; Tajfel et al., 1971), where the preference for ingroup gains was outweighed by the preference for outgroup loss in a crucial domain of public health.

Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel et al., 1971, p. 176) argued that such outgroup discrimination might be evoked because of "generic" social norms of intergroup behaviour in many societies. We expect only those high in defensive national identity to embrace such extremely competitive norms in intergroup relations, likely driven by a motivation to protect the ingroup's positive image (Cislak et al., 2018; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022) or to assert its dominance over others (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Wagner et al., 2012). This would be in line with past research

linking maximising the difference with competitive predispositions, such as social dominance orientation (Sidanius et al., 2007) and high group status (Malkin & Ari, 2013). It has also been linked with racism and sexism among men (Navarrete et al., 2010). Despite maximum difference offering a competitive advantage, it refuses benefits for both parties, thus neither showing consideration for others nor one's own ingroup members. Indeed, recent research has linked defensive national identity to an instrumental view on the ingroup (Cichocka et al., 2021) and social cynicism—a negative view on human nature (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022), perhaps allowing those high in defensive national identity to dismiss the consequences of their actions.

In his work on social identity, Turner (1975) emphasised the social (rather than objective) aspect of intergroup competition, meaning that the reward is not necessarily quantifiable or monetary in nature. The goal is not objective gain but relative gain compared to the outgroup, and the reward is maintaining a positive social identity (Abrams & Hogg, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Based on this theorising, Hinkle and Brown (1990) suggested that "the degree of positive intergroup differentiation" should be linked to "the strength of people's identifications with a group" (p. 62), but past research has found little evidence for this association (Sidanius et al., 2007; see also Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Our studies suggest that it might be because past work did not distinguish between more secure and more defensive forms of ingroup identity (see also Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). We argue that it is defensive identity that captures a motivation for ingroup recognition and dominance, while those secure in their identity should be content with their ingroup and might not need to engage in strong intergroup differentiation (see e.g., Cichocka, 2016; Cislak et al., 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2020). Indeed, in Studies 4 and 5, after partialling out the effects of defensive national identity, secure national identity was unrelated to maximising the difference.

3.6.1 Limitations & Future Research

The studies presented here are not without limitations. Because Studies 4 and 5 were correlational, we experimentally manipulated perceived ingroup disadvantaged in Study 6 to establish causality. While the manipulation did significantly increase preference for maximum difference in line with our pre-registered hypothesis, the effect size was small. It should be noted that experimental manipulations of collective narcissism are still in their infancy, and there is currently not a widely accepted, well-tested, context independent direct manipulation available. The manipulation (Marchlewska et al., 2018) was originally tested among UK participants in a pre-Brexit context and its effects might may be weaker in the contemporary political environment. In the current paper, we decided not to include a manipulation check in order not to affect the experimental results (see Hauser et al., 2018). However, it would be useful if the intervention was thoroughly validated again to confirm that it elicits defensive ingroup identity. Overall, more research should be devoted on how defensive reactions can be manipulated. Last, in light of previous findings linking social dominance orientation with a preference for maximising the difference (Sidanius et al., 2007), including a measure of social dominance orientation as a control would have strengthened this research.

The present findings have implications for the study of populist decision making. A preference for maximising the difference between groups may help explain why some populist leaders and movements initiate actions that seem to be self-defeating for the nation. Past research shows that support for populist parties and politicians is linked to higher national narcissism (e.g., Lantos & Forgas, 2021; Marchlewska et al., 2018). Also, defensive national identities more broadly motivated support for policies that renounced benefits offered by membership in supranational organisations. For example, defensive identities among the British public predicted support for the decision to leave the European Union

(Cislak et al., 2020; Marchlewska et al., 2018; Zmigrod et al., 2018) and to forgo benefits of working with the EU during crises (e.g., by refusing cooperation on medical equipment during the pandemic, Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022). Maximum differentiation between the ingroup and outgroup (at any cost) may characterise populist decision making. Future research would do well to investigate more closely how defensive national identities predict support for populist policies that may end up being problematic or counterproductive for the national interest in terms of material wealth, public health, or international influence.

3.6.2 Conclusions

The different ways people identity with their national group may impact how they act on behalf of their group in competitive intergroup contexts. We found evidence suggesting that defensive national identity was related to a preference for maximising the difference in COVID-19 resource allocation, an economically irrational strategy that may provide a positive social comparison, but at the same time result in objective harm to the ingroup. This demonstrates how leaders focusing on their country's disadvantage, entitlement, and superiority may manufacture consent among the public for accepting self-harm in intergroup relations. Therefore, less might be seen as more, at least when it promises recognition or dominance of the ingroup.

Chapter 4[21]: Party People – Differentiating the Associations of Partisan Identification and Partisan Narcissism with Political Effectiveness, Partisan Loyalty, and Volunteering

4.1 Abstract

We investigate the role of partisan identity in predicting political effectiveness, partisan loyalty, and volunteering in a sample of candidates for parliament and local offices (*N*=214). We differentiate the strength of partisan identification from partisan narcissism — a belief in the greatness of one's political party that is not appreciated by others. We found that partisan identification was related to higher levels of political skill, while also predicting intentions to stay with the party and more time spent volunteering in party activities. Meanwhile, partisan narcissism was related to low integrity, with those high in this belief reporting more inclination to engage in secrecy, deception, and political blood-sport. Partisan narcissism was also related to past membership in other political parties. Cumulatively, these results suggest that partisan identification is associated with meticulousness and benevolence in politicians' work. Conversely, partisan narcissism seems to contribute to being cunning in the political arena.

Keywords: partisanship, political workers, collective narcissism, ingroup identification, political skill

[21] This chapter has been submitted for publication as a research article. It is co-authored by Aleksandra Cislak, Madeleine Wyatt and Aleksandra Cichocka.

4.2 Introduction

Social identities play a central role in everyday life, be it in nations, communities, workplaces, or sports clubs (Ellemers et al., 2002). In this paper, we examine partisan identity among active political party members seeking influence and running for office. Judging from real life events, it seems obvious that partisanship is influential in politicians' conduct. Take for example Barack Obama's cross-partisan nomination of three Republican secretaries to his original cabinet (M. Phillips, 2009), versus Boris Johnson's sacking of 21 members from his Conservative party for not following the party line (Culbertson, 2019). Yet, surprisingly little attention seems to be given to the role partisanship might play in shaping politicians' own behaviours and attitudes, potentially because politicians are a notoriously difficult group to recruit for research (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). While classic work in political science has underlined the importance of partisanship for voters' turnout and participation (Dalton, 2016), partisanship has gained a rather negative reputation in both public discourse and academic research (Bump, 2019; Drutman, 2017; Gaskell, 2020; Lelkes & Westwood, 2017; McConnell et al., 2018). Here, we will examine partisan identity, not as passive support that is common for most citizens (Simonton, 1998), but as an important social identity among highly active candidates, which may have implications for the way they go about political work.

We rely on a unique sample of parliamentary and local candidates to test if two forms of partisan identity are related differently to selected aspects of political work. More specifically, we examined whether 1) political effectiveness, 2) partisan loyalty and 3) volunteering in party activities were differentially predicted by partisan identification, the emotional significance attached to one's party membership (Tajfel, 1978; see also Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008) and partisan narcissism, a belief that one's political party is exceptional and entitled to special treatment (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009;

Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022). With respect to political effectiveness, we examined integrity—the extent to which a politician is open and honest in their communication, avoids secrecy, deception or engaging in political blood-sports (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018), and political skill—the ability to achieve one's goals by acting politically (Ferris et al., 2005). With respect to partisan loyalty, we examined intentions to leave the party in the future and membership in other political parties in the past (i.e., switching). Last, we examined volunteering in party activities. We will first review the literature on organisational identification, then move to political work, and finally, we discuss how partisan identity may be related to political effectiveness, partisan loyalty, and volunteering in party activities.

4.2.1 Ingroup Identity and Work-related Outcomes

Research conducted predominantly in the business context suggests that one important determinant of work-related outcomes is identification with one's organisation (Hogg & Terry, 2000), that is feeling part of the organisation and evaluating it positively (Leach et al., 2008; Tajfel, 1978). Here, we adopt this definition for partisan identification among parliamentary and local candidates and measure it in terms of positive affect towards the party, centrality of partisan identity for the self and ties with other party members (Cameron, 2004). This approach therefore differs from that of studies of mass public opinion, which view partisan identification among voters as an affective attachment to a preferred political party one is not necessarily an active member of (cf. Dalton, 2016). This approach to partisan identification is novel, but corresponds to an emerging literature on politicians as political workers that engage with their political workplaces not merely as distant party supporters but central to their daily lives (Silvester et al., 2014, 2021; Wyatt & Silvester, 2018). For active politicians, partisan identity could serve as an important organisational identity (cf. Greene, 2004), similar to workplace identity (Riketta, 2005).

Organisational identification correlates with positive outcomes in the workplace, including higher job satisfaction, job performance, and lower turnover intentions (Lee et al., 2015; Riketta, 2005). One explanation for why this is the case may be that identification is linked to increased work motivation (Van Knippenberg, 2000), organisational citizenship behaviour, and readiness to cooperate (Dukerich et al., 2002). This has implications beyond individual performance, as identification among workers has been found to predict group-level performance of organisations (Thomas et al., 2019). Organisational identification, therefore, appears to nurture a concern for the organisation's general welfare and motivates better conduct and results. We suspect that this can be the case for candidates for parliament and local offices, which are deeply involved in their party and likely to have developed a strong sense of identification (see e.g., Van Knippenberg, 2000; Wegge et al., 2006).

However, people can identify with their social groups in different ways. Recent research indicates that it is important to differentiate genuine ingroup identification from collective narcissism — a defensive ingroup identity that can have problematic consequences both for relations within and between groups (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka & Cislak, 2020). As alluded to earlier, collective narcissism is a belief in ingroup's greatness which is contingent on external validation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Research generally controls for its overlap with social identification (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), with the remaining variance accounting for defensive entitlement and concern about external recognition of the ingroup in the eyes of others (Marchlewska et al., 2020). Collective narcissism increases when people's feelings of autonomy or self-worth are threatened (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018; Golec de Zavala et al., 2020) — people might compensate for frustrated personal needs by investing in the ingroup image (Eker et al., 2022). This is likely why those high in collective narcissism are more concerned with how the ingroup reflects on them, rather than with the welfare of other group members (Cichocka,

2016). Consequently, the ingroup can be used as a tool for self-enhancement, either via direct interpersonal exploitation (Cichocka et al., 2021) or via intergroup comparisons (Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022). While collective narcissism has only been studied to a limited extent in organisations, research has linked it with anti-social behaviour in the workplace, such as objectification of co-workers and undermining colleagues (Cichocka et al., 2021). The partisan context specifically should be a relevant setting to study collective narcissism, given how hostile relations (interpersonal and intergroup) can be between and within political parties (see Bocian et al., 2021; Cichocka et al., 2021).

To investigate how partisan narcissism and partisan identification may be differentially associated with variables indicative of functioning of politicians, we will focus on three sets of outcomes: political effectiveness, partisan loyalty, and volunteering in party activities.

4.2.2 Political Effectiveness: Political Skill and Integrity

Sophisticated political craftmanship entails gaining the support of peers and the wider public, and then utilising connections and influence to effectively reach political objectives (Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). We define political effectiveness as the ability to understand and navigate political work environments, in order to acquire power, influence others, and achieve political goals (Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). This definition is based on the assumption that 'politics at work' are not inherently malevolent as is often assumed (Mintzberg, 1983). Rather, political behaviour is expected to occur in large and complicated organisations that have members with competing views on how work should be conducted, which goals should be prioritised, and how they should be achieved (Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). Naturally, people will differ in how capable they are in navigating such an environment. We tap into these concepts using two political effectiveness constructs: political skill (Ferris et al., 2005) and

integrity (Silvester et al., 2014). We propose that partisan identification and partisan narcissism could emerge as important predictors of these outcomes.

Political skill is the "ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's personal and/or organisational objectives" (Ahearn et al., 2004, p. 311). Political skill consists of four social competencies: social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability, and apparent sincerity (Ferris et al 2005). In an attempt to achieve support, a politically skilled individual always presents themselves and their work in the best possible light, and each of these four dimensions can be used to achieve that (Ferris et al., 2005). Political skill has been found to predict real-life electoral performance of political elites (Silvester et al., 2020) and some even argue that political skill is one of the most important competencies of leaders (Treadway et al., 2004). The link between political skill and high performance in the job seems to be driven by social effectiveness, that is, politically skilled individuals knowing what to do in different circumstances (Ferris et al., 2008). Underlining this, meta-analytic evidence (Bing et al., 2011) posits that political skill is more important for good performance in jobs with higher demands for social interactions, such as working as a politician.

The second variable of focus is integrity (Silvester et al., 2014). Integrity is the extent to which a politician is open and honest in their communication, avoids secrecy, deception or engaging in political blood-sports (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018). In this, we mean integrity in party interactions rather than electorate-facing ethics or morals. The effects of integrity on electoral performance have received only limited research attention, although Wyatt and Silvester (2018) found that ratings of integrity of local politicians', provided by party workers and colleagues, was associated with their electoral performance. Integrity, assessed via speech, seems to relate to longer tenure in politics (Mondak, 1995) and peer-rated integrity has been associated with resilience in a political role, while negatively predicting

Machiavellianism (Silvester et al., 2014). The opposite of integrity is politicking — a readiness to engage in secrecy, deception, and political blood-sport (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018).

In a community of likeminded and highly socialised group members, such as a political party, appearing genuine, sincere, and committed is key in gathering support and climbing the political ladder. Political skill (Ferris et al., 2005) and integrity (Silvester et al., 2014) both entail coming across as pro-social, benevolent and altruistic. Highly identified workers exhibit honesty and consideration when they interact with peers (Grice et al., 2006), which conveys an image of the highly identified worker as caring and thoughtful towards colleagues. A politically effective worker can therefore use their pro-social traits in attempting to attaining a work-related goal (Ahearn et al., 2004) and establish a positive reputation in the work place (Blickle, Schneider, et al., 2011). Relatedly, politically skilled individuals are described as being self-confident, rather than self-absorbed, and as such, showing an outward focus (Ferris et al., 2005), and concern for others in their organisation (Brouer et al., 2013). In accordance to this, one prior study distinguishing between partisan identification and partisan narcissism found partisan identification to relate to benevolent political will, a motivation to engage in politics for the common good (Cichocka et al., 2021). Overall, we expect identification to be linked with trust and a more balanced view on inter- and intragroup relations (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020), thus likely facilitating greater political skill and integrity among politicians high in partisan identification.

Contrarywise to partisan identification, we expected partisan narcissism to be negatively related to political effectiveness because individuals high in this belief may lack many of the pro-social, trustful, and benevolent elements accompanying partisan identification (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2021). For example, collective narcissism has exhibited positive relationships with individual narcissism and psychological entitlement (e.g., Golec

de Zavala et al., 2009). Indeed, one study connected partisan narcissism with a self-serving motivation to engage in politics and objectification of co-party members (Cichocka et al., 2021). The same research linked collective narcissism in organisations with "backstabbing" behaviour, such as telling on co-workers and keeping information secret (Cichocka et al 2021). Collective narcissism is also robustly related to suspicion and conspiratorial thinking (Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Sternisko et al., 2021). This orientation towards conflict and mistrust may lead those high in partisan narcissism to engage in politicking, the opposite of integrity, and thus prefer secrecy, deception, and blood-sport (Silvester et al., 2014). Such uncommunal tactics are unlikely to go unnoticed for long, likely resulting in the given politician becoming unpopular among colleagues, which may earn them a bad image and hinder effective influence attempts to appear sincere and genuine, often crucial to obtain political goals (Ferris et al., 2008; Treadway et al., 2004). Thus, partisan narcissism might be a worse predictor of political effectiveness.

4.2.3 Partisan Loyalty: Switching in the Past and Intentions to Leave in the Future

Ingroup loyalty is important for the betterment of political parties as any other social group. As has been demonstrated in other contexts, we expect partisan identification to predict to greater intentions to stay with the party in the future (Ellemers et al., 1997; Marchlewska et al., 2020; Randsley de Moura et al., 2009; Van Dick et al., 2004). Loyalty can be an effective persuasion tactic of its own, as research from political science suggests that it is appealing to voters (Folke & Rickne, 2020). Thus, we predicted those high in ingroup identification to be less likely to switch parties in the past or future.

Meanwhile, in the context of national ingroups, collective narcissism has been associated with greater readiness to leave one's homeland for personal gains (Marchlewska et al., 2020). This is likely because those high in collective narcissism care more about how the group benefits them or reflects on them, than being loyal to group members (Cichocka,

2016). How the ingroup reflects on the self may be especially relevant in the political party context. Public opinion is volatile, and decisions made by the party or issue positions taken can create unpopularity and dissatisfaction among the electorate, at least in the short term. Unlike other more fixed categories, political parties in a multi-party system are fluid and flexible, and switching political parties is not a rare occurrence. Leaving the party may therefore be "a way out" for those high in partisan narcissism to avoid ego-harm (Cichocka, 2016). We therefore expected partisan narcissism to be linked to intentions to leave the party in the future as well as having switched parties in the past.

4.2.4 Volunteering in Party Activities

In addition to possessing effective and committed politicians, it is important for the party that its candidates participate in everyday business of the grassroot. Prior research has linked national identification with volunteering effort without an expectation of renumeration (Lai et al., 2013) and organisational identification with going the extra mile in helping the organisation and their co-workers (Lee et al., 2015). Studies have repeatedly shown that highly identified workers cooperate more with colleagues (Bartel, 2001), and overall exhibit organisational citizenship behaviour (van Dick et al., 2006). This is possibly because self-interest and the organisation's interest are seen as synergetic (van Dick et al., 2006). In our study, we expected partisan identification to predict volunteering in party activities (Greene, 2004). While volunteering is a form of organisational citizenship behaviour, it can also be a tactic of its own. As alluded to earlier, being seen by co-partisans as selfless in allocating one's own free time for the betterment of the party may demonstrate a devotion to the party and help one in becoming an appealing candidate. A skilled political worker will be able to use the positive image gained from such behaviours to attain goals (Ferris et al., 2008). However, volunteering can be taxing and a "quick pay-off" for one's effort is not guaranteed. As those high in collective narcissism prefer short-term ego enhancement (Cislak et al., 2018;

Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022) and are more concerned with how the ingroup image reflects on themselves than with benefiting the ingroup (Cichocka, 2016), we expect those high in partisan narcissism to spend less time volunteering for the party.

4.2.5 The Present Study

We test our hypotheses in a sample of elite members of the Left-Greens, a left-wing political party in Iceland. The sample has a few advantages. First, responses were collected at the same time point among members of a single political party, meaning that factors such as ideology and norms are controlled for naturally. Second, our survey had a good response rate, with 59% of the total population of parliamentary and local candidates participating. We examine whether their partisan narcissism versus partisan identification predict 1) political effectiveness (measured as political skill and integrity), 2) partisan loyalty (measured as intentions to leave the party in the future and actual past party switching) and 3) volunteering in party activities. Hypotheses are outlined in Figure 4.1.

To control for the possible confounding effects of socialisation (see e.g., Van Knippenberg, 2000; Wegge et al., 2006), a separate set in analyses controls for tenure, that is years active in the party.

Figure 4.1

Schematic Outline of Partisan Narcissism and Identification Variables as Predictors of Political Effectiveness, Party Loyalty, and Volunteering



4.3 Study 7

4.3.1 Method

Participants and Recruitment. The study was conducted between November 2017 and February 2018 among the Left-Greens — a left-wing party that has led the current government coalition since 2017. The Icelandic voting system is based on party-list proportional representation. The Left-Greens' lists were accessed through the Ministry of the Interior's archives (www.kosning.is). We sought to contact all candidates (N=388) of the parliamentary elections of 2013, 2016, 2017, and municipal elections of 2014. By the time of data collection, 19 candidates had left the party and five had passed away; 67 candidates did not reply to two telephone calls, or their telephone numbers could not be found. Of the candidates contacted, 12 refused to participate, 285 agreed, and 245 started the online survey. In total, 31 participants (12.65%) were excluded from further analysis due to missing data (less than one full scale completed), leaving 214 participants (59% of the available population) in the final dataset. We aimed for a sample size of at least 173, which would provide 80% power to detect the typical effect size in social/personality psychology of r = .21 (Richard et al., 2003). This study was not preregistered.

All materials were in Icelandic, translated by one of the researchers and reviewed by professionals in survey designs. Mean age of participants was 48.53 years (SD = 13.91), and 53.66% were female, 45.85% male, and one participant (0.49%) identified as another gender. We used dummy variables in our analyses to account for the effects of different genders.

The data set has also been used in a separate paper (Cichocka et al., 2021), focusing on a different set of outcomes related to social rather than political functioning of party members. We were not able to make the data public due to privacy concerns, but for the

purpose of this thesis, all materials, data and codes are available here: https://osf.io/kw5um/?view_only=dbfe8ad638b64a7ab1c3c5517d5f5f8d

Measures. Answers for all scales ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Partisan Narcissism. Partisan narcissism was measured using the 9-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), e.g., "I insist upon the Left-Greens getting the respect they are due", $M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.96$, $\alpha = .81$.

Partisan Identification. Identification with the Left Greens was measured using the 12-item Social Identification Scale (Cameron, 2004). The scale was computed by combining the three subscales of the scale: ingroup ties (e.g., "I have a lot in common with other members of the Left-Greens), centrality (e.g., "I often think about the fact that I am a member of the Left-Greens"), and ingroup affect (e.g., "In general, I'm glad to be a member of the Left-Greens"), $M = 5.09$, $SD = 0.84$, $\alpha = .81$.

Political Skill. Political skill was measured with the Political Skill Inventory (Ferris et al., 2005). The inventory includes four subscales. The items were adapted to reflect the political nature of participants' work, as many will hold jobs outside of politics as well; for example: "I spend a lot of time and effort in my political work networking with others" (networking ability), "I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me" (interpersonal influence), "I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others" (social astuteness), and "It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do" (apparent sincerity). We computed the scales total score (18 items; $\alpha = .90$, $M = 5.11$, $SD = 0.77$). The results were similar when we analysed each subscale separately (see the Appendix C for details).

Integrity. Following Wyatt and Silvester (2018), we operationalised integrity by reverse coding the "politicking" scale from the Political Performance Questionnaire (Silvester

et al., 2014) which measures various aspects of competence in a political role (for other subscales of political performance, refer to Appendix C). Politicking was measured with items such as "Sometimes there is a need for secrecy when making decisions" (reversed, 5 items, $M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.27$, $\alpha = .76$).

Intentions to Leave the Party. Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the statement "I might leave from the Left-Greens sometime in the future", on a scale from 1 to 7 ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.99$).

Switching Parties. Participants were asked whether they had been members of a political party other than the Left-Green Movement since the party's foundation in 1999. A hundred fifty participants said no (73.53%, coded as 0) and 54 said yes (26.47%, coded as 1). Ten participants left this question blank.

Volunteering. Participants were asked how many hours they volunteered for the party under two circumstances, during election campaigns and outside of election campaigns. The two correlated moderately, $r(202) = .39$, $p < .001$. These two items were averaged to reflect a global score of volunteering ($M = 11.48$, $SD = 8.70$).

Tenure in the Party. Participants were asked which year they became members of the Left-Greens (1999 – 2017). This question was used to compute tenure in party, measured as years since joining. This variable is used as a control variable in supplementary regression analyses ($M = 11.87$, $SD = 6.17$).

4.3.1 Results

Correlations among continuous variables are displayed in Table 4.1. Partisan narcissism was positively associated with political skill, but negatively related to integrity and intentions to leave the party. Partisan identification was related positively to political skill and volunteering, but negatively related to intentions to leave the party. Note that while both partisan identification and partisan narcissism were negatively associated with intention to

leave the party and positively related to political skill, the effects for partisan identification were about twice as large as for partisan narcissism.

Table 4.1

Bivariate Correlations Among Continuous Variables (Study 7)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5
1. Partisan narcissism					
2. Partisan identification	.33***				
3. Political skill	.14*	.32***			
4. Integrity	-.22***	-.06	-.07		
5. Volunteering	.05	.20**	.33***	-.10	
6. Intention to leave party	-.19**	-.42***	-.16*	.07	-.15*

*p< .05. **p<.01. ***p< .001.

Partisan narcissism and partisan identification were entered simultaneously as predictors in separate regression models for each dependent variable with pairwise exclusions for missing data (see Table 4.2). Gender and age were also added as control variables[22]. We used dummy variables for female and non-binary gender with male gender as the reference category.

Partisan identification was a significant, positive predictor of political skill (β = .34, p <.001), whereas partisan narcissism was not a significant predictor (β = .04, p = .563). Partisan narcissism was a significant, negative predictor of integrity (β = -.18, p = .010), whereas partisan identification was not a significant predictor (β = .01, p = .928). Partisan

[22] Pattern of results remained the same without these control variables.

identification was a significant, positive predictor of volunteering[23] (β = .22, p = .004), whereas partisan narcissism was not a significant predictor (β = -.02, p = .763). Partisan identification was a significant, negative predictor of intentions to leave the party in the future (β = -.36, p < .001), whereas partisan narcissism was not a significant predictor (β = -.05, p = .455).

[23] The volunteering variable was highly skewed, with most participants reporting few hours. We therefore repeated our regression analysis with 5,000 bootstrap samples. Pattern of results remained the same.

Table 4.2

Regression Analyses with Partisan Identification Variables as Predictors of Outcome Variables (Study 7)

	Political Skill			Integrity			Volunteering			Intentions to Leave		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
Partisan narcissism	0.03	[-0.08,0.15]	.04	-0.24**	[-0.42,-0.06]	-.18	-0.20	[-1.54,1.13]	-.02	-0.10	[-0.38,0.17]	-.05
Partisan identification	0.31***	[0.18,0.44]	.34	0.01	[-0.20,0.22]	.01	2.27**	[0.72,3.82]	.22	-0.85***	[-1.17,-0.54]	-.36
Female (vs male)	0.03	[-0.18,0.23]	.02	0.81***	[0.47,1.15]	.32	-1.96	[-4.44,0.51]	-.11	0.01	[-0.49,0.52]	.003
Non-binary (vs male)	-0.31	[-1.76,1.15]	-.03	-0.60	[-2.97,1.77]	-.03	-8.68	[-25.96,8.59]	-.07	1.21	[-2.31,4.73]	.04
Age	-0.01*	[-0.02,-0.01]	-.16	-0.004	[-0.02,0.01]	-.04	-0.05	[-0.14,0.04]	-.08	-0.04***	[-0.06,-0.02]	-.26
F (*df*)	5.87 (5,194)***			7.39 (5,194)***			2.36 (5,192)*			12.69***		
R^2	.13			.16			.06			.25		

Note. CI = confidence interval. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

We then proceeded to examine past switching between political parties as an outcome of partisan narcissism and partisan identification in a logistic regression analysis[24] (Table 4.3). One point increase in partisan narcissism was associated with a 1.56 increase in the odds of having been a member of another party in the past (b = 0.45, p = .022). Social identification was not a significant predictor, although its direction was negative and marginally significant (OR= 0.67, b = -0.40, p = .060).

Table 4.3

Logistic Regression Analyses with Past Switching Between Political Parties as a Dependent Variable (Study 7)

Predictor	*b*	OR	95%CI
Partisan narcissism	0.45*	1.56	[1.07,2.29]
Partisan identification	-0.40	0.67	[0.44,1.02]
Female (vs male)	-0.39	0.68	[0.35,1.32]
Non-binary (vs male)	-20.72	0.00	[0.00,0.00]
Age	-0.02	0.98	[0.96,1.01]
χ^2 (*df*)	11.97 (5, N=197)*		
Nagelkerke R^2	.09		

Note. CI = confidence interval. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

[24] Using switching between parties as an outcome creates the temporal problem of predicting past behaviour from current levels of partisan narcissism. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, and for consistency with other analyses, we decided to include switching as an outcome variable rather than a predictor of current levels of partisan narcissism. However, regression analyses with partisan narcissism as an outcome yield similar results.

We repeated the above analyses with tenure as a control variable. We chose to include tenure in a separate set of analyses as this variable had a lot of missing data, mostly due to participants not being sure which exact year they joined the party. Regression analyses can be found in the Appendix C. The pattern of results remained the same for all dependent variables, except that partisan narcissism became a marginally significant predictor of switching political parties, possibly due to data attrition.

4.4 Chapter 4 General Discussion

We examined partisan narcissism and partisan identification as predictors of outcomes important for functioning of active partisans running as candidates for parliament and local offices. First, we found that partisan identification was related to higher political effectiveness, in that it predicted higher political skill, while partisan narcissism related with lower political effectiveness, in that it predicted lower integrity in one's political role. Second, we found evidence that these different types of identity differentially predicted measures of partisan loyalty, while partisan identification predicted lower willingness to leave the party in the future, partisan narcissism predicted membership in other political parties in the past. Last, although partisan narcissism was not related to time spent volunteering in party activities, partisan identification positively predicted such dedication. In sum, contrary to popular stereotypes (Arendt & Marquart, 2015), we found partisans that feel a part of their organisation and evaluate it positively (Leach et al., 2008; Tajfel, 1978) to exhibit higher skills related to their profession, and benevolent objectives, such as intending to stay with the party and volunteering in its activities. Meanwhile, partisan narcissism was associated with more malevolent behaviours stereotypical of politicians, that is low integrity and less-than-genuine attachment to the ingroup.

A large literature suggests that strong organisational identification can yield positive outcomes for the organisation and the individual worker (Riketta, 2005; Wegge et al., 2006),

whereas an emerging literature on collective narcissism in organisations suggest that the narcissistic component of identification has detrimental effects on work-related outcomes (Cichocka et al., 2021). Our study contributes towards an integration of these literatures in several ways. First, little research effort has been devoted to link organisational (or political party) identification with political behaviour in organisations, even though identification has been found to be a strong predictor of other work-related outcomes (Riketta, 2005). In particular, few studies to date have examined effectiveness of politicians as political workers, other than electoral performance (cf. Silvester et al., 2014; Silvester & Dykes, 2007). Second, although politicians seem to show different attachments to their parties, few studies to date have distinguished between collective narcissism and identification in the partisan context (cf., Bocian et al., 2021; Cichocka et al., 2021), Third, we rely on data from actual parliamentary and local candidates, not an "from a distance" assessment of the party completed by voters (Simonton, 1998).

4.4.1 Partisan Identity and Political Effectiveness

Politics is art of the possible, or so the saying goes. From our findings, it seems that partisan identification can potentially aid in mastering one's political skillset. Political skill is a political effectiveness construct entailing the ability to understand and influence others in order to enhance political objectives (Ahearn et al., 2004; Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). While political skill is as not inherently pro-social, it seems that having ties with the ingroup, evaluating it positively, and seeing it as central in one's self-image (Cameron, 2004) goes hand in hand with coming across as benevolent, genuine and portraying one's work in the most positive light (Treadway et al., 2004). Political skill is first and foremost an interpersonal skill entailing astutely and subtly influencing those around you, the ability to network with others at all levels of the organisation and knowing what to do in different interpersonal situations (Ferris et al., 2008). Such gestures likely yield a positive image

within the organisation (Blickle, Schneider, et al., 2011), facilitating networking and approachability, ultimately aiding in attainment of political goals. Social identification makes it easier to form bonds with other members of the group (Acar, 2014), perhaps a crucial element to be considered in the interpretation of the present findings. Overall, partisan identification in our sample seemed to be related to more "people skills" and "savviness", essential to climb the political ladder (Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). In other words, pro-organisational and benevolent behaviour can serve as an apparatus in the politically effective worker's toolbox.

Political cognition and political sense-making, that is how one interprets political events and makes attributes and decisions, may possibly be important mediators of the relationships we observed in this study (Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). Secure forms of ingroup identity, net of collective narcissism, have been associated with a more balanced view on intergroup relations and ingroup interests (e.g., Cislak et al., 2018; Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022), free of conspiratorial ideation (Cichocka et al., 2016), likely leading to more astute decision making among politicians high in partisan identification. Partisan identification may not predispose politicians to perceiving enemies and plots everywhere. Such a secure and confident mindset may facilitate coalition-building, reaching across the aisle to political opponents, within and outside the party. Indeed, in the national context, secure ingroup identity has been linked with support for democratic norms and principles, which necessitates putting trust in others (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022). In sum, ingroup ties, affect and centrality (Cameron, 2004; Cichocka, 2016) may be essential features in facilitating accurate political cognition. Having a secure relationship with the ingroup may ultimately aide one in achieving one's political goals.

In our study, partisan narcissism was unrelated to political skill, suggesting that it is at best unhelpful in achieving political goals. It was, however, negatively related to integrity in

one's political role. In other words, it predicted greater engagement in politicking behaviour, a readiness to engage in secrecy, deception, and political blood-sport (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018). This is in accordance with research linking collective narcissism to opposition to democratic principles (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022) as well as a willingness to conspire against one's ingroup members (Biddlestone et al., 2022). In the context of partisan narcissism specifically, the role of political cognition and subsequent decision making should be underlined (Silvester & Wyatt, 2018). The conflict orientation of partisan narcissism maybe due to distrust and attributing conspiratorial intentions to both political opponents and party comrades (Biddlestone et al., 2021; Cichocka, 2016). Such distrust can sabotage political effectiveness by inaccurately attributing sinister intentions to others, and suspicious interpretation of mundane political events. Furthermore, collective narcissism has been found to relate with counterproductive decision making in ingroup affairs. For example, partisan narcissism relates to bias in moral judgements about actions aimed to serve ingroup interest (Bocian et al., 2021). In the national context, collective narcissism is linked to support for policies that can harm the nation in the long run, a preference seemingly driven by the need to make the group appear strong and resistant to external pressures (Cislak et al., 2018; Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021; Gronfeldt, Cislak, Sternisko, et al., 2022).

Collective narcissism has also been linked with self-serving behaviour in organisations rather than a genuine motivation to benefit the ingroup (Cichocka et al., 2021). In the political party context, Cichocka and colleagues (2021, Study 3) found that partisan narcissism was related to having an instrumental view of co-party members, that is, using ingroup members as means to an end. This relationship was mediated by a self-serving motivation to engage in politics. Such behaviours are unlikely to go unnoticed for long and may ultimately generate a negative image, an important quality to have in order to persuade others (Ferris et al., 2008; Treadway et al., 2004). In this, collective narcissism resembles

individual narcissism, which tends to predict engagement in short-term self-aggrandising strategies, which harm social relationships in the long-term (Cichocka et al., 2021; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). Furthermore, recent research has linked collective narcissism with social cynicism, a negative view on human nature (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2022). A cynical mindset may allow those high in partisan narcissism to dismiss the effects of secrecy, deception and blood-sport on those around them, instead of working towards goals with interpersonal skills, such as coalition building, networking, and astutely influencing those around them (Ferris et al., 2008; Silvester & Wyatt, 2018).

4.4.2 The Good Comrade: Partisan Loyalty and Volunteering

Partisan identification predicted lower intentions to leave the party and more reported hours of volunteering for the party. This is consistent with research showing the benefits of organisational identification in the business context (see e.g., Abrams, Ando, & Hinkle, 1998; Riketta, 2005). Both variables can be viewed as important for the future health and functioning of an organisation. High levels of social identification may yield an intrinsic motivation to work hard in order to benefit one's organisation (Van Knippenberg, 2000) and stay with it (Ellemers et al., 1997). In the mind of highly identified members, self-interest and the organisation's interests may be seen as synergetic, meaning that loyalty and time spent volunteering benefits both oneself and the organisation, and no compensation is therefore required in return (van Dick et al., 2006). In any case, those high in partisan identification likely made the correct choice to stay with the party, as studies suggest that candidates who demonstrate party loyalty fare better in elections (Folke & Rickne, 2020).

Partisan narcissism was not related to intentions to leave the party or volunteering. The lack of a significant finding for intentions to leave may have been due to a lack of self-serving motive in the measure (i.e., we did not ask about monetary gain or ego enhancement). It may also have been due to social desirability, as being seen as disloyal may reflect poorly

on the self. However, membership in other parties in the past is more difficult to deny. Previous studies on national narcissism have found a link with intentions to leave if it were personally beneficial (Marchlewska et al., 2020), but never considered those group members who have already made the leap. One of the advantages of studying collective narcissism in an organisational setting is that it more easily allows for switching than national groups. Our study therefore adds to the literature suggesting that collective narcissism is associated with lower ingroup loyalty as this is the first study finding evidence for those high in collective narcissism "jumping" from group to group. This echoes with recent findings linking collective narcissism to seeking group membership to gain self-worth, recognition or prestige (Eker et al., 2022).

4.4.3 Strengths, Limitations and Future Research

Our sample is a primary strength of the current research. We contacted almost every candidate running in a given period, with a high response rate. The sample can be considered close to representative for the Left-Greens as it entails over half of the population (59%) of party members actively seeking office. It should be noted that the sample was recruited from a left-wing party, in a homogeneous country in Northern Europe. While we would expect the relationships exhibited here to generalise across different context, they could also be products of a cultural and political environment. Future studies should strive to examine partisan narcissism on the right-wing of the political spectrum, and in different cultural contexts.

Because the present sample comes from a single political party, we were able to hold factors such as political ideology and party norms constant in the analyses. Thus, our study offered a rare opportunity to get a "up-close" account of politicians' self-reported behaviours, rather than "at-a-distance" measures where voters, the public or experts draw inferences, as most previous studies have relied on (Simonton, 1998). However, it should be acknowledged that the role of ideology was not considered in this research, and it is an important topic for

future research. Ideally, this research should be replicated across the ideological spectrum. Partisan narcissism and partisan identification may differ in their manifestations according to what is desirable or undesirable in each ideological space. For example, it may be that the political effectiveness constructs examined here differ in their relative importance for the left and the right.

Our data was cross-sectional, so causality cannot be established. Although we considered partisan identification and narcissism as predictors, it is possible to speculate that political effectiveness builds identification with one's party. To disentangle these effects, future research should involve longitudinal studies. We also relied on-self report data, not *other*-rated skills and performance as some previous studies of effectiveness and performance (Ahearn et al., 2004; Silvester et al., 2014). Past work has shown positive associations between political skill, as assessed by co-workers, with actual performance in work setting (Blickle, Ferris, et al., 2011). Still, it would be useful for future research to get externally reported assessments of political effectiveness and link them with self-rated partisanship. It would also be fruitful for future research on politician's performance to examine more "hard" indicators of past performance. For example, politician's self-reported identification could be examined as a predictor of past/future success at the ballot box, legislation passed, disclosure of conflict of interests, tax records or annual reports, intraparty elections and so on.

Future studies should also investigate long-term performance outcomes. For example, it is uncertain how politicking works as a strategy. Even though it is reasonable to assume that it has negative social consequences, it is possible that over time this type of skill is more effective because those individuals are able to push things through, whereas politicians who do not engage in politicking may struggle to get their policies fulfilled (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018). For example, recent research has found factors of the "Dark Triad" to be associated with politicians' higher success at the ballot box (Blais et al., 2019) and higher levels of

political engagement among voters (Chen et al., 2021). In other words, it is possible politicking may increase chances of "getting things done" in the political arena due to a readiness to strongarm others when it is deemed justified. In the words of the infamous Frank Underwood, "the road to power is paved with hypocrisy and casualties."

Integrating more indicators of political effectiveness into the partisanship framework proposed in this paper would be fruitful for the literature. Future studies should investigate further how leaders' charisma (House et al., 1990) relates to their politicking behaviour and partisan narcissism. Intuatively, partisan narcissists may be charismatic especially in the beginning of their career and then fall into the self-defeating pattern individual narcissists do (Krizan & Herlache, 2018), or perhaps partisan narcissists' charisma, appeal or reach is limited only to strongly identified partisans.

Finally, our research contributed to the growing literature on collective narcissism. Past studies mostly focused on collective narcissism in the national context (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020), occasionally applying it to other groups, including gender (Górska et al., 2020) and business (Cichocka et al., 2021), religious (Marchlewska, Cichocka, et al., 2019) or extremist (Jasko et al., 2020) organisations. Here, we examine the role of collective narcissism within the political party context, which has been studied less frequently (but see Bocian et al., 2021; Cichocka et al., 2021). Given the conflict driven, and often hostile, inter-, and intragroup dynamics in politics, partisan narcissism seems to be an important factor to consider in future research on partisanship.

4.4.4 Conclusions

We found evidence linking partisan identification with higher political effectiveness, partisan loyalty, and volunteering among candidates for parliament and local office. Thus, it seems that those that identify with the group strive for authenticity and representation of diverse voices within the group, while avoiding conflict and decisiveness, even though it may

in some instances be a necessary facet of political life. Meanwhile, partisan narcissism was related to lower integrity in one's political role, a behaviour also known as "politicking". Therefore, partisan narcissism seems rather to be associated with more devious work habits that many find stereotypical of politicians. We also present novel evidence suggesting that those high in collective narcissism "jump" between groups, possibly to take advantage of acquiring a new, positive social identity for ego enhancement. Those narcissistically identified with such groups are also those who may undermine group integrity to attain their personal or group goals.

General Discussion

This thesis set out to examine the intragroup concomitants of collective narcissism, which have hitherto been understudied compared to its intergroup consequences (Cichocka, 2016). As reviewed in Chapter 1, theory holds that those high in collective narcissism are especially sensitive to intergroup comparisons and preoccupied with the ingroup's positive image. Therefore, the overarching expectation in the seven empirical studies reported was that those high in collective narcissism prioritised image concerns (Chapters 2 and 3) or callousness in relations within the group (Chapter 4) over the welfare of ingroup members.

Studies in Chapter 2 found that national narcissism related to willingness to sacrifice ingroup members to improve intergroup comparisons. Studies in Chapter 3 corroborated these findings by directly quantifying ingroup harm by revisiting the Tajfel matrices (Sidanius et al., 2007; Tajfel et al., 1971). Indeed, those high in national narcissism (and defensive national identity more broadly) chose to maximise the difference between groups, and thereby accepted harm to the ingroup to hurt an outgroup even more (Sidanius et al., 2007). Chapter 4 found that candidates high in partisan narcissism resolved to "politicking" in their political work, which entails a preference for secrecy, deception and blood-sport (Silvester et al., 2014). The findings from Chapter 4 indicate how image-management strategies revealed in Chapters 2 and 3 may be imposed on ingroup members. Overall, the research presented here suggests that those high in collective narcissism view the ingroup as a tool for group-based ego enhancement. In this general discussion, I will provide an overview of the results reported, their contribution to the wider literature, and recommendations for future research directions.

Contribution and Overview of Results

In theoretical Chapter 1, I reviewed research linking national narcissism with support for illiberal politics, and made a comparison with social dominance orientation (Pratto et al.,

1994), another important psychological determinant of illiberalism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). While both constructs predict support for illiberal political leaders and movements (Cislak et al., 2020; Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018), national narcissism is unique in its hypersensitivity to external threat, fixation on intergroup comparisons and demand for an impeccable ingroup image (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). This chronic need for positive intergroup comparisons (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013) seems to influence attitudes about ingroup affairs too. For example, even though national narcissism is robustly related to outgroup hostility (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016) and support for extreme outgroup violence (Cichocka, Bocian, et al., 2022), those high in national narcissism also support punitive policies towards their own ingroup members (Biddlestone et al., 2022). There are indications from recent studies that support for such hurtful policies may be driven by a motivation to assert the ingroup's image to outsiders (Cislak et al., 2018; Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021). Inspired by these findings, hypotheses were tested in realms of sacrificial attitudes (Chapter 2), counterproductive decision making (Chapter 3), and manipulative interpersonal relations within groups in terms of willingness to engage in political blood sport, deception, and secrecy (Chapter 4).

Chapter 2 established that national narcissism related with willingness to sacrifice ingroup members in the COVID-19 pandemic. Those high in national narcissism reported support for short-sighted measures to improve intergroup comparisons and preserve the country's reputation, such as refusing international cooperation (Study 1), reducing testing for COVID-19 (Study 2), and releasing an unapproved vaccine (Study 3). Similar to individual narcissists, those high in collective narcissism make short-sighted and egotistic decisions, that will end up reflecting negatively on the self in the long-run (Cichocka et al., 2021; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Vazire & Funder, 2006). However, the most important

contribution of Chapter 2 is that it directly demonstrated acceptance of ingroup harm. Previous studies had found that collective narcissism was related to support for policy proposals that could be potentially harmful for the ingroup, but the possibility remained that not everyone fully understood the long-term consequences of a decreased vaccination uptake (Cislak, Marchlewska, et al., 2021) or unsustainable exploitation of nature (Cislak et al., 2018). An important contribution of the present thesis is demonstrating that even though the possibility of ingroup harm was made explicit, those high in collective narcissism were still in favour of these image enhancing policies. This suggests that this process operates (at least in part) at a conscious state of awareness and those high in collective narcissism do understand the harm and risks involved.

In interpreting the findings reported in Chapter 2, it is important to underline that they pertain to sacrificial attitudes about *other* ingroup members, not *self*-sacrifice on behalf of the ingroup (Whitehouse, 2018a, 2018b). I make the theoretical argument that because of their entitlement (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and craving for external recognition (Cichocka, 2016), those high in collective narcissism do the exact opposite of *self*-sacrifice and prefer sacrificing *others* in the group, to acquire a temporary ego-boost based on an emboldened ingroup image. This view is supported by previous research showing that those high in collective narcissism view ingroup members as objects that can be exploited (Cichocka et al., 2021). Here, it is helpful to make a comparison with identity fusion, a visceral sense of "oneness" with the ingroup to the extent that borders between the personal and social selves diminish (Swann Jr. et al., 2012). Collective narcissism and identity fusion have similar outcomes on the intergroup level, such as extreme competitiveness and the feeling that the ingroup should win at any cost (Buhrmester et al., 2018; Keenan & Golec de Zavala, 2021). Meanwhile, identify fusion is related to personally costly *self*-sacrifice to benefit the group (Purzycki & Lang, 2019; Swann Jr. et al., 2014). These two forms of excessive ingroup

positivity therefore seem to have different consequences for intragroup relations in that identity fusion predicts *self*-sacrifice but collective narcissism predicts sacrifice of *others*.

Chapter 3 extended findings on ingroup sacrifice by revisiting the maximising the difference item from the Tajfel matrices (Bourhis et al., 1994; Tajfel et al., 1971). Inspired by research on allocation of social resources (Sidanius et al., 2007), we used this measure to directly quantify ingroup harm, in which preference for outgroup loss outweighs ingroup profit. Indeed, it was found that national narcissism predicted the preference for maximum difference in a vaccine allocation task (Study 4), which was replicated for defensive identity more broadly (including nationalism, Study 5). Study 6 provided causal evidence, as manipulating perceived long-term ingroup deprivation, a known predictor of national narcissism (Marchlewska et al., 2018), increased the preference for maximum difference. Importantly, Chapter 3 complements findings from Chapter 2 in that it studied decision-making rather than attitudes. Participants were asked to imagine what they would do if they were acting on behalf of their nation in negotiations about important social resources. Inflicting harm on the ingroup in this manner may be a way to "save face" in intergroup relations, in which a positive social comparison is prioritised over objectivity in decision-making.

The fourth and final empirical chapter of the thesis studied collective narcissism in a different context, namely in political parties. One of the benefits of studying collective narcissism in an applied setting is that it more easily allows for the examination of interpersonal relations (Cichocka et al., 2021). This research goes beyond the other studies in that it probed into reported past behaviour and interactions with others. Study 7 found that partisan narcissism negatively predicted integrity in one's political role — the extent to which a politician is open and honest in their communication, avoids secrecy, deception or engaging in political blood-sport (Wyatt & Silvester, 2018). In other words, those high in partisan

narcissism engaged in "politicking" behaviour, which has been associated with Machiavellianism (Silvester et al., 2014). Findings from Study 7 demonstrate what may happen when elements of secure identification (Cameron, 2004) are not present in one's attachment to the group: An ingroup member becomes someone that does not enjoy the protection of belonging to the same "sect", and can therefore be strongarmed or deceived to serve personal aims (Cichocka et al., 2021). Furthermore, those high in partisan narcissism were more likely to have belonged to other political parties in the past. This is complementary to past evidence showing that collective narcissism is associated with lower ingroup loyalty (Marchlewska et al., 2020). This finding lends support to the notion that the ingroup serves as a strong brand for those high in collective narcissism. "Jumping ship" may be a way to potentially go gain a positive social identity elsewhere (Ellemers et al., 1997; Marchlewska et al., 2020).

While the focus of the thesis was on collective narcissism, ingroup identification is also worthy of attention. As reviewed earlier, ingroup identification is the emotional significance attached to one's group membership (Leach et al., 2008; Tajfel, 1978), and after accounting for its overlap with collective narcissism, ingroup identification represents secure ingroup identity, an unpretentious investment in the ingroup, independent of external recognition (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska et al., 2020). In Chapters 2 and 3, secure national identity was unrelated to support for ingroup harm. However, Chapter 4 (Study 7) found that secure identity predicted constructive ingroup involvement (volunteering, loyalty) and thus contributes to a large literature emphasising the positive effects of organisational identification on work-related outcomes (see e.g., Lee et al., 2015; Riketta, 2005). This literature has, however, rarely discriminated between different forms of identity. The results of Study 7 further suggest that partisan identification can potentially help in mastering work-related competencies, here measured in terms of political

skill (Ferris et al., 2005). Indeed, people high in organisational identification are likely to come across as motivated to work in the organisation's interests, thereby earning colleagues' trust and gaining a positive reputation in the workplace, which are crucial factors in career progression (Treadway et al., 2004). Therefore, although that there are strong indications that secure identification is beneficial for the group as a whole (Thomas et al., 2019), it can also be beneficial for oneself.

Recommendations for Future Research

In the *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness,* in which some of the first notions of "group narcissism" were made, Fromm (1973) noted that aggression does not merely arise between unfamiliar outgroups, but within groups too: "It is notorious that no war between countries elicits as much hate and cruelty as civil war, in which there is no lack of acquaintance between the two warring sides" (p. 57). Indeed, the research presented in this thesis suggest that a strive for group-based ego enhancement in collective narcissism can facilitate mutual hostilities within social groups. However, other explanations have been proposed. In line with Fromm's reasoning, proximity to fellow ingroup members may be an enabling factor of exploitation. For example, collective narcissism is related more strongly with objectification of ingroup members than outgroup members (Cichocka et al., 2021). Possibly, because they know their ingroup well, but do not feel genuinely attached to it, those high in collective narcissism are able to use this proximity and knowledge about ingroup members to exploit or dismiss them for egotistical gains (Cichocka et al., 2021). However, there are likely more causes of problematic ingroup relations than opportunism. Recent research has found that those high in collective narcissism report more willingness to conspire against ingroup members perceived to be typical rather than non-typical of the ingroup (Biddlestone et al., 2022). This opens the possibility that one driver of ingroup harm among those high in collective narcissism is attribution of sinister intentions to ingroup

members, and because of this lack of trust, the most typical ingroup members are also perceived as the ones most capable to conspire against the self (Biddlestone et al., 2022).

Each of these potential motivators (group-based ego enhancement, proximity, attribution of sinister intentions) are possible and have empirical support, but future research should strive to gain a more overarching explanation of the ambivalent relationship those high in collective narcissism have with their ingroup and its members. In this effort, a deeper understanding of the roots of collective narcissism is necessary. As reviewed in the introduction, collective narcissism is thought to stem from frustration of individual needs (Cichocka, 2016), such as low personal control (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018) and lack of self-worth (Golec de Zavala et al., 2020; but see Cichocka, Sengupta, et al., 2022). Group and individual relative deprivation may also be contributing factors (Golec de Zavala et al., 2021; Marchlewska et al., 2018). Perceived exclusion by outgroups may also increase collective narcissism (Cichocka, Sengupta, et al., 2022; Hase et al., 2021). These experiences entail a failure to attain something that is important for an integral sense of self, so it is conceivable that they can all be captured by the concept of ressentiment (Salmela & Capelos, 2021).

Ressentiment is a complex emotion elicited by negative feelings such as envy, shame and anger resulting from social comparisons. In ressentiment, these feelings remain repressed due to the persons inability to express them (Capelos & Demertzis, 2022; Demertzis et al., 2022). It is an affective compensation for life's failures, experienced by those who feel powerless, victimised, and left behind. Ressentiment has recently been proposed as an emotional mechanism generating and sustaining collective narcissism (Capelos, 2022), which resonates with Adorno's classic notion that "weak egos… require the compensation of identifying themselves with… great collectives" (Adorno, 1963, p. 94) and Fromm's (1973,

p. 217) argument that collective narcissism arises from the powerlessness and misery felt by the deprived in society.

A core element in ressentiment is the bitter parallel transvaluation of 1) an identity that was once desired to something rotten and unwanted, and 2) the self from being inferior to being superior (Salmela & Capelos, 2021). Is it possible that the ingroup undergoes a transvaluation in ressentiment and its expression is the ambivalent, shallow, and superficial ingroup relations we see in collective narcissism? Those high in collective narcissism crave an impeccable image of a glorious ingroup, but such overreliance on external validation is guaranteed to fail (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). In ressentiment, failure to generate a wanted identity results in a feeling of shame. The feeling is repressed but persists unconsciously, and leads to an intense antipathy or an intense preoccupation with the unattainable identity (Salmela & Capelos, 2021). Speculatively, shame accompanied by repeated failed attempts to reach the desired glorious ingroup image may lead to the devaluation of fellow ingroup members, while the self is protected by holding a victimhood position (Salmela & Capelos, 2021). Indeed, there is empirical evidence that those high in collective narcissism both strongly resent their ingroup members[25] (Gronfeldt, Cislak, Winiewski, et al., 2022) and also bask in the ingroup's suffering and martyrdom (Forgas & Lantos, 2019; Skarżyńska & Przybyła, 2015). Such forms of ingroup glorification can be used to overcome low self-worth

[25] To illustrate this point, in preliminary data not reported in this thesis, collective narcissism predicts blatant dehumanisation of one's ingroup, that is thinking the ingroup is not fully human but closer to lower animals (Gronfeldt, Cislak, Winiewski, et al., 2022). Dehumanisation captures intense distain and hate, traditionally applied in research on extreme outgroup prejudice (Kteily et al., 2015).

and establish a morally superior sense of victimhood (Kazlauskaitė, 2022; Salmela & Capelos, 2021).

Ressentiment has a rich history in philosophy and psychoanalytic thinking (e.g., Nietzsche, 1885/1961; Scheler, 1915/1961, as cited in Samela & Capelos, 2021), but has recently been empirically validated and a scale designed to measure it among individuals (Demertzis et al., 2022). Future studies should further investigate ressentiment as a precursor and a reinforcer of collective narcissism. Ressentiment may be especially informative in explaining "shallow" and hubristic ingroup relations associated with collective narcissism in this thesis.

Finally, reducing negative social consequences of collective narcissism remains a compelling topic for future research. At least two approaches are conceivable, 1) directly targeting the roots of collective narcissism, or 2) attenuating its negative interpersonal and intergroup consequences (i.e., the defensive response). Focusing first on 1), theory holds that deep-rooted feelings of frustration underlie collective narcissism (Cichocka, 2016; see also Fromm, 1973). Alleviating the underlying frustration is theoretically possible, and has been demonstrated experimentally by restoring sense of personal control over one's life, which decreased collective narcissism and increased ingroup identification (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018). Recent theorisation on ressentiment has also brought attention to the poor social and economic conditions under which collective narcissism can develop (Salmela & Capelos, 2021; see also Demertzis et al., 2022). Corroborating this view, national narcissism is higher in countries that are less globalised, especially in terms of their economies and political systems (Cichocka, Sengupta, et al., 2022). Furthermore, Fromm (1973, p. 217) argued that to reduce collective narcissism, the "misery, monotony, dullness, and powerlessness that exist in large sectors of the population would have to be eliminated", which would only be achieved with "drastic changes in the social organisation". Deducting

from this logic, it may be difficult to imagine a large-scale social intervention to reduce collective narcissism without significantly improved living conditions. However, it should inspire future studies to revisit the personal control hypothesis (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018) and expand it by investigating how economic and social circumstances affect people's sense of control over one's life as a basis for collective narcissism.

Due to the entrenched and somewhat impermeable nature of collective narcissism, researchers have turned to 2), manipulating its defensive response specifically. For example, perceived ingroup criticism or insults accelerate outgroup hostility among those high in collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). Less work has been devoted to attenuating the defensive response. Emotional regulation has been proposed as a potential buffer to the harmful consequences of collective narcissism due to its associations with negative emotionality and hyperbolic reactions to negative events regarding the ingroup (Golec de Zavala, 2019; Golec de Zavala et al., 2020). However, Hase and colleagues (2021) found that among those high in collective narcissism, a short mindfulness intervention increased emotional arousal in an intergroup exclusion paradigm. In other words, asking those high in collective narcissism to observe their thoughts and emotions *increased* the defensive response. Interventions that are typically beneficial for the general population may therefore be ineffective for those high in collective narcissism. While these findings are somewhat discouraging, it is worthwhile for researchers to devote more resources to attenuate the defensive response those high in collective narcissism exhibit. For example, increasing social connectedness (Golec de Zavala, 2019) may possibly reduce the effect of collective narcissism on objectification of ingroup members (Cichocka et al., 2021). Researchers have also highlighted the roles of gratitude and compassion (Golec de Zavala, 2019), which may possibly reduce the chronic need for intergroup comparisons (Cichocka, 2016).

Limitations

The research presented in this thesis is not without limitations. Ideally, I would have liked to provide more causal evidence. In Chapter 2, Study 1 was correlational in nature so in Studies 2 and 3, I attempted to manipulate collective narcissism's defensive response by testing if outgroup comparison (vs no comparison) would accelerate the effects of national narcissism on ingroup sacrifice. This failed in both studies, meaning that essentially Chapter 2 only entails correlational evidence. More broadly speaking, establishing causality remains a problem for collective narcissism research because there is still no robust method of manipulating it directly (cf. Marchlewska et al., 2018). This is why, in Chapter 2, I followed the example of some researchers that have resolved this problem by manipulating the defensive response specifically (cf. Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013). Other researchers have managed to manipulate collective narcissism with long-term relative deprivation (cf. Marchlewska et al., 2018), which did indeed increase the preference for maximising the difference in Study 6, Chapter 3. However, the shortcoming of this intervention is that it is context-specific to UK-EU relations. As mentioned earlier, more effort should be devoted to designing a manipulation of collective narcissism to aid experimental research.

Another limitation of this thesis that the measures used largely fail to capture real life behaviour. Some attempts were made, but they have shortcomings. Chapter 3 used the Tajfel matrices, which are decision making tasks that can to an extent be viewed as proxies for real life behaviour, but they lack ecological validity. Chapter 4 relied on self-report measures of how one interacts with colleagues, but the possible effect of social desirability limits the generalisability of these findings (and they cannot establish causality). The measures used were also specific to a certain profession (i.e., politics). Future research should strive to probe more deeply into how collective narcissism shapes social life within groups by using diverse

methods. For example, longitudinal studies using random intercept cross-lagged panel models (Cichocka et al., 2019; Hamaker et al., 2015) could be useful to examine if organisational narcissism causes unconstructive or hostile behaviour, assessed via self-report or externally rated by colleagues (cf. Cichocka et al., 2021). Moreover, social network analysis (see Bracegirdle et al., 2022) could be a fruitful approach to study organisational narcissism and intragroup relations. Based on the finding in Chapter 4 that partisan narcissism predicted politicking behaviour, I speculated that such conduct could potentially lead to unpopularity and loss of reputation within the organisation. Social network analysis could reveal where those high in collective narcissism "really stand" within their ingroup by mapping frequency and quality of contact with other ingroup members. Indeed, if it turns out that those high in collective narcissism "cluster" together and remain relatively isolated from the group at large, social network analysis could corroborate theorisation claiming that ressentimentful individuals validate their "improved new selves" through shallow social sharing with like-minded peers (Salmela & Capelos, 2021).

Conclusion

Collective narcissism may have some destructive social consequences. Those high in collective narcissism lack psychological ties to the group and positive emotional valence attached to it (Cichocka, 2016), likely leading to them feeling like they have no particular duties to their fellow citizens (Marchlewska et al., 2020). In the studies presented in this thesis, this was evident in willingness to sacrifice fellow ingroup members, forgoing important social resources, and a preference to interact with ingroup members with force, deception, and conflict. Collective narcissism reflects a dark side of social identification. Rather than seeing the ingroup as a valued and precious part of one's identity that should be protected and cared for, in collective narcissism the group is in service to the self. The group becomes a source of group-based ego enhancement, a short-lasting comfort needing constant

reinforcement with no concern for the consequences for one's fellow ingroup members. Indeed, with friends like these, who needs enemies?

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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTS

Study 1 Supplement

Ethnicity and Racial Groups

When broken down by ethnicity and racial groups, Study 1 had 277 White participants, 3 were Mixed, one was Asian or Asian British, one was Black or Black British, nine reported their ethnicity was "other" and seven said they preferred not to say. Therefore, our sample was 93% White. Due to this imbalance, further analysis of ethnicity was not feasible.

Resistance to the EU

The survey included various items measuring resistance or scepticism towards the European Union. In addition to the group reputation concern item in main manuscript, "The UK's reputation in the world would have been damaged by participating in the EU scheme" we also included the following items: "The UK would have looked weak in the eyes of the world had it participated in the EU scheme"; "Refusing to participate in the EU scheme shows the world that the UK doesn't need the EU"; "Refusing to participate in the scheme sends a clear message to the EU"; "The UK can manage by itself, we don't need the EU's help." We averaged these items tapping into an index of resistance to the EU. After adjusting for ideology and satisfaction with Boris Johnson, national narcissism predicted resistance to the EU (β = .41, b = 0.48 [95%CI 0.36, 0.60], p < .001), but national identification did not (β = -.04, b = -0.03 [95%CI -0.17, 0.08], p = .532).

Ideology

Right-wing ideology was included in the main analyses for Study 1, so refer to main manuscript for correlations. To examine the effect of ideological extremity, we conducted a square transformation of the original mean centred ideology variable (i.e., quadratic effect). We repeated the analyses in Table 2 by adding ideological extremity as a predictor to examine if the quadratic effect predicted the outcome over and above linear effects of ideology. The effect of ideology remained similar, but ideological extremity did not have an effect on any of the dependent variables (Table A1).

We examined the possible interactions of right-wing ideology and national narcissism (Table A2). There was no significant interaction for support for opting out of the EU scheme ($\beta = .04$, $p = .10$). However, there was a significant interaction of right-wing ideology and national narcissism on ingroup sacrifice ($\beta = .30$, $p = .006$). The relationship was stronger among participants on the right ($\beta = .40$, $p < .001$) than on the left ($\beta = .25$, $p = .003$). There was also a significant interaction of right-wing ideology and national narcissism on group reputation concern ($\beta = .36$, $p = .002$). The relationship was stronger among participants on the right ($\beta = .32$, $p<.001$) than on the left ($\beta = .14$, $p = .11$).

Table A1

Regression Analysis of Support for Opting out of the EU Scheme, In-group Sacrifice and Group Reputation Concern, With Ideological Extremism as Additional Predictor (Study 1)

	DV: Opting out of EU scheme			DV: Sacrifice of In-group members			DV: Group Reputation Concern		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.29***	[0.13,0.45]	.19	0.38***	[0.21,0.54]	.30	0.48***	[0.32,0.63]	.38
National identification	0.15	[-0.02,0.32]	.09	-0.09	[-0.26,0.08]	-.06	-0.15	[-0.31,0.02]	-.11
Satisfaction with Johnson	0.28***	[0.21,0.34]	.50	0.13***	[0.06,0.19]	.27	0.14***	[0.08,0.20]	.30
Right-wing Ideology	0.04	[-0.05,0.14]	.05	0.11*	[0.02,0.20]	.14	0.11*	[0.02,0.19]	.14
Ideological Extremism	0.01	[-0.01,0.04]	.04	0.01	[-0.02,0.04]	.04	0.01	[-0.02,0.03]	.02
F (df)	70.37 (5,287)***			30.87(5,287)***			41.84(5,286)***		
R^2	.55			.35			.42		

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table A2

Regression Analysis of Support for Opting out of the EU Scheme, In-group Sacrifice and Group Reputation Concern, Including The Interaction of National Narcissism and Right-wing Ideology (Study 1)

	DV: Opting out of EU scheme			DV: Sacrifice of In-group members			DV: Group Reputation Concern		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.25**	[0.08,0.42]	.17	0.40***	[0.24,0.56]	.32	0.29***	[0.12,0.46]	.23
National identification	0.16	[-0.01,0.33]	.10	-0.13	[-0.29,0.03]	-.09	-0.07	[-0.24,0.10]	-.05
Satisfaction with Johnson	0.28***	[0.22,0.34]	.50	0.14***	[0.08,0.20]	.29	0.12***	[0.06,0.19]	.26
Right-wing Ideology	-0.06	[-0.22,0.10]	-.07	-0.07	[-0.22,0.08]	-.09	-0.10	[-0.26,0.06]	-.13
Right-wing ideology × National narcissism	0.04	[-0.01,0.09]	.16	0.07**	[0.02,0.11]	.30	0.08**	[0.03,0.13]	.36
F (df)		71.31(5,287)***			44.48(5,286)***			33.77(5,287)***	
R^2		.55			.44			.37	

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Study 2 Supplement

Ethnicity and Racial Groups

When broken down by ethnicity and racial groups, 261 of our participants were White, 50 Black or African American, 28 Asian or Asian American, 19 Hispanic or Latino Americans (of any race), 5 were Native Americans and Alaska Natives, 3 were Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders, 13 chose "Other" and 2 chose "Prefer not to say". We computed dummy variables to reflect this, but due to small group sizes, we grouped Native Americans and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders together (n=8). Those who selected "Other" and "Prefer not to say" were group together (n=8).

We then entered these variables as predictors in the same moderation analysis as reported in Study 2, with negative testing attitudes as the dependent variable and continuous predictors mean-centred (see Table A3, Step 1). White race was the reference category. Compared to White participants, Black or African American participants were more likely to report negative testing attitudes ($\beta = .12$, $p = .004$), but there were no other significant effects of racial groups/ethnicity. In Step 2, we examined the interaction of national narcissism and racial groups/ethnicity, for groups with more than 15 participants (that is, Black or African American, Asian or Asian American, Hispanic or Latino Americans). We found no significant interaction effects.

Table A3

Regression Analyses with Negative Testing Attitudes, Including Racial Groups/Ethnicities as Predictors (Study 2)

Step 1 (Main effects of predictors used in main analyses and ethnicity)			
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.09***	[0.05,0.14]	.24
National identification	-0.01	[-0.06,0.03]	-.03
Satisfaction with President Trump	.10***	[0.08,0.12]	.45
Hispanic[a]	-0.12	[-0.39,0.15]	-.04
Black[b]	0.26**	[0.08,0.43]	.12
Asian[c]	-0.13	[-0.36,0.10]	-.04
Native[d]	0.03	[-0.38,0.44]	.01
Other racial group/ethnicity	0.04	[-0.26,0.34]	.01
Condition	-0.07*	[-0.13,-0.01]	-.09
F (df)		31.51(9,371)***	
R^2		.42	
Step 2 (interactions between national narcissism and racial groups/ethnicity)			
NN × Condition	-0.03*	[-0.07,-0.002]	-0.09
NN × Hispanic[a]	-0.05	[-0.21,0.11]	-0.03
NN × Black[b]	0.07	[-0.02,0.16]	0.06
NN × Asian[c]	-0.09	[-0.30,0.12]	-0.05
F (df)		22.57(13,367)***	
R^2		.43	

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$. NN = National narcissism.

[a] Hispanic or Latino American (vs. White). [b] Black or African American (vs. White). [c] Asian or Asian American (vs. White). [d] Native Americans and Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders (vs. White).

Ideology

Ideology was not included in the pre-registered analyses in the main manuscript, so we include correlations of ideology and other study variables in Table A4. It exhibited positive strong or moderate correlations with all study variables. Most notably, it correlated with negative testing attitudes.

Table A4

Zero-order Correlations Among Study 2 Variables, Including Ideology (Study 2)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5
1. National narcissism					
2. National identification	.40***				
3. Negative testing attitudes	.55***	.22***			
4. Group reputation concern	.32***	.13*	.31***		
5. Satisfaction with President Trump	.71***	.33***	.62***	.29***	
6. Right-wing ideology	.42***	.25***	.39***	.18***	.58***

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

We repeated the regression analysis of Study 2, but including ideology and ideological extremity as predictors (same methodology as described in the Study 1 Supplement). Interestingly, when entered along with ideological extremity, ideology was not a significant predictor of negative testing attitudes ($\beta = .09$, $p = .079$). Ideological extremity was, however, a significant negative predictor ($\beta = -.13$, $p = .004$), indicating that moderate

participants had more negative testing attitudes than those on the ideological extremes (Table A5).

Table A5

Regression Analyses with Negative Testing Attitudes as the Dependent Variable, Including Ideology Variables as Predictors (Study 2)

Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.11***	[0.06,0.15]	.27
National identification	-0.02	[-0.07,0.02]	-.04
Satisfaction with President Trump	0.10***	[0.07,0.12]	.44
Right-wing ideology	0.02	[-0.003,0.05]	.09
Ideological Extremism	-0.01**	[-0.02,-0.003]	-.13
Condition	-0.05	[-0.11,0.01]	-.07
Condition × National narcissism	0.03	[-0.06,0.003]	.07
F (df)		41.55(7,373)***	
R^2		.44	

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Finally, we examined whether there was an interaction between national narcissism and right-wing ideology (Table A6). The interaction was not significant (β = -.21, $p = .13$).

Table A6

Regression Analyses with Negative Testing Attitudes as the Dependent Variable, Including the Interaction of National Narcissism and Right-wing Ideology (Study 2)

Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.15***	[0.08,0.22]	.37
National identification	-0.02	[-0.07,0.02]	-.05
Satisfaction with President Trump	0.09***	[0.07,0.12]	.42
Right-wing ideology	0.05	[-0.004,0.10]	.18
Condition	-0.06*	[-0.12,-0.003]	-.08
Condition × National narcissism	-0.03*	[-0.06,-0.001]	.08
National narcissism × Right-wing ideology	-0.01	[-0.02,0.002]	-.21
F (df)		40.02(7,373)***	
R^2		.43	

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Study 3 Supplement

Ethnicity and Racial Groups

When broken down by ethnicity, 251 participants were White, 46 were Asian, 38 were Hispanic or Latino Americans (of any race), 20 were Black or African American, 4 Native Americans and Alaska Natives, nine said "Other" and two preferred not to say. We coded dummy variables in accordance with the categorisation described in Study 2 Supplement. We then conducted a similar regression model as in Study 2 Supplement, where we add racial/ethnicity dummy variables as predictors (Table A7). Compared to White participants, Native Americans and Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific

Islanders were more likely to support rushing the vaccine development (β = .09, *p* = .039). No other significant differences were observed.

Again, we checked for interaction effects for national narcissism and racial groups/ethnicities with 15 or more participants. There was no significant interaction effect for Asian participants (β = .04, *p* = .46, Step 2) nor Black or African American participants (β = -.09, *p* = .068, Step 2). However, the interaction was significant for Hispanic or Latino American participants (β = -.13, *p* = .004, Step 2). We then dissected the interaction effect. While the relationship between national narcissism and support for rushing the vaccine was positive and significant among White participants (β = .47, *b* = 0.42, 95%CI [0.31, 0.52], *p* < .001), it was not among Hispanics or Latino American participants (β = .11, *b* = 0.10, 95%CI [-0.15, 0.35], *p* = .44).

Table A7

Regression Analyses with Support for Rushing the Vaccine, Including Racial Groups/Ethnicities as Predictors (Study 3)

Step 1 (Main effects of predictors used in main analyses and racial groups/ethnicity)			
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.39***	[0.29.0.49]	.44
National identification	-0.08	[-0.16,0.004]	-.09
Satisfaction with President Trump	.09***	[0.05,0.14]	.26
General vaccine support	.21***	[0.11,0.30]	.20
Hispanic[a]	-0.12	[-0.47,0.24]	-.03
Black[b]	0.19	[-0.29,0.67]	.03
Asian[c]	0.08	[-0.25,0.40]	.02
Native[d]	1.08*	[0.06,2.10]	.09
Other racial group/ethnicity	-0.03	[-0.65,0.59]	-.004

Condition	-0.18***	[-0.29,-0.08]	-.15
F (df)		17.26(10,359)***	
R^2		.33	
Step 2 (interactions between national narcissism and racial groups/ethnicity)			
NN × Condition	0.00	[-0.07,0.08]	.00
NN × Hispanic[a]	-0.38**	[-0.65,-0.12]	-.13
NN × Black[b]	-0.28	[-0.59,0.02]	-.09
NN × Asian[c]	-0.11	[-0.39,0.18]	-.04
F (df)		13.34(14,355)***	
R^2		.35	

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$. NN = National narcissism.

[a] Hispanic or Latino American (vs. White). [b] Black or African American (vs. White). [c] Asian or Asian American (vs. White). [d] Native Americans and Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders (vs. White).

Ideology

Correlations of ideology with other Study 3 variables are shown in Table A8. Ideology and support for rushing vaccine development correlated moderately.

Table A8

Zero-order Correlations Among Study 3 Variables, Including Ideology (Study 3)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5
1. National narcissism					
2. National identification	.44***				
3. Support for rushing the vaccine	.49***	.18***			
4. Satisfaction with President Trump	.60***	.34***	.41***		
5. Group reputation concern	.40***	.16**	.49***	.30***	
6. Right-wing ideology	59***	.36***	.40***	.75***	.34***

Note. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

We added ideology and ideological extremity as predictors to the same interaction analysis as in Study 3 in the main manuscript (Table A9). Ideology had a marginally significant positive effect (β = .14, $p = .053$), but ideological extremity did not have an effect (β = .02, $p = .70$).

Table A9

Interaction Analysis with Support for Rushing the Vaccine as the Dependent Variable, Including Ideology Variables as Predictors (Study 3)

Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.37***	[0.26,0.47]	.41
National identification	-0.08*	[-0.17,-0.001]	-.10
Satisfaction with President Trump	0.06*	[0.01,0.11]	.16
General vaccine support	0.20***	[0.10,0.29]	.19
Condition	-0.25*	[-0.48,-0.01]	-.20
Condition × National narcissism	0.02	[-0.05,0.10]	.06

Right-wing ideology	0.06	[-0.001,0.12]	.14
Ideological Extremism	0.002	[-0.01,0.02]	.02
F (df)		21.47(8,361)***	
R^2		.32	

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Finally, we examined the possible interaction between national narcissism and right-wing ideology (Table A10). The interaction was significant (β=.10, p=.034). The effect was stronger for participants on the right (β = .44, $p < .001$) than on the left (β = .25, $p = .008$).

Table A10

Regression Analysis with Support for Rushing the Vaccine as the Dependent Variable, Including the Interaction between National Narcissism and Right-wing Ideology (Study 3)

Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β
National narcissism	0.34***	[0.23,0.44]	.38
National identification	-0.07	[-0.16,0.01]	-.09
Satisfaction with President Trump	0.06*	[0.01,0.11]	.16
General vaccine support	0.18***	[0.09,0.28]	.18
Condition	-0.24*	[-0.47,-0.01]	-.20
Condition × National narcissism	0.02	[-0.05,0.10]	.06
Right-wing ideology	0.06	[-0.002,0.12]	.13
National narcissism × Right-wing ideology	0.03*	[0.002,0.05]	.10
F (df)		22.28(8,361)***	
R^2		.33	

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Counterbalancing of National Narcissism and Identification Variables

Participants who completed the national identification scale before the national narcissism scale reported higher levels of national identification (M=6.00, SD=1.30), than those who completed it after (M=5.45, SD=1.54). An independent samples t-test suggested that the difference was significant ($t(382)=3.77$, $p < .001$). This did not affect the results of the subsequent regression analyses.

A Note on Single-Item Measures

Ingroup Sacrifice

Ingroup sacrifice was operationalised in each study depending on the situation of the pandemic at each given time. The circumstances in which these studies were conducted were time sensitive, and it was important to be quick while these issues were politically relevant. In Study 1, ingroup sacrifice was measured with a single item. Study 1 was an exploratory study conducted in the turbulent first weeks of the pandemic in early spring of 2021. We relied on a multi-item measures in Study 2 (in which we operationalised in-group sacrifice as negativity towards testing for COVID-19 measured with five items) and Study 3 (in which we operationalised ingroup sacrifice as rushing the vaccine development, measured with three items; see online Materials). These measures had a high face validity. Note also that ingroup sacrifice and national narcissism had similar correlations across studies (Study 1 r=.59, p<.001, Study 2 r=.55, p<.001, Study 3 r=.49, p<.001).

Group Reputation Concern

We captured group reputation concern with a face valid single items in all studies. These measures showed similar relationships with other study variables (r's with national narcissism, Study 1 $r = .53$, $p < .001$, Study 2 $r = .32$, $p < .001$, Study 3 $r = .40$, $p < .001$).

APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 3 SUPPLEMENTS

Study 4 Supplementary Materials

Tajfel Matrices Instructions

As you may already know, the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca will soon be releasing its COVID-19 vaccine (developed together with the University of Oxford), to the world's population. **Now, in this exercise, we would like you to imagine that you could decide on how to divide the vaccine between the United Kingdom and the European Union.** International agreements on medical equipment and pharmaceuticals are complicated, and decisions are made on scenarios designed up by experts and bureaucrats. Here, we want to know how you would make such decisions. Below are six scenarios of how the vaccine could be distributed between the UK and the EU next month (numbers represent millions of doses of the vaccine). We want to know which option in each scenario you think should be chosen.

You are not a part of a negotiation team; you do not need to consider whether the other side (the EU) would agree. We only want to know which possibility should be chosen according to you. Please note that each number represents millions of doses of vaccines.

Supplementary Analysis Controlling for Understanding of Tajfel Matrices Task

As a robustness check, we controlled for levels of understanding (yes vs unsure). Controlling for understanding did not affect the pattern of results (see Table B1).

Table B1

Structural Equation Model Analyses with Maximum Difference as the Dependent Variable, Controlling for Understanding of Tajfel Matrices Task (Study 4)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
National narcissism	0.57	[0.10,1.04]	.18	.017
National identification	-0.02	[-0.70,0.64]	-.004	.97
Understanding[1]	0.48	[-0.51,1.47]	.05	.34
R^2		.04		

Note. [1]Coded yes=1 and unsure=2. CI = confidence interval. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(171)=433.295$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df=3.03$, *CFI* = .935, *RMSEA* = 0.068 [0.06, 0.075], *SRMR* = 0.059.

Structural Equation Model Analyses with Demographic Variables

The structural equation model in Study 4, with demographics as controls, is presented in Table B2. National narcissism remained a significant, positive predictor of the tendency to maximise the difference. Female participants reported higher tendency to maximise the difference than male participants, and education negatively predicted the tendency to maximise the difference.

Table B2

Structural Equation Model Analyses, Including Demographic Variables, with Maximum Difference as the Dependent Variable (Study 4)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
National narcissism	0.52	[0.05,0.98]	.17	.030
National identification	-0.12	[-0.77,0.54]	-.03	.729
Female gender (vs Male gender)	1.56	[0.83,2.30]	.20	<.001
Non-binary (vs Male gender)	0.18	[-2.82,3.19]	.01	.905

Age	0.01	[-0.02,0.03]	.02	.748
Mixed ethnicity (vs White)	-1.51	[-3.42,0.40]	-.07	.122
Asian ethnicity (vs White)	-0.08	[-1.75,1.60]	-.004	.929
Black ethnicity (vs White)	0.53	[-2.14,3.20]	.02	.698
Arab ethnicity (vs White)	-2.48	[-9.53,4.58]	-.03	.491
Another ethnicity (vs White)	-2.24	[-6.29,1.81]	-.05	.279
Prefer not to say (vs White)	2.57	[-1.47,6.62]	.06	.212
Education	-0.48	[-0.85,-0.12]	-.12	.010
R^2		.09		

Note. CI = confidence interval. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(298) = 721.071$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.42$, *CFI* = .908, *RMSEA* = 0.057 [0.052, 0.063], *SRMR* = 0.073.

Study 5 Supplementary Materials

Tajfel Matrices Instructions

As you may already know, the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca has now released its COVID-19 vaccine (developed together with the University of Oxford). Now, in this exercise, we would like you to imagine that you could decide on how to divide the vaccine between the United Kingdom and the European Union. International agreements on medical equipment and pharmaceuticals are complicated, and decisions are made on scenarios designed up by experts and bureaucrats. Here, we want to know how you would make such decisions. Below are six scenarios of how the vaccine could be distributed between the UK and the EU next month (numbers represent millions of doses of the vaccine). We want to know which option in each scenario you think should be chosen.

You are not a part of a negotiation team; you do not need to consider whether the other side (the EU) would agree. We only want to know which possibility should be chosen according to you. Please note that each number represents millions of doses of vaccines.

Supplementary Analysis Controlling for Understanding of Tajfel Matrices Task

Controlling for understanding of the Tajfel matrices in the structural equation modelling analysis reported in the main manuscript did not affect the pattern of results (see Table B3).

Table B3

Structural Equation Model Analyses, Controlling for Understanding of Tajfel Matrices (Study 5)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
Defensive national identity	0.40	[0.02, 0.78]	.15	.035
Secure national identity	0.06	[-0.27, 0.39]	.03	.706
Understanding[1]	0.08	[-0.71, 0.86]	.01	.852
R^2		.03		

Note. [1]Coded yes=1 and unsure=2. CI = confidence interval. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(770) = 2560.12$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.33$, *CFI* = .898, *RMSEA* = 0.069 [0.066, 0.072], *SRMR* = 0.06.

Structural Equation Model Analyses with Demographic Variables

We report the analyses from the main paper, including demographic variables, in Table B4. Female participants reported higher tendency to maximise the difference than male participants. Furthermore, age was a positive predictor while education was a negative predictor of the tendency to maximise the difference. Ethnicity was not included in this data set.

Table B4

Structural Equation Model Analyses with Demographic Variables as Predictors of Maximum Difference (Study 5)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
Defensive national identity	0.44	[0.06,0.81]	.16	.022
Secure national identity	-0.10	[-0.43,0.23]	-.04	.357
Female gender (vs Male gender)	0.63	[0.04,1.22]	.09	.036
Non-binary (vs Male gender)	1.33	[-1.49,4.14]	.04	.357
Prefer not to say (vs Male gender)	2.59	[-1.80,6.97]	.05	.248
Age	0.04	[0.02,0.06]	.18	<.001
Education	-0.23	[-0.43,-0.03]	-.10	.027
R^2		.07		

Note. CI = confidence interval. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(926) = 2891.322$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.12$, *CFI* = .889, *RMSEA* = 0.066 [0.063, 0.069], *SRMR* = 0.075.

Pre-registered Regression Analyses of National Narcissism and National Identification

Our pre-registration only included the prediction that national narcissism would predict the tendency to maximise the difference while controlling for national identification: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=iz5eq9 However, we did mention nationalism and patriotism as a part of our exploratory analyses. We decided to integrate these variables in superordinate latent variables using structural equation modelling, as explained in the main manuscript. Pre-registered regression analyses are presented in Table B5. As hypothesised, national narcissism predicted maximising the difference.

Table B5

Regression Analyses with National Narcissism and National Identification as Predictors of Maximising the Difference (Study 5)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
National narcissism	0.39	[0.07, 0.72]	.14	.019
National identification	0.04	[-0.25, 0.33]	.02	.766
F(df)		5.34 (2,488), $p = .005$		
R^2		.02		

Note. CI = confidence interval.

Supplementary Analyses of Nationalism and Patriotism

We also investigated nationalism and patriotism as predictors of the tendency to maximise the difference (see Table B6). Nationalism predicted the tendency to maximise the difference, whereas patriotism did not.

Table B6

Regression Analyses with Nationalism and Patriotism as Predictors of Maximising the Difference (Study 5)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
Nationalism	0.37	[0.05, 0.68]	.13	.022
Patriotism	0.14	[-0.14, 0.44]	.06	.319
F(df)		7.26 (2,488), $p<.001$		
R^2		.03		

Note. CI = confidence interval.

Note on Exclusions of Duplicates

Twenty participants were identified as duplicates in Study 5 (which was a part of a larger survey on national identity), because they had also participated in Study 4. Although we did not pre-register this, we decided to exclude these participants from the analyses reported in the main manuscript because they already had experience with the Tajfel matrices. We report the results using the full sample, with duplicates, in Table B7. The pattern of results remained the same.

Table B7

Structural Equation Model Analyses Including Excluded Participants (Study 5)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
Defensive national identity	0.41	[0.04,0.77]	.15	.028
Secure national identity	0.06	[-0.26,0.38]	.02	.724
R^2		.03		

Note. CI = confidence interval. Goodness-of-fit indices: $\chi^2(731) = 2575.845$, $p<.001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.52$, *CFI* = .900, *RMSEA* = 0.07 [0.067, 0.073], *SRMR* = 0.059.

Study 6

Long-term Disadvantage Condition

Understanding the UK's Long Relationship with the EU

In 2016, the United Kingdom sent shockwaves throughout the world when it decided in a referendum to leave the European Union. For the first time, a member state chose to withdraw from the organisation. Now, as some time has passed, it is a good time to reflect on why the UK decided to leave the EU after having been a member for almost five decades.

Looking back on the referendum, it should not come as a great surprise that a majority of the British public decided to leave. Questions regarding the UK's political and economic interests within the EU had been surfacing for years, if not decades. Specifically, many British people asked difficult questions regarding how its membership with the EU had influenced UK's international standing. The UK's power had undoubtedly been compromised over many decades, particularly following its gradual withdrawal from its colonial empire and initial refusal to join the EU following World War II. Having lost its empire, Britain perhaps suffered an imperial hangover, and strived to establish its new role by continuing to give orders, rather than take them.

Realising it was fighting a losing battle, the UK finally agreed to join the EU in 1973, then termed the Common Market. As the EU grew in size and power over the decades, it continued to increase its sphere of influence and began shaping more aspects of daily life in the UK. Membership did have some advantages, especially for trade and security. Furthermore, although the UK had decreased power over its borders, it can be argued that the flow of immigrants fuelled economic growth. However, it was the British public's result that the benefits did not outweigh the cost. One example were the huge membership fees the UK had to pay. After decades of membership, these fees cumulated to astonishing sums.

While a member, the EU's influence over the UK's domestic and foreign policies was especially strong due to the long-lasting decline of the UK as a world power. Reflecting on the current post-Brexit relationship between the EU and the UK, a mixed picture emerges. The two should now be independent and equal neighbours, but many think the UK continues to be marginalised by the EU.

Baseline Condition

Understanding the European Union

The UK was a member state of the EU for 47 years and will continue to work with the EU in various areas, although the relationship between the two has now changed. Now that some years have passed since the referendum on EU membership, in which the British people voted to leave the organisation, many now speculate on the nature of the relationship between the UK and the EU.

Following the Second World War, there were efforts to prevent future conflict by increasing economic interdependence between European countries. This led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). The UK initially refused to join, but eventually agreed to an accession treaty in 1972, thus officially joining the EU on the 1st of January, 1973.

Since then, the EU continued to grow in size and power, and expanded its sphere of influence over the 27 European countries that constitute it today. Membership in the EU, essentially a political and economic membership between its members, requires extra responsibilities and offers extra benefits. For example, although its members have to keep their borders open, this makes it easier for people to travel and work in other countries. Furthermore, despite charging billions of pounds in membership fees, membership in the EU results in easier trade between member countries and increased security.

The UK was the first country to leave the organisation. The future beholds the consequences

of the decision, but now, both parties agree that the two are independent and equal partners that will strive to keep a good relationship.

Exclusion Criteria and Additional Participants Recruitment

We pre-registered that we would exclude participants failing comprehension and attention checks (note that in this study, we only included a "yes" or "no" option in the comprehension check, leaving out the "unsure" option also included in Studies 1 and 2). We first recruited 825 participants, with 74 reporting they did not understand the Tajfel matrices and 76 participants failing an attention check (there was some overlap between the groups, with 13 participants failing both checks). This left 688 participants, which was below the target sample size of 788 which our G*power analysis suggested was necessary for detecting a small effect (Cohen's *d*=.20). We therefore recruited an additional 200 participants from Prolific, with 204 participants submitting a response. This resulted in 1,029 participants in total, before exclusions. One hundred participants reported not understanding the matrices, with 94 failing an attention check. Thereof, 16 failed both checks. This left us with a sample size of 851, which is the sample used in our analyses.

Controlling for Demographics

To check the robustness of the effect observed in experimental Study 6, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with maximising the difference as the dependent variable, and entered experimental condition, gender, age, ethnicity, and education as predictors (see Table B8). Experimental condition remained a significant predictor of the preference for maximum difference. Again, female participants reported higher tendency to maximise the difference than male participants. Age and Asian ethnicity positively predicted maximising the difference.

Table B8

Regression Analyses with Condition and Demographic Variables as Predictors of Maximising the Difference (Study 6)

Predictor	*b*	95% CI	β	*p*
Experimental condition	0.53	[0.06,1.01]	.08	.028
Female gender (vs Male)	0.93	[0.41,1.44]	.12	<.001
Non-binary (vs Male)	-0.68	[-3.53,2.18]	-.02	.641
Age	0.05	[0.31,0.07]	.19	<.001
Mixed ethnicity (vs White)	-0.21	[-1.77,1.36]	-.01	.800
Asian ethnicity (vs White)	1.22	[0.14,2.30]	.08	.027
Black ethnicity (vs White)	0.31	[-1.31,1.94]	.01	.706
Arab ethnicity (vs White)	-6.47	[-13.27,0.34]	-.06	.062
Another ethnicity (vs White)	-1.92	[-6.74,2.90]	-.03	.434
Education	-0.20	[-0.45,0.05]	-.05	.117
F(df)		5.31(10,828), *p*<.001		
R^2		.06		

Note. CI = confidence interval.

Distribution of Item Responses for Maximising the Difference

Distribution of choices on the maximum difference item across all studies is displayed in Table B9.

Table B9

Frequency of Choices on the Maximum Difference Item Made by Participants in All Studies in Chapter 3 (Studies 4-6)

	Maximum Joint Profit & Maximum In-group Profit						Parity		Maximum Difference					
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	Total
	UK=19	UK=18	UK=17	UK=16	UK=15	UK=14	UK=13	UK=12	UK=11	UK=10	UK=9	UK=8	UK=7	
	EU=25	EU=23	EU=21	EU=19	EU=17	EU=15	EU=13	EU=11	EU=9	EU=7	EU=5	EU=3	EU=1	
Study 4	35.3%	3.0%	4.6%	3.0%	3.2%	1.8%	24.9%	4.4%	5.3%	7.2%	1.4%	2.3%	3.5%	100%
	n=153	*n*=13	*n*=20	*n*=13	*n*=14	*n*=8	*n*=108	*n*=19	*n*=23	*n*=31	*n*=6	*n*=10	*n*=15	*N*=433
Study 5	40.7%	4.7%	3.9%	3.9%	5.3%	3.7%	23.2%	4.7%	6.7%	1.0%	0.2%	0.6%	1.4%	100%
	n=200	*n*=23	*n*=19	*n*=19	*n*=26	*n*=18	*n*=114	*n*=23	*n*=33	*n*=5	*n*=1	*n*=3	*n*=7	*N*=491
Study 6	16.8%	2.9%	2.6%	3.6%	2.7%	3.3%	35.5%	4.2%	4.7%	8.3%	5.3%	4.5%	5.5%	100%
	n=143	*n*=25	*n*=22	*n*=31	*n*=23	*n*=28	*n*=302	*n*=36	*n*=40	*n*=71	*n*=45	*n*=38	*n*=47	*N*=851

Note on Pull Scores

In line with our pre-registrations, in our studies we focused on the maximising the difference item[26] following past research using Tajfel matrices to measure preferences for real life resource allocations (Malkin & Ari, 2013; Navarrete et al., 2010; Sidanius et al., 2007). However, some researchers working with minimal groups calculate so-called pull scores from the matrices (see Bourhis et al., 1994; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). As we included the reversed item in all studies, it was possible to calculate the pull score of maximum difference on maximum ingroup profit and maximum joint profit to corroborate our preregistered analyses. In Study 4, national narcissism predicted the pull score of maximising the difference on maximum ingroup profit and maximum joint profit, β = .30, *b* = 1.35, 95% CI [0.68, 2.02], $p < .001$. National identification was not a significant predictor, β = .04, *b* = 0.22, 95% CI [-0.72, 1.17], $p = .646$. Goodness-of-fit indices were acceptable: $\chi^2(128) = 424.06$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.31$, *CFI* = .934, *RMSEA* = 0.073 [.065, .081], *SRMR* = 0.061. In Study 5, defensive national identity was a significant predictor of the pull score, β = .20, *b* = 0.78, 95% CI [0.24, 1.33], $p = .005$, but secure national identity was not a significant predictor, β = .06, *b* = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.67], $p = .393$. Goodness-of-fit indices were again acceptable: $\chi^2(731) = 2509.88$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.43$, *CFI* = .899, *RMSEA* = 0.070 [.067, .073], *SRMR* = 0.060. In Study 6, the experimental intervention did not significantly increase the pull of maximum difference on maximum ingroup profit and maximum joint profit, although the effect was in the expected direction (baseline: *M* = 1.23, *SD* = 5.32; ingroup disadvantage condition: *M* = 1.73, *SD*= 5.48), *t* = -1.35, $p = .177$; Cohen's *d* = .09.

[26] This item is sometimes referred to as the "Vladimir's choice" (see Sidanius et al., 2007).

APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 4 SUPPLEMENTS

Supplementary Materials

Tenure

Tenure had considerable attrition, mostly due to participants not remembering which year they joined the party (*n*=38, 17.8% of the total *N*=214). For this reason, we included analyses including tenure in the Supplement. Bivariate correlations among study variables, including tenure, are presented in Table C1. Tenure correlated negatively with intentions to leave the party in the future.

Table C1

Bivariate Correlations Among Continuous Variables, Including Tenure (Study 7)

Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. Partisan narcissism						
2. Partisan identification	.33***					
3. Political skill	.14***	.32***				
4. Integrity	-.22***	-.06	-.07			
5. Volunteering	.05	.20***	.33***	-.10		
6. Intention to leave party	-.19***	-.42***	-.16*	.07	-.15*	
7. Tenure	.01	.14	-.04	-.11	.14	-.28***

Note. *p< .05. **p<.01. ***p< .001.

In Table C2, we repeated the analysis reported in the main manuscript, including tenure as a predictor of political skill, integrity, volunteering, and intentions to leave the party in the future. Including tenure did not affect the pattern of results. Tenure was only a significant, negative predictor of intentions to leave the party in the future (β = -.15, p = .044).

Table C2

Regression Analyses with Partisan Identification Variables as Predictors of Outcome Variables, Including Tenure (Study 7)

	Political Skill			Integrity			Volunteering			Intentions to Leave		
Predictor	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
Partisan narcissism	0.03	[-0.09,0.15]	.04	-0.24*	[-0.44,-0.05]	-.19	-0.10	[-1.53,1.33]	-.01	-0.13	[-0.42,0.17]	-.06
Partisan identification	0.31***	[0.17,0.45]	.34	0.02	[-0.22,0.25]	.01	2.10*	[0.44,3.77]	.20	-0.82***	[-1.16,-0.48]	-.34
Female (vs male)	0.02	[-0.21,0.25]	.01	0.80***	[0.43,1.17]	.32	-1.63	[-4.29,1.04]	-.09	-0.06	[-0.61,0.48]	-.02
Non-binary (vs male)	-0.29	[-1.88,1.31]	-.03	-0.54	[-3.13,2.04]	-.03	-10.40	[-28.94,8.15]	-.08	1.59	[-2.20,5.38]	.06
Age	-0.01	[-0.02,0.001]	-.15	-0.003	[-0.02,0.01]	-.03	-0.09	[-0.19,0.02]	-.14	-0.03**	[-0.05,-0.01]	-.20
Tenure	-0.002	[-0.02,0.02]	-.02	-.01	[-0.04,0.03]	-.03	0.23	[-0.01,0.46]	.16	-0.05*	[-0.10,-0.001]	-.15
F (*df*)	4.17 (6,165)***			5.27 (6,165)***			2.33 (6,165)*			9.91***		
R^2	.13			.16			.08			.27		

Note. CI = confidence interval. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

We further report past switching between political parties as an outcome of partisan narcissism and partisan identification, including tenure as a control, in Table C3. After including tenure, partisan narcissism became an insignificant predictor of switching (*OR* = 1.41, $b = 0.34$, $p = .113$). It should be noted, that after including tenure in the analyses, *N* dropped from 197 to 169.

Table C3

Logistic Regression Analyses with Past Switching Between Political Parties an Outcome of Partisan Narcissism and Partisan Identification, Including Tenure (Study 7)

Predictor	*b*	OR	95%CI
Partisan narcissism	0.34	1.40	[0.92,2.22]
Partisan identification	-0.21	0.81	[0.51,0.12]
Female (vs male)	-0.48	0.62	[0.29,1.31]
Non-binary (vs male)	-20.11	0.00	[0.00,0.00]
Age	-0.01	0.99	[0.96,1.02]
Tenure	-0.07	0.93	[0.88,0.99]
χ^2 (*df*)		13.28 (6,169)*	
Nagelkerke R^2		.11	

Note. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

Political Skill Subscales

Regression analyses for subscales of the Political Skill Inventory (Ferris et al., 2005) are presented in Table C4. Partisan identification was a significant predictor of all subscales.

Table C4

Regression Analysis with Partisan Identification Variables as Predictors of Political Skill Subscales (Study 7)

	Networking Ability			Interpersonal Influence			Social Astuteness			Apparent Sincerity		
	b	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
Partisan narcissism	0.08	[-0.11,0.27]	.06	-0.01	[-0.14,0.13]	-.01	0.01	[-0.11,14]	.02	0.01	[-0.08,0.10]	.02
Partisan identification	0.46***	[0.28,0.72]	.33	0.18*	[0.03,0.33]	.17	0.28***	[0.13,0.43]	.27	0.17***	[0.07,0.27]	.23
Female (vs male)	-0.12	[-0.47,0.22]	-.05	0.19*	[-0.06,0.43]	.11	-0.06	[-0.30,0.18]	-.04	0.26***	[0.10,0.42]	.21
Non-binary (vs male)	-1.18	[-3.62,1.26]	-.06	0.01	[-1.71,1.73]	.001	1.23	[-0.42,2.89]	.10	-1.58**	[-2.71,-0.46]	-.18
Age	-0.01	[-0.02,0.004]	-.09	-0.01*	[-0.02,-0.002]	-.17	-0.01	[-0.02,0.000]	-.13	-0.01**	[-0.01,-0.003]	-.19
F (*df*)	5.48 (5,194)***			2.71 (5,194)*			3.91 (5,193)**			8.34 (5,194)***		
R^2	.12			.07			.09			.18		

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Political Performance Inventory

Analyses are repeated for remaining subscales of the Political Performance Questionnaire (Silvester et al., 2014) in Table C5 (politicking is reported in main manuscript). Partisan identification positively predicted analytical skills ($\beta = .26$, $p < .001$) and representing people ($\beta = .20$, $p = .008$).

Table C5

Regression Analysis with Partisan Identification Variables as Predictors of Political Performance Inventory Subscales (Study 7)

	Resilience			Analytical skills			Representing people			Relating to others		
	b	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β	*b*	95%CI	β
Partisan narcissism	-0.11	[-0.30,0.07]	-.09	-0.08	[-0.24,0.07]	-.08	0.06	[-0.11,0.22]	.05	0.09	[-0.06,0.24]	.09
Partisan identification	0.18	[-0.03,0.39]	.13	0.32***	[0.14,0.51]	.26	0.26**	[0.07,0.45]	.20	0.13	[-0.04,0.30]	.12
Female (vs male)	-0.04	[-0.38,0.30]	-.02	-0.42**	[-0.72,-0.13]	-.20	0.001	[-0.30,0.31]	.001	0.17	[-0.10,0.44]	.09
Non-binary (vs male)	1.41	[-0.97,3.78]	.08	0.86	[-1.18,2.90]	.06	-1.93	[-4.06,0.21]	-.13	-1.30	[-3.20,0.60]	-.10
Age	0.10	[-0.002,0.02]	.12	-0.01	[-0.02,0.00]	-.14	-0.003	[-0.01,0.01]	-.04	-0.01*	[-0.02,-0.001]	-.16
F (*df*)	1.69 (5,194)			4.15 (5,194)***			2.63 (5,191)*			2.75 (5,191)*		
R^2	.04			.10			.06			.07		

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.