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**PROTRACTED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
IN SOUTH ASIA : THE ROUTE TO INTRACTABILITY
IN THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 1947-1990**

**By
Abdur Rob Khan**

**A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D. in
International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury
Kent, December 1993**

ABSTRACT

The central concern of the thesis is a detailed analysis of protracted international conflicts (PICs) in a bid to explain how and why certain international conflicts become intractable. The manner in which a conflict becomes protracted is a fundamental question that confronts any analyst of contemporary international conflicts. Is protractedness a property of particular sorts of conflicts or is it associated with specific types of actors in a conflict? Is it a concatenation of such dimensions? Or is protractedness a product of circumstances? Moreover, protractedness may be latent, if so, it is necessary to study the actual and potential triggers that lead to a protracted state of conflict. In short, the nature of protracted conflicts has been ill-defined. It is the purpose of the thesis to develop a sharper definition of PIC and elucidate its causes, patterns and underlying processes.

The present thesis has been developed in the specific context of South Asia through a case study of the Kashmir conflict, 1947-1990. In explaining the route to intractability of the conflict, specific attention has been paid to its origin in 1947 over the status of the Princely state of Kashmir, its persistence and linkage with other issues and conflicts, and its occasional flare ups in military hostilities and violence, including its latest transformation into a secessionist insurgency supplanting the inter-state conflict.

The origin of a conflict has been viewed in the thesis as an outcome of a complex process of linkages and polarisation in which other conflicts, issues and actors coalesce over a salient issue. The salient issue itself may be an outcome of a prior conflictual process. Left to itself, the conflict coagulates internally and, at the same time, links up with other issues or conflicts to become intractable and resistant to resolution. The conflict may also transform itself as new issues and parties are added to the old dispute. In short, it develops a life of its own.

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In the process of preparing the thesis, I have been indebted to many individuals and institutions in many ways. Without the patient guidance and encouragement from my Supervisor, Professor A. J. R. Groom, this thesis could not have been carried through to a completion. I am indebted to Prof. Groom for his constructive criticisms and insightful comments on the earlier drafts of the thesis. I am also grateful to Dr. Keith Webb and Dr. Stephen Chan for their valuable comments on my research from time to time. I am also thankful to Dr. Chris Brown, Mr. Dan Hiester and Dr. Andy Williams for their helpful comments on draft chapters of the thesis presented in research seminars of the Department. During my field trip to South Asia in the Summer and Autumn of 1991 I benefited from discussion of my research project with Prof. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema of the Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Prof. Shelton Kodikara of the Colombo University, Colombo, Prof. S. D. Muni of Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Dr. Bhabani Sen Gupta of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. I am grateful to all of them.

I am indebted to my employer, the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies(BIISS), Dhaka, especially Barrister A. K. H. Morshed, Chairman of the Board of Governors, for granting me study leave to pursue the doctoral work at Kent. The moral encouragement from Brig(Retd) M. Abdul Hafiz, former Director General of BIISS, will be remembered by me with gratitude. My esteemed colleagues at BIISS, especially Dr. Iftekharuzzaman, Research Director, deserve special thanks for all the support and encouragement extended wholeheartedly to me. I record my immense gratitude to the Association of Commonwealth Universities for sponsoring the programme and covering my tuition and maintenance for over three years. The Charles Wallace (Bangladesh) Trust and the Board of Politics and International Relations, UKC, supported me generously both during the field trip stage and during my the extended stay in the UK for completion of the thesis. The Islamic Society, UKCSU, has also been generous in providing financial assistance to me. I am especially thankful to my friend Salman Aladwani of Computing Science, UKC, for taking personal initiatives in this matter.

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A Ph. D. thesis is no less a family enterprise. Apart from providing me all the moral support which I badly needed in the protracted course of the thesis, my wife Mahmuda did an immensely valuable job in typing out the lengthy bibliography and the appendix materials, and doing innumerable typographical corrections of the text. My beloved children, Naomi and Abdullah, contributed no less by bearing patiently my long absence in the evenings from home. My father and other relations back in Bangladesh bore patiently my long absence and sent me constantly words of inspiration. It is time that I go back to them.

For my father, Ali Azim Khan

and

in memory of my late mother, Latifunnessa

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PART ONE

FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER II PROTRACTED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER III THE EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND : A COM-
PENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
IN SOUTH ASIA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Phenomenon of Protracted Conflicts

The post-Second World War international system has witnessed the outbreak and persistence of several inter-state and internationalised domestic conflicts, many in the Third World, which are seemingly unresolvable. If anything, most of them have become progressively more intense and intractable, despite the extensive use of traditional conflict resolution measures.¹ Once underway, these conflicts assume different forms over time, subsume, or get linked with, new issues, and manifest themselves at different levels. They have been, and still are, the most complex of all international conflicts.

One need not go far to look for these extended conflicts displaying varied forms and patterns. Some conflicts have survived for several decades with a high degree of persistent tensions and erupted in militarised violence a number of times. Over these decades they have undergone significant transformation in actors and issues, yet the old ones still persist. The Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, and the Kashmir conflict in South Asia, are cases in point. Many prolonged conflicts grow in the domestic sphere but undergo transformation with twists and turns in issues and actor alignment. The Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka in the wake of the Indian intervention, the Afghanistan problem following the [former] Soviet intervention, the Kampuchean problem involving the Vietnamese intervention, and the Angolan civil war with the Cuban presence, would fall into this category. Some have become dormant after prolonged periods of sustained or sporadic violence, yet the basic issues of contention remain unresolved

¹ Gochman and Maoz argue that, the "patterns of dispute behavior have become more persistent than we often assume." See, Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976 : Procedures, Patterns, and Insights", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28(4), December 1984 : 612. See, also, William Eckhardt and Edward E. Azar, "Major Military Conflicts and Interventions : 1945-1979", *International Interactions*, 5(4) January 1978 : 75-110.

leaving the possibility of eruption again. Examples are the Iran-Iraq war, the Cyprus conflict and the Lebanon problem. Many of these extended conflicts again have several interlocking dimensions, as observed in the Middle East, Indochina, and the Horn of Africa.² The component conflicts are usually interconnected and a rise in tensions along one axis tends to affect the others.³

Many more examples of conflicts displaying the characteristics of complexity, persistence and transformation could be cited.⁴ A recent study suggests that nearly half of the militarised inter-state disputes in the post-Second World War period took place within the framework of what has been described as 'enduring rivalry'.⁵ The proportion of prolonged international conflicts will be much higher if internationalised domestic conflicts are also taken into consideration.⁶ Thus, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the extended and very complex conflicts which are intractable and resistant to resolution make them a special category of international conflicts.

What relevance do these prolonged conflicts have for the post-Cold War era? An answer may not be found straightaway. Apparently, the forces released by the demise of Cold War seem to have had a favourable impact on the transformation of some of the old conflicts into tractable ones.⁷ However, one needs to be careful about correlating the transformation in some of the conflicts with the end of Cold War.⁸ The balance of evidence is more on the contrary side. In the

² Buzan's concept of 'regional security complex' is an approximation to this phenomenon. See, Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton : Wheatsheaf) 1983 : 105-105, 125-26. Illustration of interlocked conflicts in the context of the Middle East may be found in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Virginia L. Lussier and Dale Tahtinen, "Conflict Interactions in the Middle East, 1949-1967", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16(2), June 1972 : 135-54. For general pattern of conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Horn, see, Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia*, **Adelphi Paper 162**, IISS, London, 1980, and Samuel S. Makinda, *Security in the Horn of Africa*, **Adelphi Paper 269**, IISS, London, 1992, respectively.

⁴ A somewhat dated but concise and data-based description of conflict cases with a sense of historical continuity may be found in R. L. Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflicts, 1945-74 : Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh : University Center for International Relations, University of Pittsburgh) 1976.

⁵ See, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries", *International Interactions*, 18, 1992, quoted in their "Enduring Rivalries : Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns", *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(2), June 1993 : 148.

⁶ See, Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict : Theory and Cases* (Aldershot, Hampshire : Dartmouth Publishing Company) 1990 : 2.

⁷ Examples are, the Iran-Iraq conflict, Eritria, Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Angola.

⁸ See, for example, Rajni Kothari, "The New Det  nte : Some Reflections from the South", *Alternatives*, XIV(3), July 1989 : 189-99. See also, M. N. Katz, "Why Does the Cold War Continue in the Third World?",

first instance, the world has been ushered into the post-Cold War era with "a huge array of traditional quarrels".⁹ In particular, the "Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmir and Cyprus are daily reminders of [the] gloomy forms of [their] permanence."¹⁰ Secondly, several new conflicts have also surfaced in the post-Cold War period and at least some of them are unlikely to be resolved soon. There is also the possibility of short term reversals on counts of recurrence of old conflicts or the emergence of new ones over issues, such as the resurgence of ethno-nationalism and a worsening of environmental problems.¹¹ Thus, the "civil wars, and forms of violent international conflict falling short of war, are widespread and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future".¹²

We are, therefore, dealing with a sub-set of international conflicts which has always been near the top of the agenda of international politics.¹³ Yet they continue to resist resolution and persist amidst tensions and periodic hostilities. They have also attracted scholarly attention, yet attempts at tackling directly the issues surrounding these conflicts as a distinct category have been meagre.¹⁴ Arguably, an adequate understanding of their dynamics is a precondition for an appropriate policy response to tackle them.¹⁵ Against this backdrop, the central concern of the

Journal of Peace Research, 27(1), 1990 : 1-7.

⁹ See, Stanley Hoffman, "A New World and Its Troubles", *Foreign Affairs*, 69(4), Fall 1990 : 115. For similar arguments on the backlog of conflicts in Asia and the Pacific regions, see, Michael Howard, "Old Conflicts and New Disorders" in *Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part I*, Conference Papers, **Adelphi Paper 275**, IISS, London, 1993 : 7-8.

¹⁰ See, Hoffman, *ibid* : 115.

¹¹ On the rise of ethno-religious conflicts, see, Patrick Brogan, *World Conflicts : Why and Where Are They Happening* (London : Bloomsbury) 1989 : vii-viii. On environmental conflicts, see, Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold : Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", *International Security*, 16(2), Fall 1991 : 76-116.

¹² See, Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? : A Review Article", *International Security*, 14(4), Spring 1990 : 63. Similar arguments are made in John L. Gaddis, "Towards the Post-Cold War World", *Foreign Affairs*, 70(2), Spring 1991 : 111.

¹³ See, Goertz and Diehl, *op. cit.* : 169.

¹⁴ For a general critique of conflict studies, especially the failure to take into account the temporal connectedness of conflicts, see, Philippe Braillard, "Towards a Reorientation of the Empirical Study of International Conflict", *UNESCO Yearbook of Peace and Conflict Studies 1981* (Paris : UNESCO) 1982 : 51-61.

¹⁵ Singer argues, "even modest improvements in the ... cumulation of knowledge can be policy-relevant." See, J. D. Singer(ed.), *Correlates of War I : Research Origins and Rationale* (New York : Free Press) 1979 : 132-33. Michael Banks points out a general lack of correspondence between theory of international conflicts and the practice of conflict resolution. See, his "The International Relations Discipline : Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution?" in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution : Theory and Practice* (Brighton, Sussex : Wheatsheaf Books) 1986 : 5-27. See, also, John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict : A Handbook* (Lanham, MD : University Press of America) 1987 : 21-22.

present thesis is an understanding of the dynamics of these prolonged international conflicts, which we shall call the **Protracted International Conflicts (PICs)**. In this introductory chapter, we set out the objectives of the thesis, define the concept of protracted international conflict, and outline the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Objectives and Scope of the Thesis

The central objective of the present thesis is to explain *how* and *why* certain international conflicts become protracted over time. In particular, the questions which will guide the enquiry of the thesis are : Is protractedness an inherent property of certain international conflicts? Is it associated with circumstantial factors surrounding the conflicts? Or, is it a concatenation of multiple factors and dimensions? Secondly, if conflicts are not inherently intractable, what logically compelling reason is there that conflicts should become protracted over time? Thus, an elucidation of the causes and processes underlying the intractability of international conflicts constitute the focus of enquiry of the thesis.

The present thesis has been developed in the specific geographical context of South Asia.¹⁶ The focus on South Asia is purposive and reflects mainly the academic interests and origin-bias of the present researcher. The region has also been historically conflict prone, like many other Third World areas. Colonial legacies have further complicated the conflict scenario. Right from the partition of the Subcontinent into two independent countries, namely, India and Pakistan in 1947, the region has been in the grip of persistent conflicts. A prominent example has been the Kashmir conflict.¹⁷ The reference period for the study will be 1947-1990, with the events around the decolonisation of 1947 being considered as a watershed.

South Asian international conflicts will constitute the empirical content of the thesis in two interlinked stages. First, a survey of international conflicts in the region of South Asia will be

¹⁶ The region includes the seven countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. For historical, geographical and political profiles of both ancient and contemporary South Asia, see, Francis Robinson (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) 1989 : 68-166. See, also, Map 1.

¹⁷ Among other protracted conflicts in the region, the Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a notable one.

Map 1
South Asia



undertaken to provide an historical context and spatial and temporal characteristics of the contemporary South Asian conflicts. The universe of cases of the PICs will also be identified. In the second stage, a detailed examination of the questions raised above within the bounds of a single case of protracted international conflict from the region, namely, the Kashmir conflict during 1947-1990 will constitute the core of the thesis. This is a pre-selected case study. However, the general survey of international conflicts and an overview of the universe of PICs in the region during the reference period will put the case in a broader perspective. The study is exploratory in nature. Of the two questions, 'how' and 'why' the PICs become intractable, the balance will be in favour of the empirical examination of the 'how' question.

1.3 Defining Protracted International Conflicts (PICs)

The focus of the study is on explaining the protractedness of international conflicts. The international dimension of conflicts would differentiate this study from many others that take an holistic approach to conflicts irrespective of levels of their manifestation.¹⁸ A more fundamental aspect of the conceptual discussion concerns protractedness, especially delimiting its conceptual components. A working definition will be provided on the basis of an elaboration of the 'international' dimension and the 'protractedness' of our unit of analysis.

1.3.1 International Conflict

Generally, international conflicts (IC) could be defined as overt and coercive or hostile interactions between international actors. Available empirical studies on international conflicts are not always explicit on the level of international actors and the threshold of coercive or hostile interactions, leaving the possibility of loose ends - residual or otherwise - in the concept. For example, in some studies, the threshold of hostile interactions is quite high, but the actor criterion

¹⁸ The international arena of conflicts makes a substantive difference in the dynamics of the conflicts and in the approach to resolution of the conflicts. The present study, of course, shares this particular point of departure with other studies. See, Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflicts : International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) 1982 : 14-16.

has been left open-ended with the possibility of the inclusion of an unspecified number of sub-state actors.¹⁹ The question is not whether to include sub-state actors or not, because an analysis of international conflicts should not be confined to state-centric actors alone. The point is where to draw the line. We propose to consider only those sub-national groups as international actors who are organised, and are capable of launching substantive defensive or offensive campaigns reaching out beyond the borders of the concerned state. In other words, we shall be confined to sub-national actors with a border-crossing political or military capability.²⁰

Likewise, hostile interactions in international conflicts could be brought within a fairly specified range without being unduly exclusivist. Some empirical studies on international conflicts do not require militarised violence for a dispute to qualify as conflicts.²¹ Some studies again set the threshold of hostile interactions at nominal levels, such as, threat to use or mere display of, military force, without actual violence having to take place.²² However, militarised or organised violence is an essential element of international conflicts.²³ By this criterion, we are excluding those conflicts in which violence has not been used at all. However, the difference between violent and non-violent conflicts lies not so much in the type of issues,²⁴ as in the very

¹⁹ In defining 'war' in Correlates of War(COW) project, Singer argues "any understanding of international wars in general cannot rest on inter-state wars alone; we must consider other international wars ... in which the system member's forces fought against those (however irregular and disorganized) of a political entity which was not a qualified system member, but in which the member nevertheless sustained a minimum of 1000 battle connected fatalities". See, J. D. Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965 : A Statistical Handbook* (New York : John Willey & Sons Inc.) 1972 : 19, 30-32. For a similar open-ended definition of war, see, Istvan Kende, "Twenty-Five Years of Local Wars", *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(1), 1971 : 5-22 and his follow-up, "Wars of Ten Years (1967-76)", *Journal of Peace Research*, 15(3), 1978 : 227-41.

²⁰ For more on this debate, see, Frederick W. Frey, "The Problem of Actor Designation in Political Analysis", *Comparative Politics* 17(2), January 1985: 127-52. See, also, J. D. Singer, "The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The International System : Theoretical Essays* (Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood Press, Publishers) 1961 : 77-92.

²¹ A prominent example is Butterworth's concept of 'Interstate Security Conflict'. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 3.

²² Maoz's 'Serious Interstate Disputes' (SID), and 'International Crisis' of Brecher and Wilkenfeld, are examples of nominal military actions. See, Maoz, *op. cit.* : 2, and Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crises in World Politics", *World Politics*, 34(3), April 1982 : 383.

²³ I. W. Zartman, "Military Elements in Regional Unrest", *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 29(3), March 1969 : 75-87

²⁴ One is reminded of the Football War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. Although the football game was merely a trigger, it nevertheless, signifies that the outbreak of violence does not need any specific category of issues. For a case description of the Football War, see, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 438-41.

act of using force by one or both the sides, because once violence has been used, "a significant threshold has been crossed to a second phase, in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least reasonably expected."²⁵ Arguably, the military option is not frequently exercised in hostile interactions, yet the dyadic or triadic interactions begin to operate at a different relational range with the actual exercise of a military option.

On the basis of the above discussion we may define international conflict (IC) as, overt and explicitly hostile or violent interactions between international actors, including sub-national actors with border crossing political and military capabilities. Such a conceptualisation of international conflict has some epistemological implications. In traditional conflict studies, international conflict is viewed as an event-based ahistorical phenomenon under the assumption that conflictual events are independent.²⁶ Conflicts, in general, are basically a *process* and an outcome of evolution of "prior conflictual process" and any "arbitrary separation of the outbreak of international violence from the global process of which it is but a specific phase" leads to distortions in the findings.²⁷ To sum up, the concept of international conflict, as defined here, identifies the arena of the conflict and also sets the epistemological orientation towards looking at conflicts as a *process* of hostile interactions. Thus far, we have not talked about the role of issues in the conflict dynamics. In the context of defining 'protractedness' of international conflicts we take up this aspect.

1.3.2 Protracted International Conflicts

On the basis of the observed patterns of prolonged conflicts,²⁸ and the concept of IC, as just defined, we may define the protracted international conflicts (PICs) tentatively as inter-state and internationalised domestic conflicts with extended duration, higher stakes and resistance to

²⁵ See, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars : A Strategy for the 1970s* (London : Allen Lane the Penguin Press) 1969 : 26

²⁶ A critique of traditional conflict studies literature on this point may be found in Braillard, *op. cit.* : 54-55. See also, David Dessler, "Beyond Correlation : Towards a Causal Theory of War", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(3), September 1991 : 340-41.

²⁷ See, Braillard, *ibid* : 56.

²⁸ As seen in Section 1.1 above.

resolution. Is high stake in the issues of conflicts pre-existing in the PICs? Likewise, is resistance to resolution a feature or an essential component of the concept of PICs? These questions will be addressed here as we attempt to provide an operational definition of the PICs. As no ready definition of the concept is available, a set of related concepts dealing with the protractedness of conflicts in general are reviewed first.

One such concept is 'protracted social conflict' (PSC) of Azar. Azar defined the concept of PSC in the following manner :

Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare, fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high – the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity. While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination.²⁹

In this definition, Azar *et al* highlight the nature of issues involved and the behavioral patterns of PSC over time. Azar's primary focus has been on societal roots of mainly internal conflicts. According to Azar, "PSC is different from the conventional notion of inter-state or social conflict because it posits as its essential elements each individual member of society, as well as groups internal and external to the country to which each individual belongs. It further posits that both individuals and groups are closely intertwined in terms of deep-seated racial, ethnic, and religious identities."³⁰ Burton offers a similar definition of what he calls 'deep-rooted conflict', as involving the "preservation of cultures and human values and needs" which cannot be compromised.³¹ Azar and Burton, thus, deal specifically with ethnic, cultural, religious and similar structural conflicts. Secondly, they posit their conceptualisation on an ontological basis. Based on these, it may be argued that Azar's PSC and Burton's 'deep-rooted conflict' deal with only a part of the coverage of the present study, namely, internationalised domestic conflicts.

²⁹ See, Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict : Theory and Practice in the Middle East", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 8(1), Issue 29, Autumn 1978 : 50.

³⁰ See, Azar(1986a), *op. cit.* : 395.

³¹ See, Burton(1987), *op. cit.* : 3.

However, Azar claims explicitly, to an extent contradicting himself, that the ontology paradigm can explain conflicts at all levels including the inter-state ones.³² To Azar, the domestic and the international levels are the arenas, the "motivations for action are internal, not systemic or international."³³ We differ with this position, because it will be rather sweeping and, at the same time, somewhat unrealistic to argue that roots of all, or even most, international conflicts are to be located at the domestic spheres. Nor could all conflicts be characterised as ethnic, religious or identity related. For examples, territoriality, borders and sharing of resources, are important and substantive issues, but they cannot be considered as ontological at an initial stage of conflictual interactions. Over time, a salient issue may turn into an ontological one. The assumption of a pre-existing ontological or fundamental issue, however, glosses over much of the explanation and thus, will have less empirical value.

In this context, we may introduce another related concept, namely, 'intractable conflict' as used by the Syracuse University-based 'Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts' (PARC), in short known as, the Syracuse Group.³⁴ According to this group, an intractable conflict "is defined as a prolonged conflictual psychological process between (or among) parties that has three primary characteristics : (1) it is resistant to being resolved, (2) it has some conflict intensifying features not related to the initial issues in contention, (3) it involves attempts (and/or success) to harm the other party, by at least one of the parties."³⁵ Although both Azar's PSCs and the Syracuse Group's intractable conflicts take an holistic approach to conflicts, and take cognizance of the ontological aspects in conflict dynamics, the similarities are rather superficial. Underneath the surface, there are epistemological differences. The Syracuse Group argues that "Tractability or intractability is not an inherent characteristic of a conflict. Every conflict is an

³² Azar claims that the "origins of international conflict are, therefore, in domestic movements for the satisfaction of needs and in the drives of nations and states to satisfy the same needs. For this reason, distinctions made between, domestic and international conflicts are misleading." See, Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts : Ten Propositions", *International Interactions*, 12(1), 1985 : 64. See, also, Burton(1987), *ibid* : 3.

³³ See, Azar (1985) *ibid* : 64.

³⁴ See, Louis Kriesberg, Terrel A. Northup and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation* (Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse University Press) 1989.

³⁵ See, Terrel A. Northup, "The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict" in Kriesberg *et al*, *ibid* : 62.

evolving relationship, and whether or not it becomes intractable is the result of a complex process".³⁶ Unlike Azar, the Syracuse Group takes an empirical position with respect to protracted conflicts. Our epistemological position will be somewhere in between the ontological formulation of PSCs and the contingent approach of the 'intractable conflicts'. By this, we are implying that protracted conflicts involve issues which are salient or substantive but short of ontological or fundamental value. Certain amount of saliency is needed to distinguish PICs from ephemeral or inconsequential conflicts. One aspect which is, however, missing in this conceptualisation is an explicit time dimension.

An explicit temporal component is found in 'enduring rivalry' as used by Goertz and Diehl.³⁷ By 'enduring rivalry', Goertz and Diehl mean repeated conflicts among the same set of states.³⁸ To Goertz and Diehl, the "concept of enduring rivalry can be said to have three components : competitiveness, time and spatial consistency."³⁹ The essence of enduring rivalry, as stipulated by Goertz and Diehl, seems to lie in spatial consistency, meaning a given number of antagonists.⁴⁰ These three components, according to Goertz and Diehl, ensure an historical continuity of conflicts.⁴¹ However, spatial consistency, which itself is a rigid assumption, may not always ensure that a conflict will be enduring or persistent, unless the motive force of continued hostility is specified. We argue that spatial complexity, as opposed to spatial consistency, is a more realistic component of intractable conflicts.⁴² Moreover, it is possible, as will be seen shortly, to specify theoretical possibility and empirically plausible circumstances under which conflicts do transform breaking the spatial consistency premise.

On the basis of the above conceptual review, we may identify the essential elements of PICs as substantive issue of high stake, temporal protractedness and spatial complexities. Temporal

³⁶ See, Louis Kriesberg, "Transforming Conflicts in the Middle East and Central Europe" in Kriesberg *et al*, *ibid* : 119.

³⁷ For an excellent review of earlier works on 'enduring rivalry' and their development into a coherent piece, see, Goertz and Diehl(1992) and Goertz and Diehl(1993), *op. cit*.

³⁸ See, Goertz and Diehl(1993), *ibid* : 147.

³⁹ *Ibid* : 154.

⁴⁰ *Ibid* : 154-55.

⁴¹ *Ibid* : 150-51, 153.

⁴² This is also implicit in the exposition of both Azar and the Syracuse Group.

protractedness is intuitively clear but needs operationalisation. One way of measuring protractedness is to take into consideration the events that take place within the confines of a conflict over time. Goertz and Diehl have measured the temporal component of 'enduring rivalry' in terms of a minimum of "three militarised disputes within a period of fifteen years."⁴³ This is, of course, highly arbitrary because there are instances in which historical continuity of the conflicts has been maintained by persistent tensions with just one military flare up within Goertz and Diehl's time limit of fifteen years. Instead, we introduce specific and measurable elements of temporal protractedness : persistent tensions, 'resistance to resolution', and re-definition of an issue or stakes in an issue. We believe resistance is a critical element in protracted conflicts not sufficiently recognised in traditional conflict studies. While the Syracuse Group argues that a "conflict is intractable if it resists attempts at resolution",⁴⁴ there is little clue as to how to measure "stubbornness", as they call it.⁴⁵ Resistance is basically a function of superficial or aborted peace initiatives.⁴⁶ A conflict also becomes resistant if the parties harden their position and retract from earlier concessions they were prepared to make to each other.

Another temporal element of protractedness is redefining issues and identity by the conflict parties with the passage of time. The significance of redefinition of identity and addition of issues can be appreciated by the fact that conflict is an evolving relationship in which new material stakes, new symbolic issues and enhancement of the existing stakes are constantly produced as time passes.⁴⁷ The spatial components of PICs may be identified, following Azar, as spillover of tensions and hostilities, and interlinkage of issues and actors.⁴⁸ The tendency of prolonged

⁴³ See, Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Race to War : Testing Some Empirical Linkages", *Sociological Quarterly*, 26 : 390-406, quoted in Goertz and Diehl, *op. cit.* : 159.

⁴⁴ See, Kriesberg *et al*, *op. cit.* : 3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 3.

⁴⁶ The role of aborted negotiations or mediation in protractedness is like an inadequate dose of anti-biotic medicine that makes the disease resistant to further medication. Burton, argues in similar vein, "the traditional processes of power bargaining and mediation are themselves an additional reason for conflicts to be protracted. It is they which lead to temporary settlements without tackling the underlying issues. See, John W. Burton, "The History of International Conflict Resolution" in Azar and Burton (eds.), *op. cit.* : 52.

⁴⁷ See, John Agnew, "Beyond Reason : Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts" in Kriesberg *et al*, *op. cit.* : 50-51.

⁴⁸ See, the process dynamics of protracted social conflicts in Azar(1990), *op. cit.* : 13.

conflicts to spillover and interlink leads to cumulation of tensions and hostilities over time and extension of the coverage of the conflict over space.

Thus, extended duration, persistent tensions, resistance to resolution, and spilling over and interlinking propensity, are the essential properties of the concept of PICs. On the basis of this, we would define PICs as : inter-state or internationalised domestic conflicts over substantive issues of extended duration, with persistent tensions, which resist resolution and display a tendency to spill over and interlink, and become intractable.

To sum up the discussion thus far, we have made a brief *tour de horizon* to introduce the empirical phenomenon of protracted international conflicts (PICs), set the objectives of the thesis, and defined the concept of the PICs, outlining, *inter alia*, the measuring criteria of the 'international' dimension, and the conceptual components of protectedness. The research burden of the thesis lies in stipulating some logical relationship among the conceptual components and examining the relationship empirically in the context of a PIC case in South Asia. As we are poised for entering the substance of the thesis in the subsequent chapters, the structure of the thesis may be outlined.

1.4 The Structure of the Thesis

The bulk of thesis will consist of empirical discussion, preceded by a conceptual and theoretical framework, and followed by conclusions. The thesis has been developed into ten chapters grouped into four broad parts. **Part One** comprising of Chapters I-III, concerns the conceptual and theoretical framework as well as an empirical background of the South Asian conflict scenario. Chapter I defined the objectives of the thesis and identified conceptual components of protracted international conflicts (PICs). An attempt is made in Chapter II to evolve a theoretical framework to guide the empirical examination of a PIC case. For the purpose of the thesis, the theoretical arguments in connection with Azar's protracted social conflicts (PSCs) have been adapted and combined with those of the 'Conflict Diffusion' theory of wider wars to derive an analytical frame of enquiry. Chapter III provides an empirical perspective to the

PIC case of Kashmir through a survey of the contemporary South Asian international conflicts during the reference period, 1947-1990.

Parts Two to Four examine how the PIC of Kashmir originated in 1947, became protracted and broke into periodic flare ups. Three prominent landmarks have been identified in the long-drawn course of the conflict : its origins in the 1947-49 war between India and Pakistan, the second flare up in 1965 involving the same dyad, and the latest Kashmiri uprising from within Kashmir, spearheaded by the Kashmiri militants. These three landmarks are each the subject matter of each of the three empirical parts in chronological order. In each part, there are two chapters, the first one deals basically with the antecedents, and the second, with the precipitants and course of the violent phase of the conflict.

To give a preview of the empirical chapters, Chapter IV sets the prelude to the first Kashmir war of 1947-49 in terms of heightening of the Hindu-Muslim feuds in British India on the eve decolonisation in 1947. The Hindu-Muslim feuds were transformed into a general but intense India-Pakistan ideological rivalry and a contest for the Princely states, which, according to the stipulations of the decolonisation by Britain, were to accede to either India or Pakistan. Chapter V deals with the critical questions as to why the India-Pakistan antagonism and the contest for the Princely accession converged on Kashmir? Did Kashmiri politics itself have anything to do with it? How were the transfer of power and the partition of the Subcontinent linked with the issue of the Princely accession, especially that of Kashmir? The precipitation of the conflict through a linkage of different forces at different levels constitutes the subject matter of Chapter V. The chapter also covers the militarised violence between India and Pakistan which continued until they agreed to a cease-fire on January 1, 1949.

Chapter VI takes the thread from the the UN-mediated cease-fire of January 1, 1949 and examines the first decade of the Kashmir conflict until 1958, after which the conflict entered a different phase through its linkage with the Sino-Indian border war and Cold War politics. During 1949-1958, the Kashmir problem not only became intractable notwithstanding a series of UN mediation efforts and bilateral negotiations, but also remained tension ridden through

transmission of feedback tensions from other bilateral disputes and political developments in Kashmir itself. Chapter VII concentrates mainly on the reinforced phase of Cold War in the early 1960s in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. The realignment of power relations and the resulting balance of power developed a sense of desperation in Pakistan. Pakistan's desperation was stimulated positively by internal unrests in Kashmir which indeed sent wrong signals to Pakistan about the mood of the Kashmiris to get rid of the Indian rule. Pakistan sent trained infiltrators in August 1965 to stimulate and organise the internal rebellion. India, in retaliation, struck at the international borders Pakistan and the second Kashmir war broke out.

The post-1965 period witnessed three distinct processes, all had their roots in Kashmir and all converged on Kashmir again in 1989-1990 to create a triangular stand-off situation. Firstly, at the bilateral level, Kashmir as an issue became politically and militarily stalemated. There was, at best, a thawing in the stalemate following the signing of the Simla Agreement in the wake of the emergence of Bangladesh in late 1971. The two countries initiated a normalisation process in the 1980s but it only limped at best. Kashmir as a bilateral issue continued to bedevil relations. Secondly, Kashmir also set in motion a process of mutual interference in each other's internal affairs that led them from the 1965 war over Kashmir to another war over the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. The process of interference continued through the problems in the Punjab and Sind. Thus, the ground was prepared for a bilateral route to Kashmir and a reopening of the Kashmir issue. These two processes have been elucidated in Chapter VIII. What actually brought them to the brink of a major war was the internal route to a new Kashmiri situation of a secessionist movement, also set in motion during the second Kashmir war. The genesis of the militancy and the tension between the old inter-state conflict and this militancy have been dealt with in Chapter IX. The substance of the empirical arguments in the light of the theoretical framework has been consolidated in the concluding part (Chapter X) of the thesis.

Data for the study have been obtained from extensive archival research both in the United Kingdom, and in the South Asian region, in particular, India and Pakistan, during a field study trip to those countries in the Summer and Autumn of 1991. Several interviews were also

conducted during the trip with political leaders and Government officials - both incumbent and retired - scholars, journalists and other men of public affairs.⁴⁹

1.5 Summing Up the Key Concerns

Incidences of PICs have been galore in the contemporary international system. They have also been near the top of the agenda of international politics as well. Yet very few direct attempts have been made at a systematic study of these conflicts as a distinct category. The central concern of the thesis is a detailed examination of protracted international conflicts (PICs) in a bid to explain how and why certain international conflicts get protracted over time.

PICs are defined as inter-state or internationalised domestic conflicts over substantive issues, with extended duration, persistent tensions, and seemingly no visible termination. For the purpose of the thesis, while protractedness is not viewed to be an inherent in the issues or parties of an international conflicts, the issues, nonetheless play an important part in explaining a gradual route to its intractability. The other two components of the concept are temporal persistence and spatial linkages. It is through stipulating a logical relationship among the components that we intend to undertake the empirical examination of a PIC case.

The empirical content of the work will have a specific geographical focus on South Asia. Specifically, we shall focus on the route to intractability of the Kashmir conflict during 1947-1990. The PIC case, however, will be put in a broader perspective through a survey of international conflicts in the region during the reference period of the study. Before that, however, we make an attempt to evolve a theoretical framework of the study.

⁴⁹ See, Appendix I on *Interviews Conducted for the Thesis*.

CHAPTER II

PROTRACTED INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS : A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In keeping with the objective of the thesis, e.g., explaining the origin, persistence and periodic flare ups of protracted international conflicts (PICs), the task in this chapter is to evolve an analytical framework and specify its underlying theoretical arguments to guide the empirical examination. Usually, theoretical discourse in empirical conflict studies, as in other branches of social science, takes two separate but not necessarily mutually exclusive paths. One is oriented to a deductive process of testing and confirming hypotheses derived logically from a theory grounded in axiomatic premises.¹ The other is an inductive process of generating empirical findings, generalising and cumulating them into a coherent piece of "suggestive relationships", leading eventually to a theory after further testing and confirmation.² Our goal in this thesis is not either way of theory building or hypothesis testing. Rather, we have a modest and intermediate goal of a systematic examination of an empirical problem with the purpose of what Mesquita called "evaluating the patterns within individual events".³ We are concerned mainly with gaining a better explanation and greater insights into the empirical problem of PICs in a manner which

¹ For general remarks on deductive process in social scientific research, see, Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) 1970 : 91-196. In the context of international conflicts, see, R. L. Simowitz and Barry L. Price, "Progress in the Study of International Conflict : A Methodological Critique", *Journal of Peace Research*, 23(1), 1986 : 29-40; David Dessler, "Beyond Correlations : Toward a Causal Theory of War", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(3), September 1991 : 337-55; Philippe Braillard, "Towards a Reorientation of the Empirical Study of International Conflict" in *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies 1981* (Paris : UNESCO) 1982 : 51-61, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Towards a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict : A Personal View", *International Studies Quarterly*, 29(2), June 1985 : 121-36.

² See, John A. Vasquez, "The Steps to War : Towards a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings", *World Politics*, 40(1), October 1987 : 114.

³ See, Bueno de Mesquita, *op. cit.* : 135.

would pave the way to further research and cumulation of knowledge base.⁴ In view of this, our aim in this chapter is to develop a theoretically relevant framework of analysis of PICs. However, in the absence of any readily applicable theoretical frame for the problem in hand, our approach in this chapter will be largely heuristic in nature building on available related works.

We shall deal with two sets of works, one dealing specifically with the prolonged or intractable [societal] conflicts, the other with the general phenomena of 'wider wars' or 'conflict widening' process. The first set concerns works related to 'protracted social conflicts' of Azar,⁵ although related works like Burton's 'deep-rooted conflicts',⁶ the 'intractable conflicts' of the Syracuse Group, led by Kriesberg⁷ will be brought in where appropriate. It should be mentioned that a full-fledged causal or explanatory analysis was beyond the scope of these works. The focus of all the three works mentioned here was on resolution of conflicts, especially evaluating practical experiences with their respective models or formulae of conflict resolution.

The second set of works under the rubric of Conflict Diffusion theory focuses less on issues but mainly on the process of widening of conflicts. The Conflict Diffusion theory deals with the growth of an on-going conflict through spatial 'contagion' or linkage, and temporal 'reinforcement' or persistence, although the exact causal repertoire varies from study to study.⁸ In general, it is argued that an analysis of interaction between actor(s) and the environment of conflict enables one to detect mechanisms that lead to a spread of war.⁹ Although the theory does

⁴ This, in essence, will be a combination of both processes, although the bias is in favour of gaining greater empirical insights. Waltz said in this context, "we nevertheless need some sense of the puzzling connections of things and events before we can worry about constructing theories." See, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA : Addison Wesley) 1979 : 8.

⁵ Among his works, the one that contains an explicit analytical frame is, Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict : Theory and Cases* (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK : Dartmouth Books) 1990.

⁶ See, John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict : A Handbook* (Lanham, MD : University Press of America) 1987.

⁷ See, Louis Kriesberg, Terrel A. Northup and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation* (Syracuse : Syracuse University Press) 1989.

⁸ See, W. W. Davis, G. Duncan and R. M. Siverson, "The Dynamics of Warfare, 1816-1965", *American Journal of Political Science*, 22(4), 1978 : 772-92; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War", *American Political Science Review*, 74(4), 1980 : 932-46; J. Faber, H. W. Houweling and G. C. Siccama, "Diffusion of War : Some Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence", *Journal of Peace Research*, 21(3), 1983 : 277-88; Henk W. Houweling and Jan G. Siccama, "The Epidemiology of War, 1916-1980", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29(4), December 1985 : 641-663.

⁹ See, Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "Theoretical and Logical Issues in the Study of International Diffusion", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2(4), October 1990 : 396-403.

not deal directly with protracted conflicts as such, the idea that conflicts spread over time and space makes it a potential tool of analysis for protracted or persistent wars, which in our conceptualisation, has both a temporal as well as a spatial dimensions.

Thus, we have at our disposal two sets of works, one focuses on issues of conflicts and less on their explanatory aspects, and the other deals basically with mechanism of propagation of violence but less with the logic of violence. What we need is a logical basis as well as an analytical frame for explaining and demonstrating 'the mechanics of violence' of PICs. In this chapter, we propose to make an attempt at supplementing the issue-dimension of conflict, that is, logic of violence associated with protracted conflicts, with the mechanism of violence associated with wider wars, in particular, the Conflict Diffusion theory.

In what follows, the existing theoretical arguments associated with protracted conflicts, especially those of Azar, are reviewed in Section 2.2. The theoretical arguments based on Conflict Diffusion theory are reviewed in Section 2.3. An integrated framework is arrived at in Section 2.4 on the basis of assessing the justification and compatibility between the two sets. An analytical frame is also evolved on the basis of interlinking the analytical variables in Section 2.5.

2.2 Existing Theoretical Bases of Protracted Conflicts

This section appraises how far the issue-oriented ontology paradigm of protracted *social* conflicts (PSCs) can also explain the protracted *international* conflicts (PICs). We hope to argue that the central tenet of the ontology paradigm of the PSCs, which posits almost a pre-existing causal repertoire, needs modification because not only does it deal with a specific type of conflicts, the explanatory value of such a framework is also limited. Even if Azar did attempt some explanation of PSCs in some of his earlier works, the arguments are speculative and need to be put in a coherent manner.

2.2.1 Ontology in Protracted Social Conflicts

Edward Azar argued that roots of protracted social conflicts are ontological in nature.¹⁰ This argument merits a closer scrutiny. Azar traced the origins of the PSCs in the following manner :

We are led to the hypothesis that the source of protracted social conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are *security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation* in the processes that determine conditions of security and identity, and other such developmental requirements. The real source of conflict is the denial of those human needs that are common to all and whose pursuit is an ontological drive in all. [emphases original]¹¹

To Azar, the ontological issues themselves can explain a large part of the mechanism that leads to the growth of PSCs. Azar argues :

Protracted social conflicts have typical characteristics that account for their prolonged nature. In particular, they have enduring features such as economic and technological underdevelopment, and unintegrated social and political systems. ... These observable features provide the infrastructure for intractable conflict : multi-ethnic and communal cleavages and disintegration, underdevelopment and distributive injustice. The re-emergence of conflict in the same situation, a particular characteristics of protracted social conflicts, suggests to anyone monitoring events over a long period that the real sources of conflict – as distinct from features – are deep-rooted in the lives and ontological beings of those concerned.¹²

As these conflicts are rooted in "human needs and long-standing cultural values" which will "not be traded, exchanged or bargained over",¹³ there is every reason that they will be "pursued in the long run by all means available, including the possible acquisition and use of destructive weapons."¹⁴ Thus, in these conflicts there is "no distinguishable point of termination. It is only in the long run that they will 'end' by cooling off, transforming or withering away; one cannot expect these conflicts to be terminated by explicit decision."¹⁵ Likewise Azar elaborates:

¹⁰ See, Edward E. Azar, "The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situations" in Dina A. Zinnes(ed.), *Conflict Processes and the Breakdown of International Systems, Monograph Series in Global Affairs*, Vol. 20, Book Two, (Denver, Colo. : University of Denver Press) 1983 : 81.

¹¹ See, Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts : Ten Propositions", *International Interactions*, 12(1), 1985 : 60.

¹²

¹³ See, *ibid* : 61.

¹⁴ See, Azar(1990), *op. cit.* : 2.

¹⁵ See, Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 8(1), Issue 29, Autumn 1978 : 50.

They [PSCs] do not permit change in the fundamental grievances, and continually reduce the chances for dealing with conflict settlement issues. They tend to generate, reinforce, or intensify mutual images of deception. They tend too to increase the likelihood of confusion in the direct and indirect communications between the parties and their allies. They increase the anxieties of the parties to the conflict, and they foster tensions and conflict-maintenance strategies. In the protracted conflict situation, the conflict becomes an arena of redefining issues rather than a means for adjudicating them; it is therefore, futile to look for any ultimate solution. The conflict process becomes the source rather than the outcome of policy.¹⁶

Let us examine how these arguments fit into Azar's analytical frame. What Azar calls his analytical framework has two components : 'genesis' dynamics, and 'process level' dynamics.¹⁷ The genesis of PSCs, according to Azar, is accounted for by four clusters of variables : *communal structure*; *communal needs* - acceptance or recognition needs, access or participation needs, and security, including biological needs; *role of the state* in governance and allocation of resources, and its *international linkage*. Azar's central argument is that interactions among these variables in a multi-communal society breeds deprivation and hence, clashes of interests. These clashes are accentuated by the exploitative role of the state authority, which, in turn, is linked with the international system in a clientele relationship. Clashes of interests are ignited into violent conflict by triggers. The process dynamics take over.¹⁸

Evidently, Azar's framework deals with how specific types of primarily domestic conflicts, such as ethnic or minority conflicts originate in a multi-communal society. The argument that identity and basic needs sharpened by interaction among conflicting groups including the state authority raise the level of hostility and provide the motive force in the outbreak of serious conflicts seems to be reasonable. However, this exposition of origins of protracted conflicts may be flawed on a number of counts. Firstly, the assumption of the immutable nature of issues is employed to explain much of the mechanism of an outbreak of conflicts in Azar's scheme of things. In real world dynamics, however, even if there are some pre-existing historical fissures along ethnic or communal lines, these are mediated, linked and activated by other factors and issues, some of which may not be as closely related or purposive as Azar's frame would suggest.

¹⁶ *Ibid* : 51.

¹⁷ For details including diagrammatic representation, see, Azar(1990) *op. cit.* : 7-17.

¹⁸ See, Azar(1990), *ibid* : 7-12.

In short, Azar's frame presupposes an integrated system, which in real world may not be obtainable. Secondly, much remains to be desired in terms specifying the relative weight of factors that interact at the origin phase of conflicts. This means we need a clearer exposition as to how issues and actors interact to lead to an initiation of conflicts. Thirdly, the argument that ontology makes conflicts inherently intractable gives only a static picture. The temporal aspect of the protractedness is missing. At the initial stage, these issues are nebulous and they gather substance and shape only gradually. As argued by Agnew, "Group identity is defined *in conflict* rather than being a 'pre-existing' cause of it."¹⁹ Fourthly, the ethnic and identity related conflicts are not the result of deprivation, underdevelopment and threat to existence and identity alone. They may also result from qualitatively opposite factors like overdevelopment and affluence, as has been the case with the problems of Quebec and Basque nationalism in Canada and Spain, respectively.²⁰ To an extent, the Sikh separatism in the Punjab in India is more a case of relative affluence than deprivation and underdevelopment.

In Azar's frame of 'process level' dynamics, two elements are critical : the action-reaction between the communal groups and the state authority, as observed in the genesis phase as well, and the 'built-in properties of conflict'. By 'built-in' properties Azar means "perceptions and cognitive processes generated through experiences of conflictual interactions, such as premature closure, misattribution of motives, stereotyping, tunnel vision, bolstering and polarisation."²¹ These, according to Azar, tend to make the conflicts self-perpetuating. These psychological factors are, by no means, unique to any specific type of conflicts. Thus, they would not tell us why certain conflicts will be protracted while others not or certain conflicts more protracted than others. Azar does mention some factors and processes such as 'spill-over in issues and actors', and 'perpetuation through amplifying feedback' in his 'process dynamics' without elaboration.²²

¹⁹ See. John Agnew, "Beyond Reason : Spatial and Temporal Sources of Conflicts" in Louis Kriesberg, Terrel A. Northup and Stuart Thorson (eds). *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation* (Syracuse, N. Y. : Syracuse University Press) 1989 : 51.

²⁰ See, Agnew, *ibid* : 44.

²¹ See, C. R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflicts*, (London : Macmillan Press) 1981, quoted in Azar(1990), *op. cit.* : 15.

²² See, for example, the process-level dynamics in Azar(1990), *op. cit.* : 13.

We may review Azar's other works in a bid to assess if they add to the explanatory power of his basic proposition.

2.2.2 The Analytical Aspects in Azar's Framework of Protracted Social Conflicts

Azar assumes that the structural factors that lie at the root of the PSCs are multi-causal and interconnected. According to him, "The interconnected nature of the various structural factors (political, ethnic, religious, linguistic) is what makes protracted social conflicts so devastatingly unresolvable. It is impossible to isolate each issue and resolve it separately, because each aspect of the conflict is linked to the others at different levels. This means that each new factor compounds the complexity of the conflict in an unexpected manner because it tends to be linked with every other factor."²³ Regarding the causal mechanism, he argues that in the PSCs, "structural behaviour (ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic) has affected overt hostile behaviour (interaction), creating a complicated causal network that makes these conflicts difficult to 'solve'", because "when tension reduction is achieved in one level of the dispute, another will flare up, almost as if by hydraulic action."²⁴ Thus, "resiliency of the protracted social conflicts stems from the interconnectedness of these structural factors."²⁵

The resiliency is also contributed to by what appears to be interactions between temporal and spatial dimensions of protracted social conflicts. According to Azar, these conflicts "exhibit a strong capacity to grow in terms of the number of involved actors and sub-actors and in terms of goals, objectives and types of grievances that sustain the conflict setting."²⁶ Azar identifies two factors that causes conflicts to move over space : the intense self-perpetuating animosities generated by the conflicts, and the conscious attempts of involved actors to draw support and mobilise resources. According to him:

²³ See, Azar (1983), *op. cit.* : 92.

²⁴ *Ibid* : 85.

²⁵ *Ibid* : 85.

²⁶ See, Azar *et al* (1978) *op. cit.* : 50.

Protracted conflicts arouse intense animosities This animosity causes the conflict to spill over a broad spectrum of issues and to *in and of itself* push the rivalry outside the inter-state framework. In the case of the Middle East, this spillover has been singularly pronounced. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a fundamental issue in the politics of the confrontation states, substantially (if not decisively) affecting interest group formation, and articulation, and fractionation.²⁷ [emphasis original]

Regarding linkages of issues and actors, Azar argues that as tensions increase, the victimised party draws attention of the constituents not only to the event but also to a broad range of issues of needs beyond the framework of the conflict. A momentum for organising and mobilising resources through diverse strategies takes precedence.²⁸ Regarding temporal changes in these conflicts, Azar argues:

These conflicts appear to start with one set of stated goals, primary actors and tactics, but very quickly acquire new sub-actors, new goals and new types of resources and behaviours. In Northern Ireland and in the Middle East, the protest movements broke down into many factions as new leaders came to the fore with slightly different emphases. Thus, conflicts that commence as a clear confrontation between one authority and an opposition become complicated with many parties and issues that make the process of resolution all the more difficult.²⁹

From the above it turns out that Azar recognised the interconnected nature of different facets of an issue that made the conflicts intractable. He also talked about the interlinking tendencies of conflicts, and the changes and transformation which the conflicts undergo. The underlying factor, according to Azar, is the fundamental nature of issues that provides a driving force to the conflict parties to display these behavioural characteristics. Our epistemological position has been that issues in a conflict at any point of time is an outcome of a triangular interaction between issues, actors and the conflict environment. Thus, a clearer exposition of these behavioural propositions is needed. Moreover, as we have also pointed out earlier, Azar's assumption of an integrated conflict environment is not always tenable. Instead, we need an alternative formulation of these interactions in a loose environment in which non-purposive factors play catalytic role in the spread of violence. It is with this objective in mind we review critically the Conflict Diffusion theory.

²⁷ See, *ibid* : 55.

²⁸ Azar(1990), *op. cit.* : 12-14.

²⁹ Azar(1986a), *op. cit.* : 37.

2.3 The Conflict Diffusion Theory and the Spread of International Conflicts

The Conflict Diffusion theory, which is based on the accepted wisdom that "conflict breeds conflict",³⁰ provides an alternative perspective to prolonged conflicts by postulating that conflict lingers and spreads through a chain of events occurring either within continuing hostilities, or in a spatially and functionally related space with respect to the original conflict. History is replete with instances of wars being linked over time and space. A single conflictual incident kindles conflagrations of a similar nature, as happened with anti-colonial wars against France in Indochina, Africa and the Middle East in a row, South Africa's involvement in neighbouring Angola and Mozambique, and Israel's in Lebanon and Syria.³¹ In a general rivalry, such conflictual incidents generate decisional cues for the opponents, as happened with Anglo-French initiatives in the Suez and Russia's crushing of the Hungarian revolution, both happening within a very short span of time in late October-November 1956.³² On the other hand, tactical and strategic factors often result in the dragging of uninvolved countries in a continuing warfare, as happened with the German attack on Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia in 1938, on Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1939 and Denmark in 1940, during the Second World War.³³ The protracted French-German rivalry in the late 19th century and early 20th century is an example of how bilateral conflicts reinforced and hardened over time.³⁴ These examples suggest that a continuing war sets in motion a series of chain reactions within its own operational milieu or in linked areas, which in turn, send feedback as well as forward spillovers. The question is : how do these linkages and spillovers operate and how far would they explain the growth and transformation of a continuing conflict? The following sections answers this question.

³⁰ See, Mark I. Lichbach and Ted R. Gurr, "The Conflict Process : A Formal Model", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), March 1981 : 3.

³¹ See, Davies, Duncan and Siverson, *op. cit.* : 777.

³² *Ibid* : 777.

³³ See, Urs Luterbacher, "Last Word About War? : A Review Article", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28(1), March 1984 : 167-68.

³⁴ See, *ibid* : 777.

2.3.1 Existing Research on Conflict Diffusion Theory

The general theory of Conflict Diffusion deals with the "growth of an ongoing conflict, the process by which states join an ongoing war and the scope of the conflict becomes enlarged".³⁵ Thus, a conflict may grow on its own dynamics or through other parties' joining, or the conflict itself may spark other conflicts, with the possibilities of receiving feedback. We would first review how the proponents of the theory have postulated its basic principles and assumptions.³⁶ The proponents of the theory identified the following four diffusion related processes :

Positive Reinforcement : The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *increases* the likelihood that the *same* nation will experience subsequent war participations;

Negative Reinforcement : The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *decreases* the likelihood that the *same* nation will experience subsequent war participations;

Positive Spatial Diffusion : The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *increases* the likelihood that *other* nations will experience subsequent war participations; and

Negative Spatial Diffusion : The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation *decreases* the likelihood that *other* nations will experience subsequent war participations. [emphases original]³⁷

These four processes have been illustrated with the help of a flow diagram (Fig. 1). It shows the war behaviour(X) of countries i and j, respectively at times t0, t1, and t2. The starting point of the flow diagram is the conflictual move X by country i at time t0, following which its own conflict behaviour may be reinforced (temporal diffusion) and/or it may entangle other participants like j in the conflict at time t1 (spatial diffusion). Two more possibilities of negative spatial diffusion or negative reinforcement are also shown.³⁸

³⁵ See, Siverson and Starr(1990), *op. cit.* : 64.

³⁶ The most consistent proponents of the theory have been Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most for more than a decade since the mid-seventies. Benjamin Most died in 1985, although some of his works with Starr have been published in 1990. See, Most and Starr(1990). Of late, Starr has been joined by Randolph Siverson. See, Siverson and Starr (1990). Midlarsky (1970); Houweling and Siccama (1985); Goertz(1990) brought in their respective epistemological perspectives and enriched the explanatory capability of the theory. However, the most succinct statement of the postulate may be found in Most and Starr (1980).

³⁷ See, Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, and Geopolitics, and the Spread of War", *American Political Science Review*, 74(4), 1980 : 933.

³⁸ Examples of negative reinforcement and negative spatial diffusion may be difficult to come by because they are in a sense counterfactuals. In any case, Japan's withdrawal posture in the post-Second World War

The above mentioned processes fairly corroborate the historical patterns in the spread of warfare in both directions – spatial and temporal. They are based distinctly on the assumption that the wars are not distributed independently over time and space. These four propositions of Most and Starr are the hallmarks of the Conflict Diffusion theory in that they state explicitly that conflicts interlink spatially and persist temporally to generate or reinforce further conflicts. If backed by logic as to why should conflicts interlink and persist in the first instance, they are capable of providing a reasonably sound explanatory frame for protracted international conflicts.




Fig 1 : Spatial and Temporal Diffusion

- Index :
- X_{t0}^i = Country i takes conflictual step X at time t_0
 - $X_{t1, t2}^i$ = Conflictual behaviour of i reinforced at t_1 and t_2 because of its own action at t_0
 - $(X_{t1}^i + X_{t1}^j)$ = Country j joins on-going conflict at t_1 following X_{t0}^i
 - X_{t2}^j = j refrains from X at t_2 following its own action at t_1
 - X_{t2}^{i*} = i withdraws following $(X_{t1}^i + X_{t1}^j)$

may be an example of negative reinforcement. A perceptible reduction in the number of coups in Latin America after the killing of Allende could be an example of negative spatial diffusion. See, Most and Starr (1980), *ibid* : 933-34.

The logical reasons that Most and Starr have adduced have been drawn from eclectic sources such as Boulding's 'theory of viability' meaning a state's war behaviour would depend on the impact of the first occurrence of war on its perception of viability. A defeat may lead to a more determined posture to avenge the loss, as with the reactions of Arab nations to the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 (positive reinforcement), or it may lead to a calm resignation, as with Japan's posture in the post-Second World War (negative reinforcement).³⁹ In developing the reinforcement propositions, Most and Starr borrowed Blainey's argument that "confidence" and "optimism" generated by a war may affect the concerned actor's subsequent war participation.⁴⁰

According to Most and Starr, inter-nation diffusion (spatial diffusion) occurs in proximate geographical situation following the principle of 'loss of strength gradient' (LSG) of Boulding and the role played by Midlarsky's notion of 'uncertainty'.⁴¹ Following Midlarsky, they hypothesised that, "more bordering nations may create more more uncertainty by reducing control over the environment and nations may go to war to reduce uncertainty."⁴² Eventually, Most and Starr focused the direction of their research on spatial factors such as borders as the 'agent' of diffusion and virtually dropped the temporal dimensions. They formulated a 'warring border nations' (WBN) hypothesis and brought in more refinement in the concept of borders by making a distinction between colonial borders, contiguous borders and economic zones. Yet, their findings were far from being conclusive and satisfactory.⁴³ However, realising that mere interactional opportunity was at best necessary but not sufficient for diffusion, they introduced a 'willingness' element following Bueno de Mesquita's 'Expected Utility' model.⁴⁴ The new spatial element they incorporated in the process was alliance relations which link and array actors on both sides of a conflict.

³⁹ See, Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defence* (New York : Harper and Row) 1962, quoted in Most and Starr, *op. cit.* : 934.

⁴⁰ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Cause of War* (New York : Free Press) 1973, cited in Most and Starr, *ibid* : 934.

⁴¹ See, *ibid* : 935.

⁴² *Ibid* : 935.

⁴³ See, Benjamin A. Most, Harvey Starr and Randolph Siverson, "The logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict" in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), *Hand of War Studies*, (Boston MA Unwin Hyman) 1989 : 119-27.

⁴⁴ *ibid* : 127-33.

Finally, the conclusion they reached verged on near frustration that the "diffusion of warfares appears to be more limited than one might originally have thought."⁴⁵ That means not only were they less successful in finding out a logical and compelling factor behind diffusion, they also came to the conclusion that diffusion itself takes place less frequently than it would seem. One may argue that issues are an important factor to be taken into consideration in assessing conflict widening process. Moreover, Most and Starr also underscored the need for a comprehensive approach to the problem of wider wars :

As was said, this conclusion does not in and of itself advance an understanding of the diffusion/contagion process. It does, however, clarify the limitations of the existing theoretical discussions of such efforts - including our own - and suggests yet another means by which diffusion/contagion arguments can be integrated conceptually with more traditional explanations of public policies.⁴⁶

They also recognised faintly by way of self-critique the role of temporal persistence of warfares :

"A single opportunity is rarely associated with war joining. It is only when *the opportunities accumulate*, or more importantly, are attached to the political opportunity indicated by alliance that the chances of joining an on-going war *begins to build* significantly."⁴⁷

Temporal elements in conflict diffusion remain largely underdeveloped. Davis *et al* used a 'Modified Poisson' process in their analysis of diffusion of wider wars, and thus attempted to take the time element into consideration to detect what they called 'infectious contagion'. However, they did so on a global basis disregarding the geographical distribution of conflicts.⁴⁸ Even if conflicts were found to be linked, such linkages reflected mainly a spurious correlation. Houweling *et al* recognised the need for time-space interactions in demonstrating the spread of warfare following what they called an 'epidemiological' approach. They ended up with the argument that the spread of warfare follows the principle of *tertius gaudens*, that is, a third party's taking the tactical advantage to join a current war.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ See, *ibid* : 135.

⁴⁶ See, Most and Starr (1990) *op. cit.* : 409.

⁴⁷ Emphasis added. See, Siverson and Starr (1990), *op. cit.* : 63.

⁴⁸ See, Davis, Duncan and Siverson (1978), *op. cit.* : 785-92.

⁴⁹ See, Houweling, Faber and Siccama (1985), *op. cit.* : 661.

Within the spatial analytical frame itself, an interesting debate has been whether the diffusion process is as passive and automated as suggested metaphorically by some of the explanatory terms used in the diffusion literature, such as 'infectious contagion', 'epidemiological approach'.⁵⁰ Goertz dismissed the idea of contagion initially and tried to posit the diffusion propositions in a rational actor oriented 'interventionist' model.⁵¹ However, at a later stage, Goertz and Diehl realised the contradictions that the rational actor model leads to because of the assumption that conflicts are temporally dependent. In a rational actor model, the decision makers do not take into account the impact of the past in their calculations.⁵² The debate, however, is largely a misnomer because both elements are operative in complex processes like conflict widening. Arguably war is not caused singly by conscious decisions of a few key persons, but by "broad sociopolitical forces and movements that are beyond the control of any particular rulers. decisions to start wars, for instance, even though taken by individual political leaders, are merely the final expression of such large forces."⁵³ What Luterbacher was aiming at was to bend the rational actor model of decision making to tone down the salience of decision makers in the conflict process. However, there are prominent examples in history in which countries have been dragged into conflicts in an unpremeditated manner. Insofar as these new participants are concerned, the forces that led to their joining have been more autonomous than being parts of a rational decision making process. Conflicts and wars are certainly one of the most serious businesses that confront an actor or a government and thus, it cannot be as automated and passive as the disease metaphor would suggest. At the same time, nations are pulled into the vortex of conflicts by forces that may be the outcome of conscious decisions elsewhere but for these particular participants, the driving force is autonomous. The mechanisms of diffusion are more like 'linkage politics', as also claimed by Most and Starr.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ See, Gary Goertz, "Contagion or Intervention : Two Views on Wider Wars", unpublished paper presented in a seminar at the University of Kent at Canterbury, April 24, 1990.

⁵¹ *Ibid* : 16-19.

⁵² See, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries : Theoretical Constructs and empirical Patterns", *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(2), June 1993 : 147-72

⁵³ See, Luterbacher (1984), *op. cit.* : 166.

⁵⁴ See, Most and Starr (1990), *op. cit.* : 410.

The spatial and temporal dimensions are intertwined in a complex and mutually reinforcing explanatory, if not causal, network. On face value at least, spatial contagion cannot occur without some lapse of time. Similarly, persistence cannot be linear, although some like Goertz and Diehl, have assumed spatial consistency in explaining what they called ‘enduring’ conflicts.⁵⁵ While conflicts do not spread to any and every direction without some causal links, conflicts do not take place in a rigid and sanitised dyadic frame either. Frameworks of enquiry that stipulate confinement to dyadic frames cannot take into account a very important aspect of the dynamics of the prolonged conflicts, namely, their transformation. The thrust of the argument is that the spatial and temporal dimensions of diffusion are interlinked and have to be viewed as such. In other words, it is the alternating or simultaneous spatial and temporal diffusion that makes the PICs persistent as well as protracted or intractable.

To sum up, our experiences with the two sets of approaches, one focusing directly on a sub-set of protracted conflicts, and the other dealing epistemologically with the phenomenon of conflict widening, are mixed. None by itself can answer theoretically the question as to why and how certain international conflicts persist and become intractable. Yet both have elements that we suspect to be complementary and thus hold the prospects of being accommodated in a comprehensive theoretical framework.

2.4 Towards a Temporal-Spatial Diffusion Framework of Protracted International Conflict : A Synthesis

In our attempt to integrate the two approaches, it would be necessary to state the assumptions on which the proposed framework is to be based. First, conflict is an outcome of interaction among three variables, actors, issue and environment. The salience of issues sets the momentum for actors, but at times, the environment also sets the pace. The decisional factor of conflict actors are also important. This assumption, in effect, takes on board both perspectives of a conflict course, namely, an autonomous or sociological perspective, as is the case with the Conflict Diffusion theory, and an issue-actor-centric decisional view, as with the framework of

⁵⁵ See, Goertz and Diehl, op. cit. : 150.

PSCs. Secondly, we retain the assumption of interdependence that is, events or conflicts are not spatially and temporally independent. Thirdly, it is assumed that the temporal and spatial dimensions of conflict widening are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. This has two implications. First, protractedness is not a binary or discrete property. It moves both ways on a spectrum of intractability depending on the forces operating on the course of the conflict.⁵⁶ Secondly, because of the salience of issue, not only the persistence factor, but also the diffusion process of constant interlinking and interpenetration are operative throughout the course of the conflict, including the pre-conflict and origin phases.

On the basis of the discussion of the preceding sections and the assumptions just made, we develop the following suggestive propositions that would guide the empirical enquiry of the thesis :

Proposition 1 : The origin of an international conflict is an outcome of a complex process involving reinforcement of accumulated tensions, and diffusion and interlinkages of issues; the level or arena of the conflict and the intensity of violence will be dictated by the centrality and salience of an issue over which most of the conflictual interactions take place.

In a sense, the proposition is a deduction from the argument that origin of the conflict is but a part of the global process of a conflict and therefore, should not be separated.⁵⁷ However, the proposition addresses a more important question, why the forces distributed ubiquitously in the conflict environment should converge on a principal axis of conflict or a salient issue and become subsumed in it to make the conflict explode into violence. We are arguing that salience of an issue sets in motion a process of polarisation and combination in the conflict environment. In this context, Vasquez argues :

⁵⁶ See, Kriesberg, *et al* (1989), *op. cit.* : 3.

⁵⁷ For a persuasive argument, see, Braillard (1982), *op. cit.* : 155. For a rigorous model based analysis of the contagion-diffusion process in the 'sub-war' or origin phase of conflicts, see, John M. Rothgeb, Jr., "Interaction and Participation in Sub-war Conflict, 1959-63", *International Interactions*, 11(3-4), 1984 : 357-80.

Polarization focuses the attention of both sides on the main issue that divide them and reduces the salience of cross-cutting issues. This promotes persistent disagreement; makes all minor stakes symbolic of larger ones (thereby collapsing all issues between the main rivals into one overarching issue); and greatly accentuates rivalry and hostility.⁵⁸

We shall investigate the origins of the Kashmir war in 1947 to gain more insights. It may be mentioned that the origin of a PIC is intended to be explained by the same interaction process as will be employed to explain persistence and intractability. For the latter, however, we need a more explicit proposition.

Proposition 2: Once a conflict is initiated over a salient issue as an outcome of prior conflictual processes or sub-wars, persistence and degree of intractability of the conflict would depend on the degree to which violence and tensions interlink with other issues or conflicts, and also on the nature of the conflict management and resolution attempts undertaken.

It would make sense to argue that given the salience of an issue, lapse of time and the growth of vested interests around the issue, also possibly contribute to intractability.

Proposition 3: Periodic flare ups in protracted conflicts may occur for a variety of situations but the underlying reason is one of cumulation of tensions in the dyadic relations or a change in the operational milieu of the conflict.

Azar emphasises the potency of issues or combination of issues in such flare ups, when he says, "Two factors, one hostile and one peaceful, may neutralize each other. By the same token two seemingly harmless and neutral elements may create an unanticipated combustion of hostility."⁵⁹

Vasquez, on the other hand, focuses on the role of coalition building and accumulation of threat perception, when he says,

it seems plausible that in a protracted conflict between equals that becomes a rivalry, the making of an alliance by one side will lead to the making of a counter-alliance as well as a competition for allies. This will polarize the system and produce a number of effects which increase the perceived threat and lead to behaviour that is more conflictual.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See, Vasquez (1987), *op. cit.* : 128.

⁵⁹ See, Azar(1983), *op. cit.* : 92.

It remains for the empirical investigation to make further inferences on this.

Proposition 4: An ideal condition for transformation is a prolonged stalemate, and existence of fissures in the immediate conflict environment providing outlets for new actors to join the conflict.

Prolonged periods of stalemate in a deep-rooted and historical conflict, we tried to argue above, lead to a search for alternative outlets on the part of existing actors as well as sub-actors whose visibility remains largely blurred when the conflict is active. It is in this context that changes in the environmental variables tend to stimulate or influence the course of the conflict.

We have developed these propositions to guide the case study paying specific attention to the origin, persistence and possible transformation of the PIC case. However, to facilitate the examination, we also attempt to develop an ideal type analytical frame in which the variables or factors are presented in a sequential phase.

2.5 An Analytical Framework of Spatial-Temporal Conflict Diffusion

Given the objectives of the thesis in terms of tracking down the course of a prolonged conflict in order to explain its protractedness, one useful technique, again heuristic in orientation, is, *synchronising, timing sequencing and event linking*.⁶¹ The meaning of these expressions will be evident if an ideal type of the chain of relationships among the conceptual components of protractedness, namely, the temporal and spatial aspects are depicted based on the line of theoretical arguments in the preceding section. Such a chain of relationship is shown in Figure 2. The 'origin' of the protractedness is shown, as postulated, as the outcome of the previous sub-war phase. The origin coincides with a militarised phase resulting in intense hostilities and animosities, which, in turn, spill over into the operational milieu. The temporal dimensions are set in by two forces, operating theoretically in opposite directions : generation and solidifying the

⁶⁰ See, Vasquez(1987), *op. cit.* : 127-28.

⁶¹ For detailed discussion, see, William J. Dixon, "The Discrete Sequential Analysis of Dynamic International Behaviour", *Quality and Quantity*, International Journal of Methodology, 22(3), 1988 : 239-54.




Fig 2 : Spatial and Temporal Diffusion in Protracted International Conflicts

‘enemy’ psychosis and attempts at cooling off, mediation or negotiations. In case the attempts abort, the conflict passes the first phase of protractedness.

Certain general remarks on the basis of the analytical model may be made. First, the origins of the conflict, as conceptualised and presented here, uphold the adage that ‘conflict breeds conflict’. Thus, the origins of a conflict take place when a high salience conflict is joined by other conflicting issues and actors. The idea is that the salience of an issue in a conflict induces other related conflicts to converge toward the conflict spot. Secondly, it is hard to isolate conceptually the spatial diffusion and temporal protractedness, because they are mutually reinforcing. However, for analytical purposes, it may be argued that a very intricate process is operative : tensions emit to link up and feedback tensions come in amplified form. Thirdly, we have made protractedness an empirical possibility rather than a deterministic outcome. Thus, a conflict may subside, cool off, get protracted or transform. Transformation refers to a change of actor and arena. It would be interesting to see empirically under what circumstances change of arenas takes place.

2.6 The Summing Up

In the preceding chapter, the conceptual components of the PICs were identified. The task left for this chapter has been to evolve a theoretical and analytical framework to provide an understanding of the underlying relationship between protractedness or intractability and the conceptual components. Two sets of available works have been reviewed at the beginning. One set focuses directly on the protracted conflicts themselves, though it is conceptually narrower in scope than the concept of PIC. The second set concerns the conflict widening process. The review suggests that neither set answers the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ questions satisfactorily. The proponents of deep-rooted or protracted societal conflicts impute ontological values to the issues. The concerns of PICs are much wider. Even within their epistemological boundaries, the ontology paradigm runs into trouble because ethnicity, religion, language, distributive and participative needs are ontological, but the way conflicts evolve, these issues may not be pre-

existing in immutable proportion in a conflict situation. In order to make the framework of protracted conflicts tenable theoretically and empirically, we have modified the basic assumption of ontology into one in which issues are conceived as substantive or valuable ones.

The position that the present work has taken is that both approaches have something useful but none by itself can offer a satisfactory frame of analysis. Of course, the factors that made this combination possible were the compatibility and sort of natural linkage because both basically deal with the same set of conflicts.

The basic proposition that underlies the framework is a combined role issues, actors and the environmental variables. The issues set the momentum for actors, but the environment itself sometimes overtakes the momentum from the actors. The combination or interactions produce diffusion of conflicts. Such a framework liberates the PICs from the unrealistically rigorous rational actor model and the passivity of the contagion frame, as a variant of diffusion theory. Likewise, it does not have to depend on the strong assumption of ontological forces to propel the conflicts.

The analytical frame basically relates the conceptual components of protracted international conflicts, namely, spatial linkage, and temporal protractedness. In linking the predictor variables to the phenomenon of protractedness, these two predictors are broken into sub-variables to make the direction of operation of the variables evident. In this sense, the analytical frame is more than a collection of some organising concepts. They depict the process of operation showing protractedness as an empirical possibility among many. However, the analytical frame is not a deterministic relationship. Many questions have been raised but they have been left open for empirical investigation. It is only on the basis of empirical examination of a PIC case that we shall be able to answer them and take up a brief discussion of the findings. However, in order to put the case study in a broader empirical perspective, a compendium of contemporary international conflicts in the region of South Asia is undertaken in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND : A COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA 1947-1990

3.1 Introduction

The burden of the empirical investigation of the thesis, to recapitulate, is on the case study of a protracted international conflict in South Asia, namely, Kashmir, 1947-90. In order to put the case in a broader empirical perspective, a survey based on a compendium of spatial and temporal characteristics of international conflicts of the region during the period under reference will be undertaken in this chapter. The universe of cases of protracted international conflicts (PIC) in the region will also be identified. It is not the purpose of the exercise to lead to a selection of the PIC case in a systematic manner for the case study, because the case is evidently pre-selected. Besides, the number of international conflicts and hence, the universe of PICs in South Asia, we suspect, will be very limited for any such meaningful exercise. Moreover, the pre-selected case of Kashmir, by any standard, is the most enduring and most complex of the conflicts in the region. However, we propose to present a brief profile of PICs in the universe. The profile is expected to provide a *post factum* justification of the pre-selection.

The chapter begins with an historical overview of conflicts and warfare in the region since very early periods of the South Asian history (Section 3.2). Although a detailed and rigorous analysis of the elements of change and continuity of these conflicts and warfare in the region is beyond the scope of the chapter, the historical overview will nonetheless put some of the prolonged and problematic conflicts of contemporary South Asia in perspective. Section 3.3 gives a comparative overview of contemporary South Asian conflicts, on the basis of a review of different datasets and data based studies on international conflicts.¹ The overview will also aid the

¹ See, Appendices IIa-IIe.

compilation of a general list of 'candidate' international conflicts.² These candidate cases are screened following the criteria of international conflicts of this study³ to obtain a list of international conflicts in South Asia.⁴ The spatial and temporal characteristics of the conflicts are discussed in Section 3.4. A second stage screening based on the criteria of protractedness⁵ will be undertaken in Section 3.5 to obtain the universe of cases of protracted international conflicts. Finally, a comparative profile of the PIC cases in South Asia is provided with a few preliminary remarks on the Kashmir conflict in Section 3.6.

3.2. Conflicts and Warfare in South Asia : An Historical Background

The history of the present region of South Asia is one of conflict and warfare between diverse powers and population groups right from the collapse of the Indus civilisation around the second millennium B.C. until the departure of the British from the Subcontinent in 1947. The "great cycle of South Asian history", especially its political demography, consisted of wave after wave of inflow of several races spanning over a period of more than three thousand years.⁶ The constant inflow of diverse population groups over such a long period of time was accompanied by frictions with frequent outbursts in violent conflict. Consequently, conflict became an endemic element of settlement and political development of the region. The conflicts assumed different forms – ritualistic war, political or greed war, heroic or aggrandizing war, holy war, and protective or defensive war.⁷ Of course, the issues, content and forms of the conflicts had changed, and many had also ceased to be extant in course of time. Others, however, had left

² By 'candidate' international conflicts, we mean disputes, crises and conflicts in the region which satisfy the inclusion criteria of at least one of the available data based conflict studies, and thus, have the possibility of meeting the criteria of international conflicts of the present study. See, Appendix III.

³ See, Section 1.3.1, Chapter I.

⁴ See, Appendix IV.

⁵ See, Section 1.3.2, Chapter I.

⁵ See, Appendix IV.

⁶ See, Hugh Tinker, *South Asia : A Short History* (London : The Macmillan Press) [Reprinted] 1989 : 1-27. Also see, Francis Robinson (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives* (Cambridge : The Cambridge University Press) 1989 : 68-166.

⁷ For the typology, see, Ofer Zur, "The Psychohistory of Warfare : The Coevolution [sic] of Culture, Psychology and Enemy", *Journal of Peace Research*, 24(2), 1987 : 125-134.

strong legacies for contemporary conflicts of the region.

The overriding factor that shaped the history of the region throughout the ages was a 'palimpsest' nature of its assimilation. Most of the alien races and cultures were absorbed in the local societies, yet the incoming races retained their distinctive traits.⁸ This process of assimilation engendered elements of coexistence and conflict, as has aptly been summed up by Hugh Tinker :

For long periods of time, rival religions and cultures have coexisted in South Asia. ... Time and again, this peaceful coexistence has been rudely terminated, as leaders of one community have sought to dominate and obliterate their rivals. In almost every instance, the attempt to impose a unified system of thought, or of government has shattered the loose but workable harmony of coexistence and hastened the fragmentation of the Indic world.⁹

The cycle of domination and unification followed by disintegration had been an important source of conflicts in the region since very early times. The history of formation and disintegration of several large empires of South Asia, such as the Magadha empire under the Nanda dynasty during the fourth century B.C., the Mauryan empire during 321-185 B.C., the Gupta era during 300 A.D to the latter half of fifth century A.D., the Khilji era, 1299-1320 under the Delhi Sultanate, and finally, Akbar's reign as the height of the Mughal period, bears testimony to this pattern. Warfare was an integral part of the very process of empire building and its protection. Besides, the power and wealth of these empires also attracted hostile and coveted attention from powers in the hills and steppes of Central Asia and adjoining places.¹⁰

The first set of recorded conflicts in the region took place around the period of the Aryan settlement and its expansion southward from the site of the Indus civilisation. Scholars are in general agreement on the basis of recent archeological findings, that the Aryan tribes fought the Dravidians with their superior weaponry in the latter's city based civilisation in the Indus basin. The Dravidians were eventually driven southward.¹¹ The semi-nomadic Aryans, however, left

⁸ See, Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Bombay : Asia Publishing House) 1966 : 50-60.

⁹ See Tinker, *op. cit.* : xiv.

¹⁰ See, Robinson, *op. cit.* : 90-99.:296

¹¹ See, Stanley Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia : Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Super-powers* (New York : Oxford University Press) 1982 : 9. See, also, his *A New History of India* (New York : Oxford University Press) [4th edition] 1993 : 14, 25.

the arid Indus basin and moved to the fertile Ganges Valley to the south-east where they became involved in constant conflict with the local people mainly over cattle and land for settlement. As life of the Aryans was being transformed from a pastoral to an agricultural one, the tribal kinship bond assumed a territorial identity, and the inter-tribal conflicts over assets (cattle, agricultural land) and domination became frequent. One such noted conflict was the battle of *Dasarajana*, or the ten kings, in which a confederacy of ten kings led by the *Brahmin* priest, Visvamitra was defeated by the *Bharatas*, who favoured another priest, Vashistha.¹² As political life became more organised and some rudimentary forms of state or self-governing political entity, known as *janapadas* or republics, came into existence, "ceaseless wars among themselves, with endless changes of ranks and frontiers" became commonplace.¹³ The scope of such conflicts ranged from internal (intra-tribe, even intra-family) to inter-republic feuds for conquest of territories, domination and the establishment of tributary relationships.¹⁴

Internal power struggles, rivalry and palace politics had been commonplace in the Subcontinent in almost every major historical period. It was observed to be as prevalent during the Vedic-Classical Age (1500 B.C. to 650 A.D.) as during the period of Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526 A.D.) and the Mughal empire (1526-1707). Internal power struggles were the main contributory factors to the collapse of these dynasties and empires. The seal of collapse in most cases was put by an involvement in local feuds by external powers both on their own and by invitation.¹⁵ Babar, a Central Asian warrior, was invited by the contenders of throne in Delhi

¹² It is after the *Bharatas*, who lived between the river Sarasvati (in Punjab, eventually lost in the desert of Rajasthan), and the river Yamuna, that the whole of the territory came to be known as *Bharatvarsha*, the Indian Subcontinent.

¹³ See, Percival Spear (ed.), *Oxford History of India* (New Delhi : Oxford University Press) [4th edition] 1981 : 91-92.

¹⁴ The earliest form of power struggle was an intra-dynastic one, which occurred in the noted 18-day battles between the *Kurus* and *Pandavas* at Kurukshetra around 800 B.C. This constituted the subject matter of the epic, *Mahabharata*. See, E. J. Rapson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of India, Vol. I : Ancient India* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press : 262-75. See, also, R. Thaper, *Ancient Indian Social History : Some Interpretations*, (New Delhi) 1978.

¹⁵ The classic case, again drawing from another epic story, *Ramayana*, was the linkage of two conflicts originating in two separate locations, one in Ayodhya in the mid-Ganges Valley, and the other, in the island of Lanka (present Sri Lanka), ruled by the *Ravanas* (demons). In Ayodhya, an intra-family power struggle over succession to the throne led to the self-banishment of the Hindu Lord, Rama and his wife, Seeta. As the *Ravanas* kidnapped Seeta, the younger brother of Rama, Lakshman, launched a campaign to recover her. Lakshman succeeded in his mission with the connivance of one of the *Ravana's* brothers, again because of fratricidal squabbles. For some details, see, Rapson, *op. cit.* : 264.

against Ibrahim Lodhi. This paved the way to the collapse of the Delhi Sultanate and the ushering in of the Mughal era.¹⁶

In medieval Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), mercenaries were hired from South India to fight local wars. It was one of the mechanisms through which Southern Indian kingdoms, themselves engaged in constant warfare, were linked to Sri Lankan politics, possibly presaging the conflictual relevance that the present South Indian state of Tamil Nadu bears to the Tamil ethnic problems in Sri Lanka. The entry of the Portuguese and the Dutch in succession in the politics of Sri Lanka also illustrates another example of external intervention by invitation in local conflicts. In the context of rivalry for the control over the whole of Ceylon among three contending local kingdoms, namely, Jaffna (in northern Sri Lanka, Tamil populated and the base of the present Tamil militants), Kandy (southern Sri Lanka) and Kotte (near Colombo), the king of Kotte hoped that the Portuguese protection would preserve his realm against rival kingdoms and against his plotting brothers.¹⁷ However, the Portuguese rulers got entrenched in Ceylon and clashed with the very local powers they were supposed to protect. The ruler of Kandy invited the Dutch to fight the Portuguese. The Dutch did the job of ousting the Portuguese, but they, in turn, got entrenched in Ceylon by establishing their hold in Jaffna.¹⁸

The Portuguese sea power was also involved in conflicts between the rulers of Bengal and independent Arakan (in Burma, bordering Bangladesh). Another historic example of local-external interface marking the watershed in the history of the Subcontinent was the connivance of the Calcutta financial class, known as the *Seths*, with Robert Clive against the last *Nawab* (ruler) of Bengal, Sirajuddoula in the battle of Plassey, 1757.¹⁹ It was through such participation in neighbourly enmity which eventually led to a consolidation of the British power in the Subcontinent, step by step, from revenue rights to administrative and military responsibility and

¹⁶ See Robinson, *op. cit.* : 99

¹⁷ For details, see Tinker, *op. cit.* : 86-87; and C.R. de Silva, *The Portuguese in Ceylon, 1617-1638*, (Colombo : Ceylon University Press) 1972.

¹⁸ See K.W. Goonewardena, *The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1638-1658* (The Hague : Netherlands Institute of International Cultural Relations) 1958, cited in Hugh Tinker, *op. cit.* : 90-91.

¹⁹ See, Robinson, *op. cit.* : 110-11

eventually, to the development of power relations, by the end of nineteenth century. In the process, the British fought several major wars with the Mahrattas, the Sikhs and the Afghans.²⁰

Other variants of external linkage of domestic and regional conflicts were also observed. Sometimes the region was sucked into the external politics of Central Asia.²¹ Again conflicts were transferred from elsewhere to the region and its vicinity. Thus, the Portuguese opening of the sea route to the Indian Ocean region led to sea battles between the Portuguese, on the one hand, and the Persian and the Arab powers, on the other.²² As the Portuguese consolidated their hold in peninsular India and adjoining regions, they were challenged by emerging Protestant maritime powers, the Dutch and the British, who had been so long absorbed in fighting Spain around their shores.²³ When Portugal was defeated by Spain, while the former still retained its hold over the Eastern sea trade including in the Indian Ocean, warfare shifted to the Indian Ocean areas. Britain and the Netherlands became pitted against Portugal. Thus, "the English and Dutch entry into Asia was an extension of the Protestant cause : economic warfare against Madrid and Rome."²⁴

Another dimension of the European conflict fought in and around the region concerned the War of the Austrian Succession in which all the countries of Western Europe including France and Britain were involved. This was followed by seventy years of naval warfare in the Eastern seas between France and Britain.²⁵ In particular, it took many years of fighting before the British could dislodge the well-entrenched French position. Even then the French retained some territories until after the decolonisation of the Subcontinent by the British in 1947.²⁶ The external conflicts fought in the region as such did not survive the passage of time. What, however,

²⁰ See, Robinson, *op. cit.* : 111-20. Also, see, J. E. Schwartzberg, *Historical Atlas of South Asia* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press) 1978 : 210-14. For a review of these wars in the context of contemporary interstate and extra-systemic wars, see, Melvin Small and J. D. Singer, *Resort to Arms : International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications) 1982 : 79-80, 82-99, and 222-32.

²¹ See, Tinker, *op. cit.* : 8.

²² *Ibid* : 81, 84.

²³ *Ibid* : 85.

²⁴ *Ibid* : 89.

²⁵ For some details, see, Spear, *The Oxford History of India*, *op. cit.* : 455-64.

²⁶ See, R. L. Butterworth, *Management of Interstate Conflict, 1945-74 : Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press) 1976 : 112-13.

survived with significant resilience was dissension and division caused by siding and co-option of the local groups with contending external powers. The divisions among the local elements often took place along religious and ethnic lines. This happened both in the mainland Subcontinent and in the island state of Sri Lanka. Of course, the ethnic and religious cleavages, while being exacerbated by external interference, had their own internal logic of origins and persistence.

In fact, the most prominent facet of conflict that survived the passage of time and left strong legacies for contemporary conflicts of South Asia had been the conflicts between races and religions with cross-cutting edges.²⁷ The ethno-religious convulsions and cross-national overlappings of ethnicity, language and religion, often resulting in communal violence, ethnic separatism with inter-state implications in the region, are arguably taking place along certain politico-demographic fault lines, deeply rooted in the history of the region.²⁸ A number of such fault lines may be identified. Firstly, the introduction of religion itself in territories comprising present South Asia had been conflictual. Development of conflict lines spanned intra-religious as well as inter-religious spheres. Thus, the Aryans distinguished between the people of *Aryavarta* and those living beyond it, even if they were Aryans. In Aryan perceptions, those who lived in the Punjab across the river Sarasvati were not part of the land of the pure. The people who lived in the Punjab are believed to be descendants of the Scythian population, who came to the region later and who had different ethno-cultural traits. The emergence of the contemporary divide between the heartland Hindus and the Punjabi speaking people as a prelude to the present Sikh separatism might be traced to this original divide. The Punjab happened to be treated as a frontier of the Subcontinent both by the insiders and outsiders. The external forces mostly stopped at the Punjab while extending their territorial control over the region.²⁹

²⁷ See, Malcolm Yapp, "Language, Religion and Political Identity : A General Framework" : 1-34, and David Taylor, "Political Identity in South Asia" : 255-65, in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.), *Political Identity in South Asia* (London : Curzon Press) 1979.

²⁸ A politico-demographic fault line is frequently used to indicate certain deep structural schism, cleavages and soft spots, where a volcano of violence may erupt whenever a suitable outlet is created. An analogy may also be drawn to the concept of 'shatterbelt' which is used in conflict studies to refer to a geographical area where people of diverse origins co-exist retaining separate identities, so that external powers get a foothold to escalate conflicts. For some details, see, Philip Kelly, "Escalation of Regional Conflicts : Testing the Shatterbelt Concept", *Political Geography Quarterly*, 5(2), April 1986 : 161-80.

²⁹ The Aryans took five centuries to move from the Khyber to beyond the region of Delhi. See, Wolpert(1993), *ibid* : 29. At a later stage, Cyrus II, could extend his Persian empire up to Punjab. For historical

A second divide occurred along religio-ethnic line in Sri Lanka. Several factors may be held responsible for the development of this ethno-religious division. The first, we recall, was that a political clash between Hinduism and Buddhism which occurred as early as the Maurya period. In fact, many historians believe that following the disintegration of the empire of Ashoka as a backlash of *Brahminism*, Buddhism was exiled to Burma and Sri Lanka.³⁰ Thus, the traditional rivalry between Hinduism and Buddhism found resiliency in the Sinhalese-Tamil relations. Secondly, prolonged conflicts among the three South Indian kingdoms - the Cholas, Cheras and Pandyas - were also in course of time extended to Sri Lanka.³¹

The most prominent geopolitical fault line, however, developed between the Hindus and the Muslims, the two largest religious groups in the Subcontinent. The introduction of Islam in the Subcontinent, which itself was conflictual,³² had a powerful impact on the Subcontinental politics. It started with the founding of the Delhi Sultanate by the Mamluks in 1206.³³ It is this religious divide that led to several bloody communal turmoils on the eve of the partition of 1947.³⁴ The Hindu-Muslim communal divide was transformed into an India-Pakistan rivalry, and thus shaped the direction of inter-state relations between India and Pakistan for a long time to come after independence.³⁵

From what we have outlined briefly above, it turns out that the region of South Asia witnessed several facets of historical conflicts. Some conflicts are no longer extant because of the changed circumstances. However, warfare along ethnic and religious lines and external

background leading to the emergence of the Sikh community see, Charles Gough and Arthur D. Innes, *The Sikhs and The Sikh Wars (The Rise, Conquest, and Annexation of the Punjab State)* (Delhi : National Book Shop) 1984 [Reprinted] : 12-19

³⁰ The *Brahmin* class always provided the political, administrative and diplomatic talents to the various dynastic rulers. Kautilya, the author of *Arthashastra*, a classic work on statecraft and diplomacy, was the Prime Minister of Chandragupta, the Grandfather of Ashoka. See, Robinson, *op. cit.* : 77.

³¹ See, Wolpert (1993), *op. cit.* : 99-103. See also, de Silva, *op. cit.*

³² The Arab sea trade was repeatedly disrupted by pirates, but the Hindu king Dahir of Sind did not take measures against the pirates, despite repeated requests, Muhammad bin Quasim invaded and captured Sind in 711. Of course, the major thrust of the political Islam in the Subcontinent came by land from the north. See, Spear, *op. cit.* : 38-40. See, also, Wolpert(1993), *op. cit.* : 105-12.

³³ See, Spear, *ibid* : 232-70.

³⁴ See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 30-32.

³⁵ This is in anticipation of an argument in Chapter IV.

interference in local wars seem to have left strong legacies for the contemporary conflicts in the region. It is in this perspective that we made an attempt to delve into "roots of its [South Asia's] ancient yet enduring forest of complex culture to help clarify the dominant ideas, attitudes, fears and aspirations of its modern heirs".³⁶ It is the contemporary conflicts of South Asia's 'modern heirs' to which we are turning now.

3.3 Contemporary South Asian International Conflicts in Existing Conflict Studies

In this section, we take an overview of the contemporary South Asian international conflicts, in general, on the basis of a review of existing data based studies. It is expected that a comparative picture will provide a useful stepping stone for building a compendium of international conflicts in the region, containing *inter alia* their temporal and spatial characteristics of the conflicts. Five such data based studies are considered. These are, Correlates of War (COW) project,³⁷ International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) project,³⁸ Butterworth's data with synopses,³⁹ Maoz's serious interstate dispute (SID) data, as an offshoot of the COW data,⁴⁰ and Kende's data on 'local wars'.⁴¹ In what follows, an individual as well as comparative profile of the datasets on South Asian international conflicts is given.

The COW data deal with three categories of war : inter-state wars between state-directed armies, colonial or imperial wars, and civil wars. In the last category, at least one participant is not a member of the state-system. One critical test of war is the criterion of 1000 battle casualties.⁴² In all, 14 conflicts in South Asia during 1816-1980 qualify as wars following COW

³⁶ See, Wolpert(1982), *op. cit.* : 7-8.

³⁷ See, Small and Singer, *op. cit.* : 78-96, for a list of all international and civil wars between 1816-1980 with some basic information.

³⁸ See, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crises in World Politics", *World Politics*, 34(3), April 1982 : 380-417 for concepts and basic profile of the international crises between 1945-1980. Region-wise international crises data, organised at both actor level and system level, are available in the computing system of the University of Kent at Canterbury(UKC), courtesy, Dr. Keith Webb, International Relations, UKC.

³⁹ See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 481-509, for the Codebook and data.

⁴⁰ See, Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict : International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) 1982 : 233-46, for a list of randomly sampled SIDs during 1816-1976.

⁴¹ See, Istvan Kende, "Twenty Five Years of Local Wars", *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(1), 1971: 5-22, and "Ten Years of Local Wars", *Journal of Peace Research*, 15(3), 1978 : 327-41.

⁴² See, Small and Singer, *op. cit.* : 36-47.

criteria.⁴³ Of them, five – British-Maharattan war (1817-18), the British-Sikh war (1845-46), the First British-Afghan war (1848-49), the Sepoy Mutiny (1857) and the Second British-Afghan war (1878-79) – occurred before the reference period of the study, 1947-1990. Of the remaining nine, the COW project characterised two – the First Kashmir war (1947-49) and the Hyderabad war (1948) – as imperial wars, four – the Sino-Indian war (1962), the Second Kashmir war (1965), the Russo-Afghan war (1979-80),⁴⁴ and the Bangladesh war (1971) – as inter-state, while three – the Pakistani civil war (1971), the initial phase of the Bangladesh war, the Afghanistan war (1978-79), and the Sri Lankan Trotskyite insurrection by the *Janata Vimukti Peramuna* (JVP) – as civil wars.⁴⁵ Among these entries, whether the Russo-Afghan war of 1979-80 could be considered as an inter-state war is open to question. To be precise, before the Soviet intervention in December 1979, there was a row between the former Soviet Union and Afghan President Hafizullah Amin. But as he was removed from the scene and Babrak Karmal was installed the Russo-Afghan coalition fought a prolonged civil war against the Afghan *Mujahedins*. The latter, however, has been entered separately and rightly so, as a civil war.⁴⁶

If the COW criteria are applied to the period beyond 1980, no significant inter-state war will be included,⁴⁷ but a number of domestic conflicts, notably, Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, 1983-90, Sikh separatism in the Indian state of the Punjab (1984-90), and Kashmiri militancy on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989-90, will be added to the list. Incidentally, all the three domestic conflicts just mentioned have undergone internationalisation in varying degrees.⁴⁸ According to the COW criteria, only the Sri Lankan insurrection in 1971 among the South Asian

⁴³ See, Appendix IIa. See, also Small and Singer, *ibid* : 79-80, 222. Although Afghanistan has not been considered as a member of the South Asian sub-system, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the protracted wars that ensued have been considered a South Asian conflict, inasmuch as Pakistan was an important, even if not direct, party, to the conflict.

⁴⁴ The Russo-Afghan war, 1979-89, again cannot be considered an inter-state between Afghanistan.

⁴⁵ See, Appendix IIa.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

⁴⁷ The Siachen conflict which broke into open confrontations several times between India and Pakistan during 1984-88, will not satisfy the battle casualty criterion of the COW dataset.

⁴⁸ To be precise, the Kashmir problem has historically been an interstate conflict. The recent Kashmiri militancy with its goal of a separation of the Jammu and Kashmir State from the Indian Union also has its fallout on the India-Pakistan bilateral relations. More discussions will be made in Chapters VIII and IX. For internationalisation of the Sikh and the Tamil problem, see, K. M. de Silva and R. J. May (eds.), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict* (London : Pinter Publishers) 1991 : 42-57 and 76-115, respectively.

wars, could be considered as a decoupled civil war from the point of view of internationalisation.

The COW data, although generated by probably the most extensive and ambitious continuing research project on international conflicts at the global level,⁴⁹ need significant supplementing before being used for conflict studies at regional or sub-regional levels. This is for two reasons. First, valuable details, especially of the lower-threshold cases at micro-level are lost with a global focus on conflicts because of what may be called the 'telescopic effect'. From a regional perspective, the lower-threshold cases are significant yet they cannot be obtained through applying the global level criteria. Secondly, the COW criteria are too exclusive in some cases, and too inclusive in others.

The second dataset dealing with 'international crises' has been generated by the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) project. Apart from other differences, the major contrast between COW data and the international crisis behaviour (ICB) data is that in the latter, actual military force may not be used at all, while in the COW conception of war, not only militarised violence has actually been used, but the toll of battle casualty has to reach a certain threshold.

A crisis is basically a perceived situation for an actor arising out of an act, event or change in a system that poses grave threat to central values of the concerned actors with only finite time to respond.⁵⁰ The ICB dataset identified 16 crisis cases in South Asia for the period 1947-85.⁵¹ However, there are two glaring cases of unexplained omission. One is the Marxist insurrection by the Trotskite *Janata Vimukti Peramuna* (JVP - People's Liberation Front) in April 1971, which almost toppled the Government in Colombo. The second omission has been the ethnic riot, again in Sri Lanka in July 1983. The ethnic violence was an international crisis of grave dimension threatening the incumbent Jayewardene regime in Colombo. It was out of this threat perception that Colombo reportedly sought assistance from a number of countries in apprehension of an Indian attack in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils.⁵² Another anomaly concerned the Goa crisis in

⁴⁹ For a critique of the COW project, see, David Dessler, "Beyond Correlations : Toward a Causal Theory of War", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(3), September 1991 : 337-55

⁵⁰ See, related discussion in Section 1.3.1 in Chapter I.

⁵¹ See, Appendix IIb.

⁵² This, in turn, provoked India to enunciate what came to be dubbed as the India Doctrine or the Indian

1961, which has been recorded as a single actor crisis case for Portugal. The Indian military action in Goa in 1961 was, in fact, a sequel to earlier hostile interactions between India and Portugal.⁵³ The Goa problem, thus, was an interstate crisis.

As is inherent in the concept of crisis, inconsequential cases have been recorded in the ICB dataset while more serious cases have been left out. Thus, the crisis of the 'Punjab War Scare' which occurred in mid-1951 in India-Pakistan relations following significant mobilisation of their respective troops, more serious crisis cases like the Bengal communal riot, over which both India and Pakistan came to the brink of the precipice,⁵⁴ have not been mentioned in the ICB data. In the period beyond 1985,⁵⁵ a number of crises took place in the region. In India-Pakistan relations alone three cases may be mentioned : the hostilities in the Siachen Glacier, the nuclear debate, especially, the reported possibility of attack on each other's nuclear installations, and the latest Kashmiri militancy with the spectre of both conventional and nuclear confrontations looming large over the horizon a number of times during the 1989-90 period. In India-Sri Lanka relations, a major crisis situation developed when the Indian aircrafts escorted by MiG fighters dropped relief goods in besieged Jaffna in May 1987. Following this incident, the usually defiant Jayewardene regime buckled to sign the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 on the Tamil ethnic problem. Of course, a real crisis situation that we are constrained to exclude because of the absence of the military dimension was the Indo-Nepal trade and transit *impasse* of 1989-90 in which landlocked Nepal faced an economic blockade from India.⁵⁶

Butterworth built up his dataset using the concept of 'interstate security conflicts', which "centrally involve specific power political aims and demands having direct impact on national behaviour and that which were perceived internationally as being focused on political-security

version of the Monroe Doctrine. See, *India Today*, August 1983. Also see, Abdur Rob Khan, *Strategic Factors in Indo-Sri Lankan Relations*, **BIISS Papers** [Dhaka] No 4, 1986.

⁵³ See, O. Salazar, "Goa and the Indian Union: The Portuguese View", *Foreign Affairs*, 34(3), 1956 : 418-31.

⁵⁴ See, *The Round Table*, 40(159), June 1950 : 264.

⁵⁵ The ICB data available to the present researcher were updated to 1985.

⁵⁶ For some details of the dispute from a Nepali perspective, see, Dhruva Kumar, "Managing Nepal's India Policy", *Asian Survey*, 30(7), July 1990 : 697-710.

affairs."⁵⁷ Butterworth excluded domestic strife that did not lead directly to inter-state conflicts, and diffuse antagonism and instances of general interstate competition. The decolonisation process involving technical negotiations, as happened with Sri Lankan independence from the UK, was excluded while the decolonisation process involving intercommunal hostilities, competing territorial claims, as happened with the Indian Subcontinent in 1947, was included. During 1945-74, which was Butterworth's time frame, a total of 17 cases of inter-state conflict in South Asia was recorded by Butterworth.⁵⁸ If the Butterworth criteria are extended for the period beyond 1974 up to 1990, at least twelve more cases could be included.⁵⁹ Evidently, the threshold of hostile interactions in the Butterworth data is rather low. Thus, such cases as the Nepalese Exiles in 1960, in which violence in the inter-state aspect was non-existent, the issue of the transfer of the French Territories, which took place without much fuss from the French authorities, the Indus Canal Water disputes, in which military force was displayed but not actually used, have been included as inter-state conflict cases. In this respect, the Butterworth data come closer to ICB data, despite the fact that there are major conceptual differences between the two. Mentionably, there are cases which the COW project took on board but Butterworth did not, because of the absence of the international dimension, as with the 1971 Sri Lankan insurrection.

The next dataset in our review concerns the 'Serious Interstate Dispute' (SID) cases of Zeev Maoz. He recorded nine dispute cases for the period 1945-76.⁶⁰ However, as the list of the SIDs is only sampled, one has reason to believe that the actual number of SIDs during the period under reference will be higher. The constituents of SIDs are military confrontation activities (MCA) which include verbal acts like mere threats and non-violent acts such as the display of military force. In this respect, SIDs become empirically comparable to the ICB and Butterworth datasets.

⁵⁷ See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 2-3.

⁵⁸ See, Appendix IIc. We have dropped Butterworth's 'India-Pakistan Negotiations' during 1949-64 (Case Nos. 047, 048) on Kashmir because it was more a case of a conflict management than a conflict case. Of course, a number of crisis situations developed in India-Pakistan relations during this period, as we have mentioned in connection with the review of the ICB data. The Rann of Kutch incident of 1956 has been counted separately by Butterworth as a conflict case, although it was a mere incident of the SID type, which will be reviewed next.

⁵⁹ These may be checked from Appendix III.

⁶⁰ See, Appendix IIId.

Secondly, SID/MCA is incident dependent, rather than interaction dependent. In this sense, it is comparable to the ICB data. In fact, a single shot in a single day, so to say, would qualify as case of SID. If such a standard is followed, perhaps, the universe of cases would be unbounded, especially in a Third World region like South Asia with more than half a dozen countries having contiguous borders. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the data for the SIDs have been generated from the COW dataset and the problem of ‘telescopic effect’ becomes more evident from the recorded SIDs.⁶¹

Istvan Kende recorded 12 cases of local wars in South Asia during 1945-76, on the basis of the criteria of the use of state-controlled armed forces at least on one side, and some form of organised activities at the other end.⁶² Kende’s concept of sub-national actors is rather open-ended. For example, the Hindu-Muslim violence of 1946 in the Subcontinent before the independence of India and Pakistan, which was largely the outcomes of unorganised communal violence and reprisals, has been recorded as a case of local war.⁶³ Secondly, the international dimension of the war is not embodied in Kende’s concept,⁶⁴ so that additional criterion has to be applied to obtain inter-state and internationalised local wars. Kende’s data, however, serve the useful purpose of providing insights on the ‘sub-war’ phase of conflicts which, in course of time, become open, violent and extensive.

The above comparative overview makes the interrelationship among the concepts of disputes, conflicts, crises and wars evident. Firstly, the event of a war, which is the most intense and violent form of hostile interactions, passes through other forms of hostile interactions such as disputes, militarised disputes, crisis and conflicts short of war. Thus, the major wars of South Asia, namely, the two Kashmir wars, the Bangladesh independence war, and the Sino-Indian border wars, have been recorded in all datasets reviewed here using varying measurement criteria. The relationship between war and crisis is a tricky one because a crisis may precede, accompany

⁶¹ See, Appendix II d.

⁶² See, Appendix II e.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ See, Kende(1978), *op. cit.* : 327-28.

or follow a war situation. A series of crises may end up in a war or open hostilities, as happened with Goa, Pakhtunistan, and the Sino-Indian borders.⁶⁵ On the other hand, because of the memory of a past war, a number of crises may develop, as happened in the tension-ridden interregnum 1949-1960 in India-Pakistan relations. Whether a particular crisis situation was also accompanied by incidents of violence short of major hostilities may be checked from a comparison of the ICB and SID entries. On the other hand, a comparison of the Kende and COW data provides information as to whether a domestic conflict, like the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971, the Tamil ethnic conflict of 1983-90, was internationalised and if it had an inter-state phase as well.

This type of exercise also provides multiple checks while compiling the list of possible international conflicts. As the datasets are by no means updated, these varied criteria could be applied to obtain what we call a list of candidate cases of international conflicts from which to screen out the international conflicts that satisfy the criteria set out in the conceptual discussion.

3.4 A Compendium of International Conflicts in South Asia, 1947-89

On the basis of the above exercise, we have been able to prepare a list of 31 candidate or possible international conflicts in South Asia during 1947-90.⁶⁶ Out of them, we have considered those conflictual episodes as ICs which involved overt and explicitly hostile interactions over substantive power and security related or some vital issues between international actors, including sub-national actors with border crossing political and military capability.⁶⁷ A total of 17 IC cases has been found for the period 1947-1990.⁶⁸ The discussion that follows is based on these 17 cases. However, where applicable and where needed to make observation on a particular type of conflicts, we have also drawn from the candidate cases. It should be mentioned that those conflict episodes in which evidently the same set of issues, actors and spots were involved, have been

⁶⁵ This is evident from a comparison between Appendix IIa and Appendix IIb.

⁶⁶ See, Appendix III.

⁶⁷ For concept and criteria of international conflicts (IC), see, Section 1.3.1 in Chapter I.

⁶⁸ See, Appendix IV.

combined to represent a single conflict case. A prominent example has been the Kashmir conflict. The two spells of wars in 1947-48 and in 1965, constitute a single conflict case. The latest Kashmiri militancy has been recorded as a separate IC case because of the qualitatively different kind of conflictual interactions taking place in the latest phase. However, from the point of view of protracted conflicts, which conceptually embody such changes and transformations, the three episodes have been combined as a single PIC case.⁶⁹

3.4.1 Temporal Characteristics of International Conflicts in South Asia

As with the pattern of conflicts in the region in historical perspective, different manifestations of conflicts, ranging from minor irritants and non-violent disputes to full-scale wars have been observed in South Asia over the period 1947-90. The first ever international conflict following the decolonisation of the Subcontinent took place over the accession of the Princely state of Junagadh (1947-48) on 18 August 1947, within only four days of decolonisation. It was followed in quick succession by a conflict over Kashmir's accession (1947-65) in October 1947 between the newly independent countries of India and Pakistan.⁷⁰ The latest one is the Kashmiri militancy in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, 1989-90. In between several other conflicts have taken place but 17 qualify as IC for this thesis.

Before we go into some details of these 17 IC cases, it is pertinent to touch on what this conflict figure means in a broader perspective. In other words, has South Asia become more conflict prone compared to some of the adjoining regions? The limited information that we have compiled on South Asian conflicts does not lend itself to such a comparison. However, on the basis of some of the datasets we have used, it may be argued that South Asia is not as conflict prone as the two outflanking regions of the Middle East and South East Asia.⁷¹ If, however,

⁶⁹ See, Section 3.5 below.

⁷⁰ Details of the decolonisation process will be taken up in Chapter IV. For the moment, see Robinson, *op. cit.* : 71-166. Also see, Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 1961, *passim*. Synoptical views of the tumultuous events of the decolonisation and accompanying conflicts may be found in Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 30-32.

⁷¹ The Butterworth data, the unit of analysis of which is inter-state power-political conflict, suggest that 43 inter-state conflicts took place in the Middle East (excluding the Gulf for which the figure is 14) during 1945-74, 24 in South East Asia while the corresponding figure for South Asia was 18. Another more updated

allowances are made for the number and age of states in the respective systems for the comparable period, it may be argued that the region of South Asia has not been any less conflict prone than the other two regions. We have also to take into consideration the fact that both the flanking regions have been strategically more important than South Asia during the period under review. We may also make a comparison among these regions on the basis of the trend of military spending, which again is at best a rough indicator of conflictual tendencies, especially given the fact that a substantial number of cases of ICs involve non-state actors. While the five larger countries of South Asia⁷² with nearly one-fifth of the world population has spent only 1.4% of the world military spending in 1985 compared to 7.5% for the Middle East during the same year, it is significant that military spending for the region of South Asia has been increasing at a real annual rate of 6% since 1975 when military spending of the other two regions had at least experienced retardation, if not actually declined.⁷³ More insights about the trend of conflicts may be obtained from looking at the temporal distribution of the ICs in South Asia.⁷⁴

Among the 17 ICs under consideration, four ICs (Junagadh, Kashmir, Hyderabad and Pakhtunistan) were initiated in the late 1940s (1947-49), five (Naga Insurgency, Goa, Rann of Kutch, Sino-Indian Borders and Sino-Nepalese Borders) were initiated in the 1950s, one (Mizo Insurgency) in the 1960s, two (Bangladesh Independence and Baluch Insurgency) in the 1970s, while five (Chakma Insurgency, Sikh Separatism, Tamil Ethnic Conflict, Siachen Glacier, and the Kashmiri militancy) in the 1980s.⁷⁵ Apparently there has been a relative decline in the number of conflicts initiated in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s after which again the curve begins to rise. If the number of candidate cases are also taken into consideration,⁷⁶ the decade of the 1980s

set of indicative figures may be found in the ICB data on international crisis cases which give the corresponding three figures at 54, 30 and 16 respectively for the period 1945-84.

⁷² India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Data on military spending for the tiny countries of Bhutan and the Maldives are not usually available. The Maldives, in fact has no standing army excepting 500 police (known as, *laskareen*).

⁷³ Figures are quoted from *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, for SIPRI, Stockholm) 1986 : 23.

⁷⁴ It may, however, be pointed out that the number of IC cases is rather limited so as not to warrant any meaningful statistical treatment.

⁷⁵ See, Appendix IV.

⁷⁶ See, Appendix III.

may be said to have witnessed the highest number of conflictual episodes, while the 1970s witnessed the second highest. The conclusion remains valid even if we take into view the size of the sub-system membership in different decades. While the two most conflict-prone countries, India and Pakistan, came into being in 1947, a significant development was Bangladesh in 1971 from the point of view of addition of new conflicts to the sub-system. However, the Maldives' emergence in 1965 and the Indian protectorate Sikkim's disappearance in 1975 as a semi-independent entity had little impact on the South Asian conflict system. Likewise, Bhutan's pre-existence as an independent state in 1947 also did not have any impact on the region's conflict situation.

An important aspect of the conflict trend in the region is the duration of the conflicts, which apart from an interest in itself, will provide understanding of the distribution of continuing conflicts in a given time period or at a point of time. A dispute or conflict enters the IC threshold when a substantive form of hostile interactions begins and an exit from the IC arena occurs when such hostilities cease or subside.⁷⁷ Following this criterion, it is observed that conflict duration in South Asia ranged from little over one month (Junagadh and Hyderabad) to 18 years (Kashmir, 1947-65). On an average, most of the conflicts are of the duration exceeding five years. In terms of continuing conflicts, it is observed that four conflicts were continuing during the 1940s, out of which one continued in the 1950s. In the latter decade, seven conflicts were continuing of which six were initiated in the same decade. While the number of conflicts initiated in the 1960s were lower than in the 1950s, as many as eight conflicts were continuing in the 1960s, the highest in a decade. While some of the conflicts initiated in the 1950s and 1960 dragged on into the decade of the 1970s along with those initiated in the same decade, the decade of the 1980s seems to have started with almost a clean slate.⁷⁸

Thus, the first clustering is observed during the period 1947-49, the immediate aftermath of decolonisation and partition, with all the legacies of the colonial period beginning to surface in

⁷⁷ See, Section 1.3.1.

⁷⁸ To be precise, all of the five ICs initiated in the 1980s snowballed into ICs from dispute status in earlier decades. Siachen is a new conflict, but it is also a colonial legacy of boundary demarcation.

the tension-ridden atmosphere. The countries of South Asia began their nation building efforts in 1947-48 but could not escape from the colonial legacies even after a decade. Thus, a second clustering of an assortment of conflicts, related to both colonial legacies and nation building efforts, is observed during the period 1959-65. With a brief lull in the 1970s, a third clustering occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s. When read with the spatial dimension of the ICs, especially their mutual interactions, some tentative conclusions might be reached from these clusterings of the ICs.

3.4.2 Spatial Characteristics of the South Asian International Conflicts

The spatial characteristics of South Asian conflicts will be reviewed mainly in terms of actors and issues. In the context of the actors in conflicts, a distinction is made between the conflict actors and the involved parties. Conflict actors are the 'combatants' of the conflicts. On the other hand, involved parties are the ones who are not directly involved in the conflict but make a politically significant contribution to the cause of either side of the conflict.⁷⁹ For example, in the context of the Bangladesh independence war of 1971, Sri Lanka, Burma and Iran provided transit, and also possibly, refuelling facilities for Pakistani aircraft, as India banned Pakistani overflights. The role of Burma, Sri Lanka and Iran may not be considered as politically significant involvement in the Bangladesh war. However, India's substantial assistance to the Bangladesh Liberation Forces until it itself became a direct party in November 1971, US gunboat diplomacy in terms of moving the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, and for that matter, the Soviet veto in the UN in favour of India, involved parties in the same conflict.

A review of conflict parties makes it evident that excepting the Bangladesh independence and Tamil ethnic conflict cases, all other conflict cases took place within dyadic frames.⁸⁰ It was in these two internationalised domestic conflicts that a transformation of parties occurred. A

⁷⁹ The ICB Codebook for international crises refers to the role of the involved actors in terms of the following types of activities: direct military, semi-military, covert, economic and political other than mere statements of approval or disapproval by officials. See, Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *ICB Codebook 2 for System Level Dataset*, *op. cit.*: 15. This, however, is rather an all inclusive criterion.

⁸⁰ See, Appendix IV.

similar trend is also observed in the latest phase of Kashmiri militancy, compared to Secondly, most of the South Asian conflicts witnessed involved parties, some being extra-regional, as in the conflicts of the earlier periods. In more recent conflicts, however, the involved parties have mainly been from the region itself.⁸¹ In this context it has been observed that in recent years, the countries of the region have displayed the proclivity of involving or interfering in each other's internal problems on an increasing scale.⁸² Examples are Kashmir, the Bengali autonomy and independence movement, Pakhtunistan, Naga and Mizo insurgencies, Baluchistan, Bangladesh, Chakma Insurgency, and the Sikh separatism, to cite the prominent ones.⁸³ It may also be observed that the conflict cases which witnessed multiple parties, both direct and in an involved capacity, were of the ethnic or secessionist type.

In terms of some quantitative trends, it is observed that among the 17 ICs, India, by far the biggest country having frontiers with as many as six countries, four of them in South Asia,⁸⁴ was involved explicitly in 14 cases. Among these there was a role transition from an involved party to a direct one in two cases (Bangladesh and Tamil ethnic conflict). Pakistan was involved directly in 11 cases, of which in four it has been an involved actor. While India's role underwent a transition from an involved to a direct one in two South Asian conflicts, Pakistan's role, in the context of the latest phase of the Kashmir conflict, underwent a transition from a direct to an involved one.⁸⁵ This role transition within the framework of what we have called transformation of conflicts needs further probing in order to understand the dynamics of these rather complicated conflicts.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ This transformation of the Kashmir conflict is discussed in Chapter IX.

⁸¹ See, for details, Appendix IV.

⁸² See, Bhabani Sen Gupta and Amit Gupta, "Changing Patterns of Regional Conflicts in South Asia" in Bhabani Sen Gupta (ed.) *Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia* (New Delhi : South Asia Publishers) 1985 : 263.

⁸³ This point is elaborated in Section 8.2 of Chapter VIII.

⁸⁴ Sri Lanka and the Maldives are island states. With them as well, India shares maritime boundaries.

⁸⁵ This is a matter-of-fact statement, bereft of the historical polemics involved. India had always denied Pakistan any *locus standi* in the Kashmir conflict, excepting its trouble making role, while Pakistan had always claimed itself to be a legitimate party to the conflict, especially, when the question of settlement of the conflict came.

⁸⁶ See, conceptual discussion in Section 1.3.2 Chapter I, and theoretical discussion in Section 2.4 in Chapter II.

Secondly, as with the historical tradition of the region, South Asian conflicts witnessed the involvement of extra-regional as well as proximate powers – as both direct parties, as with Portugal, China and Afghanistan, and involved parties, as with the USA, the former Soviet Union, Iran and Iraq. However, in very recent years, involvement of the extra-regional and proximate powers in the intra-regional conflicts, has witnessed a marked decline, corresponding to a rise of the intra-regional countries in similar role. An understanding of the nature of such involvement by intra-regional parties will provide insights about spatial linkages of international conflicts in a geographical area. Thirdly, several of the South Asian conflicts have witnessed the involvement of several subnational actors. In 10 out of the 17 IC cases, sub-national actors have been one of the direct parties. Although the sub-national actors were dominant in the initial phases of the colonial conflicts, such as Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad, they were subsumed with one of the major actors of the conflicts in course of time.

With regard to the issues and types of South Asian conflicts, four such types can be identified : territorial, ideological, ethnic and security related.⁸⁷ As many as nine out of the 17 IC cases involved some form of territoriality as an issue in South Asia during 1947-90. Although there has been a marked decline in territorial disputes, a perusal of the candidate cases suggests that a number of outstanding territorial cases are still there.⁸⁸ As the environmental and resource sharing conflicts are likely to be prominent in the near future, these outstanding issues including the maritime boundary demarcation, are likely to intermesh with the new causes of conflicts and thus, complicate the scenario.⁸⁹

Ideological issues such as religion, bases of nationalism and the regime type or the political system, have been enmeshed in a number of conflicts in the region. Religious antagonism lay at the root of the partition of the Subcontinent, in the aftermath of which the religious rivalry was

⁸⁷ One prominent type of conflict, namely, the colonial conflicts, of which Junagadh and Hyderabad are examples, have become extinct, although other colonial legacies, such as the territorial and ethno-religious conflicts, continue to haunt the Subcontinent. See, Sen Gupta and Gupta, *op. cit.* : 248-49.

⁸⁸ See, Appendix III.

⁸⁹ For some details of the environmental as a source of conflicts in South Asia, see, Shaukat Hassan, *Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia*, **Adelphi Paper 262**, IISS, London.

transformed into interstate rivalry. Even the Kashmir conflict had a significant religious content of local origin.⁹⁰ However, over the decades, the cross-border aspect of communal problems declined, the very recent upsurge over the Ayodhya issue showed that the potency of religious issues in inter-state relations remains as strong as ever.

The other dimension of intra-regional ideological conflicts that also have apparently subsided in recent years is the frictions resulting from divergent regime types. Frictions between incompatible regimes have mostly been reflected in diffused antagonism between India and the military regimes of Pakistan. They have also been visible in other dyadic relations in South Asia. Examples are, the India-Nepal relations following the ouster of the Nepali Congress Government through a palace coup in 1960,⁹¹ India-Bangladesh relations after the 1975 change-over (followed by a succession of military regimes), and India-Sri Lankan relations following Jayewardene's change-over from a Parliamentary to an executive Presidential system in 1982. The only case which, however, came to the limelight on this count was the Nepali exiles case, when India's assistance to the rebel exiles, though covert and unofficial was a matter of such serious concern for the Nepali monarch that he ousted the Nepali Congress from power. In the 1980s, especially following the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), it seems that the chemistry of regime friction has given way to a modicum of coexistence of the divergent regimes.

However, the most conspicuous of conflicts in South Asia have been those centering on ethnic issues. A good number of these conflicts have crossed the conflict threshold but many more remain below the threshold, so that the present catalogue of ethnic problems in South Asia, disregarding the conflict status for a moment, will be sizable indeed.⁹² Some examples are : the insurgency in Assam, first by the *Bodo* tribals, and in recent times, by the mainstream Assamese youth, the Gorkhaland problem centering on ethnic Nepalese in India, Sind, Pakhtunistan and the

⁹⁰ See, I. Copland, "Islam and Political Mobilisation in Kashmir, 1931-34", *Pacific Affairs*, 54(2), 1981 : 228-59.

⁹¹ See, 'Nepali Exiles' Case in Butterworth dataset, in Appendix IIc.

⁹² For a concise comparative picture, see, Shaukat Hassan, *Problems of Internal Stability in South Asia*, **PSIS Occasional Papers** [Geneva], No. 1, June 1988.

Baluch problems in Pakistan, the Chakma tribal insurgency in Bangladesh, ethnic Indians in Terai area of Nepal, and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Ethnic conflicts have occurred in South Asia throughout all the decades in the post-1947 period. They seem to have been more numerous in recent times, especially in the 1980s. While many still remain dormant, they are likely to surface in violent forms as perceptions of economic, political and cultural deprivation harden among the ethnic minorities.

It should be pointed out that the typology of conflicts, especially those in the Third World regions including South Asia, is largely an analytical artifact. Even a cursory perusal of the compilation of conflict cases under different conceptualisations as well as those of the present study⁹³ would reveal that a single conflict case could be characterised by more than one typological denomination. Also multiple actors are involved many conflicts. It is reasonable to expect these issues and actors across conflicts would interact and interlink. Likewise, if time element is introduced, it is also pertinent to ask, do issues and actors in the same conflict change and hence, transform the complexion of the conflicts? Although a much more rigorous exercise than the present compendium is needed to answer these questions,⁹⁴ a tentative attempt is made below.

3.4.3 Spatial and Temporal Linkages of the South Asian Conflicts

Geographical contiguity is believed to facilitate spatial linkage of conflicts. In the context of South Asia, four of the seven countries have contiguous borders. The Subcontinent itself is connected by land with the Northeast and Central Asian landmass. Yet, spatial linkages between South Asian conflicts were observed only in a few instances. That is, in an India-v-neighbour X conflict, neighbour Y did not participate, or initiate a new war to take advantage of the principle of *tertius gaudens*,⁹⁵ excepting of course, some minor tit-for-tat cases.⁹⁶ In the recent Tamil

⁹³ See, Appendices IIa-IIe, III & IV.

⁹⁴ These questions have received scholarly attention under the rubric of what has come to be known as the Conflict Diffusion theory. See, Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War", *American Political Science Review*, 74(4), 1980 : 932-46. We shall also address these questions in the context of our case study on Kashmir.

⁹⁵ See, Henk Houweling, and Jan G. Siccama, "The Epidemiology of war, 1816-1980", *Journal of*

ethnic problem in which India was, first indirectly then directly, involved, Pakistan offered some training and personnel assistance to Colombo to counter ethnic insurgency in the pre-1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord period.⁹⁷

On the whole, spatial linkages in conflicts in South Asia worked in a limited way. From the point of view of conflict management in a regional system, this is certainly an advantage, especially when compared with the complex of interlocks in conflicts that exists, for example, in the Horn. This advantage, however, seems to have been counter-balanced by the other dimension of linkages, that is, temporal persistence of conflicts within a dyadic frame. There are several conflicts in South Asia which have been persisting in complicated shape for long. Kashmir is a prominent example. In what follows, a profile of such conflicts is presented briefly.

3.5 The Universe of Cases – Protracted International Conflicts in South Asia

The criteria for identifying protracted international conflicts (PIC), are three-fold : persistence over time, more than one violent phase in the course of hostile interactions, and a substantive issue over which the conflict ensues. Applying these criteria to the 17 ICs we are able to identify seven cases which we shall call the universe of analysis for the present study.⁹⁸ The cases are : Kashmir 1947-90, Pakhtunistan 1948-1960, Sino-Indian Borders 1959-62, Naga and Mizo Insurgencies 1955-75,⁹⁹ Baluchistan 1973-1978, Tamil Ethnic Conflict 1983-89, and the Siachen Glacier 1984-89. It should be pointed out that the three phases of the Kashmir conflict – 1947-49, 1965 and the latest 1989-90 – have been combined to make one PIC case.

The seven cases represent different typologies such as conventional border conflict (Sino-Indian Borders, Siachen Glacier), territorial-cum-ethno-religious conflict (Kashmir), and ethnic

Conflict Resolution, 29(4) 1985 : 641.

⁹⁶ We have earlier mentioned about Sri Lanka and Burma's offering transit and refuelling facilities to Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of independence.

⁹⁷ For some details, see, S. D. Muni, *Pangs of Proximity : India and Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis* (New Delhi : Sage Publications, for International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) 1993 : 53-54. See, also, P. Venkateshwar Rao, "Foreign Involvement in Sri Lanka", *The Round Table*, 78(309), January 1989 : 88-100.

⁹⁸ See, the last column in Appendix IV.

⁹⁹ Although the Naga and Mizo insurgencies are separate cases, they have been combined to represent one PIC in view of their very close links.

conflicts (Naga, Mizo, Baluchistan and Tamil). The PIC cases combine in them multiple issues.¹⁰⁰ Three major conflicts in the regions, namely, Kashmir, Sino-Indian border war and the Bangladesh war of independence were linked in a significant way with Great Power rivalry. Secondly, the ethnic conflicts have been observed to be linked with territorial integrity of the host country. Moreover, cross-currents of interests of the external actors are involved in most of the South Asian ethnic conflicts. This was observed in low intensity conflicts such as the Baluch insurgency, as well as in the intensely violent ones, such as the Tamil ethnic conflict. observed to be involved

Thirdly, the territorial conflicts, such as Sino-Indian borders conflict and Siachen, are mainly of the extended type and not as prolonged as others like Kashmir and Tamil conflicts. Although they interlinked with other conflicts, they are still less complicated. In the context of the Siachen conflict, it may be pointed out that the conflict was in a violent phase in late 1989, when the Kashmiri militancy started. Siachen was observed to have subsided over the duration of the Kashmiri militancy. It is, however, doubtful if in the event of a conventional war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, this would have been the case. Otherwise, the two problems, Kashmir and Siachen, despite their physical proximity, did not get linked up.

Goertz and Diehl argue that territoriality as an issue could be a predictor of protracted conflicts.¹⁰¹ We cannot reject the territoriality hypothesis out of hand either, because Kashmir combines in it ethno-religiosity as well as territoriality. On the other hand, Azar emphasised the identity-related or structural factors as essential element of protracted conflicts.¹⁰² Keeping the other four ethnic PIC cases in view, it may be argued certain amount of salience of the issue is required for protractedness. Beyond that much would depend on how the issues, actors and environmental variables operate on that particular issue under focus. Of course, this is a tentative conclusion and the case study of Kashmir would shed more insight in this regard. Secondly, our

¹⁰⁰ See, Appendix IV.

¹⁰¹ Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, "Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflicts", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32(1), March 1988 : 103-22

¹⁰² See, See, Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts : Ten Propositions", *International Interactions*, 12(1), 1985 : 59-60.

concept of protractedness is not a binary phenomenon. Protractedness is viewed to move on a intractability continuum. Thus, some of the ethnic conflicts like Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan do not seem to be as intractable as others such as the Tamil ethnic problem. Even the same conflict displays fluctuating intensity of violence and varying degree of intractability.

3.6 Conclusions

South Asia had been a conflict ridden region throughout its history. Several phases of geopolitical and demographic transformation have left legacies of conflicts, new issues and parties of conflicts have emerged and if anything, the contemporary conflicts have become more violent and complicated over the years. While some of the old conflicts seem to have ceased to recur, others continue to bedevil South Asian politics in one form or the other. At the same time new issues, mainly related to nation building efforts are manifest in intercommunal relations and in the perception of the elite.

Secondly, in most cases, there has been a tendency of issues, especially ethnicity, religion and security perceptions to be linked up. Between given dyads too, several actual and potential conflict cases become intermeshed. Ethnic conflicts display the tendency of linking up more parties. The question that remains unanswered and we hope to take up in the case study is how and under what circumstances this linking up and interactions take place. Also of interest to us will be the impact they have on the conflict course. However, a few preliminary remarks on the PIC case is in order on the basis of the comparative profile of different international conflicts, as reviewed in this chapter.

It may be argued that Kashmir has been the most complex and enduring conflict in terms the number of issues involved, its duration and the changes it has undergone. It is also a representative PIC case in the sense that it combines in it at least two issues – territoriality and ethno-religiousity which have been two prominent sources of conflicts in South Asia. It also embodied in it the crux of power relations between India and Pakistan. Of course, the same logic could be twisted to argue that the characteristics that make it a representative case also make it unrepresentative in the sense that the pattern of combination of the factors and also other

peculiarities – the strategic location of Kashmir, for example – are not to be found in other PIC cases. This, however, is more a caveat to facilitate interpretation of the findings in proper perspective, than an indication of an atypical case of Kashmir. Of course, there are other general features of the South Asian conflict scenario that need to be kept in mind while interpreting the findings of the thesis. With these remarks, we enter the substance of the thesis, that is, an examination of the complex processes, multiple issues, changes and transformation that have been involved in the route to intractability of the Kashmir conflict during the period 1947-1990.


It took the British more than three hundred years to build up their Indian Empire. They dismantled it in just over seventy days in 1947. Such a rapid collapse of imperial structures would hardly surprise anyone today in the light of what has been happening in Eastern Europe. In 1947, however, ... [it] not only brought the British Indian Empire to an end but also saw the first stage of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. [Alastair Lamb, 1991]

PART TWO

THE FIRST KASHMIR WAR

CHAPTER IV A PRELUDE TO KASHMIR 1947 : DECOLONIZATION, HINDU-MUSLIM FEUDS AND THE FALLOUT FROM PARTITION

CHAPTER V THE FIRST KASHMIR WAR 1947-1949 : INTERNAL TURMOILS, INTER-DOMINION RIVALRY AND THE TRIBAL INVASION



Map 2
The Princely States

Source : Robinson(1989) : 140

CHAPTER IV

A PRELUDE TO KASHMIR 1947 : DECOLONISATION, HINDU-MUSLIM FEUDS AND THE FALLOUT FROM PARTITION

4.1 Introduction

The decolonisation of British India in 1947 marked a watershed in the contemporary history of the Subcontinent because of the political change it introduced in the Subcontinent in terms of the emergence of two independent states – India and Pakistan.¹ A more remarkable aspect of the decolonisation overshadowing the political development was the the extraordinary circumstances of administrative haste, communal violence and traumas amidst which the dual processes of transfer of power to successor authorities and accession of the Indian Princes² to either authority, was carried out.³ The forces released by the turbulent process of decolonisation culminated in a number of violent conflicts in its immediate aftermath.⁴ Among these, Kashmir proved to be the most violent and enduring,⁵ "charged not only with international potential, but [also] with a vital significance nearer home, for ...[the] Empire and Commonwealth".⁶ Indeed, the "Kashmir dispute

¹ The political impact was felt beyond the Subcontinent, especially on the Commonwealth. See, R. J. Moore, "Mountbatten, India, and the Commonwealth", *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, XIX(1), March 1981 : 5.

² The Indian Princes, numbering over 500, accounted for one-fourth of India's population and two-fifths of its territories. They were autonomous territories separate from British India. Their relations with the British Crown were guided by the principle of 'Paramountcy' under which the Princes retained maximum internal autonomy but ceded defence, foreign affairs and communications to the British Crown. For a distribution of the Princely states in India on the eve of decolonisation, see, Map 2.

³ At the time of the First World War, the best that was envisaged for British India was a progressive realisation of self-government as an integral part of the British empire. Even in the thirties British withdrawal from India in less than twenty to thirty years was not thought realistic. While the Second World War brought such a possibility forward as a post-War scenario, the developments in the Subcontinent itself made a drastic "shrinkage of options" to effect an hasty withdrawal of the British in 1947. See, C. H. Philips and Mary D. Wainwright (eds.), *The Partition of India : Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947* (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd) 1970 : 13. See, also, Appendix V for landmarks in empire building and decolonisation.

⁴ As seen in the compendium in Chapter III, at least five of the South Asian international conflicts, namely, Junagadh, Kashmir, Hyderabad, Pakhtunistan, and a few years later, Goa, could be traced to the decolonisation process of 1947. See, Appendix IV.

⁵ The origins of the Kashmir War 1947-49, will be discussed in Chapter V.

⁶ See, Lord Birdwood, "Kashmir", *International Affairs*, 28(3), July 1952 : 299.

... guaranteed that a state of tension should continue in being between the two major powers of the Subcontinent".⁷

As a sequel to persisting tensions and bitterness which gradually pervaded the whole gamut of the India-Pakistan bilateral relations over the coming years,⁸ armed violence erupted for the second time over Kashmir in 1965.⁹ In 1971 again, major battles spilled over into Kashmir in the wake of a full-scale general war between the two countries over the independence of Bangladesh. If a solution was apparent in the post-1971 period following the signing of the Simla Agreement,¹⁰ it only proved to be elusive. The contentious issues remained alive throughout the 1970s, although at a reduced level of tensions.¹¹ In the 1980s, it appeared that the two countries were learning to live as neighbours despite the conflicts and an incipient cooperation was emerging with Kashmir being kept on the side, even if unresolved.¹² However, the bilateral relations were overtaken by a sudden stand-off on Kashmir in late 1989 following the emergence of a secessionist movement by the Kashmiri militants.¹³ The possibility of a war to sort out the fate of Kashmir, which could not be resolved over these decades, remained high throughout 1989 and 1990.¹⁴ Wars have thus far been averted, but the Kashmiri militancy continues, and the corresponding tensions in bilateral relations remain in an off-now and on-again style. With the Kashmiri militancy, however, events have come to a full circle in India-Pakistan relations. In 1947, Kashmir provided the cauldron of conflicts between the two antagonists who were otherwise poised for a bitter rivalry over the ideological basis of their national existence. It was

⁷ See, Alastair Lamb, *Crisis in Kashmir : 1947 to 1966* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1966 : 1.

⁸ See, Chapter VI.

⁹ See, Chapter VII.

¹⁰ See, M. Ayoob, "India and Pakistan : Prospects for Detente", *Pacific Community*, 8(1), October 1976 : 149-69, and S. Chopra, *Post-Simla Indo-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi : Deep & Deep Publishers) 1988.

¹¹ See, M. Ayoob, "India, Pakistan and the Superpower", *The World Today*, 38(5), May 1982 : 194-202. See, also, Dieter Braun, "Changes in South Asian Internal and External Relationship", *The World Today*, 34(10), October 1978 : 390-400.

¹² See, J. Kumar, *Irritants in India-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi : Deep and Deep Publishers) 1989, especially, Chapters 3 & 4. The long interregnum of 1966-1988 in India-Pakistan relations with Kashmir in perspective will be covered in Chapter VIII.

¹³ See, Ashutosh Varshney, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir : Antinomies of Nationalism", *Asian Survey*, 31(2), February 1991 : 997-1019; and Akbar S. Ahmed, "Kashmir 1990 : Islamic Revolt or Kashmiri Nationalism", *Strategic Studies*, XIV(3), Spring 1991 : 22-29.

¹⁴ Kashmiri militancy with accompanying bilateral tensions and hostilities will be taken up in Chapter IX.

from within Kashmir again that a new force has emerged to intensify and complicate the old conflict. An examination of the Kashmir problem, therefore, starts with understanding the central divide between the two antagonists and ends with an understanding of contemporary Kashmir itself.

The subject matter of this first chapter on our case study is the genesis phase of the Kashmir conflict. It is a phase of conflicts in which issues are defined and redefined, and forces begin to take concrete shape and get arrayed, as part of what is known as 'prior conflictual process' or 'sub-war' phase.¹⁵ An attempt will be made to identify forces engendered by the decolonisation of British India which set the ground for the Kashmir conflict. The subject of decolonisation of British India is by itself a vast subject of active interests to students and scholars of the Commonwealth, in general, and South Asia, in particular.¹⁶ A full length discussion of the decolonisation is beyond the scope of the present thesis. We shall be concerned with those aspects which created antagonistic bilateral relations between the two newly born Dominions of India and Pakistan, and also engendered forces that subsequently became linked with Kashmir's own turmoils, leading eventually to an India-Pakistan war over Kashmir's accession. Key questions to be addressed in this chapter are : Why was British India partitioned along Hindu-Muslim religious line, when there were other possibilities of transfer of power? How were the twin processes of transfer of power and accession of the Indian Princes related? Where did the Princely state of Kashmir fit in the business of partition and the inter-Dominion contest for the Princes?

¹⁵ See, Section 2.4 in Chapter II. See also, Philippe Braillard, "Towards Reorientation of the Empirical Study of International Conflict", *UNESCO Yearbook of Peace and Conflict Studies 1981* (Paris : UNESCO) 1982 : 51-61

¹⁶ Against the backdrop of a continuing conflict in Kashmir, and persistent old controversies over the transfer of power, the recent spurt of scholarly focus on the area is due to increased accessibility to valuable official and unofficial documents, and private papers, in the Public Records Office (PRO), the India Office Library (IOL) and in other select libraries in the UK. Another breakthrough has been the HMG-initiated compilation of documents and papers, in a 12-volume series, edited by Nicholas S. Mansergh, in association with E. W. R. Lumby and Penderel Moon, entitled, *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India : The Transfer of Power 1942-47*. The publication of the series took place during the period 1970-83. Henceforth, the series will be identified as *TOP*. An excellent survey of literature on the transfer of power covering works based mainly on the recently released documents may be found in R. J. Moore, "The Transfer of Power : An Historiographical Survey", *South Asia : Journal of South Asian Studies* [New South Wales], IX(1), March 1986 : 83-96

In setting the prelude to the Kashmir conflict, we shall first examine the nature of the Hindu-Muslim communal feuds and the divergent approaches of the élites of the two communities to the transfer of power (Section 4.2). The controversies in the partition process, especially in the Punjab, and the communal carnage and mass migration, both having relevance for the origins of the Kashmir conflict, will be discussed in Section 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 deal with the other aspect of decolonisation, that is, accession of the Indian Princes to either Dominion. The policies and postures of the relevant actors with regard to the issue of accession will be covered in Section 4.4, while a brief review of the problems of accession of the rebel Princes, namely, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir will be covered in 4.5. The last one, of course, will be touched upon only briefly, as a detailed discussion is awaited in Chapter V.

4.2 Muslim Separatism and Hindu-Muslim Rivalry

In the long drawn out Indian independence movement, the emergence of the Muslim nationalism and their demand for a separate homeland have been considered as an outstanding political development in of the influence it exerted on the decolonisation process in 1947.¹⁷ While religion and a religious sense of belonging constituted an historically divisive force of considerable potentialities, there were other divisive forces as well in the Subcontinent.¹⁸ The discussion of this section is expected to highlight how Hindu-Muslim feuds turned out to be a salient force and an "expression of real conflict"¹⁹ around which all other conflictual forces coalesced.

The possible ways in which power could have been transferred ranged from a united India under the 'Plan Union' to several independent states under the 'Plan Balkan'.²⁰ Power was

¹⁷ See, Philips and Wainwright, *op. cit.* : 11.

¹⁸ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study of India-Pakistan Relations*, (Bombay : Asia Publishing House) 1966 : 1.

¹⁹ See, Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press) : 25.

²⁰ For elaboration, see, Moore(1981), *op. cit.* : 9-37. This counterfactual line of argument is pursued to get out of the problem of what Philips and Wainwright considered arguments with hindsight, and Moore considered "determinism in the historiography" resulting in fixed or restricted views. See, Philips and Wainwright, *op. cit.* : 12; and Moore(1986), *op. cit.* : 88. While certain element of determinism cannot be avoided, it is expected that a critical review of the alternatives would put the final outcome of the partition along the Hindu-Muslim religious lines in a broader perspective.

transferred eventually to dual successor authorities on the basis of an hastily drawn 'Plan Partition'.²¹ Of these possibilities, the most probable was a united India, which was the goal of the National Congress representing the majority of the about 400 million Indian population. The British Government also made it an avowed objective to transfer power to a united India with a strong centre.²² Although the reality of Pakistan became apparent in 1940, neither the Cripps Mission of 1942 nor the Cabinet Mission of 1946 countenanced the possibility of Pakistan. As late as March 1947, the British government tried to persuade an unwilling Jinnah to accept a formula for a united India.²³ The specific decision on partition and the creation of Pakistan was not taken until late May 1947.

On the other hand, the spectre of a balkanised India along the Princely and provincial borders was also looming large. The 1935 Act, the purpose of which was a federation of the provinces and the Indian Princes with a strong centre, for all practical purposes provided the possibility of independent Princes, because they had the right to withhold their participation in the federation indefinitely.²⁴ In none of the Mission reports and plans,²⁵ not even in the Partition Plan of June 3, 1947, the issue of final status of the Princes was made explicit. A good number of the Indian Princes declared, on the eve of partition, their intention to retain independence when the British would depart from India.²⁶ Lord Wavell's 'Breakdown Plan' of British withdrawal province by province from "Hindustan, leaving it to its own devices" in the event of a lack of agreement between the two main rivals, also bore the possibility of a balkanised India apart from guaranteeing a 'medium Pakistan' excluding East Bengal and Assam.²⁷ A balkanised India again

²¹ For some details of how the 'Plan Partition' was drawn up in a stroke of four hours' times, see, Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 1961 : 109-27. See, also, Moore(1981), *op. cit.* : 28-37; and Hugh Tinker, "Incident at Simla, May 1947 – What the Documents Reveal : A Moment of Truth for the Historians?", *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, XX(2), July 1982 : 200-22

²² See, Philips and Wainwright, *op. cit.* : 18.

²³ See, R. J. Moore, *Escape from the Empire : The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem* (Oxford : Clarendon Press) 1983 : 215-44. See, also Mosley, *op. cit.* : 96-98.

²⁴ See, G. Douds, "The Indian Princes : Britain's Fifth Column", *South Asia, Journal of South Asian Studies*, XI(2) December 1988 : 57-68

²⁵ Mention may be made of the Cripps Mission of 1942, the Cabinet Mission of 1946, for example.

²⁶ For details of the accession of the Princes, see Sections 4.4 and 4.5 below.

²⁷ See, Moore(1983), *op. cit.* : 183-87.

became a real possibility when Mountbatten, apparently and interestingly with the consent of Nehru, drew up what he called formally the 'Plan Balkan' and sent it to London with his staff officer, Lord Ismay, for approval. Under the plan, the unwilling provinces "should have the right to decide whether to join a Hindustan Group, a Pakistan Group, or possibly even remain completely independent".²⁸ It was, however, following 'Nehru's bombshell' in Simla in reaction to the plan, slightly revised in London, that it had to be abandoned and the 'Plan Partition' was drawn up.²⁹

There was also the possibility of a united Bengal's attaining a Dominion status with the eventual goal of independence.³⁰ The ambivalence of the British Government as well as the last Viceroy, towards Suhrawardy's plea for an independent Bengal, is well documented.³¹ The proposal was abandoned finally by the India Committee of HM Government as late as May 28, 1947, as both Jinnah and Nehru rejected the idea.³² The least of all the possibilities, if the official position and formal postures of the British Government and the National Congress are indicators, was Jinnah's demand for Pakistan comprising of the Muslim majority provinces. Even the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, which formed the basis of the demand for Pakistan contained the prospect of more than one Muslim state. Eventually, of course, it was on the basis of religious separatism that the Subcontinent was partitioned into two Dominions – India and Pakistan.

Questions has been raised as to how fundamental was the Hindu-Muslim divide and how deterministic was its role in the partition of India? For example, it has been argued that the partition could have been avoided if the British withdrawal had not been so hasty.³³ Jalal casts doubt if Pakistan was the goal of Jinnah even in 1947. It was Mountbatten who imposed the

²⁸ See, Moore(1981), *op. cit.* : 11.

²⁹ See, Tinker(1982), *op. cit.* : 200-22; and Moore(1981), *ibid* : 28-33.

³⁰ It has been argued that despite the absence of any historical memories of independence, Bengal witnessed a remarkable growth of an identity base. See, David Taylor, "Political Identity in South Asia" in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp(eds.), *Political Identity in South Asia* (London : Curzon Press) 1979 : 259-60.

³¹ See, India Office Record(IOR), correspondence between Viceroy and the Secretary of State, L/P & J/10/79.

³² See, Moore(1981), *op. cit.* : 36-37.

³³ Ganguly, in analysing the causes of the Kashmir war of 1947 considers the extra-ordinary haste of the British as one of the main contributing factors of the war. See, Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia : Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947*, (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) 1986 : 10.

Pakistan solution on British India.³⁴ Philips argues that "Pakistan was not delivered from the deep womb of time", it had its start in 1937.³⁵ With regard to the nature of the Hindu-Muslim divide, it has been argued that the divide was not basic and it had been played up. Gupta holds that it was convenient for the British to play up the religious divisions without having to face any threat to the territorial integrity of British India.³⁶ Even if the diabolical aspect is overlooked, Gupta continues, the British might have found India already riven along religious lines and considered it expedient to play this up.³⁷ Similarly, Philips and Wainwright highlight the relative development of Muslim religious nationalism as compared to other bases of nationalism, and the ready availability of a leadership.³⁸ Brass, however, is totally sceptic about any solid basis of an Hindu-Muslim divide. His thesis was that the Muslim separatism was an expedient ploy of the Indian educated Muslims to protect their group interests.³⁹ These are, of course, not isolated or mutually exclusive hypotheses. There is an underlying assumption that the event of partition based on Muslim separatism can be explained in terms of policies and postures of the actors in the last ten years.⁴⁰ It is also implied that, had not the Muslim elites pursued diabolically the goal of Pakistan to protect their own interests, the basic unity of India could have been maintained. It will be argued here that there had been a basic fissure in Hindu-Muslim relations, even if the edge

³⁴ See, Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman : Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) 1985 : 292-93.

³⁵ See, C. H. Philips, "The Partition of India, 1947", Montagu Burton Lecture, 1967, quoted in Moore(1973a), *op. cit.* : 80.

³⁶ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 1. See, also, Ganguly, *op. cit.* : 10-11.

³⁷ *Ibid* : 1.

³⁸ See, Philips and Wainwright (eds.), *op. cit.* : 11-12.

³⁹ Brass argued that "Muslim leaders in north India in the late nineteenth century did not recognise a common destiny with the Hindus, because they saw themselves in danger of losing their privileges as a dominant community." See, P. R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press) 1975 : 140. He makes a more fundamental claim that, "it was only through the social mobilisation of the Muslim population that" the differences between Islam and Hinduism "could be communicated and stressed to the mass of Muslims, whose religious practices and language did not differ as significantly from the mass of Hindus as did the religious practices and language of the elite Muslim groups from the Hindu". [emphasis added] See, Brass, *loc. cit.* : 179. See, also Paul Brass, "Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia" in Taylor and Yapp (eds.), *op. cit.* : 35-77.

⁴⁰ Moore points out that such an assumption ignores the social bases of the independence movement in British India. He does not, however, proceed further with an alternative assumption. See, R. J. Moore, "The Demission of Power in South Asia : Some Perspectives", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, II(1), October 1973 : 80-81.

of the fissure might have been blunted somewhat by co-existence and interactions. Secondly, as the process of articulation of nationalism started in late nineteenth century, Muslim separatism began taking shape around the Hindu-Muslim fissure in reaction to an all-encompassing Indian nationalism. Thus, Muslim separatism had a real basis, it has only been defined and redefined in the midst of unfolding events around the Indian independence movement. It will be pertinent to review the basic tenets of arguments and counter-arguments on the Muslim separatism between the National Congress and the Muslim League.

The tug of war between the National Congress and the Muslim League revolved round the question of whether the Muslims were a separate nation or not. This question has not yet been resolved and it is doubtful if ever it will be resolved. The National Congress stood for the unity of India and claimed to represent, as a secular party, the people of India as a whole. Nehru argued :

India beyond all doubt possesses a deep underlying fundamental unity, far more profound than that produced either by geographical isolation or by political suzerainty. That unity transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners and sect.⁴¹

Differences, if any, the National Congress argued, were superficial and temporary, not fundamental, created by opportunistic and power hungry Muslim elites, and facilitated by the presence of a 'third party', meaning the imperial power, which ruled over India by method of *divide et impera*.⁴² That the Muslim League did not represent even the whole of the Indian Muslims and they failed to get more than five percent of the Muslim votes in the 1937 elections, was a handy argument to the National Congress. On the other hand, the National Congress itself had a prominent Muslim in the person of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as a top ranking leader of the party.⁴³

⁴¹ See, Vincent Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford : The Clarendon Press) 1928 : x, quoted Korbel, *op. cit.* : 26.

⁴² Nehru argued, "The whole question of minorities and majorities in India is tied up with foreign and third party rule. Eliminate that, and the basic aspect of this question changes." See, Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Unity of India* (New York : The John Day Company) 1946 : 233

⁴³ Dr. Azad countered the Muslim League's demand for a homeland saying : "Scheme for Pakistan is a symbol of defeatism ... an analogy of Jewish homeland where Muslims would be content to withdraw to a corner specially reserved for them". Quoted in Mosley, *op. cit.* : 22.

It is the fundamental unity of India that the Muslim League challenged. While to Congress, "the Subcontinent is inescapably one nation", to the Muslim League, "it is, just as inescapably, two."⁴⁴ The Muslim League considered the religious and social differences as fundamental and framed their political ideology on these bases. Jinnah argued that :

it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and their misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most ...troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature ... based mainly on conflicting ideas and conception.⁴⁵

In their view, any political arrangement involving both Hindus and Muslims would perpetuate Hindu domination beyond retrieval by mere constitutional safeguards. Thus, while for Congress, the solution lay in what it called 'Quit India' on the part of Britain, the Muslim League wanted the British to 'divide and quit'.⁴⁶

The above arguments have several dimensions – historical, political, societal and theological. We may only touch the contours of these aspects to bring out the conflictual dimensions of the debate. Historically, these two religious communities had shared an antagonistic relationship, mildly termed as 'militant co-existence' by Tinker.⁴⁷ The historical memories of the two communities are antagonistic, as has been summed up aptly by Krishna :

The inescapable truth seems to be that Hindu India cannot escape the consequences of its medieval defeat, however much it might try, and Indian Islam cannot overcome the consequences of the failure of its mission of conquest in India whatever it might do.⁴⁸

Thus, the concept of Indian unity which the Congress so passionately believed in was at best an ideal. Although the concept of an Indian unity in its geopolitical sense was theoretically and logically appealing, there were more myths than reality in the goal. As Gupta also points out, the idea of the unity of India was at best "a conceptual unity in the minds of the elite for centuries"⁴⁹

⁴⁴ See, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 25.

⁴⁵ Quoted from Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore : Kashmiri Bazar) 1942 : 153.

⁴⁶ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 9-10.

⁴⁷ See, Hugh Tinker, *South Asia : A Short History* (London : Macmillan Press) 1989 : xiv.

⁴⁸ See, Gopal Krishna, "Communalism Revisited" (in two parts), *Times of India*, 23, 24 July 1974, quoted in Partha S. Ghosh, *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia* (Dhaka : University Press Limited) 1989 : 40.

⁴⁹ Gupta, *op. cit.* : 6.

but was hardly so in reality, except for brief interludes. While one finds it difficult to deny the notion of an overarching Indian culture and traditions, historically "it would be anachronistic to talk of a South Asian or Indian identity in the pre-colonial period", because the "fluidity of political power would in any case have hindered the emergence of any persistent political identities, ...".⁵⁰

To pursue the question of religious segregation versus socio-cultural practices between the two communities, fine distinctions have to be made between existential factors and values and ideology. Social interactions and co-existence cannot be the basis for drawing the conclusion that there were little 'pre-existing objective differences' between the two communities or that the differences were not fundamental.⁵¹ Admittedly, partly due to the social interactions and partly due to the Sufi influence, elements of syncretism penetrated the religious practices of the Muslims. However, arguing that Islam in the Subcontinent has been "essentially syncretistic",⁵² has many political, as well as religious, implications. It was basically out of a similar logic that the National Congress maintained that there were no basic differences between the two communities. To the Muslims, accepting such a proposition was tantamount to compromising the basic principles of Islam, which they valued so much. It became a question of defining ideology and formalising political position on the basis of that ideology. It should also be pointed out that such a debate has been going on ever since the Muslim League was created in 1906 to safeguard the interests of the Muslims and the debate itself sharpened the identity consciousness of the Muslims.⁵³

⁵⁰ See, Taylor(1979), *op. cit.* : 258. See, also, Section 3.2 of Chapter III.

⁵¹ See, interesting debate on this point between Robinson and Brass in Francis Robinson, "Nation Formation : The Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism" : 215-30, and Paul Brass, "A Reply to Francis Robinson" : 231-34, in *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 15(3), March 1977.

⁵² Asim Roy, for example, in the context of Bengal, rejects the argument that the syncretistic practices were "folk" or "degenerate" form of Islam, rather Islam in Bengal was "originally syncretistic". See, Asim Roy, *The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal* (Princeton : Princeton University Press) 1983, quoted here from a review by Kenneth McPherson in *South Asia, Journal of South Asian Studies*, IX(1), June 1986 : 107.

⁵³ For this mutual dimension of the issue of Muslim separatism, see personal reflections in I. H. Qureshi, "A Case Study of the Social Relations Between the muslims and the Hindus, 1935-47" in Philips and Wainwright(eds.), *op. cit.* : 360-68.

The brief experiences of 1937-39 with a Congress Ministry in the provinces is a pointer more to this direction than anything else. In a way the outcome and aftermath of the 1937 provincial elections served as a landmark in polarisation of communal politics and emergence of a rigid bi-partisan politics in the Subcontinent. The election outcome emboldened the National Congress to profess and practise the claim of the party as the sole representative of the Indian people. The Congress High Command imposed policies to bludgeon Muslims into conformity. For example, Hindi was to be a medium of instruction, Hindi was to be written in *Devnagari* script even where Urdu was the lingua franca; the Congress flag and a Hindu national anthem with an anti-Muslim overtone was adopted for the provinces where the Congress formed the government. These experiences gave the Muslims an alternative : "The Muslim provinces of Bengal, Punjab, Sind and NWFP might achieve freedom from Hindu India: as individual sovereign units; in groups, with or without the Muslim states; or in a single Muslim states."⁵⁴

To be precise, the political mobilisation of the Muslims started much earlier. Inspired by the benefits of a separate electorate even in Muslim majority provinces, the politicians began formulating constitutional schemes that would consolidate their position. One such effort was directed at creating new provinces in British India. Thus, the separation of Sind from Bombay, attaining a provincial status for the politically backward Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Provinces, the demand for vesting of power upon sovereign provinces – all are indicative of such efforts.⁵⁵ By the late 1920s, the Hindu-Muslim conflict was converted into irreconcilable constitutional demands:

From 1928 onwards there is quite definitely a new model of Hindu-Moslem antagonism which shows itself in organised political action for political ends. It is something deeper, more enduring, and more embracing in its objectives than the old traditional, semi-instinctive antagonism which vented itself in in street fights, and stone-throwing, and quarter-staff play on days of religious ceremonies of festivals. The Moslems are manoeuvring for position in readiness for the coming of responsible self-government.⁵⁶

Thus, the "Muslim rejection of a unitary solution to the problem of demitting empire was the

⁵⁴ See, Moore(1973a), *op. cit.* : 88.

⁵⁵ See, Moore (1973a), *ibid* : 85-86.

⁵⁶ John Coatman, *Years of Destiny : India* (London), 1932, quoted in Moore(1973a), *ibid* : 86

logical consequence of thirty years of constitutional development. .. History of the partition should be read in terms of a dialectic between Indian communities and the constitutional opportunities available."⁵⁷

Two counter-examples are cited to argue that partition was not inevitable. One was Jinnah's apparent preparedness to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 the salient feature of which was a united India. The second was the performance of the Muslim League in the Punjab provincial elections of 1946, which is attributed usually to failure of the Unionist Party rather than to an appeal of the goal of Pakistan to the mass people.⁵⁸ With regard to the first argument, a close look at the conditions under which Jinnah was prepared to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan would reveal that they were tantamount to a separate Muslim homeland with "an implied right of secession" inherent in the Plan.⁵⁹ With regard to the switch of support from the ruling Unionist Party to the Muslim League in as late as 1946, a distinction has be made between provincial politics entrenched in landed aristocracy and local religious leaders, and the politics of Muslim nationalism at the national or British India level. The spiritual and economic life of the Punjab peasantry was enmeshed and tied to these interests. When the Muslim League provided a viable alternative at the local level, did the Muslim mass and the local élite risk to break with the Unionist party in the province. It represents the difficulties the Muslim League encountered in making a successful electoral debut rather than a lack of support.

To drive home the point of the above arguments, we may argue counterfactually that even if Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Plan and by a stroke of accident or in a natural process, power was transferred to a single authority, it would have only delayed the birth of Muslim state(s). The rupture between the National Congress and the Muslim League was complete. In one of their first few meetings Jinnah told Mountbatten, "if your Excellency was prepared to let the Muslim League have only the Sind Desert I would still prefer to accept that and have a separate Muslim

⁵⁷ See, *ibid* : 88.

⁵⁸ For the second argument, see, see, I. A Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937-1947", *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, XX(1), March 1982 : 5-24.

⁵⁹ See, Moore(1983), *op. cit.* : 155-56. See, also, A. G. Noorani, "The Cabinet Mission and Its After-math" in Philips and Wainwright (eds.), *op. cit.* : 104-16.

state in those conditions than to continue in bondage to the Congress with apparently more generous conditions."⁶⁰ Toward the close of 1946 after the failure of the Cabinet Mission, "instability was hitting the political parties", all the parties were finding it difficult to keep a grip on the supporters.⁶¹ Mansergh argues, that the transfer of power to a single successor may well have precipitated "the bloodiest civil war in the history of Asia".⁶² That bloodshed and instability could not be avoided, however, is another story, reflecting the magnitude of the problem. To an extent, it was like a self-fulfilling prophesy as well. As Gordon Johnson concludes, "all the politicians – British and Indian alike – rushed for fear of a worst collapse; and in cutting through the final difficulties were overwhelmed by the horror of it all".⁶³ To sum up, there had been religious and historical divide between the Hindus and Muslims in British India, even if there had been coexistence on the basis of social and cultural interactions. Such coexistence had also been shattered historically by communal feuds. When question of political identity and nationalism came up, the set of beliefs, values and loyalties that the Muslims held high came to the fore.

4.3 Partition and the Transfer of Power – Kashmir in Perspective

Hindu-Muslim relations were a major determinant of the course of the Indian independence movement and subsequent inter-state relations, but communal relations were also shaped to a great extent by the course of the movement, especially, the policy and postures of the main actors – the British Indian Government, the National congress, and the Muslim League.⁶⁴ The political role of another communal group, namely, the Sikhs in the Punjab, was less significant because of its *de facto* coalition with the National Congress. However, the Sikhs played a decisive role in the communal front in 1947. In this section, we are particularly concerned about certain aspects of the partition process and its immediate impact on the communal front in the Punjab that spilled

⁶⁰ Quoted in Francis Robinson (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) 1989 : 145.

⁶¹ *Ibid* : 145.

⁶² Quoted in Moore(1973a), *op. cit.* : 88.

⁶³ See, *Ibid* : 147.

⁶⁴ See, Appendix VI. A detailed chronology of events during 1935-1947 may be found in Philips and Wainwright(eds.), *op. cit.* : 554-83.

over eventually into Kashmir. Of course, the overall impact of the partition on bilateral relations which, in turn, led them to take antagonistic postures on the accession of the Indian Princes will also be brought out.

4.3.1 The Partition of the Punjab – Controversies

The Hindu-Muslim feuds contributed to the rigidification of the Hindu-Muslim rivalry and caused the partition of the Subcontinent in August 1947. Especially, the partition of the Punjab left important legacies of direct relevance for the Kashmir problem. As Lamb argued, "The mechanism of partition, as applied to the Punjab, more than any other single factor, created the immediate background to the Kashmir dispute".⁶⁵ One such aspect of direct relevance, apart from the communal dimension, was a controversial award of the Boundary Commission, created for the purpose of demarcating the territories in mixed-populated Punjab. The controversies persist, and they are still pursued with circumstantial evidence including personal accounts, as the documents and paper works on the proceedings of the Boundary Commissions were destroyed.

The Indian Independence Act provided for a 'notional' partition of the provinces solely on the basis of religious composition of population in the administrative districts. Thus, contiguous Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority districts were assigned to India and Pakistan respectively. The Boundary Commissions constituted for this purpose were "to demarcate the boundaries ... on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous areas of Muslims and non-Muslims taking into considerations other factors".⁶⁶ The 'other factors' were not specified, but, as the British Parliament was told, it was provided to take care of the special circumstances of the Sikh communities including their property and temples.⁶⁷ Sir Cyril Radcliffe, an eminent British Jurist, was appointed the Chairman of both the Commissions, each having four members, representing the Muslims and non-Muslims. Sir Cyril, however, found the Muslim and non-Muslim members of the Commission hardly agreeing on any point. So, he made his own awards

⁶⁵ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 103.

⁶⁶ See, Mansergh and Moon (eds.), *TOP*, *op. cit.* XI : 415.

⁶⁷ See, *TOP*, XII : 144.

which the National Congress and the Muslim League had pledged to accept.⁶⁸ Although the awards were to be made public on the same day as the transfer of power, its publication was delayed by two days, and this delay itself became a subject of controversy.⁶⁹

More controversial were some of the specific awards given the fact that the principle could not be followed to the letter because of 'stubborn geography'. Consequently, a certain amount of arbitrariness was inherent in the process. Radcliffe himself also admitted later, "each decision at each point was debatable" because of the nature of the job.⁷⁰ At least on one count, the deviation proved explosive. It concerned the awards on Gurdaspur in East Punjab and Ferozepur in Lahore, West Punjab.⁷¹ The controversy was that a number of Muslim majority areas were allocated to India following *Tehsil* (sub-districts) boundaries, while the notional partition was to be made along district boundaries.⁷² This, in the Pakistani perception, was viewed to be guided by considerations of facilitating Kashmir's accession to India. According to one participant in the Punjab Boundary Commission from the Pakistani side, "By assigning these two Muslim majority areas [Batala and Gurdaspur] also to India, Radcliffe provided India with a link to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and paved the way for the bitterest dispute between India and Pakistan."⁷³

Radcliffe might have been guided by a number of 'other factors' in his decision to allot the *Tehsil* to India. The first reason could be one of a technical nature centering on the issue of administrative convenience. The Upper Bari Doab Canal system for irrigating extensive areas in both East and West Punjab had its headworks in Gurdaspur, hence partitioning the canal system and the headworks might have caused a dislocation. Radcliffe later explained in London, that

⁶⁸ See, R. J. Moore, *The Making of New Commonwealth* (Clarendon : Oxford University Press) 1987 : 25.

⁶⁹ See, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 19.

⁷⁰ See, Radcliffe to Michel, 28 March 1965, in Aloys A. Michel, *The Indus Basin : A Study of the Effects of Partition* (New Haven : Yale University Press) 1967 : 194.

⁷¹ There was another deviation. In East Bengal [later East Pakistan, now Bangladesh], the non-Muslim area of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, inhabited largely by the Chakma Hill tribes, was awarded to Pakistan, much to the resentment of the local tribes who wanted to join India. The Indian flag was hoisted there after the transfer of power and it had to be brought down by force. Of course, they were later reconciled to their lot. But after the independence of Bangladesh, there had been an estrangement between the Hill tribes and the authorities in Dhaka presaging the problem of the Chakma insurgency in the 1980s. See, Chapter III.


⁷² The deviation from the principle of the partition may be found in Map 3.

⁷³ See, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York : Columbia University Press) 1967 : 215.

Source : Moore(1987) : 28-29

Map 3

The Partition of the Punjab



Gurdaspur was allocated to East Punjab "to keep the canals and headworks as much as possible under one administrative system."⁷⁴ However, Michel argues, on the basis of his extensive investigation, that the Upper Bari Doab Canal system irrigated more lands in Lahore than in Amritsar and Gurdaspur combined together, and if the administrative control were to be exercised from Lahore, any attempt to deprive Amritsar would have deprived more lands in Pakistan of scarce irrigation water.⁷⁵

A second consideration could be to assuage the feelings of the Sikhs, who had been demanding a Sikh homeland, which could not be otherwise taken care of in the transfer of power and the partition process. This is apparently a plausible argument. If Gurdaspur was awarded to Pakistan, then the Sikh city of Amritsar would have been surrounded by Muslim districts, and the Sikhs would have also found an access to the Sikh populated Hoshiarpur district rather difficult.⁷⁶ It was well known at that time that the Sikhs were getting restless because the partition would affect them severely in West Punjab.⁷⁷ The authorities were aware of their preparation for a showdown with the Muslims. Thus, the allocation of Gurdaspur, and later changing allegedly the initial award of the Ferozepur district in Lahore to East Punjab (India) seem to have been guided consistently by the desire to enlarge as much possible the homeland of the Sikhs and thereby, to placate them. Although such attempts were not enough to assuage the Sikhs,⁷⁸ there was little that the authorities could do, given the more pressing problem the Hindu-Muslim disagreement over the transfer of power. However if the Sikh factor had been the only factor available, it is an open question whether the Muslims would have felt the same amount of bitterness as they felt about Gurdaspur. There was yet a third factor.

⁷⁴ See, Hugh Tinker, "Pressure, Persuasion, Decision : Factors in the Partition of the Punjab", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 36, 1977 : 702. The related documents may be found in the Political Department, Transfer of Power Papers, L/P & J/10/119, India Office Records. See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 30.

⁷⁵ Moore quoting Michel. See, Moore(1987), *ibid* : 30.

⁷⁶ See, Map 3.

⁷⁷ The main concerns of the Sikhs were the landed property and Shrines in West Punjab. The Sikh leader Master Tara Singh proposed a partition in the Punjab on the basis of immovable property to protect them. But this was not accepted.

⁷⁸ See, Moore(1987): *op. cit.* : 38.

The third factor was Kashmir. It was the unanimous view of Pakistani leaders that the Gurdaspur decision had been manipulated keeping in mind the issue of accession of Kashmir that had been brewing up in the meantime. Among all the possibilities, the Kashmir factor seemed to be more plausible because Gurdaspur and Kashmir had been frequently linked in the partition politics that had been going on since the enactment of the Indian Independence Act. Gurdaspur was in the mind of everybody because of its crucial location. On the announcement of the June 3, Plan, the annexure to the plan gave a list of Muslim majority districts on the basis of the 1941 population census.⁷⁹ However, on June 4, Mountbatten said in a press conference that "in the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab the population is 50.4 per cent Muslims, I think, and 49.6 percent non-Muslims. With a difference of 0.8 per cent you will see at once that it is unlikely that the Boundary Commission will throw the whole district into Muslim majority areas."⁸⁰ Mountbatten later told Abdur Rab Nishtar, Muslim League leader and Minister in the Interim Government that, "Kashmir is so placed geographically that it could join either Dominion, provided a part of Gurdaspur were put into East Punjab by the Commission".⁸¹ This meant that the importance of Kashmir was in the mind of the key personalities of the day.

As the Boundary Commission started working, intense lobbying was going on for a favourable award. On August 8, a provisional map was leaked out from the office of the Secretary of the Punjab Governor, Jenkins. According to the map all the three *Tehsils* of Gurdaspur were allotted to India, while the districts of Ferozepur and Zira with a Muslim population of 55% and 65% per cent respectively, were allotted to Pakistan. The knowledge of this provisional allocation aroused symmetrical type of reactions among the Muslim League and the National Congress circles. The National Congress protested that the future Indian Government was going to be deprived of the vital district of Ferozepur, while the Muslim League believed Pakistan was unduly deprived of Gurdaspur because of the Kashmir factor.⁸² The National Congress, on the

⁷⁹ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 31-June 7, 1947 : 8632.

⁸⁰ See, Mountbatten, *Time Only to Look Forward* (London : Nicholas Kaye) 1949 : 30.

⁸¹ See, *TOP*, XII : 151.

⁸² Mohammad Ali recounts that when he went to see Lord Ismay he happened to see the provisional map showing Ferozepur in Pakistan and Gurdaspur in India. See, Mohammad Ali, *op. cit.* : 217-17.

other hand, had its focus on Ferozepur and Zira, the award of which to Pakistan meant Pakistan's access across the Sutlej to the East, leaving no natural barrier between west Punjab (Pakistan) and Delhi.⁸³ Nehru protested to Mountbatten but got an official polite reproach from Mountbatten, as Liaquat Ali Khan also got one from Lord Ismay, that it would be unfair to interfere with the proceedings of the Boundary Commission.

Radcliffe completed his awards on August 12, but the Viceroy did not publish them until two days after the transfer of power. When the awards were published, it was found that Ferozepur and Zira had also been allocated to India. Pakistan was protesting for Gurdaspur, but when the awards were published Pakistan discovered it had also lost Ferozepur and Zira. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Pakistan's Minister of Communication viewed it as a "parting kick of the British to Pakistan", while Gazhanfar Ali Khan, Minister of Education, threatened to leave the Commonwealth.⁸⁴ In response to the allegation of interference made by Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister in early 1948 when the Kashmir problem was well under way, Mountbatten wrote to Lord Ismay that in his meeting with Radcliffe "about this time" at Ismay's house, "for a drink", :

If I had any idea that this particular and relatively small incident might become a 'Cause Celebre' I should of course have kept a very accurate record and got it agreed with you and Radcliffe.⁸⁵

Moore argues in this context :

It seems more likely that the revision that Radcliffe made between the 10th and 13th reweighed the factors that the award acknowledged – railway, waterway and the Sutlej as a frontier. Ferozepur city was the railway terminus for south-east Punjab, a central town and a bastion of the defence of India.⁸⁶

The conclusion that one can reach from the above is that while the award on Ferozepur could be explained in terms of Sikh factors, without reference to the Kashmir question, the delay in publication may be explained either way. Moore argues, "Gurdaspur award is [also] explicable

⁸³ See, Map 3. The Indian reading of the provisional award was that Radcliffe had attempted to compensate Pakistan for the loss of Gurdaspur. See, *TOP*, XII : 395.

⁸⁴ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, September 6-13, 1947 : 8813.

⁸⁵ See, Ismay Papers, III/7/24, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London, quoted in Moore(1987), *op. cit.*: 36.

⁸⁶ See, Moore(1987), *ibid* : 36-37.

without reference to Kashmir".⁸⁷ Lamb argues persuasively with the use of excellent inferences that the delay could be to persuade the *Maharaja* to accede to India through keeping an element of uncertainty.⁸⁸ Knowing that the *Maharaja* of Kashmir had a clear disliking for Pakistan and a strong preference for independence, the uncertainty of Gurdaspur might force him to join India. Much of this may be "hindsight arguments", as one of the interviewees suggested,⁸⁹ but "the Pakistanis were convinced that the Governor-General and the National Congress had been preparing the ground for Kashmir's accession to India. Gurdaspur was just the beginning."⁹⁰

4.3.2 The Partition and Communal Violence – Spillover Effect

It is notable that the Hindu-Muslim communal rivalry and feuds led to the decision on partition, but the major communal carnage and population displacement involved the Sikhs pitted against the Muslims in the Punjab, yet the other partitioned province remained relatively calm in the wake of publication of the boundary awards.⁹¹ By all counts, the 5.7 million Sikhs were presented with a *fait accompli* on the partition of Punjab. The Sikhs became aware of the grim prospects of partition in March 1947 following the British announcement in February 1947. Earlier, the coalition government of the Sikh Akali Party and the Muslim Unionist Party had been toppled by the Muslim League sending signals to the Sikhs of the reality of Pakistan. Since then the Sikhs were arming themselves and preparing for any eventuality. The Government had information about their activities, yet took no action on the apprehension that mass arrests at that stage would simply aggravate the situation.⁹² Instead, the Government tried in its own way to placate the Sikh sentiments, and deferred the publication of the awards on partition.

⁸⁷ *Ibid* : 33.

⁸⁸ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 114-16.

⁸⁹ Prof. S. D. Muni, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, in an interview with the present researcher, September 1991.

⁹⁰ Prof. Khan Zaman Mirza, Institute of Kashmir Studies, Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir, in an interview with the researcher, August 1991.

⁹¹ See, E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-7* (London : Allen & Unwin Ltd) 1954 : 192-93.

⁹² See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.*: 39.

However, the inevitable could not be deferred. During the following weeks, "a communal war of succession" had started.⁹³ There was a mass exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from what had become West Pakistan and an even greater flood of Muslims from Delhi and East Punjab into the new state. It has been calculated that almost six million moved east and eight million moved westward. "Perhaps as many as 200,000 did not get to the journey's end, but were massacred. It was a horrific start to the relations between the two great neighbours."⁹⁴ As the refugees moved both ways throughout August, the "eddies were felt in the adjacent provinces".⁹⁵ "From the disruptions of central Punjab in August the infection of terror and reprisal spread in September until it extended from Delhi to Peshawar." Tales of genocide spread even faster and caused fresh conflagration in unaffected areas. "From his motor car Baldev Singh observed a "lemming-like" two way procession of refugees; from the air Ismay observed how superior was the organisation of the Sikh exodus. Where the Muslims straggled the Sikhs moved in military file." Patiala was affected where, according to the report of a 'reliable worker' of Nehru, the Muslims died like "goats and sheep".⁹⁶ According to another observer, "probably the worst of all the 1947 massacres" was that of the Muslims in Jammu.⁹⁷

The impact of the Punjab and Patiala killings on the greater region may be assessed from the accounts of Sir George Cunningham, who was the Governor of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). First, there were reprisals against the Sikhs and Hindus in NWFP in response to killings in East Punjab. It became obvious to Cunningham that "unless the Punjab slaughters ceased at once it would be impossible to hold back our people; there have been so many revolting stories of the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab."⁹⁸ On 23 September, Cunningham wrote, "I have had offers from practically every tribe along the frontier to be allowed to go and kill Sikhs in Eastern Punjab, and I think I would only have to hold up my little finger to get a *laskar* of 40,000

⁹³ See, Moore(1987), *ibid* : 40. See, also Lumby(1954) *op. cit.* : 187-90.

⁹⁴ See, Tinker(1989), *op. cit.* : 215.

⁹⁵ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 42.

⁹⁶ *Ibid* : 44.

⁹⁷ See, Sir Terrence Creagh Coen, *The Indian Political Service : A Study in Indirect Rule*, London, 1971 : 139.

⁹⁸ *Cunningham's Diary*, 4 September 1947, India Office Library(IOL), quoted in Moore(1987), *ibid* : 45.

or 50,000."⁹⁹ Later Cunningham gave an account of the gradual swell of tribal feelings until it boiled up into an invasion of Kashmir.¹⁰⁰ However, before the tribal people invaded Kashmir, three separate groups of organised gangs entered into Kashmir, as a spillover of the Punjab killings. They were the Sikh activists, the Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh(RSSS), who were a well-known Hindu militant group, and the Muslim National Guards, an armed youth group of the Muslim League. Communal violence flared up in Jammu. It appeared that the Hindu and Sikh refugees, together with the militant RSSS, under the encouragement from the Dogra ruler in Kashmir, wanted to reduce the Muslims to a minority. The Muslim National Guards came in to protect the Muslims from being persecuted. Of course, this triangular communal violence would soon be linked to a local rebellion of the Muslims of Poonch,¹⁰¹ and in quick succession, to Pakistan-Kashmir State disputes in which the Kashmir Government would complain of Hindu and Sikh massacre by Muslim activists from West Punjab in Pakistan.

Two factors seemed to have contributed to this spillover of communal violence to Kashmir and adjoining areas. One is the local geopolitics and historical memories which intermeshed not only inter-communal relations among the Muslims, the Sikhs and the Hindus, but also the inter-regional relations among the Punjab, Kashmir and the North West Frontier (NWFP) from where would emerge a fourth group of armed activists, namely, the tribal invaders. Secondly, the fluidity of the extra-ordinary circumstances where law and order had collapsed totally and various armed groups were calling the shots.

To sum up, the discussion of the section demonstrated that the partition of the Subcontinent, which itself was almost singularly shaped by the Hindu-Muslim divide, left a number of controversies regarding award of particular territories and physical facilities, and gave rise to massive communal displacement and violence, especially, in the Punjab. Both these factors – the controversies and the communal fallout were direct inputs to prior conflictual processes in and over Kashmir. We have had a brief look of the relevance of partition-related communal violence

⁹⁹ *Ibid* : 45.

¹⁰⁰ This refers to the much talked about tribal invasion, to be taken up in Chapter V.

¹⁰¹ To be covered in Section 5.2.3 in Chapter V.

for prior conflictual process in Kashmir in this Section. Both will be carried forward in the following chapter. Before that, however, it would be pertinent to examine how the partition and the resulting communal violence were shaped within the inter-state relations of the newly born Dominions. It will be seen in this chapter that the mind-set resulting from the Hindu-Muslim rivalry and the general inter-state antagonism, in turn, set them in yet another race for the accession of the Indian Princes, in general, and that of Kashmir, in particular.

4.4. From Hindu-Muslim Feuds to Inter-state Rivalry

The partition of the Subcontinent along communal lines provided the seal of the Hindu-Muslim divide. Pakistan was identified as a Muslim state and India for some time was also designated unofficially as *Hindustan*, or a Hindu state. The shared past and to an extent, the shared heritage of common languages and culture was hidden, at least for the time being, under the burden of communal hatred. This was reflected in inter-state relations in the form of a divergent orientation, attitudes and perceptions, aptly summed up by Gupta as "conflicting images and self-images" held in India and Pakistan of the two states and the two peoples.¹⁰²

The legacy of the Hindu-Muslim divide was reflected mainly in the divergent political systems and foreign policy orientations of the two newly emergent Dominions. It turned out that, the India 'leaders' attitude and behaviour towards Pakistan was guided by the pre-independence assumption that Pakistan was a transient phenomenon. Frequent statements emanated from New Delhi to this effect and Pakistani reactions to them only deepened bitterness among an élite, which had shared its professional and political career with Indians even until very recently. At the very least the Pakistanis perceived these statements to be indicative of Indian desire of "making life difficult for Pakistan."¹⁰³ General Auchinleck, the last Chief of the British Indian Army, who was based in New Delhi after the partition to oversee the division of the armed forces and the military stores between the two Dominions, wrote in this context :

¹⁰² Gupta, *op. cit.* : 16.

¹⁰³ Source : *Interview* in Karachi, August 1991.

I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In that I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers, and indeed by all responsible British officers cognizant of the situation.¹⁰⁴

The bitterness and mutual suspicions were reflected in inter-state relations. To quote Gupta,

The problems of Indo-Pakistan relations arose out of the fact that their mutual relations did not pose the normal problems of relations between two separate nations. It has not been easy for the present generation of Indians and Pakistanis to forget the past and to evolve a normal attitude towards the neighbour. Each is involved with the other through facts of history, geography, culture, language, and memories of recent past. It is against this background that India and Pakistan began to function as sovereign states and found themselves engaged in conflicts over many issues of which Kashmir is but one.¹⁰⁵

Thus, the very process culminating in independence engendered bitterness and hatred between the two neighbours. This led to the growth of what may be termed as "constricted inter-state relations",¹⁰⁶ meaning, sub-normal or abnormality in relations. The 'pent-up' emotions in turn, gave rise to inhibition in behaviour and reaction. Developing this argument Gupta emphasised the "madness of partition in which expediency rather than consistent principle" was the guiding factor.¹⁰⁷

Of course, as one looks back for a realistic re-assessment of the pattern of inter-state relations obtaining amidst prevailing chaos and confusion, mass migration and communal killings, one may indeed also argue that "both Indian and Pakistani leaderships displayed admirable maturity" in handling bilateral relations.¹⁰⁸ Despite the prevailing strains and stresses, the leaderships of both countries did attempt to sort out bilateral entanglements, especially in the

¹⁰⁴ See, Auchinleck's report of September 28, 1947, for the Prime Minister, quoted in Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 53.

¹⁰⁵ Gupta, *op. cit.* : 16

¹⁰⁶ The expression was used by Dr. Bhabani Sen Gupta of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, while giving an interview to the present author in October 1991.

¹⁰⁷ Source : *Interview, ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ This was interestingly the argument of one of the interviewees in Pakistan, Brig (Retd.) Bashir Ahmed, Director, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, during my field work in Pakistan in August 1991. While the commonly found views in Pakistan corroborated the 'constricted' relations hypothesis, he had a point when he said, "things could have been worse under the circumstances. Look at the scale of fighting in the battle front in 1948." By the last sentence he meant the very low intensity of fighting, which, given the overall military capability and preparedness in the Subcontinent at that time, is not a very convincing argument, although many argue these lines. For example, see, Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir* (London : Robert Hale Limited) 1956 : 77.

context of management of communal problems and minority affairs.¹⁰⁹ Secondly and more importantly, the very complex tasks of division of the armed forces, ordnances and stores and other assets, exchange control and currency management, trade relations, sharing of water resources from common rivers, proved extremely complicated. Yet both countries, especially their bureaucrats, rose to the occasion and tried to sort out the issues, though with repeated setbacks.¹¹⁰

It would, however, be a partial picture to argue that the two Dominions were tiding over bilateral difficulties without the entanglement of other issues. There was indeed substantial entanglements of financial and trade dealings with the problem under study, that is, the Kashmir problem, which had already been under way between the two countries. In order to understand Kashmir, however, we need to have a background idea of the contest for the Indian Princes that had been continuing ever since the British announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Subcontinent.

4.5 The Accession of the Princely States : Residual Approach

If there was a 'madness' in the business of partition, possibly because of the gigantic nature of the task, there was, in effect, no principle to be followed on the issue of accession of the Indian Princes either to India or Pakistan. Preoccupation of the parties with the partition made accession at best a residual task. The only area where the concerned actors were consistent was the pursuit of their respective interests. It will be seen that in the absence of a clear-cut and well-planned policy on the disposal of the affairs of the Princes, the interested parties, including the Princes, had their own convenient interpretation of the broad policy guidelines. This itself provided the immediate operational milieu in which the Kashmir conflict took place.

¹⁰⁹ It may indeed be argued that had the management of the communal problem, when it was a joint problem just on the eve of independence, been conducted with a minimum of commitment, the Subcontinent would have been richer by many thousand lives. Details of the measure taken jointly and separately by the two Dominions may be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 17-24, 1948 : 9050-51.

¹¹⁰ Details of dozens of agreements and accords setting up normal diplomatic and trade relations between the two dominions may be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 24-31, 1948 : 9066-67; April 17-24, 1948 : 9226; June 26-30, 1948 : 9359; July 3-10, 1948 : 9372.

4.5.1 British Policy Towards the Indian Princes – The Unceremonious Lapse of Paramountcy

In the face of the rising tide of Indian nationalism in the 1930s, the Indian Princes were viewed as a "bulwark of the British rule",¹¹¹ but it was the dynamics of Indian nationalism and Muslim separatism which led to a rapid change of their status in the 1940s. In 1947 when power was transferred to the newly born Dominions, paramountcy unceremoniously lapsed. In the meantime, the British Government did make an effort to prepare the Princes for their place in new India, but in the exigencies of the situation, it could hardly avoid "the charge of abandoning its protégés who had so recently supported it in war."¹¹² Several factors might be held responsible for the haphazard and *ad hoc* manner in which finally the Princes' affairs were managed. First, there was an element of complacency on the part of the British Government that once the main problem of transfer of power was sorted out, "the states would fall in line."¹¹³ Most of the 500 odd Princes did fall in line to sign up the Instrument of Accession to India when they were asked to do so by the Viceroy on July 25, 1947.¹¹⁴ However, a good number of Princes did also stand out, although all caved in eventually, some under coercion and some under force, excepting Kashmir. Had the communal violence and India-Pakistan rivalry not overshadowed the Subcontinent, it is plausible that more conflicts would have ensued involving the recalcitrant Princes.

Secondly, Britain had an entrenched interest in maintaining some kind of links with the Subcontinent which could have been the successor authorities remaining within the Commonwealth or some political and military links being maintained with the Princes. Given the National Congress's initial reservation about the Commonwealth connection or a Dominion status, and the sheer speed with which the National Congress versus Muslim League rivalry was intensifying, it seemed that the decision making élites in London and Delhi were divided as to

¹¹¹ See, G. Douds, *op. cit.* : 64-65

¹¹² See, E. W. R. Lumby, "British Policy Towards the Indian states, 1940-7" in Philips and Wainwright (eds.), *op. cit.* : 95.

¹¹³ See, Moore(1983), *op. cit.* : 290.

¹¹⁴ See, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 171-76.

which course would endure and sustain British interests. As the Second World War started, the majority were in favour of a Commonwealth link, and as a natural corollary, followed a policy that would integrate eventually the Princes with India, because that was the political preference of the National Congress. Yet, there those who because of the uncertainty of Congress' posture and because of the prior commitment of the British Government to the Princes, wanted to retain links with the Princes. Both views were prominent and aimed at promoting national interests, yet conflicting signals, contradictory public and private commitments and rather ambivalent public policy statements were adding to confusion and misinterpretation. Thirdly, the exigencies of the circumstances around the transfer of power which themselves were propelling the events did not allow, to be fair, any administrative preparation for the orderly disposal of the Princes. Fourthly, to a great extent, the Princes themselves were also responsible for being confronted with a *fait accompli* at the last moment, because having entrenched interests in an autocratic and extravagant way of life, they were not prepared to recognise the reality, initiate administrative reforms and arrive at a political understanding with the successor authorities in British India. However, it was the second factor, that is lack of consistency of approach towards the Princes which polarised greatly all the British Indian parties involved in the accession process.

Although Britain's faith in the Princes as a 'bulwark' of its interests began to erode in the late-thirties,¹¹⁵ the important personalities in the British Government in London and the British Indian Government in Delhi continued to assure officially and in private, its commitment to the survival of Princes would be honoured.¹¹⁶ While such assurances were maintained until the Cabinet Mission of 1946, ambivalence had already crept in with respect to military protection of the Princes by the Crown in the event of external attacks. This reinforced the search for sovereign status on the part of several prominent Princes like Indore, Bhopal, Mysore, Jodhpur, Travancore,

¹¹⁵ See, Douds, *op. cit.* : 65-67.

¹¹⁶ Viceroy Wavell, for example, reaffirmed in 1941 on the eve of the Cripps Mission that British position with respect to the Princes remain unchanged. See, E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-7* (London : George Allen & Unwin) 1954 : 214-22. Sir Stafford Cripps, while addressing the Chamber of the Princes in March 1942, spoke of the "survival" of the Princes "as valued and respected elements in the new Indian polity which was yet to be evolved." Quoted in Lumby(1970), *op. cit.* : 96.

Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

An important source of ambiguity lay in the discrepancies between official policy statements and unofficial explanations. The official position of the Cabinet Mission was expressed in a *Memorandum of States' Treaties and Paramountcy*, dated May 12, 1946, addressed to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, which stated that, when a fully self-governing or independent *government or governments* came into being :

His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise His powers of paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and that all rights surrendered by the States to the paramount Power will return to the States. ... The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them.¹¹⁷

The Memorandum, in effect, gave three options to the Princes, namely, joining India, joining Pakistan or retaining independence with some kind of "political arrangements" with the successor governments in India. Throughout the subsequent periods in which the idea of successor 'governments' was dropped and then re-adopted, the position remained the same.¹¹⁸ If anything, the stand became only clearer. For example, the Indian Independence Act of July 18, 1947 read like this:

As from the appointed day [i.e., 15th August, 1947] : the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the Rulers of Indian States ...¹¹⁹

Thus, the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, the Partition Plan of June 3, 1947, and the Indian Independence Act of July 18, 1947, all made the States "technically and legally ...independent", as Mountbatten later explained to the Chamber of Princes on July 25, 1947.¹²⁰ While the British Government declined to speculate about what would happen if some Princes stood aside and

¹¹⁷ See, Command Paper No. 6385, 1946, quoted in K. S. Hasan(ed.) *The Kashmir Question : Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan* (Karachi : The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs) 1966 : 3.

¹¹⁸ See, Hasan, *ibid* : 3, and Korbel, *op. cit.* : 47.

¹¹⁹ Indian Independence Act, 18 July 1947, reproduced in *TOP*, XII, 1983 : 237-38.

¹²⁰ See, Mountbatten, *Time Only to Look Forward*, Speeches of Rear Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma (London : Nicholas Kaye) 1949 : 52.

advised prudence for such cases, it did not renounce categorically any possible links with any such vacillating Prince.¹²¹ A section of the bureaucracy both in Delhi and London was very eager to protect the *status quo*, at least with regard to those unwilling to join either Dominion.¹²²

More conflicting were the roles of the Viceroy, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, and that of Sir Conrad Corfield, the Head of the Political Department, which used to administer the affairs of the Princes. The Viceroy himself started persuading the unwilling Princes to join the Indian Union. Mountbatten started with the premise of "technically and legally" free Princes, but he ended up offering the Princes literally only one option, that is, to sign the Instrument of Accession and join to India,¹²³ and "one by one the Princes queued up to sign".¹²⁴

In British India, the Political Department headed by Sir Conrad Corfield, which looked after the Princes' affairs, was virtually at cross-purposes with the National Congress and the Viceroy. It was the Political Department which ensured, despite the contrary wish of the National Congress, that the paramountcy was not transferred to the successor Dominion of India. Corfield was also encouraging the Princes not to sign the Instrument.¹²⁵ The consequence was that the National Congress, the Muslim League and the Princes interpreted the policy of 'lapse of Paramountcy' according to their respective interests.

4.5.2 The Indian National Congress and the Muslim League Towards the Princes – Self-interests or Habitual Rivalry?

As the concrete plan of partition of the Subcontinent and simultaneous lapse of paramountcy were announced, the National Congress and the Muslim League started bickering

¹²¹ See, *House of Commons Debate*, in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 5-12, 1947 : 8699-8700.

¹²² See, IOL, R/1, the preface of "Transfer of Selected Records to United Kingdom Authority, 1947", *Crown Representative's Records*.

¹²³ Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten's Press Adviser, wrote about the Viceroy's meeting with the Princes : "he used every weapon in his armoury of persuasion, making it clear at the outset that in the proposed Instrument of Accession, which V. P. Menon had devised, [the Princes] were being provided with a political offer from Congress which was not likely to be repeated. ... He reminded them that after the 15th of August he would no longer be in a position to mediate on their behalf as Crown Representative, and warned those Princes who were hoping to build up their own store of arms that the weapons they would get would in any case be obsolete." See, Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London : Robert Hale) 1951 : 140-42. See also, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 172-75.

¹²⁴ See, Mosley, *ibid* : 173.

¹²⁵ For details, including Nehru's protests with regard to Corfield's policies, see, IOL, R/1/1/4628.

about the meaning of the lapse of paramountcy. The bickering was partly habitual and partly guided by the specific concern of accession of the Princes. Throughout the negotiations of the Cabinet Mission and subsequent schemes, the Congress upheld the position that the paramountcy of the Princes should not be transferred to the rulers.¹²⁶ The Congress argued that the fate of the Princes was linked inescapably with British India and they had no other option such as independence. As a practical policy the Congress organised States Peoples' Conference in the Princely states, which, *inter alia*, encouraged civil disobedience and underground movements to bring about political reforms in the States.¹²⁷ The Congress logic was that it was the people, not the rulers, who would have the final say about the accession of the states. Consequently, the National Congress was put on a collision course with many of the Indian Princes. In order to ensure that the Princes did not pre-empt the Congress by declaring independence on the lapse of the paramountcy, it insisted that the future Indian Government under the National Congress be recognised as the real successor authority to which paramountcy should be transferred.¹²⁸ Although the British Government declined to transfer paramountcy to the would-be Indian Government, the Congress leaders were able to obtain a promise from London that paramountcy would not lapse on or before the date transfer of power so that the rulers did not get the opportunity to declare independence.¹²⁹

Moreover, the Congress turned the apparently unfavourable circumstances to its advantage through a deft manoeuvring. As Lord Mountbatten was the Viceroy of British India, the would-be Governor-General of independent India and the Crown Representative for the Indian Princes at the same time, his unique position was utilised effectively by the National Congress to persuade the Princes to make up their mind and join India.¹³⁰

The Muslim League followed apparently a 'constitutional' approach in the matter of accession of the Princely states, and gave an interpretation of the Indian Independence Act which

¹²⁶ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 42.

¹²⁷ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 37-44.

¹²⁸ The would-be Pakistan Government was considered as a break-away or seceding authority.

¹²⁹ See, Lumby(1954), *op. cit.* : 208.

¹³⁰ For details, see, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 168-92.

was close to the views of the Princes themselves. Jinnah, for example, argued consistently that the Princely states not only were free to join either Dominion, they had also the option of remaining free. In a statement on June 17, 1947, he said :

Constitutionally and legally the Indian States will be independent sovereign States on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves any course they like to adopt. It is open to the States to join the Hindustan [Indian] Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or decide to remain independent. In my opinion they are free to remain independent if they so desire.¹³¹

This gives rise to an immediate question as to how the Muslim League justified its position to itself, knowing fully well that the *Maharaja* of Kashmir intended to retain independence, the Muslim League, Jinnah no less, had also displayed its preference that Kashmir should join Pakistan, while Kashmir itself preferred to join India.¹³² One reason could be that the issue of accession was not that significant for Pakistan because only a few of the Princes were expected to join Pakistan. Secondly, it seemed that the Muslim League leadership, in general and Jinnah, in particular, was more than confident that Kashmir was bound to come to Pakistan.¹³³ Thirdly, in view of the above, it is plausible that the motive was that of gaining as many Princes as possible.¹³⁴ The National Congress, of course, believed that the motive of the Muslim League was to create problems for India.¹³⁵ This is not to suggest that Pakistan took casually the business of accession of the Princes. As mentioned, many of the Princes preferred to join Pakistan or have close links with Pakistan and Pakistan, in turn, offered at least moral support to these reticent Princes.¹³⁶ In the process, several disputes emerged regarding the Princes some of which appeared to be serious.

¹³¹ See, *TOP*, XI : 438. See, also *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* June 28 – July 5, 1947 : 8696.

¹³² This is in anticipation of a discussion in Chapter V. cf. Jinnah's visit to Kashmir and his keen interest to visit again, once the race for Kashmir would intensify in near future.

¹³³ Jinnah is quoted to have said to a deputation of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference that, "Kashmir is in my pocket". Quoted by Mir Abdul Aziz, "Siachen Part of Baltistan", *Morning News*, March 30, 1986.

¹³⁴ Jinnah's dealing with the Princes of Jodhpur and Jaisalmar, who offered to join Pakistan, despite their geographical position and population composition suggesting that they ought to join India, may be mentioned. See, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 177-80.

¹³⁵ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 45.

¹³⁶ For details of the supportive statements and wrangles between the National Congress and the Muslim League, see, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 47-50.

4.5.3 The Responses of the Princes – Coerced to Accede

The Princes tried to coordinate their stand on the call for joining the Constituent Assembly of a future India through the Chamber of Princes, a loose forum of the Princes. The Princes asserted, *inter alia*, that the States would enter in the future Union only by negotiations; their participation in the Constituent Assembly would not prejudice their ultimate decision; and that paramountcy would necessarily revert to the States and would not be inherited by any successor state.¹³⁷ However, as negotiations proceeded and the prospects for Pakistan gradually became evident, there was a rift among the Princes, willy nilly along communal lines. About fifty of the Princely States, mostly Hindus in terms of the religious denomination of the rulers and the ruled, joined the Constituent Assembly of India, breaking the ranks and violating the collective decision of the Princes reached earlier. However, some including Hindu Princess decided to retain independence, or have close relations with Pakistan. The Nawab of Bhopal was making a desperate effort to form an independent Rajasthan state comprising of a number of neighbouring states of central India. In the wake of publication of the June 3, 1947 Plan, two of the largest Princely states - Hyderabad and Travancore - also declared their willingness to become sovereign and deal with the rest of India on equal terms.¹³⁸ They also proceeded to establish diplomatic relations with a future Pakistan,¹³⁹ and the Muslim League's espousal for the cause of Princely independence led to verbal battles between the Congress and the Muslim League. The process was carried one step further by the joint initiative of Congress, especially, through V. P. Menon and Patel, and in the person of Lord Mountbatten.¹⁴⁰ Coercive activities of the States Peoples' Conference were intensified. Staunchly independent minded states like Bhopal and Travancore capitulated. By the time India and Pakistan became independent, only three remained out of the fold - Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. The accession dispute ensued in consequence.

¹³⁷ See, Lumby (1954), *op. cit.* : 228.

¹³⁸ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 14-21, 1947 : 8667.

¹³⁹ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 28 - July 5, 1947 : 8696. For eventual persuasion and manoeuvring in, Menon to Dewan of Travancore, July 14, 1947, R/3/1/144, IOL.

¹⁴⁰ Those who did not sign after the Viceroy's meetings included Jodhpur, Jaisalmar, Bhopal, Travancore, Indore, Junagadh, Mysore, Kashmir, Hyderabad. See, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 173

4.5.3.1 The Rebel Princes – Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir

The Junagadh problem took place during September-October and early November 1947. The Hyderabad issue also started more or less at the same time but it staggered on until September 13, 1948 when Indian forces eventually captured the State. The Kashmir accession problem began brewing in September 1947 but it assumed a crisis shape in late October 1947. By November 1947, pitched battles began to turn into major engagements which continued until the cease-fire on January 1, 1949. It will be seen that although there was no physical linkage of these three problems, they were linked nonetheless.

The *Nawab* of Junagadh a Muslim ruler over a largely Hindu population, announced the accession of the state to Pakistan in late August 1947. Two of his tributaries, Mangrol and Babariwad, however, acceded to India. The neighbouring Hindu states like Nawanagar, which acceded to India reacted adversely. Sharp exchanges, minor skirmishes and border incursions between the neighbouring states followed. At one point, Junagadh moved its troops into Mangrol and Babariwad and occupied them.¹⁴¹ India protested against Junagadh's accession to Pakistan on the grounds that it contravened the principles of geographical contiguity and population composition. Secondly, a government-in-exile, known as the *Azad Junagadh Government*, headed by a nephew of Mahatma Gandhi, was set up in neighbouring Rajkot.¹⁴² Thirdly, a blockade of rail, road and air traffic was imposed on Junagadh disrupting postal and telegraphic communications and stopping the coal and petrol supply.¹⁴³ Fourthly, a battalion of Indian troops was moved to Razkot.¹⁴⁴ Pakistan, on its part, accepted the accession but did little beyond sending a small contingent of police.¹⁴⁵ The *Jam Saheb* of Nawanagar, a neighbouring Prince, who had already acceded to India, however, complained not only of the atrocities of Junagadh

¹⁴¹ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*. 4-11 October 1947 : 8860-61

¹⁴² Lumby, *op. cit.* 238

¹⁴³ *Ibid* : 238.

¹⁴⁴ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 4-11 October 1947 : 8860-61. See, also Richard P. Cronin and Barbara L. LePoer, "The Kashmir Dispute : Historical Background to the Current Struggle", *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington D.C. : Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) 1991 : 5.

¹⁴⁵ See, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 185.

troops but also of the presence of a Pakistan sloop, *ex-HMS Godavari*, in Junagadh's port, Veraval.¹⁴⁶ Pakistan's limitations were, however, obvious. They knew all too well that the underground Congress in Junagadh, as in other states, was very powerful and the neighbouring States with backing from India, were hostile enough. All that they could do was to take a principled and tactical stand. In response to India's call for talks about assessing the people's choice on the future of Junagadh, Pakistan agreed to discuss the issue and establish the principle of plebiscite in "this or any other states" possibly keeping Kashmir in mind, because the Kashmir problem had already begun brewing up.¹⁴⁷ In a meeting with Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru was reluctant to agree to the proposal as a general principle, but under Mountbatten's pressure, agreed that in future, a disputed accession case would be subjected to a referendum or plebiscite.¹⁴⁸

However, insofar as Junagadh was concerned, things were getting worse because of the blockade and the law and order problem. There were skirmishes between State troops and neighbouring troops. The Nawab fled to Kashmir in his private plane. India had in the meantime, mobilised a contingent of 1400 troops, 2000 neighbouring States' troops, light tanks and a squadron of air force planes.¹⁴⁹ Eventually, the Indian forces moved in and occupied Junagadh. Pakistan accused India of aggression. India assured Pakistan that a plebiscite would be held. It was held in February 1948 and the outcome went in favour of India.¹⁵⁰ Pakistan, however, decided to complain to the Security Council about the Indian aggression on its territory, along with other complaints including Kashmir, and whenever convenient used it as a tenuous bargaining chip in the Kashmir negotiations.

The case of Hyderabad was slightly different in that the dispute throughout was confined between the State and the Union of India, unlike Junagadh in which Pakistan was a party. The *Nizam* (Ruler) of Hyderabad was insisting on independence and India in response imposed an

¹⁴⁶ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *ibid* : 8861. This particular point, however, was neither admitted nor rejected nor was it pursued by India.

¹⁴⁷ See, Lumby, *op. cit.* : 239. Mosley argues that Junagadh had always been expendable to Pakistan. So far as they were concerned, its main use was to test the good faith of Congress. See, Mosley, *op. cit.* : 186.

¹⁴⁸ See, Cronin and LePoer, *op. cit.* : 8

¹⁴⁹ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 31-February 7, 1948 : 4085

¹⁵⁰ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, March 6-13, 1948 : 9154

economic and transport blockade, a convenient tactic which India had used against Junagadh.¹⁵¹ India's concerns were two-fold : an independent state of the size and capability of Hyderabad within Indian territories was detrimental to its security interests. Although Hyderabad's accession to Pakistan was almost absurd, given Hyderabad's India-locked geography, and the *Nizam* also possibly did not entertain such an idea,¹⁵² the leverage Pakistan could apply was not negligible.

Hyderabad had a formidable military and diplomatic capability. In the face of Indian pressure for acceding to the Union, the *Nizam* began diplomatic lobbying and purchasing arms and ammunition from abroad. As both the Kashmir and Hyderabad problems were under way, there were reports that some "English privateers were running guns into Hyderabad by night flights from Pakistan".¹⁵³ "Hyderabad Muslim elite had close contacts with Pakistan, as many Pakistani officials had served [earlier] in Hyderabad, such as Ghulam Muhammad as the Finance Member of *Nizam's* government in 1943-45, Zahid Hussain, the Pakistan Minister had served in a similar capacity in Hyderabad. Hyderabad advanced a loan of [Rupees] 12 crores [120 million] in early 1948 to Pakistan ... as India withheld Pakistan[']s share of undivided country's assets. Mir Laik Ali, the last PM of Hyderabad was in a Pakistan delegation to the UN in August 1947."¹⁵⁴ Chaudhuri Muhammad Ali spoke of his own experience of a meeting between Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru, in which he and Patel were present. In that meeting as Liaquat Ali Khan was explaining the inconsistency of India's stand on Junagadh and Kashmir, Patel said, "Why do you compare Junagadh with Kashmir? Talk of Hyderabad and Kashmir, and we could reach an agreement".¹⁵⁵ It is also reported, although no documentary evidence is available, that because of these leverages, the Indian Congress leader Sardar Patel offered that Pakistan took its hands off Hyderabad as a *quid pro quo* for Kashmir.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Whether by learning, Pakistan also applied these tactics against Kashmir in September 1947.

¹⁵² Although Hyderabad might have at times casually talked of joining Pakistan as a bargaining chip, the *Nizam* gave a secret promise to Mountbatten not to accede to Pakistan. See, V. P. Menon, *The Story of Integration of the Indian States* (Bombay : Orient Longman) 1956 : 319, 335.

¹⁵³ Noel Baker to Attlee, July 5, 1948, Prime Minister's File, PRO, quoted in Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 85.

¹⁵⁴ Dr. Omar Khalidi, a Hyderabad Muslim and an author on Hyderabad, in a personal communication with the researcher, January 1993. For similar business interests between Pakistanis and Hyderabad, see, *Pakistan Times*, March 6, 1988.

¹⁵⁵ See, Ali(1967), *op. cit.* : 299.

¹⁵⁶ This has been claimed by a veteran Kashmiri journalist based in Rawalpindi, Mir Abdul Aziz. He has

In any case, intense diplomatic and psychological pressure were mounted on the *Nizam* and his administration through the machinery of the States Department headed by Patel, the Congress strong man, and assisted by V.P. Menon, and through the person of Lord Mountbatten to make sure that Hyderabad did not retain its declared independence. From inside, the State Congress activists were creating a difficult law and order situation to use it as a pretext of raising the communist bogey.¹⁵⁷ After much persuasion and pressure, a Standstill Agreement was about to be signed in late October 1947 when the news of the tribal invasion in Kashmir and the *Maharaja's* accession as well as the landing of Indian troops reached Hyderabad. The Muslim organisation, *Ittehadul Muslemin*, mounted so much pressure on the Government of Hyderabad that Hyderabad reneged on its pledge to sign the agreement. Eventually Mountbatten prevailed and a Standstill Agreement was signed on November 29, 1947 for one year.¹⁵⁸ But the situation was deteriorating, thanks again to the activities of *Razakars*, the armed cadre of the *Ittehadul Muslemin* and State Congress activists. Both sides complained about breaches of the agreement, attacks and incursions.¹⁵⁹ Finally, on September 13, 1948, two months before the expiry of the Standstill agreement, India launched its five-day "police operation" with an armoured division under the command of three Generals and a contingent of airforce planes.¹⁶⁰ Hyderabad caved in and the case was withdrawn from the Security Council. By this time, the case of Kashmir had become much more complicated, because if the legacies of the partition and accession dispute were converging toward Kashmir, the tendency for expediting such a convergence was being strengthened from inside Kashmir. This, however, is to anticipate the discussion in Chapter V.

a first hand report of the exchange between Sardar Ibrahim, President of Azad Kashmir and Ghulam Muhammad, the Pakistani Finance Minister. The Finance Minister reportedly told Sardar Ibrahim, "You do not know, Hyderabad is already ours as an independent state and as regards Kashmir, we will get it by plebiscite." See, *Pakistan Times*, March 6, and March 20, 1988.

¹⁵⁷ See, R. L. Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict 1945-1974 : Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh : Pittsburgh University Press) 1976 : 111. Also see, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 3-10, 1948 : 9036.

¹⁵⁸ See, *Annual Register 1949* : 135. Also see, Lumby, *op. cit.* : 243.

¹⁵⁹ See, for details, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 3-10, 1948 : 9036.

¹⁶⁰ For some details of the military operation headed by three Lieutenant Generals see, Omar Khalidi (ed.), *Hyderabad : After the Fall*, **HHS Monograph Series** (Wichita, Kansas : Hyderabad Historical Society) No. 4, 1988

4.6 Conclusions

The central concern of this initial chapter of our case study on the Kashmir conflict, 1947-1990, has been to set the prelude of the first Kashmir war of 1947-1948. We were concerned specifically with examining how the conflictual environment was created and how the forces, which, in hindsight, played a critical role in the conflict, had been shaped and arrayed against one another before the conflict started. This we did through examining the twin processes of decolonisation in British India, namely, the transfer of power and the disposal of the Princely states. The nature of Hindu-Muslim rivalry, its impact on partition, the fallout and the legacies of partition, and the circumstances in which the accession issue provided an immediate operational conflict environment to the two antagonists, India and Pakistan, constituted the subject matter of the present chapter. It remains for the next chapter to deal with the political developments within Kashmir which attracted both the communal forces released by the partition and resultant communal violence, and also the two antagonists, to whom Kashmir began to reflect a mirror image of their own conflicting ideologies.

The Hindu-Muslim divide in the Subcontinent had been an historical divide based on religious difference and political rivalry. Social and cultural interactions through centuries of coexistence might have blunted some of the differences, but the divide remained. As the question of political independence of India as a whole arose, both the communities fell back on historical experiences, cultural traditions and other bases of primordial loyalties to define their identity. The National Congress evolved an all-encompassing Indian nationalism which was essentially secular. The Muslims fell back on religion as a basis of nationalism, because to them accepting an all-Indian nationalism was tantamount to taking a formal stand that there were no basic difference between the two communities. As there had been a solid theological basis to that belief, in formal stand the theological basis became more prominent than day-to-day coexistence and interactions. Even if the stand was feeble at the initial stage, the dialectics of animated debate and political manoeuvrings over this issue solidified the divide. Even if the concrete demand for Pakistan as a separate homeland came as late as 1940, and for that matter, the Punjab Unionist party of the

Muslims gave way to the Muslim League still later in 1946, these must be viewed as an inevitable outcome of this long drawn process, not instant events. In the process, the Hindu-Muslim divide became acute and immutable by the time India and Pakistan came into being. This suggests that the Hindu-Muslim divide became fundamental through conflictual processes based on pre-existing divides or fissures.

The second conclusion of the chapter follows from the first. Once the Hindu-Muslim divide had rigidified, it played a decisive role in shaping the course of events, including the hastening of decolonisation and partition of the Subcontinent. The conclusion centred on the question : why did the decolonisation take the form of a partition along the Hindu-Muslim religious line when it could have taken any of many other possibilities? The salience and intensity of the Hindu-Muslim rivalry again provided the answer. We have argued that the multiple sub-conflicts were polarised and merged with the greater conflict of a united India versus separation of a Muslim homeland, namely, Pakistan. Such an event-centric interpretation is justified by the fact that the tumult of events did in fact overtake elements of conscious efforts. While it appeared initially that none of the concerned parties could make a concession to the others, in effect none came out with what it wanted.¹⁶¹ The National Congress did not attain the goal of a united India, as it had to be partitioned. Yet Jinnah got only a 'moth-eaten' Pakistan with a significant percentage of Muslim population and Muslim-majority districts remaining in India. The paramountcy lapsed and the Indian Princes became technically 'independent', yet almost all of them were coerced to join one or the other Dominion. Force had to be applied to the reticent ones, but the use of force exploded into inter-Dominion war at least in one case, that is, Kashmir. Whether such coalescence of forces did resolve or only suppressed temporarily the other facets of sub-conflicts is a different but interesting question.¹⁶² The point we want to make and this will be pursued further, is that conflicts tend to find expression through coalescence with other conflicts. The nature and locus of

¹⁶¹ See, Robinson, *op. cit.* : 145.

¹⁶² One may refer to the Pakhtunistan problem, the Punjab problem, the East-West Pakistan conflicts leading to the birth of Bangladesh, all of which at the time of partition were subsumed under the greater conflict.

the coalescence will depend on the relative salience of the issues of the respective conflicts.

The third conclusion we have arrived at is that the partition process resulted in some forces and legacies that reflected on the Kashmir question. The most prominent was a small land area in the Punjab which created a good deal of controversy and, in a way, linked the process of transfer of power with the accession of the Princely state of Kashmir. Had there been no Kashmir war, it is unlikely that Gurdaspur would have created such misgivings. On the other hand, had there been no Kashmir war yet India and Pakistan were born in an atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, then it is highly likely that the controversies of partition, especially surrounding the alleged change of awards on Ferozepur would have become salient. In any case, the Gurdaspur issue, and the induction of communal activists from all three sides, namely, the RSSS (Rastriya Syam Sevak Sangha), the Sikhs and the Muslim National Guards, precipitated the domestic turmoil in Kashmir, and paved the way eventually to an induction of another group of external forces, namely the tribals from the NWFP. The tribal invasion, in turn, acted as the trigger for the deployment of Indian troops and the onset of the Kashmir war. this, however, will be dealt with in Chapter V.



CHAPTER V

THE FIRST KASHMIR WAR 1947-1949 : INTERNAL TURMOILS, INTER-DOMINION RIVALRY AND THE TRIBAL INVASION

5.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, the decolonisation of British India consisting of two parallel processes, namely, the transfer of power to successor Dominions of India and Pakistan, and the accession of the Indian Princely states to either Dominion, has been analysed in a bid to set the prelude to the Kashmir conflict. It was argued that the intense Hindu-Muslim rivalry for power and nationhood in British India played a decisive role in shaping the mode of transfer of power in 1947. The bitterness and hostilities associated with the transfer of power were transformed into antagonistic inter-Dominion relations and a rivalry for the Princely territories, especially Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. We stopped at a stage when the general antagonism and the rivalry for the Princely states narrowed down to Kashmir, the Hindu ruler of which had decided to retain an independent and sovereign status.

It was also argued that the partition of the Punjab province, apart from being in itself a source of an immense human tragedy of mass killings and mass migration, provided two critical links between the two processes – transfer of power and the accession – with Kashmir in perspective. One was a controversial award of the Punjab Boundary Commission which was guided allegedly by consideration of Kashmir's accession. This in itself would have been a minor matter and there were apparently very plausible reasons other than Kashmir that might have guided the decision.¹ However, as the two Dominions were in an intense rivalry to secure the accession of Kashmir, the Kashmir aspect of the controversy was intensified. The other link was provided by the spread of communal violence to Kashmir, as the southern parts of the State

¹ See, Section 4.3.1 in Chapter IV.

abutted the cross-road of the movement of about 12 million population both ways between the East and West Punjab in 1947 amidst the orgy of mass killings.

The scope of the preceding chapter was limited to an understanding of 'prior conflictual processes' or sub-wars surrounding the dual processes of transfer of power and the accession of the Princely states. It is the task of the present chapter to examine how these forces, already polarised along the Hindu-Muslim ideological divide, were linked with internal political developments in Kashmir and the combined effect not only sucked in other agents of violence from the adjoining areas but also led to inter-Dominion hostilities over the political future of Kashmir. The undeclared war which began in the process in late October 1947 lasted until January 1, 1949. Drawing the relationship between the feuds and sub-conflicts associated with the transfer of power and the Kashmir war, Korbel argued, "This, then, is the setting for the tragic drama of modern Kashmir, a setting entirely essential to the full meaning of each scene. ... The prologue to this drama is the epilogue of another", meaning "the final provisions for independence and the separation of India and Pakistan".² By way of demonstrating the linkage between the two sets of events, the burden of the present chapter is on explaining the onset of the Kashmir conflict in 1947.

The questions that will guide the discussion of the chapter are : why and how the various sub-conflicts associated with the transfer of power and the accession of the Princes gravitated toward, or 'collapsed' into the internal political turmoils and the accession dilemma of the Kashmir state? What was the pattern and the underlying logic of the convergence? In answering these questions, we start with the Kashmir end and examine how forces were gradually shaping in conjunction with other local forces to reflect a proto-type of an India-Pakistan ideological rivalry.

Section 5.2 deals with the internal political developments in Kashmir leading to the Poonch rebellion in the Summer and Autumn of 1947, which attracted communal activists from the Punjab, and precipitated the tribal invasion in late October 1947. Section 5.3 deals with the

² See, Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press) 1954 : 43.

prelude to the inter-Dominion aspect of the internal turmoils and accession dilemma of the Kashmir state, especially, disputes between Pakistan and Kashmir, and the policies and postures of the National Congress and Muslim League towards the indecisive *Maharaja* of Kashmir. Section 5.4 covers the tribal invasion precipitating an Indian intervention, while Section 5.5, the pitched battles and protracted mediation which proceeded side by side until January 1, 1949 when a cease-fire was effected between the combatants.

5.2 Political Developments in Kashmir : The Conflict Cauldron

The roots of the Kashmir conflict have to be traced as much to the internal political developments in Kashmir as to the bilateral domain of India-Pakistan relations. Given the tormented nature of the history and geopolitics of the state, it has been argued that the conflict that ensued in the immediate post-partition period in Kashmir, was "latent to the structure of the state, fundamental to the geopolitical creation of the region."³ The Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, commonly known as the Kashmir state, constituted historically a mosaic of different geopolitical, administrative and demographic entities. Fissures developed along the interface of these diverse entities and these, in turn, facilitated the penetration of external conflicts. Thus, internal political developments in Kashmir provided largely the cauldron of the Kashmir conflict.

5.2.1 Kashmir – the Composite State

The tormented history of Kashmir could be traced conveniently to the fact that it lay at the vortex of multilateral conflicts – Sikh-Afghan, British-Sikh and British-Afghan – for several centuries. The British joined later in the traditional Sikh-Afghan rivalry. "The Sikhs had memories of separate statehood, a *Suba*, to set beside Pathan recollections of a Durrani empire extending beyond Afghanistan to Lahore and Srinagar [Kashmir]. Among them was the splendour of Peshawar, ravished by the Sikhs when they sacked it in 1823."⁴ By a twist of events,

³ Comment by Alastair Lamb in a seminar on "Kashmir" organised by the International Institute of Kashmir Studies, London, May 10, 1992.

⁴ See, R. J. Moore, *Making the New Commonwealth* (Oxford : Clarendon Press) 1987 : 25.

the Dogra Hindu dynasty from Jammu got suzerainty over Kashmir through the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846 for its loyalty to the British in the British-Sikh wars.⁵ Their initial attempts to take over the Kashmir Valley from the Muslims were repulsed. Subsequently the local resistance was suppressed with the help of a British contingent. The ruler-ruled relations were thus communalised from the beginning because of the "pent-up hatred of the Hindus for the five centuries of Muslim rule."⁶ The Muslims also considered the Dogras as an 'alien ruler' and the fissures so developed could not be mended.⁷ The Dogras did not succeed in establishing control over northern areas, too. Wary of the increasing Russian presence in the vicinity, the British constituted the Gilgit Agency and ruled it directly through a political agent. Poonch, also known as the Punjab Hill State, was administered separately by a Dogra ruler of a different line of succession. On the eve of the transfer of power, the British Indian Government reverted the control of the territories of the Gilgit Agency and Poonch to the Kashmiri *Maharaja*, a descendent of the Dogra dynasty. However, a separatist tendency had already developed in Gilgit under the aegis of the Political Department which controlled the Princely states. The local Muslims declared their accession to [would-be] Pakistan and the decision proved final.⁸ The Poonchis also resented the decision and eventually broke into a rebellion.⁹

The fragility of the state was evident in more fundamental ways in the ethno-religious divisions of the state population. Of the four million total population, according to the 1941 census, 77% were Muslims, 20% Hindus and about two percent Sikhs. The Buddhists of Tibeto-Mongolian origin living in Ladakh adjoining the Chinese province of Sinkiang, accounted for only one per cent.¹⁰ The picture was further complicated by ethnic and linguistic divisions. The

⁵ The Dogras obtained control over Jammu from the Sikhs as a reward for their assistance in the Sikh-Afghan war. Yet, as the British-Sikh war broke out in 1845, the Dogra ruler assisted the British and the reward this time was the Kashmir Valley for a nominal price of 7.5 million rupees (approx. 1750,000 at current prices). For a brief history, see, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 9-15.

⁶ *Ibid* : 13.

⁷ See, Prem Nath Bazaz, *The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir* (New Delhi : Kashmir Publishing Co.) 1954.

⁸ See, Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study of India-Pakistan Relations* (Bombay : Asia publishing House) 1966 : 108-9. For details, see also, Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990* (Hertfordshire, UK : Roxford Books) 1991 : 53-75.

⁹ See, Section 5.2.3 below.

¹⁰ See, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 6.

Muslims in the Kashmir Valley¹¹ and in the Dodah district of Jammu, had been Kashmiri speaking,¹² while the Muslims of Poonch, Jammu and other areas presently within the jurisdiction of Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir with its capital at Muzaffarabad, had been Punjabis. The Kashmir Valley could be distinguished from Jammu on ethnic grounds in that the Jammu Hindus and the Muslims had been Punjabis while the Muslims and Hindus in the Valley had been the Kashmiris proper.¹³ Jammu had nearly half the state population of which 61% were Muslims, and 41% Hindus.¹⁴ The river Chenab could be considered as the dividing line, with the Muslims living mostly on the north and west, while the Hindus, on the south and east.

The Jammu factor played an important role in Kashmiri politics. The politics of Jammu, unlike that of the Kashmir Valley where the Hindus and Muslims lived more or less harmoniously, was communalised much earlier and when the communal violence in the Punjab spilled over to Kashmir, Jammu was the first to be affected. The polarisation of the Kashmiri politics along the Hindu-Muslim, and for that matter, India-Pakistan ideological lines was much more visible in Jammu than in the Kashmir Valley. The Valley-Jammu political division transcended the religious lines and was evident between the Muslims of the two regions. These religious and ethnic fissures were to be manifest in many of the turning points of Kashmir's history, like a general lack of support from the Valley Muslims for the Poonch rebellion in the Summer and the tribal invasion later in the Autumn of 1947. Going still further back, the political preferences of the two groups of Muslims were formalised in the shape of the Muslim Conference led by Jammu-based Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas and the National Conference led by Valley-based Sheikh Abdullah. The former preferred accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, the latter to India.¹⁵

¹¹ The Kashmir Valley, roughly about one-third of the State, had been the seat of political power and the hub of economic activities, and thus, constituted the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. It is also the base of the present Kashmiri insurgency.

¹² According to one source, nearly 60% of the state population speak Kashmiri. Urdu has been the lingua franca of the State. See, Mir Abdul Aziz, "The State of Jammu and Kashmir", *Pakistan Observer*, June 6, 1991.

¹³ The Valley Hindus numbering about 7,30,000, according to the 1941 census, are known as Kashmiri *Pandits*. Nehru was a descendent of the Kashmiri *Pandits*. On the other hand, the Jammu Hindus are known as the Dogra Hindus.

¹⁴ Quoted in Lord Birdwood, "Kashmir", *International Affairs*, 28(3), July 1952 : 300.

¹⁵ Not only that, during the early 1950s when Sheikh Abdullah had estranged relations with Nehru leading to his downfall in 1953, the Jammu Hindus played a significant role by showing their unequivocal support for Kashmir's integration with India as Abdullah was toying with the idea of an independent Kashmir.

Thus, unlike the British India, Kashmiri people were divided along many cross-cutting lines. Such ethno-religious and linguistic divisions were reflected in the politics of Kashmir.

5.2.2 From Political Process to Political Void 1931-1947

A few salients of Kashmiri politics are worth mentioning in order to understand the political process of Kashmir in the 1930s and 1940s. First, although the Kashmir Valley had been known for its communal harmony, the Dogra rulers' relations with the Kashmiris, in general, were communalised. So was the politics in Jammu. Secondly, the Valley Kashmiris were known proverbially for their pacific nature.¹⁶ However, whenever there was any affront on their religion, the Kashmiris often reacted in violent manner.¹⁷ Even if the Valley Muslims were less forthcoming especially on communal issues, the Jammu and the Poonchi Muslims made the first move, as with the Poonch rebellion and the initiative to set up a separatist *Azad Kashmir* Government in the Summer of 1947.¹⁸ Thirdly, compared to older generations, the educated young Kashmiris in the late 1920s and 1930s had become politically more conscious through higher education and exposure to the Indian nationalist movement. They also began demanding political liberalisation and redressing of their socio-economic grievances.

A major milestone in the people's movement was the jail revolt of July 13, 1931, which originated from a religious issue.¹⁹ The riot and unrest which met with brutal repressions by the *Maharaja*²⁰ soon turned into wider political unrest centering on political liberalisation and

For details, see, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 197-99.

¹⁶ It was said, "One soldier armed with no more than a bayonet could drive 4,000 Kashmiris in whatever direction he desired!". Quoted in Birdwood (1952), *op. cit.* : 300. It was also said that the Kashmiris were afraid of blood and they could not even slaughter a chicken. The Kashmiris, however, resent such characterisation as myths created by the oppressive rulers, who banned not only cow slaughter but also any kind of animals and birds. The Dogra rulers, when they first established their control over Kashmir, were said to have confiscated every weapon the Kashmiris had, even their kitchen knives. Source : *Interview* with cross-sections of Kashmiris in Muzaffarabad, August 1991.

¹⁷ Most of the few mass upheavals in Kashmir, especially the ones in 1931 and 1964, Alastair Lamb pointed out to the researcher, had religious origins. Source : *Interview*, in July 1992, London.

¹⁸ See, Section 5.2.3 below.

¹⁹ Various versions of the trigger in the form of a religious insult on the Muslims are available. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 89.

²⁰ The revolt was helped by Muslims from the Punjab in tens and thousands, led by the Muslim political party, the Ahrar party. See, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 18-19. Ali mentions that about 30,000 volunteers courted arrests during the unrest. See, Chaudhuri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York : Columbia University Press) 1967 : 283. See also, Ian Copland, "Islam and Political Mobilisation in Kashmir, 1931-

agrarian reforms.²¹ In the wake of the unrest, a number of political reforms were introduced on the initiatives of the British Government. These included the formation of a Legislative Assembly consisting of 75 members on the basis of a limited franchise. The participation of the Muslims in the political process was also facilitated.²² Two young Muslim leaders, Sheikh Abdullah from the Kashmir Valley and Chaudhury Ghulam Abbas from Jammu, formed a political party called the Muslim Conference, which fought the elections for the newly formed Legislative Assembly, and won 19 out of 21 communal seats allocated to the Muslims.²³

However, the initiation of the political process in Kashmir also marked the beginning of the formal rupture along Jammu-Valley line of Muslim politics. The rupture presaged the subsequent division of Kashmir in 1947-48 into two parts, Jammu and Kashmir state in India, and *Azad Kashmir* controlled by Pakistan, as they stand today. While the Muslim Conference represented the predominantly Muslim population and was committed, initially at least, to safeguarding the interests of the Muslims, the political outlook of the two leaders, Sheikh Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas, were completely different. Sheikh Abdullah was committed to the ending of communalism and autocratic rules,²⁴ Ghulam Abbas's viewpoint, on the other hand, was sympathetic to the "outlook and appeal of the Muslim League".²⁵ This polarisation along the National Congress versus the Muslim League division was no coincidence. Both owed their political leanings to background and contacts.²⁶ Sheikh Abdullah's nationalistic fervours swayed the Kashmiris but his overt secularistic leanings created reservations in many members and followers of the Muslim Conference and other Kashmiri Muslims. The Muslims saw a gradual veering of the Muslim Conference party towards the Congress. The process of polarisation was

34", *Pacific Affairs*, 54(2) 1981 : 228-59.

²¹ See, Birdwood(1952), *ibid* : 301.

²² The Hindus and the Sikhs had already had formed their political parties, apparently with the blessing of the *Maharaja*. See, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 15.

²³ *Ibid* : 19.

²⁴ See, Lamb(1966), *op. cit.* : 29-31.

²⁵ See, Birdwood(1952), *op. cit.* : 301.

²⁶ Sheikh Abdullah evidently was deeply influenced in his thoughts by the Indian National Congress leaders like Nehru and Gandhi. Much of this common outlook developed as they worked together in the States' Peoples' Conference, a semi-covert body aiming at the establishment of democratic rights of the people in the Princely states. See, Birdwood (1952), *op. cit.* : 301.

complete in 1939 when the Party endorsed the policy of the Congress towards the Second World War.²⁷ Consequently, the Muslim Conference was split into two in the late 1930s, Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference, and Chaudhury Abbas's Muslim Conference, the latter retaining the original name of the party.

This was also the time when the Congress-Muslim League rupture was irretrievably complete following the breakdown of the electoral understanding in the Provincial elections.²⁸ In 1940, the Muslim League formally demanded a Pakistan, with Kashmir included in it.²⁹ Its repercussions were felt in Kashmir, and the schisms between the Muslim Conference and the National Conference appeared to mirror the Congress-Muslim League rivalry in British India,³⁰ of course, with a significant difference that the civil society in the state, in general, and that in the Valley, in particular, was not as communalised along the religious lines as in British India. Links between the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference were solidified, and the rift between Jinnah and Sheikh Abdullah was correspondingly complete following Jinnah's abortive visit to Kashmir in 1944 for mending fences between Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas.³¹

The political scenario in Kashmir around this time assumed a similar triangular configuration as in British India. The National Conference with its pro-Congress secular leanings and a goal of people's *raj* was dually pitted against the Muslim Conference, and the *Maharaja*. For the Muslim Conference, the link between the National Conference and the National Congress, was an anathema, because in their perception, it would end up with Kashmir's joining India. Thus, the Muslim Conference and the *Maharaja* found themselves in common opposition to the National Conference.³² Such a configuration of interests made the political process in Kashmir

²⁷ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 52-53.

²⁸ See, Section 4.2 in Chapter IV.

²⁹ Gupta, however, quoting extensively from the *Gandhi-Jinnah Talks*, published by the Hindustan Times Ltd, New Delhi in 1944, argues that Jinnah's scheme of Pakistan, according to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, was "only confined to British India". See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 46. However, the idea that 'K' in PAKISTAN signified Kashmir, as was originally the case in 1931 when Chowdhury Rehmat Ali coined the word, had widely been circulated and the Muslim Conference also believed in the idea.

³⁰ See, D. C. Jha, *Indo-Pakistan Relations* (Patna : Bharat Bhawan) 1972 : 47-119.

³¹ See, Ali(1966), *op. cit.* : 283. Details of the visit may also be found in Gupta, *op. cit.* : 58-60.

³² At this juncture, the Muslim Conference played apparently the tune of the *Maharaja* who was staunchly in favour of independence. The Muslim Conference assured the *Maharaja* in early May 1947 of their "support and cooperation of the Muslims" in his bid for independence. See, *Dawn* [Karachi], May 11, 1947,

look like that of the British India. Korbelt writes :

As in British India, ... where any political concession by the British government deepened the split between the Indian National Congress and the League, so in Kashmir, with every political concession made by the Maharaja, the abyss grew between the National Conference with its program of unity for all India and the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference.³³

It becomes evident from the above that while the religious divide in Kashmir, at least in the Kashmir Valley, was not as polarised as in British India, the political complexion through mutual interpenetration assumed nonetheless similar complexion. This, in turn, shaped greatly the political events in Kashmir itself in the immediate future. A more critical aspect was the signal it conveyed to the antagonists of the two would-be Dominions, which found it convenient to view Kashmir in terms of their own ideological rivalry.³⁴

The National Conference in the meantime launched its *New Kashmir Plan* which, *inter alia* aimed at establishing a people's *raj*.³⁵ In the assessment of the National Conference, the situation was "ripe for a full-fledged popular struggle against the despotic rule."³⁶ However, the 'Quit Kashmir' movement of the National Conference in May 1946, with the objective of compelling the "autocratic Dogra House" to surrender sovereignty to the people, led to the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and his followers.³⁷ The Muslim Conference launched a 'Campaign of Action', on the model of what Jinnah started as the 'Direct Action Day' in August 1946. Its leader Ghulam Abbas was arrested by the *Maharaja* in reaction. The removal of the two leading figures from the political scene at this critical juncture of time created a political void in Kashmir. It made the impact of another major development more visible than otherwise it would have been. The development was the peasant uprising in Poonch which began in July 1947. The Poonch uprising, because of the critical timing of the eve of decolonisation, led to a zeroing down of Indian and

quoted in Gupta, *op. cit.* : 94. Similar support was also extended in July 1947. See, Gupta, *loc. cit.* : 95.

³³ See, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 21.

³⁴ See, Section 5.3 below.

³⁵ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 60.

³⁶ See, *ibid* : 60.

³⁷ Abdullah later explained that the movement was a logical extension of the policy of 'Quit India'. *Ibid* : 61-62.

³⁷ See, Korbelt, *ibid* : 23.

Pakistani involvement in the affairs of the state culminating in the tribal invasion from the North-West Frontier Province(NWFP) of Pakistan and the subsequent Indian despatch of airborne troops.

5.2.3 The Poonch Uprising – Emitting Conflict Signals

The significance of the Poonch rebellion in the Summer of 1947 for the onset of the Kashmir conflict lies in its transformation from mainly an internal and socio-economic issue-based conflict, at least initially, delinked from the mainstream of the *anti-Maharaja* campaign, to the centre stage of the accession debate of the state. In its transformation, the rebellion became linked with the communal orgy and the activities of the armed gangs from the Punjab representing all the three sides – the Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs – and in turn, began sending out conflict signals to the co-religionists in the NWFP. It was also at this stage that the acrimonious and low key conflict between Kashmir and Pakistan started and continued until the tribal invasion in the third week of October 1947 had transformed it into an India-Pakistan war. If the political development in Kashmir provided the cauldron to the India-Pakistan conflict, it was precisely these dual roles of the Poonch rebellion which played that role. Korbelt writes :

Kashmir was brewing with revolt against the Maharaja long before the tribesmen invaded the country. The political opposition launched in 1930 was carried into an open resistance in 1946. This was resumed in the spring of 1947, and it reached the critical climax in the summer when the news of the fratricidal struggle in Punjab echoed throughout Kashmir.³⁸

The attachment of the feudal state of Poonch to Kashmir, as noted earlier, led to a disaffection between the *Maharaja* and the Poonchis. Open fissures developed mainly over economic deprivation. The Poonchis, known as one of the hardy fighting stocks, provided about 60,000 personnel to the British Indian army during the Second World War. As they were demobilised after the War, they sought jobs with the *Maharaja's* state forces but they were rejected. On return, they found their life made all the more difficult by *Maharaja's* tax policies.

³⁸ See, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 66.

Almost everything in their possessions, land, cattle, crops, houses, windows, even it is said, wives, had been taxed and on top, they had to pay the *Zaildari* tax to cover for the cost of tax collection. Police were deployed to oversee tax collection. Secondly, prices of essentials rose sharply and supplies were scarce. The Poonchis started a 'no tax' movement in protest. Demonstrations were brutally suppressed but were followed by counter-demonstrations, firing and martial-law throughout May-June, 1947.³⁹ The *anti-Maharaja* campaigns took a communal shape when the *Maharaja's* policies turned out to be one of Muslim persecution. Not only were the state troops engaged in the repression of the Muslims, the *Maharaja's* administration distributed reportedly about 7,000 muzzle-loader rifles among the Hindus in Poonch, ostensibly for their self-defence.⁴⁰

As power was transferred in British India in the middle of August 1947, the Poonch rebellion began to be externalised. On August 14 Pakistani flags were hoisted in Poonch and adjoining areas like Mirpur, but these were forced down and martial law was declared. In the meantime, boundary awards partitioning the Punjab along communal lines were announced. The communal violence which had engulfed the Punjab soon spilled over to Kashmir.⁴¹ Birdwood gives a vivid description of what happened in the Poonch and Jammu area :

It was but an extension of events in the Punjab – with this difference, that it was inspired by the Kashmir Government and was a quite ruthless manifestation of that deliberate policy of what could only be 'extermination'. ... It increased in tempo and spread to Jammu Province ... with the infiltration of the RSSS, the Akali Sikhs, and members of the Indian National Army from India.⁴²

Similar remarks were also made by *The Round Table*:

The struggle in Kashmir must be seen against the background of the migrations and massacres of August and September 1947, which left behind a trail of fear and hate along the new international border, a line not demarcated by any natural features, and running up to the Kashmir border. The State of Kashmir and Jammu was thus, both for India and for Pakistan, an exposed flank of a 'front' of hostility and danger, though

³⁹ For details, see, M. Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight – For Freedom* Vol. II, (1947-1978) (Lahore : Ferozsons Ltd) 1979 :864-66.

⁴⁰ See, Lord Birdwood, *The Two Nations and Kashmir* (London : Robert Hale) 1956 : 49-50.

⁴¹ The geopolitical location of the Punjab and Kashmir with no natural barrier together with the fluidity of the situation greatly contributed to these events.

⁴² Birdwood(1952), *ibid.* : 302.

not of actual war.⁴³

Obviously, the Muslim elements, namely, Muslim National Guards, the youth volunteers of the Muslim League, also came in from the Pakistani side. In the meantime, the nucleus of the 'Azad Kashmir Government', under the leadership of Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, a young *Zemindar* (landlord) belonging to the Muslim Conference party came into being. They also decided in favour of accession to Pakistan. In order to reinforce armed resistance they looked for arms and the only natural place where arms could be procured easily was the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where an open bazaar of indigenous arms was readily available. The other possible reason that they went to the NWFP for arms could be that the Muslim League Premier of that Province, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan hailed from Kashmir. It is believed that such contacts and through them the horror stories of Muslim persecutions, provided the stimulus for the subsequent tribal invasion which took place amidst acrimonious charges and counter-charges between Pakistan and the Kashmir State Government over armed infiltration and armed incursions.

To sum up, an attempt has been made in this section at identifying the forces that were generated in the Kashmiri politics to pull other forces of communalism from adjoining areas into Kashmiri in the Summer and Autumn of 1947. Communal fissures were developed in the Kashmiri polity at two levels. At a micro level, "an indigenous and complex tyranny was spreading" in Kashmir during April-October 1947 in the form of the Poonch rebellion,⁴⁴ which in turn facilitated the spillover of communal elements from the Punjab and precipitated the tribal invasion. What, however, converted the invasion into an interstate war was the complexion of political development at the broader level. The overall political behaviour of the two actors, the National Conference and the Muslim Conference with the *Maharaja* providing the third pole of the triangular politics assumed a complexion that reflected the ideological rivalry of the main actors in the British Indian politics, namely, the National Congress and the Muslim League. How the main actors themselves related to this phenomenon was unravelled as the *Maharaja* was confronted with the accession dilemma on the eve of the transfer of power.

⁴³ See, *The Round Table*, 39, December 1948 : 38.

⁴⁴ See, Korbél, *op. cit.* : 72.

5.3 The Accession Dilemma for Kashmir and the Dominions

As the Poonch rebellion became communalised, and armed bands in support of all the communities – the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs – entered Kashmir, a series of acrimonious exchanges took place between the Kashmir State Government and Pakistan mainly over the conduct of the normal economic transactions. Armed incursions both ways across the borders and communal violence also provided contentious issues. The economic issues were of vital importance for Kashmir in view of the fact that the supply of necessities for Kashmir came from Pakistan and Kashmir's links the outside world including postal communication, had to be conducted through Pakistan. On independence of Pakistan and India, the *Maharaja*, who was bent on retaining independence, offered to sign a Standstill Agreement to continue the existing links. Pakistan signed the agreement but India did not. In the wake of the communal violence and uprising in Poonch, the supplies from Pakistan stopped. Kashmir believed that Pakistan was coercing the state to join it, while Pakistan suspected that Kashmir was preparing the grounds through such accusations for its accession to India. Whether there was any basis for such mutual suspicion needs to be examined in the context of the triangular relations between Pakistan and the Kashmir state, on the one hand, and India and the Kashmir state, on the other.

5.3.1 The Dispute Between Kashmir State and Pakistan

As mentioned, disputes arose between the Dominion of Pakistan and the Kashmir State mainly over two issues, economic blockade by Pakistan against Kashmir and armed infiltration across borders into Kashmir to incite communal violence.⁴⁵ Pakistan denied of any incursion from across the Pakistani side. In response to the Kashmiri complaint an of economic blockade by Pakistan on the supply of food, petrol, medicine, and bank currencies, the Pakistani Foreign Minister admitted of a disruption in supplies, but it was due, according the Pakistan, to

⁴⁵ On September 4, the Chief of Staff of the Jammu and Kashmir State forces complained to Pakistan of armed infiltration from Pakistan, and requested the Pakistani Government to stop these flows. See, S. Gupta, *op. cit.* : 100-101

inadequate security arrangements for the vehicles in the prevailing communal violence in the Punjab.⁴⁶ Kashmir remained unconvinced. Kashmir considered the blockade as coercive tactics by Pakistan.⁴⁷ The acrimonious exchanges became sharper with a new dimension when the newly appointed Kashmiri Prime Minister, Meher Chand Mahajan, complained that thousands of armed Pakistanis had crossed the frontier from Sialkot into the Poonch area to commit "horror on non-Moslems".⁴⁸ The communication, addressed to both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, continued that the Kashmiri Government, "considers these acts extremely unfriendly", and asked the Pakistani leaders to "put a stop to all the inequities being perpetrated". The message concluded :

If, unfortunately, this request is not heeded the Government [of Kashmir]... would be justified in *asking for friendly assistance* and in opposing trespass on its fundamental rights.[emphasis added]⁴⁹

The Pakistani Prime Minister, in his reply of October 18, was "astonished to hear ... [the] threat to ask for assistance," presumably "meaning thereby assistance from an outside Power." ⁵⁰ His message concluded, "The only object of this intervention by an outside Power secured by you would be to complete the process of suppressing Muslims to enable you to join the Indian Dominion as a *coup d'état* against the declared and well-known will of the Muslims and others who form 85 percent of the population of your State. If this policy is not changed... the gravest consequence will follow for which you alone will be held responsible."⁵¹

The gravest consequence followed within a couple of days from the Pakistani side as a few thousand armed tribesmen invaded Kashmir to effect its accession to Pakistan. Whether the Prime Minister meant this in his last reply to the Kashmiri Prime Minister or it was an independent

⁴⁶ See, text of Pakistani Foreign Minister's reply to the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, in P. L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute* (New Delhi : International Books) 1965 : 52.

⁴⁷ See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 51-52. It is quite plausible that Pakistan was applying an economic blockade because in its perception, Kashmir was preparing the ground for acceding to India. The *Dawn* published from Karachi talked of the "Government's decision" to stop the supplies to Kashmir. See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 103. It is also plausible that given an antagonistic relations and a contest for the Princes, India's economic blockade against Junagadh and Hyderabad might have provided a learning effect to Pakistan.

⁴⁸ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 8-15, 1947 : 8930

⁴⁹ See, *ibid* : 8930

⁵⁰ See, K. S. Hasan(ed.), *The Kashmir Question : Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan*, (Karachi : Pakistan Institute of International Affairs) 1966 : 50-51.

⁵¹ *Ibid* : 51.

development is a moot point. However, reference to 'friendly assistance', which to Pakistan at that time meant none other than India, intensified Pakistan's suspicion that the *Maharaja* was gradually veering towards acceding to India. In the meantime, Sheikh Abdullah's release on September 29, 1947, while the Muslim Conference leader, Ghulam Abbas was still being detained on lesser charges, seemed to be ominous for Pakistan. On his release, Sheikh Abdullah talked more of people's power first so that the question of accession, in his opinion, could be taken up later once power had been transferred to the people. He did not hide his disliking for Pakistan's theocratic ideology as well.⁵² Signs of contacts between the Kashmir state and India became apparent. As the realisation dawned on Pakistan that accession of Kashmir to Pakistan through peaceful means was not possible, alternatives were explored.

From the accounts of a senior officer of the Pakistan Army who became actively involved on the Pakistani side of the accession issue of Kashmir,⁵³ it turns out that under the auspices of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, a small committee began working to find ways and means of assisting the *Azad Kashmir* forces, the nucleus of which had already taken shape from the Poonch rebellion, to effect Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. The essence of the plan was to divert about 4,000 rifles to be given to the *Azad* forces, basically to preempt any Indian intervention by land or air.⁵⁴ One important premise on the basis of which the assistance was to be offered by Pakistan to the Kashmiris was that "any action by us was to be of an unofficial nature, and no Pakistani troops or officers were to take an active part in it".⁵⁵ Two important

⁵² Pakistan interpreted this as an attempt to "by-pass the main issue" or "a round about way of supporting the accession to India." See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 102. Interviewees in Rawalpindi and Muzaffarabad described eye-witness accounts of Sheikh Abdullah's meeting on October 3, 1947, and talked about the frustration of the crowd who expected that Abdullah would make a statement in favour of acceding to Pakistan. Source, *inter alia*, Interview with Mir Abdul Aziz, Rawalpindi. August 1991.

⁵³ It was General Akbar Khan. He, as a Colonel in the Pakistan Army, was Director of Arms and Equipment, GHQ at that time. Later he became General but in the early 1950s, was the principal accused in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, on charge of plotting to overthrow the Government. The charges were later dropped. In any case, his participant-accounts of the Pakistani preparations and of the tribal invasions from the NWFP may be found in, Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir* (Karachi : Pak Publishers Limited) 1970.

⁵⁴ Details may be found in Akbar Khan, *ibid* : 13-18.

⁵⁵ General Akbar, quoting Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, in *ibid* : 12. Lt. General(Retd.) Habibullah of the Pakistan Army claimed recently in a newspaper article that Liaquat Ali Khan told him, "If you start firing and even if one soldier of ours is killed, I will consider you a murderer. ... We are getting Kashmir on a plate". Quoted in Mir Abdul Aziz, "Focus on Kashmir : Operation Half-Hearted of 1947", *Pakistan Observer*, July 21, 1991.

personalities involved in the committee were Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, who was one of the pioneers of the Poonch rebellion and later became the Prime Minister of the Azad Kashmir Government, and Khurshid Anwar, a Commander of the Muslim League National Guard. Akbar Khan's accounts of the meetings which the Committee held with Liaquat Ali Khan suggest that serious dissensions and personality clashes were growing among the Committee members, especially between Khurshid Anwar who was to lead one sector of the operation and Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan, in charge of the overall plan.⁵⁶ It also turned out that before the rifles could reach Kashmir the initiative was taken by the tribals on a different front, that is, Domel-Muzaffarabad sector of Kashmir's border further north, under the leadership of the same Khurshid Anwar, but apparently without the knowledge of any of the Committee members. Akbar Khan writes :

I cannot say exactly when it was decided that an attack by tribesmen should be carried out in the manner that it was. I had, however, been hearing that Khurshid Anwar was gathering a *laskar* of tribesmen.⁵⁷

Akbar Khan reports he met the tribesmen on October 29, when the tribesmen had already been repulsed by intervention of Indian airborne troops. He took charge of the operation at a later date in early November 1947 with the mandate of keeping "the fight going for three months which would be enough time to achieve our [sic] political object by negotiations and other means."⁵⁸ The role this committee had in organising the tribal operations is not clear. For one, the NWFP Chief Minister, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan had a significant role, it has also been mentioned earlier. The diary records of George Cunningham, the then Governor of the NWFP suggest that a Pakistani Minister visited Peshawar at that time to organise the tribes.⁵⁹ This suggests at least some knowledge of the Pakistani Government in what was going on. However, like Khurshid Anwar, others were also involved in individual capacity in organising the campaign. For

⁵⁶ See, Akbar Khan, *ibid* 17-18.

⁵⁷ *Ibid* : 22-23. That Khurshid Anwar was gathering a *laskar* (contingent) himself was confirmed by Mr. Ghulam Din Wani, a Minister of the first ever Cabinet of the Azad Kashmir government. Mr. Wani recollected, he did not have a very clear idea as to who Khurshid Anwar was, excepting that he was claiming himself a Major. Source : *Interview* in Rawalpindi, August 1991.

⁵⁸ See, Akbar Khan, *ibid* : 33. This was the mandate of Liaquat Ali Khan, the Pakistani Prime Minister.

⁵⁹ See, Cunningham's Diary, October 18, 1947, quoted in Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 50.

example, Khan of Mamdot, a former Chief Minister of the Punjab, claimed to have had spent a sizable amount from his own pocket to facilitate the tribal invasion.⁶⁰ It also turned out that the strategy and tactics of the tribal invasion were at variance with those of the plan that the small committee was making.

From this account of the Pakistani perspectives and postures towards Kashmir at the 'sub-war' phase of the conflict, certain conclusions follow. Firstly, the Muslim League and later the Pakistan Government had an active interest in what decision was taken by the Kashmiri *Maharaja* on accession. Although disruption in supply of essentials to Kashmir in those days was not unnatural, it is equally plausible that Kashmir's unwillingness to accede to Pakistan when Kashmir was otherwise dependent on Pakistan for the supply of essentials might have justified Pakistan's mounting an economic blockade on Kashmir. Secondly, as the low level conflictual interactions were continuing between Pakistan and the Kashmir state, some kind of preparations were also going on in Pakistan at different levels to influence Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Some had the knowledge and encouragement of top ranking Pakistani officials, yet some were being carried out almost autonomously. We now turn to review how the Indian National Congress, and subsequently, the Dominion of India, was relating to Kashmir in regard to its accession.

5.3.2. The National Congress and the Dominion of India Towards Kashmir

The Indian National Congress leaders began taking an interest in the affairs of Kashmir when the possibility of the partition became a reality after the arrival of Mountbatten of Burma as the last Viceroy in March 1947. Kashmir seemed to be a priority area.⁶¹ In particular, the National Congress took a number of steps with regard to Kashmir that appeared to have been guided by a consideration of Kashmir's accession in mind. It will be seen that these steps as such did not immediately succeed in their objectives. Yet, they revealed the importance of the Princely

⁶⁰ See, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 95.

⁶¹ As early as April 22, 1947, Nehru told Mountbatten, "the future of Kashmir might produce a difficult problem." See, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon(eds.), *Transfer of Power to India* [henceforth TOP], Vol. X, 1981 : 194.

state of Kashmir to India. Secondly, such steps led, as also did those of the Muslim League and Pakistan, to an intensification of the rivalry for Kashmir.

Once the partition plan of June 3, 1947 had been announced, several important personalities of the Indian National Congress party and the British Indian Government visited Kashmir to persuade the *Maharaja* either to accede to India or to desist from declaring independence. Such personalities included Congress President Acharya Kripalani, and the Viceroy, Mountbatten in June, and the Princes of Kapurthala and Patiala, both from neighbouring Punjab in July, and Gandhi in early August, 1947. Lord Ismay, the Chief Staff Officer of the Viceroy (after August 15, 1947, Governor-General of the Dominion of India) also visited Kashmir in September 1947.⁶² Of these, most controversial had been Mountbatten's visit because of his position as the head of the government of still an undivided India.⁶³ Mountbatten later said in a meeting of the East India Association in London about what went on during his visit :

I went up personally and saw the Maharaja. I spent four days with him in July[sic]; on every one of those four days I persisted with the same advice : "Ascertain the wishes of your people by any means and join whichever Dominion your people wish to join by August 14 this year..." Had he acceded to Pakistan before August 14, the future government of India had allowed me to give His Highness the assurance that no objection whatever would be raised.⁶⁴

Campbell-Johnson, Mountbatten's Press Secretary and V. P. Menon, his Reforms Commissioner [later, the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of States] also corroborate these proceedings based on the Viceroy's briefings on his visit.⁶⁵ However, V. P. Menon himself also described how ardently Nehru and Patel approached Mountbatten to use his good offices and personal influence to negotiate the accession of the Princes to the Union.⁶⁶ Around this time, both Gandhi and Nehru

⁶² See, Premnath Bazaz, *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir* (Karachi : National Book Foundation Edition) 1976 : 272. Also see, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 59-64.

⁶³ The controversies arising out of Mountbatten's attempts to persuade the *Maharaja* to accede to India led subsequently his Staff Officer Lord Ismay to approach a number of individuals familiar with the partition process to write in support of Mountbatten. See, R. J. Moore, "Mountbatten, India, and the Commonwealth", *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, XIX(1), March 1981 : 6. See, also H. V. Hodson, "Earl Mountbatten's Role in the Partition of India", *The Round Table* 70(277), January 1980 : 102-106

⁶⁴ See, Mountbatten, *Time Only to Look Forward* (London : Nicholas Kaye) 1949 : 268-69.

⁶⁵ See, Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London : Robert Hale) 1951 : 120 ; and V. P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* (Calcutta : Orient Longmans) 1956 : 116.

⁶⁶ See, V. P. Menon, *ibid* : 92-95.

became concerned about the intentions of the *Maharaja*.⁶⁷ It is also recorded that before the visit Mountbatten received briefing letters from K.P.S. Menon, an influential leader in the Congress hierarchy, and from Nehru himself. Nehru's eight-page memorandum underscored the vital importance of Kashmir for the Indian Union. The content of the brief and the report on the visit which Mountbatten wrote to Nehru on his return, explaining his lack of success, are suggestive that his visit had the main objective of persuading the *Maharaja* to decide Kashmir's accession in favour of the Indian Union.⁶⁸ Nehru's memorandum contained some specific suggestions to be conveyed to the *Maharaja*, namely, the removal of the "corrupt" Prime Minister, Kak,⁶⁹ the release of Sheikh Abdullah and instituting of a responsible government under him, and finally, taking the "normal and obvious course" of joining the Constituent Assembly of India.⁷⁰ Mountbatten's visit evoked intense interests and speculation in the Muslim League circles.⁷¹ and it still persists as to what went on during the visit because there is no independent record.⁷²

In the light of the *Maharaja*'s indecision until the last minute when the tribal forces were on

⁶⁷ See, Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.* : 120.

⁶⁸ These are well-documented. For Menon's letter, which he asked Mountbatten to destroy (but it survived) and Nehru's memorandum, see, *TOP XI* : 390-91, 446-48; Docs. 201 & 229 respectively. Original copy of Nehru's Memorandum may be seen in IOL, *Retraction of Paramountcy*, R/3/1/136, 1947.

⁶⁹ Two factors might have worked behind this advice. First, Nehru had a bitter personal memory of his arrest by Pandit Kak's regime in 1946 when Nehru tried to enter Kashmir in support of Sheikh Abdullah who had been arrested for his 'Quit Kashmir' movement. Secondly, Pandit Kak was known for a friendly disposition towards Jinnah. He was also in favour of Kashmir's independence and against joining India. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 108.

⁷⁰ See, IOL, R/3/1/136.

⁷¹ The Karachi-based *Dawn* wrote on August 24, 1947, "Rumour also has it that Lord Mountbatten has been trying pressure on the *Maharaja* to join the Indian Union." For other Pakistani reactions, see, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 57.

⁷² Curiously enough, Patel's reported assurance through the Viceroy to the *Maharaja* that his accession to Pakistan would not be considered as an unfriendly act by India is not documented anywhere, not even in the ten-volume compilation of Patel's letters between 1945-50, edited by Durga Das. Lamb(1991) takes the radical view that such a dialogue might not have taken place at all. See, Lamb *op. cit.* : 119. However, Patel's overall disposition towards Kashmir and other Princely states like Hyderabad, as was indicated in Section 4.5.1 of Chapter IV, suggests that this was a consistent view of his towards Kashmir. Likewise, in the context of lending an Indian Army officer, Col. Kashmir Singh Katoch, to the state of Kashmir, he said, "If the State decides to join the other Dominion, Col. Katoch will return to the Indian Dominion". See, Durga Das(ed.), *Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945-50* (Ahmedabad : Navjivan Publishing House) 1970, Vol I : 37-38. In any case, in the original context of this note, Collins and Lapierre reported of some additional conversations between Mountbatten and the *Maharaja*. In response to Mountbatten's liberal suggestion of joining Pakistan, the *Maharaja* was reported to have said, "I do not want to accede to Pakistan on any account". Mountbatten "then not only commanded categorically that he [Maharaja] must then join India but also offered to send immediately an Infantry Division to preserve the integrity of .. [his] boundaries". See Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom At Midnight*, (New York : Simon and Schuster) 1975 : 205.

the outskirts of Srinagar, it would seem that the visits were of little effect in persuading the *Maharaja* to accede to India. However, important steps were being taken or contemplated on the Indian side, as also on the Pakistan side, each in its own way, to effect the accession of the State in favour of the respective sides. Some of the concrete steps taken by the States Ministry of the Indian Union in cooperation with the Defence and Transport ministries aimed basically at linking the state of Jammu and Kashmir through roads and a speedy communication system. Nehru was recorded to have written to Patel on September 27, 1947 in this context :

The approach of the winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The only normal route there is via the Jhelum Valley. The Jammu route can hardly be used during winter and air traffic is also suspended. Therefore, it is important that something should be done before these winter conditions set in. This means practically by the end of October or at the latest the beginning of November. Indeed, air traffic will be difficult even before that. ... It seems to me urgently necessary, therefore, that the accession to the India Union should take place early.

Things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the cooperation of Sheikh Abdullah. Once the state accedes to India, it will become very difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union. If, however, there is delay in this accession, then Pakistan will go ahead, without much fear of consequences, [e]specially when the winter isolates Kashmir.⁷³

On October 2, 1947 Patel wrote to the *Maharaja* in the same letter that he sent through Mahajan :

In the meantime, I am expediting as much possible the linking up of the State with the Indian Dominion by means of telegraph, telephones, wireless and roads. We fully realise the need for despatch and urgency and I can assure you that we shall do our best.⁷⁴

The Kashmiri Government, on its own, also made several representations to the Indian Government for ensuring its safety and security in the face of the deteriorating situation. The requests were not only for arms and ammunition,⁷⁵ but reportedly also for a "concentration of military forces at Madhopore or at any equally near or convenient centre for rendering military assistance to Kashmir in case it was needed."⁷⁶ However, it appears that the Kashmiri

⁷³ See, Nehru to Sardar Patel, in Durga Das, *ibid* : 45-47.

⁷⁴ *Ibid* : 42-43. As a follow-up of this assurance, Patel's letter to the Minister of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India indicates the steps they were talking. See, Patel's letter to N. V. Gadgil, *ibid* : 57

⁷⁵ Vide, Kashmiri Minister's letter to Patel, dated 1st October 1947. See, *ibid* : 43-44.

⁷⁶ Kashmiri Deputy Prime Minister, R.L. Batra to Sardar Patel, 3 October 1947. See *ibid* : 48

Government was seeking assistance on its own terms. This is evident from the "almost fatal indecisiveness" of the *Maharaja*, as Patel put it,⁷⁷ despite all pleas from the National Congress and the Government of India to arrive at a decision on the accession of Kashmir in cooperation with Sheikh Abdullah after his release. While Sheikh Abdullah was released on September 29, 1947, he was not involved in the administration until Kashmir was forced to seek accession from India in the wake of the tribal invasion. More importantly, the Kashmiri *Maharaja* sought military assistance from one of his Princely colleagues, the *Maharaja* of Patiala. The Patiala Government lent him a battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain artillery some time on October 17 or 18, so that when the Indian troops finally intervened in Jammu and Kashmir on October 27, 1947, the Patiala gunners, who legally and technically were Indian forces by terms and conditions of the Instrument of Accession, were very much in Srinagar.⁷⁸ This particular instance indicates that the *Maharaja* was desperate to keep his option open, even though out of compulsions he was responding slowly to Indian pressure. Even in the last minute, when the tribal invaders were within the borders of Kashmir, the *Maharaja* sent his Deputy Prime Minister R.L. Batra to seek military assistance from India, but the offer of accession was still withheld. Only when New Delhi declined to assist without accession did he cave in.⁷⁹

Whether the Indian Government also knew of the above particular incident, is not clear. However, they, on their part, were preparing all the same for any eventuality. Controversy remains as the extent to which they carried their preparations. From the Pakistani side, the

⁷⁷ *Ibid* : 56.

⁷⁸ This piece of explosive information has been mentioned earlier in a number of works of Kashmiri as well as Indian authors. See, Saraf, *op. cit.* : 909; Lt. General L. P. Sen, *Slender was the Thread : Kashmir confrontation 1947-48*, (New Delhi) 1969 : 64, Maj General D. K. Palit, *Jammu and Kashmir Army : History of the J&K Rifles* (Dehra Dun), 1972 : 197. Lamb brought it out in prominence. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 131 and note 17 in page 142. According to General L. P. Sen, the Patiala forces had been in Srinagar for ten days. See, Sen, *ibid* : 64. Lamb infers from this that when the Kashmiri Prime Minister threatened Pakistan of seeking "friendly assistance", he might have had Patiala in mind. See, *ibid* : 143, note 24. In a seminar on Kashmir organised by the International Institute of Kashmir Studies, London, in June 1992, a Kashmiri from Jammu also confirmed the movement of Patiala troops in Jammu. Although Lamb only vaguely claims that "Pakistan, of course, had it[s] own information as to what was going on in Srinagar and what the *Maharaja* and his advisers might be planning", it is curious that this event had not yet been picked up by Pakistan in their effort to make the case that tribal invasion or no invasion, the accession of Kashmir in any case would have been presented as a *fait accompli*.

⁷⁹ See, M. C. Mahajan, *Looking Back*, London, 1963 : 150-51.

contention was that the Indian military intervention in Kashmir had been pre-planned. General Frank Messervy, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army until February 15, 1948, claimed later that there was "much evidence that this accession had been deliberately planned for some weeks before the event."⁸⁰ India, on the other hand, contradicted such assertions through the joint statement of the three Commanding Officers in charge of the Indian armed forces, themselves all British. The statement, which found its place in the speech of the Indian delegation to the Security Council, concluded : "No plans were made for sending these forces, nor were such plans even considered before 25 October, three days after the tribal invasion had begun."⁸¹ This, however, could not dispel the misgivings of Pakistan. When Nehru's explanation of the circumstances under which the troops had to be despatched to Srinagar reached Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, their reaction was that Pakistan did not accept the accession done by "fraud and violence".⁸²

From this comparative picture, it becomes evident that both India and Pakistan were proceeding in their own ways to effect the accession of the State of Kashmir to the respective Dominions. Kashmir's significance to each of them was much more than they were ready to claim publicly. Indeed, ever since the partition of British India became a distinct possibility, both undertook positive efforts to persuade the *Maharaja* as well as the political élites to accede to their respective polities. Yet, both the Muslim League and the National Congress displayed an apparent lack of interest in Kashmir. Pakistan's apparent lack of interests⁸³ arose possibly from overconfidence, given Kashmir's geographic and economic linkage with Pakistan and a Muslim-majority population of the state, that Kashmir had no alternative than to join Pakistan.⁸⁴ The

⁸⁰ General Sir Frank Messervy, "Kashmir", *Asiatic Review*, 45, January 1949 : 469

⁸¹ See, *Security Council Official Records*, Third Year, 1948, Nos. 1-15 : 222-23. Birdwood also claims, "I have it from the British officer in charge of the operation" that the operation was an improvised one. See, Birdwood(1952), *op. cit.* : 302-3.

⁸² See, telegram of the Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, October 29, 1947, in Hasan(ed.), *op. cit.* : 64.

⁸³ cf. Jinnah's press statement on June 17, 1947, supporting the Princes who were aspirant of independence. See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, June 28-July 5, 1947 : 8696.

⁸⁴ The overconfidence is evident from Jinnah's oft-quoted saying, "Kashmir would fall into our lap like a ripe fruit". See, Ali(1967), *op. cit.* : 297. Sardar Ibrahim, the President of Azad Kashmir confronted Ghulam Muhammad, the Pakistan Finance Minister from Hyderabad as to why Patel's offer of Kashmir on a *quid pro quo* basis for Hyderabad was not accepted. Ghulam Muhammad said, "Ibrahim, you are too young a politician. Hyderabad is already ours as an independent state and Kashmir we are sure to get by plebiscite". Quot-

Indian side of the detached view seems to have been guided by a wariness of the possible controversy in the future. Gupta quotes the following of V. P. Menon's views :

The Government of India was not, Menon says, immediately interested so much in Kashmir. The State [of Kashmir] had its own peculiar problems which could be resolved in course of time, and "our hands were already full and, if truth be told, I for one had simply no time to think of Kashmir".⁸⁵

Similar views have also been expressed elsewhere to make the point that

there is good reason to believe that had the Maharaja decided to join Pakistan – as every argument ...bade him to do – India would have peacefully accepted the decision. Indeed, had he sought to join India at once, the Indian Government might have been reluctant to accept his accession. While he paused irresolute, tribesmen from the North-West poured into his State.⁸⁶

Whether the tribal invasion altered the course of events is a legitimate question and it will be pursued in the succeeding section. However, the premise on which the above conclusion is based is open to question, as much as are Pakistan's detached views. Apart from strategic importance of Kashmir to both, the accession of Kashmir to either Dominion reflected the realisation of the unfulfilled ideology of the Dominion concerned. Secondly, the turn of events in the immediate aftermath of the partition not only raised the significance of Kashmir to both, they also created a sense of urgency in both. Thus, Patel wrote to Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister in early October 1947, "there is no time to lose if the reports which we hear of *similar* preparations for intervention on the part of the Pakistan Government are correct." [emphasis added]⁸⁷ To sum up, Kashmir had its intrinsic value to both India and Pakistan. The decolonisation and partition of India enhanced that value manifold. The tragic events of the partition of the Punjab and the internal developments arrayed the forces of the two hostile Dominions onto Kashmir, while the tribal invasion as one of those forces, served as the trigger. Was this an independent trigger? What exactly does independence of events mean in this context because the NWFP was a *de jure* Pakistan territory, as Patiala was India's? We are turning to this trigger now.

ed in Mir Abdul Aziz, "Kashmir : Operation Half-hearted of 1947", *Pakistan Observer*, July 21, 1991. This statement also indicates the desire to maximise gains and not to lose Hyderabad for something which was almost theirs.

⁸⁵ Menon(1956), *op. cit.* : 395, quoted in Gupta, *op. cit.* : 99.

⁸⁶ See, *Round Table*, 39, December 1948 : 38.

⁸⁷ See, Durga Das (ed.), *op. cit.* : 57.

5.4 The Tribal Invasion, Accession and Intervention

The most controversial and talked about aspect of the Kashmir conflict of 1947-48 was the tribal invasion of October 22, 1947, which has been considered as the date of origin of the Kashmir war 1947-48. In this section it will be argued that while there had been an element of surprise in the tribal invasion for all the three governments of the day, namely, Pakistan, India and Kashmir, such an act was not totally unanticipated to any of them. All the actors were preparing for an anticipated showdown over Kashmir. From this, it will appear that in a conflict situation, as tension heightens, the trigger usually is neither accidental nor spurious. The trigger is provided by one of many possibilities. the actual course of the conflict may not be pre-planned either on the part of one or more of the actors. It is just one of the logical possibilities along which the course of events flow.

The commonplace view in the Indian circles and among British officials sympathetic to Indian viewpoints, held that the tribal invasion of October 22, 1947 had the knowledge and approval of the Pakistan Government or to put it even stronger, the Pakistan Government organised the attack.⁸⁸ Pakistan also had been censured subsequently on moral grounds for aiding, abetting and sustaining the attacks on Kashmir, which since October 26, was Indian territory after the accession by the *Maharaja*. Pakistan refuted the charge of organising or even assisting the tribal invasion and counter-charged :

The Pathan raid on Kashmir did not start till 22 October. It is quite clear therefore that Kashmir's plan for asking for Indian troops – and it could hardly have been unilateral – was formed quite independently of this raid and all evidence and action taken shows it was prearranged. It would seem rather to have been made after failure of the troops to suppress people of Poonch and in anticipation of reaction which they expected to their massacre of Muslims in Jammu.⁸⁹

The motivational and organisational aspects of the tribal invasion are a murky area. The

⁸⁸ See, Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.* : 229. Mountbatten's report to Nehru on return from Lahore where he met Jinnah on the crisis gave such an impression that Jinnah had the capability of withdrawing the tribals, if he so wished. See, IOL, *Viceroy's Papers on Transfer of Power* R/3/1/1, 1947.

⁸⁹ See, "Telegram of the Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed to the Prime Minister of India, 30 October 1947", reprinted from *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir* (New Delhi : Government of India) n.d., in Hasan (ed.), *op. cit.* : 68.

NWFP, in general, on the eve of the invasion was a troubled spot where the Muslim League and National Congress were at loggerheads over the fate of the Province. As the inevitability of the Province's joining Pakistan became evident, the Pathan leadership of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, also popularly known as the *Frontier Gandhi*, demanded an independent Pakhtunistan. They had to be persuaded with great difficulty to accept a referendum as to whether the NWFP would be joining India or Pakistan. The National Congress manoeuvring for retaining the incumbent Congress ministry in the NWFP left a popular impression that Congress possibly was not reconciled to the idea of the NWFP going to Pakistan. Against this background, the stimulus of the Poonch rebellion and the related horror stories of Muslim persecution reached the NWFP, mainly through the Poonchis who came for purchasing local arms. Birdwood narrates :

Stories, already related, of atrocities committed against Moslems in East Punjab States and the persecution in Jammu and Poonch, were magnified and distorted to fan the flames, though indeed the plain truth was sufficiently revolting. In particular, many Sikhs, forced from their lands in West Punjab and without homes in the East, were smouldering in resentment and seeking revenge. And in the meantime, they hit out brutally and without mercy at any Moslems within their reach. The counter-movement from the frontier was therefore not only adventures : it was jihad the kind of reaction which is comprehensible only to a few who have worked for long years among the Mahsuds, Wazirs and Afridis of the frontier.⁹⁰

It is quite plausible that the *jihad* motivation of the NWFP tribals, especially in view of their religious links with the Muslims in Kashmir, whose persecution had become a bazaar story in Pakistan, were utilised effectively by the NWFP élites. The spectre of Kashmir's accession to India and a possible onslaught of the Indian troops on the NWFP to link it with Kashmir, and hence, India, might have loomed large in their mind. The bitter political feuds between the Muslim League and the National Congress over the control of the government in the province even after the outcome of the referendum had gone in favour of Pakistan were reminders.⁹¹ There were also the historical memories of Sikh-Pathan rivalries, which might have surfaced in Kashmir because the conflict signals which were coming from Jammu and Poonch were one of Sikh

⁹⁰ See, Birdwood(1956), *op. cit.* : 56. For the Governor of the NWFP, George Cunningham's first hand report, see, Section 4.3.2 in Chapter IV.

⁹¹ See, NWFP Governor to Viceroy, 9 July 1947, *Post-Referendum Problems in North-West Frontier Province*, R/3/1/165 : 7, IOL.

atrocities as a fallout of the partition of the Punjab.

However, if India could not escape the controversy of its allegedly pre-planned military intervention in the final drama culminating in the Kashmir war, Pakistan could not escape the blame of its share in the organisation and mobilisation of the tribal forces who played the trigger role in the war. Moore challenges the conclusion of Cunningham that the tribal invasion was provoked largely by the atrocities on the Muslims in the Punjab and Kashmir.⁹² However, the eclectic sources that Moore quotes to make the argument⁹³ point at best to the conclusion that Birdwood reached earlier. Birdwood concluded, "Nevertheless, officers of the Pakistan Forces sensed what was afoot, for I have their own testimony. The general conclusion is that, while there was no plan of control by the Pakistan Government at the highest level, there was knowledge and tacit assistance."⁹⁴ Korbel argued, "It would appear that the Pakistani central authorities did not initiate the tribal invasion. On the other hand it would also appear that the Prime Minister of the North West Frontier Province, himself a Kashmiri, and his officers did give the tribesmen help. ... When, however, the Indian army was sent to intervene in what up to that time was considered to be primarily a civil war, an unknown number of Pakistani nationals joined the *Azad* forces for which the Pakistan government was undoubtedly responsible."⁹⁵ Akbar Khan's accounts suggest that at the unofficial or semi-official level, there were several attempts which included recruitment of volunteers and tribesmen, and supply of arms to the resistance force.⁹⁶ It could also be known that what was planned at the semi-official level did not have any relationship with what actually took place in the form of tribal invasion.⁹⁷ Of course, there is no point in attempting or reaching a conclusive judgement on what the fact was other than the purpose of setting the record right,

⁹² See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 46.

⁹³ See, *ibid* : 49-50.

⁹⁴ See, Birdwood(1956), *op. cit.* : 53.

⁹⁵ See, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 95.

⁹⁶ See, Akbar Khan, *op. cit.* : 13-18.

⁹⁷ Source : *Interview* with Ghulam Din Wani, *op. cit.* Mr. Khurshid Anwar, who organised the tribal invasion on his own, said in an interview on December 6, 1947, "the attack on Kashmir was originally planned from two sides – one from the regions adjoining Kashmir State in the tribal belt and the other from the Pakistan border. While the frontier tribesmen's attack materialised the other one did not, owing to various obstructions placed by the Pakistan Government in the way of the attackers." See, Hasan(ed.), *op. cit.* : 96.

because every single piece of claim and counter-claim has been refuted and counter-refuted over these decades. Of more importance for the conflict was the flow of information available at that particular point of time and the perception which the information helped to frame.⁹⁸

Coming to the tribal invasion itself, the first batch of the tribal *laskar*, numbering about 2,000, entered Kashmiri territory at Domel from Abbottabad in Pakistan on October 22, 1947. The State troops deployed there could hardly put up any resistance. The Muslim soldiers not only deserted but also killed their Dogra commander. The Muslim villagers joined the tribes. They soon reached Muzaffarabad and in three days came up to Baramullah, some 30 miles from Srinagar, the summer capital of the *Maharaja*. Their goal was to reach Srinagar, yet for strange reasons, they were detained in Baramullah for two vital days and when the first batch of 300 airborne Sikh troops landed at Srinagar airport, they encountered the tribals about four miles away from the airport, and the tribals narrowly missed what they wanted to achieve in Kashmir.⁹⁹

The news of the tribal invasion reached Delhi through two sources, One was through the person of the Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir, Batra, who rushed to Delhi for arms and assistance. The second source was a telegram from Pakistan Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi by the British Commanding Officers.¹⁰⁰ The situation was reviewed in the Defence Committee meeting on October 25, in which it was decided that V. P. Menon, the Secretary of the States Ministry, would rush to Srinagar to assess the situation. It was also decided, on insistence of Mountbatten that military assistance could only be provided on accession by the State to India. V.

⁹⁸ For example, although it is now well-established that Jinnah was more or less in the dark about what was going on in the Pakistan side as well, the information that New Delhi had at that time was that Jinnah was waiting at Abbottabad "to ride in triumph into Kashmir", as Mountbatten told Ian Stephens. See, Campbell-Johnson(1949), *op. cit.* : 225. Such information and other prior episodes framed Mountbatten's attitude towards Jinnah when the former visited Lahore on November 1, 1947, to have a discussion about peaceful settlement of the problem. See, *ibid* : 229-30.

⁹⁹ For loot and plundering theory to explain the delay of the tribals, see, Birdwood(1956), *ibid* : 57-58. Also see, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 75-76, and Gupta, *op. cit.* : 111-12. In Akbar Khan's opinion, however, the delay was because of the internal problem within the Provisional Azad Kashmir Government. According to Khan, as reports of the formation of the Azad Government was coming around this time, Khurshid Anwar, the leader of the tribals, was waiting for his own position in the Government hierarchy. See, Akbar Khan, *op. cit.* : 50-51. Mir Abdul Aziz a veteran Kashmiri activist turned journalist confirmed the power rivalry that was going on in the newly formed Azad Kashmir Government. See, *The Pakistan Observer*, July 7, 1991. However, both could be true, because that the tribes engaged in looting and arson has been acknowledged by many sources in Pakistan.

¹⁰⁰ See, Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.* : 224.

P. Menon advised the *Maharaja* of Indian views and the *Maharaja* agreed. On October 26, the Defence Committee decided to send troops. The *Maharaja* signed the Instrument of Accession on the same day and accordingly troops were flown in next morning and Srinagar was barely saved from falling into the hands of the tribals. Along with the acceptance of the Instrument of Accession, Mountbatten wrote in a letter to the *Maharaja* :

My Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of disputes, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored and the soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.¹⁰¹

In Karachi and Lahore, the news of Indian troop deployment came in the evening of October 27 through a telegram from Nehru. Jinnah received the news with shock and surprise and immediately ordered General Gracey, the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to rush troops to Kashmir. Gracey called General Auchinleck, the Joint Chief of Armed Forces, based in Delhi for advice. Auchinleck flew in next morning and persuaded Jinnah to withdraw the orders because of the serious implications of Pakistan troops movement which would have not only the unpleasant and improbable eventuality of British troops fighting on opposing sides but also the possibility of a general war between India and Pakistan. Jinnah withdrew the orders. Srinagar thus being saved from imminent fall and Jinnah being persuaded to withdraw orders, the initiative temporarily passed on to political fields. But the battleground already had been prepared for year-long pitched battles involving not only the tribals but also Azad Kashmir irregulars and at a later date, Pakistani regular troops.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Birdwood(1956), *op. cit.* : 58.

5.5 The Undeclared War and Cease-fire through Prolonged Mediation

5.5.1 From the Crises of Invasion and Intervention to Pitched Battles for Territory

A perusal of the events between October 22, 1947, when the tribal invasion had begun, and January 1, 1949, when a cease-fire was finally brought into effect, suggests that the militarised conflict went through three phases.¹⁰² The phases were, *crisis* from October 22 1947 to end of the year; *reinforcement* by India during the Spring, and by Pakistan during the Summer of 1948; and *holding up* or territorial battles, during August-December 1948. The crisis phase began with the infiltration of the large gangs of tribals into Kashmir on October 22. They were at the outskirts of Srinagar on October 25. Srinagar, the capital city was about to fall and the *Maharaja* fled to Jammu. However, the tribes were repulsed by the Indian intervention on October 27. They held on to several important positions including Baramullah for a few weeks. By the end of the first week of November, however, Indian troops captured Baramullah, and Uri a fortnight later. Poonch remained in tribal hands quite some time and Gilgit was still out of bounds for the Indians.¹⁰³ By the end of November, reinforced tribal contingents reached west of Uri and moved further south. India, in response, reinforced its troops, so that "gradually a line came to be stabilised running from Tithwal to a point just west of Poonch, then down to the Pakistan border at Bhingar. There it remained ever since".¹⁰⁴ This means that the military outcome was determined within the first few weeks of the war and subsequent battles only made minor adjustments in the battlefield. In a way, the outcome presaged the political outcome, that is the reality of the two Kashmirs roughly along this line.

In late December, another crisis developed for India as the winter set in and Jammu and Kashmir was virtually cut off from India. At least two Indian garrisons, one in Jhangar and the

¹⁰² For descriptions of the course of the war by military officials involved in the battlefield, see, E. A. Vas (Retired Lt. General), *Without Baggage : A Personal Account of the Jammu and Kashmir Operations, October 1947-January 1949* (Dehradun, India : Natraj Publishers) 1987; Akbar Khan *op. cit.* Also see, *White Papers* published from New Delhi and Rawalpindi.

¹⁰³ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 58.

¹⁰⁴ See, Birdwood(1952), *op. cit.* : 304.

other in Poonch, were cut off or blockaded. The Uri sector vital for the defence of Srinagar and Baramullah was also threatened. Mountbatten feared that India, in reprisal or to ease the pressure, might "decide to march into West Punjab."¹⁰⁵ Jinnah cabled to Cunningham, the NWFP Governor, that Indian troops were threatening Pakistan's frontiers.¹⁰⁶ Mountbatten prevailed on Nehru to go to the UN to call upon Pakistan to desist from aiding the tribals. Nehru complied, yet he wrote back to Mountbatten, "If grave danger threatens us in Kashmir or elsewhere on the West Punjab frontier then we must not hesitate to march through Pakistan territory towards the bases."¹⁰⁷

As the winter passed by, India reinforced supplies and troops and began offensive against the rebels and tribesmen. Earlier Pakistan's difficulties with the ill-disciplined tribes were matched by India's logistical problems. Yet they could hold on to Poonch and Uri. With the Indian reinforcement in the Spring, Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister looked forward to ousting the raiders by mid-year. It was at this stage that Pakistan decided, with the consent of the British commanding officer, General Gracey, to deploy Pakistani regular troops in Kashmir in a bid to keep the Indian army from touching Pakistani borders, as Pakistan later explained to the UNCIP members in a written report in July, 1948.¹⁰⁸

Once the participation of the Pakistan army became known and there was every possibility that a cease-fire was in the offing, the battle turned out to be one of holding out and occupying as much territory as possible before the cease-fire. From the beginning of the year until September, India retained the initiative. From October, however, Pakistan began preparation for a large offensive on Indian forward supply and communication lines in the Jhelum area, itself risking Lahore. By mid-December, it shattered the Indian line of communication again giving rise to a

¹⁰⁵ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 59. Eventually it turned out to be a stalemate where India held on to its position. See, *Annual Register 1948*, [London] Vol. 190, 1949 : 131, and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 31-February 7, 1948 : 9085.

¹⁰⁶ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 60.

¹⁰⁷ See, Campbell-Johnson, *op. cit.* : 257.

¹⁰⁸ For a Pakistani explanation of the rationale for troop deployment, see, Meherunnisa Ali, "Jinnah's Perception of Pakistan's Foreign Policy and the Kashmir Issue", *Pakistan Horizon*, 43(2), April 1990(special issue) : 63. For the debate on exact date of the intervention by the Pakistani troops, see, Birdwood(1956), *op. cit.* : 67-68.

crisis. However, the mediation process that had been going on since the beginning of 1948 eventually prevailed and a cease-fire was announced with effect from January 1, 1949.

It was a militarily indecisive battle in which holding on rather than military victory was the immediate objective of both sides. It was not because they did not want victory, but because of the realisation that it was not achievable. This very military outcome had in turn significant political implications both for the future of the State of Kashmir and for the conflict itself. The war led to the *de facto* partition of the State into Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir and the Indian controlled Kashmir and that decided the basic negotiating position of both India and Pakistan.

5.5.2 The Abortive Negotiations, Prolonged UN Mediation and Cease-Fire

The negotiations and mediation process leading to a cease-fire need not as such be covered in dealing with the militarily violent phase of a conflict. We have, however, some specific reasons for making a brief review of the bilateral negotiations and prolonged mediation by the United Nations. In the first place, the negotiations and mediation process started almost from the start of the conflict and proceeded side by side with the pitched battles until January 1, 1949. These conflict resolution attempts need to be kept in view in order to obtain a complete picture of the conflict. Secondly, it was through the prolonged negotiations and mediatory efforts that the basic position of the parties and the value they attached to the issue of contention were revealed. The negotiating position of the parties and changes in it, if any, over this period, will provide useful benchmarks against which to compare the changes and continuity in the conflict over the coming years.¹⁰⁹ Thirdly, it will also be instructive, as a benchmark again, to analyse briefly the external inputs to the conflict, if any, in terms of nature of the UN mediation process itself, on the one hand, and the policies and postures of the Great Powers with regard to Kashmir, on the other, during this period.

¹⁰⁹ The course of the conflict over the coming decade 1949-1958 will be covered in Chapter VI.

During the period of over one year until the cease-fire of January 1, 1949, the peace process over Kashmir went through three phases – bilateral negotiations during the first three months, after which the case was taken to the United Nations, the first three or four months of 1948 when the case was debated at the UN, and the last six months of 1948 when intensive mediation was carried out by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, created especially for resolving the Kashmir problem. In the negotiation phase, the combatants tried to resolve the problem bilaterally. Four face-to-face meetings including the first one between Jinnah and Mountbatten, and as many as seventeen telegraphic communications took place between India and Pakistan until the end of December 1947.¹¹⁰ Subsequently, in the mediation phases, seven resolutions, five by the Security Council and two by the UNCIP were adopted.¹¹¹ It will be found that at the very initial stage, the two combatants evinced clear interest in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It was also remarkable that at the initial stage, there was at least a semblance of agreement between the two about the nature of the problem, a solution and how that could be attained. Yet as the peace process unfolded through the phases, the agreements were transformed into disagreements one by one, so that it would appear that the cease-fire was the best that could be achieved under the circumstances. The main argument of the section is that by the time the conflict broke out the parties had already imputed fundamental value to Kashmir. If there was some semblance of agreements, beneath them lay basic difference of approach to the problem. The lengthy peace process only provided them the opportunity to articulate and harden their formal position and in the process disagreements surfaced one by one. Whether the approach underlying the mediation process and the external inputs had anything to do with this hardening of position will also be examined.

As India was in the *de facto* occupation of bulk of the territory and the seat of political power of Kashmir, the change of position will concern mainly India. However, Pakistan also held

¹¹⁰ See, Hasan(ed.), *op. cit.* : 62-106. See also, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 160-61.

¹¹¹ The list of the Resolutions may be found in the Document Section of the Bibliography. Mention may also be made of several communications between the individual combatants and the UNCIP seeking clarifications and giving reactions to particular resolutions or to the stand of the opponent. These may be found in some details with commentary Lakhapal, *op. cit.* : 141-58.

at least the veto power to any settlement because the tribals and other forces supported by Pakistan were fighting in Kashmir and they could not be dislodged by force. In a way, the political stalemate that was soon to develop was also inherent in the military situation in which neither party was decisive. In any case, the initial position India took, consistent with their expressed position to the *Maharaja*, was that the accession of Kashmir was provisional,¹¹² that there was an element of dispute in the case, and that the future of the state would be decided by referring to the people.¹¹³ India also "agreed to an impartial international agency like the United Nations supervising any referendum."¹¹⁴ Apparently at least, India agreed to do, almost on its own, what Pakistan demanded. Yet the operational part of India's position that the Indian troops had been sent to safeguard the life and property of the Kashmiris from the onslaught of the tribes, and that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the law and order was restored and Kashmir was cleared of the tribal forces,¹¹⁵ was something totally unacceptable to Pakistan. For Pakistan, as long as the Indian troops and other armed gangs were on the soil of Kashmir, the goal of the resistance force consisting of the tribesmen, the Azad forces and other irregulars in terms of saving the Muslims from massacre, was not attained. So, Pakistan stuck to its original proposal of a simultaneous withdrawal of all troops, armed gangs and tribals from Kashmir, as made by Jinnah to Mountbatten.¹¹⁶ It was also the Pakistani position that with Sheikh Abdullah's administration in power, there was no real hope of getting a "free plebiscite".¹¹⁷ Differences over

¹¹² Vide, Mountbatten's letter of acceptance to Maharaja, dated October 27, 1947. See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 57. Nehru's telegram to Attlee dated October 25, a copy of which was endorsed to Liaquat Ali Khan on October 26, read, "the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India." See, Hasan(ed.), *op. cit.* : 62.

¹¹³ Nehru's telegram to Prime Minister Attlee also said, "Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to the view." See, Hasan(ed.), *ibid* : 62. Nehru in a subsequent telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan, dated October 31, said, "as soon as the invader has been driven from Kashmir soil, and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion." See, *Ibid* : 71.

¹¹⁴ See, Nehru's broadcast on November 2, 1947, in *ibid* : 82.

¹¹⁵ Nehru's telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan dated October 30, read, "Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government but also to the people Kashmir and to the World." See, Hasan(ed.), *ibid* : 71. Nehru repeated this assurance in his broadcast to the nation on November 2, 1947. See, *ibid* : 75.

¹¹⁶ See, Pakistan Prime Minister's telegram addressed to the Prime Minister of India, dated November 6, 1947, in *ibid* : 83-84.

¹¹⁷ See, Pakistani Prime Minister's telegram to the Indian Prime Minister, dated November 24, 1947, in

the conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite grew wider, as India was willing neither to withdraw its forces until peace and order had been restored, nor to replace Sheikh Abdullah's administration which, in India's view, was "based on the will of the people and ...impartial".¹¹⁸

By the middle of December the only area of agreement that remained was the holding of a plebiscite under UN auspices. India in the meantime, had begun sounding out two important points. One was Pakistan was not a party to the conflict,¹¹⁹ and the other one was that not only the legitimacy of Sheikh Abdullah's regime but also Kashmir's accession to India could not be questioned. Thus, even if India reiterated its commitment to the "democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum ... under international auspices" as it decided to take the case to the UN on January 1, 1948, the thrust of its case was to request the Security Council, under Article 35, to "call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance [to the raiders]".¹²⁰ The event of the accession was also put in a different light when it was stated that the "Government of India were thus approached, not only officially by the State authorities, but also on behalf of the people of Kashmir, both for military aid and for accession."¹²¹ As Pakistan also made a counter-complaint to the UN, which put Kashmir in a broader perspective of the overall Indian hostile attitude towards Pakistan,¹²² a verbal battle ensued on the floor of the UN Security Council, in the process of which, the position of the parties became open.

As the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan(UNCIP) started its mediation, India demanded that Pakistan be declared as an aggressor.¹²³ India became further adamant on this demand as Pakistan's introduction of its regular troops in Kashmir became known publicly in

ibid : 95.

¹¹⁸ See, Indian Prime Minister's telegram to Pakistani Prime Minister, dated November 21, 1947, in *ibid* : 93.

¹¹⁹ The cue to this position, interestingly, was taken by Nehru from Liaquat Ali's assertion that Pakistan did not aid the tribals in their invasion which they did on their own. See, telegrams exchanged between the two Prime Ministers, dated December 12 and 16, 1947, respectively, in *ibid* : 96-98.

¹²⁰ Vide S/628, *Security Council Official Records(SCOR)*, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948 : 139-44.

¹²¹ *Ibid*.

¹²² See, letter of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated January 15, 1948, with an enclosure of three documents. S/646 and Corr. I, *SCOR*, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, Annex 6 : 67-87, in Hasan, *op. cit.* : 114-59.

¹²³ See, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 124-25.

the summer of 1948.¹²⁴ India also hardened its position that any premise or arrangement that called into question Kashmir's accession to India would not be countenanced. Moreover, the plebiscite was a matter to be undertaken by India and the Sheikh Abdullah regime.¹²⁵ Along with these conditions, Indian insistence on the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir and no role of Pakistan in Kashmir soon became the hallmarks of Indian position. Pakistan's position was precisely the opposite – withdrawal of Indian troops on a simultaneous basis, neutral administration and plebiscite under the UN auspices. Pakistan further insisted on the legitimacy of the Azad Kashmir Government.¹²⁶ Thus, it was obvious that while the originally agreed solution was being talked about, both were heading for a political division of Kashmir.

Moreover, what appeared to be matters of mere technical and procedural details turned out to be a basic question of who would get Kashmir. During the period under reference, all possible solutions, namely, a plebiscite, arbitration, Kashmir's independence and finally, partition, had been broached, discussed and eventually, all were rejected by either or both of the parties.¹²⁷ The last alternative, that is partition "on the basis of territories at present occupied or controlled by Pakistan or India", was tried by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. However, both the parties revealed their irreducible minimum demand for the Kashmir Valley.¹²⁸ While India would have risked the Valley by agreeing to any method involving semblance of popular decision making, because it would also entail some amount of demilitarisation and some sort of neutral administration for Kashmir, any logical partition of the state would have wiped the chance of gaining the Valley on the part of Pakistan.

It would be hard to relate the shifts and manoeuvrings of the parties to the style and approach of the mediation process, given the high stake that Kashmir commanded with the

¹²⁴ See, *ibid* : 121.

¹²⁵ Richard P. Cronin, and Barbara L. LePoer, "The Kashmir Dispute : Historical Background to the Current Struggle", *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington D.C. : Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) 1991 : 10.

¹²⁶ See, the United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-49*, (New York : UN) 1948 : 398-99. See, also Cronin and LePoer, *op. cit.* : 11.

¹²⁷ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.*: 91.

¹²⁸ See, *ibid* : 91.

parties. Yet partly at least, the room for manoeuvrings arose from a lack of decisiveness in the UN approach and the extenuating circumstance under which mediation was carried out. The Security Council, and later, the UNCIP, in their frantic efforts to evolve an agreed formula made their best to accommodate as much of the the irreconcilable position of either party as possible. However, in doing so it happened that an agreed area was rendered contentious, and in the process, alienation of the parties increased. At least the initial three resolutions of the Security Council displayed an even-handed approach and envisaged roughly a simultaneous approach to demilitarisation and plebiscite arrangements with a significant, if not totally satisfactory to Pakistan, role for Pakistan.¹²⁹ In the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948, however, the issue of the plebiscite, including the appointment of a plebiscite administrator got minimal reference, to the frustration of Pakistan.¹³⁰ As the UNCIP aimed at arriving at an agreement on the cease-fire, it literally was torn between these irreconcilable positions and all it did was to introduce a change here and there to address this or that point of the combatants. The manner it was done was not at all decisive and while "Pakistan was not placated India became exasperated".¹³¹ Such changes were made more frequently in a bid to persuade the parties to accept the UNCIP Resolution of August 13, 1948.¹³²

Of course, the political influence over the functioning of the UN system also played a role in the vacillation of the parties. At the beginning the position of the Great Powers, especially the UK, which had just withdrawn from the Subcontinent leaving important British political and military personnel still in the service of both the Dominions, was an even-handed one, as reflected in the initial responses of the Security Council in January.¹³³ The even handed approach was seen

¹²⁹ For text of the resolutions, see, Hasan, *op. cit.* : 160-68.

¹³⁰ See, *Ibid* : 180-83.

¹³¹ See, Moore, *op. cit.* : 81.

¹³² The first hand details are recorded in Korbelt(1966). Incidentally, Korbelt, a Czech diplomat, was the first President of the UNCIP when these negotiations were going on. See. Korbelt(1966), *op. cit.* : 154-61. More details in Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 160-72.

¹³³ See, Telegram of the President of the Security Council to the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan, S/636, *Security Council Official Records(SCOR)*, Third Year, January 6, 1948 : 4-5; Security Council Resolution S/651 of January 17, 1948, *SCOR*, Third Year, January 17, 1948 : 1; and Resolution S/654, *SCOR* Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, Annex 1 : 64-65.

by India as partisan and "governed by power politics".¹³⁴ In the assessment of a section of the British elites, both in India and London, the approach of Britain might alienate India from the Commonwealth.¹³⁵ Some official assessment also made the same point in a different way, saying that "There were signs that India was now moving towards willingness to accept permanent membership of the Commonwealth."¹³⁶ Consequently, during the recess of the UN session in February and March 1948, significant changes were observed in the British and the US positions, especially with regard to use of Pakistani troops in the administration of the proposed plebiscite and Sheikh Abdullah's regime.¹³⁷

The Security Council adopted a resolution on April 21, 1948, which built on Indian willingness to broaden the base of the Sheikh Abdullah regime and to reduce its military presence in Kashmir and to hold a plebiscite, on the one hand, and on Pakistan's demand for an impartial plebiscite under a UN-appointed plebiscite administrator.¹³⁸ Pakistan's role in the plebiscite was virtually dropped. Eventually, neither Dominion accepted the resolution. In the meantime, the limits of Pakistani covert assistance to the tribes and other irregulars became evident in the wake of what came to be known as the Indian Spring offensive which threatened a pincer move on Pakistan's own international frontiers. It was estimated that if the Indian forces moved beyond Poonch and Mirpur, "some three million Muslims would flee west" to Pakistan threatening its fragile economy. Thus, at this stage, Pakistan committed about three battalions of regular troops to Kashmir. However, the news was suppressed on extra-Subcontinental considerations. Precisely at this time, there was a rift in Anglo-American policies towards the Middle East following US recognition of Israel. The Foreign Office assessment foresaw the possibility of a "Muslim solidarity against the West".¹³⁹ Thus, the knowledge of Pakistani regular troops in Kashmir did

¹³⁴ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 74.

¹³⁵ See, *Cunningham Diary*, February 22, 1948, quoted in *ibid* : 74.

¹³⁶ See, Cabinet Papers 134/55, PRO, quoted in *ibid* : 78.

¹³⁷ For earlier British and US position, see, *ibid* : 72. Mountbatten wrote to Cripps in the aftermath, "the appalling tension under which we were living when the whole HMG were regarded as being anti-Indian has been lifted, and I can never tell you how grateful I am for this change. I hope you will keep these remarks to yourself for I feel they are rather unconstitutional, but I wanted you to know how grateful I was for the line you have taken up". See, Mountbatten to Cripps, April 2, 1948, Cabinet Papers 127/139, quoted in *ibid* : 81.

¹³⁸ For text of the Security Council Resolution, S/726, see, Hasan, *op. cit.* : 163-68.

¹³⁹ See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.* : 84.

not become public until the UNCIP was told by Pakistan itself in July 1948, when the Commission started functioning in the Subcontinent.

However, the need for addressing India's sensibilities, already high following the disclosure of Pakistani troops in Kashmir, was heightened by public condemnation of India in the wake of India's 'police operation' in Hyderabad.¹⁴⁰ There were also reports of the presence of British officers in the Pakistan Army fighting in Kashmir. Mountbatten, who had already left India, wrote to Nehru, "The decisive voices in the British Cabinet are extremely sympathetic and well-disposed towards India."¹⁴¹ Thus, there were multiple pulls on Kashmir at cross-purposes at the very early stage of the conflict. To Britain, the membership of India to the Commonwealth was important. However, from the perspective of the Cold War politics in which Britain was an active member, pressuring Pakistan too much or its dismemberment following a massive Indian military thrust, was also considered to have a limit because of the proximity of the Soviet Union. There was also the pull of the Middle East politics, which itself, incidentally, was becoming the hotbed of another protracted conflict, namely, the Palestine problem. Pakistan needed to be placated on the ground that Palestine had been dismembered and the state of Israel had come into being.¹⁴² In the process of this pulls and tensions, the merit of the issues involved in the Kashmir conflict was lost.

5.6 Conclusions

An attempt has been made in this chapter at explaining the onset of the Kashmir conflict in late October 1947. The substance of the arguments is that an explosion of the accession problem of Kashmir into an open conflict or war between the Dominions of India and Pakistan was the result of the combination of two sets of forces – an high stake rivalry for Kashmir between the two newly born Dominions, and several low level conflictual forces polarised along communal lines. The Hindu-Muslim rivalry itself crystallised into a principal axis of conflict in the

¹⁴⁰ See, Section 4.5.3 in Chapter IV.

¹⁴¹ Mountbatten to Nehru, August 15, 1948, in Durga Das(ed.), *op. cit.* : 220-22.

¹⁴² See, Moore(1987), *op. cit.*: 94.

Subcontinent through the same process of diffusion and feedbacks¹⁴³ as were later operative in the case of Kashmir. There, was thus the dual convergence of the central divide with the internal political divide in Kashmir, on the hand, and those in the local geopolitics in which Kashmir was a part.

First, in addition to its strategic value, Kashmir came to reflect the ideological rivalry between the two dominions. More precisely, Kashmir was viewed as a test case of realisation of the respective national ideologies. Gupta argued that the "clash over Kashmir was symbolic of the two independent States which succeeded the British authorities in India. This conflict was largely a result of the fears, jealousies, and rivalries that marked the political processes at work in India before freedom and culminated on the partition of the Subcontinent."¹⁴⁴ Korbelt made the same argument when he said, "The real cause of all the bitterness and bloodshed, ... that have characterised the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromising struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organization, two scales of values, ... that find themselves locked in [a] deadly conflict, a conflict in which Kashmir has become both symbol and battleground."¹⁴⁵ Similar viewpoints have also been expressed by the leaders and opinion making elites of India and Pakistan. Nehru said, "... it is not Kashmir, therefore, but rather a much deeper conflict that comes in the way of friendly relations between India and Pakistan and the situation is a grave one. We cannot give up the basic ideal which we have held so long and on which the whole conception of our state is founded."¹⁴⁶ To a Pakistani soldier-turned scholar, Kashmir was not the problem, rather a "symptom"; the problem "springs from other sources. If there were no Kashmir, there could be something else, for the conflict which plagues us is deeper and has its origin in history and psyche of the two peoples".¹⁴⁷ The question that comes immediately to the mind, is, how was this ontological dimension of Kashmir invested in it? Because, notwithstanding

¹⁴³ This was our conclusion Chapter IV.

¹⁴⁴ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 1.

¹⁴⁵ See, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 25.

¹⁴⁶ See, *ibid* : 43.

¹⁴⁷ Late Gen. A.I. Akram, the founder President of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, in "In Quest of Peace : Self-inflicted Wounds", *Indian Express*, 22 March 1983.

Kashmir's strategic significance, the high salience of Kashmir to their identity or ideological frame was not pre-existing. A second and equally crucial question is, why did not the antagonists fight over anything else, as General Akram, argued, they would have had, if there were no Kashmir? We, therefore, turn to the second strand of the argument, concerning the nature of the other forces and convergence towards Kashmir.

The forces and factors that combined with India-Pakistan rivalry for Kashmir operated at different levels. Many of these were the direct and indirect legacies of the transfer of power and the partition process, but some were also the product of local geopolitical dynamics. The Kashmiri polity which provided the cauldron to the conflict also had multiple fissures in ruler-ruled and inter-communal relations. While the single most determining factor was the ideological rivalry between India and Pakistan, this alone could not explain the onset of the conflict because the forces which got linked up with it had their independent origins. The crucial question addressed in the chapter was : how did the ideological rivalry and other forces converge on Kashmir? The strategic value of Kashmir led the two antagonists to develop a competitive attitude towards Kashmir. As the decolonisation process was set in motion in early 1947, concrete steps were undertaken to persuade the *Maharaja* and the local élites to accede to the respective Dominion. The competitive postures gained their own momentum as the complexion of the local politics in Kashmir became a mirror image of the National Congress-Muslim League politics in British India. At the sub-state level, Kashmiri local politics pulled in conflicting forces from the adjoining Punjab and the North West Frontier Provinces(NWFP). However, it was the salience of the ideological rivalry that subsumed all other rivalries and feuds into the inter-state level to explode in a violent conflict. Kashmir, thus, became "both [a] symbol and [a] battleground" for India-Pakistan rivalry.¹⁴⁸

By the time conflict broke into open violence, the combatants had developed stakes in the issue much higher than had been given to believe by both the parties.¹⁴⁹ The high salience of

¹⁴⁸ See, Korbél, *op. cit.* : 25.

¹⁴⁹ See, arguments in this regard in Chapter IV.

Kashmir to both was evident in the lengthy bilateral negotiations and the UN mediation processes before they could be brought to agree to a cease-fire on January 1, 1949. Although initially both India and Pakistan spoke in optimistic terms of a solution,¹⁵⁰ it soon became apparent that they spoke from diametrically opposite positions. The conditions each attached to the withdrawal of forces under its control and to the holding of the plebiscite would have greatly influenced the outcome of the plebiscite in its favour. Signs of intractability of the negotiating positions became apparent even in the early stages of the mediation when the parties gave their own interpretation of the UN and UNCIP resolutions and accepted only those provisions favourable to their respective positions. The UN Commission itself, guided partly by the desire to bring an early cease-fire and partly under the influence of the global power politics, agreed to modifications and reinterpretation of the August 13 resolution that paved way to a great extent to intractability. Under the circumstances, the best that could be achieved was a cease-fire agreement according to Part I of the August 13, 1948 UNCIP Resolution.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Ostensibly and initially at least, both sides agreed on the withdrawal of forces external to Kashmir, and the holding of a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. See, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 61-76.

¹⁵¹ For text of the Resolution, (S/995), see, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 152-54.

PART THREE

THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR

CHAPTER VI KASHMIR 1949-1958 : PROLONGED MEDIA-
TION AND PERSISTENT TENSION

CHAPTER VII THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR 1965 : COLD
WAR LINKAGES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
KASHMIR

CHAPTER VI

KASHMIR 1949-1958 : PROLONGED MEDIATION AND PERSISTENT TENSION

6.1 Introduction

The present chapter examines the persistence and intractability of the Kashmir conflict over the decade 1949-1958. In a way elements of intractability of the conflict had already taken roots. The combatants had developed almost an ontological stake in the ideological rivalry of religious-v-secular basis of nationalism. Earlier, with the contest for the Indian Princes set in motion, the antagonists began imputing such basic values to Kashmir because of its strategic importance and its political complexion reflecting a mirror image of the India-Pakistan ideological rivalry. Once both the parties committed themselves to violent means of gaining Kashmir, the stakes were raised many times high. The high salience of Kashmir to both were evident in the lengthy negotiations and UN mediation process before they could be brought to agree to a cease-fire on January 1, 1949.

The UN mediation process, in any case, continued in the 1950s in order to bring agreement on truce terms and preparations for a plebiscite.¹ Some brief and abortive bilateral negotiations also took place in the early 1950s. In the late 1950s, however, the UN itself seemingly lost interest in the issue because of its inability to bring the parties to any agreed solution, however ingeniously formulated. There was hardly any agreement left between the parties. The aim of Pakistan was to implement the agreed solution of holding a plebiscite, while India repudiated formally and explicitly its commitment to such a solution. An examination of the UN mediation processes will be undertaken in this chapter to understand how the conflict survived the mediation

¹ The details of the truce terms and conditions for plebiscite were formulated as supplementary to the August 13, 1948 resolution in UNCIP Resolution, S/1196, of January 5, 1949. See, P. L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Disputes* (New Delhi : International Books) 1965 : 158-60.

efforts and negotiations, and the position of the parties became intractable.

However, the UN mediation process did not take place in a vacuum. The two neighbours had to interact in other areas mainly to sort out economic, political and administrative tangles arising out of partition of an otherwise single political, administrative and economic unit for at least about two hundred years. Most of these issues turned out to be contentious, some on their own merit and some as a result of spillover tensions from the Kashmir conflict. In the process, the two countries came to the brink of open hostilities on a number of occasions on issues such as minority problem in Bengal, trade disputes and the sharing of waters of the Indus river. Eventually they had to arrive at a modicum of co-existence on these issues, even if temporarily, because these affected vitally the life of the common people. Did such cooperations leave any positive feedbacks for Kashmir? An analysis of the conflictual and cooperative interactions may shed valuable insights into persistence of the conflict. The focus of the chapter is on the first decade of the Kashmir war until 1958. After that conflict entered a different phase greater fluidity following in Sino-Indian border war and the reinforced Cold War inputs.

In what follows, the impact of the UN mediation processes on the respective stand of the parties is reviewed in Section 6.2. It will be seen how the formal stand of the parties changed over time and how a series of interminable stalemates drove one of the parties to desperation. Bilateral contentious issues like trade, minority and water issues, will be reviewed in Section 6.3 with a view to examining the diffusion and feedback effects between these two sets of conflicts, Kashmir singly, on the one hand, and the contentious bilateral issues, on the other.

6.2 UN Mediation and Bilateral Negotiations 1949-58 : The Route to Intractability

The period between the cease-fire of January 1, 1949 and 1958 witnessed two phases of UN mediation, the first during 1949-1953 and the second during 1957-58, with the intervening period being accounted for by either abortive bilateral negotiations or inactivity. These phases have been dealt with separately here from other developments in order to understand how the conflict survived the prolonged mediation and negotiations and whether they also had any impact on the

nature and course of the conflict itself.

6.2.1 UN Mediation and Arbitration 1949-53

In discussing the response of the parties to UN mediation in the post-cease-fire period, a distinction has to be made between formal or official positions and the actual position of the parties. In the early 1950s, both the parties were still formally committed to the UNCIP Resolution of August 13, with respect to demilitarisation and a plebiscite. However, in the process of mediation by UNCIP, India had expressed in no uncertain terms that the accession of the State of Kashmir to India was irrevocable. In the sphere of formal negotiations, clear stalemate was visible on two counts, namely, the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Forces² and the administration of the Northern Areas, to be vacated by Pakistan under the UNCIP Resolution of August 13, 1948.³ Then there was the main problem of a simultaneous or sequential withdrawal of troops.⁴ Pakistan demanded the retention of the administrative infrastructure of the Azad Kashmir Government and the Azad Forces, and placing the administration of Kashmir in neutral UN hands during plebiscite. While rejecting all of these, India insisted on the legitimacy of Sheikh Abdullah's regime in Kashmir to be above question. India also demanded that Pakistan be declared an 'aggressor' and be precluded from any role whatsoever in the proposed plebiscite.⁵ As for India's own responsibility, its position was one of conditional withdrawal of a part of its troops only when Pakistan had completed unconditional withdrawal of its troops.⁶

The role of the Plebiscite Administrator was also a major issue of dispute, because in the Indian view, admitting an outside administrator into Kashmir would impinge on the sovereignty

² The Azad Forces referred to irregular armed men in Azad Kashmir supported by Pakistan.

³ See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 175-76.

⁴ For the position of the parties and the varying interpretation given by the UNCIP to India and Pakistan respectively, see, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 154-70.

⁵ While the UNCIP was unwilling to go into the merit of the case to declare Pakistan an "aggressor", according to India, precluding Pakistan from a role in the plebiscite was one of the conditions agreed by UNCIP, upon which its acceptance of the August 13, 1948 Resolution was based. See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 156.

⁶ *Ibid* : 156.

of the State. To Pakistan, a neutral authority in the person of a Plebiscite Administrator was a precondition for a free and impartial plebiscite. In the meantime, India had begun questioning the wisdom and viability of a plebiscite as a method of ascertaining the wishes of the people because of the complexity involved and the likely adverse consequences the campaigns for the plebiscite might have on the stability of the State.⁷

A clear *impasse* developed over the twin issues of disbanding the Azad Kashmir Forces and the control of the Northern Areas in mid-1949. UNCIP proposed a meeting between the two Prime Ministers to sort out the differences. The meeting, however, did not take place because of the lack of agreement on the agenda.⁸ UNCIP then drew an arbitration proposal. Admiral Chester Nimitz of the US Navy, who had already been appointed the proposed Plebiscite Administrator, was recommended for the position of an arbitrator.⁹ The proposal was also endorsed by a joint appeal from President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. Pakistan accepted it but India termed the joint appeal as an "highly objectionable" interference.¹⁰ The UN mediation process itself came almost to a dead-end following India's rejection of the arbitration proposal. Following the *impasse*, the UNCIP was replaced by a UN Representative.

The UN Representative, it seemed, could salvage the mediation process for quite some time but the conflict was not untangled a bit. The intricate level to which each mediator went to make the proposal or mediation package acceptable to the alternately intransigent side contributed to further intractability. Eventually when the mediator gave up new dead-ends were created. This would be evident from a brief run down of the mediation attempts by individual UN representatives – General McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Graham – in succession until mid-1953 when the mediation process gave way to bilateral negotiations.

⁷ See, Nehru's point to this effect to the UNCIP delegations, Vide "Aide Memoire No. I : S/1196 Annex 4", dated 21 December 1948 in Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 161. In Srinagar, Nehru was also quoted as saying, Kashmir was a part of India and no power on earth could separate it. See, *The Economist*, July 16, 1949 : 143.

⁸ Pakistan's position was that these issues, as per clarification of the Commission, were to be taken at the plebiscite stage, and therefore, could not be subject of negotiation at this stage. See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 149.

⁹ Vide its Memorandum (S/AC.12/251) dated August 26, 1949. See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 180-82.

¹⁰ Vide, Nehru's speech in the *Lok Sabha*, February 12, 1951. See, *The Economist*, October 1, 1949 : 715.

The first choice of a UN representative fell on General McNaughton of Canada, the outgoing President of the Security Council. General McNaughton formulated a set of proposals based on the already agreed areas. However, in effect, they brought within the purview of demilitarisation a number of issues in such a manner as to be unacceptable to India but on the whole acceptable to Pakistan.¹¹ McNaughton envisaged an "agreed programme of progressive demilitarisation" ensuring a balance of forces on the two sides of the cease-fire line so "as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the cease-fire line".¹² The proposal also included a reduction of the State militia on the Indian side of Kashmir side by side with reduction of the Azad Forces on the Pakistani side. These provisions were rejected by India. However, the end note of the McNaughton proposal which authorised the UN representative to "make any suggestions to the Governments of India and Pakistan which in his opinion are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the Kashmir" was liked by India because it provided an opening beyond the plebiscite-based settlement much to the exasperation of Pakistan.¹³ Pakistan bitterly opposed any such idea because it would deviate from the principle of a plebiscite. The consequence was that both India and Pakistan virtually rejected the McNaughton proposals. In his report to the Security Council on February 3, 1950, General McNaughton concluded that "in the absence of clear evidence that further mediation by me would seem likely to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan toward an agreed action, I do not believe that further activity on my part would serve any useful purpose."¹⁴

Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent jurist from Australia, became the next UN representative under Security Council resolution (S/1469) of March 14, 1950, with a mandate "to assist in the

¹¹ The new issues were the inclusion of the State militia on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, the Azad Forces (on Pakistan side) and the question of administration of the Northern Areas explicitly within the purview of the demilitarisation plan. The specific proposal for retaining contingents of Azad forces for law and order and instilling confidence among the masses were also a new elements. For commentary and text of the McNaughton proposals, see, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 186-90.

¹² See, *ibid* : 187.

¹³ Given that two-thirds of Kashmir was under Indian control, a free and impartial plebiscite was the only hope for Pakistan to get Kashmir. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, thus, wanted to restrict the scope of suggestions by the UN representative within the UNCIP Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. It will be seen that McNaughton's successor, Sir Owen Dixon, made this clause the basis of his mediation package.

¹⁴ See Lakhanpal. *op. cit.* : 187.

preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarisation".¹⁵ Sir Owen tried initially all the earlier formulae attempted by the UN. He worked out meticulous details of the sequences of withdrawal of the regular troops as well as disbanding of the militia on the Indian-held Kashmir side and the Azad Forces on the Pakistan side. In a joint meeting with the two Prime Ministers face to face, Dixon offered the proposals one by one to secure their agreement on demilitarisation and preliminaries to a plebiscite. On the basis of the reactions of the two sides, Dixon came to the conclusion that "India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character as would permit the plebiscite being conducted in ... freedom and fairness...".¹⁶

Having reached that conclusion, Sir Owen unfolded his own plan for a limited plebiscite mainly with a view to obviating the difficulty of the overall demilitarisation of the State. The plan envisaged that the areas where the plebiscite outcome was certain to be in India's or Pakistan's favour would be allocated accordingly without actually holding a plebiscite. Only the most problematic area, which turned out to be the Kashmir Valley, would be put to a plebiscite.¹⁷ Pakistan rejected outrightly the idea of a limited plebiscite and refused to enter into discussion with the Indian Prime Minister on the idea as a negotiating point lest it prejudiced Pakistan's stand on an overall plebiscite. Nehru, on the other hand, readily agreed to the idea.¹⁸ Even if Pakistan could be assured that its stand on an overall plebiscite would not be prejudiced by joining talks on a limited plebiscite, Pakistan wanted a firm commitment on the impartiality of the plebiscite in the problematic area of the Kashmir Valley. It would mean the institution of a neutral administration, even if temporarily in the Valley. It would also entail a demilitarisation or at least, a substantial troop withdrawal from the Valley. These were precisely the points of India's objection to an overall plebiscite and yet a limited plebiscite was entailing them all the same.

¹⁵ See, Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967 : Documents and Commentary* Vol. II : Asia, (London : Oxford University Press) 1970 : 374-75.

¹⁶ Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 213. See also, *The Economist*, August 12, 1950 : 299.

¹⁷ See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 214

¹⁸ If one recalls, the seed for a limited plebiscite was sown even before the McNaughton Plan, in the course of negotiations with UNCIP members. See, *The Round Table*, 41(161), December 1950 : 78.

India's reaction to Pakistan's conditionality was "an emphatic refusal to agree to any such provision".¹⁹

While the Dixon initiative failed, it brought to the fore at least three alternatives to an overall plebiscite. The first one was the idea of a regional plebiscite in which regions would be allocated on the basis of a plebiscite held individually in regions of the state. A limited plebiscite in the problematic areas where the population composition was sufficiently mixed up constituted the second alternative and Dixon plan was based on this premise. When that failed, Dixon recommended a third alternative, that is, a *status quo* or the virtual partition of Kashmir along the cease-fire line which was to be converted into an international frontier.²⁰ In the process, the cause of a single plebiscite which had so long been the cornerstone of UN mediation process was undermined. The alternatives to a single plebiscite looked simple and pragmatic, but insofar as the core issue of the seat of power of Kashmir, that is, the Valley, was concerned, none could break its zero-sum dimension. Consequently, while a new basis of agreement on a new formula was difficult to achieve, the old basis was almost gone in the process of new proposals and new rounds of mediation.

Frustrated with the UN, Pakistan pinned some hope on the Commonwealth of which both India and Pakistan were members. The Commonwealth initiative was undertaken rather informally on the occasion of the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference in mid-January 1951. However, out of two suggestions made by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the one concerning a partial or limited plebiscite was rejected by Pakistan, while the other, namely, the induction of a small Commonwealth contingent during a plebiscite was rejected by India.²¹ The

¹⁹ Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 218. Later, in explaining the reason with rhetorics that accepting the latest suggestion would amount to "surrender to aggression". See, "Pakistan : Strained Relations with India Continue" *The Round Table*, 41(161) December 1950 : 79. See also, *The Economist*, August 26, 1950 : 412. India also argued that the security of the State precluded any possibility of withdrawal of Indian troops and that "supersession of the lawful government of the state for any period could never be countenanced". See, Richard P. Cronin and B. L. LePoer, "The Kashmir Dispute : Historical Background to the Current Struggle", *CRS Report for the Congress*, (Washington D.C.) July 1991 : 13.

²⁰ See, Higgins, *op. cit.* : 376.

²¹ Nehru in his address to the *Lok Sabha* on February 12, 1951, said that no foreign troops could be permitted to land on the Indian soil. See, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 229-32. See, also, *The Economist*, January 20, 1951 : 121.

Commonwealth initiative indicated that the idea of a limited plebiscite or a partition had caught the imagination of the mediators and the Powers.²² Secondly, it also reflected Pakistan's growing desperation and a pressure of public opinion on its foreign policy making. Indeed, popular pressure compelled the Prime Minister of Pakistan to give an ultimatum to the Commonwealth that unless something could be done about Kashmir, he would boycott the meeting. Other sources of Pakistan's sense of desperation included steps in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to confer legitimacy on the State's accession to India, and continuous deadlocks in trade and communal problems spilling across the borders.²³ The cumulative impact of all this was a growing frustration in Pakistan about Kashmir. On the one hand, Indian attempts to shift from earlier positions prompted Pakistan to stick to the original and bilaterally agreed position with greater commitments. On the other, "a cool determination was taking shape in Pakistan in her search for friends and allies to bolster security and influence or pressurise India. It was realised that mere lip service or moral support were not enough."²⁴

The stalemate to which the Dixon initiative led was broken by a development in Kashmir following Sheikh Abdullah's decision in late October 1950 to convene a Constituent Assembly for deciding on the accession issue.²⁵ Pakistan protested to the Security Council upon which the Council adopted a UK-USA sponsored resolution, affirming that the decision of the Constituent Assembly would not constitute a disposition of the State, in keeping with UNCIP resolutions accepted by the parties.²⁶ India apparently accepted this position, but its attitude towards the Kashmir Constituent Assembly was patronising.²⁷ The Council also decided to appoint a new UN representative charged with effecting demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the

²² It will be seen in Chapter VII that Pakistan's Western allies would be pressurising it to accept a partition of the State along the cease-fire line.

²³ These will be discussed below.

²⁴ Source : *Interview* in Islamabad, August 1991.

²⁵ That Sheikh Abdullah had a different intention of drafting a constitution for Kashmir while delaying the ratification of the accession will be highlighted in Section 9.2 of Chapter IX.

²⁶ For text of the Resolution S/2017 Rev. 1, dated March 30, 1951, see, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 235-36.

²⁷ The Indian representative in the Security Council said that, "while the Constituent Assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on the accession issue, it could take no decision on it. ... this opinion will not bind my Government or prejudice the position of this Council". See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 233.

basis of UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. India and Pakistan were also urged by the Security Council to accept an arbitration on their differences, if any, arising from mediation and reported by the UN representative. Nehru, however, declined to accept an arbitration but agreed to cooperate with the UN representative when nominated. Dr. Graham, an eminent American educationist, politician and diplomat, was appointed as the new UN representative under Security Council resolution of March 30, 1951.²⁸

Dr. Graham started his mediation mission in a charged atmosphere caused by the convening of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, and India's deployment of troops along the Punjab borders.²⁹ Dr. Graham made a progressive and balanced demilitarisation on both sides as a point of departure for his mediation.³⁰ India showed, apparently at least, its readiness to discuss this question with the Graham mission. This was a significant development in that India agreed in principle to the proposal of a troop withdrawal in linked steps, with Pakistan taking the first step.³¹ Dr. Graham set to work out the forces level in different steps and to determine at what phase the Plebiscite Administrator, Admiral Nimitz, was to be appointed. "With a remarkable resilience Dr. Graham persevered long enough, in extraordinary difficult circumstances ... He sought to identify the differences and to overcome them one by one."³² Much progress was made yet the arduous number-game of the forces level foundered on the rock of the conflicting quantum of forces to be retained by each side of the cease-fire line.³³

²⁸ See, *ibid* : 36

²⁹ See, "Pakistan : Armed Menace on the Border", *The Round Table*, 42(165), December 1951 : 71. Also see, *The Economist*, June 16, 1951 : 1427-28 and August 18, 1951 : 389-90.

³⁰ It may be recalled that General McNaughton had a similar approach. Sir Owen Dixon, on the other hand, tried to by-pass these evidently knotty issues.

³¹ See, *The Economist*, January 26, 1952 : 200.

³² See, Higgins, *op. cit.* : 376.

³³ See, *The Economist*, May 10, 1952 : 382-83. A Pakistani self-critique argued that this was possibly the best opportunity Pakistan lost by not agreeing to whatever figure India was suggesting as the maximum number of troops Pakistan could retain and the number India was insisting on retaining, and thus, hasten the process of induction of the Plebiscite Administrator. For such retrospective arguments, see, Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute*, (Islamabad : Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 1977, (henceforth White Paper, Pakistan, 1977), published in *The Pakistan Times*, 16-18 January 1977. However, it was counter-argued that whatever formal position India took, it always had more than one "exit point" to get out of any commitment unfavourable to it. Source : *Interview* in Islamabad, August 1991. That India would have done so in the event of Pakistan's agreeing to whatever figures India suggested was borne out by later event as narrated by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the Pakistan Parliament. He said, "I made this proposal. All right, let India keep 28,000. We will take out all Pakistan forces. Then let the Plebiscite Administrator come into office. ... This was a clear acceptance of what Mrs. Pandit had proposed. As soon as this was

Dr. Graham, thus, conceded failure in early 1953 saying, "agreement was not possible at the time between the two governments. ... *The same difficulties that existed as early as 1949 were still the main obstacles in the way of carrying out the commitments*".³⁴ By that time the dispute had witnessed more than five years of arduous UN mediation. Graham also concluded his report with the hope that instead of "the United Nations Representative continuing to report differences to the Security Council, may the leadership of our 400,000,000 people [of India and Pakistan], with the goodwill and assistance of the United Nations, join in negotiating an agreement on Kashmir".³⁵ An opening for such negotiations was provided by an informal meeting between the two Prime Ministers in London in mid-1953. In the meantime, the stalemate in the UN mediation was also overtaken by an anti-climax in Kashmir through the removal from power of Sheikh Abdullah, who was instrumental in Kashmir's accession to India and the subsequent consolidation of the Indian hold on Kashmir. This paved the way for a reinforcement of the process of bilateral negotiations between the two Governments that had already been under way. However, as the following discussion will show, it was to prove abortive.

6.2.2 From Mediation to Bilateral Negotiations 1953-55

Apart from the stalemate in UN mediation, some other antecedents seemed to have raised hope for direct negotiations in Pakistan where exasperation and impatience with lengthy mediation and debates on the UN floor were creating substantial pressure on the Government of Pakistan.³⁶ One was the conclusion of a three-year jute agreement between India and Pakistan after a prolonged trade dispute over jute and other commodities.³⁷ Secondly, prospects for

announced in India, her eminent brother characterised it as a fantastic proposal. The proposal was theirs, not mine. If it had been regarded as fantastic, it should not have been forwarded. This is how the matter stood before the Security Council." See, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) debate, April 22, 1954 : 1234. Of course, the reason India did not agree to such a proposal was that it would have left the Azad Kashmir Forces intact, something that India was not prepared to accept.

³⁴ Emphasis added. See, S. Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study of India-Pakistan Relations*, (Bombay : Asia Publishing House) 1966 : 253.

³⁵ See, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 235.

³⁶ India was always in favour of bilateral negotiations. Thus the return of the negotiations to the bilateral level was considered an achievement by India. See, *The Economist*, August 8, 1953 : 394.

³⁷ See Section 6.3.1 below. See also, *The Economist*, April 11, 1953 : 80.

bilateral talks brightened further when the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali had a preliminary and informal talk with Nehru in London.³⁸

The official follow-up of the preliminary talks resulted in setting up of a joint steering committee and also setting of the agenda for a Prime Ministerial meeting in September 1953. Optimism was raised in Pakistan, in particular. The Prime Minister of Pakistan went to the extent of declaring that the Kashmir problem would be solved in one year.³⁹ Following the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir which led to a widespread rioting in Srinagar and popular resentment in Pakistan,⁴⁰ an emergency meeting was held between the two Prime Minister in late August at the request of Mr. Mohammad Ali. The talks resulted in a measure of tentative agreement.⁴¹ The joint communiqué issued at the end of the three-day talks said,

The Kashmir dispute was specially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State ... causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by [a] fair and impartial plebiscite. ... The Prime Ministers agreed that these preliminary issues should be considered *by them directly* in order to arrive at agreements in regard to this. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of a plebiscite administrator ... by the end of April 1954. Previous to that date the preliminary issues referred to above should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken. With this purpose in view Committees of Military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers.[emphasis added]⁴²

Notable was the complete bypassing of the UN although Kashmir was still on the UN agenda. However, Pakistan seemed to have gained some significant concessions from India. Firstly, the precise schedule of demilitarisation – the main cause of the deadlock – was left to be discussed and decided later. Secondly, an Indian agreement to set a precise date for the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator made the event of a plebiscite a real possibility compared to earlier anti-plebiscite position of India. However, it was not to be. For, back to Karachi, it was discovered to the utter puzzlement of the simple-minded Prime Minister that Admiral Nimitz was not going to

³⁸ See, "India : The Congress Loses Ground", *The Round Table*, 43(172), September 1953 : 379.

³⁹ See, *The Economist*, August 1, 1953 : 314.

⁴⁰ See, *The Economist*, August 15, 1953 : 439.

⁴¹ "Pakistan : Plebiscite in Kashmir", *The Round Table*, 44(173), December 1953 : 82.

⁴² Quoted from Korbel, *op. cit.* : 193.

be the Plebiscite Administrator.⁴³ Rather some one from "a small nation of Asia or Europe" would be preferred.⁴⁴ To Pakistan's query, Nehru declared, "the fact of Nimitz[s] nomination as administrator by the United Nations is now an historical memory and I have almost forgotten about it."⁴⁵ Pakistan branded Nehru's attitude as "deliberate shock tactics designed to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the United States".⁴⁶ The problem reverted further back than where it had been previously. Not only did the demilitarisation issue remain unsettled, an agreed step of appointing an Administrator, to be implemented when demilitarisation was effected, became a disputed and unsettled issue. Moreover, the precedent of bypassing the UN had been set. The consolidation of the Indian hold over Kashmir had indeed advanced by leaps with Sheikh Abdullah being off the stage and a more pliable regime of Bakshi Golam Mohammad in power.⁴⁷ In the meantime, Pakistan's negotiations with the USA for military assistance became public. In the Indian view the context of its commitment to a plebiscite had changed and thus it wriggled conveniently out of it.⁴⁸

6.2.3 Back to the UN 1957-58

Kashmir remained out of the UN for about three years. There was also a stalemate in bilateral negotiations following Pakistan's joining the Western alliance. An attempt at further integration of the State into the Union including extension of Indian tax laws to the State brought the bilateral problem to the fore.⁴⁹ Nehru, in the meantime, again proposed a *de facto* partition of the State or an acceptance of the *status quo*. Pakistan was quick to reject such ideas.⁵⁰ On the

⁴³ Although the UN was sidetracked, Pakistan could not anticipate that India was sidetracking a UN-mediated agreed formula on which Pakistan pinned so much hope. Secondly, Pakistan valued General Nimitz's nomination possibly because some kind of overtures were being exchanged between Karachi and Washington over what was to become an alliance relations in about a year's time. See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

⁴⁴ See, Korbel, *op. cit.* : 194.

⁴⁵ *Ibid* : 194.

⁴⁶ See, *The New York Times*, August 29, 1953.

⁴⁷ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 202.

⁴⁸ The two Prime Ministers met on a number of occasions after this and Mohammad Ali tried to put Kashmir back on the agenda but Nehru said, the problem could not be solved in a few hours if it had evaded solution for seven years. See, Korbel, *ibid* 195.

⁴⁹ See, "Pakistan : A Note on Kashmir", *The Round Table*, 44(177), December 1954 : 99.

⁵⁰ See, "India and Her Neighbours", *The Round Table*, 45(184), September 1956 : 346.

Indian side the Jammu and Kashmir Government declared by the end of 1956 that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir had finished drafting a constitution for the State and according to it, Kashmir "is and shall be an integral part of India".⁵¹ Against this background, Pakistan decided to take the issue to the Security Council. Mr. Noon, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, protested the Indian action of integration of the disputed State with the Union in contravention of Security Council Resolution of March 1951, and demanded firm action by the Security Council to implement the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.⁵² Pakistan also requested the Council specifically to (i) call upon India to refrain from accepting the change envisaged in the new Constitution adopted by the Kashmiri Constituent Assembly; (ii) to spell out the obligations of the parties under Article 307 of the Charter; and (iii) to arrange the withdrawal of troops and the surrender of functions of protecting the State to a UN force at once.⁵³ Mentionably, the concept of a UN force was a new idea.

The Indian response was usual but forceful. It argued that there was no dispute in Kashmir as the "question of Kashmir has been settled by the people of Kashmir".⁵⁴ While acknowledging the existence of UN Security Council resolutions, especially those of January 17 and 20, 1948, India discounted the value of its commitment to a plebiscite on three counts – first, Pakistan had not withdrawn its troops to facilitate a plebiscite, second, the commitment was to the people of Kashmir, not to Pakistan, and third, even if it was an offer to Pakistan, the "offer terminates when it is not accepted".⁵⁵ Moreover, "if nothing else had happened, ten long years had passed and what was then an unsettled state of affairs demanding a settlement was now a largely settled matter which was to be unsettled or left alone."⁵⁶

At least the face value of the logic was impeccable and leak-proof in the sense to every

⁵¹ See, *The Economist*, December 1, 1956 : 769-70.

⁵² Vide Letter, S/3767, quoted in S. Gupta, *op. cit.* : 311-12.

⁵³ *Ibid* : 313.

⁵⁴ This referred to the ratification of the accession and the framing of an appropriate Constitution by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. See, Krishna Menon's speech at the UN in SCOR, 762, 763, and 764, meetings, 1957, quoted in Gupta, *ibid* : 313.

⁵⁵ *Ibid* : 314.

⁵⁶ *Ibid* : 315.

possible Pakistani response, there was an anticipated counter-response from the Indian side. Apparently and initially, however, the UN response to Pakistan's appeal went in favour of Pakistan. Whether this was because of Pakistan's support for the West in major crises at the centre stage of global politics – the Suez and the invasion of Hungary – or India's being on the wrong side on these crises, is debatable.

While Gupta suggests that from "the Western viewpoint, Pakistan was at the least an ally and India at most a friend,"⁵⁷ The reality was a little more subtle. Because of the low salience of South Asia in global politics,⁵⁸ the West failed to make a distinction between allies and friends in the region. It was because of a blurring of this difference that Pakistan suffered tremendous frustrations from its allies.⁵⁹ More importantly, the tension of linkage between the two sets of equations left both India and Pakistan suspicious of the Western intentions at one time or the other.

In any case, because of the apparent convergence of the positions of the Western allies and Pakistan on some issues at that juncture of time, Pakistan's case received support from the Western allies. A Security Council resolution, adopted in the face of opposition from the USSR and India, reaffirmed the earlier Security Council resolutions, especially, those of April 21, 1948, June 3, 1948, March 14, 1950, March 30, 1951, and the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948 and 5 January 1949, and reminded the two governments that a final disposition of the state would be determined by the will of the people expressed through democratic method of a free and fair plebiscite under UN auspices.⁶⁰ The operative part of the resolution reaffirmed that the action of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly would not constitute the final disposition of the State. It was

⁵⁷ *Ibid* : 310.

⁵⁸ Commitment of the Powers to the Subcontinent, including its ally Pakistan, was always subservient to the global context of the Cold War and the Middle East. This has been succinctly put by S. D. Muni in his "South Asia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (New York : St. Martins) 1980 : 55-62.

⁵⁹ Again by the same token, it will be seen in Chapter VII, when China came to the centre stage of the Cold War and India happened to be on the other side of China in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the Sino-Soviet rift becoming irreparable, Pakistan again suffered relegation.

⁶⁰ For text of the resolution, S/3779, see, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 277-78. Also see, "Pakistan : Rebuff from Egypt", *op. cit.* : 175.

also stated that further consideration of the dispute would follow.⁶¹

As a follow-up, a draft resolution was introduced by Britain, the USA, Cuba and Australia on February 14, 1957, expressing concern over the lack of progress in the settlement of the dispute. The draft also endorsed the Pakistani suggestion of a UN force and requested the Council President, Gunnar Jarring,

to examine with the governments of India and Pakistan proposals which in his opinion are likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation or to the establishment of other conditions for the progress towards the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and *bearing in mind the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force*. [emphasis added]⁶²

India was opposed totally to the resolution. The Soviet Union, in its support for India, threatened the use of its veto unless certain of its amendments were incorporated in the resolution. The amendments in effect suggested the dropping of not only the provision of a UN force and demilitarisation as a goal of any UN mission, but also any reference to all other UN resolutions. The USSR did actually use its veto as the resolution was put to the vote without incorporating the Soviet as well as the Colombian amendments in support of India. Eventually a simpler resolution requesting Gunnar Jarring to make a rather open-ended visit to the Subcontinent was proposed. The draft was adopted with the Soviet abstention.

Accordingly, Jarring visited the Subcontinent between March 14 and April 11, 1957 and submitted his report on April 29 1957.⁶³ While Jarring's visit as such did not make any headway, the report contained certain observations that tended to support India's political arguments. Jarring argued that "grave problems ... might arise in connection with and as a result of the plebiscite".⁶⁴ Secondly, it was also felt that the implementation of Part I of the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948, which dealt with the cease-fire might have created the deadlock.⁶⁵ During the

⁶¹ See, Lakhanpal, *ibid* : 278.

⁶² See, SCOR, S/3793, in *ibid* : 278.

⁶³ See, text of Jarring Report, SCOR, S/3821, in *ibid* : 278-82.

⁶⁴ *Ibid* : 280.

⁶⁵ *Ibid* : 280.

discussion of the Jarring report, another draft resolution was tabled by the UK, the USA and three others, which in effect, favoured reopening of the Graham initiatives not only from where he left off in 1953,⁶⁶ but also from a more preliminary step of examining the utility of Parts I and II of the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948. From Pakistan's point of view, it was that the tagging of Parts I and II would raise unnecessarily many subsidiary issues.⁶⁷ From the Indian point of view, recognition of the preliminary steps was a success but retention of demilitarisation as a goal of any UN mission was completely unacceptable. In the face of the threat of another Soviet veto, the sponsors of the resolution accepted amendments which virtually eliminated demilitarisation as a goal. The amended resolution was passed, much to Pakistan's resentment.

Dr. Graham, thus, visited the Subcontinent for the second time during January 12 – February 15, 1958 to have a series of meetings with both the governments and submitted his report on March 18, 1958.⁶⁸ The Graham report went a step further backward and found several problems with the implementation of Part I of the UNCIP resolutions including the technical problem of evacuation and administration of the evacuated territories on the Pakistani side of Azad Kashmir. Dr. Graham also emphasised the need for an early agreement between India and Pakistan on the interpretation of the provisions regarding a plebiscite in the UN resolutions. Finally, Dr. Graham recommended for a Prime Ministers' conference in early spring or at the earliest possible date.⁶⁹ In the process, not only were the negotiations sent back to the bilateral level, some of the previously settled issues also became undone. India's position had also become almost totally intractable. Nehru said at a press conference soon after the submission of the Graham report that there were two realities which needed to be accepted : Pakistan's aggression and Kashmir's accession to India. and "if these things are admitted other matters can be

⁶⁶ The Graham initiative failed over the disagreement on the number of troops to be retained on either side on demilitarisation.

⁶⁷ Around this time, there was some slackening and weariness in the Western, especially, US support. Mention may be made of the disappointments arising from the Eisenhower-Suhrawardy talks which referred to Kashmir non-committally as a mere regional issue. See, "Pakistan : The Prime Minister's Travels", *The Round Table*, 47(188), September 1957 : 395. Mention may also be made of Eisenhower-Ayub talks in early December 1959, when there was no direct reference to Kashmir, despite Pakistan's insistence. See, "Pakistan : A Formidable Plan", *The Round Table*, 50(198), March 1960 : 200.

⁶⁸ See, text of the Graham Report, S/3984 of March 18, 1958 in *ibid* : 285-92.

⁶⁹ *Ibid* : 291.

discussed."⁷⁰

Soon after this tension rose in bilateral relations,⁷¹ although they were able to solve one of the existing problems of the issue, namely enclave territories through the Noon-Nehru agreement.⁷² However, before any other areas could be discussed, the Government of General Iskander Mirza was ousted from power by General Ayub in a military coup. India-Pakistan relations were also overtaken by events of more serious import. These included the emerging problem of Tibet and its fallout on Kashmir through Sino-Indian relations and a reinforced Cold War politics in the Subcontinent as a reaction to the Sino-Indian border conflict.⁷³

To sum up, the time period covered in this section is 1949-58, that is, precisely a decade during which the Kashmir dispute completed a full circle of UN mediation and bilateral negotiations. Over this period, there were two levels of shift in the position of the parties. At one level, they swapped virtually their position between 1947-1958. In 1947 when the problem started, Pakistan had a holistic approach to overall bilateral problems of which Kashmir was a part, while to India, Kashmir presented a very specific problem requiring immediate solution. Over the decade their approaches to the problem changed. To India, in the late 1950s, Kashmir was a settled question, what was needed was an improvement in bilateral relations through freezing the *status quo* in Kashmir. For Pakistan, on the other hand, an improvement in bilateral relations was contingent on solution of the Kashmir problem through a fair and impartial plebiscite. At a formal level, the shift was radical for India, because if anything, Pakistan had over time become more committed to a plebiscite despite attempts to soften its position on a plebiscite. Its position was, therefore, no less intractable, apparently simple though. It seemed that because of the opposite pulls and mutual veto on Kashmir, one intending to freeze it, the other intending

⁷⁰ See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 338.

⁷¹ One such incident was the shooting down of an Indian Air Force Canberra plane which intruded deep into Pakistan air space. According to Pakistan, the plane was on a reconnaissance photographic mission of military targets while according to India, the aircraft strayed into Pakistan. Krishna Menon, interestingly, stated in the *Lok Sabha* that his Government would have to think seriously whether Indian aircraft should be armed in future. See, "Pakistan : Revolt on the Land", *The Round Table*, 49(195), June 1959 : 299-300.

⁷² See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 339.

⁷³ See, "India : The Dragon Apparent", *The Round Table*, 49(196), September 1959 : 395-98. The impact of the Sino-Indian border wars and the Cold War politics on Kashmir will be discussed in Chapter VII.

to solve it, both sides developed a vested interest in keeping the problem alive.

Did the mediation process itself have anything to do with this locked situation in Kashmir? It is difficult to say anything conclusively because there had been so many intervening variables. However, a few remarks are in order. The task of mediation in the context of the Kashmir dispute was, in a sense, simple, and amenable to a technical solution by experts in military affairs and diplomacy, as the parties had already agreed how the problem should be solved. Their agreement was also formalised in the UNCIP resolutions. So the mediatory role, it seemed, was to be confined mostly to procedural issues. However, as events turned out, there was at best a superficial agreement on the basic issue. More importantly, while one party religiously and most ardently adhered to the agreement, the other party did everything within its capability to wriggle out of the commitment. In fact did wriggle out it at the first available opportunity. So, the problem was basically political. The procedural focus, therefore, led to a branching out of the issue into intricate issues and took away all the mediatory energies. The political aspects, however, remained untouched, only to be realised at a later date, when the mediators had already decided to give up. Because of procedural focus, the mediatory attempts took on board mainly the viewpoints of the most intransigent party to the neglect of those of the other. Obviously, it was the latter's turn to be intransigent and this bred an habitual rejectionist attitude.

Secondly, when the mediatory resources were exhausted on the rock of procedural obstacles, it was taken back to the political plane. This time, the procedural aspects were missing and this provided the exit when some political agreement was on the horizon but the party concerned could afford not to bind itself by commitment. Arguably, therefore, the Kashmir issue engaged the greatest amount of UN mediatory resources, yet it was always starved of adequate and decisive intervention. Beyond procedural focus, there was a major external limitation on the UN mediation process. The Cold War politics, it was seen, was not merely a parallel process, it actually interfered with the mediation process on extra-regional considerations. This is a syndrome, which was only perceptible in the cease-fire negotiation stage,⁷⁴ but it will be seen to

⁷⁴ See, Section 5.5.2 in Chapter V.

play a decisive role in the events precipitating in the second flare up in Kashmir in 1965.⁷⁵ The source of persisting tensions, however, over Kashmir has to be traced in India-Pakistan bilateral relations as well.

6.3 Other Bilateral Disputes and Kashmir : Linkages, Diffusion and Persisting Tensions

Although the Kashmir problem occupied the centre stage of India-Pakistan relations, the two governments had been grappling with some other vital problems such as the division of assets and financial resources, trade and currency disputes, minority problems, and the sharing of the water resources of common rivers between the two countries.⁷⁶ These issues were existing independently of the Kashmir problem and they gave rise to hot exchanges, hostile actions and retaliation, generating intense emotions on both sides. In fact, trade, minority problems and the water sharing disputes carried the two countries almost to the brink of war a number of times. Eventually, of course, they could reach some settlement on them. In any case, since these disputes were coexisting with Kashmir within the same dyadic frame, it would be pertinent to examine if the two sets of disputes and conflicts affected one another by way of diffusion and feedback. We shall also be interested to find if the cooperative interactions of the two neighbours had any moderating influence on the overall conflictual bilateral relations.

6.3.1 The 'Trade War' and the 'Battle of Rupees' 1949-51 – Politics in Economics

During the colonial era the Subcontinent grew as a single economic unit following the development of transport networks and market oriented economic activities. Evidently, the partition resulted in a serious dislocation of economic activities and an uneven distribution of economic resources.⁷⁷ While complementary economic factors dictated a close cooperation, it

⁷⁵ To be discussed in Chapter VII.

⁷⁶ Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan added another problem while speaking in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in February 1950. It was the problem of Junagadh, although its integration with India had already become a *fait accompli* following the outcome of the referendum in favour of India. See, "Pakistan : Five Disputes with India", *The Round Table*, 40(158), March 1950 : 164.

⁷⁷ A well-documented picture of the unevenness may be found in G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966*, (London : Pall Mall Press) 1968 : 141-43.

was almost unthinkable that the two economies would ever work together for mutual benefits in the prevailing situation of persisting political tensions and mutual bitterness. Instead, the existing economic ties began to be snapped one by one. Even if sheer necessity brought them together to sort out the difficulties, such interactions were interrupted on political considerations, and disentanglement of one problem was followed by entanglement of another. The two antagonists began diverting trade from each other so that by the time the political relations were sufficiently strained over Kashmir in 1960, trade between them was reduced to an insignificant proportion from as high as 40% of the total transactions either way in the early years of independence.⁷⁸ While conflict of economic interests is not unnatural between trading partners, it will be seen that political considerations not only complicated the process of sorting them out, they also increased the frequency of such frictions.

The India-Pakistan trade relations were first affected by customs and tariff problems in November 1947 at a time when fighting in Kashmir was well under way and it had already affected the process of division of assets and financial resources.⁷⁹ Pakistan decided to collect customs duty on the huge amount of its own produce of raw jute at its land borders instead of letting the duty to be collected at the Calcutta Port because in that case the revenue would have accrued to India. India retaliated with similar measures by declaring Pakistan a "foreign country" for the purpose of levying customs duty. Soon a "spate of orders issued from Delhi and Karachi" raised trade barriers against almost all products flowing between the two countries.⁸⁰ Pakistan was spending its scarce foreign exchange reserves in buying coal from the USA and Britain instead of India, while India looked overseas for cotton of a type grown in Sind and the West Punjab.⁸¹ Even if a trade agreement could have been signed in May 1948 to ease the mutual supply of essential commodities which could not be made up through trade diversion, there was an enormous balance of trade in favour of Pakistan affecting the overall trade relations.⁸² A new

⁷⁸ See, Choudhury, *ibid* : 145.

⁷⁹ That the Kashmir problem affected the division of assets and other resources between the newly born Dominions has been indicated in Chapter IV.

⁸⁰ For details, see, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 22-29, 1947 : 8952.

⁸¹ Choudhury, *op. cit* : 144.

⁸² See, *ibid* : 146.

agreement on June 30, 1949 sought to achieve an equilibrium between India's exports to and imports from Pakistan. The trade agreement laid down an elaborate mechanism for reducing trade deficits and rationalising the structure of bilateral trade.

However, in September 1949, a third hurdle came from external sources when Britain devalued the pound sterling and the Indian Government decided to follow suit. The Government of Pakistan, however, decided not to devalue its currency (Rupee) because of its optimistic economic conditions at that time.⁸³ India reacted rather sharply when Pakistan declined to devalue its currency, because the over-valued Pakistani currency further worsened India's balance of payment situation. The Reserve Bank of India stopped quoting any rate for the sale and purchase of the Pakistani Rupee. It seemed that accepting an higher value of Pakistani currency would be tantamount to endorsing the suggestion that Pakistan's economy was on a stronger footing. Percival Griffiths related that a member of the Indian intelligentsia in Delhi told him, "I would rather see both countries ruined than agree that the Pakistan rupee should be worth one iota more than the Indian rupee".⁸⁴ Similar sentiments were expressed by Patel, India's Deputy Prime Minister and Nehru's second man, "We do not mind if our mills remain idle but we are not fools to pay Rs. 145 for Rs. 100 worth of Pakistani jute."⁸⁵

It was around this time that a political deadlock developed over the Kashmir mediation by the UNCIP and the two Bengals experienced the minority problem. It seemed that one problem was affecting the others. Soon a war of attrition in trade and finance started. India raised embargoes over supplies like coal to Pakistan in retaliation against Pakistan's alleged refusal to release 60 barges carrying 300,000 bales of jute to India under contracts made before the devaluation row.⁸⁶ The consequence was that inter-Dominion trade came to a dead end.

⁸³ The Government of Pakistan in a press note stated : "Our balance of payments position is not such as to necessitate devaluation, nor do our exports, which consist almost entirely of raw materials, admit of any appreciable expansion. The decision not to devalue will mean cheaper imports which should have a welcome effect on the general cost of living". See, *ibid* : 147.

⁸⁴ See, Percival Griffiths, *Modern India* (London : Benn) 1965 : 180, quoted in Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 149.

⁸⁵ See, *Statesman*, January 5, 1950. For more of these political arguments, *The Economist*, December 31, 1949 : 1473-74 and March 25, 1950 : 673.

⁸⁶ See, "Pakistan : Five Disputes with India", *op. cit.* : 164-65.

Although the Nehru-Liaquat meeting over the minority issue⁸⁷ provided an exit in the form of a short term agreement from the deadlock in jute badly needed by India and essential supplies like coal, badly needed by Pakistan,⁸⁸ the main issue of the "battle of rupees" could not be solved. On this issue the position of both the parties remained as rigid as ever.⁸⁹ The devaluation issue and the resulting *de facto* mutual sanctions assumed, in the opinion of many observers, "even more urgency than the aging Kashmir dispute, which has lost some of its emotional appeal and has come to be regarded as a tangle which only the specialists in military and external affairs can unravel."⁹⁰ Whether Kashmir had any direct bearing on the economic war or *vice versa* is difficult to establish, but the overall bilateral relations were heated up several times during 1950-1951 over minorities, water sharing and the Kashmir problem itself. The mutual impact was, however, undeniable. Pakistan was getting, in its perception, a raw deal on Kashmir because the successive missions of UN representatives witnessed only a hardening of India's position on the plebiscite issue. The Kashmiri Constituent Assembly, in the meantime, took constitutional steps to integrate Kashmir with India. Thus, a relatively stronger economic position might have made Pakistan's position rather adamant on Kashmir where its leverage was limited.⁹¹ Only when Pakistan's economic bargaining position was weakened in the wake of a slump in the jute market, did Pakistan agree to devalue its Rupee paving the way for a three-year trade pact.⁹²

6.3.2 The Minority Problem 1950 - Close to the Brink of a War

The Hindu-Muslim communal problem which had been a part of the overall Hindu-Muslim rivalry in the Subcontinent was reactivated by the 'trade war' in 1950. As the economic blockade affected the business circle as well as the common people in Calcutta, the Muslims there became

⁸⁷ See, Section 6.3.2 that follows.

⁸⁸ See, *The Economist*, April 29, 1950 : 963-64.

⁸⁹ See, "India : The Border and the Minorities", *The Round Table*, 40(159), June 1950 : 261.

⁹⁰ *Ibid* : 262.

⁹¹ See, "India : The Borders and the Minorities", *The Round Table*, 40(159), June 1950 : 261-62.

⁹² For some details of the reversals of Pakistan's economic conditions, see, "Pakistan : Mullahs and Modernists", *The Round Table*, 41(168), September 1952 : 366-67. For the trade pact and other agreements, see, "India : Trade Agreement with Pakistan", *The Round Table*, 42(168), September 1952 : 360; and "India : The Debate on Foreign Policy", *The Round Table*, 43(171), June 1953 : 267-68.

the scapegoats. Taking advantage of the explosive situation, the extremist *Hindu Mahasabha* began to fan the flames of communal hatred which gradually touched the political relations between the two countries. Irredentist claims over Pakistan as a whole or over the eastern wing of Pakistan [now Bangladesh] were heard frequently.⁹³ Sardar Patel, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister, said in Calcutta in January 1950, "Bengalis want more room for expansion. It is my earnest desire to help Bengal in its hour of need to the maximum of my capacity."⁹⁴ He also urged the Bengali Hindus to "show courage, bravery, in full expectation of the good days to come".⁹⁵ A few days after this, rioting broke out in various parts of West Bengal, and later in Calcutta itself and in its suburbs. The killing and looting of Muslims and the resulting flow of refugees going to East Bengal [former East Pakistan] led to an outbreak of communal violence in Dhaka on February 10, 1950. The rioting spread rapidly to other parts of the province [of East Pakistan], which had a total Hindu population of about 11 to 12 million.⁹⁶ Provocative signals of a 'police operation' in East Bengal, a reminder of India's division strength-military operation in 1948 to liberate Hyderabad, were received in the eastern wing of Pakistan. Observers felt that a mass exodus either way would easily whip up emotions to take the two countries to a war path.⁹⁷ Apart from communal violence, the other reason for a spurt of Hindu migration from the then East Pakistan was the fear that war might break out again between India and Pakistan. Such a fear was spread by newspapers in Calcutta clamouring for war against Pakistan. The Pakistani press complemented this by publishing "fantastically exaggerated accounts of the casualties among the Muslims of Calcutta".⁹⁸

When Nehru visited Calcutta, he was put under intense popular pressure to declare war or

⁹³ The President of the Hindu Mahasabha openly declared at a conference in Calcutta in late December 1949 that Pakistan must be reabsorbed into India. See, *The Economist*, February 18, 1950 : 380. An extremist body, self-styled as, *The Council for the Protection of Rights of Minorities*, sponsored a provisional government of East Pakistan. See, "Pakistan : Improving Prospects of Peace", *The Round Table*, 40(159), June 1950 : 263.

⁹⁴ See, *The Statesman*, January 5, 1950, quoted in Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 188.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ See, "Pakistan : Improving Prospects of Peace", *op. cit.* : 262.

⁹⁷ See, *ibid* : 263-64.

⁹⁸ See, *ibid* : 264.

resign. He said in the *Lok Sabha* on February 22, 1950, that he had proposed that a joint delegation should visit the affected areas, but if the method suggested to the Pakistan Government was not agreed to, "it may be that we may have to adopt other methods."⁹⁹ Nehru continued, "To me it appears that what has happened in Kashmir and what is happening in East Bengal are all interlinked and we cannot separate them."¹⁰⁰ Liaquat Ali Khan reacted by saying, "If India wants war, Pakistan is prepared".¹⁰¹ By the end of March, it became an open secret that certain troop movements of grave portents had taken place. "The cancellation of all Indian army leave brought the 'edge of the precipice' in sight."¹⁰² The outlook was very bleak. The editor of the Calcutta-based *Statesman* wrote later, "By the first week of March, whatever Delhi's intentions, war had nearly come. The two countries were within a hair-breath of it. Troops had been moved, not only in Bengal but - more perturbing - in the Punjab."¹⁰³ The flow of refugees had continued unabated. By the end of March, 400,000 refugees had been registered in the then East Pakistan, and as many were estimated to have crossed into West Bengal from East Pakistan. The general nervousness had spread to other parts of India, and some 1200 refugees were entering West Pakistan daily. It was in this breathtaking atmosphere a sigh of relief was heard all over the Subcontinent when Liaquat Khan offered to come to Delhi and Nehru accepted the offer readily.¹⁰⁴

The talks of the two Prime Ministers in early April 1950 amidst great expectations resulted in an agreement, which later came to be known as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950. Nehru, commenting on the outcome of the talks, said, "We have stopped ourselves on the edge of a precipice and turned our back on it".¹⁰⁵ The agreement dealt with the problem generally confronting the minorities in both countries, their fundamental rights and the adoption of measures to prevent communal disorders.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ *Times of India*, February 23, 1950, quoted in Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 190.

¹⁰⁰ See, Choudhury, *ibid* : 190.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid* : 192.

¹⁰² *Ibid* : 192.

¹⁰³ See, Ian Stephens, *Horned Moon* (London : Chatto and Windus) 1953 : 33.

¹⁰⁴ See, *The Round Table*, 40(159), *op. cit.* : 264.

¹⁰⁵ See, *The Economist*, April 15, 1950 : 817.

¹⁰⁶ See, *The Round Table*, 40(159), *op. cit.* : 264-65. For follow-up and implementation of the agreement, see, "Pakistan : Deferred Judgement on Korea", *The Round Table*, 40(160), September 1950 : 373.

While the Nehru-Liaquat Pact could not possibly wipe out the menace of communal violence from the politics of India and Pakistan, it did take away the sting of the communal violence that tended immediately to be reflected in bilateral relations, already rendered tension-ridden by other issues. In the then East Pakistan, which was one of the few hot spots of communal problems in the Subcontinent, the spirit of the agreement had some positive impact on the psyche of the minorities. For example, throughout the summer of 1951, when the threat of another war between India and Pakistan was imminent on the issue of troop mobilisation,¹⁰⁷ the eyes of observers were fixed on East Bengal. However, it became evident that having gone through the unhappy experiences of the spring of 1950, the Hindu community of East Bengal was reconciled to their lot in East Pakistan, and thus any untoward communal incidents were averted.¹⁰⁸ The *Round Table* correspondent wrote from Pakistan :

So grave was the situation that few people now doubt that war would actually have begun if there had been a single serious outbreak in East Bengal during the month of March. By the mercy of providence, there was no communal incident, major or minor, in that province from the third week of February right up to the time of the *detente* resulting from the Nehru-Liaquat meeting in New Delhi in the first week of April.¹⁰⁹

The agreement also helped temporarily to break the deadlock on trade, as was noted earlier. Beyond that, however, the ripples were not felt in more deep seated problems like Kashmir.

6.3.3 Between War and No-War Again 1951

If a possible war between India and Pakistan over the minority issue could be averted by a meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, the impact of the agreement, however, did not have any positive feedback on other aspects of bilateral relations. For both countries appeared to be poised for another war in mid-1951 following India's mobilisation of troops in Punjab and other places near the border. One source puts the degree of mobilisation of Indian armed forces at 90%.¹¹⁰ Liaquat Ali Khan called for the removal of threat from the border. Nehru assured him

¹⁰⁷ See Section 6.3.3 below.

¹⁰⁸ See, "Pakistan : Armed Menace on the Border", *The Round Table*, 42(165), December 1951 : 70.

¹⁰⁹ See, *The Round Table*, 40(159), *op. cit.* : 263.

¹¹⁰ See, "Pakistan : Armed Menace on the Border", *op. cit.* : 69.

that the move was precautionary.¹¹¹ The assurance could not defuse the crisis as the press in both countries had become hysterical about war.¹¹² In fact, troop concentration took place on both sides of the India-Pakistan borders and bitter accusations of unprovoked aggression had been passing between New Delhi and Karachi, despite the fact that the trade pact signed in February 1951 was working very well and it was also expected that the improved economic relations would sweeten political relations as well.¹¹³

The crisis of troop deployment coincided with the adoption of a Constitution for Kashmir by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Abdullah made a statement to the effect that Kashmir's accession to India was irreversible. In Pakistan's perception, these postures including the troop deployment to the border by India was designed to overawe Pakistan into accepting Kashmir's accession as a *fait accompli*.¹¹⁴ In the meantime, the possibility of a tribal attack was speculated upon in India, and Nehru had this in mind when he explained that the deployment was a "precautionary" step.¹¹⁵ The reported threat by the tribal leaders came at a time when neither the UN nor the Commonwealth initiative could make any headway to resolve the conflict. The leading chiefs of the *Mahsuds*, *Afridis*, *Mohmands* and other tribes expressed such threats as they became frustrated with the endless and unproductive mediation. Earlier, they had been persuaded to withdraw their warriors when the cease-fire came into effect in January 1949 on the assurance that plebiscite would be held shortly. They regarded themselves as having been duped. They were recorded as saying that if the Security Council failed to deliver the goods within a few months, they would consider themselves free to reopen their *jihad*.¹¹⁶ Nehru in response said, if anything like that happened, India would take it as an "act of aggression and will react militarily at the frontier of the Punjab and of Bengal".¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ See, "Peace or War", *The Economist*, August 25, 1951 : 460-61.

¹¹² See, *The Economist*, July 21, 1951 : 139-40.

¹¹³ See, "India : Tensions on the Border", *The Round Table*, 41(164), September 1951 : 368.

¹¹⁴ See, *The Economist*, August 25 1951.

¹¹⁵ See, *ibid* : 316.

¹¹⁶ See, "Pakistan : Kashmir and the London Conference", *The Round Table*, 41(162), March 1951 : 170. Reports on their impatience in "Pakistan : Kashmir and the United Nations", *The Round Table*, 41(163), June 1951 : 273.

¹¹⁷ See, *The Economist*, August 25, 1951 : 316.

The crisis, however, died down gradually. At the same time, the two countries had been exchanging views on a no-war declaration since 1949. There was, however, a basic difference of approach between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan. Nehru suggested that both sides should sign a simple declaration that neither would go to war against the other for the settlement of their differences. Liaquat Ali Khan proposed that the No-War declaration should be reinforced by a regular procedure for getting those differences settled. The Pakistani Prime Minister suggested that with regard to all inter-Dominion disputes, the method of negotiations should be tried for two months, where there was scope, followed, if that failed, by two months for mediation, followed, if that failed, by arbitration. The outcome of the arbitration would be binding on the parties.¹¹⁸ Thus, in the protracted negotiations over a No-War Pact, Liaquat Ali Khan wanted the 'peaceful means' to be defined specifically while Nehru was in favour of a short declaration and avoiding a prior commitment.¹¹⁹ The no-war initiatives thus proved to be a non-starter.

6.3.4 The Water Sharing Dispute 1950-60 – Technical Cooperation Amidst Political Disputes

One important legacy of partition in the physical and economic sphere in the Subcontinent was the problem of sharing equitably the waters of common rivers between the two arch antagonists. The British had developed possibly the largest and most intricate irrigation system in the 1860s in the Indus and its five tributaries - the Jhelum and Chenab, known together with the Indus as the western rivers, and the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, known as the eastern rivers. About 50 million people depended on the irrigation system.¹²⁰ However, due to the exigencies of the political situation, issues were compounded by communal strife. The Boundary Commission also made a hasty division of the irrigation system in the Punjab on the assumption that the future Dominions would exercise joint control and neither side would do anything until an alternative was developed. The upper reaches of the canals and rivers fell in India and the lower reaches, in

¹¹⁸ See, "Pakistan : Strained Relations with India Continue", *The Round Table*, 41(161), December 1950 : 80.

¹¹⁹ See, "Pakistan : Five Disputes with India", *The Round Table*, 40(158), March 1950 : 164.

¹²⁰ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 156. For a concise and factually informative description with map, see, "Dividing the Waters : The Canal Question in the Punjab", *The Round Table*, 45(178), March 1955 : 240.

Pakistan. Forty out of fifty million of the Indus basin population and two-thirds of the irrigated areas fell in Pakistan, yet the head-works of the canals fell in India and some in Kashmir occupied by India.¹²¹

Immediately after partition, wrangling started over the interpretation of the silence of the Radcliffe Award over the equitable and acceptable division of the irrigation system. India argued that its right to control the water works and the development of its own water resources was recognised by the Commission. Pakistan's argument, on the other hand, centred on its rights to the irrigation system as a lower riparian country in international law.¹²² At one point, Pakistan proposed taking the case to the International Court of Justice, but Nehru repudiated the proposal as not worthy of "self-respecting nations" in taking such cases to outside world.¹²³ A bilateral tribunal was set up but it could not solve the problem. The tribunal was dissolved on April 1, 1948 and the next day, the East Punjab Government in India diverted water from the Pakistani canals fed by headworks of Madhopur(India) on the river Ravi and Ferozepur on the Sutlej for about one month.¹²⁴ The damage was done both materially – because it was the peak of the cropping season in Pakistan and about 1.5 million acres of cropped land were starved of waters for five weeks – and psychologically, because it sent deep panic signals to Pakistan that India was out to destroy Pakistan.

Around this time, differences between parties over a solution of the Kashmir problem were sharpened. India made a military thrust in Kashmir so much so that Pakistan was apprehensive that India would push on Pakistan's international frontier.¹²⁵ Nehru in any case intervened,

¹²¹ The debate over allocation of the Gurdaspur and Ferozepur headworks in India by the Boundary Commission has been noted in Section 4.3.1 in Chapter IV. See, also, Choudhury, *ibid* : 156; and *The Economist*, February 28, 1953 : 578.

¹²² See, "Waters of Strife : The Dispute in the Indus Basin", *The Round Table*, 48(192), September 1958 : 364.

¹²³ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 159.

¹²⁴ See, "Waters of Strife : The Dispute in the Indus Basin", *op. cit.* : 362, 364

¹²⁵ As has been discussed in Chapter V, it was this spring offensive of India in Kashmir that provided Pakistan with the rationale of moving regular troops into Kashmir as a defensive step. Of course, India did not accept such an argument, rather it added a strong point in favour of India that Pakistan was the aggressor and it must end the aggression before India could carry out its part of the obligation in Kashmir with respect to the plebiscite.

overrode the East Punjab Government and restored the water supply. An agreement was signed on May 4, 1948 in which India promised not to interfere with the water supply, and Pakistan, on its part, undertook to pay for the water in advance. India registered the agreement with the UN Secretariat as a treaty while Pakistan remained resentful that the agreement was signed under duress.¹²⁶ Habitual charges of breaches of agreement were brought against each other. India's unilateral development of its water with decreased water supply for Pakistan was viewed as a "peculiar use of force" by India, while Pakistan was charged with non-payment of the *seigniorage* or royalty for the use of water.¹²⁷ The situation deteriorated and this coincided with the troop deployment crisis of July-August 1951.¹²⁸ Whether the water had led the two countries to the brink of a war, as claimed by some,¹²⁹ is hard to establish because of the fluidity of the situation and the intermeshing nature of events and issues. However, there was every possibility that this crisis would also become militarised, as the World Bank President, Eugene Black recalled later:

The relations between India and Pakistan were thus thrown into a crisis which was to continue along the border intermittently throughout the decade that followed. Five long years after partition Indian and Pakistani troops were still facing each other behind sandbags and barbed wire at irrigation headworks along the frontiers ...this was most likely to lead to all-out war.¹³⁰

The defusion of the crisis, however, came fortuitously from an external source. Mr. David Lilienthal, the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, concluded an extensive tour of the Subcontinent in August 1951. He said in an article in the American magazine, *Colliers* :

- i. Without water for irrigation, 20,000,000 acres in West Pakistan would dry up in a week, tens of millions would starve. No army with bombs and shell fire will devastate a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting of the sources of water that keep the fields and people of Pakistan alive.
- ii. India's present course of drawing more and more water from the upstreams of these rivers will injure Pakistan and endanger peace.
- iii. Pakistan's present use of water should be confirmed by India.¹³¹

¹²⁶ See, "Pakistan : Problems of Partition", *The Round Table*, 44(176), September 1954 : 403.

¹²⁷ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 158.

¹²⁸ See, Section 6.3.3 above.

¹²⁹ See, Brecher and Wilkenfeld's crisis dataset in *International Crisis Behaviour* project, as tabulated in Appendix IIb.

¹³⁰ See, Eugene R. Black, "The Indus : A Moral for Nations", *New York Times*, December 11, 1960.

Mr. Lilienthal's article drew the attention of Mr. Eugene Black, who wrote to India and Pakistan suggesting that a "working party" of engineers could tackle the problem as a cooperative venture, "not in a political climate, without relation to past negotiations and past claims and independently of political issues."¹³² Both India and Pakistan readily accepted the proposal and nominated their engineers for talks in Washington. As a precaution, a temporary tripartite agreement was concluded in May 1952, under which both the contending parties undertook not to diminish the supplies available to each other pending development of alternative supplies under international auspices.¹³³

As the talks recommenced in Washington in September 1953 under the aegis of the World Bank, there followed a long struggle for an agreement, with both parties submitting irreconcilable and politically motivated plans. Both the sides, of course appreciated the long term aspect of harnessing of the common waters to their mutual benefit. It was the short term sharing of available waters under the existing facilities which posed difficulties. Finally, on February 5, 1954, the World Bank representative put forward a conceptually simple and politically expedient proposal, provided the large sums of money required were available. The entire flow of the three western rivers was to be made available to Pakistan, while the three eastern rivers would be reserved for India. For a specified transitional period of five years India would continue to supply from the eastern rivers the water that Pakistan used to get until link canals were developed to siphon waters from the western rivers to the south-east of Pakistan's territories, and the waters surrendered by way of allocation of eastern rivers to India were replaced with the cost to be paid by India in proportion to the benefits received.¹³⁴

Although both sides agreed to the proposal,¹³⁵ negotiations entered the most difficult phase of working out the procedures of implementation. It took six years of painstaking negotiations to

¹³¹ See, "Another Korea in the Making", *Colliers*, August 1951, quoted in "Pakistan : Problems of Partition", *The Round Table*, 44(176), September 1954 : 403. *op. cit.* : 243.

¹³² See, "Dividing the Waters ...", *op. cit.* : 244.

¹³³ See, *ibid* : 244. Also see, "A Punjab Powder Keg", *The Economist*, February 28, 1953 : 578.

¹³⁴ See, "Dividing the Waters ...", *The Round Table*, *op. cit.* : 244.

¹³⁵ One indication was the willingness of both the parties to abide by World Bank mediation whenever the negotiations ran aground. More discussion of this point is made at the end of this sub-section.

arrive at a final agreement. From Pakistan's point of view, the most tangible cost was the gigantic engineering aspect of the task, its technical feasibility and the uncertainty associated with it, compared to the concrete established irrigation system it would be sacrificing in favour of India.¹³⁶ Pakistan also doubted India's good faith in making waters available to Pakistan from the eastern rivers during the transitional period and was fearful of the possibility of a political use of waters of the western rivers to gain concessions over Kashmir.¹³⁷ The World Bank modified the plan and provided for more storage works to assuage Pakistan's sense of uncertainty and risks.

On the Indian side, the greatest cost was the foresaking of some major projects, which in the event of a joint approach rather than a split or partition approach as envisaged in the World Bank plan, would have benefited both, but mainly India.¹³⁸ Secondly, India resented the fact that it had to finance the construction of link canals and storages within Pakistan for the use of Pakistan at a cost of tremendous sacrifice in its Second Five Year Plan. India also resented the foot-dragging policy of Pakistan in developing the alternative canal system.

The bickering from both sides continued. At one point, India warned that by 1962 when its Sirhind feeder and Rajasthan canal would be operative, it would need all the waters of eastern rivers. Pakistan, in the meantime, had again taken the Kashmir case to the Security Council following further Indian and Kashmiri measures toward integrating the State into India. The tense mood on both sides was reflected in the water issue on which the earlier temporary agreement could not be renewed for about a year.¹³⁹ Furthermore, the plan in modified form became so huge that it became apparent that India alone would not be able to bear its cost, even if it wanted to. So, donors had to be found to underwrite the cost. There were less costly alternatives, but those

¹³⁶ For details see, See "Dividing the Water ...", *op. cit.* : 245. Also see, "Indo-Pakistani Relations : Areas of Conflict", *op. cit.* : 169-70, for actual problem of leakage, breaches and water logging apart from other side effects.

¹³⁷ See, "Waters of Strife ...", *op. cit.* : 366.

¹³⁸ One such project was the Diangadh project on the river Chenab in Jammu with vast potential for the Bikaner desert in Rajasthan. The second was the possibility of storing the waters of the Chenab at Mahru and linking it through tunneling with the Ravi to enhance water availability in the eastern rivers, allocated to India. See, "Waters of Strife ...", *ibid* : 365.

¹³⁹ See, "Waters of Strife ...", *ibid* : 367-68. See also "The Punjab Water Dispute", *The Economist*, July 12, 1958 : 115.

presupposed a friendly cooperation between India and Pakistan, yet this was an element miserably lacking in their bilateral relations. At last, with the availability of donors like the USA, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and through the patience and persistence of the World Bank officials, all the knots were untied and the Indus Water Agreement involving the biggest ever replacement of water systems through seven link canals and five barrages with an estimated cost of £380 million was signed by Nehru and Ayub in Karachi on September 19, 1960.¹⁴⁰

We have re-examined the water dispute between India and Pakistan in the 1950s keeping Kashmir in perspective. In particular, our concern was to examine what type of feedback relations were observed between conflict and cooperation regarding the water issue, on the one hand, and the Kashmir problem, on the other. We were also interested in understanding how the two adversaries could manage to cooperate on the water issue while they still differed substantially on the Kashmir problem. Apparently, the linkage between the two sets of conflicts, despite their geopolitical proximity, was "associative and sentimental rather than practical".¹⁴¹ However, the intangible linkages turned out to be substantive in an atmosphere of misgivings and misperception. To India, linking the two was an attempt on the part of Pakistan to attain a bargaining chip, to Pakistan, this very Indian attitude was tantamount to an intention of not solving either problem. Pakistan, in any case, viewed the two problems to be inextricably linked. President Ayub Khan said in a broadcast on September 4, 1960 :

The very fact that we will have to be content with the waters of three western rivers underlines the importance for us of having physical control on the upper reaches of these rivers to secure the maximum utilisation for the ever growing needs of West Pakistan.¹⁴²

Having said that, it should be pointed out that, as with other bilateral disputes, the water issue bore a single-track relationship with Kashmir, that is, conflictual interactions on Kashmir affected the water issue as also other issues, but when they could manage to cooperate on the water issue, the positive feedback was hardly reflected on Kashmir. The occasion of signing the

¹⁴⁰ See, "Pakistan : End of the Water Dispute" *The Round Table*, 51(201), December 1960 : 73.

¹⁴¹ For such arguments, see, "Dividing the Waters ...", *op. cit.* : 242.

¹⁴² See, "Pakistan : End of Water Dispute", *op. cit.* : 74.

Indus water treaty raised much hope, especially in Pakistan, about resolving the Kashmir problem. In a situation when Pakistan was trying frantically to keep the conflict alive,¹⁴³ Nehru's statement in the *Lok Sabha* on September 7, 1960, that "I am prepared to discuss any subject, including Kashmir. I have never refused to discuss the subject."¹⁴⁴ raised hopes in Pakistan. However, the outcome of the talks on the Indus waters held in the summer resort of Muree in Pakistan, made it evident that he was doing merely a public relations exercise. The joint communiqué on September 23, 1960 went no further than noting that, "This was a difficult question which required careful consideration" and the two leaders "agreed to give further thought to the question with a view to finding a solution."¹⁴⁵ In frustration, President Ayub told a press conference the next day :

Kashmir is keeping the two countries apart, and unless this is settled, we would remain apart. So long as we remain apart the solution of other problems stands in danger of being nullified. If we stand divided we stand to lose.¹⁴⁶

The operational milieu was congenial at that time, the borders were tranquil, an agreement had been reached on a number of financial issues, the two Finance Ministers were to meet again in November 1960, and a new trade agreement was expected to be signed in March 1961. Yet when the question of Kashmir came up in Muree, the best that the two leaders could do was to confirm the dead-end of the problem.

The question is, how was cooperation possible in water sharing, when it was not possible in Kashmir? For one, cooperation in the water sector had its own merits and compulsions, as with other bilateral issues, like trade, and the minority issue. Secondly, the water sharing arrangements were based on purely engineering and technical cooperation. Thanks to the patience and perseverance of the World Bank officials, they maintained the technical nature of the negotiations consistently and persistently despite so many attempts by the adversaries to stress the political

¹⁴³ Pakistan had earlier failed to make a mention the issue in the Eisenhower-Ayub joint communiqué in Karachi in 1959. Nehru told his American audience in a television interview during his visit to America, that "[in] so far as the public on both sides are concerned they have forgotten the [Kashmir] question, at least they do not shout about it." Quoted in *ibid* : 74.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid* : 75.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid* : 75.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid* : 75.

aspect of the proposed solutions. Both the adversaries had confidence in the impartiality of the mediators. Michel argues, "As the partition and the Indus Water treaty demonstrate, [the] question of land and water rights can be solved, however, imperfectly, by awards made by impartial referees in the secrecy of the chambers or through painstaking negotiations conducted in confidence and with the benefit of expert technical advice and financial cooperation."¹⁴⁷ However, mere technical nature of the solution was not possibly enough to bring the parties to a solution unless it had a suitable political content. As Michel further argues, "But the Kashmir dispute has dragged on through two hot wars and eighteen years of unsteady truce".¹⁴⁸ The reason that the Indus water issue could be solved but Kashmir was not lay in the coincidence of the engineering solution with the political temperament of the parties, that is, the principle of partition, ensuring the *complete independence of the control of the two groups of rivers divided between India and Pakistan*. The idea of complete separation of the control of the water resources had "bitten deep into the imagination of both countries".¹⁴⁹ Of course, it should also be pointed out that the water issue was not allowed to be locked into a zero-sum problem, while Kashmir had long ago been so. That is one of the main reasons why the most practical and otherwise acceptable solution of partition did not work in Kashmir. The basic issue had been who would get the Kashmir Valley and the partition could not solve that problem.

The water issue also sheds some light as to whether the problem of Kashmir could have been solved before being locked into the zero-sum syndrome. The decisiveness of the solution and the apparent doggedness with which the mediators stuck to their position in solving the water issue was notable. Once a solution was found there was little change in it, even when it became apparent that cooperation through joint sharing of irrigation projects was a less costly and more technically feasible solution rather than the split projects. Compared to this, in the case of the

¹⁴⁷ See, A. A. Michel, *The Indus Rivers : A Study of the Effects of Partition* (New Haven : Yale University Press) 1967 : 546.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid* : 546.

¹⁴⁹ See, "Waters of Strife", *op. cit.* : 368. For this point, see also, Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan Relations : 1947-1955* (Amsterdam : Djambatan) 1963, quoted in Douglas C. Makeig, "War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process", *Pacific Affairs*, 60(2), Summer 1987 : 284.

Kashmir conflict, the mediators agreed in principle to look into alternative solution other than plebiscite even before a cease-fire could be effective.¹⁵⁰

6.4 Conclusions

The purpose of the chapter has been to explain the persistence of the Kashmir conflict during the decade of 1949-1958. The burden of the chapter was on examining how the Kashmir conflict survived the prolonged UN mediation efforts and bilateral negotiations, on the one hand, and how it interacted with other aspects of India-Pakistan relations in the 1950s, on the other. The overall finding is that while a series of stalemate in the mediation added layers of intractability to the issue of contention and position of the parties, hostile interactions over a number of bilateral issues ensured the persistence of tensions in the overall bilateral relations, as well as over Kashmir. The conflict persisted through hardening of position of the parties and resistance to resolution, and the process was reinforced by diffusion and feedback between Kashmir on the one hand, and other bilateral conflicts, on the other. Secondly, The interaction between these two sets of conflicts – Kashmir and other bilateral disputes – led to a reactivation and persistence of tensions. The net result was the persistence of the conflict over the first decade of its origins, after which new inputs from extra-regional as well as from within Kashmir led to a second flare up in 1965.¹⁵¹

Once a cease-fire had become effective on January 1, 1949, the focus of the UNCIP mediation efforts was on arriving at an agreement between the parties on steps to demilitarisation and administrative preparation for a plebiscite. Over a period of five years in the first phase of the UN mediations and another three years in the second phase, as many as six initiatives were taken to deal with different aspects of the two main problem, namely, demilitarisation, leading to a plebiscite. What was at the beginning a question of sequence of withdrawal of Pakistani troops and the bulk of the Indian troops, in addition to an agreed complete withdrawal of the armed

¹⁵⁰ See, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 161. See also, Section 6.2.1 above.

¹⁵¹ This, however, is going to constitute the subject matter of Chapter VII.

tribesmen, gradually rolled on to the question of number of forces on either side, Indian troops on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, while the Azad Kashmir forces on the Pakistan side. The last such attempt on demilitarisation foundered on these number games. On the question of administrative conditions for a plebiscite, several formulations were attempted, yet no agreement could be reached. Side by side with these formal negotiation, the two sides changed their approach to the conflict, Pakistan from a position of resolution of the comprehensive problem of India-Pakistan relations, of which Kashmir was only a part, to one of single-minded insistence on a free and impartial plebiscite as the key to resolving the bilateral problem. India on the other hand, shifted position from one of a specific problem of Kashmir to freezing the *status quo* in Kashmir and improve the bilateral relations. A time came when India's pursuit was how to kill the problem as an agenda of the UN, while Pakistan's frantic efforts lay in somehow keeping the conflict alive, so that a solution might be found out in future. The tension between these opposite pulls was enough to keep the conflict alive.

Of course, the mediation process itself had a lot to do with the persistence. First of all, the mediation attempts at one time or the other, were viewed to be partisan by either or both parties. Of course, one has to recognise the difficult circumstances under which they operated to achieve a cease-fire, and then an agreement on demilitarisation and plebiscite. While evidently they had to balance and seek compromise between the parties, often the balance was sought not on the merit of the issue. A glaring case had been the way the UNCIP dealt with the issue of dealing with Pakistan's introduction of regular forces in Kashmir. Pakistan was not condemned mainly on grounds of extraneous factors.¹⁵² The price of not condemning Pakistan was paid not only by Pakistan but also by the Kashmiris, because the cause of a free and impartial plebiscite was severely compromised. Moreover, none of the initiatives were decisive. In fact, it was pointed out at the beginning that by the time a cease-fire was arranged, the parties had already been exposed to all possible formulations of a solution and the respective position was sufficiently hardened as well. Compared to that, the initiatives were to an extent academic.

¹⁵² See, Section 5.5.2 in Chapter V.

While the sterility of the UN approach led to interminable stalemate, the conflict on the ground was kept alive by a number of factors. Prominent among them were a number of bilateral disputes in India-Pakistan relations. While these issues had their independent origins and existence, Kashmir did make a difference for them and in turn, they had a feedback impact on Kashmir itself, so that, if not aggravated, they at least contributed to persistent tension in the overall bilateral relations as well as over Kashmir. On each of these issues, especially, trade, minority and water issues, war-like situations and sometimes, war preparations took place and these got wide publicity in the media. It had also a significant impact on people's psyche, so that throughout the long interregnum, people thought of war as a likely option for both the parties.

More importantly, while cooperation also took place between the two otherwise antagonistic neighbours, it took place on merit of the issues. Water, minority, boundary and to an extent, trade, were issues in which a certain degree of mutuality was involved and as such, cooperation did take place. Compared to Kashmir, these were the issues that affected the day to day life of the people directly. Kashmir, while a popular and emotional issue, concerned mainly the statesmen and politicians. Tensions over Kashmir were transmitted to these areas and in turn, there was a second degree transmission of tensions back in Kashmir. However, the same pattern of linkage or diffusion was not observed in case of cooperation in those areas in so far as their apparently expected positive feedback was concerned. This observation went contrary to the commonly held wisdom that cooperation in other areas would eventually soften positively the deadlocked and hardened ground of Kashmir. Instead, it had on opposite impact.

From the point of view of diffusion of conflicts, this is a significant conclusion. In the first place it signifies the high salience and intractability of the Kashmir conflict which is the central concern of the thesis. Secondly, it also indicates the limits and facilitation of diffusion of cooperation and conflicts, which, as we have seen, are linked in a single track relationship. Thirdly, we may refer back our conclusion on diffusion in multiple-dyad conflicts based on the survey of international conflicts in South Asia,¹⁵³ and compare it with our finding on diffusion of

¹⁵³ See, Section 3.4.3 in Chapter III.

issues and conflicts within a single dyadic relations. This suggests that diffusion requires a close or tight political environment not always found in a regional setting, even if the countries are located in proximate geographical setting. We have got only some feeble signals about the role of alliance in linking conflicts and taking of sides. The next chapter will provide a better vantage point to look at this phenomenon, at least the conflict intensifying role it played.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR 1965 : COLD WAR LINKAGES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN KASHMIR

7.1 Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to account for the second flare up of the prolonged Kashmir conflict in 1965. In a situation of prolonged stalemate in a conflict, flare ups or militarised violence may occur from a marked change in the operational environment or a continuous building up of tensions in bilateral relations. In the mid-1960s, both these conditions were present in the milieu of the Kashmir conflict. Tensions had been building up over Kashmir from the late 1950s, partly from failure of the UN mediation and partly from the decision of Pakistan's allies to arm India in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. The linkage of the Sino-Indian border war and Cold War politics with Kashmir dramatically changed the environment of the conflict. In Pakistan's perception, the overall situation was going beyond retrieval. An element of desperation was injected in Pakistan's decision making, while an element of obstinacy in India through its Cold War inputs. Side by side with Pakistan's desperation, the internal developments in Kashmir and in India-Pakistan bilateral relations raised Pakistan's hope that the time was ripe and high for retrieval of the fast fleeting situation in Kashmir. Thus, the chapter highlights the significance of linkages and feedbacks in periodic flare ups in a situation of protracted conflicts. It is also argued that while the eventual responsibility of initiating a war may be pinpointed, the factors that precipitate that decision making is often ignored in the light of the eventual and more clear-cut locus of responsibility. In situation of protracted conflicts the role of these less clear role is needed to be highlighted.

To take the cue from the preceding chapter, the Kashmir conflict survived UN mediation efforts as well as bilateral negotiations in the 1950s. Both parties, for divergent reasons, had an

interest in the lingering of the conflict. As India was not agreeing to the holding of a plebiscite under the aegis of the UN, for Pakistan, prolonging the conflict was a better option than accepting an unfavourable solution. On the other hand, as Pakistan was not agreeing to any solution short of a UN-supervised plebiscite, India opted for buying time in the hope that with the passage of time the *status quo* would be frozen into an accepted fact. Spillover tensions from other bilateral disputes also spilled over into the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan's joining the Western alliance in 1954-55 amidst its frustration with the protracted UN mediation process was no less a contributory factor for hardening of India's position.¹

Cold War politics penetrated the Subcontinent in two phases, first, in the mid-1950s when Pakistan joined the Western alliance in a bid to bolster its security *vis-à-vis* India, second, when Cold War politics itself pushed into the Subcontinent in the context of the Sino-Indian war to bolster India's security much to the exasperation of Pakistan. The final touch of integration of Kashmir to the Indian Union in 1964 also made Pakistan desperate for a solution. The impetus for a unilateral action on the part of Pakistan in Kashmir came from the political developments on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, and a brief India-Pakistan encounter in the Rann of Kutch in the spring of 1965.² In Pakistan's perception, a situation had developed which was ripe for internal revolt in Kashmir against New Delhi, and all that Pakistan had to do was to hasten it. Besides, in its assessment, India was yet to recover from the reverses suffered in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The tactics Pakistan followed was one of infiltration of trained guerrillas in August 1965. Retaliation from India led to a full-fledged, yet inconclusive, war that lasted for seventeen days.

In what follows, the first two sections(7.2 and 7.3) assess the impact of the two phases of Cold War on Subcontinental politics in general, and Kashmir, in particular. Section 7.4 examines the role of several precipitants in the September 1965 war. Section 7.5 reviews the course of the

¹ It was in reaction to Pakistan's joining the alliance that India repudiated formally its commitment to holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide whether Kashmir would accede to India or Pakistan. See, Section 6.2.2 in Chapter VI.

² The Rann of Kutch lies in the Rajasthan-Sind border. See, Section 7.5.4 below for the brief military encounters in the Rann of Kutch.

war leading to a cease-fire and the Tashkent declaration of January 1966.

7.2 The Cold War in the Subcontinent : A Dilemma of Alliance

Although the involvement of the Great Powers in the first Kashmir war during 1947-49 was minimal,³ the dilemma for the West, in particular in not being able to pressurise either antagonist too far on grounds of cross-cutting interests in the Middle East and Asia at large, was evident.⁴ The same sort of dilemma arose immediately after Pakistan had joined in an alliance relationship with the West in 1954.⁵ In this section, we shall examine the impact that Cold War left initially on the position of the parties before a renewed phase of Cold War penetrated the Subcontinent in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war.

A perusal of the initial diplomacy centering on Pakistan's joining the Western alliance reveals that from the very beginning it was a problematic partnership. Pakistan shared at best superficially the Western goal of containing communism, especially the Soviet thrust in the Middle East and the Chinese thrust in the Indochina.⁶ For all practical purposes, Pakistan joined the alliance to serve its security needs, the procurement of arms and equipment, and the much needed diplomatic leverage to solve the Kashmir problem.⁷ The West, the USA in particular, while appreciating Pakistan's security needs in the context of the Subcontinent,⁸ needed Pakistan in the context of containing communism in the Middle East and the Far East. It was least

³ Of course, the United Kingdom as a departing imperial power was substantially involved in the affairs of the Subcontinent at that time. The Kashmir war of 1947-49 put the United Kingdom into an awkward position of almost getting involved in the conflict on both sides, because British officers were still serving the armies of both the Dominions. See, Section 5.4 in Chapter V.

⁴ As seen in Section 5.5.2 in Chap V.

⁵ Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Agreement with the USA in May 1954 and joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954. A year later it joined the Baghdad Pact, which had five formal members – Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Britain and Pakistan. The USA was a sponsor, yet not a formal member of the Organisation. Baghdad pulled out of the Pact in 1958 following which the Pact came to be known as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). For details from the Pakistani point of view, see, S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis* (Karachi : Oxford University Press) 1990 : 158-73. See, also, "Pakistan and Her Neighbours", *The Round Table*, 46(183), June 1956 : 236.

⁶ See, Burke and Ziring, *ibid* : 163-71. See, also, Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule : The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) 1990 : 176.

⁷ See, Keith Callard, *Pakistan : A Political Study* (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd) 1957 : 321-22.

⁸ See, Burke and Ziring, *op. cit.* : 162-65.

concerned about the specific local problem of Kashmir. Thus, the alliance was forged from two unequal levels of intensity of needs.⁹ The main problem was Pakistan's worth to the West in the context of either the Middle East or the Far East. In the Middle East, the danger of communism was far less real than the Arab-Israeli conflict and Pakistan's interests and natural leanings in that conflict was contrary to the Western interests. Nor was its leverage on Nasser of Egypt strong enough. Similarly, in the context of the Far East and Indochina also, Pakistan did not have enough influence.¹⁰ Yet, for the West, the USA, in particular, these non-Subcontinental issues were vital.

At the initial stage, an Islamic shield with Pakistan included in it around Soviet Union appeared feasible and appealing. However, with the Arab-Israeli conflict coming to the fore as the salient conflict in the Middle East, and with a certain amount of stabilisation in US-Soviet relations, the need for an Islamic shield turned out to be largely academic. Because of this incongruity, there was a large gap between the 'loads' of Pakistan's expectation from the alliance, and the 'responsiveness' of alliance partners, with Pakistan's 'capability' or leverage working as the intervening variable.¹¹ Moreover, Pakistan's stand on the Suez crisis, Tunisian independence and the Iranian oil crisis, was seen as a violation of its alliance commitment. On the other hand, India's non-Subcontinental Cold War value rated much higher than that of Pakistan, and despite India's pursuit of 'immoral non-alignment', the West's India bias was obvious and less subtle. Of course, India was very critical of the West's courting Pakistan, thereby bringing Cold War to the door step of the subcontinent.¹² The main reason behind the Indian opposition to Pakistan's

⁹ Muni wrote about the convergence of the two levels – the global concern of the Great Powers to contain communism and the regional concern of Pakistan to attain a local balance of power. It will be argued here that the two concerns were a mismatch. As an ally, Pakistan possibly was a next best alternative for the West. In Muni's own words, the "US, in its overall global strategy, had vital stakes in the Indian economic and political system and would have preferred Indian co-operation in its military and strategic moves against the 'communist threat'." See, S. D. Muni, "South Asia" in M. Ayoob(ed.), *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (New York : St. Martins) 1980 : 56-58.

¹⁰ For a brief but general survey of the threats of communism, see, "Danger Spots of 1951 : Possible Soviet Strategy After Korea", *The Round Table*, 41(161), December 1950 : 36-43.

¹¹ See, M. Ayoob, *Pakistan's Alliance with the United States, 1954-1965 : A Study in Loads, Capabilities and Responsiveness*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science, University of Hawaii, 1966.

¹² See, "India : The Debate on Foreign Policy", *The Round Table*, 43(171), June 1953 : 267. Also see, "India : Mr. Nehru's Congress", *The Round Table*, 44(174), March 1954 : 192.

joining the alliance was the Kashmir factor, not Cold War as such.¹³ India resented the fact that the US assistance to Pakistan had emboldened Pakistan not to accept the partition of Kashmir as a *fait accompli*.¹⁴

For Pakistan, the sources of frustration from the alliance were manifold. In the first place, India found Pakistan's joining in the alliance as an easy pretext to wriggle out of its commitment to a plebiscite. Secondly, apart from the military and economic assistance, the West's non-committed stand on Kashmir *vis-à-vis* India was not much help to Pakistan.¹⁵ Much to Pakistan's exasperation, there was significant cooperation between India and the USA in the Cold War context. If the USA was providing military and economic assistance to Pakistan, an ally, it was also finalising a major economic assistance programme for India when the anti-Pact campaigns in India were at their height.¹⁶

The paradox of the Western alliance was nowhere more acutely evident than in the context of Southeast Asia where Pakistan was asked to participate militarily while India's role was sought as a peace maker.¹⁷ Moreover, following Kennedy's coming to power which signified a shift toward idealism, India's neutralism was seen more as a virtue, even a bulwark against communism. Nehru was urged by Vice President Johnson "to extend his leadership to other areas of South-East Asia".¹⁸ Nehru's mediatory role in the context of Formosa and the Korean war, and in defusing the hydrogen bomb issue were important to the West.¹⁹ In the meantime, amendments were made in the criteria for US arms assistance which facilitated the supply of arms to any country irrespective of relationship as an US ally.²⁰

¹³ An insightful analysis of India's shrewd perception of Cold War may be found in Muni, *op. cit.* : 56-58.

¹⁴ See, "India : The Five Year Plan", *The Round Table*, 43(170), March 1953 : 171.

¹⁵ Pakistan could not persuade the members of the Council of SEATO to issue a statement supportive of its stand on Kashmir in March 1956. See, *The Annual Register 1956*, Vol. 198, 1957 : 161.

¹⁶ See, "India : Mr. Nehru's Congress", *The Round Table*, 44(174), March 1954 : 193. For some details, see, also, G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India : 1947-1966* (London : Pall Mall Press) 1968 : 238.

¹⁷ See, "Pakistan : President Ayub and President Kennedy", *The Round Table*, 51(204), September 1961 : 406.

¹⁸ See, *ibid* : 406-7.

¹⁹ See, "India : Mr. Nehru's Travels" *The Round Table*, 45(180), September 1955 : 382-84.

²⁰ See, "India : Mr. Nehru's Travels", *ibid* : 383.

The other dimension of Cold War in the Subcontinent was Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviets started their relations in a matter-of-fact manner with a proper recognition of India as a future power of Asia. Khrushchev and Bulganin declared during their visit to India in June 1955 that Kashmir was an integral part of India.²¹ They also supported the Indian claim over Goa unequivocally,²² condemned military alliances, and supported the principles of *panch shila*.²³ The mutuality in the emerging Indo-Soviet relations became instantly evident. India needed the type of support that the Soviet Union was prepared to give. Likewise, India admired the Soviet Union to the measure she needed as a would-be Superpower. India looked at Soviet Union not through the coloured glass of Cold War.²⁴ The mutuality of the relationship was reflected in the USSR support for India in the areas of vital need - Kashmir and Goa.²⁵ An assurance of the Soviet Union to India in the Security Council was also given.²⁶ India on the other hand, supported the USSR on German neutralisation, without of course, sacrificing its own principle of non-alignment so that on the question of Vietnam, it did not extend the type of support the Soviet Union would have wanted.²⁷

From the comparative picture of the role of Cold War in the Subcontinent, it is evident that Pakistan's bid to pull in the West in an alliance relationship did not bring a dividend in the 1950s so far as Kashmir was concerned. While Cold War politics pulled Pakistan outward to non-Subcontinental issues, its leverage on those issues in the Middle East or the South East Asia was, however, limited. It received military and economic assistance from the West but Western support for its stand on Kashmir was very little. India, on the other hand, maintained a discreet

²¹ See, "Tovarishchi Errant", *The Round Table*, 46(182), March 1956 : 117-21.

²² The Soviet leaders exploited successfully the frictions between India and the USA on the issue of Goa caused by the US verbal support for Portugal. Dulles, for example, declared Goa as a province of Portugal. See, "Tovarishchi Errant", *ibid* : 117.

²³ The five principles of peaceful coexistence, formulated in Nehru-Chou Enlai agreement on Tibet in 1952. See, *ibid* : 119.

²⁴ *Ibid* : 119. See, also Muni, *op. cit.* : 56-57.

²⁵ See, "Tovarishchi Errant", *op. cit.* : 119.

²⁶ Although India was initially sceptical of any such assistance, later events proved that the Soviet Union lived up to its commitment to India. See, "India : Winter of Manoeuvres", *The Round Table*, 46(182), March 1956 : 174.

²⁷ "Tovarishchi Errant", *op. cit.* : 119.

distance from Cold War politics, yet because of its size, and active and forthcoming stand on international issues of global significance, was courted by both the West and the Soviet Union. The West's balanced approach toward the India-Pakistan dyad was as good as supporting the *status quo* in Kashmir. The unequivocal Soviet support backed by its use of veto power in the Security Council, also stood India in the good stead of gaining from both the worlds. This not only created a complete disillusionment of Pakistan with the UN mediation process but also witnessed the beginning of its frustration with allies. However, much more frustration still remained in store for Pakistan as the second spell of Cold War penetrated the Subcontinent in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war.

7.3 Sino-Indian Border Disputes and Reinforced Cold War in the Subcontinent 1959-65

It is beyond the scope of the thesis to provide details of the Sino-Indian border war of October 1962. A brief outline of the unfolding of the conflict into a border war is in order in view of the war's playing an important catalytic role in the course of the Kashmir conflict during the 1960-65 period.²⁸ Opinions differ as to the real motives behind the Chinese thrust into India. A plausible and widely held theory was that the Chinese were angered by the Indian policy reversal on the Tibetan issue in 1959 and they retaliated by reviving long standing but dormant territorial claims against India.²⁹ A second theory was that the Chinese had a greater design in South Asia that transcended the mere territorial gains. Nehru, for example, remarked, "we look upon China as a country with profound inimical intentions towards our independence and institutions" and that the Chinese attack was "premeditated".³⁰ This version of Chinese motives was also subscribed to

²⁸ For news accounts of the Sino-Indian war, see, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, December 8-15, 1962 : 19121-27, and December 15-22, 1962 : 19140-42. Insider accounts of the Sino-Indian border war may be found in S. S. Khera, *India's Defence Problem* (Bombay : Orient Longmans) 1968, and J. P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder : The Curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962* (Bombay : Thacker & Company Limited) 1969. See, also Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York : Pantheon) 1970 : 171-443.

²⁹ On the Tibetan issue, the granting of asylum and sanctuary to the Dalai Lama by India in the wake of the Khamba revolt in Tibet in 1959 was indeed a reversal of its policy from the early 1950s of recognising Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. See, "Foreign Policy of Mr. Nehru", *The Round Table*, 44(176), September 1954 : 366; and "Chinese Expansion : Asian Communism on the March", *The Round Table*, 50(197), December 1959 : 9-11.

³⁰ See, Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India", *Foreign Affairs*, 41(3), April 1963 : 458.

by the USA,³¹ especially, in view of Cold War experiences in Korea and Vietnam. It was in this conviction that the USA started arming India in the early 1960s, initially on an immediate basis and later, on a long term basis, much to the resentment of Pakistan. Pakistan argued that as China had attained its limited territorial objectives it was unlikely to venture in the Subcontinent any more.³²

China's protests to Indian over its reversal of Tibet policy were accompanied by a Chinese refusal to recognise the Sino-Indian border demarcation along the McMahon Line.³³ In the meantime, China's building of a road from Tibet to Sinkiang over Indian territories became publicly known. The Indian initial belief was that China could be persuaded to vacate the lands by invoking the principle of *panch shila*, which had worked so well until then in their bilateral relations.³⁴ When diplomacy and conciliatory policies failed,³⁵ India set up some 24 new posts along the McMahon Line early in 1962 leading to an escalation in troop movements on the Chinese side. On September 8 when a new post was set up in a disputed Eastern sector by India, the war was set off with the Chinese forces pushing the Indian forces behind the McMahon Line.³⁶ India sent reinforcements and China retaliated by a massive thrust on October 20 in Ladakh and the NEFA (North Eastern frontier Agency in India). The Indian troops were forced to retreat. On November 21, China declared a unilateral cease-fire after withdrawing in the eastern sector but holding on to its territorial claims in Ladakh, and then proposed negotiations for a peaceful settlement.³⁷ Diplomacy took over but it took long to cool tempers. The trauma of the

³¹ For a glimpse of the US view, see, John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal : A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years* (London : Hamish Hamilton) 1969 : 474-75. The British Government, on the other hand, with its long dealings with the Chinese, argued that China had very limited territorial objectives. For details, see, Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day 1961-63* (London : Macmillan) : 235, quoted in Muni, *op. cit.* : 61.

³² See, President Ayub Khan's article, "The Pakistan-American Alliance : Stresses and Strains", *Foreign Affairs*, 42(2), January 1964 : 202-203. See, also William J. Barnds, "India in Transition : Friends and Neighbours", *Foreign Affairs*, 46(3), April 1968 : 559.

³³ For Chinese approach to the McMahon line, see, Maxwell, *op. cit.* : 94-95, 122.

³⁴ For initial exchanges between India and China on the border issue, see, Dalvi, *op. cit.* : 18-23.

³⁵ Nehru's suggestion for a *quid pro quo* of Ladakh in return for a Chinese concession in the NEFA did not work out. See, Barnds, *op. cit.* : 551. Bilateral discussion in New Delhi in 1960 at the invitation of Nehru also did not manage to break the stalemate. See, "India : Portrait of a Polity", *The Round Table*, 50(199), June 1960 : 298.

³⁶ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, December 15-22, 1962 : 19141.

³⁷ See, R. L. Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict 1945-74 : Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press) 1976 : 333-34. China withdrew to the actual line of control as on November

unexpected reverses on the military front on Indian psyche was tremendous.

Of more importance, for our purpose, was the chain reactions it set in motion over the problem of Kashmir, which, in a sense, was in a doldrum following the failure of the second round of UN mediation in 1958 and in the wake of political change in Pakistan. Since 1959 when the frictions between India and China developed into skirmishes and subsequently into hostilities and war, the chain reactions included Pakistan's abortive offer of a reconciliation with India on a bilateral basis, the flow of Western and Soviet arms for India, and at the same time, the West's attempts at a reconciliation between the antagonists to enable India to face any further eventuality of a Chinese attack. Another critical offshoot was the emergence of a Sino-Pakistan entente, which in turn, had deep impact on the Indian and West's psyche. The net result, it will be seen, was a highly fluid situation in Kashmir. An intense frustration led Pakistan to the verge of a unilateral decision, that is, sending infiltrators into Kashmir, which culminated into a full scale war.

7.3.1 Pakistan's Initial Conciliatory Tone Rebuffed

Whether the reverses for India in the Sino-Indian war generated an opportunistic psychology in Pakistan is open to question, although some tended to argue, and the West was convinced, that, "an India disarmed and enfeebled by China, without succour from outside, would have presented to Pakistan a temptation difficult to resist – certainly so far as Kashmir was concerned".³⁸ Pakistan evidently wanted to exploit the situation to reach a settlement of the vexed Kashmir problem. It displayed a conciliatory tone, even if ostensibly, as early as in 1959 when it was difficult to anticipate a Chinese thrust of a scale it made on India. As India was going through a review of its Tibet policy in May 1959, Ayub Khan proposed a joint defence of the

7, 1962 and added that if India did not respond positively to its proposal for cease-fire, China would "take the initiative to carry out" its own measures. India on the other hand proposed Chinese withdrawal behind the line of control as of 8 September 1962. See, *The Economist*, December 1, 1962 : 914.

³⁸ See, Herbert Feldman, *From Crisis to Crisis : Pakistan 1962-1969* (London : Oxford University Press) 1972 : 127.

Subcontinent to India.³⁹ President Ayub argued, "The crux of the whole thing is that Indian and Pakistan forces are at the moment facing each other: if the differences between them were resolved, these forces could be released to the job of defending their territories."⁴⁰ Evidently, Ayub Khan's proposed joint defence could come through resolving the outstanding difference between the two countries including the Kashmir conflict.

Nehru rejected forthrightly Ayub's offer. He countered, "Pakistan authorities tended to regard the current Sino-Indian relations as an opportunity to press India to make all sorts of concession to them."⁴¹ He also told the the *Lok Sabha* on May 5, 1959 :

We do not propose to have a military alliance with any country, come what may. ... I am all for settling our troubles with Pakistan and living normal, friendly and neighbourly lives - but we do not want to have a common defence policy which is almost some kind of military alliance - I do not understand against whom people talk about common defence policies. Are we to become members of the Baghdad Pact or SEATO or something else?⁴²

The credibility of Pakistan's offer was discounted in Indian eyes because Pakistan had just signed the US-Pakistan agreement of cooperation for security and defence at Ankara in March 1959. The agreement, according to a Pakistani analyst, was more significant than the earlier 1954 treaty, because the former contained a clear guarantee for the defence and security of Pakistan from any source whether communist or not.⁴³ However, Ayub Khan was at pains to impress upon Nehru his sincerity. He wrote in his memoirs later:

The Indian leaders thought that I was suggesting some kind of a defence pact and their reaction was one of fright and distrust. ... I clarified my proposal, explaining that it did not mean any special type of pact about which India need to be so perturbed. What I had in mind was a general understanding for peace between the two countries. I emphasized that the prerequisite for such an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir and the canal waters.⁴⁴

Ayub regretted that, "Mr. Nehru deliberately chose to misunderstand the proposal ... to divert public opinion from the real issue, which was to come to a settlement on outstanding disputes and

³⁹ An abortive earlier version of the joint defence plan was the offer of a no-war pact. See, Section 6.3.3 in Chapter VI.

⁴⁰ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 253.

⁴¹ See, self-quoting in Nehru(1963), *op. cit.* : 459.

⁴² Quoted from *Dawn*, May 5, 1959 in Mohammed Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography* (London : Oxford University Press) 1967 : 127.

⁴³ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 251-52.

⁴⁴ See, Ayub Khan(1967), *op. cit.* : 127.

to live on peaceful terms." ⁴⁵ Pakistan repeated the offer in September 1959 when Ayub halted at Palam Airport in Delhi on his way to former East Pakistan. He also showed sympathy with India's hard times with China. Nehru, however, cold shouldered him again.⁴⁶

Thus, the Pakistani initiative on the eve of the Sino-Indian conflict for mending fences with India over Kashmir was a non-starter. On the other hand, the Chinese threats on the Indian borders had already alerted the West of a communist danger in South Asia. As the Chinese danger actually materialised, both Western and Soviet military assistance began pouring into India to meet any eventuality of a recurrence of a Chinese attack.

7.3.2 Western and Soviet Military Assistance for Non-aligned India and Pakistan's Reactions 1962-64

India received a "prompt response" from Britain, the United States of America and other friendly countries including the Soviet Union to its requests for military equipment and supplies, as Nehru told the Indian *Lok Sabha* on November 9, 1962.⁴⁷ Once the emergency requirements had been met, a 'politico-military' mission, headed by Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, visited the Subcontinent with a view to ascertaining the military requirements of India and holding an "informal exchange of views with the Indian and Pakistan Governments on matters arising out of the present situation."⁴⁸ A US team led by Mr. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State, also embarked upon a simultaneous politico-military

⁴⁵ *Ibid* : 127.

⁴⁶ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 256. Observers tend to argue that in the late 1950s, especially after Ayub's coming to power, there was some shift in Pakistan's position on Kashmir and it is in this spirit of solving the dispute that Ayub proposed the no-war pact. For example, when a correspondent of the *New York Times*, asked if he would still insist on plebiscite, Ayub replied, "If we are shown any other sensible suggestion, we are ready to look at it. There are three parties to the dispute (India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir). Let us get together". See, "Pakistan : The Comity of Islam", *The Round Table*, 50(199), June 1960 : 302.

⁴⁷ The first consignment of military assistance to reach India was from the UK on October 29 in two Royal Air Force planes. Arrangements were also made for a "continuous supply" of small arms from Britain by air and sea. Arms from the USA started arriving on November 3 after Nehru had given the details of India military requirements to US Ambassador, Kenneth Galbraith on October 29. Ten US transport planes began airlifting military equipments from Germany on a round-the-clock basis. Subsequently, 12 American airforce transport planes with 200 crew helped the Indian Army airlift troops to the frontiers. See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 12-19, 1963 : 19194-95. See also, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 27-August 3, 1963 : 19541. For supply of American arms, see, also, Galbraith, *op. cit.* : 444-59.

⁴⁸ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 12-19, 1963 : 19195. The second objective referred to the mediated bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan that were to begin soon. See, Section 7.3.3 below.

mission to the Subcontinent.⁴⁹ In early 1963, a joint US-Commonwealth air defence mission spent about a month in India examining the "problems and technical requirements involved in organizing an effective air defence against the possibility of any further Chinese attacks".⁵⁰ However, an Anglo-American suggestion to station a contingent of Commonwealth air force fighter planes in India was initially agreed to but later cancelled in the face of protests in the Indian Parliament.⁵¹

The visit of the Anglo-American politico-military missions led subsequently to the conversion of the temporary military assistance into a long term one in the interest of US global policy.⁵² The USA assured India that the "military assistance which the United States is giving India is not intended to involve India in a military alliance or otherwise influence her policy of non-alignment" but was designed solely to "help defend India's independence".⁵³ The assurance provided implicitly a flexibility that allowed India to receive military aid from the Soviet Union as well. Despite some unspecified "little difficulty", which could be the China factor, the Soviet Union started delivery of the supply of MiG fighter aircrafts in December 1963.⁵⁴ Thus, in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war, India received military assistance from both sides of Cold War. In what follows, Pakistan's immediate reactions are reviewed.⁵⁵

Pakistan protested against the continued military assistance to India on several grounds. First, such a generous policy of arming India blurred the distinction between an ally and a neutral "to a vanishing point".⁵⁶ Secondly, it upset the military balance⁵⁷ and kept the underlying

⁴⁹ For details, see, Galbraith, *op. cit.* : 494-99.

⁵⁰ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 12-19, 1963 : 19195, and September 21-28, 1963 : 19648.

⁵¹ Nehru denied in the Parliament on February 21, 1963, an unsubstantiated press report that India was being covered by an US-Commonwealth "air umbrella". See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, September 21-28, 1963 : 19648.

⁵² See, Galbraith, *op. cit.* : 525-26. Mention may be made of the Indian condoning of the deployment of the US Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean in early 1964. In response to a query in the *Lok Sabha*, Nehru replied that the visit of the US fleet was aimed at "getting acquainted", but "it does not apply to us in any way". See, "Pakistan : America in the Indian Ocean", *The Round Table*, 54(214), March 1964 : 176-77. On a similar debate, see "India Aligned?", *The Economist*, October 1, 1964 : 345.

⁵³ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 12-19, 1963 : 19194.

⁵⁴ *Ibid* : 19196.

⁵⁵ The Sino-Pakistan rapprochement will be dealt with in Section 7.3.4 below.

⁵⁶ Ayub Khan(1964), *op. cit.* : 208.

⁵⁷ This was also precisely India's point that US arms would make Pakistan status-conscious and keen to

problem unresolved because it made India more defiant.⁵⁸ Thirdly, the arming of India on such a scale, Pakistan argued, had no justification because China did not have any intention of embarking on any further adventure in the Subcontinent. Pakistan further argued that both India and China were willing to resolve their dispute in a peaceful manner. Moreover, the Sino-Indian dispute was not a Cold War issue.⁵⁹ When Pakistan protested over the Nassau agreement, the USA assured Pakistan that it was a "temporary arrangement".⁶⁰ President Kennedy earlier assured President Ayub that it was not the intention of the USA to disturb the balance of power in the Subcontinent, and in the event that the United States found it necessary to supply arms to India, Pakistan would be consulted.⁶¹

However, as the USA felt the need for military assistance to India on a long term basis, the US Administration became more frank. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, told the House Armed Forces Committee on January 7, 1964 that although US military assistance has "deeply troubled Pakistan", it was in America's interest "to improve the quality of India's defences."⁶² President Ayub argued :

In the military field, it is not criminal intention that counts, it is the capability. But their [India's] intentions towards Pakistan were always malicious. ... Our position alone should be enough to bring home to Britain and America our state of desperation. Anyone who sits down and works out these things knows that their [West's] policies are really driving Pakistan against the wall.⁶³

The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Bhutto, summed up the consequence of arming India in the following way :

change the *status quo*. See, Muni, *op. cit.* : 47-50

⁵⁸ Pakistan argued that Nehru's attitude on Kashmir had hardened further following the US decision to provide long term military assistance to India. Nehru was quoted saying in the Parliament on September 3, 1963, that any change in Kashmir would have "disastrous consequences". Nehru quoted in *Times of India*, September 4, 1963, cited in Ayub, *ibid* : 208. The personal accounts of the US Ambassador, Galbraith, describe how pliable were Nehru's attitude towards a reconciliation in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Indian war. See, Galbraith, *op. cit.* : 442.

⁵⁹ President Ayub again quoted Nehru to make the point. Nehru at one point argued that the Sino-Indian conflict had nothing to do with communism but was the result of Chinese "imperialist expansionism". See, Philip Potter in the *Baltimore Sun*, November 10, 1962, quoted in Ayub(1964) *op. cit.* : 203.

⁶⁰ See, "Pakistan : The Coolness of America", *The Round Table*, 55(220), September 1965 : 370.

⁶¹ See, "Pakistan : A Flexible Foreign Policy", *The Round Table*, 54(213), December 1963 : 87.

⁶² See, "Pakistan : America in the Indian Ocean", *op. cit.* : 176.

⁶³ See, "Pakistan : A Flexible Foreign Policy", *op. cit.* : 91.

India can turn round to the United States and say, "Now close your eyes. The partition of India was an injustice to the Bharat Mata (Mother India). Let us settle the problem in our own way." And if that happens what will be our position? The United States Government should realize our difficulties as an ally and a friend.⁶⁴

In 1965, President Ayub Khan expressed similar apprehensions :

That our fears were not unfounded was proved beyond doubt by the massing of the whole of the Indian army along our borders during the last three months. Unfortunately, we failed to convert the United States to our point of view because it was claimed that they must persist in this line of action in the interest of their global policies.⁶⁵

Beyond protests and counter-protests, the Pakistani decision makers were looking for alternative allies, which it found in China. Did Pakistan's China linkage bring about any significant change in Kashmir? Before we take up this issue, a review of another round of bilateral negotiations mediated by the West is in order. If in the pre-1959 period, there was a stalemate on the UN front over Kashmir, a similar stalemate developed in the Great Power mediation and also in bilateral negotiations. All that Pakistan was left with was intense frustration about any peaceful means of solving the Kashmir problem.

7.3.3 Mediated Bilateral Negotiations : Half-hearted and Abortive

We have earlier seen that Pakistan's attempts at reviving the bilateral negotiations, firstly when signs of Chinese incursions in Indian territories became evident, and secondly, on the occasion of the signing the Indus Water treaty, were not successful. However, it was through the persuasion of the West in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war that the two countries agreed to negotiate over Kashmir. It will be seen that the Western influence was not decisive enough so that the talks were almost aborted before they could start.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ See, "Pakistan : The Coolness of America". *op. cit.* : 371

⁶⁵ *Ibid* : 372.

⁶⁶ The joint Anglo-American 'politico-military missions' to the Subcontinent tried to impress upon Nehru and Ayub Khan the importance of making a fresh attempt to solve the Kashmir problem, in view of the situation created by the Chinese aggression. The outcome of several shuttle missions by Sandys and Harriman during November 24-29, 1962 was an agreed declaration of intent on bilateral talks on Kashmir. Before Mr. Sandys could return to Britain, Nehru declared in the *Lok Sabha* on November 30, that, "we explained to them [Sandys and Harriman] our position in regard to it and pointed out that anything that involved an upset of the present arrangements would be very harmful to the people of Kashmir as well as to the future relations of India and Pakistan. I explained to them again, however, our basic principles and how it was not possible for us to bypass or ignore them" Mr. Sandys flew back to New Delhi following Pakistan's protests. Nehru assured him that the proposed talks would not be restricted by any preconditions. Thus, the crisis of a premature breakdown was averted. See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 27-August 3, 1963 : 19541-42.

Between December 27, 1962 and May 16, 1963, six rounds of bilateral talks were held at ministerial levels with occasional intervention by the British and US envoys posted in the Subcontinent. The talks concentrated upon the idea of a non-plebiscite based partition, to which Pakistan agreed without prejudicing its stand on a plebiscite, provided that the Kashmir Valley was awarded to it. In the fifth round of the talks in Karachi, the only concession Pakistan was prepared to make, in view of the Sino-Indian conflict, was to allow a temporary transit through the Valley to Ladakh. This, however, was rejected by India.⁶⁷ India, on the other hand, was prepared to transfer substantial areas even adjacent to the Kashmir Valley but under no circumstances would it be prepared to foresake the Valley itself.⁶⁸ Thus, when the talks finally broke down, it became evident that the Kashmir Valley was the "heart of the problem", in the words of Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto.⁶⁹ The mediated bilateral negotiations turned out to be a replay of the earlier UN missions, especially a replica of the Dixon mission.⁷⁰ Perhaps, it was more than that, as *The Economist* gave an interesting account of what was going on :

London and Washington may have thought the topic was still Kashmir. From a closer vantage point, it was evident that the real issue was Western arms aid to India, with which both disputants for different reasons were obsessed. Both sides were evidently posturing for the benefit of outside observers : Pakistan to ensure that the scale of Western arms delivery to India was linked to a settlement, India by showing willing but not too willing, to ensure that it was not. It seems that India has substantially gained its point.⁷¹

Thus came another stalemate in the mediation process when tempers in Pakistan were rising because of US arms assistance to India on a long term basis. President Ayub said in a press conference in May 1964 that it was Pakistan's "firm belief that the war machine now being built up by India could not be brought to bear against China because of the insurmountable difficulties and lack of communications over the high mountain ranges", and that Pakistan was therefore

⁶⁷ See, *ibid* : 19543.

⁶⁸ For details of the proceedings of the talks, see, *ibid* : 19543.

⁶⁹ See, the text of Foreign Minister Bhutto's statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan on July 24, 1963 in Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 304.

⁷⁰ See, Section 6.2.1 in Chapter VI.

⁷¹ See, *The Economist*, May 25, 1963 : 765.

"faced with a great threat."⁷² President Ayub continued that the small neighbours of India were "scared" and that they would be compelled to "Take refuge under China".⁷³ Foreign Minister Bhutto also had been talking of "re-appraising" and the "reshaping" of the foreign policy of Pakistan.⁷⁴ We turn now to what this meant and to the reactions of the West to such an initiative by Pakistan.

7.3.4 The Emerging Sino-Pakistan Entente and its Impact on the Kashmir Problem

The questions which were raised in the context of the penetration of Cold War politics in the Subcontinent could also be raised in the context of the Sino-Pakistan relations. In particular, we shall be interested in the basis of the China-Pakistan links. As a follow up, it would be interesting to examine if Pakistan looked at its relations with China as an alternative to its links with the West or if it was used merely as a bargaining chip in Pakistan's equation with the West. For its impact on Kashmir, the strength of Chinese support for Pakistan will be compared with the adverse reactions from the West because of Pakistan's befriending China.

Initially at least, Sino-Pakistan friendship was based on a common anti-Indian content. Yet, in reaching that common stand, both reversed their respective stand toward each other. Following the rapid estrangement between India and China in the wake of the Khamba revolt in Tibet and the Chinese construction of roads allegedly across Indian territories in 1959, Ayub proposed, as we have seen, a 'joint defence' aimed contextually at least, against China. Chou Enlai, on his part, echoing almost Khrushchev in March 16, 1956, said, "the people of Kashmir have already expressed their will" on the issue of accession to India. Even as late as July 1961, when China and Pakistan had already agreed to discuss the demarcation of borders, Chou maintained that formal position.⁷⁵ President Ayub, on the other hand, warned the Chinese on October 23, 1959, that if they encroached upon the territory of Pakistan, they would be expelled with all the force at his disposal.⁷⁶ Ayub, however, also suggested that the two countries should negotiate the borders

⁷² See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *op. cit.* : 19544.

⁷³ President Ayub's statement on July 8, 1963 in *ibid* : 19544.

⁷⁴ *Ibid* : 19544.

⁷⁵ See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 19-26, 1963 : 19208.

⁷⁶ See, *The Times*, October 24, 1959, quoted in Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*

and China responded positively to his proposal. Although the initial understanding, as both the parties gave the world to believe, was that the agreement, if any, would be provisional, so that it did not prejudice the disputed status of Kashmir, the final agreement reached on March 2, 1963, under which territorial adjustments in the Gilgit-Baltistan sector also took place, did not reflect any such sensibilities.⁷⁷

The Sino-Pakistan relationship soon moved toward closer cooperation. Following Chou Enlai's visit to Pakistan in the first half of 1964, there was wide speculation in the press that a defence arrangement was in the offing. Pakistan, however, dismissed promptly any such possibility and reiterated its commitment to the alliance relations with the West.⁷⁸ China, of course, began to provide Pakistan with substantial military assistance including MiG aircraft and other military equipments. Economic relations also began to expand. Pakistan supported China's entry into the UN, a role earlier played by India in the mid- and late 1950s.⁷⁹

Although Pakistan assured the West that its opening to China was not at the cost of its links with the West,⁸⁰ Pakistan's explanations hardly satisfied its allies, particularly the USA, which initiated several retaliatory measures against Pakistan. The immediate casualty was economic assistance, direct as well as those through multilateral agencies like the World Bank. Senator Wayne Morse told the Senate :

(Hertfordshire, UK : Roxford Books) 1991 : 237. See, also, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *ibid* : 19208.

⁷⁷ While India protested that Pakistan without any *locus standi* in Kashmir had surrendered about 13,000 square miles to China, Pakistan claimed that it had instead a net gain of about 700 square miles. The other ground on which India protested over the agreement was that China had interfered at a time when both India and Pakistan were working toward a settlement of the Kashmir dispute under the Commonwealth initiative. See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 25-June 1, 1963 : 19427-28. Also see, "India and Pakistan : Pressures External and Internal", *The Round Table*, 54(215), June 1964 : 235.

⁷⁸ See, "Pakistan : Crisis in Kashmir", *The Round Table*, 54(215), June 1964 : 289-90.

⁷⁹ See, *ibid* : 290.

⁸⁰ Pakistan argued that its China policy was, in the first instance, part of a general opening to the communist bloc to provide greater flexibility to its foreign policy in the early 1960s. A series of barter deals were signed with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania and China. Pakistan also signed an air agreement with the Soviet Union and China. For some details, see, "Pakistan : A Flexible Foreign Policy", *op. cit.* : 87-88. Secondly, it was argued that, by signing a border agreement with communist China, it had obviated the possibility of the kind of conflict that an undemarcated border had already precipitated in the Subcontinent, meaning the 1962 Sino-Indian border wars. See, "Pakistan : A Flexible Foreign Policy", *loc. cit.* : 88.

Since Pakistan, by admission of her own Foreign Minister, has no quarrel with Red China but only with India, I do not see any justification for the continuation of our large foreign aid programme to Pakistan.⁸¹

The cut in the economic assistance included the World Bank's delaying the processing of the case for financing the Karachi steel mill, the suspension of a \$4 million US loan for a modern airport in the Eastern wing of Pakistan, and the postponement of the Pakistan aid-consortium meeting unilaterally by the USA.

More damaging was the indirect impact on Kashmir through a decoupling of US military aid to India and its stand on Kashmir. In Pakistan's perception, it was US relaxation of its arms supply policy that led to India's intransigence on Kashmir manifest in the abrogation of the Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which ensured a special status of Kashmir. An emboldened India also mobilised troops all along the cease-fire lines and even threatened to use force to occupy the village of Chaknot which had been administered by the Azad Kashmir Government since the cease-fire of 1949.⁸²

Pakistan's reactions to US retaliation was one of injured and helpless resentment. Responding to American displeasure at Sino-Pakistan links, Ayub Khan argued that because of its geographical location, Pakistan's friendship with China and the Soviet Union was an imperative. While addressing a meeting of the Pakistan Muslim League on July 14, 1965, he said,

If the Americans want that we should incur the hostility of China and the U.S.S.R. without any rhyme or reason and also humiliate ourselves before the Indians, we cannot accept their conditions.⁸³

Thus, an estrangement between Pakistan and the US was complete. If Pakistan intended to use the China card to enhance its bargaining position, as India did in the context of Cold War politics, it failed. If it also intended to develop the Sino-Pakistan relations in the context of a possible confrontation with India, the test was yet to come.

To sum up, Cold War entered the Subcontinent in two phases. First, Pakistan's attempt at

⁸¹ See, "Pakistan : A Flexible Foreign Policy", *ibid* : 88. For similar remarks linking US aid to Pakistan's China policy by George Ball, US Under Secretary of State, see, *The Economist*, September 7, 1963 : 824.

⁸² See, "Pakistan : A Flexible Foreign Policy", *ibid* : 91.

⁸³ See, "Pakistan : The Coolness of America", *op. cit.* : 372-73.

pulling it in during the mid-1950s to prop up its security and use it as a leverage in the context of Kashmir, did not have a significant impact excepting that it gave India a pretext to retract from committed position. To that extent Pakistan's frustrations were deepened. In the second phase, the penetration of Cold War in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was explicitly in favour of India yet most of the elements in India-Pakistan relations, be they the military balance or status of the Kashmir dispute, were unsettled. Ostensibly at least, the West tried to mediate a bilateral settlement. However, it was no less abortive than the earlier UN attempts. In the process, the limits of the Great Power leverage was also evident to Pakistan. It seems there was some good probability of a Western mediated settlement. However, the West was only too careful to avoid giving India the impression of "blackmail in a time of weakness".⁸⁴ This, in turn, made India more obstinate and Pakistan extremely frustrated about any hope of an acceptable solution. Pakistan intended to use the China card as a bargaining chip, the key elements in the Pakistani decision making circle came to believe that they could bank on China on any unilateral measure. Thus, if frustration led Pakistan to the path of unilateral decision making, the China factor made it look feasible. Of course, there were other factors that sent Pakistan positive signals. We are now turning to them.

7.4 Precipitants

In this section, a number of developments in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and in India-Pakistan relations will be reviewed with a view to identifying their significance in Pakistani decision making to take unilateral steps that led to a war. In Kashmir the events centred on New Delhi-Srinagar relations as well as some fortuitous incidents like the loss of a holy relic from a Srinagar mosque. The event in the India-Pakistan bilateral relations concerned the brief encounter between the two antagonists in the barren lands in Kutch in the Rajasthan-Sind border.

⁸⁴ See, Galbraith, *op. cit.* : 444. The domestic situation in India in the post-1962 period, especially, following the death of Nehru in 1964 also precluded, arguably the possibility of any accommodative gesture towards Pakistan. See, Muni, *op. cit.* : 44.

7.4.1. Theft of a Relic and Communal Violence 1963 - Positive Signals for Pakistan?

We have earlier pointed out that the history of the Kashmiri uprising bears an interesting consistency. Whenever there has been an affront on their religious sensibilities, the otherwise docile Kashmiris rose against those perceived to be responsible.⁸⁵ One such incident happened in December 1963 when the Kashmiri Muslims reacted violently in protest against the theft of a sacred hair of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) from a mosque called *Hazratbal Shrine*. A mass movement started. On December 27, a large procession took to the streets of Srinagar in protest against the killing by the State police of a protester the previous day.⁸⁶ A *Muslim Action Committee* was formed in Kashmir and the movement assumed on a political character, demanding a plebiscite in Kashmir.⁸⁷ Sheikh Abdullah, who by now had a decade of estranged relations with New Delhi, was also on record saying on February 3, 1964 that "the recent episode of the holy relic at Hazratbal has extremely shocked the sensitive Kashmiri Muslims who now openly declare that even their religion and culture is not safe with India."⁸⁸ The incident soon petered out as the relic returned mysteriously to its place and it was also identified and confirmed formally by a committee instituted by the Indian Government and headed by Lal Bahadur Shastri.⁸⁹ In the Indian assessment, the recovery of the relic by Indian authorities themselves raised their credibility. For Pakistan the incident carried a different kind of meaning. It gave Pakistan a signal that the Kashmiris were in favour of Pakistan and they would express their views in Pakistan's favour if given the opportunity.

Some other consequences flowed from the incident. One was the sparking of a communal riot first in East Pakistan and then in some of the Indian cities.⁹⁰ Thus, the India-Pakistan relations were further warmed up. Secondly, Pakistan revived the Kashmir case in the Security

⁸⁵ See, Section 5.2.2 in Chapter V.

⁸⁶ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 284.

⁸⁷ *Ibid* : 285.

⁸⁸ Quoted in Government of Pakistan *White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute*, (Islamabad : Ministry of Foreign Affairs) January 1977, (henceforth, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*).

⁸⁹ Shastri was soon to take over as Prime Minister after the death of Nehru.

⁹⁰ See, *The Economist*, February 8, 1964 : 493-94, March 28, 1964 : 1194 and April 18, 1964 : 261. See, also, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 120.

Council to "consider the grave situation that [had] arisen in the State".⁹¹ However, the best that came out of the Security Council was a draft consensus which in essence asked India and Pakistan to find an amicable way of solving the dispute.⁹² To Pakistan, it became more obvious than ever before that the forum of the Security Council had virtually become ineffective even for the purpose of keeping the conflict alive. Thirdly and more importantly, the dilemma of Pakistan's foreign policy alignment became all the more acute in view of the US obsession with China so that the US link was no longer of any assistance.⁹³ Nor could the nascent Sino-Pakistan relations grow as an effective substitute because of the huge economic leverage the US exercised over Pakistan.

7.4.2 Release of Sheikh Abdullah 1964 - Hopes Frustrated

The holy relic episode also led New Delhi to release Sheikh Abdullah on March 30, 1964.⁹⁴ His release, however, created more confusion than leading to any clear cut direction. In his enthusiastic but characteristically ambiguous language, he began to talk of Kashmir's independence guaranteed by India and Pakistan, as a solution of Kashmir problem.⁹⁵ However, seeing the mood of the people, he told a gathering on April 23, 1964 that he would not come in their way if they chose to join Pakistan.⁹⁶ Nehru at this time had been talking about India and Pakistan's coming closer, "even constitutionally" to solve bilateral differences. Thus, there were three alternatives on the table : independence of Kashmir guaranteed possibly by an Indo-Pakistani condominium.⁹⁷ a "constitutional approach" leading to a "confederation" between India

⁹¹ See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

⁹² See, for text of the Security Council message, which was just a summation of the debate far from a resolution, Lakhanpal, *op. cit.* : 307-8.

⁹³ For example, on February 28, 1964, the US Assistant Secretary of State made the following non-committal statement, "It is not for us to say how the Kashmir dispute should be solved. It is for India and Pakistan and the people concerned to settle this complex problem". Quoted in the *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

⁹⁴ Abdullah's release was prompted by the thinking that a Kashmiri voice could bring some breakthrough in the stalemate. See, *The Economist*, April 4, 1964 : 20.

⁹⁵ Text of a statement by Sheikh Abdullah on May 12, 1964, may be found in *Hindu*, May 13, 1964, quoted in S. Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study in India Pakistan Relations* (Bombay : Asia Publishing House) 1966 : 392

⁹⁶ See, *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, August 1-8, 1964 : 20215.

⁹⁷ See, *The Round Table*, 54, September, 1964 : 388.

and Pakistan with Kashmir as a part,⁹⁸ and of course, Pakistan's well-known demand for a plebiscite. On release, Abdullah first met Prime Minister Nehru and then went to meet President Ayub. Sheikh Abdullah's visit to Pakistan aroused a lot of public enthusiasm, possibly on the expectation that he had Nehru's authority to bring about a breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan relations. But what he had to say was not at all liked by Pakistan. His proposal that Kashmir should become independent was rejected by Ayub Khan on the grounds that Kashmir could not be viable and instead it would become the "hotbed of international intrigues".⁹⁹ His proposal of confederation, which found favour in India, was, also, rejected in Pakistan because it smacked of undoing what the partition of the Subcontinent had achieved.¹⁰⁰ In the midst of his visit to Pakistan, Nehru died and Abdullah dropped his plan of visiting Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir and returned to New Delhi. Thus, if Sheikh Abdullah factor raised any optimism in Pakistan, the hopes were frustrated.

7.4.3 The Erosion of Kashmir's Autonomy 1964 - India's Final Touch on Integration

After the death of Nehru, Shastri displayed some initial conciliatory postures toward Pakistan. Pakistan also agreed to give him some time to allow Shastri to settle down. However, such conciliatory tones were soon gone as he proceeded to take the final step in integrating Kashmir completely within the Indian Union. On December 4, 1964, the Indian Government abolished the special status of Kashmir which was ensured under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. On December 21, the Indian President issued a proclamation and assumed the powers and functions of both Government and legislature of Kashmir and declared that "the state's inclusion in the Union was complete, final and irrevocable".¹⁰¹ The Pakistan

⁹⁸ For some more details of the confederation idea, see, S. D. Muni, "India and Regionalism in South Asia", a paper presented at a seminar on 'Continuity and Change in India's Foreign Policy' held in New Delhi, May 1978, quoted in Muni, *op. cit.* : 48.

⁹⁹ See, Feldman, *op. cit.* : 131.

¹⁰⁰ See, Feldman, *ibid* : 130.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 286-87. The designation of the head of the Kashmir state was also changed from *Sadr-i-Ryasat* to Governor in line with other Indian states. See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 391. See also, Shaheen Akhtar, "Uprising in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir", *Regional Studies*, IX(2), Spring 1991 : 12-13.

Government's reaction was bitter as the move not only violated the Security Council's draft consensus of May 1964, it also further distanced any hope of settlement.

Reactions inside the Kashmir Valley were, however, of some significance to Pakistan. Widespread unrest was stirred under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah's newly launched Plebiscite Front. On January 15, 1965, a 'protest day' was observed throughout the State leading to police firing in Srinagar. Sheikh Abdullah addressed a huge public meeting and appealed to the people of Kashmir to "defeat the purpose of those who are trying to tighten the chains of slavery on the Muslims of Kashmir."¹⁰² He also declared, "You cannot achieve freedom by imploring anybody and in view of India's present attitude you have to think how to face her effectively."¹⁰³ The desire for a plebiscite was reinforced among people, who were "determined to die on their feet rather than live on their knees."¹⁰⁴ As a result India shifted its policy from a "selective pruning of the movement's most radical elements to [an] all out suppression."¹⁰⁵ Reports of such repression charged the people of Pakistan emotionally and the leadership determined to utilise the popular discontent and the movements to its advantage.

7.4.4 The Re-arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1965

If the release of Sheikh Abdullah aroused popular expectations, his rearrest again whipped up resentment and more unrests sending further confirmed signal to Pakistan that India was fast losing its links with Kashmir. Amidst the popular unrests, Sheikh Abdullah proceeded to Mecca for pilgrimage. In the course of his travels, Abdullah made some statements in favour of Kashmir's autonomy. He went to Algiers and met Chou Enlai there, much to the chagrin of the Indian Government. In the face of the Opposition pressure in the Parliament the Government felt it had no alternative but to arrest Abdullah again. More trouble and firing on crowds followed in

¹⁰² Quoted in "Pakistan : Pakistan's Case in Kashmir" *The Round Table*, 56(221), December 1965 : 76.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ See, Patricia C. Sympton, *The Kashmir Dispute in World Politics* (Ann Arbor, Michigan : University Microfilms Inc.) 1969 : 58.

¹⁰⁵ See, J. Anthony Lucas, "India acts to crush Kashmir movement aimed at plebiscite", *New York Times*, October 25, 1965 : 1.

Srinagar.¹⁰⁶ The Plebiscite Front and the Awami Action Committee, headed by Maulavi Farooq, campaigned for Abdullah's release. As Maulavi Farooq wanted accession to Pakistan and the Plebiscite Front's demand for a plebiscite also came close to such a position, "there appeared to be much pro-Pakistan sentiment among some of the vocal elements in Kashmir in early 1965. In these conditions Pakistan tried to seize the initiative."¹⁰⁷

To summarise the impact of the Abdullah factor, for India it only heightened the sense of urgency to integrate Kashmir within its body politic. On the other hand, Pakistan had got just the reverse signals. In fact, the prospects of internal upheaval in Kashmir, as signified by the incident of the theft of the holy relic and the emotions and hopes aroused over the release and re-arrest of Abdullah were mixed up together. Abdullah's relations with New Delhi remained estranged for most of the post-partition period; he was also aware of the popular sentiments of the Muslims, which were apparently at least favourable to Pakistan, yet he did not come closer to Pakistan. When on pilgrimage, his passport was impounded by the Indian authorities and he was asked to return to New Delhi. The Pakistan Government offered to provide him with a Pakistani passport, but he declined and returned to New Delhi to be arrested.¹⁰⁸ It seems these sobering aspects of the Abdullah factor did not receive any serious thought in Pakistan amidst the euphoria created by the popular sentiments and unrests. However, the link between these signals and what happened in the bilateral domain from August 1965 onward was provided by a brief military encounter between India and Pakistan in the Spring of 1965.

7.4.5 Brief Encounters in the Rann of Kutch, April 1965 : Nerve Testing for Bigger Battles

The brief encounters in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 were but one in a long series of hostile interactions between the two neighbours, yet it was the biggest armed clash between them since 1948.¹⁰⁹ In a sense, it was also a prelude to still bigger battles which followed less than six

¹⁰⁶ See, *Dawn*, April 11, 1965.

¹⁰⁷ Tariq Rahman, "The Kashmir Problem : A Brief Survey", *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, X1(2), July-December 1990 : 5-6.

¹⁰⁸ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 209.

¹⁰⁹ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 288.

months later over the more pressing problem of Kashmir. The problem in the Rann¹¹⁰ of Kutch was a colonial legacy of undemarcated boundaries. During the British period there were claims and counter-claims over about 3,500 square miles of these barren and marshy lands between the Princely state of Kutch which became part of Indian state of Gujarat, and the Sind Province, which became part of Pakistan. During the partition, India claimed the whole of the Rann on the basis of historical evidence including British maps, while Pakistan also claimed the northern half on some historical basis as well as the grounds that the Rann being virtually an inland sea should be divided on the middle. Accordingly Pakistan continued to administer the northern half and maintained a police post at Chad Bet within that half.¹¹¹ In 1956, however, Indian forces, under air cover, dislodged the Pakistani post and occupied it.¹¹² Pakistan protested but the matter was kept at that, excepting that in 1960 the dispute found a place in the Ayub-Nehru talks.¹¹³

In the first quarter of 1965, when the situation in Kashmir was also tense, it became evident to Pakistan that India was making a heavy military build-up in the Rann. The 21st Indian Infantry Division was deployed in the area, the headquarters of the Indian armed forces in Gujarat was shifted forward to the Rann, and large-scale naval and military exercises were also carried out in March. The Pakistani version was that India started two offensive moves, one on April 4 and the other on April 8, on the Pakistani post at Ding within Pakistani territory and they were unsuccessful. Pakistan started a counter-offensive on April 9 and thus began the "little war".¹¹⁴ India, on the other hand, claimed that from the beginning of the year Pakistani forces had been patrolling the area and establishing posts in Indian territory.¹¹⁵ It was also claimed that in March

¹¹⁰ *Rann* means barren, waste or desolate land.

¹¹¹ Pakistan's claim over the Rann was based on the alignment of pillars erected during 1924, the boundary ran half way through the Rann. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 214. Also an acceptance of the Indian position would take the international frontier to the shore of Sind. Pakistan argued that the Rann was basically a sea and the boundary should, therefore, be the middle of the waterbody. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 255 and his note 8 : 272.

¹¹² For some details, see, *The Economist*, March 3, 1956 : 544. For the Pakistani version of the incidents, see, the Government of Pakistan, *The Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debate*, Karachi, March 9, 1956 : 230-31.

¹¹³ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 289. The parties agreed to maintain the *status quo* pending a *de jure* settlement of the dispute. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 214.

¹¹⁴ See, *ibid* : 289-90.

¹¹⁵ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* 255. For the Indian point of view, see, Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Pakistan's Aggression in Kutch*, New Delhi, 1965.

1965 the Pakistani police occupied the post of Kanjarkot and some other points on the Indian side. On April 9, Pakistani forces shelled two Indian outposts south of Kanjarkot heavily and India protested against such "unprovoked, utterly lawless and aggressive attacks".¹¹⁶ Whoever started the clashes,¹¹⁷ a series of military engagements involving tanks and armoured cars followed, between April 19-29, 1965.¹¹⁸ Coupled with this, a fierce war mongering started between the two capitals. Indian response to a cease-fire call by Pakistan was that it was unacceptable so long as Kanjarkot was not evacuated by Pakistan.¹¹⁹ On April 28, Shastri threatened military action against Pakistan on a battleground of India's own choice.¹²⁰ Ayub replied that this would mean "a general and total war between India and Pakistan".¹²¹ The Indian side moved its forces very close to the border in an offensive posture, as Pakistan complained in a letter to the Security Council on May 8.¹²² Coupled with these threatening postures and exchange of acrimonies, spasmodic fighting continued until June 30, when eventually an agreement was signed through the mediation of the British Government.¹²³

The agreement provided, *inter alia*, for a disengagement of the armies, and a mechanism for settlement of the dispute through ministerial meetings and failing that, by an arbitration tribunal of "independent persons".¹²⁴ Although fears were expressed that the battles might not be confined to the barren Kutch but could spread to Kashmir, it proved to be unfounded, at least for the time being. The hope that the positive impact of the agreement would improve the overall bilateral relations¹²⁵ were, however, belied by the events that soon began to be unfolding in Kashmir.

¹¹⁶ See, *Annual Register*, 1965, Vol. 207, 1966 : 81-82.

¹¹⁷ For claims and counter-claims, see, *The Economist*, May 1, 1965 : 513. Feldman puts it interestingly, in view of the difficulty of establishing who initiated the battles, by saying "both sides fired the first shot". See, Feldman, *op. cit.* : 134.

¹¹⁸ For details of the description of the conflict, see, conflict case, "Rann of Kutch #2, 1965-69" in Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 390-91.

¹¹⁹ See, *Annual Register*, *op. cit.* : 82.

¹²⁰ See, *Statesman*, April 29, 1965.

¹²¹ See, *Sunday Times* [London], May 2, 1965.

¹²² See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 291.

¹²³ See, *Annual Register* 1965, *op. cit.* : 82.

¹²⁴ On February 19, 1968, the Tribunal constituted by the agreement of the parties, awarded 90% of the Rann to India and 10% (about 300 square miles) to Pakistan. The border was subsequently demarcated and the tribunal formally dissolved in September 1969. See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 391.

¹²⁵ The "self-implementing" dispute settlement mechanism in the context of the Rann of Kutch issue included several alternatives in the event of disagreement. This vindicated the Pakistani suggestion of similar

The brief battle had far more significant psychological impact on both the combatants. It seems that the Pakistani troops had the better of the fighting and captured a fair quantity of warlike stores, less perhaps through their own prowess than through the mistakes of the Indian planning in putting its supply depots too far forward and without adequate protection.¹²⁶ The relative advantages that Pakistan had in the field seemed to have "convince[d] Ayub Khan that the Pakistani soldier had demonstrated a clear superiority over his Indian counterpart and that Indian forces in the Rann had displayed a feebleness comparable with their performance against the Chinese in 1962."¹²⁷ This was a very crucial conclusion and it had its bearing on the decision making process regarding Kashmir some months later. Moreover, the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the Kutch were as bitter as ever. Heated debate ensued in India as a backlash to the amicable settlement of the Kutch, which was viewed in India as a weakness. The hard talking in turn generated reactions in Pakistan. Even in Pakistan, which had welcomed the arbitration proposal, warlike feelings persisted and were reflected in Ayub Khan's broadcast on June 1, 1965 :

We have made it clear, time and again, that we do not want war. ... Our abhorrence of war does not, however, mean that we are not going to defend our country if attacked. I visited the troops on the front and found them in high spirits. I am confident that if war is forced on us, the fighting forces of Pakistan will give an excellent account of themselves.¹²⁸

By then, however, preparations were afoot, at least on the Pakistan side so that the Pakistani soldiers would get an opportunity to give an account of themselves in Kashmir itself.

For a balanced point of view, however, the Rann of Kutch episode bore a deeper meaning for Kashmir in terms of each other's military and psychological disposition. According to Feldman, the Rann of Kutch affair might be considered as a "mutually conducted experiment in nerve-testing, in which each side was trying to determine how far they would go in a confrontation of troops across the international border."¹²⁹ The situation in Kashmir in the

measures as far back as 1951 in response to Nehru's single step No-War declaration. See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹²⁶ See, Feldman, *op. cit.* : 135.

¹²⁷ *Ibid* : 135.

¹²⁸ *Ibid* : 136.

¹²⁹ *Ibid* : 133-34. Lamb argues in similar vein, "one has the distinct impression of a reconnaissance in force by both sides, each trying to feel out the other's weakness." See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 256.

meantime was tense and it seemed that both sides were readily disposed for an encounter over any irritant. Indeed, arguably the Rann incident had "removed the psychological barriers. It proved that an armed confrontation between India and Pakistan across an international boundary was possible. Moreover, this brief skirmish had enlivened people's interest and concern with the idea of war."¹³⁰ And the war, in fact, was not far away, because some kind of preparation had started amidst the very peace talks on the Rann of Kutch.

7.5 The September 1965 War

7.5.1 Infiltration Tactics Again - 'Operation Gibraltar' and Clashes Across the Cease Fire Line

If the Rann of Kutch affair showed arguably that a war between India and Pakistan was militarily possible, the political impetus may have been provided much earlier, as we have seen, through the growing fluidity over the status of Kashmir. India had earlier made it clear to Pakistan that "Kashmir is a settled fact which cannot be the subject of debate or negotiations".¹³¹ Realising that neither a reference of the case to the Security Council nor mediation or bilateral negotiations would bring any positive outcome, Pakistan had two options left : forgetting all about Kashmir and accepting the *status quo*; or adopting such other measures as Pakistan thought appropriate, irrespective of other powers and agencies - that is, going it alone. From what appeared during June, July and August 1965, without the benefit of hindsight of what happened in late August and September 1965, it may be argued that Ayub Government, or "rather a small coterie within it"¹³² chose for "an independent course of action, not excluding the use of Pakistan's armed forces should that become necessary".¹³³ Although the exact nature of preparations was not

¹³⁰ For example, the *Dawn* in its June 6, 1965 edition carried an article entitled, "Where are India's West-equipped Mountain Divisions?". It stated among other things, that if India forced a war on Pakistan, the correct strategy for Pakistan would "obviously be to go for a knock-out in the Mohamed Ali Clay style." Quoted from Feldman, *op. cit.* : 140.

¹³¹ See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*. The Indian Prime Minister also made it abundantly clear to Ayub that "in any negotiations for a permanent settlement of the dispute, Pakistan must accept Jammu and Kashmir as a constituent State of the Indian Union. According to India, Pakistan had no claim whatsoever in or to Jammu and Kashmir." See, B. L. Sharma, *The Kashmir Story*, (New York : Asia Publishing House) 1967 : 189.

¹³² See, Tariq Rahman, *op. cit.* : 6.

¹³³ See, Feldman *op. cit.* : 139.

evident at that time, it seems recruitment and training started as early as June 1965.¹³⁴

The basic purpose of the initiative, code named, 'Operation Gibraltar',¹³⁵ was to "defreeze the issue" of Kashmir through undertaking deep-raids inside the Indian part of Kashmir and eventually to initiate a long-term guerrilla war to make it impossible for India to hold on.¹³⁶

While the sense of urgency was provided by "India's intractability ...to resolve the deadlock",¹³⁷ the erosion of Kashmir's autonomy, and more importantly, the impending adverse military balance because of Pakistan's allies' decision to arm India on a long term basis, the possible factors that influenced Ayub's decision to create unrest leading to the use of military force for the acquisition of the territory were several fold. Ayub's convincing victory in the 1965 presidential elections enhanced his level of confidence in the people's mandate for his initiative.¹³⁸ He may also have banked upon a possible support from China and Indonesia the assurance of which Ayub received during his extensive foreign tours¹³⁹ The poor performance of the Indian troops in the Sino-Indian border wars and the perceived or apparent superior performance of Pakistani troops during the brief Rann of Kutch war, both served to convince Ayub that an open confrontation with India was possible. Political developments in Kashmir

¹³⁴ The Pakistani Government, of course, argued that the whole episode was a spontaneous revolt of the people of Kashmir joined by their brethren across the highly artificial cease-fire line. See, Choudhury. *op. cit.* : 293-94. There are different Pakistani versions as well of the episodes in the Summer and Autumn of 1965. Asghar Khan (Air Marshall), *The First Round : The Study of Pakistan Army* (New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd) 1979, which is critical of the trio - President Ayub, Foreign Minister Bhutto and Army Chief General Musa - regarding the advisability of the whole operation; Maj. General Musa, *My Version : India-Pakistan War 1965* (Islamabad : Wazidalis) 1983, which is critical of the Foreign Minister and his Secretary while defending the role of the Army and President Ayub. Bhutto and the Foreign Ministry's defence of their own role comes in Government of Pakistan, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*, which was published simultaneously by all major dailies in Pakistan, 16-18 January 1977.

¹³⁵ The word, *Gibraltar* is a corruption of "Gebel(mountain) of Tareq". Tareq was a famous Arab General who crossed North Africa into Spain, burned his boats behind so that there was no going back and eventually reached the mountainous peninsula in the Atlantic, the present Gibraltar. Basically, the operation was code named so in order to symbolise the valour as well as determination of the Pakistani generals. See, "War over Kashmir", *Newsweek*, September 20, 1965 : 33.

¹³⁶ See, Musa, *op. cit.* : 2. According to the then President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Qayyum : "our action in 1965 could possibly have a dual purpose; one, a test of strength of the armies facing each other and two, in the least, to revive the Kashmir issue so as to drag it closer to a possible solution by making it difficult for India to remain inside Kashmir." See, Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayyum Khan, *Brief Note on Operation 'Gibraltar'* (Rawalpindi : publisher not mentioned) 1987 : 3.

¹³⁷ See, Musa, *ibid* : 2.

¹³⁸ See, K. P. Misra, M. V. Lakhi and Virendra Narain, *Pakistan's Search for Constitutional Consensus* (New Delhi : Impex India) 1967 : 164-75, quoted in Muni, *op. cit.* : 44.

¹³⁹ See, Feldman, *op. cit.* : 149.

were believed to send signals that the Kashmiri people were prepared to rise against Indian authority. The belief was, no doubt, fortified by some Kashmiri leaders who later were to participate in the 'Provisional Government'.¹⁴⁰ A belief also existed that irrespective of the military pressure that Pakistan might exert on Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government would not extend the war across international frontiers in the Punjab or elsewhere in order to relieve the pressure. In fact, the advocates of the initiative also argued that the impact of Pakistan's action in the counter-offensive phase, code named 'Operation Grandslam' in Akhnur deep inside Kashmir would be so decisive that "India would simply be overwhelmed."¹⁴¹

The Gibraltar forces consisted of about 7,000 *Mujahedin* (meaning those who fight in the cause of religion) from Azad Kashmir equipped with light machine guns and mortars, besides personal weapons and wireless sets. Some air drops of stores and commodities were also made.¹⁴² The Pakistani aided infiltrators began pouring into the Kashmir Valley across the cease fire line on August 5, 1965.¹⁴³ On August 9, it was announced that a Revolutionary Council had been set up in Jammu and Kashmir. Disturbances broke out in Srinagar.¹⁴⁴ Rioting and civil commotion engulfed the Valley throughout August and by the end of August the Indian

¹⁴⁰ See, *ibid* : 150.

¹⁴¹ Source : *Interview* in Islamabad, August 1991. The initiative referred to here was the much-talked-about letter that Bhutto wrote to Ayub on May 12, 1965 in which he argued that "India is at present in no mood to risk a general war of unlimited duration for the annihilation of Pakistan". The fervent appeal of Bhutto ended thus : "This is our hour of decision and may God guide us on the right path." See, *White Paper, Pakistan*, 1977. While Bhutto in his letter quotes Pakistani intelligence sources to make his point on the morale of the Pakistani "nameless soldiers", he simply makes a presumptuous conclusion on the likely pattern of India's reactions. Bhutto in his letter also said that the United States had assured him that if the war was confined to Kashmir, India would not attack Pakistan. See, Agha Hussain Hamadani, "Self-determination as a Base of Kashmir's Freedom : A Case Study of Indo-Pak Relations", unpublished paper presented at a seminar at the Queen Elizabeth House on 19 June 1991 : 12. See, in this context, the interesting self-critique of the 1965 war in various issues of *The Muslim* (Islamabad) during February 1987 compiled in the *Strategic Digest* (New Delhi), Vol. XVI(2), February 1987 : 243-62. Also see, a special issue of *Mehdi Papers* brought out from Karachi by one of the war veterans of 1965, under the banner of Mehdi Foundation, Karachi.

¹⁴² See, Musa, *op. cit.* : 36-37. See, also, "Violence in the Vale", *Time*, August 20, 1965 : 31.

¹⁴³ The Pakistani Law Minister, Mr. S. M. Zafar told the Security Council on September 18, that the Azad Kashmir Government had provided arms to Kashmiris living along the cease-fire line for self-defence. The step was taken because of repeated cease-fire violations by India. Most of these men were ex-servicemen and many of them joined their brethren in Indian-held Kashmir when they rose in revolt on August 8, 1965. See, "Pakistan : Pakistani Case in Kashmir", *op. cit.* : 77.

¹⁴⁴ Tareq Abdullah, elder son of Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader in Indian jail around this time, wrote in British newspapers, including *The Economist*, that the Kashmiri people had risen in a revolt against India. See, Feldman, *op. cit.* : 142.

Government also admitted that some damage had been done by the infiltrators.¹⁴⁵

India's reactions to the infiltration were violent. By the second week of August one third of the infiltrators had been either captured or killed by the Indian forces.¹⁴⁶ Indian forces decided to strike at the source of the infiltration in Azad Kashmir and accordingly they crossed the cease-fire line on August 14 and on next day they reoccupied three posts near Kargil, which they had earlier vacated on June 30. "Seemingly encouraged by the silence of Pakistan's President Mohammad Ayub Khan, India stepped up the tempo."¹⁴⁷ On August 22, the Indian Prime Minister announced that India would carry the fight to the Pakistan side.¹⁴⁸ Until September 1, the Indian forces occupied a number of territories on the Pakistan side of Kashmir, including vital Tithwal and Haji Pir passes.¹⁴⁹ The Indian forces also decided to "correct the cease fire line where it bulged toward the Kashmir capital Srinagar : the salient was reduced from about eighty miles to sixteen".¹⁵⁰

It soon became evident that, in the face of heavy odds and because of very poor planning without taking the Kashmiri leaders on both sides of the cease-fire line into confidence,¹⁵¹ the 'Operation Gibraltar' was not going to succeed. Then the second phase of Pakistan's plan, code named 'Operation Grandslam' began. By the end of August, it became known that Azad Kashmir forces, supported by units of Pakistan Regular Army, had crossed the cease-fire line and were operating in Jammu and Kashmir against Indian forces.¹⁵² The situation snowballed rapidly into a crisis. The Pakistani forces made their way up to Akhnur and Chhamb, threatening to strike at the

¹⁴⁵ Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul wrote: "It was surprising that such a large number of men had managed to slip across our borders supposed to be so vigilantly guarded and our ignorance in advance of their plans to do so. In some areas, such as Budil, in Riasi Tehsil, in the Jammu sector, it took us considerable effort to get rid of the administration which the infiltrators had set up there." See his *The Untold Stories* (Bombay : Allied Publishers) 1967 : 472. For news reports on the infiltration, see, "Violence in the Vale", *Time*, August 20, 1965.

¹⁴⁶ See, "A Matter of Honour", *Time*, September 10, 1965.

¹⁴⁷ See, Sympson, *op. cit.* : 53.

¹⁴⁸ See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*. Also see, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 339. The Indian Defence Minister later stated in the Parliament : "Whenever India had found it necessary to cross the cease-fire line to defend it, she had done so and I have no doubt we are ready to do so again". See, "Pakistan's Case in Kashmir", *ibid* : 77.

¹⁴⁹ See, Sympson, *op. cit.* : 53.

¹⁵⁰ See, *Time*, September 10, 1965 : 21. An official in Delhi said, "The United Nations has not been able to see to it that the cease fire line is observed. India has taken the task upon itself." See, Sympson, *ibid* : 54.

¹⁵¹ There has been a consensus among the critics of the 1965 war that this was a serious lacuna. See, *ibid*. Also see, Abdul Qayyum Khan, *op. cit.* : 11

¹⁵² See, *Dawn*, 31 August, 1965.

vital road that connects Jammu and Srinagar. The evident intention of their thrust was to snap the vital communication and supply lines of India. While they were successful in Chhamb, it was again because of bad planning and some administrative problems. However, they failed to capture Akhnur, strategically vital for Indian lines of communication and supplies.¹⁵³ As Pakistan forces intensified their thrust into Akhnur, India crossed international borders on 6 September near Lahore, and later near Sialkot, radically altering the nature and intensity of the war.¹⁵⁴

7.5.2 India's Crossing of International Borders and Full Scale War

The critical Pakistani assumption that India would not risk widening the scope of the war was disproved when Indian troops launched a three-pronged drive towards Lahore before dawn on September 6, 1965. The thrust was also accompanied by a simultaneous advance towards another major Pakistani city, Sialkot, along the border with Jammu. India also made a move toward Sind to tie up one division of the Pakistan army there.¹⁵⁵ According to a message received by Harold Wilson from the UN sources, the mobilisation was massive and "India's aim was the military defeat of Pakistan".¹⁵⁶ A major tank battle ensued. Another tank battle developed near Khemkaran on the Indian side when a column of Pakistani Patton tanks proceeded toward the Indian city of Amritsar in Eastern Punjab.¹⁵⁷ The fighting was concentrated in the western sector. Apart from very limited engagements, Eastern Pakistan did not witness any fighting. It is argued that India being sensitive to the rising nationalism in Eastern Pakistan limited its action there.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ This is another issue that is debated still in Pakistan. Some even suspect that the administrative changes that the Government effected in terms of transferring the commanding officer elsewhere at this critical point of time was because of American pressure. See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*. However, this conspiracy theory has been rejected by General Musa while defending the role of GHQ and that of President Ayub. See, Musa, *op. cit.* : 39-41.

¹⁵⁴ *The Round Table* correspondent writing from New Delhi held that the Indian move was also in response to the Pakistani design of a "thrust - this time towards the Punjab or even Delhi" for which Pakistan was massing its first armoured division with supporting forces. See, "India : The Indian Approach to Kashmir", *The Round Table*, 56(221), December 1965 : 72. Gen Musa's account, however, asserts that he ordered Pakistan army to the battle locations on the night of September 4 after their "forward formations and intelligence agencies started reporting unusual vehicular movements opposite their areas of responsibility, particularly in Lahore and Kasur sectors" from September 3 onwards. See, Musa, *ibid* : 47.

¹⁵⁵ See, *The Economist*, September 11, 1965 : 954.

¹⁵⁶ See, Harold Wilson's letter to Noel Baker, published in *Dawn*, January 6, 1966.

¹⁵⁷ See, Ganguly, *op. cit.* : 89.

¹⁵⁸ For all practical purposes, Pakistan's military preparations were concentrated in Western Pakistan, and the East Pakistanis felt vulnerable to possible Indian attack. This became an issue between East Pakistani

Amidst claims and counter-claims it turned out that both sides suffered heavy casualties. A more significant military aspect was that neither side was able to attain their respective military objectives. Indeed, a stalemate developed on all fronts. This resulted in a decline in the will to fight, especially in Pakistan. Moreover, intense pressure was brought to bear on both the combatants to halt the fighting.

On September 6, the US Ambassador in Pakistan met Ayub Khan and expressed the US annoyance for initiating the war.¹⁵⁹ On September 8, the US State Department announced the imposition of an arms embargo on both the combatants. Pakistan expressed protests and resentment that the US was equating Pakistan, an ally, with India.¹⁶⁰ While Pakistan's main concern was accepting a cease-fire that contained a self-implementing aspect regarding the settlement of the Kashmir problem, both the USA and UK tried only to bring about an end to hostilities without linking such conditions to a cease-fire. The issue could be taken up. The US Presidential Assistant also warned Pakistan of President Johnson's "annoyance with Pakistan" and made it "crystal clear that Pakistan could not expect U.S. assistance in case of a conflict with India", further adding that "a double defeat for the Indian armed forces ... coming after the debacle with China in 1962 ... would be intolerable for India."¹⁶¹ On September 12, Pakistan appealed for assistance to all friendly countries including China. On 16 September came the Chinese ultimatum to India threatening to open a third front of the war unless India removed its deployment from the Sikkim sector. The ultimatum read :

[The] Indian Government has always pursued a policy of chauvinism and expansionism towards its neighbouring countries. ... The question now is that India

political leaders and the central Government of Pakistan, culminating in the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. See, Section 8.2.1 in Chapter VIII.

¹⁵⁹ The Ambassador equated the use of force in a disputed territory with that across international frontiers. The Ambassador during the meeting at least three times used the expression, "India has you by the throat". One of the reasons for US annoyance was the fact that earlier the US tried to prevail on Pakistan not to attack Akhnur in Kashmir on the assurance that India in that case would not cross the international frontier. See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹⁶⁰ The US argument was that such a measure was intended merely to lend support to the efforts of the UN Secretary General to bring about a cease-fire vide his call for the cessation of hostilities on 6 September 1965. The Pakistan Foreign Minister made a frantic plea, "if you sell arms to us, we'll sell and barter our commodities, our gold and whatever we have", to which the Ambassador's reply was, that he had no brief from Washington. See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹⁶¹ See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

has not only refused to recognize the right of of the Kashmiri people to self-determination, but openly launched an all-out armed attack against Pakistan. This cannot but arouse [a] grave concern of the Chinese Government. ... The Chinese Government now demands that the Indian Government dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself within three days of the delivery of the present note ...; otherwise the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.¹⁶²

It is believed that Pakistan's understanding with China was that the Pakistan Government would hold on the ground in the battlefield. But as soon as the ultimatum was issued, the Pakistan Government faced two frontal attacks – diplomatically, the Government was thrown on the defensive by the USA and UK that Pakistan had a role in the ultimatum. On the military front, the pressure from India was intensified. Despite unwillingness of a section of the decision making élite from the Foreign Ministry and the GHQ to cease-fire, Pakistan began to soften. President Ayub was quoted on September 19, that Pakistan was ready to accept a cease-fire even if it did not include a guaranteed plebiscite in Kashmir, as Pakistan had demanded it earlier.¹⁶³ Thus, the Chinese ultimatum fizzled out¹⁶⁴ and instead of a public denunciation, President Ayub confirmed to the UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson, on the insistence of the British High Commissioner, that he had told the Chinese Government to keep out of the present conflict.¹⁶⁵ The Pakistani White Paper, thus, laments :

The direct sequel to this concerted diplomatic offensive by the Great Powers which had secured from President Ayub Khan an agreement to forestall any possible Chinese intervention - even though it might have been of benefit to the cause of the people of Kashmir and strengthened Pakistan's position - was the cease-fire of 23 September.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Quoted in *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹⁶³ See, *The New York Times*, September 19, 1965.

¹⁶⁴ The Indian version has been that the Indian forces were in strength in Sikkim and this together with a warning from the USA and the Soviet Union led to a "hasty retreat" of the Chinese. See, "India : Indian Approach to Kashmir", *op. cit* : 73. But the *White Paper* that the Pakistan Government brought out argued that Pakistan in the face of strong pressure from the USA and the UK could not play its part, thus the Chinese cooled down. China, on the other hand, claimed that in the face of ultimatum, India did dismantle one of its military post in the Sikkim-China border. It is also reported that India wanted tactical air support from the West if necessary. See, *The Economist*, September 25, 1965 : 1177.

¹⁶⁵ See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

7.5.3 The Cease-fire and Mediation

The will to fight began to decline soon after the initiation of the war, as both sides failed to catch each other by surprise. The peace process, however, was as tortuous as ever.¹⁶⁷ The UN Secretary General, U Thant had been trying to bring about an end to the hostilities. The Security Council called for cease-fire on both sides on September 4.¹⁶⁸ On September 6 again, the Security Council passed a resolution calling upon both parties to end the fighting. But both sides added preconditions to their acceptance.¹⁶⁹ Thus, the Security Council's deadline for a cease-fire of September 14, 1965 expired with the fighting still continuing. After much negotiations by the UK and USA, both parties accepted the Security Council resolution of September 20, on the basis of which the cease-fire was effected at 3.30 am, September 23, 1965, instead of 12 noon on September 22, as originally scheduled, possibly both sides wanted to hurry to consolidate territorial gains before silencing the guns.¹⁷⁰

The Security Council resolution of September 20, provided for negotiations between India and Pakistan for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. However, once the cease-fire was effected, the post-cease-fire diplomacy leading to the Tashkent Declaration of January 10, 1966, virtually wiped the Kashmir problem from the formal domain of India-Pakistan relations.

The cease-fire on Kashmir was followed by President Ayub's visit to the USA during December 12-14, 1965. The main concerns of President Ayub were some kind of assurance from the USA that the Kashmir problem would be solved and economic assistance resumed. The US Administration, however, told Ayub candidly that they would not use aid as a lever against India. Moreover, Pakistan was advised politely to forget about the type of solution it wanted for Kashmir.¹⁷¹ The USA once again conveyed their annoyance at Pakistan's China connection,

¹⁶⁷ See, *The Economist*, September 18, 1965 : 1076.

¹⁶⁸ See, *Annual Register* Vol. 207, 1965 : 67.

¹⁶⁹ For details of the conditions, see, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹⁷⁰ According to Russell Brines, "the [Indian] army was given sufficient time to inflict more attrition on the Pakistani forces but not enough to launch a more punishing offensive." See, Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London : Pall Mall Press) 1968 : 347.

¹⁷¹ For details of what went in Washington during President Ayub's visit, see, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

especially, in view of growing US involvement in Vietnam.¹⁷²

In the meantime, Soviet leader Kosygin offered to mediate between India and Pakistan. Both the parties accepted the offer. Accordingly a summit conference was held at Tashkent from January 3-10, 1966. Pakistan insisted on an agreement including some kind of "self-executing mechanism" for a post-war settlement of the Kashmir problem. The mediators forewarned Pakistan that linking the Kashmir issue with any agreement on normalisation would lead to a deadlock. Pakistan also, it appeared, dreaded any deadlock. All that India agreeable to was to sign a friendship treaty or no-war declaration.¹⁷³ The tortuous talks resulted in a Joint Declaration, known as the Tashkent Declaration, in which no mention of the settlement of the Kashmir problem was indicated. Of course, non-committal statement was added :

They [the participants at Tashkent] considered that the interests of peace in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of Pakistan and India were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.¹⁷⁴

A significant aspect of the declaration was the withdrawal of troops to their respective positions before August 5, 1965. As neither side gained any major military victory, the withdrawal did not pose any major problem, although the problem of cease-fire violations continued as before.¹⁷⁵

In a longer time frame, however, the Tashkent process did not solve any of the outstanding problems other than restoring the pre-war military situation in Kashmir. India did not get a 'no-war' pact, and the Pakistani people viewed the Tashkent agreement as a sell out.¹⁷⁶ This, together with the fluid situation in Eastern Pakistan, led to a internal crisis in Pakistan, culminating in another India-Pakistan war and the birth of Bangladesh. This, however, will constitute the partial subject matter of the succeeding chapter

¹⁷² See, Brines, *op. cit.* : 349.

¹⁷³ See, *White Paper, Pakistan, 1977*.

¹⁷⁴ For text of the Tashkent Declaration, see, *Pakistan Horizon*, 43(2), April 1990 : 118-20.

¹⁷⁵ See, Choudhury, *op. cit.* : 302.

¹⁷⁶ See, Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power : Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982* (New Delhi : Sage Publications) 1984 : 198. For popular reactions in Pakistan, see, "Pakistan : passions not yet spent", *The Economist*, January 22, 1966 : 296-97.

7.6 Conclusions

The second Kashmir war of 1965 may apparently be viewed as an outcome of a linear development of events from one war to another. The two combatants fought inconclusive battles over the fate of Kashmir in 1947-48. They agreed almost readily on the principle of settling the conflict at an early stage, yet they failed for eighteen years to agree on the procedure of implementing the agreed formula of a plebiscite in Kashmir. The stronger party, that is India, had an interest in preserving the *status quo* of the outcome of the inconclusive battle and used all its influence to wipe out the formal dimension of the conflict both internally through constitutional measures and externally through deft manoeuvring with the UN mediation process. The aggrieved party, that is Pakistan, on the other hand, was driven to desperation with every such attempt of the stronger party and when possible avenues of peaceful resolution were exhausted, it resorted to violence and the second war began.

However, persistence of the conflict over such a long tension-ridden interregnum cannot be explained without reference to several forces – local, regional and extra-regional – with which the Kashmir question got linked up. The present chapter, in an attempt to explain the second flare up on Kashmir in 1965, dealt with two critical stimulants. One was Cold War inputs, initially in the latter part of 1950s but in a reinforced form in the early to mid-1960s. The other was the internal developments in the Indian side of Kashmir in the 1960s. The burden of the Chapter lay in understanding the process through which these linkages and feedback culminated in the second Kashmir war.

In one sense, Cold War had been actively present and influential in Subcontinental politics because Pakistan was an active member of the Western alliance. In the 1960s, even if Pakistan was somewhat sidetracked, India was courted in all earnestness in the context of the Sino-Indian border war. Yet, in another sense, Cold War had at best a derivative interest in the affairs of the Subcontinent, and thus, the regional issues remained subservient to the global interests of the protagonists of Cold War, especially the West. Even within the domain of secondary importance of the region of South Asia in Great Power politics, their linkage with the two local antagonists

was asymmetrical. For Pakistan, Kashmir and the Cold War were, at best, tangentially linked. Cold war efforts were aimed at sucking Pakistan into its fold without any commitment on Kashmir, while Pakistan's whole efforts were aimed at sucking Cold War into Kashmir context. The intense sense of frustration generated out of this inability was reinforced by the West's generous arms assistance to India initially on an emergency basis, in the midst and aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, and later on a long term basis. One important motive of the initiation of the infiltrators' raid in Kashmir that eventually led to the full-scale war, was to preempt the emerging military balance out of this assistance to India and of course, to find out a military solution of the Kashmir problem. However, no less important than the question of military balance was the decoupling of the West's assistance from a possible solution to the Kashmir problem.

In the process of discussing the role of Cold War, it was also possible to observe the linkages and feedback of the conflict with other contemporaneous conflicts in South Asia. In the preceding chapter, we have argued that the diffusion process worked mainly within the bilateral domain, excepting some indirect links with Hyderabad and Junagadh. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kashmir got linked up with Sino-Indian border war. Had the Chinese ultimatum worked, the war would have spread over a greater battlefield across the Himalayan borders between India and China. Moreover, it was highly likely that the other Powers would have been brought in had China intervened. Apart from this deterrent, it is possible to argue that war is perhaps too serious a business to spread across geographical boundaries, and more importantly, through the vehicle of friendship or alliance. The limitations of alliance as in the spread of war was also evident in case of any lack of links between Kashmir and Goa problems, although both aggrieved parties, namely, Pakistan and Portugal, happened to be allies of the West and both had a common enemy, namely, India.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Of course, there was verbal support for Portugal when India was planning to move its troops to Goa and when India actually did, the West decried the move. But beyond that, there was no move, although interestingly, the US Ambassador to India, Kenneth Galbraith, discloses that Portugal did suggest to the USA that Pakistan move two of its divisions to the border "to frighten the Indians". See, Galbraith, *op. cit.* : 282.

PART FOUR

THE KASHMIRI UPRISING FROM WITHIN

CHAPTER VIII POST-TASHKENT INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
1966-1988 : KASHMIR IN PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER IX THE KASHMIRI UPRISING 1989-1990 : NEW
DIMENSIONS OF AN OLD CONFLICT

CHAPTER VIII

POST-TASHKENT INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

1966-88 : KASHMIR IN PERSPECTIVE

8.1 Introduction

What happens when a protracted conflict over an issue inextricably linked with the identity of the parties concerned is stalemated on all fronts? Does the conflict remain confined within the original dyad on the same old issues or new issues and parties begin to surface? How do the old and new issues relate to each other? While India-Pakistan relations before and after the Tashkent Agreement received scholarly attention, these questions remain largely unanswered. By way of explaining persistence of the conflict in a dormant state in the post-Tashkent period, the present chapter addresses these questions to set the prelude to the recent internal uprising in Kashmir. It is expected that in the process, a dimension of diffusion that has so far remained unexplored will come to the light and contribute to the argument of the thesis.

The Tashkent process of 1966 restored the bilateral diplomatic relations, reaffirmed the 1949 cease-fire line, and committed both the parties to the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of each other".¹ However, the Tashkent process reflected a military and political dead-end over Kashmir. This also apparently took Kashmir away from the bilateral domain for quite some time. Yet Kashmir found its way back to the bilateral relations through domestic routes. This was evident in the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. The India-Pakistan all out war in December 1971 was mainly an escalated phase of a secessionist war arising out of a major internal fissure between the two wings of erstwhile Pakistan, separated geographically by India for more than 1000 miles. Eventually India was entangled through the refugees and its support and sympathy for the Bengali freedom fighters.

¹ See, *Pakistan Horizon*, 43(2), April 1990 : 118.

The 1965 war over Kashmir had a domestic backlash in Pakistan which snowballed into the Bangladesh crisis in 1971. As the crisis developed into an India-Pakistan military confrontation, apart from a violent secessionist war, military violence spilled over into Kashmir. However, it is not always appreciated that there existed almost a symbiotic relationship between developments in Kashmir and those in the former East Pakistan.² Moreover, even in Bangladesh in 1971 set in motion a chain of action-reaction in the context of other domestic issues in both Pakistan and India, including Baluchistan, the Punjab, Sind and the democratic agitation in Pakistan leading all the way up to Kashmir again. The physical proximity and the "conflictual texture" of bilateral relations were enmeshed to create a situation in which Pakistan could easily point the finger towards India for its ethnic troubles.³ Likewise, India raised serious accusations against Pakistani involvement in its ethnic problems, especially in the Punjab and Kashmir. The present chapter in its attempt to set the prelude to the recent uprising in Kashmir as a new phase of the old Kashmir problem argues that a tit-for-tat link of the Kissingerian trade-off type could be discerned in these basically domestic conflicts which later were internationalised.⁴

The domestic route to Kashmir, of course, has to be understood in the broader context of India-Pakistan bilateral relations which were marked by both conflictual and cooperative interactions over the long intervening period of 1966-89. The Kashmir problem could, in the meantime, be at best shelved but not solved despite the best of the opportunity available to India and Pakistan in the 1970s. Pakistan continued to project its right to keep alive the dispute and uphold the cause of self-determination of the Kashmiris. The maligned issue of Kashmir provided the environment and context in which other disputes such as the Siachen Glacier and the

² One such exception is Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire, UK : Roxford Books) 1991 : 282-95. However, Lamb stopped at 1971 without appreciating the chain of such linkages that could be tracked down up until the recent uprising in Kashmir through other internal conflicts, mainly of ethno-religious types.

³ See, Partha S. Ghosh, "India's Relations with Its Neighbours : The Ethnic Factor" in K. M. de Silva and R. J. May (eds.), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict* (London : Pinter Publishers) 1991 : 34.

⁴ The Kissingerian trade-off, which is a kind of *Realpolitik* interaction similar to Rosenau's 'reactive' linkage politics, is one of the ways in which conflict diffusion takes place. See, J. N. Rosenau, "Towards the Study of National-International Linkages" in J. N. Rosenau(ed.), *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (London : Pinter Publishers) 1980 : 375. For use of the Kissingerian trade-off in the context of the Gulf war, 1990-91, see, Peter Jenkins, "Faced with Two Conflicts in One", *Independent*, October 16, 1990 : 17. For theoretical arguments, see, Chapter II.

nuclear issue cropped up into bilateral relations. As the two antagonists were wrangling over these issues, they were overtaken by events in Kashmir in the form of a Kashmiri insurgency.⁵ However, India and Pakistan also initiated a process of normalisation of bilateral relations from the beginning of the 1980s. It would be interesting to see how these interactions shaped the bilateral relations with Kashmir in perspective.

The time period covered in the present chapter is 1966-1989 up to the resurgence of Kashmiri militancy. The chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first section deals with mutual involvement in each other's internal issues almost in an alternate fashion. The second section covers the overall bilateral relations in the post-Tashkent period including the brief rapprochement of the post-1971 period which was soon overshadowed by Afghanistan and an arms race, the nuclear debate and the hostilities over the Siachen Glacier.

8.2 The Kashmir Syndrome Diffused to Domestic Issues

8.2.1 From Kashmir to Bangladesh 1966-72

It is commonplace to argue that the two mileposts in India-Pakistan relations – the Tashkent Agreement of January 1966 in the wake of 1965 Kashmir war, and the Simla Agreement following the all out war over Bangladesh's independence – were separate and disjointed, excepting that they took place between the same combatants and the theatre of the war in its penultimate stage spilled over to Kashmir.⁶ However, it will be argued that even if the physical links between the two conflicts were tenuous, the Kashmir problem, and the autonomy and independence movement for Bangladesh were linked in a much more tangible way so as to survive these two wars and provide the missing link between 1971 and the latest phase of the uprising. For the period 1966-71 under review, the argument is that India's intervention in the

⁵ The Kashmiri militancy of 1989-90 will be covered in Chapter IX.

⁶ Ganguly makes a conceptual linkage between the two Kashmir wars of 1947-48 and 1965 on the one hand and the Bangladesh war of 1971, on the other, within the common analytical frame of ethnic-separatist war. See, Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia : India-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947* (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) 1986 : 1. The present researcher's view is that such conceptual linkages are untenable because the parameters of the two Kashmir wars and that over Bangladesh were different.

Bangladesh war of independence was not only humanitarian and strategic, it had also to do with Kashmir on a tactical ground in response to Pakistan's role in 1965, or even before that.

The root cause of the East Pakistan crisis in the spring of 1971 however, has to be traced within the Pakistan polity in the context of the ever widening regional imbalances between the two provinces of East and West Pakistan through discrimination by the Punjabi military-bureaucratic ruling élites. The policy of discrimination, initially on the issue of language, began to sharpen Bengali nationalism in the early 1950s.⁷ However, it was the domestic backlash to the outcome of the Kashmir war in 1965 that led the grievances of the Bengalis to come to a head. To be precise, the backlash started in West Pakistan.⁸ What was initially a discontent against the Ayub regime on Kashmir mainly in West Pakistan inspired an articulation of discontent against the regime on other issues of immediate concern in the former East Pakistan. It was more than an emulation or contagion process⁹ that led to the spread of unrest to East Pakistan. In the first place, as the Pakistani troops were deployed almost exclusively along the West Pakistani borders during the 1965 war, leaving the East Pakistanis vulnerable to a possible Indian attack, the Bengali élites resented that they were left undefended because of Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.¹⁰

Secondly, the Bengalis also felt that because of Kashmir, an exclusively West Pakistani concern, they suffered doubly, from the severance of their economic relations with India, and

⁷ For an excellent account of the economic imbalances between the two wings and the grievances of the East Pakistanis, see Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan : Failure in National Integration* (New York : Columbia University Press) 1972. See also an insider account by G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington : Indiana University Press) 1974. See, also, Aziz Ahmad, "Pakistan Faces Democracy : A Provincial Nationality", and his, "Pakistan from Within : A Three-way Split", *The Round Table*, 62(245), January 1972 : 15-28. An Indian perspective may be found in Pran Chopra, "East Bengal : A Crisis for India", *World Today*, 27(9), September : 372-79

⁸ The common perception in West Pakistan in the aftermath of the Kashmir war of 1965 was that Ayub Khan lost Kashmir not only in the battlefield but also at the negotiation table in Tashkent. Z. A. Bhutto, his Foreign Minister, distanced himself from the Tashkent process and put the blame on Ayub and his military coterie. The first sign of general discontent over the outcome of the war and the Tashkent declaration was evident in the student riot in Lahore. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit* : 274.

⁹ These are two factors that lead to a spread or diffusion of unrest, protest and conflicts. See, Chapter II. In the context of diffusion of domestic conflicts, see, Mark I. Lichbach and Ted R. Gurr, "The Conflict Process : A Formal Model", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(1), March 1981 : 3-29.

¹⁰ The attack, in any case, did not materialise. Some sources claimed that India refrained consciously from doing so to earn the good will of the East Pakistanis. On the other hand, that the Pakistan Air Force planes bombed deliberately the outskirts of Dhaka to malign the friendly posture of India. See, Gowher Rizvi, "The Rivalry between India and Pakistan" in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi(eds.), *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers* (London : Macmillan) 1986 : 114.

from a rupture of the supply lines from West Pakistan because of the war.¹¹ Thirdly, the causes of the economic hardships and heightened the regional imbalances against East Pakistan could also be traced to the the concentration of political power and decision making of Pakistan in the hands of the civil-military bureaucracy ostensibly because of the continuing Kashmir problem.¹² The Bengalis became gradually disillusioned with their political union with West Pakistan. The backlash of the 1965 war carried it one step further and expedited the growth of a Bengali separatism.

As the Bengali autonomist movement snowballed into a crisis¹³ leading eventually to a military crackdown by the Pakistani army and to a spontaneous resistance movement by Bengali youths,¹⁴ India began to show sympathy towards the movement and expressed concern at the inflow of Bengali refugees into West Bengal of India.¹⁵ A close perusal of events around this time would lend credit to the argument that India was taking a positive interest in the developments in the then East Pakistan.¹⁶ One significant development of this period was India's banning of Pakistani overflights over India in early February 1971 following the hijacking and subsequent destruction of an Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship plane in Lahore Airport by two Kashmiri youths belonging to a Kashmiri resistance group known as *Al Fatah*.¹⁷ The banning, in

¹¹ See, Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis : India-Pakistan-Bangla Desh* (London : Chatto and Windus) 1975 : 21.

¹² See, Emajuddin Ahamed, "Exclusive Bureaucratic Elites in Pakistan : Their Socio-economic Background", *Indian Political Science Review* [New Delhi], 15(1), January 1981 : 52-67. Also see, Shireen M. Mazari, "Kashmir as a Factor in Pakistan's Domestic Politics 1947-1985", *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* [Islamabad], VIII(2), July-December 1987 : 19-26.

¹³ See, Rehman Sobhan, "Negotiations for Bangla Desh : A Participant's View", *South Asian Review* [New South Wales], 4(4), July 1971 : 315-26.

¹⁴ The Bengali resistance movement was spearheaded by the *Mukti Bahinee* or freedom fighters under the leadership of the Awami League, the party that won the majority seats in the 1970 elections both at the national and provincial levels.

¹⁵ See, *Annual Register of World Events in 1971*, Vol. 213, 1972 : 272. The Indian perception of the movement for Bangladesh at the initial stage may be found in Mohammad Ayoob *et al*, *Bangla Desh : A Struggle for Nationhood* (New Delhi : Vikas Publications) 1971; L. M. Singhvi (ed.), *Bangla Desh : Background and Perspectives* (New Delhi : National Publishing House) 1971.

¹⁶ See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, March 27, 1971 and *Rajya Sabha Debate*, March 27, 1971, as reproduced in Government of India, *Bangla Desh Documents Vol. I*, (New Delhi : Ministry of External Affairs), September 1971 : 669-72. In a resolution passed by both Houses of the Indian Parliament on March 31, 1971, it was stated, "The House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of India". See, A. Appadorai (ed.), *Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations 1947-1972* (New Delhi : Oxford University Press) 1982 : 404-5.

¹⁷ For more details, see, Chapter IX.

the context of which Mrs. Indira Gandhi assured the *Lok Sabha* that there was no "intention to resume permission" in the near future,¹⁸ deepened the sense of crisis facing the Pakistani military junta. The event had opened virtually the international dimension of an otherwise domestic crisis much before the cross-border refugee flow began. The banning of the overflight of Pakistani civil and military planes caused long detours and delays in reinforcement of troops and logistics for the impending crisis.¹⁹ Was this a mere coincidence or were there some links?

The question raised above would take us even further back to 1963-64 when in the context of the Sino-Indian conflict, the USA proposed a confederation of India and Pakistan incorporating Kashmir within it as a solution to the intractable Kashmir problem.²⁰ A variant of the confederation idea was a mini-confederation involving Bengal and Assam, known as BENGSSAM, with a possible military base against China.²¹ The Bengali élites also began to take an interest in an independent Bangladesh, with possible assistance from India.²² While the CIA plan did not get off the ground, the idea of independence died hard with the Bengalis. Then came the much talked about *Agartala conspiracy* in which India was implicated in a conspiracy of secession of East Pakistan.²³ The conspiracy explored, *inter alia*, the "theoretical" possibility of separation between the two wings, namely, "a possible ban of overflights" for tactical and strategic reasons.²⁴

¹⁸ See, *Bangladesh Documents*, *op. cit.* : 671.

¹⁹ As many as six flights a week had to be diverted via Colombo. Of course, India also had to divert its flights to the north-eastern states over the then East Pakistan but Pakistan's was the most difficult one. See, *The Economist*, February 13, 1971 : 39.

²⁰ President Ayub Khan confirmed the existence of such a US plan on the basis of his tours to the United States. See, Mohammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance : Stresses and Strains", *Foreign Affairs*, 42(2), January 1964 : 195-209. When Sheikh Abdullah proposed such a plan to Ayub in 1964, the plan reportedly had the blessings of Nehru. Ayub, however, rejected the plan outright. See, Section 7.4.2 in Chapter VII.

²¹ There were reports that "pro-American elements in East Pakistan are getting encouraged to think in terms of secession which probably means a pro-Indian East Pakistan backed by America militarily and economically." See, *The Round Table*, 53(212), September 1963 : 396, quoted in its 55(220), September 1965 issue : 371.

²² Statement of various leftist leaders of Bangladesh at a later period seems to suggest the authenticity of such a plan. See, J. S. Gupta, *History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh 1943-1973 : Some Involvement* (Calcutta : Naya Prokash) 1974 : 217-18.

²³ Officials of the Indian Deputy High Commission in Dhaka took an active part in several parleys with political leaders in Dhaka. Later a meeting was held in Agartala, the capital of the bordering Indian state of Tripura. From this, the case derived its name. See, an involved observer's account in J.S. Gupta, *ibid* : 193-98.

²⁴ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 284.

The unearthing of the conspiracy case led to several arrests including that of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the chief of the Awami League party which spearheaded the autonomy and later independence movement of Bangladesh. The arrest touched off new popular agitation not only in East Pakistan but also in West Pakistan that led eventually to the exit of Ayub thus paving the way for martial law and eventually the Bangladesh crisis.²⁵

However, the reason why the Indian authorities followed up the movement in East Pakistan cannot be understood without referring to what was happening on the Indian side of Kashmir in the post-Tashkent period. The infiltrators, known as *Mujahedins*, whom Pakistan admittedly sent into the Kashmir Valley to incite rebellion in August 1965, were still active within the Kashmir state. Lamb argues that India, especially the Indian intelligence, had been planning something in 1965 in retaliation for Pakistan's role in infiltration and the legacies thereof that continued for quite some time. The Agartala case was a first phase and the culmination was the banning of overflight following the hijacking incident, which itself was reportedly stage managed by India as a pretext to ban the Pakistani overflight.²⁶ Lamb draws profusely on the proceedings of the tribunal of the hijacking case in Pakistan and upholds the verdict that one of the defendants was an Indian agent sent to organise the hijacking to find a pretext of the ban of overflight. Lamb concludes :

In February 1971 what we might call an Agartala condition came into existence with the Indian banning of Pakistan's overflights across the thousand miles or so of Indian territory which separated West from East Pakistan. In that, *this was a direct consequence of the Kashmir dispute, and in a very real sense, emerged from the situation created by the 1965 war. [emphasis added]*.²⁷

²⁵ J. S. Gupta's personal accounts, which seem to be more or less objective, indicate that like the CIA plan, there was some substance in the case, although the ruling regime of Pakistan fabricated it extensively. He writes, "I, as a remote though direct witness to efforts made in East Pakistan for a rebellion would record here that Pakistan Intelligence did find a clue which was not fabricated. In fact, some one involved in the plan for a rebellion passed on the information about it to Pakistan Intelligence Service." See, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 198. Lamb(1991) delving independently through the documents of the tribunal for the conspiracy case also reaches the same conclusion regarding the substance of the case and Indian links of some sorts. See, Lamb, *op. cit.* : 284.

²⁶ See, Lamb, *ibid* : 279-81. In the wake of the hijacking incident in January 1971, Pakistan apprehended that India in retaliation might ban the overflight. See *The Economist*, February 3, 1971 : 39 and February 6, 1971 : 74. Pakistan made similar accusations to the Security Council vide its complaints S/I0116, dated February 13, 1971. See, Appadorai, *op. cit.* : 405-406.

Circumstantial evidence supports Lamb's argument although it is hard to find independent evidence to sustain it. The Indian Government's reaction to the "abetment, incitement and encouragement given by the authorities in West Pakistan in helping of hijacking of Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship aircraft" was one of indignation and veiled threat.²⁸

Even if there was no conspiratorial element in the ban of overflights, the event in itself does support our argument that developments in Kashmir had a significant bearing on the Bangladesh crisis. The ban was a direct challenge from India to Pakistan's control over East Pakistan. This, in turn, added an element of hysteria in the Pakistan Government's response to what was initially a reactive resistance movement. Thus, before the resistance movement assumed the shape of a crisis, the battle lines had been drawn between the central Government and the resistance movement in the then East Pakistan, on the one hand, and between India and Pakistan, on the other. Moreover, the contemporary thinking in India as the crisis was developing suggested that a permanent resolution of the Kashmir problem was a major determinant in India's intervention in Bangladesh.

With this digression, we return to the Bangladesh crisis. Mrs. Gandhi wrote to world leaders to call on or persuade Pakistan to accept a political solution of the problem so that the refugees could return home safely.²⁹ The Indian Government was particularly incensed that both Washington and Beijing which had leverage over the Yahya regime in Islamabad were instead encouraging the autocratic regime in Pakistan.³⁰ To heighten the sense of exasperation in New Delhi, Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to Beijing via Islamabad.³¹ To hedge against the emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis, India agreed to the signing of the 20-year India-Soviet Friendship Treaty in August 1971.³² To explain the treaty and to lobby in favour of her

²⁷ See, Lamb, *ibid* : 285.

²⁸ For Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's statement, see, Appadorai, *op. cit.* : 399.

²⁹ See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 273.

³⁰ For report of US arms supply, see, Jackson, *op. cit.* : 63 and 65. For text of Chou Enlai's letter to Pakistani President Yahya Khan, see, Jackson, *loc. cit.* : 173.

³¹ See, *ibid* : 65.

³² Mentionably the treaty had been on the table for quite some time. For Indian perspective on the signing of the treaty, see, Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power : Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982* (New Delhi : Sage Publications) 1984 : 129-42.

Bangladesh policy, Mrs. Gandhi made an extensive tour to western capitals. While in general support and sympathy for the humanitarian aspects were forthcoming, there was a clear reticence among the Powers to fall in line with the Indian stand in the crisis.³³ India accelerated the training and arming of the freedom fighters, escalating the India-Pakistan crisis to an inter-state conflict level. In November, as India intensified its assistance to the freedom fighters including providing cover and support forces for their operations inside what was imminently to be Bangladesh, the US Seventh Fleet moved from Saigon waters to the Bay of Bengal in what later came to be known as 'gunboat diplomacy' and an American 'tilt' toward Pakistan.³⁴ The Soviets, in reply, moved their warships to the Bay of Bengal as well.³⁵ When Yahya Khan struck on the western frontiers to engage the Indian forces there and relieve pressure on the eastern wing on December 3, 1971, India struck back the following day. In the meantime, India recognised the Government of Bangladesh and in retaliation Pakistan snapped diplomatic relations with India. A full-scale war broke out spilling over to Kashmir, Punjab and Sind in the western frontiers and lasting for 14 days. The Pakistan army in the eastern wing surrendered paving the way for the emergence of independent Bangladesh.³⁶ The coming months until the middle of 1972 witnessed the post-war settlement processes including the signing of the 1972 Simla Agreement between Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Z. A. Bhutto paving the way for the normalisation of bilateral relations.

To summarise the discussion of the section, with the political, military and diplomatic stalemate developing over Kashmir in bilateral relations, events began to shape in the domestic sphere as a backlash to the 1965 war. The crisis of Bengali autonomy movement snowballed into a secessionist moment and later as a bilateral confrontation. To a great extent, events flowed

³³ See, *ibid* : 223-24.

³⁴ See, J. M. McConnell and A. M. Kelly, "Super Power Naval Diplomacy : Lessons of the Indo-Pakistan Crisis of 1971", *Survival* [London], 15(6), November-December 1973 : 284-95; For an Indian perspective, see, Sanjoy Banerjee, "Explaining the American Tilt in the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis : A Late Dependency Approach", *International Studies Quarterly*, 31(2), June 1987 : 201-16; and a Pakistani perspective may be found in K. Hyder, "United States and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971", *Pakistan Horizon*, 25(2), 1972 : 63-74.

³⁵ See, Mansingh, *op. cit.* : 147.

³⁶ For details of the events in the closing months of 1971 culminating in the fourteen days' war in December, see, Jackson, *op. cit.* : 75-144. For eye-witness accounts of the fall of Dhaka and the surrender of the Pakistan army, see, Siddiq Salik, *Witness to Surrender*, (Karachi : Oxford University Press) 1977.

from Kashmir, subsequent events in the Bangladesh crisis were also shaped by Kashmir. The 1971 war by itself was a major war, more violent, wider in scale and more decisive in nature. In the aftermath of the war, the politics of India-Pakistan relations returned to the path of normalisation, cooperation in other areas and polemical rhetoric on-again and off-again with regard to Kashmir. However, centrifugal tendencies in Pakistan were yet to be over, as was evident from the problem in Baluchistan.

8.2.2 The Baluch Insurgency in Pakistan

The Baluch demand for a greater autonomy under the leadership of the National Awami Party(NAP), which also spearheaded such movement in the North West Frontier Province(NWFP),³⁷ came to a head in 1973 following a series of revolts organised by the Baluch Liberation Front with its headquarters in Iraq.³⁸ The problem snowballed into a full-fledged insurgency when Bhutto dismissed the NAP Government in Baluchistan.³⁹ Several parties, apart from Pakistan, had converging and conflicting interests in Baluchistan. Afghanistan's policy in Baluchistan was an extension of its Pakhtunistan policy in view of the fact that a significant percentage of the population in Baluchistan were Pakhtuns and Afghanistan was in favour of a greater Pakhtunistan. The Baluch themselves did not subscribe to such a view, nor did Moscow agree to the Afghan viewpoints, because it had its own interests in Baluchistan.⁴⁰ Iran and Iraq had mainly derivative interests in the Baluch problem, because they brought their own traditional rivalry to bear on the Baluch issue in Pakistan. Iran and Pakistan had some joint interests in quelling the Baluch insurgency because Irani Baluchis were also in revolt. Iran's traditional friendship with Pakistan was also a factor in evoking Tehran's interests in the Baluch problem. A third reason was Iran's interest in neutralising Pakistan's Libyan connection.⁴¹ The Shah of Iran

³⁷ See, Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan" *Aussenpolitik*, 31(3), 1980 : 289-98.

³⁸ See, R. L. Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict 1945-1974 : Data with Synopses* (Pittsburgh : Pittsburgh University Press) 1976 : 471.

³⁹ See, Baloch, *op. cit.* : 297-98.

⁴⁰ See, *ibid* : 292-93.

⁴¹ Libyan connection began in 1975 in the wake of Z. A. Bhutto's initiative on an Islamic bomb with Libyan money. This was indeed disliked by pro-Western Shah.

provided valuable assistance in exerting its influence on Afghanistan in Kabul-Islamabad historical disputes.⁴² Iraq came in support of the Baluchis mainly because Iran, which had been supporting the Kurdish rebels against Baghdad, was on the other side of the problem.⁴³ Iraq had, of course, some common cause with the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ This account suggests that intricate and cross-cutting interests were involved in the Baluch problem.

India came in only indirectly through its intimate relations with the National Awami Party (NAP) and the bilateral trade-off factor. India did not recognise the Durand Line as a border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that way it supported the Pakhtunistan issue, as well as the Baluch issue.⁴⁵ However, there were other aspects of the Indian interests in Baluchistan not usually appreciated. For example, Iran's role in Subcontinental affairs through its connection with Pakistan made India wary of the Baluch problem. Secondly, Indian support for pro-Moscow Iraq in the Iran-Iraq rivalry created an impression in Pakistan that the Moscow-Delhi-Baghdad axis was out to create an independent Baluchistan.⁴⁶ India provided intermittent support to the minorities in Pakistan including the Baluch as a means of putting pressure on Pakistan. In the immediate post-Bangladesh period Pakistan accused India of fomenting revolt in Baluchistan and in the Frontier to further the disintegration of Pakistan.⁴⁷

At a later date in the post-Afghanistan period, India's interests in Baluchistan became part of a overall dislike in India for the Zia regime following the massive US military assistance to Pakistan.⁴⁸ While evidence of this is not available from the Indian side, some are available from

⁴² See, Leslie M. Pryor, "Arms and Shah", *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978 : 62, quoted in M. Ahsen Chaudhuri, "Pakistan and Regional Security : A Pakistani View", *India Quarterly*, 36(2), April-June 1980 : 180.

⁴³ See, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 471.

⁴⁴ See, Selig Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia", *Foreign Policy* 45, Winter, 1981-82 : 89. One may refer to the seizure of Soviet arms in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad in 1973 and Iraqi support for a greater Baluchistan. See, Baloch, *op. cit.* : 298. See, also, Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977* (London : Macmillan) 1980 : 96.

⁴⁵ See, M. Ayoob, "Pakhtoonistan : A Ghost Resurrected", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 8(38), September 9, 1973 : 1551-57. See also, H. A. S. Jafri, "India's Pakhtoonistan Policy : Notes Towards Role Identification", *South Asian Studies*, 5(1), January 1970 : 49-62

⁴⁶ See, Chaudhuri, *op. cit.* : 180.

⁴⁷ See, for details, Satish Kumar, *op. cit.* : 223.

⁴⁸ Similar argument by Harrison has been noted above. See, also Selig Harrison, *op. cit.* : 85, 94-96.

the Baluch side. Baluch people in the wake of the independence of Bangladesh war looked upon India as a liberator.⁴⁹ The former Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Ataullah Mengal in an interview from his exile in London, declared the independence of Baluchistan. Asked whether he believed that India would be neutral, antagonistic or sympathetic" to the Baluch national cause, he said, "It all depends on a number of factors ... As far as Baluchistan is concerned, we might have expected quite a lot from India. .. But, we can say one thing for certain. If the present relationship between India and Pakistan continues to be one of antagonism, then India will certainly not feel unhappy if a part of Pakistan becomes an independent state".⁵⁰

Thus, Indian involvement in Pakistan's Pakhtun and Baluch insurgencies was rather indirect. However, it should also be pointed out that in bilateral relations, perceptions, even if less tangible, matter more than facts and any interference anywhere makes the victim determined to pay back elsewhere. Given the proximate locations of two neighbours with overlapping ethnic and religious populations, such opportunities to pay back were not difficult to come by.

8.2.3 The Sikh Problem in the Indian Punjab and Pakistani 'Links'

The problem of Sikh separatism started as an issue of Centre-State relations as Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in toppling the Janata-Akali coalition (1977-80) through tapping Hindu sentiments as she discovered in her election success in Jammu in 1981-82. A political road to Punjab polarising Sikh-Hindu divisions, however, precipitated an impasse in the Punjab as well.⁵¹ Subsequently, Indian security operation in the Sikh Golden Temple, code named, 'Operation Blue Star' on June 6, 1984, served a severe blow to Sikh confidence in the Indian Union.⁵² Another impact of the operation was the liquidation of the extremist and at the same time discrediting the moderate

⁴⁹ See, Baloch, *op. cit.* : 299.

⁵⁰ See, Lawrence Lifschultz, "Independent Baluchistan : Ataullah Mengal's Declaration of Independence", *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 1983 : 751, quoted in Partha S. Ghosh, *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia* (Dhaka : University Press Ltd) 1989 : 43.

⁵¹ See, Ashok Kapur, "Indian Foreign Policy : Perspectives and Present Predicaments", *The Round Table*, 74(295), July 1985 : 236. For an historical perspective of the problem, see, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict : The Punjab Crisis of the 1980s" in de Silva and May (eds.), *op. cit.* : 52-53.

⁵² See, Niranjana M. Khilnani, "Vacuum in the Punjab", *The Round Table*, 73(292), October 1984 : 418-19.

leaderships who surrendered to the army. The backlash was severe, as evident from the killing of Mrs. Gandhi and the pogrom by the Hindus that followed.⁵³ Our purpose here is to examine the bilateral dimension of the Sikh problem in the Punjab.

From Indian sources, it becomes evident that the problem in Punjab, like the Bangladesh crisis, had its international dimensions even before it came to a boiling point domestically in 1984. First, it was reported that some British Sikhs remarked as early as 1974 that if Bangladesh could be established with Indian help, there was no reason why 'Khalistan' could not be achieved with Pakistan's help.⁵⁴ Secondly, it is also claimed that Zia made contact with the Sikhs in 1977, with the objective which transcended Khalistan to obtain a "leverage so as to re-open the Kashmir issue, if possible".⁵⁵ In any case, the allegations against Pakistan in the context of the Sikh problem were manifold - providing sanctuary to the disgruntled Sikhs including about 2000 Sikh army deserters, training and arming the Sikh militants and providing liaison with expatriate Sikhs.⁵⁶ In Indian perceptions, the Sikh problem had the prospect of a 'second Pakistan' in the area.⁵⁷ The argument was that if Sikhs become aligned with Pakistan, the social base of the Punjab - through which central Indian military lines of communication pass - would no longer be reliable, and the Sikhs could not be counted on to cooperate with Indian military authorities in a crisis with Pakistan.⁵⁸ To the extent that Sikh extremism in Punjab could only be satisfied by 'Khalistan', "hostility of Punjab to Indian political authority and military power ...[would be] a new element in the Indo-Pakistan military balance."⁵⁹

⁵³ Accounts of the eventful Sikh problem in 1984 can be found in M.J. Akbar, *India : The Siege Within* (London : Penguin Books) 1985; Arun Shourie *et al The Assassination and After* (New Delhi : Roli International) 1985; Khushwant Singh and Kuldip Nayar, *The Tragedy of Punjab* (New Delhi : Vision Books) 1984; and Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, *Amritsar : Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle* (London : Jonathan Cape) 1985.

⁵⁴ See, Government of India, *White Paper on the Punjab*, (New Delhi) 1984. See, also, *Statesman*, July 20, 1983, cited in Ghosh(1989), *op. cit.* : 45.

⁵⁵ See, Kapur (1985), *op. cit.* : 237.

⁵⁶ See, Rizvi, *op. cit.* : 17-18. See, also, Rasul B. Rais, "Internationalization of the Punjab Crisis : A Pakistani Perspective" in Silva and May (eds.) *op. cit.* : 42, and Inder Malhotra, "Punjab - The Pak Connection", *The Times of India*, April 4, 1988.

⁵⁷ The idea of a 'Second Pakistan' appears in Kapur(1985), *op. cit.* : 236. It may be mentioned that the 'panthic committee' of the Sikhs proclaimed the formation of a separate Sikh state on 29 April 1986 and announced its intention to seek recognition from various countries including India and Pakistan. See, *The Annual Register 1986*, Vol 228, 1987 : 272.

⁵⁸ See, Kapur (1985) *op. cit.* : 236-37.

⁵⁹ *Ibid* : 236-37.

As Rajiv Gandhi came to power in India, allegations that the Pakistan Government was heavily involved in fomenting unrest in the Punjab were backed by 'evidence'. The Indian Foreign Minister, B. R. Bhagat alleged in February 1986 that India had "concrete evidence" that Pakistan was supporting actively the Sikh separatists.⁶⁰ He also expressed concerns about the continued presence of Pakistani army divisions along the borders and also the exercises the Pakistani army carried out in October 1986.⁶¹ Pakistan, however, denied any involvement in the Indian Punjab. It cited the example that the Lahore High Court imposed severe punishment on the Sikh hijackers of the Indian airline to prove its non-involvement.⁶² However, the handling of the hijacking issue at the initial stage only deepened India's suspicion. For example, President Zia refused to hand over the Sikh hijackers to India, on the ground that the two countries did not have an extradition treaty.⁶³ This irritated India to the point of postponing the continuing normalisation talks involving the Indian proposal of a friendship treaty and the Pakistani proposal of a no war pact, at least by two months.⁶⁴

One prominent reason why India gradually became obsessed with the Pakistani involvement in the Sikh separatist movement was its link with Kashmir, because, in the Indian perception, not only is there a Sikh-Pakistan nexus which has its effect on Kashmir, but there is also a direct Sikh-Kashmir nexus. Khilnani writes :

The ousting of Farooq Abdullah had become inevitable after the army action in Punjab. Apart from the wider question of national security in the wake of the rise of anti-national forces in J & K during his regime, there was the question of breaking the links of the Punjab terrorists in Jammu, clearing the hide-outs there and blocking their passage through the region to Pakistan. With the Chief Minister extending patronage to them, his administration could not be relied upon to undertake measures against them or to cooperate with the army in its operations. Terrorism in Punjab could not be eliminated altogether as long as Farooq Abdullah was in power in Srinagar. His ousting had become all the more necessary as new problems arose in the Punjab.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Rizvi argues that such allegations were made at a time when the Rajiv-Longowal agreement on the Punjab failed and attention of the people had to be diverted to external sources. See, Rizvi, *op. cit.* : 18.

⁶¹ See, *The Annual Register 1986*, Vol. 228, 1987 : 274.

⁶² See, Razvi, *op. cit.* : 271.

⁶³ See, *New York Times*, July 6, 1984 : 2.

⁶⁴ See, *New York Times*, July 17, 1984 : 5.

⁶⁵ See, Khilnani, *op. cit.* : 421.

A Member of the Indian Parliament said in March 1990:

I do not understand why this coincidence whenever there is a spurt of violence in Kashmir, there is a spurt of violence in Punjab. ... the secessionist forces working in Kashmir, fundamentalism working in northern India and communal forces working in Punjab are working hand in hand ...⁶⁶

8.2.4 Sind and the Democratic Movement in Pakistan

While India complained of Pakistan's involvement in the Punjab, Pakistan had similar grounds for complaining against India's complicity in the democratic movement in Pakistan, in general, and the Sind problem in particular. As the oppositional agitation in Pakistan in the form of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was gaining momentum, the Indian top leadership including Mrs. Gandhi, and Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao expressed sympathy for the MRD in August 1983. In the face of protest from Pakistan,⁶⁷ India argued that it could not turn a blind eye towards the democratic rights of the people in the neighbouring countries.⁶⁸ As if to sustain the momentum of supporting anti-Zia groups, the Congress Party organised a World Sindhi Conference in October 1983 in New Delhi in which Members of the Indian Parliament made "highly offensive and objectionable" remarks.⁶⁹ In late 1986, the Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zain Nurani, alleged that Pakistan had proof that India had been training the Sind separatists in as many as 17 camps within India.⁷⁰ Following a spate of bomb blasts in Sind in July 1987, Pakistan accused India and Afghanistan of masterminding the bombing.⁷¹ Later, Zia ul-Haq said in an interview that his Government had "evidence to show that they [India] have been interfering in the affairs of Sind."⁷² In August 1988, the Pakistani President again

⁶⁶ See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIII/12, March 27, 1990 : Col. 368. For an Indian Muslim perspective of the Kashmir problem, see, Omar Khalidi, "Kashmir and Muslim Politics in India" in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.), *Perspectives on Kashmir : The Roots of Conflict in South Asia* (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) 1992, especially, Chapter 12.

⁶⁷ President Zia alleged that a foreign power was helping the MRD and "it was so planned that immediately they [MRD] began the agitational activities, a foreign power, as agreed earlier, came out with its support". See, *Asian Recorder*, November 29, 1983 : 17498, cited in Ghosh, *op. cit.* : 42.

⁶⁸ See, Rizvi, *op. cit.* : 15.

⁶⁹ See, *The Muslim*, October 26, 1983. See, also, Ghosh, *op. cit.* : 42.

⁷⁰ See, *Jang* [Urdu Daily], October 22, 1986, and *The Nation*, December 14, 1986. See, also, *India Today*, June 15, 1988 : 104.

⁷¹ See, *The Hindu* [Madras], July 18, 1987.

⁷² See, *Times of India*, July 25, 1988.

alleged that Pakistan had concrete proof that India was interfering in Sind.⁷³ It may also be mentioned in this context that Mr. G. M. Syed, a Sindhi nationalist leader claimed at a later date that during his visit to India, he was offered technical and material help for his *Sindhudesh* movement, but he declined the offer.⁷⁴ The Government controlled daily *The Pakistan Times*, organised a counter-symposium in Lahore titled "Indian policy of interference in the internal affairs of the neighbouring countries".⁷⁵ This was followed in quick succession by several developments, prominent among which were reports of possible attacks and counter-attacks on each other's nuclear installations, fighting in the Siachen, and reports on Pakistan's involvement in the Sikh problem in the Indian Punjab state.

From what has been described above, it turns out that the stalemate over the Kashmir problem in the 1960s provided a domestic outlet first in the forms of origins of separatism in East Bengal, culminating in the birth of Bangladesh. More importantly, Kashmir set in motion a process of mutual involvement in each others internal affairs, which carried them in conflictual postures from Kashmir to Bangladesh, through Baluchistan, the Punjab, Sind and eventually to Kashmir. However, for a balanced analysis, the post-1971 India-Pakistan relations were not all conflictual. The Simla Agreement of 1972 set a process of cooperation in motion as well and it was carried through into the 1980s.

8.3 Bilateral Relations 1966-89 – Cooperation Amidst Conflicts

8.3.1 Brief Rapprochement in the 1970s

The all out India-Pakistan war of 1971 expediting the birth of Bangladesh had significant consequences for Subcontinental power relations, in general and Kashmir, in particular. In Indian perceptions, the war outcome signified the restoration of the 'natural hierarchy' destroying the

⁷³ See, *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, August 4-10, 1988. A cover story on the Indian intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), published in the Calcutta based *Sunday* suggested that RAW in collaboration with the Afghan intelligence agency, KHAD, was providing low level assistance to the Sind activists. See, *Sunday*, September 18-24, 1988.

⁷⁴ See, *The Nation* [Lahore], September 7, 1987.

⁷⁵ For a report of the symposium, see, *The Pakistan Times*, October 22, 1983.

'balance of imbalances' in the Subcontinent maintained artificially so long by external interference.⁷⁶ It was also viewed as a success of Indian secularism and democracy over Pakistan's Islamic theocracy-based 'two-nation theory' and its military dictatorship.⁷⁷ According to Kapur, the most notable impact of the 1971 war was the "incremental development of an Indo-centric power relations in the Subcontinent", with India "at the helm",⁷⁸ which in turn, was expected to "bring about an element of stability in the region. Along with Pakistan's military defeat, Indian policy makers became confident that the outcome would discourage the external powers from meddling in Subcontinental affairs. That satisfied an important objective of India's regional policy, that is, strategic unity of South Asia"⁷⁹ Pakistan's reaction was one of "pragmatism, even if sullen. What was more the common people accepted the outcome with calm resignation and did not put the blame on the regime in power."⁸⁰ Thus, the reactions of India and Pakistan to the outcome of the Bangladesh War of 1971 apparently bore the prospects of peace and stability in the region.

Insofar as Kashmir was concerned, it appeared that the Bangladesh war paved the way for a permanent solution of the otherwise intractable problem. However, as things developed, a paradox became increasingly evident in India-Pakistan relations. The post-war situation in the Subcontinent did create the psychological make up in both India and Pakistan for improvement of bilateral relations and along with it, Kashmir came up in the forefront of bilateral negotiations. Yet the best that they could do was to "defer the settlement of Kashmir and tackle other issues in the hope that the problem would die down or could be taken up at an unspecified opportune moment. The decision makers were partly right because while India-Pakistan relations in general reached a stage of *détente* even if briefly, the opportune moment, in fact, was fast slipping

⁷⁶ Ayoob emphasises the fact that for the first time a clear victor emerged from a war in South Asia's contemporary history. See, Ayoob(1976), *op. cit.* : 150.

⁷⁷ See, K.R. Narayanan, "New Perspectives in Indian Foreign Policy", *The Round Table*, 62(248), October 1972 : 454-55.

⁷⁸ See, Ashok Kapur, "The Indian Subcontinent : The Contemporary Structure of Power and the Development of Power Relations", *Asian Survey*, 28(7), July 1988 : 693-94. For similar arguments, see, K.R. Narayanan, "India's Growth as a Regional Power", *The Round Table*, 62(248), October 1972 : 453.

⁷⁹ Source : *Interview* in New Delhi, September, 1991.

⁸⁰ Source : *Interview* in Lahore, August 1991. See, also, Ayoob, *op. cit.* : 169.

away."⁸¹

If anything, the diplomacy of the interregnum until the signing of the Simla Agreement in June 1972 suggested that Kashmir had returned to the top of the agenda both as an issue itself and as a bargaining chip in settling other more pressing issues, such as demarcation of the line of actual control (LAC) in Kashmir, troop withdrawal, exchange of prisoners of war.⁸²

The Simla Agreement that followed in June 1972 provided an agreed framework for dealing with outstanding bilateral issues. As a basic principle, the Simla Agreement stipulated that :

The government of India and the government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for promotion of friendly and harmonious relationship and establishment of durable peace in the Sub-continent⁸³

This basic principle was followed by a specific commitment of the parties "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral mechanism or by other peaceful means mutually agreed upon."⁸⁴ There were also provisions for resumption of trade, communications and cooperation in agreed economic fields and exchange in the fields of science and culture.⁸⁵

Regarding Kashmir, it was agreed that both parties would respect each other's line of actual control (LAC) as determined by the cease-fire in Kashmir as of December 17, 1971, "without prejudice to the recognised position of either side."⁸⁶ It was also agreed that neither side would seek to alter the LAC "unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations."⁸⁷ While India insisted on converting the LAC into an international boundary, the Pakistan Premier resisted the pressure mainly on domestic grounds that it would be hard to sell the idea to the

⁸¹ Source : *Interview* in New Delhi, September 1991.

⁸² The last was quite pressing in view of the fact that as many as 93,000 Pakistani POWs were in captivity in India. For minute details of India-Pakistan bilateral relations leading to the Simla agreement from the Indian perspectives setting the tone of what followed the period of brief rapprochement of the 1970s, see, Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd) 1978 : 217-68. For a Pakistani account, see, S. M. Burke, "The Post-War Diplomacy of the India-Pakistan War of 1971", *Asian Survey*, 13(7), July 1973 : 1036-49. For a less detailed but more introspective analysis, see, S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis* (Karachi : Oxford University Press) 1990 : 397-413.

⁸³ Quoted from Narayanan, *op. cit.* : 455.

⁸⁴ *Ibid* : 455.

⁸⁵ *Ibid* : 455.

⁸⁶ *Ibid* : 455.

⁸⁷ *Ibid* : 456. See, also, Ayoob (1976), *op. cit.* : 164.

Pakistani people at that critical moment of Pakistan's national life.⁸⁸ India, on its part, assured Pakistan of the former's 'hands off' in Baluchistan and the Pakhtun problems in NWFP while Pakistan agreed virtually to abandon Kashmir.⁸⁹

One of the reasons that the post-1971 period is considered an high period of rapprochement in India-Pakistan relations is that the Simla Agreement was followed by progressive implementation of a number of stipulations of the agreement and this made the rapprochement visible. India withdrew from territories occupied during the war. The return of the POWs, even those earlier detained for trial as war criminals by the Bangladesh Government, was viewed as major success for Pakistan statesmanship.⁹⁰ During May-July 1976, rail and air traffic were resumed and so were the diplomatic relations.⁹¹

The overall tension in bilateral relations was reduced significantly so much so that even during the period of emergency in India there was a relaxed view of Pakistan, unlike in the past when in periods of national hardship and crisis, an external enemy in the shape of Pakistan was available and the same was true of the Indian image in Pakistan where a favourable balance of civil-military relations prevailed.⁹²

Follow-ups in Kashmir from both sides were significant. It appeared that both India and Pakistan were poised for reaching a *modus vivendi* of settling outstanding differences including the Kashmir problem.⁹³ To begin with, Mrs. Gandhi showed understanding of Mr. Bhutto's domestic predicaments in converting the LAC right away into an international frontier. With regard to the cause of Kashmiri self-determination into Pakistan, Bhutto made a remarkable departure from the traditional position when he said on return from Simla that while Pakistan supported the Kashmiri right to self-determination, "they must take necessary steps to own the

⁸⁸ Bhutto later said in an interview with an Indian scholar, "I don't think that with all the problems heaped on us, of a burning and immediate nature, that it would be advisable to go into the heart of the problem [of Kashmir] straightaway". See, Satish Kumar, *op. cit.* : 361.

⁸⁹ See, Howard Wriggins, *op. cit.* : 284.

⁹⁰ See, Narayanan, *op. cit.* : 456.

⁹¹ See, Ayoob(1976), *op. cit.* : 150.

⁹² See, *ibid* : 156-57.

⁹³ See, Narayanan, *op. cit.* : 454. A group of journalists visiting Pakistan in 1973 reported that "Kashmir no longer appeared an issue in Indo-Pak relations". See, Satish Kumar, *op. cit.* : 280.

right".⁹⁴

The other factor that was believed to have contributed to the rapprochement was the coincidence of the Subcontinental changes with *détente* in global power relations. This resulted in a low profile of the Great Powers in Subcontinental affairs.⁹⁵ Some argued that as long as the issues of conflict as well as cooperation were of Subcontinental origins, as happened roughly during 1972-78, a *détente* prevailed in bilateral relations.⁹⁶ Apparently, one has reason to lend credence to the theory, especially in view of the fact that this brief period of *détente* came to an end following the penetration of the Second Cold War into the Subcontinent through the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Until Afghanistan, the issues of conflict and cooperation in India-Pakistan relations were of Subcontinental origins and thus a modicum of co-existence prevailed in the Subcontinent. Secondly it was also argued that the unquestionable military superiority of India which helped to maintain a 'natural hierarchy' in the Subcontinent that contributed to the growth of rapprochement.⁹⁷ In the Pakistani perspective, it was also a question of "acquiescence on the part of Pakistan" not only in the context of the military superiority of India but also in the context of "maintaining a favourable civil-military balance in the internal power structure of Pakistan" which led the ruling élite to accept the regional power relations.⁹⁸

Why then could not India and Pakistan solve the Kashmir problem once and for all when

⁹⁴ See, *ibid* : 165. Whether it was a calm resignation or incitement of the Kashmiris is difficult to say. Pakistan, for example, did not relinquish the right of raising the Kashmir issue on every possible occasion, even during the rule of Bhutto. On the other hand, prophetically enough, the Kashmiris took upon themselves to earn the right in late 1980s.

⁹⁵ See, Ayoob(1976), *op. cit.* : 154, and Narayanan, *op. cit.* : 453. Also see, Norman D. Palmer, "The Changing Scene in South Asia - internal and external dimensions", *Orbis*, Fall 1975 : 898; Dieter Braun, "Changes in South Asian Intra-regional and External Relations", *The World Today*, 34(10), October 1978 : 390-400. However, some argue that the implied consensual low profile of the Great Powers in general would not be a correct description. While Chinese and Soviet interests in South Asia remained as active as ever, the US lost interest in Pakistan because of Pakistan's deliberate policy of diversification of foreign policy, especially, its emphasis on its West Asian identity at a time when the US had a difficult time with the Arab countries in the post-1973 period when the oil embargo was imposed. See, Amit Gupta, "Pakistan's Acquisition of Arms : Rationale, Quest and Implications for India", *IDSJ Journal*, XIV(3), January-March 1982 : 424.

⁹⁶ See, Kapur(1988), *op. cit.* 697. See, also, B. K. Wariawalla, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty : The Subcontinent Restructured", *The Round Table*, 62(246), April 1972 : 199.

⁹⁷ Varshney puts it more bluntly saying that a militarily weak Pakistan is a condition for the Subcontinental stability. See, Varshney, *op. cit.* : 1019.

⁹⁸ Source : *Interview* in Islamabad, August 1991.

détente prevailed? From the Indian side, the commonplace argument has been the Pakistani regime's unwillingness to solve the problem, and a propensity to exploit *détente* to its full advantage to consolidate its position domestically and externally. Even if there is truth in this argument, it is highly unlikely that conversion of the LAC into an international frontier would have been accepted by Kashmiris on either side of the LAC. Bhutto's attempt to convert the Azad Kashmir into a normal province of Pakistan was rebuffed by the Azad Kashmiris, although they had acceded voluntarily to Pakistan and would advocate for accession of the other side of Kashmir to Pakistan as well.⁹⁹ The political instability on the Indian side including the experiences of India even after the signing of the Indira-Sheikh Abdullah Accord in 1975, are indicators of the problems faced by India during the corresponding period.¹⁰⁰

Apart from this basic problem in Kashmir, it seemed that there were basic differences between India and Pakistan on the Simla approach - India taking it as a possible viable framework of bilateral relations while Pakistan was taking it as one of the many such agreements and accords reached between them earlier. Such basic differences rendered the *détente* transitory and problems like Afghanistan only proved to be manifestation of the symptoms of the basic problem.

8.3.2 The Breakdown of the Rapprochement : Kashmir Resurfaces Amidst Conflict and Cooperation

As the rapprochement in India-Pakistan relations reached its peak in the mid-1970s through the resumption of full diplomatic relations and the initiation of other measures such as the resumption of land and air communications and limited trade relations, the forces of rupture were also set in motion in the same process.¹⁰¹ The coolness in bilateral relations was not visible until

⁹⁹ For details of this Kashmiri 'individualism', see, Saraf, *op. cit.* : An interesting ambiguity of the Azad Kashmiris has been their opposition to the idea of integration of not only Azad Kashmir with Pakistan, pending the 'liberation' of the whole of Kashmir, but also the northern territories of Baltistan and Gilgit, which are *de jure* Pakistani territories. See, Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Khan, "Kashmir Problem : Options for Settlement", *Address to Staff College, Quetta*, April 11, 1989 : 5-6. Such an attitude has significant implications for the present uprising which will be taken up in the succeeding Chapter.

¹⁰⁰ As will be seen in Section 9.3.1 in Chapter IX.

¹⁰¹ While Ayoob(1976) and Braun(1978) talked enthusiastically of the emerging or visible *détente* in India-Pakistan relations, at the end of the decade when the *détente* was put to the test, it turned out that there was little, if any structural change in Subcontinental power relations. The changes were "more apparent than

the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979. Yet several irritants and disputes began to crack the surface of bilateral relations right from the mid-1970s. The Pokhran nuclear test by India in May 1974, for example, evoked strong and deep-seated reactions in Pakistan.¹⁰² Apart from the short term adverse reactions, more important, in hindsight, was the growth of nuclear ambitions in Pakistan, allegedly, in the initial stage, with Libyan financial backing.¹⁰³

Secondly, although it seemed that there was little hope of regaining Kashmir, at the rhetorical level Pakistan began, or rather continued, raising the Kashmir issue whenever occasion arose and the frequency which fell in the post-Simla period began to increase.¹⁰⁴

Added to this was the memory of the 1971 humiliations accepted by Pakistan ostensibly with good grace, for the time being. The Indian leaders believed that Pakistan was eager for an

real", "more psychological and transient than material". See, M. Ayoob, "India, Pakistan and Superpower Rivalry", *The World Today*, 38(5), May 1982 : 195. Ayoob in his article also argues that the gap in the India-Pakistan military balance was reduced to a marginal level through the massive military build up by Pakistan in the post-1971 period. This also has been the argument in Burke and Ziring(1990). See, Burke and Ziring, *op. cit.* : 425-26. For the earlier arguments, see, Ayoob(1976), *op. cit.* : 150-58, and D. Braun(1978), *op. cit.* : 390.

¹⁰² Bhutto, in his letter to Mrs. Gandhi, said that the nuclear explosion had introduced an "imbancing factor" in the continuing process of normalisation of bilateral relations. See, Peter Lyon, "The Indian Bomb : Nuclear Tests for 'Peaceful Purpose'?", *The Round Table*, 64(208), October 1974 : 408.

¹⁰³ The Pakistan Premier was recorded to have said that Pakistan would go nuclear even if the Pakistanis would have to "eat grass". Libyan involvement with Pakistan in the so-called Islamic Bomb, however, was disliked by Tehran, which, through its leverages on the Kurd and the Baluch problem, helped to persuade Pakistan to drop the Libyan involvement. See, Burke and Ziring, *op. cit.* quoting from G. S. Bhargava, *South Asian Security After Afghanistan* (Boston : Lexington Books) 1983 : 426.

¹⁰⁴ For example, in November 1973, Bhutto while visiting Azad Kashmir, gave a call for *hartal* or strike on the Indian side of Kashmir and urged the Kashmiri youths to join Pakistan's Special Services Guards or Commandos and undergo training for realising the goal of self-determination themselves. See, Satish Kumar, *op. cit.* : 281-82. Then incensed by Sheikh Abdullah's coming to terms with Mrs. Gandhi in 1975, Pakistan Premier Z.A. Bhutto gave a call for a strike in Azad Kashmir in support of the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris through a UN plebiscite. See, *New York Times*, February 13, 1975 : 12. In 1976, Bhutto again raised the issue in a banquet in Beijing causing the Indian Chargé d'Affaires there to walk out. See, *New York Times*, May 30, 1976 : 8. In 1979, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister visiting Islamabad in the wake of the Afghanistan problem reiterated Chinese backing for the Pakistani stand on the Kashmir dispute. See, *New York Times*, January 25, 1979 : 5. In course of time, the rhetoric was replaced by seriousness in the Indian perception. For example, in 1982, India cancelled the visit of the Indian delegation to Islamabad to discuss the non-aggression pact, as Agha Hilaly had said that Kashmir was under Indian military occupation. See, *New York Times*, February 26, 1982 : 4. During Agha Shahi's visit to New Delhi, he raised the issue of Kashmir in a banquet putting India on the defensive because Pakistan upheld the principle of the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris. Again, during the visit of Narasimha Rao in 1981, then Mrs. Gandhi's Foreign Minister, Zia said that India's attempt to bury the Kashmir problem would meet his stubborn resistance. See, Banarjee, *op. cit.* : 282 and 285. Pakistan also raised the Kashmir issue at the seventh Non-aligned Summit in New Delhi in 1983. See, Vasudevan, *op. cit.* : 35. Mrs. Gandhi, in return, began showing sympathy to the democratic movement in Pakistan as a whole and the ethnic movement in Sind. See, Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan", *Pacific Affairs*, 57(2), Summer 1984 : 298.

opportunity to regain some of the prestige lost in 1971. Harrison quotes *The Economist* to argue that some of the thousands of Pakistani officers who were prisoners of war in India after the 1971 conflict would "dream of revenge - at least of inflicting some sort of limited humiliation on India."¹⁰⁵ Bhutto in a way also confirmed such a perception when he said, "... in the minds of our people the separation of East Pakistan was not as a result of the differences that developed between the two parties, between East and West Pakistan. In the minds of the people, it was brought about, the severance was brought about by an act of war".¹⁰⁶

There are other factors that need to be mentioned before we come to the main point of discussion of the section. When Bhutto was ousted from power in 1977, there was some setback in India-Pakistan bilateral relations, but the setback was not evident because of the coming to power in India of the lenient Janata regime of Morarji Desai who brought a qualitative change in India's relations with its South Asian neighbours. But the period of honeymoon was over when Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in 1980.¹⁰⁷ Her return to power was preceded by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan bringing Pakistan to the status of a frontline state¹⁰⁸ in the renewed phase of the Cold War.¹⁰⁹ In this section, we would be more concerned with the impact of the Afghanistan issue on India-Pakistan relations. Initially at least, there was a semblance of consensus between India and Pakistan about the implications of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for the security of South Asia. If Pakistan was alarmed because the Soviet Union was on its doorstep, India was concerned that the buffer between India and the Soviet Union had been threatened. Thus the Foreign Minister of India Mr. Narasimha Rao¹¹⁰ suggested guardedly that

¹⁰⁵ See, Harrison, *op. cit.* : 93-94.

¹⁰⁶ See, Bhutto's interview with Satish Kumar, in Kumar, *op. cit.* : 365.

¹⁰⁷ See, Amit Gupta, *op. cit.* : 430.

¹⁰⁸ Especially in view of Shah's fall and the emergence of an anti-Western Islamic regime in Iran. See, Ayoob(1982), *op. cit.* : 197.

¹⁰⁹ A full length discussion of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and for that matter, the second Cold War is beyond the scope of the present thesis. Ayoob, in any case, argues that unlike the Euro-centric nature of the first Cold War, the Afghanistan problem brought the second Cold War into the immediate vicinity of South Asia. See, Ayoob(1982), *op. cit.* : 194. Reincert, similarly argues that during the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO notwithstanding, the participation of the South Asian countries in the Cold War was indirect at best. Afghanistan ushered in direct participation in the Cold War. See, A. Reincert, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", *Foreign Affairs*, 61(2), Winter 1983 : 423

¹¹⁰ Current Prime Minister of India since June 1991. Earlier, in 1980, Mrs. Gandhi sent emissaries to Pakistan to express the assurance that India was not "insensitive to the anxiety and concern" of Pakistan. See, Jotirmoy Banarjee, "Hot and Cold Diplomacy in Indo-Pakistani Relations", *Asian Survey*, 23(3), March 1983

both India and Pakistan should adopt a common posture toward the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan, because India had "an abiding interest, even a vested interest in the stability of Pakistan".¹¹¹ However, as within only four days of this call Pakistan struck a deal with the US for the supply of weapons, "the spectre of F-16s in the hands of the unstable Zia regime overshadowed Afghanistan in Indian eyes. A growing number of Indians ... [were] calling for efforts to destabilise or dismember Pakistan before it can build up a more favourable military position with foreign support."¹¹² Rizvi, however, quotes the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, to argue that soon after the induction of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, it was Zia who approached India to explore the possibility of a "joint posture" on Afghanistan. India, however, was going through the election transition, and hence, was slow to respond and in the meantime Pakistan reached an understanding with the USA.¹¹³

Zia also reportedly put India on the defensive by suggesting that India should exert its influence to effect a Soviet withdrawal.¹¹⁴ Moreover, guided mainly by antagonistic and divergent perceptions of South Asian security, both had divergent accounts of the Soviet motivations for intervention in Afghanistan.¹¹⁵ India gave a complex and unconventional reasoning of Soviet motivations for its move in Afghanistan. The Soviet involvement, in Indian opinion, had more to do with the Western involvement in the region that pulled the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Then there was the question of Muslims in Central Asia.¹¹⁶

The divergent perception was sharpened by the US offer of military and economic assistance in the context of Afghanistan. India had several arguments against US assistance to Pakistan. First, the arms given to Pakistan in all probability would be used against India because

: 281, quoting *Statesman*, February 6, 1980.

¹¹¹ See, Selig S. Harrison, *op. cit.* : 101.

¹¹² *Ibid* : 85.

¹¹³ See, Hassan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan-India Relations in the Eighties", *Regional Studies* XIII(3), Summer 1990 : 4.

¹¹⁴ See, Banarjee, *op. cit.* : 281.

¹¹⁵ See, Ayoob(1982), *op. cit.* : 198. More interesting insights may be found in Indian journalist Rajendra Sareen's published transcript of his lengthy interviews with President Zia ul-Haq in 1982. See, Rajendra Sareen, *Pakistan : The India Factor* (New Delhi : Allied), 1984 : 151-84.

¹¹⁶ See, Reincert, *op. cit.* : 423, 434. Indian perception is reflected in B. Vivekananda, "Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan Viewed from India", *Asia Pacific Community*, 9, Summer 1980 : 72.

the Soviet Union lacked the motivation to cross into Pakistan, and Pakistan would not be able to stem such a thrust, if it came at all, however heavily armed Pakistan was. Moreover, initially at least, the Reagan administration was not forthcoming, despite India's insistence, with the assurance that the arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India.¹¹⁷ Secondly, arming Pakistan would exacerbate rather than solve the Afghan problem, because so long as the Afghan resistance continued, there was little chance that the Soviet Union would voluntarily withdraw. Thirdly, Pakistan as a threat to Indian security had its separate historical origins and Soviet penetration in Afghanistan had little changed the strategic scenario. For example, India pointed out that 80% of Pakistani forces were deployed against India even after the Soviet intrusion. The US suggestion of moving two divisions of its troops away to the western borders was politely rejected by Pakistan.¹¹⁸ Apart from rhetoric, Pakistan did not deny the tenor of Indian arguments regarding Pakistan's justification of the armament programme. Zia, for example, seemed to have recognised the reality that Pakistan on its own would be crushed under a Soviet thrust. But that would be a major conflict and other powers would inevitably be pulled in. So, Pakistan's armed strength should be measured by its capacity to deter India.¹¹⁹

As the USA went ahead with arming Pakistan, an arms race was set in motion. The Soviet Union offered India military hardware worth \$1.6 billion. Then India purchased modern aircraft from Britain, France, Germany and Italy. If the divergent views on Afghanistan had their fallout on the arms race, the arms race, in turn, had two prominent fallouts - one positive, that is sustained efforts to achieving a no-war pact, and one negative, the nuclear debate.¹²⁰

Pakistan initiated what later came to be known as a 'peace offensive' through offering to sign a no-war pact with India mainly to assuage India's feelings in the wake of the arms deal with

¹¹⁷ It may be recalled that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy gave such a formal assurance to Nehru in the 1950s and early 1960s regarding US military assistance to Pakistan. See, Harrison, *op. cit.* : 95-96.

¹¹⁸ See, P. Vasudevan, "India and Her Neighbours", *IDSJ Journal*, XV(2), July-September 1983 : 34.

¹¹⁹ A Pakistani critique of India's views on US arms supply to Pakistan may be found in Rizvi, *op. cit.* : 5-8. For Pakistan's shrewd perception, see, Gupta, *op. cit.* : 432.

¹²⁰ It is beyond the scope of the thesis to go into the details of these aspects of bilateral relations, except to the extent that they impinge on Kashmir, especially to the extent necessary to show how these aspects converged eventually on the Kashmir issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

the USA, at least to "undercut India's propaganda barrage" in this regard.¹²¹ India initially did not take the offer seriously. India considered the proposed no-war pact as both as narrow and redundant as the Simla Agreement was a viable and sufficient framework for resolving bilateral disputes and promoting cooperation. However, as Pakistan persisted in its offer, the Pakistani proposal and several exchanges on it constituted the basis of bilateral negotiations in early 1982. Soon the talks ran aground on a number of issues, namely, Pakistan's reference to the Kashmir problem in international fora like the UN Human Rights Commission, India's adverse comments on Pakistan's security requirements, and the question of reconciling Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact and India's counter-offer of a friendship and cooperation treaty. The difference between the two versions was not merely semantic. Pakistan's unwillingness to an incorporation of its renunciation of its right to use force in bilateral disputes was tantamount to its surrendering Kashmir.¹²² Pakistan was also unwilling to denounce its right to grant foreign bases. India, however, insisted on these points.¹²³ Though India and Pakistan both acknowledged the spirit underlying the two draft proposals they failed to evolve a mutually acceptable version incorporating the areas of agreement.¹²⁴ In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi declared categorically that Pakistan's no-war pact was not acceptable to India. After Zia's death, Benazir Bhutto also declared that her Government was not interested in the no-war pact.

However, in the meantime, other developments of a more pressing nature overtook their bilateral relations. Even if they failed to agree, the most tangible gain in bilateral relations was a post-1971 type rapprochement or working relations which suffered many a jolt but were not completely ruptured. However, as in the 1970s, the rapprochement did not take root, so that when a major jolt came, the achievements in bilateral relations did not take long to be wiped out. Two such jolts came in the shape of the Siachen dispute and the hitch over Pakistan's alleged development of nuclear weapons. As significant political developments were also taking place in

¹²¹ The formal offer was communicated to India on November 22, 1981. See, Rizvi, *op. cit.* : 8-9.

¹²² The same view as held by Bhutto, while signing the Simla agreement in 1972.

¹²³ See, Rizvi, *op. cit.* : 11-13.

¹²⁴ See, Douglas C. Makeig, "War, No-war and the Indo-Pakistan Negotiation Process", *Pacific Affairs*, 60(2), Summer 1987 : 271-94.

Kashmir itself, these two issues not only provided the missing link in the continuity of the Kashmir dispute, they were at one stage to be subsumed in the Kashmir dispute in 1990. It is in this perspective that we review the Siachen dispute and the nuclear issue in the following section.

8.3.3 The Siachen Glacier, the Nuclear Weapons Issues and No-war Talks

Although India occupied the Siachen Glacier¹²⁵ in 1977, it did not become an issue in bilateral relations until the mid-1980s when fighting broke out in this strategic but barren mountain land. Around this time, India-Pakistan relations were at a low ebb. The Siachen issue began to send problem signals as Pakistan began raising the Kashmir issue in international fora including the UN. To India, this was a violation of the Simla Accord which stipulated the resolution outstanding problems including Kashmir through bilateral means.¹²⁶

India claimed that the Siachen Glacier lies to the east of the LAC in Kashmir while Pakistan claimed to the contrary. In Pakistan's estimation, New Delhi's sensitivity to Siachen stems from its proximity to China's borders and the implications of strengthened China-Pakistan military collaboration.¹²⁷ Between 1984 and 1989, relations between India and Pakistan followed the alternating pattern of setbacks over Siachen, the nuclear issue and Pakistan's suspected role in Sikh militancy, on the one hand and their simultaneous efforts to continue the no-war or friendship treaty talks initiated in 1981, on the other.

Zia's offer of a no-war pact and negotiations for force level ratios and force disengagement was not taken seriously by the Indian Government for a number of reasons. First, Mrs. Gandhi was unwilling to lend support to a proposal that would boost domestically a military regime. In fact she went one step further to lend support to the movement for restoration of democracy (MRD) in Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan's no-war pact was in India's perception a cosmetic touch unless the basic problem of Kashmir was resolved. Indian officials insisted instead on converting

¹²⁵ Siachen is a strategic link between Pakistan and China. See, S. M. Mujtaba Razvi, "Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia", *The Round Table*, 75(299), July 1986 : 278.

¹²⁶ Pakistan, while emphasising peaceful means of resolving outstanding problems, did not consider itself to be bound by the Simla agreement not to raise the issue of Kashmir in international forums.

¹²⁷ See, Razvi, *op. cit.* : 271.

the LAC into a permanent border, a condition that hardly any regime in Pakistan would have ventured to do.¹²⁸ Thirdly, there were political hitches in that Pakistan refused to disavow its right to grant base facilities to foreign powers and to give shelter to terrorists operating from bases in Pakistan in India territories.

The other issue was Pakistan's reported attainment or near attainment of a nuclear weapons capability.¹²⁹ Relations were strained by these factors as well as India's occupation of a strategic position in the Siachen and by the Sikh hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane were salvaged temporarily by Zia-Rajiv talks in New York and it was in December 1986 that Pakistan agreed to cooperate with India in coordinating border security so that the Sikh extremists could not use Pakistani territory as a base.¹³⁰ There are two probable reasons behind Pakistan's agreeing to such measures. First, as the regional cooperative venture in the form of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) took root in 1985 and took up terrorism as an area of cooperation,¹³¹ such an agreement would make Pakistan look less suspect to the outside world. Secondly, there was progress in another field of vital importance to Pakistan, namely, an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations.¹³²

However, any progress made in this field was wiped out again by realities on the ground. Early in 1987, India put its forces on maximum alert following a reported Pakistani troop build up on the border. Pakistan denied any such build up. Both sides were found to be willing to talk out the crisis yet neither side seemed to be willing to halt large scale troop movements.¹³³ Talks were

¹²⁸ See, Harrison, *op. cit.* : 99. Bhutto said in 1973, the "no-war" pact has a dirty history, because it involved ... it means almost surrender of Kashmir in the minds of the people, the way it was brought about.[sic] And one phrase was used all the times, 'no war' pact, and it was said, no, no, no, no 'no-war' pact. So that has a bad history." See, Satish Kumar, *op. cit.* : 363.

¹²⁹ The report of a possible Osirak-type Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations with Israel only exacerbated bilateral relations. See, *India Today*, February 15, 1985 : 18. Earlier, the report was that India approached Israel for information on its successful attack on Iraqi nuclear installations. See, *The Statesman* July 30, and August 4, 1981. The report, even if only rumour, did not sound implausible because both were not favourably disposed to an 'Islamic Bomb' with support from Libya and Saudi Arabia. See, Banarjee, *op. cit.* : 286.

¹³⁰ See, *New York Times*, December 22, 1986 : 3.

¹³¹ The SAARC process led to the intertwining of the two issues of illegal border crossing with terrorism. See, *New York Times*, December 22, 1986 : 3.

¹³² See, *New York Times*, December 28, 1986 : 6.

¹³³ See, *New York Times*, January 24, 25 and 26, 1987.

stepped up to defuse the crisis, a time table for partial withdrawal of the troops on both sides was made and the process was reinforced by what came to be known as Zia's cricket diplomacy in February 1987 when he met Rajiv Gandhi on the occasion of his ostensible trip to India to watch cricket.¹³⁴ In the latter part of 1987, again military manoeuvres on both sides took place. More exchanges took place in Siachen where India had recently established military posts. India charged that Pakistan attempted the dislodging of Indian troops from their strategic location while Pakistan alleged 'aggressive movements' of Indian troops in Kashmir. Pakistan also reported of casualties on its side following Indian firing across the borders.¹³⁵ While relations remained largely strained in 1987 as the two armies engaged in large-scale manoeuvres close to their borders, talks also continued over a number of bilateral contentious issues including the worrisome nuclear issue, to a degree that had not been observed for the previous ten years.¹³⁶ 1988, on the other hand, witnessed some level of understanding between the two adversaries. Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto met for the first time in Islamabad on the occasion of the SAARC summit of the Heads of Governments of the seven South Asian countries. More remarkably, they signed a treaty the draft of which had been there for a few years which provided that they would not attack each other's nuclear installations.¹³⁷ However, this failed to resolve the problem of the Siachen. In May 1989, the two armies again clashed causing casualties. The Defence Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in June and agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement of the Glacier problem.¹³⁸ This was followed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad in mid-July to have talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Bhutto. Military delegation from both countries also met to determine ground positions on the Glacier.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ See, *New York Times*, February 22, 1987 : 18.

¹³⁵ See, *New York Times*, October 5 : 14 and 11 : 3, 1987.

¹³⁶ See, *The Annual Register 1987*, Vol. 229, 1988 : 292-93, 299.

¹³⁷ See, *New York Times*, January 3, 1989 : 10. See, also *The Annual Register, 1988*, Vol. 230, 1989 : 312.

¹³⁸ The agreement stipulated, *inter alia*, that "The actions of both sides were to be based on redeployment of the forces to reduce the chances of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of the future positions on the ground so as to conform to the Simla agreement and to a more durable peace in the Siachen area." Quoted in *Keesing's Record of World Events*, June 1989 : 36736. They were also contemplating building a demilitarised zone in disputed Kashmir. See, *New York Times*. June 28, 1989 : 3.

¹³⁹ *Keesing's Record of World Events*, July 1989 : 36813-14.

In 1989, despite Rajiv's visit to Islamabad in July 1989 and some prospects for resolving the vexed Siachen problem in north-western Kashmir, the familiar pattern of accusation and counter-accusations resumed, which in a sense was not unnatural because of the election year in India and Rajiv Gandhi's gloomier prospects of re-election.¹⁴⁰ Then, there was also alarming reports of military build-ups on both sides.¹⁴¹ However, before the year was over, Siachen was overtaken by more dramatic developments in Kashmir. This, however, we propose to take up in the succeeding chapter.

8.4 Conclusions

The subject matter of the present chapter has been India-Pakistan relations during the period 1966-89 covering the post-Tashkent period up to the resurgence of Kashmiri militancy from within Kashmir. The basic objective was to set the prelude to the Kashmiri militancy that revived the otherwise stalemated conflict with a new dimension of internal upsurge. The pattern of India-Pakistan bilateral relations during the 1950s was observed to be roughly holding during the long interregnum of 1966-1989 as well. What this meant was that the Pakistani involvement in the affairs of Kashmir in the 1960s set in motion a process that led to an Indian reprisal, the concrete manifestation of which was to be found in India's involvement in the internal affairs of Pakistan, culminating in the birth of Bangladesh. However, the process did not stop at Bangladesh. A series of mutual involvements followed, which included Baluchistan, Punjab and Sind. An Indian politician in the larger context of this mutual involvement was listing such cases in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India and finally zeroed down to Kashmir to say, "So here in Kashmir, Pakistan has the perfect opportunity to pay us back. They have only to give enough support to keep the insurgency running for a long time."¹⁴² Thus, within the India-Pakistani bilateral domain, a complex process of linkage and feedback were in operation, as was also the case in the 1950s.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ See, *Annual Register 1989*, Vol. 231, 1990 : 308.

¹⁴¹ See, *ibid* : 302.

¹⁴² See, *New York Times*, May 24, 1990 : A10.

¹⁴³ See, Chapter VI.

In the 1950s, of course, such a diffusion process was more evident because of the salience of overall conflictual relations. In the post-1971 period, however, the focus of bilateral relations was deflected initially by the cooperative process in the 1970s, and in the 1980s by a mixture conflictual issues and an incipient cooperative process signified by the normalisation talks. Apparently at least, it seemed that the India-Pakistan dyad could bury Kashmir and interact on issues other than Kashmir, even if some of the interactions were hostile enough.¹⁴⁴ However, a close observation of the normalisation talks revealed that Kashmir was very much near the surface and the bilateral talks suffered set backs because of the same old Kashmir issue. Moreover, the reason that they could not proceed very far with either a no-war pact or a friendship treaty was the deep mistrust towards each other contributed largely by mutual hostility over Kashmir over the past decades. Both the parties, more so Pakistan, realised the futility of the use of force, yet they were both hostages of the mind-set created by Kashmir.

One could argue that perhaps given sufficient time in which Kashmir was not disturbed, the problem might have subsided, as Azar expected about this type of conflict. However, the experience of the 1970s and 1980s proved that conflicts of this type cannot be left aside. Moreover, even if there was a temporary respite on the bilateral dimension of the conflict, forces working at other levels may stimulate the conflict and entangle the other levels in the course of time. That is what happened in the late 1980s.

¹⁴⁴ The outbreak of hostilities on Siachen was an example.

CHAPTER IX

THE KASHMIRI UPRISING 1989-1990 : NEW DIMENSIONS OF AN OLD CONFLICT

9.1 Introduction

Until the Second Kashmir war of 1965, the conflict was confined largely to the inter-state level. Because of the high politics of bilateral confrontation and persistent tensions, the sub-state actors including the very people of Kashmir for whose sake the two antagonists were ostensibly fighting were largely reduced to a secondary position because of "the obsessive dimension in Indian and Pakistani attitudes toward Kashmir" as a territorial conflict.¹ In the post-Tashkent period, the sub-national actors did impinge on the bilateral relations through a mutual proclivity of interfering in each other's internal conflicts – mostly ethno-religious in nature – on the part of the two antagonists. Thus, the scope of the diffusion process was extended to an extent across domestic-bilateral levels in the seventies and eighties. However, the overall tenor of the conflictual interactions in the India-Pakistan relations remained largely dyadic. Insofar as Kashmir was concerned, there seemed to be an "unspoken recognition that there can be no change in the *status quo* without the great danger of a devastating war. Neither side reckoned with a third party's disturbing the arrangement."² The uprising in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir during 1989-1990 and later, however, not only brought the two traditional antagonists to the brink of another major flare up but also transformed the very complexion of the conflict from a dyadic into a *de facto* triadic one.

Although an India-Pakistan war in 1990 and afterward has been avoided, the insurgency of the Kashmiri militants fighting for separation from the Indian Union continues unabated. In the

¹ See, Ayesha Jalal, "Kashmir Scars", *The New Republic*, 203(4), July 23, 1990 : 18. See, also Gowher Rizvi, "Case for Self-determination in Kashmir Remains Unique", *Weekly Dialogue*, [Dhaka] April 27, 1990 : 1, 5.

² See, Edward W. Desmond, "The Road to War?", *Time*, May 14, 1990 : 18.

process, the sub-state actors of the Kashmiri militants have made themselves visible and established themselves as a party in the conflict on their own merits. An explanation of this transformation of the conflict across the level of actors will constitute the major burden of the present chapter. In the process, the nature of the present uprising and its fallout on India-Pakistan relations will also be dealt with. While the focus is on the uprising and militancy during 1989-1990, where appropriate more recent developments will be covered.

The present chapter has three main sections. Section 9.2 traces the background of the present uprising in terms of the internal developments within Kashmir and the dialectics of Delhi-Srinagar relations leading to a transformation of the conflict. Section 9.3 examines the nature of uprising in terms of the degree of militancy and the people's participation in it. Section 9.4 assesses the bilateral dimensions of the uprising, especially the dialectics between the new and old elements of the conflict. The India-Pakistan mutual perceptions of brinkmanship amidst the Kashmiri militancy, the possibility of a war between them and the peace process that followed to avoid a war will also be dealt with.

9.2 The Background to the Present Uprising in the Kashmir Valley

Several explanations – mainly polemical – are available as to why the region's most intractable conflict flared up again in 1989 after a prolonged period of dormant existence. The recent uprising in Kashmir is seen by India as a deep seated destabilisation plan of its secular polity by Pakistan.³ To Pakistan, the Kashmiris have taken up arms because of the continued denial of their right of self-determination by India.⁴ Between these official positions a wide range of views may be found which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some argue that the recent uprising arose from higher aspirations kindled by the Indian policy of "positive discrimination" in favour of the minorities,⁵ or from a rise of an "imagined nationalism", fanned by external

³ See, the then Indian Foreign Minister, I. K. Gujral's statement in the *Rajya Sabha* [the Upper House of the Indian Parliament], in *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIV/3, May 3, 1990 : Col 103.

⁴ See, the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's statement in the Senate [the Upper House of the Pakistani Parliament] on January 4, 1990, quoted in *The Morning News* [Karachi], January 5, 1990.

⁵ See, Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir", *Foreign Affairs*, 69(5), Winter 1990-91 : 58-59.

sources.⁶ Among others, opinion is divided as to whether the uprising owes its origin to a Kashmiri secular ethnic and cultural identity,⁷ or to ethno-religious factors.⁸ Yet some tend to highlight the issue of immediate socio-economic deprivation, denial, broken promises and mismanagement.⁹

While these viewpoints provide valuable insights in understanding the present multi-faceted uprising in Kashmir, they are at best partial as they emphasise on selective aspects of the uprising and discard the others. The roots of the present uprising have to be traced to a combination of several factors, including an historical development of the Kashmiri traditions distinct from those of India and Pakistan, and developments in post-1947 Delhi-Srinagar relations. Moreover, the recent uprising has been inspired to a significant extent by recent developments in the regional and global sphere. These old and new elements, it will be seen, have added further intractability to the conflict.

9.2.1 Kashmiri Identity Consciousness in Historical Perspective

Kashmiri identity may be examined in historical perspective at two levels – an ethno-demographic level, and an élite level where the aspirations of the community are articulated and given expression. It is held generally that the Kashmiris developed a sense of distinct identity as a community of people through the ages. The identity had a religious colour but it also transcended the barriers of religion to encompass a community dimension. The evolution of a Kashmiri

⁶ For an elaboration of the concept, see, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflection on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London : Verso) 1992 [reprinted]. For a use of the concept in the context of the Kashmiris, see, Ashutosh Varshney, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir : Antinomies of Nationalism", *Asian Survey*, 31(2), February 1991 : 998.

⁷ See, Gautam Navalakha, "Kashmir : Defending National-Cultural Identity", *Economic and Political Weekly* [Bombay], March 3, 1990 : 422-23; Iftikhar H. Malik, "Ethnicity and Contemporary South Asian Politics : The Kashmir Conflict as a Case Study", *The Round Table*, 323, July 1992 : 203-14.

⁸ See, Balraj Puri, "Kashmiri Muslims, Islam and Kashmiri Tradition", *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 10, 1990 : 307-08; Akbar S. Ahmed, "Kashmir 1990 : Islamic Revolt or Kashmir Nationalism", *Strategic Studies* [Islamabad], XIV(3), Spring 1991 : 22-29, and his latest *Postmodernism and Islam* (London : Routledge) 1992, especially the section titled, "Kashmir : A Paradigmatic Postmodernist Muslim Movement?" : 141-53.

⁹ N. Y. Dole, "Kashmir : A Deep-rooted Alienation", *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 5-12, 1990 : 978-79; "Kashmir : Not a Nationality Question", *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 10, 1990 : 299; Shaheen Akhtar, "Uprising in Indian-held Jammu & Kashmir", *Regional Studies* [Islamabad], IX(2), Spring 1990 : 3-71.

identity dates back even before the Christian era when the Kashmiri Hindus adopted Buddhism *en masse*, then turned to Hinduism *en masse*, and again turned to Islam, again, *en masse*.¹⁰ Thus, Kashmiri identity is a product of common emotional and historical experiences. They "fought subjugation under the Mughals, the Sikhs and the Dogras".¹¹ In the context of the present struggle, it is said, "The crisis in Kashmir is not the result of impoverishment, unemployment and such things. True, they have contributed to the crisis, especially the rampant corruption encouraged by the large central grants meant to buy people's loyalty. But the roots of the crisis lie primarily in Kashmiris' fears for their cultural identity in the face of the advance of the Hindu/Hindi notion of nationalism".¹²

The Kashmiri identity is often described as *Kashmiriyat*, which means being a Kashmiri. However it is yet to find a consensual root in Kashmir.¹³ *Kashmiriyat* is apparently a fairly innocuous and comprehensive description. However, problem arises because of the narrow ideological and regional focus that has been ascribed to it by one group of militants, namely, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF is largely confined to the Kashmiri speaking Kashmir Valley and is secular in orientation. The problem, however, is much more deeper, because Kashmir itself is a composite state consisting of at least three distinct communities from the point of view of ethnicity and religion – the Kashmiri Muslims and the Hindu Pandits in the Valley, Dogra Hindus and Punjabi Muslims in Jammu and Tibeto Mongolian Buddhists in Ladakh.¹⁴ At least, two groups, the Jammu Hindus and the Ladakhi Buddhists are ardent advocates of the continuation of an Indian identity.¹⁵ Even those who are for

¹⁰ The underlying emphasis of this statement is on the community dimension. It does not mean that all the Kashmiris turned to these religions including Islam. For the above argument, see, Shaheen Akhtar, *op. cit.* : 41. See, also, a brief historical note on Kashmir in *Kashmir : An Introduction* (London : International Institute of Kashmir Studies) 1988, and Hussam-ud-din Ahmed, *Islam in Kashmir (1320-1819)* (London : International Institute of Kashmir Studies) 1986.

¹¹ See, *India Today* [New Delhi], September 1989, quoted in Akhtar, *op. cit.* : 40.

¹² See, Navalakha, *op. cit.* : 423.

¹³ See, Varshney, *op. cit.* : 1006-1008.

¹⁴ The regional, ethnic and religious distinctiveness of different population groups has been indicated in Section 5.2.1 in Chapter V. For a religious distribution of the population in the three regions of the Valley, Jammu and Ladakh, as per 1981 Census of Indian population, see Varshney, *op. cit.* : 1006.

¹⁵ The Valley Hindus are not as strong advocates of Indian identity as the other two regions, but in the event of Kashmir's being separated from India, they would opt for India, JKLF's professing of secularism notwithstanding.

a separation of Kashmir from India, are divided on the role of Islam, which is the religion of 90% of the Valley population and more than 80% of the state population, as an element of the nationalist struggle. The other major militant organisation, namely, the *Hizbul Mujahedin*, for example, advocates the establishment of an Islamic state having close relations with Pakistan.

Having introduced the controversy on Kashmiri nationalism the ramifications of which will be brought out in the succeeding sections, it should also be pointed out that the Kashmiri identity has the twin facets of ethnicity and religion, either side becoming dominant depending on the particular circumstances. Majority of the Kashmiris are religious Muslims. They resented any affront to their religious sentiments. At the same time they are less communal than the rest of India and Pakistan as well.¹⁶ According to Balraj Puri, a Hindu from Jammu :

Kashmiri Muslims, who constitute 95 per cent of the population of the valley, have always reconciled cosmopolitan Islamic affiliations with territorial patriotism because Islam in Kashmir is rooted in the Kashmiri tradition and Kashmiri tradition is permeated with Islam. The Kashmiri Muslim remains a Kashmiri as well as a Muslim and rarely suffers from the schizophrenic pangs which Islamic links and local patriotism often create among Muslims elsewhere in the sub-continent.¹⁷

Moreover, a metamorphosis of outlook and views has been taking place between the Valley Muslims and the Muslims of Jammu over the past decades. The outlook perceptions of the Valley Muslims have changed significantly. It is said that the present uprising owes its origin partly to a culpable feeling among the Valley Muslims that they did not respond favourably to the Poonch rebellion and the tribal invasion of 1947 and the *Mujahedin* infiltration of 1965 for their own liberation from Indian control.¹⁸ The uprising, which was initially confined to the Valley, had gradually spread among the Muslims in Jammu district who have ethnic and linguistic affinity with those in Azad Kashmir and the Pakistani Punjab. The demand for allowing a 'soft border' for greater interactions between Kashmiris of both sides of the Line of Actual Control(LAC) has long been voiced on both sides and supported by scholars and opinion making élites from India

¹⁶ For this tolerant aspect of Islam in Kashmir, see, Hussam-ud-din Ahmed, *op. cit.* : 41-42. This is, of course, not to deny the changes that have taken place over the last decade in terms of a revival of orthodox Islam.

¹⁷ See, Balraj Puri (February 1990), *op. cit.* : 307.

¹⁸ Source : *Interview* in Muzaffarabad (Azad Kashmir), 1991 and in London, 1992.

and Pakistan.¹⁹ From this, it turns out that the ideological configuration in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, especially, among the Muslims has radically changed from what was at the time of the transfer of power in 1947. The Jammu-Valley distinction between the Muslims has largely been blurred over time. Even if a section of the militants upholds the goal of a secular united Kashmir, the divisive role of the secular principle in present day Kashmir is far less compared to the tumultuous period of Kashmir's accession to India in 1947.

With regard to the role of the Kashmiri élites who articulated the aspirations of the Kashmiris, the vision of a single individual played a decisive role in the autonomist or independence demand of the Kashmiris until the early 1980s. The person was Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular, and at the same time somewhat controversial, personality in Kashmir. He was popular because he articulated and symbolised the aspirations of the Kashmiris, which to him, at times meant the maximum possible freedom within the Indian Union but at others, they meant outright independence.²⁰ He was controversial as well because he had secular ideological leanings which at times made him subservient to the Indian National Congress, to the disliking of most Kashmiris.²¹ He was at heart a supporter of independence of Kashmir but he also realised that his preference had to be limited between India and Pakistan.²² He preferred the better of the two options – acceding to secular India rather than to theocratic Pakistan. However, the bottom line of his preference was the maximum possible autonomy to preserve the separateness of Kashmir, as ensured by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.²³ However, whenever opportunities permitted him or there was disillusionment about Indian secularism, of which he

¹⁹ See, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "A Solution for Kashmir Dispute?", *Regional Studies*, 4(4), Autumn 1986 : 3-15; B. G. Verghese, "New Mood in Kashmir", *Indian Express*, July 12, 1991. Also, *Interview* with Mir Abdul Aziz, Rawalpindi, August 1991.

²⁰ For some details, see, Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire : Roxford Books) 1991 :189-99.

²¹ Josef Korbel, the First Chief of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan(UNCIP) recalls his conversation with Abdullah during his visit to Srinagar in 1948: "he was convinced that a union of Kashmir with Pakistan would finally work against the interests of his people. They would be better off with India – but what could he do if the sentiments of his people pushed them in a direction against his better judgement?" See, Josef Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton : Princeton University Press) 1954 : 147-51.

²² See, *ibid* : 147.

²³ When put into operation through the Nehru-Abdullah agreement of 1951, it included a separate constitution and a flag for Kashmir side by side with the Union flag, customs checks at Kashmir's border with India, and a ban on non-Kashmiris buying property in Kashmir.

had an abundance during and after his prolonged incarcerations since 1953, he tried to take Kashmir away, little by little, from the Indian Union.²⁴ As his original political platform, the National Conference, had been usurped by those who were in power, he floated the platform of the Plebiscite Front which stood for a federal Kashmir either independent or acceding to Pakistan.²⁵ He intended to contest the *Lok Sabha*²⁶ elections on the issue of accession of Kashmir. Alarmed at Abdullah's popularity and its implications for the future of Kashmir, New Delhi banned the Plebiscite Front and sent its leader, Sheikh Abdullah again to prison.²⁷ Released in 1974, he continued harping on the pre-1953 autonomy for Kashmir. Although other Kashmiri leaders were far less nationalist than Abdullah from the point of view of preserving Kashmir's autonomous existence, all including Sheikh Abdullah's son, Farooq Abdullah, the last Kashmiri head of its Government tended to guard zealously the special status of Kashmir conferred under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.²⁸

One important factor not adequately recognised is the impact of the conflict dynamics on the psyche of the Kashmiris. The Kashmiris, it seems have taken a cue of self-determination from the commitment of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders to the cause of a plebiscite under the UN

²⁴ For some detail of a negotiated route to independence as viewed by Sheikh Abdullah, see his "Kashmir, India and Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, 43(3), April 1965 : 534. Among other instances reflecting his definite initiative for independence, mention may be made of his delaying the ratification of Kashmiri's provisional accession by the newly convened Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in 1951. Instead, his concern was the drafting of a separate constitution for Kashmir, much to the disliking of New Delhi. In this context, he claimed a "100 per cent sovereignty" of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, over which "neither the Indian Parliament nor any other Parliament outside the State has any jurisdiction." See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 24-31, 1952 : 12232. Secondly, he allegedly entered into dialogue with the United States for the independence of Kashmir, and for this, he was ousted from power. Akbar in this context argues persuasively that Abdullah was a victim of an intelligence-cum-Home Ministry conspiracy. See, M. J. Akbar, *India : The Siege Within, Challenges to a Nation's Unity* (Middlesex : Penguin Books) 1985 : 259-60. Varshney, however, brings out fresh evidence from recently released State Department documents to argue that Sheikh Abdullah met a number of US officials including the then US Ambassador to India, L. Henderson. For details, see, Varshney, *op. cit.* : 1005. Thirdly, on his release from jail in 1964 he toyed with the idea of a guaranteed independence for Kashmir along with Nehru's idea of a India-Pakistan confederation with Kashmir as a part thereof. Fifthly, his initiative of the Kashmiri resettlement bill whereby the Kashmiri State Government would be empowered to grant citizenship to those Kashmiris who were refugees either in Pakistan or Azad Kashmir was also perceived to be one such step. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 319-20.

²⁵ See, his speech at the Second Kashmir State People's Conference in June 1970. See, Lamb(1991), *op. cit.* : 285.

²⁶ Lower House of the Indian Parliament.

²⁷ Lamb, *ibid* : 285.

²⁸ The lone exception was Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, who replaced Sheikh Abdullah in 1953. See, *ibid* : 200-10.

auspices. Ghulam Nabi Hagaroo, an associate of Sheikh Abdullah said, "Ask Jawaharlal Nehru. It is he who promised us our choice. In 1950. he addressed a large rally of Kashmiris at Lal Chowk[Srinagar neighbourhood] where he repeated his promise. Since then the concept of right of self-determination has gone into our blood. India stood committed in the UN also".²⁹ Likewise, the JKLF frequently refers to the views of Jinnah that the Princely states were "constitutionally and legally" independent sovereign states, and were free to decide their future.³⁰ In particular, the high politics of the India-Pakistan relations over Kashmir including more than two wars, the prolonged mediation and negotiations over the fate of the Kashmiris, the rhetorics of self-determination through a plebiscite, all have made it repeatedly and abundantly clear to them that they themselves have to do something about it. The experiences of Kashmir's political union with New Delhi also shaped greatly the idea of a separate destiny.

9.2.2 The Route to the Delhi-Srinagar Rift

9.2.2.1 Constitutional and Political Relations

One of the factors that led Sheikh Abdullah to opt for the Indian Union was the prospect of constitutional and political freedom in Kashmir's relations with the Centre. The best of the deal that Kashmir got, even if temporarily, was the provision of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which conferred special status on Kashmir. New Delhi, however, later began backtracking about the status arguing that the special constitutional status was a temporary arrangement under the extraordinary circumstances of the conflict with Pakistan. The Kashmiris, including Sheikh Abdullah, on the other hand, argued that the very extraordinary circumstances of Kashmir's accession to India should confer upon it the special status on a permanent basis. In the tug of war in Delhi-Srinagar relations, Delhi's aim was to take away as much autonomy as possible from the

²⁹ See, *The Afternoon Despatch and Courier [Bombay]*, April 2, 1990 .

³⁰ This refers to the press statement of Jinnah of June 17, 1947, as quoted in JKLF, *Ideology and Objectives of the Jammu [and] Kashmir Liberation Front*, undated (probably between 1986 and 1989) booklet, Lance, UK.

Article so as to put Kashmir eventually on an equal footing with other Indian states. The Kashmiri regimes even if most of them were otherwise favourably disposed towards New Delhi insofar as the accession issue was concerned, tried to preserve the Article in its pre-1953, meaning original, form. New Delhi, in any case was on the constant look out for a pliable regimes in Srinagar through manipulation election, encouraging factionalism and ousting of the incumbent from power, whenever needed. Political relations between New Delhi and Srinagar, therefore, were one of constant turbulence.³¹

The basic problem lay in New Delhi's lack of confidence in the regime they put in power. One contributing factor to this lack of confidence was the suspected presence of the Pakistan factor in the psyche of the Kashmiris including the incumbent regimes. Thus, starting with Sheikh Abdullah down to Farooq Abdullah, with half a dozen regimes in between, all at one time or the other were suspects. This mistrust haunted New Delhi all the time.³² Eventually the mistrust percolated to the level of every single Kashmiri. *The Economist* wrote in 1986,

Sheikh Abdullah wanted to be part of a secular, not a Muslim, country. But Islam could not be set aside so easily. ... The Nehru family was originally Kashmiri, but the prime ministers the family produced - Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv - have seemed convinced that, unless they kept a tight hold on Kashmir, it would slip its leash and join Pakistan.³³

That also explains partly at least why India so readily went back on its promise to organise the plebiscite in Kashmir, and for that matter, why it had been so reticent to hold a free and fair election in the state.³⁴ The basic element of mistrust was reinforced by the existence of an indeterminate number of pro-Pakistani Kashmiris in the Valley. The expression of pro-Pakistani feelings in the form of raising of Pakistani flags on public buildings, pro-Pakistani slogans and

³¹ For some details, see, Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir : A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (Bombay : Asia Publishing House) 1966 : 362-408. See, also Lamb, *op. cit.* : 182-213.

³² During Sheikh Abdullah's second term in office, Mrs. Gandhi accused him of patronising the Jamaa't, an orthodox Islami party in the Valley. See, *Pakistan Times*, September 22, 1980. Likewise, whenever there was an incident showing support among the Kashmiris for Pakistan, as happened during a one-day cricket match between India and the West Indies in 1983, the incumbent regime was blamed for it. See, Akbar, *op. cit.* : 285. Even G. M. Shah, who became the trusted man of New Delhi after the ouster of Farooq Abdullah in 1983, was blamed for being too soft towards the incipient militancy in the mid-1980s. He was therefore, dismissed by Rajiv Gandhi in 1986.

³³ See, "Kashmir could run away", *The Economist*, September 20, 1986 : 59-60.

³⁴ See, *Time*, February 5, 1990 : 33.

making pro-Pakistani propaganda, deepened New Delhi's suspicion towards the Kashmiris in general. The element of mistrust was carried to the extreme and no attempt was made for its reversal. The consequence was a self-propagating mistrust, as argued by Morris-Jones :

Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state, has still to be firmly appeased, largely because its yearning for autonomy beyond its special constitutional status have too readily been misinterpreted as pro-Pakistani - with the predictable consequence that the lie becomes a little more true than it would otherwise have been."³⁵

Instead of building a relationship of mutual confidence, there had always been a search for a counterweight on New Delhi's part. Such efforts consisted of political manipulations and farcical elections in the 1950s and 1960s.³⁶ In the early 1980 the Jammu Hindus were cultivated as a counterweight.³⁷ This in turn, injected an element of communalism in the state and in Srinagar's equation with New Delhi. Another milestone in the distancing between Srinagar and New Delhi were the elections of 1987 in which rigging, manipulation and communal element were manifest.³⁸

The rift was contributed to no less by corrupt politicians who said one thing in New Delhi, another in Srinagar but in effect pursued reckless self-aggrandisement. The common people viewed the politicians as New Delhi's men. This is one of the reasons why the politicians of every political hue, even those who spearheaded the movement in 1988, have become largely irrelevant to the people. They pin their hope of *azadi* (independence) only on the militants.³⁹ New Delhi's credibility, however, suffered both ways. The Kashmiris also believed that it was a part of the policy of New Delhi to discredit and defame Kashmiri leaders one after another - Sheikh Abdullah, Bakhshi, Masudi, Beg. Such perceptions were transmitted to the new generations. Thus, dismissal of Farooq Abdullah under the doubtful circumstances of the defection of legislators from his National Conference Party in 1984 led to a widespread resentment in

³⁵ See, W. H. Morris-Jones, "Realities and Dreams : Ebb and Flow in the Politics of Separatism", *The Round Table*, 75(298), April 1986 : 133.

³⁶ For details, see, Akhtar, *op. cit.* : 15.

³⁷ Placating the anti-Srinagar sentiments among the Jammu Hindus was initiated by Mrs. Gandhi in 1980 elections. For some details of this point, see, M. J. Akbar, *op. cit.* : 283-84.

³⁸ For election details, see, *The Times*, March 21, 1987 : 7a; March 24 : 7b and March 25 : 10b. See also, *New York Times*, May 30, 1987 : 4.

³⁹ See, *India Today*, May 31, 1989 : 72.

Kashmir.⁴⁰ It turns out, therefore, that the constitutional and political alienation between Srinagar and New Delhi had dual casualties, relation with the Indian Union and the political élites. This, to a great extent, paved the way for the emergence of the young Kashmiri militants.

9.2.2.2 Socio-economic Deprivation

A section of the élites in New Delhi believed that as with the Punjab, another of the Indian states in the grip of secessionist violence, Kashmir has also been highly pampered and subsidised.⁴¹ The Kashmiris have completely different perceptions. To them socio-economic deprivation provided the immediate context of the present uprising. Their catalogue of socio-economic grievances include, *inter alia*, a reverse flow of resources from the state to the Centre.⁴² Consequently, the bulk of the deficit financing of the state has been incurred to pay interest to the Centre.⁴³ In this context a member of the *Lok Sabha* from the Jammu and Kashmir state said :

there is no special subsidy at any point of time which has been granted to Jammu and Kashmir. All that they have been getting is what every other Indian gets, perhaps much less than that, but there was a subsidy which was known as food subsidy that was given in 1953 when Shri Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was arrested and that the record be straightened, it was Shri Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who stopped that subsidy in 1975.⁴⁴

Another major grievance has been the rising unemployment among the educated youths.⁴⁵ The unemployed Muslim youths also resented the fact that Hindu youths were given preference over them in public sector employment including local administration and military services.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ See, *New York Times*, July 3, 1984 : 6; July 5, 1984 : 5.

⁴¹ See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, March 28, 1990.

⁴² Admittedly the per capita assistance from the Centre is possibly high in Kashmir, as is also the case with other Hill States like the Himachal Pradesh and North Eastern states, but the loan-grant ratio of the Centre's assistance for Jammu and Kashmir has been 70:30 as compared to 90:10 for other states on average. See, Arshad Maqsood, "New Delhi and Kashmir : Integration or Alienation?", in *Kashmir Dossier*, New Delhi, February 1991, quoted in, *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 24, 1991 : 1960-61.

⁴³ Maqsood estimates that during 1991, out of a total of Rs. 3700 million deficit financing, Rs. 3000 were incurred for interest payments. See, Maqsood, *ibid* : 10.

⁴⁴ See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/13, March 28, 1990 : Col. 694.

⁴⁵ Educated unemployment in Kashmir, according to one source, had gone up from 100,000 in 1986-87 to 300,000 in 1989-90. See, *The Statesman*, April 23, 1989.

⁴⁶ See, Akhtar, *op. cit.* : 44-45. For state and communal representation of the Kashmiris in the administrative and other services, see, tabular compilation by a New Delhi-based human rights organisation, Committee for Initiative on Kashmir in *India's Kashmir War : A Report* (New Delhi : Committee for Initiative on Kashmir) March 1990 : 43-48. The report concludes, as of March 1990, "only 25% of the IAS [Indian Administrative Service] personnel are from the state and out of 22 Secretaries [top ranking IAS official] only 5 are Kashmiri Muslims", despite an agreement in 1958 that 50% would be from the State Service. See, *India's*

It has also been complained that bulk of the Centre's funding went to roads and communication, and power generation and transmission sectors which benefited the Centre more than the local people because these sectors were controlled by the Centre.⁴⁷ Incidentally, the issue of chronic power shortage in Srinagar in 1988 led to the unrest that gradually culminated into the present crisis.

Finally, there has been an adverse pattern of trade between Kashmir and the rest of India following abolition of the custom barriers in the wake of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953. The Kashmiris have always been resentful of Kashmir's dependence on the Centre for most of the essential supplies including food, medicine and fuel and for marketing of their own products.⁴⁸

While such an account has parallels in other disadvantaged and disgruntled Indian states like Assam,⁴⁹ what has been unique in this particular case is its peculiar demographic composition, its tortuous history, and the psychological and perceptual baggage associated with it.⁵⁰ The conditions of the common Kashmiris have worsened, while the state élite was become highly corrupt and abusive of power. Dr. Farooq Abdullah, contemptuously known as the disco man, for example, spent a huge amount of money in developing luxury projects such as a Golf course, cable cars and a boulevard,⁵¹ while the most parts of the thickly populated city of Srinagar remain without basic amenities like power, drinking water and drainage. Public wrath against the state élites had always turned into anti-Indian sentiments because of the expectations aroused by Kashmir's association with India. A Kashmiri youth told *The India Express*: "We

Kashmir War, loc. cit. : 43.

⁴⁷ It is alleged that Srinagar remains without electricity for several days in winter while electricity generated in Kashmir's hydro-electricity projects were transferred elsewhere. The transfer of these projects to the National Hydro-electricity Power Corporation was effected in the 1980s under G. M. Shah and Jagmohan, two controversial administrators planted by New Delhi.

⁴⁸ See, Akbar, *op. cit.* : 158.

⁴⁹ In Assam an agitation against illegal foreigners turned into an anti-Centre movement, resulting eventually in a secessionist movement launched by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).

⁵⁰ Mazoor Ahmed 28, a shopkeeper, said in this context, "For 40 years, despite promises, there has been no improvement. Everything is filthier, grimmer. There is no jobs. To enter engineering or medical colleges, officials are bribed with Maruti cars. When we protest we are branded terrorists. Our MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] has not visited us once." See, *India Today*, May 31, 1989 : 69. See, also, *Kashmir Bleeds* (Islamabad : Institute of Policy Studies, compiled by Human Rights Commission in Srinagar) 1991 : 28.

⁵¹ See, *ibid* : 30.

were never a part of India. We became associated with India only because we wanted to build roads, hospitals, etc. Even the [State] Assembly was only to connect the *mohollas* [neighbourhoods] to Srinagar. It does not mean that we are Indians."⁵² Thus, the economic grievances along with political frustration served as an immediate factor in Kashmir's alienation process. Kashmiri identity consciousness, in the meantime, has also been sharpened. What made separatism look as a plausible alternative in the eyes of the Kashmiris have been epoch making developments in their immediate surrounding, as well as in the regional and global spheres.

9.2.3 Changes in the Local, Regional and Global Environment

Changes in the immediate regional and global environment provided significant impetus to the uprising. In one sense, what has been happening in Kashmir was but part of a broader regional or even global phenomenon. Throughout the 1980s ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional grievances were making themselves felt in the region, especially in countries like India itself, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and even in tiny Bhutan.⁵³ The Kashmiris have also been witnessing a separatist movement in neighbouring Punjab from the early 1980s. Of no less significance has been their general exposure to the twin revolutionary changes of a global scale. Firstly, the easing of tensions in Superpower relations, and its fallout on the Eastern Europe and then, on the Soviet Union itself leading eventually to its disintegration, all have been viewed as the victory of the people against autocracy and oppression. Secondly, the resurgence of Islam in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the Palestinian *intifadah*, and the *Mujahedin* success in Afghanistan provided even a great impetus to the young generation between 20 and 30 years, who in the late 1980s constituted about 40% of the population.⁵⁴ Referring to the impact of these regional and global changes, Inder Mohan, a member of the Indian Group of Civil Liberties, who visited the Valley in March 1990, wrote:

⁵² See, *Indian Express*, June 10, 1990.

⁵³ For brief survey of such tendencies in South Asia, see, *New York Times*, January 4, 1987 : 1 and April 26, 1987 : 19.

⁵⁴ See, *India Today*, June 14, 1990 : 3.

The determination of the people to fight to the end for the objective is something to be seen to be believed. They feel inspired by the developments in the Soviet Republics, the Eastern European countries and withdrawal of the Russian forces from Afghanistan. The people of Kashmir draw a parallel or contrast between the realistic response of Gorbachev to the situation there and the drifting or oppressive response of our leaders to the problem of Kashmir.⁵⁵

This was also admitted grudgingly by Jagmohan, the Governor of Kashmir during the height of the militancy (December 1989-May 1990) in his personal accounts of the events in Kashmir. He said :

Virtual incitement was provided by our own television which kept broadcasting programmes on ethnic revolution in Azerbaizan and liberation movement in Rumania.⁵⁶

Regarding the influence of the Islamic resurgence, observers and analysts consider the Kashmir problem as part of the general upsurge in Islamic fervour that ranges from "east to west then south" covering Kashmir, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Lebanon and the West Bank, where some of the most violent, volatile conflicts in the world are being played out with "a deep historical current" running through them all.⁵⁷ It is also argued that in recent years "indigenous Kashmiri Islam with its roots in the Sufi tradition has been systematically supplanted by a doctrinaire faith whose political goal is an Islamic state".⁵⁸ An *Indian Express* reporter writes of his own experience in Srinagar :

The demands of Srinagar ...epitomised for me two formidable realities in Kashmir today - 'separateness' to Kashmir from India has been nurtured in the public mind for 43 years through unrelenting repetition; and fundamentalists (and watchful neighbours?) have interpreted this separateness to the youth in terms of the Holy War.⁵⁹

Ahmed compares the structural similarities of the Kashmiri uprising with the Palestinian *intifadah* and resurgence of Islam in the former Soviet Central Asia.⁶⁰ Ahmed concludes that "it

⁵⁵ See, *Mainstream*, April 7, 1990.

⁵⁶ Quoted in B. G. Verghese's review of Jagmohan's book titled, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* (New Delhi : Allied Publishers) 1991, in *Sunday Mail* [New Delhi], October 6, 1991.

⁵⁷ See, Charles Krauthammer, "This Islamic 'Arc of Crisis' Traces a Global Intifada", *International Herald Tribune*, February 17-18, 1990 : 4.

⁵⁸ See, "Battle for Kashmir", *Sunday* [Calcutta], 26 January-1 February 1992 : 12.

⁵⁹ See, *Indian Express*, June 10, 1990.

⁶⁰ See, Akbar S. Ahmed, "Islamic Revolt or Kashmiri Nationalism", *Strategic Studies* [Islamabad], XIV(3), Spring 1991 : 22. See, also, Ghani Eirabie, " 'Intifada' in Kashmir : A new challenge to Pakistan", *The Muslim*, [Islamabad] December 20, 1989 for similar comparison. For some brief idea about the Israeli *intifadah*, especially, the concept of combining Islam with territorial nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza by

is a combination of external and internal factors that has created the conditions for, and explains, the Kashmir movement in 1990. There is little doubt that it is substantially different to [sic] earlier expressions of identity. In this case, the desperation and determination appear extreme, sustaining the movement against the full and heavy-handed might of the state. Islamic revivalism is part of the explanation for the movements, [sic] deprivation and distrust the other parts. The clumsy handling of the movement by government ensures its continuation. ... The sheer lack of clarity is compounded with absence of judgement."⁶¹

Thus, the Kashmiri identity consciousness and the rise of its separatist aspirations had both historical and contemporary origins. In its internal dimension, however, there are elements of contradiction and indeterminacy as to whether the identity is *Kashmiriyat* with a tolerant Islam but a broad secular tinge or it is for an Islamic state with close links with Pakistan or even outright accession to Pakistan within the framework of the UN Resolutions of 1948. Such contradictions are, to an extent, inherent in an abstract and all-encompassing concepts like nationalism, especially in the post-modernist era.⁶² Evidently, however, there has been a clear turn towards a separation from India.⁶³ On the crucial issue of subsequent sovereign independence or accession to Pakistan, there would be "no compulsion of the people to join Pakistan or remain independent. The people will decide their future," said a spokesman of the *Hizbul Mujahedin*.⁶⁴

the *Hamas*, the fundamentalist Palestinian group, see, Glenn Frankel, "Islam's rallying cry : For Israel it means yet another headache", *Washington Post*, December 25-31, 1989 : 15-16.

⁶¹ See, Ahmed(1991), *op. cit.* : 29.

⁶² The important characteristics of which have been aptly summed up by Akbar Ahmed : "Post-modernism is to look for the richness of meaning rather than clarity of meaning, to avoid choices between black and white, to evoke many levels of meaning and combinations of focus. It is an enigmatic and troubling post-modernity". See, Akbar S. Ahmed, "Postmodernist Perceptions of Islam : Observing the Observer", *Asian Survey*, XXXI(3), March 1991 : 213-14.

⁶³ Verghese, on the basis of personal talks with senior surrendered militants could identify "a flicker of interests" in them to queries like "why *azadi* could not be achieved within India through genuinely free elections and negotiation of fresh terms for Centre-State relations if so desired by a popularly elected government." See, Verghese, *op. cit.* A recent feature in the *India Today*, on the situation in Kashmir, took a realist position on the separatism in Kashmir : "everything is not always the way it looks in Kashmir. Right now the mood is militant and separatist. But there have been periods in Kashmir ... when the mood in the Valley was not anti-Indian or even separatist. ... So the virulent anti-Indian wave sweeping the Valley could well have ups and down." See, *India Today*, May 31, 1993 : 43-44.

⁶⁴ See, his interview in *Frontline*, October 12-25, 1991 : 12-13. Although the *Hizbul Mujahedin* is not always as liberal as it sounds here, both the JKLF and the *Hizb*, despite basic differences and occasional open conflict, try to minimise publicly any such divergence in approach. Javed Mir, the current leader of JKLF in

To sum up, in this section an attempt has been made to trace the background and nature of the current uprising in Kashmir spearheaded by young militants and backed by the common people. While a sense of Kashmiri identity was rooted in history, there has also been certain amount of indeterminacy, as to how best to give expression to that identity. The élites also vacillated and groped for an appropriate path for Kashmiri nationalism. While the common mass were divided, so were the élites, the dominant section of whom, of course, opted for India in 1947. Since then at least three factors sharpened the urge for searching concrete ways and means of an alternative future of Kashmir. One was the India-Pakistan conflicts which broke twice into war and the protracted negotiations over their fate, their right of self-determination. Before their eyes, they saw how the two combatants paid lip service to their cause and the battle for self-determination was converted into a territorial conflict for Kashmir. The best India and Pakistan could achieve was a series of interminable stalemates and sidetracking of the main issue. If there was a disillusionment here, it was further sharpened and heightened by a second factor, that is, their experience with the Indian Union since 1947. They tasted neither secularism nor development, both of which apparently had lured initially the local élites and a section of the populace. The frictions in Srinagar-Delhi relations over the past decades made the ordinary Kashmiris "inured to the phenomenon of latent political discontent frequently spilling into the streets."⁶⁵

An intervening third factor was the role of the local élites. The people were totally disillusioned not only with an Indian mode of expression of their national identity but also with the local élites themselves. The height of disillusionment occurred in 1987 when the State Assembly elections were rigged massively. Another landmark in popular unrest was the chronic power shortage in 1988. In the light of regional and global changes in East-West relations and in the Islamic world, an alternative looked feasible in the eyes of the Kashmiris, the youth in

the Valley, for example, said in response to a similar question, "They [the militants] are all different paths to a same goal – which is ouster of the Indian Army and a plebiscite." See, *India Today* March 1990. Recently also he reiterated that position when he said, "The *Hizbul Mujahedin* is also fighting for freedom. Why should we fight them? Yes, we've had some differences but they have always been minor." See, *India Today*, May 31, 1993 : 39.

⁶⁵ See, "Kashmir Valley : Militant Siege", *India Today*, January 31, 1990 : 22.

particular. This section, therefore, also explained the transformation of the conflict from an India-Pakistan to a Kashmiri one. Of course, things are still "tentative", as a scholar remarked in 1991.⁶⁶ The transformation is not a clear-cut one, especially in view of its tensions with the entrenched bilateral dimension. Thus, the nature of the uprising and its bilateral dimension need some careful examination.

9.3 The Present Uprising in Kashmir

9.3.1 The Watershed - the Kashmiri Militants Come into the Limelight

The former Pakistani Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto said in 1972 in the context of the Simla Agreement that, "Twenty five years of history has told us that no right of self-determination can be achieved by proxy".⁶⁷ The only way, he said, the Kashmiris could win their right of self-determination was for them to fight for it, and if they launched a "freedom struggle", Pakistan would join it.⁶⁸ It seems, to prove Bhutto's prophetic statement posthumously and to disprove their proverbial pacifism, the Kashmiri youths have taken up arms on a separatist mission. A Kashmiri scholar also echoed similar views : "the present uprising has actually taken off from the point Pakistan had resigned from its obligations."⁶⁹ In fact, a low-key militancy has been going on in the Valley ever since the birth of *Al-Fatah*, a precursor of the present day JKLF.⁷⁰ However, the present uprising got its impetus from two more recent episodes, one was the 1987 State Assembly elections and the second, the successful kidnapping of the then Union Home Minister's daughter as a ransom for the release of captive militants. The first development marked the mass recruitment and swelling of the ranks of the militants, while the second was a shot in the arm for the militants, inviting, in turn, a spiralling sequence of state repression, alienation and

⁶⁶ See, David Taylor, "The Kashmir Crisis", *Asian Affairs*, [London] XXII(III), October 1991 : 304.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Private Limited) 1978 : 237.

⁶⁸ Quoted in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, August 19-26, 1972 : 25433.

⁶⁹ Dr. Ayyub Thukar, Director of the International Institute of Kashmir Studies, London, in an interview with the *Impact International*, [London], 20(3), February 9-21, 1990 : 12.

⁷⁰ For details, see, Section 8.2.1 in Chapter VIII.

surge of popular unrest in the Kashmir Valley.

After the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982, the mantle of the Government fell on his son, Dr. Farooq Abdullah. Like his father, his popularity waxed and waned depending on his stand on Kashmir's autonomy *vis-à-vis* New Delhi.⁷¹ However, when he entered into election arrangements with Rajiv Gandhi's Congress in 1986, he lost all credibility of protecting the interests of the Kashmiris. More damaging was the election itself, for it was "marked by chicanery and deceit on a scale not witnessed in recent years in India."⁷² In the elections, a new opposition coalition, known as the Muslim United Front (MUF), commanding the support of the "secessionists, Islamic fundamentalists and frustrated Kashmiri youth, was launched and it contested the March 1987 polls for seats in the state assembly".⁷³ Not only was the election rigged before the eyes of the polling agents of the MUF, they were also beaten and jailed.⁷⁴ Later on the intelligence agencies found that the militants were mainly from amongst the young men who were "guarding ballot boxes for the Muslim United Front (MUF) candidates in the last elections".⁷⁵ A series of unrests, agitation and street violence including bomb explosions in government buildings and buses followed against the Congress-National Conference coalition Government of Farooq Abdullah over power shortages and unemployment throughout 1988 and 1989. Since mid-1989, police-crowd clashes became frequent leading to the deployment of paramilitary forces.⁷⁶ A defiant mood got hold of the Kashmiris, especially the youth.⁷⁷ The people in general, and the youth in particular, lost faith in elections. Some demanded the holding of the unfulfilled plebiscite. Rajiv Gandhi called the November 1989 national elections as a

⁷¹ See, Akbar, *op. cit.* : 283-87.

⁷² See, Ganguly(1991), *op. cit.*: 63.

⁷³ See, Asia Watch, *Kashmir Under Siege : Human Rights in India* (Washington : Human Rights Watch), May 1991 : 12. According to independent reports, the Muslim candidates did extremely well in several districts. Farooq Abdullah said in an interview with the same source, "The results were disturbing to me." See, *New York Times*, May 30, 1987 : 4.

⁷⁴ See, *Illustrated Weekly of India*, February 4, 1990.

⁷⁵ See, Shekhar Gupta, "Militants Siege", *India Today*, January 3, 1990 : 35.

⁷⁶ See, *New York Times*, October 1, 1989 : 21.

⁷⁷ A police official remarked in May 1989, "They have lost fear. They stand right in front of your guns and dare you to shoot them. ...This behaviour is new, it is almost un-Kashmiri". See, *India Today*, May 31, 1989, quoted in *Kashmir Bleeds*, *op. cit.* : 27.

substitute for plebiscite but the militants replied by calling a state-wide boycott of the elections. The voter turn out in the elections was only five per cent.⁷⁸

The Kashmiri militants came into the limelight through the kidnapping of the daughter of a Union Minister, a Muslim from the Kashmir Valley in December 1989, by JKLF members. Among others, their main demand was release of five militants from the Indian jail. The newly-installed National Front government of V. P. Singh gave in. It was considered to be a remarkable victory by the militants in popular perception. Crowds danced in the street in celebration. The Central Government reacted by replacing the incumbent State Governor by Jagmohan, a hard liner who had been instrumental in removal of the Abdullah Government in 1984. Farooq Abdullah reacted by resigning as Chief Minister. Governor's rule was imposed and with that started "the most brutal repressive tactics; continued curfews, raids, searches, molestation of women, deaths in police custody and indiscriminating firing on unarmed people."⁷⁹

9.3.2 What Do the Kashmiri Militants Stand for?

This section deals mainly with the political side of the Kashmiri uprising, especially what the people in general and militant groups, in particular, collectively and individually want and how they want it to materialise. The inter-relationship among the militants will also be brought out. It is difficult to give an exact estimate of the number of Kashmiri militant groups and their strength. There has always been a fluidity in terms of coalition building and cross-party recruitment among the guerrillas so that such changes not only brought variations in size but also brought significant flexibility in the tactics and ideological orientation of the militants. While various sources put the number of guerrilla groups over a wide range between four and 150 and the size of the militant ranks between 1500 and 5000 or more.⁸⁰ However, the main guerrilla

⁷⁸ See, *India Today*, May 31, 1989 : 34.

⁷⁹ See, Akhtar, *op. cit.* : 33.

⁸⁰ By an Indian official account, in all 143 organisations were operating with a total strength of 3000, with about 5000 waiting at the border to cross in. See, Verghese, *op. cit.* One source estimated at the initial stage of the uprising, the number of 'A' category guerrillas, meaning the hardcore ones, to be 40 to 50 and of them, according to the source, only 15 would pass as A+. See *Times of India*, February 1990. For other estimates, see, also *Sunday*, May 20-26, 1990 : 32-33; and *New York Times*, October 5, 1990 : A4; and *The Hindu*, December 3, 1990.

groups which matter in the Kashmiri uprising and insurgency would be below ten. They may be divided broadly into two groups, one group standing for the complete independence of Kashmir as a whole from both India and Pakistan, and the other for a close political association with Pakistan. The most prominent in the former has been the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which, established in 1966, has also been the oldest and one of the two largest groups. It is headed by Amanullah Khan, nearly 60, with his headquarters based in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. It stands for a sovereign, secular and re-united Kashmir independent of both India and Pakistan, consisting of territories on both sides of the LAC and the northern territories of Gilgit and Baltistan.⁸¹ JKLF's view of the present phase of the conflict is as follows :

To put it a bit more precisely, Kashmir issue basically and exclusively concerns the right of 8 million Kashmiris to shape their own future as sole master of the homeland. This issue is not at all, a dispute between India and Pakistan over a piece of territory as vested interests and the self-made claimants to the proprietorship of Kashmir want the world to believe.⁸²

However, its present focus is to fight for a separation from India, while the question of eventual status being left to be decided later.

In the second category, the prominent group has been the *Hizbul Mujahedin*, which came into being sometime in 1988.⁸³ The orthodox Jammu and Kashmir *Jamaa't-e-Islami* is the parent body of the *Hizbul Mujahedin* group. Among the other groups in the second category, People's League, *Janbaz Commando Force*, Islamic Students League, *Operation Balakot*, *Mahaz-e-Azadi*, *Jamiat-e-Tulaba*, *Allah Tigers*, *Hamza Squad*, *Muslimeen Commando Force*, are the prominent ones in the sense that at one time or in other they came in media focus for their activities or stand.⁸⁴ The *Hizbul Mujahedin* and other Islamic minded groups stand for the separation of Kashmir from India, establishment of Islamic rule and eventually joining Pakistan, by way of

⁸¹ See, *Strategic Survey 1991-92* [IISS, London] 1992 : 167. See, also *Impact International* [London], 20(8), April 27-May 10, 1990 : 12.

⁸² See, JKLF, *The Tragic Story of Kashmir* (Luton : Kashmir House), undated : 3.

⁸³ The *Hizbul Mujahedin* claims its birth in the midst of the unrest in the Kashmir Valley following the popular reaction to the death of Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq in an air crash, which the pro-Pakistan elements in the Valley believed to be a conspiracy of India. See, *Hizbul* leader, G. M. Shafi's interview with *Impact International* in London, in its issue, 22(13-14), July 10- August 13, 1992 : 11.

⁸⁴ For a profile of these groups see, Hafeez R. Khan, "The Kashmir Intifada", *Pakistan Horizon*, 43(2), April 1990 : 92-94; a more detailed description in Akhtar, *op. cit.* : 46-58; and *Impact International*, 20(8), *op. cit.* : 11-13.

exercise of their right of self-determination as envisaged in the UN resolutions of 1948.⁸⁵ Farooq Rehman, chief of People's League, one of the components of the Islamic coalition, says, "Our religion is our inspiration. We consider Islamic ideology and the right of self-determination intertwined. And the establishment of an Islamic society under Islamic values is our ultimate goal".⁸⁶ The *Hizbul Mujahedin* itself seems to be modelled on and influenced by the Afghan guerrilla groups especially the *Hizbi-Islami* group of Gulbudin Hekmatyar.⁸⁷

Although most of the guerrilla groups received encouragement, moral and material support from Pakistan, at least unofficially, the *Hizbul Mujahedin*, because of its ideology and objectives, received most of the Pakistani patronage. The JKLF because of its ideological goal of a secular independent Kashmir state remains a big dilemma for Pakistan.

The militant groups, especially the *Hizbul Mujaheden* and the JKLF are opposed to each other. They often engage in internecine quarrels.⁸⁸ However, all the militant groups are in agreement on the minimum and vital point, that is, separation from India first.⁸⁹ More importantly, each of them emphasise this point more than their differences and there is less infighting among them than some of the other guerrilla movements elsewhere in the region. Even those who espouse the cause of an accession to Pakistan consider it to be a matter to be decided at a later phase. The *Hizbul Mujahedin* makes an effort to emphasise that their movement is not communal or directed against the Kashmiri Hindus. The JKLF, likewise, has recently begun espousing a more fundamentalist ideology for Kashmir.⁹⁰ More interestingly, there has been a fluidity cross-recruitments of the activists across these ideological boundaries, especially between

⁸⁵ See, *Tehreek-e-Hurriyet-e-Kashmir : A Profile* [a coalition of the Islamic minded groups] (London : Information Division, Tehreek-e-Hurriyet-e-Kashmir) undated : 3.

⁸⁶ See, *Illustrated Weekly of India*, March 10, 1985 : 10-11, 13.

⁸⁷ See, *The Times*, January 30, 1990.

⁸⁸ In early 1991, a prominent leader of the JKLF was killed by *Hizbul Mujahedin*. An American Pakistani scholar commented in this connection that, "It seems like a movement in terms of leadership and organization three times worse than [the] Afghan Mujahideens' movement". See, Eqbal Ahmad, "Kashmir and Its Challenge", *Pakistan Horizon* [Karachi], 43(3), July 1990 : 12. However, this will be an exaggeration of the divergence in approach to Kashmir's separation from India among the militants.

⁸⁹ In response to a question on the divergent paths and goals of the militants, Javed Mir, the leader of JKLF in the Kashmir Valley said, "They are all different paths to a same goal - which is ouster of the Indian Army and a plebiscite." See, *India Today*, March 15, 1990.

⁹⁰ See, Asia Watch, *op. cit.* : 20.

the JKLF and the *Hizb* and this phenomenon has not been considered to be a case of betrayal, as is usually done in such underground movements. On the whole, therefore, the overriding sentiments are for *azadi* or independence which seemed to tone down the other conflicting goals.⁹¹ And it is this overriding tide that provided the momentum for the uprising.

9.3.3 The Degree of Militancy

Although the militant activities had been going on sporadically in the Kashmir Valley for a long time, the most sustained militancy gained momentum through a mass-based uprising. It fed on the violent anti-Indian mass demonstrations as a sequel of attempts by the Indian security forces to disperse the jubilant demonstrators following the kidnapping incident.⁹² As every attempt was made by India to quell the uprising through continuous curfews for days and indiscriminate firing on the crowd, the militants matched their activities with such mass upsurge. They followed initially urban guerrilla-type hit and run tactics. In this they were helped by a "well-organised network of informers and support base throughout the valley" that kept them ahead of the police.⁹³ Gradually this gave way to frontal exchanges, clashes and fighting, sometimes using rockets.⁹⁴ As the Indian security forces changed tactics to avoid mass alienation, the militants spread outside the Valley, the heart of the Kashmiri speaking area, to other areas of Poonch, Rajouri and Doda district of Jammu.⁹⁵ In this context, Dr. Farooq Haider, a leader of the Rawalpindi-based JKLF in an interview spoke of a long drawn out guerrilla war. "We chose Srinagar and the Kashmir Valley as the first stage of our attack. What has happened so far is the urban phase, mostly sabotage and hit-and-run tactics. Now the Indian Army is concentrating in

⁹¹ See, *The Economist*, March 31, 1990 : 62.

⁹² *The Guardian* in its January 29, 1990 issue wrote that a "popular uprising was underway, crowds defying curfew". *The Times*, in its February 1, 1990 issue reported that a separatist movement was underway which had "mass indigenous support". *The Independent* and *The Guardian* in their February 24, 1990 issues, described the size of the demonstration that marched peacefully to the UN Observer Office in Srinagar to be between 400,000-500,000, almost half of Srinagar's population.

⁹³ See, *New York Times*, January 10, 1990 : A3.

⁹⁴ See, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, June 1990 : 37530.

⁹⁵ See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIII/12, March 27, 1990 : Cols. 358, 389. See, also, *New York Times*, August 13, 1990 : A7.

the cities, we are going to pull them out, just like chewing gum, towards the border and the rural areas, spreading them out over a large area where they will be vulnerable", he said.⁹⁶ Around this time, the militants began attacking military convoys and installations in the outskirts of the cities.⁹⁷ Indian sources seem to have confirmed this pattern when the Calcutta-based *Sunday* magazine wrote :

When the insurgency resurfaced in late 1989, it had crossed stage one, or in Mao Zedong's lexicon, the "organizational phase". Now it has successfully entered stage two, in which the insurgents are launching almost copybook terrorist and guerrilla attacks on the security forces. It may have also entered stage three, involving conventional battles. But this was prevented - albeit just about - by the timely intervention of the army.⁹⁸

The Indian Government's response had always been relentless. When Governor Jagmohan was replaced by former RAW chief and V. P. Singh's Security Adviser, Girish Saxena, he declared the Kashmir Valley, the Jammu area and areas adjacent to the LAC as disturbed areas.⁹⁹ According to the *Times of India*, the move was intended to provide legal cover for stepping up the security measures in view of the fact that "the army and other security forces were coming under increasing attacks from militants and counter-insurgency measures were yielding far from satisfactory results. Civilian killings, too, were going on unabated and had become more brutal. Besides, the administration was being paralysed by the militants sponsored measures..".¹⁰⁰ "Such pressures had to be offset both through action and psychologically", explained an official source.¹⁰¹ By August 1990, it became a war of nerves in the sense that each side tried to outwit the other in sophistication, in tactics and venue of operation, and in working on the nerve of the common people.¹⁰² By official estimates, the security forces of India killed 700 militants in two years until July 1991, and arrested about 2000, besides seizing huge amounts of arms and ammunition.¹⁰³

⁹⁶ See, *The Economist*, June 9, 1990 : 64.

⁹⁷ See, *Times of India*, August 8, 1990.

⁹⁸ See, *Sunday*, December 22-28, 1991 : 40.

⁹⁹ See, *Times of India*, July 6, 1990.

¹⁰⁰ See, *Times of India*, July 8, 1990.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² For details of such battle of nerves, see, "Continuing war of nerves in Kashmir", *Times of India*, August 19, 1990.

¹⁰³ See, *The Hindu*, July 7, 1991.

The high-pitched militancy of the first half of 1990 waned apparently by late 1990. The picture in 1991 or even later, however, remained disconcerting from the Indian point of view. An official who has been handling Kashmiri affairs, told *Frontline*, "Militancy has become more extensive. More and more boys are coming and going [to Pakistan]."¹⁰⁴ "The whole thing is becoming unmanageable. The security forces have been unable to make a dent on the militant movement. The entire administration is under militant threat. No work goes on in the offices outside the Secretariat in Srinagar," the official said.¹⁰⁵ The encounters between the militants and the security forces also became lengthy and bloody.¹⁰⁶

9.3.4 Kashmiri *Intifada* : The Popular Dimension of the Uprising

People's support for the militants has been complete and unswerving, because *azadi* or self-determination which is used interchangeably with plebiscite both consciously and unconsciously, "has caught their imagination".¹⁰⁷ The degree of popular support for the militants has been enhanced greatly by the repressive and often brutal counter-insurgency measures of the Indian security forces, as has been described by the *Sunday Times*:

It has been this way in Kashmir for much of the past years : every pinprick by the militants has earned a sledge hammer in return; slowly but surely, the whole of the Kashmir Valley has been alienated.¹⁰⁸

A Kashmiri journalist told the *Sunday Times* : "India has lost Kashmir politically, ideologically and emotionally. It is only physically they are here."¹⁰⁹

For every degree of alienation from the Indian Union, arguably there has been a corresponding rise in of pro-Pakistani sentiment, partly in reality and partly in the perception of

¹⁰⁴ See, "Kashmir's War : Now an open confrontation", *Frontline*, October 12-25, 1991 : 9.

¹⁰⁵ See, *ibid* : 9.

¹⁰⁶ For some details of a 72-hour long encounters, see, "A Deceptive Calm", *India Today*, June 30, 1991 : 39.

¹⁰⁷ See, N. Y. Dole, "Kashmir : A Deep-rooted Alienation", *op. cit. The Illustrated Weekly of India* wrote in April 1990, "Irrespective of whether they are peons in government offices or bearers in hotels, all of them talk of independence. They desire that the promise made to them by Jawaharlal Nehru to hold plebiscite there be fulfilled now." See, *Illustrated Weekly of India*, April 22, 1990.

¹⁰⁸ See, *Sunday Times*, June 2, 1991. See, also, *India's Kashmir War : A Report*, *op. cit.* : 24-26.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* For details of the initial days of Kashmiri *intifadah*, see, "Kashmir Valley : Militant Siege", *India Today*, January 31, 1990 : 22-31.

New Delhi. G. M. Shah, son-in-law of Sheikh Abdullah and Chief Minister of Kashmir as Rajiv Gandhi's choice following the ouster of Farooq Abdullah said in an interview, "I support a plebiscite. I will opt for Pakistan. And so would everyone else."¹¹⁰ A *Lok Sabha* Member from Udhampur, Jammu gave a vivid description of how ubiquitously the supporters of the militants and Pakistan were spread through out the Valley,¹¹¹ in the civil and police administration, in medical institutes, financial institutions and even in religious places like mosques. A businessman in Srinagar said, "They have made every Muslim a suspect of the Indian armed forces' attempt to subdue a fast-growing independence movement. We are all militants now."¹¹² It is of course, by no means clear how far the pro-Pakistani sentiments are solidly for accession to Pakistan. Jalal argues, "Pro-Pakistani fervour may simply be the most potent symbol available to Kashmiris, one that dramatizes Kashmiri rejection of a union with India."¹¹³ However, the fact remains that both pro-Pakistani sentiments and Islamic fervour have become trendy in the Jammu and Kashmir state, so that even if those who do not support the change wholeheartedly go with the trend.¹¹⁴

The other aspect of the popular uprising is the inter-communal relations between the Muslims and the Hindus in the Valley as well as in Jammu. From the Indian side, the uprising is viewed mainly in terms of the brutalities of the militants in killing innocent people, officials, and especially the minority communities, such as Hindus and Sikhs. The most controversial issue in this regard has been the reported exodus of about half of the Hindus from the Valley, known as *Kashmiri Brahmin Pandits*, mainly to Jammu and some to New Delhi, because of actual persecution or threat of persecution by the Muslim militants.¹¹⁵ There have been contradictory

¹¹⁰ See, *Afternoon Despatch and Courier* [Bombay], March 30, 1990.

¹¹¹ He said, "Flags of JKLF and Pakistan hoist on every roof top". See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/13, March 28, 1990 : Col. 667. Inderjit Badhwar wrote in *India Today* earlier, "no matter how irrational the vision, the youth of Kashmir will persist in the belief that their rights will be better safeguarded within a Muslim country like Pakistan." See, "Kashmir : Valley of Tears", *India Today*, May 31, 1989.

¹¹² See, *New York Times*, June 15, 1990.

¹¹³ See, Ayesha Jalal, "Kashmir Scars", *The New Republic*, [Washington D. C.] July 23, 1990 : 19.

¹¹⁴ The Committee for Initiative on Kashmir, which visited Kashmir in March 1990, quotes a Government Officer to make this point : "Till January 19, I was against the militants. Today, I am for them." See, *India's Kashmir War : A Report op. cit. : 2*.

¹¹⁵ For varying figures, see, *India Today*, April 30, 1990. See also, Amit Barua, "The Fleeting Pandits", *Frontline*, September 29, 1990, cited in *Kashmir Bleeds, op. cit. : 208*.

versions of the story. The Kashmir State Government as well as the Union Government provided documentary evidence supporting the allegation that there might have been some incidence of threats, even persecution.¹¹⁶ The Kashmiri militants including the *Hizbul Mujahedin*, on the other hand, claimed that the migration of the Kashmiri *pandits* had been sponsored by the State Government, especially under the initiative of former Governor Jagmohan, to malign the militants and the communal situation. They also claimed that if there has been any persecution, it was specific cases of collaboration and government informers. The Kashmiri militants, they argued, were fighting the Indian security forces against occupation, not a communal battle against any population groups.¹¹⁷ In this context, Siraj Sidhva, an Indian commentator wrote, "Nothing has broken the Kashmiri spirit more in these troubled times than the communalisation of the issue. Government employees who have stayed in Srinagar and worked during curfew did not receive the pay last month; those who ran away to Jammu have been assured of land, guaranteed their pay and given relief".¹¹⁸

9.3.5 Regional and International Linkages of the Uprising

Earlier we have reviewed the immediate, regional and global milieu in which the uprising was taking place.¹¹⁹ The discussion is carried forward here and it would be seen that each side - the militants, Pakistan and New Delhi - had been internationalising the uprising to strengthen their respective sides while accusing the others of malafide international connections.

Regarding the international connection of the Kashmiri militants, Indian Foreign Minister Gujral said, "There have been several reports indicating that the Kashmiri extremist groups have been in touch with the Afghan *Mujahedins*, obtaining weapons and training. There are also reports suggesting that some of the Kashmiri groups have been participating in the fighting

¹¹⁶ A balanced picture may be found in Edward W. Desmond, "Exodus and Escape from Kashmir", *Time*, April 16, 1990 : 22-23. The article quoted some Hindu migrants in Jammu refugee camps said, "There is no-body in the valley to speak for us or for India. It has already become Pakistan". See, *ibid*.

¹¹⁷ See, Asia Watch, *op. cit.* : 147.

¹¹⁸ See, *Sunday*, March 25-31, 1990.

¹¹⁹ See, Section 9.2.3 above.

against the Government there."¹²⁰ A militant spokesman, while denying any official linkage with Pakistan, confirmed the "excellent contacts with Afghan guerrillas and arms black market in Pakistan".¹²¹ Some of the guerrilla groups have Iranian connections.¹²² It also seems that the militants, at least the JKLF, have established contacts with the Sikh militants in the beleaguered Indian state of the Punjab.¹²³ It also seems that the *Hizbul Mujahedin* is not lagging behind in such contacts. A spokesman of the *Hizb* claimed that they had been able to establish links with the Khalistan Commando Force(KCF) in Punjab, the United Liberation Front of Asom(ULFA) and the People's War Group(PWG), the largest Communist Party of India(Marxist-Leninist) organisation in India, in a bid to evoke support and sympathy for their struggle for self-determination. Any impact of the extra-Kashmiri links of the militants, other than those with Pakistan and the Afghan *Mujahedin* is, however, difficult to assess because of the tenuous nature of such links.¹²⁴

New Delhi's initiatives for internationalising the conflict have been two-pronged : countering Pakistan's internationalisation attempts and strengthening its own counter-insurgency measures in Kashmir with the help of some foreign intelligence agents. By reacting vehemently to every Pakistani move and using bilateral and multilateral fora to project Pakistani subversion, India also internationalised the conflict, no less than Pakistan.¹²⁵ With regard to the foreign agencies, India took reportedly the help of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, in countering the militancy in the Valley. Mossad's involvement in South Asia dates back to the late 1980s when the Sri Lankan Government involved it to counter the Tamil militants in the northern and eastern provinces.¹²⁶ India's engaging the Israeli agents actively in countering Kashmiri militants

¹²⁰ See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIV/3, May 3, 1990 : Col. 102.

¹²¹ See, *Independent*, May 25, 1991.

¹²² See, Hafeez R. Khan, *op. cit.* : 95-98

¹²³ See, "JKLF : Diminishing Sway", *India Today*, October 31, 1991 : 102.

¹²⁴ See, *Frontline*, October 12-25, 1991 : 12.

¹²⁵ See, "Has India lost to Pakistan on the Kashmir question? Yes, says Sunil Adam, No, says Subha Singh", *The Pioneer*, [New Delhi] February 17, 1992 : 6.

¹²⁶ Mossad's experience in dealing with the Palestinian *intifadah* in West Bank and Gaza was utilised by the Sri Lankan Government as well as the Indian Government in the context of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. In a bizarre twist of events, at one time, the Mossad was involved in training Indian troops to counter the Tamil militants in Sri Lanka, who were being trained in camps nearby. This has been revealed in the accounts of a former Mossad agent Victor Ostrovsky. See, his *By Way of Deception* (New York : Arrow

came to light in mid-1991 when a shoot out took place between the *Hizbul Mujahedin* militants and a group of Israeli 'tourists' with military training, resulting in three Israelis being wounded, one killed and one captured.¹²⁷ The Israelis were claimed to be tourists, but there were reasons independent of India's previous experience with the Mossad, for engaging them in Kashmir since the uprising in Kashmir resembled or happened to be modelled on, the Palestinian *intifadah*. Pakistani news agencies, of course, went one step further to report that intelligence agencies from four countries, India, Israel, the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan, were working hand in hand, with a well-planned design to wipe out the militancy from the Kashmir Valley.¹²⁸ It would be hard to substantiate the Pakistani allegations regarding the involvement of foreign intelligence agents in the Valley. However, with the appointment of Mr. Girish Saxena, the former chief of RAW, the Indian intelligence agency, as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, there had been much change in the tactics of counter-insurgency measures with more and more militant leaders being captured so that by mid-1991, the intensity of the uprising had tapered off significantly.¹²⁹

Pakistan's attempt at internationalisation of the Kashmiri problem has had several facets. The main approach has been to project the present uprising is the result of India's non-fulfilment of its commitment to self-determination to the Kashmiris within the framework of the UN Resolutions of 1948. A second plank of Pakistan's international campaign has been the human rights violations by the Indian authorities. Here Pakistan had admittedly more substance to project to the world.¹³⁰ However, Pakistan was rebuffed internationally on the political dimension, especially by the USA. The USA conveyed to Pakistan privately that it was opposed to raising the issue in the Security Council and to the concept of a plebiscite as a solution to the Kashmir

Books) 1990. The Indian connection with Israel, however, came much earlier in mid-1984 in the context of the so-called Islamic Bomb of Pakistan, as also revealed in the same accounts. Indian interest in the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facilities and the rumours of a joint action against Pakistani facilities have been noted earlier. See, Section 8.3.3 in Chapter VIII.

¹²⁷ See, *Frontier Post* [Peshawar], July 25, 1991. For some details, see, *Independent*, June 29 and July 4, 1991. Notably, before this incident the Indian authorities had asked all foreigners to leave Kashmir on grounds of security. See, *The Time*, April 23, 1991.

¹²⁸ See, *Pakistan Observer*, July 29, 1991.

¹²⁹ See, *New York Times*, May 10, *The Guardian*, May 7, : 50; *Independent*, May 7, : 67 and *Washington Post*, May 7, 1991 : 66; and *Sunday*, December 22-28, 1991 : 40-41.

¹³⁰ See, Verghese, *ibid*.

problem. The USA also threatened to cut aid to Pakistan if Pakistan continued "aiding, abetting state terrorism."¹³¹

To summarise the discussion of this section on the Kashmiri uprising, it can be said with certainty that the alienation of the Kashmiris is virtually total.¹³² The overwhelming majority are for separation from India, although they are divided on the issue of sovereign independence or accession to Pakistan. As they want to decide this later, apparently at least, the majority of the Kashmiris in the Valley now appear to be pro-Pakistani. The militants have been able to undermine the civilian administration, they have marginalised the moderate politicians totally and resisted successfully any attempts to organise elections. Because of the "universal betrayal by all political leaders ... our youths now prefer to listen to the sound of the gun rather than even my voice. There are no longer any institutions here, no political heroes," lamented Abdul Ghani Lone, a one time radical firebrand and leader of People's Conference.¹³³ This was also confirmed by G. M. Shah, the former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who said, the leadership of the agitation "is now with men who have an idea of freedom and a gun in hands. In the process, mainstream politicians like me have become irrelevant."¹³⁴ In some aspects, they have succeeded in establishing their own rules such as closure of movie houses, liquor shops and beauty parlours and the introduction of rice cultivation in place of hops which are used for making alcohol.¹³⁵

However, all said, the critical issue is that they have not been able to pose a significant challenge to the massive Indian security machine deployed in the state to the tune of about

¹³¹ See, Selig A. Harrison, "How to Help Prevent a War Between India and Pakistan", *International Herald Tribune*, April 24, 1990. See, also, Mushahid Hussain, "Kashmir Issue : The International Dimension", *BISS Journal*, [Dhaka] 12(3), July 1991 : 410-411. At a subsequent point of time, the USA did cut its aid programme when another issue was joined with it, that is, Pakistan's virtual admission of its nuclear programme. Besides, as India could project successfully that it was a case of gross interference in the internal affairs of India. Consequently, Pakistan was about to be declared as a terrorist state by America. See, *Strategic Survey 1991-92* [IISS, London], 1992 : 167.

¹³² Hussain recounts a conversation with a group of visiting Indian scholars in May 1990. Asked as to how many Kashmiri Muslims were really with India in the Valley, one of India's well-known scholars and columnists, Dr. Bhabani Sen Gupta, replied, "Only one: Dr. Farooq Abdullah. But that doesn't mean we'll give up Kashmir". See, Mushahid Hussain, *op. cit.* : 418-19.

¹³³ See, *India Today*, May 31, 1989.

¹³⁴ See, *India Today*, June 14, 1990 : 3.

¹³⁵ See, *New York Times*, January 10, 1990 : A3.

300,000 as of mid-1991.¹³⁶ Given the capability of the Indian Army and their commitment to the logic of the state, that is, not to allow secession at whatever cost, it is an open question as to what extent the militants would be able to pose such a challenge by themselves.¹³⁷ Of course, they can raise the cost of holding on in Kashmir enormously. Besides, if it is a compulsion of security for India, it is a compulsion of survival for the Kashmiris. The other edge they have is the support of an interested party in the conflict, that is, Pakistan. Pakistan, however, feel the limits of power *vis-à-vis* India.¹³⁸ Pakistan also faces the same dilemma of independence-versus-accession, as also confronts the Kashmiri militants in general. It should also be mentioned that the conflict is yet to be a tripartite one formally. The Kashmiris claim that they could not be left out in any negotiation.¹³⁹ However, they are yet to make any dent in the international sphere. It puts a limit on the capability of the militants. However, insofar as the old antagonists are concerned it indicates that still there are some room for manoeuvre. It would be interesting in this context to see how the traditional antagonists over Kashmir, that is, India and Pakistan, have been relating to each other over the uprising.

9.4 The Uprising and India-Pakistan Relations

9.4.1 Mutual Role Perception of India and Pakistan

The growing pro-Pakistani sentiments in the Kashmir Valley led India to point accusing fingers towards Pakistan for instigating the Kashmiri youth from the Valley to cross the Line of Control, training them and then then pushing them back across the LAC under Pakistani own cover of fire.¹⁴⁰ It was also reported in the *Rajya- Sabha* that,

¹³⁶ See, *Independent*, May 25, 1991 : 12. For earlier estimate of 150,000, as of mid-1990, see, *Washington Post*, November 16, 1990.

¹³⁷ In a recent feature, an *India Today* reporter sums up the situation : "while India may not be able to control Kashmir, there is little doubt that India will be able to hold on to it no matter what it takes militarily. *Today*, May 31, 1993 : 43.

¹³⁸ See, Jalal(1990), *op. cit.* : 19.

¹³⁹ This was the position of Sheikh Abdullah right from the time when the UNCIP Mission visited the Subcontinent and he tried covertly to meet the Mission Chief. For details, see, Korbelt, *op. cit.* : 126. Likewise, the JKLF has been insisting that the fate of Kashmir cannot be decided in New Delhi and Islamabad.

¹⁴⁰ See, K. Subrahmanyam, "Kashmir", *Strategic Analysis*, XIII(3), May 1990 : 141. See also, *The Hindu*, July 9, 1991. The Indian Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral, participating in the *Rajya Sabha* debate on May 3,

Ms Bhutto has declared that they have opened a Kashmir Fund and they have already contributed some money for that. They have talked about 'Jehad' and making recruitments, etc. All these things are concrete proof about Pakistan's involvement. ... Why have they opened the Kashmir Fund? Why have they made advertisement for 'Jehad'? Why are they making recruitments? If that is not direct involvement, then what else is?¹⁴¹

A more direct charge was that of Pakistani nationals' crossing the LAC, as well as the international borders. A *Lok Sabha* Member said:

This problem ... was already there. The situation deteriorated because the Pak supporter terrorists [sic] of Azad Kashmir have been indulging in terrorist activities by infiltrating into our borders.¹⁴²

Beneath all these charges has been a suspicion in the Indian mind that Pakistan's interference in Kashmir as in the Punjab, was guided by a deep-seated desire for revenge for what India did to Pakistan in 1971. Ghosh argues,

Pakistani involvement in the Punjabi or Kashmiri problems, or to be more precise, the Pakistani temptation to destabilize these states, ... has to be viewed from a larger perspective. India's role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 still haunts the national memory of Pakistan, and if the latter ever has a similar opportunity, say, in Punjab or Kashmir, it would have no hesitation in exploiting the disaffection to keep the secessionist forces active, and to pose a threat to India's stability.¹⁴³

1990, quoted Selig Harrison's article in the *Washington Post* of April 23, 1990 (reprinted in *International Herald Tribune*, April 24, 1990) which said, "Evidence obtained in Pakistan as well as through Indian and American intelligence sources indicate that 63 Pakistan operated camps have been functioning at various times during the past two years". See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIV/3, May 3, 1990 : Col. 102. Earlier India presented the details of Pakistani interference in Kashmir and the Punjab to the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi. See, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, February 1990 : 37246. *India Today* produced its own account of the training activities based on a visit of its own reporter to Azad Kashmir, which India calls the 'Pakistan Occupied Kashmir' or PoK. See, "Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir : Cocking a Militant Snook", *India Today*, October 31, 1991 : 94-104.

¹⁴¹ The source also quoted the Afghan Foreign Minister to make the case that the Pakistan Inter-service Intelligence which had been operative in helping directly the Afghan *Mujahedins* were also involved in Kashmir. See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIV/2, May 2, 1990 : Col. 227. Earlier it was stated in the *Lok Sabha* that Ms. Benazir Bhutto had allocated Rs. 100 million and Mr. Nawaz Sharif had allocated Rs. 150 million for the Fund. See, *Lok Sabha Debate* Vol. III/13, March 28, 1990 : Col. 655. Another Member from Jammu region said, "There is a competition between *Islami Jamhuri Ittihad* [IJI], the former ruling of Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir's Pakistan People's Party in the matter of assistance to the terrorists. We know that in Azad Kashmir's Budget an amount of Rs. one crore [ten million] is allocated every year for subversive activities and Rs. 50 lakh [5 million] are provided to Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front." See, *ibid* : Col. 669.

¹⁴² See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/13, 9th series, March 28, 1990 : Col. 674.

¹⁴³ See, Partha S. Ghosh, "India's Relations with its Neighbours : The Ethnic Factor" in K. M. de Silva and R. J. May (eds.), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict* (London : Pinter Publishers) 1991 : 35-36. The Indian élites also became wary of the reported shift in ideological underpinnings of the Pakistan Army from anti-communism, as demonstrated by the *Exercise Zarbe-i-Momin*, conducted by the Pakistan Army in 1990. See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/20, April 10, 1990 : Col. 393.

Apart from the fallout of the tensions generated by the intensity of the Kashmiri uprising, the other reasons that war mongering reached a high pitch at bilateral level, was the 'discovery' of a Pakistani plan, code named 'Operation Topac' to annex Kashmir through fomenting trouble.¹⁴⁴ The plan was considered as a "low-risk-high-yield strategy" of General Zia.¹⁴⁵ Yet, it was later discovered that "the 'Op Topac' document ... is not a genuine official document but a piece of scenario writing [written] by a team of researchers who has put together over a period of months, as a result of painstaking research, their assessment of likely course of action that Pakistan intended to adopt in Kashmir."¹⁴⁶ Verghese writes in this context, "Many were taken in and believed Operation Topac to be a Pak strategy paper that had fallen into the hands of Indian intelligence. It is possibly from such misconceptions that certain misconceptions followed in the minds of many, Jagmohan included. ... The truth of the matter is that Operation Topac was a war-gaming exercise written up by the Indian Defence Review Research Team in January 1990."¹⁴⁷

Pakistani perceptions of India's role in Kashmir, on the other hand, originated from the "deep-seated grievances ... over Kashmir, which India considers a virtually closed chapter whereas Pakistan believes it a dispute to be settled."¹⁴⁸ The Pakistanis believed that the root cause of the Kashmiri uprising has been the continued denial of the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris as recognised by both the parties and the UN, and the Indian Government's failure to address the socio-economic grievances. Pakistan also believed that the brutal response of the Indian security forces including gross violation of human rights had exacerbated the uprising. Secondly, they argued that instead of initiating a political process, the Indians had been following a policy of creating dissension among the militants, as has been the policy of Israel in West Bank

¹⁴⁴ For a convincing argument about the existence of the Pakistani plan, with its reproduction in the annexure, see, a veteran Indian defence analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, *op. cit.* : 181-183

¹⁴⁵ See, Gen. Popli, "Military Balance and Options", *Indian Express*, May 22, 1990.

¹⁴⁶ This was the end-note of Subrahmanyam's Monograph. However, Subrahmanyam continues, "The assessment published in July 1989, has been thoroughly vindicated by subsequent events and hence the references do not in any case vitiate the analysis." See, Subrahmanyam, *ibid* : 198.

¹⁴⁷ See, Verghese, *Sunday Mail*, October 6, 1991.

¹⁴⁸ See, Rajendra Sareen, *Pakistan : The India Factor* (New Delhi : Allied Publishers Private Limited) 1984 : 10.

and Gaza.¹⁴⁹ Thirdly, the Pakistanis believe widely that the Indians make Pakistan a scapegoat for their own failure in Kashmir. The reason behind this is what Ahmad calls the 'incumbency syndrome' under which the incumbent regime finds it hard to admit failure and relent on its position, lest it is viewed as weakness.¹⁵⁰

At another level, there has been much euphoria about the Kashmiri popular uprising, possibly raised by the 'Soviet syndrome'.¹⁵¹ However, there were sobering perceptions as well. Many found it hard to believe that India would relent so easily in Kashmir without fighting a war with Pakistan. Some also argued that there are reasons independent of Kashmir that India has every incentive to wage a war on Pakistan.¹⁵²

Regardless of the possibility of India making war, the Pakistanis find it impossible to withhold moral and political support from their co-religionist Kashmiris. Although the Pakistan military strategists admit that the Pakistan Army is not strong enough to engage the Indian Army, there is pressure on the Government – which has been denying any official involvement – to provide assistance to the militants, even if in a less dangerous way, "short of provoking a war".¹⁵³ There is some sense of desperation among many. Mushahid Hussain, a free lance analyst of Pakistan said in an interview, "If we can't help the rebels now, we might as well pack our bags. We have to draw the bottomline unless we want to be a glorified Nepal or Bhutan."¹⁵⁴ However, insofar as the official position of the Government of Pakistan was concerned, there was no

¹⁴⁹ See, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Is Kashmir a Proxy War? : A Pakistani View", *Lanka Guardian*, [Colombo] 14(20), February 15, 1992 : 8. See also, Ahmad, *op. cit.* : 10.

¹⁵⁰ See, Ahmad, *ibid* : 14-16.

¹⁵¹ Such beliefs, of course, have been held in Pakistan for a long time. An Indian journalist, for example, summed up his experiences of visits to Pakistan where the élites believed that India had reached a point where it was bound to "break down under the strain of its different constituencies pulling in diverse directions." See, Sareen, *op. cit.* : 12. Such perceptions have been sharpened in recent times in view of the breakdown of a "far stronger and ideologically bound" empire like the Soviet Union. Source : *Interview* with Mushahid Hussain in Islamabad, August 1991.

¹⁵² It is argued that the huge military industrial complex that India has built up would find its own logic of a war, given the traditional enmity and many other outstanding issues. See, Ahmad, *op. cit.* : 16.

¹⁵³ See, *Strategic Survey 1991-92* [IISS, London] 1992 : 166-67. Earlier a veteran Azad Kashmiri politician said, : "We should be able to cash the mounting unrest particularly amongst the youth inside the Indian-held Kashmir and try to stifle India's stay in Kashmir making it difficult everyday. It should be made politically costly for them." See, Address by Sarder Mohammad Abdul Qayyum, President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir to the officers of Army Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan, April 6, 1989 : 17-18.

¹⁵⁴ See, *Time*, May 14, 1990 : 19.

training and arming of the militants. They even at one stage invited UN officials to verify if there were any such training camps, as India complained. Like the Kashmiri militants, the Pakistanis are also not willing to talk about the independence option for the Kashmiris for different reasons of its own. They dismiss summarily such ideas. When pressed they are quick to point out the visible and "very tangible" support for Pakistan among the Kashmiris in general.¹⁵⁵

9.4.2 Brinkmanship and Possibilities of War

Although the latest phase of the Kashmir conflict, manifest mainly in the popular uprising and militant activities in the Kashmir Valley, has not witnessed so far any actual military flare up of the type seen three times earlier between India and Pakistan, there was indeed a real possibility of war including a nuclear dimension. The conflict also displayed the propensity to be linked with the Sikh problem in the Punjab. It is worthwhile to review those possibilities and to examine how eventually these were minimised.

The possibilities of war persisted throughout 1990-91. However, the first half of 1990 was the period of a heightened possibility of war. Whenever the uprising reached a new peak or the brutality of the Indian forces in the state was severe, the possibility of war arose. Thus, January, March and mid-April 1990 were some of the landmarks in the uprising when a talk of war was heard in the media and from responsible circles in both Islamabad and New Delhi.¹⁵⁶ On April 10, the Indian Prime Minister, V. P. Singh, warned Pakistan that unless it stopped inciting insurgency in Kashmir and neighbouring Punjab, it should be ready for a war that would not stop until India "achieved its strategic objective."¹⁵⁷ He also asked the Indians to prepare for a war.¹⁵⁸ Again in mid-May 1990 following the killing of Mirwaiz Farooq, the veteran religious leader of

¹⁵⁵ Based on the impression from numerous interviews and general exchange of views with a cross-sections of Pakistanis.

¹⁵⁶ In Indian perception, a crisis occurred in late January 1990, when the militants reportedly planned to declare independence on the Indian Republic day. This also coincided with Pakistani stridency. See, Sanjoy Hazarika, "India tells of foiling uprising in Kashmir", *New York Times*, January 29, 1990 : A12. See, also, *The Economist*, February 3, 1990 : 56.

¹⁵⁷ See, *The Economist*, April 21, 1990 : 71.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid* : 71.

Kashmir, by unknown assailants, and more importantly, the killing of scores of mourners when the security forces opened fire indiscriminately on the funeral procession of the late cleric, tensions rose to a new height. The Madras-based daily, *The Hindu*, reported that both India and Pakistan initiated substantial aggressive troop movements and the two countries came close to a war on May 22, 1990.¹⁵⁹ It was also on this occasion that the US intelligence sources warned of the possibility of the impending crisis taking a nuclear turn.

Although both the Governments were aware of the futility of wars, and they could not afford one either, several factors made a war look probable. The most frequently heard was an accidental war due mainly to 'heating up' of the borders through the crossing of the militants and the exchange of fire. It was also believed that the existence of weak Governments in both India and Pakistan might make them prone to being 'overtaken by events' and pushed inexorably to a war. At the initial stage of the uprising, especially during January-April, the possibility of an accidental war was strong, because of the passions and reactions that the tumult of the uprisings in Kashmir caused in Islamabad and New Delhi respectively. In India, the National Front Government of V. P. Singh was in coalition with the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which talked of war and suggested war with Pakistan. In Pakistan, the People's Party Government of Benazir Bhutto was in power through the sufferance of the Army, and thus, had to do some tough talking to ward off any threat to her position. Both Government were making "patriotic noises that sometimes precede war - especially, unintentional ones".¹⁶⁰ On January 31, a nervous Bombay stock market fell sharply. Notwithstanding Yaqub Khan's earlier optimism that "I do not believe either side wants to go to war", he himself went live on the Pakistani television on January 31, to say that, "Pakistan could not be cowed down by any pressure or threats and it will continue to support the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people".¹⁶¹ As the Kashmiris

¹⁵⁹ See, *The Hindu*, 31 May 1990, quoted in *Keesing's Record of World Events*, May 1990 : 37451.

¹⁶⁰ See, *The Economist*, February 3, 1990 : 56. It was also argued that "If both India and Pakistan become prisoners of their own words, they could yet drift into a war that neither of them wants". See, *The Economist*, March 31, 1990 : 62. The *Strategic Survey 1989-90* commented : "Neither of them can renounce another war over Kashmir as a policy option, even though both would avoid one – Singh because of its potentially debilitating effect on his development priorities, Bhutto because of the delicate civil-military equation in Pakistani politics." See, *Strategic Survey 1989-90* [IISS, London] 1990 : 174.

¹⁶¹ See, *New York Times*, February 1, 1990 : A5.

claimed the responsibility for the bombing in a number of places outside Kashmir, including Bombay, for the first time, 'grandstanding' by both beleaguered Prime Ministers continued and emotions rose high. A Western analyst in Islamabad commented, "What scares us is that given the emotions let loose over Kashmir, they [India and Pakistan] may get really riled up".¹⁶² A Pakistani official explained, "South Asians, all of us, seem to have a fatal problem in politics. We do not analyse and do not seem to understand where they are taking us. We are driven by events."¹⁶³

There was also the possibility of a pre-emptive strike by India on the training camps in Azad Kashmir. India claimed that it had incontrovertible proof of the existence of training camps. There had also been heated discussion in the Indian Parliament about the possibility of pre-emptive strikes on those camps. In a veiled threat to Pakistan in the *Rajya Sabha*, Indian Foreign Minister said,

We are keeping our communication channels open in the belief that they[Pakistan] will realise that it is in their larger interest that they should abandon their misguided policies *before they are overtaken by events*.¹⁶⁴ [emphasis added]

Earlier, a Member of the *Lok Sabha* said :

Bomb the camps, Sir, it does not matter if hundred thousand people were killed. The integrity of the nation must be maintained at any cost. ... If necessary, if this revolt goes on, I would appeal to the Government to hand over Jammu and Kashmir straightaway to the Army for maintaining the integrity of the nation.¹⁶⁵

However, most serious although less probable was the possibility of an all out and catastrophic war following a general mobilisation on both sides, including the use of nuclear weapons or a nuclear blackmail. The possibility of the use of nuclear weapons was talked about and in that charged atmosphere, nothing seemed improbable. By mid-May 1990, signs were evident that both sides were making a significant mobilisation of their respective troops to the

¹⁶² See, Edward W. Desmond, "Sabers Rattle the Subcontinent", *Time*, April 23, 1990 : 24. The most frequently asked question in New Delhi and Islamabad was : "Will there be another war?" See, Barbara Crossette, "India and Pakistan Make the Most of Hard Feelings", *New York Times*, April 22, 1990 : E3.

¹⁶³ See, *New York Times*, *ibid*.

¹⁶⁴ For the Minister's statement and other Members' contribution to the debate on the possibility of strikes, see, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vols. CLIV/2, May 2, 1990 : Cols. 222-25; CLIV/3, May 3, 1990 : Cols. 101-102.

¹⁶⁵ See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/13, March 28, 1990 : Cols. 676, 679. For similar views by Indian politicians, see, *The Economist*, June 9, 1990 : 64.

borders, increasing their overall readiness and building up ammunition stocks. South Asian experts considered these as defensive moves,¹⁶⁶ but a Western diplomat in Islamabad said, "Each side believes the other is doing more than it actually has." Balraj Puri, a political activist argued, "In the prevailing war hysteria, a small mistake is enough to plunge the countries into war."¹⁶⁷ However, what became more alarming, as the momentum of war hysteria was building,¹⁶⁸ was the information available to the both Superpowers that both countries had been readying their nuclear arsenals.¹⁶⁹ Benazir Bhutto also, while admitting that there was a real possibility that India would use the Kashmiri dispute as a pretext for war, made the "most explicit warning so far of the threat of conflict."¹⁷⁰ Another disconcerting fact was the apparent failure of the mission of Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser to the US President earlier to call for restraint.¹⁷¹ The media and opinion making élites in both countries were also talking in terms of a nuclear war.¹⁷²

Of course, the defence intelligence community in Washington was divided as to whether the Pakistani move was a real threat or bluff.¹⁷³ In a recent article in the *New Yorker* Seymour Hersh quotes Robert Gates, who later became the Director of the CIA, as saying that President Bush

¹⁶⁶ An Indian analyst, for example, recounted that given the terrain on the India-Pakistan borders, a war is not possible as long as they have not mobilised their heavy artillery. Source : Conversation with Prof. S. D. Muni during his visit to Canterbury in early June 1993.

¹⁶⁷ See, *Time*, May 14, 1990 : 21.

¹⁶⁸ Tensions were heightened surrounding the episode of the killing of Maulavi Farooq, as mentioned earlier. Said Bhabani Sen Gupta of the New Delhi based think-tank group, Centre for Policy Research said, "We are now in the gray zone between war and peace and dangerously drifting toward conflict." See, *ibid* : 19.

¹⁶⁹ American spy satellites photographed heavily armed convoys leaving the Pakistani nuclear complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields. They also filmed what some analysts said were special racks designed to carry nuclear bombs being fitted to Pakistani F16 aircraft. On the other hand the Soviet Union also detected signs that India was also readying its nuclear arsenals for war. "If readiness is measured on a scale of one to 10 and the Indians are normally at six, they have moved to nine," said a senior Pentagon official. See, James Adams, "Pakistan 'nuclear war threat', *Sunday Times*, May 27, 1990.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*. Pakistani Army Chief responded with 'irritation' to some of the suggestions that Robert Gates made while New Delhi asked him to dissuade Pakistan instead of India. See, *New York Times*, May 21, : A6-7, and May 22, 1990 : A8.

¹⁷² See, J. A. Nair, "How Not to Face a Nuclear Pakistan?", *The Statesman*, May 21, 1990. In Pakistan it was suggested in a seminar in Islamabad in 1990, *inter alia*, that "Nuclear deterrence against India should be made an operational part of our defence policy". See, Institute of Policy Studies, *The Present Phase of the Kashmir Problem : Challenge and Response, Recommendations of IPS Seminar* (Islamabad) 1990 : 12.

¹⁷³ Nuclear proliferation expert Leonard S. Spector believed that such a move by Pakistan could be a bluff. See, "India-Pakistan War : It Could be Nuclear", *New York Times*, June 7, 1990 : A23.

sent him to India and Pakistan to defuse the possibility of "the most dangerous nuclear confrontation of the postwar era."¹⁷⁴ Although the debate is far from being conclusive, some observations may be made. Firstly, given the amount of information available at that particular time, it appeared really to be a nuclear crisis. However, as the crisis did not materialise, diversity of retrospective speculations appeared.¹⁷⁵ Thus, perception and assessment based on the flow of information at that time and those at a later point, especially on an issue that did not actually take the speculated course, are bound to vary. Secondly, it also seems that Pakistan, either because it apprehended a real possibility of war so that a credible deterrent was needed, or it wanted to utilise the occasion to disclose its nuclear capability, did actually send out the signal that it intended to use its nuclear arsenal. Although both sides displayed belligerent mood during Robert Gates' visit, tempers began to cool down after his visit and the crisis was defused. Both sides agreed to discuss some confidence building measures that were already on the table.¹⁷⁶

In August 1990, following strong US pressure on Pakistan and with the removal of Benazir Bhutto's Government in Pakistan, it appeared that the two antagonists were possibly out of the danger zone. Yet frequent skirmishes including artillery exchanges across the borders took place and tensions built up.¹⁷⁷ In the beginning of 1992 again, tensions rose on the occasion of a proposed march across the LAC by the JKLF. Fearing the consequences, it was the Pakistan Government which prevented the march forcibly from its taking place.¹⁷⁸ There were these many

¹⁷⁴ See, a report on the article in the *Washington Post*, March 22-29, 1993. Also see, Douglas Jehl, "Did India and Pakistan Face Atomic War?", *New York Times*, March 23, 1993 : A3.

¹⁷⁵ Robert Gates says, "You can never prove a negative. You can't say that something would have happened had there not been a mission, but I think the President clearly was concerned." See, *Washington Post*, *op. cit.* He also said, "I was convinced that if a war started, it would be nuclear." *Ibid.* On the other hand, Richard Haas, who accompanied Gates, now recounts, "the bottomline I drew from it is not that we were on the brink of a nuclear war, but that we were on the brink of a war, and beyond that all bets were off." See, *New York Times*, *op. cit.* More interesting is the comments of Prof. Stephen Cohen who was visiting India and Pakistan at that time. At that time, he told the *Time* correspondent, when in Islamabad, "This is the first neonuclear [sic] crisis that does not directly involve the superpowers". See, Edward W. Desmond, "The Road to War?", *Time*, May 14, 1990 : 19. Yet, reacting to the recent article in the *New Yorker*, he said that the two nations might have been on the verge of a battle, but only with conventional weapons. "At that time, I felt the U.S. government was overreacting," Prof. Cohen said, "The uprising in Kashmir was mostly indigenous and dropping nuclear weapons on each other would not have dealt with the problem." See, *Washington Post*, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ See, *Strategic Survey 1990-91*, [IISS, London] 1991 : 215.

¹⁷⁷ See, *The Hindu*, July 1991.

¹⁷⁸ See, *The Pioneer*, *op. cit.* See, also, *Strategic Survey 1991-92*, [IISS, London] 1992 : 167.

possibilities, much talk of war, yet the war did not take place. In the following section, we explore how the war was avoided.

9.4.3 How the War was Avoided

9.4.3.1 Built-in Restraints

The military limitations contributed considerably to an exercise of restraint by both sides despite all provocations and temptations for war. First of all, whatever advancement Pakistan made in its arms build up, the substantial gap in the military balance remained. The memory of its demonstration in the 1971 war was very much in the decision makers' minds.¹⁷⁹ There might have been a slight decline of the margin, as also admitted by the Indian side.¹⁸⁰ but, if anything, that had more a sobering impact on the Indian psyche, given recent Sri Lankan debacle,¹⁸¹ than boosting a war making morale in Pakistan.

More prominent was the restraint due to the very changed configuration of the triangular relations. The realisation that given the boiling condition in Kashmir, war would not solve the Kashmir problem was also a possible contribution to restraint. The former Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Eduardo Faleiro said in this context :

War will not solve any problem with Pakistan; war will definitely not solve the Kashmir issue. Kashmir will remain, war or no war, or what the Governor in Kashmir is doing. Therefore, the only alternative is negotiations. I plead for dialogue with Pakistan and the Pakistani leadership within the parameters of the Simla Agreement. That is the option and that must be utilized and there is no other option. ... So please don't talk of war as it indicates an absolute failure of our diplomacy.¹⁸²

Then the implications of a war on the territorial integrity of both India and Pakistan also exerted some restraint. For India, any conventional battle with Pakistan would be fought, at least partly, in the Indian states of the Punjab and Kashmir, unless it carried the war on Pakistani soil

¹⁷⁹ See, Jalal, *op. cit.* : 19.

¹⁸⁰ See, Ravi Rikhye, "Indo-Pak Relations : Military Balance Unchanged", *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 9, 1990 : 1229.

¹⁸¹ Restraints on the Indian side on this count were advised by the former Chief of Army in India, General Sundarji. See, *New York Times*, April 22, 1990 : E3. For similar sobering notes, see, Anita Desai, "India : The Seed of Destruction", *The New York Book Review*, XXXVIII(12), June 29, 1991.

¹⁸² See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/17, April 5, 1990 : Col. 612-13.

as it did in the 1965.¹⁸³ If war broke out in Kashmir and the Punjab, for example, there was a good probability that the loyalty of the Sikhs towards India would be in question.¹⁸⁴ Mr. Surjit Mann, the Sikh leader is reported to have said in 1990 when war clouds were hanging over the Subcontinent, "If there is a war between India and Pakistan, the Sikhs shall identify themselves on the side of Pakistan."¹⁸⁵ A similar apprehension was reflected in the statement of a Congress Member in the *Lok Sabha* when he said,

You may start a war with limited purpose, but you may not be able to stop a war. ... We may make whatever gains in battle, in a long war to defeat Pakistan. ... But can you stop Pakistani troops from entering 10 miles or 20 miles into our territory? ... We have seen that we have seemed to have been losing civilian control over these areas. If the Pakistan Army moves in 10 miles, 15 miles and actually establishes a *de facto* or declare a certain independence to [sic] 'Khalistan', what will we do about it? No Government will be [in] a position ... to stop the war.¹⁸⁶

Regarding the relative significance of the Punjab, Prem Bhatia, a prominent member of the opinion making élite in New Delhi told a Pakistani editor : "Kashmir is not the only question; in fact, Punjab is a bigger question for us. We might be able to negotiate with you on Kashmir, but we can't on Punjab."¹⁸⁷

Similar limitations were applicable for Pakistan. Firstly, although Azad Kashmir had acceded to Pakistan and the leadership in the territory has always been for accession of the whole territories of Kashmir through a plebiscite to Pakistan, relations between Azad Kashmir and Islamabad had been an uneasy one. The JKLF, which stands for total independence of Kashmir, is more welcome in Muzaffarabad, capital of Azad Kashmir than in Rawalpindi or Islamabad. There are signs that elements in Azad Kashmir feel a closer affinity towards the Indian side of Kashmir than Pakistan itself.¹⁸⁸ In 1984, dissenting voices advocating for an independent Kashmir

¹⁸³ However, a senior general in the Indian Army, while advocating for a nuclear deterrent for India, admitted that the scenarios of "Indian armour crossing the Sukkur barrage over the Indus and slice Pakistan into two are a thing of the past". See, *India Today*, April 30, 1993 : 44.

¹⁸⁴ See, *New York Times*, June 9, 1990 : 3.

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in *Rajya Sabha [Upper House] Debate*, Vol. CLIV/5, May 7, 1990 : Col 266.

¹⁸⁶ See, *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/17, April 5, 1990 : Col. 629.

¹⁸⁷ See, Eqbal Ahmed, *op. cit.* : 14.

¹⁸⁸ Voices opposed to accession of Azad Kashmir to Pakistan in Azad Kashmir are not difficult to be heard. The People's National Party (PNP) and the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation League, advocating for such a position, are active in Mirpur (Azad Kashmir). Some elements in the ruling Muslim Conference Party want Gilgit to be part of Azad Kashmir instead of being an integral part of Pakistan. See, *India Today*, October 31, 1991 : 104.

including Azad Kashmir could be heard.¹⁸⁹ Pakistan is no less wary that the position of the militants that 'independence first' through armed struggle and then the question of accession has many more uncertain possibilities than resolution of the conflict through negotiations. It is because of this that there had been flicker of understanding in New Delhi that much of Benazir Bhutto's stridency was at least partly borne by the desire to pre-empt a call of independence by the militants, especially JKLF.¹⁹⁰ It may be mentioned that following the tragic death of Rajiv Gandhi, some militants said that, "Now is the time to go on the offensive and attack the occupying forces". However, the Pakistan Army told their Indian counterparts that they could deploy troops out of Kashmir to maintain law and order in Indian cities because Pakistan had no wish to create problems for India on the Kashmir borders.¹⁹¹ Thus, it is plausible to argue that several limitations inherent in the Kashmir imbroglio helped the two traditional antagonists to avoid a war.

9.4.3.2 Mediatory Influence

Mediatory influence, and to an extent pressure, especially on Pakistan, also played a significant role in putting a brake on the momentum to war. Mediatory influence operated on both India and Pakistan while the pressure seems to have operated on Pakistan alone in dissuading it from its possible military moves and training and assisting the Kashmiri militants.

The question of mediation takes us back to the mission of Robert Gates to both Pakistan and India. Gates made it clear to both the countries that while the USA had no intention to mediate, it was prepared to offer its services to ensure that troops were pulled back from the borders. He also offered certain political proposals, such as toning down public statements, strict control over borders in Azad Kashmir for Pakistan and checking human rights violations for India.¹⁹² While these political proposals were rebuffed in Islamabad and in New Delhi, Gates' offer of sharing

¹⁸⁹ See, Address of Azad Kashmir President, April 6, 1988, *op. cit.* : 26.

¹⁹⁰ See, *The Economist*, March 31, 1990 : 62.

¹⁹¹ See, *Independent*, May 25, 1991.

¹⁹² See, *New York Times*, May 21, 1990 : A7.

intelligence information on troop movement obtained from United States spy satellites was readily agreed to by both. It appeared that the US efforts at influencing restraints on the combatants had the consent of the other Superpower as well as that of China, because the Powers were unwilling to spoil the 'fashionable atmosphere' of the post-Cold War period.¹⁹³ The two Superpowers shared evidently intelligence information on the Subcontinental affairs at that time.¹⁹⁴ By keeping both sides fully and equally informed, and thus making both equally advantageous or disadvantageous, the danger that either side could steal a march over the other, could be averted.¹⁹⁵ The situation resembled roughly a prisoners' dilemma like situation in which both had to cooperate even if involuntarily.

Regarding the second factor, the US had been applying pressure on Pakistan since early 1990 to dissuade the Pakistani Army from intervening in Kashmir. US officials reportedly advised Pakistan not to take such "extremely foolish" measures as deploying troops to forward defences along the LAC in Kashmir.¹⁹⁶ The USA also made its political position clear that it would not support the cause of a plebiscite in Kashmir and Pakistan had to sort this out with India within the framework of the Simla Agreement.¹⁹⁷ The Soviet Union and China also favoured bilateral peaceful resolution of the problem.¹⁹⁸ Thirdly, at one stage, the US accused Pakistan of "fomenting terrorism through supporting Kashmiri militants".¹⁹⁹ In fact, the USA pursued this issue with Pakistan until the latter reduced its assistance to the Kashmiri militants significantly.

Fourthly, in the immediate aftermath of the Geneva accord on Afghanistan, a distancing of the US from Pakistan began for various reasons, culminating in the linking of aid with Pakistan's nuclear programme in October 1991.²⁰⁰ The solution of the Afghan problem at the Superpower

¹⁹³ See, *The Economist*, April 21, 1990 : 71.

¹⁹⁴ See, *Sunday Times*, May 27, 1990.

¹⁹⁵ See, *The Economist*, May 26, 1990 : 74.

¹⁹⁶ See, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, February 1990 : 37246.

¹⁹⁷ For statement of the US Ambassador in Pakistan to this effect, see, *The Muslim*, December 16, 1990. See also, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIV/3, May 3, 1990 : Col. 100. See, also *Lok Sabha Debate*, Vol. III/17, April 5, 1990 : Col. 621.

¹⁹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹⁹ See, *The Nation*, [Lahore] July 28, 1991.

²⁰⁰ The Geneva accord itself through the provision of 'negative symmetry' slowed down US military as-

level led to a decline in the 'value' of Pakistan. Issues such as drugs and Pakistan's nuclear programme came to the fore. As pressure was intensified, Pakistan also became adamant and almost open about its nuclear ambitions.²⁰¹ However, Pakistan's defiance had a limit set by such critical elements as economic and some limited military assistance which Pakistan could not afford to overlook. This had possibly a sobering impact on Pakistan's position on Kashmir and its aid to the Kashmiri militants.²⁰²

9.4.3.3 Bilateral Initiatives to Defuse Tensions

Parallel to external mediation two levels of bilateral talks were held between India and Pakistan to defuse the tensions and resolve the conflict - military and political. It will be seen that, while military tensions could be eased, the political goal of resolving the root cause of the problem was virtually a non-starter. As tensions developed in bilateral relations following the uprising in the Kashmir Valley, the Indian Army Headquarters contacted their Pakistani counterparts and "cautioned them against their decision to man their forward defence in the plains area of Jammu and Punjab."²⁰³ Since then contact was maintained between the two headquarters to ensure that military movements were not misinterpreted.²⁰⁴ Some tangible impact was also visible.

India and Pakistan withdrew troops from the common border in early June 1990 in an attempt to defuse tension caused by the unrest in Kashmir. The Indian Defence Ministry made it public that this was the result of an unilateral Indian initiative in the Punjab which Pakistan later

sistance to the Afghan Mujahedins through Pakistan, to match a corresponding commitment of the former Soviet Union to cut military assistance to the Kabul regime. See, *The Nation*, July 28, 1991.

²⁰¹ Pakistani emissary to USA, Mr. Wasim Sajjad's categorical reply to James Baker, former US Secretary of State, is noteworthy. Mr Sajjad said that it was "impossible" to "roll back" its nuclear programme. See, Mushahid Hussain, "A 'Pakistani Lobby' is taking shape", *The Nation* [Lahore], July 28, 1991. See also, Michael Gordon, "Nuclear Issues Slow US Aid to Pakistan", *New York Times*, October 1, 1990 : A3. For some details of the drug factor in the US-Pakistan relations, see, *Washington Post*, May 21-27, 1990 : 15. See, also Barbara Crosette, "US-Pakistan Bone of Contention : Narcotics", *New York Times*, December 5, 1990 : A15.

²⁰² See, *Asia Watch*, *op. cit.* : 22.

²⁰³ See, *The Hindu*, February 24, 1990 .

²⁰⁴ See, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, February 1990 : 37246.

reciprocated. V. P. Singh, in an interview, said on June 3, that a set of proposals had been sent to Pakistan aimed at reducing the risk of war in Kashmir. Islamabad reacted saying that the Indian proposals needed serious considerations "notwithstanding the fact that [they] do not address the central issues which are the root cause of the current tension".²⁰⁵ The two parties also agreed for talks to be held in July 1990 aimed at reducing tensions on the borders.²⁰⁶ A second meeting of the senior officials dealt with military confidence building measures. However, unease and tensions persisted in bilateral relations as India did not agree to alter the deployment of its forces in the Kashmir border area. Between August 13 and 21, the two forces clashed in Kashmir involving an exchange of heavy artillery fire across the cease-fire line.²⁰⁷

Much of the deadlocks occurred at the political level. Both parties displayed a general willingness to resolve the conflict. Yet, Pakistan with all its diplomatic efforts failed to break the "vicious cycle of Indian leak-proof arguments",²⁰⁸ while India found Pakistan's position still outdated. When Pakistan attempted to raise the issue in international fora, India's argument was that Kashmir has been a bilateral dispute to be solved within the framework of the Simla Agreement. However, when the matter came down to the bilateral level, all that India was prepared to discuss under the rubric of a reduction of tensions was Pakistan's refraining from helping the militants. "So all that had changed over these decades in India's political position was the substitution of 'vacating Pakistani aggression in Kashmir' by 'stop arming' the militants'"²⁰⁹ Beyond this, there was nothing that India was prepared to negotiate politically over Kashmir. On the other hand, India detected no change in Pakistan's old "unhelpful position". While making a statement in the *Rajya Sabha*, the then Indian Foreign Minister said that Pakistan applied unacceptable conditions to such talks, such as observance of the "outdated UN Resolutions", "troop deployment and neutral mechanism" to verify allegations and counter-allegations.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ See, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, June 1990 : 37530.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid* : 37530.

²⁰⁷ See, *Keesing's Record of World Events*, August 1990 : 37653.

²⁰⁸ Source : *Interview* in Islamabad, August 1991.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*. For similar views, see, Barbara Crosette, "India Rejects Talks with Pakistan", *New York Times*, June 9, 1990 : 3

²¹⁰ See, *Rajya Sabha Debate*, Vol. CLIV/3, May 3, 1990 : Col. 98.

Looking at the problem from a Pakistan perspective, it may be argued that initially the political and military aspects of the uprising were enmeshed and that generated euphoria in Pakistan about the real possibility of re-opening up the Kashmir issue, perhaps within the framework of UN resolutions. However, as things fell into their places and the military aspects were somewhat subdued through confidence building measures at bilateral level, on the one hand, and intensified military operations within the Jammu and Kashmir state by India, on the other, the prospects of the political became evidently dim. It also seemed to have brought a sober mood in Islamabad, as may be evident from Nawaz Sharif's statement in late 1991 that, "The UN resolutions should form the basis of the talks but fresh ideas which come up across the table should also be discussed."²¹¹

On a comparative basis, which one was the decisive factor in avoiding an India-Pakistan war? In the particular case of Kashmir, it is difficult to argue that the Simla spirit provided the restraint to the antagonists. It seems that the in-built limitations facing both the antagonists and the rather coercive mediatory role, - even if coercive is a strong term here - played the decisive role. First of all, the odds of an accidental flare up were not insignificant. However, even if war otherwise proved feasible, the in-built limitations blocked the feasibility for both sides. Secondly, the role of the Great Powers was decisive and qualitatively different from that in 1965 and 1971 in the sense there was a triangular consensus and the USA, Soviet Union and China this time that war should be avoided. Pressure on Pakistan in particular, was decisive. Then intelligence sharing made war unattractive for the initiator. There is also reason to believe that the military confidence building which helped averting the war was not a bilateral process alone. The military confidence building process was underwritten by the external powers, mainly the USA.

9.5 Conclusions

The Kashmir conflict in 1947-48 was basically an ideological one between a secular nationalism of India and an Islamic nationalism of Pakistan. Of course, both the combatants also

²¹¹ See, *India Today*, October 31, 1991 : 104.

became committed formally in the wake of the outbreak of the first Kashmir war in late October 1947 to the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris through a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. While the salience of the deep-rooted ideological conflict persisted over the subsequent decades, it gradually assumed the shape of a territorial conflict throughout the prolonged UN mediation, the 1965 war and the 1971 war over the independence of Bangladesh. All mediation attempts were stalemated, the wars themselves also were militarily inconclusive as far as Kashmir was concerned. However, it was expected that the Simla Agreement of 1972 would lead to a bilateral territorial settlement between India and Pakistan along the existing cease-fire line which divided the original Jammu and Kashmir state into two parts – one encompassing the Kashmir Valley had been formally integrated into the Indian Union, and the other, nominally autonomous but controlled by Pakistan. The events of the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated that instead Kashmir remained at best in a state of suspended animation amidst cross-currents of bilateral relations characterised by the twin tracks of conflictual and cooperative interactions over issues like Siachen and nuclear capability on the one hand, and a proclivity to get involved in each other's internal problems, on the other. Apparently at least, neither side reckoned with the resurgence from within Kashmir in 1989-90 over the most talked-about yet most neglected aspect of the conflict, namely, the wishes of the people of Kashmir, especially, those in the Kashmir Valley, to decide the future of Kashmir. The aim of the present chapter has been to explain the transformation of the protracted Kashmir conflict into Kashmiri popular uprising combined with violent militancy to separate Kashmir from the Indian Union.

The discussion of the chapter made it evident that the Kashmir Valley from which the present uprising originated had the infrastructure of a separate Kashmiri identity rooted in history, its culture, religion and language. The post-colonial élites had an understanding of that identity but failed to articulate and direct it decisively. The high politics of Hindu-Muslim and later India-Pakistan rivalries overwhelmed such tendencies, if any, Kashmiri separatism has, however, been sharpened by disillusionment of the common people on a number of counts : firstly, the territorial nature of the conflict that India and Pakistan fought between themselves while paying

lip-service to the cause of the self-determination of the Kashmiri people; secondly, their experience with the Indian Union, and thirdly, the role of the local politicians, including Sheikh Abdullah. The other factors that played a critical catalytic role were the regional and global changes in the realms of people's power or popular upsurge and the Islamic resurgence, especially in Afghanistan and the former Soviet Central Asian republics.

From this, certain conclusions may be deduced. In the first place, the very lingering of the conflict in stalemate over such a long time provided the opportunity as well as the impetus for transformation to find an alternative outlet. Secondly, the history of the Kashmir conflict over the period 1947-89 reveals that the separatist aspirations of the Kashmiris had been kindled by the combatants through their repeated commitments to the cause of self-determination of the Kashmiris. Yet, for all practical purposes, they either sidetracked or glossed over the issue, as was the case with India, or only paid lip service to the cause, as was the case with Pakistan, in the perception of the Kashmiri people. Thirdly, the transformation of the Kashmir conflict makes it part of a new generation of conflicts based on ethno-religious issues and nationalistic resurgence in the post-Cold War era.

The present uprising marking a transformation of the old Kashmir conflict has several new elements. An overwhelming mass base of the uprising and the militancy accompanied by a total alienation of the populace from the Indian Union is the new element. The fact that the moderate leadership appears to be discredited totally *vis-à-vis* the young generation who constitute the backbone of the militancy is also a new element. It is the challenge of these new elements that sharpens the dilemmas facing the traditional antagonists - India and Pakistan. Along with the new elements, the old elements of the conflict, especially the ideological aspect, has resurfaced. As the uprising has a strong Islamic element, Pakistan's leverage over the conflict has increased significantly compared to its position in the 1960s and 1970s. Although, its role is contested by India and disliked by the Powers, its support and sympathy for the militants looks natural and legitimate. However strenuously India might have had tried over the past five decades to make the world believe that the Kashmir problem no longer existed, the uprising at least has given the

recognition that there is a problem in Kashmir. In the sequel, even if the nature of the problem is significantly different, Pakistan's strenuous efforts over these years to keep the problem alive have conferred on it a certain amount of legitimacy as a party, whether India admits it or not. The pace of the events, however, seems to have rendered its advocacy for a plebiscite under the UN auspices somewhat outdated. This is for two reasons. One is the usual reason that India has been furnishing that there had been so much change that a plebiscite under the formula as envisaged in 1948 would be impracticable. A more fundamental reason is that the Kashmiris by demanding complete separation from India first have outpaced Pakistan in its limited interpretation of the concept of self-determination.²¹² As long as nothing was happening and India was claiming that that by participating in a number of elections at national and state levels the Kashmiris have decided their future, Pakistan's consistent plea for a plebiscite carried weight. However, the Kashmiri secessionist uprising has not only belied the Indian claim,²¹³ it has also outpaced the Pakistani interpretation of self-determination.²¹⁴

The conflict, in turn, presents a complex web, without the participants' knowing how to untangle it. The Kashmiri militancy, in the first instance, is far from being clear as to what its eventual goals are – sovereign independence or joining Pakistan – exception of course, the goal of separation from India. The lack of clarity intensifies the dilemma of Pakistan because it has been helping all the militants, more or less. However, the ideological goal of JKLF – which commands wider popular support and appeal among the Kashmiri people – in terms of secularism and retention of sovereign independence possibly with a united Kashmir has serious implications for Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan cannot afford to lose control over JKLF by

²¹² Pakistan has been arguing that the right of self-determination should be realised within the framework of the UN resolutions of 1948 which envisaged the holding of a plebiscite under the UN auspices to decide Kashmir's accession to India or Pakistan.

²¹³ India's argument was based on a so-called *de facto* situation, and the uprising presents a new *de facto* situation.

²¹⁴ Of course, Pakistan's plea for a plebiscite has a legalistic basis in that a plebiscite is a commitment of both the parties recognised by the UN and the issue has not been discarded or disowned by the UN. See, Fahmida Ashraf, *The Kashmir Dispute*, **Strategy Papers** No SP-027, (Islamabad : Institute of Strategic Studies) June 1990 : 22, and 25 for fn 19. Having said that, it should also be pointed out that the UN Secretary General reacted to a Pakistani plea for a plebiscite by saying that the UN could not do anything unless it was approached by both the parties.

allowing it to enter into dialogue with the Indian Government on the grounds that India finds it acceptable ideologically to make some compromise with the JKLF.

For India, which is still in control of the situation with military force, the single mindedness of the Kashmiri militants in their goal of separation is the biggest challenge. India is applying the 'reason of the state' and argues that no matter what the cost, Kashmir cannot be let out. However, given the scale and unabated nature of militancy and the ubiquitous nature of the LAC that demarcates the two Kashmirs, a question that is being asked by observers, if not yet by the Indians : how long India can sustain the militancy? Given India's vast military might and its seasoned experience in dealing with several insurgencies, this question is admittedly still academic. However, how long will it remain so is open to question, knowing that the whole Muslim population in the state is alienated. Continuation of military control will drive then further to militancy. No concrete steps could be taken to initiate any meaningful dialogue with the militants. The Indian Government's efforts over the last three years to establish contacts and initiate talks with the JKLF have not produced any results.²¹⁵

A second dilemma for India lies in its dealing with Pakistan. Even if India can wage a war against Pakistan and achieve a significant victory, it cannot hope to win Kashmir because the basic problem lies not in Pakistan but in the Kashmir Valley. In the event of the Sikh problem being linked with Kashmir, a strategic disadvantage might arise for India. The militants face no less a dilemma. Even if complete independence is their eventual goal, the formidable reality is India's military might. The second hurdle lies in the regional reality of both India and Pakistan's stake in Kashmir. Given the material, human and emotional investment that the two traditional antagonists have made in Kashmir, a peaceful solution will demand that militants enter into some kind of arrangements with both India and Pakistan. Both the traditional antagonists at least share one interest that goes against the spirit of the Kashmiri aspirations. It is possibly because of these intricacies and complexities that the protracted conflict had embodied over these decades that the

²¹⁵ See, *India Today*, May 31, 1993 : 39.

in-built checks and balances did not lead to a flare up, although there was a high probability and a number of times it was about to cross the crisis threshold. In view of these dilemmas for all the three parties, is there is any peaceful way out?

PART FIVE

IN CONCLUSION

CHAPTER X : CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to highlight the substance of the empirical arguments of the thesis in the light of its theoretical framework on protracted international conflicts. Our purpose has not been to undertake any testing of hypotheses as such. Nevertheless, some theoretical propositions were developed to guide the case study. We shall make an attempt to bring out the theoretical underpinnings of our empirical findings in the light of those theoretical propositions. The wider relevance of the framework of enquiry and the findings of the thesis for study of similar prolonged and intractable conflicts in the region and elsewhere will also be pointed out.

The focus of the thesis has been admittedly on a positive analysis of conflicts rather than on aspects of conflict resolution and conflict management. Making any sort of normative judgement on resolution of similar conflicts was beyond the scope of its analysis. However, there has been an implicit perspective in the thesis. In the light of the perspective, the implications of the findings of the thesis for the management and resolution of similar protracted conflicts will be briefly touched upon. We shall also, as an end-note, outline possible future scenarios for this continuing conflict. To begin with, a summary of the discussion of the thesis thus far may be presented.

10.1 A Summary of the Thesis

The subject matter of the thesis has been an analysis of the dynamics of protracted international conflicts (PICs), the incidence of which has been galore in the contemporary international system. The central objective of the thesis has been to explain how and why certain international conflicts become protracted. Is protractedness inherent in certain international conflicts? Or, is it a product of circumstances? In the light of these questions, it has been the purpose of the thesis to develop a precise definition of the concept of protracted international

conflicts and elucidate its causes, patterns and underlying processes.

The thesis has been developed in the specific context of South Asia through a case study of the Kashmir conflict, 1947-1990, the most prolonged and intractable conflict in the region. The scope of the case study included the origin of the conflict in 1947 over the status of the Princely state of Kashmir, its persistence and linkages with other issues and conflicts, and its subsequent flare ups and military hostilities including its latest transformation into a local insurgency supplanting the old conflict.

The thesis explains intractability of international conflicts in terms of interactions between issues, actors and conflict environment. The theoretical frame has been evolved through a combination of an ontology-based explanation, on the one hand,¹ and the linkage politics-based explanation of wider wars, on the other.² A protracted conflict originates as an outcome of a complex process of linkages and polarisation in which other conflicts, issues and actors in the conflict environment coalesce over a salient issue, which itself may be the outcome of a prior conflictual process. Secondly, once a conflict is initiated over a salient issue, its intractability depends on the degree to which violence and tensions interlink with other issues or conflicts, and also on the nature of the conflict resolution attempts undertaken. Thirdly, periodic flare ups in protracted conflicts may occur for a variety of factors, but the underlying reason is usually provided by cumulation of tensions through linkage and polarisation, and a change in the operational environment. Finally, an intractable and stalemated conflict itself facilitates change and transformation in a conflict because while traditional adversaries remain locked over old issues, other parameters of the conflict may change and create alternative channels of interactions involving new actors and issues.³

The case study on Kashmir began with understanding the process and circumstances leading to an onset of the conflict in late October 1947.⁴ A three-stage analytical argument has been built,

¹ This refers principally to Azar's framework of 'protracted social conflicts'. For discussion based on Azar's and other related works, see, Section 2.2.1 in Chapter II.

² This refers mainly to the Conflict Diffusion theory. See, Section 2.3.1 in Chapter II.

³ See, Sections 2.4 and 2.5 in Chapter II.

⁴ See, Part Two, Chapters IV & V.



the first two stages dealt with 'prior conflictual processes' and sub-wars, while the third stage, with trigger leading to an inter-state conflict. The first stage concerned the formation of the principal axis of the conflict through transformation of the Hindu-Muslim rivalry into an inter-Dominion ideological rivalry. Its role in setting a contest for the accession of the Princely states to the respective Dominions and in stimulating sub-national and local communal forces is also depicted.

In the second stage, the cauldron of the conflict was shaped in Kashmir initially and mainly through local political dynamics, but later through a polarisation of local political forces along both the communal and ideological lines as were observed in India-Pakistan relations. Communal fissures developed in the ruler-ruled relations between the Hindu *Maharaja* of Kashmir and his largely Muslim subjects, mainly over his autocratic rules and discriminatory policies. This internal communalisation was reinforced with spillover of communal violence from the immediate vicinity of Kashmir, especially from the Punjab. Conflict signals were being sent to local forces in the eastern and western Punjabs and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). So Kashmir began to witness the kind of communal violence which was ravaging both sides of Punjab.

The pattern of India-Pakistan ideological rivalry was also manifest at the level of élite politics of Kashmir. The triangular relations between the *Maharaja*, the secular National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah, and the Islamic-minded Muslim Conference, over such issues as political liberalisation and the future status of Kashmir, came to reflect the pattern of ideological divide and political bickerings as observed in pre- and post-independence India and Pakistan. The stake of Kashmir was raised and the two antagonists attempted in their own way to influence the decision of the vacillating *Maharaja* to accede to their respective polity. They did not succeed because the *Maharaja* was staunchly in favour of retaining independence of Kashmir. However, India-Pakistan rivalry for Kashmir did provide a rallying point or a salient axis around which other forces arising out of the partition, local geopolitics and Kashmir's own internal politics coalesced. Polarisation of the local and sub-national forces along the line of India-Pakistan

ideological rivalry was complete, India-Pakistan rivalry for Kashmir's accession was intense and one of the local forces, namely, armed tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), provided the trigger in the third stage through invading Kashmir to effect its accession to Pakistan. As the tribesmen reached the outskirts of Baramullah, *Maharaja's* call for emergency assistance, India's insistence on Kashmir's accession first, the *Maharaja's* signing of the instrument of accession and India's despatch of airborne troops happened in quick succession with extraordinary rapidity. Pakistan had already been embroiled in Kashmir and some tenuous Pakistani links with the trigger were also possibly there. Thus, an inter-state conflict began.

Arguably, the trigger could have been provided by any of forces – local communal, quasi-state and inter-state – all of which had already been polarised and linked to the main dividing lines. Once the trigger was provided, all the sub-national and local forces were subsumed at the inter-state level because of its salience. Yet the role these forces played in catalysing each other and in building up tensions along the main axis was no less important. Such an analysis provides disentangling of the relative weight of contributing forces within a coherent frame of analysis. In a conflict situation, the salient factor is often given a disproportionate role but the other forces and factors are lost sight of. In retrospect, such an approach of placing appropriate weight to the individual factors rather than lumping them in dyadic frame could possibly have spared the two countries of the prolonged perils that followed.⁵

Having examined the onset of the conflict, the focus shifted onto an examination of how the Kashmir conflict survived prolonged UN mediation efforts and bilateral negotiations and exploded eventually into another flare up in 1965.⁶ Seeds of intractability in the conflict had already been sown in the high stakes that the parties had developed for Kashmir through the prior conflictual process and subsequent military hostilities. Intractability was also latent in the

⁵ Mentionably, such an approach was evident to an extent in the very initial stage of the conflict. Jinnah, for example, suggested to Mountbatten on November 1, 1947, that the two Governor-Generals deal with the tribesmen and other outside forces jointly. Likewise, Nehru also displayed in his initial correspondence with Liaquat Ali Khan a tendency to distinguish between the role of the Pakistan Government and the tribesmen. See, P. L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute* (New Delhi : International Books) 1965 : 62-63, 66, 70-72. However, neither party pursued this approach any further.

⁶ See, Part Three, Chapters VI and VII.

inconclusive nature of the battle outcomes which converted the ideological rivalry for Kashmir into a territorial one. A series of stalemates in UN mediation efforts and bilateral negotiations added layers of intractability to the conflict over the decade 1949-1958. None of the conflict resolution measures were decisive enough compared to the already hardened position of the parties on the issue of contention.

Secondly, while the conflict persisted through hardening of position of the parties and their resistance to resolution, the process was reinforced by diffusion and feedback tensions from other bilateral disputes. A single track relationship was observed between these two sets of conflicts. Kashmir affected the overall tenor of conflictual interactions over trade, minorities, boundary demarcation and water sharing, and made some of them worse to the extent that the two antagonists were driven to the brink of wars on a number of occasions. However, subsequent cooperation in those areas, guided mainly by merit of the individual cases, did not have any positive feedback on Kashmir. This finding goes contrary to the commonly held wisdom that cooperation in non-conflictual or less problematic areas would eventually soften positively the deadlocked and hardened conflict.

Intractability and persistent tensions as such may not lead to military hostilities. What led to the second Kashmir war of 1965? The two combatants fought inconclusive battles over the fate of Kashmir in 1947-48. They agreed almost readily on the principle of settling the conflict at an early stage, yet they were not able for nearly two decades to agree on the procedure of implementing the agreed formula of a plebiscite in Kashmir. The stronger party, that is, India, had an interest in preserving the *status quo* of the outcome of the inconclusive battles. Hence it used all its influence to wipe out the conflict through rendering it irrelevant both internally through constitutional measures, and externally through deft manoeuvring with the UN mediation process. The aggrieved party, that is Pakistan, on the other hand, was driven to desperation with every such attempt of the stronger party. When possible avenues of peaceful resolution were exhausted, it resorted to violence and the second war began.

Apparently, this was a case of 'status inconsistency', as argued by Muni,⁷ or one of

⁷ See, S. D. Muni, "South Asia" in M. Ayoob (ed.) *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (New

'frustration-aggression' motivations of war.⁸ However, such encapsulation of the 1965 war will lead to loss of vital explanatory factors which fit well within the persistence and linkage frame of analysis. Especially two critical stimulants rendered the parameters of the Kashmir highly fluid. These were Cold War politics and the Sino-Indian border war. Although Cold War entered the Subcontinent in the mid-1950s, its reinforced entry in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict played a more critical role in the context of Kashmir. Cold War had at best a derivative interest in the affairs of the Subcontinent, and thus, the regional issues remained subservient to the global interests of the protagonists of the Cold War, especially the West. Even within the domain of secondary importance of the region of South Asia in Great Power politics, their linkage with the two local antagonists was asymmetrical. For Pakistan, Kashmir and the Cold War P were, at best, linked tangentially. The West's main interests in Pakistan were, first by default because India was not interested to be a party, and second, in the context of the Middle East. There was very little, if any, formal commitment on the part of the West to Pakistan in respect of Kashmir, yet Pakistan's whole efforts were aimed at pulling the Western leverage in the context of Kashmir. The other factor which provided Pakistan with significant decisional cue was the internal development within Kashmir over such issues as loss of the holy relic, release and rearrest of Sheikh Abdullah resulting in popular unrests, which to Pakistan signified as a Poonch-rebellion like situation insofar as Srinagar-Delhi relations were concerned.⁹

In the process of discussing the role of the Cold War, it was also possible to observe the linkages and feedback of the conflict with other coexisting conflicts in South Asia.¹⁰ In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kashmir got linked up with the Sino-Indian border war, mainly through penetration of the Cold War in response to that war, and the Sino-Pakistan *entente* in response thereto. When the second Kashmir war broke out, China at one stage served an ultimatum on

York : St. Martins) 1980 : 47-50.

⁸ For a brief expose of Ted Gurr's frustration-aggression theory of war, see, Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict : International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) 1982 : 92-94.

⁹ See, Sections 7.2 and 7.3.2 in Chapter VII.

¹⁰ A general survey of the South Asian international conflicts has been presented in Chapter III.

India to dismantle its military installations in Sikkim. It seemed that the ultimatum was aimed mainly at deterring India from attacking Pakistan. The ultimatum, however, fizzled out and the deterrent also failed. Had the Chinese followed up its ultimatum, the war would have spread over a greater battlefield across the Himalayan borders between India and China. However, violence in Kashmir did not spread beyond the India-Pakistan relations. Likewise, there was some possibility that the Goa problem and the Kashmir conflict would be linked in view of the fact that the aggrieved parties, namely, Portugal and Pakistan, were both Western allies. But actually they did not. From these two instances, it follows that diffusion process may provide stimulus to other conflicts in close proximity and close political relations. Some low level conflictual interactions may also take place in the affected disputes. But the process does not necessarily lead to militarised hostility to spread from one to the other, unless the political relationship is close enough or the operational environment is fluid enough.¹¹ Secondly, in conflict situation, alliance relationships do not necessarily lead to taking the predictable side in a war, as was evident in the West's behaviour before and during the 1965 war. A more critical role of alliance relations in a conflict is its contribution more to a fluidity than stability through an arms-race-like competition for allies.

In the final two empirical chapters of the thesis the subject matter has been India-Pakistan relations during the post-Tashkent period leading to the Kashmiri uprising and militancy during 1989-90.¹² The Kashmiri militancy revived an otherwise stalemated conflict with a new dimension of internal upsurge. Our main concern was explaining this internal upsurge and assessing its impact on the old conflict, and of course, the future of Kashmir itself. A closer scrutiny of the meandering course of the protracted conflict revealed that as the bilateral India-Pakistan relations centering on Kashmir were stalemated, the main developments in Kashmir took other two routes – a bilateral side-route and an internal route – at the juncture of which the two

¹¹ The fluid operational environment was observed to spread conflicts during and in the immediate aftermath of the partition, especially between the Punjab, Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. See, Sections 4.3.2 in Chapter IV and 5.2 in Chapter V.

¹² See, Chapters VIII & IX in Part Four.

antagonists have again been confronted with each other as well as a third party, the Kashmiri militants. This conclusion needs some elaboration.

Firstly, the two Kashmir wars of 1947-48 and 1965 set in motion a process of reprisals through interference in each other's internal problems. In particular, Pakistan's sending in trained infiltrators into Kashmir which to India was, by all means, as an integral part of its Union, led to India's reprisals, the concrete manifestation of which was to be found in India's involvement in the then East Pakistan, culminating in the birth of Bangladesh. However, the process did not stop at Bangladesh. A number of mutual involvements followed, to an extent in Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan, but mainly in Punjab and Sind.¹³ As the internal politics of the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir came a the boiling point, Pakistan had the 'perfect opportunity' to pay India back. Thus, within the India-Pakistani bilateral domain, a complex process of linkage politics have catapulted the two antagonists again to Kashmir, which otherwise was stalemated in the post-1971 period. Did the Kashmir problem then subside in the post-Bangladesh period? Before highlighting the internal route to Kashmir, this point is worth recapitulating.

Apparently, the focus of India-Pakistan bilateral relations in the post-1971 period was deflected from Kashmir, initially through a cooperative process in the 1970s, and but by a mixture conflictual and cooperative interactions in the 1980s.¹⁴ It also seemed that the India-Pakistan dyad could leave Kashmir aside and interact on issues other than Kashmir, even if some of the interactions proved hostile enough.¹⁵ However, a close observation of the India-Pakistan normalisation process of the 1970s and 1980s reveals that Kashmir was very much near the surface of bilateral relations. The normalisation process suffered setbacks because of the same old Kashmir issue. The reason that they could not proceed very far with either a 'no-war pact' or a 'friendship treaty' was the deep mistrust towards each other contributed largely by mutual hostilities on Kashmir over the past decades. Both the parties, more so Pakistan, realised the futility of the use of force, yet they were both hostages of the mind-set created by Kashmir.

¹³ See, Section 8.2 in Chapter VIII.

¹⁴ For details, see, Section 8.3 in Chapter VIII.

¹⁵ The outbreak of hostilities on Siachen is an example.

The internal route to a stand-off on Kashmir, however, was more dramatic. Apparently at least, neither side reckoned with a resurgence from within Kashmir in the scale it did during 1989-1990. The issue of the present uprising has been the most talked-about self-determination of the people of Kashmir over which the two traditional antagonists were fighting ostensibly. An examination of the nature and process of transformation of the protracted Kashmir conflict into an Kashmiri popular uprising and violent militancy showed that it was neither sudden nor unexpected. The trigger, the manner in which the militancy broke, and the scale in which it continued were probably unexpected. Otherwise, the factors and process leading to the uprising can be traced to historical and contemporary as well as more recent developments in and around Kashmir.

It has been argued in the thesis that an infrastructure of a separate identity of Kashmir could be traced to the history, cultural and religious traditions of Kashmir. At the time of partition, the élites deflected this identity into an Indian identity because of their ideological leanings and by the exigencies of the circumstances. A notable aspect of this Indian identity was its rather narrow base confined to the the local élites. From Sheikh Abdullah down to Farooq Abdullah, all local Muslim élites suffered from an identity crisis. Sheikh Abdullah, in particular, was at times too much Kashmiri to the Indians but at others, he was too much Indian to the Kashmiris. A second characteristics of Kashmir's tenuous links with India originates from the extraordinary circumstances of its accession to India and the conflict that followed. The dust did not settle and the process of integration did not take a root. Such tenuous links distinguished Kashmir from any other Indian states even if some of them witnessed more severe forms of secessionist insurgency. Thus, over these years, through political, constitutional, cultural and socio-economic estrangement, the alienation became deeper and at the same time, the local élites became discredited. Once the moderate and mediatory elements were eliminated, the deluge became sudden and Kashmiri youths were catapulted to a position of being the only credible Kashmiri elements.

A second and more critical element of the transformation has been ideological in nature.

The goal of self-determination in two possible routes – an Islamic route and a secular route – not only has reactivated the old conflict, but also has made the conflict devastatingly intractable. Initially the conflict was mainly ideological in nature. The territorial dimension was latent but soon it came to the foreground when the combatants began holding on to their respective battle gains and at the same time evict each other from its occupied territory through diplomacy. The militancy has reactivated and reinforced the ideological dimension. Thus, the militancy and the old conflict combines two most potent sources of conflict – ideology and territoriality. The new ideological elements need to be understood in their proper perspective. The goal of separatism has an element of secularism in that one of the top two militant groups – the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – upholds the cause of a secular and multi-religious society in Kashmir. Theoretically such a goal should have been best realised within the Indian Union. This also could have been a talking point between New Delhi and the JKLF. Yet, such attempts on the part of New Delhi to arrive at an understanding with the JKLF have proved elusive over the last more than two years. Thus, the Kashmiri goal of secularism outstrips the Indian ideology of secularism.

Similar has been the challenge for Pakistan. First, the demand for the right of self-determination the Kashmiris has enhanced Pakistan's position significantly. So long India had countered the Pakistani position by saying that Pakistan demand for a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN based on UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan) resolution of August 13, 1948 was outdated. Kashmir was claimed to be an integral part of India by virtue of the accession of the *Maharaja*. India also seemed to have been able to present Pakistan with a *fait accompli* on the ground that by participating in a number of elections at national and state levels the Kashmiris had exercised right of self-determination and decided their future. It also seemed that the Simla framework gained some legitimacy in international sphere as a means of settling all disputes including Kashmir bilaterally. However, the Kashmiri uprising has proved that the Kashmiris were yet to exercise their right of self-determination and the conflict is far from being settled. A visible support for Pakistan in the uprising also vindicates largely Pakistan's position. However, the eventual goal of the Kashmiri militancy is still murky,

the *Hizbul Mujahedin's* asserted goal of secession and accession to Pakistan notwithstanding. The point that we want to make here is that the Kashmiris by demanding complete separation from India, with the eventual goal of the militancy remaining unclear, have outpaced Pakistan in its limited interpretation of the concept of self-determination.¹⁶ A second aspect of the dilemma for Pakistan arises out of the Islamic dimension of the present uprising. As the uprising has a strong Islamic element, it has no doubt, added to Pakistan's traditional ideological stand that a plebiscite in Kashmir would accomplish an unfinished business of the partition of 1947. The Islamic element also has enhanced Pakistan's leverage over the conflict actors in Kashmir compared to its position in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet again, the orthodox Islamic dimension of the ideology of the militancy outpaces the Islamic element within the polity of Pakistan, notwithstanding its own avowed goal of Islamisation.

The conflict, in turn, presents a complex web, without the participants' knowing how to untangle it. One, for instance, is not sure about the locus of the leadership and the parameters of a negotiated solution. The lack of clarity intensifies the dilemma of Pakistan because, it has been helping all the militants, more or less. However, the ideological goal of the JKLF, that is a sovereign and united Kashmir, has or is likely to have, a wider appeal among the Kashmiris. Such a goal has serious implications for Pakistan's territorial integrity. On the other hand, Pakistan cannot afford to lose control over the JKLF by allowing it to enter into an understanding with the Indian Government.

As to India, it is still in control of the situation through military force. However, the single mindedness of the militants with respect to the minimum common goal of separation is the biggest challenge. Virtually no one among the Kashmiris, excepting the Hindus and the Buddhists, is in favour of India. In Kashmir, India is being guided by the 'reason of the state', so that no matter what the cost is, Kashmir will not be allowed to secede. Moreover, there is a strong national consensus among the Indians on this goal. This itself puts a limit to any

¹⁶ Pakistan has been arguing that the right of self-determination should be within the framework of the UN resolutions of 1948 which envisaged the holding of a plebiscite under the UN auspices to decide Kashmir's accession to India or Pakistan.

concession to the militants.¹⁷ One can argue, how long can India sustain its high-pitched counter-insurgency, given the scale and unabated nature of militancy and the rather porous and ubiquitous nature of the LAC that demarcates the two Kashmirs? With India's vast military might and its seasoned counter-insurgency experience, this question is still academic. How long, however, will it remain so is open to question, knowing that the whole Muslim population in Kashmir is alienated and continuation of military control will drive the Kashmiris to further militancy. There has been virtually no progress towards a peaceful settlement with the militants, despite several abortive attempts.¹⁸

The militants face no less a dilemma. Even if complete independence be their eventual goal, it is debatable if they can ignore the regional geopolitics, especially given the landlocked yet strategically important location of Kashmir. This may not sound logical and rational to the Kashmiris, but it is a reality that both India and Pakistan had made immense investments in Kashmir in terms of material, human and emotional resources over these decades. Both of them are against the independence of Kashmir. Of course, all the three have their respective veto powers. This means that any solution in Kashmir has to be consensual on a tripartite basis. Is there any ground where the three may have some commonality as well? We shall follow this up toward the end. Before that, the key empirical and theoretical achievements of the thesis may be highlighted.

10.2 The Substance of the Findings

The thesis provides a unified analysis of protractedness – including the origin, persistence, flare ups and transformation – of the Kashmir conflict which remains intractable for about last five decades. The key variables employed to unpack intractability have been the potency of issues and the process through which linkage and feedbacks between conflicts and events take place. In

¹⁷ See, in this context, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Limits of Consensus Politics", *Economic and Political Weekly*, April 7, 1990 : 699-701. See, also "Trapped in National Consensus", *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 5-12, 1990 : 969.

¹⁸ See, *India Today*, May 31, 1993 : 39.

the context of the salient issue of Hindu-Muslim rivalry, it has been observed that co-existing issues and actors of lesser potency tended to coalesce and polarise around this issue making it further salient over time.¹⁹ The Hindu-Muslim rivalry, and later the secular versus religious ideological rivalry provided a rallying point around which sub-conflicts and sub-national communal actors aligned in the context of the accession of the Princely state of Kashmir. Once the conflict began, the issue of contention was refined and redefined by the actors over a prolonged period and it did not die down or subside. It was resilient enough to undergo transformation and rally newer sets of forces around it. While such transformation may open new opportunities of resolution of the protracted conflict, the interaction between the new elements and the old ones has added fresh dose of intractability. Thus the twin factors, a coagulation of the issue of conflict, on the one hand, and the process of its feedback and linkages with others, on the other, provide the key explanation of protractedness in the Kashmir conflict, 1947-1990.

The achievement of the thesis lies not so much in revelation of new fact or in any attempt to bring in new evidence to reinforce or contradict the existing scholarship on the Kashmir problem. The thesis makes more substantive contribution in two related areas. Firstly, in a situation where bulk of the scholarship on Kashmir, and for that matter, on most of the Subcontinental issues are characterised by polemics and partisanship, the event-centric framework of focusing on interactions among issues, actors and conflict environment provided an alternative approach to an analysis of intractable conflicts like that on Kashmir. Secondly, the empirical discussions and findings of the thesis provided a re-interpretation of many of the crucial events in the prolonged course of the conflict. The research can be carried forward in the context of either Kashmir with a view to generating more insights that may eventually change the rigid mind-set of the antagonists, or other conflicts to enhance the level of understanding of intractability of these conflicts. It is hoped that cumulation of knowledge in the field will enhance the predictive capability with respect to the likely course in a continuing PIC.

¹⁹ See, Section 4.2 in Chapter IV.

As a continuation of the second contribution the thesis has highlighted the intricacies of the PIC, which if overlooked or read differently might colour the vision and complicate conflict resolution attempts. The thesis also underscores the seriousness and intractability of the continuing conflict in all its gravity. The triangular dimension of the conflict has rendered it further intractable, but at the same time, for a just solution it is also important that the voice of the third party be heard. The greater hurdle now in the path of a resolution of the conflict lies in continuing the traditional territorial approach of the old combatants. This point has been amply in the discussion of the thesis. Besides, in view of the fact that the Kashmir conflict has traditionally provided the hub around which India-Pakistan relations revolved, the present analysis covering the period 1947-1990 also provides a better vantage point of observing the twin flow of conflicts and cooperation in India-Pakistan relations and their net impact on the state of bilateral relations.

To put the findings of the study in perspective, the experience of the research may briefly be touched. It was rather a difficult job in putting the protracted, and at the same time, meandering and apparently diverse course of the conflict in a single frame of analysis. It may have appeared at times, especially in the context of the second flare up of 1965, that the event-centric analytical frame was less visible while the actor-centric decisional variables were more in force. However, it would be seen that the emphasis was on the underlying process which linked several stimulants and forces to Pakistan's unilateral decision to send infiltrators in Kashmir. Likewise, in the post-Tashkent period until the recent uprising of 1989-90, the continuity of the conflict within the concept of PIC might be in question. This we have tackled again taking a closer look at the India-Pakistan bilateral relations than what a cursory observation would have revealed. The continuity has been explained in terms of two processes. First, it has been argued that in the bilateral process in which the visibility of the conflict was reduced, but because of the salience of Kashmir in the texture of India-Pakistan relations, the conflict did not die down. Rather it was very much near the surface and continued to upset the achievement in cooperative process apparently set in motion by the Simla Agreement of 1972. Second and more important was an

internal route the idea of which has been borrowed and adapted from Lamb.²⁰ However, in doing so, the idea that we have developed, that is, conflict branches out and manifests itself through alternative channels in situation of prolonged stalemate has not only provided an analytical artifact, it has also furnished deeper insights about intricate conflict behaviour. This also lends credence to the argument that a conflict, as protracted and intractable as Kashmir cannot just subside without conscious efforts at solving them.

What message can be drawn from the discussion on the protracted conflicts? The message may be deduced from our epistemological position that protractedness is a concatenation of both issues and the processes through which it is linked with other issues, conflicts and actors. Thus, the root cause of the conflict has to be addressed directly and decisively. Left to itself, the conflict will coagulate itself adding to its own propensity to link with other issues. Thus, any expectation that the conflict itself will subside may not come true. A protracted conflict involves an issue or issues that only attains gravity over time. Because the basic issue of contention is a specific problem needing specific and explicit solution. Going around the issue does not solve it, rather postpones a bigger conflict. Thus, waiting for an opportune moment or the right kind of atmosphere to be created, confidence to be built to approach the problem does not seem to be appropriate. These measures to create a congenial atmosphere may actually accompany a conflict resolution measure aimed at solving the basic problem. No matter what other steps are taken to improve the bilateral relations, the malignant cancer will only eat them up. Other measures may help managing the conflict, but it is also the other name of nurturing the conflict to enable it branch out to new areas and to assume a gigantic stature in course of time.

The essence of the framework of analysis can be applied to a wide variety of conflictual situations. The basic assumption that events are interlinked provides a useful starting point of an analysis of conflicts which are in essence an outcome of prior conflicts and disputes. The accompanying interactional analytical frame also likewise accounts for the role of different forces

²⁰ We are talking about the tit-for-tat policy which found its origin in Kashmir in the 1960s and returned to Kashmir in the late 1980s. Lamb, however, stopped at 1971 in the birth of Bangladesh. See, Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertfordshire : Roxford Books) 1991 : 279-97.

that come to impinge on the conflict. The specific theoretical propositions of the thesis also provide useful guide for enquiry into similar conflicts. Some specific areas of research are suggested below.

10.3 Further Research in Protracted International Conflicts

Two areas of further research in protracted conflicts may be identified immediately. One area concerns the timing and nature of intervention in conflict resolution.²¹ The idea, sharpened by the finding of the thesis, is based on the accepted wisdom of prevention and averting rather than confronting and curing. In any historical or retrospective analysis, one comes across, as we did in the context of Kashmir conflict, many missed opportunities. Can this type of analysis provide useful clues for deciding the timing of intervention rather than depending on mere using intuition and foresight? On the basis of the findings of this study, the researcher believes that a comparative study of a successfully mediated conflict and an unsuccessfully mediated conflict could generate a body of knowledge which can be used to lay down a set of normative propositions as guidelines for detecting an opportune moment. Careful observation of changes in position of the parties, the circumstances in which a new issue or actor links up and the like in both conflicts might be instructive. Even the furnishing of a clear evidence of the rising opportunity cost of not making a timely concession serves a useful purpose of alerting the decision makers and mediators. Of course, there are subtleties need to be taken into consideration. There is a concept of 'ripeness' of conflict, which means, *inter alia*, that a concession, unless justified by the gravity of the situation, may cost the regime or the decision maker its position.²² These are the matters about which deeper insights may be obtained from comparative case study of different types of protracted conflicts.

²¹ For similar works, see, Louis Kriesberg and Stuart Thorson (eds.), *Timing for Conflict Deescalation* (Syracuse, NY : Syracuse University Press) 1992. Another dated but related work has been Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars : A Strategy for the 1970s* (London : Allen Lane the Penguin Press) 1969.

²² See, I. W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution : Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York : Oxford University) 1989 : 266-73.

The second area concerns the replicability of the framework in the context of other prolonged conflicts in the region and beyond. One conflict that readily comes to the mind is the Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The Tamil conflict had been an internal secessionist ethnic insurgency in northern and eastern Sri Lanka which came to the fore in July 1983. At about the same time, the conflict began to be internationalised with the involvement of India in the twin roles of an 'honest broker' and a sympathiser, to say the least, to the Tamil militants. In the Sri Lankan perception, India's role was one of training and arming the Tamil militants, and thus, was set against the territorial integrity of the island state. The spectre of a united Tamil land for 50 million Tamils across the Palk Straits also haunted the Sinhalese mind. India, on the other hand, was concerned about the safety and the security of the Tamils, with whom the Tamils in Tamil Nadu have strong ethnic bonds. More important in Indian perceptions were the security concerns in the event Sri Lanka would involve extra-regional powers in the backwaters of India, and there was some visible signs of that concern.²³ Thus, for all the parties to the conflict, ontological issues were involved. India had its predominant security concerns to enter into the Sri Lankan imbroglio. Through the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 an immediate threat to the Sri Lankan territorial integrity was possibly averted, but other than that, neither the Tamil cause nor that of a satisfactory resolution of the conflict was served. One area of interest could be observing the transformation of India's role from a mediator to a direct party in conflict in a twist of events that poised it first fighting the Tamils along side the Sri Lankan forces, and in yet another twist, against both the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan forces, the latter two having entered into a marriage of convenience. Broadly speaking, the Tamil ethnic conflict followed an inside-outward-inward course, compared to an outside-inward-cum-outward in the case of the Kashmir conflict.²⁴ A comparative study of the courses of these two conflicts would be instructive in identifying the phases or points of successful intervention either by the involved parties or by a

²³ The reported attempts by Sri Lanka to lease out the Trincomalee naval harbour and communication facilities in the Katunaike Airport are examples.

²⁴ Meaning, the Tamil conflict became internationalised from its principally internal phase and in 1990, again it became internalised following the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The Kashmir conflict, on the other hand, started as a bilateral conflict, but in its transformation, it has attained an internalised dimension, yet retained the bilateral dimension.

third party.

In course of developing the thesis, the researcher also caught glimpses of some other promising areas of research. One such area, hitherto unexplored yet remaining a problematic of the contemporary international system, is the phenomenon of interlocking conflicts, in which a complex of several conflicts co-exists in a manner that stimuli to one would be felt in others. In the light of the findings of this study, it would be interesting to see, if the individual conflicts in the complex are homogeneous in transmission of stimuli so that both negative as well as positive signals are transmitted more or less to every point. One such complex, in the view of the researcher, is the Horn of Africa, which may be studied in a comparative perspective of South Asia. At a cursory level, it seems conflicts in the Horn are more interlocked than in South Asia.

The researcher is also interested in observing how the interactions between two opposite but simultaneous flows of conflicts and cooperation take place and how the net result exerts its influence on the direction of bilateral relations. It is his hunch, based on the limited scope of such observation in the thesis, that the pattern of interactions would follow roughly the route of a 'trade cycle', to use a macro-economic terminology, in which the opposite streams mark short-term ups and downs, and at the same time, set the limits of long term growth.

10.4 Future Scenarios for Kashmir

We consider two broad scenarios, first, a conflict scenario in which the conflict parties will be left to themselves and they will fight it out in their own ways, and second, a scenario of peace, in which the parties involved resolve the conflict or arrive at some modicum of a settlement. The two scenarios, are not, however, discrete and mutually exclusive. In reality, we may observe a mixture of both rather than all conflictual or a complete resolution of the conflict. The conflict scenario is based the assumption that India and Pakistan will not be able to come out of the historical mind-set in the foreseeable future. Secondly, an almost total and mutual alienation has developed in New Delhi-Srinagar relations. The Kashmiris will continue to bear the legacy of New Delhi's suspicion. New Delhi's credibility, likewise, in Srinagar stands discounted and any

cosmetic change from New Delhi will not heal the breach. The implication of the second assumption is that any rise in violence on the part of the militants will lead to a spiralling of violence. Taking the first assumption into consideration, a rise of violence, in turn, will raise tempers in Pakistan and thus, the level of interference from Pakistan will also increase. Thirdly, the present configuration of the parties will continue and no breakthrough, for example, an India-JKLF link up, and for that matter, in the Islamabad-JKLF rift, will not emerge in the near future. This assumption concerns the continuity of the present state of lack of clarity in the militancy, which at times will put a check on polarisation of forces, but at others, will add to violence, or at least, will ensure a persistent level of tensions and hostilities.

The scenario of peace is based on the following assumptions. Firstly, positive aspects of the post-Cold War era will prevail. In the post-Cold War era several new independent countries have emerged, and a number of intractable conflicts have become tractable, the latest being the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the West Bank and Gaza. Secondly, both India and Pakistan realise the futility of conflict and will reinforce the normalisation process that was initiated in the 1980. Thirdly, none of the three sides will overlook the overriding security concerns of the other two. While it will be observed that the assumptions are essential for a peace scenario, and they are the most optimistic one can bank on, all of them are indeed based on tenuous grounds. There is yet to be a basis for peace talks. The conflict is trilateral, yet, it has still to be formulated as such. The only peace talks that both the JKLF and *Hizbul Mujahedin* are agreeable to individually are unconditional tripartite talks in Geneva or at a neutral place under the auspices of the UN. New Delhi is agreeable to talks with the militants within the framework of an Indian Union. It is highly unlikely that a common ground will be found soon. India-Pakistan talks, insofar as resolution of the Kashmir problem is concerned are far from a meeting of minds.

The militants' Islamic label will discount their international standing. A scenario could be a PLO-Israel type agreement over the head of the Kashmiri militants. The probability is high because it might find a ready recognition from the international community. A scenario in which the militancy is headed off and the moderate section being coopted to cooperate with New Delhi

is also difficult to visualise. However, if India offers an unconditional and unadulterated version of Article 370 plus a confederal relationship, it might put the militants off balance because some of the remaining moderate elements and the common people might be attracted by it. The Kashmiri tourism industry, the backbone of its economy is almost ruined. The second most important activity, handicrafts and woollen products are also connected with tourism. Of course, such an offer of maximum autonomy is unlikely to come until there is a clear indication that the decisive section of the Kashmiris will buy it, because otherwise, the Indian authority will find it extremely difficult to break the barrier of a negative consensus among the Indians, thanks also to rise of the Hindu extremist parties, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In view of this, a long haul for peace remains ahead.

The thesis, thus, is constrained to end on a problematic tone. It need not, however, be all pessimistic, because there is a growing realisation in both India and Pakistan that war will not solve the problem, and the rights of the Kashmiris promised to them have long been neglected. Before we end, however, it will be pertinent to provide an inventory of the various proposals for solution of the Kashmir problem that have been available from time to time. The idea is to highlight the implications of different proposals for the parties. It is also our purpose to underscore the point that it is not impossible to evolve a formula that can take care of the essence of the points of view of all the parties.

An Overall Plebiscite

An overall plebiscite in the Jammu and Kashmir state to decide its future either with India or Pakistan has been the original proposal agreed to by both India and Pakistan, and later formalised by the UN in UN Security Council and UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan). Yet this could not be implemented because India and Pakistan could not agree on two vital preliminaries, namely, troops withdrawal or demilitarisation, and ensuring a fair and impartial plebiscite under the supervision of a neutral administration. In the 1950s, India resisted any attempt to hold a plebiscite on the ground that situation had changed and a plebiscite would

destabilise the state as well as the Indian polity through communal convulsions. The basic problem was that the Kashmir state, especially, the Kashmir Valley, was too valuable to put to the gambling of a voting.

Pakistan is still insistent on an overall plebiscite. The present militancy justifies Pakistan's position that the Kashmir problem is far solved. The *Hizbul Mujahedin*, currently the strongest of the militants supports Pakistan's idea. However, opinion in Kashmir is clearly divided, as the oldest and one of the top popular militant groups is in favour of complete independence. It is open to question if the conditions stipulated in the UN resolutions can be ensured for holding an overall plebiscite.

Restoration of Article 370 of the Constitution of the Indian Union

Restoration of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution is an option for conferring maximum possible autonomy to the Jammu and Kashmir State within the framework of the Indian Union. It is highly unlikely that the Indian Government will be able to offer the type of guarantee clause that would be acceptable to the Kashmiris, in view of their bitter experience with Article 370. Given the extreme degree to which alienation of the Kashmiris from the Indian Union has been carried to, this is possibly the best that India can expect. Many Kashmiris, especially the fence-sitters also might be tempted by it. But it does not take care of the bilateral dimension of the conflict involving Pakistan.

A Plebiscite with a Third Option

The 'third option', means the option of independence be added to the two options of joining either India or Pakistan.²⁵ This formula had been favoured by the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah, it may be recalled. This position is now only favoured by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). To both India and Pakistan, this option is worse than a two-option plebiscite.

²⁵ See, M.H. Askari, "Kashmir : the Third Option", *Dawn*, February 26, 1992.

Partition and Limited and Deferred Plebiscite

This limited plebiscite is basically a modification of the Dixon plan. An outline of the plan has been offered by Prof. Cheema of Pakistan. According to him :

Azad Kashmir and Baltistan should stay with Pakistan. Jammu and Ladakh should go to India. The Kashmir Valley should be put under trusteeship for at least a decade or even more in keeping with the dictates of the situation with a view to prepare the Valley for eventual plebiscite.²⁶

It seems Pakistan will be agreeable to such a plan but presently at least it is completely unacceptable to India, as had been in the context of allowing a neutral authority to take over the administration of Kashmir to ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite. For the militants, it may at best be a Hobson's choice.

Confederation or India-Pakistani Condominium

The idea of a confederation is equally old, first floated by Nehru in 1964, and rejected by Pakistan out of hand. In the Pakistani perceptions this has been a proposal a big problem for solving a smaller one. Recently, General Sundarji, the energetic former Army Chief of India, advocated such a plan.²⁷ As a confederation will include some constitutional relations between India and Pakistan, the latter will reject such a proposal, as it had done in the past. The idea of condominium also involves a joint approach but it is substantively different from a confederation in that no constitutional relationship between the two is needed. It would involve a joint administration of Kashmir. Between these two, the former will be preferable to India but the latter to Pakistan. Militants, of course, will reject both.

Two-Tier Federation

This proposal comes from moderate Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), those who feel that the Kashmiris have been the greatest sufferers of the India-Pakistani conflict. They view Kashmir as a human problem and the LAC as an artificial line. Pending a

²⁶ See, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "A Solution for Kashmir Dispute?", *Regional Studies*, 4(4), Autumn 1986 : 12.

²⁷ See, *India Today*, August 31, 1986 : 86.

negotiated settlement, the border should be opened facilitating communication on both sides, so that families may be united. Recently, a proposal in similar vein has been offered by a liberal scholar in New Delhi, B.G. Verghese. He suggests that "both India and Pakistan vest their respective parts of J & K with greater autonomy as might be negotiated separately by the local people with their respective metropolitan government and then permit the two units to federate around the devolved subjects with regional autonomy within each as desired, as for Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh on the Indian side and POK, the Northern Territories and Gilgit within Pakistan. ... The idea may appear complex at first but is perfectly practicable with both India and Pakistan treating J & K as a demilitarized zone of peace while safeguarding its external frontiers. Nationals of each country would have full access to all of Greater J & K."²⁸ However, as Verghese himself admits, such an intricate is impracticable in the prevailing political atmosphere.

Guaranteed Sovereignty or Sovereignty-Association

The idea of 'sovereignty association' is not new though semantically it is new.²⁹ The idea is based on the reality of the regional power configuration and the security paranoia of both India and Pakistan. Yet at the same time, it recognises the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris with a *united independent Kashmir* at the core of the proposal. To quote Jalal :

Given a measure of flexibility, the fears and the interests of the two main regional powers can be accommodated within the political framework for a reunited and independent Kashmir. The arrangement would be based on "sovereignty-association" with both India and Pakistan. This notion differs in essentials from the idea of an Indo-Pakistan condominium over Kashmir, which negates the right of Kashmiri self-determination. It is also at complete variance with the concept of a loose federation between India, Pakistan, and Kashmir, which overlooks the great variations in the composition and characteristics of these three political entities.³⁰

The essence of what Jalal means is this. First, the principle of self-determination will have to be extended to the Kashmiris - Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists alike. Secondly, there will be an "imaginative interpretation" of sovereignty in a relative perspective which "may lead to the notion

²⁸ See, B. G. Verghese, "New Mood in Kashmir", *Indian Express*, July 12, 1991.

²⁹ The idea of sovereignty association has been advanced by Ayesha Jalal in "Kashmir Scars", *The New Republic* July 23, 1990 : 19-20.

³⁰ See, *ibid* : 19.

of layers of sovereignty, and enable the much needed reconciliation of power with principle, of authority with freedom."³¹ With regard to operationalisation, Jalal advocates for a two-stage plebiscite or referendum. In the first round, people in Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side will vote mainly on two options : union with India or independence, with possible union with Azad Kashmir. If a "free and fair vote is cast", their right of self-determination will have been exercised. In the event of majority voting for independence, union with India stands annulled. However, if Hindu-majority Jammu and Buddhist majority vote overwhelmingly in favour of union with India despite the overall majority for independence, then they should be allowed to remain with India.³² In the event of Kashmir (more appropriately, the Kashmir Valley's) deciding in favour of independence, Azad Kashmiris should be allowed to vote on similar principles, that is, union with Pakistan or independence. If the decision is in favour of independence, then both Kashmirs will be united and the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir will decide on what terms to be associated with the regional powers. Kashmir will be demilitarised, but for security reason, India may have a limited military presence in Ladakh, and Pakistan, in the Afghan borders.³³ The proposal accommodates the principle of partition, the third option, guaranteed sovereignty and the regional powers' security considerations.

Of this, the last one seems acceptable to the Kashmiris, they will have to make the least concession, but both India and Pakistan will have to make tremendous concessions. However, as has been pointed out in this concluding chapter, Kashmir has been an old conflict, but new realities have emerged. Unless they are recognised and acted upon, all the three parties who are locked in Kashmir, will continue to bleed.

³¹ See, *ibid* : 20.

³² See, *ibid* : 20.

³³ See, *Ibid* : 20.

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Memorandum Embodying the Clarification Given by Mr. A. Lozano on the Commission's Proposals of December 11, 1948

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Letter from the UN Representative F. P. Graham to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, September 7, 1951(S/2375 Annex 2)

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, November 10, 1951(S/2392)

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, February 21, 1987(S/ 3793)

Report Submitted by the President of the Security Council(for the Month of February) Mr. Gunnar Jarring, to the President of the Security Council, April 29, 1957(S/3821)

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, December 2, 1957(S/3922)

Report Submitted by the UN Representative for India and Pakistan to the President of the Security Council, April 28, 1958(S/3984)

Draft Resolution Submitted to the Security Council, June 22, 1962, (S/5134)[not adopted]

Report of the President of the Security Council during the Debate on the India-Pakistan Question, May 18, 1964 [which virtually closed the debate on Kashmir in the UN, although it concluded on this note : "The India-Pakistan question remains on the agenda of the Security Council".]

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Mainstream [Weekly, Calcutta]

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Economic and Political Weekly [Bombay]

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APPENDIX I

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR THE THESIS

Interviews in India and Pakistan¹

Prof. Sarwar Abbasi
Vice Chancellor
Jammu and Kashmir University
Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir

Brig(Retd) Bashir Ahmed
Director
Institute of Regional Studies
Islamabad

Prof. Kalim Bahadur
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi

Mr. B. R. Bhagat
Member, Lok Sabha,
Former Foreign Minister of India
New Delhi

Prof. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
Department of International Relations
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad

Mr. Pran Chopra
Visiting Professor
Centre for Policy Research
New Delhi

Mr. Eric Gonsalves
Director
India International Centre
Former External Affairs Secretary of India
New Delhi

Dr. Bhabani Sen Gupta
Research Professor

¹ Designation/formal identification of the interviewees as at the time of interviews conducted in Pakistan during August-September, and in India, during September-October, 1991. Names are given in an alphabetical order.

Centre for Policy Research
New Delhi

Mr. I. K. Gujral
Member, Lok Sabha,
Former Foreign Minister of India
New Delhi

Mr. Mushahid Hussain
Former Editor
The Muslim, Lahore
Currently, Free Lance Analyst

Mr. Hafiz R. Khan
Secretary
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Karachi

Dr. Shireen M. Mazari
Chairperson
Department of Defence and Strategic Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad

Prof. Khan Zaman Mirza
Director
Institute of Kashmir Studies
Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir

Prof. S.D. Muni
Chairman
Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and South-west
Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi

Mr. Niaz Naik
Chairman
Institute of Strategic Studies
Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
Islamabad

Dr. V. A. Pai Panandikar
Director
Centre for Policy Research
New Delhi

Col(Retd) Abdul Qayyum
President
Institute of Regional Studies
Islamabad

Prof M. S. Rajan
 Professor Emeritus
 School of International Studies
 Jawaharlal Nehru University
 New Delhi

Mr. T. Sreedhar Rao
 Deputy Director
 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA)
 New Delhi

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh
 Director
 IDSA, New Delhi

Mr. K. Subrahmanyam
 Defence Analyst,
 Former Director
 IDSA, New Delhi

Mr. B. G. Verghese
 Visiting Professor
 Centre for Policy Research
 New Delhi

Lt Gen(Reted) Syed Zakir Ali Zaidi
 Director General
 Institute of Strategic Studies
 Islamabad

Dr. S. M. Zaman
 Director
 National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research
 Islamabad

Other Interviews/Correspondence

Prof. Adam Curle
 London
 [Interview in 1991, London]

Dr. Omar Khalidi
 Author on Hyderabad affairs and Muslim politics in India
 [Correspondence, January 1993]

Mr. Alastair Lamb
 Herts, England
 Author of Sino-Indian Relations, Kashmir,
 Currently working on Transfer of Power
 in India

[Interview, June 1992, London]

Seminar/Group Discussion

Bangladesh Institute of International & Strategic Studies
Dhaka

Pakistan Institute of National Affairs
Lahore

Institute of Kashmir Studies
Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir

APPENDIX IIa

INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WARS IN SOUTH ASIA
1947-1980 – COW DATA

WAR(1)/PARTIES	DURATION (Months)	BATTLE CASUALTY	TYPOLGY
FIRST KASHMIR India[vs?] 1947-49	14.3	1,500	Imperial(2)
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad 1948	0.2	1,000	Imperial
SINO-INDIAN China-India 1962	1.1	1,000	Interstate
SECOND KASHMIR India-Pakistan 1965	1.6	6,800	Interstate
BANGLADESH India-Pakistan 1971	0.6	11,000	Interstate
RUSSO-AFGHAN Afghanistan-Russia 1979-80	12.4	10,500	Interstate(3)
PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR Pakistan-Bengalis 1971	8.3	50,000	Civil war
SRI LANKAN CIVIL WAR Colombo-Marxist Guerillas 1971	1.3	2000	Civil war (Guerrilla insurrection)
AFGHANISTAN Kabul-Mujahedins 1978-79	18.6	10,000	Civil War

Source: Correlates of War(COW) project data. See, Melvin Small and J. D. Singer, *Resort to Arms : International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications) 1982 : 79-80, Table 4.2 : 82-99; Tables 13.1 and 13.2 : 222-32

Notes: 1. The following extra-systemic wars have been excluded because they took place before 1947 : British- Mahratta War (1817-18); British-Sikh War(1845-48), First

British-Afghan War(1848–49); Sepoy Mutiny(1857-59) and the Second British Afghan War(1878-79).

2. The First Kashmir War, 1947-49 was an interstate war between India and Pakistan, not an imperial war.

3. The Russo-Afghan war was not an interstate war between Russia and Afghanistan.

APPENDIX IIb

INTERNATIONAL CRISES IN SOUTH ASIA 1947-85 –
ICB DATA

CRISIS/ACTORS/ DATE	TRIGGER	VIOLENCE	VALUES THREATENED
JUNAGADH India-Pakistan, 8.47–2.48	Junagadh's acceding to Pakistan	Minor clash, violence important	Territorial integrity
KASHMIR I India-Pakistan, 10.47–9.48	Tribal invasion from NWFP into Kashmir	Full-scale war, violence pre- eminent	Territorial integrity
HYDERABAD Hyderabad 8.48–8.48	UN's inability to deal with India's invasion	Minor clash, vio- lence pre-eminent	Grave damage, survival threat- ened
PUSHTUNISATN I Pushtuns, Pakistan-Afghanistan 3.49–10.50	Pakistan's militry build-up on Afghan borders	Serious clash, violence important	Ethnic bonds, territorial claims
PUNJAB WAR SCARE India-Pakistan 7.51–8.51	Pakistan moved a brigade near Punjab borders	Display of force, no violence	Territorial integrity
PUSHTUNISTAN II Afghanistan-Pakistan 3.51–11.55	Pakistan's formal integration of Pushtunistan	None	Territorial claims
GOA I Portugal 8.55–9.55	Indian volunteers (Satyagrahis) crossed into Goa and began resistance	Minor clash, minor violence	Subversion, threat to poltical system in the colony
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS I China-India 8.55–4.60	Chinese troops occupied Ladakh and Southern Tibet near McMohan Line	Minor clash, violence pre- eminent	Territorial integrity
PUSHTUNISTAN III 5.61–12.62	Afghanistan raided Pakistan territories	Serious clash, violence not important	Territorial integrity
GOA II Portugal	India invaded Goa	Minor clash, minor violence	Survival of the regime

12.61				in the colony
SINO-INDIAN II China–India 11-12.62	Chinese military thrust	Full scale war major violence	Territorial integrity	
RANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan 4.65–6.65	Mutual accusation of attacks	Serious clash, minor violence	Territorial integrity	
KASHMIR II India-Pakistan 8.65–1.66	Pakistan attacked Indian held Kashmir by sending infiltrators	Full-scale war violence pre- eminent	Territorial claims	
BANGLADESH Pakistan– Bengalis–India 3.71–12.71	Crackdown of Pakis- tani troops on Bengalis, resistance and refugees, India's role	War, violence pre-eminent	Grave damage, survival threatened	
AFGHANISTAN INVASION Pakistan-Afghanistan US-USSR 3.79–7.79	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Serious clash, violence major US–Russia global rivalry	Pakistan – threat to independence	
SOVIET THREAT TO PAKISTAN Pakistan 6.79–7.79	Verbal political	No violence	Low threat	

Source: International Crisis Behaviour(ICB) project 1930-1980, System Level Dataset, decoded from dataset available in the Minitab, University of Kent at Canterbury(UKC), courtesy, Dr. Keith Webb, Centre for Analysis of Conflict, Board of Politics and International Relations, UKC. For details of Codebook, see, Brecher and Wilkenfeld(1989).

Notes: 1. Month(s) & year(s) indicate dates of the international crisis.

2. NWFP – North West Frontier Province, which just joined Pakistan on the basis of a referendum.

APPENDIX IIc

INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA 1945-74 –
BUTTERWORTH DATA

CONFLICT/PARTIES/ DATE	ISSUES	VIOLENCE	TPOLOGY
INDIA–PAKISTAN INDEPENDENCE Hindus–Muslims–UK 1941–1947	Mode of decoloni- sation; religious vs secular basis of partition	Major non-conventional- communal violence	Colonial
ACCESSION OF KASHMIR(1) India-Pakistan 1947-49	Whether Muslim majority Kashmir ruled by Hindu ruler to join India or Pakistan, religion salient	Major military operation, conven- tional war	General Interstate
PAKHTUNISTAN (Pushtunistan) 1947–1963	Territorial and ethnicity; Afghan rejection of Durand Line border and sym- pathy for separate Pakhtun state	Several military incursions & clashes	General Interstate
INDUS CANAL WATER DISPUTE India-Pakistan 1948–1960	Sharing of common Indus waters, linked to Kashmir problem	Non-violent but display of military force by both	General Interstate
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad 1948	Accession, demand for separate status rejected by India; communist insurgency (Telengana problem)	Major military operation by India	Colonial, General Interstate(2)
FRENCH TERRI- TORIES India-France 1948–1962	India asked transfer of French territo- ries, communist problem	Minor non-military violence	Colonial
SINO–INDIAN BORDERS I India–China 1954–1960	Territorial claims and counter-claims disputed borders; (McMohan Line)	Massive military deployment, several incursions and clashes	General Inter-state
NAGA–MIZO INSURGENCY(3) India–Naga & Mizo Tribes – Pakistan	Ethnic/cultural identity autonomy, secession	Violent insurrect- ions & military operations	General Internal

1955–1972

GOA Portugal-India 1955–1961	Portugal's unwillingness to transfer its Indian colonies to India	Mobilisation & display of force & sizable military operation	Colonial
RANN OF KUTCH I India-Pakistan 1955–1964	Territorial claims & disputed borders	Display of force and minor clash	General Interstate
SINO-NEPALESE BORDERS China-Nepal 1959-1962	Border demarcation, pursuit of Tibetan rebels	Display of force incursions and minor clash	General Interstate
NEPALESE EXILES ISSUES Kathmandu-Exiles-India 1961-1962	Royal Palace coup against Nepali Congress Govt., Indian support for exiled Nepali Congress	Non-conventional non-military violence, rebel raids and uprisings	General Internal
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS II India-China 1962–1963	Continuation of territorial & border dispute	Major conventional war	General Inter-state
RANN OF KUTCH II India-Pakistan 1965–1969	Continuation of territorial disputes	Military clashes	General Interstate
KASHMIR WAR II India-Pakistan 1962–65	Deadlocks in mediations, Pakistan's frustrations, internal unrest in Kashmir	Major military operation, full-scale war	General Interstate
BANGLADESH Bengalis(East Pakistan)–Islamabad–India 1971–1974	Autonomy, liberation war, refugee, interstate issues	Non-conventional (guerilla) & conventional warfare	General Internal & Interstate
BALUCHISTAN Islamabad-Baluch Tribe 1973-1974(4)	Autonomy, linkage with Pakhtun & Kurdish problems	Insurgency & major military operation	General Internal

Source: Based on decoding of data and informal content analysis of synoptical description of conflict cases from R. L. Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflicts, 1945–74 : Data with Synposes* (Pittsburgh : Pittsburgh University) 1976

Notes: 1. The Kashmir Negotiations 1949-64(Case Nos. 047, 048) is not included in the list as a conflict, though it constituted a conflict management case in Butterworth, 1976 : 117-120

2. Hyderabad, 1948 should constitute a 'Colonial' conflict case rather than a 'General Interstate' conflict.
3. The Naga and Mizo insurgency cases have been joined as a single case.
4. The Baluch problem was a continuing conflict at the terminal year of the coding period.

APPENDIX II*d*

SERIOUS INTERSTATE DISPUTES (SID) IN SOUTH ASIA
1945-75 – MAOZ DATA

SID CASE/PARTIES(1) DATE	TYPE OF SID(2)	OUTCOME(3)	COMPATIBLE WITH
JUNAGADH DISPUTE India–Pakistan 1947	Minor-minor	Win (no war)	Butterworth ICB Kende
GOA CRISIS India–Portugal 1954	Minor-minor	Win	Butterworth ICB Kende
PUSHTUNISTAN CRISIS Afghanistan–Pakistan 1955	Minor-minor	Tie	Butterworth ICB Kende
INDO-PAKISTANI(4) India–Pakistan 1956	Minor-minor	Tie(no war)	?
INDO-PAKISTANI(4) India–Pakistan 1958	Minor-minor	Tie(no war)	?
KASHMIR DISPUTE(5) China–India 1959	Major-minor	Win	Butterworth ICB Kende
PUSHTUNISTAN Afghanistan–Pakistan 1960	Minor-minor	Lose	Butterworth ICB Kende
PRELUDE TO INDO-PAK WAR(6) Pakistan–India 1965	Minor-minor	Lose	Butterworth ICB Kende
INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR Pakistan–India 1971	Minor-minor	Lose	COW ICB Butterworth Kende

Source The sample of 9 South Asian SIDs are part of the 146 global SIDs drawn randomly from a universe generated from the COW data. For details see, Zeev Maoz, *Paths to Conflict : International Dispute Initiation, 1865-1976* (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press) : 233-46

- Notes:
1. First party is the initiator of the SID against the second party.
 2. Type of SID follows from the combination of the initiator and target depending on respective power status as in Cox-Jacobson scale. For details, see, Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven : Yale University Press) 1973.
 3. Outcome signifies the initiator's perspective.
 4. India-Pakistan 1956 refers to the Rann of Kutch I, in Butterworth. However, there was no significant military incidents between India and Pakistan in 1958, other than perhaps building up of tensions over deadlocks in Kashmir negotiations.
 5. To be precise, this is a SID between India and China in the Ladakh-Tibetan sector, as a prelude to the 1962 Sino-Indian border wars. Designating it as a Kashmir dispute is confusing.
 6. This SID refers to the Rann of Kutch war between India and Pakistan, which was distinct from the Kashmir war of 1965. Of course, the two wars were linked.

APPENDIX IIe
 LOCAL WARS IN SOUTH ASIA 1945-1976 –
 KENDE'S DATA

LOCAL WAR/PARTIES DATE	ISSUES/TYPLOGY	COMPATIBLE WITH
INDIA-PAKISTAN Hindus-Muslims 1946-47	Religious; Internal Tribal, with foreign participation(2)	BW(1)
HYDERABAD India-Hyderabad 1947-48	Internal anti-regime, without foreign participation	BW ICB(3)
KASHMIR I India-Pakistan 1947-48	Frontier war with foreign participation(4)	COW BW ICB, SID(5)
NAGA INSURGENCY Delhi-Naga Tribe 1956-64	Internal tribal, without foreign participation(6)	BW
NEPALESE ROYAL PALACE COUP Kathmandu-Nepali Congress, 1961-62	Internal anti-regime, without foreign participation(7)	BW
GOA India-Portugal 1961	Internal tribal, with foreign participation	ICB BW SID
SINO-INDIAN India-China 1962	Frontier war, without foreign participation	COW, ICB BW, SID
RANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan 1965	Frontier war without foreign participation	ICB BW SID
KASHMIR II India-Pakistan 1965	Frontier war without foreign participation	COW ICB SID
MIZO UPRISING Delhi-Mizo Tribe 1966-67	Internal tribal, without foreign participation(8)	BW
BANGLADESH Islamabad-Bengalis 1971	Internal tribal, war with foreign participation	COW ICB BW, SID

LEFTIST INSURRECTION IN SRI LANKA Colombo-JVP(9) 1971	Internal anti-regime war without foreign participation	ICB
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Source : Local wars 1945-76, in Istvan Kende, "Wars in Ten years (1967-1976)", *Journal of Peace Research*, 15(3), 1978 : 327-41.

- Notes:
1. Butterworth's criteria of international conflicts are :(i) specific power political aims and demands and, (ii) focused on political and security affairs in international perception. See, Butterworth(1976).
 2. Kende considered war being fought between tribes, ethnic and religious groups, for separation of certain territories or for a certain degree of autonomy, as 'tribal war'.
 3. ICB criteria(See Appendix IIb) for international crises are three-fold : threat to basic values, finite time for response, and the likelihood of involvement in military hostility. See, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1982) : 381-417.
 4. It is not clear what Kende meant by 'foreign participation', because there was no significant foreign participation in the 1947-49 Kashmir war.
 5. Serious Interstate Dispute (SID) is a set of interactions among states involving the explicit, overt, and government directed threat, display or use of force in short temporal intervals. List of SIDs in South Asia are presented in Appendix Id. For details, see, Zeev Maoz(1982).
 6. There was some foreign participation in the insurgency from the Chinese and the Pakistani sides.
 7. There was some Indian involvement in terms of moral and material help to the rebel Nepali Congress.
 8. The Mizoes, like the Nagas, received some foreign assistance.
 9. Janata Vimukti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front). The insurrection was quelled with military assistance from India and other countries.

APPENDIX III

CANDIDATE CASES OF SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, 1947-90

CONFLICT/ PARTIES/DATE	ISSUES	HOSTILE INTERACTIONS	COMPATIBLE WITH(1)
INDIA–PAKISTAN INDEPENDENCE Britain–Congress– Muslim League 1946–47	Secular vs religious nationalism; united vs partitioned India	Major non-conven- tional communal violence, approx. death 800,000(2)	BW Kende
JUNAGADH'S ACCESSION– JNGDH State– India-Pakistan 1947-65	Accession of Hindu- majority, Muslim ruled Princely state to Pakistan, opposed by India, prelude to Kashmir	Clashes between JNGDH & neighbouring states; 'display' of force by by Pakistan; military occupation by India(3)	BW ICB Kende SID IC[PS]
KASHMIR – ACCESSION & PLEBISCITE India-Pakistan 1947-65	Accession of Muslim majority & Hindu ruled Kashmir to India, opposed by Pakistan; India's unwillingness to hold plebiscite on Kashmir's status	tribal invasion from NWFP; Indian troops clashed with tribals, and Pakistani troops, two conventional wars	COW BW ICB SID Kende IC[PS](4)
HYDERABAD Hyderabad (Princely state)– India 1948	India not accepting separate status of the Hindu majority Muslim ruled state	Minor communist insurgency followed by Indian military operation(5)	COW ICB BW SID, Kende IC[PS]
INDUS CANAL WATER DISPUTE India–Pakistan 1948–60	Sharing of waters of common rivers; linked to Kashmir conflict	Basically non-military & non-violent hostile interactions; brief display of force, resolved by WB mediations(6)	BW ICB SID(nc)
FRENCH TERRITO- RIES IN INDIA India–France 1948–62	Transfer of French colonies to India; communist insurgency	Minor non-military violence, mutually resolved	BW
PAKHTUNISTAN Pakistan–Afghanistan 1949–63	Ethnic autonomy for the Pakhtuns; disputed Durand Line borders	Several military incursions & clashes	ICB BW Kende SID, IC[PS](7)

GOA Portugal-India 1955-61(8)	Portugal unwilling to cede colonies- Goa, Daman & Diu to India	Local violence, display of force by both sides, sizable military operation by India	BW ICB Kende SID IC[PS]
NAGA INSURGENCY Indian Govt-Naga Tribal Insurgents 1955-64	Ethnic identity- regional autonomy; secession, external links	Violent guerrilla campaigns and counter- insurgency measures by Indian troops	COW(nc) BW Kende IC[PS]
RANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan 1955-65(9)	Disputed borders and territorial claims	Military incursions & clashes ending in near full-scale war	BW ICB, Kende SID, IC[PS]
SINO-INDIAN BORDERS China-India 1959-62	Disputed borders, Macmahon Line- territorial claims	Military incursions & clashes ending in full-scale conventional war	COW, BW ICB, Kende SID IC[PS]
SINO-NEPALESE BORDERS China-Nepal 1959-61	Undemarcated borders, hot pursuit of Tibetan rebels inside Nepalese territories	Display of force incursions & minor military clashes	BW Kende(nc) SID(nc) IC[PS](10)
NEPALESE EXILES Nepalese Govt.- Exiled Nepali Congress-(India) 1960-61	Internal anti-regime rebellion; monarchy vs democracy; covert Indian assistance	Violent armed rebellion & Govt violent response(11)	BW Kende
MIZO INSURGENCY Indian Govt-Mizo Insurgents 1964-72	Ethnic identity, regional autonomy, secession	Violent guerrilla activities with covert help from Pakistan; Govt counter-insurgency measures	COW(nc), BW Kende IC[PS]
BANGLADESH INDEPENDENCE Pakistan Govt- Bangladesh Libera- tion Forces-India 1971	Autonomy movement, secessionist turn, Bengali refugees to India, interstate power rivalry	Non-conventional guerrilla and conventional full-scale war	COW, BW ICB Kende SID IC[PS]
CEYLON LEFTIST INSURRECTION Colombo regime- Leftist Guerrillas 1971	Internal anti-regime leftist insurrection by JVP(12)	Major armed insurr- ection lasting five weeks, quelled with external military assistance	COW, Kende ICB(nc)
BALUCH INSURGENCY PAK Govt.-Baluch- Insurgents	Ethnic identity and autonomy, linked to the Pakhtun & Kurdish problem(13)	Armed insurgency, major counter-insur- gency operation by Bhutto regime	COW(nc), BW Kende(nc) IC[PS]

(Iran & Iraq)
on opposite sides
1973–78

TIN BIGHA CORRIDOR India-Bangladesh 1975–90	Treaty non-compliance by India in handing over corridor for access to enclaves	Non military, non- violent tensions, diplomatic tussles	BW(nct)
INDO-BANGLADESH GANGES WATER DISPUTE India-Bangladesh 1977–90	Resource sharing, use of common rivers, linked to other bilateral issues	Non-military, non- violent but heightened tensions	BW(nct)
SOUTH TALPATTY ISLAND India-Bangladesh 1978–82–	Maritime boundary demarcation, territorial dispute over new island in the Bay of Bengal	Display of force– naval ships by India(14)	BW(nc) SID(nc)
MUHRIR CHAR India-Bangladesh 1979–85	Boundary demarcation of border rivers, territorial dispute	Clashes between paramilitary forces(15)	BW(nct) SID(nc)
AFGHANISTAN Russia–Mujahedins– Pakistan–USA 1979–89(16)	Foreign military, intervention, anti- regime war, refugees to Pakistan	Major military operations in protract- ed conventional & non-conventional warfare	COW, BW ICB, SID Kende IC[PS]
CHAKMA INSURGENCY Dhaka-Chakmas & other Hill Tribes– (India) 1980–90	Ethnic identity– autonomy; repatriation of tribal refugees from India, training & other support to the insurgents	Armed insurgency & counter-insurgency	BW(nct) Kende(nct) IC[PS](17)
ASSAM PROBLEM New Delhi-Assamese Youths-(Bangladesh) 1981–90	Expulsion of Bengali (allegedly Bangladeshi) settlers from Assam, secessionist turn(18)	Major communal violence, tensions in in India-Bangladesh relations; counter- insurgency measures against ULFA	BW(nc) Kende(nc)
TAMIL ETHNIC CONFLICT Colombo–Tamil Militants(LTTE)– Indian Forces(IPKF) (IPKF) 1983–89	Separate Tamil Home- land (Eelam), Colombo's attempt in pulling in external powers, withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka(19)	Violent armed insur- gency & major military- operations by Lanka forces and IPKF	COW(nct), BW(nct) ICB(nct) Kende(nct) SID(nct) IC[PS]
PUNJAB PROBLEM New Delhi–Sikhs–	Centre-state relations, separatist demand,	Persistent internal violence, major	COW(nct), Kende(nct) ICB(nct)

(Pakistan) 1984–90(20)	alleged Pakistani support for the Khalistan movement	security operations, display of force by India & Pakistan	IC[PIC]
SIACHEN GLACIER India-Pakistan 1984–87(21)	Border and territorial disputes	Several major military clashes	ICB(nct) BW(nc), SID(nct) Kende(nct), IC[PIC]
INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ISSUE India-Pakistan 1984–87(22)	Bilateral power issue, nuclear rivalry	Non-military non-violent hostile interactions, threat to each other's nuclear facilities	BW(nct) ICB(nc)
ABORTIVE COUP IN MALDIVES Male Govt.– Coups Makers 1988	Internal anti-regime coup by Soldiers of Fortunes	Major military operation by India when requested by Male, minor violence(23)	ICB(nct)
INDO-NEPAL TRADE & TRANSIT DISPUTE India-Nepal 1988–89(24)	Economic–mutual reprisals on trade and manpower, power–security– Nepal's purchase of Chinese arms	Non-military– economic blockade against land-locked Nepal	BW(nct) ICB(nct)
KASHMIRI MILITANCY Kashmiri Militants– India-Pakistan 1989–90–	secession from India; independence or joining Pakistan(25)	Insurgency & major counter-insurgency opera- operation by the Indian forces; training & assistance by Pakistan	COW(nct) ICB(nct) BW(nct) SID(nct) Kende(nct), IC[PS]

Sources: Based on Appendix IIa-IIe, consultation of secondary sources, as indicated mostly case by case. For most of the disputes/conflicts upto early 1970s, the general source is the data matrix and case descriptions in R. L. Butterworth(1976)

Notes: 1. IC[PS] - International Conflict, according to the present study; COW - Correlates of War project Data; BW - Butterworth(1976) - Interstate Conflict; ICB - International Crisis Behaviour Project - International Crisis; Kende - Kende(1978) - Local War; SID - Maoz(1982) - Serious Interstate Dispute; JNGDH - The Princely State of Junagadh; NWFP - North West Frontier Province of Pakistan; IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Forces in Sri Lanka; LTTE - Liberation Tamil Tigers for Eelam(Sri Lanka); ULFA - United Liberation Forces of Assam(India); WB - World Bank; nc - not covered by the study; nct - not covered by the time period of the study.

2. In a sense, the case of the India-Pakistan Independence movement meets the COW criteria of extra-systemic or imperial war, especially the phase of the 'Quit India' movement during the early 1940s in which the fatality figure exceeded the COW threshold. The fatality figure has been quoted from Patrick Brogan, *World Conflicts : Why and Where They are Happening* (London : Bloomsbury) 1989

3. See, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. VII, 1948-50 : 9593, 9995; ICB Data

on South Asian subset. See also, Sultana Afraz, "The Junagadh Affair and the Hyderabad Case", *The Round Table*, 78(309), January 1989 : 101-106.

4. The Kashmir Wars, 1947 and 1965 have been considered as a single conflict case as per definition of international conflict, provided in Chapter I of the thesis.

5. See, Afraz, *op. cit.*

6. At one stage of the hostile interactions in 1951, it seemed that war between India and Pakistan over the canal water dispute was imminent when Pakistan moved a brigade to Poonch near the Punjab borders. See, Tufail Jawed, "The World Bank and the Indus Basin Dispute : Mediation by the World Bank, II", *Pakistan Horizon*, 19(1) 1966 : 34-44. This particular incident has been recorded as a crisis case under the title, PUNJAB WAR SCARE in the ICB data set.

7. Considered as three ICB cases, 1949, 1955 and 1961 and two SID cases.

8. Considered as two ICB and SID cases.

9. Considered as two separate cases in ICB, Kende and SID - 1955 and 1965.

10. Apparently, the clashes between the Chinese and the Nepalese armies with some fatalities, were not substantive. The Chinese authorities regretted after the first incident that it was a case of misunderstanding. However, the nature of clashes and repetition thereof suggest that it was not so. Given the nature of Sino-Indian relations at that time, the Nepal factor to both India and China was of substantive importance. For description of the case, see, Butterworth, *op. cit.* : 263-64. See, also S. D. Muni, "Sino-Nepalese Relations : Two Troubled years 1959-60", *South Asian Studies*, 3(1), January 1968 : 34-46

11. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, III, 13-20 October 1962 : 19024 -28

12. JVP - Janata Vimukti Peramuna, a Marxist rebel group consisting of Sri Lankan educated unemployed youths. The insurrection, believed to be organised with North Korean assistance and at least indirect Chinese help (the Chinese Government later cleared its position to Sri Lanka), was quelled by military assistance from India, Pakistan, Britain, USA (through Britain), USSR and Yugoslavia. See, S. Arasaratnam, "The Ceylon Insurrection of April 1971 : Some Causes and Consequences", *Pacific Affairs*, 45(3), Fall 1972; 356-71; and Fred Halliday, "The Ceylonese Insurrection", *New Left Review*, 69 September-October 1971 : 55-59.

13. See, Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan, Pashtunistan, Baluchistan", *Aussenpolitik*, 31(3) 1980 : 283-301.

14. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XXVII, 18 September 1981 : 31091

15. *Ibid.*

16. The ICB data set considered the Afghanistan case up to 1980, while the problem itself dragged on in a protracted warfare until 15 February 1989 when the Soviet troops were withdrawn. After this, however, the problem collapsed into an anti-regime insurgency with reduced involvement of Pakistan and the USA. The Afghanistan case, however, has been excluded from the purview of the present study because it is not a South Asian conflict in geographical terms and Pakistan's involvement roughly parallels

India's involvement, if any, in the Tibetan Autonomy case, which, also was not a Sub-continental conflict.

17. See, Gowhar Rizvi, "Bangladesh : Insurgency in the Hills", *The Round Table*, 305, January 1988 : 39-44

18. For an earlier phase of the anti-immigrant agitation, see, Amalendu Guha, "Little Nationalism Turned Chauvinist : Assam's Anti-Foreigner Upsurge, 1979-80", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 15(41-42-43), October 1980 : 1699-1720. With the signing of an agreement between former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the AASU, the Assamese youth organisation spearheading the movement, and with formation of a new state government by the AASU President after the elections held under the agreement, the mainstream Assamese problem seemed to be over. However, the resurgence of secessionist feelings among the groups again in the late 1980s belied such hopes.

19. See, Shelton U. Kodikara, "Crisis in Sri Lanka : The JVP, the Indian troops and the Tamil Problem", *Asian Survey*, 29(7), July 1989 : 716-24.

20. Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, "Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order", *Asian Survey*, 29(3), March 1989 : 330

21. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XXXIII, 1987 : 34990

22. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XXXII, March 1989 : 34241

23. *Times of India*, 3, 4, 5 November 1988. Also see, Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Maldives Confirms India's Role in South Asia", *Dhaka Courier*, 18-23 November 1988.

24. Nirjan Koirala, "Nepal in 1989 : A Very Difficult Year", *Asian Survey*, 30(2), February 1990.

25. See, A. Lamb, *Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990* (Hertford : Roxford Books) 1991 : 322-340.

APPENDIX IV

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA, 1947-1990

CONFLICT/PARTY DURATION/ STATUS(1)	VIOLENT PHASES	ISSUE LINKAGE	PARTY LINKAGES (2)	CONFLICT LINKAGE	WHETH- ER PIC(3)
JUNAGADH India–Pakistan Very short, R(F)	One	Accession+ religion+ power-security	Original dyad+ [UN]	Kashmir	NO
KASHMIR India–Pakistan Prolonged Stalemate	Two	Accession+ religion+ territorial+ power-security+ Cold War	Original dyad+ [UN+West]+ Russia+China	Most of India-Pak dyadic conflicts	YES
HYDERABAD India– Hyderabad Short, R(F)	One	Accession+ communist insurgency	Original dyad+ Pakistan+ [UN]	Kashmir indirectly	NO
PAKHTUNIST- AN, Afghanistan– Pakistan-Pakhtuns Prolonged Subsided	Two	Accession+ borders+ ethnicity	Original triad Russia+[Iran/ Turkey]	Baluch problem	YES
GOA India–Portugal Extended–R(F)	Two	Colonial+ law & order	Original dyad+ [UN+ICJ]	None	NO
NAGA INSURGEN- CY, India-Naga Insurgents, Prolonged Subsided	Several	Ethnicity+ internal Cold War+ Internal security	Original actors+China+ Pakistan+ Burma	Several insurgencies in Northeast India & Burma	YES
RANN OF KUTCH India-Pakistan Extended–R(P)	Two	Disputed borders+ territorial	Original dyad+ [UK+ICJ]	Kashmir	NO
SINO–NEPALESE BORDERS China–Nepal extended–R(P)	Two	Disputed borders	Original dyad	Tibetan rebels+ Sino-Indian borders	NO
SINO–INDIAN BORDERS China–India Extended–	Two	Disputed borders+ territorial	Original dyad	Kashmir+ Cold War	YES

subsidied

MIZO INSURGENCY India-Mizo Insurgents; prolonged- subsidied	Several	Ethnicity+ internal security	Original dyad+ Pakistan+ China	Other insurgenc- ies	YES
BANGLADESH INDEPENDENCE Pakistan Govt- short-R(F&P)	sustained violence, major war in Dec'71	Autonomy to secession+ territorial integrity+ refugee+ power-rivalry	Original triad+ Great Powers+ [UN]	Kashmir+ Cold War	NO
BALUCHISTAN Pakistan-Baluchis prolonged- dormant	More than one	Autonomy, ethnicity	Original dyad+ Iraq+Iran+ Afghanistan	Pakhtun problem+ Kurdish rebellion	YES
CHAKMA INSURGENCY Bangladesh- Chakmas Prolonged- continues	More than one	Ethnicity+ autonomy territorial integrity	Indian/Tripura Govts	TNV(4)+ inter-state issues(5)	NO
TAMIL ETHNIC CONFLICT Colombo-Tamil militants(LTTE) (LTTE), Prolonged, continues (internally)	Sustained violence	Ethnicity+ secession+ Tamil Homeland territorial	[Indian Govt]+ Indian Govt	Broad Indo- Sri Lankan security issues, Tamil Nadu politics	YES
PUNJAB PROBLEM India-Sikh Separatists Prolonged- continues	Sustained violence	Centre-state relations+ secession (Khalistan)+ external interference	Pakistani involvement	Kashmir & Sindh problem	NO
SIACHEN India-Pakistan Extended- dormant	More than one	territorial, power- security	Original dyad only	On-going bilateral conflicts - Kashmir, nuclear issue	YES
KASHMIRI MILITANCY India-Kashmiri Militants	sustained violence	Kashmir's separation, from India, joining	Original dyad+ Pakistan+ [Great Powers]	On-going bilateral disputes	YES

Source	Based on Appendix IIa–IIe, Appendix III, and consultation of literature.
Notes:	<div>1. Status : R(F) = Resolved by Force; R(P) =Resolved Peacefully; R(F&P) =Resolved with both means.</div> <div>2. Parties joining the conflict as mediators or peace makers are placed in parenthesis [].</div> <div>3. PIC - Protracted International Conflicts</div> <div>4. TNV = Tripura National Volunteers.</div> <div>5. The main Indo-Bangladesh irritant, namely, the Ganges water issue, has often been linked as a bargaining chip.</div>

APPENDIX V

LANDMARKS IN EMPIRE BUILDING AND DECOLONISATION
IN BRITISH INDIA 1857-1947

YEAR	EVENT	YEAR	EVENT
1858	Sepoy Mutiny; British Crown assumes direct control of India	1861	Indian Councils Act. Central Legislative Council formed. Also Legislative Councils for Madras, Bombay, Bengal, North-Western Provinces & the Punjab
1882	Ripon's Resolution on Local Self-Government – direct election to municipal councils and district boards	1883	Ilbert Bill gives Indian judges the right to try Europeans. European protest brings amendment and nationalist response from Indians
1885	Foundation of the Indian National Congress in Bombay	1892	Indian Councils Act enlarges the size and the powers of legislative councils at the centre and in the provinces.
1905	Partition of Bengal	1906	October– Muslim deputation to the Viceroy for separate electorates and weightage in representation to take account of Muslim 'political importance'. December– Foundation of All-India Muslim League at Dhaka
1908	Congress constitution declares its aim to be the attainment of a 'system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing Members of the British Empire'	1909	Indian Councils Act. Morley-Minto reforms to the legislative councils introduce elections at the centre and separate electorates for Muslims in all councils.
1911	Coronation Durbar of George V; reunification of Bengal and the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi	1913	Muslim League adopts 'self-government suitable to India' as its goal
1915	M. K. Gandhi returns to India from South Africa	1916	Congress and the Muslim League conclude the Lucknow Pact, a joint constitutional scheme for India on the basis of dominion status
1917	Secretary of State, Montagu, announces 'the gradual development of self-governing institu-	1919	February– Rowlatt Bills passed enabling government to try political cases without juries;

	tion with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire' to be the aim of the British in India		April– Amritsar firing during martial law enforcement in the Punjab, over 300 are killed and 1000 injured; December– Indian Councils Act. Montagu-Chelmsford reforms– territorial constituencies and a measure of provincial autonomy. Provincial government is divided into 'reserved' and 'transferred' areas (diarchy)
1920-22	Congress-Khilafat Committee non-cooperation campaign. Gandhi now leads Congress, its aim becomes the achievement of Swaraj, its organisation is transformed for the purpose of mass mobilisation	1922	Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das from the Swaraj Party to wreck the legislative councils from within
1927	Simon Commission appointed to enquire into the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms	1928	Nehru Report proposes a constitution in which India would attain dominion status with full responsible government at the centre and in the provinces, and which in character is more unitary than federal. It recommends the abolition of separate electorates for Muslims but an increase in the number of majority provinces from two or four
1930	Congress declares January 26 Independence Day. Muhammad Iqbal in his address to the Muslim League suggests the formation of a Muslim state within the Indian Federation	1930-31	Mass Civil Disobedience campaign led by Gandhi
1930-32	Communal Award grants separate electorates to Muslims, Sikhs and Untouchables. Gandhi fasts in protest; Poona Pact replaces electorates for Untouchables with some reserved seats	1935	Government of India Act gives almost complete autonomy to the provinces. It establishes 'the Federation of India' comprising both provinces and Princely state, with a federal central government and legislature for the management of central subjects.
1937	First general election under 1935 Act. Congress forms government in seven out of eleven provinces, adding an eight in 1938	1939	Congress governments resign because Government of India declares war without consulting Indians
1940	Lahore Resolution; Muslim League declares the formation of Pakistan to be its goal	1942	March-April– Cripps Mission. Cripps offers dominion status or full independence after the

			war in return for India's assistance for the war. The offer is refused August– 'Quit India' movement. Over 60,000 arrested
1945	Simla Conference of all political groups fails to agree over the composition of the Executive Council	1945-46	Second general elections under the 1935 Act. The Muslim League wins over 90 percent of reserved Muslim seats
1946	Cabinet Mission fails to win agreement from Congress and Muslim League over India's constitutional future	1947	February– Britain announces that it will leave India by June 1948; Mountbatten becomes the Viceroy; June 3 –Mountbatten announces the partition of the Subcontinent into India and Pakistan by August 15 August 14– Pakistan wins freedom August 15– India wins freedom August 17– Radcliffe awards on boundary demarcation followed by communal violence and mass migration in the Punjab August 18–Junagadh accedes to India; September–India occupies Junagadh October 22–Armed tribes from the NWFP invade Kashmir Maharaja accedes to India October 27–India sends troops to Kashmir, Kashmir war begins

Source: Adopted from, J. E. Schwartzberg(ed.), *A Historical Atlas of South Asia* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press) 1978 : 70; Francis Robinson(ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1989 : 138-39; and Hugh Tinker, *South Asia : A Short History* (London : Macmillan Press) 1989 : 217-18